




**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY  
FORMULATION OF AYUB KHAN AND PERVEZ  
MUSHARRAF TOWARDS INDIA**



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# APPROVAL SHEET

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION OF AYUB KHAN AND PERVEZ MUSHARRAF TOWARDS INDIA

By


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
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
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
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Despite all this guidance and help, however, responsibility of all the errors in this thesis lies on me.

**MAY ALLAH ALMIGHTY BLESS THEM ALL (AMEEN).**



**Hira Riaz Chohan**

**Date:05 june 2015**

*In the name of Allah The Most Merciful The  
Most Kind*

DEDICATION

THIS HUMBLE WORK IS DEDICATED TO MY

AMI, ABU, SISTER SANA (LATE) &

MY

BETTERHALF *AKHTAR* WHO ENLIGHTEN WAYS

OF MY LIFE

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

MNC	Multinational cooperation
NGO	Non-Government Organizations
SEATO	South- East Asian Treaty Organizations
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
EU	Europeans Union
NWFP	North-west frontier Province
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
NPT	Non-Proliferation Nuclear Treaty
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
KRL	Khan Research Laboratories
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conferences
UN	United Nations
LOC	Line of Control
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USA	United States OF America
USSR	Union of Soviet Social Republic

## ABSTRACT

The foreign policy of Pakistan seeks to promote the internationally recognized norms of inter-state relations, i.e. respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other state; non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes. However, Pakistan evolved some basic principles of foreign policy including *national security, economic interest, peaceful coexistence, Islamic solidarity, non-alignment and bilateralism*. Nevertheless, its security has remained the cornerstone of its foreign policy, because of its geographical location and historical background. Its relationship with super powers and regional powers have been fluctuating according to political weather, injecting a permanent feelings of uncertainty in their friendship. Thus, Pakistan's foreign policy underwent changes to exigencies of time and requirement of international situation and was influenced internally by administrative troika i.e. President, Prime Minister and Commander-In-Chief of the Pakistan Army. In Pakistan, Military dominated politics and policy making most of the times. Therefore, the current study aims at comparing and analyzing foreign policy formulation towards India during Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf's regimes. The study has further focused the factors; external, internal and personality traits, effecting the foreign policy formulation during Ayub and Musharraf's eras. The study utilizes a number of primary and secondary sources as data for qualitative analysis by following descriptive and historical method along with analytical approach for this research. The study reveals the transformative patterns of Pakistan's foreign policy towards India during the regimes of General Ayub Khan and General Musharraf as military rulers of the country. The pre-war circumstances (the 1965 war and the 1999 Kargil battle) constricted the pattern of foreign policy of both

the military rulers towards India; on the contrary, the post-war circumstances (the 1965 war and the 1999 Kargil battle) augmented the foreign policy of these rulers with flexibility. This transformation in the patterns from rigidity before the crisis and flexibility after the crisis indicates the policy of co-existence of both the countries (Pakistan and India) must be the key factor in formulating the foreign policy both sides of the border to live in the region as cordial neighbours.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## a) Statement of the Problem:

Since the establishment of Pakistan, the first and foremost objective behind the formulation of foreign policy of Pakistan remained national security, preservation of its ideology and development<sup>1</sup> of the country. In fact, Pakistan's foreign policy was influenced by administrative troika i.e. President, Prime Minister and Commander-In-Chief of the Pakistan Army. In Pakistan, Military dominated politics and policy making most of the times. Ayub Khan, the first Martial law administrator ruled Pakistan for one decade (1958-1969). Foreign policy of Pakistan towards India played a pivot role for domestic and international political scenario during Ayub and Musharraf eras. In the era of Ayub and Musharraf, many important developments affected the Indo-Pakistan relationship. Core area of Pakistan's foreign policy during both of the generals had been Kashmir. The policy over Kashmir has radically changed in Musharraf's era, who ruled Pakistan for eight years and eighteen months (1999-2008). In the process of pursuing peace with India since the start of 2004 Musharraf considered Kashmir as the core issue and hindrance to socio-economic cooperation between India and Pakistan. The current developments have proved that if the Kashmir issue left unresolved the regional peace is on stake. In the process of pursuing peace with India since the start of 2004 Musharraf considered Kashmir as the core issue and hindrance to socio-economic cooperation between India and Pakistan.<sup>2</sup>

In the mid of 21th Century, this region has gained much importance due to immense resources, trade routes, war on terrorism, presence two nuclear powers (Pakistan and

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<sup>1</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Master: A Political Autobiography* (Islamabad: Mr. books, 2002), 114-115.

<sup>2</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* ( New York: Free Press, 2006) , 297.

India) and aggressive revival of Russia. In this connection it is beyond doubt that the regional peace and security further contributes to the world peace. The peace of this region mainly depends on Indo-Pak relations as the major player of this region. Foreign Policy of Pakistan towards India has great impact within the domestic political paradigm also. Civil and Military relations always depend on the outlook of Pakistan's foreign policy towards India. The War of 1965 and Kargil War 1999 have deep impact over not only Pakistan's domestic politics but international also. In this connection the period of the two military generals as heads of state is taken to analyze the patterns and trends of Pakistan's foreign policy towards India.

While studying Ayub and Musharraf in the domain of foreign policy it has been observed that following factors effected foreign policy formulation of both the generals:

- i) External factors which includes economic condition/demands of Pakistan, geopolitical settings/environment and regional/international agreements, pacts and disputes
- ii) Internal Factors; domestic political agenda and opposition of political and religious forces
- iii) Personality Traits; which deals with attitude and perception and leadership skills

Therefore, the purpose of the study is to compare and analyze the political agenda in foreign policy towards India during Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf's regimes. The intention of the study is not to give a comprehensive narrative of foreign policy of both the dictators, as that exercise has been carried out elsewhere by several other historians and writers.<sup>3</sup> Instead the study is basically an analysis of those trends and

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<sup>3</sup>Lawrence Ziring, *Ayub Khan Era: Politics In Pakistan 1958-1969* ( New York :Syracuse University Press),1971 and Asif Haroon, *Muhammad bin Qasim to General Pervez Musharraf: Triumphs, Tribulations, Scars of 1971 Tragedy and Current Challenges*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2000, 78

patterns which were prominent in the particular time of these two military generals; Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf.

**b) Objectives of the Research:**

The aim of the study is to compare the political agenda in foreign policy towards India by the two Generals; Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf. The study critically evaluates those internal and external factors which were involved in the relations between India and Pakistan during the period of these two dictators respectively. It also highlights the patterns such as reproaching strategies towards India which were visible in the time of these dictators.

**c) Research Questions:**

Following are the questions considered in the study:

1. How did internal and external factors affect the attitude of Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf in foreign policy making towards India?
2. What types of Patterns and trends in the foreign policy making towards India have been prominent in Ayub Khan and Musharraf's regimes?

**d) Methodology:**

The study follows descriptive method along with analytical approach for this research. A number of primary sources such as biographical accounts, autobiographies and personal diaries are consulted. However, secondary sources which are available in the form of books, articles, dissertations, journals and Encyclopedias are also be given attention for data collection. For data analysis, historical analysis method of qualitative research is used because the present study mostly depends on documentary sources. So this method remained useful for this study. However, during the analysis the challenges of this method were kept in mind;

- Documents may be falsified deliberately.
- Words and Phrases used in old records may now have very different meaning

**e) Limitations:**

The present study belongs to very recent time and if the interviews would have been conducted from those personalities who are subject of this research it would have made the study more authentic but due to time constraints and financial resources of the researcher the interviews are opted out. So, the researcher mostly relied on primary and secondary sources. Foreign Ministry of Pakistan does not release confidential documents to researchers which remained another limitation of the study beyond the control of the researcher.

**2. Rationale of the study:**

On the whole, Ayub Khan's regime from 1958 to 1969 and Pervez Musharraf's regime from 1999 to 2008 has been covered in this research to have insight of the foreign policy making by both the dictators. The research is significant as it aims to analyze the effects to provide comprehensive and comparative study of their foreign policy making attitudes towards India. It has also unfolded the realities by having peep into the past in consideration of facts based on historical and logical reasoning. The topic has also a unique significance in the history of Pakistan because by comparing both the rulers, this study has highlighted the role of leadership in foreign policy making towards India. Important trends and patterns also are brought on to the corpus of the history of foreign policy of Pakistan.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 91.



### 3. Literature Review

Comparative study of Ayub Khan's and Pervez Musharraf's attitude towards India and role of leadership in foreign policy making has not been mentioned by many historians. Most of the historians and writers wrote about them discretely, except few historians. However, the researcher consulted the following books about the subject and found gaps.

*Friends not Master* by Ayub Khan is an autobiography and a primary source on Ayub regime. This book highlighted in detail all the incidence and events which happened during Ayub Khan's regime while, this book gives information about only Ayub Khan's times (1958 - 1962) (1962 - 1969). In fact, the book provides details on political era of Ayub Khan in Pakistan from his own perspective.

Ayub Khan's *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972* personal diary is one of primary sources for the current study that includes almost all the events from 1966 to 1972. These events include war of 1965, his presidentship, Yahya Khan's rule and debacle of Bangladesh. Though, the diary remained incomplete due to Ayub Khan's bad health, however, it witnesses sufficient evidence to study his attitude in foreign policy making towards India. These personal accounts do also provide sufficient data to address foreign policy patterns of Ayub Khan towards India.

*In the Line of Fire* a memoire was an effort put forward by Pervez Musharraf to present his own view points on several national and international issues connected with his policies as chief executive of the country. These political conflicts include role of Pakistan after 9/11; Pakistan nuclear program and role of A.Q.Khan; and Kargill conflict 1999. With the help of circumstantial evidences he endeavors his

policy of alignment with the USA against Taliban in Afghanistan. His strong criticism on A.Q. Khan for nuclear proliferation and defeat in Kargil conflict as a 'political suicide' were important political agendas of the book.

Abdul Sattar's *Foreign Policy-2005: A Concise History* gives a detailed account on the Indo-Pakistan relations. The author's analysis in the book tells that the foreign policy discourse of Pakistan is partially dominated by multidimensional concerns such as development, security and foreign assistance.<sup>5</sup> But the author has ignored the role of domestic politics and especially of the role of military in the foreign policy making of Pakistan.

Peter R. Blood's *Pakistan: A Country Study* claims in the chapter on Ayub Khan that Ayub Khan wanted friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries<sup>6</sup> The author also discussed the foreign policy of India and Pakistan but he does not indicate or analyze those factors which are involved in improving relations between both the countries. His major focus is on description of all events of the history of Pakistan rather than to analyze them.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has a different perspective about the foreign policy of Ayub Khan towards India. In his book, *Reshaping Foreign Policy*, he argued about the agreement between Pakistan and India e.g. Tashkent Declaration(1972) that says "this pact is not acceptable when all the important issues e.g. Kashmir dispute, Farakka Barrage and all the other issues remained unsolved."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Foreign Policy-2005: A Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), i-iii.

<sup>6</sup> Peter R. Blood, *Pakistan: A Country Study* (New York: Library of Congress, 1995), 51.

<sup>7</sup> Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hasan, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Reshaping Foreign Policy* (Lahore:

S.M Burke and Lawrence Ziring's *Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis* is an impressive and lucid analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's Foreign Policy under went rapid changes under Ayub Khan. According to the author the foreign policy of Ayub Khan's times was the ultimate result of Pakistan's need for security and development as well as preservation of its ideology, the core principles of its government. Ayub Khan adopted a policy more consistent than it was in the past due to frequent changes in ministries and governments<sup>8</sup>. However, the authors have paid less importance to the analysis of foreign policy of Ayub Khan and the internal politics of Pakistan.

Daniel E. Harmon's *Pervez Musharraf: President of Pakistan* is a biography of Pervez Musharraf. In this book the writer gives a detailed account of Musharraf's life and his political career. He argued that Musharraf wanted to establish cordial relation with India but different incidents like attack on Indian Parliament and the Indian claimed terrorist's activities proved hindrance to bridge the gulf between the two countries. The author has focused less attention on the relations of India and Pakistan.

O.P Ralhan in his two volumes *Agra India and Pakistan Summit* argued that Pakistan is responsible for worst relationship between India and Pakistan.<sup>9</sup> In this account the author's Indian perspective is visible. Another book is *Indo- Pak Relations* by N.S

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Nafees Printer, 1973), 11.

<sup>8</sup> S.M Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972), 212.

<sup>9</sup> O.P Ralhan, *Agra: India and Pakistan Summit* ( New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 2002) , i-iii.

Gehlot and Anusatsangi also focus on all the ups and downs in India Pakistan relationship. The book gives perspective of India clearly.

#### **4. Organization of the Study:**

Apart from introduction and conclusion the thesis consists of three chapters. Introductory section provides background knowledge based on objectives, statement of the problem and research questions on the issue investigated. The first chapter lays the foundation of the study by providing constituents of foreign policy by giving general information about military and foreign policy relationship in the context of Pakistan. The second chapter deals with theoretical underpinnings of the study by discussing and relating theoretical framework with the study. The third chapter consists of the findings of study. The chapter discusses the observed similarities and differences in patterns and trends of foreign policy of Ayub and Musharraf towards India. The section of conclusion concludes the study and proposes recommendation based on the findings of the study.

## **Chapter: 1**

### **Foreign policy Formulation Process, Goals, Strategies and Analysis: Military and Foreign Policy Relationship**

#### **1.1 Underpinning the concept of foreign policy**

The foreign policy of a country is in a sense a projection of its social, political and economic policies.<sup>10</sup> In broader perspective foreign policy is the range of actions taken by varying sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage, in order to advance the national interests.<sup>11</sup>

##### **a) Principles of Pakistan Foreign Policy**

In 1948, Jinnah Father of Pakistan clearly highlighted the goals for the formation of foreign Policy of Pakistan<sup>12</sup>

“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.”<sup>13</sup>

The Constitution of Pakistan also has clause about the conduct of foreign policy of Pakistan. According to Constitution of Pakistan 1973 Article 40:

“The State shall endeavor to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and friendly

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<sup>10</sup> G.W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1946-1966* (London: Pall Mall, 1968), 121.

<sup>11</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy* (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), 91.

<sup>12</sup> Mehrunnisa Ali, ed., *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1971-1998* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 77.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid*;

relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.”<sup>14</sup>

However, Pakistan evolved some basic principles of foreign policy which are as under:<sup>15</sup>

- 1. National Security**
- 2. Economic Stability of the Country**
- 3. Good Relations with Muslim world**
- 4. Peaceful Co-existence**
- 5. Non Alignment**
- 6. Bilateralism**
- 7. Charter of United Nations**

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy seeks to protect, endorse and development Pakistan’s national interests in the external domain. The Foreign policy playing role towards protecting Pakistan’s security and advancing Pakistan’s development agenda for progress and prosperity following the guiding principles laid out by our founding fathers.

#### **b) Objectives of Pakistan Foreign Policy**

According to the guiding principles laid down by the Quaid-e-Azam and Article 1-14 of the constitution of Pakistan 1973, the objectives of foreign policy can be summarized as under:<sup>16</sup>

- To Promote Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a moderate and democratic country.

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<sup>14</sup> Constitution of Pakistan 1973, Article 40 (i) and Michael R. Chambers (ed.), *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002, 201

<sup>15</sup> Pervez Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947-58* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 171.

<sup>16</sup> Rasul B. Rais, *War Without Winners: Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition after the Cold War*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 87.

- Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world, especially major powers and immediate neighbours.
- Protecting national security and geo-strategic interests, including Kashmir.
- Consolidating commercial and economic cooperation with international world.
- Ensuring optimal utilization of national resources for regional and international cooperation.

## **1.2 Determinants of Foreign Policy: Imperatives of Foreign Policy**

### **Design<sup>17</sup>**

The dominant model of the global system continues to hold the view that the world is composed of a system of sovereign states. The most important actors within the global system continue to be the central governments of sovereign states. Each central government has relationships with other central governments and other international actors. These relationships are summarized as that country's foreign policy.

#### **1-History**

History of a country not only sets the course for the nation to go ahead in terms of establishing the relations with outer world but also shapes positive and negative patterns of behaviour for a particular state like;

**Positive Patterns of foreign Behaviour:** Pakistan-Arab relations, Pakistan-China Relations

**Negative Patterns of foreign Behaviour:** Indo-Pak relations

Another aspect is that; History of a country deeply influences the foreign policy of a country. It is seen that the people having common history they pursue an effective

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<sup>17</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 113-141.

foreign policy, because of the support of all segments of society. On the other hand, a country which is culturally and historically fragmented cannot pursue an effective foreign policy.

**2-Religion:** Religion has always been a dominant feature of the life of human beings; therefore it paves the way to run affairs not only of individual life only but also it shapes patterns for a state to behave towards other states; particularly in Muslim world.

### **3-Ideology**

Ideology plays a pivotal role in the formulation of foreign policy. A student of history/international relations can observe, very easily, the ups and downs in the relations of states on ideological grounds, like:

- i) Hindu-Muslims divided for the reason of ideological differences-Two Nation Theory
- ii) World remained divided into Two Blocks-Capitalism and Socialism-from 1947-91 due to ideological Cold war.

**4-Political System:** States with same political systems can understand each other in a better way, therefore states prefer to establish relations with other states with same political scheme and organization in-order to have friendly relations; for example; Indo-US relations, and, European Union.

### **5-Society and Cultural: Norms & Values:**

Cultural norms & values also play prominent role while formulating foreign policy of a country. Societies with same culture are equipped with the centripetal forces (Forces of Attraction) consequently friendly ties and relations among states are built. In the connection with this the world has again moved towards regional relations and



establishing regional organizations like; European Union, African Union, Arab League, ASEAN, SAARC, OIC, ECO etc.

**6-Technological Development:** Being technologically advanced and having less technological innovation, in both cases it affects the state to formulate its foreign relations. Technologically poor states always frame a set of rules to get closer to the technologically developed countries in-order to achieve specific targets, like Pakistan preferred to establish relations with US since its birth due to desire of having defense related technologies and equipment in-order to counter potential security threat perceived from aggressive India.

Similarly technologically developed states are able to shape foreign policy in-order to strengthen democracy and to achieve national interests.

**7-Geography:** Geography of a country including its fertility, climate, location, waterways, area, coastal line, natural resources, and population also influence the foreign policy. In this way geography plays a very crucial role in shaping and building foreign relations of states. States cannot change their neighbors; therefore according to geographic location each state puts efforts for peaceful co-existence by building up friendly relations with neighboring state.

**a) Geo-strategic Players:** States having big area, coastal line, natural resources and big population, are powerful geo-strategic players and play very effective role in the region and even beyond the region, therefore weaker states have to take care of interests not only for themselves but of great geo-strategic players also while formulating foreign policy.

**b) Pivotal states:** These states, though, are not powerful but help the powerful states for achieving specific goals and objectives as pivotal states act like launching pad for the powerful states, like; Iran, Pakistan, Turkey etc.

**8-Economic Development and National Resources:** The stage of economic development which a country has its impact on its foreign policy. Another aspect of economy on foreign policy can be analyzed as under:

**Large or developed economies vs. Small economies:** Countries having large economies are mostly European states. These economies help the state to provide not only the basic facilities of life to citizens but also attract other states, consequently, the foreign policy; sovereignty and prestige of the weaker attracted states are badly influenced by the economically developed states. Like; drone attacks in Pakistan.

**9-Alliances:** Alliances are mainly made to achieve the balance of power; therefore Alliance system has also deep impact of the foreign policies of the ally countries. Mainly two kinds of balancing of power can be achieved through an alliance:

**i) Hard Balancing:** Hard balancing includes; formal treaty, tough conditions, strong commitments etc, e.g. NATO

**ii) Soft Balancing:** Pak-American alliance like; CENTO, SENTO are examples of soft balancing. In such balancing foreign policy is shaped on the directions of the allies. Pakistan's Foreign Policy from 1950-1960 was directed by America because of the CENTO and SENTO.

## CHAPTER: 2

### ASSORTMENT OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN

The international or global political system constitutes the environment in which the units of international politics operate. These units are basically sovereign states. Goals, aspirations, needs, attitudes, latitude of choice and actions of these units (states) are significantly influenced by the overall distribution of structure of power in the international system.<sup>18</sup>

**2.1 Mode or Instrument for Achieving Goals to Sovereign States:** In the global system states have their specific goals and objectives but at the same time goals and objectives set by the sovereign units are contradictory to each other's interests, consequently clash is obvious phenomenon within the international system. States always try to maximize their interests through effective mode or instrument of foreign policy. Hence states having more appropriate and effective foreign policy gain more.

**i) Foreign Policy:** "Foreign Policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete courses of action to attain these objectives and preserve interests"<sup>19</sup>

Therefore, objectives or purposes achieved by foreign policy are basically the objectives and purposes of the state. In this connection it is assumed that, whenever purposes of foreign policy are addressed actually the purposes of states are being addressed.

**ii) Aspects of Foreign Policy:** Aspects of foreign policy include the ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a problem or promote some change in the:

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<sup>18</sup> Semmel, A. K, "Small Group Dynamics in Foreign Policy-Making." *In Biopolitics, Political Psychology and International Politics*, ed., G. W. Hopple (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 94-113.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid;

- i. The policies
- ii. Attitudes
- iii. Actions of another state
- iv. Non-State actors (Terrorist Groups, NGOs, MNCs etc.)
- v. International economy
- vi. Physical environment of the world

### **iii) Instrument or mode of Foreign Policy:**

The following are the instruments of foreign policy through which aspects and goals of foreign policy can be achieved:

- i. Sending a diplomatic note
- ii. Attending a summit meeting
- iii. Enunciating a doctrine
- iv. Making an alliance
- v. Formulating long range but vague objective such as “Peace with freedom” or a “New World Order”

## **2.2 Common Purposes of Modern States: Foreign Policy**

- 1. Security**
- 2. Autonomy**
- 3. Welfare**
- 4. Status and Prestige**

### **1-SECURITY: Theoretical Approach to understand the notion of security**

Security; in wider perspective, is denoted as national security within the modern state system. True security is generated only when real national interests; such as, survival, power, prosperity, freedom, peace and ideology is attained. Therefore “Security is the

sense of protection; of citizens, assets, and national interests, from violence and danger regardless internal or external.

In the modern world term “security” or “national security” is used and abused by many governments to justify external aggression and the stifling of internal opposition. Restraints on the freedom of speech press and assembly (gathering), character assassination, and even mass murder are committed in the name of national security.

Most governments that have launched wars of aggression or significant military interventions have similarly claimed that their policies were designed to defend or preserve national security. This was rationale both for American intervention of Nicaragua in 1980s and Iraq’s attack on Kuwait in 1990. But in most instances, the search for security involves more benign attitude and actions.<sup>20</sup>

**Search for Security is Universal in Nature:**

For one reason it can be claimed that the search for security is universal because states maintain military forces. Most of the states allocate a significant proportion of their economic output for arms and defense related activities in-order to maintain internal and external security.

**Internal Security** involves potential threats coming from the internal or territorial sources like crime, rebellious acts, secession, revolutions etc.

**External Security** involves potential threats coming from beyond or across the border or external sources, like other states, or non-state actors (terrorist groups).

Therefore, governments or states maintain armed forces to deter, to cope or to deal with internal as well as external threats and vulnerabilities.

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<sup>20</sup> *ibid*;

**Vulnerabilities:** Vulnerabilities derive largely from geographic characteristics of a state. Vulnerabilities are potential avenues for military invasion or economic coercion. Mountain passes, narrow waterways, major transportation corridors etc are included in vulnerabilities e.g. Turkey and Poland are the best examples for it.

Vulnerable states require more forces while invulnerable states require less forces comparatively; for example, North Americans were literally invulnerable to attack from any quarter (part, area, neighborhood), and thus maintained only small armed forces.

**Threats:** Threats are those more immediate capabilities in the hands of adversaries (enemies) that may be used to exploit vulnerabilities. EXP: Throughout the cold war “soviet threat” was prominent because it was thought that soviets had immense military capabilities they might at any time be tempted to exploit vulnerabilities.

**Defining Stems, Features and Characteristics of Threat:**

- 1- Threats are immediate capabilities in the hands of adversaries
- 2- Threats are not always explicit (open, clear) and self-evident (obvious)
- 3- There is not any universal agreement that vulnerabilities will not be exploited by others in threatening manners.
- 4- Threats may well be contested
- 5- Threats may take the form of a demand or claim to territory, armed incursion into a neighbor, or control over strategic territorial assets
- 6- Threats not only mean for the physical basis of state but it may also be directed against ideas and ideologies. The Soviet threat throughout the Cold War was portrayed as an assault on traditional Western liberal values, or to the “American way of Life”.

7- Threat-or taking advantage of certain vulnerabilities, may be used in terms of deprivation of economic assets or national wealth. Certain states may be vulnerable to blockade, sanctions, or the cut-off of energy supplies.

**Internal Threat:** If the state is internally weak, it is vulnerable to domestic rebellion and secession and thus the threat to state is primarily internal.

**External Threat:** If any state has attraction; economically, politically or geographically, for other states or seems to be dangerous to others-threat will be external.

**Internal Turmoil Can Escalate into the Threat of External Intervention:**

But some time outside powers frequently become involved in the domestic politics of their neighbors (particularly where the ideological or ethnic contest are going on) internal turmoil can escalate into the threat of external intervention. The armed intervention of the United States in Grenada in 1983, in Nicaragua during the 1980s and present US intervention in Libya are best examples for it.

**Traditional vs. Modern Notion of Threat:** Traditionally states have chosen to go to war; somewhat easily, to protect certain values. But in Nuclear era the most overwhelming threat may be war itself. In a condition of nuclear war, all the values (territory, population, regime, ideology and economies) can be destroyed in a matter of days or even hours. For those who possess nuclear weapons, then, the main task of national security policy is less to cope with a specific, identifiable threat than it is to prevent war.

**Common Security Policies:**

Governments can enhance their security by decreasing vulnerabilities and by diminishing perceived threat from one or more perceived adversaries. This involves

mixture of military deployments in-order to reduce vulnerabilities and particular or specific policies for other states in-order to reduce threats.

Following are some common security policies that emphasize threat reduction:<sup>21</sup>

- I) Policy of Isolation
- II) Self-Reliance
- III) Neutrality and Non-Alignment
- IV) Alliance Strategies

#### **I) Policy of Isolation:**

Isolation refers remoteness or separation from rest of the world.

##### **i) Components of Isolation:**

- a) to remain uninvolved in the affairs of others
- b) to avoid military commitments to others

##### **ii) Mechanism of Isolation:**

- a) Geographical remoteness, like US isolation policy
- b) Physical features of the state, like Bhutan isolated itself till 1950s because of high mountain range of Himalaya
- c) Steps taken by states like Blockade etc.

##### **iii) Types of Isolation Policies:**

- a) **Economic Isolation Policy:** Japan practiced a strict isolation until 1854 and she was commercially isolated. In 1854, US coerced Japan to open it-self up for commercial and missionary activities. This is an example of economic isolation policy.

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<sup>21</sup> Rosenau, J. N, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy." *In Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*, ed., R. B. Farrell(London: Northwestern University Press, 1966) 115-169.



- b) **Political Isolation Policy:** In this type of policy states isolate themselves on political grounds, like; talks, negotiations etc.
- c) **Militarily Isolation Policy:** US adopted a military isolationist strategy in the relation to Europe throughout the nineteenth century.
- d) **Rigorous Isolation Policies:** Most recently Burma and Albania sustained policies of rigorous isolation by expelling foreigners by prohibiting foreign investments, discouraging all forms of external penetration including tourism, avoiding all forms of military entanglements and finally sealing off their societies from various forms of external contacts.

**iv) Need for the Policy of Isolation:**

- a) Minimize the external direct threat
- b) Minimize the external involvement into domestic affairs
- c) To achieve autonomy in-terms of domestic policies

**v) Implications of the Isolation Policy: Success and Failure of Isolation Strategies**

Often it is observed that isolated state is not a supplier of needed goods or resources to others. In brief, the isolationist states offered very little of what others wanted or needed, and therefore they are sufficiently strong to close off their societies from normal contacts with the outside world. They did not need large military forces to act as deterrents against outside threats. In such a case the energies of the isolationist states are directed to internal security. In short the implications, success or failure of the isolation strategy depends upon the situation that how a state is important for the outer world; if important isolation policy will be difficult to apply or at least success would be for limited time period because the rest of the world needed it to be intact.

## II) Self-Reliance:

Self-Reliance is also a strategy to reduce external threat but it differs with Isolation in terms of theme. In isolation threats are reduced by making oneself aloof, unattractive and by rigid exclusion of foreign presence. But in Self-reliance threat is reduced by deterrence: Building up military capabilities to keep all adversaries at bay. While studying the concept of Self-reliance, another concept particularly for America is used that is “fortress America” security strategy. That would mean terminating membership in all alliances and concentrating all military capabilities on the home base. During early 1960s China practiced the same policy. It effectively terminated its alliance with the Soviet Union, refused to redefine its relationship with western countries and showed determination to protect “revolution” and China by its own means.<sup>22</sup>

## III) Neutrality and Non-Alignment:

**A) Neutrality:** Technically Neutrality refers to the legal status of a state during armed hostilities. Under the international law of neutrality, if a non-belligerent in wartime does not extend certain rights and obligations to the belligerents, it is neutral. In this way a state is Neutral when it:

- i) Does not permit use of its territory as a base for military operations by one of the belligerents.
- ii) Does not furnish military assistance to the belligerents.
- iii) Enjoys freedom for herself of passing it non-military goods and passengers on the open seas and in certain conditions through belligerent blockades.

**i) Neutral Status of a State in Peace Time:** A neutral state has a special status during peace time as well. Its hallmarks (characteristics) are non-involvement in

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<sup>22</sup> Russett, B. M, *Can a Democratic Peace Be Built? International Interactions*, (1993), 282.

other's conflicts, avoidance of all military alliances, and prohibiting the use of its territory by others for military purposes.

**ii) Implementation of the Policy of Neutrality:** In the case of most neutrals the policy is developed through the following instruments:

- a) Unilaterally
- b) Bilaterally
- c) Multilaterally
- d) In some cases it is observed that great powers resolves the conflict, and decide to neutralize a state. The European powers neutralized:<sup>23</sup>
  - Switzerland in 1815<sup>24</sup>
  - Belgium in 1831<sup>25</sup>
  - Luxembourg in 1867<sup>26</sup>

**B) Non-alignment:** It has been used to describe the policies of new states, mostly of the Third World, as distinct from European Neutrals<sup>27</sup> (Switzerland, Ireland, Finland etc.)

Nonalignment in fact refers to a very loose coalition of states that agree to avoid making military commitments to serve the interests of the great powers.

Most nonaligned states are not self-reliant (independent/self-sufficient) in either military or economic dimensions. In-general nonalignment is not a very useful term because it seems to cover so many different kinds of behavior.

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<sup>23</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002) , 13

<sup>24</sup> Ibid p37

<sup>25</sup> Ibid p44

<sup>26</sup> Ibid p91

<sup>27</sup> Britannica Encyclopedia, European Neutrals sands for non-aligned European states, whereas neutralized states are those states which are kept non-aligned by great powers.

**i) Difference between Neutrality and Non-alignment:** States; that are neutral or neutralized, limit their freedom of choice mean they avoid alliances and other military arrangements in-order to reduce vulnerabilities and threats.

Whereas nonaligned states do not so restrict themselves because of low economic indicators, weak political structure, less developed institutions etc. therefore such states join at least regional alliances. Unlike the European Neutrals, nonaligned countries have no pledges to remain uninvolved in great powers conflicts.

#### **IV) Alliance Strategies:**

Thucydides observed 2500 years ago that mutual fear is the most solid basis to avoid threats.<sup>28</sup> Therefore most common strategy for reducing vulnerabilities or threats is to augment (enhance) military power, not just by building up one's own capabilities, but by enlisting the aid or support of others.<sup>29</sup>

##### **i) Need for Alliance Strategy Policy and its Implications:**

When two or more parties (states) perceive a common threat, they are like to engage in various types of military collaboration. Alliance strategy includes:

- i) Provision of technical advisors.
- ii) Granting of arms. and
- iii) Exchanging of information.

##### **ii) Main Criteria for the Classification of Military Alliances:**

Alliances have significant effects on military planning and development, therefore military alliances can be classified and compared according to four main criteria:

- a) **The Casus Foederis:** (The situation in which mutual commitments are to become operational)

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<sup>28</sup> O.P Ralhan, *Agra:India and Pakistan Summit*, New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 2002

<sup>29</sup> Ibid; 39.

- b) **Commitments undertaken.**
- c) **Integration of forces. and**
- d) **Geographical scope.**
- a) **The Casus Foederis:**

The term *Casus Foederis* refers to any situation in which the parties of alliance will use the force and provide assistance to one of the signatories (ally parties) that is on warlike stake, but it is again difficult to understand the complicated terms *warlike* and *situation*; for example The 1939 German-Italian "Pact of Steel".<sup>30</sup>

For this the NATO treaty<sup>31</sup> in Article-5, explains that military measures can be taken only in response to an *actual armed attack* on one of the signatories. It means the actual armed attack is that particular situation or warlike stake due to which alliance is operated.

### **b) Commitments Undertaken**

Alliance treaties also differ according to the type of response even when the particular situation arises, for example:<sup>32</sup>

#### **Types Alliance Responses under Commitments**

- **"Hair-trigger" Clause<sup>33</sup>:** The Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty of 1948 provided that if one of the parties "drawn into military activities" the

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<sup>30</sup> Britannica: Pact of Steel, Alliance between Germany and Italy. Signed by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini on May 22, 1939, it formalized the 1936 Rome-Berlin Axis agreement, linking the two countries politically and militarily.

<sup>31</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, D.C. on 4 April 1949, is the treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The treaty was created with an armed attack by the Soviet Union against Western Europe in mind, but the mutual self-defense clause was never invoked during the Cold War. Rather, it was invoked for the first time in 2001 in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center and The Pentagon in Operation Eagle Assist.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid; 37.

other will immediately give military and other help by all means. This type of commitment is called a “hair-trigger” clause because it automatically commits the signatories to military action if the *casus foedris* (warlike situation) occurs.

- **Brussels Pact (17 March 1948):** Brussels Pact among Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg leaves little flexibility for decision makers and diplomats to decide what to do once the *casus foedris* arises.<sup>34</sup>
- **The ANZUS Treaty (1948):** This treaty ties Australia, New Zealand, and the United States into a defensive alliance system, explains that each party will “act to meet the danger in accordance with its constitutional process”. This treaty contains no precise military commitments, nor does it provide any course of action to which the parties commit themselves if one of them is attacked.<sup>35</sup>
- **Japanese-American Security Treaty (Renewed) 1960:** This treaty provides only for “consultations” between the Parties if Japan is attacked.

#### **Types of Treaties: Alliance responsibilities under commitments**

- **Mutual Defense Treaties:** These types of treaties put equal burden on all signatories and require all the signatories to assume equal commitments towards each other. According to the principles in the NATO and Warsaw treaties, an attack on any one of the signatories is to be considered an

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<sup>33</sup> Bevens, Charles Irving, “North Atlantic Treaty”. *Treaties and other international agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949*. Volume 4, Multilateral 1946-1949(1968),

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 45

<sup>35</sup> Hawke Government events; 1985. The Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Library. 6 March 2013. Retrieved April 23, 2013.

attack on all. Every signatory is required to come to the aid of victim of aggression or armed attack (Article-5 NATO treaty).

- **One-Sided Defense Treaties:** Such treaties put unequal burden on signatories, because as per Japan-US Security Treaty 1960, after “consultations” US may become obligated to defend Japan against external attack, but Japan is not obligated under the security treaty to assist in the defense of North America if war or invasion is occurred there because the treaty is one-sided (Article-5, Clause-iv).
- **Guarantee Treaty:** In this type of treaty one or more states receive guarantees for their security from a third party or parties, while the guaranteeing power or powers receive nothing in return except the possibility of enhancing stability and peace. This type of treaties was prominent in 1920s. The example for it is Locarno Treaty of 1925, in which Great Britain and Italy undertook to come to the assistance of France, Belgium and Germany. In return Great Britain and Italy received nothing tangible from the beneficiaries.<sup>36</sup>

### c) **Integration of Forces**

Alliances may also be distinguished according to the degree of integration of military forces. Alliance treaties in historic international system were merely casual coordination of military planning and the national forces remained organizationally and administratively distinct.

But European alliances in the eighteenth century typically required signatories to provide a specified number of men and funds for the common efforts. Austro-German

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<sup>36</sup> Ausmin 2011, media release, 14 September 2011, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Foreignminister.gov.au. 14 September 2011. Retrieved 2011-10-03.

Dual Alliance 1879 was another example where military coordination was carried out.<sup>37</sup>

#### **d) Geographical Scope**

Finally alliances differ with respect to the scope of their coverage and geographic existence. The question raises that what about the status of colonies of the signatories whether these colonies beyond the territory of signatory state will also be included in the security related treaty or not for example NATO Treaty 1949.

#### **V) Strains in Alliances**

Aside from poor military planning and lack of political cohesiveness and political disagreement between allies, several other factors and situations can cause strain in alliances, impairing their effectiveness both as deterrents and as fighting organizations.<sup>38</sup>

#### **Factors That Lead to Strain In Military Alliances:**

- i. **Divergence of objectives:** when the objectives of two or more parties begin to diverge, strain in alliances is definite. If the objectives become incongruent (dissimilar), or the potential enemy of one alliance partner is not the enemy of the other, serious problems of cooperation and coordination arise and make the alliance more formal than real.
- ii. **Tactical issue:** The major powers some time make alliance to achieve any specific goal. This alliance is not a long term- strategic-alliance but tactical alliance-that works only up till the solution of a specific issue. The American-

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid;

<sup>38</sup> Sampson, M, "Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy." *In New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, ed., C. F. Hermann, C. W. Kegley, and J. N. Rosenau (Boston: Allen & Unwin.1987), 384-408.



Pakistani alliance during cold war was the best example of it. Such type of alliance soon came to strain due to the tactics of the major powers.

- iii. **Dissimilarity in Treat perception:** Alliance cohesion is also apt to be strained if a threat arises against only one or few of the alliance partners, so that other members do not perceive the same threat. For example Cyprus issue divided Greece and Turkey and created strains between each of them and other NATO members.
- iv. **Incompatibility of the major social and political values of allying states:** Another important factor that may lead to strains in military alliances is incompatibility of the major social and political values of allying states.
- v. **Development of Nuclear Weapons:** Development of Nuclear Weapons may have divisive effects on modern alliances. In the post-World War-II period, most states of Western Europe were eager to receive the protection of American "Nuclear Umbrella".

#### vi) Contracting Out

Most sovereign states ultimately rely on themselves for security, and develop various types of armed forces. But occasionally, some states are incapable of sustaining the costs of maintaining such forces. In these circumstances, they "Contract Out" to others to provide for their protection. In the nineteenth century, there were a number of "Protectorates" attached to the British Empire. These were proto-states that had full internal autonomy, but were not sovereign. The imperial power provided military forces for the protectorates, usually in exchange for economic privileges.

#### 2-AUTONOMY

Autonomy is the ability to formulate and carry out domestic and external policies in terms of a government's own priorities, whatever those might be.

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**Difference in theoretical implications for Developed and Developing States:**

The doctrine of sovereignty provides the legal basis for autonomy but the problems lie with the dependent states of third world (LDCs) because international economic system is structured in such a manner that they have little latitude of choice. Weak, dependent states are subject to the whims of the international marketplace or to the various forms of economic pressure of the industrial countries. For example, if a developing country wishes to obtain a loan from the World Bank, it may have to adopt austerity policies (reduction of state subsidies, curtailment of social services, increased taxes, and higher interest rates) that can lead to popular discontent and the electoral defeat (or coup) of the government. The conditionality of the loans seriously erodes the capacity of recipients to fashion their domestic economic policies according to the choice of international economic system, whether it suits recipient domestic environment or not. Therefore some governments refuse the international aid or loans to avoid loose autonomy. On the other hand Developed states enjoy more autonomy in terms of political and economic policies as they are no doubt interdependent but not dependent.<sup>39</sup>

**Policies for Preservation of Autonomy:** Autonomy can be maintained, or its erosion reduced by:

- i) Building-up Military, Economic and Scientific strength:
- ii) Reducing reliance upon external sources:
- iii) Reducing imports and enhance exports:
- iv) Locating new markets for exports:
- v) Increasing the latitude of choice: and

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<sup>39</sup> Snare, C, "Applying Personality Theory to Foreign Policy Behavior: Evaluating Three Methods of Assessment." *In Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*, ed., E. Singer and V. M. Hudson. Boulder( CO: Westview Press,1992), 103-134.

- vi) Reducing the price of supplies.

However, the global system is working in the direction of autonomy erosion in the name of Welfare of the States and Peoples.<sup>40</sup>

### **3-WELFARE**

In present age, it has become common public faith and expectations of citizens of any country that with security, government's main tasks are to provide their people with civic rights and promote economic growth and efficiency; these tasks generally enhance or sustain public welfare. In modern times the welfare state is considered responsible for:<sup>41</sup>

- i) Increase in economic growth:
- ii) To decrease unemployment:
- iii) To provide their people quality of life

**Governments take the following steps in-order to attain revenue for Welfare:<sup>42</sup>**

- i) Tax Collection
- ii) Utilization natural and local resources
- iii) Get loans from developed countries

In turn of this, government gives their people different facilities and rights according to their resources and availability of facilities;

- i) Free or cheap education
- ii) Housing loans
- iii) Health facilities.
- iv) Employment insurance:

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 139

<sup>41</sup> Sprout, H., & M. Sprout (1957) Environment Factors in the Study of International Politics. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1:309-328. , 9.

<sup>42</sup> ibid;

### **2.3. Pakistan's Foreign Policy towards India: Chronological Developments**

Pakistan and India have never been in good relations with each other since the partition of Sub-continent into two independent states in 1947. India's denial of the reality that Pakistan is a separate independent state put Indian masses in believing in the myth of reunion of Pakistan with India. Many issues ranging from socio-political to geo-political are responsible of this rift between the two countries. For example, water dispute, states annexation issue, financial issue but the most importantly Kashmir dispute remained the key barrier to bridge the gap between the two countries. This has created high magnitude of bitterness which has always been stopping both the countries to develop cordial relation. After the period of more than 68 years, every peace dialogue and negotiations remained unsuccessful due to the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, both the countries fought many declared and undeclared wars such as wars in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 due to this problem. India herself took this problem to the door of United Nation but never materialized the decision of the UN to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. However, this tension is still prevailing and falling the states apart from developing a bond of cordial relationship.

After Independence, Pakistan and India started their journey in the same footing of democracy, however, unfortunately, civilian government of Pakistan could not control internal and foreign matters fully that gave Military the impression of weakening of external borders of the country. On the basis of this perception of fallacy Military interfered in the political matters of the Pakistan which resulted into more than thirty three years of Military rule over Pakistan. In this period, they not only influenced the internal matters but also affected external matters of the country. One area of the

external matters is foreign policy of Pakistan. In this area, according to many political and defense analysts<sup>43</sup>, foreign policy of Pakistan towards India is of great importance because the biggest threat to the freedom and existence of Pakistan is from India due to existence of the myth of greater India among some extremist fractions of Indian society even today. So, for the safety of the country, decision makers of the foreign policy have to make road map to deal with the problem. The first martial law administrator who became the President of Pakistan ruled for 11 years (1958-1969) clearly indicated the objectives of his foreign policy, national security, ideology and development<sup>44</sup>. Moreover, he considered the situation important and felt the security threat from Indian. So, he acted like a political leader apparently, though, he was a soldier primarily. He articulated his foreign policy many times. He became ally of the USA; moreover, he was also known as an architect of SENTO and CENTO in 1955<sup>45</sup> and considered these pacts significant in getting military aid from the USA.

In Ayub era, India offered Pakistan to have a No War Pact but Pakistan was not ready to accept it due to lack of trust. However, Pakistan wanted to have a Joint Defense Pact but Indians were reluctant to agree with Pakistan in this respect. From 19 to 23 September 1960 Indus Water Treaty was signed between India and Pakistan and at that time of agreement both the countries were agreed to establish relationship on rational basis. Kashmir issue remained a hindrance in filling the gap between the two countries. In the Sino-Indian war 1962 Pakistan supported china due to which the relationship between the two states (Pakistan and China) became closer.

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<sup>43</sup> Shahid M.Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 29, Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign policy 1947-2009: A Concise History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 37.

<sup>44</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (Islamabad: Mr. Book (pvt) LTD, 2002), 114.

<sup>45</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign policy*, 51-58.

India and Pakistan fought three declared wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 and many undeclared low intensity wars<sup>46</sup>. Many historians argue that Ayub Khan was not in favour of war.<sup>47</sup> After war, from 4<sup>th</sup> January to 10<sup>th</sup> January 1966 Tashkent Conference was held in Russia. In this conference, India and Pakistan tried to normalize their relations with certain declarations;<sup>48</sup> however, instead of this agreement both the countries could not establish good relations. This might be due to Indian desire to get revenge from Pakistan and they waited for the moment when they could achieve their objective. So, after the Ayub's regime, in 1971 they got the chance and both the countries once again indulged in a war. As a result, Pakistan was not only defeated but its eastern wing was also separated from it as an independent state of "Bangladesh". After Ayub Khan's regime, India alleged Pakistan for Sikh insurgency in Indian Punjab in 1984.<sup>49</sup>

For the last three decades, India has been maneuvering the situation to isolate Pakistan from the world and also distorting the image of Pakistan in the eyes of the world on the account of terrorism. The most recent clash was that of Kargil crisis in 1999 which resulted in both military and political defeat of Pakistan. In 1999, Pervez Musharraf got the power. In his era, he remained flexible in foreign policies towards India as President of Pakistan and was also keen to have a bilateral relations with India but he always faced allegations of terrorist activities in Pakistan especially after 9/11 2001. Indian once again blamed Pakistan for the act of attack on Indian parliament in December, 2001 without probing the matter deeply. These allegations

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<sup>46</sup> Khalid Mehmood, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Lahore: Nasir publisher, 2007), 333.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid; 335.

<sup>48</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign policy*, 112.

<sup>49</sup> Khalid Mehmood, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 344.

created more rifts between the two countries and once again due to security threat from each other both the countries increased their armed forces at their international borders. Later on, when tension was decreased to some extent, Indian government invited Musharraf to talk on Kashmir issue on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2001 at Agra which resulted into an agreement called Agra Summit.<sup>50</sup> Both the leaders, Vajpayee and Musharraf wanted to bring transformation in the relationship of both neighbouring countries but due to non-cooperative behavior of Indian leadership and cabinet committee that too could not be materialized.<sup>51</sup>

In 2004, Vajpayee visited Pakistan to attend SAARC summit and at this occasion both the leaders announced a contract to start a “Composite Dialogue” and showed their willingness to have peaceful settlement on all issues including Kashmir issue. These dialogues included talks about peace and cooperation, terrorism and friendly exchange programs. Moreover, senior officers of both the sides had meetings to discuss “Confidence Building Measures” to lessen intensity of burning issues.<sup>52</sup> All the major agreements reached up to the period of 2008. Trade discussions were made and progress was prominent in Musharraf times, Siachen issue was also discussed frequently. However, no agreement was made on Sir Creek issue<sup>53</sup>. After the resignation of Musharraf further development was not observed in bridging the gaps between India and Pakistan.

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<sup>50</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign policy*, 263-265.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid;

<sup>52</sup> Ibid; 314.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid; 315.

## **2.4. Pakistan's Foreign Policy Towards India: Regional and Global Dimensions**

Regionally, Pakistan was the second declared nuclear power and in the world it was included in the category of third world country. After independence, the founder of Pakistan Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah started his journey with idealistic views that Pakistan would have mutual and sincere attitude towards all the neighbours including India.<sup>54</sup> However, Pakistan had a security threat from India since the independence in the region.<sup>55</sup> This was the result of political and military discourse adopted on the other side of the border that due to complex geographical conditions Pakistan had to rejoin India to materialize the dream of "Akhand Bharat". So, for every government whether it was civilian or military it was the major task to preserve the country from her arch enemy-India. Every government set objectives to deal with three major concerns of the country i.e. national security, development and ideology. Unfortunately, due to incompetent civilian leadership in Pakistan Military always interfered in political matters of the government. More than 30 years military ruled over Pakistan. Military leadership used different tactics to deal with neighbouring countries especially with India.

General Ayub Khan who was the first martial law administrator ruled for nearly 10 years. During his rule, he inferred intentions of the Indian threat towards Pakistan. He came up with the conclusion that Pakistan had security threat from India which is many times bigger country than Pakistan in size and in economy as well. India day by day increased her military power to pressurize Pakistan. Before becoming president of Pakistan Ayub Khan was already partner in the pact of SEATO and CENTO with

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid; 17.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid;



America during the early years of Pakistan. Furthermore, during military rule of Ayub Khan India tried to isolate Pakistan in the world and sometimes directly pressurized diplomatically, politically and militarily. Afghanistan which is a Muslim country also favoured India regionally and on the other side, Soviet Union was already annoyed of Pakistan due to its inclination towards America for bilateral relations.<sup>56</sup> These were the challenges which Pakistan faced during Ayub's regime, and keeping this in view, Ayub Khan started quest for security in that crucial era and designed his pro-West foreign policy. Ayub Khan insisted that America must play its role to resolve Kashmir issue peacefully and as a result America promised that if India did not resolve the issue peacefully they would support Pakistan in United Nations.<sup>57</sup> However, the issue could not be resolved and it resulted in a second war in 1965 between the two countries. Pakistan got lot of regional support especially from China. On the other side, the stance of the big powers of the globe was different.

The USA as an ally of Pakistan took a neutral position. Instead of Ayub Khan's appeal for help, Britain and American wanted a ceasefire and immediate solution of Kashmir problem. The UN Security Council also passed resolutions<sup>58</sup> and made commitment with Pakistan that they would resolve Kashmir problem but this commitment has never been fulfilled.<sup>59</sup> After the war, Pakistan developed close relations with China. Pakistan fully understood the global politics and tried to improve relation with at least one Communist Country i.e. Soviet Union. Moreover, Pakistan also tried to establish bilateral relation with India due to severe external pressures of maintaining peace in the region.

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<sup>56</sup>Shahid M.Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 39

<sup>57</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 71.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid; 111.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid;99-110.

The last Military ruler of Pakistan General Musharraf followed the same footing of a former general Ayub Khan. He ruled over Pakistan for 10 years (1999-2008). In his regime, he also wanted to protect national interest and ideology and he was also anxious about the development of the country. He used the slogan "SAB SE PHELE PAKISTAN" means "Pakistan First". In his regime the fluctuating events of the world greatly shifted the attention of Musharraf to the world affairs i.e. 9/11. In his time the adverse nature of India did not change. Before becoming President he was involved in Kargil war 1999 with India. But with the event of 9/11 the whole scenario of the world changed and India tried to exploit this situation and anti-Muslim discourse developed in India too, while, Musharraf wisely handled the situation and gave the idea of "Enlightened Moderation".<sup>60</sup> He was also keen for the settlement of Kashmir.

Musharraf visited Agra and discussed all core issues with them but Indians were still reluctant as ever before.<sup>61</sup> Globally, Musharraf came in front for the war against terror but Pakistan not only wanted to reject terrorism regionally but also globally. Musharraf knew that bilateral relations between India and Pakistan were important not only for the peace in South Asia but also for the peace of the world.

Due to this, Musharraf showed flexible approach towards India. However, in 2004 the Indian prime minister visited Pakistan and leaders of both the countries decided to have dialogue on "Core Issues" but these diplomatic talks were also not very much successful in the context of historical perceptions and assumptions. However, trade agreements and people to people contact were established. After Musharraf, no

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid; 296.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid; 288.

further development was seen in developing good relation of India and Pakistan and the key countries including the USA and England were also failed in finding the reasonable solution for the long lasting problem i.e. Kashmir issue of the region and the world.

## Chapter: 3

### **Reorientation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy Towards India: A Comparative Analysis of Ayub and Musharraf's Perception, Magnitude and Construct of Foreign Policy**

#### **3.1 Difference in Perception of Foreign Policy Paradigm with regards to India**

Perception in foreign policy formulation has been found different not only among civilian governments but also among military rulers in Pakistan since partition towards super powers of the time in general and towards India in particular. This might have been occurred due to difference in level of threat from India and compulsion of accompanying world powers to maintain their interests in this region. Some unfortunate incidents of the partition and British's collaboration with India in distributing assets revealed intentions of both the states against nascent state of Pakistan in 1947. Civilian government having all this in mind decided to join SEATO without keeping Army in pool according to Ayub Khan<sup>62</sup>, however, Baghdad Pact known as CENTO was favoured by him as diplomatic deterrence against India.<sup>63</sup> On his visit to Moscow in 1967, Kosygin showed his concern over Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO.<sup>64</sup> As Ayub Khan always obsessed with perceived threat of India over Kashmir especially for Pakistan he started seeking friends and went to the Western block of the USA. However, Musharraf felt differently due to its military strength with the help of China and some other Muslim countries. Besides of that he could talk more bravely with India on equal basis due to Pakistan's nuclear power.

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<sup>62</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign policy*, 52.

<sup>63</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (Islamabad: Mr. Book (pvt) LTD, 2002), 116.

<sup>64</sup> *ibid*; 171.

### 3.1.1 Level of Threat

Level of threat from India had always been different during the regimes of Musharraf and Ayub. During Ayub Khan's regime threat from India had always been greater because of the weak position of Pakistan in the region and intensification of Cold War between the USA and USSR. Pakistan was sandwiched state between the two powers and wedge due to evil design of India because India by 1998(Pakistan became Nuclear Power of the World) never accepted Pakistan as a sovereign state on the map of the world.

India's all those (even now) conspiracies against Pakistan had a long history of deep hatred against the sovereign state of Pakistan. Unjust distribution of assets and forcible evacuation of Muslims from India to Pakistan to cripple the economy of the nascent state were some of the notorious steps taken by Indian government. More cunningly the occupation of the major parts of the State of Jammu and Kashmir exposed biased intentions of India against Pakistan. Indian leaders were quiet open in revealing their biased designs, for instance, the president of Indian National Congress in 1947 and the first Indian Home Minister-Sardar Patel announced basis of Indian foreign policy as "sooner than later, we shall again be united in common allegiance to our country".<sup>65</sup>

Security was a grave issue due to two geographically separated parts- East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Securing not only borders but also preserving ideology was a serious challenge to the foreign policy makers of Pakistan during Ayub Khan's era. India's Pakistan oriented foreign policy was vested by the principle of "divide and rule" ideologically. The same was done when people of East Pakistan were inculcated with different identity of Bengali based on distinct culture and language. Furthermore,

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<sup>65</sup> Shahid M.Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign policy*, 1.

Pakistan was portrayed negatively as neo-colonial power and Bengali as colonized by Indian intellectuals and civil and military beaureacracy.

After sensing the high level of threat from India, Ayub Khan realized that Pakistan had to depend on some foreign assistance for economic development in the country and at the same time ensuring security from India. India was having upper hand due to Pakistan's weak geographical location as East Pakistan was surrounded by India from three sides and West Pakistan as a small country was wedged by supper power of the time-Soviet Union, China and India itself. Ayub Khan thought of converting this physical weakness into strength by continuing membership with SEATO and CENTO. However, on the other side, keeping strong relation with emerging power of China in spite of China's anxiety over Soviet Union's philosophical and political contradictions with China was again another challenge for Ayub Khan as head of the state.

His firm belief of perceived threats from India is also reflected explicitly in his letter to the US President Kennedy about the supply of arms to India in 1962 apparently against China. He wrote,

“ .....she (India) has built up her forces.....mainly with American and British equipment three to four times our strength and has openly declared that Pakistan is her enemy number one.....on top of all this, the recent conflict between India and China has led to developments of grave concern to you.....We believe this is the direct outcome of distorted and fallacious thinking on the part of Mr. Nehru and his associates and consequence of a baseless foreign policy that has been following....However, in the light of the promise that you were good enough to make, namely, that we shall be consulted before you gave any military assistance to India, we did expect to be consulted and also informed as to the types and the quantities of weapons and equipment which are now in the process of being supplied to them, it is regrettable that none of this has been done”.<sup>66</sup>

Though, President Kennedy reassured time and again that the military aid given to India would not be used against Pakistan but Indian dark history of pledges over several issues including Pakistan restrained Ayub Khan from his perceived threat from India.

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid; 141-143.

Level of threat from India increased when Ayub Khan's perceived high expectations from the USA on the issue of Kashmir declined time and again which placed Ayub Khan in a difficult and challenging situation. Ayub Khan was always found on the defending position with and sudden bent of his mind occurred. India's argument of massacre of Muslims of India over holding the plebiscite in Kashmir; West's aim of attracting India into Western camp by supply of heavy arms and financial support and India's legal maneuvering in 1963 over replacing the title of President with Governor and Prime Minister with Chief Minister abolished all the hopes of resolving Kashmir dispute.<sup>67</sup> That legal maneuvering was explicitly violation of 1949 resolution of United Nations over Kashmir. This also resulted into agitation among Kashmiri Muslims which turned into a movement of exercising self-determination right in December 1963. Pakistan approached the United Nations but the Pakistani voice was nothing more than in air and American ambassador considered Pakistani act nothing more than exploitation of Kashmir issue for their internal politics.<sup>68</sup>

In May 1964 Sheikh Abdullah a Kashmiri leader (1905-1982) after his release from Indian jail came to Pakistan apparently for some settlement over Kashmir, though his role was suspicious over Kashmir issue, and invited Ayub Khan for New Delhi and he accepted the invitation. Unfortunately, Nehru died next day and all hopes of peace were also buried then. Next prime minister of India followed the same conventional footsteps of his predecessors and initiated moves of merger of Kashmir with India through constitutional amendment.<sup>69</sup>

As compared to Ayub Khan the regime of Musharraf faced serious challenges in post 9/11 situation. The pressure of the USA and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over Pakistan increased for handing over Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan (A Nuclear

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<sup>67</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign policy*, 99.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*; 100.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*; 101.

Scientist) to America for his alleged acts of proliferation of nuclear activities to Iran, North Korea and Libya. Threat of Taliban was also high as they refused to keep any good connections with Pakistan military in particular. Terrorist activities increased in cities of Pakistan which was catalyzed by sectarianism as well. On the other hand, Musharraf's acts in Balochistan also provided India an opportunity to exploit the situation and they started interfering in Balochistan and supported separatists though small in number. India perceived similar threats from Taliban or *Jihadis* especially from *Lashkar-e-Tayyaba*<sup>70</sup> and *Jammatuddawa*<sup>71</sup>. Kargil adventure of Musharraf also put him in trouble on political matrix and unfortunate incidents of Mumbai attacks 2008 and attacks on Indian parliament 2001 posed serious threats to Pakistan from all sides.

The incident of 9/11 put Pakistan at back foot from all the fronts including North-West front in Afghanistan, eastern front of India and even China and other countries became very conscious in the situation. Taliban who had been great deterrence of Pakistan against India from 1994 to 2001 lost their importance before demands of the United States. The president of the United States put a straightforward question to Musharraf, "Are you with us or against us"? And Musharraf could not stain the pressure and announced alleged military actions against Taliban.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, The United State threatened Pakistan directly by throwing the country to the Stone Age.<sup>73</sup> On the other side, India as usual remained on toes to exploit Pakistan regionally and internationally and an intense situation was created time and again on line of control of Kashmir. Above all, Pakistan faced internal threats as well in as the public

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<sup>70</sup> This is known as the one of the active terrorist organization in south Asia in general and operated in Pakistan specifically.

<sup>71</sup> This organization also operates mainly from Pakistan and has had sanctions placed against it as a terrorist organization by the United Nations.

<sup>72</sup> Shahid M.Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 315.

<sup>73</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 201.



opinion was against Musharraf and was considered a pawn. Many attacks on civil and military personals started by terrorists/Taliban in streets of Pakistan and Musharraf himself attacked by Taliban two times with narrow escape.

### **3.1.2 Deterrence Policy**

Ayub Khan showed more dependence on deterrence policy than Musharraf. Even before Ayub Khan Pakistan's civilian governments worked on the same policy due to high polarization of the world at that time into two camps of the USA and USSR. India's apparently neutralism was another threat to security of Pakistan as India used to exaggerate the Sino-Indian situation exploited and both the USA and USSR and won not only sympathies on moral grounds but also remained successful to obtain intensive military support from both of the super powers. By then, the USA and USSR had smelled the emergence of Chinese Communism which was perceived as a serious ideological threat by Soviet Union and USA at the same time. On the other hand, all such threats and international situation compelled Pakistan for its security by 1954 to become part of suspected communism oriented Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as two different deterrents serving the same purpose.

In 1958, when Ayub Khan took over the reign of country, Pakistan was facing serious and constant security threat from India. In addition to these improving living conditions of Pakistani people was another challenge for the Ayub's regime. Pakistan had to depend for some foreign assistance for economic development in the country and at the same time ensuring security from India. Continuing the membership with SEATO and CENTO without sacrificing the relations with the emerging power China was another grave challenge to Ayub Khan's foreign policy of Pakistan.

Pakistan's nuclear program was also a part of deterrence policy because it was first India that revealed its intentions of acquiring nuclear weapons in 1946 from the mouth of Homi Bhabha-a nuclear physics professor in India.<sup>74</sup> Later in 1960s India's plan of obtaining nuclear weapons was exposed with a lame excuse of Sino-India confrontations. This all triggered Pakistan to think about nuclear program.

In the North-Western border in Afghanistan Pakistan's good relations with Taliban till 2001 served as deterrence to India as Pakistan share a long border with Afghanistan which provides a strategic depth to both Pakistan and India.<sup>75</sup> Secondly, Taliban having not good opinion about India and Israel supported deterrence policy of Pakistan. However, 9/11 culminated into defeat of Taliban in Afghanistan that deprived Pakistan of an important deterrence against India and Afghanistan developed a bond of military cooperation with India which might serve a serious threat to Pakistan at Pak-Afghan border. Musharraf's decision of becoming ally of forces against terrorism also served a strong deterrence and India was quite critical of the United States for not doing a direct operation in Pakistan against terrorists what they used to call *jihadis*. On American demand of "Do More" Musharraf launched several military operations in FATA and other tribal areas of Pakistan. So, 9/11 determined the framework of Pakistan foreign policy laid on the matrix of "moderation and enlightenment".<sup>76</sup> He urged to revisit the whole ideology of Pakistan which prevented India to propagate Pakistan as an "epicenter of terrorism"<sup>77</sup>.

### 3.1.3 Approach Towards Indian Response

Ayub Khan's attitude towards peace between India and Pakistan seemed quite positive which was taken compromising at that time in Pakistan by some intellectuals.

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<sup>74</sup> Sattar, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 167.

<sup>75</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 317.

<sup>76</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 295.

<sup>77</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 327.

On the other side, the Indian leadership showed apparently the same attitude of relaxation and compromising but amalgamated with lot of distrust. India stressed on

“Let us forget our disputes; let us have a no-war pact; let us have more trade, more freedom of movement between the two countries and the more cultural exchanges. This will soften feelings on the two sides and once an atmosphere of goodwill and understanding develops, all the problems will resolve themselves.”<sup>78</sup>

However, Ayub Khan, representing the public sentiments, united the people of Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir could not respond according to Indians' will. Secondly forgetting important dispute of Kashmir would mean dragging Pakistan into death due to draught because of water canals in Kashmir.<sup>79</sup> Signing no war pact would also have proved beneficial for India only because India was not ready to reduce its military expenditures on the excuse of presence of Chinese threat.

Building atmosphere of goodwill without resolving important issue of Kashmir and throwing it in the seas of history would give no permanence to peace between the two countries, maintained Ayub Khan. And India's history of pledges and agreements with Pakistan is full of many U-turns. Right from the beginning of partition India's biased attitude towards distributions of ammunition and other assets and not meeting the resolution of United Nation over the use of right of self-determination of Kashmiris made Ayub Khan stricter in making foreign policy of Pakistan towards India. According to him, Indian foreign policy towards Pakistan followed set patterns of normalizing the situation first and “now that things are normal why raise the problem” subsequently. Keeping all these in mind Ayub Khan, in 1959, presented the policy of “reappraisal, for forgetting and forgiving, and for more realistic and rationale, and sensible relationship with each other”<sup>80</sup>. The policy followed the framework of joint defense which was considered negatively on both sides of the

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<sup>78</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, 121.

<sup>79</sup> *ibid*;

<sup>80</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, 123.

borders. Indian considered it as an attack on Indian soil and some Pakistani intellectuals took it as intention of joint confederation. Offering proposal against the ideological thoughts of the people of both sides gave hibernated politicians a golden opportunity in Pakistan to criticize Ayub Khan's proposal of joint defense.

Another political mistake, according to some Pakistani historians, was made by Ayub Khan at the time of demarcation of Sino-Pakistan border when Nehru approached Ayub Khan and took the newly designed map of Pak-China border. This border demarcation agreement catalyzed positive relation between China and Pakistan which ultimately created a pressure felt by India. It was the same time when Nehru came to Pakistan to sign Indus Basin Treaty.<sup>81</sup> Despite of having firm stance on Kashmir and knowing the Indian minds Ayub Khan surprisingly handed over the map of China-Pakistan newly defined territories to Mr. Nehru which provided an opportunity to India to distort the image of Pakistan and to win the sympathies of Western governments especially the USA. Indians criticized Ayub Khan by manipulating that the demarcation treaty between China and Pakistan initiated by Pakistan and, in doing so, that had provided the highest place to China to observe rest of the world. Feeling the pressure India started to explore the possibilities of rapprochement with China.

As compared to Ayub Khan's military rule, the regime of Musharraf faced extraordinary situations replete with no hope of betterment of the people of Pakistan socially and economically. He had been encountered with many serious challenges at indigenous and global level. Indigenously, Taliban became not only a serious threat to the integrity of the country but Musharraf also was attacked by Taliban in Rawalpindi. 9/11 put Musharraf into the most difficult situation of his life. It was very difficult to

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<sup>81</sup> *ibid*;

disown the people (Taliban) who once were the strength of Pakistan against India in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

9/11 provided India a golden opportunity to start a media campaign against Pakistan not only in India but also in the Western world. Indians as usual did not miss the opportunity and started a strong media campaign to align Pakistan with Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In addition to this, Kargil was recent down fall of Pakistani military under the patronage of Musharraf as an army chief. However, he behaved more pragmatically with India on different occasions during his rule. At different important occasions including “Islamabad Declaration”, “Agra Summit” and at other diplomatic meetings whether in Pakistan, India or in USA he appeared to be very effective in building relations with India in all domains of life. According to some historians of Pakistan, Musharraf compromised over the issue of Kashmir to some extent and on the other side some believed, he thought about the issue out of the box. His ‘Confidence Building Measures’ (CBMs), are considered significant strategy of bridging the gaps of trust among the people of India and Pakistan. However, CBMs proved to be more effective on this side of the border (Pakistan) rather than on the other side.

### **3.2 Objectives of Pakistan Foreign Policy: Security, Development and Survival**

Foreign policy in the regime of Ayub Khan was laid on the principle of security and development simultaneously. Having foreign assistance for economic development and security without compromising national interest was a grave problem to be addressed in the foreign policy of the country.

#### **3.2.1 Security Paradigms of Ayub and Musharraf:**

Keeping the political and geographic realities Ayub Khan set a paradigm of bilateralism as he realized the situation when he said,

“Our approach to world powers and to our neighbors is dictated by a sense of our limitations...we are not in position either to influence their decisions or to solve their problems. The basis of foreign policy thus is that we stay within our own means, political as well as economic.....all we expect is that we should be left alone to ....to bring about greater unity among our people, to promote their welfare and to preserve their identity.”<sup>82</sup>

So, his bilateral approach was determined by not only the limitations of Pakistan but also the limitations of other big powers and neighbors. However, India's approach of Neutralism was based on the principle of bargaining due to its strong geographical position to ensure interests of USA and Soviet Union in Asia.

Ayub Khan's paradigm of bilateral equations with India, United States of America, Soviet Union and China had several explicit and implicit influences on foreign policy of Pakistan towards India.

As Ayub Khan believed that Pakistan could not make progress mundanely and militarily without assistance of the Western block. He announced Pro-West (in general) and Pro-America (in particular) foreign policy of Pakistan by considering “the most allied ally”.<sup>83</sup> Pakistan's major concern was resolving the Kashmir dispute and lessening the threat magnitude from India and America's aim was to help Pakistan in a region threatened by Communism. This resulted into bilateral agreement for defense and cooperation between USA and Pakistan which apparently upgraded security of Pakistan threatened by India. India felt insecure over the pacts between Pakistan and USA and showed hostile attitude over the agreement. The American authorities approached Indian political leadership and made clarification that the pact did not go against India in any case. In addition to this, America's desire to establish a base in North West of Pakistan to observe Russian military movements was seriously taken by China. Later on Sino-Indian war of 1962 and western block's substantial moral, financial and militarily support for India against China made Ayub Khan think

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid; 120.

<sup>83</sup> A. K Hameed, *Foreign Policies of Major Powers* (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1989)i-iii.

differently and suspiciously as he reacted in his political autobiography in these words, “ I think it is necessary to trace the development in greater detail in order to show how the United States reacted to the situation and how we came to gradual and painful realization that as between India and Pakistan, the United States had chosen India”.<sup>84</sup>

The Pro-Indian attitude of the USA and anti-Pakistan attitude of India tilted Ayub Khan’s mind towards a natural and more sensible alliance with China. Pakistan explicit support for China’s membership in United Nations and, in addition to this, Kashmir dispute and Tibet dispute put the nations aligned; however, Ayub Khan had more in mind about demarcation of border with China on northern part of the country. China was reluctant initially to talk about the issue due to its recent involvement with India in Sino-Indian war. However, Ayub Khan remained successful to make China willing over the demarcation of the border in the north of Pakistan. Thus as a result, China and Pakistan shared common mountain of K2 as done with Nepal about Mount Everest.

Furthermore, Realizing fiasco of Pakistan-USA relation for security point of view Ayub Khan tried to apply his bilateral policy paradigm/framework on USSR. That also seemed a rational decision in the context of international politics when the world was divided into two camps, one with the USA and the other with USSR. From geographical and strategic point of view, having relations with immediate neighbors is important and significant instead of having false romance across the seas. Secondly, incident of U-2 plane<sup>85</sup> and explicit threat of perishing Peshawar in Pakistan by USSR put Ayub Khan in weaker position. For this rationale behind the move, he might have

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<sup>84</sup>Ayub khan, *Friends not Masters*, 139.

<sup>85</sup> The USA used Peshawar airbase of Pakistan for high –level U-2 ‘spy in the Sky’ surveillance aircraft for illegal flights over the soviet Union for photographic intelligence.however, this spy detected by USSR, Sattar,*Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 56.

declared his visit to Soviet Union in 1965 a successful visit as he mentioned in his auto-biography, "We had achieved more in one day than others had done in eighteen years".<sup>86</sup> He talked to Kosygin and showed his concern over the supply of arms to India from USA and Soviet Union at the same time which would create a serious threat to the region. Kosygin might have realized the nature of Sino-Soviet differences and India's role in that situation which ultimately put Pakistan and USSR on the same page. Ayub Khan's bilateralism did not undermine India's strong influence in Afghanistan which could be used any time against Pakistan. India's ties with Afghanistan could easily be understood by the fact that Afghanistan was the only country to resist Pakistan's admission in the United Nations. Secondly, demand of Pakhtoonistan was also supported by Afghanistan backed up by India. Afghanistan as a land locked country felt some pressure of Ayub Khan's visit of Moscow in 1965. However, Ayub Khan's intentions were not only to assure security from India but also to develop cordial relations with Afghanistan as a Muslim country.

So, Ayub Khan's bilateral equations were focused with the theme of assuring security from India. It was due to India's Pakistan-oriented foreign policy. Ayub Khan's focus on formulating foreign policy in relation with either the USA or USSR on one side and China on the other side was revolving around the constant threat of India. However, some of the economic goals were achieved by Ayub Khan during the relation with the USA which is beyond the scope of this study.

Musharraf's foreign policy faced serious challenges as compared to Ayub Khan as Pakistan got directly involved in world politics in form of war against terror and left no other choice by world powers. Ayub Khan's foreign policy was revolving against India because India was the only serious threat to Pakistan. However in Musharraf's

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<sup>86</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, 173.



time Pakistan faced international threats from the United States and from India as usual. The Taliban who had been a great shield for Pakistan and the USA in Soviet war, before 9/11, turned against with deadly attitude towards Pakistan. The incident of 9/11 changed the whole scenario of the world politics in general and politics of Muslim world in particular with Pakistan as their nucleus of war against terror. Musharraf had to think sensibly to cope with the situation and he had to revise his foreign policy altogether. So, he turned out to be Western ally against terrorism and had the same stance against India as he used to have before 9/11.

From 1994 when he was Commander In chief of Pakistan Army to 2001 Chief Executive of Pakistan he and his predecessors supported Taliban as they were a strong protection on north western border against India. Pakistan had strategic relations with Taliban and the dominant group of Deobandi school of thought in KPK and Balochistan too had vivid ideological similarities with them. Therefore, they got attention and sympathies of some religious groups of Pakistan after American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Musharraf had to fight at three fronts, one at international, second with India and third with internal militants and extremist groups. All this caused a serious damage to Kashmir cause as all the *jihadis* turned against him and stopped supporting Pakistan on Kashmir issue.

Some analysts favored this alliance a sensible decision of Musharraf on the argument that the United States always helped Pakistan in economic and military domains against Indian aggression.<sup>87</sup> For instance, the USA gave massive economic aid to Pakistan during Ayub and Musharraf regimes and Americans supplied modern weapons to Pakistan used in 1965; the USA prevented India to invade East Pakistan covertly and restraint India during Kargil crisis and during intense confrontation

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<sup>87</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 322.

between Pakistan and India during 2002-2003.<sup>88</sup> But we must not be unmindful of the facts that America's preference of India over Pakistan all the time in all domain of life ranging from economic assistance to military support. Nevertheless, Musharraf was left with no choice except to join Western alliance against terrorism this kept India away from Pakistan and Pakistan enjoyed central position in the world due to its significant role in the war against terror.

So, 9/11 had explicit influence on Pakistan's foreign policy for western border and eastern border with a conventional rivalry of India as India highlighted Islamic terrorism in Afghanistan and tribal areas of Afghanistan which served a point of common interest between India and the USA which was exploited by India as usual.

On the other hand Musharraf's foreign policy towards Western world in general and India in particular was based on his philosophy of "moderation and enlightenment" of the society<sup>89</sup> quite contrary to Ayub Khan and on the basis of the same philosophy he urged to develop good relations with Israelis.<sup>90</sup> This sudden shift in foreign policy paradigm seemed sole intention of Musharraf which had multifarious implications on the security of Pakistan. Firstly, it would be helpful to change the minds of the Pakistani people conditioned with eternal rivalry of Israel on the basis of the argument that some Muslim countries also had relations with Israel. Secondly, it would turn all the religious groups of Pakistan against Musharraf, though; some of them were in favour of his war against terrorism. Thirdly, this policy would make the world powers please with him which would bring large investments in Pakistan and that happened

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid;

<sup>89</sup> Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 201.

<sup>90</sup> *Musharraf Opens debate on Israel Relations*. BBC news. 3 July 2003. Retrieved July 4, 2012.

in reality. Finally, India's propaganda of tagging Pakistan with terrorism and religious extremism as an "epicenter of terrorism"<sup>91</sup> would be aborted in future.

Similar to Ayub Khan's era Musharraf's era also became a hub of business in different fields of commerce. This switch of policy provided several benefits to Pakistan. Firstly, Pakistan enjoyed special prestige among allies and thus the business world turned towards Pakistan for investment which had not happened in Ayub times when he joined USSR, however; he got sufficient aid from America which was spent on several welfare projects. Secondly, In Musharraf's time Pakistan's economic assistance increased to \$10 billion in five years; Pakistan's debt was written off and export of Pakistan mounted 50% in that time.<sup>92</sup> Thirdly, after a long time Pakistan got F-16 including some other military assistance in Musharraf's time which was highly criticized by India. However, Musharraf's foreign policy was more effective than Ayub's with regard to attract foreign investment in the country. He considered the efficiency of diplomats with their success of attracting foreign investors and he was of the believe that "twenty first century will be driven by geo-economics more than by geostrategic or geopolitics."<sup>93</sup>

### 3.2.2 Contrast in Nuclear Policy Developments

Pakistan Nuclear program was a part of deterrence policy as mentioned previously and in the time of Ayub it gained some pace when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto then Foreign Minister of Pakistan expressed sentiments of Pakistani people among public in 1965. He said that we would acquire atomic weapons if Indians do so no matter what cost we have to pay. However, according to some of the Pakistani writers such as Sattar claimed that Ayub himself was not in favour of such explicit announcement.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 327.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid; 320.

<sup>93</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In the line of fire*, 306.

<sup>94</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 271.

Zulfiqar Bhutto won public appreciation along including some political leaders and he allocated sufficient budget for Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), to expand its nuclear program. It is also said that the military leadership including Ayub Khan did not feel necessary to acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>95</sup>The proposal made by PAEC of buying plutonium from France was rejected by the president Ayub Khan in 1966. Ayub Khan and other military leadership believed in conventional warfare as sufficient resource.<sup>96</sup>Several interpretations of Ayub Khan's restraint from acquiring nuclear weapons could be provided. One of that was the lack of capacity to absorb international pressure when the country is just revived from the war of 1965.

Such restraint from Ayub Khan was surprising when Indian's plan of nuclear program was vivid. No solid justification could be given over nuclear deterrence other than Indian's ambitious make up for nuclear warfare. Over the non-proliferation of nuclear deterrence initiated by the USA and UN, non-nuclear states including Pakistan put two conditions before nuclear states for signing NPT. One was that nuclear states would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and the other was help of non-nuclear states threatened by nuclear warfare. All the five nuclear states could not guarantee to non-nuclear states over this concern. It was the time when Pakistan was ready to sign NPT provided India would do the same at the same time.

However, the US gave Pakistan a nuclear reactor of low capacity under the conditions of complete inspection of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Few years later, Canada also agreed for assisting in construction of nuclear power plant of 120 megawatt which was completed in 1972 under the complete authority of International Atomic Agency.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Sattar, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 161.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*;

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*; 160.

The world digested Indian earlier nuclear test in 1974 on the argument of its peaceful purpose which later proved wrong in 1998. And India did five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13 in 1998 and Nawaz Sharif government responded by doing six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30 1998 as reaction to Indian nuclear aggression. The whole Western World turned against Pakistan except Muslim countries because Pakistan the world seventh and the first Islamic nuclear power. When Musharraf dethroned a democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999 and took over the regime, Western media and states become active to pressurize Pakistan for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Musharraf decided to absorb the pressure of the world, however; he was against the connotative association of the bomb as "Islamic Bomb" because there were no Christian or Hindu bombs. Such ideological manifestation of the nuclear bomb according to him turned the world against Pakistan. This appropriation of weapons with religion was indeed an irrational rationalization of the critics of Pakistan and no religion can ever be appropriated with any kind of weapon in the world.

After becoming the Chief of the Army Staff in 1998 his proposal of separate secretariat of nuclear program under government was completely ambiguous seemed subjective against Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan who along with his team turned a dream into reality. Musharraf suggested for the formation of National Command Authority (NCA) along with a secretariat to manage the program operationally and financially. However, the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif did not approve the recommendation. Musharraf revealed all the secret of government to government nuclear pacts with North Korea under the administration of Abdul Qadeer Khan. After military take over Musharraf implemented the system of NCA which was disapproved by Nawaz Sharif

previously.<sup>98</sup> The second thing which he did was the removal of A.Q. Khan as chairman of PAEC due to his suspicious network of nuclear proliferation according to Musharraf though he could not get any evidence even with the help of CIA against A.Q. Khan as he admitted in his memoir in the words,

“United States continued to raise questions about proliferation in Pakistan at some point in past, but like us, they had no concrete evidence. We kept denying allegations, because we did not have evidence; we had suspicions only”.<sup>99</sup>

However, In 2003 according to Musharraf, the CIA chief provided some evidence and Musharraf found himself in difficulty as he declared it as “the most serious and saddest crisis” in his time. And as a result of his dealings with the situation and access of the United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Pakistan’s nuclear centrifuges in Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at Kahuta, perhaps, had made the nuclear deterrence volatile.

Musharraf could not protest even to the USA on nuclear agreement with India in 2005, though; the agreement was done under non-proliferation laws of IEAE and “equal criteria- based treatment was denied to Pakistan”.<sup>100</sup> At times it seemed as eruption of some conspiracy theories that the Pakistani nuclear weapons would go direct in the hands of the USA and IEAE during Musharraf regimes which did not happen however.

It is clear from the above discussion that all the nuclear crises faced by Pakistan were in the time of military dictators. And military rulers could not tackle the situations skillfully and surrendered before the diplomatic pressures of the USA which in turn weakened Pakistan in the eyes of long awakening enemy, India.

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<sup>98</sup> Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 287.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid*; 289

<sup>100</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 169.

### 3.2.3 The Policy of Coexistence in Ayub and Musharraf Period

The policy of coexistence followed by both the military rulers Ayub and Musharraf with India was similar to the policy of civil governments. This has been reflected at different scales of time since 1962. Pakistan's policy of coexistence remained vivid during all the crises between India and Pakistan including Rann of Kutch Crisis, War of 1965, Tashkent Agreement, Kargil Crisis, Agra Summit, and Islamabad Declaration and on several others occasions for example Mumbai Attacks.

Starting from Rann of Kutch, Ayub Khan showed remarkable patience and compromise despite of harsh criticism of public and civil leadership over India's invasion of Rann Kutch a disputed territory since 1947. Despite of ceasefire in 1960 on Rann of Kutch a sandwiched area of 3,500 square miles between Sindh and Gujarat of India, Indian forces trespassed their territorial limits and were engulfed by Pakistani army at one time. That could have been a serious disaster for India but Ayub retrieved on the interference of Security Council of United Nations. And even over the unjust distribution of land was done by the tribunal of Security Council:<sup>101</sup> Ayub Khan showed great respect for the Security Council. It also gave a clear gesture to India for peace talks on all the issues but Indians never regarded peace process initiated from this side of the border.

Over nuclear access Ayub Khan had a little different opinion from civil leadership on the basis of balance of power in the region knowing the Indian intention of acquiring nuclear access by any means. When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto proposed of buying nuclear warfare-plutonium from France at reasonable price Ayub Khan disapproved the idea. Ayub Khan and his military leadership believed in conventional military power sufficient even knowing Indian's vivid nuclear plans. Ayub Khan did not want to

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<sup>101</sup> Sartaj Aziz, *Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan's History* (London: Oxford University Press), 36-42.

disturb the peace of the region in general and peace across Pakistan and India in particular. He might have thought nuclear warfare as deterrence to peace rather a deterrence to war. By any interpretation policy of coexistence was clear from his approach.

Akin to Ayub, Musharraf moved a step forward to build strong peaceful relations with India. Despite of several allegations of attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001 and Mumbai Attacks in 2008 Musharraf talked about peace in the region and between the two countries. And he promised to punish those responsible of Mumbai attacks if they were in Pakistan. He convinced the world over Mumbai attacks with the argument that there are some anti-peace elements on both side of the border and we have to curb them first. Islamabad Declaration and Confidence Building Measures “at greater scale of communication links, trade and travel, unprecedented cultural exchanges and decrease in hostile propaganda” and several summits and meetings to resolve all the issues of Pakistan and Kashmir including “Siachen, Sir Creek, cross border terrorism, and deduction in defense forces”<sup>102</sup> were held and initiated by Musharraf which showed his great sensibility over the realization of peace in the region and between the two countries.

### **3.3 Construct of Foreign Policy Towards India: Ayub opposed to Musharraf**

Musharraf attitude towards India could be analyzed from two sides of the coin. The one when he was the chief of army staff and the other when he was the Chief executive of the country. Being the chief of the army staff he was similarly rigid over Kashmir as Ayub was during his rule. The Kargil adventure as his sole ambition to climb up the hill tops in Kargil and his stress over army action the only solution of the dispute of Kargil and Kashmir suddenly changed when he became the chief executive

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<sup>102</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 330-331.



of the country. Being the chief executive he tried to pose a Statesman at international level but at national level his treatment with Dr. A. Q Khan was indeed a dictatorial attitude and based on some personal grudges as reflected from his memoir.<sup>103</sup>

However, coming back to India his foreign policy was more laid on the philosophical matrix of “enlightenment moderation” even on the Kashmir dispute. His words clearly reveal his state of mind toward India when he said,

“I have thought very deeply about our hostile relationship over the past half century and more: our wars, Siachen, Kargil, and the struggle for freedom in Indian held Kashmir. The collective effect of all these military actions has been to force both sides back to the negotiating table-but from this point forward, military actions can do no more. There is no military solution to our problems. The way forward is through diplomacy. I believe India has realized that it can no longer use military coercion against Pakistan.”<sup>104</sup>

Contrary to Ayub’s time China has developed strong economic relations with Pakistan and Musharraf encouraged this diplomacy based on socio-economic activities and stressed more on bilateral relations with China and India both.

Ayub had a very strong stance over Kashmir and always preferred Kashmir as one of the major disputes between Pakistan and India and always moved forward through military actions dominantly. However, Musharraf believed in some “out of the box” solution of Kashmir after becoming the chief executive of Pakistan and he designed a “parallel track of confidence building measures-CBMs and conflict resolution”, while India preferred first on CBMs.<sup>105</sup> Agra Summit, Islamabad Declaration and some other joint statements passed over different occasions such as SAARC, 2002 and 2001 UN Summits revealed his urge to find some “out of the box” solution of Kashmir not only acceptable to both India and Pakistan but also to people of the Kashmir.

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<sup>103</sup> Musharraf, *in the Line of Fire*, 289.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*; 297.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*;302.

### 3.3.1 Direct Role of Military in Foreign Policy Formulation

Both of the military rulers Ayub and Musharraf had some civilian personalities in defense committees, however; military supremacy over the civilians had always been reflected in the foreign policy of Pakistan towards India especially. The War of 1965 or even response to Indian ceasefire violation at the disputed territory of Rann of Kutch was solely a decision of Ayub as is reported by the Aziz Ahamad<sup>106</sup>. Similarly, on Kargil issue, Musharraf denomination in foreign policy formulation process is vivid as reflected by Aziz Ahmad<sup>107</sup> and the political statement of Nawaz Sharif as he claimed the Kargil operation started on May 5<sup>th</sup> and the Prime Minister was informed on May 17 when the whole design was exposed to the world. However, Musharraf blamed civil government for its defeat.<sup>108</sup> Let us cover first the denomination of Ayub over foreign policy formulation process by having detailed analysis of the war of 1965 and Rann of Kutch issue. Then Musharraf's influence on foreign policy formulation process will be covered through detailed analysis of Kargil Operation. The difference of approach from civil governments will also be discussed in the next sections.

In 1965 Ayub Khan's implicit acceptance of supremacy of India was revealed over the issue of Rann of Kutch when India violated the 1960 ceasefire over the Rann of Kutch territory and Pakistan went to the United Nations in 1965. It was decided there that tribunal's award would not be questioned in any case and as a result Pakistan was satisfied over getting 10 percent of the disputed territory and India ignited over getting even 90 percent of the disputed territory.<sup>109</sup> Though, in April 1965 Pakistani forces took control over Indian forces and could have taken all the territory back but

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<sup>106</sup> Sartaj Aziz, *Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan's History* (London: Oxford University Press), 36-42.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid; 254.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid; 262.

<sup>109</sup> Sattar, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 103.

surprisingly Ayub Khan ordered a restraint.<sup>110</sup> Ayub Khan's failure of making brave decision still put him in trouble due to biased attitude of the USA towards Pakistan and he finally declared America as 'power drunk' and started looking for new 'friends not masters'.<sup>111</sup>

The Rann of Kutch humiliated Ayub Khan not only in the world but also in the country which made him exasperated and on the other side India did read accurately the weak position of Pakistan over Rann of Kutch award of United Nations tribunal. He formulated a Kashmir Publicity Committee and made the foreign secretary Aziz Ahmed its head. Operation Gibraltar was planned on three false and irrational assumptions even by knowing the attitude and strong position of India militarily and diplomatically. First assumption was that guerillas would be supported by Kashmiri people; second was Indians would never dare to attack Azad Kashmir and third was rule out of Indians' attack on international border. Though Aziz Ahmed resisted the operation Gibraltar unless Pakistani army becomes militarily strong but on the suggestion of his generals, Ayub Khan approved the plan and instructed GHQ for preparation<sup>112</sup>. All the three hypotheses were nullified by Indians' military methods.

The guerillas entered Kashmir and unexpectedly were not joined by Kashmiri people. Nevertheless heavy damage was inflicted upon Indian army and as a response Indian army occupied Kargil in the north along with Haji Pir Pass near Azad Kashmir. Pakistan army advanced to the point of Akhnor a transit point between Jammu and Kashmir. As result of all this Indian army quite surprisingly attacked on international border at Lahore on September 6 1965 that was halted due to chivalric defense of Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan's less equipped air force caused a heavy damage to Indian

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid; 102.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid; 104.

<sup>112</sup> Aziz, *Between Dreams and Realities*, 39.

air force and shot down its seventy five aircrafts. Almost hundred coastal ships of India were also caught by Pakistan navy. Despite of small size and disparity of resources Pakistani forces startled India and its helpers and remained beneficial due to large territorial gains as compared to India. However, no one had a decisive victory.<sup>113</sup>

China's admirable role of reliving Indian pressure from Pakistan is unforgettable for Pakistani people.<sup>114</sup> China gave several statements in support of Pakistan and increased its pressure on India by giving ultimatum of three days on 16 and 19 September to restraint from Sino-Indian border. This made the powers feel the importance of the situation and on 20<sup>th</sup> September the United Nations passed a resolution of ceasefire and solutions of Kashmir dispute wrapped in the words of "what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problems underlying the present conflict."<sup>115</sup> Pakistan's request of military assistance was responded quite generously by China. In this situation, Ayub Khan asked China to send this military assistance by sea instead of aircrafts by smelling American's threat of attack<sup>116</sup> which clearly showed his lack of trust in previously close friend.

This resulted into beneficial in a sense that the USA stopped supplying arms to both India and Pakistan and Pakistan got a sincere friend in neighbor as China. Secondly, the USSR Prime Minister, Kosygin 'took exception to India's crossing the international border'<sup>117</sup>revealed USSR's attitude towards Indians' aggression. Initially, the USA did not pay any heed over the request of Ayub Khan to play its role in Kashmir dispute, however; China's ultimatum to India compelled Washington to interfere and assist Security Council of the United Nations. As a result of 1962

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<sup>113</sup> Sattar, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 106.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*; 108.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*; 107.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*; 108.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*; 110.

memoir of assuring Pakistani support against Indian aggression, Ayub Khan made complaint to the USA but Washington did not consider that as Indian aggression.<sup>118</sup> SEATO and CENTO also revealed disinterested towards political and moral support of Pakistan. This all, however; as a result of the war raised serious questions over foreign policy of Pakistan and having had a sincere friend in neighbor ruled out the direct attack of India on international borders to greater extent and on disputed border to some extent.

Like ventures of Ayub of 1965 and retrieval of Rann of Kutch occupied territories were sole decisions of Military leadership and Ayub Khan, similarly; Kargil venture what Musharraf declared a “political suicide” was also Musharraf’s own venture. According to Aziz Ahmed Political leadership was kept in dark about the operation which India considered a serious threat to Jammu and Kashmir territory. The operation was started on May 6<sup>th</sup> and the Prime Minister was informed on May the 17<sup>th</sup> 1999, when all the plans were exposed before India and media of the world. Being sole administrator of the country Musharraf interfered into the working of Atomic Energy Commission of Pakistan and removed Dr. A.Q. Khan from the chairmanship and adopted a severe attitude against him. Musharraf’s this act of harshness was criticized by public, media and some politicians in the country.

Though Musharraf is criticized for his alignment with western forces against terrorism, the question raises what would have been done by Nawaz Sharif or Benazir if any one of them had been in government that time? It was Musharraf who admitted that he was thrown into “line of fire” by the situation and there would be no other choice if there had been any one else except Musharraf. Yet the argument comes against Musharraf and very right in a sense we cannot assume things as hypotheses

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid; 109.

are not enough for history building. This is true because in foreign policy formulation military has always been given a considerable standpoint.

The 9/11 incident put Musharraf in a situation where no way out could be found. He joined the war against terrorism contrary to the wishes of the public and several political leaders. The same Taliban who had been serving as deterrence of Pakistan in Afghanistan against India turned into a serious threat to security of Pakistan.

Even much before 9/11, in May 1999 Kargil crisis was the sole product of Musharraf's mind according to Aziz Ahmad and Nawaz Sharif's own statements after his arrival from Saudi Arabia to contest elections of 2008. Musharraf had a strong conviction over Kargil issue as Chief of Staff of Army. Though, Pakistan had vivid victory militarily in Kargil war according to many Pakistani and Indian defense analysts. Indian losses were very high and a meticulous calculation revealed that Indian forces lost two aircrafts and one helicopter and billions of rupees in that military campaign. And above all four hundred Indian soldiers were died and India had to hide such a high death toll against a small number of Mujahidins roughly seven hundred from their mass.<sup>119</sup> Thus Musharraf as a Chief of Army Staff influenced Pakistan's foreign policy and Washington Agreement brought huge humiliation for the country.

He reported that Kargil adventure was not in knowledge of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Seven hundred Mujahidins/soldiers crossed LOC on May 5 and after the revealing of infiltration the Army Chief gave briefing to the Prime Minister on May 17, 1999.<sup>120</sup> However, Musharraf declared the Kargil war as "political suicide."<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 265.

<sup>120</sup> Aziz, *between dreams and realities*, 262.

<sup>121</sup> Musharraf, *In the line of fire*, 87-97.

### 3.3.2 Differences between Political Wing and Military Over Policy Towards India

The Rann of Kutch and Operation Gibraltar based on three hypotheses as mentioned previously elsewhere humiliated and exasperated Ayub Khan not only in Pakistan but also in the rest of the world. Though Aziz Ahmed did not approve the operation, but on the advice of high-ranking officials, Ayub Khan instructed GHQ to make preparations for the new battlefield.<sup>122</sup>

Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff was a strong believer of success on Kargil and was ambitious to hoist the flag of Pakistan in Srinagar later on in few months. When India sensed coming defeat, they knocked the doors of White House in Washington and remained successful. Though, according to some analysts that was the result of India's effective diplomacy but one must not be unmindful about the concern of Western World over nuclear war between Pakistan and India. However, American media gave the impression that Pakistan begged for and awarded.<sup>123</sup> On the whole, all this illusionary approach put Pakistan in trouble and made Pakistan isolated in the world. Lack of coordination among military and Civil government was also vivid by the statements of statesmen that US and G-8 would be supporting Pakistan's cause and China would be sending military assistance, on the contrary to all this, none of the country from the powerful world supported Pakistan and even the OIC did not take the same stance in UN in this situation. Such statements or white lies put the military in illusions and Washington agreement revealed turned out against all that.

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<sup>122</sup> Sattar, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 105.

<sup>123</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 271.

### **3.4 Range of Identification of Problems and Stratagem to Surmount:**

#### **A Reappraisal**

##### **3.4.1 Civil-Military Alignment**

Unfortunately, the role of military and political leadership in foreign policy formulation process in Pakistan has always been confrontational. The attitude of military leadership towards India has been found to be different during democratic rule and military rule. During military rule the chief executives for instance Ayub Khan and Musharraf had mild attitude towards India when they were doing their duties as Chief of the Army Staff. During military rule they pretended to be more like diplomats/statesmen and as Chief of the Army Staff looked more aggressive and less flexible.

Secondly, the political leadership could not address the foreign policy formulation process effectively might be due to several reasons and military dominance could be one of the reasons. However, interestingly, all the military rulers except Musharraf hired civil diplomats for foreign policy issues such as the role of Zulfikar Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad in Ayub Khan remained positive almost. War of 1965 was the sole decision of Ayub Khan despite of reluctance shown by political leadership and civil diplomats. However, Musharraf was different from Ayub Khan who always believed in his own diplomatic capabilities despite of knowing himself as army ruler. This all has been happening due to supremacy of the army over civil governments owing fragile democratic system in the country. Bad governance and lack of political morality among political parties always provided doors opened for military rulers. Furthermore, military rulers and political leaders both failed to conquer the hearts of the people and remained indifferent to unify and integrate the diverse ethnic and cultural groups of Pakistani population. This was the reason despite of having a noble



idea of moderation and enlightenment Musharraf could not win all the people of Pakistan and as a consequence failed to make independent foreign policy of country.

However, it seems that both army and political leadership have realized their role for the security of the country not only from internal threats but also from external threats. It is believed all over the civilized countries that only interaction at diplomatic level could improve the relation between two enemies and strong diplomacy could serve the role of significant deterrence. In this regard, the role of superpowers of the time has always been ironical as for as relation between India and Pakistan is concerned. Despite of believing in doctrine of democracy the powerful leaders of the time promoted dictatorship in Pakistan by having allies from them. So, it is the need of time to strengthen democracy in the country and let the people feel the comfort of it in their daily life by improving governance in the country to develop alignment between army and civil governments.

#### **3.4.2. Out of Box Thinking**

Reshaping the ideologies of the people to develop significance of regional and global citizenship along with their individual identities need to think out of box about the role of individuals and nations both in India and Pakistan. For example, the intellectuals from all the domains of life must modify the thinking of the people from their indigenous identities to regional and global identities in both India and Pakistan. Re-conditioning of the minds of the masses from social, religious and geopolitical animosity to regional and global relationship could play a vital role to bring peace and harmony between both nations. Instead of turning our cities into Hiroshima we have to re-think about our stance over different issues including Kashmir. This out of box thinking and realization of geopolitical realities of both the countries being powerful

regionally and important globally can open new doors of progress for the poor people of India and Pakistan.

Similarly, this unconventional thought of looking things from apparently sad side would bring stability in the politics of both countries. Politicians in India still exploit Indo-Pak relations to achieve their political motives, however; Pakistan in this regard proved to be more mature as electoral campaigns 2008 and 2013 did not observe any discourse against India. This as a result, brought more sensibility and responsibility among the politicians of Pakistan despite of recent (August, 2013 and October 2014) violations of LOC by India. On the other hand, Indian politicians exploiting the LOC issues to achieve their political motives as the discourse on Indian new channels could be analyzed easily. Some of the politicians and media persons in spite of knowing the nuclear deterrence of both countries stimulated the masses and military for "Pakistan Operation." Surprisingly, international powers did not pay any heed to this discourse of animosity diffusing in India through its media. On the other hand, like politicians, the media persons of Pakistan are playing very positive role in developing peaceful thinking of the masses over the aggression of Indian forces, politicians and media. The same approach is needed to be adopted on the other side of the border i.e India.

Furthermore, there are certain myths of domination through reunion or reintegration prevailing in India which has conditioned the cognitive facet of thinking of the common man. This conditioning, though under the process of de-conditioning due to existence of new generation, has been done mainly by the intellectuals of pre-partition generation and first generation after partition. With the passage of time people might embark on the unconventional way of thinking to bridge the gaps of interaction among the people of India and Pakistan. However, the prevailing myth of reintegration or reunion of Pakistan and Bangladesh with India will result nothing

except more stress and strain. Reintegration myth has no political, social and ideological basis as it has been observed in the case of India's effort to reunite with West Bengal on the basis of common race and language. The people of West Bengal believe in strong bondage of religion to align with. If India justifies this reintegration on the basis of its larger size of land, economy and military then it must not be overlooked that many small countries for example, Cuba, Vietnam and Taiwan survived despite of having their larger neighbors as enemies. They survived through practicing of shrewd policies of relationships with other countries instead of obsessing with military dominance. There is lesson for Pakistan in this that Pakistan always focused on military equation to balance with India and always believed in victory through military which put the man in street in great trouble.<sup>124</sup>

### **3.4.3 Genesis of fresh stratagem**

For last sixty eight years the focal theme of foreign policy of India and Pakistan has been revolving around safety from each other and superpowers of each time made alignments with these two countries for their interests. And paradoxically both India and Pakistan secured their interests more than their own. Both countries have the bitter legacy of conflicts such as war of 1965, Kashmir, Siachen, Kargil, debacle of East Pakistan, and issues of water crisis.

The founding fathers of both the countries stressed over peaceful relationship, as Quaid-e-Azam suggested joint defense against any other threat and Jawaharlal Nehru also realized the importance of both India and Pakistan for the peace of the region and "this conflict and wasteful effort will wipe us out from the face of the earth".<sup>125</sup>

However, India dreamt always to lead the region this could easily be identified when India demanded its admission in Security Council of the United Nations. This might

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<sup>124</sup> Shahid Amin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, 205.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid; 190.

be due to its pride of having larger land territory and second largest population of the world. This might also be due to its growing economy due to foreign investment in this age of consumerism. More importantly, this pride might also be the result of the large equipped army in the world. And more realistically debacle of Pakistan in 1971 encouraged India attacking not only land territory of Pakistan but also the ideology of two nation theory. However, it must not be overlooked by Indian historians that the poet of the east, Muhammad Iqbal presented the idea of Pakistan including Sindh, NWFP (KPK), Punjab and Balochistan only. Girilal a renowned Indian intellectual commented over the myth of failure of two nation theory in these words "what did India get out of the 1971 War? Instead of one Pakistan, now there are two Pakistans."<sup>126</sup> Anti-India feelings in Bengalis rose due to India's policy of distorting image of Islam through associating it with terrorism in the world and this has also been reflected in its futile effort to reintegrate West Bengal on the basis of solidarity through racial and linguistic identity.<sup>127</sup> This shows the solid unifying force of Muslim identity and endorses the existence of two nation theory. Secondly, India must not undermine her own Muslim population which is more than total population of Pakistan, so, this could also raise a secessionist movement in India which would of course be supported by the Muslim world.

Encouraging secessionists from both sides is heinous policy in this age of nuclear warfare. Indian army helped and trained Bengalis in East Pakistan after 1965 War and also provided arms and hired other mercenaries in Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtoonwa (previously called NWFP). They supported Khan Abdul Ghaffar for Pakhtoonistan in KP, GM Syed in Sindh for Sindhudesh and in Balochistan as well. On the other side it is believed that Pakistan also had helped the Sikhs in 1980 in

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid; 200.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid;

India for secessionist movement of *Khalistan*. The Indians also maintain that Pakistani military had helped Tamil Nados in India with the help of Sri Lanka. Even now India's involvement in Sindh and Balochistan has been evidenced by government officials in Pakistan. All these, invisible intrusions gave nothing to both Pakistan and India except losses. Pakistan, in this regard showed positive attitude when Benazir Bhutto during her first term gave lists of all Indian Sikhs involved in *Khalistan* movement to India and there has no evidence been provided by Indian official against Pakistan's involvement in secessionists' movements in India. However, India's attitude is still reflecting the same old strategy of interventions in Balochistan especially.

The more worrisome fact is that both countries have been involved into nuclear warfare race which turned the citizens on both sides more deprived of even basic necessities of life. The heavy burdens of defense made the economy crippled and the sufferers are common people only. Allocation of heavy budget to defense shows magnitude of insecurity on both sides which is done at the cost of human rights. Any major war now would result nothing more than devastation and perish of the two nations. So, having fear of nuclear holocaust the two countries have to solve their major issues including Kashmir issue which aggravated many trivial issues that turned into serious ones ultimately under elevating attitude of hatred against each other. Both the countries have to go through the realm of reality and must have "no war pact" or "no first use of nuclear weapons" approved not only by parliament and by referenda of masses.<sup>128</sup>

This could only provide a road map to resolve their problems to achieve durable peace in both countries. Firstly, Kashmir issue has always been the mother of all the

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid;195.

problems, so; both countries have to come out of the box to endorse some give and take phenomenon. To conduct plebiscite is unacceptable to India and accepting *de facto* control of India over Kashmir is indigestible for Pakistan. In this situation both countries must regard the wish of Kashmiri people by any deal.

Pakistan has strong moral grounds and legal grounds over the issue of Kashmir. Kashmiri people have been waiting under the UN approved resolution of Plebiscite since 1947 when Jawaharlal Nehru committed by saying, "our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order restored and leave the decision about the future of the state to the people is not merely a pledge to your government (Pakistani government) but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world."<sup>129</sup> Same pledge has been made on several international occasions by Indian officials but never turned into reality. Indian constitution considered Kashmir as 'integral part' of India which has no legal justification according to international moralities of law and human rights. On the other side, Pakistan does not consider, Azad Kashmir an integral part of Pakistan rather it is considered as Kashmir and people of Kashmir on both sides can reunite as separate nations state according to Pakistani stance which is highly moral and legal at the same time.

After 9/11 Pakistan has gained significant position in the world. Musharraf could have conditioned the war against terrorism against the US sincere involvement in the Kashmir dispute. Now, when NATO forces have planned to evacuate Afghanistan, Pakistan could place her demand before the world in general and the United States in particular to take serious interest in Kashmir dispute when there is already strong moral and legal position of Pakistan on the table. China has developed now

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<sup>129</sup> Ibid; 212.

trustworthy relations with India and China could also be involved to mediate in resolving the problem of Kashmir.

## **Conclusion**

South Asia in general and Pakistan and India in particular have always been centre of interest for established and emerging powers of the world due to its geo-political importance and existence of immense natural and human resources. Pakistan has got special attention of the world due to its role in war against terrorism and newly intent of Pak-China economic corridor. These two socio-political and economic ventures have identified the role of India too in the contemporary arena of world politics. However, both of the countries have been hostile to each other since the partition which affected them seriously socially, politically and economically. Declared and undeclared wars, Kashmir dispute and live tension on the border have been major stumbling block in normalization of the relation between the countries.

This situation of lasting conflict determines the role of foreign policy as a viable measuring tool to identify, analyse and suggest solutions to both the countries for peace and prosperity in the region generally and in the countries especially. Their expanding interaction in cultural, scientific and technological fields with outer world as important indicators establishes the niche for progress of both the countries. Therefore, it was deemed considered to analyze different patterns of foreign policy during the regimes of military rulers including Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf. These rationale behind selecting these two eras for the current research lies in the logos that during these regimes some major political developments have been observed. For example, Ayub's welcome in the USA against USSR and Musharraf's need for the world on war against terrorism led India to revisit its foreign policy on Pakistan. In addition, the interaction between India and Pakistan at diplomatic and geo-strategic level has also been observed maximum since the 1947.



Therefore, the current study aims at doing critical analysis of Ayub and Musharraf's foreign policy towards India by following analytical approach with descriptive methods of analysis. The study focuses on the exploration and analysis of patterns and trends of the both military rulers in foreign policy of Pakistan towards India. Primary and secondary resources were consulted to identify the patterns and trends; however, the contemporariness in the nature of the study also stopped the researchers in accessing confidential documents on the issue and conducting interviews of the relevant personalities. The study shows that the factors which affected the foreign policy of both military rulers towards India are as follows:

- a) External factors which includes Economical, geo-political and regional/international agreements and disputes
- b) Internal factors; internal political agendas and opposition/pressure groups
- c) Personality traits; which deals with attitudes and leadership skills.

However, the study reveals that Musharraf and Ayub considered Kashmir dispute as a major hurdle to normalize relations between India and Pakistan. Ayub had been always in state of no compromise, but, Musharraf showed some flexibility towards the resolution of the dispute after 2004. Some other major similarities and differences in the patterns and trends of both military rulers in foreign policy making were also critically examined. The analysis showed that Ayub adopted non-coherent approach in his foreign policy towards India and joined western block as deterrence to counter Indian threat to Pakistan. His offensive and defensive approach replete with non-compromise at Kashmir dispute resulted into declared war of 1965. On the contrary, Musharraf in the disguise of statesman rationally dealt India on Kashmir issue. This shift in Pakistan's foreign policy was result of metaclismic change in world politics due to 9/11 incident in the USA. This incident culminated into serious challenges to

the security of Pakistan not only from terrorist organizations working in Pakistan and abroad but also Indian hostility towards Pakistan also posited Musharraf in revisiting set patterns of foreign policy. In addition, western pressure on Pakistan to become ally in war against terrorism also determined some new trends in foreign policy of Pakistan towards India. Therefore, a shift from dogmatic set of traditions to a little compromising but bilateral and approach of co-existence was observed in foreign policy of Musharraf towards to India.

Besides the differences, similar patterns and trends were also observed in Ayub and Musharraf's foreign policy towards India. For example, Ayub tried to convince India on Joint Defense Pact which also shows his non-traditional attitude in foreign policy history of Pakistan towards India and, similarly, Musharraf showed pragmatic attitude towards India in the forms of Islamabad Declaration (2004) and Agra Summit (2001) as a result of his vision on the concept of Joint Mechanism. Due to popularity of Musharraf in international media and owing to his diplomatic successes, Indian media started propaganda campaign against Pakistan to sabotage these successful agreements. Similar success was gained by Ayub on his welcome to the USA by President Kennedy. Furthermore, objectives of foreign policy formulation including Security, Preservation of Ideology and Development remained same in the times of both rulers. And the policy of co-existence which was manifestation of civilian governments' foreign policy was adopted by Ayub and Musharraf both.

### **Proposals and Recommendations**

Keeping in mind the findings of the study following recommendations are made for foreign policy makers of both countries.

- a) Reshaping the ideologies of masses of both the countries; India and Pakistan.
- b) India should uplift ban from investing in Pakistan.

- c) Non-Aggression attitude of policies must be promoted
- d) Propaganda by media of both countries must be avoided
- e) Reinterpretation of traditional Indian notion of “Akhand Bharat” and acceptance of Pakistan as sovereign states be adopted
- f) Effective confidence building measures must be adopted
- g) The civil government role in foreign policy must be increased
- h) Pakistan and India should enhance trade activities in-order to avoid conflicts
- i) Pakistan and should establish relations with on equal grounds we can say that both should have balanced relations
- j) Cultural exchange programs and sports between two countries should be promoted.
- k) In current scenario India should stop interfering in internal matters of Pakistan.

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