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“Extremism in Pakistan’s Tribal Belt: An Evaluation”



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Submitted by
Gul Mat Khan, MS Student
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A thesis submitted in partial
fulfillment of the degree of Masters
of Philosophy in Politics and
International Relations



Supervisor
Professor Dr. M. Nazrul Islam

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
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
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
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
Certified that contents and form of the thesis titled "Extremism in Pakistan's Tribal Belt: An Evaluation" submitted by Gul Mat Khan have been found satisfactory for the requirement of the degree of M.S / M. Phil Politics and International Relations.

Dated: Supervisor: 
Dr. M. Nazrul Islam
Professor and Head,
Department of Politics and International Relations
International Islamic University,
Islamabad.

Dated: Internal Examiner: 
Dr. Manzeer Khan
Assistant Professor,
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University,
Islamabad.

Dated: External Examiner: 
Dr. Noman Omer Sattar
Head,
Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies,
National Defence University,
Islamabad.


Professor Dr. Nazrul Islam,
Head,
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University,
Islamabad.


Professor Dr. Nabi Bux Jumani
Dean,
Faculty of Social Sciences,
International Islamic University,
Islamabad.

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ABSTRACT

Department of Politics and IR, Faculty of Social Sciences, Islamic International University Islamabad runs MS programs for the students of Politics and IR for which thesis is mandatory for the fulfillment of the award of the MS degree. The topic selected by me is the “Extremism in Pakistan’s Tribal belt: An Evaluation”. It aims to determine the main causes of extremism in the tribal belt of the country after the 9/11, and its effects in the shape of extremism.

There are different inter related terms like extremist and extremism, militant and militancy, subversion, sabotage and saboteur, terrorist and terrorism, Jihad and Jihadism, insurgent and insurgency, fundamentalist and fundamentalism. Explaining these terms is very important in the context of the ongoing conflict in the tribal belt of the country. It is important to explain what sort of activity is going on in the tribal areas; otherwise it would be difficult to identify the solutions.

Extremism in the tribal belt is a continuation of the historical factors of the Islamic history. It includes the history of independence movements, reformative, guerilla, revolutionary, insurgents, and Mujahidin and Jihadi movements in various phases of history. The movements include the Muslims early and medieval advances towards the Europe, especially Spain and the subsequent trauma of defeat in Spain, Crusades and their brutalities, colonialisation of the Muslim states and the reactive Islamic movements, Reformist and revolutionary movements within the Muslim world like Muslim Brotherhood, etc. The latest movements are Mujahidin in Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. 9/11 incident plays the role of an immediate factor in promoting extremism in the tribal areas because the subsequent actions of the Pakistani government and the U.S. and its coalition partners on the other side of the border created havoc in the tribal areas through security forces operations and the U.S. drone attacks in FATA and operations in Afghanistan.

There were long-term factors also waiting for an appropriate moment in the tribal areas. These factors include lack of economic and political development. Decades old British enacted laws in the form of FCR govern the areas; there is no political freedom and rights for the tribesmen. They are second-rate citizens of the country. The areas are

extremely backward in terms of economic development. There is no industry, economic zones and employment opportunities. The problem is further complicated by the lack of education, lack of media coverage and activism as far as tribal areas are concerned. Many in the settled areas of the country do not know their plight. Foreign involvement also works as a useful factor for the perpetrators.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

It has been my privilege to conduct research on the topic and write this thesis. Profound gratitude must go to the Faculty of Social Sciences International Islamic University, Islamabad, without whose continuous guidance and encouragement, this thesis would never have been realized.

I am thankful to the respectable Dean Faculty of Social Sciences Professor Dr. M. Nazrul Islam, for creating a good environment at the department of Politics and IR and broadening our mental capabilities by involving us in stimulating and challenging tasks for achieving the goal of experiential learning .His arduous commitment and tenacity of purpose towards the Faculty of Social Sciences has left a permanent and pleasant impression on my mind as well other students of the faculty.

I am grateful to Professor Dr. M. Nazrul Islam who also happened to be my thesis supervisor for the thesis guided me so well that I have been able to compile my research and study in the form of this thesis. He constantly encouraged and appreciated my humble efforts towards this research effort. I acknowledge his valuable support towards writing this thesis and pray for his eternal happiness.

I also owe much gratitude to Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed, President Islamic International University Islamabad for his guidance and arming me with the research techniques.

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
List of Abbreviations

AI	Ansar-ul-Islam
ANA	Afghan National Army
APA	Assistant Political Agent
BMG	Baitullah Mehsood Group
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
F.R	Frontier Region
FC	Frontier Corps/Frontier Constabulary
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
GIACC	Global Infrastructure Anti corruption Center
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRA	Irish Republican Army
KPK	Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa
LEA	Law Enforcement Agencies
LFO	Legal Framework Order
LI	Lashkar-e-Islam
MQM	Mutahidda Qaumi Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization of Economic cooperation and Development
PA	Political Agent
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SDPI	Sustainable Development Policy
SSG	Special Services Group
SSP	Sepah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
TJP	Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan
TNFJ	Tehrik Nifaze Fiqah Jafria
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taleban Pakistan
WHO	World Health Organization
UN	United Nations
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council


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
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
ORAKZAI AGENCY



BAJAUR AGENCY



KURRAM AGENCY



CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1:i Statement of the Study

US-Pakistan relations have fluctuated across the years, from close cooperation to mutual distrust and disappointment, depending on their foreign policy objectives and their national interests. Realism and its offshoot neo-realism assume that inter-state relationship and the foreign policy decision-making process of the states is dominated by their national security perspectives which are influenced by the changing dynamics of regional and global power structure. In this structure the states act as rational actors pursuing its vital national interests of survival, security and development. It is the pursuit of these interests, which shapes the foreign policy of a state and its relationship with others. Here Pakistan is a good example, which right from the beginning has been following the U.S. line in its foreign policy from CENTO and SEATO and then the Afghan war of late seventy's. The U.S after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan ignored the Afghan Mujahidin and was left at the mercy of the inherited civil war. Meanwhile the Afghan Mujahidin as well as the Arab fighters had liberty to move from one part of tribal areas to another as well as Afghanistan.

The incidence of September 11, (2001), brought a change in US-Pakistan relations. Soon after the incident of September 11 (2001), the US administration focused its eyes on Pakistan for its support in the war against terrorism. In achieving the goals of eliminating Taliban from Afghanistan, the geo-strategic proximity, cultural and religious affiliations led the tribal areas of Pakistan as the safe heaven of Mujahidin/Taliban and the Arab fighters, which would cross the borders for fighting against the U.S. and its coalition forces there as Pakistan shared a 2430 kilometers long border with Afghanistan.

In pursuing the Taliban, the U.S. has to urge for action against the militants fighting coalition forces in Afghanistan. The resultant Pakistani action made the Taliban the enemies of Pakistan. The alliance with the US against the Taliban and the consequent operation against Taliban government in Afghanistan and the anti-terrorist/Taliban activities at home by the Pakistan army gave rise to widespread resentment especially in the Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa (LPK), the tribal areas and serious law and order situation in the country. This in turn resulted in political disturbances, uncertainty, unrest and chaos in Pakistan.

The focus of this study is to analyze the patterns and dynamics of the extremist activities in Pakistan after September 11 (2001) and the implications of its partnership with the U.S. for Pakistan. It will also analyze the main causes of extremism in the tribal belt. Besides, the researcher will also analyze the implications of extremism and its trends in the area.

1:ii Objectives of the Study

The objective of the study is to highlight the causes of the Taliban insurgency in the tribal belt in particular and Pakistan in general. The second objective is to identify the failures of the government of Pakistan to visualize the consequences of the Afghan war and its involvement in the war as partner of the U.S. The final objective is to suggest some remedies of the Taliban extremism in Pakistan.

1:iii Justification of the Study

The study of extremism in Pakistan is an important area of research and requires in-depth analysis of theoretical concepts, and to determine its historical factors, state of extremism in FATA, and main causes which gives rise to extremism there. In the post

9/11 Period, the world is faced with the menace of extremism in general and Pakistan in particular. Pakistan's strategic location and its relations with its neighbors i.e., Iran, Afghanistan and India based on mistrust and suspicion further complicate its war effort against the menace of terrorism and extremism. Pakistan had to pursue its old foreign policy objectives of security and economic development. The incident of September 11 (2001) forces Pakistan to align itself closely with the United States and achieve its foreign policy objectives.

The study of extremism in Pakistan's tribal areas is important in the sense that it will contribute towards the vision of peace and stability in Pakistan on one hand and to economic growth and development in these areas on the other. This study will provide an insight into the root causes of extremism and the poor law and order situation in Pakistan. It will also provide an insight into the future line of action against extremism in FATA.

1:iv Theoretical Framework

Here it becomes essential to briefly explain various theoretical concepts. In this connection various key words like extremism, extremist, radicalism and radical, insurgency and insurgent, militancy and militant, subversion, sabotage and terrorism and terrorist etc are required to be explained as below:

1:iv: a Extremism

Extremism is a term which is used for describing various actions or ideologies of people or groups outside the perceived political center of a society; or otherwise claimed to violate common moral standards. In democratic societies, persons or groups that

pursue the replacement of democracy with an authoritarian regime are usually termed as extremists¹.

Extremism is usually contrasted with moderation, and extremists with moderates. For example, in contemporary discussions in Western countries of Islam, or of Islamic political movements, it is common for there to be a heavy stress on the distinction between extremist and moderate Muslims. It is also not uncommon to necessarily define distinctions regarding extremist Christians as opposed to moderate Christians, as in countries such as the United States. Political agendas perceived as extremist often include those from the far left or far right as well as fundamentalism or, as a more general term, fanaticism².

Robert F. Kennedy is of the view that "What is objectionable, what is dangerous about extremists is not that they are extreme but that they are intolerant. The evil is not what they say about their cause, but what they say about their opponents³."

The term extremist is used to identify groups and individuals who have become radicalized, in some way, even though the term radical originally meant to go to the root of a social problem. It is often used with reference to those who use or advocate violence against the will of society at large, but it is also used by some to describe those who advocate or use violence to enforce the will of the social body, such as a government or majority constituency. Those described as extremist would not acknowledge that what they pursue constitutes violence and would instead speak in terms of acts of resistance or

¹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism> (accessed 11 August, 2010).

² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism#Uses_of_the_term_in_.22mainstream.22_politics (accessed 15 August, 2010).

³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism#Uses_of_the_term_in_.22mainstream.22_politics (accessed 15 August, 2010).

militant action or the use of force. Ideology and methodology often become inextricably linked under the single term extremism⁴.

In this way, both Communism and Fascism were considered in the postwar "Western democracies" as "extremist" movements. The term was also used at times to describe groups which held views outside of the "mainstream" but which did not necessarily advocate the use of physical force to achieve their objectives.

Extremist religious groups are found in many religions as some religious organizations have historically used tactics to encourage fear-based obedience to doctrines, such as fear-mongering tactics, and intense and unscientifically-based opposition to the physical realities of the universe, and intentional to covet to religion. Religious Extremism is concurrent throughout the Middle East, Africa and U.K. and growing in the USA, based on extremist interpretations of Doctrine or Extremist interpretation of events⁵.

What is objectionable, what is dangerous about extremists is not that they are extreme but that they are intolerant. The evil is not what they say about their cause, but what they say about their opponents. The same is also true about the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan who tolerates no body and eliminated common people as well as religious personalities like Maulana Hasan Jan (shaheed). In this connection the term was often used interchangeably, with extremist during the Cold War period, although the two words are not synonymous.

Extremism is also defined as a state of mind, and as an attitude. It may be based less on facts and more on perceptions. It is founded on judgmental deductions, which

⁴http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism#Uses_of_the_term_in_.22mainstream.22_politics (accessed 15 August, 2010).

⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism#Other_terms (accessed 15 August, 2010).

may or may not be accurate; and may be revolving around myths. Imagined perceptions of inequitable and unfair treatment, deprivation of economic equity and lack of access to opportunities contribute towards extremism. Lack of compatible knowledge, market friendly skills and opportunities required to get going along the mainstream economic activity contributes towards creating a negative mentality. Moreover, stereotyping, discrimination and communal segregation, inadequate enfranchising of backyard communities into political system are supplementary factors of extremism.

Traditional agents of horizontal and vertical polarizations mix with the socio-economic and political inadequacies and make a complex mosaic, which encourages breeding as well as ideological hardening of extremist cells. Once religious alignments lend themselves to become vehicles for processing, patronizing and projecting extremism, the ideological hardening begins to draw its strength from the delusion of divine blessings⁶. In such cases, use of military power as the only instrument to counter extremism does not work; rather it enhances the number of sympathizers of extremists. Moreover, this in turn boosts them, which go into surge production, both in terms of numbers and emotional attachments.

Such a situation provides an opportunity to the vested interests to win over the under-privileged groups towards a perpetual hatred against the privileged ones, which is reinforced through emotional exploitation. It happened almost in the same pattern in FATA where the unprivileged class of society was motivated and exploited to the extreme in the shape of extremist Taliban who spared no prominent individual there.

⁶<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Opinions/Columns/06-Jul-2009/Genesis-of-extremism> (accessed 08 July,2010).

Maliks, tribal elders, even religious scholars not falling to their line of narrow thinking and mentality were brutally killed and those who survived this onslaught migrated from the area to the down districts of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa. The whole tribal structure was destroyed by the extremist Taliban in the name of Shariah and Islam and misguided the ill fated illiterate and less *Madrassah* educated religious students into their fold and took them into a direction to uproot the privileged class of Maliks, elders and other rich people of the area for forcing them to follow their line of action or donate them generously for their version of Jihad against their own state and security forces⁷.

Multiple education systems with divergent curricula also create problems in the long run. Some curricula have comparative advantage over the others in the context of access to opportunities and power. On the lower end, there are curricula, which do not prepare the students for easy integration into mainstream socio-economic strata. Hence, over a period of time former students of inadequate curricula emerge as an under-privileged lot. Being alumni of a common educational system, they evolve and associate themselves with a group identity, based on their form of education. Frustration leads them to extremism en-block⁸.

Jerome Himmelstein, a sociologist, has objected to the philosophy of describing the term of extremists for some right wing groups by the centrist groups and sociologists in the 1960s and 1970s and declared that, "At best this characterization tells us nothing substantive about the people it labels; at worst it paints a false picture⁹." The act of

⁷ <http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?203564> (accessed 16 August, 2010).

⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism#Other_terms (accessed 15 August, 2010).

⁹ Himmelstein, Jerome L. All But Sleeping with the Enemy: "Studying the Radical Right Up Close". *ASA Francisco: (1988), p.7.*

labeling a person, group or action as extremist is most of the time is a technique used to further a political goal — especially by governments seeking to defend the status quo, or political centrists. In any event, the term extremist — like the word violence— cannot be regarded as value-neutral. Pakistan is also faced with the dilemma from the international community as well as its arch rival and enemy India with her media onslaught against Pakistan¹⁰.

Some writers have mentioned some traits of a "political extremist", ranging from behavior like "a tendency to character assassination over hateful behavior like "name calling and labeling" to general character traits like "a tendency to term opponents and critics as evil", "a tendency to substitute intimidation for argument"¹¹.

Some also argue that besides the extremism of the left and right there is also an *extremism of the center*, and that it actually formed the base of Fascism¹². Joining extremist groups has been seen to arise from beliefs about the acceptability of aggression towards the group's target. For example, in Pakistan, prediction of beliefs about the acceptability of aggression against Jews may be easy that who would join an extremist anti-Jewish group¹³. Cultural differences in acceptability about aggression towards certain groups may explain extremism towards certain targets. However, intervention

¹⁰ [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nx6fswRCCU_Mumbai_Terror_Attacks - Indian Media Launches Propaganda against Pakistan](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nx6fswRCCU_Mumbai_Terror_Attacks_-_Indian_Media_Launches_Propaganda_against_Pakistan) (accessed 20 October, 2010).

¹¹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism> (accessed 20 October, 2010).

¹² G. M. Tamás: *On Post-Fascism*, Boston Review, Summer 2000.

¹³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism#cite_ref-amjad_1-0, Identifying and changing the normative beliefs about aggression which lead young Muslim adults to join anti-Semitic groups in Pakistan. *Aggressive Behavior*, pp.35, 514-519.

may change these beliefs easily, which offer a way in which extremism can be discouraged¹⁴.

The attitude or behavior of an extremist may be expressed as part of a spectrum which ranges from mild interest through obsession to fanaticism and extremism. The resemblance between the extreme left and extreme right, or between different religious zealots, may mean only that all these are unacceptable from the point of view of the mainstream or majority.

1:iv: b Insurgency

It is defined as a revolt against an established authority, especially a government. It is also defined as a rebellion against the leadership of a political party. Moreover, it is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority i.e. an authority recognized by the United Nations when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency warfare¹⁵.

Insurgency means the quality or circumstance of being rebellious or an instance of rebellion; an insurgence. It also means the state or condition of being in revolt or insurrection¹⁶. Insurgency is a noun which means rebellion, rising, revolution, resistance, revolt, uprising, mutiny, insurrection, and insurgence. It is an organized opposition to authority; a conflict in which one faction tries to wrest control from another¹⁷.

¹⁴ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremism> (accessed 20 October, 2010).

¹⁵ <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/insurgencies> (accessed 20 October, 2010).

¹⁶ <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/insurgency> (accessed 21 October, 2010).

¹⁷ <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/insurgency> (accessed 18 August, 2010).

If there is a rebellion against the authority and as such recognized by the United Nations and those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents, then such a rebellion is called insurgency, though not all rebellions are insurgencies, as a state of belligerency may exist between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces. For example, during the American Civil War, the Confederate States of America was recognized as a belligerent power and not as a sovereign state, and the Confederate warships were given same rights as United States warships in foreign ports¹⁸.

The use of the insurgency becomes neutral when it is used for describing a movement's unlawfulness as being unauthorized or in conflict with the law of the land. However, when it is used by a state or another authority under threat, "insurgency" often causes an implication of illegitimacy, whereas those rising up will see the authority itself as being illegitimate.

Insurgents do utilize political motivation for their cause on those who participate in their cause, while the term brigandry implies no political motivation. In an uprising having little support as most of their allies have surrendered, then such a resistance may be described as brigandry and those who participate as brigands¹⁹.

There are two reasons that the distinction on whether an uprising is an insurgency or belligerency has not been clearly codified by the internationally accepted laws of war. The first is that international law does not interfere in matters which are solely the internal affairs of sovereign states, although recent developments such as the

¹⁸ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency>, (accessed 18 August, 22010).

¹⁹ ¹⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency#cite_note-5#cite_5 (accessed 19 August, 2010).

responsibility to protect is going to undermine this approach. The second is because at the Hague Conference of 1899 there was disagreement between the Great Powers who considered *francs-tireurs* to be unlawful combatants subject to execution on capture and smaller states who maintained that they should be considered lawful combatants. The dispute resulted in a compromise wording being included in the Hague Conventions known as the Martens Clause after the diplomat who drafted the clause²⁰.

The Third Geneva Convention, as well as the other Geneva Conventions, are oriented to conflict involving nation-states, and only loosely address irregular forces:

"Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized are resistance movements..."²¹

The UN Department of Defense (DOD) defines it as "an organized movement which aims at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict"²². These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency is being called revolutionary war or internal war. In addition, insurgency is also known as irregular warfare.

There are insurgent groups and each has different specifics but share the property of an attempt to disrupt the central government by means considered illegal by that

²⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency#cite_note-7#cite_7 (accessed 19 August, 2010).

²¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency#cite_note-Geneva_3-8#cite_note-Geneva_3-8 (accessed 19 August, 2010).

²² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency#cite_note-jp1-02-9#cite_note-jp1-02-9 (accessed 19 August, 2010).

government. However, insurgents today need not be part of a highly organized movement. Some are networked with only loose objectives and mission-type orders for their survival while most are divided and factionalized by area, composition, or goals. In this connection the example of Baloch Liberation Army may be cited here which has a loose organization with foreign support from India²³.

Another difference is the intent of the component activities and operations of insurgencies versus terrorism. There is nothing inherent in either insurgency or guerilla warfare that requires the use of terror but some successful insurgencies and guerilla campaigns employed terrorism and terror tactics, and some developed into conflicts where terror tactics and terrorism became predominant; there have been others that effectively renounced the use of terrorism. The deliberate choice to use terrorism considers its effectiveness in inspiring further resistance, destroying government efficiency, and mobilizing support. Disagreement on the costs of employing terror tactics, or whether terror operations are to be given primacy within the insurgency campaign, have frequently led to the "urban guerilla" or terrorist wings of an insurgency splintering off to pursue the revolutionary goal by their own methods²⁴.

The main objective of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or some portion of its territory, or for political concessions. Insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. External support, recognition or approval from other countries or political entities is very useful to insurgents, but some time it may not be required. A terror group does not enjoy active

²³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_Liberation_Army (accessed 22 August, 2010).

²⁴ <http://www.terrorism-research.com/insurgency/> (accessed 22 August, 2010).

support or sympathy of a large portion of the population whereas insurgents will frequently describe themselves as "insurgents" or "guerillas", terrorists will not refer to themselves as "terrorists" but describe for themselves terms like military or political terminology i.e. freedom fighters, soldiers, activists etc.

Insurgency need not require the targeting of non-combatants, but many insurgencies in addition to the military also include police and security personnel in the combatants. Terrorists do not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. The inhuman and criminal mind of terrorists justifies extreme measures against anyone known as hostile and expands the groups of acceptable targets by conducting operations against new targets without any warning or notice of hostilities. But unfortunately, insurgents in Balochistan follow the path of extremists²⁵.

1:iv: c Militancy

The word militancy's usage usually refers to non-state military groups pursuing an ideological programme. In the way in which the term is deployed in the media, it is thus used as an ambiguous half way house between more legitimate terms such as, say, activist group, and the more loaded term extremists, or terrorists²⁶.

Militant action is usually based on self-interested self-assertion and balance of power is always a factor in militant negotiations, and their action becomes militant precisely when power itself comes into dispute. So the thesis is that militancy fundamentally privileges power. Militant action fights for power, not simply through it. That is why it is frequently locked in antagonism with authority.

²⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_conflict#Fifth_conflict_2004_E2.80.93_to_date_.28led_by_Nawab_Akbar_Khan_Bugti_and_Mir_Balach_Marri.29 (accessed 22 August, 2010).

²⁶ <http://thecommune.wordpress.com/2010/02/26/what-is-militancy/> (accessed 27 October, 2010).

The militant decision, because it fights for power is directly political; it establishes clear friend and enemy distinctions, and can operate only along those faultlines to start with: management and employees; Islamists and secularists etc.

A militant action does not seek to accommodate itself within the prevailing consensus, but rupture the consensus itself. If successful it changes the objective situation through its action, and defines the very terms of discourse which follow from it. Besides, a militant action has to equally aim to change the objective situation and terms of discourse. It seems that Al-Qaeda has been remarkably successful in changing the entire global situation: from the way we travel, to the erosion of privacy, drawing the United States into ongoing conflict in the Middle East, and so on. Whether or not their fight for power is successful—it generally seems to be fought indirectly through proxy in any case²⁷.

With the defeat of the global revolutionary movement—coinciding with the end of the Cold War, perhaps as the late 1970s—militant Islam has come to define the terms with the support of the West to defeat the communists at any cost, which spread throughout the world in the form of Islamic movements fighting for Shariah system. The Afghan Jihad gave a new impetus to the nature of militancy and transformed it into transnational phenomenon. The militants in various forms emerged everywhere in the world. The Bosnian war and the U.S. attack on Iraq and later on, on Afghanistan gave it further impetus with militants roaming everywhere.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Professor Charles A. Kimball, also chairperson of religion at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and ex- Middle East director for the National Council of Churches from 1983 to 1990 writes in "*The Christian Century*", October 24-31, 2001, pp. 18-23, that "since September 11 has produced a cognitive dissonance among Americans about Islam.... On the one hand, selected Muslim leaders declare, "Islam is a religion of peace" and President Bush asserts repeatedly that the U.S. has no quarrel with Islam, "which is a good and peaceful religion." On the other hand, taped messages from Osama bin Laden and Sulaiman abu Gaith, the five-page document of suicide bomber Muhammad Atta, and large public demonstrations supporting bin Laden in Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq and Gaza reveal clear connections to a militant Islam²⁸.

In many Muslim countries movements for political reforms are frequently marginalized or crushed besides, having deplorable human rights records. Economic disparity and perceptions of exploitation are additional ingredients contributing to political instability. Extraordinary wealth enjoyed by the ruling elite provides evidence for those who argue that their countries are still very much controlled by external powers. In this regard there is a general belief among the Muslims that Islam can provide a viable framework for the state and society as the existing political, economic and social systems have failed. More and more individuals and groups are attracted to revolutionary movements²⁹.

²⁸ <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2157> (accessed 26 October, 2010).

²⁹ *Ibid.*

Anger and frustration inspiring violence directed towards the United States is not new, but the events of September 11 shifted everything to a different level. The perpetrators ignored Islam's absolute prohibitions against suicide and the taking of innocent life. The anger towards the U.S. is due to its support of Israel, continuing sanctions against Iraq, attack on Iraq and Afghanistan. General Norman Swartzkopf has acknowledged several times on national TV that the U.S. helped train bin Laden and his forces. In the late 1970s they were considered "freedom fighters," since the enemy in Afghanistan was the U.S.S.R.

The Muslims know that in Algeria, the U.S. supported the regime in power when it halted elections in the early '90s after the first of two rounds. It was clear that Islamic parties were going to win the elections with 80 percent of the popular vote. Many Muslims around the world are not impressed by presidential speeches praising virtues of freedom, peace, and democracy as they see canceled elections and the subsequent arrest of Islamist leaders in Algeria. The killings of innocent civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan has defamed the U.S. Similarly, drone attacks on tribesmen in FATA cannot make the U.S. popular, but unfortunately those who would defend themselves in such conditions would be declared militants³⁰.

1:iv: d Rebellion

Rebellion means the "refusal to accept some authority or code or convention. It also denotes that "each generation must have its own rebellion". It refers to organized opposition to authority; a conflict in which one faction tries to wrest control from

³⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan, (accessed 27 October, 2010).

another. It is a refusal of obedience or order. Thus a rebellion means armed resistance to the authority of an established government. It may, therefore, be seen as encompassing a range of behaviors from civil disobedience and mass nonviolent resistance, to violent and organized attempts to destroy an established authority such as the government³¹.

Rebellion may also refer to opposition to one in authority or in control. It could be an open, armed, and usually unsuccessful defiance of or resistance to an official government. Moreover, it may also be an instance of such defiance or resistance.

If it is applied to students which are prone to or participating in a rebellion, they will be called as rebellious students and if it is resorted to, or characteristic of a rebel or rebellion, then it will be considered as a rebellious behaviour.

One of the main faults of revolutions is that usually they aim to replace the ruling elite rather than address the problems of the fundamental structure existing in society. A rebellion in the literal sense may include a range of behaviours like civil disobedience to a violent organized attempt to overthrow authority. It is an act to show displeasure and its strength in the situation.

Participants of rebellions are known as rebels. History has seen many rebellions in many countries and places. Some of the most famous ones have been the Boxer rebellion in China, the French Revolution in France, Russian revolution, American War of Independence, Iranian Revolution, and Indian freedom struggle etc. It is not necessary that the rebellion must have far reaching and lasting effects as at time it may work and at other time it may not work. It may have several causes and motives. It is worth

³¹ *Ibid.*

mentioning here that many do not know the fact that rebellion can also be non-violent in nature as it was during Gandhi's Satyagraha.

There is another term, which is explained as an armed rebellion against a constituted authority but all rebellions are not insurgencies, because a state of belligerency may exist between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces. On the other hand, a terrorist group may pursue political, even revolutionary, goals, but their violence replaces rather than complements a political program whereas insurgencies do have political objectives, for achieving those objectives may provide social services. Moreover, insurgents have overt, even legal, and political wings. Here the example of Baloch insurgents may be referred.

1:iv: e Terrorism

All insurgencies are not included in terrorism, with the caveat that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. Despite the fact that there is no accepted definition in international law, a United Nations- sponsored working definitions include one drafted by Alex P. Schmid in 2002 for the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism is:

“Without attempting a comprehensive definition of terrorism, it would be useful to delineate some broad characteristics of the phenomenon. Terrorism is, in most cases, essentially a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for a political or ideological (whether secular or religious) purpose. Terrorism is a criminal act, but it is more than mere criminality. To overcome the problem of terrorism it is necessary to understand its political nature as well

as its basic criminality and psychology. The United Nations needs to address both sides of this equation³².”

Mao considered terrorism a basic part of his first part of the three phases of revolutionary warfare³³. Mao considered terrorism to be part of forming a guerilla movement. Several insurgency models recognize that completed acts of terrorism widen the security gap. Marxist guerrilla theoretician Carlos Marighella specifically recommended acts of terror, as a means of accomplishing something that fits the concept of opening the security gap³⁴.

Lenin writes about terrorism that “it is one form of military strength essential during certain moments of battle; however, Lenin along with Mark rejected terrorism as matter of principle³⁵.”

Why is terrorism the most easily restored to type of warfare? In nuclear warfare, there is Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) of all the warring states, which is not a feasible option. Conventional warfare is expensive whereas cheap warfare is preferred with the use of small, money proliferation and narcotics³⁶. Both the ex-USSR and the US as well as India has been doing it. In the case of the latter, it has been involved in

³² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency#cite_note-UNterr-21#cite_note-UNterr-21 (accessed 29 October, 2010).

³³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency#cite_note-MaoProtracted-18#cite_note-MaoProtracted-18 (accessed 29 October, 2010).

³⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency#cite_note-Marighella-22#cite_note-Marighella-22 (accessed 29 October, 2010).

³⁵ Rav Deepak, Rav Seema, *Terrorism, A comprehensive Analysis of World Terrorism* (New Delhi: A.P.H.Publishing Corporation, 2004), 3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

sponsoring terrorism in Balochistan and FATA by supporting, financing and training the Baloch insurgents from its so-called consulates in Afghanistan³⁷.

Famous political historian Walter Laqueur says that a comprehensive definition of terrorism was impossible due to a variety of circumstances in which such a violence had appeared and the numerous competing political causes whose advocates had used it³⁸.

The word terrorism was first used in the vocabulary of Western civilization during the French Revolution and derived, in particular from the period (1793 – 94) of Jacobin rule under Robs Pierre known as the “Reign of Terror”. Some forty thousand people and counter-revolutionaries lost their lives in the process, many executed by the guillotine. At the end of the eighteenth century the term terrorism meant a campaign of violence undertaken by government machinery to consolidate its hold on the country³⁹.

But today, terrorism” is more evenly associated with the activities of private groups and organizations, which are also called non-state actors i.e. Al-Qaeda, Jemmaah Islamiyya of Indonesia and People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces⁴⁰.

“Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat in the pursuit of Political changes”⁴¹.

Another definition of terrorism defines it more comprehensively as follows,

“An anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby the direct targets of the violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity)

³⁷ <http://www.Ahmadqureshi\Indian weapons in swat & FATA> (accessed 16 June, 2009).

³⁸ Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston: Little Brown 1977),5.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz,1999), 43.

⁴¹ Alex Schmid, Peter Jongman et al. *Political Terrorism* (New Brunsoick, NJ: Transaction ,1988), 28.

or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators”⁴².

Some democratic states also provide definition for prosecution or extradition of those accused perpetrating or planning to perpetrate certain acts i.e.: -

German Federal Republic: “Terrorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended...by means of assaults on the life and property of others, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in act 129a of the penal code”.

United Kingdom: “For purpose of the legislation, terrorism is the use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear”⁴³.

United States: “Premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”⁴⁴.

As a theoretical endeavor, terrorism has partly influenced some audience or multiple audiences for some purposes or benefits, which the terrorists have in mind in the line of their struggle. According to V.I. Lenin, the purpose of terrorism is to terrify for a generalized sense of anxiety and fear in the public and that is why the world fears chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists⁴⁵. The terror makes the people restricted to their homes and destroys their collective will to fight it collectively. Its visible negative effects were observed on tourist economy in Israel and Indonesian Island

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Alex Schmid, *The Response Problem as a Definition Problem: Terrorism and Political Violence*, (4:4 1992), 8-9.

⁴⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1999), 38.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.

of Bali. The same way it affected the airline industry throughout the United States in the year following 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

Another purpose of terror is attention and publicity for their cause. The mass media besides, its positive role starts playing fool by showing live shows of the terrorist acts of unknown groups, making them as symbols of fear and terror.

Provoking government authorities for over reaction may be another aim of the terrorists i.e. targeting indiscriminately against people belonging to the same segment of the population like students, workers, and ethnic minorities on whose behalf the terrorist claim to act. It becomes a favour for the terrorists by doing their job. In police search operations in Peshawar against miscreants, this is a routine blunder of the police that they detain and torture innocent people for allegations of having links with militant organization like Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Some acts of violence may boost the morale of the terrorist group's members as well as of the community on whose behalf the terrorists carry out attacks. Terrorist acts also reveal the weaknesses of the government, previously believed to be very stronger. Terrorist acts serve as a ray of hope for the weaker segments of the society. The events of 9/11 horrified millions of Americans but it gratified millions in the Middle East and elsewhere⁴⁶.

A purpose may be by staging bank robberies and kidnappings rich people to acquire the ability for maintaining their operations and get new and better weapons. In this connection, examples of Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) led by Mangal Bagh and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are relevant examples but indulging in such operations, the so-

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 6.

called ideological organizations lose their ideological strength and corrupt their structure, which may not survive for longer.

Moreover, another purpose of terrorist organization to carry out terrorist attacks is to maintain discipline within its own lines. For example, Hakimullah Mehsood soon after taking charge of the TTP after the death of Baitullah Mehsood in a drone attack in his native village of South Waziristan Agency conducted a suicide mission on the Parade Lane Masjid in Rawalpindi Cantt to show the world and his associates that TTP was still powerful and awesome. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack in an email sent to the CNN in which approximately 37 people were killed instantly; while 61 others were injured, including women and children⁴⁷.

Terrorism is a tactic not a goal in itself. The terrorists may plan by using terrorism to bring about revolutionary social, economic and political changes. Mark, Trotsky and Mao are examples of founders of revolutions. The objectives of terrorist groups are also national independence, the creation of an independent state carved from territories that were previously under the control of some other country. The Liberation Tiger of Tamil Elam has carried thousand of terrorist acts over more than two decades with the goal of an independent homeland in Sri Lanka for Tamil minority. The Indian Sikhs had also carried out terrorist acts for the establishment of Khalistan. The terrorist acts carried out in Spain by the Basque movement were also aimed at the establishment of an independent Basque homeland and liberty (ETA) in Northern Spain⁴⁸.

Terrorist violence is some times a result of reaction and is used for maintaining racial supremacy such as the Ku Klux Klan in the US or to promote the establishment or

⁴⁷ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/December_2009_Rawalpindi_attack , accessed on 29 October 2010.

⁴⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basque_National_Liberation_Movement , accessed on 29 October 2010.

re-establishment of a right wing dictatorship in the name of neo-Nazi or new Fascist idea. Baloch insurgents killing Punjabi and other ethnic groups in Balochistan are also a reaction to have the Baloch supremacy in the province.

Since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, groups inspired by religion like Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbadin Hekmatyar) and Jamiat-e-Islami etc waged war against the Communist forces in Afghanistan. Recently, the Taliban elements are waging Jihad against the presence and occupation of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. The Chechens guerilla warfare against Russians was also inspired by the Islamic ideology. The Kashmiri Mujahideen struggle against the Indian occupation is also based on the Islamic ideology. Al-Qaeda followers blamed for their involvement in the twin towers attacks have also based their struggle on the ideology of Islam. Single issue like the women right to have abortion in the US has a backlash: a "right to life movement has emerged, which is submitted for ending this practice. Other such issues may be environment, etc⁴⁹.

The role of the state in terrorism is also very important. If terrorism is morally repugnant activity, it is important to show that states do it too, especially those targeted for attack by non-state organizations i.e. terrorist groups. A state may be involved in interacting terrorist attacks against innocent civilians; those challenging the state are justified in responding in kind. Actually, the violence of the challenges becomes acts of legitimate self-Defence⁵⁰.

State terror or the use of terrorist tactics against their own citizens is another aspect, which is concerned with the non-state or private organizations waging terrorist campaigns. Governments may also be involved in supporting or sponsoring non-state

⁴⁹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1999), 8.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 10.

actors or organizations like the USSR and East Germany were accused of sponsoring such organizations in Europe. India is a clear example, which sponsors Baloch insurgents in Balochistan from its consulates in Afghanistan⁵¹.

1: v LITERATURE REVIEW

Before beginning proper work on the research topic a lot of material has been studied on the topic in depth. A book titled “*Taliban Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*”, which has been written by Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistan journalist, covers the important pieces of Afghan the Taliban history, policies of the Taliban, their governance and *Shariah*. Besides, it also covers the issues involving global and regional interests in Afghanistan. The new great game has been comprehensively covered in the book. Another book of the same author titled “*Taliban, the story of the Afghan Warlords*” also covers the Taliban movement, their history, and internal and external policies, relations with its neighbors like Iran, Pakistan and Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states.

“*Taliban and the Afghan turmoil, the role of USA, Pakistan, Iran and China*” is another book on the issue and has been edited by Sreedhar, covering issues like the Taliban, their history, policies and external factors including the role of the USA, China, Pakistan and Iran. Since the book has been edited and written by the Indian writers, therefore, it is totally biased towards the role of Pakistan and ignores the roles played by India and Iran.

“*The fragmentation of Afghanistan*” is another book which has been written by Barnett R. Rubin and covers the issues like state, society and politics, history from the

⁵¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_Liberation_Army (accessed 29 October, 2010).

cold war to the collapse of the USSR, the Islamic resistance, the society and international system. Ahmad Saleem a Pakistani writer has written a book "*Post Taliban*" which covers the issues like the New Afghanistan, Bonn agreement, Afghanistan's problems and the world efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan. Omer Nasir's book titled "*Inside the Jihad: My life with Al Qaeda, A spy's Story*", covers the inside activities of Al-Qaeda.

Maira Madalena L. Carvalhe-Firchar and Matthiar Firchar's book "*Pakistan under siege*" after September 11th 2001" covers the history, policies and *Shairah* system of the Taliban, terrorism and terrorist attacks. An Internet article mentioning "*Iran caught shipping arms to Taliban*" was also studied in detail. Similarly, another Internet article mentions *Al-Qaeda Iranian connection* by linking Zaraqwi with Iranian authorities. It was claimed that Zaraqwi after getting injured in December 2001 US bombing campaign was treated in Iran.

Essential Readings on "Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21st century" edited by Harvey W. Kushner, published by Gordian Knot Books University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2002, was studied for the topic which is a very relevant book on the issue and covers topics like definitions of terrorism, the mind of the terrorist: Psychological Aspects of Terrorism, state culture and Terrorism, Media, Communications and Terrorism, the victims of terrorism and the chemical and biological warfare agents and terrorism.

Leonard Weinberg's "A beginner's Guide to Global Terrorism, published in 2005 by Leonard Weinberg at Oxford, London is a brief book on the subject but is very comprehensive covering the contents like definitions of terrorism, brief history of

terrorism, the first war of the twenty first century, who they are, where they come from and why they do it, reacting to terrorism and the end of terrorism etc.

M.G Chitkara's "Combating Terrorism", published by APH publishing Corporation, New Delhi covers topics like terrorism, its roots, remedies at global level, theoretical concepts, jihad, Osama and Taliban, martyr and terrorist, Al-Qaeda Jihad, various Islamic organizations with details of terrorism threats in the future. The writer has presented his thoughts with a biased approach, as he is an Indian. He has not left any occasion of sparing Pakistan's so-called mistakes as per the thinking of the author.

There is another book "Terrorism" A Global Phenomenon" written by Sadhir Kumar Singh and published in 2000 by Authors Press from Laxmi Nagar, Delhi. The author has in a very professional manner carried out his research on the topics like, "Terrorism, nature of terrorism, economics, crime and terror, political terrorism, international terrorism, diplomacy and terrorism, revolutionary terrorism, Islamic terrorism, terrorism in India, counter terrorism, and terrorism and the United Nations. The author is though an Indian, but his approach is not as much biased as that of the previous one was. The topics mentioned have been covered very well.

"Islamic Terrorism, Myth or Reality" (in two volumes) volume 1, edited by M. H. Syed and published in 2002 by Kalpaz Publications from Delhi covers topics like terrorism and its definitions, small weapons contents of terror – Guns, big weapons of terror, terrorists behind the mask, money, terrorism factors, training, religious terrorism, facts of jihad, Pre-requisites of terrorism, the stalemate of ideology, terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir unabated insurgency, Islamic economy new masterminds, and journey from tradition to reformism. The author being an Indian Muslim has the Indian line of thought.

A small book, "Terrorism, the New World Disorder" written by Nicholas Fotwn, Boris Kashmikon and Joannek Zekea, published by Continuum International Publishing Group in 2008 at Chinnai Micro Print, Chennai India covers the contents of "Terrorism, Suicide/Martyr Terrorism cases from the recent past, political and military causes of terrorism, personal profiles, the future of terrorism and arguments in favour and against terrorism. The author has tackled the issues in a better way than the Indian authors. His approach is more professional and in-depth.

Terrorism in South Asia: Views from India has been edited by A. Subramanyam Raju and published in 2004 by India Research Press, New Delhi. The book covers issues like theoretical aspects of terrorism, terrorism and violence new trends, bio-terrorism, terrorism in Kashmir and women and terrorism. The author as an Indian has highlighted the contents with the Indian mentality however; overall, it is a very good book and may be read by all those who are interested to know the ifs and buts of terrorism.

Randall D. Law's "Terrorism, A History" has been published in 2009 by Polity Press Malden, MA 02148, USA. It is a latest book on the issue with a better approach than the Indian authors. The author covers the contents like terror and tyrannicide in the ancient world and the middle ages and in the early modern era in Europe, the Dawn of revolutionary terrorism, Russian revolutionary terrorism, the Era of the European Labour anarchy and terror in America, the Dawn of Ethno – Nationalist terrorism, the Era of state terror, De-colonializaiton and its effects, the era of leftists and international terrorism the rise of Jihadists terrorism, alternative and the 9/11, the war on terror and recent trends in terrorism. The details of the contents seem to have been well – researched.

Michael Bonner's "Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrine and Practice" has been published in 2008 by Press Princeton – edu in the USA. It covers contents like introduction of Jihad, its theoretical perspective, Islamic explanations, the Prophet and his Companions conquests, martyrdom, encounter with the other empires, armies and frontiers, colonial empire, modern state and new jihad. The book, though very brief but is very comprehensive and thought provoking.

The book "the New Terror New Wars" written by Paul Gilbert and published in 2003 by Edinburgh University Press Ltd, in Edinburgh covers subjects like old and new wars, the sight of self defense, myths of identity, Hatred and revenge the conduct of war and restoring peace. The reading of the book enables the reader about the concept of terrorism in depth with its causes and remedies.

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 Jerrold M. Post's "The Mind of the Terrorists: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda" published in 2007 by Pal Grove MACHMILLAN TM at New York America, covers contents mainly on nationalist separatist terrorists, social revolutionary movement, religious extremist terrorism and the changing face of terrorism. The author has caused various nationalist movements like IRA, Kurdistan Workers Party, Secular Palestinian Movement, Basque Movement etc as well as the Islamic movements like Hamas, Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda and its global Jihad, suicide terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction and challenges and implications. Every topic has been well defined and explained by retaining the reader's interest in the book.

D. P. Sharma's book on, "Countering Terrorism" was published by Lancers books in 1992 in New Delhi. The book covers topics like terrorism, counter terrorism, and terrorism in India. The author has covered the topics and the sub-topics with a unique

style. Very few books may be so innovative and creative. The author is an Indian and has discussed various issues in the light of Indian policies. One unique topic has been discussed and that is the role of intelligence agencies in countering terrorism.

Deepak Rao and Seema Rao's "Terrorism: A comprehensive Analysis of World Terrorism" has been published by A. P. H. Publishing Corporation in Darya Ganj, New Delhi in 2004. The authors cover general terrorism, terrorist movements in India and the world, terrorist events, terrorism in South Asia, Al-Qaeda, insurgency in India, terrorism of the future and appendices. The topics though brief but are very comprehensive. It gives a full picture of the events going on in the world. The book is really worth reading.

Another book written by Ted Rall, "Gas War: the truth behind the American occupation of Afghanistan which has been written in 2002 and published by writers Club in New York, USA, covers the topic in details. The author has focused on the causes of the USA's attack on Afghanistan, which he himself answers as for oil, and energy resources of Afghanistan and central Asian states (CIS) with particular interest in Pak – Afghan–Turkman Gas Pipeline.

The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad's "Pakistan after 9/11. The turn around" 2-day conference in collaboration with Allama Iqbal Fellowship and Wolfram College, Cambridge University (April 21 – 25, 2005) was also read for the research.

Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, a research paper written by Dr. Noor ul Haq, Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan and Dr Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri and published by IPRI through Asia Printers Islamabad in March 2005 is another useful research material read for the research topic.

Pakistan Army Green Book – 2006, published by Services Book Club, GHQ, Rawalpindi through Izhar Printers Lahore in 2006 has been very useful while collections material for the research underhand. The Green Book has been blessed with the very learned, experienced and visionary senior army officers' write-ups. The articles in the book are mainly related to terrorism, its causes, remedies, dynamics and role of army in the counter terrorism, and terrorism and its impact on the security of Pakistan.

Barry Davies B. E. M.'s "Terrorism: Inside a World Phenomenon" was published in Great Britain in 2003 by Virgin Book's Ltd. The book's contents are history of modern terrorism, terrorist organizations attacks, antiterrorists units, successful counter – terrorism and the future of terrorism. The materials and approach of the book does not worth attention. In other words the book style is boring and is difficult to be read by many readers.

A small book compiled on a seminar on Federally Administered Tribal areas (FATA) on December 07 – 08, 2004 by Area Study Centre Peshawar University with Collaboration of Hanns – Seidal Foundation Germany was also very helpful in organizing the data on FATA as the book covered many useful topics related to FATA.

1:vi Research Hypothesis

The Uni-polar nature of the international system and the preemptive position of the US after September 11 (2001), led Pakistan to follow the U.S. line of action in its tribal belt with no vision of its repercussions for the state of Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan has to change its foreign and domestic policies, which paved the way for deteriorated law and order situation in the country. The post 9/11 Pak-US partnerships in turn resulted in political, and economic stagnation in Pakistan. Pakistan's U turn was

wrong as decades old trained and well hosted Mujahidin were suddenly declared terrorists. Deployment of troops in Tribal areas and buckling down under the US pressure of “Do More” against the Taliban in Tribal belt is another cause of extremism in FATA. Agreements inked with the Taliban were not honoured. Indiscriminate bombings isolated tribesmen. Initially tolerating some Taliban groups like in Swat was a blunder. Backwardness of the tribal areas in terms of economy and political awareness and participation also led to a great disaster in the shape of extremism. Besides, foreign interference and support to miscreants further deteriorated the state of affairs in FATA.

However, Pakistan has to adopt a pragmatic policy against the Taliban and extremism. It should be tough against elements like TTP/Baitullah Mehsood Group (BMG) whereas it should restrain pro-Pakistan elements on Pakistani soil, particularly in tribal areas, so that the US does not ask for action against them. Pakistan has also to make itself ready for the post conflict/operation situation by carrying development works in various sectors like education, health, communication and political participation and integration of tribesmen.

1:vi Research Methodology

This research will be mainly focused on qualitative analysis by employing documentary analysis which includes published material, historical data, books, journals, articles, newspapers, and Internet sources for getting a background and critical appraisal of the issue in hand.

1:vii Periodization

The thesis will cover the period of September 2001 to 2010 with the 9/11 Incident and its aftermath, though historical factors will also be discussed in the thesis.

1.viii Organization of the Study

The proposed study runs into 169 pages having 6 chapters with Bibliography and Appendices.

Chapter 1: Introduction: It introduces the topic, describes the purpose of study and states the justification and the methodology of the study. It also provides a brief overview of the literature related to the various aspects of the topic under discussion. Moreover, it also provides an insight into the theoretical concepts of extremism, insurgency, militancy, rebellion and terrorism.

Chapter 2: Historical Background of Extremism: In this chapter the researcher has discussed historical factors responsible for extremism in FATA i.e. the role of European Powers in the rise of extremism through their imperial and colonial policies in the Muslim World followed by various Jihadi movements, Muslim scholars and thinkers, Afghan Jihad, issues of Kashmir and Palestine, Bosnia, Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Chapter 3: State of Extremism in FATA: In this chapter the researcher has discussed various aspects of extremism in the tribal belt i.e. political, ethnic, sectarian extremism, fundamentalism or religious extremism, and Jihadi extremism.

Chapter 4: post 9/11 Events and the Rise of Extremism in FATA: In this chapter the researcher has tried to link the 9/11 and post 9/11 events with extremism in the tribal belt of the country.

Chapter 5: Major Factors of Extremism: In this section the researcher will try to highlight the major factors of extremism in FATA i.e., social, economic, political and external factors. In the external factors the drone syndrome will be discussed.

Chapter 6: It contains findings and recommendations followed by Appendices and Bibliography.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EXTREMISM

On the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan, Hussain Haqqani in his article published in the Gulf News on 04 April 2007 is of the view that the Pakistani media is concerned about the expanding influence of the Taliban within the country whereas the government was very ruthless for the politicians. He adds that the influence of the Taliban has expanded to settled areas of Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa and federal capital and terms it the failure of intelligence agencies. He also criticized Pervez Musharraf's military regime for its failure in this direction despite infusions of US economic and military assistance.

Hussain Haqqani further mentioned four explanations for the rise of extremism in Pakistan: first, Pakistani establishment thinks that extremism has deep roots in the country and need many years and funding; second, American officials, especially ex-US ambassador Ryan Crocker claims that Pakistani government does not have the capacity to control the Taliban; third, is that Pakistan's military-intelligence-bureaucratic complex is deliberately encouraging extremism to extort more international support, manage domestic crises and to have expanding influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir; and fourth explanation is Pakistan's rulers give priority to regime survival above long-term national strength.

As far as the first explanation is concerned, the researcher does not agree with Hussain Haqqani as extremism is deep rooted in Pakistan and it can not be flushed out in days or months. On the second explanation that Pakistan lacks capacity to control Taliban, the researcher agrees partly with it with a different perspective as there are many

actors involved in this game to destabilize and engage Pakistan in the U.S. led “War on Terror”. Millions of dollars are allegedly being spent by the foreign powers on financing and arming these anti Pakistan Taliban. Americans are also alleged for their suspected role in this connection to build pressure on Pakistan to continue fighting along side the U.S. The researcher does not agree with the third explanation as far as extremism in Paskitan is concerned as no sane would like to let his home set on fire. This is probably his mind set which compels him to criticize military establishment in one way or the other. However, the fourth explanation seems very rational as it has been a practice in Pakistan in the absence of strong institutions that the rulers sacrifice the country’s long term objectives just for prolonging their personal rule. For example Musharraf deliberately carried out the Lal Masjid operation to have the appeasement of the West in general and the Bush administration in particular.

The immediate cause of the rising extremism in Pakistan is attributed to the incident of 9/11, which changed the face of the world in terms of global politics and policies. The war on terror is on the lips of men, women, old and young alike. The September 11; the three airlines hitting Pentagon and the two main Towers of the World Trade Centre followed a series of changes in the national and global policies of the countries. As an immediate effect, it caused the invasion of Afghanistan as part of Bush administration “War on Terror” with Al Qaeda as the main accused in this whole episode⁵². Here, the long-term causes of extremism at country level as well on global level are usually ignored. There are historical factors, which have also contributed a lot to

⁵²Randall D. LAW, *Terrorism: A History* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009),281.

the menace of extremism not only in Pakistan's Tribal belt but also at global level. Some of the factors are highlighted below:

2:i Jihadism

The basic tent in Islam is *Tauhid*, the oneness of God, which demands strict monotheism with all the authority of Allah. Every Muslims has to be guided solely by Shariah as explained in Quran and Sunnah. So the Muslims "Political Ideal" has been the early Islamic Empire or *Khilafat* which was lost when Ottoman Turkish Empire collapsed in 1920s in which the Khalifa was both political and spiritual leader⁵³. Earlier the four Sunni schools of thought had developed their own interpretative framework for applying the Quran and Hadith.

Many spiritual leaders have tried to reinvigorate the idea of the Caliphate and return to the mythical purity and ideal existence of the Salafi or "Predecessors"-the first Muslims of the Seventh Century⁵⁴. One of such leaders was Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, a fourteen-century scholar whose philosophy was that Islam always sought state power so that the Muslims could live under leaders ruling in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet (P.B.U.H.). For this purpose, he proclaimed Jihad as a critical component of the faith. Jihad has two meanings: the greatest Jihad concerned with the inner struggle to live as per Shariah instructions while the lesser Jihad is a war to ensure that the Muslims live under Shariah bound Muslim rulers. Ibn Taymiyya also declared those rulers who did not follow Shariah in letter and spirit as *Kafirs* who could be killed. Ibne Abdul Wahhab, an

⁵³ *Ibid*, p-282.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

eighteen-century scholar further advanced this thought and explained “*Tauheed and Jihad*” in his teachings⁵⁵.

2:ii Islam and Europe

The Muslims could not forget the fall of the Muslim Spain at the hands of the Christians and the subsequent horror the Christians inflicted on the Muslims, their property and honour. It was further added by Muslims anger prevalent in their society today on the fall of their most powerful empires in the Middle East in the eighteenth century and its territories falling in the hands of the rising powers of Europe like Italy, France and Great Britain. By the 1920, only a few Muslim states with Muslim population remained independent. Most of the modern Middle East was the mandate territory of the League of Nations-imperial colonies of the British and French. Across the Islamic World, only a small Westernized elite was created who accepted the Western secularization, industrialization and bureaucratization as the only option.

Meanwhile, people like Rashid Rida (1935) opted for the return to the values and practice of the righteous predecessors. He referred to the Quranic term *Jahiliya* to the spiritual ignorance or darkness of Pre-Islamic Arabia and applied to the Middle East⁵⁶.

2:iii Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood

Hassan al Banna, a primary school teacher, in 1928 in Egypt formed the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul ul Muslimeen). The goal of which was the creation of spiritually oriented society. Our task “Al Banna wrote” is to stand against the materialistic and sinful desires. He believed that Western civilization was decaying from within and was on the brink of collapse. The Muslim brotherhood published books, preached and

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.283.

engaged in missionary work and established schools, health care units, welfare societies and social clubs. In 1930's it had three hundred branches. It infiltrated in military by creating an armed group to fight at an appropriate time. In 1948, the group attacked British and Jewish shops besides, killing a judge and other government officials. The prime minister banned the organization but within three weeks, a Brotherhood member assassinated the Egyptian prime minister. In February 1949 Hasan Al- Banna was killed. In 1952, Jamal Nasser who lifted ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, which had then 75000 members, overthrew the British backed Farooq but the modernists and secularists could not accommodate the Islamists of Muslim Brotherhood⁵⁷.

Sayyid Qutb a modernizing school inspector in early life and later on, became the pre-eminent Islamic scholar and ideologist of the twentieth century. He grew disenchanted with the West and its influence on Egypt. After his education in America he came back to his country, left his service and joined the Muslim Brotherhood⁵⁸.

After an assassination attempt on Jamal Nasser, in 1954 by a Muslim Brotherhood member, he was also arrested and sent for 15 years jail where he produced the eight volumes exegesis, "*In the shade of the Quran*", which was later abridged into the work for which he is best known, "*Milestones*". In this book he brought together multiple strains of Islamists thinking into complete and disturbing worldview, thus becoming a guide for thousands of people. He wrote about the concept of "*Tauheed*" that demands commitment to living in a community that follows all of Shariah. He termed the Arab rulers as the new "*Pharaohs*" with Israel as the most recent "*Crusader*" state⁵⁹. He saw

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.283-284.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*.

the U.S. involved in every thing, encouraging carnal sensuality, materialism, and idolatrous worship of the laws of man.

Sayyid Qutb recommended that a revolutionary vanguard should first establish an Islamic state and then, from above impose Islamization on Egyptian society that had deviated to Arab nationalistic ideologies⁶⁰. His subsequent years behind prison walls gave him an opportunity to confirm what Maududi's writing made him aware, and that is what convinced the secular Nasserites to condemn him to death on false accusations.

What is necessary, Qutb demanded, is "a full revolt against human ruler ship in all its shapes and forms, systems and arrangements...It means destroying the kingdom of man to establish the kingdom of heaven on earth⁶¹."

2:iv Islamism Finds an Audience

The failure of Nasser to deliver on his grandiose promises of prosperity via the command economy and national rejuvenation through Pan-Arabism and after his death in 1970, his successor, Anwar Sadat, adopting a different path, encouraging capitalism and closer ties to the West coupled with the police suppressing dissent and failure to provide jobs to the well trained educated youth as expected undermined the popularity of Sadat's regime and instead started looking towards Qutb's vision.

Meanwhile, Sadat engaged in US-brokered talks with Israel, signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state in 1979 followed by the substantial military and financial aid from America. It led to uproar in the public, for it opened up Sadat to charges of becoming another "New Pharaoh" willing to allow the further expansion of *Jahiliyah* into Egypt.

⁶⁰ <http://www.islam101.com/history/people/century20/syedQutb.htm> (accessed 31 October, 2010).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Sadat government also provided women the right to divorce and banned the wearing “Veil” in universities of the Egyptian version of Muslims modesty clothing for women.

Under these conditions, Qutb’s call for a new generation of Islamic leadership unfettered by centuries of scholarly interpretations was particularly well received. The message that many heard was that piety and the Quran could be enough⁶². Later on, Sadat gave relaxations to Muslim Brotherhood by removing ban on it whereas the Brotherhood renounced violence but continued its preaching of the presence of *Jahiliya*, the evils of secularization with a goal to establish an Islamic state, eliminate Western influence, and enforce *Shariah*⁶³.

Another factor was Middle East’s oil wealth after the oil embargo of 1973 caused prices to skyrocket but this new revenue disproportionately benefited the region’s elite. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia with one-quarter of the world’s petroleum reserves forged an alliance with puritanical Wahhabist clerics who endorsed the dynasty as the protectors of Islam. This wealth also allowed the kingdom’s Wahhabist clerics to expand their influence abroad by establishing schools, training religious leaders, setting up social services, and dissemination literature, including the writings of the *Jihadists* like Ibn Taymiyya. It also adversely angered the radical Islamists in Saudi Arabia as it gave free licence of imposing Wahhabism on the rest of the religious segments of the Kingdom besides; the Wahhabbi Ulama also adopted silence about any political role for the religion.

⁶² <http://www.islam101.com/history/people/century20/syedQutb.htm> (accessed 31 October, 2010).

⁶³ Randall D. LAW, *Terrorism: A History* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 283.

2:v Jihadists Organize Jihad in Egypt

Two important Egyptian leaders were the blind cleric Omar Ahmad Abdel Rahman (1938) – known as Sheikh Omar and Ayman al –Zawahiri (1951), followers of Qutb who left the Muslim Brotherhood in order to preach and plot violence. Rahman, a theology instructor at an Egyptian university, became widely known as one of the most vocal opponents of Sadat⁶⁴. Rahman got closer to a radical Jihadi outfit “al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya”, the Islamic Group that had cells in nearly every Egyptian university.

Al-Zawahiri, a surgeon by profession and a member of a prominent middle-class family formed a revolutionary cell, which, in the mid-1970s, merged with others around Cairo. This umbrella organization was known as Jamaat al-Jihad (the Jihad Group), or simply al-Jihad. Like Rehman, he denounced *Jahiliyah* and embraced jihad⁶⁵. Both believed in conspiratorial violence, but it was al-Zawahiri who would make it the essence of his life’s work.

The Egyptian Jihadists returned from Afghanistan started their *Jihad* against the Egyptian regime and from 1992 to 1997 killed more than twelve hundred people, including Egypt’s speaker of parliament, a government minister, and the head of the country’s counter terrorism unit. The Islamic Group of Omer Ahmed Abdel Rahman and Al-Zawahiri’s organization, al-Jihad targeted intellectuals, journalists, Christians, government officials, and foreign tourists. Al-Jihad, a first Sunni organization started suicide bombings, a tactic previously used only by Shiite.

In October 1981, a small al Jihad cell within the Egyptian army assassinated President Sadat while reviewing troops during a public holiday. Sadat’s successor, Hosni

⁶⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omar_Abdel-Rahman (accessed 31 October, 2010).

⁶⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayman_al-Zawahiri (accessed 31 October, 2010).

Mubarak, coordinated arrests of thousands of Islamists along with al-Zawahiri and Rahman to capitalize on the assassination. The suspects were held in the twelfth-century fortress for many months. Both Rehman and al-Zawahiri used their trials to preach their principles to the broader public, "We owe to God obedience and no obedience is owed to (the president of the Republic) who disobeys God". Rehman was bailed out while al-Zawahiri was sentenced to three-years term⁶⁶.

Mubarak crushed al-Jihad, the Islamic Group, and other small Jihadi groups plotting against the state since the mid-1970s. In the 1980s, Mubarak successfully controlled the moderate Islamists including the Muslim Brotherhood through concessions. Al-Jihad was almost entirely crushed in the early 1990s when the Egyptian police arrested the organization's membership director along with his lists whereas in 1997 Rehman's followers brokered a truce with the government. This forced Al-Zawahiri to come to Afghanistan and gather bitter dissenters for planning further attacks against the Egyptian authorities.

2:vi The Iranian Revolution

During the turbulent years 1979-83, Islamism and Jihadism began to move the foundations of the Middle East, becoming a transnational phenomenon from Algeria to Afghanistan. The only hope for uniting such wide-ranging movement was to explain its motives and its goals that transcended regional differences, to look outside the Middle East for the fundamental source of *Jahiliyah* and a target that could bring *Jihadists* together⁶⁷.

⁶⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayman_al-Zawahiri (accessed 31 October, 2010).

⁶⁷ Randall D. LAW, *Terrorism, A History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 288-289.

The Middle East's movements greatest success to date began with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 though occurred in a Shiite society it inspired Sunni Islamists and radical *Jihadists* throughout the Muslim world. The ruler of Iran, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, personified *Jahiliyah* to Islamists for he used oil revenues to develop a modern, industrialized state. In January 1979, the Shah fled and Khomeini returned to get a historical welcome. After three months, Iranians passed referendum proclaiming an Islamic republic where a regime of clerics would enforce *Shariah* as per the Shia *Fiqah*. The Iranian Revolution had great influence on other *Jihadists* to hope for a similar revolution in their own countries⁶⁸.

The Revolution produced another precedent: the use of terrorism as a means of mainly symbolic blows against the Great Satan. In November 1979, the revolutionaries staged the hostage crisis by storming the American embassy and taking sixty-three hostages.

The Revolution also invigorated the already influential feature of Shiites: the celebration of martyrdom. After 1979, this behaviour became a critical component of Iran national symbol as a means of uniting the populace, and re-channeling potentially destabilizing political demands for the national unity.

The Revolution also caused as a great factor of religious extremism as it could not convert its revolution into an Islamic revolution representing all the religious sects of the Muslim Umma rather the Iranian Embassies and cultural centers were blamed in some Muslim countries for supporting the local Shiites. Prior to the 1979 Revolution, there was peace in Pakistan particularly with Shias and Sunnis living in harmony. Tehreek-e-Jafria

⁶⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_revolution (accessed 31 October, 2010).

Pakistan (TJP) and Tehreek-e-Nefaze Fiqqahi Jafria (TNFJ) were formed in Pakistan to look after the Shiites interests. As a defence mechanism, some extremist Sunni religious groups emerged, particularly, Sepah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) led by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and later on, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) led by Riaz Basra. This gave rise to continuous Shia - Sunni tussle, the results of which are in the form of sectarian clashes in Kurram Agency and tensions in Gilgit-Baltistan and the rest of the country with Shia concentration⁶⁹.

2:vii Hezbollah and Terrorism

Hezbollah's role as an extremist and terrorist organization has made it known throughout the world. The mastermind behind Hezbollah's terror operations was the Lebanese Shiite Imad Mughniyeh who, for years was one of Arafat's bodyguards. He later became Hezbollah's security chief, getting military training from Iranian Revolutionary Guards. He was the main contact between Iran and Hezbollah until his death in a car bombing in February 2008.

Mughniyeh introduced two tactics into jihad with the West: the use of suicide bombers and kidnappings. He and his cousin, the explosives expert Mustafa Badreddin, under the name of Islamic Jihad, a shadowy front for Hezbollah, carried out many attacks from 1982 including a suicide attack in November 1982, on Israeli military headquarters in Tyre killing ninety Israelis and some Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners. Some other suicide missions and other attacks were claimed by the organization with fatal effects including attacks on barracks housing US and French peacekeepers in Beirut with 241 American and fifty-eight French paratroopers' casualties. Hezbollah has been accused of

⁶⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lower_Kurram_Agency (accessed 31 October, 2010).

committing attacks and kidnappings. Between 1982 and 1986, in the midst of the Lebanese Civil War, 36 suicide attacks were carried out in Lebanon against American, French, Lebanese, and Israeli targets killing 659 people⁷⁰.

Mughniyeh also worked for Iran by carrying out attacks outside Lebanon against the enemies of Iran as in December 1983, along with another Iranian-backed Shiite group carried out suicide bombings of six targets in Kuwait, including the American and French embassies. In April 1984, a Hezbollah attack on restaurants in Spain killed eighteen members of US military. Hezbollah teams hijacked airliners, twice murdering Americans. After Badreddin was arrested and sentenced to death in Kuwait for the December 1983 attacks despite kidnapping Americans in Beirut.

US officials eventually sold anti-tank missiles and other weapons systems to Iran through Israeli intermediaries to pressurize Mughniyeh and Hezbollah to release American hostages. Mughniyeh remained active well into the 1990s' carrying out operations against Hezbollah and Iran's enemies. The group's rhetoric was dominated by Islamist pronouncements, but actually it was motivated by ethno-nationalist concerns and its existence as an Iranian-funded extension of its foreign policy.

2:viii State Terrorism

State terrorism is the oldest form of terrorism, which has been applied and practiced throughout history. It is a dreaded instrument of brutality and terror with legitimacy of the 'the law of the jungle'. Gradually, state terrorism acquired political recognition and an institutional status for the state security and ideology with the worst examples in contemporary history of state sponsored terrorism are Nazis' followed by the

⁷⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah_military_activities (accessed 31 October, 2010).

Communist purges and persecutions in the Soviet Union between the two Great Wars as well as the recent Serb atrocities in the Balkans. Despite UN guarantees, states indulge in terror and violence against their peoples and neighbours. It still goes on undeterred, in the occupied Palestinian Territories and the Indian Held Kashmir. The advocates of state terrorism are usually fascist regimes, dictatorships, radical or reactionary governments and even democracies for getting away with their crimes of political oppression and violations of human rights⁷¹.

It means 'systematic' application of lethal state power to crush or curtail political opposition to preserve state security. It is heavy-handed and repressive and acquires an extra-legal character by: suppressing the guaranteed basic human rights. It is delimiting or bypassing the established judicial process; and distorting, modifying or corrupting the constitutional judicial order through arbitrary legislations or superimposing the order with clandestine state sanctions.

Its application has two dimensions: the internal and the external i.e. repression against its own targeted people which are revolutionary or rebellious, while the external is sponsored by the state outside its borders, a targeted neighbour or hostile country⁷². The case of Indian Held Kashmir perfectly fits into the repressive methods of terrorism being perpetrated by the Indian security forces under the patronage of the Union government.

The external dimension of state terrorism is based on the assumption that terrorism can be used as an instrument of foreign policy against a rival state(s) to destabilize and weaken it. The sponsor state acts by deploying agents to inflict

⁷¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_terrorism (accessed 31 October, 2010).

⁷² http://ipripak.org/papers/terrorism.shtml#_ftn38#_ftn38 (accessed 31 October, 2010).

destruction besides, stimulating subversive and insurgent activities with political or psychological support through propaganda, funding, and training⁷³.

India is a classic example of state sponsored terrorism in Balochistan and FATA as well as the rest of the country through regular subversive and terror activities exploiting sectarian and ethnic unrest particularly in Sindh for decades. India has also been supporting separatist Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka forcing a costly military operation and later resulting in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination by a Tamil suicide bomber⁷⁴.

State terrorism in the long run and as a reaction gives birth to extremism in the society as the target community has no other option but to inflict losses on its powerful suppresser state at any cost. The Indian Held Kashmir *Mujahidin* has no other option but to fight the Indian security forces and force them for their demand of a separate homeland. Same is the case with the rest of the Muslim movements which have been kept suppressed for a long time have to resort to extremism and terrorism as a survival tool against the much powerful state apparatus i.e. the Palestinians, the Chechens, Afghan Taliban, and Al Qaeda elements etc.

2:ix Jihadists in Saudi Arabia and Syria

In Saudi Arabia, "*Jihadists*" after consolidating their strength to crush the *Jahiliyah* and a regime that helped spread Wahhabism with its elite class i.e. the prince's luxuries life styles blocked the political ambitions of Islamists, and welcomed the United States. In November 1979 four to five hundred insurgents seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca on the last day of the annual pilgrimage. The leader of the group was Juhayman al-Utaybi, a wild-eyed fundamentalist preacher who recruited followers from the Muslim

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Brotherhood chapter at the Islamic University of Medina used to deliver sermons from the mosque's public address system during the two-week crisis denouncing: Saudi Arabia's closed relationship with the U.S. which supported Israel, the presence of thousands of Western military and technical advisors in the kingdom, the decadent ways of its rulers, and corruption of the country's Muslim clerics. al-Utaybi and his followers hoped to cause an uprising that would lead to the establishment of an Islamic state. The Saudi authorities finally managed to seize the holy site and arrest al-Utaybi and his associates. After few weeks, al-Utaybi along with sixty-two of his followers was executed by beheading⁷⁵.

In the same way results of Jihadists efforts in Syria were also not encouraging. In 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood started carrying out guerrilla attacks and terrorist strikes against the dictatorial regime of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, including an assault on a military school that killed over eighty cadets, a series of car bombs in Damascus, which killed few hundred civilians. Hafiz Assad brutally dealt with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria to the brink of extinction by killing tens of thousands of civilians in the process.

2:x The Afghan Mujahidin

In December 1979, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to prop up the Afghan communists who had come to power in a coup. The Afghans' radical Marxist-Leninist agenda was not feasible, as it had no industrial infrastructure or working class. Its tribal chieftains immediately took up arms against the new communist regime and quickly became *Mujahidin*.

⁷⁵ Randall D. LAW, *Terrorism, A History* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 288-289.

The U.S. immediately exploited the opportunity to humiliate its Cold War enemy and President Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, proposed an indirect intervention via Pakistan and urged that the Afghanistan's resistance should continue by sending more money and arms shipments to the rebels. Brzezinski did not bother to see that Muhammad Zia-al-Haq was an ardent Islamist and that the largest Mujahidin group had a loose affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. Within a year besides, the U.S. flow of arms, cash, and advisors to Pakistan, money from its allies- Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Israel, France, Britain, and even the People's Republic of China started pouring in through Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to support seven major armed Mujahidin groups. Training was also imparted to the Mujahidin groups in the use of small and heavy weapons, sniper rifles, camouflage, explosives, and car bombs⁷⁶.

The first year US Congress secretly appropriated about \$30 million for the Mujahidin and by 1987, the annual American appropriation had reached \$630 million, exuberantly encouraged by Congress, biggest supporter of the Mujahidin Charlie Wilson, Texas Democrat who frequently traveled to Pakistan for adventure. In 1986, the U.S. provided the most sophisticated weapon shoulder-launched anti- aircraft "Stinger missiles" to Mujahidin and with its skillful use forced the Soviets to decrease the use of helicopters, which shifted the balance to Afghanistan's Anti-Communist forces⁷⁷.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia wanted to establish their presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan independent of the US for channeling funds through various religious and social agencies to the Mujahidin and recruiting small contingents of men to fight

⁷⁶ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahideen> (accessed 31 October, 2010).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

alongside them. Islamist clerics throughout the Middle East urged their fellow Muslims to help in ousting the Soviet infidels from Afghanistan by waging Jihad either through financial or physical support.

The collective effort against the Communists also helped cement their own armies with American weapons and training for countering the Soviet-backed Syrians and the drift towards communism of some of their intellectuals. Over all, a culture of jihad got developed in the Arab states, which would later on be difficult for them to contain.

2:xi Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan

Osama Bin Laden was a successful fundraiser and recruiter for the Afghan Jihad who was a young and pious millionaire. His father was Yemeni, but had become the operator of Saudi Arabia's largest construction business and a close associate of King Faisal. Born in 1957, bin Laden attended university in the city of Jeddah and studied under two influential Islamists: Muhammad Qutb, younger brother of Egypt's Islamist martyr, and Abdullah Azzam, a radical Islamic scholar from Palestine. The latter was very skilled at recruiting fighters for the anti-communist jihad. The importance of martyrdom grew so much that it attracted so many Arab Mujahidin to visit Afghanistan for Jihad against the Soviets.

Bin Laden became jihad's biggest private financier, collecting millions of dollars to support Jihad and refugees. In 1984 he visited Afghanistan and two years later, brought his family to Pakistan. On the same year he and Azzam established the Services Bureau to get funds, recruit fighters, and operate a training base near Peshawar, in Khyber

Pukhtoonkhwa. At around 1987, Osama began venturing into Afghanistan with small bands of *Mujahidin*⁷⁸.

Azzam had critical influences on the intellectual development of bin Laden during his time in Afghanistan, convincing him of the need of an organization capable of fomenting and leading international jihad against non-Muslims. The other influence on Bin Laden was al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian leader of al-Jihad, who first traveled to Pakistan in 1980 to work in a hospital for refugees. He knew that Pakistan and Afghanistan were far better for organizing jihad than Egypt. His hope was to develop a battle-tested, conspiratorial group for delivering results in Egypt. He returned to Afghanistan after his release from prison in 1985 and embraced the doctrine of *takfir* (the excommunication and even killing of heretical Muslims)⁷⁹.

Bin Laden merged the worldviews of Azzam and al-Zawahiri, committing himself to continuing *takfiri* jihad beyond Afghanistan's borders after the war against the Soviets ended, but where and against whom? In the meantime, Bin Laden, in 1988 started to set up the infrastructure for training and maintaining a band of elite, committed fighters, a private army dedicated to jihad with the support of his personal wealth and his fundraising abilities. The body's name was Al-Qaeda- "the base," that is, the training base where this group would be organized. Besides bin Laden, most of the other leaders of Al-Qaeda were Egyptians, including Al-Zawahiri⁸⁰.

The estimated number of Arabs who fought in Afghanistan was around five thousand. Their military influence was minor, and the Afghans who considered their *jihadist* death wish odd- and oddly un-Islamic often marginalized them. Generally, they

⁷⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_Laden (accessed 31 October, 2010).

⁷⁹ Randall D. LAW, *Terrorism, A History* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 297-298

⁸⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_Laden (accessed 31 October, 2010).

fought less than their Afghan comrades; the Arabs became immersed in the culture of Anti-Communist jihad and acquired the means to wage it. The Americans had little control about the use and misuse of weapons as their transfer was in the hands of Pakistan's intelligence services. Besides, the Americans also did not care about who used the weapons.

About fifteen thousand Soviet soldiers had died in the Afghan war and by 1988, the Soviet Union's leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, decided to withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The Arab fighters also fought for post Communist supremacy when it became clear that Afghanistan's Communist regime could not hold out long on its own. The first casualty of this civil war was Bin Laden's chief mentor, Abdullah Azzam; killed by an enormous roadside bomb in November 1989 but no one claimed credit for the assassination.

After returning to Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden excited with the victory against the Soviets started pondering what to do with Al-Qaeda, his small well-armed and trained holy warriors. When Iraqi forces under the leadership of Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, threatening the entire region, Bin Laden opposed the Saudis inclination to turn to the United States for aid. Bin Laden urged the Saudis to allow him to defend the Saudi kingdom against the Saddam onslaught, which was rebuffed by the Saudi kingdom⁸¹.

2:xii Bin Laden Focuses on the US

In 1992, after the fall of Kabul, most of the foreign Mujahidin had gone to their home countries while some were refused entry into their homelands knowing how

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

potentially dangerous these armed and trained Afghan Arabs were. Some became stateless warriors, where, in the summer of 1989, a coup inspired by a radical Islamist, Hassan al-Turabi, deposed the civilian government and opened Sudan to Islamists and *Jihadists* to have a new international center for jihad. Bin Laden, also arrived and settled in Sudan, briefly abandoning jihad⁸².

Three things drew him out of early retirement and turned him anti-American or international figure of extremism. First, the continuing presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia and then in 1992 after the Gulf War, US soldiers arrived in nearby Somalia under a UN mandate to halt fighting in that country's civil war. Bin Laden was disgusted about the inroads of the United States into the Islamic World, aided by leading Muslim states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the Zionist state of Israel. Like Sayyid Qutb, the towering figure of modern Islamism, Bin Laden sensed the influence of the United States behind every manifestation of *Jahiliyah* and in every example of Arab or Muslim impotence. Like Qutb, he also believed the United States was vulnerable. Bin Laden's belief in America's lack of willingness to sustain casualties was strengthened further by Bill Clinton quickly extracting US troops from Somalia in October 1993 after an ambush killed eighteen soldiers.

The second factor in Bin Laden's transition to committed international Jihadists was his constant mingling in Khartoum with the leaders of Islamist and *Jihadi* groups from every corner of the Muslim world like the representatives of Al-jihad, the Islamic groups, Hamas, the Abu Nidal Organization, and Carlos the Jackal.

⁸² <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khartoum> (accessed 31 October, 2010).

The third factor was a new round of intense study of the Quran and Islamic history, particularly his discovery of the teachings of ibn Taymiyya and his *fatwas* presumably provided all the Quranic support necessary for a campaign against the enemies of Islam.

The question arises that how to go ahead with the agenda of *Jihad*? Attacks on heretical Muslim rulers and societies had limits, as these were resilient, authoritarian states with state machinery at their disposal. Bin Laden believed that the U.S. dollars given both in foreign aid and as payment of oil propped up these states. To force the United States out of the Middle East could help the regeneration of Islam.

Bin Laden's decision to target the United States was also motivated by the need to pull together *Jihadi* groups into a united fold of international *Jihad* who, as Bin Laden knew were at each other's throats in Afghanistan. This was also observed in the Middle East as anger, jealousy, and suspicion had long prevented Egyptians, Saudis, Syrians, and Iraqis from cooperating, even against the Israelis.

He was convinced that only a terror campaign against the U.S provided the targets and symbols that could demolish sectarian, cultural, and ethno nationalist barriers that divided the international *Jihadists* movement against itself. For this purpose, the Middle East's history of victimization by Crusaders and imperialists could be exploited and expected that the United States could be enticed into responding with strike or an invasion of an Islamic county for applying the Afghan Jihad experience against the U.S.

2: xiii The Taliban and Bin Laden

In 1996, the Sudan Islamist ruler Hassan al-Turabi asked Osama Bin Laden expulsion from Sudan as he was creating troubles for country. Bin Laden came to

Afghanistan where the Taliban welcomed him who under Mullah Muhammad Omer preached an austere version of Islam that attracted Saudi Arabia's radicals as well as the Afghan population tired of the decades old war⁸³.

Osama now made Afghanistan as the next base of global jihad against the U.S., though almost bankrupted by his hasty expulsion from Sudan besides, scattering his organization. He issued his "Declaration of War" against the U.S. in August 1996, as his primary concern was the continuing presence of the U.S. forces in Saudi⁸⁴. Al-Zawahiri merged most of Al-jihad's organization into Al-Qaeda. Al-Zawahiri's first action was to issue a *fatwa* declaring the killing of Americans and their allies – civilians and military – as a duty of every Muslim. The declaration cited three grievances: the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, suffering of Iraqi civilians with the anti-Saddam economic sanctions, and US backing of Israel⁸⁵.

In 1997, in an interview with Peter Arnett of CNN Osama bin Laden declared the entire Saudi royal family to be heretics⁸⁶. He also revealed his objective as the enforcement of *Shariah* in his adopted homeland and termed revolution as the answer to all the questions.

But it has little effect on the Jihadi organizations though it attracted individuals into Afghanistan for training and combat operations whereas Al-Qaeda functioned as an umbrella organization. Allegedly, about ten to twenty thousand men traveled to Bin Laden's training facilities in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, when the camps were destroyed in the wake of 9/11 which imparted training in the use of small arms as well as

⁸³ Randall D. LAW, *Terrorism, A History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 304.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 305

⁸⁵ Osama Bin Laden "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" 1996, <http://www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen1.htm> (accessed 01 November, 2010).

⁸⁶ *Ibid*.

indoctrination into al-Qaeda ideology. Most volunteers were from the middle class and educated professionals having spent much of their lives in the West. The most important ambition of these volunteers was martyrdom.

2: xiv Al-Qaeda Attacks

Some factors restrained the Clinton administration (1993-2001) from acting forcefully against the *Jihadists* threat⁸⁷. The end of Cold War had led many Americans including the president to think for concentrating on domestic issues whereas the institutions that had been active to wage Cold War were focused on the collection and analysis of data from sources that provided little information on terrorist cells, besides, thinking that terrorism primarily existed as a covert extension of enemy states' military and foreign policy. Another view held by Americans was that most global terrorism involved hijacking that was largely meant to publicize a cause and not inflict large casualties. Only at the end of 1996 did US officials became aware for the first time of Al-Qaeda.

On August 7, 1998, Al-Qaeda carried out the first terrorist attacks against the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar us Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring over 4,500 others⁸⁸. After ten days, it was followed by the US cruise missiles attack against three targets; the first was a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant thought to be making chemical weapons for Bin Laden, and the other two were Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The missile strikes brought new recruits into the Bin Laden camp.

In 1999, unearthing of Al-Qaeda's plan to bomb targets in Los Angeles, Yemen, and Jordan led to many arrests. In October 2000, an Al-Qaeda team detonated a small

⁸⁷ Randall D. LAW, *Terrorism, A History* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 305.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 307

boat with the missile destroyer USS Cole refueling in the Yemeni port of Aden killing seventeen American sailors.

Though Al-Qaeda grew in the late 1980s and 1990s, but the international jihad against the Western influence was growing mainly due to the participation of Arab fighters who had taken part in Afghan Jihad but these groups used the same vocabulary of *Jahiliyah*, *Takfir*, and *Salafa*⁸⁹. They also promoted each other's struggles with a hope of all regional Islamists campaigns into a single united one. Moreover, they bartered propaganda and promotional materials, including cheap videos and DVDs of grisly executions and martyrdoms.

2: xv Hamas

Hamas, the most vibrant Islamist organization in Palestine was found in the 1940s as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the late 1970s, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin transformed it into a broader Islamic Society with the goals; providing Islamic education and social service, and preparation for armed resistance to Israel. It is alleged that from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s Israeli government had provided assistance to Yassin's group to undermine largely secular Fatah and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

With the first *Intifada* in December 1987, Yassin reformed the group as Hamas, meaning the Islamic Resistance Movement, also meaning "zeal" in Arabic⁹⁰. Abdullah Azzam contributed significantly to the Hamas' constitution denoting its dual concerns as both an ethno-nationalist organization devoted to the liberation of Palestine and the destruction of Israel and an Islamist group dedicated to spiritual and social awakening

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p-308.

⁹⁰ "HAMAS" <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas> (accessed 01 November, 2010).

and the establishment of *Shariah* state. Hamas devoted many resources to social and educational programs, which made it popular even among the secularists.

2:xvi Suicide Bombing in Palestine

Hamas became a critical organizer of the *Intifada* besides, conventional attacks on Israelis, its paramilitary wing; the Al-Qassam Brigade carried out suicide attacks against Israel and from 1993 until 2005 had killed over four hundred Israelis in such attacks. Other organizations like Islamic Jihad, originally affiliated with Al-Zawahiri's Al-Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades, a military arm of Arafat's Fatah had also used suicide bombers in Israel and Palestine since 1993 by causing more than two hundred fatalities.

Two reasons are given for Hamas' decision to start using suicide bombers more than five years after the start of the Intifada. First, the suicide attacks were aimed at to undermine the Oslo peace process, which began in September 1993, leading to the creation of the Palestinian Authority and Arafat's renunciation of terrorism and recognition of the Israel⁹¹. Second, it was a tactic of retaliation against acts of the Israelis like in February 1994, Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli-American extremist killed twenty-nine Muslims worshipping in the Patriarchs Mosque in Hebron, West Bank besides Israel's targeted assassinations of militant Palestinian leaders, such as Hamas' principal bomb maker and the leader of the Al-Qassam Brigades. Another factor to turn towards suicide attacks is stated to be the rapid increase of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza as from 1990 to 2002, the number tripled from 76,000 to 226,000.

Out of the legitimate political and social problems, Hamas and other groups were able to find plenty of recruits. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin described the use of suicide

⁹¹Hamas, "History" <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas> (accessed 01 November, 2010).

bombers: “Once we have warplanes and missiles, then we can think of changing our means of legitimate self-defense. But right now, we can only tackle the fire with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves”⁹². Israeli atrocities and Palestinians suicide attacks have made both the parties tired. For instance, in October 1994 in Tel Aviv a Hamas activist after the death of his brother carried out a suicide mission on an Israeli army vehicle. Israeli authorities identified the bomber and later that day, demolished the family's home.

But even Israeli soldiers felt the futility of such punitive actions. During one operation in 2002, an Israeli soldier lamented,

“There's no way to break the system of terror in the West Bank, because the system is now in the minds of the people, in the minds of the teenagers, and what we're doing by this operation is gibing them more reasons to build that system”⁹³.

2:xvii Jihad in Bosnia and Chechnya

In the early 1990s Serbia launched attacks against the breakaway Muslim state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and killed hundreds of Muslims brutally. The Serb forces attacked Bosnia's civilian population in Eastern Bosnia. The Serb forces—military, police, the paramilitaries and, sometimes, even Serb villagers—applied the same pattern: Bosnian houses and apartments were systematically ransacked or burnt down, Bosnians were rounded up or captured and beaten or killed. Men and women were separated....⁹⁴.

The Serbs raped the Muslim women and then shot them dead by burying them in collective graves. Mujahidin, especially, the Arabs who had returned from Afghanistan

⁹² *Randall D. LAW, Terrorism: A History (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 310.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ “1992 ethnic cleansing campaign in Eastern Bosnia” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnian_War (accessed 01 November, 2010).

reached Bosnia in search of *Jihad* against the Serbs and their supporters numbering around four thousand veterans of Afghan war against the Communists⁹⁵.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union presented an even more attractive opportunity to wage jihad. On September 6, 1991, militants of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People party, created by the former Soviet Air Force general Dzhokhar Dudayev stormed a session of the Chechen-Ingush USSR Supreme Soviet⁹⁶. The attack caused the death of the head of the Grozny's branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Vitaly Kutsenko and dissolved the government of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic of the Soviet Union.

In the next month, Dudayev won overwhelming majority in the elections to oust the interim administration supported by central government and became president and declared independence from the Soviet Union. In November 1991, Yeltsin dispatched troops to Grozny but Dudayev's forces surrounded them at the airport and forced to withdraw. Chechnya made initial declaration of sovereignty, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic split in two parts in June 1992 amidst the Ingush armed conflict against another Russian republic, North Ossetia. Chechnya declared full independence from Moscow in 1993 as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Chechnya proved to be a real epicenter of violence in the former USSR located in the northern Caucasus with a history of opposing Russian and Soviet imperialism since the nineteenth century. By 1994, open fighting assumed between Chechen guerrillas and

⁹⁵Randall D. LAW, *Terrorism: A History* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 310.

⁹⁶“Chechen declaration of independence” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Chechen_War (accessed 01 November, 2010).

Russian troops, turning half of Chechnya one million populations into refugees. Al-Qaeda, also joined this war by sponsoring a small Jihadist enterprise led by Shamil Basayev, a Chechen warlord, and a Saudi-born Amir al-Khattab. The goal was to create a pure Islamic land clean of infidels serving as a springboard for a “New World Islamic Order. The first war ended in early 1996.

Several groups carried out hijackings, and attacks on Russians and pro- Kremlin Chechen politicians. Hostages were forced to pay ransoms and many were beheaded while suicide bombers targeted public places and assassinated officials. Al-Khattab claimed after some unclaimed attacks in Russia that the war had shifted to all Russian cities and would be directed against all Russians.

Vladimir Putin open warfare against Chechnya destroyed its capital Grozny and through the use of land and airpower slowly turned the war in its favour. By 2002, guerrillas were driven out of all the urban areas. This was followed by bomb blasts and suicide attacks in Russia. Basayev mainly depended on suicide bombers, many of them women dubbed as “black widows”, however, he was killed in 2006 by a Russian covert operation or by rival guerrillas. But still the guerilla warfare is s going on in Chechnya

2:xviii Jihadism in Algeria

Islamism and Jihadism caused more bloodshed in areas where there was already political instability like Algeria, which by the late 1980s had been ruled by the secular, Socialist National Liberation Front since independence in 1962. Its one-party rule generated growing opposition led by the Islamic Salvation Front who aimed at a

theocratic state and enforcement of Shariah. For legitimacy purposes the government introduced some economic reforms as well as amending the constitution for multi-party elections. Salvation Front thundered against the spread of Jahiliyah and Western influences and won the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991 with 82 percent of available seats, whereupon the government sure of the Islamist sweep of the parliament cancelled the second round of the elections.

From 1992 to 2000 at least 160,000 people died during the Algerian Civil War between the government and the Islamists including the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), whose radical Jihadists pronouncement went far beyond what the Islamic Salvation Front had demanded. Several thousands of Algerians fought against their government who had taken part in Afghan jihad. GIA attracted much attention for its terrorist attacks on Algeria's foreign community in 1993 and 1994, but the vast majority of GIA's twentieth-century Kharijites, the early Muslim faction that judged it permissible to kill *takfiri*, those Muslims "excommunicated" for their failure to follow every injunction of Islam.

As the civil war weakened, GIA lost almost all-public support, and most of its leaders were killed through police infiltration. In 1999, bold government initiative brought 85 percent of GIA's fighters away from the movement with amnesty and till 2002 Algeria has regained a semblance of peace since 2002.

The fear of communism compelled the United States of America to create and support organizations throughout the world, which could stop the onslaught of the Communist revolutions in different parts of the world. Americans supported Islamic organizations in the Middle East to have hurdles for the advancement of communism

there. The Muslim Brotherhood was initially ignored but its growth alarmed the Egyptian Regime against the Islamists threat. During the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan were made the hubs of international Jihadis for waging a holy war against the communists there.

Direct funding for the Mujahidin fighting against the Communists in Afghanistan were sent. Further training and equipments i.e. weapons, arms and ammunitions were also provided in abundance so that the Mujahidin could concentrate on the Jihad. More and more Madrassahs were encouraged to function as nurseries of Jihadists against the Soviets. The Western delegations would visit religious Madrassahs to foster support against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The flow of Mujahidin from various countries as well as the local nurseries in the form of Madrassahs not only complicated the international dynamics of those countries but also created problems for Pakistan in general and the tribal belt in particular which would be later on, in the aftermath of 2001, exploited by the external forces and events. Moreover, the Arab Mujahidin were termed as terrorists and extremists and the tribals were asked to expel them from FATA, as they were then terrorists. But it was impossible for the tribesmen as the factors of hospitality, and religious bonds, etc could not be ignored. In other words the demand of expelling those Arab Mujahidin and other fighters was very irrational and illogical.

The government actions against this backdrop infuriated the tribals, as military operations were started on behest of the U.S. in the tribal belt, which as a reaction led to extremism there.

CHAPTER 3: STATE OF EXTREMISM IN FATA

For a long time, extremism had remained categorized into many variations including the traditional i.e., the state sponsored extremism and the revolutionary. The latter grew as a reaction to political and social injustices, as an auxiliary to insurgency and rebellion to win freedom and bring about political and social changes and as a response to state sponsored extremism. The revolutionary concept by its very nature being dynamic expanded to absorb new challenges and opportunities thrown up by the changing political and social conditions during the Twentieth century. Today, there are many variations within its fold with its distinct socio-political character, objectives and the nature of terror and violence – from propaganda campaign, assassination and gun running to mass killings and destruction i.e. attacks on World Trade Center in New York.

The extremists are born out of political factors sustained with strong motivation. The use of terror and violence is usually resorted to only under compelling and desperate circumstances⁹⁷. Extremists believe in the righteousness of their cause, which in some cases tends to assume fanatical proportion, as in the case of religious extremism. Consistent with the expanding scope of extremists activities along with the original motivations, a broad spectrum of new ones – ethnic sub-national separatism, ideological and/or revolutionary upsurge, religious extremism, sectarian extremist struggle against political injustices, state sponsored terror, drug mafia and crime syndicates and numerous other interest groups etc. is now added by driving the extremist groups to a new level of violence domestically as well as worldwide.

⁹⁷ Robert H. Kupperman & Debra Van Opsta, ed., *Terrorism*. In International Military and Defence Encyclopedia (Washington: Bracey's Inc), 2726-28.

Their causal linkages to violence, however, may not be easily demarcated due to their distinct division and territorial limits, though in some cases these overlap and reinforce each other particularly when under threat. For example, ethnic sub-national rebel groups have a tendency to establish a nexus or take advantage of situation, with drug mafia and religious extremists.

Various shapes of extremism are discussed in the following lines.

3:i Political Extremism

Political extremism is a distinctive disorder of the modern world. It originated as a term and practice, less than two centuries ago and has come into the spotlight of global conflict in our lifetime. For political strategy, it began its course as a part of guerrilla warfare and insurgency to overthrow governments, gain independence from colonial rule, to assert ethnic identity and recognition, to force constitutional guarantees or to draw global attention etc. It is the weapon of the weak and uses terror and violence to intimidate and cause fear in the state or government for accepting its demands i.e. political change. As per the UN Research Institute for Social Development, there are three main root causes of political terrorism i.e. (1) cultural identity or distinction; (2) psychological factors—arising out of the sense of deprivation and marginalization; and (3) rational calculations—the use of violence as per requirements⁹⁸. Conflicts of ethnic or religious nature are linked with political violence. Political violence in the modern world is mostly characterized by religious and ethnic identities.

The tribal areas are the most backward of the country and no government has given attention for resolving their decade's long political, economic and social problems

⁹⁸ *The Search for Identity: Ethnicity, Religion and Political Violence*, <http://www.unrisd.org/engindex/publ/list/op/op6/op06-05.htm> (accessed 01 November, 2010).

despite their repeated promises before and during elections. Even the military regime of Musharraf did not bring any tangible change in the tribal system, which could have been instrumental in bringing some positive changes in the long run. This provided space to the extremists already waiting for such opportunities in the tribal areas. Initiative was taken by the oppressed tribals in South Waziristan Agency and later on the remaining tribal areas of Mohmand, Bajaur, North Waziristan, Orakzai and Khyber agencies as well as to the FR Region of Kohat, Tank and Bannu.

Political extremism is categorized into various forms. The most sensational forms of political extremism is revolutionary in character, also called agitational extremism or extremism from below, its primary objective is to destabilize and topple the incumbent regime, replacing it with a political apparatus more acceptable to the revolutionaries⁹⁹. Revolutionary groups seek violence to fulfill their objectives through guerrilla warfare tactics. It is directed to overthrow domestic regime, gain independence or self-rule as sub-national group or attain liberation from foreign rule.

TTP in the beginning took over Swat, South Waziristan Agency, Orakzai Agency and some parts of Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies through this tactic and enforced their brand of Islamic interpretation of Shariah there. Initially, they set up their area or village organizations of TTP ranks where likeminded motivated and some criminals were gathered and organized under the TTP leadership. Donations, *Zakat*, *Sadqat* and extortions were collected from the people. Later on, they also switched over to the strategy of kidnapping rich people and asked them for ransoms in millions of rupees. They also imposed taxes on the area rich people like factory owners and industrialists etc.

⁹⁹ Donald J. Hanle, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare*, 132.

Moreover, the militant activities of IRA in Ireland, the Afghan *Mujahidin* against the Communists and the freedom fighters in Kashmir are examples of revolutionary violence against the foreign occupation. It is generally believed that both the nature and scope of extremism is political, its objectives, methodology and organizational structure of the groups, point to gaining political power, or at least promoting their political ideas¹⁰⁰. Although these militant activities are protected under the UN conventions, they have consistently been condemned and brutalized by the state.

3:ii Ethnic Extremism

Political extremism based on ethnicity has assumed dangerously significant role in domestic as well as international politics. Countries with multi-ethnic composition are faced with this problem as the ethnic groups use ethnic identity for political purposes. The ideology, which motivates such groups, exploit the injustices being inflicted on them by the controlling elites of state or by some other, favoured groups within the state¹⁰¹.

Mutahhida Qaumi Movement (MQM) is one example of this type of extremism in the country, which has exploited the ethnic motivations of their respective community. Now the party is a very influential in the provincial and national politics of the country and usually remains part and parcel of the federal and provincial governments successively. The party cannot tolerate any other group in the city of Karachi, especially the Pukhtoon community that is growing in numbers there. On daily basis there is a target killing of people belonging to various communities there.

¹⁰⁰ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, "Insurgency in the Contemporary World: Some Theoretical Aspects" http://www.idsa-India.org/an_dec_6.html pp.2-3.

¹⁰¹ Harold A. Gould, "The Roots and Fruits of 'Terrorism'", http://www.d-n-i.net/FCS_Folder/gould_terrorism.htm (accessed 01 November, 2010).

The psychological concept of relative deprivation vis-à-vis other favoured groups breed frustration among the marginalized groups, who nourish and transfer their grievances to their fellows and succeeding generations in order to consolidate their intra-group ties as deterrence to the encroachment of their rights. Therefore, they resort to all possible means to ensure that their rights are preserved and safeguarded. Besides all other efforts, terrorism also becomes one of the extreme measures to redress their group's grievances¹⁰². In FATA Socio-cultural ethnicity has thus become the basis for resistance in the forms of religious, *Jihadi* and sectarian extremism to resist rival tribes or state authority, perceived to be in the hands of the rival hostile ethnic communities.

It is generally believed that an ethnic-religious combine can potentially prove to be the most destructive. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in South Waziristan and the rest of the FATA agencies has played havoc with the local population, government institutions in general and security forces in particular. People were motivated in the name of religion and Pukhtoon nationalism and ethnic pride in a very systematic manner. Thus, they were able to exploit the local customs and traditions of Pukhtoon Wali in their favour. Mullah Muhammad Omer Taliban government also fell in this category when he refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the U.S. as it would have violated the Pukhtoon traditions for handing over a guest to a foreign country.

3:iii Fundamentalism or Religious Extremism

Religion as a driving force behind the increasing lethality of domestic and international terrorism has faded the old views about terrorists, such as political idealism, recognition or calculated restraint etc. and the new motivations of religious extremists

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

have created a sense of chaotic panic. Most of the recent past successful ethno-nationalist and ideologically motivated terrorist groups, suppressed their religious character against the colonial masters by keeping the political and nationalist motivation as the dominant factor¹⁰³.

The objectives of religious extremists are to protect their own culture or ways of life from the dangers of deviations and external influences of alien religions or cultures. They believe in their recognition and identity as a role model. Their wish to overthrow the existing order or force fundamental changes in policy and attitude give religious extremism a political character. By using a religious justification for violence, religious extremists in FATA and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa have broken the state's monopoly on morally justifiable killings by beheading and slaughtering people caught in line of their movement objectives. Suicide attacks, killing of government officials and pro-government elders are justified in the line of their so-called *Jihad*. This gives the extremists freedom from any political or moral restraints. Religiously tainted perceptions of the extremists in FATA in the shape of TTP elements are inflexible and inherently hostile which make the terrorist acts, highly destructive and ruthless. In their zealous approach for the establishment of a theocratic order, religious terrorist often mixes up transcendental and divinely inspired imperatives with anti-government populism and imaginary external conspiracy notions.

Religion manifests the capacity to draw unflinching loyalty and allegiance, which other causes fail to elicit from their followers but this has been exploited by the TTP extremists for their own brand of interpretations of Shariah and Islam and has put the

¹⁰³ Bruce Hoffman, Revival of Religious Terrorism <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.winter98.9/methods.html> (accessed 01 November 2010).

government in a complicated position to counter it. This has distorted the image of Islam, as Islam is now considered in the world as aggressive and intolerant of other's views.

3:iv Jihadi Extremism

The global threat from religious extremism emanates from the anti-West sentiments, more particularly against the US for unfriendly and unfair treatment given to the Muslims with a clear example of the Middle East. This led to the global Jihad against the U.S. and it was for the first time manifested through bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Out of it the rise of Osama bin Laden and his Islamic movement, Al Qaeda, brought a new chapter in the world:- the global Jihad against the U.S. and its allies. Finally, the bombing of the World Trade Centre and the Twin Towers led Americans and its allies to fight the global Jihadists based in Afghanistan.

They attacked Afghanistan and over threw Taliban government. They fled to the rural areas as well as to the mountains and a large number of local, Afghan Jihadists and Al Qaeda elements also entered the tribal belt of Pakistan with an intent to gather, train, equip themselves and attack the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan. Some prominent local religious figures also said yes to this global Jihad against the Americans, however, these Jihadists adopted the policy of no harm for Pakistan.

This is the main concern of the Americans and its allies in Afghanistan. These Jihadists as a matter of principle and organization do not fall themselves into the local, ethnic, tribal and sectarian issues as for them, these are the tricks of the enemy to divide them. They also avoid confrontation with the security forces of the country and focus on their Jihad against the U.S. The American 'War against Terror' in Afghanistan would stay and haunt the memory, possibly becoming a catalyst for greater extremism and

hatred, unless the real causes of religious upsurge and violence are fairly addressed and resolved.

The religious and Jihadi groups operating from FATA are Maulvi Nazir Group operating from South Waziristan Agency, Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahader group and Haqqani network from North Waziristan Agency, and Amar Bel Maroof Wa nahi Anel Munker previously led by late Namdar from Bara, Khyber Agency, etc. and very recently the splinter group of TTP in Kurram Agency led by Saeed khan from lower and Central Kurram.

3:v Sectarianism

Much of the current tension originated after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Shiite Iran encouraged some Shiites in Pakistan in general and Kurram Agency in particular to import the Shia revolution from Iran while President Zia al-Haq also responded with the same force to neutralize the movement of Shiasm in the country¹⁰⁴. In this retrospective, the current rreligious extremism in the tribal belt of Pakistan has emerged with a more parochial version, divided along sects within the same belief system particularly in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies as well as district Kohat and Hangu and has triggered widespread instability within the state. These divisions in belief system have led to the emergence of sectarian strife and terrorism. The case of Shia-Sunni divergence in Pakistan and its assumption of militancy have introduced potentially serious problems for the policy makers. It is further complicated by its external dimension in the form of aid from abroad. Gun firing and throwing of grenades in mosques, assassination of prominent

¹⁰⁴http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4893 (accessed 30 October, 2010).

personalities and officials associated with either of the sects illustrate how focused targets are being taken¹⁰⁵.

Independent sources have reported elders of Lower Kurram to have lost their authority to a band of displaced people of their sect from Parachinar and Taliban militants of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These Taliban dismantled the whole tribal structure of Kurram Agency, the most educated and scenic among the other agencies. Similarly, the Shia population has also lost their authority to a band of sectarian extremists led by Allama Abid Hussain Al-Hussaini, ex-senator and vocal leader of Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP). Local Mehdi Militia and Hezbollah formed by Abid Hussain Al Hussaini have assumed dangerous role of flushing Sunnis from their native areas and if any Shia elder or Malik tries to advise wisdom, he is not heard rather intimidated by the followers of Abid Hussaini. The conflict has so far taken the lives of hundreds of people but there is no stoppage to it. Property worth billions of rupees has been destroyed. However, there is no action on the part of the government to stop these Shia-Sunni butchers from slaughtering innocent people.

¹⁰⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurram_Valley (accessed 30 October, 2010).

CHAPTER 4: 9/11 EVENTS AND EXTREMISM IN FATA

On September 11, 2001 Nineteen Arabs allegedly hijacked three airlines and flew them into the Pentagon and the two main Towers of the World Trade Center. The fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. The attacks killed three thousand people with 10 percent non Americans, and caused billions of dollars damage to the American economy followed by the U.S. invasions on Afghanistan and Iraq as a so called Bush administration's "War on Terror". Al Qaeda, a shadowy transnational organization formed in the 1980's by the Arab Muslim Osama Bin Laden for fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, accepted the responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. The doctrine of motivation for Osama Bin Laden was Jihadism. Jihadism has overshadowed both ethno-nationalism and revolutionary leftism and preeminent force behind terrorism today¹⁰⁶.

September 11 US attacks changed the scenario of the world in general and the tribal areas in particular. U.S started its "war on terror" and asked Pakistan to be the frontline state. Since the beginning of the Afghan war, the *Mujahidin* fighting the Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan assumed leadership roles in some parts of the Pakistani tribal areas, particularly the agencies of North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Bajaur. After the Taliban fall in 2001, many of the regime's members and supporters fled across the border into Pakistan's ethnically Pakhtoon areas in general and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in particular. September 11 attacks on the US changed the scenario of these tribal areas as it brought the Taliban under attack. North and South Waziristan came under international spotlight. US threatened Pakistan to be a part of 'war on terror'. Pakistan has to accept this for national security concerns and became a key

¹⁰⁶ LAW. Randall D, *Terrorism: A History*. (Cambridge, U.K: Polity Press, 2009), 281.

player in the US-led alliance. Pakistani president has to accept this as President Musharraf said: 'Nine eleven came as a thunderbolt. I confronted acute challenges. I decided on the route of opportunities. I had to absorb external pressure and mould domestic opinion towards my decision. It was a tough decision.'¹⁰⁷

'Operation Enduring Freedom' started in October 2001. Pakistan gave three air bases to the U.S. This created anti-Pakistan feelings not only among the Afghan brothers but also among the many Pakistanis. This dramatically reversed the previous decade's policy of trying to influence Afghan politics through the Taliban. The policy reversal immediately brought the state into conflict with the pro-Taliban elements in Pakistan. Musharraf government despite being a key ally of the US war on terror has been constantly pushed by Washington, "To Do More" in the tribal areas and prevent cross-border attacks on Afghan and coalition military forces. Because of so much pressure Pakistani government negotiated with tribesmen and for the first time in their history they agreed to allow military presence on assurance that it would bring in funds and development programs without interfering in their internal tribal and cultural aspects of life.

4:i The Position of FATA

Today, FATA is being called a cause and center of militancy by many, not only in Pakistan but even the Afghan government and the international community is blaming Pakistan for giving a safe haven to militants there while, FATA people feel that they are being subjected to killings and forcible displacements not only by the US and NATO forces but by the Pakistani army and the militant groups as well. The international

¹⁰⁷ *Musharraf attends detailed briefing on Foreign Policy*, <http://www.fas.org> (accessed 8 June, 2008).

community and global media term FATA as the factor of instability in the region, but most people in the country and even outside believe otherwise, as it is basically due to the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan.

FATA is the focus of world attention once again and despite its extreme poverty and backwardness have always played a pivotal role in the history of the region. There is a society distinguished for its hospitality, bravery, culture and traditions. FATA has been in international focus, since the Cold War years between the two superpowers of the time for its geo strategic location but it was ignored as the Soviet forces left Afghanistan till the incident of 9/11. Tribesmen, realizing the situation welcomed the troop's deployment. The people of FATA have conservative Islamic orientation but they have their *Jirga* system (the assembly of elders and influential people) for resolving disputes.

Unfortunately very little attention was paid to the development activities of these tribal areas. In 1999 and even till 2001, the total budget for FATA used to be no more than 800 to 900 million rupees for 3.5 million people and over 27,000 sq kilometers of area. Gradually, it was increased and today it stands at roughly 7.5 billion rupees, close to 100 million US dollars. It is, indeed, a very small amount considering the area, population, and the potential for development. FATA was neglected and unfortunately no serious attempt was made by any government to bring the tribal areas into the national mainstream.

4:ii Post 9/11 Army Operations

In the first week of December 2001, the Allied Forces launched an operation in *Tora Bora in Koh-e-Sufaid* (White-mountain) opposite to Kurram agency on the Afghan side by keeping the Pakistan government and its military command uninformed. In this

operation, many Arab fighters of Al Qaeda crossed over into Kurram Agency and were arrested whereas 8 to 10 militants died in encounter with the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) while some militants might have hid in search of refuge due to the absence of LEAs in those "No-go areas"¹⁰⁸. There was realization of this possible movement on the Pakistan side and as Pakistan did not want it to happen, the decision was taken to deploy Pakistan army in the area. As a result of this decision, there were more than 240 people who came across and were caught without a shot being fired.

In 2003, Pakistani security forces entered into FATA to prevent spillover of operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan and stop miscreants, deny use of territory for terrorist activities, open up hitherto no go areas and integrate FATA into the national mainstream. Taking advantage of the proximity of border, rugged terrain, semi autonomous nature of FATA, old Afghan war ties and common religious beliefs on both sides some foreign elements and Taliban found sanctuaries in FATA¹⁰⁹. Presently over 120,000 security forces (Army and Frontier Corps) are guarding the 1100 check posts on the western border.

Four pronged strategy was adopted: deployment of forces to open up the area for military operations, initiating political process and bringing the area into the mainstream, starting administrative measures and carrying out development works. In FATA, security forces have carried out 161 major and minor operations against extremists with unprecedented success by killing over 3000 terrorists and capturing almost 4000 while

¹⁰⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tora_Bora (accessed 30 October, 2010).

¹⁰⁹ <http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/awpreview/TextContent.aspx?pld=366> (accessed 30 October, 2010).

over 1400 officers and men of Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps embraced *Shahadat*. Military Operations created conducive environment for political process.

Pakistan army entered very peacefully into Khyber agency and "No-go areas" such as *Tirah*, east of Kurram agency, and *Shawal* in North Waziristan and South Waziristan.

In March-April 2002 Coalition Forces launched an operation "Anaconda" near North and South Waziristan on Afghanistan side by keeping Pakistan in the darkness. Nevertheless, Pakistan had to deploy a brigade comprising of about 8-10 thousand soldiers and cleared the *Shawal* area with the cooperation of the tribesmen.

All tribal agencies have cultural, ethnic and historical links with Afghanistan and are ethnically and ideologically close to Taliban. South Waziristan having about 300 kilometers border with Afghanistan became the hub of Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements as most of the Al-Qaeda associates; nearly 500 were captured from this area and handed over to the US authorities¹¹⁰.

Pakistan after being reported by Allied Forces regarding Al Qaeda elements hideouts in Mohmand Agency with almost one-fourth of its area as inaccessible and on 20 June 2003 Pakistan Army started its journey in the morning and by 6'o clock in the evening reached the Afghan border, almost just as a walkover. The army along with the *Jirga* people did come under slight fire near *Lala Pass* by some miscreants believed to be from the Afghan side and by August 2003; all the inaccessible areas were under army's control.

¹¹⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waziristan_Agency (accessed 30 October, 2010).

Pakistan army had carried out four military operations in the tribal area since the September 11 attacks: the first on 27 June 2002; the second on 2 October 2003, the third on 8 January 2004 and the fourth on 13 March 2004. The earlier operations lacked public support.

In October 2003 Military operation was started in Angoor Adda, South Waziristan, and in January 2004, an unsuccessful second operation was launched but except arresting 25 local suspects no Al-Qaeda elements were found. On 28 February there was a firing incident in which 11 persons were killed and another six injured. As a reaction, the tribals along the border fired rockets at the Pakistani troops that were deployed to hunt down the Al-Qaeda elements. As a punitive measure, the Ahmadzai, a leading sub-tribe of the Wazirs was collectively fined for Rs. 5.4 million under the law of “collective responsibility” for failing to prevent these attacks.

The fourth operation since 9/11 after the expiry of the dead line of 20 February 2004, was launched in March 2004 which involved 2,000 soldiers and militiamen (Wazirsitan Scouts and *khasadars* in villages) near Wana, including SSG and the Quick Reaction Force, based in Tarbela having 14 helicopters on “search and destroy” missions. About 20 local tribesmen including some foreign women were captured while the houses of suspected tribesmen were razed for providing shelter to militants like Saudis, Egyptians, Yemenis, Uzbeks and Chechens were razed.

Pakistani political opposition alleged these attacks at the behest of the US, while the government would as usual deny it while the world appreciated Pakistan’s efforts to counter terrorism but Karzai government would still accuse Pakistan of half-hearted attempts to curb “cross border” terrorism. Moreover, the two assassination attempts on

Musharraf in December 2003 with alleged Al-Qaeda links had convinced the government to pursue more determinedly its anti-terrorist policies.

4:iii Madrassah Air Strike

On 30 October 2006, Pakistani army conducted an air strike with possible U.S. involvement, against a *madrassa* in Damadola Bajaur region bordering Afghanistan, killing 70 to 80 people. In retaliation for the attack militants on 8 November 2006 conducted a suicide bombing on an army camp, killing 42 Pakistani soldiers and wounding 20 others. The Madrassa air strike of the Pakistan army with the possible U.S. collaboration created hue and cry throughout the country and created sympathies for the miscreants in all segments of the society. All religious organizations, civil society, and political parties condemned this brutal act which tarnished the image of the government and the military. This incident subsequently led to the rise of the emergence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in Bajuar Agency which was later on to be crushed by the military after heavy losses from both sides¹¹¹.

The Operation of Bajaur was a great success story by security forces, which commenced in August 2008 following highhandedness by militants in the agency. Over 1600 militants were killed in the operation including some important commanders and foreigners while 86 security forces personnel also embraced *Shahadat*. Agency was cleansed of militants and writ of the government was restored¹¹².

Pakistan's military operations continued after that and are still continuing in Bajaur and Mohmand while some limited operation is taking place in Khyber Agency.

¹¹¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damadola_airstrike (accessed 31 October, 2010).

¹¹² <http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/awpreview/TextContent.aspx?pld=366> (accessed 30 October, 2010).

The operation in Swat - settled area was very successful where the estimates are that Pakistani forces killed over 2500 people allegedly linked with Taliban elements. Over 1,200 of Pakistan's own troops have been killed and over 3,000 were wounded. Regarding the foreigners present and killed in FATA, different nationalities are mentioned.

4:iv Post 9/11 Situation in Afghanistan and its Impact

Pakistan has suffered a lot due to military interventions in Afghanistan as during the Soviet Union invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan as the frontline state had to render a lot of sacrifices in the form of massive influxes of refugees:- about six million and at least 2.6 million are still in Pakistan; and introduction of weapons and drug culture in the society. After the Soviet troop's withdrawal, Afghanistan was left in civil war from which the country never recovered. The Taliban appearance was the main consequence of abandoning Afghanistan.

The U.S. blamed Osama bin Laden for 9/11 attacks and approached the then Afghan government of Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden to the United States which the latter refused to oblige on their own principles, right or wrong. Afghanistan was invaded and objectives of the invasion were to kill or capture Osama bin Laden, and destroy the potential of Al-Qaeda as a threat to the world, destroy and replace Taliban with a democratic government in Afghanistan leading to reconstruction, rehabilitation and socioeconomic development¹¹³. Interestingly, the strategy used for this was predominantly military.

¹¹³ <http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/10/29/30196391.html> (accessed 30 October, 2010).

However, in view of the above tall claims of reconstruction, rehabilitation and socioeconomic development and the current situation in Afghanistan, the picture is very pathetic. After the passage of almost 9 Years after the US attack, the whereabouts of Osama are still unknown. Taliban have been overthrown but they are still active and potential threat with a rising resistance. As per the Coalition forces estimates that hardcore Taliban were few hundred but these few hundred Taliban are still fighting the forces of 39 countries in Afghanistan - an estimated 140,000 troops of the most modern armies of the world. Due to these military operations and resultant collateral damage, starting fighting alongside the Taliban has also alienated peaceful segments of the society. This Taliban movement has now snowballed into a form of a nationalist liberation war.

As far as establishing democracy is concerned, elections were held in Afghanistan, but the vast majority of Pukhtoon community was marginalized politically which had been felt by the Pukhtoon majority. They also feel that the U.S. and Northern alliance have common interests as all the government departments including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Police etc have been dominated by the Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek minorities. Resultantly, their democracy is confined to the capital Kabul with no hold or control over the rest of the country.

A lot of money was promised for reconstruction and rehabilitation but much less was actually released - US \$15 billion as against the promised \$25 billion¹¹⁴. But the pace

¹¹⁴ http://www.ips.org.pk/international-relation/global-issues-a-politics/1057.html#_ftn7 (accessed 30 October, 2010).

of development initiatives is very slow mainly due to the security situation, as well corruption of the Afghan government¹¹⁵.

4:v 9/11 and Extremism in FATA

Before 9/11, Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was peaceful as the ongoing insurgency is not a local phenomenon; instead extremism has spilled over into Pakistan from the Western borders where the U.S. and its Allied Forces have miserably failed in achieving their stated targets. The areas were stable even during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and later during the infighting among various Afghan groups despite the fact that about one-fourth of the total five million Afghan refugees were living together in the tribal areas. There were no suicide attackers and no militancy. Taliban were present but no one had ever heard of militant Taliban till March 2004.

Even in the initial years after the US attack on Afghanistan in 2001, this tribal belt remained calm. NATO and American operations without intimating Pakistani authorities has resulted in foreign militants being pushed into Pakistani areas. Agreements with militants that could ensure peace in the area were sabotaged with air strikes, pressure and propaganda - resulting in expansion of the militancy. Youth of the area are getting inclined towards extremism because FATA is underdeveloped, with scarce social services and almost no job opportunities despite having vast potential for development, i.e. in the mineral sector etc. National strategy about the "War on Terror" needs to be reviewed and the development potential of FATA should be exploited.

¹¹⁵ <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/article683261.ece> (accessed 30 October, 2010).

Before 9/11 there was peace and tranquility in the tribal areas of Pakistan and whatever extremist's activities take place in the tribal areas today, it is the outcome of the U.S. invasion on Afghanistan and ensuing events. Our tribal areas have become the centers of militancy and violence besides its spread towards settled areas like Swat, Malakand, and the surrounding belt of Peshawar, Bannu, and D.I.Khan etc. Currently, Pakistan has deployed about 120,000 Pakistani troops on the western border and they are engaged in fierce battles in Bajaur, Mohmand, Swat and parts of Khyber Agency.

Hundreds of Pakistanis have lost their lives in suicide attacks all across the country. Pakistani economy has been literally destroyed; while the leadership has to beg like professional beggars for the survival of the economy. Pakistan has lost its image, as the West and Coalition forces perceive that Pakistan sponsors terrorism, which is totally wrong. "In terms of damage, casualties and psychological setback, no country fighting terror has suffered as much as Pakistan. Yet, it is being perceived as a threat itself¹¹⁶".

Despite the fact that coalition forces are in Afghanistan for the last nine years but the world has been very negative regarding the presence and assistance of 2.5 million refugees in Pakistan¹¹⁷. Conversely, there are elements that like always try to exploit this unstable situation. One can find linkages between instability in Afghanistan and resultant troubles in FATA and the deteriorating situation in Balochistan.

Due to the anti-US and anti-West sentiments in the country, the common man terms the "War on Terror" as an American war, which is being fought by the Pakistan government. There is no credibility of our own government in the minds of the people.

¹¹⁶ http://www.ips.org.pk/international-relation/global-issues-a-politics/1057.html#_ftn7 (accessed 30 October, 2010).

¹¹⁷ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_refugees (accessed 30 October, 2010).

Pakistanis in general and the tribesmen in particular were disenchanted from the government and the military for embracing the U.S. war on terror. Anti-government feelings increased in the public due to the loss of civilian casualties and the consequent devastation it brought in these areas whereas the Taliban have also lost their respect by roughly handling the people in Swat, South Waziristan and Orakzai Agencies.

The rising trend in militancy has led to the emergence of many criminal groups in the garb of Taliban and other religious militants, which are now active in the tribal region's seven agencies, six FR regions and some settled districts. They kidnap people for ransom and failing to pay the demand of ransom the kidnapped is either killed or kept in prolonged detention. Kidnapping for ransom is now a common feature of the Pakhtoon belt, both in settled and the tribal areas. Moreover, in some cases, the criminals also slaughter the kidnapped individuals so that the rest of the people are terrorized.

Militancy has ruined the Pakhtoon social structure. The *Maliks* and elders system is its prime target. First, the militants killed a large number of tribal *Maliks* and elders in South and North Waziristan, and Orakzai, Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies and then they repeated the same tactic in Swat. The militants are now killing elders and *Maliks* in Orakzai, Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies whereas they are equally terrorized in Kurram and Khyber Agencies.

Moreover, some *Jirgahs* of tribesmen were targeted in tribal areas through suicide bombings: first *Jirgah* was targeted by a suicide attacker in Darra Adam Khel, causing the killing of at least 35 elders and wounding many others. The second *Jirgah* was targeted in Bajaur Agency and the third and the most deadly suicide attack was on a

Jirgah in Dabori, Orakzai Agency killing more than 100 prominent tribal elders & *Maliks* which had planned to chalk out a strategy against militants.

The rising militancy coupled with the extreme poverty has also led to sectarianism in the already troubled society of tribal areas. Both Shia-Sunni extremists target each other particularly in Kurram Agency and Hangu district in KPK for the last four years where both sects initiate war on pity issues¹¹⁸. The militants also hunt the employers of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and no NGO worker may dare to work in open in the militants affected areas.

Another most affected segment of FATA and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa is the civil Society. These people due to their education and grooming tend to be moderate, pro-democracy and anti-extremism by holding liberal views are suspected by the miscreants as well as by the government forces and are in some cases subjected to torture and even killing. Many journalists have been so far killed by miscreants for writing pro-government or anti-miscreants news and columns etc., in the newspapers.

The miscreants are destroying health, educational and other public welfare related facilities, which were either established by the government, the private sector or by welfare organizations. The people are now faced with humanitarian crisis in some of the areas.

¹¹⁸ *Military controls situation with the help of Elders of both groups*, <http://www.dawnnews.com> (accessed 12 January, 2008).

CHAPTER 5: MAJOR FACTORS OF EXTREMISM

Extremism is not a product of a single factor rather there are many factors of extremism in the tribal belt of Pakistan, however, all of them are not intended to be explained rather some major factors will be explained as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

5:i Social Factors: Education system

Among the social factors, the researcher will endeavour to highlight the role of education system prevailing in FATA. The dubious educational system is among a number of problems that individuals and groups face on daily basis in Pakistan. Despite huge educational expenditures and budgets allocated by the Governments, the double standards are still there. This has been one of the reasons that the true talent never gets an opportunity to prove them whereas it also becomes a source of breeding extremism in the society in the long run.

While entering the practical life one of the most horrendous discrimination that is made in employment sectors, is that individuals with better command over English language are given priority on those who cannot speak this language in a fluent way. Some times this kind of attitude adopted by organizations gives an impression that the required merit is not dependent on marks and distinctions but rather a command over this language. One cannot underestimate or denounce the importance of English language but it is absolutely discrimination, if your qualification is ignored and merely a speaking power is given more importance.

This is one of the flaws of our education system coupled with other problems of education, which the researcher is going to discuss here. There are two different systems

of education in our country, which is the real problem both on ideological as well as economic front.

Today the government school system does not offer good environment and opportunity. Pakistan has a divisive education system which has created a huge gap between the “Have's and Have not's”. This system has deeply penetrated into our culture, the results of which are division of society. Different tiers have been created in the system over a period of 64 years to facilitate the hold of the elite over the nation. Until and unless drastic changes are brought to correct the education system, there will be problems as far as social cohesion on economic lines is concerned.

5:i: a Categories of Education System

The multiple tier education system is highlighted in the following categories¹¹⁹:

5:i: a: i Cambridge Education system

This foreign education system is aimed for the children of u[per rich class so that they can after graduation go overseas for higher education. This category produces good professionals with good command over English language and modern sciences i.e. medicines, science and technology, and social sciences etc. Most of such students succeed in competitive examinations and occupy senior positions in the bureaucracy of the country.

¹¹⁹ “Pakistan’s Existing Education System”

<http://www.insaf.pk/Media/InsafBlog/tabid/168/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/1646/Pakistans-Existing-Education-System-Guest-Post-by-Mr-Fida-Hussain-Sayani.aspx> (accessed 05 November, 2010).

5:i: a: ii **Pakistan Secondary Education system**

Private and government schools provide this type of education, one for the middle class and the other for the poor. The one for the middle class has English as a medium of instruction in English and the other one in Urdu. The children from these institutions, if have good grades and the parental financial capital go to the colleges of their preference and the rest either becomes clerks, cashiers, sales person in a shop, worker in the factory or any other work which comes in their way.

5:i: a: iii **Madrassah Education System**

This category of education provides religious education to the students free of cost through the donations of rich and God fearing people. Here only subjects related to the religion of Islam are taught. These students after getting their degrees from the Madrassahs have no other option but to go the Madrassahs anywhere he might teach as a teacher or may be employed as a Khateeb/imam in a Masjid. Most such students are from the poor backgrounds.

Pakistan's redundant education system has become a matter of international concern. Lack of access to quality education, which limits economic opportunity, makes Pakistani youths the target of extremist groups. About half of the adult population of Pakistan can't read, and net primary enrollment rates remain the lowest in South Asia. The education system is faced with inadequate government funding, lack of institutional capacity, and a poor curriculum that leads to intolerance and extremism. Some efforts have been taken by the government of Pakistan, the West and the World Bank to reform the system but still there serious challenges in this sector.

A 'Dysfunctional' System

Three different streams in education i.e., public schools, private schools, and Islamic religious schools/Madrassahs have created unequal opportunities for students. Of the total number of students going to primary school, 73 percent go to public or government schools, 26 percent to private schools, and less than one percent to madrassahs¹²⁰. Within the public and the private sector, there are elite schools with a small minority of students. The majority of students attend low-quality private and public schools with poor curriculum, limited teaching materials, and inadequate number of trained teachers, or in many cases absent teachers.

The government-mandated curriculum is a major concern for Western observers who believe that it encourages intolerance and a narrow worldview. Except in some elite private schools, which do not follow the government-prescribed curriculum, all public schools and registered private schools have been required to teach Islamiyat, or Islamic studies, for nearly thirty years. However, it is the only reason to believe so as there are many other factors which are responsible for extremism.

A 2003 report covering curriculum and textbooks by the Islamabad-based independent Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) claimed that for two decades, the curricula and official textbooks in subjects such as English, social studies, civics, and Urdu has material which is contrary to the goals and values of a progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan¹²¹ which includes the curriculum and textbooks full of hate material by encouraging prejudice, bigotry and discrimination towards women, religious minorities, and other nations, especially India. Similarly, in 2004, Pervez

¹²⁰“Pakistan's Education System and Links to Extremism”http://www.cfr.org/publication/20364/pakistans_education_system_and_links_to_extremism.html#p1 (accessed 05 November, 2010).

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

Hoodbhoy, professor and chairman of Islamabad-based Quaid-i-Azam University wrote in *Foreign Affairs*: "Pakistani schools--and not just madrassas are creating zealots with a passion for jihad and martyrdom.

It is a fact that access at all levels to educational opportunities remains low. Few people educated in public schools are able to get higher position of social mobility. There is also a gender gap in schools with the girls having fewer enrollments in schools.

Government Reform Plans

Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, there was an insistence that Islam was to form the basis of the education system. After assuming power in a coup in 1977, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq made Islamic studies compulsory at all levels of education through colleges, and declared madrasa certificates equivalent to normal university degrees. Several successive governments made efforts to tackle curriculum reform through new education policies, but could not be successful as expected.

Pakistan's weak education sector is a result of lack of commitment to education and poor implementation of policies. It recognizes pervasive corruption in the system whereas the government's current spending on education i.e., 2.7 percent of gross domestic product, which is not adequate.

5:i: b National Education Policy

The National Education Policy 2009 has suggested the following policy actions:

- ◇ Increase spending on education to 7 percent of GDP;
- ◇ Increase public-private partnerships;
- ◇ Introduce subjects taught in regular schools in madrassahs;

- ◊ Increase teacher training, enact curriculum reform, and improve teaching aid materials;
- ◊ Introduce food-based incentives to increase enrollment and improve retention, especially for girls.

Some experts believe that most of the reforms remain on papers only as new textbooks written as a result of curriculum reform in 2002 have not yet been printed. Since then, there have been two more education policies (in 2006 and 2009). There are also doubts about the government's ability to spend the allocated money on education. Moreover, 20 percent to 30 percent of all government funds allocated to any sector is not spent.

Reforms in education system in the country's restive regions, where the government is busy in fighting the extremists, may be even more difficult. In FATA male literacy is 29.5 percent as compared to the national average of 54.8 percent and female literacy is only 3 percent compared to the national average of 32 percent¹²². There are nine colleges which teach the intermediate and degree levels, but they only accept males whereas there is only one degree college for women in FATA's Quarram Agency.

5:i: c The 'Madrassa Issue

The Madrassahs rose as colleges of learning in the Islamic world in the 11th century, though there were institutions of learning earlier. They catered not only to the religious establishment, though that was the dominant influence over them, but also the secular one and supplied religious scholars, physicians, administrative officials, judges and teachers.

¹²² *Ibid.*

In 1947 there were only 189 madrassahs in Pakistan. In 2002 the country had 10,000-13,000 unregistered madrassahs with an estimated 1.7 to 1.9 million students. A 2008 estimate puts this figure at "over 40,000"¹²³. Most madrassahs in Pakistan cater to the dominant Sunni sect.

After the 9/11 incident Pakistan's religious schools or madrassahs came into lime light being dubbed for violence and extremism. Since then, there has been much debate over madrassahs and their connection to militancy.

In Pakistan in the 1980s, Madrassahs underwent a complete change under Zia's Islamization efforts, probaly for playing a role in the anti-Soviet campaign in neighboring Afghanistan that radicalized some of these madrassahs. New madrassahs established, funded and supported by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. where students were encouraged to join the Afghan resistance. The same is true about the Taliban who were mostly educated in Pakistani Madrassahs.

Actual numbers of madrassahs in Pakistan remain a point of contention among scholars. The enrollment in madrassahs comprises a very small share of the full-time education market, as low as 1 percent. Even in the Pashtoon belt bordering Afghanistan where they are most popular, the study says madrassa enrollment is less than 7.5 percent. Experts say there is no credible information for the number of unregistered madrassahs, but estimates of registered madrassahs range from ten thousand to twenty thousand¹²⁴.

There has also been concern that madrassas in Pakistan's tribal areas provide suicide attackers in Afghanistan. Some people believe that suicide attackers in

¹²³ "Madrassas in Pakistan" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrassas_in_Pakistan (accessed 05 November, 2010).

¹²⁴ "Pakistan's Education System and Links to Extremism" http://www.cfr.org/publication/20364/pakistans_education_system_and_links_to_extremism.html#p1 (accessed 05 November, 2010).

Afghanistan have been drawn mostly from madrassahs across the border in Pakistan. Analysts also point to the role of madrassahs in sectarian conflict as some madrassahs are founded on sectarian lines and their primary objective is to produce students and religious scholars capable of defending the virtues of a particular school of thought. However, some experts have challenged assumptions of these schools as major militant hubs. All madrassahs are not involved in *Jihadi* training as well as suicide bombers. In many cases, unemployed youth are the most vulnerable targets of suicide hunters.

5:1: d Reforms in Madrassahs

The government of Pakistan has recently taken some steps to reform madrassahs, but it has little success so far. In 2001, former President Pervez Musharraf promulgated the Pakistan Madrassah Education Board Ordinance to establish three model madrassahs which would include regular school subjects such as English, mathematics, and computer science in their curricula. In 2002, it was followed up with a Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance promising funding to madrassahs that formally registered with the government. But so far only five hundred madrassahs have accepted curriculum reforms since 2002¹²⁵.

Some experts advise against madrassah reform. CFR's Markey says that madrassahs have never been intended to be more than seminaries and to violate that tradition in the name of an education program seems to be misplaced but Saleem H. Ali, visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, opined about curricular reforms at madrassahs as well as international support for such programs that indirect U.S. support could be offered through capacity-building programs for teachers across all sectors,

¹²⁵ "Madrassa Reform in tatters" <http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-madrassa-reforms-in-tatters-qs-03> (accessed 05 November, 2010).

including madrassahs¹²⁶. Broad educational enhancement of the madrassahs will be essential to prevent Pakistan's slide towards a failed nuclear state as it will enable the students to have respectable livelihood through the degrees of the modern sciences.

5:i: e U.S. Funding

Since 2002, the USAID has invested over \$682 million for reforming Pakistan's education system. In September 2009, the U.S. Congress approved a new bill authorizing \$1.5 billion a year in nonmilitary aid for the next five years starting in 2010 while the bill does not earmark a specific amount for education, it is authorized to provide assistance in educational reform including programs for development of modern, nationwide school curriculums for public, private, and religious schools and support for the oversight of all educational institutions, including religious schools¹²⁷..

However, there are concerns in the Western World about the transparent use of the aid money for the uplift of educational projects as some believe that a large portion of development assistance is spent on international consultants and overhead costs besides, the poor record of the Pakistani government on transparency and distribution of aid.

5:i: f Recommendations

For bringing reforms into the education system of the country, the following reforms are recommended:

- ◊ The growth of low-cost private schools is generally more efficient than public schools and hence, boosting the private sector will help reform the system.

¹²⁶ "Pakistan's Madrassas: The Need for Internal Reform and the Role of International Assistance" http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/08_pakistan_ali.aspx (accessed 05 November, 2010).

¹²⁷ "Education program" <http://www.usaid.gov/pk/sectors/education/> (accessed 05 November, 2010).

- ◇ Modern subjects should be incorporated in the syllabus of madrassahs.
- ◇ Madrassahs students should also be imparted technical education.
- ◇ Factors such as physical distance to schools and presence of female teachers are usually considered as an important determinant for girls' education.
- ◇ Stipends can help to encourage parents to send their children to schools when incentives other than quality of education are a determinant in enrollment.

Madrassahs reforms are possible if sincere efforts are undertaken by the government other than under the dictates of the West. The U.S. led war on terror is also its main factor besides, the Iranian funded madrassahs mushroom growth in the country.

5:ii Economic Factors

It is important to explain extremism in terms of suicide bombing as being caused by poverty and lack of education. But this cannot be said with finality though it will be very helpful for the policy makers to hear or others seeking to influence international aid and development policy for positively affecting counter terrorism efforts. The core problem, which spreads extremism, is the unjust distribution of wealth around the world, which is further complicated by the IMF and the World Bank.

People with good economic growth are less inclined towards extremism and similarly, political activism, including violent activity, is less attractive for people with good economic opportunities¹²⁸. In other words economic growth decreases extremism.

¹²⁸“Causes of Terrorism Are (Still) Political”, <http://terrorism.about.com/od/causes/a/NewTerrorism.htm> (accessed 02 November, 2010).

Hence, there is a close link between counter terrorism policy, and international aid and development policies.

It is argued by some that terrorists have higher educations and incomes than expected. This is very true in the case of Palestinian Hamas suicide bombers and extremists who were comparatively not from the poor backgrounds. Here, it is necessary that they follow a just mission which is clear to every body whereas the poverty and illiteracy element is considered reasonable as far as Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas extremists are concerned. TTP has been using suicide bombers and extremists belonging to the poor economic and educational backgrounds against the security forces of Pakistan.

5:ii:a State of FATA Economy

Pakistan military support for US in Afghanistan during the Mujahideen war against the Soviets in Afghanistan led Pakistani society into extremism and as the U.S. left Pakistan got deprived of the U.S. economic assistance coupled with by the burden of almost four million Afghans on its soil as well the resultant unemployment of its own citizens further increased poverty. Zia-ul Haq Islamization process encouraged Madrassahs system and religious segments of the society. The poor segments of society had no financial resources to afford their children education costs and had to send their kids to Madrassahs, some of which were imparting education with a specific mindset¹²⁹.

¹²⁹"Factors contributing to Extremism and Radicalization", <http://waziristanhills.com/FATA/FATAinGeneral/FactorsofExtremismandRadicalization/tabid/123/language/en-GB/Default.aspx> (accessed 02 November, 2010).

On the other hand the Iranians also kept supporting the Shia community through their funding and expertise with a view to strengthen them for playing a forceful political role in Pakistan, which led to sectarian strife and ultimately Shia Sunni tensions. So, both sides created a large army of extremist youth having no skills except becoming Mullahs or to fight Jihad.

FATA is the most impoverished belt of Pakistan with majority of its population living in rural areas. According to a WHO report of 2001 nearly 50 per cent of tribesmen are living in abject poverty, 75 per cent have no access to clean drinking water. Problems of infant and maternal mortality are severe. The population growth rate is 3.9 per cent as compared to nationally cited figures of 3 per cent. The literacy rate is 29.3 per cent against the national average of 40 per cent while female literacy is less than one percent. In this regard the following two tables indicating selected development indicators for Pakistan, Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa and FATA.

Table: I**Selected Development Indicators for Pakistan, KPK and FATA: 1998, 2003**

Indicator	Pakistan	KPK	FATA
Literacy ratio (both sexes, %)	43.92	35.41	17.42
Male literacy ratio (%)	54.81	51.39	29.51
Female literacy ratio (%)	32.02	18.82	3.00
Population per doctor	1,226	4,916	7,670
Population per bed in health institutions	1,341	1,594	2,179
Roads (per sq km)	0.26	0.13	0.17

Source: FATA Secretariat, "Socio Economic Indicators" [http:// www.fata.gov.pk](http://www.fata.gov.pk)

Table: II**Demographic Indicators (Pakistan, KPK and FATA, 1998)**

Indicator	Pakistan	KPK	FATA
Geographical area (sq km)	796,096	74,521	27,220
Annual population growth, 1981-98 (%)	2.69	2.82	2.19
Average household size (persons)	6.80	8.00	9.30
Urban population (% of total)	32.50	16.87	2.70
Population density (persons per sq km)	166.30	238.10	116.70

Source: FATA Secretariat, "Socio Economic Indicators" [http:// www.fata.gov.pk](http://www.fata.gov.pk)

With around 3 percent of the national population, FATA receives only about 1 percent of the national budget. Nearly 66 per cent of households live below the poverty line. The per capita income in FATA is half that of Pakistan's national average¹³⁰. FATA had the country's highest emigration ratio even before the advent of extremists, further increased by the army operations by displacing thousands of people. The unemployment rate is 60 to 80 percent. In view of the situation depicted above, it is argued that the main cause of the rise of extremism and terrorism in Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa and the tribal

¹³⁰ "Factors of Extremism and Radicalization" <http://waziristanhills.com> (accessed 02 November, 2010).

areas is due to adverse economic conditions affecting livelihoods, employment, social sector and infrastructure¹³¹.

5:ii:b Economic Impact of Afghan Crisis on Tribal Areas

Economically, FATA is very poor as there are no industrial units available in these territories while their resources are meager with scarce agricultural lands. The settlement of millions of Afghan refugees in the tribal areas depleted their meager resources.

Most of the Afghans migrants were un-skilled and poor, so they rushed towards the towns to find jobs and agreed to work even with 50% less of the Pakistani workers' wages as the aid coming from the Aid Giving Agencies was not sufficient for their needs. Other Afghans were rich urbanites and had relatives abroad¹³². They rented houses or purchased properties in the towns and established their own businesses there. They also occupied the transport business, thus damaging the tribesmen economically. Gradually, the Afghans also monopolized the business in the tribal towns, particularly, in Khyber Agency where smuggled goods shopping plazas (Karkhano Market near Jamrud) emerged on the main road of the agency, which made businesses for the local tribesmen very competitive and difficult.

The prices of properties also rose tremendously when the rich Afghan refugees initiated purchasing properties in the tribal areas, which made it difficult for the common tribesmen to purchase lands for themselves. The Afghans settling in the towns overloaded the inadequate civic facilities besides, overcrowding hospitals and other such public

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Syed Minhajul Hassan, ed., "The Impact of the Afghan on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan" Seminar on Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan held in Peshawar 7-8 December 2004, (Peshawar University: Area Study Centre 2004), 59.

facilities, which created anger among the tribesmen¹³³. The Afghan refugees also affected the environment and health of the tribal people besides, destroying the forest and grazing.

5:ii: c Economy and Livelihood

The people of FATA have very little livelihood opportunities, as the local economy is mainly pastoral with very limited cultivable agricultural lands. The tribesmen are usually committed locally in the primary-level activities such as subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing, or small-scale business whereas some are engaged in trade within the tribal belt or down-country markets. Women have active role in agricultural activities, besides attending to household work and family duties.

5:ii:d Industry

Tribal areas are ignored in terms of industrial development, as there are very few limited industries in the tribal belt and some unorganized mining. Despite significant potential for investment in the mineral sector, the FATA region has not been able to attract investments in setting up industries using locally available raw materials. Unemployed youth is comprised of unskilled labourers or they join local security and paramilitary forces. Some go in search of livelihood to other parts of the country while some leave for Middle East for supporting their families. Some are permanently settled in other cities along with their families.

5:ii:e Agriculture

Though most of the cultivable land of FATA region is un-irrigated yet there exist markets for certain fruits grown in the region. The climate and soil composition is

¹³³ *Ibid.*

conducive for vegetable and fruit production. The total cultivated area of the FATA region is only 0.91 percent as compared to national total of 21.99 million hectares. Only 0.42 percent of the cultivable area is irrigated as compared to 18.9 percent for the whole country.

Per acre yields of all major crops are low. Per capita income of the rural population is assumed to be well below the national average as is proved by the fact that over 50% of the population lives below the poverty line whereas the official national average is 38 %.

This problem has been further compounded by the ban on poppy cultivation in the region by the government. Poppy being a cash crop and grown on marginal lands provided some incentive.

Shahid Javed Burki writes in an article in the “Daily *Dawn*” dated 05 January 2010 that “There cannot be any doubt that there is a relationship between poor economic performance and the rise of extremism and resort to insurgency. That such a relationship exists and should inform counterinsurgency efforts is contested by some experts¹³⁴”.

Pakistan’s extremism hit areas are more backward belt and falls behind the rest of the country in almost all the socio-economic indicators. Punjab, the country’s largest populated province with 55 per cent of the total economy and 57 per cent of the GDP is followed by Sindh, the second largest populated province of almost 23 per cent with 27.5 per cent of GDP. Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa has 13.7 per cent of the population but only eight per cent of GDP. Balochistan, the largest province in terms of area with richest energy and mineral resources has more than five per cent population with only three per

¹³⁴ “Economics and extremism” <http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/19-economics-and-extremism-hh-04> (accessed 02 November, 2010).

cent of GDP. Although population and national income data for Fata are not very reliable but guess estimates for the share of the two are 2.4 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively. Islamabad, the last geographical entity in the country has 0.8 per cent of the population, and one per cent of GDP. Sindh with \$1,270 per capita income is the most prosperous province while KPK is the poorest with only \$606. Fata has slightly more income per head of \$663, mostly remittances sent by workers from other cities of Pakistan as well as from the Middle East¹³⁵.

Poverty and economic inequalities in Pakistan have caused extremism and violence against the government and its people, though some of them may be ideologically motivated for extremism, but overall, poverty plays an important role in encouraging extremist tendencies in the society. Therefore, focusing on skills training and job provision, the youth of any backward area needs to be given priority over other segments of the society.

There is an important question regarding the source of income of the extremist groups in the tribal belt of the country with the Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistan as one of the prominent groups for waging their warfare against the security forces of the country¹³⁶. When they were weak, they would collect donations from motivated religious minded affiliates as well as others but with the passage of time they got powerful and rich and resorted to other options. They would ask rich people of the area for donation for their “so-called Jihad” and in case of non-payment will kidnap or kill that individual. Another

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ “Taliban Sources of support” <http://politicsandlifesciences.wordpress.com/2009/09/18/taliban-sources-of-support/> (accessed 02 November, 2010).

method is to enforce monthly or quarterly payment on rich people of the area. Another method was to fix almost an affordable amount per family of the tribe and in this way a lot of amount will be collected with the Taliban. *Jizya* is also collected from the non-Muslim communities like Sikhs and Hindus. Moreover, government officials are kidnapped for demanding heavy extortions from their families. Besides, NGOs workers are very attractive for the Taliban zealots to kidnap for heavy ransoms. In one such case President of a human rights organization based at Islamabad Mr. Habib Malik Orakzai was kidnapped from Darra Adam Khel while coming from Kurram Agency to Islamabad and was released after getting ransom money from him. Some extremists groups are involved in smuggling of banned items from Afghanistan into the tribal areas and earn a lot of money from this easy source. In such cases they just allow the passage of smuggled goods from the area under their control. The extremist groups would add unemployed and poor youth to their fold by sharing some of the money with them. In this way extremists attract the youth.

5:ii:f Development in FATA under Army

As per ex-corps commander, Lt. General Ali Muhammad Orakzai about 25 percent territory of FATA was “no go” area, when the army entered the tribal areas¹³⁷. Total funds allocated for 2002-2003 Annual Development Programme were 214 per cent greater than received in 1999 whereas development projects worth Rs 600 million were already completed in FATA. Besides, 278 primary, 61 secondary and 594 community schools were opened in FATA during the tenure of Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai as Corps Commander while construction of 1,400 km roads was in addition to it.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

12 small dams were also planned in the area to meet the requirements of water and agriculture;

Army engineers completed a 19-km long Shilman-Shinpokh road to serve a population of around 20,000 and to link Khyber Agency with Mohmand Agency. A 12-km long Inzari Kandao-Choota Frontier road was also completed and in Tirah Valley, a 14 km Kemia Gul-Tor Dara track was opened to the public. More funds were expected in addition to Rs. 7.5 billion already allocated for the development work.

The Forestry Department has started a social forestry programme involving whole communities, with the government as facilitator, in 2.7 per cent of plains and easy slopes in the rugged mountain terrain of FATA.

There is great potential for developing gems and marble sectors on scientific lines for converting it into value added products. Two industrial estates of small-and-medium industries were to be established with the cooperation of private sector.

After the truce between the government forces and the five militants of the Zalikhel tribe on 24 April 2003, the new corps commander has announced Rs 91 million for undertaking development work in South Waziristan to build 177 kms of roads, five schools, two water supply schemes and 50 hand pumps.

As for development of Mohmand agency, more than Rs 344 million were given under the Annual Development Programme; Degree colleges were planned to be established at Agency headquarters' level to be followed by at the Tehsil level. Besides, a

hospital at the Agency headquarters and Basic Health Units (BHUs) were in the pipeline at grass root levels.

5:ii: g Corruption in FATA and Extremism

Transparency International ranked Pakistan 139th among 180 countries in its 2009 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) issued in November 2009¹³⁸. A World Bank report lists corruption and lack of transparency as the two core reasons that hamper Pakistan's drive for development. Many people in Pakistan believe that much of the development and a significant portion of the operations allocations are lost due to bribery and other related illegal and unethical activities. The extreme poverty and lack of infrastructure and basic services in the rural areas of FATA is in part fueled by bribery, influence peddling, extortion, and abuse of power. The people of Pakistan and the international donors must rise to the occasion and start pressuring the government to curb corruption and to improve governance in FATA. Failure for doing so will continue sufferings of the poor tribesmen which will further drag them towards extremism.

5:ii: h Composition of Corruption

The most comprehensive definition of "corruption" can be found at the web site of the Global Infrastructure Anti Corruption Center (GIACC) <http://www.giaccentre.org>, which says that, "In its wider sense, corruption includes one or more of bribery, extortion, fraud, deception, collusion, cartels, abuse of power, embezzlement, trading in influence

¹³⁸ "Corruption Index Transparency International"
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2009/nov/17/corruption-index-transparency-international#data>
 (accessed 04 November, 2010).

and money laundering". The purpose of corruption is to provide some one unfair advantage at the expense of either another individual entity (person or corporate) or a collective entity. In all cases, it is illegal, dishonest, and unethical. A bribe may be a cash payment or some valuable gift.

5:ii: j Corruption in FATA

Officials of political demonstration from the political agent to the lower clerk are involved in corruption and malpractices by receiving money in exchange for awarding a contract, job, promotion or approving invoices for payment. All departments in FATA as compared to the settled areas have more corruption. Contracts in FATA are awarded usually on ring system where the contractors, works department and the political administration officials in a deal fix the most favourable rates for the contractors and the remaining contractors who are left out of the bidding process, are given their pre-fixed share in the anticipated benefit of the contract besides, paying the share of the government officials in advance. An inspecting engineer also gets his share in the booty and approves the project for payment. A treasury official also receives money to pass contractor invoices knowing that inspection certificates lacks all required approvals.

Moreover, contracts are awarded without any bidding to the blue eyed Maliks and elders on the pretext of their active role in the maintenance of law and order situation in the area, however, in awarding such contracts, the officials get their commission in advance.

When any untoward incident happens, the officials of political administration start arresting innocent tribesmen under the pretext of collective responsibility, and are sent to lock ups and jails. The touts of the political administration then start negotiations with the poor and miserable heirs of the arrested people and get their relatives released after getting the required bribes from them or otherwise the accused will stay in the prison for an indefinite period. Similarly, in the dispute resolution also, the officials get bribes from both parties and the one paying more is given a favourable decision. Corruption is so rampant there that the tribesmen are bound to be attracted to extremist elements.

An important business publication such as World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report (2007-08) is of the view that corruption is the third greatest problem for companies doing business in Pakistan and lists the first two problems i.e. government bureaucracy and poor infrastructure¹³⁹. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is of the view that the World Bank and the Auditor General of Pakistan have complained about governance problems in recruitment, its selection, absenteeism and bribery. This has resulted in cancellation or suspension of some of the World Bank's projects such as the Balochistan Primary Education Project¹⁴⁰.

Permits and *Rahdari system* in FATA has also increased corruption otherwise the officials involved in the process will never give the permit to an individual who does not pay advance or periodical share of his profit as bribes. In this process unlimited permits are given to those people who are privy and shareholders of their benefits with Political

¹³⁹ "Corruption" (<http://www3.weforum.org/en/index.htm> (accessed 04 Novemebr, 2010).

¹⁴⁰ "Corruption in Pakistan hurts common People and Breeds Extremism" <http://iaoj.wordpress.com/2010/01/23/> (accessed 04 November, 2010).

agent or his concerned clerk. The unlimited issuance of permits and *Rahdaris* leads to smuggling to Afghanistan and back into the country which adversely affects the local population in the form of price hike of items like *Atta* and meat etc. This price hike may lead the poor poorer, which one day may make him the prey of extremists by recruiting him into their organization for carrying out extremist and sabotage activities.

To a varying degree, corruption exists in almost all countries. However, the degree to which corruption adversely impacts common people's lives and increases poverty is directly proportional to the level of corruption and how wide spread it is in the society. In a country like Pakistan, where each penny should be spent to uplift people from poverty, corruption has a very negative impact. The fields in which corruption negatively and directly affect the standard, thinking and reaction among the masses are defective infrastructure of roads, educational institutions, hospital facilities, water projects, bridges or housing units.

Causes of corruption in the FATA administration are lack of accountability, low salaries, and unrestrictive discretionary powers given to officials, ineffectiveness of anti-corruption bodies, passive and corrupt role of the office of the Auditor General (AG) of Pakistan's local officers, and the weak or partial role of media in highlighting the corrupt practices of political demonstration.

Some steps to curb corruption may be: increase in salaries of government officials in line with the remuneration prevalent in private sector; introduction of speedy judicial process for those involved in corruption; honesty and simplicity be encouraged as role models; media role should be proactive in launching anti-corruption campaigns; corrupt

effective for getting their rights from the usurpers. At the end of all planning, the extremists resort to violence as a last resort being left with no other option.

5:iii: a The Geographic and Demographic Profile

FATA has seven agencies with six frontier regions, which include Bajaur agency, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan agencies. Orakzai agency does not have a border with Afghanistan. Close to Khyber agency are Frontier Region (FR) Peshawar and FR Kohat - of which the famous Darra Adamkhel is a part. And down below are FR Bannu, FR Lakki, FR Tank and FR Dera Ismail Khan (see Appendix: I). The area is spread over 27,000 sq kilometers compared to Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa, which is over 100,000 sq kilometers. It has a population of 3.5 million as per 1998 census, which is underestimated; as very few had gone there to see the actual population. All the people of tribal areas are Muslims. It is an egalitarian society guided by local norms, values and traditions called *Pukhtoonwali* (*Pukhtoon* code of honour). Characteristics and traits of the FATA people include humanity, chivalry, revenge, honour, social equality, local autonomy, independence of tribes and sub-tribes. Historically, foreign interference has not been accepted.

FATA has been an underdeveloped region of the country despite the fact it has mainly located on the Durand Line with Afghanistan which the latter would claim it as its part in the early decades of Pakistan's birth by challenging legality of the Durand Line Agreement with the British which was inked between the Afghan Amir Abdu Rehman and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand (see Appendix: II). Ideally this part of the country should have been more developed so that the people could not be tempted towards the Afghan side. But this area's underdevelopment can be understood from its literacy rate

which is only 17 percent (as compared to the average 45% for Pakistan) and among the female population it is even low, just 3%. Similarly, the lack of health facilities also speaks of its backwardness as there is one bed in hospitals for every 2327 people as compared to 1450 in the rest of Pakistan. For a population of 8189, only one doctor is available and a mere 43% people have access to safe drinking water¹⁴¹.

5:iii: b Governance System

FATA enjoys a special constitutional status. The area falls under the executive authority of the federation, which appoints the Governor who is the Chief Executive of the tribal areas (see Appendix :III, IV, and V). Twelve members of National Assembly from FATA are elected on an adult franchise basis. But, they cannot legislate for FATA. There are also eight senators from FATA in the Senate of Pakistan. In the old structure of administration for FATA, the divisional commissioners enjoyed immense powers and prestige in the affairs of FATA (see Appendix-VI). Now a dedicated FATA Secretariat works with an Additional Secretary, Chief Secretary and four other secretaries heading various departments. A semi-autonomous body named FATA Development Authority was created in 2006 as a capacity building measure.

Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) of FATA Secretariat oversees four secretaries for finance, planning, law & order and administration and coordination. Before 2006, there was only one secretary in the Governor House who was responsible for all these functions besides, looking after the governor¹⁴². Due to a lot of corruption complaints, independent monitoring system is claimed to have been introduced in FATA in 2006 with

¹⁴¹ PAIMAN Alumni Trust, "FATA Analysis Report Part 1", (Overview 2008): 2.

¹⁴²http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57&Itemid=61, (accessed 30 October, 2010).

experts from both private and public sectors besides, Governor's Inspection Team. At the field level, there are Political Agents (PAs) who take care of administration.

The Frontier Corps is maintaining law and order in the agencies for over a hundred years. The system of political agents may be described as the "carrot and the stick" system i.e. development activities and the Frontier Corps under the political administration functioning as the stick respectively. In addition, there is *Khasadar* force recruited from the local tribes, and Levies to maintain law and order in the area. The institution of *Maliks* (tribal elders) also functions there¹⁴³.

5:iii: c Links of Political Factors with Extremism

In this regard some examples of movements, which resorted to extremist tactics as mentioned in the above paragraph are discussed here. For example, the Zionists who bombed British targets in 1930s mandate Palestine felt that they did it to create a Jewish state. The Irish Republican Army bombed English targets in the 1980s as a reaction to the British colonizing their lands. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Palestinian resistance groups' armed effort for the Liberation of Palestine was a justifiable response to the occupation of their lands. Osama Bin Laden's declaration of Jihad on American interests in the 1990s emerged from his faith that the presence of the U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia was against the Islamic teachings¹⁴⁴. So people who choose terrorist tactics are also persuaded that violence, or the threat of violence will be effective for their cause to achieve.

¹⁴³ <http://fata.gov.pk/> (accessed 30 October, 2010).

¹⁴⁴ "The Causes of Terrorism" http://terrorism.about.com/od/causes/a/causes_terror.htm (accessed 02 November, 2010).

If we analyse the above statement at local level especially at FATA level, we come to the conclusion that extremism in FATA has been caused by political factors. The tribesmen do not enjoy their full political and social freedom. There is a lengthy process to go the High Court against the decision of the Political agent, which even the middle class people cannot afford. There is no rule of law but the law of the jungle. Political agent has absolute powers i.e. financial, judicial, developmental, and administrative. There is no body else in Pakistan, which enjoys too many powers. Tribesmen are arbitrarily arrested, prosecuted and jailed without any legal trial or process. Even witnesses are not examined because the Political agent does not need them having super discretionary powers in his position.

The common wisdom views that extremism is inherently political because people adopt the path of extremism for political reasons, which is also termed as the “strategic” model of extremists¹⁴⁵. It points out that people resort to extremism when they come to believe that terrorism is beneficial for them in terms of political advantages of extremism because some issues cannot be resolved through peaceful protests. In the case of the tribesmen too, the political agent or his subordinates do not hear their voice as they are there for minting money and not for resolving the problems of the tribesmen or for service delivery. In the same way, the local representatives of the media also do not convey their voice to the mainstream media because they get “Brown Envelopes” from the political administration.

¹⁴⁵ “Political Rights and Terrorism”, <http://www.Terrorism is inherently political> (accessed 05 November, 2010).

5:iii: d FATA, the Dark Region of Pakistan

Ignorance of the world and the negative role of the media about the perception of FATA in the post September 11th period, has been developed of an area where only the gun-totting Al-Qaeda terrorists roam but they ignore that there were other factors of extremism in the FATA region as well which were older than the existence of Al-Qaeda. The justice system introduced by the British imperialists and supplemented by the Pakistani authorities under the framework of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901 is the basic hurdle in the way of access to justice. In the long run the systematic denial of the legal and judicial reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bred the seeds of institutionalized Taliban style of justice in the FATA region and the absence of the State structure and governance created the favourable environment for the rise of the extremist elements there which the country has to fight for a longer period facing human and material losses.

The government of Pakistan through its self proclaimed agreement of 1951-1952 with the tribal people living in FATA has undertaken to consult the tribes while deciding any issue as per their customs and traditions besides, maintaining law and order, carrying out developmental works, establishment of communications, defence, and public works (see Appendix: VII). The political agent is bound to work for the interest of the tribal people. In resolving various issues with the tribals, the political agent is also bound to use the powers entrusted in him under the 40 FCR rationally and not for his personal benefits against those whom he does not like while dealing them in his administration. But

unfortunately we observe that the seat of political agent has assumed very importance due to the financial benefits through corruption.

Still one feels that the political administration, provincial government or the federal government has not learnt any lesson from the past blunder of continuing with the decades old Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 and are hell bent by defending this draconian law, especially by the middle and upper class bureaucracy as well as a limited number of Maliks or the so called elders who have financial and political interests in the status quo.

5:iii: e Judiciary and the Role of Political Agent

The executive authority of the President of Pakistan has been extended to the FATA who rules it directly through the provincial governor. But ironically, the area is treated like an enemy occupied area with no sympathy for residents as the tribal region has been kept away from development. Under Article 247 (3) of the Constitution of 1973, no act of Parliament is applicable to the FATA or any part thereof unless the President of Pakistan so directs. The Governor of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa acts as the “agent” to the President of Pakistan.

In the field it is the political agent or in his absence, the Assistant Political Agent posted in each Agency of the FATA enjoys the supreme powers unimagined by any one in the civilized world, who is the real boss on the ground. He is both the judge and the jury. Under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901, the Political Agent or his deputy, the Assistant Political Agent, enjoys rampant powers – both executive and judicial.

There is no regulatory mechanism to check the misuse of powers by the Political Agent, which often results in serious human rights violations. Under the FCR, the tribal jirga or council tries the accused and submits its recommendations for conviction or acquittal to the Political Agent and the Political Agent makes a decision accordingly but he is not bound to follow the Jirga's recommendations¹⁴⁶. There is a very tough legal procedure for the tribesmen to challenge the verdict of the political agent as the matter decided by the political agent will be first challenged in the court of the Commissioner FCR, who is usually a grade 20 district cadre officer and after that the matter can be taken with the FCR Commission comprising of the Home Affairs Secretary and Law secretary etc. which is tedious and almost impossible process for the tribesmen. Every tribesman has to follow this procedure. So, the orders of the Political Agent cannot be challenged before the higher courts. In effect, there is virtually no separation of the judiciary from the executive in the FATA. Cases of human rights violations are challengeable only in the high court but that too takes a difficult process and in most of the cases the cases are not properly heard even in the high court.

So the Constitution has virtually put the entire populace of the FATA region at the mercy of the President of Pakistan for any reform and development in the region as the Political Agent has been ruling the tribal region with absolute authority with the help of black laws and he is literally beyond the reach of the law.

¹⁴⁶ *Amnesty International U.S.A "Pakistan Unlawful executions in tribal areas"*
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGASA330132006&lang=e> (accessed 04 November, 2010).

5:iii: f The Frontier Crimes Regulations: The Basic Fault Line

The Frontier Crimes Regulations of 1901 (FCR), a draconian black law is against the spirit of the constitution as well as Islam was enacted by the British colonialists as an instrument of subjugation of the tribal people and to check any rebellion. In 1979, the Balochistan High Court (the Shariat bench) held that the FCR was discriminatory and un-Islamic. On 29 July 2002, the Lahore High Court ruled that the Frontier Crimes Regulation was no more in existence following the Balochistan High Court's judgment of 1979 and hence, detention under the FCR was “illegal”¹⁴⁷.

The FCR empowers the authorities to arrest and detain any one without any solid reason. The accused cannot get bail in such cases. Against all civilized laws and jurisprudence, the FCR provides for collective punishment to the family members or blood relatives instead of punishing only the guilty. Family members or blood relatives are handed a jail term for no crime of their own. Innocent people become victims of this black law.

Article 13 (a) of the Constitution of Pakistan states that no person “shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once”. But under the Frontier

¹⁴⁷. FCR is no more a law: LHC, Dawn, 31 July 2002, <http://www.dawn.com/2002/07/31/nat9.htm>

Crimes Regulation, tribal prisoners had to serve two or more sentences for the same crime under the decree of the political agent who exploits the sections of the 40 FCR¹⁴⁸.

Amnesty International in its report regarding unlawful executions in the tribal belt dated 04 May 2006 wrote to the Pakistani government:

“Amnesty International considers the law governing the FATA, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (FCR), ... deeply flawed as it does not ensure the human rights protection afforded by the Constitution of Pakistan, or Pakistan's international obligations as a state party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. For example, under the FCR, people suspected of having committed a criminal offence are heard, without legal representation, by a formally constituted tribal jirga or council The Political Agent.... is not bound by the jirga's recommendations. Punishments, which the Political Agent can impose, include fines, house destruction and imprisonment but not the death penalty. There is no possibility of appealing against conviction or punishment under the FCR as the jurisdiction of Pakistan's higher judiciary..... does not extend to the FATA¹⁴⁹.

FCR violates rights guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan and international human rights law, including the right to equal protection of the law, the right to fair trial, to legal counsel and to appeal, and the right to be prosecuted only for offences of which one is suspected, not for offences allegedly committed by a relative. The Amnesty

¹⁴⁸ PHC asks FATA security secy to check admin's powers, *The Daily Times*, 13 April 2007.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

International also conveyed its concern to the Government of Pakistan on such violations¹⁵⁰.

Before 1956, FCR covered the whole of the Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa; but through an amendment, the settled districts of the province were exempted from FCR. Similarly, FCR was abolished in 1973 in Balochistan. However, the people of FATA are still governed by FCR, which is undemocratic, repressive and a violation of human rights.

5:iii: g Constitutional Blockade to Access to Justice And Reforms

The Government officially admitted the miscarriage of justice by the Jirga system of administration of justice. Its candid web page states that, “Although the Jirga mechanism enjoys widespread favour, corruption has begun to enter the system”¹⁵¹. The poor and more vulnerable segments of society cannot afford to convene a Jirga as a number of requirements are to be fulfilled for a Jirga to be held, including hospitality. There is also a grievance frequently voiced that in most cases Jirga decisions favour the richer and more influential party.

On the contrary, there is no effort to provide access to the rule of law to the people of FATA because the Constitution itself is the biggest hurdle to the access of justice as Article 247(7) states “Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ *ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM, Government of FATA*, <http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?link=3> (accessed 04 November, 2010).

Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) by law otherwise provides.” Moreover, no legislation passed by the Parliament is applicable to the FATA region without the assent of the President under Article 247 (3) of the Constitution.

To summarize, we come to the conclusion that Article 247(3) of the Constitution has excluded FATA from all legal reforms that Pakistan has witnessed since 1947 by enacting tens of laws relating to administration, social, economic, political and judicial reforms to cope with the changing social needs but these reforms have been effectively denied to the people of FATA due to the bar provided in Article 247(3).

5:iii: h Extension of Adult Franchise to FATA

Although Pakistan adopted universal adult franchise as the basis of electoral process immediately after independence in 1947, the people of FATA were kept deprived of this fundamental democratic right for about fifty years. Under 1973 Constitution, the *Maliks* (numbering about 37000) constituted the Electoral College for the election to 8 seats of the National Assembly which under the constitutional reforms package of Musharraf regime i.e. Legal Framework Order (LFO) the number of National Assembly seats was raised to 12. It was in 1996, that the federal government of Pakistan decided to introduce adult franchise in the Tribal Areas for the elections held in 1997.

According to the electoral rolls of the 1997 elections, total number of registered votes was 1.6 million including 0.4 million female votes. Successive governments of Pakistan had been postponing this decision due to the policy of appeasement towards the tribal chiefs (*Maliks*), who feared the loss of their entrenched privileged position. In the last elections held on 10 October 2002, the total number of registered votes was 1289274.

5:iii: j Party-less Elections in FATA

Despite the right of adult franchise, the Tribal Areas people do not yet enjoy political and legal rights as equal citizens of Pakistan. Article 25 of the 1973 Constitution declares that all citizens of Pakistan are equal before law; but this article is not applicable to FATA, although under Article 1 of the Constitution FATA is part of the territories of Pakistan. The two elections (1997 and 2002) following the introduction of adult franchise in FATA were held on non-party basis. Despite persistent demands of all segments of the society in FATA, political parties are not allowed to extend their activities in the Tribal Areas. Under Article 247 of the Constitution, federal government enjoys absolute authority over the Tribal Areas. Under sub-section (7) of the same Article, High Courts and Supreme Court of Pakistan are barred from exercising jurisdiction over FATA.

5:iii: k Devolution Plan in FATA

The federal government has introduced the tribal version of Devolution Plan in FATA, establishing Agency Councils consisting of elected representatives of the tribal people. The tribal *SufedResh* and *Maliks* elect agency councilors. But actually, these councilors have no authority over the political agent or his subordinate officials in FATA; rather they are merely used as rubber stamps for their interests. At the same time the demand for allowing the political parties to function in FATA is also being raised with rising voice by the Human Rights activists and civil society organizations. After 9/11 the Tribal Areas of Pakistan are witnessing rapid social, economic and political change.

5:iii: l Representation in the Senate and Provincial Assembly

The people of FATA have been given representation in the Senate of Pakistan, the Upper House where equal representation has been given to all the four federating units of

the country except FATA, which has been given less representation there. On the other hand the tribesmen of FATA do not have any representation in the provincial assembly of Khyber Pukhtoon Khwa, which is against the democratic norm and values. One wonders over the political stupidity and senselessness of the top political leadership of the country regarding the plight of the people of FATA. Every body raises fingers at the political atrocities of our enemies but there is no sane voice for tribesmen, which may help them in any capacity.

5:iii: m Pukhtoon and Pukhtoon Wali

Pakhtoon feel immense pride in their independence and claim that they have never been conquered in their 3000 years' history (except, briefly by Genghis Khan and Tamerlane). As regards the number of Pashtoon tribes, there are about 60 tribes but the figure rises above 400 after counting all sub-clans. The largest and influential tribes are the Afridi, Achakzais, Bangash, Durrani, Khattak, Mehsuds, Mohammadzai, Mohmand, Orakzai, Shinwari, Yusufzai and Waziri. Pashtunwali, the pre-Islamic Pakhtoon tribal code, demands hospitality, generosity when someone asks for pardon or protection and an absolute obligation to avenge. Honour and chivalry are considered the hallmarks of this tradition. Due to this ethnic pride Mullah Muhammad Omer in response to some of his colleague's advice to surrender Osama Bin Laden to the international community uttered a historical sentence that he did not want to destroy the Pukhtoon history and traditions by handing over a guest which is against the Pukhtoon values.

In the same context, the Pukhtoons of tribal areas follow the tradition of Pukhtoon Wali in letter and spirit. Arab Mujahidin as well as Afghans while being chased by the Americans and its allies from Afghanistan were given shelter, full protection and

security. This resulted into the leakage of information regarding the presence of Arab and Afghan Mujahidin on the Pakistani soil in the tribal belt, which ultimately led to the government demand of expulsion of Mujahidin from their areas followed by the refusal of the tribes concerned. Finally, the situation would lead to clashes between the government security forces and the tribesmen on the issue of giving sanctuaries to the foreign militants. Such clashes would lead to major clashes between the security forces and the tribesmen and would also spread to other areas in the tribal areas. Similarly, the initial response and reaction of the tribesmen will be a mixture of secular and ethno-nationalistic in nature but gradually, this phenomenon will be changed and the reins will be taken over by the religious elements from the secular and ethno-nationalists.

However, with the passage of time, the government response will become harsher and harsher as it would be under tremendous pressure from the U.S. and her coalition partners fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for starting a decisive war against the Mujahidin and their Arab facilitators and the operations would lead to the rising anti-government and anti-army feelings in the tribal areas of the country which will very systematically change into extremism and violence and then terrorism. The terrorism will finally take its ugly shape in the form of suicide terrorism. Nurseries will be nurtured and Qari Hussains will emerge as the most dreadful personalities of the world, some terming him an Indian agent, some American agent and some as the agent of reaction, revenge and wrong policies of the government.

The successive governments of Pakistan, instead of establishing direct contact with the people at gross root level, continued to follow the British policy of dealing through the local tribal chiefs i.e., Maliks in the Tribal Areas. After 1947, there was a

hope of drastic political and administrative reforms in the tribal belt but it did not happen. The primary reason was probably Pakistan's strained relations with Afghanistan. In view of Afghanistan's hostile propaganda on the issue of Pakhtunistan, the successive governments of Pakistan did not introduce any political change for fear of alienating the powerful and influential Maliks in the Tribal Areas. After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, the support to Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation became the priority of Pakistan. The tribal Areas continued to suffer from neglect. Now it is time to introduce drastic reforms in the tribal areas by bringing suitable amendments in the FCR, political reforms and the structure of administration in FATA as in the absence of these reforms and non-provision of certain political rights, extremism has occupied the tribal mainland with unforgettable harsh memories of human and material losses.

5:iv External Factors

There are some external factors of extremism like foreign involvement in the form of financial assistance, military training, diplomatic support for extremists, direct military intervention and the latest phenomena of using Drones. Drone issue will be discussed in the following lines.

5:iv:a Drone Syndrome and Extremism

The U.S. drone attacks against the targets in the tribal belt of the country have led to the rising wave of extremism there. The U.S. CIA's Special Activities Division has carried out a series of attacks on the so called terrorist targets in Pakistan's tribal belt, especially North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Kurram and Khyber Agencies

respectively since 2004 through drones (UAVs - unmanned aerial vehicles)¹⁵². Under the Bush administration, these attacks were carried out as a part of the US "War on Terrorism" for defeating Taliban and Al Qaeda militants having safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas¹⁵³ operated remotely from Creech Air Force Base and are still going on under President Barak Obama administration¹⁵⁴. The drones are a weapon of choice for the U.S. against al-Qaeda and Taliban and is also referred as "*Drone War*". Ironically, the government of Pakistan publicly condemns these attacks but is secretly sharing intelligence with Americans¹⁵⁵ and also allowed the drones to operate from Shamsi airfield in Pakistan¹⁵⁶.

5:v:b Statistics of Drone Attacks

The following is a table showing U.S. Drones attacks in Pakistan's tribal belt of Pakistan from 2004 to 2010¹⁵⁷;

¹⁵² " *The year of the Drone, An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan. 2004-2010*, <http://Counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones> (accessed 05 November, 2010).

¹⁵³ "The CIA's Silent War in Pakistan", *TIME*, 01 June 2009.

¹⁵⁴ "Strikes in Pakistan Underscore Obama's Options", *The New York Times*, 23 January 2010.

¹⁵⁵ "Qaeda Planner in Pakistan Killed by Drone", *The New York Times*, 11 December 2009.

¹⁵⁶ "Pakistan allowing CIA to use airbase for drone strikes", *The Australian*, 19 February 2009.

¹⁵⁷ "*Drone Attacks in Pakistan*", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan (accessed 04 November, 2010).

Table:III**US Drone Strike Statistics**

Year	Number of Drone Strikes	Number Killed
2004	1	5
2005	2	7
2006	2	23
2007	4	74
2008	34	296
2009	53	709
2010	89	749
Total	185	1,863

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan

If we assess the number of drone attacks in Pakistan tribal belt by the U.S. CIA led operations, the number of drones' attacks has got momentum in 2008 followed by increase in number whereas year 2010 has crossed proportions with so far 89 drone attacks.

5:v:c Important Personalities killed in Drone Strikes

During the period of 2004 to 2007 drone attacks killing of the following important personalities of Taliban and Al Qaeda was claimed¹⁵⁸:

- 18 June 2004: 5 including Nek Muhammad Wazir near Wana, South Waziristan
- 14 May 2005: 2 killed including Haitham al-Yemni near the Afghan border in North Waziristan

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

- 30 November 2005: Al Qaeda's 3rd in command, Abu Hamza Rabia killed in Asoray, near Miramshah, North Waziristan
- 13 January 2006: Damadola air strike killed about 80 innocent madrassah students in Bajaur Agency but reportedly missed Ayman al Zawahri.

The following important killings took place during 2008¹⁵⁹:

- 29 January 29, 2008: Abu Laith al-Libi killed in North Waziristan.
- 14 May 2008: 12 including Abu Sulayman Al-Jazairi killed near Damadola, Bajaur.
- 28 July 2008: Midhat Mursi and 5 other alleged Al-Qaeda operatives killed in South Waziristan.
- 13 August 2008: Drone strike on a compound of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar killed Taliban commander Abdul Rehman, along with Islam Wazir, three Turkmen, and several Arab fighters.
- 30 August 2008: Missile strike in South Waziristan kills two militants with Canadian passports.
- 17 September 2008: In Baghar Cheena, South Waziristan killed 5 including Al Qaeda operative Abu Ubaydah al Tunisi.
- 16 October 2008: Al-Qaeda leader Khalid Habib killed near Taparghai, South Waziristan.
- 31 October 2008: 20 killed including Al-Qaeda operative Abu Akash and Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim (Abu Jihad al-Masri) in Waziristan.
- 19 November 2008: Abdullah Azam al-Saudi killed in Bannu.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

- 22 November 2008: British Al-Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf and Abu Zubair al-Masri killed in North Waziristan

During 2009 the following Al Qaeda and Taliban elements were calimed to have been killed through drones' attacks¹⁶⁰:

- 1 January 2009: 2 senior al-Qaeda leaders Usama al-Kini and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Sweden killed.
- 23 January 2009: In the first attacks since Barak Obama became U.S. president killed 14 in Waziristan in 2 attacks.
- 23 June 2009: At Makeen killed at least 80 but missed Baitullah Mehsood.
- 5 August 2009: In South Waziristan killed 12, including Baitullah Mehsood, his wife, and his wife's parents.
- 27 August 2009: In Tapar Ghai, Kanigram, South Waziristan killed 8 people including Tahir Yo'ldosh, leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Similarly, important militants claimed to have been successfully targetted during 2010 are¹⁶¹:

- 17 January 2010: In Shaktoi, South Waziristan killed 20 people including injuries to the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsood.
- 15 February 2010: Killed Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, leader of Turkistani Islamic Party in North Waziristan.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

- 18 February 2010: 4 killed in North Waziristan including Mohammed Haqqani, the brother of Afghan Taliban commander Sirajuddin of the Haqqani network.
- 8 March 2010: Reportedly killed five including Hussein al-Yemeni (also called Saddam Hussein Al Hussami), an Al Qaeda operative who planned the Camp Chapman Attack.
- 15 May 2010: Killed 15 in Khyber Agency in the first such strike in this area.
- 19 June 2010: In Haider Khel, North Waziristan's Mir Ali town killed 16 including Al Qaeda leader Abu Ahmed Tarkash.
- 14 August 2010: In Mir Ali, North Waziristan killed 13 including Taliban commander, Amir Moaviya.
- 27 August 2010: killed 5 suspected militants in a first such reported drone strike in Kurram Agency.
- 25 September 2010: Killed 4 in Datta Khel, North Waziristan including Sheikh Fateh Al Misri, Al-Qaeda's new 3rd in command allegedly planning an attack in London, Paris or Berlin through British Muslims on Mumbai style.
- 7 October 2010: In North Waziristan Killed 5 including an Al-Qaeda leader Atiyah Abe al-Rehman.

5:v:d Drone weapons

As per media reports the CIA drones has lately in 2009 or 2010 started employing smaller missiles "Small Smart Weapon" or Scorpion of the size of a violin case (21 inches long) and weigh 16 kilograms to minimize collateral damage to civilians by decreasing public outrage over the missile strikes. The missiles are used in combination

with the latest technology for accuracy and expanded surveillance, including the use of small, unarmed drones about the size of "pizza platters" to exactly pinpoint the location of targets¹⁶².

5:v:e US Justification of Drone Attacks

Barak Obama after assuming power as the U.S. president authorized continuation of drone attacks for its successful results against Al-Qaeda leadership¹⁶³. On 14 February 2009 the spectrum of drone attacks was broadened to target training camps run by Baitullah Mehsood¹⁶⁴. In March 2009 Obama was reported for considering expanding drone attacks to include Balochistan¹⁶⁵, probably to target the so-called Quetta Shoora hideouts in Balochistan.

On 25 March 2010, US State Department legal advisor Harold Koh termed the drone strikes as legal under the right to self-defense as the US is involved in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates and therefore may use force consistent with self-defense under international law¹⁶⁶ and claimed that the Predator strikes had killed nine of al-Qaeda's 20 top commanders. He added that consequently many top Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders had to flee to Quetta or to Karachi¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶² "Drone Attacks" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan (accessed 05 November, 2010).

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ "Obama Widens Missile Strikes Inside Pakistan", <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/world/asia/18terror.html> (accessed 21 February, 2009).

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 17 March 2009.

¹⁶⁶ "Drone Attacks in Pakistan", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan#cite_note-247#cite_247 (accessed 04 November, 2010).

¹⁶⁷ "Drone Attacks in Pakistan", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan#cite_note-248#cite_248 (accessed 04 November 2010).

Even there is reaction in the US against the drone attacks especially among the politicians who have condemned these strikes. Dennis Kucinich, U.S. Congressman has opined that the U.S. has been violating international law by carrying out strikes against a country that never attacked the United States¹⁶⁸. However, the U.S. government sources stress the utility of drone attacks as it has eroded the Al Qaeda's strength by sowing the seeds of uncertainty among its ranks, sometimes leading mutual distrust. Moreover, in May 2009 it was reported that the USA was sharing drone intelligence with Pakistan¹⁶⁹ and that the US would continue the drone attacks.

On July 20, 2009, the Brooking Institution issued a report that ten civilians died in the drone attacks for every militant killed and advised long term solution for halting Al-Qaeda's activity in Pakistan to support Pakistan's counter insurgency efforts¹⁷⁰.

In December 2009 Barak Obama authorized the expansion of the drone attacks to parallel the decision to send 30,000 more American troops to Afghanistan and some senior U.S. officials were pushing for extending the strikes into Quetta. At a news conference in Islamabad on January 7, 2010 Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman claimed that drone attacks were effective and would continue but US would make greater efforts to prevent collateral damage. He also divulged the information that in the US defence budget for 2011 a 75% increase in funds has been demanded to enhance the drone operations¹⁷¹.

¹⁶⁸ "Drone Attacks in Pakistan", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan#cite_note-249#cite_249 (accessed 05 November, 2010).

¹⁶⁹ "US Shares Drone Intelligence with Pakistan, But No Joint Control", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drone_attacks_in_Pakistan#cite_ref-253#cite_ref-253 (accessed 05 November, 2010).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, cite ref 257.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

The U.S. increased strikes against the Pakistani Taliban gained some favour from the Pakistani government but analysts wonder why the U.S. has been lately awakened about the terrorism of TTP in Pakistan and some believe that probably as it is suspected that the U.S. feared the arrest of TTP leadership by the Pakistani security forces in the South Waziristan military operation where Baitullah Mehsood was encircled from three directions who could have later on revealed shocking secrets of the U.S. involvement in supporting the TTP elements in FATA and elsewhere in Pakistan. Ironically, the U.S. led coalition forces had opened the Afghan border during the military offensive of Pakistani forces against the TTP hideouts and bases in South Waziristan.

A study "The Year of the Drone" published in February 2010 by New American Foundation wrote that in 114 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and early 2010 about between 834 and 1,216 individuals were killed, about two thirds of whom were thought to be militants and one third were civilians¹⁷².

5:v:f Pakistan's Response

Pakistan as usual has repeatedly been protesting the drone attacks as it is the violation of its sovereignty as well as the cause of collateral damage for innocent men, women and children creating unrest and anger in the public against the government¹⁷³. General David Petraeus was intimated in November 2008 that these strikes were counter productive. However on 4 October 2008, "*The Washington Post*" claimed that there was a secret deal between the US and Pakistan allowing these drone attacks. U.S. Senator

¹⁷² Ibid, cite ref 266.

¹⁷³ Ibid, Cite ref.268

Dianne Feinstein revealed in February 2009: “As I understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base¹⁷⁴.”

On the other hand the government of Pakistan denies this charge though there are credible reports that drones fly from the Shamsi air base of Pakistan. The British newspaper *The Times* on 18 February 2009 claimed that CIA was using Shamsi airfield, located 310 kms southwest of Quetta and 48 kms from the Afghan border, as its base for drone operations. The area around the base is a high-security zone and no one is allowed there. Top US officials confirmed to Fox News Channel that Shamsi airfield had been used by the CIA to launch the drones since 2002¹⁷⁵.

The Pakistani leadership including the president, prime minister and other have been just issuing statements against the drone attacks but inwardly, they know that these drone attacks had their secret approval as charged by *The Daily Telegraph*, Pakistani intelligence has agreed to secretly provide information to the United States on Mehsood's and his militants' whereabouts while publicly the Pakistani government will continue to condemn the attacks¹⁷⁶. As per Pakistani estimates from January 14, 2006 to April 8, 2009, 60 U.S. strikes had killed 701 people, of which 14 were Al-Qaeda militants and 687 innocent civilians¹⁷⁷. In December 2009 Pakistan's Defence minister Ahmed Mukhtar confessed the use of Shamsi airfield by the U.S. but added that Pakistan was not satisfied with payments for using the facility¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, Cite ref.272, 273

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, cite ref.267

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, cite ref.282

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, cite ref.283

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, cite ref.284

5:v:g **Role of United Nations Human Rights Council**

On June 3, 2009, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in a report criticized the US tactics and alleged that the US government has failed to keep track of civilian casualties of its military operations, including the drone attacks and to provide means for citizens of affected nations to obtain information about the casualties and any legal inquests regarding them as such information with the U.S. military is inaccessible to the public due to the high level of secrecy surrounding the drone attacks program¹⁷⁹ while the US representative argued that the UN investigator for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions does not have jurisdiction over US military actions, whereas a US diplomat claimed that the US military was investigating any wrongdoing and doing all it can to furnish information about the deaths. The U.S. drone attacks have no relevance with the international law. Strangely, the Alston's report on 2 June 2010 justified the U.S. drone attacks under the pretext of self defence¹⁸⁰.

There is no body to effectively counter the U.S. drone attacks at national and international forums. The government of Pakistan whatsoever, it may state at national and international level through her foreign missions or spokesmen, the fact is that Pakistan has tacit agreement with the U.S over the drone attacks. It is very strange that every body at responsible position lies with the nation. No one is willing to unearth the real story behind the drone attacks agreement with America. One is further shocked after analyzing the issue in the context of dictatorial and democratic governments.

One may expect the selling of national interests from a dictator in any way but it is ironic to see democratic government at par with the dictatorship in the sale of national

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 289

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, cite ref.293

interests, probably for their political survival as the U.S. might have some role in the domestic politics of Pakistan. However, the world media as illustrated above revealed the Government agreement with the U.S. for which they are not supposed to agree in an unconstitutional way without taking the parliament and other national stakeholders into confidence. In other words, the government has no right to sacrifice national sovereignty to a country that gives collateral damages to our tribal belt by causing extremism there and thus the hopes of a tolerant society are getting into the clouds.

5:v:h Reality of Drone Targets

The real figures of civilian losses are shocking, as the U.S. or Pakistani side except some unverifiable media reports about the losses does not provide correct information. According to Pakistan Body Count, a website managed by Zeeshan Usmani, a professor at Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute since 2004 to 2010 in over 124 drone attacks only 30 Al-Qaeda operatives perished whereas 1266 civilians were killed and over 445 were left injured to run a tally of 2.5% as the strike rate against the Al-Qaeda operatives.

So actually 97.5% innocent people lost their lives in drone strikes against Al-Qaeda. The heavy cost of the U.S. "War on Terror" has almost led Pakistan almost to the verge of an economic collapse, while unfortunately the political leadership remains unmoved to the destruction brewing around them for the sake of their personal greed to get the dollars from Washington in lieu of their silence and their deliberate ignorance. On the contrary, the tribesmen have no other option but to resort to extremism for taking revenge from the perpetrators.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

6:i Findings

Historical factors have played a very important role in shaping the environment for extremism in the tribal belt of the country. The Muslims could not forget the fall of the Muslim Spain at the hands of the Christians and the subsequent horror the West inflicted on the Muslims. It was further fuelled by Muslims anger prevalent in their society today on the fall of their most powerful empires in the Middle East in the eighteenth century and its territories falling in the hands of the rising powers of Europe.

The waves of Jihad were spread throughout the Muslim World by the Islamic movements like Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Al Qaeda with profound effects on the Jihadi culture in Pakistan in general and the tribal areas in particular. Hamas introduced suicide bombers in their resistance, which gave a new impetus to the Palestinian liberation resistance. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt introduced new trends for the Islamic movements. At times it became a threat for the secular governments in Egypt, which also resulted in the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian President. Leaders like Syed Qutb made Muslim Brotherhood a revolutionary organization. The Arab - Israel war provided the basis for Jihad against the West for the Israeli atrocities and its support by the European powers in general and the U.S. in particular. Despite their rights, the Palestinians have been unable to get their right of freedom from the Israeli clutches, which in turn angers the Muslim youth, the world over.

Two important Egyptian leaders i.e. the blind cleric Omar Ahmad Abdel Rahman, also known as Sheikh Omar and Ayman al -Zawahiri both followers of Qutb

have also profound influence on the nature and direction of Jihad in the Muslim world. Rahman got closer to a radical Jihadi outfit “al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya”, the Islamic Group. Al-Zawahiri formed a revolutionary cell Jamaat al-Jihad (the Jihad Group). Like Rehman, he denounced *Jahiliyah* and adopted jihad. Both believed in conspiratorial violence.

The Iranian Revolution also inspired even the Sunni Islamists and radical *Jihadists* throughout the Muslim world, though later on it caused frictions in the Muslim world due to its hard-line Shiite ideology. It also caused Shia Sunni tensions in some areas of the Muslim world. Iran also supported and patronized Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has introduced new tactics of suicide bombings and kidnappings.

The Afghan Jihad gathered Mujahidin from all over the world, particularly from the Arab world to fight against the Soviet Communists. The strength of Arabs in Afghan war, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda were players of history, which dominated the minds of Jihadists in the region. The thoughts of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Al Banna left everlasting effects on the minds and thoughts of the recent leaders of global Jihadi movements. Finally, this led to the emergence of Al Qaeda at the debris of Afghan Jihad touched horizons of Jihad and affected the whole world. Taking its roots in Afghanistan it spread the world over with its awesome tactics. At the same time the Taliban also emerged as the dominant power as compared to the rest of the Jihadi groups in Afghanistan, which fought against the Soviets for a decade. The Taliban government in Kabul further strengthened the *Jihadi* elements in Afghanistan as well as on the Pakistani side in the tribal areas.

In the early 1990s Serbia launched attacks against the breakaway Muslim state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and killed hundreds of Muslims in a very brutal manner. Bosnian houses and apartments were systematically ransacked or burnt down, Bosnian civilians were rounded up or captured, and sometimes beaten or killed in the process. The Serbs raped and killed the Muslim women by burying them in collective graves. Mujahidin, especially, the Arabs who had returned from Afghanistan reached Bosnia in search of *Jihad* against the Serbs and their supporters.

Chechens had been opposing Russian and Soviet imperialism since the nineteenth century. By 1994, open fighting assumed between Chechen guerrillas and Russian troops, turning half of Chechnya: one million populations into refugees. Al-Qaeda also joined this war by sponsoring a small *Jihadists* enterprise led by Shamil Basayev, a Chechen warlord, and a Saudi-born Amir al-Khattab. The goal was to create a pure Islamic land clean of infidels serving as a springboard for a “new world Islamic order.

Similarly, state terrorism also paved the way for the emergence and strength of *Jihadi* organizations especially in Indian Occupied Kashmir and Palestine. Moreover, the dual standards of international community regarding the election victory of Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria forced the peaceful Islamists to wage jihad against their own government.

In FATA extremism exists in the shape of political extremism. The political vacuum created by the negligence of the government causes it. There is another face of extremism in FATA, which is termed as ethnic extremism. Taliban extremism in FATA is a product of religion and Pukhtoon nationalism and ethnic pride in a very systematic

manner and has been able to exploit the local customs and traditions of Pukhtoon Wali in their favour. Religion has been used as a driving force for lethal domestic and international terrorism as the religious motivations have created a sense of chaotic panic. The global threat from religious extremism emanates from the anti-West sentiments, more particularly against the US for unfriendly and unfair treatment given to the Muslims; thus leading to the global Jihad against the U.S.

Extremism has a sectarian face in the country in general and the tribal areas in particular. The Taliban and the Shia extremists fighting in Kurram Agency, Hangu and Orakzai Agency are clear examples. So in this part of the tribal areas, extremism has a sectarian orientation.

The incident of 9/11 and the post 9/11 actions by the U.S. and her coalition partners in the form of their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan including Pakistan's U-turn worked as an immediate cause of extremism in the tribal areas. Post 9/11 Pakistan Army Operations in FATA also worked as a fuel for extremism.

Lack of economic development, poor economic conditions of FATA i.e. unemployment, negative economic impact of Afghan crisis, poverty, and corruption prepared the ground for extremism. Similarly, political factors like governing system in FATA is not relevant to the people's requirement and changed situation. Political Parties Act has not been extended to FATA, thus alienating the tribesmen from the mainstream politics of the country. Political administration is also alleged of human rights violations in the name of peace in the tribal areas. The British decades old administrative system is still intact in FATA where political agent assumes unnecessary extra powers. The

political agent exercises powers of a judge, administrator, and as a police officer. Frontier Crimes Regulation has also weakened the tribal society and made it prone to extremism.

Moreover, lack of educational institutes and schools as well as irrelevant education policy further deteriorated the tribal society. Similarly, the drone attacks created great resentment in the tribesmen against the U.S. and the government of Pakistan and gave way to extremism in the tribal society through the essential element of Pukhtoonwali i.e. revenge.

6:ii Recommendations

The following are some of the recommendations for eliminating extremism:

- ◇ There is an urgent need for massive development activities in FATA. It is time that all the world community assists Pakistan in developing FATA in various fields.
- ◇ Pakistan should be given sizeable economic aid as per its losses as the ten billion dollars given so far are less than its losses. In this regard ignoring Pakistan will further complicate the problem of extremism.
- ◇ Geographic and cultural aspects of FATA need to be taken into account while initiating any action or operation in the area. Tribesmen may be tactfully tackled by respecting their customs and traditions while persuading them for expelling those foreigners from the area who create problems for the Government of Pakistan.

- ◇ Industrial zones should be established in FATA so that job opportunities are created for the youth of the area by minimizing their chances to divert towards extremism and extremist groups.
- ◇ The colonial system of administration needs to be changed by granting fundamental rights and social services to the people.
- ◇ Political reforms should be initiated in FATA. Political Parties Act should be extended to FATA.
- ◇ FCR should be amended as per local traditions and values and the discretionary powers enjoyed by the Political administration should be withdrawn.
- ◇ Separate judicial structure should be erected in FATA to decide the cases of tribesmen against the Political Administration and among themselves.
- ◇ FATA should be brought into the mainstream by giving representation in the provincial assembly.
- ◇ Peace agreements with the Taliban should be honoured.
- ◇ The role of Malik and Political agent should be rationalized. Both have common interests, which need to be rationalized in view of the public interests.
- ◇ At least 7% of the total GDP should be spent on education at national level, in which FATA should be given more priority.
- ◇ Education should be given top priority by solving the issue of teachers' deficiency.
- ◇ Private schools should be supported and encouraged in FATA.
- ◇ More schools should be constructed in FATA to educate the youth.
- ◇ Madrassahs may be supported for teaching mix syllabus.

- ◇ Military operations should be launched against specific anti-state targets to avoid collateral damage and general targets should be avoided where common people are killed.
- ◇ Drone attacks should be stopped as it alienates the tribesmen from the government.
- ◇ Air strikes are not favoured at all whether from outside or within the country as these only alienate the people and cause tremendous damage.
- ◇ Dialogue process should be encouraged by taking independent decisions while entering into agreements with the Taliban or the tribesmen.
- ◇ Pakistan should quit this war on terror, as it is not the war of Pakistan rather we are fighting others war at our own cost.
- ◇ Solution of FATA problems should be seen in the backdrop of the Afghan war as a comprehensive approach means addressing the problem regionally by resolving the problem in Afghanistan, FATA and the rest of Pakistan.
- ◇ Foreign interference should be stopped in FATA to have durable peace and development there.

APPENDIX-I**COMPOSITION OF TRIBAL AREAS**

(Article 246 of 1973 Constitution)

The Tribal Areas as defined in Article 246 of the constitution are:

- (a) Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
- (b) Provincially Administered Tribal Areas.

FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS

Name of Agency/F.R	Area in Sq. Miles.	Population According to March 1981 Census (in thousand)	Main Tribes
Bajuar Agency	498	289	Ultman Khel, Salarzai Charmungi.
Mohmand Agency	887	164	Tarakzai, Halimzai, Khwaezai, Baezai, Safi, Mullagori, and Utman Khel.
Khyber Agency	995	284	Afridi, Shinwari, Mullagori,
Orakzai Agency	403	359	Orakzai.
Kurram Agency	1305	294	Turi, Bangash, Ziamusht, Mengal.
N.W. Agency	1817	239	Utmanzai Wazir, Daur Saidgi, Gurbaz.
S.W. Agency	2556	310	Mahsud and Ahmadza Wazir.
F.R. Peshawar	101	37	Hassan Khel.
F.R. Kohat	363	57	Jawaki and Adam Khel.
F.R. Bannu	339	79	Jani Khel, Bakka.
F.R. D.I. Khan	1247	86	Bhittani, Sherani.
	10511	2198	

PROVINCIALY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS**North West Frontier Province****Malakand Division**

1. Chitral District.
2. Dir District.
3. Swat District (Which includes Kalam).
4. Malakand Protected Areas.

Peshawar Division

5. Tribal Areas adjoining Hazara District and the former State of Amb.

Quetta Division

6. Zhob District.
7. Loralai District (excluding Duki Tehsil).
8. Dalbandin Tehsil of Chagai District.

Sibi Division

9. Marri-Bugti Tribal Agency.

APPENDIX-II**DURAND LINE AGREEMENT-1893**

Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G.C.S.I.,

Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, KCIE, CSI, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the Government of India on the other part,-1893.

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both, His Highness the and the Government of India, are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of -influence, so that for the future, there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it hereby agreed as follows:

- (1) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map (not reproduced) attached to this agreement.
- (2) The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.
- (3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness, the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand, that, he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajawar or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal Valley. The British Government

also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Wazir country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

- (4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map (not reproduced) attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.
- (5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government, the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:

"From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost, known locally, as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and turning southward, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west

and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road."

- (3) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, as a full and satisfactory *settlement* of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier, and both the Governments of India and His Highness the Amir, undertake that any differences of detail such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible, all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.
- (6) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of amunitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit, in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His highness.

Kabul;
H.M. Durand.
12th November, 1893
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan

APPENDIX-III

**APPOINTMENT OF THE GOVERNOR NWFP AS AGENT TO THE
PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN FOR THE TRIBAL AREAS**

COPY
THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN

EXTRAORDINARY
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
Islamabad, Thursday, June 25, 1970
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
MINISTRY OF HOME AND KASHMIR AFFAIRS AND
STATES FRONTIER REGIONS

(States and F.R. Division)

NOTIFICATION
Islamabad, the 25th June, 1.970.

S.R.O. 109(I)/70.-In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (2) of Article 5 of the Province of West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970 (P.O. No. 1 of 1970), read with (section 22 of the Central Clauses Act, 1897) (X of 1897), the President is pleased to direct that all administrative jurisdiction exercisable by him in the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas shall be exercised by the Governor of the North West Frontier Province in such manner and to such extent as the President may direct, and that, in the exercise of such jurisdiction the Governor shall be the Agent to the President in those Areas.

(F.6(15)-FI (SOU) /70.]

A.M.S. AHMAD,

S.Pk., PSP., Secretary.

APPENDIX-IV**POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR AS AGENT TO THE
PRESIDENT IN THE SPECIAL AREAS OF WEST PAKISTAN
PROVINCE**

The Governor of West Pakistan shall be the Agent to the President in the Special Areas of West Pakistan.

He shall ensure, that the administration in these areas is carried out in conformity with the policies laid down, and the directives issued, by the Central Government from time to time.

It will be his special responsibility to see that the Provincial Government and the officers charged with the administration of the Special Areas, take all such steps as may be necessary, for the implementation of policies laid down by the Government of Pakistan and for securing such national objectives, as may be specified within the shortest possible time, or within; such period as may be prescribed by the President in this behalf.

The Governor shall ensure that high priority is given to the development of Special Areas, and that adequate funds are placed by the Provincial Government at the disposal of the Divisional Commissioners of Peshawar, D.I. Khan, Quetta and Kalat and other officers and departments concerned, to carry out the development programme in those areas, within the schedule time.

The Governor will make all appointments to the posts of Divisional Commissioners of Peshawar, D.I. Khan, Quetta and Kalat and the Political Agents, after consulting the Central Government Ministry of States and Frontier Regions.

All appointments and transfers to administrative posts within the Special Areas will be made, as far as possible, in consultation with the Divisional Commissioners concerned.

All the Civil Armed Forces in West Pakistan, shall function under the Governor's supervision and operational control, subject to the administrative control and directives of the Central Government.

The Governor shall exercise such financial powers, in respect of the central funds allocated for these areas, as may be delegated to him by the Central Government, from time to time.

Subject to the directions, if any, of the Central Government, the Governor may delegate such of his powers to the Divisional Commissioners as may appear to him to be appropriate.

The Governor shall exercise all the powers of the former A.G.G. under the Grey Book, containing instructions regulating the use of Army and the Air Force for the maintenance of peace, and law and order in the Special Areas, except destructive air action against habitations, for which, the previous sanction of the Central Government will be necessary.

By order of the President of Pakistan

Sd/

N.A. Faruqi

Cabinet Secretary

APPENDIX-V**ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
GOVERNOR NWFP IN THE TRIBAL AREAS**

From: The Joint Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs and States and Frontier Regions (STATE AND F.R. DIVISION) "S" Block, ISLAMABAD.

To:

The Chief Secretary, Government of NWF Province, Peshawar.

Subject: **Administration of the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas.**

Sir,

I am directed to say that the marginally noted areas in North West Frontier have been defined in Article 3(a) of the West Pakistan (Dissolution) Order, 1970 as the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas. The Order further provides that these areas shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through such officers as he may appoint; and the President may, in that behalf give such directions as he deems fit. In pursuance of these provisions the President has been pleased to direct that the Governor, NWF Province, shall act as Agent to the President for the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas, and shall exercise immediate executive authority in these Areas in such manner and to such extent as the President may direct from time to time.

1. Mohmand Agency.
2. Kurram Agency.

3. Khyber Agency.
 4. North Waziristan Agency.
 5. South Waziristan Agency.
 6. The Tribal Areas adjoining Kohat District.
 7. The Tribal Areas, adjoining Peshawar District.
 8. The Tribal Areas, adjoining Bannu District.
 9. The Tribal Areas, adjoining D.I. Khan.
 10. The Tribal Areas of Malakand Division.
2. The Governor NWFP in his capacity as Agent to the President as notified in the States and Frontier Regions Division Notification No. S.R.O. 109(I)/70, dated the 25th June, 1970 shall exercise the following powers:
- (i) He shall ensure that the administration in these is carried out in conformity with the areas policies laid down and the directives issued by the Central Government from time to time.
 - (ii) It will be his special responsibility to see that the Provincial Government and the officers charged with the administration of these areas take all such steps as may be necessary for the implementation of the policies laid down by the Government of Pakistan and for securing such national objectives as may be specified within the shortest possible time or within such period as may be prescribed by the President in this behalf.
 - (iii) He shall ensure that high priority is given to Development and that the funds placed at his disposal for development and administration are utilized in

accordance with the policies laid down by the Central Government for the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas.

- (iv) He shall supervise the operations and functions of the Development Corporation set up for the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas, in accordance with the policies laid down and directive issued by the Central Government.
- (v) He shall make all appointments to the posts of Divisional Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and the Political Agents concerned with the Administration of Centrally Administered Tribal Areas in consultation with the Central Government in the States and Frontier Regions Division.
- (vi) The Civil Armed Forces in the NWFP and the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas shall function under his supervision and operational control subject to the administrative control and directions of the Central Government.
- (vii) He shall exercise such financial powers in respect of the Central funds allocated for these areas as may be delegated to him by the Central Government from time to time.
- (viii) He shall subject to the directions if any of the Central Government, delegating such of his powers to the Divisional Commissioners as may be appear to him to be appropriate.
- (ix) He shall exercise of all the powers as Agent to the President laid down in the Grey Book containing instructions regulating the use of Army and the Air Force for the maintenance of peace and law and order in the Tribal Areas.

3. I am also to say that the following arrangements shall be made for carrying out the administration of the aforesaid areas:

- (a) The Local Administration in the North West Frontier Province as existed in the pre-Integration period shall be revived and placed under the Chief Secretary and shall be entrusted with the such powers and functions as were assigned to it in the pre-One Unit period.
- (b)
 - (i) The services of the Provincial Departments shall be utilized for catering to the needs of the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas within the sphere of their respective jurisdictions.
 - (ii) Each Secretary of the Provincial Government will act as the Secretary to Local Administration in respect of his Department and will be authorized to correspond direct with the States and Frontier Regions Division with regard to matters falling within his jurisdiction.
 - (iii) The Finance Secretary, NWFP, will in addition to his duties as Finance Secretary, work as Financial Advisor to the Local Administration in respect of the aforesaid areas.
- (c) The Development Corporation set up for the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas shall be responsible for the formation of new Development Plans and their execution.
- (ci) The day-to-day administration of the area will be the responsibility of the Political Agents/Deputy Commissioners in the Tribal Areas which shall be carried out by them under the supervision/direction of the Divisional Commissioners and the Local Administration of NWFP.

APPENDIX-VI**POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONERS
OF PESHAWAR, D.I. KHAN, QUETTA AND KALAT IN RELATION
TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF SPECIAL AREAS OF WEST
PAKISTAN**

1. The Commissioners shall work under the supervision of the Governor of West Pakistan.
2. The Commissioners will ordinarily receive the orders of the President through the Governor, but in urgent cases, they may be addressed direct. In matters, in which the Central Government is interested, particularly in matters having a bearing on foreign policy and defence, the Commissioners may correspond direct with the Central Government in immediate cases provided that they will submit copies of all such correspondence to the Governor for information.
3. The Commissioners shall guide, supervise and control the working of all branches of administration in the Agencies, falling under their jurisdiction and in the Special Areas attached to the districts concerned.
4. The Commissioners shall exercise the powers of the F.C.R. within the areas under their administrative control.
5. The Commissioner of Peshawar Division shall supervise the work of the Tribal Publicity Organization at Peshawar, subject to the direction and control of the Central Government. This organization shall prepare material for publicity keeping in view the

needs of the Special Areas under the administrative control of the Commissioner of D.I. Khan Division as well.

6. The Commissioner of Peshawar Division shall guide supervise and control the functions of the Chief Powindah Officer and his staff in Peshawar and D.I. Khan Division.

7. The Commissioners may deputize for the Governor at the annual Jirgas in the latter's absence.

8. The Commissioners shall exercise such powers, as may be delegated to them by the Agent to the President or the Central Government, in respect of the Central Public Works within their jurisdiction.

9. The Commissioners shall exercise all the powers of the former Political Resident, North West Frontier, as laid down in the Grey Book, except powers to order destructive air action against habitations, for which prior sanction of the Central Government will be necessary.

10. The Commissioners shall be Chairmen of the Divisional Development Boards for the development of areas under their jurisdiction.

11. Adequate secret service and entertainment grants shall be placed by the Provincial Government at the disposal of the Commissioners for customary payments to tribesmen.

12. The Commissioners shall superintend and exercise operational control over the normal functions of the Frontier Corps and units of the Frontier Constabulary located in the Special Areas under their jurisdiction, subject to such directives as may be issued by the Agent to the President or the Central Government.

13. The Commissioners shall exercise the powers of sanctioning, suspending or confiscating any Maliki allowance and the powers to create new Maliks, in any tribe within their jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Agent to the President and the Central Government.

14. The Commissioners of Peshawar and D.I. Khan Division shall exercise operational control over all Khassadars and Levies operating in the areas falling in their jurisdiction, subject to the overall financial and administrative control of the Central Government.

15. The Commissioners shall be responsible, for the implementation of the Central Government's Policy, for the control of the visits of foreigners to areas under their jurisdiction.

By order of the President of Pakistan.

Sd/

N.A. Faruqi

Cabinet Secretary

APPENDIX-VII**GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT WITH
THE TRIBAL PEOPLE (1951-52)**

We proclaim that our territory is an integral part of the dominion of Pakistan and we are citizens of Pakistan.

2. We pledge our loyalty to the Constitution of Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan as by law established.

3. We shall remain peaceful and law abiding citizens of Pakistan and shall render every assistance to Government, whenever called upon to do so.

4. We and our tribes shall have no dealings with any other power and the friends of Pakistan shall be our friends and the enemies of Pakistan shall be our enemies.

5. We shall protect the rights and interests of Pakistan at all cost and shall faithfully abide by the directions given to us by the Government of Pakistan in this regard from time to time.

6. We shall render every assistance to the officials of the Pakistan Government in our areas and shall ensure their safety.

7. We shall facilitate the construction of roads, other public works, defence installations and establishment of communications in our areas and shall ensure the safety and protection of all Government property in our area. We shall also render every assistance to Government in the social and economic development of our area.

8. In the internal affairs of our tribe, the Pakistan Government will ensure the maintenance of our tribal customs and usages and all our tribal matters and internal disputes shall be settled in accordance with our tribal customs and in consultation with and through our tribal leaders.

9. The Government of Pakistan will continue to pay us our annual Muajib of Rs. _____ for the tribe and Rs. _____ as lungis for Maliks and representatives of our tribes. These grants will be subject to good behaviour and the fulfillment of the obligations detailed above, which our tribe has undertaken upon itself.

10. We shall attend to all summons of the officers of the Pakistan Government and shall call on the Political Agent, to receive our annual Muajibs in the spring every year. If we fail to do so, the Muajibs for the year shall be forfeited to the Government of Pakistan.

11. That, we shall abide by all the previous undertakings given and agreements made by us, from time to time, with the Government.

Source: Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (States and Frontier Regions Division)

"S" Block Pakistan Secretariat Islamabad.

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