





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Da'wah in a Secular State:

**A Case Study of Najmuddin Erbakan Islamic
Movement, Turkey**



By



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
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD

(2015)

MS
297.272
TAC

1. Islam and secularism
2. Islam and State

Da'wah in a Secular State:
A Case Study of NajmuddinErbakan Islamic
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FINAL APPROVAL

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International Islamic University, Islamabad as a partial fulfillment of
requirement for the award of the degree of MS Islamic Studies.**

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my beloved parents for their unconditional love, endless support and encouragement. Also I would feel honor to dedicate it to my husband, Muhammad Adeel, Thanks as you were a constant source of support and motivation, especially for having confidence in me.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work present in the following thesis is my own effort, except where otherwise acknowledged and that the thesis is my own composition. No part of the thesis has been previously presented for any other degree.

Date _____

Tayyaba Malik

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In the name of Allah; the most gracious and the most kind. All praise is for Allah, the lord of the universe, and prayers be upon Muhammad, His messenger.

There are a number of people that I would like to offer my sincere gratitude for helping bring this study to completion. First and foremost, I must acknowledge my limitless thanks to Allah for His help and bless. I am sure that this would have never become truth without His guidance. Also I am in debt of gratitude to my university for giving me an opportunity to complete this work.

Importantly, I would like to thank my Supervisor; Mr. Khalilur Rehman, and my teacher and thesis co-supervisor; Lecturer Mr. Ameer Usman, IIUI, who has been so supportive throughout this work. Their ideas, advice, insightful criticism and encouragement aided my thesis in real sense. Furthermore, I am really grateful to Professor Dr Abdul Qadir Haroon, whose valuable suggestions and guidance was greatly needed and deeply appreciated. I would also like to take this opportunity to say warm thanks to Study Commission Director Mr. Yusuf Yalaniz, Central Executive Committee member of the Youth Branches of Saadet Party, Turkey, your guidance, your discussion, ideas, and feedback have been absolutely invaluable.

Tayyaba Malik

List of Abbreviations:

DP	Democratic Party
FP	Felicity Party
JP	Justice Party
JDP (JDP)	Justice and Development Party
MNP	MilliNizam Party
MP	Motherland Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
NOP	National Order Party
NSC	National Security Council
PKK	Kurdistan worker Party
RPP	Republican Peoples Party
RP	Refah Party (Welfare Party)
SPO	State Planning Organization
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TPP	True Path Party
VP	Virtue Party

Abstract:

As we all know, that in Islam there are constants and there are variables. Some of Shari'ah commandants change with the change of time and space; same is the case with Da'wah methodology that may also change, with the change of person, place and time. As a matter of fact, it is the duty of Dai (preacher) to understand the circumstances and adopt an appropriate method, in the light of Quran and Sunnah, to resolve a certain issue or to find a way out under critical circumstances.

This is a study of Da'wah Strategy in a Secular state: A case study of NajmuddinErbakan Movement in Turkey.

While being a student of Islamic Da'wah, and having a dream to figure out Da'wah work in a broader perspective, I have been deeply interested in the study of Islamic Movements, their methodologies, failures and success examples. This interest further pushed me to take up the case of Erbakan movement, Turkey to ponder upon, as in my humble opinion to date; this experience has a lot of lessons of wisdom and insights inside in it for all the Islamic movements, Da'wah organizations and think tanks round the globe, to learn from it. So, I have chosen this topic to learn from this unique Da'wah experience and provide somewhat valuable study for others, in human capacity, to benefit from it.

A short historical review would help understand the topic better.

The Caliphate was legitimately eliminated on March 3, 1924 and a new era began which was very much different from the previous era in almost all aspects. The elimination of the caliphate was followed by a wide-ranging effort to separate the governmental and religious associations. Mustafa Kamal Ataturk brought a series of changes in political, social, economic, legal, educational areas. Numerous restrictions were imposed to reshape the Turkey as a secular nation state, where practicing religion in any sphere of life was outlawed. These changes were put into practice under the headship of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk (1881-1938) in harmony with Kamalist dogma.

The transformation began with the so-called modernization of the constitution, including endorsing the new Constitution of 1924, and the adaptation of European laws and jurisprudence to the needs of the new republic. It was followed by a detailed secularization and renovation of the management, where main focus was on the educational structure and scheme. The growth of industry was encouraged by strategies such as import substitution and the initiating state enterprise and state banks. Main thought behind these reforms was the belief that in order to be modernize, Turkish society would have to westernize itself both politically and culturally. Interestingly, all this could not uproot the attachment and love for Islam from the hearts and minds of Turkish people.

To encounter with secular ideologies, the Islamic Movements did not compromise rather they chalked out a comprehensive strategy keeping themselves in the constitutional framework of the country and Najmuddin Erbakan is the most promising name in this respect. The political philosophy of Erbakan; Milli Gorus, emphasize the spreading out Islamic ethics and ideals in Turkey and to keep distance from the negative impacts of the West focusing closer relations to Muslim states. A series of Islamic parties were initiated by Erbakan and all his parties were banned one after another accused of having Islamic or anti secular agenda. Erbakan continued his struggle and in a period of almost half a century the Islamic movements were able to regain political power even though in a narrower sense. Islam was restricted to the hearts of believers and mosques, while Muslims were considered as second-rated people in the country. With Erbakan, Muslims of today's Turkey believed that they must have the strongest right to be heard in the potential of their country. He was, for many, surely the unchallenged leader of the Islamic political movement.

In a period of almost half a century the Islamic movements were able to regain political power even though in a narrower sense. They are still finding their way, despite ups and downs, from time to time, in the constitutional framework and moving ahead.

This work explores the experience of Islamic restoration in Turkey through the analysis of Islamic movement of Erbakan. Islamic revivalism is not a new phenomenon

as Islamic history is constantly punctuated by Islamic resurgence. Its key principle is to return to Islamic origins, values and fundamentals of the faith described in the Holy Qur'an as well as the Sunnah. Revival of Islam in Turkey has its roots in Muslim responses to Kamalists secularization and nationalization process. The thesis argues that the Islamic movement of Erbakan played a crucial role in the revival process and contributed a lot. It was due to the efforts of Islamic people that in the last few decades there have been a considerable increase in Islamic perception in Turkey. Erbakan's Islamic movements shielded the national and spiritual values of Turkish people. Due to all his efforts Turkey to some extent returned to its historic role. Erbakan left a Turkey which is much more at ease with itself and its place between Middle East Europe and then it used to be in past.

Aims and Objective of this study:

This study aims to significantly recognize the kind of opportunities, difficulties and challenges in the way of Da'wah in a secular state. One can easily understand that complexity and diversity of situation would not be the same even in all secular countries. That is why; I have chosen the case study of Erbakan movement, Turkey, to have a close look, on Da'wah strategies, familiarizing myself and the readers, with the state of affairs, in social and political contexts.

Hypothesis:

Many Islamic movements have emerged during 19th and 20th century. Each of them has its own significance. Some of them have been very popular and influential but being to come and remain into power for a very considerable time is the peculiarity of non-other than the Erbakan Movement in Turkey. Like others they also faced ups and downs.

This thesis is an effort to trace, explore and analyze the mystery behind this success story. How they were able to educate and convince masses in a secular country? What are the distinguished features of their strategy or scheme of work? And what they have delivered especially on social welfare front or achieved so far?

Literature Review:

I have found a number of books on this topic, most of the English writings give a biased view about the Da'wah efforts there and present Islam as a threat not only for Turkey but also for the whole west at large. Also, they criticize Erbakan and his Islamic movement prejudicially. Every strategy and policy of Erbakan is criticized just because he is a Muslim. These thoughts are evident in the following books: "Revival of modern Islam in Turkey" by Uriel Heyd, "Turkish Islam and secular state" by Hakan Yavuz and "A Changing Turkey: Threat to Europe and USA" by Heinz Karamer and "The mobilization of political Islam in Turkey" by Eligur Banu.

"الحركة الإسلامية الحديثة في تركيا" by Mustafa Muhammad , also Nuaymi, Ahmad Nuri' book الحركات الإسلامية الحديثة في تركيا: حاضرها ومستقبلها دراسة حول الصراع بين الدين والدولة في تركيا is a general introduction of Islamic movements and short survey of political history. While "The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire" by Selcuk Aksin Somel, give a brief account of Turkish history before and secularization.

I intend to present an objective picture of situation especially to the English readers.

Research Methodology:

As my thesis is a case study so mainly, I have adopted the descriptive research methodology. Description and interpretation of events and circumstances since the beginning of the movements till present day was focal point. I had also followed analytical and critical method in this study. The objective analysis was to explore the Turkish history since secularization to the current day developments while objective and unbiased criticism remained an essential tool to highlight achievements and shortcomings in different Da'wah strategies.

Thesis outline:

This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one contains the definitions, short history of Turkey before secularization, which is further divided into four periods;

the Emergence and Progressive Period, Expansion Period, Declining Period, and the Collapse Period. The chapter also analyzes the circumstances that led to secularization.

Chapter two selectively talk about the secular nature of Turkey by discussing its constitution. Discussion is extended to two stages; first when the process of secularization began with Kamal Ataturk' reforms and second when constitution was secularize particularly, also its consequences. Including how Islam based struggle succeeded in the secular country somehow.

Chapter three looks at the life and political struggle of the NajmuddinErbakan. Moreover it describes the different phases of the Islamic movement from the beginning to current. While chapter four, investigate the Refah Party of Erbakan in details; from its organizational setup to its Da'wah and social welfare strategy. Its Foreign policies are also discussed in this chapter.

In last the conclusion is given. It contains summary of the whole work and some important findings.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Definition of Secularism

Translating the term “Secularism” is indeed a tedious job, as there is no similar word in standard Arabic, Persian, or Turkish that is accurately the identical to “secular” or “secularism”. An early illusion to the term was drawn from the Qura’nic word, “Dahr” which refers to Atheists¹.

Some others, looking for a proper translation of “secularism” chose “ladini” which translates as “nonreligious” or “irreligious”. A subsequent new expression was “Imaniyya” (from Ilm; Science) or “almaniyya” العلمانية (this worldly) came in reaction to the French word Laicism, it emerged in the Muslim world at the end of the 19th century in the dictionary of a Christian Lebanese scholar.²

Secularism is often detained by the French term laicite, and, is translated as “religious neutrality of public institutions”³

Any movement in society heading away from otherworldliness to life on earth is secularism. There was a strong preference for religious persons to look down on human affairs and to deliberate on God and the afterlife in the European Middle Ages (the period from the collapse of Roman civilization in the 5th century to the period of the Renaissance the 13th, 14th, or 15th century). As a result to this medieval trend, secularism demonstrated itself in the development of humanism⁴, at the time of the renaissance; when people were more interested in human cultural accomplishments and the possibilities of their execution. The movement on the way to secularization has been in evolution for many decades and has often been regarded as anti-Christian and generally anti-religious. However, in the last half of 20th century, some theologians initiated supporting secular Christianity. They recommended that Christianity should not

¹ Ignacz Goldziher, “Dahriyya” in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, New ed., Vol; 2, Leiden: Brill, 1960. p.95-97

² John Keane, “Secularism” in David Marquand and Ronald L. Nettle, eds. *Religion and Democracy* Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. p.15

³ Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, “Secularism, Women and the State: the Mediterranean world in 21st century”. ISSC, 2009. p.11

⁴ According to the *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*; humanism is philosophy concealed to emphasize human welfare and dignity, generally prefers critical thinking and evidence over established doctrines or faith.

be concerned only with the sacred and the otherworldly, but that man should find in the world the opportunity to promote Christian value. These theologians defend that the real implication of the message of Jesus can be revealed and satisfied in the daily dealings of secular urban living.¹ Most common definition of secularism is that; Secularism is removal of the domination of religious authority from diverse spheres of society, or Social movement that aims to distract people expressed interest in the afterlife to the worldly life only.²

1.1.1. Multiple Context of Secularism

- A belief that discards religion, especially in morals, the approach that religion should have no position in civil affairs.³
- "Secularity (adjective) refers to "worldly" or "temporal", is the condition of being separate from religion, or not being absolutely associated to any particular religion."⁴
- A system of political or social beliefs that rejects all forms of religious devotion and worship. Or the vision that public education and further affairs of civil policy should be carry out without the preamble of a religious factor.⁵
- A movement heading away from otherworldliness to life on earth.⁶ According to Barry A Kosmin: "Secularism and secularity" secular and its cognates signify a range of phenomena, including:
 - a) The "mere" absence of any direct reference to transcendental or supernatural ideas or phenomena (as in the "purely" economic or political or technological)

¹ The New Encyclopedia Britannica , "Secularism" vol:10,p.594

² M. Hakan Yavuz, John L. Esposito "Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement" Syracuse University Press, 2003. p.15

³The World English Dictionary.

⁴The American Heritage Dictionary of English language.

⁵ Dictionary.com

⁶ The New Encyclopedia Britannica, "Secularism" Vol: 10. p.594

- b) Recession or minimization of the visibility or role of “religion” in society as an institution or a general social force, or restriction of its formal influence or role in the administration of government
- c) Personal indifference to or neglect of matters transcendental, supernatural, or metaphysical.
- d) Affirmative or hostile rejection of transcendental, supernatural, or metaphysical ideas, phenomena, or religious institutions.
- e) Lack of personal identification or affiliation with “religious” traditions or institutions (regardless of personal metaphysical stance).
- f) Subordination of metaphysical to other considerations in selected contexts or in general.

1.1.2. Main features of secularism

The basic argument in secularism is not essentially among religion and the world. The conflict is often involving the forces of tradition, which tend to promote the domination of religion and holy law, and the forces of transformation.

The term “secular” is currently used in sociological literature for the state of a society that is usually proficient of supporting a level of differentiation and gentleness in its value system.¹

It also calls for the less importance of the religion for social life, as people. Feelings, dedication and faithfulness should less and less relative to religion.

“Political secularism” refers to the relationship between the religion and the state, and it affirms that the churches and the state are neatly separated.²

¹Berkes.Niyazi, “The Development of Secularism in Turkey”. McGill University Press.1964.p.6

²John L. Esposito, Emad El-Din Shahin, “The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics”. Oxford University Press,2013.p.70

The sense of socially secular concerns the fact that society should not be influenced by law, politics and education is general and become less and less frequently use religious rituals.

While in term of philosophy or ideas it means that religious beliefs and views should not be consider as divinely, they should be regarded as humanly constructed.¹

Laicization in French is sometimes used as synonymous with secularization, but the English term secularization has a narrower connotations:² it refers specially to the abrogation of priestly offices and judicial roles, teachings and social work, to specialists for whom theological qualifications are no longer necessary or appropriate.

1.2. Short History of Turkey before Secularization

Ankara is the capital of Turkey while largest city is Istanbul. The country's official language is Turkish, spoken natively by approximately 85 percent of the population. The area of Turkey is 783,562 km and total population is 77,695,904 where huge majority of the population is Muslim.

Geographically, Turkey forms a natural bridge between the old world continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. Turkey is on the Mediterranean, with 97% of its territory in West Asia and the Middle East, and with a small section in Southeastern Europe separated by the Turkish Straits. With the Black Sea to the north and the Aegean Sea in the west and Mediterranean Sea to the southwest, Turkey is surrounded by Bulgaria and Greece to the west, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to the northeast, Syria, Iraq and Iran to the southeast. The country is encircled by seas on three sides and Turkey is the world's 37th-largest country in terms of area. Turkey also contains the Sea of Marmara in the northwest.³

¹Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement. p.15

²Bryan R. Wilson, "Secularism", the Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Mircea Eliade. Macmillan, 1995 p.159-165

³The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html> visited: July 20,2015



Turkey has old heritage of the history. It was in the sixth century that Mongols came here and settled down and almost in the eighth century Islam was introduced. After the downfall of Abbasids the era of Seljuk's was started which also lasted for more than a century.

For a cursory view, Turkish history particularly Ottoman era can be divided into the following four parts:-

- (a) The Emergence and Progressive period (1299-1520)
- (b) Expansion Period (1520-1774)
- (c) Declining Period (1774-1914)
- (d) Collapse Period (1914-1922)

¹ eMapsWorld, <http://emapsworld.com/turkey-capital-map.html>, visited: July 20,2015

1.2.1. The Emergence and Progressive period

The phrase “Ottoman” indicates the name of the Dynasty’s founder, Usman (“Ottoman” in English). The Ottoman family was a part of the Kayı tribe of OghuzTurks, who migrated to Iran in the 9th Century. UsmanBey was selected as leader with the harmony of all other Oghuz Tribe men. Historically, all the men of the ruling family had a comparable right to claim the throne in Turkey.¹ The Ottomans eliminated the practice of dividing their lands between different inheritors, differing to the roving Turkish practice. This alteration had caused bloody struggles for the rule between siblings and furthermore it was the main cause of breakdown of their states in a very little period. This radical change appears to be the one of the main causes to enable the Ottomans to grow over the next century into one of the whole world’s supreme kingdom.

In accordance with a famous saying of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), which consecrated the objective of capturing Constantinople², many Muslim and Turkish commanders and captors tried hard to attain the dignified goal. The city was also having a vast strategic and symbolic significance. Sultan Muhammad-II finally took over the command of Constantinople on May 29, 1453. He was given the title of Conqueror (Fatih). The Ottomans were by then a world power. After the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman sultans technically asserted to be the successors of the Roman Empire. Pope Pius II³ acknowledged this assertion of right. The Ottomans declared Istanbul their capital instead of Edirne shortly after having control over the city.⁴

Keeping in view a possible threat from the East, Sultan Muhammad-II conquered Anatolia and amalgamated it in the Ottoman Empire. To attain of a centralized and reliable control over the territory, Muhammad II’s measures included elimination of all possible members of his family likely to seek a right to the throne. The practice of

¹ Sulciman seydi, “An Outline of 2000 years of Turkish History”. Ankara; Ministry of Culture and Tourism publication, 2009.p.76-80

² “Verily, Constantinople shall be conquered, its commander shall be the best commander ever and his army shall be the best army ever.” al-Tabarani, al-Mu’jam al-Kabir 2:38 #1216.

³ Pius-II was the head of Catholic Church from 1458 to 1464. He remained engaged in planning war against the Ottoman Turks, who had conquered Constantinople in 1453. And finally he called for a new crusade against the Ottomans.

⁴ An Outline .p.83

murdering the male inheritors of a prince when he becomes a ruler was justifiable. By this way they avoided risings and opponent claims to the throne. By adopting this unkind policy he succeeded to introduce a New World Order (Nizam-ı Alam). Muhammad II had two heirs, Cem and Bayezid II, both claimed for the power. Resultantly Bayezid II came forward as a successor of his father¹.

Bayezid II encountered two significant threats from Memluk's Muslim State², and Safavid's³ State respectively. The Ottomans campaign against the Memluk's for more than 6 years started in 1485 remained fruitless. Later on in 1516-1517 both Egypt and Syria become part of Ottoman's monarchy. The holy cities of Makkah and Madina also fell under their control. From Sultan Muhammad II onward the Ottomans had adopted posture of Muslim World's leader. The Safavids threat was different in nature from Memluks. The budding of the Safavid's in Iran under the supremacy of Shah Ismail⁴, posed a remarkable threat to the Ottomans. The Safavids were believers of Shi'ism and quite unfriendly to the Ottoman State. During the last years of Bayezid's era Safavid propagated against Ottoman Empire optimally and a notable Shi'i-inspired revolt among the Turks tribes of Eastern Anatolia was witnessed⁵.

1.2.2. Expansion Period

Thereafter, came Suleiman-I⁶ (1520-1566) who took over the reign of a powerful Empire comfortably. Suleiman-I was contemporarian, but a hard-hitting rival of the Roman Emperor Charles-V (1519-56), Francis-I of France (1515-47), Henry-VIII of England (1509-47), and Ivan of Russia (1530-84). Under the able command of Suleiman-

¹ Selcuk Aksin Somel, "The A to Z of the Ottoman Empire", Vol; 152. Scarecrow Press, 2010. p.40

² A state located in medieval Egypt. It lasted from the downfall of the Ayyubid Dynasty till the conquest of Egypt by Ottomans in 1517. Ottoman Sultan Salem-I conquered Cairo on January 20.

³ The Safavid's dynasty was most important dynasty of Iran. Safavids ruled the greatest Persian Empire after the conquest of the Persia, and initiated the twelve school of Shia Islam as the official religion. They were controlling Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, most of Iraq Georgia, also parts of Pakistan and Turkey.

⁴ Shah Ismail was the founder of Safavid dynasty. He unified all of Iran by 1509, and converted Iran from Sunni to Shia Islam.

⁵ An Outline. p. 87

⁶ Suleiman I was son of Sultan Salem I. In his era Ottoman dynasty gained a pitch of greatness and prosperity. He is commonly designated by European writers "the Magnificent".

I, the Ottoman Empire maintained the status of a world power.¹ They played a very important role in the world politics. His plans to weaken Roman Empire and Roman Catholic Church succeeded by and large.

While Ottomans were engaged at the fronts of Europe, the Safavids started creating trouble in their eastern border. The situation forced the Ottoman ruler to launch a crucial campaign against Safavids in 1553. The ending of the operation was the Amasya Agreement² concluded in 1555³. Under the requirements of this cease fire Shah Ismail and his associates accepted the Ottoman's domination more than Baghdad, Tabriz, and Eastern Anatolia. Suleiman-I, the Magnificent, passed away from this mortal world in 1566. At that point of the time territory of the Ottoman Empire had stretched from the Arabian Peninsula to the Balkan Peninsula. In the following years of extension, the Empire's International border further expanded gradually.⁴

Suleiman-I, was succeeded by a number of his unqualified heirs. Contrary to the historical traditions his successor Salem-II (1566-1574) even runaway to command his troops in a war. Such an undesired act on the part of a Sultan had visible negative effects on the overall morale of the soldiers and resulted in to a slowed down Ottoman conquests series. However, Muhammad III (1595-1603) speeded up the campaign and overpowered the Crusaders at the encounter of Keresztes⁵ (Hogova) in 1596. He was the last Ottoman Sultan who had killed his own son and brothers for the sake of throne⁶.

Subsequently Ottoman Sultans discarded the long persistent practice of killing their brothers, but never trusted their loyalty. As per the new practice, the brothers of the Sultan were used to imprison in the palace. Despite their luxurious living they were restricted to small rooms in far-off circumstances, famous as the cage system. They

¹Agoston Gabor, Bruce Atan Maters: "Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire" Info base Publishing, 2009. p. 512-514.

²First written peace agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran. (May 29, 1555).

³The A to Z of Ottoman Empire. p. 304

⁴Roger Savory, "Iran under the Safavids", Cambridge University Press, 2007. p. 64

⁵The Battle was fought between a combined Habsburg-Transylvanian army and the Ottomans in Northern Hungary. The battle resulted in victory of Ottomans.

⁶H.J. Kissling, Bertold Spuler, N. Barbour, H. Braun, H. Hartal., "The Last Great Muslim Empires", Translated by F.R.C Bagley, Brill 1997. p.35

further excluded the practice of making the princes governor of the provinces. Sultan Ahmed I (1603-1617) initiated an official code which affirmed that the oldest member of the Ottoman Empire would come up the throne¹. Paradoxically, after Suleiman I, mainly the Ottoman Sultans were not enough responsible and level-headed to exercise a complete control over the state affairs. Though Usman II (1618-1622), famous as young Usman struggled to regain the primacy of a real ruler, but he was killed by the Janissaries². His son named Murad IV (1622 – 1640) who was only eight year's old became Sultan of Ottoman Empire and ruled the Sultanate for 19 years. His successor Ibrahim (1640-1648) was quite incapable of handling the government thus he appointed a number of *Vazir* to run the state matters. In Sultan Ibrahim's reign, the Ottoman kingdom rapidly arrives at the edge of collapse. Sultan Ibrahim was killed in an uprising in 1648³. He was succeeded by his seven years old son Muhammad IV (1648-1687). Turhan Hatice Sultan (the mother of Muhammad IV) appointed an aged, mature man Koprulu, as grand *Vazir* in October 1656, who became so powerful that the era was named after the same *Vazir* instead of the then Sultan⁴. Formation of the famous Holy league⁵ by Pope XI took place in 1684. Holy Roman Empire, the Venetian Republic, and Poland were allied of Holy league. It was later own joined by Russia in 1686. A sixteen yearlong series of war had to be fought by Ottoman against the newly emerged league⁶. Unfortunately owing to incompetent and incapable Ottoman's command and control the league succeeded and imposed to accept the Treaty of Karlowitz⁷ in 1699. The treaty had begun the decline of Ottoman in the Eastern Europe⁸. In the following years Ottoman fought a number of unsuccessful wars against European countries and Russia to get back the lost territory and make advancement towards Moscow. The situation forced the Ottoman to evaluate their

¹Outline, 95

²Force created by Sultan Murad I, were young Christian boys from conquered countries, who were converted to Islam. They were the Ottoman Empire's first standing army.

³Tassos A. Mikropoulos, "Elevating and Safeguarding Culture using tool of the Information and Society: Dusty traces of the Muslim Culture" Earthlab, 2008. p.197

⁴Ali Aldosari, "Middle East western Asia and Northern Africa" Marshall Cavendish, 2007, p. 756.

⁵The Holy league comprises an alliance of Poland Venice and Habsburg Austria with the aim to free Europe of the Ottoman. {(Marshall Cavendish, "Illustrated dictionary of the Muslim World "Marshall Cavendish, 2010)}

⁶Stanely Sandler, "Ground Warfare: An international Encyclopedia", Vol I, ABC-CLIO, 2002 Pg 985.

⁷Peace Treaty signed on January, 26, 1699, terminated the war between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy league.

⁸The A to Z of Ottoman, p.305

expansionist policy. Accordingly they followed a policy of peace from 1718 to 1730, but the Russia imposed a devastating war on them which lasted for six years (1768 to 1774). In addition to lose a vast territory of strategic importance, the Ottoman's experienced a critical economic problem as well. This resulted into a visible unrest among general public.

1.2.3. Declining Period

At the end of the Russo Turkish war, Ottoman's were forced to sign a dishonorable treaty of KucukKaynarca¹ (*KuchukKainarji*) with Russia on extremely hard terms and conditions². The offensive agreement resulted in the inauguration of Ottoman fall down in southeastern Europe and the Black Sea. Following the downfall of Mustafa III, Abdulhamid I³ (1774-1789) took over the responsibility of the Sultanate. His successor Young sultan Salem III (1789-1807) tried hard to restore Ottoman's traditional esteem but to no avail⁴. Ultimately, the Janissaries overthrew and caged Salem III and selected his nephew Mustafa IV (1807-1808) as new sultan⁵. Mahmud II (1808-1839) replaced him in 1808. Consequent to the Greek War of Independence, the Ottomans were left with no option other than to accept the creation of a self-sufficient Greek Empire. This incident marked the starting of the steady division of the Ottoman territory. Tsar Nicholas-I⁶ of Russia hatefully declared the Ottoman kingdom as the "Sick Man of Europe"⁷ in 1853. The situation was such an alarming that a large scale immigration tuning to 7 millions of people took place from within the various parts of Ottoman ruled territory to Anatolia. The circumstances lead to break out numerous nationalists'

¹Pact Signed at the conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-74 at KuçukKaynarca, in Bulgaria. This treaty gave Russia the right to establish consulates everywhere in the Ottoman Empire and to protect Orthodox Christians in the Empire etc

²MesutUyar, Edward J. Erickson, "A military History of the Ottomans: From Usman to Ataturk", ABC-CLIO, 2009, p.16

³A pious man with a deep interest in state affairs, he was in favor of reform and nominated eligible grand vazirs, initiated army reforms, endeavored to reinforce the central government in contrast to provincial rulers importantly in Syria, Egypt and Iraq.

⁴Can Esen, "Early steps to the foundation of Modern Turkey: Nineteen century Reforms and the Young Turk Revolution", GRIN Verlag, 2012, p.6

⁵Olivier Roy, "Turkey Today: A European Country?" Anthem Press, 2005 p.109

⁶He was younger brother of Alexander I, and was the Emperor of Russia from 1825 until 1885. His role in Russo-Turk war and defeat of the Ottoman Empire as well as in ascendancy of Russia as a world power is highly noticeable.

⁷As Ottoman Empire had lost its territories and was gradually falling under the control of Europeans.

movements and the Ottomans domain started shrinking remarkably in the last quarter of 19th century¹.

1.2.4. Collapse Period

During the period of nationalist uprising Bulgarian gangs slaughtered thousands of innocent Turkish people including children, women, and old men in alliance with the Russia. The Armenian and Balkan nations also had full support of Russia and Great Britain to get independence from Ottomans. These rebels together formed the Balkan League and crushed the Ottoman forces.

The Balkan Wars proved most disastrous in the history of Turkey. Another deadly blow was the decision of the Ottomans' regarding First World War to side with the Germany. Turkish youth revolted against the Ottoman ruler in 1920 and formed an equivalent government with its capital at Ankara in 1920. They declared the Turkey as a democratic country and disband the Ottoman parliament. Instead they established the Turkish Grand National Assembly headed by Mustafa Kamal Pasha. They finally abolished the Ottomans' Sultanate in November 1922². With this the Ottoman dynasty came to its logical end as they failed to fulfill the pre requisite of a Muslim state. As described by Molana Maududi³; Sovereignty of Allah, Final Authority of Al Quran walSunnah, consultation(the Shura), Correct use of Government exchequer, Independent Judiciary and the last but not least due regard of Public Opinion are the nonnegotiable characteristics of an Islamic state.

The decline of the Ottoman dynasty can be justified with following reasons; unqualified rulers, disputes of inheritors for throne, quitting expansion of the empire and lastly the poor economic conditions. As the rulers were immature, incompetent and were unaware how to administrate the Empire properly so ultimately they were more focused on just stabilizing their rule than state's expansion. Common people also faced trouble

¹An Outline, p. 104-119.

²An Outline, p.140.

³Maududi, Abu Al Ala, "Khilafat O Malookiat" TarjumaanUl Quran, 1992. p. 247- 275.

when in 1768 the Russia imposed a devastating war on Ottomans they not only lost vast territory of strategic importance but also the faced inflation problem.

1.3. Review of the circumstances that led to Secularization

1.3.1. Historical Preview

The Ottoman state had emerged as the result of an Islamic movement under the leadership of Ghazi Usman, founder of the ottoman dynasty, established in 1330. The Sufis and Ghazis of Anatolia played a major role in the movement. They derived their title of Sultan from the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo. In its formative stages, the Ottoman State was of a far more democratic character in comparison with its contemporaries, since its rulers depended for their power on the support of their people and the 'Ulma'. But when the Ottoman dominions expanded, the rulers became autocrats whose sole ambition was to conquer alien lands at every cost. After the reign of Sultan Muhammad II (1421-1451), the palace became a hub of conspiracies under the manipulation of the European wives of the Sultans. The role of Roxelana-khurram¹, the Russian favorite of Sultan Sulciman the Magnificent, in shaping the state policies in her own interest is so obvious that nobody can deny the historical fact.

The decline of the Ottoman dynasty paved ways of secularization in Turkey. The whole process was multifaceted. Initially, the downfall of the dynasty took place with the development of civilization and intellectual activity was shortened or almost absent. The decline of the Islamic thought started when the caliphate failed to fulfill the needs of the developing civilization. It was basically the decline of the Islamic thought that was perceived as inability of Islam to satisfy the needs of the time. In such circumstances, secularism got an edge. It was Sultan Salem-III who made the first move to introduced Westernization during his period. Furthermore it was supported by Sultan Mahmud II and

¹She was known as Hurrem Sultan in Turkish History. Hürrem acted as Suleiman's advisor on matters of state, and seems to have had an influence upon foreign affairs and international politics. <http://www.boutiqueottoman.com/who-is-hurrem-sultan-roxelana-hoyam-sultana/>

his successors during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876)¹. Midhat Pasha was the most vocal supporter of Western thoughts. He advised the Sheikh-ul-Islam² to issue a Fatwa for implementation of Western laws in the courts, for the reason that Islam does not forbid their implementation. It was also advocated that the accomplishment of the independent system within the ruling system and the adoption of Europeans laws within the courts neither change the Islamic nature of the State, nor the Islamic nature of the laws. To some it was still considered as a modification idea within the state. No body looked upon these laws and rules as being rules of Kufr.

3. Aforementioned Fatwa of the Sheikh-ul-Islam and other like minded intellectuals was supported by the following grounds³:-

(a) A Muslim state was permitted to adopt any thought, or rule, or law that did not contradict Islam and that had not been prohibited.

(b) The absence of the rebuke is permission. So taking a matter whose prohibition has not been mentioned would be Mubah. Therefore, anything that Shari'ah kept silent about is Mubah. The adoption of rules and laws which have not been mentioned by the Shari'ah and which the Shari'ah did not mention by any prohibition is part of the Mubah.

(c) Democracy is from Islam, for it is based on Shura' (consultation), justice and equality. In this way it was deduced that democracy is from Islam and the Qur'an mentioned it and the Messenger (saw) commanded it.

¹Tanzimat means reorganization. It was the period of reformation to westernize the Ottoman Kingdom, also to protect its territorial integrity against nationalist movements and competent forces. Agoston Gabor, Bruce Atan Maters: "Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire" Info base Publishing, 2009. p. 553-556.

Baran, Z. "Torn Country Turkey between Secularism and Islamism" Hoover Press, 2010, p.18

²The Sheikh-ul-Islam, a dignitary whose title denoted the Chief of Islam, was the head of the Ulama or religio-judicial hierarchy of the Empire. The title was created, in 1423 by the Ottoman Emperor Muhammad II. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/ot-sheik-ul-islam.htm>. Date visited: March 6, 2015

³ Zallum, Abdul Qadeem: "How the Khilafah was destroyed" Al - Khilafah Publications, 2000. (<http://www.khiliafah.com>), p.41-42

1.3.2. Modernization of Turkish Institutes

Subsequently establishment of numerous Western Institutions like creation of new Courts of Law and modern educational setup etc. took place. Furthermore, administration and the defense services structure were also revamped. A conflicting mix of the old and the new institutions was quite evident in the beginning of 19th century. Despite all the hard work to create harmony and uniformity, it remained fruitless due to a wide gap between the two entirely different civilizations. Ottoman failed to create a nation of heterogeneous elements. Their indifference to nationalism, on account of the Ottoman universalism, caused irreparable losses to the Turks nation.

The movement for modernization and secularization of the traditional Caliphate gained drive from the French revolution, and continued passionately during the 19th century. Ironically in the Ottoman Empire, the Turks did not participate in economic affairs. Businessmen and technicians were non-Muslim. The Turks were either laborers or government officials. The Ottoman government depended almost entirely on its officials. The Turks suffered not only economically, but also culturally. The dawn of the 20th millennium brought countless miseries and in humiliation for the traditionally proud Turkish national. The Young Turk revolution¹ of 1908, the growth of Turkish nationalism and the establishment of the Turkish Republic were express outcome of these frustrations. In a real term secularization of the Ottoman State took place when the nationalities of the Empire annulled the idea of a Muslim Ummah and acquired their national independence. Moreover, Arab mutinies bowed down the idea of the 'Islamic Ummah' (international community of all Muslims). These historic developments gave birth to Turkish nationalism as the popular ideology of the Young Turk movement².

¹ The revolution was to overthrow the Sultan's absolute power by the elite Turks, and the exchange of parliamentary government under their authority.

² M. Sukru Hanioglu: "Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902 -1908". Oxford University Press, 2001 p. 3-8

1.3.3. Blow of Nationalist Movements

By then the dominant Young Turks faction whole heartedly concluded that, it was the Turkish people, not the Muslim Ummah that should be the actual force behind the national transformation. It was also concluded that to overcome the miseries of Turkish nation in economic and social arena development of science and the nationhood identity is a must. That premeditated understanding provided a fertile soil for formation of secularized society. The expansion of a secular learning system, inspired by the West, enlarged the amount of the people who were supporter of Western thinkers. In addition, these natives were the main promoters of excessive modernization. It can be concluded that the replacement of the previous structure of education by western, was a major reason that paved the path for the secularization¹. Alternatively, the rise of the Turkish patriotism destabilized the religious identity. The slogan "To be Turk" became more significant than "to be Muslim". This renovation of identity directed to decline of the religious conviction at individuals' level.

With that condition Mustafa Kamal aimed to end the centuries old hostility between the European Powers and Turkey. He succeeded in the implementation of secularist reforms mainly because the ground was gradually and favorably prepared by his predecessors since long. His fascinating personality, his popularity as the national hero of Turkish revolution and above all the decisive role of Turkish Nationalism Movement were the major contributory factors to establish a secular regime in Turkey after the victory that ended the War of Liberation in 1922. He founded a new nationalists and Secularist state of Turkey. Thus he formed the Republic of the Turkish People on 29 October 1923.

In this chapter, I have tried to give a brief summary of Ottoman history since its formation till the decline. In addition, I attempted to give details on how the

¹ Selcuk Aksin Somel, "The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire 1839 – 1908". BRILL, 2001 p.13-38 Also, *The A to Z of the Ottoman*. p.321 – 324

Empire was dispersed, and the circumstances that led to the formation of new Republic. While the next chapter will investigate the secularization period of Turkish history highlighting the reforms that were initiated in order to stabilize the secular nature of the Republic of Turkey.

Chapter 2

Turkey as a secular state: an Analysis

2.1. Secularization (1923 -38) of Turkish Constitution and the Role of Kamal Ataturk

2.1.1 Enactment of Laws

The Constitution of 1921 was the first to announce that “sovereignty is entirely and totally vested in the people.” This declaration symbolized a strong exit from the previous theocratic system, where sovereignty was entrusted to Allah and handed over to the Sultans¹. After declaring this, the Constitution documented that the Republic of Turkey would be a democratic state, where the willpower of the people, instead of Allah’, would decide the laws and policies. Although, the first Constitution set up a democratic system, a secular order was not until now in place. Article 2 declared that Islam would be the official religion of the Republic of Turkey. Certainly a secular regime does not have an official state religion; this provision was, definitely, a confrontational compromise. The Constitution had 24 articles, while the first nine articles were about the prime principles which support the base of state². The foreword of Constitution largely prohibited religious intervention in State affairs for the first time in Turkish Constitutional history. According to the Constitution, authority is for nation without any conditions and restrictions; the lawmaking and decision-making powers were granted to the Assembly, and the elected Speaker, have to act as the ex officio head of the Council of ministers. Mustafa Kamal convinced the legislative body to give him more authoritarian powers. The assembly was requested to recognize itself as representative of the nation, and then to hand over its powers to Kamal and his government.

Secularization was infused under the state control, in the amount that state let, in other words, its limits were also set by the state itself. However, the most crucial reform for secularization was the exclusion of the emperor and the sovereignty of the Ottoman family in November 1922. With the declaration of the Republic in October 1923 and it

¹Constitutions of Turkey: Constitution of Turkey, Constitutional court of Turkey, Turkish Constitution of 1921. Turkish Constitution of 1961. LLC Books, General Books LLC, 2010

²The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, <http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/icerik/12>. Visited: January 13, 2013

was announced that sovereignty is unconditionally owned by the nation. The prohibition of religious institutions of the Ottoman society, the law of educational unification and the outlawing of the Caliphate were all realized in 1924.¹ In the newly adopted constitution, still Islam was accepted as the official religion in Turkey. The situation remained unchanged till April 1928. "Laic"² feature of the state was made lawful in the constitution in February 1937. By the omitting of the article regarding to Islam as the official religion in Turkey from the 1924 Constitution, the constitution gained a secular feature.

Secularism was the outcome of Ataturk's reforms carried out mainly in the years 1923 - 1938. The six principles of Ataturk's or "six arrows"³ were approved in the official agenda of the Republican People Party (RPP). The so-called "Arrows of Kamalism" include republicanism⁴, populism⁵, secularism, revolutionism⁶, nationalism⁷, and statism⁸. These principles came to be associated with Kamalism, and the modification carried out during 1920s and 1930s, is acknowledged as 'Ataturk's reforms. Kamalist principles such as secularism refer to the views of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, later on a law was passed, which stated 'disrespecting or damaging the divine legacy of Ataturk' a crime liable to be punished. For a long time, this law was used to avoid any criticism or any objective assessment of Ataturk's reforms or Kamalism. Under the requirements of constitution Ataturk's reforms were provided with full comfort. These reforms were not allowed to be amended. Further to that, even suggestions to revise these articles in the constitution were not allowed. The rule of secularism was the characteristic of the phase when Ataturk directed the nation. It proved to be the fundamental pillars of Ataturk's uprising. Secularism was taken as a mean by Ataturk to eliminate

¹The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, <http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/icerik/12>. Visited: January 13, 2013

²"Laic": Relating to the Laity: Secular. (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English language, 4th Edition).

³Jacob M Landau "Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey" BRILL, 1984, p. 26

⁴Governing any nation as a republic, emphasizing liberty, rule of law, popular sovereignty practiced by citizens.

⁵A political strategy based on calculated appeal to the interests or prejudices of ordinary people.

⁶A believe in the spread of revolutionary ideas and principles.

⁷Loyalty or devotion to one's country: Patriotism. The doctrine, that one's national culture and interests are superior to any other. It also refer to the independence of nations to attain their goals

⁸The practice of focusing economy and politic factors of the state, as a result position for the individual or community weakens with regard to the government

the predominant religious pressure from public life, also, it meant dishearten private religious devotion as well. The most significant element of Kamalist secularization is the objective to take Islam under state control and to cease the influence of religion in political, social and cultural spheres. With laicism as the ideology of the state, a secular culture and a secular lifestyle was aimed to be developed by the republican elite.

2.1.2 Kamal Ataturk Reforms

The reforms related to creating a secular society during 1923 to 1938 is enlisted below:¹

- (a) A secular Constitution adopted and enforced.
- (b) The Constitution protected secularism in two oaths of office. The language used in the Constitution indicated the importance of secularism to its originators.
- (c) The traditional strongholds of Islam were visibly undermined.
- (d) The substitution of religious symbols with the symbols of European civilization carried out.
- (e) Secularization of social life and eradicating the impact of popular Islam in everyday life.
- (f) Polygamy was prohibited in 1925 and civil marriage was made compulsory in 1926.
- (g) The fez was forbidden and replaced by European hats and caps with a declaration in Kastamonu².

¹Sena Karasipahi, "Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kamalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals". I.B. Tauris, 2009, p. 22.

²One of the provinces of Turkey.

- (h) Religious orders and societies like *Tarikat*¹ were closed and members of the religious clergy were forced to wear a uniform-dress prescribed by the state.
- (i) A new civil code based on European model replaced the Islamic one.
- (j) Exclusion of the article from the constitution which affirmed Islam as the country religion in 1928.
- (k) The Turkish state was declared officially secular.
- (l) Replacement of Arabic alphabets with the Latin alphabet.
- (m) The call to prayer; Azaan was planned to be made in Turkish and not in Arabic².
- (n) Women were given equal rights with men to hold office.
- (o) Adoption of the Gregorian calendar and Sunday as the weekly official holiday.
- (p) Adoption of surname: In 1934, a law was passed about the adoption a surname. “Mustafa Kamal declared that no longer would names follow the traditional pattern of son-of-father, but that each person would adopt a family name, to continue through the generations. Mustafa Kamal himself became Kamal Atatürk (father of the Turks)”³

2.1.3 Impact of the Reforms

These reforms show that secularization was achieved not only in the constitutional law, but also in social life. In the songs, myths, dances, all forms of culture, it was attempted to construct non-Islamic and folkloric Turkish identity which

¹Tarikats are religious order initiated to “search for divine truth”. They have been part of Turkish social and cultural life for a long time.

²Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey p. 38

³Ungor.UgurUmit, “The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia 1913-1950” Oxford University Press, 2012.p. 231

would well suit the secular-republican society of a nation-state. Turkish secularization attempted to repress the religious practices of society and took Islam under the control of the state. A religious state institution named Religious Affairs Directory was established during the early republican period in 1924¹. Religious clergy became state officers. Since the establishment of the Religious Affairs Directory did not mean the complete separation of religion and state affairs in line with the official description of laicism in the Turkish Constitution. It indicated a case of state intervention in religion. The Turkish case denotes a unique definition and application of Secularism. The constitutional definition of laicism on the one hand, and its institutional application; the Religious Affairs Directory, on the other hand are different and thus stands as a sharp contrast to each other. By 1923, the government of Kamal Ataturk had created back of governmental, judicial, and administrative bodies.

Pursuant to Kamal Ataturk's desire, the parliament decided to produce a new constitution at the start of 1924. The new Constitution² contained 105 articles, and was approved by a greater part of the Assembly on April 20, 1924. It's known as the longest-living constitution in Turkish history. As, it was put into practice for 36 years and was mainly, conformed to the Secular ideas. In the 1924 Constitution, the country's system was primarily the similar to that of the earlier Constitution. The parliamentary system was implemented for forming the government and cooperative responsibility. The lawmaking and administrative powers were absolute in the Assembly and the Assembly had right to dissolve the government at any time. Oppositely, the government did not have the right to suspend the Assembly. On the other hand, the President and the commission of Ministers were granted executive powers. According to the 1924 Constitution, every person had unchallengeable equality before the law; torment and brutal or atypical punishment were not allowed; individual freedom, freedom of morals and religion, besides freedom of thought and expression were assured in addition to all civilian and political rights and freedoms. Also, there were no conditions on economic

¹ Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh, "The Gulen Movement: A sociological Analysis of a civic movement routed in Moderate Islam." Springer, 2009. p.14

² Basak Ince, "Citizen and Identity in Turkey: From Ataturk's Republic to the present day". I. B. Tauris, 2012. p. 43

and social rights. Since the foundation of the republic, the major problem Turkey is facing is the struggle between secularism, and Islam and traditional Islamic views. Ataturk had created a cultural mutiny, not only by closing down the foundation of Islam as a state religion, but also introduced changes in clothing and education, removing the Arabic alphabet and frequently trying to throw Turkey into the contemporary western world with even more vigor¹.

Another most important step towards secularization was that Ataturk brought to an end the nation's quest for Jihad, substituting it with the expression: "Peace at home, peace in the world"². Accordingly, this shift disconnected the religious concept of jihad from the government system, and aimed for economic growth through peace. Every reform throughout the shaping period of the Republic was planned to scratch and damage the legacy of the Ottoman political and social influence and to set up a modern and secular structure to identify the latest Turkish realm. In order to get rid of every sign that had a connection with the Ottoman-Islamic tradition and to thoroughly "break from the Ottoman era," a whole detachment was ensured from intellectual and fictional characteristics of the past. The Turkish language for the state influential was to be purified, and as a result, it was purified from its Arabic and Islamic influence, supposed to scheduled and revise the secular characteristics through writings, education, and the media. After the introduction of the Latin alphabet, books, magazines, newspapers, and official papers were placed in the records for years to come. Other considerable reforms included implementation of the Swiss civil and Italian penal codes, and the acceptance of laws concerning to the unification of education which mostly assisted the budding of secular traditions, symbols, and practices.

¹Torn Country.p.24-30

²Adrien Katherine Wing, Ozan O. Varol. "Is Secularism Possible in a Majority – Muslim Country? : The Turkish Example". p. 13

2.2 Secular Constitution and Aftermath

2.2.1 Evolution of Secularism in Turkey

The Kamalist reforms gave a soaring surge to Secularism from 1921 to 1928. That continued to encompass large areas of national life in Turkey with its appalling effects, until it reached its climax in 1945. It began to subside in 1949 with the introduction of optional religious education in schools. The year 1949 marks beginning of a period of modernization in secularism which has continued up to the present time.¹ Some anti-secular tendencies had developed between 1950 and 1960 when the Democratic Party was in power. After the army' takeover in May 27, 1960, the military government headed by General CemalGursel² restated its dedication to the Kamalist principles. The Constitution of 1961 introduced certain modifications in these principles, and ensured a better distribution of powers.

The first attempt made by the Kamalist regime to separate Religion and State was aimed at limiting the practice of religion within the precincts of places of worship. Its actual result was the inferiority and dependency of religion to the state. Secular state of turkey not only suppressed the political and social influence of the Ulma, its main target seemed to be the total elimination of religion from the politics, cultural and social life of the Turkish nation³.

The opposing Islamic reforms of the Kamalist government put the religion defunct in Turkey as a social Institution. They failed to comprehend the deep-rooted influence of Islam over the Turkish people. The secular reforms actually played an essentialfunction in Turkey. The lack of formal spiritual education in the 1930's seems to have provided a strong impetus for renewed efforts on the part of educated Muslims to

¹Muhammad Rashid Feroz, "Islam and Secularism in Post-Kamalist Turkey". Islamic Research Institute, 1976.p.106

²CemalGursel was a military officer, and the 4th president of Turkey. Participated, in all the Western front campaigns during Turkish War of Independence in 1920-1923.

³ Mark L. Haas, "The Clash of Ideologies: Middle Eastern Politics and American Security", Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 171

produce abundant literature on the various aspects of Islam in 1940's. The Turkish government finally introduced optional religious education in schools early in 1949.¹

2.2.2 Emergence of Multi-Party System

When Turkey joined the United Nations in 1945, Ismet Inonu² permitted the creation of a resistant party to demonstrate to the western powers the good intentions of the Republican regime for the maintenance of democratic institutions. The success of the Democratic Party in 1950 was a landmark in the history of the Republic of Turkey. The RPP had ruled Turkey uninterruptedly for about 27 years with an authoritarian and almost dictatorial regime. For the period of the single party rule (1923-1950) of the RPP, the party was inclined toward aggressive secularism by persuading the locking up of religion in individual's conscience as a personal matter.³

The democrats had campaigned vigorously for four years among all classes of people to win popular support for the establishment of a truly representative regime. They succeeded in winning the sympathy of the peasants who were dissatisfied with the agrarian reforms⁴, and the overwhelming support of the religious class and middle class businessmen. The republicans had become unpopular on account of their extreme secularist policy. The democrats were liberal secularists who agreed in general with the basic policy of Atatürk on westernization and secularism. They differed from the principles of Kamalism on certain points, such as religious affairs and estimates. The multiparty elections of 1950 initiated an argument on secularism. The new government formed by the Democrat Party (DP)⁵, assured more religious liberty to society.

¹ W. Col Durham, David M. Kirkham, Tore Lindholm, "Islam and Political - Cultural Europe". Ashgate Publishing, 2013. p.147-155

² Mustafa Ismet Inonu was an Army General. He remained the Prime Minister of Turkey and later succeeded Mustafa Kamal as president of the Turkey. In 1938, the RPP labeled him as National Chief. Ismet Inonu served as Turkish Prime Minister for many times, and was loyal to the system that Mustafa Kamal had introduced.

³ The Development of Secularism in Turkey. p. 26

⁴ Agrarian reforms referred to land reforms confined to redistribution of land among peasants.

⁵ The party was established on January 07, 1946. The Member of Parliament of the Republican People's Party (RPP), Celal Bayar, Adnan Menders, resigned or were dismissed from the (RPP) and founded the Democratic Party which became Turkey's first Opposition party. The 1950's election resulted in a landslide victory of the Democratic Party

The changes introduced by the democratic regime were manifold. Religious education was made obligatory in primary institutions. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was enlarged in order to encourage and guide religious education in more proper and organized way. The aim of the cultural policy of the new regime was to maintain Islam as an integral element of Turkish culture. The Democratic regime introduced some changes in other facets of state as well. The Turkish foreign policy revamped. Turkey entered into a defense alliance with Pakistan, Iran and Iraq known as Baghdad Pact¹. Turkish delegates began to participate in various cultural conferences in the Muslim Countries. A delegation consisting of two deputies and a newspaper editor attended the World Muslim Conference held in Karachi in 1950. Turkish pilgrims were allowed to perform the Hajj at Mecca. These were quite major changes in the policy of a secular state which had until then discouraged all kinds of religious activity for about a quarter of a century.

2.2.3 Resurgence of Islam

A motion before the Grand National Assembly was presented by a Deputy from Konya in 1959 seeking an amendment in the Turkish constitution to declare the Islam as a State Religion. However the same could not succeed. Again similar motions came up before the Grand National Assembly from time to time up to 1960. The developments so made during the rule of the Democratic Party were clear manifestation that the resurgence of Islam was evident in the Political and social life of the Turkish people. It did not mean simply the phenomenal increase in religious activity among the masses. The policy of the DP was conducive in application of Islam to the daily life of People of Turkey. It led to appearance of a new generation of young people including men and women taking keen interest in Islam, and very much proud of their being Muslim.

Resurgence of Islam became alarming for the secularists. Increased religious activity of the Muslim groups and the *Tarikats* led to outbursts of anti-secularist demonstration and the destruction of Ataturk's statues in various places. Secularists

¹ The defense alliance was between Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq United Kingdom and Iran. Its aim was to maintain the peace and security order in the region.

accused the Democratic regime of manipulating and exploiting religion for political purpose. Another important development was the emergence of the influence of Islam in Turkish politics. The secularist policy of the state began to be criticized openly at the meetings of political parties¹.

After winning another General Election, the Democratic Party started to follow the authoritarian attitude of its predecessor, the Republican People's Party. They also started suppressing opposition. Political opponents were imprisoned, and strict censorship was imposed on newspapers and other publications. The regime had worked chaotically on industrial and economic development to convince the people that maximum industrialization could be achieved within the shortest possible time. The result was inflation, anarchy and confusion. The dispute among the doctrines of secularism and Islam has a decisive moment with 27th May 1960 interference of the Army, headed by a faction of youthful officers. The dissatisfaction of the Turkish Army with the Democrats policies was evident. Under the circumstances the Turkish military authorities imposed Martial law under the leadership of General Cemal Gursel.

A new constitution Assembly came into existence in January, 1961, and a new constitution was framed within a period of six months. A referendum was held to approve the Constitution in July 1961. It was affected immediately. It contained only four principles of Kamalism instead of the six mentioned in the Constitution of 1924². These principles include republicanism, nationalism, secularism and revolutionism³. These principles of estimates and populism were deleted. Socialism⁴ was adopted as an additional principle. Article 2 of this Constitution intensely declared that "The Turkish Republic is a secular democratic, national and social realm". While, Article 19 stated that "Nobody shall be tolerable to abuse religion or religious feelings or things in any way,

¹Angel Rabasa, F. Stephen Larrabee, "The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey". Rand Corporation, 2008. p.36-38.

²Banu Eligur. "The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey", Cambridge University press 2010, p. 60-61.

³In Political sense, rapid and often irreversible change in the established order. Revolution involves a radical change in government, usually accomplished through violence that may also result in changes to the economic system, social structure, and cultural values.

⁴A theory or system of social organization advocating placing the ownership and control of capital, land, and means of production in the community as a whole.

it's not permissible for political or private advantage or for gaining authority, also it will not be permitted to base even partially, the basic social, economic and legal order of the state on religious grounds¹. Anyone found violating this prevention, or even found persuading others to do so, shall be punished by the proper laws. If such violation is done by associations and political parties, then, the party shall be permanently closed down by authorized courts and finally by order of the Constitutional Court". Therefore, the 1961 Constitution firmly discouraged the misuse or abuse of religion under the warning of penalties.

The Justice Party founded by General Ragip Gumuspala² soon after the ban imposed on the Democratic Party in 1960, consisted mainly of ex-members and sympathizers of the Democratic Party. After the General Election of October, 1961, the Justice Party had a bulk of votes in the National Assembly and the Senate, but it had to form a combine government with the Republican People's Party. The strength of the party became still greater after the General elections of 1965 when it was capable to figure a government on its own. This was a clear indication that the power and influence of the Secularists had gradually declined in recent years. The development in Turkish politics since 1950 have provided ample evidence to prove that moderation in secularism has come to stay, and that Islam is no longer confined to the conscience of the people, as desired by the leaders of the Kamalist regime.

The TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) ruled the country's politics until 1965. After the formation of Army' Mutual Assistance Association(OYAK)³, the armed forces started to guard the capital system⁴. Though, stability of economics and politics as planned by TAF was not long lasting and this lead to an indirect military interference on 12 March 1971. Consequently, the Demirel' government was enforced to depart after the senior

¹The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey. p.60-61

²Turkish Army General also the prime mover of the Justice party (JP). He operated as the Chief of the General Staff after the military coup of May 27, 1960, but was retired against his will by the new government. Later he formed Justice Party in obstruction to the ruling RPP on 1961.

³OYAK provides its member with "Supplementary retirement benefits" excluding the official retirement fund. Also provides its members with benefits such as loan, home loan, and retirement income system.

⁴Capitalism is the system in which a country' trade and industry are controlled by the private owners for profit.

officers of the TAF gave a warning to the president. TAF demanded a new government asserting that the state is in need for a “strong and capable government” that could restore the rebellious situation. They also warned in case the demand is negated, it would lead to taking over the supervision of the country. Legally speaking, a soft martial law was enforced by emphasizing military’s power. The civil rights widened in the 1961 Constitution were minimized. The constitutional amendments provided a wider space to the military. The audit of the military spending became more secluded. After the amendments in 1973, the key role of the National Security Council (NSC) was enlarged to make suggestions to the government.

The Third interference by military to save the Kamalists Republic in 1980 had extensive impact all through the country. For the period of the three years of the military rule, the supporters of the right and the left were put behind the bars and political parties were disqualified. However soon after this interference by the Army, the State Planning Organization (SPO) was instructed to produce a National Culture Plan. It was a widespread effort to bring back Islam to its pre-republican role and status by de-secularizing all educational, historical, artistic, technical, and linguistic institutes. For this purpose Article 163 of the Penal Code which banned the religious parties, was canceled in 1989. In corresponding with the globalization process, identity politics became an essential issue. Whereas the notion of national characteristics was being disputed, religious, cultural and gender based identity claims articulated strongly. The expressions of identity claims were the main reason behind the social anxiety such as the continuing uneasiness between the secularists and the Islamic that showed itself in the 1990s, with the emergence of the “headscarf issue”¹. The Constitutional Court disqualified the female students with headscarves to enter into the universities regardless of the belief of the Islamic groups who said it is a basic right. Another identity claim belonged to the Kurds. Thereafter in 1991, when the Soviet Union comes to its fall, the articles of Penal Code² relating the prohibition of revolutionary socialism were expelled

¹Ergun Ozbudun, “Democratization and Politics of Constitution making in Turkey.” Central European University Press, 2009. p.106

²Salomon Ruysdael, “New Trends in Turkish Foreign Affairs: Bridges and Boundaries.” iUniverse, 2002. p. 43

from the set of guidelines. The situation was therefore convenient for a democratic capture by Islamic parties.

The differing views of the pro-Islamic groups on secularism from the 1950s to the 1990s can be summarized as under:-

(a) Tolerant view¹: The followers of this view tried to liberalize practices of the secular Turkish state. Their aim was to replace the assertive secularism with a more passive secularism. The central right parties, including the DP, the Justice Party (JP), the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP) generally adopted this position².

(b) Austere view: A few Islamic movements and communities generally tended to focus on Islamic tenants and preferred to keep silent about secularism, such as teaching the Qur'an to the youth and opening dormitories for students. Among these groups Nur movement founded by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi³, was the most prominent school of thought. To them "Ninety-nine percent of Islam is about ethics, worship, the hereafter, and virtue. Only one percent is about politics; leave that to the rulers." Hefurther said "I seek shelter in God from Satan and politics."⁴

(c) Islamic view: NajmuddinErbakan is considered originator of this view. He founded the National Order Party in 1970 and the National Salvation Party in 1972. Both parties were accused of being anti-secular and disbanded following the military coup d'états of 1971 and 1980. In 1983, Erbakan founded the Welfare Party (WP). In the 1995 national elections, the WP received 21.4 percent of the

¹M.HakanYavuz, "The Emergence of a new Turkey: Democracy and the JDP Parti" University of Utah Press, 2006. Pg 139

²AhmetT.Kuru, "Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey" Cambridge University Press, 2009. p.241

³A Religious leader mainly inclined towards Sufi doctrines. Also, creator of the Nur movement and writer of the Risale-i-Nur.Nursi's faith movement has played an important part in the resurgence of Islam in Turkey.

⁴Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, *Risale-i NurKülliyatı* [The Epistles of Light Collection] (Istanbul: Nesil, 1996), 1922. p.368

votes and became the leading party. Erbakan became the prime minister in 1996 in the WP-TPP coalition. His followers are known to be hardliner and staunch believers of Islam but despite all they generally avoided direct criticism of secularism.¹

2.2.4 Achievements of Islamists

In 1990's the Islamic movement had a significant awakening and it started turning to be a strong player in the political field. In beginning of 1997, a harsh warning was given to the Islamic Refah Party (Welfare Party) by the secular armed force which was later followed by armed force takeover in February 28, 1997. Consequently the coalition of Refah and True Path Party broken down, as the RP was closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Toppling of elected Government by Military Establishment proved very obstructive for Muslims to practice Islam also for Islamic education in Turkey. The ban on wearing headscarf in universities was firmly imposed, the institutions of religious education known as Imam-Hatip² secondary schools were shut down, and teaching the Qur'an to children under age twelve became against the law. The military disqualified supposedly Muslim and known virtuous officers. Adding to this, Islam oriented businesses and economic institutions faced official prejudice.³ Such domination resulted in a conversion in Islamic parties in terms of their views of Turkey's EU membership, and secularism.⁴ Erdogan's Justice and Development party was a prominent player in this alteration. In 2000, three young leaders; Erdogan, Arınç and Abdullah Gül gave emphasis to their pro-secular and pro-democratic ideas.⁵ Particularly Erdogan's associates stressed to reinterpret the Secularism in more tolerant way, asserting the religious liberty and rights of individual. They believed that the new interpretation of secularism, should express the fact that Turkey is bearing dual

¹Gunes Murat Tezcur, "Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation." University of Texas Press, 2010. p.146

²Hatip is from Arabic word "Khatib", the one who convey the address.

³ M. Hakan Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere," *Journal of International Affairs*, 54:2000. p.21-42

⁴İhsan D. Dağı, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey." *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 13 (Summer 2004): 135-151.

⁵Erdogan and Arınç's interviews, *Zaman*, February 6, 2000. Also, Gül's interview, *Hürriyet*, February 8, 2000. Visited on: May 15, 2013

civilizations at a time. It is a part of the West; on the other hand, its population is significantly Muslim. It is therefore imperative that secularism in Turkey must be in conformity with this dual socio-cultural background. An analysis and true accomplishment of secularism in Turkey is necessary. There is no room for a monopolistic, totalitarian, and Jacobin secularism in Turkish society. The JDP promoted a Secularism assuring freedom of religion and conscience. The JDP government faced a complex situation. As, state institutions had to show their loyalty to the established secularism if they want be legal and lawful in Turkish politics.¹ Whereas, there existed ever increasing pressure to redefine the established notion of secularism in Turkey. Erdogan openly stressed “state neutrality toward all religions and doctrines” while expressing his consideration of secularism.²

Erdogan’ party practically could not succeed to remodel secularism in Turkey because of its power restriction and legal barriers. The reason behind the power limitation of the JDP was the opposition of the Kamalist elite President Sezer³, the RPP, also the resistance from the Constitutional Court, the Council of State, and the generals to protect the aggressive secularism in state. While some other groups of media and industrialists were also opposing it and referred it to the definition of secularism by Constitutional Court, and its declaration that the official nature of Turkey as a secular state is and unchangeable. Contrary to the court’s viewpoint the Turkish society, is really religious. It is very hard to limit religion to the private sphere while letting the public sphere dominated by the secular, in a religious society. “Secular” Turkish laws and state follows religious freedom in public sphere while encourage national identity and nationalism for the homeland on the whole. Concerns over the potential for conflict between a traditional social order of the country embedded in Islam and secular establishment supported by the military resurfaced with the landslide election victory of the Islamist-based Justice and Development Party in 2002. Generally, it is considered that JDP is an inheritor to

¹ See Yüksel Sezgin, “Can the Israeli Status Quo Model Help Post-February 28 Turkey Solve its Problems,” *Turkish Studies* 4 (Autumn 2003) p.47-70

² Erdogan interview to *Zaman* on February 6, 2000.

³ The 10th President of Turkey (2000-2007), was elected after Suleiman Demirel by Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Erbakan' Refah party, which managed to form government but soon ousted by army coup in 1997. Many prominent members of the current ruling class inclusive the country's Prime Minister and President were knowingly affiliated with the banned Welfare Party.

2.2.5 Current Scenario

The constitutional validity of the Justice and Development party has been challenged several times by the secular rivals. In March 2008, an appeal by the chief prosecutor to close down the Justice and Development party including its pioneer; Abdullah Gul and RecepTayyipErdogan, was barely discarded by the constitutional court. Party and its leaders were blamed for to set up an Islamic state butErdogan kept stressing civilian superiority over the military persistently. Of late in a stark contrast to the past verdicts of superior courts, the heavy sentences given to retired military officers in Ergenekon case¹ (Judgment announced on 5 August 2013),² indicates the success ofErdogangovernment inaltering the nature of the connection between civilian governments and the military.Previously military was considered as the final authority in Turkish politics for decades andduring 1960 and 1997, the army dissolved four civilian governments.After 5 years of proceedings in court, finally the court delivered 17 life sentences to previouslywell-known figures of the military, including politicians and media correspondents, in Ergenekon case. The case has wrecked military domination of approximately half a century, andprovided stability and more favorable conditions for an increased utilization of power by the civilian government.

The Ergenekontrial were based on a belief that behind weakening and even overthrow of governments in past, there was a network of secularists, army officers and business leaders. In the Ergenekon case, the government of ReccpTayyipErdoganblamed that network conspiracy cause social unrest in society that would later inflame a military revolution. The court largely agreed with the government's argument. In only five years, the Ergenekon case has changed people's opinion of the government from largely

¹Ergenekonis the secret network of the secularist, ultranationalist in Turkey with possible relation with members of the country's military and security forces. It aims to overthrow the elected governments.

²<http://jang.com.pk/jang/aug2013-daily/05-08-2013/u4529.htm>

progressive, to authoritarian. With the final decision of the court in Ergenekon case, the Kamalist model of authority comes to its end within Turkey. Certainly, today none of the traditional institutions of the Kamalist regime; courts, legislative body and military, are strong as much to bound the power of a strong government. The court decision has deeply changed the landscape for Turkish politics by considerably reducing the chance of military interference. As of today the Turkish Government have very good relations with the command of the military, currently headed by General Necdet Ozel.¹

The success of Erdogan' party, as measured by many, is because of its best economic reforms as party policy makers were fully aware of the fact that economy is among the founding stone of a successful government body. However, the smart legal policies of Justice and Development Party cannot be neglected in this regard. As the survival of JDP in government without facing any major interference of army, is due to the initiative taken against the military involvement in government.

¹General Necdet Ozel is the Chief of the Turkish General Staff since 2011. He is an army man with strong democratic credentials.

Chapter 3

NajmuddinErbakan' Islamic Movement: an Analysis

3.1 Biography of NajmuddinErbakan

The account of Turkish religious politics is one and the same to the story of Erbakan in politics. NajmuddinErbakan was undoubtedly one of the leading names in Turkish politics. His role is very valuable in the current situation in Turkey. The revival of Islam in Turkey is perhaps the most astonishing incident that happened in 20th century and role of Erbakan in this regard is highly commendable.

3.1.1 Early Life

NajmuddinErbakan (NecmettinErbakan), his name "Najmuddin" exactly be translated as 'the Star of Religion,' was definitely the star of Turkey's political Islam. Erbakan was born on 29th October, 1926, in the city of Sinop¹, in Northern Turkey. His father Muhammad Sabri Bik was a judge in Shari'at court for many years. Erbakan was brought up by Shaikh M. ZahidKotku².

Erbakan got his early education in Istanbul and Trabazan, and then he graduated as Mechanical Engineer from the Istanbul Technical University (ITU) in 1948. After this he moved to Germany for higher education and earned a PhD Degree from the German RWTH Aachen University. He was a bright student throughout his education carrier. On his return to Turkey he was appointed as Lecturer at ITU and later Professor in 1965.³

On his return form Germany, Erbakan was very enthusiastic about applying the revolutionary ideas of German industry. He presented many projects to the Minister of the State at that time. These ideas could boost Turkey's economy and can free Turkey from US dependence. Erbakan strongly believed that Turkey must produce its own automobiles. Afterward, the first vehicle was shaped in the first local automobile

¹Sinop is situated on the most northern margin of the Black Sea coast, in modern Turkey, It is the capital of Sinop Province.

²He was the Imam of Iskenderpaşa Mosque and a Naqshbandi Sheikh. Erbakan was deeply influenced by the sheikh Kotku morally and ethically.
<http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haberYazdir&ArticleID=70763&tip=>

³ Muhammad Mustafa, "Al-Harka al-Islamia al-Hadeetha fi Turkiya" (الحركة الاسلامية الحديثة في تركيا) p.159

corporation of the country initiated by Erbakan. The GUMUS Motor Company, another firm set up by him began its serial production on March 1, 1960. In the same year Industrial Congress in Ankara, Erbakan introduced the Turkish made engines produced by the GUMUS Motor Company. He told the Congress that his new industrial aim was to produce automobiles in Turkey. For the aim of producing the first Turkish made car, Erbakan was given permission to use the Eskisehir Railroad workshops (CER). Thus, the DEVRIM Automobile's first domestic car was produced in Eskisehir.¹ At the request of the military, Erbakan presented an industrial conference that was attended by more than 200 high-ranking military officers. The title of his presentation was; how to solve the development problems facing Turkey and countering the Defense Industry's needs.

Before getting into politics, Erbakan participated in many associations. At first, he joined the Mechanical Engineers' Association and became its chairman. Shortly, he served as Secretary General in Turkish Union of Commerce, Industry, and Trade Exchange. Since he always asserted the importance of welfare of the undersized tradesmen and craftsmen, he stood for their rights in the union.

3.1.2 Political Career

Life and political career of Erbakan are closely connected to the most popular pro-Islamic political struggle in Turkey. Blend of successes and setbacks has always marked his career.

First Erbakan wanted to work as an academician but then he realized that he can not accomplish his goals as an academician because he observed that the routes of the problem in Turkey lays in its political system. So he decided to be "An opposition within the system" and for this he appeared from Konya as an independent candidate in 1969. He received the victory and become MP. Erbakan ideology was published in manifesto, and titled MilliGorus (National View) in 1969. MilliGorus concerns about the basic religious education Islamic moral and along with devoting a lot concentration to rapid

¹http://www.eskisehir-bld.gov.tr/eng/eskisehir_turu_devrim.php. visited: November 12,2013

industrial development and independence of Turkey economically¹. Soon after, he formed an Islamic Party named the National Order party. The party was pioneer to advocate the Islamic identity in Turkey. This party was banned by the Military Government in 1971 and was accused of having anti secular agenda.² As he was the man of struggle so he reformed the party in 1972 and operated as a Deputy Prime Minister. Unfortunately the party was banned again by the military in 1980 he was jailed by the secular authorities. He was banned to participate in any kind of political activities from 1980 to 1987. On his return to politics, by continuing the headship of Refah, Erbakan took strong action in opposition to Kamalism,³ and promoted an Islamic currency, Islamic NATO, Islamic UN, and an Islamic version of European Union. Also he condemned Zionism publically and throughout his political career he was in favor of the Jerusalem recapture campaign. During 1980s and 1990, RP was successfully spreading its vision, objective to all from rural to urban middle classes.⁴ Erbakan argued that the resurgence of Islam in the twentieth century has followed a four-phase course in the relationship between Muslim countries and the West. The first phase was one of wars between Western countries and the Islamic world at the beginning of the century which was followed by Western domination. The third was independence, and finally there was a period of development as the Muslim countries entered into a close interrelationship based on brotherhood and mutual aid. In Erbakan view, this last phase will ultimately lead to the creation of a United Muslim Nations (as an alternative to the UN); a Muslim Economic Community, with an Islamic Dinar as common unit of currency, and a Muslim version of NATO.⁵

¹Ali Carkoglu, Barry Robin, Barry M. Robin, "Religion and Politics in Turkey" Routledge, 2006. p. 48-66

² Mustafa Erdogan, "Islam in Turkish Politics: Turkey's Quest for Democracy without Islam". Critique, 1999, p. 25-36

³Kamalism: The political, economic, and social principles advocated by Kamal Ataturk and designed to create a modern republican secular Turkish state out of a portion of the Ottoman Empire.

⁴Ihsan D. Dagi, "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization" Turkish Studies; 6, 2005. p. 12-16. See also, Z. Onis, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective" ,p.743-66

⁵Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Political Development in Turkey", Leiden: EJ Brill, 1981, p.104

On his return to politics, he was nominated as head of the Refah Party. Erbakan was a strong supporter of moving back from the "North Atlantic Treaty Organization"¹, terminating all kind of contracts with Israel along with making progress regarding warm and quick relations with Middle Eastern countries as Iran Egypt and Syria. His suggestions were truly upsetting for Western leaders, as they had relied on friendly and open secular government in Turkey. Still, Refah got a prominent victory in 1995, Parliamentary elections and captured 158 of the 550 seats in the Assembly. This shows that Erbakan found a large number of supporters for his view. Thus, Refah became the former Islam oriented party to win a common election in Turkey. Erbakan formed the coalition government with Tansu Ciller² of True Path party (TPP).³

3.1.3 Views and Contributions

I. On Zionism:

Erbakan faced many hurdles throughout his political struggle. His parties were banned one after another. The reason behind this all opposition was that Erbakan very openly mentioned Israel as a major threat against all Muslims and condemned the secular reforms and secularism. He believed that Israel could not accomplish his ambition without threatening Turkish independence. His anticipation was based on the widespread Jewish believe also pointed out in the Old Testament and frequently repeated by Zionist ancestors.⁴

Jews consider that so called "Promised land" comprise the region between the rivers Euphrates and Nile; and it includes considerable part of Turkey. Also, Erbakan always expressed his views very frankly about the expansion project of Israel. When Israel announced in 1980 that Jerusalem will be their capital, Erbakan openly stated;

¹ Military alliance established by the Washington treaty (The North Atlantic Treaty) in April 4, 1949.

² Ciller was economist and politician and remained the Prime Minister of Turkey between 1993 and 1996. She is the only female Prime Minister of Turkey up to now.

³ M.Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey." *Comparative Politics*, 1997 p.63-82

⁴ King James Version, "Bible" Genesis. 12:7. 13: 15, 15:18.

“those who know Zionism¹ compare it to an octopus. This octopus has numberless arms. Communism is one arm, while capitalism is another and racism another arm. Those who become part of these without knowing, are serving Zionism, are fighting for Zionism – whatever they might call themselves”²

Certainly, Erbakan presented his ideology and views, regarding the negative influences of western theories either political or economic, in such a way that was profoundly rooted in anti-Zionism. Erbakan's perception of the world's affairs can easily be understood by his interview given in 2007³:

“All nonbeliever nations are one Zionist body; Jews want to occupy the land from Morocco to Indonesia, the Zionists worked for 5,767 years to put up a world order in which Jews ruled the power and the money, the US dollar is Zionist currency, the Jewish “bacteria” must be detected for a treat to be found; Zionists initiated the Crusades, Jews founded Protestantism and the Capitalist order; and Bush attacked Iraq to build Greater Israel, so Jesus can return.”

Erbakan also pointed out that Zionism had enslaved Muslims and the other world population through economic and political dominance. He never forgot to mention his anti-Zionist thought in his campaign. He also realized that dependence on the west politically and the implementation of western life style was a Zionist trick as the ultimate purpose of Zionism is to demolish Muslim lands and to destroy the Islamic values and social life of Muslims. Once he said: “The brain of the exploitation monster that

¹ The National movement of Jews aims the restoration of the homeland for the Jewish people and the attainment of Jewish dominion in the land of Israel.

² Syed Muhammad Qasim, “Revival Movements of Islam and Islamic World:” Al-Faisal Nashran , 2011. p.665

³ David Vielhaber, “The MilliGorus of Germany”. <http://www.hudson.org/research/9879-the-milli-g-r-s-of-germany-> visited: April 2,2014

oppresses the world is Zionism. Its heart is Crusader Europe, its right arm is America and its left arm is Russia."¹

II. Foreign policy:

Erbakan also condemned secularism as National Order party; the first party established by Erbakan, was accused of acting against the secular nature of the state and was ultimately banned. When repeatedly bans were put on Islamic party initiated by him, many of his followers and companion were fed up with defeat. They argued him to admit the reality that Turkish society is dominated by secular authorizes and survival is almost impossible without accepting the Secularism with US etc. Erbakan refused to do so as he believed that it's more important to work in right direction than success. He rejected the notion of "superior west" and asserted the superiority of Islamic civilization and its compatibility with science.² He was in an open opposition to Turkey's membership to the EU; to him EU was a "Christian club." Following his Islamic foreign policy agenda, Erbakan gave his first visits to countries such as Iran and Libya.

III. Formation of D-8:

He is also the inventor of the organization connecting eight Muslim countries³ internationally, well-known as Developing Eight (D-8).⁴ Six star flag of D-8 symbolizes the six basic principles or targets of forming the organization;

- Strategy of No war, efforts for peace.
- Dialogue will be the preferred way in case of disputes
- No double standards of justice
- Equality among all, supremacy belongs to God.

¹Raphael Israeli, "Muslim anti-Semitism in Christian Europe" (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), p. 108

²Turker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey' in Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East". Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, eds. St. Martin's Press, 1984, p. 89

³Jeffrey Haynes, "Religion and Politics in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa" Routledge, 2009, p.156

⁴D-8 includes Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iran, Egypt, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia

- Cooperation with Islamic world
- Democracy, freedom for all and protection of human rights

His movements shielded the national and spiritual values of Turkish people. Due to all his efforts Turkey to some extent returned to its historic role. Due to all the efforts of Erbakan today's Turkey that is a lot more at ease with itself and its place along with Middle East and Europe than it was before. Even though almost all Turkish governments didn't paid attention to his warnings to resist ties to Israel and to stay away from Europe, but Turkey's role in the region has been significantly improved with time. To be sure, Turkey's better relation with its neighboring countries especially with Muslim countries clearly illustrate the Erbakan' original "national view," but the policies behind these foreign associations are much more pragmatic and less ideological than Erbakan' visualization. Still Turkey has improved its position of perceived inferiority with Europe and got recognition of its particular potencies, which have to a large extent, increased its pressure influence in the region. ¹

Apparently Erbakan emphasized the internal danger facing the Islamic world in the twentieth century. This danger comes from Muslim public figures and movements which have wittingly allowed them to be enchanted by Western ideas of nationalism, socialism, liberalism, economic development and democracy. Those fallen in love for the West, are Muslims in appearance only.² A necessary result of all this is intellectual slavery of the Muslim world.

In contrast to secularist intellectuals, who see conservative Islam as a state of inertia and the reason for the decline of the Ottoman Empire,³ Erbakan interprets the decline as a consequence of the Ottomans' acceptance of the influence of foreign culture. The increase of western influence in Ottoman intellectual thoughts resulted in decrease of Islamic philosophy and traditions. According to Erbakan it was the superiority of Islamic

¹ الحركة الاسلامية الحديثة في تركيا p. 160-170

² Emmanuel Sivan, "Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution", LIMES 21(1989) p.2

³The Development of Secularism in Turkey. p.23-50

philosophy that had been the key factor behind the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, to recapture its magnificence and world prominence, Turkey would have to return to its past as a Muslim society. Erbakan also advocate that to recover peace order and social justice, the renovation of Islamic moral qualities in the Turkish society is important. Erbakan rejected Western cultural influences and emphasized the exercise of a national moral consciousness. He believed that Turkey could catch up with Western technology only if its superior culture and morality can be revived. Erbakan believed that the country's problems can be solved through the material or technical and the spiritual development plans. He also criticized the unjustified circulation of wealth and the dependence of the Turkish economy on foreign markets. He also condemned the weak economical situation, which result in Turkey' dependence on foreign aid and accordingly has lost its dominion in foreign policy. He also believes that the development of local technology along with rapid industrialization would place Turkey among the materially developed countries¹.

Erbakan' idea of democratic society is a system of government which enlarges the moral brilliance of the individual and brings to power only those who obtain such excellence, a political system which wipe out wrong spending, and corruption, in addition to mandating objective.²Erbakan gave prime importance to the issue of "social Justice". He constantly criticized the ruling governments for their lack of concern to the troubles of the poor and needy. Therefore the Welfare Party has been continuously raising its voice against rising prices and unemployment, the lack of sufficient social security and medical insurance programs, and the misuse of government credit which favors the affluent with social connections.³

The legendary leader was suffering from respiratory problems and a chronic vein infection in his left leg. But he lost nothing from his passion and zeal and held meetings

¹ Islam and Political Development in Turkey, p. 158

²MetinHeper, SabriSayari, "Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey", Lexington Books, 2002.p.140-141

³BinnazToprak, "Islam and Political Development in Turkey", Leiden: EJ Brill, 1981 p. 103

with party associates even in hospital. He died of heart failure on 27, February 2011 at the age of 85. Many important Muslim figures, from around the world attended Erbakan's funeral in Ankara on March 1, 2011. Hamas Health Minister BassamNaim issued a statement following Erbakan's death. In his statement Naim referred to Erbakan as a "...leading figure and thinker of the Muslim world." He continued saying: "Turkey and the Muslim world have lost a major flag of contemporary Islam who devoted his entire life to Islamic issues, particularly those in Palestinc and Jerusalem." ¹

Obviously Ideology and passion could not die, call for revolution could not go worthless, and Erbakan was that ideology, passion and call for a change. He was movement himself who always believed that limits exist only in mind, regardless of all hurdles; it's our willpower that matters to accomplish a goal in life.

3.2 Different Phases of Erbakan' Islamic Movement

The evolution of democratic system in Turkey had its effect on the continuous struggle between the Islam and secularism. Now, the governments had to pay attentionto demands of both sides: Muslims and secularists. As the discontentment of the religious masses was one of the mainreasonsat the backof the rise of political Islamic parties in Turkey. The power struggle between Islamic and secularist groups remained peaceful and within the legal framework of the democracy. In 1964, after the conversion to democracy occurred in Turkey, more than twenty political parties were established to confront the ruling party in the approaching elections. Among them, NajmuddinErbakan is one of leading names in this regard. Erbakanfounded and remained leader of a number of Islamic political parties. These parties gained popularity and worked efficiently but were banned by secular authorities of Turkey.

The whole struggle period can be divided into three phases:

1. Establishment of political party.
2. Divergence within the party.

¹ World bulletin, politics-14:08, February 27 , 2011, Sunday

3. Achievements and contributions.

3.2.1 Establishment of political party

The political vision of Erbakan was thoroughly against Westernization and secularization, he asked for the deposition of the secular Kamalists regime all through his political career. He was an appealing, determined leader, who was completely aware of the administrative procedures, political bodies, and standards of the West. In 1969, his political career began when he was succeeded as an independent candidate for Konya, after failing to get Demirel's support for his inclusion in the Justice Party.¹ In 1970 he founded the Milli Nizam Party, "National Order Party" and served as its chairman. The economic crisis of the late 1960's had changed the existing balance of class forces. Big business interests, based mostly in Istanbul and organized into large holding companies, clash begins with small and medium provincial assets. The Justice Party steadily gained popularity among big business and as a result lost the support and favor of the remaining population. This resulted in the formation of many small political parties. Among them, the National Order Party of Erbakan was the very first Islamic party to emerge and distinctly promoted the philosophy of political Islam. The party's electoral support was mainly based on craftsmen, undersized merchants and other low income middle classes within the country. From that time, Erbakan has directed five Islamic parties, four of which were closed down by the military as they were accused of having an anti secular agenda². In the meantime Erbakan presented his point of view as a program, known as "National Vision" which carries out the schedule of modifying Turkey into an Islamic state.

¹ Suleiman Demirel is a Turkish politician who was 9th President of Turkey and had served five times as the Prime Minister. He was elected leader of the Justice Party after Adnan Menderes Democratic Party was banned.

² Political parties of Erbakan were banned by the constitutional court as they were blamed to violate the Article 14 of the Turkish Constitution related to the secular nature of the state. The article 14 states that any right or the freedom demonstrated in the Constitution is not allowed to practice with the aim to violate the integrity of the state its nation and territory, or challenging the existence of the Turkish Republic. Also, any plan to wipe out the fundamental rights and freedom assured by the constitution or any effort to place the government under the control of a specific group or individuals, is not permissible.

The “national View” was the focus of the NOP program; first political party of Erbakan formed in 1970, the program asserted that it's the need of the time to adapt the Islamic values in order to make progress. Thus mutual aid with Islamic countries along with rapid Industrialization was given importance. Furthermore, formation of Islamic World Union was suggested and promoted to replace the European Economic Community. As the party was in favor of Islamic values and the corporation between Islamic countries so secular authorizes considered it a threat and ultimately was banned by the military in 1971.¹ Soon after, here-established the party it below the title of National Salvation party. Supporters' of the party were those social groups such as minor tradesman and artisans which had been hardest hit by economic policy and were least able to defend themselves through existing political institutions. The National Salvation Party's stress on moral virtues attracted those people who felt their traditional institutions and values to be under attack. The National Salvation Party was comparatively successful in 1970 elections. NSP remained the coalition partner in many governments formed during its period. The success of the party was mainly due to its recognition that the prior cause leads to electoral success is to satisfy the basic needs of the voting public.² Rapid industrialization was the focus of the party. For this, the party requested to the Anatolian entrepreneurs with traditional and regional backgrounds, together with requesting the poor and promising them increase in goods prices will be controlled and minimized along with other social welfare reforms. Economic growth was the declared goal of the party and was given more importance.

In 1980, the military interrupted again and NSP was closed down. Furthermore, the successor of NSP, the Welfare (Refah), was established in 1983 when the government was handed over to civilians by military generals. The Welfare Party and the National Salvation party both shared the common strategy of answering the needs of public to increase party acceptance among masses. With the exception that the Welfare party was

¹Niyazi Öktem, “Religion in Turkey” *BYU L. REV.*, 2002. p.371, 395–396

²Mehran Kamrava, “Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The Rise and Demise of Turkey's Refah Party”. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1998), p.275-301

more active at the masses level. To help the poor people, widespread community services were offered by the party activists. The party also became a channel for social mobility¹. This resulted in marvelous victory of the party in 1994 municipal election; as Welfare won 28 municipalities. After a year in 1995 elections, the Welfare Party remained so successful that it was able to form a coalition government. The task of configuring the government was given to Erbakan; the welfare leader, as the party had received the maximum percentage of votes. So, in 1996 Erbakan became the prime minister.

The reason behind the success of the Welfare party was that it had learned the first lesson of democracy; to respond to the interests and demands of the people entitled to vote. On the other hand, with this all the party strongly stood against the issue of secularism and was advocating the Islam. During this Welfare Party gets the support from Islamic Intellectuals who were struggling for religious freedom, from Sunni Kurds looking for state identification and from the urban poor masses that were in quest of social integrity.² Gulalp illustrates the social base of the movement as: “A vertical bloc comprising segments of different socio-economic classes, united in their common opposition to Kamalism and their expression of political will through the assertion of an Islamic identity”³

Soon Erbakan was forced to accept 18 recommendations reaffirming that Turkey is a secular state. Among them more highlighted are:⁴

- Prohibit any calls for the implementation of Islamic law.
- Impose censorship on Islamic radio and television
- Prohibit the wearing of any outfit that disregards state law, meaning a ban on the veil.

¹ Political Islam and the Welfare party in Turkey. p.71-73

² Political Islam and the Welfare party in Turkey. p.63-82

³ Gulalp, Haldun. “Globalization and political Islam: The Social days of Turkey Welfare party” International Journal of Middle east studies 33, August, 2001.p. 433-448

⁴ DiyāRashwān, “The Spectrum of Islamist Movements,” Vol.1, Verlag Hans Schiler, 2007.p.199-201

- Revive article 163 of the penal code that criminalizes any religiously motivated political activity.
- Implementation of the article 174 of the constitution, which upholds the sanctity of reforms in place, from the time when Turkish republic was established in 1923.
- Make education compulsory for eight years, which, in effect, meant the closure of schools for imams and preachers.
- Close Qur'anic schools run by Religious people.
- Ban the establishment of a new mosque in Taqsim Quarter in Istanbul
- Dismiss some provincial governors due to their membership in the Islamic movement.
- Hold heads of parties responsible for statements and declarations made by mayors belonging to their parties.

The Military briefed governmental and judicial organization about “Islamic threat” present in Turkey. Due to this pressure from National Security Council, on June 18, 1997 Erbakan had to resign. Welfare party was banned and Erbakan was expelled from parliament by the Turkish Constitutional court for 5 years. Challenging the official ban, the welfare party was reemerged as the Virtue (Fazelit) party but it was banned in 2001 and was accused of a center for anti-secular activities. As soon as the ban on political activities had ended, Erbakan initiated the Felicity Party, and remained its leader in 2003–2004 also in 2010 and onwards.

The parties led by the Erbakan were the very first Turkish parties that were real Islamic parties, that is why Erbakan's political parties were largely faced confrontation from secular administrative powers of the State and from civil society groups and were ultimately banned one after another. However, he continued his efforts playing a vital role in Turkish politics and for renaissance of Islam in Turkey.

3.2.2 Divergence within the Party

Soon after the ban on virtue party June, 2001 two opposing factions emerged within the party; fundamentals and innovators. The reason for the split was the

differences of opinion among the members of party. The differences between two can easily be understood by the idea defined by Daniel Brumberg,¹ He largely categorize the nature of Islamic sects into three;

Radical Fundamentalism, Reformist Fundamentalism and Islamic moderation or liberalism, consequently, parties who follow radical fundamentalism planned at using force to alter the system of the state in order to form an Islamic government. While the parties who have the aim of establishing an Islamic state following Islamic law, but are in opposition to use of violence and moderate in their policies belong to reformist fundamentalists group. Or it can simply be stated that they try to establish electoral support to win the elections. 'Islamic Liberals hunt for extension of religious freedoms in a largely democratic situation. The aim of Islamic Liberals is not to form an Islamic state. As a substitute of doing this they struggle to co-exist with the secular establishment of the state. So, we can define Welfare Party as a reformist fundamental; while Justice and Development Party can be define as an Islamic Liberal party.²

Fundamentals were now in the Felicity Party (Saadet Party) after closure of Virtue (Fazelit) Party. Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip Erdogan were leading Innovators. Initially both parties shared same destiny and were banned from politics later Erdogan was elected as JDP leader.

The Saadet Party is a political organization, which carries out its activities in accordance with the Constitution of the Turkey³. On the other hand the Justice and development party also do not define itself as an Islamic party instead choosing to describe them as a liberal democratic party⁴. The constitution of the Justice and

¹He is an associate professor at Georgetown University also a senior program officer in the Center for Conflict Management. The center aims to focus the issues of democratization and political reform in the Islamic world.

²William Hale, Ergun Ozbudun, "Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the JDP" Routledge, 2009. p.09

³Saadet Party; The Statues of the Party. Saadet.org.tr/kurumsal/chapter-i-general-principals/47. Visited: January 19, 2015

⁴ Islam, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey.p.20

Development party also declares that the party is officially a secular political party, as Turkey' Constitution requires of all political parties.

The current Constitution of Turkey; the constitution of 1982, do not support any religion and as well not classify an official and certified religion for the state.¹ The Constitution allow the religious freedom at personal level, but it restrict the religious groups under the control of state, and the constitution openly affirms religious groups are not allowed to participate in Turkish politics representing any religious belief or forming a religious party. Under the Article 24 of the constitution, exercising religion in politics is banned. It forbids even the partial involvement of the fundamental social, economic, political or legal order of the state in religious principles. While in the Article 68, political parties whose agenda, proceedings and principles are found close to any religion are supposed to be shut down by the Constitutional Court.² This is the reason why the political parties of Erbakan were closed down one after another because of their Islamic activities by the Constitutional Court.

Saadet Party is the last party that belongs to the National outlook movement. In terms of its ideological outlook, the party is very similar to its predecessor moderate Islamic Welfare Party. The party strongly condemn joining the EU, capitalism, relations with the US and Israel.³ Saadet Party officially defends fundamental rights and freedoms recognized by the international community, rule of law and social equality, along with freedom of Religion; religious beliefs and practices. The party program states that each human beings should enjoy religious freedom, and freedom of ethical values. In addition every person should also have the right of offering his religious duties and worshipping in isolation and in a group. The program also claims that the Party' higher goal is to develop the population morally and spiritually by national and religious

¹ The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/tu.html,) visited: January 24, 2013.

² Ergun Ozbudun, "The Constitution System of Turkey: 1876 to the Present". Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.p.28

³ Hurriyet Daily News.Akyol.M, 2010. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/meanwhile-in-the-islamist-campamp8230.aspx?pageID=438&n=meanwhile-in-the-islamist-camp8230-2010-08-03>, Visited: January 18, 2015.

values.¹The Felicity Party works both as a political party and a vast social organization. It has party branches in almost every district, small towns and cities in the country. The party' program also stress that the most important thing that differentiates Felicity party from the other parties is their spiritualism. As mentioned in party' program; "the party takes "the improvement of one's self" as the source of spiritualism and prosperity can be achieved only with the achievement of the materialistic side along with spiritualism."²

The Saadet party has not been electorally successful, received just 2.5% of the votes in 2002 general election. In general elections of 2004 it won 4.1% of the votes and remained slightly successful as compared to previous elections. While in 2011 elections, the party could obtain only1.24% votes. Erbakan' Saadet Party was reduced to insignificance because of the political success of Erdogan' Justice and Development party.

While working on explanation of party' failure, I was in contact with a number of people in Turkey who are current members of Saadet party. The point I came across was that no changes were brought in their working methods and system; perhaps it's the growing influence of the Erdogan and his party that resulted in reduction of Saadet party' acceptance by masses. However, to me this argument is not that much worthy to give good reason for the downfall of the Saadet party. As it's not essential that evolution of one must result into breakdown of the other specially in case of two Parties like Saadet and Justice and Development who share the same past and belong to same origin. Both parties and their leaderships belong to Erbakan, they worked together under Erbakan for a long time.

As long as I am concerned, after going through discussions and related material, it seems to me that there are two most important reasons behind the downfall of the Saadet party;

¹FP Party Program. <http://www.saadet.org.tr/kurumsal/2.-characteristics-and-principles-of-the-state/115> visited: January 19, 2015.

²FP Party Program. <http://www.saadet.org.tr/kurumsal/2.-characteristics-and-principles-of-the-state/115>, visited: January 19, 2015.

- Leadership crisis
- Differences within the party

Unfortunately, it seems apparently true that party is depriving of a strong leadership. There seems no one to bear the strong and influential qualities of Erbakan' personality after his departure to replace him. Erbakan was courageous and insightful; his understanding of social, religious and political issues and conditions was deep and strong. He was fully aware how to pave path to the hearts of his spectators and how to win their trust.

Second thing that cause harm to party' reputation, in my opinion, is the differences between the party members. Diversity and creative criticism is always welcomed in democratic process and difference of opinion is considered productive, but if it go over it can be destructive. Undue criticism can result in disputes among members which can further lead to decline of the party. If party' strength is fading, consequently trust of the people in it will also shatter. This can finally lead to rejection by the masses.

So I believe, In order to recapture the strength and dignity the party had previously, party need to take some crucial initiatives to improve the situation. It's natural that when people work together, misunderstandings and conflicts are predictable but it's essential that differences should be minimized and instead of always disagreeing over minor issues, focus should remain on unity for achieving the greater objectives.

The victory of Welfare party in general elections of February 28, 1995, and clear victory of JDP in November 2002, convinced various secular groups to take necessary measures against "Political Islam".

Among many other reasons of JDP success in 2002 elections, the Mayor-ship of Erdogan under Welfare' label is crucial as after the victory of Welfare party in local elections of 1989, Erdogan had been elected mayor Istanbul. Turkey biggest city' victory by an Islamic party was a real upset for the secularist and Turkish media since they have taken it as an proof of Islamic reinstallation, and adanger for secular society. During his Mayor ship he focused largely on solving problems of the city; Water supply, pollution

etc¹. The most condemned policy of Erdogan administration was the ban on the alcohol. Secular elites considered it as the first step towards launching an order based on Islamic laws and as anti-secularshift². Keeping in view the whole experience of Turkish Islamic political parties, it can be summed up that democracy is the best form of government as it provides space for the anti-system parties, though it restricts their activities and moderate their ideologies. Definitely, Turkish experience has so much to learn for other Muslim countries. Turkish case also demonstrate that democratic system works best if chance of working free is given to Islamic movement.

Accordingly, the leadership of JDP declares that they did not base their Party around an Islamic identity, and emphasized that its focus was democratization. The party considered the well of the nation, the rule of law and stability as the main reference to its idea of government³. Erdogan kept in mind the experiences of its predecessor Islamic Parties and learnt that without compatibility with Army and Secularists group political survival is inadequate. As MetinHeper describe that relationship of Islam and democracy may work smoothly if Islamic groups keep their struggle restricted within the limits of the secular system and depose of their effort against the basic principles of the secularism. As well as, the secularistshave notenforced their values and ideologies on Islamic groups.⁴

So the leadership of JDP asserted that the Party favors the secular democratic nature of the state, and they also declared that they are against the religious exploitation, asserted that secularism restricts the state not the individuals. Erdogan himself explain his statement “my reference is Islam” by affirming that his reference to Islam is at private level⁵. For this, they avoided the label of “Islamic democratic” for their party, the

¹ Megan Cox Gurdan, “The Face of Radical Islam” Christian Science Monitor, Vol 88, No. 139 p.6

²Alven Iran Cinar, “Refah Party and the city Administration of Istanbul : Liberal Islam, Localism, and Hybridity” New perspectives Turkey, No. 16 (Spring 1997)p.37

³Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey, p.20-21

⁴MetinHeper, ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?’,The Middle East Journal, vol. 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 45.

⁵Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey, p.9

Justice and Development party firmly denies having Islamic agenda and described itself as a traditional democratic party. Still Secularists camp blame that it's just a deception they are having an Islamic agenda in real, as they do not have any other option but to present themselves as reformist or innovators as it was not legally allowed to refer them as Muslim activists¹. In November, 2002, when JDP swept to victory with 34% of the votes the felicity party was relegated to the sidelines. Erbakan continued with Saadet party, remained active, and ended his days with it. After Erbakan, Mustafa Kamalak² was the newly elected head of the Saadet Party since March 5, 2011.

Keeping in view the parties led by Erbakan it can be observed that, determination, consistency, firmness, and never acceptance of impossibility are the unique features that mark the political career of Erbakan. This also is an evidence of his agitation for renaissance of Islam in Turkey. The Turkish case briefly explains the frustration and hardships associated with the process of revolution and conversion to democracy and modernity. Turkey has been struggling to blend itself with the modern world for two centuries. It has accomplished much in the process. Yet there is still a long way to go.

3.2.3 Achievements and Contributions

Turkey is a unique Muslim country where state religion is not Islam although it is a secular state with an Islamic society.³ On the other hand, today's Turkey is distinctly more Islamic than it was in the 1970s. As Islam was not declared as state religion, many organizations and parties based on Islamic philosophy or which are anti-secular in their ideologies were banned occasionally. However, luckily, Erbakan' Welfare Party and Justice and Development party of Erdogan somehow managed to win parliamentary elections in 1995 and 2002 respectively. The Welfare is an important and good example for other Islamic movements, as it has proved its ability to deal with the unfriendly circumstances and to work in an incompatible situation. WP not only accepted the

¹M.Hakan Yavuz, "Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey", Cambridge University Press, 2009. p.2

²Mustafa Kamalak is the present leader of the Erbakan' Felicity Party.

³Gunter Seufert, "State and Islam in Turkey", Berlin (German Institute for International and policy, study 29), 2004, p. 7

democracy also practiced it so well, joined coalitions with other parties and made compromises where needed and acted responsibly in triumph and acted as a "loyal opposition," in defeat.

In 1969, Erbakan published his political ideology, known as the Milli Görüş. His ideology which is clearly based on Islam, adds Ottoman and nationalist influences to its conservative political dogma, an anti-Western stance and the idea of harmony among all the world's Muslims. Also, Erbakan's contribution could never be ignored as he directed way of Islamic movements toward democracy, in a Muslim country with secular constitution.

When in 1970, Erbakan founded the National Order Party (NOP); it became a proper platform to display the Islamic ideologies of the Islamic movement. Beside the protection of traditional moral values, the party's also paid attention to economic strategic objectives, like rapid industrialization supervised by the state, the development of heavy industry, and the safeguard of small companies. Party also criticized Turkey's affiliation with the European Community (EC), and predicted it as unfavorable to Turkey commercially.¹

The National Order Party was the former party to raise voice to initiate the state investment program for the Kurdish part of the nation state, which remained deprived of many rights for a long time. Furthermore, even though secularism was generally agreed upon, but the program was repeatedly promoted termination of the state's control above religion.² In parliamentary elections of 1973, the National Order Party all of a sudden appeared as the third-largest party with 11.8 percent of the vote, and it mainly had the most support from the poor and neglected areas of the central Anatolia and from Kurdish hedge. In a coalition consisting of a unique union of left wing nationalists and Islamic National Order party, NOP was in government to execute responsibilities from

¹Cemal Karakas, "Turkey: Islam and Laicism between the Interests of State, Politics, and Society." Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2007, p.14

²Melih Yürüsen/Atilla Yayla, Die Türkische Wohlfahrtspartei, Sankt Augustin (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Interne Studien No. 134) 1997, p. 30.

January to November of 1974. The most important decision of this partnership was the expedition of Turkish troops to Cyprus. Throughout this small tenure another change was the increase in number of schools for the training of preachers that increased from 36 to 437 and that of mosques from 43,000 (1972) to 57,000.¹

Erbakan' National Order Party openly attacked the global influence of what he saw as a Zionist plan and called for a break in relations with Israel, and condemned relations with Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians. He was in opposition to the United States because of its "Zionist" and the "Israel-friendly" policies and insisted that Turkish law should be readjusted according to Islamic law.²

In January 2009, Erdogan condemned the Israeli air campaign against the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and stated that "Allah will punish it."³ In 2009, the annual meeting of WEF in Davos⁴, he publicly scolded the Israeli president, accused Israel of killing Palestinian children and referred to Gaza as an "open air prison". That October, Ankara halt Israel from participating in joint military exercises with the US and Italy, and called upon the world to recognize Hamas as the "legitimate government of the Palestinian people."⁵ Two years later, at the opening of the UN General Assembly in September 2011, Erdogan spoke again to this theme by describing the Palestinian issue as a "bleeding wound" and accused Israel of troubling all attempts to resolve it. And, unsurprisingly, he sums up the demands his government has issued to Israel charging it with having made "a serious mistake against a country and a people."⁶

¹ Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, p. 124.

² Cemal Karakas, p.15 Also in, Philip Robins," Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War" C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2003.p.146-147

³ SaziyaBurcuGiray, "Turkish Policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Ed. Moshe Ma'oz, Muslim Attitudes to Jews and Israel.Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p. 173.

⁴ The World Economic Forum (WEF) is a self-governing international organization dedicated to improving world condition through private cooperation. It mainly focuses the issues world is facing currently, including health and the environment.

⁵ Torn Country; Turkey, between Secularism and Islamism p. 117-121.

⁶ Neil MacFarquhar, "Harsh Words from Turkey about Israel, and From Iran about United States," The New York Times, 22 September 2011.

Erbakan also strongly promoted an Islamic fundamentalist political philosophy which calls for a comeback to national-historical roots together with modernization. This philosophy is based on a symbiosis between industrialization and culture. Its aim is the creation of a strong Turkey -Great Turkey once again.

After the political ban on National Order party, when Erbakan reinvented his party under the “Welfare” title in 1983 he very clearly described his idea of Islamic nationalism which can be summarized as:¹

- Islam is the primary bond uniting Turks.
- The role of state in modernization and industrialization is very significant and it must be played accordingly. He always admired the German model of industrialization.
- The state must be a welfare state and pursue social justice.
- The current financial order of profit-based transactions must be replaced by an Islamic economy.
- Clear opposition to membership of Turkey in the European Union, also Westernization of Turkey is not accepted anymore, Turkey has to return to its Islamic roots.

One of the reasons of ban on Erbakan and its party, Welfare was that he had always supported the observance of the headscarves in public and especially in educational bodies.²At party's 4th meeting in October, 1993 Erbakansaid: “... In four years of our party government, we never allowed implementing the article of Persecution Code against any child, also there was not such hostility toward wearing headscarves”.

Erbakan also advocated the plurality of legal system derived from the “Madina Agreement”, which had assured basic right to live according to their own legal system for the minorities; Jewish and other non-believer's communities, not according to Islamic

¹The Spectrum, .p.197-198

² Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey.p.4-6

law. Keeping in view the Madina Agreement, Islamic intellectual and politicians suggests that unbiased social co-existence of different religious groups is possible if each religious group had a chance to follow his legal system freely. Additionally; on 10 October 1993 at Welfare party conference Erbakan had spoken as follow:

“... We shall assure all human right particularly the right to live according to legal system a person prefers. The governments should be free from centralism. The State which was established by the secular elites is an exploitive State, which is not serving its people instead exploiting their basic rights. It does not allow the liberty to choose one's code of law. If got the chance to serve the country, we shall assure that a Muslim will be able to get married before the mufti, if he desires, and a Christian will be able to marry according to his preference in church.”¹

When Erbakan was in power he made clear statements that indicated he wanted to change the direction of Turkish foreign policy. His first international visit to Iran, Libya, Egypt and Nigeria showed that he was more concerned with improving Turkey's relations with the Muslims countries than those of western specifically United States.² Erbakan always presented his party as the only party who is honestly working for the benefits of the people, but he did not relegate himself to dealing only with domestic issues.³ Most important of all Erbakan' contributed in laying suitable grounds for the coming Islam loving people to come in power and that's what we observe in elections 2007 result. The Justice and Development Party under Erdogan got 334 seats out of 550 and that's happened in a country where we find absolute rejection for religion and religious people before 50 years. Political and geographical understanding of Muslims has changed especially in Turkey and generally in Islamic World due to Erbakan. For last 20 years of Turkey' history, Islam was restricted to the hearts and mosques, and Muslims were considered as middling people. It was surely because of Erbakan' effort that

¹ A. Mark Weisburd, “Comparative Human Rights Law: Expression, Association, Religion”, Vol.01 Carolina Academic Press, 2008.p.49-50

² YaseminÇelik, “Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy”, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999.p.90-91

³ Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy.p.83-90

today Muslims of Turkey believed that they must have the strongest right to be heard in the future of their country.

Yusuf Kanlı, from Hurriyet Daily News commented on Erbakan as: "certainly, he was a Mujahid. He never accepted defeat. He never accepted less than Islamic resurgence for Turkey and that's why he never compromised on his "national view" political principle. He was courageous, faced problems throughout his political career; his parties were banned and he was expelled from politics, even then he faced media with determination and a smile on his face. One of his students, Bülent Arınç said about him, "Erbakan was a man who did politics for the sake of God."¹

Surely, Erbakan was not just a politician with an Islamic viewpoint. Throughout his life, he kept the flame of Islam burning during the darkest days of the secular control, struggled hard and sacrificed. Also, he had credit of proving that it's not impossible to shine in unfriendly circumstances, his party was not only able to form government but also proved its ability to work within democratic structure.

After discussing Erbakan' political ideology and his life thoroughly in this chapter, now I shall move toward the Refah party which was the finest of all the political parties of Erbakan as it was well organized of all. Next chapter will give an account of Refah as a success story of the Islamic movement including the Da'wah and social welfare strategies adopted by the party.

¹<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pagcid=438&n=in-memori-am-Najmuddin-erbakan-2011-02-28>. Visited: December 28,2013

Chapter 4

Refah Party; Da'wah & Social welfare Strategy of Islamic Movement

4.1 Da'wah Strategy of Erbakan' Refah Party

The rise of Refah party to national prominence is connected to the remarkable organizational capabilities of the party. In order to widely spread its message to the people, Refah depended largely on a wide set-up of volunteers and members. The number of these volunteers and members is increasing since the formation of party. In 1991, Refah had 800,000 registered members and this number increased to 1.6 million in 1993. Currently party claims to have more than 4 million registered members. Mostly party got the support along with membership from the graduates of Islamic schools; Imam Hatip and Qur'an schools. These institutes were closed down under Ataturk and were reopened in 1951 and are registered with the directorate of Religious Affairs. Numerous students are receiving education in these institutes; they saw Refah as the only devoted party struggling for revival of Islam so their electoral support went for Refah.

Religiously educated people were highly motivated for Refah but it is not enough to interpret the success of Refah with religious education. There are a number of reasons that resulted in vigorous increase in party popularity, support and membership. A survey was conducted by Refah officials to identify the reason behind the growing fraction of members joining the party. The results of the survey establish the following reasons:¹

- disappointment of the secular parties to provide domestic stability
- Prosecution of the people by the state
- Prohibition of Islamic dress code
- The Kurdish problem
- Unemployment
- Anti- Islamic media

¹Birol A, Yesilada, "Comparative Political Parties and party Elites: Essays in Honor of Samuel J. Eldersveld." University of Michigan, 1999. p. 134-140

- U.S led operation offer ease and its support of the Kurdish workers party (PKK)
- The fascination of Refah's message
- Rising terrorism and government's incapability to deal with it.

Now moving towards the Da'wah strategy of Refah party, I went through a number of books and was in contact with many active members of Saadet party, but could find any specific or typical Da'wah strategy. I believe, while studying Erbakan' Islamic movement, it should be kept in mind that Da'wah is not only about addressing the huge audiences; instead it should be taken in wider context. If we talk about their methodology; they were not so strict like Ikhwan nor have any specific levels like JamatIslami or the other Islamic movements have. Also, they are wisely open; anyone who is agreed upon and loyal to party' aim and objectives, is likely to be a member.

4.1.1 Organizational Setup of Party

In 1990s, the Turkish community can be categorized into three fractions;

1. The political people; who were in politics and were against the ideology of Refah.
2. Neutral or common people; who were either supportive to Refah ideology or against it, among them a sub category can be those who were ignorant of Refah' program and message.
3. The Refah's supporters

The Refah members were advised to focus the second grouping, which was supposed to be the future of Refah or at least they will vote for Refah if party succeeded in changing their political views.¹


Social platforms and employment campaigns run by Refah party underline it from the other political parties of Turkey. The executive setup of the Refah Party was extremely built-up and was planned to penetrate even into most basic level of every zone namely the apartment building. Certainly Refah's utmost strength lies in its party workers. Refah has the largest network of party workers, and amusingly they are in contact with even the average Turkish citizen. The highly provoked, well-disciplined and strongly dedicated supporters consider their struggle to reassure Islam and Islamic values in society and they consider it as a task specified by Almighty Allah. They function at the basic level of community, paying visit to each and every area, street, and residence in the town, separately collecting data of every individual and family, estimating the data, and finding solutions for problems. In order to enter the small communities, a team of women along with party activists was there who can organize home visits at any time of the day, these female activists really contributed to party's strength and acceptance. The party workers preferred personal, face-to-face interaction with masses rather than mass media; they use to go door-to-door for explaining the party's plain viewpoint. They approach the ailing people providing them medical aid, helping jobless people in finding suitable jobs, helping children in their home tasks, and providing food, fuel, and other supplies that people need. Most importantly, they show kindnesses and admiration of the hardships of life for ordinary people, respect for their occupation and their efforts.² The most prominent thing that makes different in Refah and its rivals was its ladies committees. These 'ladies commission' were in each unit at every level. This ladies commission was the most dynamic feature of the party; it played a vital role in party's electoral success by visiting family units every week. The members of this commission adopted a long-term

¹The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey. p. 192-193

²Scencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey," Middle East Journal, winter 1996, p 52.

strategy and special attention was given to the ignored, poor zones of the society. Their main emphasized was on acceptance of Islam as a living social practice. While paying weekly visits to homes, these Muslim activist females taught the others how to raise their children implementing the Islamic rules and what an Islamic family should be. Social gatherings were also organized to talk about how to interpret Islam correctly, the rights of women given by Allah almighty and influence of current political and socioeconomic issues on women and their families.¹

The organizational setup of Refah demonstrates the importance that party gave to each side of the society in order to penetrate in it. The party divided its members to sections. Every neighborhood had an officer to deal out to it, who in turn manages three other officials who have the responsibilities of buildings. The neighborhood officer use to report the information to an inspector, who further reportsit to area chairman. Lastly, the area chairman report to provincial council of party. The council consists of 50 regular members and 50 financers. The same systemis followed nationally. Party' internal structure can be understood by the following figure.



¹ "Muslim women are getting organized" MilliGazete, October 20, 1991. p.10 Also , Aysesaktander, "Becoming the other as a Muslaim in Turkey : Turkish women Vs. Islamist women" new perspectives on Turkey 11(Fall 1994) p. 115

Regardless of these campaign hard works, Refah also utilized modern technology to maintain automated record of voter registration. These records were so precise that once these records were asked by the Istanbul government several years ago, when a blast in one of the poor urban areas was followed by plenty of deaths. The records of Refah party helped the administration to verify who had lived there at the time of the eruption.¹ To run its all programs smoothly, and to support the party masses, the party was in need of sufficient funding. Many accused Refah party of getting funding from Iran's religious groups and it is banned in Turkey. Refah states "most funds come from members (limited to \$1200 a year), including Turkish workers in Germany, and from religious and social foundations."²

Certainly the party's leadership as well as the efforts of the workers, added as catalyst in party success. Refah grasped enormous acceptance in public because of its capability of solving the economic and social issues. The party was also able to properly convey its message and ideology. So finally Refah was able to lift up the Islamic restoration not only in Turkey but in entire Islamic world.

4.2 Social Welfare Strategy and Policies

4.2.1 Social Welfare Strategy

Summarizing the whole Turkish' experience it can be stated that a quick shift has been observed in Turkey, as it had altered from being the last protector of the Islamic world to a territory where the supreme majority was Muslims but Islam was not the official religion, the Arabic *Azan* was forbidden, Madaras were shut down and every

¹Henri Barkey, "Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question," World Policy Journal, Spring 1996. p. 45

²Marvine Howe, "Tension Between Islamists and Secularists Grows in Turkey," The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May/June 1996. (<http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/170-washington-report-archives-1994-1999/may-june-1996/11989-tension-between-islam-and-secularists-grows-in-turkey.html>) visited: 22 August, 2014.

presentation of faith was condemned. The fez and the veil were not allowed on the basis that they are link with the past and are chains holding back the modernization of the republic.

Beginning in the 1960s, Najmuddin Erbakan emerged as a central figure of the Muslim Brotherhood into Turkey. He appeared on the political scenario of Turkey by winning election of 1970 as an independent from religiously traditional Konya. He was surely the greatest Muslim leader that had the credit of reviving Islam in Turkey. In sharp contrast to the reformist and secularist strength of the Ataturk period, Erbakan believed Turkey was in moral decay due to Western influences. He advocated filtering society by restoring Islam's predominant role in it. A series of Islamic political parties were initiated by Najmuddin Erbakan during past 30 years, he was very efficient as deputy prime minister in 1970s and prime minister in 1990s. In early 1990s, Islam or more specifically political Islam underwent a strong renaissance. The Welfare Party received 19 percent of the vote and won the mayor ship of 28 municipalities, together with two major cities, Istanbul and Ankara in local elections of 1994. While in national elections of 1995, Welfare was able to receive 21.6 percent of the vote and formed a combined government with the True Path Party, with Erbakan as prime minister. Although the party had very short tenure as government, but its efforts contributed a lot to society and resulted in improving party's image too.

There are many factors that added to Welfare's strong screening. Possibly, the central was a change in the political program of Welfare party; the new program gave more importance to social matters rather than religious matters.¹ This shift permitted Welfare to widen its call away from the aggressive religious right. Simultaneously, Welfare gained popularity and support from the urban poor's who previously had voted for the Republican Peoples party, because of its remarkable Just Order program² Also the political ideology of Refah affirms that the prime duty of the elected government is to

¹Dağı, "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity," p. 25.

²The Just Order consisted of thirty-one articles, which deal with social and cultural issues but main emphases is given to economic issues.

provide facilities to the voters. Democracy is the form of government that guarantees individuals the right to live according to their values.¹ Refah advocates the freedom to wear traditional religious clothes and that Muslims should be allowed to resolve legal issues in Islamic courts if they prefer, and to carry out business as per Islamic guidelines. Refah not only gave importance to practicing and adoption of Islamic values at individual level but also importance is given to community level, so, one must have to contribute to community besides being faithful individually.

Welfare party had the best and well organized setup and was outstanding with a group of dedicated Muslims women, who were working voluntarily for the party and added to party's strength by conveying party's message to every family through regular home visits and providing a set-up of social and welfare help to the deserving people.

The party's workers network was exceptionally efficient, targeting all the areas where social and welfare help was needed; working in the slums and other poor areas in cities, facilitating people to find jobs, giving free health care and medical aid along with free food. Other social facilities provided by the party include the circulation of free groceries during the holy month of Ramadan and fuel in winter, providing assistance in home tasks for children of the poor, and establishment of the 'marriage waqf'.² Erbakan also guaranteed the delivery of low-priced bread, fruits, vegetables and meat to suffering families within municipalities of Welfare party mayors.³ He also stood for the rights of civil servants who were asking for an increment in their salaries and also he promoted the Islamic currency (dinar) and was not in favor of the single European currency as planned by the government for future.

Refah party not only worked on economic grounds but also emphasized the importance of moral honest and fair behavior. All the members of Welfare party were advised to be polite and kind generally and especially while dealing with public, also

¹ Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: How Far From Consolidation?," *Journal of Democracy*, 1996, p. 134

² Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities, p.289 see Also *Milliyet*, 12 April 1995, p. 21. <http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/Arsiv/1995/04/12>. visited: December 28, 2013

³ Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities, p.289

party encouraged them to use the traditional greetings in their daily life like replacing *Günaydın* with Islamic greeting *Selamünaleyküm*.¹ Refah also worked to enlarge the position of Islamic associations and their functioning within society, for example Islamic schools and banks, commerce companies, and religious organizations. The steady Islamization of the system of government by Refah was an imperative step on the way to launching an Islamic state.²

The Welfare Party was seen by the population as an alternative to the corrupt, weak and out-of-touch government of the late eighties. The Welfare Party's popularity came from years of hard political work, running practically corruption free local councils, and helping the poor, whose needs have not been met by secular government. The success and increasing popularity of Refah party can be justified by many ways, but to me perhaps the loyal efforts of party's masses contributed most in Refah' achievements.

4.2.2 Foreign Policy challenges

Refah held an extraordinary agenda of defense and foreign policy for Turkey. At national level, the most immediate security issue facing Turkey was the nationalist rebellion of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which had been constant in southeastern part of the country since the mid-1980s. The eastern and southeastern areas where the Kurdish population lived were overlooked politically and economically from a long time. The state neither initiated any projects to develop the areas nor permitted the Kurds to use their mother tongues in their media and schooling. Under such circumstances, the Kurdish workers Party came forward in 1975; an organization focusing the southeastern part of Turkey, and started effort against the Turkish state. Basically its aim was to work for cultural and political rights and liberty of the Kurds in Turkey. Later in 1984, the PKK was transformed to a paramilitary group; it started attacks and bombings against government system, the military, and various institutions of the

¹Rusen, Neither, "Sharia Nor Democracy: Understanding the Refah Party" Istanbul: Metis Guncel, 1994. p. 82-83.

²Sabri Sayari, "Turkey's Islamist Challenge," Middle East Quarterly, September 1996. p. 37

state. As this all was a side product of Republic of Turkey' foundation, so Erbakan proposed nothing less than a redefinition of Turkish nationalism in an effort to resolve the country' most irritating internal security problem. The Refah party openly accused the Turkish state and its racist Kamalist policies. Refah suggested the Muslim solidatory as treatment for the problem of PKK violence. ¹

As prime minister, Erbakan directed Fetullah Erbas - Refah deputy of Kurdish origin- and another Muslim deputy Ismail Nacar, to meet with leaders in southeast to discuss how hostilities might be brought to an end. Erbakan argued that Kurds are the Muslim brothers who had to be given their political and economic rights. The party prepared a special development program to strengthen eastern and southern Turkey. They promised to solve the terrorism of PKK with more appropriate, modern technology. ²

Changes in Turkey' Foreign policy, were also recommended by Erbakan. He proposed a loosening of relations with United states, Europe and Israel in favor of stronger ties with Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia and Iran, which the Refah considered Turkey' natural partner. The Welfare party presented five foreign policy goals to extend Turkey' relations with other Muslim countries, they were as follow:³

1. To resolve the conflicts between various Islamic countries, the establishment of a United Nation of the Islamic countries was proposed.
2. Initiating a common market of Muslim countries
3. Introducing a common Islamic currency
4. A combined defense force of Muslim countries.
5. The foundation of a cultural cooperation Organization by Islamic countries.

¹Steven A. Cook, "Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey". JHU Press, 2007 p. 110-116

²Yesim Arat, "Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics." SUNY Press, 2012 p.30-40

³Semih Idiz, "Refah's Foreign Policy Outlook". Turkish Probe, 1 April 1994, p. 7.

Refah officials were fully confident that these proposed goals of foreign policy may look distant but, if implemented; they would effectively end the Turkey's and other Muslim countries' dependence on the West. As expressed in an interview by one of the official of Welfare party:

“When compared with the West, the Islamic nations are far behind today in income and living standards. But we represent a great faction; a human grouping of 1.5 billion natives. We can increase current living standards ten times or even one hundred-fold if we can come together and work for our own market. This is not hatred towards the West. We don't hate anyone. It's just that's what we want to do”.¹

“The same as the West unites to serve its interests; the Islamic nation should unite for its own good. This is both logical and the reasonable thing to do. This will save us not only in this world, but also in the one to come.”² Views expressed by another party official.

Refah succeeded in getting the support of business groups in many of its programs and ideology. The most important illustration of this was MUSIAD, an association of Muslim business that was formed in 1990 and was strongly supporting the devotion to Islamic values and standards. MUSIAD mainly focus the small to medium sized businesses. The members of MUSIAD struggle to earn by utilizing religiously legalized way, also providing good pay and safe working conditions to its members. With more than 2000 members, it is now the most powerful Islamic voice on political and economic matters. Both, Refah and MUSIAD, suggest that Turkey' political and economic relations with other Muslim countries should be stronger and criticize the continuing participation of Turkey in Western associations. They also are against the privatization of companies like telecommunications and transportation, and both argue that the financial system based on interest is not acceptable at the cost of Turkey's industrial growth.³

¹Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities, p.290

²Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities, p.290

³ John Doxey, “Islamist Business Forges Ahead,” The Middle East, 1996.p.18

Due to all its policies, also the social welfare programs, the party had displayed a remarkable expansion and acceptance by Turkish society since 1983. The success of Refah party was definitely a critical point in the history of Turkey as it has shaken the unchallenged continuance of Kamalists secular ideology. Turks today see their country as part of the Islamic world and consider themselves as being Muslims. Obviously this couldn't be possible without the charismatic leadership of Erbakan, and Refah's volunteer's loyal efforts added more to it.

4.3 Current Political Status of Islam in Turkey

After decades of decline (1923-1950) Islam underwent revival in Turkey (1950-1980) and has now appeared as the dominant political force in the country. The republic continues to have a secular constitution, and religion is still denied complete access to the governing body, but religious forces have gained such importance institutionally and in terms of their impact on the masses. Turkey's importance, in shaping the security conditions of Middle East, to US strategy can never be neglected. Though it's a country with majority of Muslims, at the same time it's a secular democracy. A member of NATO and a continuing ally of U.S. The strength of Islam is increased in Turkey during last several years. Previously, religion and religious rights were just a division randomly talked by the parties of mainstream center-right. While in 1970s, it appeared as a separate political struggle under the guidance of Najmuddin Erbakan. Strong critics and analysis of secular authorities was faced by the Islamic parties and many times they were banned ultimately. Still, they managed to step forward in different disguises demonstrating their strength and stability also their capability to catch the attention of an important part of the Turkish electorates. Still, they remained generally a trimming movement.¹ Usually, it has been considered that most Turks prefer their affiliation with the Republic of Turkey over being Muslim. Conversely, a recent survey² performed in more than 20 cities of Turkey

¹Verner End, Udo Steinbach. "Islam in the World Today; A Handbook of Politics, Religion, Culture and Society". Cornell University Press, 2010 p. 221-230

²The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, p.23

and funded by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), showed a significant increase in the Turks preference of Muslim identity.

Turks' Identity

Primary Identity Percentage of Respondents

Turk	19.4	
Muslim	44.6	
Citizen of Turkish Republic		29.9
Kurd	2.7	
Alvis	1.1	
Other	1.3	
No reply	1.0	

The data clearly shows that religious association of Turkish people is almost twice the affiliation of Turks with Republic. Chairman of TESEV Can Paker believes that if we divide Turks into two categories then one-third of them are secular, and two-thirds are religious.¹

4.3.1 JDP- the Current Ruling Party

The success of the Islamic rooted Justice and Development Party, in the two current national elections, surely shows that political Islam is becoming stronger in Turkey' politics. The JDP was able to won 34% of votes in elections of 2002 which granted the opportunity for party to govern on its own. The performance of party in the July 2007 election was even better, as party managed to receive 46.6 %of the votes, while the party representing the Ataturk secular tradition, CHP, received 20.9 % of the votes and stood second. This was an unexpected accomplishment for a party like JDP that

¹The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, p.23

was new in politics as it was not present before August 2001, and it also shows the speedy change in perception of Turkish people regarding political Islam that has moved out political Islam from political gloom to become an active participant of Turkish politics. Though JDP never interpreted itself as an Islamic party but constantly asserted that it's a "conservative democratic party" but is always blamed by the many Kamalists that it has a secret Islamic agenda to overthrow the secular regime so it's a threat for the secular Turkish state.

Performance of the JDP forms a major example of the "moderation" of political Islam by embracing democracy, modernity, and liberal global Economy. The party claim to follow conservative democracy in its programs and its performance, since 2002, in government has been noticeably even-tempered¹. The JDP adopted a new strategy in contrast to Erbakan ideology although both struggle to same. The JDP has opened up to the west but it maintains close ties to the Islamic world and has shown the way for the Islam further integration into Turkish society. The success of the JDP attributed to the number of factors:-²

- Positive economic developments
- Support by Kurds and Member of non-Islamic Minorities who hope for greater security and right as a result of EU demand.
- Backing from a new post Kamalists generation that is frustrated and on the lookout for new alternatives.
- JDP has achieved tremendous reforms regarding constant economic strength and growth. Turkey's EU succession talks were managed to start in 2005. Another factor that highlight the JDP from others is its courage to stand up to military' involvement

¹. J F Hoge, Jr, 'Turkey at the Boiling Point', International Herald Tribune, 22 May 2007

² Islam in the World Today; A Handbook , p. 221-240

in democratic process. It became the first ruling party since 1960, which has publicly objected to the military's participation and criticism of the government.¹

4.3.2 Achievements of JDP

Justice and Development Party is always been accused of having some hidden Islamic agenda. This belief is prevailing among secularists, who feel endangered by Turkey's ruling Justice and Development party, which has links to political Islam in past. The real jolt for such people was the announcement by the Prime Minister Erdogan that his goal was to raise a "Religious Youth". In this regard a school a reform has been approved which lifts the ban on Madrasas and Religious schools. It includes measures that will allow schools specializing in religious education along with the modern sciences to take boys and girls from the age of 11 instead of 15. Also there will be optional classes of Quran Studies and the life of Holy Prophet (SAW) in other schools. The reform faced critics of many who argue that quality of education will suffer. Critics also blamed the JDP for promoting Islamic agenda which can be a threat to secular nature of country².

Another project that sparked the anger among secular authority was to redevelop Istanbul's Gezi Park³ in to a complex with new mosque and shopping centre. The project intended as the Muslims living in the region of Taksim demanded for praying places.⁴ Before, in 1997 Refah party insisted on the same and strongly argued that for 600,000 Muslims living in this area there are only 3 undersized mosques and circulating population in these mosques is about 2 million. While for minority having population of 23000, there are 14 churches. Refah party also supported the project of mosque by claiming that they want to "rebuild" the mosque actually. This is also revealed by many

¹Government Hits Back at Military Interference in Election Process', Today's Zaman, 28 April 2007
http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_government-hits-back-at-military-interference-in-election-process_109749.html Visited: January 19, 2014

²AL Arabiya, News <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/30/204265.html>. Visited: January 19, 2014.

³Gezi Park is an area inside the Taksim Square.

⁴BBC News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22753752>. Visited: January 21, 2014

Islamic dailies and magazines that before 55 years there was a mosque in Taksim. The mosque was built during the era of the Ottoman Empire within the limits of headquarters of military at Taksim. The military headquarter along with the historical mosque was cleaned outtogetherin 1940by order of Ismet Inonu; the second president of Turkish Republic.¹

Among the most remarkable achievement of the government is that Turkey has paid its final loan payment to the IMF and admirably, Erdogan is the only Prime Minister who went on tour to United States without having any IMF debit.²The very first IMF loan was taken in 1961 by the CemalGürsel government under a stand-by agreement. From 1961 till today, Turkey has taken debt of 56.5 billion U.S dollars. When JDP has taken control of the Turkey' government, the debts to IMF was exceeding the limits and IMF representatives were visiting Turkey every month for investigations. Before JDP, almost all the governmentswere asking for the concession in loan recovery and promising the improvements in internal policy to get more loans from the IMF. A new chapter begins with the victory of JDP in national elections with Erdogan as a prime minister. On prior basis, the newly elected government privatized the complete state sector and initiatives were taken to control and resolve corruption issues in newly privatized plan.

Through this privatization of the state sector, Prime Minister Erdoganlaunched a total new economic model in which the recentlyproduced private sector would not be a burden on the state and the state would not excessively burden the private sector with rules and regulations in return. Government has also taken initiative of interest free banking i.e. Islamic banking. According to a survey, Islamic banking, which favors an interest free system and follows the requirements of Shaira (Islamic law),has emerged as

¹Hurriyet Daily News <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/why-a-mosque-in-taksim.aspx?pageID=438&n=why-a-mosque-in-taksim-1997-01-31> visited: January 23, 2014.

²AL ARABIYA News visited: January 22, 2014

an outstanding system, the Islamic banks have expanded at an average of 19 percent every year, and their market volume reached \$1.3 billion in 2011.¹

Prime Minister Erdogan faced criticism of secular authorities on ending the headscarf ban. Erdogan said to his party's policymaker in a parliamentary speech:

"We have now abolished obsolete provision which was against the spirit of the republic. It's a step toward normalization... A dark time finally comes to an end... Headscarf-wearing women are full part of the republic, as well as those who do not wear it."²

Secular critics of Erdogan see removal of headscarf ban as yet another move by Turkey's government to impose an Islamic agenda along with the partial restriction on sale and advertisement of alcohol. Between 10 pm and 6 am, traders will not be permitted to sell alcohol while the sale of alcohol near worship places and schools will also be not allowed.³

Erdogan party has already successfully completed three tenures, and in recent elections it again managed to succeed. Their continuing victory demonstrates the gradual increase in acceptance of Islam and specially the political Islam by Turkish public. Whereas Economy remained the main focus of the party, and possibly this is the chief reason behind the success of the Justice and development party.

¹ Hurriyat Daily News <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nid=43360> visited: January 22, 14.

² Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/10/turkey-lifts-decades-old-ban-headscarves-201310814177943704.html> visited: January 22, 14.

³ Hurriyet, <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/restrictions-on-alcohol-sales-go-into-effect-today-in-turkey.aspx?PageID=238&NID=54074&NewsCatID=344>. Visited: January 22, 14.

Conclusion

From 1980s onward, Turkey has been going through the restructuring phase. The changes have been made in almost every sphere; social life, economic, politics. An increase in the function and position of Islam have also been observed and becoming an important part of society.

Islam was introduced to Turkey almost in the 8th and 9th centuries. Consequently to Islamic struggle, The Ottoman Empire came to existence under the leadership of Ghazi Usman, founder of the Ottoman dynasty. The Empire lasted for more than 6 centuries; 1299-1922. After the elimination of the Ottoman Caliphate, the Turkish Republic was formed under command of Kamal Ataturk, in 1923. Ataturk's main aspire was to modernize or better to say Westernize the Turkish society by all means. As originators of republic of Turkey were determined to eliminate all the aspects of Ottoman Empire so changes were made from top to bottom. Religion was banned on prime basis, because to them, Religion would have been an obstruction to the process of so called westernization or modernization. All kind of religious activities were banned. Aim was to uproot the religious consciousness of the Turkish people.

Things started to change with the introduction of multiparty system in 1950. The 1970s were of the great importance as the first serious political parties with Islamic ideology were setup. Erbakan's Milli Nizam party (National Order Party) and Milli Salamat party (National Salvation Party) contributed a lot in restoration of Islam into political system of Turkey. Other three Islamic Parties led by Erbakan are; Welfare Party, Virtue (Fazelit) Party, Felicity Party. He also published a manifesto "Milli Gorus", which accomplish his ideology of restoring Turkey to an Islamic state.

The Islamic parties of Erbakan gave crucial importance to rapid industrialization, mutual aid with Islamic countries and social welfare programs to uproot poverty and providing better living conditions to all. The Islamic movement also aimed to implement Islam to daily life of the Turkish people. However with this all, the parties never failed to convey their disagreement for the secularism and their affection and promotion of Islam and Islamic reforms.

Erbakan' struggle was not against the modernization of Turkey, rather he was in opposition to western influence. He rejected the superiority of west and asserted the superiority of Islamic civilization and its compatibility with modern sciences and progress. He always emphasized on Turkey's strong relation with Muslim countries, instead of West. The formation of Developing Eight (D-8) is an impressive achievement on his account. He also criticized the dependence of Turkish economy on foreign markets. He argued that development of local technology along with rapid industrialization would move Turkey from an inferior position in Europe to a position of identification and acknowledgment of its challenging strength.

Erbakan was leader of very first Turkish parties that were Islamic parties in real sense. His political vision was anti- western; anti- secular. Throughout his political career he was a resistance for the secular authorities. He struggled for the replacement of the Kamalists regime with the Islamic. His movement shielded the national and spiritual values of Turkish people. Secularist authorities considered the Islamic movement a threat to secular regime so all the parties faced hostility and opposition and were ultimately banned one after the other.

In 2001, when the Erbakan Virtue party was banned, the Islamic movement entered into a new episode. RecepTayyipErdogan, who was a brilliant member of Erbakan group and was well-known mayor of Istanbul under Refah' banner, announced his detachment with the party and decided to form his own political party. This split was due to difference of opinion regarding strategy. The emerging party was named Justice and Development Party, which was an Islamic liberal party. Unlike Erbakan, who was fundamentalist in his policies and strategies and whose Islamic movement aimed the formation of an Islamic state, Erdogan tried to exist together with the secular organization of the country also carrying some aspect of Erbakan' Islamic movement.

Among all the Parties that Erbakan had formed, Refah or Welfare Party was the most prominent one. Refah embraced the popularity and enjoyed success in consecutive elections; 1994s municipal elections in which,Refahnominees for mayor ship of Istanbul succeeded in 28 municipalities, and 1995 elections, the Refah Party obtained the

maximum percentage of votes, ultimately the task of structuring the government was given to the Refah and Erbakan was the prime minister. Refah had the largest numbers of members and best organizational capabilities. The success of Refah can be justified with its best social and welfare reform. Refah's strategy was based on the first lesson of democracy and that is to fulfill the requirements of the voters. Party's active members and volunteers performed thorough social services to help the poor. The secular system of the country got worried about Welfare's increasing popularity and soon it was shut down.

However Erdogan's Justice and Development Party, which was mostly supposed by the secular authorities as a continuity of the Islamic movement of Erbakan, excel much into the secular system than the Islamic parties of Erbakan. The leaders of Justice and Development Party never disregard the miserable old experiences of Islamic struggle and learnt that the survival in a secular system is only possible by avoiding collide with the secularist groups and having compatibility with army. They believe that Islam-democracy relationship can work best and penetrate into the system if the Islamic parties get chance to work freely along with preventing their struggle in opposition to the main principles of the secular organizations well if the secularists stop enforcing their assumed modern lifestyles and values on the Muslims.

The party's leadership asserted that JDP supports democracy, and party will struggle for a democratic secular state. They also declared that the party is strongly against the exploitation of religion; secularism can restricts the state regarding religion not the individuals. So everyone is free to follow and practice the religion he is inclined to.

After Erbakan's Welfare party, the Islamic party that rose to prominent in 2002 elections was Justice and Development Party. Though it was liberal in nature but in secular circles was considered as Islamic because its leading members were from the Islamic movement. In the very first elections, after Justice and Development Party was formed, the party embraced victory with 34% votes. The reasons that are mainly counted on this impressive victory's account are:

- **Mayor-ship of Istanbul and welfare reforms**

Erdogan enjoyed the mayor-ship of Istanbul under Refah label; he focused largely on social problems. Many Islamic reforms were also introduced like ban on alcohol, though it was partial but Erdogan faced strong critique of the secular authorities.

- **Best economic Reforms**

The marvelous continuous success of JD party can also be justified with its best economic reforms. Erdogan' policies had lifted the Turkey to 17th position in World economic Ranking of the countries¹. Another highlighted happening in JD rule was the return of IMF loan.

- **Islamic Reforms**

The increasing popularity of Justice and Development Party among people is also due the Islamic reforms that have been taken time to time. Like, ending the ban on wearing headscarves, interest free banking, and partial ban on sale of alcohol and removing the ban on Islamic schools.

- **Supremacy of civilian institutions over military**

Previously, Islamic parties were banned often due the interference of the military in the government, so to avoid this, the JD party stood for the supremacy of civilians. To strengthen the parliament and stop obstruction of army in country' administration, in 2003, the JDP government set off modification to the Law on Public Financial Management. Although it is not completely implemented yet, but it made the JDP to bound the military budget below the educational funds.

In 2006, to avoid the military interference in government during peaceful time, another modification was made to Military Criminal code.

¹http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_turkish-economy-declines-from-17th-to-19th-place-in-ranking-of-biggest-economies_368579.html. Date visited: February 13,2015

The legal moves of Justice and Development party to minimize the military involvement in the political field added effectiveness to the democratic process and the success of the JD party demonstrate the growing strength of Political Islam in Turkey.

Important Findings:

Analysis of the Islamic parties and movement led by NajmuddinErbakan, and political party of Erdogan results in following findings;

1. The Islamic movement of Turkey is the most successful experience among modern Islamic movement.
1. The task of Da'wah (Preaching of Islam) is multidimensional. Includes all the aspects of human life from individual to collective level.
2. Da'wah should be an organized, determined and a continuous effort to call the humanity to the Allah (SWT), towards accepting Islam as a complete code of life and convincing them to implement and establishing the Islam in the political body of the country. While the sole objective of this activity is to get the pleasure of Allah (SWT).
3. Consistency and believe is essential. As Allah (SWT) has told us in the holy Quran that do not despair nor loose hope for you shall succeed if you are believers.
4. Another salient feature of Erbakan' Islamic movement is that they didn't go for speed change instead their policy and progress was gradual.
5. Perhaps the best part of the movement was its social welfare strategy. They attracted the masses through serving them and through fulfilling their needs.
6. It may also be right that movement has weakened to some extent on its ideological basis, rifts and gaps are needed to be reduced more.

7. Probably among many other reasons of Erdogan' party success, continuous governance accountability is very important. Surveys are conducted in every month to know the public opinion about party, also it helped to know that whether party popularity has increased or decrease during the month and what's the reason behind it.
8. Moreover, all means were utilized to increase the acceptance of Islamic movement in secular society; best economic reforms were introduced, policies and initiative taken in this regard has lift the Turkey to top 20 countries in the world economic ranking. Also to smoothly run the democratic system, gradual amendments in constitution has been established regarding the supremacy of civilian institution over military.

The history of Islamic struggle in Turkey, especially political struggle, also reveals that democracy is best for the organization of the anti-system parties. Turkey' experience confirms that democratic system works best if the Islamic movements are given chances to work freely. This is the most important lesson of Turkish experience, and it has role model for other Muslim countries, Specifically, if I talk about Pakistan, there are a number of Islamic political parties struggling for years like JamatIslami, JamiatUlema e Islam, Jamiat Ulema e Pakistan and many others. Beside all of their efforts none of them could rose to prominence. Kceping in view the Islamic movement of Turkey, perhaps it's the strategic limitations of these parties. Turkish Religious parties go through transitional stages from conservative to liberally religious democratic parties. The democracy force them to tighten relation with general public, and build social and welfare relation with peoples of Turkey. They focus on every city, town and village and make their units in each village. Adjacent to Islam and Islamic values their main focus remained economy and development. On the other hand Religious parties in Pakistan from the first day till present are working with same strategy, their conservative nature bridging gap between general public and religious parties. Rigidness towards western countries and towards technological changes created ambiguity in general public mind that their rule will bring them back to stone ages. The other problem religious parties are facing is, in Turkey and

Egypt religious parties are making alliance with Nationalist parties while in Pakistan religious and Nationalist parties are working in different direction.

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