

**EVALUATING THE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN PAKISTAN'S
FOREIGN POLICY: POST 9/11 ERA**



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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to loving memory of my parents, whose deepest wish was to witness my attainment of the highest academic degree.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIML	All India Muslim League
ANI	Asian News International
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian political party)
C2D	Centre for Culture and Development
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measures
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CISS	Centre for International Security Studies
CSD	Cold Start Doctrine
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation
ETPB	Evacuee Trust Property Board
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
FSD	Full Spectrum Deterrence
FU	First Use
GACA	Gandhara Art and Cultural Association
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAF	Indian Air Force
IOK	Indian-Occupied Kashmir
IS	Islamic State (also known as ISIS)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan's intelligence agency)
ISSI	Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammed
KBS	Korean Broadcasting System
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (a province in Pakistan)
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
MCD	Minimum Credible Deterrence
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAP	National Action Plan (Pakistan's counter-terrorism plan)
NCA	National Command Authority
NCLs	National Control Lists
NCP	National Curriculum of Pakistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFU	No First Use (of nuclear weapons)
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSP	National Security Policy
NYT	New York Times
OBL	Osama Bin Laden
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
PCENS	Pakistan Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security
PeP	Paigham -e -Pakistan
PNRA	Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
PID	Press Information Department
PINSTECH	Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology
PIPS	Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PoW -	Prisoner of War
PPP -	Pakistan Peoples Party
PRP	Personnel Reliability Programme
PSGPC	Pakistan Sikh Gurdwara Parbandhak Committte
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
PTDC	Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

PTM	Pashtun Tahafuz Movement
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing (India's foreign intelligence agency)
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SNC	Single National Curriculum
SPD	Strategic Plans Division
SRR	Strategic Restraint Regime
TIAC	Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization
TNWS	Tactical Nuclear Weapons
TPNWs	Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V-DEM	Varieties of Democracy
WoT	War on Terror
WP	Washington Post

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Abstract

The study aims to evaluate the role of Pakistan's national identity and its impact on Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era through the theoretical lens of constructivism. The research begins with expatiation of the historical salience of identity in the establishment of Pakistan and in its subsequent history leading up to 9/11. The study then goes on to bring to light how after the tragic incident of 9/11 Pakistan was portrayed only in negative light by Pakistan's significant "others" namely the US and India to serve their geopolitical interests. This negative construction of Pakistan's identity engendered ontological insecurity for Pakistan. This pushed Pakistani state to reorient its identity so that the negative projection of Pakistani identity can be neutralised. The study has attempted to show the tropes of Pakistan's post 9/11 national identity. The study goes on to show as to what similarities and differences define Pakistan's pre 9/11 and post 9/11 identities share. The study also dwells on the impact of Pakistan's identity tropes on Pakistan's foreign policy. The study not only delineates the features or elements of Pakistani identity by analysing various discourses and practices of the state between 2001 to 2023 but also goes to explain how identity narratives have shaped Pakistan's foreign policy. The research doesn't remain confined to delineation of the elements of identity rather it goes on to show the impact of Pakistan's post 9/11 identity discourses on its foreign policy. The research shows that Pakistan's post 9/11 identity has profoundly shaped foreign policy of Pakistan. The findings of the study confirms the hypothesis of the study, Pakistani state reoriented its national identity in response to negative construction of its identity by the US and India and resultantly the reoriented national identity profoundly shaped Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era. In the light of the findings, the study makes recommendations to fully harness the positive potential of Pakistan's representational identity by narrowing the gap between iteration of identity and its actualisation.

INTRODUCTION

State identity has always been a dynamic social construct. National identity though largely a stable construct is not necessarily an immutable concept. Cataclysmic events invariably shake and transform the stable nature of identity constructs and give birth to new identity constructs. German and Japanese pacifist identities in post second world war era, Turkish identity after the collapse of Ottoman empire, formation of European identity in the aftermath of world war II and identity construction of East Europeans states after disintegration of USSR corroborate the assertion that the concept of identity is not immutable. All the aforementioned actors constructed antithetical identities after reflecting on the nature of their respective cataclysmic events. Having said this, national identity is marked by continuations of illusions and the elaboration of convenient fables about who "we" are " (Micheal, n.d.). Moreover, the dynamic nature of identity is the product of the interplay between the structural and agential forces. In response to structural variables, construction of national identity is always steered by the political and intellectual elites of a nation state (Alexandrov, n.d.).

By the national identity of Pakistan, the researcher in the context of the dissertation means the image or the identity Pakistan communicates to the world. It includes all the verbal and non-verbal identity markers or the tropes of national identity. In this study by national identity we mean projection of Pakistan's state's identity at international level. It does not deal with domestic or provincial identities of Pakistan, here the research only deals with Pakistani state identity: the image or the identity of the state that it communicates to the world.

The salience of national identity in relation to foreign policy of states is well

established(Kuniko, n.d.). Pakistan in reality was firstly an idea than a sovereign solemnisation of an independent territory. In fact, it was the quest for protection of Muslim identity that led to creation of Pakistan. Muslim league in erstwhile united India fully knew the importance of unity in winning freedom from the colonialists. They only wanted reassurance from Hindu majority that their separate identity will be protected under any new constitutional dispensation. The historic Lucknow pact enshrined the commitment of Congress whereby it assured Indian Muslims that their separate identity will be protected. But unfortunately, Congress reneged from its promises and thus struck a fatal blow to possibility of a united India.

After winning independence Pakistani state continue to define Pakistan's identity against the foil of Indian identity. The whole process of identity construction was based upon accentuation of difference between Hindu identity and Muslim identity (K. K. Aziz, 2002). The unbridgeable religious and cultural gulf between binary of 'we' (Muslims) versus 'them' (Hindus) justified the urgency and necessity of partition and continued to shape and inform adversarial Indo-Pak relations in post-independence era.

Moreover, the salience and pertinence of national identity in relation to Pakistan's foreign policy continued during the cold war era. Ideational convergences vis-à-vis the US were accentuated and Pakistani foreign policy elites aimed to dovetail Pakistani identity into the matrix of the US' identity.

During the cold war era convergences in relation to Pakistan and American identities were accentuated. Pakistan's Western political elites were intellectually, culturally inclined to align with the US. Islamic teachings and political concepts like democracy and liberal values were cherry picked to cement relations with the

US. While the initial phase of Pak-US relations was defined by accentuation of democratic values and advocacy of liberal economic order against the communist's system, the later phase of identity construction which started in the wake of USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, markedly reshaped Pakistani identity.

The pre 9/11 identity was predominately and overwhelmingly dominated by reliance upon Islamic culture and history. The pre 9/11 identity was completely bereft of South-Asianness and aligned itself with Middle Eastern Islamic identity (Madhia, n.d.). Cultural and civilizational linkages with the Middle East were communicated through curriculum and media. No serious efforts were made to establish cultural connections with the non-Muslim Asian countries.

The erstwhile identity was exclusionary in the sense that it only emphasised the distinctiveness of the Muslim identity and excluded/ ignored the other elements of state identity. The monochromatic lens of Pan-Islamist ideology largely coloured Pakistan's foreign policy. All the secular elements like non-Muslim heritage, art and literature were conveniently ignored.

The cataclysmic event of 11th September 2001, metamorphosed the whole world and Pakistan was a not an exception. In fact, Pakistan was made into central theatre of war against the extremists in the region. The whole edifice of the militaristic identity that was created in the height of cold war became a *bête noire* of the US. Those very elements that the US was instrumental in creating became *bête noir* for the US and the very narrative the US led to create was consigned to the dustbin of history. Pakistan was caught in an ideational quandary.

Pakistani state elites responded by reorienting Pakistani identity to counter negative

construction of its identity by its significant others. In “What is Pakistani?” Javed Jabber mentions thirty positive aspects of Pakistan’s identity. The Pakistani identity described by him is democratic, cosmopolitan and progressive in nature (Javed Jabbar,2019).

Pervez Musharraf articulately avers in his book ‘In the Line of Fire: A memoir’ that September 1, 2001, increased our domestic problems manifold and greatly reshaped our international relations. He goes on to state the diverse yet contested colours of Pakistani identity: extremist elements of identity, moderate elements of identity, Westernised elites, rural and urban cultures that form Pakistan’s identity (Musharraf, 2014).

Pervez Musharraf’s idea of ‘enlightened moderation’ epitomised the reflexivity of the agents when faced with preponderance of adversarial structural pressures. Though Musharraf was not able to achieve the significant domestic support for his idea of enlightened moderation but he was able to positively engage the international audience. Moreover, his espousal of enlightened moderation set the direction of Pakistan’s national identity narratives in post 9/11 era. All the subsequent identity iterations of Pakistan attempted to project Pakistan as a tolerant, responsible and moderate state.

The research aims to evaluate reconstruction of Pakistan’s national identity and its impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy in post 9/11 era. It aims to bring to fore as to what necessitated the foreign policy elites to reorient Pakistan’s identity and how Pakistan’s identity has been constructed by Pakistan’s foreign policy elites through their discourses and practices in post 9/11 era and as to how and as to what extent Pakistan’s foreign policy is shaped by its national identity.

1. Rationale of the Study

Studying the ideational character of any nation's foreign policy is important as ideational as well as material character of a nation drive its foreign policy. Most of the works that focus on Pakistan foreign policy as mentioned in the literature review section of the study, analyse Pakistan's external relations with the aid of material variables.

There is a shortage of literature on Pakistan's foreign policy that focuses on the ideational factors that shape its foreign policy. Moreover, few scholarly works exist that analyse the ideational drivers of Pakistan's foreign policy from 9/11 to present. For those who are interested in deeper understanding of Pakistan foreign policy responses since 9/11, the identity discourses and how these identity discourses shaped the practices of the state and how it resultantly informed Pakistan's national identity have little to rely on to achieve their objective. The research is a humble endeavour in that direction. The research attempts to evaluate the role of national identity in understanding Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era. It attempts to show that Pakistan's national identity is co-constituted by the material/ideational structures and agents. Consequently, the interplay of agential and structural forces also co-constituted Pakistan's foreign policy. Thus understanding the ideational drivers of the foreign policy along with already understood material drivers of the foreign policy give a complete picture of Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era.

2. Statement of the Problem

In 9/11 era, Pakistan's significant 'others' i.e. the US and India started a well orchestrated campaign to brand Pakistan negatively to serve their geopolitical interests. To counter the negative branding by its significant 'others' Pakistan's foreign policy

elites set on a course to re-evaluate Pakistan's national identity and reoriented the existing identity to cope with the new ideational challenges. The reorientation of Pakistan's identity, its nature, dynamics and its impact on foreign policy in post 9/11 era has not been scholarly evaluate.

3. Objectives of the Study

- a. To show the historical salience of Pakistan national identity.
- b. To evaluate the factors that necessitated reorientation of Pakistan's national identity in post 9/11 era.
- c. To show the identity tropes of Pakistan's national identity discourses in post9/11 era.
- d. To show as to how Pakistan's post 9/11 national identity shapes its foreign policy.

4. Research Questions:

- a. How has Pakistan's identity evolved historically?
- b. How Pakistan's significant 'others' i.e. the US and India projected Pakistan's identity in post 9/11 era?
- c. What are the identity tropes of Pakistan's post 9/11 national identity?
- d. What are the similarities and differences between Pakistan's pre 9/11 and post 9/11 identities?
- e. How Pakistan's post 9/11 national identity shapes its foreign policy?

5. Significance of the Study

Since 1990s in general and since 9/11 in particular Pakistan has been singularly branded with negative epithets like most 'dangerous country', 'a home of terror',

‘exporter of terrorism, ‘terrorist heartland’, ‘most inhospitable place on earth’ and ‘a failed state’ to name a few. These negative and lopsided epithets are in reality a product of a narrative created by Pakistan’s significant ‘others’ that aims to vilify Pakistan to achieve their desired strategic goals.

The study is of paramount importance as it aims to show as to how Pakistan’s significant ‘others’ constructed its identity through their political and media discourses. The research is important as it aims to comprehensively and methodically denude the imposed layers on Pakistani identity. The research shows that Pakistan has always behaved like a modern nation state and has always responded to pressures of international systems like any civilized polity of the world and this trend continues even to this day. The study is one of pioneering works on the topic of reorientation of Pakistan’s national identity in post 9/11 era.

The study attempts to fill the gap in knowledge on relationship between national identity and foreign policy and how national identity and foreign policy mutually constitute each other. Since the World is keenly interested in the ideational character of a Muslim nuclear power in the 21st century whose identity predominately is defined in monolithic colouration of extremism, the study could prove to be a valuable contribution in enlightening the world about the actual tropes of Pakistan identity and how its identity shapes its foreign policy.

6. Delimitation of the Study

The scope of the study is limited to reorientation of Pakistan’s identity after 9/11 to 2023. The aforementioned period has been selected as it marks the beginning of a distinctive phase of Pakistan’s history when Pakistan in an overnight found itself at a crossroad of history. The policy decisions it has made since then and the

discursive practices it has been part thereof, merits detailed scholarly attention. The study views the aforementioned period as a watershed period in Pakistan's history as Pakistan has been consistently and lopsidedly coloured in hues of extremism since 9/11.

Notwithstanding its failures and periodic contradictions, interestingly Pakistan has been consistently responding by proffering identity narratives and practices that bespeak of its moderate, inclusive, democratic and responsible character. in its international relations The study of the aforementioned period has the scholarly worth to help us understand the tropes of Pakistani post 9/11 identity and how identity is co-constituted by the structures and agents and how it shapes foreign policy and vice versa.

The study does not include domestic contestation of Pakistan's Identity reorientations and various provincial and local identities that exist in Pakistan. The study solely focuses on the identity discourses and practices of Pakistani state that relates to its identity and foreign policy. The study at systemic level only attempts to understand the role of discursive power of Pakistan's significant others in relation to Pakistan's identity and Pakistan's response to negative projection of its identity by producing counter identity discourse and actualising it through its policies. At domestic level it is confined to understand the role, policies, practices and aims of Pakistan's foreign policy elites that relate to Pakistan's national identity and foreign policy.

7. Literature Review

There is a clear dearth of academic literature on the proposed topic of the dissertation. Although much has been written on Pakistan's identity in the formative

years of the country yet only a limited number of scholarly works have been written on the role of identity in Pakistan's foreign policy and as the view of the literature shows few works have been written to evaluate the role of national identity in Pakistan's external relations.

The researcher has found only one PhD dissertation that focuses on role of identity in Pakistan's foreign policy but its scope is limited. It only deals with Pakistan's identity construction vis-a-vis Pakistan's security collaboration with the US. It highlighted as to how Pakistan's foreign policy elites attempted to reconstruct Pakistan's security related collaboration with the US over three period of extended security collaboration i.e. 1947 to 1962, 1979 to 1989 and from 2001 to 2012. The dissertation solely talks about Pakistan's identity construction in relation to security collaboration with the US, it does not talk about as to how Pakistan also constructs its identity against India, its past identities and does not evaluate the role of national identity on its foreign policy. The conclusions drawn from the dissertation indicate that Pakistan's foreign policy leaders shaped the country's identity with a pragmatic intention, aiming to enhance security cooperation with the United States.

The present research on the other hand postulates that current phase of Pakistan's identity construction is based on genuine realisation in Pakistan elites that Pakistan has to brand itself as a modern nation state in dealing with the world. The dissertation also misses out on the role played by norms, socialisation and role played by other social actors at domestic and systemic level in shaping Pakistan's national identity and resultantly its foreign policy.

Moreover, it does not talk about as to how Pakistan's identity influences its foreign policy and how it can be used to predict Pakistan's foreign policy. The present

research also shows that Pakistan is not reconstituting its identity merely to seek security collaboration with the US rather Pakistan's is redefining its identity works at a grand scale and for a global audience in order to survive and thrive in a multipolar world.

Diplomats like Abdul Sattar and Shahid Ameen penned works that cover diplomatic history of Pakistan during their times. Their works lack theorisation of international relations they even did not dwell on the role of identity as a key driver of foreign policy. Moreover, where they mentioned the role of identity in Pakistan's foreign policy, they invariably focused only on the Islamic aspect of Pakistani identity and that too in an unproblematic manner.

The works of S.M Burke and Lawrence Ziring discuss the contours and dynamics of Pakistan's foreign policy at length but they too didn't focus on the role of identity in Pakistan's foreign policy.

Husain Haqqani's work brings to fore the institutional tug of war and its resultant impact on identity, ideology and foreign policy of Pakistan. Moreover, his work too lacks expressed and explicit international relations theorisation. The focus of his work is to give an alternate account of power struggle between the civilian and military elites and how the former attempted to steer the wheel of the state.

'Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State' falls in the category of edited books. Noted scholars of the country contributed research articles to this work but no article focused on the relationship between Pakistan's identity and its foreign policy.

Only a handful number of works focus on Pakistan's identity but among them there isn't a single work that dwells on the role of Identity in Pakistan's foreign policy let alone reorientation of Pakistan's identity after 9/11. Masood Ashraf Raja (Raja,

2010) makes use of post-positivist epistemology to deconstruct identity formation of Pakistan between 1857 and 1947, there too he attempted to deconstruct formation of Pakistan identity through the literary works. The work falls in the category of postcolonial literature rather than a book on international relations and foreign policy of Pakistan. Moreover, it only focuses on identity formation from the war of independence to Pakistan's independence.

Farzana Shaikh's 'Making Sense of Pakistan' (Shaikh, 2012) by using an interpretive epistemology attempted to highlight the causes of Pakistan's identity crisis and asserted that Pakistan's reliance on political Islam is an attempt to compensate for its identity crisis. This book too does not deal with lopsided construction of Pakistan's identity by its significant 'others' and how Pakistani state mediated the negative construction by producing countervailing discourses and practices. Moreover, the main thrust of the study is focused on the domestic factors that shapes Pakistan's identity and foreign policy. International relation theorisation falls outside the confines of the study.

Ayesha Jalal view as to how religion, culture and nationalism have shaped Muslim identity from 1850s to 1947 (Jalal, 2014). The view of the literature makes amply clear that literature on Pakistan external relations and identity formation of Pakistan and its impact on foreign policy in post 9/11 era is very limited. Neither there is a work that dwells on the variable of identity in Pakistan's foreign policy nor reorientation of Pakistan's identity after 9/11.

David Campbell analyses the intriguing role of identity in influencing international relations. He lays bare the very nature of identity by focusing on the role played by difference, danger and otherness in constitution of the identity of the US. He goes

on to say that identity lies at the very core of the US foreign policy. He avers that identity is neither fixed nor ordained by the God, conversely identity is produced in relation to declared others of a state. The book is based on a path breaking argument: as to how the identity of the US is discursively constituted through difference, danger and otherness and resultantly as to how identity influences foreign policy preferences of the US. The work does provide a theoretical background and also serves as an illustrative example for the researchers who are interested in identity and its relationship with foreign policy but the book deals only with identity construction of the US and it does not analyse constitution of Pakistani identity in general and post 9/11 identity constructions in particular and as to how national identity influences its foreign policy.

Ahmed Waqas Waheed work falls in the scholarly domains of deconstruction and decolonization in International Relations. It brings to light as to how the knowledge on Pakistan is subjectively produced in Eurocentric IR literature and area studies through various representations and discourses. It amply exposes the knowledge power nexus that lies at the heart of Pakistan's negative identity construction in the West. The book primarily studies how Pakistani identity is fixed or stabilised through knowledge produced by the Western intelligentsia and how it is represented in their writings. The book does not involve itself in counter argument to tell us as to what is Pakistan's true identity. Firstly, the author goes on to show how knowledge on Pakistan has been produced by the Western intellectual entrepreneurs and secondly, he goes on to deconstruct and decolonize the subjective knowledge produced on Pakistan by the Western epistemological community and further reproduced through Western pedagogical practitioners. The book neither deals with reorientation of Pakistani identity nor with evaluation of identity in

relation to foreign policy.

Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin explains as to how identity and normative ideas condition the foreign policy behaviour of Baltic states. The theoretical approach espoused by the authors who contributed to this volume has been derived from constructivism. The theoretical approach shows independent causal power of ideational structures. The authors who contributed to this volume base conceptualisation of identity on three premises or postulates: Identities are shaped through construction, rather than being inherent or fundamental; they are interconnected and encompass connections to different 'noteworthy others'; moreover, identities are structured as narratives within discourses.

(Berg & Ehin, 2009) assert that cold relations between Russia and Baltic states are caused by conflictual identities. Baltic and Russian Post Soviet identities and historical narratives are irreconcilable and antagonistic and how consolidation and institutionalisation of their respective identities further exacerbated their antagonistic relations. They go on to say that this ideational conflict of Baltic and Russian identities fully manifest itself in European institution where both Russia and the Baltic states deny the Europeanness of each other.

This edited volume though is of great help in providing theoretical background and in explaining the independent causal power of identity and how it shapes foreign policy behaviour of states, explaining reconstruction of Pakistani identity and how it derives Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour fall outside of the purview of the book.

Dirk Nabers in his article "Filling the Void of Meaning: Identity construction in U.S. Foreign Policy After September 11,2001" attempts to show how identity is

constructed through foreign policy (Nabers, 2009). The author has based his argument on theoretical insights given by Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and their followers and critics. It shows how the notion of war on terror has been naturalised through discourse. How empty signifiers like freedom, peace, security, order civilization, and good were attributed to American people and rest of the world was only portrayed in negative light. The study avers that crises are necessary for an identity change. Crises engender new voids that needs to be filled and thus in this process of filling the voids new identities are created. The article provides a very relevant theoretical background to the present study but reconstruction of Pakistani Identity falls outside its scope.

8. Theoretical Framework

“Foreign policy is at least in part an act of social construction; it is what the actors decide what it will be” (Kubálková, 2015). Constructivism has been used as a theoretical framework to deconstruct reorientation of Pakistan’s identity and to evaluate its impact on foreign policy. The choice of the theoretical framework is appropriate to the research as the very title of the research bespeaks of interpretive epistemology. The theoretical framework of constructivism provides the requisite theoretical insights to understand the reorientation of Pakistan’s national identity in its foreign policy and how identity and foreign policy and agents and structures mutually constitute each other.

The bedrock of constructivism is about constitutive power of shared ideas on identities, interests and social structures (Wendt, 2006). The constructivist ontology defines notions of subjectivity, context and power. The shared interpretations of norms, regulations, and ideologies have the potential to shape identities,

motivations, and behaviours." The setting, whether it's geographical, historical, or societal, plays a vital role in forming meanings, though these meanings can be subject to disagreement. The analysis of power dynamics investigates the ways in which specific meanings gain prominence over others. Another fundamental assumption of constructivism is the concept of mutual creation (Klotz & Lynch, 2007).

Epistemologically constructivist scholars are divided in two groups namely Positivists and post-positivists. Positivist constructivists hold norms as stable whereas post positivists hold norms as unstable. As for causality the Positivists aim to give explanation and thus end up making generalisations whereas the post positivists strive to have understanding of particular phenomena (Klotz & Lynch, 2007).

Identity and interests are two important concepts in constructivism. According to constructivists identities define interests. This emphasis on causal power of identity on interests set constructivism apart from neoliberal, neorealist and neo-Marxist theories that ascribe the defining power to material interests as prime driver of state's interests.

As far as unit of analysis is concerned constructivism is divided into three levels of analysis namely systemic level, unit-level and holistic level. The systemic level of analysis posits that identities are shaped by international structures and unit level of analysis avers that domestic factors shape state's identity. The holistic level of analysis is located in the middle of the afore-mentioned extremes. It ascribes defining power to both systemic level and unit level as shapers of state's interests (Burchill, 2005). The research aims to adopt this holistic level of analysis to understand reorientation of Pakistan's national identity and evaluation of its role in

shaping its foreign policy.

Broadly defined constructivism is divided into two scholarly schools namely North American and European schools. They not only ask different questions about foreign policy but they also employ different methods to answer their research questions. The North American approach emphasizes the significance of "social norms" and "identities" in shaping international relations and influencing foreign policy decisions. Rooted in a positivist epistemology, this school aims to reveal the underlying top-down and deductive processes, along with the causal connections between actors, norms, interests, and identity (Smith et al., 2012, p. 72).

The North American group is also branded as "conventional," "standard" or "American" constructivism, the chief theorists of this school are: Alexander Wendt, Emmanuel Adler, Nicholas Onuf, John Gerard Ruggie, Peter Katzenstein and Martha Finnemore (Chernoff, 2007, p. 69). The European school of constructivism principally focuses on the "language," "linguistic constructions" and "social discourses" in construction of international relations. They employ post-positivist epistemology and use inductive research studies. The chief theorist of "interpretive/interpretative constructivism" are: Friedrich Kratochwil and Ted Hopf (Smith et al., 2012, p. 73). Despite epistemological difference and concomitant differences of methods, emphasis upon constitutive power of ideational factors instead of material factors in constructing social reality is the point of convergence between these two schools. In the research both varieties of constructivism namely the North American and European variant will be used to understand the reorientation of the national identity through Pakistan's foreign policy.

If we solely rely on realist theory, we miss as to how the state attempted to

structurally reorient Pakistani state through its performative discourses and by introducing reforms in education and political systems. If we rely on neo-realism to explain Pakistan foreign policy, we fail to account for discursive strategy Pakistani leadership employed to construct identity of the state that has had an abiding impact on Pakistan's foreign policy.

Realist paradigm has been mostly used to explain Pakistan's alliance with the US in the war against terror, by using constructivism as a theory we have been able to understand as to how the relationship was constructed by different actors. It was not just the dictates of the US power which forced Pakistan to side with the US. Pakistan in its past has always been more than ready to side with the West, Pakistan's alliance with the US during cold war is a case in point.

If we only rely on material explanations, we miss out the discursive formation of Pakistan's response and its performative discourses which have survived the US withdrawal from the region. The extensive data used in the study testifies to the fact that Pakistan's foreign policy elites institutionalised the discursive strategies through political and other social institution.

Should we use realist variables to study role of identity in Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era we come to see that Pakistan's response was fixed and mechanical it was coerced to comply with the dictates of the hegemon, the US. The realist theory assigns all agency to international structure and deprive Pakistan of any agency.

If we only rely on realist principles to explain Pakistan's foreign policy we fail to account for the role of international socialisation of Pakistan through norms, we also fail to see how Pakistani state internalised international norms.

9. Research Methodology

Qualitative research methodology has been employed to analyse the data. Deductive approach has been used to interpret the data to affirm or reject argument of the study. NVivo 12 software has been used to interpret qualitative data in order to bring to light the construction of Pakistani identity by its significant others i.e. the US and India and also to bring to light Pakistan's response to negative construction of its identity by reorienting its identity through its identity discourses and actualisation of these discourses through its practices. In addition to use of NVivo as a tool to interpret qualitative data, simple discourse analysis of the primary texts has been carried out to understand reorientation of Pakistani identity. Discourse analysis as a method completely synchronises with constructivist epistemology.

10. Research Design

In the research case study approach has been adopted to understand reorientation of Pakistan's identity and its relationship with Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era. The period after 9/11 is selected as a starting point of the research as it marks beginning of identity reorientation. The tenures of Pervez Musharraf 2001-2008, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) 2008-2013, Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) 2013-2018 and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), 2018- to 2022 have been studied in relation to studying relationship between national identity and foreign policy. Corresponding to the aforementioned tenures of the governments, the role/influence of international actors like the US and India on Pakistan's national identity has been analysed.

11. Data Collection

Since the research forays into an evolving and emerging process of reorientation of Pakistan's identity and its relationship with Pakistan's foreign policy so there is shortage of primary scholarly data on Pakistan's attempts of reorienting its national identity and how Pakistan's identity and foreign policy mutually constitute each other. The researcher has generated primary data through semi-structured interviews of Pakistani diplomats, military officials, experts and academics.

In addition to collection of primary data through interview, the research has extensively relied on the primary data of speeches made at Annual UN General Assembly Sessions by successive Pakistani and Indian heads of governments/state since 2001 to present. The research has also relied on the primary data collected from the dramas and films of Hollywood and Bollywood and from the editorials of the New York Times and Washington Post to understand negative construction of Pakistan's identity.

In addition to the primary data, data from secondary sources have also been relied upon to comprehensively understand the role of national identity and its impact on foreign policy and vice versa.

12. Data Analysis

The research uses qualitative methods of collection of data through interviews and through the analysis of the primary sources like speeches, editorials and media discourses. The existing data like policy statements, press releases of the foreign office of Pakistan, speeches made by state dignitaries and officials at international forums have been analysed through NVivo 12 and discourse analysis.

13. Organisation of Study

In the introductory chapter, the study dwells on significance of the research, expatiates on the main research questions, make a mention of the rationale of the study, make a mention of the limitation of the research, and discuss at length the research design, literature review and the methodology used in the research.

Chapter 1: National Identity and Foreign Policy: Conceptual Framework

In the chapter identity has been conceptualised in constructivist paradigm. The chapter expatiates upon the relationship between identity and foreign policy. It dwells on the relationship between state and identity. The chapter then goes on to expatiate on utility and efficacy of the theories of realism and constructivism in explaining foreign policy. The theoretical debate brings to fore the relevance and pertinence of constructivism in relation to understanding Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era. Agent structure debate and its relevance to understanding foreign policy has also been discussed in detail. The chapter highlights as to how the factor of socialisation contributes to change in identity and foreign policy. The chapter also problematises identity as a causal variable in explaining a state's foreign policy, the role of internationalisation of norms in shaping identity and foreign policy and the utility of the concept of corporate identity in understanding identity of a state. Lastly, the chapter dwells on the value of identity as a causal variable and the co-constitution of identity and foreign policy.

Chapter 2: The Genesis of Pakistan's National Identity

The chapter aims to historically highlight salience of ideational factors that contributed to creation of Pakistan and maintenance of a socially constructed identity in the pre - independence era leading up to 1947. The history of Pakistan's freedom struggle vouches for causal power of ideational forces in shaping material political realities and thus validating the causality of ideational factors vis-à-vis affairs of a state.

Historical instances explored in this chapter offer a historical link that lends credence to the role played by identity in shaping Pakistan's foreign relations in its subsequent history. Moreover, the historical overview given in the chapter illustrates that identity is relational in nature, is socially constructed by variables of unit and systemic level. The pre-independence history of Pakistan is illustrative in explaining the salience of Pakistan's post-independence identity. The historical overview of Pakistan's pre-independence history is also instructive in the sense that it tells us as to how Indian Muslims view themselves and the foils i.e. Hindus and the British against which they constructed their identity and as to how their counter foils: Hindus constructed their identity in opposition to identity of Indian Muslims.

Chapter 3: The Evolution of National Identity and Its Impact on Pakistan's Foreign Policy (1947-2001)

The chapter examines the process and dynamics of Pakistan's identity construction in post-independence era: from 1947 to 2001. Firstly, the chapter shows as to how after winning independence Pakistani state went on to define its identity to teach to masses that why All India Muslim League demanded a separate homeland and as to how Indian Muslims have an antithetical identity in relation to Hindu Identity. The

unbridgeable religious and cultural gulf between binaries of 'we' (Muslims) versus 'them' (Hindus) justified the urgency, necessity of partition and the future trajectory of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Secondly, the chapter highlights the second strand of Pakistan's identity: convergences and commonalities between the Western and Pakistani identities. Thirdly, the chapter brings to light as to how Pakistani foreign policy and political elites went on to make Islam as super structural component of its identity and then used to cement relations with other Muslim countries especially Middle Eastern countries and through espousal of Pan-Islamic causes. Lastly the chapter shows as to how and to what extent the construction of various strands of Pakistan's identity influenced its foreign policy.

Chapter 4: Defining Pakistan's Identity: The Role of the US and India in Post 9/11 Era

External actors played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's post-independence identity. The United States played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's identity through socialisation processes from the 1950s to the 1980s. Middle Eastern Muslim countries, with whom Pakistan shared a desire for fraternal relations based on religious affinity also contributed in constructing Pakistan's identity. India, Pakistan's adversary continues to demonise Pakistan to serve its geo-political interests. It went on to define Pakistan as a religious orthodoxy by flaunting its secular identity.

From 1950s to 1989, the interests of the US and Pakistan mostly converged. The only point of major divergence was Pakistan's nuclear programme. Divergences as far as the US was concerned, increased between the two countries during 1990s due

to Pakistan's nuclear programme. These divergences morphed into new challenges and issues in Post US attack on Afghanistan in 2001. Pakistan took a volte face by withdrawing recognition and support of Taliban and became America's important ally in the war against terror. The new alliance between Pakistan and the US was initially marked by bonhomie but as the US started to face losses in the US due to its own failures it started to accuse Pakistan of harbouring, nurturing and sheltering terrorists. The US started to construct Pakistan as the most dangerous ally, an explosive and unstable country, a failed state.

The chapter brings to fore the negative construction of Pakistani identity in post 9/11 era in selected dramas and Hollywood films and editorials published in New York Times and Washington Post. Analysis of the narratives embedded in the discourses bring to fore that the US attempted to project a particularly negative identity of Pakistan. This negative construction of Pakistani identity put the ontological security of the state in jeopardy.

The chapter also dwells on the role played by India, Pakistan's another significant 'other' in negatively constructing Pakistani identity. India adroitly benefitted from adversarial discourse on Pakistan by branding it as an exporter of terrorism and as a nursery of terrorism. By constructing and promoting negative representational identity of Pakistan India attempted to achieve its geostrategic objectives.

Chapter 5: Reorientation and Actualisation of Pakistan's Identity in Response to Negative Constructions by Its Significant 'Others'

This chapter aims to shed light on how Pakistani foreign policy elites have responded to the negative characterisation of Pakistan by the United States and India. It will explore the distinctive features of Pakistan's identity discourse and

examine the ways in which Pakistan's representational identity has evolved from previous iterations, while also identifying any persistent similarities in its self-projection as a responsible state. Furthermore, the chapter delves into the influence of Pakistan's representational identity on its foreign policy and vice versa.

In nutshell, the chapter seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the strategies employed by Pakistani foreign policy elites in shaping and reshaping Pakistan's representational identity, and the subsequent implications for its engagement with the international community.

Chapter 6: Pakistan's Identity as a Responsible Nuclear State and Its Nuclear Diplomacy

The present chapter aims to show that the trope of Pakistan's national identity that is; Pakistan's projection of itself as a responsible nuclear state and how this self-conception and projection shape and inform Pakistan's nuclear policy. The discourse of Pakistan's highest leaderships endeavours to project and define Pakistan as a responsible and a peaceful nuclear state. As Pakistan on the whole endeavours to construct an oppositional and antithetical identity in relation to hegemonic Indian identity, this ideational jostling of oppositional and antithetical identities is also evident in Pakistan's nuclear policy. As in other domains of identity construction Pakistan treats India as its major/ dominant 'other' and as a foil of its identity, here too in Pakistan's nuclear policy, India is projected as an expansionist, hegemonic and a revisionist state with a proven track record of aggression against Pakistan, a destabilising force that left no option for Pakistan but to find security in adoption of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a regional hegemon.

The chapter also aims to highlight that in addition to India as a dominant 'other'

vis-à-vis Pakistan's nuclear policy, the West led by the US also immensely contributes to shape and inform Pakistan's nuclear policy. In post 9/11 era Western discriminatory discourse in relation to Pakistan's nuclear programme primarily generated in Western think tanks, media and academia at the behest of US aimed to construct Pakistan's nuclear assets as unsafe, as a threat to global peace.

The narrative was padded that Pakistan's nuclear assets could fall into the hands of terrorists which could unleash nuclear Armageddon. In this context Pakistan's nuclear policy underscore the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and Pakistan's unwavering resolve to prevent nuclear terrorism or any untoward incident related to safety and security of its nuclear assets. The Chapter goes on to show as to how the Western discourse was countered by Pakistani foreign policy elites through a counter discourse/ counter identity i.e. by projecting itself as a responsible, international norm compliant state and by undertaking tangible policy measures to neutralise the discriminatory identity construction.

Chapter 7: Findings, Conclusion and Way Forward

In the last chapter a comprehensive evaluation of all the preceding chapters is made to understand the reorientation of Pakistan's identity, its dynamic and impact on foreign policy. The chapter also suggests a way forward to fully benefit from reorientation of Pakistani identity.

CHAPTER-1

National Identity and Foreign Policy: Conceptual Framework

Identities define actors by informing them as to who they are, as to what their interests are and as to how their interests are constituted by them and as to how identities can be used to predict behaviour of other social actors. At personal level, individuals ascribe certain attributes, images and meanings to themselves. This self-description aims to show how a certain individual is different from others. It also shows as to what image of the self a certain individual wants to convey to others or how others should understand him or her. When individuals interact, they always aim to maintain their distinctness and individuality (Snow, 2001, p. 4).

Notwithstanding the difference in social, personal and collective identities, they overlap and interact at many levels (Snow, 2001, p. 4). By keeping the foregoing in view, we can see that identities are always relational and constructed through the process of interaction. Similarly, identities of state are produced through interaction and participation of actors at systemic and unit level of analysis (Tidy, 2012a, p. 16). Identity of a state therefore, is also reflective of and is shaped by anarchical nature and character of international politics (Bartelson, 2001, p. 16).

The centrality of concept of identity vis-à-vis foreign policy, wars and inter-state conflicts, is an old conceptual phenomenon (paul, n.d.). Some scholars are of the view that some identities have an inherent proclivity and propensity for aggression or hostility towards other states (Kelman & Fisher, 2016). According to Mary Kaldor (2007) Foreign policy elites can justify war¹ by manipulating the politics

¹ The term “identity politics” refers to movements that mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power.

of identity. States in order to achieve a unifying national identity invent and craft a common enemy. Identity often plays a pivotal role in explaining foreign policy and it also affects the process of foreign policy (paul, n.d.).

In 1960s scholars of international relations closely studied, the role of national identities in the light of pioneering integration studies of Karl Deutsch (1956) and Ernst Haas (1964). However, in the 1980s onwards theories of identity were sidelined and theories anchored in scientific realism gained traction and prominence. Identity as an explanatory variable got neglected and marginalized due to the fact that theories based on scientific realism and rational choice models surmised that all nations have uniform national interests. (Telhami & Barnett, 2002). Over the period of years, due to dominance of positivist epistemologies, IR scholars started equating theories of identity with unscientific, biased or value laden knowledge (paul, n.d.).

However, in the post-cold war era, identity theories staged an emphatic come back and this return of identity theories to mainstream of IR is what (Lapid & Kratochwil, 1997) terms as ‘the return of culture and identity in IR theory’. However, the proverbial return of culture and identity is not marked by repetition of past theories of identity in 1960s when identity theories were essentially based on the concept of “identity politics”, which refers to struggle for power of the political movements rallied around religious, ethnic and racial identity for aiming to win political power.

Deutsch (1966) talks about inherent limits of the process of supranational integration and says that the modern nation–state is ‘still the chief political instrument for getting things done’. The prime focus of new theories of identity on the other hand lies on construction of social relations (Hosu, 2017, p. 24).

In 1950s and 1960s political movements brought impact of identity on political struggle in the limelight, it led to a growing realisation that social theory must give central importance to politics of identity. In recent past the concept of identity has been used to explain many international happenings. Although theories grounded in identity cannot claim to explain every change in external behaviour of states yet their explanatory power and salience in issue areas where politics of identity holds sway is well established.

The concept of identity like many concepts of international relations isn't beyond contestation. The contested nature of this concept has been brought home by many casestudies that points to its structural weaknesses (Katzenstein & Social Science Research Council, 1996). Semantic/ definitional differences of terms like national identity, state identity and trans- national identity are strongly contested. The contested nature of these concepts will be explored in detail later in the chapter.

Realism and constructivism assign different roles to state identity in explaining foreign policy of states. Due to the fluid and contested nature of identity, it is hard to theorise identity let alone to base ontological suppositions on it. Notwithstanding what has been said in the foregoing sentence the aim of the present chapter is to emphatically reiterate the theoretical salience of identity in increasing our understanding of foreign policy by showing as to how national identity is conceptualised, from where it originates, approaches that explain national identity formation and last but not the least to show the causal role it plays in the process of foreign policy decision making.

As mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, the study defines the term 'national identity' as a certain projection of state that foreign policy elites of a

country aim to communicate to the outside world. The study aims to show explanatory power of identity vis-à-vis foreign policy decision making. Local identities i.e. ethnic, racial and religious identities albeit important are not the focus of the study.

Firstly, the chapter begins with definition of “state” and its external behaviour. The argument of the study is based on co-constitution of national identity of Pakistan by systemic and unit level variables.

Secondly, the chapter dwells on importance of norms and its centrality vis-à-vis foreign policy decision making. Therefore, it is important to define “norms” and to show as to how norms function and how the norms are filtered and internalised by states (Albert et al., 2001).

Thirdly the chapter defines and operationalises “national identity” and expatiates upon the process that engenders national identity and describe as to how national identity can be identified. Lastly it has been delineated as to how national identity shapes foreign policy.

The theoretical framework of the study has been adopted from Adel Al Toraifi’s work titled “Understanding the role of state identity in foreign policy decision-making: the rise of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (1997-2009)”. The theoretical framework explains the causal role played by ideational and material variables in shaping the Saudi- Iranian rapprochement. It challenges the dominance of realist explanation in explaining the phenomenon of Saudi Iranian rapprochement. The theoretical framework not only aligns with the objectives of the study but it also serves as appropriate lens to theoretically explain the research questions of the present study (Al Toraifi, 2012).

1.1 Theoretical Paradigms of Foreign Policy Analysis

IR as a branch of knowledge that generally details and encapsulates external behaviour of states in international relations, in international relations, politics and state are inextricably connected with each other (Bartelson, 2001). Famous sociologist (Weber, 1994) has defined state as a “human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”, simultaneously he defined ‘politics’ as an act of “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state”.

The journey to define an identity can only be embarked upon once the features of state itself have been comprehensibly articulated. When state itself is well defined in the outset, its identity can easily be recognised.

Foreign policy has traditionally been viewed through the perspective of cost and benefit analysis of realist and power politics tradition. Traditional foreign policy analysis assumes that rationality (calculation of cost and benefits) defines thoughts and actions of political leaders and foreign policy elites in their insatiable search for the holy grail of power to ensure their control over the political environment (Rosati, n.d.). Rationality as understood by neorealist’ supposes that political actors view the world with objective accuracy and make decisions based on rational calculations. Neorealist’ assume that actors weigh cost and benefits of orderly available policy choices and only make those choices that maximise their benefits and minimise their costs. This model of rationality directs foreign policy analysts to zoom in on systemic constraints that impedes external behaviour of states and define state as a rational actor and take national interests as an objective

phenomenon of foreign policy (Rosati, n.d.).

On the contrary of what has been said in the preceding sentence, practically we do not see that foreign policy elites are automatically programmed to make rational choices since in constructivism national interest is treated as a subjective phenomenon i.e., its definition varies from person to person and definitely from state to state.

1.2 Defining State as a ‘Politico-Institutional and Politico-Territorial Entity

Academicians spar with each other regarding the definition of state in FPA literature. Much of the FPA literature bases its definition of state on the knowledge produced in the disciplines of political science and sociology, it describes state as a domestic entity. This literature mainly rests its debates on the difference between “state” and “society” at domestic level and goes on to understand mutual interaction of “state” and “society”. This difference between state and society translates to Weberian definition of state that views state and society as distinct political phenomena and where state is defined in politico-institutional terms and is equated with “central government” (Buzan, 2007). The other type of definition of state in IR treats state as a unit that exists with other identical units and the mutual interaction of these units means states (politico-territorial entity) produce international system (Buzan, 2007).

These two perspectives of state in FPA literature are important to understand the concept of national identity. The concept of the national identity can only be operationalised if we define state comprehensively by embracing both perspectives of state that is viewing state both as an inward looking and outward-looking entity

(Buzan,2007).

A broad definition of state by including both internal and external dimensions of state is necessary for complete documentation of the internal issues, dynamics of state and external behaviour of state vis-à-vis other states at systemic level (Buzan, 2007). Therefore, to comprehensively study the concept of state identity it is essential to delve deep into the nature of state to understand its local identities various internal ideologies and influence of various forms of government and the nature of its external relations with other states.

For Buzan in order to define state we need to acknowledge its three constitutive parts. Firstly, its Ideational part, a governing mechanism that ensures provision of order, welfare for all and defence from external belligerence; secondly, the institutional part that consists of the entire gamut of its elements namely its legislative, judicial and executive institutions including its governing legal and constitutional frameworks and thirdly, the physical elements of state like its population, territory, natural resources and national capital or wealth.

When it comes to elements, constitutive parts and legal and constitutional frameworks of states, all states are similar. But this leads to a question if all states are similar do, they also behave similarly? On the contrary to the foregoing assertion what we find is that despite having similar features states do not behave similarly. Though states are structurally similarly yet behaviourally they are different. From the perspective of mainstream realist theories of power politics behaviour of state is determined by their power vis-à-vis other states and international system. For constructivists behaviour of states is determined by ideas of political elites and their ideas define and structure national interests of states and their concomitant external

behaviour.

Causal insights of some of the theories in IR as articulated above give different explanations about divergences in behaviour of states. Similar level of divergence can be seen in literature of IR when it comes to determining the future of nation state in 21st century. The future of nation state in 21st century started to be viewed sceptically due to emergence, profusion and importance of non-state actors and emergence of globalisation in international system.

According to (Bartelson, 2001) “state is challenged by new forms of authority and community which transcends the inherited divide between the domestic and the international, and it will therefore ultimately be replaced by new forms of political life which know nothing of this distinction and what once followed from it”. Similarly, some of the critics’ spell doom for nation state due to withering effects of globalisation on nation state. They assert that the sovereignty of state is increasingly being corroded and eroded by powerful non-state actors like INGOs, international organisations and their legal and normative structures. They contend that nation state like tribe, the city state and empire will become a relic of past (Bartelson, 2001; Clark, 1998).

On the contrary of what has been said above, state has not only withstood the onslaught of globalisation but it emerged stronger than ever before. Therefore, understanding state becomes even more important.

Notwithstanding the abstractness of the state it still exists as the most central concept in IR (Buzan, 2007). Nothing reifies abstractness of state more than the concept of state identity. Like other distinctive markers of states’ material and intellectual resources, the concept of state identity also helps us to differentiate

states from one another. Not only the concept of identity gives a form to states but it also has an explanatory power to predict behaviour of states. Nothing makes IR a more valuable branch of knowledge than its power to predict the behaviour of states. The concept of state identity is thus a typical concept of IR due to its predictive power vis-à-vis behaviour of states.

Despite the predictive power of IR vis-à-vis behaviour of state, the concept of state is still elusive. Notwithstanding the elusiveness of the state, it is still the most important unit of international system. State as a political institution has surpassed its competitors to such an extent that it has become a universal institution of political legitimacy. Buzan avers that “In theory, the state dominates both in terms of political allegiance and authority, and in terms of its command over instruments of force”. To put it in another way state not only has administrative and coercive power over its inhabitants and territories but it also exercises absolute power and authority over its state identity (Halliday, 2015).

1.3 Explaining Foreign Policy through Realist and Constructivist Approaches

Although Foreign policy is the most commonly analysed subject in international relations yet understanding foreign policies of states is not devoid of problems. A host of actors at domestic and systemic level vie for the control over foreign policy making processes of their respective states. States take a wide array of actions ranging from declaration of wars, erection of trade barriers; to taking action or avoiding action on enforcement of environmental standards; whether to enter into international agreements and decide whether to honour those agreements or not (Lake, 2009).

Though foreign policy of a state can be understood through its foreign policy discourses and actions but these foreign policy discourses and actions do not reveal the preferences of state. Knowing the process through which preference are set and how the set preferences are then prioritised is very important to understand the factors that actually influence world politics.

Though there is no shortage of approaches that explain foreign policy but the present study will confine itself to realism and constructivism as these theories are the most dominant approaches that define foreign policy. To begin with the most dominant approach of IR and foreign policy: realism which suggests that the most significant driving forces behind foreign policy decisions are materialistic factors such as military power, economic power, and how states strive to attain as many resources as possible in order to survive in an anarchical environment.

Realists aim at identification of causal relations in variables. For realists' foreign policy is programmed by rational choice. The anarchic nature of international system programmes states to act rationally with a view to maximise their power (Griffiths, 2007). In realists IR, states compete with one another for material gains and always accept the option which is most beneficial and advantageous for them and states that do not act rationally are forced out of the system (Griffiths, 2007) (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985) avers, "State strategies are understood as having been decided rationally, after taking costs and benefits of different possible courses of action into account". In accordance with this perspective policies of states that pertain to armament and interventionist policies are the most expressive cases of foreign policy (Waltz, 1979).

For realists' foreign policy is largely determined by materialist forces of

international system. World politics can best be understood by analysing the key determinant of foreign policy: distribution of material capabilities among states (Mearsheimer, 1995).

The bedrock of neorealism is the key assumption that international politics is inherently repetitive, 'the more it changes, the more it stays the same'. The aforementioned assumption of neo-realism has been expressed most communicatively by (Waltz, 1979). "The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly". Thus, there is no possibility of change in foreign policy. To counter repetitive patterns of international politics, states continue to balance, aim for hegemony and largely avoid cooperation.

Contrary to neo-realism, constructivism challenges deterministic effect of anarchy on the conduct of states. For constructivists conduct of states can be shaped by socialisation; that work through adoption of certain norms that states consider advantageous or through internalisation of certain norms.

Constructivists assign causal role to ideational forces vis-à-vis foreign policy of states. For them foreign policy like identities and interests of states are socially constructed. Ideational factors determine foreign policy of states, on the other hand neo-realists assign causal role to material factors.

Constructivists like Finnemore and Wendt do not ignore systemic processes they talk about social construction of identities and interests through both ideational and systemic processes. Though schools of IR differ as to how to explain foreign policy but all the schools of IR are in unison when it comes to highlighting importance of explaining the conduct of states. We all know that in neo-realism (Waltz, 1979) and

in neoliberal institutionalism. (Keohane, 2005) investigating behaviour of states is the main objective. Centrality of investigating foreign policy of states also lies at the heart of many constructivists and English school theories. Even the theories (postmodernism, critical and feminists) that emerged to challenge the existing structure of social power centre their attention more often than not on critical investigation of foreign policy (Lake, 2009).

The utility of studying foreign policy cannot be overemphasised to explain, predict and anticipate behaviour and action of states. In a highly deceptive and hazy milieu of international politics with behaviour of states intentionally shrouded and wrapped in deception and enigma; studying foreign policy throws light on the darkest recesses of international politics thus bringing more certainty and clarity in relation to understanding conduct of states.

Furthermore, another feature of foreign policy analysis that endears foreign policy analysis to IR scholars is its causal approach to explaining foreign policy. Due to multiple causal factors of foreign policy that varies from country to country; attributing universal causal factors to explaining foreign policy doesn't give accurate and complete information about predicting behaviour of states. In some countries which have undemocratic and despotic political system; individuals, a group or a single party maybe the single most important causal factor that shapes foreign policy of a state. On the other hand, in democratic countries or in the countries of global North a host of actors ranging from media, interest groups, international law, domestic politics and national debates; to a name a few, shape a state's foreign policy. The nature and meanings of terms like sovereignty and national interests vary from country to country and period to period.

A host of domestic and systemic actors and factors influence and shape a state's foreign policy. Notwithstanding the foregoing, states have a considerable autonomy in making their foreign policy and this gives states more space to impose their view of foreign policy on their societies and other states (Halliday, 2005). The concept of state's independence in relation to foreign policy making affirms the argument that conduct of states is not determinately conditioned by only a host of internal political factors like despotic nature of the regime, issue of class, salience of religion, or the matrix of ethnic relationships (Halliday, 2015).

Besides realism and constructivism, a host of other approaches ranging from critical theorist and liberal peace theorists and historical sociology have attempted to investigate role of identities in foreign policy (Stets & Burke, 1996).

1.4 Agent structure Debate in Foreign Policy

Explanation of foreign policy is a contested area like so many other areas and issues in IR. Differences vis-à-vis explaining foreign policy notwithstanding, many leading scholars like Waltz (2008) Wendt (1999) have attempted to explain conduct of states through the theoretical insights of systemic theories. There are also some scholars who have given different pathways that states traverse to compete with other states. For instance, in foreign policy analysis we see that behaviour of states diverge due to distinctive identity and nature of every state (Hill, 2003).

The focus of foreign policy analysis is to study and unwrap the mutual interactions of states. It aims to analyse stated or unstated objectives that states want to achieve through interaction with other states and attempt to extract predictive and explanatory insights from their study.

States are the primary actors in FPA; the entire gamut of the governmental activities

of states that have direct or indirect bearing on outside world are part of foreign policy (Alden & Aran, 2017). The biggest contribution of FPA to IR is its focus on identification of the moments of theoretical interaction between the key causal factors in relation to conduct of state namely material and ideational factors. It is not the state where the key causal factors meet each other rather the two causal determinants of foreign policy conjoin each other in foreign policy makers (Hudson, 2007).

The approach of foreign policy analysis aims to study the decision-making processes, the domestic and international context, impact of decisions, and the decision makers that shape conduct of states' external behaviour. "FPA is necessarily concerned not only with the actors involved in the state's formal decision-making apparatus, but also with the variety of sub-national sources of influence upon state foreign policy".

Both agent centric and structure centric approaches use structural variables to explain and evaluate foreign policy but the concept and understanding of structural variables is considerably different (Wendt, 2006). Systemic theorists which ascribe causal power to international system have become reductionist in their approach by treating states as a standalone variable (Leon,2005).

All the strands of realism give causal power to international system in relation to foreign policy making. Neoclassical realism and "second image reversed" theories, that aim to show as to how the domestic structures of state are impacted by systemic factors and domestic factors alone do not shape foreign policy.

Unlike the systemic theories some theories like a new strand of institutionalism (Keohane & Martin, 2014), a new version of liberal theory (Moravcsik, 1997) and

democratic peace all attempt to downgrade or altogether dismiss causal significance of international system by pejoratively branding it as mere “abstractions”. Alternately these theorists aim to dilate on the causal factors at the micro level that influence conduct of states (*Political Philosophy and Rational Injustice: From Normative to Critical Theory*, n.d.).

The difference in the two theoretical camps has made great theoretical contribution in enriching IR theory in general and external relations of states in particular (Wight, 2006). This theoretical difference at the level of analysis and its causality vis-à-vis behaviour of states conspicuously show an important divide in methodology of IR as a discipline or in other words it shows an ontological divide. Competing ontologies are the hallmarks of politics and the study of international relations is not an exception. These ontological disputes in fact immensely contribute to richness of IR as a discipline. The competing ontologies ask competing ontological questions in relation to the essence and ethos of the objects. This theoretical and ontological jostling is known in social sciences as agent structure debate.

Salience and significance of agent structure debate has been grandly extended to all the scientific theories of social sciences by (Wendt,2006) who avers “All social scientific theories embody an at least implicit solution to the agent structure problem”. As to how international structure enables and constraints behaviour of states and as to how much power do actors have in beating and evading the constraints of international system. In international politics; structure is defined as a group of relatively immutable constraints vis-à-vis conduct of states (Hopf,1998). Constraints of international system are embodied in material structures like balance of power or international economic structures. From a constructivist perspective it is also important that how action of an actor reproduce itself and the international

system (Hopf,1998).

The agent structure debate leads to causation problem in international relations. Those IR scholars who attribute causal power to international system vis-à-vis addressing the issues and puzzles of foreign policy are confronted with a challenging question as to what material and ideational causal factors shape international system.

If we take ideational factors as a lead determinant of international system, then we need to evaluate what identity state elites and institution ascribe to themselves. Embarking on a journey to explain foreign policy ideationally we have to admit of centrality of national and international ideas embodied in norms and rules that determine foreign policy of a state.

We find many instances where certain norms are internalised by states and the states act accordingly. Unlike internalised norms, we also find examples where certain norms are imposed on states by international system/ hegemons. Instances can also be found of states that resist imposition of systemic norms². All the aforementioned scenarios stamp importance of norms in relation to explaining foreign policy (Finnemore& Sikkink, 1998a). For those who adhered to conventional explanations of foreign policy fail to explain and predict change in foreign policy particularly the identity espoused by states at a certain point of time. The approach that fully accounts for temporal conduct of states and espousal of a certain identity or that explains how focus of state has shifted on a certain strand of existing identity is: role theory (Holsti, 1970).It aims to explain foreign policy by centring its attention

² There are two types of norms: (1) regulative norms set the basic rules for standards of conduct by encouraging or prohibiting certain behaviours; (2) constitutive norms define a behaviour and assign meanings to that behaviour.

on role conceptions and norms that reproduce foreign policy (Abdelal et al., n.d.).

Constructivism does not privilege agency over structure as in realist paradigm, structure is privileged over agency. Notwithstanding the foregoing assertion, constructivists treat international relations as social relations and being social relations, international relations are inherently capable and susceptible to change. The social world does have power structures but we see that competition between agents and structure continue and at times the competition between agent and structures give birth to new realities. Constructivist challenges the realist notion of fixed interests and assumption of treating individual actors devoid of agency and treat them as puppets in the hands of structural forces.

Constructivists assign reflexivity to actors, the actors reflect on their experiences, events, happenings, and outcomes. Reflexivity of actors provide fuel to the agential power of actors. Reflection is simultaneously a product of ideas and a source of new ideas which resultantly shape behaviour of actors. Constructivism delves into the power of human consciousness and brings to light how human consciousness shapes the structural forces and as to how structures attempt to shape actors.

The power of agency alludes to the capacity of actors to act freely in line with their own preferences. The actors or the agents explicitly act to shape the social world in larger milieu of implicit structural constraints. The structural forces shape agents through the power of socialisation and this in response shapes the structural variables of social interaction. The foregoing brings to fore the co-constitution of reality by agents and structures that highlights inadequacy of reductionist approaches like realism in explaining the nuanced realities and deeper understanding of political phenomena.

Both Wendt and Finnemore believe in co-constitution of international relations. They argue that agents and structures mutually constitute each other which means structure shapes agency and vice versa. Co-constitution of international political realities admits of the role played by ideas and beliefs of actors and groups in shaping and even giving birth to new social and political structures. Wendt avers that identities and interest are not exogenously constructed.

The study does not privilege agency over structure in explaining the role of national identity in Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era. The study argues with a constructivist lens that shows co-constitution of the Pakistan's national identity by the agents and structures. Pakistan's identity construction by its significant 'others' namely the US and India provide the normative framework through which Pakistani state elites responded by constructing the alternate reality of Pakistan. If we privilege structure over agency or vice versa we miss the normative framework and agential role in understanding Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era.

1.5 The Role of Norms

The positions that individual take in any socially accepted groups can be defined as roles (Thies, 2003). Roles can also be defined as the expected behaviour deemed fit for a given identity (Fukuyama & Katzenstein, 1997). To be more exact and specific; roles mean to have a set of "repertoires of behaviour, inferred from others' expectations and one's own conceptions, selected at least partly in response to cues and demands" (Walker, 2017). In order to understand identity at the level of state we must get prepared to encounter a contentious debate due to diverse backgrounds of individuals who are yoked together in the confines of state (Buzan, 2007).

Role theory becomes an invaluable tool that offers the best model to explore the

links between identity of a state, its interests and normative change. It also acts a model to explore the normative influence of fundamental institutional structures (Griffiths, 2007). It manifests itself through regulative and constitutive actions and functions of international institutional structures. This claim is testified by the identity-based theorists who aver that if we minus constructivist norms as variable vis-à-vis explaining foreign policy of a state; understanding its actions becomes incomprehensible and unexplainable (Griffiths, 2007).

Norms play a normative role by setting rules and by sanctifying certain meanings whereby some actions of state are sanctified and some are declared as illegitimate. Identity based theorists opine that mere material constraints like balance of power alone cannot account for explaining foreign policy. We also need to understand impact and influence of international norms and practices to explain international conduct of states and their foreign policy decisions. For identity-based theorists; state, its identity and foreign policy are inseparably linked with one another (Griffiths, 2007).

To fully account for influence of identity on foreign policy and to evaluate as to how change in state identity wields causal and constitutive effects on foreign policy, we need to devise an appropriate theoretical framework. To achieve the foregoing objective, we need to focus on two key normative elements of socialisation and normative change; that can explain change in identity of a state.

1.6 Influence of the Socialisation on Change in State Identity and Foreign Policy

Types of identity range from individual level to collective level. Individuals have their own identities at personal and social level. These types of identity intersect

albeit maintaining and preserving their respective distinctness. Collective identity of a nation is embodied and encapsulated by states³. Since states themselves are abstractions sans state actors. Actually, it is a group of state actors that constructs identity of a state through its discourses, inter-subjective beliefs, policies and practices. Moreover, identities of the actors are part and parcel of the process of socialisation. The ideational structures created through the process of socialisation construct identities of the actors by defining their roles and goals in international system (Tidy, 2012a).

Since states are characterised by social actors and produce a social reality through their mutual interactions thus their identities also get socially constructed (Wendt, 2006). “States are concerned about their ontological presence, which means they need to consciously explain themselves in ways meaningful to other actors” (Wendt, 2006). A distinct ontological presence and considerations are key to provide states a reason to exist. Their ideas, values that they cherish and their perceptions of themselves and others justify their existence as states (Hermann & Hermann, 1989). In this sense state identity and foreign policy become two faces of the same coin as state identity enshrines its constructed image and both foreign policy and state identity aim to reach out to external world. Both internal and external variables determine a state’s foreign policy.

However, construction of state identity is a product of the domestic actors and institutions that act as a refining filter and as an intervening variable between both external and internal factors that attempt to construct identity of a state. In this sense,

³ Personal identities are the attributes and meanings attributed to oneself by the actor; they are self-designations and self-attributions regarded as personally distinctive. They are especially likely to be asserted during the course of interaction. Moreover, social and personal identities are different yet typically overlapping and interacting constructs; such is the relationship between collective, social, and personal identities.

“state identity refers to the state’s perception of what role it should play and what status it should enjoy in international relations” (Matsumura, 2008).

State identity like any other social phenomenon is not fixed. It changes with corresponding changes in international politics. Big events in international politics or big events that happen within a state generally lead to change in identity. A change in identity of a state is led by the elites and these attempts of the elites to change the identity of the state do not go unchallenged. There are always domestic actors who have based their own group identities on state identity which is being reconstituted. When they see the elites who embark on a journey to change identity of state they challenge it with full might as they see change in identity as a threat to their existence. Constraints vis-à-vis change in identity are not merely confined to domestic actors and their hostile opinion, a number of domestic and international constraints like dynamic international power structures, status of economy or condition of economy, technological capabilities of states all play a competing role in shaping identity of a state (Matsumura, 2008).

State identity once get established it starts defining interactions/ relations between states. It is through the prism of identity that states perceive each other as friendly, hostile or as competitors. While interacting with each other their identities are either affirmed or get threatened. The process of socialisation from the theoretical standpoint of role theory is assumed as a part of role relationship that occurs between different actors (Thies, 2003). To develop a relationship, adoption and espousal of a certain role by an actor engenders a counter role.

1.7 The Process of Normative Change

Identity of a state is displayed by the choices a nation state makes vis-à-vis adoption

of some norms while rejecting some other norms. Identities of state can be based on intra-state identities like identities based and derived from sectarian or ethnic landscape of a state or identities can also be based on identities that transcend states such as Pan-Asian, European and Pan-Islamist identities. Espousal of a certain identity by a state represents its ontological choice made in the normative debate. “Norms and beliefs operating on the role expectations and demands of relevant others refer to the regulative content of international politics, while norms and beliefs operating on an actor’s own role conceptions, or role identities, refer to the constitutive accounts of actors themselves” (Thies, 2003). Changes in norms take place through two processes known as internalisation and identification.

1.8 Internalisation

Some norms through wide exposure, repetition and dissemination in elites’ circles become a common-sense knowledge. Their value and importance are never questioned. When ingress and acceptability of some norms in a state’s discourse reach to this level, we say that these norms have been internalised and thus states automatically conform to these norms. The internalised norms wield a great influence on the conduct of states. Actions of state that are based on essence and ethos of these norms are neither questioned nor consciously followed. Rather states just conform to these norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998a).

According to **(Griffiths, et al. 2008)** norms are of two types namely regulative norms and constitutive norms. Regulative norms aim to regulate the conduct of states by setting the rules by incentivising certain behaviours and by prohibiting some behaviours. On the other hand, constitutive norms describe a certain behaviour and give meanings to it. Through the process of internalisation states endeavour to

disseminate certain norms that aligns with the priorities of their foreign policy. Through promotion of these norms, they seek to align interests of other states with their own identity and thereby they further their own interests tacitly.

Since proliferation and acceptance of internalised norms is not questioned, they do not become controversial and seldom become subject of heated political debates. These taken for granted norms are: concept of state sovereignty, human rights, self-defence, self-determination etc. Transnational proliferation of these internalised norms that have increased at rapid pace due to globalisation; make actions and conduct of so many states similar. This similarity in conduct and actions of sovereign states confuse foreign policy scholars (Wight, 2006).

The normative inclinations and proclivities of policy elites are shaped by international organisations that are further strengthened by forces of globalisation. The institutional linkages between the transnational organisations and states' bureaucracies have strengthened these linkages and made transference of these institutionalised norms easier. "Diplomatic tools such as confidence-building measures and Track II diplomacy may follow a similar logic. Generally speaking, this argument suggests that routes to normative change may be similarly indirect and evolutionary: procedural changes that create new political processes can lead to gradual and inadvertent normative, ideational, and political convergence" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998a).

Norms once acquired are also consolidated and universalised through repeated practices that ultimately become habitual part of state's actions. Proliferation, consolidation and universalisation of these norms also become a battleground as different states compete with each other to promote their own norms (Finnemore &

Sikkink, 1998a). The states may also spar over interpretations of the internalised norms to realise and further their interests.

Alexander Wendt aptly summed up the reasons that compel or impel states to adopt norms. He avers that; “It is useful to consider three reasons—degrees of internalisation—why actors may observe cultural norms: because they are forced to, because it is in their self-interest and because they perceive the norms as legitimate” (Wendt, 2006).

Thus, how far a state internalises vary from state to state both temporally and spatially. Therefore, while we set on to assess the influence of a norm on foreign policy of a state, we must take into account its relative strength at national and international level (Goertz & Diehl, 1992).

1.9 Identification

Norms embody a prescribed behaviour. As we know that norms aim to both define and regulate state behaviour. When a state or international ideational entrepreneurs promote a certain norm, they express their approval and acceptance of the behaviour that the norm being promoted prescribe for other actors. Moreover, “identification runs on a continuum from negative to positive, from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self. It also varies by issue and time” (Wendt, 2006).

It is the power of identification that defines and determines as to how borders and frontiers of the self should be drawn vis-à-vis other state. If states do not positively identify with each other their interests will not be positively defined in relation to each other. The negative identification with a state will be exploited only

to gratify the positive image of the self (Wendt, 2006).

In case of positive identification with other states empathy and respect for the other actor develop and impact relations between states. Application of an array of diplomatic tools such as CBMs etc. in dealing with a state shows positive identification. On the other hand, when behaviour of states in relation to each other gets threatening and hostile; it exemplifies negative identification (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998a).

1.10 Problematisation of Identity as a Variable

When we admit that international norms influence identity of states, do we also believe that due to common international norms; states have similar identities. The answer is in negative; we know that notwithstanding existence of international norms, states have ideational differences among them.

Identity of a state neither at domestic level nor at international level is free from contestations. With contestation of identity at both levels of analysis, things get even fuzzier as the question arises as to whose identity hold sway in this ideational contestation. Though it is commonly believed that the dominant identity can superimpose its version on other identities yet it remains elusive as to how and as to what extent the dominant identities shape other identities.

Notwithstanding Wendtian (Wendt, 2006) admittance of the centrality of identity vis-à-vis understanding behaviour of a state; the theoretical tradition of constructivism lacks a unanimous model of identity. Constructivists have not been able to unanimously and conclusively decide as to how identities are constituted to begin with, as to how domestic and interactional structures co-constitute identity

and as to how it define and measure identity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998a).

In his coauthored work (Abdelal et al., n.d.) enquired, “If identity is a key variable explaining political, economic and social behaviour, how does it vary, why does it vary, and how would one know variation if one saw it?” The authors of the aforementioned work analysed around six hundred identity-based articles of social science and found out two elements of social identity i.e. “content” and “contestation” (Abdelal et al., n.d.). The term content embodies norms that shape identity, comparison with the defined others, social aim and cognitive models whereas the term “Contestation” aims to makes us analyse whether there is intra-group agreement on the “content” of identity or not.

They also posed a question on chronological dimension of formation of identity and its expressions. A vast majority of IR scholars are of the view that the concept of identity is relatively stable and immutable. If we agree with them on this, we might miss out on utilisation of a very handy tool (identity) for understanding foreign policy. It is empirically known that identities are formed over a greater length of time and also remain unchanged for years correspondingly. Notwithstanding, the foregoing assertion; identity of a state does get changed especially due to political upheavals etc. To align with the dictates and exigencies of changing world; identity has to remain flexible.

To fully account for utility of identity vis-à-vis conduct of state and its empirical value; we are fortunate to have the concept of corporate identity, the model of which can be used to strengthen the empirical utility of identity.

1.11 Utility of the Model of Corporate Identity for Understanding Identity of a State

As states populate international political system similarly international economic system is largely occupied by corporations. Over the years due to a rapid increase in number of global and local corporations' interest of the academicians and practitioners have increased in the concept of corporate identity.

Though great work has been carried out to define, to identify and to understand the concept of national identity yet it lacks definitive and exhaustive theorising. As states exist in a highly competitive world where they aim to survive in an anarchical world. Similarly, corporations aim to survive in a highly competitive system of market economy. Corporations adopt multiple strategies ranging from material and ideational strategies.

One of the ideational strategies used by the corporations to maintain their individuality is to develop and manage their corporate image (identity). The concept of corporate identity has been aptly defined as “the organisation’s presentation of itself to its various stakeholders and the means by which it distinguishes itself from all other organisations” (Markwick & Fill, 1997).

Importance of corporate identity can be gauged from the fact that it is widely recognised as a strategic asset and an invaluable mean to secure competitive advantage over its competitors. A distinctive and popular identity of a corporation motivates its human resource, enhance and inspire confidence of all the stakeholders in the worth of the company (Melewar & Jenkins, 2002).

Similarity between corporations and states is not merely confined to their centrality as actors vis-à-vis their respective systems, rather we see that states like

corporations are equally aware of importance of identity for maintaining their ideational distinction in a highly integrated world. Needless to say, that some scholars of IR rightly affix the concept of corporate identity on state and postulates that state construct itself from its identity which serves as some ontological priori (Mielniczuk, 2020).

Alexander Wendt (Wendt, 2006) contends that identity acts as an independent variable that defines interests of states and resultantly it's practices and policies. He goes on to distinguish between identity of a state which is constructed by its foreign policy elites after incorporating its unique material and ideational attributes and its social identity; which is constructed by other social actors. The identity which is constructed by other social actors is based on their perceptions and lenses with which they view a state. Wendt gives more importance to the process of structuration in constructing identity of a state than to construction of identity of a state by its own foreign policy elites. A system of international institutions stamp legitimacy on states and states through their actions reproduce international institutions. By excluding the role of other actors except those actors who work at systemic level he pushes us to take a narrow and immutable view of identity (Price & Reus - Smit, 1998).

Numerous studies on corporate identity in early 1990s lead to theorisation of state identity as a distinct concept. A host of theorists like (Lynch, 1998; Chafetz et al., 1998 and Telhami & Barnett, 2002) attempted to theorise state identity. One of the theorists has aptly defined state identity as “the set of beliefs about the nature and purpose of the state expressed in public articulations of state actions and ideals” (Lynch, 1998).

Through the concept of state identity, a state defines its duties, rights and responsibilities at systemic level and also define other actors by constructing their state identity in relations to identities of other social actors (Demitras-Coskun, 2008). As things are known through their opposites that tell how they are different from others or how others are different from the self. Construction of state identity is always a relational exercise where self is defined in relation to other actors. The purpose could range from aiming to show how a state is different from other actors or conversely how a state is like other states (Chafetz et al., 1998). Other theorists like (Telhami & Barnett, 2002) has attempted to define state identity “as the corporate and officially demarcated identity linked to the state apparatus”. By state we mean the political apparatus of the state that has complete monopoly over the use of force in a state and does not include other social actors (Smith et al., 2012).

In the present study the term national identity relates to role conception of a state by its foreign policy elites i.e., to define its role at international level and to inform itself regarding its international standing and status. Foreign policy elites of a country decide as to what the role of the state should be at international level after factoring in its constraints at domestic level i.e., economic health of a country, its hard power and power of public opinion by naming a few constraints at domestic level (Matsumura, 2008).

Constraints do not exist only at domestic level rather there are also constraints at systemic level that have an impact on formation of state identity. Thus, we see that identity of a state is constituted by adjusting to domestic and systemic constraints. The identity that states choose for themselves make some states as their natural partners and friends and others as their natural foes, foils and adversaries. Thus, identity of a state by defining a state as to what it is in relation to other actors define

foreign policy of state.

The best theory to explain relationship between identity of a state and its foreign policy is role theory. Scholars of IR who have attempted to study as to how identities are formed; generally, give preference to roles and role identities (Wendt, 2006; Thies, 2003). It is said that the “concept of “role” should be a key concept in structural theorising about the international system” (Wendt, 2006). Identities created through conception of roles; show internalisation of status of some state vis-à-vis existing systemic and unit level role relationships (Thies, 2003). Hence the best available conceptual tool to know as to how identity of state and materialistic factors impact and shape its foreign policy is the role conception.

1.12 Operationalisation and Customisation of National Identity

A group of people who share a common homeland, myths, memories; are bound by rights and duties in relation to each other and also have and cherish distinctive markers that set them apart from others (Telhami & Barnett, 2002). As nation itself is a construct based on some material realities. Similarly, the concept that defines its identity is also constructed by the material and ideational factors. A host of powerful actors in every nation shapes their national identities over a period of time by defining collective character and shared will of a state (Toffolo, 2003a).

Toffolo goes on to contend (Toffolo, 2003b) that it is important to operationalise the concept of national identity so as to distinguish it from the general concept of national identity for greater conceptual clarity. Generally, the concept of national identity includes all the domestic features of a nation state ranging from description

of its ethnicities, languages, dress and collective social and political values.

On the other hand, Identity of a state entails a set of meaning and description that its state elites aim to convey to international community. This customised conception of national identity meant only for the consumption of international community largely determine as to how its foreign policy is oriented. This statist facet of national identity has been operationalised and espoused by the present study.

Self-designation of a state as a “revolutionary” or “non-aligned” in the days of cold war had a bearing on conduct of a country relations vis-à-vis the US and the USSR. In post-cold war era when states are ideationally categorised as “liberal” and “democratic” it shapes their foreign policy towards other states (Toffolo, 2003b). Furthermore, the domestic variant of national identity reflects only domestic markers and is only determined by internal actors whereas external variant of national identity is also co-defined and co-constituted by external players that are; both states and international organisations. These external players brand other states as “evil states”, “outlaw states” or “terrorist states” etc. to realise their foreign policy objectives (Tidy, 2012a).

National identity of a state includes complete variants of its identity in its fold. There can be many facets, features and components of a state’s identity like a state can simultaneously aspire to showcase itself as a revolutionary and a nationalistic entity (Tidy, 2012a). Both variants of identities namely internal variant (national identity) and external variant of national identity (state identity) despite their different targeted audience remain closely related to each other (Matsumura, 2008).

The distinction between these external and internal identity is of paramount

importance to ensure conceptual clarity and theoretical rigour of the study. As state identity is different from national identity both in terms of its focus, direction and constitution similarly, state identity is different from political regimes. Political regimes only aim to maintain political power of a leader or a party in a domestic setting and has nothing to deal with external policy of a state (Matsumura, 2008).

In a nutshell, it can be said that internal identity of a state encapsulates all the internal facets, features and shared memories, shared values, of a state deemed important by national elites that can be harnessed to achieve national unity and cohesion. On other hand external identity guides and steers a nation's direction vis-à-vis its relationship with other states, its status and its position in comity of nations.

1.13 How is Foreign Policy Shaped by State Identity and Vice Versa?

(McSweeney, 1984) elucidates the causal power of state identity as, “The “I”, or subject, who formulates preferences, wants, interests, is linguistically placed prior to the action of satisfying them. What kind of entity ‘I am’ is made to determine what kind of wants I have? What we want follows from who we are”.

State identity shapes foreign policy orientations of a state by making certain policy options as natural and logical (Campbell, 1998a) contends that states through their foreign policy practices either acquire their new identities or preserve past identities of states. Establishing foreign relations with other nations give an opportunity to states to get international legitimacy and get economic benefits. Leaders in the process of policymaking use state identity as a guide to achieve the goals of their foreign policy (Demitras-Coskun, 2008).

In his celebrated work, 'Writing Security', (Campbell, 1998a) challenged the practice of linking foreign policy with national interests. This method was then the most popular method used to analyse foreign policy. Campbell avers that foreign policy practices of states engenderers a dynamic concept of identity which is constructed to deal with external threats, his approach directly challenged the old method which treated identity as static (Hosu, 2017).

States inescapably acquire identities by virtue of their existence. Discursive domain of identity becomes a "site in which political struggles are enacted" (Campbell, 1998a). David Campbell avers that there are two aspects of foreign policy, namely foreign policy as representational practice and conventional foreign policy. Representational foreign policy helps to differentiate self from others. In the traditional aspect of foreign policy identities are taken for granted. It is assumed that their boundaries pertaining to identity have already been drawn and achieved. Both traditional and representational aspects of foreign policy vindicate salience of foreign policy in relation to existence of state as an ideational construct. It is assumed that foreign policy is a vital tool to ensure distinction between "us and them". The construction of self in relation to the declared other or others; a form of exclusive identity is promoted and perpetuated in the sovereign states out of which it has grown (Campbell, 1998a).

There is an interesting debate in relation to centrality of the role of identity in foreign policy. The moot question in this regard is to know what comes first foreign policy or state? According to traditionalists state comes first. However, David Campbell challenges this proposition and contends that state identity comes prior to engagement of a state in international system. He goes on to say that states are dynamic construct subject to the process of continual change and transformation

(Campbell, 1998a).

State identity is inherent to formation of state and it is a dynamic concept. Its dynamic character is determined by the policies of the state. Campbell contends that a state's response to danger mainly determines its state identity. He avers that "The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility" (Campbell, 1998a). State identity is also shaped by the external adversaries as well as friendly states (Hosu, 2017).

1.14 The Matrix of State Identity and Foreign Policy

According to the model proposed by (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998a) State identity plays a major role in influencing foreign policy. In fact, both foreign policy and state identity co-constitute each other. External happenings shape foreign policy which in turn forces foreign policy elites of states to adjust their state identities and give appropriate foreign policy responses in the light of these happenings. The dynamics of international system resultantly make identity a dynamic concept whereby state elites act as an intervening variable to mediate between international happenings and construction of identity at state level.

Moreover, international organisations through norms, rules, incentives, inducements and their coercive actions forces state elites to adjust and review their state identities. Foreign policy elites cannot afford to ignore the directions of international institutions and organisations as adherence to their policies, rules and frameworks give legitimacy to states. In the light of foregoing discussion, it can be said that external happenings and direct involvement of foreign actors in states pushes foreign policy elites to redefine and reset their identities.

As it has been said earlier that both foreign policy and state identity co-constitute each other. Firstly, according to Saideman (2002) state identity can be used as a tool to win support of other states or it can be used to attenuate opposition, like Pakistan has used its Islamic identity to cement its relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Secondly, State identity can act as a constraint on behaviour of states and their strategic thinking. Thirdly, state identity can be used to justify or legitimise actions of states. Fourthly, it can be used to stabilise other countries.

Like any other explanatory tool, the explanatory tool of state identity is contested. Firstly, for some identity based theorists' identity plays a causal role, secondly, for some it acts as an intervening variable between international system and unit level and thirdly, for some other theorists it plays both causal and constitutive roles in shaping foreign policy of states (Telhami & Barnett, 2002).

The dissertation has espoused the third explanation offered by (Telhami & Barnett, 2002). It ascribes both causal and constitutive power to identity vis-à-vis foreign policy.

This explanation provides most accurate and appropriate lens to evaluate role of identity in foreign policy of Pakistan in post 9/11 era. The cataclysmic event of 9/11 and the ideational literature produced in the US and India constructed Pakistan's identity negatively. The negative external construction of Pakistan's identity forced Pakistan's foreign policy elites to redefine its old identity in acceptable terms to preserve its ontological presence in the face of ideational onslaught unleashed by its significant others.

How Pakistan's national identity is constructed externally alone does not completely account for formation of its state identity in post 9/11 era. Only external

pressure hasn't forced Pakistan foreign policy elites to redefine their national identity rather the state elites internalised international norms and reviewed their past practices, inadequacies and failures of their old identity narratives in satisfying the ontological needs of the state in the new political context.

Moreover, the state elites internalised international norms like democratic values, pluralist thinking, freedom of speech, religious freedom, women rights and women empowerment etc.

In Pakistan's post 9//1 identity all the internalised norms are incorporated. Therefore, Pakistan's identity has constituted its foreign policy and its foreign policy is also shaped by external actors.

According to (Alons, 2007) foreign policy is subject to both domestic level and system level constraints. Both types of constraints dominate foreign policy making relative to their power. There are some scholars who privilege external constraints over domestic constraints in relation to foreign policy making. They contend that power of domestic constraints is limited due to fragmented nature of domestic politics.

Mandelbaum (1988) avers domestic politics "have particular influence on foreign policy when they are acute, when a government is unstable, and when the legitimacy of a regime itself is in dispute." He goes on to say foreign policy of a state is "determined totally by its position in the [international] system" the gaps are filled by domestic constraints.

Scholars who ascribe causal power to domestic constraints vis-à-vis foreign policy decision making aver that since foreign policy decisions are made by the political elites who are in one way or the other answerable to domestic stakeholders.

However, in the democratic countries domestic constraints play a more dominant role in influencing foreign policy decision making whereas in dictatorial systems domestic constraints comparatively play little role in shaping foreign policy decision making of their country.

Despite admittance of the causal influence of domestic constraints on foreign policy decision making, there is no consensus among the scholars as to what extent domestic constraints influence foreign policy decision making. Even there are competing explanations of “domestic politics”. The competing explanations in relation to domestic politics are aptly elucidated by (Fearon, 1998), he contends that “what counts as a domestic-political explanation is defined by opposition to systemic or structural explanations.” He says the term domestic politics has often been mentioned in explaining the process of foreign policy decision making but it has not been properly elucidated. He spelled out two variants of domestic politics in relation to foreign policy decision making. Each of these variants of domestic politics gives a different concept of unit level explanation. He says “If a systemic IR theory pictures states as unitary, rational actor, then a domestic-political explanation is one in which domestic-political interactions in at least one state yields a suboptimal foreign policy relative to some normative standard. Or, if a systemic IR theory pictures states as unitary, rational actors and also requires that attributes of particular states not enter the explanation, then a domestic-political explanation is any one that involves state characteristics other than relative power”.

Jeanne A. Hey's edited work “Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour” sheds great light on foreign policy processes of small powers. The work challenged the dominant proposition in IR which treats small powers as only dependents and asserts that the foreign policy of small states is solely

determined by international system. The book contents that small powers do have the domestic political system that influence their foreign policy. They do have active and proactive foreign policy decision making processes and do not merely have “passive and reactive” and hence dance to the tunes of international system (Hey, 2003).

The aforementioned work is of great salience and relevance for evaluation of the role of Pakistan’s identity in its foreign policy. The empirical evidence and the theoretical insights of the work show that Pakistan’s identity has not been merely constructed by the external actors rather it is co-constituted at both systemic and unit levels.

Innenpolitik theories, emphasises causal power of domestic variable in relation to foreign policy making. Both variants of neo-realist theory that are “Offensive realism” and “Defensive realism” give causal power to systemic variables. Whereby the “offensive realism” give dominant role to system level variables and “Defensive realism” take softer stance by not ascribing all-encompassing and overarching power to systemic factors.

Unlike neo-realism "neoclassical realism" include both external and internal variables in explaining foreign policy of a state. Adherents of this theory contends that foreign policy of a country is dictated by its position in international system and by its relative material capabilities. What sets it apart from classical realism and neo-realism is its admittance of domestic variables as intervening variables. They contend that relative power of a state and its relative position in international system is mediated by the perceptions of the political elite, “the neoclassical realists believe, understanding the links between power and policy requires close

examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented” (Giddens, 2009).

Hermann and Hermann in their seminal study empirically prove impact of domestic power structures on external behaviour of states. They developed a model to analyse domestic power structures of twenty-five states stretched over a period of a decade. They found out that where the decision process was dominated by the leader or by a few, such nations tend to behave more aggressively at international level (Hermann & Hermann, 1989).

Putnam developed a “two level game” model to explain external behaviour of states. He avers that a leader before making any foreign policy decision has to simultaneously take unit level and system level variable into account (Putnam, 1988).

Role of public opinion in determining foreign policy of a state is mediated by its political system and domestic processes. In liberal democracies public opinion play a more dominant role than in dictatorial and autocratic system (Risse-Kappen, 1991).

By keeping the foregoing discussion in view, it seems plausible to assume that by only ascribing causal power to one determinant of foreign policy we will not be able to fully understand change in foreign policy and account for external behaviour of states. Since foreign policy decision making is a complex process reducing to only one variable will grossly compromise the possibility of accurate analysis of foreign policy.

If we rely on neo-realism to explain Pakistan’s foreign policy and start believing

that US coerced Pakistan into submission, then we expect this relationship to be a transient phenomenon. On the contrary we see that the public by and large acquiesced to Pakistan siding with the US due to discursive strategies employed by Pakistani elites to justify Pakistan's alliance with the US as the elite discourses successfully attempted to show that it is consistent with superstructures of Pakistani identity. The superstructures admitted of the liberality of interpretation. The malleability and diversity of Islamic superstructure allowed space to the elites to chart Pakistan's foreign policy in the new political context. Had the Islamic superstructure of identity been rigid, the elites would have been trapped in its confines.

Neo realism fail to bring to fore the role played by assumption, principles, values and their constitutive impact on state policy. Nazya Fiaz quotes Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri, Pakistan's ex-foreign minister when he avers that the decision of Pakistan to side with the US in the war against terror was not dictated by US coercive diplomacy as some have attempted to imply. The decision was in sync with Pakistan's past policies, values and principles (Fiaz,2010).

A country envisioned by Sir Syed and Iqbal and led by Jinnah and by pragmatists like Ayub, Bhutto, trailblazing Benazir Bhutto and steered by Westernised elites was not expected to side with retrogressive politics of Taliban.

Pakistan's historic cultural connections with the West has deep rooted impact on Pakistani society and state, Pakistan relationship with the West is rooted in Anglo Indian traditions that graduated into new forms during cold war and the war against terror. Keeping the historic connection between Pakistan and the West in general and the US in particular it was nigh impossible for Pakistan not to side with the US

given the ideological leeway granted by the Islamic superstructure.

If we solely rely on realist theory, we miss as to how the state attempted to structurally reorient Pakistani state through its performative discourses and by introducing reforms in education and political systems. If we rely on neo-realism to explain Pakistan foreign policy, we fail to account for discursive strategy Pakistani leadership employed to construct identity of the state that has had an abiding impact on Pakistan's foreign policy.

Realist paradigm has been mostly used to explain Pakistan's alliance with the US in the war against terror, by using constructivism as a theory we have been able to understand as to how the relationship was constructed by different actors. It was not just the dictates of US power which forced Pakistan to side with the US. Pakistan in its past has always been more than ready to side with the West, Pakistan's alliance with the US during cold war is a case in point.

If we only rely on material explanations, we miss out the discursive formation of Pakistan's response and its performative discourses which have survived the US withdrawal from the region. The extensive data used in the study testifies to the fact that Pakistan's foreign policy elites institutionalised the discursive strategies through political and other social institution.

Should we use realist variables to study role of identity in Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era we come to see that Pakistan's response was fixed and mechanical it was coerced to comply with the dictates of the hegemon, the US. The realist theory assigns all agency to international structure and deprive Pakistan of any agency.

If we only rely on realist principles to explain Pakistan's foreign policy we fail to account for the role of international socialisation of Pakistan through norms, we also fail to see how Pakistani state internalised international norms.

Nazya Fiaz takes exception to predominance of neo-realist paradigm in explaining Pakistan's post 9/11 foreign policy. She says plethora of literature produced in post 9/11 era unproblematically reduce Pakistan's response to US foreign policy as a product of deterministic logic of US' hegemonic power. She contends that Pak US relations in post 9/11 era were shaped by the social structure and the discourse generated by the political elites (Fiaz, 2010).

Keeping the foregoing in view, the study considers it necessary to study the discursive powers of both external and internal actors in relation to both foreign policy and formation of state identity. "State identities may be the product of a complex interplay between international and domestic discourses, producing some identities that are more stable than others" (Neumann, n.d.; Klotz & Lynch, 2007).

1.15 Utility of State Identity as an Explanatory Tool in Relation to External Behaviour of States

After going through literature, it can be safely said that identity is influenced by both domestic and external factors. Another question which is equally if not more important is to know as to how and how far state identity as a concept shapes foreign policy of states.

We do not find consistent examples with regard to influence of state identity on foreign policy of state. In the cold war era both China and USSR shared communist identities but their shared identities didn't bring them closer. On the other hand, in

1970s the US and China despite being ideologically polar opposites got closer to each other (Abdelalet al., n.d.).

Similarly, Iraq under Ba’thist rule (1968–2003) contrary to its identity as a promoter and defender of Arab nationalism invaded Kuwait (Mufti, 1996). Another example that shows that foreign policy of a state does not always correspond with its avowed state identity is the US. It claims to be a champion of human rights and democracy but it has invaded more countries than any other country.

The reason behind this apparent contradiction between the professed identity and external actions which are inconsistent with it are due to state’s obsession of its survival in the anarchical international system. When the very survival of states is at stakes nations don’t hesitate to sacrifice its lofty ideals and principles enshrined in its identities at the altar of survival strategies. Mearsheimer contends (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007) that “Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters relatively little for how it acts towards other states. Nor does it matter much who is in charge of conducting a state’s foreign policy”.

Does the inconsistent behaviour of states vis-à-vis its state identities mean that the concept of state identity has little or no impact on external behaviour of states? To come to this conclusion would deprive us from utilising a valuable tool in understanding the complex matrix of foreign policy decision making. The relevance and usefulness of identity as a concept in relation to foreign policy can be reestablished through the examples where we see that when nation states apparently act against their proclaimed identities, they justify their external actions through their identities. US declared that it invaded Iraq to spread democracy. The US justifies many of its invasions and foreign policy behaviour on the names of

international norms and the values it cherishes as a nation state.

An interesting point to make here is that smaller countries or weaker countries tend to more religiously follow their state identities through their foreign policy actions. A case in point is Pakistan. Islamic identity is one of the most dominant strands of its national identity. Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world can largely be explained through its state identity. Pakistan's denial to recognise Israel can also be attributed to its Islamic identity. If Pakistan recognises Israel, it can harvest immense political and economic benefits. Political and economic benefits that can result in recognition of Israel notwithstanding its entrenched Islamic identity doesn't permit it to go against its state identity.

Another example which testifies to explanatory power of identity vis-à-vis foreign policy decision making is non-aligned identity of India in 60s and 70s. It largely remained neutral in the cold war despite being main recipient of Soviet aid and weaponry. Another case in point where we see that nations states adhered to its proclaimed identities are the Nordic countries and Switzerland. The Nordic countries and Switzerland have state identities which are based on the principles of neutrality, welfare of citizenry, arbitration and alleviation of global poverty. These countries consistently adhere to their state identities.

The foregoing in view, we can safely surmise that the lens of identity like other variables does not absolutely account for understanding and explaining behaviour of state but it is relevant in most cases than not with regard to conduct of the state.

Conclusion

Nation states first and foremost are a set of coherent ideas, that are objectified later

through the elements of a state. Thus, both material and ideational characteristics make them up. Any theory that focuses on only one dimension of state's character cannot fully explain and understand the entire gamut of state's foreign policy behaviour. For these theorists international Politics is repetitive and there is no theoretical provision in these theories to account for dramatic change in external relations of state. These theorists take state as a rational actor that always weigh costs and benefits of the available policy options and only espouse the policies where benefits outweigh the costs. This rationality of states can be empirically proven by espousing positivist epistemologies. Materialist theorists like neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are the predominant theories that attempt to empirically explain behaviour of states.

On the other hand, non-materialist theories like constructivism assign causal power to ideational factors in relation to foreign policy decision making. In the dissertation formation of national identity and its impact on foreign policy have been viewed through the lens of constructivism. In the theoretical framework national identity has been defined and operationalised. It has been elucidated that national identity is a dynamic concept. It is not fixed. Foreign policy elites based on ever changing realities of international politics continue to adjust it to changing international circumstances.

It has two definitional variants namely the external variant of state identity also known as state identity and internal variant of identity known as domestic identity or national identity which reflects the domestic ideational and materialists features of a state.

The external variant of national identity is based on the role assigned to a state by

its political elites and external forces. This variant of identity is only meant for consumption of international audience. As corporations advance and promote their corporate identities to survive and thrive in the competitive world of market economy similarly nation states form their state identity to set themselves apart from others especially from their competitors. They define their identity in relation to their rivals and competitors.

The ideational branding of self as good; the rivals and competitors as bad are part of ideational battle that characterises international politics. Nation states do not just brand themselves independently at domestic level rather they are also branded by the international actors including states, academia, media, study centres, intellectuals and international organisations. International actors through various means like knowledge production, norms, socialisation, incentives, inducements and coercive policies aim to change identity of the states.

Hence it has been stated that both national and international forces shape identity of a state. It is not correct to only assign causal power to either domestic factors or international factors in relation to formation of state identity.

In the theoretical framework the effectiveness of the concept of identity in relation to foreign policy has been theoretically evaluated in detail. It has come to fore that there are some instances where states acted in contravention of their professed and declared identities. But this limitation of the state identity as an explanatory tool vis-à-vis foreign policy decision making is countered through many counter examples where state identity did play a predictive and causal role in explaining foreign policy.

CHAPTER-2

The Genesis of Pakistan's National Identity

Before we go on to evaluate reconstruction of Pakistan's national identity and as to how it impacts and get impacted by its foreign policy in post 9/11 era; it is pertinent to historically analyse formation of Pakistan's identity and how it impacted the political dynamics of pre-independence days, independence movement and the period leading up to 9/11 era.

The pre-independence history of Pakistan is illustrative in explaining the salience of Pakistan's post-independence identity. The historical overview of Pakistan's pre-independence history is also instructive in the sense that it tells us as to how Indian Muslims view themselves and their foils i.e. Hindus and the British against whom they constructed their identity and as to how their counter foil: Hindus constructed their identity in opposition to identity of Indian Muslims.

The Indian Muslims constructed their identity against three ideational foils namely the Hindus, the British and their own glorious past. The pertinence of the pre-independence identity is increased when we weigh its causal impact on freedom struggle. It testifies to one of the arguments of the thesis i.e., identity is socially constructed and that it has causal and constitutive effect on behaviour of actors.

The chapter aims to historically highlight salience of ideational factors that contributed to creation of Pakistan and maintenance of a socially constructed identity in the pre-independence era leading up to 1947. The history of Pakistan's

freedom struggle vouches for constitutive and causal power of ideational forces in shaping material political realities and thus validating the causality of ideational factors vis-à-vis affairs of a state. Historical instances explored in this chapter offer a historical link that substantiates the role played by identity in shaping Pakistan's foreign relations in its subsequent history. Moreover, the historical overview given in the chapter illustrates that identity is relational in nature, is socially constructed by unit and system level variables.

2.1 Background

It is assumed that states are mere abstractions sans social actors. These social actors give embodiment to the construct of a state. Identity of a state is constructed by a host of actors at domestic and international level through their discourses, inter subjective beliefs, policies and practices. The ideational structures created through the process of socialisation construct identities of the actors by defining their roles and goals in international system (Tidy, 2012a).

In the sub-continent, there were three main actors namely Muslims, Hindus and the British. Muslim identity in pre-independence era was constructed in relation to three defined others or binaries i.e. the Hindus, the British and the glorious past of the Muslims. A distinct identity was constructed to fill the void created by the ontological insecurities in relation to the aforementioned foils of the identity. All the foils against whom the identity of the Indian Muslims was constructed were so dominant that it resulted into ontological insecurities for the Indian Muslims. The Indian Muslims had to sail against the all-powerful identities i.e. majoritarian Hindu, the commanding and the politically dominant British and last but not the least against their own erstwhile glorious past identity.

The social interaction between the Hindus and Muslims had influenced both the communities. Many social influences of Hindu society crept into the culture of Indian Muslims and vice versa. Since the Arab conquest of Sind; a large part of subcontinent remained under the Muslim rule, some Muslim rulers like Akbar attempted to assimilate Islamic culture with the Hindu culture for the sake of political expediency. The cultural assimilation between the Hindus and Muslims was bound to happen since both the communities were living together and this mutuality of cultural influences was boosted, promoted by the political elites. This cultural assimilation between the two communities was deemed detrimental to the purity, sanctity and immutability of Muslim belief system. Some religious leaders vehemently opposed ingress of Hindu influence in Muslim society and embarked upon a mission to rid Muslim culture and society of the Hindu influences.

2.2 Ontological Security and Identity

The concept of ontological security which has mainly been enriched and expounded by Giddens is based on the premise that states are as much concerned about the security of their consistent self as they are concerned about their material and physical security. States may go on to sacrifice their material security for the sake of their ontological security (identity) which informs as to who they are (Wendt, 2006). States in order to make their interaction predictable and routinised, aspire to have orderly, consistent and secure interaction with others (Mcsweeney, 1996). "It is through these routinised relationships with their significant others that states construct their identities" (Mitzen, 2006).

Importance of physical security for states notwithstanding, fulfillment of ontological security satisfies self-identity needs of a state. Fulfillment of a state's

ontological security not only affirms materiality of a state but it also tells us as to how a state see itself and as to how it wants to be viewed by others. For maintenance of a consistent narration of self, states need a narrative which enlivens and revives the routinised foreign behaviour of a state. States consistently attempt to ensure congruence of the narrative with their self-image. If they find dissonance between the narrative and the self-image, states establish a routinised behaviour again to maintain their consistent self-identity (Steele, 2007).

Indian Muslim despite having successive periods of suzerainty over subcontinent i.e. Arab conquest of Sind, conquests by Persian and Afghan rulers and last but not the least by the Mughals; Indian Muslims remained keen to not only showcase the richness of their civilization but also zealously strived to guard their Muslim identity in the deluge of Hindu majority. Maintenance of civilizational identity has been a prime concern for the Indian Muslims. In the official narrative of Pakistani state, the creation of the country is attributed to the 'two nation theory'. According to the theory "Indian Muslims were always a distinct community that had resisted assimilation into the subcontinent's predominantly Hindu culture (Jalal, 2014). The quest to preserve and maintain their identity vis-à-vis the Hindu majority can be summed up in the intellectual streams namely the syncretic, the purists and the pro-Western stream of intellectuals in the colonial era.

Insecurities of Indian Muslims as a minority vis-à-vis their significant others namely, Hindus, the British and their own past went on to define their identity in the colonial era. Once they realised their ontological insecurities, they zealously embarked upon a journey to convert their insecurities into securities through a coherent and articulate articulation of the self. In the succeeding section of the chapter the study will attempt to highlight as to how the Indian Muslims strived to

transform their ontological insecurities into ontological security to realise their political objectives.

2.3 Ideology of Pakistan

The issue of identity lay at the heart of Pakistan's independence movement. It won't be an overstatement to say that preservation of distinct character/status of Indian Muslims was the *raison d'être* of the independence movement. The idea of Pakistan in fact germinated from the identity politics. The politics of identity then morphed into a well-articulated ideology. The creation of Pakistan was based on an ideology. It is believed that two societies, two cultures and two civilizations came into being the moment Muslims arrived in sub-continent.

2.3.1 Progenitors of Two Nation Theory

Indian Muslim religious elites were fully mindful and cognisant of the fact that Indian Muslims being a religious minority perpetually remain at the risk of losing their individuality and distinct identity because they remain constantly exposed to subtle cultural and social influences of a majority which is well entrenched in its religious and social traditions. The Muslim religious elites remained vigilant to ensure that Islamic doctrine is not diluted with un-Islamic beliefs and practices. The ulema consistently worked for realisation of three cognate goals of preserving the purity of the Islamic teachings, preservation of the Muslim community and strengthening of the Muslim Empire (Qureshi, 1998).

Against the religious heterodoxy of Akbar (1556-1605) which culminated in his announcement of a syncretic religion named *Din-i-Ilahi* in 1582 and his admittance of Hindu practices in his court on the basis of political expediency and last but not

the least the heterodoxy of the Muslim Sufis.

The celebrated Islamic Scholar Sheikh Mujaddid Alif Sānī took up the cudgel to defend the purity of Islamic creed by scholarly challenging the heretical religious innovations of Akbar's syncretic religion. He exhorted Indian Muslims to revert to the purity of Muslim doctrines, beliefs and practices by shunning the heretical practices and customs. He was able to enlist noted nobles of Akbar and Jahangir's time into his discipleship and was able to persuade them to not accept any order which is repugnant to Islamic injunctions. He also worked hard to reconcile the differences between the orthodox religious scholars and the Sufis who have imbibed syncretic tendencies in their religious practices.

After him Shāh WalīUllāh Muḥaddith Dehlavī came forward to defend the purity of Muslim beliefs and practices by challenging the innovative and heretical practices and tendencies that have prevailed in Muslim society. After him his son Shāh Abdul Azīz, started an organised movement for revival of Islam in 1820 AD. The movement played a consequential role in renaissance of Indian Muslims. It played a seminal role in promotion of two nation theory. Though the Tehrīk e Mujahedeen was crushed in 1831 but it left indelible impact on the political consciousness of Indian Muslims.

By keeping the foregoing in view, we can see that identities are always relational and constructed through the process of interaction. Similarly, identities of state are produced through interaction and participation of actors at systemic and unit level of analysis (Tidy, 2012b). This opposite binary construction of identity aimed to legitimise and naturalise its actions "identities are constructed, not natural or essential; they are relational and involve, references to various "significant others";

and third, identities have a discursive, narrative structure” (Berg & Ehin, 2009).

The ideology of Pakistan which was part and parcel of its identity along with its elements which includes religion, culture and literature; to quote Iqbal’s words acted as a “living operative factor” in the consciousness of Indian Muslims.

The ideology was anchored on a separate identity construction of Indian Muslims, the distinctiveness of their identity as evident from their religion, culture, civilization, customs, literature and distinct way of life. The Indian Muslims had no issue in living in united India but Indian National Congress and other Hindu reformist parties/entities in India didn’t leave an iota of doubt in the minds of Indian Muslims through their double standards vis-à-vis protection of the rights of the minorities. Every time Indian Muslims partnered with Indian National Congress to unitedly fight for independence of India they only met with disappointment and disillusionment due to double standards of the latter party. Intransigence and bigotry didn’t allow the Hindu leadership to reconcile with distinct Muslim identity and to give constitutional guarantees for protection of their rights. They didn’t miss any opportunity to dilute or crush the distinctive character of Indian Muslims under the juggernaut of Hindu majoritarianism. The celebrated historian K.K Aziz avers that Hindu Muslim conflict was not merely a product of religious differences, “It was clash of two civilizations, of two peoples who had different languages, different literary roots, different ideas of education, different philosophical sources, and different concepts of art.” He goes on to say that due to yawning cultural gulf between the two communities and divergent social customs and divergent modes of livelihood; the possibility of united Indian is only a pipe dream (K.K. Aziz, n.d.)

By keeping the foregoing in view it can be safely stated that for Indian Muslims

creation of Pakistan was realisation of an idea. Pakistan owes its creation to set of ideas as later renounced in its ideology. Material circumstances or the objective political realities

gave birth to the ideas or more precisely speaking formulation of its ideology and resultantly the ideology determined its political course of action. Thus the creation of Pakistan serves as a great example to illustrate as to how ideational factors can shape material realities and vice versa.

As we know that identity is a relational concept. Construction of any identity is made in relation to a declared significant other. In the case of Indian Muslims, the declared significant other for Muslim political elites was the parallel identity construction of Indian Muslims constructed by Indian National Congress wherein their distinct character was merged into a monolithic Indian character. Construction of a parallel Identity provided the foil to Indian Muslim elites, the foil helped them to describe as to how and in what respect they are different from the dominant other and resultantly they challenged the identity this dominant other affixed on them.

Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi has succinctly challenged the fallacious assumption advanced by the Indian National Congress that Indian Muslims shared every aspect of culture with the Hindus except their religion. To buttress his argument; that is to show that the two communities had little in common. He goes on to elucidate the distinctiveness of the identity of the Indian Muslims by comparing the phenomena of Muslim culture with that of the counter foil of Hindu culture. He says Muslim houses are airy, spacious and open to light unlike houses of Hindus which give an air of secretive exclusiveness. Similarly, he elaborates differences in utensils used by Hindus and Muslims. The differences in cultural artefacts do not stop here rather

it goes on to include differences in cuisine, custom/ ceremonies, architectural differences between mosque and the temple, difference in literature, language, painting and music. He rhetorically concludes his argument by posing a rhetorical question “How could two peoples with such divergence in their outlook, beliefs, mores, tastes and inclinations be molded into one without making one, or the other, or both to sacrifice something that had entered into the innermost recesses of their souls? (Qureshi, 1988).

The foregoing opposite binary construction of Muslim identity aimed to legitimise and naturalise the freedom struggle of Pakistan. The binary of Muslim identity codified the cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims. The codification of differences of Muslim identity vis-a-vis Hindu Identity laid the ground for partition of sub-continent. The entire journey of Pakistan’s freedom struggle validates the ideational power of identity in shaping and defining the material realities of political world.

The struggle of the Indian Muslims to preserve their distinct identity under the preponderant influence of Hinduism in the subcontinent had been their prime concern and top priority. In his another illustrious work Ishtiaq Husain Quershi says that the only concern of Indian Muslim since their arrival in subcontinent had been to preserve their religious and cultural identity (Qureshi, 1988).

Muslim identity in pre-independence was also constructed against the binary of the rise of Hindu Mahasabha and its concomitant influence over the hardliners in the congress. Rise of Hindu radical groups increased the insecurity of Indian Muslims and made their quest for distinct identity more ardent. It was the Hindu identity of Congress, its ideology and its evangelical political mission that ultimately created

an unbridgeable gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims. The ideology of Pakistan provides a discursive, narrative structure whereby the self (Indian Muslims) is constructed in relation to the significant other (Hindus).

It is said that the quest for consolidation of a separate Muslim identity started well before the idea of Pakistan dawned upon in the minds of Muslim intellectuals. Empirically speaking the struggle to preserve distinct Muslim identity started by Syed Ahmed Brelvi; he attempted to rid Muslim culture of Hindu influences. The Madrassas of Deoband and Muhammedan Educational Conference spread awareness among masses by telling them as to how Indian Muslims belong to a distinct group. Efforts of these institutions culminated in form of Muslim consciousness movement (M. M. Afzal, 2014)

S.M Ikram avers that the seeds of Muslim separatism were sown when Muslims arrived in the subcontinent. All efforts to establish a bridge between Hindus and Muslims ended in smoke (Ikram, 2000, p-1). Muslims had been rulers of subcontinent for centuries, in India their civilization took root after Arab conquest of Sind in eighth century, it grew in thirteenth century in the era of Delhi Sultante and reached its zenith during Mughal rule. Muslim rulers of India benefited from the achievements, practices and intellectual bank of Muslim civilization and other civilizations like Persian and Byzantium civilization over which Muslims once ruled. Indian Muslim rulers applied their civilizational knowledge to improve the social lot of their subjects.

Muslim rule in India suffered a major setback in 1757 when the army of East India company led by Lt. colonel Robert Clive defeated Nawab Siraj-ud-Dawlah. This marked ascendancy of Great Brittan that lasted for almost two centuries. It is

pertinent to mention that the decline of Mughal empire started after demise of Aurangzeb in 1707. Successive Mughal rulers neither had the foresight nor ability to strengthen their empire. Due to the weakness of Mughals, Marathas emerged as a leading force in 17th century and Sikhs in 18th century. The rise of Marathas, Sikhs and finally the ascendancy of East India Company changed the fate of Indians in the latter half of 18th century.

Successive Muslim leaders from Shah Waliullah who invited Ahmed Shah Abdali to end the rule of Marathas in India, Haji Shariatullah's Faraizi movement, Syed Ahmed Shaheed Jihad movement which aimed to preserve Muslim culture and identity during Sikhs' rule, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's educational, literary and political contribution to preserving the culture of Indian Muslims. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Agha Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, Ali Brothers and host of other Muslim leaders belaboured to highlight distinctive identity of Indian Muslims.

Though political decline of Muslim started after Aurangzeb's death in 1707 and then it declined further irreparably in 1757 but the most fatal blow to the edifice of Muslim power in the subcontinent was inflicted in 1857 when the last though symbolic vestige of Muslim power in India, the last Mughal emperor was imprisoned, exiled and executed.

Series of losses from early 18th century to second half of 19th century immensely spread frustration, despondency and fear of cultural and political subjugation among Indian Muslims which culminated in 1857. In post 1857 era, Muslims were relegated from the position of elites to third class citizens. Muslim separatism took one of the most defining turns in the aftermath of 1857. Muslims who had ruled over the subcontinent for centuries became the victim of colonial wrath and vengeance (they

were singled out as perpetrators of the war of independence which the British termed mutiny) and the growing assertiveness of the Hindu community.

A number of Muslim elites took up the cudgel for preservation of Muslim identity and culture. The chief among them were Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in 19th century and Allama Muhammad Iqbal in the first half of 20th century. Both these stalwarts had a lasting impact on Jinnah's thinking. Jinnah's intellectual proclivities of synthesising modernity with tradition owe its origin to works of these two stalwarts.

Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan founded the Aligarh movement which played a seminal role in political reawakening of Indian Muslims. The movement is called the pivot of Muslim renaissance in India. 1857 enkindled the flame of introspection to find out causes of Muslim decline. Sir Syed became the voice of time and literally transformed Muslims into a nation. The Aligarh movement was necessitated by the circumstances of 1857. The movement was primarily cultural in nature, it aimed to reproduce progressive values in literature, society, education and religion. The literature produced under the influence of the movement promoted Muslim nationalism and progressivism, at societal level. It aimed to promote loyalty to the English by accentuating the convergences between the English and the Muslims and by downplaying the divergences, in the domain of education it aimed to benefit from intellectual worthiness of the English, in religion it promoted reason and shunned fanaticism (K. K. Aziz, 2002).

Sir Syed rightly assessed that the English are going to be the future rulers of India. He also genuinely believed in the scientific and material advancement of the English civilization. He attempted to bring home the point to Indian Muslims that their promising future in post 1857 era lies in espousal of Western education and that

there are more convergences between Islam and the Western world than there are divergences.

Khursheed Kamal Aziz opines that services of Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan can be summed up in three points: fidelity to the British, commitment to education and aloofness from politics (K. K. Aziz, 2002). To ensure loyalty to the British he extolled the strengths and merits of the English. He exhorted Indian Muslims to cooperate with the English. His commitment to education as a vehicle for bringing change in the lives of Indian Muslims is evident from a number of educational institutions he established. His policy of exhorting Muslims to stay aloof from the politics emanated from his foresighted realisation of anticipating the demerits of parliamentary system in India given the disproportionate numerical advantage enjoyed by Hindus. He was convinced that parliamentary institutions will only serve the interests of the majority and the historical distinctness of Indian Muslims is likely to be trampled under the juggernaut of Hindu Majoritarianism. He averred that parliamentary institutions are not suitable for India, it is only suitable for a country inhabited by one nation. He was convinced that any advancement towards establishment of parliamentary institutions in India would add one more rivet in Muslim shackles (K. K. Aziz, 2002).

Akbar S. Ahmed has termed Sir Syed Ahmed Khan the first great synthesiser of Islam and modernity and termed Jinnah as the second. Both Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Jinnah asserted the distinctiveness of Muslim culture vis-à-vis Hindu culture (A. S. Ahmed, 1997). Like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Jinnah also supported emancipation of women and protection of minorities.

After Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the next most potent and impactful Muslim voice that

appeared on the horizon of Indian Muslims was that of Allama Muhammad Iqbal. Like Sir Syed he too aimed at renaissance of Indian Muslims. Iqbal believed that Sir Syed's ideas offered a new orientation of Islam (H. Malik, 1980). Sir Syed Ahmed Khan contributed to renaissance of Indian Muslims through his writings and educational intuitions, Iqbal contributed to Muslim renaissance through his poetry and politics. Like Sir Syed, Iqbal was also a great synthesiser but unlike Sir Syed he was convinced of the superiority of Muslim civilization over the Western civilization. He appreciated the virtues and strengths of the West but he looked to the glorious Muslim past to enkindle the flame of intellectual rejuvenation in the minds of Indian Muslims.

Ali Brothers and Iqbal opposed Jinnah before 1920s but in 1930s they saw him the only hope for Indian Muslims (A. S. Ahmed, 1997). Like Jinnah Iqbal too once believed in unity of India but the conduct of Congress and its leadership in 1930s changed his heart and he became one of the leading voices of Muslim separatism in the subcontinent. As a supporter of united India he penned 'Taranah-i-Hind' and later when he espoused Muslim separatism he penned 'Taranah-i-Milli'. Dr Akbar S Ahmed is of the view that Jinnah discovered Islamic identity through Iqbal. Iqbal wrote eight letters to Jinnah between 1936 to 1937. These epistles shed great light on their relationship (Ibid). Iqbal's Taranah-i-Hind is considered more inclusive and broadminded anthem than that of "Bande-Matram" penned by Bankim Chandar Chatterji (Ikram & Embree, 1970).

Iqbal passed through three different phases in his life, the first phase is known as nationalist phase, the second phase is known as Pan-Islamist phase and third phase is known as Muslim nationalist phase (Mujahid, 1990). As a Muslim nationalist during 1920s and 1930s, Iqbal increasingly became aware of strategy of Congress

leadership of furthering communal agenda in the garb of democracy. A litany of events starting from botched Khilafat Movement, Nehru Report and reaction of Congress to Jinnah's Fourteen Points made Iqbal realise that the Congress leadership is determined to obliterate all the constitutional protections which are necessary to maintain and preserve the distinct identity of Indian Muslims.

Iqbal's ideas as a Muslim nationalist culminated in 1930s after he realised that the Congress leadership is not willing to cede any space to Indian Muslims for preservation and protection of their distinct identity. Iqbal's ideas as a Muslim nationalist bloomed into idea of Pakistan in his address at annual meeting of Muslim League in Allahabad. He asserted that India encompasses diverse human communities that have varied racial backgrounds, languages, and religious beliefs. Their actions are not guided by a shared racial identity. Consequently, he advocated establishment of a unified Muslim state, aligning with the well-being of both India and Islam. He goes on to say that amalgamation of Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Balochistan into a singular state is an imperative given the current intransigent attitude of Congress. He envisioned the creation of a unified North-West Indian Muslim State for Indian Muslims in general and for Muslims in North West India in particular (Sherwani, 1995).

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Allama Muhammad Iqbal had a great impact on Jinnah. Jinnah treaded the path charted by Sir Syed and Iqbal. Jinnah went on to ensure distinctiveness of Muslim identity and culture, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah emerged as the ultimately spokesperson of Indian Muslims in 20th century. He not only rid Muslim of the imperialist rule of great Brittan but also saved Indian Muslims from the majoritarian rule of Hindus. Akbar S. Ahmed avers, Indian Muslims gleaned their uniqueness from Islam, successive Indian Muslim rulers

gave territory to Indian Muslims and the poet of East gifted direction and a fulfilling destiny to them. Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave all the three (Islamic Identity, direction and self-fulfilling destiny) to Indian Muslim single handedly.

The conversion of Jinnah from a leader who vehemently advocated Hindu Muslim unity to a leader who espoused Muslim separatism as the only viable option to rid India of its constitutional, political and social problems was neither sudden nor reactionary. G.K Gokhale called him “the ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity”. Hector Bolitho, Jinnah’s biographer says that when he came to know about Gokhale’s death, it filled his heart with sorrow and grief (Bolitho, 1981). This shows that he held Gokhale, a Brahmin in high esteem. The dictates of religion didn’t hamper him from looking up to a Brahmin as a political guru and a mentor. His adulation of Gokhale shows that he was deeply enmeshed in the liberal humanist values and believed in progressiveness of Islam as a religion.

Jinnah presided over the historic joint session of All India Muslim League and Indian National Congress at Lucknow. Historic Lucknow pact was signed at this session. At this occasion he declared himself as a ‘staunch Congressman’. He didn’t believe in sectarianism (R. Afzal, 1996). However, Jinnah’s views of Congress changed after 1920s when Gandhi replaced erstwhile stalwarts of the party like Gokhale, P. Mehta, Dadabhai Naoroji and Tilak. Gandhi presented himself as a symbol of lost archetypal Hindu identity. Disappointed with Gandhi’s communal style of politics where he presented himself as a leader with a universal message but actually his style and character was coloured by Hinduism.

Jinnah held Gandhi responsible for revival of Hindu raj in India (Gandhi, 1980). Resultantly, Jinnah parted ways with Congress in 1920. However, he continued to

preach the value of Hindu Muslim unity for the welfare and betterment of Indians. Nehru report which reneged on the promise of awarding separate electorate to Indian Muslims in Lucknow pact further dented the prospects of rapprochement between Muslims and Hindus. After 1930s his language and style become more Islamised that picked further pace in 1940s. At this point Jinnah had reached a vintage point of history from where he could see that obduracy of Congress leadership in relation to not accepting separate status of Muslims.

By 1940s Jinnah became clear that the intransigence of congress leadership in relation to accommodating concerns of Indian Muslims regarding their rights as a separate community has made reconciliation between the two communities unthinkable. Jinnah rightly assessed the aspirations of Indian Muslims that they want reversion to an old order whereby they could live peacefully by preserving their distinct culture and identity. He also accurately assessed the designs of Indian National Congress. Hindus, unlike Muslims do not want reversion to an old order (when Muslims were the rulers) rather they wanted a new order whereby they could dominate Indian Muslims under the juggernaut of brute Hindu majoritarianism.

Jinnah warned Indian Muslims of the growing political and cultural assertiveness of Hindus. In response to the growing assertiveness of Hindus, Jinnah exhorted Indian Muslims to shun their political dormancy in order to actively work for realisation of their political, cultural and religious rights. He warned Indian Muslims that if they do not rise to the challenge of growing assertiveness of the majority community they will be relegated to the status of lower castes and their religion will be exterminated from Hindustan (Sayeed, 2009).

Jinnah's cultural nationalism is also evident from his support for Urdu language as

an identity marker of Indian Muslims. Jinnah saw Urdu as a very polished and refined language of Indian Muslims. The Quaid seemed fully aware of the fact that Urdu is repository of best Muslim thoughts and expression produced in India. The cosmopolitan vocabulary of Urdu with extensive borrowings from Persian, Arabic and local languages made Urdu a very refined synthesis of the civilizational languages of Persian, Arab and Indian civilizations. Jinnah ardently, emphatically and decisively declared Urdu as a national language of Pakistan due to ideational importance of Urdu in the independence movement as an identity marker and due to its subsequent importance in solidifying it as a symbol and purveyor of national identity in post-independence Pakistan (Haque, 2022).

The ideational importance of Urdu is also stamped when we analyse the fact that in post-independence Pakistan Urdu was declared the national language of Pakistan notwithstanding fewer number of native speakers of the language at the time of creation of Pakistan. Numerically speaking Bangla language was the biggest language and there were other regional languages as well but Quaid declared Urdu as a national language due to its ideational importance in freedom movement.

As it has been highlighted earlier in this section that Jinnah's conversion from a staunch supporter of Congress to an ardent supporter of Muslim separatism started in 1920s with ascendancy of Gandhian politics that turned the style and language of Congress more reflective of Hindu Mahasabha than its avowed secular principles.

Akber S. Ahmed avers that Jinnah's attire and language became more reflective of his Muslim identity. The combination of Karakuli cap, Sherwani then commonly worn by students of Aligarh Muslim university and English suits indicated that he was proud of his Muslim identity and comfortable with Western culture.

In this time period Jinnah got convinced that Indian Muslims possessed “distinct civilization, language, literature, art, architecture, laws, moral codes, customs and calendars, history and traditions” Jinnah told Mountbatten “India has never been a true nation. It only looks that way on the map. The cows I want to eat; the Hindu stop me from killing. Every time a Hindu shakes hands with me he has to wash his hands. The only thing Muslim has in common with Hindu is his slavery to the British” (L. Collins,2019). He also declared that Islam is the bedrock and sheet anchor of Pakistani identity(A. S. Ahmed, 1997). Jinnah’s zealous work to get the rights of Indian Muslim accepted earned him ire of majority community. They launched a volley of attacks on his credentials to unsuccessfully dilute his appeal. For his ardent support of Muslim separatism Hindu writers in 1940s disparagingly termed him another Aurangzeb (Mujahid, 1990).

Keeping the foregoing in view we can state in nutshell that Jinnah; who once had been looked up to as an ‘ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity’ till 1920s, obduracy and intransigence of the leadership of Congress transformed him into a leading voice of Muslim separatism after 1930s.

There have been a number of progenitors of two nation theory starting from Shah Waliullah, Syed Ahmed Brelvi, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Ali Brothers, Agha Khan, Allama Muhammad Iqbal and many others but Muslim separatism found its strongest and loudest voice in Jinnah. He turned the politics of Muslim separatism into mass politics, his words resonated with feelings and aspirations of the Muslim masses who called him Quaid-e-Azam.

Jinnah influenced and shaped the identity and resultantly the political fate of Indian Muslims by not only etching in their collective memory as to how they are culturally and religiously different from the majority community but Jinnah also gifted a

fusion of modernity and Islamic tradition as one of the lasting albeit contested tropes of Pakistan's national identity. This lasting influence on Pakistan identity was the product of his penchant for eclecticism. Jinnah symbolised a synthesis and a fusion between tradition and modernity that is between Islam and the West. He has been part of strong tradition of eclecticism in South Asia. Akbar. S. Ahmed opines that three strands of political thoughts dominated the intellectual firmament of Indian Muslims that are: Muslim orthodoxy, heterodoxy and synthesis of modernity and tradition. Jinnah belonged to the last strand of political thought (A. S. Ahmed, 1997). It is the last strand of Muslim political thought which has been the driving force not only during the independence movement but also in Pakistan's post-independence era. He said that Islam is still as relevant to our lives as it had been 1300 years ago and that there is no contradiction between Islam and democracy. Besides Jinnah, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Agha Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, Liaquat Ali Khan also belong to this strand of Muslim thought.

Jinnah had a voice of enlightened moderation. He believed and iterated that there are many convergences between the Western political system and Islamic political system. He absorbed the best traits of the West and the Islamic civilization especially after 1940s (A. S. Ahmed, 1997). He was a progressive who gave importance to synthesis of modernity and tradition. Jinnah is rightly considered a product of Anglo Indian culture as well as Islamic culture, his frugality, punctuality, honesty, bluntness, his faithful espousal of meritocracy was product of the influence of English culture on him. The influence of Islamic culture on his thoughts and ideas can also be deciphered from his first two speeches which he made in constituent assembly.

The discursive practices of Indian Muslim elites to preserve their distinct identity

vis-à-vis Hindu identity, spawned ontological insecurity for the Indian Hindus. We have already discussed the salience of the concept for explicating the concept of national identity in one of the preceding sections of the chapter. To fulfill their self-identity needs; Indian Hindus despite being in majority in united India felt paranoid and resultantly became more assertive in not only maintaining their distinct identity vis-à-vis Indian Muslims but also went a step further in imposing their identity on diverse Indian groups including Indian Muslims.

2.3.2 Hindu Revivalist Movements and Their Impact on Hindu and Muslim Identities

Notwithstanding the status of Indian Muslims as a minority in united India; Indian Hindus unjustifiably perceived the attempts of Indian Muslims to preserve their identity in the face of a preponderantly majoritarian Identity as a threat to Hindu Identity. The very arrival of Muslims in subcontinent was perceived as threatening with grave implication for the purity and sanctity of Hindu creed and culture. The Muslim encountered their ontological insecurity vis-à-vis Hindus by sticking to their ideals and by cherishing their glorious heritage. Adherence to their ideals and the inspiration offered by their glorious past gave Indian Muslims political ascendancy in the subcontinent. Despite presence of Hindu majority, Indian Muslims neither lost their distinct identity and ideals nor they lost their political power to Hindus. Hinduism failed to penetrate and make inroads into Islamic culture. The political power of Muslims coupled with adherence of Indian Muslims to their religious ideals engendered political, social and religious insecurities for Hindus.

To cope up with their insecurities the Hindus started revivalist movements to

safeguard and preserve their distinct identity vis-à-vis Islam and the Indian Muslims. In 19th century, Hindu elites started Hindu reformists and revivalists' movements as a means to unite diverse and divided Hindu society against the perceived threats of Islam and Christianity. Raja Mohan Roy founded Brahma Samaj in 1828 and Dayanand Saraswati founded Arya Samaj in 1875 for preservation of Hindu identity. These movements 'otherise' Indian Muslims and Christians to preserve their distinct Hindu identity. The decline and backwardness of Hindus were attributed to the Indian Muslims and the British. The ultimate aim of these revivalist and reformist movements was to regain their lost politico-social ascendancy.

The leaders of these movements employed the myths of the superiority of Hindu religion, culture and their motherland: India; as a sacred piece of land that needs to be cleaned off foreign cultural and political influences. Stories of Hindu heroes were constructed with a view to project dominant history of Hindus. Religious icons i.e. cult of Kali for power, gau mata for fertility and progress, the river Ganges for unity of Hindus and last but not the least Bharat was branded as Bharatmata (M. M. Afzal, 2014). The proponents of Arya Samaj traced the origins of Hindus to the Aryan civilization. The leaders of Arya Samaj urged Indian Muslims to reconvert to Hinduism due to two reasons. Firstly, Hinduism is a superior religion and secondly, by reconverting to Hinduism they will undo their forcible conversion made earlier at the behest of Muslim rulers.

The xenophobic elite Hindu middle class went a step further in 1911 by replacing AryaSamaj with Hindu Samaj. Replacement of Arya Samaj with Hindu Samaj vociferously declared that India is only for Hindus and also aimed to establish the declaration of Hindus as a separate nation (M. M. Afzal, 2014).

Later the movement zealously espoused the slogan of Swaraj and declared it as their birth right. Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856 – 1920) gave a new slogan to the movement i.e. “Swaraj is our birth right” and refused to accommodate Muslims aspirations in post- British India. In 1880s and 1890s cow protection societies were formed precisely to protect slaughtering of cows on the holy occasion of Eid-ul-Azha in a bid to foment communal riots. The revivalist Hindu Movements also zealously espoused the proselytising mission of reconverting the erstwhile Hindus who embraced Islam.

Hindu society was anchored in the rigid caste system which was ever dominated and controlled by the Brahmins. For the low castes escape from this rigid system was neighimpossible. The lower castes were caught in an inescapable vortex of caste system. Inthis rigid caste system, the lower castes had to fend for themselves. Both ideationally and materially they remain outsiders in the Brahmin controlled religion.

So, we can say that Hindu Identity was not a mass identity it was only based on the Brahmin order which was inherently exclusionary in character in ethos. Therefore, it is rightly said that Hindu nationalism took birth after arrival of Muslims in India. Indian Muslims not only started ruling over the subcontinent but they also proffered an alternate code of life to the masses of subcontinent. The essence and ethos of the Muslim code of life was based on egalitarianism and equality. The egalitarian teachings and principles of Islam fascinated the lower castes to such an extent that they started challenging the rigid castesystem of Hindus and stated embracing Islam. David N. Lorenzen avers that the Hinduism is a product of the mutual interaction between Islam and Hindus (Sharma, 2015).

As the presence and political dominance of Indian Muslims spawned identity crisis for Hindus similarly in 18th century the political dominance of the British spawned identity crisis for Indian Muslims. Exposure of Muslim culture and Christian culture led to intellectual and political awakening in Hindus and they started questioning the grounds on which the dominance of Brahmins rested. The Hindus had to acquiesce to other influences to preserve their religion. Hence, today Modern-day Hinduism has become a cocktail of myriads of religious practices and beliefs culled from a host of religion including Islam and Christianity.

The Hindu religious elites stoked anti-Muslim sentiments to curb the flood of conversion of low caste Hindus to Islam. The litany of anti-Muslim sentiments morphed into a separate militarist Hindu Identity which aimed to unleash forces of hatred and violence against Muslims (Huzur, 2012).

The new Hindu nationalist identity was formed against the foil of Indian Muslims who were projected as invaders who not only destroyed the territorial sanctity of mother India but also soiled the purported purity and greatness of Hindu civilization. The Hindu religious elites stoked xenophobic and paranoid thinking among Hindus masses vis-à-vis Indian Muslims. They were exhorted to keep their guard up against Muslim influence which they perceived as pervasive. They were warned that if they kept their guard down against cultural ingress of Islam, they would lose their distinct Hindu identity. The Hindu religious elites projected Muslim rulers as cruel and exploitative; for inculcation of fear and hatred against Muslims (Anantha Murthy et al., 2016).

Hindu religious and political elites got a handy opportunity to reassert the primacy of their culture and religion by cooperating with the British in the wake and aftermath

of the war of independence 1857. The Hindu elites took full advantage of the antipathy of Indian Muslims against the British whom they didn't accept as new rulers. The British in turn held Indian Muslims solely responsible for leading and orchestrating the war of independence which they termed as a mutiny. The mutual distrust and acrimony between the British and the Indian Muslims were shrewdly exploited by the Hindu elites to reassert and regain the primacy of their past. The Hindus vehemently espoused the modern British education system to reap politico-economic dividends. Participation in the British educational system in India was embraced as a divine opportunity to regain their past glory and re-establish great Hindu civilization of ancient times. In consequence of their espousal of the British introduced modern education system Hindus aimed to grab government jobs to regain the glory of their past.

Emboldened by their success in winning British patronage, support and government jobs, the Hindus attempted to reassert themselves in the political affairs of India. Resultantly the empowered Hindu nationalists started exhorting the Hindu middle class to assert their cultural distinctness in relation to Indian Muslims, they demanded that the Persian script of Urdu should be replaced with Devanagari script. Hindu nationalists based on their majority population and major share in the government jobs, provocatively pushed Hindu elite-middle class to demand Hindi in Devanagari script instead of Urdu in Persian script.

Moreover, Hindus opposed the separate electorate system of 1909 and separate share for the Muslims in government jobs by demanding merit-based appointments which antagonized the Muslims (M. M. Afzal, 2014).

The Hindu elites constructed Indian Muslims as a foil of their renewed competitive

identity. Indian Muslims were held responsible for deprivation of Hindus and their backwardness. For unification of diverse and divided Hindu society the Hindu elites needed a common threat to their political, religious and cultural interests which they conveniently found in the form of Indian Muslims. The cultural xenophobia of Hindu elites precluded any possibility of reconciliation with Indian Muslims. The Hindu religious elites aimed to regain the ground lost to Muslims during rule of the latter in India. They wanted to get political and cultural power so that they could dominant again the affairs of the sub-continent after the departure of the British colonialists. Although Hindus were in majority yet they were afraid of Muslims because they feared that if Hindus are not awakened Muslim can again take the reins of united India in their Hands. All the aforementioned reasons impelled and compelled the Hindu elites to start Hindunationalist movements to reassert their combative identity vis-à-vis Indian Muslims.

2.3.3 Role of Hindu Mahasabha in Construction of a Conflictual Hindu and Muslim Identities

Though a plethora of Hindu supremacist leaders were working to establish Hindu superiority but they lacked a united forum to synergise their efforts for realisation of their agenda. To achieve this end, Madan Mohan Malaviya established Hindu Mahasabha by fusing different Hindu supremacist forces under one umbrella in 1915. In order to promote its acceptance and popularity in Hindu masses it started to work for cow protection, Sanskritisation of Hindi language and welfare of Hindu populace. Although Gandhi's non-communal politics during Khilafat movement decreased the space for realisation of divisive political agenda of Mahasabha yet the divisive politics of Mahasabha was revived when Indian Muslims started to

demand a separate homeland. The supremacist character of Mahasabha and its hatred against Indian Muslims became evident when it declared all Muslims as “Maleech” which meant that Hindus cannot live and mix with Muslims (Tamimi, 2009). Their bigotry and anti-Muslim political rant became conspicuous when they vehemently opposed any political decision which benefited Indian Muslims be it the demand for separate electorate, reservation of quota for Indian Muslims in government jobs, espousal of Urdu as an official language and partition of Bengal (Vaishnav, 2019).

Adherents of Hindu Mahasabha attempted to stoke communal violence by committing sacrilegious acts against the holy prophet (PBUH) in order to penalise Indian Muslims (D. L. A. Ali, n.d.).

Indian nationalism had numerous ideational fountain heads: religious nationalism of Swami Vivekananda, cultural nationalism of Tilak and Hindu nationalism of Savarkar and Aurobindo Gosh. All of the aforesaid Hindu revivalist leaders including Raja Ram Mohan Roy and Swami Dayanand Saraswati were ardent believers of superiority of Hinduism vis-à-vis Islam and Christianity. The religious zeal and superiority complex of Hindu revivalist leaders imbued and instilled violence, intolerance and exclusionary ethos in nationalism espoused by the Hindu elites. The violent practices of these revivalists’ movements acted as a wedge to create division between Hindus and Muslims. A case in point that immensely contributed to widening the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims, was establishment of Hindu Mahasaba in 1882. Subsequent to its establishment in Lahore, its branches spread in all the districts of Punjab. It espoused and promoted movements like Shuddi and Sangathan. These movements had avowed mission of reconverting Muslims to the religion of their forefathers. The Mahasaba went on to train a cadre of Hindu youth; with an expressed mission to go to any extent in

defending the purity of Hindu culture through preservation of Hindu Identity by preventing Indian Muslims from cow slaughtering. In order to provoke Indian Muslims; the trained cadre of youth was exhorted to play music in front of Masjids during prayer time (D. L. A. Ali, n.d.).

Another instance of Mahsaba's exclusionary politics could be seen in organisation of Hindu Melas. Entry of non-Hindus was strictly prohibited in these Hindu melas. The melas were used as a training ground to instill a sense of cultural and religious superiority in Hindu youth and to train them in martial arts, lathis, sword etc. to defend their identity.

The exclusionary political agenda of the Hindu reformist groups was not just confined to their own organisations. Rather they also acted as a pressure group to influence decisions of Indian National Congress for promotion and preservation of Hindu culture (Vaishnav, 2019). Indian history was reinterpreted to widen the gulf between Indian Muslims and Hindus. It was propagated that Muslim rulers discriminated Hindus by destroying Hindu culture, constructed mosques by razing Hindu temples and by forcing Hindu populace to convert to Islam (Khushwant Singh, 2003).

2.4 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar's Exclusionary Ideology: Impact on Construction of Hindu and Muslim Identities

The term Hindutva owe its origin to Vinayak Damodar Savarkar but its roots can be traced back further to colonial era when Hindu Muslim riots were rife (Joshy & Seethi, 2015). Precisely speaking the idea of the Hindutva took birth in the throes of 19th century as a product of Hindu revivalist and reformist movements. In 1923

Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966); a Hindu ideologue wrote a book titled “Hindutva: Who is a Hindu”. Savarkar was Hindu supremacist who ardently and zealously believed in Hindu majoritarianism and its supremacy over all other religious groups in India. He believed that the collective Hindu identity can be realised through the ideology of Hindutva as it includes all the features of the life and race of Hindus (Sharma, 2015). Savarkar believed that the ideology of Hindutva is not merely a product of Hindu faith rather it is inclusive of all the cultural and social aspects of a society. Savarkar critically explored the question; as to what factors are responsible for the weaknesses of Hindus as a nation. He came to the conclusion that intra- differences of Hindus in the domains of culture, religions, festivals and myth have played a detrimental role in relation to prosperity of Hindu nation. To address this problem, he attempted to synthesise the religious, cultural and linguistic commonalities of a Hindu society in the ideology of Hindutva (Zafar, 2018).

Savarkar being a Hindu supremacist aimed to inspire Hindus to achieve Hindu dominance. He vehemently believed that Hindus could only earn respect by pursuing the goal of Hindu dominance. The main goal of the Hindutva ideology was to establish a Hindu rashtra based on a supremacist Hindu identity and vilification of Indian Muslims. Savarkar attempted to portray Hindus as a victim of Muslim rulers. Muslim rulers were presented as cruel usurpers and aggressors who destroyed the ancient Hindu culture. Muslim rulers were held responsible for all the maladies that ail Hindu society. In his vitriol against Muslim rulers, he went on to allege that under Muslim rulers; Hindus were denied religious freedom.

He quoted imposition of Jizya as a discriminatory tool of Muslim rulers which bespeaked of intolerant and cruel policies of Muslim rulers in relation to Indian

Hindus. He believed that Indian Hindus can avenge the injustices done to them by pursuing aggressive ideology of Hindutva. Hindutva is a racist ideology as Savarkar supplanted religion with race in Hindutva ideology. His hatred against Muslims also became evident when he pelted stone at a Mosque that led to Hindu Muslim riots (Sharma, 2015).

Indian Muslims were treated as adversaries who needed to be vanquished so that the road to establishment of Hindu rashtra can be paved. Another instance of his anti-Muslim rant and policies can be found in his vehement opposition to award of separate electorate to Indian Muslims. His ideology fanned Hindu extremism which resultantly antagonized both the communities and precluded any possibility of rapprochement even through cordial means (Sarkar, 2018).

It was Hitler's ideology of Nazism which inspired him. He believed the relationship between the Germans and Jews is illustrative and instructive for Indian Hindus vis-à-vis Indian Muslims (Nandrajog, 2010). He exhorted his ideological cohort to mete out same cruel treatment to Indian Muslims as Hitler meted out to the Jews. It was Sarvarkar not Muhammad Ali Jinnah who branded Indian Muslims and Indian Hindus as separate nations thus laying the foundation of two nation theory. His exclusionary and supremacist ideology led him to oppose secular ideology and inclusive philosophy of Gandhi (Walsh, 2006).

The ideology of Hindutva was anchored in amoral prescriptions of Chankya. The ideology of Hindutva exhorted its adherents to establish Hindu supremacist rule by hook or by crook (Khushwant Singh, 2003). In order to inculcate the combative and militant spirit in Hindus new myths were created and Indian history was reinterpreted by using the ideological lens of the Hindutva ideology. Hindu past

was glorified and Muslim rulers were demonised. As a result of rewriting of historical accounts; all the leaders be they Hindus or Sikhs who fought against the Muslims were declared as heroes. The glorification of Hindus, their past and demonisation of Muslim rulers further widened the gulf between Hindus and Muslims thus paving the way for establishment of Hindu Supremacist rule (Walsh, 2006).

Vinayak Damodar Savarkar used the word Hindu in geographic sense, he considered only those inhabitants of India as Hindus who regard India as their motherland, their ancestral land and last but not the least as a sacred land (Anantha Murthy et al., 2016; Tiwari, 2019).

He wanted to unite all the inhabitants of India under the rubric of Hindu nation by disregarding their religious affiliation as a basis of a separate nationhood. His concept of unity does not entail inclusivity rather it is exclusionary in character and ethos. It is unity “that ignores the inherent diversity, and silences those who do not consider India their punyabhoomi” (Anantha Murthy et al., 2016).

He claimed that Hindus are the descendants of Aryans and thus they are the true nationals of India. He threw Indian Christians and Indian Muslims outside the fold of India nation for being outsiders and invaders. The local religions i.e., the Aryan religions including Sikhism were accepted and loyalty of the adherents of these religions was regarded as unquestionable. Furthermore, in order to qualify as Hindu besides one’s loyalty to mother India one has to own Sanskrit language. This narrow touchstone of Indian nationalism excluded Indian Muslims and Christians from the fold of Indian nationalism as they were declared as others.

Muslims have sacred places in Makkha and Madina and their sacred language is

Arabic. For Indian Muslims Sanskrit which is a fundamental part of Hindu nationalism does not hold any sacred value. Therefore, their allegiance to Hindu culture is doubtful. Moreover, Sarvarkar's concept of nation is imbued with race, the nation which he envisions encompasses the people with the same racial stock. He goes on to say that Hindus are not "just a nation, they are a race". He says all Hindus are related, they come from the same stock and they are blood relatives (Anantha Murthy et al., 2016).

He pontificated a narrow idea of nationalism which had a touch of fascism. His narrow fascist ideology is evident from the fact that when he says that foreigners can only become Hindus if they accept Hindu history, culture and start worshipping Hindustan. In other words, outsiders can only become part of Hindu family if they embrace ideology of Hindutva (Anantha Murthy et al., 2016).

Savarker claimed that the ideology of Hindutva emerged victorious during the reign of Akbar and Dara Shikoh due to their espousal of syncretic policies (Anantha Murthy et al., 2016). Thus, in his eyes Muslims can only qualify as Hindus if they pursue syncretic ideas and practices. If they do not adulterate their beliefs and religious doctrines with syncretic values, they fail to qualify as Hindus. For Savarkar Hindus act as the core community for Indian nation. Others who do not fulfill the criteria to become Hindu cannot become part of Hindu rashtra no matter how long they have been living in India. (Anantha Murthy et al., 2016).

The ideology of Hindutva was based on the assumption that Hinduism sums up national identity of India. Indian culture was treated as synonymous of Hindu culture. This ideology of Hindutva amounts to and is akin to ethnic nationalism (Jaffrelot, 2007). The road to establishment of Hindu rashtra can only be paved if

Muslims and Christians are forced to leave India (Walsh, 2006). Hindus being the majority in India had a divine right that entitles them to rule India exclusively after departure of Great Britain (Hali, 2018).

The exclusionary ideology of Savarkar was an anathema to rich cultural and religious diversity of India. The variant of Indian identity constructed by Savarkar had Indian Muslims and the colonialists as its foils. The narrow variant of Indian nationalism dented the attempts of Indian National Congress which was working to construct an inclusive and a secular identity for Indians. The articulation of 'ethnic nationalism' pushed a deep wedge between the Indian Muslims and Hindus. Resultantly Indian Muslims used the xenophobic variant of Indian nationalism espoused by Savarkar as its foil in construction of their own identity.

2.5 The impact of Sangh Parivar on construction of Hindu and Muslim Identities

The espousal of the ideology of Hindutva made the division between Hindus and Muslims wider and starker. The ideology of Hindutva clearly set the two communities apart thus laying the intellectual and cultural foundations that vividly set the two communities apart. In fact, the ideology of Hindutva turned the two communities into two nations. Once the cultural boundaries of Indian nationalism were defined; the Hindu leader set on a course to realise their goal of establishing a Hindu rashtra based on the ideology of Hindutva. Muslims were demonised and were presented as a threat to the vision of nation espoused by the ideology of Hindutva (Khushwant Singh, 2003). The identity constructed by the ideology of Hindutva portrayed Muslims and Christians as a threat to establishment of Hindu rashtra. It was claimed that espousal of the ideology of Hindutva is imperative if Hindus want

to stop Indian Muslims from re- subjugating and re-dominating Indian Hindus (Ram, 1996). Hindu Mahasabha was entrusted with the responsibility to popularise Hindutva ideology among masses by unleashing a process of social construction through organisation of cultural festivals (M. M. Afzal, 2014).

2.6 Establishment of RSS and Impact on Construction of Hindu and Muslim Identities

‘Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’ was founded by a known anti Muslim Hindu named Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in 1925. It aimed to implement Hindutva ideology with force. It was formed on the occasion of a Hindu festival named ‘Dussehra’ which marks the victory of Rama (good) over Ravan (evil) thus implicitly it aimed to inspire Hindu youth to feel victorious against Indian Muslims. RSS eyed the moment when the British will depart from India as a defining moment whereby it can get hold of power for establishment of an exclusive Hindu state (Khushwant Singh, 2003). Overtly RSS wanted to bring social harmony in Indian society but deep in its core it harboured malice and grudge against Muslims for allegedly polluting Indian cultural and civilizational values (Sharda, 2021).

Dr. Hedgewar vehemently opposed the secular and inclusive identity of India propounded by Gandhi and termed his policies as an appeasement of Muslims. He also vehemently opposed the establishment of All India Muslim League for it being an anathema to the construct of united mother India. His anti-Muslim feelings can be gauged from his vitriolic rhetoric against the orthodox Muslims when they tried to preserve their distinct identity vis-à-vis the construct of ‘social harmony’ which

RSS wanted to impose on India Muslims. He unjustly and unfairly equated the attempts of Indian Muslims to preserve their distinct identity to fanaticism and held Muslims responsible for fomenting communal violence in India.

Though initially it was established as a social organisation but failure of Mahasabha in protecting rights of Hindus ceded space to RSS and it gained more traction among masses (Vaishnav, 2019). It successfully harnessed, exploited and capitalised on the ideological resources of Mahasabha in forming its ideology and devising its organisational strategies (M. M. Afzal, 2014). As a starting point RSS developed its own unique identity markers i.e., khaki uniform, saffron flags, salutes, drills and parade and its own party songs to make itself distinct (Murshid, n.d.).

Once it was able to develop its own unique identity markers it went on to impose these identity markers on other communities thus contributing to Hindu supremacist designs. Its adoption of saffron colour is a sign of purity and strength in Hindu mythology (Nandrajog, 2010).

The exclusionary identity embraced by RSS becomes more conspicuous when we analyse their demand to make 'Manava-dharma-shastra': a book of Hindus laws to be used as a constitution of India instead of the then Indian constitution. Its Hindutva driven zeal caused it to supplant the tri-colour Indian flag with that of saffron flag because it is the saffron flag which is a true sign and symbol of a Hindu Rashtra (Murshid, n.d.).

According to Shashi Tharoor: an eminent Indian politician, the first supporter and promoter of two nation theory was Veer Damodar Savarkar who exhorted Indians three years before the passage of Pakistan resolution to treat Hindus and Muslims as two separate nations (Tharoor, 2018).

2.7 Impact of Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906 – 1973) on Construction of Confrontational Hindu Identity Vis-à-vis Indian Muslims

Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar after the demise of Hedgewar; was entrusted with the responsibility to lead RSS as a sarsang chalak in 1940. He successfully attempted to turn Hindutva ideology into an ideology of masses through propaganda, enforcement of strict discipline and by establishing a system of relief services for the people struck by natural disasters (Khushwant Singh, 2003). These strategies proved successful in winning the heart of masses and the Hindutva ideology started to take roots in Indian society.

Like his predecessor he too was a Hindu supremacist who believed in the superiority of Hindu culture. He saw the presence of Indian Muslims in India as adulterous and impure which was deemed detrimental to the purity and sanctity of Hindu religious rituals and practices. He believed that the solution to restore the purity of Hindu culture lies in regeneration of national ideology (Tharoor, 2018). Like his predecessor he too had a narrow, parochial and supremacist vision of India in mind when he propagated that only Hindus have a right to be rulers of India and those who fail to attain the sanctimonious status of Hinduhood can live in India only as if they subscribe to the supremacy of Hindu culture (Sharda, 2021).

He viewed the nation as an embodiment of culture. It is the concept of cultural nationalism which characterises his conception of nationalism. He didn't give primacy to the values of territorial nationalism. He propounded that a nation has geographic, racial, religious, cultural, and linguistic identity markers as its core elements (M. M. Afzal, 2014).

Geographically speaking Indian Muslims qualify to become Hindunationals but as narrated above he gave primacy or power of nullifying the importance of other elements to culture, in defining nationhood. He goes on to say that a nation is made up of the people and by people he means the people from the same racial stock and the people who believe in the supremacy of the same culture.

Hence his construction of nationhood excludes Indian Muslims from the fold of Indian nation. Furthermore, he says that a state is subservient to the will of the people who form the core of its existence and is bound to cater to social, economic, spiritual and cultural needs of a nation.

It was none other than Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar who referred to ‘two nation theory’ in one of his books titled “We or Our Nationalism Defined”. The book was published in 1939, it preceded the passage of Pakistan resolution in 1940 (Siddiqui, 2016). It shows that it was Ideologues of Hindutva who divided India into two nations not the other way round.

It was not Muslims who started to espouse an exclusionary identity solely based on Islamic religion rather it was the narrow, parochial and supremacist conception of Hindutva ideology which forced Muslims to opt for establishment of a separate nation. The supremacist identity that Hindutva wants to impose on all Indians has been articulately narrated by Christophe Jeffrelot in the following line:

“The non-Hindu peoples in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture — in one word they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far

less preferential treatment—not even citizen’s rights” (Jaffrelot, 2007).

Muslims knew that had they lived in united India, with parliamentary form of government in place, their separate identity would have been crushed under the juggernaut of Hindu majoritarianism. The fear of cultural, political, economic and social subjugation was not unfounded; the iteration of the ideology of Hindutva and thereign of cruelties, discrimination and injustices unleashed by Congress ministries in 1937 left no doubt in the minds of Indian Muslims with regard to supremacist agenda of Hindu elites. Though ostensibly and theoretically Congress claimed to be a secular party yet practically speaking it pursued the same supremacist agenda of Hindu ideology under the garb of parliamentary democracy.

Moreover, it couldn’t remain immune from the populist rhetoric of Hindutva ideology that started to gain traction among masses under the active political role pursued by Golwalker.

Golwalker’s majoritarian agenda is made conspicuous when he bestowed the right to rule over India to Hindu majority and give them a license to lord over the affairs of minorities (Kelkar, 2011). His supremacist political agenda is made evident by the fact that Hindutva ideology used Hitler’s Nazism and Mussolini’s Fascism as inspirational fountainheads. Golwalker praised Hitler’s holocaust of Jews in his book titled “We or Our Nationalism Defined” and advocated for application of Hitler’s strategies in India to exterminate Indian Muslims from India. In the aforementioned book he narrates the utility of Hitler’s strategy to solve India’s communal problems in the below mentioned paragraph.

To preserve the integrity of the nation and its culture, Germany astounded the international community by expelling Semitic races, namely the Jews, from the

country. This showcased the pinnacle of national pride. Germany also demonstrated the immense challenge of assimilating races and cultures with fundamental differences into a single unified entity. This serves as a valuable lesson for us in Hindustan to understand and draw insights from (Golwalkar's *We or Our Nationhood Defined*, 2020).

Hindu nationalist leaders like B.S Moonje and S.P Mookerjee had a long association with Mussolini which had formative impact on organisational system and strategies of RSS (Hali, 2018). Golwalkar's Fascist impact on Indian Identity also gets evidenced by the fact that he ridiculed Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence. He avers that "all Hindugods carried weapons". Therefore, Gandhi was wrong in shunning violence when he espoused non-violence as a strategy to achieve political goals (Tharoor, 2018). Espousal of violence as a political tool left an indelible impact on psyche and identity of Hindus.

It also further widened the ever-yawning gulf between Hindus and Muslims. His fascist ideology is also manifested by his ardent exhortation to Hindus for stopping Muslims and Christians from becoming Indians. "They could live only at the sufferance of the majority Hindu community" (Ziya Us Salam, 2018).

The proponents of Hindutva aver that the Hindutva forces aimed to achieve unity in India through its ideology without any discrimination of caste or creed. However, contrary to the assertion of the supporters and sympathisers of Hindutva, Hindutva ideology envisioned unity of all the Indian communities by accepting and imposing its version of history, culture and ideology. Others can only enter in the fold of Indian nationalism if they subscribe to values and culture espoused by the forces of Hindutva. This hegemonic agenda of Hindutva forces was bound to make minorities

like Indian Muslims feel insecure.

The hegemonic agenda of Hindutva aimed to change political, physical and cultural landscape of India in accordance with its ideology. By foreseeing the catastrophic impact of Hindus coming to power; the first president of All India Muslim League avers that if the majoritarian Hindus were to lead India then Indian Muslims must realise that their lives, their tangible and intangible assets are in danger (Wolpert, 1984).

The hegemonic discourse, ideology and discriminatory practices of Hindus led the Muslims to have a homogenous identity to counter their hegemonic foil: Hindus. Thus, gulf created by the divisive politics of Hindutva had far reaching impact on the identity construction of Indian Muslims. The discursive and ideational jostling of two communities was finally embraced by the Muslim political elites which ultimately led to establishment of Pakistan as a separate state.

2.8 Construction of Muslim identity under British Rule in India

The British colonialists had played an instrumental role in transforming identities of its subjects. The impact of British empire on identity of Muslims can be found in Muslim's espousal of modern state, modern knowledge, capitalism and modern mode of communication and the resultant emergence of identities at various levels (Robinson, 1998).

Before the advent of British in India Muslims immigrants who migrated from Iran, central Asia, Afghanistan and Arab world had their identities based on their place of origin i.e. Turk Muslim, Persian Muslim and Afghan Muslims, they had religious identities like Shia and Sunni. It was the British empire which saw Indians as

Hindus or Muslims. The British viewed all Muslims homogeneously and gave them a homogenous identity. It was adoption of the homogenous identity along with the concept of nation state which saw culmination of British influence on Indian Muslim identity in pre-independence era (Robinson, 1998).

The real interaction between the British and the Indian Muslims started after 1857 with the war of independence which the British colonialist termed as mutiny. Muslims were wholly and squarely held responsible for the so-called mutiny.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan who was a pragmatist and a visionary leader was fully aware of the weaknesses of Muslim masses and rulers, he was also fully aware of the strength and merits of the Western civilization. He prophetically assessed that British are going to have a long rule in India. Therefore, commonalities between the Muslims and the colonialists should be highlighted and promoted. He prescribed loyalty to the British colonialists as a future political course of action (Sayeed, 2009). He urged the Muslims to learn English language and to benefit from Western advancement in sciences. He also reached out to the British authorities in India to explain to them the reasons behind Muslims resentment and hostility towards the British. He conveyed to the British authorities in India that Muslims are hostile towards them because the British have ended the Muslim rule in India but generally speaking, they are still loyal to the British.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan didn't merely urge Muslims to benefit from Western education system for their utilitarian benefit rather he was also able to bring home this point to Indian Muslims that by learning English language and Western sciences they would be in a better position to defend their religion against the onslaught of orientalist (Sayeed, 2009).

The biggest impact the British had on the identity of Indian Muslims happened through the educational system set up by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. There is no denying the fact that Sir Syed Ahmed Khan promoted reconciliation between the British colonialists and the Indian Muslims and also urged Indian Muslims to remain loyal to the British, but the biggest contribution of the educational system lies in producing a party of Muslim intellectuals which played a pivotal part in establishment of Pakistan.

The chapter has attempted to bring to fore how Muslim identity in united India evolved. How the significant 'others' of Indian Muslims namely Hindus and the British attempted to shape identity of Indian Muslims and as to how Indian Muslims attempted to define themselves in response to the projection of their identity by their significant others. The chapter has brought forward the conclusion that in pre-independence era identity played a leading role in shaping the politics of India and it ultimately led to division of India. The chapter provides ample historically background to understand Pakistan's post-independence identity.

Chapter-3

The Evolution of National Identity and its Impact on Pakistan's Foreign Policy (1947-2001)

The present chapter examines the processes and dynamics of Pakistan's identity construction in post-independence era: from 1947 to 2001. Firstly, the chapter shows as to how after winning independence Pakistani state went on to define its identity to teach to masses that why All India Muslim League demanded a separate homeland and as to how Indian Muslims have a diametrically opposed identity in relation to Hindu Identity. The unbridgeable religious and cultural gulf between binaries of 'we' (Muslims) versus 'them' (Hindus) justified the urgency, necessity of partition and the future trajectory of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Secondly, the chapter highlights the second strand of Pakistan's identity: convergences and commonalities between the Western and Pakistani identities. Thirdly, the chapter brings to light as to how Pakistani foreign policy and political elites went on to make Islam as a super-structural component of its identity and then used it to cement relations with the Muslim countries, especially Middle Eastern countries by espousing Pan-Islamic causes and by underscoring cultural and religious affinities. Lastly the chapter shows as to how and to what extent the construction of various strands of Pakistan's identity influenced its foreign policy.

3.1 Identity Construction Vis-à-vis Indian Identity

“... all nations bear some marks of their origin. The circumstances that accompanied their birth and contributed to their development affect the whole term of their being” (Tocqueville & Mayer, 1994).

After independence Pakistani political elites went on to make Islam, otherisation of India as one of the main tropes of Pakistani identity. Pakistani nationalism was imbued with an ideology that treated India as its ideational foil. India, as a foil of Pakistani identity has been the most dominant feature of Pakistani identity. After winning independence and the problems and challenges that emerged thereof, Pakistan believed that India posed not only a military threat but also acted as a diplomatic rival of Pakistan (Choudhury, 1968).

After winning independence Pakistani political elites have to construct identity of Pakistan as a part of its nation building processes. Pakistan not only needed to tell the world that how it is different from its foil (India) but it also needed to tell its people as to who they are and how they are different from others. Formation of national identity is an important component of nation building. The political elites of a country interveneculturally to impose their version of national identity on the masses. Hence, it can be said that national identity is an elitist project (Utz, 2005).

Before Pakistan's identity formation and its impact on its foreign policy is explained, it is necessary to dwell on the process of identity formation and the role 'othering' plays in it. Chantal Mouffe avers that identity formation is anchored on an exclusivity where an adversarial actor has to be excluded (Mouffe, 1993).

Dominique Schnapper avers that "Collective attachments are always affirmed in opposition to others..." (Schnapper, 2002). By keeping the foregoing in view, we can safely surmise that formation of national identity is invariably linked with declaration of a common adversary. Hence, it is safe to aver that the defined other plays a constitutive role in national identity formation. Halls firmly argues that constructing the "positive" meaning and identity of any term hinges on its relation

to the other, to what it lacks, to its constitutive outside (Hall & Du Gay, 1996).

In expounding the role of 'otherisation' in defining national identities, Seyla Benhabib states that in the process of identity formation, the aim is to show as to how one is different from its defined other. Thus, the politics of difference vis-à-vis the defined other is the ultimate goal of the political elites when they embark on the journey of national identity formation (Benhabib et al., 2007).

The whole process of identity construction was based upon accentuation of difference between Hindu identity and Muslim Identity (K. K. Aziz, n.d.). Hussain Haqqani avers that Pakistani state elites used Islam "to unify the multiethnic and multilingual Pakistanistate, they have also used it to reinforce Pakistan's identity in opposition to India's predominant Hindu population" (Haqqani, 2010).

India in post-independence scenario not only posed an existential material threat to the physical security of the nascent Pakistani state but it also posed a potent ideational threat to the newly founded state.

Before partition of the subcontinent, Indian National Congress attempted to present itself as the sole spokesperson of a monolithic Indian identity. In post-independence era it continued its ideational onslaught on Pakistani Identity by portraying the latter as an aberration of Indian Identity and a product of colonial artifice. It attempted to subsume Pakistani identity by nullifying the differences between the antithetical identities of the two polities by merely ascribing the creation of Pakistan to colonialists.

"Two Nation Theory" that aims to highlight as to how the two nations i.e. Pakistan and India are culturally and religious different, was again embraced to establish the

distinctive character of Pakistani identity. The Indian polity was defined in diametrically opposed terms so as to differentiate character and ethos of Pakistani Identity from a bigger, hegemonic and adversarial Indian Identity. “Two Nation Theory” was not only espoused during the independence movement as an official narrative but also in post-independence era it continued to play a major role in defining Pakistani identity.

Right after its independence in 1947, Pakistan started its quest for construction of a distinct identity and realisation of international recognition that could set it apart from India. Unlike the state of India, Pakistan being a new state had to construct a separate identity in order to get international recognition. Pakistani state elites were fully cognisant of the fact that if Pakistan couldn't establish its separate identity vis-à-vis India it will not be able to carve its own niche at international level.

The best choice Pakistani elites had, in order to achieve a separate identity vis-à-vis India was espousal of an Islamic identity, it was the Islamic identity that undergird Two Nation theory which served as the *raison d'être* for establishment of a separate country(M. A. Khan, 2011).

3.2 Being a Pakistani means “A South Asian Muslim who is not an Indian

The Muslim leaders who led Indian Muslim during the freedom struggle and also played leading role in Pakistan's formative years strategically aimed to craft a distinct Pakistani identity. Adoption of the Islam and the concept of Islamic unity shaped Pakistan's foreign policy in ideological ways. The ideological dimension of Pakistan's foreign policy was a product of foreign policy elites' conviction that

instead of territorial nationalism, ideological nationalism should act as the bedrock of Pakistan's identity. The ideology of Pakistan was used to detach/ separate Pakistan from 'Hindu' India historically, geographically and from a civilizational perspective (Pande, 2018).

Benedict Anderson, avers that nations are "imagined communities," construction of their identities and the construction of the identity of their defined "others" determine not only their domestic policies but also determine their foreign policies (Anderson, 1991). The founding leaders of the country based Pakistan's identity on Islam. The Hindu India was defined as 'other'. Identity in this sense means that 'other' is understood as a distinct and discrete in relation to its own identity. An aggressive and hegemonic Hindu India against the backdrop of Muslim Pakistan engendered mistrust and further increased insecurity of Pakistan which was initially a product of material disparities between the two states.

Indian hegemonic desires to re-absorb Pakistan left no doubts in the minds of the founding fathers that India posed an existential threat to integrity of Pakistan. To neutralise both ideational and material threats posed by 'Hindu' India, the political elites of Pakistan were led to ideologically determine Pakistan's national identity and a concomitant foreign policy (Pande, 2018). Construction of Pakistani national identity was considered imperative to ensure national survival (M. A. Khan, 2011).

For Pakistan's foreign policy elites securing distinctiveness of Pakistani national identity was akin to securing territorial integrity of the country. Pakistan's national identity influenced both external and internal politics of the country. From the internal point of view, the ideology driven identity of Pakistan was used to unite the ethnically and linguistically diverse country. Pakistan had the distinction of being

the first Muslim majority country to declare itself as an Islamic Republic in its first constitution, promulgated in 1956. Objective Resolution passed in 1949 also stressed upon political leaders to provide an enabling environment to Pakistani Muslims whereby they can order their lives according to Islamic teachings and requirements.

Indian failure to reconcile to partition of India coupled with its material superiority and aggressive designs; exacerbated ontological insecurities of Pakistan. Pakistani foreign policy elites were fully cognisant of the requirements of international anarchical system. They fully knew that materially speaking they couldn't compete with India. Therefore, they had to look for allies in the international community. They instrumentally used Pakistan's ideology driven national identity to establish religious and cultural connections with the Muslim countries and also tried to construct ideational convergences with the West especially with the US.

To institutionalise the contours and facets of distinctive national identity; Pakistani state elites like elites of other post- colonial states went on to promote, disseminate and to narrate the contours and facets of its ideology driven national identity through its curricula. Differences between the 'Hindu' India and Muslim Pakistan were accentuated and propagated with a view to validate creation of Pakistan and to bring to fore impossibility of the two nations staying together.

Veteran Pakistani journalist Khaled Ahmed in an interview with Aparna Pande says that it seems inherent to individuals that being Pakistani necessitates an anti-Hindu stance: it's intrinsic to the identity, a fundamental aspect. Defining oneself in contrast to the 'other' is essential. For Pakistanis, India has become that definitive 'other' (Pande, 2018).

3.3 Pakistan's Islamic identity: Accentuated Otherisation of India

Waheed-uz-Zaman avers that Islamic ideology and establishment of an Islamic state was the driving force of freedom struggle, it was the bedrock of the freedom movement, it was people's ideology and last but not the least it was the *raison d'être* for the establishment of Pakistan. Pakistan can't survive without its ideology; Arabs, Persians and Turks if they lose their Islamic identities (God forbids) they could still retain their distinct identity as Arabs, Turks and Persians. However, if Pakistan disconnects itself from its ideology it might cease to exist (Zaman, 1974)

National identity which happens to be a mandatory part of nationalism and the process of nation building often derives its contents from linguistic affinities, cultural commonalities, ethnic, territorial and civilizational linkages of a set of people. However, in case of Pakistan what sets Pakistani national identity apart from the traditional national identities which derive their contents from all the above-mentioned ideational resources; is Pakistan's sole and exclusive reliance on common religion of the majority as the ultimate marker of its national identity. The exclusive reliance on Islamic ideology as a component of national identity was a utilitarian and instrumental choice to unite ethnically and linguistically diverse populace at domestic level and to make the country distinct vis-à-vis 'Hindu' India at external level and to connect with Islamic world. But the instrumentality of the identity narrative and tropes have emanated from the foundational ideas of the freedom struggle whereby preservation of Islamic identity was the cardinal goal of the freedom struggle. Therefore, adoption of Islamic identity was not merely a

rational choice but it was first and foremost the product of the ideational construct of the state. The primacy of the ideational construct of the state stamps the primacy and priority of ideas over rational calculations.

The ideology driven Pakistani national identity acts as an “ideological safeguard” that protects Pakistan’s territorial integrity against centrifugal forces at domestic level and solve its ideational dilemma vis-à-vis Indian material might and aggressive designs at external level (M. A. Khan, 2011).

Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary, Tanvir Ahmed Khan in an interview with Aparna Pande avers that Pakistan’s foreign policy elites espoused Islamic ideology for instrumental, utilitarian and expedient purposes. As compared to history and geography as determinants of foreign policy; Pakistan foreign policy is disproportionately skewed in favour of ideology. Resultantly the foreign policy of Pakistan has always remained under the influence of its ideology (Pande, 2018). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the instrumentality of the ideology has emanated from ideational constructs of the elites who viewed India as Pakistan’s significant other. It is their contrarian worldview vis-à-vis India which coloured Pakistani identity narratives and discourses.

3.4 Indian Irreconcilability to Partition of India Drove a Wedge between India and Pakistan.

India didn’t reconcile to the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan’s insecurity vis-à-vis Indian irreconcilability to partition was accentuated when it came to light that Indian Ministry for External Affairs drafted a clandestine document for Indian Cabinet. The document purportedly advised the Indian government that the primary aim of

Indian foreign policy should be the dissolution of Pakistan, through peaceful methods if feasible, and by alternative means if required. (Feldman et al., 2001).

It was not the only revelation that exposed Indian aggressive and hegemonic Indian designs in relation to Pakistan. There were a plethora of policies and statements of Indian officials that exposed Indian hegemonic designs i.e. India withheld transference of Pakistani assets, it started a water war with Pakistan by stopping the flow of Indus river, occupied Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir and incendiary statements of Hindutva nationalists' leaders that insinuated undoing of partition. Pakistan's sense of insecurity caused by failure of Indian leadership to reconcile with partition of India was further strengthened and entrenched when Field Marshal Auchinleck, the first commander-in-chief of Indian Army made a revealing statement on 28th October, 1947. He said that he has no reservations whatsoever in stating that the current Indian Cabinet is firmly committed to exerting every effort to hinder the establishment of a stable foundation for the Dominion of Pakistan (Connell, 1959).

British Prime Minister Clement Atlee perhaps based his hope to see a reunited India by keeping in view hegemonic intentions of India; he believed that partition may not last as there is a possibility that this separation might not be permanent, and the two emerging Dominions that we are currently establishing could eventually reunite to constitute a significant member state within the British Commonwealth of Nations (Burke, 1974).

Similarly, Lord Listowel, the final British secretary of state for India, expressed, "One can only wish that as the drawbacks of division become evident through practical experience, the two Dominions will willingly opt to come together once

again as a unified Indian Dominion. Such an entity could attain the global stature commensurate with its territories and resources (Burke, 1974).

The hope and possibility of the reunion of India as expressed by the British officials show that they didn't regard viability of Indian partition due to irreconcilability of Indian leadership to the partition. Had India been supportive of Pakistan it wouldn't have tried to choke Pakistan economically, socially and militarily.

By keeping the foregoing details in view, it is safe to surmise that Pakistan's fears, apprehensions and insecurities were not unfounded. This sense of insecurity in relation to Indian hegemonic designs remained and became the major influence on perceptions of Pakistani foreign policy elites, these perceptions influenced the conception of self- vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan's early leadership be it military or civilian knew the world is anarchical and also knew that Pakistan is facing serious threats from India. Based on selfish conduct of Indian government, Pakistani foreign policy elites fully knew that India would not accept partition till Pakistan start dancing to Indian tunes. Statements of the leaders of Indian National Congress and Hindutva leadership entrenched Pakistani fears.

Political, economic and historical factors often determine foreign policies of nation states. Foreign policy formulations that aim to achieve national interests are mostly based on rational calculations. But pure rational calculations alone do not determine foreign policy. There may be some ideational factors like fear, hatred produced by the bitterness of the past and these factors may be intermingled with material and religious considerations that determine foreign policy of a nation.

The feelings of fear, insecurity and hatred bring forth a passion that rules foreign policy of every country. The passion that defines foreign policy of nation states cannot be termed entirely irrational and emotional. The ruling passion of a nation's foreign policy is rationalised based on the acrimonious relationship of the past. Partition of the sub-continent was one such catastrophic and traumatic happening that produced mutual hatred and ill will. In consequence of the mutual fear and ill will, Pakistan being a smaller country formulated foreign policy which was dictated by fear of India (Sayeed, 2023).

Pakistan's ideology drew its substance from two nation theory, perceptions and vision of Muslim elites in pre-independence era and last but not the least from ever looming Indian threats. Pakistan's ideology not only shaped its foreign policy but also shaped its national identity. The perceived irreconcilability of 'Hindu' India to the partition helped Pakistani elites to keep the two-nation theory alive and relevant in post-independence era (Pande, 2018).

The belief of Pakistani political elites in irreconcilability of 'Hindu' India to the partition and unacceptance of the rationale that undergird establishment of Pakistan coupled with overarching revisionist ambitions of India which aimed to trample Pakistan "beneath a massive, hostile, nearby Hindu culture" (Stephens, 1963) influenced the genesis of Pakistan and its future course of action.

Keeping in view exclusionary and discriminatory politics of Indian National Congress, at the time of partition the leadership of AIML exhorted the British to declare India as 'Hindustan'. Muslim leadership including Muhammad Ali Jinnah used the term Hindustan for India to represent the Hindu character of Indian state on the premise that after the separation of Indian Muslims what would be left behind in

India were Hindus (Pande, 2018).

Moreover, the espousal of the nomenclature of Hindustan for India is also consistent with pertinence of two nation theory.

3.5 Indian Hegemonic Conduct Ingrained Insecurities into Pakistani National Identity

As recently as the year 2000, an article published in the prominent Pakistani newspaper Daily Dawn underscored the deeply entrenched ideological divide between India and Pakistan. The article highlighted that since its inception, Pakistan has grappled with the formidable challenge of crafting a distinct national identity separate from India. Emanating from a rupture within India's historical civilization, Pakistan has engaged in extensive discourse regarding the establishment of its unique cultural identity. This identity is intended not only to set it apart from India but also to make it comprehensible to the global community.

During the 1960s, a prominent editorial in a major Pakistani newspaper echoed this perspective, asserting that "While the primary preoccupation of the Christian West might be curbing Chinese Communism, for Muslim Pakistan, the paramount focus is restraining aggressive and militant Hinduism." (Sayeed, 2023).

Aslam Siddiqi, in his analysis of Pakistan's security and foreign policy, delves into the perspectives of Pakistan's leaders concerning both its regional context and the global arena. Siddiqi asserts that Pakistan's chosen course of action was compelled by the security challenges it encountered and its geopolitical positioning (Siddiqi, 1960).

Decades later, former Pakistani ambassador Shahid Amin underscored the

persistent and nearly obsessive aspect of Pakistan's foreign policy in relation to its quest for security in the face of 'Hindu' India, a significantly larger and ideologically distinct neighbour. Amin expressed that Pakistan's actions within its foreign relations have been notably shaped by its perception of an existential peril emanating from India (Amin, 2005).

The way a state defines itself and defines the 'other' determines who the state imagines as a 'threat' and which policies it follows to counter that threat and guarantee its own survival. In this case, 'Hindu' India was envisioned as a threat to the very survival of 'Islamic' Pakistan. Thus, in the eyes of the policy-makers, it followed that Pakistan's interests lay in 'containing' India, 'seeking parity' with India, 'gaining' allies against India and 'escaping' an Indian identity or heritage. Pakistan's policy towards India, Afghanistan, the United States, China and the Muslim world reflects various aspects of this basic construct.

Indian hegemonic discourse as epitomised by its irreconcilability to Indian partition didn't bode well for good relations between India and Pakistan.

Indian hegemonic designs didn't remain confined to discourse alone. The forcible takeover of Kashmir and the resultant war between the two countries buttressed Pakistani fears vis-à-vis power asymmetries between India and Pakistan. To make up for the lack of power parity between the two countries, Pakistani foreign policy elites set on a course to find allies who can support Pakistan militarily and economically. Had India reconciled to creation of Pakistan, Pakistan wouldn't have to wade into cold war politics. It was Indian status as Pakistan's significant other which made its actions hegemonic from the outset, it was otherisation of India and resultant ideational and material divergences between the two countries that

spawned fears for Pakistan and it was forced to pick sides in cold war era and beyond.

The ideational onslaught of Indian leadership on the idea of Pakistan in the aftermath of partition soon morphed into Indian hegemonic conduct. The hegemonic conduct of India turned the sense of insecurity which was initially based mostly on perceptions into reality.

Survival in the anarchic world is the *raison d'être* of every state's foreign policy. Pakistani foreign policy elites in order to ensure survival of the state formulated Pakistan's foreign policy in response to hegemonic Indian conduct. The hegemonic conduct of India created a lasting siege mentality vis-à-vis Indian conduct in the region and beyond.

The siege mentality is borne out by Indian centric foreign policy of Pakistan. The origin of this siege mentality can be traced back to early years of Pakistan's inception. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan once said: some individuals within the neighbouring nation, harbouring animosity towards Pakistan's creation, aimed to weaken its foundation. They employed a strategy of burdening Pakistan with the sudden responsibility of accommodating seven million refugees within a short span of time. These refugees, forced to leave their ancestral residences, sought sanctuary within Pakistan. (M. A. Khan, 2011).

Indian intransigence in relation to the partition was not just confined to the leadership of Indian National Congress rather the main thrust of the opposition to normalisation of relations between the two countries in the immediate aftermath of partition came from the Indian communalists. Communalists in India kept constant pressure on Nehru for adoption of hawkish stance on the disputes between the two

countries.

3.6 Hindu Nationalism in Post-Independent India Vindicated the Rationale behind Creation of Pakistan

Hindu nationalists couldn't stomach creation of Pakistan. Hindu nationalists not only opposed the politics of AIML but they also disapproved of the politics of Gandhiji. They condemn Gandhiji for his anti-communalist policies and derisively termed his policies as appeasement of Muslims. Nathuram Godse assassinated Gandhi on 30th January 1948 accusing the latter of being soft on Muslim and for his policies which were deemed detrimental to Hindus and Hinduism (Godse & Godse, 1993).

Nehru was very keen to maintain a positive image of India at international level. In the post-independence era he morphed into a liberal. He fully knew that if the policies of Hindus nationalists are implemented then India will be doomed.

3.7 The Adversarial Indian and Pakistani Identities Spawned Disputes

India launched an ideational onslaught on the idea of Pakistan by attempting to nullify emergence of Pakistan by declaring it as a colonial artifice and by promoting the idea of unviability of Pakistani state. Indian hegemonic rhetoric soon translated into reality when on April 1, 1948, it cut off water supply from the two head-works of the Punjab canal system. Through this hegemonic move India aimed to suffocate West Pakistan's fledgling agrarian economy which was heavily if not solely dependent on water flowing from Indian controlled head works. "No army with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land as thoroughly as [West] Pakistan could

be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the resources of water that keep the fields and the people of [West] Pakistan alive" (Chopra, 1965).

In another defiant move vis-à-vis Indian hegemony: Pakistan didn't toe Indian line by not devaluing its currency in response to devaluation of Indian rupee in September 1949. India responded with yet another provocative move by cutting the supply of badly needed coal supply to Pakistan. The move virtually stopped the trade between the two countries. Trade relations between the two countries could only be restored after signing of trade agreement in February 1951 (Choudhury, 1968). Hegemonic Indian conduct perpetuated siege mentality in the minds of Pakistani foreign policy elites. Resultantly, mutual mistrust, recriminations and acrimony between the two countries were ingrained and etched indelibly in Pakistan's national identity.

3.8 Kashmir and Pakistan's National Identity

Indian annexation of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir not only created security dilemma for Pakistan but it also posed an ideational threat to the idea of Pakistan. Among the annexed territories, Indian Occupied Kashmir held especial ideational significance vis-à-vis national identities of India and Pakistan. From Indian perspective the state of Jammu Kashmir is emblematic of its secular identity and secession from India could act as a catalyst for balkanisation of culturally and religiously diverse Indian state.

On the other hand, Kashmir is ideationally important for Pakistan for very different reasons. The letter "K" is part of the country's acronymic nomenclature. It also relates to the very idea of Pakistan which is anchored on two-nation theory.

According to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's inaugural democratically elected civilian prime minister, the persistence of a Muslim-majority region within India would undermine the fundamental purpose of Pakistan. He asserts that the integrity of Pakistan hinges on the inclusion of Jammu and Kashmir, not just from a territorial perspective, but also in terms of its ideological significance. (Z. A. Bhutto, 1969).

Since independence Pakistan's successive political leaders have been treating Kashmir issue as the 'unfinished business of partition'. Kashmir has been the linchpin of Pakistan's foreign policy and successive Pakistani leaders have tried to resolve the gridlock on Kashmir either through peaceful or other means.

The importance and significance of Kashmir with regard to Pakistan's national identity/self can be gauged and measured from the following assertion of Pakistan's first prime minister when he says that "the liberation of Kashmir is a cardinal belief of every Pakistani. Pakistan would remain incomplete until the whole of Kashmir has been liberated". In the same vein he said that "for Pakistan, Kashmir is a vital necessity; for India it is an imperialistic adventure" (Brecher, 1953).

Emphatic otherisation of India was also necessitated by the fact that after the partition a sizeable Muslim population stayed behind in India. Therefore, Pakistani foreign policy elites have to steadily highlight the antithetical character of Indian state to justify creation of Pakistan (Pande, 2018).

3.9 Role of Islam in Pakistan's Identity

Wali Nasr, a prominent political scientist, asserts that in post-colonial Muslim nations, a strategy of state-driven Islamisation is often employed both to establish

legitimacy and to quell secular opposition. Governments might exercise physical control over their populations, but for effective governance, they must also wield ideological influence over their citizens. In the context of Pakistan, its founders recognised the necessity of an overarching ideology to unify Muslims from various regions of former British India into a cohesive nation. Even during the 1940s, the Muslim League, lacking robust grassroots structures, utilised Islamic slogans as a unifying force (Naṣr, 2001).

A fundamental query in the political dialogue surrounding Pakistan revolves around whether it is a "territory for Muslims" or a "community of Muslims progressing towards its course as an Islamic state"(Talbot, 1998). Following its independence, the formulation of a distinctive Pakistani national ideology required the incorporation of Islam and the distinctiveness of Muslims to shape a state identity. Pakistan was formally designated as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and its progression towards an Islamic orientation has consistently remained a declared state policy.

On the domestic front, Pakistani policymakers embraced an Islamisation strategy to validate their governance and unify what they perceived as a fragile, multi-ethnic nation, while also preparing to counter potential threats from neighbouring 'Hindu' India. All of Pakistan's constitutions have consistently underscored the significant role of Islam and emphasized that no legislation within the country should run counter to any principles of Islam (Newman, 1962).

The critical role of Islam in the pre-independence identity of Pakistan has been explained at length in the previous chapter. Islam continued to play an important role in Pakistan's identity in post-independence era. In fact, Islam has always acted

as a supreme ideational super-structure in relation to Pakistan's national identity. Like the timeless significance of the logic of power in international relations, the ideational superstructure of Islam has acted as a constant factor in construction of Pakistani identity and formation of goals and objectives of its foreign policy.

Other components or thematic characteristics of Pakistan's national identity remains largely subservient to the ideational dictates of component of Islamic super structure. As liberal democracy and secularism are the two super ideational structures of the Western civilization where no policy prescription is accepted if it contravenes these superstructures of Western identity. Similarly, no policy can garner public support in Pakistan if it contravenes or is not connected/aligned in some way with the super structure of Islamic identity.

The super structure of Islam has been found as the most dominant and consequential among all tropes of Pakistan's national identity that have a bearing on Pakistan's foreign policy formulations. It has not only shaped Pakistan's self-image vis-à-vis its significant other (India), employed domestically as a binding force to unite its diverse and heterogeneous society but also acted as a key trope of Pakistan's national identity that shaped its relations with both Muslim and Western worlds.

No nation state can think of survival in the anarchical yet interconnected world without establishing relations with the outside world. Nation states establish relationships with the outside world to fulfill their material and ideational interests. Nation states initiate the process of establishing relationship with external actors by highlighting and accentuating material and ideational convergences between states. Needless to say, Pakistan's foreign policy elites also followed this approach (of finding material and ideational convergences with other states) to establish

relationship with the external world.

The pertinence of Islamic identity in relation to Pakistan's foreign policy is indisputable in its history and will continue to be an important causal factor in shaping country's foreign and domestic policies in future. Pakistan's Islamic character has in the past and will continue in the future to be a factor in that country's domestic and foreign policies. In both domestic and foreign policy, Islam is seen as an element of identity, throughout the history of the state's existence, all of Pakistan's leaders have sought close relations with the Muslim world because such a policy has been popular domestically; in addition, they probably did so to serve as a justification for their country's existence (Bishku, 1992).

Pakistan's founding fathers being a product of Anglo-Indian and Muslim traditions aspired to establish the state on the principles of Western democratic theory. They envisioned to dovetail Islam into constitutional democracy. They didn't view modern democracy and the Islamic principles as antithetical or contradictory. They believed that the tenets of Western democracy i.e. "fairness, justice, compassion and honesty are all tenets of Islam" (Ziring, 1993).

The role of Islam in relation to formulation of Pakistan's foreign policy has been treated as one of the fundamental variables since the country gained its independence. Though Pakistan also established strong and enduring partnerships with non-Muslim powers like the US and the People's Republic of China yet on the parallel it continued to promote and highlight its cultural and religious affinities and connections with the wider Muslim world. Since Pakistan was founded to protect the constitutional interests of Indian Muslims, association with wider Muslim world, problems and causes was hence a logical corollary of its foundational rationale.

In post-independence era the ideational conception of self as a Muslim polity established to espouse and promote relations with the wider Muslim world was enshrined in Pakistan's first constitution under Article 24 whereby strengthening of fraternal relations with the Muslim world was made incumbent upon the state (Choudhury, 1969). The act of enshrining the establishment of fraternal relations with the Muslim World henceforward became a linchpin of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's Muslim identity was also preserved in 1962 constitution. Establishment of fraternal relations with the Muslim World was again enshrined in principles of policy of the constitution of 1973 constitution, Article 40 makes establishment of friendly relations with the global South in general and the Muslim world in particular incumbent upon the state. The article also mandated the state to promote international peace and to play its role in peaceful settlement of international disputes. (Article 40 of the Constitution, 1973)

3.10 Pan- Islamism: Impact on Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Creation of Pakistan was unique in the sense that it defied Westphalian tenet of territoriality. Pakistan was founded with a vision to provide a befitting place to Indian Muslims belonging to different ethnic, racial and linguistic groups whereby they could order their lives in accordance with Islamic principles. The notions of shared ethnicity, language and race were subordinated under the superstructure of Islam. By keeping the foregoing in view, it seems logical for Pakistan to embark on a mission to find brotherhood and support in the Muslim World (S. S. Khan, 2003). Right after independence Pakistan's foreign policy elites set on a course to capitalise on its ideational super structure; its Islamic identity to bolster its relationship with the external world especially with the Muslim world.

In 1948 Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah also underscored the need to unite all the Muslim countries for their survival in the anarchic world, governed by the tenets of power politics. Nothing better illustrates the dominance of power politics over moral principles than disputes of Kashmir, Palestine and Indonesia. To cope with this challenging situation the Muslims need to unite so that their voice is heard in the comity of nations (I. Ahmed, 2023).

Pakistan's first Prime Minister stated that that for Pakistanis it is of paramount importance to strengthen its brotherly relations with Muslim world. He said that our hearts reverberate with those who would embrace and support policies, measures and take decision that aim to bring geographically diverse Muslim world closer to promote cooperation between the Muslim countries. Pakistan's cardinal mission statement is to try to its fullest potential of a nation state, its goal of establishing close and lasting cooperation with the Muslim world (Burke, 1974).

Pakistan's foreign policy prominently embraced an Islamic-led identity, underscored by its Pan-Islamism perspective. Chaudary Khaleeq-uz-Zaman, the then president of the All India Muslim League (AIML), articulated the vision of Pakistan's foreign policy aiming to unite all Muslim nations under the concept of 'Islamistan' (Siddiqi, 1960).

In the first seven years of the country's independence Pakistan tried to market its status as a fifth largest Muslim country in the world to develop close partnerships with Muslim world. Pakistan's forthcoming diplomatic support for liberation of Indonesia is a case in point. Its close and cordial relations with Iran and Turkey started right after independence.

Since its inception as a sovereign state, Pakistan took up the cudgel for Muslim

causes like the Palestinian, Algerian, Tunisian, Turkish Cypriot dispute, Moroccan, Libyan and Indonesian liberation struggles. However, among all these causes Pakistan most unequivocally, consistently and vociferously supported two causes that are: Palestinian and Kashmiri liberation struggles. Like the issue of Kashmir, Palestinian dispute strikes chords with the people of Pakistan (Howell, 1962).

Pan-Islamic aspirations and leanings of Pakistan's foreign policy elites were realised when Pakistan joined Central Treaty Organisation having Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and the UK as its members. In Ayyub Khan's words, through this pro-Western alliance, there was an opportunity for Pakistan's political elites to translate their Pan-Islamic aspirations into a reality by forming an alliance of Muslim countries under the umbrella of Christian world. The alliance was a means to satisfy the Pan-Islamic tendencies of the Muslim world (Ayub Khan, 1967).

Guided by its ideology and super-structural trope of its identity, Pakistan not only started establishing fraternal relations with Muslim countries after independence but also tried to play active part in the then multilateral Muslim organisation like 'World Muslim Congress'. The organisation was founded in 1926 in Makkah by the then Saudi king *Abdul Aziz*. Pakistan started working to revive the organisation under the very leadership of the founding father, *Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*. In February 1949 and February 1951, the third and fourth conferences of the organisation were held in the then capital of Pakistan, Karachi respectively to revive the dormant organisation. The fourth conference of the organisation turned out to be very seminal as it laid the foundations of the Congress' contribution of strengthening fraternal relation among Muslim polities and the peoples(n.d.).

In 1949 and in 1954, Pakistan in order to promote convergences and commonalities

vis-à-vis Muslim world hosted the first and the third meetings of International Economic Conference, respectively in furtherance of Pakistan's goal of establishing friendly relations with the Muslim world (Burke, 1974).

Pakistan remained very active on diplomatic front in the UN to promote and support Causes of the wider Muslim world. There have been two constant foreign policy goals of Pakistan that are; to address its material and ontological insecurities vis-à-vis India and its desire to establish close and friendly relations with Muslim world especially with countries having overwhelming Muslim majority (Bishku, 1992).

In the era of 1960s Pakistan attempted to extensively employ Islamic idiom to further strengthen its relations with the Islamic world. Lack of US support in 1965 war, forced Pakistani foreign policy elites to look for support elsewhere especially to the Muslim world with which it enjoys ideological affinities. Pakistan managed to secure support of some Muslim countries like Indonesia, Iran and Turkey during 1965 war. Pakistan also started playing a more active and robust role in advocating Muslim causes like the Palestinian cause especially after six-day Arab Israel war in 1967.

Though Pakistan continued to give importance to Pan-Islamism in its foreign policy yet on the whole other Muslim countries were more concerned about their domestic problems rather than transnational inspirations (Chopra, 1965).

In 1969, it was burning of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem which acted as stimulus to awaken the political consciousness of the Muslims by underscoring the importance of Muslim unity in dealing with the challenges and issues faced by the Muslim world. "The geopolitical changes in the Middle East signaled the tipping of the scale from Pan-Arabism to Pan-Islamism, culminating in the creation of the

OIC that same year” (Z. S. Ahmed & Akbarzadeh, 2023).

The incident galvanised Muslims to seek protection and survival in unity. In order to practically achieve unity in Muslim states Organisation of Islamic Conference (renamed as Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in 2011) was founded in Rabat in 1969. Pakistan was one of the founding members of the organisation. The first Islamic summit was held in Rabat in 1969, Pakistan was one of the 25 countries which participated in the summit.

After independence, Pakistan hitched its national wagon to Western/American stars but the US’ generous arms supply to India during Sino-India border dispute of 1962 despite Pakistan’s vociferous protest (as it rightly feared that these weapons would eventually be employed against Pakistan), lack of Western support especially during Indo-Pak war of 1965 and cold response of US during 1971 war, made Pakistan feel a sense of betrayal at the hands of the US. Pakistan foreign policy elites especially Bhutto learnt an invaluable lesson that support from diverse players is far more important and effective than sole reliance on a single and unreliable power. To forge new partnerships or to reinvigorate and rejuvenate commonalities with old partners; realisation of material interests was based on ideational convergences.

The debacle of East Pakistan and concomitant establishment of Bangladesh as a sovereign state had a lasting impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy. The foreign policy elites especially Bhutto was deeply disgruntled with the US and hence was constrained to turn Pakistan away from the US. Bhutto embraced the Muslim world more vehemently and zealously. He tried to cement relations with the Muslim world by embracing Islamic socialism and by connecting Pakistan’s foreign policy with the principles of Non-Aligned Movement. Bhutto’s nationalization of institutions

was aligned with the economic model pursued by Islamic countries like Egypt, Algeria, and Libya.

Pakistan's insecurity vis-à-vis India also played a part in Bhutto's drive to use Islamic identity as a tool to cement relations with the Islamic world. He attempted to establish an Islamic block, not only to decrease Pakistan's reliance on the US for fulfillment of its economic needs but it was also an attempt to neutralise Indian growing clout in South Asian region.

The debacle of East Pakistan and the resultant secession of East Pakistan served as a watershed incident in Pakistan's history. It served as a moment of reckoning to take stock of national policies. The historical event of secession of East Pakistan had a lasting impact on the collective memory of Pakistan's foreign policy elites especially on Bhutto.

The historical memory conditioned Bhutto's drive to pursue more independent foreign policy in post secession 1971 era. 'Collective memory' refers to the memories that a community collectively holds about its past. It can be understood as a subjective portrayal of the past created by current political actors to meet the social and historical needs of the community (Hunt, 2010). The historical memory of the debacle of East Pakistan not only instills a sense of loss of sanctimonious territory in the collective national memory but also wiped out a sense of security in the minds of Pakistan's foreign policy elites. The sense of security which Pakistan has been drawing from partnership with the US in relation to India dashed to the ground, Pakistan was once again left to fend for itself. The tragic and traumatic event shed scales from the eyes of foreign policy elites in relation to US being the guarantor of Pakistan's security. Pakistan once again felt betrayed. This repeated

betrayal of the US had a lasting impact on Pakistan's foreign policy. The memory of the US' betrayal was etched and became an inseparable part of Pakistan's ontological narratives.

Bhutto had a strong vision of strengthening Pan-Islamism by fostering closer ties with Muslim nations. To achieve this goal, he embarked on a significant diplomatic tour in January 1972, visiting countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey (Rizvi, 1993). Bhutto's foreign policy agenda of Pan-Islamism sought to decrease economic reliance on the United States by seeking financial assistance from wealthy Muslim nations (Delvoie, 1996). Bhutto achieved significant success in enhancing ties with crucial Muslim nations like Libya and Saudi Arabia. He further solidified Pakistan's position as an important Islamic stronghold by hosting the second OIC summit in 1974 in Lahore, during which Colonel Gadhafi praised Pakistan as "the citadel of Islam in Asia" (F. Bhutto, 2010). As per Rizvi, the significance of this event lay in its ability to uplift Pakistan's morale and emphasise the importance that the Muslim world attributed to this nation (Rizvi, 1993).

In later years, General Zia actively advocated for the concept of the Muslim 'Ummah' and sought to emulate Saudi Arabia's Islamic system, implementing what came to be known as the 'Islamization of Pakistan'. These strengthened ties with Saudi Arabia also contributed to the reinforcement of Pakistan's Islamic identity (Muzaffar et al., 2017)

In the OIC Summit of January 1981, General Zia reaffirmed and solidified relations with the Saudi-led Arab states, employing religious sentiments once again. Zia emphasised that the Islamic world was confronting new challenges and dangers that

posed threats to the sovereignty and independence of Muslim states. He highlighted issues such as the occupation of the first Qibla of Muslims, the plight of Palestinian refugees, ongoing threats to Iran, and the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan (*RESOLUTIONS ON THE POLITICAL, LEGAL AND INFORMATION AFFAIRS*, 1981).

General Zia used Pan-Islamist policies to serve Pakistan's interests and to win political legitimacy. He continued Pakistan's policy of championing the cause of Palestinian Muslims and Kashmir Muslims. Pakistan under Zia, maintained neutrality during Gulf War. Support of Palestinians and neutrality during gulf war helped Zia to get legitimacy and respect in Muslim World.

Zia like his predecessors pursued India centric policies. In Afghanistan, Pakistan was supporting Afghan Mujahedeen to neutralise Indian support of Marxist regime, which was friendly to India and was hostile to Pakistan. Zia vehemently attempted to further solidify Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world especially Arab world. Pakistan continued to play a leading role in OIC.

Zia, continued to patronise and support Pakistan's nuclear programme despite hostile international environment. Pakistan's continuation of nuclear programme bespeaks of the salience of India factor in Pakistan's foreign policy. If we minus India as an adversary and a mortal enemy than Pakistan's quest for nuclear power becomes meaningless.

In 1979, before Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter administration had cut off all aid to Pakistan due to Pakistan's policy of pursuing its nuclear programme. The aid was however, restored later by Reagan administration in early 1980s (Bray, 2023). Under Zia, Pakistan once again became a US partner to contain Soviet threat. The relationship however, remained transactional primarily for the US. The US

needed Pakistan to contain Soviet communism in the region and Pakistan needed the US aid and weapons to neutralise Indian threat by enhancing its defence capabilities but Pakistan on the whole desired to establish long lasting relationship with the US.

At domestic level Zia introduced an extensive programme of Islamisation that left indelible impact on formation of Pakistani identity. The Islamisation of constitution, laws and education system had a lasting, enduring and abiding impact on the social construction of Pakistani identity. It is not beside the point to mention that Zia was not the first ruler who Islamised curriculum, successive leaders right from Pakistan's independence have used curriculum as a medium to promote Islamic ideology as a binding glue to achieve national harmony (Khalid & Khan, 2006).

What makes Zia's Islamisation drive distinct from preceding episodes was replacement of Muslim conservatism with Muslim fundamentalism and militarism. The identity formed through injection of fundamentalism and militarism in Pakistani psyche through education not only created schism and acrimony at inter-religious level but also created and perpetuated intra-religious divisions between Sunnis and Shias (Zaidi, 2011).

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provided an ideal opportunity to Zia for getting international legitimacy. The alliance of Saudi Arabia, the US and Pakistan was formed to bleed Soviets with thousands cuts.

In the post-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan became foremost American ally, Saudi Arabia came forward to provide funds for training, recruiting Muslim Jihadis from across the Muslim world. With Saudi money thousands of religious seminaries were established across the length and breadth of Pakistan. These

religious seminaries funded by wealthy Saudis (David, 2002) provided continuous provisions of fighters.

Imported radical Islam supplanted local strand of tolerant Islam as defined by Sufi traditions. Social construction of Pakistani identity didn't stop here, Zia engaged his band of official historians with a view to rewrite history. The rewritten history linked Pakistani identity with Saudi Arabia, the salience of Arab conquest of Sind in 712 was presented as a seminal year which laid the foundation of Pakistani identity (Hoodbouy, 2018). Pakistan's pre-Islamic heritage was either wiped out from the curriculum or mentioned only as a passing reference. The identity thus created was exclusionary in nature.

Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan became breeding ground of Jihadis where books funded by the US and printed by the university of Nebraska at Omaha were taught to Afghan children, the books were also used by the local Pakistani Pakhtoons. The university of Nebraska established its printing press at Nair Bagh in Peshawar. Craig Davis has analysed some contents of the books to show that how Islamic radicalism and militarism was promoted thorough these books. The books had images of bombs, daggers and tanks to prepare a warlike mentality in children. Reportedly, the US had spent more than \$50 million on publication of these books (Z. Ali, 2013).

The foregoing paragraphs highlight the ideational structures that were employed by Pakistan with Saudi and American support to construct a particular identity of Pakistan. Pakistani identity was militarised, Arabised and India continue to be 'otherised'.

This phase of Pakistani identity construction has most lasting impact on Pakistani

state than any other era of Pakistani identity construction. Zia's process of Islamisation was intrinsically characterised by fundamentalism and militarism, this process was etched in national memory and consciousness through education and mass media. This exclusionary identity became so entrenched in Pakistan's body politic that Pakistan's successive governments up to 9/11 couldn't undo the negativity of this identity (Nayyar & Salim, 2003).

Yar Muhammad avers that instead of reversing the radical and exclusionary strand of Pakistani identity "successive governments progressively 'Islamised' the national educational system" (Y. Muhammad, 2019). Successive government continued the trend of Islamisation giving primacy to Islamic faith as a superstructure and supreme marker of Pakistani identity over other determinants of nationhood (S. S. Ali, 2013).

3.11 Variation in Importance of Islam as a Factor in Pakistan's Foreign Policy in Post-Independence Era

Svante E. Cornell avers that establishment of Pakistan as a nation state is unique event as its rationale was neither ethnic nor territorial like other states rather solely it was its religious identity that gave birth to Pakistan (Shaffer, 2006).

Centrality of Islamic superstructure notwithstanding, analysis of the variations in salience of Islam as a superstructure of Pakistan's identity in post-independence era merits great attention. On the face of it different Pakistani leaders from Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, Ayub Khan, Z.A Bhutto, Zia -ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif to Imran Khan (to name the most prominent Pakistani heads of the government) can be divided into three groups namely the conservatives,

fundamentalists and the liberals or the secular leaders. This categorisation of the leaders into the aforementioned groups invariably raises questions over the relevance of Islamic superstructure in shaping Pakistan's identity and foreign policy. The review of the literature dealing with both pre-independence and post-independence eras shows that it was injection of Islamic rhetoric that helped AIML to win mass support in pre-independence era and it was the superstructure of Islam that was employed again in post-independence era to construct not only Pakistan's identity in opposition to Hindu India but also to promote national cohesion and unity at domestic level.

Generally speaking, Zia-ul-Haq is considered responsible for Islamisation in Pakistan but Hussain Haqqani has rightly challenged this assertion he says that Zia's policy of Islamisation was a continuation of ideology of Pakistan hence it can't be termed as a novelty and aberration (Haqqani, 2010). As we have already discussed at length in second chapter of the dissertation that Jinnah couldn't be called a secular leader in the sense of the word as understood by the Western world. He was a great synthesiser like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Iqbal. Like them he didn't see any contradiction between Islam and the merits of modernity. For him the merits of modernity are reconcilable with Islam.

Like Jinnah, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Iqbal, Liaqat Ali Khan was also a great synthesiser. In his address at luncheon meeting hosted by National Press Club in Washington on 4th May 1950 he said that many people misinterpret the phrase we use to describe the *raison d'etre* of Pakistani state that is its Islamic way of life. He goes onto say that Islam has certain principles of social and economic justice and it also espouses certain human values which are necessary for human welfare. Islamic way of life doesn't mean espousal of theocracy rather Islam rejects theocracy.

Adherence to Islamic way of life doesn't mean descend into intolerance and medievalism. He goes on to call the Islamic way of life as a final article of faith for the state.

The prime minister also talked about the cultural and religious links between Pakistan and Middle Eastern Muslim countries. He iterated that these links are natural and they will stand the test of time. Khan in his address at Town Hall further elucidated the phrase Islamic way of life by explaining that it means espousal of democracy, human rights, private property, equality of all citizens and sense of responsibility towards fellow men in need. He concludes that this Islamic way of life can equally be expressed through any other expression (L. A. Khan, 1950). The centrality of Islam during LiaqatAli Khan's era is also evident from the passage of historic Objective Resolution in 1949.

In the 1950s, the Islamic superstructure played an important role in influencing Pakistan's foreign policy. The country attempted to buttress its identity and interests by underscoring its Islamic ideology as a 'strategic entity' in its relations with the Muslimworld in Middle East.

During the formative years of Pakistan, Islamic ideology acted as a cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy. In pre-independence era, Indian Muslims vehemently associated themselves with Ottoman empire, after independence this association morphed into Pakistan's quest for Pan-Islamism. Between 1949 and 1955 a host of conferences of the Muslim world were held in the then capital of Pakistan, Karachi to establish close relations with the Muslim world. The first constitution of the country framed and promulgated in 1956, declared Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. The constitution not only declared Pakistan as an Islamic Republic but it also made

endeavours to promote bonds of unity among Muslim states incumbent on the state under article 24 of the constitution (Faheem et al., 2021).

Pakistan joined Baghdad Pact, a defensive organisation in 1955, in 1959 the organisation was renamed as CENTO when Iraq decided to leave the organisation. The founding members of organisation were Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. The inclusion of Pakistan in this defence organisation show the influence of Pakistan ideology on its foreign policy. Pakistan had been trying to get support of Muslim world to ensure its economic, military and ideational security against Hindu India but to little avail. The Western sponsored Baghdad pact provided the opportunity to connect with the key Muslim countries. Notwithstanding the failure of the organisation as a bulwark against communism and promoting joint defence of the members' state, Pakistan's membership of the organisation bespeaks for the penchant of its leadership to rely on ideational sources to cement relations with the Muslim world. Pakistan's membership of the organisation showed that it gave importance to Pan-Islamism whereas Arab nationalist especially the Ba'athists didn't take fancy to the Pan-Islamism.

General Muhammad Ayub Khan who is grouped amongst the secular leaders of Pakistan also espoused the Islamic superstructure to promote ideological integration at domestic level. He said that Islam was the cornerstone of Pakistan's independence movement so naturally its salience in ensuring ideological integration at domestic level is unassailably established. He believed that foreign policy projects the domestic social, political and economic realities of a state. Pakistan's desire to establish fraternal relations with the Muslim world stems from Pakistan's deep rooted ideological affinity with the Muslim world that itself is a product of the defining role played by Islamic ideology in Pakistan's independence movement. He

also attempted to rationally unravel the complexity of Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world when he says that Muslim countries have their issues with the Western powers and they also suffer from internal dissention. Muslim countries fail to realise that Pakistan doesn't have power to resolve these issues. He goes on to say that Muslim countries also fail to see that unlike them Pakistan doesn't have dispute with the West rather it has disputes with its hostile neighbour. Ayub Khan like his predecessors couldn't think of formulating the foreign policy of Pakistan beyond the dictates of Pakistan's ideology. He was astute enough that any foreign policy that deviates from the superstructure will be highly unpopular at domestic level (F. M. M. A. Khan, 2009).

As far as the role of religion in the polity was concerned, Ayub Khan like Jinnah believed in progressive character of Islam and opposed dogmatism. He was an ardent believer of assimilative and adoptive character of Islam. In the constitution of 1962 which was promulgated in May 1962, references to the holy Quran and Sunnah were made in the directive principles, the constitution also mandated establishment of an Advisory council of Islamic ideology. Like Sir Syed, Jinnah and Iqbal, he believed in the dynamism of Islamic faith. For him the essence and miracle of Islam lies in it being an assimilative force between life and religion and religion prevails as long as this connection stays intact. It is worthwhile to state that initially the word Islamic was omitted from the formal nomenclature of state but later under the pressure of the orthodox forces he accepted to retake the word 'Islamic' and also agreed to restore all the Islamic features of 1956 constitution (M. Muhammad, 2018).

In the light of the foregoing it can safely be surmised that Ayub despite being steeped in Anglo Indian traditions and a modernist couldn't fully deviate from

admitting the centrality of Islamic ideational superstructure in defining the Pakistani self. This centrality of Islamic superstructure is also borne out by the Legal Framework order issued by Yahya Khan wherein in article 20 of the order it is stated that Pakistan came into being to preserve Islamic ideology (M. Muhammad, 2018).

Bhutto as highlighted in the preceding section was a Muslim pragmatist who used Islamic idiom and symbolism to garner and galvanise support of masses to further his policies. He cemented Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world by building on the ideational convergences and took Pakistan's historical espousal of Pan-Islamism to new heights. At domestic level he espoused the slogan of Islamic socialism. In one of his public addresses at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi he stated that we are 'first Muslims and then Pakistanis'. He also equated Socialism with the Islamic concept of Musavat and found no difference between Islamic socio-economic principles and Socialism (Z. A. Bhutto, 2018). Pakistan fully supported the Arabs during Arab Israel war of 1973 (Bishku, 1992). Mir Zohair Hussain avers that Bhutto, despite being a secular and liberal leader can be identified with revivalism of Islam. He adroitly exploited Islamic history and culture to skilfully steer his domestic and foreign policy (Mutalib et al., 1996).

As highlighted in the preceding section; three events (US arms supply to India during Sino-India border dispute, arms embargo on Pakistan during Indo-Pak war of 1965 and US' cold response in 1971) played a defining role in the mental map of Bhutto in relation to Pakistan's relations with the US. Bhutto attempted to diversify Pakistan's foreign relations by vehemently espousing Pan-Islamism and by establishing closer relations with communist China. Bhutto through his slogan of 'Islamic Socialism' has already attempted to highlight the convergences between socialism and Islam. By establishing closer relations with China he was attempting

to amalgamate the principles of Islamic distributive justice with socialism. Bhutto's socialist ideas along with other factors influenced him to forge closer relations with China especially after his appointment as a foreign minister in 1963. Bhutto's version of 'Islamic Socialism' was a combination of using India as an ideational and material adversary, Islam and nationalism (Bahadur, 1977).

It was Bhutto's nationalist ideology which shaped Pakistan's relations with other countries in general and with the US and India in particular. Bhutto attempted to establish balanced relations with the US and also worked to reduce Pakistan's heavy reliance on the US as an ally as it has failed to protect the ideational and territorial integrity of the country.

It was not Bhutto who distanced Pakistan from the US rather it was the US which pushed Pakistan to fend for itself against the hegemonic India. The defence agreements miserably failed to protect the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Arms supply to Pakistan virtually terminated with introduction of new arms policy in 1967. The US negligence towards legitimate security concerns of Pakistan made the defence pacts anachronistic. US further alienated Pakistan by opposing Pakistan's nuclear programme which was necessitated by its legitimate security concerns. By not supporting Pakistan against India to preserve the territorial integrity of Pakistan against its material and ideational foe, the US challenged the seminal construct of Pakistan's identity. Islamic ideology and Pakistani nationalism which has been characterised by using India as a foil forms the bedrock of Pakistani identity. The US by giving a cold shoulder to Pakistan during the latter's conflict with its material and ideational foe made impossible for Bhutto to rely on the US as a patron of first choice.

Zia continued Bhutto's espousal of Pan-Islamism and declared Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world as a strong pillar of Pakistan's foreign policy (Dawīša, 1985). The dynamics of Pak US relations changed during Zia era with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US which has virtually cold shouldered Pakistan in 1970s extended hand of friendship to Pakistan which Zia has been more than ready to accept to get international legitimacy and economic and security benefits for the country.

Pak-US relations during Zia era were bolstered by material convergences between the US and Pakistan. But having said this, the US promoted and sponsored Jihad which aligned with the type of identity Zia wanted to espouse for the country. Zia has been able to justify alliance with the US as Jihad against the communist Soviet aggressor held central position in Zia's ideational calculus. The US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia together sponsored Jihad by supporting Mujahedeen and by establishing a complete ideational structure to ensure continuous supply of recruits for the war against Soviet occupation.

Both Zia and Bhutto were simultaneously constrained and enabled by the superstructure of Islamic identity in relation to formulating Pakistan's foreign policy. However, they managed to appropriate and cherry-pick different strands of Islam (Bhutto's Islamic Socialism and Pan Islamism and Zia's espousal of religious fundamentalism) shaped Pakistan's foreign policy. By keeping the foregoing in view, it can safely be surmised that the superstructure of Islam constantly shaped Pakistan's foreign policy.

3.12 The Decade of 1990s and Pakistani Identity

Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as the first female head of a Muslim state on 2nd

December 1988. In foreign policy domain she attempted to establish normal relations with India. She invited Rajiv Gandhi and Sania Gandhi to attend SAARC conference in Pakistan. The visit resulted into signing of an accord wherein both countries committed to each other that they will not attack each other's nuclear facilities. Both the countries also agreed to share with each other the list their nuclear facilities every year on the first January. Rajiv Gandhi six months later paid a visit to Islamabad on bilateral basis. On this occasion, Benazir once again reiterated publically Pakistan's interest in making South Asia a nuclear free zone if India agrees to this proposal (Mahmood, 2004).

Unlike her predecessor, she genuinely wanted to improve relation between India and Pakistan. She believed economic relations between India and Pakistan will have positive effect on overall relations between the two countries (Sultana, n.d.). On Kashmir issue, she continued to support implementation of relevant UN resolutions for solution of the Kashmir dispute.

On Afghanistan issue, Pakistan's continued to support Afghanmujahideen against Soviet back Marxist Afghan regime of Najibullah (Mahmood, 2004). During the time period of 1988 to 1991, army chief general Mirza Aslam Baig and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan from 1988 to 1993 acted as the custodians and guardians of Zia's legacy. They represented the continuation of Zia's rule. They continued to control the strings of the government from behind, they operated behind the façade of civilian leadership. When Benazir didn't acquiesce fully to their script she was shown the door (Haqqani, 2010). Under the influence of military establishment, she was dubbed as a security risk who could roll back Pakistan's nuclear programme. But she continued to pursue Pakistan's nuclear programme. She also continued Pakistan's policy of denying existence of nuclear capability. But at the same time,

she continued to say that acquisition of nuclear technology is the right of Pakistan being a sovereign country. As far as relations with the Muslim world were concerned, she continued to pursue friendly relations with Muslim countries.

During her second term which started in October 1993 and lasted till November 1996. She promised to promote democracy and tolerance in the country (Ziring, 1993). During her second term as the prime minister of Pakistan she remained more circumspect in dealing with India as she didn't want to offend Pakistan's military establishment by cosying up to India.

She continued to support Pakistan's long-standing stance on both Kashmir and Afghanistan. Benazir Bhutto's trusted interior minister, Major general (ret'd) Naseerullah Babar was known as an architect of Taliban. He had a long association with Afghan Mujahideen that started in 1974-77. Z.A Bhutto directed Babar to establish connections with Afghan Mujahideens to neutralise Daoud's support for Baloch insurgents. That relationship was further strengthened during 1993-1996 (Imtiaz, 2011). So, it was natural for Pakistan to recognise Taliban's regime when it achieved victory over its adversaries in Afghanistan, Pakistan was one of the three countries which recognised Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Journalist and Pakistan's foremost human rights activist, I.A Rahman terms the two stints of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister of Pakistan like a continuation of General Zia's regime. In his first term he continued Zia's drive of Islamisation. In this regard, his second term is more illustrative in demonstrating Nawaz's desire to Islamise Pakistan's constitution. The proposed 15th amendment of the constitution showed Nawaz's desire to further Islamize Pakistan's constitution although the proposed amendment couldn't get through the senate and like Zia's 9th amendment

to constitution it lapsed. He continued to pursue Pakistan's Kashmir policy. He also continued to support and promote Pakistan's nuclear programme.

In 1998 when India conducted nuclear tests, Pakistan also responded by testing its nuclear devices in May 1998. Nawaz Sharif didn't succumb to the US and Western pressure and didn't desist from conducting nuclear tests. Like Benazir he too wanted to improve relations with India especially during his second term. Indian prime minister Vajpayee paid a historical visit to Lahore in February 1999. The historic Lahore accord was signed in Lahore. The normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan that started with signing of Lahore accord came to nothing when Kargil war started. There were contesting views with regard to Kargil war, the Nawaz government alleged that the war has been started by Musharaff without informing the civilian leadership whereas Musharraf says that he has fully informed the (Z. Ali, 2013).

Nawaz's Kashmir policy, drive for Islamisation of society and continuous support for Pakistan's nuclear weapons is the old policy pattern that successive Pakistani governments have followed. Both Nawaz and Benazir's as prime ministers genuinely tried to improve relations with India but they failed. In the era of 1990s like previous eras, we see that Kashmir Dispute, nuclear issue and economic security remained the corner stone of Pakistan's foreign policy in 1990s. As far as the social construction of society is concerned Zia era policy remained in vogue till 2001.

The exclusionary identity continued to dominate as a marker of Pakistani identity. In this era like previous ones, India is continued to be viewed as a revisionist and hegemonic state which does not miss a single chance to harm Pakistani interests at

regional and global level. In October 1999, when Musharraf wrested power from the elected government, Pakistan was already under sanction and international opprobrium for Pakistan's alleged support for Afghan Taliban and above all due to continuous development of nuclear devices.

During the cold war era convergences vis-à-vis the US were accentuated and Pakistani foreign policy elites aimed to dovetail Pakistani identity into the matrix of the US' identity. The whole process of identity construction during the cold war era was led by the US foreign policy elites and Pakistani foreign policy elites in the wake of USSR's invasion of Afghanistan (M. Afzal, 2015). Islamic teachings were cherry picked to serve strategic interests. This phase of identity construction markedly reshapes Pakistani identity into a monochromatic militaristic identity.

The pre 9/11 identity was predominately and over whelming based upon Islamic connections. Non-Muslim history and heritage was disavowed and neglected. The pre-9/11 identity and its iterations largely remained aloof from Pakistan's Pan-Asian identity and aligned itself with Middle Eastern Islamic identity (M. Afzal, 2015). Cultural and civilizational linkages with the Middle East were communicated through curriculum and media. No serious efforts were made to establish cultural connections with the non- Muslim Asian countries.

The erstwhile identity was exclusionary in the sense that it only emphasised the distinctiveness of the Muslim identity and excluded/ ignored the other elements of state identity. The monochromatic lense of Pan-Islamist ideology largely coloured Pakistan's foreign policy. All the secular elements like non-Muslim heritage, art and literature were conveniently ignored.

The chapter has highlighted as to how Pakistan's foreign policy elites constructed

Pakistani identity and in post-independence era and how Pakistani identity shaped its foreign policy. The chapter shows that the oppositional identities of Hindus and Muslims in pre-independence era morphed into adversarial identity constructions of India and Pakistan. The chapter also shows that in post-independence era Pakistan's foreign policy elites have extensively used Pakistan's Islamic identity to connect with Muslim countries. Pakistani foreign policy elites used India as a foil to construct Pakistani identity. The ideational divergences between India and Pakistani narrations of the self-morphed into material conflicts. The chapter also shows that during the era under review in the chapter Pakistan's foreign policy elites also attempted to constructed Pakistani identity to cement its relations with the US. In the period between 1950s and 1990s, the cold war era, Pakistan's foreign policy elites attempted to construct ideational convergences between Pakistani and American identity. Pakistani foreign policy elites projected anti communist identity to converge its interests with the US. The US and Pakistan were presented as a natural partner in fight against the godless communists. The chapter sets the tone and background to understand and evaluate the role of national identity in Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era.

Chapter-4

Defining Pakistan's Identity: The Role of the US and India in Post

9/11 Era

4.1 Introduction

During the 1950s, when the world was caught in the throes of Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with American camp by building on the ideational and material convergences between the two states. This alignment was further solidified during the 1980s through Pakistan's major alliance with the United States in the Afghan Jihad against the USSR. Consequently, the United States emerged as Pakistan's preferred patron to counterbalance India's hegemony.

The United States played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's identity through socialisation processes and internalisation of norms from the 1950s to the 1980s. Middle Eastern Muslim countries, with which Pakistan shared a desire for fraternal relations based on religious affinity, also joined forces with the United States in constructing Pakistan's identity to serve American interests in the region during the Afghan War.

The cognitive normative framework of the US and Middle Eastern elites shaped the ideational character of Pakistani state. Pakistani elites negotiated these structural influences and went on to construct a new face of the state. In this phase of US' and Pakistan interaction the relationship was defined by complementarity of identities. The commonalities between the US and Pakistani identities were accentuated and the difference minimised.

However, after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan found itself at a crossroad. The jihadist

identity that the United States had sponsored, promoted, and valued was now deemed an anathema for continuation and perpetuation of American interests in the post-9/11 era. Pakistan was stuck in a quandary with regard to holding onto its former jihadist identity by not distancing itself from the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan and restoring the halcyon days of Pak US friendly relations of Cold War era. The United States desired Pakistan to be a compliant, client state serving its interests entirely. Pakistan faced numerous social and political challenges in meeting American demands, making the journey arduous and complex.

Unlike the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, when the United States and its allies played a role in positively constructing Pakistan's identity, this era witnessed a negative construction of Pakistan's identity by the United States and its allies both ideationally and materially.

It is important to recognise that norms and institutions are not inherently existing entities but are rather created and shaped by specific communities within specific contexts. Furthermore, these institutions reciprocally influence and shape those communities. Objective measures of what is considered good or bad, right or wrong, do not exist. Instead, judgments of what is perceived as good or bad, right or wrong, depends on the particular standpoint one adopts.

India, taking advantage of the rifts between the United States and Pakistan, capitalised on the narrative of terrorism to serve its regional interests. This chapter aims to highlight how Pakistan's significant others, namely the United States, Europe, and India, attempted to negatively construct Pakistan's identity by labeling it a 'failed state, a 'failing state', a 'rogue state', a 'garrison state', a 'terrorist state', and so on.

The chapter aims to show how Pakistan's significant others namely the US, and India attempted to construct Pakistan's negative identity through political discourse, selective films, dramas and print media in post 9/11 era.

To highlight the centrality of ideational factors at play in Pak US relations, the ideational drivers of the alliance has also been highlighted to vouch for centrality of ideational factors. To prove centrality of ideas, the chapter also shows that it was not the realist logic which dictated the decision of the then leadership of Pakistan to side with the US rather the alliance is attributed to a host of ideational factors like the historic connections between the two states and the advantage the alliance could engender for Pakistan's significant 'other', India in the event of Pakistan siding with Taliban. India centeredness has been a dominant trope of Pakistan's identity discourses.

Simple discourse analysis has been used to highlight negative construction of Pakistani identity. The method of simple discourse analysis has been selected due to its simplicity and methodological flexibility. The key finding of the chapter is that Pakistan post 9/11 image is not a neutral or value free reflection of Pakistan's actual identity rather it was constructed by its significant others: the US and India through their political and media discourses.

4.2 The Drivers of the Alliance

According to Seth Jones Afghanistan was invaded by the US and its Western allies in consequence of the tragic attack of 9/11. The allies had the four major goals to accomplish in order to make their mission successful namely, apprehension or elimination of Osama Bin Laden (henceforward OBL), destruction of the terrorist network of Al-Qaeda, removal of Taliban regime and installation of a broad based

democratic dispensation (Jones, 2010)

Though President Musharraf himself stated that the tone and tenor of US leadership i.e. Secretary of State, Collin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage was very threatening and un-accommodative i.e. ‘You are either with us or against us’ and that the US would ‘bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age’ (Musharraf, 2006). Western epistemic community also quoted the hard hitting American stance, demanding from Pakistan a blanket support to eliminate Al-Qaeda led by OBL and its sympathisers and Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It is said that it was US’ coercive diplomacy that compelled the then Pakistani President to side with the US in its “global war on terror”.

To attribute Pakistan’s decision to join US led war against terror merely to US’ coercive diplomacy is to miss important points. (S. Malik, personal communication, March 2023) Dr. Muhammad Saif Malik challenges this widely held assertion by saying that US coercive diplomacy did push Pakistan to quickly side with the US but other compelling ideational factors played a leading role in shaping foreign policy preference of Pakistan like to deny India, its significant other an opportunity of siding with the US and resultantly depriving it of the opportunity to harm its interests in Afghanistan.

Another factor that influenced Pakistan to side with the US was Pakistan’s historic connections with the US. The memory of Pak US alliance during cold war era and how Pakistan benefited from this alliance was still fresh in the minds of Pakistani establishment. He said Musharraf’s act of attributing his decision to US coercive diplomacy was a trick which he played to gallery because he knew that in the eyes of Pakistani public the volte face would be seen as a betrayal and negation of

Pakistan's Islamic identity.

From the realist perspective national identity didn't shape or constraint Pakistan's foreign policy rather it was dictated by hegemonic power of the hegemon, the US. The study challenges this dominant construct of realism by bringing the role of the agency of Pakistani actors, the role played by underlying social structures, political discourses and the structural constraints into its fold.

Neo-realist scholars in explaining Pakistan's foreign policy have ignored to weigh the interplay of structure, identity, agency and discourse. This combination of structure, identity, agency and discourse as emphasised by the constructivists like Alexander Wendt (1999), Onuf (1989), Adler (1997) and Reus-Smit (2009) and Finnemore shaped Pakistan's foreign policy. A combination of structure, identity, agency and discourses holds pivotal importance to get a nuanced understanding of Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11.

Pakistani elites were constrained as well enabled by the ideational structure of the state in cooperating with the US in post 9/11 era. They were constrained in the sense that prior to 9/11 the national identity prioritises maintenance and promotion of brotherly relations with the Muslim world but in the post 9/11 severing relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and supporting the invading forces militated against the established ideational structure.

In this context while explaining the failure of national identity in stopping Pakistan from cooperating with the US, the realists make a mistake by treating identity as an immutable concept like anarchy and power. Whereas in constructivism which treats international relations as social relations; nothing is immutable.

In fact, the theoretical advantage of constructivism lies in its admittance of change. The Pakistani elites which were constrained by its ideational structures from cooperating with the US against a brotherly Muslim country were also enabled by that very ideational structure by appropriating true Islamic identity and by highlighting the deviance of Taliban from this true Islamic identity (Fiaz, 2010).

In the official discourse Taliban were represented as violent and intolerant assemblage who go against true Islamic teachings of tolerance and moderation. President Musharraf in referring to supporters of Taliban said that we are duty bound to liberate Islam from the clutches of the ignorant by realising original essence of Islam (Fiaz, 2010).

Musharraf extensively used Islamic references like 'hikmat', metaphorically using the migration of the holy prophet as an instructive symbol of wisdom that shows preference of wisdom over emotionalism, he also declared Pakistan as a fortress of Islam and attempted to directly equate threat to Pakistan as a threat to Islam (Musharraf, 2006).

It was not just the coercive US' diplomacy alone as commonly believed which compelled Pakistan to side with the US ideational factor like emphasising moderate aspects of Islam, to deny leverage to its significant other, India, memory of cold war, historical connections of Pakistani civil and military elites with US also shaped Pakistan's decision in joining the US camp.

For realist scholars Pakistan's decision was a purely rational decision taken after thorough cost benefit analysis yet the scholars miss the fine point that espousal of rationality (primarily an idea) which is hallmark of Western political thought itself is indicative of shared intellectual lenses of Pakistani and Western elites. A scholar

avers that another ideational factor which pushed Pakistan to join the US led war against terror was Pakistan's well founded realisation that if it fails to align American line it will be labelled as collaborator of terrorists. (Ziring, 2005)

Shuja Nawaz the author of celebrated book "Crossed Swords: Pakistan its Army, and Wars Within" avers that Musharraf's decision to side with the US was not surprising given the then prevalent circumstances. He goes on to say that 'anyone in President Pervez Musharraf's place would have decided in favor of siding with the US in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks'. It is not the president's decision to join the war which was challenged by many in Pakistan rather it was his policy of giving free hand to Americans which made his decision contentious (Nawaz, 2017)

Mahreen Zehra- Malik underscored the role of India factor (Pakistan's significant other)in compelling Pakistan to act with alacrity in responding positively to US demands of all out cooperation in the war against terror. The fear that India by partnering with the US could influence US' stance on Kashmir dispute and expand its nuclear capability to the detriment of Pakistani interests compelled Pakistan to side with the US (Malik, n.d.). Another news which accentuated Pakistan's fears was Indian move to offer three Airbases in Jammu, Punjab and Gujarat and unspecified port facilities to US strike forces (Ashraf, 2002). The aforementioned reference corroborates the role of Pakistan's oppositional other, India in acting as an independent variable in the decision making calculus of Pakistani leadership.

To convey Pakistan's sympathies and sadness over the tragic event of 9/11 the then president of Pakistan sent a letter of condolence to the American counterpart. The letter was also published in local newspapers on 12th September 2001. In the letter the president unequivocally condemned the dastardly attack in New York and

Washington and urged the world to unitedly eradicate “this modern day evil.”

Inputs from stakeholders were immediately sought to chart a course of action in the given scenario. The response of the foreign office, the defender of Pakistan’s sovereignty at diplomatic level and the lead conveyor of Pakistan’s foreign policy was clear and unambiguous. The response aimed to professionally steer the Pakistani ship to shore in the midst of the tumultuous storm of 9/11. The foreign office prescribed clear and unambiguous alliance with the US and the option of defiance or noncompliance was rejected. The foreign office policy prescription also highlighted the high cost associated with noncompliance, consequently prohibits defiance. The foreign office policy prescription also highlights the advantages India could accrue from Pakistan’s noncompliance with the US demands. The foreign office also considered it prudent to support “the global consensus,” and “not oppose US attacks against targets within Afghanistan” (Sattar, 2020).

The foregoing policy prescription of the Foreign Office also attests to Pakistan’s identity trope i.e. Pakistan a responsible sovereign state. Pakistan since its inception followed the global consensus to show its role identity as a responsible international player. Here again in the case of policy prescription we could see that how important it is for foreign office to follow global consensus in the fight against terror.

To win support of Pakistani Public for the volte-face in Pakistan’s foreign policy the then president of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf addressed the nation on national television on 19th September 2001. The president explained the factors that have pushed Pakistan to side with the US in the war against terror. The president based his rationale of joining the war on material and ideational grounds. He apprised the nation that defiance of US demands would be detrimental to Pakistan’s vital

interests that pertain to Pakistan's sovereignty, economy, strategic assets (nuclear weapons) and Kashmir cause (material grounds). He also justified his decision by highlighting Indian readiness to support the US to get Pakistan declared as a terrorist state (Ideational ground).

To buttress his argument of supporting the US he stated that the US has not only achieved international support but also managed to secure support of Muslim countries. Mentioning of support of Muslim countries is very revealing because by quoting supporting of Muslim countries he appealed to the superstructure of Pakistani identity, Islam. He goes on to say that the decision is in line with Islam as Islam teaches 'Hikmat, wisdom. By extension, he wanted to convey to the public that failure to support the US would not only be unwise but would also go against the spirit of Islam.

He also quoted the no war pact of the holy prophet with infidel Meccans to defend the Muslims against threats from the Jews. Through this example he wanted to impress upon the masses that Islam doesn't prohibit alliance with non-Muslims if it serves the interests of Muslim. In the same vein he declared Pakistan as a fort of Islam (Ideational ground) He also appealed to nationalist sentiment of the masses that "Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary."

By relying on the identity trope of Islam, responsible sovereign state, the role of oppositional other (India) and nationalism, president Musharraf wanted to win support of the public (Khan, 2013). He very well knew that even the impression that Pakistan's new policy is not consistent with Pakistan's dominant identity tropes will dent the prospects of winning public support for the new policy.

It is pertinent to mention here that Pervez Musharraf didn't just use Islamic identity

as a tool to placate masses rather the superstructure of Islamic identity granted sufficient reasons to think of an alliance with the US. By appropriating the tolerant and moderate versions of Islam and by declaring Taliban outsiders of Islamic tradition, the elites were able to turn the constraining effect of the Islamic superstructure into enabling effect of the superstructure.

4.3 The Euphoria of Initial Years 2001-2005

Pakistan once again gained global attention by aligning with the United States in its efforts against terrorism, reminiscent of the prominent role it played following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The US fully knew that Pakistan's support is indispensable and pivotal for realisation of US objectives. Pakistan's "geographic proximity and its vast intelligence information on Afghanistan were seen as crucial for any military action against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda".

Post 9/11 scenario and realities propelled Pervez Musharraf from a state of relative political obscurity onto the international stage. Formerly marginalised and shunned as a dictator, Musharraf emerged as a pivotal ally of Western nations. He provided reassurances to the Western powers regarding his commitment to curbing the entrenched tendencies of his nation towards religious fundamentalism and extremist ideologies (Hussain, 2008).

During the early years of Afghan war Pakistan and US worked in unison to eliminate Al-Qaeda from the region. The early years from 2001 to 2005 were marked by convergences between the US and Pakistan. Pakistan's government actively confronted the threat posed by Al-Qaeda from the early stages of the war in Afghanistan. To track and intercept Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, Pakistan deployed approximately 25,000 troops along its border with Afghanistan in late

2001 and 2002.

The collaborative efforts between Pakistan and the United States in intelligence, law enforcement, finance, and military domains led to the successful apprehension of more than 500 suspected members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (*U.S. Foreign Policy towards Pakistan*, n.d.). Pakistan arrested top and mid-tier leadership of Al-Qaeda like Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the third-senior most leader of Al-Qaeda and the architect of the September 11 attacks.

In June 2004, a secret agreement between the CIA and ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) facilitated a joint counterterrorism campaign, which aimed at targeting Al-Qaeda and its local affiliates, and was further expanded in 2008 to enhance the capabilities of the U.S. counterterrorism efforts (Mir, 2018). The Pak US cooperation against Al-Qaeda and its local affiliates continue to flourish in the mid to late 2010s when Pakistan in collaboration with the US clamp down on the Islamic State (IS). Pakistan's actions against this group, which comprised defectors from the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, aligned once again with U.S. counterterrorism objectives (Mistry, 2020).

This era of convergence between the US and Pakistan vis-à-vis terrorism and extremism soon ended and was substituted with the era of bickering discord and divergences. Washington considered Pakistani actions against Afghan Taliban lacking, who have clandestinely sheltered in Pakistan's tribal area after being routed from Kabul. Not only the US considered Pakistan's actions against militants insufficient but it also expressed concerns over the alleged involvement of Pakistan's ISI's in not taking decisive action against the militant groups that target both Afghan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

The euphoria of initial years of alliance with Pakistan against the terrorists soon transformed and morphed into frustration of US. 2006 can be termed as a very consequential year for Pak US alliance.

In 2006 Afghanistan saw resurgence of Taliban and resultant rise in attacks on ISAF. Sudden rise in violence in Afghanistan was perplexing for the US. As the US failed to curb the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan it started blaming Pakistan for its inability to stop Taliban from using its territory as a launching pad to attack ISAF in Afghanistan. The below mentioned references unequivocally illustrates Washington's frustration with Pakistan's actions (which the latter considered inadequate and insufficient) against the militants hiding in the tribal belt.

During their joint press conference on 4th March 2006, a visible unease was apparent in Musharraf as he stood alongside President Bush, who explicitly stated that his visit to Islamabad aimed to assess the Pakistani leader's continued commitment to the war on terror.

These remarks conveyed the mounting frustration of the American administration regarding Musharraf's perceived failure to effectively curtail the utilisation of Pakistani territory by Taliban insurgents as a launching pad for attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan. This issue had become a significant source of contention in the relations between Washington and Islamabad, exacerbated by the escalating violence in Afghanistan, which resulted in substantial casualties of U.S. troops. In fact, the number of American soldiers killed in early 2006 exceeded the combined total of the preceding four years since the removal of the Taliban regime in December 2001(Hussain, 2008).

Before visiting Pakistan, Bush paid a three-day visit to India where the president

spoke highly of Indian credentials that qualify it as an emerging global power and also signed the historic civil nuclear deal with India. In contrast to the previous day's events in New Delhi, where the U.S. President praised India as an emerging global power and granted it an exceptional civilian nuclear technology agreement, Musharraf was publicly lectured in the press conference to deal with Taliban toughly, accompanied by ambiguous commitments for future economic, military, and technological aid (*Bush Rules Out a Nuclear Deal with Pakistanis - The New York Times*, n.d.).

Professor Dinshaw Mistry of University of Cincinnati also echoes the growing divergences between the US and Pakistan after initial years of convergences in early 2000s. He avers that in the initial years of the Afghanistan war, there was a notable alignment between the United States and Pakistan, as the Taliban had not yet re-established their presence and Pakistan took action against Al-Qaeda.

However, in the 2010s, a substantial shift occurred, leading to significant divergence between the two parties. During this period, the Taliban staged resurgence, posing a significant threat to the U.S. military operations, while Pakistan was accused of failure in addressing the existence of Taliban safe havens within its border (Mistry, 2020).

Another two issues that bedeviled Pak US relations in late 2000s were alleged Pakistani inaction against Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura. Washington accused Pakistan of turning a blind eye on the activities of these networks. It was alleged that Islamabad displayed limited direct military intervention against the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network (Topich, 2018; Coll, 2018). By 2002, numerous Afghan Taliban fighters, accompanied by some members of Al-Qaeda,

infiltrated Pakistan's tribal regions.

Seeking sanctuary, a majority sought refuge in the South Waziristan and North Waziristan agencies, while others fled northward into the Mohmand and Bajaur agencies. Within Pakistan's borders, they regrouped, subsequently reestablishing control over certain rural Pashtun areas in Afghanistan by 2005 and launching an offensive in southern Afghanistan in 2006 (Farrell & Giustozzi, 2013; Jones, 2008). In the years spanning from 2007 to the 2010s, Pakistan gradually deployed its forces in the tribal areas, primarily engaging in combat against Pakistani militants. As a consequence, Afghan Taliban were displaced from these regions, although they managed to escape to alternative areas and cross the border into Afghanistan due to the porous border.

Furthermore, the leadership of the Afghan Taliban clandestinely took refuge in Pakistani cities such as Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi, strategically positioning themselves beyond the reach of U.S. drone strikes. From these locations, they exercised command and control over their operations and raised funds to sustain the insurgency in Afghanistan (Jones, 2013). Additionally, Pakistan allegedly refrained from conducting military operations against the Haqqani network, a semi-autonomous faction of the Taliban's Quetta Shura, while maintaining a financial separation but expressing allegiance to it (*The Tenacious, Toxic Haqqani Network / Middle East Institute*, n.d.). In 2011, following the Haqqanis' attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had previously endeavoured to cultivate relations with Pakistan's military leadership, openly accused the group of serving as a "veritable arm" of the ISI (*US Admiral: 'Haqqani Is Veritable Arm of Pakistan's ISI' -BBC News*, n.d.).

According to Pakistani journalist Anwar Iqbal based in Washington, the year 2011 proved to be the most consequential time period, much like 2001, as it revealed the delicate and precarious state of the relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Iqbal draws a parallel between these two years, stating that while the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, brought Pakistan back onto the international stage, the events unfolding in 2011 are pushing the country to be marginalised and excluded from the global stage (*The Washington Diary - Pakistan - DAWN.COM*, n.d.).

The events of 2011 which exposed the fragile nature of Pak US relations include Raymond Davies affairs, unilateral raid of Navy Seals on compound of OBL in Abbottabad and attack of NATO ground and aerial forces on two Pakistani check posts in November 2011. (*United States-Pakistan Relations: Facing a Critical Juncture / ISPU*, n.d.)

When OBL was taken down, it spurred widespread suspicion in the US whether Pakistan was complicit in hiding OBL in the compound since 2005 until his eventual demise in 2011 (Riedel, 2011). This incident, along with Pakistan's incarceration of a Pakistani doctor who played a role in getting OBL located, significantly strained the relationship between the United States and Pakistan (Mistry, 2020).

Speaking in press conference, during her Visit to Pakistan in October 2011, US Secretary of State said "We think that Pakistan for a variety of reasons has the capacity to encourage, to push, to squeeze ... terrorists, including the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban, to be willing to engage in the peace process,". She goes on to urge Pakistani leadership for the need to take actions against the militants without any differentiation because all the terrorists are lethal for all. "You can't keep snakes

in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours” (India, 2011). These blunt remarks shared in press conference were illustrative of Washington’s frustration with alleged lack of Pakistan’s support in pressing Haqqani Network and Afghan Taliban and to bring them on table for negotiation.

Additionally, certain tribal areas remained untouched by the Pakistani military for several years, providing a sanctuary for some Al-Qaeda members as well as numerous Taliban fighters (Gunaratna & Nielsen, 2008). Moreover, various Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders found refuge within Pakistani cities (Levy & Scott-Clark, 2017). Ayman Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy, operated from Pakistan and announced the establishment of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent in 2014. Reportedly, some of its members were based in Karachi, where they sought recruits and financial support through the city's financial networks and madrassahs.

The aforementioned divergences outlined in the preceding pages and embedded in political discourse establish the backdrop for the shaping of Pakistan's identity by the United States in the post-9/11 era. Given the existing divergences between the United States and Pakistan, with the latter not fully conforming to the former's expectations, international pressure was intensified through the negative portrayal and construction of Pakistan's image and identity within U.S. media, academia, and think tanks.

The foregoing section has attempted not only to dwell on the nature of political discourse vis-à-vis representation of Pakistan but it has also brought to fore the conflictual points that led to negative representation of Pakistan in political discourse. In the next section, representation of Pakistan in American dramas and Hollywood films will be analysed.

It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan's identity has not just been shaped through dramas and films. Construction of Pakistan's identity has also been carried out through knowledge production in Western think tanks, area studies, academia and through pedagogical practices of US professors of International Relations. This aspect of Pakistan's identity construction has been meticulously and exhaustively analysed by Ahmed Waqas Waheed in his masterpiece titled "Constructing Pakistan through Knowledge Production in International Relations and Area Studies" (Waheed. 2020).

Waheed's magnum opus does not focus on the political discourse and media discourse to study representation of Pakistani identity. He focuses on examining the sources of knowledge political elites rely on, that is knowledge produced for them in think tanks, area studies and in the discipline of International Relations itself. The book primarily concentrates on the process of Knowledge production in think tanks, area studies and International Relations to study representation of Pakistani Identity. The book concludes after reviewing the academic literature produced in leading journals associated with think tanks, literature produced by area studies, literature produced in International Relations and associated pedagogical practices that Pakistan's identity has been negatively constructed in these sources of knowledge production.

He goes on to say that knowledge which constructs Pakistan in negative terms reflects the eurocentrism of IR, the knowledge is subjective and it also smacks of colonialism. The book confirms the role played by the US in shaping Pakistan's identity through its factories of knowledge production which are termed as MODE II of knowledge production (Waheed, 2020). The book through discourse analysis of the articles published in think tanks associated journals has brought to fore

negative and subjective representation of Pakistan. For instance, within themes dominated by the "War on Terror," the discourse tends to overlook the significant human and economic costs borne by Pakistan (Waheed, 2020). Pakistan has suffered the loss of nearly 9,000 security personnel and approximately 23,000 civilians as a result of the War on Terror (Crawford, n.d.).

Additionally, Pakistan has faced a substantial economic burden since 2001, amounting to an estimated 250 billion US dollars, which is seven times higher than the foreign aid it has received (Pasha, n.d.). Despite these realities, the discourse often emphasises the supposed benevolence of US aid to Pakistan and its "significant" contribution to the country but ignored Pakistan's contribution in the war against terror.

Similarly, discussions surrounding Pakistan's nuclear status tend to disregard the deep-rooted hostility and rivalry between India and Pakistan, as well as the historical developments that led to Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear technology. Western discourse wields significant power in determining which interpretations of knowledge are privileged, who is considered the authoritative subject, and how that subject is positioned within the discursive field. This perpetuates a specific interpretation of Pakistan's identity and actions (Waheed, 2020).

By adding on and building on the monumental work of Waheed, the next section of the chapter will attempt to bring to fore the representation of Pakistan identity in American dramas and Hollywood films. The choice of the dramas and the films have been firstly made due to their role in projection of the priorities set by the elites of the US and secondly due to wide range of semiotic discourse offered by them. The semiotic richness of the medium sheds further light on construction of Pakistani

identity. The Hollywood films and American dramas invariably toed the line of US establishment in relation to construction of Pakistan's national identity.

4.4 Construction of Pakistan Identity through American Dramas and Hollywood Films

The Centre for Research on Globalization asserts that there has been a significant level of collaboration between Hollywood and government agencies such as the Department of Defence and the CIA since the early 21st century (Lévesque, 2014). Films like "Black Hawk Down"(2001), "Zero Dark Thirty" (2012), and "Argo" (2012) are cited as examples of Hollywood productions that appear to align with and promote U.S. foreign policy objectives (*Screen Propaganda, Hollywood and the CIA - Global Research*Global Research - Centre for Research on Globalization, n.d.).

In 1996, the CIA established its Media Liaison Office to provide guidance and support to the film industry (*Lights, Camera... Covert Action: The Deep Politics of Hollywood* Global ResearchGlobal Research - Centre for Research on Globalization, n.d.).

Furthermore, the CIA released a report in 1991 titled the "Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness," which acknowledged the agency's involvement in reviewing film scripts and maintaining relationships with major news networks, influencing journalists to alter, withhold, or delay stories that could impact national security interests (*Lights, Camera... Covert Action: The Deep Politics of Hollywood* - Global Research Global Research - Centre for Research on Globalization, n.d.).

In the documentary "Militainment," Roger Stahl highlights various instances of collusion between the U.S. state policy apparatus and the entertainment industry (Stahl, 2010).

The portrayal of Arabs or Muslims as a common adversary in Hollywood films, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been observed by scholars like Jack Shaheen. This trend was not limited to the post-9/11 era but had been prevalent even prior to that event. Shaheen highlights that Hollywood had produced approximately eleven hundred movies featuring Arabs depicted in stereotypical ways, with many films before 9/11 consistently emphasising the superiority of Westerners and dehumanising Arabs, often accompanied by negative depictions of Islam (Shaheen, 2015).

The events of September 11, 2001, had a profound impact on shaping the perception of Muslims as terrorists within the American public consciousness. Consequently, the U.S. government shifted its approach to counterterrorism, adopting a comprehensive "War on Terror" strategy (Powell, 2018).

According to Powell, the Arab and Muslim individuals involved in the 9/11 attacks became representative figures of Islam in the eyes of media influencers, perpetuating the equation between Muslims and terrorism. Powell highlights the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media, where in acts of terrorism, no matter how horrific, possess the ability to captivate and command the attention of the media (Powell, 2018).

The stereotypical portrayal of Muslims extends beyond Arabs and is also prevalent

in the representation of non-Arab Muslims, including Pakistanis⁴. As the 2008 U.S. Presidential elections approached, Pakistan became a prominent topic not only among politicians but also among the American public and the global community. President Obama adopted a tough stance towards Pakistan and advocated for escalated drone attacks (Lyon & Bolognani, 2011). Subsequently, the arrest of Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani expatriate accused of planning a car bombing in Times Square in 2010, further reinforced the association of "Pakistani" with "terrorist." Additionally, the discovery of Osama bin Laden hiding in Pakistan solidified the perception of Pakistanis as terrorists within the consciousness of the American public (Feyerick, 2010). Pakistan has been recurrently mentioned in the US media as a source of radicalisation and as a breeding ground of terrorism. The characterisation of Pakistan as the fountainhead of radicalisation and extremism evokes the insecurity imaginary of average white citizens.

In the present section negative construction of Pakistani identity in US popular culture will be unearthed through analysis of the popular US crime show 'Numbers', 'Homeland 2011-2015' "The Sopranos," and films 'Iron Man 3' 'Zero Dark Thirty' and 'G.I Joe: Retaliation'. The analysis of these TV shows and films shows negative portrayal of Pakistanis. In the below mentioned section these shows and films will be analysed one by one to illustrate negative construction of Pakistani identity.

The depiction of Pakistan and its diaspora in popular culture in the United States has undergone a significant shift towards a more politically ambiguous and

⁴ It is important to note that most people in the Western world equate all Muslims as Arabs and fail to recognise that many Muslims such as Pakistanis, Afghans and Iranians are in fact, not Arab. Muslims are thus homogenized even though they are an ethnically diverse group.

threatening portrayal. In the last 15 years, especially since the events of 9/11, Pakistani characters have often been prominently featured in procedural crime and political thriller television series, where their representation is highly politicised and negative. For instance, in the FBI procedural crime show "Numbers," a Pakistani charity becomes the focal point of a terrorist investigation conducted by the FBI²². Although the episode seemingly attempts to convey that not all Pakistanis are terrorists or sympathisers, it implied that it is difficult to discern which Pakistanis may harbour terrorist intentions or sympathies. Additionally, it implies that innocent-looking individuals as well as guilty ones from the Pakistani community may have close social network connections with potentially harmful implications (Lyon & Bolognani, 2011).

In the sixth season of the widely acclaimed mafia television series, "The Sopranos," a fictional FBI agent named Dwight Harris seeks the assistance of Tony Soprano to identify individuals of Pakistani descent who are implicated in a credit card fraud scheme and suspected of providing financial support for international terrorism.

Once again, the underlying message is evident—Pakistanis are portrayed as untrustworthy. Despite their seemingly secular and assimilative nature, individuals of Pakistani origin in the United States are portrayed as having potential connections with global networks of political violence. This portrayal suggests that regardless of their apparent alignment with American values and lifestyles (which can vary across different regions of the country), they are perceived as posing a potential threat. (Lyon & Bolognani, 2011).

By applying the discursive strategy of framing on "The Sopranos" we can examine how narrative of the story constructs a particular perspective or interpretation of

events. Pakistanis are framed in the framework of criminality and terrorism. The cast includes only two Pakistani Characters namely, Ahmed and Muhammad who are involved in stealing credit cards. By not including other Pakistani characters the duo of Ahmed and Muhammad has been treated as representative face of Pakistani Muslims. Besides their involvement in credit card scam they have also been suspected of being part of Al- Qaeda's sleeper cells.

Moreover, the Pakistanis have also been stereotyped in the story as terror financiers and being involved in corrupt practices. Pakistanis have been presented through stereotypes which perpetuate entrenched negative perceptions regarding Pakistanis. Pakistanis have been associated with terror financing and criminal activities.

Through the rhetorical device of association Pakistanis have been associated with terror and criminality. The association strengthens prevalent stereotypes and fuels suspicion towards Pakistani Americans. The untrustworthiness of Pakistanis regardless of their demeanour and behaviour has been reinforced through the use of implication and insinuations.

In the movie Iron Man 3 released in 2013 in a particular scene involving War Machine (James Rhodes, portrayed by Don Cheadle) in the movie, an unfortunate reinforcement of a casual and offhand stereotype about Muslims in general and Pakistani women in particular occurs. War Machine, an enhanced U.S. agent/liaison, is dispatched to investigate a suspected Mandarin broadcast point in Pakistan. During this sequence, he forcibly enters a room where Muslim women wearing black hijabs are diligently sewing at individual desks.

This portrayal is significant due to minimum contribution of Muslim females playing active role in the media, particularly during the period when the movie was

released in 2013. The depiction of this group in the film perpetuates a narrative of weakness, fear, and enslavement of Muslim women in general and Pakistani women in particular. The conspicuous use of hijabs not only emphasises their religious identity but also erases their individuality, as they are all depicted in identical attire. What compounds the constructed nature of this scene is the subsequent development: a veiled extremist soldier, working for the Mandarin, removes her hijab and incapacitates War Machine. The implication, intentional or not, is that beneath traditional Islamic attire lies malicious intent or, more specifically, terrorism. In a mere thirty seconds, two harmful stereotypes are normalised, perpetuating damaging narratives.

In this film too, not only Pakistan has been stereotyped but Pakistani women have also been stereotyped. Pakistan has been stereotyped as a breeding ground and safe haven of militants. Pakistani women have been stereotyped as enslaved, oppressed, and encaged by religious orthodoxy, they lack agency and are waiting for the messiahs who can liberate them from the clutches of Islamic religious orthodoxy. War Machine addresses the bevy of hijab wearing females as a liberator: “Yes, you’re free, if you weren’t before. Iron Patriot on the job. Happy to help. No need to thank me.”

Framing of the story also perpetuates the image of Pakistan as a place infested and teeming with terrorists of all hues. In the story Pakistan has been presented as a host of terrorists. No other representation of Pakistan has been made in the story. By excluding other facets and pictures of diverse and vibrant Pakistani society the movie aims to re-articulate and re-validate dominant political discourses of the time: Pakistan is nothing but a nursery and safe haven of terrorism.

The movie, 'Zero Dark Thirty' narrates the sensational story of OBL's recovery by CIA and his subsequent elimination through an aerial raid on his compound in Abbottabad by the US Navy Seals in May 2011. The movie claims to be true to real events. The movie starts with a scene where a terrorist named 'Ammar' is being subjected to severe torture by Dane, CIA operative for almost first twenty minutes of the movie. He is kept at an undisclosed location in Pakistan. Soon Dane was joined by another CIA operative, Maya. Through her facial expression it has been hinted that she didn't like the treatment being meted out to Ammar. Terrorists attack in London and Saudi Arabia are also shown in the movie and the ensuing frustration it causes to CIA's Station Chief in Islamabad, Joseph Bradley and to his team.

The terrorist attack on Marriot Hotel Islamabad is also shown where many lives were lost. Maya and his colleagues were also present in the hotel when the hotel was attacked but they survived. Once Maya while she was leaving her workplace came under severe gun attack. The moment her car came out of the gate, two militant disembarked from the car and started firing at her indiscriminately. She immediately reversed her vehicle to the safe house and survived. The search for OBL continued and after a hectic process that spanned over a period of ten years OBL was finally located in Abbottabad. Maya the ingenious CIA operative got a clue of Bin Laden's courier Ibrahim Syed alias Abu Ahmed Al-Kuwaiti. He was tracked and through him they reached to the compound where he was hiding with OBL. The movie ended with elimination of OBL and thus the mission succeeded.

The movie 'Zero Dark Thirty' reinforces existing political discourses. In the movie Pakistan has been stereotyped as most dangerous and unsafe place and a safe haven of terrorists. Maya complained that in Islamabad there are check posts everywhere. This was to imply that Islamabad; the capital of Pakistan is unsafe. The stereotype

of Pakistan as an unsafe place was again reinforced when Maya came under intense gun attack in broad daylight and the assailant escaped easily. This was to imply the helplessness or complicity of Pakistan as terrorist strike their target at will and are moving scot free in the heart of capital. Maya's dialogue aims to construct Pakistan as an unsafe country by saying 'In Pakistan every American is on hit list of terrorists whether he belongs to CIA or not'. Pakistan was also stereotyped as an unsafe place when Joseph Broadly was called back to Washington to save his life because the family of a victim who was killed in a drone strike was protesting outside US embassy and demanding that he be put behind the bars.

Pakistan was also stereotyped as a safe haven of terrorists. Ammar was apprehended in Karachi. And Maya said that two Pakistani cities namely Peshawar and Rawalpindi are brimming and festering with terrorists of Al-Qaeda.

ISI has also been stereotyped as uncooperative and complicit in harbouring terrorists. Thrice in the movie ISI has been spoken of as uncooperative and complicit. Firstly, Dane told Maya that he complained to CIA Station Chief regarding slow response of ISI in nabbing terrorist in Lahore. This was to imply that ISI by giving a slow response gave an opportunity to terrorists to escape. Secondly, when Joseph Bradley was called back due to safety reasons, Maya told him that ISI deceived him. Thirdly, ISI was accused of not cooperating with CIA when the latter wanted to track Ibrahim Syed, OBL's courier. ISI has been portrayed as perfidious and treacherous.

The movie frames Pakistan as a hotbed of terrorism and safe haven of terrorist. In the story when Pakistan was introduced for the first time, the landmark of a mosque was shown to show the Islamic component of Pakistani identity reductively and

depriving it of its rich socio-cultural diversity and heritage. The image of Pakistan has been reduced to violence, a safe haven of terrorists and a personification of insecurity depriving it of its rich socio-cultural ethos and life.

The film 'G I Joe Retaliation' was released in 2013. In the movie Pakistan has been portrayed as a failed state in the wake of the events that started after killing of its fictional president. After the killing violence erupted in Pakistan and militants took over the control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons thus threatening the global peace and security. The US has been shown as a responsible state which acts with alacrity to preserve global peace by sending the Joe squad to Pakistan to take over its nuclear weapons.

The film deploys several discursive strategies to paint Pakistan in negative light. Firstly, by showing assassination of the president and the ensuing violence and resultant exposure of Pakistan's inability to secure its nuclear weapons. These events aim to frame Pakistan as an unstable and unsafe place. It validates the dominant political discourse that hypothesises the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Just as the events of the film raised serious questions over the safety and security of Pakistan nuclear weapons similarly the dominant political discourses visualise such a possibility where nuclear weapons can fall into the wrong hands thus endangering global peace and security.

In the movie Pakistan has been stereotyped as a fragile and a failed state. Pakistan has also been stereotyped as a victim of nuclear terrorism. Depiction of violence and chaos also reinforce the stereotypical description of Pakistan as a violence prone state. The ease with which militants gained access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons shows the incapacity, inability and irresponsibility of Pakistani state in preserving

its strategic weapons. It also implies that since Pakistan cannot secure its strategic weapons therefore it poses threat to global peace and the best means to preserve global peace is to denuclearise Pakistan. The turban wearing terrorists clad in Shalwar Qameez who got hold of Pakistan's nuclear weapons perpetuates the threat of nuclear terrorism emanating from Pakistan which concomitantly present Pakistan as a threat to global peace and security.

By employing the rhetorical devices like visual representation, underscoring the ease with which the Joe Squad took over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, validates negative characterisation of Pakistan as a failed state.

4.5 Construction of Pakistan's Identity in US Print Media in Post 9/11 Era

In this section it has been attempted to find out construction of Pakistan's identity in post 9/11 era through discourse analysis of the editorials published in two leading American dailies, New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post (WP) between 2001 to 2022. The newspapers have been selected due to their wide readership and influence in local and global news market. In 2021, NYT had 7.8 million digital and print subscribers (*New York Times Q1 2021 Earnings - The New York Times*, n.d.). Similarly, WP had nearly 3 million subscribers across digital and print media in 2020 (*The Washington Post Is Nearing 3 Million Digital Subscribers | Nieman Journalism Lab*, n.d.). Selection of NYT is also important because it appeals to both local and global educated readers. WP is important because it caters to the news need of the people interested in American politics.

Firstly, the discourse analysis of the editorials brings to fore that Pakistan

particularly Pakistan army and ISI have been stereotyped and framed as sponsor or complicit partners in promoting terrorism in the region. Secondly, Pakistan has been framed as an irresponsible nuclear state due to its poor anti-proliferation record and due to vulnerability of its nuclear programme to perpetrators of nuclear terrorism. Thirdly, Pakistan has been framed as a dangerous country. Fourthly, Pakistan has been stereotyped as an unsafe place for journalists. Fifthly, Pakistan's democracy has been represented as weak and fragile. Sixthly, Pakistan has been alleged to use terrorists as a hedge against Indian interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Lastly, unlike Pakistan, India, Pakistan's arch rival has largely been presented positively. Positive projection of India, Pakistan's dominant and oppositional other further contributes to negative representation of Pakistan. The text of the editorials has been analysed with NVivo 12.

The aim of doing the discourse analysis of editorials is to bring to fore that as to how Pakistan has been represented in the US print media. The discourse analysis brings to fore that Pakistan's identity has been negatively constructed. The section highlights that Pakistan has been stereotyped and framed in a particular way. The negative representation in the print media aligns with broader political discourses. In fact, the negative representation of Pakistan's identity has been reproduced in the print media.

Firstly, the analysis of the editorials shows that Pakistan in general and Pakistan army and ISI in particular play a double game with the US. They have been accused of harbouring those militants who serve their interest in Afghanistan and Kashmir. They were accused of only targeting the militants belonging to Al-Qaida and TTP. Pakistan's complicity in promoting terrorism in the region or its alleged practice of differentiating between good militants and bad militants have been most frequently

highlighted in the editorials. The node of Pakistan being a sponsor of terrorism, allegedly playing doublegame has been mentioned ninety-seven times in these editorials. Pakistan received negative characterisation and representation as an abettor of terrorists notwithstanding the myriad of operation it launched against the terrorists, thousands of civilian and military casualties and billions of dollars lost to the economy. There has been negligible appreciation of the contribution made by Pakistan in the war against terrorism. This thematic node has the highest representation in the editorials.

Secondly, the discourse analysis of the editorials also brings to fore that Pakistan has been framed as an irresponsible nuclear state due to the issue of nuclear proliferation exacerbated with disclosure of the so-called A. Q Khan network in February, 2004 and the issue of safety and security of nuclear weapons exacerbated due to prevalence of terrorism in the country. In consequence of the foregoing happenings, Pakistan has been framed as an irresponsible nuclear state whose nuclear weapons are vulnerable to terrorists. In the editorial forty references have been made to Pakistan's nuclear programme. These references paint only a negative picture of Pakistan's nuclear programme. Pakistan has been dubbed as a nuclear pariah state, 'a merchant of nuclearbomb technology', fastest growing nuclear power and how the fragility, insecurity of the state makes Pakistan's nuclear weapons vulnerable to the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism.

Thirdly, the editorials present Pakistan in general and Pakistan army and ISI in particular as abettors of terrorists. It is framed that Pakistan in general and Pakistan Army and ISI in particular use some militants as a hedge against Indian interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The discourse dubs Pakistan, its army and intelligence service as duplicitous in promoting militants to neutralise Indian influence and

interests in the region. The discourse attributes Pakistan's espousal of some militants to neutralise Indian interests in the region to Pakistan's 'outmoded vision of India as a mortal enemy'. Pakistan has been framed as a creator of Taliban, Haqqani Network and facilitator of Kashmir focused militant organisations like Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. In the editorials twenty-one references have been made about Pakistan's alleged act of using militants as a hedge against Indian interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Fourthly, the discourse in the editorials stereotypes Pakistan as a praetorian state. Pakistan's shortcomings in terms of its democratic credentials have been widely enunciated and democratic progression underrated. Negative representation of Pakistan as a failing democracy or a non-functional democracy is understandable as from 1999 to 2008 Pakistan was directly ruled by the dictator, General Pervez Musharraf. Representation of Pakistan as fragile democracy aligns with broader political discourse. The rhetoric of democracy is used to coerce Pakistan into submission by maligning its image as a fragile and non-functional democracy. More than twenty-one references have been made in the text of the editorials to construct Pakistan's image as a fragile and ever failing democracy.

Fifthly, Pakistan has been represented as a country where media curbs are a norm. The ecosystem of media has been represented as marred with violence, intimidation and self/ state censorship of media. Pakistan has been framed as a most dangerous place for journalists where press is muzzled, where state apparatus is intolerant of dissenting voices, where media persons are subjected to repression, torture, systematic intimidation and to even outright assassinations.

Sixthly, Pakistan has been framed as a dangerous country, generally speaking of the

discursive practices embedded in the editorial discourse as highlighted in the foregoing themes of Pakistan as an irresponsible nuclear state, Pakistan as a supporter and abettor of militants, curbs on media, fragile democracy by extension represent Pakistan as a dangerous country. Besides this general characterisation of Pakistan as a dangerous country, in the editorial discourse Pakistan has been specifically framed as a dangerous country. The discourse dubs Pakistan as a threatened state, a failing state where extremists are on the rampage threatening the very existence of state, the country riling in mortal danger, a crippled and chaotic state, a state least bothered by the presence of combustible triggers that pose gravest threat to its survival and earned a dubious reputation of being a fastest growing nuclear weapons state.

Lastly India, contrary to Pakistan, relatively received positive representation in the editorial discourse. The discourse frames India as the fastest growing economy and the biggest democracy in the world. Contrarily, Pakistan has been framed as a fragile and violence prone democracy, a failing state and the country with fastest growing nuclear weapons. US' Civilian nuclear deal with India is not challenged and disputed in the editorial discourse. India has also been framed as a responsible state that showed remarkable restraint in response to Mumbai attacks.

The editorial discourse brings home the point that Pakistan has largely received negative representation in the editorial discourse. The editorial discourse frames Pakistan as a boiling pot of terrorism and extremism where nuclear weapons are dangerously vulnerable to take over of terrorists. The negative representation of Pakistan in the editorial discourse of NYT and WP can be traced back to era of 1990s in post-Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But in the initial years of the Pak US alliance against terrorism, Pakistan's negative representation relatively

declined but it picked unprecedented pace and intensity after exposure of AQ Khan's network and ISAF's growing losses in Afghanistan.

After the invasion of Afghanistan in October, 2001, 2006 was the bloodiest year for the allied troops in Afghanistan. From this year onwards, Taliban resurgence became a norm. Consequently, a well-orchestrated campaign started in the US to dub Pakistan in general and its army and premiere security agency in particular as abettors of Afghan Taliban especially Haqanni Network and Kashmir focused militant organisations like Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e- Taiba and the same discourse was reproduced in the editorial discourse of NYT and WP.

The negative representation is also evident from the themes of Pakistan being an irresponsible state that dangerously flirts with dangers by espousing militants to serve narrow interests of its military and intelligence service and by espousing tactical nuclear weapons. The discourse also frames Pakistan as a dangerous state, a repressive and dangerous state for media where democracy barely breathes under the oppressive weight of praetorian state apparatus. The figure given on the next page illustrate the negative representation of Pakistan in the editorials of NYT and WP from 2001 to 2022.




Figure-I

4.6 The Indian Construction of Pakistan's Identity

Pakistan, since its inception as an independent sovereign state, confronted significant material and ideational insecurities in relation to India, its significant other. The partition plan, deemed unjust, coupled with India's hegemonic behaviour, further exacerbated Pakistan's already existing insecurities. The founding father of Pakistan, at one point, expressed disappointment over India's conduct and the complicity of the British in enabling India to weaken the newly established nation, leading to the characterisation of Pakistan as a "moth-eaten and truncated" entity.

Typically, nation states achieve independence through the resolution of major contentious issues, allowing stakeholders to reconcile and collaborate towards shared goals and interests. However, in the case of Pakistan, the opposite proved true. India, refusing to accept partition, pursued a post-independence trajectory that propelled Pakistan to seek external patrons for its defence against India's hegemonic material and ideational onslaught. The pattern has persisted to this day.

It is logical to expect from India, Pakistan's arch rival to negatively represent Pakistan's identity in its discourses. India, has always attempted to paint Pakistan in bad light. However, after 9/11, India seized upon the opportunity created by unfavourable global narratives about Pakistan and a few attacks of militants it faced on its soil to implicate Pakistan in global terrorism discourse.

The representation of Pakistan's identity will be analysed through the discourses that travel beyond India and have a global appeal or address global audience. For this purpose, the representation of Pakistan embedded in the speeches made by successive Indian leaders at annual UN General Assembly session between 2001 to 2022, will be analysed to find Indian employment of discursive strategies in relation to Pakistan's representational identity. Moreover, discourse analysis of selected Bollywood films has also been carried out to find representational identity of Pakistan. The choice of Bollywood films has been made due the influence these movies exert in and beyond India.

Cinema has gained acknowledgment as a highly influential visual medium that warrants examination for its portrayals, the establishment and reinforcement of stereotypes, and its role in shaping and challenging traditions (Bharat & Kumar, 2012).

4.7 Bollywood/ Netflix Film (s) and Representation of Pakistan

Raksha Kumar, an award winning Multimedia journalist, wrote an op-ed in New York Times titled 'How Bollywood's views on Pakistan Evolved'. In this op-ed she brought to fore the evolution of Bollywood's views regarding portrayal of Pakistan since independence to 2012, the year when the op-ed was published. She posits that in the beginning of its cinematic history Bollywood films avoided Pakistan as a subject. Raksha Kumar traces the origin of Indian jingoistic films to era of 1960s, an era marked by strengthening of Indian identity. Pakistan was the convenient foil which was used to promote Indian unity (Bharat & Kumar, 2012)

Prof. Nirmal Kumar who co-edited the book "Filming the Line of Control" with Meenakshi Bharat attributes absence of Pakistan as a subject in post-independence Bollywood cinema due to Pakistan's association with tragic incident of partition. They aver that "Partition was a personal embarrassment for various people in the industry, therefore, one never saw any films that referred to Pakistan, even diagonally, in the initial years of India's formation".

They go on to say that following an initial period of silence, a discourse of hostility and cultural antagonism emerged, finding expression within cinematic narratives. This manifested in various forms, ranging from cultural confrontation to explicit criticism of Pakistan. One notable example of early Hindi films directly referencing Pakistan is *Upkar* (The Favour, 1965). The India-Pakistan theme gained significant prominence with *Hindustan Ki Kasam* (Swear by India, 1973). *Gadar*, a film characterised by its vehement anti-Pakistan stance, marks the turning point in Indian cinema vis-à-vis negative representation of Pakistan. The film despite being rabidly anti Pakistan, achieved substantial commercial success (Bharat & Kumar, 2012).

Jannat Asrar in her op-ed published in Daily Times quotes Mira Hashmi, a celebrated actress and TV host who says that Bollywood films do reflect the dominant social or political ideologies i.e Nehruvian ideology and Modi's ideology (*Bollywood's Cinematic Perception of Pakistanis: Fantasy or Propaganda?* - Daily Times, n.d.).

Representation of Pakistan in Bollywood movies align with concurrent dominant social and political trends in India. The objectives of the Hindutva ideology have become evident through certain events, such as the demolition of the Babri Mosque and the implementation of new immigration laws in India. These events, directly or indirectly influenced by the RSS, reflect the ideological agenda.

Following the 1990s, Hindi cinema began featuring contentious, negative, and nationalistic content, particularly portraying Muslims and Islam in a critical light, while favoring Hindi nationalism (Rajgopal, 2011). Movies such as Raja (1992), Sarfarosh (1999), Bombay (1995), Gaddar (2001), Mission Kashmir (2000), and Pinjar (2003) exemplify the inclusion of content aligned with Hindu nationalism. These films depict Hindu male protagonists engaged in the defence of their motherland against predominantly Muslim adversaries (Anantha Murthy et al., 2016).

Meenakshi Bharat and Nirmal Kumar aver that films like "Main Hoon Na", 2004 a blockbuster movie, paint Pakistan neutrally if not positively, similarly the super hit movie "Veer-Zaara" has romanticised the need to foster friendly relations between India and Pakistan (Bharat & Kumar, 2012). Both these movies were released in 2004 which aligned with resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan with initiation of composite dialogue. After 2004 a series of anti-Pakistan movies were

made in Bollywood and the trend continues to this day. This pattern also attests to the influence of larger political structural discourses and their reproduction in films.

A host of writers have dwelled on negative representation of Muslims in Indian movies (Gietty, 2019; Athique, 2008; Bhat, 2019; Qutub, 2013; Iedema, 2001; Lichtner, 2008; Abbas, 2013; Balraj, 2011; Mubeen, 2022 and Bhutto, 2023). These writers have brought to fore negative representations of Muslim in movies in post 9/11 era.

Review of the anti-Pakistan films shows that anti-Pakistan movies can be classified into two groups: one that implicate Muslims as terrorists or facilitators of terrorists by stereotyping them as intolerant and extremist and the second group of Indian movies that target Pakistan army and ISI as a promoter of terrorism. The latter category of movies is a recent phenomenon exception being "Hero: A Spy's Love Story" which was released in 2003. Bollywood movies like 'Agent Vinod', 'Ek Tha Tiger', and 'D Day' have portrayed the military, intelligence services, and religious groups of Pakistan in an overwhelmingly negative manner (*Bollywood Is Obsessed with Pakistan. We'd Be Flattered If It Weren't So Nasty | Bollywood | The Guardian*, n.d.).

Throughout its history, Bollywood has consistently mirrored the prevailing political trends in India. The films of the 1950s captured the sense of optimism and romanticism in the newly independent country. In the 1970s, the protagonist was often portrayed as a proud yet marginalised individual battling against powerful and corrupt forces. During the 1990s, there was an influx of films depicting neo-liberal yuppies, situated in Dubai, enjoying the nightlife of London discos, and driving luxurious Mercedes cars. However, since the rise of Narendra Modi and his right-

wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) nearly nine years ago, Bollywood has readily embraced his contentious political agenda (*Bollywood Is Obsessed with Pakistan. We'd Be Flattered If It Weren't So Nasty/ Bollywood | The Guardian*, n.d.).

In this section discourse analysis of two films released in 2023 namely 'Pathaan' and 'Mission Majnu' will be conducted to prove sustained negative portrayal of Pakistan in Indian movies.

The choice of these two films is very instructive as they make negative representation of two important elements of Pakistani state, Pakistan's nuclear weapons and its army. These movies merit close attention in relation to Pakistan's representational identity as the film 'Mission Majnu' attempted to malign Pakistan's nuclear programme by branding it as a symbol of power projection and the film 'Pathaan' attempted to tarnish the image of Pakistan's professional army as a rogue army. Vilification of Pakistan army and Pakistan's nuclear programme in the movies align with broader global and Indian discourses that brand Pakistanis as intolerant and extremists and frame Pakistan army and ISI as a sponsor of terrorism in the region and beyond.

4.8 Representation of Pakistan's Identity in the Film 'Pathaan'

The film begins in Lahore and the image of Badshahi mosque is shown. Then the scene shifts to the oncologist's clinic where the oncologist informs general Qadir Fareed about his affliction with brain tumor and was told that he had only three years to live. Meanwhile a news is flashed on TV which announces that India has revoked article 370 of Indian constitution. The general fumes with anger and says that it is declaration of war. He proclaims that three years are enough for him (to bring India down to its knees). He says, now is the time to befriend Satan (Jim). He

contacts a deranged terrorist (Jim) to bring India to its knees by wreaking havoc on India. Jim abducts Indian scientists in Dubai who have gone there to attend a seminar and start making biological weapon (a deadly mutated variant of smallpox) for General Qadir, in order to attack Indian cities with the biological weapons. 'Pathaan' an operative of RAW along with his team is given the responsibility to neutralise/thwart the biological attack.

The film attempts to represent Pakistan army as an unprofessional force where extremists like General Qadir Fareed can rise to one of the highest posts in the army and can act with impunity and audacity without any institutional check and balances. Through the character of general Fareed attempt has been made to frame Pakistan army as an institution which is infested with rogue elements that have linked with terrorists. Dr. Rubina Khalid, the renegade ISI operative who have switched her loyalties to Pathaan's mission of saving Indian cities from the biological weapon attack frames general Qadir Fareed as a rogue element in the army when she said "General Qadir is not one of us, when our people will come to know of his nefarious plan, they will hang him". General Qadir (Representative of rogue elements in Pakistan army) is presented as a client of a terrorist. Jim says that I have made the biological weapon for my client(general Qadir).

Pakistani generals have also been stereotyped as filthy rich (can lavishly fund terrorists) with no mechanism of checks and balances in place to hold them accountable for misusing resources at their disposal. The only representation of Pakistan army in the film is, general Qadir, alternative perspective or the institutional response has been totally ignored, to show that rogue elements in Pakistan army can not only act alone sans monitoring and control of the institution they also have immense resources at their disposal. When Dr. Khalid asked Jim

whether the Pakistani government is also complicit in this plan of general Qadir or not. Jim replied in negative and said “No, but extremist elements in ISI are with him (Jim)”. Here too ISI has been framed as partner and a sponsor of terrorists.

In the film an attempt has also been made to stereotype the Kashmir freedom struggle by linking it with agenda of terrorists. Jim warns Indian government to “vacate Kashmir, after 24 hours if one Indian soldier, one tank and one tricolour is found in Kashmir, India will be attacked with the biological weapon”.

The legitimate freedom struggle and the right of self-determination of Kashmiri people have been stereotyped, violence in Kashmir is caused by terrorists who are funded and supported by Pakistan army. Moreover, Indian unwillingness to negotiate with Pakistan on the pretext of Pakistan’s alleged support to India focused militant organisation has been justified through the dialogue of Colonel Ruthra when he says “We don’t negotiate with terrorists”.

Through the character of renegade operative of ISI, Dr. Rubina Khalid, ISI is again stereotyped as cruel and inhuman intelligence agency. Dr. Rubina left ISI to satisfy her conscience because she couldn’t remain the part of the organisation that does not value human life. When she decided to team up with Pathaan to foil the biological attack, Pathaan warned her that her actions and moves will be closely watched and if she takes one wrong step she will be eliminated. In reply Dr. Rubina says “I Won’t take any wrong step, I have already taken many wrong steps. Now the time has come to erase them”. Through this dialogue ISI has been stereotyped as an inherently evil organisation and all the people associated with it are evil doers and to recompense for evil deeds they need to join just forces like RAW.

The protagonist of the film, ‘Pathaan’, who has been lovingly named ‘Pathaan’ by

Afghan villagers whose children he saved from a drone attack on a religious seminary while he was working with Americans in Afghanistan. This portrays the hero, an operative of RAW as inherently kind and compassionate, the one who saves Afghan Children from the devastation of a drone attack. He is a hero of the villagers. He has been presented as a foil to the character of Jim and General Qadir who in their vengeance do not differentiate between innocent people and combatants and are amoral characters. The beastly nature of the general is shown through the dialogue "Khair nahi, Qahar Chiya (I don't want goodness, I only want furious vengeance)". The protagonist has also been presented as a messiah who doesn't even hesitate to sacrifice his own life to save innocent Indian people from the attack of the biological weapon.

4.9 Representation of Pakistan's Identity in the Netflix Film 'Mission Majnu'

The Netflix film, Mission Majnu released in January 2023, is a story of RAW's covert operation carried out by its agents, prominent among them, Amandeep Singh, the protagonist who impersonates as a Muslim with the name Tariq. The mission of the RAW's operative is to know the secret location of Pakistan's atomic programme.

Like other jingoistic Indian films, Mission Majnu also stereotypes Pakistan as untrustworthy and undemocratic. Contrary to Pakistan's representation as an immoral state, India has been projected as a principled state. India is projected as a progressive and a cosmopolitan state when Amandeep says "How can I forget the Sardarji, who sheltered me in the Gurdwara and made sure that I never sleep hungry and father Joseph who fought with everyone to let me study in that school". Again

through another dialogue attempt has been made to project India as a tolerant and peaceful state. Kao, head of RAW says “We are India, we didn’t grow up with hatred, we grew up with love. In fact, we got freedom on the basis of love and peace”. At another place a character sings the praise of India’s incomparable beauty “is there any country in the world like India?”.

Pakistan is contrarily branded as a “fanatic country” and “untrustworthy”. Since both India and Pakistan treat each other as a foil (other) in relation to their respective identities. Hence, India’s self-projection as a peaceful state impliedly suggest that Pakistan is not a peaceful state. In the film Pakistan’s nuclear programme has also been framed and stereotyped as a project which was initiated to project power. The introductory or the tagline of the film equates nuclear weapons with power. The tagline is, “nuclear weapons, the ultimate symbol of power”. The discourse attempt to construct Pakistan’s nuclear programme as a project dictated by the dictates of power projection rather than as a means to ensure deterrence against hegemonic India.

Another stereotype pertaining to Pakistan’s nuclear programme is representation of Pakistan’s nuclear programme as an illicit and illegitimate venture whereas India nuclear programme is projected as legitimate and lawful. Kao while referring to Indian nuclear programme says “we did everything legally to make the bomb”. Contrarily he attempted to project Pakistan’s nuclear programme as a product of an illegitimate network of nuclear smugglers.

The film also stereotypes AQ Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear programme as a rogue, unprincipled and untrustworthy person. R.N Kao dubs him as “the world most dangerous scientist”. In a meeting headed by the then Prime Minister of

Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a participant of the meeting suggested the name of AQ Khan to Bhutto for acceleration of Pakistan's nuclear programme. A participant of the meeting objected to his name (AQ Khan's name) as he allegedly violated many rules while he was in Pakistan. The participant goes on to say we can't trust him because he can do anything (moral or immoral act) to get the desired results. Prime Minister Bhutto immediately interrupted the participant with the words "then he is the man we want". The foregoing discussion stereotypes Khan as a Machiavellian hero for whom the ends justifies the means. Pakistan's nuclear programme has also been framed and stereotyped as having links with terrorists and that Pakistan is an irresponsible nuclear state which poses greatest threat to global peace and security. Kao says that Colonel Qaddafi has funded 500\$ million to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. He goes on to say that "for the world he is a terrorist but for Pakistan he is a close friend". By calling Qaddafi a terrorist and linking him with Pakistan's nuclear programme attempt is made to stereotype Pakistan's nuclear programme and its links with alleged perpetrators of nuclear terrorism. To further link Pakistan's nuclear programme with terrorists and to frame it as an Islamic bomb. R.N Kao, head of RAW says to Moraji Dosai that "Pakistan has made a deal with Qaddafi, in exchange of his funding, they will provide him nuclear weapons and then a time will come when every Muslim terrorist will have nuclear weapons".

In the film Pakistan has also been stereotyped as a garrison and praetorian state where military reigns supreme. R. N Kao frames Pakistan as a praetorian state when he says "Pakistan is not run by the civilian government it is run by the military". Bhutto the civilian leader is only marginally shown in the film, it is Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator who is used as a face of Pakistani government. He is projected as

uncouth, duplicitous and cruel ruler. The character of Moraji Dosai serves as a moral foil of Zia-ul-Haq.

Discourse analysis of the aforementioned films shows how India attempts to negatively define and represent Pakistan in its films. The analysis put forward in the section also bring to fore that the discourse generated in these films represent or even reproduce the larger national and international political narratives about Pakistan. Discourse analysis of the film confirms to earlier studies conducted to prove negative representation of Pakistan in Bollywood in post 9/11 era. What sets these films apart from the earlier movies is the alignment of the discourse generated in these films with Western discourse on Pakistan. These films touched upon the three highly sensitive representations of Pakistan in the West, vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear programme to the perpetrators of global terrorism, branding Pakistan as a sponsor and facilitator of terrorists and presence of rogue elements in Pakistan army, ISI and the threat it poses to global peace and security.

4.10 Representation of Pakistan through the Speeches Made by Successive Indian Leaders at the Annual Sessions of UNGA from 2001 to 2022

The speeches delivered by successive Indian leaders at the annual sessions of UNGA between 2001 and 2022, provide a rich source for finding representational identities of India and Pakistan. Through the speeches successive Indian leaders not only defined themselves as to what India is, and as to what it stands for as a sovereign state but its leaders also attempted to use Pakistan's representation as a foil, a foil which is inconveniently and extensively used to represent the positive identity of India. Since identity is a relational concept, it naturally drives sources of

its self-identification from its designated others. In the construction and representation of identities besides the domestic sources of identity (culture, values and traditions etc.) the external sources also play a major part in actualising identities of states. Both India and Pakistan ‘otherised’ each other in their respective identity discourses. The contrarian and oppositional representation of India and Pakistan will be discussed in the succeeding paragraph.

Firstly, in the speeches, Pakistan has been branded as an epicentre, exporter and sponsor of terrorism. Contrarily India, has been represented as a benevolent power in the world. Secondly, Pakistan is represented as an irresponsible nuclear power, contrarily India, has been presented as a responsible nuclear state. Thirdly, Pakistan has been represented as a source of instability in Afghanistan, India contrarily, has been represented as a source of stability and benevolence. Fourthly, India has been represented as the largest democracy with rich linguistic, religious and cultural diversities, when India prides itself as a democracy it takes a dig at Pakistan due to the latter’s chequered political history. When India takes pride in its diverse religious landscape it again makes a veiled jibe at Pakistan for absence of religious diversity or the lack of it, in comparison to India. Fifthly, India considers Kashmir as an integral part of its territory that is opposite of how Pakistan defines Kashmir in relation to its identity. The text of the speeches has been analysed with NVivo 12.




Figure-II

The discourse analysis brings to fore that Pakistan’s identity has been negatively and relationally constructed. The section highlights that Pakistan has been stereotyped and framed in particular way. The representation of Pakistan shows as to how India attempt to construct Pakistan in its international discourse. The chapter dwelled on the role of the ideational constructs in shaping relations between India, Pakistan and the US. It sheds light on the ideational drivers of Pak US alliance in post 9/11 era contrary to predominant realist explanations. To give the context for understanding the role of US in constructing Pakistan’s identity at structural level, divergences between the two states have been highlighted and shown that these divergences embedded in political discourse shaped US media discourse in relation to Pakistan’s identity. The main thrust of the chapter is to understand as to how the US and India attempted to negatively construct Pakistan’s identity in the post 9/11 era.

Through the discourse analysis of editorials, films, dramas and speeches the

discursive construction of Pakistan's identity by its significant 'others' has been brought to fore. Both the US and India identically and negatively define Pakistani identity in the era under review. Both India and the US branded Pakistan as a hotbed of terrorism and exporter of terrorism, both countries attempted to vilify Pakistan's nuclear programme, Pakistan army and ISI. This ideational onslaught of characterisation of Pakistan as a hotbed and exporter of terrorism unleashed by the super power and the regional power aimed to project Pakistan's persona negatively to serve their respective national interests.

Chapter-5

Reorientation and Actualisation of Pakistan's Identity in Post 9/11

Era

“States are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming” (Campbell, 1998b)

The preceding chapter highlighted the ways in which Pakistan's significant ‘others’, namely the United States and India, have shaped a specific representation of Pakistan through their political, media, and popular cultural narratives. The chapter also revealed that the construction of Pakistan's identity in media and popular culture often perpetuates negative portrayals that align with the prevailing political discourses. It is important to note that this constructed identity is not impartial; rather, it is subjectively crafted to serve the respective interests of the United States and India. The construction of Pakistan's identity reflects a deliberate and purposeful alignment with the agendas of the two states.

As emphasised in the preceding chapter, Pakistan's representational identity has been defined by certain negative portrayals, including its association with terrorism, perception of it being an intolerant and praetorian state, the presence of rogue elements within its military and intelligence agencies, labelling Pakistan as an irresponsible state, raising concerns about the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons

to terrorists, and questioning the future of democracy in the country. In response to this negative characterisation, Pakistani foreign policy elites embarked on a process of redefining and reorienting Pakistan's representational identity.

This chapter aims to shed light on how Pakistani foreign policy elites have responded to the negative characterisation of Pakistan by the United States and India. It will explore the distinctive features of Pakistan's identity discourses and examine the ways in which Pakistan's representational identity has evolved from previous iterations, while also identifying any persistent similarities in its self-projection as a responsible state. Furthermore, the chapter will delve into the influence of Pakistan's representational identity on its foreign policy.

In nutshell, the chapter seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the strategies employed by Pakistani foreign policy elites in shaping and reshaping Pakistan's representational identity, and the subsequent implications for its engagement with the international community.

As highlighted in previous chapter that the realists attribute Pakistan's cooperation with the US in post 9/11 era to the dictates of power politics. The theoretical construct of neo-realism though compelling in its own right doesn't fit for present study. The present study doesn't privilege structure over agency (as the realists do) rather it espouses co-constitution of identity through identity discourses and the active role played by the elites in negotiating and neutralising the power of the structure and the impact of structure on Pakistan's identity in post 9/11 era. The identity discourse constitutes identity and vice versa. The thrust of the research lies in the efforts of Pakistani political elites to challenge the structural production of self and to supplant it with alternate ideational construct of the state.

In the course of its history, particularly in recent decades, Pakistan has faced stigmatisation from Western governments, primarily the United States. This stigmatisation has been based on three broad areas of perceived deviant behaviour: the fragility of Pakistan's democratic institutions, concerns about nuclear proliferation, and suspicions of connections between certain branches of government or security agencies and insurgent or terrorist groups. These three aspects are interconnected, and Western officials have consistently advocated for the establishment of a robust democratic system in Pakistan as a means to address all three areas of concern (Vandamme, 2022)

Certain patterns and agreements tend to arise when examining the concept of identity, which can be understood at three distinct levels: individual, relational, and collective. At the individual level, the focus is on how actors define and perceive themselves. Relational identity pertains to the roles individuals assume in relation to others, and how these roles are defined and interpreted by the individuals involved. Collective identity, also known as social identity, involves the identification and categorisation of actors into specific groups. It encompasses the meanings attributed to these social groups and categories, as well as the emotions, beliefs, and attitudes that arise from identifying with them (Vignoles et al., 2011).

It is important to note that identity, at all three levels, is a product of social construction resulting from the interactive process between social actors and their social environment. Therefore, identity is inherently relational, shaped by the dynamics between individuals and their surrounding social context (Vandamme, 2022).

According to Flamm, the development of a sense of self or self-identity is

influenced by the reflection upon and interaction with significant and generalised others (Flamm, 2019). In simpler terms, individuals define and understand themselves by differentiating what they are from what they are not (Telhami & Barnett, 2002).

Negative construction of Pakistani identity in the aftermath of 9/11 was exacerbated by growing divergences among Pakistan, the US and India, to counter the negative characterisation of Pakistan identity, Pakistan set on a course to respond to negative construction of its identity. It attempted to supplant negative representation of Pakistani identity with positive projection of the self. In the succeeding section speeches made by successive Pakistani leader at UNGA between 2001 to 2022 will be analysed to bring out instances that show that Pakistan, in order to counter negative characterisation attempted to define its representational identity positively.

5.1 Constructing Pakistan's Counter Identity through the Speeches Made at UNGA between 2001 to 2022

The adversarial discourse generated by the US and India defined Pakistan as a hub of terrorism and promoter of terrorism. Pakistan countered this negative narrative construction by branding itself as a promoter of peace in the region and beyond. In the speeches there are thirty-eight references to branding Pakistan as a promoter of peace. It projected itself as a country with rich history of tolerant Islam. Pakistan projected itself as one of the biggest contributors to UN peace keeping missions, it projected itself as a promoter of peace in Afghanistan, it called for peaceful resolution of disputes between India and Pakistan through the resolutions of United Nations Security Council. Pakistan also attempted to project itself as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world. It also attempted to define itself as power

that has immensely contributed to elimination of terrorism. It also attempted to project itself as a country which is full of vibrancy, modernity, tolerance, peace and a moderate democracy which aims to achieve economic and social justice for the people.

One of the most dominant thematic nodes of Pakistan's identity in 9/11 era as highlighted in the speeches: is Pakistan's belief in multilateralism. The projection of multilateralism is in line with the overarching thematic node of Pakistan identity that is, projection of Pakistan as a responsible state. There are seventy references to Pakistan's projection of multilateralism as a trope of its identity in the speeches.

In the discourse Pakistan welcomed the ascendancy of multilateralism whenever it took place and it expressed its concerns whenever there were threats to multilateralism. The discourse also show that Pakistan has always pinned high hopes on the UN as an international institution which serves as platform for dialogue and diplomacy. The discourse presents the UN as an indispensable institution which plays a pivotal role in promoting peace and prosperity in the interdependent world, "Pakistan wishes to pursue cooperative multilateralism and to strengthen the United Nations – this unique forum which is indispensable, in our interdependent world, for all States, large or small, powerful or weak". The discourse regards multilateral institutions like the UN indispensable to promote cooperation and achieved shared global goals.

To counter negative representation of Pakistan as an irresponsible nuclear state, Pakistan attempted to project its credentials as a responsible nuclear state. The US in particular and India in general attempted to tarnish the image of Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state. The discourse linked Pakistan programme with nuclear proliferation and raised questions over safety and security of its nuclear weapons.

In response to this negative construction Pakistan attempted to project its credentials as a responsible nuclear state. Pakistan projected its nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence rather than as a tool of power projection as constructed by India and the US. It projected its principal stance of not pursuing arms race with India as an indication of its role as a responsible nuclear state. Pakistan also project its responsible conduct as a nuclear state by highlighting the number of nuclear restraint regimes it offered to India and the fact that India spurned all those offers of pursuing the goal of nuclear restrain in the region. Moreover, Pakistan also projected espousal of nuclear weapons as a Hobson's choice that it was to either live under the shadow of Indian hegemony or to adopt nuclear weapons for its defence, Pakistan "developed nuclear weapons only when these were introduced in our region by this neighbour". To nullify Indian discursive attempts of branding Pakistan's nuclear weapons as weapons of aggression, Pakistan contrarily projected its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Indian hegemonic design. To nullify the susceptibility and vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear weapons to the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism, it projects the steps it has taken to ensure safety and security of its nuclear weapons.

Projection of Islam as a peaceful religion. Islam being the superstructure of Pakistani identity is projected as a peaceful and tolerant religion. Projection of Islam as a tolerant and peaceful religion is meant to indirectly brand Pakistan as a peaceful and tolerant country since Islam is the sine qua non of Pakistani identity. In the post 9/11 era both Islam and Islamic countries especially Pakistan were equated with terrorism at the altar of geopolitics. Both India and the US stigmatised Pakistan for the sake of their geopolitical interests. India by equating Pakistan with terrorism attempted to delegitimise freedom struggle of Kashmiris in Indian

occupied Kashmir (IOK) while the US attempted to scapegoat Pakistan for its failure to curb insurgency in Afghanistan. Plethora of literature was produced at the behest of the US and India to malign Islam and Pakistan.

Pakistan's foreign policy elites as evident from the speeches made at the UNGA from 2001 to 2022 show that they were fully alive and alert to counter the negative ideational representation of Islam and concomitantly Pakistan. They fully knew the impact negative representations has on the reputation of the country in the interconnected world. Promoting Islam as a tolerant religion was meant to serve several purposes for Pakistan namely to address its ontological insecurity created by the negative representation of Islam. since Islam is the alpha and omega of Pakistani identity, vilification and stigmatisation of Islam as an intolerant and extremist religion damaged the very foundation of Pakistani 'self' thus promotion of Islam as a peaceful and tolerant religion aimed to enhance ontological security of Pakistani 'self'.

Besides addressing its ontological insecurity, Pakistan, through projection of Islam as a peaceful and tolerant religion aimed to preserve its leadership role in the Islamic world. Pakistan has historically used its Islamic identity instrumentally to establish relations with the Islamic world. Moreover, projection of Islam as a peaceful and tolerant religion is in line with Pakistan's historic reliance on Pan-Islamism in its national identity and lastly Pakistan, by taking up cudgels for the projection of Islam as a tolerant religion catered to the identity needs of its public at domestic level.

The most prominent identity trope of Pakistani identity as represented and reproduced in the speeches, is Pakistan's support for Pan-Islamic causes. In the speeches this node of Pakistan's representational identity has the highest number of

references which number to one hundred and four. The identity trope of taking up cudgels for the Palestine and Kashmir causes help Pakistan to reinforce its Islamic identity. At international level use of this identity trope helps Pakistan to connect with fifty-seven Muslim countries, at domestic level it helps the governing elites to get support of the public who zealously own the identity trope of Pan-Islamism. Historically this identity trope served Pakistan well both at domestic level when it comes to the issue of political legitimacy and internationally when it comes to represent Pakistan as a part of the wider Islamic world. In fact, this identity trope has persisted in the narrative identity of Pakistan since independence.

The roots of this identity tropes can be traced to Pakistan's freedom struggle and its ideology. In the post-independence era, Pakistani political and military elites used Islam and Pan-Islamic causes as a nation building tool to address fissiparous and centrifugal forces that was at play to promote provincial identities. Islam has always played an instrumental role as a nation building tool but Islamization during Zia era and in the subsequent history up to 9/11 perpetuated and solidified Islam as a tool of nation building.

The deep entrenchment of Islam in Pakistani 'self' is the reason behind Pakistan's foreign policy elites to couch and enshrine their policies in Islamic idiom to gain traction at domestic level. Pakistani foreign policy elites fully know that if the public deems that the identity and the policy of Pakistan deviates or is at variance with the superstructure of Islam then it will be rejected by the public forthrightly and concomitantly depriving the elites of political legitimacy.

Another identity trope which relates to the superstructure of Pakistani identity, is repudiation and rejection of Islamophobia by Pakistan. The identity trope aligns

with the superstructure of Pakistani identity as it is in consonance with the tropes of Pakistan being a projector of Islam as a peaceful religion and Pakistan's support for Islamic causes. The below given figures show items clustered by coding similarity between the identity nodes of Pakistan that are projection of Islam as a peaceful religion, Projection of Pakistan as an advocate of causes of the Muslim world and projection of Pakistan as a leading voice against Islamophobia.

Since identity is a relational concept, the narrative identity of Pakistan is incomplete without the reference of India as its defined 'other'. India too uses Pakistan as a foil of its identity. India defines itself by differentiating itself from Pakistan and Pakistan defines itself by differentiating itself from India. In the speeches there are seventy references to India as a defined 'other' of Pakistani identity.

The discourse 'otherised' India by projecting it as a regional hegemon, a destabilising force, an oppressor in Kashmir, a Hindutva controlled state and Islamophobic state. Contrary to projection of India as an intolerant and Hindutva inspired state Pakistan defines itself as a tolerant, modern and moderate state. Pakistan projects its approach to improving relations with India as bold, sincere and flexible and expect from India to emulate Pakistan's approach. How Pakistan used India as a foil to represent itself through the speeches is illustrated by the below given figure.




Figure-III

The below given figure sums up the representation of Pakistani identity in the speeches made by successive Pakistani leaders at annual sessions of UNGA from 2001 to 2022.




Figure-IV

5.2 Differences and Similarities between Pakistan's Pre 9/11 Identity and Post 9/11 Identity

Jelena Subotic posits that nation states at times of major crises and dangers to a host of state securities like social, physical, and ontological securities selectively activate narratives. The purpose of activating these selective narratives is to use these narratives as a cognitive bridge between the newly adopted policy which successfully solves the issue of physical security by simultaneously preserving ontological security of the state “through offering autobiographical continuity, a sense of routine, familiarity, and calm” (Subotić, 2015).

Pakistan foreign policy elites also selectively activated the narratives of its identity in order to neutralise the negative representational discourse generated by Pakistan's defined 'others' in post 9/11 era. Response to the negative representation of the identity is of paramount importance in the sense that identity precedes interest. The theoretical construct adopted in the study privileges identity over interests as the latter according to constructivist logic is determined by the former.

In the wake of the tragedy of 9/11, not only physical security of the state was at stake but also the ideational security of the state. Pakistan had to shift its foreign policy from supporting Taliban regime in Afghanistan to becoming ally of the US in fight against terrorism. The superstructure of Islam was reinterpreted to support the policy change. The continued salience of Islam (albeit with emphasis on selective characteristics of Islam) as a superstructure of Pakistani identity served tri-purposes, it provided ontological security to the state, it legitimised the policy change and it also attempted to neutralise the negative representation of Islam and Pakistan.

It is an intriguing question as to how Pakistan Identity changed or what aspects of Pakistan identity persisted in the post 9/11 era. The analysis of the speeches shows that in both pre 9/11 and post 9/11 representational identities, Islam has persisted as a superstructure of Pakistani identity. But the superstructure of Islam has been interpreted and used in a way that attempts to neutralise the negative construction of Pakistan as an intolerant and a state sponsor of terrorism.

The identity discourse enshrined in the speeches not only project Islam as a peaceful religion but also by extension represent Pakistan as a bastion of toleration, moderation, democracy, progressiveness and inclusivity. Though Islam as a superstructure of Pakistani identity persisted but selective elements of Islam like projection of Islam as a peaceful and tolerant religion were emphasised and reiterated. This emphasis on themes of moderation, tolerance and peacefulness align with the overall representational identity which Pakistan attempted to project in order to neutralise negative othering by the US and India.

Keeping the foregoing in view, it comes to fore that though the superstructure of Islam persisted in Pakistan's identity discourse but emphasis and repetition of selective features of Islam and Pakistani identity discourse like tolerance, peace, moderation, progressiveness, democracy were the new identity tropes of Pakistani identity which distinguished Pakistan's identity in post 9/11 era from its pre 9/11 identity. The novelty of the identity tropes was not new in thematic sense but it was new in frequency, emphasis and repetition of selective tropes.

Ambassador (rtd) Shahid Gul Kiani while commenting on the historical background of Pakistani identity avers that in the wake of post 9/11 era Pakistan was caught in the eye of storm, the vilification of Pakistani state became a vogue to which India

also contributed. The conservative and exclusive identity which was constructed in 1980s, in Zia's era became a liability for the state in geopolitical realities of post 9/11 era.

The extremist elements engendered by the state at the behest of the US in 1980s, in post 9/11 era turned their guns against their erstwhile benefactors. Pakistan despite being a victim and fighter against terrorism was labeled as a facilitator of terrorism. This put the diplomatic corps of Pakistan in a tight fix, we had to project the true representational reality of Pakistan that gives an all-encompassing picture of our society. The ambassador said when 9/11 took place he was serving as an acting deputy head of Pakistani mission in Canada. People in the West knew Pakistan through the representation country received in the Western media and academia which was negative in nature.

The adversarial or negative discourse on Pakistani identity was exacerbated by coupling Pakistan and Afghanistan as one region. To counter the negative representation of Pakistan, visits of the leading Canadians to Pakistan were arranged. On their return to Canada their views about the country were found positively changed. He goes on to say that in post 9/11 era we had very clear plan, a plan to project Pakistan's authentic story, showcasing its religious and cultural diversity and projection of moderate features of Pakistani state. Besides arranging the visits of Canadian members of parliament, we also arranged cultural programmes in Canada to promote Pakistan's soft image. He laments though that our inconsistencies and at times contradictory policies prevented Pakistan from actualising its progressive identity which resultantly made the task of diplomats to project positive reality of Pakistan to the world very difficult. He supports the finding of the preceding section that Pakistan's foreign policy did attempt to focus, intensify

and magnify moderate aspects of Pakistani identity to neutralise negative construction of its identity by its significant ‘others’. The post 9/11 identity narrative of Pakistan shows the dynamic nature of Pakistan, it responded by producing counter identity discourses to its negative characterisation as foreign policy does not evolve in Isolation (S. Kiani, personal communication, March 2023).

Brigadier (retd) Dr. Muhammad Saif-ur-Rahman, an academic and ex-director of India Study Centre at Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad says that post 9/11 era was indeed a hostile era in relation to construction of Pakistan’s identity. Despite being in the frontline to curb the menace of terrorism in its all forms and manifestations, Pakistan was labelled as a part of problem rather than as a part of the solution. Pakistan foreignpolicy elites set on a course to project Pakistan’s contrarian identity, an Identity which projected Pakistan as a leading force against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Pakistan’s identity in post 9/11 era has had features which distinguish Pakistan from its identity of 1980s. Firstly, extremism and fundamentalism was equated with terrorism and was dealt with accordingly. Formation and execution of National Action Plan is a case in point which stands as a testament to Pakistan’s resolve in owning the war on terrorism. Secondly, in Post 9/11 era, Pakistan attempted to project itself as a neutral country that has espoused neutrality in the pursuit of peace. Thirdly, another distinctive feature of Pakistani identity is to project women empowerment. Last but not the least Pakistan’s act of owning and promoting its pre-Islamic heritage and its acts of heritage preservation of pre-Islamic era are also indicative of change in Pakistani identity narratives in post 9/11 era (S. Malik, personal communication, March 2023).

A serving diplomat who wished not to be named says that even prior to 9/11 two incidents negatively shaped Pakistani identity that were: state sponsored promotion of fundamentalism and Jihadism in response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and spread of sectarianism in the wake of Iranian revolution. These two watershed events had already tarnished the historical moderate identity of Pakistan. In post 9/11 era due to divergences between the US and Pakistan, negative characterisation of Pakistan picked unprecedented pace. India smartly chipped in to cash in on the war on terror to delegitimise freedom struggle in Kashmir and label Pakistan as a facilitator and promoter of terrorism. In this backdrop, Pakistan attempted to project its positive reality to the world.

To project positive picture of the state cultural diplomacy was espoused, inter alia to neutralise negative characterisation of the state. Espousal of cultural diplomacy i.e. promotion of Sufi music, arts and crafts and Pakistan's pre-Islamic heritage can't be termed as a new phenomenon what distinguished Pakistan's cultural diplomacy was the level of intensity, emphasis, realisation and reiteration of the utility of the cultural heritage in relation to projection of Pakistan as a moderate and a modern democratic state.

Dr. Nadeem Omar Tarar, head of Gandhara chair, avers that prior to 9/11 era, Pakistan intermittently used its heritage especially its Buddhist heritage to connect with the non-Muslim world but the efforts were more intermittent than consistent. In Post 9/11 era what we are witnessing is a greater realisation to cash on cultural heritage as a tool to project the positive story of Pakistan. (N. Tarar, personal communication, March 2023).

The fluidity and dynamism of Pakistani identity discourses confirm the findings of

existing literature on identity which treats identity as a social construct which is fluid and malleable due to its very nature. Identity, whether in terms of how groups perceive themselves or how they are defined, is not fixed but rather subject to change. Identities are not predetermined but rather constructed through political, social, and cultural means. They are shaped and reshaped through ongoing interactions between the state and society, particularly in relation to the allocation of power and resources. These dynamic processes play a crucial role in the formation and evolution of identities.

Pakistan's identity discourses stressed upon the need for producing matching responses to counter negative representations of Pakistan by its defined 'others'. The interaction with international actors influence the constitution of Pakistani identity as highlighted in the preceding paragraphs. It has come to fore that though superstructure of Islam persisted in relation to Pakistani identity during the era under review but emphasis and iteration and reiteration of the selective features of the Islamic identity shows that Pakistan's identity evolved in post 9/11 era and this evolution also speaks of the agency of Pakistani actors against structural variables.

5.3 Actualising Pakistani Identity: Explaining as to how Pakistan's Representational Identity Shapes Its Foreign Policy.

If we consider discourse as constitutive of the world, then the formation of identity can be understood as arising solely through intersubjective processes. Discourses encompass various bodies of knowledge encompassing fields like science, law, history, and theology (Miskimmon et al., 2013). These bodies of knowledge are woven into narratives that allow actors to make sense of their own selves. In a world

characterised by diverse histories, cultures, and disparate social realities, it is through the act of storytelling that identity can be established (DeVereaux & Griffin, 2017). Stories serve as the fundamental building blocks of identity, enabling individuals to comprehend "who we are" and "what we are" in relation to the broader existence. The connection between narratives and identity is of paramount significance, as it is through this connection that we can decipher why a particular action holds importance.

The identity projected at annual sessions of UNGA from 2001 to 2022 brings to fore a number of identity tropes i.e. Pakistan being a moderate, responsible, tolerant and democratic Islamic state. The succeeding section of the chapter will highlight as to how Pakistan's identity influenced Pakistan's foreign policy, How the sub-themes of democracy, modernity, tolerance, inclusivity, moderation and Pakistan being a voice of Muslims, derives and shapes Pakistan's foreign policy.

These narratives and identity tropes are so crucial that the legitimacy of foreign policies hinges on leaders' ability to align policies with these established identity narratives, irrespective of the specific details of the policy at hand. In other words, the invocation of familiar narratives of Pakistani identity is essential for Pakistani foreign policy to gain political acceptance at both domestic and international level. These identity tropes coloured policies of Pakistan's successive regimes from 2001 to 2022.

Contrary to prevailing approaches in the study of foreign policy in International Relations (IR), it has been argued in the succeeding section of the chapter that the representational identity of Pakistan is integral to shaping Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour. The agency Taylor Robertson MacDonald ascribes to dominant and

repetitive narrative identity of Canada in relation to Canadian foreign policy equally applies to the impact of narrative identity on Pakistan's foreign policy. MacDonald while talking about the impact of narrative identity on foreign policy avers that projection of a certain representational identity makes some policy options more feasible than others. He goes on to say that foreign policies rely on narratives of identity that articulate "who we are" and "who they are" to legitimise "what we must do" (McDonald, 2023).

5.4 Promotion of Non-Muslim Heritage: A Means to Project and Actualise Pakistan's Identity as a Moderate and Tolerant state

Senator (retd) Javed Jabbar who has recently penned the book on Pakistan's national identity and is inarguably one of the leading voices that dwell on the nature of Pakistani identity especially in post 9/11 era. He pays a tribute to Pakistan's rich religious diversity and treats the followers of pre-Islamic religions living in the country as original Pakistanis. He says that "there is also the Hindu Pakistani, there is also the Christian Pakistani, there is also the Buddhist Pakistani and I call them the original Pakistanis because, territoriality is the basis for national identity this is their land this was their land, we Muslims encroached on their land took it over and decided to call it Pakistan" (*IPRI / Javed Jabbar / Identification and Actualisation of National Narrative of Pakistan - YouTube*, n.d.).

The assertions of Javed Jabbar who is known to be close to Pakistan's establishment and enjoys close connections in Pakistan's power corridors epitomises the consensus view of Pakistani state that it needs to own its pre-Islamic heritage to promote its soft image. Pakistan has not just confined itself to narrating the positive elements of

Pakistani identity rather it has also attempted to translate the rhetoric of identity narrative into reality.

To actualise its progressive identity, Pakistan has taken significant steps to connect with countries of Asia Pacific region and Sikhs diaspora by capitalising on its diverse cultural/religious heritage. In post 9/11 era, Pakistan attempted to capitalise on whatever resources it had to improve its international image. The state was in hunt of the resources which could play a role in projection of the positive reality of Pakistan. Foregoing in view, the state espoused religious tourism not only to project Pakistan's moderate/inclusive identity but also to translate its narrative identity into reality. Pakistan used its extant Pre-Islamic heritage to bolster its positive image in the world and to substantiate its narrative identity.

The present chapter brings to light that promotion of extant Pre-Islamic heritage is consistent with Pakistan's representational identity as a moderate and progressive state. The research does not deny the economic drivers of Pakistan's adoption of tourism as a diplomatic tool but it emphasises upon projection of heritage as a tool to bolster Pakistan's much maligned image and practices of the state which show that the state has embodied the Non-Muslim heritage as a part of its culture.

Consequently, adoption and ownership of the Non-Muslim heritage shapes Pakistan's foreign policy. There is extant literature on this subject which support this point that Pakistan's political and foreign policy professionals actively promoted Non-Muslim heritage to connect with external world and to improve its image. Moreover, there has been enough discursive practices through which it has been attempted to embed Pakistan's Non-Muslim heritage as a part of its culture. All these claims have been extensively supported by the practices of the state.

In pre 9/11 era Pakistan also made occasional and inconsistent use of its Pre-Islamic heritage. In 1950s Pakistan did employ its Buddhist heritage to connect with the Buddhist countries but the efforts lacked vigour, imagination and consistency (N. Tarar, personal communication, March 2023). Andrew Amstutz, who has extensively worked on South Asian history writes that from 1950 to 1969, curators of Pakistani culture co-opted Buddhist heritage to differentiate itself from India. This allowed Pakistan to construct international cultural connections with the Southeast Asia and to Europe (Amstutz, 2019). In 1970s and 1980s both Bhutto and Zia promoted Pan-Islamism and the ownership and projection of Pakistan's Non-Muslim heritage was put on a back burner. Haroon Khalid, author of the celebrated work "Walking with Nanak" says in Pakistan, prior to the secession of East Pakistan, the educational curriculum included a subject called History that encompassed the nation's cultural diversity.

However, following the secession of East Pakistan, this subject was replaced with Pakistan Studies. This shift led to a change in how Pakistani history was portrayed, becoming more exclusive and tailored to support the ideology of Pakistan. According to the author, this transformation erased traces of pre-Islamic heritage and even positioned Muhammad Bin Qasim as the first Pakistani. The introduction of Pakistan Studies aimed to foster a distinct Pakistani identity and omitted stories of figures like Ram, Buddha, Ashoka, and Kanishka, while emphasizing figures like Mahmud Ghaznavi and the Mughals" (*In Pakistan, Appreciation of the Indus Valley Civilisation Ties in with Attempts to Erase Its Hindu Past - DAWN.COM*, n.d.).

Due to promotion of a certain ideology which was exclusive in nature in 1970s and 1980s, the space for projection and ownership of Pre-Islamic heritage were

squeezed. As a result of Afghan Jihad, the society was radicalised and the space for secular voice and projects declined and the trend continued up to 2001.

In post 9/11 era Pakistan was demonised and it was caught in the eye of storm where its significant others painted it in negative light as amply illustrated in the previous chapter. In response to its negative projection, Pakistan started to project its positive reality. Not only Pakistan promoted itself as a tolerant, peaceful, progressive country through the rhetoric but it also started to actualise its identity in more synergetic and consistent way as compared to the past. In post 9/11 one of the resources that were espoused by the state to actualise its progressive identity was ownership and projection of its Pre-Islamic heritage.

In the succeeding section Pakistan's ownership and projection of its Pre-Islamic heritage will be presented as a proof of the assertion that Pakistan's identity has shaped Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour but before that the inherently political nature of tourism will be brought to light to establish connection between Pakistan's promotion of heritage and its foreign policy.

Generally, tourism is viewed as an economic activity. It is believed that there are economic drivers behind promotion of tourism and the activity is carried out only for economic benefits. However, the recent literature has highlighted that tourism is not just an economic activity, it has political drivers and it also creates political dividends. According to renowned sociocultural anthropologist Noel B. Salazar, known for his transdisciplinary exploration of the interplay between heritage and tourism, "Tourism is inherently intertwined with broader economic and geopolitical frameworks, a connection that cannot be severed" (Salazar, 2010).

The enthusiasm and dedication to promote religious tourism in Pakistan clearly

indicate the Pakistani state's intention to leverage its heritage for gaining political dividends. While the tourism sector is commonly perceived as an economic domain, its underlying political connections and implications have not been fully investigated. Tourism functions as both a political and economic endeavour. Scholars P. M. Burns and M. Novelli extensively explored the inseparable relationship between politics and tourism, asserting that "Tourism is a potent fusion of cultural, economic, and political dynamics." Moreover, they argue that "Tourism development in itself holds political significance, involving policy decisions on public investments (such as human capital and infrastructure development) and managing the sustainable utilisation of resources (Burns & Novelli, 2007).

Tourism has consistently been wielded as a mechanism to propagate specific values. The intrinsic connection between values and tourism is widely acknowledged. Beyond being a mere physical encounter, tourism encompasses an abstract experience. In a keynote speech at a conference, King Simeon II, former Prime Minister of Bulgaria, articulated that the notion of culture intertwined with tourism immediately evokes notions of peace, unity, and shared comprehension. (World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), 2015).

Cognisant of the politico-economic importance of the tourism, both China and India are actively promoting 'Buddhist diplomacy' in a competitive manner. This simultaneous engagement is moving in the direction of rivalry. The article titled 'Buddhism: A New Frontier in China India Rivalry' by Jayadev Ranade delves into the documentation and analysis of this rivalry. (*Buddhism: A New Frontier in the China-India Rivalry - Carnegie India - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, n.d.). It is well within reason to suggest that Pakistan is closely observing India's assertive adoption of 'Buddhist diplomacy'. Similar to India, Pakistan also possesses Buddhist

heritage. Just as India and China have done, Pakistan has chosen to leverage and capitalise on its heritage to present and realise its progressive identity.

In the succeeding paragraphs it will be illustrated as to how Pakistan's self-conception as a moderate and progressive state shaped its foreign policy. The impact of the identity can be seen in Pakistan's adoption of its extant Pre-Islamic heritage as a platform of the actualisation of its identity. Pakistan espoused its Buddhist heritage, Sikh heritage and Hindu heritage to project itself as a moderate and progressive state.

5.5 Projection of Pakistan's Hindu Heritage

Pakistan has embraced its Hindu heritage in alignment with its self-projection as a moderate and tolerant Islamic state. By taking ownership of its Hindu heritage sites spread across the country, Pakistan aims to present a positive image to the global community. These sites hold great significance for Hindu followers; for instance, Panchmuki Hanoman Mandir in Karachi and Sadhu Bela in Sukkur are revered by adherents of Hinduism. However, the most sacred sites for Hindus in Pakistan include the Katas Raj Temple complex in Chakwal, Hinglaj Mata in Baluchistan, and Sharda Peeth in Azad Jammu Kashmir.

Distinguished Hindu statesmen ranging from L.K. Advani, Jaswant Singh, to Nitish Kumar have made visits to Raj Katas and Hinglaj Mata in the past. Notably, L.K. Advani, the former Indian leader of opposition in Lok Sabha and the then President of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), undertook a brief visit to Katas Raj in June 2005. His visit was marked by the inauguration of conservation efforts at the Satghraah temple (*Advani Visits Katas Raj - Newspaper - DAWN.COM*, n.d.). As a gesture of goodwill in May 2015, Pakistan dispatched a container of sacred water from the

'Amar Kund' (a holy pond) of Katas Raj to LK Advani. (*Govt Sends Holy Water of Katas Raj Temple to Advani*, n.d.). In February 2006, Jaswant Singh, the former foreign minister and at that time the leader of the opposition in the Rajya Sabha, headed a group of eighty-six pilgrims to the Hinglaj Mata temple in Baluchistan. During this visit, he stressed the primary aim of promoting peace, harmony, and positive relations between the two countries. (*Jaswant Visits Temple in Balochistan - Newspaper - DAWN.COM*, n.d.).

In November 2012, Nitish Kumar, the then Chief Minister of Bihar, accompanied by a delegation that included Rajya Sabha MP N K Singh and other officials, toured Taxila and Katas Raj. While at Katas Raj, he praised the Pakistani government's efforts in restoring the holy pond. He expressed optimism that the restoration of this sacred site would significantly contribute to enhancing cross-cultural relations between India and Pakistan. (*Nitish Visits Taxila, Ancient Hindu Temples in Pak Punjab - The Hindu BusinessLine*, n.d.).

In January 2017, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, visited Katas Raj in the Chakwal district near Islamabad. During this visit, he inaugurated a water filtration plant named AmratJal. On this occasion, he conveyed a message of peace to followers of all religions and expressed his commitment to transforming Pakistan into a minority-friendly nation. Shiv Partab Bajaj, one of the twenty pilgrims who visited the temple in 2017, noted that the first group after partition arrived at Katas Raj in 1982. He highlighted that while the situation at Katas Raj was underdeveloped at that time, significant developmental work has since been undertaken, for which Indians are appreciative of the Pakistani government. (*Hindu Pilgrims Celebrate Shivaratri at Katas Raj - Pakistan - DAWN.COM*, n.d.).

On 26th March 2019 Times of India reported that Imran Khan's government has given a green signal to open the Sharda Peeth Corridor (*Pakistan Okays Plan to Open ShardaPeeth Corridor for Hindu Pilgrims in PoK*, n.d.). A diplomat who wished not to be named says that Pakistan would have opened the corridor had India not abrogated article 370 and 35-A of Indian constitution in August 2019.

For Pakistan it was not an easy decision to make given the location of the temple in the disputed territory. Opening of the corridor could have weakened Pakistan stance on Kashmir, offended Kashmiris who are bravely fighting for the freedom against Indian occupation, strengthened Indian claim of historical connection with Kashmir. Despite these strong arguments that inhibited opening of the corridor, Pakistan willingness to open the corridor amounted to revolutionary change in its foreign policy. It bespeaks of the actualisation of Pakistan's moderate identity and proof of the assertion that Pakistan's self-conception as a tolerant and progressive state shapes its foreign policy.

Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board inaugurated renovation and uplifting of KatasRaj Temple Complex on April 1, 2022. The renovation, maintenance and repair work was carried out at a massive level (*RESTORATION AND UPLIFTING OF KATAS RAJTEMPLES / Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB)*, n.d.).

Despite tension being at the highest level between India and Pakistan, Pakistan has not stopped issuance of visas to Hindu pilgrims who wanted to visit Katas Raj Temples Complex for celebrations of Maha Shivratri. Continuous issuance of visa to Hindu pilgrims and the restoration, uplifting of the temple bespeaks of actualisation of Pakistan's self-conception and projection as a tolerant and progressive state.

5.6 Promotion of Sikh Heritage as an Expression of Pakistan's Progressive Identity

According to Amardeep Singh, the author of "Lost Heritage: The Sikh Legacy in Pakistan," Pakistan holds a similar significance for Sikhs as Mecca and Medina do for Muslim (S. Amardeep, personal communication, June 2016). This encapsulates the significance of Pakistan in the Sikh community, not only in India but also across the world. The revered and sanctified Sikh sites in Pakistan hold a profound allure, deeply rooted in spiritual essence. Guru Nanak's birth and passing both occurred in Pakistan, making it a pivotal place of origin for Sikhism. The country's role as the birthplace of this faith is an indisputably established fact.

The Sikh community faced immense hardships during the partition of India in 1947. They not only experienced loss of lives and property but were also deprived of unrestricted access to over 75 percent of their historically significant gurdwaras, including the birthplace of Guru Nanak and other revered sites for the Sikh faith (Pannu,2019).

In this regard, the first significant engagement between India and Pakistan took place in September 1974. A protocol was signed between the two states that promised non-discriminatory access to Sikh pilgrims to their sacred shrines in Pakistan and also aimed at ensuring maintenance of the Sikh shrines (India, 1974). The signing of the Protocol on Visits to Religious Shrines in 1974 marked a limited achievement for the worldwide Sikh community, granting them access to historical sites in Pakistan. However, India choose not to engage in discussions with Pakistan concerning the Darbar Sahib in the subsequent decades. This lack of communication occurred in the backdrop of emerging transnational Sikh political

aspirations and the growth of the Khalistan movement (Bainiwal, 2020).

During the mid-1970s, Ganga Singh Dhillon, a prominent businessman based in Washington, D.C., who had extensive connections within the US political establishment, established the Nankana Sahib Foundation in 1974. The foundation aimed to preserve and maintain Sikh sacred shrines in Pakistan, with the objective of creating an international organisation managed by Sikhs to oversee these institutions. Dhillon forged a close friendship with President Zia-ul-Haq, the military leader of Pakistan at the time, who himself had been a refugee from East Punjab. President Zia-ul-Haq recognised the significance of allowing free access to these shrines and ensuring the freedom of worship as a means of influencing Sikh sentiments in both India and the diaspora (*I'm an Agent of Guru Nanak: Ganga Singh Dhillon - India Today*, n.d.).

Due to the Khalistan movement India didn't reciprocate the support provided by Pakistan and the global Sikh community to ensuring visits of Sikhs to their sacred sites in Pakistan. From 1970s to 2000, efforts were made by the diasporic Sikh community to promote Sikh religious tourism but the efforts were marked by inconsistency and were especially constrained by lack of cooperation from India. Pakistani government too on its own didn't allocate any considerable amount to restoration and preservation of the Sikh holy sites.

In 1999, addressing the concerns expressed by the Sikh diaspora regarding the state of Sikh gurdwaras in Pakistan, the Pakistani government took action by establishing the Pakistan Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (PSGPK). The PSGPK was tasked with overseeing the management of Sikh shrines under the authority of the Evacuee Trust Property Board (*In Pakistan, Appreciation of the Indus Valley*

Civilisation Ties in with Attempts to Erase Its Hindu Past - DAWN.COM, n.d.).

Though the foregoing history illustrates that Pakistan did historically try to facilitate Sikh pilgrims and it also contributed meagerly to preserve the heritage yet the real impetus to preserve the Sikh heritage of Pakistan was dawned upon Pakistani leadership in post 9/11 era to reap political and economic dividends. In the last decade or so Pakistan has taken serious steps to own and project its Sikh heritage.

Despite the increased tensions between India and Pakistan following the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in 2001 and the subsequent escalation in hostilities, there were notable efforts towards détente. These initiatives aimed to enhance dialogue between East and West Punjab, with preliminary steps taken to establish the Kartarpur corridor and initiate a bus service from Amritsar to Nankana Sahib in 2006 (Talbot, 1998).

Today holy sites of Sikhs are not only well preserved in Pakistan but are also projected as a symbol of interfaith harmony and religious diversity of Pakistan. Every year Pakistan welcomes Sikhs from around the world including Sikhs from India to visit the holy sites of Nankana sahib, Punja sahib and Darbar sahib. Despite rocky and tumultuous relationship between India and Pakistan, Pakistan never stopped the Sikhs from visiting their holy sites.

Every year Pakistan issues visas to thousands of Sikhs pilgrims from across the globe including India to visit their sites in connection with their religious festivals. AmardeepSingh avers that off late Pakistan has realised the potential of the Sikh heritage to garner political and economic dividend (*I'm an Agent of Guru Nanak: Ganga Singh Dhillon - India Today, n.d.).*

Ambassador retired Shahid Kiani avers that there has been a strong realisation in Pakistan to walk the talk when it comes to projection of Pakistan as a diverse and tolerant society. Promotion and ownership of Pakistan's Pre-Islamic heritages like Buddhist, Sikh and Hindu heritage vindicate Pakistan's self-conception and projection as a progressive state. (S. Kiani, personal communication, March 2023).

In 2017 Punjab government in collaboration with World Bank Group launched Punjab Tourism for Economic Growth Project. The project aims at restoration and conversion of five Gurdwaras namely, Nankana Sahib, Gurdwara Sacha Sauda, Gurdwara Punja Sahib Hasanabdal, Gurdwara Kartarpur Sahib and Gurdwara Rohri Sahib Eminabad in Gujranwala. It also includes the construction of Sikh heritage museum, 220 guest rooms and a three-star hotel in Nankana Sahib (*Punjab Plans to Attract More Religious Tourists - Newspaper - DAWN.COM*, n.d.). Besides promoting economic activities through tourism the project aims to promote and advance tolerance and pluralism through appreciation of cultural diversity. The project also testifies to Pakistan's self-conception as a tolerant and progressive state. Pakistan has taken steps to enhance travel opportunities for the Sikh diaspora by implementing measures such as visa-on-arrival facilities. Additionally, the country has actively promoted its cultural "soft power" to generate renewed interest in Sikh cultural and religious heritage in Pakistan. This can be observed through publications like Singh's "Lost Heritage: The Sikh Legacy in Pakistan" and Khalid's "Walking with Nanak" which contribute to highlighting and preserving Sikh heritage within Pakistan (Singh, 2020).

In June 2019, Pakistan with the support of Sikh foundation in UK installed a life size, seven feet tall statue of Maharaja Ranjit Singh at Lahore fort to commemorate his 180th death anniversary. The installation of the statue of a conqueror who is

reviled and hated by many in Pakistan shows that the state is willing to embrace its history more inclusively. Though the statue was vandalised in 2021 but the government got it restored and reinstalled it (*Maharaja Ranjit Singh's Statue Restored to Golden Shine*, n.d.)

In November 2019, Pakistan issued a commemorative stamp to mark 550th birth anniversary of Guru Nanak. It shows Pakistan's ownership of its Sikh heritage. The analysis of the text of the stamp shows that Pakistan project itself as a birthplace of Guru Nanak and find no incongruity and contradiction between Pakistan being a Muslim country and a projector and custodian of its Non-Muslim heritage.



(Radio Pakistan, 2019) **Figure-V**

In November 2018, a significant step was taken by the governments of Pakistan and India with the establishment of the Kartarpur Corridor. This corridor, spanning across the river Ravi, connects the holy sites of Dera Baba Nanak Sahib in India and Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Kartarpur, Pakistan. The opening of this corridor represents a potential shift towards enhanced cooperation and signifies a symbolic milestone in the shared cultural history of the Punjab region (Bainiwal, 2020).

Establishment of Kartarpur marks the apogee of Pakistan's efforts to project and actualise its diverse heritage. In light of the extensive historical context, it is

essential to comprehend the current decision made by the Pakistan government and the positive response from India. The official stance on this initiative aligns with the principles of Islam, which emphasises respect for all religions. It is in accordance with Pakistan's policy of fostering interfaith harmony and promoting religious tolerance (*Kashmir to Kartarpur*, n.d.).

Press release of Pakistan's foreign office dated 23rd November 2018 also attempted to justify opening of corridor as an expression of its Islamic identity. The press release terms opening of the corridor as a representation of the primacy, Pakistan accords to minorities. The press release goes on to say that opening of the corridor is in sync and congruent with Pakistan's peaceful neighbourhood policy as envisioned by Quaid-e- Azam's "Pakistan's Kartarpur Spirit can be a step forward in the right direction from conflict to cooperation, animosity to peace and enmity to friendship" (*Pakistan Decides to Open the Kartarpur Corridor – Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, n.d.).

What distinguishes Pakistan's position from Indian position in relation to construction of the corridor is the fact that in Pakistan there has been consensus among all political parties in Pakistan over opening of corridor contrary to India where it remained a contentious subject between Congress and BJP (Singh, 2020). Consensus among Pakistani political elites shows that political elites are convinced that adoption of Pre- Islamic heritage is vital to translate its identity discourse of peaceful state into reality. This translation of identity narrative into reality lends more credence to Pakistan's self-conception and projection as a moderate state.

5.7 Promotion of Buddhist Heritage as an Expression of Pakistan's Moderate Identity

Pakistan can be appropriately referred to as the birthplace of Buddhism, given that Monk Maranatha from Gandhara played a significant role in propagating Buddhism to countries like China, Korea, and Japan. (*Gandhara Art And Culture Association / GACA*, n.d.). Gandhara encompassed Swat and Peshawar valleys in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as Taxila in Punjab. In ancient times, Gandhara held a central position along the Silk Road. This trade network facilitated the exchange of various commodities including textiles, precious stones, woodwork, metalwork, incense, saffron, and timber. Stretching over 15,000 kilometers, this route connected regions from Japan's West coast through China, Southeast Asia, India, and onward to the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Beyond its economic significance, the Silk Road served as a conduit for the transfer of culture, education, and religious beliefs. It wasn't solely a trade pathway, but also a medium through which ideas, languages, traditions, and spiritual philosophies were shared. The government has keenly acknowledged the potential of Buddhist religious tourism and has undertaken substantial measures to foster it. This strategic approach aims to not only harness the economic advantages but also to espouse it as an expression of its representational identity and to garner soft power and to promote regional connections.

In recent times, the country has astutely engaged with countries having substantial Buddhist populations, including China, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and South Korea. This outreach has been instrumental in cultivating bilateral relationships founded on a shared spiritual heritage. (*"Gandhara Symposium 2023 – Cultural*

Diplomacy: Reviving Gandhara Civilization & Buddhist Heritage in Pakistan / Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, n.d.).

Pakistan's strategic utilisation of its Buddhist heritage for diplomatic purposes traces its origins back to 1984. During this time, Pakistan embarked on a collaborative effort with the Japan Broadcasting Corporation to organise a comprehensive exhibition showcasing the rich Gandhara art of Pakistan. This exhibition was held across three prominent Japanese cities, namely Tokyo, Osaka, and Fukuoka, from February 25 to July 15, 1984. (*"Gandhara Symposium 2023 – Cultural Diplomacy: Reviving Gandhara Civilization & Buddhist Heritage in Pakistan / Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, n.d.)*

Likewise, in October 2002, a noteworthy sequence of exhibitions titled "The Treasures of Pakistan: Gandhara" was unveiled across four major cities in Japan, specifically Tokyo, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Nagoya. Spanning an entire year, these exhibitions stood as a testament to the enduring collaboration between Pakistan's federal ministry of minorities, culture, sports, tourism, and youth affairs and Japan's Broadcasting Corporation. The foundation for this initiative was laid in August 2002. This collaborative effort saw the participation of Peshawar, Lahore, and Karachi museums, collectively contributing over 50 exquisite sculptures from the Gandhara civilization. This exhibition was a spectacular showcase of the multifaceted heritage of Islamic Pakistan, spanning back to its Buddhist roots. (*PESHAWAR: Japan to Hold Exhibition on Gandhara Civilization - Newspaper - DAWN.COM, n.d.).*

In February of 2017, a significant memorandum of understanding was inked between the governments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and China's Shaanxi province,

signifying their mutual commitment to the preservation of cultural heritage in the province. In September 2012, a collaborative effort between Pakistan High Commission and the Singapore Buddhist Federation resulted in a seminar titled "Buddhism in Pakistan and China." This event aimed to rekindle the shared Buddhist heritage that thrived along the historical Silk Road, fostering a renewed sense of connections. Highlighting Pakistan's proactive approach, the Pakistani ambassador to South Korea, Zahid Nasrullah Khan, conveyed Pakistan's aspiration to construct meaningful cultural bridges with the Korean populace in a press conference at the Pakistani embassy in South Korea on November 9, 2015.

During the period spanning 2010 to 2016, Muhammad Daud Ehtisham, the press attaché of the Pakistan High Commission, made a distinctive mark within diplomatic circles for his active promotion of Buddhist and cultural connections between Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In 2010, heeding a request from former Sri Lankan President Mahindra Rajapaksa, the then-Pakistani President Asif Zardari dispatched Buddhist relics from the Gandhara region to be showcased in Sri Lanka. In June 2011, on the occasion of the 2,600th anniversary of Buddha's enlightenment, Pakistan ceremoniously handed over two significant Buddhist relics to Sri Lanka. In a noteworthy gesture, the Sri Lankan government arranged a month-long exhibition of these revered relics before entrusting them to the care of the monks at the Bodhigayana Kapuwa temple situated near Colombo. Another instance of Pakistan's proactive engagement is evident in their intent to attract religious tourists from Thailand. In January 2017, the Managing Director of PTDC engaged in discussions with the Thai ambassador in Pakistan, aiming to explore the potential of religious tourism in fostering stronger bilateral relations. (*Diplomacy, Heritage, and Cultural Pride: Reviving the Buddhist Legacy of Islamic Pakistan - Buddhistdoor Global*, n.d.-a).

In May of 2016, the federal department of archaeology and museums orchestrated the ceremonial hand over of sacred bone relics of Lord Buddha, alongside a stone reliquary and an ornate golden casket. During this event, Irfan Siddiqui, Prime Minister's advisor on national history and literary heritage, expressed the profound significance of the occasion, stating: "Today, our purpose is to rekindle our long-standing cultural ties by becoming part of an exhibition featuring the revered relics of Lord Buddha to Sri Lanka, aligning with the forthcoming Vesak festival scheduled from May 19 to June 30, to be hosted across various venues." The advisor further emphasised that this exhibition was made feasible due to the visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Sri Lanka, during which he extended an offer to periodically dispatch sacred relics of Buddha to Sri Lanka, thus cementing and invigorating the enduring cultural rapport between the two nations. (*Buddhist Relics Handed over to Sri Lanka for Exhibition - Newspaper - DAWN.COM*, n.d.).

In both 2016 and 2017, a delegation of esteemed Sri Lankan Monks embarked on a visit to Pakistan, graciously invited by the Pakistani government to partake in the commemoration of the Vesak festival. On both occasions, the revered monks undertook pilgrimages to their sacred sites, conducting solemn rituals and expressing deep appreciation towards Pakistan for its consistent and robust support to Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation (PTDC) has meticulously organised a captivating Buddhist heritage exhibition in October 2017. Envisioned as a collaborative effort, the exhibition hosted the active eleven Buddhist nations, including significant players such as China, Nepal, and Thailand. Expressing the overarching objective, a PTDC representative shared insights with the Express Tribune, explaining that the exhibition's core aim is to illuminate the profound Buddhist heritage ensconced within Taxila, Takht Bhai, and

Swat. The representative emphasised the pivotal role of such exhibitions in amplifying the awareness about Pakistan's rich Buddhist civilization, while also highlighting the potential for heightened tourist foot- fall through comprehensive and well-directed promotion. (*PTDC to Organise Buddha Heritage Exhibition in October*, n.d.; *Diplomacy, Heritage, and Cultural Pride: Reviving the Buddhist Legacy of Islamic Pakistan - Buddhistdoor Global*, n.d.- b)

The instances mentioned above collectively underscore how Pakistan's self-projection as a nation characterised by tolerance and progressiveness has significantly influenced its endeavours in Buddhist heritage diplomacy. This approach has been driven by a confluence of political factors, including the strategic promotion of a tolerant national image and the cultivation of diplomatic relations with countries sharing historical and cultural ties.

As emphasised earlier, Pakistan's endeavours to adopt its Buddhist heritage stretched as far back as 1984. Yet, the consistency of these efforts has not always matched the potential material and ideational dividends. Nonetheless, in recent times, Pakistan has exhibited a reinvigorated commitment to the promotion of its Buddhist religious heritage. This determination is substantiated by the ongoing collaborations with various countries and organisations, as elucidated by the aforementioned developments.

It's relevant to inquire about the political benefits that Pakistan envisions through the promotion of religious tourism centred on its Buddhist heritage. An examination of the existing literature and an assessment of recent advancements suggest that Pakistan's primary objective is to enhance its soft image within the Buddhist realm. Through the promotion and dissemination of its Buddhist heritage, Pakistan seeks

to underscore the cultural affinities shared between itself and the Buddhist world. Validly asserting itself as the guardian and as home of Buddhism, Pakistan strives to strengthen its historical and cultural connections with the Buddhist world.

By emphasising that Buddhism and Buddhist art emanated from this region and traversed the Silk Road to reach the Buddhist communities in China, Korea, and Japan, Pakistan endeavours to underscore the shared cultural bonds between itself and the wider Buddhist world. The espousal and ownership of Pakistan's Buddhist heritage shows that Pakistan's representational identity that is tolerant and progressive, shaped its foreign policy.

Pakistan perceives the promotion and preservation of its Buddhist heritage as a reflection of its identity. Diplomacy inherently involves highlighting shared elements and convergences, which in turn can mitigate differences and open doors on new areas of mutual interest. In an article titled 'Diplomacy, Heritage, and Cultural Pride: Reviving the Buddhist Legacy of Islamic Pakistan,' BD Dipananda articulates that "Despite the absence of a contemporary Buddhist presence in Pakistan, its remarkable Buddhist legacy remains a bridge to other Asian nations. This legacy offers a strong foundation to cultivate fresh connections with Buddhist countries, particularly in the era of the One Belt, One Road initiative.

Dr. Nadeem Omar Tarar, who holds Gandhara chair at University of Wah says since 2010 Pakistan has been regularly hosting Buddhist festivals to celebrate and appreciate its Buddhist heritage. There is no doubt that in Pakistan's power corridors there is a strong realisation that we need to build connection with the Buddhist world through the shared culture and heritage. Gandhara Resource Centre, Taxila and Centre for Culture and Development are working in collaboration with

Pakistani institutions and international partners to promote Pakistan's Buddhist heritage. Furthermore, it is important to highlight the role Ministry of Foreign Affairs is playing in owning and promoting Buddhist heritage.

Embassies in Buddhist countries especially in Sri Lanka, Korea and Thailand are very active in this regard. A number of international exhibitions have been arranged in Korea and Thailand to showcase Pakistan's Buddhist heritage. In 2021, Pakistan's embassy in Korea released a comprehensive documentary to showcase Pakistan's Buddhist heritage. Other missions are also following this trend (N. Tarar, personal communication, March 2023). The panoply of the activities bespeaks of the impact of Pakistan self-conception as a progressive state on its foreign policy.

In 2021, Centre for Culture and Development on behalf of UNESCO and in partnership with Punjab government organised a festival to explore Gandhara civilization (*Gandhara Festival – Roots or Routes: Exploring Pakistan's Buddhist and Jain Histories – C2D*, n.d.). The title of the festival was very instructive and illuminating, "Roots or Routes: Exploring Pakistan's Buddhist and Jain Histories". The title is emblematic of Pakistan's quest to reclaim its Pre-Islamic heritage of Buddhism as an expression and actualisation of its moderate and inclusive identity.

In 2021 the first Buddhist International conference titled "Rediscovering a Shared spiritual heritage: First International Conference on Buddhism in Pakistan" was organised by Taxila Institute of Asian Civilizations, Quaid-I- Azam University (TIAC) and Silk Centre. The title of the conference is very instructive as it shows Pakistan's quest for finding connections with Buddhist world in the age of Belt and Road Initiative (Silk Centre, 2021). In November 2023, the institute is going to host second International Conference on Buddhism (I. Shaukat, personal

communication, March 2023).

In March 2023, Pakistan attended first International Conference on Shared Buddhist Heritage which was held in India under the aegis of SCO. Advisor to Pakistan's Tourism Coordination Board, Mr Imran Shaukat represented Pakistan in the conference. In an interview to ANI he says "This Buddhist civilization, if we want to look at it, is actually the first binding glue that brings these countries and cultures together. It would be very nice to go back in history and forget differences and go back to see how we were all connected then and how can we find commonalities rather than the differences between all our cultures. And remember, at one time we were the same culture and we were the same people". He goes on to say that since last decade or so there is increased awareness and recognition of Pakistan's Pre-Islamic heritages Pakistan has taken significant and serious steps to own and publicise Pakistan's Buddhist heritage (*"India Playing Wonderful Role..." Pak Delegation at SCO Conference on 'Shared Buddhist Heritage' - YouTube, n.d.*).

In July 2023, Pakistan hosted a three day International Gandhara Symposium titled "Cultural Diplomacy: Reviving Gandhara Civilization and Buddhist heritage in Pakistan" in Islamabad. The symposium was jointly organised by PM Task Force on Gandhara Tourism, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad and Directorate of Archaeology and Museums, Government of KPK. Academicians and Buddhist faith leaders from Malaysia, China, Nepal, Thailand, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Pakistan attended the symposium. President of Pakistan made an inaugural address at the conference. He highlighted Pakistan's rich Buddhist heritage and appreciated the value of Pakistan's Buddhist heritage for promotion of peace and harmony in the world. He said that both the people and government of Pakistan feel pride in preservation of Pakistan's Buddhist heritage. President of Pakistan

inaugurated the symposium and dwelled on the cultural links between Pakistan and the Buddhist world. The inaugural session was also addressed by Chairman PM Task Force, Dr. Ramesh Vankwani. He opined that the symposium is indicative and emblematic of Pakistan's commitment to preservation and projection of Pakistan's extant Buddhist heritage (*"Gandhara Symposium 2023 – Cultural Diplomacy: Reviving Gandhara Civilization & Buddhist Heritage in Pakistan | Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, n.d.*).

The proceedings of the symposium were telecasted live on Pakistani media. Minister for Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony also addressed the symposium. The official patronage extended to the symposium is unprecedented in relation to projection of Pakistan's Buddhist heritage. One of the key take away idea that emerged from this symposium is the idea to establish a Gandhara Tourism Authority. The authority is envisioned as a body to project Pakistan's rich Buddhist heritage for realisation of politico-economic dividends in a more synergetic, consistent, coherent and in a non- contradictory manner. The draft summary for establishment of the authority has already been forwarded to Law and Justice Division. After vetting of the summary, it will be presented before the federal cabinet for approval (I. Shaukat, personal communication, March 2023). The abovementioned event and the official patronage extended to the event and the follow up measures show Pakistan's resolve to adopt/own and project its Buddhist heritage.

5.8 Actualisation of a Moderate Identity through Paigham-e-Pakistan

The issuance of the unanimous fatwa by more than 1800 Pakistani Islamic scholars not only rejects terrorism but also set the stage and direction for actualisation of Pakistani identity as a tolerant and progressive state. The document titled "Paigham-e-Pakistan" has been unanimously agreed upon and is formulated in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Prophet, and the Constitution of Pakistan. It represents the collective thoughts and perspectives of the State of Pakistan. The message presented in this document aims to address the challenges faced by Pakistan and provides a foundation for devising strategies to achieve the objectives outlined in the Objectives Resolution. Additionally, this message serves to project Pakistan as a strong, united, developed, cultured, and modern nation in the comity of nations. As a consensus-based document, it holds the potential to contribute to the reconstruction of Pakistani society based on core values such as tolerance, spirituality, justice, equality, and a balanced approach to fulfilling rights and obligations (*Paigham e Pakistan*, n.d.).

The contents of Paigham-e-Pakistan (PeP) exhibit a comprehensive and well-structured argument. It emphasises the reconstruction of Pakistani society and underscores the importance of treating other religions with respect and dignity. According to the document, it is essential for Muslims to engage in persuasive dialogue to encourage others to embrace Islam, while also upholding their own religious practices independently and freely.

Furthermore, PeP acknowledges and supports the constitutional provisions on religious freedom, considering them to be in harmony with the fundamental

principles of Islam. It asserts that all citizens are entitled to fundamental rights within the boundaries of the law and ethical principles. These rights include equality in both status and opportunities, equal treatment before the law, socio-economic and political justice, as well as the rights of expression, belief, worship, and freedom of assembly (Rana, 2021)

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan, professor of politics and International relations at International Islamic University, Islamabad opines that Paigham-e-Pakistan hasn't created a new narrative rather it has reiterated the message of Islam. He declared Paigham-e-Pakistan as a panacea to promote national unity and positive reality of Pakistan (*The Essence of Paigham-e-Pakistan / By Dr Muhammad Khan - Pakistan Observer*, n.d.).

The central focus of Paigham-e-Pakistan is to promote unity, peace, interfaith harmony, social justice, and gender equality. It recognises and upholds the importance of preserving freedom of expression, association, and belief. The initiative also advocates for the protection of political, economic, and cultural rights. It stands against human rights violations such as harassment and discrimination. Moreover, Paigham-e-Pakistan strives to enhance democratic systems, emphasising accountability, transparency, and the safeguarding of fundamental rights (Akhtar, 2023)

5.9 Re-Recording of National Anthem and Actualisation of Pakistan's Progressive Identity

On the occasion of 75th birth anniversary of Pakistan, Pakistan launched re-recorded national anthem. The semiotic analysis of the visuals shows representation of a number of features of Pakistani identity tropes like projecting Pakistan as a

religiously and culturally diverse country, a supporter of women empowerment and as an Islamic state that acts as a custodian of diverse religious heritage.

In the video of the anthem, presented in a captivating travelogue format, the audience is taken on a visual journey across Pakistan, showcasing its diverse regions and the vibrant individuals who call it their home. The captivating scenes capture people from different walks of life singing the national anthem, symbolising their love and pride for their country. Furthermore, the video highlights the rich tapestry of religions and professions that exist within Pakistan, showcasing the country's remarkable diversity (*The Re- Recorded, more 'inclusive' National Anthem Is out to Mark the 75th Anniversary of Pakistan's Independence - Culture - Images, n.d.*).

The fact of the matter is that Pakistan has always been a diverse country but the religious diversity has neither been owned nor been propagated in this manner.

In the below given image taken from re-recorded national anthem, projects Pakistan's religious diversity, this projection of religious diversity was not highlighted in previous visual representations of national anthem.



Figure-VI

(The Re-Recorded, More 'inclusive' National Anthem Is out to Mark the 75th Anniversary of Pakistan's Independence - Culture - Images, n.d.)

5.10 Actualisation of Identity through Revised National Curriculum of Pakistan

On 16th August 2021, Prime Minister Imran Khan launched Single National curriculum to end disparity and discrimination in education system of Pakistan (*PM Officially Launches Single National Curriculum Today - Pakistan - DAWN.COM*, n.d.). In 2022, Federal Education Ministry renamed SNC as National curriculum of Pakistan (NCP) (*Education Ministry Renames Single National Curriculum - Pakistan - DAWN.COM*, n.d.). The curriculum books were rewritten keeping in view the new realities, advances, national needs and aspirations. As aptly stated by Frederick Rudolph, the curriculum has served as a platform where we define our collective identity and understanding of ourselves (Rudolph, 1977). Curriculum includes various dimensions of identity, but the aspect most closely linked to the curriculum is the concept of national belonging and the significance attributed to it. The curriculum plays a crucial role in shaping our perception of which nation we belong to and the implications and significance associated with that sense of belonging (*Curriculum and National Identity.Pdf(Review)Adobe Cloud Storage*, n.d.).

Dr. Sohail Bin Aziz, Assistant Educational Advisor at Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training (he has been closely associated with formation of National Curriculum of Pakistan) says that curriculum is always a living document that reflects and corresponds to changing realities. After 9/11 Pakistan not only faced threats to its physical security due to increased instances of terrorism in the country but it also faced identity crisis. To cope with new realities curriculum was revised in 2006. The revised curriculum though emblematic of a renewed

realisation to project Pakistan as a tolerant and diverse country, couldn't be implemented due to governance issues. The curriculum inter alia aimed to promote tolerance, diversity and peace. The realisation to revise national curriculum and to make it more inclusive was borne out of indigenous realisation and experiences. Similarly, the present formation of National Curriculum of Pakistan actualises Pakistan's iteration of national identity as a tolerant, diverse and peaceful society. The elements of the identity i.e. tolerance, diversity, interfaith harmony espoused in the curriculum are different from the elements of identity espoused in Zia era. Pakistan's post 9/11 national identity is rejection of exclusionary identity nurtured and sponsored by the state in 1970s and 1980s and that marks revival of Pakistan's cosmopolitan identity formed after independence and that remained functional till secession of East Pakistan.

When we analyse the General Knowledge books of class-1 to Class-3, we realise how interfaith harmony, tolerance and appreciation of diversity have been promoted. Similarly, the books of Social Studies and History aims to instill the values of tolerance, appreciation of diversity and inter faith harmony (S. Aziz, personal communication, March 2023).

The analysis of the books of NCP from grade-1 to grade-10 shows that the identity tropes of Pakistan identity like Pakistan being a diverse, tolerant and peaceful country has been actualised through the curriculum.

It is pertinent to ask as to how curriculum is related to national identity and as to how the identity espoused in the curriculum can influence foreign policy of a country. The answer to this question is that curriculum influences our perceptions about how we define ourselves and also has a bearing on defining our role at national

and international level. Role of curriculum in shaping our attitudes, values and beliefs is well established in academic literature. (Thiessen, 2007).

States are an assemblage, the beliefs, values and attitude of people invariably shape a nation's foreign policy. Since attitudes and values are nurtured through curriculum besides other social institutions, the study of curriculum in relation to national identity and foreign policy is very pertinent. The sense of identity sanctioned and nurtured through curriculum influence perspectives of public on foreign relations of a state. Sohail Bin Aziz opines that promotion of a particular type of identity by espousing a certain historical account of events, values, aspirations and national achievements. Espousal of certain values, achievements, cultures and heroes instill a collective identity that shapes the worldview of citizens. The collective identity thus formed can then shape foreign policy decisions, shaping a state's stance on international issues. (S. Aziz, personal communication, March 2023).

In addition to role of collective identity, nurtured and instilled in public conscience through curriculum, curriculum acts as the site of actualisation of a nation's identity. Actualisation of identity through curriculum prepares the ground for cooperation with the countries that are portrayed as friends and makes conflict more likely with the states that are "otherised".

5.11 How Pakistan's Policy of Neutrality Informs its National Identity

Pakistan's self-conception as a promoter of peace within and beyond is consistent with Pakistan's foreign policy in the Yemen conflict, Ukraine War and Saudi Iran relations. Ambassador (rtd) Afrasaib Hashmi avers that Pakistan's self-conception as a promotor

of peace explains Pakistan's policy in Yemen conflict and Saudi Iran relations to name a few (A. Hashmi, personal communication, March 2023).

Dr. Muhammad Saif-ur-Rahman posits that in the post 9/11 era Pakistan has always projected itself as a responsible international state that believes in diplomacy to solve conflictual issues. Pakistan neutrality in Yemen, and Pakistan's role of a bridge in Saudi Iran relations are cases in point (S. Malik, personal communication, March 2023).

The chapter shows as to how Pakistan defines itself in post 9/11 era and as to how the identity tropes influenced its foreign policy. The chapter brought to fore that Pakistan has not just relied on iteration of its identity rather it actualised its identity. The actualisation of Identity shows that Identity narratives shape foreign policy.

The chapter also shows that new elements of Pakistani identity in post 9/11 era are constructed to otherised national identity conception in 1970s and 1980s. The chapter argues that the identity projected at annual sessions of UNGA between 20001 to 2022 bring to fore a number of identity tropes i.e. projection of Pakistan as a progressive, responsible, tolerant and democratic Islamic state and how the identity narratives influence Pakistani foreign policy.

These narratives or identity tropes are so crucial that the legitimacy of foreign policies hinges on leaders' ability to align policies with these established narratives, irrespective of the specific details of the policy at hand. In other words, the invocation of familiar narratives of Pakistani identity is essential for Pakistani foreign policy to gain political acceptance at both domestic and international level. These identity tropes shaped foreign policy during the period under the review.

Chapter-6

Pakistan's Identity as a Responsible Nuclear State and its Nuclear Diplomacy

“While the political elites and populations of Pakistan's significant others admittedly share a somewhat careful, even negative view of the country, Pakistan remains fully integrated as an active participant of the international system; more so, it defines itself as such” (Vandamme, 2022).

6.1 National Identity and Nuclear Policy

The present chapter aims to show that the trope of Pakistan's national identity that is; Pakistan's self projection as a responsible nuclear state and how this self-conception and projection shapes and informs Pakistan's nuclear policy. The discourse of Pakistan's highest leadership endeavours to project and define Pakistan as a responsible and peaceful nuclear state. As Pakistan on the whole endeavours to construct an oppositional and antithetical identity in relation to hegemonic Indian identity, this ideational jostling of oppositional and antithetical identities is also evident in Pakistan's nuclear policy. As in other domains of identity construction Pakistan treats India as its major/ dominant 'other' and as a foil of its identity, here too in Pakistan's nuclear policy India is projected as an expansionist, hegemonic and revisionist state with a proven track record of aggression against Pakistan, a destabilising force that has left no option for Pakistan but to find security in adoption of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a regional hegemon.

The chapter also aims to highlight that in addition to India as a dominant 'other' vis-à-vis Pakistan's nuclear policy, the West led by the US also immensely

contributes to shape and inform Pakistan's nuclear policy. In post 9/11 era, Western discriminatory discourses in relation to Pakistan's nuclear programme primarily generated in Western think tanks, media and academia at the behest of US aimed to construct Pakistan's nuclear assets as unsafe, as a threat to global peace.

The narrative was paddled that Pakistan's nuclear assets could fall into the hands of terrorists which could unleash nuclear Armageddon on the West in general and on the US in particular. In this context Pakistan's nuclear policy underscores the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and Pakistan's unwavering resolve to prevent nuclear terrorism or any untoward incident related to safety and security of its nuclear assets. The Chapter goes on to show as to how the Western discourse was countered by Pakistani foreign policy elites through a counter discourse/ counter identity i.e. projection of the country as a responsible international norm compliant state and by undertaking tangible policy measures to neutralise the discriminatory identity construction.

The chapter also dwells on the role of international norms in shaping Pakistan's nuclear policy. The chapter also attempts to attest to effectiveness of constructivist approach in explaining Pakistan's nuclear policy. Adoption of constructivist approach to study Pakistan's nuclear policy challenges the dominance of realist lens in explaining Pakistan's nuclear policy.

Using a constructivist lens, the chapter highlights as to how the tropes of Pakistani identity i.e. projection of Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state and India centricity of its identity shape its foreign policy perspectives and as to how the tropes of identity are created and maintained through discourse and practices of the state.

The chapter also argues that International norms and treaties shape Pakistan's

nuclear policy and its relationship with international nuclear order. While Pakistan's self-image as a peaceful and responsible nuclear state is often contested by the West and its arch rival, India, it remains a key component of Pakistan's foreign policy.

On the whole, the chapter underscores the tropes of Pakistan's national identity in post 9/11 era, in the domain of nuclear policy that are, conception and projection of Pakistan as a responsible, peaceful and a norm compliant state and how these identity tropes mutually constitute Pakistan's nuclear policy.

6.2 Relevance of Constructivism in Explaining Pakistan's Nuclear Policy

The existing literature on Pakistan's nuclear policy is predominately characterised by realist/neorealist theories. Scholars using this lens focus on security dilemma and stability and instability paradox to explain Pakistan's nuclear policy. Scholars who have attempted to study Pakistan's nuclear policy fail to see any utility of constructivism to explain the phenomenon in question. The study however, adopts constructivists lens to explain Pakistan's nuclear policy in order to understand the ideational variable at play in shaping Pakistan's nuclear policy.

According to realists Pakistan's contribution to nuclear arms race is not going to end unless its security concerns are sufficiently and satisfactorily addressed. Realist do not give any importance to international norms in shaping preferences of the state. On the contrary, constructivism ascribes active role to international norms and social environment. Resultantly, behaviour of Pakistan is shaped and could further be influenced by global social environment, growing international norms of non-proliferation and international disarmament norms. Mario E Carranza opines that international non-proliferations norms have shaped Pakistan's nuclear policy which

is evident from the fact that Pakistan's has observed moratorium on nuclear tests, Pakistan has also stopped from using nuclear weapons so far, Pakistan's institutionalised and growing cooperation with IAEA and adoption of United Nation's Security Council's resolution 1540 and Pakistan's attempt to win the status of a responsible nuclear state (Carranza, 2016).

Wendt's social constructivist perspective highlights that entrenched security dilemmas within institutions are resistant to transformation; however, he contends that these dilemmas are not inherent to anarchy or nature. In other words, they are not perpetual and can be overcome if the involved actors cultivate alternative identities through interactive processes (*Social Theory of International Politics*, 2012).

According to constructivists, global norms can be viewed as social constructs. These norms undergo a distinct life cycle, involving emergence, a "norm cascade," and internalisation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998b). Norms play a dual role, either shaping identities from the outset by establishing expectations regarding suitable identities for a specific context (referred to as "constituting") or regulating behaviour for pre-existing identities (referred to as "regulating"). Consequently, norms collectively set expectations regarding the identities that actors will assume in a specific environment and how these identities will influence behaviour under different circumstances (Fukuyama & Katzenstein, 1997).

Constructivism underscores the significance of ideas, identity, and interaction within the international system, elucidating that the human world is not inherently given or natural. Instead, it asserts that the human world is an outcome of artifice, constructed through the deliberate actions of the involved actors.

Firstly, constructivists assert the significance of normative and ideational structures, viewing them as equally important as material structures. This emphasis stems from the understanding that material structures derive meaning from human actions through the shared knowledge within which they are embedded. The importance of normative and ideational structures is underscored by their role in shaping the social identities of political actors (*Social Theory of International Politics*, 2012).

Secondly, in alignment with A. Wendt's perspective, identities are considered foundational to interests. Simply put, identities are deemed consequential. Thirdly, constructivists posit the interdependence of agents and structures. According to Wendt, an individual actor's meaning and identity, as well as patterns of acceptable economic or political activity, are shaped by institutionalised norms and ideas. Wendt's definition further specifies identity as "a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions." This underscores the subjective nature of identity rooted in an actor's self-understandings (*Social Theory of International Politics*, 2012).

Wendt also acknowledges that identities are shaped not only by internal perceptions but also by external structures. He explains that two types of ideas contribute to identity: those held by the self and those held by others. Furthermore, the constructivist approach acknowledges the possibility of multiple identities and the potential for transitions between them. In this framework, narratives play a significant role, recognising the influential power of speech acts in shaping the thoughts of many and this should not be underestimated (*Social Theory of International Politics*, 2012).

In the domain of foreign policy, an intriguing question arises: what prompted

Pakistan to perceive a threat from India's nuclear deterrent but not from that of China? A constructivist perspective suggests that the answer lies in considerations of identities and socially constructed threats. The social construct of the "other" in the case of India, signifying a potential Indian attack on Pakistan, may have been more influential than that of China. Despite the fact that India's nuclear deterrent might not have been explicitly directed at Pakistan, the perceived threat was significant based on the constructed social identity (Márová, 2013).

Keeping the foregoing in view, it can safely be concluded that realist/neorealist frame lacks theoretical utility in explaining the influence of norms on Pakistan's nuclear policy, how Pakistan's significant 'others' have attempted to frame Pakistan's nuclear policy, how norms relate to Pakistan's identity discourses and how these identity discourses shape Pakistan nuclear policy. In the succeeding section an attempt will be made to bring to light how Western discourses (structure) framed Pakistani nuclear policy to legitimise their discriminatory policies.

6.3 Pakistan as an Abnormal Nuclear State: Constructing Pakistan's Identity from the Above

In hard core areas of International Relations like security, International Relations scholars predominantly influenced by realism; see little role of ideational factors in shaping security policies of states. The realists' scholars aver that it is the national interest which defines state's behaviour. Constructivists however, challenge this assertion, they are of the view that the dichotomy between the interest and identities is entirely false (Telhami & Barnett, 2002). Constructivists agree with realists that interests drive policies but they give agency to actors who interpret interests in any given situation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998a). In line with the foregoing arguments

we can safely surmise that constructivists treat national identity as a key causal factor that shapes national interest.

Though Pakistan projects itself internationally as a responsible nuclear state yet the West views it as anything but a responsible nuclear state. Graham Allison, an authority on issues pertaining to national security and nuclear weapons, portrays Pakistan as the most threatening site that can be used by terrorists to perpetuate nuclear terrorism. Pakistan has been projected as a country which is infested with rogue elements who want to use Pakistan's nuclear technology to defend Muslims across the globe. He has attempted to construct Pakistan's nuclear bomb as an Islamic bomb. He has also attempted to project dominance of "nuclear hawks" in Pakistan nuclear establishment, who view the bomb as a collective property of the Muslim civilization (Allison, 2004).

Graham Allison downplayed the tangible steps which Pakistan has taken, to ensure safety and security of its nuclear assets. Famous American academic Stephen P. Cohen commenting on fragility of Pakistani state says that "the failure of Pakistan would be a multidimensional geostrategic calamity, generating enormous uncertainties in a world that craves order and predictability" (Cohen, 2002).

Similarly, Daniel Markey, a preeminent American scholar on South Asia also treats Pakistan as a failing state with unparalleled catastrophic impact on the security of the world (Markey, 2013). These conceptions of Pakistan as a failing state, a state not averse to taking risks, a cauldron of extremism and fundamentalism epitomise the Western views of Pakistan's nuclear programme.

Going by the tenets of constructivism it becomes clear that a particular identity of Pakistan is constructed by Western Scholars and policy makers by subjectively

viewing Pakistan's nuclear policy. The subjectivity becomes obvious when more or less identical material facts pertaining to Indian nuclear programme that also pose a threat to international non-proliferation regimes are treated lightly or conveniently ignored.

Western scholars construct negative identity of Pakistan as a nuclear state. Not only Pakistan's nuclear programme is viewed as dangerous but also Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is considered destabilising and uncalled for. Materially speaking Pakistan's nuclear programme did expand and its doctrine did evolve in response to perceived changing geopolitical realities, destabilising doctrinal and operational changes introduced by India, Pakistan's significant other. The influence of these objective realities or material facts are subjectively interpreted. The meanings that the Western actors attach to these material facts are mediated by contingent historical and cultural conceptions of Pakistan as Wendt says "People act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them" (Wendt, 1992).

Mark Fitzpatrick, Toby Dalton, Mark Hibbs, Michael Krepon and George Perkovich and a host of other Western scholars have attempted over the years to chart a plan for mainstreaming of Pakistan's nuclear programme by suggesting discriminatory proposals, without paying any heed to Pakistan's legitimate security concerns. "The general assumption of such studies is that Pakistan is not a 'normal nuclear state' and therefore requires to take certain steps in order to qualify as one" (*Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 45., n.d.*).

Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon in the report titled 'Normal Nuclear Pakistan'

proposed measures for mainstreaming of Pakistan's nuclear programme like the proposals that Pakistan should sign Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT without waiting for India, Pakistan should reduce the production of tactical nuclear weapons, shift its nuclear doctrine from Full Spectrum Deterrence to Strategic Deterrence and stop its opposition to negotiations of Fissile Material Cut off treaty last but not the least stop production of fissile material (*Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 45., n.d.*).

For Pakistan signing CTBT and not taking existing fissile stock into account before finalisation of FMCT amounts to sacrificing Pakistan's legitimate and rightful security concerns at the altar of Indian ambitions as a regional power. Western discriminatory discourses concede to Indian security concerns in relation to nuclear programme of People's Republic of China but they are not ready to give this opportunity to Pakistan whose security has been threatened by a revisionist neighbour since inception of the country. Western scholars do not pay any heed to the conventional and non-conventional asymmetries and the dangers that venomous Hindutva ideology pose to national security of Pakistan.

6.4 India as a Dominant 'other' in Pakistan's Nuclear Policy

Pakistan on the whole endeavours to construct an oppositional and antithetical identity in relation to hegemonic Indian identity, this ideational jostling of oppositional and antithetical identities is also evident in Pakistan's nuclear policy. As in other domains of identity construction Pakistan treats India as its major/ dominant 'other' here too in Pakistan's nuclear policy India is projected as an expansionist, hegemonic and revisionist state with a proven track record of

aggression against Pakistan, a destabilising force that has left no option for Pakistan but to find security in adoption of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a regional hegemon.

The *raison d'être* of Pakistan's nuclear programme is defence against a regional hegemon, India. Pakistan's nuclear programme is India centric and only defensive in nature. The defensive posture of the nuclear programme is indicative of Pakistan's identity as a peaceful state. A state that has been fighting for its survival against a regional hegemon, India. By defining its nuclear posture as defensive it impliedly constructs Indian nuclear programme as offensive and destabilising.

In his keynote address at seventh IISS-Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) (Pakistan) Workshop on 'South Asian Strategic Stability: Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control' Lieutenant General (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, Advisor, National Command Authority; and former Director-General, Strategic Plans Division dwelled at length on the rationale behind Pakistan's nuclear policy and as to how India irresponsibly behaved to destabilise regional stability every time in last fifty years and as to how Pakistan always responded responsibly whenever the 'instability-stability' pendulum is shaken. In his address he directly and impliedly endeavoured to construct India as a hegemonic, expansionist and as an irresponsible nuclear actor, and contrary to India, Pakistani Identity is constructed as that of a stabilising and responsible nuclear actor.

Empirically speaking he brought to fore the irresponsible Indian conduct, spanned over a period of last fifty years. He argues that India started one destabilising step every seven years and Pakistan responded every time by giving a stabilising response.

Firstly, after secession of East Pakistan in 1971, India destabilised the region by conducting nuclear tests in 1974. Indian nuclear tests altered the shaky regional strategic stability. To neutralise the revisionist act and to restore regional stability, Pakistan had to embark on a nuclear programme.

Secondly, in 1986-87, India mobilised its army and air force without any provocation to Pakistan's international borders. Pakistan responded not only by moving its conventional force to the international borders but also, for the first time Pakistan signalled its nuclear capability; with dropping of this hint, a basic form of nuclear deterrence was introduced in the region. The hint of existence of Pakistan's nuclear capability deterred Indian aggression and again Pakistan was able to maintain regional peace.

Thirdly, in 1990s India again destabilised the tenuous regional strategic balance by establishing its ballistic missile programme. It built nuclear delivery systems having short and medium range missiles named Prithvi and Agni. These missiles had the reach across the length and breadth of Pakistan. This time too; Pakistan responded very responsibly to fill the strategic gap engendered by revisionist Indian move by establishing its own ballistic missile programme.

Fourthly, in 1998 India took another provocative and destabilising step by testing five nuclear devices. Pakistan again responded very responsibly with six nuclear tests and that too after two weeks of provocative Indian move. The nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan again restored the strategic stability in the region.

Fifthly, Indian ambition to become a regional hegemon continues to not only exist but also has become more pernicious in 21st century. To coerce Pakistan to submission, India launched operation Parakram, the operation led to full scale

deployment of forces for ten months. In 2005 Indian strategic community conceived a destabilising doctrine named 'Cold Start Doctrine' henceforward CSD, in 2010 they operationalised it. India continued to deny existence of CSD until 2014 when they formally admitted existence of CSD.

CSD is a highly provocative and destabilising doctrine as it envisions the scope of limited war under nuclear overhang. This time too Pakistan responded very responsibly, to restore strategic balance by making doctrinal, operational and weapon developmental adjustments in both nuclear and conventional arms domains. In non-conventional domain Pakistan introduced the doctrine of 'Full Spectrum Deterrence'. Adoption of 'Full Spectrum Deterrence' neutralised CSD and again regional balance was preserved.

Sixthly, Indian so-called surgical air strike in Balakot, February 2019 was another destabilising attempt of India that up the ante by violating international border. Pakistan gave a measured and a calculated response in two ways, in Rajouri sector it hit with accuracy and precision unmanned sides of three ground targets, spared senior military officers present in one of the three targeted targets. The calibrated and measured response showed Pakistan's capability without further escalating the situation. In addition to targeting unmanned ground targets, Pakistan also shot down two Indian fighter jets and also capture an Indian pilot. By giving a measured, well calibrated and responsible response Pakistan once again contributed to regional stability in response to destabilising Indian move.

Lastly, India's mammoth and ever burgeoning defence allocation coupled with its military modernisation in conventional and non-conventional domains and its space programme provide sufficient grounds to conclude that mammoth and ever growing

defence allocations and military modernisation “keep South Asia in a perpetual state of strategic Instability”. (*CISS–IISS 8th International Workshop on Strategic Stability in South Asia - CISS Pakistan*, n.d.).

All the foregoing empirical evidence aimed to present Pakistan as a responsible state by highlighting Indian strategic moves as destabilising and revisionist. To lend further credence to Pakistan’s self projection as a peaceful and responsible nuclear state it is iterated that Pakistan’s nuclear programme is devoid of any regional and global power ambition as its nuclear programme is defensive in nature and it is only India centric. Kidwai by giving a chronological account of Pakistan’s strategic moves in the domain of nuclear weapons aims to show that Pakistan is a reluctant entrant into the nuclear club. It is the fear of hegemonic India which forced Pakistan to find refuge and security in nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s reluctant entry into nuclear club is indicative of its peaceful and responsible identity as a nation state.

It is pertinent to ponder over the phenomena that as to why Pakistan’s strategic community and elites time and again explain to the West that Pakistan’s nuclear programme is India centric and Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state. The answer of the foregoing question is, after 9/11 Pakistan wants to allay Western concerns with regard to safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The West fears that the weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists who could wage nuclear terrorism. In this context two oppositional binaries are constructed by Pakistani nuclear establishment that project India as a dominant ‘other’ of Pakistan, destabilising force/ an agent provocateur and Pakistan as peaceful state that has no hegemonic ambitions and that has always behaved responsibly to restore regional balance. Another important aim of explaining the rationale, background of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is to tell the West that Pakistan’s strategic

community understands Western concerns and is willing to further secure its nuclear assets by aligning them with best international norms and practices.

6.5 The Exposure of So-Called Khan Network

The unearthing of the AQ Khan network in 2004 severely dented Pakistan's reputation. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, hailed as a father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, was framed as the head of the international proliferation ring. The exposure of the ring not only sullied Pakistan's image as a responsible nuclear state but also underscored failure of international export control regimes. The Khan network saga brings to fore, the centrality of the international norms/regimes and the stigmatisation of nuclear proliferation in influencing behaviour of state.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is significant to highlight that complete attribution of the network to A.Q Khan seems oversimplification of a complex problem with intentional act of ignoring structural aspects of nuclear proliferation. The sole attribution of the network to Khan appears an advertent attempt on the part of the US to downplay the role played by the European suppliers, especially the Tinner family in the wider environment of international cooperation and the failure of collective international responsibility in the domain of nuclear non-proliferation.

Understanding the so-called AQ Khan network from a constructivist lens shows an intricate interplay of ideational factors like ideas, shared norms, structural factors and international actors. The exposure of the Tinner family as a CIA mole since late 1990s adds another dimension to the narrative (C. Collins & Frantz, 2011). The revelation that the Tinner family had been on CIA's watch list since late 1990s if not earlier (C. Collins & Frantz, 2011), raises pertinent questions over the dubious role of CIA in the whole proliferation saga.

Understanding this complex web of actors and diverse motives at play in this saga from a constructivist perspective brings to light an advertent attempt on the part of the US to tarnish and discredit Pakistan's nuclear establishment, legitimising Western efforts to stop Pakistan's nuclear programme and possibly forcing Pakistan to reverse its nuclear programme.

The act of solely attributing Khan's network to Dr. A.Q Khan, the US and European's discourses attempted to downplay the role of rogue European suppliers and failure of international non-proliferation regimes. This framing underscores the part played by constructed narratives in order to shape international perceptions. The failure of the US and European non-proliferation regimes is reduced to only the rogueness of a few deviant actors, deflecting attention from the failure of Western led and controlled non-proliferation institutional mechanisms. The perspective of constructivism underscores the power of norms and the power of discourse in shaping reality. The perspective sheds light as to how the narrative around the network was constructed.

Furthermore, the destruction of a huge cache of data related to the activities of the network on the orders of the Swiss Federal Council brings to light foul play enacted at the behest of CIA (Albright & Rietz, 2012). A constructivist lens informs us that through destruction and manipulation of the data the US wanted to further its agenda of tarnishing the image of Pakistan. CIA's influence goes beyond ensuring destruction of data; it attempted to ensure that minimum punishment, if any, be given to the Tinner family in acknowledgement of their work as an asset of CIA.

In the broader sense, the understanding of the saga from a constructivist lens brings to light an interplay of structural forces (CIA and Swiss authorities), the relevance of

international norms and the constructed narratives which were harnessed for wider strategic objectives.

It is relevant to state that existence of the network and Khan's connections with suppliers are not disputed. The section takes exception to the act of overlooking complicity and failures of Western non-proliferation establishment by reducing it to the footnote of the saga. The section questions the disproportionate labeling of Pakistan and AQ Khan as compared to rogue European suppliers and failure of Western non-proliferation regimes. Had the Western powerful discourses not attempted to characterise it subjectively, the network could very well have been dubbed as a consortium of rogue European suppliers.

In the aftermath of the revelation of the network, Pakistan realised the gravity of the situation initiated actions to salvage its nuclear programme and its reputation as a responsible nuclear state. Pakistan has consistently attempted to promote its representational identity as a responsible nuclear state. However, in the aftermath of the exposure of the network, Pakistan sped up its representational narrative with more vigour and consistency than ever before and showed its earnestness and eagerness to comply with international norms.

The vilification campaign launched by the US to tarnish Pakistan's credentials as a responsible nuclear state acted as a significant structural element shaping the world view of Pakistan's policymakers as evident from the prevalence of counter identity discourses and concomitant practices of the state. The response is a manifestation of the interplay of agents and structures which affirms the key feature of constructivism that is co-constitution of reality. Pakistan's adherence to many important norms bespeaks of the influence of international socialisation

mechanisms and internalisation of norms.

6.6 Pakistan's International Discourse and Construction of its Role as a Responsible Nuclear State

Lene Hensen says that the discourse generated by the foreign policy elites go a long way in constructing representational identities of states, she says that "Foreign policy elites play a vital role in the production and reproduction of representational identities". By keeping the foregoing in view, when we say that Pakistan defines itself as a responsible nuclear state (which has always embedded international norms into its role identity) we mean that its state elites (political, bureaucratic and military elites) have always defined it through their discourse as such at bilateral, regional and international fora.

The discourse is generated in response to international knowledge construction on Pakistan's nuclear programme in the West (which paints Pakistan's nuclear programme as a possible source of nuclear terrorism and a possible source of atomic proliferation).

It is a gargantuan task to interpret and study the discursive aspects of the complete discourse which Pakistani elites have generated to counter-construct Pakistan's identity at international level. Therefore, for practical convenience, the researcher has chosen the forum of annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) sessions as a data set. The discourse generated at this forum is most representative for two reasons: firstly, the top leadership, mostly head of state/ government represents their respective countries at the annual UNGA sessions. Therefore, what they iterate or reiterate in the sessions has the highest authenticity vis-à-vis policies

of their respective states, in a way they sum up salient features and achievements of their foreign policy in their speeches. Secondly, the platform of UNGA provides the most effective option to present credentials of a state to international audience with temporal and spatial efficiency.

Since independence, Pakistani successive heads of state, being cognisant of the importance of annual UNGA session has regularly and actively participated in these sessions. As the present study studies Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era and evaluation of the role of its national identity in its foreign policy, therefore, speeches made by Pakistani heads of state/ government or their representatives (Foreign Ministers etc.) who addressed the sessions on their behalf between 2001 and 2022 have been included in the study. The constitutive impact of the identity discourses iterated at the forum will be analysed in a chronological order so that development of Pakistan's identity and its impact on foreign policy can be closely studied.

The role of discourse in constructing identities at national and international levels is well established. It is stated that identities of states are also a product of the interplay between domestic and international discourses (Tidy, 2012b; Neumann, n.d.; Klotz & Lynch, 2007). The discourse that defines Pakistan's identity in UNGA session reflect the domestic and international level variables that co-constitute Pakistani identity and its iteration.

President Pervez Musharraf in his address to 56th UNGA Session (Nov 10, 2001) constructed Pakistani identity as a responsible nuclear state by using verbal expressions like 'deeply conscious of nuclear' dimension of the security environment' to highlight Pakistan's sense of responsibility as a nuclear state. He also attempted to construct credentials of Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state by

offering nuclear restraint regime to India, by offering Regional Test Ban Treaty. He dedicated two paragraphs of his speech to construct Pakistan's identity as a responsible nuclear player.

At the 57th Session of the UN General Assembly (12 September 2002), President Pervez Musharraf highlighted the fragility of strategic stability in South Asia and the concomitant responsibilities places on both nuclear states. President Musharraf pointed out that strategic stability in South Asia is highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks like terrorism and concomitant Indian miscalculation. The president implied that India is not as responsible as Pakistan, as its strategic elites are prone to miscalculate due their reckless and impetuous behaviour.

At the 58th session of the UN General Assembly (24th September 2003), President Pervez Musharraf proposed to India 'to ensure mutual nuclear restraint and conventional arms balance'. The president goes on to lament on Indian massive conventional and non-conventional build-up and as to how the arms build-up will severely hurt regional strategic balance. In the same vein the president urged international community to contribute to regional peace and stability by not providing arms to India. The president again attempted to present Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state because it wants to maintain strategic stability in the region and projected India as destabilising power in the region.

On September 24th 2004, President Musharraf while supporting multilateralism called for the need for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (Musharraf, 2004). The then foreign minister of Pakistan, Mr. Khursheed M. Kasuri on 21st September 2005 while participating in general debate at UNGA's 60th session urged International community and the UN to play their part in promoting consensus on

nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (KASURI, 2005).

President Pervez Musharraf's in his address to 61st UNGA Session on 19th September 2006 reiterated that Pakistan has proposed to India a regional conventional and non-conventional restraint regime. The president also expresses Pakistan's desire to not enter into any arms race with India. The president also highlighted the discriminatory nature of international nuclear regimes (Pervez Musharraf, 2006). The president by reiterating Pakistan's proposal for strategic restraint and Pakistan's plan of not entering into any arms race with India aimed to project Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state. India was constructed as an irresponsible state because it has neither agreed to Pakistan's proposal of nuclear nor conventional restraint.

In 62nd United Nations General Assembly session, Riaz Muhammad Khan, Pakistan's foreign secretary represented Pakistan. He urged the world community to embrace Pakistan as a friend not as an enemy. He also attempted to project Pakistan as a responsible and norm compliant state (Khan, 2007). The then president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari in his address at UNGA in 2008 unequivocally expressed Pakistan's support for disarmament and non-proliferation based on the principals of equal security for all states. The president also stressed upon Pakistan's role in promotion of peaceful means of conflict resolution and strategic restraint in the region (Zardari, 2008). Through these iterations and reiterations, the president aimed to present Pakistan as a peaceful and responsible nuclear state. Similarly, in 2009, president Zardari reiterated Pakistan's continuous policy of restraint, disarmament and restraint (Zardari, 2009).

In 2010 at annual UNGA session Pakistan's foreign minister, Makhdoom Shah

Mahmood Qureshi spoke of Pakistan's abiding commitment to the norms of disarmament and non-proliferation based on equality and non-discrimination. The foreign minister also highlighted Indian adoption of aggressive doctrines and asymmetric conventional build-up which is destabilising the regional strategic stability. The foreign minister also reiterated Pakistan's proposal for regional strategic restraint regime and highlighted the positive impact of the regime on peace and security of the region (Qureshi, 2010). By presenting Pakistan as an advocate of disarmament, non-proliferation and strategic restraint the FM attempted to construct Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state. Where as India being a perpetrator of conventional arms build-up is projected as a destabilising force.

In 2011 while addressing UNGA on behalf of the prime minister of Pakistan, foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar spoke of the mutual responsibilities of India and Pakistan as nuclear states to play their part in enhancing regional strategic stability and to avoid arms race in the region (Khar, 2011). By shouldering these responsibilities, she attempted to project Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state.

In 2013, prime minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif while addressing the Sixty-eighth Session of the UNGA spoke one hundred and sixty-nine words about Pakistan's role as a responsible nuclear state. He highlighted the salient features of Pakistan nuclear policy like support for disarmament, non-proliferation, strategic restraint, to avoid arms race, Pakistan's strong credentials to get membership of regimes like nuclear suppliers group (Nawaz Sharif, 2013). By highlighting and reiterating the features of Pakistan's nuclear policy the prime minister attempted to present Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state.

In September 2014, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif again highlighted the features of Pakistan's nuclear policy. In his speech he spoke more than two hundred words about Pakistan's role as a responsible nuclear state. Besides highlighting the regular features of Pakistan's nuclear policy like continuous support for disarmament, non-proliferation, the need to have just and fair nuclear regimes and the value Pakistan places on strategic restraint, he mentioned that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe and secure, fool proof national exports control regimes which have been aligned with international best practices (Nawaz Sharif, 2014). It is important to note that the prime minister talked about the safety and security of Pakistan's atomic weapons to dispel the identity construct of Pakistan as an irresponsible state whose atomic weapons can fall into the hands of terrorists.

In 2015, while addressing UNGA, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, prime minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan reiterated features of Pakistan's nuclear policy and again spoke about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In his speech at UNGA session 2015, the prime minister again mentioned the safety and security of nuclear weapons to neutralise the construction of Pakistan as a rogue, failing and insecure states by its adversaries. In his address to 2016 session of UNGA, he reiterated the features of Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy.

Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, prime minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan while addressing 72nd UNGA session talked about Indian specificity of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and spoke of the safety and security of nuclear weapons as acknowledged by international experts (Abbasi, 2017).

In 2019, Prime minister Imran Khan urged the UN and international community to solve Kashmir dispute in accordance with the United Nation Security Council's

resolutions, lack of action on the part of the UN and the international community can push two nuclear armed countries to war. Through this statement PM attempted to present Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state because it believes in resolution of disputes in accordance with international law and warns the world of the horrors of nuclear war if the UN and the world community fail to play their part in promoting peace and stability in South Asia.

In 2021, PM Imran Khan while addressing UNGA session said that “India’s military build-up, development of advanced nuclear weapons, and acquisition of destabilising conventional capabilities, can erode mutual deterrence between the two countries” (Desk, 2019). PM Imran Khan projected India as a destabilising force and Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state because by countering Indian revisionist policies it has maintained deterrence in the region.

The discourse embedded in the speeches of Pakistani leaders from 2001 to 2021 which pertains to Pakistan’s nuclear policy brings to fore the motifs of Pakistani identity that are : projection of Pakistan as a promoter of regional stability, India centricity and defensive nature of its programme, ardent support of disarmament and non-proliferation, safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, projection of Pakistan as a supporter and promoter of conventional and non-conventional restraint and projection of Pakistan as a victim of international discriminatory nuclear regimes. The discourse also highlights that Pakistan despite not being part of some nuclear regimes has meticulously adhered to best international practices and guidelines. Conversely, India has been projected as a destabilising force, a seeker of regional and global power ambitions and a beneficiary of international discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. The aforementioned motifs of the discourse of Pakistani leadership define Pakistan’s

identity as a responsible nuclear state.

6.7 Origin of Pakistan's Nuclear Programme

The history of Pakistan's nuclear programme is illustrative of Pakistan's role as a peaceful and responsible state. In the coming paragraphs it will be unequivocally explained that Pakistan espoused nuclear weapons due to it being ditched by the US in wars of 1965 and 1971 and India being Pakistan's significant other, the two ideational factors. Right after its independence unlike India, Pakistan didn't show any interest whatsoever to espouse nuclear technology for industrial and commercial uses but this changed when in 1953 US President D. Eisenhower announced his "Atom for Peace" proposal. The US president made an offer of sharing nuclear technology for welfare of the humanity with rest of the world. In 1954, to take advantage of this opportunity Pakistan's attempted to build the new institutions needed to lead research in the domain of nuclear technology for scientific and industrial uses (Tellis, 2022). To build human capital in the domain of nuclear science, Pakistan sent its scientists abroad for training and research. During this period Pakistan set up research centres to investigate application of nuclear technology in the sector of agriculture, health and industry. The journey to capitalise on the industrial and scientific potential of atomic energy, Pakistan continued its efforts at a languid pace till the early part of 1960s. Pakistan by the end of 1963, was able to establish two important institutions related to nuclear technology namely, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). PAEC was given the task to oversee and manage development of nuclear energy in the country. Whereas PINSTECH aimed to attract Pakistani expatriate scientists engaged in nuclear research in the West back to Pakistan. (Chakma, 2002).

From 1954 to 1971, Pakistan remained an active advocate of nuclear disarmament. Pakistani state elites never looked to nuclear technology as a bulwark of its security against Indian aggression. Rather they always looked to Western security alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) as guarantors of its security though these US supported alliances were meant only to contain spread of communism. But the motive of Pakistan to join these security pacts was to get Western support in the event of Indian aggression.

Courtesy of the pacts, advanced conventional weapons flowed to Pakistan on concessional rates. Besides receiving these conventional weapons from the US on concessional terms, Pakistan also hoped that Western powers would quickly come to defend Pakistan in the event of Indian belligerence against Pakistan (Sattar, 2007).

The abovementioned scholarly reference shows that though being constantly in security dilemma vis-à-vis India the radical option of espousing nuclear weapons as a bulwark against its arch rival was not even considered in the first two decades or so of the country, though the consideration of pursuing nuclear option against a bigger conventional and belligerent power seemed logical for a smaller state. Even the horrific wars of 1948 and 1965 couldn't decisively push Pakistan to espouse nuclear weapons to offset the mighty conventional force of India.

Pakistan's journey of harnessing nuclear technology for industrial and commercial uses was marked by slow but incremental expansion between 1963 and 1971, Pakistan acquired its first research reactor in 1965 under the US president's programme 'Atom for Peace. Pakistan also signed an agreement with Canada for

provision of a safeguarded pressurised heavy water reactor (F. H. Khan, 2012). Acquisition of these reactors show Pakistan's resolve to pursue nuclear energy for industrial and commercial uses. Chamka says that when India decided to convert its peaceful nuclear programme into weapon development programme in response to and in the aftermath of a humiliating defeat at the hands of Chinese in 1962, Pakistan for the first time contemplated on the possibility of establishing its own nuclear programme (*WashingtonPost.Com: India-Pakistan Report*, n.d.).

This conclusion however, seemed farfetched. Empirically speaking even if Pakistani leadership thought of the possibility of establishing its own nuclear programme it didn't translate into reality or manifested itself in any tangible form. The fact remains that even Indian foray into nuclear weapon development in 1960s couldn't shake the resolve of Pakistani leadership that hitherto aimed to deal with Indian threat through conventional means especially when it had confidence in Western alliance system.

However, it was in the aftermath of 1965 war when for the first time we find a mention of Pakistan's rhetoric related to utility of nuclear weapons to ensure its defence against India. Samina Ahmed avers that the US' failure to come to rescue of Pakistan against India in 1965 and its decision to impose arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, ignoring Pakistan's status as an ally of the US for the first time exposed the unreliability of Western alliances to Pakistani leadership. The realisation was very discomfoting because since independence, Pakistan; to counter Indian conventional might adopted conventional means like forging conventional alliances with the West for preservation of its security in relation to India. The unreliability of the US led alliances as experienced by Pakistan in Indo-Pak war of 1965 forced Pakistan's foreign policy elites to reassess and re-evaluate

the utility of Western alliance for preservation of its security (S. Ahmed, 1999).

In 1965, a journalist from the Manchester Guardian asked Bhutto, the then foreign minister of Pakistan that how Pakistan would react if India acquired nuclear weapons, Bhutto's response is etched in history, he declared "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no alternative" (*FOREIGN AFFAIRS Pakistan, India and The Bomb - The New York Times*, n.d.). This categorical and unequivocal declaration of Bhutto vindicates Pakistan's rationale of espousing nuclear weapon, that is Indian espousal of nuclear weapons.

Renowned expert on nuclearisation of South Asia, Ashley Tellis avers that it was Indian fear which prevented Pakistan from signing Non Proliferation treaty in 1968 despite the fact that it disavowed use of nuclear weapons, nevertheless due to clandestine Indian nuclear programme Pakistan kept the option of developing nuclear weapons open if need arose. Ashley Tellis like Kidwai trace the commencement of Pakistan's nuclear programme to Indo-Pak war in 1971 (Tellis, 2022).

Feroz Khan an ace scholar on nuclearisation of South Asia says that Bhutto who by then was prime minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, convened a meeting and tasked PAEC to start work on development of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of Pakistan's security. Khan goes on to say that Pakistan's fears in relation to clandestine Indian nuclear programme turned out to be well founded when India tested its nuclear device in May 1974. The Indian test of its nuclear device was a watershed event in the history of Pakistan's nuclear programme, Indian nuclear test decisively pushed Pakistan to accelerate its efforts for production of a nuclear

deterrent (F. H. Khan, 2012).

Constructivist tenets underscore the role of ideational factors in shaping behaviour of actors. In this context, India centric nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme is emblematic of a regional security construct. Perception of India as a security threat shapes Pakistan's nuclear policy. India is not only treated as a material threat but this material threat is mediated by the shared meanings within Pakistan's strategic community. Pakistan's defensive nuclear programme nicely dovetails into Pakistan's representational discourse of showing Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state.

Pakistan is not a conventional power like China and India, both these countries have the conventional means to preserve their security sans making a recourse to nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan unlike India and China is conventionally speaking a weaker state. For Pakistan there is no substitute of nuclear weapons for preservation of its security (Tellis, 2022). Pakistan's military leaders believe in the ultimate efficacy and utility of the nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Indian aggression since 1980s. This belief in the ultimate value of the nuclear weapons in relation to Pakistan's security against India enjoys primacy in Pakistan's security policy. The features of Pakistan's nuclear policy that are, nuclear doctrine, operational plan and nature of nuclear weapons illustrate beyond any doubt that Pakistan's nuclear Programme is defensive in nature and it is only India centric. In succeeding paragraphs Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, nature of its nuclear programme will be dwelled upon at length to bring home the point that nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme and its doctrinal iterations nicely dovetail into Pakistan's representational identity as a responsible nuclear state.

6.8 Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine: Illustration of Pakistan's Defensive Nuclear Programme

The ace nuclear scholar, Brig (Rtd.) Naeem Salik defines doctrine as a foundational plan/ guideline that explains the reason and purpose of a particular force as a bedrock of organisational and force structure. He goes on to define doctrine as a set of “guidelines for force configuration and the nature, type and number of weapons and delivery systems that would be needed to implement the doctrine” (Salik, n.d.). The aforementioned definition brings home the point that in order to understand any conventional or non-conventional weapon programme we need to study the doctrine that governs and defines weapon programme. Though Pakistan has not formally declared its nuclear doctrine yet statements, writings and academic literature produced by Pakistan's strategic security elites bring to fore the features of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine.

Scholars like Brig (Rtd) Naeem Salik, an insider of Pakistan's nuclear establishment and an eminent scholar on nuclearisation of South Asia believes that Pakistan has not declared its nuclear doctrine to keep ambiguity, as ambiguity suits a conventionally weaker state. He goes on to say that ambiguity adds value to deterrence (Salik, n.d.). Arguing on the same lines Rizwan zeb, a Pakistani scholar who writes on role of nuclear weapons in international politics says that clear formulation and declaration of nuclear doctrine will provide an ideal opportunity to India, a bigger military and economic power to neutralise the deterrent value of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. To achieve deterrence mere fact of possessing nuclear weapons is sufficient for Pakistan (*Pakistan: A Reluctant Nuclear State, 20 Years After? – Asia Dialogue*, n.d.).

As evident from the above references, it is clear that Pakistan has not formally announced its nuclear doctrine to preserve the deterrent value of its nuclear weapons. Pakistan expression of not entering into nuclear arms race with India is in line with Pakistan's representational identity of a responsible nuclear state. Moreover, Pakistan is not the only state in the world which has not declared its nuclear doctrine formally, People's Republic of China has also not declared its nuclear doctrine and like Pakistan it treats ambiguity as a valuable strategy. China has kept its nuclear programme in ambiguity to deter attempts of its adversaries to blunt the deterrent value of its nuclear programme. By keeping the foregoing in view, the responsible conduct of Pakistan is apparent from the fact that it was the dire need to have deterrence against a regional adversary which pushed Pakistan to espouse nuclear weapons.

Though Pakistan has not formally declared its nuclear doctrine for the reason of its value to its deterrence yet it doesn't mean that Pakistan doesn't have any nuclear doctrine, officially undeclared though that may be. The fact however remains that prior to 1998, in the covert nuclear era of Pakistan, discussion pertaining to nuclear doctrine, management of nuclear weapons was almost non-existent, neither the issue was discussed in military, civil bureaucracy nor it was discussed in academia. This however, changed when Pakistan tested its nuclear devices in 1998. By the time India issued its draft nuclear doctrine in 1999, Pakistan had already formulated its nuclear doctrine. This feat made possible by the fact that Pakistan after testing its nuclear capability started working with alacrity to formulate a doctrine and to have in place an effective command and control system. (Salik, n.d.).

Notwithstanding, the aforementioned caveat of an undeclared nuclear doctrine; based on iterations of Pakistan's political, strategic elites and writings of Pakistani

academics who write on nuclear issue especially with the privilege of being insiders. Ashely J. Tellis has reconstructed the features of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine which at declaratory level are: "The commitment to restraint", "The emphasis on stabilisation" and "The imperative of deterring India" features of the doctrine at the operational level are: "Usable military instruments", "Threatening unacceptable damage, speedy war termination and last but not the least doctrinal shift at both declaratory and operational level.

The aforementioned features are in line with Pakistan Identity trope, Pakistan a responsible nuclear state. For instance, in 1999, 'the commitment to restraint' as conveyed by the then prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif iterates Pakistan's espousal of the nuclear doctrine by espousing "minimum credible deterrence,". The doctrine means that Pakistan would deploy nuclear force which would be marked by "nuclear restraint" (Chakma, 2006). Pakistan's espousal of nuclear restraint is emblematic of its responsible conduct. By emphasizing on the notion of restraint Pakistan aimed to communicate to the world that Pakistan's conventional asymmetries in relation to India, fear of strategic coercion and its geographic disadvantage pushed Pakistan to espouse nuclear weapons and concomitantly it would deploy minimum nuclear force to protect its security. Deployment of minimum but credible nuclear force have the dual advantage for Pakistan that is, to deter Indian aggression and to free Pakistan from competing with India in a conventional or nuclear arms race (Sattar, 2020).

The feature of nuclear restraint is suggestive of Pakistan's desire of not seeking to engage in nuclear brinkmanship or to start an arms race with India. Similarly, through the declaratory feature of threatening India with unacceptable damage and speedy termination (when survival of the state is at stake) are indicative of Pakistan's

defensive posture rather than the other way round. What else could be proof of Pakistan's role as a responsible nuclear power than its aim to show restraint in the domain of nuclear weapons and to adopt a defensive posture.

Ambassador Afrasaib Hashmi who served in India for more than seven and half years as a diplomat in different capacities including as a deputy head of the mission avers that strategic stability in South Asia is not threatened by Pakistan's adoption of Full Spectrum Deterrence which is nothing more than continuation of the same logic that underpinned Pakistan's erstwhile doctrine, Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD). Now in the context of new geo-strategic and geo-political realities of the region coupled with the resurgence and dominance of Hindutva ideology in India, the scope and meaning of the word minimum for Pakistan has changed. Now Pakistan can only counter belligerent ideology of Hindutva coupled with conventional and non-conventional might of India through adoption of Full Spectrum Deterrence. He concludes that threat to regional deterrence is not posed by Pakistan's nuclear doctrine (Pakistan despite having tactical weapons in its nuclear repertoire, maintains a defensive posture and use the nuclear weapons as a deterrent) but the threat to regional peace and stability is posed by ever growing Indian conventional and non-conventional might and the revisionist policies of Hindutva dominated Indian state. This lethal combination of conventional might and Hindutva ideology brought South Asia on the brink of nuclear Armageddon in Post Pulwma military stand-off (A. Hashmi, personal communication, March 2023).

6.9 BJP's Hyper Nationalism: A threat to Regional Strategic Stability

It is not adoption of FSD which poses a threat to regional strategic stability rather it is the irresponsible conduct of Hindutva led India government which poses serious threats to regional peace and security. The conduct of Modi government since coming to power 2014 in general and since 2019 in particular has been manifestly irresponsible and brought the region on brink of nuclear conflict.

BJP during its election campaign in 2019 led by none other than PM Modi himself issued irresponsible statements to stoke anti Pakistan sentiments in Indian public for electoral gains. Prime Minister Modi on 4th April 2019 brazenly declared that Indian surgical strike has exposed Pakistan's 'nuclear bluff'. He vehemently and in a tone characterised by bravado said: "Pakistan has threatened us with nuclear, nuclear, nuclear" and then goes on to pose a rhetorical question to the audience, "didn't we deflate their nuclear threat or not?". What could be a more irresponsible conduct of a leader who happens to be the chairman of India's National Command Authority, entrusted with the responsibility to authorise use of Indian nuclear weapons to say that "Every other day, they used to say 'we have a nuclear button, we have a nuclear button.' What do we have then? Have we kept it for Diwali?" He also once said that "When Pakistan captured Abhinandan, I said [to Pakistan] that if anything happens to our pilot, we will not leave you." He goes on to add that luckily for Pakistan as it announced that, " they would return the pilot on the second day, else it was going to be a 'qatal ki raat' [a night of slaughter (*Lok Sabha Elections 2019: Qatal Ki Raat - PM Narendra Modi Speaks of US Claims After Pakistan Capture of IAF Pilot Abhinandan Varthaman*, n.d.).

Lt. Gen (Rtd) Khalid Kidwai who served as a head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division for more than fifteen years and who currently serves as an advisor of Pakistan's National Command Authority expressed his apprehensions regarding fate of Indian nuclear weapons in the hands of extremist elements in India and termed this scenario as worrisome and alarming for regional strategic stability.

He says regional strategic stability is at a great risk as Indian nuclear weapons are controlled by Hindu fundamentalists. He goes on to say that "The custodial controls of India's large triad of the nuclear arsenal have now fallen firmly in the hands of an extremist fundamentalist leadership," he goes on to add that the "toxic mix of poisonous ideology and custody of nuclear weapons" pose a grave threat to regional strategic stability.

Expressing his apprehension over the membership of Hindu fundamentalist in Indian NCA he says that the political council of NCA is being led by PM Modi, the executive council of NCA is led by national security advisor Ajit Doval and a few ministers like Home Minister Amit shah and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh who have background of RSS. The irresponsible conduct of the leadership mentioned above as evident from their aggressive nuclear stance and provocative statements pose a real threat to regional strategic stability. He termed the air strike in Balakot in February 2019 and the missile incidents in March 2022 as instances of extremists engaging in acts of aggression against their nuclear-armed neighbouring country, without fully considering the potential ramifications. (*CISS-IISS 8th International Workshop on Strategic Stability in South Asia - CISS Pakistan*, n.d.).

The recent shocking revelation of ex-governor of Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir, Mr Satya Pal Malik in an interview with Karan Thapar exposed Indian

rehearsed plan to blame Pakistan for the attack. Styapal Malik, the ex-governor said that when he told PM Modi that the attack took place due to our own incompetence, the PM told him to remain silent on this. Similarly, national security advisor, Ajit Doval told him to not speak of security lapses on the part of Indian government. The ex-governor said after listening to the PM and the national security advisor, it became clear to me that now the onus/blame of the attack would be shifted to Pakistan for electoral gains in coming national elections. The ex-governor pointed out serious security lapses on the part of Indian Home Ministry and Central Reserve Police Force. He squarely put the blame of the attack on Home Minister, Mr Rajnath Singh. Upon asked by the interviewer that would we ever be able to know the truth of Pulwama attack. The governor responded that the “the government has good reasons to hide the facts of the case and use it for some other purposes”. The interview exposed Modi’s government ploy to use the attack as an election strategy (*Modi Silenced Me On Pulwama Lapses, Is Ignorant on J&K, Has No Problem with Corruption—Ex-Gov Malik - YouTube*, n.d.). The shocking revelations of the interview exposed the reckless conduct of a nuclear state that claims to be a responsible nuclear player.

Prof Dr. Saif Ur- Rehman Malik who has served as a head of India Study Centre at Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad says that Modi government by selling anti Pakistan narrative to its electorate has created a demand in Indian public to be hawkish on Pakistan. Modi berates India’s past leadership for being soft on Pakistan. The entrenchment of the slogan of Pakistan bashing in Indian electoral politics has sown the seeds of war and hatred between the wo countries. By keeping the foregoing in view, now, the easiest ploy for Indian politicians to come to power is to ignite anti Pakistan sentiment of Indian Public (which the politicians have so

assiduously worked to promote in the first place) to win elections. The proliferation of war mongering rhetoric in Indian Public under the dominance of Hindutva ideology poses greatest threat to regional stability in South Asia than anything else (S. Malik, personal communication, March 2023).

Prof. Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal a well-known expert on nuclearisation of South Asia avers that though the BJP's rancorous and supremacist election campaign is termed as an aberration rather than a norm in Indian political history. Notwithstanding the debate on BJP's supremacist election campaign as to whether it is an aberration or a norm, the fact of the matter is the campaign has "acted as a catalyst in changing India's nuclear doctrine from non-deployable status to deployed nuclear assets, swapping No-First-Use(NFU) with First-Use (FU) nuclear policy and above all replacing nuclear deterrence with nuclear compellence strategy against Pakistan" (*Hilal English*, n.d.).

The realisation that strategic stability in South Asia is in serious jeopardy due to dominance of Hindutva ideology in Indian polity. This fear is widely shared in Pakistani policy circles. None other than Pakistan's ex- prime Minister Imran Khan himself raised the question over the safety and security of Indian nuclear weapons in the hands of Hindu supremacists and the threat it posed to regional stability. He tweeted on 17th August 2019 to sensitize the world about the safety and security of Indian nuclear weapons in the control of Hindu supremacists. He urged International community that the international community should earnestly contemplate the safety and security of India's nuclear arsenal under the governance of the extremist and prejudiced Hindu nationalist government. This is a matter that holds implications not only for the region but also for the global arena (Z. Khan, 2023).

To go an extra step in sensitising the world about the possible nuclear danger posed by Hindu supremacist, India to the regional and global peace, the ex-PM wrote an article in New York Times on 30th April 2019. He writes; We are not merely facing an antagonistic administration. We are confronted with a 'New India', led by individuals and a political party rooted in the Hindu nationalist organisation, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or the RSS. (Z. Khan, 2023).

This projection of “new India” which is represented by Hindu supremacist leaders like Modi is inherently irresponsible and opposite of what Pakistan stands for in the 21st century. Through the statements like above Pakistan wants to tell the world that threat to global and regional security is not posed by the nuclear Pakistan but rather it is posed by the Hindu religious fanatics who control Indian polity today. The irresponsible statements of Indian leadership and their conduct in the recent Past is illustrative of the dangers that lie ahead for the region and the world. Last but not the least this must be borne in the mind that the fears of Pakistani leadership about irresponsible conduct and statements of Indian leadership are neither misplaced nor unfounded. In the following paragraph the irresponsible conduct of Indian top leadership including the prime minister of India highlighted below provides incontrovertible proof of uncertain future of peace and security in the region.

6.10 Indian Surgical Strikes and Pakistan’s Responsible Response

Modi after coming to power in 2014, adopted a belligerent foreign policy, loaded with phraseology of power politics, Hindu resurgence and chest thumping rhetoric in relation to use of nuclear weapons. The adoption of power politics based foreign policy characterised by a concomitant world view deprived Indian foreign policy of even its rhetorical pretentious notions like Ahmisa, non-interference and non-

intervention.

Modi often accuses the opposition Congress party of 'being soft on Pakistan' he berated the opposition party for not paying the adversary back in the same coin. Modi asserts that congress inability to give a befitting response has only emboldened Pakistan. PM Modi brazenly quotes the belligerent policy of his government that has purportedly taught Pakistan a lesson every time it attacked India through terrorism. Modi's belligerent rhetoric translated into practical military strategy when he blatantly adopted surgical strike as a sub-conventional tool to test strategic stability of South Asia.

Before we move to discuss the question as to how Modi's military strategy of surgical strike is disastrous for strategic stability of South Asia and how Pakistan has responded calculatedly and measuredly to preserve the strategic stability in the region, we need to define what a surgical strike is and when and why India has included the strategy into its military doctrine. Surgical strike is defined as a targeted and swift military operation that aims only to target a legitimate military target without causing any or minimal collateral damage (Shultz et al., 1992). Modi's government incorporated the strategy of surgical strike in its armed forces doctrine in 2017. It named the doctrine as 'Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces'. The doctrine states that India has switched to a pro- active and practical form of military strategy to counter a wider array of conflictual situations. The doctrine goes on to say that "The response to terror provocations could be in the form of 'surgical strikes', and these would be subsumed in the sub-conventional portion of the spectrum of armed conflict". The doctrine admitted of the possibility of the escalation of hostility from sub-conventional level to full conventional level subject to operational, strategic, military preparedness, domestic and international level

variables. The doctrine also underscored the importance and value of credible deterrence, coercive diplomacy and finally unleashing punitive retaliation in a 'nuclear environment across a spectrum of conflict' (Ministry of Defence, 2017)

Modi government does not pay any heed to the inherently destabilising nature of surgical strikes in a nuclearised environment. Without paying any heed to the inherent dangers of a surgical strike and its destabilising impact on deterrence stability, Modi flaunts surgical strikes to promote his macho image and as a sign of powerful India. His macho image and war mongering rhetoric endeared him to the public. Lt. General Prakash Menon, says that Modi's government projects surgical strikes as a symbol of the government's resolve, emblematic of a government which is willing to go to any extent to protect the interest of the state. Through these strikes Modi government plays to gallery of domestic audience for electoral gains. Modi in his election campaign made surgical strike part and parcel of his political rhetoric and projected the reckless act of carrying out surgical strikes against a nuclear armed neighbour as a success and achievement.

India in response to 'Uri attack' for the first time claimed that it had carried out a surgical strike to strike terrorists camps in Azad Jammu Kashmir. Pakistan termed the strike a 'phantom strike', Pakistan issued denial regarding occurrence of the surgical strike and sought credible evidence. Pakistan acted responsibly by preventing escalation by dint of its mature, calibrated and saner approach.

Dr Salma Malik, a renowned professor of Strategic Studies in Quaid-e-Azam university Islamabad avers that Pakistan's mature and responsible response neutralised Indian adventurism. She dwells on the catastrophic impact of dangerous and reckless military strategy on regional strategic stability by pointing out that the

possibility of a nuclear-armed nation initiating a deliberate and pre-planned precise attack using its conventional military within the borders of another country, thereby inciting a retaliatory response, represents a highly perilous and irresponsible act in the annals of nuclear history.

It is pertinent to mention that although India couldn't provide credible evidence to this effect, that actually it carried out a surgical strike on Pakistan, yet Indian very iteration of the value of surgical strike to teach nuclear Pakistan a lesson; seriously put South Asian nuclear powers on the edge of nuclear brinkmanship. Islamabad lived up to its role identity as a responsible nuclear state, in response to the 'phantom strike' it acted with caution and restrained which was in line with its past practices and well established policies.

The fascination of Modi government with surgical strike as a belligerent tool to coerce nuclear armed Pakistan into submission is widespread in Indian strategic community. On 24th September 2018, the then Indian Army Chief, General Bipin Rawat in an interview with 'Indian Today' unabashedly and irresponsibly declared that there was a need to carry out one more surgical strike. It was not an isolated statement which only represented his view on regional security even that statement itself coming from the head of a nuclear armed regional power's army chief had a sufficient explosiveness to hurt regional strategic stability. The statement was representative of widespread Indian military discourse on Pakistan. In fact, the mantra of surgical strike became an electoral gimmick in BJP's election campaign. Modi and his coterie heedless of the dangerous and catastrophic implications of their irresponsible statements regarding use of sub-conventional means like surgical strikes on regional strategic stability continued to peddle war mongering rhetoric for narrow electoral gains.

In line with the strategic discourse that valued sub-conventional means like surgical strikes to teach Pakistan a lesson, India actually carried out a surgical strike on Balakot albeit a botched one on 26th February, 2019. India in line with its consistent irresponsible conduct trigger strategic instability carried out the surgical strike to milk political and electoral mileage.

By carrying out the botched air strike, India violated the sovereignty of mainland Pakistan and crossed the Rubicon of international border. Pakistan responded in a well calibrated fashion within thirty hours of the strike to restore the regional strategic balance. To restore deterrence, Pakistan engaged three unmanned targets in the Rajouri sector and the precision strike meticulously ensured that Indian senior military leadership present at one of the targeted positions were spared to show restraint and to avoid further escalation. Secondly, PAF shot down two fighter jets of IAF by remaining well within its borders and apprehended a pilot of the one of the downed jet. Pakistan's emphatic yet responsible and calibrated response unequivocally conveyed to India that Pakistan would never permit strategic instability to become a norm.

Pakistan's responsible conduct successfully managed to restore strategic stability and the new normal of Indian reckless conduct as a nuclear state was not allowed to prevail. Lt. General Kidwai warns India for playing with fire by incorporating destabilising doctrines like cold start and actualising surgical strikes as a strategy. He says "an active military conflict situation, especially a limited one with nuclear armed Pakistan, while it may be easy to climb the first rung on the escalatory ladder, the second rung would always belong to Pakistan, and that India's choice to move to the third rung would invariably be dangerously problematic in anticipation of the fourth rung response by Pakistan" (*CISS-IISS 8th International Workshop on*

Strategic Stability in South Asia -CISS Pakistan, n.d.).

6.11 Indian Conduct Post-Balakot Surgical Strike

Indian conduct post 2019 Balakot crisis continued to bespeaks of the trends set in India after BJP's coming to power in 2014. Nothing could illustrate Indian state's irresponsible conduct as a nuclear state as conspicuously as Indian act of revoking Article 370 and 35-A of Indian constitution. In blatant disregard to the UN acknowledged Jammu& Kashmir dispute as a nuclear flashpoint and the principal casus belli between Indian and Pakistan, Modi's Hindutva inspired government unilaterally changed the character of one of the oldest disputes in UN history. Importance of Kashmir for Pakistan is no less than the importance of Taiwan for People's Republic of China and Ukraine for NATO and the US. What could be a bigger proof of Pakistan's restraint than not resorting to force in response to Indian revisionist act of revocation of article 370 and 35-A.

Fuelled by the ideology of Hindutva, the euphoria of India's rise as an economic and military power has resuscitated the dreams of Akhand Bharat cherished. Indresh Kumar, a RSS leader once claimed in March 2019 that, "Pakistan would reunite with India by 2025, that Indians would settle in and migrate to Lahore...and a European Union style Akhand Bharat would form" (Kumar, 2019). This rhetoric of forced and imposed integration amounts to an ideational attack on ideological foundations of the Pakistani state and an affront to independence and sovereignty of Pakistan. Pakistan being a responsible state only counter this hegemonic desire of RSS inspired political elites of India with counter narrative without even insinuating any use of force as an instrument of its policy in its foreign policy and political discourse.

On 9th March 2022, the world witnessed another irresponsible Indian act of firing a supersonic Missile, BrahMos into Pakistani territory. Indian claimed that it was an accidental launch. Lt. Gen Khalid Kidwai rejects Indian claim that the missile was accidentally fired into Pakistan. He said being head of SPD he has overseen many tests of missiles and based on his experience can safely say the missile couldn't have been fired without getting clearance from the highest political level and detailed operational and tactical planning spanning over weeks must have been carried out before launching the missile into Pakistan (*CISS-IISS 8th International Workshop on Strategic Stability in South Asia - CISS Pakistan*, n.d.).

For arguments sake even if we admit that the missile was indeed accidentally launched, it amounts to confession on India as it bespeaks of a weak, ineffective and unreliable command and control system. According to Pakistan's foreign office "The incident revealed technical lapses and systemic loopholes of serious nature in India's handling of its strategic weapons". Pakistan foreign office in its press briefing termed this incident as another instance of Indian irresponsible act that has once again threatened peace and security of the entire region. The press briefing goes on to say that in response to irresponsible act Pakistan in line with it being a responsible nuclear state acted with characteristic restraint. "Pakistan demonstrated exemplary restraint, which is a testament of its systemic maturity and abiding commitment to peace as a responsible nuclear state" (MOFA, 2022).

On 10th March 2023, a year after the incident of missile launch Pakistan issued a press release to communicate to the world that the Government of India has not agreed to conduct a joint inquiry into the incident to ascertain the facts of the incident. Pakistan also pointed out that India failed to share the finding of its internal inquiry into the case. Moreover, Pakistan also questions the hasty and unilateral

closure of internal inquiry and expressed doubts over the effectiveness of Indian command and control system. Through the press release Pakistan also once again demanded from India that it should accede to Pakistani request for joint probe and issue clarification regarding security protocols and technical safeguards in place to prevent accidental or unauthorised use of strategic weapons (*ACDIS – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.*).

6.12 International Nuclear Norms and Treaties Prove Pakistan's Role as a Responsible Nuclear State

Pakistan is an ardent supporter of multilateralism in international politics. Being a supporter of multilateralism it plays an important role in promotion of international peace and security. Pakistan claims that it is committed to rule based and non-discriminatory nuclear order and awards prime importance to the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament (*ACDIS – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.*).

Being a supporter of multilateralism and a responsible nuclear power, Pakistan despite not formally becoming part of some of the treaties and regimes have largely internalised international nuclear norms and regimes. Pakistan defines its national interest and fight for its survival within the ambit of these norms. Some norms through wide exposure, repetition and dissemination in elites' circles become a common sense knowledge. Their value and importance is never questioned. When ingress and acceptability of some norms in a state's discourse reach to this level we say that these norms have been internalised and thus states automatically conform to these norms. The internalised norms wield a great influence on the conduct of states. Actions of state that are based on essence and ethos of these norms are neither

questioned nor consciously followed. Rather states just confirm to these norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998a).

Pakistan's nuclear policy has also been shaped by the internalised nuclear norms and systemic pressures and treaties. Resultantly socialisation through international norms have contributed to Pakistan's own commitment to responsible nuclear behaviour. For example, Pakistan's adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines and its acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, participation in international security summits, bilateral agreements with India and adoption of a robust command and control mechanism demonstrate how international norms through international nuclear regimes and domestic level ideational construct of Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state defines Pakistan's nuclear policy.

Both at the formation of Partially Test Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty Pakistan supported these treaties. However, Pakistan couldn't become member of the CTBT due to Indian refusal to become a signatory of the treaty. Similarly, due to regional geopolitical and geo-strategic constraints (India factor) and discriminatory nature of treaties like NPT and FMCT and US's indifference to CTBT, NPT and FMCT(US factor), Pakistan couldn't sign these treaties.

It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan has always supported NPT and made its act of signing the treaty contingent upon Indian signing of the treaty. India in complete disregard of NPT conducted the test of its nuclear device in 1974 (Z. Khan, 2023).

Since 1970s Pakistan has offered a host of proposals to achieve nuclear disarmament in the region. Pakistan in line with its past role as a responsible nuclear state still offers many proposals pertaining to stop nuclear and conventional arms race in the

region. To understand Pakistan's nuclear policy in post 9/11 era it is vital that we take an historical analysis of Pakistan's proposal for nuclear disarmament in the region so that we can better comprehend the current dynamics of Pakistan's nuclear policy.

Firstly, in 1973 Pakistan proposed a missile free zone in South Asia and also proposed to India to hold a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, Secondly, Pakistan offered India to declare the region a free nuclear zone in 1974. Thirdly, in 1979 Pakistan proposed to India that both countries should jointly announce renouncing acquisition or manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Fourthly, also in 1979 Pakistan proposed to India to make mechanism for mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. Fifthly, Pakistan proposed to India that both India and Pakistan should simultaneously sign NPT. Sixthly, in 1979 Pakistan proposed to India to simultaneously accept guidelines of International Atomic Energy Agency on all nuclear facilities. Lastly, in 1987, Pakistan proposed to India that both countries should enter into nuclear test ban treaty at bilateral or at regional level. Last but not the least in 1997, Pakistan proposed to India a no war pact. All these peace and stability oriented proposals fell on deaf ears of India and international community.

Continuing its past practices and initiatives as a responsible nuclear state, Pakistan proposed establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) in South Asia. The bedrock of SRR is its interconnected elements namely conflict resolution, balance in conventional force and restraint in non-conventional domains; in the domain of nuclear and missile development. The regime has all the features to establish stability in the region. Unfortunately, the proposal has not been given any importance by the regional power India, rendering the proposal ineffective (*ACDIS – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.*).

To historicise Pakistan's role as a responsible nuclear state which is ever ready to comply with international nuclear norms and regimes, Pakistan's participation in the below mentioned nuclear treaties and regimes illustrate the fact that Pakistan's conduct as a responsible nuclear state is not a novelty rather it is a continuation of Pakistan's policies which are rooted in Pakistan's diplomatic history. Similarly, the historical account of the nuclear norms, treaties and regimes unambiguously illustrate the fact that it has always been India which destabilised the region by misusing or cheating international nuclear norms and regimes not the other way round.

6.12.1 “Partial Test Ban Treaty” (PTBT)

Pakistan has always been in the forefront to support international norms and regimes in the nuclear domain. Pakistan was one of the earliest countries that signed PTBT in 1963 when the treaty was opened for signatures. The treaty prohibited testing of nuclear weapons in the outer space, the seabed and in the atmosphere. Under the treaty, the states were only allowed to conduct underground nuclear tests. It will not be beside the point to mention that India played a leading part in drafting the treaty and also led in signing the treaty. Despite India being a signatory of the treaty, Pakistan's disarmament policies before and after the signing of the treaty had been to ensure that India didn't go nuclear and to expose Indian ambition of building nuclear weapons whenever possible (Sultan. 2019). Pakistan supported Indian proposal on both normative and strategic grounds. Normatively speaking Pakistan wanted a nuclear free world for the betterment of humanity, strategically, Pakistan by expressing its all-out support to prohibit all out support for prohibition of complete nuclear testing including underground was aimed at India. The proposal aimed to thwart Indian nuclear ambitions(Moshavar, 1991) In the same vein, on 30th

September 1963 in his address at UN General Assembly session, the then foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto expressed hope that soon underground testing will also be prohibited through international agreements. The drivers that pushed Pakistan to sign the treaty immediately after its opening for signature and to follow India in signing the treaty are illustrative of India specificity Pakistan's foreign policy in general and nuclear policy in particular. Another pertinent nuance to be noted in Bhutto's address at UNGA session of 30th September 1963 was Pakistan's desire and hope that soon through agreements underground testing will also be prohibited. Pakistan through these insinuations wanted to forestall Indian plans of going nuclear. This trend of Indian specificity in relation to Pakistan foreign policy in general and nuclear policy in particular continues to this day. 'Otherisation' of India as a regional hegemon and a revisionist state and Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state and a system supporter state are the ideational constructs that Pakistani state employs to conduct its foreign relations.

6.12.2 “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (CTBT)

The CTBT is a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It prohibits “all nuclear explosions everywhere and by everyone”. Negotiations for conclusion of the treaty were held at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Both India and Pakistan played an active role in the negotiation that led to finalisation of the CTBT treaty.

In 1996 Pakistan voted for the treaty when adopted by the UN General Assembly. Despite being a non-signatory state of CTBT, “Pakistan serves as an accredited observer state of the preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)” (*ACDIS – Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, n.d.).

India which remained active during negotiation of the treaty strangely came forward

to oppose adoption of the treaty. Only three countries opposed adoption of the treaty namely, India, Libya and Bhutan (*Universalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Norms*, 2018). Moreover, India made support for the treaty contingent upon policies of the nuclear weapon states towards complete nuclear disarmament. India managed to externalise international pressure by adopting the moral position that India can only work in this direction if nuclear weapons states explicitly announce their commitments towards nuclear disarmament. Indian moral position got exposed when it objected to a clause of the treaty that stated, after three years a conference of the state parties would be convened again to unanimously decide as to what steps, measures that align with international law be taken to expedite the ratification process. India explicitly expressed its discontent over this clause and deemed it as an infringement of its sovereignty. It expressed its fear that India would be compelled to ratify the treaty.

Indian forestalled consensus on the text of the treaty on the pretext that nuclear weapons states must lead the way by explicitly committing to nuclear disarmament. India employ this strategy to this day, to fail any international attempts towards nuclear disarmament. By setting precondition on the nuclear weapons states for nuclear disarmament, India exposes its ambitions to become a global power. Ostensibly it says that its nuclear programme is imperative for its security in relation to China but while opposing the treaty it didn't make signing of the treaty conditional on signing of the treaty by its adversary, China. Rather it has set precondition on all nuclear powers which means it has extra regional ambitions.

Unlike India, Pakistan has been supportive of the treaty and has always been willing to sign the treaty provided India is ready to sign it. In 1987 the then prime minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Junejo at annual UNGA session expressed Pakistan's

unreserved willingness to joint nuclear test ban treaties at regional, global and bilateral level. He invited India to sign a bilateral test ban treaty which would help provide mutual reassurance to both nations and the international community that neither country harbours any intent to pursue the development of nuclear weapons.” To the disappointment of the world and Pakistan, India spurned this offer. The historical account of Pakistan’s nuclear disarmament is of great salience and pertinence because the trends, patterns and Indian thinking in relation to nuclear disarmament has been consistent, sticky and abiding. As evident from historically conduct of India in the area of nuclear disarmament like it’s so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 when it unscrupulously benefited from civilian nuclear technology to start its weapon programme or its opposition to CTBT, NPT and FMCT, India has always played a duplicitous role. It has always aspired to compete with global nuclear powers. India's stance on global arms control and disarmament treaties was influenced by its aspiration to receive equal treatment at par with other prominent nuclear states, even prior to its official declaration as a nuclear-armed nation (*Universalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Norms*, 2018).

Pakistan’s foreign policy elites time and again highlight Pakistan’s responsible role in nuclear disarmament and Indian revisionist policies that compelled Pakistan to go nuclear. In 2016 Pakistan again, consistent with its past conduct and role conception as a responsible international player offered to India a nuclear test ban treaty at bilateral level. India again spurned the offer as consistent with its past conduct marked by duplicity and intransigence.

Leading scholars on nuclear armament Michael Krepon avers, in terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Pakistan's stance is anticipated to be more aligned with that of New Delhi rather than Washington. Even if the US

Senate were to approve ratification, Pakistan is likely to adopt a cautious approach, contingent on India's determination. In the event of India resuming nuclear testing, Pakistan is inclined to do the same. Conversely, if India accedes to the CTBT, Pakistan is likely to take a similar path (*Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Centre and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 45., n.d.*).

6.12.3 “Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” (NPT)

The treaty was signed in 1968. Though both India and Pakistan played an active part in formulation of NPT yet both the states didn't sign the treaty due to different reasons. India initially rejected the treaty by terming it as 'nuclear apartheid' a division between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have nots. India objected to discriminatory criterion for acceptance of nuclear weapons state from the cut-off date of January, 1967. Pakistan unlike India supported the treaty on normative grounds but made signing of the treaty contingent on Indian decision to sign and ratify it. Pakistan's hope of joining the treaty was shattered to ground when India conducted its so-called 'peaceful nuclear explosion'.

The year 1974 was a watershed event in the history of nuclear arms race in South Asia as Pakistan had already decided to start its nuclear programme after the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. Now, with nuclearisation of South Asia, Pakistan considered signing of the treaty against its strategic interests. India not only pushed Pakistan to desist from signing the treaty by testing nuclear devices in 1974 and 1998 but it also spurned a series of Pakistan's confidence building measures in the domain of disarmament at regional level (*Universalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Norms, 2018*).

Indian position on NPT changed in the post 1998 scenario. Earlier India has objected to the discriminatory character of the treaty but now in the post 1998 scenario it had no issues in joining the treaty provided it is allowed to enter in the treaty as a nuclear weapon state. In post 1998 scenario Pakistan's opposition to the treaty changed from normative grounds to strategic grounds especially in the wake of India's alliance with the US and Western countries and concomitant asymmetries it engendered in conventional and non-conventional weaponry. In the post 9/11 era, Pakistan not only continue to base its decision of signing the treaty contingent upon Indian signing of the treaty but also Pakistan wants to enter into the treaty as a nuclear weapon state (Z. Khan,2023).

Pakistan is often discriminately targeted for not signing international non-proliferation treaties and projected as a dangerous nuclear state and as the world's fastest growing nuclear power by turning a blind eye to the independent variable that defines Pakistan nuclear policy. That independent variable is India. Pakistan has always responded to Indian destabilising actions (that has always acted as an anathema to regional strategic stability and peace) by restoring the regional balance.

Foregoing in view it can be safely surmised that Pakistan's unwillingness to sign NPT and other nonproliferation treaties are not incongruent with its identity as a responsible nuclear state rather it vindicates Pakistan's identity as responsible nuclear state on two grounds. Firstly, Pakistan's nuclear programme is defensive in nature and is India specific. Secondly, Pakistan's conduct in the nuclear domain has always contributed to furtherance of strategic stability in the region.

6.12.4 “Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty” (FMCT)

The idea to ban production of fissile material dates back to 1953 when President

Eisenhower in his celebrated speech 'Atoms for Peace' proposed that production of fissile material be banned. Forty years after the president made this speech, the UN General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution titled as the 'Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.' The Resolution demanded from member states to draft a "non-discriminatory multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (UN Resolution, 1993).

India was one of the co-sponsors of the UN General Assembly resolution but it didn't agree with a provision of the draft treaty that calls for inclusion and cutting of existing fissile material stock. In fact, India was not the only state that objected to this provision rather all nuclear weapons state NWS objected to this provision. They agreed to cut the future fissile stocks but were reluctant to do away with existing fissile stock. Pakistan's perspective is that given India's earlier commencement of fissile material production and its possession of substantial unsafeguarded fissile materials, a treaty for a 'cut-off' on such materials would potentially reinforce regional imbalances, placing Pakistan at a sustained disadvantage in comparison to India (Sultan, 2019).

The impasse concerning the conclusion of a non-discriminatory multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" was ultimately resolved in 2009 when US President BarackObama called for the finalisation of a multilateral, non-discriminatory, and verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty (Obama, 2009). President Obama's address served as a driving force that mobilised nations to create a Programme of Work(PoW), facilitating the commencement of official negotiations for the treaty's finalisation.

However, India disrupted the consensus by asserting its refusal to commit to obligations that might substantially compromise its security concerns or hinder its strategic initiatives (Indian Statement, 2009).

Pakistan being a responsible nuclear state despite having termed Programme of Work as an imperfect document agreed to become part of it because it led to break the stalemate over the proceedings of Conference on Disarmament in this regard. But when India once again showed obduracy and intransigence for finalisation of the treaty, Pakistan stopped supporting the PoW. Pakistan categorically declared that an agreement cannot be accepted on conditions that exclude India's military initiatives, as they have a direct impact on Pakistan's regional security and overall strategic equilibrium (Akram, 2009).

As in the case of other non-proliferation and disarmament multilateral treaties and regimes Pakistan in case of FMCT also actively participated in reaching at a consensus document that could effectively lead to signing of a non-discriminatory and verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty but again as in other cases of NPT and CTBT Pakistan's efforts were nullified by Indian regional and global nuclear ambitions.

6.12.5 “Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” (TPNWs)

The idea to have a new disarmament norm was espoused by non-governmental organisations and a few non-weapon nuclear weapons states. The efforts of the NGOs finally led to formulation of a legally binding disarmament treaty that makes it mandatory for all member states to completely eliminate nuclear weapons from their territories. However, the treaty doesn't apply to non-member states. All nuclear weapons possessor states including Pakistan and India have not joined the

treaty because the considerations of these states have not been taken into account (*Universalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Norms*, 2018).

Here again Pakistan followed other nuclear possessor states in not joining the treaty. If the act of not joining this treaty isn't an irresponsible act on the part of other nuclear possessor states, that also have comparatively less insecurities how could Pakistan be squarely blamed for not signing the treaty. Pakistan made it clear to international community, earlier, as in other cases that it couldn't join the treaty because Pakistan solely relies on nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the conventional and non-conventional asymmetries posed by its adversary.

In the nutshell, by keeping the foregoing in view it can safely be said based on empirical grounds and historical record that Pakistan has always been in the forefront of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation but it was constrained to not join the treaties due to Indian power ambitions and unwillingness to become part of these treaties and the India centrism is one of the cardinal constructs of identity discourses and narratives. All the foregoing paragraphs illustrates that Pakistan unlike India espoused nuclear weapons only as a necessity and compulsion to ensure its survival against its ideational foil.

Pakistan's seriousness in relation to building nuclear security architecture is evident from its adherence to a wide range of legal instruments and establishment of institutions that govern its nuclear apparatus. The legal instruments and the governing institution aim to ensure that Pakistan's nuclear activities are safe and secure. The comprehensive legal frameworks that governs all nuclear activities in Pakistan are "National Command Authority Act of 2010, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Ordinance of 1965, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Ordinance of 2001 and the 2004 'Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Materials and

Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems” (MOFA, 2010). These legal instruments in their entirety show the recognition Pakistan accords to importance of establishing a robust legal framework to govern nuclear activities.

Through enactment of the legal instruments, Pakistan has established a robust command and control system and ensures regulation of nuclear activities, implementation of nuclear export regimes and non-proliferation. These instruments are indicative of the realisation of Pakistan’s security establishment regarding the need to have strict oversight and accountability in dealing with nuclear materials and technologies. To ensure transparency and robust monitoring of civilian nuclear activities Pakistan established Nuclear Regulatory Authority in 2001 (PNRA, 2001).

The establishment of the institution is a living proof of Pakistan’s abiding commitment to international nuclear safety standards and Pakistan’s quest for harnessing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in a safe and a secure way. The effectiveness and robustness of PNRA as a regulatory institution has been acknowledged by none other than IAEA in its report. The report declares that PNRA is “an independent and competent regulatory body, empowered with full scope of regulatory powers required by the IAEA standards” (IAEA, 2014). Pakistan’s faithful adherence to the legal framework project its role identity as a responsible nuclear state.

Pakistan not only drafted and implemented legal instruments at domestic level to govern its nuclear activities but it also joined the following relevant legal instruments:

- i. ‘CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment’
- ii. BTWC ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction’
- iii. ‘IAEA Guidelines INFCIRC/225/Rev.5’
- iv. ‘Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources’
- v. Subscription to IAEA protocol of ‘Incident Trafficking and Data Base’ (ITDB) (*Universalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Norms*, 2018)
- vi. ‘Export Control Act on Goods, technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems’—also known as Strategic Export Control Act’ (SECA)
- vii. ‘Import and Exports (Control) Act of 1950’
- viii. ‘Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance of 1984 and Regulation of 1990’
- ix. ‘Pakistan Trade Policy of 2004–05’
- x. ‘Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance (2000) (MOFA, 2023)

Pakistan’s strict adherence to the aforementioned domestic and international legal instruments that govern the nuclear activities demonstrate Pakistan’s credentials as

a responsible nuclear state. When Pakistan defines itself as a responsible nuclear state at bilateral, regional and international fora this self-definition goes on to shape its policies. By keeping the foregoing in the view we come to know that Pakistan being a responsible nuclear state has not only joined international legal instruments but also drafted legal instruments at domestic level which govern the entire gamut of Pakistan's nuclear affairs. To implement these international and national legal instruments, Pakistan has established a network of the state of art institutions/ administrative infrastructure to govern nuclear affairs in the country. In the following paragraphs the administrative infrastructure has been briefly outlined.

6.13 Role of National Command Authority (NCA)

National Command Authority (NCA) is the highest governing body that is responsible for nuclear affairs of the country. It governs nuclear safeguards, security and export control. NCA is headed by the prime minister of Pakistan. All three services chiefs, federal Interior minister, federal finance minister and federal defence minister and Director General Strategic Plans Division acts as a secretary of the authority. SPD serves as a secretariat of the authority. The authority ensures civilian control of nuclear assets.

6.14 Role of Strategic Plans Division (SPD)

SPD is the practical arm of NCA that deals with physical security of the nuclear weapons. It implements decisions made at NCA. Since SPD acts as a secretariat of NCA it "is responsible for developing technical solutions including the Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP), besides putting in place adequate intelligence and security arrangements to cover all security and nonproliferation-related aspects". Two divisions namely the security and intelligence divisions deal with internal and

external security threats to nuclear assets.

6.15 Pakistan Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security (PCENS)

Establishment of Pakistan's centres of excellence on nuclear Security was a landmark achievement. The centre imparts training on security, intelligence, counter intelligence and technical training to Pakistan's strategic force. It is Pakistan's centre of excellence in nuclear security. Pakistan is promoting it as a regional and international training centre in collaboration with IAEA. By 2016, the centre has trained more than 25000 security personnel who deal with security of nuclear weapons (National statement, 2016)

6.16 Establishment of Strategic Control Division and Oversight

Board

To ensure implementation of the comprehensive Strategic Export Control Act of 2004, Pakistan established Strategic Control Division in the Ministry of Affairs (MOFA). It is responsible for management of export of sensitive goods and technologies and enforcement of SECA. "SECDIV is also responsible for making rules and regulations; issue licenses for exports and re-exports of sensitive goods and technology; and carry out periodic revision and review of National Control Lists (NCLs)", Pakistan has so far carried out four reviews of its NCLs; the last one was done in November 2016 and was circulated as an information circular by the IAEA on February 17, 2017". "These lists are completely harmonised with the NSG, MTCR and the Australia Group" (UNSC Resolution, 2017)

The SECA provides for establishment of an Oversight Board in order to make work of SECDIV more efficient, to provide guidance for the achievements of the SECA's objectives and to ensure implementation of SECA in letter and spirit. The Board is

headed by Secretary MOFA with members from different departments (*ACDIS – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.*).

Pakistan's entry into international, national legal instruments that pertain to nuclear activities and enforcement of these legal instruments through establishment of administrative infrastructure bespeak of Pakistan's identity as a responsible nuclear state. The chapter has brought to fore the fact that rationale of Pakistan's nuclear programme that is deterrence against a powerful and revisionist adversary stamps Pakistan's role as a responsible nuclear power. The evolution and the present dynamics (nature of atomic arsenals, doctrinal shifts and Pakistan's role in international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and norms) of Pakistan's nuclear programme illustrate that Pakistan's nuclear programme is India specific.

Evaluation of the historical account of Pakistan's nuclear programme from its inception to present bring to fore the finding that Pakistan has always acted as responsible nuclear state. Before it started its atomic programme it fully supported nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and regimes. It supported international nuclear norms during its covert era of nuclearisation as well as in its overt era of nuclearisation provided India enters into the legally binding instruments. Pakistan's has offered to India a host of proposal like making the region a free nuclear zone, a missile free zone, regional test ban treaty, joint renouncing of nuclear weapons, no war pact to name a few and presently Pakistan offers to India Strategic Restraint Regime but all these proposals have been spurned by India.

By offering the aforementioned peace promoting proposals Pakistan has demonstrated its identity as a responsible nuclear state. The chapter also brings to

fore the finding that Pakistan's nuclear policy also evolved in post 9/11 era due to construction of Pakistan's identity as an irresponsible nuclear state in the West. Pakistan responded to these ideational challenges by projecting Pakistan as responsible nuclear state, Pakistan attempted to nullify the negative Western construction (Pakistan being a dangerous nuclear state where nuclear weapons can fall into the hands of terrorists) by presenting its credentials (Legal instruments, administrative infrastructure and defensive nuclear posture and India specificity of its nuclear programme) that tangibly demonstrate Pakistan's identity as a responsible nuclear state.

The chapter dwelled on the relevance of constructivist perspective to understand Pakistan's nuclear policy by highlighting the inadequacies of realism for fully accounting for Pakistan's nuclear policy.

Chapter-7

Findings, Conclusion, and Way Forward

The pre-independence history of Pakistan is illustrative in explaining the salience of Pakistan's post-independence identity. The historical overview of Pakistan's pre-independence identity or its foundational identity is also instructive in the sense that it tells us as to how Indian Muslims viewed themselves and the foils i.e. Hindus and the British against which they constructed their identity and as to how their foil: Hindus constructed their identity in opposition to identity of Indian Muslims.

The Indian Muslims constructed their identity against three ideational foils namely the Hindus, the British and their own religious identity. The pertinence of the pre-independence identity is increased when we weigh its causal impact on freedom struggle. The first chapter of the study brings to fore salience of ideational factors that contributed to creation of Pakistan and maintenance of a socially constructed identity in the pre -independence era. The history of Pakistan's freedom struggle vouches for causal power of ideational forces in shaping material political realities and thus validating the causality of ideational factors vis-à-vis affairs of a state. Historical instances explored in the study offer a historical link that lends credence to the role played by identity in shaping Pakistan's foreign relations in its subsequent history. The historical overview given in the study illustrates that identity is relational in nature, is socially constructed by unit level and system level variables.

The study has also brought to light the processes and dynamics of Pakistan's identity construction in post-independence era: from 1947 to 2001. Firstly, the study shows as

to how after winning independence Pakistani state went on to define its identity to teach to masses that why All India Muslim League demanded a separate homeland and as to how Indian Muslims have a diametrically opposed identity from Hindu Identity. The unbridgeable religious and cultural gulf between binaries of 'We' (Muslims) versus 'Them'(Hindus) justified the urgency, necessity of partition and the future trajectory of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Secondly, the study highlights the second strand of Pakistan's identity: convergences and commonalities between the Western and Pakistani identity in post-independence era. Thirdly, the study brings to light as to how Pakistani foreign policy and political elites went on to make Islam as super structural component of its identity and then how this superstructure contributed to cement relations with other Muslim countries especially Middle Eastern countries. The study also dwells on Pakistan's espousal of Pan-Islamic causes and how it impacted Pakistan's foreign policy.

The study also shows as to how India, taking advantage of the rifts between the United States, the West, and Pakistan, capitalised on the narrative of terrorism to negatively construct Pakistan's identity in post 9/11 era. This study highlights as to how Pakistan's significant others, namely the United States and India, attempted to negatively construct Pakistan's identity by labeling it as a 'failed state, a 'failing state', a 'rogue state', a 'garrison state', a 'terrorist state', 'epicentre of terrorism', 'promoter of terrorism' and so on. The study analysed the discursive means like political discourse, selective films, dramas and print media discourses that were used to construct Pakistan's negative identity. The study analyses Pakistan's identity construction through the lens of Wendtian Constructivism coupled with the method of simple discourse analysis. One

of the key findings of study is that Pakistan post 9/11 image is not a neutral or value free reflection of Pakistan's actual identity rather it was constructed by its significant others through political and media discourses and through popular culture.

The preceding paragraph highlights the ways in which Pakistan's significant 'others', namely the United States and India, have constructed a particular negative representation of Pakistan through their political, media, and popular cultural narratives. The study also reveals that the construction of Pakistan's identity in media and popular culture often perpetuates negative portrayals that align with the prevailing political discourse. It is important to note that this constructed identity is not impartial; rather, it is subjectively crafted to serve the respective interests of the United States and India. The construction of Pakistan's identity reflects a deliberate and purposeful alignment with the agendas of these two nations.

The study brings to fore the tropes of Pakistan's negative representational identity which are emblematic of the vilification campaign launched against the persona of Pakistani state like associating Pakistan with terrorism, projecting Pakistan as an intolerant and praetorian state, projecting Pakistan army and intelligence agencies as promoters of terrorism and brand it as a nursery of rogue elements, labeling Pakistan as an irresponsible state, raising concerns about the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons to terrorists, and questioning the democratic credentials of the country.

In response to this negative characterisation, Pakistani foreign policy elites embarked on a process of redefining and reorienting Pakistan's representational identity. The study builds on its main argument on the historical foundation of Pakistani identity and its impact on Pakistan foreign policy and body politics and systemic construction of its

identity in post 9/11 era. The study illuminates as to how Pakistani foreign policy elites have responded to the negative characterisation of Pakistan by the United States and India. The research also brings to fore the distinctive features of Pakistan's identity discourses like projection of Pakistan as a promoter of peace, tolerance, democratic values, projection of Islam as a peaceful religion and Pakistan's enduring support for resolution of the disputes of the Muslim world. Review of the literature on Pakistan's national identity shows that there are three competing strands of Pakistani identity constructed over the years namely Islamist identity strand, nation state identity strand and Identity strand based on plurality (e.g, Adeney, 2007; Ahmad, 2004, 2008; Lall, 2012a; Shafqat, 2009). In Islamist identity strand, Islam is the alpha and omega of Pakistani identity, in nation statist identity strand treats Pakistani identity as a relational construct vis-à-vis India and in pluralist strand of identity, Pakistani identity reflects religious, cultural and linguistic plurality of the country. The post 9/11 construction of Pakistan's national identity has attempted to synthesise the competing identity strands of Pakistani identity.

The study not only delineates the features or elements of Pakistani identity through discourse analysis of the speeches made by successive Pakistani leaders between 2001 to 2022 at annual UNGA sessions but also goes to explain how identity narratives have shaped Pakistan's foreign policy.

The research doesn't remain confined to delineation of the elements of identity rather it goes on to show the impact of Pakistan's post 9/11 identity discourses on its foreign policy. The research shows that Pakistan's post 9/11 identity has profoundly shaped foreign policy of Pakistan, Pakistan's self-narration as a promoter of peace explains

Pakistan's adoption of neutrality as a tenet of its foreign policy in post 9/11 era, Pakistan's support for multilateralism and Pakistan's foreign policy in relation to war in Yemen and broader Middle Eastern conflicts are proofs of the impact of identity discourses on its foreign policy.

Pakistan's adoption, promotion and projection of its diverse heritage to connect with the outside world show the impact of the trope of Pakistan's moderate identity. The study also shows that to lend credence and to be consistent with Pakistan's narration of the self as a promoter of peace, tolerance, harmony and moderation, Pakistani state also attempted to reconstruct Pakistani society, Paigham-e-Pakistan and formulation of more progressive and inclusive curriculum in the form of NCP are cases in point.

Another trope of Pakistani identity that explains Pakistan's foreign policy that is, Pakistan as a responsible nuclear state in post 9/11 era and how Pakistan's self narration and projection as a responsible nuclear state shapes its foreign policy. The discourse of Pakistan's highest leaderships endeavours to project and define Pakistan as a responsible and peaceful nuclear state. As Pakistan on the whole endeavours to construct an oppositional and antithetical identity in relation to hegemonic Indian identity, this ideational jostling of oppositional and antithetical identities is also evident in Pakistan's nuclear policy. As in other domains of identity construction, Pakistan treats India as its major/dominant 'other' and as a foil of its identity, in Pakistan's nuclear policy India is projected as an expansionist, hegemonic and revisionist state with a proven track record of aggression against Pakistan, a destabilising force that left no option for Pakistan but to find security in adoption of

nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a regional hegemon.

The research also highlights that in addition to India as a dominant 'other' vis-à-vis Pakistan's nuclear policy, the US also immensely contributes to shape and inform Pakistan's nuclear policy. In post 9/11 era discriminatory discourse in relation to Pakistan's nuclear programme primarily generated in think tanks, media and academia at the behest of US, aimed to construct Pakistan's nuclear assets as unsafe, as a threat to global peace. The narrative was paddled that Pakistan's nuclear assets could fall into the hands of terrorists which could unleash nuclear Armageddon on the West in general and on the US in particular. In this context Pakistan's nuclear policy underscores the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and Pakistan's unwavering resolve to prevent nuclear terrorism or any untoward incident related to safety and security of its nuclear assets. The study goes on to show as to how the Western discourse was countered by Pakistani foreign policy elites through a counter discourse/ counter identity i.e. a responsible international norm compliant state and by undertaking policy measures to neutralise the discriminatory identity construction.

The study underscores the relevance and pertinence of the tropes of Pakistan's national identity in post 9/11 era, in the domain of nuclear policy that is, Pakistan a responsible nuclear state and how this identity trope mutually constitutes Pakistan's nuclear policy. The study also argues that International norms and treaties shapes Pakistan's nuclear policy and its relationship with international nuclear order. While Pakistan's self-image as a peaceful and responsible nuclear state is often contested by the West and its arch rival, India, it remains a key component of Pakistan's

identity discourses that shapes its foreign policy.

Another key finding pertaining to construction of Pakistan's post 9/11 identity is that some elements of Pakistani identity persisted while some new elements were implanted in Pakistani identity. The elements which persisted as tropes in the identity are: Islam as a superstructure of Pakistani identity, Pakistan's support for the causes of the Muslim world and India as Pakistan's significant 'other'. Though the superstructure of Islam persisted as an overarching trope of the identity what adds new shades and colours to Pakistan Islamic identity is Pakistan's repeated projection of Islam as a peaceful and tolerant religion. The post 9/11 identity discourses project Islam and concomitantly Pakistan, as a force of moderation, dynamism, peace and tolerance.

The emphasis and the frequency of iterating the elements of peace, tolerance and moderation as distinctive and cardinal features of Islam and Pakistan is unique to Pakistan's post 9/11 identity discourses. Pakistan's post 9/11 identity discourses are set in opposition to identity discourses of late 1970s and 1980s. The post 9/11 identity discourses mark the revival of Pakistan's original identity discourses. Pakistan's post 9/11 identity discourses like original identity discourses that lasted till secession of East Pakistan, brand Pakistan as a progressive, peaceful and tolerant state. So, the new identity discourses are in a way reversion to Pakistan's original identity.

The evaluation of the role of national identity in Pakistan's foreign policy shows that the concept of national identity remained as one of the major determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's significant others namely India and the US

ascribed negative representational identity to Pakistan. The negative representational identity imposed on Pakistan, forced it to respond correspondingly to address the negative characterisation of the country. Projection of Pakistan as a state which has contrarian reality to what is depicted at international level constitutes one of the major elements of Pakistan's foreign policy.

The research shows that identity has remained as one of the key variables that explains Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era. If we ignore the variable of national identity in relation to Pakistan's foreign policy, we may not be able to make full sense of many policy choices that Pakistan made in post 9/11 era like comprehending Pakistan's nuclear policy, Pakistan's support for multilateralism, Pakistan's India centric foreign policy, the actualisation of Pakistan's identity at domestic level and how the domestic actualisation of Identity has an impact on Pakistan's foreign policy.

The study of the evaluation of Pakistan's national identity bring to light that Pakistan's post 9/11 identity has been co-constituted at systemic level and domestic level. At systemic level the US and India (among others), constructed a particular identity of Pakistan in addition to international socialisation and compliance of international norms and treaties also shaped Pakistan's identity. In response to systemic construction of its identity, Pakistani state not only attempted to project the alternate reality of Pakistan but it also attempted to live the identity narratives. Actualisation of the identity invariably affects foreign policy of the state since actualisation of identity is not only emblematic of the existing values that drive actions of the state but it also creates new values, beliefs and shapes behaviour of actors.

7.1 Way Forward

If identity is an image which informs as to who we are and how we are different from the surrounding objects or the background of the image, narrative is the story which we employ to communicate our identifications in more appealing, understandable and relatable manner with others. Mere projection and description of the self sans actualisation of narrative identity, fail to achieve desired results. If effectiveness of identity depends on the effectiveness and quality of the narratives, the effectiveness of the narratives rest on performance of the narratives.

As the chapter five amply dwelt upon the practices of Pakistan's foreign policy elites who actively responded to negative representational identity of the country by constructing a counter identity of Pakistan in order to neutralise the negative representational identity. The chapter also shows that not only Pakistani foreign policy elites projected Pakistan in a certain positive way but the iteration and projection of the identity also shapes Pakistan's foreign policy. Ambassador (ret'd) Shahid Gul Kiani opines that all states aim to project their identities positively to protect and promote their interests but only those states are able to harness the positive projection of their identities which translate the rhetoric of identity projection into reality at domestic and international level. National identity is not just characterised by the rhetoric rather more than that national identity is co-constituted and validated by the practices and actions of the state at both at domestic and international levels. Job of a diplomat or anyone entrusted with a diplomatic assignment of projecting the positive representational identity of a state, is enabled and constrained by the practices of state at both domestic and international level.

Words (rhetoric) can't be louder than actions, other states only buy the narrative if it corresponds to reality (S. Kiani, personal communication, March 2023).

Hina Rabbani Khar in her address at a seminar in Islamabad Policy Research Institute dwelt on the importance of actualising identity discourses to fully realise the potential dividends of the narratives. She dwelt on the importance of the actualisation of the identity narratives by saying that “you have to live the narrative, you have to eat, breathe, and live the narrative, and then it becomes a real, a real reflection at the strategic and operational level”. She goes on to say that “narrative shaping is important but narrative doing and living that narrative is even more important. It is a settled matter that narrative is not only what you say mostly it is seen as what you do right” (*IPRI | Javed Jabbar | Identification and Actualisation of National Narrative of Pakistan - YouTube*, n.d.).

Keeping the foregoing in view, we can compare the job of a diplomat or a leader performing a diplomatic task with that of a photographer just as a photographer captures the actual image and his/her artistry and mastery is judged on the basis of the correspondence of the image to actual reality similarly the representational identity communicated by the diplomat is only accepted if it corresponds to the reality of the state. As the photographer loses his/her creativity and authenticity if he/she edits the image similarly if a diplomat or a leader projects a doctored/false picture of the affairs of the state, the identity narrative loses credence and thus becomes ineffective.

It is pertinent to mention that there always remains a gap between the

representational identity or the rhetoric of the representational identity and actual policies and practices of the states. Pakistan is no exception in this sense. The rich and powerful countries, the system leaders also suffer from the dichotomy between their projection of self (rhetoric) and their policies and practices. The US defines itself as a democracy and as a champion of democracy and human rights at global level. In Post-world war II era, the US foreign policy had two main objectives, firstly to prevent spread of communism and secondly, to promote democracy. However, the US role as a promoter of democracy is characterised by contradictory policies and practices. The contradictory policies of the US which are not congruent with its identity discourses perhaps outnumber its policies that actualise its identity discourses. In regions like the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the U.S. consistently aligned itself with oppressive, short-sighted, corrupt, and unpopular governments, such as the Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, the Somoza dynasty of Nicaragua, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, among others (Afoaku, 1991). The US support for the authoritarian regimes was dictated by the dictates of cold war politics. The US subordinated democracy to the dictates of realpolitik. Like the US other system leaders also pursue policies which are not only inconsistent with their identity narrative but at times blatantly contradict their identity tropes.

System leaders like the US and other powerful states though face criticism for pursuing policies which are incongruent and inconsistent with their professed identity narratives but they largely remain unscathed due to their material and ideational

power structures. Unlike the system leaders like the US, a developing country like Pakistan can seldom afford to deviate from the actualising the positive iterations of its identity discourses. If it deviates, it suffers greater losses both in material and reputational domains than the system leaders.

Pakistan with formulation, iteration and somewhat actualisation of its counter identity has been able to moderately neutralise the negative representational identity foisted upon the persona of Pakistani state by its significant ‘others’. Having said this, Pakistan has much to do in order to make its identity narrative more credible and authentic. Pakistan has branded itself as a democratic country in post 9/11 era especially after the ouster of General Musharraf from power but Pakistan has only been moderately able to actualise its democratic identity. Pakistan for past couple of years has been consistently branded and ranked as a “hybrid democracy” in Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index. The Democracy index defines a “hybrid democracy” as a democracy that has more conspicuous and noticeable flaws and weaknesses than are found in “flawed democracy”. In “Hybrid Democracies” elections are neither free nor transparent. Pressure on opposition and the contesting candidates is a norm. Significant deficiencies are more widespread in authoritarian regimes compared to imperfect democracies pertaining to political culture, government functionality, and political engagement in these democracies not only corruption is rampant but rule of law is also weak. In these democracies civil society is toothless, media persons are harassed and pressurised and judiciary is pliant (*Democracy Index 2022 | Economist Intelligence Unit, n.d.*).

The US not for profit organisation, Freedom House which publishes its annual report

titled 'Freedom in the World' documents "political rights and civil liberties, composed of numerical ratings and descriptive texts for each country and a select group of territories". The 2023 report of the Freedom House has branded and categorised Pakistan as 'Partly Free' country. The report in its overview of the status of civil and political rights in Pakistan says that Pakistan conducts periodic elections within a competitive multiparty political framework. Nevertheless, the military wields significant control over security and policy matters, leading to media intimidation and a lack of accountability for excessive or unlawful use of force. There are selective limitations on civil liberties, and religious minorities and perceived opponents face attacks from Islamist militants (*Pakistan: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report/ Freedom House, n.d.*)

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute's annual report 2023 has categorised Pakistan as an 'electoral autocracy'. The electoral autocracies are defined by dominance of the executive branch over the legislature, judiciary and mass media. These countries are termed democracies only because elections are held regularly in these countries, they lack other attributes of democracy. The negative categorisation of Pakistan as a "Hybrid Democracy", "Partly Free" and "Electoral Autocracy" show that Pakistan's identity has been constructed by Western epistemic community. Notwithstanding the elements of subjectivity and constructed nature of the aforementioned categorisation, the fact remains that Pakistan has not fully actualised the democratic trope of its identity. Pakistan can only fully harness the power of its positive representational identity if it upgrades its democratic credentials by actualising its identity narratives. The status of a "Hybrid Democracy" is worse and

more negative than the status of a “flawed Democracy”, similarly the categorisation of ‘Partly Free’ and ‘Electoral Autocracy’ also fall in one of the least respected tiers of democratic hierarchy.

These negative labels show that mere rhetorical projection of the democratic identity will not serve the purpose of Pakistan to transform its international image. In the interconnected world, the global actors do not have the access to official source of information only rather they rely on diverse sources which work relatively independent of government machinery to know a country. They rely more on actions and policies of states to evaluate a state as a democracy. The world can’t be persuaded merely through the rhetorical projection of Pakistan’s democratic identity sans full spectrum democratisation of the country. Pakistan can only get optimal benefit from the positive projection of its identity if it upgrades its democratic credentials.

On 14th January 2022 Pakistan announced its first National Security Policy NSP (*Pakistan’s New National Security Policy: A Step in the Right Direction - Atlantic Council*, n.d.). The policy was appreciated at international level for putting emphasis on Human security, gender security and declaring economic security as a pivot of national security over which the edifice of Pakistan’s comprehensive security rests. The policy claims that now the focus of national security has shifted from geopolitics to geo-economics. The policy reflects a significant realisation among Pakistan's civil and military elites that obsession with geopolitics wont serve Pakistan’s interests given Pakistan’s political and economic challenges. They recognise that in the 21st century, characterised by growing multi-polarity and power struggles between superpowers, the country cannot achieve progress and prosperity solely by adhering

to a national security conception based on geopolitics. This shift is essential, given Pakistan's own economic and political issues.

The features of NSP like emphasis on human security, gender security and centrality of economic security in national security are indeed laudable features but Pakistan can only harness the power of these features if it implements them in letter and spirit. If Pakistan wants to reap the dividends of pivoting its security policy on economic security, then it must take tangible measures to implement the policy. Implementation of the NSP in letter and spirit would lay the foundation and set the stage for the transformation of the state from a national security state into a democratic state.

NSP embodies the vision and direction to transform Pakistan from a security state to a democratic state. It envisions “A strong Federation through democratic strengthening, political stability, consistent policies, and consensus on issues of national importance”. The translation of this vision invariably challenges the edifice of security state.

Arshad Ali and Robert G. Patman have enlisted the features of Pakistani state which makes it a security state. The first feature of Pakistan as a security state is its obsession of India. The centrality of India factor in Pakistan’s foreign and security policy has securitised the polity of Pakistan. The second feature of Pakistan’s identity as a security state is not allowing the space and opportunity to democratic institutions to bloom fully in order to maintain a “controlled form of democracy”. The third feature of Pakistani security state identity is prioritisation of the interests of the

military over nation building. The fourth feature is the proclivity and penchant of the military establishment for centralisation of power. The fifth feature is Pakistan's reliance on asymmetric warfare to neutralise hegemonic India, the sixth feature is lack of debate on defence spending and the last feature is existence of military industrial complex.

The above-mentioned identity tropes foisted upon the Pakistani identity can be challenged but the fact remains that Pakistan's detractors find sufficient evidence to corroborate and buttress these labels. Our contradictory policies and conduct provide grist to mills of Pakistan's adversaries. Pakistan can only benefit from the positive projection of the state if it lives out its tropes faithfully. Pakistan has to practically transform itself from the alleged label of security state into a democratic, welfare state and this can be achieved through implementation of the vision encapsulated in NSP. This transformation is key to success of Pakistan's identity narratives. Without this transformation, Pakistan's identity narratives will remain shallow, hollow and will lack substance and credence.

The Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) assesses and examines the progress of developing countries and those undergoing transitions in their efforts to promote democratic principles and establish a market economy. Annual report of BTI 2022 says that "The Pakistani state's monopoly on the use of force is contested by terrorist organisations, sectarian groups, ethno-nationalist insurgencies, and criminal gangs involved in the smuggling of goods and narcotics" (Heinrich et al., 2024).

If Pakistan wants to project its identity narrative successfully it must maintain

monopoly over the use of force in its territory. Neither it should cede space to extremist organisations nor to private individuals. This is an area where Pakistan faces fierce challenges. In Post-Taliban take over Afghanistan after withdrawal of the US in August 2021, Pakistan has experienced a resurgence of terrorism.

Kathy Gannon, former director of Associated Press for Afghanistan and Pakistan in her story titled “Afghan Taliban’s victory boosts Pakistan’s radicals” quotes Brian Glyn Williams, Amir Rana and Bill Roggio to know the repercussion of Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan and the impact it may have on radical elements in Pakistan. she quotes Brian Glyn Williams, an esteemed professor of Islamic history at the University of Massachusetts, who is considered an authority on jihad movements as saying that the remarkable triumph of the Afghan Taliban in overcoming the formidable American superpower has instilled confidence in the Pakistani Taliban. They appear to hold the conviction that they can also effectively wage a victorious holy war against the Pakistani 'infidel' state and have consequently resumed their insurgent activities.

She also quotes Amir Rana, the executive director of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies based in Islamabad who avers that the events unfolding in Afghanistan have had a notable impact on radical religious parties in Pakistan. These parties openly exhibit hostility towards minority Shiite Muslims, labelling them as heretics, and sometimes mobilise large crowds to support their hard-line interpretation of Islam. One particular party, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, is dedicated to defending a contentious blasphemy law, which has been misused against minorities and political opponents and can incite violent mobs over mere accusations of insulting Islam.

Rana cautioned that Amidst a growing wave of religious fervour, Pakistani society faces the risk of transforming into a state resembling the Taliban-run Afghanistan. Bill Roggio who works in a US based think tank named ‘Foundation for Defence of Democracies’ says that Pakistan must bear in mind during talks with TTP that as Afghan Taliban want to rule over the entire Afghanistan Pakistani Taliban too want to rule over entire country so Pakistan should tread with caution in peace talks with TTP (*Afghan Taliban’s Victory Boosts Pakistan’s Radicals – The Diplomat*, n.d.).

The threat to the monopoly of Pakistani state over the use of violence is not just threatened by TTP and sectarian outfits rather all the radical elements pose a threat to safety and security of state. Pakistan has to defeat these forces of darkness if it wants to give credence to iterations of its moderate Islamic identity.

Hina Rabbani Khar, Pakistan’s minister of state for foreign affairs rightly says that “The state must have monopoly over the use of violence and that is a lesson Pakistan has learnt with hard blood money and lots of lives we cannot let that lesson go away” (*IPRI/Javed Jabbar | Identification and Actualisation of National Narrative of Pakistan - YouTube*, n.d.). Pakistan must not allow anyone to challenge the writ of the state and the writ of the state must be exercised democratically.

Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) in collaboration with The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) published a report titled “Strengthening Governance in Pakistan Assessing the National Action Plan to counter Terrorism and Extremism”. The report has dwelt upon the success and failures of NAP and also suggested a way forward to steer the country out of the troubled waters. The recommendations of the

report provide very pertinent solutions to Pakistan's intractable issues that plague Pakistani polity like terrorism, radicalisation, backsliding of democratic institutions, challenges pertaining to nation building, formation of counter narrative, civilian ownership of NAP, rehabilitation of the internally displaced persons, peace oriented foreign policy choices, democracy and nation building through reforms in education (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2020).

The report emphatically underscores that solutions of Pakistan's myriads of problems lie in establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions. Pakistan must work for establishment of inclusive democracy. The inclusive democracy with its inherent political synergy and resilience can go a long way in stemming the tide of extremism. Weakness of democratic institutions breed political instability which provides fertile ground to the germination and perpetuation of extremism.

Historic policies like National Action Plan (NAP), National Curriculum of Pakistan (NCP) and Pagham-e-Pakistan encompass the vision to stem the tide of terrorism and radicalisation in the country. Pakistan must work consistently to implement the aforementioned policies in letter and spirit to provide an enabling environment for flowering of Pakistan's moderate Islamic identity. Implementation of these policies will contribute to restoring the original tolerant and inclusive Pakistani identity which was overtaken by the exclusionary identity of 1980s.

Terrorism and radicalisation cannot be eliminated only through kinetic means. Non-kinetic means like dissemination of counter narratives and the resolution of socio-economic and political grievances of the disenfranchised segments of society can

immensely contribute to wean the extremists away from the lure of extremist ideologies. To achieve this, civilian leadership should take full ownership of the institutions that have been established to curb terrorism in the country, civilian institutions should take lead in taking non-kinetic measures against terrorism and radicalisation. So far, it is the military establishment that has been playing a leading role in anti-terrorism and anti- radicalisation campaign.

In the past, Pakistan conducted several kinetic operations in the tribal region to eliminate terrorism. Pakistani military has been able to vacate the areas from the militants but since victory of Afghan Taliban, the militants have been emboldened to move and regroup in their strongholds in the region. The militants in recent past attempted to establish their foothold in Swat and Dir. However, we witnessed unprecedented response from the locals who were inspired by Pashtun Tahafuz Movement's message of peace and rejection of Talibanisation. The Taliban were denied space to establish their foothold in the area due to resistance from local population.

The preceding paragraph bring to light the positive role of PTM in the domain of counterterrorism. Pakistani state despite its strained relations with the organisation could find common grounds in order to combat the resurgence of the militants of TTP. PTM has been decrying Pakistan military's alleged human rights violations against Pashtuns and has also accused it as a protector and facilitator of some terrorists. The military on the other hand has accused the group of being influenced by foreign interests to create discontent in Pakistan. Both the parties need to soften their stances to accommodate genuine concerns of each other. The shared goal of

countering the TTP could serve as a potential area for cooperation. By forming an alliance, both parties could strengthen their counterterrorism efforts and address the security challenges posed by the TTP.

Moreover, a closer relationship between the PTM and the Pakistan state could help address concerns about potential Pashtun separatism, as cooperation on security matters may foster trust and understanding between the two parties. Ultimately, a united front against the TTP would be crucial in safeguarding Pakistan's stability and security (*Pakistan Should Collaborate with the PTM on Counterterrorism Operations— South Asian Voices*, n.d.).

Partnership and collaboration with PTM will go a long way in providing crucial local support base to Pakistan military to operate with full effectiveness ensuring lasting peace in the tribal region. PTM, the anathema of Pakistan's security establishment could act as a panacea for establishment for promotion of peace and democracy in the tribal region. If peace and democracy take roots in the tribal region it will have immensely positive impact on peace and security in Pakistan.

In a nutshell, it is suggested that actualisation of Pakistan's progressive, democratic, tolerant and inclusive identity at both domestic and international level is a sine qua non for effective realisation of the dividends of Pakistan's identity discourses that aim to project the country positively.

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Appendix-I
Questionnaire for Interviews

**Topic Evaluating National Identity in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:
Post 9/11 Era**

Ph.D. Scholar

Muhammad Idrees

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Department of International Relations International Islamic University Islamabad.

It is humbly stated that I am enrolled as a PhD scholar in IR department, at International Islamic University Islamabad. The research scholar needs your scholarly opinion/insight on the topic of the PhD dissertation titled: “Evaluating the role of State Identity in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Post 9/11 Era”. It is pertinent to share the abstract of the dissertation and interview questions so that the researcher can fully benefit from your vast array of knowledge and expertise.

Abstract

The study aims to evaluate the role of Pakistan’s national identity and its impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy in post 9/11 era through the theoretical lens of constructivism. The research begins with expatiation of the historical salience of identity in the establishment of Pakistan and in its subsequent history leading up to 9/11. The study then goes on to bring to light how after the tragic incident of 9/11 Pakistan was portrayed only in negative light by Pakistan’s significant “others” namely the US and India to serve their geopolitical interests. This negative construction of Pakistan’s identity engendered ontological insecurity for Pakistan. This pushed Pakistani state to reorient its identity so that the negative projection of Pakistani identity can be neutralised. The study has attempted to show the tropes of Pakistan’s post 9/11 national identity. The study goes on to show as to what similarities and differences define Pakistan’s pre 9/11 and post 9/11 identities share.

The study also dwells on the impact of Pakistan's identity tropes on Pakistan's foreign policy. The study not only delineates the features or elements of Pakistani identity by analysing various discourses and practices of the state between 2001 to 2023 but also goes to explain how identity narratives have shaped Pakistan's foreign policy. The research doesn't remain confined to delineation of the elements of identity rather it goes on to show the impact of Pakistan's post 9/11 identity discourses on its foreign policy. The research shows that Pakistan's post 9/11 identity has profoundly shaped foreign policy of Pakistan. The findings of the study confirms the hypothesis of the study, Pakistani state reoriented its national identity in response to negative construction of its identity by the US and India and resultantly the reoriented national identity profoundly shaped Pakistan's foreign policy in post 9/11 era. In the light of the findings, the study makes recommendations to fully harness the positive potential of Pakistan's representational identity by narrowing the gap between iteration of identity and its actualisation

Interview Questions

1. Do you agree with the statement that in order to counter negative construction of Pakistan's national identity in Western and Indian discourses in post 9/11 era; Pakistani foreign policy elites set out on a course to reconstruct Pakistan's state identity?
2. What role historically national identity played in Pakistan's foreign policy?
3. What are the features or the lineaments of Pakistan's identity in post- 9/11 era and as to how it is different from the past identity?
4. Which factors pushed Pakistan's foreign policy elites to reconstruct state identity in post 9/11 era?

5. How India has used the ‘bogey of terrorism’ to malign Pakistan’s national identity in post 9/11 era?
6. How far international norms, their internalisation and socialisation contributed to reconstruction of Pakistan’s national identity in post 9/11 era?
7. How does national identity shape and drive Pakistan’s Foreign policy in post 9/11 era?
8. How India continued to be viewed as an oppositional ‘other,’ especially after the dominance of Hindutva in India vis-à-vis reconstruction of Pakistan’s post 9//11 national identities?
9. What irritants can hinder the reconstruction of Pakistan’s moderate identity?
10. Why is it important to evaluate the role of national identity in Pakistan’s foreign policy in post 9/11 era?

Appendix- II
Interview Schedule Guide

SR. No.	Name	Designation	Mode of Interview	Date & Place
1.	Shahid Masroor Gul Kiani	Ambassador (retd) He has served in various capacities in Pakistan's missions abroad and as an Ambassador to Vietnam and High Commissioner to Malaysia. He is on the visiting faculty of four mainstream public universities in Islamabad and Adviser to the India Centre at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.	Personal Interview/ Online	April 12, 2023 Islamabad.
2.	Dr Saif-Ur-Reman Malik, TI(M),	Brigadier (retd) & Academic Director Research & Publications NDU, founding HoD MPhil programme of National Security and War Course, founding Director BS Programme, editor NDU journal, Margalla Papers and ISSRA papers. Authored four books on research methodology along with a number of research articles in national and international journals.	Personal Interview	May 11, 2022.
3.	Dr Nadeem Omar Tarar	A historical anthologist and the Executive Director, centre for Cultural and Development, Islamabad & holds Gandhara Chair at University of Wah.	Personal Interview	October 16, 2022.
4.	Imran Shauket	Imran is an entrepreneur turned development professional Imran has a unique background and combination of experiences in myriad	Personal Interview	October 22, 2022. Islamabad.

disciplines and continents. Due to this distinctive background, Imran has been asked to serve as Senior Advisor to GOP, and advisor to many international organisations including USAID, German Technical Assistance, the UN Group, Japan International Cooperation, Swiss Development agency, governments and missions. Imran has written extensively and has over authored over 30 published works.

5.	Afrasiab Mehdi Hashmi	Afrasiab Mehdi Hashmi is a Pakistani diplomat and author. He served as Pakistan's High Commissioner to Bangladesh from 2011 to 2014, and as High Commissioner to New Zealand from 2016 to 2017	Personal Interview on	October 26, 2022 Islamabad
6.	A senior diplomat who wished not to be named	Serving Senior Diplomat	Personal Interview (Online)	October 25, 2022. Islamabad.
7.	Amardeep Singh	A Singapore-based chronicler, embarked on a remarkable journey to explore the remnants of the Sikh community that once thrived in Pakistan. His book, “Lost Heritage: The Sikh Legacy in Pakistan”, published in 2016, delves into this rich history across West Punjab, North-West Frontier, and Pakistan administered Kashmir.	Personal Interview	June 11, 2016. Islamabad.

8.	Suhail Bin Aziz	<p>Suhail has worked in the field of education for over 24 years, both in the public and private sectors. He also holds credentials from Oxford University's Continuing Education Division. Arizona State University also awarded him a teaching certificate. He attended the illustrious International Visitors Leadership Programme (IVLP) in 2018. For the past few years, Mr. Suhail has been instrumental in shaping new educational policies, writing new textbooks, and most importantly developing the new national curriculum of Pakistan at the National Curriculum Council (NCC). During his stay at the NCC, Mr. Suhail played an instrumental role in maintaining inter-faith and intra-faith harmony by helping develop the first-ever Religious Education curriculum of Pakistan for seven minority faiths: Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, Kalasha, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism. In addition to this, he coordinated the committee responsible for developing the Islamic Education curriculum with focus on commonalities among different schools of thought.</p> <p>In February 2024, he joined the National Rehmatul lil Aalameen Wa Khatam un Nabiyyin Authority (NRKNA).</p>	Personal Interview	December 6, 2022. Islamabad
9.	Rashid Wali Janjua	<p>Brigadier (retd) & Researcher, Director Research Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)</p>	Personal Interview (Online)	November 23, 2022. Islamabad.

Appendix- III

A sample of Speeches made by successive Pakistani heads of government/state at UNGA from 2001 to 2022

Note: The study has analysed twenty-two speeches made by successive Pakistani heads of government/state at UNGA from 2001 to 2022, however due to shortage of space only a sample of these speeches consisting of five speeches has been reproduced below. The sample represents all the successive governments of Pakistan from 2001 to 2022.

1. President Pervez Musharraf's Speech at 56th UNGA Session (Nov 10, 2001)

Mr. President

Mr. Secretary General

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to extend to you Mr. President, my felicitations on your election. I also wish to congratulate your predecessor Mr. Harri Holkeri for his stewardship of the millennium session of the General Assembly. Deep appreciation is also due to the Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan for his untiring efforts to translate the vision of the Millennium Declaration into policies and actions by the World Community. Mr. Secretary General, please also accept my heartiest congratulations on the award of the centenary Nobel Peace Prize conferred upon you and your organisation and your election for a second term to your prestigious office.

Last year, at the Millennium Summit, all of us were looking forward to a renaissance in the new millennium. A renaissance in the hearts and minds of people, for a better world where peace and justice would prevail. Unfortunately, today we gather against the somber backdrop of the terrorist outrage that the world witnessed in shock and horror on that fateful day of 11 September. In seconds images of fire and death reached all of us. Thousands of innocent lives were lost in minutes. Eighty nations lost some of their brightest and their best. Pakistan like the rest of the world mourned the colossal loss of innocent lives. The map of the world changed and the entire globe descended

into a deep crisis. At a time of such great turmoil when there is indeed a need for clear thought and firm action. I come from Pakistan with a message of determination and resolve as well as a message of peace for all people.

The General Assembly this year meets under the shadow of a horrendous act of terror perpetrated against the people of the United States, an act for which no grievance or cause can ever be a justification, an act that must be condemned unambiguously and in the strongest words. This was an attack on humanity itself, and we all must therefore, unite to fight this scourge.

Mr. President,

Now that the world has bonded itself to fight against terrorism, it is time for introspection. We owe it to posterity that in this dark hour we shed light on some dangerous and growing trends, misconceptions and misperceptions which, if not cleared, may lead the world into even greater disorder and disharmony.

The religion of Islam, and Muslims in various parts of the world, are being held responsible for the trials the world is facing. This point of view is totally misplaced. Just as all religions teach peace and love for fellow beings, so does Islam place upon its adherents the obligation to do good, to be generous, merciful, kind and just to fellow beings. The Muslim greeting Assalam-o-Alaikum meaning "Peace be upon you" symbolizes the very essence of Islamic faith. Islam is a religion of peace, of compassion and of tolerance. Terrorism is not a Christian, Buddhist, Jewish or a Muslim belief. It is to be condemned no matter who the perpetrator is, be it an individual, a group or a state.

We need to ask ourselves what really causes these extreme acts around the world. To my mind it is the unresolved political disputes the world over, disputes in Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine, Kashmir and other places. Unfortunately, all these disputes involve Muslims, and more sadly the Muslims happen to be the victims in all which tends to give a religious tinge to these otherwise political disputes. The lack of progress in resolution of these disputes has created in them a sense of deprivation, hopelessness and powerlessness. The frustration gets even worse when such disputes like Kashmir and Palestine remain unsettled for decades despite the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. The question then is, whether it is the people asking for their

rights in accordance with UN Resolutions who are to be called terrorist or whether it is the countries refusing to implement the UN resolutions who are perpetrators of state terrorism. In Kashmir, Indian occupation forces have killed over 75,000 Kashmiris attributing these killings to foreign terrorists. It is time India must stop such deceit. UN Security Council Resolutions on Kashmir must be implemented. Media images of the Palestinian child Muhammad Al Durrrah were etched on the hearts and minds of people all over the world. It is perverse to regard the rape of Kashmiri women as a punishment inflicted in the course of war. The images of that moment when the World Trade Centre Tower came down will remain definitive for all the agony, disbelief and loss that people suffer from acts of terror all over the world. All forms of terror must be condemned, prevented and fought against, but in so doing the world must not trample upon the genuine rights, aspirations and urges of the people, who are fighting for their liberation and are subjected to state terrorism.

To fight the extremist, deprive him of his motivation. The extremist survives in an environment where millions suffer injustice and indignity. Deprive him of his support by giving the world peace, security, justice and dignity for all people regardless of faith, religion or creed.

A just and honourable solution for the people of Kashmir, an end to the miseries of the people of Palestine are the major burning issues that have to be addressed vigorously, boldly, imaginatively and urgently. Unless we go to the root causes, cosmetics will only make matters worse. Consider the analogy of a tree. Terrorists are like so many leaves, you take out some, there will be plenty more and an unending growth. Terrorist networks are branches, you prune a few and there will be others and more growth. The only way to go, is to go for the roots. Eliminate the roots and there will be no tree. The roots, Mr. President, are the causes, which need to be addressed, tackled and eliminated, fairly, justly and honourably. Give people back their dignity, their self-respect and their honour. In essence, therefore, to tackle the issue of terrorism in its entirety we need to follow a three-pronged strategy of going for individual terrorists, moving against terrorist organisations and addressing disputes around the world in a just manner. After the events of 11th September, Pakistan took a deliberate principled decision to join the world coalition in its fight against terrorism.

This decision has catapulted us, once again, as a frontline state in the battle against terrorism. While the people of Pakistan have accepted this new reality, they still suffer from a sense of betrayal and abandonment, when they were left in the lurch in 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Then also, we were a frontline state and what we got in return was three million refugees, a shattered economy, drugs and Kalashnikov culture, to be faced single handedly through our limited resources. Pakistan only hopes that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated and Pakistan's legitimate concerns will be addressed. Our economy again faces a crisis of a fallout of the operations in Afghanistan. We need financial and commercial support on an urgent basis and hope that this will be forthcoming.

Mr. President,

After 11 September Pakistan had been trying its utmost with the Afghan government ever since Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda became an international issue, till the last moment to avert military action in Afghanistan. Regrettably, we did not meet with success and the coalition operation against terrorists in Afghanistan continues with no immediate end in sight. Sadly, enough, the civilian casualties in this action are getting projected more as an open war against the already poor, suffering and innocent people of Afghanistan. The world in general and Pakistan in particular mourns the loss of these innocent lives and sympathizes with the bereaved. It is desirable that the military operation be as short and accurately targeted as possible. It is also essential that a fall back political strategy be evolved which could attain the same objective as being sought through military application. In its entirety dealing with Afghanistan, involves a three pronged strategy—the military, political and humanitarian cum rehabilitation strategies. It must remain the effort of the coalition to prevent a vacuum, leading to anarchy, after achieving military objectives, through immediate application of political and rehabilitation strategies.

In our view, the political set up in Afghanistan must be home-grown and not imposed, ensuring the unity and territorial integrity, of Afghanistan, with a broad-based, multi-ethnic dispensation, representative of the demographic composition of the country.

The people of Afghanistan have been suffering the ravages and devastation of conflicts for over two decades. It is the moral obligation of the world community to support

them generously. Assistance to Afghanistan should be in two forms. Firstly, the ongoing humanitarian assistance and secondly, the post-military operations, rehabilitation and reconstruction. To offset the ill effects of the ongoing military operation, it is imperative that we launch a more coordinated and concerted humanitarian relief effort inside and outside Afghanistan with a more generous funding. This will go a long way to alleviate the sufferings of the common Afghan. It is equally important that concurrently we formulate a post operation rehabilitation programme, once peace returns to Afghanistan. This effort would entail, at the minimum, restoration of water management systems, reviving of agriculture through land development, reconstruction of physical infrastructure (roads, buildings & utilities) and establishment of institutions.

A stable and peaceful Afghanistan is in the vital interest of the region and in particular of Pakistan. Conditions must be created for more than three million refugees in Pakistan to return to their country. We propose the establishment of an “Afghan Trust Fund” under UN auspices for the rehabilitation and reconstruction process.

Mr. President,

I would now like to focus on the harsh realities in the developing countries which have a relationship with extremism of all forms. Poverty and deprivation lead to frustration, making the masses vulnerable to exploitation by extremist organisations. It is the collective, moral responsibility of the developed world to address this issue squarely. Through substantive economic uplift, poverty alleviation and social action programmes in the developing countries. Economic imbalances have to be removed for a just, equitable and harmonious world order. A major step in this direction would be to reduce, if not eliminate, the debt burden, hanging as a millstone around the necks of the poor and the under – developed. The bigger tragedy of the third world is that their rulers, together with their minions plunder the country’s wealth and are afforded easy access and safe havens to stash away the loot in the first world. Since long restrictions have been imposed on laundering of drug money and recently money for terrorists is being choked. Why can similar restrictions not be imposed on loot money laundering?

I appeal through this forum to all the developed countries to legislate against deposits

of ill-gotten money, to assist in investigation against the looters and to ensure the early return of the plundered wealth to the countries of their origin. In fact, I would not be far off the mark if I state that with the return of this looted money, many of the developing countries may be able to pay back their debts and revive their economies.

Mr. President,

Pakistan is also deeply conscious of the nuclear dimension of the security environment of our region, the danger it poses and the responsibility it places on nuclear weapon states, particularly the two nuclear states in South Asia. We are ready to discuss how Pakistan and India can create a stable South Asian security mechanism through a peaceful resolution of disputes, preservation of nuclear and conventional balance, confidence building measures and non-use of force prescribed by the UN Charter. In this context, we are ready to discuss nuclear and missile restraints as well as nuclear risk reduction measures with India in a structured, comprehensive and integrated dialogue.

Pakistan is fully alive to the responsibilities of its nuclear status. We have declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Pakistan was not the first to initiate nuclear tests and will not be the first to resume them. We are ready to formalize a bilateral treaty with India for mutual test ban. We have strengthened our export controls and have established multi-layered custodial controls on our nuclear assets. Let me assure you all, that our strategic assets are well guarded and in very safe hands.

We have constantly upgraded our command and control measures and instituted an elaborate nuclear command control mechanism for iron clad custodial controls to ensure the safety and security of our assets. Pakistan is opposed to an arms race in South Asia, be it nuclear or conventional. We will maintain deterrence at the minimum level.

Mr. President,

I would now like to very briefly cover the internal developments in Pakistan. Over the past two years the focus has been on our economic revival, poverty alleviation, improving governance, political restructuring and introducing genuine democracy in the country. We have successfully put in place a sound democratic structure, based on empowerment of the people at the grassroots levels. A revolutionary step has been

taken by providing one-third of the seats to women at district level governing councils. I want to put on record in this august gathering that Pakistan is proud of this representation and empowerment of women, which is a unique feature in the world. Our resolve of holding elections to national and provincial assemblies and the Senate in October 2002 in accordance with the road map announced last August, will remain unchanged in spite of the prevailing environment in the region.

Mr. President,

In conclusion and, in keeping with this time of enormous trial and tribulations we are going through, I wish to make an appeal. An appeal for the sake of mankind, for the sake of our future generations and for the sake of a better world. Let justice prevail, let no people be wronged, let sufferings be eliminated, let discontent be addressed, let humanity rise as one nation to eliminate subjugation of the weak, and let there be peace.

Thank you.

2. President Pervez Musharraf's Speech at 57th UNGA Session (Sep 12, 2002)

Mr. President,

Mr. Secretary-General,

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I extend to you, Mr. President, my felicitations on your election. I also congratulate your predecessor, Dr. Seung-Soo Han, for his able stewardship of the preceding session of the General Assembly.

We commend Secretary-General Kofi Annan for his commitment and dedicated efforts in the pursuit of the Charter's purposes and principles. I congratulate Switzerland and East Timor on their admission to membership of the United Nations.

Mr. President,

Last year," this Assembly met under the shadow of the terrorist attacks on New York,

our host city. The horror, of that day galvanized the international community to combat this modern day evil, which threatens to destabilise our societies.

Pakistan is in the forefront of the fight against heritage. We have made major sacrifices in this war. We have interdicted infiltration by Al-Qaeda into Pakistan. We have arrested and deported foreign suspects found on our territory. We are determined not to allow anyone to use our soil for terrorist acts inside or outside Pakistan. However, Mr. President, unfortunately some quarters are utilizing the war against terrorism as a vehicle to spread hatred against Islam and Muslims. Terrorism has no creed, nor a religion. In our globalizing world, religious and cultural diversity should, be a vehicle for complementary creativity and dynamism, not the rationale for a new ideological or political confrontation. A sustained dialogue between the Islamic and Western nations is essential to remove the veil of ignorance and prejudice and to promote harmony and cooperation. As a first step, I propose that the General Assembly consider the adoption of a Declaration on Religious and Cultural Understanding, Harmony and Cooperation.

Mr. President, there is need to address the root causes of terrorism. It is not religion, which impels a terrorist act; it is often a sense of frustration and powerlessness to redress persistent injustice. When a people, right to self-determination and freedom are brutally suppressed by foreign occupation; they can be expected to resist this by all means at their disposal. Terrorist attacks must be condemned. But acts of terrorism by individuals or groups cannot be the justification to outlaw the just struggle of a people for self-determination and liberation from colonial or foreign occupation. Nor can it justify state terrorism.

Misusing the rationale of war against terrorism, India has sought to de-legitimise the Kashmiri freedom struggle, tarnish Pakistan with the brush of terrorism and drive a wedge between it and its coalition partners. Boasting of its coercive capability, India has deployed about a million troops in battle formation against Pakistan. Such threatening and aggressive posturing will not resolve disputes. We cannot be coerced or frightened into compromising our principled position on Kashmir.

The conflict in occupied Kashmir is being waged by the Kashmiris. No amount of external assistance could have inspired the Kashmiri people to sacrifice the lives of

80,000 of their youth and to sustain their struggle for decades against India's occupation army.

India's planned elections in Kashmir will once again be rigged. Such elections, under Indian occupation, will not help peace; they may set it back. The people of Jammu & Kashmir must be allowed to exercise their right to determine their own future in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.

Despite India's provocations and threats over the past year, Pakistan has acted with restraint and responsibility. We have advanced several peace proposals. They have been spurned by India. Let me declare from this rostrum: Pakistan will not start a conflict with India. But if war is thrust upon us we shall exercise our right to self-defence fully and effectively.

With nuclear weapons now in the possession of both countries, it is small wonder that people describe South Asia as "the most dangerous place on Earth." Today, peace in South Asia is hostage to one accident, one act of terrorism, one strategic miscalculation by India.

In this dangerous situation, crisis management cannot afford to become a substitute for conflict resolution. The steps required to avoid a conflict and advance peace are clear:

Mutual withdrawal of forward deployed forces by both States; Observance of a cease-fire along the Line of Control in Kashmir; and Cessation of India's state terrorism against the Kashmiri people.

Simultaneously, a dialogue must be resumed between India and Pakistan. The structure for such a dialogue was agreed between Prime Minister Vajpayee and myself at Agra. The Kashmiris should be fully associated with the dialogue on Kashmir and should be allowed to travel freely to Pakistan and Azad Kashmir.

To ensure sustainable peace and stability in South Asia, a Kashmir solution should be accompanied by agreed measures for nuclear restraint and a conventional arms balance between India and Pakistan. India's ongoing massive military buildup reflects its known desire for domination over South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In the interest of regional and global stability, this must be discouraged.

Mr. President,

India's belligerence also reflects the chauvinistic ideology of the Hindu extremist parties and organisations. Rising Hindu fanaticism in India has targeted Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and even the even the scheduled caste Hindus. Last February, an estimated 2000 innocent Muslims were massacred in Gujrat with the complicity of BJP State leaders. There must be accountability for this massacre. The international community must act to oppose Hindu extremism with the same determination it displayed in combating terrorism, religious bigotry, ethnic cleansing and fascist tendencies elsewhere.

Even as Hindu fundamentalism is rising in India, Pakistan is waging a successful struggle to restore its traditions of a tolerant Islam. We are acting vigorously to eradicate the sad legacy of the Afghanistan war: religious extremism, drugs and guns. We are determined to transform into reality the vision of our Founding Father, the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: for a progressive, modern, democratic, Islamic State. We wish to play a constructive role in promoting peace and prosperity in South Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf region.

We have empowered the people by devolving decision-making to the grassroots; Improved human rights, virtually eliminated exploitive child labour and empowered women;

We have rationalized economic policies and, despite internal and external shocks, set Pakistan on the path of sustained growth.

Pakistan has become the first country to set up a Human Development Fund with the collaboration of UNDP and a National Volunteers Corps for the achievement of the Millennium goals of poverty alleviation and Human development. In' 30 days, we will hold national and provincial elections, completing the process of restoring democracy in Pakistan.

Mr. President,

We are happy with the positive changes in Afghanistan, after two decades of conflict. We fully support President Hamid Karzai. We appreciate the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, to bring hope and peace

to the long-suffering Afghan people. We believe that faithful implementation of the Bonn process and the Tokyo commitments is essential for success. Ensuring credible security in Kabul and other centres through an expanded international presence is paramount. This was brought home by the attempt, a few days ago, to assassinate President Karzai. Reconstruction of Afghanistan through early release of funds agreed in the Tokyo commitment is essential for strengthening the central government as well as for peace and security in Afghanistan.

The international community must urgently revive the Middle East peace process to realise a comprehensive and just peace on the basis of the resolutions of the Security Council and the principle of land for peace. Pakistan supports the full and faithful implementation of all Security Council Resolutions.

Mr. President,

In our globalizing yet divided world, the most important war we must fight is the war against poverty. The objectives of this "war" have been identified - at the Millennium Summit, in Doha, Monterrey and Johannesburg. We must implement the commitments made in an integrated and coherent manner. A pernicious aspect of the international Banking system is the stashing away, in secret accounts, of illegally acquired money by corrupt elite from developing to developed countries.

Mr. President,

Despite current differences among governments, people both from rich and poor nations, are beginning to embrace universal values and common goals: avoiding war; ending poverty, hunger, disease, discrimination and human rights violations; promoting democracy; sharing technology; creating decent work for all; and protecting the environment.

We must capture this growing spirit of global humanism to advance the quest for global prosperity and universal peace. This can be accomplished only at and by the United Nations. This is the central purpose, the reason for the existence, of this Organisation.

Our decisions and actions today will shape events of the future. We must rid ourselves of forces of intolerance and radicalism. We have to create a safer world for our future

generations - a world of peace and conciliation, not one of conflict and tension.

I thank you, Mr. President.

Address by General Pervez Musharraf President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan at the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 22, 2004 New York Address by General Pervez Musharraf President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, at 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York - 22 September 2004

Mr. President, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, allow me to extend our warm felicitations on your election as the President of the General Assembly. We congratulate H.E. Mr. Julian Hunte for his successful stewardship of the 58th Session of the Assembly. I also reaffirm our deep appreciation for the wise leadership of the Secretary General, H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan, and his services for the cause of peace and progress in the world. Mr. President, a profound transformation is underway in international relations. The dangerous balances of the Cold War have been replaced by the complex and equally dangerous realities of our world today. It is a world marked by intensifying globalization – of economies, production, trade and information, on one side, and terrorist violence, poverty and disease, on the other. The growing asymmetries in power among States, discrimination in the dispensation of international justice, repression of peoples' legitimate aspirations, and growing socio-economic disparities, have precipitated "new threats" to international peace and security: The threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and imploding States. The world today sees turmoil and upheaval everywhere – especially in the Third World and more specifically in the Muslim World. Too many fronts have been opened, too many battle lines drawn. The time for closing fronts has come. The world today is crying for peace, reconciliation and reform. Our objective today has to be harmony through reconciliation and accommodation, globally and regionally. Mr. President, Terrorism poses the most urgent threat to many countries, including the most powerful States. For many of us, the terrorist threat is close and personal. Terrorism threatens Pakistan's vital national interests and objectives. We have thus

participated actively in the unprecedented global campaign against it. Pakistan has led the way in this campaign. Our counter-terrorist campaign is ongoing. The global cooperation against Terrorism has been highly successful. Determined and collective action has contained and disrupted the violent agendas of the terrorists. We are winning the battle against terrorists. However, what we are doing is insufficient to win the ultimate war against them. The immediate anti-terrorist response has to be accompanied by a clear, long-term strategy striking at the root of the problem if we are to ensure final success against this scourge. Mr. President, I had proposed the two pronged strategy of Enlightened Moderation to overcome terrorism and prevent a clash of civilizations. The last Islamic Summit in Malaysia endorsed this plan which involves, on the one hand, internal socio-economic reform in the Muslim world and, on the other, active support from the major powers to ensure political justice and socio-economic revival for all Islamic peoples. While the Islamic World has taken its first step in the form of nominating a Commission of Eminent Persons to propose measures for a Renaissance in the Muslim World, the major powers of the West have yet to show movement, by seriously trying, to resolve internationally recognised disputes affecting the Muslim world. The industrialized world must support the endeavour for an Islamic renaissance especially through adequate financial and technical assistance and larger trade opportunities. Most importantly, justice must be offered to Islamic peoples in the form of resolution of all outstanding international disputes which affect Muslims. There is no time to lose. Action has to be taken before an iron curtain finally descends between the West and the Islamic World. Mr. President, the tragedy of Palestine is an open wound inflicted on the psyche of every Muslim. It generates anger and resentment across the Islamic World. Continued Israeli violence and erection of the illegal separation wall by them, usurping more Palestinian land, as well as suicide attacks by misguided Palestinians, are frustrating the prospects of peace and prolonging the agony of the Palestinian people. While Pakistan stands for peace – recognising the right of Israel to exist, as also the right of the Palestinians to have their own homeland, we can never accept the usurpation of additional Palestinian land. Israel has no right to erect its separation wall beyond its 1967 boundaries. Pakistan calls on Israel to withdraw the wall from all occupied Palestinian lands, taking it back

to the pre-1967 boundaries. We also call on Israel to stop the daily atrocities against Palestinians. Pakistan also call on President Yasser Arafat to use his influence to reciprocally halt the Intifada and give peace a chance. A major responsibility rests with the Quartet, and in particular with the world's greatest power, to secure a fair and peaceful solution of the problem, realizing the vision of two states – Israel and Palestine – living side by side in peace and security. The US can and must play the role of a just broker of peace. Peace must succeed in the Middle East; failure, Mr. President, is no more an option. Mr. President, it has always been my conviction that Pakistan and India can resolve all their differences, including over Jammu and Kashmir, through a sincere dialogue. The dangerous confrontation of 2002 and the three wars prior to that between our two countries have demonstrated that there is no military solution to our problems. The aspiration for peace enjoys popular support in Pakistan and, I also believe, in India. Neither country can achieve its ambition for social and economic progress in the absence of peace. We must achieve peace for the sake of the impoverished people of South Asia – for their development and prosperity. After several aborted attempts, Pakistan and India have been able to initiate Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and a composite dialogue this year to address all 2 outstanding issues. Pakistan has pursued this process with complete sincerity, giving bilateralism a final chance. We feel that the dual channels of CBMs and the Dialogue Process must proceed in tandem. We also are firmly committed to resolving all disputes with India peacefully including the Kashmir dispute. This cannot be ignored. Its resolution cannot be delayed. We desire a resolution of Kashmir which is just and acceptable to India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. We also seek strategic stability with India. I am glad to say, Mr. President, that uptill now the normalization process has progressed well, in a cordial atmosphere.

Now that the negotiations are entering the difficult stage of grappling with solutions to previously irreconcilable disputes, Pakistan hopes that India shows the same sincerity, flexibility and boldness that Pakistan will demonstrate. I look forward to my meeting day after tomorrow with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. I would like to convey to him that this is the moment for peace – we must not allow it to slip away. Mr. President, Iraq has taken a serious turn, to the anguish of the entire world

community. It is imperative that together with closing the Palestine and Kashmir fronts, we also wind down the Iraq confrontation. Pakistan stands for restoration of peace and stability in Iraq, ensuring its unity and territorial integrity. This can only be achieved through handing over governance authority to the people of Iraq and allowing them full control over their natural resources. Internal law and order and security can be best promoted by local Iraqi Police or Militia, which needs to be built up expeditiously.

At an opportune time, and, on request of people and Government of Iraq, the Muslim World could play a role in bringing peace and harmony to this conflict torn Nation. Mr. President, the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan will be an important landmark in the country's progress towards democracy and stability. Pakistan will do all it can to prevent terrorists from using our territory to disrupt the Afghan election process. The subsequent Parliamentary elections in April 2005 would also augur well for self-governance in Afghanistan. While the political channel is progressing well and we wish President Karzai all success, the process of building the Afghan National Army and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan needs to be accelerated to install durable peace in Afghanistan. Mr. President, in our globalized world, peace and development are interdependent – now more than ever. Despite dynamic growth in some parts of the developing world, economic and social disparities are increasing. The rich are richer; the poor are poorer. Over two billion people on - our planet — a quarter of the world's population — live in abject poverty, afflicted by hunger, disease and conflict. Islands of peace and prosperity cannot coexist for long within oceans of instability and poverty. A bold and innovative global strategy is required to redress the growing inequalities. Good governance is a precondition for development. But, it is equally essential to rectify the glaring inequities and imbalances in the international financial and trade systems. Official Development Assistance can and must be doubled. Innovative ways can and must be adopted to generate the financial resources required for development. The billions transferred abroad by corrupt leaders should be returned to the looted countries to finance poverty alleviation, 3 education and health. International investment flows should be consciously directed to the poorer developing countries. It can unleash the latent power of the poor for consumption and

production. We also know by now that trade, and not just aid, is the way to promote growth and to benefit from globalization.

However, it has to be made more equitable. It should eliminate unfair agricultural subsidies, remove high and escalating tariffs that discriminate against the products of the poor and offer special and differential treatment to disadvantaged developing countries. In my view, we need more than a level playing field; we need a field tilted in favour of the developing countries. Unless the world's leaders generate the political will required to agree and implement these measures urgently, the Millennium Development Goals, proclaimed by the United Nations, will remain a mirage. Mr. President, In Pakistan, we are well on the way to transforming our country into a modern, progressive, tolerant, democratic, Islamic state, reflecting the vision of our founding father, the Quaid-e-Azam. Democracy has been restored in Pakistan. The people have been empowered through a revolutionary Local Government System. Our women have been empowered. However, like other developing countries, Pakistan confronts several challenges. But, we are confident of success. Our governance is good. Our national priorities are clear. Mr. President, Today, there is welcome resurgence of support for multilateralism. This must be a multilateralism based on the principles of the UN Charter, a cooperative and democratic multilateralism. It must seek just, peaceful and durable solutions to conflicts and disputes. It must promote a programme for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It must foster global development and prosperity. All our collective aspirations can be best pursued within this World Organisation. The United Nations must be strengthened and revitalized to respond to the challenges of Twenty-first Century. The UN Security Council should become more effective, democratic and representative. There is no agreement on the aspiration of a few States to acquire permanent membership of the Security Council. The overwhelming majority of states are against the creation of new centres of privilege. The Council should be enlarged to ensure the representation of the mostly small and medium states which have joined the United Nations over the last three decades. We have to consider new ideas to craft a consensus on the enlargement of elected members on the Security Council. Mr. President, Pakistan believes that a new consensus on peace, security and development, can and should be achieved on the

occasion of the 60 the Anniversary of the United Nations next year. The summit meeting suggested by the Secretary General for next year must lead to a negotiated Final Document adopted by consensus. This historic Summit will, I hope, create a new paradigm to achieve universal peace and prosperity.

3. Statement by the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan His Excellency Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, at the Sixty Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York 25 September 2009

BISMILLAH IR-REHMAN AR-RAHIM

Mr. President,

Mr. Secretary General,

Excellencies,

Distinguished Delegates,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

ASSALAM-O-ALAIKUM

I am honoured to return to this chamber of hope, peace and cooperation. I wish to convey to you the warm greetings of the people of Pakistan. We are delighted to see you, Mr. President, presiding over the General Assembly.

Mr. President,

High ideals of the United Nations have inspired our vision of the global society. A global society that is based on Peace and justice; freedom and human rights; equality and equal opportunity; freedom from want and hunger; tolerance and harmony; A global society; that celebrates its unity in diversity; that believes in sovereign equality of nations, large or small; that promotes, truth and reconciliation.

Mr. President,

On behalf of the people of Pakistan I assure you of our cooperation to fashion a safer and better world; a world in which all children - yours and mine-live in peace and

harmony.

Mr. President,

This is a world in which we all depend on one another. It demands a return to the path of the United Nations. It calls for reforming the United Nations on principles of sovereign equality and consensus building.

Mr. President,

In Pakistan the will of the people has prevailed; our people have witnessed a profound democratic transformation. We have entered into a new era of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Democracy in Pakistan is of great importance, not only for our country, but also for our region, and the world. Pakistan has struggled hard for democracy.

My late wife Shaheed Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto led the fight for democracy and laid down her life for it following in the footsteps of her great father Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto she made the ultimate sacrifice, so that our nation may live in democracy.

We are now following in her footsteps. I, my Party, my people and Pakistani democracy are grateful to the international community to our Secretary General His Excellency Ban Ki Moon for constituting an International Commission of Investigation into her assassination. We are confident that the Commission will bring out all dimensions of her life, work and tragic assassination.

Mr. President,

The world supported our struggle for democracy. We thank you for that support. Democracy in Pakistan is beginning to achieve successes in the fight against militancy. The real challenge now is to make democracy sustainable, indeed irreversible. This requires that democracy should be able to deliver; It should meet aspirations of our people for progress and prosperity. It must give our people peace and stability.

Mr. President,

Unfortunately, our neighbourhood has witnessed decades of conflict. Pakistan has suffered greatly from terrorism and religious extremism. Terrorism and extremism was not known to our society and culture. Religious extremism entered our society and the region when we all in the free world decided to confront the rival ideology.

The policy was based on the exploitation of religion to motivate Muslims around the world to wage jihadi was the policy when the jihadi leaders were referred to as the Moral equivalents of George Washington.

It was a policy that allowed war-lords and criminals to destroy civilization. The virus multiplied and has affected the world. To eliminate militancy, we must strike at its roots. Surgery alone may not be enough. We need to address the causes of deprivation, poverty and illiteracy. We need to adopt dialogue, development and a judicious use of force as our strategy.

Mr. President,

Pakistan has firmly responded to the challenges of extremism and militancy. Democracy has given peoples ownership to the fight against terrorism. Today our nation stands fully united in this struggle. Our law enforcement agencies have, within a short span of time, cleared the large areas in Malakand from the militants. Over 2.5 million were forced to leave their homes. About 2 million were hosted by their relatives and friends. I salute the host families.

Democracy and political ownership of war have proved to be chief weapons in the fight against militancy. In a short span of ten weeks most of the internally displaced have returned to their homes. We are now engaged in rebuilding their lives. Pakistan appreciates the support and understanding of the international community in our efforts. We urge the international community to reinforce this support further. We are determined to eliminate terrorism and extremism from our territory. For this early return of peace and stability in Afghanistan is critical.

The flow of weapons across the region must stop. The funding and support to militants by drug barons and other elements must stop. We also believe regional efforts for peace and stability. We also believe that regional cooperation against terrorism and extremism holds great promise. We emphasize regional efforts for peace and stability. Pakistan will continue to work with Afghanistan and the international community for the early restoration of peace and stability in that country. Pakistan has hosted almost 3 million Afghan refugees for the past three decades. We have been providing for them on our own. We call upon the world to help in the safe return of refugees to their homes. Pakistan's democracy has begun to deliver. We are doing more in our self-

interest. We urge the world democracies to do more for peace and development of the people affected by militancy and terror. We need to create economic opportunities for our people. We urge our friends and partners to help Pakistan with market access for the economic revival and well-being of their people.

Mr. President,

Pakistan desires friendly relations with India. We believe that dialogue is the only way forward. The absence of dialogue leads to tensions that must be avoided. We look forward to the resumption of the Composite Dialogue process. We seek a peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues with India. Meaningful progress towards resolution of the Kashmir dispute is necessary for durable peace and stability in South Asia.

Mr. President,

Pakistan also supports the rights of the Palestinian people as guaranteed in several UN Resolutions. Durable peace in the Middle East requires that the issue of Palestine is addressed meaningfully. We also call for the immediate release of {Ahn-Sun-Sew-Kee}.

Mr. President,

All nations seek security. Peace and security are closely linked. Equal security for all is important. We support all efforts for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The principle of equal security is of fundamental importance for achieving these objectives. Imbalance in security especially at the regional levels needs to be redressed.

Pakistan will continue to play a constructive role:

- In promoting conflict resolution and restraint in South Asia.
- In promoting initiatives on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on the basis of non-discrimination.

Mr. President,

Pakistan's priority is economic development. We wish to build on our internal strengths. In this effort, we seek partnerships. We seek to develop win-win situations. We are engaged in economic revival by:

- Developing our agriculture,

- Building mega hydel projects,
- Initiating water conservation projects and
- Undertaking infrastructure development projects.
- Promoting regional trade and cooperation
- Encouraging, beyond governments, the corporate sector in the development.

We need to develop frameworks for cooperation that will deliver quickly.

Mr. President,

In overcoming the challenges faced by the world the United Nations has a central role to play. Guided by its principles and the high ideals in its Charter the UN is destined to succeed. Pakistan is determined to convert all challenges into opportunities. A democratic Pakistan will continue to uphold the ideals and values of the United Nations.

Together we shall succeed.

Thank you.

4. Address by H.E. Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan at the General Debate of the Sixty-eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (27 September 2013)

Mr. President,

I congratulate you on your election as the President of the United Nations General Assembly. It is a fitting recognition of your distinguished career.

I also commend Mr. Vuk Jeremie, for his outstanding leadership of the General Assembly in the past one year.

Secretary General Ban Iii-moon has led the organisation ably and wisely. We were glad to receive him in Pakistan in mid-August, as our honored guest on the anniversary of the Independence Day of Pakistan.

Mr. President,

I stand here today before this Assembly, soon after my country has seen a new dawn, I come before this house in all humility, as the elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, for the third time. I feel exonerated, as my supporters and I stood in our struggle for democracy.

I am happy to inform the distinguished delegates that we now have a strong Parliament, an independent judiciary, a free media and a vibrant civil society. But there is no room for complacency. We cannot lower our guard. Democracy needs constant vigilance and strong institutions. It needs careful nurturing. Most importantly, it is not promises, but good governance that sustains democracy. My Government has put people at the centre. We will work to give them peace and security, an environment of growth and development. I am pursuing an inclusive approach for the entire nation.

Mr. President,

Pakistan is an ardent supporter of the United Nations, which is an anchor of peace and a beacon of hope for all nations. The United Nations universal character provides a forum to discuss, evolve and implement global responses to pressing problems of our times.

Pakistan upholds international law and promotes international consensus. The security of our world is assured and reinforced by friendly relations between nations and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

The United Nations needs reform. But it should be a reform that reflects the interests of all; not the ambitions of a few. We believe that the Security Council's composition should be made more representative, democratic and equitable; and its Work more effective, transparent and accountable. The intended reforms must however plan for a dynamic future, not entrench or replicate outdated historical patterns, based on privileges.

The role and authority of the General Assembly must be fully restored and revitalized, In the past few years, the General Assembly has regained influence in responding to challenges in regard to peace and security, development and climate change. It is becoming a platform of choice. Yet, it has to go a long way to acquire its full authority.

Mr. President,

To save the world from the scourge of war, we have to continue to strive for a fair and just international order, based on rule of law. Festering disputes must be resolved. In this regard, the United Nations has to play a critical role. The United Nations must continue to remain attentive to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and the full realisation of the right to self-determination of its people. The suffering of the people cannot be brushed under the carpet, because of power politics.

As in the past, Pakistan calls upon the international community to give an opportunity to the Kashmiris to decide their future peacefully, in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions. The issue of Jammu and Kashmir was presented to the Security Council in January 1948; and yet the issue remains unresolved after nearly seven decades.

I have an aspiration for regional peace and stability. I have shared this Vision with leaders in our neighbourhood. Shortly after assuming office, I received a message of goodwill from the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh. I extended an invitation to him to engage with us to address all outstanding issues between our two countries. Prime Minister Singh's response was positive.

Our two countries have wasted massive resources in an arms race. We could have used those resources for the economic well-being of our people. We still have that opportunity. Pakistan and India can prosper together; and the entire region would benefit from our cooperation.

We stand ready to reengage with India in a substantive and purposeful dialogue I am looking forward to meeting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh here in New York to make a new beginning. We have a solid basis to do that. We can build on the Lahore Accord signed in 1999, which contained a road map for the resolution of our differences through peaceful negotiations. I am committed to working for a peaceful and economically prosperous region. This is what our people want and this is what I have long aspired for.

Mr. President,

It gave me great pleasure to welcome President Karzai in Islamabad last month. We reaffirmed our shared goal of a peaceful, stable and united Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan are and should remain masters of their own destiny. We support an

inclusive, Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, leading to national reconciliation. I reassured President Karzai that we do not wish to interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs; nor do we have any favourites in that country. In fact, we have an earnest hope that the Afghans themselves will unite for peace, prosperity and development of their great country. Pakistan encourages United Nations efforts for the stabilisation of Afghanistan. We will work together with Afghanistan for regional and economic cooperation that would establish and reinforce regional trade, energy and communications corridors.

A manifestation of our solidarity with the Afghan people has been our willingness to host millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan for many decades. International support for their repatriation as well as reintegration in Afghanistan is indispensable. We also look forward to UN support in addressing other trans-regional challenges, including the flow of narcotics.

Mr. President,

Last year, Palestine was given the status of non-member observer state by this Assembly. We hope that soon Palestine will join this body as a full member state. We are glad that the stalled peace process has started again. It should lead to the consolidation of an independent, viable and contiguous state of Palestine, based on the pre-1967 borders, with Al Quds Al Sharif as its capital. Pakistan will continue to demonstrate its solidarity with the people of Palestine.

Mr. President,

Even as we meet here, Syria is in turmoil, with Syrians killing Syrians. We appeal to the Syrian Government and opposition groups to move to the negotiating table in Geneva to prepare a road map for national reconciliation and the necessary political transitions. More war will lead to more killings that need to be stopped. AS party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Pakistan remains opposed to the use of chemical Weapons. We condemn its use in the strongest terms.

We welcome the agreement reached between the United States and Russia, and supported by other permanent members of the Security Council, to secure and destroy chemical weapons in Syria. This crucial step has facilitated consensus Within the Council to adopt a resolution, which will not only address the issue of chemical

weapons but start the stalled political process in Syria that would lead to national reconciliation and solutions that are acceptable to the people of Syria. Pakistan will support that resolution. Acceptance of the Geneva One document and a decision on the dates for the convening of the Geneva Two Conference will be a big step in ending the crisis in Syria. I call on all forces to invest their political will and capital in diplomacy to bring peace to Syria.

Mr. President,

As a responsible nuclear weapon state, we will continue to pursue the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation and adhere to the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, without entering into an arms race. We would not, however, remain oblivious to the evolving security dynamics in South Asia, nor would we agree to an arrangement that is detrimental to our security and strategic interests. Our position on the proposed Fissile Material Treaty is determined by our national security interests and the objective of strategic stability in South Asia.

Safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy, without discrimination, is essential for economic development. Pakistan qualifies for full access to civil nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, to meet its growing energy needs, for continued economic growth. By the same token, as a mainstream partner in the global non-proliferation regime, Pakistan has impeccable credentials to join the multilateral export control regime, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Pakistan will continue to participate constructively in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process, which is a laudable initiative.

Mr. President,

As a country that has suffered grievously for the past many years, we condemn terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations. In the past twelve years, we have given huge sacrifices, in blood and resources. We have lost 40,000 precious lives of men, women and children, which include 8,000 defence and security personnel. There have been colossal damages to social and physical infrastructure as well. Our economy has been denied the opportunity to grow fully. This must change now. I have tried to forge national consensus on a cohesive policy to eliminate terrorism from our Soil. For that purpose, I convened an all Parties Conference, which spoke unanimously against

terrorism.

We are resolved to oppose the forces of terrorism, by all means at our disposal. At the same time, we have offered dialogue to end violence, wean young extremists off extremism, and integrate all segments of our Society into the national mainstream. Winning hearts and minds, particularly of the youth, is as important as using guns to deter terrorism. But dialogue should not be seen as a sign of weakness or a tool of appeasement.

Mr. President,

The war against terrorism must be waged Within the framework of international law. The use of armed drones in the border areas of Pakistan is a continued violation of our territorial integrity. It results in casualties of innocent civilians and is detrimental to our resolve and efforts to eliminate extremism and terrorism from Pakistan. I have urged the United States to cease these Strikes, so that we could avert further casualties and suffering.

Mr. President,

Terrorism knows no borders. It has no religion or creed, which is Why maligning a whole people or a religion on this account, is unfair and unwise. Islam is a religion of peace, compassion and brotherhood and yet most insidious form of contemporary racism in the name of religion is on the rise. Peaceful Muslim communities are profiled and subjected to discriminatory practices. Their faith, culture, holy personalities and scriptures are under attack. Stereotyping of Muslims as extremists and terrorists must stop. We must all use the influence and reach of the United Nations to avert a clash of civilizations and promote harmony among followers of diverse religions, all around the world. Terrorism negates Islam's humanistic outlook and noble values. Those who perpetrate terrorism are enemies of Muslims and Islam itself.

Mr. President,

Pakistan is the largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping. Since 1960, We have contributed 150,000 troops. One hundred and thirty-five of our peacekeepers have lost their lives in service of peace. This is our most tangible assistance to the United Nations efforts to maintain international peace and security.

We fully Support the United Nations effort to finalise and implement a single, coherent post-2015 Development Agenda that identifies benchmarks for poverty alleviation, sustainable development and Social inclusion. More importantly, we should prepare ourselves to respond effectively to save our planet from the ravages of climate change.

Mr. President,

Our Government has undertaken an economic revolution in Pakistan so that it too, can become part of the emerging markets. We have all the fundamentals and human and natural resources for such a transformation. In the immediate future, our challenge is to overcome a Volatile Security environment, correct structural imbalances in the economy and bring an end to energy shortages. We are building a new Pakistan with a robust economy. From the international community, we do not seek aid, but enhanced trade, market access, investment and strong economic partnerships.

We are creating a new framework for Change to provide equal opportunities and social justice for everyone, eliminate exploitation of the poor, harness our human resources and restore the dignity of our citizens.

We intend to use education as a key driver of socio-economic development of Pakistan. We are introducing a National Health Service across Pakistan with the participation of private sector. We have also made eradication of polio in Pakistan a matter of great importance for my Government, as we are determined to make Pakistan a polio free country.

It is our strong resolve to promote full participation of women in national development, while protecting their political, social and cultural rights as agents of change. More than 63 percent of our population is under the age of 25. By investing in their education and skills, we aim to tap into this demographic dividend. Minorities are equal citizens of Pakistan. They not only have complete freedom to worship, but also full protection to their rights to education, employment and political participation.

We are deeply saddened by the recent terrorist attack on the members of a minority community in Peshawar. This heinous attack has united the entire Pakistani nation in support of our brothers and sisters of all faith in Pakistan. We share their grief and declared three days of mourning. This attack has been carried out by the same elements who have attacked mosques, shrines, innocent citizens, and members of

our security forces. However, this attack has further strengthened my Government`s resolve to deal with terrorism and extremism in a resolute and comprehensive manner, as I had reiterated in my very first speech at the National Assembly of Pakistan.

Mr. President,

In conclusion, I Wish to emphasize to this august Assembly that Pakistan is a strong supporter of multilateral diplomacy, convinced that it is the most legitimate, ultimate guarantor of peace and security, economic and social development, and respect for universal human rights. As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Pakistan has been making every effort to strengthen the role of diplomacy to resolve conflicts and to help build states in post-conflict situations. In all instances, we have upheld the primacy of the Charter. We need multilateral diplomacy so that we continue to respect diversity While reaching decisions that impact our fate as members of the international community. Towards this end, the United Nations - the virtual World parliament - is our best hope.

I thank you, Mr. President.

5. Prime Minister Imran Khan's Address at 75th United Nations General Assembly Session

Mr. President, Secretary General Guterres, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am honoured to address the United Nations General Assembly once again. I congratulate His Excellency Mr. Volkan Bozkir on his election as the President of the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly.

We also appreciate the skillful leadership of the outgoing President, His Excellency Tijani Muhammad-Bande, especially during the COVID-19 crisis. We commend the leadership of the Secretary General in these extremely turbulent times.

Mr. President,

Since my government assumed office, our consistent effort has been to fundamentally transform Pakistan. We envisage ‘Naya Pakistan’ to be modeled on the principles of

the State of Madinah, established by our Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

A just and humane society where all Government policies are directed at lifting our citizens out of poverty and creating a just and equitable dispensation. To achieve this goal, we need to have peace and stability. Thus our foreign policy aims to have peace with our neighbours and settle disputes through dialogue.

Mr. President,

The 75th Anniversary of the United Nations is an extremely important milestone as this is the only body in the world that can help us achieve our goals of peace and stability in our neighbourhood. This is also a time for us to reflect whether as the United Nations we have been able to realise the promise we collectively made to our peoples. Today, the foundations of the ‘world order’ – non-use of or threat of unilateral force, self-determination of peoples, the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, international cooperation – all these ideals are being systematically eroded. International agreements are being flouted and set aside. Renewed great-power rivalries are leading to a new arms race. Conflicts are proliferating and intensifying. Military occupation and illegal annexations are suppressing the rights of human beings to self-determination.

According to respected Professor Noam Chomsky, mankind is at even a greater risk than it was before the 1st and 2nd World Wars in the last century, and this is because of the increased threat of nuclear war, Climate Change, and sadly the rise of authoritarian regimes. We must come together to prevent such a catastrophe. We believe that the driving force in international relations must be cooperation, in accordance with the principles of international law, and not confrontation and force. We all must emphatically reaffirm our support for multilateralism.

Mr. President,

The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the oneness of humanity. In our interconnected world, no one is safe unless everyone is safe. Locking down to control the pandemic has triggered the worst recession since the Great Depression in the last Century. This has hit the poorest countries the hardest as well as the poor in all the countries. In Pakistan, we realised very early on that if we imposed a strict lockdown, the type that several affluent countries had imposed, we would have more people dying

of hunger than the virus. Therefore, we adopted a policy of ‘smart lockdown.’ While concentrating on the virus hot-spots we opened up our agricultural sector immediately and then followed it up by the construction sector, which employed most of the people. At the same time, and this is despite financial constraints, my government deployed an unprecedented 8 billion dollars for our health services; plus, support the poorest and most vulnerable households with direct cash payments through Ehsaas programme; and then subsidies to the small businesses. Even though our ‘smart lockdown’ was heavily criticized in the beginning, but thanks to Almighty Allah’s Grace, we have not only managed to control the virus, stabilise our economy, but most importantly, we have been able to protect the poorest segment of the society from the worst fall out of the lock down. Today, Pakistan’s response is cited among the success stories in controlling and responding to the pandemic. However, we are still not out of the woods, like no country is out of the woods today.

Mr. President,

It was obvious from the outset that developing countries would need fiscal space to respond to, and recover from, the COVID crisis. Debt relief is one of the best ways to create that fiscal space for developing countries. Therefore, in early April, I called for a “Global Initiative on Debt Relief”. We appreciate the G-20’s official debt suspension initiative and the emergency and rapid financing offered by the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UN Agencies. This, however, is not going to be enough. The IMF has estimated that developing countries will need over US\$ 2.5 trillion to respond and recover from the crisis. The official debt suspension will need to be extended and expanded. Additional debt relief measures will also be needed. Development Banks should ensure adequate financial inflows. Rich countries have generated over ten trillion dollars to finance their own response and recovery. They should support the creation of at least US\$500 billion in new Special Drawing Rights for the developing world.

Mr. President,

In my address to the General Assembly last year, I had highlighted the tremendous damage that illicit financial flows from developing countries to rich countries and to offshore tax havens cause. This leads to the impoverishment of the developing nations.

Money that could be used towards human development is siphoned off by corrupt elites. The loss of foreign exchange causes currency depreciation that in turn leads to inflation and poverty. The quest for getting back these stolen resources is nearly impossible, given the cumbersome procedures. Moreover, the powerful money launderers have access to the best lawyers. And sadly, because they are the beneficiaries, there is a lack of political will in the rich countries to curb this criminal activity.

Mr. President,

If this phenomenon is unaddressed, it will continue to accentuate the inequality between the rich and the poor nations, and eventually will spark off a far bigger global crisis than the present migration issue poses.

The rich states cannot hold forth on human rights and justice when they provide sanctuary to money launderers' and their looted wealth. There are robust anti-Money Laundering and anti-Terrorist Financing regimes. I call upon this Assembly to take the lead in efforts to build a global framework to stem the illicit financial flows and ensure speedy repatriation of stolen wealth. It is important to realise that the aid that flows from rich countries to the developing world is miniscule compared to the massive out-flows by our corrupt elites.

Mr. President,

This year, I must again reiterate the threat posed to mankind due to Climate Change. Unprecedented fires in Australia, Siberia, California, Brazil; unprecedented floodings in various parts of the world; record temperatures even in the Arctic Circle. This should make us all worried for our future generations. Commitments made through the Paris Agreement must be fulfilled, in particular the commitment to mobilise US\$ 100 billion annually as climate finance.

Pakistan's contribution to carbon emissions is minimal, but it is one of those countries most affected by climate change. Yet, we have decided to take the lead as we consider addressing climate change a universal responsibility. We have launched an extremely ambitious programme to plant 10 billion trees in the next three years as our contribution to mitigating the effects of climate change.

Mr. President,

The pandemic was an opportunity to bring humanity together. Unfortunately, it has instead fanned nationalism, increased global tensions, and given rise to racial and religious hatred and violence against vulnerable minorities in several places.

These trends have also accentuated ‘Islamophobia’. Muslims continue to be targeted with impunity in many countries. Our shrines are being destroyed; our Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) insulted; the Holy Quran burnt – and all this in the name of freedom of speech.

Incidents in Europe, including republication of blasphemous sketches by Charlie Hebdo, are recent examples. We stress that willful provocations and incitement to hate and violence must be universally outlawed. This Assembly should declare an “International Day to Combat Islamophobia” and build a coalition to fight this scourge – scourge that splits humanity.

Mr. President,

The one country in the world today where, I am sad to say, the state sponsors Islamophobia, is India. The reason behind this is RSS ideology that unfortunately rules India today. This extremist ideology was founded in 1920s. The RSS founding fathers were inspired by the Nazis and they adopted their concepts of racial purity and supremacy. While the Nazis hate was directed at the Jews, the RSS directs it towards the Muslims and to a lesser extent towards the Christians.

They believe that India is exclusively for Hindus and others are not equal citizens. The secularism of Gandhi and Nehru has been replaced by the dream of creating a Hindu Rashtra by subjugating, even cleansing India’s 200 million Muslims and other minorities.

In 1992, the RSS destroyed the Babri Mosque; in 2002, some 2000 Muslims were slaughtered in Gujarat, and this was under the watch of Chief Minister Modi; and in 2007, over 50 Muslims were burnt alive by RSS arsonists aboard the Samjhota Express Train. In Assam, around two million Muslims face the prospects of being arbitrarily stripped of their nationality through the adoption of discriminatory laws. There are

reports of large concentration camps being filled with by Muslim Indian citizens.

Muslims were falsely blamed, vilified and victimized for spreading the Corona virus. They were denied medical attention on many occasions, their businesses were boycotted. Cow vigilantes attack and kill Muslims with impunity. Last February, Muslims faced targeted killings, with police complicity in New Delhi. Mass registrations in the past have often been a precursor to genocide, e.g. the Nuremburg Laws in Germany in 1935 and then in 1982 in Myanmar. The Hindutva ideology is set to marginalize almost 300 million human beings – Muslims, Christians and Sikhs. This is unprecedented in history and this does not augur well for the future of India as we all know that marginalization of human beings leads to their radicalisation.

Mr. President,

For over 72 years, India has illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir against the wishes of the Kashmiri people, and in blatant violation of the resolutions of the Security Council and indeed its own commitments to the people of Kashmir. On 5th August last year, India illegally and unilaterally sought to change the status of the occupied territories and deployed additional troops, bringing the total number to 900,000, to impose a military siege on 8 million Kashmiris. All Kashmiri political leaders were incarcerated; about 13,000 Kashmiri youth were abducted and thousands tortured; a complete curfew was imposed, accompanied by a total communications blackout.

Indian occupation forces have used brute force including pellet guns against peaceful protestors; imposed collective punishments, including the destruction of entire neighbourhoods, and extra-judicially murdered hundreds of innocent young Kashmiris in fake “encounters”, refusing even to hand over their bodies for burial. The Kashmiri media, and those daring to raise their voice, are being systematically harassed and intimidated through the use of draconian laws. All of this is well documented in the reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, communications from the Special Rapporteurs of Human Rights Council, statements from human rights and civil society organisations.

The international community must investigate these grave violations and prosecute the Indian civil and military personnel involved in state terrorism and serious crimes against humanity, being perpetrated, I am sad to say, with complete impunity. The

objective of this brutal campaign is to impose what the RSS-BJP regime has itself called the 'Final Solution' for Jammu and Kashmir. To this end, the military siege is being followed by moves to change the demographic structure of the occupied territory. This is an attempt to obliterate the distinct Kashmiri identity in order to affect the outcome of a plebiscite envisaged in the UN Security Council resolutions. This action is in violation of the UN Charter, Council resolutions and international law, particularly the 4th Geneva Convention. Changing demographic structure of occupied territory is a war crime.

Mr. President,

The brave Kashmiri people will never submit to Indian occupation and oppression. Their struggle is indigenous. They are fighting for a just cause and generation after generation have laid down their lives to rid themselves of Indian occupation.

The government and people of Pakistan are committed to standing by and supporting their Kashmiri brothers and sisters in their legitimate struggle for self-determination.

Mr. President,

In order to divert attention from its illegal actions and atrocities in Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, India is playing a dangerous game of upping the military ante against Pakistan in a nuclearised environment. Despite constant Indian provocations and ceasefire violations along the Line of Control and the Working Boundary targeting innocent civilians, Pakistan has exercised maximum restraint. We have consistently sensitized the world community about a 'false flag' operation and another ill-conceived misadventure by India. My parents, Mr. President, were born in the colonial India and I was the first generation that grew up in an independent Pakistan. I want to make it clear that any attempt by the fascist totalitarian RSS-led Indian government to aggress against Pakistan will be met by a nation that will fight for its freedom to the end.

Mr. President,

There will be no durable peace and stability in South Asia until the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is resolved on the basis of international legitimacy. Kashmir has been rightly described as a "nuclear flash point". The Security Council must prevent a

disastrous conflict and secure the implementation of its own resolutions as it did in the case of East Timor. The Council has considered the situation in Jammu and Kashmir three times in the past year. It must take appropriate enforcement actions. It must also take steps to protect the Kashmiris from an impending genocide by India. Pakistan has always called for a peaceful solution. To this end, India must rescind the measures it has instituted since 5 August 2019, end its military siege and other gross human rights violations, and agree to resolve the Jammu & Kashmir dispute in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and of course the wishes of the people of Kashmir.

Mr. President,

Pakistan's desire for peace in our region is also manifest in our efforts to promote a political solution in Afghanistan.

I have consistently maintained over the past two decades that there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. The only way forward was and is a political settlement which involves the full spectrum of Afghanistan's political actors.

Pakistan fully facilitated the process that culminated in the U.S.-Taliban Peace Agreement on 29 February 2020. Pakistan is deeply gratified that it has fulfilled its part of the responsibility. The Afghan leaders must now seize this historic opportunity to achieve reconciliation and restore peace in their war-torn country. Through the Intra-Afghan Negotiations that commenced on 12th of September, they must work out an inclusive, broad-based and comprehensive political settlement. The process must be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, and without any interference or outside influence.

Early return of Afghan refugees must be a part of this political solution. After almost two decades of war, it is imperative not to allow "spoilers" – within and outside Afghanistan – to subvert the peace process. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will open new opportunities for development and regional connectivity.

Mr. President,

Palestine remains a 'festering wound'. A just and lasting settlement is indispensable, for the Middle East and actually the world. Illegal annexations of Palestinian territory, the building of illegal settlements and the imposition of inhuman living conditions on

the Palestinian people especially in Gaza cannot bring peace to a troubled region. Pakistan continues to support a two-state solution – in line with the UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, within the internationally agreed parameters, and they are; pre-1967 borders, and Al-Quds Al-Sharif as the Capital of a united, contiguous and independent Palestinian state.

Mr. President,

The United Nations remains the best legitimate avenue for collective action – in managing international conflicts, fostering peace and security, promoting equitable development and addressing global problems. I urge the Secretary-General to take the lead in preventing global conflicts. He should convene Summit-level meetings to address regional hot spots and resolve outstanding disputes.

The United Nations should be made fully responsive to the challenges of our times. A comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including the Security Council, is essential to promote greater democracy, accountability, transparency and efficiency. Pakistan will continue to participate actively in this process and endeavour, with other Member States, to build a world where conflict is outlawed and equitable prosperity for all pursued in conditions of peace and security.

I thank you.