

MS THESIS

US COUNTER TERRORISM EFFORTS IN SOMALIA (2006-  
2015)



RESEARCHER

MOHAMED HILAL YASIN  
221-FSS/MSIR/F22

SUPERVISOR

DR. MASOOD UR REHMAN KHATTAK

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD PAKISTAN

(August 2024)

US COUNTER TERRORISM EFFORTS IN SOMALIA (2006-2015)

Submitted By

MOHAMED HILAL YASIN

221-FSS/MSIR/F22

A Research Thesis

Submitted to

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Faculty of Social Sciences

International Islamic University Islamabad-Pakistan

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the  
Degree of Masters of Science in International Relations

(2024)



### FINAL APPROVAL

This is to certify that we gone through and evaluated the thesis titled “US Counter Terrorism Efforts in Somalia (2006-2015)”, submitted by Mr. Mohamed Hilal Yasin, a student of MS International Relations under University Registration No. 221-FSS/MSIR/F22, for award of the degree of MS International Relations. This research work is satisfactory.

1. **Supervisor**

Dr. Masood ur Rehman  
Lecturer  
Department of Politics & International Relations  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
International Islamic University, Islamabad

2. **Internal Examiner**

Dr. Tauqeer Hussain Sargana  
Assistant Professor  
Department of Politics & International Relations  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
International Islamic University, Islamabad

3. **External Examiner**

Dr. Muhammad Umer Hayat  
Senior Associate Professor  
Head, Dept. of Humanities & Social Sciences  
Bahria University, Islamabad.

4. **Chairperson/HOD**

Department of Politics & International Relations  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
International Islamic University, Islamabad

5. **Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences**

International Islamic University, Islamabad

## DECLARATION

I Mohamed Hilal Yasin, bearing registration number 221-FSS/MSIR/F22, a student of MS International Relations at International Islamic University Islamabad do hereby declare that the thesis US COUNTER TERRORISM EFFORTS IN SOMALIA (2006-2015) submitted by me in partial fulfillment of MS degree, is my original work, and has not been submitted or published earlier. I also solemnly declare that it shall not, in future, be submitted by me for obtaining any other degree from this at any other university or institution.

I also understand that if evidence of plagiarism is found in my thesis dissertation at any stage, even after the award of a degree, the work may be cancelled and the degree revoked.

---

Date of Submission

---

Mohmed Hilal Yasin

## DEDICATION

This Research work is dedicated to all those circumstances yet life changing, which allowed us to dream But, More so it is to dedicated to my adorable and enchanting parents, whose heartfelt prayers and altruistic love as deep as see, as philanthropic and pure as unsullied lily, as constant as northern star and whose advises and suggestions as valuable as the most precious diamonds, have always transformed my dreams into reality.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to Almighty Allah the Beneficent, the Merciful, the Creator, the Sustainer, the Builder, the Omnipotent, the Omnipresent, the One Who was the first; the One Who will be the last, for providing ability to complete this humble contribution within the stipulated time. All respects for the greatest educator and the benefactor of the mankind, Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), who advised all of us to continue getting education from cradle to grave.

The researcher feels privileged and great pleasure to place on record her sincere gratitude to esteemed supervisor Dr. Masood Ur Rehman Khattak (Assistant Professor), HEC approved supervisor at International Islamic University Islamabad, under whose overwhelming cooperation, valuable guidance, expert suggestions, and trust and sympathetic supervision not only during the conduct and completion of this research work but in the entire course work. Perhaps, researcher would never be able to do this effort without his kind cooperation and nonstop encouragements. May Almighty bless him!

Meanwhile, the researcher feels honored to express his deep sense of gratitude and indebtedness to his ever-affectionate parents, siblings and friends for their moral support and encouragement during the study. The researcher offers his profound thanks to all the university's academic and administrative officials for their cooperation rendered to them during this research work.

Blessings upon all!

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION .....	iii
DEDICATION .....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vi
ABSTRACT .....	1
CHAPTER 1 .....	2
1.1 Background of the Study .....	2
1.2 Problem Statement .....	4
1.3 Significance of the Study .....	5
1.4 Objectives of the Study .....	6
1.5 Research Questions .....	6
1.6 Delimitation(s) of the Study .....	6
1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW.....	7
1.7.1 Review of related literature .....	7
1.8 Theoretical/Conceptual Framework .....	13
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) .....	14
1.8.2 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and Counter Terrorism Efforts in Somalia:	

A Case Study of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab .....	15
1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	16
1.9.1 Research Design .....	16
1.9.2 Population .....	16
1.9.3 Sampling .....	16
1.9.4 Instrument(s) .....	16
1.9.5 Procedure (Data Collection) .....	16
1.9.6 Data Analysis .....	17
1.9.7 Ethical Consideration .....	17
1.10 Organization of the Study .....	17
CHAPTER 2 .....	19
2.1 INTRODUCTION .....	19
2.2 Theorizing Regional Security Complex Theory .....	20
2.2.1 Origin of Regional Security Complex .....	20
2.2.2 Concept of States: Regional Security Complex .....	22
2.2.3 Core Assumptions of Regional Security Complex .....	23
2.2.4 Regional Security Complex: Case study of Somalia .....	24
2.2.4 Critical Analysis of Theoretical Framework .....	31
CHAPTER 3 .....	36
3.1 INTRODUCTION .....	36
3.2 Historical Perspective of Ongoing Conflicts in Somalia .....	36
3.3 Political Factors .....	40
3.4 Power Struggle amongst Different Groups.....	40
3.5 Fall of Siad Barre and Civil War .....	41
3.6 Emergence of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) .....	42
3.7 Emergence of Al Shabaab and its Development.....	43
3.7.1 Relationships with Al-Qaeda.....	45



3.8 Economic Instability .....	46
3.9 External Powers: Instability in Somalia .....	48
3.9.1 Role of UNO in Somalia.....	48
3.9.2 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Instability in Somalia .....	49
3.9.3 Impacts on Political Stability .....	49
3.10 Conclusion .....	50
CHAPTER 4 .....	52
4.1 INTRODUCTION .....	52
4.2 Emergence of Al-Shabab .....	53
4.2.1 Expansionism of Al-Shabab .....	54
4.2.2 Ashes to Governance .....	54
4.2.3 Clan politics and Clannism: Al-Shabab .....	57
4.2.4 Strategies of Al-Shabab .....	57
4.3 Somali Nationalism and Xenophobia .....	58
4.4 Conspiracy .....	59
4.5 Islamism: Social Transformation .....	60
4.6 Factors Responsible for the Emergence of Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in Somalia .....	61
4.6.1 Failure of Government to Provide Basic Necessities .....	61
4.6.2 Education .....	62
4.6.3 Distribution of Food .....	62
4.6.4 Absence of Local Administration .....	63
4.6.5 Unemployment .....	64
4.6.6 Lack of Interaction between Political Leader and Public .....	66
4.7 Emergence of Al-Qaeda in Somalia .....	66
4.7.1 Al-Qaeda and Its Activities in Somalia .....	67
4.7.2 Al-Qaeda’s Strategies in Somalia .....	69
4.7.3 Objectives of Al-Qaeda in Somalia .....	70
4.8 Conclusion .....	72
CHAPTER 5 .....	73

5.1 INTRODUCTION .....	73
5.2 Role of Regional Power.....	74
5.2.1 Ethiopia .....	74
5.2.2 Eritrea .....	77
5.2.3 Djibouti .....	81
5.3 Role of Extra-Regional Power in Somalia .....	83
5.3.1 US: Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Somalia .....	83
5.3.2 Analysis of History .....	83
5.3.3 Legal Basis for US's Intervention in Somalia .....	85
5.4 Role of United Nations Organization (UNO) in Somalia .....	87
5.5 Conclusion .....	88
CHAPTER 6 .....	90
Bibliography .....	98

## ABSTRACT

Somalia is confronted with a wide range of intricate domestic obstacles, such as political division, governance concerns, humanitarian crises, and security risks. These interrelated issues have impeded the nation's efforts to achieve peace, stability, and growth. Persistent security concerns define the internal situation of Somalia. Al-Qaeda and the terrorist organization Al-Shabab continue to pose a serious danger to stability. Both Somali security forces and foreign allies have made efforts, although both still conduct out assaults that target civilians, security personnel, and government buildings. The humanitarian crisis has been made worse by the thousands of Somalis who have been forced to flee due to security fears. Furthermore, the unstable security environment is exacerbated by disputes between clans and intercommunal violence, which frequently impedes the development of peace and stability. In the United States' counterterrorism operations, Somalia has frequently been overlooked. Media attention is often drawn to drone strikes, military advisers supporting Somali partner forces, or al-Shabaab attacks in the area, but it soon wanes. The research examines counter terrorism activities in Somalia, especially Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab fighters. Its goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of counter-terrorism initiatives and identify significant elements that influence their outcomes. The research relies heavily on qualitative approaches and document analysis. The research strives to provide a thorough knowledge of the changing counterterrorism methods in response to these extremist organizations' operations by analyzing the historical and contextual elements that have contributed to their creation and survival. It also investigates the difficulties and triumphs found throughout the execution of antiterrorism measures. The sociopolitical, economic, and geographical elements that determine the efficacy of these initiatives will be examined. The expected objectives include insights on how to improve counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, as well as lessons that might impact global counterterrorism policies. Data collection and analysis will adhere to ethical standards. Overall, the goal of this research is to give a focused and complete evaluation of Somalia's counter-terrorism activities and their implications for larger security issues.

## CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Somalia's role in global counter-terrorism efforts against Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab is important. This thesis examines how well strategies work to stop these groups and the challenges they face.

### 1.1 Background of the Study

Somalia faces a complex array of internal challenges, including security threats, political fragmentation, a humanitarian crisis, and governance issues. These challenges are interconnected and have hindered the country's progress towards peace, stability, and development. Somalia's internal conditions are characterized by persistent security challenges. The presence of the extremist group Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda remains a significant threat to stability. Despite efforts by both Somali security forces and international partners, both continue to carry out attacks, targeting government institutions, security forces, and civilians. These security concerns have led to the displacement of thousands of Somalis, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Moreover, clan-based conflicts and inter-communal violence add to the volatile security situation, often hindering progress toward peace and stability. Political fragmentation is another key internal challenge (M. Khayre, 2016). Somalia's political landscape is divided along clan lines, and competition for power and resources among various clans and regional administrations has often resulted in political gridlock.

Moreover, the country has experienced delays in holding elections and disputes over electoral processes, leading to periods of political instability. The establishment of a federal system has also faced challenges in terms of defining the roles and responsibilities of federal and regional governments. These internal political divisions have impeded state-building efforts and hindered the formulation and implementation of cohesive national policies. Somalia's internal conditions are further exacerbated by a protracted humanitarian crisis. The country faces recurrent droughts and food shortages, which, combined with ongoing conflicts and displacement, have resulted in a high prevalence of malnutrition and food insecurity. Access to basic services, including healthcare and education, is limited, particularly in rural areas. The humanitarian situation is compounded by inadequate infrastructure, including road networks and healthcare facilities (E. STREDNANSKY, 1996). Humanitarian organizations and international donors continue to provide assistance, but the

scale of need remains daunting, with millions of Somalis dependent on external aid for their survival.

Governance challenges and corruption contribute significantly to Somalia's internal conditions. The weak state institutions and governance structures struggle to provide essential services, enforce the rule of law, and combat corruption effectively. Corruption is pervasive and impacts all sectors, from public administration to business. It erodes trust in government institutions and hampers efforts to attract foreign investment. Furthermore, the lack of transparency and accountability in public financial management has hindered the country's ability to utilize resources efficiently for development. Addressing governance and corruption issues is essential for building a functioning state and improving the overall internal conditions in Somalia. Neighboring countries play a crucial role in shaping the security and stability of Somalia. Given the shared borders and regional interconnectedness, the security dynamics in Somalia have a direct impact on the security interests of its neighbors (Maruf, 2023).

Countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti have been actively involved in efforts to combat extremist groups, such as Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda that operate in Somalia. They have contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and participated in joint military operations to counter terrorism. Additionally, neighboring states often engage in intelligence sharing and cross-border cooperation to address security threats emanating from Somalia. Their involvement underscores the interconnected nature of security challenges in the Horn of Africa and the importance of regional collaboration to enhance stability in Somalia. They are often involved in mediating political disputes, supporting peace negotiations, and facilitating dialogue among different Somali stakeholders. Ethiopia, in particular, has been active in mediating political agreements and hosting talks aimed at resolving internal conflicts and promoting reconciliation in Somalia (Moller, 2009). The engagement of neighboring countries in diplomacy is motivated by the desire to see a stable and peaceful Somalia, which can contribute to regional stability and economic cooperation.

These diplomatic efforts reflect the recognition that political stability in Somalia is not only a Somali concern but also a regional one, with implications for neighboring states. Economic ties between Somalia and its neighbors are also significant. The neighboring countries provide essential

trade routes, access to ports, and cross-border economic opportunities. For instance, Somalia relies on ports in countries like Djibouti and Kenya for the import and export of goods. The economic well-being of Somali regions, particularly in the border areas, is closely linked to economic interactions with neighboring states. The stability of these economic relationships is essential for the economic development of Somalia and the well-being of its population. Moreover, regional economic organizations, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), provide platforms for dialogue and cooperation on economic matters, aiming to foster economic growth and integration in the Horn of Africa. Neighboring countries, therefore, have a stake in Somalia's economic stability and development.

Furthermore, External factors and international engagement have significantly shaped the dynamics in Somalia. Somalia's strategic location along the Horn of Africa has attracted the attention of global and regional powers. Countries like the United States, European Union member states, and Gulf States have been involved in efforts to stabilize the region and counter terrorism. International actors provide financial and logistical support to AMISOM and contribute to capacity-building initiatives for the Somali security forces. Moreover, external actors have engaged in diplomatic efforts to mediate conflicts and support political processes in Somalia. While international involvement is often well-intentioned and aimed at improving the situation in Somalia, it can also introduce complexities and differing interests that need to be carefully managed (Kitua, 2015). The interplay of these external factors, along with regional dynamics, further underscores the importance of coordinated international efforts to address the challenges facing Somalia and promote its long-term stability.

## 1.2 Problem Statement

Somalia stands at the intersection of complex regional dynamics and global security concerns, particularly with regards to the presence and activities of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab. Over the years, various regional and external powers have intervened in Somalia with the purported aim of addressing security and stability issues within the region. Concurrently, counter-terrorism strategies have been implemented with the aim of mitigating the threats posed by Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab. However, despite these efforts, Somalia continues to grapple with persistent security challenges.

The effectiveness of regional and external interventions in addressing security and stability within Somalia remains unclear. Moreover, the extent to which counter-terrorism strategies have succeeded in neutralizing the activities of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab demands critical examination. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the approaches adopted by regional and external powers, as well as the efficacy of counter-terrorism measures, is imperative to inform future policy interventions and enhance security outcomes in Somalia.

Therefore, the overarching problem to be addressed in this study is:

"How effective have the regional and external powers been in addressing security and stability in Somalia, and to what extent have counter-terrorism strategies succeeded in countering the activities of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab?"

This problem statement seeks to explore the complexities surrounding security efforts in Somalia, highlighting the need to assess the objectives, impacts, and limitations of regional interventions and counter-terrorism measures. By addressing this problem, the study aims to provide insights that can inform more informed and effective strategies for enhancing security and stability in Somalia, both regionally and globally.

### 1.3 Significance of the Study

The significance of studying counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia, with a specific focus on the case of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab militants, cannot be overstated. Somalia has been a hotbed of terrorism for decades, and Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab have proven to be persistent and adaptive threats to not only the region but also to international security. Understanding the nuances of counter-terrorism in this context is of paramount importance for several reasons. Firstly, Somalia's unique blend of state fragility, political instability, and societal vulnerabilities provides a complex environment that challenges conventional counter-terrorism strategies. As such, an in-depth study of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia can serve as a valuable reference for policymakers, scholars, and security experts seeking to design more effective and context-specific counter-terrorism approaches. Moreover, Somalia's geographical location on the Horn of Africa and its proximity to key international maritime routes make it a strategically vital area for global security. Therefore,

the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia has implications for the stability of the entire region and the prevention of terrorism spill over into other parts of Africa. Crucially, the study of counter-terrorism in Somalia provides a critical foundation for crafting informed policies and strategies that can enhance security not only in the Horn of Africa but also globally.

#### 1.4 Objectives of the Study

- To understand and describe the US counter-terrorism strategies implemented in Somalia to counter transnational terrorist groups and their local affiliates.
- To analyze the impact of US counter-terrorism efforts on the political, economic, and strategic situation in Somalia

#### 1.5 Research Questions

- What are US counter-terror strategies in Somalia to counter transnational terrorist groups and their local affiliates?
- What is the impact of US counter-terrorism efforts on the political, economic, and strategic situation in Somalia?

#### 1.6 Delimitation(s) of the Study

This study primarily concentrates on the counter-terrorism efforts within the territorial boundaries of Somalia. While recognizing the regional and international dimensions of the issue, the research will primarily assess the strategies and activities undertaken within Somalia's borders. The primary focus of this research is on Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab as the two main extremist organizations operating in Somalia. While acknowledging the presence of other groups, the study will primarily examine the counter-terrorism efforts specific to these two entities. The research will cover counter-terrorism efforts and the activities of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab in Somalia from 2000 to the present (2023), taking into account key developments during this period. While acknowledging the broader sociopolitical implications, the study will specifically assess the humanitarian and societal consequences of the presence of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab in Somalia. The research acknowledges the role of external factors, such as neighboring countries, regional organizations,



and international powers. Still, the primary focus will be on how these external factors directly influence the counter-terrorism landscape within Somalia.

## 1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review explores counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia, focusing on Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab. It synthesizes existing research to understand the effectiveness and challenges of strategies deployed.

### 1.7.1 Review of related literature

To explore the lapses in the research area of “Counter Terrorism Efforts in Somalia: A Case Study of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab”, I intend to review the existing scholarly articles, journals, and books. I have dissected the research topic into three sections- to analyze the root causes of instability in Somalia, the role of regional and external powers in eradicating terrorism from Somalia, analysis of the factors contributing to the growth of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab and the analysis of implications of these militant groups on human rights in Somalia.

In the report United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), it has accentuated that political chaos was real cause of instability in Somalia. The downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991 plunged Somalia into a state of turmoil, characterized by a power struggle between rival factions, clan clashes, and pervasive violence. The resulting humanitarian crisis, with millions of Somalis facing malnutrition and displacement, underscores the severity of the situation. The events of this period left an indelible mark on Somalia's history, shaping its political landscape for years to come. Despite the perilous circumstances in post-Barre Somalia, the United Nations, in collaboration with the ICRC and NGOs, demonstrated unwavering dedication to providing humanitarian assistance. Their efforts not only alleviated the suffering of the Somali people but also underscored the importance of international cooperation in addressing crises. The legacy of the UN's commitment to Somalia serves as a testament to the resilience of humanitarian aid in the face of adversity (United Nations Operations in Somalia, 2010).

Afyare Abdi Elmi and Abdullahi Barise in the research article *The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies* accentuate the historical causes of Somalia. Somalia's history is marked by a tragic narrative of oppression, violence, and unmet aspirations. The transition from the democratic era's unfulfilled promises to the brutality of Siad Barre's regime and armed factions inflicted immeasurable suffering on the Somali people. Understanding this tumultuous history is vital for addressing the nation's current challenges and striving for a more stable and peaceful future. The Somali civil war's intricate causes encompass political, economic, cultural, and psychological dimensions, with various internal and external actors shaping its trajectory. At its core, the competition for power and resources remains a pivotal driver, albeit one that has evolved as Somalia's socio-economic landscape changed. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for comprehending the conflict's complexities and for crafting effective strategies to promote peace, stability, and equitable resource distribution in Somalia ( Elmi & Barise, 2006).

Ismail I. Ahmed and Reginald Herbold Green, in the article *The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions, and Reconstruction* explore the complex historical and contemporary dynamics in Somalia and Somaliland. It also sheds light on the impact of war, state collapse, external interventions, and reconstruction efforts in the region. One of the central themes is the difference in state stability between Somalia and Somaliland. While Somalia lacked a history of a stable state before Italian rule, Somaliland had a historical precedent, notably the Haud-Hargeisa-Berbera-Arabia trade axis. The historical divergence played a significant role in shaping their respective trajectories and responses to state collapse. The dictator's military campaigns against regions such as Somaliland and Bosaso, as well as conflicts with neighboring Ethiopia. Of particular importance is the role played by the Somaliland Liberation War (1987-1991) in contributing to the eventual collapse of Said Barre's regime in 1991 ( I. Ahmed & Green, 1999). An essential aspect covered in the article is the economic foundations of both Somalia and Somaliland, revolving around pastoral production, commerce, and remittances.

Zakaria Ousman Ramadane, in the article *Somalia: State Failure, Poverty and Terrorism* highlights the complex relations between these factors and provides insights into Somalia's troubled history and ongoing challenges. The disintegration of the Somali state and the collapse of

central authority led to political fragmentation, clan-based conflicts, and the absence of essential state functions. Poverty in Somalia has been pervasive, with various factors contributing to its persistence. This poverty has had profound implications for social and political stability in the country. Somalia has also been a focal point for terrorism and extremism, notably with the emergence of Al-Shabaab. The role of external actors in Somalia's state-building efforts and counterterrorism operations has been a subject of scrutiny. The dynamics of external interventions, local resilience, and adaptive strategies further complicate the picture ( Ramadane, 2014). Understanding these complexities is essential for devising effective strategies for addressing Somalia's long-standing issues and promoting stability and development in the region.

Peter Maundu, in the article *Instability in Somalia and Humanitarian Crisis* identifies that political instability drag the country into humanitarian crisis. Somalia has long grappled with political instability, which has escalated into a severe humanitarian crisis. The country's historical significance was underscored by its attraction to Italian, British, and French colonial powers. Positioned strategically for trade interests, military expansion, and conquests in Africa, Somalia became a focal point for colonial competition. Consequently, Somalia was divided into five distinct colonial territories, each with its own sovereignty. The legacy of these colonial divisions continues to haunt the modern Somali Republic, which was established in 1960 by merging two former colonies: Somalia Italian and British Somaliland. These regions had contrasting colonial experiences, leading to disparities in language and culture. While some residents spoke English due to British influence, others used Italian, creating a linguistic divide. This linguistic incongruity persisted for over a decade after independence, despite widespread use of the Somali language among the populace ( Maundu, 2019). The delayed establishment of Somali as a written language further exacerbated the differences between these regions, making national unification challenging.

Bjorn Moller, in the report *The Somali Conflict: The Role of External Actors* analyzed that beyond domestic factors, external factors are also responsible for rising political, economic and social chaos in Somalia. The protracted Somali conflict has been significantly influenced and exacerbated by the involvement of external actors, ranging from neighboring states to international organizations. This complex web of external influences has shaped the course of the conflict, contributing to its persistence and instability. Somalia's neighbors, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, have been deeply involved in the conflict. Ethiopia, in particular, has intervened militarily

on several occasions to support various Somali factions. These neighboring states have pursued their interests, often exacerbating regional tensions. At times, their interventions have been driven by concerns over cross-border insecurity and the desire to establish proxy governments friendly to their interests within Somalia.

International organizations, including the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and the Arab League, have also played pivotal roles. The UN has engaged in peacekeeping missions, such as UNOSOM, while the AU has deployed troops as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). These missions have sought to stabilize the country, but their effectiveness has been hampered by the challenges of state-building and the complex security environment. Western powers, particularly the United States and European nations, have been involved in counterterrorism efforts within Somalia. Their focus has often been on combating extremist groups like Al-Shabaab, leading to military interventions and support for Somali security forces. However, these efforts have sometimes overlooked underlying political and social drivers of conflict, potentially contributing to a cycle of violence (Moller, 2009). Humanitarian organizations, while primarily engaged in providing relief and assistance, have also played an indirect role in the Somali conflict.

Ahmed Ali M. Khayre in the research paper *Somalia: An Overview of the Historical and Current Situation* explores the multifaceted nature of external interventions in Somalia over the years, shedding light on the motivations, consequences, and lessons learned from these actions. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) represented a significant international intervention in the early 1990s. Initially conceived as a humanitarian mission to address the famine and conflict in Somalia, it quickly evolved into a complex peacekeeping operation. The UNOSOM mission included a multinational coalition, and its engagement highlighted the challenges of coordinating international efforts in a volatile and fragmented environment. The humanitarian aspect of the intervention aimed to provide relief to those affected by famine and civil strife but also revealed the difficulties of navigating the complex socio-political landscape of Somalia. Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in late 2006 aimed to counter the rising influence of the Islamist group Al-Shabaab, which had gained control over significant parts of the country. Ethiopia's military campaign further complicated the conflict and led to a prolonged period of instability. Subsequently, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established to support the

Somali government's efforts to restore stability ( M. Khayre, 2016). AMISOM's intervention underscores the importance of regional actors in addressing the crisis, albeit with significant challenges related to resource constraints and security.

Abdulahi Osman in the research article *Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality* analyzed cultural as the source of conflict in Somalia. The roots of the Somali conflict are deeply intertwined with local factors. The traditional socio-economic mode of production, primarily pastoralism or agro-pastoralism, has played a pivotal role. This lifestyle, based on nomadic herding and a reliance on scarce natural resources, has historically led to competition and disputes over grazing land and water resources among various clans and sub-clans. Inequality and economic decline have been significant drivers of the Somali conflict. Clans and sub-clans often cite the existence of inequality, where certain groups receive preferential treatment over others in resource allocation and political power. This sense of injustice has fueled grievances and led to conflict initiation as marginalized communities seek redress. The ready availability of weapons in Somalia has added fuel to the conflict. Proliferation of arms, both locally produced and smuggled from external sources, has amplified the intensity and longevity of clashes. This ease of access to weapons has enabled factions to pursue their agendas with devastating consequences ( Osman, 2007).

Harun Maruf in the article *Somalia's Neighbors to Send Additional Troops to Fight AlShabab* accentuates the role of neighboring countries to deteriorate the domestic condition of Somalia. The Horn of Africa region has long been plagued by instability, with terrorist groups such as Al-Shabab posing a significant threat to both regional and international security. In response to this threat, Somalia's neighbors have been considering and, in some cases, actively sending additional troops to combat Al-Shabab. One key aspect of the literature regarding Somalia's neighbors sending additional troops to fight Al-Shabab involves understanding the motivations behind these actions. Various factors drive neighboring countries to contribute more troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) or other multinational efforts. The instability caused by Al-Shabab has a direct impact on the security and stability of neighboring countries, making it imperative for them to take proactive measures. Neighboring countries may have economic and political interests in Somalia, and a stable Somalia is often seen as conducive to these interests (Maruf, 2023).

Christiane E. Philipp in the article *Somalia – A Very Special Case* highlights the role of United Nations Organizations (UNO) as peace keeping force in Somalia. The primary objective of UNOSOM was to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilian populations. This mission was conceived as a traditional peacekeeping effort, marking a historic departure from previous United Nations peacekeeping endeavors by placing a significant emphasis on enabling the provision of emergency assistance to civilian populations. In contrast to peace enforcement missions, which aim to achieve their goals through the use of force, peacekeeping missions like UNOSOM were expected to refrain from initiating the use of force and could only employ weapons in cases of self-defense. Self-defense, in this context, typically encompassed the protection of the mission's mandate, as well as the safety of personnel and property. The Security Council significantly expanded the deployment of peacekeeping forces following the end of the Cold War. These forces were frequently deployed within states embroiled in civil conflicts, rather than in conflicts between states. UN forces often found themselves contending with irregular armed groups and insurgents instead of regular national armies ( E. Philipp, 2005). These civil conflicts led to humanitarian crises, massive refugee movements, and the breakdown of state institutions.

Mohammed Dhaysane in the research article *UN chief reaffirms support to Somalia’s path to peace, stability* explore and analyze the significance of the UN Chief's reaffirmation of support for Somalia. The UN's multifaceted approach, while facing significant challenges, remains a crucial component of Somalia's journey towards lasting peace and stability. Further research and continued international cooperation are essential to overcoming the hurdles that lie ahead. It also examines the challenges of achieving political stability and consensus within Somalia, including issues related to governance, federalism, and elections. It explore the role of regional actors and regional organizations, such as the African Union, in collaboration with the UN, in contributing to Somalia's peace and stability (Dhaysane , 2023).

Vanda Felbab-Brown in the article *Somalia’s Challenges in 2023* explored multiple challenges in Somalia. Somalia has been grappling with a multitude of complex challenges that have hindered its progress towards stability and development. As of the year 2023, several critical issues continue to impact the nation. Explore the efforts to establish a stable and functioning government, including issues related to governance structures, federalism, and political reconciliation. There are enormous challenges related to organizing fair and inclusive elections and the progress made in electoral reforms. It explores the role of climate change in exacerbating droughts and resource scarcity in Somalia. The international actors, including the United Nations, African Union, and donor countries have been playing significant part to address the ongoing political chaos in Somalia through peacekeeping missions, aid, and diplomatic efforts. These challenges lead towards food

insecurity, displacement, and access to basic services on the Somali population (Felbab-Brown, 2023).

Bortoluzzi Garcia in the article *Somalia-Current Political and Security Dynamics* analyzed the economic and political instability as the root cause of civil war in Somalia. Somalia has grappled with deep-rooted political instability for decades, a consequence of a prolonged civil war, state collapse, and the absence of effective governance structures. The country's political landscape is marked by fragmentation, clan-based divisions, and the struggle for power among various factions. The absence of a functioning central government has resulted in the emergence of regional administrations and a complex web of power dynamics. The inability to establish stable governance institutions has impeded state-building efforts and hindered the country's ability to provide essential services and security to its citizens. Political instability has not only perpetuated conflict but has also created an environment conducive to the growth of extremist groups like AlShabab, further complicating Somalia's path to peace and stability. Economic instability is another pressing challenge facing Somalia.

Moreover, years of conflict, insecurity, and weak governance have severely hindered economic development. The country's economy largely relies on agriculture and livestock, but these sectors have been hampered by recurring droughts and climate-related challenges. The lack of infrastructure, financial institutions, and a stable business environment has deterred foreign investment and economic growth. Moreover, piracy off the Somali coast has disrupted maritime trade routes, negatively impacting the country's potential for economic recovery. High unemployment rates and limited opportunities for economic advancement have contributed to widespread poverty and reliance on international aid (Garcia , 2022).

## 1.8 Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

To understand the research area, it is important to explain the study with the help of relevant theory of international relations. The use of theory in international relations (IR) serves several important purposes, helping scholars, policymakers, and analysts to better understand, explain, and predict the complex dynamics of the international system. The international system is inherently complex, involving interactions among numerous states, non-state actors, and global issues. Theories provide

frameworks for making sense of this complexity by organizing and explaining international events and phenomena. There are numbers of theories which helps to elaborate the objectives and key findings of the research topic “Counter Terrorism Efforts in Somalia: A Case Study of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab Militants,” but the most appropriate is the Regional Security

Complex Theory (RSCT)

### 1.8.1 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), established by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde in the early 1990s, offers a distinctive perspective within the area of international relations and security studies. RSCT suggests that, in contrast to traditional state-centric methods, a regional perspective is necessary to comprehend security dynamics. This theory holds that regions are important analytical units that offer a deeper understanding of the interactions between states within a common geographic proximity. The theory presents the idea of "security complexes," in which states share common risks and difficulties and are dependent on one another for security. Geographical closeness, shared security concerns, and historical ties all influence these complexes. States may differentiate themselves within these complexes, establishing hierarchies according to their threat assessments, security strategies, and capabilities. Additionally, RSCT highlights the phenomena known as "securitization," in which some problems are presented as existential threats that call for drastic actions.

This process varies depending on the location. As a result, RSCT offers a useful framework for examining how regional variables affect security dynamics, giving rise to a more thorough and context-specific understanding of international relations. This theory is frequently used by academics and analysts to look into regional security concerns and the various responses that arise in various parts of the world, helping to create a more comprehensive understanding of the complexity involved in global security.

### 1.8.2 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and Counter Terrorism



## Efforts in Somalia: A Case Study of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) becomes a vital instrument for analyzing the collective security issues the Horn of Africa faces in the context of counterterrorism activities in Somalia. It emphasizes the notion that a state's security is intricately linked to the security of its neighbors, forming what is referred to as a "regional security complex." This interdependence suggests that a state's actions can have a significant impact on other states' security environments. Applying Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to the Somali situation goes beyond the traditional national security viewpoint. It entails a thorough examination of how regional collaborations, diplomatic relations, and conflicts influence the success of counterterrorism efforts. The presence of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab raises the stakes because these terrorist groups operate beyond country borders, necessitating a coordinated regional strategy to combat the common danger.

The case study of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab in Somalia serves as a microcosm of the larger regional security system. Examining the reaction of neighboring governments and regional organizations, such as the African Union and IGAD, can provide useful insights into the dynamics of cooperation efforts and the roadblocks encountered in the battle against terrorism. In this setting, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) allows for a more detailed investigation, exposing how regional complexities shape the methods and outcomes of counter-terrorism activities in Somalia, giving insight on the interdependence of security concerns across the vast Horn of Africa area.

### 1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 1.9.1 Research Design

This study employs a qualitative method, gathering data from secondary sources such as books, research papers, reports, journals, and articles. It is based on an analytical case study. While the case study approach can be somewhat confusing, it is important to remember that research is generally aimed at forming generalizations. A single case study cannot reliably serve as the foundation for a generalization or disprove an existing one. However, case studies can significantly contribute to the development of broader hypotheses. Descriptive research constitutes a large portion of case study research. In an enhanced case study, a single case often serves as the unit of analysis, with an emphasis on qualitative analysis (both interpretative and analytical). This

approach provides a detailed process analysis, though the generalizability of the conclusions is limited. The long-term effects of the results are another consideration.

### 1.9.2 Population

The research proposal's population includes various scholars' perspectives, popular magazines, and online sources. In this study, the unit of analysis is the research population.

### 1.9.3 Sampling

I am utilizing snowball sampling for my research. Similar to a snowball growing in size, this method progressively accumulates valid information. Beginning with initial contacts, I expand my network to identify credible sources. This approach helps pinpoint key stakeholders and affected individuals, providing valuable insights into counter-terrorism efforts. It ensures the collection of accurate and detailed data for a comprehensive analysis.

### 1.9.4 Instrument(s)

Instrumentation refers to the tools used to gather information for research. The instruments employed to collect qualitative data in this study include published papers, book reviews, online journals, and articles.

### 1.9.5 Procedure (Data Collection)

The methodology adopted for this study is qualitative, focusing on a comprehensive and in-depth exploration of the subject matter. The primary method utilized is desk analysis of secondary materials, which involves a systematic review and examination of existing literature, including books, articles, research papers, and journals. By drawing upon these secondary sources, the study aims to synthesize, interpret, and analyze the available information to generate insights and conclusions. The qualitative approach allows for a nuanced understanding of the subject, capturing diverse viewpoints, historical context, and expert opinions. This method enables the researcher to delve into complex issues, explore patterns, and identify trends within the existing body of knowledge.

### 1.9.6 Data Analysis

The data analysis process involves several crucial steps to transform raw data into valuable insights for academics and policymakers. These steps include data cleaning, data conversion, and data modeling, all aimed at extracting meaningful information from the collected data. In this study, the researcher will use only the first two steps. The outcomes of data analysis help address research questions and provide informed perspectives for decision-making. Data cleaning is an essential preliminary step that involves identifying and rectifying errors, inconsistencies, or inaccuracies in the collected data. Data conversion refers to transforming data into a suitable format for analysis.

### 1.9.7 Ethical Consideration

During my research, I avoid any form of discrimination and do my best to analyse the controversial topic and come up with a solution.

### 1.10 Organization of the Study

The Organization of the Study is divided into six chapters.

#### Chapter One “Introduction”

Certainly, this part of the study focuses on establishing the foundation for the research by addressing key aspects related to the research area. It typically includes the statement of the problem, research questions, objectives and research methodology.

#### Chapter Two “Theoretical Framework”

This study chapter deals with the application of suitable and appropriate theory to elaborate the research topic.

#### Chapter Three “Causes of Instability in Somalia”

Chapter Three offers a comprehensive analysis of the causes of instability in Somalia, examining both internal and external factors that have perpetuated conflict and hindered progress toward peace and development. By providing a nuanced understanding of these root causes, the chapter lays the

groundwork for a more informed and effective approach to addressing Somalia's complex challenges in the subsequent sections of this study.

#### Chapter Four “Factors Contributing in the growth of Al-Qaeda and AlShabab in Somalia”

This chapter deals with the intricate web of factors that exert a profound influence on the security and stability landscape in Somalia. It begins by scrutinizing the role of non-state actors, particularly Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in perpetuating insecurity through acts of terrorism, insurgency, and control of significant territories. This chapter also explores the transnational dimensions of terrorism, highlighting how Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda links with international extremist networks amplify the security challenges not only for Somalia but for the broader region.

#### Chapter Fifth “Constructive Role of Regional and External Powers to eradicate Terrorism in Somalia”

This chapter discusses the contributions of regional and external powers to Somalia's peace and development, highlighting its multifaceted efforts to promote stability and foster positive change in the country.

#### Chapter Six “Conclusion”

This part of the study deals with the closing remarks and findings of the research topic.

## CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

## 2.1 INTRODUCTION

The field of International Relations offers diverse theoretical frameworks that enable us to comprehend and interpret the complexities of the global landscape. These theoretical lenses provide unique perspectives through which we can analyze and make sense of international phenomena, contributing to our understanding of the world (McGlinchey & Gold, 2017). The concept of theory in International Relations encompasses a framework of principles that underpin the activities, interactions, and practices of nations. These theories serve to elucidate and predict various behaviors and generate new insights. According to Waltz (1979), theories are structured around sets of laws governing specific behaviors or phenomena. In the realm of International Relations, Waltz further posits that theories elucidate the laws governing international politics or recurrent patterns of state behavior (Waltz, 1979). Hollis and Smith (1990) assert that theories serve dual purposes: they aim to both explain and predict behavior, as well as to deepen our understanding of the global landscape. They critique prevailing forms of domination and perspectives, contemplate ideal organizational structures, and reflect on the process of theorizing itself. Additionally, theories in International Relations strive to acquire knowledge, examine the evolution of the field, and forecast state behavior (Hollis & Smith, 1991). Another objective of theorizing in International Relations is to scrutinize both intermittent and ongoing debates within the field itself.

Within the realm of International Relations, it's important to note that there isn't a singular variant of each theory. Scholars often exhibit diverse perspectives and interpretations, even when aligned with the same theoretical approach. Each scholar brings forth a unique interpretation of the global landscape, encompassing notions of peace, conflict, and the state's role in relation to individuals. Every theory within International Relations offers a valid, albeit distinct, perspective on the world (McGlinchey, Walters, & Gold, 2017). By discerning recurring patterns and trends in historical and contemporary international relations, theories empower researchers and policymakers to anticipate potential outcomes and ramifications of diverse actions and policies. This predictive capability supports strategic planning, risk evaluation, and the formulation of well-informed foreign policy decisions, ultimately bolstering global stability and security. The application of theoretical frameworks in International Relations carries significant implications for the crafting and scrutiny of foreign policies. Policymakers leverage theoretical perspectives to gauge the

potential ramifications of various policy alternatives and strategies on international relations (A. Cruz, J Brabazon, S. Halfhill, & M. Ritzel, 2020). Whether rooted in realist assessments of power and national interest or liberal advocacies for cooperation and institutional frameworks, theories furnish both a normative framework and analytical foundation for shaping policies in alignment with a state's objectives and priorities on the global stage. Thus, theory serves as an invaluable instrument for both the development and critical assessment of foreign policies, assisting states in navigating the intricate terrain of global politics (Cristol, 2019).

## 2.2 Theorizing Regional Security Complex Theory

This chapter discuss counter terrorism efforts in Somalia in theoretical perspective. I did literature review to find out the most appropriate theory of international relations that particularly deals with chosen research area. As the research area "Counter terrorism efforts in Somalia: A case study of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab accentuates that suitable theory is regional security complex theory.

### 2.2.1 Origin of Regional Security Complex

The Regional Security Complexes (RSC) theory emerged during the 1980s through the pioneering work of scholars associated with the Copenhagen School, notably B. Buzan and O. Wæver. This theoretical framework focuses on regional security dynamics and facilitates comprehensive security analyses across various geographical regions. It was conceived with the recognition of the necessity to understand the intricacies and nuances of international relations at the regional level (Buzan , 2003). Moreover, the RSC theory aimed to bridge the gap between the prevailing paradigms in security studies, namely the state-centric approach and the global perspective. These traditional viewpoints often overlooked the significance of regional dynamics, thereby limiting the understanding of security challenges by disregarding the interplay among actors within their immediate geographical contexts (Buzan, 1988).

Over the span of nearly four decades since its inception, the Regional Security Complexes (RSC) theory has undergone several refinements. One significant evolution involves the broadening of its scope beyond the original delineation of political and military sectors (Sadurski, 2022). This expansion allows for a more comprehensive examination of security issues, encompassing economic, environmental, and social dimensions. Nonetheless, while the theory has adapted to

include these additional sectors, its fundamental principles and core assumptions have remained intact. This continuity underscores the enduring relevance of the RSC theory as a valuable research framework for studying regional security dynamics, demonstrating its continued utility and widespread acceptance among scholars in the field (Tahir, 2022).

It is essential to recognize that the Regional Security Complexes (RSC) theory addresses the multifaceted nature of security, which encompasses both a state and a process. Given this understanding, it is imperative for the RSC theory to remain adaptable in order to effectively analyze the phenomenon it seeks to understand. Thus, in addition to its foundational assumptions, the theory must possess the flexibility to evolve and accommodate changes in the security landscape. This adaptability enables scholars to investigate emerging security phenomena or explore new dimensions of security that may not have been initially considered (Al-Jader & Jaafar, 2022). Furthermore, researchers advocate for the development or augmentation of the theory to incorporate aspects not fully elaborated upon in its original formulation. The dynamic nature of the security environment necessitates such flexibility, allowing for the refinement of conceptual frameworks to facilitate more precise analyses of emerging security challenges (Amable, 2022).

The Theory of Regional Security Complexes, as envisioned by its creators, aims to offer a conceptual framework for understanding the evolving dynamics of international security in the post-Cold War era. Central to this theory is the premise that the regional level serves as the foundational unit for security analyses. While national security perspectives are limited in scope, focusing solely on the interests of individual states, the global perspective tends to oversimplify security dynamics, failing to account for the nuanced variations across different regions (Walsh, 2021). In contrast, the regional level strikes a balance between these extremes, recognizing the interplay between national security concerns and broader global security dynamics. It acknowledges that security challenges vary in intensity and nature from one region to another, highlighting the importance of context-specific analyses. Moreover, the regional level functions as a crucial arena where interactions among states shape the broader international security landscape, constituting a subsystem within the international system (Buzan, 1988).

### 2.2.2 Concept of States: Regional Security Complex

Regional security complexes are fundamentally shaped by the states comprising them, highlighting that the analysis of security from a trans-state perspective does not seek to diminish the significance or role of states. According to the RSC theory, states serve as the primary actors in international relations, as they define regional boundaries and drive processes related to securitization and desecuritization. This framework acknowledges that states play a pivotal role in shaping the formation and operation of regional security complexes. Moreover, the RSC theory offers the advantage of mitigating the tendency to overemphasize the influence of global powers as the sole arbiters of global security (Pratama, 2013). Instead, it directs attention towards local factors that contribute to the establishment of regional orders. Within these regional contexts, security dynamics are shaped by a complex interplay of power balances, rivalries, and alliances among key actors. Such arrangements define the regional security landscape and influence the potential for external powers to exert influence.

The concept of a regional security complex transcends mere geographical boundaries, serving as a socially constructed analytical tool shaped by the security-related activities of actors within the international arena (E. Kelly, 2007). While geographical proximity forms a foundational element, the notion of a regional security complex is not confined to conventional geographic regions with well-defined physical boundaries. Instead, it encompasses a group of states in close proximity, where security interactions are influenced by spatial dynamics rather than rigid geographical delineations. Scholars such as Acharya (2007), Fawn (2009), Hemmer & Katzenstein (2002), and Mansfield & Milner (1999) emphasize that the composition and contours of a regional security complex are subject to change based on the security concerns addressed by participating actors. Although geographical factors play a role, the concept extends beyond traditional geographic or geopolitical regions. As noted by Thompson (1973), Dumala (2009), and Hettne (2005), the boundaries and structure of a regional security complex may not always align perfectly with commonly accepted geographical regions, reflecting the fluid and socially constructed nature of this analytical framework (Sadurski, 2022).

The configuration of a regional security complex can undergo changes in three distinct ways: it may persist in its existing state, experience internal transformations, or undergo external



alterations. An intriguing phenomenon associated with such changes is known as overlap. This term describes a situation wherein one or more global powers directly engage with the regional complex, thereby overshadowing the previously dominant regional security dynamics. It is crucial to note that this "overlap" phenomenon differs from superpower intervention in regional arrangements (Aparecida Ferreira Souza, 2021). The classical theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSC) primarily centered on states as the foundational units within a region and emphasized two key sectors: political and military. However, the evolution of this concept involved broadening the scope to incorporate a wider array of actors, including non-state entities, in the realm of regional security studies. Furthermore, the RSC introduced a novel approach by integrating additional sectors relevant to security considerations, such as economic, social, and environmental dimensions. This departure from a narrow focus solely on force-based interactions among actors marked a significant shift in the understanding of regional security dynamics (Buzan, *The Southeast Asian Security Complex*, 1988).

The concept of sectors serves as a valuable tool for examining the international security system, as it illuminates specific types of relationships among actors within a complex. By delineating various sectors such as political, military, economic, social, and ecological it becomes feasible to differentiate between different forms of interactions. This framework facilitates the identification of relevant actors unique to each sector, beyond those commonly found in all sectors, such as states. Moreover, it enables the characterization of distinct features and activities associated with each sector. Through the lens of sectors, it becomes possible to discern developmental trends pertaining to different types of threats within a given complex (Gjørsv, 2005). Additionally, sectors allow for the exploration of the diverse perceptions of these threats within the context of each sector.

### 2.2.3 Core Assumptions of Regional Security Complex

1. The Regional Complex Security theory is deeply rooted in the notion of regional complexes, wherein security dynamics are contingent upon the interactions and power equilibrium among various actors. As certain states and non-state entities experience fluctuations in strength and engagement within specific regions, the need for continuous review and adaptation to these developments becomes imperative (Jarzabek, 2020).

2. The rise of non-state actors as significant and autonomous entities, posing challenges to the traditional dominance of nation-states, necessitates careful consideration. This development has the potential to challenge a fundamental assumption of the Regional Complex Security Theory (RCST), which posits that states are the principal securitizing actors influencing security dynamics within regional complexes (Buzan , 2003).
3. The delineation of regional complexes stems from the geopolitical circumstances of the latter half of the 1990s, circumstances that have undergone significant transformations since. Observations indicate that shifts in the global balance of power have led to gradual yet persistent alterations in these boundaries. Acknowledging this fundamental change in the international system structure is imperative for the theory to maintain its explanatory efficacy (Jarzabek, 2020).
4. A substantial disparity exists between the roster of primary security threats and challenges prevalent today compared to those identified and prioritized two decades ago. Twenty years ago, certain threats such as cyber threats were non-existent, whereas others, like religious radicalism, were considerably underestimated (A. Cruz, J Brabazon, S. Halfhill, & M. Ritzel, 2020).
5. The dynamics of security within Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) are significantly influenced by variable patterns of amity and enmity, a factor that has not been adequately addressed within the framework of RSCT until now. These patterns undergo changes over time both within individual regional complexes and across them (Aparecida Ferreira Souza, 2021).

#### 2.2.4 Regional Security Complex: Case study of Somalia

The Regional Complex Security Theory (RCST) presents a nuanced framework for analyzing security dynamics within specific regions, emphasizing the intricate interplay of various actors and power structures. In the context of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, the application of RCST offers valuable insights into the complexities of combating extremist organizations such as AlQaeda and Al-Shabab. RCST posits that security dynamics within a region are influenced by the interactions and power equilibrium among different actors, including states, non-state entities, and international organizations (Hersi & O. Akinola, March 2024). In the case of Somalia, the presence

of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab creates a volatile security environment characterized by shifting alliances and power struggles. The competition for influence and control among these groups, coupled with weak state institutions, exacerbates the challenges of countering terrorism in the region. Additionally, external factors such as intervention by regional and global powers further complicate the security landscape, highlighting the interconnectedness of regional security issues (Walsh, 2021).

The effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia is contingent upon the actions and capabilities of both state and non-state actors. While the Somali government and its security forces play a central role in combating terrorism, their capacity is often constrained by political instability, corruption, and resource limitations. Non-state actors, including local militias and clan-based groups, also influence security dynamics, sometimes aligning with or opposing extremist organizations based on shifting interests (J. Cannon & Donelli, 2020). Furthermore, external factors such as the United States and African Union contribute to counterterrorism efforts through military assistance and training programs, illustrating the multi-dimensional nature of security cooperation in the region.

Despite concerted efforts to address terrorism in Somalia, significant challenges persist. The lack of effective governance, socioeconomic disparities, and ideological grievances provide fertile ground for extremist recruitment and radicalization (Mesfin, 2013). Moreover, the porous borders and ungoverned spaces within Somalia enable terrorist groups to operate and evade detection, posing a persistent threat to regional stability. However, there are also opportunities for enhancing counterterrorism efforts, including strengthening state institutions, promoting community engagement, and addressing root causes of extremism through development initiatives. Regional cooperation and coordination among neighboring countries are crucial for disrupting terrorist networks and enhancing border security (Juma, 2020).

The emergence of non-state actors as significant and autonomous entities has reshaped the landscape of global security, challenging the traditional dominance of nation-states. This paradigm shift poses profound implications for the Regional Complex Security Theory (RCST), which traditionally emphasizes the role of states as the principal securitizing actors within regional complexes. In the context of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, the rise of non-state actors such

as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab introduces new complexities that warrant careful consideration and reevaluation of existing theoretical frameworks (Cardoso, 2016). The proliferation of non-state actors in Somalia, including extremist groups like Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab, has fundamentally altered security dynamics within the region. These groups operate independently of state control and possess significant capabilities to influence security outcomes through acts of terrorism, insurgency, and asymmetric warfare.

Moreover, their ability to exploit ungoverned spaces, mobilize resources, and recruit followers challenges the traditional notion of state-centric security governance envisioned by RCST. Consequently, the power dynamics within regional complexes are no longer solely determined by interactions among states but are also shaped by the actions and agendas of non-state actors. The dominance of non-state actors in shaping security dynamics presents profound challenges to state-centric approaches to counterterrorism in Somalia. Traditional strategies that rely solely on state institutions and military capabilities may prove insufficient in addressing the multifaceted nature of the terrorist threat (K. Gebru, Zeru, & Tekalign, 2023). Furthermore, the weak governance structures and political instability in Somalia exacerbate the challenges of coordinating effective responses to terrorism, allowing non-state actors to exploit vulnerabilities and perpetuate violence with impunity.

As a result, conventional notions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity are increasingly challenged by the influence of non-state actors on regional security. The rise of non-state actors as significant and autonomous entities necessitates a reevaluation of the assumptions underlying RCST, particularly regarding the primacy of states as securitizing actors within regional complexes. While states continue to play a central role in shaping security dynamics, the influence of non-state actors cannot be overlooked. RCST must adapt to account for the complex interactions and power dynamics involving both state and non-state actors, recognizing the interplay of multiple actors in shaping regional security outcomes (Söderbaum & Tavares, 2009). This requires a more nuanced understanding of how non-state actors challenge, coexist with, or collaborate with states in the pursuit of security objectives.

In light of the evolving security landscape in Somalia, counterterrorism strategies must evolve to address the challenges posed by non-state actors effectively. This entails adopting a comprehensive

approach that goes beyond military solutions to encompass diplomatic, economic, and social measures aimed at undermining the appeal and resilience of extremist ideologies. Engaging with local communities, addressing grievances, and building resilience against radicalization are essential components of a holistic counterterrorism strategy that acknowledges the role of non-state actors in shaping security dynamics ( Persson & Brommesson, 2012). Additionally, regional cooperation and international partnerships are indispensable for countering transnational terrorist networks operating in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region.

The Regional Complex Security Theory (RCST) offers a valuable framework for analyzing security dynamics within specific regions, emphasizing the interactions and power equilibrium among various actors. However, the delineation of regional complexes, which forms the basis of RCST, has evolved in response to shifting geopolitical circumstances. In the context of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, understanding these transformations is crucial for maintaining the theory's explanatory efficacy and relevance. The geopolitical landscape of the latter half of the 1990s was characterized by distinct regional complexes defined by geopolitical, cultural, and historical factors. However, since then, significant transformations in the global balance of power have gradually redrawn the boundaries of these complexes (Tar & Mustapha, 2017). Economic integration, technological advancements, and geopolitical realignments have blurred traditional divisions, leading to the emergence of new centers of influence and cooperation.

In the case of Somalia, these shifts have profound implications for understanding the dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism within the Horn of Africa region. The alterations in regional complexes have had a direct impact on security dynamics, influencing the distribution of power, alliances, and security threats. As traditional boundaries dissolve and new geopolitical realities emerge, the relationships between states and non-state actors within and across regions undergo transformation. In Somalia, this manifests in the changing dynamics of terrorist groups such as AlQaeda and Al-Shabab, whose operations transcend traditional borders and alliances, challenging conventional approaches to counter-terrorism ( Kłosowicz, 2015).

Acknowledging the evolving nature of regional complexes is imperative for RCST to maintain its explanatory efficacy in understanding contemporary security challenges. By adapting to these shifts, the theory can better account for the complex interactions and power dynamics shaping

security outcomes in Somalia and other regions. This requires a nuanced understanding of how geopolitical transformations intersect with local dynamics to influence security governance and response strategies. The evolving nature of regional complexes has significant implications for counterterrorism efforts in Somalia (Prys-Hansen & Frazier , 2024). Traditional approaches that focus solely on state-centric security measures may overlook the transnational nature of terrorist threats and the role of non-state actors in shaping security dynamics.

Effective counterterrorism strategies must take into account the fluidity of regional boundaries, the interconnectedness of security threats, and the need for collaborative, multi-dimensional responses involving states, international organizations, and local communities. Adapting RCST to accommodate shifts in regional complexes requires revisiting its core assumptions and methodologies. Incorporating insights from geopolitics, globalization, and regional studies can enrich the theory's analytical framework and enhance its applicability to contemporary security challenges. By recognizing the dynamic nature of regional complexes and their impact on security governance, RCST can remain a relevant and valuable tool for understanding and addressing security threats in Somalia and beyond ( RAHIM & Abukar, 2021).

The landscape of security threats has undergone profound transformations over the past two decades, necessitating a reassessment of counterterrorism efforts in regions like Somalia. This essay explores the significant disparity between the security threats prevalent today and those identified and prioritized two decades ago, with a focus on the case study of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia concerning groups like Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab. Twenty years ago, the security landscape was characterized by a different set of threats compared to the present day. While traditional threats such as interstate conflicts and conventional terrorism persisted, new challenges emerged that were previously non-existent or underestimated. One such example is cyber threats, which have proliferated in recent years, posing significant risks to national security and critical infrastructure ( J. Kilroy Jr , Sumano, & Hataley, 2017).

Similarly, religious radicalism, particularly Islamist extremism, has gained prominence as a potent security threat, challenging conventional notions of terrorism and extremism. The evolving nature of security threats has profound implications for counterterrorism efforts in Somalia. Traditional approaches that focus solely on combating armed insurgencies and conventional terrorist tactics

may prove insufficient in addressing emerging challenges such as cyberterrorism and religious radicalism. Moreover, the interconnectedness of global networks and the rapid dissemination of extremist ideologies through online platforms present formidable challenges for traditional counterterrorism strategies, requiring innovative and adaptive responses (Aparecida Ferreira Souza, 2021).

One of the key challenges in addressing contemporary security threats is the historical underestimation of certain risks, such as religious radicalism. Two decades ago, the extent of Islamist extremism and its potential to fuel terrorism in regions like Somalia were often underestimated or overlooked. However, the rise of groups like Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab has demonstrated the grave consequences of neglecting religious radicalism as a significant security threat, underscoring the need for a more comprehensive approach to counterterrorism. To effectively address contemporary security threats in Somalia, counterterrorism strategies must evolve to encompass a broader range of challenges and vulnerabilities (Buzan , 2003). This entails integrating cyber defense measures, countering online radicalization efforts, and addressing the root causes of religious extremism through community engagement and radicalization programs.

Additionally, enhancing intelligence-sharing mechanisms and building partnerships with regional and international stakeholders are essential for combating transnational terrorist networks operating in the Horn of Africa region. Addressing contemporary security threats requires a concerted effort involving multilateral cooperation and collaboration among states, international organizations, and non-state actors. In the case of Somalia, regional initiatives such as the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) have played a crucial role in supporting the Somali government's efforts to combat terrorism and stabilize the country ( Cardoso, 2016). However, sustained international support and coordination are necessary to address the root causes of insecurity and promote longterm stability in the region.

The dynamics of security within Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) are influenced by variable patterns of amity and enmity among states and non-state actors, a factor that has received limited attention within the framework of Regional Complex Security Theory (RCST). In the case of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, understanding these shifting patterns of cooperation and conflict is essential for comprehensively addressing the threat posed by groups like Al-Qaeda and

Al-Shabab ( E. Kelly, 2007). Amity and enmity dynamics refer to the varying degrees of friendship and hostility among states and non-state actors within regional complexes. These patterns are not static but evolve over time in response to changing geopolitical, economic, and ideological factors. Within the context of RSCs, amity and enmity influence security cooperation, alliances, and conflicts, shaping the overall security environment of a region. In Somalia, where the presence of terrorist organizations poses a significant threat to stability, understanding these dynamics is crucial for devising effective counterterrorism measures.

The inclusion of amity and enmity dynamics within the framework of RCST enriches our understanding of security dynamics within regional complexes. By acknowledging the fluid nature of relationships among actors, RCST can better explain the complexities of security governance and response strategies (Report, 2008). This requires a shift from a purely state-centric perspective to a more nuanced analysis that considers the interactions between states, non-state actors, and regional dynamics of cooperation and conflict. In the case of Somalia, where state fragility and regional rivalries intersect with transnational terrorism, incorporating amity and enmity dynamics into RCST enhances its explanatory power.

Amity and enmity dynamics have direct implications for counterterrorism efforts in Somalia. Cooperation among states within the region is essential for sharing intelligence, coordinating military operations, and implementing preventive measures against terrorist attacks. However, regional rivalries and historical animosities may hinder effective cooperation, allowing terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab to exploit divisions and operate with impunity. Moreover, the presence of external actors with divergent interests further complicates efforts to build consensus and unity of purpose in combating terrorism (Apuuli, 2023). Addressing the impact of amity and enmity dynamics on counterterrorism strategies requires a multifaceted approach that goes beyond traditional security measures. Diplomatic engagement, conflict resolution, and confidence-building measures are essential for mitigating regional tensions and fostering cooperation among states in the fight against terrorism.

Additionally, enhancing regional mechanisms for information sharing, joint training exercises, and capacity-building initiatives can strengthen the collective response to terrorist threats in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa region (MANDRUP, 2021). Mediation and conflict resolution efforts



play a vital role in managing amity and enmity dynamics within RSCs and promoting regional stability. Third-party mediators, including regional organizations and international actors, can facilitate dialogue and negotiation processes aimed at resolving underlying disputes and building trust among conflicting parties. By addressing root causes of conflict and promoting reconciliation, mediation efforts contribute to creating an environment conducive to effective counterterrorism cooperation in Somalia and beyond (Menkhaus, Somalia Case Study).

#### 2.2.4 Critical Analysis of Theoretical Framework

The Horn of Africa has long been synonymous with political turmoil and instability, with Somalia standing out as a poignant example. The nation's trajectory has been marred by decades of conflict, internal strife, and failed governance, leading to profound humanitarian crises and widespread suffering. Somalia's instability can be traced back to the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, which plunged the country into a state of protracted civil war and clan-based conflict. The absence of a functioning central government allowed warlords and armed factions to vie for power, exacerbating social fragmentation and institutional breakdown. Subsequent attempts at statebuilding and reconciliation, including the formation of transitional governments and international interventions, have been marred by challenges such as corruption, factionalism, and external interference, perpetuating cycles of violence and instability.

Central to Somalia's instability is the intricate interplay of clan affiliations, resource competition, and identity politics. Clan-based networks not only serve as sources of social cohesion and protection but also fuel intra and inter-clan tensions, often exploited by political elites to consolidate power and perpetuate divisions. Additionally, the marginalization of certain regions and communities, coupled with economic deprivation and unequal access to resources, exacerbates grievances and fosters conditions ripe for recruitment by extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab. Somalia's instability is further compounded by external factors, including regional power struggles, transnational terrorism, and maritime piracy. Neighboring states, each with their own strategic interests, have historically intervened in Somali affairs, either directly or by supporting proxy militias, thereby perpetuating cycles of violence and undermining efforts at national reconciliation.

Moreover, Somalia's strategic location along key maritime routes has made it vulnerable to criminal activities such as piracy, which not only disrupts international trade but also contributes to the

erosion of state authority. The prolonged instability in Somalia has had dire humanitarian consequences, with millions of people displaced, impoverished, and deprived of basic services. Persistent insecurity impedes access to healthcare, education, and livelihoods, exacerbating poverty and vulnerability. Moreover, recurrent droughts and environmental degradation, exacerbated by climate change, exacerbate food insecurity and displacement, placing additional strains on already fragile humanitarian systems.

Addressing Somalia's instability requires a holistic approach that addresses its root causes while promoting inclusive governance, socio-economic development, and conflict resolution mechanisms. This entails strengthening state institutions, fostering reconciliation and dialogue among diverse stakeholders, and addressing the underlying grievances driving conflict. Furthermore, international actors must support locally-led initiatives, prioritize humanitarian assistance, and coordinate efforts to combat transnational threats such as terrorism and piracy. External powers play a pivotal role in Somalia's efforts to counter terrorism, given the transnational nature of extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab. Regional and international actors have been actively involved in providing military, financial, and logistical support to the Somali government and allied forces in their fight against terrorism.

This assistance often includes training and equipping security forces, intelligence sharing, and targeted military operations aimed at degrading terrorist networks and disrupting their activities. Moreover, external powers contribute to capacity-building initiatives and institutional reforms aimed at enhancing Somalia's counterterrorism capabilities and promoting stability. However, the role of external powers in Somalia's counterterrorism efforts is not without challenges and controversies. While external support is crucial in bolstering Somalia's security apparatus, it also raises concerns about sovereignty, accountability, and the potential for unintended consequences. Some critics argue that heavy reliance on external assistance may undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of national institutions, perpetuate dependency dynamics, and exacerbate tensions with local communities.

Moreover, concerns have been raised about the potential for human rights abuses and civilian casualties resulting from military operations conducted with external support, highlighting the importance of ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law and respect for human

rights principles. Despite these challenges, external powers remain indispensable partners in Somalia's fight against terrorism, given the transnational nature of the threat and the limited capacity of the Somali state to address it alone. Moving forward, it is essential for external actors to coordinate their efforts effectively, aligning their strategies with Somali priorities and ensuring the promotion of inclusive governance, community engagement, and long-term development initiatives. By striking a balance between security imperatives and respect for human rights and sovereignty, external powers can contribute to building a more resilient and stable Somalia, free from the scourge of terrorism.

In the complex landscape of Somalia's fight against terrorism, several strategies have been employed by both domestic and international actors to address the threat posed by groups such as Al-Shabaab. One key approach is the bolstering of security forces and law enforcement agencies to enhance their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist activities. This includes the provision of training, equipment, and intelligence support, as well as the implementation of counterinsurgency tactics aimed at targeting insurgent networks and disrupting their operations. However, while strengthening security forces is essential, it must be complemented by broader efforts to address the underlying grievances and socio-economic factors driving recruitment and radicalization.

Another crucial strategy involves fostering community engagement and empowerment to build resilience against extremist ideologies and promote alternative pathways to address grievances. This entails working closely with local communities, religious leaders, and civil society organizations to counter radical narratives, promote tolerance and pluralism, and address root causes of conflict and marginalization. Moreover, community-based initiatives can play a vital role in providing social services, economic opportunities, and rehabilitation and reintegration support to individuals at risk of radicalization or those disengaging from extremist groups. Furthermore, efforts to counter terrorism in Somalia must also focus on strengthening governance and rule of law to address governance deficits and promote accountability and transparency. This includes supporting efforts to build effective and inclusive institutions, enhance judicial capacity, and combat corruption, which not only undermines state legitimacy but also creates fertile ground for terrorist recruitment and exploitation.

Additionally, promoting human rights and adherence to the rule of law is essential to winning the trust and cooperation of local populations and avoiding further alienation and radicalization. Moreover, regional and international cooperation and coordination are critical in addressing the transnational dimensions of terrorism in Somalia. This includes sharing intelligence, coordinating military operations, and implementing sanctions and diplomatic measures to disrupt terrorist financing and support networks. However, while external support is crucial, it must be aligned with Somali priorities and respect the principles of sovereignty and ownership, avoiding the pitfalls of neocolonial interventionism and fostering dependency dynamics.

The profound expansion of cross-border trade originating from Somalia and extending into Kenya has demonstrated a fluctuating impact on conflict dynamics. On occasions, it has acted as a catalyst for fostering cooperation among clans and enhancing rudimentary security measures. Conversely, there have been instances where it has triggered conflicts revolving around the control and dominance of pivotal trade routes. Consequently, rival clans increasingly perceive control over strategic locations not merely through an administrative lens, but rather as a mechanism for asserting exclusive authority within designated areas, thereby impeding or excluding other clans from accessing vital resources such as pastures and commercial opportunities.

This competitive struggle often manifests in the manipulation of geographical sites to perpetrate localized ethnic cleansing, significantly escalating the political stakes associated with territorial control. The root cause of Somalia's protracted civil unrest can be traced back to the emergence of a militaristic regime characterized by its oppressive governance and suppression of a vibrant social fabric. At a deeper historical level, the collapse of the state epitomizes a fundamental disjunction between the structure of the post-colonial state and the intricate dynamics inherent within civil society. Efforts to enhance civil education should prioritize pastoralist communities and other groups most affected by persistent conflicts. It is imperative to educate border communities about various forms of criminal activities that stem from instability in Somalia. Increasing public awareness regarding such criminal behaviors and the underlying causes of ongoing conflicts is essential.

Education plays a pivotal role in international development not only by improving the well-being of individuals and households but also by generating positive societal outcomes. Extensive

empirical evidence consistently highlights the positive effects of education in enhancing wellbeing, reducing poverty, and mitigating vulnerabilities, particularly among rural and urban populations. Moreover, education is increasingly acknowledged as a significant factor in understanding the root causes of civil wars. Its role in addressing conflict dynamics has gained recognition within the international development discourse. By addressing the educational needs of marginalized communities and promoting awareness of the consequences of instability, strides can be made towards fostering peace and stability in the region.

## CHAPTER 3

### CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN SOMALIA

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Somali civil war is driven by a multitude of intricate factors, encompassing political, economic, cultural, and psychological dimensions. Both internal and external actors have significantly influenced the conflict at various stages. Fundamentally, the origins of the Somali conflict lie in the competition for resources and power, the presence of a repressive state, and the lingering impacts of colonial rule. The primary factor behind the creation and persistence of clan-based militias' conflicts is the struggle for power and resources (Elmi & Barise, January ). One of the foremost challenges in Somalia is political in nature. The federal government struggles with both legitimacy and capacity, hindering its ability to govern the country's territory effectively. Somalia's power dynamics are marked by competing elites, clan-based allegiances, and numerous militias vying for control over resources and strategic routes. The state is largely seen as either absent or inefficient. Under the leadership of President Abdullahi Mohamed, efforts have been made to centralize power by attempting to control the internal affairs of states and suppress their moves toward greater autonomy (PINTO, 2020).

#### 3.2 Historical Perspective of Ongoing Conflicts in Somalia

Somalia's strategic position along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean was of significant geopolitical importance to European empires and regional Ethiopian expansion efforts. By the late 19th century, Somalia became a battleground for colonial powers including Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, and Ethiopia. In 1827, Britain took control of Aden (now in contemporary Yemen) and aimed to dominate the Somali port town of Berbera. The British sought to control the Somali coast to ensure a steady supply of meat and other goods to their army stationed in Aden, which was crucial for defending British India. Despite both Egypt and Britain having vested interests in Zeila

and Berbera, the British ultimately secured these towns (ALİYEV & ÇALIŞKAN, 2023). The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and the Mahdist uprising in Sudan (1881) against AngloEgyptian rule led to Egypt withdrawing from Somalia, allowing Britain and Ethiopia to vie for the territory. Subsequently, in 1887, Britain established a protectorate over northwest Somalia, known as British Somaliland.

Although Britain signed protection treaties with various Somali clans, some territories claimed by Ethiopia included these clans. This area, known as Ogaden, would become a long-standing point of contention. Additionally, other Somalis found themselves under British Kenyan jurisdiction in the Northern Frontier District (NFD). France also pursued trading interests in Somalia, particularly aiming to build a coaling station in the Red Sea to facilitate naval communication with Indochina and to connect the Gulf of Aden with their equatorial African colonies. They acquired the port of Obok in 1859 in northwest Somalia and established a trading company with Ethiopia in 1881, leading to a rivalry with Britain (G. Patman, 2015). By 1888, competitive imperialism between Britain and France resulted in an agreement to divide northern Somalia between Zeila and Djibouti. The construction of the Franco-Ethiopian railway further connected Djibouti with Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's main port.

Before the partition of Somali territory, Italy had imperial ambitions in Ethiopia. Despite extensive diplomatic disputes over Italy's protectorate claims, Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II's Circular Letter asserted Ethiopian sovereignty and territorial claims, leading to the Battle of Adwa in 1896. Ethiopia's victory expelled Italian forces, although Italy retained control of Eritrea. Britain, France, and Italy subsequently recognized Ethiopia's regional dominance and negotiated with Emperor Menelik II, who sought to expand over the Cushitic-speaking Oromo and Somali populations around Harar and southeastward ( Al Awsat, 2024). By 1900, the Emperor had seized the Ogaden region in western Somalia. Italy's defeat heightened the colonial government's focus on occupying Somalia, envisioning a trade route through the Suez Canal and Red Sea to India. Consequently, in 1905, Italy began direct administration of Italian Somaliland.

The division of Somali people and their land is considered a root cause of ongoing conflicts in the Horn of Africa. During the Scramble for Africa, following the Berlin Conference of 1884, the Somali territory was split among various colonial powers. The British took control of Northern Somalia, known as Somaliland, and the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD), predominantly

inhabited by Somalis. The French claimed the northwest coast, now Djibouti, as their colony. The Ethiopian Empire seized the Ogaden region, while Italy acquired southern Somalia. This partition severely impacted the mobility of pastoralists, who traditionally moved with their livestock across the region in search of water. The new boundaries imposed strict conditions that hindered this movement (Magan, 2016). Somalis could no longer freely move across territories as they had for centuries. Crossing from one occupied region to another now involved heavy taxation or the risk of being denied entry.

Crucially, each colonial power had its own interests to protect: the British aimed to use Somaliland as a meat supply source for their troops in Aden, Yemen; the French established the Somali coast as a coaling station and a strategic base linking their colonies in Africa and Indochina; and Ethiopia sought to expand its territory and resources. The British also used the Northern Frontier District (NFD) as a buffer zone against migrations of Somalis and Oromo from the south and north. Unlike the European colonizers, Ethiopian soldiers frequently raided and harassed the Somali pastoralist communities in Ogaden (Turton, 2009). Somalia's journey from colonization to independence and subsequently to civil war is a complex one. In the 19th century, European powers colonized Somalia, with Britain and Italy establishing British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1884 and 1889, respectively. These two territories eventually united to form an independent Somalia on July 1, 1960.

The hope for a prosperous nation was soon shattered by the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 1969. His death triggered a coup led by the Supreme Revolutionary Council, under the command of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. This coup marked the onset of years of dictatorship and oppression until Barre was overthrown by warlords and rebel groups from various clans," Somali journalist Mohamed Odowa told DW. Politics based on tribalism led to numerous injustices, grievances, and rebellions by tribal groups lacking a cohesive agenda," Somali political analyst Mohamed Haji Husein Rage explained to DW. As a result, Somalia paid a heavy price. Siad Barre's significant strategic error was attempting to implement "scientific socialism," a secular and atheistic system, in a predominantly conservative Muslim country (Jalloh, 2020).

The emergence of clan-states in contemporary Somalia is deeply rooted in Somali history. Contrary to the Western concept of the nation-state, it is mistakenly believed that pre-colonial Somalis lived



in a stateless society. This misconception ignores the existence of clan republics, which had established rules but lacked centralized rulers. The clan-based republics observed by European explorers and ethnographers during colonial and pre-colonial times did not conform to the Weberian model of a nation-state, which is defined by territorial boundaries. From the perspective of colonial explorers, Somalia lacked internationally recognized states, a national administration with genuine authority, formal nationwide legal and judicial systems, national banking and insurance services, national telecommunications and postal systems, national public services, formal education and healthcare systems, national police and public security, and water services ( Ingiriis, 2018). Despite this, Somalis managed to survive and prosper, utilizing their unique sociopolitical systems and clan-based state structures.

Moreover, Somalis managed to survive and thrive by relying on their own socio-political systems and state structures. During the pre-colonial era and much of the colonial period, the coastal areas in the north of Somali territory were referred to as “Guban,” which translates to the Burned Land. Prior to colonial intervention, the Somali regions (or more accurately, territories) were divided into clan-based zones, whose existence was widely recognized. Each clan acknowledged the presence of others in adjacent zones, despite fierce competition for resources such as water, land, pasture, camels, and women (Sosinski, 2014). With the onset of colonialism in the early 1880s, Somali territories in the Horn of Africa were divided by colonial powers into five regions: British Somaliland in the north, Somalia Italiana in the south, the Somali-inhabited northeastern province of Kenya the Northern Frontier District (NFD), La Côte Française des Somalis (the French Somali Coast, later renamed Djibouti), and the Somali-populated eastern Ethiopia.

In July 1960, two of these regions gained independence. At that time, no one anticipated that the newly formed republic, created from the union of British Somaliland and the UN Trust Territory of Somalia (formerly Somalia Italiana), would eventually become a failed post-colonial statebuilding experiment ( H. Abdulla, 2006). While colonial regimes divided the Somali territories into five regions, Somalis within Somalia have now organized themselves into five states. That were Galmudug State, Hirshabelle State, Jubbaland State, Puntland State, and Southwest State. Additionally, there are ongoing efforts within Somaliland to establish five clan-states, sometimes through violent means: Awdal State, Khaatumo State, Zeila/Lughaya State, Maakhir State, and Beesha Dhexe (Central Clan) State. This trend represents a reversion to the pre-colonial period, as

evidenced by the reconfiguration of these clan-states. The collapse of the state in Somalia, influenced by clan dynamics, prevented any single group from taking over the entire country, resulting instead in each clan controlling its own territory as a clan-state (Mark-Thiesen, A.

Mihatsch, & M. Sikes, 2021).

### 3.3 Political Factors

The security of a nation is a fundamental need, crucial for stability and development. Without stability, a country's prosperity and growth are jeopardized. Somalia has experienced prolonged violence and cruelty inflicted by its own people, enduring harsh conditions under both democratic and military regimes. During the democratic period (1960-1969), newly independent Somalia and its nascent institutions fell short of public expectations, leading to increased poverty and declining security. This era was marked by corruption, nepotism, and cronyism within state institutions (Sperber, 2021). The military regime, led by Siad Barre, exacerbated the situation through indiscriminate killings, village burnings, and torture as methods of control, mirrored by armed factions. The conflict resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, widespread displacement, and significant destruction of businesses and public infrastructure.

Despite numerous attempts by Somali political stakeholders to resolve the political crisis and establish interim and transitional governments, instability and political fragmentation persist (Gavin, 2022). Over the past two decades, Somalia has faced continuous unrest due to leadership issues and instability. Political disputes, leadership failures, lack of rule of law, and escalating national security concerns pose severe challenges to the stability of Somalia. The fundamental cause of Somalia's instability is poor governance. The arbitrary extension of what frequently constitutes exclusionary and unaccountable rule perpetuates this dysfunction. Clan and political rivalries continue to exist. Similar to previous Somalian governments, the relationship between the president and the prime minister, who hail from different clans, remains tense, although it is not as severe as during the Farmaajo administration (Felbab-Brown, 2023).

### 3.4 Power Struggle amongst Different Groups

Somalia's global security issues are deeply rooted in a persistent political crisis. The fall of Barre and the resulting "state failure" have been significant political events in Somalia. However, the current intricate political landscape largely stems from developments since 2004, when national

reconciliation talks led to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This agreement was contested from the beginning and has been a source of conflict ever since (M. Desai, 2019). The first president under the TFG was Abdullahi Yusuf. His administration was perceived as “a narrow coalition dominated by the clans of the President and his Prime Minister, Mohamed Ghedi.” Additionally, Yusuf was seen by some as “a puppet of neighboring Ethiopia,” which has been a significant influence in Somali affairs. By 2005, significant political divisions had emerged within Somalia’s TFG, further polarizing the political elite and hindering efforts to reestablish a centralized government (Magan, 2016).

### 3.5 Fall of Siad Barre and Civil War

Despite Somalia’s ethnic, religious, and linguistic homogeneity, its population is divided into clans tracing their lineage to a common ancestor. During the colonial era under Italy and Great Britain, clans became a key element in state administration and political rivalry. Colonial authorities established a patrimonial system for resource allocation, utilized divide-and-rule tactics along clan lines, and implemented collective punishment of clans. These strategies persisted during subsequent periods of conflict. Somalia achieved independence after a decade-long UN Trusteeship from 1950 to 1960. Adan Abdullah Osman Daar, president of the Legislative Assembly, was elected as provisional president. On July 12, 1960, President Adan Abdullah appointed Abdi Rashid Ali Shirmarke as prime minister. President Abdi Rashid Ali Shirmarke was assassinated by a government policeman in Las Anod, northern Somalia, on October 15, 1969. The northern and southern regions unified under a multi-party democracy, which lasted from 1960 to 1969 (D. Payton, 1980).

In 1969, a bloodless coup brought President Siad Barre to power. From 1969 to 1978, Barre’s regime enjoyed relative popularity and financial support from both the Soviet Union and Western institutions. While presenting Somalia as a constitutional state to international observers, Barre cultivated a patrimonial system increasingly centered on clan identity. The government funded and armed clan-based paramilitaries, worsening relations among communities that had previously coexisted peacefully and intermarried without significant conflict. Instead of entirely excluding certain clans, Barre coopted influential figures from specific sub-clans, leading to divisions within the larger clans ( S. Hall, 2015). During this period, the regime enacted laws granting the state

extensive powers of detention and execution. Several paramilitary groups, militias, and security agencies were established, including the National Security Service and the Victory Pioneers.

Moreover, the Barre regime grew increasingly oppressive and violent from the late 1970s through the 1980s. The 1980s saw the emergence of opposition armed groups, with the largest being the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM, primarily composed of members of the Isaak clan from northwestern Somalia, arose in response to state marginalization and abuse, including the purge of Isaak members from civil service positions, business confiscations, arrests, detentions, and violence against Isaak civilians ( Prunier, 1995). Throughout the 1980s, the Siad Barre regime reacted to opposition militias with increasingly violent and repressive measures targeting various clan populations. Starting in 1982, the government imposed curfews in certain areas, which served as a pretext for detaining and extorting civilians. Mobile Military Courts (MMCs) were deployed to combat opposition militants and their associated civilian populations.

Although the violence from 1988 to 1990 was predominantly one-sided, SNM forces were also responsible for civilian casualties. Sensing the weakening of the Barre regime, several clan-based militias emerged to secure control over their respective regions. The United Somali Congress (USC), representing the Hawiye clan in Central Somalia, formed in late 1989 ( Norris & Bruton, 2011). In one incident in Buli Burti, the Red Berets killed fifty unarmed civilians, including prominent local figures such as elected officials, clan elders, and Islamic leaders, in retaliation for a USC attack on Somali Armed Forces (SAF) troops. Despite these actions, the government continued to lose ground, eventually controlling only about ten to fifteen percent of the country's territory. By the end of 1990, the USC launched an offensive on Mogadishu, and on January 27, 1991, Barre fled the capital (Abidwahab, 2016).

### 3.6 Emergence of Islamic Courts Union (ICU)

Somalia's factionalism led to the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an alliance of Islamist groups that, by 2006, controlled and governed all of Mogadishu and much of south-central Somalia. The Islamic Union (IU) was an Islamist organization that did not rely on clan power. Its leaders, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, came from various clans. In 1996, the struggling IU fled to Mogadishu after clashing with General Aideed and others in different parts of the country and joined the Islamic court initiative. By 2000, these diverse but related courts formally

established the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an umbrella organization with Sheikh Aweys exerting significant influence over the group ( Barnes & Hassan, 2007). Shortly thereafter, certain elements within the ICU began adopting radical stances, causing concern for the US and provoking Ethiopia. The US was alarmed by the increasing radicalization within the ICU. But remained cautious due to its traumatic experiences in 1993, when Somali militias shot down two US Black Hawk helicopters. Consequently, it resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers and the subsequent dragging of some bodies through the streets of Mogadishu (Magara , 2021). The US supported Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia, which resulted in the ICU's collapse and the reinstatement of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Ethiopia achieved rapid and significant military successes and undertook efforts to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

However, the prolonged presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia and their joint military operations with TFG forces contributed to the radicalization of thousands of Somalis. This fueled the growth of increasingly violent armed groups in Somalia, most notably Al Shabaab ( Harper, 2012). There were four significant motives behind the establishment of the Islamic courts. Firstly, the courts' militias were able to eliminate the de facto borders that separated areas controlled by rival clans, a change that was particularly favored by Somali businessmen and supported by civilians who could once again travel safely. Secondly, faction leaders were able to sustain public support by enhancing security and stability through the Sharia court system. This system prioritized healthcare and education, reduced crime, implemented environmental regulations, and even nearly eradicated piracy during the ICU's six-month rule. Thirdly, the courts system helped to prevent inter-clan conflicts. Lastly, for Islamists, the courts served to promote Sharia as the foundation for an Islamic state (Deforche, 2013).

### 3.7 Emergence of Al Shabaab and its Development

Numerous sources detail the emergence and growth of Al Shabaab. Menkhaus, for example, highlights how by 2007 Somalia continued to experience political fragmentation and the marginalization of radicals within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and opposition groups. During this period, exiled leaders of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), which included non-Islamist Somalis. This move angered

Al Shabaab, causing it to break away. By early 2009, significant milestones were achieved, including the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the Djibouti agreement, which led to the establishment of a broad-based government featuring the moderate Islamist leadership of the ICU's Sheikh Sharif ( Klobucista, Masters, & Sergie, 2022).

Al Shabaab faced a significant political challenge as it encountered external pressure and a growing internal political consensus under President Sharif. The group also faced increasing resistance from clan militias allied with the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG), who opposed the rise of a radical jihadist group. Despite mounting pressure, Al Shabaab continued to regroup, organize, and expand. The 2009 battle involving the TFG, Al Shabaab, and another Islamist group, Hisbul Islamiyya, was a pivotal event in Al Shabaab's early development ( Blanchard, 2023). This conflict contributed to Al Shabaab's regrouping and strengthening but also highlighted that Islamism is not necessarily a unifying force in Somali politics. By 2011, Al Shabaab had extended its influence into the region, including kidnappings along the Kenyan coast, threatening Kenya's multi-million-dollar tourism industry.

In October 2011, Kenya launched a military operation against Al Shabaab in Somalia, named 'Operation Linda Nchi' (Protect the Nation). This was a significant security gamble for Kenya, as it did not involve conventional warfare. Kenyan troops later joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was established to combat Al Shabaab, among other objectives ( Hansen, March 2016). AMISOM is a complex peacekeeping mission with mixed and contested security outcomes. Despite AMISOM's presence, Al Shabaab continues to adapt, expand, and proliferate. Al Shabaab has remained resilient despite extensive regional and international military efforts, including US drone attacks. The group has demonstrated its ability to execute sophisticated attacks both within and outside Somalia, including the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, the 2015 Garissa University attack, and the 2019 DusitD2 attack ( Ramadane, 2014).

Additionally, Al Shabaab controls certain territories in Somalia where it provides various services, such as running COVID-19 response programs. The group is also reportedly adept at moving millions of dollars through formal banking systems. The recent wave of well-coordinated attacks demonstrates that Al Shabaab remains a formidable force, actively influencing Somali politics and posing an existential threat to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The pattern of Al Shabaab attacks shows how the terrorist group exploits political crises to undermine the Mogadishu

administration ( Sperber, 2021). If this trend continues unchecked, and if Somali leadership fails to develop effective strategies for resolving political crises, Al Shabaab may attempt to overthrow the

TFG. Given this risk, it is important for the people of Somalia and their leaders to intensify efforts towards swiftly resolving the current political crisis. Establishing mechanisms for efficient and predictable management of the country's political processes is essential (Wolseley Prah, 2023).

The war against Al-Shabaab's Islamist insurgency has devastated Somalia for over fifteen years, with no signs of abating. Military operations by the Somali government and its foreign partners have been hindered partly by discord between Mogadishu and the country's federal member states. Al-Shabaab has proven resilient, adapting to counter-insurgency efforts and embedding itself deeper into Somali society. The new government led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud may inspire confidence that Somali forces can effectively combat the militants (Marchal, 2019). However, defeating Al-Shabaab by force alone is unlikely. Mohamud's government should continue military operations while intensifying efforts to mend relations among Somali elites. Simultaneously, it should explore engaging Al-Shabaab's leaders to assess the feasibility of political talks and consider initial confidence-building measures to reduce violence. The challenges to dialogue with militants are substantial, but given that the alternative is ongoing war, engagement is worth attempting (Sosinski, 2014).

### 3.7.1 Relationships with Al-Qaeda

Since the fall of Somalia's central government in 1991, following the overthrow of Dictator Mohamed Siad Barre by warlords, Mogadishu, the nation's capital, has been a hotspot of conflict and competing militant factions. For the past 16 years, the absence of an official national police force has significantly contributed to the prevailing lawlessness. Al Qaeda and affiliated Islamic militant groups, such as the Islamic Courts Union (often referred to as the Somali Islamists), have been central too much of Somalia's ongoing violence since 1991. Over the past decade, these extremist groups have seized control of most of the country and its major cities, except for a few areas in the west and north near the Ethiopian border. Mohammed Atta, the al Qaeda terrorist responsible for piloting the first plane into the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, visited Somalia in 1998 (Krieger, 2007).

Some of Al Shabaab's founding members received training with Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in East Africa, including Fazul Mohammed, the late mastermind behind the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania have been associated with the group. Al

Shabaab expressed allegiance to Al Qaeda in its early years, and the groups announced a formal affiliation in 2012. While Al Shabaab's leaders broadly share Al Qaeda's transnational agenda, the group operates independently. Among other AQ affiliates, Al Shabaab maintains ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), collaborating on a smuggling network. In 2015, some Al Shabaab members advocated for shifting allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Al Shabaab leadership rejected this proposal and initiated a deadly crackdown on IS supporters. Despite this, a small IS faction in northern Somalia survived. Al Shabaab remains the dominant group and views the IS cell as a rival (Blanchard, 2023).

Moreover, the cooperation between the groups is limited and irregular, but the relationship has proven durable despite the loss of leaders on both sides and the emergence of the Islamic State in northeastern Somalia. The resilience of this alliance can be attributed to several factors: AlShabaab's connections to Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen, which may have enhanced Al-Shabaab's military expertise; Al-Qaeda's capability to assist Al-Shabaab in raising funds; Al-Shabaab's oath of allegiance (bayah) to Al-Qaeda; and the trust and predictability of the alliance, bolstered by ideological and personal ties among some leaders. Al-Shabaab leaders leverage this relationship to justify measures for enforcing unity, controlling its members, and preventing defections to the Islamic State. This flexible alliance allows Al-Shabaab leaders to access assistance and jihadi prestige while maintaining a high degree of autonomy (Bacon & Muibu, 2019).

### 3.8 Economic Instability

Among these nations, Somalia has experienced the most significant decline in prosperity relative to its status in the 1960s. The collapse of Siad Barre's government in 1991 triggered a prolonged civil war that ravaged the economy, infrastructure, and public institutions, leading to a substantial loss of human capital. This situation has been further exacerbated by climate shocks affecting agriculture and livestock, which together constitute the largest portion of Somalia's GDP. After two decades marked by conflict, state collapse, warlordism, and fragile transitional governments, the Federal Government of Somalia was established in 2012, introducing a "road map" aimed at stabilization, recovery, and reconstruction. This framework suggests that with gradual increases in



savings and investment, Somalia could potentially achieve rapid economic growth (M. Desai, Somalia's path to stability, 2019).

Somalia is not a member of any regional economic blocs and has few formal trade agreements with other nations. The US and the European Union currently do not have trade agreements with Somalia, and the country is not a member of the World Trade Organization, further complicating the ability of local firms to compete on regional and international levels. In 2012, Somalia exported goods valued at US\$693 million (509 million euros), according to data from the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade (Parrin, 2014). Although this marks a significant increase compared to 2008, when exports were less than half this amount, the country still faces a substantial trade deficit. In 2012, imports were valued at \$1.818 billion (1,335 million euros). Somalia's primary export market is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which absorbs more than half of its total exports.

Worth-mentioning, three countries UAE, Yemen, and Oman account for 82.5 percent of all exports, mainly livestock, from Somalia. Regional partners often impose strict restrictions on Somalia, primarily due to security concerns. Since the early 1990s, no official banknotes have been printed (Ahmed, 2017). The collapse of the Central Bank and the banking system created a vacuum in monetary and regulatory control, which completely disrupted the country's payment system. This led to "currency substitution and the growth of the parallel currency market," with warlords and militias issuing their own currency, resulting in a large black market for currency. Officially, the Somali shilling trades at around 1,200 to the US dollar, but on the black market, it is about 15 times that rate. The Central Bank continues to struggle with limited capacity and pervasive corruption (Hashi Nor, 2017).

Somalia holds vast reserves, and even before the collapse of the government, major companies were exploring the potential for mining oil and gas. However, the development of this sector is hampered by a lack of legislation and political conflicts at both regional and national levels. There is currently growing hostility between the Federal Government of Somalia and regional administrations that have signed oil deals independently of the government," noted a UN Monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea in a July letter to the Security Council (Wilson, 2016). The conflict is intensified by discrepancies between the 2008 petroleum law, which federal petroleum officials cite, and Somalia's Constitution. After the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime

in 1991, the private sector took over the provision of most basic goods and services, performing relatively well despite rampant insecurity and lack of infrastructure (Guha-Sapir & Ratnayake). Everything is being provided by the private sector - water, electricity, telecommunications, everything. In the absence of a government, a regulatory framework, and with no one else providing these services, the private sector had to step in and do what they could (Felbab-Brown, 2023).

### 3.9 External Powers: Instability in Somalia

International intervention in Somalia commenced in December 1992 with an initial military operation aimed at protecting relief supplies from looting and ensuring the effective distribution of food. Troops from multiple countries, including Australia, Canada, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Zimbabwe, participated in this effort. President Bush announced the United States' decision to establish a military operation to ensure the safety of the relief mission and provide logistical support to United Nations personnel. Subsequent negotiations took place in late December 1992 and early January 1993, primarily through United Nations channels. The Operation Restore Hope mission officially began on December 9, 1992. The operation's plan was largely adhered to with only minor adjustments (Ali Afyare, 2024).

#### 3.9.1 Role of UNO in Somalia

The United Nations had been involved in Somalia before the deployment of Operation Restore Hope. In January 1992, the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established with a mandate to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This included securing supply lines to urban centers, monitoring airports and seaports, and promoting the distribution of relief supplies within Somalia. According to U.N. Security Council Resolution 733, this mandate was confined to Mogadishu, and U.N. troops were restricted to protecting humanitarian supplies, explicitly prohibited from using force against any other targets (M. LEDERER, 2024). Despite its establishment, UNOSOM faced significant challenges due to political disunity, insufficient funding, and confusion over local leadership. The withdrawal of the U.N. security force created a security vacuum, which was exploited by Somali political factions, further destabilizing the country and leading to the initiation of Operation Restore Hope. The U.N. mission has closely collaborated with African Union peacekeepers. The current transitional mission, ATMIS, has been gradually reducing its presence and is scheduled to transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces by the

end of the year. In November, at Somalia's request due to ongoing conflicts with al-Shabab, the Security Council suspended the AU pullout for three months (Hassan, 2024).

### 3.9.2 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Instability in Somalia

Peace and security are essential for the well-being of citizens, underpinning the survival and development of a nation's political, social, and economic aspects. Unfortunately, Somalia has faced continuous conflict since the collapse of its state in 1991, resulting in an unstable security situation and significant humanitarian shortages. Peacekeepers, particularly from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), alongside community-operated organizations such as the United Nations, African Union, and European Union, play a crucial role in promoting stability and recovery (D Williams, 2013). AMISOM is a regional peacekeeping mission approved by the United Nations and operated by the African Union's Peace and Security Council. Its primary purpose is to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in stabilizing the country. Beyond peacekeeping, AMISOM aims to foster enduring peace by supporting the construction of essential Somali institutions. The mission, conducted by the African Union with logistical support from the United Nations, encompasses a range of tasks including reconciliation, peacebuilding, state-building, the provision of basic public services, and the establishment of conditions for inclusive and sustainable peace (Shahow, 2024).

Most casualties attributed to ATMIS are reportedly caused by retaliatory or indiscriminate fire from its troops when attacked by al-Shabaab using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines, or grenades. While incidents have decreased over the three-year period mentioned in the U.N. report, a significant source of harm from ATMIS/AMISOM has been due to AU vehicles unintentionally injuring civilians while traveling at high speeds in Mogadishu and other cities in south-central Somalia. Additionally, mortars fired by ATMIS at al-Shabaab positions, particularly from Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), sometimes land in civilian areas, causing casualties, injuries, and property damage (Hersi & O. Akinola, March 2024).

### 3.9.3 Impacts on Political Stability

International intervention in Somalia's security sector, supported by the UN, US, and EU, currently employs top-down approaches that grant politicians control over resources without assigning corresponding responsibilities. This approach may inadvertently increase the vocationalization of

security actors rather than decrease it. Establishing courts in Mogadishu should not be centered on supporting individual politicians, as this compromises their impartiality and undermines the rehabilitation of vocationalized forces. Reliable and enduring justice provision is more likely when political capture of justice duties is avoided or balanced (Bacon & Muibu, 2019). In analysis, from a bottom-up perspective, reveals that justice provision by traditional elders and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is closely tied to security. Understanding the roles of institutions involved in justice provision and how traditional elders and politicians share this responsibility is crucial. Although the focus often lies on security provision, justice remains a central issue.

It has been observed that linking security with justice provision is more likely to maintain justice as a public good. This connection, however, is not guaranteed and must be thoughtfully designed. In Mogadishu, the remnants of the defeated court system are viewed as political symbols of the TFG. Unlike the perceived impartiality of traditional elders, the defunct security courts, captured by warlords, lost their impartiality. Historical evidence shows the consequences of decoupling justice provision from security, emphasizing the need for a balanced and integrated approach to both (Hassan, 2024).

### 3.10 Conclusion

Decades-long instability in Somalia is a complex problem with historical, political, and socioeconomic roots. Ethnic and clan conflicts have been fostered by artificial borders and divisions, which have historically left profound scars from colonialism. Following independence, authoritarian governments most notably Siad Barre's dictatorship that used cruel methods to stifle dissent and hold onto power deepened these differences. When Barre's rule fell in 1991, competing groups fought for control of the country's newly created disarray. The emergence of warlords and the country's division into autonomous areas during this time severely weakened the legitimacy and ability of the central government to rule. Political instability has been sustained by the absence of a strong sense of national identity and efficient governing institutions. The inability of several transitional administrations to establish authority and credibility has been exacerbated by outside interference and rivalries within the area, which frequently lend support to opposing groups for tactical objectives. Socioeconomic factors such as ongoing poverty, unemployment, and underdevelopment make it easier for extremist organizations like Al-Shabaab to attract new

members by taking use of complaints against the national government. Furthermore, the humanitarian catastrophe is made worse by environmental issues like food shortages and recurring droughts, which undermine stability efforts. In order to address the root causes of Somalia's instability and promote lasting peace, a comprehensive strategy involving inclusive governance, economic growth, political reconciliation, and regional collaboration is needed.

## CHAPTER 4

# FACTORS CONTRIBUTING IN THE GROWTH OF AL-QAEDA AND AL-SHABAB IN SOMALIA

### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

Al-Shabaab, a militant Islamist group based in Somalia, has well-established connections to al-Qaeda. Since 2006, Al-Shabaab has been actively involved in an insurgency against Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The group initially emerged as a militia affiliated with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of local and clan-based Islamic courts that formed in southern Somalia in 2004 to combat the lawlessness and banditry following the collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre's government in 1991. Beginning around 2004, this militia functioned as the ICU's armed wing, incorporating former members of the disbanded Somali militant Islamist group al-Itihaad al-Islamiyyah and fighters who had either fought for or received training from al-Qaeda. Known as "the Youth" or al-Shabaab, the group was led by Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, a Somali operative reportedly trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al-Shabaab's ideology was more radical than that of the ICU, advocating a puritanical form of Islam that starkly contrasted with the Sufi-influenced practices of many Somalis (Khan, 2024).

In early 2006, al-Shabaab fighters played a crucial role in assisting the ICU in its battles against a coalition of Mogadishu warlords, who were secretly supported by the United States in an attempt to suppress militant Islamism. The ICU successfully defeated the warlords and took control of Mogadishu in June 2006, subsequently rebranding itself as the Somali Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SSICC). This victory significantly strengthened al-Shabaab, allowing them to capture the warlords' arsenals. The SSICC's control over Mogadishu raised concerns for the TFG, which was based in Kenya and the Somali city of Baydhabo, as well as for its international allies, especially the United States, which feared that the SSICC might provide a haven for al-Qaeda (Hansen, March 2016).

Throughout its decades-long political turmoil, radical Islamist organizations have come and gone in Somalia, one of the world's poorest countries. Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, also known as Unity of Islam, is a violent Salafi extremist group that peaked in the 1990s following the overthrow of the Siad

Barre military dictatorship (1969–1991) and the start of a civil war. Analysts see this group as al-Shabab’s forerunner and the breeding ground for many of its leaders. A group of Somali extremists with Middle Eastern education founded AIAI, which aimed to create an Islamist emirate in Somalia. Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, provided some funding and weapons for AIAI. Many of its warriors, including some of the current al-Shabab commanders, were driven out of the nation in the late 1990s by the Ethiopian army and its Somali backers, and many went to fight in Afghanistan. In the days following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. State Department classified the group as a terrorist organization ( Masters, 2014).

## 4.2 Emergence of Al-Shabab

Although its precise beginnings are unknown, al-Shabab became a unified force in 2004–2006, rising to prominence as a potent and exceptionally violent armed group while operating under the auspices of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which oversaw a large portion of southern and central Somalia in 2005-2006. In an effort to put an end to the wrongdoings of local warlords and bring in a time of stability and justice, the UIC movement gathered together local Shariah courts presided over by a varied range of religious and community leaders from Somalia. The leadership of the UIC comprised a broad range of Islamist figures, from moderates linked to local Sufi traditions, such as its chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, to more radical Salafi-leaning individuals like Hasan Dahir Aweys. Aweys had been a key figure in Somalia's first organized militant Islamist movement of the 1990s, al-Ittihad al-Islami (the Islamic Union) (Anzalone, 2014).

Moreover, the UIC successfully imposed law and order throughout the territory it controlled during its brief period of political power from 2003 to 2006, which seriously undermined the legitimacy of the weak and corrupt Somali TFG led by President Abdullahi Yusuf at the time. Since Mohamed Siyad Barre's overthrow and the start of the civil war in 1991, Somalia has not seen a comparable era of peace and rebirth. Aweys, the head of the UIC's shura consultative council, had served as a mentor to Adan Hashi Farah “Ayro,” the first Amir of al-Shabab and one of its original members. Ayro was the one who led the group's evolution from a tiny, covert organization to a larger military cadre and increased operational capabilities ( Hansen, 2013). In the 1990s, he traveled to Afghanistan and trained at a jihadist military camp, where he met Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda.

Although officially a component of the UIC's military wing, the group functioned as a separate unit during the intense combat in 2006. Eventually, 'Ayro separated with Aweys and chastised him for getting too entangled in clan politics. He then adopted a militant and globalized “Islamic” identity that, at least in theory, prioritized religious identification over clan and national identity. Due to the UIC's achievements, Somali diaspora populations in North America, Europe, East Africa, and Australia supported it, and some of the refugees from the civil war started to return ( Keating & Matt, 2018). Robow and Ibrahim al-Afghani (Ibrahim Hajji Jama Mee'aad), popularly known as Abu Bakr al-Zayla'i, were two additional founding members of Al-Shabab. They represented a range of Somali tribes and had also visited Islamist military training facilities in Afghanistan before, where they started setting the foundation for the organization that would eventually become al-Shabab when they returned in the second part of the 1990s. Their recruiting attempts were concentrated on young people without jobs in Somalia.

Ironically, the variety that made up the UIC's strength also made it a vulnerability. Ultimately, the more militant voices inside the umbrella contributed significantly to the open conflicts that broke out in the fall and winter of 2006 between the UIC and Ethiopia, a neighbor and regional giant (Mogadishu, 2023). Between February and June 2006, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, a military coalition of warlords and businessmen supported by the US, was decisively defeated by the UIC. This development alarmed Ethiopia's president, Meles Zenawi, who was worried about the potential rise of an "Islamic state" to the east. Tensions were further escalated by bombastic and inflammatory statements from certain UIC officials, especially from those in its military branch like Robow and warlord Yusuf Mohamed “Indha'adde” Siyad. As a result, on December 24, 2006, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia. By January 2007, the heads of the courts had left after the UIC's armed forces were soundly beaten in lopsided engagements by expertly trained and well-equipped Ethiopian soldiers (Johsons, 2017).

#### 4.2.1 Expansionism of Al-Shabab

#### 4.2.2 Ashes to Governance

Al-Shabab was forced into hiding after the Ethiopian invasion, but it came back to life in 2007 and began an insurgency against the Somali TFG, Ethiopian forces, and AMISOM forces. At this point, the group was completely independent of the UIC's remnants. Though not the sole armed resistance



force, the group possessed the highest level of organization and military prowess. It was also the most diversified, with members of several clans and sub-clans making up both the leadership and the general populace. The insurgency was not deterred by the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as the former UIC head or by the 2009 détente between UIC moderates and the TFG. Sheikh Sharif's election was deemed fraudulent by Al-Shabab, who also charged Sheikh Sharif and other UIC moderates of betraying their faith by consenting to take part in the TFG ( Mwangi, 2021). AlShabab benefited from mistakes and mistreatment committed by the TFG and Ethiopian forces, including the decision to outlaw the niqab (facial veil) during counterinsurgency operations and abuses of the civilian populace.

Al-Shabab rapidly gained territory in 2008, showcasing the group's leadership and field commanders with a brand-new difficulty: managing these regions and their inhabitants. Following its territorial expansion in the latter part of 2008 and early 2009, the group's leadership created eight administrative districts and named walis (governors) in each of these regions ( Di John, 2010). Known as “Islamic districts” (al-wilayat al-Islamiyya) in insurgent communiqués and media, these districts housed local Shariah courts, the office of finance and social affairs, and Jaysh al-Hisba, al-Shabab's "police" force. The TFG, Ethiopia, or its Somali militia partners retained active garrison forces from the Jaysh al-'Usra (Army of Difficulty/Hardship), the group's frontline fighting force, in areas bordering their territory.

Al-Shabab used a highly philistine interpretation of Shariah as its main tool for maintaining control over the regions it occupied (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). By 2009, the organization had succeeded in establishing a more peaceful and stable society, despite the use of violence, by implementing hudud penalties such as floggings, amputation of thieves' hands, and death. Shariah was put into effect for political and financial reasons. From an ideological standpoint, it aligned with al-Shabab's distinct Islamist political perspective, which somewhat elevates transnational Muslim identity and maintains that Islamic law is the only path to a decent society. Second, by using military force to impose “insurgent Shariah,” al-Shabab was able to suppress widespread criminal activity including highway robberies, theft, extortion, and murder while also fostering an atmosphere that let local businesses recover to some extent (Skjelderup, Ainashe, & Abdulle, 2020).

The local administrations of the organization levied taxes on these same areas, using the proceeds to finance social initiatives and military activities carried out by the rebels. Throughout 2009 and

2010, district officials and rebel leaders kept growing their local political systems. With intentions to ultimately expand these into other districts, al-Shabab's justice office started a complaints court (mahkama al-mazalim) in the Middle and Lower Shabelle areas in late 2011 in response to mounting battlefield pressures and dissatisfaction among civilian populations inside its holdings. Its foundation served to both demonstrate that rebel commanders were aware of atrocities by other insurgents were occurring and to create the appearance that the group was offering victims' compensation ( Last & Seaboyer, 2011). Along with carrying out small- and medium-sized building and repair projects, the rebel group courted the civilian populations inside its borders by repairing buildings and infrastructure that had been destroyed during the civil conflict.

Aware of the importance of media operations in its fight against the federal government of Somalia, as well as AMISOM and other international supporters, al-Shabab invested a great deal of effort in expanding its media infrastructure, which presently consists of websites, media offices, and terrestrial radio stations like al-Furqaan and al-Andalus. These media groups, especially the alKata'ib Media Foundation, consistently exhibit their reasonably sophisticated operations through their high-quality video productions in many languages, including English, Somali, Arabic, and Swahili (Walt & Solomon, 2014). Media strategists for Al-Shabab have also been in the forefront of using social media particularly twitter- as a propaganda weapon. However, social media has also shown to be a double-edged sword for the organization as it gives opponents of al-Shabab, especially ex-members like the late Omar Hammami, the ability to confront and engage the group's media operators in open online discussions.

Aware of its limited appeal to Somalis and its limited supply of money and personnel, al-Shabab started to methodically focus on planning public events in 2009. These include youth contests for memorizing and reciting the Quran, training sessions for local Shariah court judges and clan elders, training sessions for merchants, and celebrations of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha ( Lederach, Clos, & Ansel, 2011). An ideological education component is also a part of the group's recruitment training routine; fighters, and especially recruiters/missionaries (du'at), must complete a curriculum via one of al-Shabab's "academies," such as the Abdullah Azzam Military Academy. The education office of the rebel group has also attempted to alter the curriculum in kid-friendly schools under its jurisdiction, introducing a strict section where "deviant" religions-Shii Islam, the faith of the Alawite people, Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, and Judaism are openly denounced. The

leadership of the group is well aware of the necessity of brainwashing next generations of adherents and supporters (Anzalone, 2014).

#### 4.2.3 Clan politics and Clannism: Al-Shabab

The leadership of Al-Shabab approached clan politics and "clannism" within Somalia with pragmatism. Though rebel leaders have harshly criticized blind and destructive clan loyalty, pointing out that they were largely to blame for the country's protracted civil conflict, clan politics have not completely disappeared. Through their media activities, the rebels portray themselves as one of the only organizations in the nation where people from a wide range of clans and sub-clans may not only fit in, but also thrive. In contrast to the majority of other groups in Somalia, whose members typically come from one or two clans or sub-clans, the group's leadership and membership are recruited from several clans and sub-clans ( Schaefer & Black, 2011). Elders from clans and sub-clans have also engaged in double dealing, attempting to place clan members in high positions inside al-Shabab and the Somali government in order to minimize their losses and strengthen their ties to both sides of the ongoing battle. Al-Shabab has also attracted members from disgruntled Kenyan Muslims and the minority Bantu populations in southern Somalia.

#### 4.2.4 Strategies of Al-Shabab

The legitimacy strategies employed by Al-Shabaab as a non-state armed entity are analyzed within the context of Somalia's state collapse. As previously said, the political process approach emphasizes that it is essential to analyze movements' methods and formation within the framework of their political environment. The formation, tactics, and degree of success of these movements are all influenced by the political opportunity structure. When a state falls apart, its citizens are left without access to fundamental social, economic, and political goods and services as well as efficient government. Non-state actors get the chance to offer some of these products and services, and as a result, they gain legitimacy ( Mwangi, 2021). The breakdown of Somalia's state has given AlShabaab the chance to implement tactics meant to win over the local populace and establish its legitimacy. A few of these tactics are covered in this section. They consist of: spreading xenophobia and Somali nationalism; using propaganda; changing society; and offering social services. All of these tactics use different forms of Islamism.

### 4.3 Somali Nationalism and Xenophobia

Utilizing Islamism, Al-Shabaab has used racism and Somali nationalism to undermine the TFG and outside players like AMISOM, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The goal is to both validate its existence and rally public support for its violent uprising, particularly the jihad. Following Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia in 2006, a wave of extreme nationalist feeling among Somalis emerged, encouraging Al-Shabaab to use Somali nationalism to garner support for its military operations and further its extremist goals both inside and outside of Somalia. However, the employment of Somali nationalism is motivated more by pragmatic considerations than by true nationalist or intellectual views. Complex cocktail of nationalist, Islamist, anti-Ethiopian, antiAmerican, anti-Western, antiforeigner sentiments were sparked by Ethiopian forces' occupation of Somalia ( Elliot & Holzer, 2009). As a result, Al-Shabaab became the principal force behind armed opposition to Ethiopian occupation. By fusing jihadist ideology with Somali nationalism and antiEthiopian sentiment, the group was able to garner the sympathy of many Somalis, including many who had previously been leery of its radical Islamism.

Al-Shabaab targets Kenya with nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric for several political reasons. These include Kenya's political and military support for Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), its endorsement of US-supported counterterrorism efforts aimed at Somalis and Somalia, and its perception as a Christian state. Kenya is widely viewed as a frontline state against the spread of Islamist extremism in the Horn of Africa (Menkhaus, 2009). Al-Shabaab and United Nations (UN) agencies have highlighted Kenya's involvement in recruiting and training Kenyan Somali and Somali youth for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its military. Al-Shabaab has also leveraged nationalism and anti-Kenyan sentiment in response to Kenya's military intervention in Somalia, which began in August 2011. Subsequently, the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), which led this operation, were integrated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in July 2012.

Since the incursion, Al-Shabaab has characterized the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) as an occupying force. Djibouti faces a comparable situation, having received support from the United States for its military involvement with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. During the Obama administration, efforts were made to bolster the TFG by funding arms and aiding

the Djiboutian military in training Somali troops (Pippard, 2010). Al-Shabaab's hostility towards AMISOM is rooted in the belief that the force serves as a principal defender of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Various factions within Al-Shabaab have joined forces against AMISOM, gaining support from the Somali people by condemning the AU mission's methods as un-Islamic and exploiting long-standing Somali grievances against foreign interference. Al-Shabaab has also denounced AMISOM as an occupying force. Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and AMISOM have all been labeled as 'apostates' by Al-Shabaab, with the aim of inciting religious and nationalist sentiments among Somalis. This rhetoric, featured in numerous Somali newspapers and websites, advocates for the expulsion and withdrawal of these 'apostates' from Somalia (Blanchard, 2023).

#### 4.4 Conspiracy

Al-Shabaab's use of nationalism and xenophobia to build legitimacy is closely linked to its propaganda efforts. The state's collapse creates a fertile ground for propaganda by opening up new avenues for political expression. Without functional legal media constraints, non-state actors like Al-Shabaab can establish their own media outlets and spread propaganda freely, allowing them to shape the political narrative and pursue their goals. Al-Shabaab seeks community support and legitimacy through significant investments in Somalia's multimedia sector. The group has crafted a strategic communications approach to bolster its extreme form of Islamism and discourage external intervention in Somalia. Its propaganda primarily aims to glorify its role in global jihad and criticize the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). By using Quranic texts to validate its political claims, Al-Shabaab's media significantly impacts Somali youth, who are particularly influenced by its messages due to their age and social context.

Al-Shabaab leverages the internet to spread its propaganda through a strategy with three primary objectives. First, it bypasses the mistrust towards Western and some Muslim media outlets. Second, it showcases the group's technological capabilities, distinguishing itself as the sole faction in Somalia with professionally maintained websites and high-quality video production. Third, it enables communication with the Somali diaspora and the global jihadi network. The group's videos, aligned with its politico-religious ideologies, feature compelling rhetoric that resonates with the public. Al-Shabaab's media output encompasses not only reports on martyrdom operations and

military successes but also governance issues. Its radio stations, including Quran Karim Radio FM, Somali Wayen Radio FM, HornAfrik Radio, and Radio Al-Andalus, broadcast jihadist content and present the movement as a provider of vital economic and political services, thus positioning itself as a competent governing force in Somalia. The ultimate aim of these efforts is to gain legitimacy.

#### 4.5 Islamism: Social Transformation

One of Al-Shabaab's key strategies for legitimizing itself is to reshape Somali society and assert social control. The group advocates for Islamism as a means of social transformation, using its extreme interpretation to standardize Somali culture and society. This approach seeks to eradicate what Al-Shabaab views as detrimental traits, such as clannism and Islamic pluralism. By promoting Salafi-Wahhabism, Al-Shabaab challenges existing social structures, forges cross-clan alliances, and presents a revolutionary alternative intended to gain legitimacy. Although Somalis share common ethnicity, culture, language, and religion, clan affiliations are a major aspect of their identity. Clans employ traditional customary laws to govern their communities independently of modern state frameworks, wielding significant influence over society.

In Somalia, Islam functions as a unifying identity that transcends clan divisions, while society is predominantly organized by lineage. Alliances are typically formed based on the closeness of one's lineage to others. Traditionally, Islamic identity is expected to complement rather than challenge the dominance of clannism. Historically, Somalia's conflicts were mainly between warring clans and sub-clans. However, this dynamic shifted significantly with the collapse of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the emergence of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab's strategy is to transform Somalia's predominantly Shafi'i Sunni Muslim population, traditionally influenced by apolitical Sufi orders, into radical Wahhabi-Salafist followers. This transformation aims to standardize Somali society and diminish the influence of clannism.

Al-Shabaab has addressed the challenges posed by clannism in two key ways. First, it has leveraged the widespread desire for unity among the population. The group's leadership is notably diverse in terms of clan representation, a departure from traditional Somali norms. By promoting individuals from minority clans to senior positions and encouraging them to protect against traditionally dominant clans, Al-Shabaab has expanded its influence across various regions. The movement's rhetoric explicitly dismisses clan loyalty, which is vital for engaging with a society deeply rooted

in clannism. Second, Al-Shabaab has utilized its extremist Salafi-Wahhabi ideology to recruit and indoctrinate young fighters who are less influenced by clan affiliations. These recruits, being more susceptible to radicalization, are quickly absorbed into the group's global jihadist agenda. Consequently, the movement has extended its control over clan dynamics.

Al-Shabaab's interpretation of Islamism, characterized by an ultraconservative application of Shari'a, functions as its primary ideological and political framework. The movement recognizes that effectively reintegrating into Somali society scarred by years of political violence requires a process of religious (re)socialization. Al-Shabaab provides several pathways for this process. Its extreme form of Islamism disregards historical debates on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and Shari'a, allowing young adherents to believe that their interpretation is the sole correct one. This belief empowers them to challenge dissenting views, including those of elders and religious leaders (wadaad). Additionally, Al-Shabaab's version of Islamism offers a means for the youth to connect with global jihadist networks and practice their faith irrespective of local conditions. By leveraging its religious rhetoric and practices, Al-Shabaab has achieved a measure of social control and legitimacy.

#### 4.6 Factors Responsible for the Emergence of Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in Somalia

The government of Somalia has failed to perform its core functions like providing political and economic goods and services which caused crises of authority and legitimacy that can ultimately lead to collapse of Somalia.

##### 4.6.1 Failure of Government to Provide Basic Necessities

A major issue facing the nation is the absence of a well-functioning administration that can sufficiently supply these services. There has rarely been a significant civil service presence within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. In many regions of the country, AlShabaab has been the only entity able to provide essential services due to the absence of a functional government. It has succeeded in part because the TFG was unable to provide vital services that were in dire need of delivery. Al Shabaab offers the following services: employment, public works

and local administration, food and alms distribution, training and education, justice and security, and public works.

#### 4.6.2 Education

Many Somalis lack access to education, and Al-Shabaab is becoming more and more involved in the field of education. It is the sole organization that offers education in many parts of the nation, although a narrowly focused and fundamentalist “Islamic education curriculum”. Although it doesn't seem like the organization has established any schools or hired instructors just yet, in some of its administrations, it has put administrators in charge of education. In southern Somalia, there are increasingly extremist madrassas (Islamic schools) where youngsters are brainwashed in radical interpretations of Islam and pushed to join the ranks of Al-Shabaab. These institutions also harbor sympathizers and members of the organization. For instance, the school authorities in southern Somalia's Lower Shabelle district exercised their power in January 2010 by dividing pupils into male and female sections and mandating that all students follow rigid Islamic dress requirements.

Additionally, the authorities renamed the schools after Muhammad's adherents. Al-Shabaab and the Saudi government sponsor madrassas and mosques, which tend to have a fundamentalist bent. Al-Shabab also runs educational initiatives in an effort to create significant connections among society. It has held Qur'anic recitation and memorization competitions for youngsters, education sessions for Islamic preachers and da'wa militants, and information seminars on the legal obligations of traders, including women, in accordance with Al-Shabab's interpretation of Shari'a. One example of this was a training session for Shari'a court judges in all the territories controlled by Al-Shabaab, which was conducted under the direction of the movement's Office of the Judiciary and ran from March until early June of the same year.

#### 4.6.3 Distribution of Food

Al-Shabaab is essential in distributing food and cash to the impacted and vulnerable populations in a nation where hunger and drought are pervasive and violent. It has established food distribution centers, gathers zakat from the areas under its jurisdiction, and then gives money to the most vulnerable. Additionally, AlShabaab is trying to establish some credibility by managing the delivery of food assistance inside the nation. It supervises the distribution of food aid and which



foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are allowed to work in the areas under its jurisdiction. To implement its rules, the organization set up a "Office for Supervising the Affairs of Foreign Agencies." Al-Shabaab wants to establish itself as the rightful ruler of the areas it controls and to project an image of protection for the populace, which is why it is working to influence foreign non-governmental organizations. First off, Al Shabaab charges that foreign food aid and the US government are undermining Somali farmers in the midst of harvest season. Additionally, it cautions the Somali people not to rely too much on outside help.

Thus, Al-Shabaab has outlawed the delivery of any food assistance linked to the US and other Western nations. The World Food Program (WFP) has been asked to only provide food aid that is harvested in Somalia. Al-Shabaab uses international NGO regulation as a means of projecting an image of protecting the Somali people against a US plot that used humanitarian aid to destabilize the nation.<sup>69</sup> Second, the name of this "Office" gives Somalis the impression that Al-Shabaab is better than foreign organizations in the areas it controls. This impression is strengthened when foreign nongovernmental organizations are told by the Al-Shabaab administration when, how, and where they can give relief, and when these directives are subsequently violently enforced. For instance, in July 2009, the movement invaded the headquarters of two UN assistance organizations in southern Somalia and subsequently prohibited the activities of three UN relief organizations in regions it controlled, demonstrating its ability to enforce its rules.

#### 4.6.4 Absence of Local Administration

The protracted instability and underdevelopment of Somalia have been greatly exacerbated by the lack of efficient local government. When the central government collapsed in 1991, a power vacuum resulted in the country being divided into areas ruled by warlords and numerous militias based on clans (Menkhaus, 2006). Local government mechanisms collapsed in the absence of a centralized authority, leaving the public sector, law enforcement, and courts in disarray. Extremist organizations like Al-Shabaab have taken advantage of this power vacuum to create parallel governments and seize control of vast areas of land, which has prolonged conflict and instability (Hansen, 2013). Al-Shabaab has set up governments other than the TFG to rule "Islamic Provinces" in the absence of local governance or local government structures. Additionally, in many of the regions under its jurisdiction, it has delegated power to neighborhood associations. Al-Shabaab

uses its Islamic local governments to offer public works services that would often come from government funding. The Islamic Provinces' governments have organized their local constituencies to carry out public works initiatives, such constructing bridges and fixing roads.

The movement also manages local governance, and part of that is trying to regulate information flow in order to shape public opinion and establish credibility. In addition, the execution of development initiatives and the distribution of humanitarian relief have been hampered by the lack of local government. The implementation of healthcare services, educational initiatives, and infrastructure projects all depend on efficient local administration. But in Somalia, the absence of trustworthy local government entities has resulted in corruption and poor administration, taking funds away from those in need (Leeson, 2007). The lack of local partners makes it difficult for international assistance groups to function in such a setting and makes it difficult for them to give ongoing help. This impedes not just short-term relief operations but also long-term development and rebuilding projects that are essential to national stabilization.

Furthermore, attempts to create inclusive and legal political processes have been hampered by the lack of local governance. In order to promote community involvement and guarantee that the opinions of various groups are heard during the decision-making process, local governance frameworks are essential. The absence of these kinds of institutions has exacerbated political marginalization and disenfranchisement in Somalia, especially for disadvantaged groups and minority clans (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). It is challenging to accomplish national reconciliation and peacebuilding as a result of this exclusion, which has stoked resentment and disputes. Rebuilding local government is so essential to creating a framework for governance, promoting social cohesion, and aiding in Somalia's general stabilization and progress.

#### 4.6.5 Unemployment

One of the main causes of Somalia's instability is unemployment, which also has a major impact on the region's ongoing violence and socioeconomic problems. High rates of unemployment have made it easier for radical organizations like Al-Shabaab to attract new members and radicalize existing ones, especially among young people. In order to achieve financial stability and social recognition, many young Somalis are left with few options due to the lack of economic prospects, which frequently leads them to join militant groups. This is according to Ali and Ahmed (2019).

The vicious cycle of extremism and unemployment feeds into violence and thwarts national stabilization initiatives.

Additionally, unemployment increases social unrest and poverty, which in turn fuels civil unrest and erodes the legitimacy of the state as an effective government. Somalia has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, at over 67%, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2020). This has serious ramifications for social cohesion and development. Because of the high unemployment rate and general poverty, many turn to criminal enterprises like smuggling and piracy as a last resort for survival. It is difficult for the administration to enact sensible policies and uphold order in a context of lawlessness and instability. Furthermore, the absence of job prospects makes it more difficult to reconstruct Somalia's economy and infrastructure, which impedes long-term stability. Lack of a strong labor market deters investment and slows economic expansion, which feeds a vicious cycle of instability and underdevelopment. According to Elmi (2021), as people grow more pessimistic about the chances of an economic recovery, the ongoing unemployment crisis undermines public confidence in national and international institutions. Therefore, addressing unemployment is essential for long-term peace and sustainable development in Somalia, as well as for lowering current security risks. In order to break this cycle and achieve stability, the government must work in tandem with foreign partners to enhance education and vocational training, as well as to provide employment possibilities.

The local population is also employed by the movement. The main method for accomplishing this is via hiring both military and civilian staff. Dedicated to global jihad and Salafi-Wahhabism, AlShabaab's leaders effectively leverage their organizational skills, theological expertise, and financial resources to continuously recruit, train, and motivate followers to participate in jihad, particularly as combatants and suicide bombers. These resources typically have an emotional and financial pull on those who join as fighters and suicide bombers because they believe the movement's potential advantages exceed its possible drawbacks. Al-Shabaab compensates their suicide bombers and regular soldiers for lives lost during combat. It has established a formal compensation structure that pays a fighter or low ranking officer a monthly wage ranging from US\$60 to US\$200. Suicide bombers also receive financial rewards for recruiting, and their families receive substantial compensation for carrying out the suicide mission, therefore the costs associated

with them are higher. In addition to military members, Al-Shabaab also hires civilians to undertake particular tasks or handle secretarial work.

#### 4.6.6 Lack of Interaction between Political Leader and Public

Al-Shabaab offers additional services, including as outreach initiatives based on well planned town visits by its commanders. The movement uses a well-known strategy known as “koormeer,” or "visit," in which its soldiers pay a visit to a town or village in order to acquire legitimacy. The public relations and political approach is really well-thought-out. Publicly addressing the populace, clerics discuss the necessity for reforms and the benefits the movement may provide the Somali people. Al-Shabaab also arranges marketplaces and offers medical services. In addition to welcoming it into their cities, Somali communities particularly those in the south have occasionally donated zakat to support the movement's jihadi activities. As a means of maintaining its operations, Al-Shabaab relies heavily on community-level operations, which is why it is always looking to develop its local infrastructure and support. Al-Shabaab strives to spread the word about its continual investment in human, financial, and material resources for the provision of essential products and services to demonstrate its ability to assume a "governance role" inside the nation. According to analysts any regular force will find it impossible to eradicate the movement as long as it has the backing of the general public and retains all of its strategic advantages, including mobility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali people. Gaining the support of Somalia's civilian population is a necessary first step in combating Al-Shabaab.

#### 4.7 Emergence of Al-Qaeda in Somalia

After the Soviet Union fell apart and the Afghan War ended in 1989, bin Laden founded Al Qaeda with the goal of waging jihad against America, which he perceived as the new great enemy of Islam. The initial assault by Al Qaeda happened at the December 1992 marked the start of the USUN operation in Somalia. An important turning point in the 1990s for the growth of Al Qaeda was the Somali conflict. Although Washington was unaware of it at the time, military support from bin Laden's multinational insurgent group, Al Qaeda, and some of bin Laden's fighters' involvement in the Black Hawk Down incident which ultimately led Clinton to withdraw US troops from Somalia were partially responsible for the militia led by General Aideed's standing stiff

resistance in the country (Clarke, 2009). The Clinton administration's PDD 25 of May 1994 gave official language to the phenomenon that came to be known as the “Somalia Syndrome.”

This action represented a definite retreat from the more conventional state-centric approach to international security from the notion that taking part in multilateral intervention in failing governments served a national interest for the united governments. A gap began to appear between US security strategy and the post-Cold War era's altered security landscape with the onset of the Somalia Syndrome (Rwengabo, 2016). Al Qaeda launched a series of progressively increasing terrorist attacks against American interests and people, as well as those of allies, in countries including Somalia, the United States, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen between 1992 and 2000. Furthermore, compared to its predecessor, the Bush administration did far less to discourage organizations like Al Qaeda from pursuing jihad against the United States convinced that the Black Hawk Down tragedy's true lesson was that it had (G. Patman, 2015).

The Bush administration effectively reasserted the "Somalia Syndrome," rejecting nation-building and reinforcing the traditional belief that security primarily depended on the military capabilities of the sovereign state. This stance emphasized the risks and limitations of intervening beyond the scope of American national interests. Consequently, the Bush administration was conceptually hesitant to recognize that non-state terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda posed a significant threat to the US (Bari, 2024).

#### 4.7.1 Al-Qaeda and Its Activities in Somalia

It seemed that the conflicting clans and Islam would make it difficult for foreign Islamic soldiers to enter Somalia. Although there was a great deal of difference across the groups, there was one important connection. The side led by General Mohammed Farah Aideed and the AIAI were adamantly against the UNOSOM peacekeeping mission. This acted as a catalyst for unrest against US and UN soldiers in Somalia and as a point of entry for foreign Islamists into the nation. Al Qaeda took advantage of this and started aggressively interacting with the main Somalian organizations. The main goals of al Qaeda envoys to Somalia were to establish a base of operations by assisting Hussein, the son of General Aideed, and al-Ittihad al-Islamiya ( T. Wilson, 2005). The factions were desperate for bin Laden's financial and military help as they fought for control of

Somalia due to the political unrest, physical destruction, and UN involvement. Al Qaeda would not have been able to wreak its havoc on the United States without these crucial ties.

Al-Qaeda would have had to deal with being outsiders who were very different from the local Somalis in many aspects if it had just turned up in Somalia. Al Qaeda would have had to overcome not just the ethnic divide but also the struggle between its religion and the deeply ingrained clan structure in Somalia (Levy, 2024). The groups' mutual understanding served as the foundation from which they could function. Even though there were some signs that this connection was developing before the peacekeeping troops were ambushed, it was mostly missed until the operation had been thoroughly examined and evaluated. Information from sources confirms bin Laden's involvement," the CIA subsequently declared. Osama was charged by the US Attorney General on June 8, 1998, for his part in providing instruction to the tribesmen who murdered eighteen American servicemen in Somalia in 1993 (Osman, 2013).

Moreover, the AIAI's disdain for UNOSOM soldiers prevented any delegates from entering Luuq or conducting business there. Arabs were permitted to visit the Islamic government on a sporadic basis by small aircraft while this veil was in place. There have been several reports of Sudanese backing for AIAI in Luuq. This raised the possibility that foreign Islamic militants were using or supporting the community. The withdrawal of U.S. soldiers in March 1994 prevented the U.S. from inflicting a fatal blow to al Qaeda's intention to spread internationally, primarily because of ignorance (Atwan, 2015). The connections that the organizations had been founded in Somalia were meant to be long-term endeavors in the nation and surrounding area, not just temporary ones. There were three goals for the connection. Three goals are in sight: first, to grow its base in Somalia while fighting American soldiers stationed there; second, to strengthen ties with the AIAI and other armed Islamist organizations; and third, to branch out from Somalia and develop operations throughout Africa. Although this region was the main target, the group also benefited from the presence of US soldiers in neighboring Somalia and other nations. U.S. intelligence claims that al Qaeda conducted preparations for the 1998 embassy attacks from Somalia, using the country as a regional base of operations ( G. Jones, Liepman, & Chandler, 2016).

#### 4.7.2 Al-Qaeda's Strategies in Somalia

The worldwide terrorist group Al-Qaeda has used a number of tactics to become established and keep up its presence in Somalia, a country marked by political unrest and violence. Using local militant organizations, most notably Al-Shabaab, as proxies to achieve its goals has been one of the main tactics. Al-Qaeda has been able to expand its ideological influence and take use of local resources and expertise thanks to this cooperation (Botha, 2013). Originally a nationalist rebel group, Al-Shabaab has been more and more aligned with the global jihadist ideology that Al-Qaeda espouses. The symbiotic connection between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab in Somalia has been made possible by their shared ideologies. Al-Qaeda provides training, finance, and strategic direction, while Al-Shabaab supplies personnel and operational capabilities (Hansen, 2013). Al-Qaeda has been able to continue its operations in spite of the difficulties presented by counterterrorism initiatives thanks in large part to this collaboration.

Utilizing the socio-political and economic grievances of the local populace is a key tactic used by Al-Qaeda in Somalia. Al-Qaeda has been able to recruit militants and acquire support by portraying itself as the protector of Islam and the Somali people against foreign meddling and unscrupulous administration. This story works especially well in places where there is little to no government presence, which gives Al-Qaeda the opportunity to seize the initiative (Barnes & Hassan, 2007). Al-Qaeda has used pragmatic tactics in addition to ideological propaganda to win people over. One noteworthy tactic has been the provision of social services, including healthcare, education, and legal assistance. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have gained legitimacy and support by providing for the population's urgent necessities and establishing a semblance of administration (Menkhaus, 2006).

Al-Qaeda has also used highly developed military techniques as part of its operational strategy in Somalia. These include targeted assassinations that are directed at both foreign and domestic targets, suicide bombers, and guerilla warfare. These strategies accomplish a number of goals: they weaken the legitimacy of the Somali government, discourage outside action, and preserve an atmosphere of unrest and terror that supports Al-Qaeda's goals (Shinn, 2011). Propaganda and the media have been important tools in Al-Qaeda's arsenal in Somalia. Social media is only one of the many venues Al-Qaeda has used to spread its message, acknowledge its accomplishments, and

enlist new recruits. Its use of the media not only expands its audience but also keeps its supporters and operators motivated (Maruf & Joseph, 2018).

Al-Qaeda has also carefully formed partnerships with other extremist organizations inside the area. Al-Qaeda has expanded its influence outside of Somalia and improved its operational skills by forming a network of allied organizations. The jihadist movement in East Africa as a whole has been strengthened by these partnerships since they have made it easier to share resources, information, and operational knowledge (Vidino, 2005). Another noteworthy tactic has been the enlistment of foreign fighters. People from all around the world have been drawn to Al-Qaeda's cause in Somalia. The skills, resources, and networks that these foreign fighters frequently bring to the table improve Al-Qaeda and its affiliates' operational efficacy. Furthermore, their existence emphasizes how worldwide Al-Qaeda's jihadist mission is (Harmon, 2010). For both regional and international entities, combating Al-Qaeda in Somalia has proven to be a difficult task. The group's capacity to bounce back from setbacks and carry on with its operations is a clear indication of its adaptability and resilience. Its decentralized structure, which preserves doctrinal consistency while granting local affiliates substantial authority, contributes to its resiliency (Menkhaus, 2014).

#### 4.7.3 Objectives of Al-Qaeda in Somalia

Al-Qaeda's engagement in Somalia is motivated by a variety of intricate aims that stem from its overarching strategic objectives. Establishing a base of operations in the Horn of Africa and using Somalia's advantageous position to launch strikes against opponents in the region and the West is one of the main goals. Al-Qaeda attempted to take advantage of the power vacuum left by the early 1990s collapse of the Somali state in order to provide a safe haven for its agents and associates (Menkhaus, 2004). Al-Qaeda also wants to assist regional Islamist organizations like Al-Shabaab in their efforts to impose Sharia law throughout Somalia. Al-Qaeda improves its operational skills and expands its ideological clout by forming alliances with these organizations and enlisting local militants. The 2012 declaration of Al-Shabaab's allegiance to Al-Qaeda was a major step toward the organization's establishment of an Islamic emirate in Somalia (Hansen, 2013).

One of Al-Qaeda's goals in Somalia is to weaken the influence of the West in the area. To destabilize the area and dissuade international engagement, Al-Qaeda targets Western interests and allies, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali government troops.



Al-Qaeda's worldwide strategy, which aims to lessen Western military and political influence in nations with a majority of Muslims, is characterized by a persistent anti-Western posture (Shinn, 2011). Moreover, Somalia serves as a training ground for terrorists used by Al-Qaeda. The constant fighting and the ungoverned areas provide it the perfect setting for teaching new recruits terrorist and guerilla warfare techniques. Then, these recruits may be used to carry out attacks both domestically and abroad, supporting Al-Qaeda's overarching goal of waging worldwide jihad (Masters, 2015).

Al-Qaeda's other main goal in Somalia is to finance its activities. The profitable black market channels in the area, such as smuggling and piracy, provide considerable cash sources. Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations frequently take use of local resources to finance their operations, as seen by Al-Shabaab's control over ports and their role in the smuggling of charcoal to the Gulf nations (UN Security Council, 2014). Al-Qaeda also seeks to strengthen its base of support in Somalia by taking advantage of local grievances and clan dynamics. Al-Qaeda may more successfully recruit and assimilate into Somali society by framing itself as a protector of underprivileged tribes or those denied rights by the government. This strategy aids in maintaining and strengthening the insurgency's long-term efforts (Barnes & Hassan, 2007). Another fundamental goal is to spread Salafi-jihadist ideology. Al-Qaeda uses media and education as tactics to win over hearts and minds in order to indoctrinate the local populace with its radical interpretation of Islam. Al-Qaeda seeks to ingrain a strict ideological base that will support its long-term objectives through the establishment of madrasas and the dissemination of literature (Marchal, 2011).

Al-Qaeda's ambitions in Somalia are strategically aligned with the goal of regional instability. Al-Qaeda aims to prevent the formation of powerful, secular, or Western-aligned regimes in the area by promoting instability. Chaos like this undermines international counterterrorism operations as well as regional security, providing Al-Qaeda with additional leeway (Le Sage, 2010). The objective of Al-Qaeda's presence in Somalia is to help its affiliates throughout Africa and beyond with operational and logistical assistance. Al-Qaeda can more easily transfer militants, weapons, and supplies between the Middle East, East Africa, and other operational theaters because to Somalia's advantageous geographic position. Its international terrorist effort depends on this network (Pham, 2011). Last but not least, Al-Qaeda wants to undermine and eventually replace

Somalia's established power institutions with its own form of government. Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations want to create legitimacy and seize control of regions by creating courts, providing social services, and implementing their interpretation of Sharia law. This shadow government is a component of a larger plan to establish an Islamic state that has the same ideology as Al-Qaeda (Harnisch, 2010).

## 4.8 Conclusion

Historical, sociopolitical, and economic issues all had a role in the rise of Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in Somalia. In the past, Somalia saw a protracted period of civil conflict and state disintegration following the fall of the Siad Barre administration in 1991. Because there was no central administration, there was an atmosphere of disorder and lawlessness, which was ideal for the growth of extremist organizations. Because there was a leadership vacuum, extremist organizations like Al-Shabab were able to take advantage of the turmoil and dissatisfaction in the community by promising peace and order. Socio-politically, the growth of these militant organizations was greatly aided by the clan-based structure of Somali society and the factionalism that followed. Al-Shabab, in particular, was particularly skilled at navigating the intricate relationships between clans, allying with some while marginalizing others. Their astute placement enabled them to acquire credibility and support from the community. These organizations also profited from the failure of several regional and international initiatives, which were frequently seen as foreign meddling and stoked nationalist feelings and anti-government rhetoric. Many became disillusioned with foreign operations and incompetent administration, leading many to turn to Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda for their ideological promises.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS TO ERADICATE TERRORISM IN SOMALIA

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the fall of General Siyad Barre's military regime in 1991, toppled by rebel factions led by warlords and politicians, Somalia has lacked a functioning government. The warlords' vested

interests in power, economics, and personal gain obstructed the formation of a unified administration capable of addressing the social, economic, and political injustices inflicted by the previous military rule. This failure contributed to the onset of the nation's prolonged civil war. Numerous periods of the conflict in Somalia resulted in the deaths of thousands of Somalis, while many more fled their home country in search of safety and a better life abroad (Nyadera , Ahmed , & Agwanda , 2019). Warlords and clan militias battled for control of resources and power across the nation's anarchy. This struggle for resources and dominance never stopped among armed groups; it persisted throughout all clans and groupings.

Using a variety of strategies, the international community has attempted to restore peace and stability to Somalia. For instance, in 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) gave its approval for a unilateral UN military action in Somalia. In a similar vein, the African Union (AU) has launched fifteen peace efforts to establish a legitimate government in Somalia with the assistance of the international community (Muhammed, 2014). In addition, the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) worked to find a peaceful solution to the Somali war. The neighboring states of Somalia have also individually attempted to put an end to the violence there. Nevertheless, a variety of barriers have hampered these attempts, including financial difficulties, internal spoilers, and inconsistent foreign actors.

Worth-mentioning, the many exterior components of the conflict and the other parties participating present another challenge for those engaged in peacemaking and peacekeeping. This is a similarly significant aspect of the Somali crisis that has not gotten enough attention but is becoming more and more involved in the current fighting (Moller, 2009). There are a minimum of three aspects that contribute to the exterior dimension of the conflict and the engagement of other parties. The first is the security worry that some of Somalia's neighbors, especially Ethiopia, have as a result of the turmoil in Somalia. The second is the competition between several nations for supremacy in the Horn of Africa. Next on the list is the fight against terrorism (Mulugeta , 2009).

## 5.2 Role of Regional Power

Following the 2011 Arab Uprisings, a louder regional geopolitical competition has formed, with Somalia and its autonomous areas being the newest victims. If this rivalry for military, political, and economic domination continues unchecked, it will exacerbate the instability and disintegration

already present in Somalia and its two semi-autonomous areas, Puntland and Somaliland. Situated at the entrance of the Red Sea waterway, more instability of this precarious state might have far-reaching consequences that beyond the borders of the Middle East and North Africa (Hoffman, 2020).

### 5.2.1 Ethiopia

The primary and enduring cause contributing to the ongoing turmoil in Somalia is Ethiopia's intervention. This interference has provided all spoilers (both individuals and groups) with guns and sanctuary. It has exploited the Somali peace process in Kenya and the transitional government that was established, undermining the two most significant peace deals (the Arta Agreement of 2000 and the Cairo Accord of 1997). Ethiopia has occasionally taken control of multiple towns in southern Somalia and has often transferred arms across the border. Put another way, Ethiopia, a strong and strategically located nation, is an adversarial neighbor that seeks to keep Somalia fragmented and weak. Our claim will be supported by a brief overview of the two nations' historical connections and an examination of Ethiopia's actions to sabotage Somalia's efforts to promote peace (Stedman, 2001).

Ethiopia, a landlocked nation of 91.73 million people, is surrounded by Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. Ethiopia is situated in the Horn of Africa. Nine regional republics and two city administrations were established as a result of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution, which was enacted by Ethiopia in the wake of the 1991 political revolution. Somalia, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella are four of these regions; they are categorized as Developing Regional States (DRS) because of their historical marginalization and low levels of development as compared to more developed areas of the nation ( Samatar, 2007). The Somali regional state, which is situated in the eastern Ethiopian lowlands, has boundaries with Kenya to the southwest, Djibouti to the north, Somalia to the east, south, and north, and the Ethiopian regions of Oromia and Afar to the west. The Somali regional state is composed of six administrative centers, 93 woredas, and 11 administrative zones. The region of Ethiopia populated by Somalis has historically been referred to as Ogaden region. The largest Somali sub-clan residing in the Somali area goes by the name Ogaden. It also used as the moniker

for the 1977-1978 conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. The area was once called as Somali Regional State, but after 1991 it was renamed as area (Mohamed , 2018).

Somalis and Ethiopians, especially Highlanders, have had tumultuous and unsatisfactory interactions throughout history. There are religious and ethnic divides between the two peoples. Ethiopia was one of the colonial powers that divided Somalia into five regions, according to the Somali people. As a result, there have been hundreds of skirmishes along the border between Ethiopia and Somalia in addition to two significant wars that took place in 1964 and 1977. Ethiopian sovereignty over the Ogaden area served as the catalyst for the conflict. Ethiopia has backed Somali opposition movements (SSDF, SNM, USC, and SPM), and Somalia has armed and funded opposition organizations seeking to topple Ethiopia's government ( Elm & Barise, 2010). In order to oppose Siad Barre's military regime, all opposition parties have launched wars from Ethiopia, and Ethiopia has played a significant role in sustaining Somalia's civil war, especially during the previous fourteen years.

Ethiopia blatantly and successfully undermined the Arta Peace Agreement in 2000 and the Cairo Accord in 1997. In 1997, in Cairo, Egypt, twenty-eight Somali warlords and faction leaders reached an agreement on a formula for power-sharing. They also chose to establish a federal government. The warlords and faction leaders in Somalia at the time were split into two groups: the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), which was supported by Ethiopia and comprised fifteen factions, known as the Sodere Group or SSA, and the Somali National Alliance (SNA), which was composed of thirteen factions and had some assistance from Libya (Harter, 2024). Hussein Mohamed Aided served as the chairman of the SNA, while Ali Mahdi Mohamed headed the SSA. Both of these organizations took part in the Cairo Conference and ruled over the majority of Somalia. Protests and marches in favor of the Cairo Accord were held by the Somali people in several places, including Mogadishu, the capital.

Two of the twenty-eight warlords who were gathering in Cairo were actively recruited by Ethiopia. General Adan Abdullahi Nur and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the president of Somalia at the moment, were urged to leave the meeting and reject its conclusions (Aynte, 2024). They travelled straight to Addis Ababa from Cairo. Ethiopia began to overtly lend its military and political backing to these two group leaders. Egypt's attempts to put an end to the civil war in Somalia were essentially thwarted by Ethiopia and these two warlords. Violence returned to Somalia, and several

cities were taken over. While Ethiopia got more overtly involved in the conflict, with its army seizing control of many important cities in southern Somalia, the UN and Western nations showed no interest in getting involved (Lawal, 2024). Additionally, several factions, such as the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Baidoa, the Somali National Front (SNF) in the Gedo region, and the United Somali Congress (USC) in Mogadishu and Hiraan, were receiving ammunition and, at times, direct military support from Ethiopia. This occurred despite the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by Security Council Resolution 733, which was adopted in January 1992.

In response to the ongoing conflict in Somalia, President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti launched a peace initiative in 1999. During his address to the UN General Assembly in September of that year, he presented his plan for resolving the Somali conflict. Guelleh committed to organizing a national reconciliation conference that would include the participation of civil society and traditional leaders (Mohamed A. , 2024). He appealed to the international community for support. Guelleh asserted that if warlords obstructed his peace plan, they should be deemed 'criminals' by the international community. However, he offered warlords a chance to join the process, provided they accepted the conference's outcomes. Consequently, the Djibouti Conference, also known as the Arta Conference, became the largest Somali-led peace conference ever, with over 3,000 Somalis attending. Traditional leaders, civil society organizations, intellectuals, and businesspeople gathered to seek forgiveness and establish a national government (Warsameh, 2024).

Worth-mentioning, the conference selected over 900 delegates, who then formed a 245-seat Transitional National Assembly (TNA). This assembly was responsible for enacting the Transitional National Charter (TNC). The open and transparent reconciliation conference garnered significantly more support, both internationally and from Somalis, than the earlier Cairo Conference. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization, endorsed the initiative, while Arab countries provided some financial assistance (Dhaysane, 2024). The ARABSAT satellite facilitated the broadcasting of the conference proceedings to Somalia and the surrounding region via television and radio. The UN, the USA, and the European Union (EU) also publicly supported the Djibouti initiative.

The conference saw participation from over three thousand Somalis, including some warlords, in contrast to the mere twenty-eight warlords and faction leaders who were invited to the Cairo Conference ( Dahir, 2024). The conference's outcome was unexpectedly favorable. Somalis successfully established a national caretaker government that garnered widespread acceptance and support. This development was embraced by hundreds of thousands of Somalis nationwide, with the exception of the self-declared breakaway region of Somaliland, which maintained substantial conflicts with the rest of Somalia. Despite Ethiopia's initial support for the conference, evidenced by the attendance of its prime minister at the inauguration ceremony, the country was reluctant to endorse and support the resulting government. Subsequently, Ethiopia initiated an international campaign opposing the Transitional National Government (TNG) ( Webb, 2024).

After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, Ethiopia attempted to depict TNG leaders as extremists aligned with Bin Laden, ultimately succeeding in weakening the TNG. However, other factors like internal strife, corruption, and resource shortages also played roles in its collapse. Regardless of its intentions, Ethiopia has significantly hindered peace-building efforts in Somalia ( Felbab-Brown, 2020). Since the civil war began, Ethiopia has strategically manipulated Somali factions, alternately supporting and undermining them. This tactic has become particularly evident over the past ten years. Ethiopia initiated a resolution for a new peace conference in Kenya. From the beginning of this conference, Ethiopia influenced the peace process by controlling the agenda and the forum. With the host country's support, Ethiopia empowered the warlords it favored while marginalizing traditional, religious, and civil society leaders ( Yared, 2016).

### 5.2.2 Eritrea

A group of related conflicts in the Horn of Africa garner more attention when these local conflicts are tied to American counterterrorism concerns. Local rivalries and conflict dynamics with a stronger regional basis, however, are what are essentially driving events on the ground. Between 1998 and 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea engaged in a bloody border battle that left many unresolved issues since the peace agreements that were supposed to put an end to it were never carried out. Eritrea becomes upset as a result, and one way it expresses this dissatisfaction is by starting to back anti-Ethiopian organizations in both Somalia and Ethiopia. Furthermore, Ethiopia views Somalia

as a conduit for the Eritrean danger, which is one of the reasons it sends soldiers into the country. In any case, Eritrea is so concerned about Ethiopia that it would utilize Somalia to transfer rebels into Ethiopia until Ethiopia is able to take action (Lyons, 2007).

Growing authoritarianism in Asmara and Addis Ababa is linked to the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is at a standstill. The ruling parties in both republics faced fierce internal opposition after the Algiers Agreement was signed, partly as a result of the conflict. Dissidents were either incarcerated or banished by their respective leaders, who successfully suppressed opposition. Over the years, neither has created the groundwork for amicable political rivalry and both rely on coercion to maintain their positions of authority. Since the 2000 truce, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have become more dictatorial (Maruf, 2021). Threats to the country and the border dispute have been used as justifications for political activity limitations, and the absence of democratic accountability has permitted both regimes to continue implementing very damaging and militarized policies. There may be fresh possibilities to advance political change in both states if the border dispute is resolved.

The impasse at the border and the underlying issues with authoritarian political systems and shaky regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea are inextricably tied to regional conflicts and international policies centered on the Horn of Africa (Rubin, 2021). Eritrea and Ethiopia have both shown that they are ready and able to deploy proxies to weaken one another. Asmara has provided assistance to armed Ethiopian rebel organizations, including the Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Additionally, Eritrea maintains tight ties with Sudanese organizations in Darfur, particularly with those that are active in eastern Sudan. Ethiopia has furthermore backed opposition movements in Eritrea ( Klein, 2016).

Ethiopia and Eritrea compete with one another by endorsing opposing parties in adjacent states, in addition to aiding each other's rebels and opposition activities. Abdullahi Yusuf and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia are mostly backed by Addis Ababa. In keeping with a deeply rooted tradition of supporting the enemy of one's adversary, Eritrea has supported Ethiopian opposition organizations based in Somalia, including the ONLF and OLF, and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which has since reorganized as the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia with its headquarters in Asmara, with the goal of containing Ethiopian forces in the east



(Gebreluel, 2021). Even though UN reports from late 2006 claimed that hundreds of Eritrean forces were in Somalia, relatively few of them were apprehended during Ethiopia's later operation, indicating that this figure was likely much off target.

Crucially, In December 2006, the proxy battle in Somalia took a significant turn for the worse. By claiming irredentist claims to the Ogaden, prominent UIC figures like Hassan Dahir Aweys, the former head of the anti-Ethiopian al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, attempted to incite Ethiopia to war in late 2006. But as the UIC lacked the power to drive Ethiopia out of the area, these threats were more symbolic than actual. Addis Ababa viewed the risks posed by Eritrea and internal Ethiopian insurgent organizations like the OLF and ONLF as the reason for the UIC's hazards and the pressing need for action (Ahmed A. , 2020). In territories under UIC control, these foes, both internal and regional, had stepped up their military posture. Ethiopia was obligated to respond due to the possibility that these threats might intensify over time, not because of the Islamic Courts' philosophy, irredentist ambitions, or affiliations with al-Qaeda. By supplying the military force necessary to expel the UIC from Mogadishu, close the safe havens that Ethiopia's adversaries had been providing, and install the TFG in the capital of Somalia, Ethiopia took proactive action (Metzel, 2023).

Following a swift and unexpected offensive, the TFG backed by Ethiopian forces ousted the UIC and the militias that were linked with it, which had been in charge of Mogadishu since June 2006. The TFG battled and persisted in needing Ethiopian military assistance to hold onto power to include important stakeholders, including many of the moderate leaders within the broad Islamic Courts movement and the influential Hawiye clan chiefs based in Mogadishu. Due to the tremendous violence, many Somalis view Ethiopian forces as foreign conquerors, and significant constituencies have become hostile. The expectations that a strong African Union or UN force would be sent in to enable Ethiopian forces to leave the country never came to pass (and were never feasible) (Reuters, 2018). Eritrea has persisted in backing Islamic Court elements and was involved in the September 2007 formation of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Asmara.

The 2007 unrest in the Somali area of eastern Ethiopia (the Ogaden) was partly caused by the intensifying war within Somalia. An oil exploration site was assaulted by the ONLF, which was a component of Ethiopia's initial transitional government. April 2007, resulting in the deaths of

Chinese laborers and civilians. In response, the Ethiopian government launched a ferocious counter-insurgency operation that caused widespread population displacement, market disruption, and a humanitarian crisis. Extremely high rates of abuse are reported in the area by human rights monitoring organizations ( France-Press, 2018). Addis Ababa considers the ONLF to be especially dangerous for two reasons. First, it is seen as a component of a danger network that connects the ONLF, the Islamic Courts in Somalia, and Eritrea. Strong command of the area is required to stop these opponents from utilizing the Ogaden as a thin border to launch an attack against the regime.

Second, there has recently been an increase in economic interest in regional international oil and gas exploration. Ethiopia has agreements in place with many foreign firms to investigate the Ogaden for oil and gas ( Gavin, 2022). The EPRDF's interest in defending these contracts is directly jeopardized by the ONLF's warning against continuing exploration of our people's natural resources. A ceasefire deal negotiated by the UN was signed in Djibouti in June 2008 by the TFG and a portion of the ARS, although it had little impact on the conflict in southern Somalia. The accord was rejected by the Shabaab militias and the more extremist Asmara-based part of the ARS, who persisted in their attacks against Ethiopian officials and the TFG. As the President and the Prime Minister quarreled over the dismissal of the Mogadishu mayor in August, divisions inside the TFG came to light ( Yibeltal & Kupemba, 2024).

Moreover, the execution of humanitarian workers made it exceedingly risky to keep feeding the millions of people in need. In a place where so many previous accords have failed, there are few indications that the Djibouti pact would succeed in restoring stability. In addition, there are signs that the fighting in Somaliland and Puntland, to the north, is getting worse. Ethiopia-Eritrea rivalry aside, the crisis in Somalia has its own dynamics and is not only a sideshow (Woldemariam, 2019). This is also true of domestic politics in Asmara and Addis Ababa. Resolving the proxy conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea alone would not address Somalia's stability issues. But the more significant regional vulnerabilities are complex and made more difficult to resolve by the several groups that Asmara and Addis Ababa, partly driven by the dynamics of their proxy war, supported (Dhaysane M. , 2024).

### 5.2.3 Djibouti

The impoverished nation of Djibouti is primarily urban and is distinguished by high rates of unemployment, malnutrition in children, and illiteracy. About 70% of people live in towns and cities, mostly in Djibouti, the country's capital. Primarily, the rural populace lives off of herding cattle on the move. Due to its lack of natural resources and propensity for floods and droughts, the nation imports more than 80% of its food from Europe or its neighbors. The provision of healthcare is hampered by inadequate infrastructure, a lack of supplies and equipment, and a paucity of trained workers, especially in areas outside the capital. Due to the fact that the treatments offered are still superior to those in their nearby home countries, over one-third of people receiving health care are migrants ( Al Awsat, 2024). Djibouti is an important transit route for migrants and asylum seekers traveling to the Gulf States and other destinations due to its political stability and advantageous location at the meeting point of East Africa and the Gulf States along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Approximately 100,000 individuals, primarily from Ethiopia and some Somalia, go through Djibouti every year in an effort to risk their lives by sailing to Yemen, generally reaching the port of Obock.

Rather than being a prospective home for international terrorist groups, Djibouti's significance comes from its transit capabilities (ALİYEV & ÇALIŞKAN, 2023). But since 1999, a number of events may have made Djibouti more appealing to international terrorists: the country's proactive president, who took office in May 1999 and one of his first goals was to rekindle a contentious reconciliation in Somalia that stoked clan rivalries; the country's chronic drought and poverty, which is being made worse by the influx of over 800 U.S. military personnel; the recent democratic parliamentary elections, which by law prohibit the losing party from directly participating; the growing tensions between Djibouti and Ethiopia due to Djibouti's privatization of its port in 2000; and President Jacques Chirac's announcement in February that France will revitalize ( Bereketeab, 2016).

Somalia is attempting a negotiated peace deal once more following around fifteen unsuccessful peacemaking attempts. The failure of the Transitional Federal administration (TFG) to unite into a national administration that is inclusive and supported by all Somalis led to the start of the Djibouti peace process in May 2008. It also occurs at a time when humanitarian conditions and security are

rapidly worsening due to Ethiopia's forced removal of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) (Muhammad, 2008). It was motivated by the knowledge that the Islamist organizations, who denied the TFG a footing in the majority of Somalia, would not agree to a diplomatic settlement in order to end the Somali conflict. As many would agree, the Djibouti process is currently the only game in town, to use the words of one Somali expert. It does offer some optimism for the nation's political future. Thus, a lot of people argue that all parties involved internal and external should support it.

Additionally, a few other factors have raised the Djibouti process's likelihood of success. The United Nations is in charge of the Djibouti process, in contrast to many of the other attempts. Major external players from both inside and beyond the area, such as Ethiopia, the League of Arab States, and the US, assist this process as well (Kennard & Einashe, 2019). Recent developments, most notably Ethiopia's withdrawal and TFG President Abdulahi Yusuf's resignation, improved the chances of the process proceeding. Regretfully, despite their great relevance, they alone will not ensure the success of the current project. The Djibouti process continues to be beset by significant unknowns. First and foremost, it's important to acknowledge that the Somali war has important regional implications. In this sense, the Djibouti process would follow other failed initiatives if it does not address Ethiopia's legitimate security concerns, which include Ogaden's recognition as a legitimate part of Ethiopian territory and the cessation of Somali actors' harboring and supporting armed groups fighting against the Addis Ababa authorities (Rome, 2024).

Involving all significant players in the Somali situation is the second essential. The minimal involvement of these important key actors has contributed to the failure of many previous processes. The TFG and the moderate ARS-Djibouti group of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia are currently at the center of the Djibouti process. These organizations only make up a very small percentage of the key actors in Somalia whose participation is essential to bringing about a sustainable peace (Ford, 2024). This includes members of civil society such as local councils, women, business leaders, clan elders, and the Somali Diaspora, in addition to the militant Islamist factions known as al Shabaab, which presently controls most of Somalia and the Asmara-based wing of the ARS. There are differences and conflicts both amongst and among the parties who are now involved in the Djibouti process.

In addition to the differences inside the TFG, ARS-Djibouti and TFG actors cannot agree on whether or not ARS-Djibouti should be included in the TFG parliament that will choose the next president to succeed Abdulahi Yusuf (Dhaysane M. , 2023). Such differences and conflicts might worsen, eventually resulting in a catastrophe that dogged several attempts to improve Somalia. Thirdly, every region of Somalia has to be the center of attention. The Djibouti process has, for obvious reasons, thus far concentrated on finding a solution to the crisis in south central Somalia. For the past eighteen years, the most of the fighting has been concentrated in this region of Somalia. While it seems sense to concentrate on one region of Somalia, such piece meal tactics are ineffective for addressing the war throughout Somalia. One issue that such an approach overlooks is the state of affairs in Somaliland, which is essentially a product and expression of the Somalia conflict. Every peace effort aimed at resolving the Somali conflict comprehensively ought to consider the various areas of Somalia ( Almi, 2011).

### 5.3 Role of Extra-Regional Power in Somalia

#### 5.3.1 US: Counter-Terrorism Efforts in Somalia

Somalia has often been a neglected arena in the U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Occasionally, drone strikes, military advisors aiding Somali partner forces, or al-Shabaab attacks in the region capture media attention, but such coverage quickly fades. Despite this, Somalia has been central to some of the most challenging counterterrorism legal and policy issues. These include determining the most effective ways to support multinational forces and underdeveloped local partners, assessing whether a terrorist group with predominantly local goals is genuinely at war with the United States, deciding the appropriate role (if any) of U.S. strikes within a broader campaign, managing risks to U.S. forces in volatile areas, and deploying civilian aid in highly dangerous environments ( A.

Hathaway & Hartig, 2022).

#### 5.3.2 Analysis of History

U.S. military engagement in Somalia began in the early 1990s with a humanitarian mission under the United Nations (U.N.) to address famine relief. This involvement is notably remembered for the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993. This conflict primarily involved Somali warlords obstructing food aid distribution. The battle foreshadowed the nature of future U.S.

counterterrorism efforts post-9/11 (C. Mueller, 2023). During the engagement, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) aiming to apprehend a high-value target became entrapped by militants and supportive locals. The confrontation resulted in 19 American soldiers killed, 73 wounded, one captured, and two Black Hawk helicopters shot down and destroyed. The battle also claimed the lives of hundreds of Somalis, including civilians. A haunting image from the incident was that of deceased U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets. According to books by Lawrence Wright and Ali Soufan, operatives from the nascent al-Qaeda organization were present in Mogadishu at the time and were involved in the downing of the helicopters (D. Williams, 2024).

In response to the tragedy, Congress imposed several restrictions on U.S. operations in Somalia. President Bill Clinton withdrew the majority of U.S. forces well before the congressional deadline. Despite the withdrawal, the conflict continued to shape American views on urban and guerrilla warfare, involvement in Somalia, and the supervision of Special Operations Forces (SOF). The "Black Hawk Down" incident humbled U.S. policymakers, leading them to largely avoid engagement in Somalia's civil conflict, instead prioritizing the tracking of al-Qaeda operatives through the CIA ( Yousif, 2023). By the early 2000s, Somalia's situation had further deteriorated, leading to the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a fundamentalist group that gained support by fighting warlords and promising justice and peace. After defeating a coalition of warlords in 2006, the ICU took control of Mogadishu and much of central and southern Somalia.

Concerned about an Islamist regime on its border, Ethiopia, with support from allied Somali forces, launched an offensive to reclaim Mogadishu from the ICU. The U.S.-supported Ethiopian invasion faced minimal resistance, leading to the ICU's collapse by the end of December 2006. U.S. officials became increasingly alarmed as al-Shabaab formed closer ties with al-Qaeda (SCHMIDT, 2022). In 2011, U.S. forces apprehended Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a liaison between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), during his travel between Yemen and Somalia. As alShabaab gained more influence, there was mounting pressure for the U.S. to adopt a more aggressive counterterrorism stance in Somalia. However, the Black Hawk Down incident continued to deter policymakers from deploying combat advisors to AMISOM or the Somali National Army (SNA). Additionally, debates over whether all of al-Shabaab or just certain operatives were aligned with al-Qaeda, and whether al-Shabaab intended to target the U.S. or had

mainly local and regional ambitions, raised legal and policy issues regarding the use of lethal force against the group (Harrison, 2023).

There were significant questions about whether actions against al-Shabaab were justified under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF). In October 2013, the U.S. military deployed a small team of advisors to Mogadishu to support AMISOM operations. The U.S. also carried out occasional airstrikes against al-Shabaab operatives, including a 2014 strike that killed Ahmad Abdi Godane, the emir of al-Shabaab, due to his role as an al-Qaeda member posing an imminent threat to U.S. persons (Schmitt, 2023). Despite facing increasing pressure, al-Shabaab adapted by employing hit-and-run guerrilla tactics against AMISOM instead of attempting to hold territory. The group won over and coerced local populations through its harsh justice system and toll collection.

Al-Shabaab's system, although brutal and intolerant, offered a level of justice and conflict resolution that starkly contrasted with the ineffective government in Mogadishu. In 2016, the Obama administration classified al-Shabaab, not just its individual members or factions, as an “associated force” of al-Qaeda, making it a target under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). Although the administration had already been conducting collective selfdefense strikes against al-Shabaab to support ground partner forces, this designation permitted more extensive lethal operations by the United States against the group, extending beyond targeting only those members associated with al-Qaeda's core (M. Schwartz, 2021).

### 5.3.3 Legal Basis for US’s Intervention in Somalia

By the time President Donald Trump took office, progress in Somalia had stalled, and policymakers grew increasingly worried about the growing threat posed by al-Shabaab both regionally and globally. U.S. officials called for more decisive actions, prompting Trump to endorse a new strategy that emphasized increased airstrikes and expanded advisory support. In early 2017, President Trump designated parts of Somalia as an “area of active hostilities,” which allowed for more lenient war-zone targeting rules compared to the guidelines established under the Obama administration's Presidential Policy Guidance (Bari D.-B. , 2024). According to the 2016 Obama Administration Legal and Policy Frameworks Report, U.S. operations in Somalia have been conducted with the consent of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and in furtherance of

U.S. national self-defense. While relying solely on the right of self-defense might not suffice as an international legal justification, the consent of the FGS despite its limited control over the country yet recognized internationally as the official central government provides adequate international legal authority for these ongoing operations (André, Jr, 2023).

One of the ongoing legal and policy challenges of the war in Somalia has been how to justify strikes conducted in “collective self-defense” of Somali or AMISOM forces. In July 2021, the Biden administration declared that it had invoked collective self-defense to use military force against threats not directed at U.S. forces but at an elite Somali National Army unit known as the Danab. This justification has been used by the United States since at least 2016 to support strikes in Somalia (Raza, 2022). Subsequently, a Pentagon spokesperson stated that the United States had the authority for these strikes under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter "to conduct collective self-defense of partner forces." However, as noted at the time, this justification was unnecessary if the U.S. military was indeed operating in the country with the consent of the FGS.

In Somalia (and across Africa), the United States finds itself trapped in a cycle of recurrent strikes and counter-strikes, alongside frustratingly slow progress in building local capacities, with little hope of decisively defeating the adversary or undermining its local support base. Terrorist groups exploit deep-seated grievances to garner local backing (Kim, 2023). While the Somali government expresses willingness to collaborate with the United States, it has demonstrated incapacity to independently combat threats, resolve entrenched political divisions, or establish effective governance. Consequently, the United States is in a challenging position of aiding local forces unable to effectively confront the threats they face forces that would likely suffer if U.S. support were withdrawn.

Somalia ranks among the world's most corrupt governments. While investments in building governmental capacity are essential, they are unlikely to bring about significant change as long as corruption persists. Development aid could help diminish support for al-Shabaab and create opportunities for vulnerable Somali youth (Lopez, 2022). However, without addressing governance issues, such efforts will have limited impact. Improving governance hinges on resolving Somalia's divisive politics and establishing a government that inclusively incorporates the country's complex clan dynamics. Achieving these goals will necessitate the Biden administration's consideration of



increased civilian aid, deploying experts to Somalia, and diplomatically supporting political reconciliation, alongside military efforts to counter al-Shabaab (Turse, 2024).

#### 5.4 Role of United Nations Organization (UNO) in Somalia

Since the early 1990s, Somalia has faced persistent instability exacerbated by the presence of various armed groups and terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab. The United Nations' engagement in Somalia has been guided by Security Council resolutions and mandates aimed at supporting the country's state-building efforts, enhancing security sector reform, and promoting peacebuilding initiatives. One of the key roles of the UN in Somalia has been to facilitate political dialogue and reconciliation among different factions. This process is crucial in addressing the underlying grievances that fuel extremism and terrorism. For instance, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) has supported efforts to establish inclusive political processes and strengthen governance institutions, which are essential for countering terrorism (United Nations Security Council, 2021).

Moreover, the UN has supported efforts to build the capacity of Somali security forces to effectively counter terrorism. This includes providing training, equipment, and logistical support to Somali national security forces and AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) troops deployed in the country. These efforts have been aimed at enhancing the ability of local forces to conduct counter-terrorism operations and maintain security in areas liberated from terrorist groups. Additionally, the United Nations has been actively involved in promoting humanitarian assistance and development initiatives in Somalia. By addressing root causes such as poverty, marginalization, and lack of economic opportunities, the UN aims to reduce the conditions conducive to terrorism and extremism. Humanitarian agencies under the UN umbrella provide critical aid to vulnerable populations affected by conflict and instability, thereby promoting stability and resilience in the region (Thakur, 2009).

Logistics have always posed significant challenges for African Union (AU) peacekeepers in Somalia. The difficulties were so severe that, in 2009, the UN established the UN Support Office to AMISOM (later renamed UNSOS in 2015) to provide logistical support. UNSOS has since created Joint Operations Centers and Joint Operational Logistics Bases across mission sectors to coordinate the transfer of operating bases from ATMIS to Somali forces and manage the closure

and removal of equipment when necessary. However, some ATMIS forward operating bases are situated farther from local population centers than the Somali army prefers. Relocating these bases is costly and time-consuming, but maintaining them in vulnerable locations prone to Al-Shabaab attacks is also not ideal. Additionally, recent heavy rains have flooded some operating bases, disrupting supply lines and affecting the ability of troops to support the local population. At the strategic level, UNSOS faces the conflicting tasks of supporting the ATMIS drawdown while also backing an ongoing offensive campaign, which might extend to a new southern front. There is uncertainty about how Somali forces would ensure the necessary logistical support without the presence of ATMIS and UNSOS (D. Williams, 2024).

The United Nations and the Somali government have launched a \$1.6 billion appeal to tackle humanitarian challenges in Somalia. The 2024 Humanitarian Needs Action Plan aims to provide life-saving support to over 5 million Somalis this year. The U.N. highlights that climate shocks, conflict, widespread poverty, and disease outbreaks continue to drive humanitarian needs in the Horn of Africa country. This appeal comes at a time when Somalia is grappling with prolonged dry spells followed by heavy rains and deadly flash floods. Regarding the overall humanitarian situation in Somalia for 2024, World Vision anticipates that humanitarian needs will remain high due to recurrent shocks induced by climate change, alongside underlying factors such as conflict and insecurity (Mohamed A. , 2024).

## 5.5 Conclusion

The elimination of terrorism in Somalia requires a multipronged strategy in which foreign and regional powers are essential. Terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab have been weakened by the vital military backing and stability offered by regional entities like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Together with the Somali National Army, these regional troops have put an end to terrorist activities and regained territory by coordinating security measures. Furthermore, bordering nations especially Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea have played a crucial role in crossborder initiatives to stop terrorist infiltration and cut off supply channels. Their participation emphasizes how crucial regional collaboration is to combating terrorism's transnational aspect and promoting security in Somalia. However, other countries have made substantial contributions in the form of financing, instruction, and intelligence support. Countries like the US and the EU have

contributed significantly to Somalia's security forces and governance frameworks through financial aid and capacity-building initiatives. The primary causes of terrorism, such as political unrest, poverty, and illiteracy, which terrorist organizations take advantage of to attract new members, are the focus of these initiatives. Furthermore, outside parties have supported diplomatic efforts in Somalia that promote inclusive government and political reconciliation. External powers lessen the attraction of terrorism by assisting in the creation of environments that are favorable for long-term stability and peace via their support of peacebuilding and development initiatives. Therefore, the joint efforts of external and regional powers are essential to establishing a long-term framework for the eradication of terrorism in Somalia, underscoring the necessity of ongoing cooperation and calculated action.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

To encapsulate the whole writings, it has been observed that Somalia is currently engaged in an ongoing conflict with al-Shabaab, a militant organization that aims to expel all foreign forces and establish an Islamist caliphate, replacing the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The instability in Somalia can be traced to two major factors: internal and external, or distant and immediate causes, particularly following the collapse of the Somali state in early 1991. Internal factors include clannism, weak governments, and competition for scarce resources, illiteracy, and radical Islamism. On the other hand, external factors contributing to the conflict encompass the colonial legacy, the Cold War, the Ogaden War, regional and international interventions, and proxy wars. In Somalia, conflicts arise from two main types of resources: rural and urban. In rural areas, people compete over water sources, land for pasture, and livestock ownership. In urban settings, the contention revolves around leadership and domination, arms accumulation, access to senior jobs, and similar pursuits. In both scenarios, clans are relied upon as networks to achieve these goals. To overthrow the military regime in Somalia, hostile clans mobilized their militias to fight state forces. Once the regime fell, these clans turned against each other for political dominance and resource control.

Since the country entered a period of statelessness in early 1991, clan reliance has intensified. Resource scarcity has exacerbated the situation, leading to conflicts within and between sub-clans. The prolonged infighting has disrupted farming activities, causing severe hunger and starvation that claimed thousands of lives and forced many to seek refuge in neighboring countries or become internally displaced persons (IDPs). The widespread cutting of trees for charcoal and other purposes has nearly deforested the land, leading to extensive desertification, which, coupled with unprecedented population growth, has further aggravated the situation. The scarcity of resources in Somalia fails to meet the social needs of its population, leading to widespread unrest. As the English proverb goes, “a hungry man is an angry man,” and many individuals may resort to crime to sustain their lives. A significant factor contributing to the conflicts in Somalia is unemployment. Jobless young men often go to great lengths to find employment. Many are recruited by warlords

to fight on their behalf, some turn to piracy, while others join groups like al-Shabaab. Additionally, some youth resort to extorting money from passengers by setting up barriers on highways. If there were more employment opportunities, the incidence of insecurity would likely decrease.

Many hold the military regime, which came to power in a bloodless coup d'état in October 1969 following the death of Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmarke, the democratically elected president, responsible for much of Somalia's current issues. The regime promptly replaced the national constitution with Scientific Socialism, aiming to align the country with the Soviet-led bloc. This shift was followed by a nationalization program, through which the government assumed control over the nation's economic resources, including land management and distribution. However, the regime's allocation of these nationalized assets to the president's close family members and political allies sparked widespread anger. High levels of social inequality, nepotism, clan favoritism, and poorly conceived economic policies deprived citizens of their basic rights. Public mistrust of the government escalated to unprecedented levels, ultimately leading some desperate clans to take up arms and overthrow the regime in January 1991.

Moreover, during the rule of the civilian government, Somali society faced fewer problems, and overall, things seemed to be going relatively well, despite allegations of nepotism and corruption among government officials. The real issues began with the advent of the military government, which lacked governance experience and abused its power, leading the country into its current predicament. Consequently, the military government that ruled from 1969 to 1991 is often blamed for the subsequent turmoil. Mohamed Siad Barre, the military ruler, replaced religion with Scientific Socialism to demonstrate his allegiance to the USSR. Prominent Sheikhs and religious clerics who opposed him were executed to deter any further dissent. In 1975, the revolutionary government undertook actions considered immoral by many, which are believed to have contributed to Somalia's misfortunes. Forcing the population to prioritize Soviet Socialism over their religion was seen as a grave error. Barre's obsession with the new ideology of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels led him to enforce these beliefs at the expense of parts of the holy Quran, resulting in the execution of resistant religious clerics.

Similarly, social discrimination and state inefficiency significantly contributed to the people's uprising. The international community has been criticized for its half-hearted and uncommitted

approach to finding a solution to the Somali crisis. While violent conflicts occur worldwide, other countries often step in to assist those in a state of war and conflict. Unfortunately, Somalia lacks such friendly states willing to make sacrifices to help resolve its issues and rebuild the failed state. For instance, Kenya experienced ethnic violence during the 2007 election, resulting in over a thousand deaths. However, this was quickly addressed with the help of leaders like former UN head Kofi Annan and Tanzanian presidents, supported by the international community and the UN Security Council. They tirelessly mediated between the government and the opposition. Additionally, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the violence perpetrators sent a strong warning to potential wrongdoers. Somalia has been in turmoil for nearly a quarter of a century, yet the international community has not committed to ending the violence. This lack of dedication suggests a disregard for Somalia's plight.

The role of clan elders in mediating peace between clans through traditional laws, known as Xeer, has been significantly undermined by the judiciary system of pre-colonial states. When the state collapsed, clan elders struggled to manage the resulting conflicts effectively. Somali society is organized into aggregate clan-families, each with its own chiefs or leaders for guidance. However, these leaders often fail to mobilize their members and foster loyalty within the clan, leading to a lack of unity. The complex structure of clans inherently allows for disunity among members. Uneducated clan members are often easily influenced to take up arms and follow their leaders' orders. Studies indicate that mono-ethnic societies, like Somalia, are more prone to conflicts and wars compared to multi-ethnic ones. Some cunning clan warlords have achieved their goals by framing their cause as just, while religious leaders have presented conflicts as holy wars. The constant manipulation by these leaders perpetuates ongoing violence among Somalis.

Politicians and clan leaders in Somalia have increasingly utilized clans as instruments to secure more power and influence, exacerbating violence in the country. This shift has altered the dynamics between clans, leading some to form coalitions based not solely on kinship but also on political or economic interests. Ambitious clans with strong militias seek to control resource-rich territories at the expense of smaller clans, prolonging conflicts. Warlords sometimes organize their own militias or manipulate existing militias to shift loyalty to their cause. Additionally, businessmen have begun forming private militias drawn from their clan-family to protect their assets. These private militias

are often more loyal and accountable to the businessmen than militias under collective clan control or commanded by traditional war leaders.

Moreover, the impact of global terrorism and piracy has posed additional security challenges both within Somalia and the broader East African region. Al-Shabaab, in particular, has exploited governance gaps and societal grievances to advance its extremist agenda, further destabilizing the country and undermining peacebuilding efforts. The international community's engagement, though crucial, has often been characterized by competing interests and inconsistent support, impacting the effectiveness of interventions aimed at fostering stability. Despite these challenges, there have been notable efforts towards peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia. The formation of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012 marked a significant step towards political reconciliation and institutional development. International support for state-building processes, including capacity-building initiatives and humanitarian aid, has also contributed to modest gains in security and governance. However, sustained commitment from both Somali stakeholders and the international community remains essential to addressing the root causes of instability and achieving long-term peace and prosperity in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab, an Islamist extremist organization, has significantly shaped Somalia's political landscape through its actions, ideologies, and interactions with domestic and international entities. Firstly, Al-Shabaab emerged in the mid-2000s as a radical offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union, aiming to establish a strict interpretation of Sharia law across Somalia. Initially gaining ground through local grievances and clan-based support, the group quickly escalated its influence by exploiting political vacuums and governance failures in the war-torn nation. Secondly, Al-Shabaab's military tactics, including guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks, have destabilized the fragile political environment in Somalia. The group has targeted government officials, security forces, and civilians' alike, instilling fear and disrupting governance efforts. Such violence not only undermines state authority but also deters international investment and aid crucial for Somalia's development.

Thirdly, Al-Shabaab's control over territories, especially rural areas and parts of southern Somalia, has provided it with resources and territorial leverage. This control allows the group to impose its rule, collect taxes, and recruit fighters, further entrenching its influence over local populations and challenging the legitimacy of the Somali government. Moreover, Al-Shabaab's international

connections and funding sources, including links to global jihadist networks and illicit activities like charcoal smuggling and extortion, sustain its operations and augment its capacity to sow instability. These external ties complicate efforts to contain the group within Somalia's borders and underscore its transnational impact on regional security. Furthermore, the ideological allure of AlShabaab, rooted in anti-Western sentiment and a perceived defense of Islam against external intervention, attracts disaffected youth and perpetuates cycles of radicalization. This ideological narrative not only fuels internal conflict but also complicates peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts aimed at resolving Somalia's protracted instability.

Al-Qaeda's involvement in Somalia has been a significant factor contributing to the country's prolonged political instability. As a global jihadist network, Al-Qaeda's influence in Somalia primarily manifests through its local affiliate, Al-Shabaab. This connection amplifies the impact of terrorist activities in the region, exacerbating the challenges faced by the Somali government and the international community in establishing peace and stability. Firstly, Al-Qaeda's strategic partnership with Al-Shabaab has bolstered the latter's operational capabilities and ideological coherence. By providing training, funding, and strategic guidance, Al-Qaeda has enabled AlShabaab to enhance its terrorist tactics and extend its reach. This collaboration has resulted in more sophisticated and deadly attacks, targeting not only Somali security forces and government officials but also international entities and civilians. These attacks disrupt governance and deter foreign aid and investment crucial for Somalia's recovery.

Secondly, Al-Qaeda's ideological influence on Al-Shabaab has reinforced the group's extremist narrative, which seeks to establish a caliphate governed by a strict interpretation of Sharia law. This ideology resonates with disaffected Somali youth and those marginalized by the country's political and economic structures. The allure of participating in a global jihadist movement provides AlShabaab with a steady stream of recruits, perpetuating cycles of violence and instability in the region. Thirdly, Al-Qaeda's involvement in Somalia has regional implications, complicating efforts to stabilize not only Somalia but also the broader Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab's allegiance to AlQaeda has attracted foreign fighters and facilitated cross-border operations, undermining regional security. This transnational dimension of terrorism necessitates a coordinated response from neighboring countries and international actors, further complicating Somalia's internal political dynamics.



Moreover, Al-Qaeda's role in Somalia has significant implications for international security. Al-Shabaab's allegiance to Al-Qaeda means that Somalia serves as a potential launching pad for terrorist attacks beyond Africa. The threat of international terrorism emanating from Somalia necessitates a global response, drawing international military interventions and counterterrorism efforts into the region. These interventions, while aimed at dismantling terrorist networks, often result in collateral damage and further destabilize the local political environment. Al-Qaeda's connection with Al-Shabaab has economic repercussions that contribute to Somalia's instability. The group's involvement in illicit activities, such as smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom, undermines the formal economy and fuels corruption. This shadow economy not only funds terrorist activities but also weakens state institutions, making it more difficult for the Somali government to assert control and implement effective governance.

The United States has a long-standing history of military involvement in Somalia, beginning with the infamous 1993 Battle of Mogadishu. This operation, often referred to as "Black Hawk Down," ended disastrously and led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This withdrawal contributed to the further destabilization of Somalia, creating a power vacuum that facilitated the emergence of extremist groups. In the absence of a central government, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamist militia, rose to power in an effort to restore order. This militia faced opposition from the Transitional Federal Government and various tribes and factions that were unwilling to relinquish power to the ICU. The economic damage and social devastation caused by U.S. actions in Somalia are profound, with little indication that the U.S. approach will change in the near future. Besides the suffering of families affected by the violence, the lack of transparency and accountability has led to an enduring tragedy for Somali victims of the U.S.'s covert operations. However, this does not absolve Al-Shabaab of its crimes. The militant group continues to exploit socially and economically disenfranchised communities in Somalia for recruitment. Al-Shabaab is responsible for numerous bombings targeting civilians across Africa and the Middle East, resulting in hundreds of deaths.

Currently, the U.S. mission in Somalia encompasses both political and military dimensions. Politically, the focus has been on assisting in the development of effective Somali state institutions, including security forces such as the Somali National Army (SNA) and both federal and regional police forces. The U.S. has endorsed a federal model of government for Somalia, supporting the

creation of a new constitution, which has remained in provisional draft form for over seven years due to the ongoing lack of political agreement between Somalia's federal and regional authorities. Since the early 2000s, U.S. diplomatic efforts have fluctuated between engaging with federal and regional authorities. By early 2020, the official U.S. stance emphasized that reconciliation between the Federal Government and Federal Member States is a crucial step towards reestablishing governance, security, and prosperity for all Somalis.

The United Nations (UN) has played a crucial role in Somalia for several decades, particularly in efforts to stabilize the country, provide humanitarian aid, and support political reconciliation. The UN's involvement in Somalia encompasses a range of initiatives, from peacekeeping and political missions to development and humanitarian assistance. The UN's initial involvement in Somalia dates back to the early 1990s following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, which led to a protracted civil war. In 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was established to provide humanitarian relief amid widespread famine and conflict. This mission was succeeded by UNOSOM II in 1993, with a mandate to support peace enforcement and nationbuilding efforts. However, the missions faced significant challenges, including the infamous Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, which led to the withdrawal of UN forces in 1995.

The UN has continuously supported political processes aimed at achieving reconciliation and establishing stable governance structures in Somalia. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was established in 1995 to support peace efforts and facilitate dialogue among Somali factions. In 2013, UNPOS was replaced by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), which has been instrumental in supporting the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and its efforts towards political stability, federalism, and democratization. The UN, through various agencies like the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has been a critical provider of humanitarian aid in Somalia. These agencies have addressed issues such as food insecurity, malnutrition, displacement, and access to basic services, particularly during periods of drought and conflict.

In understanding the complex dynamics of Somalia's stability and development, the roles of the

United Nations (UN), the United States, and regional powers are pivotal and interconnected. The UN has played a critical role through its peacekeeping missions, political mediation, and humanitarian assistance. Initiatives such as UNSOM have been instrumental in supporting Somalia's federal governance structures and facilitating dialogue between federal and regional authorities. Moreover, the UN's efforts in coordinating international support and providing essential services have been crucial in addressing the country's humanitarian crises exacerbated by conflicts and climate shocks. The United States has historically engaged in Somalia through military interventions, diplomatic efforts, and humanitarian aid. Its military operations, often in collaboration with regional partners and under UN auspices, have aimed at combating terrorism and stabilizing the country. Additionally, U.S. diplomatic initiatives have focused on supporting political reconciliation and fostering governance reforms. However, the U.S. approach has faced criticisms regarding transparency and long-term strategic consistency, highlighting the need for a more balanced approach that prioritizes sustainable development and local empowerment.

The U.S. faces a challenging situation in Somalia, but there are better alternatives to its current approach. A more balanced U.S. policy should prioritize supporting Somalia's stabilization efforts and promoting reconciliation at all levels of Somali society and government. To foster a better-informed public debate, relevant Congressional committees should hold hearings on U.S. policies and objectives in Somalia. Additionally, Congress should allocate more funds for non-military initiatives to help shape a more balanced U.S. policy. In the long term, reconciliation efforts might include negotiations with Al-Shabaab. While these talks would be Somali-led, the U.S. should prepare for this possibility and signal to Mogadishu that it will not obstruct such efforts when the time is right.

## Bibliography

- A. Hathaway, O., & Hartig, L. (2022, March 31). Still at War: The United States in Somalia. Retrieved from <https://www.justsecurity.org/80921/still-at-war-the-united-states-insomalia/>
- Al Awsat, A. (2024, July). Egypt to Promote Cooperation with Djibouti, Somalia. Retrieved from <https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5039707-egypt-promote-cooperation-djiboutisomalia>
- Almi, A. A. (2011, July). Somalia's Foreign Policy: Stages and Initial Odds. *Open Journal of Political Science*, 11(3). doi:<https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2021.113025>
- Barnes, C., & Hassan, H. (2007). The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1(2), 151-160. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/17531050701452382>
- Bereketeab, R. (2016, June-December). Djibouti: Strategic Location, Asset or Curse. *Journal of African Foreign Affairs*, 3(1/2), 5-18. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26661713>
- Blanchard, L. P. (2023, February 14). Al Shabaab. Retrieved from <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10170.pdf>
- Cardoso, N. C. (2016, July/December). REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: CONFLICTS, AGENDAS AND THREATS. *Brazilian Journal of African Studies*, 131-165. Retrieved from <https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/rbea/article/download/68849/40024/292509>
- D Williams, P. (2013, August 13). The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges. 2(2). doi:<https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bz>
- Dahir, A. L. (2024, February 27). Hunger, Terrorism and the Threat of War: Somalia's Year of Crises. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/africa/somaliaethiopia-al-shabab-conflict.html>

- Di John, J. (2010, February). The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature and Agenda for Research with Specific Reference to Sub-Saharan Africa. *European Journal of Development Research*, 22(1), 10-30. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2009.44>
- E. Kelly, R. (2007, Summer). Security Theory in the "New Regionalism". *International Studies Review*, 9(2), 197-229. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4621805>
- Elliot, A., & Holzer, G.-S. (2009, November 11). The invention of ‘terrorism’ in Somalia: paradigms and policy in US foreign relations. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 16(2), 215-244,. doi:doi=10.1080/10220460903268984
- Elm, A. A., & Barise, A. (2010, July 2nd). The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies. *African Security Review* , 15(1), 32-54. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2006.9627386>
- Felbab-Brown, V. (2020, November 20). What Ethiopia’s crisis means for Somalia . Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-ethiopias-crisis-means-for-somalia/>
- France-Presse, A. (2018, June 30). Somalia, Eritrea Mend Ties as Change Sweeps Horn of Africa. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-eritrea-mend-ties-change-sweepshorn-of-africa/4505695.html>
- G. Jones, S., Liepman, A., & Chandler, N. (2016, September 13). Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia. Retrieved from [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1539.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html)
- Gavin, M. (2022, July 20). Stranded Somali Soldiers Raise Questions About Horn Alliances . Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/blog/stranded-somali-soldiers-raise-questions-about-horn-alliances>
- H. Abdulla, A. (2006, April 17). Divinding Somalia into Banana Republics. Retrieved from <https://sudantribune.com/article15675/>

- Hansen, S. J. ( March 2016). Al-Shabaab in Somalia. HURST. Retrieved from <https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/al-shabaab-in-somalia/>
- Hansen, S. J. (2013, April). Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Retrieved from <https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/al-shabaab-in-somalia/>
- Harper, M. (2012). Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State. Retrieved from <https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/faq/islamic-courts-union>
- Ingiriis, M. H. (2018, June 22). From Pre-Colonial Past to the PostColonial Present: The Contemporary Clan-Based Configurations of Statebuilding in Somalia. *African Studies Review*, 16(2), 55-77. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2017.144>
- J. Kilroy Jr , R., Sumano, A. o., & Hataley, T. (2017). Security Inequalities in North America: Reassessing Regional Security Complex Theory . *Strategic Security*, 10(4). doi:<http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.4.1613>
- Keating, M., & Matt, W. (2018). Motivations and Drivers of Al-Shabaab. In *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab* (pp. 309–317). Oxford Academic. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0027>
- Klein, C. (2016, June 15). A Wake-up Call for Eritrea and Ethiopia. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/eritrea/wake-call-eritrea-and-ethiopia>
- Klobucista, C., Masters, J., & Sergie, M. A. (2022, December 6). Al-Shabaab. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab>
- Kłosowicz, R. (2015). The Role of Ethiopia in the Regional Security Complex of the Horn of Africa. *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 2(2), 83-97. Retrieved from <https://www.academia.edu/>
- Last, D., & Seaboyer, A. (2011, November). Clan and Islamic Identities in Somali Society. pp. 25-38. Retrieved from <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA574116.pdf>

- Lederach, J. P., Clos, R., & Ansel, D. (2011). Somalia: Creating space for fresh approaches to peacebuilding. pp. 12-14. doi:91-87748-95-9
- Masters, J. (2014, September 5). Al-Shabab. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/alshabab/p18650>
- McGlinchey, S., Walters, R., & Gold, D. (2017, December 24). Getting Started with International Relations Theory. Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/12/24/getting-started-withinternational-relations-theory/>
- Mohamed, A. (2024, February 19). Tensions Escalate Between Somalia, Ethiopia Over AU Summit Incident . Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/tensions-escalate-between-somalia-ethiopian-over-au-summit-incident-/7494152.html>
- Mwangi, O. G. (2021, March 25). Al-Shabaab. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.785>
- Norris, J., & Bruton, B. (2011). Twenty Years of Collapse. Center for American Progress and One Earth Future Foundation. Retrieved from <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf>
- Parrin, A. (2014, February 14). Five challenges for Somalia's economic reconstruction. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/>
- Persson, J., & Brommesson, D. (2012, September- December). Regions as Security Providers: The Evolution of the West African Regional Security Complex. pp. 15-25. Retrieved from <https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download>
- Prunier, G. (1995, July 1). Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990 - 1995. Retrieved from <https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/writenet/1995/en/54273>
- RAHIM, K. A., & Abukar, A. A. (2021, February 24). Challenges of Federalism in Somalia: The Perspectives and Opportunities . Advance. doi:<https://doi.org/10.31124/advance.14044376.v1>

- Ramadane, Z. O. (2014, August). Somalia: State Failure, Poverty and Terrorism. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 6(7), 13-16 . Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351270>
- S. Hall, G. (2015, April). WARLORDS OF THE SOMALI CIVIL WAR (1988-1995). pp. 10-15. Retrieved from <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1012774.pdf>
- Samatar, A. I. (2007, January 24). Ethiopian federalism: autonomy versus control in the Somali region. *Third World Quarterly* , 25(6), 1131-1154 . doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000256931>
- Schaefer, A., & Black, A. (2011, November 4). Clan and Conflict in Somalia: Al-Shabaab and the Myth of “Transcending Clan Politics”. *Terrorism Monitor* , 9(40). Retrieved from <https://jamestown.org/program/clan-and-conflict-in-somalia-al-shabaab-and-the-myth-oftranscending-clan-politics/>
- Sperber, A. (2021, May 20). Back from the brink? Somalia’s political crisis explained. Retrieved from <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/5/20/somalias-politicalcrisis-explained>
- T. Wilson, K. (2005). Somalia: Potential Home for the al Qaeda Terror Network . Retrieved from <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA506989.pdf>
- Thakur, R. (2009, September). From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* , 32(3), 387-410. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/161981>
- Warsameh, F. A. (2024, January 11). IntelBrief: Tensions Growing Between Ethiopia and Somalia Over Somaliland Port Deal . Retrieved from <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024january-11/>
- Webb, M. (2024, February 22). What the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal means for Washington’s strategy in the Red Sea. Retrieved from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-dealmeans-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/>



- Wilson, T. (2016). Economic Recovery in Somalia. *Bildhaan* , 15, 46-65. Retrieved from <https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=bildhaan>
- Yared, E. (2016, March 21). ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI WAR OVER THE OGADEN REGION (1977–1978) . Retrieved from <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/ethiopiansomali-war-over-ogaden-region-1977-1978/>
- Yibeltal, K., & Kupemba, D. N. (2024, April 4). Somalia expels Ethiopian ambassador amid row over Somaliland port deal. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68734631>
- Yousif, E. (2023, March 20). US Security Assistance to Somalia. Retrieved from <https://www.stimson.org/2023/us-security-cooperation-with-somalia/>
- A. Cruz, M., J Brabazon, J., S. Halfhill, D., & M. Ritzel, S. (2020, February 3). Between Theory and Practice: The Utility of International Relations Theory to the Military Practitioner. Retrieved from <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/>
- Abidwahab, M. (2016, December 8). The Rise and Fall of the Somali State. Retrieved from <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/rise-and-fall-somali-state>
- Ahmed, A. (2020, December 27). Tigray crisis: Eritrea's role in Ethiopian conflict . Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55295650>
- Ahmed, E. (2017). *The Informal Economy in Civil War: Hargeisa - Somaliland*. Cardiff University. Retrieved from [https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0007/1057732/Theinformal-economy-in-civil-war-Hargeisa.pdf](https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/1057732/Theinformal-economy-in-civil-war-Hargeisa.pdf)
- Ali Afyare, A. (2024, May). The Effect of International Intervention on Political Stability in Mogadishu, Somalia. *Journal (North Louisiana Historical Association)*, 7(8). Retrieved from

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380493876\\_The\\_Effect\\_of\\_International\\_Intervention\\_on\\_Political\\_Stability\\_in\\_Mogadishu\\_Somalia](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380493876_The_Effect_of_International_Intervention_on_Political_Stability_in_Mogadishu_Somalia)

ALİYEV, P., & ÇALIŞKAN, G. (2023, December 28). "How Does The Geopolitical Position Of Djibouti Influence Its Relations With Great Powers? The Journal of Diplomacy and Strategy , 4(2), 190-228. Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/articlefile/3421144>

Al-Jader, S. Z., & Jaafar, Z. G. (2022). The Thesis of Merging The Regions: An Approach to The Concept of The Regional Security Complex. *Journal of Positive School Psychology*, 6(7), 2177-2185. Retrieved from <http://journalppw.com/>

Amable, D. S. (2022, October 28). Theorizing the Emergence of Security Regions: An Adaptation for the Regional Security Complex Theory. *Global Studies Quarterly*, 2(4). doi:<https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac065>

André, Jr, L. (2023, January 17). Increase Security for the United States and Somalia . Retrieved from <https://so.usembassy.gov/the-partnership-between-the-united-states-and-somaliashared-interests-shared-goals/>

Anzalone, C. (2014, October 3). The rise and Fall of Al-Shabab in Somalia. *Turkish Review*, 4(4), 386-395. doi:1411392112

Aparecida Ferreira Souza, T. (2021). Rethinking the Regional Security Complex Theory: A South American view between 2008-2016. *Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional*, 7(1), 83-103. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.18847/1.13.7>

Apuuli, K. P. (2023, September 20). Regional Organizations and Conflict Management in Africa: The Case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa Region. *International Studies Associations and Oxford University Press*. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.640>

- Atwan, A.-B. (2015). *The Secret History of Al-Qaeda*. Retrieved from <https://books.google.com.pk/books?i>
- Aynte, A. (2024, January 30). Ethiopia's dangerous game in East Africa could spark conflict. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/1/30/ethiopias-dangerous-gamein-east-africa-could-spark-conflict>
- Bacon, T., & Muibu, D. (2019). *Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab: A Resilient Alliance*. Get access Arrow. In *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab* (pp. 391–400). Oxford Academic. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0035>
- Bari, B. (2024, May 31). *The War in Somalia*. Retrieved from <https://www.newamerica.org/futuresecurity/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/the-war-in-somalia/>
- Bari, D.-B. (2024, May 31). *The War in Somalia*. Retrieved from <https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/thewar-in-somalia/>
- Buzan, B. (2003). *Regional Security Complex Theory in the Post-Cold War World*. In B. Buzan, *Theories of New Regionalism* (pp. 140-159). Palgrave Macmillan. doi:[10.1057/9781403938794\\_8](https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403938794_8)
- Buzan, B. (1988, June). *The Southeast Asian Security Complex*. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 10(1), 1-16. doi:[25797984](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X0000101)
- C. Mueller, J. (2023, October 4). *Despite one of the US military's greatest fiascos, American troops are still in Somalia fighting an endless war*. Retrieved from <https://theconversation.com/d>
- Clarke, W. (2009). *Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia*. In *Learning From Somalia* (pp. 89-108). Taylor & Francis Online. doi:[10.4324/9780429499289-2](https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429499289-2)
- Cristol, J. (2019, November 26). *International Relations Theory*.

doi:10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0039

- D. Payton, G. (1980, September). The Somali Coup of 1969: The Case for Soviet Complicity. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18(3), 493-508. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/160366>
- D. Williams, P. (2024, February 12). Peacekeepers and Political Stability in Somalia . Retrieved from <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/02/12/peacekeepers-and-political-stability-insomalia/>
- D. Williams, P. (2024, May 28). Understanding US Policy in Somalia . Retrieved from <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/understanding-us-policy-somalia>
- Deforche, R. (2013). Stabilization and Common Identity: Reflections on the Islamic Courts Union and Al-Itihaad. *Bildhaan* , 13, 102-120. Retrieved from <https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1149&context=bildhaan>
- Dhaysane, M. (2023, September 29). Iran announces restoration of diplomatic ties with Djibouti after 7-year hiatus. Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/iran-announcesrestoration-of-diplomatic-ties-with-djibouti-after-7-year-hiatus/2998880>
- Dhaysane, M. (2024, June 2). Ethiopia's premier rules out conflict with Somalia regarding Red Sea Access deal with Somaliland. Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/ethiopia-premier-rules-out-conflict-with-somalia-regarding-red-sea-access-deal-withsomaliland/3129565>
- Elmi, A. A., & Barise, A. (January , 2006). The Somali Conflict: Root causes, obstacles, and peace-building strategies. *African Security Review*, 15(1), 32-54. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2006.9627386>
- Felbab-Brown, V. (2023, January 27). Somalia's challenges in 2023 . Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/somalias-challenges-in-2023/>

- Ford, N. (2024, May 14). Djibouti's diplomacy in the international arena . Retrieved from <https://african.business/2024/05/dossier/djiboutis-diplomacy-in-the-international-arena>
- G. Patman, R. (2015). The roots of strategic failure: The Somalia Syndrome and Al Qaeda's path to 9/11. *International Politics*, 52(1), 89–109. Retrieved from <http://www.palgravejournals.com/ip>
- Gavin, M. (2022, April 13). Somalia's Political Paradoxes Forestall Progress and Stability . Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/blog/somalias-political-paradoxes-forestall-progressand-stability>
- Gebreluel, G. (2021, May 20). The tripartite alliance destabilising the Horn of Africa. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/10/the-tripartite-alliance-that-destabilising-the-horn-of-africa>
- Gjørsv, G. H. (2005, June). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. *International Studies Review* , 7(2), 269-274. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281090398>
- Guha-Sapir, D., & Ratnayake, R. (n.d.). Consequences of Ongoing Civil Conflict in Somalia: Evidence for Public Health Responses. 6(8). doi:<https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000108>
- Harrison, S. (2023, September 28). America Needs a New Strategy in Somalia . Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/somalia/america-needs-new-strategy-somalia>
- Harter, F. (2024, January 13). We are ready for a war?: Somalia threatens conflict with Ethiopia over breakaway region . Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/>
- Hashi Nor, A. (2017, April 11). Six Things to Know About Somalia's Economy. Retrieved from <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/04/11/NA041117-Six-Things-to-Know-About-Somalia-Economy>

- Hassan, M. O. (2024, May 9). Somalia calls for termination of UN political mission . Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-calls-for-termination-of-un-politicalmission/7604835.html>
- Hersi, M. F., & O. Akinola, A. (March 2024). Regional Security and the Role of IGAD in Somalia. In *IGAD and Multilateral Security in the Horn of Africa* (pp. 179-217). ResearchGate. doi:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51548-4\\_8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51548-4_8)
- Hoffman, J. (2020, March 4). Regional Rivalries and Instability in Somalia . Retrieved from <https://csps.gmu.edu/2020/05/04/regional-rivalries-and-instability-in-somalia/>
- Hollis, M., & Smith, S. (1991). *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Retrieved from <https://www.academia.edu/6992988>
- J. Cannon, B., & Donelli, F. (2020, April 20). Asymmetric Alliances and High Polarity: Evaluating Regional Security Complexes in the Middle East and Horn of Africa. *Third World Quarterly* , 41(3), 1-21. doi:10.1080/01436597.2019.1693255
- Jalloh, A.-B. (2020, June 30). Somalia's tumultuous 60-year journey. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/somalias-tumultuous-60-year-journey-after-independence/a-53977180>
- Jarżabek, J. (2020). Regional security complex theory. In *Securitization Revisited* (pp. 123-140). Routledge. Retrieved from <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/>
- Johsons. (2017, December 22). Who are Somalia's al-Shabab? Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689>
- Juma, T. O. (2020, September 14). Application of Regional Security Complex Theory in Electoral Management , a view of East African Regions. Retrieved from <https://juniperpublishers.com/ttsr/TTSR.MS.ID.555635>

- K. Gebru, M., Zeru, G., & Tekalign, Y. (2023, June 30). The impact of the Middle East and Gulf states' involvement on the Horn of Africa's peace and security: Applying regional security complex theory. *Digest of Middle East Studies*. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12301>
- Kennard , M., & Einashe, I. (2019, March 19). For Somaliland and Djibouti, Will New Friends Bring Benefits? Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/somaliland-somaliahorn-of-africa-djibouti-military-oil-uae-qatar-berbera-port/>
- Khan, Q. (2024, June 3). Britannica. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Shabaab>.
- Kim, S. (2023, August 15). U.S Response to Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Retrieved from <https://aceusa.org/blog/research/research-foreignpolicy/us-response-to-conflict-with-al-shabaab-insomalia/>
- Krieger, R. (2007, February). Who Will Win Somalia's Tug of War? Retrieved from [https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/rough/2007/02/somalia\\_a\\_reporlinks.html](https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/rough/2007/02/somalia_a_reporlinks.html)
- Lawal, S. (2024, January 6). Why is Somalia so angry about Ethiopia's new Red Sea port deal? .
- Levy, I. (2024, March 18). Emirati Military Support Is Making a Difference in Somalia . Retrieved from <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/emirati-military-supportmaking-difference-somalia>
- Lopez, C. (2022, May 16). U.S. to Resume Small, Persistent Presence in Somalia. Retrieved from <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3033345/us-to-resumesmall-persistent-presence-in-somalia/>
- Lyons, T. (2007, August 22). Lyons: Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict Fueling Somalia Crisis . Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/interview/lyons-ethiopia-eritrea-conflict-fueling-somalia-crisis>
- M. Desai, R. (2019, October 2). Somalia's path to stability. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/somalias-path-to-stability/>
- M. Desai, R. (2019, October 2). Somalia's path to stability. Retrieved from

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/somalias-path-to-stability/>

- M. LEDERER, E. (2024, May 10). Somalia wants to terminate the UN political mission assisting peace efforts in the country. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/un-somaliapolitical-mission-terminate-alshabab-military-a6130200c5a34cc18ef65e808890b5e6>
- M. Schwartz, S. (2021, June 12). The Way Forward for the United States in Somalia. Retrieved from <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/way-forward-united-states-somalia/>
- Magan, A. I. (2016). Somalia: Instability, Conflict, and Federalism. 40-43. Retrieved from [https://nmbu.brage.unit.no/nmbu-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2400997/magan\\_2016.pdf?sequence=5](https://nmbu.brage.unit.no/nmbu-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2400997/magan_2016.pdf?sequence=5)
- Magara , I. (2021, June 15). The political crisis in Somalia and the resurgence of Al Shabaab . Retrieved from <https://euideas.eui.eu/2021/06/15/the-political-crisis-in-somalia-and-theresurgence-of-al-shabaab/>
- MANDRUP, T. (2021, February 24). Security in Somalia beyond 2021 – the future role of AMISOM and the international community. Retrieved from <https://www.accord.org.za/>
- Marchal, R. (2019). Motivations and Drivers of Al-Shabaab . In *War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab* (pp. 309–317). Oxford Academics. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190947910.003.0027>
- Mark-Thiesen, C., A. Mihatsch, M., & M. Sikes, M. (2021). *The Politics of Historical Memory and Commemoration in Africa*. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2021. doi:3110655497, 9783110655490
- Maruf, H. (2021, February 19). Clandestine Training of Somali Forces in Eritrea Stirs Families' Concern. Retrieved from [https://www.voanews.com/a/africa\\_clandestine-training-somaliforces-eritrea-stirs-families-concern/6202295.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_clandestine-training-somaliforces-eritrea-stirs-families-concern/6202295.html)



- McGlinchey, S., & Gold, D. (2017, January 9). International Relations Theory. pp. 5-8. Retrieved from <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/09/international-relations-theory>
- Menkhaus, K. (2009, March 11). Violent Islamic Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America. Retrieved from <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/031109Menkhaus031109.pdf>
- Menkhaus, K. (Somalia Case Study). Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: . Retrieved from [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c191358ed915d0c3d63f6ab/Somalia\\_case\\_study.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c191358ed915d0c3d63f6ab/Somalia_case_study.pdf)
- Mesfin, B. (2013, September 9). The Horn of Africa Security Complex. Retrieved from <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/169057>
- Metzel, M. (2023, June 13). Eritrea rejoins East Africa bloc after exit 16 years ago. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/13/eritrea-rejoins-east-africa-bloc-after-exit-16years-ago>
- Mogadishu. (2023, March 21). Sustaining Gains in Somalia's Offensive against Al-Shabaab. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b187-sustaininggains-somalias-offensive-against-al-shabaab>
- Mohamed , A. A. (2018, December 10). Assessment of Conflict Dynamics in Somali National Regional State of Ethiopia . *Journal of Public Policy and Administration*, 2(4), 40-48. doi:115580539/10.11648.j.jppa.20180204.11-libre.pdf
- Mohamed, A. (2024, January 31). UN, Somalia Launch \$1.6 Billion Appeal for Humanitarian Aid . Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/un-somalia-launch-1-6-billion-appeal-forhumanitarian-aid/7465489.html>
- Moller, B. (2009). The Somali Conflict: The role of External Factors. Danish Institute for International Studies. Retrieved from <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/59871/1/592906116.pdf>

- Muhammad, A. (2008, May 2). Djibouti. *The Adelphi Papers*, 32(269), 53-62.  
doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/05679329208449108>
- Muhammed, H. Y. (2014, Spring). *The Role of External Actors in the Somali Conflict* . 10-12. Malmo University. Retrieved from <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1482499/FULLTEXT01.pdf>
- Mulugeta , K. (2009, December). *The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD*. pp. 8-10. Retrieved from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/07937-book.pdf>
- Nyadera , I. N., Ahmed , M. S., & Agwanda , B. (2019, October 18). *Transformation of the Somali Civil -War and Reflections for a Social Contract Peacebuilding Process*. Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences, 18(4), 1346-1366. Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/830939>
- Osman, J. (2013, December 16). *Exclusive: inside an al-Shabaab training camp* . Retrieved from <https://www.channel4.com/news/al-shabaab-somalia-kenya-westgate-al-qaeda>
- Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2014). *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria* . Retrieved from [https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exldoc/pleins\\_textes/divers15-04/010064362.pdf](https://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exldoc/pleins_textes/divers15-04/010064362.pdf)
- PINTO, T. N. (2020, July 20). *A fragile state in a troubled region* . Retrieved from <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/somalia-challenges/>
- Pippard, T. (2010, July 3). *Al-Shabab's Agenda in the Wake of the Kampala Suicide Attacks* . 3(7). Retrieved from <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/al-shababs-agenda-in-the-wake-of-the-kampalasuicide-attacks/>
- Pratama, C. P. (2013). *Central Asia as a Regional Security Complex from the Perspectives of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism* . *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, 15(1), 84-96. doi:10.7454/global.v15i1.16

- Prys-Hansen, M., & Frazier, D. (2024, February 24). The regional powers research program: a new way forward. *International Politics*, 61, 1-21. doi:10.1057/s41311-024-00563-y
- Raza, H. (2022, November 4). US Intervention in Somalia: Justified or Unnecessary? Retrieved from <https://www.paradigmshift.com.pk/us-intervention-in-somalia/>
- Report, S. (2008). Targeting in complex emergencies: Somalia country case study. Tufts University. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/targeting-complexemergencies-somalia-country-case-study>
- Reuters. (2018, June 30). Somalia, Eritrea to establish diplomatic ties, open embassies. Retrieved from [s://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-eritrea-to-establish-diplomatic-ties-openembassies-idUSKBN1KK1O5/](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-eritrea-to-establish-diplomatic-ties-openembassies-idUSKBN1KK1O5/)
- Rome. (2024, February 22). With the agreements signed with Somalia and Djibouti, Turkey strengthens its presence in the Red Sea. Retrieved from <https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/>
- Rubin, M. (2021, June 14). Eritrea and Somalia's Behavior in the Tigray Conflict Is Worse Than First Reported. Retrieved from <https://www.aei.org/op-eds/eritrea-and-somalias-behaviorin-the-tigray-conflict-is-worse-than-first-reported/>
- Rwengabo, S. (2016, July). AMISOM and African-Centred Solutions to Peace and Security Challenges. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308898703>
- Sadurski, L. (2022, August). REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX THEORY: WHY IS THIS CONCEPT STILL WORTH DEVELOPING? *Athenaeum: Polish Political Science Studies*, 75(3), 137-153. doi:10.15804/athena.2022.75.08
- SCHMIDT, E. (2022, November). The US Helped Destroy Modern Somalia. Retrieved from <https://jacobin.com/2022/11/somalia-cold-war-war-on-terror-us-interventiondestabilization>

- Schmitt, E. (2023, June 27). Out of the Box: How to Rebalance U.S. Somalia Policy . Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/us-horn-africa-somalia/7-out-box-how-rebalance-ussomalia-policy>
- Shahow, A. A. (2024, February 28). Before Leaving Somalia, African Union Should Provide Compensation for Civilian Harm. Retrieved from <https://www.justsecurity.org/92822/>
- Skjelderup, M., Ainashe, M., & Abdulle, A. M. (2020, July 9). Militant Islamism and local clan dynamics in Somalia: the expansion of the Islamic Courts Union in Lower Jubba province. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 14(3), 553-571 . doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789929>
- Söderbaum , F., & Tavares, R. (2009, May-December). Problematizing Regional Organizations in African Security. *African Security*, 2(2/3). Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48598791>
- Sosinski, C. (2014, October 8). Colonization of Somalia. Retrieved from <https://sites.psu.edu/afr110/2014/10/08/colonization-of-somalia/>
- Stedman, S. J. (2001, September). Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers. Retrieved from [https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ImplementingPeaceAgreementsinCivilWars\\_IPI2001.pdf](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ImplementingPeaceAgreementsinCivilWars_IPI2001.pdf)
- Tahir, M. (2022, November 2nd). Regional Security Complex Theory and Soft Power: Mapping China's Engagement in Afghanistan. *Margalla Papers*, 39-48. doi:<https://doi.org/10.54690/margallapapers.26.2.120>
- Tar, U., & Mustapha, M. (2017). The Emerging Architecture of a Regional Security Complex in the Lake Chad Basin. Retrieved from <https://www.semanticscholar.org/>
- Turse, N. (2024, March 7). WHO COULD HAVE PREDICTED THE U.S. WAR IN SOMALIA

- WOULD FAIL? THE PENTAGON. Retrieved from  
<https://theintercept.com/2024/03/07/pentagon-somalia-africa-terrorism-failure/>
- Turton, E. (2009, January 22). Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule and the Development of Somali Political Activity in Kenya 1893–1960. *The Journal of African History*, 13(1), 119-143. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700000293>
- Walsh, B. (2021, January 25). Revisiting Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa: Museveni's Uganda and Regional Security in East Africa. *African Security*, 13(4), 300-324. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1873507>
- Walsh, B. (2021, January 25). Revisiting Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa: Museveni's Uganda and Regional Security in East Africa. *African Security*, 13(4), 300-324. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1873507>
- Walt, R., & Solomon, H. (2014, Spring). Histories and Spaces of Terrorism in Africa: The Post9/11 Strategic Challenge of Somalia's al Shabab. *Afro Eurasian Studies Journal*, 3(1). Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/700301>
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Retrieved from <https://www.scirp.org/reference/referencespapers?referenceid=1084153>
- Woldemariam, M. (2019, May). The Eritrea-Ethiopia Thaw and Its Regional Impact. *Current History*, 118(808), 181-187. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48614446>
- Wolseley Prah, P. (2023, October 19). From Somalia with Love: Unveiling Al-Shabaab's Recruitment Strategies, Power Projection, and the Somali Government's Countermeasures. doi:10.5772/intechopen.1002425

