

**ARMENIAN AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: CASE STUDY OF NAGORNO-
KARABAKH CONFLICT**



by

Afshan Naz

68-FSS/MSIR/F15

Supervisor


Dr.Sadaf Farooq

Department of Politics and IR,

Faculty of Social Sciences

International Islamic University, Islamabad

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Certification

Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled "Armenian Azerbaijan Relations: Case Study of Nagorno Karabakh Conflict" submitted by Afshan Naz Registration no. 68-FSS/MSIR/F15, have been found satisfactory for the requirements of the degree of MS in International Relations

Supervisor:



Dr. Sadaf Farooq
Assistant Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad

Internal Examiner:



Professor Dr. Amna Mahmood
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad


External Examiner:



Dr. Noman Omar Sattar
Area Study Center
Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad



Professor Dr. Amna Mahmood
Chairperson
Politics and International Relations
International Islamic University Islamabad



Professor Dr. Samina Yasmin Malik
Dean
Faculty of Social Sciences,
International Islamic University Islamabad

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own and autonomous work. All sources and aids used have been indicated as such. All texts either quoted directly or paraphrased have been indicated by in-text citation.

Afshan Naz

68-FSS/MSIR/F15

DEDECATED TO MY BELOVED PARENTS

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In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious and the most Merciful

First of all, I am highly thankful to Almighty Allah who has given me enough strength to complete this task. After that I am thankful to my parents, they co-operated and helped me a lot in the completion of my research. Their care, encouragement, love, and affection made me able to stand at my existing position.

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Figure 1.1 Map of Nagorno-Karabakh region



Source: History of Nagorno-Karabakh. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_NagornoKarabakh#/media/File:Republic_of_Artsakh_map.png

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BTC	Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan Pipeline
CE	Council of Europe
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CR	Conciliation Resources
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EP	Eastern Partnership
EPNK	European Partnership for Peaceful settlement of the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh
EU	European Union
ICGR	International Crisis Group Report
IDP's	Internally Displaced Persons
LINKS	London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NK	Nagorno-Karabakh
NKAO	Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
NKR	Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Abstract

Two South Caucasian states Armenia and Azerbaijan have conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh region located in Azerbaijan but populated by Armenians. The conflict is of ethnic nature over the area which is of geographical and strategic importance. Since the early years of 20th century and during a full-fledged war of 1994 it faced massacres and violations on small and large scales. Even after passing more than two decades the conflict is still unresolved and human rights are getting violated. The area is important strategically due to which major powers and international organizations are also active in this conflict. The study focuses on interests and role major powers are playing conflict resolution. It also analyses the factors which are creating obstacles in peaceful resolution of the conflict. Through qualitative research and by using primary and secondary techniques of data collection it is analysed that what techniques can best suit this scenario to overcome the mass killings and skirmishes on the borders of conflicting states. Seeking peace and creating smooth lines of interaction between Armenia and Azerbaijan, mutual efforts by governmental and non-governmental officials, international security guarantee and role of organizations can make the conflict get settled. Though organizations are presenting proposals and bringing two parties on dialogue table but there is lack of implementation. Through proper implementation of selected strategies and wise and intellectual role of leaders on both sides it is possible to resolve the conflict.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Nagorno-Karabakh is a territory of ethnic conflict between republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan over self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a region in Azerbaijan primarily populated by Armenians. It was basically a self-designed conflict. It has its origins in early 20th century which began in 1988 and escalated into a full scale war in early 1990s. At the peak of the conflict – 1988-1994– some 25,000 people were killed and more than one million people were displaced from their homes: 350,000 Armenians run away from Azerbaijan to Armenia, 185,000 Azeris escaped from Armenia to Azerbaijan, and some half a million Azeris were ousted from their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas, which all fell under Armenian control. Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan continued till a ceasefire was signed in 1994. Enclave parliament voted in favor of uniting itself with Armenia.

As a result of referendum, people voted for independence which was rejected by Azerbaijan. During Soviet fall, Azerbaijan seceded itself from Soviet Union, Armenian majority voted to secede from Azerbaijan and proclaimed unrecognized republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. International mediation failed and Armenia captured most of the Azerbaijani territory. In spite of the efforts made by some actors the conflict could not be resolved and still exists as it is. While there were some happenings involving victims in previous years, 2014 was a year of marked decline, with dozens of losses on both sides. In November 2014, an Armenian helicopter was put down by the Azeris (who claimed

the helicopter was on a mission to attack Azeri troops near the border with Nagorno-Karabakh), an incident observed as one of the most serious since the 1994 negotiating period. The trend continued into January 2015, and there is severe cause for concern that the succession will result in repeated war. Furthermore, Russia, which for years profited from the dormancy in which there was neither war nor peace and supported its own status there, may now be interested in escalation so that it can install its own diplomacy troops in the region (Linderstrauss, 2015).

Some countries are having economic and strategic interests in the region like U.S.A and Russia. Russia wants to regain its control and influence in South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is biggest buyer of Arms and ammunition from Russia and Armenia is fully dependent in transportation, telecommunication, banking and energy sector. Main actor working for peaceful resolution is OSCE Minsk Group. Other organizations like Council of Europe and European Union have least role (Klever, 2013). Turkey is interested in pipeline construction to decrease its dependence on Middle Eastern oil and Russian gas and to gain it from Caspian Sea for domestic consumption (Cornell, 1999). The conflict is still unresolved and its main reason is lack of support from political domain in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Better peace building efforts may minimize the conflict leading it towards settlement. In both the conflicting states political leaders are not free to impose their action rather there is the environment of international major power's rule.

1.1 Rationale of the Study

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is an ethnic conflict between the Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan over the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, a region in Azerbaijan populated primarily by ethnic Armenians. This study will explore all the causes behind the conflicted scenario and will come up with best possible solutions for maintenance of peace.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has its origins in the early 20th century, although the present conflict began in 1988 and escalated into a full-scale war in the early 1990s. Tensions and border skirmishes have continued in the region despite an official cease-fire signed in 1994. After passing almost 28 years of long run the conflict is still there. Several efforts have been made by OSCE Minsk Group, European Union, Russia, U.S.A and Turkey for the peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but all those efforts have been failed. The study would focus on the factors behind the failure of efforts. It would also suggest best possible strategies for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

1.3 Objective of the Study

- To highlight the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan
- To analyze the role of mediators and actors working for generating peace
- To explore the factors of failure of peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
- To elaborate the best possible strategies for peaceful resolution of NK conflict

1.4 Research Question

1. What were the factors which led to the origin of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
2. What are the obstacles in peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
3. Who is the main beneficiary of unresolved nature of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
4. How mediators and main actors played their role in working for peaceful resolution in the region?
5. What strategies can be adopted for peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The research will be significant in various ways. The research will provide firsthand knowledge for researchers, students, intellectuals and other persons who will be interested to know the facts about the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It will provide a better understanding of knowledge of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for academicians and practitioners. Further it would be helpful for policy makers to resolve it well.

1.6 Operational Definitions of Major Terms

1.6.1 Mediator

A person who attempts to make people involved in a conflict come to an agreement is called mediator. Here by using the word mediator my purpose is to mention state, organization or any other body which acted as mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan for conflict resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia prominently acted as

mediator by organizing OSCE Minsk Group in 1992. European Union played its role by European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EP). Council of Europe mediated through Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE).

1.6.2 Strategy

A detailed plan for achieving idea is called strategy. The thesis is aimed at exploring the best possible strategies which can be used for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. For Example, military action, backup plan, stage by stage solution, package solution.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

In 1970 John Galtung used the term 'peace building' for the first time. He introduced bottom up approach to replace coercion with peace and focused on structural view only. Later on John Paul Lederach proposed its further terms and levels like grass root level, local levels, and NGO's and international actor's level. Concept of peace building was further elaborated by UN secretary general 'Boutros Ghali' by his report 'An Agenda for Peace'.

Although the theory was criticized by Jennifer Hazen as liberal democratic model need to be revised as rushed transition may undermine stability and David Chandler said that role of third party or any other external support may make government weak and always dependent on foreign powers. Even after having loopholes the Peace-building theory seems to be adjustable according to the scenario of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Peace keeping bodies can play the role to eliminate doubts between the conflicting states through dialogue, exchange of information and replacement of all the reservations. This

is how compromise may work. Such acts need their origination from the very lower grass root levels. Leaders may play their role in convincing people to come on the peace and compromise front and to make it possible through implementation and ratification. Beside such official acts representatives from both sides may work unofficially through track II diplomacy. In such a way creative resolution ideas may make their way forward towards resolution.

Peace-building can change attitudes. Some other peace-building techniques include grass root dialogue groups, training in conflict resolution techniques, Truth commissions, which could help victims accept settlement by formally recognizing the harm done to them and Capacity-building efforts aimed at the formation of networks of local NGOs, including important grass-roots or mid-level leaders, with a commitment to conflict resolution. Experts of dialogue groups can play important roles in such networks. The common outlook is to bring together people from the groups in conflict at a neutral site, often to live together for a period of time, to discuss in detail the issues that divide them. If peace builders could manage time and build some arguments whether bitter or smooth, after some meaningful debate both the parties to the conflict may reach to some point of mutual understanding. It can make the way more inclined towards settlement. Sometimes peace building through such techniques may get hurdles when few groups do not completely agree with such methodology. In such situations, methodology seems ineffective but it only happens because of lack of coordination and its implementation on minor level. It's functioning on larger and organized level increases its chances of bringing best consequences.

Peace building efforts will be more prone towards better results when both government and civil societies will step forward with greater collaboration. Governmental and non-governmental organizations may create stronger platform for human rights activation. A first step is to secure support from the groups or governments in conflict, through diplomatic methodologies explaining how peace-building will help incumbent leaders by building support for their peacemaking. However contribution in peace-building dialogues essentially involves a free visit to a resort, leaders might offer participation as a bonus to lower-level officials who support their peace policy. Such officials are suitable target of peace-building efforts, and offering the bonus would give them the reason to be vocal in support of peace and may enhance their insight desire towards settlement. Funding might best be handled through autonomous groups such as the US Institute of Peace or the Eurasia Foundation, which are skilled at identifying and monitoring NGOs on the ground who can carry out such work. Peace-building, however, changes attitudes only at the individual level; such changes must be leveraged to alter the overall climate of opinion as well.

Most of all, leaders must develop alternative tools for gathering support, and develop a language for talking publicly about peace and reconciliation that resonates emotionally with their followers, so they can counter emotional nationalist petitions. Also the leaders must be convinced of the need to turn their media into promoters of peace before an agreement is reached. Mediators need to emphasize the importance of peacemaking debates in governments involved in negotiations. Peace-building tools such as truth commissions can help by contradicting false charges with precise facts. A first

step would be to support the creation of television programming featuring peace-building efforts, and intervening diplomatically to gain access for such programs on local government-sponsored broadcasts. Another set of policies should be aimed at recasting ethno-nationalist myths into cooperative and tolerant ones, especially by promoting the writing and teaching of fair-minded history instead of the ethnocentric and scapegoating kind. Again, this may seem unnecessarily intrusive, but it is necessary. If children are taught in school that their group's demands are unquestionably justified, and that opposing claims are threatening and unjustified, then it becomes impossible later for national leaders to defend a settlement of the conflict based on compromise. To address this problem, governments and international organizations must routinely assess school curricula, and criticize and pressure countries that teach hostile myths to their schoolchildren. For example, in Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could usefully take on this job, institutionalizing a process of evaluating the national histories and writings appearing on school curricula. Many of these tasks are, to be sure, long-term ones that would take decades to fully bear fruit. That is as it should be. Conflict resolution is not only about reaching agreements, but about reaching agreements that can hold permanently. The job of peace-building is to create an atmosphere in which a settlement can be reached, and be sustained once reached. In ethnic conflicts, characterized as they are by deep fear and hatred, the job realistically takes decades to be completed. Peace-building is one of the important and effective tools to perform this task (Kaufman, 2000).

2. Literature Review

Literature regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is searched through different sources of information including books, articles, journals, previous thesis on the issue and internet material. Primary sources of information are given in references section. The study is focused mainly on the role of main actors working for peaceful resolution of the conflict like OSCE Minsk group, European Union, Council of Europe, United Nations, EPNK and other civil society organizations. Beside this, role of mediators is enlightened, developments in conflict in the year 2013 and its futuristic perspective. After 1988, violence leads to war between Armenia and Azerbaijan due to disagreement about the status of NK. In 1992, OSCE Minsk group started peace negotiations. European Union is also involved. Mutual distrust is crucial obstacle towards resolution, lack of contacts and confidence of Minsk group is also lacking. Context is defined by Armenia at preserving current situation and building legitimacy and Azerbaijan is aimed at resorting its territorial integrity and building up its military force. Status quo can benefit elites in both countries. International role is also important especially Russia's role, Russia has a big economic interest in the region because of Azerbaijani's arms purchase, big share in economic sector of Armenia. Non resolution gave Russia big influence in the region. Interests of EU and U.S are more balanced. Lack of long term commitment by international community is also a reason of non-resolution. Minsk process is confidential only on official level; also Armenia and Azerbaijan are having full control over negotiations (Klever, 2010). Although this research is a detailed study of the conflict, role of mediators is the main focus of the study and well elaborated but even after such a

detail study no best possible strategies are given as how this conflict can be resolved peacefully.

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is generalized from local to global level. In initial years Azerbaijan was having its own ethnic problems, later on full scale war held between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Transition in levels of conflict in such a way changed nature of confrontation and ways of resolving the problem. Dynamics of conflict were on ethno-confessional level, regional level, soviet post-soviet level and international level. In this book problem is discussed in its international legal aspects which resulted in the form of legal approach to find its solution which is no more than a dead end. However international law contains a lot of principles which come into clash due to their differences. NK conflict is a political factor along with having legal approach. Along with it all variants of political settlement of problem of NK brought together. Positions of Azerbaijan, Azeri's, territorial exchange, position of authorities of NK were important variants. Cyprus model was meant to exist as agreeing with its de-facto existence and not the de-jure. Chechen model was another important variant.

Different strategies are discussed regarding resolution of the problem like military solution, package solution, stage by stage solution, backup plan, integration approaches, external coercion or Dayton schemes, Dartmouth variant etc. Socio political conditions in Armenia and Azerbaijan and their effect on conflict are noticed (Abasov. Khachatrian, 2006). This book is a best one of its kind which gave entailed list of techniques which can be adopted for peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but unluckily it cannot

have such an impact that techniques could be materialized. Lack of implementation of techniques led to minimization of significance of this study.

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the severe conflict of post-soviet era with a lot of victims, refugees and massive destruction. Military phase ended in 1994 with preservation of peace without the involvement of foreign peace keeping bodies. Despite the efforts of mediators conflict remained unresolved later on. During entire soviet period Azerbaijan committed policies of repression and discrimination in all sectors based on ethnic grounds. During last years of Soviet Union in accordance with USSR legislation NK legally obtained independence from Azerbaijan. In 1998 a decision was adopted to transfer the autonomous region from Azerbaijan to Armenia but Azerbaijan parliament rejected it. A special governing committee was formed for Karabakh thus withdrawing Karabakh from Baku's subordination and subjecting it directly to Moscow. In 1989 parliament of Armenia and representatives of Karabakh adopted joint decision to reunite Armenia and Karabakh. A law was passed later on for minorities to determine their future status. In 1991 NK declared itself autonomous republic. Violence erupted due to Azerbaijan's use of force over Armenians resulting in genocide. US senate condemned it. Later on cease fire negotiations held between Azerbaijan and NKR in 1993(Kocharyan, 2015). On the whole this research explains only the facts about the happenings, as what has happened in which era and on which side. Article does not discuss at all what its title shows which is "why the issue is still not resolved".

Research provided an analysis to distinguish between the positions and interests of main actors evaluating the peace process, factors accounting its continuous failure,

developing recommendations to resolve it. Peace can be attained by long term strategy of addressing mutual perceptions, security issues and democracy. Legal status of NK is also important to attain the attention. Democratization, Turkish Armenian reconciliation, regional, economic, political and security integration are preconditions for lasting peace (Gamaghelyan, 2004). This articles covers a vast portion of study but according to the writer, conflict cannot be resolved by any short term or long term strategy and focuses on one solution in the form of Turkish Armenian reconciliation.

This research is concentrated on historical background of NK conflict and attitude of world community regarding the negotiations on the issue. It provides the analysis of political, economic, security and sociocultural dynamics. The paper discussed the factors of failure of resolution and provided recommendations on how the issue can be sort out. The conflict is also studied in the context of oil and gas politics in central Asian region. However failure of conflict to be resolved seems to be due to lack of concern and interest of international community along with mistrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan rather than the inability of mediators. Russian and Armenian companies are in competition to dominate the region however Armenian administration should leave oil and gas construction projects for Russian and Chinese companies. Examining the issue on ground realities it cannot be solved on short term basis. Democratization process, ethnic identical factors, Armenia Turkey reconciliation and regional economic integration can be supposed to consider long term strategies for solution(Khalid, 2008). The conflict is considered as interstate conflict of Armenia and Azerbaijan although it is also intrastate

in nature. Due to understanding of conflict as an interstate one it founds difficulty and hurdles in peaceful resolution due of lack of international concern.

Rise of NK conflict in 1988 between Caucasian nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in mass killings. It was regarded as internal conflict by few and external by some others. In this research controversial roots of the issue are charted out from earliest times till late Soviet era. Its history is revealed from the time when Azerbaijan was claimed to be the part of Armenian kingdom in 1905 till the ups and downs of 1918 and further history, other events of soviet era from 1921 to 1987 are also discussed. Another list of important events like war from 1992 till 1994, Russia's broker, relations of Turkey and Azerbaijan, Iran's Azerbaijani relations, U.S.A moving towards commitment, mediation process and NK in perspective of Eurasian Geopolitics were analyzed. However any solution to the problem is difficult to implement, long term strategies are needed. Level of mistrust is hurdle in this regard(Cornell, 1999).

Armenia and Azerbaijan claimed NK to be their part differently. This study entails all the incidents happened in the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh resulting in deadly consequences. According to Human Rights watch and international law Azerbaijan faced brutality by Armenia. In 1994 Russian broker ceasefire left NK under Armenian control. Some principles were made regarding the rights of Azerbaijan, status of NK, Lachine corridor, rights if IDPs and refugees and international security guarantee named "Madrid principles". How implementation mattered. Religious and cultural monuments in NK were destroyed and leaders or higher authorities did not agreed on single final decision. However all the minor incidents seem to be moving towards war (Caspian information

Centre Report, 2012). This research presented thoroughly important facts but is not concluded well as how the pitfalls can be overcome. How the implementation can be made possible to attain the desired consequences.

In the light of massive deterioration of Russian Turkish relations after downing of Russian fighter jet in 2015 and muscle flexing of Mr. Putin and Mr. Erdogan it is to be feared that south Caucasus might become venue of proxy war. Firstly adherence to basic principles of Minsk group is supposed to lead to a lasting solution of the conflict. Secondly any short term settlement solution is impossible. Thirdly NK is not a frozen conflict because there have been happening smaller or larger skirmishes along contact line since 22 years (Schumacher, 2016). There seems lack of hope or positive ends which spoils the beauty of whole article.

3. Research Methodology

This study is qualitative in nature. It is both exploratory and descriptive. It is based on primary and secondary resources. Among primary resources online government and embassies documents are included. Among secondary resources books, journals and newspapers are used.

4. Organization of the Study

The whole thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the whole study and it also includes theoretical framework. Chapter two discusses the historical background of Nagorno-Karabakh region. Chapter three discusses the important events in post 9/11 era which contributed towards more destruction due to the

conflict. Chapter four summarized the role of major powers in conflict resolution and hurdles coming their way as lack of implementation. Chapter five discusses the role of organizations and their proposals. Chapter six concludes the whole thesis and suggest some strategies to resolve the conflict.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During ancient times and early Middle Ages, Karabakh was known to be part of an independent state Caucasian Albania which existed from IV century till VIII century. In VIII century Arabs entered in South Caucasus which became the cause of the acceptance of Islam by most of the Albans. After the end of independent Albania, Karabakh remained under the rule of Muslim states including Sajids, Salarids, Shaddadids, Atabeks and Jalairids on the territory of Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh occasionally became the part of Muslim Empires like Seljuk Turks in XI century, Mongolian Dynasty of Ilkhanids, Timurids Empire since XIII-XV and since XVI-XVIII Nagorno-Karabakh was ruled by Safavid Dynasty along with Azerbaijan. In XVIII Azerbaijan was captured by Russian Empire. During all these rules, some Khanates seem prominent in ruling the Karabakh region. Till XIX Azerbaijan was tried to be dominated by Iran, Ottoman and Russian Empires. Some Khanates defended themselves with weapons while others preferred vassal agreements (Karakoc, 2011).

On May 14, 1805 Karabakh became the protectorate of Russia due to Kurekchai agreement held between Azerbaijani Khan Ibrahim Khalil and Russian emperor Tsitsianov. Later on Ibrahim Khalil was assassinated and due to unstable rule by his son tsarist govt. tried to weaken economic position of Muslim emperors and latterly in mid XIX Russian authorities abolished Khanates of whole Azerbaijan. Migrating Armenians

from Iran and Turkey were settled on Muslim majority areas. Karabakh was made part of military Muslim district in Shusha which was ruled by Armenian Ancestors at that time. Russian authorities rivaled Ottoman Empire during their sociopolitical crisis and used Armenians to conquer Southern Caucasus regions on cost of the promise they made with Armenians to handover Azerbaijan to them. The conflicts between the two resulted in wars (Cornell, 2005). First Russian Iranian war (1804-1813) resulted in Gulistan treaty where custody of Karabakhalong with Dagheston and Georgia was set under Russian control. 2nd Russian Iranian war (1826-1828) ended with Turkmenchai pact between the two where Erivan Khanate and Nakhchivan Khanate became absolute property of Russia. Both the rules were abolished by Russia and territory was named Armenian region headed by Russian Officials in 1828 which further renamed as Erivan Governorate in 1849, now it is Yerevan. Armenians could successfully settle themselves there in 1836 (A Summary of Karabakh History, 2014).

During the course of 19th century south Caucasus was altered by Russians in favor of Armenians but in late 19th century Armenians were suppressed by Russians in the wave of Russification. Due to harsh economic and ethnic tensions first Russian revolution took place in 1905. First time violence occurred between Armenia and Azerbaijan same year. It keeps on happening till 1906 and soothed until the demise of Russian Empire in 1917. Both Azerbaijani Turks and Armenians lived in peace in Karabakh region till the end of First World War 3rd March 1918. But this peace period resulted in even more bloody confrontations on April 30th 1918. War broke out from 1920 till 1922 during the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Fighting broke out between the First Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in three

specific regions: Nakhchevan, Zangezur (today the Armenian province of Syunik) and Karabakh itself, in Azerbaijan.

The Karabakh Armenians tried to announce their independence but failed to make contact with the Republic of Armenia. After the downfall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Armenian General Andranik Ozanian entered Karabakh with military success and was headed towards the region capital of Shusha in December 1918. British troops occupied the South Caucasus in 1919, and the British command suggested conflict to be solved at the Paris Peace Conference. Later, the British conditionally declared Azerbaijani statesman Khosrovbey Sultanov ordered him to crush any unrest in the region. Shusha massacre estimated 20,000 Armenians. Again the 1919 Paris Conference resulted in recognition of Azerbaijan's control over Karabakh (Karakoc, 2011). 1921 seemed to be in favor of Armenia but status of Karabakh was questioned.

2.1 Cold War Era

In November 1924 NK was proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. In 1930 Armenians again attempted to regain control over Karabakh along with Nakhijivan but they were not supported by Russian authorities. Karabakh was further disconnected from Armenia due to dissolution of Federative Republic of Transcaucasia in 1936. Due to economic neglect of Karabakh by Azerbaijan tensions erupted and continued from 1963 till 1968. Fall of Soviet Union left Armenia and Azerbaijan self-governing states at war with each other with no trained and official armies. Closed border with Azerbaijan turned into a fighting zone for Armenia whose citizens were being killed in the conflict. Armenia was almost prepared for war as its army core was set by a Soviet

officers. Along with it, Fedayin fighters were handed over with weapons, guns, boots, clothes and camouflage on the basis of their willingness only in Armenia. Azerbaijan was in much feebler situation (Cornell, 2005).

In late 1980s Glasnost movement made it easier when Armenians of NKAO openly demanded annexation of Karabakh with Soviet Armenia. Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of 1985, Glasnost and Perestroika created nationalist feelings amongst local populations. In February 1988, local Soviet NKAO pleaded to USSR Supreme Soviet to transfer NKAO from Azerbaijan SSR to Armenian SSR which is approved by Armenia and condemned by Azerbaijan. It resulted in clash and further casualties. Karabakh committee members had to face prison till May 1989 in Moscow when Moscow enforced direct regulation on Karabakh for a short period of time. In January 1990 Soviet leadership stated state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh and open fire upon citizens killing around 130 (De Waal 2003).

In 1945, 1965 and 1977 Karabakh Armenians sent letters and petitions to Moscow for their unification with Soviet Armenia which is again mobilized during the emergence of Glasnost and perestroika movements. Movement by Armenians was quite different from all previous efforts as Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have now settled in areas like Moscow, Yerevan and Tashkent due to which large informal network has been formed across Soviet Union. It became an ambitious movement. The crisis began in 1988. On 21 February there held a meeting in devotion to the crisis in Kremlin. According to Gorbachev there were 19 probable territorial clashes in Soviet Union. Asking for independence by Nagorno-Karabakh was completely new thing against Lenin's slogan

that was “All power to the Soviets”. On 22nd Feb there held violence in Aghdam an Azerbaijani town as a result of protest which was moving towards Armenia. A secretive drive for unification of Karabakh with Armenia was present for decades (De Waal, 2003).

On 26, 27 Feb, 1988 Demonstrations were systematized in Sumgait under the slogan “Death to Armenians!” against 18000 Armenian citizens there. The whole atrocities occurred in three days altogether named as Sumgait. It was only one more example of Azerbaijan’s racist policies and cleansing of Armenians. On 27 Feb, a mass gathering at Lenin square was aimed at hitting Armenians, destroying their residences, rapping the women, burning and torturing all Armenians. Even children, oldies and all others were killed with knives and axes also they were being burned alive. Women were facing the ugliest kind of physical tortures leading them towards death which showed not only the planning of few hours but a long term planning which was depicted in their use of weapons and destruction. It ended with almost 32 being killed according to official statement but other sources agree the digit above hundreds, hundreds disabled, numerous were misplaced along with 18000 fled from the town. Mikhail Gorbachev called it only hooliganism diverting a set schemed plan to individual criminal acts where only 8 were sentenced to death, rest were imprisoned for few years only. Those engaged in Sumgait massacre were now sitting in Azerbaijan parliament according to Zerkalo, Newspaper, Azerbaijan 21 Feb, 2003 (The Sumgait Syndrome, 2012).

Ethnic cleansing in Baku resulted in 35000 Armenians left there in 1990 out of 250,000 Armenians in 1988. Citizens had to face every kind of possible brutality and

physical torture including being set on fire alive or throwing down from balconies. These massacres were also pre planned as mobs were having list of Armenians along with addresses to be targeted according to a reporter of human rights watch. On February 1992 Armenian Attack in Khodzaly resulted in mass violence. It was Azeri-Turk military operation in Khodzaly inside Karabakh. Attacks moved from here and Shusha towards Stepankert. There is controversy regarding the exact number of mass killings. Azeri Interior Ministry claimed the number to be 100 dead and 250 wounded but Western Media later on exposed 1000 death toll of Azeri Turk civilians. Another event of ethnic cleansing took place in Maragha a region of Nagorno-Karabakh on 10th April 1992 where 50 persons were killed and 49 were taken as prisoners (The Sumgait Syndrome, 2012).

2.2 Post-Cold War Era

Random clashes came to be more common in the first months of 1991. Moscow fixed a joint military operation along with Azerbaijan in spring and summer of the same year for the secret purpose of clearing up 24 villages of Armenian population in NKAO and to eliminate parliamentary armies, the operation also named as search and destroy operation. Casualties reported till June 1991 were 816. Under the effect of Gorbachev movements and declarations against him Nagorno-Karabakh also demanded independence on September 2, 1991. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia moved ahead to control their independence declaration. Soviet army backed up Karabakh Armenians which was soon felt by Azeri government. So on 26 November, Autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh was abolished and a referendum was systematized on 8 December in Karabakh to approve the secession which resulted in 99 % positive response. Soviet

troops were withdrawn from the region leaving the rivalries in direct clash. Meanwhile Soviet Union ceased to exist when Azeris were expecting the Moscow to resolve it while Armenians were preparing themselves militarily for this purpose. During peace negotiations in 1993-1996 Armenia favored right of self-determination for Armenians in Karabakh. From the very beginning till 1998 and couple of years ahead main problem seemed to be lack of dialogue between the administrators of Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was the main reason the conflict is still an ongoing one (De Waal, 2003).

2.2.1 Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994)

The ownership of Nagorno-Karabakh is still a severely dubious issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan named Artsakh by Armenians, referring it this name under the regulation of Armenian princes, its history goes back several centuries, where it came under the regulation of several different empires. Shortly before the Ottoman Empire's submission in the war, the Russian Empire collapsed in November 1917 and came under the control of the Bolsheviks. The three nations of the Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, formerly under the rule of the Russians, declared their independence to form the Transcaucasian Federation. Fighting soon broke out between the Democratic Republic of Armenia and the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in three specific regions: Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and Karabakh itself. Both fought for division of their boundaries according to three provinces. The Karabakh Armenians tried to declare their independence but remained unsuccessful to make contact with the Republic of Armenia.

As Azerbaijan tried to curtail secessionist move in Karabakh, it resulted in an armed conflict that took place between Armenian majority in Karabakh enclave and republic of

Armenia and republic of Azerbaijan from Feb 1988 till May 1994. Enclave parliament voted in favor of unification with Armenia on February 20, 1988 while majority of Karabakh inhabitants voted for independence as a result of referendum. Full scale war break out in late winter of 1992. International actors could not mediate the issue successfully. Armenian forces captured the outer portion of enclave by force and by the end of the war in 1994 became owner of whole mountainous area of enclave along with 14 % territory of Azerbaijan. To curtail the ongoing war, Russia acted as mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan and successfully came to an end while signing an agreement between the two in May 1994. It could happen through the efforts of OSCE Minsk group. So the war ended (Lindenstrauss, 2015). Almost 36,000 Armenian refugees and 71000 IDPs resulted from Sumgait incidents and cleansing moved towards Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand 1992-1994 war resulted in expelling out of tens of thousands of Armenians out of their homes from Nagorno-Karabakh (Fact Sheet of Nagorno-Karabakh office, 2006).

2.2.2 Terpetrossian resign-1998

The twelve independent republics became members of the Commonwealth of Independent States following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1992. Approximately one-third of the book is devoted to Russia, along with other issues of foreign policy it also includes sections on Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Terpetrossian faced massive protests in February 1993 as he was not initiating war against Azerbaijan. OSCE group presented its terms in the form of Lisbon principles in

Nov 1996 according to which Autonomy for Karabakh Armenians was guaranteed along with demand for restoration of Soviet era borders. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh authorities rejected the proposal but Terpetrossian came under international pressure. In March 1997 Terpetrossian asked the President of Nagorno-Karabakh to become his Prime Minister. Both worked for economic reform plans. After few months he declared to follow the Lisbon principles allowing the Nagorno-Karabakh to preserve freedom and technically remain as part of Azerbaijan. It was complete direction towards settlement of dispute. But Terpetrossian has to bear its cost. He came under severe criticism as well as physical attacks even by his own party members. He was called traitor. All this lead him to resign. His policies died along with his resignation on Feb 3, 1998. Started steps towards resolution could not be finalized (Shoemaker, 2014).

CHAPTER 3

NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT in POST 9/11 ERA

9/11 is that incident of U.S history which brought distinct change in every state's behavior. Most of the countries around the globe step forward to a single platform against terrorism. Like most other countries, states encircling the Caucasian states also came ahead. War in Caucasus region flared the debate and the neighboring countries of Caucasus also entered in the alliance against terrorism. 1988-1994 era of war resulted in large number of refugees including 250000 Armenian and 1.1 million Azerbaijani along with thousands of deaths. Bloodshed was tried to stop by international mediation efforts. Before this incident as a result of Perestroika movement by Gorbachev, demonstrations held by Armenians and Azeris living in Karabakh in 1987 and 1988 respectively. Exchange of population happened from 140,000 Armenians and 48,000 Azeris living in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence on 6 Jan, 1992. After six years of war and ceasefire along with couple of incidents there was a time when Armenia was under President Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijan was headed by President Heydar Aliyev. Both met during a CIS summit in Moscow on 24 January, 2000 where Mr. Putin theoretically guaranteed settlement. Following the peace talk's efforts from 1995 till 1999, there held peace talks again between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Florida from 3-6 April, 2001. These were proposed by OSCE Minsk Group. Same year additional peace talks held in June in Geneva. Previously in December 1995, OSCE ministers offered for direct contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials to direct

the conflict towards the resolution. In 1999 both sides' officials met for the five times but could not end successfully (Congressional Research Service Report, 2001).

3.1 Axe Murder RamilSafrov Case

Committee on Legal affairs and Human Rights published a detailed analysis regarding the 2004 Axe Murder RamilSafarov Case. It was also a prominent step towards the bittering of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and shows the intensity of cold heartedness among citizens towards each other. RamilSafarov was lieutenant of Azerbaijani Army who went on NATO sponsored English Language training course in Budapest Hungary where he deliberately killed an Armenian with Axe giving him 16 blows and was intended to kill one more Armenian just for the national cause. Case proceeded, he confessed his crime and suffered eight years penalty in Hungary. But the sad part was, upon requesting to extradite him to Azerbaijan, he was sent to Azerbaijan as a result of mass protestations and cutting of diplomatic ties with Hungary by Azerbaijan. Upon entering his home town he became national hero and welcomed with flowers and bows. Even he was given an apartment and a years' back salary along with promotion (Council of Europe Report, 2014).

3.2Mardakert Skirmishes and Moscow Declaration-2008

Between the time period of 2004 and 2008 no distinguished incident came its way. Historical incidents keep on bittering the situation and time goes on. Presidential elections held in 2008. SerzhSargsyan became the President even with weak legitimacy. He used to face mass protests at the cost of democracy. As a result in First week of

March 2 police officers were killed along with 8 protestors. It also injured 130 people. Emergency imposed for 20 days further deteriorating the situation leading towards clashes on 4 March 2008. Many soldiers and citizens of Armenia and Azerbaijan died. Ruling elites used the conflict and the intensification to distract the public attention to Azerbaijan. The reports of violence were full of blame against each other by both sides (Grigoryan, 2016).

On 2nd Nov 2008 the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was tried to be settled by direct dialogue. Presidents of the two sides met in Moscow along with the Russian President. Efforts were mediated by Russia, U.S.A and France. Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents were ensured to be supported in the establishment of security and peaceful scenario in South Caucasus according to the norms of International law. But in the year 2009 peace talks ended without gaining any fruitful results (Declaration by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia on Nagorno-Karabakh,2008).

3.3 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict-2009 Onwards

On 10 July, 2009 Presidents of Minsk Group co-chair presented a group of statements in L'Aquila named Madrid Principles to sort out the dispute. These were originally presented in 2007 and updated later on. These consisted of six main elements including the return of territories, a defined status for Nagorno-Karabakh, corridor link between Armenia and Azerbaijan, consideration of general will in NK in future, rights for IDPs and refugees and international security for maintenance of peace. Its publication activated the negotiation process and many joint statements came out. From 2008 till 2011 Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met many times upon Russian invitation in

Russia and adopted joint declaration. In April 2010 it was the first time in their history that head of Armenian Church made a visit to Azerbaijan for peace purpose. Efforts for the settlement of dispute never ended but unluckily failed to bring normalization effects. According to this research the issue could not be finalized yet even after passing of couple of decades due to several reasons. It is being tried to distort the original version of the conflict molding it in various shapes according to the needs and interests of parties to the conflict and mediators as well, presentation of mean and falsified resolution proposals lacking effective implementation, non-seriousness regarding the OSCE concerns and actions, lack of CBMs between the parties, economic sufferings, destruction of original historic facts and last but not least non-binding of mutual accords and refrain from implementation (Kocharyan,2016).

The Russian, U.S. and French presidents visibly projected settlement patterns in 2009 and 2010. They focused those processes must be based on rules and regulations of international law, charter of United Nations and Final Act of Helsinki. They said the principles should be based on non-use of force or threat of use of force as well as non-intervention. Right of self-determination and equal rights be ensured. These mediation efforts were all in vain and the situation always remained in phase of no war, no peace(International Crisis Group-Policy briefing, 2011).

3.4 Rising Tensions in 2014-2016

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was posed to be one of the bloodiest conflict in South Caucasus. After 1994 ceasefire, 2014 witnessed mass violence killing dozens of persons on both sides. Violence started in November 2014 when Azeris troops dropped

an Armenian helicopter by shooting over Nagorno-Karabakh territory which they claim to be on some violent mission. It continued till January 2015 and it was feared that the incident may lead towards the eruption of war. In 2014-2015, shelling and explosions of violence occurred on a daily basis. Dozens of military staffs were killed, civilians were injured or killed, and civilian property was damaged. However this time U.S.A and France tried to mediate the conflict to lessen down its intensification. They organized peace talks in Oct 2014 in Paris. But the conflict could not get any direction towards peace. The major cause behind non resolution can be considered as some neighboring state's interests such as Russia which is getting practicality of its interests on its cost. Prolongation seems beneficial for such states (Lindenstrauss, 2015).

In 2015 Moscow entered into the South Caucasus with new zeal to have some end of the conflict. In autumn 2015 Lavrov plan was presented by Moscow with some important features to inject energy into the process towards peace. Azerbaijan which previously had cut down the Railway routes were supposed to restart it and Armenia had to leave the control of 2 to 3 areas around Karabakh. It was also included to deploy peace keeping forces in those areas but it was suspicious as Russia wanted to dominate by such act. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan opposed the offer for the presence of military forces in Karabakh. The process did not ended fully till next year's incidents. These were followed by April 2016 violence. April clashes took place in two main points. These places were earlier the main hubs of fighting during 1990s war. One was North East side of Line of Control and second was Eastern most side of Jabrayil district in far south of Line of Control. Surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh region, both places were under Armenian control. Azerbaijan tried to recapture the places more dangerously. It involved more

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number of troops, more heavy artillery and multiple range missile system. It resulted in civilian and economic loss on both sides. Large number of casualties erupted. Violence erupted in 2016 was a clear stamp on failure of all the efforts, mediations, peace talks, peace talk agreements, failure on part of NGOs, IGOs and all other actors and mediators(International Crisis Group report, 2016). Twenty first century witnessed a bunch of incidents which altogether proved that the conflict is not frozen at all. It included the historical events like Axe Murder RamilSafarov Case, Mardakert skirmishes leading towards Moscow declaration and other minor events seem to be moving towards full-fledged war. These cases present a proof that all the efforts by actors and mediators are fruitless, all the human right organizations are presenting only theoretical proposals without any practical implementation.

CHAPTER4

ROLE OF MAJOR POWERS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a matter of interest for many regional and international powers based on varying reasons. Some of those remained interested only till the beginning of the conflict while others are still playing their role. Whole conflict resolution phenomenon depicted the direction and intensity of conflict management and conflict resolution. Following are the main powers which dominated the affairs of South Caucasus states i.e., Armenia and Azerbaijan specially the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh region:

1. U.S.A
2. Iran
3. Turkey
4. Russia

Figure 4.1: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Caspian region



Source: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_conflict

Figure 4.1 elaborates how turkey, Russia and Iran are bordering the Caspian region which are the main actors of conflict resolution.

4.1 Role of U.S.A in Conflict Resolution

U.S.A was among the first countries to recognize Azerbaijan's independence on 25 Dec, 1992. Both countries took a pleasant start of ties on diplomatic front. Embassies were established in Baku and Washington DC few months after recognition. Over seventy bilateral agreements were signed covering most of the areas (Pashaveya and Blank, 2016, p, 6). According to U.S Ambassador to Azerbaijan Robert Chekuta, U.S.A has since 1992, allocated US \$1.3 billion for realization of various programs in Azerbaijan. Armenia got independence in 1991 after Soviet fall. Keeping in view the last decade of unrest and geographically landlocked location of Armenia, Ter-Petrosyan as first elected president set the two important foreign policy objectives among others. According to which it was necessary to normalize state's relations with other states to ensure its security. Secondly Armenia will not align itself with any political or military bloc leaving the Communist and joining any other. These factors remained important till 1998 (Petros, 2003).

U.S.A recognized Armenia on 25th December 1991 and on 27th January 1992 started establishing diplomatic ties. In initial years Armenia was looking forward for assistance in different areas. U.S.A was its center for attention in financial, technical and security areas. But regarding security issues America trusted Turkey to act as guarantor in the region. This act was probably unacceptable by Armenia (Adalian, 1995). After 2001 America got its influence in Armenia to cut the wave of terrorism and to counter the spread of Islam. In the year 2003 U.S.A started normalizing its relations with whole south Caucasus region only to serve their own interests. It was particularly interested in good

ties with Azerbaijan to have a way till Caspian oil. Overall Armenian American ties are smooth but due to lack of natural resources later is least interested (Petros, 2003).

In the initial years of independence, U.S foreign policy provided a framework to enlist the categories of interests of America in South Caucasus region. Whole interests were focused on policy, process and geopolitics based on different arenas in the very first phase after Soviet fall.

1. In policy formulation Following were points of consideration:
 - Democratic stability and political reforms
 - Privatization process and market economic reformation
 - Management and mediation of the conflicts
 - Counterterrorism and security insurance
2. In its phase of process evolution, U.S aimed at strengthening statehood and sovereignty. It was also revolving around conflict management and mediation through diplomatic means.
3. Geopolitical agenda was based on providing alternative transit routes for the transport of oil and gas in such a way as to exclude Iran. Process also included to cut down the dependence of Armenia and Azerbaijan including whole region on Russia for oil and gas pipeline and infrastructure (Giragosian, 2012, p, 242,243). U.S policies towards Armenia and Azerbaijan also revolve around the purpose to minimize the Russian influence in the region and exploring more areas for cooperation e.g., OSCE Minsk Group partnership (Giragosian, 2012, p, 249).

Under Bush administration there came a shift in policy which was previously focused on exclusion of Iran and Russia from Caspian oil reserves export now altered towards counterterrorism moves. South Caucasus offered US to act against terrorism in nearer Iran. As long as there came a change in security policies of U.S.A, Bush administration strengthened its ties with Azerbaijan and also the military and security assistance was increased (Giragosian, 2012, p, 246 to 248). After Bush, Obama came into power and the relations between America and Azerbaijan framed by international happenings and events which prove to be stressed. Statements made by U.S earlier on human rights negated during Obama administration by referring all those as interference in Azerbaijan's sovereignty (Ibrahimov, 2014).U.S.A very often played significant roles in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan. U.S.A always supported and worked in collaboration with CSCE Minsk Group's tasks. Along with this, when UNSC adopted different resolutions in this cause, U.S.A gave it strength and support. But during Clinton and Bush administrations role of U.S.A was mostly limited as the participant of OSCE Minsk Group.

1. In 1992 United Nations and CSCE sent their missions to Baku, Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakh to observe the situation of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. James Baker (U.S secretary of state) headed its first mission on 12-18 February. CSCE sponsored peace talks were aided by him as how to present the conflict. Principal parties named their rules as Baker Rules after James Baker. According to these rules Armenia and Azerbaijan were regarded as the parties to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh territory. After Khojaly massacre of 25th and 26th February, CSCE and UN sent their delegations to the region in March 1992.

Former was headed by U.S Ambassador John J. Maresca while later was headed by U.S secretary of state Cyrus Vance (Pashayeva, G and Blank, S., 2016, p, 13). Later on in 1994, John Maresca gave a proposal named “Proposal for settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh” to the U.S Institute of Peace which was based on associated statehood and self-government. It proved to be quite helpful for other researchers. It consisted of eight important elements:

- Nagorno-Karabakh’s status
- Documentation
- Returning the refugees and displaced persons
- Donor’s conference
- Role of U.S.A
- International guarantees
- A treaty on access of mutual rights
- Economic provisions.

According to this proposal Nagorno-Karabakh should be given the status of a self-governing legal entity as Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh under republic of Azerbaijan. Its territorial borders would be those of NKAO of 1988. It can have offensive military capability. It can keep security forces and self-defense forces. Its clause on treaty of Mutual Rights of Transit and access would have to be signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan will have equal access to Lachin corridor and other trade routes as that of Armenia, which will be monitored internationally. Donor conference was aimed at estimating financial requirements for whole framework of reconstruction between the

two. U.S has to appoint special person for all the clauses of the proposal to be practical by the roles of UNSC, CSCE and Minsk Group (Pashayeva and Blank, 2016).

1. U.S.A supported 822 resolution of April 30, 1993 of UNSC according to which following things were respected and have to keep safe:
 - Territorial integrity
 - Sovereignty
 - Security of international borders
 - Avoiding the use of force to acquire territory
 - Asking for ceasefire
 - Immediate with-drawl of forces from occupied areas of Azerbaijan
2. U.S.A also valued articles 853, 874 and 884 of 1993 by UNSC which were about territorial integrity and sovereignty of republic of Azerbaijan and unconditional removal of forces along with return of displaced persons (Pashayeva and Blank, 2016).
3. After the ceasefire 1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, U.S.A played its role on joining OSCE Minsk Group efforts by appointing its diplomats for conflict resolution mechanism along with envoys of France and Russia. In 2001 Minsk Group co-chairs brought Armenian and Azerbaijani President on series of peace talks in Key West Florida to reach an end of resolution but the meeting remained unsuccessful in achieving its goals (Hill, Kirisci and Moffat).
4. In 1995 U.S state department appointed Joseph Presel as special Ambassador for Nagorno-Karabakh. He held special delicate talks with Armenian presidential

advisor and Azerbaijani counterpart. They use to discuss the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and point of differences on Lachin and Shusha (Pashayeva and Blank, 2016).

5. From 1997 to 1998, U.S.A along with other Minsk Group co-chairs presented three proposals for settlement. Two were based on resolving all the disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan and alienation of status to Nagorno-Karabakh. First was presented in May 1997 which was rejected by Nagorno-Karabakh although given due place by Armenia and Azerbaijan. Second proposal was stage by stage solution presented in September 1997, agreed by both Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents. Its first stage demanded with-drawl of Armenia from six occupied districts, restoration of peace talks and returning the displaced persons. Second stage would address the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians living in Azerbaijan rejected the proposal as evacuating the districts they will lose the benefits of trade from south and direct access to Iran. Plan could not be succeeded also because in the meanwhile Ter-petrosyan resigned and new Armenian President Robert Kocharyan declined the whole proposal. Third proposal was to build a common state between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh to make the both coexist. It was rejected by Azerbaijan. U.S.A also acted as participant of OSCE Minsk Group when it arranged bilateral meetings for peace talks between Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan in 1999(Pashayeva and Blank, 2016).
6. In 2001 U.S held peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Key West Florida over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Under this effort most of the issues on an estimate of 80-90 percent reach an agreement (Lindenstrauss, 2015).

administrations Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was less important to America than that of Bosnian conflict which ended in peaceful Dayton agreement while all the peace efforts regarding NK conflict remain fruitless. Peace oriented talks by Joseph Presel very often seem near resolution but could not get the desired results and the conflict remained as it was. Proposals presented in 1997 and 1998 could not get their fulfilment because whole three parties did not take it as given in their favor and resignation of Armenian president and declination by new president distorted its whole strength and value. Overall there lacks any clear and effective policy by U.S.A for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Although working as 3rd important participant of Minsk Group co-chair, it made several mediation efforts but all those remain least effective.

4.2 Role of Iran in Conflict Resolution

Relations between Armenia and Iran are only need based. As in past Armenia opted multi-facet foreign policy to fulfill its purposes of trade and Western objectives. On the other hand Azerbaijan and Iran have religious similarities. Both are Shiite majority states. Both are democracies. Also the economic conditions are on same fronts. But even after sharing a vast portion of similarities and being the neighbors both could not have best kind of ties. Armenia is shaping its actions with Iran's guidance but Azerbaijan is independent in all course of actions. Besides having enough commonalities both Azerbaijan and Armenia had become quite contrary to each other in different ways. Azerbaijan was secular while Iran was religious. Former is expanding militarily while later is stagnating economically. Azerbaijan is exporting natural resources while Iran is unable to get any reserves due to sanctions (Misera, 2013).

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7. After September 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S.A focused on strong security policy around the globe including south Caucasus states. Azerbaijan supported U.S.A's war against terrorism. 907 freedom act of U.S.A was repealed under Bush administration in 2002 which strengthened U.S Azerbaijan ties in security and military missions. This step was important in regard of minimizing the intensity of conflict by suppressing the acts of terrorism in whole region including Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2003, 2006 and 2008 official visits were exchanged between Azerbaijan and America. But mediation process became passive in these years although Madrid principles were presented but they were just theoretical(Pashayeva and Blank, 2016).So in these years least number of efforts were made by America in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.
8. From 2009 to 2016 special ambassadors served for mediation efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as OSCE co-chairs. Those were Mathew Bryza (2006-9), Robert Brodtke (2009-13) and James Warlick (2013-16). They made efforts through track 2 diplomacy (Pashayeva and Blank, 2016, p, 30). These were the minor efforts made during Obama administration although Obama's tilt always remained towards Azerbaijan which is a biased approach.

The resolutions passed by UNSC were showing tilt towards Azerbaijan. Those were unjust. Right of self-determination that was favorable to Armenia was completely lacking. It showed U.S.A's behavior on newly emerged post-soviet states and interest in energy reserves of Azerbaijan. Same was the case with John Maresca's proposal which was more prone towards Azerbaijan giving it more leverage. That was the reason it could not get enough and equal weightage from both sides. During Bush and Clinton's

administrations Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was less important to America than that of Bosnian conflict which ended in peaceful Dayton agreement while all the peace efforts regarding NK conflict remain fruitless. Peace oriented talks by Joseph Presel very often seem near resolution but could not get the desired results and the conflict remained as it was. Proposals presented in 1997 and 1998 could not get their fulfilment because whole three parties did not take it as given in their favor and resignation of Armenian president and declination by new president distorted its whole strength and value. Overall there lacks any clear and effective policy by U.S.A for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Although working as 3rd important participant of Minsk Group co-chair, it made several mediation efforts but all those remain least effective.

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Iran is the second state beside Russia to share its longest borders with South Caucasus Azerbaijan. It was expected to be most influential in the region due to its peak interests. Following are those:

1. Wealth of energy reserves

Oil and gas resources in Caspian Sea are reason of interest for Iran even after having the second largest gas reserves as it is unable to export.

2. Distinctions with Azerbaijan

The greatest among those is Iran good relations with Azerbaijan's foe that is Armenia and another one is Baku's smoothening ties with Israel which is on confrontation with Iran.

3. Trade expansion

Armenia has only one open border to trade with that is Iran. So Iran can play its role further expanding towards Georgia and abroad (Boonstra, 2015).

Although Iran is having comforts in South Caucasus but on conflict resolution efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan it could not form any place and it could play its role a very few times which is unclear. Due to having differences with Azerbaijan its tilt on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is towards Armenia which is a biased approach.

In January 2016, Iran's foreign minister called Baku and Yerevan to dissolve the differences over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iran was ready for mediation. Previously Iran had cooperation with Armenia on trade and energy fronts but with Azerbaijan it had distinctions (International Crisis Group Report, 2016). However even after having energy and trade interests in South Caucasus, Iran could not

play any effective role in conflict resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its main reason was weak economic and political resources to take part.

4.3 Role of Turkey in the Conflict Resolution

Throughout the history, Turkey's relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan remained in a condition of flux. There seems ups and downs however in order to maintain its status as a good state, Turkey very often tries to have normal relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and other neighboring states. After Soviet fall in 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became a threat for Turkey in domestic and foreign policy making. Turkish policies towards Azerbaijan in initial years was including support for independence of Azerbaijan and its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh along with other interests. This happened with change in policy due to Khojaly massacre as previously its stance was neutral. It changed dramatically due to public pressure, opposition and parliamentarians who opposed government's neutral stance and favored Azerbaijan. Tensions rise between Turkey and Armenia in 1992 when their troops occupied Shusha and kept on increasing. However keeping the differences aside Turkey tried to smooth its relations with Armenia and after U.S it was second country to recognize Armenia in 1991 (Abilov, 2015).

Turkey was the first state to recognize Azerbaijan after its independence in 1991. Turkey was supposed to fill the power vacuum after Russia's exit from Azerbaijan due to its ethnic and linguistic commonalities in political and military spheres (Abushov, 2010). Whole political order was changed after world war two which effected Turkey also. Turkey was getting assistance from NATO and the West culturally and economically. As Turkey was supposed to get leadership in its community, it was feeling affinity with

Azerbaijan based on ethnic and linguistic grounds so it was assisted on economic, military and political fronts. So the Elchibey's government ended than came Heydar Aliyev who reshaped the whole policy towards stability and pragmatism. Relations with Iran and Russia were refined. Pro Turkish coordination ended. During this era the strategic ties could not be strengthened. Economic sphere was focused including Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline. In 2003 IlhamAliyev became the president who continued his father's policies. Bilateral relations further moved towards energy and security cooperation and efforts over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In 2012 further 'mutual agreements made the terms stronger (Efe, 2012).

Relations between Armenia and Turkey moved positively with start of trade and bilateral cooperation but could not flourish for long run and deteriorated in 1992. In the year 2008, Turkish Armenian relations started normalizing again. Turkey wanted to reopen closed border since 1993 for transport purposes and mutual cooperation. A "road map" agreement was signed between Turkey and Armenia on April 2009 to fulfill their aims. However these goodwill gestures were flexible enough to wither away any time (Falkowski, 2009).

In 1992, Turkish Paul Globe started a peace plan based on territorial swap. According to this plan, Armenian territory which connects Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan should be assigned to Azerbaijan while later should give part of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. But this was rejected by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Again in 1999 peace talks held between Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan according to land swap but could not become fruitful (Abilov, 2015). In all OSCE Minsk Group meetings Turkey

held a strong stance on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution and removal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan (Abilov, 2015). On 13 August, 2008 the Prime Minister of Turkey Tayyip Erdogan presented a multifaceted diplomatic edge to promote peace, stability, and cooperation among the countries of South Caucasus, including Turkey and Russia. Despite such moves in South Caucasus, Turkey's role in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution remained indirect and minimum (International Crisis Group Report, 2016). However instead of having desire to rule the region after Soviet fall Turkey made itself prominent in conflict resolution but lack any effective policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan and its conflict management.

4.4 Role of Russia in Conflict Resolution

Russian policy towards the Caucasian states always kept on fluctuating. It was never static and in the course of history different factors keep on changing it towards Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1990's Russian Federation was Western oriented and intended to democratize its neighboring republics. But soon after a decade passed, its policies became anti-west. It aimed at attaining hegemony on former Soviet territories (Ryabov, p, 260). In 1990's and 1991 Kremlin's policy was more prone towards Azerbaijan which was favoring status quo while Armenia wanted independence. And in 1992 there came a policy shift in Moscow which lead its betterment of relations with Iran and worsening with Baku. The point of interest is that during war both Armenia and Azerbaijan claimed to be assisted by Russia in economic and military ways. Resultantly Russian military intervention in Caucasus region is to continue its dominance in the region. But it is unclear whether Russia is fulfilling its aim or not. In 1999 whole scenario

changed as Russia find its confident alliance with Armenia while Azerbaijan's policies were anti Russia (Cornell, 2005).

Russia was interested in South Caucasus due to following reasons:

1. Changing Foreign Policy Demands

In 1991 onwards Russia was in the process of attaining super power status against west due to which it was in dire need to re structure its foreign policy goals. It was trying to regain control over near abroad territories. Russia was facing identity crisis after soviet fall as well.

2. Status as great power

In opposition to uni-polarity of US, Russia negated to be the regional great power and by playing role in international community it intended to acquire great power status. For this purpose it was necessary to be dominant over Armenia and Azerbaijan as neighboring states and make these states dependent upon Russia.

3. Regional Interests

South Caucasus is important for Russia since 17th century. Turkey and Iran were its Muslim rivals so through expansion it made south Caucasian states as a shield. This kind of importance increased when oil reserves were exposed in Baku. In 19th century Russia used soft and hard power in Armenia and Azerbaijan to fulfill its aims. Even Russian language and literature was preached there. It also has security concerns in the region as to establish peace in its vicinity. South Caucasus is important to get north Caucasus under control.

4. Geopolitical Interests

Military bases are supposed to ensure physical presence and influence in the region and to negate that of U.S presence or control. Russia is only interested in maintaining its image as great power. Peace keeping forces are also deployed to get the aim (Abushov, 2010). Both short term and long term interests of Russia in South Caucasus made it important for Russia to play active roles in conflict resolution and peace keeping. So Russia played its role in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution along with other conflicts on several occasions.

On 12 May 1994, Russia held an agreement among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh which ceased years of fighting. After it since 1997 Russia along with France and U.S made several peace efforts including package solution and step by step solution. Package solution was to reach some conclusion regarding status of Nagorno-Karabakh and step by step solution was to address most of the issues. These include removal of forces from occupied areas, international guarantee of security to Karabakh, returning the displaced persons to their homes and smoothing the ties between the conflicting states including reopening of trade. Both these plans were opposite to each other. However then President Ter-Petrossian favored step by step which could not be availed due to the disapprovals he has to face. Further peace talks were arranged in Key West and Paris in 2000-2002 which ended with the failure of package plan during Ilham Aliyev the president of Azerbaijan. In 2004 Prague process was introduced which covered the meetings of Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This plan was launched with the efforts of Russia along with U.S and France. It was to

get agree on certain kind of mechanism which may determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh in future. Series of meetings resulted in positive hopes that peace could be achieved in the year 2006 (Zourabian, 2006).

In 2008, Dmitri Medvedev was the president of Russia. He was intended to show something distinct in his foreign policy so he made tireless efforts to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan did not agreed on basic principles provided to them. Kazan and Sochi summits arranged in this regard in 2011 and 2012 respectively failed. In 2012, Putin returned to the presidency and efforts towards the conflict resolution decreased. In 2013 Presidents were again called to hold a dialogue but the effort remain fruitless because they did not talk directly. Same happened again in 2015 as both the presidents ignored each other's presence. But Russia keep on trying for Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents to reach an agreement. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Baku and Yerevan and met his counter parts to enhance his diplomatic efforts. Later on he presented his proposal to reenergize the process based on certain principles. Later on it was termed as Lavrov plan by observers. It included deploying the peace keeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous Oblast and extraction of Armenians from its districts and Azerbaijan was supposed to remove trade and transportation barriers (International Crisis Group Report, 2015).

U.S.A, Iran, Turkey and Russia are major contributors in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. However Russia's role is most distinct through Minsk Group where France is also co-chair. Most of the efforts by all the major powers are fruitless due to

lack of international security guarantee, implementation and lack of trust in both sides of officials.

CHAPTER 5

ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS IN NAGORNOKARABAKH CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Throughout the history of long run conflict between South Caucasian states of Central Asia, Armenia and Azerbaijan some regional and international organizations remain active in conflict resolution process. Somehow organizations managed to show their presence by creating dialogue forums, presenting resolution plans and other significant efforts. In 1992, the OSCE Minsk Group started the peace negotiations and became the main political body concerned with peace negotiations, controlled by the Co-Chairmen and Personal Representative of the OSCE Chair. In 1994, a ceasefire agreement was reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan which ended the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The present condition in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still based on this 1994 ceasefire contract. Moreover the OSCE, the European Union is sideways involved with the conflict through Special Representative on the South Caucasus and CSO aid. Civil Society actors involved in peace building are the European Partnership for Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh, the European Movement and several CSOs from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Following are the organizations playing their role in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process:

5.1 OSCE Minsk Group

5.2 European Union

5.3 Council of Europe

5.4 United Nations

5.5 European Partnership for peaceful settlement of the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh(EPNK)

5.6 Civil society Organizations

5.1 OSCE Minsk Group

CSCE created OSCE in 1992. It was aimed at organizing a conference in Minsk to have peace oriented negotiation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It consisted of ambassadors from Russia, France and United States. Unfortunately conference could not be materialized however it proved fruitful later on by becoming first active body in this regard.

Main objectives of this body included:

- To provide a proper framework for conflict resolution
- To organize the Minsk conference and a ceasefire agreement
- Installing ~~peace~~ peace keeping forces to enhance the peace process (Klever,2013)

OSCE Minsk Group made various efforts in the form of presenting set of principles, signing agreements and assuring peace keeping at the end. Few of those efforts and events by OSCE are as follows:

1) Step by step approach

After 1994 *cease fire*, OSCE adopted a step by step approach for the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict consisting of two phases. It was under the shade of Budapest

Summit which offered to consider Nagorno-Karabakh as third party to the conflict later on. First step was aimed at curbing out the military conflict and to create such a kind of scenario that OSCE Minsk conference could be summoned. Second step was aimed at reaching some final agreement for peaceful settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and giving it final legal status. Budapest Summit also adopted proper methodology and techniques to reach final resolution. It consisted of concluding the Agreement, installing the PKF, executing the Agreement, and summoning the Minsk Conference to determine the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh (Zourabian, 2006).

2) Package proposal

According to 1997 package proposal it was proposed that a final comprehensive agreement will be implemented and concluded with assigning a final status to Nagorno-Karabakh that will be consented by Minsk Conference. As previously in step by step approach agenda was limited till discussing the agreement and creating suitable scenario. According to it Karabakh would have its own constitution approved by people through referendum, its own army, national anthem and flag. The citizens will be free to make their independent judiciary, executive and legislature. They may keep their police force. Nagorno-Karabakh would be free to maintain its domestic and foreign relations. They will be free to choose ethnic values and language of their own will. But Nagorno-Karabakh rejected the proposal (Zourabian, 2006).

3) 1998 Common state Proposal

This proposal was a slight modification in 1997 package solution, both given by Minsk Group. Its main clause was de jure unity of Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan

although having recognized borders. De-facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh was cut down. Due to looser and de jure formulation of Nagorno-Karabakh republic, it was obvious that it can be easily occupied by Armenia so Azerbaijan rejected the proposal. Also it was the violation of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. One major flaw in this proposal was undecided status of Lachin district due to which it was not considered a complete package (Zourbian, 2006).

4) Land swap idea

In the years of 1999 till 2002 land swap idea was introduced to manage the shortcomings of common state proposal according to which Meghari land would be handed over to Azerbaijan and Lachin district to be given to Armenia. However no official documents could be found showing the implementation of land swap plan. It was suspected that land swap plan was designed in order to hand over the control of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia by joining Meghari land corridor to Azerbaijan.

5) Referendum

None of the techniques, proposals or plans could work and final status of Nagorno-Karabakh remained unsolved. Later on Minsk group co-chairs gave the idea of referendum to decide the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. It was considered as a road map towards the settlement of the conflict and establishment of peace. But this could not be implemented (Zourbian, 2006).

6) Madrid Principles

In 2007, OSCE members Russia, France and United States presented Madrid principles in the form of a certain set of rules for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. These ideologies were based on Helsinki final act principles of equal rights and self-determination of people, also territorial integrity and non-use of force. Total fourteen clauses were presented out of those only six were approved and made public:

- The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their previous residence
- International security assurances that would include a peacekeeping procedure.
- A short-term status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance
- A passageway linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh
- Return of the territories nearby Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control
- Upcoming determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally obligatory expression of will (Klever, 2013)

5.2 European Union

The role of European Union between Armenia and Azerbaijan is specified with Eastern Partnership and European Neighborhood policy. Both are aligned with specific domains. EaP is tasked for betterment of relations between Eastern European and South Caucasus countries through bilateral agreements and trade treaties. ENP's task is to create interest in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for European Union by enhancing security, stability and prosperity in its neighbor states. Since 2008, EU has appointed its

delegations in Armenia and Azerbaijan but no active role is being noticed. In 2011 EU also appointed European Union special representative to South Caucasus, Philippe Lefort. He has to prevent conflict to happen and to settle it in peace. Mr. Lefort supported Minsk Group efforts by visiting South Caucasus on three different times. He used to conduct dialogue and meetings between the conflicting states on behalf of EU (Klever, 2013). Role of European Union in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution is not very defined and it is limited. It did not clearly adopted the policy to strengthen any of the three conflicting sides. It has its bilateral ties with Azerbaijan on different grounds like trade, economy, development, human rights, international law and spreading the rules of democracy. Its ties seem to be inclined towards Caspian energy needs. But it did not used any soft or hard core to settle the disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However its least role seems via Minsk group co-chairs Russia, France and America (Popescu, 2009).

5.3 Council of Europe

Least role of Council of Europe is seen in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In 1994 Parliamentary Assembly of council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution to support OSCE Minsk Group. As the UN passed a resolution to withdraw military forces from all the occupied territories so in 2005 PACE was called to comply the description. In 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 PACE members refrained self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh government to held elections (Klever, 2013). May be this act was meant to avoid further violence. Not much information can be availed through existing literature.

5.4 United Nations

United Nations is not involved in resolution of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 2008 UN General Assembly adopted resolution 62/243 on 14th March. According to the resolution territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was to be valued and Armenian forces to be extracted from all the occupied areas. But this was not accepted by Minsk Group because OSCE Minsk Group's process was not considered in decision making (Klever, 2013).

5.5 European Partnership for peaceful settlement of the Conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK)

EPNK is a European Civil Society initiative started in June 2010. Its main goal was to normalize Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through a series of peace building efforts. In this regard several new initiatives were taken like Conciliation Resources, Crisis Management Initiative, International Alert, Kvinna till Kvinna and the London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building (LINKS). Beside its two phases from June 2010 to November 2011 and second start from March 2012, it also worked on already taken initiatives for earlier London based organizations from 2003 to 2009 (Klever, 2013).

- International alert is one of the main organizations under EPNK. Within EPNK it has a lead role. It is based in London. In Nagorno-Karabakh region it is limited in providing its information on peace building (Klever, 2013).
- Another one is Conciliation Resources. This is a London based organization. Generally it used to work on people having conflicts to develop peace. Under the umbrella of EPNK it is providing a forum where Armenians and Azerbaijani's are

free to discuss and settle their basic issues. It includes academics, analysts and thinkers from Armenia and Azerbaijan to discuss over Nagorno-Karabakh. There is another initiative entitled 'dialogue through film' for youth of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh to sit and work together on their issues (Klever, 2013).

- One important working body is Crisis Management Initiative(CMI). It is situated in Helsinki, Finland. Its Main objective is to create peace while working on the conflicts. Under EPNK it is aimed to train 21 young leaders from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Otherwise projects of CMI are not clear (Klever, 2013).
- Kvinna till Kvinna is another body under EPNK. It is based in Johanneshov, Swedon. Under EPNK their only role is to empower women of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh especially those who are the effected by Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Klever, 2013).
- London Information Network on Conflicts and State Building (LINKS) is another important working entity.Links is focused on research work after dialogue and thorough analysis. It conducted interviews of almost twenty crucial characters in this regard. LINKS created an online news portal named Commonsplace.eu. in this platform with the cooperation of Armenian ArmInfo News Agency and Azerbaijani lnews.az to enhance the research quality (Klever, 2013).

5.6 Civil society Organizations

Few civil society organizations also made efforts to minimize the severity of the conflict which are following:

- Stepanakert Press Club, Nagorno-Karabakh is located in Nagorno-Karabakh and used to publish an independent newspaper Demo and monthly journal named Analyticon. Its publications make active contribution to the scenario and bring the issues and incidents to the limelight.
- Public council for Foreign and Security Policy, Nagorno-Karabakh is a non-government entity constituting the persons from Nagorno-Karabakh. Acting as think tank it conveys recommendations to international organizations (Klever, 2013).
- The Society for Humanitarian Research, Azerbaijanis based in Azerbaijan. As it is a human rights organization so it works for betterment of peace. It is also a partner of EPNK. It holds dialogue forums with Armenia and round table talks to establish peace.
- Internews Azerbaijan and Internews Armenia is an international organization but in Armenia and Azerbaijan Internews work as separate Non-governmental organizations. Its main objective is to promote freedom of speech and free media.
- International and Comparative Law Centre, Armenia, while locating in Armenia it works for enhancing foreign relations of Armenia and also to establish rule of law. It created a web page named Karabakhfacts.com to find out the real facts

behind Nagorno-Karabakh conflict where literature in the form of documents is provided. It is also aimed to conduct research and analysis.

- Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, Armenia and Azerbaijan is based on Helsinki Final Act 1975. In Armenia and Azerbaijan these give legal advice and respond to human rights violations as their main concern is human rights, peace and democracy. They use to arrange regular meetings with Minsk Group members through Karabakh Public Council.
- Yerevan Press Club, Armenia is established in 1995. It is aimed to strengthen democratic foundations and to support the growth of independent and professional media (Klever, 2013).
- Helsinki Initiative-92(HI-92), Nagorno-Karabakh used to work on various projects like providing internet forums, discussion clubs, seminars, cultural exchange programs and educational training. These projects help making the scenario smooth and betterment of the area which is less prone towards frontline environment.
- Eurasia Partnership Foundation, Armenia and Azerbaijan used to arrange projects to deal with Nagorno-Karabakh conflict including empowerment of people, giving grants to social tycoons and cross border collaboration.
- 11 IKV/PAX Christi also played its role. Since 1992, Dutch organization is involved in peace establishment of Nagorno-Karabakh. They are aimed at creating Youth peace movement. Its basic purpose is only to create peace (Klever, 2013).

From 2010 till June 2013, the state of the peace talks was termed as a deadlock, with a growing number of ceasefire violations and less meetings between the governments and Minsk Group. Some voices expressed their concern about the rising possibilities of war. However, from June 2013 onwards there is an obvious rise in the activities of the Minsk Group. The negotiations of Azerbaijan and Armenia with the EU about the Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements started in 2010 and are said to lead to more EU influence. However, negotiations with Azerbaijan show a lack of progress, and the announcement of Armenia in September that they will join a Russian-led Customs Union might greatly diminish EU influence, because according to European Commissioner Füle political integration cannot continue without economic integration. Numerous meetings took place, new announcements were released and OSCE Chair Leonid Kozhara visited Baku and Yerevan declaring a strengthening of Minsk Group activity. Also, the US appointed a new Co-chairman, which is quite active in providing information on social media.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Centuries ago Karabakh remained under different dynasties of Mongolians, Safavids, and Turks. Till 20th century, most of the time it was ruled by Russia. But soviet fall of 1991 and the movements followed by it lead it towards a proper shape. Since 1994, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has been continuously rising. Apparently the area seems least significant, but the Caucasus has strategic value to nearby powers like Russia, Turkey and Iran. After Soviet fall in 1991, dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh keeps on rising day by day though it was part of Azerbaijan at that time but claimed by Armenia. Troops from both sides engaged in continuous fighting. In 1992, the OSCE Minsk Group started the peace talks and became the main political figure concerned with peace negotiations, led by the Co-Chairmen and Personal Representative of the OSCE Chair. In 1994, a ceasefire contract was reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan which ended the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The present situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still based on this 1994 ceasefire agreement. Besides the OSCE, the European Union is involved with the conflict through Special Representative on the South Caucasus and CSO funding. Civil Society players are also involved in peace building which is the European Partnership for Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. The European Movement and several CSOs from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh are active for this cause. In war it was reported that weaponries such as multiple rocket launch systems firing Grad rockets were used along with helicopter gunships which was

the proof that it was not an isolated incident because use of weapons of this category would have to be approved by much higher expertise divisions. Then there was the most significant opening of the negotiating period since 1994 while having a dozen dead and many suffering on each side.

There are a number of obstacles to reach a settlement of the dispute. The mutual and historical mistrust between the Armenians and the Azeris and the atmosphere of the violence during the fighting have made both sides suspicious that it is the other side's people not its government that is the problem. Security matters and immigrants on both sides are obstacles. Azerbaijan is not safe while Armenians inhabit seven of its provinces, and Armenians feel extremely weak encircled by Azeris and Turks. The governments in both of the capitals remain highly doubtful of each other. Finally, the negotiating process itself is a hurdle, as one of the parties to the conflict most affected by the outcome, Nagorno-Karabakh, was not permitted a place at the negotiating table because of Azeri oppositions.

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, skirmishes on the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan should not be neglected. This conflict needs settlement on human rights violations basis, territorial integrity, right of self-determination and every aspect. Although the battles in distant places are of little interest to many, but it should be remembered that all the wars the United States has been involved in since World War II have been in most distant places of little interest. Also the Caucasus is important strategically. The northern Caucasus is under Russian control, but its Chechnya and Dagestan regions constitute Muslim population. The southern Caucasus constitute former Soviet republics,

independent since the fall of the Soviet Union. Armenia is Christian majority. Azerbaijan comprised of Shiite. The boundaries of these countries were first set by the czars and then reset several times by the Soviets. It seems that the borders were designed to be fought over. This is a section where memories are long and tempers can be short. Each country's claim has a degree of legality. The land constitute dry grasslands and snowy elevations. It is a place where battles go on for a very long time because the landscape makes it very difficult for any war to reach an end. This is the case with these three states and the gathering of tribes that live there.

Early negotiation initiatives between the two belligerent parties were endeavored by Russia, Iran, Turkey, and France. However, cease-fire agreements were regularly broken within minutes of their signing. When both Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) in 1992, the mediation rod was passed to that group, which continues to play the important role in mediation struggles. A subdivision of CSCE members, labelled the "Minsk Group" of countries, so-called after the location of its first assembling, was formed to join the negotiation talks. (The participants of the Minsk Group are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States.) The Minsk Group is led jointly by Russia, the United States, and France.

The experience with Russia and then the Soviet Union clarified that whenever there seems peace over the years of history it was imposed by outsiders. The Caucasus was vital for strategic reasons. It choked Turkish and Persian access to the Russian

heartland. Since the Soviet departure, the region has had its traditional internal clashes, but outside powers have also manipulated the area and sought to spread their power. The Turks had dispute with the Armenians over their charge of massacre after World War I. The Iranians somehow managed to increase their influence in Azerbaijan. The United States objects Armenia's close ties with Russia, but a major Armenian community bounds U.S. action. It also objects to Azerbaijan's human rights record but uses Azerbaijani services for conveying troops to Afghanistan. Each great power has its strategic interests in the area. For the Russians, holding the High Caucasus is a strategic imperative and to make sure that it is safe in the north, Russia tries to keep the south in balance and use to counter Turkish and Iranian and American influence. For the Iranians, Azerbaijan is a threat because it can be used as a base against Iran. For Turkey, Armenia is an enemy. Azerbaijan is largely Shiite and Turkey mostly Sunni, there are ethnic and linguistic links between their people. So Azerbaijan is an important partner for Turkey. For the United States, the region is of no importance or of least importance. If the United States goes to implement a containment strategy on Russia, it will not be limited to Central Europe but to the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea. However, no country but Azerbaijan and Armenia has an interest in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Couple of organizations and big powers are aligned with the conflict for conflict resolution but there seems least improvements. OSCE Minsk Group, European Union, Council of Europe, United Nations and many smaller civil society organizations came up with agenda of conflict resolution but due to lack of implementation, biased plans and lack of mutual understanding conflict remained as it is. Conflict is still there as that of two decades ago, massacres are still its part, human rights community seems nowhere,

suggestions for conflict resolution got no implementation at all. Whatever the reasons may be for unresolved nature of the conflict, whatever is the history or scenario, nothing is more powerful than human intellect and human rights rules and regulations. Conflict is in our hands. It can be resolved with positive attitude and efforts. Through proper implementation of best possible strategies the conflict can be resolved soon.

Factual study of each and every aspect of the conflict between South Caucasian states of Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh region elaborates well that somewhere there in the history it has been shaped by will. Its unsolved nature is benefiting how much to whom is the big question mark. Apparently most of the prominent actors are working since almost twenty three years for the conflict resolution but we got zero consequences. Leaving aside how is the conflict managed to originate, who is working for its cause, which organizations are been made, what output could they bring, which is the main actor (OSCE Minsk Group), who are its members, who are responsible for its decision making, what proposals were presented till now and till how much degree those all have been implemented, all the question marks are the bricks of a single wall. Anyhow looking upon the years of history it is obvious that some of the previous strategies and plans are now expired. Having in mind all the proposals and their validity it can be assumed that few of them are still workable with little or no modifications at all. The conflict can be ended through some techniques. Here are some recommendations that can be helpful in conflict resolution:

- First of all there is dire need of thorough and unbiased study of historical facts and figures. With the ambition in the minds today's scholars, policy makers and

educationists should avail any of the platform to perform this task. They all should belong to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh region. Their unbiased nature will definitely help them figure out the real causes of the conflict whether that is connection of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia or Azerbaijan or keeping in mind the recent scenario, what could be its ultimate solution. However now this is not the thing like timely fight between two brothers, citizens of all the three sides have grievances, they had faced sufferings they are not easy to call on feasting table to do all this in smooth environment. Also the agenda is being properly guided through some guideline. Similarly this can be done by proper guidance. This is only possible by making upper and lower side smooth to work. Officials and common men are the tools to be polished. Track 2 diplomacy can work in citizens bringing some sense of responsibility. Historical literature which is only bringing violations of human rights and massacre need to be reviewed wisely.

- Most effective and organized body throughout the years of conflict has been the OSCE Minsk Group. It presented couple of proposals but not a single among all could work out. Few of those are still considerable if can be implemented via proper channel.
- Giving Nagorno-Karabakh legal status to be a separate state and convincing Armenia and Azerbaijan on this decision can be helpful.
- Referendum can be a choice. Giving citizens the right of self-determination and let them decide what they want but again it can be a tilted decision due to earlier shifting of population. Now return of refugees and IDP's will be a complex task.

Even after that the citizens living there need to live with every kind of freedom and it would be a better step to avoid future violence.

- If not a single formula could work, there should be reformation of whole Minsk Group's organization where co-chairs can be changed. Russia while being in its members will never want to solve the conflict because it is getting its benefits in the form of Caspian oil and selling ammunition to the conflicting states.
- United Nation is the biggest peace keeping entity in the world but it is quite. There can be much more than just passing a resolution to safeguard the territorial integrity of states. There is no implementation of this clause even. Rights are violating, UN is absent, and massacres are happening, UN is nowhere, borders are unsafe, and UN is only theoretical. United Nation can play the best role if could break the silence.
- Historically mistrust is endorsed between Armenians and Azeris. It has deepen its roots till their cultural identities. Their varying traits depict their differences. Grass root efforts and efforts at very lower level like counselling the citizens may clarify the direction of conflict towards resolution.
- The process of negotiation is asymmetrical. Governments of both Armenia and Azerbaijan can make efforts to lessen the barriers, build confidence building measures and to shape the process of mediation.
- Last but not least nothing is possible without practical involvement of U.S.A, Russia and other major powers. Without their consent organizations are paralyzed and so are their proposals. OSCE, UN, EU or any other organization cannot work

best without the consent of major powers. Their will is required to settle the dispute.

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