


**US GRAND STRATEGY IN POST 9/11 ERA:
A CASE STUDY OF AFGHANISTAN**



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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD
2022**

PhD
355.033C4

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Accession No 7425487^u

National Security
World Politics
Diplomatic relations

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
**Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the
PhD Degree in the Discipline of Social Sciences with specialization in
International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences**

**INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD
2022**

Certification

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
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DEDICATION

This research is lovingly dedicated to my respected parents, Munawar Ali Cheema and Maqsooda Munawar.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First, by the grace of Allah Almighty I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Noor Fatima whose sincerity and encouragement I will never forget. She has been an inspiration as I hurdled through the path of this Ph.D. degree. She is the true definition of a leader and the ultimate role model. Her level of knowledge, patience, and ingenuity is something I will always keep aspiring to. This thesis would not have been possible without her. I am thankful for the extraordinary experiences she arranged for me and for providing opportunities for me to grow professionally.

I am grateful for my parents especially my father who is unfortunately is not among us, whose constant love and support kept me motivated and confident. My accomplishments and success are because he believed in me. My warm and heartfelt thanks go to my mother for her tremendous support and hope she had given to me. Deepest thanks to my siblings, who keep me grounded, remind me of what is important in life, and are always supportive of my adventures. Finally, I owe my deepest gratitude to Nohman Zaheer, my husband. I am forever thankful for his unconditional love and support throughout the entire thesis process and every day.

Finally, this thesis for all those who believe in the richness of learning.

List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ADB	Agriculture Development Bank
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFS	Afghan Currency
AID	Agency for International Development
AITF	Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghanistan New Beginning Program
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANDSF	Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces
ANF	Anti-Narcotics Force
ANSC	Afghanistan National Security Council
AP	Associated Press
APAPPS	Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Stability
APRP	Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program
AQ	Al-Qaeda
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ATTA	Afghan Transit Trade Agreement
CAREC	Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation
CIA	Central intelligence Authority
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Del	Delegations, Delegate

DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Network
GCG	Quadrilateral Coordination Group
GOIRA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GOP	Government of Pakistan
HOA	Hearth of Asia
HPC	High Peace Council
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LDCs	Less Develop Countries
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSA	Maritime Security Agency
NA	Northern Alliance
NA	Northern Areas
NACP	National AIDS Control Program
NAS	Narcotics Affairs Section
NATO	Non-Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCPJ	National Consultative Peace Jirga
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
NUG	National Unity Government
NWFP	Northwest Frontier province
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PM	Prime Minister
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
UNCND	United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs
UNDCP	United Nation International Drug Control Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nation General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nation Office on Drugs and Crimes
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	US of America
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
VOA	Voice of America
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
WOT	War on Terror

ABSTRACT:

The US invaded Afghanistan in post 9/11 era for the promotion of peace and democracy however, Afghanistan remained powerful and unstable. Between weapons, volatile politics, religious and ethnic rivalry and Muslim extremism, the stability of Afghanistan was a very serious challenge. The US committed a strategic mistake by not pursuing nation- building or not creating persistent commitments to Afghanistan. Even in early Afghanistan's policy, strategic errors were made by US policy makers as they had missed opportunity to stabilize Afghanistan in 1978 and 1992. While keeping in view the previous strategic errors US devised a new strategy in post 9/11 era which was called grand strategy. There are number of diplomatic, military and economic factors that explain the US grand strategy toward Afghanistan. The results of U.S. Grand Strategy in Afghanistan have varied and created new friends and foes. Despite U.S. efforts to scratch Afghanistan off the list of the world's failed nations, security in Afghanistan remained weak, poverty ubiquitous and the future uncertain. Kenneth Waltz's theory Neorealism explains variation in US grand strategy from the years immediately preceding its entry into World War II until the present. It also explains how the top leaders of the US assess international threats and opportunities and adjusts national security policies in response to those threats and opportunities, and then mobilizes the human and material resources necessary to implement those policies. The first half of this thesis focuses on U.S. security interests and the threat environment of Afghanistan, and the second half describes the diplomatic, military and economic attributes of a selective engagement of grand strategy and finally the shortcomings of post 9/11 U.S. Grand strategy in Afghanistan.

INTRODUCTION:

The strategic community has debated American grand strategy with greater intensity than rigor for decades. As a result, there have been a few strategic blunders, as well as more widespread strategic misunderstandings. The worldwide environment in which America's grand strategy functions now is vastly different from that in which it was conceived in the 1950s. The fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, which together stood for one-half of a loosely bipolar world, is without a question the most stunning upheaval. Ideological and security concerns that used to bind governments to their various camps are no longer effective uniting forces. Furthermore, disparities in economic growth are altering how many countries see their position in the international community. This is the start of a new era in world politics (Barfield, 2010).

South Asia has long been a prominent element of US foreign policy, especially since the 1980s Afghan War. In the region, the superpower has waged two wars: one through proxies and the other directly. The US ' engagement in Afghanistan in the 1980s was a reply to the USSR, and it was largely bent upon punishing the Communists instead of the Afghan people's independence or prosperity. The war in Iraq drew focus away from the fighting in Afghanistan shortly after the invasion in 2001 (Chandrasekaran, 2012).

Regardless of earlier agreements, whenever Afghanistan emerges on the US agenda, it is pushed aside in favor of more vital matters and eventually scrapped by policymakers in the US. The U.S developed various agricultural programs in Afghanistan after WWII. In 1978, however, when the Soviets invaded, these

initiatives were abandoned. When America's hostility to Communism clashed with its commitments in Afghanistan during the Cold War Era, the US withdrew. Following the grave incident of 9/11, US policymakers attempted but in vain to develop a novel grand plan for Afghanistan. The Afghan conflict hasn't been easy on the American pocket. Thousands of lives have been sacrificed in the US, and millions of dollars in taxpayer funds are still being expended approximately every day (Masud, 2014).

Instead of, the aftermath of 9/11, US policy regarding Afghanistan displays a pattern of systemic contradiction in US Foreign policy and a prolonged indifference to the region and Afghanistan. Instances of incoherence and indifference aren't confined to Afghanistan's politics and security apparatus only. It also includes a disregard for the Afghan people and a lack of understanding of the country's broader significance in world security framework. Interesting to note is the fact that, the post-9/11 invasion did not start these patterns of inconsistency and indifference. Afghanistan has never been considered as US 's top priority in any of these circumstances, and as a result, US foreign policy in Afghanistan has generally faltered (Jones,2010)

They failed because of difficult domestic and international circumstances. They also failed because of conceptual limitations because the American foreign policy was short of insight and attention to details. They had flawed understanding of Afghanistan for the war that lay ahead. Nation-building has never been viewed as a quick or simple task. Following 9/11, the US could not afford to pay any attention to Afghanistan, whose democratic systems were practically non-existent. When the US lowered force numbers in Afghanistan in 2006, the Taliban was able to re-enter the country, posing

a danger to US objectives and Afghanistan's stability. By 2006, the US had lost a significant amount of community support in Afghanistan, particularly in critical southern districts. In 2009, when Obama assumed office, the Afghan war had already been on for eight years, and little substantial progress had been made. The state-building that had been achievable in 2001 was becoming increasingly out of reach (Joseph, 2004).

When looking at the history of US-Afghan relations, it appears that the US is well-positioned to affect substantial, long-term change in Afghanistan, but it fails to do so by struggling to make an appropriate commitment to Kabul's stability and security. Early US disasters to establish and protect Kabul proven a climate that proliferated the Taliban and gave Osama bin Laden safe haven. Instead of learning from previous failures, the US wasted a chance to remedy it in 2001. (Gallup, 2013). Since then, the Taliban insurgency has resurfaced in Afghanistan, and the US is prepared to abandon the country in a situation identical to that which permitted Osama Bin Laden to function from there primarily. Many Afghans are disillusioned by the Afghan government's mismanagement; a scary number of Afghans remain in hopeless poverty; and the drug mafia has recovered, providing the Taliban with a stable stream of cash. The US is concerned about these countries because there is so much at risk in the region's future. As a global leader, America has a strong interest in the region's stability, from nonproliferation to counterterrorism (Anthony, 2012).

This area may confront more significant threats to security than any other in the world now, thanks to armaments, unpredictable politics, cultural and religious strife, and Muslim extremism. Although religious and cultural conflict has always existed in the

region, the degree at which it now threatens to ignite is unparalleled. Progress has been gradual and constrained, given the seriousness of the situation in Afghanistan. Despite American efforts to remove Afghanistan from the list of failed states, the country's security is precarious, poverty is widespread, and the future is unclear (Rashid, 2009).

1. RATIONALE OF THE STUDY:

The US is the prominent actor in the world politics and as a sole power its presence cannot be ignored in contemporary affairs. The US has used its power to safeguard its national interests in Afghanistan. There are number of diplomatic, military and economic factors that explain the US grand strategy toward Afghanistan. The results of U.S. Grand Strategy in Afghanistan have varied, and created new friends and foes. This research is important to analyze the US strategic trends towards Afghanistan in post 9/11 era. Furthermore, this study is to examine whether US Grand Strategy efforts in Afghanistan has served the US national interests. Finally this research will be able to suggest concrete analysis on the shortcomings of US Grand strategy and policy actions towards Afghanistan.

2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

In the post 9/11 era, the Grand strategy of US has played a vital role in the world politics. In this scenario there are number of diplomatic, military and economic factors that explains the US grand strategy toward Afghanistan. The aim of this research is first to understand the fallacies of the U.S. grand strategy in Afghanistan keeping in view the environment of Afghanistan. Furthermore, this study will examine the challenges facing by Afghanistan and policy options to cope with these problems while keeping in view the shortcomings of US grand strategy.

3.OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:

The objectives of the study are to examine.

- To highlight the main objectives of US Grand strategy
- To understand the relationship between grand strategy and foreign policy of America
- To understand the objectives, interests and policy actions of US Grand Strategy in Afghanistan in post 9/11 era
- To highlight the shortcomings of US Grand Strategy while keeping in view the problems in Afghanistan.

4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

1. How US Grand Strategy is related to the foreign policy goals and aspirations?
2. What was the strategic security threat environment in Afghanistan at the time of US attack on Afghanistan?
3. What are the diplomatic, military and economic attributes of America's Grand Strategy in Afghanistan?
4. What are the shortcomings of Post 9/11 US Grand Strategy in Afghanistan?
5. What kind of challenges Afghanistan is facing and how the US policy makers can find a way to cope with these problems keeping in view the loopholes of US Grand Strategy?

5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY:

The US of America played a significant role in the Afghanistan during the post 9/11 era. The US has used its power to safeguard its national interests in Afghanistan. The results of U.S. Grand Strategy in Afghanistan have varied, and created new friends and foes. This thesis will address the period of the post 9/11 era. In this period US faced a changing strategic reality; to promote the democracy in Afghanistan. US has pursued a number of national interests during the post 9/11 era, some more vital than others. The purpose of this study is to examine whether post 9/11 US Grand Strategy efforts in Afghanistan has served the US national interests. This examination will be done by analyzing the US foreign policy activities to secure its national interests, defined by the Grand Strategy, in the Afghan region. This study will also help the policy makers to understand how they can find a way to cope with the security challenges of Afghanistan keeping in view the shortcomings of US grand strategy. This study will be helpful for the future researchers and students to open the future avenues of research.

6. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF MAJOR TERMS:

6.1 FOREIGN POLICY:

Foreign policy is the general objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states. The development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behavior of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs.

6.2 NATIONAL SECURITY:

According to the US Department of Defense National security is an often used term with many meanings. They defined national security simply as: "A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the US"

6.3 GRAND STRATEGY:

The DOD gives this definition: "national security strategy is the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It's also called as national strategy or grand strategy.

7. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Neorealism is an international political philosophy. This theory's major proponent is Kenneth Waltz. It aims to describe how nations, particularly the most dominant, operate and interact with one another on the global stage. The most important concerns in international relations in the past, present, and future include conflict, the avoidance and prevention of war, power balance, and power-seeking tendencies, security rivalry, weapons races, and alliance creation. When it comes to explaining outcomes in international politics, Neorealism means that the theory focuses largely on the impacts of the international system's structure.

Two aspects of the international system stand out in Waltz's conceptualization of structure. To begin with, anarchy is the organizing principle of the international system. This essentially implies a global government doesn't exist, therefore there is no greater authority than the system's primary components, the states. Consequently,

this creates an international system that is in essence, a self-help system made up of independent, functionally indistinct individuals who must constantly be alert to fend for themselves.

The allocation of capacities among the entities that make up the international system is the second distinguishing premise of the structure of international politics. Capabilities, or power, varies greatly among states; nations are distinguished based on how much power they have, even if they are functionally homogeneous. Disparities in power result in differences in the types and magnitudes of limitations that states encounter, resulting in differences in how states act or should behave. One of Waltz's primary observations is that structural limitations arising from power distribution compel or urge governments to act in one manner while avoid behaving in another. States, being rational actors, prefer to adopt the tactics that best assist them achieve their goals, at least in the long run. Any state's first purpose is to survive, since if it fails to do so, all the state's other objectives will become unattainable. The somewhat larger concept of security is a more elusive form of the phrase survival. Neorealism, it is assumed, emphasizes security as a primary goal of nations. According to Waltz, nations usually want to maximize security.

As per this idea, for the governments to safe and secure in an unregulated environment, they must adhere to the structural restrictions that govern their operations. Powerful nations can, and indeed must, do more than weaker governments. As relative authority grows, so does the scope of one's objectives. Even the most powerful governments, however, should not be too concerned about the power projection potential that come with possessing superior capabilities. The idea that anarchy is the international

system's governing principle leads to the obvious but intrinsically valid conclusion that conflicts will occur since there is nothing to prevent them. Nations will always have competing interests; occasionally these competing interests are over crucial problems; sometimes rivals make mistakes in estimating relative power; and sometimes nations make bad decisions in estimating the resolution of adversaries.

Consequently, a contradiction can occasionally devolve into a full-fledged war. Furthermore, battles occasionally erupt as a result of an imbalance of power, making conquest potentially successful effort. In all these circumstances, the primary cause of military confrontation is the absence of a worldwide sovereign, or a world government, to prevent it. The US ' use of the unipolar moment has mostly comprised of measures to institutionalize, where feasible, expand the world order that the US has shaped. The number of instances is extensive and includes North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) expansion and strengthening, the deepening of important security alliances around the globe, the reinforcement of the institutions that form the basis of economic globalization and capitalism, occasionally targeting uncompromising regimes, as well as cementing its ideological dominance and agenda-setting authority in the global community.

Kenneth Waltz's theory describes changes in US grand strategic interests from the period leading up to WWII to the present. The theory explains and describes how the US ' top officials analyze global threats and opportunities, alter national security protocols in reaction to those risks and opportunities, and mobilize the human and physical resources needed to put those measures into place. Hence, the international system is the main reason of the American grand strategic activity. The international

system, on the other hand, can only impact a country's foreign and security policy through the estimates and judgments of decision-makers. This indicates that, at least for a short time, risk assessment and the determination of policy choices are seldom factually viable or predictable based only on systemic considerations. Ultimately, after leaders have recognized risks and their chosen techniques for dealing with them, they must mobilize national public support and extract the resources needed from civil society. This research will look at the critiques and determine whether Neorealism is relevant in understanding US Grand Strategy in Afghanistan in the post-9/11 age.

8. LITERATURE REVIEW:

Although the West has a lengthy and complicated relationship with the community who live in today's Afghanistan, the English were the initial contributor of White dominance in the region prior to World War II. Although this timeframe is largely irrelevant to discussions of US-Afghan relations, it is worth mentioning because many academics view the timespan of British control in Afghanistan as an instructive anecdote of the difficulties of nation formation in Kabul and a major contributor to future hostility.

In the wake of 9/11, Bob Woodward, (2002) summarizes and describes the Bush Administration's perspectives. Woodward also looks at how the government came up with policies and strategies to combat terrorism.

Gideon Rose (2005) discusses the first war plan, which was developed from Bush Era doctrine, and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He also puts the present administration's regional policies and objectives in perspective. Interestingly, it displays an unavailability of comparable policy references akin to Woodward's

work, based on the state of the Obama Administration's Kabul strategy. Almost all the challenges that the US were facing in Afghanistan also were present during the English engagement in Afghanistan, according to Thomas Barfield (2010).

The English, like the US, encountered stiff opposition from Afghan elites who augmented their earnings via corruption. Barfield connects the formation of the contemporary Afghan state to this time in general. Abdur Rahman's administration is responsible for the Islamic supremacy, ethnic tensions, financial malaise, and the concentration of authority in Afghanistan. The conflicts of this period were crucial in establishing the present Afghan nation. According to him, the conflicts consolidated wealth and influence in Kabul, making Abdur Rahman Afghanistan's uncontested ruler.

Although authority in Afghanistan had previously been decentralized, Abdur Rahman centralized control with the support of the British, notwithstanding the sense of self-efficacy that still exists in Afghanistan presently. Abdur Rahman was placed as the Amir of Northern Afghanistan by the British, and he employed several deadly internal battles to eliminate sources of dissent and constructed a more centralized administration. In this scenario, arguably Abdur Rahman's experience could have been instructional for the US and the Karzai regime, which strained to deal with dishonest provincial authorities outside of Kabul's power.

Rahman substituted incumbent provincial officials with individuals he could seamlessly dismiss, if necessary, in order to consolidate his control. The influence of Abdur Rahman is not entirely favorable. Here on, Barfield blames this time and Abdur Rahman's administration for Afghanistan's economic collapse. Abdur Rahman

substantially transformed the foundation of Afghanistan via his conquest, transforming it into one that is highly Islamic and distrustful of centralized authority. Ironically for Afghanistan, this wasn't the last time Western forces intervened in their country because of a war. Kabul was also heavily influenced by World War II. While Afghanistan stayed ostensibly neutral throughout the battle, had the chance offered, it would have certainly turned against its historic English adversaries.

Although a convenient coalition with Germany to evict the British never materialized during the Second World War; the war had a significant influence on the West Asian colonies. The dissolution of the West's Asian colonial empires began with the Second World War, according to Barfield. With British influence in Asia waning, other countries such as the U.S. and Soviet Union would express an interest in Afghanistan.

Moreover, during World War II, the British withdrew from India, resulting in the birth of Pakistan, a country that rapidly became intimately linked to India. After the departure of the British in the early twentieth century, the U.S assumed the position of Afghanistan's principal western influence, which it retained until the Cold War ended. The early 1950s, marked the start of US's tumultuous and fluctuating engagement with Kabul. While many academics have written substantially about the US ' Cold War role, there is far less interest in the years leading up to the emergence of Communism in Afghanistan.

One researcher who examines this early phase of US participation is Rajiv Chandrasekaran (2012). The seeds of US neglect were also sowed during this time. With US's state-building expedition in Afghanistan in 2001, American forces discovered neglected constructions from the country's earlier state-building

endeavors, such as the Kajaki dam. His research shows his interpretation of US-Afghan ties in the 1950s, including the participation of USAID and multinational firms like Morrison-Knudsen. Whereas early Western attempts in Afghanistan were generally successful, notably in the field of agriculture,

Chandrasekaran claims that the task was left incomplete. The Kajaki dam is a specimen of such a plan. This dam, which was completed in early 1953 in southern Afghanistan, supplied Kandahar and the nearby towns with the first stable supply of energy. Although the dam was built and many generators were placed as part of the US' early involvement in Kabul, the operation stood unfinished. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, USAID departed the country before the plans to construct more generators and elevate the dam could be implemented. As part of its regular Cold War strategy of enmity against Communist regimes, the US withdrew support for the dam and comparable ventures. Regardless of the fact that considerable development and modernization were being undertaken in Kabul through initiatives like the Kajaki dam, the US withdrew from the country as soon as the war ended.

In his paper, Peter Thomsen (2011) highlights the cultural disparities amongst Afghan and Russian communities that hampered the spread of Soviet-style Communism in Kabul. He points out that Afghanistan's proletariat numbered less than 20,000 people. In reality, the centralized authority and secularism imposed by Soviet-style Communism were incompatible with many Afghans' individuality and faith. Difficulties for the Afghan Communist Party arose very quickly as a consequence of these inherent disparities. The PDPA's diminishing stature led its leaders to seek aid from the Soviets just under a year after the revolution. As the Communist

administration became increasingly reliant on Soviet funding and, ultimately, outright involvement, the US saw a chance to retaliate against its Cold War foe. A long-term insurgency in Kabul might limit the Soviets' capacity to project influence into the Arab's oil reserves. It could also humiliate and encircle Afghan and even Soviet soldiers as they try to put down the revolt. The US had a perfect chance to undercut Soviet goals by assisting the Afghan mujahedeen. The CIA was used by US to achieve its geopolitical goals.

Andrew Hartman (2002) analyses a variety of features of American grand policy in Afghanistan throughout the Cold War era. He looks at the policy of arming mujahedeen to fight the Communists in Afghanistan, as well as the fallout. He finds that American Cold War strategy has put more than just the safety of Americans at stake; it has rather put the safety of individuals around the globe in jeopardy, including Afghan nationals.

Hartman's study highlights several important policy errors that America repeated in 2001. To begin with, it points out that short-term U.S. considerations of Afghan policy, particularly weaponry supplies to anti-Western Mujahedeen commanders, which had an adverse impact on the People of the US of America. Moreover, despite the consequences of such CIA projects, their utilization was unjustifiable considering the US's ultimate exit and disengagement. Even though the CIA's practices throughout this time period are clearly reported, researchers keep debating the morality and rationale for them. Despite one's own feelings on the efficiency or morality of these kind of CIA programs, it is apparent that they were not created with Afghanistan or

its inhabitants in mind. The selling of weaponry, on the other hand, was almost entirely confined to an anti-Soviet unit.

Financial assistance ceased in December 1991, when the USSR dissolved, according to Steve Coll (2004). The US administration felt that it no longer had any interests of the country. While the Americans anticipated it could easily leave Afghanistan, elements competing for control in the wake of the Soviet regime's demise would not go peacefully into the night. Infighting like this not only wrecked the lives of countless Afghans, but it also created a climate in which organizations like al-Qaeda could thrive and, many years down the line, kill Americans on September 11. With the Communists gone, the delicate mujahedeen coalitions disintegrated in the absence of a shared foe. Afghanistan quickly descended into chaos when the Soviet Union disintegrated and the U.S withdrew. The Afghan people suffered while the groups fought. The Afghan people eventually became disillusioned as the various groups fought. The Taliban ascended to power in Afghanistan due to a lack of central body and a people yearning for order.

While Terry Anderson (2011) considers the original intervention in Afghanistan to be a military success, certain analysts, such as writer Ahmed Rashid, have continually criticized the US ' post-invasion goals and plans or a lack thereof.

In *Descent into Chaos*, Ahmad Rashid (2000) gives a thorough history of the events that shaped present Afghanistan. Rashid briefly reviews the circumstances leading up to September 11 before embarking into a scathing indictment of the American strategy; particularly the country's inability to participate in solid nation-building in Afghanistan. His research is on the US ' inability to protect the country

after September 11, 2001, and to embark up on nation-building on a scale that might have countered the allure of extremism and religious terrorism and prevented state collapse.

According to Craig Mullaney (2010), the Afghan war was inadequately underfunded. Mullaney depicts an Afghan army that was unprepared to adapt to the demands of national development, from soldier strength to supplies for maintenance. Mullaney highlights a lack of preparation and competence that impeded Afghanistan's state building endeavor, in addition to the material deficiencies. Mullaney's work indicates a weakness in US's early grand strategy in Afghanistan that goes beyond a mere logistic shortfall. Not only U.S. soldiers missed physical equipment, but they were also emotionally and psychologically inadequate. While the under-resourcing noted by Mullaney undoubtedly hampered early American initiatives in Afghanistan, the development of a model Afghan state may be unattainable until the US shifts not just its political priorities, but also its mental approach towards the country. This wider culture of indifference, which dates to the American WWII tactics, is also crucial to comprehending Afghanistan's inability to form a country.

The narrative of the soldiers who fought in one of the biggest American military operations since 2001 invasion is told in this HBO documentary from 2010. Even though other publications, such as General Stanley McChrystal's memoir, portray this attack as a constructive turning point in McChrystal's leadership, this documentary emphasizes the difficulties US forces face in engaging with the native community and collaborating with Afghan domestic troops.

Seth Jones (2010) feels that the U.S squandered a golden chance to create a secure and stable Afghan state. Seth highlights not just the chances that were wasted during the initial attack, but also how these prospects were lost in the face of a resurgent Afghan Taliban. The Taliban's comeback in 2006 compelled the US to reconsider its strategy.

Number of the researcher's efforts re-energized American operations, ultimately leading to fundamental shifts in the US strategy to Kabul. The emergence of counterinsurgency philosophy in the American military is one instance of this reassessment. While there is a considerable and extensive literature on Afghanistan's past and the US ' connection with it, these studies fall short of pinpointing the fundamental problem with US grand policy in Afghanistan. When America initially attacked Afghanistan in 2001, Ahmed Rashid sees a squandered chance. Chandrasekaran points out chances that were squandered in the 1950s and under President Obama. While they and other experts frequently point to lost chances for the US to assist Kabul, they fail to capture the inherent contradictions in US strategy or the fundamental problems in Afghanistan.

9. METHODOLOGY:

9.1 RESEARCH DESIGN:

This study will be qualitative in nature. The methodology undertaken in this research would be mainly descriptive and explanatory.

9.2 DATA COLLECTION:

This research will use both primary and secondary methods. Since this thesis methodology is a qualitative literature-assessing survey, literature of different kinds is the main source that will be used to collect data. Primary sources such as semi-structured interviews (from experts, and analyst) will be conducted when required. Purposive sampling technique will be used. Online government documents and official statements of policy makers including US' 18 national security strategy. These documents will be analyzed through content analysis. Books would be secondary source of information and data. Articles and journals would be other sources that will be used to collect data.

1.9.3 DATA ANALYSIS:

S. #	Sources	Nature of document	Availability	Information to be extracted
1	Books and articles on US-Afghan relations.	Academic and semi-academics	DSS library, (QAU), NDU library, National library, Area study center,	Information about historical background of US-Afghan relations, post invasion period, and Taliban resurgence
2	Interviews (semi-structured) Using Purposive sampling N=15	Strategist, retired policy makers, academicians	Centre for international strategic studies Islamabad, NDU, RAND, Lindon university US, University of Reading UK.	Information about the dynamic foreign policy context over the course of US involvement, and situation in Afghanistan
3	Policy papers, online government documents and organizational reports	National and international	IPRI, IPCS, CSIS and official websites.	Information about US National interests in Afghanistan, keeping in view the security environment of Afghanistan To get the information about the timeline of major foreign policy activities conducted by US administration after 9/11

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Introduction

In view of the way that it delivers information, arguments, and samples with theory for the outcomes, the theoretical framework is a vital endeavor in the research procedure. The scope of the research is the framework that aids scholarly study activity that exhibits, exposes, and defines. During the evaluation, structural difficulties arise, and the theoretical framework aids in the resolution of these concerns. Furthermore, it provides responses to new challenges that have not before been addressed in the context of other views. This, along with research answers for research difficulties, is highlighted. Theoretical framework provides an expert with appropriate study instruments with which a researcher interprets data, studies it over, and completes it with a future perspective in mind.

It also verifies the theory's importance in terms of specific concerns and topics that are still being examined and explored. It is critical that a theory's relevance to the problem under consideration be established. It will be necessary to depict the current situation about the role of the US in the Afghan devastation, with the purpose of determining the relevance of the theory to the study issue, US Grand Strategy toward Afghanistan in the Post-9/11 Period.

1.2 NEO-REALISM:

According to Neorealism, the essence of the international structure is determined by its organizing principle, anarchy, or lawlessness and the distribution of capacities, assessed by how many dominant elements in the global arena. Kenneth N. Waltz, who established Neorealism theory in *Theory of International Politics*, made clear an argument that had long been implied in realism texts (1979). Neorealism is systemic, positivist, realist, and deductive.

The international structure's chaotic organizing principle is decentralized, which means there is no official centralized authority, and all sovereign states are unitary equal under this system. The core argument of Neorealism theory is that the unregulated international order is a tolerant setting in which nations are free to act as they like (Waltz 1959: 233). These countries operate as per the notion of self-help, which means that they prioritize their self-interests over the objectives of other nations.

States are meant to prioritize ensuring their own survival as a prerequisite for pursuing other goals. The drive to survive is the primary factor influencing their actions, since it ensures that governments create aggressive military infrastructure in order to engage in international interventionism and increase their relative supremacy. Since states can never be certain of what other nations might do in the future, there is indeed a lack of trust among them, leading them to be careful of power transfers that might put their security at risk. The security issue is defined as a lack of trust caused by a high level of uncertainty.

Nations are compared in terms of desires, but not in terms of their capacity to fulfil them. The relative placement of states based on abilities determines the distribution of capacity. Because of the structural split of capacities, concerns about relative advances made by other states, as well as the possibility of dependent on other states, stymie state-to-state cooperation. The objective and relative capacities of each state to increase relative strength limit one another, culminating in a 'power balance' that characterizes international relations. It also poses a security threat that all governments must deal with. The two strategies by which nations balance power are internal and external adjustment. Internal balance is achieved when countries develop their own capacity as a result of economic progress. When states develop alliances to offset the might of greater states or coalitions, this is known as external balancing.

Neorealist contend that there are basically three separate systems based on changes in capacity allocation, as determined by the quantity of big giants in the global arena. A unipolar setup has only one superpower, a bipolar order, on the other hand, has two big states, and lastly, a multipolar world has multiple superpowers. Neorealist school of thought thinks that a bipolar international order is more robust and stable (less susceptible to big power conflict and systemic alteration) as compared to a multipolar one since balancing can only happen through internal balancing because there are no extra-large powers with whom to build coalitions. There are less potential for miscalculations in a bipolar system since it only requires internal balancing instead of external balancing, and thus decreases the chances of big power war. That is a great arrangement in the theory.

1.3 NEO REALIST THEORY: CONCEPTS AND CLAIMS

The international-political order is the basic notion of Neorealism theory. Waltz abstracts from all aspects of international politics to get at this notion, which he defines simply as a framework with interconnected components (1979: 79). The structure of the international political system, according to Waltz, has three characteristics. First and foremost, the structure is lawless. There is no universal authority with the capability to execute international law.

Second, the system is made up of two or more similar units (autonomous, sovereign nations) that all want to live but have varying material capacities. The main players, or major powers, are those who have the most power. Finally, specific international systems can be distinguished based on the number of significant actors involved or the dispersion of abilities among units. Multipolar systems have three or more big powers, bipolar systems have two or more comparable main powers, and unipolar systems have one state with unmatched strength (1979: 97-98; 2000: 27-8).

Waltz and other structural realists derive how the international political system would function based on these notions. The first argument Neorealism get from the idea of an anarchic international-political system is that governments are free to act as they choose. States must aid themselves if they are to live and achieve whatever other goals they may have since there are no constraints on what states might do intentionally or unwittingly to injure one another.

acquire a wide variety of material capabilities, such as population and territory, natural resource abundance, economic capacity, military power, political stability, and competence (Waltz 1979: 131). As states acquire capacities, they gain the ability to go on the offensive and attack or meddle in the internal affairs of other countries.

A state can launch such conduct because of global anarchy. Attacks, invasions, and other interference occur because there is nothing to restrain them in the absence of a global authority to prevent, prohibit, or penalize such activity. To put it another way, worldwide anarchy is the acceptable or eventual cause of their behavior. The primary or prompt cause of a specific attack or involvement, on the other hand, is the match that lights the fire started by international anarchy at a specific moment and location. The reasons of governments that launch war and conflict are among the causative factors. These impulses, according to Waltz, are eternally different. A state's desire may be to take over the entire planet at its most extreme.

Warfare undertaken by powers trying to increase their authority are known as ruthless wars. Waltz and other structural realists argue that large countries are more driven to attack and meddle in other states, particularly ones weaker than themselves, based on the copulation of global anarchy and contrasts in relative capabilities. When big powers do so, their acts are defined in terms of what makes their tremendous power feasible, not in terms of their specific reasons.

The distinctions between capitalist, communist, dictatorial, and progressive imperialism are fascinating and significant, but they are all variations of great power imperialism, which is defined as major powers' endeavors to govern, dominate, and lead global or regional matters (Waltz, 1979). Efforts to implement or uphold

international law may be among these initiatives. However, since international jurisdiction is based on capabilities, international law is likely to be applicable exclusively to the weak, not the powerful. Since there is no global government to oversee how nations in general and big powers utilize their capacities, Neorealism claim that insecurity, or at the very least, ambiguity about each other's future intentions and plans, is the fundamental condition of international politics.

They believe that this uncertainty will exhibit itself in an anxiety over relative benefits. To put it another way, states don't inquire, "Will both of us benefit?" but rather, "Who will benefit more?" (Waltz, 1979, p. 105.) This preoccupation with relative benefits has three implications. First, anxiety for relative gains reveals itself in the rise of unwelcome conflicts and wars. For instance, a country aiming to improve its defense capabilities can create new military capacity. Other countries may fear that the state is preparing to attack them, and they may attack the state before it can strike them, because there is no world government to enforce the solely defensive use of the state's new powers. This is an illustration of the security conundrum.

The anarchic nature of the global political system, according to Neorealism, creates motive for nations to pay more attention to other states' capabilities than their declared intentions. The structural realists' skepticism about the chances for permanent peaceful coexistence stems from the security conundrum. Even if all governments had the best of intentions, war and conflict would still be a possibility since the security challenge is caused by their circumstances, not by their wills.

Unintended conflicts or wars for security or defense are hostilities prompted by uncertainty about how governments would employ their relative capabilities. Second,

irrespective of the nature or immediate intent of either partner, concern for relative gains makes collaboration impossible. Even the potential of significant absolute advantages for both players does not motivate collaboration, according to Waltz, if one party is afraid of how the other may utilize its new powers. International collaboration is not impossible because of concerns about proportional gains. Instead, it has an impact on which countries collaborate on which issues and how long that collaboration will persist (Grieco 1988).

The enemy of my enemy is my friend, and war-winning alliances fall apart, are examples of structural-realist assumptions regarding cooperation. This leads to the third result of states' concern for relative gains: the establishment of power balances on a regular basis. As inequalities in relative capacities arise across states, powerful nations find themselves more capable of surviving and achieving whatever other objectives they may have than intermediate powers and weak nations. This either entices or encourages people to take one of two actions. Either they strive to dominate the globe or expand their power, or they associate their goals with the preservation of a given order and, as a result, behave in ways that benefit the general good, whatever they define it. Regardless of their differences, both indicate instances of imperialism.

It is always feasible that major countries will execute such practices in the absence of a global authority to prevent them unless they fear retaliation from other powerful states. When one great power moves forcefully in a multipolar or bipolar system, structural realists anticipate the other great powers to try to counter this action sooner or later (Waltz 1979: 125).

Similarly, unipolarity assumes that at least one middle power would acquire the skills necessary to safeguard its rights from the unipolar and thus counterbalance the strength of the unipolar. The idea is not that an imbalance can never arise, but that once broken, a balance will return sooner or later, in some form or another. As we've ascertained, the idea of global anarchy underpins all structural-realist theory's fundamental causal assumptions. Since there is no global government to provide national security, international violence, warfare, and power imbalances are common occurrences in international affairs, and collaborations to modify these consequences frequently fail.

Neo-realism, which evolved from classical realism, places a greater emphasis on the global and international system, as well as the significance of non-state actors. They acknowledge that states are afflicted by apprehensions of security and are essentially violent. Neo-realists argue that all nations don't trust one another due to the anarchical and interest-based system, and that they are now growing military capacities using joint organizations and financial growth. A state should always be aware of what is going on in the world around it, and it should take a logical and pragmatic approach to dealing with the challenges that arise while dealing with the international political system (Breacher, 2002).

According to Neo-realists, states' first goal is to ensure their own existence, which is a prerequisite for pursuing new goals. To preserve the state's deterrence, a state's survival necessitates the growth of hostile defense mechanisms. As a consequence of the degree of vulnerability and the lack of confidence on exchanging states, a security

concern is presented. There is a lack of faith between nations since they cannot be certain of potential demands of different nations.

The states will be presented in the global framework by the crucial character of world legislative concerns, which is political mobilization. In this context, Kenneth Waltz's book *"Hypothesis of International Politics"* notes, "The states in the global framework will be governed by the critical nature of global administrative difficulties, which is tumultuous in nature." All states' sovereignty is the same; it refers to the protection of their own deviations, motivating various forces. That is why, as per Neo-realists, the proliferation of capacities; control inside the global arena is defined by the lawlessness norm. As a result, a few nations become more competent than others, as states are unable to forego their own needs for the purpose of other players. Self-interest eventually takes over.

States have two sets of levels in dealing power, according to Neo-realists: (1) Internal Balancing and (2) External Balancing. States build their capacities through internal balance by boosting economic development and defense spending, the most basic of which is greater investment and military might, as well as creating reasonably skilled people. Nations develop conspiracies with varied states as a tool for external balancing, normalizing and keeping an eye on more powerful states and forces of various alliances, in some way.

According to Neo-realists, there are three possible frameworks based on advancements in the distribution of capacities, with the number of overwhelming powers regulating the international system on a very foundational level in the unipolar

arrangement of the world, where there is only a single enormous state, a bipolar setup has di or two big forces, and a multipolar arrangement has multiple dominant elements. Neo-realists believe that a bipolar framework is less susceptible to conflict and systemic alteration, and thus more solid when compared to a multipolar system, since adjusting can only happen by way of internal adjusting because there aren't any supplemental remarkable entities in the global arena to structure organizations with. Because a bipolar model just has internal balancing instead of exterior balancing plus internal balancing, there is little room for errors and hence less risk of unbelievable force conflict.

TH 25487 The strength of the international system, according to neo-realists, is in its connection. In the eyes of neo-realists, the state's power is based on its size, territory, and population, as well as its development, investment capabilities, political resiliency, military competence, and fitness. The rationale of self-improvement and compelling governmental concerns is inextricably linked to the global revolutionary framework.

The cornerstone of construction for the variant posterior theories is neo-realism, which is the beginning point of international politics assessment. Yet, the advent of fresh challenges to neorealist thought has resulted in the theory's relative marginalization today. This is an effort to portray that neo- realism's is diachronic, and that its fundamental claims can be proven throughout time, considering both the past and present global system. To support my claim, I will concentrate on Waltz and Mearsheimer's theoretical analyses, which are two of the most influential neo-realists (Baldwin, 1993). To begin, considering neorealism's key assumptions about structure, power, and war-and-peace shifts, as well as a parallel examination of them. Second,

despite its recent fall, neo-portrayals realisms of international relations continue to be a timeless knowledge for analyzing international relations.

Before the start of the Second Cold War, neo-realist theory rose to the forefront of political debates as a response to the contemporary challenges of globalization, as a revival of the state's role over the structure, and to restate the importance of bipolarity and systemic constrictions in global politics. To begin, we should explore the key theoretical constructs of neo-realists in order to establish a clear picture of the theory's validity to the present.

Kenneth Waltz was the first to establish 'autonomy of international politics' as a distinct subject from internal politics, to bring scientific rigor to the study of politics. According to Waltz, the system is made up of "structural and basic levels." As a result, he distinguishes among external and internal forces that influence the international system, and he proposes the "systemic theory" as a framework for describing the behaviors of nations in the global system (Waltz, 615-628,1988).

Waltz's theory is useful for forecasting. As per him, in the anarchical state of the global community, there is a specified "structural continuity" across time. The structure diversity of the unit ensures a disparity in policy consequences. As a result, commonalities in political institutions between nations imply comparable political outcomes.

Internationally, "anarchy" is a bigger law that establishes a balance amongst nations in order to ensure their survival. Though governments have a wide range of domestic policies, their foreign policy has a unique analogy: "international political systems are in a state of cooperation." No one has the authority to dictate, and no one is obligated

to follow." States acknowledge the presence of some "structural restrictions" imposed by their mutual anarchy, which have a decisive impact on relations and force them to play a game of diplomacy and survival. Referring to their neighbors, states harmonize their interests and ambitions. Consequently, every state's role in the global order is classified and regulated by the international order of states. To distinguish domestic politics from foreign politics, Waltz examines his grandiose political structure hypothesis based on three fundamental estimates.

Neo-realists hold a skeptical perspective of international relations, as evidenced by their assumption. In the same way, this refutes democratic peace and liberalism arguments. Neorealist theory is related to the US ' War on Terrorism because it combats the fact that the globe is in chaos. This illness is also likely to worsen in the future.

This is an inconceivable challenge for neo-realists, given the fact that if there is upheaval and conflict, what will be the reaction to the subject of war? When the theory of necessity arises, neo-realists recognize that the democratic system and other similar terminology are subjective, and that functional states tend to modify the connotations of the concepts for their own advantage.

Due to systemic drives, the US attacked Afghanistan at the time when Al-Qaeda smashed into the twin towers, as it is believed in world politics that power must be preserved at whatever cost. Because the state is the main participant, there should be no bargaining on the sensitivity of its authority. An act like September 11th might exacerbate the threat of retaliation from a state with the massive power that the US

possesses. In this regard, the US response of ambushing Afghanistan was justified in the perspective of the international political system, which is intrinsically lawless.

America appears to have attacked Afghanistan in order to achieve its objectives, but it has so far misjudged disastrously. Washington has not lately lost sight of its goals, but it has created more problems for itself. Today, America can't avoid following in the footsteps of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, failing to achieve a remarkable cumulative victory despite its vast military might. As substantiated evidence proves, various superpowers have tried to attack and subdue Afghanistan in history, but have failed miserably (Crews, Tarzi, 2008).

Neorealism stresses global pressures by emphasizing the global distribution of power, and claims that material or structural factors at the world stage determine strategic transformation (Johnston, 61-154, 1998). According to the neorealist viewpoint, the chaotic global order, in which conflict is still a possibility, forces nations to rely on their own logistic capacities in a survival game. Consequently, international forces are the fundamental driver of individual governments' strategic actions. Neorealist thinkers do not dispute that nations have their very own history and philosophical schemas, rather they argue that the pressures of global competition tend to eradicate internal distinctions, and that states eventually operate in the same way, paying close regard to their own interests and hence achieving homogeneity (Doyle 1997).

An essentially international theory, according to Waltz, cannot claim to describe any foreign policy or great game; rather it can merely give answers to global consequences. Even some realists are baffled as to how someone can develop a theory of global

consequences without inference specific assertions regarding unit nations' conduct (Elman, 1996). When Waltz claims that nations balance each other, he is predicting more than just consequences: he is also predicting foreign-policy actions, whether deliberate or not. As a result, a realistic account of fluctuations in great strategic conceptions as logical state responses to fluctuating international situations may be sketched. A neorealist, on the other hand, would draw a causal arrow from global circumstances to strategic action, with ideas having minimal impact. (Mearsheimer, 1994).

Contemporary neorealist are divided into two types: 'aggressive' and 'defensive.' The adversarial structure of the international system, according to offensive realists, encourages governments to grow their relative power whenever feasible. The 'tragedy' of the stalemate, as described by Mearsheimer, is the ambiguity about other nations' intentions, which motivates individual nations to fear the worst and increase their degree of safety over others. As a result, powerful governments act as though they want supremacy, even if they merely want to survive. As a result, the sole important distinction between nations, and the greatest predictor of their great game, is their relative power (Mearsheimer, 2001).

1.4 US Grand strategy

At critical foreign-policy moments in the past, realists have advocated for a restructuring of strategy along realist lines. Their statements imply that pursuing 'the national interest' is component of realism, and that the notion of realist 'national interest' is in stark contrast to other, substantially dogmatic, foreign policy objectives. From a neo realistic perspective, the US is only a single of multitude of nations in a

chaotic global arena built on power. The primary restriction on foreign policy, according to neorealism, is the international distribution of capacities. Nations define their objectives, they contend, "in terms of power, pursuing goals that have some tangibly recognizable advantage for society as a whole." Major conflicts tend to be abrupt expressions of core problems in this sense. Major conflicts, in this sense, appear to be the outward expressions of fundamental shifts in power distribution (Morgenthau, 1965).

In truth, realism's rivals are just as concerned with pursuing the 'national interest,' but they do not on the scope and nature of the aims that jeopardize 'the national interest.' "Rather than between it and other strategic philosophies, the primary arguments concerning American foreign policy are better understood as contests within the conceptual sense of 'the national interest'" (Quinn, 2008).

The objective of such remarks is not to criticize the success of any one grand strategy method, but to shift the conversation elsewhere from a binary relationship between national interest and realist school of thought. "Ideology has always been thought of in opposition to some order of reality or understanding from which it would be possible to acknowledge its misleading and erroneous character," Aletta Norval claims. The problem of the contemporary state as a reference point for analysis has been a fundamental contribution of critical international relations. The building of the contemporary state and the production of novel forms of knowing have acted simultaneously to redefine the essence of security, according to recent study. The result has been to show that identity considerations have always been present in theories of international relations, notably security ones (Norval, 2000).

"The seeming lack of an attention to identity in security ideas ought to be viewed in actuality as a retrospective remnant of an intentional decision to remove identity problems from the political domain," writes Michael Williams. Although that practice is premised on liberal belief in the authority of science to pacify political clash, the origins of realism's vision of a national interest that is factual can be found in liberal inclination, to build a tangible and absolute basis for political implementation (William, 1998).

Several security experts have remarked on the lack of identity in past debates. They tried to include identity as a mediating factor in order to enhance neorealist arguments since they saw identity as consistent with neorealism. Security experts with a much more critical viewpoint, on the other hand, argue that the lack of identity from the early discussion cannot be overlooked. In security theories, the absence of identity might be problematic, which is conceptualized due to the realization that world ideas and security theories were fundamental parts of the political activities that made up that world. As a result, as part of a wider rigorous approach to security studies, both US grand strategy and contextualized, historical perspectives are integrally interwoven (Posen, 1993).

It's critical to comprehend what the concepts of strategy or planning and its broad descendant grand strategy have referred to throughout history. The term strategy has been widely misunderstood; it is not correctly implemented in everyday usage, and its definition has evolved through time. Hence, Carl von Clausewitz described tactics as the theory of using armed might in conflict, and strategy as the idea of using troops to achieve the War's objectives. Even though Clausewitz gave valuable concepts, his

perspective was limited by the sort of military campaigns that existed at the time. Clausewitz's description fell short of describing the conflicts of the 20th and 21st centuries, which were shaped by the idea and implementation of all-out war, as well as the mobilization of the populace and material infrastructure (Clausewitz, 2007)

The genealogical and conceptual breakthrough in the examination of strategic concept was made by Basil Liddell Hart. "The objective of grand strategy or higher strategy is to coordinate and steer all of a nation's resources toward the achievement of the political objective of attack, the aim established by basic policy," he explained. As for the superior most level of national strategy, we can apply Hart's concept of grand strategy. However, Hart went considerable far, claiming that the goal of attack is to achieve a better harmony, and that it is vital to engage in war with continual respect for the harmony you wish, even if just from your own point of view. The most significant conclusion he reached as a result of this idea that the most essential errand questioning national policymakers was to define the realm of a "better peace" was that grand strategy was about far more than merely combat monitoring (Hart, 1967).

Military strength is only one of the tools of great game, which must also consider and employ the power of financial, diplomatic, economic, and, not least, moral pressings. It ought not only unite the different tools, rather also govern their usage to prevent future peace from being jeopardized. The true meaning of strategy is defined not only with conflicts and battles, but also with the employment of power in order to attain political objectives as effectively as possible. This underlines the importance of grand strategy in both peace and conflict. As a result, this approach opened for the possibility that states can pursue basic objectives that do not necessitate the use of armed force.

Military success was not the most important consideration in grand strategy. Success in combat could not fulfil the prerequisites of sound strategy if it rendered the state weaker and more vulnerable.

1.5 Terrorism as a Conceptual Framework

Terrorism is an ancient idea in history as hunger for power, which has been in human beings from the beginning of time. This one occurrence has wreaked havoc on human history on a massive scale. Terrorism is a complicated and dynamic phenomenon that is difficult to identify and comprehend, despite its long and deep history in human history. It is tricky to congeal and evaluate the difference from terrorist activity and a typical violent act today since it has taken on so many various forms. Terrorism was once thought to be caused by societal inequities, which might be economic, social, or political in nature, but which result in violent acts and terrorist acts. The terrorist of one country is the freedom fighter of another. However, there is a compelling argument for the legitimacy of the context of violence and terrorism. On the one hand, if aggression is employed to overthrow a tyrant or liberate a seized territory, terrorism is acceptable and falls under the category of freedom struggle. Fighting has a moral component in the realm of social and political life, according to this. On the other hand, in International Politics, under the Neo-realist banner, the very same freedom fighters are deemed non-state actors or terrorists, posing a danger to the state's sovereignty.

In the recent past, the state utilized force and bloodshed to expel the bourgeoisie from France. During the French Revolution in 1789, the systematic utilization of the force was first employed. As Sue Mahan has pointed out, this period was known as the "rule

of terror." Terrorism has been interwoven with politics, and as a result, it is no longer a psychological issue. Mostly every act of terrorism now has political ramifications and effects. Terrorism, according to Bruce Hoffman, is essentially and intrinsically political. Terrorism-related ideas and concepts frequently evolve in response to changing circumstances. It's also about power; the quest for power, the attainment of power, and the application of power to achieve goals.

In today's world, terrorism is a very different phenomena than it was in the past. It has been transformed into a worldwide community with various features. Nowadays, terrorizing the contemporary world has become more harmful, violent, and explicit. Terrorists have also used polished and up-to-date tactics in order to fulfil their mission. Terrorist groups in the past were dispersed and disorderly, and they were not well-organized, and they acted rashly on occasion. One of the factors, in terms of the causes, was that contact in earlier days was not long-lasting and robust. With the improvement of transport and communications, terrorists have begun to utilize these methods. The strikes on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers demonstrated this.

Terrorism was considered as an act of aggression against a country by non-state actors underneath the guidance of 'realpolitik' in security studies and international relations. There are also state-sponsoring terrorism kinds, in which states are complicit in terrorist attacks against their own populations. These acts might be directed towards a minority or a set of individuals, or they can be directed at a state. Nations turn to this form of terrorism because waging a full-fledged war is often unaffordable at the time.

Religion has grown in importance as a political instrument, playing an increasingly important part in the day-to-day lives of ordinary people, and exerting a significant impact on their thoughts and feelings. Terrorists rarely have religious aspirations, but

they cleverly exploit religion to excuse their crimes. Regarding religious terrorism, there are two perspectives. On the one hand, it has become a religious mission for liberation activists in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya to liberate Muslims from authoritarian and imperialist non-Muslim regimes. On the other side, the West is persuaded that it is indeed a clear case of extremism rather than a struggle for freedom. However, just because those striving for their liberty are Muslims does not indicate they are engaging in Islamic terrorism, which is an area where the West appears to be losing touch with impartiality in this monitoring (Kopila, 2008).

On the scale of the conflict, there was more coercion than negotiation. America might be able to defeat and dominate Afghanistan, but the prospects are slim. Afghanistan's status is extremely perilous on a regional and extra-regional basis, since the nation is vital to NATO, the US, and Russia, India, China, Pakistan, and Central Asian states. This perplexing scenario will be a major embarrassment for NATO soldiers. They have slaughtered many innocent people, particularly thousands of their own soldiers, yet their results have been insignificant.

According to political history no country has ever won a two-front war. In this sense, the US government made a grave error by attacking two fronts simultaneously, such as when it attacked Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq two years later in the eleventh month of 2003. The attention switched from Afghanistan to the Middle East as a result of this transition. As a result, the US has lost in Baghdad and has also been expelled. This was a major humiliation because they found no WMDs in Iraq, even though the US and its supporters struck Iraq during the Bush administration. Following the same blunder, Washington and NATO are currently in the same scenario as before.

They strike here to damage the Al-Qaeda network, but it's because they're more eager to react now that their chief Osama Bin Laden has been killed in Pakistan. Pakistan's interests now lie in Afghanistan, which is calm and friendly. As a result, the two capitals' stability became interwoven. On the other hand, the instability in Afghanistan has a high risk of spilling over into Pakistan due to the shared religion and culture of both groups of the state, which is part of the regional security complex's dynamic (Maroof,1990).

It would be appropriate to infer that Pakistan has bleak prospects for Afghanistan's future, and that Pakistan has taken a different course than the US desired or requested. Since Pakistan is undoubtedly a sovereign country capable of devising its own policies based on its own national interests, this was only logical. As a result, it's critical that America and Pakistan, as the two primary stakeholders, are on the same page in order to develop a clear policy for a friendly Afghanistan.

The neo-realist approach is pertinent here, with allusions to Kabul specifically and the region to explain the US ' conflicting attitudes toward victim states. Neo-realist dynamics are evident in the US ' disengagement from Afghanistan. The US has attempted to influence Pakistan and Afghanistan's participation in the application of the two policies and plans outlined above by utilizing its strength and influence. In order to create better results and outcomes, the US wants to retain and contain a minimal role in this unpleasant scenario. Given US strategic objectives and the ongoing fight on terror, Pakistani assistance is relatively vital.

There are problems of commonalities and differences on the question of current US policy in Afghanistan, as stated not just by Afghanistan and Pakistan but also by other

regional nations. Considering the dynamics of the continuing battle against terrorism in Afghanistan, the Neo-realism theory aids in defining what outcome the governments at risk should be prepared to confront in the near future. Picture such complicated relationships would provide a clearer understanding of what is going on in the military-industrial complex.

1.6 Neorealism theory-linkage to power politics & war

In his book "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," Kenneth Waltz, the originator of neo-realism, said that the concept is a comprehensive examination of international politics in which nations act as units and units as components of a system. Anarchy, which disrupts the system, is what characterizes the essential form of the unit. Many major forces create disruption and irregularity in the system in order to create chaos and discontent (Waltz, 1988).

It is the system that is important, not the individual's desire for power. Great nations occasionally use their international clout to guarantee their own security. When a state is weak and anarchic, harmony is hard to achieve; instead, war is the only option. However, in the past, for the balance of power correction flexibility, turn laws were stringent and settlement possibilities were limited. While the flexibility of the postmodern adjustment between two powerful governments provides alternatives for policy and commitment.

The development of neorealism theory based on international state-to-state relations. The states' conduct is predicated on the factors of opportunity and preference. States favor self-defense, and to carry it out, they employ defensive or aggressive strategies.

Nevertheless, it is not assumed that nations always consider survival as an alternative or aggressive approach as a contrast in this respect. All states desire material power to keep their structures afloat. After the Cold War ended, the world realized that material power had value, and that this changes states into dominant and weak ones. States that gain tremendous power engage in political skills and build a foreign strategy that propels them to the top, but this is not the case for tiny or weak states.

The US ' post-Cold War policy has shifted to gaining maximum military might, and with that assistance, American military incursions have jeopardized the Arab World and oil supply. While there really are no verifications that may validate imperialism theorists' claims of US corporate and economic advantage (Telhami, 2010). The US is a big power in international politics, and it continues to be active in hegemon-related issues. Following World Conflict II, the US ' engagement in Vietnam, the Gulf War, the Soviet war, the Arab Spring, the Afghan war, the Iraq war, and the Syrian war illustrate its worldwide supremacy. As a result, according to the thesis, the US hegemon must preserve both unipolarity and security. It takes advantage of political concerns and heats up regional issues in this way. These frail nations are unable to deal with politics and eventually descend into chaos and conflict. In the instance of Afghanistan, the US wisely attacked the weak state following a terrorist attack, causing regional turmoil and posing a threat to Afghanistan's surrounding tiny governments. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan saw implicit consequences as well, and the same wave was felt in other neighboring nations in the area. The presence of military forces in Central Asia posed a security danger to other countries in the region.

1.7 Neorealist Theory: War, Conflict, and Peace

The realist theories of international relations have traditionally focused only on the themes of war, peace, and conflict. The realist school of thought of IR, first espoused by the Greek Thucydides, E.H. Carr, Thomas Hobbes, Hans J. Morgenthau, and later altered and proceeded by Kenneth Waltz (1979), portray the global community as chaotic, regard nation-states as the system's fundamental constituent elements, and promote the idea that nations are primarily involved in a battle for existence via power maximization. The anarchic international system's multiple nations create an immediate problem of insecurity for every one of them, encouraging a perpetual battle for dominance, particularly among the major and great powers. As a result, international relations are understood as a self-help system in which each state strives to secure its very own security and existence. If one nation arises as the most dominant at any particular period, other big and great powers will tend to build a counterweight of strength to counteract that dominant state.

Classical realists such as E.H. Carr (1946) and Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) stressed the international system's anarchy and human aggression as primary causes of conflict. A state's desire for military and material strength that quickly warns its competitors, the absence of a central authority to oversee global affairs, revisionist aims of certain nations, as well as the dearth of morality in foreign policy are just a few of the other factors that might lead to conflict. In summary, conflict is made possible by human nature's bleakness and the international system's lawlessness. Classical realists argue that the most effective strategy to avert wars and aggressions is to create power balances that discourage governments from fighting and assist to maintain the status

quo. States confronted with the threat of war tend to develop power balances to discourage conflict, according to historical data from Europe and elsewhere.

The first significant endeavor to alter the classical realism approach and put it on a solid scientific foundation was Kenneth N. Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979). Kenneth Waltz recognizes unregulated circumstances as an independent causal factor in the global arena, as do the classical realists, and sees states as the system's fundamental components. He likes to find the tendency of state actions and its response to other states' actions within the framework of the system. According to him, systemic anarchic conditions generate insecurity dilemmas for governments and cause them to be concerned about their security. The allocation of power within the global system would establish the system's core character and encourage nations to balance versus strong or hostile powers. Although a state's internal preferences are essential, the existence of and engagement with other nations have a greater impact on international results (Waltz, 1979: 65).

In an anarchic context, systemic forces push nations to employ suitable plans to strengthen their authority and stability, chiefly by the development of power balances. According to Waltz, because systemic forces contribute to state conflicts, it is possible to ascertain and ameliorate harmful situations in advance if suitable policies are implemented.

Waltz's primary beliefs are that lawlessness is still at the core of state insecurity and that governments proceed by forging power balances, however they like to incorporate additional elements that effect state security, such as geography and technology. To describe security competition between nations, they develop a novel notion of offense-

defense balance, described as "relative difficulty or ease of combat." Powerful governments with superior military technology would readily overcome geographical limits, putting the safety of other states at risk. War would become more frequent. The defensive realists offer two theoretical additions: (a) defensive military stances aid nations in promoting security while presenting no threat to other nation's security; and (b) geographical expansion is challenging and wasteful (Walt, 2002: 204-205).

In a nutshell, defensive realists favor plans that maintain the ongoing system and see hostile conflicts as incompatible with governments' reasonable conduct. One of the fundamental drawbacks of the defensive realist perspective is that measuring nations' offense-defense capability is extremely difficult, and states seldom adopt this stance as an answer to their stability issues (Walt, 2002: 206).

The realist scholars (Copeland, 2000; Labs, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2001; Zakaria, 1998) criticize the defensive realist perspective, claiming that defensive realists who embrace the status quo are unable to explain why certain governments risk the current situation and engage in expensive combats. According to them, the solution lies in states' inability or incapacity to precisely determine the true intentions of other nations that may engage in hostile schemes in the future. Because nations cannot know one other's intentions, they are forced to strengthen their power in order to confront any future difficulties.

Unlike defensive realists, who believe that great states are involved in a tough rivalry to enhance their relative power status (but stimulate them to establish balance of power), offensive realists believe that world superpowers are involved in an intense rivalry to boost their relative power status. States' survival is dependent on their ability

to maximize their power. Great powers may not battle one other directly in order to prevent the establishment of a hegemon, but they will most likely be getting other nations to be a proxy for them. In opposition to defensive realists, offensive realists say that conquest-based expansion may be beneficial to the conqueror. Even though nations are not continually at war, the great and significant powers are opportunistic aggressors who do not hesitate to outmatch their adversaries. Historical case studies, on the other hand, are less supportive of the aggressive realism stance. A example in point is the US ' hesitancy to use its armed and financial supremacy to initiate a military attack verses the USSR in the early postwar years. At this point, it is essential to determine some of the realism theories' essential theoretical postulates that are universally held.

Although the various varieties of realist theories retain distinguishable undertones in their interpretations of actual global happenings, they tend to share the conceptual characteristics: Lawlessness is an independent force of the global arena, and conflict can never be entirely struck off in lawless conditions; Super and large powers are always suspicious of other nation's motives and are locked in a unending power contest to improve their respective power status and so ensure their survival.

The international system's unequal allocation of power leads to a volatile world setup. Systemic inequity in power allocation might motivate major powers to wage costly and hostile wars in order to enhance their positions against imagined or actual adversaries. It's worth noting that all realism ideas center on the idea of structural anarchy and the probability of massive power battles. No realist has ever argued, even for the purpose of academic speculation, on the likelihood of an actual battle between

the world's most mighty actor and a quasi-actor, a transnational organization with radical goals. Similarly, no significant realism attention was paid to the battle between the strongest state and one of the weakest and most marginalized governments at the time. The next section examines whether realism theories may provide an acceptable explanation for the conflict between the US and al-Qaida.

1.8 Neo Realist Theory to the War on Al-Qaeda

The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, and America's brutal military reaction to al-Qaeda have initiated a unique security situation in which the planet's single great power is firmly involved in a battle against a quasi-state secretive group known as al-Qaeda. The main considerations seem to be: Can neo realist school of thought accurately reflect the fluctuations of US 's battle on Al-Qaeda, or are they wrong? If otherwise, which theoretical framework can describe the Bush administration's true motivations for fighting al-Qaeda? The main goal is to investigate the explanatory capacity of realist theoretical approaches in explaining US 's war on Al-Qaeda, a quasi-state player. It claims that academic realism approaches are essentially deficient frameworks for explaining America's war on a notion known as al-Qaeda, a non-state global network of Islamic extremists.

The changing nature of the risks presented by al-Qaeda as well as other terrorist groups, as well as the Bush administration's deviation from conventional Cold War deterrence and containment notions, have generated serious challenges for realist thinkers. To address America's battle against the non-state clandestine group al-Qaeda, Neorealism, a new theoretical framework, is being developed to cover up the obvious flaws of existing realism theories.

Many IR researchers and experts agreed that the worldwide security environment had changed qualitatively after the crashes on Washington and New York on 9/11. The then President of US, George W. Bush presented his State of the Union address shortly after the attack and launched a war on terror. This was a different type of battle, one aimed at putting an end to terror and ridding the globe of dread once and for all. The president stated unequivocally, "Great harm has been done to us." Fear and freedom are at odds. The advancement of man's liberty - our generation's greatest achievement and every generation's greatest hope – now rests with us. Our nation — our generation – will rid our people of a looming menace of bloodshed. We shall enlist the world's support for this cause via our efforts and bravery. We won't get tired, we won't falter, and we won't fail. The conclusion of this fight is clear, but the course of the conflict is unknown. We believe God is not neutral between freedom and terror, justice and cruelty, and we believe God is not indifferent between them (Bush, 2001).

The war on terror was initially defined as a significant campaign to demolish al-Qaeda's networks in Kabul and deprive the organization's top order any base overseas. The National Security Strategy of the U.S published in September 2002, explained the reason for the war on terror. This text, commonly called as the Bush Doctrine, is really a collection of George Bush's several addresses made following the devastating attack. The Bush Administration's use of power method and strategy are outlined in Chapter V, "Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction."

The combination of "radicalism and technology" is defined as a danger. The gravest risk to freedom, in President Bush's words, is at the intersection of extremism and

technology. When chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons, as well as BMT, become widely available, even powerful governments and tiny organizations may be able to strike powerful nations with devastating force. Our adversaries have stated their purpose and have been discovered looking for these dreadful armaments (National Security Strategy, p. 13). 10 The redefinition of danger is a significant change from the era succeeding WWII definition of stability, which defined security as a nations or state's immunity to threats coming from beyond its borders. The main threats came from nation-states that were at odds with one another.

The new definition, on the other hand, identifies three types of threat actors: terrorist organizations able to strike anywhere on the planet, including the US ' heartland; weak states harboring terrorist organizations; and rogue nations that attack and kill their own citizens and are learnt to get their hands on Weapons of Mass Destruction. Whereas the initial two threat actors mentioned A; Qaeda plus Kabul, the third threat actor mentioned Iraq, which was the next invasion target after Afghanistan.

The rejection of the Cold War principles of intimidation and control is another significant component of the National Security Strategy 2002. "We confronted a typically status-quo, risk-averse foe throughout the Cold War," it says. However, intimidation inferred merely on the prospect of reprisal is hardly going to succeed versus chiefs of rogue nations who are more ready to take chances with their own people's lives and the riches of their countries... Traditional deterrence approaches will not operate against a terrorist adversary" (National Security strategy, p. 15). "Deterrence, the threat of huge retribution against states, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or inhabitants to defend," President Bush

said in a speech to the West Point Military Academy in New York on June 1, 2002 (Bush, 2002).

Evidently, the presentation of novel dangers, the discovery of a group of new threat actors, and the rejection of classic deterrence approach, all are the novel concepts in the security studies area. A severe challenge to the equality of states of nation-states is also mentioned in the National Security Strategy 2002. The right to pursuit down and destroy terrorist organizations everywhere in the globe gives the US an imperial role, while other countries are at the mercy of the US leadership. Even before the September 11 attacks, President Bush's foreign policy sounded arrogant unilateralism; his administration refused to join the ICC and Kyoto Protocol but went ahead with the 11 National Missile Defense programme despite fierce internal and overseas objection (Mandelbaum, 2002; Brooks and Wohl forth, 2002).

With strong backing from friends and allies, the campaign versus al-Qaeda in Afghanistan reached a new perilous stage when President Bush connected Iraq to the broader war on terror and recognized Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein as a cause of immediate threat that required a pre-emptive strike. On October 7, 2002, during a public rally in Cincinnati, Ohio, President Bush said unequivocally that Iraq will become the next target of attack after al-Qaeda. The Iraq factor divided the post-9/11 anti-terrorist alliance and polarized American public opinion on the invasion of Iraq's reason.

President Bush defended the preemptive attack on Iraq on two points in order to quell popular outrage: a nexus involving Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, and the latter's weapons of mass destruction plans. On the relationship between Al-Qaeda and

Saddam Hussein, the president alluded to knowledge that the US and the rest of the world were unaware of. He stated, "Iraq has offered safe haven to... [terrorists] throughout the years." We also know that Iraq continues to fund terrorism and aid organizations that use violence to destabilize Middle Eastern peace. Baghdad and the al-Qaeda terror organization have a common adversary, the US, as we all know. Some al-Qaeda commanders fled to Iraq after fleeing Afghanistan. One highly top al-Qaeda commander, who underwent health care session in Iraq and has been linked to biological and chemical attack plans, is among them. We now know that Iraq has taught al-Qaeda terrorists how to make bombs, lethal drugs, and toxic gases. And it's a well-known fact that Iraq's Saddam Hussein's dictatorship enthusiastically cheered the extremist strikes on US after September 11th (Bush, 2002b).

1.9 Conclusion:

The anarchic nature of the international political system, as per Neorealism theory, is the fundamental cause of war. Nations can still choose to attack others without a global government. Their objectives, as well as the direct causes of conflict, might be endlessly diversified as a result. International anarchy, on the other hand, is the final cause of conflict. Structural realists differentiate between two major objectives when assessing the immediate causes of specific attacks: ambition and security.

They realize, like classical realists, that some leaders aspire to dominate the entire world. Structural realists, unlike classical realists, realize that nations just want to live and develop may find themselves at war if they run into the security dilemma, in which they act to improve security appear to be dangers to others. The worldwide allocation of power, as per structural realists, has a significant impact on these factors. States

with superior skills may grow ambitious and attempt to shape the structure to their liking. States that build capabilities just to protect themselves from others, on the other hand, may unwittingly start a conflict.

In the context of Afghanistan, neorealism has progressed to the point where the US is involved in power politics. The invasion was launched in response to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida, but the policy was implemented only for political advantage. As neorealism indicates, in such a circumstance, a weak state must submit in the shortest amount of time viable, as per the academic discourse on Afghanistan's response to the global superpower state. The Afghan administration has been turned over by the US, which effectively installed a pro-American interim administration led by President Hamid Karzai. Overall, the US is a strong state that smashes the vulnerable state's culture and will.

The US hegemon structure is dominating, smashing all liberal and democratic norms and regulations with equal force in world affairs. However, the recent turn in US policy toward peaceful discussion and troop departure from Afghanistan is yet another political man works by a major state, even though Afghanistan's reconstruction is far from complete. Previous American administrations have worked to maximize power through politics, and as a result, wars have not been a priority. President Trump, on the other hand, has a capitalist perspective, which is like previous administrations, although he is now unwilling to spend huge amounts of money on war. Because the economy and finances no longer sustain the state's welfare goal, the US is withdrawing from Afghanistan, while remaining its base operational so that it can completely dominate regional politics

CHAPTER 2

GRAND STRATEGY V/S US FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND ASPIRATIONS

2.1 Introduction

A grand strategy identifies a country's most vital and long-lasting interests by identifying local and international restrictions, as well as its philosophy for defending or improving them (RAND, 2021). The phrase "grand strategy" refers to a long-term plan that is focused on the state's most pressing challenges and involves all facets of statecraft (military, peacemaking, and financial). Almost every important continuing analysis of unusual methods refers to two equivalent definitions. According to Paul Kennedy, "the basis of the grand strategy is therefore in method, that is, in the use of the state's laws to unify the completeness of the subcomponents, both armed and unarmed, for the purpose of protecting and improving the state's long-term welfare" (Kenedy,1991).

The preceding explanation is from Barry Posen, who takes on a comparable significant tradition and offers a far more succinct statement: The great game is "a country's inference about how it may best explain its own security." At this phase, an excellent technique concentrates on a well-concerted plan of objectives, threats, resources, and tactics. It is the theoretical framework that helps governments in determining where to go and how to get there. The hypothesis, or reasoning, is what motivates pioneers to seek safety in an uncertain and perplexing world (Lissner, 2018).

Because excellent policy necessitates a "fierce simplicity among edges and methods," a great system is public safety theory's declaration of the convention. According to basic definitions, great technique is the "determined connection of ways that are too large to close." In more precise definitions, a "chain of relevance for interests and standards" is described (Martel, 2015).

Excellent practical approach reports and conforms to an incredibly long-standing public safety tradition. Any state's primary goal is to establish a magnificent system that limits military, monetary, and political power in order to move the nation ahead (Solid, 2005). This demonstrates that power is being utilized to further these objectives. Hard force and military power are coupled with an excellent technique; unlike domestic methods, they establish the circumstances for either total success or full annihilation (Art, 2004). The extraordinary approach is often missed due to its poor construction, difficulty in adapting, and, more crucially, its role in normalization of oppression.

Grand structure may be justified as a way of ensuring national stability via the exercise of control. Therefore, it happens at a level higher than the employment of precise methods to accomplish stable precise aims and higher than the use of military force to accomplish political goals. To comprehend extraordinary method, look for long-term state behavior as indicated by center security concerns, as well as how the state acquires and develops them over time. The extraordinary American method exhibits remarkable consistency over time, prioritizing those interests that any organization would spend, execute, sabotage, or struggle to maintain in order to safeguard national interests. Great strategy, aimed at authorities, differentiates a nation's pan

encompassing activity, guides the ordering of ways and aims, and acts as a guiding light for several worldwide strategy options. However, despite its significance, the growth of intellectual and strategic analytical work on an extraordinary system has left the topic confusing, occasionally inconsistent, and difficult to analyze (Lissner, 2018).

Grand structure is the highest degree of public statecraft because it establishes how governments priorities and activate sources of capability to ensure their perceived inclinations. Without this mix, decision making is receptive, usually indifferent, and constantly harmful. A magnificent system in real American-Anglo practice is not an answer. International interactions are always tainted by exposure. In any scenario, to avoid simply walking from 1 crisis to the next, the US should establish a set of academic thresholds upon which the country can agree, beginning with the recognition that US is the primary entertainer on the global arena and that domestic security begins with deploying our resources to shelter the center and erect a shield around our adversaries (Wilkie, 2021).

Proponents of exceptional policy point to the modern era as evidence of its outstanding accomplishment; the concord and prosperity it has promoted constitute a break from the "financial trade, diplomatic strife, and recurring war" that characterized most of human history. Even so after the Cold-War era, supporters defend the organization's track record. As Brands puts it, "for all of its flaws, American policy has been instrumental in making the post-Cold-War global framework more stable, democratic, and favorable to US objectives and values than it would have been otherwise, and undeniably in accomplishing a more benign international scenario than many master observers anticipated when the post-Cold-War era began." Without a doubt, the US '

magnificent system is critical. The ascension of the US to global dominance, its response to triumph in 2 universal battles, and its evolution as a uni-polar hegemon with extraordinary strength are unique world-historical depictions.

The genuinely extraordinary US grand strategy approach is organized into 4 categories: dominion, particular commitment, seaward modification, and aggregation of the US system. The proponents of an exceptional method of pursuing authority argue that the global structure can be stable, and US Objectives adequately protected if the US seeks and maintains control, that is, assuming it possesses the capability and willingness to rule different countries and thus direct the global framework's "rules of the thoroughfare." The tactical criteria of this paradigm are particularly stringent, since they indicate that the US should be capable of overwhelming and imposing its will on any person or group of nations at any moment. According to some, the structure was chosen carelessly and would either cause or hasten US 's demise. At its heart, a great approach illustrates the objectives that a nation wishes to attain and offers direction on how the country will achieve them. Therefore, a well-crafted design approach gives high-level direction on the optimal manner in which "ends" and "signifies" are connected (Colby, 2011).

A great game is inherently more comprehensive than a tactical system, which is a plan for using one's strategic talents in each scenario to pursue a shared goal. On the other hand, a great system is secondary to an international strategy that covers all state's engagement outside its boundaries. An outstanding technique explicitly addresses the political-military components of a state's advantages, as well as the security and imperativeness of its primary goals. Finally, a great strategy is a plan or method for

accomplishing specified objectives. It is not a list of goals, but rather a road plan for capitalizing on chances in an uneven and unpredictable environment. Therefore, an excellent policy should give chiefs with a rational and informed basis for deciding what to do and what not to do, as well as how to accomplish it.

2.2 The Origins of the US ' Grand Strategy

Without a narrative backdrop, understanding American grand strategy is difficult. Prior to the revolution, the British crown was responsible for state security and the colonial national army for local security. The US developed and expanded as a regional power during the nineteenth century, only to acquire enormous power status at the turn of the 20th century. The collapse of the Spanish empire in S. America and the formation of Canada as a free independent nation in 1867 accelerated the end of European control in the Western Hemisphere. Everything else in the nineteenth century was dominated by the American Civil War. The civil war killed more Americans than any previous conflict in the history of the US. Throughout the battle, massive land and marine capabilities, as well as recruiting, were required (Hooker J.R, 2014).

The US's objectives and intentions in its relations with other states are as follows: in the massive system of offshore regulation, the US's role in the world arena is to ensure that no territorial hegemon gains authority of more than 1 of the world's critical regions, while the US partners its resources and responsibilities to accelerate its drawn-out success and restrict its contribution to complex and in vain commitments. In an offshore switching system, the US would remain involved in international

economic and political initiatives but would deploy its army only in cases when a hazardous state sought control over a crucial region of the globe (Colby, 2011).

By the Cold War's conclusion, the US had continued its remarkable practice. Despite shockwaves such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the expenses of the Iraq war, circumstances that should have strengthened to the point of correction, the US remains fixated on an incredible "power" technique. It advances in military superiority, crucial location strength, partner control and consolation, nuclear deterrence, and the financial "Open Door." Due to the US worldwide strategic foundation's enduring beliefs, the US magnificent system is difficult to modify. The military and financial powers of the US government allow it to seek dominance; nevertheless, the embedded presumptions of the spot make power the default option (International Security, 2018).

Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, presidents and legislative leaders set and continuously implemented the primary standards of American amazing arrangement. The prevalent principle was to safeguard the security of the American territory and its population, as well as the government's arrangement and financial success. The cease-fire was maintained via widespread grounding in the 1920s and monetary breakdown in the 1930s, following the natural pattern of establishing the Army as a guardian or unit.

During World War II, the US imaginative practice focused on the defeat and annihilation of Japan and Germany, not as ends in themselves, but as necessary conditions for the restoration of a stable all-inclusive request, a progressive global monetary framework, and a US population free of military danger at home and abroad. This required unwavering backing from friends, even the most repellent, such as the

Soviet Union, which demonstrated enormous activity, as well as an unprecedented financial and technological endeavor in global history (Brands, 2018).

Armed action is a tactic for achieving certain political objectives. Without a clear definition of the goals, a strategy will be ineffective. This is one of the primary causes for the battle's prolonged perplexity. Worse, the disagreement does not quite match our conceptualization of power usage, worsening the dilemma. Militant counter-psychological operations, like as the one against al-Qaeda, do not involve persuading opponents to surrender or removing their capacity to resist. At a minimum, risk awareness is necessary.

In Afghanistan, the concern is whether US pioneers would face further attacks if the US personnel is eliminated. They've tackled rejection in advance of this step. Without operational objectives, strategy becomes perplexing; yet, lawmakers have not yet determined whether the costs of continuing to do so exceed the dangers of discontinuing. Therefore, a clash of stiff inertia results. If a system is an inference of success, the exceptional method is a hypothesis of security. It details how governments secure themselves globally, based on a set of preconceived notions about how the world operates. The grand strategy addresses issues such as how much military power to acquire, where to deploy it, and when to utilize it. Additionally, it gives advice on the most efficient means of facilitating military, strategic, and financial instruments to guarantee long-term public safety. Unlike any other way for resolving issues of power during a conflict, the grand strategy works in both peace and war. The notion stresses the US military's dominance in Afghanistan. By the conclusion of the Cold War, the

US had built an extraordinary strategy based on the notion that the globe is safer while a dominating force exists on the planet.

The existence of a hegemon authority enhances stability, dependability, and prosperity. By overcoming collective activity's problems, the hegemon promotes global involvement. It acts as a financial safety net by orchestrating worldwide activity during times of crises and giving money when all other alternatives have been exhausted. It avoids conflict by removing any impediments to worldwide appeal and eliminating any competitors who are dumb enough to attempt it (Joshua, 2020).

The justification for sound strategy is protection, which is a broader concept than a single objective. Due to the emotional nature of security, a state may feel untrustworthy despite of its victory in a conflict. Alternatively, if the loss experience destabilizes recent institutional gains, it may provide the state with a lasting feeling of stability. Security is not constrained by time constraints, which is rare for combat success. Despite their existing advantages, nations lack a strong feeling of security. The heads of very stable regimes study a far fewer number of adversaries, realizing that they can be genuinely protected only if they stay attentive.

According to researchers, grand strategy is often misinterpreted and exploited. The war continues not because the forefathers of the US are pursuing any coherent goal, but because it is founded in a huge counter-spiritual captivity. This in no way satisfies conflict analysts. Nevertheless, the focus on the miraculous approach reveals it. Until American pioneers rediscover their big essential convictions and the accompanying counter-mental coercion techniques (Rovner, 2020).

2.3 The Grand Strategy's Disintegration

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks struck to the core of grand strategy, since they were the first direct attack on the nation by an outside entity since the 1812 War. The major disappointments for which America paid an exorbitant price were handled by political unwillingness to confront the broader threat and actual insight deficiencies. As tensions in Afghanistan increased in the aftermath of 9/11, so did the protection budget. When it comes to conventional security, the big plan is fundamental. The grand strategy is not restricted in any manner, shape, or form to our military capabilities and structures, but rather incorporates all kinds of public power. Considering this, caution should be used when classifying things in terms of public safety. Any evaluation should begin with an examination of our security environment, followed by an examination of threats to our essential interests, without underestimating or overestimating them.

The global security climate is well-known and identifiable at this time. Emotional militant groups and worldwide coordinated wrongdoing have grown far more important than they were before, enabled by global exchanges and data streams. In absolute terms, the world looks to be safer, since the prospect of nuclear weapons, which historically ensured death, and global combat, which has cost countless lives, appear to have passed us by.

Obviously, this area encompasses a wide array of threats for public safety professionals. Such acts include an attack on a US embassy, the abduction of American people overseas, and the seizure of US-flagged vessels on the high seas. Political pioneers in the US may also consider the use of military action in cases when

public dignity is questioned under the developing idea of "duty to secure." In any case, they do not link to extraordinary key destinations, and lawmakers allow risks while considering them as such, especially on firm ground, where more robust public aid is less assured. Promoting majority government rule and fundamental freedoms in other nations is often framed as "vital" for national security or foreign policy (Hooker, 2014).

Though the US commitment to act decisively in favor of worldwide demands may be less guaranteed than in the past, and the US monetary and military may not be as strong as they previously were. The US remains the world's most powerful country in absolute terms. In terms of physical might, the US is unmatched. It has a broad spectrum of genuine and anticipated abilities. Finally, and maybe most importantly, the most fundamental requirement for vital victory is a rational and powerful political strategy.

The fundamental principle is to address the problem as far away from the nation as feasible. The US chooses to react to major threats using a combination of techniques, depending on information, strategy, forward presence, and financial capability to hinder, prevent, or terminate security duties, while reserving military force as a last choice. Sooner than predicted, the US will confront risks when running international institutions such as the United Nations or NATO, as well as leading pre-war commitment and "shaping" processes for a wide variety of topics (Hoffman, 2013). However, when essential interests are at risk, the US will resort to exceptional measures if required. The US, as the world's most powerful country, tries to influence

the international security environment in order to avert or lessen all security concerns.

The US grand strategy is still at a crossroads.

Since the WWII, US has sought a motivated and highly connected large system capable of influencing global demand, a remarkable system that has shown to be enormously advantageous to both the US and the rest of the world in a number of ways. However, in the aftermath of the Iraq War and a horrible financial crisis, that wonderful system has come under siege, with many of the world's most powerful thinkers pleading for emotional support for the US (Brands, 2015).

2.4 Long Term Vision of US Grand Strategy in the 1970s

In 1979, Afghanistan was the country. Furthermore, decades later, several people who believed in that message lauded one of the most remarkable American successes in Cold War history. The departure of 100,000 USSR forces from Afghanistan depressed the Red Army, marking the first time since World War II that the Red Army withdrew from a nation in which it was committed. The communist war in Afghanistan, which had resurfaced, was faded (Galster, 2001). On the other hand, a beautiful system exhibits both amazing and startling states. There are few states, particularly medium-sized ones that can make an excellent approach.

One should not expect extraordinary process to be conducted as if it were a war; maybe the greatest wins of extraordinary procedure have been the battles that were not fought, the most evident being the Cold War. Furthermore, knowledge of the past is necessary for understanding the present, since only the history can explain and elaborate the elements, trends, and monetary, political, and economic systems that have resulted in the present and will positively influence the future. Additionally, a great system

involves acceptance of heinous real-world circumstances, as well as the capacity to cast doubt on one's suspicions, as well as one's wishes and claims about one's way of life.

The Soviet campaign in Afghanistan (1979–1989) may seem to have similarities to Russia's late-nineteenth-century acquisition of Samarkand and Bukhara. On the other hand, Afghan culture has never recovered from the destruction caused by the Communist power's image. As Russian evaluators note, it is the heirs of mujahedeen who battled the Soviet occupation for years that liberated Kandahar and Kabul. President Ronald Reagan was convinced by Soviet innovator Mikhail Gorbachev that a trade-off agreement was the best way to deal with tumultuous instability. The Soviet Union's breakup precipitated a full-fledged common war in Tajikistan. Kazakhstan and other newly respected Central Asian states have encouraged Russia's freshly reconstituted leadership to start a path toward greater unity (K. Baev, 2021).

As the Cold War ended, the term "grand strategy" gained increasing currency. On the other hand, the US is attempting to distinguish Russia as a danger, since a sizable portion of American society views Russian political intervention as a ruse. As Russia marched into the Levant and wreaked havoc in Eastern Europe, America shifted away from critical Middle Eastern (Syria) and Central Asian (Afghanistan) interests, rendering the establishment of North Atlantic security cooperation impossible. These enormous conflict costs are occurring at the same time that America's excessive spending continues to rise vertically. Tax cuts and greater government spending have kept yearly deficits in check while increasing the national debt to more than \$16 trillion.

On the other hand, to demonstrate how to offer public funds for emergency scenarios, charges that increased assessments on individuals and partnerships to assist in supporting the country's vast preparation program. Today, however, a significant wage disparity between affluent and poor Americans makes meeting escalating responsibilities impossible, while many in America's working-class struggle to make ends meet. Incredible war and peace methods must consider the financial resources available to accomplish vital objectives. America's present debt and acquisition posture will be unable to contend with clear partner challengers in the years ahead (Beckstrand, 2020).

2.5 US Policy towards Afghanistan after Soviet's Infiltration

Throughout the 1960s-1970s, ties between Kabul and Moscow strengthened as the Soviet Union became the primary supplier of skilled guides in Afghanistan. While attempting to rein in Soviet influence, the US faced some criticism. According to US Review, Afghanistan is a "militarily and politically neutral nation that is appropriately submissive to the USSR." However, it stated that the US "is not, and should not appear to be, focused on, or accountable for, Afghanistan's 'insurance' in any way." The region's overall influence tilted toward the US, and Afghanistan posed no substantial Soviet threat to regional security.

In 1979, the perception of US policy statements as "provincial security" shifted substantially. Iran's Shah resigned from his elevated position in January, paving the way for the rise of an anti-American, Islamic regime. After 10 months, USSR sent 100,000 troops to Afghanistan, bringing the Red Army within striking distance of Pakistan and maybe Iran. The balance of the state had changed. The White House

condemned the Soviet approach in Afghanistan, which was previously considered benign, as the "gravest threat to world unity since the WWII" (Galster, 2001).

America was fully aware that political unrest was growing in the nation. "There has been an increase in liberal action, which can be attributed to growing dissatisfaction and disappointment with current social/monetary circumstances, as well as the authority's apparent powerlessness or reluctance to deal with the country's concerns," the US International in Kabul stated in 1971. The Afghanistan People's Democratic Party was possibly the most disaffected and well-coordinated of the country's extremist factions (PDPA). Despite US backing, Daud's authoritarian rule alienated a sizable portion of the domestic population. Individuals inside the PDPA, such as Khalqis and Parchamis, had become disillusioned with Daud and desired his demise.

Despite their public agreement to resolve their differences, Parcham and Khalaq decided to assist the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; USSR tensions allegedly expected a role in the confederation. Further PDPA infiltration of the military, notably by Khalqis, elevated the party's influence over events, while Daud's hold on power deteriorated. Mir Akbar, a PDPA member, was assassinated on April 17, 1978. Numerous mourners converted Akbar's burial into an anti-regime rally, causing Daud to further tighten his hold on the PDPA, detaining several party members. His attitude encouraged the PDPA's military allies to intervene. On April 27, the military overthrew Daud, killed him, and replaced his moderate administration with a communist one, which hailed the coup as the commencement of the "Saur Revolution."

Despite enormous differences, Afghanistan experienced 4 failures, the involvement and exit of USSR military troops, the exile of 33% of the general populace, and 1,000,000 fatalities between 1973 and 1990. Throughout this period, the US policy toward Afghanistan remained consistent, with the objective of avoiding "excessive" Soviet influence. This entailed establishing a foothold against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, from which to launch hostile exercises in the region. Afghanistan was irrelevant to America in the absence of any other person (Galster, 2001).

The US had the option of expanding its influence into South Asia and maintaining its presence there until the Shah of Iran was deposed in 1979. In return for substantial military aid, the Shah provided the US access to army positions and intelligence organizations, helping in the safeguarding of oil shipments from the Persian Gulf to the "free world" and deterring USSR incursions into the Gulf or Indian Ocean. Simultaneously, it seemed as if Soviet ties to Afghanistan did not jeopardize US interests. Later, the USSR revealed a long-standing relationship with Afghanistan, and since the US desired good relations with other governments in the area, US officials saw USSR settings in Afghanistan as a foundation for a safe system (Herd, 2021).

Throughout the contemporary historical past of America, each new official organization has been responsible with creating its foreign policy, which involves stating the plan's objectives, determining which instruments and assets should be delivered, and coordinating their delivery. Throughout the early Cold War era, the Soviet Union's and its allies' supremacy was a key worry. With the development of the Truman doctrine in 1948, American foreign policy attempted to build a solid

partnership framework, which included the foundation and strengthening of NATO, in order to block communist advancement (Vinjamuri, 2021).

The failure of the US ' two-decade-long effort in Afghanistan has sparked a vital discussion about the US foreign policy motives. According to one school of thought, the US is threatening to expand its boundaries. This would result in domestic internal and strategic issues, and therefore, the US foreign policy should be more circumscribed in terms of objectives and more prudent in terms of barriers. The Cold War strategy of the US was based on the belief that if Soviet socialism could be restrained, a majority-rules democracy would eventually show to be the more sustainable framework. That strategy did not work without a hitch anywhere.

It came to an end in Iran, Vietnam, and other places during the Cold-War. It was hurt by fraud and irregularities. Nevertheless, it worked so well that Presidents Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter progressively pulled away from détente and reverted to a more quality-driven strategy, increasing the burden on the Soviets and support for pro-majority rule protestors in the USSR. This strategy, which many people thought was disgracefully foolish, was applied in 1989. Majority rebels elsewhere in Soviet-occupied Europe overthrew socialism for democratic reasons and aspired to join the progressive global demand headed by the US (Herd, 2021).

Consequently, the scope of the Afghanistan debate was significantly restricted, although not without friction. In the disappearance of the Soviet Union, everyone looked to be encouraging "Afghan self-confidence." Several members of Congress, supported by moderate opposition organizations, criticized the government for failing to seek an energetically adequate mujahidin military triumph against the PDPA.

Surprisingly, the CIA prepared for an excess of unknown advisors to accompany the demonstrators. A government agency inside the CIA's central command told Congress that a large-scale strategic assistance program for the activists would almost surely exacerbate Soviet retribution against Pakistan and would almost certainly be based on "overflows" and corruption.

The CIA remained defiant in the face of demands that it delivers American-made weaponry to the mujahidin. In general, the organization acquired a range of weaponry, the most of which were Soviet-style, in lieu of US contribution if the situation justified it. Throughout the Afghan conflict, the CIA procured weapons developed by the Soviet Union in China, Egypt, and other locations and transferred them to Pakistan. Around 1980, Egyptian and Chinese AK-47 weapons and SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles emerged in Pakistan, according to sources. This covert purchase approach protected not just US tracks, but also provided the rebels with armaments equivalent to those employed by their Soviet-backed adversaries. (Galster,2001)

Following the failure of the US in Afghanistan, many Americans are returning to debates over authenticity and restriction. Numerous valid assertions about strain and the absence of truth have been made in the past that Americans have ignored. These preemptive measures were useful later in 2001, when the US was seeking for options after the Taliban's defeat. Additionally, Legitimacy recommended the US to prepare for the worst-case scenario of the Afghan government collapsing in the aftermath of the US military departure, as well as to anticipate the worst-case scenario of the withdrawal situation (Miller, 2021).

2.6 US Grand Strategy in the 1990s

Wilson and Humphrey eventually triumphed in terms of stimulating parliamentary assistance for a more grounded rebel armed might in Afghanistan. Despite evidence of violation in the army and helpful guide programs dating all the way back to 1982, Congress ultimately invested more \$3 billion on the disguised guide for the mujahedeen, more than any other CIA undercover operation throughout the 1980s combined. By the year 1987, the US was providing approximately \$700 million per year in armed assistance to the radicals, more than Pakistan received from Washington.

Wilson used his clout on the House Intelligence Committee in 1984 to get an extra \$50 million for Afghani covert operatives and convince the CIA to acquire superior-grade Oerlikon anti-aircraft rockets capable of piercing the Soviet Union's most sophisticated counter-insurgency machine. In 1985, the CIA took a step further by obtaining the complex British-made Blowpipe anti-aircraft missile system. Additionally, in 1986, the CIA provided the mujahidin with US-made Stinger rockets, the world's most powerful shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapon, in response to tensions between a few representatives and various State and Security Department officials.

One of the war's most heinous effects was the disengagement of three million Afghan exiles in Pakistan, which needed significant assistance from Congress, the White House, and the global-regional comity. Finally, 33% of Afghanistan's pre-war population fled, attesting to the obliteration and uncertainty imposed in large part by the massive joint besiegement of the Soviet Union and the Afghan government.

The US encouraged numerous countries to donate to the despised cause for political and economic reasons. Assuming overly apparent assistance for the displaced people "undermines the mujahidin's legitimacy by focusing attention exclusively on the US role in the Afghan conflict," the US Consulate in Islamabad claimed in 1981. Numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) expressed an interest in assisting evacuees and renegades if given the required resources.

The US channeled much aid through selected non-governmental organizations and pressed other countries to assist comparable organizations or contribute to the UNHCR. Whoever delivered the book, a sizable portion eventually ended up in the hands of renegade groups, endowing them with enormous political clout in the face of the massive influx of Afghan refugees. Despite the altruistic justification of providing guidance to Pakistan's misfits, the US also attempted to alleviate financial and political tensions in Islamabad by assisting with the maintenance of an agitator structure.

In 1982, the CIA predicted that the presence of Afghani emigrants in Pakistan would exacerbate political chaos and hinder economic progress until the end of the century. While many Pakistanis showed extraordinary neighborliness and tolerance for the displaced, others laughed at them. Violent conflicts between Pakistani border tribes and Afghan refugees over few resources and political, strict, and individual obligations are revealed via links from Pakistan. To sabotage terrorist supply routes into Afghanistan, several disaffected tribes stole weapons and finances from the Afghan government.

To be completely candid, the Afghan government's invasion of Pakistan and support for renegade groups was extensive and critical to the country's long-term existence.

KHAD, the public authority's state sanctuary agency, aimed to acquire or lease the Pashtun tribes' reliance in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area (the clans frequently possessed both sides of the line). Arms and money were supplied to the traditional civilian militia, thereby preventing agitator supply missions in Pakistan. Several ancestral pioneers sought political support in response to Kabul's factual guide, by participating in government Jirga' (gatherings) and other PDPA-sponsored events. President Zia attempted to erode Pakistani clans' support for the Afghan government by spearheading anti-opiate movements throughout their homelands, among other things.

Numerous pacification measures, such as the Afghan-Soviet government's hunt and obliterate goals, as well as rebel strategies, such as the mujahedeen's swift in-and-out attacks on government-held positions and urban populations, were major reasons for the exodus to Pakistan. In any case, the ethereal bombardment caused the most havoc. A comprehensive crossline helpful guide campaign was not put in stone to combat what the Soviet Union described to as a "eradication crusade." The Agency for International Development was tasked with overseeing this unconventional scheme (AID).

The Crossline Humanitarian Assistance Program (CBHA) of AID's purpose was to arm normal Afghans and renegades with the means they needed to survive, rather than to escape to Pakistan. Pakistan was experiencing a large influx of Afghans, and deserted Afghan cities were being used to house dissidents who received little material or ethical assistance from within the country. Establishing emergency clinics and

schools, increasing yields, and putting money in neighboring residents' pockets all contribute to replenishing reserves.

The AID reports are the most lavish records in the collection, detailing the situation inside sometimes-inaccessible areas of destroyed Afghanistan and elaborating on some of the mujahidin's peculiar governance concerns. The program was engrossing and debatable, which is a characteristic of a beneficial rebellion activity. Assistance was employed to keep up with and improve the agitators' organization. In addition to giving military and humanitarian assistance, the US supplied "mental" support to the revolutionaries. In the year 1983, a one-of-a-kind was incorporated into it to organize US administrative offices in order to improve civil security and combat the adversary of American dissemination due to "public tact." US officials faced a difficult dilemma in Afghanistan, where media inclusion had been eroded by conflict and notoriety.

To address these impediments, the NSC formed the Afghan Working Group, which met twice a month to explore strategies for increasing media coverage of the conflict and generating sympathy and support for the mujahidin. Updated coverage of the fight was clearly limited, particularly given that this was the greatest combat in Soviet history, the largest CIA operation in history, and the deadliest regional conflict on the planet now. In any case, no major news organization in the US elected to post a reporter in Peshawar, Pakistan, the epic center of dissident military and political activities. American media crews seldom reached the Khyber Pass for a quick glimpse of the action. The possibility of discovering a guerrilla conflict, especially this one, was a significant factor in this decision. In general, whatever is provided will be biased against the mujahidin. A few factors help to clarify this. Unfamiliar stringers and

reporters who travelled to Peshawar or discovered a way to "inside" the agitators encountered many evacuated Afghans, all of whom had harrowing stories to tell about losing their homes and family members to Soviet/Afghan government counter-rebellion missions. Without a certain, the panorama was marred by holes left by Soviet bombs, villages were regularly cleared of their occupants, and many Afghans monitoring their route to Pakistan walked the roadways with fabricated appendages, victims of concealed mortars.

Additionally, the Afghan government has consistently shown its inability to provide reliable information, leading Western columnists to mainly depend on US authorities for battle specifics. When the government finally let journalists to return in 1986, the columnists encountered a different side of the story in Kabul: victims of rogue hidden bombs and unpredictable mujahidin rocket strikes on the city. Along these lines, most columnists believed it was more secure, both logically and practically, to depend on "Western conciliatory sources in Pakistan" for a significant chunk of the war. Regardless of how beneficial the inclusion of Western news is for mujahidin, US authorities complained about its limited scope. Senator Humpty was on the prowl for that thorny issue. He convinced Congress to approve legislation tasked the US Information Agency (USIA) with instructing Afghan militants on how to film and articulate their fight. The task, which continued regardless of the outcome of the analysis, and a few private associations to expand and "enhance" the conflict's inclusion.

The US was also prepared to exert influence through Western authors' inability to report the conflict in a comprehensive, clear manner. Once a week, a USIA staffer in

Islamabad would read excerpts from the Embassy in Kabul's Situation Report to anonymous authors. These Stirpes were required to adhere to two criteria. They provided detailed information about Afghanistan's political and military situation to US officials both at home and abroad. Additionally, they "punctuate" the Soviet news blackout by framing a piece of the Afghan Working Group's press and public data approach.

On the other hand, the press was typically restricted to hearing only the first few pages of the Strep, which provided an oversimplified overview of the country's situation, focusing primarily on government restrictions on basic liberties and mujahidin military expansion. The accompanying twenty-five to twenty-five detail-filled pages of the several currently available Stirpes depicted a much more intricate and strange battle being fought on a much broader range of levels than those of Soviet-backed socialists versus opportunity-seeking Muslims. According to documents, various US officials in Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Kabul expressed reservations about the Soviet Union's withdrawal intentions for an extended period. Concerns about Moscow's fate persisted for a time following the Soviet evacuation.

They garnered sufficient parliamentary support in April 1988 to prevent the Pentagon from securing the arrangement until President Ronald Reagan pledged to continue supplying the mujahedeen even after the Soviets departed. As a founding member of the accords, America was obliged to limiting assistance to revolutionaries on the first day of the draw out. According to Humphrey and others, this would put the agitators in a perplex position, as Kabul would continue to receive assistance from Moscow. Secretary of State brought the issue up with Soviet officials, proposing that the two

sides cease offering separate customers once the retreat began, a proposal dubbed "negative limitation."

The Soviet Union and Najibullah both rejected the plan, claiming that they were hesitant to provide Afghan extremists the same legitimacy as the Afghan government. However, fearful of an insurgent onslaught in the aftermath of the Soviet departure, the Soviet and Afghan governments hurried to put together a power-sharing pact with the mujahidin commanders. The radicals vehemently opposed the initiative, alleging it was a ploy to maintain the PDPA's hold on power. Due to congressional pressure and Soviet complaints, the US inserted an unwritten "provision" into the Geneva Accords, stating that Washington might support the insurgents provided the Soviet Union backed Kabul. In the US, this requirement is referred to as "positive evenness." Numerous misunderstandings came dangerously close to preventing the agreements from being marked. Without delay, the UN subsequently convinced the USSR to forego its ambition for an alliance administration as a condition of marking.

Pakistan desired the establishment of a revolutionary-led interim administration comprised primarily of radical and non-PDPA elements prior to signing. President Ronald Reagan contacted President Zia and assured him that the US would assist the radicals until they regained power, and that Pakistan should sign because the USSR was presumably leaving whether or not an agreement was reached. Additionally, the White House had been informed that the PDPA would destabilize the rebels shortly after the evacuation of Soviet soldiers. Additionally, while broad agreement exists in the US that the country is a global competitor, there is less agreement on the best course of action. While the Obama Administration increased its focus on the Indo-

Pacific region, approval of another trade agreement such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could jeopardize additional American positions, thereby reducing overall GDP growth. After taking office in 2017, the Trump administration promptly destroyed the pact, leaving a void that was first filled by other parties and is now expected to be filled by a more extensive provincial economic cooperation lead by China in 2020.

The US is not a party to either agreement. American forerunners appear incapable of deciding on the most effective strategy for countering China's rise and the critical role exchange drives play in sustaining power and influence. More critically, the US lacks a rational projection of American might in the Pacific in the future. All magnificent practices should overcome military activity, discretionary wishes, and the execution of financial exchange fights. In essence, great structures consider public tools for achieving predetermined global goals. Thus, genuine great diplomats do not overlook, but rather embrace, the financial costs associated with executing a tactical objective and obtaining domestic public support for protracted warfare. In this light, the post-Cold War record of economic restraint and reconciliation is appalling. To direct its post 9/11 conflicts, the US has relied on being compensated for persistent conflicts in the more prominent Middle East.

The cost of the post September 11 battles in Afghanistan and Iraq has been almost entirely paid by acquisition and insufficient funding, which presently totals \$6.4 trillion until fiscal year 2020. Indeed, even if these disputes do not result in a resolution, the nation will continue to bear the cost in terms of expert benefits and diminished consideration. The absence of war bonds or other revenue measures used

in previous wars, such as increased tax collection, has pushed the costs of these conflicts to later stages. US pioneers have not thoroughly examined the means for paying for US 's twenty-first-century combat obligations (Beckstrand, 2020).

2.7 Criticism on US Grand Strategy

Offshore adjustment experts believe that the strategy is based on a complicated history of how the global structure works. They claim that such an incredible procedure would invariably result in instability and war, jeopardizing critical American interests. Experts warn that withdrawing US security forces from unstable countries, particularly important US interests, would leave these places open to oppressive regimes and structural linkages. These experts are concerned that traditional US allies may unfavorably adjust increasing requirements or undermine US interests in these scenarios, citing the World Wars and the Cold War as examples. The mission of the US is to maintain coordination within a larger international environment aimed at resolving global challenges and boosting the peaceful role of major side contacts. In its simplest form, the US would pursue a system-safety arrangement in which a collection of states commits to collectively react to any state that breaches agreed-upon standards, mostly via enmity (William, 1999). Afghanistan was a place where inner Al-Qaeda's oppressor attacks on America on 9/11, 2001, had an unprecedented impact, aided by the successful internationalization of the US' subsequent intervention.

2.8 US Grand Strategy in Afghanistan after the 9/11 Attack

Tony Blair expressed his displeasure with the strategy's "cretinous" implementation following the conclusion of the US mission in Afghanistan. Leaving Afghanistan was

always going to be difficult, but few anticipated the ineffectiveness with which it would be handled, resulting in the loss of American life. The exit's shortcomings reflect long-standing inconsistencies in America's commitment to Afghanistan, as articulated by progressive groups. George Bush's decision to abandon the Powell Doctrine ensured that adequate force was rarely delivered, while the subsequent decision to attack Iraq demonstrated that Afghanistan was merely a diversion for US grand strategy. The Trump administration's peace agreement, which was intended to put an end to a "endless battle," reaffirmed the perception that lengthy interpretations were a relic of a bygone era (D. Boys, 2021).

This mirrors the US' uncertain policy toward Afghanistan, as shown by recent National Security Strategy reports. Afghanistan had been "falling short on the rundown of significant arranging alternatives" prior to the invasions, according to the first post-9/11 report, released in 2002. While Afghanistan had been "liberated," "alliance powers continue to pursue the Taliban and al-Qaeda," it stated. According to the report, the US would collaborate with international organizations such as the United Nations to aid "the beneficial, political, financial, and security assistance required to remake Afghanistan in such a way that it never again mistreats its own people, undermines its neighbors, or provides a safe haven for terrorists." Since 9/11, counterterrorism has been a focus of public policy, but counterterrorism and knowledge plans are not public safety strategies, and public safety strategy is not the same as public safety technique, which is not a fantastic system or public safety convention. Nothing is more vital to America's long-term survivability than a logical, competent, and powerful public security convention capable of establishing the framework for exceptional technique. Elaborate education is needed for the twenty-

first century, an American principle that would push nine thousand issues such as US superiority, extension, advancement of the realm of liberty, majority rule-based system, Laissez Faire Economy, unilateralism, globalism, the US method of war, global affairs, and supremacy.

The inability of a particular organization to refute such a principle would result from its embrace of an American Doctrine based on the country's history, culture, and characteristics. A superb system is the most basic type of diplomacy. Assuming that a state's primary objective is security, the most effective technique is a strategy for achieving it (Colucci, 2018). Successful conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are essential to win the war on terror. Addressing the two countries in this manner reflected the remarkable technique developed by the US as Afghanistan became an optional concentrate. The US would not be solely responsible for the long-term fate of Afghanistan; it intended to collaborate with the UN "to further develop accountability and successful administration."

With Osama Bin Laden evading prosecution, the US recognized the need of providing "the necessary constraint for security, financial growth, and superior governance" in Afghanistan, which is seen as "the key path to long-term peace and stability" (D. Boys, 2021). According to the report, the US had "moved beyond the massive ground conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that typified so much of American foreign policy over the preceding decade." The report once again conflated Iraq and Afghanistan, noting that US forces remained at 15,000 in both countries, down from nearly 180,000 in January 2009. Following the Taliban's demise and the assassination of Bin Laden, the organization stated that it remained committed to authorizing approaches to

counterterrorism that mitigate the threat of psychological oppression and aid in achieving appropriate compromise and harmony in order to end the violence in Afghanistan and work on provincial security.

In the year 2017, Afghanistan reverted to its role as a mirror image of the US ' outstanding technique. Trump stated that his organization's goal is to create a "stable and independent Afghanistan," but he did not specify how he would accomplish this goal other than by proceeding "to collaborate with Afghanistan to advance regional security and harmony, to combat the enemy of degrading change in Afghanistan, to bolster the government's legitimacy, and to diminish the appeal of hostile terrorist organizations.

Afghanistan has always acted as a background for larger philosophical arguments, most notably with the Soviets and, more recently, with psychological oppressor rallies, according to the National Security Strategy. Despite being the main focus of the War on Terror, Afghanistan was never a nation capable of successful subjugation and democratization. As Admiral Mullen stated, an exit after Osama bin Laden's 2011 surrender would have been acceptable, since what started as an attempt to destroy a system and remove a psychological militant innovator turned into an attempt to build a state. Thus, the operation has concluded at a cost of trillions of dollars, countless American and integrated lives, and a limitless number of Afghan casualties. Disappointment proliferates among people who have been repeatedly guided. Some have condemned the inadequate circumstances in Afghanistan, which have promoted the continuous savagery. Throughout the years, every attempt at resolving these issues appeared futile. Others say they have been duped by politicians, bureaucrats, and

military pioneers who made glowing public claims. Despite the situation's dismal deadlock, he failed to give any effective path for resolving it. "All we were told was the extent to which we required assistance and what we were permitted or required to do," one warrior added. Meanwhile, organizers in the US would never agree on critical goals. Some just want the annihilation of al-Qaeda and the overthrow of the Taliban administration that had provided it with refuge.

The first blunder was accepting responsibility for the country's growth rather than focusing only on al-elimination. Qaeda's A more circumspect approach may have emphasized measures to combat psychological oppressors. While educating the Afghan populace about the country's prospects.

Others, on the other hand, asserted that this practice benefited only temporarily. Concentrating on aggressors without addressing Afghanistan's socioeconomic and political concerns would transform the war into a manhunt with no definitive end. As part of the significant success, more ambitious goals such as establishing security, laying foundations, developing neighborhood security forces, and fostering Afghanistan's economy were requested. Following the failure of America's grand strategy in Afghanistan, the fundamental analysis of the country's objectives remains unresolved (Rovner, 2020).

While significant progress has been made in terms of security, politics, and money in Afghanistan, much more work need to be done to ensure long-term stability and defeat the Taliban insurrection. In this light, while the Afghan conflict is not always in the public eye, it remains critical to the US. Going forward, US policy should priorities

preserving the legitimacy of the Afghan state and resolving the conflict in ways that minimize the dangers of psychological oppression, flimsiness, and regional conflict.

Eliminating the potential of such a haven became the primary objective of US military actions in Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of September 11. This point was originally intended to order the Taliban's defeat, but as progress on this count proved difficult, the US established a process by the year 2010 to focus on progressing the compromise's to be an Afghan responsibility, with the US approving the financial costs. Given Afghanistan's powerless foundation, state limit issues, and the intensity of the revolution, the alternative beginning of balancing out Afghanistan—via a robust financial turn of events and a new government—became increasingly implausible by the beginning of President Obama's subsequent term. Prior to the conclusion of his government, both the open-ended battle with the Washington and Taliban's lengthy financial obligations to Kabul became dubious (Tellis, 2017).

2.9 Conclusion

A "grand strategy" is a broad objective of utilizing all facets of public capacity to advance and achieve a nation's extraordinary circle security goals. At its heart, a magnificent system depicts the state's objectives and provides guidance on how the state will accomplish them (Colby, 2011). Macroeconomics is at the heart of grand strategy, and perhaps the most important lesson learned during the Cold War is that international success is contingent on monetary persistence. In the end, it was the West's dominating financial display that created such an extremely tempting interest for nations in both the third and second worlds, enabling Washington and its allies to sustain a long-running global struggle that finally bankrupted Moscow. In this sense,

the Cold War's core premise is that America's most vital mission is to preserve a flourishing, uncontrolled economy as a source of both physical and soft power (Brands, 2015).

According to the logic of authority, the US ' destinations and interests are broad, and therefore its dangers are as well. To acquire and keep a dominating position, the creator should be able to outmatch any prospective opponent and establish influence over and approve global framework principles. This entails not just inherent military and monetary influence, but also the impression of the hegemon's authenticity and financial, and therefore more accessible, safety.

According to the power advancement theory, a primary motive for major-power conflict is a developing authority that aims to challenge or potentially overthrow the dominating power's existing request. Additionally, actions, patterns, or characteristics that impair the hegemon's capacity to manage the system, whether by power, will, or authenticity, represent a danger. The US's capacity to sustain supremacy in the present environment may be questioned in light of China's ascent and the threats posed to the US and its allies by dissident regimes such as N. Korea and Iran. The philosophical test is founded on the obvious victories of "dictator free enterprise," unmatched financial growth rates in emerging nations relative to America, and endeavors to establish an unmistakably European arrangement independent of the intercontinental connection (Colby, 2011). Three options are conceivable after the American military exit from Afghanistan: a planned settlement, shared warfare, or Taliban control. Almost certainly, the Taliban will emerge as the most appealing party in each. Afghanistan's future will be determined by how soon it recovers and by the amount of

assistance provided by the US and its allies to the Afghan government. Along these lines, the extent to which the Taliban obtain aid from other sources, particularly Pakistan, will be an issue (Elizabeth, 2021).

The US ' international strategy has become increasingly encounter-based, resulting in the corruption of the country's non-military critical resources and the reintroduction of the State Department in exchange for an over-reliance on the military and armed as the primary instrument of American great game. The CIA has also become increasingly reliant on paramilitary android assignments during this period of increased militarization. The US frequently places a low premium on its delicate financial, political, discretionary, and data restrictions, preferring to focus most of its international strategy on the benefits that military operations can provide. (Beckstra, 2020)

CHAPTER 3

AFGHANISTAN'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT BEFORE AND AFTER THE US ATTACKS

3.1 Introduction

Afghanistan's experience is characterized by a high degree of decentralization, as well as security concerns after an unknown infiltration and living difficulties for people because of the tragic condition. It has been termed the "empire's graveyard" by some. Prior to the US bombings on Afghanistan, the country's security situation deteriorated, with the Taliban seizing control of Kabul and other major cities. They imposed stringent restrictions and regulations on the populace.

The destruction of Bamiyan Buddha and the implementation of draconian regulations against women generally condemn their function. Following the US invasion of the land of Afghans, the Americans faced a significant geo- strategic stability threat scenario in the country. While the Taliban put up a valiant fight, enduring severe consequences, the US destroyed the Taliban's major towns and captured several Taliban leaders. While transporting them to detention centers.

Additionally, with the battle between remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida gaining traction in southern Afghanistan and destabilizing large swaths of the country, the prevalence of suspected warlords has been emphasized as a serious security risk in recent months (Sedra, 2003). Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Fahim, and Ismail Khan were all extremely visible personal examples of these alleged generals who became models or symbols for the current warlords. The point has been made repeatedly that

their adaptability and management of power practices are the primary hurdles to establishing national peace and security.

Afghanistan's significance has been recognized from the dawn of time by the actions of enormous powers like as the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the US, including their development of troops in Central Asia through the installation of strong control over Afghanistan. Today, control of Afghanistan results not only in the expansion of military, but also in the ability to handle China, Pakistan, India, and Iran. These states are important nuclear powers in terms of political, economic, and global security. One may argue that include Western Turkestan states in this research would aid in the comprehension of the region's force variables.

Along with its military strengths and assets, Afghanistan's worldwide location in three main social bowls (Islam, Hinduism, and China) certainly enables it to influence geo-social factors. Afghanistan, being a crossroads of three main transit routes from the Asian continent to the Southern, alongside the regions of the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Central Asian plain, plays a critical role in the establishment of gas and oil resources ranging from the Caspian Sea to the Indian Ocean. Therefore, control over its realm must be established (Karaka & Ozkurt, 2015).

Kabul's battle has lasted over years, making it the longest-running conflict in the US. An estimates ten thousand American soldiers and more than twice as many American employees for hire stayed in this war-torn country. Despite the relatively high number of obligations, the America and its partners have accomplished great success. The twenty-year war that ensued after the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in the year 1979 resulted in the annihilation of the nation's governmental organizations, military forces,

and public finances. The state of Afghanistan has been reformed, the Afghani security forces have been transformed into a public organization, and the financial scenario continues to sustain man's progress all the while growing slowly but steadily. Additionally, fifteen years after the heinous terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, additionally, the US and its allies (including Afghans) have essentially decimated the psychological insurgent organizations existing in Afghanistan that attacked the US on that pivotal day.

However, critical impediments remain to the country achieving protracted dependability and progress: the strategic framework is riven by embossed factions; the administration is harmed by debasement and inability to convey order and law; and the Afghani army, in general, is still incapable of repelling a ferocious Taliban revolt. Additionally, the economy remains dependent on massive foreign financial injections. These internal challenges, when combined with external pressures such as the persistence of growing Afghan-Pakistani animosity, the pervasiveness of ongoing provincial disputes in and over Afghanistan, and the possibility of contributor weakness as the Afghan struggle continues, could all contribute to the unravelling of the security, political, and economic gains achieved since 2001.

3.2 A Brief Early History of Afghanistan Security Situation before 9/11

Following the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919–1929), Ruler Amanullah Khan launched attacks on British soldiers in Afghanistan and secured complete independence from the United Kingdom, as stipulated in the RWP Agreement (8th August, 1919). He retained his reputation as a classic reformer in control of a government that included representatives from all ethnic groupings. He was ruled by

King Mohammad Nadir Shah (circa 1929 to 1933) and afterwards by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Many elderly Afghans recall King Zahir Shah's rule (circa 1933 to 1973) fondly for drafting a charter in 1964 that created a public assembly and improved possibilities for women, including the removal of the restriction that they hide their faces and hair. Zahir Shah, however, was also eager in creating a substantial diplomatic and munitions-buying relationship with the Soviet Union, presumably in recognition of the possibility that he would limit USSR's help to Communist organizations in the Afghan State.

The Soviets undertook huge building projects in Afghanistan during Zahir Shah's tenure, including the Salang Pass/Tunnel and the Bagram landing strips. He also expressed gratitude to the US for agricultural and economic aid. Local ancestral state forces were able to seize the field to a limited degree throughout the King's reign. Afghanistan's interest in ambiguity started to wane in the 1970s, when the government moved its attention away from the Socialist Faction and toward Islamic expansion. In what is known as the Saur (April) Revolution, the government of Daoud was ousted in April 1978 by military officials of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, Communist alliance), headed by 2 PDPA (Khalq group) pioneers, Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammad Tarakai.

Even though Tarakai was President at the time, he was ousted in Sep 1979 by Amin. The 2 leaders gathered their nation's ethnic Pashtuns and sought, in a limited way, to impose revolutionary communist change on a traditional culture via land relocation and increased female governance. The goal at speedy transition was impeded by Islamic organizations' insubordination.

On 27th Dec 1979, USSR sent soldiers into Afghanistan in order to avoid a force capture by Islamic indigenous armies referred to as the mujahedeen. The Soviets deposed Amin and replaced him with Babrak Kamal (Parcham branch of the PDPA), a PDPA pioneer who was instrumental in the 1978 PDPA coup but was expelled by Amin and Taraki. Russian living powers, who numbered around 120,000, were never able to unite the country's peripheries.

The mujahedin profited from the US ' provision of weaponry and aid through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). The radical warriors were also mostly successful, assisted by the formation of a Peshawar-based "Afghan Interim Government" in mid-1989 by seven significant factions (AIG). The bulk of the remaining mujahedin leaders are vital to the present regime; some, such as Hikmatyar, oppose it. The mujahedin's armament included shoulder-launched anti-plane missiles called as "Stingers" manufactured in the US, which proved very effective against Soviet aircraft. After adequate discussion within the President Reagan's government and among some members of Congress over whether these weapons could be used successfully and whether sending them to the mujahedin would hurt wider US-Soviet ties, the US chose to transfer them to the mujahedin in 1985.

Additionally, the mujahedin concealed and stowed weapons across Afghanistan's enormous network of natural and man-made sections and sinkholes. The Soviet Union's difficulties intensified, in part as a result of the Stinger's effectiveness in destroying Soviet helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. According to Soviet estimates, nearly 13,400 Soviet troops killed. After reformer Mikhail Gorbachev became a

pioneer in 1986, the USSR replaced Babrak Kamal with Najibullah Ahmadzai, the leader of Afghani knowledge, as he is known by his given name. Najibullah was a Ghilzai Pashtun who belonged to the PDPA's Parcham gathering (Katzman, 2010).

3.3 The Taliban Rule in Afghanistan

Along with the mujahedin organizations, Najibullah's demise exemplified the differences. Throughout April and May 1992, Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, head of one of the more modest meetings of ANLF Islamic researchers, retained control. Rabbani is elected President in June 1992, with the agreement of the main parties that he would serve until December 1994. He would not resign at that time, saying that political authority would dissolve in the absence of a clear successor. Other mujahedin groups launched similar attacks on Kabul, including one led by supposed "Head administrator" Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a Pashtun, who alleged Rabbani of associating control. Pakistan allegedly supported Hikmatyar, who never took an official working prime ecclesiastical job in Kabul because to Rabbani's objections. Hikmatyar's revolutionary Islamist Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) got major US help throughout the anti-Soviet struggle. In 1993-1994, the Taliban advance was surrounded by Afghan Islamic clerics and understudies, the bulk of whom were of provincial, Pashtun descent. Numerous former mujahidin stayed in Pakistan, disillusioned with the mujahedin organizations' struggle and concentrated their energies on Islamic theology institutions ("madrasas"), particularly those affiliated with the "Deobandi" school of Islam.

The Taliban considered the Rabbani administration as corrupt and anti-Pashtun, and the Taliban established itself as a loyal partner throughout the four years of mutual warfare (1992–1996). The Taliban gained authority of the south city of Qandahar in November 1994, aided by abandoned weaponry. By Feb 1995, it was on its way to Kabul, when it came to a standstill for an eighteen-month period. In Sep 1995, the Taliban controlled the Herat region, which borders Iran, and imprisoned Ismail Khan, Rabbani and Masood's partner, who finally fled and found shelter in Iran. Masood and Rabbani fled to the Panjshir Valley, in the north of Kabul in September 1996 with a considerable portion of their heavy weaponry after further Taliban successes close to Kabul; the Taliban gained authority of Kabul on 27th Sep 1996. Taliban terrorists stormed a UN headquarters in Kabul, kidnapping and hanging Najibullah, his brother, and others.

Mullah Muhammad Umar, who lost an eye in the anti-USSR combat while fighting as a member of Yunis Khalis' Hizb-e-Islami mujahedin organization, was the Taliban system's brains. Umar had the titles of "Head of State" and "Commandant of the Faithful," while residing in the Taliban's power dominance in Qandahar and never appearing in public, although periodically obtaining significant amounts of unexpected authority. Umar had a personal and political relationship with Osama bin Laden, and he refused to surrender to US requests for his detention. Most the Taliban's top leaders, including Umar, were Ghilzai Pashtuns from eastern Afghanistan. Their adversaries are the Durrani Pashtuns, who reign dominant in the southern region. The Taliban continued to lose foreign and internal help as they enforced rigid adherence to Islamic norms and utilized severe punishments, including executions, in the regions they controlled. The Taliban authorized its "Service for the Promotion of Virtue & the

Suppression of Vice" to employ genuine disciplines to sanction harsh Islamic works such as television, Western music, and boycotts of moving pictures. It limited women from studying or working outside the house, save for medical care, and killed a few women publicly for adultery. The Taliban blew up 2 big Buddha statues carved into the hills above Bamiyan city in March 2001, mistaking them for icons. When the Clinton administration took office, it conducted negotiations with the Taliban but lacked the experience necessary to lead the plan. Even though no entity was legally recognized as the national authority, the US continued to recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate legislature. The UN continued to seat representatives from the Rabbani administration rather than the Taliban. The State Department proposed the closure of the Afghani government's Washington, DC, office in Aug 1997.

Facilitating Al-Qaida's reign emerged became the President Clinton government's overarching Afghanistan policy. When US Envoy to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan in April 1998 with Assistant Secretary of State Karl Indurfurth and National Security Council senior officer Bruce Riedel, the Taliban refused to give up Osama bin Laden. They didn't include Mullah Umar. Following the 7th of Aug 1998, Al-Qaida attacks of US government buildings in Tanzania and Kenya, the President Clinton's Government applied dynamic pressure on the Taliban, compelling the US to approve and carry out the appropriation of some UN monies. On August 20, 1998, the US launched four rockets at purported Al-Qaida training centers in east Afghanistan but failed to target Osama Bin Laden. As per some observers, the government disregarded a few more clear liberties that would have been evident to him. President Clinton's government officials assert that they didn't seek to violently remove the Taliban due to a lack of domestic and international backing. The phrase

"Northern Alliance" refers to a group of individuals that collaborate. Throughout the year 2001, however, before the 11th of Sep attacks, the Bush Administration's strategy remained largely consistent with that of the Clinton Administration, which prioritized financial and political pressures while engaging in talks with the Taliban and avoiding armed support to the Northern Alliance. Government authorities reached this stage as a result of the 9/11 attacks, and some officials felt forced to aid racial Pashtuns in their fight against the Taliban. Additionally, covert alternatives were reportedly investigated (Drogin Bob, 2002).

The Bush Organization upped its commitment via Pakistan during a takeoff in line with the Clinton Administration's strategy to weaken the Taliban's support. Even though Taliban operative Abdul Hakim Mujahid continues to operate on a casual basis, the UNSC has requested that the Taliban delegation dismantle its New York offices.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the G. W. Bush government chose to use military action to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan since it was unable to eliminate Bin Laden. The US determined that an agreeable system in Kabul would enable US soldiers to conduct surveillance of Al Qaeda activists there. After losing Mazar-e-Sharif on 9th Nov 2001, the Taliban rule instantly dissolved, with Dostum directing state agencies. Other Northern Alliance forces, largely Tajik, whose administrators had first told US officials not to enter Kabul, marched into Kabul on November 12, 2001, amid much hoopla. The collapse of the Taliban administration in 2001 impeded both the United Nations' attempts to form a broad-based Afghani government and the global community's efforts to aid Afghanistan in building credible monitoring institutions

(Katzman, 2010). Long decades of conflict and treachery had ravaged the state established by the Interim Authority of Afghanistan in Dec 2001; it was bankrupt of resources and unable to give humanitarian support to Afghans.

According to the socialist heritage, many Afghans anticipated the state to fulfil a wide variety of capabilities, which it accomplished imperfectly or not at all. Even though Afghanistan's mujahidin and resistance warriors gave their lives for their nation, honor, and country, they were unable to work together to construct the country. Afghanistan's internal conflict under Taliban leadership, exacerbated by external causes, has rendered it the world's most impoverished nation. The state became distant from residents over these years owing to a lack of transparency, accountability, and basic help delivery. On a fundamental level, the state was incredibly centralized, yet it was either impractical or heavily influenced by many experts.

For a long period of time, dissatisfied government workers were underpaid, even though they were prepared to cope with new administrative issues and, more critically, the hardware necessary to do their duties. The administration presided over a failing economy and a society wracked by armed mobs. These concerns evolved because of Afghanistan's turbulent past, which includes foreign intervention and rallying for terror. A short history of how Afghanistan got involved in this battle will not only establish the framework for the forthcoming big study but will also explain that the country's present state is not normal or permanent, but rather the outcome of a series of unique obstacles.

Decades of violence in Afghanistan have forced the civilian population into violent and obliteration patterns that have fundamentally transformed the country's social, political, and economic systems. During the USSR invasion and invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989), Afghan culture was systematically divided, mobilized, and destroyed, displacing between 800,000 to 1.5 million Afghans. After the USSR exit in the year 1989, the country fell into civil war, as mujahedeen commanders, originally sponsored and supplied by Western actors, attempted to destroy the government before turning on one another.

As the war wreaked havoc on Afghan urban areas and exacerbated cultural divisions, Afghans and the rest of the world, weary of incessant carnage, started searching for a resistance movement capable of putting an end to the conflict. State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said at a 1996 Daily Press Briefing, "We are just now recognizing the manner in which the Taliban captured and rule Kabul; and we are displaying the direction in which we believe the Taliban will proceed. This, we feel, is a chance to kick-start a cycle of public compromise. We have no concerns and anticipate that the Taliban would respect human rights, and that the new professionals will act fast to reestablish demand and security, as well as construct a delegated interim administration in the absence of a broader public consensus." Nonetheless, when the Taliban gained control of huge sections of the nation, they imposed ever-stricter restrictions based on radical interpretations of Islam. Even though Afghans were somewhat shielded from the physical instability of conflict, they were obliged to live in a mental and social prison, enshrined in Sharia law and sanctioned by the Taliban Religious Police (Nabiha, 2006).

The George W. Bush's administration stated that the US disengagement from the area after the Soviet retreat in 1989 aided in the destabilization of Afghanistan. After the Taliban administration was toppled in 2001, the leadership and his foreign supporters wanted to establish a somewhat stable, Afghan-centric government based on public support. The United Nations backed the endeavor, which many outside observers have characterized as country building. The President Obama government's methodological audit in late 2009 first restricted official American aims to avoiding emotional war safe havens in Afghanistan, but strategy later expanded on the earlier country-building endeavor. Following the 2014 protection handover to Afghan authority, it was universally agreed that defining the boundary and reshaping Afghan administration were important components of US strategy success (Thomas, 2017).

At first, Bush's goal was to preserve the status quo of implementing financial and political pressure on the Taliban while engaging in limited talks with them and abstaining from armed help the Northern Alliance. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the executive branch was considering issuing a guide and assisting Taliban Pashtuns. Additionally, other incognito alternatives were purportedly examined. In March 2001, organization executives invited a Taliban representative to probe reciprocal concerns, and the organization boosted its commitment to Pakistan to mitigate its assistance of the Taliban, despite widespread reports that Pakistani military advisors aided the Taliban.

Despite the Northern Alliance's efforts, which included financial and military assistance from Iran, Russia, and India, the Taliban advanced, even in regions devoid of Pashtuns. At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban controlled 75% of the state's

territory, including almost all of the country's capitals. On 9th Sep, 2001 (2 days before the 9/11 attacks), the Northern Alliance suffered a huge defeat when Ahmad Shah Masoud was killed by Al-Qaida operatives posing as reporters. Muhammad Fahim, a senior lieutenant and a devout Tajik believer, triumphed against him (Katzman & Thomas, 2017).

3.4 9/11 Attacks and US Security Assistance for Afghanistan

After the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration resolved to dismiss the Taliban in an orderly manner following the Taliban's rejection of a US request to depose Bin Laden. President Bush contrasted psychological militants with fear-based oppressors, stating that an amicable system in Kabul would allow US soldiers to look for Al Qaeda terrorists there. The subsequent global mediation effort in Afghanistan, precipitated by the September 11 terrorist attacks, has elevated the nation to the forefront of global political discussion.

The US and allied countries' tactical involvement, which began in Oct 2001 and culminated in the fall of the Taliban regime in harvest season 2001, produced a forced void that was swiftly filled by many commandants acting precisely as ancestral and rigorous pioneers. These "huge guys" had either an element of genuineness or enough control over the methods of viciousness. This advancement was also facilitated by the US policy of relying on Afghan state soldiers to battle al Qaida and Taliban remnants (Suhrke et al. 2004). Therefore, the planet became acutely aware of the vicious mechanisms that had grown over 22 years of non-stop combat and that could hardly be changed via military action. Consequently, Afghanistan's generally recognized measure of peace has been continually broken by recurrent acts of brutality and the

absence of a defined division of security duties. This unpredictable scenario was perceived by global observers as a complete dearth of stability, and it was viewed as the primary impediment to all of the peace process's political steps, including the alternative Loya Jirga in June 2002, the "Constitutional Loya Jirga" in Dec 2003, the official elections in Sep 2004, and the parliamentary elections in Sep 2005. No, not quite. From 2001 until 2003, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN's extraordinary representative to Afghanistan, coined the phrase "Afghanistan need 3 things: security, security, and security" (Schetter, 2007).

The US army has been active in Afghanistan since soon after the September 11 attacks in the year 2001. NATO recognized the UN -managed International Security Assistance Force Mission in 2003. (ISAF). At its peak, ISAF comprised approximately thirteen thousand soldiers from 51 NATO and NATO-allied states. ISAF soldiers fight alongside the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in order to bolster the ANDSF's capabilities. As the ANDSF gained traction, US power levels reached a high of over 100,000 in 2011 and then started to drop through 2014. Since 2001, estimated 2,400 American army members have died in Afghanistan, and over 20,000 have been injured. The number of US mistakes in Afghanistan peaked at 499 in the year 2010 and subsequently decreased to an average of around 17 in Jan2015, when Afghan troops assumed complete responsibility for the campaign against the Taliban.

The uncontrolled fury of the Taliban uprisings of 2011 and 2012, particularly in Ghazni Province Andar District and Logar Province, seems to have faded out. A significant number of these opponents of Taliban authority will be made accessible to

anybody by powerbrokers, as will a percentage of the rural Afghan Local Police units and even regular police forces. Regardless of the absence of coordination and subsidization, some ALP units are guaranteed to fail. Others, such as those who have been recruited by the Taliban or Hezbi-Islami, may return to the Taliban or Hezbi-Islami. Others may engage in predatory behavior and criminal activity inside neighborhood networks (Felbab-Brown, 2016). In the year 2013, the stability situation in Afghanistan was governed by the exit of Western forces, the assignment of protection duties to the ANSF, and the Taliban's campaign to disband the ANSF.

Despite the Taliban's failure to adhere to this notion properly and the ANSF's strategic success, Afghan forces continue to face deep-seated issues, most notably on the "tail" (logistical and field enablers) support side. In June 2013, the ANSF assumed responsibility for security across Afghanistan, a notable accomplishment. Despite a significant military campaign by the Taliban, the ANSF did not cede any domains. The ANSF looked to be gathering pace, as they excelled at key tasks and shown enhanced planning and execution. In any case, the ANSF sustained significant casualties as a result of an outstanding Taliban fight between April - Oct, during which the insurgents launched 6,604 attacks in 30 of Afghanistan's regions, including 50 self-destructive bombings, 1,704 shootings and shillings, 1,186 bombings, and 920 traps. To retain trust, the Afghan military withheld information on the cost of blockage to the Afghan armed forces.

The US, which appears to have played a significant role in fostering instability in Afghanistan, has begun to withdraw without achieving its stated goal of bringing suffering to Afghans. The US started removing 41,000 soldiers from Afghanistan in

compliance with a bilateral security agreement. Everything but 12,000 unknown soldiers associated with NATO and its allies who were responsible for preparing and supporting the ANSF was to be destroyed under the agreement. Following this agreement, Afghanistan's President, Ashraf Ghani, made an official visit to the US and increased the number of US soldiers to be retained until the end of 2015. Therefore, the US has said that the number of soldiers it would deploy to Afghanistan as part of NATO will be expanded to around 9800, up from the original 5500 (Bowman,2015).

While the two Presidents agreed to stop the departure of US forces, they also indicated that the additional authority would be used only for planning and counter-terrorism exercises aimed at strengthening the ANSF's tactical skills. They would be incapable of carrying out hostile combat actions. However, one of the most pressing problems in Afghanistan at the present is ensuring that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can defend and sustain the country's unity. At the NATO Summit in the year 2010, where the exit strategy was discussed for the 1st time, there was broad agreement and political support for concluding the shifting of obligations from unknown armed powers to the Afghan Army and police. In any case, the reality was another story (A. Jalali, 2016). Afghans and Western troops have dramatically divergent opinions of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. Numerous lives have been lost because of the Afghan government's unbridled efforts to prevent self-destruction attacks. This conclusion demonstrates how Afghanistan's dearth of trained employees and basic assets is a significant cause of worry. (Karaca,2015)

On 1st January 2015, NATO deployed the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), a non-combat mission tasked with preparing, directing, and assisting the ANDSF. Apart from the US, 38 NATO Allies and Partners contribute soldiers to RSM and assist Afghan authorities in becoming more compelling, proficient, and viable. The BSA, as well as a September 2014 NATO Status of Forces Agreement, give the US with a legal framework and NATO capability to continue in Afghanistan (Evans, 2012).

Few reenactment objectives have proved more challenging than identifying the limit of indigenous safety abilities during the war. Controlling previous soldiers' ability and desire to resurrect barbarism, as well as changing indigenous army institutions into official state organizations, are all part of the adjustment process. This requires replacing war apparatus with a good legal and political framework, reestablishing public faith in government institutions, and transitioning away from a culture of furious resistance toward a peaceful competition for force and effect. It is a tangled web of "breaking" and "creating." Supporting harmony necessitates the destruction of war and the post-conflict era. Nonetheless, the failure to provide tempting alternatives to former civilian army soldiers might result in precocity, a recurrence of viciousness, and an upsurge in crime and lawlessness.

Disabling conflict is a short-term objective, while producing it is a long-term one. As a result, the cycle should incorporate the use of non-essential military hardware. This might be accomplished by empowering citizens to change war-driven entities into peace-building organizations. Regardless of these concerns, the Afghan Army is in desperate need of immediate air support and is far from an informed government. When the absence of coordination is considered, the Afghan Army's present situation

becomes evident. Even if the Afghan Army is retained as the nation's security force, it's easy to see them being ill-equipped to manage the whole country. If they are unable to function as a strong barrier, Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, will be exposed, defenseless, and weak (Karaca, 2015).

The ANDSF made remarkable strides over the previous years, transforming from a heterogeneous collection of turbulent local forces to a cohesive state comprised of sophisticated security organizations with skilled constraint and steadiness. Despite huge spending, global peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan are prioritizing short-term strategic objectives above long-term requirements.

The military's expansion eclipsed that of law-and-order institutions, particularly the police, with little respect for their important role in a post-conflict context. Rather than serving the general populace, the growing police forces were incorporated into a paramilitary force charged with combating equipped spoilers and guaranteeing governmental authority. Since the tactical mediation was deemed accomplished, there has been a significant shortage of giver institutional limits and assets for soundness responsibilities.

Due to decreasing moreover, regular subsidizing, reintegration of former warriors has been a significant challenge, motivating restricted provided individuals to resurrect barbarism. The mistaken assumption that the conflict was over had a profound influence on the construction and development of Afghanistan's security forces. Preparing for their magnitude and scope necessitated an assessment of current political and security situations, which omitted the possibility of significant changes in the area,

such as an increase in rebellion and migration of no state armed groups, as well as certain aspects of the ongoing conflict (Jalali, 2016).

The continuation of Afghanistan's current (apparently) stable situation following the US ' withdrawal has two primary characteristics. These may be summarized as the Taliban providing a valuable role in the public sector and non-Taliban parties restricting the Taliban's influence via the formation of an alliance government. One may argue that without a deal with the Taliban, providing security in order to accomplish the aim of regional stability and peace would be exceedingly impossible. To make this political solution viable, agreement with the Taliban should be developed through the exchange. According to historical data, liberating Afghanistan from the Taliban seems to be tough; but all other circumstances being equal, a deal with the Taliban appears to be the greatest alternative for restoring peace. With this as a top priority, the central government and foreign forces haggle with the Taliban, requesting that they participate actively in the country's subsequent administration.

In the short term, it has been proved that the present government is incapable of implementing a stable administration capable of serving the whole Afghan community. It's difficult to see the Taliban obtaining a position in the Afghan government with the backing of the whole population. A proportion of Afghanistan's ethnic, political, and socioeconomic groupings were impacted by Taliban rule. Despite the Taliban's absence from politics, these gatherings have strengthened militarily. Therefore, it looks improbable that these encounters would bolster the Taliban's negotiation position (Ozkurt, 2015).

3.5. The Financial and Political Support Provided by the US to Afghanistan

The US continued to improve Afghanistan's commercial situation, including by strengthening the country's business, administrative, and legal structures in order to attract foreign investment and trade, as well as by reviving additional trade with the US and provincial partners via exchange rate increased. Afghanistan and the US inked a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 2004, which serves as a critical bridge between the two nations' trade and speculation disputes.

The US continues to place a premium on Afghanistan's political fury, popularity-based management, and mutually advantageous two-way interactions. Following the disputed representative constitutional choice in Afghanistan in 2014, the US sought and funded a UN ballot analysis and engaged in a political process that led in the establishment of the National Unity Government. After a 3-year gap, the Afghan government conducted parliamentary elections in Oct 2018. After an evaluation period, official decisions were made in Sep 2019 and President Ashraf Ghani was declared the winner in Feb 2020. The US fully helps endeavors to reform Afghanistan's constituent entities, to strengthen its parity region, and to enhance public accountability and transparency.

The US ' development assistance is focused on promoting peace, independence, and stability, and includes projects to increase financial development through a fare-based exchange technique, to strengthen the capacity of nonmilitary personnel organizations, to increase the transparency of the equity framework, and to assist the government in maintaining and improving the gains made in education, health, and female rights over the previous ten years. Additionally, the US supports Afghan civilian society,

advocates for increased respect for fundamental freedoms, assists in the battle against opiate trafficking, and continues to offer major charitable assistance (US State Report, 2021). Essentially, the US pledged \$300 million at the Afghanistan 2020 Conference, which was co-facilitated by Finland, the United Nations, and Afghanistan and will be facilitated largely through the United Nations stage beginning in November 2020 in Geneva, with an additional \$300 million available if significant progress in the harmony interaction and on administration issues can be made. The meeting's organizers committed \$3.3 billion in funding to Afghanistan. Afghanistan focused on establishing a coherent strategy for combating corruption, strengthening government, and sustaining and expanding recent successes.

The country's security situation is more precarious and precarious today than it was during the early years of the American incursion. What is occurring in Afghanistan now is not a protracted conflict, but a perfect storm of several bloody battles and rapidly moving bleeding edges. Between global armed missions, vigilante threats, radical gatherings, culpability, and foundational forms of police and political brutality, the general public and the nation's framework are under constant attack. Afghanistan continues to be extremely vulnerable due to the pressing factors of competing global plans, staggering rates of need, social fracture, widespread defilement and exemption, drug production and addiction, dealing, and child labor, as well as a variety of other variables that contribute to the creation of inescapable and lenient viciousness frameworks. Afghans are impacted in every aspect of their life, from security to well-being. The UNSC approves Resolution 1267, establishing the so-called Al Qaida and Taliban Restrictions Committee, which designates the 2 factions as extremist organizations and puts sanctions on their finance, travel, and weapon shipments. The

United Nation action follows a time of dominance for al Qaida and its commander, Osama bin Laden, who led the terror organization from Afghanistan and Peshawar in Pakistan to Sudan in 1991 and then back to Afghanistan in the 1990s. The Taliban, which emerged from the ashes of Afghanistan's post-USSR national conflict, provides a haven for al-Qaeda to carry out its missions (CFR, Timeline, 2021).

Hamid Karzai, who served as Afghanistan's president since Dec 2001, had been appointed to oversee the nation's interim administration. His decision was made during a crisis Loya Jirga in Kabul, which was attended by 1,550 representatives from Afghanistan's 364 districts (including approximately two hundred women). Karzai, the head of the great Popalzai clan of Durrani Pashtuns, returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan following the September 11 attacks to coordinate Pashtun security against the Taliban. Numerous observers believe Karzai had been defiled by his clique and his government.

The Northern Alliance, dominated by Tajiks, fails to construct a great minister ship but succeeds in controlling official forces by giving considerable experts to the selected parliament, including the ability to reject top authority candidates. A gathering of 502 Afghan officials decides on an Afghan constitution, setting the basis for a powerful formal framework capable of uniting the nation's several ethnic groupings. The event is viewed as a significant step forward in the transition to majority rule.

"The Afghans have taken advantage of the fortunate break provided by the US and its global allies to establish the framework for majority rule organizations and to give public decisions a system," US Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay

Khalilzad announces. Karzai is chosen the most democratically elected President of Afghanistan in a historic national poll in October 2004. Citizens came out in big numbers despite the risks of intimidation and violence. Karzai garners 55% of the vote, while his closest rival, former training priest Younis Qanooni, garners 16%. Karzai's triumph in the political race has been marred by allegations of fabrication by his rivals, as well as the abduction of 3 United Nation's political race workers by a horde of attackers. In any event, the political decision is being hailed as a success for the weak nation; Afghans having not participated in legislative elections since the year 1969, under King Mohammed Zahir Shah's tenure.

President Karzai prepared the groundwork for dialogue with the uprising's "annoyed siblings" by opening backchannels at numerous levels, most notably via familial relations. One of the incentives to approach the government side is a reintegration order that gives amnesty to Taliban fighters who must leave the battle zone on the condition that they accept the Afghan constitution and renounce affiliations to al Qaida and other emotional abuser organizations. In June 2010, the peace Jirga advocated releasing Taliban detainees and lowering UN sanctions on boycotting people. Karzai announced in September the creation of a 70-member High Peace Council as the appropriate forum for talks with the Taliban. Other political signals include Amrullah Salih's replacement as the person in charge of establishing red lines for deals... the Afghan population should have a say in defining the parameters of an adequate settlement prior to any agreements with the Taliban. Amrullah Saleh and Rahmatullah Nabil were the dominant Tajiks. The politically motivated desire to reintegrate Taliban fighters and persuade them to switch allegiances has evolved into the complex and expensive Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, which was announced in

July 2010 at the Kabul meeting. The campaign, which has received \$250 million in contributions from throughout the globe, is founded on the premise that lower-ranking warriors join the Taliban for the money and may be convinced to swap sides by offers of job and promotion opportunities for their networks.

Thus far, the program has attracted few participants, possibly because it fails to address the political grievances that fuel the insurgency and does not provide adequate security assurances to Taliban who choose to reintegrate. Rather than genuine Taliban, the two or three hundred people who have so far enrolled in the reintegration program are inextricably linked to past Jamiat candidates and offenders from Herat. Without a more comprehensive measure of harmony, the application will most certainly remain uninteresting (Jarvenpaa, 2012).

Security responsibilities were effectively transferred from ISAF to the ANSF. Despite this, the ANSF suffered a greater loss of territory in the provinces than anticipated. Due to a lack of resources, Taliban-style organizations were unable to fill this void; instead, more community groups did so on a regular basis. Following President Karzai's appointment in April 2014, another Popalzai Pashtun was appointed to succeed him. His carefully cultivated network of allies eventually agreed to this man work because they recognized that any other course of action would jeopardize the carefully cultivated harmony, jeopardizing their position. Karzai's dynamism was also evident behind the scenes (Grare. F, 2014). The world community was delighted with the result of the decisions, despite their cruelty and deception, and widespread intimidation. 'The Afghan people have spoken,' President Barack Obama of the US stated. Even if the judgments were not reasonable and consistent with our ideals, this

may be acceptable in Afghanistan now. Individual voices have been heard,' we can be certain.' Many resistance groups saw the new administration as a continuation of the old one, with the president seen as a carbon copy of Karzai. In any case, the transfer and termination of the ISAF operation were hailed as victories. Afghanistan would be able to stand on its own two feet for the first time in its history.

ISAF's replacement mission, with 18,000 power forces, was still extremely significant. Additionally, a few thousand US Marines were sent from Kandahar Airfield to conduct counter-illegal intimidation operations. Despite the fact that global donor helps for the resources presented at the Tokyo Conference remained intact, the ANSF financing proceeded as scheduled in Chicago (Ahmad, 2015). Afghanistan is divided into 2 sections, one in the north and one in the south, by unseen borders. While northern tribes assist the presence of NATO and US soldiers in Afghanistan as a deterrent to the Taliban, the Pashtun ethnic group in the country's south is overwhelmingly hostile to western military intervention. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of US soldiers from Afghanistan may exacerbate the situation's worsening.

The rise of shakiness and psychological oppression, combined with the atomic security threat posed by degradation, would undoubtedly result in a security crisis on a par with Russia, China, and India's struggle for Central Asian control. Along with these dangers, increased precariousness would have a direct impact on the Caucasus, East Turkmenistan, Central Asia, and Kashmir, as well as the development of the medicine and weaponry trade (Bowman, 2015).

3.6 Abolition of Organizations and Structure:

War, counter-rebellion, and seared earth strategies by the socialist system, attacking unfamiliar soldiers and fear-based oppressor bunches gravely harmed the country regions and horticulture. The socialist system, attacking unfamiliar soldiers, and other military gatherings mined and exploded water system frameworks, and networks could not keep up and fix them. Streets and scaffolds were exploded by attacking unfamiliar soldiers, knowledge offices, and state armies. Obliterated force arches, transmission lines, and force stations abandoned upkeep. After the Soviet withdrawal and the ensuing conflicts inside the nation, upheld by outside impacts, the gas wells in northern Afghanistan were covered and shut, and their gear plundered. Food creation fell considerably. Around 33% of the populace, generally townspeople, escaped to adjoining nations as outcasts, while Kabul and different urban areas encountered a convergence of millions of inside uprooted people.

3.6.1. Consistent Breakdown of the Economy

The socialist system, with Soviet assistance, extended the part of the state in the economy and redesigned the state to satisfy this new job. To displace the gifted elites who were detained, executed, or crashed into exiling, the socialist system and its unfamiliar patrons prepared a youthful age of technocrats in Soviet-motivated philosophy, the executives, and administration, counting a promise to growing the part of the state in the economy. Following the socialist period, during the ensuing conflicts and the standard of the Taliban, the government deserted its frail endeavors to raise homegrown assets, as it had neither the limit nor authenticity to do as such. Without homegrown income, and to fund outfitted state armies and consumptions on food

endowments, the socialist system and its replacements printed gigantic amounts of banknotes, prompting out-of-control inflation. Excessive inflation made pay rates of government representatives that had when given a stately if the unassuming way of life inadequate to endure. The outcome was a further decrease in the responsibility and execution of community workers, including instructors, police, and the legal executive, and further motivator for debasement, which had additionally spread generally due to the politicization and fractionalization of the organization.

For the absence of any elective work, in any case, functionaries stayed at their posts in any event, while acquiring not exactly US\$ 20 every month, regularly trying to enhance these incomes through debasement, exchanging, settlements coming from abroad, or different positions. To take care of and mollify the inward travelers and community workers accepting insignificant pay rates, the socialist system dispersed sponsored food to many individuals. The import and circulation of sponsored food further discouraged horticultural business sectors. Albeit impractical and financially cataclysmic, this approach was well known with the metropolitan populace, large numbers of whom expect the government to supply sponsored food.

Following the events of 11 September 2001, Afghanistan turned into an extraordinary case for the global-local area. It became obvious that the political and financial disregard of Afghanistan compromised the remainder of the world. The political adjustment and financial improvement of Afghanistan got integral to the undertaking of ensuring worldwide security. Worldwide help for Afghanistan turned into a need not only for the advantage of the Afghan populace, yet for the area and the globe. Our set of experiences requested concurrent and critical consideration regarding the

monetary turn of events, political change, and security-related soundness. We did not have the advantage of sequencing these intercessions, nor do we have that extravagance presently. As the following area clarifies, the solid organization between the Afghan Government and the worldwide local area has yielded concrete and commonly supporting advancement on all fronts since (2001).

3.6.2 Economic Condition of Afghanistan

Afghanistan relied vigorously upon different extraneous benefits during the (the 1960s) and mid (1970s). Homegrown incomes came mainly from obligations on global exchange and deals of petroleum gas. Disregarding an extension of both the size of government and the extent of its exercises, government use never surpassed 10-11% of the GDP. Homegrown income assortment topped at 7% of GDP, including deals of petroleum gas, with the dump financed by the unfamiliar guide.

The public authority never had the assets to give training to most Afghan kids, particularly in the country regions. Even after the quick development of the instructive framework starting during the (the 1950s), by (1978) just 37% of young men and 8% of young ladies were selected elementary schools. Essentially, wellbeing administrations extended from the mid-(the 1950s) until the late (1970s) fundamentally in metropolitan and peri-metropolitan regions, yet the future was still low and infant, youngster, and maternal mortality high (Afghanistan Statistics, 2020).

During 2013 it turned out to be progressively evident that the Afghan economy had been based on the presence of huge unfamiliar power and help to subsidize. It was an air pocket economy. With the drawdown of ISAF and diminishing help, the financial circumstance began to disintegrate. The 5,000 soldiers had a lot more modest positive

sway on the Afghan economy. Likewise, contributors were less liberal than the responsibilities they had made at the Tokyo Conference, utilizing Kabul's notwithstanding the Tokyo models as their proper pardon. Winding down open help for the mission in troop-contributing nations and somberness in the West were more significant.

The monetary, social also, political flimsiness produced by the disintegrating monetary circumstance harmed Afghan security. One justification for this was the expanding number of jobless men who required a living and were in this manner effortlessly enlisted into the army. Gradually, the Bonn structure began to disentangle. While in the past Karzai had the option to bring together the framework, he was currently progressively doubted and seen as the focal point of debasement. He was viewed as power-hungry, purpose on straightforwardly or by implication sticking to control. The way that the circumstance was expected to weaken had effectively been motioned toward the finish of 2012 when it became obvious that money managers were moving their resources from Afghanistan. Normally, enormous shipments of gold were leaving the nation to safer regions (Naveed, 2011).

3.7 A Long-Term US Commitment to Afghanistan

Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai and the US ' President G. W. Bush issue a mutual statement highlighting their respective nations' main commitments. The affirmation grants US authorities' access to Afghan military offices for the purpose of waging "the global war on terror and combating aggressive extremism." As per the agreement, the coalition's objective is to "reinforce US-Afghan connections and contribute to Afghanistan's protracted stability, majority rule system, and thriving."

Additionally, the pact directs US to "help in the coordination, training, preparation, and support of Afghan security staff as Afghanistan develops the capability to attempt this mission," as well as to continue rebuilding the nation's economic and political popular democracy.

Mullah Dadullah, a well-known Taliban military commander, is assassinated in May 2007 in southern Afghanistan during a combined operation involving Afghan, US, and NATO troops. Dadullah is commonly thought to have headed guerrilla troops in Helmand Province throughout the fight, bringing self-devastation planes and seeking the arrest of Westerners. He once told the BBC that six self-destruct aircraft awaited his command to launch an attack on unknown troops. By the mid of the year 2007, Afghans had grown increasingly dissatisfied with a nation-building initiative that had failed to deliver on the promised harmonious profit. The response to these threats has been woefully inadequate, both in terms of international military intervention and the giver-led cycle to reconstruct the Afghan state's security design, dubbed Security-Sector Reforms (SSR). NATO has failed to get the personnel and equipment necessary to carry out its Afghan mission, and the SSR involvement has been chronically under-resourced and poorly managed from the outset. Exacerbating these concerns, widespread factionalism and debasement within the Afghan government, particularly within the security services, have emerged as major impediments to alter and a source of insecurity (Hodes & Sedra, 2007).

3.8 President Barack Obama's Afghanistan Strategy

The following US President, Barak Obama, announced in February 2007 that he intended to send an additional 17, 000 troops to the disaster area. Obama upholds the

crusade's position that Afghanistan is the most critical battlefield for the US against extremists. He says that the US will adhere to a plan to remove most war soldiers from Iraq by the end of the year 2011. By Jan 2009, the Pentagon maintained a presence in Afghanistan of 37,500 troops, evenly divided between the US and NATO. Fortifications are being constructed to thwart a "resurgent" Taliban and to halt the movement of unknown soldiers across the Pak-Afghan border in the south. In a statement on the soldier increase, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates elaborates the initial mission in Afghanistan as "excessively expansive" and calls for the establishment of more focused objectives, such as preventing and restricting psychological insurgent hideouts (Chris, 2003).

President Obama unveils a new approach for resolving conflicts, attributing it to success in Afghanistan. The procedure's primary objective, according to an interagency white paper, is to "upset, destroy, and rout al-Qaida and its areas of sanctuary in Pakistan, as well as to prevent their return to Afghanistan or Pakistan." The system requires a piece of the expanded guidance to Pakistan, as well as a rigorous criterion for assessing success against Al Qaida and the Taliban. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan lauds the approach, claiming that it would advance Afghanistan and the international-local region. According to a June 2020 assessment issued by the US Department of Defense, the US major objective in Afghanistan is to prevent it from becoming a shelter for psychological oppressors plotting strikes on the US, its interests, or its allies. As of November 2020, the US ' military commitment in Afghanistan looks to be coming to an end, with U.S. force numbers dropping after the 29th of Feb, 2020, American. -Taliban pact on counterterrorism and the withdrawal of large-scale U.S. armies (Thomas, 2020).

3.9 US-Afghanistan Security Assistance Program

The ISAF was disbanded formally on 31st Dec 2014, and the ANDSF assumed complete responsibility for stability in Afghanistan on 1st January, 2015, when the US and NATO concluded their armed operations in Afghanistan and moved on to another assignment. On 1st Jan 2015, NATO deployed the Resolute Support Force (RSM), a non-combat mission tasked with preparing, advising, and supporting the ANDSF. Apart from the US, 38 NATO nations and partners provide troops to RSM and support Afghan authorities in being more persuasive, skilled, and useful. The BSA, as well as a NATO Status of Forces Agreement adopted in September 2014, offer a legal foundation for the US and NATO forces to continue in Afghanistan (US State Report, 2021).

The US's primary public priority in Afghanistan is to ensure that the Afghan domain is never used again as a safe haven for psychological oppressors to attack the US. In terms of Afghanistan, the President's South Asia Strategy's primary objective is to aid in the establishment of a robust political solution that ends the war and mitigates the country's fear-bargainer dangers. The signing of the US-Taliban Agreement and the delivery of the US-Afghanistan Joint Declaration on February 29, 2020 are critical milestones in the US' attempts to achieve that balance. The US agreed to a condition-based, staged withdrawal of power from Afghanistan over the next 14 months if the Taliban maintains its responsibility to prevent terrorists from using the Afghan region, makes attempts to reduce brutality, and enters Intra-Afghan Negotiations (IAN) to determine the date and terms of a lasting and comprehensive cease-fire, as well as agree on Afghanistan's future political guide. The first phase of the withdrawal is already complete, with the number of troops reduced to 8,600 by July 2020. (US Department of State Report, 2020).

Even though the number of US soldiers in Afghanistan varies as a result of power movements and changing conditions on the ground, the DOD mission and US commitment to the Afghan government's security organization have remained constant. The US maintains a presence in Afghanistan principally via bases in Kabul and Bagram, with territorial center points in the provinces of Laghman and Nangarhar to the east, Kandahar to the south, Herat to the west, Helmand to the southwest, Paktiya to the southeast, and Balkh to the north. The Department of Defense conducts periodic evaluations of Afghanistan's security situation in order to identify suitable force levels for implementing the South Asia approach and carrying out the withdrawal in accordance with the US Taliban Agreement. (Katzman,2010)

3.10 The Taliban's Survival in Afghanistan Following the 9/11 Attacks

The Taliban has fought against the US-led operation in Afghanistan and the Afghan government since 2001. A collapse in intra-Afghan unity might open the door for the gathering to reconsider its use of force. The Taliban are a majority Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist organization who controlled Afghanistan from the year 1996 until 2001, when a US-led attack overturned the government, allowing al Qaida and Osama ben Ladin to seek shelter. For more than nineteen years, the Taliban gathered across the Pakistani border and has been spearheading a revolution in Kabul against the US-backed government (Gall, 2006).

On February 29, 2020, the US administration and the Taliban reached a peaceful deal that outlines a schedule for the withdrawal of American Troops from Afghanistan after more than a year of bilateral talks. The deal stipulates that the America will decrease its presence to around 8,500 soldiers in 135 days and finish the withdrawal in 14 months. Because of

this agreement, the Taliban committed to keep a region under their control free of fear-mongering organizations and to resume negotiations with the Afghan government in March 2020.

The deal followed a seven-day period of reduced bloodshed during which the Taliban were required to maintain a "vast and cross-country" reduction in brutality and US and Afghan troops were required to avoid concentrating only on Taliban-controlled areas of the country (CRF,2021). No authoritative ceasefire has been created as a result of this new arrangement. Throughout 2019 and into 2020, violence in Afghanistan rose as the US expanded air strikes and attacks against the Taliban, while the Taliban continued to attack Afghan government targets, acquire regional territory, and attack ANDSF bases and stations. Additionally, the Taliban had carried out high-profile strikes around the nation, with an eye toward Kabul. Following the conclusion of the period of diminished savagery, the Taliban quickly renewed attacks on Afghan security personnel and civilians (Gall, 2019).

3.11 Afghanistan's National Unity Government

Almost every administration in the US, as well as independent studies, have judged that Afghanistan's central and local administrations have improved their capabilities since the year 2001. Nonetheless, in the year 2014, President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Dr. Abdullah Abdullah established the US accelerated administration association (National Unity Government, or NUG). When the NUG was founded, Ghani and Abdullah decided to divide the duty of selecting a bureau and to attempt to strike a balance between talent and factional interests. Despite this, their conflicts over arrangements resulted in the

postponement of the major bureau assignments far beyond the legally mandated 30-day timeframe for such determinations (October 28, 2014).

In April 2016, Ghani and Abdullah finalized plans for the 34 regular governorships and crucial ambassadorships. Taj Mohammad Jahid was approved as Interior Minister and Attorney General in April 2016 to succeed ex-Communist army pioneer Nur-ul-Haq Ulumi, who surrendered in Feb 2016. The NUG has been a bit more active than the Karzai group on debasement issues. The administration is contemplating allowing the Kabul Bank heist's condemned offenders to face court punishment. According to published reports, the Major Crimes Task Force has increased its investigative activity against officials accused of debasement.

Ghani has also formed a High Council for Anti-corruption and Rule of Law, and with the assistance of US funding and guidance, is putting together an anti-debasement equitable programme. US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Olson applauded these efforts, as well as Ghani's focus on holding accountable those responsible for the Kabul Bank's 2011 bankruptcy, in a statement on September 15, 2016. The US Exceptional Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction claimed in a Sep 2016 report that Afghanistan's long term disciplinary agency, the High Office of Omission (HOO), lacks authority, autonomy, and capacity to carry out its instructions (Gardner, 2021).

The first full year of operation of the NUG (2014 to 2015) is unclear. The NUG finally dissolved based on the 2 tallies: It was unable to unify the 2 groups into a single administrative entity, and it was unable to acquire popular support by becoming dominant. Despite vows to combat corruption and improve government, real progress has been

incremental, uneven, and at best strategic. While President Ghani attempted to adopt some reforms and fight defilement, his efforts were mostly strategic in nature, and he neglected to implement fundamental adjustments and increase administration's effectiveness and competency.

The public authority has been paralyzed by the influence of a unique mix of self-interested political allies of the selected leaders, and the people have lost a significant amount of support. Meanwhile, security has worsened, the economy has stagnated, and the government has been unable to develop a complete bureau or allocate skilled individuals to important situations (Evans, 2012).

Ghani and Abdullah's institutional division of authority and shared capacity to identify critical circumstances, as well as their disparate advantages and political backers, block change, degrade administration, and obstruct reaction to looming threats. One of the critical difficulties confronting the NUG is holding a Constitutional Loya Jirga at the opportune moment to establish the force-sharing arrangement's sacrosanct lawfulness. This government was initially constituted under a two-year political arrangement that would expire in September 2016. The public authority should make appointments and organize area committee and parliamentary elections in order to comply with the Constitutional Loya Jirga's criteria. As a consequence, convening the Constitutional Loya Jirga on time, prior to the expiration of the NUG's proclamation, is exceedingly improbable. The situation might devolve into a spiritual crisis with unforeseeable consequences (Afghanistan, 2013 Report).

While Kabul has a global presence, NATO missions have been removed. 'We have done everything possible, but sometimes even that is insufficient,' Obama said at a meeting.

Finally, the issue is whether they need harmony at all. EU support has been significantly decreased as a result of Afghanistan's very unstable circumstances. Contributors have maintained their commitment to charitable support, and a few non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have persisted (Jair van der Lijn, 2013). The United Nations and its specialized agencies are the prime actors. Apart from constructive support, the most apparent worldwide contribution is the US's continued and even increasing counter-psychological oppression operations, notably in southern Afghanistan and portions of Pakistan. Despite criticisms regarding the use of drones, this system, together with Special Forces, serves as the backbone of the US ' counter-illegal coercion efforts (David, 2012).

Afghanistan is threatened by a foreign-backed insurgency and fear-based oppressive gatherings. These extremists, psychopaths, and criminal organizations represent a danger to the stability and security of Afghanistan. Profits from drug trafficking, tax evasion, coercion, and illegal mining, in addition to unexplained financial aid, continue to finance the insurgency and Afghan criminal organizations. Additionally, the insurgency continues to get sanctuary and assistance from external actors. The Taliban insurgency continues to pose the greatest danger to Afghan security. During this announcement time, the Taliban focused on a required 7 day decrease in aggression, which had occurred earlier in the 29th Feb commemoration of the US-Taliban pact. After the RIV concluded and the US-Taliban Agreement was signed, the Taliban resumed their attacks, concentrating their efforts on the ANDSF.

The Taliban abstained from targeting highly populated areas and concentrated their attacks on US and Coalition targets. The alternative danger to Afghan stability is internal political instability, which has developed because of the high turnout in the official

political race, challenged political decision outcomes, and the resistance's attempts to build an equitable administration. This political turmoil was exacerbated by disagreements over Afghan government practices and poor progress toward establishing an exchange group for intra Afghan accords with the Taliban. Following a series of global pressures, including the US 's decision to withdraw \$1 billion in stability assistance to Afghanistan, President Ghani and departing Chief Executive Abdullah had the option of agreeing to settle their political disagreements.

Additionally, the Afghan administration announced the creation of a commission to organize the country's political and security establishments (Gall, 2006). After agreeing to a deal with the US in 2020, the Taliban immediately launched amicable discussions with the Afghan government. According to several experts, the Taliban are a capable military force that poses a danger to Afghanistan's democratic institutions, resident rights, and provincial stability.

The gathering has withstood anti-insurgency missions by the world's most remarkable security union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 3 US organizations during a conflict that has resulted in the execution of over 6,000 US troops and hired workers, as well as over 1,100 NATO troops. Since 2007, around 46,000 civilians have been murdered, along with an estimated 73,000 Afghan military and police officers. Despite the Taliban's catastrophes, which are thought to number in the hundreds, the gathering is stronger today than it was nineteen years ago. It employs between 55, 000 and 85, 000 full-time soldiers. According to the Long War Journal of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a US-based journal that has documented the US war against al-Qaeda and other insurgent organizations since 2007, the Taliban held an estimated 19%

of the territory in mid-2021, while the government controlled 33%. Both gatherings posed a problem for the rest of the nation (Evans, 2012). The gang has continued to strike Afghan security troops and civilians with violence. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded 8,820 civilian fatalities and injuries in 2020.

Despite being 1,000 less than in 2019, ordinary citizen losses grew by 45 percent in the first three months of 2020 as compared to the same time the previous year. Directed deaths and ad-lobbed hazardous device attacks accounted for the lion's share of fatalities throughout those months. UNAMA accused the Taliban and its enemy, the Islamic State in Khorasan, for the bulk of 2020's failures. Ordinary individuals were often trapped between guerillas and government soldiers. Afghan government troops and airstrikes, which were instrumental in the battle, also often resulted in civilian losses (Stephen & Millar, 2009). Despite tremendous progress in Afghanistan's military, political, and economic sectors, several remaining components must maintain long-term stability and choke the Taliban insurgency. Thus, even if the Afghan war is not consistently in the public eye now, it continues to be of immense importance to the US. Going ahead, the US approach should prioritize preserving the integrity of the Afghan state and resolving the conflict in ways that minimize the perils of emotional conflict, instability, and strife in the region (Tellies, 2017).

3.12 The Taliban's Constant Threats

The Taliban is a primarily Pashtun Islamic radical party that controlled Afghanistan from the year 1996 to 2001, when the government was deposed, and al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were given safe shelter by a US-led attack. For more than nineteen years, the Taliban gathered across the Pakistani border and has been waging an insurrection in Kabul

against the US-backed government (Maizland, 2021). Extremist rallies continue to provide a challenge to Afghan, US, and Alliance troops. Additionally, the area is home to 20 extremist groups, making it the world's biggest concentration of Taliban and extreme organizations.

Along with Afghan and allied powers, it is probable that the Haqqani Network and Taliban will retain their ability to command unstable and other hostile operations. At the beginning of the revealing period, Taliban aggressive activities momentarily decreased (D. Lamb, 2012). The Taliban has approved crimes that are many times more horrific than those committed during this time period. US government departments and agencies continue to monitor levels of cruelty in Afghanistan and analyze whether the Taliban is adhering to the terms of the US-Taliban Agreement. The US expects the Taliban to adhere to its responsibilities under the Agreement, which specifies that military reductions of fewer than 8,600 would occur "with the Taliban's accountability and action on the promises."

Throughout this cycle, despite pressure from the coalition, the ANDSF, and the Taliban, ISIS has retained its capacity to defend itself and conduct mass loss attacks. ISIS may be shifting to smaller gatherings in urban areas that are more difficult to detect and identify now that it has been dislodged from the land it governed. Despite the fact that ISIS-K continues to make relationships with numerous organizations outside of Afghanistan, it has severely restricted operational capabilities.

3.12.1 Al-Qaida

Al-Qaida's danger to American forces and allies in Afghanistan is modest. Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), a subsidiary of Al-provincial Qaida, is the most serious threat to those components. It routinely backs and works with low level Taliban militants

in its attempts to undermine the Afghan administration, and it has a strong interest in targeting US and Western personnel and targets in the area. Al-Qaida also aids the neighboring Taliban in a few strikes, according to al-Qaida communications. Al Qaida is under ongoing coalition pressure and will prioritize maintaining a tolerable safe haven.

The few surviving al-Qaida Core members are primarily concerned with endurance, while al-Qaida pioneers are responsible for territorial presence. AQ, particularly via AQ, has remained committed to achieving its declared aims of freeing Muslim territories, creating an Islamic caliphate, and instituting Sharia law. While AQ retains an advantage in striking US personnel and other Western targets in Afghanistan and the district, the coalition's campaign has harmed AQ's capacity to command operations in Afghanistan without the backing of the Taliban. It is anticipated to pose a small danger to Afghan and US soldiers in Afghanistan. Despite recent advancements in the peace process, AQ retains close relations to the Taliban in Afghanistan, most likely for self-assurance and planning purposes (D. Lamb, 2012).

3.12.2 The Taliban's Position towards American Forces

The Taliban's enmity against the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, as well as the Afghan people, is intolerably strong, immediately disrupting the cycle of concord. As General (Scott) Miller has warned several times, the Taliban must immediately halt hostile operations and drastically limit their brutality across the nation (Kube, 2020). In Feb, the Taliban and the Americans reached an agreement in Doha, Qatar, under which foreign soldiers would withdraw from Afghanistan by May 2021 in return for Taliban assurances, including that they would refrain from attacking US and other coalition troops.

Each party has prioritized eradicating psychological warfare and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a refuge for foreign terrorists. In any case, the fundamental problem has always been that without a stable Afghan government in control of its domain, there is no assurance that the radicals would not seek shelter in Afghanistan, and no Afghan administration has ever had the option of controlling the state on its own. Pakistan's involvement in arming tyrants and agitators in Afghanistan who are driven by fear has also been a source of worry.

Without troops in Afghanistan, the US has been unable to fully confront that danger, relying on Pakistan for a military stockpile, retrograde routes, and aid in Taliban discussions. One obvious objective is to bolster Afghanistan's indigenous defense capability by addressing their inadequacies, notably in five crucial operational areas: initiative, unified weaponry combination, control and order, preparedness, and maintenance (Jalali, 2016).

While the initial extremist danger that prompted the US to invade Afghanistan is now a relic of its former self, hazards continue to exist and have changed. According to a 2018 Department of Defense report to Congress, Afghanistan and Pakistan are home to twenty psychological insurgency or guerrilla organizations. 9 President Obama's decision to keep an 8,400-strong US military presence in Afghanistan at the conclusion of his term, rather than bring down additional troops as planned, underscores how the US has regarded the Afghan struggle for over 18 years.

US officials are continually persuaded that a US withdrawal would incur extravagant costs; they are unclear of how to win the war or end it in a manner that is satisfactory for both US and Afghan security interests. Following that, the remaining portions resume

normal operation. Political development has been stymied by government-aligned obstructionist groups, most notably the Taliban, who boycotted the 2015 Afghan elections and remain unrepresented in the country's political institutions. President Ashraf Ghani's cabinet is only marginally representative, with serious intergovernmental disagreements between him and Chief Executive Officer Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Iqbal, 2015).

As a result, the US, other ISAF nations, and benefactor states are unable to do anything on the ground in Afghanistan, resulting in a significant waste of time and resources, as well as irrational cases that continue to erode US, other ISAF nations, and benefactor state support for the conflict. Promises to remain beyond 2014 and 2020 are becoming less credible in verifiable terms, and no government seems capable of demonstrating the amount of seriousness necessary to continue providing public support. There is just a limited amount of time remaining to give a visible Transition management program. The Afghan government estimates that it will need \$120 billion in help from now until 2025 to accomplish its objectives. However, this degree of support is going to be overly generous, and many of the Afghan pledges of a change in administration and the elimination of financial hurdles to growth and progress are very improbable to be maintained. At the Tokyo conference in July 2012, global donors guaranteed less than \$4 billion each year through 2016, and much of this money would never reach Afghanistan.

Authenticity founded on "Afghan as great as it gets" increases the likelihood of developing plans and activities that can, in any case, benefit US, Afghan, related, and donor interests when supported, and allows for a humbler type of Transition. This might result in an Afghanistan with a more precarious central government than is desirable, demonstrably more dispersed political and military force foci than present organizers demand, a few

provinces controlled by insurgents, and a large number of areas put to the ultimate test. Nonetheless, extremists are little known, unorganized, or united. "Afghanistan as great as it can be in reality" may, in any case, retain some structure in the event of massive ISAF power reductions and assist in doing so without Pakistan's support and while ignoring self-important pressing concerns of other states in the region (H. Cordesman & Burke, 2012).

Afghanistan's primary difficulty is sustaining security. Due to enhanced security measures whenever there is an uptick in fear-based oppressor attacks on camps, it becomes impossible to continue organizing ANSF meetings. Additionally, Afghanistan is reticent to send soldiers to Pakistan for training, although attempts have been made via the training of six cadets at the Pakistan Military Academy. With regards to the ANSF, US and Australian advisors discovered that only a handful of the total 200 units are capable of commanding military operations. The flaw is in its enrollment, which omits a sizable proportion of Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Tajiks. Therefore, the ANSF is organized around a single point of separation. Whether or whether it gets help, Afghanistan will continue to be a weak and isolated state that will rely on US and international support beyond 2014.

Typically, the Afghan National Security Force is left to deal with the aftermath of the pullback, and it is woefully unable to deal with Afghanistan's security environment. It will not be able to sustain the pressing factor of instability and, consequently, will be unprepared to cope with Afghanistan's difficult position. Afghanistan's government hardly functions. The West should be blamed for promoting a constitution in Afghanistan that is based on force centralization.

The Afghan leader has been granted immense control over assets, but he has been unable to develop national and regional public authority. To escape common war and financial recession long before the ostensible season of drawdown, success may need many mental processes operating in a condition of solid security and the organization of proper assets (Afridi, 2015). Despite the Taliban's catastrophes, which are thought to number in the hundreds, the gathering is stronger today than it was 19 years ago. It has between fifty-five and eighty-five thousand full-time warriors. By the mid of 2021, it was expected that the Taliban would control 19 percent of territory, while the government would control 33 percent (Maizland, 2021).

The US and the United Kingdom are withdrawing from Afghanistan after two decades. President Biden indicated that the remaining 2,500-3,500 US soldiers and female personnel will be evacuated by September 11th. The United Kingdom is now removing its last 750 soldiers. The date is massive. It's been a long time since Al-Qaeda's September 11 attacks on US, which were planned and coordinated from Afghanistan, inspired the American-led Coalition to overthrow the Taliban and temporarily eliminate Al Qaida (Saikal. A, 2010). The cost of this two-decade armed and stability promise - in terms of lives, jobs, and money - has been tremendous.

Over 2,300 US servicemen and women have been dead, along with 450 British soldiers and many more from a variety of nationalities and countries. Yet Afghans have suffered the brunt of the casualties, with roughly 60,000 security personnel and nearly twice that number of civilians slain. The financial cost to the American people is expected to be close to \$1 trillion (Gardner, 2021). A well-structured provincial structure for resolving Afghanistan's future scenario will allow a peaceful resolution amongst Afghans.

Bordering nations may either push Afghanistan apart in an intermediate war like to that which happened in the 1990s, or they may contribute to the country's security. The critical issue is whether territorial performers' mutual skepticism of even a smidgeon of planned local devotion can be overcome (David, 2015).

A stable Afghanistan is finally considering a real worry for all its neighbors, even though each may have their own definition of what constitutes soundness and be enticed to swear by the development of old consumer ties. The most challenging aspect of developing a territorial strategy is resolving Pakistan's and India's longstanding rivalry over Afghanistan.

Given the district's governments' mistrust, it's difficult to imagine a formal multilateral arrangement moving forward that would result in a local agreement, at least without a preliminary period of bipartisan discussion and negotiating. To begin, critical standards must be agreed upon in order to build confidence between Afghanistan and its neighbors.

At the most fundamental level, these criteria should include consideration of local and regional trustworthiness, adherence to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, and avoidance of the use of Afghani territory for intimidating exercises against its neighbors (Jarvenpaa, 2012). Trump supporters have welcomed the selection. According to their assessment, the US has achieved the goal of Operation Enduring Freedom, as no one alive today, including Osama bin Laden, participated in or aided in the 9/11 attacks, and the wreckage in Afghanistan is unlikely to change anytime soon. Trump asserts that the Afghan Armed Forces have 300,000 officers and should fight back if their country is threatened. America cannot always fight for everyone (K. Rath, 2019).

The US has a strong interest in sustaining Afghanistan's substantial economic, political, and stability achievements since the year 2001. A Taliban revival may swiftly transform Afghanistan into a psychologically repressive sanctuary. Additionally, domestic upheaval in Afghanistan may have far-reaching local ramifications, since Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia all want influence in Kabul and with subnational entertainers (CFR, 2021).

3.13 President Donald Trump's Afghanistan Policy

Donald John Trump became the president on 20th Jan 2017. He succeeded Barack Hussein Obama as the 45th President of the world power US of America. On August 21, soon after becoming the president, he made a speech on the future of US-South Asian ties. Trump's South Asian foreign policy was centered on three countries: Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, which shared first position on the list (Alizada, 2018). His address clearly conveyed his reservations about Pakistan, and he urged Pakistan to cease functioning as a refuge for Taliban organizations operating in the area. He made it quite clear that Pakistan stands to benefit from supporting the US in defeating the fear mongers.

On the other side, by siding with the Taliban, he stood to lose a great deal. He asserted that even though the US had paid Pakistan a substantial quantity of money to eradicate the Taliban, Pakistan had offered a safe haven for them. It cannot be tolerated any longer (Hafeez, 2018). In its efforts to reduce hostility within the district, and to be honest, throughout the world. It is unquestionably true that Afghanistan's advancement in terms of legislative and administrative issues, as well as economic development, is directly proportional to the number of pressing factors that the American organization can impose on the Taliban system in order to halt their operations. (2017) (Hussain, 2018).

The Afghan country and government enthusiastically welcomed Donald Trump's South Asia and Afghanistan strategy, believing that with America's assistance, Afghanistan's military would be modernized, Afghanistan would be prepared to win time before fighting the Taliban, and the matter would be resolved peacefully. Trump has given his administration carte blanche to embed as many American personnel in Afghanistan's area as they deem suitable (Owais, 2019). Prior to the 2018 accusation, Trump's one-year execution and its effects looked implausible, but the reality is that the consequences were much worse. The Taliban proved more tenacious because of the increased presence of US troops, and they were able to retain control of the Afghan provinces of Ghazni and Farah. Obama's decision to extend the time limit for air strikes resulted in the deaths of innocent Afghans because of air strikes and drone operations. NATO's military forces were strengthened during Obama's presidency to battle the war in Afghanistan; but, under Trump's administration, NATO's military forces dropped as Italy and Turkey lowered troop levels. All of this demonstrates that Trump's views are absurd and that he will be unable to keep his promises in the real world (Owais, 2019).

On August 21, US President Donald Trump unveiled the foundation for the country's new South Asia strategy, which is focused on Afghanistan. Given the US's long history in the region, America's Afghanistan strategy is intricately linked to the country's overall foreign policy. Given the stakes, Trump's rhetoric contained two critical components: To begin, there was reasonable evidence and assessment of Pakistan's role as a critical entertainer in psychological warfare. Additionally, there was a greater sense of assurance evident in India's work in the region in general, and specifically in Afghanistan. As with the US, the Afghan government lacks the resources necessary to win a meaningful struggle against the Taliban on the battlefield but would prefer not to lose through the same methods.

Consequently, the current US policy in Afghanistan, established after several polls and reassessments among President Donald Trump's close circle of advisors, seems to be more concerned with avoiding loss than with victory. The Taliban's rebirth and the growth of Daesh in Afghanistan have weakened stability, and compromise discussions with the Taliban have failed to provide a political settlement. As evidenced by Trump's remarks, negotiations with the Taliban have been pushed to the bottom of the American priority list. (Monish,2017)

3.14 Realism in Structure

According to Kenneth Waltz, neorealism is classified into two types: defensive realism and offensive realism. The international design idea is represented by its exigent rule, rebellion, and conveyance of capabilities in accordance with underlying authenticity. The chaotic demanding rule that governs the global building has expanded, suggesting the absence of a proper focal authority. From one viewpoint, hostile sincerity wants power and influence in order to achieve security via authority and control. On the other hand, defensive validity argues that the progressive nature of the global order pushes states to pursue moderate and conservative policies in order to ensure security (Gall, 2014).

Defensive realism maintains that aggressive development, as advocated by hostile pragmatists, undermines governments' proclivity to adapt to the overall impact hypothesis, hence undermining the state's primary objective, which they argue is to ensure its security. While protecting authenticity does not exclude the truth from becoming a highway battleground, nor does it deny the existence of driving reasons for state expansion, it argues that these impetuses are inconsistent rather than endemic. Protective authenticity places a premium on "underlying modifiers" such as security situation and

terrain, as well as on world-class beliefs and discernments that help to explain the disputed occurrence. Political realism is a self-interest, power, and opportunity-driven paradigm. America's policy toward Afghanistan and Iraq will be inextricably linked to these concepts, as they have been invoked throughout history (Steven. E, 2012).

Neorealism, or neo-realism, seeks to simplify IR studies by emphasizing the underlying urgent reasons sparked by revolution. In any event, classic realists differ in their assessment of how much force governments need under these situations. As a result, neorealism is typically subdivided into defensive and offensive realism. Battles based on defensive realism need such governments to obtain an adequate level of power in order to prosper (Eric, 1997).

They should not, under any circumstances, enhance their total force in pursuit of supremacy. Such action is deemed unproductive since it promotes the creation of a limiting coalition that will work against their interests. In contrast, aggressive realism defends those governments that, given the chance, should increase their total ability to become hegemons. According to this idea, the greatest security for a state's existence is power domination (Jakson & Nickson, 2009).

To begin, Mearsheimer establishes that a state must possess the military capability "to mount a legitimate fight against the world's most powerful force in order to succeed as an extraordinary force." In any event, Mearsheimer says that the US' principal adversary in the post-Cold War world, China, "does not have a substantial military at the time and is definitely not in a position to challenge the US, even in the Asia-Pacific area" (David, 2009).

By and large, Mearsheimer's meticulous examination indicates that China does not match offensive realism's defining criterion of tremendous strength. Second, if the US is a regional rather than a global hegemon, it should behave as a business-as-usual force and an offshore balancer in different regions of the globe, until a prospective hegemon threatens to undermine its heightened position. Rather of serving as an offshore halter in many regions of the globe, the author feels that America has gotten "an insufficient magnificent technique" geared for worldwide supremacy. Under such conditions, hostile reliability predicts that the two significant powers in the scenario, China and Russia, would adapt their defenses against the aggressor. He asserts categorically that no true adjusting coalition against the US has been developed or is going to be created (Pashakhanlou, 2018).

3.14.1 The Stability Apparatus in Afghanistan under American Neo -Realist Supremacy

Afghanistan was a cold war conflict zone from 1979 and 1989, when the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, conducted their intermediate warfare. US funding, which poured into the region to fan the flames of anti-communism belief, was instrumental in establishing Islamic radicalism throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan's outskirts. At first, these US-made guerrilla competitors displayed cooperation in pursuing the US 's premium in the region. The Mujahedin, alternatively referred to as political dissidents, emerged as a significant force opposing the Soviet Union's red masses and the USSR-backed Afghan administration. With the collapse of the USSR in the year 1989, the US of America gained control of the Soviets, and Afghanistan consequently lost its conservative and political significance to the US of America (Coll, 2009). Towards the

close of the cold war, the European model of global society triumphed against the Soviet's sanctioned universal humanity (Gall, 2009).

Since the events of 9/11, the US has become more assertive in its unconventional strategy toward Iraq and Afghanistan. It has expelled both the Taliban and the Saddam Hussain regime from these countries with the assistance of partners. As has been the case in the past, America's policy toward Afghanistan will be personally associated with these ideas. From an American standpoint, they are sound genuine and decided governmental concerns, as well as sound legislative issues. Many would regard America's conflict in Afghanistan as offensive, as would the notion that it is anything but an irreverent and politically base conflict. They would claim that the impoverished civilians of Iraq and Afghanistan have no responsibility for the horrors perpetrated on the US on 11th Sep, 2001. As previously demonstrated, America is simply aware of the foundations of human instinct and the age-old guiding principle of authenticity, making this a hopeful response. America was forced to reject ethical concerns or risk being attacked by A1 Qaeda, and the takeaway possibilities with Osama Ben Ladin proved weak given his set of circumstances.

Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks, it has been argued that the Bush administration was plotting a war in Afghanistan, as America became more frustrated with the Taliban. Between 1999 and 2001, the US government recognized that the Taliban would not provide the necessary security to capitalize on Central Asian monetary potential. 9/11 demonstrated America's vulnerability to attack and emphasized the importance of expelling Taliban and al-Qaida agents. The government of the US should not hesitate for a moment before acting unilaterally to destroy the cells of these fear-based oppressors, as this is the message of political authenticity. The Taliban have been guided

in Afghanistan. Additionally, al-Qaida has dispersed and is no longer using Afghanistan as a base for terrorist activity (Briscoe, 2004).

This political event shifted the desire for an international framework, resulting in the emergence of unipolarity, which was previously seen as a bipolar framework. With no other state to contend with in this unipolar framework, the US emerged as the hyper power. In the absence of a formidable foe, the US grew suspicious of events occurring locally or far away between 1989 and 2001.

Afghanistan was a big casualty, even though it served as a vital hub for American delegates throughout the cold war fight. Afghanistan was abandoned and handed over to Pakistan, which allowed for consideration of a newly created Islamic revolutionary organization, the Taliban (Smith & Owens, 2011). Where they painted a cruel and ugly picture of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Islamic revolutionary setup shared some characteristics with militant gatherings and Arab emotional terrorists who long held onto the country and openly created training courses for preparing their agents inside and undermining the West. Following the 9/11 attacks, the international community's forces launched a campaign against Afghanistan's looming role. The Taliban appeared to be crushed from the start due to prolonged military intervention; however, they have begun to re-emerge as a significant power in the fight against the unfamiliar soldier presence in the country since 2005. Formerly called as Freedom Fighters, the guerrilla competitors are now referred to as psychological militants and guerillas (Armstrong, 2011).

Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks were divided into distinct political and moral groups, each seeking power and security. This self-created condition of continual conflict and cruelty is akin to the anarchic atmosphere that exists inside the global structure.

Similarly, to how states seek force and security on a global scale, Afghans sought additional power to ensure their security during the intra-state war. This struggle for power inevitably resulted in internal strife. Individuals were mobilized along ethnic lines in Afghanistan in search of power and security. Hazara minorities were brutally suppressed, and lethal force was used against them during the Taliban rule (Coll, 2009).

Additionally, it is normal to find that these organizations place a premium on security and will go to any length to safeguard their actuality. Similarly, as with interstate war, one state's path to security becomes a source of frailty for another. For example, the way in which the Jamiat-e Islamic gathering of Afghanistan, which was besieged by Tajiks, was threateningly unfriended by Hezb-e Islamic gathering, which was besieged by Pashtuns, during the circa 1990s, demonstrates the ambiguity of the state local arena when authentic power divides. This was largely because each of these ethnically split groups want more force and security. Nonetheless, the growth of the Afghan Unity Government's formal policies in 2015 reflected this concept of a fight for power expansion among diverse ethnic groups.

The erroneous official appointment after the 2015 Presidential elections, as well as the National Unity administration, failed to assist the force in moving quietly from one legitimate authority to the next. Positivists think that building a central government would remove the internal insurrection. Additionally, they contend that, although constructing a multiethnic state is a noble objective, it is not particularly likely to succeed. Since 2001, the newly constituted Afghan state has divided its forces along geographical and ethnic lines. Among all ethnic groups, Pashtuns have dominated the Afghan political landscape, most recently when the Taliban repressive regime was founded, with Pashtuns

constituting a sizable majority. The pressure is strong because of this unequal distribution of force (Amanullah, 2016).

Kenneth Waltz's defensive realism examines global authority only in the presence of a single remarkable power in the international framework. Under such circumstances, the international framework is unipolar, as there are no other 'posts' or expressions capable of adjusting the hegemon's might. John Mearsheimer's antagonistic genuineness, in any event, qualifies him as a global and local hegemon. The first principles exert dominance over the entire planet, whereas the second principles exert dominance over a single landmass. Whether the post-Cold-War globe was unipolar, multipolar, or something else, there is an overwhelming consensus that the US has been the world's most spectacular state after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Colin, 2004).

Without a thorough analysis of Afghanistan's existing and emerging security, political, and economic landscapes, as well as their influence on US vital interests, the long-term outcome of US strategy toward Afghanistan cannot be forecast. There is widespread agreement among Afghan observers today that the stability climate in rural areas is diminishing while the lines of communication in urban areas remain stable, despite an increasing Taliban danger; the political scenario at the public level is poor but somewhat stable, despite the unavoidable deterioration in legislative foundations, which continues to undermine the system's viability and legitimacy; and financial conditions are difficult, with development (Tellies, 2017).

Regardless of how the security situation is viewed, the Taliban revolt's persistence may remain the most perilous test facing the country; despite the US, its international partners, and ordinary Afghans' costly and deliberate efforts, it is far from being extinguished.

Eliminating the possibility of such asylum became the primary goal of US armed missions in Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. This step originally mandated the Taliban's defeat, but since progress on this check proved difficult, the US approach evolved by 2010 to concentrate on developing the compromise as an Afghan requirement, with America guaranteeing its financial expenses. Given Afghanistan's powerful base, deficiencies in state control, and the insurgency's strength, the alternative starting point—balancing Afghanistan out via a robust financial turnaround and a shift in administration—became more untenable by the start of Obama bin Ladin's succeeding term. Both the unfinished business with the Taliban and America's extended financial obligations to Afghanistan became questionable before to the conclusion of his administration. As a result, President Donald Trump adopted a US strategy toward Afghanistan centered on strengthening Afghan security forces while maintaining a limited one-sided capability to counter transnational threats. Obama's one-of-a-kind strategy sought to get all US combat personnel out of Afghanistan by 2014.

In any event, given the ANSF's proven inability to defend a region independently against the Taliban, extending the presence of US fighting troops in the nation was deemed necessary. Appropriately, Obama opted to defer power for the fate of the unexpected 9,800 US soldiers in Afghanistan to his successor at the time. Regardless of whether to expand or further diminish power, the Trump administration's delaying strategy was ambiguous: the conveyed US separation is costly to maintain in absolute terms and is sufficiently broad to be viewed as possessing substance by the Taliban, yet it is insufficient to definitively shift the battle's direction to Afghanistan's side.

Despite these obstacles, Afghanistan was only briefly referenced during the 2016 official mission as a matter of international policy or public safety. Additionally, in his February 28, 2017, speech to a joint session of Congress, Trump made no mention of the issue or the nation, and his candidates for the public safety bureau got less information about Afghanistan during their confirmation hearings. Afghanistan's withdrawal from the political center of public attention reflects the more cluttered and complicated international strategic landscape that presently exists, including challenges that conceal those witnessed during the US engagement after 11th Sep, 2001. In this climate, the Donald Trump organization should reject or change its archetype and adopt a new strategy to Afghanis

CHAPTER 4

US GRAND STRATEGY'S DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASPECTS

4.1. Introduction

The US ' main priority in Afghanistan is preventing it from becoming a place of refuge for terrorist organizations planning strikes against the US, its operations, or its allies. To that end, US constantly seeks a negotiated political solution in Kabul that terminates the conflict and prohibits the Taliban from exploiting Afghanistan to threaten the US or its allies' security (DOD Report, 2020). The principal American public safety issue in the 21st century is the same as the one in the year 1776: maintaining an essential impact in its two outwardly bordering areas that keeps them inwardly separated. The expansionist policies of the US in the Western World caused concerns in East Asia and Europe. (Ross, S., 2013).

In the global platform, "grand strategy" aligns armed, political, and economical strategies to attain governments' eventual aims. Before 2001, American spectacular approach was changing, since the USSR's dominance unlocked the window to a wider spectrum of plainly fewer challenging topics. Regardless, the attacks on the Pentagon as well as the World Trade Center on 11th September 2001 (9/11) transformed the great strategy discussion and triggered a complete reconsideration of American self-assurance policy. In any regard, it may be premature to think that this reassessment will result in a complete or final response to 9/11 policies as complicated as the public financial system remain unchanged for the present. "Although the attack took place on American territory, it proved to be a strike on the core and spirit of civilization.

and perhaps most successful, of the twenty-first century. A battle on all those who aim to spread terror, as well as the administrations that enable or harbor them “(US Department of State, 2009). In the war against international terrorism, President Bush was pursuing a wide and ambitious foreign strategy.

The confusing and resistant monetary system established in Afghanistan was the complete antithesis of what a fighting Afghanistan should have been willing to accomplish in order to carry out the demanding and multi-pronged change to peace that the nation had begun on with the assistance of outsiders. From the start, it was naively supposed that the Bonn Agreement's administrative framework could be maintained without significant monetary change and that stability would not be jeopardized. The US Department of Defense and military moved a significant percentage of the cash away from the Afghanistan expenditure plan.

Expeditionary Economics was a phrase used by the US military to refer to the reactivation of monetary policy in Afghanistan's most unstable districts. Their approach of spending the most amount possible in a variety of enterprises in the hope that some would thrive was unproductive and ended in a variety of expenses and dismemberments, as well as wastage and dirt. The US aided and abetted the establishment of an institution that Afghanistan would be unable to maintain financially for an extended period. Around \$70 billion (or 60%) of the \$115 billion Congress authorized for Afghan rebuilding during that time frame was spent on planning, training, working, and sustaining the state's public safety. Between 2002 and 2016, this figure contributed for more than 33% of Afghanistan's yearly GDP. (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2017).

The nation has been at conflict with itself for a long period of time. To be very candid, the Soviet invasion essentially wrecked this shattered country's financial infrastructure. The impact of 14 years of communist rule, followed by a two-year dictatorship of a guerrilla commander and six years of Taliban governance, further compacted the nation. The US expelled the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan and destroyed their training centers in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Regrettably, the US utilized the Bonn Process to arbitrarily establish a temporary government under the charter of the United Nations on the path to the end of 2001. Despite this, all that was required was a great deal of control and arm-curling. Due to the scattered nature of the job, the US concentrated its attention on Saddam Hussain's Iraq, leaving Afghanistan in limbo. Other territorial armies, however, continued to intervene in Afghan politics. The growth of the drug market, which had reached unprecedented proportions, was thrown to this mix. Now, it is worth noting that billions of dollars in Afghanistan-related donations have been wasted. Given the lack of control, openness, and coordination, untrained laborers get high wages from sidekick employees for hire/non-legislative entities. Overhead expenses have escalated as a result of their complex network of subcontractors (Achikzad, 2010).

Attempts to transform powerful and impoverished social structures into liberal elected governments with unhindered economies, dominant business sector, and fully independent national banks have failed dismally: more than half of nations that realized harmony through UN- or US-led initiatives returned to conflict within ten years. Likewise, the majority of countries involved in the struggle to-harmony

transition, both those that regressed and those that worked out how to preserve a powerful concord, found themselves unwilling stand on their own, with unworkable economies and, in any event, high threshold conditions for food security. Afghanistan has a shameful track record of both stagnating into violence and becoming into the world's most obedient nation (DOC Research, 2017).

The opiate industry served as a significant litmus test for sustainability. It has been shown that the measures employed to fight drugs are ineffectual. Due to the low number of soldiers on the ground during the initial years of combat mediation, the US placed little focus on counternarcotic; nonetheless, this strategy progressively moved toward a stronger emphasis on annihilation.

Despite this, US, the UK, and the Afghan government had divergent positions. The US favored a more aggressive annihilation strategy, while the Afghan government and the UK urged gradual mediation with a stronger focus on sustainable livelihoods to mitigate rancher losses. Prohibition was also employed to pursue dealers, but it harmed the local populace indirectly. This cycle was challenging, diminishing the attraction of the counternarcotic system, which encouraged the insurgency even more, since they had the option of eliminating critical pay from the opiates industry.

The expansion of the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan has been related to instability. "The medicine economy reached previously unprecedented heights on a global scale, basically since Second World War, in 2007 and 2008, with 2014 being another record-breaking year," the paper said. Frailty, political power schemes, and a scarcity of viable financial choices were among the primary determinants of the poppy industry that remained mostly intact. Payments for poppies were a critical source of cash for the insurrection. Since 2014, no additional destructive actions have been employed;

yet one may claim that increased poppy cultivation was a significant factor in the insurgency (Coll, 2008).

4.2 The Diplomatic Characteristics of the US ' Grand Strategy

This sort of state-driven method is employed in the WOT to defend discretion via, the collaborative employment of peaceful and beneficial efforts by public safety frameworks and armed professionals for certainty construction, trust development, retreats, and compromise. Protection discretion is used by a number of different governments departments but is always coordinated. It is best defined as "a simple request by a state of assets across the spectrum of safeguard, to produce beneficial effects in the development of mutual and multilateral connections... by using safeguard resources to aid political aims and advance safeguard interests."

There is a well-documented connection between the US ' conciliatory and militaristic underpinnings. Once again, the Country's Responsibility is critical. It supervises, examines, and reports on the discretion of US guards, and it interacts freely with the Pentagon and similar organizations worldwide. The US guard anticipates expanding its partner network and destabilizing the number of alleged enemy or rebel groups that may aid with terrorist actions (Patrick, 2017).

Guard strategy serves as the framework for weight sharing and limit building initiatives, like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, that collaborate with the US/Afghan joint military commitment in the areas of management, stability, financial matters, and advancement via impromptu, risk-explicit groupings. The International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) basic mission in Afghanistan (2003–2014) may be the greatest example of US security discretion

combined with a credible and organized CT reaction to a particular danger of psychological oppression (Blannin, 2017).

Global security has been significantly impacted by the War on Terror, both locally and globally. After 9/11, the US launched two significant missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and has since overseen a variety of intelligence, secret, and 'black' tasks. The War against Terror cost the US the most money in its history. Additionally, US 's internal security engineering is being infiltrated by a vast fear business now. Other nations participating in the WOT have made similar breakthroughs - for instance, Australia, the U.K, and France – although not to the same extent. Additionally, the War has incurred a great expense of human security and lives. Numerous fighters and citizens have already had their lives irreversibly affected, if not destroyed.

The 9/11 attacks "ignited the most rapid and spectacular transformation in the history of US foreign policy." President Bush said on September 20, 2001, after nine days of organized public reflection: "While our struggle with terror begins with al Qaeda, it does not stop there... We will organize each asset according to our specifications... each tactic, each gadget of understanding, each legal need, each monetary influence, and each significant weapon of war... to the annihilation and demise of the global terror organization. There will be no distinction between the emotional terrorists who submitted these protests and those who shelter them... Each nation faces a choice... There is no objective basis for this claim... Either you're with us or you're with your psychological oppressors." (Murray,2017).

The War's objective was to deprive '13 "sponsorship, support, and shelter," as well as "decrease the underlying circumstances exploited by fear mongers." To accomplish these objectives, the US immediately created and executed JP 3-26. Counterterrorism

is a coordinated federal operation headed by military and civilian law enforcement organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Department of the Treasury. Soon thereafter, on Oct 7, 2001, the armed response to September 11 was launched by the government.

The US started Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, assisted by the UK and 138 other Coalition allies. Operation Enduring Freedom's primary objectives were to locate and eliminate Usama Bin Laden, as well as to destroy al Qaida and deny it a safe harbor by toppling the Taliban. Following the invasion of Iraq, the mission extended to include global Special Forces activities in North Africa, Yemen, and Afghanistan, and unprecedented interpretation projects conducted by alliance knowledge organizations in distant areas across the globe (Blannin, 2017). The US has used several strategies in Afghanistan over the past almost 18 years to combat terrorist organizations and establish a stable government.

The US has dedicated a significant quantity of money to assisting Afghanistan's development. Additionally, the US has solicited the assistance of native and foreign artists to assist in resolving the crisis. In any event, few of these methods have a well-defined set of goals or the requisite resources to accomplish them. The US' principal objective continues to be counterterrorism, but it is also participating in a number of operations, from preparing the Afghan military for combat missions to aiding with economic development. Following an early engagement with the Taliban that resulted in a temporary ceasefire in late spring 2018, President Trump selected a one-of-a-kind envoy, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who began direct planning with the Taliban. With the Taliban gaining more ground than at any point in recent memory, there is a

conscious expectation among long-term observers that compromise efforts would produce results (Fuchs, 2019).

When 9/11 occurred, the US's security relations to South Asian nations deteriorated to the point of becoming non-existent. The US had refused to recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and had done everything necessary to assist and isolate the Taliban in order to convince them to remove Al Qaida. Since US forces ousted the Taliban in the late 2001, American troops have collaborated directly with community officials, members, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and representatives from President Hamid Karzai's agency to deliver stability, useful assistance, and leisure, and to inspire a more devolved deal that is hoped to be less affable to radical groups. While certain regions under ISAF control have improved, especially the Shomali Plains, security continues to be a hindrance to the development of new organizations and institutions in many areas of Afghanistan (Nayak, 2005). T

The Afghan government, like the US, lacks the resources necessary to decisively vanquish the Taliban in the war zone, but they would prefer not to lose. As a consequence, the new US policy in Afghanistan, established after significant polling and reevaluation inside President Donald Trump's close circle of advisors, seems to be more concerned with avoiding loss than with victory. The Taliban's rebirth and the growth of Daesh in Afghanistan have weakened security, and compromise discussions with the Taliban have failed to produce a political deal.

As Trump has declared, negotiations with the Taliban to find a solution have been pushed to the bottom of America's priority list. This might be due to the increasing influence that US military commanders have acquired under Trump's presidency, during which the State Department's position has been diminished (Tourangbam).

Over the previous two decades, the US's attack on fear methods have consistently stopped it from attaining its intended results of psychological warfare victory and reshaping sensitive regions in its own image. The US ' inability to achieve its optimum idea of success in combating unlawful coercion has not been owing to obstacles set by more prominent and purposely sharp enemies. It did not occur as a result of poor asset use or an absence of battle experience.

Taking everything into account, the inability to accomplish has obviously been a result of weaknesses in US foreign policy. They have ensnared the US in protracted fights driven by fear, keeping it from achieving its own objectives in these wars. Following 9/11, a fundamental component of the US foreign policy has been to bolster weak governments by economic, social, and political development initiatives, as well as using all available means of public capacity to resist harmful ideologies.

Over the last twenty years, the United Governments' international policy has been centered on minimizing terrorist risks emanating from weak states and altering other countries' internal initiatives to align with US objective. Several American researchers and officials have concluded that success on the front lines is inadequate for essential victory. Therefore, in the years after the 9/11 attacks, US military has focused on non-combat missions such as aiding with foundation building, advocating for government change, creating rules and legislation, and assisting with financial and social activities. In Presidential records, the necessity of security and state work in combating fanaticism, the forerunner to serious offences, is emphasized. Following the Cold War's conclusion, each organization desired innovative and safer arrangements that failed terribly, locking the US in operations where it consistently failed to accomplish all of its goals due to various shortcomings. These shortcomings

range from a lack of defined and quantifiable goals to mission expansion as a result of insufficiently resourced processes to badly planned interagency and multinational efforts, and more (Azizian, 2021).

The US ' critical goals are as follows: Afghanistan is:

- 1) is never again a haven for fear-based tyrants and is a secure and reliable ally in the War on Terror.
- 2) Diminutive and popular, having a thriving private area rich;
- 3) Capable of governing its territory and defining its borders; and
- 4) Cognizant of the benefits accorded to each of its citizens.

To accomplish these objectives, the US, together with its allies and partners, is seeking a far-reaching COIN (clear, hold, and build) structure that pools tactical, military, and monetary support from the US and the rest of the globe. The COIN strategy's critical components are as follows:

- Eradicate extremist and anti-government groups from a particular area or district, hence establishing a safe refuge for guerillas and the general people;
- Maintain security by rejecting radicals' approach and development potential inside a certain area;
- Utilize the safety zone to provide humanitarian assistance and to conduct reproduction and development campaigns that will unite the Afghan people.

Prior to engaging in combat, US, as well as its friends and partners, should have a clear understanding of where to liberate, how to defend, and what to create. Prior to initiating the "reasonable" stage, the US and its friends and accomplices perform surveillance to ascertain the principal leaders, important foundation, ancestral components, and clans' ties with the government of the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan. Military activities performed during the "free" stage provide an underlying secure atmosphere conducive to the development of a stable and prosperous Afghanistan.

Additionally, (ANSF) forces remove, arrest, or expel agitators and antigovernment groups from a particular area or locality, thereby alienating these forces from the remainder of the Afghan populace. During the "hold" stage, US, its partners, and allies strive to maintain a safe environment by exploiting the rift among extremists and the people in order to move the public closer to the Kabul administration. Police and military from across the globe and in Afghanistan must retain a robust presence, preventing government members from returning. To earn the trust and faith of the local populace, the Afghan National Police (ANP) should be permitted to implement the law in line with the Afghan Constitution, particularly antinarcotics rules. Meanwhile, armed & civilian offices should engage with indigenous and indigenous pioneers, give humanitarian support, and finance newly formed taxpayer-funded organizations.

The US, international partners, and Afghans employ security and strength to establish "free" and "hold" phases for the development of the human assets, foundations, and framework necessary for a secure, strong, and prosperous Afghanistan. The US, along with people from other countries, provides caution, administrations and instruction to the nation's pioneers and administrators. International coaches and advisers assist the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) in reaching their maximum potential (ANA). Support, training, and preparation are provided to Afghan people who will serve in the state's tribunals, government facilities, and private

enterprises. The worldwide community works to establish schools, infrastructure, streets, crosses, and other pillars. (2008 US Security Report).

To develop and preserve Afghanistan's security and independence, and to maintain law and order inside the nation, the Afghan government needs competent security personnel. The long-term objective is to develop a police department and military that are well-considered, competent, culturally diverse, justly accountable, organized, prepared, and equipped to satisfy the country's security demands, and that are backed up by a sound fiscal plan. The US's efforts to accomplish these aims are focused on the following:

- Educating the ANP and ANA workforces; and
- Departmental framework for warnings and limits.

The US's long-term objective is to have the ANSF capable of guarding Afghanistan's frontiers and ensuring interior security. The ANSF's development activities assist the ANP in protecting Afghan residents and upholding the law by providing training, coaching, and equipment. Additionally, they guarantee that responsible government programs, as well as organizations at all levels, get the planning, instruction, foundations, and enactment essential to preserve and operate such powers.

4.3 Border Management and Counter-Terrorism Efforts in the US

A sovereign country's borders should be able to be monitored for the flow of people and products. Afghanistan, that has a substantial illegal opiate market and lengthy and porous frontiers, needs to secure its borders in the long run. To secure its frontiers and stop guerillas, government agents, and narco-traffickers from crossing, while yet allowing legitimate commerce and people to pass freely. Line strives to attain this levelheadedness by concentrating on two areas:

- Define the Afghan Frontier Police's (ABP) and Afghan National Army's (ANA) respective limits.

- Commitment at the community level. Obtaining Afghanistan's borders would undoubtedly protect the country's security by preventing guerillas from travelling to and from Pakistan for sanctuary.

Regaining charge of the borders would also help security by reducing or blocking the flow of illegal drugs over the border, depriving crooks and guerillas alike of a substantial source of revenue. The US seeks to strengthen the Afghan government's capacity to police its own borders via training and education of the ABP and ANA, and the authority of each association. Local commitment enhances the efficiency of security measures from both sides of the fence by facilitating data exchange and functional coordination between foreign and Afghan security personnel in Afghanistan and security agencies in neighboring countries.

Experts in unlawful Islamic intimidation on a worldwide scale have a financial stake in Afghanistan's chaotic, undemocratic, and fanatical regime. AL-Qaeda and other such organizations provide cash, training, and faculty to the Taliban and other forces aiming to destabilize the sheltered government in Kabul. Establishing and sustaining long-term stability in Afghanistan entails eliminating Islamic militant groups and their impact in the nation and region and depriving them of the resources necessary to battle government institutions. The following are instances of how the US combats terrorism:

- Military and law enforcement operations.
- Establishment of a counter-terrorist zone in Afghanistan; and
- Continuity of commitment.

US, Afghanistan, and the world community all deploy military and police resources to identify and eradicate psychological oppressor networks across Afghanistan, the country, and the globe. The US is assisting the ANSF as well as others in knowledge-gathering, judicial, and law-enforcement organizations in putting together an Afghan counter-terrorist limit. Global commitment is required to lessen the impact of international terrorist networks in Afghanistan. The US collaborates with a diverse group of individuals from throughout the globe to assist with counterterrorism strategy and activities, as well as information sharing (US Security Report, 2008).

4.4 The Military Aspects of the US ' Grand Strategy

Following the Taliban's defeat in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was sent to aid the Afghan government in ensuring stability in Kabul and its surrounding provinces, as well as to provide a secure working environment for Afghan professionals, including UN troops. Initially, ISAF maintained a low-key approach to these concerns, but rising dissatisfaction compelled the interveners to launch a more comprehensive effort. NATO assumed leadership of ISAF in 2003, and the UN enlarged ISAF's command to include the whole of Afghanistan. NATO highlighted quantification such as the total count of soldiers and cops enlisted in the ANSF, the number of children enrolled in school, monetary data collection, and the formation of foundations throughout the country to convince international and domestic audiences that state-building progress was justified (Ozdemir, 2016).

After a year of relative tranquility during 2002 through 2005, the security issue started to worsen dramatically. A void that was created in the early wake of the Taliban regime's collapse, owing primarily to Kabul's dearth of financial and military help, and Pakistan's contempt for the Taliban uprising, has led to the present predicament.

In the 2 years after foreign involvement, Afghanistan got \$57 per capita. In 2009, American President Obama ordered the deployment of an extra 30,000 US soldiers to Afghanistan in response to worsening security. America's overall number of abilities has climbed to about 100,000 (Behzan, 2018).

In a few places of the nation, Afghanistan's security crisis started deteriorated. 2008 marked the greatest level of violence since the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headed by the US initially arrived in Afghanistan. As per ISAF, the number of attacks perpetrated by extremists climbed by 33% in 2008. The 2008 military attack by ISAF and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) harmed the Afghan revolt, resulting in administrative failures and the destruction of many large refugee camps. Despite these defeats, the insurgency has retained pace, growing the breadth and velocity of its psychological repression attacks and explosives in certain regions. Expansion of extreme brutality in Afghanistan is closely tied to popular perceptions of inadequacy. (2008, Security Report).

America has two distinct tools that bolster its on-the-ground impact: cash and soldiers. Since 2002, the US has spent over \$144 billion in Afghanistan for 'alleviating poverty and reproduction,' the most of which has gone toward establishing new safety area foundations and maintaining parity with Afghan authority (Hakimi, 2021). US military' involvement in Afghanistan is partly motivated by the long-awaited objective of "controlling China." To keep an eye on the proliferation of opiates produced by Afghanistan's poppy farms. Afghanistan's extreme fanaticism and illegitimate intimidation must be put an end to (Hassan, 2010).

The US wishes to guarantee that Afghanistan does not fall to a foreign power pursuing control, such as Tehran, China, or Russia. Afghanistan's ultimate autonomy is vital for

the US to pursue a diverse wide range of interests in the nation and region. These comprise major meaningful interests in diverse financial and political loops; rule of law and responsibility; and common freedoms, women rights, and minority rights, and humanitarian concerns, such as minimizing the agony and completing the Afghan discussions (Felbab-brown, 2021). Due to violence, disease, and poverty, the US, partner countries, and the Afghan government are working to facilitate a thorough financial turnaround.

These interests are critical because they reflect American values and considering America's decision in December 2014 to transition from a more modest global mission focused on preparing and encouraging the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to a more modest global mission focused on preparing and encouraging the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

Domestically, the Afghan government is under greater criticism for failure to prevent extremist advances and for internal strife that have inspired the emergence of new political opposition groups.

According to US authorities, guerrillas' control or threaten around 40% of Afghan land, but they are not in a posture to overturn the government. The Taliban's weaknesses were revealed in May 2016, when the US traced and executed Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the Taliban's general in charge, using an unmanned aerial vehicle. Despite this, the new Taliban movement has made significant gains in the battlefield and continues to resist any negotiations with the authority (Coll, 2008).

State creation was seen as a non-essential element of the war against the Taliban & Al Qaeda by the defense establishment. Rather of establishing a government in Afghanistan, the American military chose to concentrate on consolidating its presence

(Dobbins 2008). The strategic effort quickly realize that their strategic counterinsurgency plan needed a more dependable close partner to ensure that after a territory was recovered from guerilla fighters, the local authorities could prevent radicals from recovering it. Thus, the US military embarked on a new strategy dubbed "Speeding up Success," which allowed it with the means and, in a nation building sense, the capability to establish adjacent powers that might support US armed foundation in winning the conflict.

Until mid-2019, the Pentagon reiterated the concept of state-building, namely the coercive aspects of the Afghan government. Despite the tactical obvious interest in state-building, fighting remained its primary concern. Apart from effective administration & management reproduction, the tactical method called for a state-building strategy to create a strong power base amongst Afghans so that Locals could perform jobs in lieu of American personnel during combat missions (Rasouli, 2020).

In early October 2016, an extremist organization and the country's government achieved an agreement, although the agreement had not been implemented to the other groups. Minorities and women's organizations in Afghanistan fear that a settlement with the Taliban may untie post-2001 gains in fundamental rights. While US troops aided Afghan forces in the assassination of a handful key Islamic State militants in Afghanistan, the organization has not been eliminated (CRS Report, 2001).

According to the Bush administration, the US withdrawal from the area after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 led to Afghanistan's plunge into anarchy. Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, US administration and its foreign partners attempted to establish a generally consistent Afghan federal government based on rule

of the majority. The United Nations endorsed the project, which many outside experts labelled "nation building." The Obama administration's late 2009 system assessment initially focused on US objectives on avoiding emotional repression in Afghanistan, but the approach progressively expanded on the previous nation effort. After the 2014 security handover to Afghan leadership, it has been repeatedly established that defining the limits of Afghan management and altering Afghan administration are important to the success of US policy (CFR Report, 2001).

4.5 Afghanistan's Economic and Political Situation from 1980s - 2001

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had a profound effect on the US ' global strategy. Surprisingly, the US has maintained a strategic, financial, and conciliatory presence in South Asia since the Cold War's conclusion. Throughout President George's, President Obama, and Donald Trump's administrations, the US ' policies in Afghanistan have been constant in their goal of destroying Terrorist Groups and keeping Afghanistan from becoming a place of refuge for the Taliban with global reach (Azizain, 2021). While the US accomplished its main objective of annihilating Al Qaeda and eliminating its capacity to use Afghanistan as a source of potential attacks on the US, the Taliban as well as other terrorist groups recovered power and continued to pose dangers to US interests. -Faced with these concerns, the US international policy has remained focused on anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and engaging in economic and political reforms, in order to accomplish its primary objective in Afghanistan on terms consistent with US interests.

The US intends to accomplish this objective by collaborating with the Afghan administration and the Taliban to forge a comprehensive constitutional accord that would end the conflict and guarantee that Afghanistan is no longer a viable refuge for

transnational psychological warfare. The US and the international community continue to collaborate in order to achieve the reproduction and advancement goals outlined in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

Afghanistan has substantial financial growth and stability issues, including insufficient government funding, dependence on uncertain advisors, expansion, and restricted access to appreciation on behalf of the people of Afghanistan. Constitutional self-determination has been largely missing in overcoming this challenge through comprehensive financial policy development and fundamental reform. The US, along with worldwide local area efforts, is anticipated to galvanize the Afghan government to continue moving forward towards a self-sustaining financial sector able to generate income, managing resources, and operating without reliance on foreign funds.

In 2008, Afghanistan's nutrition programme was severely stretched by global economic and weather circumstances. While increased demand increased wheat berry prices, a dry season in Afghanistan cut wheat output to its lowest point since 2000. There have been advancements in the realms of energy, transportation, communication, health, and education. At the end of August 2008, an alliance-led operation transported a power production generator more than 100 kilometers to the US AID Kajaki water project in Helmand. Once operating at full capacity, the new rotor will double the dam's age cap and deliver electricity to more than 2 million Afghans. As of Sept 2008, USAID has built or repaired almost 2,700 kilometers (km) of highway, while the worldwide local area had completed or renovated 73% of the Ring Road, cutting vehicle travel time and costs while enhancing the portability of safety capabilities (Security report, 2008).

A thriving economy in Afghanistan will bolster government confidence, provide legal employment for Afghans, and erode backing for the Taliban and other insurgents. The US system wishes to show to the Afghan populace tangible and long-term success in reproduction and development. Increased radicalization, especially in the East and South, has harmed the region's American coalition reproduction and development efforts.

To that aim, the US is working to establish the banking firms, institutions, and human resources necessary for the Afghan people to self-support. The US government places a premium on the following locations in order to accomplish its rebuilding and growth goals:

- Access to public transportation.

- Expansion of public areas.

- Agriculture and rural development; and

- Financial management and enhancement of non-public areas.

To maximize investment and interest in Afghanistan's wealth, a prudent and honest leadership should develop and maintain sound financial structures. For individuals to engage their money and effort in financial businesses, a safe atmosphere is vital. If an economy wants to thrive, it must first provide the framework for growth. The US's remaking and improvement strategy attempts to provide the groundwork for an economically viable Afghanistan.

The foundation's primary objectives are as follows:

- Modes of transport - mostly streets.

- Electricity; and

- Telecom.

Farm owners require roadways to transfer their products to commercial sectors and to cool their merchandise; retailers require energy potential to brighten their consumer exteriors; and all financial advisors involve correspondence organizations to interact with partners both within and without country. The US offers significant financial aid, resources, and the capacity to lay the groundwork for Afghanistan's economic development. The activity safety limit is critical for foundation development and support (US Security Report, 2008).

On the other hand, the Afghan government and its infrastructure continue to depend largely on foreign assistance. This will be true despite of whether the Taliban seize authority or become influential in a subsequent government. Afghans are justifiably anxious that the military departure would result in a decrease in US support for Afghanistan, like what happened in 2014 when the bulk of US-led NATO soldiers departed the country. Any considerable decrease in support would have a terrible effect on the country's already precarious health, education, neighborhood administration, and other welfare programs, as well as on traditional Afghan life. Of course, the military departure will result in a diminution in the US and other NATO nations' political and discretionary responsibility to aid in resolving the Afghan government-Taliban conflict. (Hakimi, 2021)

4.6. The US ' Political Strategy in Relation to Afghanistan

In financial terms, the political structure erected by interveners had disastrous consequences, as the focused government's domestic revenue reached a low of 5% of GDP in the first five years. Due to a lack of fundamental assets, Afghanistan's public authority was constrained in its ability to carry out its essential functions of providing security, equity, ensuring common liberties, providing essential offices to the populace

everywhere, and establishing elective pay projects to offset revenue from drug production and trafficking. Unfit to provide such powers, the public authority reasoned that political legitimacy would be impossible to obtain.

Advancement toward the political reforms proposed in the Bonn Agreement has not resulted in harmony and reliability, as one would expect. Cleaning up the mess left by more than 20 years of fighting meant overcoming enormous security obstacles. This would culminate in a shared war in which no Afghan party would be able to exert dominance. The vacuum would provide a perfect environment for violent extremist organizations like the Taliban to concentrate and flourish. Whatever the result of US efforts, the past three US presidents changed America's tactical orientation in Afghanistan with few concerns for Afghan lives, similar to how the choice to attack Afghanistan in the year 2001 sacrificed Afghan lives. For a significant number of Afghans who have placed their trust in the world's superpower, the urge toward surrender is palpable. The sword of military interference has left further marks, but the extent of the harm will only become apparent after the removal of global forces (special report, 2021).

Numerous components have aided the guerrilla challenge to Afghanistan's dependability, including

- The inadequate numbers of security authorities in several national areas.
- Quantified and distinct shortcomings in comparison to the ANDSF.
- A haven for attackers in Pakistan.
- A response to civilian casualties caused by military operations; and
- Unknown popular expectations about debt settlement and the Afghan administration's sustainability and uprightness.

To accomplish that goal, the US policy is to enable the Afghan government and law enforcement forces to protect the nation against revolt and to run it effectively and transparently. President Trump said in an August 2017 chat that he expected to reorient Afghanistan policy around a conditions-based approach, oblivious to the chain of events and public debate of troop numbers and other benchmarks. President Obama's policy looked to increase pressure on Islamabad to deny safe refuge to Afghan aggressors, as well as an obvious rejection of earlier US attempts in Afghanistan to do "country work" and establish Western-style organizations. (2001 CFR Report).

Remarkable remakes should be connected to contemporary public compromise initiatives. Compromise was exceedingly difficult in Afghanistan because to resistance from neighboring nations that favored ethnic or religious gatherings. However, compromise was necessary to enable Afghans to work and live in peace with one another and to accommodate a large number of migrants and internally displaced persons (Abdullah, 2002).

Throughout the transitory time period, the new administration handled varied ethnic groupings and locations. This kind of activity had a positive effect on the country's image and made it look more comprehensive. Despite this, the great majority of agreements made during this period were motivated by political faithfulness and personal relationships. To do this, first-class bartering and contemporary tools were utilized to examine the new government's legitimacy.

Worldwide military and development support, and global recognition, have bolstered the split government's legitimacy, most notably by enhancing its authority to transfer administrations. Despite the difficulties involved in executing a feasible state-building

approach, the current situation has fostered an atmosphere of hope and reconstruction among individuals, laying the groundwork of new forms of validity through direct resident cooperation and the voting of the chief of state and parliament members. Ideological groupings and the government were opposites.

The nation was neopatrimonialism in nature, and the meetings were primarily concerned with support organizations. In open organizations, agreements and wealth distribution were dependent on local dedication and political allegiance instead of credibility, and political parties suffered as well (Behzan, 2018).

On September 5, 2010, "Afghan High Peace Council" (HPC) was founded to oversee settlement and reintegration efforts. President Karzai then appointed former President and Northern Alliance ideological pioneer Burhan Uddin Rabbani as its leader, presumably to garner support for Taliban talks from the Northern Alliance. Rabbani was killed on 20th Sep 2011, and the HPC chose his son, Salah Uddin Rabbani, to replace him in April 2012. Rabbani is now the NUG's Foreign Minister. American envoys faced Taliban representatives for the first time in 2011, and subsequent US-Taliban meetings focused on proposals for the US to transfer five key Taliban detainees from Guantanamo Bay to a form of house arrest in Qatar, in exchange for the Taliban delivering the one US captive held by the Taliban, Bowe Bergdahl. The negotiations ceased in March 2012 but restarted in the year 2013, and in June 2013, the Taliban established an agent office in Qatar and released a statement distancing themselves from future international psychological terrorist meetings.

Nonetheless, the Taliban exploited deals with the US and Qatar by raising a flag of the former Taliban regime and declared the institution the center of the "Islamic

Emirate" of Afghanistan, the title used by the Taliban regime during its rule. These actions drove the Taliban to shut the facility, which was compelled to do so by US officials acting via Qatar. Regardless, the Taliban officials stayed in Qatar, and complicated US-Taliban negotiations began in mid-2014, supported by Qatari participation.

The "Afghan High Peace Council" (HPC) was founded on September 5, 2010, to supervise the resolution and reintegration process. President Karzai then appointed Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former President and Northern Alliance political pioneer, to oversee it, with the purpose of enlisting the Northern Alliance's aid in negotiations with the Taliban. Rabbani was killed on Sept 20, 2011, and the HPC chose his son, Salahuddin Rabbani, to replace him in April 2012. Rabbani is now the NUG's Foreign Minister (Arsala, 2007).

In 2011, US delegates managed to meet with Taliban officials for the first time, and subsequent meetings between the US and the Taliban focused on a proposal for the US to transfer 5 senior Taliban captives from Guantanamo to a type of house arrest in Qatar, and for the Taliban to deliver the one US POW it held, Bowe Bergdahl. The discussions stalled in March 2012, but restarted in 2013, with the Taliban creating a correspondent office in Qatar and making a statement distancing itself from future participation in global psychological manipulation sessions.

In any event, the Taliban violated prior agreements with the US and Qatar by raising a flag of the previous Taliban system and declared the office to be the headquarters of the "Islamic Emirate" of Afghanistan, the title used by the Taliban system during its reign. These actions caused the US government to request that the Taliban shut the facility through Qatar. Notwithstanding this, the Taliban officials stayed in Qatar, and

the complicated US-Taliban talks resumed in mid-2014 as a result of Qatari involvement (CFR Report, 2001).

In Afghanistan, it would have been critical to develop regional democratic pioneers with a direct interest in the system, both to assure enhanced safety and governance in the provinces and to expand opportunities for popular initiative. Given the lack of dedicated local administration in many sections of the nation, they created the perfect climate for tyrants and revolts to flourish and thrive. Historically, warlords in strategic regions controlled a sizable share of the money earned by customs duties collected at line crossovers inside their various zones of influence, most notably at crucial border crossings with Iran and Pakistan (DoC, 2017).

4.7. Economic Aspects of the US ' Grand Strategy

In any event, there is little question that the US government's mediation has benefited millions of Afghans. By the year 2018, average life expectancy by 16 percent, from 56 to 65. (Special Report, 2021). Each of Afghanistan's radical factions' profits from drug trafficking to varying degrees. However, the trade's harmful consequences do not stop at backing extremists; it also undermines law and order inside official positions. The arrangement calculates the average \$70 million to \$100 million per year for militants, accounting for roughly a quarter of their spending plans, which some UN officials believe to be worth approximately \$400 million.

The US approach for supporting Afghanistan in achieving self-sufficiency involves reviving economic events and integrating them into provincial exchange programs. However, Afghanistan will be ruled for an extended period by an unknown ruler (CFR Report, 2001). Additionally, defensive fighting needs large financial investments. Afghanistan's conflict is anticipated to cost an extra \$8.5 billion in 2004. In most cases,

an economy the magnitude of America could support such spending. The US will spend \$80 billion this year on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, less than 1% of the entire budget (GDP). Because of these financial outcomes, the downfall of American dominance will be accelerated.

The macroeconomic repercussions of huge, ongoing government shortages, as well as the obligation's influence on a continual balance of instalment shortfalls, are likely to hinder American progress. This choking of American progress and the acceleration of the export of American assets would speed the economy's eventual demise in the face of competing great forces. 9/11 should be seen as a human catastrophe, not a financial disaster. Despite their great human cost, the attacks had far too few direct consequences and were geographically confined to have a meaningful influence on the government's economic production. The September 11th terrorist attacks did not spur the economy into a spiral (D. Baddle, 2005). The public's perception of security was significantly impacted by security and financial results. After 2005, when stability started to erode, and in 2014, once the triple transition happened, the present condition may be observed.

The international accord, as well as aid for Afghanistan's self-sufficiency, has spurred optimism for the state's future prosperity. It was opted to continue both the exterior and interior spoilers in check. Additionally, the existing scenario enhanced the private area's and residents' feeling of security. There was an air of anticipation and restoration between 2002 and 2005. As we will see in the next part, private project and new direct prediction increased in popularity. However, this situation did not continue long. Between 2005 and 2014, the worsening of security, which includes disputed

Presidential elections, jeopardized the additions and harmed people's hopeful opinions of the future of this country (Behzan, 2018).

4.8 The Evolution of a Controversial Economy

In late 2001, Afghanistan was a shattered, powerful, and fractured state unable of providing long-term assistance or certainty to its inhabitants. The economy had contracted because of the conflict's two-decade duration. The World Bank estimated the entire cost of the war at \$240 billion in 2002, including missed progress and the price of positive aid as well as armed usage. Over 66% of the population has been displaced or fled Afghanistan, largely to Iran and Pakistan. A war economy had developed, affecting the country's financial dynamics and complicating the post-2001 reconstruction and state-building process. In 2002, the primary mission was to balance the nation and establish a true and functional state, as well as a viable economy. Whatever the case, the US and its partners' commitment to the nation was guided by the struggle of fear. Afghanistan remains weak and impotent in the face of foreign threats despite tremendous progress in constructing state structures and foundations and growing public agencies (Bizhan, 2018).

Thus, notwithstanding the slow pace of recovery since 2001, the military and political shocks of 2009 and 2014 were major missteps that increased the risk of collapse into a bombed state. Regardless, the Afghan government, particularly in the global local area, had the option of mitigating the danger by establishing a National Unity Government (2014) and addressing to maintain the progression of a modest level of assistance and military assistance for supporting the additions, respectively.

It is essential to remember that a part of the causes for the state's fragility have their origins in Afghanistan's advanced past. These include restrictive political foundations,

progressive systems' irrational financial premise, the means-based economy, the landlocked concept of the nation and its complex social mosaic, as well as furnished struggles and the contest for control of the district by extraordinary forces, resulting in numerous intrusions. While the fundamental characteristics of state delicacy evolved over time, state delicacy grew in the twenty years after the Soviet onslaught in 1979. State as well as non-state viciousness and restriction grew dominant, eroding the state limit. These enhancements impeded private sector development and exacerbated the country's vulnerability to financial and political shocks (Behzan, 2018).

While a de facto government has stayed in office in Kabul, the GIROA has dissolved and the ANSF has fragmented along Afghanistan's various group lines, a scenario similar to that in southern Somalia. Without a clear central management, roughly 350,000 NATO-trained troops have surrendered to the collector. While many refer to this era as the "second age of the warlords," it is substantially more convoluted than the 1990s' first warlord era. Countless innovative force merchants have emerged in the post-Taliban era, all vying for a piece of the action. Each of the old barons and new force agents has their own fiefdoms and is always vying for control of the drug trade, religion, and power.

The revitalized pharmaceutical exchange, which has regained economic leadership, presents a greater danger to the basis of Afghanistan's request and majority rule systems. Afghanistan is on the cusp of becoming a "narco-state," poppy farming is once again a lifeline for Afghan ranchers, and "very excellent quality" drug manufacturing and distribution are reportedly accounting for an increasing portion of Afghanistan's medical profits. The agreement is alleged to benefit top Karzai

administration officials, warlords, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda. Despite widespread narcotics contamination, English companions are seeking to assist the neighborhood in combating drug authorization capabilities. A much more difficult task will be to significantly eliminate Afghan civilians' financial ties to the drugs trade without compromising their prospects for wealth and freedom (Nayak, 2005).

Due to the absence of speculators, little left of the Afghan business has sunk. There is a great deal of blame, guilt, and harshness. The establishment of radical refugee camps has exacerbated the anarchy and lack of administration (David, 2012). The Afghan people are hurting tremendously as a result of this very unstable scenario, in which every vital liberty is being abused to an absurd degree and rule of law are non-existent. Each individual capable of leaving the nation and Afghanistan is faced with a complex channel. Numerous leaders of the GIROA and their families have fled to neighboring countries. The affluent and influential are not the only ones who have fled. Internally displaced individuals (IDPs) have surged in number because of rampant barbarism, while exiles have started to enter Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asian countries. IDPs are in an extremely precarious condition because to the scarcity of compassionate access.

The Afghan economy is thriving as a result of the 'harmony profit.' Increased public as well as new financial sponsors have been recruited because of the strengthened financial position. Agriculture is boosting output and employing a significant number of Afghans. Additionally, Chinese accounts are flooded in exchange for Aynak copper mine assets. Additionally, the nation has natural gas and oil deposits. Additionally, the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Pipeline is operational. Additionally, the US believes that Afghanistan may contain \$1 trillion in assets,

including gold, iron ore, uranium, and valuable stones like as emeralds, which have bolstered Afghan bravery. Since a consequence, the West's influence in Kabul has waned significantly, as the Afghan government may now get funds from Chinese sources as well (Afghanistan Report, 2013).

Afghanistan's economy is entirely reliant on extraordinary international support; however, this stream has been rapidly depleted. Crime and trafficking are at an all-time high across Afghanistan's system, and the country's democratic process is being disrupted by weak political systems. Most resources, notably communications, are managed by unverified sources; thus radio, tv, and other modes of communication are limited to the absolute minimum or shut down entirely. If the present situation of rule of law persists, foreign financial sponsors will forgo future initiatives in Afghanistan. The state of the economy precludes such a large influence. After 2014, in an environment characterized by instability and uncertainty, it is predicted that foreign donors would forsake their interests in Afghanistan. Additionally, given the country's financial predicament, Afghan currency would be unable to sustain its current status beyond 2014. In such conditions, the Afghan government must design plans for transitioning away from dollars and euros and toward a self-contained financial system. Afghanistan's impoverished economy will compound the country's other serious problems. "Removing NATO's authority may potentially jeopardize critical guideline duties," the New York Times argues.

Kabul is still a good distance from independence, and only around 20% of its expenditures are self-funded, with the remainder subsidized by America and its allied forces. Without a coherent Afghan plan, the country's precarious economic condition would deteriorate further. As shown by the Afghan government's present inability to

prepare for ANA and Police salaries. This precarious financial condition was included in the post-2014 plan just lately.

Throughout the NATO era, the nation's dependency on aid prohibited it from engaging in economic activity. Afghanistan must prioritize information exchange with its neighbors. Therefore, Afghanistan's economy may avoid collapse beyond 2014. Additionally, there is no tax collecting plan in place, and Afghanistan requires a sound tax assessment basis, which is critical for handling the country's issues. After 2014, adapting to the interplay of certain evaluation assortments will be a significant issue. Afghanistan has not attained the peak of civilization in any sense, and industries are critical to the economy's development (Afridi & Khan, 2015).

There are no fundamental possibilities for economic development considering the widespread damage caused to Afghanistan by 30 years of continuous fighting, the massive misappropriation of assets by global contract workers, the lack of accountability, and pervasive corruption in the government. In any event, as with Afghanistan's control, the most critical requirement for growth is to combine human bounds with the building of the state's institutional structure (Achikzad, 2012). These programs, which are not intended to give brief reprieve, disregard critical recommendations. They provide a solid basis for the development of key governance, common culture, and business institutions that will sustain the nation indefinitely. Each mile of road constructed by the US and each state official educated was intended to act as a trampoline for future enhancements and completion of the restoration project.

However, the American government has a history of failing to defend the long-term viability of its activities. Billions of millions in remake money were wasted as

underutilized or degraded operations. US authorities identified and carried out temporary operations without regard for government constraints or long-term manageability, in response to requests for expedited progress. In the US, organizations were seldom defined by the quantity of projects accomplished and money spent, but rather by the value of their employment (CFR, 2017).

Throughout time, American agreements emphasized the need of managing all US reconstruction projects, but Afghans often lacked the competence to assume project obligation. Therefore, the US government endeavored to help Afghan institutions in developing competence, but these organizations usually fell short of meeting US standards for quick development. Additionally, contamination posed a risk that US reserves delivered via the Afghan government would be squandered, extorted, or misused. These issues pushed US authorities to route the bulk of aid via channels other than the Afghan government. While the concept was possible, it reflected a lack of expertise on the part of Afghan authorities in administering and supporting long-term American productive activities. Consequently, even when programs made brief headway, they typically failed to survive due to insufficient preparation, preparation, or mobilization of the Afghans who would eventually feel responsible for them (Special Report, 2021).

Therefore, in a way, financial revamping obligated a wide framework, as it considered necessary to embody not only the renovation of management to perform and establishments that had been annihilated during the dispute, but also the transformation or creation of critical macroeconomic and micro - economic structural, scheme, lawful, and managerial structures that are crucial for policymaking, economic reactivation, and the validity and simplicity of the US economy. Economic adjustment

was also important to resolve the vast macroeconomic instability of the past (DoC Research, 2017).

4.9 US Efforts to Promote Peace in Afghanistan

Following the Taliban regime's demise in Dec 2001, the US launched a peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan. When the US military, its Western partners, and the Afghan Northern Alliance, the Taliban's competing group in the common struggle, toppled the Taliban rule, many Afghan technocrats and Western diplomats desired to construct a stable and effective administration. In either case, setting a foreign vote-based system in a region that had endured two decades of agitation was a daunting task, given Afghanistan's immature economy, the presence of the few ethno-partisan challenges among various nationalities, and, most importantly, comparable wellsprings of bandwidth to the public authority with which the warlords engaged during the 20 years of agitation and tested the focal government's authenticity in all areas of administration (Niland, 2014).

Between 2001 and 2003, the President Bush turned a blind eye to these difficulties because the American military's aim was to "kill or capture" Taliban and Al Qaida pioneers rather than remain in Afghanistan indefinitely. In any event, as the insurgency rose in strength after 2004, the Bush administration shifted its policy in Afghanistan to one of state-building. This technique was also risky for a multitude of ways: one, the Afghan venture lacked expertise in equitable government administration, making it impossible to execute an agent framework via logical political decision-making.

Apart from that, the US and other Western countries placed a premium on the construction of Kabul and other big metropolitan areas in Afghanistan, with the goal

of establishing these cities as economic and political models for the country's provinces. Nonetheless, this disregard for provincial regions paved the way for a Taliban resurrection, putting parliamentary authority to the test in wide swaths of the nation. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, US-led attempts to establish a strong, US in Kabul capable of enforcing peace and order have made little headway. The lack of engagement and human resource constraints inside the Kabul organization have resulted in the formation of a monstrous structure that will thwart any attempts to eliminate it. Afghanistan's difficulties get less consideration in the Donald administration's "America first" approach. American policymakers have lost confidence in their Afghan friends under the Trump administration, abandoning almost a decade of attempts to construct a secure, majority-rule, and cohesive state in Kabul (Niland, 2014).

The US state-building approach has emphasized the establishment of state organs based on a liberal paradigm and charged with encouraging regional peace, popular governance, and market-driven progress. Each of the official affiliations represented here, including those of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, envisioned the "triple transition to peace, dominant part government, and free market" as a self-sustaining engagement that would compel Afghanistan to respond.

Nonetheless, it has been obvious from the liberal mediation strategy's inception in 2004 that the development of a liberal economy has jeopardized the expansion of concord and majority rule government due to the inescapable consequences: social humiliation and growing inequality among Afghans. Considering that most Afghans now reside in rural areas or places in agriculture, the Afghan economy's development has led to the downfall of customary horticulture as well as a considerable drop in

income for ranchers, further fueling their disappointment with the Afghan government as well as its foreign partners. Dissatisfaction among ranchers has aided the Taliban in gaining support among provincial inhabitants in eastern and southern Afghanistan, undercutting the US reconciliation plan (Asey, 2019).

The US -led endeavor to construct a secure integrated state in Kabul to maintain law and order has made little headway in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The Kabul group is just too polluted to ever contemplate exposing. American authorities essentially abandoned their Afghan partners under the Trump presidency. Afghan quasi personnel institutions are significantly distributed in the country's extensive metropolitan regions because of the nation's well-coordinated administration. In view of the Taliban's rise, provincial areas lack legal executive and law implementation structures, undermining the state's confidence with the populace. The US and other organizations' monetary policies evolved in response to the economy's growth and the debilitation of occupiers of Afghan provinces. These methods rendered Afghanistan powerless in the sight of global financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and US aid agencies, and did not contribute to the engagement of an indigenous bourgeoisie (Azami, 2019).

Afghans were outraged by the aggressive official competitions in 2009, 2014, and 2019. They proved that making choices would not assist the nation build a stable administration. The Afghan popular administration has been damaged to the point of impossibility because of the formulation and execution of a public solidarity government in the aftermath of the disastrous 2014 official political campaign. Afghanistan's political forerunners, most notably Presidents Karzai and Ghani, have converted the country's limited ballot system into a dictatorship since the official

political struggle began in 2009. The one area in which the US-led operation has succeeded is in expanding the state's coercive power, with the Afghan National Army & Afghan Public Police growing to a combined force of around 350,000 personnel. Nonetheless, the expense of keeping up with the Afghan military is projected to be more than \$8 billion per year, highlighting Afghanistan's reliance on other nations, most notably the US. This coercive power enables the Afghan government to maintain the authoritarian cohesiveness necessary to stifle any objections with its first-class supervision. Afghanistan remains a rent seeking state 18 years after the Taliban were evicted; foreign donors fund 66% of Afghanistan's annual budget (Rasouli, 2020).

4.10. Weaknesses in the US ' Afghanistan Policy

Whatever increases are made, the critical issue is whether they are like US speculation or manageable in the event of a US exit. Reliable objectives are critical for operation success and Afghanistan's stability. Unfortunately, the US military, strategic, and developmental agencies' objectives were not always obvious or dependable, resulting in objective letdown and an unwinnable scenario. The US's primary objective and objectives in Afghanistan have varied over the previous two decades via the efforts of three political organizations, many armed administrations, as well as a few Afghan governments. At first, the rationale for bombing Afghanistan was to remove Al Qaeda, weaken the Taliban, and avert another attack on the US and its allies. Following the Taliban regime's collapse in 2001 and the fall of Al-Qaeda, the American mission in Afghanistan grew as it developed new destinations outside its initial counter-terrorism objective (Starr, 2014).

The longer the US stayed in Afghanistan, the more uncertain the aims and strategy became. To prevent the rise of al-Qaeda and other panic-based oppressor

organizations, the US presumed that the Afghan government should be fully competent to provide safety and essential administrations, while also reducing overall brutality in order to promote economic, political, and social freedoms. Consequently, the US embraced nation building and social engineering missions. However, without a predictable, unambiguous, appropriately resourced, long-term plan and the backing of the American people, America's ambitions of rebuilding Afghanistan's indigenous initiatives while fighting a varied and regenerative opponent in a nation devastated by forty years of conflict were unattainable and destined to failure. Therefore, an unwinnable conflict has developed with no apparent path to victory (Azizain, 2021). The US strategy for Afghanistan transitioned from a time-sensitive to a condition-based approach during the Obama regime to a time-sensitive approach right at the start of the Trump presidency, then back to a time-sensitive approach before the Trump administration ended, increasing the cost of winning the battle and postponing the conflict in Afghanistan. The Obama administration abandoned Bush's counterterrorism strategy in favor of a barter between counter - insurgency and antiterrorism, which included 150,000 US ground forces, NATO troops, and an influx of foreign monetary assistance to the Afghan government, which was incapable of absorbing and transporting those assets.

At the onset of the military triumph over the Taliban, US strategists, military leaders, and ordinary civilians underestimated the crucial nature of a strong Afghan government, and so failed to direct the critical work required to deliver sustained political and economic outcomes. During the early phases of the Afghan war, US system was severely underfunded. The Taliban and Al Qaeda were recovering their power and fortitude. Recruitment, preparation, and operation of the Afghan security

forces were scant and delayed, resulting in the inability to halt Taliban attacks. The US lacked a coherent, sound, adequately resourced, and protracted post-Taliban plan throughout the early phases of the conflict (Azizain, 2021).

The challenges that US authorities have found in implementing long-term, feasible reforms raise worries about the capacity of US government institutions to develop, execute, and assess remake processes. The division of responsibility within institutions did often not take into consideration the strengths and shortcomings of each office. For instance, the State Department should spearhead reproductive initiatives; unfortunately, it lacked the experience and resources necessary to lead the charge and seize control of the Afghan system. On the other hand, the Department of Defense has the required resources and experience to supervise processes, but not for large-scale redesign operations with considerable administrative and financial components (Special Report, 2021).

As a result, no one agency has the vision, skills, or resources required to create and oversee the Afghanistan restructuring system. Non-military staff offices must set an example, not merely on paper, if the US leadership is to successfully restructure a nation, especially one that is now through violent war. This unequal division of labor inevitably resulted in a precarious system. While the operation began with the goal of destroying al-Qaeda, it quickly extended to encompass the Taliban, an extreme organization with strong roots in the Afghan people, and subsequently to include a degraded Afghan government that blocked US operations at every step.

Meanwhile, security deteriorated, impeding the attempt. The US accepted that the only way to address weakness was to continue heavily investing into Afghan institutions indeterminately, but the slow progress just after the influx of civilian and military aid

between 2009 and 2011 revealed that key issues were highly improbable to be discussed by shifting asset levels. Whatever the financial approach, the US administration was just not able to take such a risk in such a constrained climate. Followed by years of pace, the US started a decade-long pullback that showed the Afghan government's continued dependence and weakness (Special Report, 2021). For other Afghans, joining the revolt was a matter of "endure or starve" owing to the inability to revive the economy comprehensively and practically, and a lack of job to exit the war or underground illicit economy promptly and properly. This includes many individuals who did not share the viewpoints or even political attitudes of the events to which they were invited. Both governmental officials and unidentified interveners have blame for Afghanistan's failure.

Afghanistan has a history of waging political conflicts to unify its many ethnic and religious groups and handle complicated connections with its neighbors since its establishment as a nation in the eighteenth century. Despite huge backing and professional assistance, these battles occurred in the context of attempts to modernize the nation, alter women's customs, enable financial development in a variety of sectors, and vigorously fight foreign norms and barriers (DoC Report, 2017).

Since the US meddled in Afghanistan in 2001, both country's first two leaders, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, have defended intervention in Afghanistan's electoral, budgetary, and sociocultural matters as part of a "state-building" framework to tackle a range of security and humanitarian concerns. The US advocated for state-building activities driven by a liberal mediation ideology aimed at promoting regional unity, democratic governance, and market-driven growth. After two years in power, Trump's

administration renounced this state-building policy, as well as all possibility of a tactical win over the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The question of establishing long-term peace in Kabul has also proved challenging for the US and Afghans (Rasouli, 2020). The US's international policy for Afghanistan is best understood as a complement to the needs of its larger international strategy. Military instructors adhere to rigid chain of command and a rigorous set of social and behavior rules.

Therefore, US soldiers and non-military personnel within the Department of Defense (DoD) are confronted with unforeseen strategic difficulties from military and battlefield perspectives. The US ' and Afghanistan's international policy shows this. Bush's method in the "Battle on Terror" was not an openly proclaimed plan. Perhaps the objective was to stimulate Americans and get clear legislative authorization to utilize force against 9/11 attack planners. It was a battlefield insight, aimed at annihilating emotional bullies rather than just dismissing them. In October 2001, the US military launched "Activity Enduring Opportunity" as it became evident that the Taliban would not cooperate with the aim to "liberate the oppressed based on fear" (Azami, 2019).

Because the tactical foundation declined to submit a substantial number of US forces, the CIA bought several key barons in the Northern Alliance with funds and munitions to fight for the US cause. The US has a policy of deploying minuscule ground troops. The military foundation successfully planned the incursion. Therefore, the aeronautical besiegement campaign in the worldwide local region would be prevented. While the US army focused its efforts on defending the country, it gave little support to the Afghans. When the worldwide media reported that the heightened besieging

attempt had resulted in multiple non-military people losses and enormous internal dislodging, the White House ordered the strategic foundation to adapt its incursion approach, which was afterwards dubbed "Speeding up Success" (Niland, 2014).

4.11 Realism in Structure

Representatives of the Structural Realist as well as other positivist eras of international affairs are largely equivalent, with few significant distinctions in style or content. Therefore, everyone who solves their sovereign state's global challenges does so in a mostly consistent manner and with nearly the same degree of ability (Wiseman, 2011). Following 9/11, the US objective in Afghanistan was mainly to topple the Taliban rule as part of the wider War on Terror (WoT). Because the system conflicts with the US government's goal of eliminating Osama bin Laden, the main suspect of the psychological oppressor attack on the US in 2001, the WoT strategy didn't stop with the breakdown of the Taliban management; rather, the circumstance in Afghanistan was moved forward towards a nation-building strategy.

Aftermath of the 9/11 psychological oppressor attack, President Bush engaged in Afghanistan under the auspices of the War on Terror (WoT), with the objective of deposing the Taliban administration. Bush administration officials pushed quickly to proclaim success in Afghanistan, collect settlement, and proceed on to Iraq. However, on December 5, 2001, the organization abruptly redirected its efforts and converted Afghanistan into a nation building operation independent of the Bonn Agreement. The firm has stayed solid for the last 17 years. The US ' presidents have alternated, but the US approach in Afghanistan has been steady. The US strategy in Afghanistan has been directed by two key objectives: the first is to safeguard the US from future Taliban

threats by using the current international structure, and the second is to foresee the establishment of new regional hegemonies in South Asia.

The needs for US international policy are determined by a variety of elements, including domestic concerns, choice producers' behaviors and belief systems, the unique political norms and benefits of American culture, economic interests, and the interests of entrance assemblages (Rahman, 2019). As a consequence, hostile realists prioritize two fundamental ideas above all other considerations. To begin, evaluate the operation of exceptional powers inside the global order. States desire a robust international policy that prioritizes capacity development as a means of guaranteeing long-term accomplishment in global legislative matters. The premise is that as governments' authority increases, their security increases as well. When a state attains supremacy, its strength reaches a degree where other entities are unlikely to invade. In any event, global supremacy is unachievable, since exceptional authorities find it difficult to expand their influence over the world's oceans on top of an opposition's remarkable power.

The second key argument of hostile pragmatists is landward adjustment, a fanciful way by which a seaward state might maintain general influence in a province while avoiding the development of a province hegemon. Great powers either attempt to retain provincial supremacy and achieve global supremacy, or they follow the seaward adjustment plan to fulfil their demands. Seaward adjustment is a method in which an exceptional power, rather than governing humanity at all times, energizes other countries in areas to take the lead in appraising skills and develop new ones and resolving disputes only when required. The US, as a province hegemon, is concerned

with conforming to global standards and preventing the creation of further provincial imperial powers (Mearsheimer 2001).

In August 2017, President Trump unveiled his Afghan plan. He became the third president of the US to get embroiled in this protracted conflict, which is probably the country's most severe. Around 10,000 US organizations and more than twice as many US project workers remain on the ground in this conflict-torn state. Obama's vow to remove American troops from Afghanistan was rescinded. Notwithstanding the Trump organization's assertions that this is a new approach that is a radical departure from President Barack Obama's technique, it is merely a minor tweak to an established system. Barak Obama, the 2008 'antiwar' hopeful who also pledged to transform Afghanistan from George W. Bush's 'awful fight' to a 'great combat,' could do nothing to absolve himself of his duties. Barak Obama initially thought that Afghanistan would become a winning state for the US, but time and painful experience have shown that Afghanistan is an endless source of unrest and a hopeless strategy for the US.

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the US faced a grave danger to public safety. This time, the threat came not from or was directed at a rival sovereign power, but at non-state militants ostensibly connected with Al-Qaeda. To alleviate the danger, the nation urged the Taliban in Kabul to assassinate Osama Bin Laden, according to a country-confirmed Al-Qaeda plan. The Taliban regime was unable of implementing the US proposals. In this vein, the Bush administration initiated the WOT operation with the main objective of destabilizing the Taliban rule on a systematic basis for the sake of absolute security. The mediation process was rushed in reaction to the 9/11 attacks, and the justification for seeking settlement after the event remains firmly rooted in public defense concerns. It was designed to destroy Al-

Qaeda and its supporters in order to avert a few potential acts of worldwide intentional torts against the US by such nations, organizations, or people.

Despite the collapse of the Taliban regime and the escape of Mullah Umar, the US operation persisted. The Bonn Agreement of 2001 underlined the importance of popular advancement, protecting human rights, preserving fundamental freedoms, and other country-structure components. Nonetheless, the primary worry remained one of safety. Similarly, actions aimed at assembling and preparing Afghan security troops were quickly dispatched and sustained. In mid-2002, the US extraordinary powers started building and preparing the Afghan National Armed Forces. The plan was advanced in mid-2003, when the Bush administration formally switched from the WoT to a strategic plan for Afghanistan. Obama administration officials continued their earlier policy, with the intention of avoiding Afghanistan from becoming a refuge for psychological tyranny and removing the US from the prospect of unlawful intimidation. President Obama claimed that mankind could not afford the financial cost that would result if Afghanistan went deeper into turmoil or if Al-Qaeda launched unrestrained attacks (New York Times 2009).

4.12 Conclusion

Outside nations have continued to utilize Afghanistan as a battlefield to accomplish their geopolitical goals. It is the result of its geographical position and an idealistic vision of a community in which racial groups fought for control with the assistance of external forces. Afghanistan has been ravaged, a substantial portion of the infrastructure destroyed, shipping channels interrupted, and employment and capital availability have dried up during the previous years of fighting and chaos. Soviet occupying soldiers had long since withdrawn. Therefore, Afghanistan suffered from

instability for a lengthy period. Finally, 9/11 gave NATO/ISAF forces an opening to act (Afridi & Manzoor Khan, 2015).

Afghanistan's conflict-torn nature demands the difficult task of state-building. It is a complicated and varied responsibility. Although the Russian intervention in Afghanistan, the escalating war between various warlords, the Taliban's ascension to power, and the US's "war on terror" all have a local dimension and entail a territorial approach, the Kabul government will be unable to find balance and reliability unless and until the local dimensions of violence are effectively addressed.

To transform Afghanistan into a modern, steady state, the world community and regional governments must adopt a long-term view, preparing to invest in both short- and long-term requirements of the local people. To reestablish stability and peace, a methodology should be established with the goal of establishing a compelling administration structure capable of maintaining law and order, putting a stop to rebellion, enhancing financial events, delivering public services, and guaranteeing social stability, all of which may help eradicate illicit medicine utilized in authorized economic operations (Mustafa & Imran, 2019).

Except for financial developments, public and international debates, media coverage, and scholarly research have focused primarily on safety, geopolitical, and social changes. Increasing the strength of governments, transitioning from a war economy to a legitimate one, and increasing administration so that nations can stand with their own two feet has reignited a desire to move quickly in Afghanistan and everywhere else. By analyzing earlier experience, it is easy to see how ill-informed the whole political structure established at Bonn was and how ineffective a portion of the 'shock' modifications intended to modernize the nation were. The authentic perspective is also

necessary to understand how the financial system established in the immediate wake of military mediation following September 11th was preposterous for a nation like Afghanistan, yet completely inadequate given the country's lack of capabilities and resources, as well as the enormous demands imposed by more than two years of conflict (DoC Research, 2017).

The US approach in Afghanistan is such that there is no convincing argument that the US will prevail in any scenario, and there is no proof that the US will ever be able to convert Afghanistan into a safe, well-known government. Furthermore, for certain officials across affiliations, the unknown risks of quitting have consistently outweighed the known hazards of staying and continuing puts an unequal burden on the US military. It is the ideal time to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the potential risks that surround them. Additionally, although the conditions are not identical, the inclusion of the Islamic State in the US exit from Iraq in 2011 and the subsequent emergence of the Islamic State have made policymakers far more risk cautious towards the present withdrawal from Afghanistan (Magsamen, 2019).

Therefore, for more than a decade, the US has been trapped in critical immobility. Regardless, it has become clearer that most of the American populace is apathetic about this situation, with just a few shouldering the weight. According to research performed by the Research Center, 58% of specialists say the Afghan war is unjustifiable. In 2018, 49% of Americans felt the US consistently failed to fulfil its objectives in Afghanistan, compared to 35% who said it consistently succeeded. Additionally, it's worth mentioning that mistrust is not exclusive to Americans. In 2018, 61% of Afghans expressed concern about the country's direction (Magsamen, 2019)

CHAPTER 5

THE POST 9/ 11 GRAND STRATEGY'S FAILURE

5.1 Introduction

The methods of grand strategy have remained similar panning throughout the era. The basic methods are the establishment of long-term alliances and mutual security preparations, as well as the maintenance of strong-armed restrictions, and the re-establishment of stable, influential, and capable military forces. Additionally, it consists of leaders in respective warfighting spheres who are capable of planning and sustaining combat influence on a global scale, as well as successfully carrying out weapons struggle; and providing intellect facilities capable of preserving global situational awareness and delivering tactical initiators.

The US aims to address large dangers using a combination of tools, depending on intellect, mediation, forward attendance, and financial strength to predict, avert, or otherwise overcome security trials while reserving military force as a last alternative. However, the US ' military forces are enormous. The capacity to seek and tolerate armed armies comparable to those of the homeland, supported by an unmatched ability to pursue and tolerate armed militaries similar to those of the motherland. At any point in time, the US will handle threats with friends, partners, or like-minded governments, via international institutions such as the UN or NATO, and through large-scale pre-conflict engagement and "shaping" operations. Until date, the US has acted alone when important interests are at issue (R.D Hooker, 2014).

Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the US developed an extraordinary method of "primacy" sometimes referred to as "leadership." This approach was sometimes

disturbed. It took until the 1960s to establish the parameters for US foreign policy debate. The approach is divided into four interconnected components: increasing military might; encouraging and encompassing allies; integrating other governments into US-directed institutions and markets; and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. These fundamental safety requirements have been established and are difficult to modify, even during jolts (Porter, 2018). The US grand plan seeks to establish supremacy on the world stage and to preserve unipolarity.

Afghanistan was a focal point of worry for the US and international counterterrorism efforts (Mir, 2020). After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American territory, the US of America's attacks on Afghanistan against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces were evaluated by an important US foreign policy issue. The US suffered much in this conflict, rather than benefiting. Over the course of almost 18 years in such a protracted battle, 2,400 US military personnel perished. The US legislature granted roughly \$141 billion for rebuilding and economic reasons, as well as to bolster Afghan security.

To begin, the decision to strike Afghanistan was more a result of an emotional response aimed at satisfying the collective mental desire for revenge for the 9/11 attacks than it was the result of prudent strategic thinking. As one researcher mentions it, the US's policy in the aftermath of Sep 11, looked to be formed in a manner that was absurd, comprehensive, and post-awful. To be fair, the US effort believed it was expected to devise a military response to the atrocities of 9/11. Nevertheless, before to the 2001's winters, the G. W. Bush's administration did not adequately evaluate the precise locations of armed operations in Kabul (Butt, 2019). US may have reasoned that they could appease the hearts and minds of ordinary Afghans and establish a

friendship of trust amongst the various Afghani factions. To assist with this, they began establishing centers and schools in an effort to build state boundaries throughout the conflict. Nonetheless, the growing number of ordinary civilian failures, dubbed blowback, hindered any chance of capturing the hearts and minds of nonmilitary troops. While the US desired the most precise use of power possible in order to avoid non-military personnel defeats, this was insufficiently accomplished. Regular citizen losses call into question the mediation's moral premise and the conflict's ethical foundation (Connah, 2020).

Following 29th February 2020, the American and Taliban agreement on counterterrorism and the departure of US and international personnel, the American military campaign in Afghanistan looks to be ending. Taking everything into account, there are still unsolved questions. The US pledged as part of the deal to evacuate all its then-12,000 soldiers within 14 months; since then, personnel have been cut by up to 66%. Therefore, the Taliban were able to prohibit several organizations, comprising Al-Qaida, from exploiting the Afghan land to recruit, train, or finance actions that pose a danger to the US or its allies. The deal is achieved through top-secret channels, raising tensions to the point that a few congressional operatives get involved.

US management have portrayed the ultimate US exit as "conditions-based," albeit they have not indicated which circumstances will terminate, reverse, or otherwise change the withdrawal sequence of events outlined in the agreement. Due to the absence of Afghan government representatives in the US-Taliban talks, several analysts surmised that the US would arrange a military withdrawal in return for a complicated political solution that protects some of the country's social, political, and economic advances

since 2001. In Feb 2020, the Taliban and American members negotiated a peace pact in Doha, Qatar that called for the total withdrawal of US troops by May 2021 in return for the Taliban refraining from attacking US forces. Taliban attacks on US soldiers have dropped since then, while attacks on Afghan security forces have increased.

According to a Pentagon statement, the Taliban's level of slaughter is excessively high in conjunction with the Afghan National Defense and Defense Forces, as well as the Afghan populace, and directly jeopardizes the peace process (NBC News, 2020 November 5). US negotiators encouraged policymakers to approach the Taliban for reconciliation, in which the Taliban pledges not to utilize similar tactics to those used before to the 9/11 attacks, and the US offers to pay the Taliban \$ 20 million per year in return for peace (Mir, 2020).

While the Taliban continue to fight the contract's completion, the US continues to remove soldiers from the country, from an anticipated fourteen thousand at the beginning of the year 2020 to an approximate four thousands five hundred at the beginning of the year, and ultimately to almost half that number in early 2021. The US, on the other hand, is optimistic about Afghanistan's present security condition. Additional troop reductions in the present military environment, while the timeframe of a decided reconciliation agreement is also undetermined, may influence the US's sustained support for and progress of Afghanistan's self-confidence organizations, according to the Pentagon (Courtney, 2020). America desires stability in Kabul in order for the victorious to leave, and America has made it quite clear that the Taliban must survive the invasion. It cannot be one-sided; all participants must be humble. Likewise, General Scott Millar, commander of NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty

Organization)'s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, stated, "What we continue to do is to avert any negative outcomes and to reposition the situation in such a way that Afghanistan is not impeded with mere war or even little stability than it currently has" (Doucet, 2020).

Many Afghani civilians feel that Western forces are exclusively responsible for their country's plight. Afghanistan's present dilemma demands global involvement. Military presence is a significant factor driving the conflict; the conflict economy benefits world-class and many multinational interests. Even with a few victories, the notion that traditional Afghans would gain from any meaningful progress or effective support is tenuous in the present environment (Sida, 2018).

For decades, Afghanistan has been engaged in a cycle of violence and devastation. Afghanistan was destabilized financially, politically, and socially during Russia's 1979–1989 operation in Afghanistan. The Taliban established a foothold in Afghanistan and was accepted by Islamabad, KSA, and the UAE. However, the Taliban's imposition of draconian regulations destabilized the state, and lastly, the US invasion on Afghanistan further shook the frail state's foundations.

5.2. The US's Uncertainty about Security in Kabul

After the 9/11, terrorist attacks, the US faced a grave danger to civilian safety. However, this time, the threat came not from a rival humongous element, but from quasi-state actors claiming affiliation with Al Qaida. To mitigate the threat, the US demanded that the Taliban in Kabul remove Osama Bin Laden, Al-claimed Qaida's commander. The Taliban regime has vehemently opposed the US idea. In this vein, the Bush administration started the WoT project, with the stated objective of basically

destabilizing the Taliban organization. Militarily contends that the intervention was necessary in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks and that the reason for pursuing the war is based on public safety concerns. Al-Qaeda and its followers were pushed for destruction so as to avert future acts of worldwide criminal intimidation against the US by such countries, organizations, or people. By Dec 2001, the Taliban regime had debacle and Mullah Umar had fled, but the American operation had not finished.

Thus, the G. W. Bush's administration formulated a technique that contrasted with those who develop psychological oppressors to fear mongers, indicating that an acceptable system in Kabul would permit US troops to search for Al Qaida instructors there (Walker, 2012). The conflict is that the US was not safe in any manner, form, or shape until and until all other conceivable outcomes of a heinous attack since Afghanistan were removed.

The US group said that by leaving Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew in 1989, it enabled the nation to collapse into disorder, and therefore decided to rebuild an Afghan central government and financial system that had been broken by three years of fighting. Numerous external analysts referred to the initiative as a national structure. State-building grew increasingly transnational when the United Nations (UN) became the official organizer of global aid. The Bonn Accord of 2001 highlighted many state-building components, including changing majority rule, fostering friendly equality, and safeguarding shared freedoms (Afghan Government Website, 2001). Regardless, the major concern was the players' safety. Attempts to organize and train Afghan security staff were equally swiftly dispatched and continued over time. In mid-2002,

shortly after the invasion, the US exceptional powers began preparing and training the Afghan National Army. After the Bush administration authoritatively shifted its Afghanistan objective from the War on Terror to a nation-building operation in mid-2003, the plan remained expedited. The Obama administration maintained its previous approach, focused on guaranteeing security, preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for illegal activity, and liberating the US from psychological persecution.

He claimed that it was the US' common responsibility to reduce danger, not for the benefit of Afghans, but for the sake of the country's peace and security. President Donald Trump, too, follows the pattern, but in a variegated manner (Tariq, 2020). President Donald John Trump adopted a American policy for Afghanistan centered on developing Afghani security staff, all the while preserving a limited one-sided antiterrorism capacity against trans-national dangers.

5.3 Afghanistan's Severe Uncertainty

Afghanistan's security situation is far worse now than it was in the 1980s. Afghan sources indicate that the worsening stability scenario is because of NATO's exit. When the international armed presence was substantially reduced in the year 2014, several areas were left too vulnerable to manage stability on their own, and they became POWs. There has been a rise in attacks because of withdrawal. Numerous Afghans have been forced to escape dangerous places because of the deteriorating situation. Around 507,000 individuals abandoned their houses in 2017. Numerous families have been internally displaced or have become IDPs as a result of the NATO surge. Afghanistan's inhabitants also face major problems with education, health, and primary necessities. Additionally, the Taliban agility is the prime source of murder

and disturbance of rule of law. The Taliban's armed capacity is presently believed to be between 50,000 and 60,000 teenagers distributed around the state and protected by at least XVII areas, which span more than half of the country.

The Taliban must also develop more sophisticated attacks and be able to carry out large-scale operations to seize control of major cities such as Faryab, Farah, and Ghazni, even only for a few hours during their strikes. Even though the Taliban's followers are among the most active armed actors engaged in targeted violence against civilians and human rights crimes, the Taliban's statement has received little condemnation. "War is inevitable for the Taliban," one responder observed, "since the government is helpless to stop them and is forced to cope with their presence in several locations." The Taliban remains prominent on regional and national levels, with its leaders making and transmitting decisions from Kabul.

While the Taliban leaders have minimal influence on regional leaders and their choices, the scenario has shown that regional commanders-in-chief carry out Mullahs' commands. In rural regions, responders jointly stated, "the Taliban do not have to do much to attract sympathizers, since the central authorities are so embarrassed by their lack of credibility." Additionally, the populace is undermined by concern, insecurity, and a lack of advances as a result of global investment over the past sixteen years (Sida, 2018). The Taliban has taken part in 2 rounds of direct discussions with the US, the most recent of which took place in Qatar with Special Representative for Kabul Zalmay Khalilzad. According to the Taliban, "the breadth of the process has increased divisions and distrust between the two factions, resulting to make all Afghan front-runners apprehensive of their own survival." "According to the Americans, the

purpose of these conversations is to conduct preliminary consultations with the Taliban before proceeding to several further negotiations with Afghan specialists." Even though the hour has come for urgent discussions with the Afghan government, the Taliban have been rejected. The Taliban's orders remain unchanged from before to the removal of foreign military involvement, including the destruction of the Taliban as counterterrorism/sanctions record and the cessation of employment in Asian countries.

Despite continuous discussions and promising chances for reconciliation, the Taliban remain adamantly hostile to the present government, and as recent votes demonstrate, ferocity consumes limited ferocity and ambiguity finishes major and significant phases in a peacetime dialogue. Rather of complete reconciliation with one another and their aspirations to construct an Islamic State in Afghanistan, the Taliban's ideology as a movement remains unsettled. At this point, there should be no precise strategy or mechanism for developing a peace process.

Nearby, Taliban unit couriers communicate their perspectives and demands on the economy and education to the government, and they even have a representation within the High Peace Council (HPCL). Finally, the Taliban has joined to be a blessing in Russia for a new round of discussions with several nations, including an Asian nation, China, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Even though neither the Kabul administration nor the US is overjoyed about these quadri-lateral discussions, the HPC is scheduled. According to Zabiullah Muhammad, the Taliban mediator, the meeting is "not about debating a particular point, but rather about conducting extensive conversations about identifying a peaceful solution to the Afghan crisis and eliminating US rule."

5.4 The Role of the US in the Present Security Scenario

The US has been embroiled in a war in an Asian nation for more than 18 years. There have been 300 deaths and 20,000 injuries among US military troops. At least 0.5 million Afghans have been killed or wounded, including government officials, Taliban combatants, and regular citizens. The US has spent around \$1 trillion on the conflict. Even though Osama bin Laden, Al-founder, Qaeda's is no longer alive, and the Taliban in Asia have not launched a significant attack on the US since September 11, the US has been unable to cultivate the brutality or transfer the war to Afghan veterans, and as a result, the Afghan administration cannot survive without US military support (Malkasian, 2020).

The US, in collaboration with Afghan working groups in the public sector and the donor community, has fostered a "Afghan Compact," a drive aimed at defining and developing target-monitoring instruments to assist in restructuring and resolving major projects involving administration, economy, security, and harmony and compromise. By and large, Afghanistan's military and security dynamics take place under the watchful eye of the United Nations and other Western powers, who have little visible quality on populace-related matters on the ground.

Additionally, it is risky to emphasize Taliban perspectives when describing the country's fate, transcendently about regional stability concerns, the arrival of Internally Displaced Persons, the threat of ruthless fundamentalism, and the Taliban's subtle potential and willingness to participate in exchange for the conflict's purpose (Sida, 2018). These are just few of the difficulties that North Atlantic Treaty Organization's forces and the American authorities face in Afghanistan. In such

circumstances, achieving peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan is a difficult challenge.

Keeping in mind continued violence and monetary dependence, it's difficult to suggest. Monetary growth and employment opportunities, as well as poverty alleviation, are inextricably linked to progress toward state stability and workable concord. According to Afghan scholars, "given the complexity of Afghanistan's difficulties and its global participation, there is a possibility of categorization in the protection, diplomatic, political, and economic circles." Apart from administrative issues and operational disagreements over the situation in Afghanistan, there is also a risk of splintering because to the ongoing high-profile worldwide talks on Afghanistan, which have been divided into security seminars (hosted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and proceed with meetings".

One critical instance is that they should connect the US's Asia policy to a much wider plan for every plot and regional stability. Any plan for the Afghan war must be integrated into a broader strategy addressing both the danger presented by global extremism and the need for regional stability, which encompasses Asia, the Indian subcontinent, South-West Asia, and Central Asia, as well as the Gulf (H. Cordesman, 2009).

Simultaneously, the scenario is critical in terms of demonstrating alternative perceptions aimed at resolving the Afghan conflict, as well as the minor issue of American multiple agendas, and focusing on all the points that in essence, define a positive strategy in Kabul in conducts that demonstrate whether accurate valuations, viable policies, necessary wages, and credible goals for progress remain.

One of US's biggest social policy issues is that it is constantly complicating notions as it approaches the threshold at which everything becomes a public concern. In the real world, a policy should include a thorough examination of any required action as well as the desired outcome, an examination of critical substitutes, and an examination of cost-benefit analysis and results. The chosen option should be accompanied by detailed implementation strategy, a detailed elaboration of the required measures and a timeline for completing them, a detailed enlisting of the logistics required and how to obtain them, and viability analysis to determine whether it is successful once implemented (H. Cordesman, 2009).

As seen by financial transactions in 2016 and a shrinking board of directors in provincial districts, security is a problem. The groups that comprise the Goyt of National Unity continue to be diverged, and a deficient support apparatus proceeds to systemic change. The monetary cycle has decreased since the withdrawal of global powers, but the administration is still largely reliant on guidance. Pak-Afghan ties have worsened as a result of growing security tensions at a time when regional gathering activity in and around the Asian nation continues.

The US' willingness to pay Asian nations forever with \$23 billion per year is dubious, much more so now that Al- Qaida's status has been minimized to doubt. Nevertheless, a collapsing Afghani system combined with a relentless Taliban attack may result in the debacle of the Kabul administration and Afghanistan, culminating in either a return to revolt or a resurgence of psychological extremist factions (Tellis and Eggers, 2017). Afghanistan is the US's war with the longest duration, lasting over 6 years. Around ten thousand US soldiers and more than double that number of US contractors are

stationed across this state of destruction. The country's semi-permanent peace and prosperity are maintained by a remarkable blockade. The Afghan social framework is fractured by deep divisions; governance is corrupt, resulting in an incompetence to implement rule of law throughout Afghanistan; the Afghan army remains ineffective in the face of a tenacious religious insurgency; and, as a result, the market remains reliant on massive influx of global aid as compared to local mechanisms of growth.

These internal obstacles, when combined with external obligations such as the persistence of Pak-Afghan animus, the prevalence of ongoing regional conflicts in an Asian country, and thus the likelihood of donor fatigue as the Afghan war continues, may conclude in the loss of the security, economic, and political gains achieved since the year 2001. If such reversals culminate in a tipping point, the existence of the Afghan administration, if not the Afghan nation, may be jeopardized (Malkasian, 2020). Given the volatility of the scenario, the US and its partners, who all together provide almost \$5 billion in yearly Afghan civilian support to the Afghan government, must make key choices about how to effectively support Afghanistan in the future.

The US's choices on its future engagement in the country seem to be the most significant foreign force impacting both the war and the development of the Afghan state. Despite internal assessments that his strategy was sluggish, if not outright failure, former President Barack Hussain Obama abandoned his long-held objective of concluding the US ' interference in Asia during his presidency, preferring instead to delegate critical policies regarding previously run US objectives and strategies for achieving them to his successor. The Donald Trump's government is investigating these allegations, and a decision on troop numbers and the future direction of the US

presence in the Asian country is due shortly. However, considering the problems confronting the White House's public safety division, as well as the time limits associated with certifying a decision at NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) summit in Germany, Brussels, on 25th May 2017, it is uncertain if this analysis is exhaustive enough. Therefore, a joint degree independent endeavor to study US technique in Asian countries may demonstrate support, and this inquiry is aimed to delve into the US ' most basic vital judgments. While aspects such as troop numbers and the type of military missions are undoubtedly significant, this area unit adequately depicts the state's territory. Similarly, the emphasis here is on the key tenets of future US engagement with Asian states, as well as the arrangements that would follow them, rather than on the random facts underlying the other options (Tellis and Eggers, 2017).

5.5 Withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan

Afghanistan became a major international strategy concern for the US following the 9/11 attacks, prompting the launch of an armed mission against Al Qaida and the Taliban. As of April 30, 2020, the US had lost approximately 2,400 military personnel in Afghanistan over an eighteen-year period. Similarly, the US has spent \$137 billion on the cycle of leisure in Kabul. The Taliban's public power was substituted by an elected administration, culminating in improvement in many places, but Kabul's destiny remains unclear. The US ' best course of action is to avert further attacks on the country by seeking asylum in Afghanistan or receiving assistance in this capacity (Thomas, 2020). Currently, the US and its allies' major objective is to restore political stability and unity in Kabul after their withdrawal from the nation within a specified

time limit. Considering this, they needed to decide whether to engage into an accord with the Taliban or not (Khan, 2020).

Currently, the US military commitment in Afghanistan is winding down as a result of the US-Taliban agreement on counterinsurgency issues reached on February 29, 2020, and the withdrawal of US and other foreign soldiers assigned to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM). As per the agreement's terms & conditions, the US agreed to withdraw all its armed troops from the Afghan Land within 14 months, while the Taliban pledged not to allow other factions, such as Al-Qaida and other fear mongering organizations, to use Afghanistan to undermine the America and its allies.

Additionally, the Taliban has expressed an interest in allowing the US to conduct security enlistments, training, and asset distribution. Although the Afghan government was not consulted during the US-Taliban talks, strategic analysts see the exit of American powers as a prelude to a complex strategic settlement that would reverse some of the sociopolitical and beneficial advances made since the year 2001. The American-Taliban framework established a framework for intra-Afghan talks scheduled to begin on 10th March 2020, but the talks were unable to proceed due to a number of impediments.

Throughout the discussions, the Taliban has maintained a different strategy of attacks from the American armed troops to the Afghan government. Although detainees were brought, they did not comply with the arrangement. The country remains mired in a state of political emergency. Ashraf Ghani was officially appointed president in September 2019 and will take office in February 2020, but the equivalent was dismissed as a forgery by his opponent and up-and-comer. The closure of the

administration's office forced Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to cancel an urgent \$1 billion US monetary guide to Kabul scheduled for this fiscal year. Another element impeding progress in the above-mentioned negotiations is the COVID-19 problem. Another remarkable obstacle to concord is the persistence of boorish protests, as illustrated by non-state entertainment demonstrations on 12th May 2020, followed by another display of brutality on 12th May 2020. The worsening rule of law scenario in the aftermath of the American-Taliban deal, which has resulted in the loss of over 1,300 nonmilitary individuals, demonstrates how harmony and reliability will become a scream in the wilderness (Tariq, 2020).

5.6 The Agreement between the Taliban and the US

Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban representative Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar signed the American-Taliban agreement in Doha on February 29, 2020, in front of a select worldwide witnesses and American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. As part of this agreement, the Kabul administration was urged to begin discussions with the Taliban as soon as feasible. According to the provisions of the agreement, the US pledged to decrease its troops from 13,000 to 8,600 in 135 days and to remove all capabilities within 14 months (Thomas, 2020). Other aspects of the deal include the exchange of prisoners between the Kabul administration and the Taliban, as well as the withdrawal of American sanctions against the Taliban by 27th August 2020.

The withdrawal of authorizations is conditional on the commencement of intra-Afghan talks. The Taliban also demonstrated their commitment to ensuring that Al-Qaeda and other radical organizations never use Afghan soil to launch attacks against American powers and their allied individuals. A few details of the arrangement are

being kept secret until everything is in place (Dozier, 2020). Michael Pompeo claimed that all Senate members will have access to the extensions, yet some felt the need to categorize them (Brufke, 2020). Even after agreeing to the deal with the Taliban, Afghanistan's security situation seems to be deteriorating. 2020 (Khan).

On 29th February 2020, the American-Taliban Pact will mark a watershed moment in global legal history. It is an important instance for both the US and Afghanistan, as the US ' policy toward Afghanistan has changed significantly since 2001. While strategic and stability factors may change, the conclusion is on the way in terms of how the various gatherings decipher the understanding and demonstrate their obligation to it (Wheelbarger, 2020). Although the American-Taliban agreement views intra-Afghan talks as critical for long-term peace and stability in Kabul, this may be the point at which they are given significant weight.

President Donald John Trump asked then-Defense Secretary James Mattis in 2018 to dramatically cut the US armed presence in the Afghan Land. The President offered this instruction while insisting that US military withdraw completely from Syria. Given that the President has already stated his desire for finishing the Afghan operation entirely, it is appropriate to evaluate the possible ramifications of an arbitrary early and complete or almost total withdrawal in violation of an agreed-upon coordination agreement. The following points are considered.

- Additional NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member states also withdraw.
- Additionally, the US, another worldwide nonmilitary human footprint, is being forcefully reduced.

- External monetary and security assistance assists in reducing.
- Kabul's official authority begins to lose credibility and authority.
- Control is shifted from the center to the periphery.
- Provincial state forces and local warlords gradually lose accountability for security.
- Provincial governments support rival inquirers for public office.
- The Taliban loses interest in achieving peace with the US.
- Through oppositional encounters, the Taliban expands its control over a territory and inhabitants.
- Afghanistan becomes embroiled in a more widespread shared battle.
- Civilian passages increase significantly, but evacuee streams increase.

Terrorist organizations, like as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, obtain an additional level of sophistication in order to plan, recruit, and launch psychological militant attacks against US territory and national objectives (Dobbins & Miller, 2019). There is no military solution to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. This, however, is only partly apparent. While victory is not an option, defeat is. No matter how justified, a sharp launch is choosing to lose. Therefore, American credibility would suffer, as would the worth of US assistance abroad, a prolonged oppressive danger originating from the Afghan area, and the potential of a required return under more awful circumstances (Campbell, 2019). President Trump outlined a new framework for Afghanistan in his August 21, 2017, speech to the nation, the central tenet of which was a change away from a period-sensitive strategy toward managing one ward based on circumstances (Khan, 2020). He focused on the fact that "for a lengthy period of time, situation on the ground, not emotional timelines, will define our approach from now on." US foes

should be unaware of our game plans or their ability to endure us. US goals included annihilating [the IS], annihilating Al Qaida, stopping the Taliban from seizing control of the Afghan soil, and averting mass panic attacks on US." After 16 months, Donald John Trump announced a total departure of the US military from Syria and allowed the removal of a portion of the US military presence in Afghanistan. President Trump explained his decision by stating that the armed goals of destroying the IS had been narrowed. He has not made a similar argument for Afghanistan.

Given the way in which the decision to reduce fighters in Afghanistan was taken, as well as the President's focus on the Afghan mission, this action should be seen as a precursor to future reductions. This will be true regardless of whether the President is convinced to amend or rescind the decision entirely. Both US friends and opponents have been warned that the US commitment to Afghanistan is precarious and might be cancelled quickly and without consultation. How long US soldiers should remain in Afghanistan and under what circumstances they should withdraw has been a source of contention both inside and outside the US administration for a long period of time, and the answer remains uncertain. Alternatively, most psychological fighting and Afghan specialists concur on the rational results of a rapid US exit. These impacts were evident when President Barack Obama originally announced a plan for complete withdrawal in 2014, and they eventually compelled him to reverse his decision. We think that an early US military withdrawal unconnected to the conclusion of a mediated deal would very certainly result in the continuation of events (Dobbins, 2019).

The US started reducing its soldiers before to the February 2020 deal and has continued to do so since then, despite US claims that Taliban violence and other acts violate the pact. On 15th January 2021, Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced that the number of US soldiers had reached 2,500, the lowest level since the year 2001, completing President Trump's November 2020 request for a drawdown. According to the New York Times, roughly 3,500 US soldiers are now stationed in Afghanistan owing to an unannounced presence of US forces.

According to a Pentagon spokesman, we are still at 2,500 Extraordinary Operations capabilities. Officials from the Trump administration insisted that the troop decrease had no discernible effect on the two main US goals in Afghanistan: antiterrorism and exhorting, preparing, and aiding Afghan authorities. Nevertheless, some American Department of Defense (DOD) officials stated at the time that President Trump's force level request was not optimal and may result in certain acclimations to American jobs and cutoff points to US.

Some external observers, including the congressionally authorized Afghanistan Analysis Gathering, doubt the degree to which the US can carry out both preparatory and antiterrorism tasks with sufficient hazard levels with a force of fewer than 4,500 men. President Biden aims to remove all American soldiers out of Afghanistan over the next two months, according to US officials, with the armed exit finished by the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, which plunged the US into its longest war. While the Taliban has threatened to resume attacks on the US if unfamiliar soldiers are not out by the deadline — and NATO has stated that it will not participate in "any gathering" about Afghanistan's future until all "unfamiliar powers" have withdrawn

— it is unclear whether the aggressors will complete the preceding risks, giving Joe Biden's plan for a staged exit between now and September added significance. Since last autumn, the Taliban has been leading stuttering negotiations with the Afghan government, which were initiated as part of the Trump accord.

The US officially has 2,500 soldiers in Afghanistan, but the number varies and is now about 1,000 more. Additionally, the association includes up to 7,000 foreign members, the bulk of whom are NATO troops (Ryan, 2021). Biden's choice follows a reassessment of US options in Afghanistan, where US peace discussions have failed to advance as planned, and the Taliban remains a significant force despite the US's twenty-year attempt to destroy the militants and build a stable, majority-rule government. Despite the presence of approximately 2,000 US administration officers, the struggle has cost billions of dollars. Regardless of the outcome, 100,000 ordinary Afghans have been injured or died. Despite considerable internal issues, "the US has vast critical interests throughout the world" (The Washington Post, 2021 April 21).

As per the terms and conditions of the US-Taliban agreement, the Taliban will neither pose a danger to American soldiers in Afghanistan, nor will they lead attacks against the Kabul Administration. Whatever the case, if the US can modify the premise for sending security troops or cut the security forces' budgetary plan, things may shift and take a different route. President Ashraf Ghani stressed that if the US withdrew or curtailed financial aid, they would be unable to assist their forces for a half year (Iqbal, 2018). At the same time, it is unknown if Afghanistan will be controlled by harmony and dependability; this will be determined in the future, after the departure of US soldiers (Tariq, 2105). The US is also uncertain if the American-Taliban discussions,

followed by intra-Afghan discussions, would succeed in returning Afghanistan to a state of harmony and stability, or whether it will suffer the same destiny of common conflict and unpredictability as in the post-USSR departure era. There are also fears about the security services' future capability to deal with emotional conflict and revolutions.

Despite this, achieving a non-aggression pact that is acceptable will not be easy. It is unclear if the Taliban is serious about achieving an accord or whether its commanders are only haggling to get US troops out of Afghanistan so Taliban fighters can disrupt the government. If or whether the Taliban is bartering in good faith, major concerns like as political force sharing, Islam's position in society, and women's rights must be handled. Falling or slowed-down agreements may undermine US interests in several ways.

First and foremost, they would almost likely lead to more bloodshed in Afghanistan, threatening the American workers and increasing the number of exiles and displaced people, so destabilizing the situation. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Afghanistan currently has the world's second-largest exile population, after Syria, with 2.7 million refugees. Deals that implode are a possibility in a few instances. Following the collapse of the Camp David peace negotiations in 2000, an intifada erupted between Israelis and Palestinians, culminating in the most severe levels of bloodshed between the two sides to that time.

The debacle of Afghan security staff or the Kabul administration might create remarkable difficulties for the US, especially in post-American-Taliban security situations. Additionally, there is a possibility that the government's hardware will fail,

allowing the Taliban to reclaim control of the nation, or at least a sizable portion of it. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has voiced fear that the US ' withdrawal of financial and security aid would damage his government within a half-year, especially law enforcement agencies. Both the Taliban and ISIS are frequently at war with one another, which can aggravate the country's security situation. In the aftermath of the Soviet pullout in 1989, Afghanistan faced the most horrific destiny.

Despite the fact that USSR exited from Afghanistan in February 1989, they retained control of the country's communist government for an extended period of time but were unable to sustain it for more than three years. They were unable to carry out their plan following the disintegration of the USSR in the year 1991, and the government was overthrown in 1992 by a Mujahedeen alliance. (Clayton, undated) Mujahedeen struggled for power, and the nation was pushed into an odd state of shared turmoil, in which the Taliban arrived, took over the government, and offered Al-Qaeda a safe harbor. Even today, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have tight ties, with the Taliban responsible for ensuring that Al Qaida does not strike American troops in Afghanistan in the future provided the terms and conditions of the existing agreement are maintained (Clayton, 2020).

The occupation was never given an opportunity due to Hamid Karzai's degradation, the warlords among his major representation partners, and the expanded kleptocratic framework that the Americans encountered. Delegitimization of the US-installed Kabul parliament – first Karzai's, then Ghani's – was likely abetted by widespread debasement (Ahsan, 2019). In addition, near to the major issue of debasement, US officials judged Afghans to be overly illiterate, unruly, and in reverse to even consider

transforming into a fighting force worthy of an independent state. The Afghan security forces, according to the Washington Post, are "uncouth, uninspired, ineffectively prepared, bad, and loaded with cowards and infiltrators." The findings show that the Afghani civilian majority was ignorant and observed social mores that differed greatly from those to which GI Joes and Janes were accustomed. In any event, it doesn't seem acceptable to blame Afghan enlisted personnel for not being able to read aero plane repair manuals or mistaking urinals for water fountains, as some US officials have claimed (Al Jazeera, 2019).

5.7 Failures of the US in Afghanistan

The flaws and loopholes of US grand strategy are as follows

5.7.1 Disordered and Fluctuating Objectives

For mission success and stability in Afghanistan, clear objectives are required. Unfortunately, the US ' objectives were not always clear or uniform among military, diplomatic, and development organizations, resulting in mission failure and an unwinnable scenario. The US mission and objectives in Afghanistan have changed significantly during the last two decades, spanning three political governments, several top generals, and various Kabul ministries. The justification for entering Afghanistan was first defined as destroying Al-Qaeda, deposing the Taliban, and preventing another attack on the US and its allies. After the fall of the Taliban government and the defeat of Al-Qaeda in 2001, the US operation in Kabul increased as it added new priorities to its counter-terrorism campaign. (Mandelbaum,3)

The aims and tactics of the US in Afghanistan became increasingly murky as time went on. To deter al-Qaeda as well as other extremist organizations from penetrating

Afghanistan, the US recognized that the Afghan government should be secure enough to provide security and basic services, and violence must be significantly lowered to develop economic, political, and social prospects. As a result, the US began on missions of nation-building and social engineering. However, America's objectives to restructure Afghanistan's domestic affairs while fighting an adaptable and regenerative enemy in a region severely damaged by 40 years of conflict were impossible to accomplish and destined to fail without a consistent, clear, adequately resourced, protracted strategy and the support of the American people. Consequently, there is no easy way out of a losing battle (Whitelock, 2019).

Even though US international policy has been extremely ambitious, overly engaged in the domestic affairs of other nations, and overwhelmingly bent upon advancing American ideals and Western values throughout the previous two decades, each government has continued to pursue them. The aims and mission of the US government, including the Pentagon, the White House, and the State Department, changed over time. Many Americans sought to use the conflict to turn Kabul into a democracy, while many others wanted to change the Afghani society, and still others wanted to modify the regional power balance between Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia. (Dempsy, 2019).

5.7.2 Uneven and inconsistent policy shifts

Years of perplexing, conflicting, and fluctuating American tactics, along with a misguided goal, resulted in the Al-Qaida, Taliban, and other Islamist Mujahedeen resurrecting, perpetuating the Afghan struggle. The underpaid and disorganized construction operations exposed policy weaknesses in the US early on. When Donald

Rumsfeld, the former American Secretary of Defense said, "We've obviously shifted from substantial combat action to a time of security, stability, and rebuilding efforts,". US and other nations began making massive expenditures in Afghanistan's state-building (Rumsfeld,2003).

Oddly, the rules, strategies, and programs for such a project were ill-conceived, inaccurate, underfunded, and inconsistent. In their attempts to develop institutions, NATO nations were divided incoherently, with each sponsoring the development of certain ministries. Wealth was pouring in at alarming rates, greatly beyond the Afghan economy's and institutions' capacity to handle it, leading to rampant corruption and deceptive practices. As a result of these policy mistakes in the US, the Al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist groups have had more space or time to develop their capabilities and strength (McMaster, 2020).

While the first US policy in Afghanistan was militarily effective in eliminating the Taliban, it was classified as a "light approach" with considerable drawbacks. With the help of US airpower and anti-Taliban militias, a tiny footprint of US Special Operations Forces and CIA operations left US forces with insufficient troops to travel across the nation collecting intelligence and attacking the enemy in a deteriorating security situation. Furthermore, because of this "light approach," US commanders were left with inadequate soldiers to block terrorist escape routes and discover and destroy terrorist hideouts. The aspects of the plan targeted at collapsing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda by denying them access to money and support were underfunded and abandoned prematurely (Nelson&Sanderson,2011).

During the Obama administration, the American strategy for Afghanistan shifted from a time-based approach to a condition-based technique at the onset of the Trump presidency, then back to a time-based outlook by the end of the President Trump's tenure, exacerbating the hurdles of winning the conflict and thus lengthening it (Dobbin,2019).

In 2009, President Barack Obama advocated a new approach that connected Afghan success to a secure Pakistan, increasing aid to Pakistan to destabilize, dismantle, and eliminate al Qaeda and its safe havens. In addition, the new strategy strengthened military presence in Afghanistan, established a timeline for troop departure, and brokered a peace agreement with the Taliban, who were traditionally identified as adversaries. The American government under President Barack Hossein Obama ditched Bush's counter-terrorism strategy in favor of a compromise that included 150,000 US and NATO troops, as well as an inflow of global monetary help to the Afghan government, which was unable to integrate and manage the funds.

While the Obama administration-imposed restrictions on how the military could engage, the Trump administration reversed course by dismissing nation-building, authorizing the mobilization of up to 7,000 additional US troops, expanding targeting authority, and allowing airstrikes to assist Afghan ground forces (Wall street journal,2019). At the conclusion of his presidency, President Trump reversed course and abandoned his earlier vow to assist the Kabul government in combating the Taliban factions, and his government sent mixed signals regarding the Taliban's resolve to separate from the Al-Qaeda. Changing policies and a uncoordinated methods reinforced and encouraged opponents, with cash earmarked for

reconstruction help falling into their hands through fraudulent ways in certain cases (Clayton,2020).

Furthermore, frequent declarations that the US military would depart without outcome-based timeframes weakened US allies' and other foreign partners' commitment to the operation. Such pronouncements fueled doubts about the US mission's dependability and commitment, emboldening the Taliban, destabilizing the Afghan government, and allowing terrorist organizations to regroup. The Trump government's decision to remove American forces from Afghanistan in 2020, for example, has harmed diplomatic attempts to broker a peace deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban (Ayotte, Dunford&Lindborg,2020).

Furthermore, US strategy first aimed to undermine and degrade the Taliban, but eventually switched to consider the Taliban a partner rather than an opponent. As a result, the Taliban grew more powerful, captured more land, and increased their attacks on Afghani security personnel and populace. Over the last 20 years, US administration has shifted its focus away from the Taliban organization and toward the Al-Qaeda network in Pakistan, erroneously assuming that the same neighboring Pakistan that harbors over tens and dozens of extremist factions would be a counterterrorism ally in destroying Al-Qaeda. The US ' illusion and false belief that the Taliban is un-affiliated with other extremist organizations, or that they would not communicate or partner with other extremists, weakened the US' will to attain its strategic goals.

5..7.3 Institutional Issues

Numerous roadblocks inherent in the compartmentalized nature, culture, and dynamics of various US institutions are blamed for Washington's incapacity to conclude the long-running 20-year war in Afghanistan on terms that are acceptable to the US national interest. Military and diplomatic operations have been disjointed and often at probabilities. The (SIGAR) or Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction stated that security assistance operations were hampered by an absence of defined command-and-control relationships among the US armed forces and the US State Department (SIGAR,2019). The absence of clear interagency leadership contributed significantly to the US ' inability to build the Afghan land as a stable and safe nation.

Civilian and military agencies in Washington created procedures to synchronize interagency stabilization programming, but agencies in Afghanistan did not work together. Because political, armed, and intelligence stovepipes impeded coherent planning, unification of activities across the many interagency initiatives was a difficulty. Military leaders in the US struggled to connect their militia plans to those of the American State Department and USAID (Reveron, 2016). The US military decided priorities on the ground without sufficient advance cooperation due to its massive budget and size, forcing civilian agencies to execute their operations in locations that were not suitable for stabilization initiatives (Sopko,2018). Another example of how this lack of cooperation manifested itself occurred in 2009 approximately, when political and armed actions were at odds. During the President Obama's era, the diplomatic international policy branch launched peace talks with the

Taliban leaders and reclassified them as non-enemies, while the military arm planned a surge to confront them on the battlefield.

The US military had to scale back aggressive operations against the Taliban as a result of this diplomatic strategy. As offensive initiatives against the terrorist group dwindled, the Taliban acquired more land, increased internal attacks, increased large-scale attacks on the Afghani populace and security personnel, and increased attacks on US soldiers with the help of Pakistan's intelligence service (McMaster,2020). The campaign also undermined the legitimacy of the Kabul government, increased the Taliban's ability to expand attacks on Kabul security personnel and the police, and destroyed faith between Americans and the Afghans.

Fast scaling decreased staff deployment tours, and the need to achieve speedy results led in human and resource shortages, which hampered stabilization efforts. Many important US initiatives were understaffed, lacked suitably qualified employees, had high team turnover, or underutilized talented native workers. Consequently, these projects did not provide the expected results. Furthermore, stabilization initiatives with insufficient manpower failed to identify or disclose the needs for (Iyengar, Shapiro,&Higarty,2017).

A variety of inefficiencies and conflicting activities are said to have emerged from differences in civilian and military aims, timescales, and culture. When American armed end-strength was lowered, civilian security staff presence was also reduced, reflecting the militia's pullout plan, undermining supervision and the long-term viability of reconstruction and development initiatives.

Furthermore, various agencies within the US government had varying levels of objective and strategic risk management, leading decision makers to pursue ineffectual policies since the unidentified risks of withdrawal exceeded the existing costs of staying. Following the US pullout in 2011, the development of the Islamic State in Iraq made officials even more risk apprehensive in Afghanistan (Magsmen&Fuchs,2019).

There may have been chances squandered at the start of the conflict that may have led to a triumphant conclusion. The Taliban attempted to broker a peace plan that illuminated disarming and recognizing Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan's chief, but the Washington Bush administration turned it down. By refusing to accept the proposal, an Afghan government was formed without the participation of major Taliban commanders who had indicated interest in participating in the solution. "Top Taliban commanders were open to giving the novel setup a try, but we didn't provide them an opportunity," according to the Washington Post. Khalilzad said that the Bush administration may have squandered an opportunity to stop the conflict soon after it began by refusing to negotiate to the Taliban.

5.7.4 Vulnerable intelligence Gathering and Sharing

Lack of intelligence collecting and sharing impeded US foreign policy, resulting in inadequate insights into enemy motivation and operations, exacerbating other flaws in US international policy, and contributing to the extended conflict in Kabul. In Afghanistan, domestic and armed intelligence to enable efficient policymaking was originally scarce and ineffective (Sopko,2018). Using a weakness in US information, terrorist militants resurrected and carried out devastating strikes on Afghan civilians

and forces. Until over a decade into the conflict, the US ' capacity to understand the Taliban's motivations and intentions was hampered by a lack of timely and accurate intelligence (Donati, &Stancati,2015).

If the US had had enough actionable intelligence early on, it might have entertained diplomatic contacts with the Taliban far sooner. Due to a lack of knowledge, US policymakers wrongly assumed that the Taliban solely had military goals, whereas in fact they had political and social purposes as well. Information and intelligence gaps occurred from many alterations in US ambassadors to Kabul, commanders, armed forces, and their populace counterparts. Furthermore, access to critical information and intelligence was hampered as a result of American diplomats staying largely within American dorms to avoid casualties. This liability aversion attitude was considered by US military leaders as devastating in terms of information collection (Waldman,2013).

5.7.5 An element of Domestic Politics in the US

Domestic political motives have played a crucial role in the US ' policy blunders in Afghanistan across presidential election cycles. Officials in the US have taken advantage of the deadlines for reevaluating Afghanistan policy, which will be influenced by the outcome of the US presidential election. For instance, President Barack Obama's plan to boost troop levels was impacted by the date of the presidential elections in the year 2012. If Obama had backed troop withdrawals, he would have seemed powerful and risked losing the election (Mandelbaum,179). In the same manner, politicians seeking votes by prematurely declaring troop withdrawals harmed

US strategy in Afghanistan by providing advance notice of American plans to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations (Waldman,841).

5.7.6 The Limitations of Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Owing to the "light footprint" strategy used in the early years of the conflict, the American counterterrorism policy in Kabul had minimal effectiveness due to being reactive to the danger of aggression, concentrating on short-term goals, missing a long-term anti-terror strategy, and giving inadequate resources to safeguard the nation. The US lacked a proactive preventative plan to stem the propagation of aggressive terrorism, delay the creation of budding extremist factions, and strengthen the weak country's resistance to transnational jihadist threats. The US ' approach has not prioritized or focused on preventing terrorist groups from regenerating. When a result, as the US attacked and fought hostile terrorist factions, other ones arose, aggression increased, and the war against terror grew. By balancing a remedial, reactive concentrations on fighting the extremism danger with a protracted goal of preventing terrorism, a proactive strategy would complement the counterterrorism approach.

5.7.7 Weak determination and War knowledge

After twenty years of conflict in Kabul without any end in sight, the determination of American leadership and the General populace to stay true to the operation has waned. Domestically, American officials made no sustained attempt to establish understanding and justification for the sacrifice of National lives and resources. Therefore, people of America are perplexed about what the US should accomplish in Kabul, why such goals should be pursued, and what approaches would achieve the goal at a fair cost. As per a Pew Research Center poll, nearly half of soldiers feel

fighting the war in Afghanistan is no longer justified, while 49 percent of the people believe that America has generally been unable to meet its goals in the nation. Furthermore, 61 percent of Afghans say their country is heading in the wrong path (Magesmen&Fuches). The former National Security Advisor Lt. General H.R. McMaster said that "The lack of commitment to maintain the fight in Afghanistan led to rationalization of the choice to withdraw and the revival of the errors and inconsistencies that weakened US strategy there nearly from the start,"(McMaster,216). The press broadly recognized on the violence when people died, and they didn't provide background. Many Americans felt the Afghan war was inconsequential as they were unaware of the fight or had little knowledge of the country. Americans are cautious of putting more money and death in Kabul because their prior investments have not delivered satisfactory outcomes (Mandelbaum,184).

5.7.8 Inability to Recognize the Enemy

Uncertainty over who to rely on or who is a foe or a friend exacerbated US strategic failures. At the start of the conflict, American forces had no idea whether they were fighting the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, or a variety of other Islamism radicals. Additionally, authorities in the US were confused if Pakistan was a friend or a threat. "I have no vision into who the evil people are," former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously said. The Taliban were formerly thought to be "backward" and "mediaeval." They did, however, show to be skilled strategic planners, with effective leadership that was fast to tap into their opponents' flaws and attain a massive intelligence connection (Dorrnsoro,2009).

Furthermore, the US ' efforts to offer mediation between the militant faction and the Afghan authorities are based on the predisposition that if the Taliban and the Afghan government share power, the Taliban will become a benign organization and stop supporting Al-Qaeda and other jihadist terrorist organizations. Others, on the other hand, see the Taliban as an untrustworthy, brutal, vicious, sexist organization linked to the Al-Qaeda network and other Islamist factions, with ties to Pakistani militia components. Essentially, the flown Osama Bin Laden was permitted to live and function out of Afghan soil by the Militants. The Taliban's standing as a friend or adversary is still up in the air. The US ' aim, according to the Obama administration, was to demolish and defeat Al-Qaeda. General Stanley McChrystal's draught strategy report, on the other hand, included no mention of Al-Qaeda, as if it wasn't any issue. Furthermore, many Afghans whom the US first regarded as allies were ultimately revealed to be untrustworthy and corrupt warlords. Because it had no other options, the Karzai government nominated warlords to political posts across Afghan institutions. Insurgencies, widespread corruption, and a false administration were the outcome. The challenge of determining the difference between a friend and an adversary, who is to be trusted and who is not remains to this day. This holds true for Afghans as well.

5.7.9 Assumptions & Miscalculations

Because of inaccurate assumptions, misjudgments, prejudices, and unsubstantiated inclinations, many defunct and unfounded US international policy actions have been undertaken, contributing to the extended Afghan conflict. To begin with, civilian and military authorities often default to a policy that prioritizes war operations above

diplomacy, expecting that the situation would improve after the adversary is eliminated. Instant, strategic and functional victories would instill complacency in the military's competitiveness, leading to a reversion to the same short-term armed strategy that would eventually be unsuccessful to produce strategic and sustainable victory in the long run. These preferences have resulted in armed force increases, the gradual increment in Kabul security staff, and hence, the shaping of US strategy to depend mainly on military solutions.

Furthermore, the US miscalculated that spending more money on bridges, schools, canals, and other civilian tenders would result in speedier security gains in Afghanistan (Whitelock, 2019). Due to the Afghan institutions' failure to absorb the money, greater economic aid resulted in increased corruption and fraud. Between 2009 and 2012, an increase in US military forces and subsequent combat actions resulted in an increase of Taliban militants. The US 'inclination to cite "sunk cost" as rationale for continually reinforcing and implementing policies based on incorrect assumptions has prevented America from undertaking the required plan changes to accomplish its long-term objective goals.

Moreover, many policymakers and the Americans mistakenly believe that the US occupation of Afghanistan is met with resistance from both Afghans and the Taliban, prolonging the conflict. The Taliban, who are now considered a US ally, are the only ones who oppose the US occupation in Afghanistan. The Afghan government and the majority of its people want the US and its coalition allies to stay and promote the creation of a self-sufficient government capable of protecting Afghans from terrorist organizations' brutality (Constable, 2019).

Reaching a cease-fire with the Militants, who supported Al-Qaeda in the heinous murder of hundreds of People in the US on 9/11/2001, and have ruthlessly tormented and massacred countless innocent Afghans, would only prolong the fight. Other US authorities believe that US strategy assumes that the Militants cannot be recognized as a peace collaborator in discussions that they are unreliable and tied to Al-Qaeda and other extremist rebel factions. The notion that the Taliban would engage with the Kabul administration in good faith and put a stop to their violence and cruelty against Afghan residents has already proven false, as violence and attacks on Afghans have increased.

Furthermore, based on US diplomatic requests and economic aid, US strategy erroneously anticipates that Pakistan would discontinue its encouragement for the Taliban and other cross border extremist factions. Pakistan's funding for Islamist extremist organizations will not be reduced or ended. It employs these organizations as its international policy extension, developing strategic depth in places like Kabul to further its national goals (McMaster,2020,8) These are only main instances of faulty predispositions which contribute to poor judgments and policy debacles in the US.

To summarize, the US ' Foreign Policy Failures in Afghanistan were caused by underlying US hurdles such as faulty suppositions, weak information sharing, organizational shortcomings, a complete absence of national communications plan, encouraging national willpower, and a lack of knowledge about who the adversary was/is.

5.8 The Future of US policy towards Afghanistan

Without a comprehensive assessment of Kabul's existing and evolving political, stability, and financial circumstances, as well as their influence on critical US interests, the future course of US strategy towards Kabul can't be accurately evaluated. There is general consensus among eyewitnesses in contemporary Afghanistan that:

- While rural security measures are deteriorating, urban regions and their modes of communication remain secure despite an increasing danger from dense growth.
- While the political situation at the public level remains poor and steady, the system's sustainability and authenticity continue to suffer as a result of the inevitable erosion of legislative underpinnings.
- Financial circumstances are unfavorable, with development rates inferred from lower foreign soldier ranks in country and are unlikely to assist well or quickly.

Regardless of how the security situation is assessed, the Taliban revolt's resolve appears to be immovable on the republic's most difficult task; despite the US and its global allies, as well as the Afghans themselves, the situation is unlikely to be destroyed. The United Nations reports that 2016 was the most violent year in the Islamic State of Afghanistan since reporting began in 2009, with over 11,000 civilians killed or injured. Between January and November 2016, the ANSF experienced an unprecedented number of fatalities, with 6,785 people killed and another 11,777 injured. Nonetheless, the game makes sense considering these losses; according to the Special Officer for Islamic State of Afghanistan Reconstruction, the Afghan government currently limits just 60% of the nation by area, and little more than 60% by population. The religious movement seems to be gaining strength as a result of the

ANSF's combat provision capabilities and the essential bounds of the several Afghanistan National Security Forces' components outside of the US Army Special Forces.

Of comparison, the internal political situation in the IS of Afghanistan in the country's finest concentrations is typically steady, notwithstanding the dismal presentation of the government of National Unity (GNU) after the 2014 presidential election's re-run. Ghani and Abdullah, the Government's Chief, must still put their animosity aside. They continue to be divided over frequently partisan positions, and electoral and political problems. Nonetheless, policy divergences between the two presidents are rare, as seen by their support for a long-term foreign presence and confrontation with Pakistan. Regardless of its shortcomings, the Government of National Unity's patience has confounded some who projected its destruction, and it may still be superior to a range of other alternatives (CEIP, 2017).

Following September 11, 2001, preventing the establishment of such a natural reserve became the primary objective of US military operations in Afghanistan. This objective first justified the Taliban's hardship; but, once a success on this front became puzzling, the US policy altered by the year 2010 to focus on extending the status of the compromise as an Afghan duty, with US bearing the financial burdens. The alternative point of initiation of settling Afghanistan through a firm monetary turnaround and a change in government was gradually recognized as unfeasible by the beginning of Barack Obama's second government, given Kabul's helpless base, nation-limited flaws, and the strength of the insurgency. Prior to the end of his administration, he

brought an end to the fighting with the Taliban, casting doubt on Washington's long-term financial commitment to Kabul (Tellis, 2017).

President Donald Trump supported a US approach aimed at strengthening Afghan security forces while maintaining a low-key one-sided counterterrorism capacity against transnational threats transiting via Afghanistan. Obama's one-of-a-kind policy calls for the complete withdrawal of American combat troops from Afghanistan by 2014. Even though the Afghan National Security Forces have shown an inability to retain territory against the Taliban, the US military presence in the nation has been expanded. At that moment, Obama sensibly opted to leave to his successor the responsibility for choosing the fate of the 9,800 American soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. Obama's postponement arrangement was unclear in terms of practicality: the conveyed US fairness is expensive to maintain in certainty terms and is large enough to be presumed as a insisting object by the Taliban, but it is inadequate to decisively alter the route of the war on Kabul's milestone or battle ground. Despite these obstacles, Asian countries were seldom cited throughout the 2016 official mission as a distant arrangement problem, or a civilian protection need. Additionally, Trump made no reference to the conflict or the nation in his 28th Feb, 2017, speech to a joint session of US Congress, and his candidates for the public safety posts faced little questions regarding Asian countries during their confirmation processes.

Kabul's departure from the political front of everyone's attention reflects the more fragmented and sophisticated strategic environment that presently exists, including challenges that have grown in prominence since the US engagement after 9-11, 2001. In this context, the Trump organization should dismiss or alter its trailblazer's reading

and instead pursue an Asian-based alternative approach. Regardless of the strategy used, the procedure's usefulness will be assessed by how well it consolidates the mission's lessons learnt so far and if it has a realistic chance of achieving the American cherished aims (R.D, Hooker, 2014).

America and its international partners have a difficult task in this situation: crafting legitimate goals for the Islamic Territory of Afghanistan that adequately protect against the most heinous threats while allowing for the consolidation of previously accomplished victories. Because bountiful has been substantially culminated in the Islamic Province of Afghanistan, the US strategy going forward should entail monitoring the Afghan state's uprightness and, to that end, focusing on putting the Taliban's threats on a firm footing and mitigating the dangers of psychological oppression, insecurity, and conflict within the district.

A magnificent system may be characterized as the utilization of the capacity to travel around the nation. As a result, it occurs outside of established procedures, such as the unilateral deployment of military force to acquire strategic goals. The only way to comprehend amazing approach is to examine protracted nation behavior as characterized by pain, core stability objectives, and the way the state acquires and pushes them through time. As a result, it appears as though the state's actions are more significant than its words. Throughout the nineteenth century, the US prospered and developed as a rising territorial power, eventually attaining extraordinary force status at the turn of the century. The psychological militant strikes of 9/11 struck to the core of incredible methods, representing the kingdom's first large-scale, urgent attack by an external force since the War of 1812. Diplomatic apprehension in confronting the

crowd's danger and a profound ignorance were critical disillusionments for which the US paid a high price. After September 11, security expenditure increased dramatically as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began and continued. While aviation-based armed forces and naval force end capabilities continued to expand or contract, the lurid Armed Forces increased from 470,000 to 548,000 and the Marine Corps increased from 158,000 to 202,000 during a decade.

America's collapse has spurred criticism regarding the lack of a clear plan. America is confronted with seemingly continuous battles with no end in sight, a catastrophic economic crisis, the advent of brutal superpowers like as China and Russia, grave future fears, and a lack of a defined aim (C. Martel, 2012). The US International Strategy Foundation has discovered one more civilian protection problem. Over the past several years, global policy specialists and prominent writers have claimed that "bombed nations" constitute a danger to global security and that strong powers such as the US should "fix" them. Nonetheless, traditional knowledge is fraught with uncertainty, imprecise interpretation, and class omissions. A significant portion of the problem stems from the absence of sound intellectual principles, as described in the national breakdown investigation.

Now, the number of catastrophe nation categories is almost equal to the number of surveys undertaken on the issue. This ambiguity confounds researchers attempting to correlate stresses with a territory's "failed ness." However, the notion gained momentum with the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. Since Afghanistan was both a failed state and a danger, experts concluded that failing nations were hostile. The emphasis on resolving state failure intensified with the US overthrow of Iraq's

unstable government and the realization that administering a failed state was difficult. Numerous experts argue that if the US can avoid state collapse or rehabilitate failed states, both international development and national security would gain.

Regardless, the Hedge group's strategy shifted significantly in the aftermath of 9/11. The 2002 public safety strategy prioritized "opening social orders and establishing the foundation for majority rule governance" as a main point of America's reaction to the 9/11 attacks, despite the possibility that disintegrating countries constituted a bigger danger than stable ones. As part of its new security policy, the organization would "help in the development of police powers, court frameworks, and legal codes, as well as local and common administrative foundations and electoral frameworks." The main goal was to "render the planet safer while also improving it." The 2002 public safety mechanism solidified the Hedge organization's adherence to the William Wilsonian tradition. The president's position on the intelligence of attempting to politicize countries had shifted.

Barack Hussain Obama expressed not much disagreement with these assumptions during his presidential campaign. Obama argued in a 2007 exposition published in *International Concerns* that "because extremely helpless social orders and frail states create ideal conditions for disease, emotional terrorism, and fight," the US must "invest logistics in developing competent, popularity-based nations capable of establishing firm and instructed networks, creating advertisements, and producing affluence." Indeed, even in Kabul, assisting the state of "nation disappointment" would not have eliminated the threat, nor would killing or apprehending Osama's receptacle have eliminated the threat. Loaded and his cohorts would have made no attempt to

ameliorate the "disappointment." When considering the numerous and consistently nonthreatening states deemed "fizzled," the way broad benefits as a consequence of nation disappointment have been used to highlight research on the subject has the appearance of sway of hand (Rovner, 2020).

The system is based on the deployment of armed might to achieve specified strategic objectives. If we cannot describe those destinations, the approach is meaningless. This is one of the primary causes for the conflict's prolonged frustration. Aggravating the issue, the war does not fit cleanly into our conventional understanding of power utilization. In anti-illegal pre-emptive operations such as the one against Al Qaida, victory does not imply compelling enemies to surrender or eradicating their ability to persist. It includes risk acceptance. The concern in Afghanistan is whether US pioneers will suffer the danger of succeeding attacks if they destroy American teachers. They have thus far addressed no. Without realistic aims, the plan is ridiculous; nonetheless, officials have not yet judged that the costs of staying exceed the dangers of leaving. The objective of an outstanding approach is security, which is a general rather than a particular state (Rovner, 2020). When Rory Stewart discusses the conundrum of conflicting objectives in Afghanistan, he says:

Afghanistan is viewed through the prisms of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, state-building, and economic development by policymakers. These classifications are so closely related that they can be grouped together or mixed in almost any way. You must first defeat the Taliban before establishing a state, and you must establish a state before crushing the Taliban. Security is impossible without advancement, and advancement is impossible without security. If you have the Taliban, you have

emotional abusers; if you don't have the turn of events, you be afraid mongers, and as Barack Hussain Obama said to the *New Yorker*, "Ungoverned regions become havens for fear mongers" (Stewart, 2009).

The failure to construct a remarkable mechanism rekindles debates about US 's decline. The US articulates an interminable war, a severe economic slump, the emergence of demanding powers like as Russia and China (perhaps as the leaders of another dictator alliance with Syria, Iran, Venezuela, and N. Korea), grave future vulnerabilities, and a lack of rational direction. It's unsurprising that the American public and political leaders continue to debate whether the US should assume global leadership (C. Martel, 2012).

The American Administration has dispatched roughly 800,000 armed workers to Afghanistan in succeeding years. It was never entirely clear why they were fighting or how likely they were to win. Frustration thrives during those who have been frequently embraced. Some have lamented Afghanistan's hopeless situation, which fosters the capacity for unrelenting brutality. Certain individuals have squandered years attempting to make sense of targets that are illogical. Others say officials and military pioneers happily sold out by giving optimistic public presentations despite the worrying standstill on the ground and refused to provide any accommodating assistance to remedy the situation.

Meanwhile, planners in the US have never been able to agree on crucial locations. Numerous attempts are being undertaken to eradicate al-Qaeda and the Taliban-protected Taliban system. According to some experts, the US made a key error in extending its aims in the aftermath of the late-2001 attack on Afghanistan. The pledge

that the US will accept responsibility for nation building rather than merely destroying al-Qaeda was the most malignant. It compelled delegates to attempt to remake a country they knew little about, and it compelled US soldiers to undertake missions for which they were unprepared. A more modest methodology might have concentrated on defusing fear while leaving Afghanistan's future in the hands of the Afghan people.

On the other hand, others cautioned that this methodology would only provide temporary benefits. Security force assistance has a contentious historic past, and focusing exclusively on assailants without addressing Kabul's political and social problems risks turning the war into a human-hunting operation with no discernible pause. Remarkable achievement prompted increased ambitious initiatives, including security installation, foundation building, training of adjacent security personnel, and economic growth in Afghanistan (Rovner, 2020).

5.9 Shift of US policy towards Afghanistan

Between 2003 and 2008, the US strategy, method, and objectives for Afghanistan changed as the nation devolved into a small effort. As a result of this critical shift, Afghanistan was assigned a single irrelevant public force and holds, while the conflict in Iraq was elevated to the US's primary endeavor. Within a short period of time, the Bramble Organization's operation in Afghanistan had devolved into a power-counter-psychological oppression activity economy. Due to a lack of public assets, the finances of power's anti-illegal intimidation policy in Kabul revealed incapacity, and the early successes of the years 2002 and 2003, as well as the global stability situation, deteriorated. As a result, the Obama Administration was forced to transition to a anti-insurgency framework centered on achieving stability and ensuring the Afghani

civilian's well-being while also conducting damaging emotional conflict against al-Qaida and the Taliban (Samples Jr. 2011).

President Donald John Trump unveiled his Afghanistan strategy in August 2017. He became the 3rd president of the US to become embroiled in the country's longest running and potentially most expensive conflict. Estimated ten thousand American Soldiers and more than twice as many American contract workers remain stationed in this war-torn country (Peters et al. 2017). The president reversed his mission pledge, which called for the exit of American forces from Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Trump administration stated that this is another procedure that is an unmistakable departure from the President Barack Hussain Obama's mechanism; however, it is only a minor tweak to a long-standing center strategy (Mill operator 2017). His model, Barak Hussein Obama, the 2008 'antiwar' candidate who likewise committed to reorient Afghanistan away from 'George W. Hedge's fight and toward 'acceptable war,' could do nothing to defend himself. Barak Obama, the idealistic president who once believed Afghanistan was in pain, has revealed himself to be the president of an endless conflict.

According to Tilly (1992), state-building requires three categories of assets: intimidation, wealth, and legitimacy. States utilize coercion, as what we should appropriately name stability institutions, to exercise an oppressive business framework over the use of (real) authority over a certain territory. Because the 9/11 attacks demonstrated that the US could now be attacked by even the most vulnerable countries and quasi state actors, the US state-creating venture's general emphasis on

security in Kabul is how it protected Afghanistan while also protecting itself from fear-based oppressors' attacks (Hayauddin, 2003).

The Trump Administration declared in January 2021 that it has decreased US soldiers in Afghanistan to 2,500, the lowest number since 2001, in preparation for a probable complete military departure by May 2021, as agreed in the February 2020 US-Taliban accord. As part of that deal, and in exchange for the complete departure of foreign forces, the Taliban concentrated on stopping other organizations, especially Al-Qaida, from using Afghan land to train, recruit, or fund actions that might imperil the US or its partners. The pact is backed by a document that, according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Miley, contains supplementary Taliban obligations, such as refraining from attacking the US or any other country. The US authorities argue that the Taliban have failed to fulfil their obligations and characterize the planned US exit as "conditions-based," but have not specified precisely which conditions would cause the withdrawal timetable outlined in the agreement to be suspended, reversed, or otherwise modified (Thomas, 2021).

The absence of Afghan government representatives in the US-Taliban discussions led some researchers to assume that the US would prioritize armed exit above a complicated strategic solution that protects some of the political, social, and humanitarian achievements achieved since the year 2001.

Following a lengthy delay, the Kabul administration and Taliban agents met informally in Doha, Qatar, on September 12, 2020, to begin their first immediate harmony settings toward such an understanding, followed by a massive second with potentially psychological implications for the ongoing Afghan war. The negotiations

do not appear to have progressed and remain muddled by a variety of reasons, including high levels of brutality. Given the impending exit deadline and the stalling of intra-Afghan talks, the US appears to have stepped up its endeavors to broker an intra-Afghan agreement.

In March 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reportedly maintained contact with Kabul administrative officials to communicate "instruction" that they build a cohesive front and participate in planned international conciliatory efforts, including sessions scheduled for Turkey in April 2021. The US also purportedly created a non-aggression pact to "kick-start" arrangements that contain a number of possibilities, including the installation of a new "temporary" administration, which the Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani has refused.

Researchers propose on what type of strategic course of action, if any, may satisfy both the elected Kabul administration and the Taliban to the point when the final gives up and are ready for war. Future strategic agendas and alterations in the security situation may have an impact on US officials' future amounts and terms of development aid. Given the critical role played by US help in building the Afghan government, several analysts warn that a complete US exit and aid cutoff would culminate in the debacle of the Kabul administration and, potentially, the return of official Taliban authority over a couple or the whole nation.

The Taliban are in a mightier military posture than at any point since the year 2001, as a result of numerous previously public assessments of the direction of the contention that have been manufactured or are not being made presently. According to a couple of Afghan specialists, the Taliban will remain in trades long enough to secure a

complete US exit, at which point the Taliban will leverage their advantage on the cutting edge to achieve state complete control (Clayton Thomas, 2021).

5.10 The US Grand Strategy failure in Afghanistan: Neo Realism

The requirements of the US ' grand strategy are dependent on a variety of variables. They may be governed by local concerns, actions, and ideologies of the leaders, special political norms and upsides of the US culture, monetary interests, the interests of campaign gatherings, etc. The purpose of the staggering powers, as evidenced by hostile credibility, is to obtain overall position. Finally, it is inconceivable for any nation to get global authority, as it is much too difficult to even just think anticipating and supporting power across the planet and into the area of erased terrific powers (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2016). Therefore, the unprecedented powers coalesce and prevent the formation of other regional hegemon. Considering this, we believe that the US, as a near hegemon on the western side of the equator and a difficult overall hegemon, is striving to cement its supremacy in South Asia by preventing the establishment of 2 major traditional hegemon, China and India. The US military presence in Afghanistan is a waterfront balance against China, whereas its armed and economic aid to Pakistan over the years has been an offshore balancing against India (Rahman, 2018).

Even though the US strategy for the fight on the gloomy enterprise in Afghanistan was supposed to finish with the deconstruction of the Taliban government, it was transformed to a long-term nation-building project. The American intelligence was afraid that if Afghanistan was left uncontrolled, emotional terrorist organizations,

allegedly Al Qaida, would develop intractable and represent a security danger to both Afghanistan and the US.

Therefore, in order to avoid additional fear-mongering attacks and to improve security as a superpower, the US initiated state-work in Afghanistan and proceeded with the mission. Additionally, antagonistic pragmatists say that the US, as a testing global hegemon, was necessary to prevent the development of two longing provincial hegemonies, India and China, using local equilibrium methods (Rahman, 2018).

One test of the US system in Kabul is that there is no plausible supposition about victory regardless of whatever tactic the US pursues. There is no guarantee that the US will be able to transform Afghanistan into a secure, well-managed larger part rule government within a reasonable timeframe. Furthermore, for several officials across affiliations, the unknown dangers of leaving have consistently outweighed the known dangers of remaining and continuing would place a disproportionate burden on the US military. It's the right time to take a careful look at those risks and the assumptions that underpin them. Furthermore, while the circumstances are not the same, the inclusion of the Islamic State in the US pullout from Iraq in 2011 and the subsequent rise of the IS have made officials substantially more hesitant to go against the recent exit from Afghanistan (Landler, 2017).

Even though the US ' principal purpose remains counterterrorism, it continues to be engaged in a broad variety of operations ranging from training Afghan military troops to aiding with financial transactions. Following an early engagement with the Taliban that resulted in a temporary ceasefire in the middle of 2018, President Trump appointed an exceptional agent, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who has been

interacting with the Taliban in secret. With the Taliban gaining ground faster than at any point in recent memory, long-term observers remain skeptical that compromise attempts would bear fruit. The year 2019 (Magsamen and Fuchs). The US, Afghanistan, and their international allies have all sustained significant financial losses and costs. Over 2,400 American troops and over 1,100 unified fighters were perished in the war since 2001. Around 100,000 civilians and military/police personnel have been killed in Afghanistan because of the fighting.

In FY 2019, the Pentagon spent nearly \$45 billion on Afghanistan alone, which is about the same as the whole spending plan of the US Department of State and the US Agency for Foreign Development, as well as most federal departments and offices (Tilly, 2017).

Although the US' actions in Afghanistan have advanced some US and Afghan interests, considerable impediments remain that prevent the US from completely fulfilling its aims. The US is powerless to influence events in Afghanistan (Magsamen & Fuchs, 2019).

States have always wanted stability and wealth, and the rival has always generated violence. States have historically been very susceptible to changing power relations. Pioneers in the US appear to recognize that America's exceptional status will be fleeting. Without rivals who can live up to the public's lofty expectations, the US will continue to be the dominant force—a position unprecedented in recent history. Adjustment is not something that everyone does on a consistent basis. As the US has demonstrated in Europe, a powerful force can suffocate adjustment. During the Cold War, the US achieved a significant victory.

Regardless of the outcome of a conflict, it is common for long-term hostility to follow. The core premise, as well as the resulting hypothesis of overall influence, do not imply that states will engage in behavior modification on a frequent basis, if at all. Adjustment is a technique for establishing endurance and seeking to preserve a state's self-governing lifestyle (Waltz, 2000).

Each time there is a flash of harmony, someone appear to announce that authenticity has perished. Alternatively, global legislative interests have shifted. In any case, the world has not transformed; the departure of the Soviet Union has reshaped the establishment of global legislative issues, and we will live with unipolarity for a while. Furthermore, the abilities and conditions that some assume are generating another global request did not modify worldwide law issues. Understanding the factors conducive to harmony is more peaceful than elucidating the ones conducive to conflict. If someone asks what may spark a war, the easy answer is "anything." Superpowers will go to any length to secure her state's interest.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks struck at the heart of the fantastic system, presenting the primary huge opportunity: an impending attack on the country by an external force. As with Vietnam and Korea, the post- September 11 period of conflict consumed a sizable portion of our armed effort and assets at the expense of other, more pressing stability concerns. Ground troops were completely absorbed by Iraq and Afghanistan deployments, leaving limited Active-Duty capacity for alternative choices, such as the Korean Peninsula. Air and marine troops had a far less role. The Army gradually reduced its capacity for delayed, state-on-state, focused energy conflict, abandoning

much of its reinforced, motorized, and field-mounted cannons power construction in favor of counterinsurgency war planning.

Even though the exceptional activities local area increased substantially in size and capabilities in a single year, it was unable to play a crucial role in the post-9/11 security scene's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency crusades. With the US effort in Iraq completed and its Afghan adventure winding down, it becomes evident that neither will be recognized as a decisive triumph in hindsight; nor has the danger of worldwide psychological oppression to the country been reduced or eliminated (Hooker Jr. 2015).

At the conclusion of a lengthy period of ant insurgency, the US ends up revisiting a well-known counterinsurgency plan. The dynamic Army will take the brunt of the guard reductions associated with the conclusion of each fight (exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 Budget Control Act), while the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps will be less impacted. The bulk of the US's ground and aviation-based military forces have been redeployed to the mainland, and guard expenditure will fall by around 10% annually over the next decade. Simultaneously, emergent, nontraditional dangers such as cybercrime, weapons of mass obliteration (biological, chemical, or radioactive) launched by non-state actors, and worldwide psychological oppression are swarming the security strategy. Different risks, such as narco trafficking, illegal migration, natural deterioration, demography-coordinated misconduct, and even environmental change, have steadily been given a role as public safety concerns (Hooker, 2014).

The conclusion of the previous non-aggression pact, as well as the impending withdrawal of US strength, continue to be pressing issues. The US has been sending

armed troops to Afghanistan for two decades, balancing domestic and international interests such as countering and recovering from COVID-19 and competing with major nations such as Russia and China. Americans should be informed, however, that harmonic arrangements are likely to be long and complex. As enticing as it may be to remove US soldiers unilaterally, this would be a mistake—more so if the Taliban are to blame. A fast US exit from Afghanistan would fundamentally enhance the country's degree of savagery, risk escalating local violence, provoke a humanitarian disaster, let a radical Islamic force to attack Kabul, and raise major questions among allies about the US' unflinching character (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).

CONCLUSION & FINDINGS

In the international system, "grand strategy" combines political, military, and economic measures to achieve governments' ultimate goals. Prior to 2001, American grand strategy was in flux, as restriction of the Soviet Bloc gave way to a broader variety of ostensibly minor threats. The breakup of the Eastern Bloc essentially ended the Cold War, leaving the US as the world's most dominant, secure, and rich nation. The US ' military supremacy, lack of competitors, and great money allowed it to engage in well-intentioned worldwide missions to alter the world without appearing to face substantial risks or repercussions. In the 1990s, the US pushed for democratic government and free market economy, as well as individual liberty and the Human Rights. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the US ' foreign policy priority switched to combating and eliminating terrorism, primarily in the Africa And the Middle east. These operations would cost almost \$5.4 trillion and result in the deaths of around 15,000 Americans.

The strikes on the Pentagon and the Twin Towers buildings on Sept. 11, 2001 (9/11) changed the grand strategy discussion and prompted a major rethinking of American security strategy. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the American government opted to wage a wide, aggressive, and preemptive war against extremists and their alleged state supporters rather than focusing on Al Qaeda and Bin Ladin. The overarching plan, which largely relied on military might, diverted resources and manpower off from the imminent danger, strengthened al Qaeda, and damaged the US ' overall national authority.

Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were instantly recognized as the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. But, almost as quickly as this decision was taken, President Bush decided to expand the range of the nation's reaction. So rather than concentrating on bin Laden and al Qaeda, the US would go after all forms of terrorism, including state-sponsored terrorism. This goal was reaffirmed in multiple Presidential addresses in September 2001, and then broadened over the course of the following year to include preemption as a cornerstone of the 'Bush Doctrine' approach. In addition, despite widespread support for soft power methods in the aftermath of 9/11, the government chose a military-first posture.

The NSC was unable to build a targeted and integrated whole-of-government response to confront the danger due to the ambiguous problem statement drawn from the 'War on Terror' declaration, as well as a misinterpretation of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda's political goals. Simultaneously time, the President's broad objectives permitted a variety of strategic objectives, such as political transition in Iraq. Efforts to construct and improve the Iraq war plan began within weeks after the 9/11 attacks, diverting attention away from Kabul and al Qaeda. Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq and the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the US' misunderstanding of bin Laden's dissatisfaction with the US presence in the Middle East.

Given the absence of strategic approach, the administration achieved several short-term victories in the fight against terrorism, including intercepting terrorist money, detaining suspected terrorists, making initial headway in Kabul, and thwarting planned terrorist strikes. Short-term victories began to give way to long-term failures when the

approach shifted toward goals other than bin Laden and al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has still not been contained, but rather flourished, after a decade of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the US ' overall national strength has been weakened, particularly its diplomatic and economic might.

Afghanistan has been facing insurgency since the withdrawal of the Russian forces in 1989 when the country was overpowered by civil war. But looking at the country in the current scenario, Taliban made it draw the attention of the world when they captured power in the country in 1994. Not only the international community but also the regional powers turned against the policies of Taliban and sided with coalition partners in the post 9/11 period. Threat assessment in the country can be prognosticated by having a look at the past and present security situation on the basis which, judgment about the future can be formed only.

The U.S counterinsurgency program centers round the uprooting of the remnants of Al-Qaeda and its allies, safeguarding the U.S army and its security partners in Afghanistan and conduct military operations in the country by maintaining peace and stability in the country. As a result of the security strategies in the post-September 2001 incident, no major terrorist activity happened in any part of the world. Various security programs were started in different parts of the world. All the major powers including the US, the United Kingdom, Pakistan and other regional powers had to embark upon security strategies in order to prevent any inconvenient act of militancy and insurgency. It is important to note security has been improved to a great extent in Afghanistan by overcoming the Al-Qaeda and related networks but the existence of

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Khorasan province is a matter of serious concern for the security agencies of Afghanistan and the ISAF.

It is a fact that the incident of 9/11 was the most crucial point in the history of the world and particularly in the history of Afghanistan. It was this era that got engaged the NATO and its allied forces in Afghanistan having far reaching ramifications. During the period from 2001 to mid-2016, some of the provinces of Afghanistan that witnessed insurgency and attacks from Taliban include Zabul, Kunar, Kandahar, Kunduz, Paktia, Paktika and Khost.

The activities of Taliban have been both offensive and defensive in nature. In the previous case, they took recourse to offensive activities in the areas where their position was stronger while in the latter case they had to embark upon defensive strategies when operations were conducted by the law enforcement agencies of both Afghanistan and the ISAF. Nevertheless this, the performance of the security forces of Afghanistan has also been not weak as in some cases they repulsed the Taliban and insurgents despite their hard struggle. Esa Khan is one such example of the security forces who murdered a militant in the vicinity of Afghan Parliament.

Outside nations have continued to utilize Afghanistan as a battlefield to accomplish their geopolitical goals. It is the result of its geographical position and an idealistic vision of a community in which racial groups fought for control with the assistance of external forces. Afghanistan has been ravaged, a substantial portion of the infrastructure destroyed, shipping channels interrupted, and employment and capital availability have dried up during the previous years of fighting and chaos. Soviet

occupying soldiers had long since withdrawn. Therefore, Afghanistan suffered from instability for a lengthy period. Finally, 9/11 gave NATO/ISAF forces an opening to act. Afghanistan's conflict-torn nature demands the difficult task of state-building. It is a complicated and varied responsibility. Although the Russian intervention in Afghanistan, the escalating war between various warlords, the Taliban's ascension to power, and the US's "war on terror" all have a local dimension and entail a territorial approach, the Kabul government will be unable to find balance and reliability unless and until the local dimensions of violence are effectively addressed.

To transform Afghanistan into a modern, steady state, the world community and regional governments must adopt a long-term view, preparing to invest in both short- and long-term requirements of the local people. To reestablish stability and peace, a methodology should be established with the goal of establishing a compelling administration structure capable of maintaining law and order, putting a stop to rebellion, enhancing financial events, delivering public services, and guaranteeing social stability, all of which may help eradicate illicit medicine utilized in authorized economic operations (Mustafa & Imran, 2019).

Except for financial developments, public and international debates, media coverage, and scholarly research have focused primarily on safety, geopolitical, and social changes. Increasing the strength of governments, transitioning from a war economy to a legitimate one, and increasing administration so that nations can stand with their own two feet has reignited a desire to move quickly in Afghanistan and everywhere else. By analyzing earlier experience, it is easy to see how ill-informed the whole political structure established at Bonn was and how ineffective a portion of the 'shock' modifications intended to modernize the nation were. The authentic perspective is also

necessary to understand how the financial system established in the immediate wake of military mediation following September 11th was preposterous for a nation like Afghanistan, yet completely inadequate given the country's lack of capabilities and resources, as well as the enormous demands imposed by more than two years of conflict (DoC Research, 2017).

The US approach in Afghanistan is such that there is no convincing argument that the US will prevail in any scenario, and there is no proof that the US will ever be able to convert Afghanistan into a safe, well-known government. Furthermore, for certain officials across affiliations, the unknown risks of quitting have consistently outweighed the known hazards of staying and continuing puts an unequal burden on the US military. It is the ideal time to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the potential risks that surround them. Additionally, although the conditions are not identical, the inclusion of the Islamic State in the US exit from Iraq in 2011 and the subsequent emergence of the Islamic State have made policymakers far more risk cautious towards the present withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Therefore, for more than a decade, the US has been trapped in critical immobility. Regardless, it has become clearer that most of the American populace is apathetic about this situation, with just a few shouldering the weight. According to research performed by the Research Center, 58% of specialists say the Afghan war is unjustifiable. In 2018, 49% of Americans felt the US consistently failed to fulfil its objectives in Afghanistan, compared to 35% who said it consistently succeeded. Additionally, it's worth mentioning that mistrust is not exclusive to Americans. In 2018, 61% of Afghans expressed concern about the country's direction.

As noted, it has become a common view that there is no military solution to the war in Afghanistan, but this is, at best, only half true. Winning may not be an available option, but losing certainly is, and a precipitous departure, no matter how rationalized, would mean choosing to lose. It is ironic that such a choice should be posed just as peace talks have begun to achieve some traction. U.S. officials and Taliban representatives have engaged in publicly acknowledged talks for long time. These talks have gained additional impetus with the appointment of a senior and very experienced American envoy. If these efforts are to succeed, Taliban leaders need to be persuaded of two things: first, that U.S. forces will leave if there is a deal and, second, that they will stay if there is not. President Trump's move tends to confirm the first while fatally undercutting the second.

At the outset of the armed dominance over the militants, US policymakers, civilians, and armed troops were unable to evaluate the need of a stable Kabul administration, and hence were unsuccessful to direct the critical work needed to attain acceptable financial and political outcomes. During important early years of the fight, the US grand plan in Afghanistan was under-resourced.

While the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were rebuilding and strengthening their positions, the US was preoccupied with the Iraq war, which consumed most of its attention and resources. Because the US was reacting to the horrific psychological extremist attacks of September 11, the US policy to attack Afghanistan was justifiable. Prior to this, the US had little chance to use diplomacy or create partnerships in the region. Nonetheless, the lessons learned from the US strategy's flaws in the Afghan conflict will be useful in a variety of missions over the next two decades.

Regretfully, the US ' failures in the war on terror over the previous two decades have consistently stopped it from attaining its desired results of eliminating terrorism and remaking vulnerable areas in its image. The failure of the US to attain its intended set of competencies in its counter-terrorism efforts has not been owing to challenges from more strong and more astute adversaries. It hasn't been owing to poor resource allocation or an absence of war-fighting expertise. Instead, the failure to succeed has been largely attributable to flaws in American foreign policy. They have ensnared the US in long-running wars on terror, obstructing its capacity to protect its own objectives in these confrontations.

This dissertation investigates why the US ' post-Cold War international policy has mainly failed to achieve US objectives when participating in regional terrorist battles. Utilizing Afghanistan as a study case, this study assesses the discrepancies, paradoxes, gaping holes, and bad policy frameworks of various US government and administration that have ensnared the country in long-running counter-terrorism wars and harmed the country's chances of responsibly ending the conflicts during the last two decades. While US international policy has deterred another sizable terror attack on U.S. territory since September 11, 2001, while also assisting many countries in achieving important societal, political, and economic gains, there is still a school of thought that US policy has harmed many countries, enlarged extremist factions, and yielded to a reemergence of more devastating jihadists. The purpose of this study is not to build on the "blame America first" viewpoint. While there have been mistakes in US policies and in the execution of missions, US involvement have resulted in huge humanitarian, financial, political, and security achievements in many nations across

the world. However, the US ' foreign policy might well have fared better. For it to be more productive in the future, it must rely on lessons gained from previous operations that failed to safeguard US interests.

Notwithstanding it's post-9/11 international policy flaws, the US stands still as one of the world's most powerful and important countries. The conflicts in which the US meddled to defeat terrorism were prolonged due to several underlying factors, such as: (1) relocating targets that were not fully consistent with the available resources; (2) an inequity of ends, methods, and means; (3) a lack of conviction to a lengthy strategy; and (4) weak strategy implementation to achieve objectives. ((5) American overconfidence in undertaking massive state endeavors without sufficient logistics and tools; (6) contradictory military and diplomatic policies; (7) mistaken speculations and wrong assumptions; (8) the predisposition to pursue short- and mid-term gains over long-term goal achievement; (9) absence of adequate awareness of the environment in which it operated and the enemy; (10) underrating the invaded state's socioeconomic, cultural, and historical attributes; (11) a drive to establish Western-style institutions that would be tough to maintain in the host country; (12) an inability to learn from previous comparable missions; and (13) a failure to handle the harmful impacts of regional players.

Despite its mostly positive motives, Washington's post-Cold War international policy has failed to achieve U.S. objectives in several conflicts throughout the world, particularly in battles on terror. It is critical to guarantee that the US ' foreign policy apparatus does not become characterized by repeating blunders in unwinnable open-ended conflicts. If terrorist groups can carry out their anti-Western goals, American

citizens will be less safe. If the war against terror increasingly subverts regions throughout the world, the refugee problem will worsen, dictatorial hegemons will grow, and nuclear-armed states will be destabilized. The US must protect itself, but it is unable to intervene in every crisis in every location to avoid terrorism.

U.S. policy should be corrected from the failures of the post-Cold War wars in order to enforce American leadership successfully, both overseas and at home, and at a lower cost than anything we've seen in these unsuccessful situations. First, and importantly, the U.S. must clearly and strictly define its interests, purposes, and objectives. Second, US policymakers should ensure that their plans and strategies are adequately resourced, cohesive, and well-coordinated throughout the government, as well as with overseas partners. Furthermore, the US must overhaul the culture of its army and nonmilitary institutes, maintain adequate regional expertise, have regional experts consider the risks, ramifications, and effectiveness of its foreign policy, and put methods in place to counter and minimize the deleterious impact of misconceptions, predispositions, and suppositions. Before undertaking on foreign endeavors with uncertain outcomes, US policy should ensure an adequate and comprehensive strategic understanding of the environment, culture, and society, infrastructural expertise, domestic constrictions of the foreign land, and, most importantly, the limits of what the US can accomplish in such landscapes.

If the US military is to participate in a conflict, US policy must guarantee that the mission's objectives are well-defined, the military's role is well-defined, and enough resources are provided to the operation. Will there be a corresponding adjustment in resources if the goal shifts, as it did in Somalia during Bill Clinton's presidency and

Iraq under President George W. Bush. Policymakers in the US must guarantee that their objectives and competencies are in sync. The long-term instability issue in Afghanistan necessitated a cost-effective long-term US strategy, but the US adopted short-term strategies, one year at a time, with frequent modifications.

"U.S. officials should acknowledge that it is necessary to employ whatever nonmilitary instrument of force feasible to persuade both allies and competitors to embrace freedom and change," then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said. Even if US authorities put in place all the necessary military and nonmilitary instruments, it will be up to American people in the government, lawmakers, and the general people to grasp that the US ' long-term self-interest requires it to embrace the responsibility of global leadership. In summary, competing aims and approaches, uneven efforts, impeded coalitions, Pakistan's poisonous effect, and explicit obstacles between the US and Kabul all added to the number of impediments the US experienced in achieving its wartime and postwar state-building objectives.

MAJOR RESEARCH FINDINGS

There are major findings of the study in regarding to the synchronization of the objectives, questions, and arguments of the thesis.

- It is a US dream to keep its supremacy prevails in the whole world. The status of superpower is clear to USA, but the fear is not being challenged by another powerful state. Now it has been a long time since the cold war has ended and, in that period, many other states like Russia, Japan, China, and Germany have gained the potential of structure and economy. So, in this scenario, it is important to stamp its hegemon in the region.
- USA claims itself a liberal state and proclaims human rights and freedom. But this statement seems paradoxical. Freedom and liberty mean everyone has a choice of their own to live a life. Something can be good in one culture and can be unacceptable in other, but this does not mean that one should start hating that culture. Keeping in mind this perspective, the USA invades Afghanistan after terrorist attack on September 11 and within two-months not only destroys the headquarters of al-Qaida but successfully terminates the Taliban government too.
- The presence of America in Afghanistan is not new, but it is present there for a long time. The structure of Afghanistan is weak and instable that is internationally acknowledged. Moreover, its geostrategic location is a gate to Middle East at the same time road to South-east Asia. The combination is entirely a blend of weak and strong because the boundary states are China, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, and India

- Moreover, it has been ten years of the end of the soviet war. The President Bush administration believes in war strategy and without war hegemon states cannot reflect deterrence. So, this is very important for the hegemon to show the power and the USA government successfully achieves the goal to warn emerging China and stable Russia.
- As far as the victory of the war is concerned, Both countries have a match at no point. One of the states, involved in war is well structured and economically established and military wise well equipped. The USA has the world's topmost weapon industry that supports the state economy and defense. There is no state in the western hemisphere to confront America. Now the case of Afghanistan is opposite, it lacks infrastructure and institutional empowerment. The industry is weak and economically destabilized. The population is less educated. Now in such a case, there is no point of victory that is possible for Afghanistan.
- This is the defeat of humanity that one power state takes advantage of the weaker state just to maintain the unipolar order of the world. Millions of people have lost their lives, property, and internally displaced. One entire generation cannot stay in peace due to such crises. But at the same time, it's a defeat of developed state that President Trump administration was working for peaceful dialogues with Taliban whom they already have removed from government by casting war upon them.

- There is a general understanding that strengthens to this point that US is on the defeating side. President Trump doctrine is that millions of dollars have been spent on war and thousands of military officials have lost their lives so the rebuilding should hand over to the state. Now the USA has withdrawn itself from war politics because it was a burden on its economy to work far off places. The public of America was also against this adventure and for a long time forcing the government to end this.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Finally, this dissertation will make policy recommendations to help the US make better informed choices as to where and for what objective to spend tax money, risk American lives, and improve the country's strategic competence to win future kinetic conflicts, especially against autocratic forces and cross border terrorist groups. To take into consideration the lessons learned from the battles of the last twenty years, this study offers the following policy suggestions to help the US make future judgments regarding whether and how to participate in counter-terrorism operations overseas. These proposals must be executed in an integrated, logical, and balanced way in order to correct flaws in existing plans and create a set of US measures that are less resource-intensive and pose a lower danger to American lives.

Re-envision the Counterterrorism Strategy

Before a war starts, invest resources to reduce the effects of terrorism. Identifying and prioritizing weak governments whose vulnerabilities constitute a serious strategic danger to US interests should be among the areas of attention for such a counterterrorism strategy. After that, the US should assess if the state is open to aid and dedicated to enhancing its stability. To recognize and comprehend emerging risks and commit resources necessary to suppress the threat, the US should build confidence and a close cooperation with the host nation. To identify and kill terrorist leaders, the US should collaborate in close proximity with the host nations. Finally, US policy should support socioeconomic reforms to strengthen host country governance and incentivize local populations to oppose extremist presence.

Ensure Policies are Based on Hierarchy of National Interest

To guide its actions, the US "whole-of-government" should establish and embrace a shared hierarchy of national interests. These national security interests will enable the US avoid trying to handle every danger and conflict by guiding investment choices in a systematic and targeted manner. Instead, it can connect its aim to a final destination, with the methods to get there well stated. The following seven levels of US national interest are recommended to underpin foreign policy decisions in this paper: 1) Avoid and deter attacks against the US ' homeland, its citizens, and its allies. 2) safeguard American democracy at home, 3) prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in areas dominated by rogue regimes that are ruled or about to be governed by terrorist groups, 4) build productive antiterrorism interactions with regional allies coherent with the U.S' national interests, 5) guarantee the applicability and security of major global systems such as trade, financial markets, energy, and supplies of products and services, and 6) prevent the emergence of mafia-style states. 7) Advocate the notions of human rights and democracy across the globe. Finally, the US must concentrate its efforts solely on the most pressing issues.

Emphasize and Resource Diplomatic and Economic Instruments of Power

Although the US maintains the power to use military action to kill or capture people or groups that pose a danger to US objectives, diplomatic and economic means of political authority must be carefully evaluated, resourced, and used. If the US decides to employ military action to achieve foreign policy goals, the armed services component of the plan ought to be part of a consolidated, coherent, and coordinated policy throughout the US administration and with partner countries. Political changes

that create suitable standards of justice, enforce accountability, promote national integration, and provide for the safety and basic necessities of the host nation's inhabitants should be encouraged by US policy. The US' plan should focus on collaborating with the global community to develop effective and long-term economic growth programs, such as expanding employment options, boosting access to health care, improving transportation by constructing infrastructure, and facilitating communication by creating mobile companies. This implies that those agencies' finances, particularly the US State Department's, must be stronger.

Employ Effective Communication Plan

When the US government makes a major foreign policy decision, it should have a clearly articulated strategic message and communication strategy in place. The importance of both internal and external audiences cannot be overstated. An effective communication strategy will eliminate confusions as well as provide constant contact to all relevant stakeholders, preventing misunderstandings, increasing faith and credibility, and keeping the American people informed about the main reason for the tough choices and capital invested during the many wars the US has fought.

Monitor Progress of Policy and Adapt as Needed

In order to establish if U.S. goals are being met, the US international policy must put in place systems to measure and assess the efficacy of implemented policies. If they aren't, the policy will need to be tweaked in order to enhance future programme success. Data collection, assessment, and analysis strategies, as well as suggestions from these evaluations, should all be included in the policy. Should the US get involved in a foreign conflict, US policy must guarantee that assessments and progress

monitoring are undertaken and, to the degree possible, presented to the US Government and the American public, along with supporting evidence. Clear-eyed, truthful, and non-political assessments are required. When assessments reveal that strategies are no longer functioning, bold changes in strategy are required.

Invest in Partner-Focused Regional Security Architecture

The US ' goal may be to promote regional security architectures while retaining a small military presence ready to intervene if required to preserve American interests. Such regional stability architectures should aid the US in defining its national security interests for every region. The architecture of each area must be based on fostering shared mutual interests among all stakeholders and leveraging the multi - polar power balance, in which regional powers share the burden of deterring enemy aggression. Even if the US has alliances with some nations that have been approved by the Senate but not with others, US strategy should effectively involve all states in each area, even those considered rivals. Our national interests coincide with those of certain countries but not with those of others. The US should strive to build positive relationships with all states in each area, while acknowledging that each relationship will be distinct depending on how well their national interests coincide. This policy is less reliant on US military presence, military support, and arms sales to maintain the balance of power, and more focused on regional diplomacy.

In conclusion, the US must continue to safeguard and defend its national interests across the world and use its military when intended to safeguard and defend its country and the People of America. The US should never abandon its goals of expanding democracy, bolstering human rights, and promoting free market capitalism. However,

in order to achieve our foreign policy goals, the US must engage in successful diplomacy, use moderate financial aid, deploy the US military when needed as part of a comprehensive and coherent plan, and guarantee that the military and civilian lines of effort are well-coordinated. Rather than using the US force as a last option, US foreign policy should identify the correct military component of the danger and customize the armed dimension of the response within the framework of a more coordinated and integrative strategy that employs all of national power's capabilities. When the US military is utilized, it should be done in a fashion that ensures a high likelihood of success, in conformity with the law of military confrontation, and as part of a comprehensive political and military strategy. Based on America's existing resource constraints, developing global dangers, and rising difficulties both within and without its borders, US foreign policy must acknowledge America's boundaries with humility. Terrorist groups continue to pose a persistent danger to US national interests as US foreign policy changes to meet the Great Power Competition. Because the US is not involved in staging counter-terrorism wars, there is a greater risk that they may escalate quickly and constitute a costly danger to US interests. While the US should not get involved in every dispute throughout the globe, it must review the repercussions of its inactivity on the country's basic principles and interests on a regular basis. The US should accept its inability to completely eradicate terrorism with humility. In particular, US policy must strike a balance between "ends, ways, and means;" establish clear and attainable specific goals; embrace effective, useful, and resource-sustainable schemes; ensure synchronization of military and diplomatic actions; develop partnerships to share the burden of counterterrorism; and leverage cooperative frameworks and geographic partnerships to increase regional states'

capacity and willingness to safeguard their autonomy and contribute to multinational. In the future decades, a reformed foreign policy should include a comprehensive, integrated, and coordinated approach including defense, diplomacy, economics, and humanitarian relief lines of effort.

However, after three years of intensified debate and reform, it's reasonable to wonder what this phase has yielded so far, and how effectively the results have served American objectives (D. Biddle, 2005). "Let every country know, whether it wants us well or ill, that we will pay whatever it takes, bear any load, endure any hardship, back any friend, resist any adversary, to guarantee the safety and triumph of liberty," President Kennedy said in January 1961. (T. Roule, 2021) After the second World War, the most continuous theme of US remarkable approach has been assistance for the liberal worldwide quest; nevertheless, the American remarkable technology has contributed significantly to the accomplishment and advancement of that request for more than seven decades. However, the shape and symptoms of US support have changed throughout time, as well as from accrediting agency to accrediting agency, and US 's connection with the liberal demand may be reaching a defining juncture once again (RAND, 2016). With the collapse of the Taliban owing to NATO forces, Afghanistan provided an especially moving setting in which to build a postwar Grand Negotiation by the conclusion of 2001. To a considerable degree, two battle strategies have characterized global negotiation. Initial and foremost, the US-led war on terror gave the first reason for mediation and commitment in Afghanistan.

The success was described as stopping al-Qaida from acquiring authority in the area in terms of limiting worldwide conceptual tyranny. This goal got linked with one shift of power eliminating the Taliban in time. The second set of objectives, which was first

promoted by the United Nations, is to assist organizations and non-governmental organizations in the progress of peacebuilding and state-building. A significant worldwide presence, particularly a strategic presence, destabilized a greater region, especially with respect to Pakistan and Iran. External differences may intersect with internal rivalry as a result of territorial and global entities' differing orientations to Kabul, resurrecting the regionalized conflict concept. In the meanwhile, international donors backed Afghan technocrats with significant expertise in assistance administrations.

This meant that technocratic services like the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the Ministry of Finance got considerable funding, while group-led operations were underpaid and unreformed, culminating in rivalry and flimsiness across the organization. The government was made up of a loose confederation of well-equipped or partially incapacitated rivalling factions and untested technocrats. The focus of international aid shifted to establishing the conventional foundations of the focused state.

At the time, Ashraf Ghani, the minister of finance, successfully mobilized guide volunteers to fund public initiatives. Nonetheless, while many critical markers of achievement could be checked off – such as a draft Constitution, the holding of decision making, the implementation of retirement, and the method of delivery of administrations through new public works, such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP), casual force organizations backed up official premises, strategies, and projects. Despite Western promises, neither a more united corporatist framework nor a more institutionalized structure was achieved. At one point, cash was pumped into the core state, lowering the cost of buying fringe elites' loyalty, while at another, sponsoring

warlords raised the cost of buying local elites' commitment to the country (de Waal, 2009). Neighborhood power brokers retained a high amount of autonomy in this setting, rejecting efforts to increase the state's control. Rather of putting their weight behind the center, they focused on techniques to assist or detect transactions (Goodhand, 2012).

The physical and associated issues of the U.S. affect the country's grand strategy to a considerable extent. Its military and financial capabilities, including its social and political foundations, define its success and stance on global political issues. Its power has an impact on the policies of numerous countries, and the global climate system. Before the World War II, the US' approach consisted of a mix of collaboration and containment. The lack of American economic stakes in Kabul, and also the United Kingdom's position as the gatekeeper of Afghan foreign affairs, precluded the two nations from forging a meaningful partnership early on. So, although US-Afghan ties aren't very old, the two nations just got independence roughly 200 years ago. 2010 (Mazhar & Jabeen).

The main goal of the USs' Cold War policy was to challenge and block the Soviets Union's push into Europe. In Europe and Asia, the Soviet Union's influence was rising. The fact that Afghanistan was on the Soviet Union's border was never supposed to cause alarm in the US. In any event, it gave financial support to Afghanistan. The September 11th terrorist attacks changed the US ' foreign policy toward Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, the US initiated tactical operations in Afghanistan after political and strategic attempts to resolve the US-Taliban deadlock over the issue of giving up Bin Laden to the US government failed. In terms of the mission in Afghanistan, the US-led coalition has had some success.

It has ousted the Taliban administration in Afghanistan and eliminated known al-Qaeda bases and organizations. In general, the US as a superpower would have several goals in a single commitment, and these goals would often conflict with one another. The US ' stance in Kabul against the Taliban is an excellent illustration of this. Afghanistan's previous strategy had been to force the Soviets out of the nation. The US had saturated the area with weapons in the 1980s. As a result of the weapons culture, a huge number of combat organizations sprung formed, bombing foreign peacekeeping operations in the area. There is undoubtedly peace, but western specialists must assess if the new regime is equipped to deal with the nation. Considering that the Taliban's void is being replaced by unstable warlords, local crooks, drug lords, and crafty criminals, the district's chances for stability and peace are poor. Moreover, the "Bush Doctrine," which had been created to fight terrorism, has brought no solutions to the present crisis.

Psychological warfare is being imprisoned by the US administration and assessment makers in sites where civilians have perished and Afghan people have been saved (Jabeen,2010). The main goal of the mediations was to establish stable, genuine, and convincing governments in order to tackle the basic sources of problems through promoting social and economic growth. Therefore, financial and social advancement within a liberal harmony framework has become the standard system for both humanitarian initiatives and counter - insurgency campaigns in bombed states, with foundation constructing and security sector reform (SSR) as notable pieces of state - building efforts. In the case of Kabul, however, social, economic, and political state building initiatives have been employed to facilitate vital and strategic Western mediation points. People who were motivated by the mediation rule worked hard to

expand these initiatives in order to defeat the insurrection in the nation and prevent it from resurfacing. (Ozdemir, 2016).

As security worsened, and as among the most evident limits on Afghanistan's capacity to utilize aid grew, Barnett Rubin and several of his associates proposed putting stability first, since any recovery would be worthless in such an unsafe climate. Although security is believed to be a requirement for the country's overall development toward peace, social, political, and financial changes will have an impact on the country's security circumstances. While the absence political legitimacy at the municipal level, and postponements in defining public safety prerogatives and allocating adequate ISAF forces across region, jeopardize security. This permitted warlords and allied civilian troops to keep control of large parts of the realm, and the money and medical advantages that came with it. However, for most of the progress, there were only sporadic efforts at financial regeneration and public conciliation. These are basically political cycles that need political administration and resources to grow and attempts to do so in Kabul were missing (CFR, 2016).

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