

CONSTRUCTION OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE US & THE UK PRESS: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

PhD Thesis



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
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May Allah (SWT) bless us all and keep us protected and productive for the cause of humanity, Ameen.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, particularly my father, Muhammad Sarwar, who died on January 21, 2019, while I was conducting research. If he were still alive, he would be ecstatic at my academic success.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Ph.D. thesis, entitled "*Construction of Islamophobia in the US & the UK Press: A Discourse Analysis*," was carried out by me for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Media and Communication Studies under the guidance and supervision of Prof. Dr. Zafar Iqbal, Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, Islamabad, and co-supervision of Prof. Dr. Fazal Rahim Khan, Dean Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Foundation University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The interpretations put forth are based on my reading and understanding of the original texts, and they are not published anywhere in the form of books, monographs, or articles. Other books, articles, and websites that I have used are mentioned in the text at the appropriate places. For the present thesis, which I am submitting to the university, no degree, diploma, or distinction has been conferred on me before, either at this or at any other university.

Muhammad Tariq
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CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the research work described in this Ph.D. dissertation is the original work of the author. It has been carried out under my direct supervision. I have personally gone through all the data, content, and results reported in the manuscript and certified its correctness and authenticity. I further certify that the material included in the thesis has not been used, partially or fully, in any manuscript already submitted or is in the process of submission in partial or complete fulfilment of the award of any other degree from any other institution. I also certify that the thesis has been developed under my supervision according to the prescribed format. I, therefore, endorse this thesis for the award of a Ph.D. degree.

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CERTIFICATE

It is certified that we have read this Ph.D. thesis entitled “*Construction of Islamophobia in the US & the UK Press: A Discourse Analysis*” submitted by Mr. Muhammad Tariq under Registration No.10-FSS/Ph.DMC/F16. It is our judgement that this thesis is of sufficient standard to warrant its acceptance by the International Islamic University Islamabad for the Ph.D. degree in Media and Communication Studies.

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ABSTRACT

Islamophobic discourses and practices have become a notable feature of the West's twenty-first-century relations with the Muslim world, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. In this dissertation, the researcher attempts to look into Islamophobic discourses in the Western media aiming at constructing Islam and Muslims to produce specific perceptions of them. The relevant literature reveal(s) that Muslims have been perceived as one of the greatest threats to Western societies for many centuries; stemming from the medieval times and seems to continue unabated even till today. The securitization approach provides the theoretical backdrop for this research, while the Discourse-Historical Approach facilitates understanding of the construction process of mediated Islamophobia. The dissertation has analyzed the leading articles (i.e., 446 in toto) from *The Independent* (UK) and *The Washington Post* (US), covering the period between November 2016 and December 2017. The analysis has found out that the selected media constructed Muslims in a way that constitutes a corpus bundle of phobias, i.e., Islamophobias. It unveiled two Islam-related phobias; the first arising from the religion itself, and the other from its system. Religio-phobia dominated the UK press where Islam (with its brand Wahhabism) was perceived as an ideological threat to the symbolic (cultural) identity of Europe and constructed it as a threat accordingly. Whereas, systemic-phobia dominated the US press, wherein Islam was not considered a religion but a political system and a political ideology (i.e., Shariah), which were constructed as threats to the US socio-politico-cultural continuity and its demographic health, respectively. The study concludes that Islamophobia stems primarily from the perception of Islam as a threat, which fuels Muslim-centered psychological, political, and structural phenomena such as prejudice, racism, and securitization. It has identified the discursive process of construction of Islamophobia, operates in a cyclical fashion; starting from problematizing Islam, which activates the process of otherizing Muslims, racializing them, and later securitizing them. Also, cyclical Islamophobia is as old as the religion of Islam itself. Therefore, the researcher recommends further inquiry into the historical cycles of this phenomenon.

Keywords: Islamophobia; prejudice; racism; otherization; racialization; securitization; threat perceptions.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAIR	Council on American-Islamic Relations
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DHA	Discourse-Historical-Analysis
ID	Independent News
ISIS (or ISIL)	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)
PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WP	The Washington Post

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Western media is afloat with anti-Islam depictions and one can find a plethora of negative themes and phrases. For example, Islam is a violent religion (Ali, 2015), Islam is incompatible with democracy and inimical to US fundamental values and principles (Hill, 2019), and Islam is a threat to the Western way of life (Perraudin, 2019). When dealing with the Muslim world, such expressions as a type of media(ted) crusade serve to defend Western powers and prove their cultural superiority. These misplaced threats and stereotypes spring from the growing phenomenon of Islamophobia that has become widespread since the events of 9/11.

The 9/11 attacks brought a surge in the incidents of targeting people in the US due to their race, ethnicity and religious identities. Muslims became victims of thousands of hate crimes, verbal abuses, and violent attacks on individuals and religious institutions.¹ Today, seventeen years down the road, Muslim women in hijab (nikab) continue to experience discrimination. Protests erupt when Muslims attempt to build places of worship and some politicians have been reported to call for a ban on Muslim migrants. The rise of anti-Muslim feelings in the West and the growing concerns about Islamic ideology and activities of Islamists constitute important inquiries about the current state of fear of Islam. A growing list of scholars related this climate of fear and

¹ FBI had recorded 1,600% increase hate-crimes against Muslims from 2000 to 2001 (Oswald, 2005, p. 1776).

hatred towards Muslims and Islam to the phenomenon of ‘Islamophobia’ (Duderija & Rane, 2018; Ogan, Willnat, Pennington, & Bashir, 2014).

Since 9/11, many polls suggest that the wider population in the US and Europe have become hostile towards Muslims. Parallel development can also be seen in the polemical discourses being engineered in political and media circles (Considine, 2017). They perceive Islam as incompatible with Western values and democracy, and Muslims are seen as threatening ‘Other’; violent, extremists, and even anti-West.² These negative perceptions are generally identified in the context of ‘Islamophobia’ and are being predominantly shaped by media (Rane, Ewart, & Martinkus, 2014).

Relevant literature shows that over the years, polemical discourses surrounding Islam and Muslims have increased remarkably since the 9/11 incident (Rane et al., 2014). Western media represented Islam as a “monolithic, homogenized, and sexist religion” and framed Muslims as “heartless, brutal, uncivilized, religious fanatics, militants, terrorists”, and as a bunch of problems (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017, p. 4). What ultimately emerged (or reemerged) was a kind of prejudice, albeit fear in traces, as a collective attitude towards Muslims and Islam which recently gathered momentum. It

² Pew Research Survey 2017 shows about 50% majority population in the United States believe that Islam is and can never be a part of western society, 44% conceive Islam and democracy are inherently in conflict with each other, 41% of the people believe that Islam encourages violence against non-Muslims, 35% of Americans see Muslims as a bunch of dangerous extremist, while 25% survey respondents say that Muslims are anti-US despite being Muslim Americans (Lipka, 2017). A stereotypical image of Islam and Muslims in the eyes of majority non-Muslim population of Europe has also developed (Field, 2007). A number of polls suggest that over 50% of majority population of Europe blamed the religion of Islam for July 7, 2005 attacks in London, 30% of Europeans believe ‘Islam is incompatible with western democracy’, 31% non-Muslims perceive Islamic values as incompatible with the British values, while 26% people describe themselves as hostile towards Muslims (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012).

was labeled as Islamophobia the meaning of which has been delineated by the Runnymede Trust of UK as “unfounded hostility towards Islam” (Conway, 1997, p. 4).

The term Islamophobia has attracted different interpretations by scholars. The coining of the term “Islamophobia” by the Runnymede Trust (1997) has not been without disagreement and criticism; more or less legitimate and plausible (Halliday, 1999). This dichotomy of the opinions of some scholars led to a brief reflection on this general concept of Islamophobia. Like, some researchers hold that Islamophobia is a “polysemic construct”, embracing different phenomena such as racism, with porous boundaries permeable to a variety of interpretations (Alfredo & Padovan, 2013, p. 586).

The act of construction of a disputed term of Islamophobia cannot simply be explained in terms of how contemporary events involving Muslims are covered and reported in media. It is strongly held that much of the media discourses on Muslims today seem to be inherited from the historical representations of Islam (Reza, 2011). For example, there is a general agreement, since the publication of the book *Orientalism* in the late 1970s that the West has for ages discussed Muslims and Islam by associating them with particularly conceived negative stereotypes, images, and feelings (Said, 1978, pp. 58-75). Said (1981) has traced such negative “Orientalist” discourse on Islam to European colonial discourse about Muslim subjects, which he eventually denounced as ideological underpinnings of British and French colonialism (Said, 1978). However, this discourse has its origin in the “defensive reactions of Christian “Orientals,” unwitting subjects of the new Muslim empire” of the early Middle Ages (Tolan, 2002, p. 67). As such, “Orientalism” and the process of “othering”

provide a basis for Islamophobia in the Western sense (Allen, 2010; Green, 2015; Halliday, 1999; Poole, 2002; Rana, 2007). It was perhaps in this context that Bleich (2011) called Islamophobia “a new word for an old concept” (p. 1582).

In his analysis, Said (2003) argues stating that what is described as “Islam” in the West more or less belongs to the discourse of “Orientalism”. Iqbal (2010) held the view that the corporate image of Islam to use as an expression coined by Said (2003) has sharpened this phenomenon of Islamophobia. Iqbal (2010) maintains that Islam or the Islamic-related fear syndrome was not altogether non-existent in anti-Muslim repertoire in history; rather it appeared in multiple shapes such as cultural or racial bias, hatred towards Muslims and Islam, and their representation as a threat to global peace. A number of researchers and scholars are of the opinion that what is discussed about Islam today is increasingly from white man’s perspective which recognizes Muslims as “Them” – a strange, different, inferior, and serious threat to the West as “Us” (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; Kumar, 2010; Poole, 2002; K. Powell, 2011). This is a pragmatic discourse, being valid to serve a contemporary counter-Islamophobia parameter for further analysis. Buehler (2011) in his study suggests that the West has inherited negative perceptions of Muslims. It is therefore unlikely that the phenomenon could have emerged simply as a result of media portrayals without a long history of Western antagonistic renderings of Islam and Muslims. It has therefore been proposed that modern studies on the phenomenon of Islamophobia must take into account all the complex variables at play including extensive Islamophobia repertoire. This attitude of

a blame game against Muslims has taken its origin all the way back to the Middle Ages till contemporary times.

1.1 Historical Context

Construction of Islamophobia and subsequent media war and its antecedent to the Islamophobia repertoire can be traced back to the medieval representations or misrepresentations of Islam, its Prophet (PBUH), and Qur'an, which at that time were part of the Church's attempt at giving an explanation for expansive growth of a new competing religious ideology and loss of lands to Muslims which hitherto belonged to Christians.³ It is an irony that misrepresentations of Islam during the formative period of this religion and its relationships with the Christian world as a rival provided the basis for the future antagonistic renderings and sufferings of Muslims. In his report, Reza (2011) argues that history reveals that, from early medieval apologists to Dante's Divine Comedy, to Martin Luther and historical grudges, all have crafted negative images of Islam and its followers, and many of these are resurrected in Western media discourse today. Based on the premise that the normal relationship between non-Muslims and Muslims in the West from the early days of Islam to the present day appears to be one of hostility, any modern study of Islamophobia in the media should take stock of the anti-Islamic repertoire of the early middle ages. Likewise, this hostility gets redeployed to produce historical, undisputed continuities in the profound Western

³ Today, Islam is also fast spreading religion of the world posing mortal threats to the western powers, particularly United States and Europe. The reports say Muslims will surpass the Christians in the second half of twenty-first century constituting the largest religious group of the world (Lipka & Hackett, 2015). The growing visibility of Muslim population in the US and Europe creates the negative perceptions of Islam and develops a grim picture of Muslims, thus constructs Islamophobia.

hostility against Islam and to regulate modern discriminatory practices and policies. Bazian (2018) suggests that theoretically and methodologically, this phenomenon should be studied while taking into account all complex variables, which include the construction of negative images of Muslims and Islam that continue historically to have utility in the present age.

Another prominent feature of the construction of Islamophobia and subsequent hostility towards Islam even goes beyond the time when Islam took re-birth in the seventh century's Europe. This was the era when there had been contestation centering on the elevation of Christianity into a state religion in Europe. Islam's arrival in Christian countries not only posed an emergent challenge to the existing narrative of the Christian world but also threatened Christian domination in the new world (Bazian, 2018). For example, most of the provinces of the early Islamic realm were wrested from Christendom, and amazingly majority of Muslim populations were converts from Christianity. Tolan, Laurens, and Veinstein (2012) notably held that the Church elders had to address the problem of religious invasion and conversion theologically as well as politically. The Churches in Europe provided scripturally grounded explanations for the loss of lands to Muslims and the conversion of Christians to Islam. In the beginning, they were not willing to accept or recognize Islam as a religion and this unwillingness was expressed in many ways. Initially, they rejected Islam calling it a form of "paganism" or "idolatry" or "heresy" (p. 163).

Penn (2015) in his research work reported that the early Syriac writers of the seventh century frequently used the terms "Arab", "Arabian", "Hagarene",

“Ishmaelite”, “Saracene”, “Son of Hagar”, “Son of Ishmael” as well as “pagan,” (polytheist) to speak of Muslims, which were rather complete misconceptions about Islam and Muslims (p. 19). These early images of Islam and its followers show dislike to the Muslim faith which branded and fitted Islam and Muslims into the category of a false religion, completely ignoring the prophecies in the Bible and the messages of the Holy Qur’an.

Tolan et al. (2012) while portraying the tale of a Christianity-led enmity to Islam held the view that when Christians had to recognize Islam as a world religion, they could only denounce it, given that Christianity alone was ‘true’ faith. In addition to being a false faith, Islam was openly tarnished by labeling it a threat to Christianity; as a universal religion, its claim to be superior to Christianity and presented to take its place. Levin (2011) pointed out that Muslims were remembered as “barbarian tyrants” in apocalyptic terms. Methodius predicted that these (Muslims) “will ... boast over their victory, how they have devastated and destroyed the Persians, Armenians, Cilicians, Isaurians, Cappadocians, Africans, Sicilians, the people of Hellas” (p. 37).⁴ Allen (2010) notes the early decades witnessed an explosive and dramatic spread of Islam both religiously and politically. Lewis (1994) maintains that in a century, Muslims established the Islamic kingdom and civilization of the formerly eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean which has been considered a major penetration

⁴ For some Orthodox scholars, Muslims were the “heretics”. For others, they were the prophesied apocalyptic “beast”, the “flail of God” and a “hellish instrument of divine vengeance on a failing Christendom”. Sometimes, Muslims were equated with old enemies of Byzantium, and called “Persians”. At other times, they were called “Ishmaelites” to mark their descent from illegitimate son of Abraham, or “Agarenes”, descended from his mother, Hagar, the concubine of the patriarch. More generally they were called “Saracens” that are descendants of Sarah, wife of Abraham (Wheatcroft, 2005, p. 93).

of Islam in the West. They ruled over new populations, the majority of them convinced by the social and cultural principles came eagerly to embrace Islamic faith and dispensation. Kumar (2012) argues that Muslim conquests began in Spain during the seventh century, continued through the entire Iberian Peninsula, and reached into Italy by the early eighth century. These developments suggest that the attack on Europe drew alarm among Orthodox Christians. Wheatcroft (2005) noted that the Orthodox Christians began to see Muslims as external and internal enemies with their ideology challenging the tenets of Christianity. Quinn (2008) narrated that for some, Muslims were just an addition to the existing enemies of Christendom threatening its social and spiritual borders. Wheatcroft (2005) further reports that the ease of the conquests and the speed with which many Christians embraced Islam led to the growth of flourishing Muslim culture and to the decay of European society resulting in a major change in social values. All this left a deep sense of loss and indignation among European Christians.

The prevailing fear led to the beginning of Arabic studies in Europe and eventually emerged as a discipline that centuries later came to be called “Orientalism”. Thus Arab, Muslims, Islam, Orientalism all became synonymous with Islamophobia. The early Church elders felt and called to build sharply-honed apologetic tools to counter the challenges to Christian faith being posed by Islamic theologians, as an offshoot of Orientalism. Lewis (1994) reported that a number of priests, monks, and scholars were forced to learn the Arabic language, translate Qur’an and study Muslim books with the aim to defend Christianity and save Christian souls from conversions to

Islam and to allay the changing spiritual climate. Meyendorff (1964) reported that it was Saint John of Damascus (675 AD – 749 or 750) who was the earliest person to offer the first qualified response to the emerging challenges of Islam from within Christianity. He took this initiative because he was a priest and monk of the highest order of his time with a large number of followers. It has been documented by Damascène and Chase (1958) that Saint John accordingly developed polemical arguments on the “lack of authority of Mohammed”, the inconsistency of the Muslim beliefs and traditions, and “their unnatural attitude toward women” and often manipulated the knowledge of Qur’an. His polemical argument has however been regarded to be based on malicious attitude per se (p. xxxii).

Janosik (2016) in his articulation of Christian-Muslim dichotomy refers to the famous work of *De Haeresibus* whereby he advanced the notion of “Heresy of the Ishmaelites”, which was one of many such heresies that not only defy but endanger the Orthodoxy and its philosophy (p. 97). This work was undertaken to serve as an anatomy of the seventh century’s so-called response of Saint John of Damascus to the challenges of Islam to the Orthodox Christianity reported by Meyendorff (1964). However, it has been further argued that if John’s treatise *Heresy of the Ishmaelites* were not written by John, and were, perhaps, from a later period, then a contemporary researcher will not be able to make any definitive statements from this text about the nature of the Muslim belief system in the first half of the eighth century or more so in the first century after the death of Muhammad (PBUH) in the year A.D. 632. However, a pragmatic view requires that if the work is authentic, then there are some critical assessments a

researcher can make about Islam, Muhammad (PBUH), and the Holy Qur'an that may differ greatly from the information that has been passed down to us from the Muslim sources, which date from the middle of the eighth century at the earliest. A critical analysis will require that an earlier eyewitness account from the pen of John than even the early Muslim Siras and Hadith. Louth (as cited in Janosik, 2016) stressed the importance of John's work by saying that if these two works (referring also to the Disputation between a Christian and a Saracen) are indeed by John Damascene (or even if their arguments can be traced back to him), they constitute the early explicit discussion of Islam by Christian theologian to serve as a reference point. Valkenberg (as cited in Janosik, 2016) goes so far as to say that since this text is one of the earliest Christian reflections on this new phenomenon called *Islamophobia* and for a long time certainly the most influential one, John of Damascus may be seen as the founder of Christian tradition concerning Islam. If this analysis is accepted, Hoyland (as cited in Janosik, 2016, p. 93) in the historical perspective concurs with Louth and Valkenberg and adds that if the chapter on Islam is "genuinely by John of Damascus, it represents the earliest Greek polemical writing against Islam," thus making John the "first" apologist to the Muslims, which ought to be owned by the Orthodox Christianity.

The irony of his hatred indicates that John showed the prophet of Muslims in the extreme dark, rather accused him of writing Qur'an by himself to deviate the people from true religions of Christianity and Judaism, as quoted by Al-Olaqi (2010), Quinn (2008), Rhodes (2009) and Sardar (1999). The analysis further reveals that he redeployed the pre-Islamic ethnic term "Saracens" in reference to Muslims whose

customs and practices he described different and contradictory to the true religions of the book. Janosik (2016) noted other points to ponder and refer to the context whereby John interpreted circumcision as “barbaric practice” without any spiritual context and criticized some Muslim orders: not to observe Sabbath (the practice of worship on Sunday for Christians), not to be baptized (practice of worship on Saturday for Jews), not to eat certain forbidden (haram) foods, and orders not to drink any wine, which are the injunctions of Quranic revelations (pp. 110-111). To some John’s work is valuable because it sheds light on the earlier dominant perception of Islam among non-Muslims – heresy. This might be valued in the light of modern stereotypes about Islam, which show the modern reader that the first marker of “otherness” was around religious identity which led to the beginnings of the process of “othering” in Europe and to form a discipline which centuries recognized as prejudice or/and racism by connecting history with the present.

Janosik (2016) in his elaborate work on the history of Islamophobia reports that John’s inscribed way of accusations towards Islam and its prophet was followed by even some modern historians and Orientalists. Two of such researchers like Cook and Crone (1977) are of the view that although he was a key historical figure, John has particular relevance for the modern world in terms of his work. It is noteworthy that today the Western world is being challenged by resurgent Islam in the same way as John witnessed in his day. Connecting history and its links this challenge takes multiple forms from the movement of population to the doctrinal and cultural challenges, and as a quest for political supremacy through a growing trend of caliphate movement; like

ISIS or Daesh. Janosik (2016) added that the world that John lived in was also complex and dynamically changing. As a chain of events, the Western Roman Empire was giving way to the eastern Empire (centered on Byzantium) which had seen periods of greatness but was facing a dangerous enemy in the form of the Muslim caliphate. Historians like Rhodes (2009) who have tried to connect the seventh century with the twentieth-century state of so-called Islamophobia holds the view that this transition of power had a profound impact on the landscape of seventh and eighth century's Byzantium; resulting in changes in language, culture, politics and even religion, as natives being forced and began submitting to Muslim conquerors. Wheatcroft (2005) added that since the early days of Muslim conquest, the Orthodox Christian hierarchy being the spiritual arm of Byzantine political power, perceived the Muslims as a unique threat to its legacy. As a historically building block, a sense of fear of Islamic expansion prevailed among Orthodox which turned them hostile towards Islam. This was the result of nurturing of the heresy syndrome like John called Muslims an "arrogant soul of the enemy, the sons of Ishmael," and as a "race born of a slave" (p. 92).

Rhodes (2009) maintains the view that it is the intimacy that either strengthens or sows seeds of enmity on the contrary. He relates this to the fact that of course, John of Damascus had been living among Muslims. He experienced the expansive Islamic culture firsthand and thus this context may account for his fierce polemical approach and enmity towards Islam and Muslims per se. But rising religion, on the other hand, and not to be ignored, was a direct threat to his status of being elder of Christianity. Resultantly, the conversion of Christians to Islam became a living challenge to his

realm of supremacy. Perhaps, and it was this fear which has been cast in the preceding pages and which turned him an irreversible enemy and a strong opponent of Islam.⁵ In his strength as an elder of Orthodox Christianity, John never left any stone unturned to institute insult against Islam and to offend its people. Hence, he repeatedly presented Islam as a “deceptive superstition”, “heresy” (p. 54). Iqbal (2010) narrated John to label Islam as a “pagan cult” (p. 84). Tolan (2002) reported that in his extreme level of enmity and hatred, John and redeployed the traditional image of pagan litholatry attributed to “Saracens”, which tend to suggest that if one scratches the monotheism of Muslim, one finds a “pagan stone-worshiper”, of course, a misjudgment out of hatred (p. 54). In another fashion, John portrayed the prophet of Muslims as “pseudo-prophet”, “hypocrites”, “liar”, “adulterer”, as Meyendorff (1964, p. 120) quotes. Green (2015) holds the view that John vehemently criticized the Prophet for allowing “polygamy”, “concubinage”, and “divorce” (p. 49). John being a priest ought to have preached the gospel of Christ and contain ingress of any competing ideology entering into his realm of ideologies. Instead, he used these polemical words and images as a weapon against Islam. There is no doubt that the literary pieces produced by John of Damascus rest on his extreme hatred and prejudice towards Islam and its prophet. It is worth saying that

⁵ John’s grandfather, Mansur-ibn-Sarjun, was the finance governor of Damascus who negotiated the surrender of the city to Muslims armies in 637, but retained his position under the Muslim Caliphs, and transmitted his office to his descendants. John’s father, Sargun ibn Mansur, inherited this position and then passed it on to John of Damascus during the caliphate of Abd al-Malik (685–705), who apparently was a good friend of John’s father (Janosik, 2016; Meyendorff, 1964). There may be many reasons of his antagonism towards Islam, however, Iqbal (2020) pointed out that John was often criticized by his opponents in Christianity that his elders handed over Damascus to Muslims when Khalid Bin Waleed (RA) attacked the city. This truth may be another fact which had made him an enemy of Islam. Moreover, becoming a monk and elder of Christian fraternity gave him an opportunity to vomit more venom against Islam and its prophet.

instead, John could have connected the biblical revelation to the revelation of the Qur'an to become a true faithful follower of Jesus Christ.

Iqbal (2010) narrates that the process of transmission of hatred and sentiments of dislike against Islam turned into an organized campaign. Thus, this chain of transmission of fear and prejudice includes many other Greek monks, Byzantine Christians, and Church elders unfortunately launched an obdurate movement of slander and vilification of Islam and its people. These anti-Islam emerging groups frequently depicted Islam as “apostasy”, “barbaric paganism” (p. 83). Tolan (2002) adds that “law of the Saracens”, “law of Muhammad” (pp. 104-106), and “religion of sword”. Ironically, the Holy Qur'an was called “theological gibberish” as reported by Kalin (2004), and the prophet of Muslims “violent”. Bazian (2018) mentioned that the Prophet of Islam was labeled “imposter”, “lustful” (p. 2), and “pseudo prophet who had himself been instructed by demons”, as reported by Tolan (2002, p. 104). Quinn (2008) reports that even some also criticized prophet's sexual proclivities and multiple wives. Di Cesare (2012) reported that the images of Muhammad (PBUH) as “pseudo-prophet”, “antichrist”, and “anti-hagiographical figure” to add remained at the heart of the polemical construction of Islam during the early Middle Ages. It has been further narrated that these negative images focused on the personality of Muhammad (PBUH) were actually attributes fitting into an already produced narrative about the distorted origin of Muslims and Islam from the era of John of Damascus.

Iqbal (2020) assessed that the period between the eighth and ninth centuries was generally remembered as the most polemical epochs of the Middle Ages towards Islam

and its people as formally initiated by John of Damascus specifically against Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Enormous literature was thus produced by researchers during this period to make Prophet's (PBUH) departed soul controversial which confirms the highest level of negativities were attached to his burial episode which were distorted and misunderstood. Sir William Muir (1887) reported that one of such filthiest literary pieces *Apology of Al Kindy* was unfortunately written in the Court of Al-Mamun in 830 A.D. which sketched the end of Muhammad's life.⁶ In her review of much of such polemical literature, Szilagyi (2014) reveals that whatever early medieval scholars and polemicists had written against Islam was not based on their misunderstandings or ignorance of the Islamic tradition; rather, these anti-Islam scholars had a deeper knowledge of Islam to build their narratives against Muslims and their faith based on the selection of *Hadīths*.⁷ She continues to report that they increasingly placed emphasis on the divergence of Islamic morals and ideals from those of Christianity which helped to discourage Christians from converting to Islam. The researcher further argues that anti-Islam polemical narratives were publicized in order “to denigrate Islam, or to prove that Christianity is superior to it, that Muhammad (PBUH) was a false prophet” (p. 113). She concludes the medieval polemical discourse against Islam and suggests that these discourses are generally thought to have stemmed from the fear of Islam as a religion and an expansive empire and as a culture per se (Szilagyi, 2014).

⁶ Its present edition was published by University of Edinburg in 1886 and reproduced by Sir William Muir, the then Principal of Edinburg University (Muir, 1887)

⁷ While some commentators; like, Meyendorff (1964) have pointed out that the work of Christian scholars, theologians and writers illustrate illustrate ignorance and permanent “misunderstanding between the two cultures and the two religious mentalities” (p. 122).

Iqbal (2020) continues that the same literature indicates historically an extreme hatred and prejudiced behavior towards Islam that was the key motivational force behind this drive by the medieval polemicists which is vehemently endorsed by Daniel (1993) which has already labeled by him as architects of early prejudices that survive until today.

The self-imposed danger of the religion of Islam has created a significant impact on the level of hatred of Christians and Jews towards Muslims. Iqbal (2020) pointed out that medieval polemicists from Christian and Jewish became prejudiced towards Muslims and Islam fairly because the mesmerizing spread of this new religion had put their existence and practices in danger. Lewis (1994) reported that since the rise of Islam and its incorporation into an Islamic empire and existing civilization of previously Christian eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, the Muslim and non-Muslim communities lived together in constant contact and communication. Both opponent religious groups lived often as rivals, sometimes as enemies. Their perceptions and attitudes towards each other were formed and confirmed by centuries of experience but for Christians more of fear than nothing else. It is with this background that Khadduri (1956) describes the normal relationship between both the communities of Christians and Muslims as a state of hostility historically building up. The polemicists rifted from the seventh century on, had been increasingly engaged and propagating on a range of religious, political, and social issues predominantly through narratives of fear in order to counter the effects of spreading Islam.

As it has already been pointed out that the hatred against Islam and Muslims built up over a couple of centuries was based on a lack of a real and pragmatic understanding of the injunctions of Qur'an and Sunnah (practices) of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), as these were all continuation of what was revealed to early Prophets like Abraham, Moses, and Jesus (Isa). Meyendorff (1964) pointed out that the so-called work of Christian scholars, theologians, writers totally illustrates ignorance, and permanently implanted misunderstanding between the two cultures, two religious mentalities, and two people, of course. Iqbal (2020) reported that Byzantium polemical discourses against Islam had uniformly included the argument that followers of Islam use violence to extend their religion, and that the early Spanish polemics also constantly point out the use of violence by Muslims. It is further added that Muslim armies were labeled as Saracens when they conquered Spain. They were seen as new barbarians or brutal crushing forces that destroyed European lands, burnt their places of worship, cut into pieces their young men, women, and infants, looted their assets, and raped their women. The researcher also reported that even peaceful acts of Muslims were unfortunately portrayed as deceitful acts so much so that surrender to Muslim armies was labeled as surrender to ruthless terror. Lyons (2014) narrates those earlier narratives by Orthodox instead laid the groundwork for future polemics against Islam that had nothing to do with what contemporary Muslims actually said, did, or believed. What ultimately emerged from the groundwork was a rigid and long-lasting corpus of apologetic and polemical works, defensive by nature and not overly concerned with anything but ridiculing and discouraging conversion on the part of Christians on the

one hand and critical appraisal of cultural Islamization or Arabization in general on the other hand.

Scholars like Bisaha (2004) were of the view that Islamic culture from the ninth century to the twelfth had also flourished into what is recognized today as Islam or the Islamic civilization. It is argued further that the early military expansions extended Islam in name only; however, it was later that with the spreading of Islamic culture a large number of people was converting to this new religion. Iqbal (2020) reported that this spread of Islam's culture was facilitated by a number of factors such as philosophical and cultural exchange programmes. Bisaha (2004) illustrates that Muslims translated the Greek literature and produced commentaries of their own which attracted people from other religions to Islam. Reports also reveal those Muslim rulers like Umayyad's Abd al-Rahman II (822–52) patronized scholars, poets, and musicians from the East who had produced a variety of literary and philosophical work which nurtured the Islamic culture. Islamic faith and culture started penetrating Europe with the occupation of Spain by Muslim rulers. Lewis (1994) pointed out that Muslim faith and Arab culture in Spain and Sicily, therefore, exercised a powerful attraction; even those who remained faithful to Christianity often adopted the Arabic language. This all put the ailing Spaniards culture at stake which still appears to be an amalgamate of Muslim culture.

The Spaniards had faced a massive onslaught of imported Islamic culture during the ninth century during the occupation of Spain by Muslim rulers. Iqbal (2020) narrates that the period witnessed a cultural invasion of the lands under Muslim control

which also troubled Christians, though it had nothing to harm their faith as such as Islam primarily promotes peace and tranquility. Since Muslims manifest a distinct culture that is deeply embedded with their religion as a part of their faith, it not only pushes them to adapt their lives in accordance with Islamic festivities but also strictly forbids heresies of other religions. Like, Christmas encountered prohibitions from Islamic religious leaders while it was a long-entrenched religious and socio-cultural ritual among the natives to celebrate it with passion. Green (2015) reported that in early Spain, the colonized *dhimmis*⁸ had smelled the danger of being at risk of losing their native culture in the hands of invaders. Iqbal (2020) adds that it was combined with a polemical discourse by the Church elders who hampered the acculturation of natives through their sermons and writings. These Church elders ultimately saw their new masters be formidable not only militarily and politically, but culturally (or religiously) as well which was considered an added impetus to the building of hatred against Islam.

The hostility of Christians towards Muslims and Islam was not only due to the continued military and political achievements of Muslim armies, but likewise, it developed from a sense of religious and cultural inferiority among people of other religions. It is historically reported that Muslims from the seventh century on were gaining advances on almost all fronts including philosophy and culture. Levin (2011) points out that Islamic civilization was far ahead of other civilizations such as

⁸ *Dhimmi* was a title given to non-Muslims (primarily Christians and Jews) who were permitted to live as permanent residents under Muslim ruled territories and required to pay a special tax known as the *jizya*. The tax represented the dhimmis' acknowledgment of their subjugation, but it also guaranteed that they will be protected by their Muslim rulers and given considerable religious and legal freedoms (Green, 2015, p. 40).

Christianity and Judaism. Historians believe that Muslims claimed that their military successes proved the superiority of their religion and culture and for this reason gained many converts. Resultantly, this claim left nothing more than a deeper sense of religious and cultural inferiority among people of the other two religions of the book. Reported facts reveal that these feelings of inferiority were expressed by monasteries and bishops from Christianity and Judaism respectively in a very dramatic way (Levin, 2011). They translated their defeat into reasons to convince their followers and thus preached to their people to avoid accepting the Muslim faith and culture. In order to strengthen their sermons, the elders of Christianity constructed the image of Muslims as anti-Christ and “Scourge of God’s fury” or merely the “rod of God’s fury” and resorted to imbibe in their people that Christians were not defeated because of the inferiority of their religion and/or culture; rather due to the reason they were not good enough Christians (Levin, 2011, pp. 41-42). Ultimately, the latent message was of course that Islam is a false religion imposed on them as being the punishment of their sins or misdeeds and added that their superior to supine status was mainly due to their distant relations with Bible and Christ, which made the infidels and disgusting creatures to rule over them. These were the religious facts employed by Christian elders which ultimately emerged into a kind of prejudice, albeit fear in traces, towards Islam and Muslims in a variety of its forms; like, Muslims turned into a race of people with eternal enmity towards others (Iqbal, 2020).

Vitkus (1999) holds that for a long time there was a tendency of ignoring the religious identity of Muslims in favor of a brand that signified a ‘barbaric ethnicity’.

Lewis (1994) holds that calling Muslims by the ethnic names, instead of religious ones, such as “Saracen” (and later as Moors, Turks, or Tatars)⁹ shows nothing more than the prejudicial fear of and dislike to Islam (p. 133). Levin (2011) adds that the images of Saracen as “Antichrist” or the “Scourge of God’s Fury” were the response to Muslim conquests; thus both were born out of “fear and frustration” felt by their spiritual and political leaders (p. 50). Resultantly, each of these images on the other hand underlined the fundamental differences (or otherness) of this powerful enemy and thereby maintained the psychological division between non-Muslim and Muslim communities in the conquered areas of the former Byzantine Empire and in Spain. Tolan (2002) argued that a ninth century’s Spanish priest, Saint Eulogius painted the picture of Muslims with the words; “our servants are now ruling us”, “they have turned our inheritance into stranger and our houses to aliens”, and “put our religion and culture at risk”. The Spanish priest goes beyond and to accentuate the difference between the Christian “us” and the Muslim “other”, he unfortunately employed animal metaphors; “Saracens (Muslims) are savages, beasts, not men like us (Christians)” (p. 94). It was the beginning of the modern concept “Othering” that remained at the heart of medieval polemics against Islam, and another parameter of hatred, fear and frustration.

Daniel (1960) reports that Christians had always shown an aggressive and xenophobic attitude towards the Muslim population, they had, however, a sense of

⁹ Saracen was an umbrella term for any Muslim and it no longer applied to other Arabs. For the most part Christians knew virtually nothing about the religion of Islam, but saw the Saracens only as the enemy. The term Moor was used both generally for Muslims and specifically to refer to those who came directly from Africa. Later, with the advances of the Turkish armies, Turk was the general term applied to the followers of "Mahomet" or Muhammad. At times when anger at Muslim aggression was the highest, as in western Europe, the term used to identify the aggressors was not Saracen but Barbari, meaning both barbarian and enemy (Smith, 1999, p. 322).

solidarity which was based on their suspicion of the “enemy people” (p. 10). By the eleventh century, as Bouma (2016) analyses, the image of Muslims and Islam was brought into sharper focus and this coincided with crusades.¹⁰ The modern concept of Islamic “Other” and Western “Self”, though had its roots in the seventh and eighth century, was increasingly highlighted by this century and as a building block, when Pope Urban II began calling for Christian crusades against Muslim despots. However, the key elements of negative othering discourse produced by religious leaders and polemicists were primarily in line with the existing narrative about the distorted and misunderstood origins of Muslims and Islam. These disputed facts included the insistence that “Islam is a violent religion, promotes coercive forms of conversion, grew by the sword, is associated with heightened sexuality” and perverted practices, irrational, “incapable of democracy, essentially untrustworthy, and anti-scientific”; the list goes on (p. 67) which parts another link in the charts of transmission of anti-Islam blame-game.

¹⁰ The fear of invading Muslims did not faded rather intensified, when Seljuk Turkish forces defeated the Christian Byzantine Empire (or Eastern Rome) in 1071. Alexios I Komnenos, Byzantine Emperor requested Pope Urban II for military aid as he was facing a military and political threat from the Turks who had already colonized the sparsely populated areas of Anatolia (Asbridge, 2012; Pierson, 2009). In response, Urban II launched a crusade in 1095 to fight against “the enemies of God” and “to restore lost Jerusalem” (Daniel, 1989b, p. 3 & 7). Many historians consider that the Pope also hoped that aiding the Eastern Church (Greek) would lead to its reunion with the Western (Latin) under his leadership, as both had been separated in mid tenth century (Pierson, 2009). Esposito (1992) noted that the call for defense of faith and Jerusalem provided the Pope an ideal opportunity to reunite the Eastern and Western Church to gain recognition for the papal authority and its role in legitimizing temporal rules (Esposito, 1992, p. 39). In Daniel’s (1989b) words, the crusade served as an instrument of “papal political expansion”. The political theory of papalists helped to form persistent and influential European attitudes. He said the overall effect of the law of the crusade, including the law governing the treatment of conquered Muslims, was the political one of sealing Europe off. The relations between the Muslim world and Europe (and America) have been problematic up to the present time. There has been mutual respect, occasional contempt, frequent hatred, and almost constant incomprehension (Daniel, 1989b).

Daniel (1989a) pointed out that the content of othering discourse against Muslims and Islam remained largely unchanged in its main lines from its first appearance in ninth-century Spain as the charts of transmission continued. The theme of Arab attack upon Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe, as Daniel (1989a) reported, was supported by current accounts of the life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the rise of Islam. The distorted images reflect that behind these lie accusations that violence is an essential part of the religion of Islam, which seemed no inconsistency to crusaders employed in religious violence. Daniel further argued that the crusades' propaganda well crafted was designed to show that Muslims were and had always been "implacable enemies", proponents of a form of religion devised to supplant and destroy Christianity adding that there was no possibility of reconciliation (Daniel, 1989a). Moreover, every possible legal step was taken to cut Christians off from Muslims, whether in territory under Christian rule or in territory under Muslim rule. It was further argued that the authorship of most of the intellectual propaganda employed during the crusades was clerical analyzed through religious platforms and it covered a vast range of different degrees of power, interests, skills, abilities, and cultural levels. The main aim was that Western Christendom wanted to create its sense of identity (Daniel, 1989a). To achieve this, the constant preoccupation with orthodoxy, the crusades against heretics, and on the contrary the development of the inquisition all tended to bear witness to the extent to which uniformity was desired by the people who ultimately made up the society as a whole.

Allen (2010) argues that in the context of crusades, Christian theologians and scholars increasingly depicted Islam initially as idolatry or ultimately as heresy, as inherited from the work of John of Damascus, in order to justify violence and aggression against Muslims; resulting in the general perception of Muslims as a barbaric enemy of the Christendom. Daniel (1989a) expressed his view that Saracen as a pagan was the impression as Roman idolaters of antiquity against whom Latin Christians struggled for centuries. Likewise, the construction of Islam as paganism appeared prominent around the period of the first crusade (1095), which gratefully served as one of the major propaganda tools for crusaders to justify their efforts for conquering the Holy Land. It was noticed that in many ways Islam became overly fantastical and, to some degree, the romanticized opposite (or other) of Christendom at a time when the vast majority of its people were living in the inherent bleakness which cannot be accepted. Overwhelmingly, the twelfth century, which was generally remembered as the age of renaissance in Europe, had however witnessed somehow the different images of Islam and Muslims in the non-Muslim imaginations which are perhaps explained by various developments in socio-economic and political setup in Europe.

Kumar (2012) reports that since mobilizing populations for crusades in the name of religious or holy wars required convincing spiritual arguments, it thus became necessary to understand the enemy. The polemics produced during this period and the other century based literature provided useful fodder for the Church to attack Islam. Quinn (2008) points that there had been growing factors which contributed to the

construction of the negative image of Islam; like, it was a period of literary and scientific developments in Europe and subsequently new information about Islam, Muslims, their culture, belief and ways of life began reaching in European parts of the world. Similarly, the accumulated literature and the work of celebrated scholars from the past seventh to the twelfth century including Islamic literature was translated into Latin which further changed the European image of understanding the Muslim world. The literature placed a great deal of emphasis and indicated that there was a drive to understand the enemy in order to develop a more polemical image of it. The efforts included translation of the Qur'an in European languages in order to construct it as "stupidity", "insanity", "superstition", and "lying" (p. 40). Iqbal (2020) maintained that Peter the Venerable (1094–1156) had translated the Qur'an into Latin in 1143 in order to find out those inscriptions in it that had contrast with Christianity and which could be transpired into anti-Christ pieces, with essentially an aim to induce and to let the people of Christ continue living with polemics against Islam and the Muslim enemy. The image of Muslims changed a bit from a pagan idolater of the past to a monotheist, who believes in one God – a partial change in the historically build up misconceptions of Islam.

Di Cesare (2012) holds that Saracen as pagan had been the impression that Christians had carried for centuries for Muslims and anyone deviating from this was considered as anti-Christ in its extreme form. When dealing with Saracens, Christian polemicists often showed the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) into diverse representations denying and discrediting his prophetic status in rejection of divine origin of the

Islamic law that posed a threat to the unity of Europe. Quinn (2008) remarked that the Christians started to portray Islam as a challenger to the European political power, for example, Peter the Venerable bitterly painted the picture of Prophet (PBUH) with the words; he was an “illiterate Arab schemer and epileptic” whose rise to power was tied to “cunning, murder, and warfare” adding that whose religious statements were a facade for “seizing political power” (p. 40). The latent message passed across was of course that Islam in its totality is a rigid progenitor of violence and is thus an “existential threat” to Christians. Quinn (2008) further argued that Peter’s work was an early attempt at the systematic negation of the religion of Islam, its Prophet (PBUH), and its practices.

Following Peter’s lines as Tolan (2002) reports that many clerics and polemicists expressed their fear and hatred of Islam by presenting the prophet of Muslims often as “heresiarch”, “trickster” and “magician” (p. 30). Even European poetry was dedicated and used as a tool to discredit Islam and its Prophet as a threatening legacy to Christianity. Some poets of the thirteenth-century induced by the messages and writings of the past rejected the Prophet (PBUH) for strictly Christian reasons. Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), a supreme Italian poet of his time portrayed Islam being a Christian schism, instead of a separate religion.

Quinn (2008) and Kalin (2004) report that Dante’s *The Divine Comedy* drew on the increasing number of pilgrim narratives and the travelers’ accounts for coming into Europe, but parted company with them in a significant way. Instead of the siege mentality of “us” against “them” that informed most of the religious commentaries.

Surprisingly, Dante's subject matter was about the moral failures of emerging European society, widespread clerical corruption in the Catholic Church, and papal arrogance. Dante called it a travel through the hell. In his extreme dislike, he presented the holiest Muslim personalities in an inferno, rather in the lowest level of inferno due to his extreme hatred towards Islam and its prophet.¹¹

Said (1978) argues, in the context of Dante's Divine Comedy, presenting the Prophet (PBUH) in grey had provided reasons for waging military and political wars against Muslim world. On the other hand, emerging literary and scientific developments enabled the Latin Europeans to see Islam through their own lenses. They considered Islam worth studying and attacking because of its profound intellectual and cultural impact on Latin Europe. It was this urge that they translated the Arabic literature into Latin. Moreover, a wave of continued religious and political advancement of Muslims into Europe was posing a constant threat to the papal authority as well as the survival of Christians. It was in this context that many scholars and elders of Christianity were forced to assemble at the General Council of the Church between 1311 and 1312 AD in Vienne. This great assembly devised *modus operandi* for dealing with the emerging challenges of Islam to the existence of Christian world on the map of the globe.

¹¹ Dismaying would be to know through Iqbal (2020) that some excerpts of this masterpiece of literature are available in European textbooks and being taught to children in the Europe even today. The literary significance of this artifact cannot be ignored because it was produced in some specific socio-cultural settings when hostility towards Islam was at peak. Iqbal (2020) expressed the concern on taking such literary polemical piece as something to be transferred as an asset to the future generations would do more harm.

The luminaries at the Council of Vienne renounced the crusades and argued, as Kalin (2004) narrates, that war is not the only solution for converting Muslims to Christianity. Roger Bacon (1214-1294), a spokesperson of the Council called for the study of Saracens' language in order to defeat them on intellectual, if not religious, grounds.¹² Iqbal (2010) pointed out that one of the monumental recommendations of the meeting of Council was declaring Islam as a “theological heresy at the level of morals and practice”. Council's elders, therefore, agreed that Muslims cannot be converted to Christianity through physical force; therefore, an academic onslaught be launched against them (p. 84). Blanks (1999) in his analytical review reported that later John of Segovia and Nicholas of Cusa called for a critical edition of the Qur'an in order to better understand the enemy and more effectively engage them on this platform.

It is relevant to note that according to Said (1978) whoever understands Orientalism as a separate field of study, believes that Orientalism commenced its formal existence with the Vienne Council's decision to establish, as an effective strategy, the chairs in Oriental languages at various universities of Europe: “Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, and Syriac at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Avignon, and Salamanca” (pp. 49-50). Weiss (1952) however believed that the purpose behind establishing these teaching posts was not only lecturing but also preparing Latin versions of writings in the language they were professing for a deeper aspect. This decision gave legal force

¹² Many other scholars of the thirteenth century came to popularize the notion that if Muslims could not be defeated through war or conversion, at least they could be defeated by intellectually and socially circumscribed. Even Raymond Lull (1235-1316), a spokesman of the Council of Vienne and the most important figure for the study of Islam in the medieval period, favoured the scholarly study of Islamic culture in tandem with the conviction that Christian faith could be demonstrated to non-believers through rational means (Kalin, 2004, p. 157).

to the missionary ideals of many members of the Western Church, proved, surprisingly enough, somewhat of a failure. Two considerations prompted in this Council's action were the conversion of the infidels and the advancement of biblical exegesis.

It is worth noting that the Vienne Council was subject to enormous political pressure from many European states; like Philip IV of France had greatly influenced the whole state of ecclesiastical affairs at his will. For example, the Council, from the first sermon by Clement-V at Vienne on 6th October 1311, was meant to deal with the case of Templars, the business of the Holy Land, and the reforms of the Church.¹³ Constable (2010) established that the Council has also included the regulations restricting both the Muslim call to prayer on Christian lands and the practice of pilgrimage to religious shrines in the regions under Christian rule. Some elders of the Council reported to have expressed extreme anger over the call to prayer from mosques in their regions showing that it was not only a religious noise, rather a public announcement of faith that primarily and periodically bothered Christians. Even some elders suggested the death penalty for this infidelity on Christians' land. Harvey (2005) adds that owing to this state of affairs, the Council resolved to launch an avalanche of diplomacy, legislations, and compromises to stop Muslim religious noise from calling for prayers.

The changing political climate in the Western Mediterranean, between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, was reflected in Christian conquests of former Muslim lands in Spain and Sicily which had re-configured the balance of powers as a large

¹³ See, <https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum15.htm> for more details about Council of Vienne

number of Muslims became under Christian rule by the mid-thirteenth century. Daniel (1989b) narrated that the Christian rulers were so prejudiced towards Islam that they even tried to restrict the social and religious freedom of Muslims in their territories to the extent that Muslim call to prayer was also subjected to legislations and negotiations. This legal conservatism was combined with the historically inherited polemical discourse by Church elders of the time who increasingly hampered the Muslim religious noise on Christian lands through their sermons and writings. For them, spiritually, the call to prayer repeatedly (five times a day) “invokes and extols” the Islamic Prophet’s name, and, absurdly, that Muslims “adore” Mohammed in their mosques (p. 24). The decisions of the Vienne Council (1312) provided legal grounds for the actions taken by Christian rulers during the later period against the Muslim population in their areas that tend to make the lives of Muslims more miserable. Iqbal (2020) reported that Alfonso X of Castile and Leon (1252–84) decreed that Muslims being deceitful creatures, devils, and diabolical by nature should enjoy lower citizen status. Alfonso X in retaliation banned the building of new mosques and sacrificing animals within Christian areas. He went to the extent and declared the existing mosques as royal property and enacted strict rules regarding marriage and sex for the Muslims. Constable (2010) narrated that similarly King James I of Aragon had converted the mosques into churches in his city. Likewise, Popes from France and Jerusalem such as Innocent-III, as reported by J. M. Powell (2014), enacted more stringent rules for Muslim populations under his rule, who were even not allowed to dress like ‘Franks’. Medieval Spain was the prime example of systematic exclusion of both Jews and Muslims reflecting a land of pure Christians.

In Spain, anti-Jewish pogroms as Harvey (2005) noted that were already in place since the end of the fourteenth century were leading to widespread conversions and the process of expulsion of Jews had also targeted Muslim populations. The Muslims were thus forced either to convert to Christianity or to leave the country reportedly between 1499 and 1526 and were banned to enter or live in different Spanish kingdoms. A new term also surfaced during this period for those Muslims who did not accept the order and were thus called “*Moriscos*”¹⁴ and expelled from Spain between 1609 and 1614. Soyer (2007) established the fact that simultaneously Muslims all across Europe suffered almost the same plight, as in Spain, their culture had completely vanished, they were forced to live in ghettos, were subjected to lower than human status, faced social restrictions even on religious festivities and were even banned to sacrifice animals or to build a mosque, as Alfonso X did under his rule. Stringent rules were enacted for Muslims; for example, they were subjected to wear clothes with distinctive slave badges, and death penalties were imposed on those having sexual relations with Christian girls.

Iqbal (2020) adds that the extent of control on Muslims was so tense that they were even banned to use bathrooms for the fear of having ‘*wuzu*’ for prayers (Ablution to perform daily prayer) and ordered to keep their doors open on Fridays and Sundays. Surprisingly, Muslim parents were also discouraged to name their newborns even

¹⁴ In the twelfth century, the term “Morisco” derived from the word “Moro” means “Moor” – a title given to the Muslims from North Africa. In the history of Spain until recent time, both the words “Moor” and “Morisco” meaning “Moorish” (in English) have been used to refer to North African and Muslim, for example, Moorish skin, that is, “Moorish leather” what is called in English “Morocco leather” (Harvey, 2005).

children with Islamic ones. Harvey (2005) established the fact that this was not a complete story of sheer hatred towards anything that may relate to Islam; even Christian women in Granada were strictly banned to dress in Moorish style so that they do not look like Muslims. These discriminatory practices and restrictions imposed on Muslims by their Christian rulers can be described as an early formal attempt by the state to contaminate their culture and to enforce its policy of Christianizing the Muslim population by stripping from them their traditional forms of dressing as indicators of religious/cultural identity. This was thus considered as an organized effort to re-orient the ways of life of Muslims and their living contrary to their faith.

The self-imposed fear of Muslims developed over the last four centuries made European nations quite timid to a great extent. Researchers like Iqbal (2020) illuminated the fact that European Christians were even afraid of Muslims to be holding any important social position. They considered this a great threat in the sense that allowing them to hold any power would mean wielding Islam to subvert Christianity.¹⁵ This state of affairs shows nothing more than Europeans' self-imposed fear of Islam as a contra force. Islam was increasingly perceived as an existential threat around the late Middle Ages which was built over from the seventh century onward. Historical literature reveals that most of the scholastic efforts at that time were centered on presenting a biased image of Islam; some examples to quote revealed this to be

¹⁵ Meanwhile, Christians were also afraid of Judaism, but Jews due to less in numbers were not as such the direct targets of such hostility as they did not have much in the past to hold reigns of world. For them, it was merely a religious animosity as being the people of other religion that crucified the Christ. While Muslims had done both – alleged to be the crucifiers and invaders to the Christendom; hence, they deserved more severe backlash of their past (Iqbal, 2020).

disparaging Islam, character assassination of its prophet, proving Muslims as sub-human, brutal forces, barbaric, and a bunch of beasts were the main elements of polemical discourse produced during medieval centuries. Available writings provide the evidence that when Christians however began to come out of the Middle Ages around the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the polemical construction about Islam began to change its course. An attitude of indifference crept in and as such Islam was less and less seen as an existential threat. This shift in attitude was due to three major developments during this period, which have been presented and assessed in the following paragraphs.

Historically developed anti-Islam sentiments, which crept over entire Europe led to an informed coalition among European nations. Kumar (2012) reported that; first, there was a plan for the expansion of a united Europe which gave way to nationalistic political projects to strengthen their collective platform against Muslims. Christians, originally, were beginning to define themselves as English, French, Spanish, and so on, as Frassetto and Blanks (1999) observed. This internal division deflected the attention of Europeans away from the external enemy. As a consequence, a set of narratives was developed from which every European drew his/her collective perception of the Muslim enemy which as Esposito and Kalin (2011) claimed led to Muslim identity being identified as “other”.

Secondly, as Frassetto and Blanks (1999) assessed, the renaissance of European culture further weakened the papal authority and as a result, the Church was no longer able to foment crusades or holy wars as such the hostility towards Islam generally took

a different direction. Seemingly, two different attitudes towards Islam appeared, as assessed by Kalin (2004), during renaissance Europe; it did not like Islam as a religion, but strangely admired the Islamic civilization. By the end of the middle ages, Islam ceased to be seen as a formidable theological adversary in the new emerging scenario, as narrated by Lumbard (2009). It rather came to be depicted as the “religion of primitive nomads devoid of intellectual or cultural sophistication” whose rise to power was just to gain political hegemony. Ultimately, this gave way to varied conceptualizations of Muslims as a political threat to Europe (p. xii).

Thirdly, this period witnessed the emergence of three powerful Muslim empires: the Mughal in India, the Safavid in Iran, and the most threatening Ottoman in Turkey. Vitkus (1999), while turning the pages into fifteenth to the seventeenth century, which was the early modern period noted to be an era of confrontations between Ottoman Empire and Christians Europe that increasingly transformed the image of Muslims into threatening “other” which existed historically, otherwise. The fall of Constantinople in the hands of Turks during the mid-fifteenth century once again reinforced the medieval fears and hatred of Muslims and Islam because the episode demonstrated that the rising Ottoman forces achieved what the earlier Ummayad’s forces could not accomplish during the seventh century. In addition, the subsequent victories of Turks from Athens (1459) to Vienna and Cyprus (1571) had their additional aspect and invoked an inferiority complex among Europeans who saw Turk Muslims as a greater external and internal challenge. On the contrary, the rise of the Ottoman

Empire did not have or posed any religious challenge to Christians rather it troubled Europe in political and social domains, as the historians report.

History reveals that when Ottomans arrived in Europe, Africa, and Asia, as Lewis (1994) noted, they exploited vast markets for commercial gains. On the other, European leaders had less to offer in terms of food, security, employment, social security, and freedom of conscience to the native. Lewis (1994) and Kumar (2012) in their historical analyses have determined that although the discovery of the Americas was posing another promising place for security, wealth, and food, a large proportion of natives from Europe migrated to the regions that belonged to Ottoman Empire for basics of life. This trend of a mass exodus of natives from Europe posed greater social and cultural challenges to the staunch Christians; and not to the religion of Christianity. Bisaha (2004) held the view that Pope Nicholas V (1447-53) responded to the Turkish threats and called for a joint crusade against them to rescue Byzantium. It is noteworthy to highlight that the authorship of intellectual propaganda for waging war against Turks was not purely clerical which had been the case with medieval crusades. Rather, this call was a joint effort by leading Christian scholars, philosophers, theologians, polemicists, painters, and many others who considered Muslims and Islam as enemies, as they inherited this element of hatred from their ancestors. The stereotypical images of Turks produced by them provided convincing reasons for waging war against them on social and political, if not religious, grounds in order to attract wider support. However, the propaganda for crusades against Turks was historically unchanged from its main lines from the medieval past (Bisaha, 2004).

Unfolding the pages of history reveals that a number of forces and factors were acting and re-acting in Muslim-Christian social, political, cultural, and religious warfare. As part of the same conflict, fearful images of Turk Muslims and Islam that worked like weapons for medieval crusaders were increasingly being recycled and reinforced by the Christians for political gains. Green (2015) narrates that a complex mixture of fears, prejudices, and hatred of Islam and its holy figures was massively expressed. For example, Martin Luther, the most towering figure of reformation of that time depicted Islam as engulfing the Christian world. His thoughts also reflect old prejudices that went before him, and his ideas ultimately served only to justify aggression against Turks in line with the propaganda employed around the first crusade.

Likewise, Allaire (1999) and Bisaha (1999) both contemporary researchers report that theologians portrayed Turks as a serious danger to European society as well as culture. Other polemicists also observed to have recycled medieval negative stereotypes; like the image of Islam as violent, lascivious, barbaric, and hateful towards women. These images of Islam remained at the heart of the polemics against Turks. Similarly, many other painters including Luca Signorelli (1450-1523), William Percy (1574-1648), and Alexander Ross (1688), as Iqbal (2020) considers, have posed Islam and Prophet (PBUH) in grey. This long hostility, albeit fear in traces, against Islam and Muslims, which spill over, made them threatening “other” and as such resultant construction of prejudice as a collective attitude began to thrive, with greater ambitions.

Historical trends show that concerns for self-security affiliating with religion and for ethnicity/race has been oscillating from one to another. It is therefore observed

that the first marker of “otherness” was around religion; and it then transfers to ethnic/racial identity by the late fifteenth century when Christian theology located differences and distinctions between Christians, Jews and Moors in blood, instead of religious ideology. Indeed, the hostility among the three religions of books, as Mignolo (2011) explains, has a long story. Around 1492, Christians managed to expel Jews, and Moors from Peninsula and with the power of ethnic/racial weapons enforced the conversion on those who wanted to stay in their dominated areas. Simultaneously, the racial configuration between Spanish, Indian, and African as a result began to take shape in the new (modern) world that was divided among powerful rulers, where subjugated people were the main losers and their lost rulers. A group of Italian humanists launched an organized intellectual and scholarly movement against their new masters calling for holy war against them focused on the histories of Turks and the crusades, epic poetry, religious and ethnographic studies of Turks for general orientation, laments on territories lost to Turks to create emotional minds, and tracts on converting Turks to Christianity. Even some of their negative stereotypes of Turks – such as backward, uncultured, and threat to the Western aspect and survive until today.

Penetration of Ottoman forces in Europe was considered to be a great threat and loss of Greek heritage. Bisaha (2004) in his research work highlighted the feelings of a Venetian renaissance humanist; Lauro Quirini (1420-1479) in a letter sent to Pope Nicholas V and expressed his reaction to the fall of Constantinople in the hands of Ottoman forces. He painted the picture of this event helplessly with the words: Constantinople had preserved the ancient Greek living language and culture so the loss

of Greek literature in the city would ensure that the heritage of Greece would fade away. Bisaha (2004) considers that the writer turned this concept against Turks with a scathing indictment of their way of life and calling them “a barbaric, uncultivated race, without established customs, or laws, living a careless, vagrant, arbitrary life” (p. 67). Apparently, with this statement, Quirini lumps Turks with ancient ethnic groups whom Christians did not resemble in the least. He equivocally reinforced the ancient Greek and Roman value judgments that bitterly portrayed nomads (or those presumed to be such) as polar opposite to the “civilized” Christians (Bisaha, 2004). Such assertions by the humanist intellectuals played, beyond doubt, an important role in nurturing prejudice as a collective attitude towards Muslims and Islam, which continued being transmitted from one generation to the other across Europe.

By large, scholars and writers from the early modern period, as Mignolo (2011) exposes, recycled the previous negative stereotypes of strangers, exotic distant countries, curious foreigners, and hostile religions perhaps making a refute to Jewish and Islamic religions whose followers they saw inferior to West. These writers, as Kumar (2012) claims, approached the Western civilization by all standards as destined to lead and save the rest of civilizations from devil, barbarism, primitivism, underdevelopment, despotism, and all sorts of abuses and to turn the unhappiness into happiness for all and forever. The renaissance humanists like Quinn and others consciously played on the ancient Greek history and culture to encourage and implant a sense of cultural distinction and introduced a more secular discourse that positioned Muslims East as inferior, backward against a superior and civilized Christian West.

Bisaha (1999, 2004) in his analytical works maintained that the renaissance humanists contrasted the notion of Western enlightenment with social and cultural evils and with the barbaric nature of Turk showing them culturally inferior to Western civilization. Kumar (2012) assessed that Muslims were increasingly labeled stereotyped as boorish, ignorant, dishonorable, immoral, ineffectual, corrupt, and irrational. By large, these intellectuals sustained the concepts of medieval “otherness” from the renaissance to the modern world. Thus, Islam and Muslims were discredited on all fronts of culture, morals, intellect, civilization, and virtues of Western standard.

Although renaissance humanists and other scholars neither had, nor exercised, any physical force against Muslims. However, the intellectual power asserted by them over the Muslim world developed a new definition of the Islamic religion. Said (1997a) argues in this context that Islam was seen as part of the East, sharing in its exoticism, mystery, corruption, and latent power. Islam had been and was seen as a military threat to the West for centuries before. The medieval period and early renaissance were believed to be a problem for Christian intellectuals and philosophers, who continued for decades to portray Islam and its prophet (PBUH) as the rankest variety of “apostasy”. Historians like Said (1997a) in their chronicles hold the view that Islamic religion had lived in Western imaginations as a kind of standing religio-cultural threat, and this fear did not prevent Western imperialism from building its institutions on Muslim land. The humanist movement, as claimed by the researcher, may be considered a formative moment because it shaped the way the minion of the West today perceived the East. It is with this background that the perceptions of Muslims as a

political and cultural threat to a growing sense of united West dominated the early modern period; particularly between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries.

By the eighteenth century, intellectual warfare was launched against Islam. Renaissance humanism, therefore, entered into a new age of enlightenment. As Allen (2010) and Green (2015) portray that an intellectual and philosophical movement began that dominated the world of ideas, which stressed the primacy of reasons in the human quest to acquire knowledge and discover the truth. This movement was bolstered by an unprecedented surge in Western interest in cultural aspects of the Islamic world. Eventually, many universities in the West sponsored Arabic scholarship and produced histories, dictionaries, and books on Islam. The pieces so produced were in place to bring a more nuanced image of Islam. Iqbal (2020) while quoting the example narrates that *Broughton's Dictionary of All Religions* (1745) classified the existing world religions into two types: true religions, (Christianity and Judaism) and false religions (all the rest including Islam). Although Muslims were no longer a military threat to the Christian West, after the fall of the Ottomans Empire¹⁶ prejudice continued to abound in both vernacular and academic language.

¹⁶ Turks integration into Europe was short-lived; they began to lose their military and political control over Christians that finally ended with the second unsuccessful siege at Vienna in 1683 that was marked as an end to a thousand years long Muslim threat to the Europe and beginning of challenges to Islamic world (Lewis, 1994, p. 180). After the defeat of Turks at the gates of Vienna, Thomas Mills emphasized that the crusade (or holy war) was part of historical legacy of almost all Englishmen, who gave a testimony of their bravery and courage against infidels – a courage that had began half a millennium before and had not abated. Even some astrologers weighed in to assure their readers that the “Bible had already fixed the date of the total destruction of Islam and the conversion of all Muslims to Christianity, namely 1701” (Matar, 2009, p. 225).

Allen (2010) quoted the example of Voltaire who maintained earlier stereotypes of Islam showing the Prophet (PBUH) in a very stereotypical manner; as a model of fanaticism and barbarism. Similarly, Green (2015) held the view that Pierre Bayle painted the picture of Muhammad (PBUH) with the words allegedly that he “forged a revelation from God” to justify his and other men’s lascivious behavior, to the detriment of females: “the permission Mahomet (Muhammad) granted to men to have many wives, and to whip them when they were not obedient, and to divorce them when they were not obedient, and to divorce them upon any displeasure, was a law very prejudicial to the female sex” (pp. 62-63). These paintings were constructed and not based on pragmatic injunctions of Islam.

Historical facts reveal, according to Allen (2010), that the West was engaged with the Islamic world in countless ways. One of such ways of interaction, as reported was that Western aristocracy and elites have frequently traveled to the Middle East for the experience of Islamic culture firsthand and to educate Europeans about Islamic civilization. They reflected their experiences and ideas about the Islamic world and culture in their travelogues. In this way, as Kumar (2012) puts in, pertained to stories of the Islamic world as an exotic and fantastic land populated by genies, harems, and all things enchanting and amusing to Westerners had ultimately shaped the Western perception of the East. Similarly, Esposito and Kalin (2011) outline the rise of secular humanism in this age and even beyond which gave rise to the reassessment of Islam; resulting in an irrational view of the religion that still dominates the media discourse on Muslims, which according to Kalin (2011) cannot accommodate Islam being

incompatible, as A. H. Ali (2011) puts in, with ideals of so-called enlightenment legacy. The legacy saw, as analyzed by Kumar (2012), Islam as an “exotic world” and enlightenment intellectuals and philosophers increasingly associated Muslims with “sensuality, promise, terror, sublimity, idyllic pleasure, (and) intense energy” (p. 21). The European legacy of enlightenment, according to Mignolo (2011), also divided the human beings into races; and in this process, “blood” as a marker of the race (or racism) shifted to the skin as a mark of distinction and whiteness came to be associated with cultural and racial superiority (p. 8). Kumar (2012) delineated this legacy into unreason and savagery (a culture perceived to be inferior, barbaric, or violent) which was conveniently located among the non-whites. Thus, all non-white (Brown, Black) were categorized in the category “Others”.

Turning over centuries not only turned the pages of history but also the practices and strategies of European Christian-dominated powers. The period between the eighteenth and early twentieth century was therefore generally remembered as an age of military expansion and contraction.¹⁷ The work of Blanks (1999) considers this threat a period when the impact of enlightenment was making themselves felt, when West was in throes and intense struggle of political upheaval; when the industrial revolution with the invention of the wheel, had gained momentum to push West into

¹⁷ Colonization began with Christopher Columbus’s discovery of America in his 1492 expedition. Portuguese and Spanish developed extensive colonial networks in North and South America in a century that followed. By seventeenth century, they were joined by French, Dutch, and British; they controlled millions of Muslims and vast territories of Asia and Africa by 1920. Christianity became the first global order of the modern world (Allen, 2010; Green, 2015; Lewis, 1994; Mignolo, 2012). The process of colonization was primarily justified by the recourse to a new body of ideas “Orientalism” – a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient – Muslim world; mainly Middle East and North Africa (Said, 1978).

the modern age; when technology was too unsophisticated and the Middle East and North Africa were practically too backward to experience the homogenizing effects of global capital and culture. Allen (2010) outlined that with imperial growth and academic inquiry working together, new understandings of Islam or Islamic civilization began to emerge. These newer emerging standards of understanding were not only premised and established as being scholarly and rationalized but also endorsed by the imperial power too. Islam came to be viewed from a more dominant position of the West, after penetrating into Africa, Asia, and America. In these colonized lands the West was becoming more powerful: a power that linked to the processes of colonization. As Sadeghi (1988) assessed that a sense of Western superiority marked by imperialism, pragmatism, and utter contempt for Islamic civilization tended to prevail. West saw a romantic exoticism mesmerized by magical East whose growing poverty and backwardness seemed only to add to its charm; added by a specialized scholarship “Orientalism” which focused on the great age of the past.¹⁸ It is in this context of colonization that the colonized territories became golden geese for the colonial masters.

The journey of Christian vs. Muslim and Christianity vs. Islam enmity, hatred, and hostility, which commenced in the seventh century and beyond, has had changing styles. The medieval period saw a cultural deformation of Muslims at the hands of

¹⁸ A widely accepted theory of nineteenth century that human society was divided into different and distinct civilizations, which existed in isolation from each other, and each driven by its own core set of values and principles. This theory held that western civilization being having roots in ancient Greece was a unique with a set of qualities that differentiated it from the rest all. These qualities included “freedom, law, rationality, science, progress, intellectual curiosity, and the spirit of invention, adventure and enterprise”. Predictably, the Islamic civilization was defined in relation to the concept of superior West, as “pre-modern, backward, primitive, despotic, static, undemocratic, and rigid” (Kumar, 2012, p. 30).

dominating Christians in the West. Except for the period of Turk's domination, division after division of both groups kept on looming over centuries. Loomba (2015) in his critical analysis held the view that there was perhaps never a time through history when West and East were so divided as the period between the eighteenth and early twentieth century witnessed. Through romanticized and fetishlike stories, the East was becoming all that its counterpart was not. The construction of "Orient" in relation to "Occident" thus developed a distinct sense of "us" (those from West) and "them" (those from Arabs and the Near Eastern people) and resultantly places onto the Orientals the characteristic of "otherness". In spite of underlying differences between colonial enterprises of various Western nations, they depicted the same behavior and produced fairly similar stereotypes of the "outsiders" – both who roamed far away on the edges of the world and those who (like the Irish) lurked uncomfortably nearer home. Thus, "laziness, aggression, violence, greed, sexual promiscuity and deviance, female masculinity and male effeminacy, bestiality, primitivism, innocence and irrationality", and numerous other adjectives, were attributed ... by the English, French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese colonialists to Turks, Africans, Native Americans, Jews, Indians, the Irish, and others (p. 115). These stereotypes created and perpetuated by the colonialists in their discourse about Muslims seem to be the continuity of earlier prejudices and biases towards Islam which have had their historical trees to the seventh century and onward.

As already revealed, the prejudice towards Islam and Muslims, as Matar (2009) recalls, was nurtured by the rich literary and theological imagination between the late fifteenth century and late eighteenth century. A number of scholars, dramatists, poets,

and preachers during this period constructed negative stereotypes of Muslims that had little or no relation to Islamic religion or civilization. But, in many ways, Islam lived on in Western imagination as a religion rooted in deceit, violence, and misogyny as numerous witnessed; like Frassetto and Blanks (1999), Green (2015), Kumar (2012). A variety of negative attitudes and attributes towards Islam and Muslims surfaced resurfaced and existed side by side since the Middle Ages. This historically long hostility, albeit fear in traces, against Islam and Muslims made them “others” and resultantly construction of prejudice as a collective attitude was the net outcome, as Said (1978) sensed through literature, which finds manifestations in the racially charged views that distinguish between “the self” and “the other” and legitimize these differences as historical truths about the Westerners and “otherness”. This was prejudice was labeled as Eurocentric hostility towards the Arabo-Islamic population in his acclaimed work: *Orientalism* (1978).¹⁹ Although theological arguments driving the hostility against Islam and Muslims lost some of their potency by end of the enlightenment age, they did linger into the modern world to a reasonable extent and effect.

With the discovery of the American continent, the human population from all over the world considered this new land as a viable abode of living. Thus, like Europe, millions of Muslims from the Middle East and Africa had migrated and settled in the

¹⁹ Said (1978) defined Orientalism in three interconnected ways: an academic discipline pertaining to anyone who teaches, researches, or writes about the region known as “the Orient” (mainly Middle East and North Africa); a way of thinking that posits a sharp dichotomy between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’ (or ‘the East’ and ‘the West’); and a discourse of power over the Orient (Said, 1978, pp. 2-3).

United States. Howell (2014) in his research work reported that when these Muslim migrants established the first mosque in Chicago in 1893, five-time calls to prayer from the high minaret of the mosque and Friday congregations sent a wave of fear and insecurity among natives Christians and Jews in America. The fears and anxieties about the religion of Islam and Muslim culture have grown over time. Schaff (2012) proclaimed that some US scholars of the nineteenth century saw Islam as a source of fanaticism and violence. A church historian, Phillip Schaff (1819-1893) said that Islam left nothing but chaos and insecurity wherever it reached the US. He also daringly criticized Qur'an as being a pack of poetic beauty mixed with absurdities, bombast, unmeaning images, and low sensuality. On the other, a disgrace to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) continued unabated by the scholars from other religions, as Neale (1847) mentioned as far as in the middle of the nineteenth century. The author (1818-1866) portrayed the prophet of Islam as; one who fooled Muslims by promising them heaven having countless sensual delights, and was making a mockery of people while showing his connection with the Angel of God.

Similarly, Churchill (1899) criticized Islam as being a fanatical frenzy and anti-women religion and being a proselytizing force against the Christians. He was so prejudiced towards Islam to the extent that he called it "as dangerous in a man, as hydrophobia in a dog" (p. 248). William Muir (1819-1905) expressed prejudice towards Islam with words; like, "the sword of Muhammed, and the Kor'an, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilization, Liberty, and the Truth which the world has yet known" as Said (1978, p. 151) traced. Some other scholars propagated that all Muslims, of

whichever ethnic origin, think and act like a barbarian person of the medieval ages and that “Islam forms a block of intangible traditions, of prejudices, of bigoted faith. The Musulman, as Servier and Moss-Blundell (1924) held the view, was bound by his religion, cannot accept Western progress. The two civilization are too different, too much opposed ever to admit of mutual interpenetration” (p. 252). For some, as López (2011) considered, Islam was the negation of civilization and barbarism; the Muslim was the “irreconcilable enemy of the Christian” (p. 564), a view which groups together all negative prejudices against the Muslims.

Historical trends reveal that the modern world emerged differently following the imprints of imperialism and nationalism, as Said (1978) noted. At this point, conversion of Muslims to Christianity and avoiding non-Muslims to embracing Islam was not considered a valid reason behind anti-Islam hostility. The image of Muslims as competing power was however did not appear to be blurred at all. Muslims as a growing number were presented as a contending force in the realm of international affairs, and the image of Islam was crystallized as an obscurant, archaic and despotic religion capable of posing serious threats to world peace as a building block by the turn of the twentieth century some scholars of the West began to locate possible areas of threat that might emanate from Islam for the Western civilization. López (2011) notes that in 1906 Louis Gustave Binger (1856-1936) declared “Islam a historical and living threat for the world” (p. 567). The most significant extent of this hostility against Muslims was the step taken by some Western scholars who employed print media for charging negative sentiments against Islam and Muslims. In this context, O'Leary

(1923) called the Balkan War of 1912-13 (prelude to the first world war) as the crusade against Islam and used media to publicize this narrative at the mass level. It was because of this reason that, from the twentieth century on, historically inherited polemical narratives against Islam and Muslims got wider publicity, acceptance, and reaction on the part of the Western populace.

The process of transmission of ideologies, sentiments, results of organized campaigns against Muslims and Islam as per its trees in the seventh century onward, was shifting from one strategy to another. Western scholars though employed print media to continue with their historical and traditional negative sentiments against Islam and its followers, the intensity of this campaign was however less intense. Poynting and Mason (2007) were of the view that in the latter part of the twentieth century, the ongoing animosity to Islam and Muslims escalated and gathered momentum into a phobia and this could have been due to mediated world. These authors quote the example of the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s which saw the emergence of a new global figure of threat and enmity: with Muslim populations of the West finding them increasingly encoded as the new “evil other”. This discourse of deviant and enemy images of the Muslims ultimately perpetuated and spread through media, and was manifested in a range of racist attacks from property damage and verbal abuse to physical assault and worse than that. These ideologies represented for many Muslims and Arabs ingrained racial ideologies stemming from the prevailing ethnocentric “European/Christian consciousness since the First Crusade” (Poynting & Mason, 2007, p. 64). Since then, the media have been involved with greater intensity and reliance,

whether unwittingly or by design, in subtly reviving and reinforcing the long-standing historically implanted hostility between the West and the Islamic world.

It is alarming to note that Islam became to be seen as the most dangerous and probably the only enemy of the West that is and could be potentially harmful to the peace and world order. Even some scholars like Huntington (1996) described Islam as a threat to Western civilization. Iqbal (2020) asserted that in the course of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, some new dimensions to the long-living hostility against Muslims emerged. These fears produced notions that increasingly contributed to medieval negative othering discourse about Islam; like, Islam as a threat to the world peace, a set of codes for the secret society of the world aimed at fighting for eternity against the world, a prejudice fostering religion against all others combined, and Muslims as a bunch of most irrational creatures that may explicitly appear to be democratic, liberal and enlightened but when could they implicitly convert to be radicalized and barbaric individuals. One cannot predict?

It became apparent that the dawn of the twenty-first century renewed and reinforced the centuries-old fear, prejudice, racism, and other ills and practically related to Islam and Muslims. The two worlds – the Western and the Muslim – became divided by the self-imposed threat perceptions and racial feelings of the past. The historic prejudicial fear of Islam and Muslims both have been amplified by media representations which eventually served to amplify the media narratives of terror and insecurity for the West. Ironically, the media representation of crime and violence is noted to be often expressed through highly racialized and class-based discourses as

Ames (2016) suggested that mainly focus on specific ethnic and cultural or religious targets; like ISIS, and other extremist groups. In nutshell, this all bears per se similarities with the targets of contemporary Islamophobia. A question arises as to what, then, could be identified as the root causes of contemporary fear and hatred of Islam, which could justify and affirm ‘Islamophobia’ in general?

1.2 Problem Statement

Presently there is no unanimous definition of Islamophobia that can comprehensively measure the phenomenon; such as discrimination, abuses, and violence against Muslims. Islamophobia is an abstract concept, but one can observe its manifestations in media. Hence, it is assumed to be a media(ted) construction. Media construct presents different images of Muslims, such as threats posed to Westerners on the basis of which people commit violence against them. This phenomenon is generally referred to as ‘Islamophobia’. Moreover, the phenomenon is historical in nature because, since the birth of Islam, the West has considered Muslims as ‘enemies’ being followers of an opposing religion or ideology and culture per se. In simple words, Islamophobia build-up is in the minds of those who consider Islam as an ‘enemy’. The current researcher thus starts this study with a historical tracing of the negative images of Islam and/or Muslims. It provides the context for studying contemporary Islamophobia as it reveals some interesting facts about the relationship between the major three religions of the book – Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.

The ‘historical context’ points to the adversarial relationships between two religions of the book i.e. Christianity and Judaism in ancient Europe before the birth of

Islam in the seventh century. There had been contestation centering on the elevation of Christianity into a state religion, but the emergence of a third contending force in the realm of religions appeared to be a major challenge to the existing narrative of a Christian world and jeopardized the future of both; Christianity and Judaism. The early establishment of the State of Islam, then its fast-paced expansion to Europe, mass conversion of people, control of Muslims over economic and social affairs, and the loss of papal authority over regional and world affairs turned out to be alarming among Christians and Judaists. Unfortunately, Islam was conceived and projected as a symbol of all problems of the world. What ultimately merged was that the prevalent Christo-Judo adversaries reduced to fight off Islam and Muslims as a common ‘enemy’ of Europe.

It is pertinent to note that the nature of hostility towards the ‘enemy’ kept on changing because of several religious and geopolitical reasons. In the beginning, there was ‘hatred’ or ‘dislike’ to Islam which turned into ‘fear’ due to its building power and rapid expansion that gave birth to ‘hostility’ against Islam, being a religion in competition with Christianity and Judaism alike. What ultimately emerged, as historians noted that when Islam did not stop its expansion, was a kind of prejudice as a collective attitude towards Muslim ‘Other’ in a variety of its forms?

It is noteworthy that the fear of ‘Other’ had manifested in religiously charged views that distinguished between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ and legitimized these differences as historical truths about Christianity and Judaism and the Muslim ‘otherness’. The first distinguished marker of Muslim otherness was around ‘religious

identity' that was mainly used to avoid people embracing Islam. However, it transferred to 'ethnic/racial' identity by the early modern period which turned the Muslims into a race of people with eternal enmity towards others; resulting in modern perceptions of Muslims as followers of opposing 'religious' or 'political' ideology to the West and as a symbol of overall terror and in Rychnovská (2014) words threat to international peace and security. Resultantly and as a synthesis, the phenomena of hatred, fear, prejudice, racism, othering, and the Western opposing ideologies when combined and aggregated together form a corpus of phobias – Islamophobia.

Historical facts and reports suggest that the centuries of prejudices, racism and perceptions of Islam as a threat (e.g. religious, political, cultural, social, or security) along with the anti-Islamic narratives in Western media have negatively influenced the perceptions of non-Muslims about Islam. They are no longer epistemologically capable of hearing interpretations of Islam or factual information about Islam in a manner that could counter the prevailing and growing widespread prejudices. If anything, the Western cognitive frameworks have been rewired and turned to the point that any information they receive is actually turned against Islam. Racism is also responsible for this damage. Green (2018) holds the view that the long history of Western antagonism towards Islam and Muslims, and the mass media coverage both being the major sources of enmity have contributed to the process of constructing Islamophobia.

Mass media are generally described as a double-edged sword. According to Howard (2003), they can be utilized for bringing groups together, and at the same time, they can become horrific weapons of escalating tensions between nations or groups.

Terrorism and Islam are subjects of huge concern for many, if not most, Americans and Europeans today; and certainly for most in the media. Esposito (2016) maintains the view that most of it started following the 9/11 tragedy, and since then there has been a continued trumpet about Islamic terrorism in the news media. Radical groups such as ISIS (or ISIL), al-Qaeda, and others are dominating the newshole in media and have increasingly become the globalized and public face of Islam. This has eventually fed and reinforced an irrational fear of Islam and mainstream Muslims, leading not only to the construction of but increase in Islamophobia.

Accepting the premise, the potential of media as powerful agents, and the complex nature of Islamophobia, it is important to observe and qualify the involvement of media in conveying, explaining, and articulating specific discourses that contribute to the construct of specific kind of phobias. Thus media, being a viable source of adding to the momentum of Islamophobia, merits a study to investigate which type, style, and kind of phobia is built on the historical groundwork and which one(s) is built on media discourse or otherwise? There is therefore a pressing need to identify what different kinds of phobias are dominant in each Western country's media which provide reasons for the construction of contemporary Islamophobia in the West? The media(ted) Islamophobia, therefore, becomes a viable piece of research. Keeping in view the outlined objectives and finding answers to the research questions emerging from the outlined objectives.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

Based on an extensive review of the term Islamophobia from the historical perspective, the following objectives of the study have been conceived in order to find answers to the questions emerging from these objectives:

- To explicate the construct of Islamophobia on the basis of discourses in the representations of Islam and Muslims by the US and the UK press.
- To trace whether there is a reflection of the past in the contemporary media discourses on Muslims and Islam.
- To identify antecedent(s)/dimension(s) of Islamophobia construction in the Western media discourses that includes prejudice, racism, and threat perceptions.
- To account for the differences, if any, in the construction of Islamophobia by the newspapers of two different societies i.e. the US and the UK.

1.4 Significance of the Study

In the existing literature which has been reviewed for this study, Islamophobia is discussed as an individual-level negative attitude; like, prejudice and racism. In other contexts, it is also discussed as a new name for an old concept of ‘Orientalism’; but, the objectives of Orientalism were political that is to dominate the Muslim world – distant geographical regions. On the contrary, however, the contemporary collective Islamophobia seems to be targeting Muslims who are living within the West in general

and the US and Europe in particular whereas the scholarship, on the other hand, mainly deals with individual-level explanations of the phenomenon. Although some scholars have debated and discussed the structural operation of Islamophobia, there is a need to discuss Islamophobia in toto as a political tool to include the divergent traits that characterize this debate.

It is generally considered that reasons or antecedents behind manifestations of Islamophobia are latent. One of the leading post-colonial critics in his acclaimed work entitled *Orientalism* (1978), Edward Said argues that “without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage-and even produce-the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (Said, 1978, p. 3). Hence, there is a need to identify the prevalent antecedents of Islamophobia manifestations that predominate in the US and the UK press, which therefore justify this dimension of inquiry on the subject matter.

Finally, this study attempts to explain the construct ‘Islamophobia’ by tracing its antecedents through media discourses in two different societies; the US and the UK. The study adopted a unique approach for analyzing the construct ‘Islamophobia’ by focusing on multiple aspects of the construct assuming it as a ‘corpus of various phobias’ in order to fill the gap and the missing links in the existing scholarship. In this way, the study adds to the existing body of research on ‘Islamophobia’, which so far presents a blurred picture before the world. The study will make a good contribution to

the overall discipline of mass communication in general and the media(ted) construct of Islamophobia in particular.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The opening chapter of this dissertation discussed the historical manifestations of Islamophobia. The phenomenon of Islamophobia can be traced back to the emergence of Islam. It remained throughout history in a multiplicity of its dimensions and conceptions—fear and hatred. Islamophobia is a discursive formation that was historically available in the form of dislike, prejudice, or “Others” that was designed not only to demonize Islam but also to serve political agendas such as justifying the violence and exclusionary practices directed at Muslims and Islam. Since these were functions of Orientalism, which indicate the process of what currently is called securitization, the current chapter explores through the available literature the link, if any, between Islamophobia and Orientalism on the one hand and then Islamophobia and Securitization on the other hand.

This chapter, therefore, proceeds as follows. First, the construction of Islamophobia is reviewed in the light of existing studies on media representations of Muslims and Islam, and this review helped in understanding the key perceptions of Islam that cover the predominant thinking about Islamophobia today. Second, the core theoretical concepts and assumptions surrounding the construct of Islamophobia are explored in order to understand how much these are associated with Orientalism and Securitization. Third, the key theoretical assumptions of securitization are summarized and efforts are made to understand how securitization theory can guide to analyze this

very phenomenon of Islamophobia through media discourses (in this study the US and the UK newspapers) surrounding Islam and/or Muslim. Finally, the research questions of this study have been deduced based on theoretical, analytical, and descriptive studies undertaken by various researchers.

2.1 Media Representations of Islam: A Review

The work of many scholars shows that Muslims had been perceived as one of the greatest threats to the Western imperial ambitions and its expansionist projects for many centuries. This stage all the way dates back to the medieval centuries and has continued all through to the twenty-first century. For example, European nations clashed with Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century. They were continuously expanding into many of the Muslim majority countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Researchers like Green (2015) opines that they have apparently declared war against Muslims and United States has become a major imperial power focusing its economic and political control over various Middle Eastern countries.²⁰ There was thus a long history of Western empires representing/constructing Muslims as threatening “Others” in many ways, but as Kumar (2010) argues that the story of media’s construction of “Islam” as an object of fear, terror, and insecurity begins with the 1979 revolution in Iran.

Contemporary researchers like Roberson (2005) and Kumar (2010) are of the view that the age-old Islamic threat, which laid dormant following World War II, re-

²⁰ See, <https://www.authortalk.audio/fortress-press.html>

emerged with the overthrow of a staunch and strategically important ally of the West i.e. Reza Pahlevi of Iran. The Cold War script that was divided between Communism and Democracy as Gasher (2002) reports was very quickly revised to accommodate a new global conflict featuring the Muslim “Other”. The world became eventually divided between the idea of Islam and the West.²¹ In her exclusive study of media representations of Islam, Poole (1999) pointed out that the “Iranian Revolution” provided reasons to media to develop an image of Islam as a “new enemy” of the West based on the historical hostile and polarized relationships between the West and Islamic world.

The work of Shuja (1982) indicates that the Iranian Revolution brought a dramatic surge in the polemical media discourses that increasingly demonized Islam and positively invoked the historical sources for Christian worry. Historical facts reveal that Western journalists frequently depicted exaggerated stereotypes and caricatures of Islam, thereby representing it both as a hostile and baneful religion. He found that Western media widely framed the Iranian Revolution as a “return to an extreme orthodoxy in Islam which is anti-Western in nature”. This discourse adopted by media led to recall that as recently as the beginning of the twentieth century, the Mohammedan world *vis-à-vis* Muslims were seen as “an alien force which Christendom had every reason to fear” (p. 62). Another study undertaken later by Zarnett (2007) also revealed that media portrayed the revolution in Iran grossly in many ways as the return of Islam.

²¹ It was correctly pointed out by a British historian that the longest and oldest cold war (and war) had been waged not between communism and democracy but Islam and Christianity, Islam has been the threat that troubled Western imagination from the fall of Constantinople till the collapse of Turkish power in World War-I (Shuja, 1982, p. 61).

Roberson (2005) pointed that Western media inherited this discourse and constructed the image of Islam as a potential political force threatening the Western world.

Said (1981) also described the revolution in Iran as the initial signifier of the revival of Islam, posing threats to political, cultural, and social domains of the Western world as Zarnett (2007) also confirmed this viewpoint. In his analysis of coverage of Muslims during and after the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-1081), Said (1981) reported that US media have been found to be increasingly representing Islam as negative “Other”, as a part of the Western outlook which he termed “Orientalism”. It was the moment of significant importance in both reinforcing the manifestations of historic ideological Orientalist discourses as it meant to Said (1981) by which Islam came to be known to many Westerners and the point from which the media’s negativities towards Muslims magnified and amplified considerably.

Poole (1999) noted that the growing tide of militarism during the 1980s and 1990s swept through a considerable portion of the Middle East. This was the debate at the centre of all sections of the media and Western society. Elgambri (2008) suggests that the coverage of Islamic groups and movements, whether moderate or militants, significantly involved conflation of Islamic religion with Islamic militancy in relation to violence carried out by militant groups, a trend which unfortunately continues even today. It was further reported that the phenomenon of Islamic militancy was presented with different labels such as Islamic terror, extremism, fundamentalism, Islamic militancy, and political Islam, and those involved in violence or deviance activities

were called Islamic terrorists, extremists, fanatics (Elgambri, 2008) and ultimately led to a convergence of Islamophobia.

According to Roberson (2005), violence, terrorism and extremist pronouncements elsewhere were projected not only on to Muslim militant groups but on to mainstream Muslims as a result of historically inherited hatred by the Westerners. Although Islamists represent a small minority of mainstream Muslim communities of the Europe and United States, Western media generalized their aggressive actions as part of perceived conflict between Islam and Western liberalism at a large. Yilmaz (2016) pointed out that the perceptions of Islam as a foreign “political ideology”, where religion is used simply to gain military or political advantage, provided substance and the definitional structure as the phenomenon of Islamophobia was being conceived by the Runnymede Trust in the late twentieth century (p. 21). Elgambri (2008) added that the so-called “political threat” continues to have utility in the present-day media discourses surrounding Islamophobia – Islamists fundamentalism and identification of Islam as a violent religion associated with terrorism (p. 51) mistakenly ignoring the message of peace of Islam.

From the trends of media’s involvement in projecting Islam and Muslims, J. E. Richardson (2004) reports that it appears that there was a tendency for the Western media to situate Muslims within the framework of conflict and violence. Kumar (2010) adds that Muslims were isolated due to cultural differences. Said (1997b) analysis of the US media coverage of Muslims found that in many instances “Islam has licensed ... expressions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred, deep yet

paradoxically free-floating hostility” on the front-line media (p. 29). On the domestic front, Rushdie Affair (1989) was an important event that created tension between the Muslim minorities and wider communities in Britain. For example, as van Dijk (1991) reported, the death threat by Iranian leader (Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran issued a fatwa against Salman Rushdie) and the protests by Muslims against *The Satanic Verses* gave way to the occasional panicky and aggressive media reporting.

van Dijk (1991) analyzed the press coverage of Rushdie Affairs and found that the incidents surrounding this event were increasingly reported as a part of global terrorism and fundamentalist intolerance. The study further revealed that Western media discourses increasingly emphasized the superiority of British values and cultures. Intellectuals of the time actively participated in the contemporary variant of the old schism between the two religions of the book – Christianity, and Islam – in which general accusations of Islam was its lack of respect and tolerance for other “religious and cultural values”(p. 3). Such a generalized bias against Islam is a clear manifestation of ignorance of the Western scholars and media about the injunctions of the Qur’an, the Holy Book. One dominant opinion among British liberals was that Muslims have to adapt themselves to Western norms and values. van Dijk (1991) concluded that the press coverage of Rushdie Affair positively contributed to negative sentiments towards out-group (British minorities) belonging to different races or ethnicities in general and led to the legitimation of “prevalent prejudices against the Muslim minorities in the Western countries” in particular (van Dijk, 1991, p. 3). Such a role of media in Western

communities appears to have widened the scope of hatred among the Westerners on the one side and Muslims on the other side.

The work of a group of few scholars shows that the fearful images of Islam around the 1980s and 1990s were compounded by the coverage of Islam that increasingly influenced and relied on the “clash of civilization” (1993) thereby framing as a framework of understanding; one that the US media were all too ready to collectively embrace after the fall of Communism (Ogan et al., 2014). The study by Said (1981) also finds that the “media, the governments, the geopolitical strategists, and ... the academic experts on Islam (were) all in concert: Islam is a threat to Western civilization (or culture)” (p. 136). This reflects that all functionaries were in liaison to consider Islam a serious threat to the West, its civilizations, and culture.

Hafez (2000) argues that Western media generally depicted Islam as a “fanatic and violent religion cutting-off hands”, “repressing women”, and presenting it hostile towards Western democracy, human rights, and Western ideas of freedom. Quoting Hafez (2000) reveals that he presented a typology of Western media’s patterns of representations of Islam which shows that: (1) Islam was associated with “politics”; (2) Islamic politics was associated with “fundamentalism”; (3); fundamentalism was associated with “terrorism”; (4) and “political violence” was framed avoiding its socio-political context (p. 5). Scholars like Fekete (2009) and Navarro (2010) pointed out with regard to the positioning of Muslim women in Western media that media usually represented them as victims of alleged Islamic sexism. Thus the one-sided biased role of media with regard to Islam has totally ignored the therapeutic objectives of

punishments for various crimes. Rather the bright side of Islam and its practices have had altogether been ignored.

Poole (2002) pointed that Western media increasingly constructed the image of Islam as a “global threat to security” of the West and labeled Islamists (or fundamentalists) as a “political and physical threat within”, the Western society. She elaborates that such coverage of Western media played an important role in changing the perceptions of the wider community in Britain about Muslims and that “Islam within” the British society was perceived as a cultural and ideological threat (p. 71). Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2007) reported that the entire Western media in the context of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror negatively framed the activities of terrorist groups. Ultimately, these negative reports resulted in widespread fear and apprehension of Islamic terrorism and violence in the US society too. These researchers narrated that the typical media coverage of Arabs and Muslim Americans before and after the 9/11 attacks, did not specifically provide the audience with a representative image of these minority groups.

Similarly, Moore, Mason, and Lewis (2008) while analyzing the UK’s newspapers articles for the period 2000 to 2008 found that British Muslims were increasingly associated with “terrorist, extremist, Islamist, suicide bomber and militant ... fanatical, fundamentalist, extremist and militant” (p. 3). Such an attitude of UK’s print media grossly appears to be biased and *malafide* as labeling the entire Muslim population to be bad will typical adjectives does not sound realistic. There are very pious and dedicated Muslims who respect and regard other religions as ordained in the

Qur'an. Poole (2004) argued that media have undoubtedly developed an image of Islam as a big threat to "mainstream values" and "security" of the West (p. 217).

In sum, as Esposito (2016) reported that since the Iranian Revolution, and subsequent events such as the American hostage, Rushdie Affairs, 9/11 attacks and other incidents of violence involving Muslims, Western media increasingly projected an enemy image of Islam being political, civilizational (cultural), and demographic (or security) threat to the entire West. If Islamophobia results from the way Muslims and Islam are represented in the media, as Benzehaf (2017) considers, then it can be thought of as a shared perception of Islam as a threat which mainly refers to political, cultural, or security threats. However, Runnymede Report (1997) reported the consequences of Islamophobia in the form of "unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs" (p. 4). Although discrimination refers to negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam, it is also clear that the process of exclusion also involves the structural operation of powers.

Researchers have found that Islamophobia is an instrument that is designed, developed, publicized, and used not only to demonize Islam but to exclude Muslims from mainstream society which involves state-level actions. The question arises as to how scholars have conceptualized Islamophobia which is a clear manifestation of hatred, enmity, and othering attitudes of the West against Islam and Muslims.

2.2 Islamophobia: A Summary and Critique

The term Islamophobia has practically very narrow dimensions such as; prejudice, racism, hatred, danger, bloodshed, physical, ideological, and cultural threats, suicide attacks, violence, and nothing more. It just revolves around some repulsive titles given to Islam and its followers. Within these narrow definitional complexities, the term Islamophobia is then made up of phobias such as; hatred, danger, bloodshed, physical, ideological and cultural threats, suicide attacks and violence. According to Furedi (2007b), phobias are discussed, both within academic and popular discourses, today as a “transcendental force” that can drive people to commit acts of verbal and physical violence against the hated ones. These phobias are narrative and abstract and, as suggested by Michel Foucault (as cited in Ramadan & Shantz, 2016, p. 4), narratives also express the modes of power of inclusion and exclusion. One of the recently constructed such conditions, as Buehler (2011) puts in, is best understood as “Islamophobia”, which is significantly spreading “like a virus” in the US and European societies increasingly through the vehicles of media (p. 639).

It is evident that the contemporary debates about Islamophobia have thoroughly parsed the neologism in the hope of arriving at a comprehensive or suitable definition which is, for years, continuously floating like an uncontrolled planet in space. Scholars with a variety of backgrounds, experiences, and their understanding of the construct have debated, defined, critically analyzed, and conceptualized the construct of Islamophobia; yet a holistic and agreed-upon definition is yet to emerge by combining all the bad adjectives associated with the term. Although it is important in any such

debate to lay out explicitly the cognitive frameworks that shape the discussion, as Lean (2012) considers it is easy to become trapped in unnecessary etymological roundabouts. In the literature, there is confusion on the first use of the term Islamophobia as its scope has never enlarged beyond hatred, danger, bloodshed, threats of all kinds, prejudice, racism, violence, etc.

López (2011) traced the origin of Islamophobia to the late nineteenth century and shows that it was used by Alain Quellien in 1910 to describe and explain the negativities of the French administrators towards Muslim subjects based on historically inherited prejudices. Quellien's pioneering perspective characterized Islamophobia as a form of prejudice, racism, and negation of Islamic civilization; and a dominant approach of labeling Muslims and Islam as an enemy of the West. The Runnymede Report (1997) identified different perceptions of Islamophobia which also include the notion that Islam is the "enemy" of the West, as reported by Conway (1997). To quote, an "enemy image" refers to a "belief (or perception) held by certain (social or cultural) group that its security and basic values are directly ... threatened by some other group" (Luostarinen as cited in López, 2011, p. 568). López (2011) held the view that the enemy image however cannot be simply based on the feelings of "dislike or antipathy"; rather it is a matter of survival and existence. López (2011) defines Islamophobia as a hostile attitude of the total West towards Muslims and Islam based on the enemy image (or perception) of Islam that represents imminent peril to the well-being or survival of the West.

The Runnymede Report defined Islamophobia as unfounded “hostility towards Islam” as Conway (1997) reports which according to Alain Quellien springs from the notion that Islam is an “irreconcilable enemy” of the West (López, 2011, p. 563). Iqbal’s (2010) perspective characterized Islamophobia as a shared perception of Islam as a threat; mainly refers to political, cultural, or security threats and nothing more. His Islamophobia Process Model (2010) also explains that these fears are a manifestation of the racially and culturally charged views about Muslims adding that these views distinguish between “the Self” and “the Other” and tend to legitimize these differences as historical inherited truth about Westerners and “Otherness”.

However, prejudice towards Islam is not a new phenomenon as Said (2003) considered. It is rather rooted in Islamic history, for example, the notion of the Arabs, the Moors, the Turks, or Tatars had long been reportedly used as iconic representations of Islam both as a hostile and baneful religion. According to Wheatcroft (2005), Muslims had been represented as an arrogant soul of the enemy, an inferior race born of a slave, barbaric ethnicity according to Vitkus (1999) and to Lewis (1994) to accentuate the difference between European “Us” and Muslim “Other” (p. 133). Daniel (1989a) has reported that Crusades Propaganda was similarly also designed to produce an idea of Muslims as “common enemy” of Europe; proponents of religion, therefore, devised to destroy Christianity and the European political powers. The latent message was, of course, that Islam *viz-a-viz* Muslims are a rigid progenitor of violence and this religion is thus an existential threat to Europeans.

The contemporary Islamophobia as Zúquete (2008) considers also refers to “a widespread mindset and fear-laden discourse in which people make blanket (and random) judgments of Islam as the enemy, as the ‘Other’, as a dangerous and unchanged, monolithic bloc that is the natural subject of well-deserved (and qualified) hostility from Westerners” (p. 323). History shows that a similar othering discourse was employed to launch crusades, according to Bouma (2016), which stereotypically associated Islam with violence and sexuality to construct the image of it as incapable of democracy and irrational creed. Daniel (1989a) reported that the key constituents of the “Christian version” of Islam at that time included the notions that “violence is an essential part ... of Islam” and that “Islam reverses Christian moral concepts” and thus poses a religious threat (p. 53). Crusades Propaganda ironically proved to be a powerful body of ideas that survived even in the contemporary media discourses on Islam. Christian negative conception of Islamic religion was grossly integrated into the body of knowledge in which many Europeans of the Middle Ages found expression in such a way as to represent the enemy as the converse of the European ideal. The negative othering discourse in a way, according to Daniel (1989a), served as a tool for the expression of Europeans’ pride in them and contempt for others. The Church elders have been described as chief proponents of medieval “cultural ethnocentrism” (Daniel, 1989a, p. 76) and the medieval polemicists as the architects of prejudices as Daniel (1993) reported in his work.

It is generally understood whether classified as a psychological trauma brought on by a certain set of experiences or social or cultural anxiety, Islamophobia in its most

simple terms refers to the self-imposed fear of Muslims and/or Islam by the West. The Runnymede Report (1997) considered that it is the fear that leads to hatred, then hostility, then discrimination, and then exclusions of Muslims from mainstream social and political affairs, as characterized by the above-noted report in its definition of Islamophobia. According to Iqbal (2010), it appears that “fear” is the main component of Islamophobia which provides reasons for racial and cultural prejudice and then “offensive actions” (p. 91).

The prejudice, whether racial or cultural, is a mental framework as Rosado (1996) accounts for in that works to protect from fears or terrors, defending socio-cultural privilege over others described as different or “Other”. One of the earliest examples of such prejudice can be the Vienne Council’s (the 1310s) decisions which out-rightly imposed restrictions on religious and cultural freedom of Muslims within the boundaries of Christians Europe for isolating them from Europeans. This is no doubt the highest degree of prejudism. Daniel (1989b) reported that it prohibited/regulated religious noise with the claim that Muslims’ call to prayer is “an affront to the divine name and a reproach to the Christian faith” (p. 23). He further argued that it was the first time when legal conservatism was combined with the anti-Muslim propaganda to the point of self-delusion (Daniel, 1989b). Constable (2010) while further clarifying stated that the decisions of the Council marked a shift in the modern aversions towards Muslims, signaling and enforcing an increased understanding of Muslims religious noise (the call for prayer) as a problem for the West

and reinforcing prohibitions by law on the religious expression of Muslim minority groups in the West.

For Daniel (1989b), the “conversion” of Muslims to Christianity was an unlimited political objective and agenda of the Crusades, which was also loudly debated by the elders of Vienne Council who recognized that they cannot be converted through physical power. The Council (1312) as Iqbal (2010) reported, therefore, formally initiated an academic onslaught against Muslims that gave birth to new mythology as Said (1978) calls “Orientalism” or a “Western style (language game) for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient (external object)” (p. 4). It may be clarified that the emergence of Orientalism as mythology; the Westerners included the representation of the East in a stereotypical way that is regarded as embodying a colonialist attitude, in the eyes of Colonial masters. Said (1978) believes that ideally;

“... without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot ... understand the ... systematic discipline by which European culture was able to (axiomatically) manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically ... imaginatively ... Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that ... no one writing, thinking or acting on the ‘Orient’ could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism” (p. 3).

According to Said (1978), Orientalism was a discourse by which the Western culture gained identity and power by setting itself off against “the Orient” as a surrogate and even “underground self” (p. 3). This led to the emergence of two opposite blocks – the West and Orients. Such depiction of “the Orient” in relation to “the Occident” has ultimately developed a distinct sense of “Us” (those from West) and “Them” (those

from Arabs and the Near Eastern people) and unfortunately placed onto the Orientals the characteristic of “otherness”. In spite of the underlying distinctions among various Western colonial powers and as such forming a state of *modus vivendi*; they produced quite similar stereotypes of the “outsiders” – both who roamed far away and those who (like the Irish) lurked nearer home because they had some ulterior motives. As Loomba (2015) argues, for example, “laziness, aggression, violence, greed, sexual promiscuity and deviance, female masculinity and male effeminacy, bestiality, primitivism, innocence and irrationality”, all bad adjectives, were attributed to Turks, Africans, Native Americans, Jews, Indians, the Irish, and others (p. 115). In other words, Islam was becoming and known for all that its counterpart (the West) was not implying that the West is pious, gentle, humanitarian, civilized, educated, peaceful, and in sum perfect by all standards. What Islam came to be known from a more dominant position, as Allen (2010) reports, one where the West was becoming more powerful: a power that was dominantly linked with the processes of colonization and imperialism.

Sayyid (2010) suggested that the term Islamophobia in the Orientalist discourse can be located within the “maintenance of the violent hierarchy” between the idea of Islam and the West (p. 15) that was also endorsed by the imperial power too. Thus, Islamophobia seems to be a new name for an “old concept” as Bleich (2011, p. 1582) reported. Sayyid’s (2010) definition of Islamophobia provides a conceptual understanding of the construct and facilitates a critique that accounts for structural operations of power; rather than individual-level behaviors identified as Islamophobia following the Runnymede Report (1997). This designation appears to transform

Islamophobia as an institution comprising of group behaviors confronting the West and reposing fear syndrome.

Transforming into a “virulent Islamophobia”, the contemporary “European Orientalism”, or what Amin-Khan (2012) calls “new Orientalism”, treats “the Orient” not as a geographical object outside the boundaries of Europe (the Occident) but as a “problem located” ... within” the society – the growing Muslim minority population as added by Fekete (2009, p. 193). The Runnymede Report (1997) definition speaks about two practical consequences of Islamophobia: (1) “discrimination” against and (2) “exclusion” of Muslim individuals and communities from social and political affairs of the West. These consequences indicate two kinds of Islamophobias: (1) private Islamophobia and (2) structural Islamophobia. According to Beydoun (2018), the former refers to “fear, suspicion, and violent targeting of Muslims by private actors” such as individuals and institutions including media (p. 32). Said (1994) holds the view that private Islamophobia finds manifestations in the media in the form of representation of Muslims, their otherization, and racialization as added by Carr and Haynes (2015). Beydoun (2018) holds the view that while the latter is defined as “fear and suspicion of Muslims” as envisaged by the state actors and this involves enforcement of laws, policy, and programming built upon the generalized presumption that Muslim identity is associated with a national security threat to the lives and properties of the natives.

According to the viewpoint of Fekete (2009), reinforcement of Orientalist ideas in the post-9/11 context is directly associated with and as a consequence “war on terror”

and the emergence of a “security state” for all stakeholders. At the core, as per the analysis given by Beydoun (2018), Islamophobia today is “the presumption of guilt” of terrorism to Islam and to Muslim citizens and immigrants in the USA by private (media) and state actors; of which sequentially following the other. Within such a cycle, media actors are the initial designer of contemporary Islamophobia.

Ramadan and Shantz (2016) asserted that Islamophobia is designed to demonize Islam not only to ensure the supremacy of the dominant group but also to justify reprehensible actions towards Muslim minorities *per se*. Current episodes on Islamophobia reveal that today’s sensational stories such as; calls for exclusion of Syrian refugees; anti-Muslim rallies; mosque arsons; and the spike in violence against *hijab*-clad of Muslim women dominate the mainstream Western media discourses on Islam with apparently no end. Continuing his discourse, Beydoun (2018) noted that like other forms of prejudice, Islamophobia is appearing to be contingent on politico-media discourse and most saliently, formal law, policy, and programming in a formal fashion. Cesari (2012) remarked that the consequences of such discourse on the “war on terror” and the status of Islam vs. Islamophobia can be seen in the form of multiple restrictions on religious and cultural activities of Muslims in Europe. These restrictions emerge to be the outcomes of a shared perception of Islam as an imminent peril that calls for emergency and extraordinary measures beyond the domain of regular political procedure. These restrictions are ultimately being interpreted by scholars and researchers as the securitization process. Sayyid (2014) summed up that therefore

contemporary Islamophobia is neither “hatred” nor “religious or cultural bias”; it is rather primarily a “political” phenomenon manufactured by state actors.

Synthesized anatomy of the widely pronounced Islamophobia in the historical perspective appears to some a fantasy, conceived as nothing but a self-imposed threat, fear, dreadfulness, and a literary play. As Beydoun (2018) pronounced that in this sense, Islamophobia seems to be a modern progeny of yesterday’s Orientalism, “a master discourse that positions Islam (and its people) as the civilizational foil of the West” (p. 36). It is imperative that in order to understand Islamophobia, it is vital to study media discourses and their melodious reporting that includes the political rhetoric and hatred inducing statements of government officials which can generate negative impact from individual to institutional level as a path to building blocks of hatred and enmity. From the Foucauldian (as cited in Ramadan & Shantz, 2016, p. 63) perspective, it is evident that discourse is not only a narrative; rather it generates the modes of power, of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, media discourses ultimately consider that Islamophobia certainly asserts the logic of exclusion – inculcation and brainwashing against the Muslim “Other”. In such Islamophobic (or Orientalist) construction, this logic is assumed to be accompanied by the criteria for inclusion by which populations have to show the qualities that they are fit for consideration. Accordingly, Islamophobia expresses a strategy of what Foucault notably describes as bio-politics – governance through discursive practices of bodily shaping and marshaling populations. Thus, Islamophobia tends to be used as a two-edged sword. On one side, it induces the indigenous population to implant hatred, enmity, disrespects against Islam and

Muslims, and on the other side, defames Islam and Muslims as a rejected faith and ignorant, uncivilized people. The Islamophobic target seems to be localized and can thus be located in specific bodies (e.g. racialized bodies) signifying the articulated “Other”, as Ramadan and Shantz (2016) reported. Malik (2005) points out and derived the following notion there from:

“The word Islamophobia has become not just a description of anti-Muslim prejudice but also a prescription for what may or may not be said about Islam”

This viewpoint, therefore, makes the term Islamophobia an open field to exploit by any means by anyone, by any definition, by any words, for targeting Islam and Muslims like a jigsaw. Sayyid (2014) points out that it is possible to read in the conceptualization of the construct Islamophobia by the Runnymede report as an outcome of the articulation between two concepts: “Orientalism” and “Racism” (p. 14). Poole (2002) holds the view that there are many instances that amply indicate that media discourses increasingly construct the Muslim minorities as an unaccepted part of the European society, representing them as “Other” or “out-group” in line with the Orientalist ideas. In the contemporary discourses surrounding Islamophobia, the construct refers to prejudice as Ogan et al. (2014) report; cultural or religious according to Modood (1997) or new racism according to Barker (1981).

Rosado (1996) expressed the view that racism is not merely a psychological problem to ponder upon. It is rather a culturally sanctioned strategy of the West for defending power or privilege or prestige which the “Whites have because of the subordinated position of racial minorities” (pp. 1-2). That is then outright racism

embodied in the interpretation of Islamophobia in the Western dictionaries. At some places, it is called “new Orientalism”, expression of which is considered to take the form of “raced and gendered portrayals and demonized cultural representations” of the followers of Islam, with the assumption of the so-called superiority of Western culture as Amin-Khan (2012) wisely reports. Amin-Khan (2012) therefore defines this form of Orientalism as “incendiary racism” which may be an inherent component of the Western mythology of Islamophobia.

Islamophobia, which now appears to be composed of numerous components of bad attributes over time, has had started its journey from individualism to a state now considered as collectivism. Thus, when the government is involved collectively legislating on targeting a group of the minorities on the basis of religious, cultural, and so-called civilization, this is a clear manifestation of racialism. On these lines, Sayyid (2014) holds the view that Islamophobia can now be considered as a form of “racialized governmentality” which is not just a matter of “ignorance or prejudice”; rather it involves a series of interventions and identifications putting in danger the well-being of Muslim minorities and mentally tempering them in the US and the UK societies. It can be understood primarily as a system of disciplining Muslim minorities by reference to the “Westernizing horizon” of so-called civilization. It is believed that the national manifestations of modern racialization or anti-Muslim racism as Sayyid (2014) considers, reflect both local and transnational self-imaginings and relations.

Carr and Haynes (2015) in their thesis show the European racism against Muslims as demonstrating the confluence of powers: (A powerful and powerless fronts).

They argued that Muslim subjects have been subjected to a “clash of civilizations” between exclusionary Europeaness and the racialized Muslimness. These researchers commented that both work to expose Muslims to a racist activity whilst concurrently excluding them from State protection (Carr & Haynes, 2015). Whether Islamophobia is a “social anxiety toward Islam and Muslim cultures”, as per the viewpoint of Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008, p. 5) or “rejection of the religious referent”, Islam is “an irreducible identity marker between ‘us’ and ‘them’” as Bleich (2012, p. 181) reported. In Semati (2010) the words Islamophobia or the fear-driven weapon posits Islam as a conception of the world that is “incompatible with modernity, with civilization, and more important with Euro-Americanness” (p. 267). Thus the followers of Islam, called Muslims become a people of ignorance, uncivilized, unfit, having a culture that conflicts with a so-called civilization of the West and Far West.

Islamophobia in its historic journey to diversity and on its long journey to maturity has embodied in its glossary racism as its offshoot with all its bitterly prosecuting attributes such as; prejudice, discrimination, antagonism, inferiority, and outright rejection of non-White races. Gotanda (2011) has presented an examination of the racialization process which reveals three main dimensions of it: (1) the “raced body” which is a “commonsense” idea of colour-races; like “black and white” distinguishing coloured people; (2) the “racial category” that refers to a “socially recognized race” or “a grouping treated as a race” that played an active role throughout US history of

“slavery and segregation”, which was legally enforced and maintained by law;²² and (3) the “ascribed subordination” which has prevailed as an active method of “hierarchy and subordination”. Quoting example Gotanda (2011) reports that the image of “Muslim terrorist” was imposed upon the Muslim groups apart from their wishes through the formal racialization process. Contemporarily, the religious uniqueness of Muslims overlaps with a Muslim “racial category” (pp. 187-188).

Sayyid (2014) concurs that Islamophobia is thus a “language game” that undermines and underscores the distinct identity of Muslims, which according to Buzan, De Wilde, and Wæver (1998) is the first step of the securitization process in the societal sector. Considine (2017) holds the view that Islamophobia also refers to “modes of operation” – a discourse by which distinct identities of Muslims and/or Islam are produced, sustained, perpetuated, and used through the mighty “machinery of representation” – the mass media as Miller (2015, p. 246) concurred. When ethnic/racial or religious/cultural categories are established, Western media exercise its power make all efforts to boost the racial progeny of Muslims by representing them, otherizing them, and racializing them to produce both their identities and emerging dangers for establishing a state of insecurity and creating fear syndrome for their exclusions from mainstream social and political affairs of the Western society – as formally referred by Runnymede Report (1997) in its definition of Islamophobia.

²² In the US, for example, both the “black and white racial categories” were formed through erasure of nationality, ethnicity, and tribe. The settlers from European parts of the world came to the United States with a distinct “nationality and ethnicity” that was dissolved into the “white racial category” for racial purposes. On the contrary, slaves from Africa who had also ethnic and tribal identities were forcibly suppressed (Gotanda, 2011, pp. 187-188).

Said (1981) while criticizing media as far back as the late twentieth century exposed the ill-intensions that “Islam is news of ... unpleasant sort ... (and) negative image of Islam are very much prevalent” (p. 36) and is still valid for the contemporary Western media’s historical representations of Islam. It is evident that polemical discourses about Muslims and Islam have unfortunately become the routine business of the US and UK media enterprises reportedly since the turn of the twenty-first century. An overt review of media representation of Islam also shows that Islam has been increasingly discussed as a civilizational (cultural), political, a demographic threat to the West and its civilization, and Muslim women are seen as victims of alleged Islamic sexism, and Muslims as followers of negated Islam are a threat to mainstream values and even safety and security of the West. Ramadan and Shantz (2016) narrate that while much has been made of privatized fears (of migration, fear, cultural decay, terror), Islamophobic discourses tend to provide the means for the expression of collective insecurity as a result of which, as per the viewpoint of Sayyid (2014), the phenomenon has come to occur in response to “problematization of Muslim identity” in terms of the ensuing challenges to the West. Balzacq (2005) holds the view that the threats associated with Islam can all be cast in terms of existence and survival, and these fears through the vehicle of media create a state of considerable insecurity and continuation of the ghost of Islamophobia from generation to generations.

The contemporary Islamophobia can be unfortunately thought of as a specific kind of “discourse”, as Vultee (2007) analyzed, that takes the form of presenting Islam and/or Muslim and/or Muslim-related issues as a perennial and self-made an

“existential threat” – one that puts the very “physical” or “cultural” continuity of the society or state at risk. The scholar adds that thereby justifying “extraordinary”, if not extralegal, measures to control and contain the threat at individual and government levels (p. 16). Buzan et al. (1998) report that this is called a “securitizing move”, whereby a power-holder (securitizing actor) according to Vultee (2007) attempts to move a certain object (or development) into the realm of “securitization”.

Balzacq (2005) describes securitization as a discursive game of motivating a specific audience to accept that the object (or development) is an imminent peril hence requires immediate measures to avoid it. This notion refers to the “audience” to be West and “object” to be Islam and Muslims. Since the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent so-called ‘war on terror’ as Kumar (2010), Morey and Yaqin (2011) and K. Powell (2011) point out that the Western politicians have been increasingly framing Islam and/or Muslims as “Other”, a gross threat to the cultural and demographic well-being of the West. This invention of the term “Securitization” is an organized campaign to present Islam and Muslims as nothing but terror and as if the Muslims are devils bound together in shackles, who can bombard the West at any time.

The emergence of “Securitization”, a newly conceived term appears to be an amalgamate of Islamophobia and its all off-shoots. This development has generated the need of preparing a policy guideline to confront the threats likely to emerge from Islamophobia. Thus the term “Securitization” has been institutionalized in the USA and the West. Gotanda (2011) holds the view that the mediated communication facilitated the policy outcome and points out the widespread acceptance of the 9/11 “Muslim

terrorist” stereotype or trope changed the US understanding of the metaphor of Islam. It is evident that, in particular, Islam itself was subsequently racialized in the US law through the racialization of Muslim citizens and immigrants. Even the racial trope of “Muslim terrorist” has come to displace Islam as a religion (Gotanda, 2011, p. 188).

Ghughunishvili (2010) finds that Muslims in the United States, being a security threat, were victimized through stringent laws related to immigration, extraordinary surveillance at the airports, and random questionings on arrival in the USA and even led to detentions. In Europe, however, political debate and the policy practice did not securitize Muslims in the wake of 9/11 as reported by Boswell (2007); rather the 7/7 London bombings demonstrated the need to project a security threat in the form of an “Other” which is both “the Radical” as well as “Orientalized Other” as viewed by Croft (2012, p. 246 & 247). As a result, according to Cesari (2012) restrictions were imposed on Mosques buildings and activities, declaring them centers of “radicalization and recruitment of future terrorists” (p. 439), and on Islamic education, and dress code such as *hijab and burqa* (Cesari, 2006, 2012). Islamophobia is the definition of Securitization, not only justifies government actions but also influences the European Court of Human Rights decisions as Ramadan (2016) reported stating imposition of such as the ban on wearing the “burka (a face veil worn by some Muslims) in public notwithstanding human rights groups”.

Finally, Islamophobia can be described as both “discourses” and “practices”, appearing increasingly in the political and media spheres with the integration of Muslim immigrant communities and intensifying after the 9/11 introrsely an effect of

securitization (Cesari, 2006). The subject of this study is ‘Islamophobic discourses’ appearing in media by which some people give repulsive titles to Islam and its followers and attempt to convince the audience that their cultural and physical continuity is threatened by Islam and Muslims. This discursive process may be called the “construction of Islamophobia” of which some recent manifestations are the discrimination of Muslim individuals and policy implementations on Muslim immigrants and refugees in the Western society. Securitization theory that emerged a couple of decades back provides the theoretical framework to study this process whereby some actors or objects are socially constructed as a matter of security thinking (Messina, 2016; Rychnovská, 2014).

2.3 Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework introduces and describes the theory which explains why the research problem under the study exists. In the paragraphs below, an effort has been made to assess the term “Islamophobia”, alongwith its various attributes, off-shoots, and emerging branches in the light of a standard theoretical framework. It will be therefore seen whether the term Islamophobia could be described, explained, developed within the norms of generally accepted theoretical framework or it is just terminology, which is being advocated since the seventh century and will continue to be a blame-game being passed on to the later generations.

The manufacture of Islamophobic discourses and practices has become a noteworthy feature of twenty-first-century social relations, perhaps particularly since the events of 9/11, 2001 after having traveled since the seventh century. Islam-related

phobias (of terror, migration, cultural decay) often involving Muslim “Other”, the physical representative of the Islamophobic object, as per the notion of Ramadan and Shantz (2016), provides frames by which Westerners make sense of changing socio-political environment and governance (of economic crisis, political austerity, and so on).

The current study seeks to analyze Islamophobic discourses which represent Muslims and/or Islam in order to produce specific kind of perceptions of them on the basis of various parameters of theoretical nature. As suggested by Poole (2002), media are increasingly engaged in producing and re-producing the dominant ideologies of the Western society in contrast to the so-called uncivilized ideology of Islam and Muslims. One of such ideologies is “Islamophobia” which according to Allen (2010) represents multiple threat perceptions of Muslims and/or Islam as Iqbal (2010) also endorsed. It also refers to the modes of operation by which distinct identities of Muslims or Islam are sustained and perpetuated with ideological significance as per the viewpoint of Considine (2017). Observations reveal that media representation of Islam is not a transparent process because, according to Poole (2002), there are always mediating effects whereby the news about Muslims are filtered through an interpretive framework such as “clash of civilization” (1993), or what Amin-Khan (2012) calls “new Orientalism”, which dominated the media discourses since the 1979 Iranian Revolution as reported by Ogan et al. (2014).

Historical events confirm that there is a strong tendency for the Western media to project an image of Islam as threatening “Other” as a part of Western outlook what

Said (1981) described as “Orientalism”. Whether yesterday’s Orientalism is judged today’s Islamophobia is looked into, both are discursive formations and thus serve the political agenda, but differ in terms of the nature of targeted Muslim “Other”. By peeping back in history, it is found that yesterday’s Orientalism was used to dominate and manage the external “Other” (geographical regions), while new Orientalism or what Fekete (2009) calls “European Orientalism” is designed to target the internal “Other” – the growing Muslim population in the US and Europe. In an effort of transforming into a virulent Islamophobia according to Said (1997b), contemporary Orientalism is sustained, and rather perpetuated by media, politicians and academic experts on Islam. This contemporary Orientalism, therefore, tends to demonize Islam in order to ensure the supremacy of the dominant group within the US and European societies, like Ramadan and Shantz (2016) view, thereby justifying reprehensible and contaminating actions or extraordinary measures taken towards the Muslim “Other”.

According to Cesari (2006), contemporary Islamophobia is a construct of two interrelated components: one is “discourses” and the other is “practices” (which include state actions and policies). A close examination reveals that the latter falls into the realm of securitization, and the former refers to patterns of media representations embodied by discourses that are contextually enabled and/or constrained. Balzacq (2011) believes that securitization theory is a discursive process that seeks to persuade certain audiences to accept a person, object, or phenomenon as the sort of serious threat demanding extraordinary procedure. Goffman (1974) argues that media play its role and represent and construct these items in a certain definite way and therefore influence

the ways individuals in the society interpret the information they receive from media. Thus, the securitization theory determines the theoretical framework of this dissertation whereby greater focus will be placed on state actions and policies to combat the epidemic of Islamophobia.

2.3.1 Securitization Theory

Based on the axiom that the term Islamophobia, alongwith its all attributes, has been assembled into the merely blended term called “securitization”. Primarily, the term securitization, when viewed in a theoretical framework, refers to the process of state agents transforming the subjects (Muslims) into matters of security; which may be labeled and known in its extreme version of politicization that enables the exceptional means to be applied in the name of security (Messina, 2016).

Proposed in the 1990s by the security studies theorists Buzan et al. (1998) from the Copenhagen School, securitization theory redefined the conceptual framework in the classical security studies that had dealt with the state and military. Instead of pointing out the objective threats, Balzacq (2010a) argues that this theory offers a constructionist perspective on how “security problems emerge, evolve and dissolve”. Rychnovská (2014) adds “security threats” are socially constructed in a process labeled and known as ‘securitization’. The theorists regard security as a “speech act” and that “language is not only concerned with what is ‘out there’ ... but is also constitutive of that very social reality” (Balzacq, 2010a, p. 56).

There are two theoretical dimensions to the theory. First, the process of securitization, as what criteria have to be met before someone can securitize a subject. Secondly the successful securitization of a subject, from non-politicized to politicized one and finally as securitized subject (Buzan et al., 1998). The speaker projects a subject as an existential threat to a designated audience (referent object); the said process is called securitizing move. However, a successful securitization can only occur when the securitizing move is recognized by the audience and that securitized subject is being considered a threat. More precisely, the securitizing actor makes a securitizing move; next, the subject has been framed as a threat and, finally, the referent object (audience) must accept that constructed threat to complete the process of securitization.

Securitizing actors are generally state agents but the theory asserts that “functional actors” can also influence the decisions in the field of security. These actors include politicians, think tanks, intellectuals, NGOs, corporations, or mass media. One actor the subject of this study is media where security problems are publicized, politicized, and securitized. Media are important actors because they contribute significantly to defining a situation by telling the news in terms of historically inherited “Us” and “Them” categorization. The theorists put in that when religious and racial/ethnic categories (e.g. Muslims or Arabs) are defined as the framework of understanding a situation, media often play a role in this (Buzan et al., 1998).

This theory is applicable to five security sectors namely environmental, economic, military, political, and societal. The characteristics of existential threats vary between these sectors. The subject of this dissertation is a societal sector in which

collective identities are made up of the potential referent object, for example, national identities (e.g. Americans, Europeans) and religious identities (e.g. Muslims, Christians). Hansen (2016) argues that identities are always changing character therefore threats in this sector are hardest to define. He contends that since the securitizing move is defined by the linguistic components and the characteristics of those are set by the speaker; hence, the speaker can deem any presentation of a threat towards identity as existential if the defined criteria for the speech act are fulfilled. This theory has been found to be useful and has great explanatory power to analyze the discursive strategies that characterize the securitization of Muslims.

2.3.2 Securitization of Muslims

Securitization is a discursive politics of security which Balzacq (2011) understands is aimed at raising something to the level of extreme politicization that makes possible the implementation of extraordinary measures and procedures in the name of security. Islamophobia may also be studied as security politics in the sense that exclusionary practices identified by the Runnymede Report (1997) represent the process of securitization which involves actors who project Islam as an existential threat to secular and political norms and, therefore, justify exceptional means to control it. Consequently, extraordinary measures and policies are formulated leading towards the exclusion of Muslims from Western society (Cesari, 2012). Hence, the phenomenon of securitization of Islam is also securitization of Muslims according to Hansen (2016) and are manifestations of contemporary Islamophobia according to Iqbal (2020).

The work of Uenal (2016) suggests that Islamophobia constitutes a two-dimensional phenomenon that consists of anti-Islam sentiment and anti-Muslim prejudice. These sentiments are expressed through anti-Islam and anti-Muslim discourses by academic, political, and media actors. These discourses represent Islam and Muslims as nothing more than a threat to values, culture, and norms, jobs, social welfare system, or physical safety and well-being of the Western society. In the political discourses, for example, Islam is contextualized as a *totalitarian fascist ideology* such as a politician from Dutch Party, Geert Wilders (as cited in Iqbal, 2020, p. 199) while expressing anti-Islamic sentiments said that he has *nothing against the Muslims just something against Islam*. Similarly, one of the American critics of Islam, Bill Warner (as cited in Iqbal, 2020, p. 199) declares Islam as a *totalitarian political ideology* that demands submission to Islam and Sharia from its followers. He further stated that this ideology is enforced by the conversion of non-believers to Islam and this has been referred to as a *fundamental transformation*.

Likewise, an analysis given by Tibi (2007) claims that *totalitarian Islamism* carried out by minority groups could create opposition to Western liberal democratic institutions. This analysis further reveals that a well-organized ideological movement known as “Muslim Brotherhood” comprised of the multifaceted network of a transnational religion has been proliferated due to international migration (Tibi, 2007). Mitchell (1993) regards this as the first ideological movement of *Islamic fundamentalism* and also that this movement poses an existential threat to the secular norms of Western society. Likewise, Philpott (2002) sees the imposition of Islamic

government all across the world as the far most agenda of this movement that succeeded in its mission to a large extent. The scholar mentioned that this movement has managed to propagate its totalitarian and radical religious Islamist ideology through madrasas in Europe. The phenomenon of *religious fundamentalism* was also associated with this new Islamists totalitarian ideology, according to Philpott (2002), which aims to restructure Western political order to the new totalitarianism. In the political and academic discourses, for example, Islamic fundamentalism is perceived as an existential threat to political and cultural order in the West. As Sharia Law (Islamic Law) provides a legal system to Muslim communities, it could also pose an identical threat.

In Europe, extensive debates about Muslims and Islam could be seen demonstrating the incompatibility of Sharia Law with human rights in the Western society and also that Muslims desire a completely separate legal system. There exists a general perception among the European community that considers Sharia Law and Islam as foreign cultures. More specifically, Nicolas Sarkozy, a French politician and former president of France, has differentiated between “good” and “bad” Islam on the basis of European secular laws threatened by the Sharia regime. In this perception of the European public, the Sharia legal system poses serious security concerns of terrorism. Moreover, there is a widespread negative perception about a strong sense of Islamic identity and Islamic terrorism as major concerns in debates on the

implementation of Sharia Law, wherein Islam is also seen as a threat to ordinary US life (Iqbal, 2020).²³

Some quarters equated Sharia Law with jihadist ideology stating that the law in itself is jihadism that will eventually lead towards the establishment of an Islamist State. A report “*Shari’ah: The Threat to America*” by the Center for Security Policy reports that the USA is under ideological threat, which consists of totalitarian sociopolitical doctrine known as Sharia (Islamic law) and every Muslim is obligated to wage jihad against those who do not adhere to this ideology and political-military code of conduct. It further documents that Islamist law seeks to impose a totalitarian ideology on its followers (Muslims) all over the world. The report claims that Sharia commands violence, Islamic terrorism and that civilizational jihad combined with jihadism of extremist kind is a threat to the national security of Western societies (Boykin et al., 2010). Likewise, contemporary political leaders and security experts in the USA also categorize Islam as a major security threat and this perception according to Belt (2014) has resulted in measures and bills to prevent the spread of Sharia (Islam Law).

Wiktorowicz (2001) holds the view that the contemporary global threat to the national security of the USA is a transnational network of radicalized Islamists, known as ‘jihad’. Jihadism is described as a violent extremist Islamic ideology and also that its adherents use violence against non-believers essentially for the purpose of establishing Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia. It has also been equated with Sunni Muslims who use violence to pursue their extremist political ideologies to

²³ See, <http://www.euro-islam.info/key-issues/islamic-law>

establish a global Islamicate (Brachman, 2008). Tibi (2007) calls Islamist Jihadism a new movement of warfare and the new ideology of religious extremism and also that this movement combined with Islamist ideology seeks to globalize Islam and is also a threat to global security.

Moreover, there also exists a perception in Western Europe that global jihad came to Europe with refugees; and that these refugees could also form coalitions with Islamist radicals and pose a serious threat to peace and normalcy in the West (Neumann, 2006). Al-Qaeda movement was seen as the driving force of Jihad Movement globally, which guides its ideological and operational agenda. Moreover, Al-Qaeda's ideology is considered to be a mixture of Wahhabi/Salafi and radical Islamist beliefs influenced by the economics, politics, and Jihadi movements of the late 1970s and onward that has contributed to the rise and spread of global terrorism (Dillon, 2009). In its report, the Pew Forum reports that the new threat faced by the USA is not just terrorism, rather it is Islamist terrorism stimulated by an extremely intolerant stream of Islam Wahhabism linked with the movement of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi ideology.²⁴ Alvi (2014) also argues that terrorism and Islamic violence are increasing because of extremist ideologies based on a new wave of support from Wahhabi/Salafi beliefs. Mandaville and Hamid (2018) put in that Wahhabism is a rigid brand of Islam that has led to the radicalization of Muslims in different parts of the world. Rakic and Jurisic (2012) declare the spreading of Wahhabism as the militant religious ideology in European

²⁴ See, <https://www.pewforum.org/2005/05/03/the-global-spread-of-wahhabi-islam-how-great-a-threat/>

countries. They point out potential threats and suggest security measures to prevent further penetration of this extremist Islamic movement in Europe.

Contemporarily, Islam has acquired a level of salience in the public debates in which Islam is being equated with extremism, terrorism, and migration, and is also framed as a security threat (Bonansinga, 2018). Since 9/11, the connection between terrorism and immigration has been reinforced through discursive strategies and immigration has become prominent in the counter-terrorism agenda of the West. In the USA, for example, immigration became a matter of national security, and discourses on the urgent implementation of counter-terrorism through immigration laws dominated the political debates (Spencer, 2008). Similarly, Muslims and Islam in Europe are also perceived and portrayed as an existential threat to security, national identity, and culture (Scroggins, 2005). The work of Humphrey (2009) demonstrates that perceptions about Muslims as socially and culturally incompatible in a multicultural society also existed even before 9/11, but the incident amply securitized Muslims and Islam as a social problem for the world. Hence, Islam and Muslim immigrants/refugees became the object of securitization through measures and policies directed at their policing and border controls.

A recent analysis by Iqbal (2020) indicates that through the process of securitization, immigration has been labeled as an existential threat and also that actors like political elites, the government alongwith public opinion construct Muslim immigrants as the security threat. It further points out that this nexus of security and immigration has resulted in negative perceptions about immigrants and created a

distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens, ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ immigrants, and also ‘bad Islam’ and law-abiding ‘good Islam’. These perceptions according to Iqbal (2020) paved the way for security-driven measures and policies to secure and control borders. This study finds manifestations of both anti-immigrants/refugees and anti-Islam feelings in the Western media, which constitutive of Islamophobia of which recent manifestations are securitization of Islam and Muslims (Iqbal, 2020).

Iqbal (2020) concludes that the phenomenon of securitization of Islam and Muslims can be studied under two broad categories related to the security threat dimension of Islamophobia, namely “ideological threat” and “existential threat”. The first category refers to the securitization of Islam and Muslims based on historically inherited perceptions of Islam as a threat to the political and cultural continuity of the West. The second one refers to the securitization of Muslims because of anti-immigrants/refugees feelings. Relevant literature points out that media have an important role in materializing these sentiments in the shape of securitization of Islam and Muslims as an important outcome of Islamophobia. The question arises as to how Western media represent and construct Islam and Muslims, or more precisely, what sentiments about Islam and Muslims are manifested in media, which are constitutive of Islamophobia *viz-a-vis* securitization of Islam and Muslims? This study attempts to address this question by dividing it into three sub-questions and by examining the manifestations of Islamophobia in the newspapers from the US and UK between the period from January 2017 to December 2017.

2.4 Research Questions

RQ.1 How are Islam and Muslims constructed in the discursive representations of Islam and Muslims by the US and UK newspapers?

RQ.2 What are the key discursive strategies of construction of Islam and Muslims in the US and UK newspapers?

RQ.3 What are the dimensions of Islamophobia, and which dimension predominates in the US and UK newspapers?

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This dissertation investigates the discursive manifestation of “Islamophobia” in the US and the UK newspapers between November 2016 and December 2017. The period selected for the study corresponds with some important developments relevant to this study like the travel ban on Muslims entering the United States, and the rise of far-right narratives in politics, etc. Beydoun (2018) termed the ban as the first policy targeting Muslims implemented by President Donald Trump who rose to the power with a demonstrably Islamophobic campaign. Beydoun (2016) calls him the first Islamophobic President and comments that if a president himself is an archetype and orchestrator of Islamophobia, then scapegoating Islam and vilifying Muslims in the political speeches and media reports is inevitable. With Donald Trump coming into power, Islamophobic discourses targeting Muslim immigrants across the West have also trumpeted.

Principle manifestations of Islamophobia, according to Petley and Richardson (2013), include negativity and hostility in academic and media discourses and political rhetoric. The subject of this study is the negativity in media where it manifests itself in the discursive representation²⁵ (i.e. representations expressed in discourse or text) of

²⁵Matus (2018) defines discursive representation as “the material or textual expression of the references or meanings elaborated by the speaker’s consciousness about himself, about reality and his world of sense”. The discursive representation re-presents the utterance, as it is a structure that gives material form to what is said (p. 13).

Islam and Muslims. There are a host of approaches to study media discourses but the commonly used methodologies include content and discourse analysis. The first one involves quantitative and qualitative assessment of media contents, e.g. studying words and images (Poole, 2002, 2006),²⁶ while the second provides a method to study the construction of these images (J. E. Richardson, 2004). This dissertation adopted critical discourse analytical method, as it studies the linguistic features and representational (discursive) strategies involved in the negative construction of Muslims and Islam—thy called Islamophobia.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis and the Media Discourses

Critical Discourse Analysis (from onward CDA) aims to show how “linguistic-discursive practices” are linked with “socio-political structures of power and domination” and what role discourse plays in the production and re-production and challenge of power and dominance (Kress (1990) and van Dijk (1993) as cited in Youssef, 2014, p. 8). CDA helps uncover the process through which “social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). Fairclough (2013) explains that:

CDA is a study of “often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between

²⁶See, <https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-methods/content-analysis>

discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony”
(Fairclough, 2013, p. 93)

Media are one of the avenues through which language manifests its power. In the modern world, media are at the centre of scholastic attention as they have superseded all other institutions of cultural production and reproduction of knowledge. There are certain reasons, as pointed out by Youssef (2014), which stimulate interest in studying media discourses: first, media discourses are ready and easily accessible data that provides rich sources for the research. Second, media discourses not only reflect speech communities’ attitudes towards language but also influence them. Third, the construction and expression of politics, culture, ideological beliefs, and social life are also being shaped and created by media. Finally, media discourses can reveal a good deal about stereotypes and social meanings embedded in and produced, and reproduced throughout the discourse and communication (Youssef, 2014).

For the CDA, the discourse is the “patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures”, whereas text is a “specific and unique realization of a discourse.....and belong to genres” (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008, p. 6). This implies that discourse may be realized through a variety of genres and texts, e.g. in newspapers. According to Mautner (2008), major dailies and weeklies are the obvious sources for analyzing dominant discourses about Islam and Muslims, rather than dissident or idiosyncratic voices. Mautner (2008) recommends examining these media in social research because of their impact on society.

A typical news analysis seeks to show “how social or political structures are manifested in the meanings or organization of news reports, and how such news reports

may, in turn, contribute to the formation or change of social cognitions of the readers or the reproduction or legitimation of the power of elites” (van Dijk, 1991, p. 45). There is a general perception that media present one side of a story that fits the interests of the dominant group(s), and the narratives they develop aim at convincing the audience about their ideological views and credibility. In CDA, such a communicative event is realized as a social practice that brings into play different sides or contributions. It involves the producers, the products (texts), and the public (readers) (Chafai, 2013, p. 90).

Chafai (2013) argues that “texts do not bear the responsibility of how discourses are produced, transmitted, understood or interpreted alone” (p. 90), as media organizations consist of journalists and editors, as well as the internal policies and guidelines. Moreover, these organizations are dominated by symbolic elites (e.g. scholars, writers, politicians, etc.) who also influence the texts production process (KhosraviNik, 2009). Similarly, audiences (or text recipients) are also important because of their understanding of information, perceptions of “ideological, power relations, and socio-political context” of the discourse. Although the reception process and the impact of discourse are equally important factors to be taken into account for comprehensive research (Chafai, 2013), the present study mainly focuses on the descriptive analysis of the text.

To analyze newspaper texts (discourse) from a CDA perspective, there are many diverse approaches within the CDA domain. One can define three main approaches: the “relational-dialectic”, “socio-cognitive” and “discourse-historical”.

The first one was developed by Fairclough (1989), which looks into important changes taking place in the modern world and their impact on the general population's strategies for communication. The second was proposed by van Dijk (1991) focusing on discrimination and racism and explores the ideological belief systems, settings, and the information comprising a specific discourse. The third one suggested by Wodak and Reisigl (2001) assumes "power, ideology, and history from a common ground for professionals in linguistics, semiotics, and discourse analysis despite the seemingly different background knowledge they advocate" (Mansouri, Biria, Mohammadi Najafabadi, & Sattar Boroujeni, 2017, p. 2).

Within CDA, the Discourse-Historical-Approach (DHA) is applied in this study because it offers a general framework for the problem-oriented research and mainly focuses on the inquiry of changes in discourse practice over a long period of time and across different genres (Mansouri et al., 2017; Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008). According to Tenorio (2011) (as cited in Shafiq, 2020, p. 16), DHA is considered as "a series of analytical and descriptive tools which are an important part of history, politics, and sociology especially in relation to methodology". It provides methods to study media discourses to analyze;

"... the implicit meaning in news discourse, making the implicit explicit by consideration of the relevant historical and socio-political environment in which the news story dialog takes place. Such considerations guide and illuminate further analytic processing, whether linguistics-based as in the analysis of semantic macrostructures or ideological-based as in the Ideological Square methodology" (G. A. Ali, 2011, p. 307).

However, the starting point of a DHA research to study the complex phenomenon such as Islamophobia, in this case, is to realize that Islamophobia “as a social practice, and as an ideology, manifests itself discursively” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2001, p. 1).

3.2 Manifestations of Islamophobia

Islamophobia is defined as an ideology (Allen, 2010) that represents multiple threat perceptions about Islam and Muslims (Iqbal, 2010). It is also described as the modes of operation by which distinct identities of Muslims or Islam are sustained and perpetuated with ideological significance (Considine, 2017). In media discourses, for example, some actors give repulsive titles to Islam and its followers linguistically and attempt to convince the audience that their cultural and physical continuity is threatened by Islam, and thereby they justify reprehensible actions or extraordinary measures towards Muslims “Other”. This discursive process of threat construction is identified as “securitization” – a facet of Islamophobia.

Securitization represents a “speech act” with a “specific rhetorical structure” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). That structure has three components: “(a) existential threats to the survival of some kind of referent object (i.e. in this case, a communal unit) that (b) require exceptional measures to protect the threatened referent object, which (c) justify and legitimize the breaking free of normal (e.g., democratic) procedures” (van Munster cited in Balzacq, 2010a, p. 107). In media, the perception of Islam as security threat finds manifestation in the discursive representations of Islam as “ideological” and “existential” threat (Iqbal, 2020, p. 197). Ideological threat refers to historically

inherited perception about Islam that this religion poses threats to the political or cultural order of the West. Presently, this perception is linked with the idea of Islam as a political ideology, where religious dimensions are used by Muslims just to seek political gain or military control (Yilmaz, 2016, pp. 20-21).

Since 1979, Western media referred phenomenon of political Islam (Islamism) as “Islamic militancy”, “Islamic extremism” and “Islamic fundamentalism” (Elgambri, 2008, p. 39; Hafez, 2000; Poole, 1999; K. Powell, 2018). Common in contemporary media discourses about “Islamic fundamentalism” is the so-called Islam’s “political threat” and identification of Islam with violent activities carried out by Muslim (Islamic) militants. Media reinforce this perception with words such as “Islamic terrorism”, “Islamic fanaticism”, and “Islamic extremism”, and thereby associating the religion of Islam, rather than extremist groups like Al-Qaida, ISIS, and other militant groups, with the phenomena of “terrorism”, “fanaticism” and “extremism”. As a result, the entire spectrum of negative attributes has been indiscriminately associated with Islam and Muslims (Elgambri, 2008, p. 181).²⁷

Political Islam also presents a “civilizational–cultural ‘awakening’ that is framed as a ‘revolt against the West’”—a threat to the dominant culture (Tibi, 2007, p. 37) and as Muslims follow Islam, they could also pose identical threats (Hansen, 2016). For example, Huntington (1996) reported that the majority of Europeans and US

²⁷For example, “Islam is anti-democracy”, “Islam is anti-women” (Iqbal, 2010, p. 99), Islam is religiously or culturally separate and inferior to the West, and Islam is “barbaric”, “irrational”, “primitive”, and “sexist”. Media generally represent Islam as “violent”, “aggressive”, “threatening”, “supportive of terrorism”, and engaged in “clash of civilizations” (Yilmaz, 2016, p. 21).

citizens consider immigration (whether native or non-native) as a threat to their culture. “Europeans see the immigration threat as Muslim or Arab”, while “Americans see it as both Latin American and Asian but primarily as Mexican” (p. 202 & 203). They perceive Muslims (i.e. immigrants and refugees) as an “existential threat” to the cultural, social, and economic health of Western society (Iqbal, 2020).

In media, this perception finds manifestation in the discursive representations of Muslims as “Other”. Othering may be characterized as “prejudice”, which is another facet of Islamophobia. In general, prejudice refers to unfavourable feelings towards a person based on that person’s group membership (e.g. religion, race/ethnicity, nationality, social class) and personal characteristics (e.g. gender, disability) (Iqbal, 2020). The “otherness” is an outcome of the intentional plan of discursive practices by which “out-group” are constructed through stigmatizing differences (real or perceived) and presented as a negation of identity and therefore motive for potential discrimination. The discursive construction of “otherness” implies the use of historical principles to divide individuals and groups into two hierarchical groups: “Us” (Self) and “Them” (Other) (Staszak, 2008).

The term “Othering”, as a product, may encompass the expressions of “racism” (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 579) which is also recognized as Islamophobia (Elahi & Khan, 2017). Racism is defined as the belief that “a ground such as ‘race’, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for a person or a group of persons, or the notion of the superiority of a person or group of persons” (R. Richardson, 2009, p. 6). The discursive manifestations of racism include;

“raced and gendered portrayals and demonized cultural representations of Muslims and Islam, with the accompanying assumption of the superiority of Western culture” (Amin-Khan, 2012, p. 1595). For example, Western media frequently constructed Muslims as “Other” through orientalist discourses, showing them exotic, backward, uncivilized, and threat to the Western “Self”(Poole, 2002) or the Occidents.

The analytical tools developed by Wodak and Reisigl (2001) are helpful to understand the construction of “Other” and particularly to study how prejudiced ideologies, e.g. Islamophobia, are constructed by means of discourse, and how discriminatory practices against Muslims are linguistically prepared, promulgated, and legitimized. For applying DHA’s method, the first step is the systematic selection and downsizing of data according to relevant criteria (Reisigl & Wodak, 2017, p. 96).

3.3 Data Selection

The main source of data analyzed in the study is made up of the texts produced by the US and UK-based newspapers. The corpus includes journalistic articles (i.e. news reports and leading articles such as features, editorials) from *The Washington Post* (WP) and *The Independent* (ID). Both these newspapers are considered to be the papers of record and enjoy wider circulation. Selection of these newspapers is made in view of the following reasons:

- Both the newspapers are considered as the leading press and they are among the influential news media organizations in the US and the UK.

- These are among the top ten newspapers in terms of circulation and ranking in their respective countries.²⁸
- These are quality newspapers in terms of their coverage of global news and views, and both the newspapers draw readers from all over the world.

The data was retrieved from a reliable source *LexisNexis* using keywords “Islam” and “Muslim”. This search provided a total of 446 articles (218 from WP and 228 from ID) in which the term “Islam” or “Muslim” are mentioned in headline and/or leads) from the selected newspapers during the period from the start of November 2016 till the end of December 2017.

The period of news coverage is based on US President Donald Trump's announcements of halting Muslim immigration to “guard against the radical Islamic terror”, as these are deemed to be critical discourse moments in the news coverage. The critical discourse moments are defined as “periods that involve specific happenings, which may challenge the “established” discursive positions” (Carvalho, 2008, p. 166). Carvalho (2008) points out that various factors may define these key moments like political activity, scientific findings, or other socially relevant events.

Articles for the analysis were then selected based on their relevance to the topic of this dissertation. This involved an open-ended reading of the retrieved texts, paying close attention to headlines and lead paragraphs in order to ascertain the relevance of

²⁸ See, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190722203322/https://www.cision.com/us/2019/01/top-ten-us-daily-newspapers/> and <https://www.statista.com/statistics/246077/reach-of-selected-national-newspapers-in-the-uk/>

an article (Carvalho, 2008). The sample of articles selected directly reported the issues concerning Islamism (or political Islam), Islamists and Muslims immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. The focus on these critical discourse moments also enables the researcher to restrict the amount of data to only relevant text. Those articles that merely mentioned Islam or Muslims were not selected for analysis. Furthermore, restricting the scope and data was necessary in order to attain the richness of textual and contextual analysis that discourse-analytical studies seek for in-depth analysis. This process resulted in a total of 38 articles (21 from WP and 17 from ID) for textual analysis.

3.4 Analytical Framework

DHA's discourse-analytical framework is three-dimensional: that is, (1) after having first established the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse (i.e. with anti-Muslim and anti-Islam ingredients); (2) the discursive (representational) strategies are investigated; then, (3) the linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens) of the discriminatory stereotypes are looked into (Reisigl & Wodak, 2017, p. 93; Wodak & Reisigl, 2001, p. 44).²⁹

The analytical tools used for the analysis of the chosen texts are “referential strategies” and “predicational” strategies, as these are helpful to understand the construction and representation of Muslims and Islam. These strategies were used to determine the in-group and out-group categories of social actors. Referential strategies

²⁹A distinction between “*types*” and “*tokens*” is made Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery (2013, p. 49): types refer to distinct word forms and tokens are all the word forms in a list (or corpus) irrespective of whether some words are repeated. The following list, for instance, contains 10 tokens, but only 04 types: desk, desk, desk, chair, chair, shelf, shelf, bookcase, bookcase, bookcase.

are used to construct and represent persons, objects or phenomena linguistically. Possible linguistic means include membership categorization devices; for example, “metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches, in the form of a part standing for the whole (pars pro toto) or a whole standing for the part (totum pro parte)” (Wodak, 2011, pp. 41-42). The predication strategies serve to provide the constructed persons, objects or phenomena with predications, which are realized as stereotypical, evaluative attributions of positive and negative traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates – such as predicative nouns, adjectives, collocations, comparisons and similes (Wodak, 2011, p. 42; Wodak & Reisigl, 2001, p. 54). Some referential strategies could also take the form of predication, due to the involvement of denotative as well as connotatively deprecatory or appreciative labeling of the persons, objects, and phenomena (Wodak & Reisigl, 2001, p. 45).

Table 1 presents referential and predication strategies drawn from the list of Wodak and Reisigl (2001, pp. 48-52) and the linguistic means by which they were realized in the analyzed texts.

Table 1: Referential and predication strategies used in the analyzed texts: selected strategies and linguistic means

SN	Selected Strategy	Linguistic means	Examples of realizations (types)
1	Collectivisation	Deictic	us, them, they, their
		collective nouns	world, nation, people, group, organization, community
		collective proper names	Isis/ISIS, Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Taliban, Muslim Brotherhood, CAIR

2	Spatialisation	Toponyms	Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan, Texas, United Arab, Emirates/UAE/Emirates, Middle East, Jordan, Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan
		Anthroponyms	citizens, residents
3	De-Spatialisation	de-toponymic anthroponyms	American, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, Egyptian, Saudi, German, Canadian.
		de-adverbial anthroponyms	Outsider
4	Explicit Dissimilation	Xenonyms	Other, alien
5	Somatisation	Racionyms	Black, white
		Genderonyms	Woman, man, male, female
		Gerontonyms	Young, children, younger, teenager, youngster, aged (e.g. 27-year-old)
6	Culturalisation	Ethnonyms	Arab, Kurdish, Serb, Uzbek, Uighur
		Linguonyms	German-speaking
		Religionyms	Muslim, Shiite/Shia/Shia, Sunni, Yazidis, Wahhabis, Salafist
		Primitivisation	Barbaric, monsters, tribal cult, fanatical killers
7	Actionalisation/ Professionalization	Actionyms	Immigrants, migrants, refugees, asylum seeker, neighbour, minorities
		Praxonyms	Author, columnist, journalists, reporter, scholar, spokesman, official, Imam, cleric, driver, bombmaker, professor, lawyer
8	Militarisation	Militarionyms	Enemy, militant, fighter, commander, force, army, soldier, militia
9	Social Problematisation	Negationyms	The poor, illegals
		Criminonyms	Terrorist, killer, prisoner, perpetrator, hijacker, bomber, criminal
		Negative ideologonyms	Islamist, extremist, radical, jihadi, jihadist
		Victimonyms	Victim

One of the defining features of textual analyses is the explication of results, which link the description of texts (or discourses) to relevant contexts (KhosraviNik, 2010, p. 66). The descriptive findings of this study were contextualized following “triangulation procedures” drawn from DHA. This procedure is helpful to minimize the risk of critical biasing and to ensure the validity of results as well (Wodak, 2001, p. 67; Wodak & Reisigl, 2001, p. 35).

3.5 Validity within DHA

The “triangulation” within DHA is based on the concept of context, which takes into account four levels:

- 1) The immediate language;
- 2) The intertextual (between texts) and interdiscursive (between discourses) relationship;
- 3) The extra-linguistic (social) level is called the ‘*context of situation*’ and explained by middle-range theories. This level attempts to explicate “discourses in place” in a given society, and accounts for the historical development of certain discourse topics and public memories on specific areas (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-67);
- 4) The broader socio-political and historical contexts.

Though these different perspectives are helpful to minimize the risk of being biased, “strict ‘objectivity’ cannot be achieved by means of discourse analysis” because of the analyst’s belief, ideology, and preconceptions which will always be embedded within the data interpretation no matter how the analyst tried to distance himself/herself from the data (Meyer, 2001, p. 30).

3.6 Unit of Analysis

Selecting a unit of analysis is an important task of the analysts, as a proper set of units is always required in any research. Though the principal unit of analysis in discourse-analytical studies is the text, this approach to the study of discourse also focuses on sentence and word-level analysis (Pascual, 2008). Following Pascual (2008), the researcher identified referential and predication strategies realized by nominal groups as the units of analysis to be used in this study, and subsequent conclusions are drawn upon them.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS & FINDINGS

The chapter at hand deals with the results and findings from the analyzed corpus obtained from two leading newspapers of the US and the UK – *The Washington Post* (onward WP) and *The Independent* (onward ID) – during the period from November 1, 2016 to December 31, 2017. The corpus included overall 446 newspaper articles (i.e. 218 from WP and 228 from ID) which were retrieved from *LexisNexis* using the keywords “Islam” and “Muslim”.

This analysis is three-dimensional, as explained in section 3.4 of the previous chapter, the first one is an entry-level analysis that served to downsize the corpus to 38 texts: 21 articles from WP and 17 from ID. It involved several critical readings of the retrieved articles to ascertain the relevance of an article to the topic of this study. The articles that contained anti-Muslim or anti-Islam sentiments were selected for in-depth discourse analysis. Following themes predominated in these selected articles:

- 1) Islamic extremism
- 2) Islamic radicalization
- 3) Islamists terrorism
- 4) Muslim immigration
- 5) Integration of Muslims

This chapter presents the findings from the next two levels. The first part of the chapter describes consolidated results of textual analysis, where formal properties of the texts are investigated and categorized into three levels. The next section explains

the results according to these levels where two key variables were accessed: (1) How are Muslims and Islam represented and constructed linguistically (nomination)? (2) What characteristics, qualities, or features are attributed to them (characterization)? The final section of this chapter presents the major findings from an in-depth discourse analysis of the texts and specifically addresses the key questions of the study.

4.1 Consolidated Results

The purpose of this analysis is to examine the discursive construction of Islamophobia and the strategies involved in the process. By “strategy” Wodak and Reisigl (2001) mean “a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim” (p. 44). The discursive strategies are further defined as the systematic ways of using language. The basic strategies in the process of construction of prejudice (in this case, Islamophobia) as collective attitude are identified as representational namely ‘nomination’ that can also bear the imprint of ‘predication’ – the attribution of traits, characteristics, and qualities (Wodak & Reisigl, 2001).

The way people (Muslims, in this case) are named in the analyzed texts identifies not only the group(s) that they are associated with (or at least the groups that the writer wants them to be associated with), as J. E. Richardson (2007) suggested, it can also signal the predominant perceptions related to them as individual and group actors. So, what could, then, be identified as the predominant western image or

perception of Muslims from the immediate language used in representative newspapers of two countries: the US and the UK?

At the risk of a gross oversimplification of the complex phenomenon under study—and the researcher acknowledges that what this study is attempting to do is elucidate general ideas based upon generic presuppositions—the simple answer, as Pratt (2011) endorses, is a fear. The threat lies at the roots of the term Islamophobia. The review of existing research on Islamophobia in media (see section 2.1) revealed that Islam-related phobias (of terror, migration, cultural decay) find manifestations in the negative representations of the Muslim 'Other'.

Framed under the theoretical perspectives of securitization, this study analyzes the manifestations of Islamophobia in two newspapers' selected texts – *The Washington Post* and *The Independent*. Adopting selected strategies from Wodak and Reisigl (2001, pp. 48-52), this analysis looks into the processes by which Muslims are constructed as “Other”, and also the practices through which such representations of Muslims are communicated in the press. The list of strategies used in this study (see Table 1 in the previous chapter) is exhaustive and inclusive; however, and precisely because of its comprehensive character, it became necessary to organize these strategies for analytical purposes so as to highlight those which may carry particular relevance to this study. Thus, these strategies are grouped from Level 1 to 3, the most sensitive to the process of construction of Islamophobia.

Level-1: The strategies included in this level can be useful to reveal the process by which Muslims come to be seen as a problem. The strategies found relevant to this analysis include:

- Collectivisation, which was realized by means of ‘collective proper nouns’ (e.g. Islamic State or ISIS) and ‘collective nouns’ (e.g. world, nation, people, group or organization), which are useful to reveal the construction of collective identities of Muslims.
- Social problematisation, which was realized by means of 'negationyms' (e.g. illegal), 'criminonyms' (e.g. killer, prisoner, perpetrator, hijacker, bomber, criminal or gunman), 'negative ideologonyms' (e.g. jihadi, jihadist, Islamist, extremist, radical or terrorist), and 'victimonyms' (e.g. victim).
- Militarisation, which was realized through 'militarionyms' (e.g. enemy, enemies, militant, fighter, commander, force, army, armies, soldier or militia).

Level-2: The strategies included in this level can be useful to reveal the process by which Muslims come to be seen as ‘Other’. The strategies selected for this analysis include:

- Collectivisation, which was realized by means of ‘deictic’ expressions (e.g. they, them, their, us, we).

- Actionalisation, which was realized by means of *actionyms* (e.g. immigrants, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, neighbours, or minorities) and *professionyms* (e.g. spokesman, Imam, cleric).

Level-3: The strategies included in this level can be useful to reveal the process by which Muslims come to be seen as the racial or cultural ‘Other’. The strategies selected for this analysis are divided into the following three groups:

- Somatisation, which means a representation of social actors in reference to a part of their body or some other physical characteristic. The linguistic means specific for this strategy in the analyzed texts include *racionyms* (reference in terms of ‘colour’ such as black), *genderonyms* (specific reference to gender such as ‘woman’, ‘man’), and *gerontonyms* (referring to individuals by their age such as ‘27-year-old’, ‘young’).
- Culturalisation, by which social actors are represented in reference to some cultural aspect to which they are associated. The linguistic means specific for this strategy include; (a) *ethnonyms* (e.g. ‘Arab’, ‘Kurdish’, ‘Serb’), (b) *linguonyms* (the reference in terms of the individual’s language such as ‘German-speaking’), (b) *religionyms* (reference in terms of religious identity such as ‘Muslim’, ‘Shia’, ‘Sunni’), and (c) *primitivisation* (identification that relates to lack of civilization such as ‘barbaric’, ‘monsters’).
- ‘Spatialisation’ refers to the representation of social actors (in this case, Muslims) in reference to a place with which they are closely associated

in a given context or personifications of a place/state/town (Van Leeuwen, 2013). The linguistic means specific for this strategy in the analyzed texts include *toponyms* used as metonymies or personifications of a place/state/town, such as ‘Iran’, ‘Syria’, and *anthroponyms*, representing a person in terms of living in a place such as ‘resident’.

- ‘De-spatialisation’ implies the representation in which social actors are presented in reference to a place, belonging to a place in this case (Pascual, 2008). The linguistic means specific for this strategy include (a) *de-toponymic anthroponyms* (reference based on local orientation such as ‘Iranian’, ‘Egyptian’, ‘Saudi’, and (b) *de-adverbial anthroponyms* (e.g. ‘outsider’).

The manifestations of the above strategies in the analyzed texts were realized through the linguistic means specific for each strategy. All instances of linguistic realizations of these strategies were manually extracted, transcribed, and categorized. A total of 1600 instances of references to Muslims were identified. The complete analysis of nomination strategies, including all instances identified and their corresponding linguistic means, is presented in Appendix 1 & 2. Also, Appendix 3 & 4 presents the detail of references used for Muslims, arranged by category of nomination/predication strategies. The following sub-sections present the results of the analysis according to the strategy level (Level 1 to 3) in which the instances were categorized, as proposed above. Included in this section is Table 2, which shows the complete list of nomination strategies, the number of instances that correspond to each

of the strategies, and the absolute percentage in relation to the total instances found in the analyzed texts of both the newspapers.

Table 2: List of nomination strategies used for representation of Muslims: number of instances found and absolute percentage in WP and ID

Level	Selected Strategy	Number of Instances		Percentage	
		WP	ID	WP (N=827)	ID (N=773)
1	PROBELAMATISATION	333	333	40.26	43.08
	Collectivisation	224	171	27.09	22.12
	• collective nouns	126	71	15.24	9.18
	• collective proper nouns	98	100	11.85	12.94
	Social Problematisation	64	106	7.73	13.72
	• negationyms	01	01	0.12	0.13
	• criminonyms	15	49	1.81	6.34
	• negative ideologonyms	48	55	5.80	7.12
	• victimonyms	00	01	00	0.13
	Militarisation	45	56	5.44	7.24
	• militarionyms	45	56	5.44	7.24
2	OTHERIZATION	172	160	20.8	20.7
	Collectivisation	53	100	6.41	12.94
	• Deictic	53	100	6.41	12.94
	Actionalisation	118	58	14.27	7.5
	• Actionyms	56	10	6.77	1.29
	• Professionyms	62	48	7.50	6.21
	Explicit Dissimilation	1	2	0.12	0.26
	• xenonyms	01	02	0.12	0.26
3	RACIALIZATION	322	280	38.94	36.22
	Somatisation	24	63	2.9	8.15
	• Racionyms	00	00	00	0.00
	• Genderonyms	11	29	1.33	3.75
	• Gerontonyms	13	34	1.57	4.40
	Culturalisation	116	87	14.03	11.25
	• Ethnonyms	06	07	0.73	0.90
	• Linguonyms	00	01	00	0.13
	• Religionyms	107	76	12.94	9.83
	• Primitivisation	03	03	0.36	0.39
	Spatialisation	126	67	15.24	8.67
	• Toponyms	114	61	13.79	7.89

• Anthroponyms	12	06	1.45	0.78
De-Spatialisation	56	63	6.77	8.15
• de-toponymic anthroponyms	56	62	6.77	8.02
• de-adverbial anthroponyms	00	01	00	0.13

4.2 Discursive Levels of Construction of Muslims and Islam

Table 3 summarizes the above results, highlighting the differences in terms of the hierarchy of nomination strategies proposed above, depending on whether the instances correspond to strategies that relate to a certain degree of sensitivity to constructing Muslims as a problem (Level-1 strategies), to sensitivity towards defining them ‘other’ (Level-2 strategies) or to making them a racialized identity (Level-3 strategies).

Table 3: Summary of nomination strategies according to hierarchical arrangement

Level	Number of Instances		Percentage	
	WP	ID	WP (N=827)	ID (N=773)
Level-1	333	333	40.26	43.08
Level-2	172	160	20.8	20.7
Level-3	322	280	38.94	36.22
Total	827	773	100	100

Table 3 shows that Level-1 strategies contain the largest percentage of instances identified in the analyzed texts and that Levels 3 and 2 follow in terms of the percentages that they represent. In terms of both the newspapers, these results indicate that Level-1 strategies contain the largest percentage of instances identified in the texts of ID as compared to that of WP, while Level-3 strategies contain a large percentage of instances identified in the texts of WP as compared to that of ID. However, Level-2

strategies contain an almost equal percentage of instances in the texts of both the newspapers.

The following sub-sections analyze the distribution of nomination strategies found in the analyzed texts of both the newspapers according to the level to which they correspond, following the hierarchy proposed in the previous section of this chapter. The discursive practice entails analyzing intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Thus, these are the important aspects of this study because intertextuality and interdiscursivity necessitate looking at the utterance (in the case of this study, statements, and quotations) as one that is related historically to other texts and discourses (Fairclough, 1992, p. 104; Wodak, 2002, p. 12). In simple words, the relationship of texts with other texts, and of discourses with other discourses, is what is carefully analyzed in the following sections of the study.

4.2.1 Discursive Level-1: Problematization

The literature discussed in section 2.1 pointed out that Western media's coverage of Islamic groups and movements between the 1980s and 1990s, whether moderate or militants, significantly involved conflation of Islamic religion with Islamic militancy in relation to violence carried out by the militant groups. This analysis of the texts collected from two representatives of that media informs that this trend continues even today. The strategies analyzed at this level reveals the linguistic processes through which such groups are systematically represented and constructed as one monolithic group with all the members sharing similar characteristics, backgrounds, intentions,

and motivations or reducing them to a problematic group (KhosraviNik, Krzyżanowski, & Wodak, 2012).

Starting with the highest percentage strategy of ‘collectivisation’, there are six types of collective nouns used for Muslims in WP and ID. Table 4 presents the details of such nouns.

Table 4: Collective nouns used for Muslims in WP and ID

Collective Nouns	Number of Instances	
	WP	ID
World	08	07
Group	41	13
Organization	19	06
Community	15	11
Nation	05	06
People	16	20
Others (e.g. network, movement, society etc.)	22	08
Total	126	71

The results presented in Table 4 show that both the newspapers represented Muslims with collective nouns such as ‘community’, ‘nation’, ‘world’, ‘organization’, ‘group’, and ‘people’. The use of such nouns tends to imply that all Muslims are the same and belong to a homogenous group (Baker et al., 2013, p. 123).

Also of relevance to examine the texts is the choice of words used to represent more directly the values and characteristics of Muslims. A collocate is a word that occurs within the neighbourhood of another word, e.g. the words presented in Table 4, usually more often than we would not expect the two words to appear together by chance but, according to DHA, such choices tend to create a particular perception about the designated group (Wodak & Reisigl, 2001). Thus, the identification of collocates

of the generic words presented in Table 4 may amount to ideological uses of language in negative discourse about Muslims (Baker et al., 2013, p. 36).

The analysis of words used as collocates of the word 'community', 'nation', and the 'world' reveals one common word 'Muslim' in an immediate neighbourhood with these three collective nouns. The terms such as 'Muslim community', 'Muslim nation', 'Muslim world' identified in WP and ID were all potentially collectivising and tended to present the image of a 'monolithic Islam' (Baker et al., 2013, p. 256). In Runnymede Report (1997), it is the basic perception related to Islamophobia (Conway, 1997). Thus, the strategy of 'collectivisation' could be said to facilitate the creation of Islamophobia as a collective attitude in both the newspapers.

However, the results presented in Table 4 reveal that this view of Islam dominated the discourse about Muslims in WP. The literature cited in chapter 2 of this study pointed out the construction of such perception in the negative representation of designated movements. This analysis found some recurrent proper nouns representing such movements in both the newspapers, as Table 5 shows.

Table 5: Collective proper nouns used for Muslims in WP and ID

Collective Proper Noun	Number of Instances	
	WP	ID
ISIS/Isis	09	58
Islamic State	39	03
al-Qaeda	14	19
Taliban	05	05
Muslim Brotherhood/Brotherhood	23	00
Council on American-Islamic Relations	06	00
Others	02	15
Total	98	100

The above results indicate that in its discourse about Muslims the ID represented three specific names presented in Table 5 but mainly addressed two 'Isis' (58 times) and 'al-Qaeda' (19 times) and that its counterpart WP referred to all but predominantly focused on two i.e. 'Islamic State' (39 times) and 'Muslim Brotherhood' (23 times). These are the names of those groups and organizations which describe themselves as Islamic in orientation (Iqbal, 2020, p. 234) and were all deemed to represent one political Islamist movement called 'Muslim Brotherhood'. In WP, this movement defined as the mother of all Islamist groups such as;

“Founded in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood is widely viewed as the mother of political Islamist movements” (WP-8:19).

The above results reveal that both the newspapers followed two different representational tracks (strategies) to describe a monolithic Islam. First, “genericisation” (or ‘generalization’) means representing individuals or groups as a single bloc, while second, “specification’ means a reference to specimens of that bloc (Wodak & Reisigl, 2001, p. 53). Thus, it could be assumed that WP tends to create a generalized view of Islam while ID presents a specified image of this religion.

The results presented in Table 4 further reveal that Muslims in WP were most frequently referred to via collective noun ‘group’ and that such nouns tended to imply that they all are the same and belong to Islam (Baker et al., 2013, p. 123). Moreover, the word ‘Muslim’ that occurred frequently within the neighbourhood of the word ‘group’ in the WP signals the Islamic orientation of designated groups. Likewise, the use of the word ‘Muslim’ to collocate with the plural word ‘groups’ tended to present the picture of an ideological bloc, i.e., Islam.

The analyzed texts of WP reveal some left-hand collocates of the term ‘Muslim group’ including word ‘American’, ‘advocacy’, ‘foreign’ and ‘lobbyist’, which signal the local or foreign affiliation of designated groups. Also, there have been found some negative ideologonyms including ‘extremist’, ‘terrorist’, ‘militant’ or ‘Islamist’ as collocates of word ‘group’ that identifies the relationship between ‘religion and terror’. Thus, it cannot be assumed that these ideologonyms were used aimlessly or mistakenly because such negative words are intended to inspire specific feelings and utilization of these words might cause the brain to feel a generalized fear (Tariq, Iqbal, & Khan, 2021). If Islam is most likely to be featured in the news discourse as being a hostile religion or as a threat, it is not surprising if such negative words like ‘terrorists’ or ‘extremist’ to represent designated groups reflect these topics. If this religion is most likely to be featured in the news discourse as a political ideology or movement, then it is not astonishing if the word ‘Islamist’ to represent designated groups reflects these topics.

The analysis of collocates of word ‘ideology’ found in WP also revealed that the manner in which Islam was described not only identifies the violent group or movement to which it is associated with, or at least the writers want it to be associated with, but it also reveals the Islamic ideology that drives them to violence. One of the frequently used collocates of the word ‘ideology’ includes the word ‘political’ that was mentioned in the following headline identified in the analyzed texts of WP;

“Why do so many Americans believe that Islam is a political ideology, not a religion?” (WP-15:1)

It is also relevant to note that a headline not only summarizes the most important information of a news article but it also performs an important cognitive function. The readers strategically use the information expressed in the headline during the process of understanding in order to create the overall meaning, or the main topics, of the rest of the text before they read it. Headline information is also used to activate the relevant knowledge in memory the readers need to understand the news report (van Dijk, 1991). Thus, as soon as the word ‘political’ is used in headlines to collocate with the word ‘ideology’ the reader will activate relevant general knowledge about ‘political Islam’, that is, the so-called “Islamism script” (Tibi, 2007, p. 37).

The perception of Islam as a political religion is not new to Western societies because Runnymede Report (1997) already identified it as a dominant perception related to Islamophobia. The report claimed that Islam in the late-twentieth century was not viewed as a religion but increasingly as a “foreign political ideology” where the religious dimensions are applied simply to gain political or military advantage and so as an instrument of control (Yilmaz, 2016, p. 21). The analysis of WP indicates that this perception still dominates the US discourses about Muslim groups and organizations identified in Table 5. It revealed that this perception finds manifestations in the negative representation of these groups as a totalitarian movement combined with political religion. The news and analysis pieces in WP frequently imported political discourse, e.g. about Islamism, to the public discourse in the form of direct and indirect quotations, for example, the following writer directly referred to Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn’s book (2016) and re-presented his statement read as;

“We're in a world war against a messianic mass movement of evil people, most of them inspired by a totalitarian ideology: Radical Islam,” he writes.(WP-1:25)

It could not be assumed that this statement was re-presented aimlessly or mistakenly because ‘messianic’ in the above-cited book refers to a “messianic vision of Khomeini and his successor” (p. 62), the term ‘movement’ represents “a fearsome movement, based on deep religious conviction” (p. 16), and the adjective ‘evil’ not only characterizes Muslims but it figuratively describes ‘Shariah’ that all Muslim adhere to (General et al., 2016). These facts reveal that Islam in the US was perceived as a form of totalitarianism and those who were deemed to represent totalitarian movement, Islamists, were all viewed as tended to subordinate civil society to the comprehensive state apparatus directed by a “totalizing Shariah” (Tibi, 2007, p. 37). However, this imagination of Shariah as ‘evil’ could be said to facilitate the creation of a generalization about this religion as ‘radical’.

The analysis of WP also points out that many devout Christians also think of Shariah in the same manner, as the anti-Muslim forces in the US want, for example, the following American commercial airline pilot's comments were made part of a WP's text;

*“White, a devout Christian, says that sharia - the guiding laws and principles of Islam - is the embodiment of that **evil**; that the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Islamic movement that is a force in Middle Eastern politics, is working to spread sharia throughout America; and that CAIR, the Islamic Society of North America, the majority of American mosques, and a host of other Muslim leaders and organizations are outgrowths of the Brotherhood on U.S. soil” (WP-14:38).*

The analysis of WP's texts further reveals that Islamic law, or the Shariah, was viewed as dangerous for the US democratic institutions and social values. As already explained, the use of the adjective 'evil' to collocate with the collective noun 'people' was tended to generalize the political fear of Shariah about all Muslims. The identified collocates of word 'ideology' in the analyzed texts of WP included the term 'political-social', which is tended to imply that Islam is a politico-social ideology (WP-15:7). While word 'dangerous' to collocate with the term 'political ideology', which represents Shariah in the American sense, could be said the attribute fitting Islam in the context of pre-eminent totalitarian threats for the survival of US society. These fears of the United States imported from the political discourses have been the part of WP's analyzed texts and the followings are some of the examples;

"In 2010, Gaffney's Center for Security Policy published a report, "Shariah: The Threat to America," arguing that Muslim religious law, or sharia, was actually a dangerous political ideology that a cabal of Muslims hoped to impose on the United States" (WP-15:16) ... "Though it certainly has spiritual elements, it would be a mistake to think of shariah as a 'religious' code in the Western sense," the report argued. (WP-15:17) ... and "that the Egypt-based Islamist movement, Gaffney alleged, harbored a sinister bid to destroy American society and implement Islamic law" (WP-2:16)... sharia is "a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and the world as we know it." (WP-2:31) ... "Although the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) works to promote Muslim civil rights across America, White wanted to convince lawmakers that it is actually working to infiltrate the U.S. government and destroy American society from within" (WP-14:4)

Moreover, such fears were reinforced through the re-presentation of survey results indicating American Muslims' views that "Muslims should have the choice of being governed by sharia in America" (WP-2:60). The analysis of WP further reveals

that Muslim American groups were described as “cultural jihadists” bent on destroying American society, as the following statement in an analyzed text of WP indicates;

“Stephen K. Bannon, the former executive chairman of Breitbart who has described Muslim American groups as "cultural jihadists" bent on destroying American society, is Trump's chief strategist. Breitbart has published several articles Gabriel has written” (WP-12:14).

The above interpretation of Muslims pointed out two American perceptions related to Islam and Muslims: Shariah was viewed as religio-cultural ideology or system and the groups that were deemed to represent this ideology or system were viewed as jihadists. These perceptions were enforced by means of statements borrowed from religious and legal experts that describe Shariah as religio-cultural ideology “a broad and variably interpreted set of ideas and principles for how to live life as a Muslim” (WP-2:28). In this perception of Shariah, Islam was viewed as “inherently violent and opposed to Judeo-Christian values” (WP-2:24). It was figuratively characterized as a diseased religion and a product of inferior culture and a form of ‘Islamofascism’. Such interpretations of Islam were also imported from political discourse to convey the fear of this religion to the wider public;

“Not Flynn. Islam, he has said, is a cancer, a political movement masquerading as a religion and the product of an inferior culture.” (WP-6:10) ... “Act for America's founder, Brigitte Gabriel, has assailed a "cancer called Islamofacism" that permeates a Muslim world in which "extreme is mainstream.” (WP-1:27)

The word ‘jihadist’ was also used as a collocate of the word ‘ideology’ in WP that tended to imply jihadisation of Islam. However, jihad was presented as different from the tradition of classical Islamic jihad. It was viewed as a transnational totalitarian movement based on the idea that “new order will first be established within the world

of Islam (i.e. ‘the Islamic state’) and then expanded to become a new world system of governance” (Tibi, 2007, p. 37). This perception of jihad dominated the discourses about Muslim groups in reference to Islam in the analyzed texts of the WP. These discourses pointed out the emergence of patterns of representation, which are constitutive of “jihad threat” (WP-2:61). This fear combined with the American perception of Islam as a politico-social threat that manifested in the following statements identified in the WP, which tend to describe this religion as the pre-eminent threat to the survival of the Western world:

“Islam is not even a religion; it is a political system that uses a deity to advance its agenda of global conquest,” said John Bennett, a Republican lawmaker in the Oklahoma state legislature, in 2014. (WP-15:8) ... He does so repeatedly himself, calling jihadists a "tribal cult" and declaring that "a global war is being waged against us by all true Radical Islamists in the name of Allah." (WP-3:31)

The strategies examined in this level of analysis also include negative ideologonyms by means of which Muslims were represented and constructed in both the newspapers. Table 6 presents the type of such ideologonyms identified.

Table 6: Negative ideologonyms used for Muslims in WP and ID

Negative ideologonyms	Number of Instances	
	WP	ID
Jihadist or Jihadi	11	17
Islamist	10	12
Extremist	06	07
Radical	06	01
Terrorist	03	03
Others	12	15
Total	48	55

The results presented in Table 6 indicate Muslims in WP and ID were frequently referred to via the word ‘jihadist’ followed by the word ‘Islamist’. These results reveal that Muslims in these newspapers were frequently represented in the context of jihad. However, ideological dynamics of jihadism were found different in both newspapers.

For example, the identification of collocates of word jihadist (or jihadi) in the analyzed texts of WP includes the word “cultural” (WP-14:12) and the term ‘wearing suits’ (WP-14:5) and ‘a "tribal cult"' (WP-3:31), which could be said to be the attributes fitting these people in the context of civilization jihad. According to the results presented above, the dominant ideology that was deemed to represent this jihad in the US context is ‘Shariah’, which was viewed as a politico-socio-religio-cultural ideology combined with a transnational politico-cultural movement with the agenda of global conquest.

The results presented in Table 5 indicate the name of frequently cited groups that were deemed to represent this movement in WP. Of these, ‘Islamic State’ and Muslim Brotherhood were often discussed in the context of civilization jihad, as following statements borrowed from a political discourse by the writers of this newspaper indicate the same:

“... the country was at risk of falling victim to "civilization jihad" at the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood.” (WP-2:15)

“The Islamic State and al-Qaeda, which all along have promoted the idea of civilizational war with the West” (WP-6:28)

The above and other similar statements incorporated in the analyzed texts of WP reflect the war narrative, which presents the US ideological and existential vision

on Islamic civilization. The lexicon of war not only raises the stakes of the public discussion but also generates a collective sense of fear and insecurity: war, after all, is about the survival of a country and its citizens. Its nouns crucially define the people involved in conflict primarily in terms of opposition (Steuter & Wills, 2009), for example, word ‘enemy’ in the following statement:

“Our country today is in a life-and-death struggle against an evil enemy, but America as a whole is certainly not at war,” Kelly said in late 2010, just days after his son, an officer leading Marines in Afghanistan, was killed. (WP-5:16)

These findings revealed that the news and analysis pieces in WP frequently used US war language to present Muslims as existential ‘enemies’ of the Western civilization. In addition, the following identified militarionyms (Table 5) used for Muslims in both the newspapers also confirm these findings.

Table 7: Militarionyms used for Muslims in WP and ID

Militarionyms	Number of Instances	
	WP	ID
Enemy/Enemies	20	05
Militant(s)	09	09
Fighter(s)	02	14
Commander(s)	00	07
Force(s)	03	04
Army/Armies	02	07
Soldier(s)	02	03
Militia(s)	02	04
Other(s)	05	03
Total	45	56

The results presented in the above Table 7 indicate that the writers in ID used more ‘militarionyms’ for Muslims than WP’s writers, but they did not describe them as enemies rather named them as ‘fighters’, perhaps, because they did not view

Muslims as an existential threat. So, then, what could be identified as the dominant perception related to jihadist ideology in the ID?

The analyzed texts of ID reveals that the immediate left-hand collocates of the word 'jihadist' (jihadi) include the word 'Salafist', '*Salafi*', 'Salafist' and 'Sunni'. If jihadist individuals or groups are more likely to be featured in the context of 'Salafi jihadism' (ID-1:8), then it is not surprising if the collocates of '*Salafi*-jihadi' (ID-1:21), 'Salafist-jihadi' (ID-2:2), and 'Sunni jihadist' (ID-13:12) reflect these topics. The use of such collocates tended to imply that the ideological motivation behind the 'Salafi-jihadism' in the UK context was viewed 'Wahhabism'. The results presented in Table 5 already revealed that there were two frequently referred groups in the ID such as 'Isis' and 'al-Qaeda' that were deemed to represent Salafist ideology and also clear in the following example.

"What has been termed Salafi jihadism, the core beliefs of Isis and al-Qaeda, developed out of Wahhabism" (ID-1:8).

In the analyzed texts of ID, Wahhabism was also referred to via the word 'ideology'. J. E. Richardson (2007) suggested that identification of 'adjectives' used as collocates of a noun (ideology) can reveal the qualities associated with people or phenomenon represented by this noun. One of the adjectives collocates with word 'ideology' identified in ID includes the word 'inflexible' (ID-6:27). The combination of these words, 'inflexible ideology', tends to present the picture of an Islam which advocates for strict morals and religious principles. The identified adjective collocates also include the word 'repressive' and 'sectarian' (ID-1:25) which tend to imply that this Islam, 'Wahhabism', is an exclusive creed, which is;

“... intolerant of all who disagree with it such as secular liberals, members of other Muslim communities such as the Shia or women resisting their chattel-like status” (ID-1:9).

The above patterns of characterization pointed out the predominant perception in the UK context related to ‘Wahhabism’ that it is strictly moral ideology of Islam and that it is against the liberal norms and values. The groups that were deemed to represent this ideology, ‘Isis’ and ‘al-Qaeda’, were viewed as carriers of “its prejudices to what they see as a logical and violent conclusion” (ID-1:9).

One of the predominant perceptions related to this ideology identified in ID is the violent nature of Islam. For example, the use of adjective collocates ‘inhumane’ (ID-3:59) and ‘radical’ (ID-12:15) with word ideology could be said the attributes fitting ‘Wahhabism’ into the historically constructed narrative that violence is an essential part of Islam. For example, a writer in ID while reporting about a suicide bomber, ‘Salman Abedi’, made the following headline.

“It is pious and inaccurate to say Abedi's actions had 'nothing to do with Islam” (ID-1:1)

In the above headline, the writer tended to associate terrorism with Islam but not with the entire religion rather its one branch of Wahhabism, as clear in the following text.

“... the variant of Islam which certainly is responsible for preparing the soil for the beliefs and actions likely to have inspired the suicide bomber Salman Abedi. The ultimate inspiration for such people (suicide bomber Salman Abedi) is Wahhabism, the puritanical, fanatical and regressive type of Islam dominant in Saudi Arabia, whose ideology is close to that of al-Qaeda and Isis” (ID-1: 5 &6).

The above findings revealed that jihadists in the UK context viewed as a source of terrorism. Whereas, jihadism that adopts terrorism as its most recent military strategy is only one branch of Islamism (Tibi, 2007, p. 37). The next strategy examined in this level is the identification of ‘criminonyms’ which also endorses these findings and reveals that jihadists or Islamists were presented as a problem in the ID because they are viewed as ‘terrorists’, as clear from the results presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Criminonyms used for Muslims in WP and ID

Criminonyms	Number of Instances	
	WP	ID
Terrorist(s)	06	16
Killers	00	05
Prisoners	00	07
Perpetrators	01	02
Hijacker(s)	02	03
Bomber(s)	02	01
Criminals	00	03
Gunmen/Gunman	01	01
Others	03	11
Total	15	49

What was common in the representation of Muslims in the two newspapers is that they presented Islam in the context of jihadists’ violence. The analysis revealed two forms of jihad in the analyzed texts of two newspapers: Salafi jihadism in ID and civilization jihad in WP. The groups that were deemed to represent ‘Salafi jihadism’ were viewed as inspired by one Islamic branch, Wahhabism, and those who were deemed to represent civilization jihad were viewed as motivated by Islamic Shariah. This tends to imply that the ID presented a sample of the Muslim community to target the face of Islamic religion, while the WP presented the entire Muslim community to target the roots of Islam

The writers on the one side of atlantic presented one branch of Islam as a prejudiced ideology, intolerant to all who disagree with its beliefs. On the other side, the writers in WP represented the entire system of Islam based on Shariah that it is inherently violent and opposed to Judeo-Christian values. These findings suggest that ID presented a symbolic view of Islam as prejudiced religion, creating a threat image of a specific Muslim community, while WP presented its synoptic picture as a politico-cultural religion, positioning all Muslims as a threat to the societal and cultural continuity of the West. In WP, for example, one finds Islamism as two features united: a transnational political movement combined with a politico-cultural ideology. The groups and those who were deemed to represent this movement, Muslims, were all viewed as an existential threat to the Western civilization, as clear from the following example.

“Bill Zedler, a Texas Republican state representative, said during a recent forum supported by ACT that he fears political correctness is masking the real problem:”Regardless of whether it's al-Qaeda, or CAIR, or the Islamic State, they just have different methodology for the destruction of Western civilization”” (WP-14:9).

The above characterization of Muslim groups in WP pointed out the evolution of a security narrative, which emerges from the American collective sense of threat assessment on Islam. The overall findings of this newspaper suggest that sweeping generalisations were made about Muslims, in ways which did not happen in the case of ID, for example, a statement by former Middle East analyst at the CIA was found which read as "I think it's likely there will be terrorist attacks in the coming years" (WP-5:40). This threat was first generalized about the designated groups presented in Table 5 and then it was transformed into a generalized fear of Islam and Muslims. Also that, this

process of generalisation was facilitated by the systematic use of language that was frequently imported from political and security discourses. The use of two words from such language was tended to frame and shape the public discourse surrounding Islam and Muslims. First, the word 'evil' was tended to figuratively present Shariah as problematic in politico-social and religio-cultural terms. Second, the metaphoric expression of 'cancer' figuratively linked these problems to Islam and was tended to describe all Muslims as carriers of this religiously specific pathology (Steuter & Wills, 2009). One of the examples of such generalisations of Islamic threats about all Muslims in the WP is presented below;

“Trump himself has stated that "Islam hates us"; his national security adviser, Michael Flynn, has called Islamism a "vicious cancer inside the body of 1.7 billion people"; his chief strategist, Stephen K. Bannon, once operated Breitbart, an alt-right news site known for anti-Muslim rhetoric.” (WP-19:11)

The disease metaphor was applied in the above example not just to those Muslims suspected of terrorism but to the whole religion. Thus, it is easy to comment in the US context that any event in which an individual Muslim is judged to have behaved badly is used as an illustrative example to condemn all Muslims for ‘terror’.

What could be identified as Islamophobia in the above discourses of representative newspapers of two contexts? In the US context, it could be identified as the perception of Islam as an ideological threat that transforms into a matter of survival and existence when it is generalized about all Muslims, while in the UK it is identified as the perception of Islam as prejudiced ideology threatening the tenets of Western culture. The first Islamophobia could be said to have emerged from the American sense

of collective threat assessment on Islam, while the second from European prejudiced feelings towards this religion. However, both facilitate the process of discrimination of Muslim individuals and communities (Conway, 1997). The strategies examined at the next levels reveal the discursive manifestations of discrimination, which are constitutive of Muslim ‘Otherness’.

4.2.2. Discursive Level-2: Otherization

Otherness is the result of a discursive process by which a dominant in-group (or what we call ‘Us’, the Self) creates one or many out-group(s) (also called ‘them’, the other) by stigmatizing a difference, real or imagined, represented as a negation of identity and thus a motive for potential discrimination. To explain it precisely, difference belongs to the realm of fact while the ‘otherness’ belongs to the realm of discourse. The creation of otherness (also called othering) consists of applying a principle that allows individuals to be classified into two hierarchical groups: us and them (Staszak, 2008, p. 2).

The identified words used for Muslims in the analyzed texts include deictic expressions. Table 9 shows the details of such deictics found in both the newspapers;

Table 9: Deictic expressions used for Muslims in WP and ID

Deictic	Number of Instances	
	WP	ID
They	16	52
Them	20	24
Their	15	17
US	02	00
We	00	07
Total	53	100

The results presented in Table 9 indicate that the writers in the two newspapers frequently used the word ‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘their’. The use of such words for Muslims tended to imply that they are different, ‘Other’, according to Chilton (2004, p. 56); *deixis* can prompt the perceptual relation of “the uttered indexical expression to various situational features”. For example, the first person plural “we” can be used to make the perceivers conceptualize group identity as “Self” or “insiders”, whereas “they” would designate an “Other” or “outsider” (Chilton, 2004). Table 9 shows that in ID Muslims were most frequently referred to via words such as ‘they’ and ‘them’, which could be said to facilitate the creation of generalization about Muslim ‘Otherness’. Otherization of Muslims may be characterized as ‘prejudice’ which started to find manifestations in European discourse on Islam fourteen hundred years back (Iqbal, 2020).

In contemporary anti-Muslim prejudice, one finds two features united: dread or hatred of Islam combined with fear or dislike of all Muslims or most Muslims (Conway, 1997, p. 1). The review of historical discourses in section 1.2 of this study points to the birth of such fears and hatred in the European world since the re-birth of Islam in the seventh century. This review revealed that the early decades witnessed an explosive spread of Islam, as within a century Muslims established the Islamic kingdom and civilization of the formerly eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Contemporarily, the Western Roman Empire was giving way to the eastern Empire (centered on Byzantium) which had seen periods of greatness but was facing a dangerous enemy in the form of Muslim caliphate. Some of the historians who tried to connect the seventh century with twentieth-century state of so-called Islamophobia

hold the view that this transition of power had a profound impact on the landscape of seventh and eighth century's Byzantium; resulting in changes in language, culture, politics, and even religion, as natives being forced and began submitting to Muslim conquerors. They inform that the early day of Muslim conquest, the Orthodox Christian hierarchy being the spiritual arm of Byzantine political power, perceived the Muslims as a unique threat to its legacy. As a historically building block, a sense of fear of Islamic expansion prevailed among Orthodox which eventually turned them hostile towards Islam (Janosik, 2016; Wheatcroft, 2005).

John of Damascus was one of the earliest priests and monks of the highest order of his time who experienced expansive Islamic culture firsthand. The irony of his hatred was that he showed the prophet of Muslims in the extreme dark, rather accused him of writing Qur'an by himself to deviate the people from true religions of Christianity and Judaism (Al-Olaqi, 2010; Quinn, 2008; Rhodes, 2009; Sardar, 1999). John frequently represented Muslims as "Saracens" whose customs and practices were viewed contradictory to the two (true) religions of the book. He differentiated Muslims by interpreting the circumcision as "barbaric practice" and criticizing Muslim orders such as not to observe Sabbath (the practice of worship on Sunday for Christians), not to be baptized (the practice of worship on Saturday for Jews), not to eat certain forbidden (haram) foods and orders not to drink any wine, which are the injunctions of Quranic revelations. To Iqbal (2020) John's work is valuable because it sheds light on the earlier dominant perception of Islam among non-Muslims – 'heresy' that the first marker of "otherness" was around religious identity which led to the beginnings of the process of

“othering” of Muslims in Europe that remained at the heart of medieval polemical discourses against Islam as a parameter of hatred, fear, and frustration.

Following Saint John, the other polemicists of the time also frequently referred to Muslims via ethnic terms such as Saracens (and later as Moors, Turks, or Tatars) which show prejudicial fear of and dislike to Islam (Lewis, 1994, p. 133). The images of Saracen as “Antichrist” or the “Scourge of God’s Fury” were the response to Muslim conquests; thus both were born out of “fear and frustration” felt by their spiritual and political leaders (Levin, 2011, p. 50). Each of these images on the other hand underlined the psychological division between non-Muslim and Muslim communities in the conquered areas of the former Byzantine Empire and in Spain. A ninth-century’s Spanish priest, Saint Eulogius painted the picture of Muslims with the words; “our servants are now ruling us”, “they have turned our inheritance into stranger and our houses to aliens”, and “put our religion and culture at risk”. The Spanish priest goes beyond and to accentuate the difference between the Christian “us” and the Muslim “other”, he unfortunately employed animal metaphors; “Saracens (Muslims) are savages, beasts, not men like us (Christians)” (Tolan, 2002, p. 94). These historic facts pointed out the evolution and emergence of patterns of representation, which are constitutive of Muslims ‘Otherness’ or what we call today ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’.

Thus, John of Damascus could truly be pronounced as the proponent of medieval “cultural ethnocentrism”(Daniel, 1989a, p. 76) and the architect of prejudices (Daniel, 1993) that remained at the heart of medieval polemical discourses, which survive till today. It is noteworthy that today the Western world is being challenged by

resurgent Islam in the same way as John of Damascus witnessed in his day. Connecting history and its links this challenge takes multiple forms from the movement of population to the doctrinal and cultural challenges and as a quest for political supremacy through a growing trend of caliphate movement; like Islamic State or Isis. This analysis revealed that historical prejudicial fear of Islamic expansion is still alive in European discourses, as evident in the following ID's text;

"Islam is meant to triumph over the infidels in a final battle" (ID-10:3) ... "Interviewees told him Isis push out messages of unity and brotherhood around their idea of a global caliphate which can be attractive to those who are looking for a sense of belonging." (ID-12:36) ... "The key thing militant groups, particularly Islamic State and al-Qaeda, depend on for recruitment purposes is convincing Muslims in the Western world that the West hates them and won't ever accept them as part of their society." (ID-13:21) ... "Some said well actually what do you expect, they're isolated, they're angry, they don't have a sense of identity, he said". (ID-12:35)

In modern literature, prejudice is described as a negative attitude and when it results in an action, it becomes discrimination (Rosado, 1996). The review of historical literature further reveals Christian theologians and scholars in the context of crusades and other episodes like them increasingly depicted Islam initially as idolatry or ultimately as heresy, as inherited from the work of John of Damascus, in order to justify violence and aggression against Muslims; resulting in general perception of Muslims as a barbaric enemy of the Christendom (Allen, 2010). By the eleventh century, the image of Islam was brought into sharper focus and this coincided, not coincidentally, with crusades (Bouma, 2016). The key constituents of the "Christian version" of Islam at that time included the notions that "violence is an essential part ... of Islam" and that "Islam reverses Christian moral concepts" (Daniel, 1989a, p. 53). Christian negative

conception of Islamic religion was integrated into the body of knowledge in which many Europeans of the middle ages found expression, in such a way as to represent the enemy as the converse of the European ideal. The negative othering discourse served as a tool for the expression of Europeans' pride in them and contempt for others and also facilitated the discrimination of Muslims (Daniel, 1989a).

One of the earliest examples of the systematic discrimination of Muslims in Europe was Vienne Council's decision to regulate the Muslim calls to prayers on Christian lands (Constable, 2010). The decision has behind it the polemical discourse by Church elders of the time who increasingly hampered the Muslim religious noise on Christian lands through their sermons and writings (Daniel, 1989b, p. 24). The same discriminatory discourses have been found in modern Western discourses. For example, the following writer in ID, while commenting on Donald Trump's announcements of building the wall and placing all Muslims on a register, used prejudiced language and made a suggestion to also ban calls to prayers from mosques for safe America;

"Then America could make itself even safer by passing a law that calls to prayers from a mosque are no longer allowed to witter on about Islam, and have to be truly American by being sponsored" (ID-9:22) ... "Trump can announce none of this is anti-Muslim, as Muslims are perfectly welcome to live in America as long as they convert to Christianity" (ID-9:25) ... "And any that can't be bothered will be deported to the 12th century." (ID-9:26) ... "It must be frustrating to see Muslims getting away with being Muslim, especially if you're a Trump-supporting Christian fundamentalist Tea Party member, as you must think, 'Why can't they be calm and peaceful like us?'" (ID-9:27)

The above-cited example identifies not only the othering of Muslims by means of 'deictic' featured in the distinction ('they' and 'us'), but it also signals the prejudicial fear about Islam, as inherited from the work of John of Damascus, because the period

that the writer mentioned had experienced restrictions on Muslims by the Christian rulers. For example, the changing political climate in the Western Mediterranean, between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, was reflected in Christian conquests of former Muslim lands in Spain and Sicily which had re-configured the balance of powers as a large number of Muslims became under Christian rule by the mid-thirteenth century. The Christian rulers were so prejudiced towards Islam that they even tried to restrict the social and religious freedom of Muslims in their territories to the extent that Muslim call to prayer was also subjected to legislations and negotiations (Daniel, 1989b). For Christians, spiritually, the call to prayer repeatedly (five times a day) “invokes and extols” the Islamic Prophet’s name, and, absurdly, that Muslims “adore” Mohammed in their mosques (Daniel, 1989b, p. 24).

The above facts revealed that the representative newspaper from the UK frequently represented and constructed Muslims as “Other”, which shows the continuity of European historic prejudices towards Islam and Muslims. On the other hand, Americans do not have a long history with Muslims but still, they show prejudiced attitudes toward them as reflected in the representation of Muslims by WP. Although WP represented Muslims less frequently through deictic expressions as compared to ID, it presented them most frequently by means of ‘actionyms’ with clearly an alienating effect, as Table 4.9 shows.

Table 10: Actionyms used for Muslims in WP and ID

Actionyms	Number of Instances	
	WP	ID
Immigrants	16	01
Migrants	03	02
Refugees	32	06
Asylum seeker(s)	03	00
Neighbour(s)	02	00
Minorities	00	01
Total	56	10

The results presented in Table 10 revealed that in WP Muslims were most frequently referred to via words such as ‘immigrants’, ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’, and ‘asylum seekers’. If we consider that every role in society has attached to it a certain identity, it becomes clear that the use of these words triggers the association between the idea of who a person is and what a person does, with the alienating effects (Pascual, 2008, p. 62). The frequent use of such words is intended to imply that Muslims in the US were deemed to represent a minority group, the out-group.

The Level-1 analysis revealed that the US government and political elites frequently represented and constructed Muslims as a threat to the socio-cultural continuity of Western society. Perhaps because the United States is a superpower, the attempt to demonize the weak ‘other’ has never been greater for them, for a variety of religious and political reasons. The analysis further revealed that the prime example of weak ‘other’ in the US since the 1979 Iranian revolution is Muslims and the Islamic religion itself. Since then, only ‘former Muslim’ (perhaps, those who considered as US allies) is acceptable to those who do not want the presence of Muslims in America (WP-14:18) and rest of Muslims they viewed as ‘enemies’ of the state, as Table 7 shows. The “enemy image” refers to a belief held by a certain group that its security and basic

values are directly threatened by some other group (Luostarinen as cited in López, 2011, p. 568). The analysis revealed that the use of adjective collocate 'evil' with the word 'enemy' represents Shariah-adherent Muslims that tended to collectivize all Muslims into a radical 'other', a monolithic force, e.g. *"Islam as an enemy of the state"* (WP-16:14). The writers in WP frequently referred to the book entitled *"How We Can Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies"* by Flynn who said;

"During World War II and the Cold War, 'the wars unleashed against us were waged in the names of our enemies' doctrines, just like jihad today," he argues" (WP-3:33).

The analysis of intertextual and interdiscursive elements revealed that US President Donald Trump and his advisers such as Flynn frequently called this war as a religious war. Their statements which are available in the analyzed texts of WP remind us of medieval crusades' propaganda when an image of Muslim 'enemy' was presented to facilitate the creation of psychological division between non-Muslim and Muslim communities. It was this image that facilitated the discrimination of Muslim minorities in Christians dominated areas (Daniel, 1989a). The medieval discourse and discrimination against Muslims, e.g. restrictions on Muslims by Christian rulers, can be described as an early formal attempt by the state to contaminate their culture and to enforce its policy of Christianizing the Muslim population. The same has been continuing in the United States which contemporarily do not want any presence of "sharia-compliant Muslim" (WP-14:43), for example, the following quotations show;

“Anyone who believes sharia law supplants American law will not be given an immigrant visa,” Trump said at an August campaign rally in North Carolina. (WP-2:64) ... “We have to understand that most Muslims do not adhere to this extreme ideology, but there is nothing wrong to refuse admittance to those who distance themselves from our values,” Sessions told the American Thinker, a conservative magazine. (WP-1:29)

However, the privilege that prejudice rationally defends is regarded as the product of racism that divides people not only psychologically but physically as well. The historical review indicates the first marker of Muslim “otherness” was around religion and then transferred to ethnic/racial identity by the late fifteenth century when Christian theology located differences and distinctions between Christians, Jews, and Moors in blood, instead of religious ideology. Around 1492, Christians managed to expel Jews and Moors from Peninsula and with the power of ethnic/racial weapons enforced the conversion on those who wanted to stay in their dominated areas. Simultaneously, the racial configuration between Spanish, Indian, and African as a result began to take shape in the modern world that was divided among powerful rulers, where subjugated people were the main losers and their lost rulers (Mignolo, 2011). Contemporarily, racism seems to be used as a synonym for ‘racialization’ which is a discursive process through which differences are naturalized and legitimated (Murji & Solomos, 2005, p. 8). The strategies examined in the next levels reveal the discursive manifestations of this racialization.

4.2.3. Discursive Level-3: Racialization

Most commonly, the concept of ‘racism’ refers to social discrimination based on practices of racialization, that is, semiotic practices that construct social relations in

terms of race category (Wodak & Reisigl, 2003, p. 577). The racial category is socially recognized 'race' or a grouping treated as a 'race'. It has played a central role in the history of slavery and segregation. Since slavery and segregation were legally enforced, the racial category was maintained by the law (Gotanda, 2011). Racialization is an ideological and representational process utilized to justify or explain social stratification, exclusion, or inclusion. Through this process, social groups are characterized as embodying proclivities toward certain ascribed attributes and behaviours (Carr & Haynes, 2015, p. 22).

The representational strategies relevant to this process examined at this level include 'somatisation', 'culturalisation', 'spatialisation' and 'de-spatialisation'. According to Table 2, the last three have more frequently been found to be employed in WP, whereas the first was used frequently in ID's contents. The identification of 'spatialisation' strategy revealed that Muslims in WP were most frequently represented in reference to the countries or states, e.g. word 'Iran', 'Iraq', or 'Syria'. The use of such words for Muslims is tended to imply that they are associated with different countries. The identification of 'de-spatialisation' strategy revealed that in WP Muslims were referred to via words such as 'Iranian', 'Iraqi', or 'Syrians' and that these words represent different national identities of Muslims. However, nation-states constitute unity ideologically, creating images of belonging and un-belonging (Carr & Haynes, 2015). Thus, such geographic references for Muslims could be said to facilitate the creation of generalization about Muslim countries and nations. This necessitates looking at the qualities attributed to these countries and nations.

It is relevant to examine collocates of word ‘countries’ and ‘nations’ used for Muslims in the analyzed texts of WP since they can reveal ideological uses of language (Baker et al., 2013, p. 36). This analysis revealed one word 'Muslim' common as a collocate of both the words 'countries' and 'nations'. The use of a combination of ‘Muslim countries’ or ‘Muslim nations’ signals the perception that these countries and nations all are the same and tended to present the picture of a monolithic Islam. There is another word ‘partner’ which collocated with the word ‘countries’ and the term ‘partner countries’ represents those that cooperate with the US in the fight against terror, such as the below example indicate.

“... several Arab states that cooperate closely with the United States in the fight against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups.” (WP-1:3)

Then, there was a combination of three words, i.e. ‘major terror-threat’, which collocated with the word ‘countries’ in WP. The use of the term "major terror-threat countries" is tended to imply that all Muslim countries were deemed to represent a terror threat in the United States. Also another term ‘alliance of evil’ was used to collocate with the word ‘countries’ such as the term ‘alliance of evil countries’ in which the word ‘evil’, as already explained above, represents Shariah’s threat to the survival of the US society. Thus, the use of the term alliance of evil countries is tended to imply that all the Muslim countries were deemed to represent an existential threat to the US society, as clear from the following example.

"If, as PC apologists tell us, there is no objective basis for members of one culture to criticize another, then it is very hard to see - and forbidden to write about or say - the existence of an international

alliance of evil countries and movements that is working to destroy us," he writes. (WP-4:44)

Moreover, membership of the nation is recognized through “cultural markers assumed or assigned indicators of common ordinary belonging”, through which the racial-cultural identity of ‘true nationals’ can be inferred (Carr & Haynes, 2015). The identification of ‘culturalisation’ strategy also revealed that Muslims in WP were frequently referred to via religious and ethnic titles words such as ‘Muslim’, ‘Arab’ or ‘Uzbek’ which all are attributes describing Muslims as unique cultural entity. As level-1 analysis already explained Shariah in the United States was deemed to represent a religious-cultural ideology, thus the use of the term ‘evil countries’ identifies not only threats associated with Muslim countries but it also signals cultural problem associated with people belonging to these countries or nations. Thus, the strategies of ‘spatialisation’, ‘de-spatialisation’ and ‘culturalisation’ could be said to facilitate the generalisation of cultural problem about all Muslims. Also, it is clear from the following quotations, which include manifestations of negative othering discourse, found in the analyzed texts of WP.

“In Harrisburg, Pa., a group that has claimed credit for white nationalist posters on college campuses, said they wanted Muslims out of the United States entirely. "I don't believe in having Muslims in the United States," said Francisco Rivera, a spokesman for Vanguard America. "Their culture is incompatible with ours." (WP-16:2-22) ... “I don't believe that all cultures are morally equivalent, and I think the West, and especially America, is far more civilized, far more ethical and moral,” he argued in a book published this year (WP-6:11) ... “We don't want them here,” Trump said in a signing ceremony at the Pentagon. “We only want to admit those into our country who will support our country and love deeply our people.” (WP-13:3) ... “McCaul's proposal on Muslim immigration is to "suspend admissions from major terror-threat countries, like Syria, until we are confident terrorist groups cannot use pathways like our refugee program as a

Trojan Horse to send operatives to attack us," according to a preview of his remarks.” (WP-7:25)

On the other hand, the representation of Muslims in the analyzed texts of ID pointed out the emergence of different patterns of racialization, which are constitutive of a specific racial category. For example, the identification of ‘somatisation’ strategy in the analyzed texts of ID found no reference to Muslims in terms of their colour but it revealed that frequently represented Muslims in reference to their gender such as ‘man’ or ‘women’ and in reference to their age such as ‘young’ or ‘27-year-old’. The following Table 11 shows the results on the identification of ‘gerontonyms’ in the analyzed texts.

Table 11: Gerontonyms used for Muslims in WP and ID

Gerontonyms	Number of Instances	
	WP	ID
Aged (e.g. 27-year-old)	04	09
Young	04	22
Children	01	02
Others (e.g. younger, teenager, youngster)	04	01
Total	13	34

The results presented in above Table 11 indicate that Muslims in ID were frequently referred to via the word ‘young’. The complete analysis shows that in ID the words such as ‘Muslim’, ‘British Muslim’, ‘recruit’ and ‘extremism’ were used as the most immediate right-hand collocates for the word ‘young’. The use of such collocates reflected the predominant theme in the ID that young Muslims were racialized as being the most vulnerable targets of Isis and other extremist groups, as clear from the following example;

“We are fighting a terrorist that exists through an ideology, and transcends organisations. We aren't just fighting the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Isis, but the ideas that drive them.” (ID-8: 8-9) ... “Many spoke about how young Muslims in the UK were “confused” and searching for an identity, which Dr Awan said allowed Isis to use a powerful marketing brand to create an identity to attract young recruits.” Some said well actually what do you expect, they're isolated, they're angry, they don't have a sense of identity, he said. Interviewees told him Isis push out messages of unity and brotherhood around their idea of a global caliphate which can be attractive to those who are looking for a sense of belonging.” (ID-12: 34-36)

There found another dominant theme in the analyzed texts of ID, as the following examples show, that the Isis fighters must be given a chance to reintegrated into society and rehabilitated rather than being sent to prison “otherwise they are gonna find another extremist group and join them”.

“Give returning Isis fighters chance to rehabilitate, say young British Muslims. Young British Muslims think Isis fighters returning from Syria should be reintegrated into society and rehabilitated rather than being sent to prison, a study suggests. The national study found young British Muslims across the UK believe returnee fighters should be reintegrated into society, with one saying the Government should “give them a chance” and another warning that “otherwise they are gonna find another extremist group and join them”” (ID-12:1-3) ... One interviewee warned: “When people feel isolated and angry because they are not being treated with respect and if they go out and fight and Syria and when they come back there is no help, then I promise you, you will see more terrorism because these young people will think why should I do anything when my own Government don't care about me.” (ID-12:6)

The above results suggest that the process of the racialization of Muslims dominated the discourse about Muslims in WP. It racialized all the Muslims as an existential threat to the socio-cultural continuity of the US society. On the other hand, ID did not racialize Muslims and because it presented only young Muslims, particularly

those who were deemed to represent the Salafist ideology which level-1 analysis also indicates, as a terror threat being the most vulnerable targets of extremist groups.

4. 3. Findings of the Study

This section presents major findings of the discourse analysis and addresses the basic research questions of the study based on the results presented in the preceding sections of this chapter.

RQ.1 How are Islam and Muslims constructed in the discursive representations of Islam and Muslims by the US and UK newspapers?

This is the main research question of the study which was addressed at three discursive levels of discursive constructions of Islam and Muslims in the preceding sections. Each level examined discursive construction and linguistic qualification of Muslims and Islam in the two discourse contexts; i.e. the US discourse context (WP) and the UK discourse context (ID). Overall findings from these discursive levels suggest that in both the discourse contexts Islam and Muslims were represented and constructed negatively.

First discursive level reveals that Islam in both the discourse contexts constructed as a 'problem' for the West. This analysis explains that this process starts with the cognitive categorization of Muslims into one unanimous group, which is a way of ordering perception and judgment (Rojo, 1995, pp. 51-52). For example, the term 'Muslim community', 'Muslim nation' and 'Muslim world', which were found in both the discourse contexts, reflects the perception of a 'monolithic Islam' (Baker et al.,

2013, p. 256). This implies that all Muslims are the same and belong to one religious group with all its followers sharing similar characteristics, backgrounds, intentions, and motivations. However, the means of this category, its function and social, and psychological significance are established inside the discourse context and change when the context changes. There found two types of Islam in both discourse contexts; one represents a religion while the other represents a system.

The religious dimension of Islam was found dominant in the UK discourse in which it was defined by ‘Wahhabism’ that represents a branch of Islam. It was constructed as a ‘prejudiced ideology, "intolerant of all who disagree with it such as secular liberals, members of other Muslim communities such as the Shia or women resisting their chattel-like status” (ID-1:9). The dominant themes that represented Islam in the UK discourse include; ‘Islam is intolerant to other religions and cultures’, ‘Islam is misogynistic ideology’ (prejudiced against women), ‘Islam is the violent ideology of jihadism’. These themes reflect the perception that Islam in the UK discourse context was viewed as a threat to the cultural identity of the West but not existential in nature.

In the US discourse, Islam did not refer to ‘religion’ but to the ‘system’ that appears to Americans to be ‘political’ in nature, for example, "Islam is far more of a ‘political system’ than a religion" (WP-15:5). It appeared that the religion of Islam does not make the Americans problematic but its political system does. This ‘political system’ was described as a form of ‘totalitarianism’ with the characteristics that place Islam in opposition with the US democratic institutions and social values. The dominant themes that represented Islam as a political system in the US discourse

include; 'Islam is anti-democracy', 'Islam is anti-freedom', for instance, "Shariah is a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States" (WP-2:31), and 'Islam is anti-women', for example, "practicing Islam means belief in the oppression of women and the murder of infidels" (WP-2:26). These themes reflect the perception that Islam as a 'political system' appears to Americans as a 'threat' to the political order of the United State. Likewise, the 'cultural system' of Islam was also described as a form of totalitarianism and constructed as 'Islamic civilization'. The dominant themes that represented Islamic civilization (or culture) include that; it is 'violent and opposed to Judeo-Christian values' (WP-2:24), 'the product of an inferior culture' (WP-6:10), and incompatible (WP-16:22) with the western culture, especially American. These themes reflected the perception that Islam civilization (or culture) also appears to Americans as a 'threat' to the western civilization which in the American sense is "more civilized, far more ethical and moral" than all other cultures (WP-6:11). Moreover, these systems were defined by 'Shariah' which itself was constructed as a "dangerous political ideology" (WP-15:16), creating the perception of Islam as an 'ideological threat' to the political and cultural continuity of the United States.

In sum, the first discursive level reveals that the US and the UK discourses mainly created the perception of Islam as a threat. In the US context, the political, cultural, and ideological fears of Islam were generalized onto all Muslims, thus creating a generalized perception of them as 'existential enemy' to the physical security of the US and its people. But, in the UK context, the religious or cultural fear of Islam was applied only to specific Muslims representing 'Wahhabism', thus creating the image of

specific Muslims as ‘threat’. In simple words, the discourse in the US context created the fear of all Muslims but in the UK context, it produced fear of most Muslims but not all. These fears generate feelings of 'hatred' which in turn provides reasons for discriminatory actions, which also include discursive practices.

Second level examined discursive manifestations of discrimination and revealed that Muslims in both the discourse contexts were categorized into social categories of 'us' and 'them', which is a way of differentiating specific group(s) from others. This is a psychological process by which people are sorted into various social categories begins with representing Muslims as 'them' and ends by reducing them to the ‘Other’ (Brons, 2015). Such construction of Muslims was found dominant in the UK discourse in which only Sunni people were characterized as a negation of western identity. This reflects nothing more than the expression of ‘ancient hatred’ because these discourses did not designate Muslims with social roles, such as ‘immigrants’, ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’, which generate alienating effects and facilitate exclusion. However, the discourse in the US context did so as a motive to exclude Muslims, perhaps, because of the perception, as already explained in the first discursive level, that they could put in danger the survival of US society.

Third level analyzed the discursive process by which social stratification and exclusion are justified. It revealed that the US discourse frequently represented Muslims through geographical references (e.g. Iran, Syria) and nationality (such as Iranian, Syrian), constructing Muslim states and nations as an ideological bloc and thus positioned the Muslim world as ‘terror-threat’. However, membership of the nation-

states is recognized through “cultural markers” (Carr & Haynes, 2015), and there found also frequent cultural references to Muslims in the US discourse. This implies that this ‘terror-threat’ was applied to the symbolic security dimension whereby the national identity of the West had to be protected against the influx of immigrants coming from alien civilizations or cultures and (Muslim) religion (Vidra, 2017). However, UK discourse did not create this security threat in reference to Muslims, rather racialized only young Muslims as being the most vulnerable target of the extremist groups because they could become a potential terrorist. Again this reflects the hatred of Islam and also because UK discourse did not recommend exclusion of these Muslims rather suggests reintegration of even fighters of extremist groups such as ‘Isis’ into the society.

RQ.2 What are the key discursive strategies of construction of Islam and Muslims in the US and UK newspapers?

Table 2 presents the discursive strategies examined in this study that frequently used in the construction of Islam and Muslims by both the newspapers. These strategies based on the functions that they performed in the analyzed discourses categorized into three main categories; ‘collectivisation’, ‘differentiation’, and ‘problematisation’. The strategies involved in the process of ‘collectivization’ of Muslims and Islam include; ‘collective nouns’, ‘collective proper nouns’, ‘toponyms’, ‘anthroponyms’, ‘de-toponymic anthroponyms’, and ‘de-adverbial anthroponyms’. The ‘differentiation’ comprises the strategies such as ‘deictic’, ‘actionyms’, ‘professionyms’, ‘genderonyms’, ‘gerontonyms’, ‘ethnonyms’, ‘linguonyms’, ‘religionyms’, and

‘primitivisation’. Whereas, ‘problematisation’ process included the strategies of ‘negationyms’, ‘criminonyms’, ‘negative ideologonyms’, and ‘victimonyms’.

RQ.3 What are the dimensions of Islamophobia, and which dimension predominates in the US and UK newspapers?

The construction of Islamophobia is based upon a three-level discursive process: the first problematisation of Muslims and Islam, second othering them, and third racializing them. First, the process of problematisation reveals that the US newspaper constructed Islam as an ‘ideological threat’ to the political and cultural continuity of the US society, and Muslims as a threat to the physical security of the state and its citizen. This is one of the discursive manifestations of ‘securitization’, which Iqbal (2020) envisaged as a facet of Islamophobia. Second, the examination of the process of ‘otherization’ pointed out that the UK newspaper frequently represented Muslims as ‘them’ or ‘their’, creating Muslims as ‘Other’. Othering is the discursive manifestation of ‘prejudice’, which is identified as another dimension of Islamophobia (Iqbal, 2010). Third, the investigation of the racialization process suggests that the US newspaper most frequently represented Muslims by means of geographical, nationalities, and cultural references, creating the image of them as a racial category. This process is described as the discursive manifestation of racism (Murji & Solomos, 2005), which is also recognized as a facet of Islamophobia (Iqbal, 2020). Finally, these findings revealed that the process of securitization and racism dimension of Islamophobia predominated in the US newspaper while prejudice in UK newspaper.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

The previous chapter of this study analyzed the discursive manifestations of “Islamophobia” in the selected media from the US and the UK context. This chapter discusses the main findings from this analysis in the light of existing studies on Islamophobia followed by a conclusion and some key recommendations from this study.

5.1 Discussion

This study was set to determine the process of construction of Islamophobia in the discursive representation of Islam and Muslims by the US and the UK newspapers. The corpus analyzed was retrieved from the *LexisNexis* database by searching two words “Islam” and “Muslim” during the period between November 2016 and December 2017. Overall, 446 leading articles containing these two words were studied including 218 from *The Washington Post* (WP) and 228 from *The Independent* (ID). These articles were analyzed using the three-dimensional discourse analytical method adopted from Discourse-Historical-Approach. The articles were first examined for Islamophobic discourses and then these discourses were studied for the identification of discursive strategies applied. The identified strategies were grouped into three levels of the discursive construction of Islam and Muslims and analyzed accordingly.

Overall findings from these analyses echoed the recent study by Iqbal (2020) and suggest that Islamophobia or fear of Islam and Muslims is not monolithic in nature, but is a corpus of various phobias; like, ‘threat perceptions’, ‘prejudice’ and ‘racism’.

These phobias are the products of three discursive processes; ‘problematization’, ‘otherization’, and ‘racialization’. These processes may be described as discursive levels of Islamophobia construction, respectively. The first level creates negative perceptions related to Islam and Muslims; such as political, cultural, ideological, or security threats. A perceived threat evokes the reaction of “fear” which is the root meaning of any ‘phobia’ (Pratt, 2016, p. 33). The fear generates feelings of “hatred” which in turn provide reason(s) for negative actions (Iqbal, 2010). Prejudice is an attitude, when it results in an action, it becomes ‘discrimination’, and both together form a basis for ‘racism’ (Rosado, 1996). Racism is a manifested form of social discrimination that functions as an ideology, of inclusion and exclusion (Carr & Haynes, 2015; Wodak & Reisigl, 2003). This means that Islamophobia emerges from the perceptions of Islam and/or Muslims as a ‘threat’ which in turn provides reasons for ‘discrimination’ against and ‘exclusion’ of Muslims (Conway, 1997; Elahi & Khan, 2017).

Though Islamophobic perceptions formed through the process of problematization, the reasons for the problem are established inside the discourse context and change when the context changes. This means that Islamophobia is a discursive phenomenon that is not constructed in the minds from a process of perception, but, rather, built-in and by discourse “as part of a collective domain of negotiation, debate, argumentative and ideological struggle” (Rojo, 1995, p. 51). By problematization, Foucault (1983, p. 65) means “how” and “why” certain things (e.g. persons, phenomena, practices) become a ‘problem’ that needs a solution. How Islam

and Muslims constructed as threats is already explained in the previous chapter, thus, this section seeks to explain 'why' they are viewed as problematic. Securitization theory provides the theoretical framework to understand this process. The researcher identified two main dimensions of Islamophobia in the discourses from UK and US contexts; the first emerges from the religion of Islam, and the other from the system of Islam.

The first dimension dominated the UK discourse context, of which manifestations are Islam as an ideological threat to the symbolic (cultural) identity of Europe. The analysis of these manifestations in the UK discourses revealed the identification of 'Wahhabism' as a prejudiced ideology, which was described as a source of Muslims' radicalization and terrorism. The work of some scholars supports these findings, for example, Mandaville and Hamid (2018) revealed that this ideology has been viewed as a rigid brand of Islam that has led to the radicalization of Muslims in different parts of the world. They declared that Saudi Arabia has represented itself as the home of Wahhabism and a base ground for terrorism. Alvi (2014) also held a similar opinion and claims that terrorism and Islamic violence are increasing because of extremist ideologies based on a new wave of support from Wahhabi/Salafi beliefs. Some other scholars like Rakic and Jurisic (2012) have already declared the spreading of Wahhabism as a militant religious ideology in European countries. They also pointed out potential threats and suggested security measures for Europe, also to prevent further penetration of this Salafist-jihadist movement that advocates for the return to traditional

Islam as practiced in the days of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and his circle of Companions (Rakic & Jurisic, 2012).

This analysis of the UK discourses revealed the names of Muslim groups which were viewed as jihadist movements and characterized that they carry out ideological “prejudices to what they see as a logical and violent conclusion” (WP-1:9). Of these, ISIS and al-Qaeda were presented as a source of extremism and terrorism and were viewed as a sort of “Islamic Khmer Rouge” (ID-1:10) “in which an armed (communist) group with a deeply twisted interpretation of the faith (Communism) presides over the mass deaths of its own people” (Menkhaus, 2011, p. 1). The Khmer Rouge is the name used for members of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in Cambodia. When Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975, they executed anyone who spoke the European language, dressed in Western clothes, which also included Cham Muslims who were killed based on their religious or cultural identity (Robinson, 2020). In this European perception, as Robinson (2020) argues, Isis was viewed as a group that "considered the display of Western cultural influence to be a major indicator of potential apostasy and social contamination” of Islam (p. 88).

This study also revealed the representation of ISIS and al-Qaeda in which both groups were described as advocates of a prejudiced Islam which is "intolerant of all who disagree with it such as secular liberals, members of other Muslim communities such as the Shia, or women resisting their chattel-like status” (ID-1:9). Dillon (2009) declared these groups as the main cause of global terrorism, and the current study also confirmed that in the UK discourse context ISIS and al-Qaeda and those who represent

them, Muslims, were all viewed as ‘terrorists’. Though terrorism is a securitizing word, an issue is securitized only if it is generalized onto all people who were deemed to represent a threat and if the audience (public) accepts this threat as a matter of security concern (Balzacq, 2010a; Vultee, 2007). The UK media discourses applied the terrorist category only to those who profess support for the Wahhabi/Salafist sect of Islam, but not onto all Muslims. This study has traced that the discourses in the UK context represented Islam and Muslims as a source of terrorism but to create the fear of Islam as an expression of ‘ancient hatred’ towards this religion and its people. Sayyid (2014) takes such expressions as discriminatory discourses and practices addressed towards specific people of Islamic identity.

At the second level, the UK's discourses collectivized Muslims into the social category of ‘Other’ (out-group) but did not assign them social functions such as ‘immigrants’ or ‘refugees’ which could otherwise generate alienating effects for the British Muslims. Moreover, this analysis revealed that the roots of this Othering discourse are stretched to the time when John of Damascus in response to the religious and systemic challenges of Islam and Muslims in seventh century’s Europe initiated an anti-Islam blame-game, for example, by calling Islam ‘heresy’ and Muslims as ‘barbaric’ (Iqbal, 2020; Janosik, 2016; Rhodes, 2009), ‘enemy’ and as a “race born of a slave” (Wheatcroft, 2005, p. 92). Since then, such discourses say more about “them” than “us”, for example, “Islam is a violent religion, promotes coercive forms of conversion, grew by the sword, is associated with heightened sexuality” and perverted practices, irrational, “incapable of democracy, essentially untrustworthy, and anti-

scientific”; the list goes on (Bouma, 2016, p. 67). These historical arguments reflect hatred of Islam, which in turn facilitated the psychological separation of Muslims from non-Muslim communities. One of the earliest examples of othering of Muslims is ninth century’s Saint Eulogius’s statement in which he painted the picture of Muslims as; “they (Muslim) have turned our inheritance into stranger and our houses to aliens”, and “put our religion and culture at risk” (Tolan, 2002, p. 94). These historical facts revealed that the early European scholars and literature perceived Islam as a challenge at religious and systemic levels and viewed Muslims as strangers, or ‘Other’.

This study revealed that modern discourses in Europe reflected the ancient fears of Islam in the form of statements such as “Islam is meant to triumph over the infidels in a final battle” (ID-10:3). Also that, this time these fears were to reinforce ancient hatred of Islam and Muslims in European minds through the historical principles of us-and-them, for example, “their idea of a global caliphate” (ID-12:36), “they're isolated, they're angry, they don't have a sense of identity” (ID-12:35) or “Why can't they be calm and peaceful like us?” (ID-9:27).

The third level analysis of UK discourses revealed that through the process of racialization young British Muslims were identified as a potential source of terrorism. However, the racialization process in the UK context did not impose the terrorist category on all or British Muslims that could otherwise securitize them but instead presented the theme that returning ISIS fighters must be given a chance to reintegrate into the British society. This implies that Muslim immigrants or minority groups were not viewed as problematic in the UK discourse context and also that Wahhabism as an

'ideological threat' was directed to symbolize Islam as a threat to the (cultural) identity of Europeans. However, when this fear transforms into an existential threat, it could facilitate the securitization process of Muslim communities (Iqbal, 2020). Thus, the 'fear' and 'hatred' manifested in the UK discourses were the expressions of prejudice towards Islam and its people, which in the Runnymede Report referred to as Islamophobia.

However, Islamophobia is not just an attitudinal bias that can drive people to commit acts of verbal and physical violence against the hated ones but it is also a structural phenomenon that operates in the form of fear and suspicion of Muslims on the part of State actors and institutions (Beydoun, 2018). While examining the manifestations of this fear and suspicion in the US laws, policy, and programming, Beydoun (2018) revealed that American Islamophobia is built upon the presumption that Muslim identity is associated with a national security threat. The current study finds that the security threat image of Muslims dominated the discourse in the US context and also revealed that this image emerges from the US politicians' threat assessment of systemic dimensions of Islam.

The first dimension of Islam that dominated the US discourse context is that of the socio-political system. The analysis of discourses from US context revealed that "Islam is far more of a 'political system' than a religion" (WP-15:5). This implies that the religious dimension of Islam is not problematic in the US context, as has been observed in the case of the UK discourse context, but instead, it is the socio-political system of this religion that dreads the US authorities. This is clear from the statement

of John Bennett, a Republican lawmaker in the Oklahoma state legislature, who argued that "Islam is not even a religion; it is a political system that uses a deity to advance its agenda of global conquest" (WP-15:8). The dominant perception related to this Islam that was detected in the US discourses is that it is a totalitarian system, which posits oppositions to the US democratic institutions and social values.

It is relevant to note here that this is an official vision of the US authorities; for example, General William G. Boykin, former US general, already argued that Islam “is a totalitarian way of life with aggressive political goals” (Cesari, 2013, p. 12). In his study, Iqbal (2020) revealed that at the political system level, Islam and modern democracy stand at binary positions in the perceptions of the Westerners. This scholar explained that political elites, hatemongers, and the Western media have made both of them appear to confront each other, instead of searching for common grounds for peaceful coexistence. In fact, Islam has more often been viewed as a political force, of which manifestations are presented in the form of ISIS, Daesh, and Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Not only this, as the analyzed US discourses indicate, some monarchs in the Arab world are also depicted as the true form of Islamic governments, while according to him, by no way, they are Islamic in their outlook and practices. He argued that this caricature of Islam’s political system dreads the Westerners, especially the Americans (Iqbal, 2020).

Moreover, the defining feature of the Islamic political system as presented in US discourse context is ‘Shariah Law’ which was described as a totalitarian ideology and “an alleged Muslim plot to impose Islamic law across American institutions” (WP-

2:27) that are built upon the democratic ideals and freedom of individuals. The theorists in the field of securitization were of the view that by threatening political institutions or ideas that hold a State together, one can threaten the stability of the State's political order (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 150). In this sense, on the basis of the findings of this study, it could be said that the politicians in the US media discourses attempted to create a consensus on Islam putting at risk our freedom and democracy. For instance, an American politician, Newt Gingrich, in a statement in the analyzed discourses argued that "Shariah is a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States" (WP-2:31). Likewise, another statement that was found in the analyzed US discourses also reflected the same sentiments that; "practicing Islam means belief in the oppression of women and the murder of infidels" (WP-2:26). These findings imply that Islam as a 'political system' and Shariah as a 'political ideology', which direct this system, both in the US discourse context were viewed as imminent threats to the State's political stability and the freedom of its people.

It is due to these perceptions of Islam as a problem for social and the political system of the US; many American political elites call this religion 'political Islam' and declare it as a 'security problem'. For example, a statement of Trump's secretary of defense, James N. Mattis was found in the US discourses who argued that "political Islam" is the major security issue facing the United States" (WP-18:3). The findings from this study revealed that in the US context the phenomenon of political Islam (or Islamism) emerged from the Iranian revolution which somewhat impeded Western democracies. It could be said that, perhaps, because the United States is a superpower

with a mighty armed force and gigantic economy, therefore, they feel threatened by any development having the likelihood of challenging the US's political powers. Thus, they accuse Iran of spreading political Islam in the Middle East and around the peace-loving world. In American Islamism, this study finds two perceptions united; a political movement combined with political ideology.

The present study found out that the groups representing the Islamist trend in the US discourse context were considered advocates of political religion. They were presented as a totalitarian political movement that tends to subordinate civil US society to the comprehensive state apparatus directed by a totalizing Shariah (WP-15:16) and that they are bent on destroying American society within. These groups and those who were deemed to represent them, Muslims, were all framed as 'terrorists' on political grounds that they are imminent threats to their country's social and political survival. For example, the American Muslim group CAIR was viewed as "it is actually working to infiltrate the U.S. government and destroy American society from within" (WP-14:4). Likewise, foreign groups, Muslim Brotherhood was also declared as a "foreign terrorist organization" (WP-7:29) because of the US perception that it is working to destroy the "American society and implement Islamic law" (WP-2:16).

Although the phenomenon of "terrorism" represents threats to the physical security of a state and its citizens, the scholars in the field of security asserted that a security threat is established if the solution to the articulated problem is proposed (Balzacq, 2010b; Buzan et al., 1998; Vultee, 2007, 2011). This study revealed evidence wherein *The Washington Post* tried to convince the audience (public) that Muslim

Brotherhood in some countries has been declared as a terrorist organization because of its potential political and physical challenges to the State. In the following example, this newspaper proposed the US administration undertake identical measures;

“After Egypt's military overthrew the elected Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013, President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi and regional allies, including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, that have also viewed the group as a political challenger designated it a terrorist organization and have urged the United States to do the same.”(WP-8:22) “The U.S. bill cites former FBI director Robert Mueller's 2011 testimony before the House Intelligence Committee in which he said: “I can say at the outset that elements of the Muslim Brotherhood both here and overseas have supported terrorism.” (WP-8:23)

The researcher suggests that the US media discourses generalized the terrorist problem onto all Muslims in a very systematic and scientific way. The findings from this study revealed that the Muslim Brotherhood was defined as the mother of all Islamist groups and movements (WP-8:19) and these groups or movements were all presented as a homogenous group with all members sharing similar characteristics, backgrounds, intentions, and motivation. This implies that all Muslim groups profess support for a monolithic Islam, which in the American sense means a political system directed by Islamic law. Then, Shariah was figuratively described as ‘evil’ and this metaphor applied not only to Muslim groups that were defined as ‘terrorist’ but to all Muslims by means of discursive strategies of collectivization and also through the metaphoric expressions such as ‘evil people’. There is no denying the fact that any practicing Muslim would consider himself or herself a Shariah adherent. Also, it is not possible to find a Muslim who practices Islam and does not believe himself or herself to be complying with Shariah. Thus, calling Muslim groups ‘terrorist’ on the basis of ‘Shariah’ is the same thing as saying that all the practicing Muslims are ‘terrorists’.

These findings suggest that Muslims in the US context were perceived by politicians and framed by media as realistic threats (to the social and political system of the United States) and terroristic threats (to the physical safety and well-being of the State). The work of some other scholars who have studied Islamophobia in different socio-political contexts also supports these findings (Cesari, 2013; Halliday, 1999; Hansen, 2016; Iqbal, 2020; Uenal, 2016).

The above findings revealed that the perception of Muslims as threats to the physical security of the state emerged from the perception of Islam as a threat to the social-political systems of the US. However, this study further suggested that Islam in the US context was also viewed as a cultural system by which Huntington (1996) means Islamic civilization. In the analyzed US discourses, the Islamic cultural system (or civilization) was also defined by ‘Shariah’, providing principles for individuals’ behaviour in the society. This system was viewed as a “product of inferior culture” (WP-6:10) and that it is “inherently violent and opposed to Judeo-Christian values” (WP-2:24). Huntington (1996) defined Western civilization as true, natural, and purely representative of the whole humanity. On the other hand, Islamic civilization has been portrayed as alien to ‘true’ civilization having fashions of the classical age and all-time anti to modernity (Western civilization). He argued that the clash is not just the problem of religion or civilization but it includes politics in it, and the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future (Huntington, 1996).

This analysis of US discourses revealed that Islamist groups were also presented in the context of civilizational jihad and religious war. They were described as a

transnational political movement bent on destroying western civilization, for example, a statement claimed that “regardless of whether it's al-Qaeda, or CAIR, or the Islamic State, they just have a different methodology for the destruction of Western civilization” (WP-14:9). These groups and organizations were described as evil enemy such as in this statement that “Our country today is in a life-and-death struggle against an *evil enemy*” (WP-5:16). This ‘evil’ metaphor was applied not just to those Muslims suspected of civilizational war against the West but also to the whole religion. For example, a statement found in the analyzed discourses of WP reflected the theme that “America is locked in a world war for its very survival, and the enemies in this wide-ranging battle are not only radical Islamist terrorists but also a chaotic, violent and angry Muslim world” (WP-5:10).

The generalization about Muslims as an ‘enemy’ facilitated the creation of psychological division between non-Muslim and Muslim communities in the US context. The analysis of discursive level-2 revealed that Muslims in the US discourses were differentiated from Americans or non-Muslims on the basis of this perception. For example, the use of terms such as ‘immigrants’, ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’, and ‘asylum seekers’ in reference to Muslims were all tended to alienate them from Americans. These patterns of representation pointed out the process of othering in which American Muslims were discursively constructed as ‘radical other’ with the potential motive to exclude them from US society. A statement found in the analyzed US discourses claimed that “we have to understand that most Muslims do not adhere to this extreme ideology, but there is nothing wrong to refuse admittance to those who distance

themselves from our values" (WP-1:29) is the clear example of justifying the exclusion of Muslims from US society.

The analysis of discursive level-3 revealed the discursive process of racialization by which social exclusion of minority groups is justified on the basis of physical characteristics. Wang (2003) held the view that a cultural system operates in the form of discursive practices, for example, in the US discourse context, Muslims were presented through the geographical references (e.g. 'Iran', 'Iraq' or 'Syria'). In this way, the US discourses characterized Muslim countries as 'terrorist threat' countries, for instance, this phrase 'alliance of evil countries' (WP-4:44) contains the metaphor 'evil', as already explained that it represents Shariah's threats, was applied not only to specific countries but to all the Muslim world thus positioning all Muslims as a threat for the Western civilization. Similarly, Muslims were presented through their nationalities, such as Syrians, Iranian, etc., which was tended to make them all an ideological (cultural) group, i.e. Muslims. Muslim immigrants were also described in terms of their culture, for example, "their culture is incompatible with ours" (WP-16:2-22), Thus, the use of the term 'evil countries' identifies not only terrorist threats associated with Muslim countries but also signals the cultural threats of the people from Muslim countries that can endanger the symbolic security of the US society.

The power of this racialization is that the racial category of "Muslim terrorist" was imposed upon all Muslims regardless of their subjective wishes. It facilitated not only the discriminatory treatment of Muslims in American society but also influences the State's policies directed at migrants coming from Muslim countries (Gotanda,

2011). Thus, racialization could be said to facilitate the securitization process of Muslims in the US discourse context. For instance, McCaul's proposal on Muslim immigration found in an article says "suspend admissions from major terror-threat countries, like Syria, until we are confident terrorist groups cannot use pathways like our refugee program as a Trojan Horse to send operatives to attack us" (WP-7:25).


Finally, the above discussion concludes that the discursive process of 'problematization' of Islam provided reasons for 'otherizing' of Muslims as different/non-belonger/aliens, 'racializing' of them as 'Muslim terrorist'. This process combined with otherization and racialization in the US discourse context also facilitated the 'securitization' process of Muslims, for example, by declaring them as a threat to the physical security of the State and its citizens, and to the symbolic security of Western civilization. While reviewing these facts, this study reached the following conclusion.

5.2 Conclusion

This study endorses the recent definition of Islamophobia proposed by Iqbal (2020) which claims that "Islamophobia is the negative posturing to Islam and Muslims" and that it emerges from three phobias related to Islam and Muslims such as "threat perceptions", "prejudice", and "racism"(p. 51). The present study makes an addition to Iqbal's research by suggesting the process through which Islamophobia is constructed. It proposed that the phobias which constitute Islamophobia are the product of three discursive processes; 'problematization', 'otherization', and 'racialization'. Of these,

the first level is described as the basic process because Sayyid (2014) suggested that Islamophobia emerges from the problematization of Muslim identity.

The study investigated the process of problematization of Islam and Muslims in the US and the UK discourses and has found that this process in these discourses started with collectivizing Muslims into one unanimous group, which is a way of ordering perceptions about Muslims that they all belong to a monolithic Islam (Baker et al., 2013; Rojo, 1995). Then, Islam was characterized as problematic in two aspects; the religion of Islam, and the system of this religion. This religion was viewed as a problem in the UK, while its system was problematic for the Americans. In the UK context, the religion of Islam (mainly refers to Wahhabism) was perceived as the cause of radicalization of Muslims and terrorism, and also as a symbolic (cultural) threat to European identity. While in the US, the system of Islam was viewed as imminent threats to the State's survival of socio-political, and cultural systems, and political Islam as an ideological threat to the physical security of the State and its citizens and to the symbolic security of Western civilization. The means of these perceived Islamic threats in the US and UK discourse contexts are reflected in the following model;




Moreover, the study further explored that the threats emanating from the religious dimension of Islam resulted in the process of ‘Otherization’ (or differentiation) of Muslims in the UK discourse context, which is defined as the discursive manifestation of anti-Muslim “prejudice” (Brons, 2015; Conway, 1997; Gabriel, 2012; Ogan et al., 2014). Thus, this analysis describes that the ‘prejudice’ dimension of Islamophobia predominates in the UK context. It has already been explained that when prejudice results in an action, e.g. discursive practices of othering, it becomes 'discrimination'. Also that, both together form a basis for ‘racism’ (Rosado, 1996), of which discursive practices are the racialization of Muslims (Carr & Haynes, 2015).

Anti-Muslim racism is already described by Runnymede Report (2017) as Islamophobia (Elahi & Khan, 2017), which contemporarily refers to religious or cultural racism (Modood, 1997). This study revealed that this facet of Islamophobia dominates the US discourse context by which Rosado (1996) means that it is a culturally sanctioned strategy to defend powers, while Beydoun (2018) described it as a form of structural (systemic) Islamophobia. The analysis of discourses from the US context suggests that the racial category "Muslim terrorist" not only imposed upon Muslim groups but on Muslims belonging to different countries and nationalities regardless of their subjective wishes. According to Gotanda (2011), the racialized image of Muslims as ‘terrorists’ earlier led to the discriminatory treatment of Muslims in the United State’s immigration policies (Gotanda, 2011). This phenomenon is

currently known as ‘securitization’ by which scholars such as Cesari (2006, 2012) and Saeed (2016) mean that it is a form of ‘Islamophobia’.

Thus, the study concludes that Islamophobia operates at three levels; societal, cultural, and policy levels. The discursive manifestations of these levels are ‘otherization’, ‘racialization’ and ‘securitization’ of Muslims respectively, which otherwise may be called ‘prejudice’, ‘racism’, ‘securitization’. Moreover, Islamophobia functions in a cyclical fashion in which one manifestation could also lead to the other(s). However, the basic Islamophobia is established inside the discourse that makes Islam problematic and provides reasons for defining Muslims as threats, leading to the othering of Muslims, racializing, or securitizing of them. Thus, this study proposes the following process model of the construction of Islamophobia.

Cyclical Islamophobia



This study also suggests that this cyclical Islamophobia is as old as the religion of Islam itself. The historical context of Islamophobia (see section 1.2 of chapter-1) revealed that this phenomenon took birth with the re-birth of Islam in the seventh century when this religion was conceived as 'problematic' by the then political and spiritual leaders. John of Damascus was the one who at that time after observing Islam's religious, political, and cultural achievements declared that a problem has taken birth for the Christian world in the shape of Islam. The work of Iqbal (2020) also confirmed the problematic positioning of this religion during its early period, and this scholar argues that John at that time declared Islam as "a punishment to the unscrupulous sins of other religions and their followers" (p. 88).

Levin (2011) pointed out that Islamic civilization in the medieval centuries was far ahead of other civilizations such as Christianity and Judaism and that this all left a sense of religious and cultural inferiority among people of the other two religions of the book who translated their defeats into reasons. For example, the images of Saracen as "Antichrist" or the "Scourge of God's Fury" were the response to Muslim conquests; thus both were born out of "fear and frustration" felt by their spiritual and political leaders (p. 50). Resultantly, each of these images underlined the fundamental differences (or otherness) of this powerful enemy and thereby maintained the psychological division between non-Muslim and Muslim communities in the conquered areas of the former Byzantine Empire and in Spain. These facts revealed that it was the image of Islam as a problem that provided reasons for Muslims' discrimination, of which discursive manifestations were 'Otherization'. For example,

a ninth century's Spanish Saint Eulogius accentuated the difference between the Christian "us" and the Muslim "other" by employing animal metaphors; such as "Saracens (Muslims) are savages, beasts, not men like us (Christians)" (Tolan, 2002, p. 94).

Likewise, there was a tendency of ignoring the religious identity of Muslims in favour of a brand that signified a 'barbaric ethnicity' (Vitkus, 1999). In this way, the discrimination of Muslims became more manifested, for example, calling Muslims by the ethnic names such as the early image of "Saracen" and later as Moors, Turks, or Tatars (Lewis, 1994, p. 133) shows the prejudicial fear or dislike to Islam on the one hand while on the other the process of what currently recognized as 'racialization' or 'ethnicization'. Thus, the othering discourses combined with racialization discourses created an image of Muslims as barbaric and "implacable enemies" of the Christians, proponents of a form of religion devised to supplant and destroy Christianity.

Moreover, it was the enemy image that facilitated legal steps to cut Christians off from Muslims, whether in territory under Christian rule or in territory under Muslim rule (Allen, 2010; Daniel, 1989a). This points to the emergence of systemic discrimination of Muslims in Europe, which currently recognized as 'securitization, of which the earliest manifestations include the Vienne Council's (1311 and 1312) decision to regulate the Muslim calls to prayers on Christian lands (Constable, 2010). This was part of the devising *modus operandi* for dealing with the emerging social, political, and cultural challenges of Islam to the existence of Christian world on the map of the globe. It might be noted that the decisions of the Vienne Council were not

purely made on religious grounds because the historical literature indicates that the Council was subject to enormous political pressure from many European states; like, Philip IV of France had greatly influenced the whole state of ecclesiastical affairs at his will (Constable, 2010).³⁰ This political and systemic Islamophobia is nowadays in practice in the United States, which is reflective of the historical cycle of Islamophobia that started by making Islam a problem and then otherized, racialized, and finally, Vienne Council securitized Muslims in the shape of a ban on ‘call to prayers’.

Finally, the findings of this study helped the researcher not only to explain the nature of Islamophobia and the process by which it develops but also to make recommendations for further research on the subject. The following are the recommendations made by this researcher.

5.3 Recommendations

- i) Islamophobia, the researcher observed, is a multifaceted collection of epistemes rather than a one-dimensional concept. This study attempted to unpack the theoretical underpinnings of Islamophobia, but the researcher believes that these could be unpacked further, which would necessitate a series of studies, of which the current work was a part. The researcher recommends further scientific inquiry into the theoretical aspects of this phenomenon in order to understand it comprehensively and to suggest measures for its remedies.

³⁰ See, <https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum15.htm> for more details about Council of Vienne

- ii) Moreover, the researcher also tried to understand the process of Islamophobia construction and found that it is a three-level process, but there could be further levels of Islamophobia that are required to be explored. The study at hand established the link between the contemporary and historical process of Islamophobia construction, and which roots it goes through have yet to be explored. Since this study was limited in scope, the researcher recommends this exploration for future research.
- iii) While researching the relevant literature, the researchers discovered a problem: the theoretical perspective on understanding Islamophobia is very muddled. Although there are multiple approaches to Islamophobia available in the literature, every seminal study leads to a different direction that creates confusion and thus makes this concept more complex instead of elucidating it. For example, one becomes confused while deciding as to whether Islamophobia should be studied from an Orientalist perspective or through the securitization perspective, or otherwise. It is a good way to explore the multiple dimensions of this phenomenon, but it is also important to develop a consensus about the theoretical perspective of Islamophobia. For a broader consensus, the researcher recommends more studies on its dimensions in order to reach a specific theoretical perspective of Islamophobia.
- iv) Contemporary Islamophobia, on the other hand, is widely regarded as a mediated construct. The present work, due to its limited scope, was able to study Islamophobia only in two newspapers representing the US and UK societies.

The analyzed media were somewhat liberal, but, besides this, the conservative media are also required to be taken into account in studying mediated Islamophobia. By analyzing both the liberal and conservative media, one can determine whether they are on a deviated path that they are attempting to follow within one society, if they are simply acquiescing to Islamophobia, or if they have a few differences. The present study explored differences between the mediated Islamophobia of two societies, but the researcher assumes that such differences might not exist between liberal and conservative media within one society that are otherwise available on all other topics. This is recommended for investigation in future studies, which would necessitate much broader and deeper research.

- v) Furthermore, it is critical to investigate how much and to what extent mediated Islamophobia affects general cognitive frameworks. The current study looked into how the media shapes Islamophobia, but it didn't look into how much mediated Islamophobia affects people's thoughts because this was beyond its scope. This is required to study the way the media construct Islamophobia and whether, in that way, it is also available in the minds of people. Are there any kinds of gap? If the gaps are there, what are the intervening factors that are creating those gaps? Or, in other words, what is causing those gaps to happen? Answers to these questions would help understand the difference between Islamophobia at the attitudinal level and at the institutional or media level. It is a general perception that what media construct also socially constructed, but

assumingly this would not be the same in the case of Islamophobia. This must also be authenticated, because there may be multiple intervening factors involved in the process of Islamophobia construction at various levels. This should be investigated and explained, because Islamophobia differs from other phenomena commonly observed in the literature, where media construction and social construction are synonymous. There might be some kinds of differences between media construction and social construction in the whole process of Islamophobia construction. If differences exist, what are the reasons behind them? This is also recommended for future research because it may aid in the development of prognostics for Islamophobia.

- vi) The final recommendation pertains to media sociology, which states that when it comes to constructing Islamophobia, the media either work capriciously or in an organized fashion. What are the media doing? Why are they doing so? These questions, of course, deserve more in-depth investigation from the standpoint of media sociology. This would help understand whether the media are capricious on the part of individuals only, regardless of the way they think about things, if they try to put that into the media, or if they are following some kind of policies and their texts and discourses are within the light of those political or policy level things. Why do media construct Islam and Muslims the way they construct them? Moreover, what are the reasons that contribute to this whole process? Since mediated creation has various implications by media sociology, such as media routines and media policies, these are indeed relevant problems

to explore, which were beyond the scope of the current investigation. Thus, it's unlikely that one will be able to comprehend the entire process of Islamophobia's mediated construction without considering questions of media sociology.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: News stories and opinion articles from The Washington Post (WP) analyzed for referential and predication strategies

WP-1

November 20, 2016 (News)

1. **National security choices stoke Muslim fears of an anti-Islamic White House**
2. News of President-elect Donald Trump's national security picks set off fresh tremors across the Islamic world on Friday as Middle Eastern allies and Muslim American groups prepared to face advisers and potential Cabinet members noted for harshly anti-Muslim rhetoric.
3. The naming of Trump's choices for attorney general, CIA director and national security adviser drew public condemnations from Muslim civil rights groups as well as private expressions of concern from several Arab states that cooperate closely with the United States in the fight against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups.
4. Some current and former government officials worried that the appointments could reinforce perceptions among the world's Muslims that the United States is at war against Islam itself.
5. American civil rights organizations and faith leaders said Friday they were disturbed by Trump's appointment of retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn to be his top national security adviser.
6. Flynn, a former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has repeatedly referred to Islam as "a cancer," claimed that a "fear of Muslims is rational" and warned - despite a lack of evidence - that Sharia or Islamic law is spreading throughout the United States.
7. Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), the president-elect's designee for attorney general, has supported Trump's call for a temporary ban on Muslim immigrants and has suggested that a "toxic ideology" lies at the root of Islam.
8. And Rep. Mike Pompeo - Trump's pick for CIA director - has co-sponsored a bill to ban the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egypt-based Islamist organization that conspiracy theorists on America's far right have accused of plotting to infiltrate the government.
9. The elevation of Flynn, Sessions and Pompeo to key positions triggered a rash of Googling in Middle Eastern capitals, where none of the three is particularly well known.

10. But what seemed quickly apparent was that all "carry a clear hawkish line against Islam" - something that could complicate regional efforts to battle terrorist groups, said Marwan Muasher, a former Jordanian ambassador to the United States.
11. "While the region has the same commitment to fight terrorism, it needs a nuanced view of Islam and of *Muslims*, rather than treating *all Muslims* with a broad brush," said Muasher, now vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank.
12. "The cause of fighting terrorism will not be helped if the new administration treats the Muslim world as a problem rather than as part of the solution."
13. American civil rights advocates and Muslim leaders echoed those concerns.
14. "All Americans should be really concerned," said Talib M. Shareef, who serves as imam and president of Washington's Masjid Muhammad, the capital's oldest mosque.
15. An Air Force veteran, Shareef said he worried that the appointments would alienate allies as well as American Muslims serving in the armed forces and in government.
16. Five of Shareef's children are active-service military, and they have already experienced discrimination while in uniform, he said.
17. "When you're needed but you're not made to feel comfortable, it's going to be difficult for you to give 100 percent. ... You are not going to excel at whatever you're needed in. And we need everybody.
18. "We need them, and they need us," Shareef said. "I don't care how powerful we say we are as a military, we will never be able to fight the battles on our own."
19. Trump's picks have largely echoed the views of the president-elect himself, who at various points in the campaign called for religious tests for immigrants as well as surveillance of American mosques.
20. Terrorism experts and human rights groups have warned that such rhetoric drives support for extremist groups by making Muslim citizens feel unwelcome in their own country.
21. "The danger is that they're going to pass legislation that not only alienates Muslim countries on which we depend for our security, but also it may alienate American Muslims and push them in the direction of our enemies," said Richard Cohen, president of the Southern Poverty Law Center.
22. Both Flynn and Sessions have dismissed criticisms of their views on Islam as oversimplifications.
23. In his 2016 book, "The Field of Fight: How We Can Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies," Flynn distinguishes between radical Islamists and

ordinary Muslims, though he at times resorts to harsh terms in describing the fight against the former.

24. He calls Islam a "political ideology" disguised as a religion.
25. "We're in a world war against a messianic mass movement of evil people, most of them inspired by a totalitarian ideology: *Radical Islam*," he writes.
26. Flynn joined the board of Act for America, an activist group that has helped introduce bills to ban Islamic Sharia law in nearly two dozen U.S. states, shortly after he joined the Trump campaign
27. Act for America's founder, Brigitte Gabriel, has assailed a "cancer called Islamofacism" that permeates a Muslim world in which "extreme is mainstream."
28. Sessions has repeatedly criticized the Obama administration over its policies for admitting Syrian refugees into the country and suggested that a religious test could be part of the process for determining who is admitted as an immigrant.
29. "We have to understand that most Muslims do not adhere to this extreme ideology, but there is nothing wrong to refuse admittance to those who distance themselves from our values," Sessions told the *American Thinker*, a conservative magazine.
30. "We need to use common sense with the who-what-where of the threat: It is the toxic ideology of Islam."
31. Ibrahim Hooper, spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic Relations, likened such views to a "kind of raw bigotry that would disqualify anyone from serving in public office."
32. "Why it's okay to be an anti-Muslim bigot and have a powerful post in the administration is a mystery," Hooper said. Of Flynn, whom Hooper described as "beyond the pale," he said: "He should not be in public office. We can only imagine what policies will flow from the fact that he believes Islam is a cancer, and that he's been at war with Islam."
33. Pompeo was not an outspoken Trump supporter during the presidential campaign and has been generally more measured in his views on immigration.
34. But following the Boston Marathon attacks in 2013, he accused Muslim American leaders of being "potentially complicit" by failing to condemn extremist views more forcibly.
35. Trump has gone further, repeatedly accusing American Muslims during his campaign of knowing about terrorists in their midst.
36. A number of Middle Eastern leaders - most notably Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Egypt's Abdel Fatah al-Sissi - cheered Trump's surprise victory last week, applauding the Republican's leadership style and predicting improved relations with the White House under a Trump presidency.

37. Erdogan also specifically praised Flynn after the retired general published an op-ed last week supporting the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, the exiled Turkish cleric and Pennsylvania resident whom Erdogan blames for inspiring the foiled July 15 coup against his government.
38. A PAC allied with the Democratic Party on Friday accused Flynn of violating federal law by failing to register with the Justice Department as a "foreign agent" under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
39. The Democratic Coalition Against Trump said Flynn signed a contract in September to lobby on behalf of a Dutch company with close ties to the Erdogan government.
40. Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a Washington think tank, also said that support among the Middle East's strongmen could wane if Trump follows through with policies that explicitly target Muslims.
41. "Erdogan is an authoritarian populist, and there was jubilation over Trump's presidency because he saw a similar style of politics on the rise in the United States," Cagaptay said.
42. "But if the administration implements policies to register Muslims or to take other discriminatory action, it's going to be very hard for Erdogan to swallow that."

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WP-2

November 6, 2016 (News)

1. **Core of Trump's Islam stance has what once were considered radical seeds**
2. As far as the Rev. Terry Jones knows, they were his ideas first.
3. "We are asking for the immediate halting of all Muslim immigration and the removal of all illegal aliens from the United States," the controversial Florida pastor told a Detroit radio station back in 2011.
4. "We are asking for the monitoring of all the mosques in America."
5. At the time, Jones's demands were dismissed as crazy, part of a set of radical beliefs and xenophobia that impelled Jones to publicly burn Qurans and air mocking videos that provoked violent attacks on embassies and consulates in Egypt, Afghanistan and Libya.
6. Four and a half years later, those policy prescriptives are a core element of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump's campaign.
7. The party's standard-bearer has borrowed heavily both in message and in membership from far-right conservative activists whose pronouncements on

Islam have long been denounced as dangerous zealotry by mainstream conservative and liberal policymakers alike.

8. Former president George W. Bush and GOP candidates Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Mitt Romney all repudiated anti-Islam rhetoric as un-American.
9. Trump has become the first and only major-party presidential candidate to adopt these ideas as his own.
10. With his calls for a complete ban on Muslim immigrants or "extreme vetting" on people entering the country, policy prescriptives once relegated to the fringe have become mainstream.
11. The migration of anti-Islam extremist views to major-party acceptance is, like much in American politics, a fusion of opportunism and ideology
12. It often has been highly profitable for its practitioners as well.
13. In 2007, Brigitte Gabriel, a former reporter for Pat Robertson's evangelical television channel and author of a book on the dangers of Islam, founded Act! for America, an organization that touted as its "first accomplishment" its 2008 campaign to shut down a Minnesota Islamic school.
14. That same year, former newspaper executive Pamela Geller used her increasingly popular libertarian blog AtlasShrugs.com to spread the falsehood during the 2008 presidential campaign that President Obama was born in Kenya and was a secret Muslim.
15. So did former Reagan administration aide Frank Gaffney Jr., whose neoconservative think tank argued that the country was at risk of falling victim to "civilization jihad" at the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood.
16. The Egypt-based Islamist movement, Gaffney alleged, harbored a sinister bid to destroy American society and implement Islamic law.
17. With the Obama rumors, Gaffney, Geller, Gabriel and others found a more direct way to advance a broader opposition to Islam - and a right-wing audience to embrace it.
18. Along the way, Kellyanne Conway, now Trump's campaign manager, contributed polling to sharpen the message.
19. By 2010, anti-Muslim activists had launched a nationwide media campaign against what they dubbed "the Ground Zero mosque," a proposal to build a mosque and Muslim community center in Lower Manhattan.
20. Act! for America convened its first "National Conference and Legislative Briefing" in Washington, which brought advocates together with lawmakers, including Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.) and then-Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-Minn.).

21. Both went on to hold congressional hearings to examine militants infiltrating the country.
22. While most mainstream politicians continued to malign the activists - the Conservative Political Action Conference barred Gaffney from speaking in 2010 after he accused two of its members of working with the Muslim Brotherhood - they spread their ideas through a network of small conferences, tea party groups, conservative churches and Jewish groups, and right-wing news outlets such as Breitbart.
23. Former Breitbart chief executive Stephen Bannon is now chief executive of the Trump campaign.
24. They told their audiences that Islam isn't a religion but a political ideology that is inherently violent and opposed to Judeo-Christian values.
25. They warned that mosques and Muslims should be watched.
26. And they argued that practicing Islam means belief in the oppression of women and the murder of infidels, and that the religion is therefore unconstitutional.
27. Most important of all, they said, was to stop the advance of what they labeled "creeping sharia," an alleged Muslim plot to impose Islamic law across American institutions.
28. Sharia is not a codified document like the U.S. Constitution, say religious and legal scholars, but rather a broad and variably interpreted set of ideas and principles for how to live life as a Muslim.
29. It offers an array of guidance, including on prayer practices, marriage, diet and finances. It also draws on tens of thousands of texts and scholarly interpretations, meaning that there is no universally approved body of Islamic law, said Intisar A. Rabb, an Islamic legal scholar at Harvard University.
30. In the summer of 2010, former House speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) offered a darker vision.
31. In a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, he said sharia is "a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and the world as we know it."
32. It was "the pre-eminent totalitarian threat of our time," said Gaffney's Center for Security Policy's report, "Shariah - The Threat to America."
33. Among its authors were former CIA director James R. Woolsey and Joseph E. Schmitz, both of whom are now national security advisers for Trump.
34. The center's general counsel, David Yerushalmi, drafted a law to ban sharia, and with the help of Act! for America began shopping the draft to lawmakers in Southern states.
35. Bills to ban sharia now have been introduced in all but 16 states. To date, Tennessee, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana and South Dakota all have passed some form of legislation to ban "foreign law"- wording adopted in most cases to avoid

an explicit violation of the Constitution, which prohibits the favoring or targeting of one religion.

36. Alabama's bill failed, but its voters banned sharia by ratifying a constitutional amendment.
37. Faiza Patel, the co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program at New York University Law School's Brennan Center for Justice, said "the idea that sharia law poses a threat to the United States is just laughable."
38. But it makes sense that sharia has worked as a focal point for the anti-Muslim movement.
39. For many Americans, the definition offered by the activists was also their first introduction to the concept.
40. "The theory that 'the Muslims are coming'" has helped anti-Muslim activists to "malign Muslim individuals and groups, and suggest that they have some sort of terrorist ties," Patel said.
41. "We've seen this with [longtime Hillary Clinton aide] Huma Abedin.
42. And we've seen a concerted campaign against [Muslim lobbyist group] the Council on American-Islamic Relations for some time."
43. The business of speaking out against Muslims also has been lucrative.
44. Seven charitable groups provided \$42.6 million to "Islamophobia think tanks" such as those run by Gaffney and Gabriel between 2001 and 2009, researchers at the Center for American Progress found.
45. In 2014, Gaffney was paid more than \$308,000, and Gabriel earned at least \$240,000, according to the IRS Form 990 filed by their organizations.
46. The 2014 rise of the Islamic State, with its gruesome beheading videos, created new fears and gave the movement new energy.
47. The Islamic State was practicing Islamic law when it executed journalists and religious minorities, the anti-Islam activists told their audiences, and so were the gunmen who carried out the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, San Bernardino, Calif., and Orlando.
48. When the 2016 election cycle rolled around, not everyone in the movement rallied immediately around Trump.
49. Some, including Gaffney, initially joined the campaign of Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), and Ben Carson also won support with references to "civilization jihad."
50. But Trump ultimately incorporated the message into his presidential platform like no other major-party candidate had before.
51. In previous presidential campaigns, the Republican candidates "beat back" the movement's conspiracy theories, said Ken Gude, a senior fellow at the Center

for American Progress, who co-authored an updated report on the movement last year.

52. "Now we have a campaign that not only isn't pushing back against them, but is also pushing and advocating those kinds of views."
53. Walid Phares, one of Trump's foreign policy advisers, was part of a Lebanese Christian militia that took part in massacres during the Lebanese civil war and has previously accused the U.S. government of being beholden to an Islamist agenda.
54. And another top adviser, retired Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, joined the board of Act! for America shortly after joining the Trump campaign.
55. Gingrich and Bachmann are also advisers.
56. But the "top expert with influence on these issues is Frank Gaffney, who advised Cruz, then provided research to Trump," Phares wrote in an email.
57. He also named Schmitz, Flynn, Gingrich and former New York mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani as key sources on developing policy ideas on Islam.
58. "A number of these folks are friends of mine," Gaffney said in an interview about Trump's inner circle.
59. "I've had conversations with them, [and] the opportunity to provide input [to the campaign], at least informally."
60. When Trump in December first called for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States," he cited a widely debunked poll, conducted by Conway for Gaffney's Center for Security Policy, that claims that 25 percent of Muslims surveyed supported violence against Americans and that 51 percent think Muslims should have the choice of being governed by sharia in America.
61. A large number of Americans have long recognized "the jihad threat," and Trump is giving voice to those sentiments, Geller said.
62. It's only the mainstream media, "a Soros-funded propaganda arm for the far-Left and its Islamic supremacist allies," she said, that has stood in the way of broader acceptance.
63. On the campaign trail, where Trump warns repeatedly of the dangers posed by Muslims, the candidate is articulating, Gaffney said, "the most serious and thoughtful and necessary policy toward the threat that we face from the global jihad movement of anybody in public life at the moment."
64. "Anyone who believes sharia law supplants American law will not be given an immigrant visa," Trump said at an August campaign rally in North Carolina. The crowd shouted its response: "U.S.A.! U.S.A.!"

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November 27, 2016 (News)

1. **This Trump adviser wants to wage a holy war**
2. the field of fight
3. How We Can Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies
4. By Michael T. Flynn and Michael Ledeen. St. Martin's Press. 194 pp. \$26.99
5. Late in the presidential race, Donald Trump warned that his opponent would start a new world war. "You're going to end up in World War III over Syria if we listen to Hillary Clinton," he told Reuters.
6. As it turns out, there was no need to worry about Clinton's hawkishness.
7. The next world war is already here. It's a religious war. And the United States is losing.
8. Such is the vision of Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the retired Army three-star who is set to become White House national security adviser after President-elect Trump takes the oath of office.
9. Thus far, Flynn is best known for his fire-breathing speech at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland this summer.
10. But six days before leading GOP delegates in a frenzy of "USA!" and "Lock her up!" chants, Flynn published a book detailing this new fight – in his telling, a multi-generational and civilizational conflict against radical Islam.
11. "We're in a world war," he writes, "but very few Americans recognize it, and fewer still have any idea how to win it."
12. "The Field of Fight ," co-authored with foreign policy writer Michael Ledeen, offers an apocalyptic vision of Islam and terrorism, rails in Trumpian tones against political correctness, and assures readers of Flynn's "maverick" credentials (even though calling yourself a maverick is pretty much the least 202averick thing possible)
13. It also offers a tantalizing glimpse of the worldview Flynn may already be sharing with his new boss.
14. Though he calls for "destroying the jihadi armies," Flynn is as focused on ideological warfare as he is on drone strikes or special operators.
15. While Trump has said he'll pursue a closer relationship with Russia and Vladimir Putin, in his book Flynn regards Moscow as part of a worldwide "enemy alliance" against the United States and concludes that the Russian president is an untrustworthy partner in the fight against the Islamic State.
16. Perhaps most revealing, Flynn seems quite comfortable with the prospect of a religious war.

17. “This kind of war is not at all new.
18. It created our world,” he writes, citing the Protestant Reformation.
19. “The world badly needs an Islamic Reformation, and we should not be surprised if violence is involved.
20. It’s normal.”
21. In the parlance of the day, one might say Trump’s national security adviser is normalizing holy wars.
22. A decades-long veteran of military operations from Grenada to Afghanistan, Flynn made his name as an intelligence officer skilled in tracking terrorist networks, distinguishing himself in particular as part of the team that battered al-Qaeda in Iraq.
23. In 2012, President Obama appointed Flynn to run the Defense Intelligence Agency, but in 2014 he was dismissed because of concerns about his management.
24. That blemish notwithstanding, Flynn highlights his record.
25. “I’ve fought in this war on physical and bureaucratic battlefields, from Afghanistan, Iraq, and African jungles, to the highest level of the United States’ intelligence and military establishments,” he writes.
26. “I know our enemies better than most ‘experts,’ and I’m plenty scared.
27. We could lose.
28. In fact, right now we’re losing.”
29. Flynn spends a great deal of time urging readers to define the enemy and to say it out loud.
30. “We’ve got to stop feeling the slightest bit guilty about calling them by name and identifying them as fanatical killers acting on behalf of a failed civilization,” he writes.
31. He does so repeatedly himself, calling jihadists a “tribal cult” and declaring that “a global war is being waged against us by all true Radical Islamists in the name of Allah.”
32. This obsession with naming names echoes the 2016 campaign, when just about every GOP candidate had to thunder about “radical Islam” and decry Obama’s reluctance to do so. But for Flynn, the rhetoric is inseparable from the war effort.
33. During World War II and the Cold War, “the wars unleashed against us were waged in the names of our enemies’ doctrines, just like jihad today,” he argues.
34. “We can’t win this war by treating Radical Islamic terrorists as a handful of crazies. ... The political and theological underpinnings of their immoral actions have to be demolished.”

35. How to do so?
36. He endorses “digital warfare,” including code-breaking and tracking terrorist communications, which are things that already happen.
37. He urges the tech industry to help, too, writing that “we can’t possibly have an effective campaign against *Radical Islamic ideology* without the cooperation of the likes of Google, Facebook, and Twitter.”
38. But he neglects to specify much of what these companies should actually do, beyond providing “their own positive messaging campaign about the betterment of humankind,” an approach only slightly more developed than Trump’s thoughts on “the cyber.”
39. Flynn also suggests that military operations should feature a sort of follow-up mockery.
40. When U.S. forces succeed in taking down terrorist groups, we should go on “the ideological offensive, asking whether the Almighty had changed sides in the holy war,” he suggests.
41. “After all, if previous victories were the result of divine blessing, were defeats not proof that their cause had been rejected on high?”
42. It’s the sick-burn approach to counterterrorism.
43. Flynn dismisses concerns about Islamophobia, contending instead that excessive “Islamophilia” (when “leftists treat Muslims as children whose feathers should not be ruffled”) makes it hard for leaders and citizens to grasp the challenge at hand.
44. “If, as PC apologists tell us, there is no objective basis for members of one culture to criticize another, then it is very hard to see – and forbidden to write about or say – the existence of an international alliance of evil countries and movements that is working to destroy us,” he writes.
45. That alliance is where Russia comes in.
46. Though Flynn has taken heat for travelling to Moscow last year and sitting beside Putin at a gala for the Kremlin-run news network RT, in “The Field of Fight” he assails Russia and its autocratic ruler.
47. Flynn brands Iran and Russia as leaders of an enemy alliance of nations, in league with anti-American forces, crime networks and terrorist groups.
48. “The Russians and Iranians have more in common than a shared enemy,” he writes.
49. “There is also a shared contempt for democracy and an agreement – by all the members of the enemy alliance – that dictatorship is a superior way to run a country, an empire, or a caliphate.” (For the record, other alliance members

include North Korea, China, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and even Bolivia.)

50. Flynn faults Obama for having “tiptoed around open criticism of Vladimir Putin’s many aggressive actions,” and despite Trump’s frequent statements that the United States and Russia can join forces against the Islamic State, Flynn expresses deep skepticism.
51. “When it is said that Russia would make an ideal partner for fighting Radical Islam, it behooves us to remember that the Russians haven’t been very effective at fighting jihadis on their own territory, and are in cahoots with the Iranians,” he writes.
52. “In Syria, the two allies have loudly proclaimed they are waging war against ISIS, but in reality the great bulk of their efforts are aimed at the opponents of the Assad regime.”
53. In addition, he explains, “there is no reason to believe Putin would welcome cooperation with us; quite the contrary, in fact.”
54. A few weeks before the election, Flynn emphasized that Trump knows “that when it comes to Russia or any other country, the common enemy we all have is radical Islam” – suggesting that any daylight between the two men is being eliminated.
55. Indeed, while there is little in “The Field of Fight” to suggest that Flynn has some overarching doctrine to impart to the incoming commander in chief, there are flashes that suggest further differences: Whereas Trump has pledged to “get out of the nation-building business,” for instance, Flynn proffers a vision reminiscent of George W. Bush’s freedom agenda.
56. “Removing the sickening chokehold of tyranny, dictatorships, and Radical Islamist regimes must be something our nation stands for whenever freedom-loving people around the world need help,” Flynn writes.
57. “If we don’t stand for this, we stand for nothing.”
58. And though he says it is a “pipe dream” to believe that Washington can bring democracy to the Middle East, “we could certainly bring order.”
59. Trump’s agreement is all that counts; for Flynn, whether the American public is on board is inconsequential.
60. “The consensus that matters is not the one that exists at the beginning of fighting, but the one at the end of the war,” he writes.
61. “If we win, our leaders will be hailed, while if we lose, they will be despised.”
62. When he attempts to sum up his recommendations, however, the result is a generic jumble of buzzwords.

63. "We must engage the violent extremists wherever they are, drive them from their safe havens, and kill them or capture them," Flynn explains.
64. "We have to organize all our national power, from military and economic to intelligence and tough-minded diplomacy," he lectures. (Reminder: Invoking diplomacy can come off as wussy, so always preface it with "tough-minded" or another macho hedge.)
65. He warns that battling religious extremists will be expensive, "and it's probably going to last through several generations."
66. And he lists the elements of a "winning" strategy: "clearly define your enemy; face reality - for politicians, this is never an easy thing to do; understand the social context and fabric of the operational environment; and recognize who's in charge of the enemy forces."
67. None of which sounds any more groundbreaking than when Hillary Clinton went on about smart power.
68. As The Washington Post has reported, former military colleagues wonder how a respected intelligence officer such as Flynn morphed so quickly into a rabid and influential partisan.
69. "The Field of Fight" reflects these sides of him, oscillating between straightforward analysis and vague, impassioned diatribes, untroubled by contradictions or evolutions.
70. The notion of a transformation - from flag officer to political insider - may be too simple.
71. The national security adviser serves the president's policy needs as well as his political interests, and different advisers and presidents have emphasized distinct aspects of the job.
72. Through his book and public pronouncements, Flynn is demonstrating a political and professional malleability rivaling that of his new chief.
73. And he demonstrates similar personal ambition, too.
74. In waging this forever war, he concludes, "one leader must be in charge overall and accountable to the president - if this leader does not meet the test, which is to win, then fire him or her and find another who can."
75. There's another field on which Flynn is eager to fight.

**

December 21, 2016 (News)

1. **Islamic State's goal: Using fear to drive a wedge between Muslims and others**
2. The claim on the official Amaq media channel was short and distressingly familiar: A "soldier of the Islamic State" was behind yet another attack on civilians in Europe, this time at a festive Christmas market in Berlin.
3. The accuracy of the claim remained in question Tuesday as German authorities searched for both a suspect and a motive behind the deadly truck assault on holiday revelers.
4. But already it appeared that the attack had achieved one of the Islamic State's stated objectives: spreading fear and chaos in a Western country in hopes of sharpening the divide between Muslims and everyone else.
5. Terrorism experts likened the claim to a declaration of all-out war against a country that until now had seen little of the terrorist violence that has rocked its Francophone neighbors.
6. Germany, with its large Muslim community and recent history of political discord over Muslim immigration, has long been viewed by the militant group as an important strategic target, despite the country's reputation for tolerance.
7. Islamic State officials in recent months have urged supporters to carry out attacks in Germany by any means - including using non-traditional weapons such as trucks - with the aim of creating an anti-Muslim backlash in Europe's biggest democracy.
8. The resulting crackdown would benefit the Islamic State, the group argues, by dividing Europeans and driving wavering Muslims into the jihadists' corner.
9. "The very fact that Germany has played only a minor role in anti-ISIS efforts - but is the most important state in Western Europe - may make it a good place to sow division within the Western alliance," said Paul Pillar, a former CIA counterterrorism official and a senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies.
10. "The spectre of Muslim refugees and immigrants turning on their hosts, in a country that has accepted an especially large share of such migrants, may intensify anti-immigration sentiment not just in Germany but also elsewhere in Europe."
11. The Islamic State's claim of responsibility came nearly 24 hours after the attack on the Breitscheidplatz square, where an unknown assailant drove a truck through a crowded Christmas street festival, killing 12 people and injuring nearly 50.

12. German police initially detained a Pakistani asylum seeker who had fled the scene, but authorities later released the man after concluding that he had not been involved.
13. The group's statement simply attributed the attack to a "soldier of the Islamic State" but gave no details about the attacker.
14. In the past, the group has claimed credit for terrorist acts committed by individuals who were inspired by its propaganda but had no direct ties to the organization or its members.
15. Some counterterrorism experts treated the claim with skepticism, noting the lack of authenticating detail as well as the truck driver's behavior during and after the attack.
16. For example, unlike previous incidents in which the perpetrators seemed to have expected death or "martyrdom," the driver of the Berlin truck fled the vehicle and escaped by blending in with the crowd.
17. "The easiest thing to say is, 'It's ISIS,' but if you're conducting an investigation, you have to ask all sorts of questions and explore all sorts of possibilities," Ali Soufan, a former FBI supervisory special agent who investigated terrorism cases, said, using another name for the Islamic State.
18. "You have to follow the evidence, and it seems interesting to me that we're seeing some stuff that we haven't seen before."
19. Lorenzo Vidino, director of the program on extremism at George Washington University, said the driver's behavior suggested that the attack may have been inspired by jihadist ideology but was not connected operationally with the Islamic State.
20. The choice of Germany may have been simply a matter of opportunity or - if the Islamic State was truly involved - a strike against a strategically important target.
21. "Germany is a target for obvious reasons," Vidino said. "One of them, paradoxically, is its open-door policy towards Syrian refugees."
22. From ISIS's perspective, that policy takes away the natural citizens of the caliphate, showing its bankruptcy.
23. Every refugee that is welcome in Germany is a living testament of how most Muslims want little to do with ISIS's project."
24. On a more strategic level, he said, the attack helps fulfil the group's core objective of widening the gulf between Muslims and non-Muslims.
25. "For any Western country they target, jihadists want more polarization between Muslims and the rest of the population," Vidino said.
26. "An attack on such a cherished, popular and Christian tradition definitely works in that direction."

27. The Islamic State's propaganda machine has produced hundreds of messages in recent months urging followers to carry out terrorist strikes abroad without waiting for specific instruction or coordination.
28. The volume of such messages has increased in recent weeks as the terrorist group has suffered a string of military defeats in its self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
29. In November, the organization's French-language media outlet called on European Muslims to replicate the July 14 terrorist attack in Nice, France, in which a French Tunisian ran over scores of people along a crowded seaside promenade, killing 86.
30. The posting featured a Muslim man vowing to "take my truck and go forth, towards my enemies upon whom I will inflict a true punishment, until they are afflicted with grief."
31. Islamic State officials have explicitly sought to link such attacks to the larger goal of making Europe intolerable for faithful Muslims.
32. A 2015 article in the group's English-language magazine, Dabiq, warned that the terrorists would soon begin targeting the West with the aim of deliberately provoking a backlash against Muslims living there.
33. "Muslims in the West," the article said, "will quickly find themselves between one of two choices: they either apostatize and adopt the [Western] religion ... or they emigrate to the Islamic State and thereby escape persecution."

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WP-5

December 11, 2016 (News)

1. **Trump's generals see world as good vs. Evil**
2. Hardened by war, they perceive militant Islam, Iran as existential threats
3. President-elect Donald Trump is assembling a national security team dominated by retired generals who share a deep distrust of Iran and have characterized the threat of militant Islam in far more dire terms than Obama administration officials and intelligence assessments.
4. The trio of ex-generals represents an emerging core of the Trump administration that is at odds with President Obama's efforts to convince the American public that - 15 years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks - terrorism continues to pose a persistent threat to the nation, but not an existential one.
5. The generals' views also cut against the grain of U.S. policies seeking to empower moderates in Iran and of U.S. intelligence assessments that terrorism no longer stands alone atop the rankings of global security threats now crowded by concerns about cyber attacks and renewed aggression by China and Russia.

6. Their views, though far from uniform, have been heavily influenced over the past 15 years by intensely personal battlefield losses, the country's waning attention to the wars and an up-close view of a ruthless enemy.
7. Those experiences could lead retired Gens. Michael T. Flynn, James N. Mattis and John F. Kelly to urge caution in Trump administration debates about the use of force.
8. But former colleagues and experts said the generals are also more likely, by virtue of their training and experience, to see malign intent or view the world as a struggle between good and evil.
9. "The nature of the job in the military is to be responsible for threats against the nation and to be blamed if the country is not prepared," said Stephen Biddle, a professor at George Washington University and frequent adviser to the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan.
10. "They tend to be very threat-focused in relation to civilians and tend to see that threat in more apocalyptic terms."
11. Statements and online postings by Flynn, Trump's choice for national security adviser, have drawn the most alarm among intelligence analysts and the foreign-policy establishment.
12. "We're in a world war, but very few Americans recognize it, and fewer still have any idea how to win it," Flynn wrote in his recent book "The Field of Fight."
13. He has also repeatedly depicted Islam as a diseased religion that represents a growing danger. "Fear of Muslims is rational," he wrote in a Twitter post earlier this year.
14. Mattis and Kelly - Trump's respective nominees for secretary of defense and secretary of homeland security - have been far more measured in their foreign-policy pronouncements and are widely respected within the foreign-policy establishment and among the United States' Gulf Arab allies.
15. Yet each has expressed hard-line views about Iran and the threat of terrorism.
16. "Our country today is in a life-and-death struggle against an evil enemy, but America as a whole is certainly not at war," Kelly said in late 2010, just days after his son, an officer leading Marines in Afghanistan, was killed.
17. "Not as a country. Not as a people."
18. Mattis's persistent warnings about the threat posed by Iran led to tensions with the White House, which urged him when he was in uniform to tone down his rhetoric.
19. He has criticized the Obama administration for taking too passive an approach to Iranian aggression and fostering "the impression in the region that the U.S. was withdrawing."

20. In a speech in April, Mattis described the Iran deal as one "drawn up with the expectation that Iran will cheat."
21. He said that one of its principal advantages would be that "we'll have better targeting data should it come to a fight at some point in the future."
22. "We're going to have to plan for the worst," Mattis said.
23. Obama has mounted an aggressive campaign to kill senior al-Qaeda and Islamic State leaders and wrest back territory seized by the extremists in Iraq and Syria.
24. But he has also emphasized that the groups are not "the vanguard of a new world order."
25. "These terrorists can never directly destroy our way of life, but we can do it for them if we lose track of who we are and the values that this nation was founded upon," the president said in a speech earlier this week.
26. The generals also share a widely held frustration in the military that they have been fighting for 15 years without the full support of the country or its civilian leaders.
27. "All of us who served and fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, month after month, year after year, have been too close to the human costs - our buddies killed in action and our Iraqi and Afghan partners assassinated," said J. Kael Weston, a State Department official who advised Marine officers in Iraq and Afghanistan and wrote "The Mirror Test," a memoir of his service.
28. "But the policymakers in D.C. have been too far removed from the blood-red tally of war."
29. When Mattis retired from the Marines in 2013, he spent two weeks zigzagging across the country visiting the parents of Marines killed under his command.
30. Kelly and his two sons have taken part in more than a dozen combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.
31. When his son's platoon was deployed to Afghanistan in 2010, he made weekly and sometimes daily trips to visit his son's wounded Marines at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Md.
32. Those trips continued after his son was killed in combat.
33. Flynn, who served in Afghanistan and as the Joint Special Operations Command's senior intelligence officer, has spent as much time deployed to war zones as almost any other general in the Army over the past 15 years.
34. The disconnect between the generals and Washington also extended to the battlefield, where military officers often felt compelled to describe the messy wars to their troops as battles between good and evil.
35. "When you explain to a lance corporal why his best friend got horribly killed and he has to go out there again and again and again, you don't have time for

geopolitics," said retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, an Iraq veteran and counterinsurgency expert.

36. "You tell him, 'We have to fight the enemy here so that we don't have to fight them at home.' "
37. A big question is how the perspectives of senior military officers, serving in Cabinet-level positions, will influence the direction of a Trump administration.
38. Obama's deep skepticism of foreign intervention meant that he often served as a brake on discussions about how the United States might respond to hostile developments overseas.
39. Trump has no foreign-policy or military experience to examine for insights into how he might respond, but his campaign posture was animated mainly by the promise of aggression.
40. "I think it's likely there will be terrorist attacks in the coming years, and I think Trump will feel tremendous pressure to be seen as acting very decisively," said Dan Byman, a former Middle East analyst at the CIA and a professor at Georgetown University.
41. Trump's advisers may be quicker to see nefarious intent because of their military experience but more cautious about U.S. military intervention or retaliation, he said.
42. Byman cited the example of the Iranian seizure of American sailors shortly before the Iran nuclear deal was signed as an example of an overseas provocation that had the potential to derail broader U.S. policy goals.
43. Trump's advisers "have a lot of personal experience and might be more inclined to see Iranian hostility as deeply planned," rather than the act of a rogue faction or a function of chaos, Byman said.
44. "They're more likely to read things negatively than the Obama administration would have."
45. "In significant ways, the chances for limited conflict with Iran go up," Byman said.
46. "But that doesn't mean to me, we bomb them."

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December 12, 2016 (editorial)

1. **Waging a war against Islam**
2. Donald Trump is about to lead the West into the third and darkest phase of its 15-year quest to neutralize the threat of Islamic extremism.
3. The first was George W. Bush's freedom initiative, which posited that political liberalization in the Middle East's rotting autocracies would dry up terrorist recruiting.
4. The second was the engagement policy of Barack Obama, who bet that respectful dialogue and attention to Muslim demands for justice – above all for the Palestinians – would make the West a less compelling target.
5. Both were widely judged to be failures.
6. Now the new president will embrace the approach that both Bush and Obama explicitly ruled out as morally wrong and practically counterproductive: civilizational conflict.
7. The outlines of what might well be called the Trump crusade are easily located in the rhetoric of Stephen K. Bannon, Michael T. Flynn, Jeff Sessions and other Trump appointees.
8. They describe a “long history of the Judeo-Christian West struggle against Islam,” as Bannon put it, or “a world war against a messianic mass movement of evil people,” as Flynn, the incoming national security adviser, has written.
9. Bush and Obama were careful to distinguish the terrorists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State from Islam itself, which they described as a great religion worthy of respect.
10. Not Flynn. Islam, he has said, is a cancer, a political movement masquerading as a religion and the product of an inferior culture.
11. “I don’t believe that all cultures are morally equivalent, and I think the West, and especially America, is far more civilized, far more ethical and moral,” he argued in a book published this year.
12. What might this mean in practice?
13. On the battlefields of the Middle East, very little. Trump’s team is certain to continue the ongoing offensives against the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria and Libya.
14. Given that they appear to be slowly succeeding, Flynn and incoming defense secretary James N. Mattis are unlikely to alter Obama’s approach of backing local forces rather than committing large numbers of U.S. troops.

15. The new administration will look for showy ways to challenge Iran, but it is unlikely to do so in the place where it would matter most: Syria.
16. Trump's civilizational conflict will be experienced not by Shiite militias or Sunni terrorists – who will surely welcome it – but by average citizens across the Muslim world.
17. They will see it in the “extreme vetting,” if not an outright ban, they will be subjected to in seeking to enter the United States.
18. And they will feel it in the ramping up of U.S. support for dictators and monarchs who are judged by Trump to be tactical allies in the civilizational war.
19. First among these will be Egypt's Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, who has been lionized by Trump and his aides for supposedly battling jihadists while seeking the “reform” of Islam.
20. In three years of the harshest rule his country has known in at least half a century, Sissi has wrecked the economy and all but destroyed a once-vibrant secular civil society.
21. Yet the increasingly unpopular dictator is quickly emerging as the foremost Trump ally in the region, already invited for the White House visit that Obama denied him.
22. Other autocratic regimes may quietly fall in behind Trump's strategy, despite its anti-Islamic cast.
23. Saudi Arabia and other monarchies will welcome heightened U.S. hostility to Iran as well as to the Muslim Brotherhood; Bahrain, the base for the U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, quickly signaled its obeisance by staging a national day celebration in Trump's new Pennsylvania Avenue hotel.
24. Europeans, too, will follow along. Rightist governments in Hungary and Poland are already cheering Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric; the more moderate of the two leading candidates to become France's next president, François Fillon, authored a book titled “Conquering Islamic Totalitarianism.”
25. Even Germany's Angela Merkel, the most prominent remaining defender of liberal democratic values, felt obliged to strike an anti-Islamic pose last week, proposing a crackdown on the minuscule number of German women who wear a burqa.
26. It's not hard to foresee the consequences of this movement.
27. Muslims who despise jihadists and long to modernize their countries with free markets and democratic institutions will be alienated from their potential Western partners.
28. The Islamic State and al-Qaeda, which all along have promoted the idea of civilizational war with the West, will gain new recruits, both in the Middle East and among Western Muslims.

29. Sissi's regime will eventually crumble from corruption and incompetence, if it avoids a popular rebellion.
30. Bush and Obama tried to transform the Muslim Middle East, or U.S. relations with it, and failed.
31. Trump's aim will be to quarantine and repress the region and its religion.
32. The worst foreseeable outcome is that he will succeed.

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WP-7

December 5, 2016 (Editorial)

1. **A workable Homeland plan for Trump**
2. Donald Trump's most polarizing promises on the campaign trail concerned how he would protect the homeland and treat Muslims inside the United States and abroad.
3. Whether and how those boasts become national policy depends heavily on his choice to lead the Department of Homeland Security.
4. So it's interesting that one leading candidate is going public with detailed - and relatively workable - plans to turn Trump's ideas into reality.
5. The leading contenders for homeland security secretary are House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Tex.), retired Marine Gen. John Kelly and Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach.
6. Kelly would give Trump a military leader who could run the southern border with efficiency.
7. Kobach, who accidentally revealed some of his ideas during a recent visit to Trump Tower, is reliably conservative but has limited experience.
8. McCaul will make his case for the job in his second annual "State of Homeland Security Address" on Dec. 7.
9. It's not a coincidence his speech coincides with the anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
10. Overall, McCaul will agree with Trump on most issues, such as "extreme vetting" of immigrants and refugees, building a border structure with Mexico and deporting criminal illegal immigrants.
11. But McCaul's speech also includes a more nuanced plan for dealing with the most pressing terrorism problem facing the United States: the threat of Islamic radicalization inside the country.
12. He has worked on the issue for years, sometimes at odds with staunch conservatives.

13. McCaul's approach is to strike a balance between cooperating with American Muslim communities and policing them, rather than cutting off government support to Muslim organizations.
14. "The Obama administration's counter-radicalization program has been a failure," McCaul told me. "
15. I would repeal and replace that office with more of a radical Islamist-based threat picture. And the way you do that is through credible voices in the community and testimonials."
16. McCaul wants to narrow counter-radicalization efforts to focus on Islamic extremism first and foremost, work with the private sector to remove terrorist content from the Internet, scale up counter-message propaganda using local Muslim voices and engage with Muslim communities to spot warning signs, as is done extensively in Europe.
17. He also wants to get Silicon Valley to deny bad actors dark spaces to communicate in encrypted apps.
18. What McCaul represents for Trump is a senior lawmaker who is steeped in the issues, has an experienced staff ready to go and has legislation prepared to bring Congress along.
19. What McCaul represents for the country is a voice of moderation for a president-elect who has often gone to extremes when talking about Islam.
20. "The Muslim community will tell you that al-Qaeda and ISIS are radicals who have hijacked their religion so you have to work with these communities to eradicate the bad actors," McCaul told me.
21. During the campaign, McCaul joined with former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani and former attorney general Michael Mukasey to write a memo that was key to Trump's evolution away from calling for a ban on Muslims entering the United States.
22. Instead, Trump shifted to a pause in immigration from countries where the threat is high and vetting insufficient.
23. In his address, McCaul will define "extreme vetting" as increasing visa security by deploying more investigators at diplomatic posts abroad.
24. He will propose further tightening the Visa Waiver Program to hold partner countries accountable for screening on their end.
25. McCaul's proposal on Muslim immigration is to "suspend admissions from major terror-threat countries, like Syria, until we are confident terrorist groups cannot use pathways like our refugee program as a Trojan Horse to send operatives to attack us," according to a preview of his remarks.

26. McCaul supports taking a military approach to securing the southern border and even inserted language into the defense authorization bill that would establish a military-style joint task force to command all government personnel there.
27. "General Kelly would be a good guy to implement that," he told me, suggesting his rival for a sub- Cabinet position.
28. Some of McCaul's proposals are sure to be controversial.
29. He wants to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization and join with Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi in cracking down on its members.
30. McCaul's plans to engage with Muslim communities have run afoul of some conservatives because they involve using government funds to support Muslim groups.
31. Homeland security secretary is not a job for a rigid ideologue or decorated military officer.
32. Management skill, direct subject-matter expertise and a willingness to engage communities of interest constructively are required.
33. McCaul's plans and experience come closest to making Trump's homeland security policies workable in the real world.

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WP-8

January 13, 2017 (News)

1. **Road clears for U.S. crackdown on foreign Muslim group**
2. U.S. lawmakers have introduced a measure calling for the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the oldest Islamist organizations in the Middle East, to be designated a foreign terrorist organization, and for the first time in recent years they are optimistic it will get signed into law.
3. The Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act, introduced this week by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.) in both chambers of Congress, advocates for the designation on the grounds that the Muslim Brotherhood espouses "a violent Islamist ideology with a mission of destroying the West."
4. It marks the fifth straight year that lawmakers have introduced legislation to this effect.
5. Previous administrations - as well as counterterrorism analysts and political scientists who study the Brotherhood - have not viewed the group, which has held elected political offices across the Middle East, as a threat, preferring to engage it diplomatically.

6. President-elect Donald Trump, his supporters say, sees things differently.
7. Trump's nominee for secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, the person who would make such a designation, on Wednesday referred to the Muslim Brotherhood as an adversary during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but he stopped short of calling for a terrorist designation.
8. Tillerson said the incoming administration's top priority in the Middle East must be defeating the Islamic State, which has been implicated in the slayings of thousands of people, but he suggested the Muslim Brotherhood would come next.
9. "The demise of ISIS will also allow us to increase our attention on other agents of radical Islam, like al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood and certain elements within Iran," Tillerson said. ISIS is another name for the Islamic State.
10. If the Trump administration adds the Muslim Brotherhood, it would mark the first time that the U.S. government has pursued the terrorist designation on ideological grounds, analysts say.
11. It is also likely to have a far-reaching impact on American Muslims at a time when Muslim community leaders say the religious minority is facing the worst harassment it has seen since the aftermath of 9/11.
12. Proponents of the measure, including members of Trump's incoming administration, have long used the Muslim Brotherhood label as shorthand for Muslim organizations, politicians and government officials with whom they disagree, and civil rights advocates fear those allegations could be used as pretext to investigate and alienate those who challenge the government's treatment of Muslims.
13. Supporters of the designation have wielded it most frequently against advocacy groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations, which regularly files lawsuits on behalf of Muslims over alleged discrimination, as well as against charities.
14. They have also used it to attack Democratic members of Congress, Muslim government officials, longtime Hillary Clinton aide Huma Abedin and the Gold Star father Khizr Khan, who criticized Trump at the Democratic National Convention in the summer.
15. Baher Azmy, legal director with the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York, said he viewed the move as "part of a two-step process to delegitimize a great swath of American Muslim advocacy organizations."
16. "This is sort of a massive cudgel, if it were passed, that could really be used to question, to target, to harass advocacy organizations," he said.
17. Supporters of the designation have suggested as much.
18. Experts on the Muslim Brotherhood say it poses no threat to the United States - typically one of the criteria for designating a foreign terrorist organization - and

many have also questioned the extent to which it is alleged to participate in violence.

19. Founded in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood is widely viewed as the mother of political Islamist movements.
20. In its modern incarnation, it has sought to implement Islamic law and governance in several Middle East states through participation in democratic elections.
21. But it has also spawned dozens of offshoots, including some extremist groups, such as the Palestinian militant group Hamas and al-Qaeda, which broke from the Muslim Brotherhood long ago.
22. After Egypt's military overthrew the elected Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013, President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi and regional allies, including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, that have also viewed the group as a political challenger designated it a terrorist organization and have urged the United States to do the same.
23. The U.S. bill cites former FBI director Robert Mueller's 2011 testimony before the House Intelligence Committee in which he said: "I can say at the outset that elements of the Muslim Brotherhood both here and overseas have supported terrorism.
24. To the extent that I can provide information, I would be happy to do so in closed session.
25. But it would be difficult to do in open session."
26. Diaz-Balart, who introduced the bill in the House, said that in subsequent closed briefings, he has "seen enough information to warrant a designation."
27. Mueller declined to comment on whether he agrees with that assessment.
28. Michele Dunne, a Middle East and foreign-policy analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that if successful, Cruz's effort would signify "the first time that the United States would declare an organization to be a foreign terrorist organization on ideological grounds.
29. Typically, she said, the designation is reserved for groups that have carried out acts of terrorism against civilians or U.S. citizens. "The Cruz bill certainly doesn't establish that the Brotherhood has done anything like that," she said.
30. Which groups make the terrorist list is not always clear-cut.
31. For example, Hamas and al-Qaeda are both on the list, but the Taliban and the Peace Brigades, both groups that have killed scores of their fellow nationals and U.S. troops, are not listed. (Some of the Taliban's subgroups are listed, as are other Iraqi Shiite militias that are similar to the Peace Brigades, formerly known as the Mahdi Army.)

January 8, 2017 (News)

1. **How the USSR's effort to destroy Islam created a generation of radicals**
2. In 1929, Soviet leader Mikhail Kalinin laid out his vision for Central Asia: "teaching the people of the Kirgiz Steppe, the small Uzbek cotton grower, and the Turkmenian gardener the ideals of the Leningrad worker."
3. It was a tall order, especially when it came to religion.
4. About 90 percent of the population there was Muslim, but atheism was the state religion of the U.S.S.R. So in the early 1920s, the Soviet government effectively banned Islam in Central Asia.
5. Books written in Arabic were burned, and Muslims weren't allowed to hold office.
6. Koranic tribunals and schools were shuttered, and conducting Muslim rituals became almost impossible.
7. In 1912, there were about 26,000 mosques in Central Asia. By 1941, there were 1,000.
8. Rather than stamp out Islam, though, efforts to stifle Islam only radicalized believers.
9. It's a trend that has played out again and again over the past century, and one that could have dire consequences in the war on terrorism.
10. Today, Central Asian Muslims are radicalizing at alarming rates.
11. Thousands have flocked to the Islamic State, and Turkish media reports suggest that the suspect who killed 39 people in an Istanbul nightclub last week was an ethnic Uighur from Kyrgyzstan.
12. In the 1930s, the Soviet move against Islam silenced moderate imams and leaders.
13. But fundamentalist leaders privately began to woo followers.
14. One of the best known was Shami-damulla, an Uzbek with ultraconservative views of Islam. He was jailed in 1932, but he left behind scores of disciples who preached his hard-line beliefs in makeshift mosques and underground schools.
15. When Joseph Stalin relaxed the Soviet Union's stance on official religion in the 1940s, it was this group of spiritual leaders who were poised to take control of the state-run, public governing bodies.
16. They did, and by the 1970s, Islam had made a comeback in much of Central Asia.
17. The holidays of Ramadan and the spring New Year of Nowruz were celebrated publicly.

18. Teahouses doubled as mosques.
19. In the 1980s, fundamentalists were further bolstered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which turned many Central Asians against the USSR, and by the weakening of travel restrictions, which brought a freer flow of information and people from the Middle East.
20. By the time the Soviet Union fell, radical Muslims had built out strong networks, allowing them to take on the fledgling governments of their newly formed countries.
21. In 1991, a group of militants took control of the former Communist Party building in an Uzbek city, demanding the establishment of an explicitly religious state in which sharia law was implemented and children were separated by gender in schools.
22. In 1992, those same militants took local authorities hostage.
23. In another part of the country, then-President Islam Karimov faced down thousands of Islamist demonstrators calling for a more accountable government.
24. Karimov and the region's other leaders quickly decided to crack down.
25. Pious Muslims were a threat to their regimes, and these autocrats used Soviet-style tools to keep the faith under political control.
26. Now, state committees regulate religious expression, censor literature and ban activities and groups that don't conform to their tastes. Muslims in Central Asia can be punished for talking about religion outside of a mosque or carrying an unauthorized Koran.
27. Thousands of Muslims have been tortured and imprisoned in the region for exercising their religious freedom, according to Human Rights Watch.
28. In Kyrgyzstan, preachers' sermons must be vetted before delivery.
29. Uzbekistan has even banned beards, outlawed Islamic dress and shuttered halal restaurants.
30. This oppression has once again pushed mainstream Muslims underground and into the arms of radicals.
31. Today, the International Crisis Group, a conflict-monitoring group, estimates that between 2,000 and 4,000 people in Central Asia have become radicalized.
32. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has partnered with the Taliban and other groups, fought against coalition troops in Afghanistan and carried out attacks in Pakistan.
33. Recently, the police in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, had a public shootout with alleged Islamic State fighters, killing six and wounding seven others.
34. Even government leaders are not immune.

35. Last year, the head of Tajikistan's elite police force defected to the Islamic State.
36. In a video posted to YouTube, he called the government "dogs" - and promised to bring jihad to Russia and the United States.

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WP-10

January 29, 2017 (News)

1. **In one week, Trump broadly recasts the enemy**
2. In just his first week in the White House, President Trump has sought to redefine America's most lethal enemy in terms far broader than his post-9/11 predecessors.
3. The net result of Trump's new approach – outlined in speeches, interviews and executive orders – is a vast departure for a country that has often struggled over the past 15 years to say whether it is at war and precisely who it is fighting.
4. With a few sweeping moves, Trump has answered those questions with a clarity that is refreshing to his supporters and alarming to some U.S. counterterrorism officials as well as most of the Muslim world.
5. For Trump and his senior policy advisers, America is locked in a world war for its very survival, and the enemies in this wide-ranging battle are not only radical Islamist terrorists but also a chaotic, violent and angry Muslim world.
6. "The world is as angry as it gets," Trump said last week from the White House.
7. "Take a look at what's happening with Aleppo.
8. Take a look at what's happening in Mosul.
9. Take a look at what's going on in the Middle East. ... The world is a mess."
10. One day later, in an appearance at the Pentagon and in signing an executive order – "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" – Trump laid out his plan to deal with what he had described as a vast and pressing threat.
11. He closed America's borders to all refugees temporarily and additionally suspended the entry of anyone from Iraq, Syria and five other predominantly Muslim countries.
12. "The optic of this is really awful," said Nada Bakos, a former CIA analyst, of the refugee ban.
13. "What they've done goes too far.
14. All it does is help [Islamic State] recruiting."
15. Trump also vowed new "extreme vetting measures" to permanently keep radical Islamist terrorists out of the United States and promised to give Christians from

the Middle East and other minority religions in the region priority over Muslim refugees.

16. Finally, he promised to pump new money into America's military, what he called "a great rebuilding of the armed services of the United States."
17. Both former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama had defined the enemy in significantly narrower terms while in office, eager to avoid any moves that might make it appear as if the United States was at war with Islam.
18. For Bush, the enemy was al-Qaeda and state sponsors of terrorism to include former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, Iran and the Taliban.
19. Obama insisted that Bush's definition was a recipe for "endless war" and singled out an even smaller group.
20. To him, the enemy was a series of terrorist death cults that he said were perverting the peaceful religion of Islam.
21. The executive order on immigration and refugees was produced at a "frenetic pace" that included none of the interagency reviews that characterized similar orders in the Bush and Obama administrations, a senior U.S. counterterrorism official said.
22. "The process was remarkable," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal deliberations.
23. "Nobody in the counterterrorism community pushed for this. None of us ever asked for it."
24. Trump described the order as a key cog in an effort to prevent terrorists from entering the United States, but the policy does not affect countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Egypt, whose citizens have launched terrorist attacks inside the United States.
25. Not one of the 19 hijackers who struck on 9/11 came from a country targeted by the order.
26. The measure drew negative responses across the world, some of which was heard by U.S. forces on the ground in the Middle East.
27. U.S. commanders advising Iraqi forces reported back that their partners were mystified by the order.
28. "It's already flowing back," said the senior counterterrorism official.
29. "They are asking, 'What do you think of us? Do you see us as the threat?'"
30. Some Iraqi lawmakers proposed banning U.S. troops and civilians from entering Iraq – an action, if followed through, that could lead the authorities in Baghdad to turn to Russia and seek more support from Iran.
31. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted that the ban would be "recorded in history as a great gift to extremists and their supporters."

32. Trump on Saturday described the move as sensible and not aimed at any particular religious group.
33. “It’s not a Muslim ban, but we were totally prepared,” he told reporters in the Oval Office.
34. “It’s working out very nicely, you see it at the airports, you see it all over ... and we’re going to have a very, very strict ban and we’re going to have extreme vetting, which we should have had in this country for many years.”
35. The stark departure from American policy over the past 15 years is a reflection not only of Trump but the somewhat dystopian vision of his closest advisers.
36. “We’re at the very beginning stages of a very brutal and bloody conflict,” said Stephen K. Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist, in a 2014 speech to a Vatican conference.
37. “We are in an outright war against jihadist Islamic fascism and this war is ... metastasizing far quicker than governments can handle it.”
38. Michael Flynn, Trump’s national security adviser, similarly describes the fight against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as a “world war.”
39. “We could lose,” he wrote in his recent book, “The Field of Fight.”
40. “In fact, right now we’re losing.”
41. Those sorts of analyses represent a radical departure from Obama, who believed that the United States had succumbed to a “season of fear” following the 9/11 attacks that produced a disastrous war in Iraq and a betrayal of America’s core values.
42. As commander in chief, he banned torture – a policy Trump has suggested he might revisit – and sought unsuccessfully to close the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
43. “Shameful” was the word that Obama used to describe calls from Trump and other presidential candidates to impose religious tests on refugees or immigrants.
44. Obama was convinced that groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State did not pose an existential threat to the country.
45. Rather, he suggested that the biggest threat came from an overreaction to the attacks that would cause the United States to turn away from the world.
46. His approach stressed America’s fearlessness in the face of attacks.
47. “That’s who the American people are – determined and not to be messed with,” Obama said in describing his counterterrorism strategy in 2013.
48. “Now we need a strategy and a politics that reflects this resilient spirit.”
49. Trump, meanwhile, has chosen a different route.

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January 26, 2017 (News)

1. **Trump order would begin 'extreme vetting' of immigrants, visitors to U.S.**
2. Activist says draft proposal 'is tantamount to a Muslim ban'
3. The Trump administration plans to start vetting would-be immigrants and visitors to the United States based partly on their opinions and ideology, and will immediately cease the resettlement of Syrian refugees in the United States, according to a draft executive order leaked Wednesday to civil rights advocates and obtained by The Washington Post.
4. The order, if enacted, would signal the beginning of the "extreme vetting" that President Trump promised on the campaign trail, as well as partial implementation of the "Muslim ban," according to civil rights advocates.
5. The order calls for an immediate 30-day halt to all immigrant and non-immigrant entry of travellers from certain countries whose citizens "would be detrimental to the interests of the United States."
6. Once signed, it would allow those with visas to be turned away at U.S. airports and other entry points.
7. The countries - designated under several provisions of law that have already singled them out for terrorism links - include Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Libya and Somalia.
8. While all are Muslim-majority countries, the list - and the ban - do not include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and numerous other Muslim-majority countries.
9. Additionally, all refugee admission and resettlement would be halted for 120 days - and until further notice, from Syria - while vetting procedures are reviewed.
10. Once restarted, annual refugee admissions from all countries would be cut from the currently authorized level of 100,000 to 50,000.
11. Asked Wednesday about the draft, White House press secretary Sean Spicer said actions dealing with refugees and other U.S. admissions would be signed later in the week, and "as we get into implementation of that executive order, we will have further details."
12. Trump's "guiding principle," he said, is to prevent entry to "people who are from a country that has a propensity for doing harm."
13. Civil rights and refugee advocates immediately expressed alarm over the policies, and said that the news has thrown groups that handle refugee resettlement and immigrant rights - including U.N. agencies - into disarray.
14. "These actions taken by Donald Trump are tantamount to a Muslim ban," Abed A. Ayoub, the legal and policy director for the American-Arab Anti-

Discrimination Committee, said during a Wednesday conference call with refugee and immigrant advocates and journalists.

15. "Regardless of how they try to frame it ... this is the Muslim ban that was promised by him on the campaign trail."
16. In justifying its actions, the order states that "hundreds of foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes since September 11, 2001."
17. Most terrorist or suspected terrorist attacks since 9/11 have been carried out by U.S. citizens.
18. The 9/11 hijackers hailed primarily from Saudi Arabia, as well as the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Lebanon - all U.S. allies, and none of which would be affected by the immediate ban.
19. Since the emergence of the Islamic State in 2014, federal prosecutors have also charged 106 people in connection with the group, many of them for planning to travel from the United States to Syria or Iraq to join it.
20. It is unclear how many were foreign-born.
21. Along with ending all Syrian refugee resettlement "until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes" have been made to vetting programs, Trump's order directs the secretaries of state and defense to deliver within 90 days a plan to provide "safe areas" inside Syria and "in the surrounding region" where displaced Syrians can await "firm resettlement, such as repatriation or potential third-country resettlement."
22. Waivers to the ban on refugees and overall priority for admission would be given to those claiming religious persecution, "provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality."
23. Some Republican lawmakers have called for special protection for Christians, Yazidis and other religious minorities fleeing the Islamic State, although the vast majority of those killed and persecuted by the militants are Muslims.
24. Additional provisions under the order, entitled "Protecting the Nation from Terrorist Attacks by Foreign Nationals," would require all travellers to the United States to provide biometric data on entry and exit from the country, instead of current entry-only requirements.
25. It would immediately suspend a waiver system under which citizens of certain countries where U.S. visas are required do not have to undergo a face-to-face interview at a U.S. consulate.
26. The entry-exit requirement resembles provisions previously in place under the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), the registry program that targeted mostly Muslim men and which the Department of

Homeland Security ultimately found to be redundant with existing protocol, and ineffective for identifying terrorists.

27. A key question for U.S. courts, if the order is challenged, will be whether the new policies exceed the reasonable boundaries of the president's executive authority on immigration or violate portions of the Constitution, legal experts say.
28. The draft order instructs the U.S. government to screen visa applicants for their ideologies.
29. "In order to protect Americans, we must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward our country and its founding principles," the draft order reads.
30. The order says the United States should screen visa applicants to block access to those "who would place violent religious edicts over American law" and those who "engage in acts of bigotry or hatred" including "honor" killings, violence against women, and persecution on the basis of religion, race, gender and sexual orientation, a description that human rights groups say also appears to be geared toward Muslims, without naming Islam explicitly.
31. Joanne Lim, the senior legislative counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union, said the wording "raises the prospect of ideological tests for admission to the U.S."
32. It could potentially be used to screen out critics of U.S. policy, and could violate Americans' First Amendment right "to hear from speakers that oppose the government's official views."

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WP-12

January 30, 2017 (News)

1. **Officials fear move will set back efforts to fight terrorism**
2. Though cast as measures meant to make the country safe, the Trump administration's moves during its first week in office are more likely to weaken the counterterrorism defenses the United States has erected over the past 16 years, several current and former U.S. officials said.
3. Through inflammatory rhetoric and hastily drawn executive orders, the administration has alienated allies, including Iraq, provided propaganda fodder to terrorist networks that frequently portray U.S. involvement in the Middle East as a religious crusade and endangered critical cooperation from often-hidden U.S. partners - whether the leader of a mosque in an American suburb or the head of a Middle East intelligence service.
4. An executive order - issued Friday and titled "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" - bans entry to people from a list

of Muslim-majority nations including Iraq, where U.S. military and intelligence agencies have for years relied on cooperation from Iraqi and Kurdish authorities, not to mention thousands of individual translators and contractors.

5. "Ultimately, we fear this executive order will become a self-inflicted wound in the fight against terrorism," Republican Sens. Lindsey O. Graham (S.C.) and John McCain (Ariz.) said Sunday in a statement.
6. "This executive order sends a signal, intended or not, that America does not want Muslims coming into our country.
7. That is why we fear this executive order may do more to help terrorist recruitment than improve our security."
8. Already, supporters of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, quickly claimed the travel ban as a victory.
9. Postings on social-media sites linked to the terrorist group predicted that President Trump's order would galvanize Muslims and claimed that it showed that the United States is at war with Islam.
10. The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
11. In tweets Sunday, Trump said, "The joint statement of former presidential candidates John McCain & Lindsey Graham is wrong - they are sadly weak on immigration.
12. The senators should focus their energies on ISIS, illegal immigration and border security instead of always looking to start World War III."
13. Separately, in a statement, Trump said the "seven countries named in the Executive Order are the same countries previously identified by the Obama administration as sources of terror," and he noted that Obama had barred refugees from Iraq for six months in 2011.
14. Trump's inauguration vow to put America first and "only America" rattled allies.
15. A leaked draft of an order on U.S. detention policies compounded those concerns by raising the prospect of rebuilding the CIA's network of notorious "black site" prisons around the world.
16. The immigration measures imposed late Friday were seen by U.S. counterterrorism officials and analysts as particularly counterproductive and poorly conceived.
17. "The whole order is and will be read as another anti-Islam, anti-Muslim action by this president and his administration," said Paul Pillar, a former top official at the CIA's Counterterrorism Center.
18. "It is not targeted at where the threat is, and the anti-Islam message that it sends is more likely to make America less safe."

19. Absent from the Trump list: Saudi Arabia or any of the other countries connected to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
20. Nor does the president's action limit travel from Pakistan, where al-Qaeda's leadership still resides.
21. Former CIA director Michael V. Hayden said that the order and other possible measures have probably forced U.S. diplomats, military commanders and agency station chiefs abroad into damage-control mode.
22. "We've got good people who will work hard at it, but there is no question that this has already created an irretrievable cost," Hayden said.
23. The refugee order "inarguably has made us less safe.
24. It has taken draconian measures against a threat that was hyped.
25. The byproduct is it feeds the Islamic militant narrative and makes it harder for our allies to side with us."
26. Despite acute concerns about the impact overseas, analysts said much of the damage may happen in the United States.
27. Counterterrorism officials have for years cast the successful integration of Muslims in the United States as a major security advantage over countries in Europe, where Muslims are more likely to be isolated and marginalized.
28. Those who study extremism fear that the sense of belonging among U.S. Muslims may begin to fray, increasing the likelihood that a U.S. citizen or resident becomes radicalized, and complicates the already-difficult task for the FBI and local authorities to cultivate relationships with Muslim community leaders.
29. "It was already an uphill climb," said Seamus Hughes, a former National Counterterrorism Center official who frequently travelled the country to meet with Muslim community members after terrorist attacks.
30. Tips to the FBI or local police from concerned parents, religious leaders and concerned Muslim citizens have been "the lifeblood of most terrorism investigations" in the United States, said Hughes, who is now at George Washington University.
31. "I don't see anyone hesitating to report an imminent threat," he said, but adding, "I can't see these orders as helping."
32. But Rep. Devin Nunes (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said in a statement, "In light of attempts by Islamic militant groups to infiltrate fighters into refugee flows to the West, along with Europe's tragic experience coping with this problem, the Trump Administration's executive order on refugees is a common-sense security measure to prevent terror attacks on the homeland."

33. In terms of overseas partnerships, no relationship has been placed under more immediate strain than that of the United States and Iraq.
34. Trump used his speech at CIA headquarters on his first day in office to declare that it was a mistake for the United States not to have seized Iraq's oil reserves after the U.S. invasion in 2003, and to hint that there might be another chance to do so.
35. The executive order sparked confusion and condemnation in Baghdad.
36. Iraqis who had worked with the U.S. military for years, often at great risk, were among the first people affected by the regulations.
37. Even before the new measures were issued, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi told reporters that his country's oil "is for Iraqis."
38. The comment also explicitly confirmed widely held suspicions in the Middle East of U.S. geopolitical motivations.
39. "It's about oil and it's a plot to destroy Islam," said Dan Byman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University.
40. "If you want to combine conspiracy theories, [Trump] is doing a good job."
41. Iraqi lawmakers over the weekend insisted that Iraq impose similar measures on the United States.
42. Moqtada al-Sadr, an influential Shiite cleric, called the decision to block Iraqi entry while Americans still come and go "arrogance," and he demanded that U.S. nationals leave the country.
43. Iraqis also have questioned the omission from the travel ban of certain Gulf and North Africa countries, whose nationals have been involved in high-profile terrorist attacks
44. Saad al-Hadithi, a spokesman for Abadi, said that the U.S. security partnership with Iraq, including American support for operations against the Islamic State and a robust arms sales program, should make the relationship with Iraq different from other countries on the list.
45. The new measures take place as the Pentagon continues to rely closely on Iraq in its campaign to defeat the Islamic State.
46. More than 6,000 U.S. troops are stationed in the country, advising Iraqi forces during a major battle in Mosul, the militant-held northern city.
47. The decision undermines Abadi, straddled between a Western ally whose support he needs to fight militants and Shiite political peers who view the U.S. presence with hostility.
48. Lukman Faily, who served as the Iraqi ambassador in Washington until last year, said that Abadi would try to draw a distinction between Iraq's security

partnership with the United States and the perceived snub contained in Trump's new order

49. "It will certainly put the prime minister in the most awkward position," Faily said.
50. "It will not help him navigate his politics while he's completing [a major battle] and while he has an oil crisis to deal with."
51. Hadithi sought to stress the temporary nature of the order.
52. "We will have a discussion with the American side," Hadithi said.
53. "If it's only for a short time to reorganize their visa and refugees work, we will understand it and take it positively."
54. It's not yet clear, however, whether the 90-day period stipulated in the executive order will be extended.

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WP-13

January 29, 2017 (News)

1. **Trump suspends refugee entry, vows priority for Christians Trump approves tougher vetting, vows priority for Christians**
2. President Trump said Friday that Christians will be given priority to come to the United States as refugees and later signed an order to suspend the admission of refugees for 120 days and increase the vetting of potential refugees from predominantly Muslim nations to screen out "radical Islamic terrorists."
3. "We don't want them here," Trump said in a signing ceremony at the Pentagon. "We only want to admit those into our country who will support our country and love deeply our people."
4. In an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network earlier Friday, Trump was asked whether he would prioritize persecuted Christians in the Middle East for admission as refugees, and he replied, "Yes."
5. "They've been horribly treated," he said.
6. "Do you know if you were a Christian in Syria it was impossible, at least very tough, to get into the United States?"
7. If you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian it was almost impossible.
8. And the reason that was so unfair - everybody was persecuted, in all fairness - but they were chopping off the heads of everybody, but more so the Christians.
9. And I thought it was very, very unfair.
10. "So we are going to help them."

11. A Pew Research Center study found that overall Christians and Muslims were admitted as refugees in about equal numbers in 2016, and far more Christians have been admitted since 2002.
12. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war and the rise of the Islamic State, many more Muslims than Christians have been killed or displaced because of the violence.
13. A 2015 Washington Post poll found that 78 percent of Americans favored equal consideration for refugees regardless of religion.
14. The order was called "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States" and contained a temporary entry ban that would affect citizens of seven countries
15. The order calls for a halt to the flow of refugees from Syria until further notice and suspends all refugee admissions for 120 days until more analysis can determine which countries harbor the greatest threat.
16. The annual intake of refugees for fiscal 2017 would also fall to 50,000 from more than 100,000 authorized now, according to the order.
17. The downsizing of the refugee program, which had grown under the Obama administration, fulfills Trump's campaign pledge to start the "extreme vetting" of immigrants and refugees, even though the United States already conducts the most rigorous and drawn-out screening process in the world.
18. Syrians are subject to special attention because the Islamic State controls significant amounts of territory in their country.
19. An estimated 11 million Syrians have fled their homes since the outbreak of fighting in 2011, with almost 5 million registered as refugees and more than 6 million internally displaced.
20. U.S. vetting has changed significantly since the refugee program was suspended for several months after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
21. After applicants register with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, that agency refers some of the most vulnerable to the United States.
22. They include single mothers and their children, victims of violence and people with severe medical conditions requiring sophisticated treatment.
23. Last year, the UNHCR referred more than 34,000 applicants, up from 16,000 in 2015 and 10,000 the year before that.
24. Syrians being considered for resettlement in the United States pass through a complex, multitiered background investigation.
25. It involves biometric and database screening, personal interviews to look for inconsistencies in their stories, and security screenings by the National

Counterterrorism Center, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the State Department.

26. The process typically takes nine months to two years to complete.
27. In the fiscal year that ended in October, the United States admitted 12,500 Syrian refugees.
28. An additional 3,500 were admitted for resettlement in the last three months of 2016.
29. The overwhelming majority were women and children.
30. Now, with Trump's executive order, the flow grinds to an immediate halt.
31. People who have sold their belongings in preparation for an imminent departure may not be allowed to board their flights to the United States.
32. It was not immediately clear what would happen to those refugees already in the air when the order was signed.
33. Some refugees were finding their appointments with DHS officials cancelled even before the order, said Linda Hartke, head of the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service.
34. Unaccompanied refugee minors living in camps, helped by the group, now cannot fly to the United States to live with foster families, she said.
35. Refugee advocates slammed the order as cruel, while proponents of tighter immigration controls said it would protect Americans from radical Islamists who might try to sneak into the United States as refugees and launch an attack.
36. "The ban on refugees will severely cripple the U.S. refugee program, leaving thousands who face life-threatening danger without humanitarian protection," said Greg Chen, director of advocacy for the American Immigration Lawyers Association.
37. "This policy does not make us safer.
38. It shows weakness and withdraws our nation from the position as global leader when so many refugees urgently need protection."
39. The International Rescue Committee called suspending refugee resettlement a "harmful and hasty" decision that would affect thousands of innocent people - mostly women and children - awaiting resettlement to the United States.
40. "America has the strongest, most successful resettlement program in the world," said David Miliband, head of the IRC.
41. "Certified by successive administrations, the U.S. resettlement program makes it harder to get to the United States as a refugee than any other route."
42. But skeptics of current vetting procedures question how effective they can be for refugees from a war-torn country such as Syria.

43. "If we're looking for the perfect way to deal with this, I'm not sure it exists," said Ira Mehlman, a spokesman for the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR).
44. "What we need to do is, the best we can, balancing the competing obligations of protecting people in imminent peril and the safety of the American people."
45. The UNHCR has warned for several years that the world is undergoing a refugee and migration crisis of epic proportions, comparable only to the period after World War II.
46. Some analysts caution that the decision to suspend refugee admissions to a country that defines itself as a nation of immigrants could lead other governments to follow suit and undermine U.S. credibility.
47. "If you want ironclad guarantees, you'd have to stop all immigration, business travelers and students," said David Martin, who worked on immigration and refugee policy at the State Department and DHS.
48. "If you're going to say you're not going to admit anybody to the United States, that's surrendering a key part of our heritage and blinding ourselves to genuine human suffering."

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WP-14

February 19, 2017 (News)

1. **'It's a spiritual battle of good and evil'**
2. AUSTIN - Roy White wants to inform as many Americans as possible about the terrorists he sees in their midst.
3. The lean, 62-year-old Air Force veteran strode into the Texas State Capitol in late January wearing a charcoal-gray pinstripe suit and an American flag tie, with the mission of warning all 181 lawmakers about a Muslim group sponsoring a gathering of Texas Muslims at the Capitol the following day.
4. Although the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) works to promote Muslim civil rights across America, White wanted to convince lawmakers that it is actually working to infiltrate the U.S. government and destroy American society from within.
5. "They're jihadists wearing suits," White said of CAIR and other Muslim organizations.
6. "That's a tough thing for us to wrap our heads around because we don't feel threatened."
7. White is the San Antonio chapter president of ACT for America, an organization that brands itself as "the nation's largest grass-roots national security advocacy organization" and attacks what it sees as the creeping threat of sharia, or Islamic

law, in the form of Muslim organizations, mosques, refugees and sympathetic politicians.

8. The group has found allies among a coterie of anti-Muslim organizations, speakers and Christian fundamentalists, as well as with some state lawmakers.
9. Bill Zedler, a Texas Republican state representative, said during a recent forum supported by ACT that he fears political correctness is masking the real problem: "Regardless of whether it's al-Qaeda, or CAIR, or the Islamic State, they just have different methodology for the destruction of Western civilization."
10. ACT, which has been a vocal advocate for President Trump and his administration, says it now has "a direct line" to the president and an ability to influence the direction of the nation.
11. "We are on the verge of playing the most pivotal role in reversing the significant damage that has been done to our nation's security and well-being over the past eight years," ACT's founder, Brigitte Gabriel, wrote in a December solicitation for donations.
12. Stephen K. Bannon, the former executive chairman of Breitbart who has described Muslim American groups as "cultural jihadists" bent on destroying American society, is Trump's chief strategist. Breitbart has published several articles Gabriel has written.
13. Trump's CIA director, Mike Pompeo, has spoken at ACT's conferences and sponsored an ACT meeting at the Capitol last year.
14. Retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, who sits on ACT's board of advisers, served as the president's national security adviser before stepping down after revelations that he might have violated the law in communications with a Russian diplomat.
15. In the first days of his presidency, Trump signed an executive order temporarily banning travellers from seven majority-Muslim countries - and all refugees - from entering the United States, an order that has been put on hold as it faces court challenges.
16. Ahmed Bedier, former executive director of CAIR's Tampa chapter, said that ACT distorts Islam and works to present it as a belief that doesn't deserve religious protection in the United States.
17. "These guys are the fringe of the fringe, and now they have people on the inside of the most powerful government in the world," said Bedier, who has frequently sparred publicly with ACT.
18. "They're fascists. They don't want any presence of Muslims in America. And the only Muslim that is acceptable to them is a former Muslim."
19. ACT, based in Virginia Beach, has nearly 17,500 volunteers and 17 staff members, according to tax records. Gabriel says ACT has 500,000 "relentless

grass-roots warriors," such as White, who are "ready to do whatever it takes to achieve our goal of a safer America."

20. A safer America, to ACT, means a nation free of all Islamic influence, a goal that has led some civil rights activists to call it a hate group akin to white supremacists.
21. It wants groups that practice or advocate sharia - the guiding principles of Islam - to be forced to disband, supports President Trump's attempt to ban travellers from several Muslim-majority countries, and opposes the resettlement of Muslim refugees in the United States.
22. It supports preserving the Constitution and its concept of American culture, which ACT says on its website means "recognizing that we are the greatest nation on Earth and that if you are an American you must be an American first."
23. Since it began its work a decade ago, ACT claims 22 legislative victories in Republican-controlled statehouses, many of them laws that stiffen criminal penalties for terrorism, keep Islamic or foreign influence out of U.S. courts, or aim to protect free speech.
24. ACT also led a successful campaign to get "errors" removed from Texas school textbooks, including what leaders consider pro-Islamic, anti-Christian, anti-Western statements.
25. In recent weeks, ACT has lobbied on behalf of Trump's travel ban.
26. On Wednesday, it circulated a message to its followers claiming that Flynn's fall was the work of "rogue weasels" and "shadow warriors" within the U.S. government trying to destroy Trump.
27. ACT's leadership acknowledges that it gets a bad rap. The Southern Poverty Law Center and other civil rights watchdogs label it an extremist group that demonizes Muslims.
28. ACT argues that the perception comes from ignorance or because the media, Democrats and Muslims hide the truth in a bid to destroy the country.
29. In a recent message to members, the group said that Islamophobia is a "deceptive narrative," that the mainstream media propagates "fake news" and that refugee advocates are "fanatics."
30. ACT has urged supporters to lobby their lawmakers to support Trump's executive order banning citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States, a policy that legal experts say amounts to a "Muslim ban" and that an appeals court unanimously kept on hold this month amid arguments that it violates the Constitution.
31. "First of all, there is no 'Muslim ban,' contrary to what the fake news media would have you believe," Gabriel wrote last week in an article for Breitbart, claiming that the countries subject to the order are "terrorist-infested."

32. "It isn't President Trump's fault all seven of those countries happen to be almost entirely Islamic."
33. Gabriel did not respond to requests for comment.
34. White, a commercial airline pilot, said the group has faced an uphill battle.
35. "I've had family members who - I've talked like this for the last four years - at first thought I was the crazy, loony uncle because they had never heard any of this stuff, because 'it's a conspiracy,'" White said as he took a break from handing out pamphlets at the Texas statehouse in Austin.
36. But, White said, he's not a conspiracy theorist, and he's not chasing UFOs: His conviction is grounded in facts and in spiritual conviction.
37. "It's a spiritual battle of good and evil, and a lot of folks on the left have a difficult time thinking that there is actually good and evil," he said.
38. White, a devout Christian, says that sharia - the guiding laws and principles of Islam - is the embodiment of that evil; that the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Islamic movement that is a force in Middle Eastern politics, is working to spread sharia throughout America; and that CAIR, the Islamic Society of North America, the majority of American mosques, and a host of other Muslim leaders and organizations are outgrowths of the Brotherhood on U.S. soil.
39. The Trump administration has been considering adding the Brotherhood to its list of designated foreign terrorist organizations; ACT considers that a top priority.
40. White hopes that Trump's travel ban will prevail and that other Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, will be added.
41. He wants mosques and American Muslim groups to denounce sharia or be disbanded, and he wants the government to bar people who associate with those groups from public office.
42. "We are going to arrest those people who promote sedition," he said.
43. That would mean any "sharia-compliant Muslim," he added.
44. Islamic scholars, Middle East experts and Muslim religious leaders say that ACT's interpretation of Islam is wrong.
45. Sharia is not a coded rule book but a vast body of religious and legal texts, subject to a range of interpretations and practice, much of which is not taken literally.
46. "Sharia as a legal system doesn't exist," said Sahar Aziz, a law professor at Texas A&M University, noting that a Muslim who claims to follow sharia is similar to a Christian saying he lives his life "in accordance with Jesus Christ."
47. ACT's critics argue that going after sharia is a subtle way to more broadly attack Muslims.

48. They also say it's dangerous.
49. The night before White visited the Capitol in Austin, a gunman who expressed support for nationalist and right-wing causes killed six people and wounded 19 others in an attack on a Quebec City mosque.
50. The day before, a fire destroyed a mosque that had previously been burglarized and vandalized in Victoria, Tex.
51. White says some people come to his meetings "who are a little bit off the mark, get a little too fired up.
52. " He turns them away, but he vows to continue pushing.
53. "I'm never going to stop telling the truth for fear of the consequences of telling the truth to people."

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WP-15

February 11, 2017 (News)

1. **Why do so many Americans believe that Islam is a political ideology, not a religion?**
2. For many Americans, President Trump's executive order on immigration was a clear case of religious discrimination since it directly targets Muslim-majority countries and gives preferential treatment to non-Muslim refugees from those countries.
3. The implication seems to be that, in keeping with Trump's campaign promises, the United States will sort people at the border based on faith.
4. For other Americans, the executive order might not seem to be a case of religious discrimination - not because the policy doesn't differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims, but because they are skeptical that Islam is actually a religion.
5. Google Islam, religion and politics, and it's easy to find websites such as PoliticalIslam.com, which claims to use "statistical methods" to prove that "Islam is far more of a political system than a religion."
6. The argument travels outside the Internet fringe of conspiracy theories.
7. "When we discuss 'Islam,' it should be assumed that we are talking about both a religion and a political-social ideology," former assistant U.S. attorney Andrew C. McCarthy wrote in the National Review in 2015.
8. "Islam is not even a religion; it is a political system that uses a deity to advance its agenda of global conquest," said John Bennett, a Republican lawmaker in the Oklahoma state legislature, in 2014.
9. A thoughtful, educated evangelical pastor recently told me that he thinks "religious liberty just needs to be protected for all belief systems, but there also

needs to be clarity as to if Islam is fully a religion, or if it's really a political movement disguised as a religion."

10. The idea has adherents at the highest levels of power.
11. "Islam is a political ideology" that "hides behind the notion of it being a religion," national security adviser Michael Flynn told an ACT for America conference in Dallas last summer.
12. The growing popularity of this idea speaks to a profound disconnect in American conversations about faith - and it offers a way that many self-proclaimed advocates of religious liberty might defend discriminatory policies against Muslims.
13. It is difficult to think of a definition of religion that does not include Islam - an ancient tradition with practitioners who believe in one God, pray and try to live their lives in accordance with a scripture.
14. So why has this particular canard taken off?
15. Wajahat Ali, a writer, lawyer and the lead author of "Fear, Inc.," a report on American Islamophobia, traces the idea's recent surge to anti-Islam activists David Yerushalmi and Frank Gaffney.
16. In 2010, Gaffney's Center for Security Policy published a report, "Shariah: The Threat to America," arguing that Muslim religious law, or sharia, was actually a dangerous political ideology that a cabal of Muslims hoped to impose on the United States.
17. "Though it certainly has spiritual elements, it would be a mistake to think of shariah as a 'religious' code in the Western sense," the report argued.
18. It also suggested banning "immigration of those who adhere to shariah ... as was previously done with adherents to the seditious ideology of communism."
19. "They misdefine sharia in a way which is not recognizable to any practicing Muslim," Ali said.
20. But the idea was influential.
21. By the summer of 2011, more than two dozen states were considering anti-sharia legislation.
22. More recently, Gaffney reportedly advised Trump's transition team.
23. For many Americans, confusion about religious law, political ideology and sharia may reflect a distinctly Christian - and especially Protestant - way of thinking about the nature of religion.
24. "It's hard to talk about this sometimes because there is no equivalent of sharia in the Christian tradition," said Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of "Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping the World."

25. "Even when you're talking to well-intentioned, well-meaning people who really want to understand, explaining sharia is very challenging because there's nothing in Christianity that's quite like it."
26. This kind of wide-ranging religious legal code may be unfamiliar to many Christians, but it's not unique to Islam.
27. There are strong similarities between sharia and Jewish law, or halakhah, which descends from legalistic sections of the Bible that both Jews and Christians consider scripture. Both words derive from roots meaning "path" or "way."
28. Judaism has also been accused of being as much a political program as a religion.
29. The "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," an influential anti-Semitic forgery, falsely depicts Jews describing Judaism as "the one and only religious and political truth."
30. Both sharia and halakhah include laws for communal as well as personal life.
31. These traditions do not necessarily draw sharp legal distinctions between religious and other kinds of spaces.
32. Certainly, some Muslims may believe that faith touches all parts of their lives, including their political involvement.
33. But the same could be said of devout members of almost any religious tradition.
34. The entanglement of faith and politics is not unique to Islam.
35. Consider the televangelist Pat Robertson, who ran for president in 1988 because, he believed, God wanted him to do so.
36. After he lost, Robertson wrote about his hope for "one of America's major political parties taking on a profoundly Christian outlook in its platforms and party structure."
37. Nevertheless, Robertson told viewers in 2007 that "
38. the idea of Islam as a political ideology fits well with our particular political moment.
39. Since the fall of communism, some Western intellectuals, most notably the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, have argued that the next great global struggle will be between Western civilization and Islamic civilization.
40. "The ideology that is against the U.S. or the American values used to be communism, and now it's Islam.
41. And it cannot be Islam as a religion.
42. It has to be Islam as a political ideology," said Jocelyne Cesari, a professor at the University of Birmingham in Britain and author of "Why the West Fears Islam," paraphrasing those arguments.

43. Increasingly, there seems to be a disconnect between those who understand the national conversation about Islam in terms of religious rights and the protection of religious minorities, and those who see it as a conversation about large-scale ideological battle.
44. As Cesari points out, thinking about Islam in those terms allows people to reconcile a commitment to First Amendment rights with a sense of Islam as an existential political enemy.
45. The stakes could be high.
46. "Once you look at Islam as a political ideology, especially one that is threatening, you can ignore or neglect all kinds of civil procedures or protection of religious freedoms that go with the status of being religious in this country."
47. Michael Schulson is a freelance journalist in Durham, N.C.

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WP-16

June 11, 2017 (News)

1. **Anti-Muslim activists fan out in U.S.**
2. rallies spur counter protests, scuffles
3. March Against Sharia underlines nation's divisions
4. NEW YORK - Anti-Muslim activists hoisted American flags and delivered fiery speeches in rallies across the country Saturday, facing off against crowds of counter-demonstrators in several cities and exposing the visceral rage that has come to define America's political extremes.
5. ACT for America, a lobbyist organization with close ties to the Trump administration, organized nationwide marches to oppose Islamic law, which the group says is a threat to U.S. society.
6. The turnout was relatively small, with rally crowds of a few dozen in many cities outnumbered almost 10 to 1 by counter-demonstrators who tried to drown out their voices with drums, bullhorns and cowbells.
7. ACT, which has drawn condemnation from civil rights groups for its frequent criticism of Islam and its efforts to pass state-level bills targeting Islamic law and refugees, organized the protests as a nationwide March Against Sharia and a defense of human rights.
8. "We're here protecting their rights, and they're trying to shut us down!"
9. Pax Hart, the organizer of the New York City rally, told his audience, referring to the gathering of hundreds of leftist activists across the street.
10. "It's insane!"

11. ACT for America, which the Southern Poverty Law Center recognizes as a hate group, was founded in 2007.
12. Its leaders, who claim a 500,000-strong membership nationally, have labeled Islam a "cancer," propagated theories of a secret plot by Muslims, Democrats, communists and the media to destroy the country from within, and sponsored lectures on how to monitor and oppose U.S. mosques.
13. The group's founder, Brigitte Gabriel, has said that she is anti-sharia, not anti-Muslim, a point that a number of the group's speakers repeated Saturday.
14. But Gabriel also has said that all practicing Muslims adhere to sharia, and speakers on Saturday made sweeping statements about Islam as an enemy of the state.
15. "We understand what Islam is, and we say 'no,' " Pawl Bazile, a member of the right-wing Proud Boys group, told a cheering crowd of a few dozen people in downtown Manhattan.
16. "You're in the land of Budweiser and bikinis, for God's sake."
17. Anyone who does not like it can move to Saudi Arabia or Syria, he said.
18. At least two white supremacist groups also joined the rallies.
19. In New York, a dozen members of Identity Evropa, which seeks a whites-only state, came to support the ACT rally, wearing tucked-in dress shirts, sunglasses and slicked-down side-parts.
20. In Harrisburg, Pa., a group that has claimed credit for white nationalist posters on college campuses, said they wanted Muslims out of the United States entirely.
21. "I don't believe in having Muslims in the United States," said Francisco Rivera, a spokesman for Vanguard America.
22. "Their culture is incompatible with ours."
23. Protesters on both sides blamed each other for the divisions on display Saturday, as anger surged through the crowds.
24. In New York, the cacophony from counter-demonstrators made it nearly impossible for them to hear their opponents' speeches.
25. But many seemed to have already made up their minds.
26. "They're Nazis," said Krish Bhatt, a Barnard College student who held a sign identifying herself as a trans Muslim.
27. Organized in part to memorialize the anniversary of the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, the multi-city demonstrations aimed to raise awareness of what ACT sees as the negative effects of Muslim immigration to the United States.
28. The rallies were laden with many false and exaggerated claims.

29. "There's rampant rape happening because of Syrian immigrants, and we have to stop that from coming to America," said Joseph Weidknecht, a 25-year-old construction worker who attended a march in Austin.
30. In Harrisburg, Steven R. Moore, 35, said he joined the march because the Islamic State extremist group is trying to impose sharia in America.
31. Islamic scholars describe sharia, or Islamic law, as a set of guidelines for Muslim life, including finances, daily rituals, marriage and divorce.
32. Sharia has a range of interpretations and practices, but certain guidelines for extreme types of criminal punishment, such as beheadings, tend to be cited by ACT as evidence of Islam's extremism.
33. Muslim leaders have countered that such extreme practices are similar to those endorsed in traditional readings of the Bible and Jewish law, and that few U.S. Muslims support such ideas.
34. In rallies in San Bernardino, Calif., New York and Seattle, columns of police moved in multiple times to separate rival protest groups as they shouted expletives at each other.
35. In New York, masked anarchists tried on multiple occasions to get past the police cordon into ACT for America's rally, prompting one arrest, as ACT's speakers blasted the counterprotest as violent "idiots," "liars" and "Marxists," from a stage adorned with the American flag.
36. ACT protesters in San Bernardino yelled profanities as they rushed a group of counterprotesters shortly before fists began to fly.
37. That rally had a few hundred supporters in a city affected by a 2015 terrorist attack that left 14 dead.
38. In Seattle, police arrested two people and used pepper spray to end a scuffle between opposing sides.
39. Roughly 200 counter-demonstrators marched toward Seattle City Hall, where they significantly outnumbered those gathered for the anti-sharia law rally.
40. Several homeless people, many of whom live in the neighborhood where the rally was held, cheered as the demonstrators marched by chanting, "Muslims are welcome here, no hate, no fear" and "When Muslim rights are under attack, what do we do?"
41. Stand up, fight back."
42. Lisa Jaffe, 52, who carried a sign saying "loving my Muslim neighbor since 1964," said she participated in the counter-demonstration because the growing lack of tolerance has no place in her America.
43. In front of the capitol building in Harrisburg, anti-fascist protesters - wearing all black and balaclavas - played drums and cowbells, chanting "no hate, no Nazis."

44. " Separated by a police barricade, the anti-sharia protesters, some of whom carried handguns, sang "America the Beautiful."
45. "This is a march against sharia, not Muslims," said Moore, of Washington County, Pa., who works in the oil and gas industry.
46. "We are not affiliated with any extremist groups. . . . Sharia is a barbaric system that the Islamic State is trying to impose in our country."
47. Timmy Wylie, a spokesman for East Shore Antifa, said the group showed up to shut down the anti-sharia march because they say it is a march against Muslims.
48. He grew up in the Harrisburg area and said citizens should instead focus on the region's struggling economy.
49. "There's a lot of people without two nickels to scrape together, but we still take care of each other," he said before the march.

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WP-17

December 7, 2016 (News)

1. **Merkel urges ban on Islamic 'full veil'**
2. Surprise move comes as German leader prepares for next year's election
3. BERLIN - German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who last year opened the door to nearly 1 million mostly Muslim migrants, staked out a tough new stance on conservative Islam on Tuesday by making her first direct call for a widespread ban on "full veil" religious coverings.
4. Her backing could add Germany to the growing list of European nations imposing restrictions on Islamic coverings as debates sharpen across the continent over religious tolerance, perceived threats to European identity and possible attacks by Islamist militants.
5. It also could signal a pragmatic shift to the right for Merkel, who is seeking a fourth term as Germany's leader.
6. In the wake of Britain's vote to leave the European Union and the U.S. election of Donald Trump, the tolerant Merkel became seen as among the last guardians of liberal democracy in the West.
7. But her handling of the migrant crisis - which damaged her approval ratings and caused internal party dissent - is now seen as a critical weakness ahead of next year's elections.
8. Her comments also came as German social media buzzed following the arrests of two asylum seekers in five days in connection with three sexual assaults, including the brutal rape and murder of a 19-year old medical student in the picturesque southern city of Freiburg.

9. Right-wing politicians are openly blaming Merkel's policy for what they decry as a migrant-fuelled crime wave.
10. Yet Merkel on Tuesday issued a reminder that she still can play the conservative card.
11. Speaking to a cheering conference of her center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), she used her strongest language yet to back a ban on certain Islamic coverings first proposed by conservatives in her party.
12. Some are calling for a law making it a regulatory offense for women to cover their faces in courtrooms, administrative buildings and schools, as well as while driving or attending demonstrations.
13. "The full veil is not appropriate here," Merkel said.
14. "It should be banned wherever it's legally possible."
15. Political message
16. Women in Germany's Muslim community of 4.7 million who actually wear a full burqa - or a loose veil that covers the entire body, often including mesh over the eyes - are exceedingly rare.
17. Some experts suggest there may be only a few hundred at most.
18. But bans on such garments are being increasingly seen as a powerful political message.
19. Merkel has previously called full Muslim veils a hindrance to migrant assimilation.
20. But her words at the party conference - reaffirming her as the CDU candidate and leader - seemed aimed at appeasing critics who have charged her with recklessly opening the door last year to hundreds of thousands fleeing war.
21. She also repeated her worries about the alleged spread of Islamic sharia law in some migrant communities.
22. "We don't want any parallel societies," she said.
23. "Our law takes precedence before tribal rules, codes of honor and sharia."
24. Other nations in Europe have imposed bans on Islamic coverings.
25. But Germany - saddled with the dark past of World War II - had shied away from doing so, citing the need to uphold religious freedoms.
26. Muslim groups said they were caught off guard by Merkel's call.
27. "I think this is election campaigning," said Burhan Kesici, chairman of the Islamic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany.
28. "It's a populist statement.
29. I was surprised ... especially since she hasn't said this with such clarity before."

30. He said that physical attacks against Muslim women with headscarves have increased and that he feared heightened rhetoric could worsen the trend.
31. The wording for the law planned in Germany probably would mirror the moves in neighboring France, not referring specifically to conservative Muslims but clearly aimed at them.
32. Yet strong differences remain within Merkel's party about how far such a proposed law should go.
33. Officials at various German ministries are already drafting language that would make it an offense for civil servants to wear garments that "make open communication more difficult or impossible."
34. The law also would impose fines on women who refuse to take off covering veils to allow law enforcement officials to compare their faces with photo IDs.
35. But some are calling for an even broader ban before the bill is submitted to Parliament in coming weeks.
36. "We are still fighting over the question of what is legally possible," CDU lawmaker Jens Spahn told broadcaster Deutschlandfunk.
37. "And I would actually like to ban it everywhere.
38. I don't want to see the full veil - no niqab, no burqa - in public life in Germany."
39. 'Live together'
40. Since the height of the crisis last year, Merkel has taken steps to stem the tide of migrants, including negotiating a deal with Turkey this year to block more from crossing into Europe.
41. On Tuesday, she reiterated that she would attempt to thwart any new wave of asylum seekers, many of them seeking to reach the West from war-ravaged places such as Syria and Iraq.
42. "A situation like the one in the late summer of 2015 cannot, should not and must not be repeated," she said.
43. "That was and is our, and my, declared political aim."
44. Merkel's call to ban coverings echoes laws in France and other European nations to put restrictions on full-face coverings such as the burqa or other Islamic traditional garb for women such as the niqab, which shows only the eyes.
45. This summer, roughly 30 French towns banned the "burkini," a swimsuit designed to allow Muslim women to enjoy the beach while observing traditional codes of modesty.
46. Manuel Valls, now a Socialist Party candidate for the French presidency, called the burkini a "provocation" and an insult to France's strict interpretation of secularism.

47. French courts have since overruled several such bans.
48. But Muslims often say that these restrictions - carried out in the name of secularism - are hypocritical, targeting one particular group

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WP-18

December 2, 2016 (News)

1. **Trump selects Mattis for defense chief**
2. General needs congressional exception to take post
3. President-elect Donald Trump said Thursday he has chosen retired Marine Gen. James N. Mattis, who has said that responding to "political Islam" is the major security issue facing the United States, to be secretary of defense.
4. "We are going to appoint Mad Dog Mattis as our secretary of defense," Trump told a rally in Cincinnati, the first stop on a post-election "thank-you tour."
5. Trump joked that the media and audience should keep the news to themselves.
6. "We are going to be announcing him Monday of next week," Trump said. "Keep it inside the room."
7. Mattis, who retired as chief of U.S. Central Command in 2013, has often said that Washington lacks an overall strategy in the Middle East, opting to instead handle issues in an ineffective one-by-one manner.
8. "Is political Islam in the best interest of the United States?"
9. Mattis said at the Heritage Foundation in 2015, speaking about the separate challenges of the Islamic State and Iranian-backed terrorism.
10. "I suggest the answer is no, but we need to have the discussion.
11. If we won't even ask the question, how do we even recognize which is our side in a fight?"
12. To take the job, Mattis will need Congress to pass legislation to bypass a federal law stating that defense secretaries must not have been on active duty in the previous seven years.
13. Congress has granted a similar exemption just once, when Gen. George C. Marshall was appointed to the job in 1950.
14. Earlier Thursday, Jason Miller, a spokesman with the Trump transition team, tweeted that no decision had been made, but Trump's son Donald Jr. retweeted a report saying that Mattis got the job.
15. Mattis, 66, served more than four decades in the Marine Corps and is known as one of the most influential military leaders of his generation, a strategic thinker who occasionally drew rebukes for his aggressive talk.

16. Since retiring, he has served as a consultant and as a visiting fellow with the Hoover Institution, a think tank at Stanford University.
17. Like Trump, Mattis favors a tougher stance against U.S. adversaries abroad, especially Iran.
18. The general, speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in April, said that while security discussions often focus on terrorist groups such as the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, the Iranian regime is "the single most enduring threat to stability and peace in the Middle East."
19. Mattis said the next president "is going to inherit a mess" and argued that the nuclear deal signed by the Obama administration last year may slow Iran's ambitions to get a nuclear weapon but will not stop them.
20. But he added that "absent a clear and present violation," he did not see a way that Washington could go back on it, because any unilateral sanctions issued by the United States would not be as valuable if allies were not on board.
21. "In terms of strengthening America's global standing among European and Middle Eastern nations alike, the sense is that America has become somewhat irrelevant in the Middle East, and we certainly have the least influence in 40 years," Mattis said.
22. But Mattis may break with Trump's practice of calling out allies for not doing enough to build stability.
23. Mattis served from November 2007 to August 2010 as the supreme allied commander of transformation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, focused on improving the military effectiveness of allies.
24. Trump called NATO "obsolete" earlier this year before saying later that he was "all for NATO" but wanted all members to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, a NATO goal.
25. "The president-elect is smart to think about putting someone as respected as Jim Mattis in this role," said a former senior Pentagon official.
26. "He's a warrior, scholar and straight shooter - literally and figuratively.
27. He speaks truth to everyone and would certainly speak truth to this new commander in chief."
28. But the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss Trump's personnel choices, said: "If there's any concern at all, it's the principle of civilian control over the military.
29. This role was never intended to be a kind of Joint Chiefs of Staff on steroids, and that's the biggest single risk tied to Mattis.

30. For Mattis, the biggest risk for him personally is that he will have a national security adviser in the form of Mike Flynn whose management style and extreme views may arch Mattis's eyebrows and cause conflict over time.
31. It's no fun to be secretary of defense if you have to constantly feud with the White House."
32. Mattis, whose nicknames include "Mad Dog" and the "Warrior Monk," has had a leading hand in some of the U.S. military's most significant operations in the past 20 years.
33. As a one-star general, he led an amphibious task force of Marines that carried out a November 2001 raid in helicopters on Afghanistan's Kandahar province, giving the Pentagon a new foothold against the Taliban after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
34. Using the call sign "Chaos," he commanded a division of Marines during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and returned there the following year to lead Marines in bloody street fighting in the city of Fallujah.
35. Mattis continued to rise through the ranks and establish his credentials as a military thinker, co-authoring the U.S. military's new counterinsurgency manual with then-Army Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus while Mattis was a three-star general at Quantico, Va.
36. He was considered a leading contender to become commandant of the Marine Corps in 2010 but was bypassed in favor of Gen. James F. Amos.
37. Instead, Mattis replaced Petraeus as the chief of Central Command, overseeing U.S. military operations across the Middle East.
38. Even though Central Command did not encompass Israel, Mattis made a concerted effort to reach out to his Israeli military counterparts, according to Steven Simon, who worked with Mattis when he served on Obama's National Security Council.
39. Simon, who now teaches at Amherst College, said Mattis made frequent stops in Israel during trips to the region, part of an effort to encourage the Jewish state and its Arab neighbors to work together to counter Iranian influence.
40. "They respected Mattis because they saw him as a straight shooter and a good listener," Simon said of the Israelis and Arabs.
41. The general retired from that position in 2013, about five months earlier than expected, prompting speculation that he was forced out after clashing with some in the Obama administration on Iran policy. U.S. officials denied that was the case at the time, and Mattis declined to comment.
42. Mattis occasionally has come under scrutiny for impolitic remarks.

43. Most notably, he said in 2005 during a panel discussion in San Diego that "it's fun to shoot some people" and "I like brawling," drawing criticism from the Marine commandant at the time, Gen. Michael Hagee.
44. But Hagee also later backed Mattis, saying the general often spoke with candor to reflect the horrors of war.
45. Other supporters noted that he often stressed to his troops that it was important to treat civilians in a combat zone with care.
46. It is unclear whether the legislation required to make Mattis the Pentagon chief will be difficult to obtain from Congress.
47. A 1947 national security law said that a general must wait 10 years from leaving active duty before becoming defense secretary.
48. An exception was granted on a one-time basis for Marshall, with lawmakers saying in special legislation at the time that it was the "sense of the Congress that after General Marshall leaves the office of Secretary of Defense, no additional appointments of military men to that office shall be approved."
49. The 10-year period was reduced to seven years in 2008 for several senior civilian defense positions, including defense secretary.
50. Congress could follow the model set by Marshall's nomination to similarly waive restrictions for Mattis, and leaders may try to vote on legislation paving the way for Mattis's nomination early next year, before Trump formally takes office.
51. In years past, Senate committees have also held confirmation hearings for Cabinet secretaries before incoming presidents deliver their formal nominations following inauguration.
52. Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), a member of the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on personnel, said Thursday night that she will oppose Mattis becoming Pentagon chief.
53. "While I deeply respect General Mattis's service, I will oppose a waiver," she said.
54. "Civilian control of our military is a fundamental principle of American democracy, and I will not vote for an exception to this rule."
55. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that he looks forward to beginning the confirmation process "as soon as possible" in the new year.
56. "General Mattis has a clear understanding of the many challenges facing the Department of Defense, the U.S. military, and our national security," McCain said.
57. "America will be fortunate to have General Mattis in its service once again."

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February 10, 2017 (Editorial)

1. **U.S. Muslims' defense: The Constitution**
2. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian is an editor on leave from Foreign Policy magazine.
3. Two weeks ago, Sarah Cochran awoke to an inbox full of panicked emails.
4. The night before, Reuters had reported that President Trump would soon sign an executive order blocking visas for citizens of seven Muslim- majority countries in the Middle East and Africa.
5. The move, an expression of the "Muslim ban" that Trump touted during his campaign, marooned Muslims legally working or studying in the United States and threatens to divide families who have relatives in their home countries.
6. Cochran is director of the Virginia chapter of Emerge USA, an organization founded in 2006 to help Muslims get involved in local politics across five states.
7. It's one of many organizations that American Muslims created in the aftermath of 9/11 to protect and advocate for their embattled community.
8. That very morning, she was already set to travel to Richmond to meet with state lawmakers to communicate the concerns of Muslim Virginians.
9. If Trump keeps his campaign promises - and so far there's every indication he will - the country may see a return to the excesses of the Bush era that saw American Muslims profiled, surveilled, harassed and marginalized.
10. Trump's administration is more openly anti-Muslim than any in history.
11. Trump himself has stated that "Islam hates us"; his national security adviser, Michael Flynn, has called Islamism a "vicious cancer inside the body of 1.7 billion people"; his chief strategist, Stephen K. Bannon, once operated Breitbart, an alt-right news site known for anti-Muslim rhetoric.
12. Sixteen years ago, many American Muslims didn't know where to turn for help.
13. There was no Emerge USA for them to email.
14. They had almost no political, social or cultural capital.
15. Now they are far better prepared.
16. That's because American Muslims have learned to arm themselves, not with weapons but with the freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution.
17. In the crucible of American society after 2001, Muslims have fully embraced the democratic ideals, expansive religious freedom and rich civil society that truly make America great.
18. On the eve of 9/11, there were no Muslims in U.S. Congress.

19. There were no Muslim-focused think tanks, few well-known Muslim journalists or comedians, and only a handful of national organizations to represent them.
20. Most Muslims lived quiet lives, studied and worked hard, and provided for their families; they didn't understand how American political organizing worked.
21. When 9/11 came, the community paid a heavy price.
22. As Muslims and Muslim charities were targeted in terrorism investigations, they had to scramble to mount a legal defense.
23. Mosques often had no idea how to respond to media requests.
24. As a result, those labeling Islam a religion of violence spoke far louder than Muslims themselves, and hate crimes against Muslims spiked - according to FBI data, there were 481 incidents in 2001 alone.
25. In September 2002, a special registration system was quietly implemented to track many Muslim and Arab immigrants from more than 20 Muslim-majority countries.
26. It lasted until 2011.
27. Most Americans didn't know this "Muslim registry" existed, because Muslims at the time didn't have the means to mobilize or publicize the issue.
28. But 16 years later, Muslim society in the United States has undergone a stunning transformation.
29. There are now two Muslim members in the U.S. House of Representatives, Keith Ellison (D-Minn.) and André Carson (D-Ind.).
30. There are Muslim staffers on Capitol Hill and numerous Muslim elected officials at the state and local levels.
31. There are dozens of new Muslim nonprofits aimed at community outreach, political engagement, interfaith ties, research and legal aid.
32. Emerge USA, where Cochran works, is just one of many, such as the Muslim Legal Fund of America, the Constitutional Law Center for Muslims in America, the Alliance for an Indivisible America 2020, WORDE, the Muslim-Jewish Advisory Council, the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding in Michigan, Ta'leef Collective in California, the Texas Muslim Women's Foundation and many others.
33. After 2001, the nation's premier Muslim civil rights advocacy organization, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), vastly expanded its footprint and now operates 30 offices nationwide.
34. Mosques in Northern Virginia have banded together to take advantage of their proximity to the nation's lawmakers.
35. "In the past, the results that the community thought were a win were having a representative showing up at your mosque or having a meeting with them," said

Colin Christopher, deputy director of government affairs at Dar Al-Hijrah in Fairfax County.

36. "We hope to usher in a new style of policy engagement.
37. It involves holding our officials publicly accountable.
38. When they make promises and they don't keep *them*, we will call *them* out."
39. As pop-culture-savvy Muslims raised in the West have reached adulthood, they have beefed up their social presence as well.
40. Aziz Ansari and Aasif Mandvi, formerly of "The Daily Show," have satirized anti-Muslim bigotry for an audience of millions.
41. Columnists such as Wajahat Ali for the New York Times and Haroon Moghul for CNN offer commentary whenever Islam makes headlines.
42. The increased visibility has paid off, as many Americans have come to know and embrace their Muslim neighbors.
43. In contrast to the 2002 registry, implemented with hardly a peep, Trump's executive order on visas and refugees sparked a massive backlash.
44. On Feb. 3, a federal judge in Seattle issued a temporary restraining order blocking the travel ban nationwide.
45. The Department of Homeland Security has reverted to pre-ban immigration policies for now.
46. But there's another threat on the horizon.
47. Lawmakers have introduced a measure that calls for the Muslim Brotherhood, a loosely organized multinational Islamist party, to be designated as a terrorist organization.
48. Such a designation could be used to launch investigations into a swath of influential Muslim organizations, charities and individuals that, even if later found to be without merit, could cripple Islamic civil society in the United States.
49. As one speaker at CAIR's annual banquet in December remarked, "A nightmare that we have been fighting in this country for the past 15 years is now in the White House. "
50. Muslims may have to harness every bit of influence at their command to protect themselves from what may be an unprecedented challenge.

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April 30, 2017 (News)

1. **Pope preaches tolerance in an unsteady Egypt**
2. CAIRO - Pope Francis urged Muslim leaders Friday to reject extremist violence in God's name and preach messages of tolerance, delivering a powerful call for action at a time when Islamist militants are persecuting Christians across the region.
3. He arrived on his two-day visit, intended to show solidarity with embattled Christians as well as improve ties with Muslim leaders, amid acute fear and uncertainty among Egypt's minority Christian community.
4. Since December, Islamic State militants have bombed churches, staged assassinations and driven hundreds of Christian families from their homes.
5. Less than three weeks ago, suicide bombings at two churches in the cities of Alexandria and Tanta killed more than 40 people and injured scores during Palm Sunday services.
6. "We have an obligation to denounce violations of human dignity and human rights, to expose attempts to justify every form of hatred in the name of religion, and to condemn these attempts as idolatrous caricatures of God," Francis told a gathering of religious leaders at a peace conference hosted by the grand imam of al-Azhar, Egypt's highest Islamic authority.
7. "Let us say once more a firm and clear 'no!' to every form of violence, vengeance and hatred carried out in the name of religion or in the name of God."
8. Only the second pope to visit Egypt, the most populous nation in the Arab world, the 80-year-old pontiff arrived on Friday afternoon amid heavy security concerns.
9. In both church attacks this month, the suicide bombers managed to penetrate sites that were guarded by security forces.
10. Security was visibly tight Friday. Police officers and soldiers in armored personnel carriers secured streets and sites the pope was to visit, including the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral and the Vatican Embassy.
11. Police in riverboats patrolled the Nile around the island of Zamalek, where the embassy is housed.
12. Nevertheless, Francis declined to ride in an armored car, preferring instead a blue Fiat car with its windows down.
13. But security forces prevented crowds from gathering to see the pontiff as he drove through the streets of Cairo.
14. Christians make up about 10 percent of Egypt's population of 95 million.

15. The vast majority are Orthodox Coptic Christians; Catholics make up less than 1 percent of the community's population.
16. After being greeted at Cairo's international airport by religious and political leaders, Francis traveled to the presidential palace in the upscale neighborhood of Heliopolis to meet with President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi.
17. In a speech in front of Sissi and diplomats, Francis expressed support for Egypt's efforts to suppress the Islamic State's Egyptian affiliate, based in the northern Sinai Peninsula.
18. The country today has an important regional role to play in "vanquishing all violence and terrorism," he said. Sissi's effort to tackle religious extremism, the pontiff said, "merits attention and appreciation."
19. Sissi, in turn, told the pontiff that Egypt was "determined to defeat" terrorism and "to hold onto our unity and not let it divide us."
20. Bringing security to Egypt is a key promise of Sissi, but the recent assaults on Christians have posed serious challenges to his abilities to fulfil it.
21. Most Christians backed Sissi's rise to power, as well as his brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, a moderate Islamist party.
22. In 2013, Sissi led a military coup that ousted elected Islamist President Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood supporters from office.
23. Since then, attacks on Christians have risen dramatically, especially in rural areas, according to data compiled by activists.
24. The violence added to Christians' sense of feeling under siege, even as they coexist with Muslims.
25. For decades, Christians have faced discrimination by successive governments that have restricted them from freely practicing their beliefs.
26. But the community now faces greater harm from the Islamic State, which in February declared that killing Christians was a focus of its campaign to destabilize Egypt.
27. In December, the group asserted responsibility for a bombing at the Coptic Cathedral complex, killing more than two dozen worshipers, most of them women and children.
28. On Friday, Francis visited the now heavily guarded site in part to pray for those who died.
29. In February, hundreds of Christians fled the Sinai Peninsula following assassinations by Islamic State militants.
30. After this month's church bombings, Sissi declared a state of emergency.

31. Yet last week, the Islamic State attacked security forces near St. Catherine's Monastery, one of the world's oldest, killing a police officer and injuring three others.
32. The central focus of the pope's visit Friday was the peace conference and meeting his host, Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, the grand imam of al-Azhar, a 1,000-year-old mosque and university revered by Sunni Muslims.
33. Before a crowd of Muslim and other religious leaders, scholars and students, Francis said a serious commitment was needed to educate youth and prevent them from being enticed by religious extremists.
34. In his address, Tayeb praised Francis for disassociating terrorism from Islam. "Islam is not a religion of terrorism because a minority from among its followers hijacked some of its texts," he said.

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WP-21

May 25, 2017 Thursday (News)

1. **Acquaintances of suspected bomber saw signs of trouble**
2. MANCHESTER, England - Salman Abedi's acquaintances were stunned to learn that he was the man believed to have carried out a suicide bombing at a concert hall this week, killing 22 people.
3. But there were signs that he was troubled - and he was not the only one in his family who caused concern, friends and officials said Wednesday.
4. Salman's 20-year-old brother Hashem was arrested in Libya late Tuesday night, according to officials there, who said the young man told authorities that he had been involved in planning the attack on the concert hall in Manchester.
5. British and other European security officials said they did not believe that Salman Abedi, 22, would have been able to build the explosive device used in Manchester by himself, and they worry that a professional bombmaker may still be at large.
6. In the Libyan-British community in southern Manchester where Salman Abedi lived, he was known as a university dropout and loner, acquaintances said.
7. Abedi was born in Britain to parents who had fled Libya during the four-decade dictatorship of Moammar Gaddafi, and moved back to their homeland several years ago, after the Libyan leader was killed.
8. Residents described Abedi as an "awkward" young man and an "isolated, dark figure" who talked to few people and travelled back and forth between Britain and Libya.

9. Abedi's father, Ramadan, asked two of his sons to move from Britain to Libya several weeks ago, said a friend of the family who last spoke to the father on Tuesday.
10. "The father said he was afraid that something would go wrong if they stayed in Britain," said the friend, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.
11. The friend did not describe the nature of the father's concerns.
12. But the friend said Salman and his brother Hashem had changed after another youth - an 18-year-old Manchester resident also of Libyan descent - was killed in the northern British city a year ago.
13. That teenager, Abdulwahab Hafidah, was stabbed in the neck in what local media reports called retaliation for his having gone into rival gang territory.
14. "It became a big source of anger for the youngsters in the Libyan community.
15. Salman and Hashem saw it as an act of anti-Muslim hate crime; they called him a martyr," the family friend said.
16. Hashem Abedi appeared to have known Hafidah.
17. Members of the Libyan immigrant community reported to local authorities more than a year ago that they feared Salman Abedi was turning increasingly radical, two friends of the family said.
18. British security authorities have acknowledged that they were aware of Abedi but said that he was not considered a major terrorism risk.
19. Ramadan Abedi told the Associated Press early Wednesday that he believed his son was innocent.
20. "Last time I spoke to him, he sounded normal," the father said in a telephone interview from Libya.
21. Still, Abedi and his wife took away their son's passport upon his arrival recently in Libya, where both brothers were supposed to celebrate the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, Libyan authorities said, citing testimony by Hashem Abedi.
22. The young men's mother returned the travel document about one week ago when Salman told his parents he wanted to travel to Saudi Arabia to prepare a pilgrimage to Mecca, according to one family friend and a Libyan official.
23. "But he was lying," said Ahmed Dagdoug, a spokesman for the Libyan counterterrorism Reda Force, which is aligned with the Libyan government that is recognized by the United Nations.
24. Instead of going to Saudi Arabia, Abedi flew back to Britain, where he is suspected of carrying out the worst terrorist attack on British soil since the London bombings in 2005.

25. Authorities worry that Abedi might be part of a network of terrorists, many of whom may remain at large.
26. "Abedi appears not intelligent enough to have built this bomb himself.
27. That's why there are concerns that a bombmaker is still out there," said a European security official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence matters.
28. Investigators are also still trying to determine whether Abedi received support from family members.
29. Libyan authorities arrested Hashem Abedi, alleging that he was aware in advance of the Manchester bombing plot and was also planning an attack in Tripoli.
30. His father, who had been working for the Libyan police force in recent years, according to an official, was also detained on Wednesday, although it was not clear on what grounds.
31. "Hashem helped Salman prepare for the attack," Dagdoug said.
32. "He had the same ideology as his brother."
33. Dagdoug said he didn't know precisely how Hashem assisted his brother.
34. But Hashem told interrogators that "we knew what we were doing," Libyan officials said.
35. Salman Abedi appeared to leave few traces of his life on social media, but there are indications that his younger brother may have been attracted to extremism.
36. In 2014, Hashem joked on Facebook about joining a militant group, commenting on the photo of a young British jihadist who had left for the war in Syria: "Inshallah [God willing] we go together."
37. The younger brother's Facebook profile revealed other signs that he had an interest in the Islamic State, which has asserted responsibility for the Manchester attack.
38. Although British authorities asked members of Salman Abedi's southern Manchester community not to speak to the media, people who knew the family said on Wednesday that Abedi cared for his parents.
39. "He really liked them," said Mohammad Fadi, 25, standing in front of the mosque where the family had worshiped.
40. Salman Abedi was born in Manchester in 1994.
41. His father sometimes led the call to prayer at the local mosque, the Manchester Islamic Center, and his older brother, Ismail, sometimes volunteered there.
42. Ismail has also been taken into custody since the attack.

43. When the parents moved back to Libya a few years ago, their sons stayed behind in Manchester.
44. Salman Abedi studied briefly at Salford University, in Manchester, but wound up dropping out.
45. "Salman was rarely seen there by other students," said community member Fadi.
46. At the mosque that the Abedi family attended, no one spoke in favor of the attack.
47. "This act of cowardice has no place in our religion," said Fawzi Haffar, a trustee at the center.

**Appendix-2: News stories and opinion articles from The Independent (ID)
analyzed for referential and predication strategies**

ID-1

May 25, 2017 (News)

1. **It is pious and inaccurate to say Abedi's actions had 'nothing to do with Islam'**
2. In the wake of the massacre in Manchester, people rightly warn against blaming the entire Muslim community in Britain and the world.
3. Certainly one of the aims of those who carry out such atrocities is to provoke the communal punishment of all Muslims, thereby alienating a portion of them who will then become open to recruitment by Isis and al-Qaeda clones.
4. This approach of not blaming Muslims in general but targeting "radicalized" or simply "evil" may appear sensible and moderate, but in practice it makes the motivation of the killers in Manchester or the Bataclan theatre in Paris in 2015 appear vaguer and less identifiable than it really is.
5. Such generalities have the unfortunate effect of preventing people pointing an accusing finger at the variant of Islam which certainly is responsible for preparing the soil for the beliefs and actions likely to have inspired the suicide bomber Salman Abedi.
6. The ultimate inspiration for such people is Wahhabism, the puritanical, fanatical and regressive type of Islam dominant in Saudi Arabia, whose ideology is close to that of al-Qaeda and Isis.
7. This is an exclusive creed, intolerant of all who disagree with it such as secular liberals, members of other Muslim communities such as the Shia or women resisting their chattel-like status.
8. What has been termed Salafi jihadism, the core beliefs of Isis and al-Qaeda, developed out of Wahhabism.
9. Adherents to this form of jihadism carry out its prejudices to what they see as a logical and violent conclusion.
10. Shia and Yazidis were not just heretics in the eyes of this movement, which was a sort of Islamic Khmer Rouge, but sub-humans who should be massacred or enslaved.
11. Any woman who transgressed against repressive social mores should be savagely punished.
12. Faith should be demonstrated by a public death of the believer, slaughtering the unbelievers, be they the 86 Shia children being evacuated by bus from their

homes in Syria on 15 April or the butchery of young fans at a pop concert in Manchester on Monday night.

13. The real causes of “261adicalized261261261” have long been known, but the government, the BBC and others seldom if ever refer to it because they do not want to offend the Saudis or be accused of anti-Islamic bias.
14. It is much easier to say, piously but quite inaccurately, that Isis and al-Qaeda and their murderous foot soldiers “have nothing to do with Islam”.
15. This has been the track record of US and UK governments since 9/11.
16. They will look in any direction except Saudi Arabia when seeking the causes of terrorism.
17. President Trump has been justly denounced and derided in the US for last Sunday accusing Iran and, in effect, the Shia community of responsibility for the wave of terrorism that has engulfed the region when it ultimately emanates from one small but immensely influential Sunni sect.
18. One of the great cultural changes in the world over the last 50 years is the way in which Wahhabism, once an isolated splinter group, has become an increasingly dominant influence over mainstream Sunni Islam, thanks to Saudi financial support.
19. A further sign of the Salafi-jihadi impact is the choice of targets: the attacks on the Bataclan theatre in Paris in 2015, a gay night club in Florida in 2016 and the Manchester Arena this week have one thing in common.
20. They were all frequented by young people enjoying entertainment and a lifestyle which made them an Isis or al-Qaeda target.
21. But these are also events where the mixing of men and women or the very presence of gay people is denounced by puritan Wahhabis and Salafi jihadis alike.
22. They both live in a cultural environment in which the 261adicalized261 of such people and activities is the norm, though their response may differ.
23. The culpability of Western governments for terrorist attacks on their own citizens is glaring but is seldom even referred to.
24. Leaders want to have a political and commercial alliance with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf oil states.
25. They have never held them to account for supporting a repressive and sectarian ideology which is likely to have inspired Salman Abedi.
26. Details of his motivation may be lacking, but the target of his attack and the method of his death is classic al-Qaeda and Isis in its mode of operating.
27. The reason these two demonic 261adicalized261261 were able to survive and expand despite the billions – perhaps trillions – of dollars spent on “the war on

terror” after 9/11 is that those responsible for stopping them deliberately missed the target and have gone on doing so.

28. After 9/11, President Bush portrayed Iraq not Saudi Arabia as the enemy; in a re-run of history President Trump is ludicrously accusing Iran of being the source of most terrorism in the Middle East.
29. This is the real 9/11 conspiracy, beloved of crackpots worldwide, but there is nothing secret about the deliberate blindness of British and American governments to the source of the beliefs that has inspired the massacres of which Manchester is only the latest – and certainly not the last – horrible example.

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ID-2

November 9, 2016 (news)

1. **Alleged Isis supporters arrested in Germany**
2. A group of suspected Isis supporters accused of radicalizing 262 people and sending them to fight in Syria have been arrested in Germany.
3. The German federal prosecutor’s office said the five men were part of a “national Salafist-jihadi network” suspected of supporting Isis.
4. The group’s alleged leader is a preacher known as Abu Walaa, who is the head of a group promoting an “authentic understanding of Islam” through online speeches, videos and texts.
5. “Ahmad Abdulaziz Abdullah A, known as Abu Walaa, openly professes his support for the so-called Islamic State [Isis] and has appeared at numerous Salafist events in the past,” a spokesperson for federal prosecutors said.
6. “The aim of the network he headed was to send people to join Isis in Syria.”
7. Officials said two of the arrested men, Hasan C, a 50-year-old Turkish citizen, and Boban S, a Serbian-German national aged 36, were tasked with teaching followers and would-be militants Arabic and radical Islam.
8. “The classes served to create the ideological and linguistic foundations for future activity with Isis, particularly for taking part in combat,” prosecutors said.
9. Abu Walaa allegedly approved and radicalized the journeys to Syria, delegating the work to fellow suspects Mahmoud O, a 27-year-old German, and Ahmed FY, a 26-year-old Cameroonian national.
10. The network is known to have transported at least one man and his family to fight for Isis in Syria.
11. Abu Walaa preaches at the German-speaking Islamic Circle of Hildesheim mosque in the city of Hildesheim, where he was arrested yesterday as police

launched coordinated raids in the states of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia.

12. The mosque was previously raided by counter-terror police in July, but no arrests were made.
13. Abu Walaa is known for his online sermons and is also prominent on Facebook, with more than 25,000 followers on a page offering his religious teachings.
14. His official Facebook page contains tacit references to jihadi violence.
15. “The Arabs fight us with their religion and they call it terrorism,” says one post, with an altered picture of Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and other American politicians.
16. Another includes photos of air strikes in Syria and Iraq saying the preacher’s “heart bleeds”, while one orders Muslim couples not to argue while the “nation” needs their help.
17. The post says: “The Ummah [nation] is bleeding and crying out for help, and Muslims are fighting about whether the socks have been washed or not.”
18. None of Abu Walaa’s pages, websites or videos had been taken down at time of writing.
19. Germany’s justice minister, Heiko Maas, called the arrests “an important blow to the extremist scene in Germany”.
20. Thomas de Maiziere, the country’s interior minister, said it was critical to prevent people from becoming “so radicalized that they are in danger of becoming terrorists”.
21. He added: “We don’t want terrorism to take place in Germany. We don’t want terrorism to be exported from Germany.”
22. Ralf Jaeger, the state interior minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, said the group was preying on vulnerable targets for recruitment in a pattern frequently seen in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.
23. “He’s young, male, he’s experienced failure, and has the problem of not feeling accepted by society and feeling excluded,” Mr Jaeger said.
24. The prosecutor’s office said the suspects had no known links to Jaber al-Bakr, a suspected Isis supporter who killed himself in prison in October two days after being arrested on suspicion of plotting to attack a Berlin airport with homemade explosives.
25. A court in Frankfurt also sentenced a 30-year-old German man to eight years in prison for war crimes and membership of Isis yesterday.
26. The court said the man, identified only as Abdelkarim E, fought for Isis in Syria in 2013 and 2014.

January 1, 2017 (Comment)

1. **This man's account of being locked up with Islamists in Egypt demands to be heard**
2. To interview a jihadi is one thing, to live among jihadis quite another.
3. To share their prison cells and their jail trucks on the way to a dictatorship's trials is both a journalist's dream and a journalist's nightmare.
4. Which makes Mohamed Fahmy a unique figure: in a prison bus, he hears his fellow inmates rejoicing at the beheading of a captured journalist in Syria.
5. "They won't let us out," a voice shouts at Fahmy in Egypt's ghastly Tora prison complex.
6. "We haven't seen the sun for weeks."
7. And he hears the rhythmic voices of prisoners reciting the Koran.
8. Fahmy, who is an Egyptian with Canadian citizenship, is the Al Jazeera English TV reporter who spent almost two years in his native country's ferocious prison system, as a guest of President al-Sisi, locked up with two colleagues for being a pro-Muslim Brotherhood "terrorist", fabricating news and endangering the "security" of the state.
9. The charges were lies and the trials that followed were a mockery of justice.
10. And when Fahmy was eventually released to travel to Canada, he took with him an extraordinary account of life among those dedicated to the West's destruction.
11. I should say at once that Fahmy is an old friend of mine, and his story is not as straightforward as it may seem
12. He and his wife-to-be first welcomed al-Sisi's military coup, which overthrew the elected Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi, and Fahmy uses the word "terrorist" quite often - rather too much in my opinion - and when I last spoke to him this week, he was back in Cairo, preparing for a New Year holiday in the resort of Sharm el-Sheikh.
13. But in the fastness of Canada, he has written *The Marriott Cell: An Epic Journey from Cairo's Scorpion Prison to Freedom* - a frightening account of his years of imprisonment, which should be a footnote in future history books on the jihadi struggle in the Middle East. (Why it has not been picked up in Britain or the US is a publisher's mystery.)
14. For Fahmy found himself both appalled by the self-righteousness of his fellow prisoners, but trusted and admired by them, because he too had fallen foul of the same cruel dictatorship.
15. You can understand how this affects him. The Koranic recitations echo through Tora Prison's verminous "Scorpion" section, and as Fahmy mumbles "half-

remembered verses, my rational, Western educated mind rises up in protest - it is, after all, a group of incarcerated Islamists with whom I pray.

16. I feel self-conscious. Silly almost... But a few of the prayers I learned as a young boy return and wash over me, drawing me along in their tide."
17. On arrival in his cell, an army of mosquitos descending upon him, Fahmy discovers that he is imprisoned with men whom he was interviewing only a few months earlier as members of the Morsi government: Essam al-Haddad, Morsi's executive aid who had met President Obama; Khaled al-Qazza, Morsi's foreign affairs adviser.
18. But there are others.
19. "I am Sheikh Murgan Salem al-Gohary," a voice calls to Fahmy down the corridor.
20. "I am a Salafist jihadist who fought alongside brother Sheikh Osama [sic] bin Laden against the Soviet and the American devils in Afghanistan, I have been married three times and I have many children.
21. I don't allow any of them to visit me to avoid humiliating them... This is all a play, a political performance by these pigs... Stick to the Koran."
22. Murgan was a member of Islamic Jihad in Palestine with strong ties to the Taliban, twice sentenced to death by ex-President Hosni Mubarak.
23. On an Egyptian television talk show, he had called for the destruction of the pyramids of Giza and the Sphinx - a true follower of the Buddha-smashing Taliban and the antiquity-exploding Isis.
24. Fahmy notes that Murgan is known as "an angry and murderous radical". Fahmy is appalled.
25. "What a nut! Now I am living with him and he is giving me advice, too."
26. Much to Fahmy's distress, a number of other prisoners shout their support, praising Al Jazeera which had, at the time - to Fahmy's horror, because his own reports were subtitled and used without his knowledge on the same channel - been carrying pro-Brotherhood material on its live Egypt network broadcasting out of Cairo.
27. "You journalists have been sent here to see the truth," a man shouted.
28. "There is a reason why God led you here!"
29. And then Fahmy discovers that some of his fellow Islamist prisoners had been filming for the Al Jazeera live channel.
30. No wonder he was in his cell.
31. The "Scorpion" unit of the prison is a "concrete tomb".

32. When Fahmy is taken for further interrogation, he finds himself in a police truck amid the Cairo traffic, and his companions whoop with delight when the driver's radio tells of three policemen killed at a checkpoint.
33. And they begin to sing: "Brandishing our guns along with our explosive belts... we will cut off the head of the snake."
34. Fahmy's neighbour, to whom he is handcuffed, is puzzled.
35. "Brother, why aren't you singing?"
36. Fahmy manages to reply calmly: "I make jihad with my pen."
37. The man, Ammar - a boxer and bomb-maker, he admits - has just returned from Syria to make "jihad in Egypt against al-Sisi and his illegitimate regime".
38. Fahmy meets Mohamed al-Zawahiri, brother of Ayman, the man appointed al-Qaeda's leader after the assassination of bin Laden.
39. "We are not bloodthirsty merciless killers," he assures Fahmy.
40. "We merely defend ourselves... demand our rights of establishing a governance based on Islamic sharia."
41. When Fahmy asks whether his connections in Sinai, where Islamists have been attacking police and troops along the Egyptian-Gaza border, might have led to his imprisonment, a man beside al-Zawahiri shouts: "What Sinai!"
42. Those are legitimate resistance fighters. Whose side are you on?"
43. Whose side, indeed?
44. In August 2014, Isis released a video of the beheading of American journalist James Foley.
45. In another prison truck, the radio news is greeted with a cheer from Fahmy's fellow prisoners.
46. Isis promises to kill another reporter, Steven Sotloff, if the US continued to bomb their positions in Iraq.
47. Fahmy was a friend of Sotloff.
48. "He must be a spy," the prisoner handcuffed to Fahmy spits out.
49. "Why would an American put himself in such danger otherwise?"
50. Fahmy knows why: risking one's life to get the story, "to show the suffering, to try to make a difference, to stop the madness".
51. He listens, aghast, as another man says that "he's just one American.
52. What about the thousands of innocent Iraqis killed by the US?"
53. Then it is Sotloff's turn.
54. Fahmy sees the next video.

55. "Steven, head and beard shaved, wears an orange jumpsuit... His small glasses, the round curves of his warm face, and the kind smile... are nowhere to be seen... He has the fortitude to hold himself upright.... I pray that his mind and heart were calm..."
56. Fahmy is enraged "that this hideous man who killed Steven and I are being labelled with the same name: terrorist."
57. But as Fahmy's freedom draws near, he can barely contain his emotion at the thought of leaving his fellow prisoners - even though he will soon fly to Canada, marry his young Egyptian fiancée, take up a journalism professorship and then return as a correspondent to the Middle East.
58. He shakes hands with a man under sentence of death.
59. "For the past six months, these men, some of them jihadists who call death and destruction down on the world for an inhumane ideology, have generously shared their food and meagre possessions."
60. Fahmy remains convinced that the torture and prison regimes of the Middle East are universities for future jihadis.
61. He also fears for the future of his own profession.
62. He quotes Adel Iskandar, a Canadian professor of Egyptian origin, on Al Jazeera's coverage of Egypt during the military coup.
63. "Al Jazeera picked a side in the conflict and ran with it," he told Fahmy, "and when the station was unable to deliver coverage from the ground, they relied on footage and reports produced by Islamist opposition groups and armed militia factions.
64. This technique became their modus operandi in Syria where the stakes and the costs are extremely high - particularly to journalists."
65. Now what, I wonder, does that remind us of?

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ID-4

January 29, 2017 (Comment)

1. **Trump's arbitrary ban on Muslim refugees sets a cruel and chilling precedent**
2. So Donald Trump is going to fuck them all.
3. No excuses for such filthy words today.
4. I'm only quoting the man whose Pentagon offices he just used to disgrace himself - and America.
5. For it was Secretary of Defence James "Mad Dog" Mattis who told Iraqis in 2003 that he came "in peace" - he even urged his Marines to be compassionate -

but said of those who might dare to resist America's illegal invasion of their country: "If you fuck with me, I'll kill you all."

6. There's no getting round it.
7. Call it Nazi, Fascist, racist, vicious, illiberal, immoral, cruel.
8. More dangerously, what Trump has done is a wicked precedent.
9. If you can stop them coming, you can chuck them out.
10. If you can demand "extreme vetting" of Muslims from seven countries, you can also demand a "values test" for those Muslims who have already made it to the USA.
11. Those on visas.
12. Those with residency only.
13. Those - if they are American citizens - with dual citizenship.
14. Or full US citizens of Muslim origin.
15. Or just Americans who are Muslims.
16. Or Hispanics.
17. Or Jews?
18. Refugees one day.
19. Citizens the next.
20. Then refugees again.
21. No, of course, Trump would never visit such obscene tests on Jewish immigrants - for they would be obscene, would they not? - and nor will he stop Christians from Muslim countries.
22. America has always condemned sectarian states, but now Trump declares that he approves of sectarianism.
23. Minorities will be welcome - the Alawites of Syria, to whom Bashar al-Assad belongs, will presumably not count, and I guess we can expect all US embassies to have three queues for visa applicants.
24. One for Muslims, one for Christians, and a third marked "Other".
25. That's where most of us will be standing in line.
26. And by doing so, we will automatically give approval to this iniquitous system - and to Trump.
27. There's no point in wasting time over the obvious: that America has bombed, directly or indirectly, five of the seven nations on Trump's banned list.

28. Sudan just escapes, but the US blew a packed Iranian passenger airliner out of the sky in 1988 and has raised no objections to Israel's bombing of Iranian personnel in Syria.
29. So that makes six.
30. There's nothing to be gained by reiterating that the four countries whose citizens participated in the international crimes against humanity of 9/11 - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Emirates and Lebanon - do not feature on the list.
31. For the Saudis must be loved, cosseted, fawned over, approved, even when they chop off heads and when their citizens funnel cash to the murderers of Isis.
32. Egypt is ruled by Trump's "fantastic guy" anti-"terrorist" president al-Sisi.
33. The glisteningly wealthy Emirates won't be touched.
34. Nor will Lebanon, although its tens of thousands of dual-national Syrians may have a tough time in the future.
35. But no, this vile piece of legislation is not aimed at nations.
36. It's targeting refugees, the poor, the huddled masses yearning to breathe free.
37. The Muslim ones, that is, not the Christians.
38. How can they ever withstand a "values test"?
39. And what are America's "values" anyway?
40. It's OK to attack sovereign states.
41. It's OK to use pilotless planes to assault men and women in other countries.
42. It's OK if your allies steal land from others for their own people, if you support Arab dictatorships that emasculate and execute and rape their prisoners, as long as they are "allies" of the USA.
43. It's OK to fast-track Saudi visas - as the Brits have been doing for years - even if they are members of the most inspirational Wahhabi cult in the world: membership includes the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Isis, you name it.
44. There's even no value in touting our own participation in this charade.
45. Having just patted the killer governments of the Gulf on the head - and heading off to do the same to Turkey's autocrat-in-chief - our poodlet prime minister, fresh out of Washington, hasn't uttered a word about Trump's wickedness.
46. Wasn't it Britain - and America, for heaven's sake - that was weeping copious tears, buckets of the stuff, for the 250,000 (or 90,000) Muslim refugees of eastern Aleppo a couple of months ago?
47. And now, so much do we care for them, that they are being well and truly fucked.
48. They were almost all Muslims in eastern Aleppo, by the way.

49. The Christians of Syria have, through no fault of their own, sought protection from Bashar.
50. And what message did the Christian priests of northern Syria give when I interviewed them?
51. They did not want their people to leave for the West, they said.
52. Hard though it was, Christians should stay in the lands of their faith, the Middle East.
53. In the West, they would merely be lost in a secular world.
54. Trump is going to make sure they are.
55. Thus America is henceforth going to "protect" itself from "radical Islamic extremists" - "Islamic" note, not "Islamist" - and we'll all be able to follow him.
56. Is non-EU Britain not going to be able to march along the same awful path?
57. If America is our economic lifeline, will it not also be our moral lifeline for the political buffoons of the United Kingdom?
58. Sure, it's a long time since World War Two.
59. But then, what did the US do before - or after - Hitler's evil? It prevented Jewish refugees from coming to America. Yes, even Anne Frank. And now they're at it again.

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ID-5

January 31, 2017 (Comment)

1. **Trump's 'Muslim ban' is playing into the hands of Isis**
2. Donald Trump's travel ban on refugees and visitors from seven Muslim countries entering the US makes a terrorist attack on Americans at home or abroad more rather than less likely.
3. It does so because one of the main purposes of al-Qaeda and Isis in carrying out atrocities is to provoke an overreaction directed against Muslim communities and states.
4. Such communal punishments vastly increase sympathy for Salafi-jihadi movements among the 1.6 billion Muslims who make up a quarter of the world's population.
5. The Trump administration justifies its action by claiming that it is only following lessons learned from 9/11 and the destruction of the Twin Towers.
6. But it has learned exactly the wrong lesson: the great success of Mohammed Atta and his eighteen hijackers was not on the day that they and 3,000 others

died, but when President George W Bush responded by leading the US into wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that are still going on.

7. Al-Qaeda and its clones had been a small organisation with perhaps as few as a thousand militants in south east Afghanistan and north west Pakistan.
8. But thanks to Bush's calamitous decisions after 9/11, it now has tens of thousands of fighters, billions of dollars in funds and cells in dozens of countries.
9. Few wars have failed so demonstrably or so badly as "the war on terror".
10. Isis and al-Qaeda activists are often supposed to be inspired simply by a demonic variant of Islam - and this is certainly how Trump has described their motivation - but in practice it was the excesses of the counter-terrorism apparatus such as torture and rendition, Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib which acted as the recruiting sergeant for the Salafi-jihadi movements.
11. The Trump administration is now sending a message to al-Qaeda and Isis that Washington is easily provoked into mindless and counter-productive repression targeting Muslims in general.
12. Those affected so far are limited in number and about the last people likely to be engaged in terrorist plots.
13. But the political impact is already immense.
14. Salafi-jihadi leaders may be monsters of cruelty and bigotry, but they are not stupid.
15. They will see that if Trump, unprovoked by any terrorist outrage, will act with such self-defeating vigour, then a few bombs or shootings directed at American targets will lead to more scatter-gun persecution of Muslims.
16. Like leaders everywhere, Isis commanders will wonder how unhinged Trump really is.
17. The banning order may in part be a high profile way of assuring Trump voters that his pledges on the campaign trail will be fulfilled.
18. But demagogues tend to become the creatures of their own rhetoric and certainly Trump's words and actions will be presented as a sectarian declaration of war by many Muslims around the world.
19. Isis will also see that by pressing their attacks they will deepen divisions within American society.
20. Bush targeted Saddam Hussein and Iraq in response to 9/11, though it was self-evident that the Iraqi leader and his regime had no connection with it.
21. It was notorious that 15 out of 19 of the hijackers were Saudis, Osama bin Laden was a Saudi and the money for the operation came from private Saudi donors, but Saudi Arabia was given a free pass regardless of strong evidence of its complicity.

22. Much the same bizarre mistargeting of Muslim countries least likely to be sending terrorists to the US is happening in 2017 as happened in 2001.
23. Though 9/11 is cited as an explanation for Trump's executive order, none of the countries whose citizens were involved (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Lebanon) are facing any restrictions.
24. The people who are being refused entry come from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Yemen and Somalia.
25. Since the main targets of al-Qaeda and Isis are Shia Muslims primarily in Iraq but also in other parts of the world, Iran is the last place which is likely to be their base.
26. Since Isis's great victories in 2014 when it captured Mosul and conquered a vast area in Iraq and Syria, it has been beaten back by a myriad of enemies.
27. Though it is fighting back hard, its eventual defeat has seemed inevitable, but with Trump fuelling the sectarian war between Muslims and non-Muslims which Isis and al-Qaeda always wanted to wage, their prospects look brighter today than they have for a long time.

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ID-6

May 22, 2017 (Comment)

1. **Donald Trump's speech to the Muslim world was all hypocrisy and condescension**
2. So after inventing "fake news", America's crazed President on Sunday gave the world's Muslims a fake speech.
3. Donald Trump said he was not in Saudi Arabia to "lecture" - but then told the world's Islamic preachers what to say, condemned "Islamist terrorism" as if violence was a solely Muslim phenomenon and then announced like an Old Testament prophet that he was in "a battle between good and evil".
4. There were no words of compassion, none of mercy, absolutely not a word of apology for his racist, anti-Muslim speeches of last year.
5. Even more incredibly, he blamed Iran - rather than Isis - for "fuelling sectarian violence", pitied the Iranian people for their "despair" a day after they had freely elected a liberal reformer as their president, and demanded the further isolation of the largest Shiite country in the Middle East.
6. The regime responsible for "so much instability" is Iran.
7. The Shiite Hezbollah were condemned.
8. So were the Shiite Yemenis.
9. Trump's Sunni Saudi hosts glowed with warmth at such wisdom.

10. And this was billed by CNN as a "reset" speech with the Muslim world.
11. For "reset", read "repair", but Trump's Sunday diatribe in Riyadh was in fact neither a "reset" nor a "repair".
12. It was the lecture he claimed he would not give.
13. "Every time a terrorist murders an innocent person, and falsely invokes the name of God, it should be an insult to every person of faith," he announced, utterly ignoring - as he had to - the fact that Saudi Arabia, not Iran, is the fountainhead of the very Wahhabi Salafist extremism whose "terrorists" murder "innocent people".
14. He tried to avoid his old racist "radical Islamic extremist" mantra and tried to replace it with "Islamist extremism" but he apparently fluffed his words and said "Islamic" as well.
15. The subtle difference he was trying to make in English was thus for Muslims no more than a variation on a theme: terrorists are Muslims.
16. All this, let us remember, came after Trump had sewn up yet another outrageous arms deal with the Saudis (\$110bn or £84.4bn) and the proposed purchase by Qatar of what Trump obscenely referred to as "a lot of beautiful military equipment".
17. It seems almost fantastical that he should make such a remark only two days before meeting the Pope who in Cairo two weeks ago railed along with the Muslim Sheikh of Al Azhar against the evil of arms dealers.
18. "We are adopting a principled realism, rooted in common values and shared interests," Trump told the Saudis and the leaders of another fifty Muslim nations on Sunday.
19. But what on earth are those values?
20. What values do the Americans share with the head-chopping, misogynist, undemocratic, dictatorial Saudis other than arms sales and oil?
21. And when Trump said that "our friends will never question our support, and our enemies will never doubt our determination," were his friends supposed to be the Saudis?
22. Or the "Islamic world" - which should surely include Iran and Syria and Yemen - and the warring militias of Libya?
23. As for "enemies", was he talking about Isis? Or Russia? Or Syria?
24. Or Iran, whose newly elected president surely wants peace with America?
25. Or was he - as part of the Muslim world will conclude with good reason - declaring his friendship with the Sunni Muslims of the world and his enmity towards the Shia Muslims?
26. For that, ultimately, was what the Riyadh speech-fest was all about.

27. Take this little quotation: "We will make decisions based on real-world outcomes - not inflexible ideology.
28. We will be guided by the lessons of experience, not the confines of rigid thinking.
29. And, wherever possible, we will seek gradual reforms - not sudden intervention."
30. Now let's parse this little horror.
31. "Decisions based on real-world outcomes" means brutal pragmatism.
32. "Gradual reforms" indicates that the US will do nothing for human rights and take no steps to prevent crimes against humanity - unless they are committed by Iran, Syria, Iraqi Shiites, the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah or Yemeni Shiite Houthis.
33. It was all about "partnership", we were supposed to believe.
34. It was about a "coalition".
35. You bet it would be.
36. For America is not going to bleed as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan.
37. It is the Arabs who must bleed as they fight each other, encouraged by the biggest arms supplier of them all.
38. Thus Trump lectured them on their need to share "their part of the burden".
39. The Arabs will be "united and strong" as "the forces of good".
40. If the battle is between "decent people of all religions" and "barbaric criminals" - "between good and evil" - as Trump inferred, it was significant, was it not, that this battle was to start in the "sacred land" of Sunni Saudi Arabia?
41. By the time Trump reached the bit in which he threatened the bad guys - "if you choose the path of terror, your life will be empty, your life will be brief, and your soul will be condemned" - he sounded like a speech-writer for Isis.
42. Apparently - and unsurprisingly, perhaps - Trump's actual speech was partly the work of the very man who wrote out his much ridiculed (and failed) legal attempt to ban Muslims of seven nations from the United States.
43. All in all, quite a "reset".
44. Trump talked of peace but was preparing the Arabs for a Sunni-Shia war.
45. The fawning leaders of the Muslim world, needless to say, clapped away when the mad president of America had finished speaking.
46. But did they understand what his words really portended?

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April 17, 2017 (Comment)

1. **Gangsters using religion as a rubber stamp for their crimes are treading a familiar path**
2. The black flags of Isis have become the latest symbols of Islamic extremism.
3. Their savagery has come to represent what we believe to be a vulgar distortion of an Abrahamic faith.
4. We've grown exhausted in our infuriation at the commitment of these people to sadistic interpretations of scripture, supposedly leading them through beheadings and slaughter, all the way to paradise.
5. But what if I told you that their fury has nothing to do with faith?
6. Terror is very big business.
7. And I mean that in the literal sense.
8. Groups such as Isis and al-Qaeda succeeded in gaining a degree of legitimacy for their cause, by dressing it as a twisted heavenly mission.
9. They are now viewed globally as Muslim fanatics rather than the hardened criminals, money launderers and drug lords that they are.
10. In his 2009 book *How to Win a Cosmic War* Reza Aslan describes what must be done in the context of this supposedly heavenly mission: "Strip this ideological conflict of its religious connotations, reject the religiously polarising rhetoric of our leaders and theirs, focus on the material matters at stake, and address the earthly issues that always lie behind the cosmic impulse."
11. In this instance, the earthly issue lying behind the cosmic impulse is illegal drugs.
12. Over the past 30 years significant links have been made between terrorism and the drugs trade.
13. In 2008 Michael Braun, the US Drug Enforcement Agency's then chief of operations, compared the organisational sophistication of the Taliban in its trafficking of opium, used to produce half the world's heroin, to that of Colombia's Farc guerillas who have long been linked to drugs such as cocaine.
14. Such "hybrids" of global drug trafficking cartels and terrorist organisations use ideological motivations to mask financial ones.
15. It is estimated that the majority of terrorist organisations have direct links to trade of illegal drugs, and the figure has grown in the past decade.
16. Approximately 40 per cent of the cocaine reaching Europe each year arrives through Africa but is grown in Colombia and Peru.

17. It is transported across the Atlantic via "Highway 10" - a route along the 10th parallel - generating an estimated £640m annually on reaching the Sahara.
18. Political instability in Mali and Niger correlates with increased cocaine seizures over the past decade as factions of Africa's branch of al-Qaeda battle for power and business.
19. Boko Haram has control of ancient trading routes through Niger towards Europe and it is widely suspected that much of their funding for recruits to rape and kidnap civilians is from drug smuggling.
20. Hezbollah and al-Shabaab are known to benefit from global drug routes, with Afghan opium reaching Kenya and Ethiopia.
21. Isis has seized control of much of the Middle Eastern and Asian drug profits, and just as the Nazis in Germany and US soldiers in Vietnam were given drugs to facilitate cold blooded atrocities, more than 11 million of the amphetamine pills that Isis fighters are given have been seized at Syrian borders last year.
22. Islam is a convenient label hiding the joining of two bloodied hands: trafficking and terrorism.
23. Global gang violence has been "Islamised".
24. Traffickers and terrorists have the same enemies and common interests, so no wonder that lands growing opium and cocaine are unstable.
25. Both require territory, which requires control of populations, through fear and exploiting the most vulnerable.
26. The similarities between South American cartel tactics and those of Islamists are extensive, from the harnessing of social media and the internet for propaganda to spread beheading videos, to projecting themselves as powerful and in pursuit of a greater cause, attracting the disaffected, despairing people at the edge of society, to whom an early death seems acceptable.
27. Criminals, addicts, or simply broken, vulnerable people are recruited into a hellish global network of brutality and greed.
28. This is reflected in the entirely un-Islamic, recurring backstory of the recent terrorist attackers, from Orlando to London.
29. Replace ideology with big bucks and a sense of belonging, Godly devotion with a disturbed, thuggish lack of morality and the conquered "caliphate" territory with a narcotic-fuelled gangland, and your picture of today's "Islamism" is a whole lot more accurate.

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September 20, 2017 (Comment)

1. **It's true that some British Muslims don't actually want to integrate - but this is about a lot more than religion; it is key that the Government and the media encourage the reality-based idea that you can be Muslim and British and not feel as though one is betraying the other**
2. For London, there is a sense of tiring familiarity unfolding with terrorism.
3. A catastrophe averted, a crisis remains.
4. How we respond to the Parsons Green attack matters.
5. There is the far-right message that says Islam and the West are incompatible - this stirs up even more violence.
6. Then there's the other message, about keeping calm and carrying on, something typical of Londoners.
7. But we need to acknowledge that this is a battle that will not end soon.
8. We are fighting a terrorist that exists through an ideology, and transcends organisations.
9. We aren't just fighting the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Isis, but the ideas that drive them.
10. People's opinions differ on what radicalises young Muslims.
11. People believe it's either Islamism or grievances over foreign policy; focus on one automatically excludes the other.
12. The truth lies in the unexplored middle.
13. Foreign policy plays a part, as it did in the 7/7 bombings.
14. But that followed soon after the invasion of Iraq.
15. Many Muslims believe that it creates the sense amongst young Muslims that the Middle East is being attacked because of its Islamic identity.
16. The growth in Islamophobia simply feeds that assertion and creates a toxic mentality amongst some that the West truly does hate Islam
17. Yet the Iraq War was 14 years ago, and the young extremists who are being radicalised are aware that the villains in the humanitarian crisis in Syria are Assad and Putin.
18. The reality is that a portion of Muslims are simply not culturally integrated, do not see Britain as home, and resentment over foreign policy builds on their vulnerability to extremism rather than outright creating it.
19. Most who become radicalised are not religious.

20. Being a Muslim today is as much a cultural identity as an actual religious one for young individuals like myself.
21. It's a sign of being different within the West, and often an identity which comes hand in hand with discrimination and persecution.
22. The conversations around Muslims in the UK, painting us as an "other", reinforce that sense but the feeling of being an outsider isn't a novel experience for many.
23. The majority of British Muslims are South Asian and have experienced discrimination of some kind, creating the feeling that they will always be rejected by parts of society.
24. Yesterday they were "Pakis" - today they are extremists.
25. Parsons Green: CCTV shows terror arrest in Newport
26. Most British Muslims are able to healthily integrate being both Muslim and Western, seeing those two identities as compatible and harmonious rather than conflicting.
27. But there are an increasing number of young Muslims who find their sense of belonging and identity elsewhere.
28. That comes from Islamophobia, but also portions of the Muslim community refusing to culturally integrate, regarding integration as a compromise of their identity.
29. They push the notion of Britain never being our home, that we will always be hated for being Muslim, that you cannot truly be British and Muslim.
30. Where does this refusal to compromise on identity arrive from?
31. It may stem from the feeling that the West has always hated Islam, and compromising with that is a betrayal of any Muslim who has suffered against American imperialism or British colonialism.
32. Many working class families who did come over from countries such as India found that culturally, Britain could never be home.
33. It was too different and integrating deeply into that would be forgetting their roots.
34. Police make third arrest in Parsons Green bombing probe
35. In this, culture and religion becomes meshed as one to create a complex identity - and theology takes a backseat.
36. Their focus is always on the Middle East and the wider Muslim world, ignoring domestic issues like the NHS or austerity which might affect their lives more directly.

37. To some, the Middle East is the only place where the Islamic identity is celebrated rather than condemned, and where they would be included and not marginalised on the fringes.
38. And though austerity does impact them, given they are not specific targets of it, the community doesn't feel attacked by it - even though they are among the most deprived in the country.
39. Combine this with anti-Muslim bigotry, fanned by the tabloid press, and many young Muslims feel besieged.
40. There is a natural instinct to withdraw and not engage with wider society.
41. The far right here have inflicted considerable damage in convincing both young, vulnerable Muslims and wider society that Islam and the West are at war with each other.
42. Parsons Green bombing: Arrest is 'very significant' says Rudd
43. It is key that the Government and the media encourage the reality-based idea that you can be Muslim and British and not feel as though one is betraying the other.
44. Working with local Muslim communities and genuinely responding to each other's concerns can be the only way of tackling this, by building mutual trust.
45. We aren't at war with Islam.
46. Our fight is to convince pockets of the Muslim community that you can be British and Muslim.
47. It requires confidence in our own liberal values and to accept - to borrow the American phrase - that this truly is a battle of hearts and minds.
48. Just look at London, which rebels against the wishes of terrorists.
49. This is inspiring for young Muslims, and watching Sadiq Khan as Mayor of London is the proof that you can be British and a Muslim.

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ID-9

November 18, 2016 (Comment)

1. **History tells us this genius idea of a Muslims database will definitely end well**
2. There is a glimmer of hope in this terrible fortnight.
3. Donald Trump is clearly making it up as he goes along, with announcements such as: "The wall is going ahead but may be part trellis with clematis plants, with holes in the petals for snipers to fire at immigrants because America is great at flowers, and a castle somewhere in Kansas if that's on the border but we'll check because I've got guys who are great at checking, and the top half of the

wall will be made out of trifle and we're going to put extra whipped cream on it because the Mexicans are paying."

4. He has to carry out his promise to build the wall because, as he explained, "650 million people could pour in".
5. That would mean every single person from Mexico, and Canada, and Central America, and South America, and Egypt, would all move to the United States at once.
6. The Grand Canyon would become El Salvador.
7. Argentina would fill up Lake Michigan.
8. No rockets could take off from Cape Canaveral because Bolivians would be camping on the launch pad.
9. So if you were picky you might doubt the figure of 650 million, but that's to miss the point because we're now in a post-correct numbers era.
10. We've listened long enough to "experts" adding things up properly and where has that got us?
11. It's time to put America in the hands of people who aren't afraid to be utterly irrational, such as Trump's chief strategist Stephen Bannon, whose wife swore he wouldn't let his daughter go to a school as there were "too many whiny brat Jews".
12. In this refreshing post-correct numbers era, Trump's team will be free to explain how over 8 million Jews whine every day, which uses up 130 per cent of US energy reserves every hour, forcing 4 billion hard-working Americans to go eight years without biscuits.
13. And how could anyone expect his daughter to learn anything in those conditions?
14. Now at last we can bring an end to this tiresome political correctness, which insists you can't say something is true just because you made it up.
15. Instead America can begin to address its problems with solutions like Trump's proposal to place all Muslims on a register.
16. This is an exciting new policy, fresh and inventive, and makes you wonder why no regime in the past has ever considered forcing one religious group to register with the authorities, while blaming them for the country's problems.
17. If it works well, maybe they could make it fun by getting them to report to the police every week and wear pretty little stars and all live cosily together in the same part of town.
18. It's a shame this sort of thing has never been tried before as it would then be easy to prove this is sure to end well.
19. The registration for Muslims could be even more accurate if they're all made to fill out one of those personality quizzes called "How jihadist are you?"

20. They would have to answer a series of question such as: "You've had a stressful morning as the washing machine has broken down and need to unwind.
21. Do you a) book yourself in for a foot massage b) relax with a bottle of wine and a takeaway pizza c) strap gelignite to your chest and march into Walmart screaming, 'In the name of Allah the almighty, the merciful, let us bring holy war to your infidel faulty appliances, peace be upon him" and blow yourself up?"
22. Then America could make itself even safer by passing a law that calls to prayers from a mosque are no longer allowed to witter on about Islam, and have to be truly American by being sponsored.
23. So on a Friday you could hear the magical sounds of "Allahu akbar, hey, does all that kneeling and bending to pray take its toll on your joints?"
24. Then you need Deep Heat, specially formulated for soothing holy joint relief - just spray as you pray."
25. Trump can announce none of this is anti-Muslim, as Muslims are perfectly welcome to live in America as long as they convert to Christianity.
26. And any that can't be bothered will be deported to the 12th century.
27. It must be frustrating to see Muslims getting away with being Muslim, especially if you're a Trump-supporting Christian fundamentalist Tea Party member, as you must think, 'Why can't they be calm and peaceful like us?
28. You'll never catch an evangelist Christian in America getting annoyed about everyday issues such as abortion or teaching evolution, and they're so pacifist they sometimes go all the way to the kitchen and back without a spare flame-thrower in case the first one goes wrong.
29. The inclusive nature of Trump has already had an effect, because Isis are said to be delighted with his victory, and a former member of the Ku Klux Klan was one of the first organisations to congratulate him.
30. Who else could bring together these two groups in a charming display of unity like that?
31. Psychopaths everywhere seem willing to put aside their differences to rejoice in Trump becoming president, and that can only be encouraging.
32. So you can understand why his supporters are so angry with anyone who's still moaning.
33. Their slogan for those who still oppose Trump is "You lost, get over it", just as they did when Obama won.
34. Back then, they graciously accepted their defeat with only the odd eight-year period insisting he wasn't American and shouldn't be allowed to take office and was probably a Muslim because he lived in Hawaii - which is why, so far, it looks like everything's going to be fine.

December 21, 2016 (News)

1. **Whatever the motive, Isis will always be keen to claim credit**
2. The change of name for the magazine of Isis was a declaration of a change in strategy.
3. It had been called Dabiq after a town in Syria where Islam is meant to triumph over the infidels in a final battle.
4. But now in retreat, losing territory, the jihadis no longer see Armageddon as imminent.
5. They declare, instead, that the jihad will be taken abroad to the enemy, striking at the heart of Western political and spiritual power, symbolically Rome, Rumiya, as the new publication is titled.
6. Isis has, of course, carried out attacks on Western targets before.
7. But it has been repeatedly asserting the threat lately and instructing its adherents in Europe and America to strike the enemy at home using any means at hand.
8. Its leaders have openly called for attacks to be carried out this Christmas: so the murders in Berlin, with the use of a truck, should not have come as a surprise.
9. Last month's issue of Rumiya specified the Bastille Day attack in Nice, the first time a truck had been used to carry out an Islamist terrorist attack, taking 86 lives, as an ideal template to cause maximum human damage by using a simple "weapon" in an operation "behind enemy lines".
10. With a photograph of a rental truck and the annual Thanksgiving Day parade in New York on the front cover, the magazine stated "though being an essential part of modern life, very few actually comprehend the destructive capability of the motor vehicle and its capacity of reaping large numbers of casualties if used in a premeditated manner".
11. Although Isis has claimed the Berlin attack through its own news agency, a direct link to the jihadis is yet to be established.
12. Yesterday evening German prosecutors also released the only suspect who had been held, citing insufficient evidence.
13. He had been identified by media only as Pakistani national Naved B - he had denied any involvement in the attack.
14. The perpetrator, or perpetrators of the violence which killed 12 people at a Christmas market is thought to be still at large.
15. But there is little doubt that it was an act of terrorism and, and as has been shown, Isis will always be keen to claim credit.

16. What happened showed the difficulties in stopping such an attack even when one was half-expected.
17. Extra security had been in place in Christmas markets and shopping areas in cities across Europe including Britain where a SAS unit is on standby along with armed police patrols.
18. Plots have been foiled in France, Belgium, the UK and Germany; but it is, unfortunately, impossible to have total security.
19. The Nice attack, in July, came a day before the attempted coup in Turkey which the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan had blamed on the exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen.
20. The Berlin attack on Monday was preceded by the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey, Andrey Karlov, in Ankara by an off-duty policeman.
21. Turkish officials sought to quickly hold the Gulen movement responsible.
22. The aim, it is claimed, was to sabotage relations with Russia which had only recently been mended following the fracture which came with the bringing down of a Russian warplane by the Turks last year.
23. Mr Gulen was, retrospectively, blamed for that as well and the Turkish F-16 pilot who fired the missile stripped of his status of national hero and imprisoned.
24. No evidence has been produced so far to prove that the ambassador's killer, Mevlut Mert Aydintas, was involved with the Gulen movement.
25. There is some evidence, however, that he may have had links with Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria.
26. Among these are his words as he stood over the fallen ambassador: "We are the ones who pledge allegiance to Mohammed, to wage jihad, to die in martyrdom" - part of an al-Nusra slogan.
27. There appears to have been was no ambiguity about the killers message: "Don't forget Aleppo, don't forget Syria. Unless our towns are secure, you won't enjoy security.
28. Everyone who is involved in this will pay a price".
29. The murder, one can reasonably conclude, was in revenge for Russia's part in the brutal assault on Aleppo.
30. Al-Nusra, which recently sought to rebrand itself by changing its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, has long been engaged in terrorist acts abroad.
31. The US, in the first days of its bombing campaign against Isis, carried out air strikes on al-Nusra in Aleppo claiming that it was plotting attacks on the West.
32. The organisation has offered rewards for the capture of Russian soldiers and airmen in Syria.

33. Its commander, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, had called on Muslims from former Soviet Caucasus to carry out attacks on civilian targets in Russia.
34. Isis is desperately trying to defend Mosul, and facing an impending assault on Raqqa, its 'capital', Al-Nusra will soon come under attack at its base of Idlib.
35. It will, like Isis, lose territory and it will to seek to carry out more strikes abroad.
36. The contagion of Syria's violence will continue its lethal spread to the outside world.

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ID-11

January 28, 2017 (News)

1. **Muslim-majority countries linked to Trump's business escape US immigration ban**
2. President Donald Trump is expected to sign an executive order suspending entry to the US for immigrants from seven Muslim-majority countries.
3. But others where he appears to have conducted business or pursued business interests appear to have escaped censure.
4. The US leader has caused outrage with the proposals to indefinitely block Syrian refugees from entering the US and bar all refugees from the rest of the world for at least 120 days.
5. Immigration from Syria and six other predominantly Muslim countries - Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen - would also be suspended for at least 30 days.
6. Mr Trump and Senator Jeff Sessions, his nominee for Attorney General, have said they wanted to focus restrictions on countries whose migrants pose a threat.
7. "Our country has enough problems without allowing people to come in who, in many cases or in some cases, are looking to do tremendous destruction," the new US leader told ABC News in his first presidential interview.
8. As a result, the new administration is working on an "extreme vetting" scheme for countries where Mr Trump believes checks are not stringent enough.
9. Iran, Sudan and Syria are all on the State Department's list of terrorism sponsors.
10. Countries in the same region not subject to the impending crackdown include Saudi Arabia, where Mr Trump had declared he registered a number of companies including THC Jeddah Hotel and DT Jeddah Technical Services, in the kingdom's second city, Jeddah - some of which have since been closed.
11. Trump Organisation lawyer Alan Garten said in December 2016: "There is no deal in Saudi Arabia."

12. In January 2016, a few months after the companies were created, Mr Trump told Fox News that he "would want to protect Saudi Arabia" from a potential Iranian threat.
13. But he added that the Arab kingdom was "going to have to help us economically" and referenced the billions of dollars the country has made from the oil trade.
14. Saudi Arabia has previously been associated with terrorism and religious extremism, and has been linked with the largest terror attack on US soil.
15. Of the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, 15 were Saudi Arabian citizens.
16. The independent American commission that investigated the attacks found no evidence that the Saudi government or senior Saudi officials financed the terrorists.
17. Saudi Arabia has strenuously denied any involvement in the attacks.
18. But US diplomatic cables released by whistle blowing website Wikileaks, revealed that private individuals in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states friendly to the United States are the chief source of funding for al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups.
19. Despite extensive efforts to limit the distribution of funds to extremists from the Middle East, the documents showed deep frustration in Washington with the level of cooperation from governments in the region.
20. "It has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority," read a cable from Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, dated 30 December, 2009.
21. "Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide," added the document.
22. Saudi officials also recently admitted to misleading the US on funding extremism, according to the Politico website.
23. In Turkey, Mr Trump's company has been paid up to \$10m (£8m) since 2014 by the developers of the luxury Trump Towers Istanbul to affix his name to the complex.
24. The building's owner, one of Turkey's biggest oil and media conglomerates, has become an influential voice for the country's increasingly repressive regime.
25. In Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, the Trump International Golf Club "features a 30,000 square foot state-of-the-art clubhouse" and is due to open this year.
26. A licensing deal linked to Trump Tower in Baku, Azerbaijan, was ended in the same bout of "housekeeping" as the Saudi companies, Mr Garten said in December.

27. It had netted Mr Trump nearly \$3m since mid-2014.

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ID-12

April 18, 2017 (News)

1. **Give returning Isis fighters chance to rehabilitate, say young British Muslims**
2. Young British Muslims think Isis fighters returning from Syria should be reintegrated into society and rehabilitated rather than being sent to prison, a study suggests.
3. The national study found young British Muslims across the UK believe returnee fighters should be reintegrated into society, with one saying the Government should "give them a chance" and another warning that "otherwise they are gonna find another extremist group and join them".
4. Dr Imran Awan, Associate Professor of Criminology at Birmingham City University, told The Independent he was surprised so many were pro-rehabilitation, "because many young Muslim voices are never heard within the discourse on terrorism".
5. Dr Awan interviewed with 25 male and 25 female British Muslims, aged between 14 and 25, from areas of the UK where there is a record of people travelling to Syria and joining Isis, to collect their views on why they think young Muslims travel to fight for jihadi groups, and what they think should happen when they return.
6. One interviewee warned: "When people feel isolated and angry because they are not being treated with respect and if they go out and fight in Syria and when they come back there is no help, then I promise you, you will see more terrorism because these young people will think why should I do anything when my own Government don't care about me."
7. As many as 800 Britons are estimated to have travelled to fight for or support jihadi groups in Syria or Iraq, and around half are feared to have returned to the UK
8. Last year, the Government admitted just 14 of nearly 400 returnee fighters have been jailed, raising fears the rest are living off the radar and may be vulnerable to radicalisation.
9. The Home Office told The Independent the number of returnee fighters who have been convicted are not routinely published.
10. The Government's current strategy for returnee fighters is to convict and imprison those they can prove have committed a crime and refer the rest to the Channel deradicalisation programme.

11. Adam Deen, Executive Director of anti-extremism think-tank Quilliam UK, warned returnee fighters must be referred to Channel and monitored in case they are planning to form a terror cell or conduct an attack.
12. "What is important here is that the more Isis are under siege and the more territory they're losing, the more they're going to channel their efforts and energies into terrorism," he said in an interview with The Independent.
13. "Those individuals that have managed to get back into the country will be activated or will be conspiring to commit some kind of terrorist act.
14. That's a major concern." Mr Deen added: "The likelihood of someone committing a terrorist attack who has gone abroad and has joined Isis is very high."
15. Channel was set up following the 7/7 attacks to identify those vulnerable to radical ideology and turn them away from the path to extremism.
16. The voluntary programme uses a network of mentors, psychologists and trained imams to counsel and guide those at risk.
17. Mr Deen said the programme was "very effective" for those who engage with the programme, leading individuals to disavow their extremist beliefs.
18. However, he said it was "a question of them agreeing to it in the first place".
19. He added: "The problem here is that it's voluntary.
20. It can't be enforced."
21. Little research has been conducted to assess the results of the Channel programme, and Mr Deen said there is a lack of transparency around the number of people referred and whether they were successfully turned away from extremism.
22. Critics have said the programme threatens to alienate Muslims, with rights groups warning it could have the adverse affect of driving people towards extremism.
23. Dr Awan said rehabilitation programmes in Denmark had been "successful in terms of policing and making sure returnee fighters are looking for jobs and contributing towards society," and suggested returnee fighters could "provide a powerful counter narrative" to dissuade people from going to fight for Isis.
24. He said his study had come at a "crucial time" following the Westminster attack, when attempts are being made to understand why 52-year-old Muslim-convert Khalid Masood ploughed a rented car through crowds of pedestrians on Westminster Bridge before fatally stabbing a police officer outside the Houses of Parliament.
25. He added: "Quite often questions are posed about why someone would do that, about what leads somebody down that pathway.

26. My report shows what in effect a lot of young Muslims think is happening."
27. The interviewees referred to several push and pull factors for why young Muslims might become radicalised and travel to fight for Isis, ranging from boredom to issues with lack of identity and concerns over foreign policy.
28. The majority of thought social media and the internet play a key role in radicalisation, with one warning "all they do is go online and some preacher then tells them to come and fight for Islam".
29. When Isis declared their "caliphate" three years ago, their fighters openly used Twitter to urge Muslims to travel to Syria and Iraq and shared gory and extreme videos.
30. "If people are watching these videos online then they are going to be radicalised because Isis are using the Internet to shout out to them that we [Muslims] are being oppressed," one 16-year-old said.
31. Another, 15, warned: "A lot of my friends are on Facebook and a lot of them are watching stuff online that are extreme."
32. Others suggested young Muslims may travel to fight in Syria simply because they are bored or looking for an adrenaline rush.
33. One said: "They want some excitement in their lives and are pushing those boundaries," while another suggested "what we are seeing really is just some young frustrated teenagers who are looking for an escape".
34. Many spoke about how young Muslims in the UK were "confused" and searching for an identity, which Dr Awan said allowed Isis to use a powerful marketing brand to create an identity to attract young recruits.
35. "Some said well actually what do you expect, they're isolated, they're angry, they don't have a sense of identity, he said.
36. Interviewees told him Isis push out messages of unity and brotherhood around their idea of a global caliphate which can be attractive to those who are looking for a sense of belonging."
37. One 16-year-old interviewee told Dr Awan: "Some of these people don't have anywhere where they believe is home.
38. So they think yes let's jump to these guys [Isis] because they are bringing me to a global brotherhood."
39. However, concerns over foreign policy were also thought to be a key part of why young British Muslims were travelling to fight in Syria.
40. "For me, it's all about foreign policy," a 16-year-old interviewee said.
41. "I actually know some of the boys that went from here and they were always talking about the problems in Palestine and the fact our government never helps them."

42. Dr Awan said: "A lot of them kept saying they were watching YouTube clips of Syrians being murdered and killed.
43. Isis tends to play on these types of anger."
44. He said he hoped his study would encourage the Government and police to reengage with young British Muslims to understand their concerns.
45. He also said his research "sheds light on what is often a heated debate" about what British Muslims really think about terrorism.

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ID-13

November 16, 2016 (News)

1. **Top Isis commander brands Trump a 'complete maniac'**
2. A top Isis commander in Afghanistan has called the President-elect Donald Trump a "complete maniac" and said his "utter hate towards Muslims" will make it "much easier" to recruit thousands more supporters.
3. Mr Trump was widely condemned for his call, shortly after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, to temporarily ban all Muslims from entering the United States until he figured out "what the hell was going on".
4. The Republican and his allies have consistently defended the ban, insisting the measure was about Americans' "safety" and not about discriminating against religion.
5. Mr Trump has since toned down his call for a ban, saying he would temporarily suspend immigration from countries that have "a history of exporting terrorism".
6. But Taliban commanders and Islamic State supporters have said the rhetoric Mr Trump used during his campaign will help their recruitment efforts, especially among disaffected young people in the West.
7. "This guy is a complete maniac.
8. His utter hate towards Muslims will make our job much easier because we can recruit thousands," Abu Omar Khorasani, a top Isis commander in Afghanistan, told Reuters.
9. "Our leaders were closely following the US election but it was unexpected that the Americans will dig their own graves and they did so," Mr Khorasani continued, describing President Barack Obama as a moderate infidel with a little more intelligence than Mr Trump.
10. A senior Taliban commander in Afghanistan said the group had kept track of Mr Trump's speeches and anti-Muslim comments: "If he does what he warned in his election campaign, I am sure it will provoke Muslim Ummah [community] across the world and jihadi organisations can exploit it."

11. Al-Qaeda, which launched the 11 September attacks on New York and the Pentagon, has not yet commented on Mr Trump's win.
12. However, Hisham al Hashimi an adviser to the Iraqi government on Sunni jihadist movements, told Reuters that "Al-Qaeda is known for its recruitment strategy that heavily quotes speeches of the White House and other Western officials."
13. Iraq's powerful Shia Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr said in a statement: "He [Donald Trump] does not differentiate between extremist and moderate Islamist trends and, at the same time, he overlooks [the fact] that his extremism will generate extremism in return."
14. The President-elect vocalised his tough stance on Islamic militants during his campaign, vowing to defeat "radical Islam just as we won the Cold War".
15. However, he has failed to give extensive details on his plans to combat jihadist groups.
16. The US saw a number of attacks inspired by Islamic militants during Mr Trump's presidential campaign, including the killing of 14 people in December 2015 in San Bernardino, California by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik, who allegedly pledged allegiance to Isis leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the June massacre of 49 people in an Orlando nightclub by a gunman who made a phone call before the attack saying, "I pledge my allegiance to [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] of the Islamic State".
17. Officials have warned that the US is likely to face similar attacks as Isis calls on its supporters to launch attacks at home rather than making the journey to the Middle East.
18. Mr Trump's office did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the statements from the militants.
19. Even if the President-elect tones down his anti-Muslim comments when he takes office in January, analysts say his statements during the campaign were enough to fuel the militants' propaganda machine.
20. "Militants will still use those quotes," said Matthew Henman, head of IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre.
21. "The key thing militant groups, particularly Islamic State and al-Qaeda, depend on for recruitment purposes is convincing Muslims in the Western world that the West hates them and won't ever accept them as part of their society."

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June 23, 2017 (News)

1. **Woman told to remove black hijab because it 'made her look like a terrorist'**
2. A Muslim woman is suing her former employers after allegedly being ordered to remove her black headscarf because the garment had "terrorist affiliations".
3. The estate agent, who did not want to be named, had been working for Harvey Dean in Bury for almost a year when she says managers took issue with her hijab.
4. A complaint filed at the Manchester Employment Tribunal says the woman was told that moving from a back office into public view meant "that it would be in the best interest of the business for her to change the colour of her hijab, due to the supposed terrorist affiliation with the colour black".
5. A colleague allegedly claimed that the predominantly white and non-Muslim community around the company's office would "feel intimidated and scared if they saw the claimant".
6. The woman, who had been wearing a black headscarf that left her face uncovered since starting at Harvey Dean, said she was not prepared to change her attire for the reasons given.
7. She says she refused again in a phone call and a meeting held the following day with the male manager, who had allegedly brought coloured hijabs into the office for her to change into.
8. Hours later, the claimant says she was reprimanded for sending a text message to her father.
9. "He then went on a tirade accusing the claimant of not working," read tribunal documents seen by The Independent.
10. "The claimant informed him that she was on her lunch break but he told her that he did not care [and] then proceeded to tell her to: 'Get the f*** out of here.'"
11. The woman left the office and, after hearing nothing further from the company, submitted a letter of resignation the following week.
12. She claimed to The Independent that her objections to the order "fell on deaf ears" and left her feeling unable to remain at the company.
13. "I was shocked at what they were asking and the reasons they were giving," the woman added.
14. The former housing sales negotiator said she felt "singled out" as the only Muslim woman in the office and claims the company discriminated against her on the basis of both religion and gender.

15. The tribunal complaint argues that her treatment created an "intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating and offensive environment", and is seeking a written admission that she was subjected to unlawful discrimination.
16. The case, which will be considered at a preliminary hearing at the Manchester Employment Tribunal on 20 July, could result in Harvey Dean paying "aggravated damages" and compensation covering loss of earnings, holiday pay and legal fees.
17. "If I receive anything, that will be of secondary importance," the claimant said.
18. "What is of primary importance to me over and above anything is that this serves as a warning to employers that such pressure upon employees is absolutely and categorically unacceptable based upon illogical ideas with no evidence," she added.
19. "Young Muslim women, whether they attend schools, colleges or work in professional environments, should never have to feel that they have to compromise their religious beliefs or water down their Muslim identity for fear of intimidating people of other or no faith."
20. Zillur Rahman, an employment lawyer representing the claimant for Rahman Lowe Solicitors, believes the case is the first of its kind in the UK following a landmark ruling at the European Court of Justice in March. Judges found that companies could legally ban employees from wearing the Islamic headscarf, but only as part of prohibitions encompassing all religious and political symbols equally.
21. "An internal rule of an undertaking which prohibits the visible wearing of any political, philosophical or religious sign does not constitute direct discrimination," the court ruled.
22. "However, in the absence of such a rule, the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the employer's services provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered an occupational requirement that could rule out discrimination."
23. The complaint in Bury alleges that Harvey Dean had no such rule in place, noting that Muslim male employees were allowed to wear beards and the company's staff handbook stated that it "does not seek to inhibit individual choice as regards appearance".
24. The company could not be reached for comment.

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December 21, 2016 (Comment)

1. **Blaming terror on Islam does nothing but feed Isis rhetoric**
2. It took the German Chancellor 15 hours to make a public statement following Monday night's terrorist attack on a Christmas market in Berlin, Germany.
3. Aware of the impact a poorly chosen phrase could have in a country divided in its sentiments toward Muslim migrants, Angela Merkel said, that while nothing was known for certain, "we must assume it was a terrorist attack."
4. Not one to let a lack of facts prevent him from forming an opinion, Donald Trump made a statement just three hours after the attack: "Isis and other Islamist terrorists continually slaughter Christians in their communities and places of worship as part of their global jihad."
5. He later tweeted: "Today there were terror attacks in Turkey, Switzerland, and Germany - and it is only getting worse."
6. The civilised world must change thinking!"
7. The tweet, I assume was to make his point loud and clear, just in case we missed it: Islamic terrorists attacked Christians during a religious festival because Islam and the Christian West are at war.
8. This isn't the first time that the President-elect has couched terrorism as a clash of civilisations between the civilised West and the barbaric caliphate.
9. In March of this year, he told CNN: "I think Islam hates us."
10. When asked to clarify if he felt that there was a war between the West and radical Islam, or the West and Islam in its totality, he replied, "It's very hard to define."
11. It's very hard to separate.
12. Because you don't know who's who."
13. This (slightly convoluted) view is not singular to the business tycoon: in 2014, Steve Bannon, his incoming chief strategist, said that the "Judeo-Christian West is in a crisis" and is "at the beginning stages of a global war against Islamic fascism".
14. As well as managing to conflate numerous Islamic denominations spanning over 50 Muslim majority countries, this binary thinking omits the simple fact that Muslims live in the West.
15. We don't yet know the identity of the victims of Monday night's tragedy but we do know from the similarly horrific Nice attack in July, in which a lorry was driven into crowds on Bastille Day, that many Muslims were counted among the dead.
16. The first victim to die was Fatima Charrihi, a French Muslim woman from Nice.

17. Following her death, her son said: "She was the first victim, there were no bodies before her.
18. She wore the veil, practising an Islam of the middle ground.
19. A real Islam, not that of the terrorists."
20. Later, a spokeswoman for the Union of Muslims of the Alpes-Maritimes said that 30 Muslim funerals were held for those who died during the attack.
21. There is no us and them, no imagined Dar-al Harb; in a globalised world these distinct cultural boundaries don't exist.
22. Ask my Muslim friend, who bought me a Christmas present last week. Ask the 4.8 million Muslims who live in Germany, who might have been eating with friends that night at the Christmas market, or walking home from work a few streets away.
23. Terrorism is an attack on the right to freedom of expression and assembly, and that's a right that German Muslims wish to partake in too.
24. Of course, the President-elect isn't a fool.
25. He knows that this divisive rhetoric serves to bolster his protectionist and isolationist domestic and foreign policies respectively.
26. We don't yet know who is responsible for the attack, but if it is an Islamic extremist group, if they want anything, it is an all-out war between Islam and "the West" - and Donald Trump should know better than to give in to terrorists' demands.

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ID-16

June 20, 2017 (Comment)

1. **When are we going to ask who radicalised the Finsbury Park mosque attacker?**
2. For years, Muslim communities and activists up and down the country have demanded that more be done to tackle Islamophobia, and for years our concerns were dismissed as nothing more than being overly sensitive to criticisms about their faith.
3. Islamophobia was portrayed as a nonsense term: for some it was deemed logical and rational to fear Islam and Muslims, to portray Muslim communities as the "other", the threat within.
4. After yesterday's terrorist attack outside a Finsbury Park mosque, in which Muslims leaving Ramadan prayers in the early hours of the morning were mowed down by a van, we saw what can happen when Islamophobia is allowed to go unchecked.

5. This attack didn't occur in a vacuum.
6. For years there has been a rise in anti-Islam sentiment.
7. After the London Bridge attack, the London Mayor's office released a statement that said there had been a 40 per cent increase in racist incidents compared with the same day last year, and a five-fold increase in the number of Islamophobic incidents.
8. Similarly, Muslim leaders reported a worrying rise in Islamophobic incidents following the Manchester attack.
9. The question must be asked about the Finsbury Park incident, as it would be asked if the attack had been perpetrated by a Muslim: who radicalised this person?
10. Was this person emboldened by an increasingly anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim agenda in the right-wing tabloid media?
11. Did he feel his actions were justified because of the popularity of Donald Trump and Brexit?
12. I've already been told not to "politicise" this attack as if it weren't inherently political.
13. Don't tell me that Islamophobia doesn't exist, or that it's been overplayed by Muslims "playing the victim".
14. If anything, Muslims are wary of reporting hate crimes against their communities, fearing that their concerns will not be taken seriously or that even if they are it will not result in a successful prosecution.
15. Women like my own mother are anxious of going outside alone, with news regularly coming in of hijabs being pulled off and women being spat at.
16. Yesterday we saw people exercising the very British right of religious freedom came under attack.
17. It's about time the Government did more to tackle the dangers posed by those who whip up Islamophobic sentiment that lead to attacks like these.
18. For too long we have allowed a double standard to occur in which this type of extremism is seen as the less dangerous counterpart to Islamic extremism, even though both are driven by the same motivations and desires, a worldview that hates diversity and believes in asserting its own supremacy.
19. Following Islamist terrorist attacks, hate preachers and their ideology are interrogated, and yesterday's incident can be no different.
20. From America to Britain, attacks against Muslims are on the rise and if we can work together across borders to tackle the rise of extremism, I'd like to know why governments can't work across borders to tackle the terrorist threat posed by Islamophobic extremists.

21. It is both dangerous and very real.
22. This isn't just a time for bold statements: many Muslims wish to see bold action.
23. Those who played a part in the rise of Islamophobia, who portrayed Muslims as the enemy within, should hold their heads in shame.

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ID-17

December 25, 2016 (Comment)

1. **The West's dismal failure - and the power of illusion**
2. Just as the catastrophic Anglo-American invasion of Iraq brought an end to epic Western military adventures in the Middle East, so the tragedy of Syria ensures that there will be no more Arab revolutions.
3. And it's taken just 13 bloodsoaked years - from 2003 to 2016 - to realign political power.
4. Russia and Iran and the Shia Muslims of the region are now deciding its future; Bashar al-Assad cannot claim victory - but he is winning.
5. "Aleppo must be taken quickly - before Mosul falls," a Syrian brigadier announced to me with a wan smile in the country's army headquarters in Damascus.
6. And it did, scarcely a month later.
7. There were - and still are - little Aleppos all over Syria in which the government and its armed "jihadi" opponents are playing "good guy" and "bad guy", depending on who is besieging whom.
8. When the Sunni militias end their siege of little Shia towns like Faour, the civilians flock to government lines.
9. It's reported as a slightly incomprehensible local dispute.
10. But when the regime's forces storm into eastern Aleppo, it's deplored around the world as a war crime.
11. I've grown tired of repeating that, yes, war crimes are committed on both sides, and Bashar's forces are no squeaky clean military cadets - although these days, we have to remember that 42 Royal Marine Commandos were not that squeaky clean in Afghanistan.
12. But the story of Aleppo is still being rethreaded into old loops, the brave but largely "jihadi" defenders disguised as nondescript "rebels", their opponents compared to Milosevic's Serb killers or Saddam's gas-bomb pilots.
13. All this will soon end. Russia realised that Obama and the weeping liberals of Europe were bluffing about the overthrow of Bashar- who, unlike Putin's Ukrainian ally in Kiev, did not run away - and backed his army.

14. The Economist made fun of Syrian soldiers because they supposedly couldn't march in step when Moscow staged a military parade at its Syrian air base.
15. But you don't have to march like the Wehrmacht to win battles.
16. The Syrian Arab Army - its real name, which is increasingly used, I notice, by the usual mountebanks who pose as "experts" on the satellite channels - boasts that it has fought simultaneously on 80 fronts against Isis, Nusrah and a clutch of other "jihadi" armies (and Free Syrian Army men who changed sides).
17. Which, given the infractions and bulges in front lines, is probably true, but perhaps not a military record to be proud of.
18. It's one thing to recapture Palmyra from Isis, quite another to lose it to Isis again in the middle of the battle for eastern Aleppo.
19. Syrian soldiers have a lot of time for their Hezbollah militia allies - who used to turn up on the battlefield better armed than the Syrians themselves - but are less enamoured of the Iranian "advisers" who supposedly know so much about open warfare.
20. I have been present when an Iranian officer called a Syrian general "stupid" - in this case, the Iranian was probably right - but Syrian officers are far more battle-trained and experienced than the Revolutionary Guard from Tehran who have sustained - along with their Afghan and Iraqi Shia allies - far more casualties than they believed possible.
21. So after almost five years of battle, the Syrian army is still in action.
22. The Nusrah and Isis forces surrounding the government sector of the eastern Syrian city of Deir ez-Zour will almost certainly be its next target - after the retaking of Palmyra, but long before the Isis capital of Raqqa, which will probably be retaken by Washington's Kurdish allies.
23. And it is the Syrian army which will most likely have to rebuild the new Syria when the war eventually ends. It will certainly decide the future of the country.
24. That doesn't mean the overthrow of Bashar.
25. Neither among his official opponents nor his mortal jihadi enemies nor the corrupt and corrupted political opposition in Turkey is there anyone who can challenge him on the ground.
26. Even if they were successful, you can be sure that the same prisons and dungeons in Syria would be in operation within 24 hours to lock up and torture the "new" opposition to a "new" regime.
27. Besides, Vladimir Putin has suffered enough humiliation after Isis's second success in Palmyra - after the Russians staged a victory concert of peace in the Roman city only a few months ago.
28. He is not going to permit the defenestration of Bashar al-Assad.

29. Oddly, Western leaders remain stupefyingly unaware of the nature of the real struggle in Syria, and even which warlords they should support.
30. Take the impotent François Hollande, who chose to tell the United Nations in September that Russia and Iran must compel Assad to make peace, because they would otherwise, along with the regime, "bear the responsibility for the division and chaos in Syria".
31. All well and good.
32. Yet only two months earlier, the same Hollande was demanding "effective action" against the Islamist Nusrah front - among the defenders of Aleppo, although most of us decided not to tell our readers this - on the grounds that Isis was in retreat and Nusrah stood to take advantage of this.
33. "That is beyond dispute," Hollande pompously remarked of Isis's "retreat".
34. That was before the retaking of Palmyra by the same Isis brigands.
35. But perhaps Hollande and his European allies - and Washington - are so besotted with their own weak and flawed policies towards Syria (always supposing they can decide what these are), that they do not realise how power moves across battlefields.
36. Instead of whinnying on about Russian brutality and mixing this in with Iranian cruelty and Hezbollah mendacity, they should be taking a close look at the mostly Sunni Muslim Syrian army which has been fighting, from the very start, against its mostly Sunni Muslim "jihadi" enemies.
37. They have always regarded Nusrah - our "allies" in eastern Aleppo, since they are paid by our Gulf chums and armed by us - to be more dangerous than Isis.
38. The Syrian army are right.
39. Here, at least, Hollande must surely agree with their conclusion.
40. Yet the power of illusion matters more to us.
41. If the West can't retake Mosul from Isis, they could hardly have stopped the Syrians retaking eastern Aleppo.
42. But they could easily encourage the Western media to concentrate on the beastly Russians in Aleppo rather than the fearful casualties inflicted on America's allies in Mosul.
43. The reporting on Aleppo these past weeks has sounded much like the accounts of British war correspondents in the First World War.
44. And the Russians could encourage their own tame media to concentrate on the victory at Aleppo rather than defeat at Palmyra.
45. As for Mosul, it's mysteriously vanished from our news.
46. I wonder why?

- 47. And how many died in Palmyra?
- 48. And, for that matter, how many were really captive in eastern Aleppo?
- 49. Was it really 250,000?
- 50. Or was it 100,000?
- 51. I came across a news report a few weeks ago which gave two overall statistics for fatalities in the entire Syrian war: 400,000; then, a few paragraphs later, 500,000 Well, which is it?
- 52. I'm always reminded of the Nazi bombing of Rotterdam in 1940 when the Allies announced that 30,000 civilians had been killed.
- 53. For years, this was the authentic figure.
- 54. Then after the war, it turned out that the real figure - though terrible enough - was only around 900, 33 times less than the official version.
- 55. Makes you wonder, doesn't it, what Syria's statistics really are?
- 56. And if we can't get those right, what are we doing interfering in the Syrian war?
- 57. Not that it matters.
- 58. Russia is back in the Middle East.
- 59. Iran is securing its political semi-circle of Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut.
- 60. And if the Gulf Arabs - or the Americans - want to reinvolve themselves, they can chat to Putin. Or to Assad.

**

Appendix 3: References to Muslims arranged by category of nomination/predication strategy. Instance number assigned, text (WP) number, and sentence number in which they appeared in the corpus from The Washington Post (WP).

1.1 COLLECTIVISATION

No	Deictics	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	They	25	1	16
2.	They	127	3	52
3.	They	27	1	18
4.	They	134	3	63
5.	They	204	4	33
6.	They	205	4	33
7.	They	244	6	17
8.	They	245	6	17
9.	They	246	6	18
10.	They	432	10	29
11.	They	576	13	8
12.	They	625	14	5
13.	They	634	14	9
14.	They	755	19	20
15.	They	777	19	39
16.	They	848	21	15
17.	Them	775	19	38
18.	Them	776	19	38
19.	Them	26	1	18
20.	Them	33	1	21
21.	Them	38	1	25
22.	Them	102	3	30
23.	Them	103	3	30
24.	Them	135	3	63
25.	them	137	3	63
26.	Them	138	3	63
27.	Them	221	5	25
28.	Them	224	5	36
29.	them	228	5	46
30.	Them	379	9	20
31.	Them	462	11	7
32.	Them	490	11	19

33.	Them	574	13	3
34.	Them	577	13	10
35.	Them	716	17	31
36.	Them	752	19	19
37.	Their	110	3	34
38.	Their	129	3	52
39.	their	136	3	63
40.	Their	159	4	10
41.	Their	259	6	27
42.	Their	283	7	24
43.	Their	348	8	31
44.	Their	387	9	25
45.	Their	391	9	27
46.	their	440	10	31
47.	Their	455	11	3
48.	Their [culture]	692	16	22
49.	Their	743	19	7
50.	Their	791	19	50
51.	Their	833	21	7
52.	Us	433	10	29
53.	Us	434	10	29

**

1.2 COLLECTIVISATION

No	<i>Collective Nouns</i>	Instance	Text (WP)	Sentence
		#	#	#
1.	Islamic world	2	1	2
2.	Muslim world	17	1	12
3.	Muslim world	39	1	27
4.	Muslim world	404	10	3
5.	Muslim world	243	6	16
6.	Muslim world	407	10	4
7.	Arab world	800	20	8
8.	world's Muslims	9	1	4
9.	Groups	347	8	31
10.	Groups	398	9	32
11.	Groups	666	14	41
12.	The group	489	11	19
13.	Groups	449	10	44
14.	the group	154	4	8

15.	the group	168	4	14
16.	the group's [core objective]	186	4	24
17.	the group's English-language magazine	200	4	32
18.	the groups	219	5	24
19.	Muslim groups	293	7	30
20.	Muslim groups	712	17	26
21.	Muslim group	622	14	3
22.	group of spiritual leaders	373	9	15
23.	Muslim American groups	4	1	2
24.	Muslim American groups	635	14	12
25.	American Muslim groups	664	14	41
26.	Muslim civil rights groups	5	1	3
27.	advocacy groups	319	8	13
28.	groups that practice or advocate sharia	642	14	21
29.	foreign Muslim group	295	8	1
30.	[Muslim lobbyist group] the Council on American-Islamic Relations	80	2	42
31.	Muslim individuals and groups	78	2	40
32.	religious group	442	10	32
33.	extremist groups	331	8	21
34.	extremist group	698	16	30
35.	extremist groups	705	16	46
36.	Islamic militant groups	536	12	32
37.	militant group	879	21	36
38.	militant group	333	8	21
39.	militant group	150	4	6
40.	group of militants	381	9	21
41.	terrorist groups	8	1	3
42.	terrorist groups	14	1	10
43.	terrorist groups	112	3	40
44.	terrorist groups	120	3	47
45.	terrorist groups	287	7	25
46.	terrorist group	517	12	9
47.	terrorist groups	728	18	18
48.	terrorist group	192	4	28
49.	terrorist death cults [religious group]	423	10	20
50.	Muslim organizations	270	7	13
51.	Muslim organizations	317	8	12
52.	Muslim organizations	628	14	5

53.	Muslim organizations	629	14	7
54.	advocacy organizations	326	8	16
55.	American Muslim advocacy organizations	325	8	15
56.	national organizations	753	19	19
57.	Muslim civil rights advocacy organization	773	19	32
58.	the organization or its members	170	4	14
59.	foreign terrorist organization	289	7	29
60.	foreign terrorist organization	298	8	2
61.	foreign terrorist organizations	660	14	39
62.	terrorist organization	328	8	18
63.	terrorist organization	787	19	47
64.	Muslim organizations, charities and individuals	788	19	48
65.	Egypt-based Islamist organization	13	1	8
66.	(Islamic State) organization	194	4	29
67.	oldest Islamist organizations	297	8	2
68.	Organizations	657	14	38
69.	Networks	378	9	20
70.	crime networks	119	3	47
71.	terrorist networks	98	3	22
72.	terrorist networks	504	12	3
73.	network of terrorists	865	21	25
74.	multinational Islamist party	786	19	47
75.	a moderate Islamist party	811	20	21
76.	Islamic civil society in the United States	789	19	48
77.	Islamic Society of North America	655	14	38
78.	political Islamist movements	330	8	19
79.	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	396	9	32
80.	Sunni Islamic movement	653	14	38
81.	Egypt-based Islamist movement	64	2	16
82.	global jihad movement	91	2	63
83.	cabal of Muslims	682	15	16
84.	Muslim charities	757	19	22
85.	foreign-born individuals	481	11	16
86.	Nationals	557	12	43
87.	Muslim members	766	19	29
88.	religious minority	315	8	11

89.	90 percent of the population there was Muslim	360	9	4
90.	Egypt's population of 95 million	802	20	14
91.	Community	744	19	7
92.	Communities	294	7	32
93.	communities	278	7	20
94.	[large] Muslim community	148	4	6
95.	Muslim community	274	7	20
96.	Muslim community	65	2	19
97.	Muslim communities	273	7	16
98.	Muslim communities	292	7	30
99.	Libyan-British community	829	21	6
100.	Libyan community	845	21	14
101.	Libyan immigrant community	851	21	17
102.	American Muslim communities	269	7	13
103.	migrant communities	711	17	21
104.	Muslim community members	533	12	29
105.	Muslim community of 4.7 million	710	17	16
106.	Nation	799	20	8
107.	Muslim nations	572	13	2
108.	Muslim-majority nations	510	12	4
109.	Middle Eastern nations	733	18	21
110.	alliance of nations	117	3	47
111.	People	476	11	12
112.	People	665	14	41
113.	People	667	14	42
114.	People	61	2	10
115.	People	509	12	4
116.	People	542	12	36
117.	People	607	13	31
118.	[innocent] people	613	13	39
119.	people	488	11	19
120.	people [in imminent peril]	620	13	44
121.	people in Central Asia	395	9	31
122.	people from the Middle East	376	9	19
123.	[a messianic mass movement of evil] people	37	1	25
124.	[a messianic mass movement of evil] people	232	6	8
125.	thousands of people	304	8	8

126.	1.7 billion people	264	19	11
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1.3 COLLECTIVISATION

No	<i>Collective Proper Nouns</i>	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Islamic State	7	1	3
2.	Islamic State	97	3	15
3.	Islamic State	82	2	46
4.	Islamic State	83	2	47
5.	Islamic State	729	18	18
6.	Islamic State	142	4	1
7.	Islamic State	804	20	17
8.	Islamic State	820	20	31
9.	Islamic State	145	4	4
10.	Islamic State	151	4	7
11.	Islamic State	153	4	8
12.	Islamic State	697	16	30
13.	Islamic State's	161	4	11
14.	Islamic State	175	4	17
15.	Islamic State	178	4	19
16.	Islamic State	179	4	20
17.	Islamic State	190	4	27
18.	Islamic State	198	4	31
19.	the Islamic State	206	4	33
20.	Islamic State leaders	217	5	23
21.	the Islamic State	235	6	9
22.	the Islamic State	236	6	12
23.	Islamic State	261	6	28
24.	Islamic State	303	8	8
25.	Islamic State	311	8	9
26.	the Islamic State	401	9	35
27.	[Islamic State]	412	10	14
28.	Islamic State	446	10	38
29.	Islamic State	451	10	44
30.	Islamic State	487	11	19
31.	Islamic State	497	11	23
32.	Islamic State	559	12	44
33.	Islamic State	561	12	45
34.	Islamic State	581	13	12

35.	Islamic State	598	13	18
36.	the Islamic State	633	14	9
37.	Islamic State	725	18	9
38.	Islamic State	883	21	37
39.	Islamic State	365	9	11
40.	ISIS	128	3	52
41.	ISIS	174	4	17
42.	ISIS's perspective	181	4	22
43.	ISIS's project	185	4	23
44.	ISIS	276	7	20
45.	ISIS	306	8	9
46.	ISIS	310	8	9
47.	ISIS	516	12	8
48.	ISIS	519	12	12
49.	Muslim Brotherhood	12	1	8
50.	Muslim Brotherhood	810	20	21
51.	Muslim Brotherhood	785	19	47
52.	Muslim Brotherhood	63	2	15
53.	Muslim Brotherhood	67	2	22
54.	Muslim Brotherhood	254	6	23
55.	Muslim Brotherhood	288	7	29
56.	Muslim Brotherhood	296	8	2
57.	Muslim Brotherhood	299	8	3
58.	Brotherhood	301	8	5
59.	Muslim Brotherhood as an adversary	302	8	7
60.	Muslim Brotherhood	305	8	8
61.	Muslim Brotherhood	309	8	9
62.	Muslim Brotherhood	312	8	10
63.	Muslim Brotherhood	316	8	12
64.	Muslim Brotherhood	327	8	18
65.	Muslim Brotherhood	329	8	19
66.	Muslim Brotherhood	337	8	22
67.	Muslim Brotherhood	341	8	23
68.	the Brotherhood	342	8	29
69.	Muslim Brotherhood	652	14	38
70.	Brotherhood	658	14	38
71.	Brotherhood	659	14	39
72.	al-Qaeda	216	5	23
73.	al-Qaeda	730	18	18

74.	al-Qaeda in Iraq	99	3	22
75.	al-Qaeda	234	6	9
76.	al-Qaeda	262	6	28
77.	al-Qaeda	275	7	20
78.	al-Qaeda	308	8	9
79.	al-Qaeda	335	8	21
80.	al-Qaeda	344	8	31
81.	al-Qaeda	418	10	18
82.	al-Qaeda	445	10	38
83.	al-Qaeda	450	10	44
84.	al-Qaeda	526	12	20
85.	al-Qaeda	631	14	9
86.	Taliban	345	8	31
87.	Taliban's	349	8	31
88.	Taliban	397	9	32
89.	the Taliban	421	10	18
90.	Taliban after the Sept. 11, 2001	734	18	33
91.	Council on American-Islamic Relations	320	8	13
92.	Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)	624	14	4
93.	Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)	774	19	33
94.	CAIR	627	14	5
95.	CAIR	632	14	9
96.	CAIR	654	14	38
97.	Hamas	334	8	21
98.	Hamas	343	8	31

**

2.1 SPATIALISATION

No	<i>Toponyms</i>	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Iran	115	3	47
2.	Iran	727	18	17
3.	Iran's ambitions	732	18	19
4.	Iran	420	10	18
5.	Iran	437	10	30
6.	Iran	464	11	7
7.	Iran	585	13	14
8.	Iran as existential threats	207	5	2

9.	distrust of Iran	208	5	3
10.	Iran and the threat of terrorism	211	5	15
11.	threat posed by Iran	213	5	18
12.	Iran will cheat	215	5	20
13.	conflict with Iran	227	5	45
14.	challenge Iran	237	6	15
15.	US hostility to Iran	253	6	23
16.	Egypt	428	10	24
17.	Egypt	472	11	8
18.	Egypt	663	14	40
19.	Egypt	796	20	3
20.	Egypt	807	20	19
21.	Egypt	808	20	20
22.	Egypt	817	20	26
23.	Egypt	336	8	22
24.	Egypt	505	1	36
25.	Egypt	843	6	19
26.	Egypt (U.S. allies)	485	11	18
27.	Egypt	23	6	19
28.	Syria	286	7	25
29.	Syria	491	11	19
30.	Syria	592	13	15
31.	Syria	618	13	42
32.	Syria	720	17	41
33.	Syria	411	10	11
34.	Syria	465	11	7
35.	Syria	586	13	14
36.	Saudi Arabia	426	10	24
37.	Saudi Arabia	471	11	8
38.	Saudi Arabia (U.S. allies)	483	11	18
39.	Saudi Arabia	523	12	19
40.	Saudi Arabia	662	14	40
41.	Saudi Arabia	252	6	23
42.	Saudi Arabia	340	8	22
43.	Iraq	410	10	11
44.	Iraq	436	10	30
45.	Iraq	463	11	7
46.	Iraq	492	11	19
47.	Iraq	503	12	3

48.	Iraq	511	12	4
49.	Iraq	539	12	33
50.	Iraq	540	12	34
51.	Iraq	550	12	41
52.	Iraq	560	12	45
53.	Iraq's security partnership	571	12	48
54.	Iraq	584	13	14
55.	Iraq	721	17	41
56.	Libya	468	11	7
57.	Libya	589	13	14
58.	Somalia	469	11	7
59.	Somalia	590	13	14
60.	Yemen	466	11	7
61.	Yemen	587	13	14
62.	Sudan	467	11	7
63.	Sudan	588	13	14
64.	Pakistan	427	10	24
65.	Pakistan	525	12	20
66.	Texas [Muslims]	623	14	3
67.	Texas [Muslim]	771	19	32
68.	United Arab Emirates	339	8	22
69.	United Arab Emirates (U.S. allies)	484	11	18
70.	Jordan	473	11	8
71.	Middle East's strongmen	52	1	40
72.	Middle East's rotting autocracies	229	6	3
73.	the Muslim Middle East	265	6	30
74.	Middle East experts	670	14	44
75.	the Middle East	414	10	15
76.	Country	545	12	37
77.	Country	477	11	12
78.	Countries	260	6	27
79.	war-torn country	617	13	42
80.	newly formed countries	380	9	20
81.	countries harbor the greatest threat	593	13	15
82.	countries where the threat is high	281	7	22
83.	partner countries	282	7	24
84.	terror-threat countries	285	7	25
85.	[international alliance of evil] countries	114	3	44

86.	Muslim countries	31	1	21
87.	Muslim countries	661	14	40
88.	Muslim countries	409	10	11
89.	countries	676	15	2
90.	Countries	425	10	24
91.	Countries	461	11	7
92.	Countries	651	14	32
93.	certain countries	459	11	5
94.	seven countries	520	12	13
95.	Muslim-majority countries	648	14	30
96.	Muslim-majority countries	739	19	4
97.	Muslim-majority countries	763	19	25
98.	majority-Muslim countries	637	14	15
99.	countries	521	12	13
100.	countries connected to the Sept. 11, 2001	524	12	19
101.	Muslim-majority countries	675	15	2
102.	Muslim-majority countries	470	11	8
103.	Muslim-majority countries	474	11	8
104.	Muslim-majority countries	643	14	21
105.	Muslim society in the United States	765	19	28
106.	North Africa countries	556	12	43
107.	Lebanon (U.S. allies)	486	11	18
108.	Kyrgyzstan	368	9	11
109.	Gulf	555	12	43
110.	North Africa countries	556	12	43
111.	religious state in which sharia law was implemented	382	9	21
112.	a caliphate	124	3	49
113.	Iraq and Syria	193	4	28
114.	Arab states	6	1	3

**

2.2 SPATIALISATION

No	Anthroponyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Muslim citizens	30	1	20
2.	Muslim citizens	535	12	30
3.	citizens of [seven countries]	583	13	14
4.	natural citizens of the caliphate	182	4	22
5.	average citizens	242	6	16

6.	whose citizens	429	10	24
7.	whose citizens	460	11	5
8.	citizens of certain countries	500	11	25
9.	U.S. citizen or resident	531	12	28
10.	citizens [of seven Muslim-majority countries]	647	14	30
11.	citizens [of seven Muslim-majority countries]	738	19	4
12.	Manchester resident	840	21	12

**

3.1 DE-SPATIALISATION

No	de-toponymic anthroponyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	American Muslims	22	1	15
2.	American Muslims	32	1	21
3.	American Muslims	742	19	7
4.	American Muslims	43	1	35
5.	American Muslims	313	8	11
6.	American Muslims	746	19	9
7.	American Muslims	747	19	12
8.	American Muslims	748	19	16
9.	U.S. Muslims	530	12	28
10.	U.S. Muslims	701	16	33
11.	U.S. Muslims	737	19	1
12.	Syrians	494	11	21
13.	Syrian	580	13	12
14.	Syrians	597	13	18
15.	Syrians	600	13	19
16.	Syrians	603	13	24
17.	Syrian [refugees]	604	13	27
18.	Syrian [immigrants]	696	16	29
19.	Syrians	599	13	19
20.	Iraqi	350	8	31
21.	Iraqi [leader Saddam Hussein]	419	10	18
22.	Iraqi	512	12	4
23.	Iraqis	541	12	36
24.	Iraqi	543	12	37
25.	Iraqis	546	12	37
26.	Iraqi	547	12	41
27.	Iraqi	549	10	30
28.	Iraqi	553	12	42
29.	Iraqis	554	12	43
30.	Iraqi [forces]	562	12	46
31.	Iraqi	568	12	48

32.	Iranians	121	3	48
33.	Iranian	731	18	18
34.	Iranians	126	3	51
35.	Iranian [influence]	735	18	39
36.	Iranian[-backed terrorism]	726	18	9
37.	Iranian [aggression]	214	5	19
38.	Iranian [seizure of American sailors]	225	5	42
39.	Iranian [hostility]	226	5	43
40.	Iranian	438	10	31
41.	German	255	6	25
42.	Egyptian	290	7	29
43.	Egyptian	805	20	17
44.	Central Asian Muslims	364	9	10
45.	Central Asians	375	9	19
46.	Middle Eastern [allies]	3	1	2
47.	Middle Eastern [leaders]	44	1	36
48.	Palestinians	231	6	4
49.	Palestinian	332	8	21
50.	Turkmenian	358	9	2
51.	Pakistani	163	4	12
52.	European Muslims	195	4	29
53.	Western Muslims	263	6	28
54.	Turkish	366	9	11
55.	Muslim Virginians	745	19	8
56.	Libyan	862	21	23

**

4.1 EXPLICIT DISSIMILATION

No	xenonyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Aliens	59	2	3

**

5.1 SOMATISATION

No	Gerontonyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	young man	835	21	8
2.	young man	826	21	4
3.	young men's mother	858	21	22
4.	young [British jihadist]	880	21	36
5.	younger brother's Facebook	882	21	37
6.	younger brother	877	21	35
7.	Youngsters	844	21	14
8.	Teenager	841	21	13
9.	Salman Abedi, 22,	827	21	5
10.	Salman's 20-year-old brother Hashem	825	21	4

11.	youth - an 18-year-old	839	21	12
12.	Mohammad Fadi, 25,	886	21	39
13.	Children	615	13	39

**

5.2 SOMATISATION

No	Genderonyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	the man	165	4	12
2.	Muslim man	196	4	30
3.	Muslim men	501	11	26
4.	women who wear a burqa	256	6	25
5.	Women	606	13	29
6.	Women	614	13	39
7.	Women	722	17	44
8.	Muslim women	723	17	45
9.	Muslim women with headscarves	714	17	30
10.	Women	717	17	34
11.	Muslim Women	772	19	32

**

6.1 CULTURALISATION

No	Ethnonyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Uzbek (cotton grower)	356	9	2
2.	(Shami-damulla) an Uzbek	372	9	14
3.	ethnic Uighur	367	9	11
4.	Kurdish	513	12	4
5.	Arabs	736	18	40
6.	Arab	761	19	25

**

6.2 CULTURALISATION

No	Religionyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Thousands of Muslims	390	9	27
2.	25 percent of Muslims surveyed supported violence against Americans	87	2	60
3.	51 percent think Muslims should have the choice of being governed by sharia in America	88	2	60
4.	all Muslim immigration	58	2	3
5.	all Muslims	16	1	11
6.	local Muslim	272	7	16
7.	Muslims in America	770	19	32
8.	Muslim fears	1	1	1

9.	fear of Muslims	10	1	6
10.	Muslims	15	1	11
11.	ordinary Muslims	36	1	23
12.	most Muslims	41	1	29
13.	Muslim leaders	18	1	13
14.	Muslim leaders	795	20	3
15.	Muslim leaders	656	14	38
16.	Muslim leaders	792	20	2
17.	Muslim leaders	700	16	33
18.	target Muslims	53	1	40
19.	Muslims	56	1	42
20.	secret Muslim	62	2	14
21.	Muslims	68	2	25
22.	Muslim	72	2	28
23.	Muslims	77	2	40
24.	Muslims	81	2	43
25.	Muslims	86	2	60
26.	Muslims	90	2	63
27.	Muslims	113	3	43
28.	Muslims	143	4	1
29.	Muslims	146	4	4
30.	Muslims	155	4	8
31.	Muslims	184	4	23
32.	Muslims	187	4	24
33.	Muslims	189	4	25
34.	faithful Muslims	199	4	31
35.	Muslims	202	4	32
36.	Muslims	203	4	33
37.	Muslims	210	5	13
38.	Muslim	230	6	4
39.	Muslims	257	6	27
40.	Muslims	266	7	2
41.	Muslims	280	7	21
42.	Muslims	318	8	12
43.	Muslims	321	8	13
44.	Muslims	361	9	5
45.	Muslim [rituals]	362	9	6
46.	[radical] Muslims	377	9	20
47.	[Pious] Muslims	386	9	25
48.	Muslims	816	20	24
49.	Muslims	756	19	22
50.	Muslims	758	19	24
51.	Muslims	759	19	24
52.	Muslim	760	19	25
53.	Muslims	764	19	27

54.	[pop-culture-savvy] Muslims	778	19	39
55.	Muslims	790	19	50
56.	Muslims	706	16	47
57.	[conservative] Muslims	715	17	31
58.	Muslims	724	17	47
59.	Muslim [ban]	740	19	5
60.	Muslims	741	19	5
61.	Muslims	749	19	17
62.	Muslims	750	19	18
63.	Muslims	754	19	20
64.	Muslims	674	14	47
65.	Muslims	677	15	4
66.	Muslims	678	15	12
67.	[practicing] Muslim	683	15	19
68.	Muslims	686	15	32
69.	[secret plot by] Muslims	688	16	12
70.	Muslims	690	16	20
71.	Muslims	691	16	21
72.	[trans] Muslim	693	16	26
73.	Muslims	702	16	40
74.	Muslims	704	16	45
75.	Muslims	389	9	26
76.	mainstream Muslims	393	9	30
77.	Muslim (ban)	443	10	33
78.	Muslim (ban)	453	11	2
79.	Muslim (ban)	457	11	4
80.	Muslim (ban)	478	11	14
81.	Muslim (ban)	480	11	15
82.	Muslims	499	11	23
83.	Muslims	502	11	30
84.	Muslims coming into our country	514	12	6
85.	galvanize Muslims	518	12	9
86.	Muslims	528	12	27
87.	Muslims	529	12	27
88.	Muslim	575	13	7
89.	Muslims	578	13	11
90.	Muslims	582	13	12
91.	Muslim	640	14	18
92.	former Muslim	641	14	18
93.	demonizes Muslims	645	14	27
94.	Muslims [hide the truth in a bid to destroy the country]	646	14	28
95.	Muslim [ban]	649	14	30
96.	Muslim [ban]	650	14	31
97.	all practicing Muslims adhere to sharia	689	16	14

98.	a Muslim who claims to follow sharia	673	14	46
99.	sharia-compliant Muslim	668	14	43
100.	Shiite	552	12	42
101.	Shiite (political peers)	566	12	47
102.	Shiite (militias)	351	8	31
103.	Shiite (militias)	239	6	16
104.	Sunni (terrorists)	241	6	16
105.	Yazidis	496	11	23
106.	practitioners who believe in one God	679	15	13
107.	believers	363	9	8

**

6.3 CULTURALISATION

No	Primitivisation	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	oppression of women	69	2	26
2.	fanatical killers acting on behalf of a failed civilization	104	3	30
3.	a "tribal cult"	106	3	31

**

7.1 ACTIONALISATION/PROFESSIONALIZATION

No	Actionyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Muslim immigrants	60	2	10
2.	Muslim immigration	149	4	6
3.	Muslim immigration	284	7	25
4.	Muslim immigration to the United States	694	16	27
5.	Immigrants	267	7	10
6.	Immigrant	92	2	64
7.	Immigrants	452	11	1
8.	Immigrants	454	11	3
9.	Immigrants	448	10	43
10.	Immigrants	595	13	17
11.	Immigrants	695	16	29
12.	Immigrants	29	1	19
13.	Muslim immigrants	11	1	7
14.	Immigrants	762	19	25
15.	Immigrants	158	4	10
16.	all immigrant and non-immigrant entry of travellers	458	11	5
17.	Migrants	160	4	10
18.	Migrants	718	17	40
19.	1 million mostly Muslim migrants	707	17	3
20.	Refugees	608	13	32

21.	Refugees	610	13	35
22.	Refugees	611	13	36
23.	Refugees	784	19	43
24.	Refugees	579	13	11
25.	Refugees	591	13	15
26.	Refugee	594	13	15
27.	Refugees	596	13	17
28.	Refugee	475	11	10
29.	Refugees	495	11	22
30.	refugees from Iraq	522	12	13
31.	refugee flows to the West	538	12	32
32.	Refugee	183	4	23
33.	Refugees	268	7	10
34.	Muslim refugees	415	10	15
35.	Muslim refugees	644	14	21
36.	Refugees	447	10	43
37.	Muslim refugees	157	4	10
38.	Refugees	424	10	21
39.	Refugees	630	14	7
40.	Refugees	621	13	46
41.	refugees	612	13	38
42.	Syrian refugees	40	1	28
43.	Syrian refugees	180	4	21
44.	Syrian refugees	456	11	3
45.	Syrian refugee	493	11	21
46.	Syrian refugees	605	13	27
47.	Refugees	591	13	15
48.	all refugees	408	10	11
49.	all refugees	638	14	15
50.	Refugee	687	16	7
51.	5 million registered as refugees	601	13	19
52.	asylum seeker	164	4	12
53.	asylum seekers	709	17	8
54.	asylum seekers	719	17	41
55.	Muslim neighbour	703	16	42
56.	Muslim neighbours	783	19	42

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7.2 ACTIONALISATION/PROFESSIONALIZATION

No	Praxonyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan	45	1	36
2.	President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi	291	7	29
3.	President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi	338	8	22

4.	President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi	803	20	16
5.	Islamist President Mohamed Morsi	814	20	22
6.	then-President Islam Karimov	384	9	23
7.	Muslim religious leaders	671	14	44
8.	Muslim community leaders	532	12	28
9.	religious leaders	534	12	30
10.	Muslim community leaders	314	8	11
11.	Muslim American leaders	42	1	34
12.	leader of a mosque	507	12	3
13.	Abed A. Ayoub, the legal and policy director for the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee	479	11	14
14.	legal director	324	8	15
15.	former executive director of CAIR's Tampa chapter	639	14	16
16.	the co-director	76	2	37
17.	the lead author of "Fear, Inc.	681	15	15
18.	the author of "Islamic Exceptionalism	685	15	24
19.	Columnists such as Wajahat Ali	781	19	41
20.	Muslim journalists or comedians	751	19	19
21.	Islamic scholars	669	14	44
22.	Islamic scholars	699	16	31
23.	religious and legal scholars	71	2	28
24.	Islamic legal scholar	74	2	29
25.	Saad al-Hadithi, a spokesman for Abadi	558	12	44
26.	Ira Mehlman, a spokesman for the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)	619	13	43
27.	Ahmed Dagdoug, a spokesman for the Libyan counterterrorism Reda Force	861	21	23
28.	Libyan official	860	21	22
29.	Muslim elected officials	768	19	30
30.	Libyan officials	875	21	34
31.	imam and president of Washington's Masjid Muhammad	20	1	14
32.	moderate imams and leaders	369	9	12
33.	imam of al-Azhar, Egypt's highest Islamic authority	798	20	6
34.	Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, the grand imam of al-Azhar Sunni Muslims	821	20	32
35.	exiled Turkish cleric	49	1	37
36.	Cleric	551	12	42
37.	Driver	171	4	15

38.	Driver	173	4	16
39.	driver	176	4	19
40.	professional bombmaker	828	21	5
41.	Bombmaker	867	21	27
42.	Sahar Aziz, a law professor	672	14	46
43.	Preachers	392	9	28
44.	Wajahat Ali, a writer, lawyer	680	15	15
45.	Burhan Kesici, chairman of the Islamic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany	713	17	27
46.	Hillary Clinton aide Huma Abedin	322	8	14
47.	[longtime Hillary Clinton aide] Huma Abedin	79	2	41
48.	Fawzi Haffar, a trustee at the center	769	21	47
49.	Iraqi and Afghan partners	222	5	27
50.	hidden U.S. partners	506	12	3
51.	Lawmakers	435	10	30
52.	Lawmakers	548	12	41
53.	Ambassador	569	12	48
54.	Libyan authorities	856	21	21
55.	Muslim staffers	767	19	30
56.	Libyan police force	870	21	30
57.	Tajikistan's elite police force	400	9	35
58.	head of a Middle East intelligence service	508	12	3
59.	cotton grower	357	9	2
60.	Gardener	359	9	2
61.	political peers	567	12	47
62.	Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi	544	12	37

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8.1 MILITARISATION

No	Militarionyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	militants infiltrating the country	66	2	21
2.	Militants	565	12	47
3.	Islamic State militants	818	20	29
4.	Islamist militants	794	20	2
5.	Islamic State militants	797	20	4
6.	Islamist militants	708	17	4
7.	Islamic militant	527	12	25
8.	the militants	498	11	23
9.	militants took local authorities hostage	383	9	22
10.	Shiite militias	352	8	31
11.	Shiite militias	238	6	16

12.	jihadi armies	94	3	14
13.	the Mahdi Army	354	8	31
14.	Islamic State fighters	399	9	33
15.	Fighters	537	12	32
16.	soldier of the Islamic State	144	4	2
17.	soldier of the Islamic State	166	4	13
18.	anti-American forces	118	3	47
19.	Iraqi forces	431	10	27
20.	Iraqi forces	563	12	46
21.	America's most lethal enemy	403	10	2
22.	the enemy	416	10	17
23.	the enemy	417	10	18
24.	the enemy	422	10	20
25.	a shared enemy	122	3	48
26.	enemies	100	3	26
27.	enemy	101	3	28
28.	enemies	108	3	33
29.	enemy	116	3	47
30.	Enemy	223	5	36
31.	enemy	402	10	1
32.	the common enemy	131	3	54
33.	Enemy	140	3	66
34.	ruthless enemy	209	5	6
35.	evil enemy	212	5	16
36.	the enemies	405	10	4
37.	our enemies	34	1	21
38.	the enemy forces	141	3	66
39.	"enemy alliance"	95	3	15
40.	enemy alliance	123	3	49
41.	Sissi led a military coup	812	20	22
42.	Peace Brigades	346	8	31
43.	Peace Brigades	353	8	31
44.	tactical allies in the civilizational war	249	6	18
45.	active-service military	24	1	16

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9.1 SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION

No	Negationyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	illegal	59	2	3

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9.2 SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION

No	Criminonyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Terrorist	111	3	36
2.	terrorists [would soon begin targeting the West]	201	4	32
3.	Terrorists	220	5	25
4.	Terrorists	233	6	9
5.	Terrorist	147	4	5
6.	Terrorist	169	4	14
7.	Perpetrators	172	4	16
8.	9/11 hijackers	482	11	18
9.	19 hijacker	430	10	25
10.	suicide bombers	801	20	9
11.	suspected bomber	823	21	1
12.	the gunmen	84	2	47
13.	Assailant	162	4	11
14.	the attacker	167	4	13
15.	bad actors	279	7	20

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9.3 SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION

No	Negative ideologonyms	Instance #	Text (WP) #	Sentence #
1.	Jihadis	125	3	51
2.	Jihadists	156	4	8
3.	jihadists	105	3	31
4.	jihadists	188	4	25
5.	Jihadists	251	6	19
6.	Jihadists	258	6	27
7.	[young] British jihadist	881	21	36
8.	jihadists [wearing suits]	626	14	5
9.	cultural jihadists	636	14	12
10.	jihadist Islamic fascism	444	10	37
11.	jihadist ideology	177	4	19
12.	Extremists	439	10	31
13.	extremist [violence in God's name]	793	20	2
14.	violent extremists	133	3	63
15.	religious extremists	139	3	65
16.	religious extremists	822	20	33
17.	the extremists in Iraq and Syria	218	5	23
18.	radical Islamist[-based threat picture]	271	7	15
19.	Radical Islamist	132	3	56
20.	radical Islamists	35	1	23
21.	radical Islamists	609	13	35

22.	true Radical Islamists	107	3	31
23.	radical Islamist terrorists	406	10	4
24.	radical Islamist terrorists	413	10	15
25.	Islamist demonstrators	385	9	23
26.	Islamist agenda	85	2	53
27.	violent Islamist	300	8	3
28.	Radicals	277	7	20
29.	Radicals	355	9	1
30.	Radicals	394	9	30
31.	Radical	93	3	3
32.	Radical	96	1	23
33.	Radical	307	8	9
34.	Radical Islamic terrorists	109	3	34
35.	radical Islamic terrorists	573	13	2
36.	Sunni terrorists	240	6	16
37.	fundamentalist leaders	370	9	13
38.	Fundamentalists	374	9	19
39.	Islamic supremacist	89	2	62
40.	authoritarian populist	55	1	41
41.	Dictators	247	6	18
42.	Monarchs	248	6	18
43.	Autocrats	388	9	25
44.	Followers (of Islamic State)	191	4	27
45.	supporters (of extremists)	441	10	31
46.	(Islamic State) supporters	152	4	7
47.	supporters of the Islamic State	515	12	8
48.	Muslim Brotherhood supporters	815	20	22

Appendix 4: References to Muslims arranged by category of nomination/predication strategy. Instance number assigned, text (ID) number, and sentence number in which they appeared in the corpus from The Independent (ID).

1.1 COLLECTIVISATION

No	Deictics	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	They	21.	1	9
2.	They	26.	1	12
3.	They	43.	1	22
4.	They	98.	2	15
5.	They	107.	2	20
6.	They	192.	3	33
7.	They	251.	3	63
8.	They	262.	4	13
9.	They	283.	4	31
10.	they are "allies" of the USA	299.	4	42
11.	They	301.	4	43
12.	They	310.	4	47
13.	They	311.	4	48
14.	They	325.	5	6
15.	They	340.	5	15
16.	They	345.	5	19
17.	They	372.	5	27
18.	They	380.	6	5
19.	They	453.	7	9
20.	They	458.	7	9
21.	They	508.	8	23
22.	They	510.	8	24
23.	They	516.	8	29
24.	They	523.	8	37
25.	They	525.	8	38
26.	They	527.	8	38
27.	they're	545.	9	19
28.	They	547.	9	20
29.	They	549.	9	25
30.	They	552.	9	28
31.	They	553.	9	28
32.	They	560.	10	5
33.	They	637.	12	3
34.	They	645.	12	6
35.	They	646.	12	6
36.	They	654.	12	10
37.	they're losing	659.	12	12

38.	they're going to channel	660.	12	12
39.	all they do	684.	12	28
40.	They	694.	12	32
41.	They	695.	12	33
42.	they're isolated	701.	12	35
43.	they're angry	702.	12	35
44.	they don't have a sense of identity	703.	12	35
45.	They	710.	12	37
46.	They	711.	12	38
47.	They	713.	12	38
48.	They	717.	12	41
49.	They	721.	12	42
50.	They	771.	14	19
51.	They	798.	15	24
52.	They	832.	17	14
53.	them	4.	1	3
54.	Them	48.	1	25
55.	Them	53.	1	27
56.	Them	61.	2	2
57.	Them	152.	3	14
58.	Them	169.	3	21
59.	Them	170.	3	21
60.	them	240.	3	59
61.	Them	255.	4	2
62.	Them	258.	4	9
63.	them	259.	4	9
64.	Them	309.	4	47
65.	Them	431.	6	37
66.	Them	490.	8	9
67.	Them	524.	8	38
68.	Them	543.	9	16
69.	Them	636.	12	3
70.	Them	639.	12	3
71.	Them	664.	12	15
72.	Them	667.	12	18
73.	Them	686.	12	28
74.	Them	718.	12	41
75.	Them	720.	12	42
76.	Them	762.	13	21
77.	Their	45.	1	22
78.	Their	102.	2	16
79.	Their	297.	4	42
80.	Their	344.	5	19
81.	Their	371.	5	27
82.	their	383.	6	5

83.	Their savagery	447.	7	3
84.	Theirs	460.	7	10
85.	Their	466.	7	17
86.	Their	521.	8	36
87.	Their	556.	9	31
88.	Their	661.	12	12
89.	Their	705.	12	36
90.	Their	772.	14	19
91.	their	773.	14	19
92.	Their	257.	4	5
93.	their fury has nothing to do with faith	449.	7	5
94.	We	131.	3	6
95.	We	207.	3	39
96.	We	517.	8	29
97.	We	691.	12	30
98.	We	696.	12	33
99.	We merely defend ourselves	211.	3	40
100.	We are the ones who pledge allegiance to Mohammed	583.	10	26

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1.2 COLLECTIVISATION

No	Collective Nouns	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Muslim world	373.	6	1
2.	Muslim world	388.	6	10
3.	Muslim world	420.	6	25
4.	Muslim world	444.	6	45
5.	Muslim world	522.	8	36
6.	Islamic world	411.	6	22
7.	World's Muslims	374.	6	2
8.	inspiration for such people is Wahhabism	12.	1	6
9.	People	44.	1	22
10.	People	60.	2	2
11.	People	73.	2	6
12.	People	106.	2	20
13.	People	296.	4	42
14.	People	337.	5	12
15.	People	362.	5	24
16.	People	382.	6	5
17.	People	448.	7	4
18.	People	476.	7	26
19.	People	479.	7	27
20.	People	603.	11	7

21.	People	644.	12	6
22.	People	648.	12	6
23.	People	669.	12	21
24.	People	671.	12	22
25.	People	675.	12	23
26.	People	709.	12	37
27.	“innocent people”	394.	6	11
28.	Muslim communities	15.	1	7
29.	the community	526.	8	38
30.	local Muslim communities	533.	8	44
31.	the Muslim community	534.	8	46
32.	Muslim communities	799.	16	2
33.	Muslim communities	800.	16	3
34.	Shia community	34.	1	17
35.	entire Muslim community	2.	1	2
36.	Muslim communities	320.	5	3
37.	Muslim community	515.	8	28
38.	Muslim Ummah [community]	738.	13	10
39.	Group	65.	2	4
40.	Group	109.	2	22
41.	Group	154.	3	15
42.	Groups	450.	7	8
43.	Sunni terrorist groups	623.	11	21
44.	Terrorist groups	618.	11	18
45.	extremist group	638.	12	3
46.	jihadi groups	650.	12	7
47.	jihadist groups	748.	13	15
48.	Islamic extremist group	797.	15	24
49.	Islamist opposition groups	252.	3	63
50.	isolated splinter group	36.	1	18
51.	Groups	555.	9	30
52.	small organisation	327.	5	7
53.	terrorist organisations	462.	7	14
54.	terrorist organisations	463.	7	15
55.	jihadi organisations	739.	13	10
56.	transcends organisations	486.	8	8
57.	two demonic organisations	52.	1	27
58.	The Ummah [nation]	103.	2	17
59.	Nation	101.	2	16
60.	Nations	290.	4	35
61.	Nations	273.	4	27
62.	Muslim nations	405.	6	18
63.	nations	440.	6	42
64.	Family	89.	2	10

65.	Turkey's biggest oil and media conglomerates	625.	11	24
66.	the huddled masses	293.	4	36
67.	Muslim couples	100.	2	16
68.	national Salafist-jihadi network	63.	2	3
69.	Network	72.	2	6
70.	Network	88.	2	10
71.	global network of brutality and greed	480.	7	27

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1.3 COLLECTIVISATION

No	Collective Proper Nouns	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Isis	5.	1	3
2.	Isis	6.	1	3
3.	Isis	14.	1	6
4.	Isis	18.	1	8
5.	Isis	30.	1	14
6.	Isis	39.	1	20
7.	Isis	51.	1	26
8.	Isis	64.	2	3
9.	Isis	74.	2	6
10.	Isis	82.	2	8
11.	Isis	90.	2	10
12.	Isis	119.	2	25
13.	Isis	217.	3	44
14.	Isis promises to kill another reporter	220.	3	46
15.	murderers of Isis	285.	4	31
16.	Isis	305.	4	43
17.	Isis	316.	5	1
18.	Isis	319.	5	3
19.	Isis	335.	5	11
20.	Isis	343.	5	19
21.	Isis	364.	5	25
22.	Isis's	367.	5	26
23.	Isis	369.	5	27
24.	Isis	379.	6	5
25.	Isis	417.	6	23
26.	Isis	439.	6	41
27.	Isis	451.	7	8
28.	Isis	489.	8	9
29.	Isis	554.	9	29
30.	Isis	557.	10	1
31.	Isis	558.	10	2
32.	Isis	562.	10	6

33.	Isis	566.	10	11
34.	Isis	572.	10	15
35.	Isis	587.	10	31
36.	Isis	591.	10	34
37.	Isis	592.	10	35
38.	Isis are under siege	658.	12	12
39.	Isis	663.	12	14
40.	Isis	676.	12	23
41.	Isis	683.	12	27
42.	Isis	687.	12	29
43.	Isis	690.	12	30
44.	Isis	700.	12	34
45.	Isis	704.	12	36
46.	Isis	723.	12	43
47.	Isis calls on its supporters	754.	13	17
48.	Isis	778.	15	1
49.	Isis	782.	15	4
50.	Isis	839.	17	18
51.	Isis	840.	17	18
52.	Isis capital of Raqqa	855.	17	22
53.	Isis's second success	860.	17	27
54.	Isis's "retreat"	864.	17	33
55.	Isis brigands.	865.	17	34
56.	Isis	874.	17	37
57.	Isis	122.	2	26
58.	Isis	446.	7	2
59.	Islamic State [Isis]	70.	2	5
60.	Islamic State	759.	13	21
61.	Islamic State	561.	13	16
62.	al-Qaeda	7.	1	3
63.	al-Qaeda	13.	1	6
64.	al-Qaeda	19.	1	8
65.	al-Qaeda	31.	1	14
66.	al-Qaeda	40.	1	20
67.	al-Qaeda	50.	1	26
68.	al-Qaeda	304.	4	43
69.	al-Qaeda	318.	5	3
70.	Al-Qaeda and its clones	326.	5	7
71.	al-Qaeda	334.	5	11
72.	al-Qaeda	363.	5	25
73.	al-Qaeda	370.	5	27
74.	al-Qaeda	452.	7	8
75.	Africa's branch of al-Qaeda	464.	7	16
76.	al-Qaeda	488.	8	9
77.	al-Qaeda	616.	11	18

78.	al-Qaeda	740.	13	11
79.	al-Qaeda	743.	13	12
80.	al-Qaeda	760.	13	21
81.	Taliban	487.	8	9
82.	Taliban	617.	11	18
83.	Taliban	173.	3	22
84.	Taliban	303.	4	43
85.	Taliban	461.	7	13
86.	Dar-al Harb	794.	15	21
87.	Shiite Hezbollah	385.	6	7
88.	Shiite Hezbollah	427.	6	32
89.	Shiite Houthis	429.	6	32
90.	Boko Haram has control of ancient trading routes	465.	7	17
91.	Hezbollah	468.	7	18
92.	al-Shabaab	469.	7	18
93.	Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria	582.	10	25
94.	Al-Nusra	585.	10	30
95.	Jabhat Fateh al-Sham	586.	10	30
96.	al-Nusra in Aleppo	588.	10	31
97.	Islamist Nusrah front	862.	17	32
98.	Nusrah stood to take advantage of this	863.	17	32
99.	Nusrah – our “allies” in eastern Aleppo	872.	17	37
100.	Hezbollah mendacity	867.	17	36

**

2.1 SPATIALISATION

No	Toponyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Iran	33.	1	17
2.	Iran	57.	1	28
3.	Iran	366.	5	25
4.	Iran	378.	6	5
5.	Iran	392.	6	11
6.	Iran	412.	6	22
7.	Iran	470.	7	19
8.	Iran	419.	6	24
9.	Iran	879.	17	59
10.	Iran	423.	6	32
11.	Iran	604.	11	9
12.	Syria	270.	4	23
13.	Syria	413.	6	22
14.	Syria	418.	6	23
15.	Syria	424.	6	32

16.	Syria's violence	593.	10	36
17.	Syria	606.	11	9
18.	Saudi Arabia	46.	1	24
19.	Saudi Arabia	55.	1	28
20.	Saudi Arabia	278.	4	30
21.	Saudi Arabia	354.	5	21
22.	Saudi Arabia	358.	5	23
23.	Saudi Arabia	391.	6	11
24.	Saudi Arabia	437.	6	40
25.	Saudi Arabia	608.	11	14
26.	Saudi Arabia	613.	11	17
27.	Saudi Arabia	614.	11	18
28.	Egypt	279.	4	30
29.	Egypt	286.	4	32
30.	Egypt	360.	5	23
31.	Iraq	347.	5	20
32.	Iraq	54.	1	28
33.	Lebanon	281.	4	30
34.	Lebanon	361.	5	23
35.	the Emirates	280.	4	30
36.	wealthy Emirates	288.	4	33
37.	UAE	359.	5	23
38.	Yemen	414.	6	22
39.	Sudan	605.	11	9
40.	Muslim countries	266.	4	21
41.	Muslim countries	355.	5	22
42.	the countries whose citizens	357.	5	23
43.	Muslim countries	600.	11	5
44.	countries	601.	11	6
45.	countries	276.	4	30
46.	Muslim-majority countries	594.	11	1
47.	the largest Shiite country	384.	6	5
48.	Muslims from seven countries	260.	4	10
49.	seven Muslim-majority countries	596.	11	2
50.	States	320.	5	3
51.	sectarian states	267.	4	22
52.	sovereign states	295.	4	38
53.	Gulf states	615.	11	18
54.	Gulf oil states	47.	1	24
55.	Qatar	401.	6	16
56.	"caliphate" territory	482.	7	29
57.	global caliphate	706.	12	36
58.	narcotic-fuelled gangland	483.	7	29
59.	little Shia towns	820.	17	8
60.	our Gulf chums	873.	17	37

61.	the Gulf	306.	4	45
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2.2 SPATIALISATION

No	Anthroponyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Turkish citizen	77.	2	7
2.	American citizens	263.	4	13
3.	full US citizens of Muslim origin	264.	4	14
4.	Saudi Arabian citizens	610.	11	15
5.	Citizens	277.	4	30
6.	their citizens	284.	4	31

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3.1 DE-SPATIALISATION

No	de-toponymic anthroponyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	British Muslims	512.	8	25
2.	British Muslims	629.	12	1
3.	British Muslims	484.	8	1
4.	British Muslims	631.	12	2
5.	British Muslims	634.	12	3
6.	British Muslims	725.	12	45
7.	British Muslims	643.	12	5
8.	British Muslims	506.	8	23
9.	Americans who are Muslims	265.	4	15
10.	Saudis	29.	1	13
11.	Saudi	37.	1	18
12.	Saudi hosts	712.	6	9
13.	Saudis	282.	4	31
14.	Saudi	300.	4	43
15.	Saudis	350.	5	21
16.	Saudi	352.	5	21
17.	Saudis	400.	6	16
18.	Saudis	403.	6	18
19.	Saudis	410.	6	21
20.	Saudi	626.	11	26
21.	Syrian	814.	17	5
22.	Syrian	830.	17	14
23.	Syrian	833.	17	14
24.	Syrian	834.	17	16
25.	Syrian	841.	17	19
26.	Syrians	844.	17	19
27.	Syrian	877.	17	51
28.	Syrian	878.	17	56

29.	Syrians	722.	12	42
30.	Syrians retaking eastern Aleppo	876.	17	40
31.	tens of thousands of dual-national Syrians	289.	4	34
32.	Iranian	381.	6	5
33.	Iranian	274.	4	28
34.	Iranian	275.	4	28
35.	Iranian	848.	17	20
36.	Iranian	866.	17	36
37.	German	117.	2	25
38.	German	85.	2	9
39.	Egyptian	135.	3	8
40.	Egyptian	145.	3	12
41.	Egyptian	175.	3	23
42.	Egyptian	236.	3	57
43.	Egyptian	248.	3	62
44.	Iraqis	227.	3	52
45.	Iraqis	256.	4	5
46.	Iraqi Shiites	425.	6	32
47.	Iraqi leader	348.	5	20
48.	Iraqi	851.	17	20
49.	Canadian	246.	3	62
50.	Canadian	136.	3	8
51.	Cameroonian national	87.	2	9
52.	Serbian-German national	79.	2	7
53.	Turkish	578.	10	23
54.	French	787.	15	16
55.	German Muslims	796.	15	23
56.	800 Britons	649.	12	7
57.	Lebanese	426.	6	32
58.	Yemeni	428.	6	32
59.	Afghan	850.	17	20
60.	South Asian	507.	8	23
61.	“Pakis”	509.	8	24
62.	Pakistani national	568.	10	13

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3.2 DE-SPATIALISATION

No	de-adverbial anthroponyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Outsider	505.	8	22

4.1 EXPLICIT DISSIMILATION

No	Xenonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	"other"	504.	8	22
2.	"other"	801.	16	3

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5.1 SOMATISATION

No	Genderonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Women	17.	1	7
2.	Woman	24.	1	11
3.	Woman	680.	15	16
4.	Woman	765.	14	4
5.	Woman	766.	14	6
6.	Woman	767.	14	11
7.	Woman	768.	14	13
8.	Women	807.	16	15
9.	Muslim woman	764.	14	2
10.	Muslim woman	769.	14	14
11.	Muslim woman	788.	15	16
12.	Men	838.	17	16
13.	arrested men	75.	2	7
14.	Man	118.	2	25
15.	the man	120.	2	26
16.	Men	159.	3	17
17.	a man	186.	3	27
18.	The man	196.	3	37
19.	the man	204.	3	38
20.	Man	214.	3	41
21.	Man	226.	3	51
22.	hideous man	230.	3	56
23.	a man	238.	3	58
24.	these men	239.	3	59
25.	Men	62.	2	3
26.	He's young, male	112.	2	23
27.	Muslim male	776.	14	23
28.	Muslim male	777.	14	23
29.	Female	642.	12	5

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5.2 SOMATISATION

No	Gerontonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Hasan C, a 50-year-old	76.	2	7
2.	Serbian-German national, aged 36	80.	2	7
3.	Mahmoud O, a 27-year-old	84.	2	9
4.	Ahmed FY, a 26-year-old	86.	2	9
5.	30-year-old	116.	2	25
6.	52-year-old Muslim-convert	677.	12	24
7.	16-year-old said	692.	12	30
8.	One 16-year-old interviewee	707.	12	37
9.	a 16-year-old interviewee	715.	12	40
10.	He's young, male	111.	2	23
11.	young Muslims	681.	12	26
12.	young Muslims	682.	12	27
13.	young frustrated teenagers	697.	12	33
14.	young Muslims in the UK	698.	12	34
15.	young Muslims	693.	12	32
16.	young British Muslims	714.	12	39
17.	young British Muslims	724.	12	44
18.	Young British Muslims	630.	12	2
19.	young British Muslims	633.	12	3
20.	young Muslim voices	641.	12	4
21.	young Muslims	491.	8	10
22.	young Muslims	494.	8	15
23.	young Muslims	514.	8	27
24.	young individuals	502.	8	20
25.	many young Muslims	528.	8	39
26.	young, vulnerable Muslims	530.	8	41
27.	young Muslims	537.	8	49
28.	Young	628.	12	1
29.	Young people	647.	12	6
30.	a young Boy	156.	3	16
31.	Young Muslim women	770.	14	19
32.	children	168.	3	20
33.	Children	28.	1	12
34.	the boys	716.	12	41

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6.1 CULTURALISATION

No	Ethnonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	The Arabs	97.	2	15
2.	Arabs	430.	6	37
3.	Arabs	432.	6	39

4.	the Arabs	441.	6	44
5.	Gulf Arabs	880.	17	60
6.	Serb	826.	17	12
7.	Kurdish	856.	17	22
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6.2 CULTURALISATION

No	Linguonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	German-speaking	92.	2	11
**				

6.3 CULTURALISATION

No	Religionyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	all Muslims	3.	1	3
2.	all Muslims	312.	4	48
3.	all Muslims	542.	9	15
4.	all refugees	599.	11	4
5.	all Muslims	730.	13	3
6.	1.6 billion Muslims	322.	5	4
7.	Muslims	500.	8	18
8.	48 million Muslims who live in Germany	795.	15	22
9.	Muslims	8.	1	4
10.	Muslims	104.	2	17
11.	Those Muslims who have already made it to the USA	261.	4	10
12.	Muslims	272.	4	24
13.	Muslim ones	294.	4	37
14.	Muslim	315.	5	1
15.	Muslims	336.	5	11
16.	Muslims	368.	5	27
17.	Muslim	377.	6	3
18.	Muslims	397.	6	15
19.	Muslims	399.	6	15
20.	Muslims	492.	8	10
21.	Muslims	493.	8	15
22.	Muslims	495.	8	15
23.	Muslim	501.	8	20
24.	Muslims	503.	8	22
25.	Muslim	513.	8	25
26.	Muslim	518.	8	29
27.	Muslim	519.	8	29
28.	any Muslim	520.	8	31

29.	Muslims	529.	8	39
30.	Muslims	531.	8	41
31.	Muslim	532.	8	43
32.	Muslim	535.	8	46
33.	Muslims	538.	8	49
34.	Muslims	541.	9	1
35.	Muslims	544.	9	19
36.	Muslims	548.	9	25
37.	Muslims	550.	9	27
38.	Muslim	551.	9	27
39.	Muslims	590.	10	33
40.	Muslims	670.	12	22
41.	Muslim-convert	678.	12	24
42.	Muslims	689.	12	29
43.	Muslims	728.	13	2
44.	Muslims	733.	13	8
45.	Muslims	761.	13	21
46.	many Muslims	786.	15	15
47.	Muslims	802.	16	4
48.	Muslim	804.	16	9
49.	Muslims “playing the victim	805.	16	13
50.	Muslims	806.	16	14
51.	Muslims	809.	16	20
52.	Muslims	810.	16	22
53.	Muslims	341.	5	15
54.	Muslims	811.	12	30
55.	Muslim identity	817.	14	19
56.	Muslim	793.	15	20
57.	the Muslim Sheikh of Al Azhar	402.	6	17
58.	Shia Muslims	365.	5	25
59.	Shia Muslims	422.	6	25
60.	Shia Muslims	812.	17	4
61.	Sunni Muslims	421.	6	25
62.	Sunni Muslim	868.	17	36
63.	Sunni Muslim	870.	17	36
64.	Shiite	386.	6	8
65.	Shia	442.	6	44
66.	Shia	16.	1	7
67.	Shia	22.	1	10
68.	Shia	27.	1	12
69.	Shia allies	852.	17	20
70.	Sunni	442.	6	44
71.	Sunni	387.	6	9
72.	Sunni	436.	6	40
73.	Yazidis	23.	1	10

74.	Believer	25.	1	12
75.	Wahhabis	41.	1	21
76.	Salafist	71.	2	5

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6.4 CULTURALISATION

No	Primitivisation	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Barbaric criminals"	434.	6	40
2.	Barbaric caliphate	785.	15	8
3.	monsters of cruelty and bigotry	339.	5	14

**

7.1 ACTIONALISATION/PROFESSIONALIZATION

No	Actionyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Muslim refugees	254.	4	1
2.	Syrian refugees	597.	11	4
3.	Syrian refugees	598.	11	4
4.	250,000 (or 90,000) Muslim refugees	308.	4	46
5.	Refugees	291.	4	36
6.	Refugees and visitors from seven Muslim countries	317.	5	2
7.	Migrants	602.	11	6
8.	Muslim migrants	780.	15	3
9.	Minorities	268.	4	23
10.	Immigrants	595.	11	2

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7.2 ACTIONALISATION/PROFESSIONALIZATION

No	Praxonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	President al-Sisi	138.	3	8
2.	president al-Sisi	287.	4	32
3.	ex-President Hosni Mubarak	174.	3	22
4.	Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi	146.	3	12
5.	Leader	205.	3	38
6.	Leader	66.	2	4
7.	the leaders	404.	6	18
8.	fawning leaders	443.	6	45
9.	Leaders	564.	10	8
10.	Our leaders	735.	13	9
11.	leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi	751.	13	16

12.	Muslim leaders	803.	16	8
13.	Saudi officials	620.	11	20
14.	Saudi officials	611.	11	16
15.	Saudi officials	624.	11	22
16.	Preacher	67.	2	4
17.	Preacher	99.	2	16
18.	Islamic preachers	375.	6	3
19.	Preacher	685.	12	28
20.	Journalist	126.	3	3
21.	Journalist	127.	3	3
22.	Journalists	185.	3	27
23.	Al Jazeera English TV reporter	137.	3	8
24.	exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen	574.	10	19
25.	Shia Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr	744.	13	13
26.	trained imams	665.	12	16
27.	bomb-maker	199.	3	37
28.	professor	247.	3	62
29.	Dr Imran Awan, Associate Professor of Criminology	640.	12	4
30.	Executive Director of anti-extremism think-tank Quilliam UK	656.	12	11
31.	a spokeswoman for the Union of Muslims	792.	15	20
32.	Zillur Rahman, an employment lawyer	774.	14	20
33.	head of a group	68.	2	4
34.	Colleagues	139.	3	8
35.	Essam al-Haddad, Morsi's executive aide	161.	3	17
36.	Khaled al-Qazza, Morsi's foreign affairs adviser	162.	3	17
37.	Mayor of London	540.	8	49
38.	F-16 pilot	579.	10	23
39.	Donors in Saudi Arabia	622.	11	21
40.	Hisham al Hashimi an adviser to the Iraqi government	741.	13	12
41.	ban <i>employees</i> from wearing the Islamic headscarf	775.	14	20
42.	Saddam's gas-bomb pilots	828.	17	12
43.	Iranian "advisers"	845.	17	19
44.	Iranian officer	846.	17	20
45.	Syrian officers	849.	17	20
46.	Saudi donors	353.	5	21
47.	followers on a (facebook) page	95.	2	13
48.	a boxer	198.	3	37

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8.1 MILITARISATION

No	Militarionyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Enemy	56.	1	28
2.	our enemies	409.	6	21
3.	Enemies	416.	6	23
4.	mortal jihadi enemies	859.	17	25
5.	"jihadi" enemies	871.	17	36
6.	militants Arabic	81.	2	7
7.	a thousand militants	328.	5	7
8.	Militants	329.	5	7
9.	Islamic militants	747.	13	14
10.	Islamic militants	749.	13	16
11.	Militants	755.	13	18
12.	Militants	756.	13	19
13.	Militants	757.	13	20
14.	militant groups	758.	13	21
15.	Fighters	688.	12	29
16.	legitimate resistance fighters	216.	3	42
17.	Fighters	331.	5	8
18.	Isis fighters	471.	7	19
19.	Isis fighters	627.	12	1
20.	Isis fighters	632.	12	2
21.	tens of thousands of fighters	330.	5	8
22.	returnee fighters	635.	12	3
23.	returnee fighters	652.	12	9
24.	returnee fighters	653.	12	10
25.	returnee fighters	657.	12	11
26.	returnee fighters	673.	12	23
27.	returnee fighters	674.	12	23
28.	400 returnee fighters have been jailed	651.	12	8
29.	Isis commander	726.	13	1
30.	Isis commander	727.	13	2
31.	Taliban commanders	731.	13	6
32.	Abu Omar Khorasani, a top Isis commander in Afghanistan	734.	13	8
33.	Taliban commander	737.	13	10
34.	Commander, Abu Mohammed al-Julani	589.	10	33
35.	Isis commanders	342.	5	16
36.	"the forces of good"	433.	6	39
37.	regime's forces	821.	17	10
38.	Bashar's forces	822.	17	11
39.	Nusrah and Isis forces	854.	17	22
40.	Syrian Army	837.	17	16

41.	Syrian army	857.	17	23
42.	Syrian army	869.	17	36
43.	Syrian army	875.	17	38
44.	Arab Army	835.	17	16
45.	"jihadi" armies	836.	17	16
46.	Syrian army	853.	17	21
47.	Soldiers	831.	17	14
48.	murderous foot soldiers	32.	1	14
49.	Soldiers	842.	17	19
50.	armed militia factions	253.	3	63
51.	warring militias of Libya	415.	6	22
52.	Hezbollah militia allies	843.	17	19
53.	Sunni militias	819.	17	8
54.	Syrian brigadier	815.	17	5
55.	military cadets	823.	17	11
56.	Syrian general "stupid"	847.	17	20

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9.1 SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION

No	Negationyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	the poor	292.	4	36

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9.2 SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION

No	Criminonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Terrorist	231.	3	56
2.	Terrorists	108.	2	20
3.	Terrorist	148.	3	12
4.	Terrorists	356.	5	22
5.	Terrorist	389.	6	11
6.	"Terrorists"	393.	6	11
7.	terrorists	398.	6	15
8.	Terrorists	474.	7	24
9.	Terrorists	536.	8	48
10.	Terrorist	779.	15	2
11.	Terrorist	781.	15	3
12.	Terrorists	791.	15	19
13.	her look like a terrorist	763.	14	1
14.	terrorist attackers	481.	7	28
15.	Terrorists	612.	11	16
16.	Terrorist	621.	11	20
17.	Killers	9.	1	4
18.	killers	827.	17	12

19.	bloodthirsty merciless killers	208.	3	39
20.	Killer	580.	10	24
21.	Killers	584.	10	27
22.	Prisoners	219.	3	45
23.	the prisoner	222.	3	48
24.	Prisoners	234.	3	57
25.	a number of other prisoners	183.	3	26
26.	Prisoners	151.	3	14
27.	prisoners reciting the Koran	133.	3	7
28.	Prisoners	298.	4	42
29.	Perpetrator	570.	10	14
30.	Perpetrators	571.	10	14
31.	Hijackers	609.	11	15
32.	eighteen hijackers	324.	5	6
33.	15 out of 19 of the hijackers	349.	5	21
34.	a gunman	752.	13	16
35.	Criminals	435.	6	40
36.	hardened criminals	455.	7	9
37.	Criminals	477.	7	27
38.	suicide bomber	10.	1	5
39.	bad guys	438.	6	41
40.	Gangsters	445.	7	1
41.	money launderers	456.	7	9
42.	drug lords	457.	7	9
43.	Gang	472.	7	23
44.	Traffickers	473.	7	24
45.	Addicts	478.	7	27
46.	terrorism sponsors	607.	11	9
47.	“bad guy”	818.	17	7
48.	nondescript “rebels”	825.	17	12
49.	Villains	498.	8	17

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9.3 SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION

No	Negative ideologonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	Salafi-jihadi	38.	1	19
2.	Salafi jihadis	42.	1	21
3.	Jihadi	124.	3	2
4.	Jihadis	125.	3	2
5.	jihadi struggle	149.	3	13
6.	Salafist jihadis	166.	3	20
7.	Salafi-jihadi	321.	5	4
8.	jihadi violence	96.	2	14
9.	Salafi-jihadi movements	333.	5	10

10.	Salafi-jihadi leaders	338.	5	14
11.	Jihadis	559.	10	4
12.	Jihadis	567.	10	11
13.	“jihadi” opponents	816.	17	7
14.	“jihadi” defenders	824.	17	12
15.	Sunni jihadist	742.	13	12
16.	Jihadists	241.	3	59
17.	Jihadist	546.	9	19
18.	Islamists	123.	3	1
19.	Islamists	155.	3	15
20.	Islamist prisoners	188.	3	29
21.	Islamists	213.	3	41
22.	“Islamist”	314.	4	55
23.	“Islamist extremism”	396.	6	14
24.	Islamist terrorism	376.	6	3
25.	Islamists	475.	7	26
26.	Islamist terrorist	565.	10	9
27.	moderate Islamist	746.	13	13
28.	Islamist terrorists	783.	15	4
29.	Islamist terrorist	808.	16	19
30.	young extremists	496.	8	17
31.	Extremists	497.	8	17
32.	Extremists	511.	8	24
33.	Extremist	745.	13	13
34.	“radical Islamic extremists”	313.	4	55
35.	“radical Islamic extremist”	395.	6	14
36.	Extremists from the Middle East	619.	11	19
37.	pro-Muslim Brotherhood “terrorist”	140.	3	8
38.	terrorist that exists through an ideology	485.	8	8
39.	Islamic terrorists	784.	15	7
40.	Muslim fanatics	454.	7	9
41.	Adherents to this form of jihadism	20.	1	9
42.	(Isis) Adherents	563.	10	7
43.	Isis supporters	58.	2	1
44.	Isis supporters	59.	2	2
45.	Isis supporter	115.	2	24
46.	recruit thousands more supporters (of Isis)	729.	13	2
47.	Islamic State supporters	732.	13	6
48.	member of Islamic Jihad	172.	3	22
49.	Follower of the Buddha-smashing Taliban and the antiquity-exploding Isis	177.	3	23
50.	Isis and al-Qaeda activists	332.	5	10
51.	Turkey’s autocrat-in-chief	307.	4	45

52.	Misogynist	406.	6	20
53.	Undemocratic	407.	6	20
54.	dictatorial Saudis	408.	6	20
55.	Morgan is known as “an angry and murderous radical”	179.	3	24

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9.4 SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION

No	Victimonyms	Instance #	Text (ID) #	Sentence #
1.	She was the first victim	789.	15	17