A TRANSITION FROM UN PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING: EMERGING ROLE OF UN POLICE

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Certification

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
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ABSTRACT

This research examines the UN responsiveness to post cold war conflicts and the transition of its operations from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. The study further finds out the correlation among the different aspects of the peacebuilding and the emerging role of UN police and problems in this regard. It also takes into account whether the police reforms can be achieved without an effective and independent judicial system keeping in view the ground realities and the mandate of the missions assigned by the UN Security Council.

The mandate of the missions assigned by the Security Council in the past was generally limited to the ceasefire monitoring and withdrawal of forces. Before the collapse of communism, UN interventions were restricted to the inter-state conflicts only. Now UN is taking part to resolve the intra-state conflicts and the mandate of the missions has enhanced to ensuring the law and order, supervising elections and institutional building of the states.

Peacebuilding is a complex phenomenon as it is directly related to the internal politics and multiple tasks are required to achieve the peace including raising the new institutions and reforming the existing one. A number of specialists including human rights experts, economists, administrators, governance specialists and police experts are required to achieve the objectives.

This study is partially descriptive and partially analytical. The descriptive informs on the needs created in the post cold war scenario, UN response to it and the muddled process of policy and doctrine development. Case studies of seven UN interventions including the CIVPOL personnel have been analyzed in the light of the mandate of the

missions assigned by the Security Council, to bridge the gap between the emerging phenomenon of peacebuilding and ground realities of the emerging role of police and its limitations.

It is concluded that the role of UN police is emerging due to the enhanced mandate of peace operations whereas the military is not suitable to perform the civilian duties. Training deficiencies and rapid rotation are found the main problems of the force. Finally, peacebuilding call for further reforms such as of "Judicial System" as the police reforms can not be sustainable without an effective judicial system.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
DCAF	Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ETPS	East Timor Police Service
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
FPUs	Formed Police Units
GoS	Government of Sudan
HNP	Haitian National Police
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFOR	International peacekeeping force
IMTFs	Integrated Mission Task Forces
IPTF	International Police Task Force
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
MIF	Multinational Interim Force
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PRIME	Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation
SOPs	Standard Operation Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SWAPO	Marxist South-West Africa People's Organization
TLPS	Timor Lorosa'e Police Service
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drug and Crime
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

After the end of cold war, a transition of United Nations (UN) Security Council operations can be observed to achieve peace in the world. UN is more active in its operations around the world after the collapse of communism. Total 64 interventions have been made by UN Security Council since 1948 to date (Annex A), while out of the total only 18 operations were carried out prior to 1991 and 5 of that are still ongoing.

The earlier crises were due to the wars between the states but now internal conflicts have become challenge for the international community. After the collapse of former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), the mandate of UN peace operations enhanced from inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts. The word peacekeeping or peacebuilding can not be found in the UN charter but UN is authorized under chapter VII of its charter to take decisions for action against conflicting states and parties to maintain the international peace and security.

In the UN system many organizations are taking part in the peacebuilding activities. Departments like United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN Peacemaker and United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) are participating in the peacebuilding process at different missions around the world.

1.1   Statement of the Study

The proposed study aims to examine the transition of UN Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding and the emerging role of the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL). It also identifies the

problems of UN peacebuilding interventions including UN CIVPOL employment, training, capabilities and limitations keeping in view the mandate assigned to them by the UN Security Council.

1.2   Objectives of the Study

The objective of the study is to analyze the UN responsiveness to post cold war conflicts and to find out the correlation among the different aspects of the peacebuilding. Whether the role of UN CIVPOL is emerging and on what grounds? Whether peace and sustainability of police reforms can be achieved independently or peacebuilding call for further reforms such as of "Judicial System"?

1.3   Justification of the Study

The role of United Nations is expanding as the world has become a global village. Presently the world is dominated by the only super power but the emerging concept of globalization and the collective interests of the human kind demand the collective efforts for peace, security and development. The nations or parties who are unable to settle their disputes and lack the resources in this regard call for UN intervention. Limited research has been made on the different aspects of the peacebuilding; therefore, this emerging phenomenon needs more research and analysis.

Developing countries and particularly Muslim states i.e. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan and Nigeria are the leading troops contributing states. The peacebuilding organizational committee includes top five providers of military personnel and civilian

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police. This research provides an analysis of the post conflict peacebuilding and UN CIVPOL issues, therefore, may be beneficial for the leading contributing countries.

1.4 Theoretical framework

During the 1990s, normative developments took place under the UN umbrella that recognized peacebuilding as an international concern and the emerging normative framework legitimized humanitarian interventions.[1] The term peacebuilding was used officially after the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali mentioned it in June 1992.

The peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities have been differentiated to a large extent but the terms are still being used interchangeably. Peacekeeping is the separation of forces through military operations and to observe ceasefire after interstate wars while peacebuilding is a broader phenomenon. The aim of the peacebuilding activities is post conflict disarmament, humanitarian assistance, institution building and reforms, conducting elections, drafting or amending constitutions and assisting transitional justice systems.[2] In some operations they both work together as peacekeepers support peacebuilders in complex operations and peacebuilders provide an exit to the peacekeepers.[3]

This research is concerned about the emerging role of UN police in the peacebuilding operations and doctrine development in this regard. Realists believe in the supremacy of state power but the assumption that states always seek their narrow

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[1]Necla Tschirgi, "Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?" *International Peace Academy*, Studies in Security and Development, New York, December 2003, 4.
[2] Richard Ponzio, "The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: origins and initial practice," *Disarmament Forum*, No.2 (2007), 6.
[3] United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 55th Session, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (A/55/305–S/2000/809), 21 August 2000, 5.

interests has been leveled to a great extent.[4] Institutionalists believe in the cooperation of the world and the present study is an analysis of the collective efforts of the world under United Nations mandate for peacebuilding in the countries recovering from the conflicts.

The mandate of UN missions vary from observing a situation while maintaining the territorial integrity of a state, withdrawal of foreign forces, rehabilitation of refugees, ensuring law and order and institution building of a state. Police reform or building a new police force has become an essential part of the institution building and reforms. The UN CIVPOL component was first time included in United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) but large scale deployment started in 1989 after a gap of 25 years. This study is an attempt to explain the peacebuilding phenomenon and an analysis of post cold war operations where UN police was deployed and assigned a mandate by the Security Council.

1.5   Literature Review

Massive flow of literature may be observed in the recent years on the subject in a holistic perspective of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In the earlier literature the terms peacekeeping and peacebuilding were used interchangeably. Though books are limited in this regard but journal articles, working papers, reports and documents of UN and other institutes are available. Limited work is also available on the performance of UN CIVPOL. In this study, particularly recent available material was reviewed since some of the UN operations including CIVPOL personal are still going on. Selected works are discussed below keeping in view the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding,

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[4] Robert Jervis, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), 987.

multidirectional peacebuilding process and doctrine development of international policing.

1.5.1 International Security, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

"New millennium, new perspectives: The United Nations, security, and governance" is a good edited work by Thakur and Newman.[5] Edward Newman has presented his observations and synthesis of security and governance in the new millennium. Melon has analyzed the Security Council in the 1990s by taking into account the conflicts addressed by the Council. The author has also observed the large deployments of Blue Helmets in some of the operations and discussed the institutional development during the millennium and the path ahead.

Intervention: Trends and Challenges in "New millennium, new perspectives: The United Nations, security, and governance" written by Oudraat presents a comprehensive analysis of intervention in internal conflicts. The author has observed that after the end of cold war, the continual violent conflict in the world is internal and United Nations intervened to stop these conflicts more than ever before. The author has discussed the legal framework for the intervention in detail at UN level.

The author has also taken into account the new doctrine and legal framework for humanitarian intervention that addresses the regional organizations' intervention and post-intervention phase. While discussing the agents of intervention, the author analyses the interest of the great powers which contribute military personals or play leading role

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[5] Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman, eds., *New Millennium, New Perspectives:*
The United Nations, Security, and Governance (United Nations University Press, 2000).

during the intervention. The author observes that the leadership theoretically must be from UN Security Council but in practice it comes from individual states.

The author takes into account two coercive instruments for intervention i.e. economic sanctions and use of force, not to punish the trouble makers but to change their behaviors. Exit strategy is emphasized by the author without mixing it with exit schedule. The author suggests the involvement of regional organizations in the interventions as a key to success.

"Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding" is an edited book by Schnabel and Ehrhart.[6] The work is focused on the need and strategies to achieve the basic security environment during the post-conflict peacebuilding in the war-torn societies. The authors argue that primarily reconstruction is the responsibility of the concerned people while other nations, regional organizations, and the United Nations assist them in this regard. The role of internal and external actors is discussed in detail with an emphasis on the role of military forces. Different case studies are taken into account from Europe to Latin American countries.

"Non Military Aspects of International Security" published by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is an edited book that highlights the non military security issues related to stability and peace in the world.[7] It deals with the economic and ecological security, human rights in international security and the contribution of the United Nations and regional organizations to the collective security system.

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[6] Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., *Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding* (United Nations University Press, 2005).
[7] UNESCO studies on peace and conflict, *Non Military Aspects of International Security* (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1995).

In this book, Brauch takes into account the contributions of UN and regional organizations for collective security in European case. The author realizes that the UN is overburdened to resolve the conflicts and highlights the importance of the regional organizations to settle the disputes. The author suggests that conflict may be resolved at the lowest level therefore, there is a need to strengthen the regional organizations gradually in this regard but he do not negate the global efforts for the conflict prevention.

"Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations" is an edited book by Aoi, Coning and Thakur.[8] The authors clarify that there may be the positive, neutral and negative consequence of peacekeeping interventions but their work is focused on the negative unintended consequences of interventions only.

The authors explain that the peacebuilding process is a joint effort of internal and external actors and may have unintended consequences. The system may respond against as anticipated but it may not be regarded failure of the mission. It is also observed by the authors that generally UN interventions are expected to produce good results as these interventions are authorized by the world body. A number of cases are analyzed in the book exploring the ways to anticipate and counter the consequences.

Knight in his research article "Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research" discusses the trends in the research and establishes a link between democratic governance and peacebuilding.[9] It is an analysis of trends in the research of peacebuilding in terms of concept, aspiration, practices and reality. The researcher regards peacebuilding a complex and multidimensional exercise and acknowledges the need for coordination among

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[8] Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations* (United Nations University Press, 2007).
[9] W. Andy Knight, "Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3 (2003): 241-264.

different actors involved in the process. This article is a critical analysis of the research on the subject and do not deal directly with the UN peacebuilding initiatives.

"International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis" is a high quality research on the subject.[10] Doyle and Sambanis stress to understand the circumstances and root causes of a conflict to achieve peace and reconciliation. Different peacekeeping missions are discussed in brief. The authors explain that multidimensional peacekeeping efforts led to the emergence of peacebuilding concept. The significance of "political space" or "effective capacity" for building peace was taken into account to describe the phenomenon.

Ten policy hypotheses were built keeping in view the ethnic and religious wars and number of factions, war duration and deaths and displacements, ethnic heterogeneity, economic development level of the states, resource dependent countries and treaties and mandate of the operations. On the basis of the empirical findings, either these hypotheses were accepted or rejected or the authors had some reservations in this regard.

"Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework" is a unique research article by Benner, Binder and Rotmann on the UN capacity for organizational learning on peacebuilding.[11] The researchers argue that there is a need to develop own model for learning in international organizations as most of the work done in this regard is in the context of business organizations. The authors claim that this study is first of its own kind. Doctrine

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[10] Michael. W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No.4 (December 2000): 779-801.
[11] Throsten Benner, Andrea Binder and Philipp Rotmann, "Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework," *Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung (DSF)*, Germany, 2007.

development of the UN peacebuilding is discussed in detail in the context of organizational learning on peacebuilding.

Coning in his research article "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations" analyses the peacebuilding process and reconciliation of societies in detail.[12] The author explains the peacebuilding stabilization, transition and consolidation phases and its different dimensions. Coning advocates the enhanced civil-military coordination in peacebuilding operations in humanitarian and non humanitarian areas. It is a good work elaborating the peacebuilding phases theoretically.

"Brahimi Report" is a detailed review of the United Nation's peace activities around the world.[13] A panel of experts of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance was headed by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Ex Foreign Minister of Algeria for the practical recommendations for future peace activities. The report is a critical analysis of the past and present UN peace operations and recommendations in this regard for future interventions. The report defines the terms peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding and acknowledge that the peacekeepers and peacebuilders are partners that cannot be separated in complex operations.

The deployment of troops i.e. military and civilian police are discussed in detail including the contribution of states both in terms of men and material. The UN capacity, challenges and strategic planning in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations is analyzed thoroughly and massive reforms at the UN secretariat are suggested.

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[12] Cedric de Coning, "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations," *AJCR*, Volume 5 No. 2 (2005): 89-118.

[13] United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 55th Session, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (A/55/305–S/2000/809), 21 August 2000.

The panel reviewed the major aspects of the UN peace operations and the variables that determine the failure and success of the operations. Since the report deals more with the analysis and recommendations for practical measures of the peace operations, therefore, the political, social and cultural aspects of the peace operations are not taken into account in detail.

"The Brahimi Report: Four Years on" presents a good debate on the implementation of the Brahimi report after the fours years of its publication, held at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.[14] New political contexts after 9/11, states' policies, UN Secretariat reforms in the light of Brahimi Report, operations in Africa and future challenges for peace operations were highlighted in the workshop.

"China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations" by Yin HE is a unique review of China's inactive policy in 1970s, adjustment of its attitude in 1980s and comparatively active participation in UN peacekeeping in late nineties.[15] The author is of the view that Westphalian norms, peace enforcement notion, Taiwan question, preference to domestic affairs and "China Threat" theory were the factors that enforced China to keep low profile in this regard. It is a good analysis of Chinese role in UN peacekeeping history.

Dodson in his Review Essay "Post Conflict Development and Peace Building: Recent Research" analyses the post cold war political violence and UN peace building missions.[16] Four case studies are taken into account and the author concludes that

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[14] Thierry Tardy, "The Brahimi Report: Four Years On," *Geneva Centre for Security Policy*, 2004.
[15] Yin HE, "China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Institute for Security and Development Policy,* Sweden, Asia Paper, July 2007.
[16] Michael Dodson, "Postconflict Development and Peace Building: Recent Research," *Peace & Change*, Vol.31, Michael No.2 (April 2006): 244-252.

strengthening the institutions is a long term process. The author also observes no connection between international terrorism and political violence.

1.5.2 International Policing and Doctrine Development

Policy paper "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions" is a comprehensive work on the subject by Dr. Eirin Mobekk.[17] The work of Mobekk is exclusive in nature as it takes into account the key issues of international policing. Transition from military operation to the civilian control is discussed in detail keeping in view the possible security gap during the process. Need for the training and reformation of local forces, judicial and penal systems and traditional justice mechanisms are emphasized.

The author finds the effectiveness of international policing in the mandate and planning of the missions and the allocated resources in this regard. The cooperation and coordination among the donors is highly stressed. Mobekk has also taken into account the key issues of pre-deployment training, quality of personnel, rotation of staff and their accountability. The other issues discussed are transfer of institutional memory, regional and international capacity building and local ownership of the entire process. Practical recommendations are given in this regard while stressing on a holistic and integrated approach for the peacebuilding process.

"Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law" is a good report published by the Stimson Center. The role of UN Police in

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[17] Eirin Mobekk, "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions," *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, Policy Paper – No.9, November 2005.

modern peace initiatives is discussed in detail.[18] The mandate of the missions and problems and progress of UN police is analyzed. The need and capacity building of the police is stressed in the report. It is a detailed report of its kind exclusively dealing with the UN police and providing practical recommendations for future interventions.

The paper "Doctrine Development in the UN Peacebuilding Apparatus: The Case of UN Constabulary Police, 1999-2006" presented by Benner, Mergenthaler and Rotmann is an account of doctrine development of UN Police and an analysis of key factors that facilitated or delayed this process.[19]

The authors analyzed the doctrine development in the UN bureaucracy keeping in view the military doctrines, the organizational infrastructure for the doctrine development of UN police, the emergence of UN police and formal comprehensive doctrine. The authors assume that there was a missing link between military stabilization and state building and this need paved the way for the development and deployment of UN Police.

Post Brahimi report development was taken as a shift in the doctrine of UN constabulary. Doctrine development, formal and informal, is analyzed and it is argued that a shift in the top leadership in the UN police division in 2005 with a new focus contributed in the formal doctrine development of CIVPOL.

Rotmann in his working paper "First Steps towards a Police Doctrine for UN Peace Operations (2001-2006)" after elaborating the concept of doctrine, explains that the steps taken in response to the Brahimi report were the beginning of the actual

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[18] William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, eds., "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, Report No. 63, Rev. 2010.
[19] Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler and Philipp Rotmann, "Doctrine Development in the UN Peacebuilding Apparatus: The Case of UN Constabulary Police, 1999-2006," 29 March 2008.

development of police doctrine for UN peace operations.[20] He finally suggests that police division and department of peacekeeping should step forward to promote the doctrine further by implementing the training and evaluation system for UN police.

"United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines" is a comprehensive guideline document for the UN Civilian Police in peace operations.[21] It is also a hand book for police commissioners. The guidelines are provided in detail and may be followed keeping in view the mandate of the mission as it covers from maintaining peace to electoral assistance and institutional development of local Police.

"United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police" is another handbook that provides human rights and criminal justice principles to be promoted in peacekeeping operations. It covers the role of police, use of force, details of crimes, rights of accused while investigation and detention and trials.[22]

1.6 Research Methodology

Study an international organization and its activities is a complex task as a number of factors involve in it; which design and framework is more suitable depends on the nature of research. The emerging peacebuilding research tries to understand the ways beyond traditional peacekeeping through which sustainable peace and development and good governance can be achieved.[23] There is a need to bridge the gap between peacebuilding

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[20] Philipp Rotmann, "First Steps towards a Police Doctrine for UN Peace Operations (2001-2006)," *International Police Executive Symposium (IPES)*, Working Paper No. 18, October 2009.
[21] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Training and Evaluation Service, *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines*, December 2000.
[22] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police*," New York. 2009.
[23] W. Andy Knight, "Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3 (2003), 241.

research and practice as the literature on the subject is in developing phase and do not differentiate in the ground realities and ideal requirements in its true sense.[24]

1.6.1 Research Design

This study is partially descriptive and partially analytical. The descriptive informs on the needs created in the post cold war scenario, UN response to it and the muddled process of policy and doctrine development. Case studies of eight UN interventions including the CIVPOL personnel are analyzed in the light of the mandate of the missions assigned by the Security Council, to bridge the gap between the emerging phenomenon of peacebuilding and ground realities of the emerging role of UN police and its limitations.

In peacebuilding, progress should be observed in terms of results rather than to the material and human resources used in this regard; only training and deployment of forces does not indicate their effectiveness.[25] Several indicators are needed to understand the conflict in the local context[26] and to measure the success against the efforts and resources deployed.

In this study, the PRIME indicator (Police Reform Indicators and Measurement Evaluation), is also taken in to account to analyze the police reforms mandated by the Security Council in peacebuilding operations. The indicator provides analysis tool under four major categories i.e. performance effectiveness, management and oversight, community relations and sustainability.[27]

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[24] Ibid, 242.
[25] Craig Cohen, "Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction," *United States Institute of Peace*, Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No.1, March 2006, 2-3.
[26] Ibid, 10.
[27] Ylber Bajraktari, et al, "The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform," *Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs*, Princeton University, January 2006, 17.

1.6.2 Data Sources

The Study includes both primary and secondary source materials. Since peacebuilding is a new phenomenon and limited books are available on the subject particularly on UN CIVPOL, therefore, numerous internal documents, reports and observers' evaluations are consulted. The primary data includes UN publications and reports, Security Council documents, Department of Peacekeeping guidelines and hand books, reports of workshops and seminars, official records and the statistics available at various UN and allied websites, UN information centre, Islamabad and UN corner at National University of Modern Languages. Islamabad.

The secondary sources include books, articles, newspapers, journals, periodicals and magazines regarding the issue covering theoretical, qualitative and quantitative peacebuilding analysis and recent trends in peacebuilding research.

1.7   Limitations of the Research

This research deals with the UN peace interventions where UN CIVPOL was deployed in the post cold war period. The researcher initially intended to collect the qualitative data through semi structured questionnaires from the police officers who have served in the UN missions. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations at New York was contacted and the office was ready to help in this regard with a condition that the questionnaire would be approved prior to the circulation to verify the information requested.

The researcher made an effort to get the information regarding the training, performance, coordination, limitations and experiences of UN Police officials served at

various peace missions (Annex B). Upon receiving the questionnaire, the DPKO informed that the questionnaire is meant for field mission personnel rather for headquarter personnel who could not meet the requirements set forth for this survey. The researcher tried to contact Pakistani police official who have served in the UN police missions but they could not be available.

1.8 Organization of the Study

The peacebuilding phenomenon, emerging role of UN police and selected cases are discussed in the study. Chapter two is an analysis of the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, activities in the peacebuilding process and its dimensions. This chapter also includes the conclusions drawn by the peacebuilding researchers and brief analysis of unintended consequences of an intervention.

Chapter three presents an analysis of policy development in the realm of peacebuilding. Brahimi report is discussed with particular emphasis on the CIVPOL. The 9/11 incident shifted the attention of the world from the analysis of peacebuilding and recommendation mentioned in the report. However, the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005 may be taken as a significant step in the peacebuilding efforts to martial the resources, therefore, the PBC, its composition and future prospects are also discussed in the chapter.

Chapter four is a detailed analysis of the emerging role of the civilian police, its establishment, deficiencies and doctrine development in this regard. The security gaps of peacebuilding process and in the working of civilian police are also discussed. The top five CIVPOL contributing countries in the last ten years are also mentioned to analyze

where the contributions are coming from. Since peacebuilding is a multidimensional phenomenon and police efficiency is directly related with the existence of impartial judiciary, therefore, judicial reforms and its significance has also been discussed briefly in the chapter.

Chapter five is an analysis of the UN missions including the significant number of international civilian police. Brief background of the conflicts, mandate of the missions and role of civilian police and achievement are discussed of every mission. All operations since 1948 to date are identified in the chapter having even smallest number of CIVPOL. An analysis of the effectiveness of the mission and CIVPOL is made in the last. Chapter seven deals with the conclusions drawn from the study and proposes the future research in this regard.

CHAPTER 2:   UN Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

The earlier crisis were generally due to the war between the states but now internal conflicts, weak security mechanisms, violence against civilians and humanitarian crisis are not only indicators of a failed state but also a challenge for the international community.[28]

The United Nations, founded in 1945, has a charter to undertake wide range of actions around the world. The UN Security Council, one of the main bodies of UN, is empowered under chapter VII of its charter to take decisions for action against conflicting states and parties to maintain the international peace and security.

Total 64 peacekeeping missions have been launched to date since 1948 by the UN Security Council. The first UN mission, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), launched in May 1948 with an initial mandate to supervise the truce in Palestine, is still ongoing. "In fact, it is an issue out of which the concept of United Nations peacekeeping evolved".[29]

The recent UN peacekeeping mission, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was launched in July 2010 in the continuation of an earlier mission in Congo. More than one UN interventions can be observed in some countries in continuation of a previous mission or new with a gap e.g. five UN missions have been launched in Haiti and four in Angola.

The mandate of UN missions vary from observing a situation while maintaining the territorial integrity of a state, withdrawal of foreign forces, rehabilitation of refugees,

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[28] Espen Barth Eide, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding," in Hanna Ojanen, ed., "Peacekeeping – Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Report 14/2006, 47.
[29] United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso> (4 April 2010).

ensuring law and order, supervising elections and institution building of a state. The majority of the UN Peacekeeping Missions were launched in the post cold war period; only 18 operations were carried out prior to 1991.

Most of the UN peace missions during the cold war were limited to cease fire monitoring and withdrawal of forces. The nature of conflicts changed over the period of time and the UN peacekeeping missions have also been deployed for the resolution of intra-state conflicts. After the cold war, UN peacekeeping has been involved in implementing the peace agreements within a state to ensure the peace.[30] These tasks, directly related to internal politics, are more complex and harder to achieve because working within a local society and parties is required for the implementation of the agreements.[31]

To sustain the peace agreements, many new tasks emerged including establishing new institutions of defense, police and judiciary; reforming the existing institutions; organizing the elections and supporting constitutional drafting.[32] Such a broad mandate could not be achieved under the peace operations unless multiple programs and experts are included to cover the post conflict peace requirements. Though military remained the major component in most of the missions but human rights monitors, governance specialists, economists, administrators, police officers and communication experts were also incorporated to achieve the enhanced peacekeeping mandates.[33]

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[30] United Nations Information Service - Vienna International Centre, *60 Years United Nations Peacekeeping*, <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/60years_peacekeeping.pdf> (28 Feb. 2010), 3.
[31] William J. Durch, "UN Peace Operations and the Brahimi Report," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, October 2001, 10.
[32] Cedric de Coning, "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations," *AJCR*, Volume 5 No. 2 (2005), 98-99.
[33] United Nations Information Service - Vienna International Centre, *60 Years United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3.

The terms peacekeeping and peacebuilding are being used interchangeably as the nature of conflicts and mandate of missions require both functions simultaneously. Peacebuilding is a broader aspect of peacekeeping. It may be argued that peacekeepers maintain a secure environment in which peacebuilders work and a secure environment is created by the peacebuilders to facilitate the departure of peacekeepers.[34]

2.1   Peacebuilding

"The term 'peacebuilding' became part of the official contemporary practitioner discourse when former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali used it in *An Agenda for Peace*"[35] in June 1992. "In the late 1990s, peacebuilding increasingly became the term of choice for multidimensional and increasingly intrusive missions with the goal of stabilizing societies and states".[36]

Since the political, civil and economic Institutions generally destroy during the conflict in a society, the state also loses its control over military and police and mistrust develops between the state and society, therefore, it is also expected from the international and domestic actors to cooperate in transforming the society towards sustainable peace.[37] International community has also a moral obligation to protect

[34] William J. Durch, "UN Peace Operations and the Brahimi Report," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, October 2001, 19.

[35] W. Andy Knight, "Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3 (2003), 247.

[36] Thorsten Benner, Andrea Binder and Philipp Rotmann, "Learning to Build Peace? United Nations Peacebuilding and Organizational Learning: Developing a Research Framework," *Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung*, Germany, 2007, 11.

[37] Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., *Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding* (United Nations University Press, 2005), 5.

civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, massive killings and maltreatment, and forced migration.[38]

Peacebuilding includes a variety of tasks comprising disarmament of conflicting parties, removal of mines, refugees' repatriation, restoration of law and order, training police forces, reforming justice systems, protection of human rights, strengthening and reforming civil institutions and supervisions of elections.[39]

2.2   Dimensions of Peacebuilding

Building peace is a complex phenomenon that needs to address the causes and after effects of a conflict. Multiple short, medium and long term programs are required to achieve sustainable peace. Coordination is must among the national and international actors, both at governmental and nongovernmental level to undertake variety of programs for the reconciliation and reconstruction of the society.[40]

There are no standard operating procedures for building peace, however, some actions are needed simultaneously and in general the process may be categorized in phases. Disarmament of different factions is considered a prerequisite in state building process.

Generally peacebuilding starts after a peace agreement and pass through stabilization, transitional and consolidation phases. When a society sustains without any external support and enters into a sustainable developmental phase, the peacebuilding ends. Transitional period consists of elections and transfer of power by interim

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[38] W. Andy Knight, "Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3 (2003), 244.
[39] Ibid, 245.
[40] Cedric de Coning, "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations," *AJCR*, Volume 5 No. 2 (2005), 91-92.

government and constitutional development. The recovery also includes establishing rule of law, sustainable economic system, reconstruction and rehabilitation. The consolidation phase includes the broad range of reforms and nation building.[41]

The police and defense forces are developed gradually and internal security shifts to the local forces. The transition also involves the development of political institutions with an encouraging democratic process. The reintegration of society, rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees and reconstruction of services is the essential part of post conflict socio economic development. Ensuring human rights and reformation of judicial system is also perquisite for ensuring sustainable peace. The whole process of peacebuilding is interdependent and its all dimensions are interlinked.[42]

2.3   Peacebuilding Research

The peacebuilding requires the coordination of all parties involved and joint strategies in this regard. Some researchers are of the view that the multidimensional concept of peacebuilding includes too many things related to a number of people; therefore, it is difficult to achieve the conceptual clarity.[43] Different analysts recommend the process in different ways for future interventions keeping in view the success and failures of past missions.

Generally peacebuilding analysts propose electoral system in a country recovering from civil war.[44] Elections were considered the ultimate purpose of peacekeeping and an exit strategy in the early 1990s. It was believed that democracy established through

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[41] Ibid, 93-94.
[42] Ibid, 95-97.
[43] W. Andy Knight, "Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3 (2003), 250.
[44] Ibid, 259.

elections would restore the peace but in some places it did not work.[45] Some analysts suggest immediate transfer of power after an accord and other argue interim government before elections.[46]

Sustainable peace is a challenging task compared to defuse the tension and an end of war as peace and rebuilding is dependent on the success of all stake holders and parties involved.[47] The internal conflicts in general are due to the struggle for the control of national resources and crisis of democracy.[48] The local leaders and populace should be realized that international peacebuilding efforts are helping hand and opportunity for limited period to control their own destiny.[49]

2.4   Unintended Consequences of Interventions

Peacebuilding is a set of broad range activities in a multi-agency environment including short, medium and long term programs of complex nature to avoid the escalation of hostilities and disputes. The system responds in both expected and unexpected way to the intervention.[50] It depends on the mission mandate, perceptions and the expectations based on the past experiences and analysis. The timing of intervention and deployment may

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[45] Lakhdar Brahimi. "United Nations Peace Operations in the 21st Century: A Few Personal Thoughts," in Hanna Ojanen, ed., "Peacekeeping – Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Report 14/2006, 16.

[46] W. Andy Knight, "Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3 (2003), 257.

[47] Espen Barth Eide, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding," pages 43-52 in Hanna Ojanen, ed., "Peacekeeping – Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Report 14/2006, 47.

[48] David M. Malone. "The Security Council in the 1990s: Inconsistent, improvisational, indispensable?" in Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman, eds., *New Millennium, New Perspectives: The United Nations, Security, and Governance* (United Nations University Press, 2000), 23.

[49] Lakhdar Brahimi. "United Nations Peace Operations in the 21st Century: A Few Personal Thoughts," in Hanna Ojanen, ed., "Peacekeeping – Peacebuilding: Preparing for the Future," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Report 14/2006, 18.

[50] Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations* (United Nations University Press, 2007), 5-6.

also cause unintended consequences e.g. the deployment of the blue helmets before the fighting was over in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia caused the non adherence to the agreement of the conflicting parties and security problems for the force itself.[51]

To avoid the negative consequences of an intervention, it is of vital importance to anticipate and counter such consequences effectively to establish the credibility and legitimacy of the intervening organization and to avoid the negative impact on the societies intervened.[52] Peacekeepers support the economic and political transition from the conflict period and without the peace and secure environment, rebuilding of the societies could not be achieved during and after their departure.[53] Primarily societies are responsible for their own destiny. Finally, it is evident that the concerned societies have to bear the consequences of the conflict and the responsibility of the reconstruction[54]; the peacekeepers are the helping hands both in terms of the economic development and institutional restructuring.

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[51] United Nations Information Service - Vienna International Centre, *60 Years United Nations Peacekeeping*, 2.
[52] Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations* (United Nations University Press, 2007), 8.
[53] Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., *Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding* (United Nations University Press, 2005), 1.
[54] Ibid, 2.

CHAPTER 3: Policy Development in Peacebuilding

In March 2000 UN secretary General, Mr. Kofi A. Annan, convened a panel of experts from around the world to review the UN peace and security efforts and practical recommendations in this regard under the chair of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. In August 2000 the penal submitted a comprehensive report to the Secretary General. The Brahimi Report is discussed below briefly with an overview of the components of peacekeeping missions including Civilian Police.

3.1 Brahimi Report

The report clearly spells out that the UN failed to meet the challenges in 1990s while UN would not be able to perform future peacebuilding without improved commitment of the member states, more financial support and institutional change. There is a need to build UN capacity to deal with the complex operations and post conflict peacebuilding.[55]

The report differentiates the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding concepts by taking into account the scope of the operations. Peacemaking is an attempt to bring a halt to ongoing conflicts through mediation and diplomacy by regional and international organizations, governmental and non governmental organizations and group of states officially or unofficially. Peacekeeping is the force separation through military operations and to observe ceasefire after interstate wars. Peacekeeping also includes the joint working of civilians and military after the civil wars to build peace. Peacebuilding is a wider phenomenon that includes reintegration of the post conflict society, establishing

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[55] United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 55th Session, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (A/55/305–S/2000/809), 21 August 2000, 1-2.

rule of law, improvement of the human rights situation, demining, elimination of corruption, education and control of diseases. After the cold war, the peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations have been combined to deal with the intrastate conflicts. The costs and risks of such operations are much greater than the traditional peacekeeping.[56]

While discussing the variables that affect the peace implementation, the panel takes into account the reasons of conflict i.e. poverty, corruption, discrimination, ethnicity, religion, political and economic objective of groups, environmental issues and spoilers including signatories.[57] It is further emphasized that for the positive outcome of the intervention, the planners should understand the environment in which they are entering vis-à-vis feasibility of the operation, analysis of the strategy and willingness and ability of the local authorities to take political and economic decision are of vital importance.[58] The report also identifies its concern about the consent of the local parties while dealing with intrastate conflicts. Adherence to the peace agreement may be limited up to the interest of the parties or a party may withdraw its consent that may result loose control of the peacekeepers.[59]

The penal also stressed the importance of the human rights component of a peace mission. This component can play an important role in the national reconciliation process. The training of the civilian and military personals on human right issues was emphasized.[60] It was also endorsed by the panel that leadership of a mission can make a difference, therefore, it was highlighted that leadership must be assembled early.

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[56] Ibid, 2-3.
[57] Ibid, 4.
[58] Ibid, 5.
[59] Ibid, 9.
[60] Ibid, 7.

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Keeping in view the casualties in past missions, the problems of the member states to convince the legislatures and public in support of troop's deployments were taken into account. It was also noted that for peacekeeping operations some countries contribute under equipped and untrained troops. It was recommended that member states should be encouraged to form coherent forces.[61]

3.1.1 Civilian Police

The penal highlighted that the major task of the civilian police is to train the local police according to the international standards. Further, the justice system must be efficient and impartial and to strengthen the institution, human rights and judicial experts along with civilian police must be available. A doctrinal shift was suggested and the new approach for the utilization of the civilian police in peace operations vis-à-vis other elements of rule of law and human rights were emphasized.

Keeping in view the importance of civilian police and second in number after military in intrastate peace operations, the penal called upon the member states to establish ready for deployment national pools of police officers. Since the shift requires more trained and specialized police officers, therefore, it was recommended that the DPKO should assist the member states in the selection and training in this regard. It was also suggested that the deployment in the operations should be for at least one year.[62]

The panel also recommended that the military and police division should be separated in to two bodies. The military unit should be restructured and police unit should be provided additional recourses and upgraded. For the civilian police effective use in the

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[61] Ibid, 17-20.
[62] Ibid, 20-21.

peace operations, a separate unit having the experts of criminal law was also proposed for providing advice to the civilian police advisor office. It was suggested that this unit should closely work with human rights commissioner in Geneva and office of the drug control prevention in Vienna.[63] Modern Technologies i.e. GIS and mapping software for Civilian Police was also recommended to facilitate them and to enhance their ability.[64]

The panel also noted the coordination among the different units of a mission has been lacking in the absence of DPKO integrated planning cell where the responsible of all units are represented; therefore, it was recommended that an Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) should be responsible for the planning of a mission.[65]

Organizational learning or institutional memory is of vital importance in decision making. The existing Lessons Learned Unit of DPKO was considered not much active by the panel. It was recommended that both new lessons learned on daily basis and mission report at the end should be taken into account for the existing and future operations.[66]

The report also takes into account the funding issue and urges member states to pay their due share. The changes for secretariat were suggested in the report. The UN field personals were also advised to respect each other keeping in view the gender and cultural differences.

3.2   Post Brahimi Report Analysis

Brahimi report was an attempt to improve the training of the peacekeepers with an emphasis on the readiness of the member states and the secretariat. The report could not

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[63] Ibid, 38.
[64] Ibid, 42.
[65] Ibid, 34-37.
[66] Ibid, 39.

address some of the issues that each operation faces due to the time limitations of four months only.[67]

One of the objectives of the Brahimi Report was to restore the lost confidence on the UN unclear strategies and capacities that was damaged in the peace operations of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The commitment gap of the major players also raised the feasibility issue of the implementation of the report.[68]

In fact, the environment in which UN operates changed after the 11 September 2001 attacks and the West support to UN reduced because the threat perceptions to the world changed. After the Iraq crisis, new questions were raised about the UN as a responsible of peace and security of the world. The legitimacy of US war against Iraq was also questioned.[69]

However, though slow than expectations, improvements can be observed after the report. The report provided a base for enhanced role of the Civilian Police and some of the recommendations in this regard were implemented.[70] The joint planning in the light of the concept of integrated Mission Task Force and better equipped DPKO could also be observed.[71]

In addition, there was no proper mechanism of funding through Security Council for peacebuilding activities and it was recognized that United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has the potential with the cooperation of other UN agencies to

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[67] William J. Durch, "UN Peace Operations and the Brahimi Report," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, October 2001, 15.
[68] Thierry Tardy, "The Brahimi Report: Four Years On," *Geneva Centre for Security Policy*, 2004, 7.
[69] Ibid, 6.
[70] Eirin Mobekk, "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions," *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, Policy Paper – No.9, November 2005, 2.
[71] Thierry Tardy, "The Brahimi Report: Four Years On," *Geneva Centre for Security Policy*, 2004, 10-11.

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implement the peacebuilding activities.[72] It was argued that it is not the responsibility of Security Council to collaborate with UNDP or other organizations for that matter. The establishment of peacebuilding commission to marshal resources for post conflict peacebuilding in 2005 may be taken as a significant initiative towards UN commitment for its peacebuilding efforts.

3.3   Peacebuilding commission

Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established in December 2005 by the UN General Assembly and Security Council as an intergovernmental advisory body to support its peacebuilding efforts. Its creation was in response of the enhanced and complex nature of the peace missions covering military, civilian, political and humanitarian aspects along with the reconstruction of the post conflict state institutions.[73]

The commission has to deal with the countries emerging from the conflict on their request before PBC, after a peace accord has concluded. The primary task of the PBC is to serve as a coordinator in the peacebuilding process depending upon the Security Council's willingness.[74] The Mandate of the PBC is to assemble resources to support the wide range of peacebuilding activities. The commission faces the challenges to get the greater unity of UN bodies and agencies for development, human rights, refugees and other related issues to the peace operations and reconstruction of a state.[75] The real gap is

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[72] United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 55th Session, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (A/55/305–S/2000/809), 21 August 2000, 7.

[73] David Atwood and Fred Tanner, "The UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva," *Disarmament Forum*, No.2 (2007), 27.

[74] Gerhard Thallinger, "The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Transitional Justice," *German Law Journal*, Vol. 08, No.07 (2007), 689.

[75] David Atwood and Fred Tanner, "The UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva," *Disarmament Forum*, No.2 (2007), 29-30.

to augment the resources to support the civilian component of the peace operations e.g. electoral management, parliamentarians' training and anti corruption policies.[76]

PBC provides service to the forgotten countries and greater financial and technical resources are needed to meet the challenges of the 21st century complex peace building missions.[77] The commission is an advisory body and within the UN framework it can influence only through its recommendations and ability to generate resources for a state that is not at the international agenda.[78]

3.3.1 Composition of PBC

The organizational committee of the PBC consists of:

> ➤ Seven members from the Security Council including the permanent members.

> ➤ Seven members elected by the economic and social council

> ➤ Five top providers of military and civilian police personal to the UN missions

> ➤ Five top providers of assessed and voluntary contributions to the UN

> ➤ Seven additional members elected by the UN General Assembly.[79]

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[76] Richard Ponzio, "The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: origins and initial practice," *Disarmament Forum*, No.2 (2007), 20.
[77] Ibid, 13.
[78] Ibid, 8.
[79] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/mem-orgcomembers.shtml > (20 April 2010).

Table 1: Ranking of Military and Civilian Police Contribution to UN Operations as of April 2001 – April 2010

Year/Sr. #	1	2	3	4	5
2001	Bangladesh 5964	Nigeria 3438	Jordan 2617	Kenya 2084	Ghana 2055
2002	Bangladesh 6008	Pakistan 5449	Nigeria 3491	India 3029	Ghana 2490
2003	Pakistan 4245	Nigeria 3316	India 2735	Bangladesh 2658	Ghana 2060
2004	Pakistan 7680	Bangladesh 6362	Nigeria 3398	India 2930	Ghana 2790
2005	Pakistan 9782	Bangladesh 7942	India 6081	Ethiopia 3417	Ghana 3318
2006	Bangladesh 10288	Pakistan 9431	India 9057	Jordan 3648	Nepal 3523
2007	Pakistan 10173	Bangladesh 9690	India 9387	Nepal 3628	Jordan 3571
2008	Pakistan 10597	Bangladesh 9045	India 8998	Nigeria 5271	Nepal 3669
2009	Pakistan 10626	Bangladesh 9220	India 8617	Nigeria 5792	Nepal 3856
2010	Pakistan 10742	Bangladesh 10212	India 8771	Nigeria 5941	Egypt 5457

Source: www.un.org/peacekeeping

Statistics provided in the above table shows that most of the human recourse contributions come from the third world. Pakistan and Bangladesh have been contributing Military and Civilian Police significantly in the UN missions since 2001. Being the major contributor and well field experienced members of the organizational committee of

the PBC, Pakistan and Bangladesh can play more effective role in the decision making process.

3.3.2 Prospects of PBC

PBC has a potential within the UN system to incorporate the civil society and non governmental organizations for the post conflict reconstructions. It has more democratic legitimacy as was established by both UN Security Council and General Assembly. Though seems unlikely with the existing resources but if it proves itself successful then it would enhance the credibility of whole of the UN.[80]

UN alone can not handle all the peacebuilding affairs. Some regional actors are developing themselves institutionally to deal with the fragile states. PBC can engage the regional organizations in this regard by assisting them in resource mobilization and by forming subcommittees in this regard.[81]

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[80] David Atwood and Fred Tanner, "The UN Peacebuilding Commission and International Geneva," *Disarmament Forum*, No.2 (2007), 35.

[81] Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Benefits and Challenges*, New York Office, 6 June 2006, 4.

CHAPTER 4: UN Civilian Police, Establishment, Deficiencies and Doctrine Development

4.1   Civilian Police Component

The establishment of civilian police component in the UN missions can be traced back in 1964 when first time 69 police officers were deployed in United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). After a gap of 25 years, in 1989 on large scale 1500 police personal were deployed in United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.

In May 2000, a Civilian Police Unit was established as a part of the Military and Civilian Police Division and within six months Civilian Police Unit was raised as a Division keeping in view the emerging role of the UN Civilian Police. Currently more than 13,000 UN Police officials are serving at different locations, contributed by the member states.

UN peacekeeping missions are including police component for more than forty years while their roles have also changed considerably with the passage of time. The UN has deployed CIVPOL in more than 30 operations for public security and institutional building. Complex tasks are being assigned to the UN Police by the Security Council i.e. public security of the societies recovering from conflict and institutional building of the local police.[82]

There is no international system of police building like military, therefore, UN police is facing identity crisis vis-à-vis resource constraints and also lacking effective

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[82] William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, eds., "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, Report No. 63, Rev. 2010, 17-19.

strategies.[83] The civilian police component has also to coordinate with different other components, agencies and organizations of the mission to fulfill the complex mandate assigned. The panel of the Brahimi Report in 2000 called for a "doctrinal shift" to utilize the UN CIVPOL in peacebuilding missions for joint working with human rights and judicial experts.[84]

Civilian Police Contribution to UN Operations as of April 2001 - April 2010

CONTRIBUTIONS

YEARS

Source: www.un.org/peacekeeping

The police coming from different countries have different policing philosophies and lacks common training that pose challenges of consistency in a mission.[85] If a common standard is not applied in a mission, different contingents from different

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[83] William J. Durch, "United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks," *GRIPS Policy Research Center*, Discussion Paper: 10-03, Rev. March 2010, 1.

[84] William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, eds., "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, Report No. 63, Rev. 2010, 1.

[85] Ibid, 46.

countries would teach their method considering it better.[86] In addition, diversity of tasks are assigned to the police from traffic control to investigation, therefore, UN should take into account the different environments, tasks and expertise of the personal deployed.[87]

Political consequences of a mission may not be neglected. The activities of UN police influence the balance of power among the local parties and a mission may not be successful without the help of the local political parties, therefore, consequences of intervention are sometime unpredictable. The political effects enhance the importance of the civilian police that demands greater integration of the police component with the broader mission.[88]

4.2   Security Gaps of Interventions

a)   Deployment Gap: After the approval of mandate and authorization of forces by the Security Council, early deployment of forces is of significant importance to achieve the objectives. Deployment of specialized people in sufficient number or authorized number are not being given due importance e.g. In Somalia and Cambodia it took several months to deploy the authorized number of CIVPOL.[89]

b)   Enforcement Gap: Without improving security environment in severe conflict areas, deployment of CIVPOL is not recommended, therefore, security gap between the deployment of military and civilian police must be filled by different kind of policing.

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[86] Eirin Mobekk. "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions," *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, Policy Paper – No.9, November 2005, 18-19.

[87] William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, eds., "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, Report No. 63, Rev. 2010, 56.

[88] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Training and Evaluation Service, *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines*, December 2000, 24.

[89] Eirin Mobekk. "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions," *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, Policy Paper – No.9, November 2005, 3.

Failure of CIVPOL to achieve the security level required is due to the inability and lack of skill to handle the complex and hostile situations. Law informant duties can be assigned to military police during the interim period. This shall require some training prior to the deployment and these duties can also be defined in the mandate accordingly.[90]

c)   Institution Gap: In the post conflict societies, generally there are no judicial or penal institutions or sufficient experts are available to follow up the police work and the basic resources are also not available to handle the load of work in this regard.[91] Keeping in view the Brahimi report recommendations, Department of Peacekeeping proposed the addition of small criminal law and judicial affairs unit with civilian police division to make rule of law strategies in peace operations; later two person unit was authorized by the General Assembly[92] that is too small as each operation needs research based strategies and support in the local context.

4.3   CIVPOL Deficiencies

Long term sustainability of peace is the objective of a mission in a country. Short term measures are required to achieve the peace and long term measures are required to achieve the sustainable peace. Raising an efficient local police force can contribute to achieve the long term goals. Training and assistance provided to the local police by the

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[90] Ibid, 3-4.
[91] Nina M. Serafino, "Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions," *Congressional Research Service*, The Library of Congress, Order Code RL32321, March 2004, 8-9.
[92] William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, eds., "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, Report No. 63, Rev. 2010, 7.

international CIVPOL is on ad hoc basis and less focus is drawn to the institutional building in the local context.[93]

> There is no universal formula for identifying all the policing needs of countries in post-conflict settings. Variables include population size, mandated tasks, land mass to be policed, size and status of local police forces, conditions of the court and prison systems, what the fighting was about, the character and content of the peace agreement (if any) and levels of local corruption.[94]

Research based strategies and policies are required by taking into account the local context in the post conflict environment. A well trained police force is required to implement theses strategies. A specialist police force is not yet developed or a mechanism is not there for the coherent actions by the international police force.

UN relies on the contributing nations that they will provide the officers of certain standard but this standard is not generally met. Week long training is provided before deployment in a mission focusing on the human rights and UN. This training lacks the history and culture on the country where mission is being deployed.[95]

The rotation of officers is another problem that affects the efficiency of the operation. There is no general policy of posting period particularly of the commanding officers. Internal transfers are routine matter from one place to another. Police officers develop working relationship with the local police and population and benefits of that may not be harvested by transferring rapidly. Therefore, rotation within country should be discouraged.

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[93] Eirin Mobekk, "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions," *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, Policy Paper – No.9, November 2005, 6.
[94] William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, eds., "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, Report No. 63, Rev. 2010, 41.
[95] Eirin Mobekk, "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions," *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, Policy Paper – No.9, November 2005, 17.

Table 2: Top Five Civilian Police Contributing Countries to UN Operations as of April 2001 – April 2010

Year/ Sr. #	1	2	3	4	5
2001	USA 836	Jordan 728	India 618	Germany 518	Pakistan 402
2002	Jordan 729	USA 677	India 623	Germany 510	Pakistan 319
2003	USA 543	India 504	Jordan 477	Germany 362	Pakistan 211
2004	USA 536	Jordan 526	India 349	Germany 282	Ukraine 193
2005	Jordan 599	Pakistan 483	USA 346	Nepal 315	India 309
2006	Jordan 762	Bangladesh 480	Nepal 466	Pakistan 459	Senegal 455
2007	Jordan 909	Pakistan 813	Bangladesh 776	Nepal 541	Senegal 489
2008	Jordan 961	Bangladesh 946	Pakistan 783	Nigeria 613	Ghana 583
2009	Jordan 1059	Bangladesh 953	Nepal 755	Nigeria 718	Pakistan 662
2010	Bangladesh 1600	Jordan 1577	Nigeria 959	Pakistan 932	Nepal 910

Source: www.un.org/peacekeeping

The statistics in the above table shows that the contributions of civilian police shifted from developed countries to the developing countries. The human rights record in the developing countries is poor and police is not specialized compared to the developed

countries, therefore, more attention is required for the pre deployment training. In addition, states do not allow their officers to serve for longer period in a mission or in another mission immediately after serving in a mission, therefore, the experience gained at UN is not utilized properly.

Finally, besides the capacity building of the UN peacekeepers, accountability of their conduct is of vital importance but the systems in this regard are weak.[96] There is a need to formulate a mechanism to deal with the UN peacekeepers who commit crimes and violate UN regulations.[97]

4.4   Civilian Police and Judicial Reforms

Restructuring the police service can not produce positive results without the improvement in the governance and management structures and transformation of judiciary and allied components. The task of restructuring of all the system is much harder as it needs a long time for training and capacity building vis-à-vis financial support in this regard.[98]

UN has recognized that transformation of criminal judicial system is a complex phenomena and the present law component of the missions is not adequate. The transformation requires great skills and leadership along with the understanding of local politics and culture, and constant monitoring and adjustments on the basis of evaluations.[99]

[96] William J. Durch, "United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks," *GRIPS Policy Research Center*, Discussion Paper: 10-03, Rev. March 2010, 18.

[97] Eirin Mobekk, "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions," *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, Policy Paper – No.9, November 2005, 22.

[98] William J. Durch, "United Nations Police Evolution, Present Capacity and Future Tasks," *GRIPS Policy Research Center*, Discussion Paper: 10-03, Rev. March 2010, 19.

[99] William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, eds., "Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law," *The Henry L. Stimson Center*, Report No. 63, Rev. 2010, 59.

Judicial reform would remain an essential component of peacebuilding process. If there are no independent judges and laws of prosecution are not available in accordance with the international human rights standards, there are no chances that training and building of police force would produce desired results. For a long period, the link between international policing and judicial reforms was ignored as judicial reforms were considered a nation building and developmental issue. No doubt these reforms take longer period than police reforms and large resources are required for that matter but police reform will eventually fail without a credible judicial system. Therefore, judicial reforms must be taken as security issue.[100]

4.5 Doctrine Development of Civilian Police

The concept of doctrine is common in military circles and has clear meaning. Official definition of military doctrine issued by the UN department of peace keeping is the "fundamental principles, practices and procedures that guide the military component of UN peacekeeping missions in support of mandated UN objectives" (UN DPKO 2001).The concept of doctrine is also not new in civilian bureaucracies. UN Peace operations doctrine is also emerging in shape of Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs), guideline and manuals.[101]

The growing tasks given to the UN police in peace operations demanded the standard guidelines in the domain of doctrine development.[102] In the light of the Brahaimi

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[100] Eirin Mobekk, "Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions," *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*, Policy Paper – No.9, November 2005, 7-8.
[101] Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler and Philipp Rotmann, "Doctrine Development in the UN Peacebuilding Apparatus: The Case of UN Constabulary Police, 1999-2006," Paper prepared for the 49th Annual ISA Convention San Francisco 29 March 2008, 3-4.
[102] Ibid, 2.

Report. DPKO recognized the need for the development of professional doctrine for UN police operations and a number of steps were taken in his regard.[103]

"United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines" issued by the department of peacekeeping operations is a step forward towards the doctrine development of UN Civilian Police. It is a hand book for police commissioners in the field and guidelines for the police contributing states to UN to train police official for UN peace operations. The guidelines spell out the responsibilities and duties of the police offices and provide guidelines for civilian operations.[104]

The 2005 on ward period may be regarded as the formal doctrine development phase of UN Police.[105] A series of document were signed including "Directives on Detention, Searches and the Use of Force for Members of Formed Police Units" describing detention procedures in the peace missions.[106] Another important development is the drafting of "Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", a description, function and organization of Formed Police Units (FPUs) of UN police and its command and control structure, issued by department of peacekeeping in November 2006.[107]

The recent development is the revision of the "United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police", issued by jointly the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, Vienna and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping

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[103] Philipp Rotmann, "First Steps towards a Police Doctrine for UN Peace Operations (2001-2006)," *International Police Executive Symposium (IPES)*, Working Paper No. 18, October 2009, 9.
[104] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Training and Evaluation Service, *United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines*, December 2000.
[105] Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler and Philipp Rotmann, "Doctrine Development in the UN Peacebuilding Apparatus: The Case of UN Constabulary Police, 1999-2006," 29 March 2008, 12.
[106] Ibid, 20.
[107] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Functions and Organization of Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Ref. DPKO/PD/2006/00060, November 2006.

Operations, New York in July 2009. The handbook covers the role of police, use of force, crimes, investigation, arrests, witnesses, trials and protection of victims, detention and imprisonment and children and refugees.[108]

Though slow but some standard guideline and principles have been developed for UN police but there is no effective system for the training of the police officials to deal with the complex situations. The rapid rotation causes the loss of organizational memory and expertise. The formation of permanent UN police force deployed in every mission with the police of contributing countries may assist more effectively in the doctrine development of CIVPOL.

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[108] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police*, New York, 2009.

CHAPTER 5:   UN missions and International Civilian Police

The police division within DPKO at the UN Secretariat, New York manages the deployment of the police component and further planning and strategies for their activities are also made there. UN "Police are being deployed in many different roles, including public order provision under an executive law enforcement mandate, training and advising local police personnel, and even reforming and rebuilding whole national police services in war-torn countries"[109].

The CIVPOL have been deployed by the Security Council in 38 UN peacekeeping missions to date ranging from 6 police personal in United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to 4468 police personal in United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Out of 38 missions, five missions were deployed in Haiti, three in Angola, three in East Timor, two in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two in Croatia and two in Congo for different time periods.

In 17 missions, 500 or more CIVPOL personal have been deployed while in 8 missions 1500 or more CIVPOL personal have been deployed. Presently six missions are continued where CIVPOL was deployed. The following list of operations presents all the missions where CIVPOL was deployed.

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[109] Philipp Rotmann, "First Steps towards a Police Doctrine for UN Peace Operations (2001-2006)," *International Police Executive Symposium (IPES)*, Working Paper No. 18, October 2009, 5.

Table 3
UN Peace Operations including CIVPOL (1948-2010)

S. No.	Acronym	Mission Name and Strength	Start Date	Closing Date
1	UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Strength (30 June 2010) 927 total uniformed personnel: 858 troops, **69 police**, 40 international civilian personnel and 111 local civilian staff	March 1964	Present
2	UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia) Maximum strength 4,493 all ranks, **1,500 civilian police** and under 2,000 international and local staff. The mission was strengthened by some 1,000 additional international personnel for the elections	April 1989	March 1990
3	MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (Territory on the north-west coast of Africa bordered by Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria) Strength (30 June 2010) 232 total uniformed personnel: 206 military observers, 20 troops, **6 police officers** 96 international civilian personnel, 162 local civilian staff and 20 United Nations Volunteers	April 1991	present
4	UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II Maximum Authorized (Oct. 1994-Feb. 1995) 350 military observers, **126 civilian police** and 14 military medical staff. There was also provision for some 220 international civilian and 145 local staff	May 1991	February 1995
5	ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador Maximum Strength (1992) 368 military observers and **315 civilian police**, supported by international and local civilian staff (The Mission was augmented by some 900 electoral observers during the election)	July 1991	April 1995
6	UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -Serbia and Montenegro - and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) Strength (March 1995) 38,599 military personnel including 684 United Nations military observers, **803 civilian police**, 2,017 other international civilian staff and 2,615 local staff	February 1992	March 1995
7	UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Maximum Strength 15,991Military component, **3,359 civilian police** (June 1993). During the electoral period, more than 50,000 Cambodians served as electoral staff and some 900 international polling station officers were seconded from	February 1992	September 1993

Governments

8	ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique Maximum strength of military component (30 November 1993) 6,576 all ranks Maximum strength of civilian police component (31 October 1994) **1,087 police observers**	December 1992	December 1994
9	UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II Authorized Strength (March 1993 - February 1994) **28,000 military and civilian police personnel**; there was also provision for approximately 2,800 international and local civilian staff Strength at the start of withdrawal (30 November 1994) 14,968 all ranks, supported by international and local civilian staff	March 1993	March 1995
10	UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia Strength (31 March 2008) 129 military observers and **16 police**, supported by 105 international civilian personnel and 208 local civilian staff	August 1993	June 2009
11	UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti Maximum Strength (30 June 1995) 6,065 troops and military support personnel, and **847 civilian police**, supported by international and local civilian staff	September 1993	June 1996
12	UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda Authorized Strength (May 1994-June 1995) 5,500 military personnel, including approximately 5,200 troops and military support personnel and 320 military observers, and **90 civilian police** (in February 1995, the authorized strength of the **civilian police was increased to 120**), supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff	October 1993	March 1996
13	UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III Strength (30 June 1997) 3,649 troops, 283 military observers and **288 civilian police**	February 1995	June 1997
14	UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia Strength (November 1995) 6,581 troops, 194 military observers and **296 civilian police**, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff	March 1995	January 1996
15	UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) Strength (February 1999) 1,049 troops, 35 military observers and **26 civilian police**, supported by 203 international and local civilian	March 1995	February 1999

staff

16	UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 1995	December 2002
		Maximum strength (November 1997) **2,047 civilian police** and military liaison personnel		
17	UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	January 1996	January 1998
		Strength (30 September 1997) Total 2,847 uniformed personnel: 2,346 troops, 97 military observers and **404 civilian police**		
18	UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	July 1996	July 1997
		Maximum Strength (November 1996) 1,297 military and **291 civilian police** personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff		
19	MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	June 1997	February 1999
		Strength (31 July 1998) 661 troops and military support personnel, 92 military observers and **403 civilian police** observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff		
20	UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August 1997	December 1997
		Authorized Strength **250 civilian police personnel** and 50 military personnel (A number of additional military personnel, provided on the basis of voluntary funding, were also attached to UNTMIH's military component.)		
21	MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	December 1997	March 2000
		Authorized Strength **300 civilian police personnel**, including a special police unit, supported by a civilian establishment of some 72 international and 133 local personnel and 17 United Nations Volunteers.		
22	UNPSG	UN Civilian Police Support Group (Croatia)	January 1998	October 1998
		Strength (30 September1998) **114 police**, supported by international and local civilian staff, and headed by the Representative of the Secretary-General		
23	MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000
		Maximum Authorized Strength 1,350 troops and military support personnel and **24 civilian police**, supported by international and local civilian staff. Additional short-term and medium-term United Nations observers were deployed during the legislative (November/December 1998) and presidential (September 1999) elections		
24	UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June 1999	Present
		Strength (10 Sept.2002)		

		4468 international police and 4933 Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers deployed in all five regions of the province and at border crossings.		
25	UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Maximum Strength (31 March 2002) Military 17,368, **UN Police 87**, international civilian 322 and local civilian 552	October 1999	December 2005
26	UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Maximum Authorized Strength Military 9,150 and **civilian police 1,640** Strength (31 March 2002) 6,281 troops, **1,288 civilian police** and 118 military observers. UNTAET also includes 737 international civilian personnel and 1,745 local civilian staff	October 1999	May 2002
27	MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Strength (30 April 2010) 18,884 troops, 712 military observers, **1,223 police**,991 international civilian personnel, 2,749 local civilian staff and 634 United Nations Volunteers	November 1999	June 2010
28	UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Maximum Strength (31 May 2002) 3,940 troops, **214 police**, supported by 229 international civilian personnel and 244 local civilian staff	July 2000	July 2008
29	UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor Authorized Strength 5,000 military personnel including 120 military observers and **1,250 civilian police** officers Provision was also made for 455 international civilian staff, 100 experts for the Civilian Support Group, 241 UN Volunteers and 977 locally recruited staff	May 2002	May 2005
30	UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia Strength (30 June 2010) 7,810 troops, 133 military observers, **1,364 police,** 436 international civilian personnel, 993 local staff and 223 UN Volunteers	September 2003	Present
31	UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire transferred authority from MINUCI and ECOWAS forces to UNOCI MINUCI - United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (May 2003 to April 2004), Strength (29 February 2004) 75 military observers supported by 54 international civilian personnel and 55 local staff UNOCI Strength (30 June 2010) 7,191 troops, 193 military observers, **1,140 police**, supported by 398 international civilian personnel, 755 local staff and 299 United Nations Volunteers	April 2004	Present
32	MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	June 2004	Present

		Strength (30 June 2010) 8,609 troops, **2,969 police**, 473 international civilian personnel, 1,235 local civilian staff and 208 United Nations Volunteers		
33	ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi Maximum Strength (30 September 2005) 5,400 troops, 168 military observers, **97 police**, supported by 316 international civilian personnel, 383 local civilian staff and 156 United Nations Volunteers	June 2004	December 2006
34	UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan Strength (30 June 2010) 9,441 troops 497 military observers, **676 police officers**, supported by 868 international civilian personnel, 2,688 local civilian staff and 369 United Nations Volunteers	March 2005	Present
35	UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste Authorized Strength **1608 police**, 34 military liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component.	August 2006	Present
36	UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Strength (30 June 2010) 17,018 troops, 251 military observers, **4,418 police officers**, 1,124 international civilian personnel, 2,626 local civilian staff and 446 United Nations Volunteers	July 2007	Present
37	MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad Strength (30 June 2010) 3,473 troops, 24 military observers, **189 police officers**, supported by 431 international civilian personnel, 597 local civilian staff and 158 United Nations Volunteers	September 2007	Present
38	MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Strength (30 June 2010) 18,653 military personnel, 704 military observers, **1,229 police** (including formed units), 982 international civilian personnel, 2,787 local civilian staff and 641 United Nations Volunteers	July 2010	Present

Source: www.un.org/peacekeeping

In this study, eight peacekeeping/Peacebuilding operations were selected as brief case studies, where more than 1500 CIVPOL personal were deployed, to analyze the background of the conflict, mandate of the mission and the role, achievements and limitations of the CIVPOL. The cases selected also cover the past and present operations

and include almost all the regions of the world i.e. UNTAG and UNAMID (Africa), UNTAC, UNTAET and UNMIT (Asia and Pacific), UNMIBH and UNMIK (Europe) and MINUSTAH (Americas).

5.1   United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) - Namibia (April 1989 to March 1990)

Background of the Conflict

Under the mandate of League of Nations, South Africa administered South West Africa from 1920 to WWII. This mandate was opposed by UN in 1945 but the occupation continued. In 1966, General Assembly revoked this mandate when Marxist South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) launched war of independence for the area that became Namibia. SWAPO started getting support from Angolan territory particularly from Cuban troops.

Establishment and Mandate of UNTAG

As per the 1988 accord Cuba has to withdraw its troops from Angola and South Africa from Namibia. UNTAG was established in February 1989 to assist the Secretary General's Special Representative to make sure the independence of Namibia through fair and free elections.[110] UNTAG had two component i.e. military and civilian.

Military component was responsible for the ceasefire and withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia while the civil component was responsible for the administration and elections. Under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

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[110] United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untag.htm> (3 April 2010).

(SRSG) command, it was the first consolidated military, police and civilian UN operation.[111] The CIVPOL had also to ensure that the SWAPOL maintained law and order impartially, efficiently and professionally.[112]

Civilian Police

Under UNTAG, "the CIVPOL component achieved an institutional position at par with other components, whereas in previous missions it had been subsumed under a military operation"[113]. The civilian component was increased to 1500 civilian police in October 1989 and during the elections 500 additional officers were deployed.

During the elections the civilian police performed election duties along with other UN officials as per the mandate given to the UNTAG. Seventy registration centers and 110 mobile registration teams covered 2,200 locations all over the country and the process was supervised by UNTAG officials and CIVPOL.[114]

The voting was described as peaceful.[115] "After the elections, the size of SWAPOL diminished sharply, which meant that CIVPOL was able to concentrate increasingly – and successfully – on maintaining peace and stability in the country".[116]

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[111] Jeff Fischer, "Elections and International Civilian Policing: History and Practice in Peace Operations," *International Foundation of Election Systems (IFES)*, White Paper, 18 June 2002, 5.

[112] Netherlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie, *United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)*, May 2009, <http://www.nimh.nl/en/images/UNTAG_tcm6-8942.pdf > (11 March 2010), 2.

[113] Jeff Fischer, "Elections and International Civilian Policing: History and Practice in Peace Operations," *International Foundation of Election Systems (IFES)*, White Paper, 18 June 2002, 5.

[114] Ibid, 13.

[115] United Nations Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets*, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 1996, cited in Jeff Fischer, "Elections and International Civilian Policing: History and Practice in Peace Operations," *International Foundation of Election Systems (IFES)*, White Paper, 18 June 2002, 13.

[116] Netherlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie, *United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)*, May 2009, <http://www.nimh.nl/en/images/UNTAG_tcm6-8942.pdf > (11 March 2010), 4.

5.2 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) – (Feb 1992 to September 1993)

Background of the Conflict

The military coup of 1970, sanctions, international isolation and subsequent long civil war devastated the state's economy and society of Cambodia. Khmer Rouge, followers of Communist Party of Kampuchea, took power in 1975. Hundreds of thousands people were killed during the Khmer Rouge regime and the social and economic infrastructure of the state was destroyed. The Vietnam's forces invaded Cambodia in 1978 and the country was further divided into factions. The civil war continued in the 1980s while the peace efforts started in 1989 in Paris. The Cambodian people were "tired from years of war followed by years of half war/half peace, tired from their long isolation...emotionally drained from hopes and promises that have subsequently been postponed or otherwise qualified".[117]

In October 1991 agreements were signed by the parties for the political settlement of the Cambodian conflict and preparation of elections while UN was assigned extraordinary role. Withdrawal of Vietnam's forces was also included in the peace process.

Mandate of UNTAC

UNTAC was established in February 1992 by UN Security Council with a mandate to ensure human rights, maintenance of law and order, fair and free elections, military

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[117] Grant Curtis, "Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process," *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development*, Switzerland, DP 48, November 1993, 11.

arrangements and civil administration, refugees' resettlement and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of infrastructure.[118]

Major components of UNTAC included the military component, police component, electoral component, civil administration component, human rights component and rehabilitation component.

Civilian Police

"UNTAC's 3,600-person Civil Police Component was charged with ensuring that law and order be maintained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms be fully protected throughout Cambodia".[119]

The civilian police deployment shows the administrative weaknesses of the mission. Police personals were deployed as individuals but not as national units. Inability to speak same language, lack of training and discipline, inability to drive and ignoring the juniors by seniors were other problems.[120]

UNTAC successfully conducted elections but the neutral political environment was not ensured as Cambodia was under fear of insecurity.[121] The peace plan was a good solution to the conflict and mandate of the UNTAC was implemented but post conflict justice arrangement was a failure due to the lack of harmony between the UN and

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[118] United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC),
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untac.htm> (5 March 2010).
[119] Grant Curtis, "Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process," *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development*, Switzerland, DP 48, November 1993, 13.
[120] Judy L. Ledgerwood, "UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia," *Asia Pacific Issues*, Analysis from the East-West Center No. 11, March 1994, 7.
[121] Grant Curtis, "Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process," *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development*, Switzerland, DP 48, November 1993, 17.

Cambodia.[122] Complete disarmament of the factions was also failure of the peace plan that doubted the long run stability in the state. However, the UNTAC helped to end two decades long war and international isolation.[123]

5.3 United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) - December 1995 to December 2002)

Background of the Conflict

Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence on 3rd March 1992 from former Yugoslavia. The Serbs of Bosnia started arms resistance with the support of Serbia and Montenegro for the partition on ethnic lines for Greater Serbia. On 14 December 1995 Dayton peace accord was signed between the warring factions and international boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina were retained. A North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) was deployed for one year for the implementation of the accord. The UNMIBH was established in December 1995 by the UN Security Council consisting of the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mandate of UNMIBH

The mandate of UNMIBH was renewed several times. The major tasks assigned to IPTF were the monitoring of law enforcement and associated judicial organizations' activities

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[122] Lucy Keller, "UNTAC in Cambodia – from Occupation, Civil War and Genocide to Peace," *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Volume 9 (2005), 178.
[123] Grant Curtis, "Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process," *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Switzerland,* DP 48, November 1993, 22.

and facilities, training and advising law enforcement agencies and government authorities for effective management.[124]

The special representative of UN Secretary General in Bosnia and Herzegovina having authority over IPTF police commissioner coordinated for the humanitarian relief and refuges, human rights, de-mining, elections, economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure.[125] The mission was terminated on 31 December 2002.

Civilian Police

The maximum strength of the mission in November 1997 was 2,047 civilian police and military liaison personnel. Under the UNMIBH mandate and implementation plan, the programs for civilian police included the police reform and restructuring, police criminal justice cooperation, institutional building and public awareness.[126]

A number of steps were taken by the UNMIBH for the police reform and restructuring. The agreements for the force number and representation of minority laid the foundations of police reform. The lack of funding and qualified instructors made the task difficult of raising police standards to the international level but adequate funding was provided from UNMIBH trust fund for two police academies. Different programs were launched for ethnic and gender representation and to minimize political influence in police work.[127]

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[124] United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH),
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/> (8 Aug. 2010).
[125] Ibid.
[126] Richard Monk, "First Preliminary Report on a Follow-On Mission to UNMIBH and the UN International Police Task Force," *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*, October 2001, 4.
[127] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (S/2002/1314), 2 December 2002.

Despite all the efforts, inadequate motivation for law enforcement reform to built public trust in the police was existed. There was a need for more openness in respect of public voice in the policing operations and transparency like other European countries. Moreover, criminal justice reforms were not given due attention than policing reforms that affected the capacity of the police investigators.[128]

The mission ended in December 2002 and European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over from UNMIBH from 1st January 2003.

5.4 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – (June 1999 to Present)

Background of the Conflict

Disintegration of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, a federal state of six provinces, started in 1989 and by 1999 only two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, remained in the federation. The Serbian control over Kosovo, an autonomous region of Serbia, was lost. Kosovo first declared independence in September 1990 and then in February 2008.

The problem of former Yugoslavia may be traced since 1960s when the states started demanding more financial autonomy but after the end of cold war in 1989 the situation changed dramatically. Under the new constitution in 1989, the status of Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia was revoked. An unofficial independent Kosovo government was formed in 1990 by Ibrahim Rugova, an Albanian leader. Serbia's oppressive measures compelled for the creation of Kosovo Liberation Army. Serbian forces massacred a large number of Albanians and forced millions to leave their homes in

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[128] Richard Monk, "First Preliminary Report on a Follow-On Mission to UNMIBH and the UN International Police Task Force," *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*, October 2001, 6-9.

Kosovo. The March 1999 seventy eight days NATO military campaign forced the Serbians to agree for withdrawal from Kosovo.

Mandate and implementation of UNMIK

UNMIK was established in June 1999 under UN resolution with comprehensive mandate for "transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo"[129]. Legislative and executive powers and the administration of the judiciary were given to the UN mission by the Security Council in Kosovo.

A number of administrative departments were established to administer the Kosovo by UNMIK with the help of local officials. The "mechanisms to provide oversight and coordinate activities both within and among the pillars of UNMIK were weak at first, but gradually improved"[130]. UNMIK also suffered lack of skilled staff to fill key vacancies and high turnover was also observed in this regard.[131]

The Mission has been engaging the Kosovan communities and regional and international actors for the security and stability of the state. "The United Nations funds and programmes, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) have continued to play important roles within the framework of Security Council resolution 1244".[132]

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[129] United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), <www.unmikonline.org> (11 April 2010).
[130] Larry K. Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Kosovo: the KFOR Experience* (Washington DC: CCRP publication series, 2002), 277.
[131] Ibid, 32.
[132] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo* (S/2010/401), 29 July 2010, 1.

UNMIK Police is the first UN international police force mandated with full executive law enforcement powers.[133] Maximum 4468 international police officers were deployed at border crossings and in all five regions of the province.

UNMIK Police was formed under the civil administration pillar of the mission. It comprised of three components: the Regular Police, the Special Police Units and the Border Police. The major goals assigned to UNMIK Police included the interim law enforcement and swift development of a professional, credible and neutral Kosovo Police Service (KPS).[134]

The elections of municipal assemblies in October 28, 2000 were the first ever democratic elections in Kosovo organized by UNMIK.[135] The elections were conducted in a secure environment under the security of UNMIK Civilian Police, Kosovo Police Service and Kosovo Protection Forces.[136]

Programs were lunched for the recruitment, selection and field training of KPS and gradually the number of UNMIK police officers started decreasing. The control of 10 police stations out of 37 was transferred to the KPS by the end of 2003. The strength of KPS officers reached to 6500 by the end of 2006. Police component of UNMIK was reduced to six only by July 2010.[137]

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[133] UNMIK Police, *Annual Report 2000*, <http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/reports/report2000.pdf> (14 April 2010), p.8.
[134] Ibid, p.11.
[135] Larry K. Wentz, ed., *Lessons From Kosovo: The KFOR Experience* (Washington DC: CCRP publication series, 2002), 70.
[136] Jeff Fischer, "Elections and International Civilian Policing: History and Practice in Peace Operations," *International Foundation of Election Systems (IFES)*, White Paper, 18 June 2002, 21.
[137] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo* (S/2010/401), 29 July 2010.

The major problems while creating KPS by UNMIK were the lack of experience and planning, inconsistent policing methods of UN Police participating countries, rotation of police officers and inadequate advisors. The performance of UN police officers in KOSOVO who were from democratic countries remained more balanced than having the less democratic record.[138]

5.5   United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) – (October 1999 to May 2002 and successive UN missions)

Background of the Conflict

East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, declared independence from Portugal in November 1975 but was invaded and occupied soon after the declaration by Indonesian forces. The integration of East Timor as 27th province of Indonesia was never recognized by the UN. The people of East Timor in August 1999 voted for independence in a UN supervised referendum.

"The path to independence had formally begun three years earlier, when the UN brokered an autonomy deal for Timor-Leste with Indonesia and Portugal, to be determined by a popular consultation".[139] UN had to oversee the transition period after the vote but following the announcement of the result violence campaign was launched by pro integration militias, some times having the Indonesian security forces support.[140] A number of people were killed and half a million were displaced.

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[138] Ylber Bajraktari, et al, "The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform, " *Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs*, Princeton University, January 2006, 137-138.
[139] Ludovic Hood, "Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004," *Civil Wars*, Vol.8, No.2 (June 2006), 144.
[140] United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm> (14 April 2010).

Mandate of UNTAET

UNTAET was established in Oct. 1999 by the resolution of the Security Council with the responsibility of overall administration of East Timor including the security, administration of justice, rehabilitation, capacity building for self government and development of civil and social services.[141] "The critical component of UNTAET's nation-building responsibilities was the establishment of an indigenous police service".[142]

Successive Missions

Following the UNTAET, A new mission United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) - May 2002 to May 2005 - was set up. The mission was established for the post independence security and stability of state with a mandate "to provide interim law enforcement and public Security, to assist in developing the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) and to contribute to the maintenance of the new country's external and internal security"[143].

In August 2006 another mission United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) - August 2006 to Present - was established to overcome the consequences of June 2006 crisis in the state. The mandate of UNMIT was to support the Government and relevant institutions to facilitate the political dialogue, to support the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, to provide support to the national police,

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[141] Ibid.

[142] Ludovic Hood, "Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004," *Civil Wars*, Vol.8, No.2 (June 2006), 146.

[143] United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMIEST), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset> (15 April 2010).

assistance in the promotion of human rights and maximum use of assistance in post conflict peacebuilding and capacity-building.[144]

Civilian Police

The maximum authorized strength of UNTAET included 1,640 civilian police personal, UNMISET included 1250 civilian police personal and the maximum authorized strength of UNMIT included 1608 civilian police personal.

There was no local police when the UN took over; therefore, a new Timor Lorosa'e Police Service (TLPS) was established from scratch.[145] There was lot of problems while establishing the new police. The UN CIVPOL was ill-prepared and lacking capacity building, and institutional development expertise. Further East Timor's political leaders were not engaged by UNTAET in police establishment.[146] It was a challenge for UNTAET to change the habits developed during the Indonesian occupation to build a state.[147] UN was lacking good mentors for training the police in the mission.[148]

> The UN's failure to develop the Polı´cia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) as a meaningful and sustainable institution was primarily the result of three main factors: inadequate planning and deficient mission design; unimaginative and weak leadership; and negligible Timorese ownership of the process.[149]

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[144] United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT),
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmit> (15 April 2010).
[145] William G. O'Neill, "Police Reform and Human Rights," *Human Rights Strengthening (HURIST)*, July 2004, 19.
[146] Ludovic Hood, "Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004," *Civil Wars*, Vol.8, No.2 (June 2006), 144.
[147] Jim Della-Giacoma, "Police Building in Timor-Leste – Mission Impossible?" Paper prepared for GRIPS State-building Workshop 2010, January 27-28, 2010, 5.
[148] William G. O'Neill, "Police Reform and Human Rights," *Human Rights Strengthening (HURIST)*, July 2004, 24.
[149] Ludovic Hood, "Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004," *Civil Wars*, Vol.8, No.2 (June 2006), 151.

The UNTAET left behind a weak police institution that shows the limitations of UN police of institutional building.[150] Building a force loyal to the political leaders instead of institutional loyalties to the state shows the poor planning at UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations.[151]

Though UN police played a role in stabalizing the country after the 2006 crisis but building the Timorese national police (PNTL) as a professional and sustainable institution seems a mission impossible as the government and police do not welcome such a role anymore. The goal to have a strong police service could only be achieved through the efforts of the Timorese police themselves under the local leadership.[152]

5.6   United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) - (June 2004 to Present)

Background of the Conflict

Haiti, an ex French colony, got independence in 1804. The US occupied the island in 1915 and left in 1934. Unrest and political violence can be observed throughout the Haitian history. The situation further deteriorated after the military coup against the elected government in 1991. Prior to the present UN mission, four successive peacekeeping missions were deployed during 1993 to 2000 in Haiti i.e. United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) - Sep. 93 to June 96, United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) - July 96 to July 1997, United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) - August 1997 to Dec. 1997, United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti

[150] Jim Della-Giacoma, "Police Building in Timor-Leste – Mission Impossible?" Paper prepared for GRIPS State-building Workshop 2010, January 27-28, 2010, 3.
[151] Ludovic Hood, "Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004," *Civil Wars*, Vol.8, No.2 (June 2006), 157-158.
[152] Jim Della-Giacoma, "Police Building in Timor-Leste – Mission Impossible?" Paper prepared for GRIPS State-building Workshop 2010, January 27-28, 2010, 3.

(MIPONUH) - December 1997 to March 2000. A political culture was developed during this period but the crisis continued. Armed conflict spread in Haiti during 2004 and a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) was authorized under the UN resolution for the maintenance of peace in February 2004 and finally the MINUSTAH took over in June 2004 from MIF.

Mandate of MINUSTAH

The mandate assigned to the mission was to maintain the rule of law, restructuring the Haitian Police, carrying out fair and free elections and to protect human rights. In 2009 this mandate was extended to the national reconciliation and political dialogue but after the January 2010 earthquake, efforts were diverted to the recovery and reconstruction of the devastated areas.[153]

Civilian Police

By 30th June 2010, 2,969 police personal were deployed under the mission. A number of steps were taken by MINUSTAH's for the improvement of the Haitian National Police (HNP) including the recruitment, curriculum revision and in-service training from UNPOL for weapon use, investigation, use of force, human rights and report writing.[154]

There was a dire need to reform and restructuring of HNP as "it became a force with increasingly corrupt, politicized, criminal and abusive elements"[155]. MINUSTAH faced many challenges. One of the challenges in this regard was the language capacity of

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[153] United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah> (28 April 2010).
[154] Eirin Mobekk, "MINUSTAH: DDR and Police, Judicial and Correctional Reform in Haiti," *ActionAid*, July 2006, 12.
[155] Ibid.

the U.N. mission; French and Creole speakers were needed for the capacity building of the HNP.[156] Initially the cooperation between HNP and MINUSTAH was lacking but lately it was achieved and HNP was gradually strengthened. Recruitment and training programs for HNP were launched. In a public opinion poll in 2008, "58 per cent of Haitians considered that there had been a positive change in the Haitian National Police"[157].

The credible and efficient judicial system is a prerequisite for the rule of law. The significance of the UN mission in Haiti will decrease and "this success story would have little value if the judicial and correctional systems have not also been reformed to deal with the increasing number of arrests generated by a more professional and efficient police department"[158].

5.7   African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) - (July 2007 to Present)

Background of the Conflict

The fighting broke out between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and rebel groups in 2003 accusing the government for oppressing the African blacks in favor of Arabs. Up to three hundred thousand people have died and 2.5 million have displaced in Darfur since the fighting broke out.

The African Union (AU) deployed a peacekeeping force named African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 for a solution to the conflict but it remained unable in

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[156] Robert Maguire, "USIPeace Briefing: What Role for the United Nations in Haiti?" *United States Institute of Peace*, November 2009, 4.

[157] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Security Council mission to Haiti* (S/2009/175), 3 April 2009, 7.

[158] Colonel Michel Duhamel, "Haiti: The Need for a Stronger Approach," (MS project, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 12.

protecting people.[159] The AU intervention was to observe the ceasefire, protection of civilians and the mediation and negotiation for the political settlement of the conflict.[160]

For the long term solution to the conflict, Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed on 5th May 2006 with the support of the AU, UN and other partners. After the high level consultations in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia, attended by the former UN Secretary General, the Security Council permanent members, GoS and AU representatives and others, a three-phased approach was developed to expand AMIS and by deploying UNAMID.[161]

Mandate of UNAMID

UNAMID was established by UN Security Council resolution on 31st July 2007 for restoration of security conditions in Darfur, protecting civilians, implementation of ceasefire arrangements, promotion of rule of law, facilitating the humanitarian relief operations and implementation of Darfur peace agreement.[162] Accordingly, UNAMID replaced AMIS on 1 January 2008. It was established because of the concerns regarding the inability of AMIS to tackle the situation in Darfur.[163]

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[159] The Darfur Consortium, "Putting People First: The Protection Challenge Facing UNAMID in Darfur", July 2008, 1.

[160] Abdelbagi Jibril, "Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success?" *HAND*, Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, Geneva (Switzerland), July 2010, 12.

[161] Peace and Security Section of United Nations Department of Public Information, *United Nations and Darfur - Fact Sheet*, August 2007, 1.

[162] African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid> (22 April 2010).

[163] Abdelbagi Jibril, "Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success?" *HAND*, Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, Geneva (Switzerland), July 2010, 15.

The strength of UN police officers was 4,418 on 30th June 2010 along with the military personals, local civilian staff and UN volunteers. The major responsibilities of the UN police were the patrolling in the camps of internally displaced persons (IDPs), training of community police, capacity building and institutional developemnt of the Sudan police through specialized training and joint operations.[164]

Training to the local police was provided by the mission on human rights and gender issues. Basic training in community policing was also provided to volunteers for patrolling in the camps. Police was patrolling in camps for 12 hours in its second phase and it was planned for 24 hours by July 2008.[165]

UNAMID has faced a several logistical and operational difficulties that affected its efforts badly.[166] Protection of civilian population is not yet ensured and around 2.9 million IDPs are still in camps in pathetic conditions.[167]

The behavior of GoS is contributing in the ineffectiveness of the mission. The recommendations of UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council regarding political, military, diplomatic, humanitarian, and legal matters have been sabotaged by GoS.[168] In addition, the important insurgent movements not taking part in

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[164] African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid> (22 April 2010).

[165] United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur* (S/2008/304), 9 May 2008, 6.

[166] Abdelbagi Jibril, "Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success?" *HAND*, Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, Geneva (Switzerland), July 2010, 15.

[167] Ibid, 6.

[168] Ibid, 23.

recent Doha political negotiations consider that there is a biased behavior of AU/UN Joint Chief Mediator in support of GoS.[169]

5.8 Effectiveness of the Missions and CIVPOL Police

It is a very difficult task to measure the success or failure of a mission. Generally the success or failure is measured by the implementation of the mandate rather than the ground realities and the sustainability of the objectives achieved. "Individual agencies are inclined to report their success at implementing programs rather than their impact on stabilization".[170]

To measure the effectiveness, several indicators may be taken into account keeping in view the phenomenon being measured. Conflict dynamics and local perceptions are important in this regard.[171] In the continued conflicts, an environment where the capacity of local institutions increases to address the conflict is also an indicator of measuring stabilization.[172] Police reform outcome may be analyzed under the four major indicators including, Performance Effectiveness, Management and Oversight, Community Relations and Sustainability.[173]

The success of one component of a mission can not be considered alone since the efficiency of all the components is directly related in implementation of the mandate to achieve the objectives. Though the mandate of the above discussed missions have

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[169] Ibid, 5.

[170] Craig Cohen, "Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction," *United States Institute of Peace*, Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 1, March 2006, 1.

[171] Ibid, 10.

[172] Ibid, 7.

[173] Ylber Bajraktari, et al, "The PRIME System: Measuring the Success of Post-Conflict Police Reform," *Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs*, Princeton University, January 2006, 5.

commonalities i.e. maintaining peace and security but varies from election duties to institution building and police reform.

In case of Namibia and Cambodia the major task was to conduct the fair and free elections vis-à-vis maintenance of law and order. The voting was overall peaceful but it was argued that in Cambodia, the political environment was not neutral and post conflict arrangements were not adequate. In both the cases, the time frame for intervention was limited. One of the biggest achievements in Cambodia was the end of two decades long war. Elections have been the part of reforms of the UN missions. In case of Bosnia and Haiti, elections were also conducted under the UN missions and a UN supervised referendum was carried out in East Timor.

In the peacebuilding process, mandate of a mission is not static; it may be improved keeping in view the ground realities. While measuring the effectiveness during a mission, decision makers should be informed for the midcourse necessary corrections.[174] In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mandate of the mission was renewed several times while in East Timor, one mission was followed by another and the third UN intervention was made with a gap of one year to overcome the consequences of a sudden crisis.

The biggest challenge for UN missions has been the institutional building and reforms. In Kosovo and East Timor the task of the UN missions was to build the credible police service while in Bosnia Herzegovina, Haiti and Darfar the task was restructuring, capacity building and institutional developemnt of the local police. The task either to

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[174] Sarah Jane Meharg, "Measuring Effectiveness in Complex Operations: What is Good Enough?" Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, Calgary AB, Oct. 2009, 11.

build the service from scratch or to restructure the police is similar in nature as both include the training and capacity building of the service.

In Bosnia public trust was not adequately developed in the police while criminal justice reforms were not given required attention. In Darfar the AU and UN behavior has been in support of Government of Sudan, consequently, have little effectiveness of the mission due to the trust deficit within parties to the conflict.

Since there is no formal UN police while formation of CIVPOL is dependent on the personal nominated by the contributing countries, therefore, inconsistent policing methods have been used for training and development of the local police. Shortage of advisors and turnover of staff is found another hurdle in the smooth implementation of the mission mandates.

"After the experience in Cambodia, proper training, deployment of officers from the same countries like military forces and improvement of the command structure was proposed as essential for the peace missions"[175] but in latter missions CIVPOL has been found ill-prepared and lacking capacity building and institutional development expertise.

"It is nearly impossible for a multinational mission composed of civilian, military, and police personnel from widely different professional, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds to achieve the unity of thought, purpose and action of an organization created from a single nation".[176] However, a positive change can be observed in the local police service after the implementation of the police capacity building and restructuring programs where institutional reforms was the mandate of the mission.

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[175] Judy L. Ledgerwood, "UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia," *Asia Pacific Issues*, Analysis from the East-West Center No. 11, March 1994, 7.
[176] Colonel Michel Duhamel, "Haiti: The Need for a Stronger Approach," MS project, U.S. Army War College, 2009, 9.

In an environment of political influence and complexity of conflicts, sustainability of peace can not be ensured. In East Timor, crisis of 2006 demanded another UN intervention to overcome the consequences in this regard. Sustainability of reforms is highly depended on the resources employed in the long run for that matter. The judicial and criminal justice reforms are also prerequisite for the sustainability of the police reforms but have not been given due attention.

CHAPTER 6: Conclusion

After the end of cold war a transformation can be observed in the UN peace operations. The mandate of the missions assigned by the Security Council in the past was generally limited to the ceasefire monitoring and withdrawal of forces. Before the collapse of communism, UN interventions were restricted to the inter-state conflicts only. Now UN is taking part to resolve the intra-state conflicts and the mandate of the missions has enhanced to ensuring the law and order, supervising elections and institutional building of the states.

Since the nature of crisis has changed and severe internal conflicts within a state have become a challenge for the international community, the peacekeepers are engaged in the implementation of the peace agreements between the conflicting parties. The terms peace keeping and peacebuilding can not be found in the UN charter but the UN is authorized under chapter VII of its charter to take action against the conflicting parties. Though the terms peacekeeping and peacebuilding are used interchangeably but peacekeeping is a narrower concept limited to separation of forces through military operations and to observe ceasefire after interstate wars. The peacebuilding is a broader concept and the term is being officially used since the early nineties.

Peacebuilding is a complex phenomenon as it is directly related to the internal politics and multiple tasks are required to achieve the peace including raising the new institutions and reforming the existing one. A number of specialists including human rights experts, economists, administrators, governance specialists and police experts are required to achieve the objectives.

In 2000 under the chair of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi a panel of experts was formed to review the UN peace and security efforts and to provide practical recommendations in this regard. The panel critically analyzed the UN peace efforts, differentiated the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding concepts and presented a number of recommendations by taking into account the different components of the peacebuilding process. The emerging role of CIVPOL was recognized, its efficiency was analyzed and recommendations were made to improve its efficiency. Later, establishment of peacebuilding commission in 2005 to marshal resources for peacebuilding can be regarded as a significant development of UN efforts.

6.1   Research Findings

It is observed that most of the post cold war missions included the CIVPOL component. Police personal were deployed on large scale first time in Namibia in 1989. Since then their role and number increased in many UN missions and numerous duties were assigned to them in the light of the mandate of the missions. It was recognized that military is neither trained nor suitable to perform the civilian duties of peacebuilding initiatives as reforms and institution building is a political and administrative phenomenon and military develops trust deficit and negative image in the masses.

The cases studied in this research reveal that the role of police is subject to the mandate assigned that varies from elections duties to ensuring law and order and human rights, training and advising law enforcement agencies, administration of justice, human relief operations and police reforms and institution building.

Since there was no organized system of police like military for peace interventions, therefore, international policing deficiencies came under limelight and a formal doctrine development started in this regard. Training deficiencies, inconsistent policing methods, deficit of institutional development expertise and rapid rotation of the CIVPOL are found the main problems of the force.

The 9/11 incident was a setback to the UN peace operations as the security perceptions of the world changed. A gradual decrease of the contribution of the forces from Europe and USA and increase from other countries is observed in this regard. Major police contributions are coming from the developing countries and they have less capacity to train the local police up to the international standards.

It is a very difficult task to measure the success of one component as a number of factor are involved in peacebuilding and a number of organizations work in this regard. The process is overall linked together. Good administration and sustainability of reforms are the major indicators to measure the effectiveness.

UN police is found effective in the short term assignments i.e. to conduct the elections and to maintain the law and order. Regarding long term assignments of institutional building and reforms, a positive change can be observed but public trust and local ownership could not be effectively developed on the new or reformed police service. Without the impartial judiciary public trust and sustainability of the reforms can not be achieved as only arrests do not solve the purpose. In addition, if the causes of the conflict are not rooted out, sustainability can also not be predicted. A spark can reverse all the process like East Timor. Rule of law can be maintained only through credible justice system.

Finally, it is observed that there is a need to improve the training deficiencies and the command structure of police service vis-à-vis sustainability of police reforms can not be achieved in isolation without an effective judicial system and peacebuilding call for judicial reforms. UN remained unable to provide credible judicial systems through the post conflict peacebuilding missions. UN criminal justice standards have been developed and recently revised but the interventions could not effectively bring the criminal justice reforms in the societies intervened.

6.2   Recommendations

Short and long term initiatives and programs are required to achieve the sustainable peace and good governance. There is a need of strategic planning in the local context as the nomenclature of every country is different. The unintended consequences of an intervention should be anticipated by the experts in advance to establish the credibility of the intervening force.

Keeping in view the enhancing mandate of the UN missions, there is a need to establish a research, monitoring and evaluation cell for each mission for a comprehensive strategy to achieve the sustainability of the objectives. Mandate of the missions may be modified and improved accordingly.

A permanent UN police force could be established and attached with every mission having the specialized training to serve in the peacebuilding missions. Regional training centers for the potential police officers from the contributing countries could also be established in South Asia and Africa. Keeping in view the India-Pakistan conflict, South Asian center may be established in Bangladesh.

A three to six months mandatory training should be the qualification to serve in UN peace missions. Before serving a mission, officers should know the mandate and objective of the mission and history of the conflict. In addition, the police officers who have served in a mission should be given priority for another mission both by the contributing countries and the UN. The input of experienced police officers is also necessary in the development and improvement of the police manuals and handbooks.

Only police reforms could not produce desired results, therefore, judicial reform should be an essential part of the missions. In addition, PBC should coordinate more effectively with non UN agencies and international organizations to work jointly and coherently. Communication with the masses is another important requirement that needs more attention to get realize the societies that reconstruction and rebuilding is their responsibility; peacebuilders are the helping hand only in this regard.

Future Research

This research is a humble effort to study the transition from UN peacekeeping to peacebuilding and emerging role of CIVPOL. There is a need of more research on peacebuilding in the local context particularly on the institutional building, human rights and judicial reforms component keeping in view the political and social culture of the conflicting societies. In addition, the decision making aspect of UN peace interventions by Security Council also needs to be studied in the realist paradigm.

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List of UN Peace Operations
1948-2010

S. No.	Acronym	Mission Name and Strength	Start Date	Closing Date
1	UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East - Palestine) Strength (30 June 2010) 153 military observers, supported by 89 international civilian personnel and 121 local civilian staff	May 1948	Present
2	UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan Strength (30 June 2010) 44 military observers, supported by 23 international civilian personnel 48 local civilian staff	January 1949	Present
3	UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force (First the Suez Canal sector and the Sinai peninsula. Later along the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza area and the international frontier in the Sinai peninsula, on the Egyptian side) Maximum Strength (February 1957) 6,073 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff	November 1956	June 1967
4	UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon Maximum Strength (November 1958) 591 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff	June 1958	December 1958
5	ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo Maximum Strength (July 1961) 19,828 all ranks, supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff	July 1960	June 1964
6	UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea Maximum Strength 1,500 infantry personnel and 76 aircraft personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff	October 1962	April 1963
7	UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission Maximum Strength 189 military personnel, including 25 military observers, 114 officers and other ranks of reconnaissance unit, 50 officers and other ranks of air unit; supported by international and local civilian staff	July 1963	September 1964

8	UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964	Present
		Strength (30 June 2010) 927 total uniformed personnel: 858 troops, **69 police**, 40 international civilian personnel and 111 local civilian staff		
9	DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	May 1965	October 1966
		Strength 2 military observers at any one time		
10	UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	September 1965	March 1966
		Maximum Strength (October 1965) 96 military observers, supported by international and local civilian staff		
11	UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency (Force Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai peninsula)	October 1973	July 1979
		Maximum Strength (February 1974) 6,973 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff		
12	UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Israel and Syria)	June 1974	Present
		Strength (30 June 2010) 1,037 troops, 76 UNTSO military observers of the Observer Group Golan, 38 international staff and 105 local civilian staff		
13	UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978	Present
		Strength (30 June 2010) 11,453 total uniformed personnel, 313 international civilian, 653 local civilian staff and50 UNTSO military observers of the Observer Group Lebanon		
14	UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May 1988	March 1990
		Maximum Strength 50 military observers, supported by a number of international and local civilian staff		
15	UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August 1988	February 1991
		Maximum Strength 400 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff		
16	UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989	May 1991
		Strength 70 military observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff		
17	UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)	April 1989	March 1990

		Maximum strength 4,493 all ranks, **1,500 civilian police** and under 2,000 international and local staff. The mission was strengthened by some 1,000 additional international personnel for the elections		
18	ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) Maximum Strength (May/June 1990) 1,098 military observers and troops supported by international and local civilian staff	November 1989	January 1992
19	UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission Maximum Strength (28 February 1995) 1,187 all ranks, including 254 military observers, supported by international and local civilian staff	April 1991	October 2003
20	MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (Territory on the north-west coast of Africa bordered by Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria) Strength (30 June 2010) 232 total uniformed personnel: 206 military observers, 20 troops, **6 police officers** 96 international civilian personnel, 162 local civilian staff and 20 United Nations Volunteers	April 1991	present
21	UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II Maximum Authorized (Oct. 1994-Feb. 1995) 350 military observers, **126 civilian police** and 14 military medical staff. There was also provision for some 220 international civilian and 145 local staff	May 1991	February 1995
22	ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador Maximum Strength (1992) 368 military observers and **315 civilian police**, supported by international and local civilian staff (The Mission was augmented by some 900 electoral observers during the election)	July 1991	April 1995
23	UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia Maximum Strength (March 1992) 1,090 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff	October 1991	March 1992
24	UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -Serbia and Montenegro - and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) Strength (March 1995) 38,599 military personnel including 684 United Nations military observers, **803 civilian police**,	February 1992	March 1995

		2,017 other international civilian staff and 2,615 local staff		
25	UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	February 1992	September 1993
		Maximum Strength 15,991Military component, **3,359 civilian police** (June 1993). During the electoral period, more than 50,000 Cambodians served as electoral staff and some 900 international polling station officers were seconded from Governments		
26	UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992	March 1993
		Maximum Strength (28 February 1993) 54 military observers and 893 troops and military support personnel, supported by international civilian and local staff		
27	ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992	December 1994
		Maximum strength of military component (30 November 1993) 6,576 all ranks Maximum strength of civilian police component (31 October 1994) **1,087 police observers**		
28	UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March 1993	March 1995
		Authorized Strength (March 1993 - February 1994) **28,000 military and civilian police personnel**; there was also provision for approximately 2,800 international and local civilian staff Strength at the start of withdrawal (30 November 1994) 14,968 all ranks, supported by international and local civilian staff		
29	UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993	September 1994
		Maximum Strength 81 military observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff		
30	UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	August 1993	June 2009
		Strength (31 March 2008) 129 military observers and **16 police**, supported by 105 international civilian personnel and 208 local civilian staff		
31	UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993	September 1997
		Authorized Strength (Sep. 1993-Nov. 1995) 303 military observers, 20 military medical personnel and 45 military engineers. There was also a provision some 90 international and 136 local civilian staff, and 58 United Nations Volunteers		
32	UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti	September 1993	June 1996
		Maximum Strength (30 June 1995)		

		6,065 troops and military support personnel, and **847 civilian police**, supported by international and local civilian staff		
33	UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda Authorized Strength (May 1994-June 1995) 5,500 military personnel, including approximately 5,200 troops and military support personnel and 320 military observers, and **90 civilian police** (in February 1995, the authorized strength of the **civilian police was increased to 120**), supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff	October 1993	March 1996
34	UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip (Republic of Chad) Observer Group STRENGTH 9 military observers, supported by 6 international civilian staff	May 1994	June 1994
35	UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan Strength Initially Authorized (December 1994) 40 military observers Maximum Authorized (September 1997) 120 military observers	December 1994	May 2000
36	UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III Strength (30 June 1997) 3,649 troops, 283 military observers and **288 civilian police**	February 1995	June 1997
37	UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia Strength (November 1995) 6,581 troops, 194 military observers and **296 civilian police**, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff	March 1995	January 1996
38	UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) Strength (February 1999) 1,049 troops, 35 military observers and **26 civilian police**, supported by 203 international and local civilian staff	March 1995	February 1999
39	UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Maximum strength (November 1997) **2,047 civilian police** and military liaison personnel	December 1995	December 2002
40	UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for	January	January 1998

		Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	1996	
		Strength (30 September 1997) Total 2,847 uniformed personnel: 2,346 troops, 97 military observers and **404 civilian police**		
41	UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (southern border between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)	January 1996	December 2002
		Authorized Strength: 28 military observers, supported by 3 international civilian personnel and 6 local civilian staff		
42	UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	July 1996	July 1997
		Maximum Strength (November 1996) 1,297 military and **291 civilian police** personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff		
43	MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	January 1997	May 1997
		Maximum Strength 132 military observers and 13 medical personnel		
44	MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	June 1997	February 1999
		Strength (31 July 1998) 661 troops and military support personnel, 92 military observers and **403 civilian police** observers, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff		
45	UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August 1997	December 1997
		Authorized Strength **250 civilian police personnel** and 50 military personnel (A number of additional military personnel, provided on the basis of voluntary funding, were also attached to UNTMIH's military component.)		
46	MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	December 1997	March 2000
		Authorized Strength **300 civilian police personnel**, including a special police unit, supported by a civilian establishment of some 72 international and 133 local personnel and 17 United Nations Volunteers.		
47	UNPSG	UN Civilian Police Support Group	January 1998	October 1998
		Strength (30 September1998) **114 police**, supported by international and local civilian staff, and headed by the Representative of the Secretary-General		
48	MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000

Maximum Authorized Strength
1,350 troops and military support personnel and **24 civilian police**, supported by international and local civilian staff. Additional short-term and medium-term United Nations observers were deployed during the legislative (November/December 1998) and presidential (September 1999) elections

49	UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	July 1998	October 1999

Maximum Strength (October 1999)
192 military observers, 15 other military personnel and a 2-person medical team, supported by international and local civilian staff

50	UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June 1999	Present

Strength (10 Sept.2002)
4468 international police and 4933 Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers deployed in all five regions of the province and at border crossings.

51	UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	October 1999	December 2005

Maximum Strength (31 March 2002)
Military 17,368, **UN Police 87**, international civilian 322 and local civilian 552

52	UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	October 1999	May 2002

Maximum Authorized Strength
Military 9,150 and **civilian police 1,640**
Strength (31 March 2002)
6,281 troops, **1,288 civilian police** and 118 military observers. UNTAET also includes 737 international civilian personnel and 1,745 local civilian staff

53	MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	November 1999	June 2010

Strength (30 April 2010)
18,884 troops, 712 military observers, **1,223 police**,991 international civilian personnel, 2,749 local civilian staff and 634 United Nations Volunteers

54	UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	July 2000	July 2008

Maximum Strength (31 May 2002)
3,940 troops, **214 police**, supported by 229 international civilian personnel and 244 local civilian staff

55	UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002	May 2005

Authorized Strength
5.000 military personnel including 120 military observers and **1,250 civilian police** officers
Provision was also made for 455 international civilian staff, 100 experts for the Civilian Support

		Group, 241 UN Volunteers and 977 locally recruited staff		
56	UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia Strength (30 June 2010) 7,810 troops. 133 military observers, **1,364 police**, 436 international civilian personnel, 993 local staff and 223 UN Volunteers	September 2003	Present
57	UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire transferred authority from MINUCI and ECOWAS forces to UNOCI MINUCI - United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (May 2003 to April 2004), Strength (29 February 2004) 75 military observers supported by 54 international civilian personnel and 55 local staff UNOCI Strength (30 June 2010) 7,191 troops, 193 military observers, **1,140 police**, supported by 398 international civilian personnel, 755 local staff and 299 United Nations Volunteers	April 2004	Present
58	MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti Strength (30 June 2010) 8,609 troops, **2,969 police**, 473 international civilian personnel, 1,235 local civilian staff and 208 United Nations Volunteers	June 2004	Present
59	ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi Maximum Strength (30 September 2005) 5,400 troops, 168 military observers, **97 police**, supported by 316 international civilian personnel, 383 local civilian staff and 156 United Nations Volunteers	June 2004	December 2006
60	UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan Strength (30 June 2010) 9,441 troops 497 military observers, **676 police officers**, supported by 868 international civilian personnel, 2,688 local civilian staff and 369 United Nations Volunteers	March 2005	Present
61	UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste Authorized Strength **1608 police**, 34 military liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component.	August 2006	Present
62	UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur Strength (30 June 2010) 17,018 troops, 251 military observers, **4,418 police officers**, 1,124 international civilian personnel, 2,626 local civilian staff and 446 United Nations Volunteers	July 2007	Present
63	MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African	September	Present

		Republic and Chad	2007	

Strength (30 June 2010)
3,473 troops, 24 military observers, **189 police officers,**
supported by 431 international civilian personnel, 597 local civilian staff and 158 United Nations Volunteers

64	MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	July 2010	Present

Strength (30 June 2010)
18,653 military personnel, 704 military observers, **1,229 police** (including formed units), 982 international civilian personnel, 2,787 local civilian staff and 641 United Nations Volunteers

Source: www.un.org/peacekeeping

In addition, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established on 28th March 2002. UNAMA is a political mission that currently operates 23 field offices throughout Afghanistan.

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United Nations Peacebuilding Operations

Research Questionnaire

Mission Name _____

Period Served _____ Year _____

Age _____ Qualification _____

Q. 1. Are you satisfied with the pre deployment training?

Q. 2. While placement did you know the mandate of the operation or the duties assigned to you?

Q. 3. Do you think the logistics and resources available to accomplish the task were adequate?

Yes   No

Q. 4. Internal co-ordination of multinational police force is a challenge?

Yes   No

Q. 5. Were you satisfied with the co-ordination among human right organizations, security agencies and civilian components?

Yes   No

Q. 6. What was the level of success of your mission? Please choose one.

   * Highly successful   * Successful   * Partially successful * Unsuccessful

Q. 7. What were the major limitations while performing your duties?

Q. 8. Once deployed/recommended in a mission may be deployed/recommended for another mission in future by your country.

Yes   No

Q. 9. What challenges you faced during operation and what lessons you learned?

Q. 10. What is the impact of your placement on personal learning and skill development?

Q. 11. Please give suggestions for the improvement of future deployment.