

**RUSSIA-CHINA STRATEGIC COOPERATION UNDER
SCO:AN ANALYSIS (2019-2023)**



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Dedication

To my Parents, Teachers & country who are
deprived of even their most basic rights

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the dynamics of Russia-China cooperation in the context of the SCO from 2019 to 2023. It discusses the still complex relationship that they share, examining both economic and military along with geopolitical aspects. This study explores how factors such as the growing confrontation with Western countries have affected this relationship. Based on the diplomatic talks, military cooperation, economic interactions, and policy harmonization within the SCO setting disclosed in the research, the authors pinpoint invaluable evidence of a strengthening partnership motivated by mutual interests in achieving shared goals of stability, economic development, and maintaining balance against the West's dominance. It stressed that the Russia-China relations have intensified during this period but are still a mixture of partnership and rivalry. Important findings with respect to further improvement of the bilateral relations, building the multipolar world and regional security in SCO area. To do so, the thesis also looks at the consequences of this strategic partnership for the configuration of world power in the context of Central Asia and the wider Eurasian space. By employing interviews with key experts, this thesis helps to expand knowledge of the multifaceted and evolving nature of Russia-China relations in the context of the SCO. The significance and sustainability of this strategic partnership and its implications on international relations of the forthcoming decades are also evaluated in the thesis.

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

Since its foundation in 2001, the Shanghai Collaboration Organization (SCO) has witnessed significant membership growth, from six founding members (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) to expansion in 2017 by two more countries (India and Pakistan) and its latest advancement in 2023 by the inclusion of Iran as a full member state. Currently there are nine members, the two most prominent of which are China and Russia. The mandate of the SCO is broad, covering several key areas of cooperation including security, economy, culture, political and diplomatic cooperation among its member states, with a strong emphasis on mutual respect, non-interference, and collaborative problem-solving. (Song, 2014).

The period of 2019–2023 is characterized as a very important and effective stage in the development of Russia-China partnership in SCO framework. It has been an era which seen many unprecedented global shocks that affected the international relations - COVID-19, growing tensions between great powers, great power politics, and not mentioning the shifts in balance of power. Under the changed conditions, the relations between Russia and China as two of the SCO founders, key actors acquire new significance.

Thus, this work explores in detail the process of their cooperation and how these two powers utilized the SCO as a means of pursuing their common agenda, containing the Western influence and altering the balance of power in the region. If one considers the military aspect of the designs and processes within the SCO, Russia and China placed the highest level of cooperation in the military mobilization complex. Economic as well as

diplomatic cooperation of Russia with China on the SCO platform brought forth union that had implications in Eurasian and global politics. Thus, this work aims at analyzing the major factors and patterns of such strategic partnership, as well as the overall effects of this collaboration on security, economic cooperation, and the global geopolitical system. Through exploring some cases of SCO Russia-China relations, the desirable changes and innovations in the recent five-year period, the paper tries to establish the empirical evidence of the SCO as a platform for Russia-China cooperation and the possible further course for the development of Eurasian politics and the world powers.

This thesis seeks to examine the dynamics of the Russian-Chinese collaboration from 2019 to 2023, focusing on their cooperation within the SCO, considering the changing in geopolitical conditions that provide both difficulties and possibilities. This research will analyze the extent and goals of their collaboration and the role of SCO in promoting and maintaining cooperation between the two nations. The SCO has evolved as an important venue for strategic collaboration between Russia and China in the twenty-first century. This thesis also investigates the changing dynamics of Russian-Chinese ties under the SCO framework between 2019-2023, a period defined by substantial geopolitical developments and challenges to the global order.

The SCO, established in 2001 has expanded beyond its initial focus on regional security to include broader economic and political cooperation (Aris, 2011). Russia and China, the organization's most powerful members, have increasingly exploited the SCO to push their mutual interests and vision of a multipolar world order (Kaczmarek, 2015). This research focusses on four important areas of inquiry to thoroughly investigate Russia-China strategic collaboration within the SCO from 2019-2023. First, it investigates security

cooperation, which includes joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism measures, as defined by de Haas (2017), to better understand how the SCO framework promotes military and security alignment between the two nations. Second, the study examines economic ties, building on Gabuev's (2020) work to evaluate trade agreements, energy accords, and infrastructure projects coordinated through SCO channels, emphasizing the economic aspects of this strategic cooperation. Third, the study evaluates geopolitical alignment, building on Allison's (2018) findings to look at joint diplomatic initiatives, mutual support in international forums, and collaborative efforts to counter Western influence, revealing broader geopolitical implications of Russia-China cooperation within the SCO.

The alliance between China and Russia has become a hot topic of study in international relations, with several research improving our understanding about this crucial partnership. Many studies have looked at the historical background and current dynamics which contribute to China's and Russia's cooperation, as well as the significance of their strategic alliance in affecting regional and global affairs. However, the SCO as a vehicle for strategic cooperation between China and Russia has not been specifically looked at mostly in these research. Several studies have recognized the SCO as a significant actor in this region, only some have examined the organization's role in advancing Russia-China cooperation in detail. The SCO's importance has been mostly seen by academics as being centered on how it supports stability and security in the region. Fewer research works have looked at other areas, such as economic cooperation and cross-cultural exchanges, where the SCO has contributed to the development of strategic ties between China and Russia over time.

China and Russia are two of the world's biggest nations in terms of both population and land area. These two nuclear-armed nations are separated by great distances. They are also United Nations permanent members.

Over the course of three more centuries, the Mongol invasions of Russia started in the thirteenth century. As a result, the Russians considered the East to be their main enemy. A major historical split occurred between the 17th and 19th centuries because of the Tsars' eastern expansion and the Manchu resistance to their rule. The 'Unequal Treaties' caused China to lose a great deal of territory to Russia in the 19th century. The treaties gave over much of the "Russian Far East" to the Qing dynasty. For this same reason, the Chinese refer to them as "Unequal Treaties".

Tensions between China and Russia increased between 1894 and 1971. Deep mistrust existed between the two nations because of the political and ideological divide between Stalin and Mao, which was exacerbated by Stalin's pathetic and self-serving support for Mao throughout the civil war. Ideological disagreements, interpersonal strife, and border issues contributed to the mutual mistrust and decline in bilateral ties. The relationship between Russia and China saw considerable upheaval, ranging from the two countries' adoption of communist doctrines in the 1950s to their development as bitter rivals that resulted in military confrontation in 1969.

The Relations between the two countries remained steady in the late 1980s. Even though Russia and China had strategic links before the fall of the USSR, their bilateral ties significantly improved in the 1990s. A new geopolitical environment emerged as the Soviet Union fell apart, with China and Russia forging a strategic alliance and the United States

emerging as the lone superpower. Since then, China and Russia's bilateral ties have significantly improved, signaling the establishment of a power balance in Asia (Taagepera, 1997).

China and Russia both believe that their bilateral ties are flourishing. As per Xinhua (2007) and the general agreement among specialists in international affairs, Russia's increasing connections with China are often seen as a noteworthy accomplishment in its efforts towards diplomacy and national security. Despite their initial skepticism, academics and intellectuals now see the significance of the Sino-Russian relationship, considering shifting global geopolitics. Since both nations put their shared national interests first and amicably addressed their differences, China and Russia's political, economic, and diplomatic ties have been steadily improving.

China's neighbors have expressed worry and discomfort over the nation's continued economic expansion and ascent to international prominence. China is wary of Russia because of its perceived unreliability as a partner, whereas Russia is wary of China due to its growing political, military, and economic strength. When faced with the prospect of Russia and China forging tighter ties, officials had to make a tough choice. Scholars and policymakers are paying greater attention to China and Russia's improving ties. But the relationship's explosive expansion over the last 20 years and its ramifications for Asia, particularly India, are not well understood. The foreign, defense, economic, and political policies of the two countries must be in line with their shared national interests (Lukin, 2018).

Numerous commissions, sub commissions, working groups, and organizations have been established to promote bilateral cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Before the conclusion of the Cold War, these entities did not exist. A captivating facet of the dynamic geopolitical environment is the strategic interaction between China and Russia. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have recently developed a strategic and economic partnership, despite their long-standing hostility and mistrust. This cooperative approach is being influenced by security and economic concerns. The primary element bringing collaboration together is now the shared danger faced by the United States. To exercise influence over the geopolitical and economic environment to their advantage, they are working to strengthen their strategic alliances. Strong diplomatic, military, and economic relations, as well as a high level of mutual trust, have supported the two countries' strategic cooperation.

Problem Statement

In the context of evolving geopolitical scenarios, it is essential to understand the changing nature and dynamics of Russia-Chinese strategic cooperation and their engagements within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While existing literature has shed insights into the factors driving their partnership, there is a need to examine the impact of evolving geopolitics on their strategic relationship and the potential challenges and opportunities that may arise in the future. Therefore, this study aims to analyze Russia-Chinese strategic cooperation under SCO from 2019 to 2023 sheds light on the evolving dynamics of their partnership and the way forward for enhancing their cooperation.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in its potential to provide critical insights into the ongoing and future trajectory of Russia-Chinese strategic cooperation, particularly within the SCO framework, from 2019 to 2023. By examining this dynamic relationship, the research will illuminate how these two major powers will shape global politics and regional stability in the coming years. This analysis will offer policymakers a valuable tool for crafting informed foreign policy decisions and strategies, as it will reveal the extent to which Russia and China collaborate, compete, or engage in a delicate balancing act within the SCO. Furthermore, the study will contribute to academic scholarship by filling gaps in existing literature and laying the foundation for future research. Ultimately, its timely examination of this partnership will enhance our understanding of the geopolitical landscape and will be of significant relevance to both practitioners and scholars in the field of international relations.

Objectives of the Study

- To examine the dynamics of Russia-China strategic cooperation from the platform of SCO.
- To evaluate the role of regional and international peer competitors in Russia and China.
- To analyze the prospects of Russia-China strategic cooperation in the wake of changing regional and global security environments.

Research Questions

- What are the key dynamics characterizing Russia-China strategic cooperation within the SCO, and how do these dynamics influence the overall nature of their partnership?
- How does the involvement of regional and international peer competitors affect the roles played by Russia and China within the SCO, and to what extent do these external factors shape their strategic decisions and interactions?
- What are the anticipated prospects for Russia-China strategic cooperation within the SCO, and how might emerging geopolitical challenges impact the trajectory of their collaboration?

Literature Review

Russia and China: A Literature Review on Geopolitics and Geo-economics

Geopolitics is of the utmost significance to both China and Russia's leaderships, according to Lo Bobo (2008), who looks at the geopolitical dimensions of Russia-China collaboration. The Economic and security factors are the key forces behind this connection. According to Lo Bobo (2008), there are issues with the relationship between the two countries. "The relationship between Russia and China is often misunderstood as either a strong anti-Western alliance, particularly against the United States, or as a relationship that is always divided due to past conflicts and differing goals," the author claims. Their union represents a new kind of geopolitics, one that is less about rigid alliances and more about a pragmatic, values-based axis of convenience. Rather than depending on a profound ideological convergence, Russia and China are reaping the benefits of their relationship, even though strategic trust is still distant. "Will Russia and China establish the parameters of global political norms in the 21st century?" In his paper "A Wary Embrace," which he

delivered at Brookings, Bobo Lo (2017) raises this topic. Beijing and Moscow's strategic partnership has transformed their formerly tense relationship from the 1980s into the current state of extensive cooperation. The author makes the case that Russia and China's relationship is significantly shaped by world geopolitics. Additionally, the connections that both nations have with the West have an impact on this relationship. The rising gap between the two countries has made the relationship between Russia and China more complex and difficult, creating a rift (Mäkinen, 2014).

Russia's issues in foreign policy Although Russia's ties with China improved significantly during the Cold War, they did not establish the same kind of collaboration with Western nations as was expected. Jeanne says Russia must shift its foreign policy to accommodate China. By taking this step, Russia would be able to oppose the rising influence of the United States and Western countries in their adjacent area and accomplish its strategic aims with the support of a dependable partner.

The author looks at the historical foundations of China's and Russia's foreign policies, showing how they developed into a complex system based on economics and security. The complex relationship between China and Russia. A few members of the ruling class in Russia predicted Japan's rise to prominence in Asia. According to the book, shared sovereignty and regional disintegration would arise from Japan's growing supremacy. The author draws attention to the potential alliance between China, Japan, and Russia. The 2004 book by Iwashita Akihiro delves deeply into the disputes between China and Russia about geography, regions, and territory. The book offers a comprehensive examination of the ways in which the "Far East" has contributed significantly to the development of Russia-China ties, which has finally resulted in the formation of a "strategic partnership."

The geography near the Russia-China border is described in detail by the author (Arbatov, 1993).

The ongoing attempts to improve relations between China and Russia, Russia's viewpoint on China, the possibility of a future collaboration, and the ways in which US activities are impacting these dynamics. From a practical perspective, the author finds the rising divide unsettling and views the relationship as positive. Geopolitics and strategic considerations, which encourage strong reconciliation and permit geopolitical maneuvering in the region, are the primary driving elements for this union. The author offers conflicting opinions on several regional issues, such as politics, economics, and security. the intricate connection between Russia and China.

A small number of Russia's governing elites foresaw Japan's ascent to dominance in Asia. According to the book, Japan's increasing dominance will lead to shared sovereignty and regional collapse. The possible alliance between China, Japan, and Russia is brought up by the author. Iwashita Akihiro's 2004 book digs deep into China and Russia's territorial conflicts over geography and regions. The book provides a thorough analysis of the way the "Far East" has influenced Russia-China relations and helped them grow to the point where a "strategic partnership" has been formed. The author provides a detailed description of the terrain close to the border between China and Russia (Tremin, 2012).

In his study, he thoroughly and persuasively looked at several aspects of the relationship between China and Russia. The continued efforts to bring Russia and China closer together, Russia's perspective on China, the potential for their future partnership, and how US actions are affecting these dynamics. From a pragmatic standpoint, the author sees the developing connection favorably and doesn't see the growing gap as concerning.

This association's strong reconciliation and facilitation of geopolitical maneuvering in the area stem from the belief that geopolitics and strategic considerations are the fundamental drivers of this alliance.

The author presents opposing viewpoints on several regional problems, including politics, economy, and security. The author has discussed international issues while outlining the Sino-Russian connection. Wishnick thinks that while the Sino-Russian partnership is significant, there are other unspoken issues. Russia, which supported Pavel Khrushchev's "strategic triangle" idea in the early 20th century, has been attempting to thwart the United States' expanding influence in Asia. The author believes that such an alliance between China and India is unlikely to occur because of their differences. Sherman Garnett (2000) points out that the Sino-Russian entente is increasing as the geopolitical realities of Asia shift. Sherman thinks that the Russia-China relationship has improved since the end of the Cold War and has advanced greatly to become a strategic partnership in the contemporary period, despite the general skepticism and concern.

Regarding relations between Russia and China, this book covers every angle, including geography, economics, and geopolitics. The growing power gap between China and Russia is also covered, as are both nations' attempts to keep their ties harmonious. Trenin Dmitri (2012) discusses how China and Russia have shaped their policies to support one another in terms of security and risk. The book traces the development of the link from its beginnings to its present status and its anticipated future trajectory. China has an impact on Russian foreign and domestic policy. Dmitri Trevin has attempted, in his works, to conduct a geopolitical and geostrategic examination of Russia's relationships with China and India. Trenin outlines the opinions of the Russian elite about the strategies that must

be developed against China and India. The bilateral ties between China and Russia are discussed in detail. The book begins with a historical overview of the connection before discussing the implications of strategic cooperation on a regional and global scale. The author highlights how the relationship is tense, which may prevent it from becoming an alliance. Another significant book is an intriguing examination of the geopolitical and economic ramifications of China's and Russia's dependence on gas and oil (Wishnick, 2021).

Chinese Foreign Policy Regarding the SCO

One of the best techniques is to associate with nations by means of multilateral associations. Thus, a local collusion among China and the focal Asian nations has turned into a doable decision for China's objectives. Tragically, executing this method has become more troublesome because of the scattered possibilities in the area. This approach is consistent and shouldn't concern Russia since China and Russia have comparative essential interests in focal Asia. Investigators from China, by and large, concurs that Beijing will think about Russia's authentic provincial interests. Li Fenglin, China's envoy to Russia from 1995 to 1998, answered Russia's interests about China's developing impact in focal Asia by stressing that his country had no design to expect influential positions on a provincial or worldwide level. China knows that Russia needs to clutch the authentic strength it has had over focal Asia. Fanatic gatherings that need to oust the Chinese government in its western locale keep on being a wellspring of worry for China.

Intergovernmental collaboration with focal Asian neighbors is important to actually destroy such cross-line organizations and go against the worldwide connections of dissident gatherings. China's essential objective in Focal Asia is to eliminate any dangers that could prompt shakiness or psychological oppression inside China. This is certainly not

a monetary or control objective; rather, it is China's international reason. The previous Chinese envoy to Russia, Li Fenglin, affirms.

Eminently, China is open to expanding participation in the field of military science research. It includes supporting the military logical foundations of the SCO part states, orchestrating gatherings and workshops on the most pressing issues standing up to military logical exploration, and meeting and trading designations from military logical associations. China is quick to see the SCO develop into a trustworthy association that handles huge areas of worldwide undertakings. The multilateral association is seen by China as the best method for speaking with an adjoining district along its northwest boundary. Nonetheless, it is trying to convince its SCO partners —particularly Russia — to team up in a manner that lines up with China's objectives and desires. Chinese scholastics are particularly worried by Russia's dull way of behaving inside the SCO and the little commitments made by focal Asian nations to its headway. China faces an imposing test from the profound verifiable, social, and institutional ties that Russia has with the focal Asian countries.

It ought to be noticed that the subject of energy collaboration isn't yet on the SCO plan since some states have not yet reached an agreement on the issue. China needs to guarantee that it can ship energy across boundaries and import oil and gas from Focal Asia. Russia needs to control the energy assets nearby, regardless of whether it is in fact conceivable to do so by utilizing its vehicle pipelines. Supplied with plentiful gaseous petrol and oil stores, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are expanding their product markets, refreshing outdated gear, and undertaking exploratory endeavors to relieve their inordinate reliance on Russia. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, without oil and gas, are anxious to exploit

their water resources and hydroelectric potential. China, in this manner, experiences issues in growing its energy and monetary participation. This is associated with the PRC's unpredictable support for this association: regardless of true explanations expressing the significance of the SCO, master decisions have fluctuated. There are currently worries over China's cooperation in the SCO because the PRC's fundamentally provincial endeavors being centered around the Belt and road Initiative (BRI). China's motivation for laying out the SCO Improvement Bank is not apparent thinking about the presence of the BRICS, AIIB, and a few other monetary organizations that arrangement with comparative matters.

Russia - China Military Cooperation

Protection and security participation among China and Russia are the main parts of their essential association. He goes on by expressing that by settling and working on online issues, the two countries have raised their protection collaboration to another level. China's consistent acquisition of Russian weapons has supported Russia's protection area. Russian pioneers were hesitant to give over their high-level military innovation to their Chinese partners for fear that their thoughts would be stolen by China's homegrown weapons area, making an opponent market for Russian items. By and by, military and security matters have overwhelmed China-Russian key ties. China and Russia have been effectively engaged in areas of strength for a union and coordinated efforts in security. The creator presents a procedure for upgraded and better military collaboration among China and Russia, focusing on three vital areas of safeguard participation: joint preparation and activities, military-innovative participation, and undeniable level designation trades. Ethan accepts that doubt among China and Russia will probably forestall any security solidarity for the present. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Association, Russia and China's essential organizations have grown consistently notwithstanding the continually changing

international climate (Alexandrov, 2018). The creator has tried to cause us to notice the fundamental parts that are moving the relationship despite the intricacy of the world conditions. The reasons and contributing components of Russia and China's essential commitment, as well as the contemporary military and security systems that have prompted the two countries' developing protection and security joint effort, have all been masterfully illustrated by the creator. The two nations are "very nearly a union," the creator claims. The Russian-Chinese military participation has been examined during three particular time spans. The years 1990-1995 had new measures pointed toward supporting certainty, deals and obtainment of weapons, and power decreases. Therefore, in 1996, China and Russia announced their "essential organization," scheduled to endure from 1995 to 2005. At last, the accentuation changed from offering weapons to completing helpful preparation and activities, which began in 2005 and are yet continuing today (Yu, & Sui, 2020).

Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Russia-Chinese Strategic Cooperation

The writing on Russia-China vital participation investigates the changing idea of their joint effort and its ramifications for worldwide international relations under the system of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The international purposes behind this collusion have been very much concentrated by scholastics, who have stressed things like a typical craving to oppose Western impact, work on local soundness, and advance monetary collaboration. With respect to nearby, Russia and China have had the option to share data and direct five joint military drills thanks to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which demonstrates a developing intermingling of their security advantages.

Another significant angle is the two nations' solid monetary relations, which incorporate significant economic accords, foundational undertakings, and energy coalitions. Researchers have firmly analyzed the impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on provincial and worldwide financial elements, since it has been instrumental in encouraging business ties. Since they help to fabricate shared understanding and fortitude between the Russian and Chinese people groups, social and individuals-to-individuals contacts under the structure of the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) have additionally collected scholarly interest. A careful assessment of the potential troubles and clashes that this partnership, as well as the perspectives of other SCO individuals on the growing Russia-China coordinated effort, might be deficient in the writing. Besides, further examination is important to decide what this organization means for global administration structures and in the event that the SCO can supplant other worldwide associations as a mind power.

The general objective of this writing survey is to shed light on the possibilities and challenges of Russia-China vital cooperation inside the SCO while additionally growing our familiarity with its numerous features. Scientists have seen how individuals-to-individuals and social contacts inside the SCO add to the bigger texture of local reconciliation as well as a sensation of fortitude between the populaces of Chinese and Russians. The role that social strategy and instructive undertakings play in impacting perspectives, advancing common comprehension, and laying the basis for long haul collaboration inside the SCO has been analyzed. Regardless, a critical in the ongoing collection of grant is the thorough assessment of potential impediments and clashes that can arise within the Russia- China collusion. Albeit the SCO gives a discussion of

coordinated effort, concerns connecting with history, varying vital plans, and differences in public interests might make the relationship hard to keep up with (Azizi, 2024).

In addition, there hasn't been a lot of examination done on other SCO individuals' perspectives about the fortifying Russia-China relationship. An intensive assessment of the SCO's impact on provincial elements requires a comprehension of how states like Beijing and Moscow, like India and Pakistan, see and respond to the partnership's rising strength. Besides, the assessment of the SCO organization among China and Russia's more extensive worldwide results has scarcely been addressed by the writing. There is still a lot to find out about the likelihood that the SCO might turn into a stabilizer for current worldwide associations, particularly with regards to worldwide administration. More inside and out research that investigates the intricacies, troubles, and more extensive ramifications of this collusion is frantically required, even though the assemblage of existing grants has enormously added to how we might interpret the perplexing parts of Russia-China key collaboration inside the system of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Future exploration tries might give a more intensive understanding of the systems impacting this critical international association and its suggestions for local and worldwide occasions by topping off these holes.

A vital part of Russia and China's essential organization is their financial collaboration under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Through programs like economic deals, energy coalitions, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the SCO assumes a basic part in advancing monetary collaboration. Cooperative foundation drives and monetary commitments feature a typical obligation to advance shared success, further developing network, and expand financial relationships. In regions like exchange help,

speculation advancement, and provincial monetary development, Russia and China can adjust their inclinations because of the SCO's laid out stage for examining financial potential outcomes and troubles. The association's capability of encouraging monetary relations not just reinforces the reconciliation of the two nations yet additionally adds to the district's financial climate.

Subsequently, the SCO is critical in deciding the monetary parts of the Russia-China collaboration as it offers a system for continuous work and reinforces the partnership's essential significance on the planet economy. Monetary relations have been one of the main areas of Russia China key joint effort, aside from security collaboration. Through channels like worldwide trade, cross-line travel, and framework, the SCO has made this joint effort more straightforward. As per Baar (2019), Russia and China presently have a lot more monetary choices concerning local financial mix, transportation network, and energy security because of their cooperation inside the SCO. A possible collaboration added to the Chinese Repertoire and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an extraordinary delineation of how SCO methods work with monetary participation (Kocamaz, 2019).

Theoretical / Conceptual Framework

In current research, a Neo-Realist theoretical framework integrates elements of Realism and sheds light on power dynamics and national interests in international relations. This approach involves analyzing Russia-China strategic cooperation within the SCO by examining how each country's pursuit of power and security influences collaborative efforts. The Neo-Realist lens encompasses issues such as balancing against regional powers, navigating competition with the United States, and managing resource considerations. In doing so, this framework acknowledges the importance of state-centric motivations and the anarchic nature of the international system, as highlighted by

traditional realism, while also incorporating nuanced considerations of the contemporary geopolitical landscape. This consolidated Neo-Realist perspective provides a comprehensive foundation for understanding the strategic interactions between Russia and China within the SCO.

These objectives are emphatically interlinked with public interests and international strategy choices, and later, these choices are being utilized as an instrument for the achievement of set public interests. In international strategy, the state's way of behaving towards different states is a significant component on the grounds that, through this way of behaving, one state figures out its international strategy methodology towards different nations to attempt its public advantages.

For a superior comprehension of the shapes of Russia's international strategies, At the same time, the different hypothetical parts of World-wide relations must be integrated. The review's center is international strategy investigation. Organization's international strategies. Through an international strategy, political activities in global relations happen, through composed systems. Nations take on international strategies to protect their public advantages. It is consequently that states plan systems based on state-driven and pragmatist standards. With this straightforward reason, the specialist starts this work, by choosing a hypothetical system that appears to be more persuasive for the contextual investigation and anticipating that the anticipated result should be pertinent and fulfilling. To this end, the scientist has put together his work with respect to the headings of 'authenticity,' as the exploration of China's international strategy towards South Asia: Authenticity would essentially continue as the hypothetical system of this review; in any case, different

features or groupings of some pragmatist researchers' speculations and significant perspectives would likewise be presented to address various questions emerging.

Neo-Realism

Kenneth Neal Waltz, a distinguished American political scientist, established a thorough methodology for elucidating the intricacies of the international system. Waltz argues that the behavior of actors in the international system is shaped by its structure. These actors must navigate and adapt to the limits imposed by the structure in order to live. The theory emphasizes a pattern of state systems based on a system-level analysis, which the author regards as more significant than a state level focus. Neorealism, in contrast to realism, posits that the behavior of states is primarily influenced by structural restrictions rather than human nature. According to neorealism, the structure of the international political system is fundamentally characterized by anarchy, as proposed by (Kenneth Neal Waltz, 1979).

An anarchic system is characterized by a highly decentralized structure where there is no central authority to govern the behavior of individual states. The prevailing logic in this system is only focused on self-interest, and states adhere to this logic to pursue their own goals. Survival is an essential need for any country existing inside this fiercely competitive global system. The states' behavior is determined by their search for survival. Although the concept of a world without a central authority is still considered an important theoretical viewpoint, it has to be adjusted by including the relational insights obtained from the theory of the complex structure of the global political system.

Waltz argues that international politics may be understood via the concepts of anarchy and hierarchy. The connections between nations are based on either hierarchy,

which involves power and subordination, or anarchy, which refers to a state of lawlessness. Waltz distinguishes between nations by their capacities or capabilities rather than their roles or functions. If we classify all international regimes as lacking a central authority, then the political structure of international relations is determined by the varying power capacities of various nations. The global norms vary based on the number of major countries in a certain order and their respective hierarchical strength in the global balance of power.

The pursuit of survival compels governments to acquire military capabilities to safeguard themselves against external interference by other states. The pursuit of military might by one nation amplifies the apprehension of other nations, leading others to adopt similar behavior as the first one. States use this strategy to acquire a position of advantage over one another. The security challenge is further exacerbated by a lack of confidence among states in the global political system.

This lack of trust is further accompanied by the parallel requirements of all countries (Lobell et al., 2009). They vary in their abilities to acquire those necessities. Their capabilities dictate the place of nations in the international system, and their capacities empower them to actively seek their interests. These talents also hinder collaboration among the states due to each nation-state's inherent competitive inclinations driven by the fear of relative advantage. The pursuit of relative benefit by each state contributes significantly to the establishment of a balance of power, which is a crucial element in the field of international relations.

Neo-realists argue that war, as a worldwide occurrence, is expected to persist soon due to the anarchic nature of the international system. They argue that achieving long-term peace is challenging due to the anarchic nature of the system. Neo-realists have a very negative perspective on international affairs. Despite the many changes occurring around the globe, the likelihood of conflict is decreasing because of nuclear deterrence, which relies on the dread of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). However, it is crucial to acknowledge the relevance and soundness of structural realism, as it offers valuable perspectives on the shortcomings inherent in the idea of the intricate nature of international relations. Expanding the breadth of the research's theoretical framework is crucial to seek explanations for unresolved questions. The researcher aims to discover the answers while adhering closely to the neo-realistic approach. However, he still has the freedom to refer to other versions of the idea, such as neo-classic realism. Undoubtedly, this endeavor does not deviate from the chosen theoretical framework; rather, it aims to fill the gaps that were not addressed in previous versions of structural realism.

Neo-realists and classical realists both emphasize the inherent conflict in politics that arises from the anarchic character of the universe. Regarding the origins of conflict, both neo-realists and classical realists seem to agree. However, classic realists draw inspiration from the previous form of realism and openly include both external and internal factors to bolster their arguments. One significant distinction between neorealist and classical realists is their understanding of states' goals. Neorealist argue that governments want "security," but classical thinkers believe that states are compelled to react to the unpredictable conditions caused by the anarchic system.

This theory examines the frameworks inside the international system. It is significant for the study as it facilitates comprehension of the international system via the allocation of capacities.

This article effectively addresses the complex issue of the regional security conundrum in South Asia, specifically concerning the shift in terrorism after World War II and the events of 9/11. The concepts of danger, threat perception, and security problems arise in the context of anarchy and self-help. The eternal characteristics of nation-states are the sense of insecurity and the urge to safeguard essential ideals. Through reciprocal rivalry, governments construct military forces and cultivate capabilities that contribute to the stratification of global power based on the varying capacities of each state.

The thesis aims to determine the current political structure of China and Russia, analyze their existing strategic cooperation, and assess their mutual effects on world powers. The allocation of power in the international system, based on capabilities, determines how states relate to one another and form their preferences within the system. This theory of Neo-Realism highlights the importance of the international structure (anarchy and power distribution) in shaping state behavior, and it also serves as a foundation for analyzing the capacities of both established and growing power centers, as well as highlighting the need for effective planning for a developing nation to consider their available alternatives. Given the emergence of several power centers in the global arena, characterized by complexity, volatility, and relative instability, emerging countries like Pakistan and India must take a proactive and dynamic strategy to maximize their gains by strengthening the capacities of their respective states.

Seize the opportunity by embracing a non-linear strategy to effectively tackle the next problem.

Research Methodology

Qualitative data has been used for this research. Research was employed by following the rules and regulations of the institution and the method of document analysis was used for the period of 2019-2023. This study only used secondary data to leverage existing information for new analysis and there are no potential ethical concerns arising from the research.

Research Design

A research design serves as a bridge between the implementation of research and research questions by providing a strategic framework for action. The primary framework used in this study was ‘qualitative research design’ that helped in examination of the increasing strategic cooperation between Russia and China under the SCO during 2019-2023. The qualitative research approach is appropriate because it allows an in-depth analysis of the factors discussed in the thesis and provides a more detailed understanding of the dynamics of the Russian-China relationship. For this research, the exploratory and analytical methods will be used, and observational techniques will be employed to conclude, keeping up with the descriptive and analytical nature of this study.

Population

The population of this study consists of key policymakers, diplomats, and government officials from Russia and China, who are actively engaged in the decision-making process related to the concerns in the security, economy, culture, political and diplomatic foreign policy of Russia and China.

Sampling

For sampling, a convenient sampling technique was utilized where the people easily accessible and relevant to this research were approached, like Political scientists and Academicians.

Operational Definitions

The researcher identified key variables and provided operational definitions for clarity and precision. Here are some variables relevant to research: This could involve shifts in regional power balances, influence on international organizations, or implications for U.S. foreign policy. The level of political, economic, and security stability in Central Asia and the extent to which Russian Chinese cooperation within the SCO contributes to or impacts stability in this region. Indicators may include conflict resolution, economic development, and security cooperation. The extent of U.S. involvement, influence, or interactions with Russia, China, and the SCO during the study period. This variable can moderate the relationship between red cross society of China RCSC and geopolitical impact, reflecting the role of the United States in the region. SCO Member States' Positions, interests, and actions of other SCO member states (e.g., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan) in response to or in conjunction with Russia-Chinese cooperation. This variable can moderate the impact of RCSC on regional stability and geopolitics.

Data Collection

For the data collection, both primary and secondary sources were used. For primary sources, the interviews, and official documents from governmental institutions like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and National Institute of Maritime Affairs (NIMA) were utilized, international organizations and think tanks like Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and the Brookings Institution

were also considered for content analysis in addition to the official SCO website. For secondary sources, books, journals, thesis, newspapers, and other internet sources were used for the accumulation of data and better understanding of the title.

Data Analysis

The content analysis technique was preferred for data analysis through which the content of interviews, official documents, and media sources was analyzed to understand the pattern of the SCO and the changes observed in Russia and China with other states policy towards China. Important politicians, academics, and industry professionals were surveyed using articles, books, links, and web links to retrieve data; their responses were analyzed by transcribing and highlighting their points of view, which were then compared to the study's central argument.

Moreover, the independent variables such as economic, strategic, and regional security were measured. We obtained depth of knowledge via the use of theme analysis methods. Applying different methods to the secondary sources allowed us to synthesize, evaluate, and extract themes from the data that supported and validated the results. The study was further validated by classifying each expert's arguments and analyzing solely the themes.

To further guarantee the research's validity, different approaches were used to compare the sources of existing information. To back up the research's central claim, each item was also compared to relevant literature and provided support from it.

Ethical Considerations

The interviews for this research were conducted under the ethical consideration of research, where the anonymity of the interviewee was protected and the information was used with the consent of the interviewee.

Organization of the Study

The first chapter is the introduction of the research: There is an introduction and four chapters in this study. Research questions and research goals are stated in the introduction, along with a summary of the findings of this study.

Other elements that comprise the first chapter of the research are the importance of the study, the Problem Statement, the delimitation of the study, the literature evaluation, the theoretical framework, the research technique, and, lastly, the organization of the study.

The second chapter of the research is about the dynamics of Russia-China strategic cooperation within the SCO: A thorough analysis of the dynamics of China-Russian strategic cooperation within the SCO is given in Chapter 2. It starts with a summary of their partnership's historical origins inside the SCO framework and follows the development of their connection throughout time. The chapter then dives into a thorough analysis of the complex dynamics influencing ties between Russia and China, focusing on how power dynamics and national interests affect their cooperative endeavors. It draws attention to the complexities of their strategic alliance, stressing both the advantages to both parties and the difficulties that come with working together. The chapter also examines the tactics both countries use to counterbalance regional powers and negotiate competition with the US, providing insight into the intricate geopolitical environment in which their collaboration takes place.

The third chapter of the research is Prospects of Russia-China Geo-Economic Cooperation within the SCO: Offering a thorough assessment of their bilateral economic cooperation, Chapter 3 explores the potential for geo-economic cooperation between China and Russia under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It starts by evaluating the two countries' present level of geo-economic cooperation and looking at the efforts and agreements that have been made. After that, the chapter suggests possible areas to deepen economic linkages by considering things like investment possibilities, trade facilitation, infrastructure development, and energy cooperation. Additionally, it does a comprehensive analysis of the reciprocal advantages of economic cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), emphasizing the favorable effects on economic development, regional stability, and geopolitical influence of both China and Russia. Through this study, Chapter 3 offers insightful information on how Russia and China's geo-economics cooperation will develop going forward inside the SCO. It also makes recommendations for how to improve cooperation even further and maximize advantages for both parties.

Chapter 4 Explores the Potential for Economic Cooperation between Russia and China under the SCO Framework, providing a thorough assessment of their bilateral economic engagement. The analysis commences with evaluating the present condition of geo-economic collaboration, scrutinizing the existing agreements and efforts between the two countries. The chapter subsequently highlights prospective avenues for enhancing economic links, considering aspects such as the advancement of infrastructure, the ease of commerce, collaboration in the energy sector, and prospects for investment. Moreover, it carries out a comprehensive evaluation of the reciprocal advantages obtained from

economic collaboration inside the SCO framework, emphasizing the favorable effects on the economic expansion, regional stability, and geopolitical sway of both Russia and China. Chapter 3 of this report offers unique insights into the future direction of Russia-China geo-economic cooperation within the SCO. It also gives suggestions for further increasing collaboration and maximizing mutual advantages.

The fifth chapter of the research is Major Findings, recommendations, and Conclusions: Major Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion, the study's last chapter, provides a brief synopsis of the most important discoveries made throughout the investigation. The chapter provides strategic proposals targeted at improving cooperation between the two countries within this multilateral framework, drawing on the extensive analysis of Russia-China strategic cooperation inside the SCO. These suggestions include actions to improve security cooperation, deepen economic integration, and build diplomatic relations. The chapter also considers the study results' wider importance, emphasizing how they may affect regional stability, international relations dynamics, and global geopolitics.

CHAPTER 1

RUSSIA-CHINA STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITHIN THE SCO

Russia-China relations in the framework of the SCO have gradually assumed a special importance in determining the affairs of Eurasia and changing the unipolar world order. Indeed, this cooperation can be described as the culmination of interest-oriented cooperation and a mutual need for security concerns and interests within the framework of the SCO.

It highlighted that the interaction between Russia and China significantly evolved owing to a number of factors, with the SCO being one of them. It has been involved in joint exercises like the “Peace Mission” series, whose main purpose is to improve the cooperation level between the members and demonstrate the readiness for participation in military operations. These exercises frequently center on the counter-terrorism operations, in compliance with the SCO’s declared aim of ‘elimination of the three evils’ – terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Furthermore, with reference to regional security, both countries have also responded through the SCO format, accompanied by the intensification of the approaches aimed at the Central Asia and Afghanistan.

In the economic aspect, both Russia and China have utilized the SCO as a stage to advance their economic concerns and their model of integration, More on this aspect later. They have advocated for the enhancement of trade in national currencies between SCO members with the vision of decreasing the use of the US dollar as a physical currency. The two powers have also supported the implementation of integrated infrastructure projects, thus connecting them to the Chinese Belt as well as Road forums and Russia’s Eurasian

Economic Union. On the economic front, the topics include organization of an SCO energy club and the promotion of cross border energy investment.

In the sphere of world management, Russia and China employed the SCO as the prism through which they call for a poly centric world. They have systematically employed SCO summits and declarations as the basis to denounce what they consider neo-imperialism of the West and intervention in domestic matters. This also entails the synchronized stances on topics like internet governance, where both states seek to increase state control of the web through the SCO. A detailed examination of the evolution of the two nations' diplomatic ties can be found below. More light is shed on the similarities and differences in the interests of the two nations. China Putting aside their prior animosity, Russia and the US are now working to improve their ties. China and Russia are two very different countries that have historically had overlapping interests. They are also neighbors. The nature of the relationship between these two countries has a considerable impact on the stability of both the regional and international environments. As a result, it's critical to consider how the histories of the two nations interact to create the current situation.

The relationship between China and Russia is distinct from their relationships with other countries and has evolved in a way that specifically suits their mutual interests and strategic needs. The decisions taken by Putin and Xi have a significant impact on the character of the relationship between China and Russia (Wendt, 1992). It is not implied by this phrase that other people are unimportant. Leaders are seldom lone individuals, and their opinions often reflect their views on well-trod stories. To say that narratives both form and are molded by leaders would be an understatement. A considerable amount of instability and irregularity has been present in the two nations' bilateral relationship.

Understanding the changes in their reciprocal interaction is made easier by a positive viewpoint. China's and Russia's political elites see each other in the larger framework of a global hierarchy where the US has a dominant position. The notable changes in their connection that have been seen are a result of this viewpoint. The long history of bilateral connections between the two nations, dating back to the seventeenth century, has had a considerable impact on how they now see one another.

1.1 Overview of Russia-China Strategic Cooperation

The foundation of Russian-Chinese relations was established during the Great Silk Road, a land trade route that united Asia and Europe. The Silk Road, which was established around the 2nd century BCE and remained active until the 14th century, facilitated trade between various civilizations, including those of China and regions that would later become part of Russia.

China's perception of Russian conduct is influenced by its turbulent history. The expansion of the Chinese and Russian empires' respective spheres of influence may be seen if one studies the history of Sino-Russian interactions up to the 17th century. Conflicts over territorial expansion did occur during the period, despite the absence of a major power rivalry. Sino-Russian relations were characterized throughout the period by competing interests rather than cooperative behavior. China was ruled by the imperial Manchus in the 17th and 18th centuries, who hated Europeans.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, new imperial powers started to establish themselves in China. In northern China, Russia became a dominant force during this period. The bilateral relations between the two countries remained sour until the middle of the nineteenth century. As the decade ended, the two countries' connection intensified.

Between the two countries, there were two distinct periods of cordial relations from the 1850s to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and after that, things quickly went south (Wilson, 2018). From 2019 to 2023, Russia-China cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization strengthened both sides. Russia, increasingly influenced by the West, Pakistan, dissatisfied with the suspension of US security assistance, and India, is eager to establish relations with China and reassess its relations with Pakistan. China and Pakistan, to further polarize world affairs, have gradually moved towards formalizing the concept of the "axis" or "counter-alliance." Although there are not enough signs that the Russia-China-Pakistan "axis" is correct, what is important is the emergence of common interests between our countries and the gradual deepening of the bond between them.

In this general context, this article will attempt to identify the factors that led to this development and analyze its impact on the period of social evaluation of Russia and India. This study will move beyond the realist view of power-neutrality and relative advantage to view the trilateral alliance as a “competitive alignment” against the US and India in the region, instead the article argues that the narrative presented in the events is inadequate to explain the state of Russia-China-Pakistan cooperation: (a) Russia’s investment relationship with India is steeped in historical nostalgia, making it unlikely that Russia will oppose the latter (b) Second, Russia’s good relations with Pakistan cannot tolerate India’s weakness. It is an arm of the so-called Axis Powers; the real attempt to view the Russia-China-Pakistan axis as anti-cooperation, given the “other countries” (such as the US and India), is not itself an organization and is fraught with many difficulties.

In 2019, Russia and China celebrated the 70th anniversary of the establishment of friendly relations with mutual high-level visits to the "China-Russia" and the development of cooperation. Come to celebrate this anniversary. This sets the tone for deeper cooperation in the coming years. Cooperation in diplomacy. They coordinate intervention within the framework of the SCO, including the sharing of medical equipment and expertise. Russia and China have stepped up efforts to develop alternative payment methods to reduce the impact of Western financial sanctions.

Despite competition in the international market, the trade volume of the two countries has increased, reaching a record level. Major exercises include the Vostok 2022 exercises, in which the Chinese military participated in Russia's exercises on an unprecedented scale. These exercises reflect the growing military cooperation and mutual trust between the two countries. They have always opposed the so-called "Western hegemony" and advocated for a more international order. This is especially true in terms of the two countries' joint response to events such as the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021 and the increased pressure on Taiwan. cooperation has strengthened. Russia and China have announced joint plans to explore the moon and develop GPS satellites. Traditionally considered a Russian powerhouse, China's economic growth in Central Asia has created some tensions. International protests China over issues such as the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the struggle for independence in Hong Kong have also occasionally caused political problems in Russia. In Ukraine, China has been cautious about supporting Russia as it seeks to maintain trade relations with Western countries.

1.2 Exploration of the Geopolitical Landscape of the Region

China was quite possibly the earliest country to perceive the Soviet Association officially. Discretionary relations between the two nations were laid out in 1924 when a settlement on "general standards of settling issues" was endorsed in Moscow. According to the arrangement, the Russian Asian Bank was taken out from the governing body of the crucially significant Chinese Eastern Rail line, and the two nations took command of it.

The reciprocal association between the two nations thrived all through the 1930s, particularly in the space of military matters, under the time, China and the USSR were both under risk from Japan's decisive international strategy and regional cases in numerous countries. Like the earlier 100 years, the two of them had an interest in obstructing Japan's Toward the east regional expansionist plans during the 1890s after Japan's 1930 attack of China. The country needed to battle to become autonomous. China's greatest security danger in the Far East was Japan, subsequently the Soviet Association gave China gigantic monetary and military help to help it guard itself. In 1930, China got an enormous guide bundle of \$250 million USD from the Soviet Association to support funding the acquisition of Russian military stuff and weapons. At the point when the Soviet Association gave China direct military help with the later piece of 1945, the Chinese had the option to course the Japanese armed force in northern China's Manchuria. Following 1949, there were 10 years of "timeless and strong companionship," which ended up being neither as the two superpowers spread their promulgation.

1949 was a defining moment throughout the entire existence of the Chinese Socialist Coalition (CCP) as it saw its rising to conspicuousness in global legislative issues. At that point, the Virus War was simply getting everything rolling and was affecting the overall influence on the planet (Chaziza, 2020).

1.3 Analysis of the Impact of Regional Geopolitics on Russia-China Strategic Cooperation within the SCO

Albeit the Shanghai Cooperation Organization "began as a position of safety body, with the fundamental motivation behind overseeing line worries between China, Russia, and previous USSR part countries," Russian President Putin said in 2018 that "it has now transformed into perhaps of the most dynamic association." 2018 CGTN report The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), while not a traditional union, has formed into a strong overall power. The primary goals of the Shanghai cooperation organization (SCO) introductory four areas of participation — governmental issues, economy, security, and get-togethers — were to neutralize psychological warfare, radicalism, and dissent.

During the 2018 Qingdao Highest point, the heads of condition of the SCO part nations emphasized the Shanghai Soul, which put areas of strength for an on complete collaboration. The SCO's unique accentuation on security participation was widened during the Qingdao Highest point to incorporate extra territorial security issues including web security, drug dealing, firearm pirating, and transnational coordinated wrongdoing. To save harmony and steadiness across Eurasia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization contemplated that "aggregate security" was more essential than the outright security of any one country. Throughout the course of recent many years, the essential collaboration among China and Russia has created to an unmatched degree. As per a joint assertion from the two heads of state, China and Russia's far reaching vital organization of participation has developed.

Numerous vulnerabilities and difficulties welcomed the post-Soviet period in 1992, however from that point forward, every country has done whatever it may take to reinforce

its situation. China and Russia are not excluded all things considered. After deliberating with one another, they have chosen to cooperate to accomplish both territorial harmony and steadiness and a multilateral request. However long the two Eurasian powers can support their developing participation inside the global system, Russian authorities say that the essential certainty among Russia and China won't falter. The two countries' associations are nearer than ever, and their shared trust has developed over the long haul.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established in 2001 by the accompanying six countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Contract" was taken on in the year 2002. Its foundations are the generosity and welcoming ties among its part nations, with an accentuation on collaborating for territorial solidness and harmony as well as a more evenhanded, majority rule, and judicious worldwide request.

Xi (2014) states that the "Shanghai Soul" maintains the accompanying standards: "shared trust, equity, regard for social variety, and normal success" among individuals; and "non-arrangement, no targeting any outsider and comprehensiveness" with respect to non-individuals. The SCO, which is presently the biggest territorial participation organization on the planet, was conceived out of Russia and China's common attention to the need for serene turn of events and the settlement of disagreements about provincial boundaries, some of which date back to the Soviet time. Accordingly, notwithstanding the six establishing individuals from the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO), the association currently counts two new full individuals, Pakistan and India, four observer states (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia), and five "dialogue partners" (Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey, and Sri Lanka). These countries engage with the SCO to foster

cooperation in areas of mutual interest but do not participate in the organization's core decision-making processes. This status allows these countries to develop closer ties with the SCO and its member states. Also, visitor agents were sent by the Relationship of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) and the Russian-drove Republic of Free States (CIS). President Recep Tayyab Erdoğan of Turkey said in 2016 that his nation was prepared to seek after full participation in the Shanghai Cooperation organization regardless of whether Ankara kept on disengaging itself from the West (Reuters, 2016).

In addition to the fact that numerous nations embrace the idea of "aggregate security," yet China and Russia likewise completely concur with the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) capability. Worldwide regulation and power are connected ideas that together connect with security. In the perspective of Russia and China, is the prevalence of a specific locale, as safeguarded by the UN and global regulation. A few states, then again, have out and out would not submit to the law, seeing it more as a discretionary than an obligatory need. Another component adding to China and Russia's participation is their common feelings of dread about US worldwide authority and their settlement on various normal targets. State-to-state harmoniousness interests or equivalent appreciations might relegate themselves a particular capability in saving the harmony and lay out a kind of partnership in global governmental issues, as per Henry Kissinger (2014).

Aggregate safety efforts are frequently intended to counter both clear and secret vital dangers. Driven by its rising apprehension about its worldwide mastery, the US has endeavored, since the death of the Soviet Association, to deliberately restore its control on the planet by reviving the wistfulness of international battle. Because of this inescapable risk, Russia and China began to consider the US to be a typical danger, even though the

SCO isn't explicitly centered around any one subject or infringement of global regulation (Frost, A. 2009, October).

1.4 Sino-Russian Strategic Cooperation and the SCO (2001–2019)

At the point when Vladimir Putin was chosen leader of Russia in 2000, the "Putin time" formally started. The heads of province of China and Russia consented to fulfill each other's requests and manufacture a helpful vital relationship for the following hundred years during a gathering to examine the confounded and surprising issues of the day. China, Russia, and the Focal Asian republics likewise started to battle provincial psychological warfare along their lines.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 2001 and turned into a worldwide association. At the St. Petersburg highest point in 2002, the SCO marked its contract. The association is a perfect representation of the regular global model with its "shared power and liabilities" structure. Its base camp is in Shanghai, while its Sanction endorsement is situated in St. Petersburg. It is the regulative archive of the SCO and frames its construction, fundamental obligations, and directing beliefs. The SCO's Provincial Enemy of Fear Monger Construction (Rodents) is answerable for issues relating to security, advancement, and fanaticism and dissidence nearby.

In 2001, the Shanghai cooperation Organization (SCO) gave an admonition against the looming dangers presented by radicalism, psychological oppression, and dissent. Indeed, even while the legislatures of China, Russia, and Focal Asia were at that point worried about nearby fear-based oppressor dangers before to the 9/11 assaults, they are currently significantly more headed to make a move. Three-fifths of the Eurasian mainland, 25% of the world's oil holds, 35% of coal stores, half of gaseous petrol assets, and half of

uranium stores are altogether held by the individuals from the SCO by and by, the adequacy of the SCO is still somewhat low, with its joined Gross domestic product making up only 25% of the worldwide Gross domestic product (Andreichyk and Tsvetkov, 2023). Security and advancement are firmly related as one of the objectives of the Shanghai Soul is to accomplish divided development between part states. In 2013, China proposed to improve collaboration along the old Silk Road, which has supported arrangement, exchange, monetary, and relational trades. Rudd (2020) claims that "the Belt and road initiative" (BRI) welcomed all Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) part and spectator states.

As well as proceeding to underscore the Shanghai Soul, the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) has helped its part nations in propelling their normal local interests through the Belt and road initiative (BRI). Russia has fundamentally added to the cooperative drives of the BRI and Eurasian Monetary organization beginning around 2014, particularly in the space of safety and connecting the two. Russia under Putin has been the main impetus behind these tasks. One outcome is the confirmation of gas pipelines connecting China with the republics of Focal Asia. Thus, the SCO part states chose to make a brought together vehicle network all through Eurasia and guarantee calculated collaboration (Lukyanov, 2009).

The SCO affirms in its essential articulation that it's anything but a collusion looking to hurt different nations or locales, yet rather that it tries to participate and have political conversations with different legislatures as well as important territorial and global organization like the CSTO, EAEU, CIS, and ASEAN. Considering that Russia and China are pushing for worldwide coordinated effort rather than one-sided activity. The Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) is entrusted with "mutually creating organizations on the

broad interests shared by the part states and following an expansive plan remembering worldwide and local collaboration for the political, exchange, monetary, and helpful circles, particularly in countering current dangers and difficulties," as per the Moscow Statement of 2003. In any case, a few scholastics have scrutinized China's and Russia's needs inside the SCO.

China and Russia have at times supported UN goals, especially those that address against psychological warfare; the SCO for instance, has worked as per the UN Security Board's Counter-Illegal Intimidation Panel. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, 2011) thinks of it as basic that the Unified Countries speedily sign the Complete Show on Battling Global Psychological oppression and the Worldwide Show to Stifle Demonstrations of Atomic Dread. The SCO said that unfamiliar military mediation in Libya and Iraq in 2011 was a critical reason for discontent since such exercises unmitigated disregarded the fundamental beliefs of state sway, regional respectability, and no impedance in inside undertakings.

The Unified Countries Goals of 1970 and 1973 ought to be stuck to by all interested individuals to respect the Libyan truce, as transparently encouraged by the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO). This shows China's and Russia's nearby joint effort in the Shanghai cooperation organization and the UN. Besides, during the 1990s, China and Russia have gone against authority, involving helpful intercession as a legitimization for acting beyond UN sanctions. They are only one of the various SCO part expresses that have perceived how rapidly the different political and monetary frameworks of today are evolving. In spite of this, considering what is happening, Russia and China have pursued with different nations, eminently the world's superpowers, to regard the assortment of

human development and endeavor towards a more equivalent and manageable worldwide economy. If the Unified Countries has any desire to resolve the major worldwide issues, it should embrace changes to ensure it can stay aware of the world's continually evolving conditions. In this manner, the UN ought to go to preparatory lengths as per the UN Sanction and rules to turn away struggles (SCO, 2017). The Shanghai Cooperation Association accepts that the Assembled Countries ought to oversee world undertakings, particularly with regards to assisting war-torn countries with modifying. For systems going through serene and fruitful advances to vote based social orders, regard for public interests and sovereign privileges is urgent, and the global local area needs to give veritable help to help this cycle along.

All the colossal headway made in battling psychological oppression is confirmation of the conflict on dread's extraordinary potential, as the Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) has distinguished three critical areas of shared interest for its individuals, including China and Russia. In any case, the SCO might not have the political will or ability to join into a conventional coalition like NATO not long from now. The SCO's response to conflicts between the "Huge Two" can't be anticipated, and the difficulties ought to be borne as a primary concern. Appropriately, for the SCO to keep working from here on out, certain inward changes or changes will likely be required (Aris, 2009).

1.5 Analysis of How Power Dynamics and National Interests Influence Collaboration

In terms of resources—natural and human—economic power, military might, and vast borders— the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become the world's most influential regional organization. Both Xi and Putin have expressed their desire to keep working together on foreign policy, and they both understand how important it is to have

similar personal opinions on important issues. During the US-China trade spat, Beijing made every effort to defend multilateralism and free trade. "Any anti-Russian attack, either rhetoric or actions, can't be tolerated without a harsh response from Russia," Putin said, adding that "as there remains only a desire of the United States to ensure by all means its global hegemony."

China and Russia are eager to safeguard their shared interests because they understand the proverb that governments with comparable military might, but not enough resources must evaluate the possible advantages against the expected costs. Beijing and Moscow have historically and strategically held differing views on many topics and have adopted alternative tactics, which is not unexpected given their varied historical and strategic cultures and domestic objectives. This is particularly true with regard to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) present and future roles and missions (Aris, 2009).

Russia was a superpower from the middle of the eighteenth century to the end of the Cold War, but China is a rising power that is disregarding its less prominent role in modern times. Russia, a fantastic nation on the rise, is keen to reclaim its place as a major player in the world economy, while China has prioritized economic modernization and technological innovation. It is crucial to keep in mind that China has been a part of the international financial and economic systems since 1979, and that globalization is a necessary component for China's development. Near their borders, particular U.S. and NATO advances have been targeted by Russian soldiers. Consequently, President Putin has pushed for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to be more engaged in Afghanistan and

Syria in addition to the nuclear issue with Iran. The de facto alliance between China and Russia would seriously obstruct American foreign policy if that were to occur. The US and its allies now see China and Russia as strategic adversaries and potential threats, according to BBC News (2017), since they think the two Eurasian superpowers will continue to challenge US interests and supremacy. The European Union generally believes that its contacts with Russia and China should strike a balance between partnership and competition, as demonstrated by Brussels' assertion that it must take China's global power into account in its negotiations. Despite having the second-highest GDP in the world, China has to start reducing poverty by 2020 in order to preserve the legitimacy of the ruling party. Thus, science and technology will be the next field of Sino-Russian cooperation, according to Beijing. In terms of innovation and original research, Russia has a clear edge over China, which is the leader in supercomputers, satellite navigation, and IT. On the other hand, some Russians are dubious of Russia's intentions and unclear of where it stands in respect to China. This is due to their perception that Russia would not perform well enough to rival Chinese companies in the market for commodities such as farms in the Far East, Baykal water, and Siberian timber. Beijing is aware that the social basis of the bilateral relations is unstable (Haysom, 2022).

Given that Russia has always considered Central Asia to be its "back garden," geopolitical divisions between the two countries are conceivable. China must so be aware of what Russia hopes to gain from the Greater Eurasia Partnership. According to Vakhtang Surguladze (2014), Moscow is essential to the CSTO and the EAEU, hence Russia's primary goal in Central Asia should be coordinating security and economic cooperation with these organizations—even if Beijing isn't a member of either. Thus, Russia and China

must maintain a flexible and morally grounded strategic cooperation. Although the challenges of peace, security, and stability are broad, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has ensured that they are addressed across the region. The connection between Xi and Putin is noteworthy in and of itself, but it also enhances the two superpowers' overall strategic collaboration and cooperative effort. Given that Russia is willing to provide China with adequate gas and oil, as well as more soybeans and other agricultural products, the two nations expect the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative to align more quickly.

In due course, the Big Two and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will need to collaborate on security-related matters. For Russia and China, it makes the greatest strategic sense to base their relationship on the respect and trust that the general populace in both countries has for one another.

1.6 Russia-China Strategic Cooperation within the SCO, and Emerging Geopolitical Challenges

On September 10, 2020, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) part states' Committee of Priests of International concerns assembled routinely in Moscow. The unfamiliar priests of Pakistan, India, and Kazakhstan were available, alongside State Councilors Jumakhon Giyosov, the top of the SCO's Local Enemy of Fear based oppressor Design (Rodents), Sirojiddin Mukhriddin, Abdulaziz Kamilov, and Wang Yi, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and the Russian Organization. On September 9, 2020, the unfamiliar clergymen of the SCO part nations took part in a video conference with Vladimir Putin, the leader of the Russian League. Sergey Lavrov, unfamiliar clergyman of the Russian League, led the gathering of the Committee of pastors of International concerns of SCO Part States. The

Coronavirus pandemic constrained the clergymen to survey the SCO's current state and prospects for what's to come. That's what they noticed, in this difficult sterile and epidemiological circumstance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has reaffirmed its huge potential as a successful stage for tending to the political, social, exchange, and financial consequences of the Coronavirus pandemic and organizing endeavors to address them. This was achieved by expanding on the standards of uniformity, proportional trust and advantages, shared conversations, regarding social variety, and ASP.

The priests discussed the drafts of the outcome papers and investigated the timetable and courses of action for the following Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Heads of State Chamber (HSC) meeting. They considered the political announcement that framed the organized methodologies of the part states to the fundamental objectives connected with advancing political, monetary, security, and philanthropic collaboration, as well as the draft Activity Plan for 2021-2025 to execute the SCO Advancement Methodology Towards 2025. These two papers had a ton of significance for them. The pastors pronounced that the SCO part states expect to assume a more dynamic part in building a multipolar worldwide request in view of these standards, as well as the target of reinforcing worldwide territorial security and dependability, the UN Sanction, multipolarity, equivalent and resolute security, and the renunciation of conflict or struggle.

Considering the conclusions voiced by the part expresses, the pastors focused on the need of setting drives in motion to advance cooperation in the production of another sort of worldwide relations in the soul of equity, fairness, and shared regard. Moreover,

they stressed that it is so pivotal to make a solitary vision to make a local area of shared fate (Šćepanović, 2022).

The clergymen focused on the requirement for expanded collaboration in the battle against security dangers and dangers and communicated grave worry about the developing degree of the connections and financing that global psychological oppression has with radicalism, rebellion, drug dealing, transnational coordinated wrongdoing, and cybercrime. The pastors said that utilizing present day advances, particularly the Web, to spread psychological oppressor and radical convictions and intrude in the inside undertakings of sovereign states is unacceptable. They advanced the UN's administration in the improvement of worldwide enforceable systems that would restrict the utilization of ICT for illegal purposes as well as principles, standards, and rules for capable state conduct in the data space. The proposed assertions by the SCO Heads of State Chamber on helping worldwide data security and fighting the engendering of fanatic, fear-based oppressor, and rebel philosophies, especially those tracked down on the web, accepted their fundamental endorsement.

The SCO's unfaltering obligation to supporting the worldwide local area's endeavors against the unlawful assembling, dealing, and utilization of medications and psychotropic substances drove the pastors to organize a draft explanation by the SCO Heads of State Committee on this. The clergymen reaffirmed the SCO part nations' obligation to the idea of unified security and the need of reinforcing the current systems for local and worldwide solidness, notwithstanding essential weapons control. The pastors underlined that the signatory nations to the Peace Arrangement, who are members in the SCO are devoted to sticking to the severe arrangements of the settlement and to effectively

and genuinely propelling its objectives. The pastors required a reliable execution of the Joint Far reaching Game plan (JCPOA) and encouraged all signatories to stringently stick to their commitments to ensure that UN Security Chamber Goal 2231, which tends to Iran's atomic program, is completely and really carried out.

The clergymen accept that the Settlement on the Focal Asian Atomic Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ), which was endorsed on May 6, 2014, would be extraordinarily reinforced and provincial security would be improved assuming all signatory nations expeditiously carried out the shield's convention. The pastors underlined the need for a universally enforceable consent to be taken on and for space to stay liberated from weapons to forestall a weapons contest in space. The pastors underlined that it is essential to return to deal with a BWC convention as quickly as time permits. This convention incorporates, in addition to other things, a component for successfully checking that BWC state parties are satisfying their commitments under the show. The significance of the Organic Weapons Show (which forbids the turn of events, creation, and accumulating of natural and harmful weapons as well as their obliteration) in safeguarding worldwide security was additionally underlined. Moreover, they demanded Geneva Demilitarization Gathering quickly initiate multilateral conversations on a global accord for the counteraction of synthetic and organic psychological militant assaults (Šćepanović, 2022).

The pastors commended Afghan endeavors to achieve a political settlement by means of comprehensive harmony talks and political talk worked with by Afghan authorities. They underlined that the SCO part states are ready to help UN-drove communications between every single significant government and worldwide associations to ensure that Afghanistan develops into a steady, quiet, and majority rule state.

Empowering joint effort inside the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Gathering is one strategy they need to accomplish this. The priests rehashed the overall agreement that, as per UN Security Chamber Goal 2254, the main practical way to a political settlement of the Syrian struggle is through UN-drove intra-Syrian discussions grounded in regard for the nation's power, freedom, solidarity, and regional respectability. They additionally underlined how significant worldwide help is to Syria's post-struggle recuperation. The clergymen stressed the need of deliberate, comprehensive multilateral measures to reestablish soundness to the worldwide economy, especially by means of the production of a climate that is free, open, and fair for speculation and exchange.

The meaning of World Exchange organization advancing the talk on exchange matters was highlighted, alongside the basic of enlarging participation to counter the development of one-sided protectionism, develop an open worldwide economy, and support the straightforward, open, and rule-represented multilateral exchanging system. In such manner, they came to an understanding that, to lay out an expansive, just, gainful together, and productive organization inside the SCO, they really should proceed to effectively carry out the Program of Multilateral Exchange, Monetary Participation for SCO Part States (Tashkent, November 2,2019) and move forward correspondence.

The ministers of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan stressed that their countries are still during the time spent executing and incorporating the Belt and Street Drive with the Eurasian Financial Association. Also, they reaffirmed their help for China's program. The pastors featured the viable collaboration between the clean and epidemiological organizations and medical services of the SCO part states with an end goal to keep up with the soundness of their populaces and furnish them

with clinical, social, and different shields during the Coronavirus pandemic. To stop the new Covid-19 plague from spreading, the SCO part states and the World Health organization (WHO) as need might have arisen to really convey. One significant part of these endeavors was the UN framework. Conclusive, very much organized, and comprehensive multilateral exercises were likewise required.

The SCO's unfamiliar priests likewise noticed the need of fostering a complete arrangement to address pandemic dangers in the district. The topics of conversation among the pastors incorporated the SCO and other worldwide associations and discussions, like the UN and its particular organizations, the CIS, the CSTO, the EAEU, and ASEAN. They additionally concurred that more grounded legitimate and administrative designs are important for the SCO's commitment with intrigued nations and global associations. The members supported the SCO Secretariat's report on the earlier year, which was given by SCO Secretary-General Vladimir Norov. The overseer of the Chief Panel of the Territorial Enemy of Psychological Oppressor Design (Rodents SCO), Jumakhon Giyosov, gave a report on the board of trustees' exercises. The clergymen adulated Russia for the work it achieved while it managed the SCO. The Committee of public facilitators of SCO Part States is answerable for coordinating the SCO Heads of States Board meeting (Sim & Aminjonov, 2020).

1.7 Sino-Russian Relations and the Evolution of the SCO

Following the 'Shanghai Five' line conversations in the last part of the 1990s, the SCO was shaped. China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan consented to the Five-Power Arrangement in Shanghai in April 1996. Alongside settling extraordinary

boundary questions from the Soviet time frame, the arrangement set rules for military activities in line zones. It required the trading of vital insight, joint military activities, and upgraded correspondence among the signatory countries. It likewise banned any tactical drills that would be viewed as provocative in specific locales. Inside the setting of China-Russian reciprocal ties, the arrangement allowed China to buy more Russian arms and to have more continuous gatherings with military authorities and more top-to-bottom assessments. It likewise opened up another line of correspondence for participation among China and Russia and facilitated strains in a generally unsound boundary region.

In 2004, the last periods of China-Russian two-sided dealings on their common boundary were finished, reinforcing their essential organization and making ready for future reciprocal exchange talks. Every one of the five signatories swore to keep organizing their common security concerns. Subsequently, the Shanghai Five turned into a vital structure on which Russia, China, and Focal Asia could deal with their essential objectives.

Since the Taliban had assumed control over a sizable piece of Afghanistan by the last part of the 1990s, the states of the nations around it started to stress increasingly more that the conflict might venture into Eurasia. Accordingly, the Shanghai Five's essential concern moved from line security to the "three wrongs" of the area: nonconformity, psychological warfare, and radicalism. In 2001, the Shanghai Five acquired official status and worldwide acknowledgment when a decree that filled in as the establishment for the Shanghai Meeting on Silk was endorsed to invite Uzbekistan into the association authoritatively. The US had the 9/11 psychological oppressor go soon after, which assisted the globalization of psychological warfare and pointed out the danger presented by fanaticism in Focal Asia. The recently settled SCO needed to guarantee joint efforts among

China and Russia, balance key and non-key collaboration, and advance its security plan. With an end goal to reinforce part certainty and foster an organized methodology against potential dangers, the SCO has attempted to facilitate joint military activities. China and Kyrgyzstan directed the main such practices in October 2002. By August of that very year, all individuals aside from Uzbekistan had taken part. The 2005 Harmony Mission practices included vital preparation, an imaginary seaward bar, and a land and/or water capable intrusion. They were done approaching Vladivostok, Russia, and Weifang, Shandong Region, China. Formally named as an enemy of dread activity, the reenactment had obvious hard-security viewpoints.

This pattern has endured: For example, the 2016 Harmony Mission, which occurred in Kyrgyzstan, interestingly included aerial rocket preparation and practices, including the arrangement of weighty gear (Lanteigne, 2012). In recent years, Sino-Russian ties and the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have seen substantial developments, reflecting broader trends in global geopolitics. Russia and China's strategic alliance has grown under the SCO framework, driven by common goals of resisting Western dominance and building a multipolar world order (Kaczmarek, 2019).

This alignment has been reflected in improved military cooperation, with joint exercises like "Vostok 2018" and "Tsentr 2019" displaying increased trust and interoperability between their armed forces (Sukhankin, 2020). Economically, the two countries have worked to increase trade and investment through SCO frameworks, such as the Greater Eurasian Partnership, which seeks to link the Eurasian Economic Union and China's Belt and Road Initiative (Lo, 2021). Recent developments, such as the rise of tensions between Russia and the West over Ukraine, have reinforced China's relevance as

a strategic partner for Russia, while also testing the limitations of their "no limits" partnership, which was announced in February 2022 (Gabuev, 2023).

The SCO has provided a forum for both countries to coordinate their responses to international crises and promote their vision of global governance, as indicated by coordinated declarations issued at SCO meetings (Lukin, 2022). However, the partnership is not without difficulties, as China's expanding economic and political dominance in Central Asia, which was previously considered Russia's area of influence, has brought subtle competitive components into their cooperation (Umarov, 2023).

The Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) were followed by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The organization reorganized and expanded once Uzbekistan joined, giving priority to regional security and stability. This was accomplished by addressing issues including working together on economic projects, battling drug manufacturing and trafficking, and counterterrorism operations. The SCO comprises four observer countries in addition to its member states: India, Pakistan, Iran, and Mongolia. In addition, the establishment of a contact group with Afghanistan gives the organization a lot more clout. The organization's focus has shifted in reaction to the changing local landscape. At first, the Shanghai Five Group was primarily concerned with economic cooperation and regional security. However, in reaction to the upsurge in terrorist activity in Uzbekistan in 1999, this emphasis shifted to counterterrorism. Counterterrorism has been a major emphasis for the organization since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan that followed.

However, the organization's goal continues to give economic partnerships and development issues a lot of weight.

1.8 SCO Focus and Agenda

The SCO is a venture that was established to securing shared security interests while being a group with economic and cultural angles. In matters of security, the SCO focuses on fighting what it calls the 'three evils': terrorism, separatism, and extremism. This encompasses the exchanging of information between member countries in terms of security, military drills, and the police force.

For such security cooperation endeavors, the organization has developed the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. This organization's economic cooperation's goals are to raise levels of trade, develop transport facilities, and increase energy cooperation. It has put forward a Development Bank of the SCO and a Special Account to fund cooperation initiatives. The organization also addresses relations between the peoples through such avenues as cultural exchanges, educational linkages, and tourism. In the current millennium, new threats and opportunities have been observed, which the SCO has started to include in its agenda, such as in the spheres of cybersecurity, food security, and cooperation in the medical sciences, especially in the wake of COVID-19 pandemic. Member states use the organization as a platform to synchronize their foreign policies in order to achieve a world order. Further, the SCO is also involved in improving interaction in spheres like innovation, environment, and humanitarian crises. With new countries joining the organization, such as India and Pakistan, in 2017, the organization is more and more challenged by the need to balance diverse members' interests as it conducts diplomacy with the aim of achieving security, stability, and development of the region.

Previously called the Shanghai Five, the SCO was established 10 years ago as a provincial body entrusted with characterizing worldwide boundaries and propelling disarmament in Focal Asia. A 'Settlement on Fortifying Military Trust in Boundary Regions' was endorsed in Shanghai on April 26, 1996, by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. This understanding became known as the Shanghai Five. The association has gone through changes consistently, which has brought about moving needs and objectives for the organization at different times.

Since its establishment, the SCO has handled normal security issues faced by its individuals, especially those connected with illegal intimidation and strict radicalism. Be that as it may, the association has long widened its domain to cover a more extensive scope of issues, including framework improvement, horticulture, water circulation, nature, fiasco reaction, monetary participation, business and ventures, transportation, energy, broadcast communications, schooling, media, the travel industry, destitution lightening, and specialized training. By settling line issues, bringing down force levels, and encouraging common military trust, regulated provincial participation lays out the power. It likewise looks to battle coordinated transnational wrongdoing and radicalized religion. As the organization's concentration and interests spread, the SCO's underlying objective dynamically developed, and different foundations and associations were laid out to fulfill the association's growing requests (Ahmad, 2018).

1.9 Main Challenges for SCO

Undoubtedly, the process of establishing and expanding a relatively new organization, like the SCO, is a challenging and time-consuming endeavor. While the SCO has become the dominant organization in Central Asia, it still has much progress to make. A minimum of

30 agreements and normative papers are required to establish the contents of the SCO Charter. Furthermore, all of these agreements must be implemented. The primary obstacles facing the organization include:

1.9.1 Maintaining Cohesion among Members

One of the main obligations of the SCO is keeping up solidarity among its member countries, which it does by empowering cooperation between them as well as great relations between their state-run administrations and common society organization. China and Russia are considerably more impressive individuals than different individuals, and the temperamental Focal Asian countries lead to a lopsided enrollment circumstance. The SCO's development into a flourishing provincial partnership has been hampered by areas of strength for Russia in the locale. The Focal Asian nations have put forth a purposeful attempt to fabricate direct organization with the US and other Western countries with an end goal to reduce their reliance on Russia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has had considerable hurdles in sustaining member cohesion in recent years, reflecting Eurasia's complicated geopolitical situation. These issues have become more obvious as the organization's membership has grown, and its interests have broadened.

One of the main issues came from the 2017 enlargement, which added India and Pakistan as full members. While boosting the SCO's global impact, this growth has also brought long-standing regional rivalries into the organization's dynamics (Stronski & Ng, 2018). The India-Pakistan conflict, which is characterized by territorial disputes and security tensions, has threatened to overshadow the SCO's broader aims and put the organization's conflict resolution processes to the test in addition, China's economic and

political development in Central Asia has created little tension with Russia, which has always been a major power in the region.

Although the two countries form a united front in the SCO, their conflicting interests in areas such as energy and infrastructure have created a balance (Umarov, 2023). This situation is further exacerbated by Russia's international isolation following its actions in Ukraine, which increases its dependence on China and can change the power dynamics in the SCO (Gabuev, 2023). Foreign policy orientation also creates problems in terms of harmony. For example, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan pursue different foreign policies, adhering to SCO agreements and maintaining good relations with Western countries. This approach sometimes involves more aggression from Russia and China towards the West (Laruelle, 2021). problem.

While all members agree on the importance of security in Afghanistan, they have different views on how to achieve security and are willing to participate directly (Pantucci, 2021). The group's failure to develop a unified strategy on this critical issue highlights the limitations of collective security mechanisms. The different economic systems of member countries, from China's state-led capital economy to India's mixed economy, make it difficult to implement trade policies around the world (Kaczmarek, 2019). Economic challenges such as China's Belt and Road Initiative and Russia's Eurasian Economic Union are affecting efforts to establish unions within the SCO framework. Utilizing their connections to the US, the heads of Focal Asian countries might attempt to get a more impartial relationship with Russia.⁵ In any case, large numbers of the security worries in Focal Asia are not restricted with the impacts of Islamic radicalism and subsequently are

past the domain of US strategy. Moreover, there are various regions in which the part countries' inclinations straightforwardly struggle with each other.

There are significant qualms and worries in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan over Uzbekistan's objectives and practices. The state-run administrations of Focal Asia have tenacious worries over the collaboration and objectives of China and Russia in the locale. Uzbekistan has recently shown hesitance to participate in the Sino-Russian drive while being a dedicated partner of the US. The way that Russian and Chinese interests don't necessarily concur is a difficult truth. Their vital and military arranging varies from each other. Russian authorities at the most elevated levels have gone against the sending of Chinese military soldiers in Focal Asia beginning around 2004.

The energy business is one region where the SCO's individuals' disparate advantages are generally evident. The Russians, for example, are anxious to advance the Trans-Siberian rail route as the primary course among Asia and Europe. It is felt that the Chinese favored the southern course to Europe, which passes through Turkey, Transcaucasia, Focal Asia, and in the long run winds up on the Mediterranean coast. It is believed that this course would present a new and significant international significance on the western piece of China.⁸ The legislatures of Focal Asia can have various objectives from those of China and Russia with regards to utilizing the district's energy assets (Allison, 2018).

The Focal Asian countries see the SCO's job and their own advantages in an unexpected way. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan need to have a major effect there and accept that the SCO's standing will assist with upgrading their standing. Then again, Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan consider their participation in the SCO to be a method for settling issues connected with their own solidness and economy. "Inside dependability with security joint effort inside the SCO structure" is definitively the way in which Kyrgyzstan characterizes it.

As per reports, the Kyrgyz are not content with the giving over of a mountain reach to China as a component of a nonaggression treaty. In 2002, following the Askaniya riots, a dissent against the public authority was held in Kyrgyzstan to voice dissatisfaction with regards to the public authority's decision to surrender a significant part of its domain to China during land discussions. Disparate perspectives straightforwardly influence part states' issues and level of investment inside the association. This asks the inquiries of the amount of an effect the SCO has on the international strategies of the Focal Asian nations and how willing these state-run administrations are to commit political and financial assets to the association. Considering that the objectives of a non-territorial power and a provincial power may not necessarily in every case concur, the Focal Asian countries' inclination for the US might make it harder for them to take part in local coalitions. Before 2005, the different unfamiliar procedures of the Focal Asian nations — which tried to boost benefits by utilizing the West, especially the bound together states, against the incipient Moscow-Beijing coalition — diminished the SCO's ability to work as an essential collusion. Already, the drawn-out improvement point of the SCO was not in accordance with the security goals of the Focal Asian nations. Their interest in the last option has developed after some time. Deciding the SCO's future job is one of the hindrances to keeping up with solidarity. China and Russia have both said that they believe the association should utilize financial collaboration and insight to act as a local security

supplier. By and by, there are clear contrasts between Beijing and Moscow in spite of the attestation that they have comparable characteristics (Rakhimov, 2018).

Development and security are two important areas on the SCO agenda. China prioritizes prosperity, but Russia puts a high priority on security. Because the members have competing interests, there is no consensus over the organization's future form. Moreover, almost every organization that works in Central Asia has a sizable membership overlap. This suggests that people who are members of one organization are also members of other organizations that are comparable to their own. These security arrangements' membership and goals overlap, which limits members'—especially Central Asian governments'—commitment to a particular group. The existence of overlapping membership causes member states to have different objectives, which might impede the advancement of the SCO.

1.9.2 The Economic Challenge

The republics in Focal Asia are all caught up in outrageous neediness. The issues of improvement, line security, water, and security are associated with the financial emergency in Focal Asia. It doesn't seem practical that significant Western speculation will be finished in a large number of nations given the current circumstances. There is currently a lot of segregation in the locale, a lot of division on the lookout, and an excess of vulnerability about what's in store. It is rather demoralizing to see that what is happening for SCO individuals is blocking the accomplishment of SCO's formative objectives. Considering the impressive deterrents China and Russia have in opening up their business sectors, the Focal Asian republics trust that these two nations will add to the area's financial turn of events. As far as it matters for them, China and Russia have minimal monetary and

financial assets to dedicate to the district. This implies that the SCO needs to work within the imperatives of its monetary assets.

The member's countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have not yet brought together a market, in spite of their shared objective to foster exchange and financial participation, increase transportation and correspondence organizations, and use energy assets.

In light of the distinct differentiations in the homegrown political and monetary states of the SCO individuals, it appears to be dubious that a streamlined commerce zone will be shaped sooner rather than later. The absence of "objective preconditions for territorial solidarity" among the republics of Focal Asia is accentuated by Boris Rumer. They don't have a typical objective in a solitary market, in contrast to the European organization, and they don't acquire significant monetary help from a part state like the US in the NAFTA. Despite the fact that there isn't a lot of exchange inside the Focal Asian locale, there is a significant amount of exchange with outside accomplices. The main part of commodities is comprised of mineral and horticultural items, but since the huge market has irregular characteristics, casual exchange has gained significance. Since the five countries of Focal Asia trade a comparative scope of products, the locale's true capacity for business extension is restricted. While Kyrgyzstan's fundamental commodities are gas and power, Kazakhstan generally sends out metal and oil. Turkmenistan is a flammable gas and cotton exporter, though Tajikistan sells power and cotton. Gold and cotton are the two essential commodities in Uzbekistan. Therefore, rather than being free, their economies are more cutthroat.

In the energy area, Focal Asian republics have given import replacement priority over territorial exchange. The confined openness of rail and airplane modes in Focal Asia represents a significant hindrance to exchange among parts of the region. Further developing the street network that connects the Focal Asian nations is fundamental. The district's now-weighty reliance on a few products has been aggravated by the presentation of protectionist exchange approaches, making it more helpless against cost shocks. In light of their weighty dependence on a few firms, the economies of Focal Asia have become monopolistic, and their business sectors are shut to new competitors (Akiner, 2000).

1.9.3 Counter-Terrorism

Since the main pressing concern bringing the conditions of the SCO together is the apparent danger introduced by Islamist revolutionaries, psychological warfare has consistently had a huge impact on the association's plan. The SCO laid out the Local Enemy of psychological oppression Design (Rodents), yet part nations' reluctance to share insight makes it less compelling.

Additionally, there are still impediments on the part of nations' capacity to take part with regards to police assets and military knowledge. Because of asset restrictions, the Territorial Enemy of Psychological Warfare Construction (Rodents) has not had the option to add to local security altogether. The association's individuals keep on voicing worries over dissident activities, which has expanded the SCO's significance to them. Uyghur dissidence in Xinjiang is a tireless issue for China. While Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are fighting rough Islamist bunches like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Development of Uzbekistan (IMU), Russia is associated with a costly battle in Chechnya.

Xingjian's neighbors are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, whose populaces share strict and social ties with the Turkic Muslim people group of Focal Asia.

The distress in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan supposedly has straightforwardly affected the circumstances of Chinese Uighurs because of connections between Uighur separatists and radical gatherings in Focal Asian countries, especially Kyrgyzstan. All alone, states can't really defy and check the activities and affiliations of radicals and psychological oppressors. The SCO presently misses the mark on durable and exhaustive reaction, which is frantically required. The SCO neglected to utilize its functional ability during the fear monger assaults in Andijan in 2005, Tashkent and Bukhara in 2004, and different areas (Haacke, 2006).

1.10 Discussion on Balance against Regional Powers and Competition with the United States

Countries frequently make collusions to adjust a strong, overwhelming state. Consequently, other arising power focuses ought to respond with a power that is equivalent to or more noteworthy than the US to balance the US's overwhelming position and capacity to impact occasions all over the planet. It is obvious from world history that a few significant Eurasian powers frequently changed their collusions to forestall the mastery of a solitary state. In the meantime, more vulnerable organizations endeavored to join against the most grounded state. The Soviet Organization adjusted the cold of the US all through the virus war. Since the USSR fell to pieces, the US has had a telling lead that has never been tested. Nonetheless, quite possibly, this awkwardness may ultimately be offset by the rising political impact of emerging nations like China and Russia. By utilizing the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), these countries have previously had the option to oppose the impact of the US on a few pieces of Eurasia.

Concerning territorial security, the "Shanghai Five" established the SCO to start with. Because of their obligation to settle regional issues and advance harmony and common confidence nearby, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan shaped the "Shanghai Five" in April 1996.

This association was at last renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. After Uzbekistan was conceded as a part, the association changed its name. Six states make up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a territorial intergovernmental association: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Around 61% of Eurasia's entire geological region is comprised of the consolidated expanse of land of the SCO part states. Two critical individuals from the association are China and Russia, whose joined populations make up around one-fourth of the world's entire population. The significant objective of the association, which was first established in 1996 under the name "Shanghai Five," was to resolve clashes over divided borders between its individuals. It likewise tried to give structure to Russia, China, and the Focal Asian republics to settle on questionable issues and advance collaboration in the field of safety. The SCO's goals have now extended to include joint efforts in different fields, including business, international strategy, energy, transportation, the climate, and multifaceted and cross disciplinary trades. After regional issues were settled, consideration moved to battling the "three wrongs" of dissidence, illegal intimidation, and fanaticism (Levy & Thompson, 2010).

China depends intensely on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to further its financial and security objectives. To maintain a harmony between the US impact on means

of China and Russia and to foster more grounded financial relations with China, Focal Asian nations need the SCO. Zhuangzhi concurs with the Chinese scholars who noted before that the SCO has contributed to the development of China-Focal Asia security and business relations. Li Lifang thinks the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) plays a significant role in China's political approach to dealing with Focal Asia. This covers asset investigations, the issues brought about by Uyghur dissent, business tries, and security issues. Like other Chinese researchers, Zhao Huasheng perceives that the SCO may ultimately spread into the Caucasus and South Asia. He guarantees that the SCO should be responsible for taking care of the security issues in Focal Asia and views the US presence there as an exceptional safety effort.

The reason Focal Asia is significant is on the grounds that it is near the new Asian superpowers: China, India, Iran, and Russia. The US presence in Focal Asia might prevent Russia, China, and Iran from forming an alliance. Besides, Afghanistan, with which Focal Asia shares a line, is the region where the US is forcefully battling fanaticism and psychological oppression. What's more, the area has an overflow of precious regular assets. Drawing from American scholastic exploration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Washington's primary worries appear to be connected with the SCO's enemy of Western position, the US and SCO's opposition for impact in Focal Asia, and the chance of Russia, China, and Iran framing a tactical coalition. Like the Americans and Chinese specialists, the Russian watchers have been following the advancement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russian books on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meticulously describe the association's objectives, including driving the US out of Focal Asia, its capability to turn into a tactical collusion against NATO, the US's part

in the upheavals in Focal Asia, and numerous different parts of the association. In any case, a review of the group of Russian academic works on the SCO shows a deficiency of "logical" works examining the security parts of the SCO. Most of the appraisals done by columnists, eyewitnesses, and lawmakers make up the collection of contemporary writing on this point (Chao, 2022).

Chapter: II

DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA-CHINA GEO-ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITHIN THE SCO

Moscow has received a warning from the Russian Federal Migration Service not to let Chinese people become the majority in the Russian Far East (RFE) by the 2030s, surpassing other ethnic groups. Moscow's new homestead act, which offers free land for building private residences as well as business and agricultural ventures to anybody who willingly relocates to the RFE, has made the matter more urgent.

Although the initiative aims to populate the country's most remote and resource-rich locations, but China's evident attention to it made the public furious and the programmer had to face enormous criticism. The original idea prohibited selling land to entities or individuals based elsewhere. However, China Daily predicted that additional Chinese migrants would rent the house from the new owners, taking advantage of the plan. Notwithstanding the warnings issued by the Russian Federal Migration Service and the new plan to encourage the repopulation of the region by Russian citizens, Moscow has a supportive attitude towards Chinese involvement in the development of the RFE. Less than 6.3 million people live in the RFE, which has a population density of one person per square kilometer and an area of more than 6.2 million square kilometers (Mkrtchyan, 2022).

Russian monarchs had to entice their subjects to establish settlements in the furthest eastern regions of the kingdom. The new strategy is a direct reaction to the government's recognition of the need to increase the population in rural parts of RFE. Since the first conquest of this distant area by Russians, Moscow has only recognized its actual resource potential in the latter part of the twentieth century. Upon the first crossing of Lake Baikal

by Russians, they alone saw the wintry sky and snow-covered steppes, which were subjected to the chilling gusts of the northern winds.

Unbeknownst to them, behind the icy roofs of the eastern area lies a territory rich in essential natural resources required to fuel the coal and gas-powered chambers of Russian trade.

2.1 Identification of Potential Areas for Expanding Economic Relations

Siberia and the Urals Federal District are included in the Far Eastern Russia, which is bigger than Australia and has eight different time zones. The Trans-Siberian railway travels 9000 kilometers (5,592 miles) between Moscow and Vladivostok, a trip that, assuming the trains are on time, takes about a week. The lack of human habitation and the restricted economic use and development of regions have been the main effects of the extraordinary distances.

Remarkably, a major obstacle to center-periphery relationships has always been the vast time and physical distance between them. The great eastern region that is today known as Siberia was conquered by the Russians in 1582, according to history. At this time, Yermak Timofeevich, a courageous Cossack explorer, received financial backing from Ivan IV to set out on an eastward journey that would traverse the Ural Mountains. The history of Eurasia was significantly shaped by the Grand Principality of Moscow. Due to the passionate geographic discoveries of the era, the exploration of the Far East for trade and commerce came to an end. It started as fur acquisition in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The fleet of Yermak set off for Siberia in 1582. The Cossacks were successful in the region at first. But the guerilla wars that followed lasted for several years until the Tatars

finally gave up. In the 1640s, Russians established the military outpost at Okhotsk, which marked the beginning of the sea route to Kamchatka, after successfully colonizing the Pacific coast of Russia. The Cossacks arrived at the Amur River in 1646, drawn by stories from the Siberians about a river that they thought flowed from the center of China, passing through a beautiful and prosperous land before emptying into the vast ocean at the eastern edge of the continent. The Cossacks forced tribute payments from the native tribes in the form of furs, thereby establishing Russian sovereignty over the area. The areas to the east of Lake Baikal were quickly and thoroughly explored in the last half of the 17th century. The survey of the Amur, Yenisei, Ob, and Lena rivers, as well as the Chukotka and Kamchatka areas, took place at this time. In addition, Russian explorers discovered the Bering Strait, which separates Russia and America, and the coast of Siberia (Wood, 2022).

Simultaneously, a political transformation took place on the next border, which would thereafter reshape the political terrain of the remote regions of Russia for the foreseeable future. The Qing Dynasty ascended to power in the Middle Kingdom. The Qing emperors implemented an expansionist strategy in the northern regions, successfully annexing Mongolia and Manchuria. In 1689, after a string of fruitless diplomatic efforts to improve bilateral ties and inconclusive military actions, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed. This treaty established...

- Russo-Chinese border from the Sea of Okhotsk,
- Demanded the dismantling of the fortress of Albazin (the bone of contention in earlier Russo-Chinese wars) and

- Prohibited the Chinese from colonizing the west bank of the Amur River (the right to collect tribute was, however, retained).

The Treaty of Nerchinsk was an important development in Russian political history as well as Russo-Chinese ties, even if not all of Russia's demands were granted. By signing this treaty, Siberia was guaranteed recognition as a part of Russia on a global scale.

The Kyakhta Peace Treaty (1721) between Russia and China settled the border dispute and established the rules for trade between the two countries. The prospects for the Russian Far East were not improved by the thawing of border tensions between China and Russia. Russian ambitions in the early modern period were mostly directed towards its western neighbors in Europe. Russia's hopes during the majority of the eighteenth century were centered on the conditions in Poland and Sweden.

However, Russian advancement in the east was further quickened by the appointment of Nikolai Mouravieff as governor-general of Eastern Siberia. The Russians established a station at Mariinsk with success in 1852. The Foreign Office and the impending possibility of war in the West impeded the advancement of Russian military operations in the East. Nevertheless, the Crimean War was a prelude to the Russians' eastern advance, even if it was a loss for them in Europe. Russia's eastward push was further aided by China's concentration on the Taiping rebels. As a result, three expeditions were sent to the Amur area between 1854 and 1856, and all of them succeeded in their goals. Consequently, by 1860, the Russians had taken control of Vladivostok, a strategically significant city. The Russians and the Japanese met as a result of the eastward expansion that continued. Japan gave up the Kurile Islands in 1875 in exchange for the Pacific Long Island. The conflict between China and Japan in 1894 was a pivotal moment in the history

of Russo-Japanese relations and in Russia's evaluation of the strategic importance of the Russian Far East (RFE). This conflict made Russia aware of the changing circumstances in the East. The island country of Japan was displacing the waning might of the formerly dominant Chinese empire. Following China's support against Japanese incursions, a series of strategic actions were initiated to counter Japan. The waning interest in constructing the Trans-Siberian Railway was a reaction to Japan's geopolitical threat. The railway was mostly seen as a catalyst for commerce and colonization but after the threat, it became a crucial part of overseeing operations in the Far East (Kiriloff, 1969).

Like the rest of Russia, Siberia was greatly impacted by the Bolshevik Revolution in the early twentieth century. Soviet rule over the Russian Far East (RFE) was established in January 1918.

On the other hand, this was also the time when Eastern Siberia began to pursue independence. Regional groups in the Far East controlled the territory during the Russian Civil War and worked with the Whites, the Bolsheviks' political enemies. However, in 1921, four areas came to an agreement to unite and form the Far Eastern Republic. During that time, Japan had taken control of a sizable chunk of the Pacific coast, including Sakhalin Island and Vladivostok, while Soviet Russia ruled the region west of Lake Baikal. Lenin suggested creating the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer state between Russia and Japan, with Chita as its capital. Following Japan's withdrawal in 1922, the Far Eastern Republic was formally merged into the USSR.

2.2 Evaluation of Bilateral Geo-Economic Cooperation between Russia and China

Mikhail Gorbachev's introduction of the Perestroika idea shaped Russian foreign policy from the 1980s until the USSR's disintegration. Contemporary Russian strategists

saw an opportunity to align Russian interests with those of the Western world's civilized countries with the establishment of the 'New World Order'. Additionally, it presented a chance to erode and eventually eliminate long-standing ethnic conflicts within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Senior officials engaged in intense debates to decide on Russia's new foreign policy throughout the four hundred and eight hours.

In this time frame, two major ideas emerged. One group was the Internationalists, led by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second group, dubbed the Drezhavniks or the Neopatriots, was made up of Supreme Soviet officials who held the position of president under State Counsellor Sergei Stankevich. Internationalism's defenders recommended a policy of non-interference in the surrounding regions. The Drezhavniks favored a strong defense of Russian security, which included moving Soviet nuclear weapons inside Russia, resolving border disputes, and giving Russians' well-being in the newly formed countries first priority.

Regarding the United States, the two camps likewise have divergent opinions. The first group was in favor of a US-centered approach, while the second group believed that pursuing such a policy would prevent the US from having a worldwide impact. Kozyrev became well-known in 1993 for his analysis of Russia's "regional responsibilities" and "national interests." Kozyrev presented a draft proposal to the Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1993. The agreement was approved by President Yeltsin in April 1993. The main goal of the new government was to prioritize local economic and political matters above security and foreign policies, which was made possible by the Osnovnye polozhenia strategy. Only two of the Osnovnye polozhenia's nine major policy recommendations dealt with issues outside of Russia. These two arguments underscored the need for maintaining

ties with recently elected administrations and protecting the rights of ethnic Russians living in these nations. The remaining sites needed to be stabilized in the "Near Abroad" since they were only locally significant. For this same reason, Kozyrev referred to the area as "the Post-Soviet Space" as a "distinct geopolitical space," and it came to be the focal point of Russian foreign policy. Additionally, decision-makers thought that Russia could bring about peace and stability in this area on its own (Tsygankov, 2016).

However, in the 1990s, Yeltsin and his administration reached the resolution that Russia's issues were too intense to be helped by depending just on the previous Soviet states. This didn't imply that the Federation of Free States (CIS), which was made to supplant the Association of Soviet Communist Republics (USSR), would be deserted. The gathering met consistently and remained together. Nevertheless, Moscow kept on pursuing the "coordination" objective by making new multilateral associations with fewer individuals. Four nations (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) framed a tradition association in 1995. Tajikistan turned into an individual from the more extensive traditions association in 1999. There were not very many positive outcomes from the consolidation. Russia, Belarus, and Armenia were gatherings for the Tashkent Security Understanding, which was, in the long run renamed the Aggregate Security Arrangement Organization (CSTO) in 1999.

Towards the end of the 1990s, Russia was seen by the post-Soviet nations as a substance unequipped for sufficiently tending to the security issues in the locale. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's development was somewhat prevented by Russia's help for the Northern Collusion. Russia's part in the Chechen struggle was likewise lacking. At the point

when the Kyrgyz government asked Russia for help in 1999 and 2000 to adapt to the Islamic development in Uzbekistan, Russia answered by declining their solicitation.

The 2001 choice to build a 1500-man military power for organization in Focal Asia was rarely completely done, despite the fact that instructional courses were hung consistently. In any case, Russia has alternate ways of affecting the previous nations. The post-Soviet nations are as yet reliant upon Russia as a result of how intertwined the Soviet economy was. Huge populations of Russians live inside the limits of these nations too, a circumstance Moscow might have the option to use for its potential benefit.

Starting around 1991, Russia's syndication on the conveyance of power has been its strongest weapon for constraining the recently autonomous republics to make concessions. This was shown rather plainly on account of Kazakhstan, where the northern part of the nation relies totally upon Russian energy supplies. Thus, various hydropower stations in Kazakhstan were given possession of intrigues in the Brought Together Energy Frameworks, Russia's regular energy organization. Consequently, Russia consented to postpone Kazakhstan's obligation. In any case, Moscow frequently won more concessions in the early, long stretches of the arrangement on account of serious areas of strength for its impact. Moreover, Russia protected invaluable agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. US specialists understood that most Caspian oil should go through different courses that sidestep Russia to arrive at overall business sectors. This acknowledgment was driven by Russia's resolved position at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to redirect oil from Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossiysk. To save its authority over the Turkmen gas industry, Russia established Turkmenrosgaz in 1995. President Niyazov lost confidence in Turkmenrosgaz; in this way, Gazprom

redirected Turkmen gas from European business sectors and circulated it to less rewarding clients in the CIS. The Russian military was stressed over the strategies that would be authorized in Focal Asia simultaneously. The Russian 201st Mechanized Division has stayed in Tajikistan despite constant charges from that nation and has not been prevented by claims that it is engaged in drug dealing. Many sections inside Russia upheld Russia's negligible support in Focal Asia. Campaigning for Russian military associations in the locale was impacted by the challenges ethnic Russians in these organizations experienced (Hahn, 2018).

The unraveling of post-Soviet economies was made possible by Russia's endeavors to control expansion within its boundaries. At the point when Vladimir Putin got to work as leader of Russia in 1999, he went over Focal Asians who knew about their nation's advantages. By tending to his foes from Focal Asia as equivalents, he turned the circumstances around and went with an exceptionally far-fetched decision for his ancestor. Russia conceded its asset constraints interestingly during his administration.

In Russia's international strategy, psychological warfare is positioned as the main danger. Putin administered the formation of the Russian Military Tenet of 2000, the Public Safety Idea of 2000, and the International Strategy Idea of 2000, all of which have psychological oppression as their primary concern. Psychological oppression was viewed as the fundamental danger to Russia, Focal Asia, and the world on the loose in January 2001. Putin said in his discourse to the Unfamiliar Service that there are numerous pressing issues confronting our country. Territorial struggles, withdrawal, illegal intimidation, uncontrolled movement, coordinated wrongdoing, and different issues are among the contributing reasons. I would need to notice the danger posed by worldwide psychological

warfare as well as the radicalism in all its forms. We are the ones who originally expressed this assessment and are credited with its boundless use. The peril presented by an undeniably all-around facilitated and efficient transnational psychological militant association should be tended by working together with our accomplices. We have a long list of motivations to forcefully advance the production of compelling global participation structures in all fields (Pomfret, 2021).

Apart from combating terrorism, Russia's policies since the early 2000s have mostly focused on the country's economic growth and the restructuring of the crumbling economic structure that was left over from the Soviet period. Within this context, as was previously indicated, Russia's first effort at economic restoration was through cooperation with the former Soviet states.

A prime example of this is the 2015 creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The goal of the Union, which consists of Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, was to bring the former Soviet governments closer together. One way to sum up the importance of the EEU is as follows: With a Gross State Product (GSP) of 2.7 trillion USD, the EEU is a massive economic alliance that includes a united economic market with a population of 170 million people, covering more than 20 million square kilometers of land. The unification of economic policies amongst member states, the creation of common market strategies, and the synchronization of policies in the fields of energy, industry, transportation, and agriculture are all essential components of the EEU. These events bolster interest in the "Asia Pacific's final frontier" and support Russia's new Asian-Pacific strategy (Cheng, 2004).

Apart from the recognition of terrorism as a threat to national unity, another important realization was the knowledge that commerce with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was not the sole way for Russia to recover economically. Moscow saw that areas of the country that had previously only been utilized as military installations or camps for exiles needed cooperation and investment. Moscow has been aggressively seeking deeper relationships with economies in the Asia-Pacific area as a result of deteriorating relations between Russia and Western nations as well as limited chances in the Central Asian market. The objective is to boost economic activity in Siberia and the resource-rich Russian Far East (RFE), which have traditionally received little or no attention in relation to regional geopolitical dynamics.

However, bilateral connections have also changed in other ways as the world order has changed. This is particularly true in the case of China and Russia, both of which have undergone recent major changes. Over the course of the Cold War, there were several ups and downs in the two countries' diplomatic relations. Russia's attempts to rebuild its economy after the collapse of Communism coincided with China's transition to a socialist market economy. Consequently, the two countries' relationship has achieved an unprecedented level of collaboration. With regard to RFE, Beijing's financial donations and broad cooperation demonstrate China's commitment in the field. Growing requests for development guarantee a thriving Chinese market nearby. Russia is keen to capitalize on China's experience in successful regional development, its remarkable skills in transport infrastructure, its continuously expanding economy, and its foreign reserves for the development of the Russian Far East, despite Chinese concerns that the Chinese presence poses a threat to the Russian population in the region (Golani, 2011).

2.3 Assessments of the Mutual Benefits of Economic Cooperation between Russia and China within the SCO

Since the independence of neighboring countries, significant powers, including China, the US, and Russia, have consistently expressed concern over the area. Due to its strategic and economic benefits, the district's unique resources and vital trade routes consistently get a great deal of attention. Efforts have been made continuously by both local and global forces to help these recently formed governments maximize the advantages of their involvement at all levels. When their objectives and desires coincide, these forces strangely support one another; yet, when their preferences and interests are unclear, they turn into rivals.

Alongside these challenges, the area has had to struggle with shifting conditions throughout time and deal with strong forces. One way to evaluate Russia-China relations in the Central Asian area is to look at how the two nations behave in various contexts. The fact that China is seen by the Russians as a danger to their dominance in Central Asia is not something they openly admit. Still, Chinese military advancement has been keenly observed by Russian intelligence. Russia is attempting to reach a bilateral deal in order to build relations with China. As an illustration, Russia signed a convention on understanding with the CSO and the CSTO as a result of the SCO and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) updating their agreement on cooperation in combating terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and organized crime (Lanteigne, 2005).

China's role within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) from 2019 to 2023 was characterized by increased assertiveness and a strategic focus on expanding its influence across Eurasia. As one of the founding members and a dominant economic power

within the bloc, China leveraged the SCO platform to advance its geopolitical and economic interests while promoting its vision of global governance. During this period, Beijing prioritized several key initiatives within the SCO framework. Foremost among these was the integration of its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the SCO's economic agenda, pushing for greater infrastructure development and connectivity across member states.

China also emphasized digital cooperation, promoting its concept of a "Digital Silk Road" and advocating for the adoption of Chinese technological standards and systems among SCO members. In the security domain, China continued to focus on combating the "three evils" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, with particular emphasis on stabilizing Afghanistan following the US withdrawal in 2021. Beijing also used the SCO to legitimize its actions in Xinjiang, garnering support from member states for its controversial policies. Diplomatically, China positioned the SCO as an alternative model of international cooperation, distinct from Western-led institutions, and used the organization to build consensus on issues like data sovereignty and internet governance. Furthermore, China's economic might allowed it to extend significant loans and investments to other SCO members, particularly in Central Asia, thereby deepening its influence in the region. However, this period also saw China navigate challenges within the SCO, including balancing its growing power with Russia's traditional influence and managing the diverse interests of an expanding membership, especially following India's entry into the organization.

China's principal policy for Central Asia is centered on trade and business, while Russia remains cautious about military intervention. We saw both cooperation and rivalry

in the intellectuals' interactions with one another in the area, depending on their respective ideologies. Jeffrey Manoff claims that China voiced its displeasure with the SCO's transition into a fully-fledged sanctuary organization, in line with Beijing's non-aligned foreign policy of avoiding confrontations with Western powers. Political analyst Bobo Lo projected that Russians will become more and more aligned with Western countries as China's influence develops, maybe as soon as the next ten years. Mark Katz suggests that Russia is more likely to emphasize the importance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which China is not a member, while downplaying the relevance of the SCO (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2009).

Chapter: III

PROSPECTS OF RUSSIA-CHINA GEO-ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITHIN THE SCO

There have been significant geopolitical shifts in Central Asia and neighboring regions over recent history. Western Turkestan (Central Asia) was incorporated into the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union, while Tibet and Xinjiang came under Chinese control. This division of Central Asia and its neighboring areas occurred from the late 19th century through the mid-20th century, with significant impacts on the political and territorial dynamics of the region. The Mongolian Nation's Republic agreed with the Soviet Association, while internal Mongolia was added by China. Since ancient times, there has been a consistent association between India and Focal Asia. Focal Asian advances affect India.

In the nineteenth century, the English provincial experts in India played the "Incomparable Game", trying to expand their control over the nation by acquiring influence over Afghanistan and Focal Asia. They didn't, nonetheless, endeavor to get total ownership of these grounds. With the assent, everything being equal, Afghanistan was characterized as a cushion state under the Deal of 1907, going about as a nonpartisan zone between Tsarist Russia and English India. The powerless and boisterous Chinese domain attempted to exploit the contending interests of a few colonialist nations in the nineteenth century. China kept a similarity to independence even after European nations split it into numerous spaces of strength. Despite the fact that China's genuine power over these countries was restricted, the English leaders of India were leaned to back China's case of command over Focal Asian regions, expecting future rivalry from the solid and growing Russian realm (Raczka, 1998).

The 20th century saw the ascent and fall of the strong Soviet Association, the formation of Pakistan and free India, as well as the Individuals' Republic of China. The international boundaries of Focal Asia and Eurasia were fundamentally influenced by the fall of the Soviet Association. There was an outstanding and significant change in the international and vital overall influence in the locale and on an overall scale. For Beijing, the separation of the Soviet Association into fifteen autonomous states introduced two open doors and difficulties. Beijing's worldwide impact filled in relation to Moscow's expected downfall. China presently can possibly grow its impact in the decisively significant and asset-rich area of Focal Asia to the ascent of free Focal Asian republics. Simultaneously, the hidden concern of developing ethnic self-assurance and nonconformity among the unsettled Uighur Muslim minority in the Xinjiang district, which borders the Focal Asian republics, significantly affected Beijing's specialists. Beijing focused on keeping up with provincial harmony and solidity by adopting a wary strategy toward Russia and Focal Asia. Simultaneously, China attempted to persuade the legislatures of Focal Asia to maintain China's solidarity and regional honesty and abstained from supporting or embracing Uighur dissident exercises in Xinjiang.

In the early years after the fall of the Soviet Association, China tried not to exploit the troubles that Russia and the Focal Asian republics were confronting. Chinese writing frequently perceives that Russia is as yet a strong worldwide power with colossal undiscovered potential, even notwithstanding its ongoing challenges. China and Russia cooperated to make a strong case for shared understanding and participation in the locale. China's drawn-out objective isn't to seek after an unduly aggressive and foolhardy

methodology but rather develop its impact in the locale through the execution of a helpful security system (Malik, 2016).

3.1 Possible Conflict between Russia and China in the SCO

China has adopted a policy of not openly opposing Russia's long-standing stances in the region. But by seizing every chance it can, China is also looking to increase its influence in the area. This includes forging military relationships in addition to strengthening economic ones. In 1999, China invested \$1.1 billion in Kazakhstan via direct foreign investment. According to Morris Rossabi, China hopes to overtake Russia as the region's leading economic force, which would put Beijing in a better position to manage its domestic policy goals.

It has been noted that China may take on the role of a guardian to protect its geopolitical and economic interests in Central Asia if its economy and military keep growing and Russia's declines. The existence of an authoritarian political culture is a key feature that unites China with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Russia has developed democratic frameworks, although the nation's democratic institutions and culture are still in their infancy. Because of this, the ruling class in Russia gets along just fine with authoritarian regimes. The administrations in the Central African Republic are definitely becoming wary of the Western focus on democratization and human rights. In fact, the authoritarian Chinese model—which blends strict political control with a free market economy—is becoming more and more attractive to the CAR governments (Turner, 2009).

China might potentially expand its influence in Central Asia and beyond by using the benefits of peace. China seems to have wholeheartedly embraced the 'Eurasian project', which encompasses an extensive area with abundant resources, including Russia, China,

and the Central Asian countries that make up the Shanghai Forum. Due to its large size, population, and significant economic and military might, China is inevitably going to have a significant impact on the group. This is particularly true considering that the power and influence of Moscow have diminished since the demise of the Soviet Union, while China's power and influence are increasing. Moscow is acutely conscious of it. However, it would avoid direct conflict with China (Pieper, 2018).

3.2 Russia-China Geo-Economic Cooperation with SCO:

China and Russia are focused on restricting Western impact in Eurasia and ensuring that they don't become focuses of Washington's plan of empowering peaceful fights for the purpose of achieving a shift in power. Their points of view on the risks they face in Focal Asia, which is viewed as a possibly shaky region with risks of fanaticism, state breakdown, and medication dealing, are in like manner comparable.

In this way, Beijing upholds adjoining tyrant state-run administrations in light of the fact that they are the best defenders of security and secularism. Similarly, the struggles including the Chechens in Russia, the Uighurs and Tibetans in China, and the danger of disobedience in Focal Asia have all been surely known by these frameworks. In specific cases, the SCO approach has begun and, in this way, deserted the "three disasters" that China and Russia need to advance —harsh government, difference, and radicalism —are what the SCO tries to battle. The Territorial Enemy of Psychological Militant Association was established by the SCO in Tashkent, with its secretariat housed in Beijing. Many issues, including ethnic contentions, strict radicalism, worldwide psychological oppression, transnational violations, weapons pirating, drug dealing, and unlawful migration, have been canvassed in the SCO's aggregate clarifications. China is seen by Russia as a fundamental

piece of its Asian energy market. Contrasted with different clients like the European Association and Japan, Russia has a bigger exchange advantage thanks to the "Chinese other option" strategy. Arrangements to further develop energy collaboration among Russia and China have been struck by Russian associations including Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft, and CNPC. Fundamentally, the central objectives of Sino-Russian energy participation were spelled out in the 2006 Sino-Russian Joint Announcement, which was endorsed during Putin's visit to China (Rumer, 2016).

As the two legislatures picked a "pluralistic methodology" in their energy associations, this commitment was considered a fundamental part of their essential coordinated effort, while likewise allowing their unmistakable freedoms to supply markets and wellsprings of energy. Since this joint effort includes the two significant powers in the locale —the customary and the arising —the affirmation of chasing after individual interests is fundamental for the extension of the SCO Energy Club. China and the West have filled nearer lately, energized by their common aversion to Russia's monstrous may and impact.

China's industry is upheld by hydrocarbons and different resources from Russia, which is esteemed for serious areas of strength in its discipline. Seeing the Western vote-based system and common freedoms as dangers to homegrown security, they went against its progression. China and Russia both need to restrict the force of the West, particularly any tactical activity upheld by the West, in specific spaces: China focuses on the South China Sea, Russia focuses on Eastern Europe, and the two countries focus on Focal Asia. After the emergency in Ukraine made relations between Russia and the West disintegrate, the separation has significantly improved Russia's relations with China. In the area of Focal

Asia, the collusion between China and Russia remains consistently strong today. Any issues between the two countries have been capably concealed by the Chinese government's deft utilization of subtlety in its dealings with Russia, which similarly means to keep Western impact out of their neighborhood area. Be that as it may, given China's ongoing thought of moving forward its safety efforts nearby, it is unclear how long this devotion will endure (Caruana, & Chatzidakis, 2014).

Examiners of governmental issues note that Russia is likewise showing signs of political advancement. The China-Focal Asia center point, home to in excess of 140 million individuals, can possibly create a market with over 1.5 billion expected clients. In addition, the example of provincial is still up in the air to a great extent in the Russian language. The development of exchange and business ties in the region has been significantly helped by the arrangement of the SCO. Regardless, the creators' interest in the SCO's capacity to further develop relations among China and Russia is developing. As per Yusufu Abulaiti, China has an unmistakable political edge in the SCO since it has made proficient channels for collaboration with its five neighbors.

Moreover, he guarantees that the production of the SCO is confirmation that China and Russia have recognized their common advantages nearby and have arrived at a split in their different ways to deal with the Focal Asian district. In such a manner, Russia addresses a potential purchaser market as well as a significant political player in encouraging political and financial collaboration among the Focal Asian countries. The game plan likewise expected the Unified Countries to play a bigger part in foreign relations. As per the announcement, neither one of the gatherings would let any external body use its domain for such goals, nor would it go into any alliance or union that compromises the other party's

security, impact, or honesty. In a crisis, it additionally considered fast respective discussions. The settlement missed the mark on shared safeguard arrangements and didn't create a traditional military union between the two legislatures. All things considered, some of its commitments were standard for associations (Fishman, 2005).

China and Russia are able to utilize the SCO to restrict U.S. influence in the region, as seen by their support for the existence of American military bases in Central Asia. Opposing the security demands made by the United States, the coordinated military actions demonstrated the rising solidarity of both nations. Even if a political-military alliance was not formed as a consequence of the operations, they did show the development of an important organization and a rise in military focused activity. Instead of using force or security measures, China's primary means of stabilizing the area was economic might. China, in contrast to Moscow, does not immediately highlight its geopolitical might or claim the area is an essential component of its "privileged sphere of authority." China gave more weight to maintaining its sway over the South China Sea than to showcasing its might in the Central Asian region. China's goal is to create a stable environment around its ambitious goals by concentrating on the underdeveloped Xinjiang Autonomous Region, home to the Turkic Muslim Uighurs.

China and Russia should communicate for a number of strong reasons. Russia is a key player in China's geopolitical calculations as a provider of cutting-edge weapons and energy resources. The governments of the two nations heavily interfered with the economy. Western countries provide challenges to both parties on issues like media freedom, religious liberty, and the advancement of democracy. They also share worries about radicalism, protest, and extremism. Russian gas is a good substitute for oil for the Chinese

because of its great energy efficiency and environmental friendliness, particularly when compared to the oil deposits in the Middle East. Russia is the main supplier to both China and the North-East Asian region, accounting for around 33 percent of world reserves and maybe much more in the unexplored regions of Siberia and the Arctic (Chung, 2004).

In order to reduce its reliance on the US and the EU and get access to the Asian marketplace, Russia must adopt a policy like China's in order to foster economic growth in its eastern regions. Roughly 10% of China's import oil needs come from Russia, which ranks as the country's fifth-largest provider of remote oil resources. Additionally, these two nations were negotiating the construction of \$11.5 billion worth of pipelines that would connect Anagarsk, Siberia, in Russia, to the Pacific Ocean. The Daqing oil reserves in China's east would also be linked to these pipelines. These nations decided to increase their cooperation in joint oil and development projects between CNPC and Rosneft during Putin's visit. Chinese participation began in 2005 when they bought a 20 percent share in Yuganskneftegaz, Yukos' principal production branch. Rosneft was able to finalize the deal thanks to China's \$6 billion loan to the Russian Kremlin.

China now has a considerable lead in the exchange of products with neighboring nations, surpassing even trade with Russia. China's expenditures on energy infrastructure have allowed it to effectively expand its influence in the region. Eighty-two percent of China's total foreign direct investment (FDI) in nations that are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) came from \$21 billion in FDI in Kazakhstan alone by the end of 2015. On the other hand, total Russian foreign direct investment (FDI) in all Central Asian (CA) countries was around \$12.7 billion in 2015, down from \$15 billion in 2010. Additionally, the production and transportation of hydrocarbons account for a significant

part (98%) of all Chinese FDI in Kazakhstan. Chinese and Russian investors are now putting more emphasis on this industry (Smith & Swain, 2010).

China has been supporting infrastructure development and making significant expenditures in the construction of railroads, roadways, and pipelines for gas and oil. Among these initiatives are the following: The oil pipeline between China and Kazakhstan was built by the Chinese, and it started to run in 2006. Between 2005 and 2008, China's purchases of oil from Kazakhstan surged by about tenfold. China has finished building a significant gas pipeline from Turkmenistan.

Since the early 1990s, China has, in contrast to Russia, principally focused on financial objectives, especially gaining access to the region's significant mineral and energy resources. The entire quantity of financial cooperation between China and neighboring nations has undoubtedly exceeded Russia's in the twenty-first century. Despite making up just 0.2-0.3% of China's overall international trade, commercial relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its neighbors are seen as a significant and potential avenue for economic growth.

Within the framework of the SCO, Chinese experts—who, for the most part, do not question that their nation's membership serves the People's Republic of China's national interests—discuss the delicate subject of Russian-Chinese relations. Some contend that China needs to give priority to economic engagement problems, while Russia ought to be regarded as a significant political power. In the end, China has to continue taking a politically subdued approach in order to keep the organization functioning well. China faces a challenge from Russia's long-standing influence in the area as governments in Central Asia look to Russia for guidance and defense, while China is viewed with some

mistrust. Reputable Chinese specialist on Central Asian affairs Zhao Huasheng believes that China should eventually catch up to Russia in terms of regional influence (Siddiqui, 2019).

Russia and China's financial cooperation will continue to grow, although more so under Chinese leadership. Chinese authorities are aware of their dominant position over Russia, according to several research results. They will never, however, admit this in public. Increased Chinese access to vital Russian economic areas, such as upstream energy development, and the restart of Russian armament shipments to China are important metrics to keep an eye on. Before, these shipments had been suspended because of worries about reverse engineering and intellectual property rights. Since China is barred from Western financial markets owing to international sanctions, Russia has tried in vain to get debt restructuring from Chinese sources.

3.3 Ensuring the Stability and Reliability of Energy Resources: SCO Energy Club

Interestingly, energy was officially recognized as a significant issue at the Shanghai Highest point on June 15, 2006. At its culmination, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the creation of an Energy Club inside the SCO to cooperate in making the association's energy strategy. A bound-together energy technique was additionally examined on September 15, 2006, during a gathering of the SCO's Heads of Government Board in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. From the get-go, certain areas are still up in the air, with a focus on broadcast communications, transportation, and energy. The creation and execution of specific teams in the energy and fuel areas, as well as in the space of present-day data and media communications innovation, got specific consideration. A choice was likewise

taken about the execution of the proposition proposed by Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Highest point, which included making a SCO Energy Club. A devoted working board on fuel and energy was entrusted by the Heads of Government with rapidly deciding if the production of a SCO Energy Club would be doable. The recommendations made by the Russian and Kazakh gatherings will be talked about by all individuals at the SCO Secretariat in 2007. The tops of the oil and energy branches of the SCO member countries would hear these suggestions in a gathering. On July 3, 2007, the SCO Energy Club was laid out in Moscow. The Energy Club unites energy makers, shoppers, and travel states to facilitate energy measures to increase energy security, as per the guidelines of the association, which additionally incorporates onlookers from the SCO. On August 16, 2007, Russian International Concerns Pastor Livor said that SCO spectators would be significant individuals from the Energy Club at the Bishkek Culmination.

While energy exchanges have so far been haggled between two gatherings, the formation of the SCO Energy Club is a stage towards a common energy technique, however, the club's goals are as yet unclear (Milard, 2017). This would include the cooperation of energy organizations from onlooker nations.

The SCO Energy Club plays an important role in ensuring stable and reliable energy among trappers in the state. The Energy Union was established to promote cooperation in the energy sector and aims to improve energy security, promote the efficient use of resources, and promote sustainable development throughout the region. Recent construction from 2019 to 2023 demonstrates the importance of this work, especially in the context of the global energy transition and the growing need to differentiate between power and stability. One of these is to strengthen the participation of large-scale projects. Member

countries, including Russia and China, are working to strengthen energy production, transportation, and distribution. This includes the development of cross-border pipelines, such as the Power of Siberia pipeline, which started supplying gas from Russia to China in December 2019. The pipeline is an important project that improves energy relations between the two countries and exemplifies the type of infrastructure that the SCO Energy Club seeks to support.

The Energy Club has also prioritized diversifying energy sources to ensure sustainability even as the global economy changes. Member countries cooperate on research and development measures to increase the use of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, and water. China's progress in solar energy technology and Russia's investment in nuclear energy form the basis of knowledge sharing and cooperation in the SCO Energy Club, strongly contributing to the region's overall energy. The main goal is to increase energy efficiency and reduce environmental impacts.

The Energy Union encourages discussion and sharing of best practices among member countries to promote energy-saving technologies and good practices. Recent conferences and workshops have highlighted the importance of transitioning to clean energy and reducing the carbon footprint as part of global efforts to combat the winds of climate change. The SCO Energy Club's focus on green energy encourages member states to implement policies that support the development of low-energy systems. The global spread of the COVID-19 virus and regional conflicts have disrupted global energy prices and supply chains, highlighting the need for regional cooperation on electronic security. The Energy Commission provides a platform for member states to respond to these challenges to ensure that energy supplies remain stable and reliable. Such cooperation is

important for the economic stability and development of the SCO region, which is based on stability and diversity. Significant progress has been made. As the global energy landscape continues to evolve, the SCO Energy Club will continue to be an important platform to promote cooperation and sustainable development in the energy sector.

As indicated by a few Western assessments, the SCO is turning into a device for the USA and its partners to be driven out of Focal Asia, jeopardizing Western security interests. There is just the letter "T" in the client's feedback. Security of energy in the West. The proposition from Iran, which is basically promulgation, to make gas estimates and control gas streams under the misrepresentation of a "gas OPEC" and work with Russia simply elevated the trepidation.

Notwithstanding, the nations that produce gas and oil for the rewarding business sectors of East and South Asia are rivals as well as accomplices with the SCO. China is presently endeavoring to essentially affect Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan's energy areas. Since these three nations have an imposing business model on gas pipeline products for Europe, they are starting to compromise Russia's predominance in Focal Asia. Subsequently, there is certainly not an obvious agreement on the side of or resistance to energy participation between Western countries and SCO individuals and spectators. Rather, there is a lot of variety here. It is hazy whether the SCO's reception of a solitary energy strategy will change the current variety of circumstances. Perceiving that security progressively covers military contemplations as well as energy challenges, security associations frequently take part in energy security. This turns out to be as expected for the CSTO as well as NATO. The CSTO is presently accountable for forestalling fear-based oppressor assaults on the gas and oil framework. The insurance of the rail line framework,

which is fundamental for key financial issues similar to energy, has been the obligation of the CSTO since around 2004. A thermal power plant in Armenia facilitated an enemy of fear monger reenactment in September 2006, coordinated by the Counter Psychological oppressor focal point of the CIS, in which powers from the CSTO partook (Contessi, 2012).

The CIS Anti-Terrorist Center held a military drill close to Aktau, Kazakhstan, in August 2005. Combating terrorists who had taken over an oil tanker on the Caspian coast was the aim of the exercise. In June 2006, the CSTO conducted joint military maneuvers in Belarus with the added objective of protecting pipelines carrying gas and oil. This served as another confirmation of the CSTO's progress in formulating plans to guarantee energy security.

It is quite unlikely that the SCO would change into an anti-Western group. Russia wants to utilize the SCO to further its goals against the West, but other nations with close economic links to the West, including China and Kazakhstan, are probably going to oppose this. Although the SCO is not a threat to the West at this time, the organization's continued security-related initiatives would make the West closely watch its activities and even consider working with it. Even with its stated anti-Western stance at the 2005 Astana Summit, the SCO may collaborate with NATO. At that time, the Secretary General of the SCO, Zhang Deguang, said that the group would be open to working with NATO on issues of common interest (Baev, 2006).

The SCO has formed into a broadly perceived association with a significant accentuation on territorial counterterrorism drives, creating some distance from its underlying focus online weaponry control. Improvements in the military and energy

security circles exhibit the developing significance of the security part of the SCO structure in the global field. Besides, these improvements may be viewed as the SCO's insignificant step towards forming a more trustworthy security consortium. Before now, the association had, for the most part, resolved political and monetary issues. In any case, the supposed changes highlight a closer organization in the field of safety.

The CSTO can possibly be vital in assisting the SCO with turning into a completely fledged security association in view of its abilities and information in military help and composed military tasks. Be that as it may, as a more settled security association than NATO, the SCO misses the mark on fundamental components. These incorporate a speedy response force, ceaseless political discussions, and a coordinated military-political framework with a super durable functional base camp. Besides, there is a critical distinction between the hierarchical improvement of the SCO and NATO: the previous option focuses on security challenges outwardly, while the last option lays areas of strength for security inside the area that is home to its member states. China is especially focused on keeping things as they are at this moment. Moreover, the SCO's member nations and eyewitnesses collaborate in various regions while likewise showing remarkable contrasts, for example, contending political and monetary objectives. Interior contrasts inside the SCO may be a deterrent to its future turn of events, particularly with regards to further developing its security perspective (Giustozzi, & Matveeva, 2008).

MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Major Findings

The strategic collaboration between Russia and China under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an intricate and diverse phenomenon, motivated by a combination of mutual interests, strategic deliberations, and conflicting agendas. At first, Russia and China found agreement on their fundamental security requirements in the area and saw cooperation in dealing with these difficulties as a way to alleviate Russian concerns about Chinese supremacy. The Russian-Chinese connection has had a mutually beneficial effect on their bilateral ties, particularly in strengthening the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Nevertheless, there is prospective rivalry looming in both the SCO and the Russian-Chinese bilateral alliance. To sustain the current favorable momentum, Beijing and Moscow must guarantee that the SCO operates not only as a conduit for their bilateral relationship but rather as an organization where other member nations feel equally important and involved, alongside the two most prominent members. Without this, the SCO will be rendered bereft of political credibility and will fail to serve as an effective catalyst for stability in the area.

Russia's apprehensions over Chinese economic encroachment in Central Asia stem from a broader, overarching anxiety about progressively assuming a subordinate role to China. Russia is more dependent on China than China is on Russia, and Russia's fundamental challenge in managing the relationship is its vulnerability, rather than China's might. Russian politicians often exhibit caution when it comes to the SCO, in contrast to their Chinese colleagues. They aim to moderate Beijing's excitement for certain aspects of the SCO collaboration. Russia aims to protect itself from excessive Chinese dominance

within the SCO by actively participating in other regional organizations. In these organizations, Russia does not have any concerns about being subordinate to China. The SCO has emerged as a leading regional organization globally, mostly because of its significant economic influence and military might. Its primary objectives include countering terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

China is determined to address these problems and engage in economic cooperation, but Russia is more determined to develop the SCO into a strategic force to counteract U.S. dominance. The foreign ministers of Russia and China have reached an agreement to begin a discussion with nations that share similar views on security cooperation in Asia and Europe. This initiative aims to oppose the efforts of the United States to enforce its influence in the area.

The economic cooperation of the SCO has been a crucial element in its growth, with China taking a prominent role in advancing trade and investment within the organization. The SCO has immense economic potential, with a collective GDP of \$3 trillion. Furthermore, the organization has established ambitious objectives to enhance trade and investment among its member nations. Nevertheless, the SCO has notable difficulties in terms of infrastructure development, regulatory harmonization, and the integration of its member nations' economies, which pose considerable impediments to its economic cooperation. Although facing these difficulties, the SCO's economic collaboration can greatly contribute to fostering regional stability and growth. The organization's economic cooperation is intricately connected to its security cooperation, and the two are mutually strengthening. The SCO can contribute to the reduction of

tensions and the promotion of a stable and secure regional environment by fostering economic cooperation and stability. The security cooperation of the SCO is a crucial component of its growth, and the organization has achieved substantial advancements in this domain in recent times. The primary objective of the SCO's security cooperation is to fight terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

Currently, security cooperation between Russia and China within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been strengthened. The frequency, scale, and complexity of joint military exercises demonstrate the trust and cooperation between the armies of the two countries. Famous exercises such as "Tsentr 2019" and "Kavkaz 2020" have demonstrated their ability to work together (Sukhankin, 2021). Intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism efforts have also expanded, and the two countries have adapted their approaches to regional security threats. The SCO's Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RATS) has become more active, enabling a coordinated response to terrorism and separatism (Omelicheva, 2022).

The results of the partnerships throughout the process have been mixed. On the other hand, bilateral trade volumes have increased, especially in the energy sector and agriculture. Supporting the domestic currency in the economy can help reduce dependence on the US dollar (Lo, 2021). However, the result of the asymmetry in economic power is more obvious, and China's economic influence in Central Asia is stronger than Russia's. The COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent trade disruptions have also highlighted the negative impact on trade relations between the two countries, especially for Russia, which has become a business in China (Gabuev, 2023). Disagreement:

Russia and China have proven that they promote regional cooperation and use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a platform to promote a vision of multilateralism. They always talk about uniting to fight against what they see as Western hegemony, especially in response to sanctions and violence (Allison, 2022). Meanwhile, the SCO conference issued a joint statement criticizing the injustice of Western powers and proposing the creation of a new type of international relations. However, this cooperation also provokes objections from Western countries, which can limit the SCO's international cooperation (Kaczmarek, 2021).

Significant changes in the school, especially in terms of governance, include the intervention of India and Pakistan in 2017. This expansion has increased the organization's international profile but also poses new challenges to decision-making. Russia and China need to be mindful of their leadership positions while looking after the interests of new members (Stronski and Ng, 2020). The organization also seeks to strengthen its capabilities in non-security areas such as cybersecurity and public health to solve global problems (Burnashev, 2022). There are some limitations and potential tensions in Russia-China relations in the SCO. Traditionally considered Russia's own power, China's economic growth in Central Asia poses a nuanced challenge. Differences in approaches to regional issues, such as cooperation with Afghanistan after 2021, highlight the difficulty of the SCO in establishing unity on important issues (Pantucci, 2023). Moreover, while the two countries display strong unity, their own relations with other SCO members and external powers differ in terms of consistency, with disagreement being better than coordination of ideas (Lukin, 2022). While these events have brought Russia closer to China in terms of language and trade, they have also tested the limits of "unlimited" cooperation between the

two countries. China's balancing act of supporting Russia while avoiding full support for its actions illustrates the complexity of the relationship between the two countries (Gabuev, 2023). The SCO's response to these international challenges demonstrates both its potential as a platform for cooperation and its limitations in dealing with international conflicts. The multifaceted nature of Russia-China strategic cooperation in the organization of cooperation.

The present situation of Russia-China relations inside the SCO is marked by an intricate interplay of mutual interests and conflicting goals. Although both nations have reached a consensus on crucial security requirements in the area, such as countering terrorism, extremism, and separatism, their cooperation is not devoid of difficulties. The SCO has evolved into a forum for China to advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and extend its economic sway, while Russia aims to convert the organization into a geopolitical counterweight to U.S. dominance. The difference in strategic goals has the potential to generate conflicts within the SCO.

For the SCO to progress, its development will rely on Russia and China's capacity to manage these conflicting interests and establish an efficient collaborative approach. Both nations acknowledge the significance of the SCO as a platform for several countries, but it may be required to implement internal reforms and systematic adjustments to preserve the organization's relevance and unity. Russia's participation in other regional organizations.

The U.S. has a substantial influence on Russia-China ties inside the SCO since the organization has emerged as a crucial platform for major power rivalry. Russia and China are endeavoring to counterbalance the influence of the United States and safeguard their

interests in the area, therefore impacting the wider geopolitical terrain. This dynamic has the potential to influence the SCO's security cooperation, as the two nations collaborate to enhance their joint endeavors in fields like counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the Russia-China cooperation inside the SCO has some difficulties. Russia's apprehensions over Chinese economic encroachment in Central Asia stem from a broader apprehension of becoming a subordinate ally to China, leading to potential conflicts and disputes within the organization. Resolving these areas of dispute will be essential for preserving the stability and efficacy of the SCO. India's apprehensions over the China-Russia alliance inside the SCO are a significant aspect to consider.

India's participation in the organization is vital due to its significant role in the area. It is essential to resolve India's concerns to ensure the long-term sustainability of the SCO. Russia and China may need to carefully navigate a difficult balance, as they want to maintain their strategic relationship while also considering the interests of other member nations.

Future Projections

The global significance of Central Asia primarily lies in its strategic geographical position, abundant energy and natural resources, and substantial geo-economic potential. The primary international players _ Russia, the USA, the European Union, and China _ have conveyed their support for peace, stability, and regional collaboration in Central Asia, as stated by the region.

The future prospects for Russia-China cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) point to a complex and ever-changing situation. In the coming years, cooperation in some areas will deepen, and new challenges and potential disagreements

will be encountered. Cooperation will also be strengthened. The SCO is likely to expand its counter-terrorism efforts and potentially develop strong mechanisms for intelligence sharing and joint operations. However, this deep military relationship may raise concerns among other SCO states and external powers, leading to tensions in the region (Stronski, 2024).

The asymmetry between Russia and China is likely to intensify. This will lead to better economic relations within the SCO, and Russia will seek to balance China's economic growth by establishing better relations with India and other member states (Lo, 2024). The development of alternative financial systems that challenge Western institutions will accelerate, although their benefits and adoption are still uncertain (Gabuev, 2024). Play a more prominent role, especially in Central and South Asia. The organization will seek to expand its influence in resolving problems and ensuring stability in the region, especially in Afghanistan (Pantucci and Lain, 2024). However, the presence of different and sometimes conflicting administrations among its members, especially the inclusion of Iran as a full member, will lead to serious problems in maintaining the union (Kaura, 2023). The organization is likely to grow and potentially expand to include additional members or supervisors. Such an expansion would enhance the organization's international representation but would also reduce the middle ground between Russia and China in decision-making (Kaczmarek, 2024). Efforts could be made to strengthen the SCO's participation in business and problem-solving processes, which could possibly lead to the creation of new institutions or the modification of existing ones. Social influence. A significant change in these trends, such as a possible thaw in Russia's relations with the West or an increase in US-China tensions, could significantly lead to Russia's accession to

the SCO (Allison, 2024). It is expected that it will become an important part of the SCO's activities, especially in the areas of intelligence, 5G networks, digital infrastructure, and other sectors. This could lead to a unique techno-economic sphere of influence that would challenge the West's technological dominance (Bendett and Kania, 2024).

These challenges have become difficult for the members. This could lead to new cooperation as well as potential disagreements over resource allocation and policy (Sternberg, 2023). Russia and China will use the platform to promote other models of international relations and development. This could include greater involvement in the reform of international institutions and structures, which could lead to creative competition with Western-led multilateral institutions (Lukin, 2024). China's cooperation plays an important role in regional and international relations, but it also faces many internal and external challenges. The organization's ability to address these issues will be critical in determining the organization's long-term impact and effectiveness in the development of global change.

However, there is a conflict among these agents. Historically, Russia has exerted influence over Asian nations and is wary of excessive involvement by the US and the European Union in the area. China acknowledges Russia's significant influence in the area and favors the deployment of Russian soldiers over the presence of US forces, which is seen as a security risk to the Northwest region. The United States supports Central Asian nations in promoting both domestic and global economic policies. The European Union has a significant economic influence in the area, but the major European nations have distinct economic and political interests in Central Asia. The escalation of violence in Ukraine has ignited a political dispute between Western nations and Russia, which has the potential to

impact the region of Central Asia as well. Central Asia prioritizes robust and mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral relationships with all of these countries.

Although we recognize the notable accomplishments in China-Russia ties, it is undeniable that there are pressing concerns that need to be addressed and equilibrium that needs to be achieved. First and foremost, there is a need to enhance the volume, structure, and manner of economic and commercial cooperation between the two nations. Despite the extensive border between the two nations, the infrastructure and operational efficiency in such regions are very insufficient. Despite extensive debates and studies spanning over two decades, the building of cross-border railway and road bridges has faced persistent delays. Despite the completion of construction, the implementation of supplementary amenities remains challenging.

The energy cooperation model between the two nations and the execution of long-term oil and gas supply contracts might be impacted by the epidemic. This could lead to disparities in price adjustments and supply scales in the future. Furthermore, as both nations successfully maintain the equilibrium between domestic financial stability and economic stimulation in light of the epidemic, they may unavoidably encounter the challenge of trade settlement. Should their commerce, including the transactions in oil and gas, be conducted using the Chinese or Russian currency for settlement? Russia may intensify its efforts to defend ecological security and enhance collaboration with China in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries due to concerns about the pandemic. This might also result in the implementation of stricter import testing criteria. The implementation of quota limitations on agricultural exports, such as soybeans, to China might potentially involve more complexity. Contemplation of the outbreaks associated with prominent wholesale

marketplaces in Moscow might potentially lead to more stringent regulations on the international movement of Chinese citizens (Gavrilovic Jovic, 2017).

Furthermore, the level and quality of cultural collaboration are still inferior to those between both parties and other nations and regions. As to Russian experts, Russia contributes 13% to the annual worldwide profits of USD 100 billion generated by paid educational materials (Kortunov 2021).

The level of strategic relationship between the two countries is not adequately reflected in their educational cooperation due to disparities in their educational systems, particularly in terms of objectives and performance evaluation. Additionally, language barriers in both directions and increasing costs, such as accommodation and daily expenses, further contribute to this mismatch. The current cooperation structures in research, technology, and innovation are insufficient and ineffective. Government agencies remain the primary catalyst in this domain, while corporations show a lack of enthusiasm as players. Due to the lack of market orientation, only a limited number of research findings have been successfully transformed into tangible goods and services. Due to restricted access to information on projects, innovation policies, institutional norms, necessary abilities, and accessible literature, there is a need to enhance information services that facilitate innovation cooperation. Enhancing collaboration in fundamental research is essential since the current number of substantial joint initiatives is limited (Crowley-Vigneau, 2022).

Furthermore, the connection is often affected by external variables outside the control of the involved parties. Rather than aligning itself with either China or the US,

Russia seems to adopt a stance of passive observation, allowing the two powers to engage in conflict but refraining from direct involvement. China should avoid making excessive concessions to the US, as this might potentially jeopardize Russia's unique chance to strengthen its economic and commercial ties with China. The rumors suggesting that Henry Kissinger influenced Donald Trump to form an alliance with Russia against China and that Russia decided to help India instead of China in their border issue, have somewhat tarnished Russia's reputation among the Chinese people (Desch, 2001).

The West has consistently used covert strategies to isolate China and Russia, driven by their geopolitical objectives. Many American intellectuals tend to overstate the potential danger posed by a Sino-Russian alliance with the United States. They often urge their government to modify its policy of containment toward Russia. As an example, Professor Graham T. Allison, a proponent of the Thucydides trap theory, said that the strategy used by Nixon and Kissinger is often referred to as "playing the China Card." Today, we should inquire if China under Xin Jinping's leadership is strategically using the "Russia card." Allison (2019, 7).

Dimitri K. Simes, the President and CEO of the Centre for National Interests, emphasized that to create effective policies, it is crucial to acknowledge and consider the unforeseen outcomes that may arise from concurrently challenging two major powers. The reference "Simes 2019, 15" is provided.

In light of this context, the infrequent joint statement made on April 25, 2020, by the presidents of Russia and the US on the "spirit of the Elbe" to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the encounter between Soviet and US troops at the Elbe River, inevitably

gave rise to different interpretations. Three Certain individuals from Russia wasted little time exaggerating the possibility of a bipolar clash between China and the US, as well as Russia's role in maintaining a balance between them. According to Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, the polarized rivalry between China and the US may worsen as the pandemic response highlights the benefits of Chinese and East Asian methods. In such circumstances, Russia must decrease its reliance on China and avoid becoming subservient to China, given Russia's recognition of the crucial role of maintaining a balance for its future. Russia should firmly reject any attempt to align itself with a faction that is mostly controlled by China. Conversely, Russia should enhance its diplomatic ties with Europe (namely Germany, France, and Italy), Japan, India, and other significant economies. This would help Russia maintain equilibrium by countering the influence of China's growing power and increasing nationalism (Trenin 2020).

Furthermore, there are sporadic instances of unproductive opinions in both nations. For instance, several factions in Russia, particularly those formerly seen as supportive of China, have lately made a sequence of unhelpful statements and actions regarding the pandemic response and the escalating geopolitical competition between China and the US. A notable contribution to the increasing assertiveness of Chinese diplomacy was made by Alexander Lukin, a professor at the Higher School of Economics (Lukin 2020). He and Andrey Dikarev from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations co-authored an essay on Russia's stance on the South China Sea issue. They straightforwardly criticized China's position, labeling it as a kind of "double standard" and equating it to the Monroe Doctrine. As per the authors, Russia claims to be neutral and has deep cooperation with other parties involved in the dispute, but in reality, it has covertly supported China by taking

various actions. This support is believed to be in exchange for China's greater support on matters related to Crimea and Western sanctions on Russia.

Conclusions

From 2019 to 2023, the good cooperation between Russia and China within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become much stronger. The strong cooperation reflects the development of politics, economy, and security between the two countries. Politically, the two countries are increasingly cooperating in their efforts to promote world order and combat the dominance of Western powers, especially the United States. This cooperation is influenced by the two countries' joint work on international issues, cooperation in the United Nations, and cooperation in various forums expressing their determination to improve global governance. Economically, Russia's participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have promoted major projects and connections in Eurasia. These measures not only promote trade cooperation, but also stimulate trade and investment between the two sides. Major projects such as railways, highways, and water pipelines have improved regional connectivity, supported economic development, and provided new opportunities for business. Cooperation has also expanded to include technology and trade, with joint ventures and investments in energy, telecommunications, high-speed rail, and other business areas. The two countries engage in military cooperation, such as the annual Peace Mission exercise, which aims to enhance cooperation and coordination between the host country's militaries. The exercises focus on counterterrorism, disaster relief, and joint operations. Russia and China have also strengthened intelligence sharing and cooperation in combating the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. This security

cooperation has been expanded to address non-traditional threats, including cybersecurity, drug trafficking, and international crime, and to demonstrate ways to ensure security in the region.

Russia's cooperation still faces many challenges. Geopolitical tensions with Western countries, especially sanctions and diplomatic pressure, have tested the durability of their cooperation.

In addition, domestic economic problems such as Russia's economic sanctions and China's economic slowdown have also caused problems in their cooperation. However, the two countries have shown the best ability to adapt and find common ground, demonstrating the importance of the ideas they attribute to their cooperation. Effective cooperation between partner organizations. This partnership plays an important role in supporting regional security, economic integration, and multilateralism. As the two countries continue to go through difficult global transitions, their participation in the SCO is likely to be an important factor in the development of the Eurasian geography and economy in the coming years. China should possess unwavering faith in this. The core and unique importance of the China-Russia relationship will remain unchanged, regardless of how China-US ties develop in the aftermath of the epidemic. Nations are not able to choose their neighboring countries, yet their enduring progress, affluence, and stability are interdependent. Third-party circumstances sometimes have a favorable or negative impact on the extent and scope of China-Russia strategic cooperation. However, they are unlikely to alter the overall direction in which both countries want to avoid antagonizing each other.

Being nice neighbors, excellent friends, and good partners, and striving for friendship from generation to generation without becoming adversaries, is not only hollow rhetoric. Regardless of the deterioration of the China-US relationship or the improvement of the China-Russia relationship, it is unrealistic to anticipate Russia's unconditional support for China or its involvement in our military conflicts. These intentional ideas should not have arisen from the outset. China and Russia should use their unique strengths in the domains of education, research, and technology to engage in mutually beneficial collaboration.

The primary objective should be to contribute to the ongoing development of the strategic partnership via coordination and the promotion of increased political confidence. Through mutual support and advice from both governments, key ministries need to engage in active consultation over current cooperation platforms and ensure a fair division of workload. To expedite China-Russia scientific and technological cooperation, it is imperative to decrease excessive dependence on the government and prioritize market-oriented collaboration, therefore enabling companies and the market to emerge as the frontrunners in this endeavor. China's 14th 5-year plan and vision for 2035 outline a transformative environment and innovative methods for growth driven by innovation. China and Russia, as big countries, must demonstrate a genuine sense of responsibility by actively pursuing innovative and transformative reforms in the global governance system. This is essential for promoting the shared prosperity and growth of the international community.

As stated by Frieden, Lake, & Schultz (2010), alliances are either formal or informal agreements for collective security between two or more independent governments

(p. 174). The SCO is not an exception. Initially, it was not intended to adhere to a structure similar to NATO.

However, the interests of the member nations and the stability of the area may be more effectively addressed. The SCO member nations have mostly addressed security concerns, including terrorism and regional instability, which have largely sprung from the United Nations' military interventions in the Middle East and Afghanistan since the start of the Persian Gulf War some thirty years ago.

The SCO follows a collective security framework based on the principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of any third party. Consequently, it has made significant efforts to broaden its capabilities in areas like commerce, investment, transportation, energy, and agriculture, as well as cultural and interpersonal relations. A strategic roadmap for the period of 2018-2022 has been established to guide SCO members in the implementation of the Treaty on Long-Term Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation (SCO, 2018). Furthermore, at the Qingdao summit, the SCO expressed support for the multilateral economic system and condemned any kind of unilateralism and trade protectionism. Central Asian member nations have shown their collaboration by committing to facilitate the transportation route connecting China, Russia, the European Union, and the Middle East.

China is often regarded as the foremost power in the SCO in terms of its economic and financial standing. The company revealed its fundamental Belt and Road Initiative concept, which outlines the essential steps towards achieving shared prosperity. Sergey Kanavsky (2013), the Executive Secretary of the SCO Business Council, has said that Russia perceives the SCO as an organization where China has the leading role, while

Russia serves as a co-founder. Russia, as a co-founder of the SCO, can exert influence on China's strategy in Central Asia due to its historical and geographical connections. Transnational institutions, whether they are global or regional, are significant because the governments that contribute to them can exert influence over the decisions made by those in power. The SCO exemplifies this kind of organization.

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