

MS RESEARCH PROPOSAL

**INDO-RUSSIAN DEFENSE COLLABORATION UNDER
NARENDRA MODI'S REGIME:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN**



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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MPHIL Degree in Discipline of Social Sciences with specialization in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences International Islamic University Islamabad.

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May, 2024

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Dedication

I dedicate this MPHIL thesis to my beloved Parents for their kindness, unparalleled inspiration and endless support throughout my studies. Dear Ami and Abu Ji, your selflessness will always be remembered. Thank you for enabling me to achieve this feat

(Acceptance by the Viva Voce Committee)

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FORWARDING SHEET

The thesis entitled INDO-RUSSIAN DEFENSE COLLABORATION UNDER NARENDRA MODI'S REGIME:IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN, submitted by Nadia Wahab in partial fulfillment of MPhil degree in Social Sciences with specialization in International Relations has been completed under my guidance and supervision. I am satisfied with the quality of student's research work and allow her to submit this thesis for further process as per IIU-rules & regulations.

Date: May, 2024

Signature: _____

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

IBG- Integrated Battle Groups

DPC- Defense Planning Committee

AI- Artificial Intelligence

SIPRI- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

JDIAF- Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces

LWD- Land Warfare Doctrine

IAF- Indian Armed Forces

NSS- National Service Scheme

APDS- Armor Plating Disposing Sabot

LOC- Line of Control

UAVs- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

MMRCA- Medium Multirole Combat Aircraft

IOR- Indian Occupied Regions

BFSRs- Battlefield Surveillance Radars

ISR- Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

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Abstract

The Indo-Russian strategic collaboration is unique and deep rooted. Both states have had strong diplomatic, economic, and strategic ties since the 1950s. Their defence trade includes aircraft carrier, Modern Tank, Aircraft, S-400 Long Range Air Defense System, Nuclear submarines and nuclear reactors. This overwhelming bilateral strategic partnership is serious threat for Pakistan's security. The induction of force multipliers by India would create conventional disparity vis-à-vis Pakistan, which may lead to an arms race, endanger conventional deterrence and create room for a limited war in the region. The investigates the Indo-Russian strategic partnership from evolution to apex and how it would tilt the balance of power in favour of India, putting nuclear deterrence at risk in South Asia.

1. INTRODUCTION

In international relations, the fundamental goal of every state is to achieve peace and ensure its survival in the world. In this context, according to the realist perspective, states must maximize their military-political power to ensure peace and survival in the anarchical world. Since power is the currency of international relations, India's military modernization through defense collaboration with Russia is accepted by many scholars of international relations. Every major act has profound implications on the domestic, regional and international levels. Likewise, India's "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" with Russia which is based on defense cooperation has profound implications for Pakistan.

The cornerstone of the growing strategic partnership between New Delhi and Moscow has been the defense cooperation that began in the early 1960s and eventually surpassed the U.S. supply of arms and military hardware to India (Mohanty, 2010). Soviet Russia became the most trustworthy partner of India in the conditions when conflicts with Pakistan and China were on the rise and relations with the U.S. was going downhill. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the trade relations between India and Russia went up and down until Vladimir Putin came into power in 2001. Indo-Russian diplomatic, economic, and military relations have regained momentum in the 21st century that it lost at the end of the Cold war.

After Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi came into power in 2014, bilateral ties with Russia have been revitalized as Modi and Putin met at various Summits, and signed many bilateral agreements and defense deals. Defense cooperation has been the main pillar of the sustained bilateral relationship between India and Russia since the Soviet era which developed into a strategic partnership in 2001. And In December 2010, the Indo-Russian strategic partnership elevated to a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership".

Russia is the second largest arms exporter in the world after the US while India has been its biggest importer of arms and military equipment. According to statistics from another report published by the Congressional Research Service, from 2016-2022 India imported 23% of the total arms exported by Russia to its arms trading partners (Congressional Research Service, 2021). According to a report published by SIPRI, Russia has contributed 62% to Indian military modernization since 2010 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022). 71% of Indian Aircraft are of Russian origin which highlights the high dependency of the Indian military on Russian arms export. However, some scholars are of the opinion that India can face a backdrop of narrowing its strategic space due to its high dependence on Russian arms and military equipment. India has gained access to highly sophisticated military equipment from Russia in its endeavor to modernize its military in order to achieve regional hegemony and gain an advantage in conventional warfare capability over Pakistan. India has developed its long-range Air Defence capability, acquired T-90 Tanks and S-400 from Russia, nuclear submarines, unarmed UAVs, aircraft with long-range surveillance, and spy satellites from contributions of the Russian arms industry. This modernization of Indian tri-forces has profound implications for Pakistan's national security as the possibility of a limited war with India cannot be ruled out keeping the nuclear power of both states in consideration

This modernization has pulled India and Pakistan into a security dilemma where India is trying to challenge the established deterrence stability with Pakistan and Pakistan has no other option but to reply with its non-conventional capability. Pakistan has been successfully managing its conventional disparities with India in recent years with the help of its domestic defense industry and Chinese support, but Pakistan may find it more challenging in the long run to maintain a conventional balance with a more powerful adversary. In order to maintain its effectiveness against

the Indian tri-forces, which is much larger in size, the Pakistan military must constantly review its offensive and defensive capabilities at the operational, strategic, and tactical levels. These most recent developments by India are having a destabilizing impact on the strategic stability of the region and also creating a disparity in conventional warfare capability that may pull India and Pakistan into a limited or nuclear war in South Asia.

1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Indo-Russian defense collaboration would create conventional disparity between India and Pakistan. The failure of conventional deterrence may invite Pakistan to rely on its nuclear weapons to deter any aggressive moves by India. Consequently, India's military modernization along with aggressive doctrines and overwhelming reliance on nuclear weapons by Pakistan would create serious security problems for the peace and security of South Asia.

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What are the strategic imperatives drive closer Indo-Russian Defense collaboration?
2. how Indo-Russian Defense collaboration evolved during the Modi era?
3. What would be the implications of Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration for Pakistan's security?

1.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The current study will be carried out with the following objectives in mind;

1. To examine the strategic imperatives that drive closer Indo-Russian Defense collaboration?

2. To analyse the deep rooted Indo-Russian Defense collaboration during the Indian PM Modi era?
3. To highlight the implications of Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration for Pakistan's security?

1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study holds great significance as it is highly relevant to global, regional, and domestic politics which is dynamic, bringing about changes every now and then. It adds to the recent and existing literature on the topic of Indo-Russian defense collaboration. Indo-Russian defense collaboration has contributed heavily to Indian military modernization under the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's regime which is creating a conventional warfare disparity between India and Pakistan in the South Asian region. Consequently, it has serious implications for Pakistan's national security and it also challenges the strategic deterrence stability of South Asia which may trigger a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. This makes the study highly significant and relevant to existing and current literature.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This study will encompass a review of the scholarly work and an analysis of different perspectives on the said topic.

2.1 Indo-Russian Relations in the 21st Century

India and Russia share a unique strategic partnership that is growing at a rapid pace since 2014. Both countries have a shared history of close associations that dates back to the Soviet era (Kapoor, 2019). It started in June 1955 when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru first officially visited the Soviet Union and in return, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited India in November 1955 (Zachariah, 2004). Arun Mohanty in his article gives a historical background of the relations between India and Russia that has evolved from friendship to “strategic bilateral partnership” over the past two decades in the 21st century. In his analysis, he outlines the significant role the Soviet Union played in fulfilling the need for India to become economically independent by developing its weapon industry.

The cornerstone of the growing strategic partnership between New Delhi and Moscow was the defense cooperation that began in the early 1960s and eventually surpassed the U.S. supply of arms and military hardware to India in the mid-1960s (Mohanty, 2010). Soviet Russia became the most trustworthy partner of India in the conditions when conflicts with Pakistan and China were on the rise and relations with the U.S. was going downhill. In the early 1970s, India’s military and heavy industry cooperation with the Soviet Union increased to such high levels that lead to the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union in August 1971 (Mohanty, 2010). By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet arms industry contributed 75% (Mohanty, 2010) to exports of arms and ammunition to the Indian defense industry. The Indo-

Soviet cooperation in defense, economy, and culture flourished in the 1980s until the disintegration of the Soviet Union took place (Chopra, 2003).

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Indo-Russian relations took a hit when President Yeltsin began to treat India differently than before. Russia adopted a Pro Western Policy in its initial 05 years and trade with India declined subsequently. Anita Singh explains how the debate over the rupee-to-ruble exchange rate and the repayment of India's debt continued in the 1990s (Singh, 1995). The reduction in India's share in Russian trade was mostly caused by the collapse of the Russian economy, competition from other rapidly developing countries, and the lack of transparency in the post-Soviet legal system. According to the author of R.G. Gidadhubli, Russian trade with India contributed only 1% of its total trade (Gidadhubli, 1998) by the end of the 1990s.

The world witnessed a turning point in the bilateral relations between India and Russia when Vladimir Putin came into power in 2001. Nivedita Kapoor in her article discusses how Indo-Russian diplomatic, economic, and military relations have regained momentum in the 21st century that it lost at the end of the Cold war (Kapoor, 2019). 2010 marked the year in which the Indo-Russian partnership achieved the level of “a special and privileged strategic partnership”(Ministry of External Affairs, Govt of India, 2010) that is heavily focused on defense cooperation between the two countries. Deep-seated and growing over time, India and Russia's strategic partnership which is primarily based on military cooperation, includes everything from army, air force, and naval modernization to counterterrorism, monitoring and surveillance, logistics, and mobility. According to Dr. Masood Khattak, through this partnership, India's army would be able to improve its general abilities and operationalize its extreme policies towards Pakistan (Khattak, 2019). Russia is assisting India with its nuclear energy demands and continuous supply, as well as with

equipment and knowledge transfer to modernize its nuclear sector, which could result in a significant shift to India's nuclear armament development (Khattak, 2019).

India had a change in leadership in 2014 when BJP leader Narendra Modi was appointed prime minister. Following the Ukrainian crisis, the annexation of Crimea, and the subsequent decline of relations with the West, Russia spent the whole year with its attention firmly focused on the internal situation. According to Meena Singh Roy, in his article “Moving Towards Consolidation: India-Russia Trade Relations” he advocates that the differences between the two countries foreign policy objectives have grown more distinct recently due to global and bilateral factors (Roy, 2016). This may have a significant impact on the Indo-Russian relationship. During the first five years of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had a prime focus on these diverging factors that could influence Indo-Russian relations (Kapoor, 2019).

According to Alexander Gabuev, these evolving political situations would impact the foreign policies of both countries in the coming years (Gabuev, 2022). Due to this, Russia became more and more dependent on China from an economic and strategic standpoint. Ashley Tellis in his article “Modi’s Three Foreign Policy Wins” gives an analysis of Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy after holding office in 2014. He states that Modi’s main foreign policy objective has been to establish and develop good bilateral relations with the host countries (Tellis, 20220). For that reason, he made many official visits across the globe and especially political ties with Russia enhanced significantly under Modi’s leadership.

Since 2014, India and Russia share good bilateral political relations that are cordial and based on mutual trust. The leaders of the two nations interact at meetings of other multilateral organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), G20, and the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (Kapoor, 2019). Nivedita Kapoor explains how these

interactions contributed to India's gaining full membership in SCO in 2017. The highest longstanding dialogue mechanism between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's strategic partnership has been the Annual Summits. According to a report published by the Embassy of India (Moscow), since 2001, 21 Annual Summits took place in India and Russia side by side Embassy of India Moscow Russia, 2022). On December 6, 2021, the last Summit took place in New Delhi. 28 MOUs and agreements were signed at the last Summit and the "India-Russia Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity" joint statement was announced. The two presidents had last spoken on September 16, 2022, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, during the SCO Summit.

In terms of economic cooperation, India and Russia share a good economic relationship. India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission for Trade Economic, Scientific & Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) and India-Russia Strategic Economic Dialogue (IRSED) are two of the primary mechanisms at the governmental level for enhancing trade and economic relations between the two countries. The two nations' bilateral investments are still strong and beat the previous goal of \$30 billion in 2018, which led to a new goal of \$50 billion by 2025. Russian investments in India are primarily in the banking, steel, petrochemicals, oil and gas, and petrochemicals sectors, while India invests in the oil, gas, and pharmaceutical sectors.

2.2 Indian Military Modernization

In order to achieve global power status, a state must possess strong military, economic and political influence along with other determinants such as technological advancements, geographical location, population, etc. India's massive military buildup and a fast pace growing economy reflect India's quest for becoming an emerging global power (Routledge, 2012). In order to modernize its Army, Air Force, and Navy, with network-centric and technological warfare

capabilities, the Indian government has allotted billions of dollars. According to the report by Times of India, India has become the third largest military spender in the world next to China and the United States (Pandit, 2022). According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), India currently has 1.4 million active troops with 11 million reserve troops making it the 3rd largest standing army in the world (ISSI, 2022). And according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2013-2017 India imported the largest number of arms and ammunition and spent US\$100 Billion dollars to enhance its military in the last 20 years (SIPRI, 2018).

Muhammed Ali Baig, Hamid Iqbal, and Syed Sabir Muhammad explain the behavior of India in military modernization of its tri-services through the lens of realism and how the international environment has been favoring India (Baig, 2018). Kenneth Waltz believed that states must rely on self-help in order to ensure their survival in the anarchical world. However, India's behavior can be explained through Mearsheimer's argument. John Mearsheimer advocated that states must maximize and transform their economic potential into offensive military capabilities. In response, Pakistan has been relying on its nuclear weapon capability and utilizing its geographical location strategically i.e. CPEC to counter India. However, India's offensive military doctrine has serious implications for Pakistan and the possibility of a nuclear arms race with India in the South Asian region due to conventional warfare capability imbalance.

While discussing the impact of Indian military modernization on regional strategic stability and implications on Pakistan, Dr. Masood in his article "Indian military modernization and implications on Pakistan" highlights how India's massive military buildup and doctrinal shifts will undermine the strategic stability of South Asia and more importantly, has created a disparity of conventional warfare capability between India and Pakistan (Khattak, 2019). India has developed

its long-range Air Defence by purchasing S-400 from Russia and acquiring T-90 Tanks and nuclear submarines, unarmed UAVs, and aircraft with long-range surveillance and spy satellites. These advancements in Indian military modernization have serious implications for Pakistan. India is planning to acquire 5 nuclear sub marines in the near future that would provide India with Second Strike Capability against Pakistan (V Pant, 2016).

Rajesh Basrur advocates that India is modernizing its military in response to China's military buildup in Asia while on the other hand, Dr. Pervez Iqbal perceives the Indian aspiration of becoming a regional hegemon (V Pant, 2016). However, some scholars believe India's military modernization reflects no strategic purpose. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta in their book "Arming without Aiming" highlight that India lacks a critical element in their massive military buildup and that is strategic planning. India is just focusing on great power accommodation (Cohen, 2013) with no real strategic purpose. This restraint will prove as a hurdle in their military modernization in the future.

2.3 Indo-Russian Defense Collaboration

Defense cooperation has been the main pillar of the sustained bilateral relationship between India and Russia since the Soviet era. Russia is the second largest arms exporter in the world after the US, while India has been its biggest buyer of arms and military equipment. The cordial bilateral relationship developed into a strategic partnership in 2000 (Arun,2010) and elevated to a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership" in December 2010 (Ministry of External Affairs India, 2010). According to SIPRI, Russia has contributed 65.5% to Indian military modernization since 1992. And another report by the Congressional Research Service highlights that from 2016-2022 India imported 23% of the total arms export of Russia to its arms trading partners (SIPRI, 2022). In 2016, 16 defense deals were signed between India and Russia which include the supply of S-400

air defense systems, Akula class nuclear-powered submarines, 11356 class frigates, AK-203/103 rifles, and T-90 Tanks . However, some scholars are of the opinion that India can face a backdrop of narrowing its strategic space due to its high dependence on Russian arms and military equipment.

After Russia invaded Ukraine, India has been facing delays in arms export from Moscow. There are two possible reasons for this delay according to Krzysztof Iwanek. One reason is that Moscow is focused on Ukraine, so its defense industry has the priority of supplying arms and ammunition to its military deployed in Ukraine instead of exporting it to India. The second reason is the Western sanctions and the cut-off supply of semiconductors that the Russian defense industry uses to make arms and military equipment. So, India has been facing the challenge of delay in Russian arms export this year. At the same time, India banned certain military products from being imported from Moscow. Some scholars argue whether this decision was wise enough from New Delhi given India's huge dependency on the Russian arms industry.

According to Krzysztof Iwanek, the import bans may not prove a miscalculation amid the delays in arms export due to Ukraine War and more importantly, India has the goal of reducing the deep dependency on the Russian defense industry for decades (Krzysztof Iwanek, 2022). New Delhi is moving towards the indigenization of its military. Muhammed Ali Baig, Hamid Iqbal, and Syed Sabir Muhammad in their article "India's Indigenization and Modernization of Defence and Military Technology: Strategic Ramifications for Pakistan" explains how Indian defense and military capabilities are being modernized and indigenized as India aspires to become an independent powerful military while reducing its dependency on the Russian defense industry at large. India's land forces acquired arms through defense deals with Russia and the United States, its navy is being evolved into a blue water navy capable of projecting power far beyond its borders,

and its air force is being rapidly armed to become a strategic force capable of acting independently (Baig, 2018). However, India still relies on its S-400 air defense delivery systems from Moscow on which it cannot impose a ban. So, the delay in arms export may prove to be a challenge for India in the near future.

2.4 Implications of the Indo-Russian Defense Collaboration on Pakistan

Indo-Russian defense collaboration has vastly contributed to the Indian military modernization of its tri-forces over recent years. India's plans for the future are shown in its acquisition of the S-400, the introduction of the Rafale, and the development of the BrahMos hypersonic cruise missiles, Akula class nuclear-powered submarines, 11356 class frigates, AK-203/103 rifles, and T-90 Tanks (Indian Defence Industries, 2021). This modernization has pulled India and Pakistan into a security dilemma where India is trying to challenge the deterrence stability with Pakistan and Pakistan has no other option but to reply with its non-conventional capability.

Pakistan has been successfully managing its conventional disparities with India in recent years with the help of its Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) through domestic defense industry and Chinese support. TNWs has been the stabilizing factor rather than destabilizing factor according to the most of Pakistan's senior Army officers. But Pakistan may find it more challenging in the long run to maintain a conventional balance with a more powerful adversary. In order to maintain its effectiveness against the Indian tri-forces, which is much larger in size, the Pakistan military must constantly review its offensive and defensive capabilities at the operational, strategic, and tactical levels. These most recent developments by India are having a destabilizing impact on the strategic stability of the region.

Peter R. Lavoy while discussing Pakistan's nuclear posture in his article "Islamabad's Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation" states that the possible outcome of the increasing deviation in the conventional warfare capabilities between India and Pakistan will be an arms race in the region as Islamabad has the obligation to match India's military might to deter India or lowering of the non-conventional weapons buildup for Pakistan (Lavoy, 2008).

Dr. Masood argues that the air and naval defense uplift could also create serious challenges for Pakistan's military. In the nuclear arena, Russia is helping India overcome its nuclear fuel needs and uninterrupted supplies, material, and technology transfer to refurbish its nuclear industry, which may bring a huge qualitative and quantitative change in its nuclear weapon program (Khattak, 2018). The induction of Russian nuclear submarines would help India to achieve assured second-strike capability and greater outreach in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea taxing Pakistan's maritime installations and economic and strategic interests.

In all likelihood, this defense collaboration would create serious strategic disparity for Pakistan. The failure of conventional deterrence may invite the weaker party (Pakistan) to rely on its nuclear weapons to deter any aggressive moves by India. Consequently, India's military modernization along with aggressive doctrines and overwhelming reliance on nuclear weapons by Pakistan would create serious security problems for the peace and security of South Asia. It is imperative for both nuclear states to avoid confrontation, refrain from aggressive doctrines and resolve all outstanding issues through amicable negotiations, only then there can be long term peace and stability in the region.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Neo-realism is a dominant theory in international relations put forward by Kenneth Waltz. Neo-realism states that the international system is anarchical due to the absence of any higher authority. The realist school of thought is dominated by power politics that advocates that states are the primary actors in international relations while survival of the young public and self-reliance through self-help are the primary objectives of the state. Therefore, states act in accordance with their supreme national interest. The security or insecurity of all states in the international system depends on the maximization or minimization of the power it attains. The power can either be hard power or soft power but the theory mainly focuses on acquiring hard power.

Neo-Realism has two shades, Offensive, and Defensive Realism. Offensive realism was put forward by John Mearsheimer that advocates that states must possess the offensive military capability to achieve dominance and hegemony in order to ensure their survival. Offensive realism is pertinent to understand the hegemonic aims of India in terms of maximizing its military power through military modernization, and acquiring modern and sophisticated weaponry by collaborating with Russia in the arms and defense industry.

While looking at India's conflicting relationship with Pakistan over the past years, we see a constant pattern of deterrence from both sides. For instance, India developed nuclear capability in the 1970s and overpowered the security dilemma. In response, Pakistan had to develop nuclear capability too in order to ensure its survival and balance out the deterrence stability. Keeping the discussion in consideration, the Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration contributing to Indian military modernization will challenge the strategic stability of the region. Following the pattern of the security dilemma, Pakistan will also strive to increase its conventional warfare capability to ensure its national security and balance out strategic deterrence stability.

From the perspective of structural realism, the defense collaboration between India and Russia can be understood as a strategic response to the anarchic nature of the international system, where states prioritize survival and security. In this system, India and Russia, as sovereign actors, collaborate to enhance their respective security and power. India's engagement with Russia, including arms purchases and joint military exercises, serves to balance against potential threats from regional powers like China and Pakistan, while also allowing India to maintain strategic autonomy and avoid over-reliance on any single power. For Russia, this partnership provides a significant market for its defense industry and a means to counterbalance NATO and U.S. influence in South Asia. The collaboration also involves crucial arms trade and technology transfer agreements that help India modernize its military and sustain a technological edge, while supporting Russia's economic and strategic interests. Geopolitically, both nations share a common interest in maintaining regional stability and countering Western dominance, making their defense collaboration a strategic maneuver to enhance their positions within the global power structure. Structural realism, with its emphasis on the anarchic international system, balance of power, and relative gains, provides a clear framework for understanding the motivations and implications of this enduring partnership.

3.1. RESEARCH GAP

Moscow's export of arms and military equipment to India is contributing heavily to the developing nuclear and conventional arms race between India and Pakistan. After analyzing the literature on the research topic, there are numerous research gaps that challenge the conduct of the study.

- 1.** The first gap is the missing stance of Russia on the escalating conflicting situation between India and Pakistan.

2. The second gap is the lack of policy recommendations produced in literature for Pakistan facing the implications of Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration and how Pakistan can take steps to de-escalate the possibility of limited war with India.

3. The third gap is to understand why India has been using offensive military doctrines in the name of defense purposes while Pakistan does not match its conventional warfare military capability.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study will be based on qualitative research methodology. Both primary and secondary data will be used to investigate and elaborate different aspects of the study. The methodology for this study would involve in-depth interviews of retired military officials, scholars & researchers from different think tanks/ academicians linked with national and international security environment. These interviews will provide an opportunity to understand under-lying problems, key concepts and will help in formulating implications and options for Pakistan's security apparatus.



4.1. Research Design:

The study is based on a qualitative research and qualifies in the Descriptive, Exploratory, and Predictive data analysis approaches. Both primary and secondary data will be used to investigate and elaborate different aspects of the study.

4.2. Population:

The methodology for this study would involve in-depth interviews of diplomats, researchers at different Think Tanks/Academicians linked with Strategic Studies and International Relations special focus on South Asia. It would clarify the strategic issues and debate related to the subject matter. These interviews will provide an opportunity to understand underlying problems, key concepts and help in formulating a Pakistani perspective/narrative on this issue which falls in the literature gap. The student will try to get as many as 20 to 25 interviews of the relevant people/experts on India, Russia and Pakistan.

4.3. Sampling:

In this research, the researcher would use snow-ball sampling to collect further information. Only relevant, qualified and highly professional people can take part in this study. Therefore, snowball sampling will be used. Through snowball sampling target person will be reached.

4.4. Instrumentation:

Structured and un-structured interviews will be conducted from retired military officials, diplomats, academicians of Strategic Studies and International Relations and member from thinktanks while close ended questionnaires will also be filled.

4.5. Data collection:

In this study, both primary and secondary data will be collected. Primary data will be collected through interviews of retired military officials, diplomats, academicians of Strategic Studies and International Relations and members from think tanks while secondary data will include the official documents and other published work including books research article and reports.

4.6. Data analysis:

In this study Data will be analysed through grounded theory. Grounded theory is a useful approach when little is known about a subject. Grounded theory starts by formulating a theory around a single data case. This means that the theory is “grounded”. It’s based on actual data, and not entirely speculative. Then additional cases can be examined to see if they are relevant and can add to the original theory. Moreover, this study will be descriptive, exploratory and predictive; therefore, primary data will be analyzed through charts, figures and tables. Similarly, for data analysis the deductive approach will be used which involves analyzing qualitative data based on a structure that is predetermined by the researcher. A researcher can use the questions as a guide for analyzing the data.

5. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The proposed study can be organized into the following chapters:

Chapter 1: Basic Features of Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration

This chapter will focus on the basic features of Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration primarily focusing the era of Narendra Modi (2014-2023).

Chapter 2: Future Prospects of Nuclear Arms Race between India and Pakistan

This chapter will predict the future of the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan in South Asia due to the Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration after Prime Minister Modi came into power in 2014. It will discuss the Indian military modernization through Indo-Russian Defense Collaboration. Further, it will discuss why the Indian army is engaged in massive military modernization of its tri-forces through the import of arms and military equipment from the Russian defense industry.

Chapter 3: Implications of Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration on Pakistan

This chapter will focus on the implications of Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration on Pakistan's security and further, it will investigate the coping mechanism that can be employed by Pakistan's political and military leadership to de-escalate the evolving conflicting situation with India.

Chapter 1 Basic Features of Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration

1.1 Introduction

Ever since the end of the Cold War, New Delhi and Moscow have maintained a robust and fruitful collaborative partnership. In 2021, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, an agreement established in 1971, celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. In addition, it marked the commemoration of their Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership's twentieth anniversary. The joint declaration announced at the most recent summit was titled "Partnership for Peace, Progress, and Prosperity (Singh,1995). The provisions covered a wide range of subjects and agreements, including education, governance, multilateralism, and commerce.

Since the year 1947, when India attained its freedom, India and Russia have developed a more robust working relationship. After the successful execution of their first commercial agreement in 1953 and the subsequent establishment of a bilateral trade agreement in 1958, it became clear that they had made significant progress. The formation of a collaborative alliance in the military-technical arena and a defence partnership that is mutually beneficial was made possible as a result of the achievement of a consensus. The initial trade agreement encompassed a number of components, one of which was the exchange of scientific and technological expertise between the two states. Following that, the partnership has flourished, with Moscow providing New Delhi with complete production lines for military equipment (Ali M, et al., 2018). These lines include tanks, planes, and other types of military hardware. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India (1947–1964), appointed his sister V. Pandit to the position of the first ambassador to the Soviet Union. This was done with the intention of bolstering the confidence that existed between India and the Soviet Union. With this decision, the political and strategic connections between the two states were expanded, which was a critical moment in the process. Nehru embarked on an official and three-week tour of the Soviet Union in June of 1955. It was in November of that same year that Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev made their way to India in reaction to the situation. Nehru's political standing was significantly elevated as a result of these visits, which also served to boost India's connections with a nation that possessed superior technological capabilities (Zachariah, 2004).

By August of 1971, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed between the two countries. India received assistance from the Soviet Union, which supported their position on East Pakistan, which is now known as Bangladesh. Additionally, the Soviet Union made certain that China would not interfere in the conflict that took place between India and Pakistan in 1971. The visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to China on November 7, 1971, which resulted in significant implications for the dissolution of Pakistan, was marked by Moscow's provision of support to India (Singh, 1995). A fleet of six vessels was sent to the Indian Ocean by the Soviet Union as a response to the United States' support of Pakistan during the conflict that took place in 1971.

On the other hand, Dhaka was taken over by the United States, and Pakistani soldiers surrendered before any direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union happened. After the war, the Soviet Union supported India's position in the United Nations and consistently opposed any resolutions that criticised India's role in the East Pakistan conflict (Singh, 1995). This was part of the Soviet Union's response to the war. This military and political backing resulted in a significant improvement to India's standing in the international arena as well as in the regional arena.

1.2 Moscow-Delhi collaboration from 2000-2013

The fundamental objective of Vladimir Putin's Asia policy was to ensure that strong relations with India were maintained as a top priority. A strategic relationship was established between him and the Indian prime minister within a span of less than six months after he took office. This was accomplished by formally approving a statement that was made during his first official trip to India, which took place in the autumn of the year 2000. A yearly summit series that would rotate between the two countries as the primary event was the goal of the cooperation, which planned to establish the series first. Every year up until the year 2021, these visits took place (Tellis, Ashley. Tellis, 2022). As a result of Moscow's announcement in 2010 of a strategic policy to shift its focus towards the East, the formal status of Moscow's relationship with Delhi was elevated to that of a "specially privileged strategic partnership."

The development of this "strategic partnership" with India was seen by the Kremlin as a means of weakening the position of the United States of America. The elite of Russia see the American actor as having an excessive amount of authority, and they have a sneaking suspicion that they are

attempting to exert their influence over the internal affairs of Russia with the help of their superior position. Moscow utilised a strategy of subverting US policy, stating that it aligned with the organic and unbiased movement of the global system towards a multipolar configuration. This technique was employed in order to undermine its own policy. As a result of the Kremlin's disdain for the United States' major role in the international order following the end of the Cold War, they actively sought partnerships with states that shared their views and were opposed to the hegemonic position of the United States. Even as early as the middle of the 1990s, the Russian elite recognised and expressed appreciation for China's growing prominence. As a consequence of this, Moscow made efforts to establish relations with India in order to preserve the equilibrium in the region. In spite of the fact that Putin initially voiced his approval of this idea, he eventually shifted his stance on the concept of "multipolarity" and refuted any charges that he harboured revisionist goals (Mohanty, 2020).

In response to the Russian proposal for a strategic alliance, India has expressed its interest in the concept. This was a direct consequence of the recent recall of the Soviet Union's help to India in enduring pressure from Western nations, particularly the United States of America. In addition to actively participating in a large number of diplomatic exchanges with the United States, India has made it a persistent goal to establish itself as a significant global participant, both on the regional and global levels. In light of this, the establishment of the strategic cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi was motivated by a common distaste for the dominant position held by Washington, a requirement for the utmost flexibility in the management of neighbouring nations and internal problems, and a prevalent sentiment against the Western world. On the basis of this line of reasoning, India became interested in the concept of a multipolar order. As an additional point of interest, the fundamental objective of the collaboration between the two parties was to reduce the growing influence of China (Pandit, 2022). When this line of reasoning was taken into consideration, the ruling class in Moscow came to the conclusion that Russia and India shared significant interests on a global scale.

Their strategic alliance was significantly vulnerable due to the fact that the two governments did not engage in any form of economic cooperation with one another. From 2009 to 2012, the value of bilateral commerce experienced a significant increase, going from \$7.5 billion to \$11 billion.

This increase occurred during the period of time. Following that, it had a decline, reaching a total of \$10.1 billion in 2013, and then falling even lower to a total of \$9.5 billion in 2014 (Consulate General of India, Vladivostok, Russia : India-Russia Defence Cooperation). This constituted a negligible fraction of India's international trade, and it was an even smaller portion of Russia's in comparison. The amount of money that Russia invested in India between the years 2000 and 2015 was four billion dollars, while India invested eight billion dollars in Russia within the same time period. These bilateral investments were not particularly substantial. Over the course of the past few years, Indian investments in the energy sector have reached a significant milestone, reaching a total of \$4.5 billion. Over the course of its involvement in two significant projects, the OVL, which is a petroleum corporation that is owned by the state, had a significant influence on the investment landscape of India.

With the acquisition of a twenty percent stake in the Sakhalin-1 project in the year 2001, the company was able to expand its footprint in the energy business. The acquisition of Imperial Energy, a company that is engaged in the exploration and extraction of oil and gas deposits in western Siberia, was accomplished by a substantial investment of \$2.6 billion in the year the year 2008 ((Mohanty, 2020). Through the use of these strategic movements, the corporation displayed its commitment to expanding its communications with the public. Collaboration between Russia and India in the areas of military and technical matters has been the primary focus of the relationship between the two countries. There are a number of factors that are responsible for the robust strategic collaboration between India and Russia. Each nation places a high level of emphasis on recognising and respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other nation. In addition, Russia has consistently provided the Indian Armed Forces with the necessary weaponry and equipment throughout the course of the previous sixty years, demonstrating its unwavering commitment for India.

In addition to this, they have a strong network of diplomatic and strategic connections, and they routinely provide support to one another in a variety of international settings. Both Russia and India hold the same position with regard to the militant issue that is occurring in Kashmir. Reports indicate that both countries have expressed apprehensions regarding Pakistan's claimed funding of militancy in Indian-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IOJ&K) (Ladwig, 2015). In the course of his trip to India in 2002, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasised the relevance of

Pakistan's commitment to eradicate the infrastructure that offers assistance to terrorists within its borders. These ideas are unquestionably representative of the Russian perspective on the Kashmir issue. Russia views Pakistan's drive for independence as an act of terrorism and maintains a prejudiced posture towards Kashmir. Furthermore, despite the fact that they have occasional conflicts, such as the Soviet Union's engagement in Afghanistan and their varied opinions on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, both countries continue to view each other as reliable allies and continue to maintain their long-lasting partnership. Because of President Putin's endorsement of the Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership during his official visit to India in October of 2000, the connection between India and Russia has been stronger over the course of time. This is especially true after President Putin signed the document. Atal Bihari Vajpai, the Prime Minister of India, travelled to Moscow in 2001 with the intention of strengthening the country's political and strategic ties with Russia (Gidadhubli, 1998).

In September of 2000, India, Russia, and Iran came together to sign a contract with the intention of building the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). The promotion of greater economic integration among the countries who participated in this programme was the primary objective of this programme, which aimed to strengthen regional connectivity. In the month of May in the year 2002, the agreement was validated by all three parties. India will be able to build economic interconnectivity with a number of countries, including Russia, Central Asia, and others, thanks to the International Corridor (Gidadhubli, 1998). Over the course of the North Pacific Ocean, notably on the island of Sakhalin, India is actively participating in oil and gas field exploration initiatives that are being conducted by Russia. A significant investment of two billion United States dollars was made by the Indian oil company ONGC Videsh Ltd. in order to acquire a significant twenty percent ownership stake in a possible offshore oil project that is located in the southernmost part of Russia.

1.3 Moscow-Delhi Defence Collaboration During Modi Era:

Ever since the time of the Cold War, India has held Russia in high regard as a trustworthy ally. This is mostly due to the extensive collaboration that the two countries have had in important areas such as military, hydrocarbons, nuclear energy, and space exploration. Moscow began the process of building diplomatic relations with China, a big adversary of India, as a direct result of the conflict that occurred in Ukraine (Tellis, 2022). Tensions have surfaced inside the partnership as

a direct consequence of this. It is clear that India and Russia's military industries continue to serve as a solid foundation for their bilateral relations, as seen by the resilient nature of these industries over the course of many years. India is receiving assistance from Russia in the process of developing and purchasing arms, which is resulting in an increase in India's defence capability. Additionally, Russia is providing assistance to India's "Made in India" programme in order to ensure its success. The Programme for Military Technical Oversight provides assistance and guidance to the two countries in their efforts to cooperate in the defence sector. Both governments have a common goal, which is to strengthen their military and technological alliance in terms of the development, manufacturing, and post-purchase assistance of defence systems. This objective is highlighted in the statement that was just given. The ministers of defence of both nations get together to discuss issues pertaining to the growth of ongoing programmes and the improvement of military technologies through collaborative efforts.

Transactions that are currently taking place include agreements about multi-barrel rocket launchers, improvements to MiG-29 aircraft, and the sale of Kamov-31 and Mi-17 helicopters. In addition, bilateral agreements concerning the production of Su-30MKI aircraft and T-90 tanks in India are now being negotiated and negotiated. In the process of developing the Brahmos missile, the two countries went from a straightforward buyer-seller dynamic to a more collaborative approach that encompassed the research, design, and production of sophisticated military platforms (Khattak, 2018). This is an example of how the bilateral partnership between the two countries has evolved over time. There is now an ongoing partnership between the two nations with the purpose of developing and manufacturing highly advanced aircraft of the Fifth Generation Fighter and Multi-Role Transport varieties. Exercises known as "INDRA" are conducted annually by the armed services of both countries. These exercises are conducted in conjunction with one another. The two nations are currently in the process of negotiating a defence logistics cooperation deal that would grant them reciprocal access to one another's ports, military sites, and support infrastructure. This arrangement would be beneficial to both nations. Through the provision of easy refuelling and replenishment facilities for aeroplanes and warships at designated economic zones, bases, and ports, the objective of this agreement is to enhance the operational efficiency of the military (Kapoor, 2019). Furthermore, it is possible that a specified number of soldiers will be stationed in the nations of the parties involved in the conflict.

As the relationship continues to evolve, this partnership is becoming more collaborative and advantageous to both parties involved. At the moment, collaborative efforts consist of training, interactions between service providers, joint exercises, the exchange of technologies, and cooperative manufacturing and development. In recent times, Russia and India have made tremendous progress in determining the many areas in which they may establish a collaborative relationship. Among these are deep-water exploration and the construction of information networks that link economies that are preoccupied with technical growth, scientific innovation, and human consciousness (Kapoor, 2019). These span a wide range of areas, including but not limited to deepwater exploration. In addition, they place a high priority on the development of secure infrastructure and the enhancement of capabilities across a wide range of industries. These industries include, but are not limited to, agribusiness, shipbuilding, rail routes, aeronautics, and essential networks that are strongly dependent on interpersonal interactions. A significant focus will be placed on fostering collaboration between the younger population and social circles throughout the organisation. It was on June 1, 2017, that the St. Petersburg Declaration was officially presented to the public. This declaration emphasises the essential importance of furthering the complete growth of India-Russia ties within the scope of the international strategies of both countries (McKercher, 2012). The undertaking of big initiatives that span several fields of study is one of the ways in which our organisation is committed to broadening the breadth of our relationship. In addition to this, our two-pronged strategy will be strengthened and refined in order to make it more focused on achieving our objectives. It is expected that India and Russia would maintain their robust and mutually beneficial engagement, which will serve as an example of a constructive paradigm of peaceful ties between sovereign nations (Mohanty, 2010). That our nation-states, as well as the international community as a whole, will profit from this is guaranteed.

In the past, India has aimed to maintain a delicate equilibrium between the United States and Russia in terms of its geopolitical objectives. However, India cannot ignore the fact that it needs to coexist with a potentially dominant force, considering China's growing influence in the region. Russia has developed strong diplomatic ties with both China and India, making it a dependable regional partner for India. He is the mastermind behind these connections. The National Security Strategy, most recently updated in July 2021, outlines Moscow's current foreign policy goals, which include a strong partnership and strategic cooperation with China, as well as a privileged strategic partnership with India. The Kremlin has identified China, India, and the Commonwealth

of Independent States as countries to enhance diplomatic ties with. The paper strongly opposes the efforts of the Western world to undermine the pillars of Russian society, national interests, and values. In addition, the Czech Republic and the United States of America are classified as "hostile nations." After undergoing multiple evaluations, it has been consistently concluded that Russia's chances of enhancing its relations with Western nations are quite bleak.

The relationship between Russia, the United States of America, and Europe has become strained since the acquisition of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. As a result, Moscow has redirected its attention towards Beijing and New Delhi. In relation to the crisis in Crimea, China and India have emerged as two nations that have voiced their support for Russia within the United Nations. These countries have built a strong reputation by providing assistance to Russia.

There is no denying that during the course of the past two years, India has established a strategic alliance with the United States. As a consequence of the United States' shift in strategy towards India and the official establishment of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), there has been a recommitment to the Indo-Pacific area as well as an increase in the level of cooperation between the two countries. In addition, Washington and Delhi have successfully formed four crucial defence treaties, which is a huge accomplishment that is typically accomplished by nations that are linked with the United States.

At a time when India is becoming closer to the United States, Russia is becoming increasingly concerned about the strategic decisions that India is making in the global power contest. At the same time that the link between India and the United States has been expanding, the bilateral connections that exist between Russia and the United States have been eroding. As a direct result of this, the diplomatic relations between India and Russia have become increasingly charged. It was the first time that Russia and India had to postpone their yearly meeting, which took place in the year 2020 (Bowen, 2021). The stated justification for the cancellation states that the cancellation was due to the COVID-19 outbreak; nevertheless, there are speculations that suggest Moscow may have worries with India's potential participation in the Quad that is led by the United States. The Russian Federation has publicly expressed its disapproval of the Quad, describing it as "belligerent and deceitful." (Bowen, 2021) In the months that followed his trip to Delhi in April 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made his way to Islamabad from there. Lavrov allegedly told Delhi that it might not be

able to rely on consistent allegiance from Moscow due to Delhi's expanding relations with Washington, according to Indian media sources. This is all because of Delhi's growing connections with Washington. There were two trips that Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar took to Russia and Georgia in July 2021 (Bowen, 2021). The primary purpose of these trips was to cultivate political ties between the two countries. Considering the hostile relations that exist between Georgia and Russia, it is feasible that Jaishankar's actions could be regarded as a possible reply to Lavrov. An authoritative source asserts that it is of the utmost importance to broaden one's knowledge in an academic manner.

It is possible that Moscow is inflating its concerns regarding the Indo-Pacific area. In their joint declaration, India and Russia reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing discussions on the harmonisation of integration and development activities in the wider Eurasian region, as well as in the Indian and Pacific seas. This commitment was made in the context of regional integration and development initiatives. Despite the fact that they do not directly mention the term "Indo-Pacific," Russian policy-making circles exhibit a full awareness of the ongoing geopolitical power struggle in the region and express a strong desire to engage in the conflict (Vavachan, 2023).

Russia and India have different perspectives on China, and these perspectives are not shared by both countries. In spite of the fact that both parties share the similar purpose of reducing their economic dependence on China, they hold opposing opinions and adopt different strategies in order to combat the growing influence of China. India does not view China as a direct competitor, in contrast to Russia, which views China as a strategic ally. Particularly in light of the border dispute that occurred in the Galwan Valley between May and June of 2020, Delhi and Beijing have a large degree of animosity against one another (Sharma, 2023) As a result of the confrontation along the border, India made a formal request to Russia to speed up the delivery of fighter jets and defence systems. Russia, which is the principal supplier of military equipment and weapons to both countries, was in a tough situation and made the decision to agree with India's request, despite the fact that it could face censure from Beijing. There is a possibility that this decision was made in order to safeguard Russia's strategic autonomy. A source claims that there is the potential for further growth in this sector, particularly within the context of an academic institution. Over the course of the last twenty years, Moscow has been actively advocating for the formation of a trilateral strategic alliance between Russia, India, and

China. However, it is unfortunate that this vision has not yet been realised. Both Delhi and Moscow share a similar perspective when it comes to assessing the potential consequences that could arise from the hegemonic position that the United States and China currently hold in a variety of political affairs and competition. The centrality of multilateralism, a multipolar global order, and the ability to independently create foreign policy is something both Russia and India have often emphasised. Both nations anticipate a significant level of participation from the United Nations in international politics. Russia reaffirmed its support for India's permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council and emphasised the necessity of providing both nations with the opportunity to increase their representation, boost their effectiveness, and advance multilateralism within the United Nations (Economic Times, 2024). India and Russia are two countries whose governments are hostile to the idea that any one nation, such as the United States or China, should have an excessive amount of power on the international stage.

1.4 Contemporary Relations between Russia and India

At the moment, the most significant aspect of India and Russia's bilateral relations is the fact that they are working together in the field of defense. A significant portion of the military hardware that is utilized in India is comprised of weapons that were supplied by Russia and the Soviet Union. The multifaceted area of defense requires effective communication and collaboration among its various components. Every single discipline of science and technology was one in which the Soviet Union excelled, with the exception of the relatively new fields of micro-miniaturization, micro-electronics, and software that was related to these fields. There was a significant gap between the Soviet Union and the Western nations in this particular domain (Economic Times, 2024). The equipment used by the Soviets was cumbersome, particularly sturdy, and simple to maneuver. It is noteworthy that the emphasis was placed on boosting the firepower rather than ensuring that the machine operator was comfortable. Both Moscow and New Delhi had criteria that were consistent with one another, and together, over the course of forty years, they developed a robust relationship in the defense sector. "Russia's historical circumstances compelled the nation to cultivate its military industry and scientific endeavors," said Victor Komardin, the Deputy Director of Rosoboronexport, during a conference that took place in New Delhi in the year 2002 (Chopra, 2003). The Russian defense industry supplied guns and other military equipment to the armed forces

of friendly governments as well as the Russian Armed Forces. These governments included the Russian Armed Forces.

Throughout the course of the field, a robust sense of trust and a broad geopolitical alignment have been built among the numerous parties that are involved. During the foreseeable future, it is projected that Russia will continue to serve as India's key defense partner. The reason for this is that the two countries have maintained their historical links for a long time and continue to work together on a project that they are both working on together (Chopra, 2003). On the other hand, the government of India is making concerted efforts to increase the variety of options available to it for acquiring military technology and equipment. Both the management of the Russian military industry and the politicians in the nation recognize the necessity of adapting to the changing dynamics of the market and the growing level of competition in the expanded weapons sector of India. The new opportunities and difficulties that have arisen as a result of India and Russia's defense ties are something that both countries need to tackle.

Russia and India have had a closer relationship since India's independence in 1947. Two major turning points in the development of a mutually beneficial defense and military-technical cooperation relationship were the beginning of the first bilateral commercial agreement in 1953 and the subsequent establishment of the second bilateral commerce agreement in 1958. A clause pertaining to the two countries' mutual sharing of scientific and technological know-how was included in the original trade agreement. For New Delhi, Moscow has set up large manufacturing plants for military hardware like tanks and airplanes. This has led to an improvement in the collaboration. India's first Prime Minister (1947–1964), Jawaharlal Nehru, appointed his sister V. Pandit as the country's first ambassador to the Soviet Union (Gidadhubli, 1998). Strengthening strategic and political ties between the two leading global powers and fostering mutual confidence were the main goals of this appointment.

In June 1955, Nehru set off on a formal three-week tour of the Soviet Union. In response, Soviet leaders Nikita S. Khrushchev and Nikolai A. Bulganin left for India in November of the same year. These crucial trips improved India's diplomatic ties with the highly developed nation and raised Nehru's profile in politics.

Multiple elements contribute to the robust strategic alliance between India and Russia. Primarily, a fundamental principle that underlies the relationship between the two governments is the reciprocal regard for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, Russia has consistently proven its reliability as an ally by consistently supplying the Indian Armed Forces with the necessary armaments and equipment since the 1960s (Gidathubli, 1998). Furthermore, they have consistently provided mutual assistance in global platforms and possess a lengthy record of diplomatic and strategic connections. A compromise has been reached between India and Russia over the militant situation in Kashmir. Based on the available information, both nations hold the belief that Pakistan is actively promoting militancy in the region of Indian-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IOJ&K). During a visit to India in 2002, the Russian Foreign Minister emphasized the need for Pakistan to dismantle terrorist infrastructure situated within its borders. The aforementioned perspectives effectively demonstrate Russia's position on the Kashmir matter, which is manipulated to depict Pakistan's genuine desire for autonomy as militancy. Moreover, it is noteworthy that both parties persist in perceiving one another as dependable allies and maintaining their enduring friendship, despite occasional divergences such as the Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan in the 1970s and contrasting viewpoints on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Singh, 1995). Since the signing of the Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership by President Putin during his official visit to India in October 2000, there has been a notable enhancement in the strength of the bilateral relationship between the two nations.

The military-technical cooperation between Delhi and Moscow is the primary pillar upon which the alliance between the two cities is built. Over the course of many years, India has maintained a close relationship with the Soviet Union and, later, with Russia after it gained its independence. Ever since the middle of the 1960s, India has been Russia's primary defence ally and a provider of armaments. This partnership has been in place since then. Russia's contribution of key technology and equipment has played a vital role in assisting India with a variety of military undertakings, providing India with invaluable technological help¹. In spite of this, a significant portion of India's military apparatus and components are still manufactured in Russia. It is clear that this is the case

due to the fact that more than sixty to seventy percent of the weapons and equipment that are now in use originate from Russia.

Despite previous warnings from the United States and the prospect of incurring fines under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), Delhi went ahead with the purchase of Russian S-400 missile defence systems in 2021. This was done in defiance of the United States' previous warnings. Following the imposition of sanctions by the United States of America on Turkey, a fellow member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, for the identical purchase that took place the previous year, there were suspicions that Washington might take parallel moves against Delhi. In light of the fact that India is a treaty partner of the United States, it is quite unlikely that CAATSA will have any effect on the country (Unacademy, 2021). It is possible that Delhi might use its procurement of Russian weapons as a geopolitical tool during negotiations with the United States, with the intention of exerting pressure on Washington to deliver modern military equipment and technology.

During the discussion, Russia's resolve to participate in the "Make in India" initiative was also brought to light. This commitment includes working together on research and development projects, as well as producing advanced military technologies and equipment jointly (Unacademy, 2021). The focus of the bilateral collaboration has shifted from solely being on sales to adopting a more collaborative approach in the industrial sector.

Although there appears to be a growing military and defence relationship between India and Russia, it is essential to recognise that both countries have been engaging in the process of expanding their clientele and hunting for a wider range of weapon providers. The year 2020 marked the year that France surpassed Russia as India's principal provider of armaments, surpassing Russia in terms of the overall amount of imports. A significant shift occurred in India's acquisition practices as a result of this moment (Khattak, 2019). According to the information provided by a source, India has been procuring military hardware and forming defence alliances with both the United States of America and Israel.

There has been a substantial increase in the amount of military cooperation and sales between Moscow and Islamabad ever since Russia allowed itself to lift the ban that it had set on the sale of guns to Pakistan in the year 2015. Druzhba (Friendship) was the name of the first ever joint military

exercise that Pakistan and Russia participated in together. It took place in September of 2016. During the course of this activity, a key milestone was reached in the development of the friendship between the two countries. It is possible that this diplomatic endeavour to build connections with Islamabad, Delhi's enemy, could serve as a subtle hint to Delhi that Moscow possesses alternative choices and that Delhi should exercise caution when developing excessively intimate ties with Islamabad.

There have been a number of cutting-edge weapon systems that Russia has either acquired or contracted to be delivered to India during the course of the past five years. These include the Su-30MKI multirole fighter aircraft, the Il-78 tanker aircraft modified for use as an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) platform, the Mi-17-IV military transport helicopters, the R-77 air-to-air missiles, the Kilo class/type 877E submarines, frigates, the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, the MiG-29K and MiG-29KUB versions for carrier-based operations, the Ka-27PL (Ka-28 version) and Ka-31 helicopters, the T-90 tanks, various radar systems for fire control, air and sea surveillance, combat, and aircraft, as well as anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, among others (Khattak, 2019).

The historical collaboration in defense between India and Russia is not only extensive but also longstanding. The framework for military technological cooperation between India and Russia has transitioned from a relationship based on buying and selling to one focused on collaborating in the research, development, and production of advanced defense systems and technologies. Earlier, the framework included of buyer-seller connections. Examples of substantial cooperation include the BrahMos Missile System and the authorized production of T-90 tanks and SU-30 aircraft in India. During the 17th Annual Summit, the parties successfully reached agreements on the procurement of S-400 air defense systems, the construction of frigates under Project 1135.6, and the formation of a joint venture to manufacture Ka-226T helicopters in India (Khattak, 2019). Furthermore, the armed forces of both nations engage in regular, prearranged training exercises and reciprocal visits. The military exercise called "Indra 2016" occurred in the Ussuriysk District of Vladivostok City from September 22nd to October 2nd, 2016. The "Indra – Navy" annual bilateral naval exercise occurred from December 14th to December 21st, 2016, off the coast of Vishakhapatnam.

Air Chief Arup Raha's visit to Russia occurred from October 24th to October 29th, 2016. In March 2017, the Chief of the Russian Navy visited India. The inaugural India-Russia Military Conference was held in Delhi in March 2017 (Rajagopalan, 2024). Over forty-five Russian groups were present at this event. In March 2017, Alexander Bortnikov, the Director of the Federal Security Service, visited India to hold discussions with the Minister of Home Affairs. He was leading a group of nine individuals to India.

As was mentioned previously, the principal objectives of the heavy weapons that India possesses are to show might and to discourage potentially hostile nations who may be India's adversaries. In point of fact, the strategic elite in the country are practically unanimous in their belief that it is imperative for India to assert its supremacy, particularly in the region surrounding the Indian Ocean. This is due to the fact that India owns a significant amount of dimensions and vulnerabilities. It is generally agreed upon that the activities that are sponsored by the present long-term defense cooperation program up until the year 2010 are expected to amount to approximately \$9 to \$10 billion and this is a figure that is commonly acknowledged.

1.5 New Areas of Cooperation

After more than a decade of discussions and a total spending of \$1.5 billion, the purchase deal for the Admiral Gorshkov, an aircraft carrier with a capacity of 45,000 tons, was finally finalized on January 20, 2004. There is an expectation that approximately seventy percent of the ship will be retrofitted. The Admiral Gorshkov, a Soviet vessel, is getting on in years. The arrival in India is anticipated to take place close to the end of the year 2008, according to the estimate. There have been a number of commentators who have expressed their reservations over the prudence of purchasing a "aged Soviet hull" (Cohen, 2013). On the other hand, the aircraft carrier held a significant amount of significance for the government of India.

The various points of view that India and Russia have maintained with regard to the West and China, as well as with regard to each other, have had a significant influence on the development of Indo-Russian relations over the course of time. Although the period of collaboration between India and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was marked by a strong sense of friendship, their shifting fortunes can be traced to their astute judgments of world geopolitics. This is the case even though the period of time in which they worked together was marked by conflict. From the time that Stalin passed away in 1953 until the present day, the bilateral relations between the two

countries have been increasingly serious. There was a blurring of the previously clear ideological borders that arose during the Cold War as a result of the partnership that existed between New Delhi and Moscow, despite the fact that their political systems were radically different (Gidathubli, 1998). The efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to convince democratic India of the inherent danger posed by Soviet communism were unsuccessful, which was a source of considerable disappointment for a large number of Western diplomats.

At the beginning of the year 1955, the Soviet Union started providing financial assistance to the Bhilai steel factory. Up until the early 1960s, they continued to provide assistance, and at that time, they also gave assistance for a second factory in Bokaro. There was a strengthening of the commercial relations between India and the Soviet Union during the course of the subsequent twelve years. Supporters of the Indo-Soviet alliance have emphasized the importance of economic planning, despite the significant differences that exist between the economies of the two countries participating in the alliance. The defeat of the Indian Army by China in 1962 led to a considerable increase in the level of military cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. This was in addition to the already existing economic relations that existed between the two countries. India received help from both the United States of America and the Soviet Union during the Indo-Pakistan War that took place in 1965 at the same time.

The United States of America abruptly stopped providing assistance to the region, which ultimately led to the Soviet Union emerging as the victor as the winner. The favorable economic conditions, the willingness to offer licenses for aircraft manufacture, and the goal to lessen dependence on the West all contributed to India's ability to keep its top position in the world. Because Moscow has been India's primary supplier of military supplies for the past sixty years, not even the disintegration of the Soviet Union has been able to put an end to this unbroken run of success. Despite this, Russia continues to hold the role of leader, albeit not to the same degree as it did in the decades prior. Diversifying the supply chain of the Indian military has been a priority for the Indian military. The expansion of Indo-Soviet relations was a direct result of India's unsuccessful attempts to collaborate with Western nations. This is an extremely important fact to keep in mind. Beginning in 1962 and continuing until 1965, India attempted to secure Bhilai from West Germany, Bokaro from the United States, and military supply from the United Kingdom and the United States. However, none of these initiatives were successful. In spite of the fact that both

parties celebrated their relationship and their ability to work together (Gidadhubli, 1998). To phrase it another way, the effect of the triangular interactions that took place between the West, the Soviet Union, and India was an increase in the level of links that existed between the Soviet Union and India.

With the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, Indo-Soviet relations reached their pinnacle, and the treaty was driven by the desire to achieve common objectives. Rather than her commitment to the Soviet cause, the reason for her change in attitude toward the pact was not because American diplomats had subtly revealed their intention to lower security duties to India in order to enhance relations with China. This was the reason for her change in attitude. After weathering the Soviets' constant pressure for a period of two years, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi eventually gave in to their demands and allowed them to take control of the country. Following the decade of the 1970s, diplomats from India and the Soviet Union acknowledged the several underlying grounds for maintaining their economic cooperation. The grounds included the strengthening of commercial connections and providing support for India's oil industry as well as other major industries. However, the so-called shared ideological commitment that they extolled was frequently driven by the desire for mutual financial benefits and the ability to preserve a certain amount of independence from global capitalist forces, which were principally focused on the United States. This was not the case. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was no longer in existence, these tendencies continued to exist, which resulted in irreparable harm being done to the relationship between India and the Soviet Union.

The relationship between New Delhi and Moscow finally hit its lowest point in the early 1990s, when both of these countries redirected their attention to the West. Once more, the disposition of the triangle relationship served as the impetus for the redesigning of the partnership, which was a process that lasted for more than a decade. The first clue was the well-known Primakov Doctrine, which was published in 1998 and advocated for the formation of a coalition consisting of China, India, and Russia in order to offset the dominant position held by the United States. By calling for a type of multipolarity, Moscow was drawn to counteract the hegemonic position of the United States in the global system. Moscow affirmed that this interpretation is accurate. In addition to this, it strengthened the long-standing skepticism that the government of New Delhi has always had toward the United States of America as a reliable friend. In the month of October in the year

2000, Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, put out a proposition for a strategic partnership agreement between India and Russia. The overarching objective of this agreement was to construct a "multipolar world." As a result of the renewed connection, India was able to reap a number of diplomatic benefits. In addition to India's efforts to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, Russia's support of India's nuclear weapons program was also included among the perks (Mohanty, 2010). In spite of the fact that there was a beneficial political partnership, the economic benefits were not very substantial.

The strong economic collaboration that existed between the two countries in the public sector during the Cold War has not yet evolved into a trading relationship that is dominated by the private sector in the twenty-first century, despite the fact that numerous attempts have been made in this direction. Through the implementation of a variety of government-to-government programs in fields including as nuclear energy, oil and gas production, space exploration, defense research and manufacture, and Indian investment in the Russian Far East, both nations have taken efforts to conceal the disparities that exist between them (Mohanty, 2010). At this moment, it appears like the perspectives that are held by the two countries are becoming more and more similar to one another. Within the context of their collective remarks with Russia, Indian leaders have expressed their support for the concept of a multipolar world and their disdain of the system that is dominated by the United States. Over the course of the past few years, India has become an increasingly important factor in Russian geopolitical concerns. It serves as a counterweight to Russia's growing dependency on China and as a collaborator in Russia's drive to challenge the dominance of the United States.

Over the course of the past few years, India has become an increasingly significant factor in Russia's geopolitical calculations. Both China and India were regarded as equal participants in the plan that Russia had developed for its national security policy for the year 2021. It is interesting to note that those who dislike being with other people and are immune to germs There were only three overseas travels that Vladimir Putin made between the beginning of the pandemic and the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine (Markey, et al., 2022). These journeys were done in order to participate in talks with the President of China, Xi Jinping, the Prime Minister of India, and the Vice President of the United States, Joe Biden. Both of these individuals are leaders in their respective countries. It was not long after the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine in 2022 that the

extent of the partnership that existed between India and Russia became widely apparent (Markey, et al., 2022).

The Indian government has not only maintained its impartiality during the crisis, but it has also boosted its acquisitions of cost-effective energy exports from Russia by capitalizing on the sanctions. All the while, India has been able to resist the intense pressure that has been placed on it by the Western nations. In addition, it has moved forward with its controversial acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system in order to make progress. It has been observed that Indian diplomats have a tendency to refrain from criticizing Russian policy, even when they continue to employ courteous language. As a result of India's refusal to condemn Russia's intervention into Ukraine, Moscow has been able to use India's democratic reputation as a weapon against some sorts of criticism. One of the reasons for this is that India is unwilling to put up a fight against the invasion. The Western nations view India's refusal to participate in the economic embargo against Russia as an additional illustration of India's democratic retreat, which is devoid of any democratic virtue. On the other hand, neither of these viewpoints takes into account the long-standing history of national interests that have served as the foundation for the relationship between India and Russia. It is important to note that these interests are not abstract concepts; rather, they are interests that are relevant to the nation. Over the course of the past few months, the administration of the United States has made major efforts to characterize the current geopolitical situation as a confrontation between authoritarian China and Russia and the democracies of the world. It is extremely improbable that such an argument would be accepted in New Delhi considering the circumstances.

While the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is now in power, has made enormous efforts to retain India's image as a functioning democracy, it is vital to emphasize that these efforts have been done despite the notable decrease in democratic values that has occurred over the past few years. Since this is the case, it would reject any rhetorical framework that establishes a connection between it and authoritarian policies. The interaction that takes place between the United States of America and China will, without a doubt, continue to have an effect on their relationship over the course of time. As a result of China's rise to prominence and the activities taken by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, India and Russia are being tugged in opposite directions, which is leading their global alliance to face a multitude of obstacles. On the other hand, as the United States and

China work to counterbalance one another, these tensions have the potential to enhance the linkages that exist between India and Russia. According to the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs, S. Jaishankar, the relationship between India and Russia revolves around the acceptance and desire for multipolarity, both as a current status and as a goal.

1.6 The War in Ukraine

In reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, New Delhi has adopted a neutral stance, urging all parties involved to suspend hostilities and investigate the prospects of reaching a diplomatic conclusion to the conflict. By not participating in any votes that were against Russia in the United Nations General Assembly and by maintaining its nonpermanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, India has subtly demonstrated its support for Russia inside the framework of the United Nations. When the draft resolution denouncing Russia's annexation of four regions of Ukraine was being voted on in the United Nations Security Council, India chose not to participate in the vote for the resolution.

The envoy of India to the United Nations condemned the initial massacre of civilians in Bucha, Ukraine, and requested that an impartial investigation be conducted pertaining to the incident. India, on the other hand, did not acknowledge that Russia was responsible for the killed individuals. Despite the fact that New Delhi has not yet placed any sanctions on Russia, it has expressed concerns about the likelihood of doing so in the future. In accordance with the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the government of the United States of America granted India an exemption in the month of July 2022 (Baig, et al., 2022). Because of this license, India was authorized to receive Russian equipment, which included the S-400s that had been obtained in the past. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, India has become a large buyer of Russian crude. This trend has continued through 2018. Furthermore, the G7 nations' approval of a price ceiling on Russian oil in early December 2022, New Delhi refrained from announcing a commitment to terminate its imports of Russian oil (Markey, et al., 2022).

During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conference that took place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, on September 16, 2022, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, made a momentous declaration. During his talk, he informed Russian President Vladimir Putin that the period of fighting has come to an end, which was a way of indirectly expressing his disapproval of the ongoing conflict near the Ukrainian border. There is a possibility that this is connected to

India's economic endeavors in Ukraine, as demonstrated by the significant delays in the delivery of train wheels for Vande Bharat, a growing semi-high-speed intercity rail system, as well as replacement components for gas turbine engines that are utilized by the Indian Navy (Warren, et al., 2022). Both of these items are manufactured in Ukraine; but, in order to contribute to the war effort, the Ukrainian businesses who were involved were required to have their production put on hold. Given that India is dependent on wheat and sunflower oil imports from Russia and Ukraine, it is possible that Modi's comment was motivated by the impact that the crisis has had on the prices of both of these commodities. There is still a lack of clarity regarding the nature of his address, making it difficult to determine if it was a direct criticism of Russia's actions or a more general appeal for peace. For the most part, India has refrained from expressing its outright condemnation of Russia's foray into Ukraine.

Chapter 2

Indian Military Modernization Future Prospects of Nuclear Arms Race between India and Pakistan

2.1 Introduction

Concerns have been raised about the strategic stability of South Asia as a result of the significant efforts that India has been making to modernise its military forces and implement doctrinal reforms. There have been visible differences in conventional capabilities that have evolved as a result of the ongoing efforts of the Indian military to modernise its capabilities. It is possible that the complex geopolitical factors that are currently taking place in South Asia will make Pakistan's prospective reliance on nuclear weapons to deter potential military moves by India even more likely. India is unwavering in its determination to establish itself as a significant player on the international stage, as seen by the rapid growth of its economy and the rapid increase of its military capabilities. The Indian military has undergone substantial expansion ever since the country gained its independence in 1947, and it currently holds the position of being the third largest armed force in the entire world. India has always been fascinated by Pakistan's efforts to enhance their military capabilities and influence their strategic outlook. This fascination has persisted throughout the course of history.

According to Rajesh Basrur, the military improvements made by India are a direct reaction to the advancements made by China, which has resulted in a highly difficult situation. According to Walter C. Ladwig, India has placed a significant amount of attention on the modernization of its military by replacing platforms and refurbishing equipment (Ladwig, 2015). This has been done in order to accommodate the modernization efforts. There has been no discernible effect on the equilibrium of the military that has been noticed. The Indian military has a significant challenge in the shape of obsolete weaponry that is contained within its stockpile. A sizeable percentage of India's budget has been designated for the purpose of enhancing its military infrastructure. This is being done in order to ensure that the country will continue to exert its strategic influence in the South Asian region. Nevertheless, the Pakistani military is making significant headway in reducing the historic disparity, which is a positive development. It is possible that Pakistan could have

challenges in the future as it endeavours to preserve the long-term equilibrium it has established with India.

India ranked as the leading global importer of armament between the years 2013 and 2017, according to data that was given by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (Vasudeva, 2021). Additionally, over the course of the past ten years, India has devoted an estimated one hundred billion dollars to the process of modernising its outdated military hardware. A significant increase was made to the budget for defence, which resulted in a total of \$53.5 billion being allocated for the 2017-2018 fiscal year.

2.2 The reform of the Indian Armed Forces

a) Strengthening the Capabilities of the Indian Army:

In light of the widespread deployment of nuclear weapons, engagement in conventional conflicts in South Africa has become increasingly dangerous. Asia is a continent that is enormous, rich in diversity, historically significant, and spectacular in its natural beauty. The calm temples of Kyoto and Angkor Wat, on the one hand, and the bustling metropolises of Tokyo and Shanghai, on the other, are just two examples of the many amazing sights and experiences that can be found in this part of the world. Since the year 2004, India has been concentrating its strategic efforts on waging a limited-scale military operation in the Kashmir region that it controls. The primary objective of this operation is to discourage Pakistan from providing support to the insurgents who are fighting for independence in that region. Over the course of time, the Indian military has shifted its strategy, shifting from the Sunderji doctrine, which placed an emphasis on deep thrusts, to the CSD doctrine, which appears to be in contrast to their ongoing efforts to modernise their military (Khattak, 2019). As part of the implementation of the Land Warfare Doctrine in 2018, the Indian Army carried out a strategic realignment of its assault formations, which are known as Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). The objective of this strategic manoeuvre was to facilitate and provide assistance for activities of a smaller size that fall below Pakistan's nuclear threshold. Using a military force that was highly adaptable, the goal was to produce a confrontation that was sudden, intense, and lightning-fast. It is feasible to draw the conclusion that the upgrading of the Indian Army is in line with its strategic position in the region. This conclusion can be reached through the consideration of the low probability of a large confrontation and the fact that both countries possess nuclear weapons. Despite this, there is still the risk of minor wars occurring in South Asia. India's current

capability to properly implement its offensive CSD against Pakistan may be subject to certain limits, according to the hypothesis put forth by Ladwig and Vipin Narang. The Indian Army, on the other hand, continues to be properly equipped to carry out its limited war strategy against Pakistan and to overcome any potential inadequacies thanks to the current military modernization programmes that it is undertaking.

In order for India to be able to carry out offensive operations against Pakistan in an effective manner, it is necessary for India to enhance the capabilities of its ground troops. This can be accomplished by purchasing cutting-edge armaments and equipment, as well as incorporating modern training approaches. This objective was the impetus for the Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) initiative, which was launched by the Indian Army in the year 2005. The Indian Army was forced to replace the ambitious initiative by two additional programmes since it was unable to accomplish the goals that it had set out to accomplish throughout its implementation. The first system is devoted to the management of the battlefield, while the second system is intended to provide infantry with modern armament for both offensive and defensive purposes. The Indian Army has recently purchased a significant supply of 7.62 mm rifles, which are designed for close quarters fighting and special operations. These rifles are designed to be used in these types of situations. As a consequence of this, efforts were focused on providing infantry people with the key competencies necessary for Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and establishing connections between these individuals, field commanders, and the central command (Khattak, 2019). All of the parties concerned were participating in this action, which was performed in an effort to improve synergy, integration, and cooperation among them. These components are absolutely necessary for effectively managing brief conflict situations in South Asia, where they are the most important.

A process of modernization and reform is currently being carried out within India's armed forces. This process is being driven by the changing geopolitical circumstances as well as the growing assertiveness of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The efforts that are being made to increase the participation of the private sector in military procurement and to reform the command structures of the Indian Armed Forces are two of the elements that observers believe are having a significant impact on the development. Because of the circumstances that surrounded the inauguration of the People's Republic of China in 2014, the administration that is led by Indian

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made it a top priority to close the gap in the capabilities of the two countries' armed forces. This purpose was brought into even greater focus as a result of a major clash that took place in the Himalayan Galwan Valley in June of 2020 between the armed forces of both countries. Concurrently with the significant advancements that India has made in terms of modernization and reform, a sizeable number of Indian troops and military equipment were swiftly deployed in the direction of the contested border with China.

In a paper that was released in July 2023, Shruti Pandalai, who was working as a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, highlighted the significant effects that the Galwan incident had on India. Pandalai thinks that this event has played a significant role in aiding New Delhi's departure from outdated notions and its adoption of a more proactive approach towards increasing the likelihood of peaceful coexistence through the readiness of the military (The Diplomat). New Delhi had the intention of strengthening the military command structure and giving precedence to any threats emerging from the People's Republic of China, according to a story that was published by The Economist at the end of November 2023. Within the Ministry of Defence, Prime Minister Modi formed a brand new Department of Military Affairs with the intention of enhancing the administration and synchronisation of all branches of the armed forces. Within the framework of this plan, he established the position of chief of defence staff, which is a uniformed command role. The establishment of a four-year enlistment period for certain military personnel was part of a plan that was carried out in order to bring the average age of the United States military personnel down from thirty-two to twenty-six.

An article published in The Economist highlights the significance of a comprehensive modernization of defence technology. The article also highlights the necessity of more involvement from businesses in the private sector. The third emergent priority has been assigned the status of "assigned." Through his remarks, Pandalai emphasised how important it is for India to work together with its external friends in order to make genuine progress in the field. The topic of discussion was government incentives that encourage competitiveness among defence entrepreneurs and drive investment in defence research and development. She was in the middle of a conversation about these incentives.

It is projected that this pattern will gain speed as a consequence of the reform that was implemented to the command structure. In order to contribute to this expedited pace, the Northern Command of India plans to devote an additional 240 million dollars for the purpose of purchasing technology by the year 2023. The government has placed a substantial amount of focus on the promotion of domestic manufacture, particularly in the field of missile systems, through the Made in India project. On the other hand, Moscow has been facing severe difficulties in meeting its requirements for arms ever since it invaded Ukraine almost two years ago. It is currently the case that New Delhi has eclipsed Moscow as the primary provider of supplies for the weapons industry (Lüdtke, 2024). India, on the other hand, has increased its level of cooperation with three of its Quad partners, namely the United States of America, Australia, and Japan.

Pandalai places a strong focus on the significance of Prime Minister Modi's trip to the United States in the middle of 2023, underlining the critical role that the United States plays in India's efforts to upgrade its military capabilities. During the course of the tour, India was able to sign a number of agreements pertaining to technology and defence, which represents a big milestone for the country. The agreements included a significant undertaking involving Critical and Emerging Technology, which lays the groundwork for an all-encompassing plan to enhance collaboration between the military and technology sectors. This was a noteworthy component of the agreements.

As India has made advances in its military capabilities, it has also expanded its collaboration with its Quad allies. This is consistent with the previous statement. According to Pandalai, the first aviation exercise of Veer Guardian 2023 was conducted at the Hyakuri aviation Base in Japan. This exercise involved both India and Japan as participants. An exercise known as Yudh Abhyas was recently carried out by the United States of America and India in a high-altitude location that is located close to the border between China and India. Furthermore, as the speaker mentioned, both Australia and India have been conducting maritime surveillance operations in the region of the Indian Ocean, which is where there has been a substantial amount of suspicious vessel activity. Experts have admitted that India's efforts to modernise its military face a substantial challenge in the form of restrictions imposed by the defence budget. When it came to spending on security in the year 2020, China allocated over \$178 billion, while India contributed approximately \$72.9 billion (or €64.3 billion). "The allocation of financial resources to the military is the main factor that determines modernization," Karnad brought attention to. "The payroll expenditure for

the labor-intensive Indian army, specifically, is rapidly increasing," (Khattak, 2019)

One hundred and fifty percent of the budget for capital expenditures in the fiscal year 2020-2021, which was thirty-eight billion dollars, was explicitly designated for the purchase of new armament and spare parts. It is essential to keep in mind that the full money was allocated to the military personnel. According to Karnad, the amount of seven billion dollars that is currently available is not sufficient for the target of modernising the military. A large modernization initiative that is aimed at combining the activities of the air force, navy, and army is receiving support from the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi on behalf of the government. The present seventeen single-service units will be supervised by five "theatre commands" with the intention of building a cohesive strategy in order to effectively manage future wars. This will bring about the development of a cohesive strategy.

Acquisition of T-90 Tanks:

The Indian Army views the Main Battle Tank (MBT), known as model number 90, as a crucial component in offensive military operations. The Indian Army utilises over 124 domestically manufactured The inventory includes a wide range of tanks, including T-72 tanks, T-90 tanks, and Arjun tanks with advanced night vision capabilities. Furthermore, a recent acquisition has been made from Russia, consisting of 464 T-90 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) with a total value of US\$2 billion (Khattak, 2019). These tanks would greatly improve the Indian Army's range and offensive capabilities. The Indian Army has strategically positioned regiments of T-90 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) in the Punjab and Rajasthan regions of Pakistan to fulfil specific objectives.

2.3 Modernisation of Indian Air Force

In terms of the largest air forces in the world, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) is ranked fourth, behind only the United States of America, China, and Russia. An impressive military force that exceeds 170,000 soldiers is under the supervision of this organisation, which is responsible for the proper management of sixty airbases that fall under its jurisdiction.

India is a nation that is rich in cultural diversity, has a major historical background, and is multicultural. The brilliant hues, great cuisine, and magnificent scenery that this location offers are what set it apart from everyone else. The lively thoroughfares of Delhi and the calm backwaters of Kerala are just two examples of the diverse range of experiences that can be found in India.

Currently, there are 33 squadrons that are part of the fleet that the Indian Air Force (IAF) currently possesses. In order to achieve complete air superiority over Pakistan, it would be necessary to expand the number of squadrons to 42. With the intention of achieving its objectives, the Indian Air Force (IAF) plans to dramatically increase the size of its aircraft fleet in the future by incorporating more than 400 additional aircraft (Khattak, 2019). There is a vast collection of aircraft that is currently being maintained by the Indian Air Force. This collection includes fighters, specialised mission aircraft, refuelling tankers, transport aircraft, helicopters, and aircraft that are used for training purposes. It is the operational capabilities of the Air Force that is enhanced by these resources.

2.4 Renovation of the Indian Navy: Achieving Supremacy at Sea

While India acknowledges the existence of operational shortcomings in its capacity to engage in naval warfare, the nation is expeditiously undertaking measures to enhance its naval capabilities and rectify the situation. The Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean are regarded as the primary operational regions of the Indian Navy. To optimise the efficacy of power exercise and oversight in the aforementioned areas, a resolution has been reached to establish three naval commands in Kochi, Mumbai, and Vishakhapatnam. With the escalating geopolitical antagonism between China and India, Harsh V. Pant predicts that the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean will render it a pivotal arena for military engagements. Pakistan has opted to collaborate with China as a strategic measure to offset the potential influence that India might otherwise wield.

Due to this, India has allocated a substantial financial investment, precisely eight billion dollars, towards the modernization of its naval fleet. To demonstrate its maritime dominance and safeguard its maritime interests, India has constructed a sizable fleet in a strategic manner. This is attributable to the reality that India's economic development has been highly dependent on maritime trade. Additionally, it boasts a navy consisting of 171 vessels and a formidable armament comprising approximately 250 aircraft and 16 submarines. In order to sustain its dominant position in the Indian Ocean Region (IORs), India plans to retain three aircraft carriers throughout the entirety of 2020. India stands alone among the nations of South Asia in its possession of an aircraft carrier.

However, scholars in South Asia hold the opinion that the aircraft carrier functions more as an inconvenience rather than an advantageous asset.

Additionally, the Indian Navy has plans to construct five nuclear submarines, which will enhance India's ability to manoeuvre and generate a reliable second strike capability against China and Pakistan in the future. This will be accomplished by establishing a nuclear submarine fleet.

They will be equipped with Sagarika (K-15) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that have a range of 3,500 kilometres. The nuclear submarines will be equipped with these missiles. India's ability to pinpoint specific places in Pakistan and strengthen its offensive capabilities will both be strengthened as a result of this strategy. A contract for the procurement of very powerful Scorpene submarines, which are outfitted with cutting-edge armament and technology, is now being discussed between India and France within the context of the ongoing negotiations. An extension of their existing relationship in the field of nuclear submarines, this deal has a value of \$3.5 billion in United States dollars and represents an extension of their partnership (Khattak, 2019). For the purpose of establishing superiority in the Interoperability Region (IOR), these submarines are equipped with a sophisticated command and control system, an unbelievable detection range, and exceptional stealth capabilities.

The Indian Navy was the first to introduce the BrahMos cruise missile, which will have a range of around 290 km. The enhanced version of BrahMos would have a range that is approximately 450 km longer than its current capability. The hypersonic BrahMos-II missile is currently being developed by India, which is now involved in the process. This highly advanced missile is capable of moving at an incredible speed of 8,575 kilometres per hour, which is an exceedingly high velocity. The major purpose of this system is to render weapons storage areas ineffective in an efficient manner, while also having the capability to target underground bunkers that are placed at substantial depths. The development of this extremely complex weapon is evidence of India's commitment to upgrading its military capabilities, which is evidenced by the invention of this weapon.

There is reason for concern over the potential effects that the BrahMos-II could have on the marine capabilities of Pakistan in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In recent times, the Indian Navy has expanded its fleet by adding eight P8-I aircraft manufactured by Boeing. These aircraft are

designed to perform Long-Range Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti-Submarine Warfare (LRMR/ASW) activities, which are a specific type of maritime reconnaissance (Khattak, 2019). The Navy's capabilities in the aforementioned sectors will be greatly strengthened as a result of the acquisition of these aircraft, which have a total worth of 2 billion United States dollars. The aircraft in question is highly advanced and armed with cutting-edge weaponry, which includes depth charges, MK-54 lightweight torpedoes, and Harpoon Block-II missiles, which are capable of causing destruction. In addition, the P8-I is equipped with the capability to detect potential threats well in advance of their proximity to India's key maritime resources. The aircraft is able to easily cover great distances because to its operational range of 1,200 nautical miles, which allows it to travel effectively. This aircraft, which has a top speed of 907 kilometres per hour, is capable of accomplishing its goals in an effective manner. "I am capable of supervising the deployment of our Submarines, and if they are not careful and lack the capability to protect themselves, they have the capacity to launch their torpedoes," explained Air Chief Marshal Rafique in his explanation. It is highly likely that Pakistan's naval and aviation assets will be discovered and destroyed under these circumstances. In the event that Pakistan were to obtain a more powerful naval force, India would consider imposing a naval blockade on Pakistan, which would be analogous to what occurred during the fight in 1971. One of the predictions made by Ashley J. Tellis is that India would continue to maintain its strong position as the leading naval force in the Indian Ocean (Tellis, 2022). The Indian Navy is expected to maintain its position as a formidable naval force in the Indian Ocean Region in the not-too-distant future, with the United States Navy being the only higher-ranking naval force in the region. It is possible that Pakistan's maritime interests in the region could be put in jeopardy if the Indian Navy were to acquire these capabilities and win supremacy in the Indian Ocean Region.

2.5 Future of India-Pakistan Nuclear Arms Race:

The nuclear stance of India is distinguished by its consideration of a triad of nuclear armaments. As a result, India has successfully developed the ballistic missiles with multi-vehicle capability (land, air, and sea) was accomplished. Pakistan has demonstrated noteworthy advancements in the development of maritime delivery systems in recent years, in addition to its initiatives in air and land delivery systems. India is placing significant importance on the advancement of a formidable second strike capability as a means to fortify its strategy of deterrence. This is being done in an effort to strengthen India's overall strategy.

Pakistan would endeavour to acquire the necessary capabilities to execute a second assault under ideal conditions. Notwithstanding this, the attainment of this objective might present greater difficulty on account of the country's relatively constrained resources in comparison to those of its more capacious neighbour, India. Conversely, Pakistan is concurrently engaged in efforts to enhance its capabilities with respect to the potentiality of executing a second offensive. This was unmistakably demonstrated in January 2017 during the Babur 3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) demonstration. In the realm of ballistic missile development, Pakistan tends to closely monitor India's progress. Rodney Jones, who emphasises the remarkable progress made by the country in this domain, asserts that India has been a leader in the subcontinent in acquiring missile delivery capabilities. This is analogous to the progress achieved by the nation in its capacity to manufacture nuclear armaments. Given the circumstances, it is evident that Pakistan is persistently striving to achieve parity with or a response to the progress made by India. Pakistan is extremely committed to preventing India and Pakistan from engaging in a nuclear arms race (Vaid, 2022). This statement underscores Pakistan's strategic stance of refraining from striving to attain missile capabilities on pace with India's. Pakistan's endeavours to enhance its missile and nuclear missile initiatives are, nevertheless, primarily motivated by the perceived threat that India presents. Despite Pakistan's desire to prevent a direct confrontation with India regarding arms acquisition, the nation should prioritise the maintenance of a credible minimum deterrent.

During the previous decade, India has achieved noteworthy advancements in the development of its ballistic missile defence (BMD) system. The main aim is to repel short- to medium-range ballistic missiles; furthermore, two locations in India will be protected, and ultimately, defences will be erected against incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Once functional and successfully deployed, the indigenous system possesses the capability to effectively counteract the impacts of Pakistan's ballistic missiles, including the Hatf, Shaheen, and Ghauri variants. A significant concern arises concerning the potential impact that India's ballistic missile defence (BMD) system might exert on the nuclear deterrence capabilities of Pakistan. As a consequence of the occurrence of this condition, Pakistan has developed an increased consciousness regarding a growing array of potential hazards. Pakistan has conveyed apprehensions regarding India's missile defence preparations, asserting that such undertakings could potentially disturb the existing deterrence equilibrium in the region. Notwithstanding India's current assessment that the BMD possesses merely the most rudimentary defensive capabilities,

the nation maintains ambitious goals for the near future. The implementation of a partial BMD system would effectively nullify the deterrence principle's objective (Vaid, 2022). This is due to the fact that the deterrence principle is predicated on the susceptibility of both entities to assault. The acquisition of a missile defence system by India would function as a preventive measure against the risk of retaliatory strikes, thereby enhancing the nation's perception of security. There exists a potentiality that the Indian BMD system does not furnish comprehensive protection; instead, it might instill an erroneous perception of security among Indian decision-makers, potentially motivating them to adopt a more assertive stance during periods of crisis. The foreign office of Pakistan has conveyed apprehensions regarding India's continuous endeavours to develop a ballistic missile system. Pakistan considers India's endeavours to be a potentially disruptive development; the foreign office of Pakistan has conveyed apprehensions regarding these endeavours. Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, a spokesperson for the Indian Foreign Office, stated that this matter has been consistently raised by Pakistan during its Composite Dialogue with the Indian government. However, India has failed to sufficiently discuss the concerns that Pakistan has raised. To maintain regional security equilibrium and enhance its defensive capabilities, Pakistan is presently engaged in the development of cruise missiles. By increasing the accuracy of its weapons and expanding its range of delivery systems, Pakistan is striving to defuse potential threats posed by India's inadequate system and preserve regional stability (Khattak, 2019). One component of the TNW development in Islamabad, which is a reaction to India's missile defence strategies, is the TNW. The assertion is further supported by the statements made by the Foreign Office Spokesperson, wherein she emphasised that Pakistan's short-range missiles effectively address three substantial challenges originating from India. Simultaneously with its notable advancements in offensive doctrine and ballistic missile system development, India has observed a discernible escalation in the asymmetrical characteristics of conventional weaponry. Given the prevailing circumstances, an assessment of Pakistan's advancements in the manufacturing of the Nasr and Cruise missiles is critical. As per this claim, the advancement of cruise and surface-to-air missiles may be considered a reaction to the perceived menace posed by India. Indeed, this underscores the security reliance that exists between the nations of Pakistan and India. Pakistan becomes more preoccupied with its own security when India enhances its defensive capabilities or procures substantial weaponry (Khattak, 2019). In light of a decline in security, the establishment

implements measures to augment its arsenal and enhance its capabilities. Consequently, the already intense competition among the nations of South Asia regarding weaponry is exacerbated.

As a result of a reduction in the efficiency of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence capabilities, an Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system has the potential to disrupt the delicate balance of deterrence that exists in South Asia. The idea of nuclear deterrence is predicated on the notion that both parties are vulnerable and in a hostile relationship with one another, which puts them at risk of being attacked. In principle, the installation and operation of a missile defence system would provide India with the potential to not be vulnerable to ballistic missile attacks that are carried out by Pakistan. On the other hand, if India were to install a missile defence system, it might be able to feel more confident in carrying out a nuclear attack without necessarily being concerned about being punished for doing so. According to the assessment of a specialist in South Asian politics, India's acquisition of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) improves the country's capacity to make decisions that are both powerful and decisive. In order to gain victory in any hypothetical battle with Pakistan, India may be willing to incur increased risks of attack in order to achieve victory. This is because the potential benefits of having a ballistic missile defence system that India may potentially enjoy. Increasing the efficiency of India's Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system will, without a doubt, make the country's defences more robust. A potential enhancement in the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system could prompt India to reevaluate its posture in relation to Pakistan, which would result in an increase in the chance of an attack and subsequent involvement against Pakistan. In general, Pakistan would be compelled to settle with less than ideal conditions. Furthermore, as a result of this, Pakistan is increasingly susceptible to the possibility of India retaliating militarily. Because of this, Pakistan's nuclear deterrent is significantly hindered, and as a result, the country is susceptible to demands and intervention from the outside world. Furthermore, it affects the ability of the South Asian region to discourage or prevent certain activities from occurring throughout the region. There are negative repercussions for the strategic stability and deterrence of the region as a result of the recurring series of acts and reactions that occur in the security dynamics between India and Pakistan. It is possible to reduce the nuclear threshold by implementing a variety of technologies and doctrines, such as the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW), and aggressive limited war plans (Khattak, 2019). This is especially true in the case of Pakistan. Utilising TNW, a specialised technology that was developed for combat

conditions that are limited to the battlefield, the objective is to impede the conventional forces of the adversary from making any further advancements within the battlefield.

The Pakistani government asserts that the deployment of these weapons will result in an increase in the country's conventional powers. On the other hand, India has stated that it is resolute in its intention to launch a substantial counterattack, claiming that the utilisation of a low-yield bomb would be the same as inciting a nuclear conflict. There is a correlation between the proximity of two countries in South Asia that are in possession of nuclear weapons and the incidence of heightened tensions between those nations. Relationships have been strained for more than half a century as a consequence of protracted conflicts, such as the one that is still going on in Kashmir. There is the potential for significant destabilising effects to be brought about by the implementation of aggressive policies, new weapon systems, conventional buildups, and BMD systems. It is possible for a seemingly trivial action to exponentially escalate into a nuclear battle that could have catastrophic consequences. Both the conventional and nuclear weapons competitions have direct and indirect consequences on the stability of the strategic situation. Both countries place a high priority on their military capabilities, with a particular emphasis on enhancing both their conventional and nuclear arsenals (Khattak, 2019). Concurrently, the allocation of financial resources towards defence has an adverse impact on the availability of funds for poverty reduction and development promotion initiatives. It is generally accepted that South Asia is a region that is confronted with substantial economic challenges. According to estimates, approximately twenty percent of the world's poorest population is found in India, which is home to a sizeable population of individuals living in poverty. In addition to this, it indicates that the rate of economic growth in both countries will be slower than initially anticipated.

2.6 Mitigation of Security Competition

Staying current with the strategic culture of the subcontinent necessitates a paradigm shift. Pakistan should seriously contemplate expanding the scope of its security framework to incorporate a more extensive array of issues beyond India alone. Consequently, Pakistan can operate independently of its neighbouring country and avoid becoming entangled in a needless arms race. At this time, the utilisation of conventional or nuclear weapons is not a feasible alternative.

Pakistan is considerably smaller in size than India, which concurrently allocates a considerably

smaller portion of its budget to defence. To ensure the protection of its sovereignty, Pakistan should meticulously deliberate on its response to India's advancements in the realm of weaponry. Conversely, a more formidable nuclear defence is imperative to protect its autonomy and mitigate the quantity of potential risks that may emanate from India. Similarly, India should proceed with more prudence when considering the augmentation of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, alongside its hasty acquisition of conventional weaponry. This anxiety has been generated in Islamabad due to the aforementioned activities; therefore, it would be prudent for India to adopt a more intellectual approach in tackling these concerns. A critical undertaking at hand is the reassessment of aggressive limited war alternatives, such as the Cold Start doctrine, in light of the potentially catastrophic ramifications that may ensue in a nuclear-armed region like South Asia. Particularly with regard to Pakistan's support for terrorism on a national and international level, India should refrain from disseminating unsubstantiated allegations concerning Pakistan. The enhancement of diplomatic relations and the resolution of any outstanding issues between the two nations would be mutually advantageous. The composite discussion process, which commenced in 2004, has been indefinitely halted due to the 2008 incident that transpired in Mumbai. It is critical that the negotiations between the two nations resume immediately so that the process of resolving issues can be expedited and the level of tension between them can be reduced. Critical as it is, the establishment of a framework for strategic restraint can only be achieved through the collaboration of both nations. Pakistan has consistently ignored India's appeals for a policy marked by strategic prudence over an extended period of time. On the contrary, it has been unsuccessful in offering a practical and efficient alternative option. It is critical to prioritise the implementation of crisis management protocols in both countries. At this time, Pakistan and India have implemented a restricted quantity of confidence-building measures, commonly referred to as CBMs (Khattak, 2018). To further enhance these operations, however, a substantial expansion is necessary. A bilateral agreement has been reached between the two countries to abstain from instigating any form of hostilities against the nuclear installations of the other country. Routinely, they exchange inventories of their nuclear storage facilities in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Additionally, a special compensation is being offered in exchange for information regarding the launch of ballistic missiles in advance. In order to foster additional collaboration, both entities are afforded the opportunity to engage in targeted

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that are explicitly crafted to cultivate trust. To provide an instance of such measures in action, consider the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for South Asia, which seeks to impose limitations on the manufacturing and implementation of ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems. An additional prospective confidence-building measure (CBM) is furnished by a pre-notice agreement pertaining to the execution of flight trials of cruise missiles, gaining a thorough comprehension with the purpose of averting accidents while on the water. Engage in dialogues that revolve around the construction of an all-encompassing framework for strategic limiting.

Chapter 3 Implications of Indo-Russian Defense Collaboration on Pakistan

3.1 Introduction

In particular for Pakistan, the fact that Russia places such a strong priority on security in South Asia has a significant impact on the strategic stability of the region. India and Russia have formed a defensive partnership, which is principally responsible for this development. The year 2015 marked the beginning of successful negotiations with Islamabad on a deal, which ultimately resulted in the delivery of four Mi-35 helicopters in 2017. The military contacts between the two groups have been significantly improved as a result of this tremendous breakthrough. The two countries demonstrated their commitment to working together and fostering mutual growth by taking part in their first joint special exercises, which took place in both 2016 and 2017. Considering the ongoing expansion of military technical collaboration between India and Russia, in addition to their strengthened partnership in the field of science and technology, it seems improbable that any strategic alliance between Pakistan and Russia could significantly influence this collaboration. It is an intriguing note that Vladimir Putin did not include Pakistan in an article that he wrote in February 2012 about Russian strategy in South Asia. This absence prevents him from discussing India or Russia's position with regard to China. Russia has shown a significant amount of interest in the ongoing "integrational" processes that are taking place in South Asia, particularly with relation to its economy. India occupies a prominent role as a "privileged strategic partner" and plays a key function in accelerating innovations inside the area.

3.2 South Asia Strategic Environment

The examination of the historical disparities that exist in South Asia
The launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile by India on January 18, 2018, proved the country's capability to target locations along the heavily populated East Chinese coastline in the event of a military conflict with the People's Republic of China. In addition to that, it examined the potential consequences that could exist for Pakistan (Khattak, 2018). As a direct result of this significant change, the strategic equilibrium that existed within the South Asian region was significantly disrupted.

Given the contentious nature of their relationship, the possibility of India and Pakistan working together on defence has the potential to significantly disrupt the power dynamic that currently exists in South Asia. According to Andrew Korybko, this collaboration would result in a transition in the strategic environment that would persist for a long time and would provoke a competition in the development of missile capabilities that are both offensive and defensive. The fact that Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons is the primary reason why South Asia is able to preserve its strategic stability at the present time.

It is possible that Pakistan's options will become more restricted as a consequence of greater defence cooperation between Russia and India in the event that India engages in any additional military activity. This is because conventional deterrence may become less effective. As a response to India's military accomplishments, Ashley Tellis suggested that Pakistan will increase the size of its nuclear arsenal (Tellis, 2022). As a result, one could argue that the establishment of such a defence collaboration will have a direct impact on the conventional deterrence in South Asia as well as the delicate equilibrium that exists between India and Pakistan, as Tellis has underlined. Furthermore, it has the potential to drive Pakistan to pursue steps such as joining in a nuclear arms competition, making alliances with other key states, or upgrading its military capacities.

It has been suggested by Michael Krepon, who works at the Stimson Centre, that India's growing conventional capabilities and assertive military policies have played a role in Pakistan's choice to construct tactical nuclear weapons and to improve the size and quality of its nuclear arsenal (Krepon, 2019). An agreement appears to have been achieved among analysts working for renowned think tanks located in Washington, District of Columbia. These think tanks include the Council on Foreign Relations, the Hudson Institute, the Carnegie Endowment, and the Congressional Research Service, among others.

3.3 Deployment of Nuclear Arms in South Asia

The deployment of nuclear arms in South Asia has greatly lowered the chance of a full armed confrontation. The traditional method of deterrence, on the other hand, is associated with a heavier financial cost and places restrictions on a nation's ability to engage in tactical operations, small-scale warfare, or forceful measures against other nations. One of the most basic and unambiguous points that Walter Ladwig makes is that Indian strategic strategists have expressed concerns about the capability of their troops to deploy advanced military technology in an effective manner in

order to overcome a wide variety of challenges (Krepon, 2019). There are a number of challenges that they must overcome, some of which include challenging terrain, limited strategic surprise, and the relative military abilities of their opponents.

However, in the not too distant future, there is a high probability that the power dynamic would move in favour of India, which will likely provide Pakistan with substantial security concerns. It is possible that an arms rivalry will break out in the region as a result of the growing gap in conventional capabilities that exists between the two countries. There is a possibility that Pakistan will feel an elevated feeling of military imperative in order to prevent India from launching a preemptive strike. On the other hand, this condition might lead Pakistan to reevaluate its nuclear threshold, which would be a positive development. In order for a nation to maintain its competitiveness in the face of India's healthy economy, it would be necessary for that nation to reallocate financial resources from social and economic development to the acquisition of assets associated to defence. Therefore, in addition to having a negative impact on Pakistan's socioeconomic standing, this circumstance would also limit the development of regional alliances and the spread of economic activities in the surrounding area. Following the adversary's arrival at the border, there would be an immediate increase in the level of hostilities, which would make the threat to the security of the region even more severe.

India is currently taking active measures to enhance its military capabilities by obtaining state-of-the-art offensive weaponry and equipment. This is being done with the aim of effectively conducting proactive military operations against Pakistan. It is important to recognise that a small dispute cannot be entirely eliminated, even while both administrations have similar strategic perspectives on nuclear deterrence. Professor Pant responded definitively to a query regarding the matter, stating that South Asia possesses abundant potential for military strategies. Professor Rajesh Basrur, an additional expert on South Asia, believes that limited conflict is a feasible solution worth considering (Basrur, 2022). The event might have potentially occurred in the year 1999, namely in Kargil. A more precise way to describe the battle would be to label it as a "peripheral war."

If a major terrorist assault occurs in India or the Indian Ocean, there is a possibility that the Indian military may contemplate carrying out restricted offensive operations within Pakistani borders. These attacks might be executed using many tactics, including CSD, preemptive military actions,

or targeted strikes, among other options. The anticipated reaction from Pakistan is characterised by a significant amount of unpredictability. Implementing a comparable military strategy in that area has the capacity to escalate hostilities and result in a prolonged and protracted conflict. As per Bharat Karnad's suggestion, if conventional deterrence fails, it is possible that India may have to resort to employing tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). However, the General Headquarters would face a major obstacle due to this decision, given the potential ramifications it could have on Pakistan. Given the possible adverse effects on global economies, it is imperative for policymakers in Pakistan and India to exercise prudence and actively seek peaceful resolutions to any lingering issues. Engaging in a conflict will inevitably result in further disorder and devastation in this region, which is not advantageous for either of the parties concerned.

3.4 Development and Deployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

As a means of discouraging the Indian armed forces from participating in aggressive military activities while simultaneously seeking the protection of a nuclear shield, Pakistan has determined that it is vital to develop tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Both the costly weapons race and the inherent imbalance that exists between the two countries are to blame for this situation. In this article, Lieutenant General (R) Muhammad Mustafa Khan, a retired military commander who had previously held the positions of Chief of Staff and Corps Commander of a Strike Corps/Commander Central Command, provides a study of Pakistan's reasoning for introducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) (Khattak, 2019). India is fully confident in its capacity to take part in a fight that is both limited and brief and that involves the use of nuclear weapons. We have developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) and have made it clear to the Indians that we intend to use them in the event that they engage in traditional combat or make any attempt to overrun the border. It is of the utmost importance to underline this fact. As far as I am concerned, the presence of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in South Asia serves as a factor that contributes to the maintenance of peace by reducing the likelihood of traditional conflicts. As part of continuing military drills, the Indian military is currently conducting live rehearsals of its offensive strategies in close proximity to Pakistan's border. These rehearsals are taking place in close proximity to Pakistan's border. In addition, India is increasing its overall military capabilities by employing force multipliers that are at the cutting edge of scientific advancement. According to Lieutenant

General (R) Naeem Khalid Lodhi, an experienced military leader and a former Corps Commander of the XXXI Corps, it has been observed that the Indians have been actively establishing their own doctrines, while we have been diligently working on devising effective counterstrategies. This is something that has been observed. Following that, there has been a lack of significant hostilities between the two countries, which strongly suggests that our actions were both sensible and effective in maintaining stability. Concerns were raised about the possibility that they may opt to use techniques that were ineffectual when engaging in aggressive military actions. Because of this, the Pakistani military has been making significant efforts to progress the development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). By virtue of their very existence, Indian plans will be dissuaded from pursuing minor objectives or superficial strategies. This is because we will make complete and unreserved use of all of the resources that are at our disposal. Because of this, the deployment of TNWs has resulted in a positive effect, which is to say that it has contributed to the development of stability rather than developing instability. As a consequence of Pakistan's involvement in the War on Terror twenty years ago, the country suffered significant economic losses (Khattak, 2019). In spite of the fact that it is facing a number of challenges, the economy of the nation is progressively developing. It is possible that Pakistan will be forced to use its nuclear arsenal as a method of deterrent in the event that the Indian military engages in either minor aggression or large incursions towards Pakistan. The objective of this strategy is to rectify the strategic imbalance that exists in the region and to protect against the possibility of preemptive military measures or counterforce attack capabilities. When one considers the current state of the economy, it is not feasible to continue to engage in a competition with India on the acquisition of weapons. There is a perilous scenario surrounding the introduction and usage of TNWs in the region due to the fact that the Indian nuclear policy does not provide a distinct differentiation between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. A threat to the region's peace and security is posed by the current circumstances, which are currently in place. Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are seen as a catalyst for stability by Pakistani strategic analysts. This is due to the fact that TNWs have been successful in discouraging India from beginning conventional attacks.

On the other hand, Gurmeet Kanwal, a researcher from India, contends that TNWs have an effect that results in instability. In spite of this, he continues to be of the opinion that there is the possibility of traditional warfare in India that extends beyond the point of nuclear escalation

(Kanwal, 2016). There is a significant level of danger in the region, and the potential outcomes of a nuclear conflict in that region would be very disastrous.

3.5 Recommendations for Pakistan

a) Indigenous Production:

In order to prioritise agility and rapid decision-making in dynamic combat scenarios, the doctrine and tactics of the Indian military are currently undergoing a process of modernization. It is difficult for Pakistan to take part in an arms race with India because of the current state of the country's economy, according to Air Marshal Ashfaque (Khattak, 2019). Pakistan must rely on its indigenous weapons production capabilities, in addition to its superior military might and strategic manoeuvres, in order to counterbalance the conventional power that India possesses for its own purposes. In view of the current nuclear situation, it is very necessary for Pakistan to strengthen its conventional capabilities in order to address operational inadequacies and maintain a deterrence against any military actions taken by India. The argument put up by Brigadier (Retired) Feroz Hassan Khan is that Pakistan ought to give top priority to the construction of robust defences and strategic measures in order to deter potential adversaries from commencing hostilities. Enhancing Pakistan's night vision capabilities and directing money towards the acquisition of a long-range air defence system should be the top priorities for the Pakistani military in order to properly defend itself against potential threats originating from India. These threats might include incoming missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or aerial vehicles. Pakistan ought to make the improvement of its military capabilities a top priority in order to successfully counteract the acquisition of considerably superior T-90 tanks by the Indian Army. For example, the calibre, velocity, distance, firepower, thermal imaging capabilities, and manoeuvrability of Al-Khalid tanks, mechanised soldiers, and C4I vehicles are all going to be improved. A further enhancement of Pakistan's defensive capabilities will be achieved by the purchase of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The requirement of boosting the number of aircraft in the Pakistan Air Force was emphasised by General (Ret) Ehsan Ul Haq, who had previously served as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Given the allegation that he made,

“My own view is that you need an addition to aircraft, you need bigger numbers. We must go for the fifth-generation aircraft wherever it is available. Today we are in a position that we can upgrade

the JF-17 better. We must possess 300 JF-17s and about 100 F-16s and other aircraft from West or the Russians but our workhorse will be upgraded JF-17 Aircraft” (Khattak, 2018).

b) Second Strike Capability:

The Indian government would attempt to outgun Pakistan in conventional warfare because to its enormous economy. To close the gaps in conventional asymmetries, Pakistan must continue to have sufficient conventional capabilities supported by reliable nuclear deterrent.

Former Ambassador Abdul Basit said, “We will not like our deterrence to fail and secondly, Pakistan is not in an arms race with India. We will maintain our deterrence at a minimum level. If India becomes irrational in its approach vis-à-vis Pakistan and leaves no option for the country, then Pakistan would have no other option but to use Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)” (Khattak, 2018).

Lieutenant General Naeem Khalid Lodhi, a retired military figure, asserts that nuclear weapons function as a highly effective deterrent when confronted with a more formidable adversary. Furthermore, he underscores the significance of preserving specific attributes, including permeability, scope, and precision, to guarantee the efficacy of the deterrent strategy. Although the presence of nuclear weapons mitigates the necessity for an arms race, it is of the utmost importance to maintain these capabilities, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. Given the prevailing conditions, it is critical that Pakistan strengthen its capability to execute a guaranteed second strike in order to safeguard its nuclear arsenal and C4I system against potential future threats that may lead to their destruction. For the Pakistani military to attain Second Strike Capability, several measures should be considered: the construction of new, intricate subterranean caverns; the implementation of sophisticated concealment techniques; the reinforcement of air defence systems around strategic targets; and the deployment of mobile warheads (Khattak, 2019). Although this is the case, there is broad consensus that nuclear submarines equipped with long-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles are the most effective means of guaranteeing a dependable Second Strike Capability.

According to Vice Admiral (Retd) Muhammad Haroon, Pakistan must get a nuclear submarine, he was of the view that “the cost of a nuclear submarine or other military systems is much lesser than

the embezzlement and corruption that takes place in the country. We can manage it, we can afford it and we can run it better than the Indians.”

Mark Fitz Patrick said, “India has such a huge advantage over Pakistan in all forms of military spending and modernisation, it is inevitable that India is going to outspend, out modernise, overwhelm in terms of numbers anything Pakistan can do. So, it is understandable that Pakistan sees nuclear weapons as an equalizer to all these advantages that India has” (Routledge, 2015)

c) Advancements in Surveillance Capabilities

Pakistan stands to gain advantages by enhancing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with respect to the South Asian region. Conversely, the aircraft is outfitted with a surveillance drone, which was specifically designed for reconnaissance operations and possesses restricted range and endurance. It is critical to increase the endurance, range, and distance capabilities of observation assets such as AWACS and UAVs so that intelligence collection regarding enemy activities and the development of effective countermeasures can be conducted more efficiently. Through the enhancement of our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, we shall effectively prevent any unforeseen assaults that the adversary might attempt to execute. A sufficient duration will be allocated to Pakistan, enabling them to diligently devise and construct an all-encompassing defence strategy. Although Pakistan's military does not currently possess space satellites suitable for military use, it does possess electronic monitoring and surveillance devices designed exclusively for the F-16 and JF-17 Thunder aircraft. Pakistan lacks the requisite technological capacities to execute the tasks that are intrinsic to the operation of a surveillance satellite. It is critical that the Pakistani military allocates additional time and resources to this specific location in order to achieve advancements. Enhancing its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities would enable the Pakistani military to gain a more comprehensive comprehension of the Indian military's whereabouts, activities, and strategic planning, both during times of peace and hostility (Khattak, 2019). Armed with this knowledge, they will possess the capacity to formulate more efficacious countermeasures.

d) Integration in the Armed Forces:

It is expected that forthcoming conflicts will be characterised by their limited magnitude, swift progression, and relentless intensity. It is anticipated that the advent of nuclear weapons and the revolution in military affairs will have substantial implications for the likelihood of these conflicts. In the context of Pakistan's defence strategy, fostering seamless integration and collaboration across all military sectors assumes paramount significance. This strategic manoeuvre will enable Pakistan to repel any prospective military aggression initiated by India. In a network-centric environment, the Pakistani military is confronted with the urgent need to enhance its Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) system to ensure streamlined and coordinated operations. This is an imperative requirement. The realisation of synergy and integration will be facilitated by this advancement. Active engagement in collaborative military exercises is imperative for the Pakistani military to attain a strategic advantage in modern-day combat scenarios. The objective of these exercises is to afford participants the chance to evaluate their preconceived notions regarding warfare, gain fresh proficiencies, and remain informed about the most recent strategies and tactics.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the defense collaboration between India and Russia has evolved into a multifaceted and strategically significant partnership that has profoundly impacted both nations' security dynamics and the broader regional stability in South Asia. Over the years, this collaboration has expanded beyond the traditional buyer-seller relationship to encompass joint development of advanced military technologies, deep cooperation in nuclear affairs, and significant contributions to India's military modernization. This partnership has not only bolstered India's military capabilities but also enhanced its strategic autonomy, allowing it to pursue more assertive policies in the region, particularly in relation to Pakistan.

The integration of Russian military technology and expertise into India's defense infrastructure has given India a technological edge, particularly in the areas of land, air, and naval forces. The joint development of weapon systems, such as the BrahMos missile and advanced aircraft, has significantly enhanced India's offensive and defensive capabilities, allowing it to implement doctrines like the Close Support Doctrine more effectively. This military enhancement, however, has created new strategic challenges for Pakistan, which finds itself increasingly reliant on its nuclear arsenal as a counterbalance to India's growing conventional superiority. The deployment of Russian nuclear submarines as part of India's naval forces further complicates the regional security environment, enhancing India's second-strike capability and shifting the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.

The deepening defense collaboration between India and Russia, while beneficial to both nations, has also introduced significant risks to regional stability. The growing military asymmetry between India and Pakistan heightens the potential for conflict escalation, particularly in a region marked by historical animosities and unresolved disputes such as Kashmir. Pakistan's increasing reliance on nuclear deterrence, coupled with the assertive military postures of both nations, raises the specter of a nuclear conflict that could have devastating consequences for South Asia and beyond. The risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in such a volatile environment cannot be

understated, making the need for effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms more urgent than ever.

Given these challenges, it is imperative that both India and Pakistan commit to strategic restraint and engage in sustained diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions. The international community, including key players like Russia, must play an active role in facilitating dialogue and promoting confidence-building measures between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Russia's unique position as a close ally of India and a global power gives it the potential to influence both nations towards a more peaceful and stable regional order. The resolution of long-standing disputes, including the Kashmir issue, through peaceful negotiation and dialogue, is essential to achieving lasting peace in South Asia.

The India-Russia defense collaboration has significantly enhanced India's military capabilities and strategic posture, it has also introduced new complexities and risks into the regional security landscape. The onus is now on India and Pakistan, with the support of the international community, to navigate these challenges responsibly, avoid actions that could lead to conflict, and work towards a peaceful resolution of their disputes. The future of South Asian security depends on the willingness of all parties involved to prioritize dialogue and diplomacy over military confrontation. The defence relationship between Russia and India has undergone substantial expansion over the course of time. This expansion has encompassed essential domains such as counterterrorism, transportation, logistics, surveillance, reconnaissance, military modernisation, and refurbishing. India's military capabilities have been significantly improved as a result of this long-lasting and growing alliance, which has also made it possible for India to pursue more assertive policies, particularly with regard to Pakistan. The Indian Armed Forces (IAF) have been able to successfully expand its offensive capabilities by participating in collaborative efforts to create cutting-edge military technology. These technologies include the most recent iteration of main battle tanks (MBTs) and other highly powerful weaponry. Specific to the implementation of India's Close Support Doctrine (CSD), which emphasises the significance of coordinated, close-range assistance for ground forces during military manoeuvres, this enhancement is applicable to the execution of the CSD. Due to India's upgrading of its military infrastructure, which is being supported by Russian technology and knowledge, Pakistan is facing new problems in the fields of naval and air defence. These challenges are specifically related to Pakistan's naval and air defence.

India not only receives conventional military assistance from Russia, but Russia also plays a significant role in addressing India's worries around nuclear weapons. The development of India's nuclear energy program has been supported by Russia's contribution, which has been essential in providing India's requirements for nuclear fuel. In addition, the involvement of Russia in the form of scientific assistance and material support has been of critical importance in the process of revitalising India's nuclear business. In addition to enhancing India's nuclear capabilities in terms of both their magnitude and their complexity, this collaboration has the potential to have a significant impact on the trajectory of India's nuclear weapons program. When it comes to Pakistan's strategic interests, economic stability, and naval infrastructure, the deployment of Russian nuclear submarines in particular represents a significant shift in policy that has the potential to put Pakistan in jeopardy. These submarines provide India with the ability to launch a retaliatory attack, which in turn strengthens India's overall ability to deter prospective threats. This is accomplished by improving India's control over the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

The expanding defence collaboration between Russia and India has enormous ramifications for the dynamics of security in the South Asian area. Indian and Russian defence cooperation is growing. Pakistan is becoming increasingly reliant on its nuclear arsenal as a method of deterrence, which is highlighted by India's continued attempts to modernise its military with support from Russia that are currently underway. The growing disparity in traditional military capabilities, in conjunction with the aggressive attitudes taken by both nations, increases the risk that the conflict may escalate towards a more serious level. In the event that conventional deterrence is found to be unsuccessful, Pakistan, which is a relatively weaker nation, may be pushed to consider the possibility of use its nuclear arsenal as a method of retaliation against any perceived or actual acts of aggression committed by India. The potential for nuclear escalation poses a significant risk to the international community's ability to maintain peace and security in South Asia.

The delicate power dynamic that exists between India and Pakistan drives home the point that there is an immediate and pressing requirement for diplomatic engagement and institutions for conflict resolution. Both nuclear-armed governments have a responsibility to make a commitment to de-escalating tensions, refraining from aggressive measures, and participating in continuous

discussion in order to effectively resolve long-standing conflicts, including the Kashmir issue. A sustained effort on the part of both countries to pursue peaceful negotiations and confidence-building measures is required in order to achieve long-term peace and stability in the region. It is also the responsibility of the international community to play a part in promoting these conversations and ensuring that the nuclear aspect of the competition between India and Pakistan does not result in disastrous implications for the region and beyond.

In summary, the evolving defense partnership between India and Russia has significantly transformed both nations' military capabilities and strategic positioning, with profound implications for regional security in South Asia. This collaboration has gone beyond the traditional arms trade, encompassing the joint development of advanced military technologies, nuclear cooperation, and comprehensive support for India's military modernization. While this partnership has undoubtedly bolstered India's military strength and strategic autonomy, enabling it to pursue more assertive policies, particularly against Pakistan, it has also introduced new complexities into the regional security environment. The growing asymmetry in conventional military power, compounded by India's enhanced nuclear capabilities and assertive postures, has intensified Pakistan's reliance on its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent, thereby increasing the risks of conflict and potential nuclear escalation in the region.

Given these heightened risks, it is imperative for both India and Pakistan to exercise strategic restraint and prioritize diplomatic engagement over military confrontation. The international community, particularly Russia, must play a crucial role in facilitating dialogue and promoting confidence-building measures between the two nuclear-armed states. The resolution of long-standing disputes, including the Kashmir issue, through peaceful negotiations is essential to achieving lasting peace and stability in South Asia. As both nations navigate these complex security dynamics, the focus must remain on preventing conflict, reducing tensions, and ensuring that the regional power balance does not tip towards a catastrophic escalation that could have far-reaching consequences beyond South Asia.

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