

**SINO-INDIA RELATIONS IN THE POST 9/11:
CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN**



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
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
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
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Acronyms

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian nations
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
INF	Intermediate-range nuclear forces
IOs	International Organizations
IT	Information Technology
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
PLA	People Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
SED	Strategic Economic Dialogues
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
TROPEX	Theater Level Operational Readiness Exercise
USA	United States of America
UNSC	United Nation Security Council

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own and autonomous work. All sources and aids used have been indicated as such. All texts either quoted directly or paraphrased have been indicated by in-text citations.

ALIA ROSHAN

48-FSS/MSIR/S15

Dedication

To my beloved Parents

Acknowledgement

In the Name of Allah, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful. Incalculable thanks to ALMIGHTY ALLAH, for giving me the courage to accomplish the assigned task. I am also thankful to our Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) for enabling us to recognize our Lord and Creator.

I am really grateful to my supervisor Dr. Sadaf Farooq for her valuable comments, inputs and time spared for my research. Throughout my research, she has been very generous and kind enough to be benefited from her insight and research skills.

A special thanks to my parents, who have been a great source of determination for me to achieve my goals in life. I would especially like to thank my brother SohrabUllah, Sister Maryam Roshan and my husband Dr. Mohammad Saqib for great support throughout the study.

ALIA ROSHAN

Abstract

India and China are the two most populous neighboring countries of Southeast Asia. Sino-Indian relations have remained estranged in the past and have undergone through many ups and downs. After the 1959 insurgency, India's intrusion in Tibet was taken like a direct contravention of domestic inviolability. They perceived it as a challenge to security and interests of China. Tibet fortification, the roadway of Aksai-Chin, and the border military patrols of China were an effort to maintain their regional hegemony. The sovereignty and security of India had to face many questions from other states if it did not defend and define its borders, respectfully, with other nations. This is the main reason that India is concerned about Chinese threat to their border because of self-determination, Independence and a position of great power in Asia. China was also motivated towards conflict, which revolved around China's national interests; just like India due to structural constraints. Both have fought a border war in the past, but now they have decided to concentrate on bilateral trade and strategic cooperation and have started efforts to move closer to each other while keeping their differences aside. The hostility and fear between China and India got aside because of economic interdependence and their mutual gains. They have understood that their relation should not be held hostage to the past or any third state. China, now, does not consider India as a threat; moreover, they both are cooperating in a number of avenues. The study will focus on Sino-India relations in the post 9/11 era and will interpret it by the complex interdependence perspective. It will further analyze how China and India have kept aside their differences and are focusing on mutual cooperation. However, China's rapprochement with India will have wide implications for Pakistan.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

China, India and Pakistan are the Asian neighbouring countries. China is a South East Asian country while India and Pakistan are located in South Asia. India and China emerged from the shadow of colonial rule around the same time and marched on separate paths for their tryst with destiny. India adopted a democratic form of government in 1947 and in 1949 the communists took the reins of China in their hand. China is the big power in the region and India is struggling to compete with China in the region. In the past, China and India engaged in a war and several smaller confrontations between 1962 and the mid-to-late 1980s. The rise of the two countries in the same geographic region has historically been a cause of conflict; India and China have themselves fallen victim to those tensions a number of times (Kumar, 2011). Although, China and India have had several confrontations but they are the trade partner, as well. Currently, their bilateral trade stands at nearly US\$60 billion. Sino-Indian relations have remained estranged in the past and have undergone through many ups and downs. Sino-Indian relations have always been complex with multilayered regional and global dimensions which have complicated their bilateral relationship. But in the post Cold War era, both the countries realized the need of cooperation for their long-term goals of security and economic development. China does not consider India a threat anymore; moreover they both are cooperating with each other in a number of avenues. They improved their relations in the sphere of political cooperation, economic collaboration, strategic reconciliation and social association. India and China have understood that their relation should not be the hostage of the past or the space for any third state. In April 2005, during Wen Jiabao's visited India, a joint statement was issued in which they stated that:

We have agreed to establish a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity and it codifies the consensus between us that India-China relations transcend bilateral issues and have now acquired a global and strategic character (Rana, 2015).

The joint military exercises were held between military forces of both the states in 2007, 2008 and 2013. There is also a series of joint Strategic Economic Dialogues (SED) between both the states; the 1st SED was held in 2011, 2nd in 2012 and 3rd in 2014. Both states have regular ministerial-level exchanges. China plans to participate in expected Indian nuclear projects worth \$150 billion (Singh, 2012). Both have signed a 'Protocol on Modalities for implementation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field along the LAC' in China-India border areas. Both the countries condemn terrorism of any form.

The Joint Working Groups between two states look into not only trade-related issues but also investments. Chief Executive Officers of both the states make recommendations to expand trade and investment cooperation. As a part of greater communication, both premiers have a telephone hotline and have an annual exchange of visits between foreign ministers. The Sino-Indian relationship, thus, appears to be moving towards a more peaceful direction of mutual understanding and cooperation. However, a lack of trust between China and India remains as an obstacle, which has prevented the relationship to develop fully (Gulshan, 2015).

On the other hand, China has friendly relations with Pakistan. China's economic focus and its utmost priority is economic growth. China sees Pakistan in terms of its economic interests (Mitra, 2012). As regard the implications of Sino-Indian rapprochement for Pakistan, different people analyze it differently. Some analysts have opined that the growing Sino-Indian relationship would shift the balance of power in Asia and this may raise serious concerns for

Pakistan. The military cooperation between China and India has made the security condition in the region challenging for Pakistan. China and India have held joint exercises. Cooperation with China will give India access to much desired industrial and military technology. India is already one of the world's largest armed forces, twice the size of that of Pakistan. It is indigenously producing tanks, armoured vehicles, jet fighters and advanced naval vessels. Realistically seeing, this may put Pakistan in a weaker position as compared to India in the security arena. Following Sino-Indian rapprochement, China is appreciating Pakistan to resolve disputes with India and build cooperative relations in economic and development sectors. Thus, there are apprehensions that China may force Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir. Sino-Indian trade which reached the set target of \$40 billion by 2010 boomed to 100 billion in 2015 (The News Online, 2014). The intensifying trade and commerce would naturally raise the stakes for China in its relationship with India. With strong economy and armed forces, India will be in a position to exert force on Pakistan much easily after having China as a neutral player in South Asia. India has an edge in Information Technology sector. Its thriving economy has potential to draw more foreign investors. So, politically, economically and militarily rising India may be a direct threat to Pakistan's security and development (Rana, 2015).

1.1 Statement of Problem

China and India are having a number of security issues. Both have fought a border war in the past, but have decided to concentrate on bilateral trade and strategic cooperation and have started efforts to move closer to each other. However, China's rapprochement with India will have wide implications for Pakistan.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

The aims and objectives of this research are:

- To find the reasons of rivalries in the past between India and China
- To identify the role played by trade and cooperation to aside the border disputes between India and China
- To examine that if Pakistan's links with China be weakened by Sino-India good relations or not?
- To analyze the Implications of growing Sino-India relations on Pakistan

1.3 Research Questions

Q: 1 Why has China moved closer to India and initiated efforts for rapprochement? What are its implications for Pakistan?

- a) To what extent has bilateral trade and strategic cooperation reduced or prevented attention from being given to security related issues in the Sino-Indian relationship?
- b) What impact will Sino-Indian rapprochement have on Sino-Pakistan entente?

1.4 Significance of the Study

This research will focus on the emerging Sino-Indian relations which have implications for Pakistan. There is, therefore, a need of a well-researched scholarly discourse to fully comprehend the potential, analyze the impediments, and highlight the future prospects of the relations among the three neighbouring countries. There is sufficient literature available on Indo-China relations

in contemporary relations and its effect on Pakistan. Most of the previous studies on Indo-China relations is based on history and there is very less material on emerging trade and cooperation between China and India which will affect Pak-China relations, therefore, there is a need of academic research on this important topic .This research will also help policy makers to recognize that Pakistan needs to understand the geo-politics of the region and use the port to induce cooperation rather than competition among regional and extra-regional players.

1.5 Research Methodology

This study will be based on qualitative method. It will be mainly analytical, descriptive and explanatory. This research would make use the primary and secondary sources of information. Among primary sources online government documents, Organizational reports and newspapers are consulted. Secondary sources will cover books, journals, relevant websites, research articles and accessible official data etc.

1.6 Operational Definition of Major Terms

Key Concepts	Operational definitions	Measurements	Data Sources
Rapprochement	A re-establishing of cordial relations in between the two countries	Détente, Reunion	Collins Dictionary http://www.memidex.com
Bilateral relations	Bilateral relations refer to the relationship between two independent regions. Cultural,	Respective, two sided relations	http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/bilateral

	economic, and political factors influence this relationship.		
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2. Theoretical Framework

This research will apply 'Complex Interdependence' which was developed by Robert O Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in the late 1970s. It was a major challenge to fundamental assumptions of traditional and structural realism which focused on military and economic capabilities to explain the state behaviour. The basic assumptions of Complex Interdependence are that the state is neither coherent nor predominant. Traditionalists say that the states are predominant actors but complex interdependence says that there are multiple channels which are predominant actors like interstate, Trans governmental and transnational. Second assumption is that they are not denying the importance of force but they say that whenever there will be a use of force, there will be a cost and benefit analysis. Realists say that there is a difference between high politics and low politics but complex interdependence theory claims that there is no difference between high and low politics. High politics is about military, weapons etc. while low politics is about economy, culture etc. The focus in this theory is the rise of international regimes and institutions that compensated traditional military capabilities and the new importance of welfare and trade in foreign policy matters compared to status and security issues. Complex Interdependence actually became a central component of the neoliberal perspective and has been widely used in the analyses of international politics making an attempt to understand willingness of states to enter into cooperative alliances with one another under conditions of anarchy and dependence. In order to analyze the Sino-Indian relations they focus on trade and security. While emphasizing the

growing importance of International Organizations (IOs) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs), this theory is said to have anticipated what is now known as Globalization. Keohane and Nye argued that in the era of interdependence, the very nature of international relations has been changed and world has become more interdependent in all respects, especially economics. This research will thus be making a theoretical contribution by applying complex interdependence to interpret the importance of trade and cooperation has for the security setting between China and India. Though India and China have many security issues with each other but they are growing their relations by trade and cooperation. On the other side, China and Pakistan also depend on one another because of their mutual interests, but India and Pakistan have many rivalries from the past till the day that's why China's closeness towards India will have an impact on Pakistan.

3. Literature Review

Arif(2013) has analysed thatthe Sino-Indian relations were flowery in 1950's, which were based on the peaceful co-existence, but the climate of Sino-Indian entente cordiale poisoned by the Tibet issue, followed by a border dispute. Finally, in 1962 Nehru's policy of no-dispute and no-negotiation led to a border war. After that, Sino-Indian relations entered an era of cold war which lasted nearly 20 years. However in 1988, the tension between the two countries was reduced and initiatives were taken for development in the relations during the era of Rajiv Gandhi. The two Asian giants, India and China, are the oldest and living civilizations of the world. India and China,being neighbors, had established trade and cultural relations since the time immemorial.Starting point for this must be the thousands year old cultural interference between China and India. The writer made an attempt to not discuss the evolution by interference

rather to start from where the trustworthy historical records are available. These historical records tell us that Sino-Indian interface was always the two-way traffic having the two elements of exchange which could be classified as material exchange and spiritual cultural exchange. The following four routes of communication were carried: 1. The Central Asian Route or Silk Route, 2. Assam-Burma and Yunnan Route or the famous Southern Silk Route, 3. Tibet Nepal Route, and 4. The Sea Route or Maritime Silk Route.

The relations between the two countries have gradually developed since the end of cold war and mutual interest of China and India in various fields has also fortified. The Sino-India relations have strengthened by the continuous visits between the heads of state and officials. They have discussed the resolution of various issues, including the border issue, by mutual cooperation. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China and this visit brought a new direction in the bilateral relations. In this paper, the writer has made an attempt to trace the history of Sino-Indian relations but has discussed very little about the competition and security issues that exist between these two countries.

Kenny (2015) stated in his article that the ongoing strategic competition and rivalries between India and China can be seen as a 'New Great Game', with equivalent to the original 'Great Game' which was played out in the 19th century between Britain and Russia for the control of South and Central Asia. The current Sino-India competition is just like the original great game in which there were territorial disputes, the strategic military alliances development and competition for access to resources, and with other powers to contain the rise of the opposing nation use of strategic relationships. The 'New Great Game' is similar to the original great game in the sense that, with the core aspect of their competition, both have mistrust on the other's strategic intentions and ambitions, based on a long history of continual territorial disputes and

diplomatic resistance. The 'New Great Game' is different as it is played by the influence of US and other regional powers between two great imperial powers in both South and Central Asia. However, an important conclusion is that the new great game is similar to the original great game in a sense that, with the core aspect of their competition, both have mistrust on the other's strategic intentions and ambitions, and because of this mistrust and the reaction of the players regional conflict can occur. He, very realistically, ignored the role of trade and cooperation in becoming the way to solve security issues between India and China.

Garver (1996) proclaimed that the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit, in 1988, to China brought momentous development in India-China relations. Following his visits Sino-Indian relations became more pleasant than at any time after the mid 1950's. The close Sino-Pakistan relations have been very important for Beijing. The long standing friendship between China and Pakistan have been "tested by adversity" which has come in the form of government change and disorders in both countries' fundamental shift in international system and war. Pakistan plays a major role in China's strategy for dealing with India and subsequently the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In Sino-Indian relations, the Sino-Pakistan entente has a significant source of debate. Reasonably, an important momentum to the development of Sino-Indian relations could provide a link to the strength of Sino-Pakistan relations. While Beijing customized its pro-Pakistan position on susceptible Kashmir question, and China's traditional friendship with Pakistan has been made up for by new elements.

The importance of Chinese national interest has underlying Chinese entente with Pakistan. The Sino-Indian relationship and Pak-Chinese relation is not expected to become zero-sum game. The development of Indian-China relations has made relations between Beijing and Islamabad

more reserved and complex. China has tried to balance Sino-Pakistan entente cordial against Sino-India new rapprochement. The continuing Sino-Pakistan close military relations and China's great support for Pakistan's national development efforts show that China is not ready to give up its entente with Pakistan on the altar of Chinese amity with India. China will try to maintain good relations with both India and Pakistan.

Malik (1993) stated that Indo-China agreement "to keep peace and tranquility" was signed in September 1993 besides the uncertain Himalayan border of India and China. The agreement between the two Asian giants enforced both India and China to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and according to the principle of "mutual and equal security" to reduce military forces along the border. It was expressed as "a significant step forward" and "landmark agreement" to develop the Sino-Indian relations which were disturbed from 1950s. It was a reasonable result of a progression of developments since the late 1980s which started from the visit of Prime Minister of India, in 1988, to China and the reciprocal visit, in 1991, of Prime Minister of China to India. The consequent dramatic changes in the global strategic environment after the end of the bipolar system with the collapse of Soviet Union at the end of Cold War are overall an improvement in bilateral Sino-India relationship. Today, relations between India and China look to be superior from any time in the previous four decades. It ought not to be supposed to direct the one by which every difficulty prevails over in the relationship. This article illustrates the underlying issues of the contemporary détente and evaluates the Sino-India bilateral relations and their perspectives with the Asian security environment after the Cold War. It concludes that a thaw in the relations between China and India has not overcome the revelries for the dominance in the region and persuade within the world multi polarity in the 21st century.

Hongyu (1995) analysed that the relations between India and Russia has also ended with the cold war. This brought an improvement in the relations between China and India because Russia was not able to defend itself anymore. Russia was not in a position to aid India, that's why the capacity of trade has dropped radically between the two countries. The developments of Sino-India relations are in the interest of, both the countries, China and India. They focus their attentions on economic development and maintain peace and stability in the Asian region.

In 1988, when Rajiv Gandhi visited China, there were the talks between the two leaders of China and India. It established the starting point for the developed Sino-Indian relations to progress with the solutions to border issues. They also talked about maintaining of peace and harmony in the areas of line of actual control (LAC) prior to decisive resolution. After 31 years, in 1991, Premier Li Peng visited India.

In 1993, during Narasimha Rao's visit to China, the Prime Ministers of the two countries, China and India, were happy with the achievements in the dialogue by the joint working team on the border issue. They agreed that the team should show rapidity in her works. In the same year, they started bilateral investment and technological cooperation and built commercial relations. 24 contracts were signed between the two countries from 1990 to February 1994. In November 1996, Jiang Zemin gave the necessary momentum for the normalization of ties to India. The relations between the two countries overwhelmingly changed and both, China and India, believed that the normalization process was permanent. In July 1997, China transferred her arms to Pakistan. This gave security threat to India. Indians viewed it as "alarming" and "dangerous". The two countries, India and China, had actually decided to freeze the border dispute and increase economic and other relations which would produce mutual confidence and energy for ultimate solution of the border issues. However, with some tension their relations continued to be

overwhelmed. Their relations strained by China's military help to Pakistan and the presence of large number of Tibetans in India.

Virmani (2006) proclaimed, in his article, that the Sino-India relations improved in the 1980s, with the opening of economies of both to each other. In 1990s, when globalization accelerated the possibilities of mutual gain also increased with the imperative of global interdependence. China's share of world trade is about eight times that of India; therefore, it was important for China. In 2000, these developments led India-China to establish the Joint Study Group (JSG) for accelerating bilateral economic cooperation. India was among top 20 trading partners of China in 2004. India was fifteenth in imports and eighteenth in exports partner of China. For India, China was a very important trade partner in 2004. She was ranking in the top five trade partners, second in imports, and third in export.

For the past 25 years, China has been averaging 9.5 percent, the fastest-growing economy whereas; India has been the eighth or ninth fastest growing economy. India and China's reforms started around the same time (from 1980), but the average growth rate of India has been slower. India is likely to be among the five fastest-growing economies and China is in top three. By the end of the decade, along with China, India will become one of the primary global growth drivers. After the United States, China and Japan; India was likely fourth-highest contributor to world GDP growth by 2010. China and India will therefore continue to expand the possibilities for trade and economic cooperation.

Matthew Southerland (2014) stated that the tension between China and India exists despite the fact that their bilateral relations have improved. In the area of security, Chinese soldiers still

cross the borders of disputed areas of China-India. The source of resistance in Sino-India relations are China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean. India has a large trade imbalance with China in the economic sphere due to the distortion effects of China's economic policy, India's institutional and economic problems and Chinese competitiveness in export-oriented industries. The leadership transitions in China, in 2012-2013, and in India Prime Minister Narendra Modi increased the potential for bilateral cooperation in 2014. On a growing number of issues, the two countries look forward to work together with stability in Afghanistan and climate change. In September 2014, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited India, China assured to invest in Indian industrial parks and high-speed rail infrastructure China. India and China also worked together in multilateral forums and institutions, such as the summits of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and the new BRICS development bank. The potential for competition, miscalculation and conflict between the two countries continue even if both China and India's governments search to lessen the tension in their relations.

Yuan (2010) analysed that the "all-weather" Sino-Pakistan relations, characterized especially by Beijing's position on the Kashmir issue and its long-standing and close defence ties with Islamabad continue to affect New Delhi's threat perceptions and Sino-Indian relations. Beijing's need to sustain friendly relations with Pakistan stems from its desire to mitigate ethnic separatist problems, improve energy security and execute its policy of hedging against a rising and future rival in India. Despite the changing international and regional security environments and Beijing's more balanced South Asian policy, this need is viewed in New Delhi as a major obstacle in enhancing mutual trust and improving bilateral relations between China and India. Conversely, without de-hyphenating Sino-Indian ties, the Pakistan factor will remain a point of

contention in fully developing the increasingly important relationship between Asia's two rising powers.

China and India have had largely peaceful relations over thousands of years. However, despite having agreed, long ago, to coexist on the basis of peaceful coexistence; border disputes have marred their relationship. More recently, the two countries have declared a strategic partnership and strengthened their economic interaction; but they suspect each other on a range of issues besides their border, such as the Dalai Lama, nuclear proliferation, and the policies towards Pakistan and the United States. This article suggests ways to moderate Sino-Indian tensions by offering some non-realist approaches. It proposes peaceful coexistence as a higher priority than national sovereignty. It suggests how Beijing and New Delhi may forge a constructive partnership, a process they have already started.

Rana (2015) stated that the Pakistan-China friendship has often been termed as “higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the oceans”. However, following the post-Cold War era, notable readjustments took place in Sino-India. This raised many concerns regarding the implications of this for Pakistan-China friendship. The changing dynamics of Pak-China relations in the context of Indo-China entente are based on how would Pakistan figure in this configuration of growing India-China relations and will this weaken Pakistan's traditional links with China? Pakistan's significance in terms of Sino-Indian relations will remain crucial.

Harding (2004) asserted that as we move further into a new century, the two most populous nations on earth, China and India, continue a long and tangled relationship. Given their contested border, their nuclear rivalry, their competition for influence in Asia, their growing economic relations and their internal problems; interaction between these two powers will deeply affect not

only stability and prosperity in the region, but also vital interests of the U.S. Yet, the dynamics of Chinese-Indian relationship are little known to Americans.

This volume brings together scholars from political science, history, economics, international relations and security studies to add depth to our understanding of China-India relations. Throughout, the contributors address three common questions: what are the similarities and differences between the two countries' strategic cultures, domestic circumstances, and international environments? What are the broader international contexts for their bilateral relations? What parallels and tensions exist between their national interests? U.S. policymakers, the academic community, and the informed public require fresh thinking and greater attention to India-China relations, as both countries promise to be of strategic importance to the United States in the decades ahead.

4. Organization of the Study

Chapter one gives an overview of the whole study and it also includes theoretical framework. Chapter two discusses a detail history of Sino-India relations. Chapter three addresses the facets of Sino-Indian Relations along the factors leading towards cooperation between India and China. Chapter fourth discusses the areas of cooperation and confrontation between India and China. Chapter five is about the implication of growing Sino-India relations on Pakistan. Chapter six is followed by conclusion with some recommendations.

Chapter 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Sino-India relation's debates often start from either of two different or opposing schools of thought which are realism and liberalism. According to realist school of thought, China-India relations are the result of the struggle for dominance in the region. It tends to portray the relation between China and India is unfriendly. It could lead them to military confrontation. There will be serious implications for neighbouring countries in the region as well as other countries. There were many disputes between India and China which operated by trade because of their own national interests. They are seeing both to build their powers (Nalpathamkalam).

According to the liberal school of thought, India and China are two emerging powers. They both cooperate with each other by trade and maintaining peaceful coexistence in the region. China and India are interdependent on each other. A long history, from the time of at least the early part of the first millennium A.D., of cultural and trade exchange between India and China exists from when the exchange of items and ideas along the Silk Road between South Asia and China emerged. Buddhism was introduced in China by India while many commodities like bamboo products and silk was exported from China to India. India's exports to China had so far been mainly limited to steel, iron and chrome ores; in view of the construction boom there. India identified a large number of new products including pharmaceuticals, software services, vehicles machinery, textile machinery, chemicals, earthmovers, aerospace and agro products for supply to China by which they collaborated (J.N.Mahanty, 1996).

Under the 1904 Anglo-Tibetan treaty, Aksai Chin was gone from British control. Qing Dynasty in China rejected the 1904 treaty. Beijing did not sign the treaty despite that the Chinese representative gave attendance and unstated acceptance of the McMahon Line. On assuming power, all previous foreign agreements were rejected by the People's Republic of China (PRC) as incompatible treaties during the century of humiliation forced upon it and they claimed to negotiate on all the borders again.

India got independence in August 1947 while China in 1949. Both countries emerged as developing states. With China's takeover of Tibet, Sino-India relations began in 1950. Diplomatic relations were established between China and India on April 1, 1950. In 1954 they became non-aligned signatories of five rules of peaceful co-existence. At the early stages of the cold war, China and India found some common sources in anti colonialism, communism, impartiality in international affairs and great power politics etc.

Government of India invited Chinese premiere in 1954 to visit India. When he visited India, on 29th April 1954, they signed an agreement on trade communication in Tibet region. India's British government recognized and gave the region of Tibet to China according to this agreement. It notably changed Tibet's status and India's position regarding Tibet when it was accepted as an autonomous region of China. Indian Prime Minister reciprocated his visit to China in October of the same year, 1954(Das, 2011).

In central sector, protest notes of the government of India and China were considered with small areas of clashes from July 1954 to July 1958. Due to several reasons these controversies between India and China rose up after signing the Panch Sheel agreement over Tibet. Nehru and Chou-

En-Lai brought these disputes in conversation between them, in the winter of 1956-1957, during the visit of Chinese premier to India (Gupta, 1974).

At the systemic level, there are three key variables by which the behaviour of India motivated differences with China. These three variables are: The Indian observation of the relationship of the global system and actuality, through structural restriction, the system's power on Indian behaviour and national interests of India. The national interests of India had to identify which were compelled to act throughout the international structure. National security is the primary interest of all the states according to neorealist. In the case of India, obviously, national security is its primary interest and it takes greater importance.

China recognized India's border has been questioned that it destabilized both India's security and sovereignty. India's security is destabilized on its territory by direct military and administrative confront, as well as a nation state delegitimizing the position of India. The sovereignty and security of India will face many questions from other states if she did not defend and define its borders, respectfully, with other nations. This is the main reason that India is concerned about Chinese threat to their border because of self determination, Independence and a position of great power in Asia.

The McMahon Line was the issue of national security of India relating to their defence interest. Indian border with China became extremely complicated because of acquisition of Tibet and the officials of the British Empire drew the border line governing by the agreement. China had never officially recognized the India and Tibet border, McMahon line, which is now in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir as an Aksai Chin, and signifies to connect Tibet and Xenjiang by road. In December 1958, correspondence began between the Prime Minister of China and India in which

the differences over border questions constrained the shape of the dispute. Across the Johnson line (declared at the international border with India), Indian representatives became responsive of consequences of Chinese violation, in 1958, and nearly unrestrained Aksai Chin. From Tibet to Xinjiang, the building of a highway was initiated by the Chinese through Aksai Chin, which was subsequently joined with Indian Territory. After a few months, Aksai Chin was demonstrated as a part of China by Chinese maps. When Chinese troops entered from the Xinjiang road to Tibet it became linked with the role of the PLA, in 1959, in Tibet and Aksai-Chin road issue (Ambrosio, 2005). The course into Tibet of PLA forces produced worries of a violent boundary claim by the People Republic of China. A security dilemma was created by these activities all along the boundary because India believed that Tibet was the most vital, in excess of South Asia for mastery, and the most efficient way for assurance of defence of India. It ought to be noted that although Tibet was accepted as part of China by the Indian government, at a popular level within India the Tibetan cause ruined important sympathy because more than 100,000 Tibetan refugees were still present in India. A continued source of friction in China-India relations was the New Delhi's constant motivation to provide asylum to the government for Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, from which Chinese border is only 200 miles away.

Chinese anger at the Indian decision to award asylum to fourteenth Dalai Lama was the counter balance of Indian aggravation at this frustration, who in 1959 took off Tibet after a failed anti Chinese revolt, mistakenly assumed by the PRC to be a CIA organized operation. In early 1960, India responded to the rising military power by China close to the McMahon Line, through organizing their armed forces along the border into forward positions with China. Both sides felt deceived and intense exchange of letters between India and China Prime Ministers, over the next three years, was the expected originator to armed conflict (Guha, 2012).

Secondly, the structure of international system defined India's policy for the 1962 border dispute at a systemic level. India's geostrategic position within the system remained neutral in the bipolar world. Within its territory to deter the third world exploitation of either bloc India stayed a powerful enough state, but weak as much necessary to be confronted by violent neighbours. The constant threat of Pakistan on their North-western border is an excellent example. Indo-Pakistan, poor relations are rooted in variables of domestic level, but the Kashmir issue came at a systemic level. India and Pakistan, both, claim the right to Kashmir's sovereignty and a seriously fortified border is the outcome of this conflict. Moreover, India made a diplomatic proposal with China and Pakistan for beginning peaceful border settlement in 1961. India has been enforced by this to take serious action in the border dispute of India and China without any apprehension.

The survival of nuclear weapons was the structural factor of the international system. The state that has the nuclear power is the great power and creates deterrence, but in the case of neither India exists with nuclear power or China, that's why they both have the chance to go for a war. When there is no fear of a nuclear war, but the chances of disputes and conflicts exist.

The employment of Indian forces to promote interest is a major example of their attack on Portuguese controlled Goa on December 17, 1961. To emphasize sovereignty over superficial territory, the use of force is an admirable example of the 9 October, 1962 PLA nasty adjacent to Ladakh. Power in opposition to PLA invasion stayed off the table on condition that the military of India assume their tactical place and potential selected substandard to the military of China. Nehru articulated the idea in 1960 after he came back from U.S diplomatic tour that the military stability had altered in favour of India due to the military aid of west and Soviet. India ignored

the effort of China to deter and engaged the use of force to resolve their territorial asserts in the lack of nuclear arsenal (Memon, 2004).

Finally, how India perceives the international system is essential to identify, that it disagrees from reality, that it inclined its decision against the People's Republic of China to make use of force. India thought that international system is open to make the Multi polar world from Bi polar world. India stayed unaligned with any of bloc, but is still receiving significant economic and military aid from both blocs. Both the sites want to be aligned with India to their own side by giving economic and military aid. Understanding this, India thought that the superpowers would mediate to stop any major war between China and India. This observation of India's value to both superpowers would cost them due to misperception of the international system. Eventually, India is abortive to recognize the super powers' interest which might, to some extent, depend on the welfare of India; each nation struggles to secure their own security. Moreover, the eagerness and aptitude of the superpowers were getting wrong by India to intervene on their behalf. In actual fact to drop the border issues, Soviet Union could not exercise to compel or control the actions of China. The global system realities and its lawless character would make sure that their judgment of utilization of power must have some effects.

Owing to the variables at a systemic level, China was motivated towards conflict, which revolved just around China's national Interests; just like India due to structural constraints. The system's influence on Chinese behaviour and anarchism also played an important role in the structure. Due to global anarchism, China and India had the same motive in which state security was their top priority. As a member of communist alliance, China did not get any assurance of

protection, for that reason its best national interests were intended by exploiting national security (Johan Svensson, 2012).

As in India's case, the main concern of PRC was to get legality/ authenticity in the worldwide system and the demarcation of official boundaries. The People Republic of China's inheritance of territory had a strong authorized and realistic interest in discussing legal boundaries, among its neighbours, which was separated by Western Imperialist. However, Indian reluctance to talk based on the superficial authenticity of the McMahon Line, peaceful settlement between Sino-Indian borders was not possible.

The second national interest is the right of outsiders to not intervene in their domestic associations was faced by China's disagreements on border with India. This standard of domestic inviolability, as of external intrusion, is one of the rights in Westphalia system of states. Due to the Indian manipulating position in domestic dealings in Tibet and Ladakh, Chinese security was destabilized. In 1960, forward posts enterprise of the Indian military and Ladakh region's patrols were direct interferences in internal zones of China. Although, it was right that China did not have any authorized autonomy over the region of Ladakh owing to its place of McMahon Line (Rasgotra & Chopra, 1997). That fight ruins in international boundaries is still arguable as ought to be settled bilaterally ahead at any rate and the People Republic of China conferred it no such appreciation. Moreover, Ladakh, and further significantly, the Aksai-Chin was a tactically decisive territory linking Tibet and Xinjiang.

After the 1959 insurgency, India's intrusions in Tibet were taken like a direct contravention of domestic inviolability. They perceived it as a challenge to security and interests of China. From 1957 to 1961, India had moved out, thus far with regard to permit, CIA bases operation beside

the boundary and used it for a secret movement in Tibet. A chain of four armed bases of India were built and manoeuvred in Tibet, north of the McMahon Line. These events showed India's aspiration to make Tibet a buffer state and identify the suzerainty of China, in the region, rather than the autonomy; hence the safety of China was threatened directly.

Boundary security, the interest of China was also in danger by the border dispute. After 1959 Tibet fortification, the roadway of Aksai-Chin, and the border military patrols of China was an effort to maintain their regional integrity.

A security dilemma shaped by Military presence in India, and they strengthened their own military capacity near disputed zones. In 1960, the adoption of a forward Indian military policy across the border joined with Indian investigation patrols and the border security of China was severely defied by the creation of military posts in the region of Ladakh and Tibet. As a result, China's PLA quarry in and around effectively militarizing the challenged border area.

During the late 1950's, the main constraining power in accomplishment of China was the geostrategic position in Asia. In early 1950, to contain the communist bloc, west struggled and fought major battle like Cold War in the Asia as well as became a part of Korean War. The People Republic of China had to cope with armed forces against China in South Korea; United States supported Republic of China in Taiwan, reinforced Japan and made a rising contribution in Indo-China in 1960s. On Western front of China, these several threats were central and in other parts of apprehension their manoeuvrability was strictly restricted. Without the knowledge of the West, the PRC was ever more unable to depend on the hold of the socialist alliance as a result of growing hostility on various territorial and diplomatic issues from U.S.S.R. The Soviets forced China to recognize India's border asserts. The relations between China and Soviet Union

were also tense in their own boundary questions. The PRC encouraged a policy of peaceful border settlement by admitting the maximum effects of this sanctuary fear to the military of China. China achieved a decisive success in reducing the effect of any possible threat from Pakistan to the defence interests of China by growing relations between India and China by using this policy. In the geostrategic atmosphere the PRC found herself encircled by a loop of aggressive states. The political inflexibility on boundary matters of India and identified insurrection in Tibet added further hazard in that loop. This situation was apparently an unexpected settlement in the relations with India's competitor Pakistan, whereas relations between India and China concurrently deteriorated in 1959. These antagonistic geostrategic surroundings lined out the possibility, via armed force, to resolve the border disagreement with India owing to the possible consequence of initializing a two facade war. Accordingly, PRC proceedings, all along the border of India, were restricted by the intercontinental organizations to defensive pretension, prevention, and establishment. This was demonstrated by several proposals from China to the representatives of India to stay round at the distance of 20 km of every border.

The PRC rapprochement with Pakistan was practical in the independence of execution and it did not require securing the border between Pakistan and China seriously. So, the policy of China to not instigate force in order to settle border dispute against India instead to fortify its military protection was perverted. Yet, the PRC believed that, on the border concern, the force expected to compete by force which was verified by the PLA contradict offensive which started on Oct 20th and Nov 16th in 1962 (The Indian Express, 2015).

Eventually, at this juncture, chaos in the worldwide system played a main role in the proceedings of the PRC on the boundary matters. The rising split of Soviet and China was a

central factor in the PRC's reluctance to depend on exterior prop up for their welfare. Simultaneously, Soviet assistance to China was strictly cut down and growing support of a nuclear program, as well. Evidently a general Sino-Soviet socialist system was irrelevant to their allies; they still offered to award India big power position in the course of nuclear advancement.

In addition to the support of Soviet, U.S. armed forces supported India in the form of financial and agricultural aid packages. Even though India promised to be neutral, the PRC did not believe on that. PRC undoubtedly assumed that India is in the West's bloc, they could not be neutral. The CIA bases in India, into Tibet, and India's role in Korean War strengthened China's opinion. At the same time, as the PRC and India did not obsess nuclear weapons but they were frightened from the offensiveness of PLA to India which would have been taken as a socialist advance by the West and, as a result, it aggravated a nuclear response. Without full Soviet support, keeping in mind the Taiwan Straits Crises and tension between China and Soviet Union, China was averse to peril a probable nuclear hit commencing the West. So, China decided that its armed reaction to India's possible hostility was virtuously political.

1962, the Sino-Indian line boundary war was broken between the two giants of Asia, China and India. The Western nations showed keen interest in that war, that's why border dispute assumed a new significance (Qureshi, 1962). Sino-Indian official relation had broken down completely after that border conflict. Even today, because of the same mistrust and suspension the border issue remains unsolved. During 1961 and 1975, in the Indo-Pak war China supported Pakistan because of Pak-China mutual differences with India.

China faced a very complex incident in the history by the name of the Cultural Revolution. That event changed the establishment and life of all the Chinese people incessantly. Although, the

movement was started by Mao, it took its own direction when the masses got mobilized. The revolution started in 1966 and came to an end in 1976. In the first two years it passed all the way through majority of violence taking place. The course of the revolution was influenced by the big efforts of groups, as the masses of China divided into groups. The students who had let down the revolution would be eliminated by the leader Mao. The PRC had gone through violence, but not a bit as extensive as the Cultural Revolution. Everyone in China was much more affected in the Revolution.

In 1976, Sino-India ambassadorial relationship was re-established and the bilateral visits started once again. A bilateral trade agreement was signed in 1984. In December 1988 Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing (Moritz, 2011). Following Rajiv Gandhi's historic visit to China, in December 1988, a process of normalization began to unfold between the two countries. During this meeting with Rajiv Gandhi on December 21, Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the central military commission of the PRC, said: "let both side forget the unpleasant period in our past relations, and let us treat everything with an eye on the future,"

This landmark visit put the India-Chinese relations on a more positive footing with opening up of more frequent and closer political, economic, military, scientific and cultural exchanges. Besides that, they set up the JWG to resolve disputes and expanded cooperative ties. In December 1991, Chinese Premier Li Peng reciprocated a visit to India. Both Nrasimha Rao and Li Ping agreed that the Sino-Indian border issues should be settled peacefully and should not become impediment to the improvement and development of relations in other areas of mutual interest. In May 1992, Indian Defence minister, Sharad Pawar visited Beijing and the two sides pledged to develop academic, scientific, technological and military exchanges. After the gap of almost

thirty years the border trade between the two neighbouring countries resumed in July 1992. Consulates were also reopened in Bombay and Shanghai in December 1992 and in June 1993 the two sides agreed to open an additional border trading post. The visits were followed by a major breakthrough in September 1993 when Prime Minister Narasimha Rao attended a summit in Beijing, hosted by Premier Li Peng. The two leaders signed the 'Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control', which called for reunion of force, recognition of and respect for the LAC and the resolution of border issues through negotiations. Moreover, there was a mutual agreement over troop reductions and a process of transparency was introduced to help implement the agreement. In 1994, the then Indian Vice President K.R.Narayan visited China and this was reciprocated by the visit of, Qian Qichen, the Chinese vice Premier and Foreign Minister to India. In 1995, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, Qiao Shi visited India.

President Jiang Zemin's visit to India, in November 1996, took India-China relations to the new heights and the second most important agreement relating to CBMs was signed by China and India. The agreement of 'Confidence-Building Measures in the Military field along the Line of Actual Control on India-China border' maintained that peace and tranquillity along the India-China border which was in the fundamental interest of both the parties and contributed positively towards resolving the boundary question. The agreement primarily outlined the de-escalation measures to possible military overtones in the India-China boundary. The momentum was maintained with exchange of many high level visits during 1997.

They agreed to promote bilateral Trade with establishment of a joint group on Economic Relations as well as on Science and Technology area. In the relationship between the two

countries the culture exchange program was inferred as a positive and impressive change. There were assumptions that through politico-diplomatic means the boundary dispute was able to resolve between the two Asian giants. Such an opinion was the basis of realism. To de-escalate the proliferation of strategic weapons, a number of initiatives were taken by both the super powers as apparent in December 1987 finishing the JNF treaty and were positively titled towards improving relations between them. In addition to this, many other positive progresses, such as end of Iran-Iraq hostility, the military withdrawal of Soviet from Afghanistan, the normalization process of Indo-Pakistan relation and in 1989 the Sino-Soviet summit made a thaw in Sino-soviet relations. All these developments had a collective impact on New Delhi and Beijing leadership without delaying to dismiss the remaining hostility between them. Secondly, the leadership of China was encouraged due to domestic pressure that they should have a direct confrontation with external powers and for improving its relations with them by the alternative way of political reunion. Thirdly, China's past opinion of international system had undergone essential change ever since its admission into UN. China started performing in a more reserved and complicated manner.

Fourthly, the style of Mao's performing foreign affairs was much different from that of those personal peculiarity stated the decision making process in China(J.M.Jain, 1989).On the border issue, both the sides had agreed to keep working since 1990s, but by building beneficial and established relations the conflict obstruction was not allowed. Reports kept one of the territorial exchange that would engage China, leaving its claim in excess of Arunachal Pradesh in exchange for India giving up its assert to Aksai Chin. Temporarily, along the border, India and China reduced mutual troops from the borders, took practical confidence-building measures, advanced

announcements of military exercises, followed local military leaders assembly and built a force for positive and constant relations (ABITBOL).

In New Delhi, a homemade hand grenade was thrown at the Chinese embassy by the Tibetans in India, in March 1992. A seminar was held at Dharamsala in that summer, 'A supporter of Tibet', which was hired by MPs and some ex-senior Indian government representatives to support Tibet's independence publicly and 'Hindustan Times' appealed to Indian government through published comments and articles. On maintaining peace and tranquility through the landmark agreement named LAC of 1993 came through in terms of clear assurance along the Sino-Indian borders with peaceful environment on the part of both countries. Small numbers of Indian parliamentarians organized an All Parties Indian parliamentary Forum in March 1994 for Tibet in which some international anti-Chinese forces were involved. Tibet an "independent sovereign state" was declared by the Forum openly. All these activities were watched by the people of China closely which was harmful to the friendly Sino-Indian relations' development (Hongyu, 1995).

A considerable point of difference remained between India and China over the uncertain boundary issue's final resolution. To resolve the Boundary issues with a rational settlement, both countries have since remained engaged in a stable and continuous dialogue. In the Military Field, an agreement on 'Confidence Building Measures along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas' was signed in 1996. The main theme of their agreement was to focus on economic issues, but the nuclear bomb blast of India in 1998 had a negative impact on this relationship. To prevent the brink threat from any possible accidental war, the two countries, China and India took a number of CBMs (confidence building measures) (India and China: emerging dynamics and regional security , 2010).

Chapter 3

FACETS OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

In terms of geopolitical position and economic prospective the two most dominant and leading Asian nations, India and China, both are the recipients to ancient civilizations. The Chinese' stand in the region has possibly inclined by the disintegration of Soviet Union due to which many changes have taken place in central Asia. With the very obvious rise and fall of the relationship between China and India has been described by some particular issues of controversies and conflict up till now. With the economic development, positive shift occurred in Sino-India relations after cold war. That was their supreme precedence because they recognized that the competition in international arena is shifting from military to economic, scientific and technological capabilities (Kemenade, 2008). Among the non-socialist countries, India became the first country who started diplomatic relations with China, as a result of leaving behind a wide gap of writing in the records of Sino-Indian friendly relations (Ruisheng, 2010). From that time, Sino-Indian relations have entered into a new era. However, almost after two decades the economy of India is still much less than China. China incorporated with the economy of the whole world despite of the fact that there is multi party democracy in India, where as communism in China (Kemenad, 2008). From the time of 1962, border dispute to 1967 and 1987 armed clashes have been the reasons for tense relations between China and India. Since 1981, China and India have tried to hold dialogue to resolve the disputed claims, several times, but they failed. Both the countries decided to put aside all the controversies and take interest in bilateral trade and investment. They signed agreements in 1993 and 1996 on maintaining peace and harmony on disputed border area (Waijiaoguanxi). They visited each other. On a variety of

regional and international issues, their cooperation for establishment of cooperative strategic partnership for peace and stability has grown up.

India and China, both, are bound to avoid conflict by varying security, economic and political situation in the region. The leadership of the both countries visited each other with the understanding of gravity of the problems. The relationship based on harmony, belief and friendship started as a result of these visits. Positive developments began in Sino-India relations in 2003. The developments were associated with the increase in trade and economic cooperation, and high level exchanges of culture, education and military etc. By following a new cordial phase in Sino-India relations, Atal Behari Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India visited China in June 2003. This was the first visit of the head of the government of India which became the most significant event in their relations. People republic of China (PRC) and Republic of India have signed the 'Declaration on principle of relations and complete cooperation'. They also reaffirmed to a long term practical and cooperative partnership (China's Foreign Affairs, 2004).

India agreed to accept the region of independent Tibet as a part of China. The state of India gave assurance not to allow political activities which are against China. In the mean time, India's sovereignty over Sikkim was delicately accepted by China. She agreed to open the border for trade and Nathu La pass for entrance and exit for trade and nation (Yuan, 2006).

To seek ultimate resolution of boundary issues, a political framework was developed by India and China nominated special representatives and signed ten agreements based on border trade, culture, education, energy, science and technology, justice and law, visa, ocean studies etc. Vajpayee's visit, in 2003, was manifested by economic direction. His visit was greatly appreciated by business administrative of his own country because Sino-Indian relations went

towards improvement with trade and cooperation after that event (China's Foreign Affairs, 2004).

3.1. From Economic Cooperation to Strategic Partnership

Vajpayee's visit in 2003 created a momentum in the following years. 2004 was also a significant year for Sino-India relations because for the first time their bilateral trade surpassed \$10 billion. In April 2005, China's Prime Minister Wen Jaibao reciprocated visit to India. A momentous accord was signed between India and China. This accord was to guide principle for India-China boundary question settlement and political parameters which expected a roadmap to facilitate the Sino-India territorial issue resolution (Yuan, 2006). A new strategic partnership was announced between India and China, on 11 April 2005, in which both the countries owing to resolve the border issues between the two raising powers and increase trade and cooperation. They also started to talk bilaterally on strategic partnership.

Covering a wide array of issues having bilateral, regional and global implication; the first and second strategic talks were held in January 2005 and in January 2006. Despite of the fact that both countries have many rivalries, they moved forward towards trade cooperation and strategic partnership because they both recognized the value of strategic and economic cooperation between these two raising powers in the region.

China and India celebrated the year 2006 as a friendship year. In the same year, in May, MoU on defence cooperation was signed between the Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, and Chinese Defence Minister General, Cao Gangchuan. This was the first such type of an agreement which gave an important sign to growing Sino-India relations (Embassy of India-Beijing, 2006).

Nathula Pass, an ancient trade route, which was a part of Silk Route that passes through the Himalayas, was reopened in July 2006, by India and China. After Sino-Indian border war, in 1962, that pass was closed. To strengthen trade cooperation, energy, investment, educational and cultural exchanges; many agreements were signed in November 2006 when Chinese president Hu Jintao visited India (Yuan, 2006). So, in the era after Cold War, a clear thaw is seen in the relation between India and China. They accomplished inclusive improvement and development in their relations especially in economic zone, as well as, in science, technology, education and cultural etc.

Under the Bangkok agreement of 2003, China and India presented tariff preferences to one another. China presented tariff preferences on 217 articles which contained food, paper steel, textile products, chemical products, medicines and machinery articles.

To deal with the border issue, China and India selected special representatives in 2003. China documented India's political control over Sikkim as a quid pro quo for India's recurrence of Tibet as a part of China in the same year.

On other hand, India presented tariff preferences over 188 articles containing primary chemical paper, steel, rubber, electric machinery, railway items, and toys. In 2005, the Chinese Prime Minister's, Wen Jiabao, tour to India gave opportunities to partner in fruitful way and signed new agreements on economic and border issues. In the past few years, extra border posts and new air connection were opened, but Indian government refused the Chinese proposal of bilateral business establishing agreements up till now. Both established joint force task to seek out the feasibility and pros and cons in detail. On political ground, their relations were demolished between 2005 and 2009 mainly due to Tibet issue and the concern about energy problems and

also because of the threat to one another from either side. In February 2006, India and China developed Taiwan-India Cooperation Council, the aim of which was to establish Taiwanese trade investment in India. Taiwanese government official was pleased to see the mixture of Taiwanese hardware experts and India's strong software industry to work in a complementary way. Presently, almost 70 percent of Chinese hardware and IT parts are prepared in the Chinese industries are based on Taiwanese' investments and this gives diversity to Taiwanese trade in the world IT market. This business of India-Taiwan rose up to 2 billion dollars in 2005. India has only a contribution of 0.67 percent in this business trade, yet the figure has expanded by 33 percent in between 1995 and 2002. The Taiwanese business trade is investing \$116 billion in India as opposed to over \$100 billion in China. In 2009, Sino-Indian cooperation during COP 15 summits got nearer to these developing Asian nations. Indian president's, Pratibha Devisingh Patil, tour to China in June 2010 was another opportunity to deepen their economic relations more.

Taiwan has tried to develop military cooperation with India but until now it's too restricted or limited despite of the fact that New Delhi has an advantage from insights of Taipei's intelligence which helps India in maintaining their relation streamlined. At last, India feels that Taiwan is the best partner in developing economic relations rather than a potential political partner. India knows the importance of Taiwan business trade to their self and its influence to China. It may comprise a potential impact on India-China's relations (Rudolf, July 2011).

As China and India relations were not good in 1950-1960 (in mid century) but in the past few years China has become the outmost business partner of India and it makes Indian law agencies to become too supportive to Chinese investment which is although not extensive but they are

expanding their business. Just like other Asian countries, India is facing troubles in expanding their economy with China despite knowing Chinese thoughts and views regarding the controversial China-India border and Indian Ocean. The leadership of both the countries have tried to work out some solution to decrease these types of controversies. Deng Xiaoping stressed the need to demilitarize China's foreign relation and expressed interest in a peaceful environment in which China could achieve economic development; improvement of Sino-India relations was a part of this strategy. Since then, China has deftly managed the contradiction between reaching out to India and providing continued assistance to Pakistan through a three pronged strategy: CBMs and increased trade with India; a neutral stance on Kashmir; and nuclear and conventional military aid to Pakistan. Economic interdependence became the trend of new Chinese foreign and trade policy. However, it was viewed largely as a tool for becoming modern, not an end in itself. It could be best characterized as a positive but limited source of cooperative behaviour. Economic interdependence introduced pluralism of actors in Chinese foreign and trade policy. The 2012-13 leadership changes in China and the 2014 election of the Prime Minister Nirender Modi in India gave new ideas to Chinese government to invest more and also gave surety of security and cooperation. Despite all such positive statements given by both the government officials, about positive relationship, these two Asian giants (both are nuclear powers) gave surety about each other and both of them gave surety to one other in their concerned areas of influence. Both of them had a major controversy in their relationship due to China-India border matter, China's implication in Indian Ocean, Pak-China relations and Tibet. In 2012, the IAF and the Indian forces took part in military exercise operation which was held near India-China border that included fighting Helicopters, fighters and operation related person. According to New Delhi, China's People Liberation Army (PLA) forces fluently crossed these controversial borders

of China-India (more than 700 times from Jan 2013 to Aug 2014) and they came to these controversial areas for just few hours and then went back. The Chinese officials did not publish that Indian forces has crossed these controversial areas of China-India border. In this regard, India had no economic benefit in business matter from China and both countries were competing for nuclear and energy excess (Southerland, 2014).China and India both were the raising powers of Asia competing each other for foreign investment, market, resources and trade etc. They also worked together bilaterally for normalizing and improving their relations by promoting trade and investment as well as free trade between them.

3.2. Factors Leading Towards Cooperation

A clear change is noticeable in India and China's attitude after sour relations having so many rivalries in the past. China and India both realized that they are an opportunity for one another, so the rivalries should be put aside. Here are some most important factors which compelled both China and India to restore their relations.

3.2.1. Change in Global and Regional Power Configuration

Regional and international power pattern was changed by the end of cold war. World power composition changed from bipolar to unipolar when USSR became disintegrated and US emerged as a super power in the world. International and regional players compelled to change their policies to regulate geo-strategic environment with the reallocation of international power structure (Memon, 2004).

When cold war ended, the good relations between Soviet and India also came to an end because Soviet did not fulfil the interest of India. In the cold war period, Soviet was the largest trade

partner as well as main supplier of new weapons to India. The end of India-Soviet good relations leads India to improve its relation with China. Thus, with the disintegration of Soviet Union, India lost its strategic benefactor. Sino-Soviet relations also moved towards normalization because Soviet had no capacity to compete China anymore. Soviet-US rivalry came to an end on one side and on the other side, Soviet's good relations with India ended because India lost its priority in Soviet foreign policy. All these happenings lead India and China to move closer and tighten their bilateral relations (Hongyu, 1995).

3.2.2. Economic Factor

For greater association, the economic motivation, obviously, helped in pushing aside old political differences. The Prime Minister of India acknowledged that, "eventually, foreign policy is the product of economic policy" (Desai). China and India, both, perceive the strength of each other as a strong benefit by growing investment, trade, and joint technology projects.

Over the last couple of years, some of the key areas in both the countries containing political status quo have seen astonishing growth in trade and other economic exchanges. India's export to and import from China increased at the average of 50.2 and 26.6 per year during the period of 2000 to 2003 (Space Daily, 2005). In 1987, bilateral trade between China and India was \$117 million which grew in 2006 to \$20 billion. During the Hu Jin Thao visit to India in 2005, the leaders of both the countries set the target of growing trade up to \$40 billion till 2010. In 2006, according to statistics of China; India was China's tenth biggest trade partner. Similarly, China was India's second biggest trade partner, according to statistics of India, in 2005-2006. Historical Nathu La Pass opened again for economic benefits by India and China in 2006. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between India and China created the biggest free trade region in the world and

closer cooperation in the region of high technology. It shows that the two countries, India and China, go really well, together. Bilateral trade between India and China has been grown rapidly for the period of 1996-2008 (Chanda, 2014).

The hostility and fear between China and India got aside with the help of economic cooperation and their mutual gains. Trade verified as a powerful CBM (confidence building measure) between the two states. They both consider one another as an opportunity (Lynn).

In various areas of common interest, China and India expanded their economic cooperation and looked towards joint projects. China and India's raised economies in the markets of one another seriously. In IT industries, both states increased cooperation where they harmonized with each other. A very interesting and significant statement was given by Wen Jiabao when he visited India that "Cooperation is just like two pagodas, hardware and software. Combined we can take the leadership position in the world". He described to open the "Asian century" for a closer cooperation of information technology. Making a more resourceful, impartial and stable energy market at the global level was in the interest of China and India. They also wanted to maintain political stability in Middle East like Asia because of their own interest for supply of oil from Middle East. Long term energy needs and for the solution of the pollution problems, China and India both expanded their nuclear power facilities. They also were interested in LNG to increase. They recognized that new markets opportunities would come with collaboration. For example, in joint exploration India and China agreed to engage for oil and gas in other countries. India's trade deficit with China has swelled to \$52.68 in 2015-16 from \$48.48 billion in previous fiscal. Increasing trade deficit with China can be attributed to the relative demand for imports in India to the relative demand for imports in India and China for each other's goods (The Economic

nuclear cooperation agreement. The growing Indo-US cooperation gave worries to China because their cooperation helped to shift the balance of China's favour into India's favour. US wanted to support India against China because US did not see China as the upcoming Superpower. The ambassador of China in India said that China supports the relations between the two countries on condition that it will not target the third country (Pan, 2008).

Chinese strategists thought that US warmed the relations with India just because US wanted to contain China in the region. China's good relations with India prevented US to use India in its containment policy for China in the region (Andersen, 2016).

3.2.4. Pakistan Factor

Pakistan and China have very good strategic and security bilateral relationship. This relationship really concerns India because India has rivalries not only with China but also with Pakistan. This became an issue between China and India from the time when China signed the historic border agreement, in March 1963, with Pakistan ceding a large piece of Pakistan occupied Kashmir territory to China. India perceived China's support to Pakistan as the containment policy against India by China (Memon, 2004). Indian defence analyst described that India believes the Pakistan-China defence cooperation as an extension policy of China against India to prevent her from rising as a global power and restricting it to a smaller prospect of South Asia. Sino-Pakistan strategic cooperation is the sign of that policy aimed at facilitating Pakistan to counterbalance against India. India claims that China intends to tie it down by giving nuclear and missile support to Pakistan. India's claim was always rejected by China and it tried to maintain good relations with India which should not have been based on decline of relationship between Pakistan and China. Beijing described that its relations with Islamabad are not embattled in opposition to any

third country (Khan, 2015). China wants to improve good relations with India without declining its relations with Pakistan. It would also lead to better relations between India and Pakistan.

Chapter 4

AREAS OF COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION

The relations between India and China have been described by the two essential and conflicting trends since 1990s. On one hand they have intensified their economic relations and shaped a united front in emphasizing their rights on global issues as “developing nations” and on the other hand they are also having some controversies with each other. However, due to the emergence of territorial disputes again since late 2000s, the other aspect of controversies in Sino-Indian relations become more visible (Kurita, 2015).

Over the past five decades, ranging from deep hostilities in 1950-1960 to rapprochement in 1980s dramatic changes have undergone in Sino-India relations. Since the demise of Soviet Union readjustment occurred in their relations. The flowery relations between China and India based on peaceful coexistence in 1950's were poisoned due to Tibet issue followed by border issue. No-dispute and no negotiation policy of Nehru led to a 1962 border war. After 20 years cold war era was lasted and the Sino-India relations improved during Rajiv Gandhi era in 1988. The tension between the two countries was minimized. With the improvement of Sino-India relations their mutual interest also strengthened in various field. The head of stats and official's continuous visits have strengthened the relations by mutual cooperation. They brought the border issues in discussion for resolution. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh carried a new trend in the Sino-India bilateral relations (Arif, 2013).

closer cooperation in the region of high technology. It shows that the two countries, India and China, go really well, together. Bilateral trade between India and China has been grown rapidly for the period of 1996-2008 (Chanda, 2014).

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times , 2016). In Sudan, oil refinery was built by China for which India arranged a Gas pipeline. To peruse the business opportunities, China Gas agreed to form a joint project all over the world.

3.2.3. US Factor

For the competition of dominant position in the region, India took the border disputes as rivalry with China and shared the US sensitivity of the "China threat" (Memon, 2004). After cold war USA adopted a vigilant policy towards China because USA considered China as a potential threat to the interest of USA. That's why USA and India build strategic partnership. They both expanded and made their trade and economic relations stronger. Their strategic and military partnership really concerned China because it created obvious shift of balance of power in South Asia (Curtis & Jr, 2006).. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President Bush accomplished a milestone agreement on cooperation of civilian nuclear energy. This deal helped to boost nuclear trade, satellite technology and energy cooperation of US with India. It provided US assistance to civilian nuclear energy program of India (Mazari, 2006).

Finally, on 2 March 2006, civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was signed between India and US in which US offered nuclear fuel and technology to New Delhi This agreement did not enter into the phase of implementation and serious concerns were raised among various rudiments, including China. It led to the belief that US accepted India as a nuclear weapon state which was contradictory to international non proliferation treaty.

The agreement was opposed by China and many other countries because it was considered as the back door for India to enter into the PSI (proliferation security initiative). The law of seas and the prohibition of WMD material to third country ships were likely to weaken due to this Indo-US

nuclear cooperation agreement. The growing Indo-US cooperation gave worries to China because their cooperation helped to shift the balance of China's favour into India's favour. US wanted to support India against China because US did not see China as the upcoming Superpower. The ambassador of China in India said that China supports the relations between the two countries on condition that it will not target the third country (Pan, 2008).

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4.1. Areas of Confrontation

In bilateral relations, remarkable improvement has taken place over the past five years but still there are a variety of geostrategic and security issues that have a position in the path to stabilize their relationship. A fundamental clash of interest deeply rooted in history, geo-politics, strategic culture and geo-economics between China and India. Following are some major issues between India and China that continue to be the foremost cause of concern.

4.1.1. Border Issue

The most important, durable and toughest challenge between China and India's good bilateral ties is the border issue. The border war between India and China extends back to the 19th century when British-India and China, both, claimed to desert and remote mountain areas between the two neighbouring countries. Sino-India relations have marked decades of fruitless diplomatic interactions and military groups manoeuvre. Rather than border issue resolution, action of British-India and China set the theatre for inconsistency.

4.1.2. Tibet Issue

China-India relations have been disturbed and have gotten serious after 1950 when China declared Tibet a major part of People Republic of China. The relation became more complicated when India gave asylum to Dalai Lama and one hundred thousand Tibetan refugees. Beijing consistently accused Dalai Lama by using Indian soil for his separatist activities. According to Thomas, 2005, China believed that India has made a secret plan with American CIA to promote insurgency in Tibet, although, India continuously refused China's charges but China forced India into stopping anti-China political activities of Dalai Lama. The political and industrial interest of Pakistan in India and the established military power of Pakistan increased the prospective outlay of threat of Pakistan to India. The India-Tibet link produced a threat for Beijing due to immense

logistical difficulties which belonged to Terrain and other remote areas (Graver 2001). A further controversy started again when a religious political leader Karmapa Lama fled to India in 2000 and Indian government took him as a Tibetan refugee and permitted to stay completely in India. In fact, India is recognizing that Tibet is a part of China but on the other hand it provided political refuge to Tibetan leaders and interfered in the internal matter of China which Chinese government noticed very deeply. This interference created mistrust between the good relations of both the countries. In 2003, the Indian PM Vajpayee visited China where he signed MOU on trade in joint declaration and recognized that Tibet a part of People Republic of China. Also, both parties signed a new agreement of trade and decided that the new trade route will be through Sikkim. India thought that Vajpayee recognized Tibet a part of China, for the first time, and China should equally recognize India's sovereignty over Sikkim, in return (Asia Today 2003), but China refused the Indian analysis that Sikkim is a part of India. At that time, Chinese Foreign Minister cleared that China dispute with India over Sikkim has not resolved yet. Sikkim issue was left to history. For that, we should respect historical facts and present circumstances. Thus, despite the positive attitude on the surface level by the two leaders and positive speech of both leaders Tibet continue to generate mutual suspicion between the two neighbours. For China, Tibet has become known as an issue of improved sensitivity following the March 2008 insurrections that erupted in ethnically Tibetan areas. Attached with the improved considered importance of Tibet in the Chinese state of mind, bilateral tensions are fuelled by the growing confidence of the Indian position in the area. This was highlighted in October 2009 by the reality that India ignored Chinese resistance to a visit by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Arunachal Pradesh and to the Dalai Lama's visit a month later. Although on at least five previous circumstances the Dalai Lama had visited Arunachal Pradesh, this latest visit was

overwhelmed by controversy as it came a few months after he travelled to Taiwan (Bajpae, 2010).

On the other hand China aware of its rising power and responsibilities has adopted a more realistic approach to resolve the Tibet issue through discussion with the Dalai Lama and concurrently approaching economic development in Tibet. The new realities of the increasing military political and economic power and international influence of China and the economic development in Tibet in recent years have also persuaded the Dalai Lama that the future of Tibet and Tibetans is best guaranteed under the People's Republic of China and resist for independence would not succeed (Nd- U.D.Bhaykoti).

4.1.3. Contest for Power and Influence in Asia

The competition for power and influence between India and China in Asia continues with détente in their relations. In order to struggle for influence, India espoused a "look east" policy. She worked hard in building good relations with energetic economies of East and Southeast Asian countries (Thomas, 2005). To counter India, China made an effort to build inroads with other South Asian states like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Burma and Bangladesh etc. through economic, political and military linkages.

India and China, both, are concentrating to control over and dominate Indian Ocean. Since the late 1970's, India emphasised on building a strong naval force. According to Xu Lisheng and Hou Ming qiang, the aim of the new maritime strategy is to turn Indian Ocean into the ocean of India. India intends to prevent China, as well as, Japan in the area to make inroads, balance the US and Russia's naval forces and to set up dominance and control over on India Ocean. Alternatively, China built ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka in order to expand its naval presence in Indian Ocean. This strategy was named as "string of pearls" by India. China

strengthened her ties with Pakistan, economically and militarily, which are located in the west of India. China promised Pakistan for additional civilian nuclear cooperation in response to Indo-US nuclear deal. China, also, assured Pakistan that she will construct four more nuclear reactors in Pakistan. As a result, China and India, both, affianced against the other in external balancing activities. India has always been wary of close links between Beijing and Islamabad and is sceptical of every Chinese move in India's immediate neighbourhood (Naidu, 2015)

The shape of the politics is changing, it is moving towards multi-polar system. The change of uni-polar world to multi-polar world has intense impact on Sino-India politics, economic and foreign affairs. So they both are facing new opportunities as well as challenges.

4.1.4. Military Power of China and India

A basic alter in the strategic calculation of India and China have been motivated by their military power. The relations between India and China military power in the last half of 20th century was irregular which seriously influenced in the favour of China. On the other hand, slow but continual path of India to socio-economic and military transformation forced Beijing to concentrate on anything else and it had been examined as a non symmetrical threat. Likewise, it was all along the border of India and China that the ultimate disparity of military power was most intensely verified in conditions of the temperament and position of the forces of India and China. The government of Tibet in Dharamsala deported approximate that, there are 500,000 forces of China that stand in different form like Garrison duty forces, Frontier guards and armed forces etc. All over Tibet, China constructed to support her forces, roads, air bases as well as communication channels. China could take the land from India which it claimed to be its own with the power and capacity gain from these communications. On the other side, India did not

secure any attempt and resources to renovate her army and construct strategic roads right from the start of Himalaya region. Along the LAC, India organized a new mountain Strike Corps in May 2014, which consisted of 80,000 troops. In the happening of PLA attack this unit was considered to have a tangible response to Indian Army's offensive alternative. At the same time, India also improved its capabilities with respect to missiles, helicopters, spy drones etc. with the definite goal of a meaningful deterrence against China by changing Indian current dissuasive position (Richards, 2015).

4.1.5 Growing Presence of China in Indian Ocean

Apparently, for the last five years, China has noticeably increased its military existence in Indian Ocean, which reflects the aspiration of China to develop its capacity for its economic development by protecting their sea routes. China imports 80% of crude oil through the Indian Ocean.

- In the Gulf of Aden the contradictory piracy operations have continued, by the PLA Navy, since January 2009. The original counter piracy round was the first outfitted operation of China naval forces, slight regional water of China, omitted from naval diplomacy.
- For the first time, the PLA navy started to deploy maritime intelligence assortment ships which had probable apparatuses facilitating them to accumulate signals and electronic intelligence to the Indian Ocean in 2012. It also enabled them to map the ocean floor for making the basis by PLA navy for more regular naval operations imminent in the region.

- A PLA Navy Task group prepared fighter patrol, in early 2014, which was ready to cover the South China Sea, Eastern Indian Ocean and Philippine Sea. The Military forces and weapons of PLA Navy were deployed in Indian Ocean for the first time. Moreover, a PLA Navy submarine, from December 2013 to February 2014, carried out its first submarine patrol of China in the Indian Ocean. Though, China informed the Military officials of India that the submarine would be underneath PLA Navy ongoing operational activity in the Gulf of Aden and China wanted to deploy its submarine for a long time to test its ability and prepare for war operations. After that, at least one and potentially two other PLA Navy submarine was deployed in Indian Ocean and started patrol on routine base.

China has played a great role in the recent years, in the investment and building of civilian port infrastructure in the Indian Ocean, as well as, the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, PLA Navy task group made ports for 12 regional countries to engage militant to military replenishment and resupply. Chinese investment in Indian commercial port, diplomacy with the other countries and ocean improved the PLA Navy abilities. Indian Ocean developed logistic Hub for future use.

During Chinese growing Military activities and investment around Indian Ocean, New Delhi also concerned its goal by being a primary security guarantor and design to encircle India and Indian Ocean.

- The Indian Navy planned the expansion of its power projection capabilities over the next decade with major surface combatants, additional aircraft carriers, long-range surveillance aircraft, fighter aircraft, amphibious ships, diesel and nuclear -powered

submarines and helicopters. In exacting, India looked for to fortify its nuclear deterrent force and to improve the Indian Navy's capacity to carry out expeditionary operations, protected important sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and managed maritime choke points.

- India's major annual naval exercise in 2014, TROPEX (Theater Level Operational Readiness Exercise) attributed India's new native military scrutiny and communications satellite, as well as, in recent times P-8I maritime patrol aircraft was purchased from the United States (Matthew Southerland, 2014).

4.2. Areas of Cooperation

The two most heavily populated countries, India and China, are jointly accounting for more than a third of the total population of world. This makes the relations between these two states critical for those living in China and India as well as for the whole world. Even though there are tensions between India and China, the two states look for to collaborate on various issues. These tensions could be decreased by the Bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

4.2.1. Economic Cooperation

China and India took action to open their economies to the priorities of the post-Soviet world positively; however China led India to open the economy in its endeavour. To a large extent the economies of India and China are accompanying equally. Both the countries benefited from each other in technological strong points, transportation, agriculture, environment protection, energy saving and industrialization (Mohanty, 2014).

The trade volume of India and China noticeably developed with the significant improvement in their relation since the start of 1990s. The total size of trade between India and China was only \$264 million in 1990; it improved to \$1.16 billion, \$18.73 billion, \$30 billion and then \$66.47 billion in 1995, 2005, 2010 and 2012 orderly.

Furthermore, in form of labour cooperation China and India both collaborated with each other by mutual investment and economic cooperation. In some fields, India takes advantage from China like infrastructure investment, traditional medicine and foreign trade, while on some other fields China takes advantage from India like financial legal system and software services industry of India etc. They both are mutually beneficial to one another. Therefore, with mutual understanding and cooperation they are moving towards a peaceful direction. Although, an obstacle of the lack of trust remains there in the relation between India and China; this prevents them to fully develop their relationship. From a historical point of view, India and China are two super powers having very strong military, as well as, trade capacity till the 19th century which used to build up half the economy of the whole world but due to some external and internal factors, India and China, both rapidly reduced in terms of power in the 19th century. Now again, they went back to their position with steady growth since 1980 and 1990, respectively. Today, China has the second largest and India has the fourth largest economy in the world. China became the world largest exporter. In economic and strategic terms, China has emerged as a major world player during the last two decades. On December 11 2001, the entry of China in the World Trade Organization has raised worry of India for the impact on her banking, insurance, IT sectors, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and agriculture (Chanda, 2014). India's Setting of unit, in China, will directly help India's business and imports. Regionally, economic performance of China is superior to the performance of India. In the recently held ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh with South-East Asian countries, India proposed a free trade area. It helped the trade of India in the region but might fall in tough competition with China. These trade related competition in India and China is not ruled out but it will help to stabilise the economic relations more to produce favourable environment for most complex bilateral political problem to resolve.

4.2.2. Technological Cooperation

China and India initiated to modify business and trade relations from single service trade to bilateral investment and technological transfer cooperation in 1990s (Hongyu, 1995). To a certain degree, bilateral trade between India and China is corresponding, but at the same time many complexities rise for growing the trade considerably in the short run due to same products export supplies by India and China. Then again, with the cooperation in the area of technology, they both successively mutually enterprise with wide forecast in this new area. Over the recent years, collaboration in science and technology developed significantly in both the countries. More than hundred projects of science and technology, India and China flourished, especially, in the field of aerospace (Khasru, 2016).

4.2.3. Military and Security Cooperation

China and India are two rising powers economically as well as militarily. Military exchanges and cooperation between India and China before the implementation of 'Look East' policy was negligible (Yuan, 2006). The new international anti-terrorism situation and the improved Sino-India diplomatic and economic relations encouraged both the countries to endorse the military contact and cooperation. The two countries started to get the right way of military contact. In the end of the last century, China and India's defence ministers visited each other's countries successfully. Since then, India and China continuously arranged the visits of their Generals and Defence Ministers. They made worship visits and combined military exercises which were fruitful for their relations. On the issue of border, India and China, both, occupied actively for border talks. As far as this, seventeen negotiation rounds have been held for settling the border issue peacefully. Defence and security consultation between India and China were regularly held. Up till now six rounds of sessions have been fulfilled (Tian, 2014).The economic and military

powers are drawing both the countries to come closer and cooperate with each other because they realize that they can gain more by cooperation not by rivalries

Chapter 5

IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

China and Pakistan are the two great strategic partners having very good relations from the start of history. Their social, political and economic systems are different from one another despite that; they developed a multidimensional relationship with a good example of peaceful coexistence. China and Pakistan, both, have a common threat to their security from India in the region. This common threat became a source to make a strong bond of entente (Javid, 2015). A boundary agreement by China and Pakistan was signed to separate the boundary between Xinjiang and the adjacent areas. The government of India strongly opposed that agreement. India complained that there was no Sino-Pakistan common border, this decision was a step towards aggressive aim of China for India.

China gave Pakistan an economic, moral and diplomatic support when there was a war between India and Pakistan in 1965. China and Pakistan's regular visits to each other gave strength to their good relations and came closer to each other. China has been supporting Pakistan economically, technologically, militarily and diplomatically since 1980's. India-China 1962 border war, Indo-US good relations and Pak-India ties are the three factors which helped China and Pakistan to come closer. China also gave ultimatum to take apart India's military work on the China-Sikkim border side towards China. It led to an urgent call by Security Council for ceasefire (Rana, 2015).

However, in December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visit helped to take positive turn and the two countries agreed to resolve border issue with mutual cooperation. China and India both worked

hard to follow the agreement addressing the border issue but still differences on LAC existed (Hongyu, 1995). The border issue between India and China is very complicated and it requires more time and tolerance to settle down. The final issue resolution requires political skills with the political decision at the highest level to vend such a resolution on their own domestic constituencies (Yuan, 2005).

However, in bilateral ties, the current progress is the evidence that in other areas of improving relations and no obstruction will be permitted by this issue. The motive behind this is that the two countries, India and China, recognized that they can gain much more by trade and mutual cooperation rather than controversies. The aspiration of China for rapprochement with India has really set up new rudiments into the fragile relations of Pakistan, India and China. Some considerable changes have taken place in the China-Pak entente with the urbanization of Indo-China rapprochement in the period of post-9/11. The implication of growing strategic cooperation between India and China on Pakistan are following:

- The change in the policy of China to Pak-India relationship on Kashmir Issue has been most noticeable. In 1999, during Kargil war, China adopted a neutral policy for the first time rather than taking side of Pakistan, when forces of Pakistan and Kashmir moved aggressively into the Line of Control of Indian side.
- After 9/11, in December 2001, when India and Pakistan were on the edge of war due to terrorist attack on Indian parliament, China once again adopted a neutral policy despite of the fact that India was an apparent aggressor, China did not support Pakistan. The focus of China is on the internal development and to maintain a stable edge which led China to set its most important goal to stop any hostility or unrest along its border especially with India.

- The relation between China and Pakistan has slowly but surely lost its original meaning since the time in which India and China relations improved. The perception of neutral policy of China towards Pakistan and India is widely held in Pakistan (Bajpae).
- Today, Sino-Pakistan relations are not lacking a question mark. Principally, the reason is that China is a regional power as well as becoming a world power. So, China just does not have to cater Pakistan's interest but also its global interest. (Ikenberrt, 2010).The growing trade and commerce between India and China naturally increases the chance to develop good relations with each other. As a result, India boosted her economy, strengthened her armed forces more and more which she will be in a position to easily use on Pakistan after having China in South Asia as a neutral player for India and Pakistan.
- In the region, Sino-India military cooperation has made security order difficult for Pakistan. For the first time, China held combine military exercise with India. Cooperation between India and China gave India much access to military and industrial technology. India already having one of the world's largest army which is producing armored vehicles, tanks, naval vessels and jet fighters. The size of India's army is also double of that of Pakistan. Practically, considering the security arena as compared to India, this may put Pakistan in a weaker position. China is pleased to resolve dispute between India and Pakistan with making economic and development cooperative relations between them. Consequently, following Sino-India rapprochement, China may put pressure on Pakistan to alter its position on Kashmir issue. At the same time, Pakistan really is concerned about India's aggressive attitude towards Pakistan. According to some analysts, the

growing relation between India and China would change the balance of power in Asia.

This may solemnly worry Pakistan.

- Despite of the fact that Pakistan and China have good defense relations with each other, Pakistan could be concerned with the military exercises and exchanges of China with India. Military to military connections cover approach for a strong loyalty. The increasing joint military exercises on Indian Ocean, defense ties and growing trade and investment between India and China raise certain questions for Pakistan. During the reciprocated visit of China's defense minister, Cao Guangchuan to India, he stated to Indian General that China would like to deepen its defense and security cooperation with India. (Reports Xinhua, the news agency of China). So, they started the military exchanges with each other, again, which were halted in July, 2010 due to the refusal of China to give visa to a top commander of India for a visit to China. Pakistan could be seen really concerned to that position. (VivekRaghuvanshi, 2001.)
- Despite the fact that there are some limitations in Sino-India rapprochement because of the border issues, China and India have deepened their economic relations. The international environment has totally changed and both the countries have come closer. Some analysts argue that in next twenty to twenty five years there will be an appearance of 'Chindia'. Seeing their closeness, Pakistan proposed the energy corridor to attract China and for improving bilateral trade and economic cooperation, Pakistan has signed a dozen of agreements with China (Engardio, 2006).
- Pakistan's exports to China might be affected negatively by India's growing exports of agricultural and textile products.

- Growing relations between India and China can possibly pave a way to India to get support from China in UNSC to secure a seat. Once India becomes a permanent member of UNSC, it will surely be more arrogant for Pakistan and Kashmir issue or other disputes will be impossible to solve in a just manner.
- Policy of China to Pakistan is mainly determinant on three aspects; support to Pakistan by arming in order that its military remains able to face India, looking for help from Pakistan to stop producing danger by Islamist extremists in western China and China using Pakistan as a trade partner. All these are slowly declining in importance. China's relations with India are more saved than ever before.
- After the terrorist attack on US in September, 9/2001 the policy of China on the issue of Kashmir did not change. The foreign minister of China declared officially in 2002, when Pak-India relations became inconsistent that:

China's position on Kashmir issue has been clear. We have always kept the Kashmir issue in between Pakistan and India over by history. The two sides should look for a new way to solve the problem suitably through peaceful dialogues and exchanges refrain from military conflicts.

Parvez Musharraf in the same year visited China to get support from China on Kashmir issue but China did not change her policy. China stated that this issue should be solved between India and Pakistan with peaceful means.

Sino-India close relationship became a factor of cooled-off relations between China and Pakistan. In post 9/11, China continued to carry its rapprochement with India. On the other hand, US involvement in Central Asia and deep collaboration of US with India increased the strategic

importance of Pakistan for China. Pakistan takes an important position in the energy security of China (Saddiqi, 2011).

The growing Sino-India relations not only effect the Sino-Pakistan relations negatively but also give some opportunities to the neighbouring countries and to the region as well. These opportunities are as follows:

- Among the newly emerging countries, the two neighboring states, India and China, are on a fast rise. The two countries would offer vital and obligatory assurance of their friendly cooperation to the peaceful rise. China has become one of the largest trade partners with the rapid development of Sino-India trade and economic relations. Friendly relations have developed by China in a separate way with, both, Pakistan and India. These are favorable in South Asia's stability. Additionally, their focus was to normalize the relations with the countries contiguous to the border of China. (Ruisheng, *Sino-Indian Relations: Sixty Years of Experience and Enlightenment*, 2010)
- The Sino-India rapprochement and its implication for Pakistan, Pakistan being an established member of the mutual courtesy of nations, consider that developing relations between India and China would be helpful for objective achievement of ascertaining tranquility and stability in the area. It would also open new opportunities of collaboration for all the countries in South Asia.
- Mutual trust due to cooperation and dependence in the region because of Sino-Indian cooperation could help resolve Pak-India disputes.

- The string of pearl strategy of China will have economic and strategic benefits for Pakistan. Gawadar port and Pak-China economic corridor and maritime silk rout are developing as the result of this strategy

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this research has been to study the contemporary growing bilateral economic and strategic relation between China and India and to explore the possible implication of these relations on Pakistan. The rise of two countries in the same geographic region has historically been a cause of conflict; India and China has themselves been a victim to those tensions, a number of times, but now China does not consider India as a threat because they both are cooperating in a number of avenues. They improved strategic and economic ties because of their mutual interest. The two countries, India and China, have actually decided to freeze the border dispute and increase economic and other relations which would produce mutual confidence and energy for ultimate solution of the border issues. However, with some tension, their relations would continue to be overwhelmed. To seek ultimate resolution of boundary issues, a political framework was developed by India and China which nominated special representatives and signed different agreements. The hostility and fear between China and India got aside with the help of economic cooperation and their mutual gains.

They really are concerned about restoring their relations of pre-conflict period because of the strategic importance. Soviet-US rivalry came to an end on one side and on the other side soviet good relations with India ended because India lost its priority in Soviet foreign policy. Now, India and China, both are considering one another as an opportunity. China and India, both, perceive the strength of each other as a strong benefit in growing investment, trade and joint

technology projects. These all happenings lead India and China to move closer and tighten their bilateral relations.

China also maintained good relations with Pakistan by giving moral, defence, trade and economic support. The aspiration of China for rapprochement with India has really set up new rudiments into the fragile relations of Pakistan, India and China. Some considerable changes have taken place in the China-Pak entente with the urbanization of Indo-China rapprochement in the period of post-cold war. Sino-India close relationship became a factor of cooled off relations between China and Pakistan. The relations between China and Pakistan have slowly but surely lost its original meaning since from the time in which India and China relations improved because of the policy change of China towards Pakistan to become a neutral player between India and Pakistan. Policy of China to Pakistan is mainly determinant on three aspects; support Pakistan by arming her in order that it remains a military able to face India, looking for help from Pakistan to stop producing danger by Islamist extremists in western China, and China using Pakistan as a trade partner. All these are slowly declining in importance. China's relations with India are more saved than ever before.

Despite the fact that Sino-India growing relations are negatively affecting Pakistan to some extent but it is creating some positive impact also. Friendly relations of China with both, Pakistan and India, have developed China in a separate way. These are favourable in South Asia's stability. Also, the mutual trust due to cooperation and dependence in the region, because of Sino-Indian cooperation, has helped in the resolution of Pak-India disputes. In the next twenty five years, Pakistan relations with China need to be characterized again while the focus of China would remain on economic ascend. Entente cordiale between Pakistan and China will continue

unabated but in the next 20-25 years, position may not remain the same. Despite of the fact that China has military ties with Pakistan, there might be impede in the economic loop. In addition, Pakistan and China, both, need to develop their positive and actual cooperation in further areas; like from armed to nation-nation links. China should, also, go back over cooperation with Pakistan. Both the countries need to go to one another with diplomatic hold on core matters. In the past, China delayed to implement the agreements with Pakistan; this gave a chance to other countries to replace China, for Pakistan. China should implement the agreements fast and positively. Moreover, the estimated jobs in the China's ventures in Balochistan have failed to meet the target. The people of the bordering tribal areas of Balochistan hardly require employment. Pakistan and China are supposed to aim at generating and rising prospects and opportunities for them. This may tighten the bond between Pakistan and China more.

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