

ARAB-IRAN CONFLICT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST



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FINAL APPROVAL

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
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DECLARATION

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Sager Ghalib Almotairi

DEDICATION

“To my teachers - present and past - who are praiseworthy for their sustenance of me on the right lines because I am today, only due to their untiring efforts for my sake.”

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

My Journey through the Gates of Knowledge is Hard but I Enjoy it.....

A Ph.D. requires a lot of hard work, many sleepless nights, and working all day. It is not, in fact, a bed of roses. Yet, I'm appreciative to All-powerful Ullah for empowering me to go through this difficult situation with vital achievement.

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“..... hat off and a three guns' salute to all of them!”

ABSTRACT

The Arab World is one of the most significant regions - both in terms of geopolitics and contemporary political issues. The Arabs and Iranians are the two key players of regional standing. However, the relations between the two have been extremely tense. This tense state of affairs raises many questions, for example: how does the Arab-Iranian relations are shaping the cultural, religious, socio-economic, and socio-geopolitical environment of the region? How has the self-perpetuating conflicting relationship between the two been mellowing on cultural, political, economic, and military fronts? How has Iran been employing proxies to further its regional designs? How the Arab States have been responding to the challenges of destabilization and what innovation has taken place to counter any such threats? These are important questions since the stability of the whole Arab region depends upon how the relations with Iran are shaped. The main objective of this study is to analyze the status of two main regional players and assess them in terms of geopolitics, military capabilities, and economic stability. The study also focuses on analyzing the power potential of Iran and the Arabs and investigating the socio-cultural basis of their conflict. In addition, this study also analyzes the Iranian way of reorienting the region and examining Arab strategy to counter such revisionist aspirations. The Iranian power from geo-strategic and geo-economic perspectives is measured by its potential ability to sustain itself and move forward. On the other hand, most of the Arab world, having emerged to be a formidable force under dynamic leadership, has been analyzed as a counterweight to the Iranian influence in the region. In summary, the Arab world looks well-positioned in terms of resources and geopolitical status as compared to Iran and is better placed to lead from the front for resolving the core issues of the region.

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INTRODUCTION

The Arabian Gulf region has typically been a source of contention. Saul Cohen¹ identifies four primary causes of intraregional conflict in the Middle East and Arabian Gulf including land limit demands, regional conflicts, irredentism, and water scarcity. The conflict between Israel and Palestine in the region is one of many others, and the dispute between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over the well-known Abu-Musa Island and other smaller islands in the Arabian Gulf. The situation is also being exacerbated by the old informal issues between Iran and Bahrain² and the Kurdish irredentist movement's recent developments in Turkey and Iraq.³ In addition, the main factor in the region's destabilization is the conflicts over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey and Iraq and Syria over the Euphrates' water resources, which brought the two countries to the brink of war in 1974. Lastly, any effort to stabilize the region has been shaken by the dispute between Israel and Syria over the Jordan stream's waters.

The Shi'ite–Sunni partisan struggle in post-2003 Iraq, with critical overflow impacts in the Gulf subregion and elsewhere, and the Iran–US nuclear conflict, with its substantial local repercussions, have added to the contention framework. The US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the resulting "fall of Baghdad" to the US have further extended the contention framework.⁴ The Iran-Saudi rivalry in Iraq and the Levant to expand their respective political spheres is the most concerning of these. These arguments, typically sparked by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, have come to dominate international pressures against Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbors right now. Due to several factors, the Arabian Gulf is regarded as the world's most important region on the map. The region has a long history of importance, and not only is it considered a large area due to oil production and extraction, but it is also located in the center of the world, connecting all of the world's financial and trading routes.

¹ Cohen, S. B. (2003). *Geopolitics of the world system*. Rowman & Littlefield.

² Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, relations between the two countries have been strained over various geopolitical issues such as the interpretations of Islam, aspirations for leadership of the Islamic world, and relations with the United States, Europe, and other Western countries. In addition, Iran has been severely critical of Bahrain for hosting the United States Fifth Fleet within the Persian Gulf at the Naval Support Activity Bahrain base. After the Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran were ransacked by Iranian protesters following the execution of Nimr al-Nimr, Bahrain followed Saudi Arabia's decision by severing diplomatic relations with Iran on January 4, 2016.

³ Kurdish nationalist uprisings have periodically occurred in Turkey, beginning with the ... Turkish Republic (Turkish Kurdistan), Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan).

⁴ See for details, Tuathail, G. Ó. (2003). "Just out looking for a fight: American affect and the invasion of Iraq. *Antipode*, 35(5), 856-870"

By and large, the groundwork of Iran was the result of the Persian Domain which was an less common power from 500 BC to 651 Promotion. Due to a significant conflict in 1501, that saw Twelver Shi'ism (the fall of Muhammad al Mehdi) declared as Iran's legitimate religion, while Sunnism was significantly maintained, the Safavid Empire offered to ascend to Iran's development. Shi'ism emerged as a means of isolating Iran from the Sunni Empire. Safavids carried out a violent mission against the Ottoman Empire and used the outskirts of Iraq to convert people. This created a wider divide between *Shias* and Sunnis and gave rise to the Iran- Iraq War. To add to this further, Khomeini's overthrow in 1979 changed some aspects of Iran by forcing Shi'ism speculations.⁵

Three major conflicts and wars within the Arab States over the past few years have resulted in local and global fragility. The Iran-Iraq conflict, the US attack on Iraq, and the Gulf War of 1990 and 1991 caused chaos throughout the region. In general, Iran was more likely to engage its political and atomic framework after Iraq fell. Iran, a powerful political and military power, used its influence in the region; the ability to intervene in the war that is currently taking place in the Gulf States and to demonstrate its capability of sending arms into the region, as well as the power and capacity to destabilize the entire equilibrium in the region. Despite this, Iran and the Gulf States share a common interest in that they share a common entrance to the world, such as the Strait of Hormuz, which provides a route for Iran and the Gulf States to transport oil and gas to the rest of the world.

Iran is an outer Gulf region and because of its strong geographical location wants to play a significant role in the Gulf issues.⁶ As noted by Olmstead (2008), historically, the Persians had a strong stake in the Arabian Gulf. They have, therefore, a great pride over this position even today and this very pride and misrepresentation of its grandiosity are the root causes of the desire to rule

⁵ Under Khomeini's leadership, Iran replaced its millennia-old monarchy with a theocratic republic. Khomeini brought about a major paradigm shift in Shia Islam. He declared that Islamic jurists are the true holders of religious and political authority, who must be obeyed as "an expression of obedience to God". For details, see: "Hamid Algar, 'Development of the Concept of velayat-i faqih since the Islamic Revolution in Iran,' paper presented at London Conference on wilayat al-faqih, in June, 1988] [p.135-8]. Also, *Ressalat*, Tehran, 7 January 1988, online http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/khomeini_promises_kept.html#Laws_in_Islam".

⁶ For more details, please see: "Abbasi Semnani, A. (2013). Iran's geopolitical position in the regional and world power relations. *Scientific-Research Quarterly of Geographical Data (SEPEHR)*, 22(SEPEHR), 96-104". Briefly, situated at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Arab states of the Middle East. This strategic position—and its access to the Persian Gulf in the south—have made Iran an important country throughout its history.

it.⁷ According to Salisbury (2015), Iran has a long history that dates back three thousand years. As a result, the country has played a significant role in exerting influence over the Gulf States⁸. In ancient times, from 550 to 330 BC in the Achaemenid, 140-224 in the Parthian, and 224-651 in the Sasanian traditions, Iran was considered to be a support for human advancement. Iran was probably the best domain that extended from the Hellespont to northern India, from Egypt to Central Asia, and up to where Kazakhstan is today. Despite this, Iran isn't seen as the major power it was in the past, especially in modern times. Because of out-of-date significance, Iran values the commonness over different neighbors and the Bay States, yet today in regional terms the country accepts no dominating capability in the Bay area. Other than this, the geographical area, military strength, largest gross, public good, and population of Iran are all direct indicators of its intervention in the Gulf. The nation has the largest military and naval force among its littoral States, and it appears to be the most grounded. The populace is over 60 million with the greatest GNP. The level of education is higher than in other nations, and the economy is extremely complex and depends on innovation. It has expansive farming offices and is more extravagant in the oil and gas industry. As a result, by pursuing the significant, significant, geographical, educational, and financial factors, they assumed a predominant role and intervened in the projects of other Gulf States. Despite all these, there is a huge difference between Iran and the rest of the world because of religious ideologies and the unique approach of the Iranians towards the rest of the Gulf countries with an expansionistic desire to export its ideology across the Gulf. For this very approach, Iran is reflected as a country with the lowest potential to form bilateral relations with its neighbors, particularly, the Arabs.⁹

⁷ Iran because of a history full of pride is having the desire to have its dominant position in the region (A Brief History of 20th-Century Iran

<https://greyartgallery.nyu.edu/>)

⁸ For a more complete history of the Persian Revolution see E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), reprinted edition; Mangol Bayat, *Iran's First Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Nikki Keddie and Mehrdad Amanat, "Iran Under the Late Qajars, 1848–1922," *Cambridge History of Iran*, v. 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 174–212; and Nikki Keddie, *Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, 1796–1925* (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Press, 1999)

⁹ In the modern political era after the second world war, Iran despite its all potential to prove itself as a powerful state has failed to use its strength. Firstly, Iran's State Delicacy Record is 52 out of 178 states, which places it in the "high advance notice" class for its absence of soundness (the lower the positioning, the higher the level of state precariousness). This score indicates that Iran's domestic management policies are unsustainable, posing serious challenges to stability, economic management, and legitimacy. Environmental degradation, a disastrous human rights record, and incompetence in response to natural disasters are just a few examples of mismanagement and lack of accountability. The most recent illustration of absurd blunder was Iran's shooting down of the Ukrainian traveler plane in the first part of the day of its retaliatory assaults on U.S. bases in Iraq that followed the death of Soleimani. Rather than tolerating liability, it at first concealed the reason, and later buckled under worldwide strain. For the past few

Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran has entered a period of authority and power in the region as a solid political and military power in the region; driven by its political ambitions and the region's desire to strengthen its financial and international relations. Iran moved in the direction of control after Saddam Hussein's regime fell and a new era of power began. It did the same in Iraq and the Gulf States. In addition, the state's vision was expanded after witnessing the 'Arab Spring' revealing its nuclear ambition to the entire world. However, Iran's nuclear ambitions created uncertainty and precariousness throughout the region. Iran emphasized the direction of the Middle East after raising its voice to demonstrate its military might; a verifiable rift developed between Iran and the Gulf States, paving the way for the new era. Not only did Iran interfere in the Middle East's political affairs, but it also interfered in the region's internal affairs, such as sharp contrasts with its stature and rising security risks for the entire region, which contributed to Iran's unsettling political influence.

The Arab World (in ancient times known ¹⁰, going against the norm, is the biggest part of the Islamic World. As Bedouin Arab identity,¹¹ the Arabs have an independent economy and political identity in the region that is well-suited to them.¹² One of the most prominent examples

days, this incident has sparked protests across the nation. Iran also detained the British Ambassador to Iran after he attended a funeral for the passengers of the downed Ukrainian plane, causing another international incident. Iran's most concerning issues comes from the uncommon, and frequently inconvenient, double arrangement of government that blends decisions in with a strong Preeminent Pioneer. Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, has veto power over Iranian decision-making and oversees, among other things, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the judicial system, and state television. There are rumors that Khamenei will resign at the age of almost 80. Even though Khamenei's position is said to be based on his religious authority, his religious credentials have always been questionable, and he lacks the charisma of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The current leader was able to consolidate his power and expand the Supreme Leader institution, but he did so through revolutionary action and political loyalty rather than careful theological study.

¹⁰ According to 'Encyclopedia Britannica' "Bedouin, also spelled Beduin, Arabic Badawi and plural Badw, Arabic-speaking nomadic peoples of the Middle Eastern deserts, especially of North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan".

¹¹ Ancestral characters and affiliations stay significant social and political markers in the cutting edge and urbanized countries of the Middle Eastern Landmass. However, it has become increasingly challenging to define what exactly constitutes a "tribal" situation in such settings, which are vastly different from the environments in which tribes originated. Although the tribe's influence is still felt in the state's political institutions, as well as in social life in general and even in state-sponsored national heritage and identity projects, it is true that the tribe is less visible as a tangible political structure than it was prior to the oil boom. "Tribalism and Political Power in the Gulf:" by Alanoud Alsharekh.

¹² After World War II, the Arab development model combined strong nationalist undertones with an emphasis on domestic production and trade protectionism, also known as import substitution industrialization. The majority of Arab states experienced positive economic growth in the first few decades following the war. Many made colossal additions in future, proficiency, and general wellbeing. The oil embargo of 1973 helped the Middle East become the

of the concept of a region with military, economic, geographic, and geopolitical capabilities is the Arab world. The Arab nationalists hold the belief that the Arab nation existed before the rise of nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries as a separate historical entity. The Arab nation developed because of the spread of Islam as a religion and culture in the region and the gradual adoption of Arabic as the language of communication. Both Arabic and Islam filled in as the mainstays of the region. Arab nationalism, as defined by Suleiman (2003), embodies "Arabs' consciousness of their specific characteristics as well as their endeavor to build a modern state capable of representing the common will of the nation and all its constituent parts." The Arab World emphasizes the integrated model of international relations in opposition to this introduction of power; consequently, comprehensive power gave it prominence in the international system.¹³

The Arab World is geographically divided into numerous States. This geographical division is a disadvantage but an opportunity as well unless and until the Arabs are not made to acknowledge the importance of a single political entity. This desire of the small Arab States has been embodied in various forms, particularly, the Arab League, the GCC, and most recently the Islamic Military Alliance. The Arab world is regarded as the cradle of civilization, and people moved along the Red Sea to northern Arabia and northern Africa, south to the Arabian Sea, eastern and southeastern Africa, and up to the Gulf due to drought and water scarcity. One of the largest populations of its kind, the Arab world has a wide range of languages, colors, human abilities, and geographical features. It is possible to say that all its nations share many social, linguistic, and demographic characteristics, including high rates of marriage, early marriage, and direct and non-dispersal pregnancies; This results in an increase in youth rates and population growth rates, which

world's fastest-growing region in the 1960s and 1970s². This event permanently changed the structure of international energy markets and set the stage for the phenomenal hydrocarbon revenues that followed. Arab states developed authoritarian bargains over time, which were implicit social contracts between governments and citizens in which social welfare, employment, and security were traded for political complacency. Unprecedented wealth began to accrue to the oil-exporting nations, particularly the Gulf monarchies.

¹³ As per Encyclopedia Britannica, "Arab integration, efforts aimed at achieving closer cooperation and assimilation between different Arab countries and subregions. Depending on the context in which the concept is used, *integration* could be meant as political, economic, or institutional. The term has been used in various frameworks, and its meaning has evolved and shifted over time. Originally employed as part of a larger project aimed at unifying the numerous Arab countries into a single Arab nation, Arab integration has also been discussed in strictly economic terms. When studied in this perspective, it is associated with efforts by Arab countries to liberalize their economies and connect with global markets".

in turn results in an increase in burdens, dependency, and the rate of illiteracy, particularly among Arab women. The Arabs, who wield potentially substantial political power in the form of the Arab League and the GCC, have been able to lay the groundwork for peace and prosperity in the region.¹⁴

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the contemporary Middle East issue presents both a danger and an opportunity to the region and the world. The Middle East's peace is a guarantee of world peace. For example, President Bush, while attending the Saban Forum on December 5, 2008, to talk about American policy in the Middle East said that no region is more key to the security of America or the tranquility of the world than the Middle East - The Middle East that is free and peaceful will be a beacon of hope, a place of opportunity, and a crucial contributor to global prosperity. After World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was divided into fragments that European powers picked up in their search for control of the region, the order was disrupted by the emerging competition for power and influence in the Middle East. The Arab world has remained the Middle East's political center, despite being broken and under intense geopolitical pressure. Conflicts and combat lines were shaped by the negative conflict that existed between the Arabs and Iranians, which led to ethnic and sectarian divides that have persisted to the present day after the Iranian revolution in 1979. The 'Arab nationalism', swept across the region following World War II and placed the Arab world at the center of global strategy in the Middle East. The Arab nationalist movement is said to have experienced an "irreversible" slide toward "political marginality" following Israel's defeat of the Arab coalition in the 1967 Six-Day War, which Nasser, the current leader of the Arab nationalist movement, had dubbed "the battle of destiny."¹⁵

After Iran was identified as the perpetrator of attacks on oil installations and tanks in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, particularly the drone attack on a Saudi oil installation in

¹⁴ In terms of hydrocarbon endowment per capita, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states can be divided into two main camps, which may partially explain the divergent policy stances. Compared to Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, the rich triplet of Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has a small population but a large hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) endowment. Through their sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have been effectively investing their excess wealth for domestic economic diversification and overseas investments. Due to their wealth, the wealthy triplet perceives the imminent threat of decarbonization of the global energy system as less severe than the other GCC members. The relationship between these states will be further strained by the anticipated decline in oil demand and revenue over the next ten years.

¹⁵ "Dawisha, A. I. (2003). *Arab nationalism in the twentieth century: from triumph to despair*. Internet Archive. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press. p. 282"

2019,¹⁶ the international community used the Iranian threat as a justification to negotiate a historic peace agreement with all parties in the region. Saudi Arabia increased its pressure on Donald Trump to respond to a devastating strike on two major oil installations by displaying drone and missile technology that, according to the kingdom, demonstrated that the attack was "unquestionably sponsored by Iran."¹⁷ In terms of basic defense efforts, the Middle East has been the most militarized region in the world; as a percentage of GDP, as a percentage of central government expenditures, and in terms of arms as a percentage of total imports, spends significantly more on military forces than anyone else in the world. Two external actors are becoming more and more frequently involved in national conflicts, although the Middle East is experiencing an exponential increase in its regional instability, particularly in light of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. In a regional Cold War that has lasted for years and had several negative effects on the region, Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are competing for power.

For many decades, internal conflicts have gripped the Middle East. Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been the two main rivals. Russia has been backing Iran, while the US has been backing the Arabs. In addition, Iran is attempting to become a nuclear power and has built a stronger military than the Arabs, its regional rival. The Arabs in general, and Saudi Arabia, in particular, were inspired in 2011 by the events of the Arab Spring to use a variety of strategies to lessen Iran's influence in the region, while Iran has been creating and strengthening certain groups, directing them to attack and occupy parts of Syria and Iraq, and directing ISIL's policies against the Shiites, effectively turning the territory of Syria and Iraq into a hotbed of civil war. Questions about the reasons behind the recent and significant shifts in Arab foreign policy between 2020 and 2021, particularly after the Democrats came to power in the United States, from an aggressive stance toward Iran and Syria to a policy of dialogue and engagement, are raised.

II. Statement of the Problem

The Arab-Iranian conflict is causing the region to become unstable. Iran has entered a period of authority as a solid political and military power in the region, particularly after the

¹⁶ This refers to the drone attack as reported by Al-Jazeera (Oil attacks 'unquestionably sponsored by Iran': Saudi Arabia | Drone Strikes News | Al Jazeera)

¹⁷ "Saudi offers 'proof' of Iran's role in oil attack and urges US response | Iran | The Guardian"

revolution. The post-revolution Iran is driven by its political and historical desire to strengthen its financial and international relationships. To provide safety to its self-perceived threat from Western influence, Iran has been involved in achieving nuclear capability. This ambition has created concerns and worries in the region. Iran escalated toward the Gulf States after raising its voice to assert its nuclear might as the dominant power; came about when Iran and the States of the Middle East had a recorded disagreement, which gave rise to a new era. In addition to political issues, Iran's pointless (from which perspective) religious mediations with Gulf States also addressed internal issues, such as the stark contrasts between its height and the rising security risks for the region as a whole, which contributed to political strife. As a result, the investigation's primary objective was to conduct an assumption-based and fact-based audit of the Arab-Iranian conflict.

III. Objectives of the Study

This study aims at achieving the following objectives:

- a. Analyze and compare the power potential (material capabilities and alliances) of Iran and Arabs.
- b. Explore the socio-cultural basis of the Arab-Iranian conflict.
- c. Analyze the Iranian way of reorienting the region to increase its influence.
- d. Analyze the response of the Arab world to Iranian revisionist aspirations in the region.

IV. Primary Question

How the Arab-Iranian relation does is shaping the cultural, religious, socio-economical, and socio-geopolitical environment of the region?

V. Secondary Questions

Keeping the above research question in view the following are the hypothetical research questions:

1. How the Arab States and Iran be compared in terms of potential power at strategic, political, economic, and military fronts?
2. How the conflict between Iran and the Arabs has been developing through the years in terms of cultural, political, economic, and military fronts?
3. How Iran has been employing proxies in different ways and means to further its regional designs?
4. How the Arab States have been responding to the revisionist aspirations of Iran and what innovation has taken place to counter Iranian threats more comprehensively?

V. Rationale of the Study

The Arabian Gulf divides Iran and the Arab world geographically, which is important from a strategic standpoint. The divide that separates the two civilizations in terms of their cultural identity dates back hundreds of years. The core of the Arab world attributes its cultural heritage to Islam, whereas Iranians still attribute their past to the great Persian Empires that existed before Islam's rise. Even though the rise of the Nazi party tarnished the Aryan identity and stigmatized many Oriental customs, Iranians of today still admire the traces of ancient Iranian culture.¹⁸ After Persia was completely conquered in 651 AD during the reign of the second rightly guided Caliph Umar Ibn al- Khattab (May Allah be pleased with him), Islam provided the connecting link between the two. The Persians remained under Islamic empires for centuries, but they kept their old Persian identity. Bernard Lewis, a well-known Middle Eastern expert, stated in this context that Arabs could not Arabize Persians because they succeeded in Islamizing them.¹⁹ As a result, the divide between Arab and Persian countries persists and has grown as time has passed.²⁰

The Arabs and Iranians achieved independence in the middle of the 20th century after centuries of being under Western and Ottoman colonial rule. Although, Iran was never colonized in the sense as other countries were colonized by the Americans or the Europeans, primarily because it was within the British and Russian spheres of influence, which meant that neither nation would allow the other to take full control of Iran. Because Britain and Russia co-ruled Iran through

¹⁸ For a detailed account, please see: "Iranian Philosophy of Religion and the History of Political Thought" by Ahmad R. Motameni. Retrieved on 23-4-2022 from: "Iranian Philosophy of Religion and the History of Political Thought" (escholarship.org)

¹⁹ Lewis, B. (2002). *Arabs in history*. OUP Oxford. Also, For more details, see for example "Bernard Lewis, *From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 43-44".

²⁰ Arabization was not "resisted" by the Persians. Arabs were content to rule others and enjoy the privilege of being the only people who spoke what they perceived as the wonderful and superior Arabic language, so there was never a policy of Arabization. It is clearly a Semitic trait to be proud of one's culture and language but not want to share it with others. On the off chance that you mean to inquire as to why, for example, Syria and Egypt turned out to be to a great extent Arab or, really, Arabic-talking though Iran didn't, one has to accept the explanation lies in the social distinction between the Arabs and the nearby networks. Aramaic, which was almost identical to Arabic and originated in the Arabian Peninsula, was spoken by Syrians. In this manner, it was more straightforward for most Syrians to skirt the little contrast among them and their Arab rulers and embrace the language of the Middle Easterner tribesmen. On the other hand, Iranians spoke many Indo-European languages, such as Persian, Kurdish, Balochi, and the now-defunct Daylami. Because Tajik and Dari, which are spoken in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, are actually dialects of Persian, I do not include them.) To put it another way, their culture and language were very different from those of the first Arab rulers. Besides, after years and years, Bedouin rulers were supplanted first by nearby Iranian rulers and afterward by the Seljuks and different lines of Turkic or Turkish beginning, so Iran was controlled by Turkish administrations until the twentieth 100 years. Because of this, Iranian languages today contain a lot of Arabic loanwords that are related to Islam. However, almost all Iranians still speak either Indo-Iranian languages or Turkish/Turkic languages, the latter being the result of Turkic migrations that began with the Seljuks in the 10th century.

the puppet Shahs and established their respective spheres of influence there, they were not required to impose direct rule, as the British were forced to do in India following the 1857 uprising. For comparative reasons, China, Thailand, Ethiopia, and Turkey got away from the destiny of turning into conventional provinces.²¹ After acquiring particular sovereign positions, the propensities of contention were there between Iran under Pahlvi Shah and Middle Easterner States yet escalation came after Islamic Upset in Tehran under Khomeini. The conflict escalated and took very serious turns over the next few years as Khomeini vowed to export the revolution throughout the Arab world with the intention of destabilizing Arab States. The eight-year Iran-Iraq War, in which almost the entire Arab world backed Saddam Hussein to eliminate Iranian threats, was the result of this growing conflict. Iran became less powerful throughout the eight-year conflict, and as a result, it no longer posed a real threat to the Arab world.

Iran started getting golden opportunities to become influential and play its cards in the form of proxy war even beyond its territory after recovering from the scars of war in the 1990s. Iran was very fortunate after 9/11 because the United States of America (USA) gave Iran a gift by overthrowing its two primary enemies' regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran's increased interaction with *Shia* populations and leadership in both States led to an increase in its influence. By tempting Shiite minority populations, Iran began expanding its covert influence throughout the Arab world in 2003.²² Jordanian King Abdullah stated in 2004 that Iran was establishing a Shiite Crescent throughout Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. From its base in Lebanon, Hezbollah waged a thirty-three-day war against Israel in 2006, demonstrating the full extent of Iranian covert play through Iraq and Syria.

²¹ Although some of these responses are partially correct, they overlook the fact that European colonialism began in 1492 and only covers the past few hundred years. Early in the colonial era, the Portuguese constructed castles and forts on the islands in southern Iran. When the Safavid Shah Abbas learned of this, he basically subcontracted the British West India Company to gather its naval fleet and eliminate the Portuguese (communication was much slower back then, there was no internet). Persia was not a maritime power so this was a coherent choice as the English have areas of strength for a custom and the Somewhat English Persian armada was fruitful in canceling the Portuguese. The fact of the matter is that the central governments from Ismail Shah of the Safavid Empire all the way up to the Qajars were strong enough to withstand European colonialism. Sometimes this was done directly, like Nader Shah's military successes against Russia, which led to the Treaty of Rasht, or by using the resources of one Western power against another, like when the Anglo-Persian took over the island of Hormuz in 1622.

²² Isa, K. H. (2018). "Sunni literary responses to the spread of Shia ideology in northern Nigeria. *Studies in African Languages and Cultures*, (52), 113-130".

Iran played a very covert role in expanding its influence and causing instability throughout the Arab world by supporting Shiite militias in Iraq, supporting Houthi rebels in Yemen, encouraging *Shias* to organize protests in Bahrain, encouraging smaller pockets of Shiites to engage in violence in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and supporting the Assad regime to maintain power. Iran has even provided Hamas and Palestine with support to incite violence and exacerbate the Palestinian issue, preventing any amicable resolution between the two States. Arab leadership has been taking proactive measures to counter Iranian plans. The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have served as the foundation for coordinated diplomatic actions against Iran. Through the formation of the Islamic Military Alliance (IMA), not only has soft power been developed at the level of the Muslim World, but the international community has also been made aware of Iran's expansionist and destabilizing agenda through proxy warfare.

From a variety of perspectives, this current study is very important and a call for the contemporary Middle East political status. Firstly, the issue of Arab-Iranian animosity, which dates back to ancient times but has recently intensified, needs to be highlighted with the emphasis that the conflict is between the Arabs as a whole and Iran. From a geostrategic and economic standpoint, Iran's power is measured by its potential capacity to sustain itself and advance. To determine the extent of the threat, both Iran's overt and covert efforts to destabilize Arab States have been thoroughly investigated. The Arab world has been analyzed as a power to reckon with to respond to the Iranian challenge of destabilization. Under vigorous leadership, it has emerged as a formidable force at the institutional level. In addition to being a very useful piece for academics, this study is of immense value to government and think tank strategic policymakers.

VI. Literature Review

Geo-Political and Economic Impasse between Iran and Arab Region

Nuruzzaman in “*Conflicts between Iran and the Gulf Arab States: An Economic Evaluation*” discusses the economic reasons for the conflict between the Arabs and Iran. It discusses the financial reasons behind the war between the Arabs and Iran. Topographically, Iran imparts its fringe to the whole northern seashores of the Arabian Gulf States Iran and the Gulf Arab States, particularly Saudi Arabia, have engaged in more intense geopolitical conflicts and competition since 2003 in the Persian Gulf subregion. Most experts and scholars have looked at the conflicts through political and strategic lenses without considering the economic aspects. This article examines the various conflicts that erupted between Iran and the Gulf Arab States after 2003, focusing on how incentives to resolve or maintain conflicts are created by economic integration or its absence. It concludes that Iran's Gulf Arab neighbors' lack of economic cooperation and low levels of economic integration prevents any significant efforts to end the conflicts. The Strait of Hormuz, which further offers the capability to control the entire Gulf States.

Hokayem (2014) reported the economic measurements are deemphasized, which has a big impact in heightening the contentions among Kuwait, Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. The Middle East is the hotbed of contentions due to restricting debates, local questions water lack, and irredentism an observation by Bulloch and Morris (2016). Among them, the maximum important clashes are of (i) Israel and Palestinian local (ii) UAE-Iran clashes over the greater modest island and Abu Musa (iii) Iran's claims over Bahrain (iv) Kurdish irredentist development in Syria, and Iraq, and the contentions among Syria and Israel (Goode, 2014). The U.S. assault on Iraq has moreover introduced extending the competition grid wherein the new clash developed (Pradhan, 2018). These contentions are sequentially related with every different inclusive of the Sunni – Shi'ite brutality that raised Iran – US atomic clashes and Iran-Saudi rivalry. Subsequently, those clashes touched off at some point with the US attack on Iraq in 2003, which noticeably contributed to political stress in the region. Towards worldwide strain among Iran and the Gulf location (Goudarzi and Nazarpour, 2019).

Iranian Ideology and the Gulf States

Iranian philosophy relies on peculiar religious interpretations. During the 1979 Iranian revolution, many political and interest groups in Iranian society came together to overthrow the Shah. This would ultimately prompt the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in April 1979 and the production of another constitution that December. However, there were two distinct movements in Iran: the movement to overthrow the Shah and the movement to establish a new political system. As Moghadam (2002:1137) contends, 'Iran had two upsets... the egalitarian transformation... [and] the Islamic upheaval'. The Shi'a Islam mosques and the clergy who ran them were the only venues for any Iranian citizen dissatisfied with the Shah because most of the protests and anger expression channels had been shut down at the beginning of the 1970s. According to Richard (1995:80),²³ the situation is as follows: The mosque served as a center for popular mobilization, a distribution center for necessities, and headquarters for revolutionary committees. As far as hierarchical design and power, then, at that point, the ulema of Iran assumed a crucial part. To answer the question of how Islamic the Iranian revolution was, it is essential to discuss the ulema's role in the revolution in 1979. It will be demonstrated that the demands of the populace did not have a strong connection to Islam, but rather that Islam permitted these demands to be expressed and became the primary driver of the revolution.

In keeping with Ehteshami and Nonneman (2015), the philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeini and his alternative depends on the angles of the person that follows the "proper manner", which is exposed by Allah to his prophets and who observes the "degenerate way" that is for doubters (Hassan, 2015). Hence, Iran views itself as an Islamic nation dedicated to battling with the oppressor. on this recognize, Iran has named the US as the '*Satan*' and they would not recognize any legitimated and controlled out of collaboration with the US on the Gulf protection (Milani, 2018).

Iranian movement and Intervention into Arabian Gulf regions

Iran is a non-Arab Gulf state. But it has synchronous cravings with a view to playing an unmistakable part in the Gulf issues (Berti and Guzansky, 2014). After getting back to Iran in 1979, the fundamentalist heads of the Islamic Republic taught an entire age of understudies,

²³ For details, see: "Richard, Y. 1995. "*Shi'ite Islam: Polity, Ideology, and Creed*. Blackwell: Oxford".

activists, and residents about the "debauched" West, "bad" Middle Easterner legislatures, and the "ill-conceived" province of Israel. The same rhetoric is still propagated by the nation's most important institutions, the body politic, officials, administrators, and the ideological machinery of the deep state. Strangely, while there have been a few discussions about strategy westward overall and the US specifically in the scholar and research organization local area in Iran throughout the long term, conversation about the Center East arrangement has pretty much been missing. The Middle East policy of Iran is viewed in a different light—almost sanctified—with the assumption that it is immune to criticism and that its justification cannot be questioned. Iran's relations with the Middle Easterner world are the most unsteady and violent in its whole international strategy engineering. Iran's foreign policy in the Middle East and beyond will continue to be shaped and energized by national security and regime security concerns, such as expanding the confrontational playground with Washington and gaining political leverage over Israel and the United States. By and by, the far-reaching fights in Iran that started in mid-September, following the grievous demise of Mahsa Amini while in confinement, have impelled a mind-boggling worldwide response, and the Islamic Republic of Iran's worldwide picture and standing has never been so low. It is still unclear what measures need to be taken and how long it will take to fix the problem, if at all, given the country's shifting foreign policy.

Iran's craving to weigh-down the Gulf region because of its perceived public satisfaction and the misrepresented discernment for the pretentiousness is a long historic inspiration. As per Salisbury (2015), Iran has a long history, which goes back 3000 years because of this, the country has wealthy involvement with training its effect over the Gulf States. It has been perceived as the help of human progress and in old events throughout 550 to 330 BC Achaemenid, 140-224 Parthian, and 224- 651 Sasanian traditions. Iran turned into possibly the exceptional domain that stretched out from the Hellespont in the direction of northern India and from Egypt towards primary Asia and up towards modern-day Kazakhstan (Gause, 2014). Because of its historic dominance, Iran has always been in an endless desire of dominating the region although the geo-strategic dimensions of the region have greatly changed (Bricklayer, 2014).²⁴

²⁴ So the manner in which Iranians have attempted to influence that awkwardness of power is by creating flighty abilities – rockets also, flighty weapons, synthetic weapons. Therefore, Iran's nuclear capabilities make sense as long as it pursues hegemonic ambitions, and nuclear weapons fit into that particular equation.

Other than this, the alternative component which represents the Iranian intercession inside the Gulf locale is in light of its topographical region, army force, largest gross, public object, and populace. The country has the biggest navy and naval force, which is ostensibly the most grounded among all its littoral States. In keeping with Aras and Akpınar (2017), the population is more than 60 million with the biggest GNP. The financial system is distinctly superior and dependent on innovation and the talent level is better than in special nations. It is extra extravagant within the oil and gas enterprise and has extensive horticultural offices. Therefore, by way of intending the important thing, memorable, geographic, instructive, and financial thing, the assumed foremost task and intercede within the issues of other Gulf States (Khalid and Safdar, 2016).

As contended by Kechichian (2016), the Islamic partisan has broken the Arab-Iran relationship considering that in 2003 additionally, it partitioned Sunni-Shi'ite, which come to be extra important while the Saddam Husain government tumbled to US powers. Other than this, inside the Arab district, oneself extended analogies of Saudi Arabia and Iran further muddled the connection and Iran is driving Shi'ite power; whilst Saudi Arabia sees itself because of the protector of Sunni Muslims (Gengler, 2015).

These partisan clashes pulled out Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Bahrain, and Lebanon separated. During 1979, there were no longer huge troubles between Iran and Saudi Arabia anticipating the issues of Soviet socialism and because of Soviet development, the Ba'ath advanced in Baghdad, which in addition placed Tehran and Riyadh in a similar circle (Davis, 2014). This made heat respective family members but after the Iranian upheaval in 1979 the dread of Gulf States closer to Iranian strict expectations increments when Ayatollah Khomeini referred to the Arab public to topple monarchical systems which had been "Un-Islamic" (Gilson, 2016). This further rebellion Shi'ite individuals in Al Hasa and using the case of 1979 the Saudi authorities censure Iran for the agitation condition that smothered disobedience in which the quantity of Shi'ites murdered and the pioneers have been constrained and restricted to oust. The connection between Saudi Arabia and Iran advanced after the Nineteen Nineties while Iran has done sober-minded worldwide techniques. Throughout this president, Khatami satisfied proactive courting which similarly upgrades the ties amongst Arab associates and towards the west coastline of the center Gulf (Hashemi and Mardani, 2016). Iran facilitated with Saudi Arabia and accompanied the structure

of OPEC as a way to preserve the oil charges at practical stages. in any case, after 2006 the episode Sunni-Shi'ite partisan finally ends up destabilizing the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran which set the two of them in competition to every different. Be that as it can, Iran mediates into the established order of properly disposed authorities within Baghdad that in addition did not represent any danger to Tehran and step by step withdrew the American and Saudi Arabia became additionally tried to assist the mainstream Iraqi authorities (Ulrichsen, 2017).

As cited by way of Esfandiary and Tabatabai (2016), Iran courting with different Gulf pals is barely identified with the local clashes. throughout 1975 the intercession of Algiers Accord the longstanding clashes among Tehran and Bagdad of prickly Shatt al-Arab had been settled and the Iraqi pioneer Saddam Hussein revoked singularly the Algiers Accord, which completed the long struggle as Tehran what is greater, Bagdad acknowledged the Accord because the legitimate (Ulrichsen, 2017). In 1971 Iran took over the islands and Abu Musa which purpose questions with UAE over the islands. Until the Nineteen Sixties, Saudi Arabia and Iran had experienced comparable troubles over the island of Farsi what is greater, Arabia which might be situated in the Arabian Gulf (Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2016).

In the direction of the end of 1968, Tehran and Riyadh settled their debates as they concurred that Arabia will have an area with Saudi Arabia also, Iran Farsi will be in Iran. later on, Bahrain settled questions that similarly compromise the connection between Iran and other Gulf of (Rouhi, 2018). Nowadays Iran does now not assure anymore Bahrain because a legitimate piece of Iran's domain, however when you consider 2007 there are a few cases that uncover that Bahrain has a place with Iran which erupts strain for the duration of the Gulf locale. In 2009 Bahrain froze its conciliatory relationship with Iran for half of a month because of the Iranian case that Bahrain is in the fourteenth vicinity of Iran.

Security Conflicts because of Iranian Intervention in Arab States Affairs

According to Ulrichsen (2017), the security clashes began because of contrasting Iran-Arab observations or the misperception, which further impact the issues of Iranian ambitions to become a nuclear power. ²⁵ The international strategy of Iran and the security approaches of Iran are

²⁵ Explainer: Iran's Nuclear Capabilities | The Iran Primer (usip.org)

engaged towards the Gulf sub-region as also noted by Rich (2012). This is the reason Iran is viewed as the “focal point” of Gulf security which the outside and intraregional power must stay to recognize. In any case, as indicated by the realities shared by Trosclair (2018), it is noticed that in the Gulf state, Iran stays an expected danger due to its geological elements which incorporate regional size, ordinary military, tremendous populace, nuclear force, and wealth oil because of which Iran gains the domineering situation in whole Gulf area. Because of the danger the sub-Gulf area instantly looks for military relations with the US so they can counter the danger from Iran.

Iranian Intervention in Yemen

Since the most recent twenty years, there is various declarations by the Saudi, Yemeni, and other Gulf nations that Iran is engaged in supporting the northern Yemeni agitators. In 2011, the circumstance changed when Iran improved its association with Yemen which caused clamorous circumstances all through the last long periods of the Saleh system. The battle in Yemen murdered around 10,000 Yemenis and the loss of life has been expanded by 50,000 during 2017. Iranian has been guaranteed by Gulf districts particularly by Saudi Arabia for the political and political help to the insubordinate gathering known as Houthis which is unquestionable (See Appendix A). The proof shows that the Iranian government is effectively associated with giving modern weapons to the defiant gatherings which are volition under the International Law and in the UNSC goal 2216.

Iranian Intervention in Syria

Since the rise of the common battle in 2012, Iran has been developing its essence in Syria and both of the States have kept up systems partnerships with one another forever (See Appendix B). Because of a drawn-out relationship and political limits, Iran gives specialized, calculated, and budgetary help to the battle troops and the Iran Supreme pioneers Ali Khamenei detailed for the Syrian government. The knowledge administrations and Iranian security are helping and exhorting the Syrian military so they can save Bashar al-Assad. In 2013 Iran had 10000 agents in Syria and announced in the Watchman the Iranian government helps the Syrian government with knowledge observing and controlling hardware. Subsequently, the intercession of the Iranian military in the Syrian strife began in 2011 and after the episode of resistance to the Assad system, Iran gave help to the Assad system including gaming hardware, correspondence gear, arms shipments, and a \$ 3.6 million budgetary guide.

The battling and war bit by bit developed all the more seriously and Iran dispatches its workplaces to the Quds powers. This Iranian mediation was raised in 2014 after the improvement of the Islamic State in Syria that debilitates Assad. Taremi (2014) the purpose for mediating in Syria is a direct result of its key worth. Syria has neighbors with Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen where the Iranian system is included effectively in the military and politically through the state armies and intermediary gatherings. The US-drove intrusion of Iraq leads to semi-occupation by the Iranians where Syria becomes one of the more prominent incentives to Tehran as it gives the immediate hallway to the Mediterranean ocean. Subsequently, the center explanation behind raising association into Syria isn't to help a partner however Iran intends to keep up its situation in the future for long-haul issues.

Iranian Intervention into Iraq

In the 1980s the Iran and Iraq strife started when Iraq attacked Iran and when the UN-handled truce was acknowledged by Iran. All through the recorded period, Iraq intends to supplant the strategic intensity of Iran in the Gulf State, and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 lead the Iraq Shi'ites to oppose the administration of Ba'athists. In any case, during all these many years the two nations have created two-sided relations and since 2005 the relationship has improved. Today the Iran and Iraq connection assumes a huge part in the recreation of the Iraqi economy as now Iran is the third biggest exchanging accomplice of Iraq with about 16% of the offer.

In 2010 both nations consented to 100 collaboration arrangements for the monetary turn of events also, the exchanging volume came to \$12 billion in 2013. The present political circumstance and security inside the Arabian Gulf reflect horrid worry of the whole locale also the world because of the significant commitment of the Gulf States towards guaranteeing harmony. The outside just as territorial powers, for example, the U.S., Russia, Europe, Iran, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait are very much aware of the criticalness of the Gulf area and its commitment to the advancement of the worldwide financial framework. Also, the solidness of the energy framework in the Gulf district has been considered as the need for the developing economies as well as Iran. Regardless of such noteworthiness, the Gulf States before and even today is encountering the circumstance of contention, war, and political agitation, because of which there is tempestuous strife driven

towards different international difficulties. Iran, being perhaps the most grounded economy in the whole district reinforces its inner framework by engaging its military and regular citizens to remain against their privileges.

The independence, furthermore, power that Iran appreciates is impacting the international elements of the Gulf States. From the investigation introduced in the paper, it was discovered that the rising clashes in the Gulf locale are because of war also, security issues (Beehner and Bruno, 2008). The intercession done by Iran isn't just restricted to political hindrances, yet towards the strict just as security of the Gulf States as well. The contention between Iran and Saudi Arabia depends on the political differences, yet where it counts the premise of the struggle lies in the strict contrasts between both nations. Because of this, military and political mediations are seen in Syria. Nonetheless, the ascent of ISIS made both the nations alongside the remainder of the world join hands in fight against ISIS so that the political and financial soundness can be reinstalled. There have likewise been steady emergencies between Bahrain and Iran, which rose to the level where Bahrain upheld Israel against Iran in Syria. The ascent of the contentions between the Gulf district is expected to the undesirable mediation of Iran in the direct and intermediary battles inside a similar district. From the investigation, it was too discovered that the significant purpose behind Iran was to guarantee its political association as a result of the rising intercession of a Western part of the world, which offered to ascend to war and the development of ISIS. Thus, to secure the nation's advantage and keep up the inner financial steadiness, Iran engaged its regular citizens and military to remain against the whole world. Plus, the nation is additionally at ensuring the strict interest inside the state and over the Gulf district to make sure about the *Shia* people group all over the world.

The Arab-Iran Issues

Gulf as a hub connecting Europe, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia but also the region's significance due to its abundance of gas and crude oil reserves. The study's findings demonstrated that Arab countries in the Gulf region lacked the confidence that States need to achieve collective security in the region and did not recognize the significance of the Arab Gulf's security. Additionally, the study demonstrated that the United States has several concerns

regarding the Gulf, including eliminating the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, combating resistance, and ensuring the stability of friendly nations.

In "*The conflict between the US and Iran in designing the Persian Gulf security order*," Wang mentions the conflict between the US and Iran in designing the Arab Gulf Security Arrangement, which aims to reveal the impact of the US-Iran conflict on Arabian Gulf security. The study showed that Iran's pursuit of Arab-Islamic security is to resist the influence of the United States in the Gulf region, and showed the different concepts and objectives of Gulf security from the United States American and Iran's perspectives. The U.S. attempt to establish a from the Arabian Gulf according to its vision of the new world order after the Cold War, based on American rules and the need for democratic reform in local communities, but with increased influence after the Iraq war, the study showed that Iran's pursuit of Arab.

In "*Iran and the future of Persian Gulf security*," Abu Talby sought to identify the future of the Arabian Gulf in light of Iran's presence. The descriptive analytical approach was used to illustrate the future of the Arabian Gulf in light of Iran's presence. The study also demonstrated the significance of securing the security of the Arabian Gulf in the long term through new regional security arrangements led by Iran and the United States in addition to the Arab countries. The study also demonstrated that in the absence of any security arrangements, the United States will demonstrate that excluding Iran from Gulf security would result in strong isolation and hostility among Arab Gulf rivals, a favorable environment for U.S. equipment, and the propagation of radical Islam. By applying Iran's behavior to the international community, their inclusion would benefit civil society and Iran's moderate power as well as the security of the Arabian Gulf.

Paul Rogers in a review named, "*Iran: Consequences of War*" note that Iran's nuclear policy's seriousness and its long- and short-term ramifications for Iran and the region as a whole must be made clear to the region. Iran has long ago decided to construct a complete nuclear fuel cycle on its territory, which will, of course, provide it with nuclear weapons and capabilities.²⁶ There are also fears that an Israeli-led military offensive and a U.S. military attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure could begin with a long-term military confrontation between Iran and the United

²⁶ Explainer: Iran's Nuclear Capabilities | The Iran Primer (usip.org)

States, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and the Arab Gulf States. —would escalate to the United States, indicating a long-term conflict, although it was initially limited.²⁷

In "Globalization and the Gulf," Fox, Mourtada-Sabbah, and Al Mutawa note that the Arabian Gulf, one of the most strategic regions in the world, played a significant role in shaping its history. Its importance has been manifested since antiquity due to its distinct geographical location between East and West, where navigation flourished between the ports of the Arabian Gulf and the ports of the Indian Ocean, in addition to its natural resources and multiple wealth, to the point where some have As a result, the Gulf region has long been the target of colonial ambitions and invasions, particularly by major European powers who have a strong desire to exert influence and establish a foothold in this area, which was regarded as a border region adjacent to one of the parties of the Indian Empire and as a link between Europe and the Far East. The significance of the Arabian Gulf as a route where the main worldwide vehicle courses and their feet meet significantly affects the historical backdrop of the Bay, and notwithstanding the essential area it has delighted in all through the different times, numerous urban communities and ports have likewise evolved on its eastern and western banks, numerous urban communities and ports that filled in as transport and dispersion habitats for merchandise, both in the period when the appearance of the Portuguese and in these urban communities and ports a few Middle Easterner emirates, which have added their personality to the locale. After discovering the Cape of Good Hope², which was regarded as a decisive work in the history of the world, the Portuguese arrived with purely colonial intentions and various political and economic ambitions, which paved the way for the establishment of the Portuguese Empire in India³ and the East, control of the corridors of the Arab world and the vital Gulf region, and opened the door for other nations to race toward the region and achieve successes comparable to those achieved by the Portuguese. The 16th century also witnessed the writing of a new history in their race to colonize multiple parts of the world, the colonial powers wanted to do a lot of different things.

The most important of these was to take advantage of weak States and control their economic capabilities. In the eyes of the colonial powers, the Gulf region did not deviate from this framework. In contrast to the Portuguese, the English, Dutch, and other forces were among the

²⁷ ibidium

most prominent. Although some of these local forces have defended the region and taken it upon themselves to resist European colonialism, such as the Omanis and Al-Qawasin did, especially in their struggle against the Portuguese and the English, the region has witnessed numerous internal conflicts among local forces in various parts of the region, which has compounded the deterioration of the situation at various levels. In addition, the region is associated with the Gulf.

Onley and Khalaf in —Shaikhly Authority in the Pre- oil Gulf: An Historical–Anthropological Study” are of the view that the —industrialized countries consider the Arab Gulf region as an important market for their products, and they openly recognize that there is no region in the world that is comparable to this region in terms of importance as they recognize the sensitivity of the situation in it, so they are very limited to their interests not to suffer any threat or any risks, and many researchers and politicians have expressed in their writings and research sought about the great strategic importance enjoyed by the Gulf regionl. The discovery of oil in the region and the associated progress of aviation have confirmed this fact. In this situation, the Arabian Gulf will likely continue to dominate international strategy for many years, it is in the middle of all our main maritime lines to the east, and contains the ports, centers, and gas stations necessary for our fleets, ships, and aircraft), and is supported by the French researcher Burbi, who mentions the subject: The Middle East, which is mostly confined to the Gulf in particular, because it is the heart of the Middle East geographically, and with its many The magic and his wonderful golden box, which is salivating.

M.L. Ross in —*Blood barrels: Why oil wealth fuels conflict*”, notes that since the emergence of its first human civilization, the Gulf region is considered an important waterway and sea and the meeting place of civilizations of the Old East, and in addition to its geographical and strategic importance, it also enjoys great economic importance and oil and gas wealth is a major source of energy worldwide. Therefore, the Gulf region has always been coveted by many great countries, because of its importance and unmatched strategic location. Thus, the Arabian Peninsula region has generally been associated with global political and economic influences and variables, and the countries bordering and adjacent to it have become influenced by the changes in the international situation more than others, and from a geographical point of view, this region includes Iran and Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman,

which overlook the Gulf, and most of this region is considered part of the Middle East in the modern political sense. Or the Greater Middle East according to the new American label. With the addition of Iran, which has a vital and strategic role in the Gulf region, Riyadh in the past era has been the key to the Gulf Arab States being one of the main countries in the region and because of its importance, it is the cradle of Islam and the center of the most important Islamic holy areas and the place where millions of Muslims visit each year. In addition to its huge oil reserves. And its role in determining its prices and influencing its global trade.

Pipes, D., & Clawson, P. (1992) in, —Ambitious Iran, troubled neighborsI note that both ancient and contemporary history records the ambition of some regional powers to control Arab lands in the Gulf region and its vicinity. This is reflected in the policies of some regional powers, particularly Iran, towards the Arabian Gulf, before the fall of the Shah and after the Iranian revolution, which continues to believe that its vital area is located within the Arab ocean adjacent to it in terms of sectarian, ideological and geographical. In general, the Arabian Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula are of great importance and exceptional importance in international relations for several considerations, as they represent the meeting area of transportation routes between the three continents, the meeting point of different trade routes, and at the same time represent a waterway that controls the most important international water straits that control the transport of oil to the developed industrialized countries, and this waterway is located on this waterway ports and maritime centers important for the trade and manufacture of this material.

A.M. Farid in —*Oil and security in the Arabian Gulf*” reviews that although the discovery of oil is a key and vital factor in the Gulf region taking its prominent place on the list of priorities of Western and American strategic policy in particular, the issue of Gulf security (as a concept and a variable dependent) did not arise as a central issue in international politics, only since Britain announced its intention to withdraw from eastern Suez in 1968, where talk began then about the "strategic vacuum" and the future of security in the region, especially after the War of Ramadan 1973, followed by the embargo, followed by the embargo. Since then, the issue of "Gulf security" has gained great importance in international and regional strategies to date, and this aspect has been addressed with different perspectives in line with the interests, objectives, and perceptions of each country's views of its national security and its various interests in the region. Due to the

strategic location of the Gulf, there has become a military significance for the Arabian Peninsula region, which has been exploited by international and regional powers to establish its military and naval bases to secure its vital interests. In addition to this, the military fleets are located in the waters of the region, due to their proximity to the hotbeds of international and regional conflicts such as the situation in Iraq, and the supervision of political and military developments, particularly about the U.S. effort to monitor Iran's conventional and nuclear weapons program. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Indo-Pakistani conflict. It is also close to the Indian Ocean and to the independent States of southern Russia (the next arc of crises). All this and others have made the island and Gulf countries of great importance, which has led to linking the security of the Arabian Gulf to the security of external forces, which consider that preserving their interests in the Arabian Gulf is a direct extension of their national security in its internal and external manifestations. Especially with the growing economic importance and dependence on natural resources, especially oil, and gas, not to mention that the Countries of the Arabian Gulf are now one of the most important monetary blocs in the world, because of the abundance of their financial savings from oil production. The Arabian Gulf region is one of the main areas in the production of oil in the world, where it is extracted from areas close to the surface of the earth, and its wells are characterized by abundant production, in addition to its good quality, and its proximity to the areas of consumption. Its characteristics (production and quality) increase the importance of the Arabian Gulf in general,

K.C. Ulrichsen in —*Internal and external security in the Arab Gulf States*” is of the view that Arabian Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula also occupy major importance in terms of proven gas reserves, which amounted to 25.793 trillion cubic meters, equivalent to 16% of the world reserves for this substance, and this is why the major countries always seek to penetrate and control the economies and markets of the Gulf countries to dominate them to revive the capital market in particular. !! Especially considering that the Arabian Gulf region is one of the most imported areas in the Third World in the past years.

Roudi, Azadi, & Mesgaran in —*Iran's population dynamics and demographic window of opportunity*” reviews that on the human side, the people in the countries of the island and the Gulf (including Iran and Iraq) are young people and their number growing rapidly, while most of them

live in low living conditions, unemployment, and underemployment are among the most wide-ranging problems in the future. Most of those who arrive in the labor market now do not have many options in front of them, as well as the modern media affect their thinking significantly and continuously, the images of love and western social openness attract many of them, the reaction of some of them to move away from the West and its means and others with its embrace and identification, which has generated an increasingly expanding social identity, while the new traditionalists in the Gulf are engaged in a fierce struggle with modernists and secularists and there is difficulty in molding and managing these political and social divisions and putting these social divisions and putting these societies The Gulf in general is on the right track to achieve both identity and individual and collective security, but U.S. interests in turn are also concerned with the matter, without a doubt, despite two decades of U.S. efforts and relations with the rulers of the region and its military presence, the Gulf remains a hotbed of volatility and ambiguity, especially since Iraq after its occupation no longer poses a direct threat to its neighbors, although its future remains unclear in the security arrangements of the region, and as it seems that the multifaceted efforts to contain Tehran's ambition do not It's still in its infancy. It is not yet clear whether the fundamental threats to U.S. interests in the region will come from the proliferation of radical Islamist forces or the sudden collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Or from the economic and demographic changes and the ambition of the Gulf neighbors, or will it be a mixture of all these data with the intervention and engagement of regional and international powers and conflicting interests with Washington, but the challenges seem certain in the next decade. The booty usually entices others to intervene in different ways, and under brilliant reformist slogans and interventions, such as the dissemination of democracy, good governance, the protection of human rights, and the response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which has made Washington the main actor in the region for a long time, especially as the Gulf remains the focus of dramatic fluctuations. The war of open identities has flared up against the entire Arab region. G. Bahgat in "Iranian-Saudi rapprochement: Prospects and implications" notes that as Iran seeks to develop its economy with its European orientation, it must pass near its Arab neighbors, especially as it is one of its most important economic partners, and it is indispensable to enjoy important wealth that contributes to the development of its industrial sectors.

A.H. Cordesman in —*Iran, oil, and the Strait of Hormuz*” argues that Iran's economy is optimistic about the opening up of the sanctions, based on natural wealth and a market of 80 million people whose Arab neighbors still top the list of its most important trading partners. Fortunately, there are Arab countries that are among the three main partners in Iran's trade, including Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, and this confirms good cooperation with Arab countries, although the decline in the price of oil globally has contributed in some way to reducing trade between the two parties. Apart from oil, Iran has non-oil products exported to thirty-two countries, industry exports amounted to \$38 billion and the agricultural sector recorded \$5 billion, while liquefied gas brought in \$7 billion. Between infrastructure destroyed by obsolescence and structural problems in the government and private sectors, the need for raw materials remains a priority in the economy and is owned by its Arab neighbors.

Bar-Joseph in —*Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution*” discusses that before the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran was one of the few Islamic countries with a good relationship with Israel, and even the monarchy led by deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi unfortunately helped pave the way for the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and the Zionist entity. This was not easy for most Iranians who saw the Palestinian cause as their cause, so when the revolution triumphed, the first measure of the revolutionaries was to raise the Palestinian flag over the first Embassy of Palestine, because the revolution and its leaders have always seen their cause in the Palestinian cause, so they did not bargain from the very first moment on the principle of choice, even if it would mean pressure, siege, and even direct or proxy wars. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the pain of Palestine, as well as that of all Arab countries, our sister and neighboring countries, was the sufferings of Iranians, and its security and freedom were our security and freedom. But some have sought to turn the Arab region into a settling theatre and a space for ambitions. The United Nations must be able to ensure that the United Nations can meet the needs of the world's population. In its proposals for new regional engineering, Iran aspires to achieve the common interests of all countries in the region, regardless of differences and differences. Because the new geometry is contained, it can prevent the involvement of one of the major parties in less influential parties.

Some experts also support the opinion that Iran has also, on various occasions, called for laying the foundations for a common security contract, based on dialogue, common principles, and confidence-building mechanisms, as a prelude to a way out of the dark tunnel that drains everyone. K.R. Singh notes in —*Iran's Quest for Security*” that the Islamic Republic of Iran has stressed more than once that its hand is always extended to all, to preserve neighborliness, security, and interests, so that all will bear responsibility before the people, before history, and before future generations. There may later be no current minimum that can be built on to reach the end of this long series. The influential external forces in the region have always enriched and cloned wars and did not give peace a chance, supporting Saddam Hussein's regime in its invasion of Iran and Kuwait, and then waging war on it to overthrow it. It supported al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and later launched campaigns to drive them out, and then returned to support another version of these groups in Syria to destroy them and prepare for their occupation under the pretext of fighting extremist groups. It did the same in Israel's war against Lebanon, its illegal occupation of Palestine and its repeated penetration into Syrian airspace, the three-year war on Yemen, and the massacres committed there with Western weapons; what has benefited our region from all the foregoing and what comes next, and what has been reflected on the world? It can be said that the policies of half a century or more have brought the world to what can be described as a state of crisis. The world today seems to be facing a dead end; international relations have become intractable to their historical bases and the sciences upon which they were built, and the region is gradually becoming a geographical area that lacks the minimum security, and where all kinds of ethnic, national, sectarian, religious, tribal, and tribal conflicts are raging.

Clarke discusses in —*A guide to Europe's new security architecture*” that security has also become a rare commodity in the sprawling one house, and among peoples who share a lot and differ easily, between Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Persians and other peoples of the region, a common history, a single culture, similar vocabulary, and customs and traditions that are almost reproduced from each other. If that is the case, why is there any need and justification as well going to the logic of confrontation, which will only lead to more hatred and new versions of pre-existing wars? Since no further war of new evils and no war with new mites is desirable, and in order not to repeat these ugly images of history, there is a need to look into each other's eyes and agreeing to resolve the differences at the table, not in the field. What is being asked is not to forget the differences,

but what is wanted is that disagreement does not spoil the issue of friendliness. In its proposals for new regional architecture, all countries of the region aspire to achieve the common interests of all the countries of the region, regardless of differences and differences.

Lotfain in —*A regional security system in the Persian Gulf*” argues that the new architecture contained can prevent the sub-nationalization of one of the most influential parties, thereby allowing small States in the region to participate and safeguard their interests. For its Arab neighbors, with whom Iran shares a land or sea border, common security is based on adherence to common standards guaranteed by United Nations charters, such as sovereignty, refraining from the threat of force, resolving crises peacefully, respecting the sovereignty of the State over its territory and the sanctity of borders, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the right to self-determination within them. The United Nations must be able to achieve the desired results. Once again, Iran is reaching out to its neighbors, and it does not maneuver in such an option because it is its strategic choice, and because it truly believes that what unites us is far more than being divided by differences based on apprehension and immediate interests, which may not be a priority in the coming years.

Milani in —*Iran's post-Cold War policy in the Persian Gulf*” is of the view that the Gulf is the most important dimension of Iranian politics, especially after the success of the Islamic Revolution, because it is like keeping up with ideological and political interests side by side, and represents ideological interests due to the spread of Shiite minorities in all Gulf countries without exception, as well as the presence of the largest Shiite bloc in an important Arab country, Iraq, with which Iran fought a terrible war that lasted eight years, which means the possibility of penetration and influence by drawing popular positions from those minorities loyal to Iran and supporting its line, and Iran has achieved success great in that corner. In addition, the Arabian Gulf of Iran has historically been the first line of defense for the national security of the Fars Plateau, and the Persians have historically used to land from the narrow plateau to the vast Arabian Valley in the Gulf, either for trade, grazing or for war, and in ancient times Persian kings hired some Gulf tribal fighters to fight with them in their wars against the Romans, for example.

K.C. Ulrichsen in —*Evolving Narratives of Political Contestation and Geopolitical Rivalry in the Persian Gulf*” is of the view that Gulf is also the geographical bloc overseeing energy corridors and has the largest oil production and reserves in history, and Iran shares the largest gas field in the world with a Gulf state (Qatar) (called The North Field Qatar and in Iran called the Southern Pars Field).

A.B. Keynoush in —*The Iranian-Saudi Arabian relationship: From ideological confrontation to pragmatic accommodation*” is of the view that the study of Iran's relations with Arab States is of great importance given their common borders from four regions. But there is no difference among Iranian researchers that the level of relations over 40 years has not been at the required level. But the most significant and influential event in the relations between the two sides during the first 10 years of the Iranian regime's life was the first Gulf War, known in Iraq as Saddam's Qadisiyah, and Iran as "holy defense." This eight-year war left a million dead, but once the Iran-Iraq war and the beginning of the Second Gulf War began after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, Iran began to arrange regional playing cards. Iran tried to turn a new page and seize the opportunity to get closer to Arab countries because the losses of the war and its economic consequences required the beginning of a new phase led by former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami's reformist governments have gradually succeeded in resolving many disputes with neighboring countries and establishing friendly relations, but the arrival of conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the growing Iranian role in Iraq in the last two years of Mohammad Khatami's term, and the escalation of international pressure on Iran's nuclear file have led to a decline in relations and the worst period since the Iranian revolution. Hassan Rouhani had promised to improve Iran's relations with neighboring countries in the 2013 presidential election but failed to make any progress so far as a result of Iran's regional expansion after the Arab Spring and the return of the revolution's export policy to Iranian regional policy priorities. Iran and its Arab neighbors' record in three decades since the end of the First Gulf War could be considered better than the second half, and the dualities of Hashemi Rafsanjani (president), Ali Akbar Velayati (foreign minister), Mohammad Khatami and Kamal Kharazi were better than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's dualities -- Manouchehr Metki, Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif.

Balkan-Şahin in —*The Ongoing Iranian Securitization of The United States After The Nuclear Deal: An Actor And Context-Based Analysis*” narrates that while Iran faces accusations from Americans and Arab States in the Middle East of interfering in the affairs of other countries, Iran's Leader Ali Khamenei, in a November 23, 2017 speech, defended Iranian interference as the regime's policy and said in justifying that "Iran will be present anywhere whose presence helps to counter infidelity and arrogance." Khamenei was at the time declaring Iran's role in Iraq and Syria. It was not hours before his speech that IRGC Commander Muhammad Ali Jafari announced, in an unprecedented admission that Iran is "providing advisory support to Yemen," in an explicit reference to the IRGC's role in training and providing weapons to Houthi rebel groups.

E.L. Rauh in —*Green Movement| Thirty Years Later: Iranian Visual Culture from the 1979 Revolution to the 2009 Presidential Protests*” views that Iran's regional role is not only of international concern but is growing every day among Iranians who expressed their displeasure during the Green Movement's protests in 2009.

Rivetti, P., Rivetti, P., & Yurova in —*Political Participation in Iran from Khatami to the Green Movement*” report that slogans of anger also varied in the biggest wave of popular protests in January 2018. According to experts, this concern puts Iran on the brink of ethnic unrest at home and may extend to Iran's neighbors. Iranians realize that public anger in neighboring countries deepens every day, challenging Iran's borders, and a 4,500-day poll conducted by the Presidential Center for Strategic Research showed that a few days after the January 2018 protests receded, 13 percent believe that Iranians are dissatisfied with their regional role behind the protests, and in the same poll 74.8% of respondents said they were resentful of the country's situation.

Kamran Taremi in “*Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf*” views the problem posed by Iran's nuclear program on security in the Arabian Gulf. The issue of security is used for the necessary collective agreements that keep the Arabian Gulf from monopolizing security by a certain country alone, keep aggression and attacks away from the territory of other countries, and exploit their natural resources, which constitute a challenge to the interests of the States of the Arab Gulf region.

Michael Ryan Kraig: —*Forging a New Security Order for the Persian Gulf*— points out that the main objective of any security strategy adopted and established by States, bilateral and multilateral, is to provide security guarantees and achieve individual interests. Collectively for itself and its communities, and for its success, it must overcome its differences revolving around narrow interests and ideology.

Kamran Taremi in “*Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf*” points out that the issue of security is used for the necessary collective agreements that keep the Arabian Gulf from monopolizing security by a certain country alone and keep aggression and attacks away from the territory of other countries, and exploit their natural resources, which constitute a challenge to the interests of the States of the Arab Gulf region.

Kamran Taremi in —*Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf*— discusses that under intermittent and conflicting global circumstances, States often find themselves unable to create a lasting and stable security system that brings security and stability to all States, especially in the presence of independent and sovereign States. The United Nations must be able to achieve the millennium development agenda.

Kamran Taremi in “*Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf*” that a few years after the end of the U.S. attack on Iraq and its occupation under the pretext of weapons of mass destruction - under the pretext of achieving security and stability for the Gulf region and the Middle East - like the rest of the crises and wars that have occurred in the region - and without long pause on the usefulness of their occurrence or their real causes or its consequences - the Iranian nuclear program began to raise many questions about the role that Iran can play, at the internal, regional and global levels as an undesirable weapon in the Arab and Islamic countries. By third parties.

Kamran Taremi in “*Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf*” also discusses that although there is agreement among researchers on the dominance of the issue of security over the Gulf countries and other countries of the world interested in this region, there are differences between them on establishing a general strategy that frames the basic dimensions of the security situation in the Arabian Gulf.

The first opinion of the studies believes that security can be achieved through the existence of an intensive collective security system co-formulated and implemented by all the States of the Arab Gulf region. In this connection, Michel D. Yaffe: —*The Gulf and a New Middle East Security System*” argues the need to create a system based on a common security strategy among the countries of the region, and therefore the owners of the need to disarm weapons of mass destruction and reduce the arms race in the region. However, this system, which is based on a common security strategy, faces a fundamental problem that is hampered by the possibility of achieving it, because the nature of the relationship between the States of the Arab Gulf region in its general framework is characterized by a relationship of division and contradiction, not the relationship of convergence and the pursuit of unity, as a result of sectarian differences and national and ethnic differences between them, not to mention disagreement over sexist security and cultural perceptions, and the different interests between their political systems.

The second view of the studies is the opposite of the first view. For example, Jeffrey Boutwell in *Middle East Security and Iran* believes that nuclear programs should be found in the countries concerned with the security of the region to create a state of balance in armaments with neighboring States, a situation that, for them, could lead to stability and security. He believes that, because of his view that it is a contradictory and unacceptable criterion for some countries of Iran's geographical proximity to possess nuclear weapons such as Israel, India, and Pakistan, at the same time, a state like the United States of America is seeking to establish security rules, principles and constitutions for other States in the Gulf region and other parts of the world, ignoring even the participation of stakeholders. (Jeffrey Bout well, 2003). It also States that a country such as Iran is surrounded by unstable States such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and a massive military presence of U.S. forces in the Arabian Gulf region, which, according to these data and circumstances, needs to look for multiple options to achieve its security requirements, national independence and preserve its vital interests.

Abedelwahed Al- Jassani, in *Hal yuhadidu al barnamig alnawawi alirani al amn alqumi alarabi* "(*Will the Iranian nuclear program threaten Arab national Security?*") argues that although there are some interesting aspects of the above-mentioned proposal, this proposal has

also met with an opposing reaction, with some Arab and foreign writers and some international organizations considering Iran's nuclear program to be a threat to the security of the countries of the region, and will increase Iran's influence on Arab and non-Arab neighbors. In the same vein, some Arab writers, for example, Abdelkhaleq Abdullah in *Attamdud al iranini fi asha'n al arabi*", (Iran's Interference in Arab affairs) believe that Iran's strategic objective of possessing the nuclear program lies in its attempt to spread its revolutionary project and intellectual beliefs based on the dissemination of its Shi'a doctrine in the world, and of course, the Arab world represents its first step, because of its geographical proximity to it.

The authors of this opinion are based on the objective, geographical and societal circumstances of the geographical neighboring countries surrounding Iran. For example, Samih Hammam Ahmed in —*Al milaf annawawi al irani moutaghayyar jaded fi moa'adalat al khaleej*" (The Iranian Nuclear issue: a new factor in the Gulf Security equation) points out that Iran's participation in the Arab Gulf States and their similarity in the cultural heritage, geographical and historical dimension, presence of some Arab and non-Arab social segments living in Arab societies and embracing Shi'ism are all factors that drive this state to expand its influence in the countries of the region, making it the target of achieving its expansionist ambitions, especially while acknowledging that there is a political and intellectual gap and possibly sectarian aspirations between some social segments of Gulf societies and their political systems of government.

Bijan Mossavar Rahmani in —*Persian Gulf Oil: Iran's Role*” argues that based on the foregoing, and the fact that the Iranian nuclear program is one of the factors that raise the security problems in the Arabian Gulf and brought the region to a critical security stage, this research came different in its thesis from previous studies because it does not focus on a one-sided perception such as the writings found by the researcher and mentioned in some of them in the research, but rather presents several possible security options and scenarios that it places before the countries of the region to overcome the security problem created by the Iranian nuclear program. In his view, the security situation in the Arabian Gulf requires building a common Arab security strategy in line with the security requirements of the region, to save it from a fourth devastating war. It calls for the activation of the complementary structures of Arab institutions at all levels of defense, political, social, and economic, a situation that is not found in previous studies despite their

modernity. After a quick review of some of the theoretical frameworks on the subject of this research, some light will be shed on the dimensions of the Iranian security perspective of the Gulf region, and its impact on Iran's Gulf policy, to learn from the proposed methods and options for the Gulf countries to deal with this country and its challenges.

The dimensions of Iran's security perception and the nuclear program. Iran itself is the largest country in the Arab Gulf region, especially after Iraq emerged from the Arab sphere as a result of the American occupation in 2003 and its support for it. As pointed out by Bijan Mossavar Rahmani in —Persian Gulf Oil: Iran's Role” on the geographical side, for example, it occupies an important strategic position overlooking the bank of the Arabian Gulf and oversees the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, controls multiple islands in the Gulf, has the high economic capacity and a larger population than the total population of the Arab Gulf States, including Iraq. Accordingly, Iran has established its security policy in the region and has built advanced nuclear and weapons programs and research, which have raised many negative and positive questions and reactions, regional and international about them and the extent of their security implications and risks to the countries of the region and the world.

Gawdat Bahgat in —*Nuclear Proliferation, the Islamic Republic of Iran*” discusses that Iran's nuclear programs began in the 1950s in Shah's time with the help of the United States of America and some Western European countries (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Org, 19/3/2008). But with the emergence of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and its adoption of foreign policies and intellectual foundations based on religious doctrines that differ from that of its predecessors, another form of the challenge has emerged in the region that has faced and continues to be challenged by the countries of the region. Based on the new changes in Iran, including the suspension of U.S. and Western support for its nuclear programs due to political disagreement with it, this country continued to work on the development of its nuclear reactor for reasons related to its vision of the supposed security threat coming to it from regional countries such as Pakistan and Israel, and international representatives of the United States. This continuation may have been due to other reasons, including economic and other motives, which lie in showing its regional and international prestige. To reactivate its nuclear programs, Iran has signed agreements with Argentina and Russia, providing Iran with Russian expertise in the fields of nuclear energy.

Zaborski in —*detering a nuclear Iran*” declares that the Iranian nuclear program has also added a security concern to the above, as the Arab Gulf States have begun to be more sensitive towards Iran and its new intentions, especially since the peaceful nuclear program of nuclear energy can be transformed into military purposes if there is political will, with other important steps, albeit more technologically and militarily complex. Going beyond talking about the state's production capacity to the goals and motives behind this program, the majority of analysts and those interested in the region are now focused on the objectives of Iran's nuclear program, with the belief among them that Iran's nuclear program's goal is to produce nuclear weapons to achieve one or both of them. The first concerns deterrence, which is often directed against other nuclear powers within Iran's territorial circle, including Israel, India, and Pakistan, or may come to blackmail non-nuclear States in the region, primarily the Arab Gulf States, which suffer from a major strategic imbalance on many levels compared to Iran's capabilities.

Mohammad Sayyed Saed in —*Iran alghaamida wa al Arab alghuraba' fi alalam alkhadea* , (Mysterious Iran and estranged Arab in a world of fallacy” presents an analysis of the Iranian trend which is based on Iran's historical anti-Arab policy in many of its objectives, where the degree of hostility to them comes according to the severity of the situation required, and according to the cultural and social heritage of some Arab countries. Moreover, those who view Iran as a Persian nationalist state, based on Shi'ism as well as a revolutionary one, seek, driven by its beliefs, to seek hegemony over Arabs in the Arab Gulf and even the entire Arab region. In this regard, these authors are based on Iran's actual practices in Arab affairs, including its intervention in Iraq, Lebanon, and some Palestinian resistance movements such as Hamas, Sudan, Jordan, and others. Mohammad Sayyed Saed in —*Iran alghaamida wa al Arab alghuraba' fi alalam alkhadea*”, (“Mysterious Iran and estranged Arab in a world of fallacy” also argues that Iran is moving according to its sectarian and nationalist faith, believes in the inevitability of an Islamic world government sooner or later, and believes that it will lead it according to its Shi'a doctrine. On the other side of the Iranian perception, it is based on a national political and security dimension and is based on Iran's rejection of the large Middle East project proposed and adopted by the United States of America, especially after its occupation of Iraq, as well as its security concerns as a result of its blockade of Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf, and Central Asia, not to mention the possession of

nuclear weapons by some of the countries of the surrounding region. These beliefs prompted the Iranian leadership to build a policy that was followed by political behavior that may be far from the truth, which kept it from collectively participating in the building of a special security system for the region based on collective engagement with the rest of the region.

Kamran Taremi in *"Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf"* views that researching the factors affecting Iranian perceptions and following up on the extent to which it affects the country's external political behavior in the Arabian Gulf, allows the interest to know the priorities of the Iranian leadership in arranging its policy within the Iranian leadership's vision based on religious doctrine according to Shiite doctrine, and therefore conceived about the nature of its dealings with Arab neighbors. On the first side, some studies indicate that Iranian policy is based on priorities, the most important of which is the need to ensure the internal political security and stability of Iranian society and to achieve its national interests. To achieve these goals, the goal of exporting the revolution, after the fall of the Shah's regime, dominated the rhetorical vocabulary of many of Iran's new leaders. Iranian policy in the 1980s was based on a policy that was subject to tension, disharmony, and attraction with the Arab Gulf States, ranging from conflict to cooperation.

Kamran Taremi in *"Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf"* views further adds that the nature of Iran's political behavior towards the countries of the region has been governed by several other factors and other reasons added, whether internal, regional, international, individual, or combined. Hence, Iran's relationship with the Arab Gulf States has not been linked to an institutional bond, because the first of them is the political and security history of the region, and the second is at odds with that of the second. Over the past centuries, the region has been subjected to multiple colonial invasions, and the colonial powers have imposed their security visions on the region and its States, especially since the latter were not able to confront and expel colonial foreign States, because they were in a state of vulnerability that did not enable them to build a common security policy in which the security of the region was achieved, while not being able to expel the colonial Powers from it. Not to mention Iran's opposition to U.S. attempts to establish a security policy for the region over the past two decades, and its attempt to exclude Iran from participating in it.

Shahram Chubin, in —*Iran's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions and Impact*” views that the post-Iran war saw a new Iranian tactical policy, moving from relying on the principle of exporting the revolution to Arab neighbors to a state of economic cooperation where it declared its willingness to cooperate with it. This tactical shift was the result of the effects of the eight-year Iraq-Iran war from September 1980 to August 1988, and its negative repercussions on the Iranian economy and other aspects of social life in that country. At this point, too, Iran has not tried to seek sectarian expansion and spread but has tried to take care of the national aspect of Iranian society to gain the support and support of all segments of Iranian society in that war. The new or tactical change in Iran's domestic political behavior has been accompanied by similar tactical behavior toward The Arabs of the Arabian Gulf as well, as this country has declared its willingness to deal with Arab countries — except Iraq — for collective security in the region.

Shireen Hunter in —*Iran after Khomeini*” States that Iran's political change towards the Arab Gulf States has been to restore diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which were interrupted during the eight-year war with Iraq, and has also ceased its support for groups that were causing riots in Gulf societies, Tehran's media campaigns against Gulf political regimes, Tehran denouncing the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and contributing to the economic blockade against Baghdad.

To add to this, Peter Jones, in —*Iran's Threat Perception and Arms Control Policies*” points out that in 1994, Tehran increased its trade with the countries of the region and with Western European countries and the Soviet Union before its dissolution. This narrative is supported by Kamran Taremi in *Iranian Perspectives on Security in the Persian Gulf* views, where he says that for the same purpose, Under Rafsanjani and Khatami, Iran has launched security initiatives with the Governments of the Gulf States, conducted security consultations, and exchanged military missions with them, and to enhance confidence between them, the Iranian navy made friendly military visits to gulf ports, and the Iranian leadership informed the Arab Gulf States of their military exercises and exercises in the Gulf as part of the new Iranian tactic.

Peter Jones, in —*Iran's Threat Perception and Arms Control Policies*” argues that to get rid of the simultaneous pressures of that phase, Iran tried to coexist with the U.S. presence and Gulf policy in the Arabian Gulf. This notion is further supported by the views of the Middle East Economic Survey that Iran cooperated with the United States to overthrow the political system in Iraq, and encouraged its Shiite and Kurdish allies opposed to the former Iraqi regime to cooperate with the United States when it entered Baghdad in March 2003. It also sent large numbers of its security services to Iraq to influence the events in this Arab country and supported social forces and armed organizations within Iraqi society for the same purpose and despite Iranian cooperation with the Gulf States in the post-cessation of the Iraq-Iran war mentioned above, the relationship between them is still in a state of mistrust and has not reached the stage of building a security strategy based on the participation of all Gulf parties.

As debated by Montgomery, B. P., & Hennerbichler, F in “*The Kurdish Files of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Regime: Struggle for Reconciliation in Iraq*”, Iran's post-Baghdad policy was characterized by a policy of contradiction and instability. Some have predicted that the fall of Baghdad and the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime could bring security to the Arabian Gulf region. But the security situation was contrary to those expectations. The security situation deteriorated at that stage and declined to its lowest levels in some areas, and in others, it was non-existent the change in the political system in Iraq led to instability in Iraq and beyond, creating sectarian and ethnic divisions within Iraqi society, which badly impacted the communities surrounding the country. The security situation in the region has worsened, changing the beliefs of some Arab leaders, and raising questions about the benefit of the fall of Baghdad and who benefits from it. Some leaders of the States and governments of the region have concluded that Iran is the real beneficiary of Iraq's fall under American and foreign occupation, and with its ambitions and sectarian policies, it has become the main threat to the States of the region and its security. At this point, international and regional attention to Iran's nuclear program has increased, and successive warnings have begun to prevent it from developing its nuclear programs, while the country has little regard for the warnings against it and has continued to develop its nuclear weapons and programs. Arab interest and debate about the implications and impact of this topic on the security of the Gulf region have not yet reached the level it should be. Because of this, the following

research will show how Arab countries will deal with the challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program.

Gawdat Bahgat in —*Nuclear Proliferation, the Islamic Republic of Iran*” views that the Gulf Arab States have tried in the past to create a balance of power with Iran in this part of the world. In the recent past, most Gulf States have helped Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war in the economic, political, and military spheres to some degree, without fear of Iranian power at the time, allowing the Iranian leadership to tamper with their security by exporting riots in Gulf societies. But in a changing world of instability, subject to the power and power that is growing in today's contemporary Arab Gulf region, Iran, the geographically closest country to the Gulf States, seems to have grown its military power at the beginning of the new century and is developing nuclear programs through which it aspires to become the active player and president of the region. Iran sought nuclear programs in Shah's time and has continued for the present - - albeit intermittently - - and could operate its nuclear reactor and could provide energy to entire Iran.

On the other hand, as noted by Emile El-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi in —*The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge*”, the restriction of the Arab Gulf States and the weakness of their political and military activity created an atmosphere of mistrust with Iran, thus relying on the United States to maintain their security, which negatively affected the role of the Arab Gulf States in dialogue with Iran to reduce its nuclear program and make it only limited. Between August 2002 and 2005, for example, they remained often silent and hesitant and spoke nothing about Iran's nuclear programs, or Iran's events in Iraq. At the beginning of 2005, Arab States began to fiesta and began to talk about the dangers of Iran's nuclear program and its possible negative repercussions on all the peoples of the Gulf region.

To confirm this, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, followed by the Saudi Ambassador to the United States of America and others, spoke about the seriousness of Iran's nuclear program (The Times, January 16, 2006) and the Iranian leadership's inflexibility toward initiatives and calls for its suspension, prompting some of these leaders as a disaster for the region (The Daily Star, February 10, 2006). Abdullah Bishara, former GCC secretary, described Iran's nuclear program as saying: "This program has completely altered the balance of power in the region, made Iran the

master of it, enabled it to possess the instrument that influences its decisions, and the REFORE the GCC must cooperate strongly and clearly because the situation of the Gulf States is not reassuring. As noted by Simon Henderson in —the New Pillar: Conservative Arab Gulf States and the US. Strategy” that the Gulf States' reaction was not uniform, on the contrary, it took on a circumstantial representative character, so it was not influential for Iran and did not push it to deal with European negotiators more flexibly on its nuclear program. The strategy of the Arab Gulf States has sought to keep the debate on Iran's nuclear program out of popular participation, perhaps aimed at appeasing Iran or at least to distance itself from its hostility as a powerful neighbor. At the same time, they have tried to rely on European diplomacy and U.S. power to focus on and deter Iran. The Gulf's handling of Iran's nuclear program has faced multiple criticisms and questions from some of the region's people, which it considers a double standard policy. Arab governments have chosen the practical way of dealing with Iran as a regional power in the Gulf, far from idealism or the method of collective security, or the conflict-based approach that many American analysts and writers have talked about.

As noted by Fariborz Mokhtari, in —*No One will scratch my back: Iranian Security perceptions in historical Context*”, Iran is in the Gulf region to stay, and will not leave, its historical ambition to lead and dominate the region, and Khomeini's desire to export the revolution to Gulf societies is still in the memory of the peoples and governments of the region.

The Iranian role through successive historical stages has posed a threat to the Arab Gulf States, Iran has occupied the three Arab islands, sought to destabilize the political system in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and attempted to stir sectarian strife among Arab communities, all Iranian policies and factors that have raised security concerns among the region's leaders and peoples towards them.

On the other hand, as noted by Gwenn Okruhlik, in “*Saudi Arabia-Iranian relations: external rapprochement and internal consolidation*”, contrary to Iran's behavior towards the Arab Gulf States, these countries did not talk about the Iranian nuclear threat, but some Arab newspapers addressed it in their general lines, and the talk on this subject remained exclusively on the Royal Court or the Emir of the countries of the region with American and foreign delegations visiting the

region to discuss the danger to the security and safety of the Arab Gulf. At the same time, the governments of the Arab Gulf States in their dealings with Iran's nuclear program have focused on following the popular reaction in Gulf societies towards this Iranian project on the one hand, and the Arab reaction and the silence of Arab forces towards it on another.

Shibly Telhami, in —*Seeing Iran Through an American Prism*” report that some studies conducted by public opinion polls in the Arab region have indicated sympathy on the part of some Arab popular currents with Iran's ambition to develop its nuclear program, as it does not see it as a threat to the Arab neighbors, but the threat to its security perceptions comes from the Israeli nuclear program. In response to the influence of other domestic and Arab environments supporting Iran, the Gulf Summit Council held in December 2005, in its final statement, did not prepare Iran's nuclear program as a major challenge against the States of the region, but on the contrary, as argued by Ellen Laipson and Emile El-Hokayem in *The Arab- Israeli Conflict and Regional Security*, criticized Israel's nuclear program.

Ellen Laipson and Emile El-Hokayem in —*The Arab- Israeli Conflict and Regional Security*” argue that as events in the region evolved, and in response to pressure from the international and regional environment, some Gulf Arab States spoke at the Gulf Summit in May 2006 about the seriousness of Iran's nuclear program and criticized its intervention in Iraqi affairs, and launched a Gulf security initiative calling for a regional treaty on the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf region and the Middle East.

Khaitous in —*Arab reactions to a nuclear-armed Iran*” says that international and regional attention to Iran's nuclear program has led to the creation of what might be called the Crisis of the Iranian nuclear file, put it in the spotlight, and it has become a question and multiple scenarios to deal with it, and the most serious of those possibilities is the possibility that the United States and its allies will launch a military strike against Iran and its nuclear facilities, while another possibility is that the crisis will be directed towards détente to resolve it, or freeze it at the current stage of searching for a final settlement. International and regional attention to Iran's nuclear program has led to the creation of what might be called the Crisis of the Iranian nuclear file, put it in the spotlight, and it has become a question and multiple scenarios to deal with it, and the most serious

of those possibilities is the possibility that the United States and its allies will launch a military strike against Iran and its nuclear facilities, while another possibility is that the crisis will be directed towards détente to resolve it, or freeze it at the current stage of searching for a final settlement.

Khaitous in —*Arab reactions to a nuclear-armed Iran*” says that there are many possibilities about the future of Iran’s nuclear file because not all the papers related to the crisis of this file have been revealed. There are many possibilities about the future of Iran’s nuclear file because not all the papers related to the crisis of this file have been revealed. There are many possibilities about the future of Iran’s nuclear file because not all the papers related to the crisis of this file have been revealed. Iran is pursuing goals that cannot be achieved by the verbal and political maneuvers the region is witnessing, and in return, the U.S. goal can only be achieved by military action. Iran is pursuing goals that cannot be achieved by the verbal and political maneuvers the region is witnessing, and in return, the U.S. goal can only be achieved by military action. Iran is pursuing goals that cannot be achieved by verbal and political maneuvers, and in return, the U.S. goals can only be achieved by military action. To date, Tehran and Washington appear to be both beneficiaries of the game factor of time. The former is trying to take advantage of the time and opportunities it is given to continue and rush to develop its nuclear energy program, to play on international contradictions, and to study and prepare for all the possibilities facing it, while the second seeks to complete the necessary data and preparations and to form an international coalition to support it in its possible military options.

Salah Awad, in —*Qadat al-mintaqa Yakhshouna harb fi Iran*”, (Annan: the region leaders are worried about a war with Iran)” proclaims that the conflict in the Gulf region will also make the region the scene of conflict and military operations that could occur between U.S. forces and their allies and the Iranian military. On the other hand, weakening or mitigating the U.S. role and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Gulf region will enter the state of fear and insecurity of small Arab States and provide Iran with the right conditions for hegemony over the region and its States.

Trita Parsi in —*Bush's Iraq Strategy: Goad Iran into War*” reports that it is true that the Gulf States support the United States in pressuring Iran to stop its nuclear program, and it shares its concern about this program, but it does not want to enter into an armed conflict with Iran and does not want to enter into the embarrassment of the difficult and embarrassing choices in the choice of its alliances, because its choice will be complicated and carries many risks, and will put itself in a state of permanent conflict with Iran, and it must prepare for a state of insecurity and instability in the region for years to come.

Mohammad Sayyed Saed in —*Iran alghaamida wa al Arab alghuraba' fi alalam alkhadea*,, (Mysterious Iran and estranged Arab in a world of fallacy)” proclaims that there are many opinions that the owners of the idea should not worry about Iran's nuclear program because they believe that it is not dangerous, nor does it threaten security in the Gulf region. Some of these writers raise the question: "If the Arabs can live in the presence of the Israeli nuclear reactor, why can't they live with an Iranian nuclear reactor?". Could it have less impact if it led to a state of balance with Israeli weapons?

Russell in —*Arab security responses to a nuclear-ready Iran*” reports that the observer of events in the region can find a general framework for Arab policy that is taking shape at this stage toward Iran's nuclear program, and the direction of the introduction of nuclear technology for the region in general. Through follow-up, it can be concluded that there are three pillars on which the new Arab policy is based, first: Arab opposition to subjecting the subject of nuclear technology to politics, and second, the right. The countries of the region are all in possession for peaceful purposes and finally look for a way to free the entire region of weapons of mass destruction, including those of Israel.

Russell in —*Arab security responses to a nuclear-ready Iran*” views that the Arab rejection of U.S. policy came at a time when the Arab vision was absent from Iran's regional influence in the region, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon, and of increasing strategic risks to its security. Arabs may also be unaware of the U.S. search for the U.S.-Iran partnership and relations that existed in the recent past. These signs have been on the horizon since their respective policies on aborting Arab power in Iraq were agreed upon, and they have also been extended to appear in reports by

administration representatives calling for U.S. dialogue with Iran rather than its hostility in Iraq, which has led to a dialogue between them and has continued so far to distribute roles between them.

El-Hokayem & Legrenzi in —*Arab Gulf States in the Shadow Of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge*” view that after Israel, Iran has become a clear example of Western and American double standards, the United States of America was the first to contribute to the establishment of nuclear plants for Iran under the Shah, and it is naturally aware of the possibility of civilian and military uses, and in the past few days, three events have coincided with three events that have demonstrated the reality of the Western vision of the region. The first event was the Russian resumption of the shipment of nuclear fuel to Iran ‘s Bushehr plant, the second event was the strong French entry into the region to market French nuclear technology products to the region's markets, and the third was an attempt by the U.S. administration to exploit The Iranian ambition to market American military products to the countries of the region, and these events revolve around keeping the Arab region in a consumer mode, not a technology product.

William Bill in —*the Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*” view the U.S. hegemony over the Arabian Gulf region prompted it to try to keep Iran from participating in building a security strategy for the Gulf, and keeping the Gulf States dependent on them in building a Gulf security policy and a defense policy aimed at eliminating the military challenges that surround it. This situation carries great risks to the interests and security of the Arab Gulf States. Despite the interaction and overlap between the interests of the United States and the Arab Gulf States, the truth shows us that those interests cannot always be identical. For the United States and the West, it views Iran from a perspective that differs from that of the Gulf. It views Iran with a post-Shah antagonistic view and considers it a challenge to its interests in the Arabian Gulf region. This country is helping the forces that the United States calls extremist in some countries in the region, and as long as it intervenes in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan.

Richard L. Russell in —*Peering Over the Horizon: Arab Threat Perception and Security Response to a Nuclear-Ready Iran*” views that the Arab Gulf States, view Iran with a different perspective from the U.S. view, because of the great overlap between Arab and Iranian societies, and therefore do not see it as a fundamental threat to their interests in the Gulf. But that does not mean that they

do not anticipate Iran's ambition and seek to dominate the region. They are concerned about the rapid growth of Iranian power in the region, as well as from Iran itself. While the United States views that country by seeing the direction of the political system in Tehran if its political orientation changes toward U.S. interests, it means a change in U.S. policy toward it. In other likely ways, this change is not related to Iran's vision of the Arab Gulf States, but only to the extent to which U.S. interests are achieved.

Dassa Kaye and Wehrey in —*A nuclear Iran: The reactions of neighbors*” narrates that accordingly, these countries have the Arab-Arab option from which they will lose nothing and come as part of the Arab national security strategy. It seems that the Arabs have been absent or may have been absent and excluded from their normal role, or at least supposed to be in the current complex situation in the Arabian Gulf region and have paid the price for this absence in previous periods. For example, the United States and Iran are negotiating events and the security situation inside Iraq in the absence of a full Arab, including Egypt, the Gulf Arab States, and Syria.

Maaïke Warmaar, Paul Aarts, Luciano Zaccara in —*Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests Over Historic Rivalry*” review relations between Iran and Gulf States from strategic as well as identity-based angles. Keeping in view the strategic location of both adversaries, the conflict is shown as going beyond Gulf to almost the whole Middle East region, with the focus being on Iraq and Syria to have dominance and influence there. Cultural identity on conflicting lines is traced historically and avenues are traced for engagement between Iran and GCC States (Warmaar et al., 2016).

Deninis C (2018), “*Jett in —The Iran Nuclear Deal: Bombs, Bureaucrats and Billionaires*” reviews how different interest groups inside the United States have been trying in various ways and means to let the deal between the United States and Iran not move forward. The details for negotiating the deal at diplomatic and back-channel doors are analyzed in detail and various pitfalls, regarding the issue are discussed.

Sajid Mahmood Khan in —*US-Iran Nuclear Deal: Power Dynamics for Iran and Saudi Arabia*” reviews the US-Iran nuclear deal as a product of hectic international diplomatic efforts to

resolve the chaotic situation, which has been gripping the Middle East region's peace and security with implications at the global stage. The deal is considered a great achievement of the Obama administration in resolving conflicts, the threat perceptions, regarding firing back of the deal are analyzed in detail. Saudi Arabian concerns, regarding Iran's emerging to be more powerful politically, economically, and militarily are brought in the light. At the same time, the Iranian way of destabilizing the region by using proxies is also analyzed. The impact of the deal on the regional balance of power is also analyzed with a negative impact on regional stability.

Norman Cigar in —*Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons: How do Countries Think about the Bomb?*” reviews the Saudi Arabian decision-making process in the context of its strategic culture. Saudi Arabian threat perceptions, regarding the Iranian nuclear program are reviewed. Saudi Arabian public opinion regarding the Iranian threat is also reviewed. At the same time, Iran's offensive designs in regional power politics are reviewed in detail.²⁸

Henry Sokolski, Patrick Clawson in —*Getting Ready for A Nuclear-Ready Iran*” review the response strategy of the Western and Middle Eastern world regarding the Possible Iranian nuclear threat. Sanctions, as well as take of military action, are reviewed. Israeli threat perceptions and possible responses, especially considering Begin Doctrine are analyzed. Iranian possible threats to sea commerce, especially for the Strait of Hormuz are analyzed in detail. A course of action, regarding transatlantic strategy is thoroughly weighed upon.²⁹

Judith Palmer in —*Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*” is of the view that Iran continues supporting terrorism across the region and Hezbollah in Lebanon is a new expression of Iranian proxy warfare of launching terrorism. Iran not only supplies weapons to Hezbollah but also provides spiritual guidance to brainwash the enthusiastic so-called holy fighters.³⁰

Mathew Levitt, in “*Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God*” comes up with the opinion that Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, has got global outreach and footprints to

²⁸ For more details, see for example “Nader Entessar, Kaveh L. Afrasiabi in *Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons: How do Countries Think about the Bomb?* (New York: Routledge, 2016)”.

²⁹ This is the argument also given by Henry Sokolski, Patrick Clawson in “*Getting Ready for A Nuclear-Ready Iran*, Carlisle: Diane Publishing, 2005”.

³⁰ “Judith Palmer in *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005)”.

wage terrorism. The writer believes that Hezbollah has covert networks for launching terrorism across the world. Bombings in major cities of the world, including the Khobar Towers bombings in Saudi Arabia in 1995 were masterminded and launched by Hezbollah, which has almost become a criminal enterprise.³¹

Marius Deeb in "*Syria, Iran and Hezbollah: The Unholy Alliance and its War on Lebanon*" terms the triple alliance as the most dangerous one for regional peace and stability as the triangle for launching terrorism works in a coordinated way. Despite strong opposition, especially in Lebanon and Syria, the triangle of terror goes on working to cause instability at a wider scale.³²

Thanassis Cambanis, "*A Privilege and Their Endless War Against Israel*" analyses the way of training Hezbollah's men with a spirit of fighting to death. The militants are trained and brainwashed in such a way that they suppose themselves to go to Paradise after dying on the battlefield.³³

Steven K. O'Hern in "*Iran's revolutionary Guard: The Threat that Grows While America Sleeps*" portrays the Revolutionary Guards as a grave threat not only to regional security but to international security also. The Revolutionary Guards are continuously shown at work with further evolving strategies, gained during wars. The Guards are now in the position of exporting revolution and can also display their economic and political power. The ultimate weapon, the Guards are thinking is the nuclear one, with possibly devastating consequences. The conflict with the Iranian regime is shown to be inevitable and this threat can be only countered if the United States makes up against this growing threat.³⁴

Stephen Kramer in "*Surrogate Terrorists: Iran's Formula for Success*" analyses the Iranian regime's strategies for creating violence and insurgency in other States by training and

³¹ "Mathew Levitt, *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's party of God*, (Washington D.C.: George Town University Press, 2013)".

³² "Marius Deeb in *Syria, Iran and Hezbollah: The Unholy Alliance and its War on Lebanon*. (Stanford: Hoover Press, 2013)".

³³ "Thanassis Cambanis, *A Privilege and Their Endless War Against Israel*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010)".

³⁴ "Steven K. O'Hern in *Iran's revolutionary Guard: The Threat that Grows While America Sleeps*, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012)".

supporting surrogate terrorists. Iran is a special way trains such militias by assisting governments in enforcing law and order and even taking over the affairs of the government, as was done in Lebanon and Iraq. Iran is working on the formula of expanding its area of influence by creating more surrogate groups.³⁵

Ronen Bergman in "*The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Covert Struggle for Control of a Rogue Regime*" reviews how Iran has been sponsoring terror across the world for more than three decades. Iran employs every weapon including assassins and Al-Qaeda in a covert way. It also brought to light, how Israelis secretly armed Iranians with chemical weapons.³⁶

Hela Jaber in "*Hezbollah: Born with A Vengeance*" comes up with the view that since Hezbollah launched the suicide bombing in Beirut in 1983, most of the covert actions and agendas of this bloodthirsty organization have come into the limelight. The element of devotion to cause, inculcated in the ranks and files of Hezbollah is brought into the daylight as this devotion inspires Hezbollah fighters to be ready to sacrifice their lives for a a holy cause.³⁷

Emanuele Ottolenghi in "*The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps*" considers the Revolutionary Guards as the custodians of the Islamic regime along with playing a vital role in running economic affairs of Iran. The Revolutionary Guards' role is also considered the determining one in moving forward with the nuclear program. In all domestic and international issues, the role of the Revolutionary Guards is portrayed as the most penetrating one with the possibility that their role will further remain, even in the decades to come.³⁸

Ali Alfoneh in "*Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards is Turning Theocracy into Military Dictatorship*" comes up with the view that with the extraordinary powers of the Revolutionary Guards, Iran is on the path of becoming a militarily dictatorial regime, with

³⁵ For more details, see for example "Stephen Kramer in *Surrogate Terrorists: Iran's Formula for Success*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 2010)".

³⁶ Ronen Bergman in *The Secret War with Iran: The 30-Year Covert Struggle for Control of A Rogue Regime*, (Yehuda: One World Publications, 2013).

³⁷ "Hela Jaber in *Hezbollah: Born with A Vengeance*, (USA: Columbia University Press, 1997)".

³⁸ "Emanuele Ottolenghi in *The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps*, (Washington D.C.: FDD Press, 2011)".

theocracy remaining intact. The role of the Revolutionary Guards is considered very dangerous for regional and international security as the Guards' led regime is going to work against international norms and traditions of mutual respect internationally.³⁹

Roger Howard in *"Iran in Crisis?: Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response"* reviews Iran-US relations thoroughly from multiple perspectives. The American response to Iranian terror is weighed from different angles. Possible internal fault lines in Iran at social and economic fronts are analyzed with possibilities of popular uprisings and an increase in the number of dissidents. At the same time, the threat of the Iranian bomb is analyzed from various perspectives because the gaining of nuclear capability can make the regime all the more threatening to the whole world.⁴⁰

Ruhollah Khomeini in *"Islamic Governemnt: Governance of the Jurist"* reviewed the Islamic principles of governance with elements of populism, which resulted in the happening of Islamic Revolution in 1979. The role of jurists in governance matters is considered vital, as the Iranian system of governance is reflected Wilat-al-Faqih. This book is a guide to the ideology of the current Iranian regime.⁴¹

Reese Erlich, Robert Scheer in *"Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and the Middle East Crisis"* take a thorough view of the U.S. faulty policy of engagement with Iran over decades. Americans are shown as confused while trying to engage with Iran. Along with having eyes on Iranian oil wealth, Americans are shown to be supporting freedom and democracy in Iran. Thus, many contradictions are shown in the U.S. engagement with the Iranian regime.⁴²

Frederic M. Wehrey in *"Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From The Iraq War to The Arab Uprisings"* analysis sectarian makeup in the Gulf which has intensified after the U.S. invasion of

³⁹ "Ali Alfoneh in *Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards is Turning Theocracy into Military Dictatorship*, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2013)".

⁴⁰ "Roger Howard in *Iran in Crisis?: Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response*, (New York: Zeb Books, 2004)".

⁴¹ "Ruhollah Khomeini in *Islamic Governemnt: Governance of the Jurist*, (Alhoda UK: Mizan Press, 2002)".

⁴² "Reese Erlich, Robert Scheer in *Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and the Middle East Crisis*, (London: Routledge, 2016)".

Iraq, with Iranian's growing influence over there. Kuwait and Bahrain are considered Iranian targets to destabilize Arab States, especially in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in 2011.⁴³

Jamai Haquani in "*Shia Crescent: Emergence of World War 3*" raises threat perceptions regarding potential Iranian nuclear capability. In case Iran gets a nuclear bomb, it will think of expanding its dominance across the Middle East up to the Mediterranean Sea, eventually to the European region, and finally to the whole Western world. These threat perceptions get credibility because possible nuclear weapons in the hands of fanatic persons like Mehmood Ahmadinejad can push the world towards a war on a global scale, possibly the Third World War with unprecedented human and material destruction.⁴⁴

"*Saudi Arabia and Iran*:" by Simon Mabon Competition on economic and strategic fronts throughout the Middle East demonstrates "Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East." In the ongoing point of view, the two States by recognizing their particular social personalities are zeroing in on showing and expanding delicate power.⁴⁵

Danny Postel and Nader Hashemi in "*Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East*" examines Middle Eastern issues from a sectarian perspective, particularly the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Tensions between sects are thought to be historical in origin and to have grown since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.⁴⁶

In "*The Struggle for Mastery in the Fertile Crescent*" Fouad Ajami examines the power struggle in the Middle East with shifting dynamics as the old order appears to be crumbling due to alleged Western influence. As a result, competition for dominance in the Middle East is getting more intense.⁴⁷

⁴³ "Frederic M. Wehrey in *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From The Iraq War to The Arab Uprisings*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014)".

⁴⁴ "Jamai Haquani in *Shia Crescent: Emergence of World War 3*, (Parker: Outskirts Press, 2008)".

⁴⁵ For more details, see for example, "Simon Mabon in *Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013)".

⁴⁶ "Nader Hashemi, Danny Postel in *Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017)".

⁴⁷ For more details, see for example, "Fouad Ajami in *The Struggle for Mastery in the Fertile Crescent*, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2014)".

In "*Understanding Shiite Leadership*:" Ori Goldberg and Shaul Mishal The book "The Art of the Middle Ground in Iran and Lebanon" looks at Shi'ite leadership from a variety of perspectives, both in terms of extreme and moderate behavior. The Iranian leadership's development along a middle path to engage constructively with the rest of the world is emphasized.⁴⁸

In "*US-Iran Nuclear Deal*:" Sajid Mehmood Khan," Power Elements for Iran and Saudi Arabia" survey the atomic arrangement as extremely certain one for every one of the partners, on the off chance that it is executed in letter and soul if not its ramifications will be exceptionally serious one to the degree of separation of a broad and escalated war.⁴⁹

In "*Losing an Enemy*:" Trita Parsi The documentary "Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy" regards the nuclear deal with Iran as a significant diplomatic achievement because it contributed to the cessation of the Iranian nuclear program and helped avert war. The successful rapprochement between President Nixon and China in the early 1970s is contrasted with this diplomacy's success.⁵⁰

John Allen Gay and Geoffrey Kemp appear in "*War with Iran: The book "Political, Military, and Economic Consequences"* examines various strategies for dealing with an extremely perilous Iran. Iran's hacking with a variety of repercussions is discussed. The Iranian response is measured from a variety of angles, including an economic one and an economic one in light of the disruptions to the oil supply.⁵¹

Scott Ritter in "*Deal Breaker: Donald Trump and the Unmaking of the Iran Nuclear Deal*" reviews the nuclear deal by the diplomatic efforts of President Obama as the deal of the century

⁴⁸ "Shaul Mishal, Ori Goldberg in *Understanding Shiite Leadership: The Art of the Middle Ground in Iran and Lebanon*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014)".

⁴⁹ "Sajid Mehmood Khan in *US-Iran Nuclear Deal: Power Dynamics for Iran and Saudi Arabia*, (South Carolina: Create Space Independent Publishing, 2018)".

⁵⁰ "Trita Parsi in *Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy*, (New haven: Yale University Press, 2017)".

⁵¹ "Geoffrey Kemp, John Allen Gay in *War with Iran: Political, Military and Economic Consequences*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013)".

and blames President Donald Trump for firing the deal in a very flamed or rather fatally flawed manner.⁵²

⁵² For more details, see for example, “Scott Ritter in *Deal Breaker: Donald Trump and the Unmaking of the Iran Nuclear Deal*, (Atlanta. Clarity Press Inc., 2018)”.

VII. Research Methodology

This work used a qualitative data approach to collect and analyze data.⁵³ This work was conducted primarily using qualitative methodology. The main topic was a comparative study of scenarios of domination in Iran and the Arab world. The study also separately reviewed some case studies from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. Data for the study were collected to achieve results within this research area. We, in this study, made use of the secondary data available in the form of internet sources and grey published literature. Given the importance of the topic and limited available data, the collection of secondary data was used in both published and unpublished data forms. The published data were collected mainly from these sources: 1) publications and reports of foreign governments and/or of international bodies/their subsidiary organizations, 2) various research reports by research scholars/universities/economists and economic analysts, etc., in different fields of studies, 3) books of various authors including handbooks, Ph.D. and master theses, magazines, and newspaper articles, 4) various other sources from university or other public libraries and archives, 5) technical and trade journals, 6) internet resources and websites, and 7) common public records and statistic manuals, historical documents and monographs, speeches, and other sources of public information and dissemination.

The unpublished data were collected from many sources. For example, from unpublished biographies/autobiographies, political diaries, political and government letters, and from scholars and research workers of government/opposition parties, various trade associations, labor bureaus

⁵³ "Every research must involve an explicit, disciplined, systematic (planned, ordered, and public) approach to find out the most appropriate results," the research advisor of this thesis asserts. The researcher typically investigates meanings and insights in a given circumstance in qualitative research, which is inductive in nature. It alludes to a scope of information assortment and investigation procedures that utilization purposive examining and semi-organized, unconditional meetings. It is referred to as a useful model that takes place in a natural setting and enables the researcher to acquire a level of detail through intense involvement in the actual experiences. It is made visible by a collection of interpretive material practices. It employs a naturalistic, interpretive approach to its subject matter and emphasizes multiple methods. It is a type of social science research that uses non-numerical data to try to make sense of these data and help us understand social life by studying specific populations or locations. It is the perceptions and translations of individuals' impression of various occasions, and it takes the depiction of individuals' discernment in a characteristic setting. It explores nearby information and comprehension of a given program, individuals' encounters, implications and connections, and social cycles and relevant variables that underestimate a gathering. It is less organized in portrayal, since it plans and constructs new hypotheses. It centers around words as opposed to numbers, this sort of exploration notices the world in its regular setting, deciphering circumstances to comprehend the implications that individuals make from one day to another life".

and organizations, and other public/private individuals and registered organizations. The other sources included media of Western and Middle Eastern origin, foreign government spokesmen and websites, speeches or statements of the officials, religious scholars' sermons, and other popular sources (e.g., social media, clerical lectures/sermons, and other relevant sources). The research was limited to previous works in or translated into English and Arabic. Persian sources were not considered due to the inability of the researcher to speak/write or understand the language hence avoiding any study bias. This thesis was meant to identify the theoretical explanation for the rivalry between Iran and the Arab World. Therefore, this work borrowed the themes of different schools of thought in the field of IR to explore the reasons for both parties becoming rivals and competitors. It mainly focused on identifying the methods and behaviors both countries were used for influencing the adjoining Muslim countries in pursuit of attaining regional influence. The purpose of this study was to explore how countries in the region are influencing other countries in the region and tarnishing regional peace. What forms the reason/ ultimate objective for their continuous striving and what are the implications of this rivalry for the region? As this thesis is mainly focusing to bring an understanding of the dominance scenario between Arabs and Iran to its readers. To scientifically analyze how they (Iran and the Arabs) behave or in what way they try to dominate the region, the research is to carry back to how their beliefs are constructed, particularly with special reference to the Iranian unique religious beliefs. This thesis also tries to explore the mutable relationships between Iran and the Arab during several periods in the past. In brief, these periods start with the famous —Islamic Revolution in Iran¹ (also known as the Iranian Revolution¹) in 1979. This led immediately to —Iran and Iraq War¹ in 1980-1988, —Gulf War I and II, and finally the —2010 Arab Spring¹. During those periods, the implementation of their foreign policies in the quest for regional power and influence will be researched. The current exploration thesis is trying to give a complete survey on the intervention of Iran in the Arab States issues dependent on the assumption, realities, and confirmations; hence, the examination was led by social occasion broad confirmations through optional methods for the information assortment. With the assistance of social constructivism, the data was built meant to assemble the various realities that helped in knowing the function of Iran and its political essentialness in the locale. It helped in getting the subjectivity towards the issue by underlining the key mediations done by Iran in the Arab state issues. With the assistance of social constructivism, the paper helped in revealing the reasonable viewpoint towards Iran's mediation in the Arab States dependent on its political and

strict interest. Because of the picked research reasoning, the exploration plan appropriate for the paper was an exploratory examination plan.

For the most part, the auxiliary examinations are upheld by the exploratory research plan, which assists with investigating issues thoroughly. An exploratory research plan helps guide basic and thorough research, mostly in the context of past research, to the realities of social events. In any case, the allocation of research trial configurations-imposed limitations on the methods obtained for articles. For example, no clear information related to the issue was discussed. The material collected for the dissertation was drawn from distributed archives and reports. In essence, the investigative report shows that general research evidence has been used to support claims and provide a substantive audit of Iran's significant intermediary activities in Middle Eastern state affairs. The material that has been utilized for directing the investigation was acquired from the diary articles, for example, —The changing view of Iran towards the Gulf StatesI by Alam, (2001); —State-Building in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq WarI and —the Gulf CrisisI by Davis, (2014); —Comparative Investigation of International Commercial Arbitration and International Law in IranI by Hashemi, and Mardani, (2016). Books have additionally been alluded, which incorporate Group strife and political activation in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf: —Rethinking the Rentier StateI by Gengler, (2015); —Iran, Iraq also, the Arab Gulf StatesI by Kechichian, (2016) and sites, for example, —Key Facts about the Way in YemenI by Aljazeera (2016); —Iran's Involvement in IraqI by Beehner, and Bruno, (2008). Paper articles have additionally been investigations, which remember the articles for Iran's Third Biggest Trading Partner of Iraq by Financial Tribune (2018); The Facts Behind Iran's Involvement in Syria by Iran News Update (2017); The History of Iran and Syria Facts and Figures by Israel Defense Force (2018). Additionally, more optional information has been accumulated to examine the issue and present an examination of it.

VIII. Organization of the Research Chapter – 1 Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, the Conceptual framework used for the present study is discussed with special reference to the Middle East issues and the conflicting situation between the Arabs and Iran.

Chapter – 2 Historical Overview of the Arab-Iranian Conflict

In this chapter, the Arab-Iran conflict is analyzed in a historical context. All the major events, happening during the previous fourteen centuries, regarding fueling this conflict are analyzed. At the same time, reconciliatory moves and strategic synchronization during different periods are also analyzed.

Chapter – 3: Iran: Geopolitics, Military Potentials, and Foreign Policy

In this chapter, Iran's strengths are gauged from various perspectives. Besides, historical and cultural elements of national power, Iranian strategic geography is considered of great value in defending against invasions. Iran's economic and military power potential is also analyzed from various perspectives. Iranian foreign policy in regional matters to gain strategic influence is analyzed in a detailed way. The way Iran has been successful in expanding its influence in the Arab World is reviewed from various angles.

Chapter – 4: The Arab World; Power Potentials, Intra-state Problems, and Military Capabilities

The Arab World is analyzed as a formidable force, with great cultural and historical strengths. Its current power potential in political, economic, and military contexts with a buildup of soft power is analyzed in detail. In the face of Iran's foreign policy challenge of gaining strategic space in the Middle East, the Arab World's strategy of increasing its power, especially by expanding its alliance system has been analyzed in detail.

Chapter – 5: Role of Major Powers and Future of the Arab World

Implications, regarding regional and international power politics in the face of intensifying conflict, are analyzed in detail in the context of the future of the Arab World

Major Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion

At the end, there is a section that provides the major findings of the study. In light of the findings, conclusions and recommendations are also provided.

CHAPTER I

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical foundation of the thesis and the analysis's structure is the focus of this Chapter of the thesis. The "neoclassical realism" paper written in 2016 by Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro serves as the basis to develop a theoretical framework for the current investigation.⁵⁴ The "social contract theory" of Thomas Hobbes⁵⁵ and the "theory of bureaucratic politics" of Graham Allison,⁵⁶ which respectively aim to complement the factors of state-society relations and domestic institutions, further enhance the theoretical framework's explanatory power. In the social science literature, the term "social contract" is increasingly used to describe sets of state-society relations, particularly in the Middle East. In any case, the term has so far remained deficiently conceptualized and its capability to illuminate an efficient examination regarding contemporary States has been underutilized. This thesis adds to the filling of this hole. It defines social contracts as a collection of formal and informal agreements regarding rights and responsibilities toward one another between social groups and their sovereigns (government or other actors in power). We contend that common agreements are halfway casual establishments, which are intended to make state-society collaborations more unsurprising and in this manner governmental issues steadier. Their substance (the deliverables exchanged between the government and society), scope (the actors involved and the geographic scope of influence), and temporal dimension (the beginning, the evolution, and the duration) all contribute to their effectiveness. Common agreements can contrast considerably in each of the three aspects. This approach supplements laid-out speculations of near legislative issues and hones the viewpoint on state-society relations. It is helpful to (i) compare state-society relations in various nations, (ii) track changes within a single nation, (iii) determine when and why social contracts are broken or even revoked, (iv) discover how external players affect state-society relations, and (v) examine how state-society relations can be improved using Pareto.

⁵⁴ "Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Taliaferro, J. W. (Eds.). (2009). *Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy*. Cambridge University Press".

⁵⁵ For details on this, please see: "Laskar, M. (2013). Summary of social contract theory by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. *Locke and Rousseau (April 4, 2013)*."

⁵⁶ See: "theory of bureaucratic politics" by Graham Allison

The present thesis demonstrates that MENA nations had very similar social contracts after independence that were based on the provision of social benefits rather than political participation. We contend that budgetary issues and an expanding population after 1985 contributed to their steady decline. The Arab uprisings of 2010–11 was the result of dissatisfaction with the lack of political participation and social benefits like employment from governments. Social contracts in the MENA region have changed since then, and their long-term stability is questionable.

The present study tries to expand the homegrown establishment element's illustrative power by executing the hypothesis of administrative governmental issues. The theory assumes that many decision-makers in a state's policymaking process have competing objectives. Each of the decision-makers comes from a different part of the government, like a revolutionary guard or the Ministry of foreign affairs. These people's inclinations and convictions are molded by the administrative office they serve, and their approach examinations, suggestions, and outlook are hence established in the regulatory interests of their association or division. Concerning this, Graham Allison argues that a particular decision is based on the power and actual performance of the actors in a policy-making situation, rather than on what best serves the state's national interest. According to Allison & Zelikow (1999), "the chess pieces are moved (...) in accordance with the power and performance of proponents and opponents of the action in question." 256).⁵⁷ As a result, the concept of government policymaking and decision-making boils down to: where you stand relies upon where you sit"⁵⁸ The entertainers in navigation pick systems and impact included defenders and adversaries because of various accepts of which results best serve their legislative division's interests, paying little heed to what best serves to aggregate and public interests. As a result, the study has chosen not to examine the international system and instead focuses solely on how the local scene of the region influences foreign policy, even though the thesis must define its area of study.

Under the neoclassical realism theoretical framework, the thesis provides an analysis of the conflicts between the Arabs and Iranians. Its goal is to explain - using a systemic theory of

⁵⁷ Allison, Graham T. & Zelikow, Philip: "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis". Pearson, 2. Edition, 1999.

⁵⁸ Durbin, Brent: "Bureaucratic politics approach". Encyclopedia Britannica 2018.

international relations - why Arab-Iranian relations are in a state of intense tension. This tension is caused by far-reaching acts like proxies and real wars, fights for the "sphere of power" and other things that seem to contradict the military regime, like establishing diplomatic relations with other countries to gain power against each other. Instead of ideology, Iran's strategy has been based on regional security concerns since 1989: After 1989, the Iranian methodology has philosophical acting, yet it's genuinely founded on Iran's public safety and system security concerns". Iran keeps on extending power such that Arab States consider threatening, however, it does so exclusively found on the possibility of public safety as opposed to oneself broadcasted readiness to send out the beliefs of the 1979 upset seen during the 1980s. The dynamic between Arab States and Iran will continue to be reflected in the backlash caused by Iran's involvement in "broken Arab States." When one looks at this buildup of Iranian power, one can't help but say "This is a threat to us" if one is sitting in the Arab world, in the Gulf States, or further away from Iran geographically." It makes no difference whether Iran is to blame for the breakup of the state in question—whether that state is Iraq, which was torn apart by the American invasion, Lebanon, which was torn apart by Iran's involvement with Hezbollah, or another state. Rather, the Arab States-run administrations will keep on viewing Iran with scorn as they keep on blending the pot in an all-around striving district.

Among Arab youth, the Iranian model of governance has failed: "The problem with Iran right now in the Arab region is the brand,". The Iranian brand has suffered a lot, especially among Arab and Shi'a youth. Meaning, the Arab youth, especially in States like Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq view the Iranian impact as adding to the bombed execution of their States. Iran has very little in common with a successful economic model that can address unemployment and the economy, two of the most pressing concerns of Arab youth. There is wary idealism toward proceeding with local conversations on relations between Iran and Saudi on the two sides, yet it stays far-fetched that these conversations will blossom into a helpful relationship: " Iran is aware that the way it interacts with Saudi Arabia is a major factor in how it interacts with the Arab world. Iran is pushing to speed up the reclamation of strategic relations. Iran and Saudi Arabia will keep on swearing off intra-provincial collaboration. Riyadh is reluctant to work more closely with Tehran because it is still reeling from the 2019 attack on Saudi oil facilities. Yemen as of now addresses the bellwether of Iran-Saudi relations. The ceasefire is still in effect, and it does open the door to lessening tensions between the two regional powers. Middle Easterner state-run administrations won't ever

acknowledge an Iranian local authority: Arab governments and societies would never accept an Iranian regional hegemony even before the revolution in Iran. It won't ever be acknowledged. Where was Iran in the Middle Eastern Spring? It was absent. Because of this, Arab societies all over the Middle East continue to reject Iran's unwanted advances and have correctly identified Iran's priority as its security—from Israel and the United States—rather than its declared ideological values.⁵⁹

According to the theoretical perspective adopted, the systemic characteristics, allied to the endowment of the units' capacities, define the foreign policy actions of the States. As an auxiliary concept, the idea of average power, and as intervening variables, the institutional format of decision-making and the perception of decision-makers. According to the hypothesis formulated, the expansion of material capacities would lead the state to expand its foreign policy actions. Case studies will be carried out based on economic data and military capabilities, previous work on the period, and, when possible, primary sources. According to the hypothesis formulated, the expansion of material capacities would lead the State to expand its foreign policy actions.

It may be difficult to accurately define the behavior of a state in a highly volatile environment such as the political environment in the Middle East, and it becomes even more difficult if it is to talk about the Arab-Iran conflicting relations and a country like Iran, in which the factors of history, geography, religion, and myth overlap in shaping its international and regional policies. It is important from the outset to confirm that the forward-looking approach is outside the scope of this study, but it is a historical account of the realities of Iranian politics towards the Middle East in the modern era. Understanding the conditions and motives that led to these policies is a logical starting point for understanding Iran's current policy and provides solid signals about its future policies, and the matter becomes clearer if this narrative is placed within a systematic theory. Since the discussion is about foreign policy, this study assumes that the theory closest to explaining Iran's political behavior in its regional environment is neo-realism. This theory is favored over others because it is the most compatible with the issue of foreign policy as a whole and has continuity as one of its most prominent characteristics. The international strategy of States in the advanced world framework is described by progression, and what occurs in unrests or upsets in systems, as per the new pragmatist hypothesis, influences the thought processes and discernments, not the tracks.

⁵⁹ Iran's playbook in the Arab world: Ideology or domestic politics? | Middle East Institute (mei.edu)

As a result, this research will first provide a general explanation of the most fundamental tenets upon which modern realism is founded. It will then focus on the most significant general factors influencing Iranian foreign policy, subject to an examination of Iran's Middle Eastern policy.

Neorealism is an extension of traditional realism that has expanded the idea of force. If power is restricted by traditional realism to combat and war; That is, in addition to military power, neorealism has expanded power to include economic, geopolitical, and geo-cultural power. This is due to the confirmation that the new conquest adopted the primary premises of traditional realism, such as the chaotic naturalness of the international system (Anarchy) and the centrality of power as a criterion for governing the relationships between these nations, in addition to the independent States' pivotal role as the primary units constituting this system. The realist theory of international relations assumes that the constituent units of the political system act in accordance with what is dictated by the nature of the system in which they exercise their sovereignty through the rules that it imposes. As a result, the nature of the internal system of the state, whether democratic or theocratic, has a significant impact on the state's foreign policy, and it is possible to predict a state's behavior given its position in this system based on what Kenneth Waltz decides.⁶⁰ The global framework is shaped through the endeavors of States to protect their reality, by fortifying their powers. The premise that the international system's governing principle is based on chaos is the foundation of neo-realism. The term "chaos" in this context does not refer to disarray or randomness; rather, it refers to the absence of a central government with the authority to maintain order and penalize rebels. As a result, each nation seeks to safeguard its security by gaining more power, creating the "Security Dilemma," in which increasing one nation's security puts another at risk. In terms of how much power the state is supposed to have, neo-realism is split into two camps: There is offensive and defensive realism. Concerning the hostile authenticity, which "Mearsheimer" is one of the most unmistakable defenders of, it requires the state to have the best measure of force and to look to force authority assuming it is inside its range to guarantee its public safety and deflect its rivals.⁶¹

⁶⁰ For details, see: "Waltz, K. (1988). The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Linklater, Andrew, Neo-Realism in Theory and Practice, The Pennsylvania State University Press".

⁶¹ See: "Mearsheimer, J. J. (2007). Structural realism. *International relations theories: Discipline and diversity*, 83, 77-94".

Neo-realists hold that doubling power is merely a means to an end and that the state's ultimate objective is to maintain its existence. Because of this discernment, neo-authenticity characterizes public interests as all that improves or ensures the public safety of the state, notwithstanding its political impact and its military and financial capacities. John Rourke argues that in realist theory, force creates right or at least ensures success.⁶² Following the US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, Iran found itself in a favorable strategic environment. By assertively attempting to expand Iran's interests throughout the Middle East, its leadership attempted to capitalize on this window of opportunity. However, it was unable to achieve its long-held goal of becoming the most powerful nation in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East as a whole. In "Wasted An open door", Thomas Juneau fosters a variation of neoclassical authenticity,⁶³ a hypothesis of international strategy botches, to investigate the causes and results of Iran's poor exhibition. He argues that Iran's assertiveness was driven by a rising power, as most forms of realism would predict. However, the peculiar nature of Iran's power and the intervention of specific domestic factors caused Iran's foreign policy to deviate, sometimes significantly, from what would be thought to be the best possible outcomes. Juneau explains that the country suffered significant and negative effects because of this subpar foreign policy.

Iran failed to maximize its power, security, and influence in three crucial areas, despite some gains: the Arab-Israeli conflict; Iraq; as well as the nuclear program Juneau additionally predicts that, as the open door consistently closes for Iran, its power, security, and impact will probably keep on declining before very long. The dynamics of regional politics can be seen through the Arab-Iranian relationship. Arabs never showed animosity toward Iran before the revolution, but since then, they have stopped being friends. As a result of Iran's brief attempt at openness, Arab-Iranian relations went through what could be described as normalized stagnation.

However, most of the time, Arabs have not been nearly as focused on Iran as his regime's sponsors in the Gulf might like. How does Arab policy toward Iran and Iran's policy toward Arabs differ from one another? We argue that the structural level of analysis or identity and ideology

⁶² See: "Rourke, J. T., & Boyer, M. A. (2008). *International politics on the world stage* (p. 141). New York: McGraw-Hill".

⁶³ For details, see: "Squandered Opportunity, Thomas Juneau develops a variant of neoclassical realism"

alone cannot account for Arab-Iranian relations. The regime's alliances and policies are influenced in large part by individual leaders, public perceptions, and domestic politics.

The most effective way to explain the alterations in the policies of the two entities toward one another is through an analysis based on "Neoclassical Realism" and "Balance of Interest" by Randall Schweller. Perception, decision-making, and policy implementation are the domestic processes that, according to the neoclassical realist approach, have the potential to skew a state's foreign policy and its responses to systemic stimuli. have a variety of influence capabilities and direct influence over one or more domestic processes. For instance, during times of crisis, the perception of the leaders can have a significant short-term impact on the formulation of foreign and security policy decisions. Foreign policy executives assume an executive role when a state's response time is limited, and a decision must be made quickly. In these situations, they are separated from the core of central administration, society, and domestic institutions. Neoclassical authenticity is a way to deal with international strategy examination. According to neoclassical realism, systemic variables like the distribution of power capacities among States can explain a state's actions in the international system; cognitive variables like how systemic pressures are perceived and misinterpreted, the intentions of other States, or threats are perceived; and domestic variables like elites, state institutions, and social actors that have an impact on the power and freedom of action of people who make decisions about foreign policy. Neoclassical realism adds that the distrust and inability of States to accurately perceive one another, as well as the inability of state leaders to mobilize state power and public support, can result in imbalances. in the international system, the rise and fall of great powers, and war while remaining faithful to the realist concept of a power balance. There are four types of power balance:

1. When one state correctly recognizes the intent of another state and balances them accordingly, we have the right balance.
2. When one nation misunderstands another as a threat and expends more resources than
 1. it needs to maintain its equilibrium; this is known as a false balance or imbalance. This makes an awkwardness.
 2. A country is out of balance when it is mistakenly thought to be ineffective or less of a threat than it is. An imbalance result from this.

3. When a nation attempts to escape balance by passing the ball or other means, it creates an imbalance. This is possible for a variety of reasons, one of which is that States cannot balance themselves. Neoclassical realism was criticized primarily for its "apparent ontological and epistemological inconsistency," according to a review study. Neoclassical realism was criticized by some studies for expanding realism "beyond all recognition or utility" and covering "nearly the entire universe of international relations theory." One of the fundamental imperfections of neoclassical authenticity is that it "will, in general, consolidate homegrown factors in an impromptu way, and its defenders have not yet recognized when these factors become a reality. have more prominent or lesser impact". However, many intriguing cases of foreign policy have been explained using Neoclassical realism, such as the turbulence in relations between South Korea and Japan, Fascist Italy's foreign policy, and Slobodan Milosevic's decision-making. Iran's choices regarding its foreign policy in the wake of the
4. Kosovo crisis in 1999, the beginning of the Cold War between Britain and Iceland, and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This theory's proponents argue that because it considers internal variables, it is especially useful for explaining situations in which it conflicts with other theories of international relations.

CHAPTER 2

Historical Overview of the Arab-Iranian Conflict

2.1 Iran and the Arab World

The history of conflict between Iran and the Arabs is as old as the two entities. Iran and the rest of the Arab World are vying for leadership and influence in the Arabian Gulf.⁶⁴ This competition for regional dominance has been around for a long time, but it became especially significant after the Arab Spring, a term that refers to a series of popular demonstrations in the Middle East that began in the last months of 2010. This rivalry is fueled by regional political, and religious divisions and identity, which are capitalized on by Tehran and Riyadh to expand their influence in the Gulf.

2.2 Iran in the Middle East: where is it, who is it and who was it?

As shown in the map above, Iran borders Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and has connections with the Caspian Sea (to the north) and the Arabian Sea (to the south). The waters surrounding the southwest are also known as the Arabian Gulf (where it meets Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates); while to the southeast, its approach to Oman is via the Gulf of Oman. It is a mostly Shiite country (within the Islamic Religion) with an economy heavily based on oil.

It is noteworthy that one of the main points of disagreement between Iran and the rest of the Middle East is not the physical issue, but the fact that it is one of the only non-Arab countries in the region. Because of this, their linguistic, political, and religious distance from their neighbors ends up becoming much more noticeable. The map below represents this ethnic distance well: in yellow, are the traditional Arab regions, and in orange, are the people of Persian origin (the Iranians).

⁶⁴ The group of countries that speak Arabic and are geographically dispersed from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea to the north of the Horn of Africa to the northeast of the Indian Ocean is referred to as the Arab-phony, or al-'Alam al-'Arabi. It spans Western Asia and North Africa and is made up of 22 nations and territories with a total population of 360 million people. It is sometimes referred to as the "Persian Gulf," but the term "Arabia Gulf" is more appropriate given that the majority of the countries in the Gulf speak Arabic.

It can also be seen from the map above that the border lines do not necessarily represent the ethnic reality of that space, which generates very delicate and complex situations, such as the concentration of the Kurds (in burgundy, in Turkey, northern Iraq, and of Syria), today the largest landless nation in the world.

The nation referred to the present time as the 'Islamic Republic of Iran' traces back to approx. 550 BC, when the Achaemenid Empire was established, and remained known as Persia for most of its history. As the first hegemon in history, the Persian Empire ruled a significant portion of the Middle East. Persianate, or evidence of its influence beyond its borders, came to be referred to as the Taj Mahal. Declaring their unique faith to be the nation's religion was another significant event in history (Wiesehöfer, 2009). The country has gone through a lot of structural changes over the past century, like the Shah's dynasty (1925-1979) and the formation of Iran today.




Figure 1: Map of the Middle East with Iran

(Courtesy of Stewart, D. J. (2012). *The Middle East today: political, geographical and cultural perspectives*. Routledge)

Among the maps presented, one element is indisputable: political distance, linguistic and religious language from Iran to the rest of the Middle East – especially from Machreck and the Maghreb and the reason for this is quite simple; unlike most of these countries, Iran it is not an Arab nation (Vaziri, 2013). Ancient Persia, now known as Iran, has always had its well-defined role in the region. Born from the hegemony of the Achaemenid Empire (550 to 300 BC), passing through Persian Islamic (after the 6th century BC), who even reached India – with the construction of the Taj Mahal for a reign of Islamic Hindus who spoke Persian -, and reaching visibility world in the 20th and 21st centuries – with the Pahlavi Dynasty, the subsequent Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its current nuclear program – the relevance of this territory not only of regionally but in the global balance of power organization. The power of his army was so respected that they became known as Immortals. This is because the Persian army never seemed to diminish. Among the 10,000 men who made up its ranks, should one die, a substitute would already take his place.

From a military point of view, the Persians were an example of strength and maintaining the same number of contingents. A curiosity is that the Persian army used elephants to fight. The Pahlevi family ruled the country from 1925 to 1979 under the Shah Dynasty, which passed from Father Reza Shah to Son Mohammed Reza Shah. Reza Pahlevi Khan, a military commander who later changed his name to Reza Shah, overthrew the British occupation of that location in 1925 through a coup d'état. Among the principal socio-political components around then were estimation and arrangement with the West (particularly the US), socially, socially and strategically; with the officialization of the name Iran in 1935, the (intentional) loss of the Persian identity; a state with a "strong secularized modernization"—no strong religious characteristics; The abolition of the obligatory chador marked the beginning of a more libertarian culture and the expansion of women's rights.

2.3 From Persia to Iran – a historical overview to 1979⁶⁵

⁶⁵ In January 1979, Iran's Shiite Islamists, led by Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, overthrew the government of Shah Reza Pahlevi, in power since the 1940s and allied with the United States, and proclaimed the Islamic Revolution. The movement has been around since 1978, when the different currents of opposition to the shah (leftists, liberals and traditionalist Muslims) united under the leadership of Khomeini – exiled since 1964 in Iraq and, since 1978, in France. The government was unable to control demonstrations of opposition to the regime, which led to the fall and exile of

It can be said that the history of present-day Iran begins with the Persian Empire. Achaemenid. In 550 BC, Cyrus the Great⁶⁶ led and won a rebellion against the Persians, bringing under its dominion all the tribes that inhabited the Iranian plateau. At the height of its domains, its territory reached 3 continents (Africa, Asia, and Europe), from current Libya to India, connecting them by an intricate set of roads.

The Persian hegemon was also known for the emancipation of slaves (including the Jews, from the domain Babylonian), for the use of an official language throughout the territory, and for being one of the main enemies of the Greek city-states (Lefebvre, 2003).

2.4 The Iranian Revolution (1979)

History shapes the future. It is also true in the case of Iran. Companies under Islamic influence have been reshaped, retaining a strong sense of community and taking the laws – both divine and human – to a new level and reference. After this time, a new relationship between Arabs and non-Arabs would change the course of the region (Sreberny and Mohammadi, 1994).

Finally, in 1979, the country's situation was once again radically transformed. The Iranian revolution was a mass revolution, led, however, by an elite clergy who endeavored to create a theocracy. Furthermore, it was the first revolution to be televised to millions of viewers. The Iranian uprising, therefore, may be characterized as a revolution of independence and defense of identity, national in the face of the globalizing process promoted by the great powers, which tends to erode borders and national identity (Parsa, 1989; Abrahamian, 1980).

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was much more about the discontent of the population on living conditions, wage cuts, rising unemployment rates, and disillusionment and frustrations with

Shah Reza Pahlavi. Power was transferred to Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiari, but it was short-lived. The armed forces joined the insurgents, and on February 1, 1979, Khomeini triumphantly returned to Tehran, Iran's capital.

⁶⁶ Cyrus the Great (in Iranian: Kurosh and Bozorg) was born between 590 and 576 BC and died in August 530 before the emissary of the last Achaemenid in Persia.

the regime (Rasler, 1996). The people took to the streets to reclaim their national roots in opposition to nearly six decades of Westernizing imposition. As stated on the first page of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “The definitive feature of this revolution, apropos of other revolts in Iran during this century, is its ideological and Islamic” (Leezenberg, 2017). The Ayatollah and his followers called for the restoration of Islam in society Iranian society because religion could solve the problems that the state had not. [...] The revolution assumed a social content [...] with a very strong anti-imperialist content (Papan-Martin, 2014).

After decades of rule, the country's unemployment and poverty rates began to rise, as did popular discontent. In 1979, the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini led a coup, now religious and conservative, with the support of the majority of the population. At that time, the following stood out: Retaking of religious and ideological roots (as stated on the first page of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran: The defining feature of this revolution, in comparison with other revolts in Iran during this century, is its ideological and Islamic nature); abrupt departure from the West, especially the USA (on page 32 of the same Constitution, it is highlighted: The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the rejection of any type of domination, both in the exercise and in submission to she; (...) the defense of the rights of all Muslims; misalignment with the dominant powers; mutual peaceful relations with non-aggressive States); Complete change in the country's political system, now with a greater democratic opening – finally, the voice of the people would be heard and represented; the officialization of a Supreme Religious Leader, making the country an Islamic ‘Theocratic Republic’.⁶⁷

The result of the Revolution was also a complete change in the political system of the parents (Mousavian, 2008; Ghani, 2019). Iran now had a supreme religious leader (above all and everyone, even the ruler), officially becoming the Islamic Theocratic Republic. this new Republic of Khomeini was based on the principle of *velayat-e faqih* (فقيه وايت) – (translated) freely as “Islamic

⁶⁷ According to the Wikipedia, “the Supreme Leader of Iran (Persian: رهبر معظم ایران, romanized: *rahbar-e mo'azzam-e irān*), also referred to as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution (رهبر معظم انقلاب اسلامی, *rahbar-e mo'azzam-e enqelāb-e eslāmi*), but officially called the Supreme Leadership Authority (مقام معظم رهبری, *maqām mo'azzam rahbari*), is the head of state and the highest political and religious authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The armed forces, judiciary, state television, and other key government organizations such as Guardian Council and Expediency Discernment Council are subject to the Supreme Leader”.

Governance”; granting him immense powers as a political leader and attesting that the government should be led by the traditional Islamic law. (Sharia), by an Islamic jurist (Faqih), and “guardians” (Velayat) over the people and the nation (Chehabi, 1991).

Regarding internal political organization and administration, there is the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregān) – an institution composed of theologians, or sages versed in laws and religion among Muslims (Ulamā) – who chooses the leader among qualified Shiite clerics based on the candidate's personal piety, experience in Islamic law and acumen politics (IRAN, 1979). This leader's powers are extensive as he, “appoints the senior officers of the Armed Forces and Revolutionary Guards (Pāsdārān-e Enqelāb), as well as members clergy of the Council of Guardians (Shūrā-ye Negahbān) and members of the judiciary. The leader is also solely responsible for declarations of war and is the Commander-in-Chief of Iran's armed forces⁶⁸. What is meant by democracy in the West cannot be juxtaposed with Iran.

2.5 21st Century: From the Arab Spring to the 2018 Protests

In 2011, most of the “Middle East” experienced the “Arab Spring.”⁶⁹ This was a series of popular uprisings intended to dethrone Statesmen, who had been in power for decades in a tyrannical and undemocratic way. At that time, however, there were few demonstrations by the Iranian population. The country's role at that time was due to the escalation of the Cold War with Saudi Arabia, disputed power, and regional influence through indirect means or the so-called “proxy wars”, where external actors (governments/militia groups/organizations, etc.) they support

⁶⁸ More importantly, the leader sets the overall direction of the nation's policy, also including the foreign policy.”⁶⁸ Not there are limits to the mandate of the leader – who even controls the press and the media – but the Assembly may remove you from office if they think you are poorly performing your duties. Currently, the will of the people and the will of God work in unison with regard to national democracy. Even though the final authority is the supreme religious leader, the electorate votes for important national offices such as the presidency, parliament and the Assembly of Experts.

⁶⁹ Iran has long liked to set itself up as the “protective power of the Shiites” and is using that pretext to expand its influence in the Arab world, especially to the detriment of the Saudis, who used to set the tone in the region. Both scenarios would have threatened not only Bahrain's power interests, but also those of Saudi rulers. Hence it was considered necessary to make the insurrection fail.

opposing sides in parallel conflicts in neighboring countries, without directly interfering with them (only via financing, military support, and training, disposition of weapons, etc.).⁷⁰

That's why Iran has led Hezbollah to act several times in Lebanon, to keep the Shiite community as far away from the protests as possible. In Iraq, pro-Iranian forces are fighting, among other things, snipers, and knife attacks, precisely aimed at preventing the majority Shiite population from rebelling against the excessive influence of the neighboring "Shiite protective power". This would seriously threaten Tehran's influence in Iraq.

Between 2011 and 2015, Iran was coerced by the International Community to submit its Nuclear Program⁷¹ to the scrutiny of the UN Security Council: The program generates controversy internationally due to the suspicion, especially in the US, that the country is developing military nuclear technology. The government denies any accusations and claims that the program does not include any purpose other than scientific and energy production purposes (Chubin, 2012).

In 2015, after years of debate and sanctions, Iran and the P5+1 (the five member countries of the UN Security Council + Germany) signed a Nuclear Agreement, which guaranteed the drastic reduction of the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions linked to the country. Here, it is worth highlighting the role of President Hassan Rouhani, elected by the Iranians in 2013, who in two years in office managed to finalize the agreement (Fürtig, 2015).

However, several factors helped to defame Iran's image from that time onwards, such as:

⁷⁰ This is also increasingly true of rival regional power Iran, which also fears a loss of regional influence. That's why Tehran Iran sent Lebanese Hezbollah to Syria as soon as possible, to protect the allied regime of Bashar al-Assad. And that is why Iran is taking a decisive stance against the new popular uprisings in Lebanon and Iraq. Both are directed against the confessional clientelist system and, if successful, would also be detrimental to the great Iranian influence that exists in both countries (Chubin, 2012).

⁷¹ According to *(Iran and the NPT | The Iran Primer (usip.org))*, "Iran, located in one of the most tense areas on the planet, in the Middle East, Iran, a fundamentalist Islamic republic, has been a matter of concern for the international community. The responsible for this situation is the nuclear program developed in that country. The mastery of nuclear technology can be used for the construction of electric power plants, in addition to the possibility of manufacturing nuclear weapons. According to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), only countries that exploded the atomic bomb before January 1, 1967 (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom and France) are entitled to possess this type of armament".

The rise to power of Donald Trump in the US (which since 2017 has indicated the president's aversion against the State of Rouhani); the growth of the nuclear energy industry in Saudi Arabia (where, again, there is great interest from the US, the Iranian opponent's national ally); and the country's involvement in conflicts across the Middle East (on account of the regional Cold War against Saudi Arabia).

Perhaps since the 1980s, the separation of the Persian state from the US has now proved its worst consequences: this is where an international image of a “villain” and “nuclear terrorist” Iran in the 21st century is built (although Saudi Arabia is aiming in the same direction with its nuclear program, with the support of the US Congress and Senate).

In 2017 and 2018, international economic sanctions quickly reached the pockets of the Iranian population who, indignant, took to the streets to protest the growing decline in the domestic economy (such as rising prices, unemployment, and economic inequality) and political repression. All the socioeconomic demands, however, revolved around one big element: with Rouhani's attention turned to foreign policy, national issues ended up in the "background", transforming all the country's scenarios (internally and externally) into a big snowball of failed policies and grievances (Akbarialiabad et al., 2021).

2.6 Iran at present

There are many elements that marked the last year in Iranian history. Highlights, however, go to its image on the international stage, such as its role in the oil and nuclear industries, the regional Cold War with Saudi Arabia (and its repercussions in the region), and the accusations of attacks against regional neighbors.

2.7 Oil in the Iranian Economy

The economy of Iran is mostly based on Petroleum (from extraction to refining), which makes it very attractive not only for its regional trading partners but for the whole world (Noorollahi et al., 2012). In other words, despite international disagreements, it is important for

the International System that the State remains politically stable and commercially open, willing to trade its product with the world – or at least until the West finds another more attractive trading partner in the region.

It is worth remembering that in the regional Cold War, Iran and Saudi Arabia also dispute supremacy in energy production, especially in the so-called geopolitics of oil. In this theme, both countries dispute issues such as elements such as greater oil production, greater regional exports, greater discoveries of new energy sources, a greater nuclear program for civil use, greater international agreements for the exploration of these sources, etc., are being explored.

US-Iran economic sanctions and their direct relationship with the oil industry

In August 2018, the US government imposed new economic sanctions on Iran, predominantly aimed at the country's energy, banking, and maritime sectors.⁷² As Tehran's oil exports account for more than half of its foreign revenues, the negative impact of international condemnations affects not just a part of the industry, but the entire national economy of the country. The sanctions weakened Iran's local currency and increased inflation in the country. This destabilization of the Iranian economy is visible in the following fragment of the speech of the US Department of Defense (April/2019):

According to the US Department of State,⁷³ “...almost a year after the United States ended its participation in the nuclear deal with Iran and five months after the full imposition of our sanctions, it is clear that our actions are restricting Iran's cash flow. They are restricting its ability to operate freely in the region. Our oil sanctions have removed approximately 1.5 million barrels of Iranian oil exports from the market since May 2018, and this has denied the regime access to more than \$10 billion in revenue. That's a loss of at least \$30 million a day and that's just for oil”.

However, “while the United States has set a goal of completely halting Iran's oil exports, in April it granted temporary import exemptions to China, India, Greece, Italy, Taiwan, Japan,

⁷² It is worth remembering that, at that time, the Trump administration had already formally withdrawn from the Nuclear Agreement

⁷³ Accessed on 22-11-2021: (“Iran Sanctions - United States Department of State”

Turkey, and South Korea to ensure low prices and no disruption to the global oil market. In response, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that "The legal department of the presidency, together with the ministers of justice and foreign affairs, will prepare an action against those involved in the elaboration and imposition of sanctions on Iran".⁷⁴

On other dates in the rest of the year, three new points became important in this intermittent context:

1. 9/11: Trump eases sanctions on Iran.
2. 22/09: Saudi Arabia may attack Iran via another actor.
3. 09/27: European Union warns Iran it may be forced to withdraw from Nuclear Agreement

2.8 International Accusations of Iranian Attacks

However, all these “back and forth” and economic attacks against Iran, coming especially from the West, are not necessarily unfounded. Although President Rouhani always denies the accusations, in 2019, several attacks that took place across the region have signs of having originated in the Iranian state. There are 3 highlights:

1. May/2019: Sabotage on ships in the Arabian Gulf (as a possible counter-response to the sending of US warships and bombers to the area, in response to threats from Iran).
1. June/2019: The attack on oil ships, with alleged video evidence.
2. September/2019: The drone attack on oil installations in Saudi Arabia (as explained in detail in this post).

As debates continue over the validity of the evidence presented in each of the cases against Iran, the actor continues to have his image internationally tarnished – since the accusations alone are enough for the trial and the scrutiny of the international media (Fathollah-Nejad, 2021; Irfan et al., 2012).

2.9 The Iran-Saudi Arabia Cold War and regional perceptions

⁷⁴ ibid

A third point that should be listed with the same importance as the other two elements above, is the regional Cold War that Iran and Arab countries and Saudi Arabia, in particular, have been fighting for years – and which has been strongly staggered since the 2011 Arab Spring when most of its Middle Eastern countries became politically unstable and socioeconomically destabilized (Yazdanpanah-dero and Dolati, 2021). While Saudi Arabia mostly supports state governments in the region [Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, Libya (in Tobruk), and Jordan], Iran aligns itself with those actors such as militias and anti-government rebel groups, who are against the order current (the famous status quo): The governments of Iraq (the biggest neighbor and Shiite ally in the region) and Lebanon (although in 2018-19, relations between the Lebanese and Iranian governments are in a sensitive state); And the groups Hezbollah (Lebanon) and Hamas (Palestine), the Houthis (Yemen) and the Kurds (in Iraqi territory) (Shams, 2021).

Thus, it becomes visible that the approximation of the Saudi State with the USA and the West facilitates political, economic, and military alliances since the Kingdom has no intention of changing the balance and the System in the Middle East. While, on the other hand, the Iranian vision of breaking with this same System, increases the intensity of the spotlight that falls on the country with each step it takes (as in its Nuclear Program) and for each incident that occurs in the region (although not even always with proof of their authorship).

CHAPTER 3

Iranian Geopolitics, Military Potential and Foreign Policy

3.1 Geo-politics

The term political geography⁷⁵ is almost always attributed to the German Friedrich Ratzel, with the production and publication of his work “Politische Geographie” (Political Geography, from 1897) (Farinelli, 2000). However, the notion that any analysis of state laws or diplomatic relations was configured as political geography existed long before him.⁷⁶

Although political geography and geopolitics share some points in common, the questions of each are different. Geopolitics consists of the international links and strategies of States, that is, the power between countries according to their circumstances and sovereignty. Political geography, on the other hand, is the side that only relates the political control of States to their territories, especially regarding administration. While geopolitics is attentive to studying interventions that can guarantee the control of power from one territory to another, political geography focuses only on its geographic space and the tensions generated in it, such as protecting borders and controlling natural resources.

Political geography behaves like a scientific study, as the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel expanded his concepts and approaches from 1887 onwards. Geopolitics, on the other hand, can be seen as a strategy used by each country to reach the maximum level of power, territorial expansion, and growth of its economy. So, more simply, the difference between them is that geopolitics transcends national borders, considering international and diplomatic disputes (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994).

⁷⁵ Political geography is concerned with the study of both the spatially uneven outcomes of political processes and the ways in which political processes are themselves affected by spatial structures.

⁷⁶ According to (Flint, C. (2006). “*Introduction to geopolitics*”. Routledge.). “Geopolitics is a component of human geography. To understand geopolitics we must first understand what is human geography. This is easier said than done, precisely because geography is a diverse and contested discipline-in fact, the easiest, and increasingly accurate, definition is that human geography is what human geographers do: accurate, but not very helpful”

3.2 Geo-politics of Iran in the Middle East

Located in Southeast Asia, Iran's location has been a strategic part of regional arrangements and international geopolitical theories (Ahmadi & Parsaeei 2005, 277- 297).⁷⁷ This situation, on the one hand, can act as a guarantee of stability and economic development, and, on the other hand, it can bring instability, insecurity, and loss of opportunities and capabilities (Ezati & Yazdanpanah 2007, 69), since its importance affects internal political issues and of the State and also strategies of regional and global powers (Malakootiyan 2004, 219). Even with all the technological advances, the experience of past wars shows States with a strategic location, can't keep away from conflicts or, in other words, assume a policy of isolation from the conflict. This is because it should recognize its geographic position as of unique importance in the formulation of strategies, especially military, acting appropriately and seeking to benefit from this essential position for development. However, this situation was not understood by Iran over the past two centuries (and even if it had been) and the country has not opted for comprehensive action and has been an arena for rivalry of global powers. Thus, the research intends to focus on the political evolution of Iran in the past two centuries in which the buffer situation has directly affected the political life of the state. During this period, Iran was immersed in the strategic competition of world powers acting as a space of dampening the competitive rivalry of these powers (Ahmadyan and Ghadbeigy, 2022; Ezati 2003, 78).

The competition between Great Britain and Russia, and the exercise of their rule, weakened and crippled the Iranian state structure in the first half of the 20th century (Fouler 1994, 23. This situation configures a new experience in Geography Politics and geopolitics resulting from power rivalries and engaged Ghajar, Phalavi, and the Islamic Republic of Iranian States. In general, the

⁷⁷ Currently, there are some important geographic regions, of politics being the focus of local, regional and international disputes. the regions geopolitics around Iran are as follows: 1. Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and Caucasus to the north; 2. The subcontinent Indian and Afghanistan to the east; 3. The Indian Ocean to the southeast; 4. The Arabian Gulf and the Sea of Oman to the south; 5. Turkey and the Arab region west of Iran. These regions have some geopolitical sub-regions. For example, northern Iran is made up of three geopolitical sub-regions including Asia Central, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus, playing a key role in the lines of communication between these three sub-regions. In general, the geographic location of Iran is a junction of lines of communication, buffer space and importance. geopolitical, geo-economics and geostrategic. The mix of these functions is responsible for putting the Iranian geographic position in a unique situation.

beginning of period investigated begins in 1800 (during British domination in India and the Russian attack on Iran).

Iran's buffer situation resulting from competition from great powers, initially between England and Russia and later between the United States and Russia, created a difficult situation for Iran, which has faced a series of difficulties to maintain its unity and sovereignty (Sayahi, 2022; Fezeli, 2022; Manshoor Gorgani 1989,). Therefore, it can be argued that the study of the history of contemporary Iran would be incomplete without considering the role of the great powers, from the geopolitical perspective, in this space.⁷⁸ In the last two centuries, relations with Russia and England, followed by relations with the United States and Russia - which maintained an interest in Iranian space, were the most important issues in Iranian foreign policy. Iran's performance was more passive, and this role was imposed by the great powers on Tehran. The inability Iranian response was proven when Russia and England attacked their territory dividing it between Russians and British without any reaction on the part of Iran. This situation continued until the end of the Cold War when Iran passed to serve as a buffer space between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this study, using bibliographical references, the variables for the formation, characteristics, and functions of buffer spaces were identified as presented. However, Sariolghalam concludes that no change is anticipated in the current Iranian foreign policy for three reasons, taking into account the various periods, dynamics of domestic politics, and political principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the possibility of a change in Iran's foreign policy (particularly on sensitive issues such as relations between Iran and the United States).

- 1) There is no connection between the nation's foreign policy and the global economic system.
- 2) The political system's ideological nature of sovereignty.
- 3) and the inclination to keep up with existing international strategy approaches by thinking about the interrelationships among authenticity and public safety and international strategy.

⁷⁸ Like Malekshoaraie Bahar put it: Iran could be compared to a person whose neck rope is being pulled to two opposite sides while debate.

Foreign policy will contribute to the continuation of Iran's revolutionary domestic order if it is based on the religious and revolutionary ideological system, and any potential shift in foreign policy will be dependent on shifts in domestic politics (Golmohammadi, 2019).

Due to its population, history, and geographical location, Iran is one of the most important Middle Eastern nations, and its role in current events has grown at an unexpected rate. Assessing Iran's true power is crucial for Iran's ruling apparatus and for other nations, both regionally and globally, in light of the dramatic developments within and around the country (Menashri, 2006).

Five factors of Iran's power can be named as follows:

- 1- Iran's geographical position at the intersection of political geographical issues Iran is the 18th largest country in the world with an area three times the size of France with an area of one million 648 thousand (and 195) square kilometers; In the Middle East, only Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan are larger than Iran. Iran is bordered by five countries and has three accesses to the sea (Caspian, Gulf, and Oman Sea) at the junction of the Arab world, Turkey, India, and Russia. Iran's foreign policy in the south (Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean), northwest (Turkey, Caucasus), in the west (Arab East), northeast (Central Asia), and east (Pakistan, Afghanistan) five strategic directions of the region that from the perspective Political geography is very important, it includes (Barthold, 2014).
- 2- Iran is one of the most populous countries in the region and only two countries, Egypt (86 million and 900 thousand people) and Turkey (81 million and 600 thousand people) have more population in the Middle East than Iran. Iran has a much larger population than its neighbors in the Arabian Gulf (Hoodfar and Assadpour. 2000).
- 3- The military strength of the Iranian Armed Forces in 2013, including the army, the Revolutionary Guards, and the paramilitary forces, was 563,000 (Nabil, 2021). Outside the borders, Iran can also count on the arms of military power, such as the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Badr Corps, or numerous Iraqi and Syrian militias from five years ago.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ As per the observations of (Pollack, K. (2013). *Unthinkable: Iran, the bomb, and American strategy*. Simon and Schuster.), "some Western officials and analysts argue that Iran's military strategy is offensive in nature, aimed at

- 4- Energy resources: Iran has one of the most important oil and natural gas resources in the world: Iran, with 9.3% of the world's proven oil reserves, is fourth after Venezuela (17.5%), Saudi Arabia (15.7%), and Canada (10.2%). It has the world's oil source. With 18.2 percent of the world's proven gas reserves, it is ahead of Russia (17.4 percent) and has the world's largest gas reserves. Iran's economy ranks 19th in the world in terms of purchasing power parity after Australia (Sedghiyan et al., 2021).
- 5- Scientific "soft power" Since 1999, Iran has overtaken Pakistan, Malaysia, and South Africa in scientific publications. The superiority of technical education, higher education, and university institutions, in which the number of female students is significant, is proved by the number of articles published by Iranian researchers in international academic journals (Nejadbahram et al., 2021).

In defining the concept of "power" in international relations, one usually relies on the definition of Raymond Aaron (2017), one of the most famous theorists of international relations during the Cold War, who said: "Power in the international arena is the ability of a political unit (country) To impose its will on other units. The tools that countries use to enforce their will in the international arena range from military power to economic power and even ideological and cultural power. Using the definition of Raymond Aron, to measure Iran's power in the Middle East, the impact that this country has had on its events to date, as well as the degree of success or failure in imposing its will on other countries in the region must also be considered.

According to the theorists of the Islamic Republic, Iran is the only regional power that can define the new rules of the game in the Middle East. Iran's presence and influence in the "four capitals" (Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Sanaa) and, more importantly, the establishment of its influence on the Mediterranean coast, as the most important signs of the country's rise, are

expanding Iran's power and ultimately restoring the Persian Empire; recognizing the severe limitations of its conventional military capabilities due to sanctions since the 1979 revolution as well as depletion as a result of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has resorted to unconventional approaches, including partnerships with non-state actors, to establish its military deterrent." Further, "as Iranians see it, the deaths of American troops have considerably more serious domestic political ramifications for a US president than Iranian military fatalities would have for the Iranian leadership."

emphasized by several military and civilian figures by several military and civilian figures (Oluwafemim, 2000).

A few Western observers in the Middle East also share this assessment. Here is a recent example of this view, an article published by Alain Frachon, one of the most important authors of the French newspaper *Le Monde*, in the same newspaper. Given *Le Monde's* influence in France, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, its view of Middle East issues cannot be ignored. *Le Monde* writes that for the first time since the Persian Empire, Iran has established itself in a position of power in the Middle East. According to him, among the events that have caused misery in the Middle East over the past few years, only one regime has consolidated its power, and that is the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Shiite House controls much of the region, and the leaders of the Islamic Republic have veto power over Lebanon, Syria, and possibly Yemen.

According to *Le Monde*, author Allen Frachon, given the situation in Iran, an unprecedented situation has arisen in the Middle East, and the Iranians have an unbroken earthen corridor between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean. It does not require a visa. In his view, the "Sunni fronts" against Shiite Iran lack unity, and Tehran has been able to approach some members of this front, from Turkey to Hamas and Qatar. However, Allen Frausson says over-expanding Iran's sphere of influence in the Middle East could be dangerous for the country. It probably means that such an expansion could unify Iran's rivals. *Le Monde's* views on the dimensions of Iran's power in the Middle East, such as the similar views expressed by several theorists in the Islamic Republic, are not very true. It is likely that several experts inside Iran, who are aware of the fundamental weaknesses of the country in various fields, will be surprised to read *Le Monde's* article and will evaluate its view superficially.

The French newspaper's analysis recalls the author of what the Western media and even several European and American politicians wrote in the 1980s and 1990s about the regime of Hafez al-Assad, the father of the current Syrian dictator (Robillard, 2021). There were many analysts who during this period, and especially after the Syrian conquest of Lebanon, described the Damascus regime as a symbol of the reconstruction of the Arab empire during the Umayyads and

the Abbasids. Known as a great strategist, Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, did not hesitate to call Hafez al-Assad "the Bismarck" of the Middle East (referring to the famous nineteenth-century Prussian Chancellor). Hafez al-Assad, the Ba'athist "Bismarck", set up a bloody dictatorship in Syria, plunged his country into the current terrible vortex, and caused its irreparable destruction. One should also be very careful about Iran's presence in the "four capitals", and to what extent such a policy can help the country's lasting interests in expanding the Islamic Republic's influence in the region.

What the current Middle East needs is not Shiites against Sunnis or Iranians against Arabs. It is also very dangerous to succumb to the illusions associated with rebuilding ancient empires to provoke nationalist instincts. In the current context of the Middle East, the main priority is to mobilize civil society as well as regional intellectuals to prevent the spread of religious, national, and tribal wars.

3.3 Iran - to become a Lasting Power

But beyond these general considerations, the emphatic emphasis on the rise of Iranian power in the Middle East has another major flaw (Sasanfar et al., 2021), and that is ignoring the principles that are considered in the definition of power in the world of the 21st century. In this definition, both geopolitical and geoeconomic perceptions must be considered. An in-depth and comprehensive review of these two impressions is beyond the scope of this thesis. Simply put, geopolitics emphasizes elements such as territory, population, number of troops mobilized, quantity and quality of weapons, and other such factors to define a country's power, while geoeconomic understanding emphasizes the role of a country. International trade and investment, it considers gross domestic product, the level of welfare of the people, the weight of the national currency, the number of large enterprises, technological capability, and so on. These two perceptions are complementary, and both should be considered in assessing the strength of a country.

Theorists of the rise of Iran's power in the Middle East, and foreign observers (including the author of *Le Monde*) whose analyzes of Iran and the region reach the same conclusion, completely forget about Iran's great geoeconomic weaknesses and, conversely, in the case of some of the progressive geopolitical aspects of Iran, even cross-sectionally and regardless of its long-term consequences, is often magnified superficially. In today's world, there is a real power that can rely on strong economic infrastructure. And this is the factor that the Islamic Republic is completely deprived of.

Iran, for example, has a fundamental problem with water, the main source of the country's survival. "Studies show that more than 70 percent of the country's environmental problems are in the field of water, and the continuation of the current trend for the next 15 years will destroy the history of several thousand," said Isa Kalantari, former Minister of Agriculture and new head of the Environmental Protection Agency. "It will be our year." He had previously said that due to the water crisis in the country if no solution is found, a large part of the population will have to leave the Iranian plateau. How can a country that is facing this great problem within itself become a lasting power on the scale of the Middle East?

Can such a fragile country assume the role of power in the destiny of the Middle East? There is no doubt that in a region with Middle Eastern characteristics, Iran cannot and should not be deprived of strong military might. But the best way for Iran to achieve lasting power is to build a strong economic infrastructure by releasing energy and resolving tensions in the country's international relations.

Other factors such as the oil economy, severe industrial weakness, unemployment, corruption, deprivation of economic infrastructure including real banking network, foreign trade focused on low-level goods, weak money, etc., pave the way for Iran to become a power. They are close to real areas. For geo-economic reasons, Iran cannot become a real power, but even from within, it is in danger of collapsing. A couple of years ago, during sanctions on the nuclear issue, this threat weighed heavily on Iran. This is a point that the President of the Islamic Republic, Hassan Rouhani, has pointed out in his election program entitled "Iran Again" for the second term of his rule. He writes: "Few can deny the fact that in 1392 the country was on the verge of financial

bankruptcy and if oil exports reached zero, the government in managing the current affairs of the country and meeting the basic needs of the people (such as paying salaries and providing Basic goods) were in serious trouble. "At the same time, inflation was rising at an unprecedented rate, and the value of the national currency was falling more than fourfold or more."

Hassan Rouhani continues: "If such a situation prevailed in the country, there would be no need for a large-scale military attack by the enemy, but the country would collapse on its own and from within." Can such a fragile country assume the role of power in the destiny of the Middle East? There is no doubt that in a region with Middle Eastern characteristics, Iran cannot and should not".

3.4 Military Potentials of Iran


In the current contemporary international ration and politics, the most important debates in all military and even some political circles about defense capabilities are based on the defense budget of the countries and this is the basis for evaluating many processes and processes in the military field. According to the Stockholm Peace Institute, in 2019, all countries in the world allocated a total of \$ 1.9 trillion in military spending, which is an increase of about 3.6 percent compared to 2018.⁸⁰ It is interesting to know that the evaluation of the military budgets of different countries in 2019 shows that for the first time in history, the two Asian countries have won the title of the holder of the largest military budgets in the world with a significant increase in budgets, respectively in the second and third ranks. The Chinese government in 2019 with 261 billion dollars and a jump of 5.1 percent of its military budget this year compared to the previous year, the second largest military budget in the world, and India with 71.1 billion dollars and a jump of 6. 8% is in the third place. Many countries see military tensions between China, India, and Pakistan as a major factor in increasing the region's military budgets, but at the same time, China has said it intends to compete with the United States militarily, and this is probably why its military budget Has significantly (Ortiz et al., 2019).⁸¹

⁸⁰ For more details on the millatary spendings by the Arab countries, please see: "Wezeman, P. D., & Kuimova, A. (2019). Military spending and arms imports by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE"

⁸¹ An overview of military budget allocation in different countries shows that the five countries, the United States, China, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia, account for about 60% of the world's total military budget, which means

3.4.1 Allocation of Military Budget, Production and Purchase?

In evaluating the military budgets of different countries, it has always been asked what this amount of military budget will be spent on. Is that country going to spend this budget on arms purchases or is it going to spend it on the development budget of the armed forces or the production of military weapons? At a glance at the level of our region, these questions can be easily answered. At the regional level, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are long-time competitors and have always been considered by various circles in evaluating military budgets. As you read in the first part of this report, Saudi Arabia has the first regional budget in 2019, the third largest in Asia, and the fifth largest military budget in the world. At the regional level, the UAE and Iran are among the middle countries. Now the question is, what has been spent on this amount of military budget in the three countries of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and in which country has more military spending increased military power? In the forthcoming sections, these are elaborated on in more detail. However, in the Figure below, a comparison between Iran and Saudi Arabia's military spending is depicted.



that there is an arms race between these five countries. Interestingly, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not in the top 10 countries in the world in terms of military budget, but it can be predicted that our country, along with a number of other countries in the region and the world, is among the top 25 countries in the world.

Figure 2: From 2010 to 2018, the amount spent on the military by Saudi Arabia and Iran.

From 2010 to 2018, the value of military expenditures in Iran and Saudi Arabia can be seen in this statistic. Iran spent approximately seven billion dollars on its military in 2018, whereas Saudi Arabia spent 56 billion dollars. (Source: Wezeman, P. D., & Kuimova, A. (2019). Military spending and arms imports by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE)

3.4.2 Military Potential Comparison with other States - Saudi Arabia

As the holder of the world's fifth largest military budget (\$ 61 billion), Saudi Arabia has made huge military expenditures, and of course, this trend of staggering military spending is not related to this year or last year, but Saudi Arabia has long been one of the top few countries in the world with a huge military budget (Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019).

A look at Saudi Arabia's holdings in various fields, however, shows that it is a major importer of arms and military equipment rather than a manufacturer or even exporter of military weapons. In 2017, for example, Saudi Arabia signed the largest arms deal in world history with the United States, known as the \$ 460 billion deal. Under the deal, \$ 110 billion in military equipment will be sold immediately to the United States by the United States, and \$ 350 billion of the remaining contract will be implemented by the United States over 10 years (Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019).

An estimate of this huge figure shows that Saudi Arabia has spent an average of \$ 46 billion a year on military arms purchases under the contract alone over the past 10 years (between 2017 and 2027), which is equivalent to more than two-thirds of Saudi Arabia's 2019 military budget. It has spent its military budget on this contract, which, of course, should be added to the annual budget, not reduced from its military budget. The contract will include the purchase of weapons and equipment, including F-15 fighter jets, C-130 and KC-130 transport aircraft, Todd missile system, warships, warships, close support aircraft, etc., from which the delivery process will begin (Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019: Sheet, 2019).

3.4.3 Military Potential Comparison with other States -United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates, like Saudi Arabia, is one of the largest importers of military equipment and weapons in the world. Saudi Arabia has the largest air force among the six GCC member States, followed by the UAE; Of course, all the planes and fighters of these two Arab regimes are imported, not domestically produced (Sheet, 2019; Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019).

UAE arms purchases show that arms purchases have increased significantly in the last 10 years, with dozens of fighter jets, helicopters, missile defense systems, armored vehicles, individual equipment, etc. coming from the country over the past years. It has bought various, especially from the United States, Russia, China, and even South Africa (Erdoğan et al., 2020 Sheet, 2019; Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019).

In a single contract with the United States, it spent \$ 6.5 billion on the Patriot air defense system and received a large number of firearms from the system along with support services.⁸² In the current situation, after the normalization of the UAE's relations with the Zionist regime, the country is trying to get the concession to buy F-35 fighter jets from the United States, which has also received the green light in this regard (Code and Industrials, 2022; Sheet, 2019; Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019).

3.4.4 Budget Allocation to Military

According to the International Assessment Centers, Iran's military budget in 2019 was about \$ 17 billion, which is about a quarter of Saudi Arabia's military budget this year. But there is a serious difference between Iran and other countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the field of military equipment and weapons, and that is Iran's different strategy. From the beginning of the imposed war, Iran, which needed weapons and military equipment to defend its soil and water, could not rely on arms purchases due to sanctions and was forced to focus its efforts on producing and building the necessary infrastructure to use the knowledge of experts. Native to design and manufacturing modern weapons and equipment, but on the other hand

⁸² LGGGGGGGS, G. L. S. G. (2022). ARMS TRANSFERS, 2021. Available on:

Maidan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, and even Jordan and Syria, based their purchases of military weapons from other countries, especially the world powers. The purchase of military weapons from other countries, although in appearance can increase the military power of the purchasing countries, in general, is not a permanent factor of power for these countries but can also be a factor of weakening these countries (Erdoğan et al., 2020; Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019).

For example, the imperial regime had bought a significant number of weapons from the United States and the West before the Islamic Revolution, but these weapons and equipment were not given to our specialists after the revolution, especially during the Revolution, because the production and even research capabilities were not given to them. The imposed war was considered a factor in weakening our country. Of course, our country's specialists during the war, by going through difficult days and using the power of local engineers and specialists, were able to solve many problems and shortcomings that were due to the cessation of Western cooperation, but again our country suffered blows from this area. The same is true today of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and many other countries in the region, meaning that if one day the United States and the West will, they can take over most of the resources of these reactionary regimes in the region within a few months (Erdoğan et al., 2020; Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019).

This issue has another side as well. In measuring the military capability of countries, centers such as Global Firepower by examining 55 components, including advanced equipment and technologies, details of the military capability of air, land, naval, and other military, and defense facilities, as well as economic facilities, financial stability, and resources. Naturally, the military power of different countries has been evaluated in the latest report of this center, Iran in 2020 is ranked 14th in the world military powers and higher than countries such as Saudi Arabia, Zionist regime, Australia, UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Pakistan, it is located in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Oman, etc. (Erdoğan et al., 2020; (Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019).

In this global ranking, Iran is the fifth largest military power in Asia, after Egypt, and the second largest military power in the tense region Middle East (Kimbal, 2022). One of the most important components in measuring the military power of countries is the amount of defense equipment production and military knowledge. Iran can be considered one of the first two countries

in terms of military knowledge and design and production of military products in the region. Because today, many sensitive and important defense products, including ballistic missiles, naval cruise missiles, ground cruise missiles, air defense missile systems, various radars, reconnaissance drones, individual equipment, military vessels, etc. are designed by our country's defense industry experts. And they are produced, and that is exactly what arms authority means (Kimbal, 2022; Wezeman and Kuimova, 2019; Erdoğan et al., 2020).

But on the other side of the field, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, etc., which are all neighbors of Iran, supply most of their equipment and weapons through foreign purchases, or at best, such as Turkey with foreign aid or form a foreign consortium to produce defense equipment. It is also worth noting that just having modern defense equipment such as fighters, AWACS, UAVs, missiles, advanced armored vehicles, etc. is not empowering; It seems that the countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia during the invasion of Yemen, based on their military capability at the beginning of the war for a few "days", but today, after several "years" of the Yemeni war, not only failed to do so. Yemenis have managed to transfer the war into the territory of Saudi Arabia and even the capital of this country. In this regard, it seems that several factors such as experience, motivation and will, faith, self-confidence, etc. are effective; What the fighters of Islamic Iran had at their disposal during the eight years of holy defense, and accordingly the unity of dozens of countries around the world to help the Ba'athist regime in Iraq to destroy the Salamis revolution could not succeed.⁸³

In Iran, the basis for acquiring military knowledge that leads to the production of defense products began during the imposed war and sanctions of that period and the global alliance not to sell defense equipment to our country and then developed during the arms embargo. During the arms embargo, Iran succeeded in designing and producing the fruits of its expert military accumulation from 1958 to the mid-1980s, and in fact, Westerners today probably acknowledge that the 10-year arms embargo period is a period of empowerment flourishing. It is the military of Iran (Kimball, 2022). Iran has been spending a huge amount of its GDP on its defense (Figure 3).

⁸³ But overall, the lack of military knowledge to produce a product is a serious shortcoming in military capability, and on the other hand, having military knowledge and producing defense products is a positive component for countries; As a rule, a powerful country like Iran is one of their owners and is a regional superpower.




Figure 3: Iran's military expenditures as a percentage of GDP from 2006 to 2017

Iran's proposed defense budget for FY 2018-2019, which begins in March 2018, is \$10.2 billion, which is approximately \$2 billion less than the country's FY 2016-2017 defense budget. The figures are based on the 40,000 Iranian Rials that each dollar represents. Artesh receives \$2.427 billion, the Revolutionary Guards receive \$6.684 billion, the Defense Ministry receives \$442.724 million, the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) receives \$424.380 million, and the Basij force receives \$295.120 million of this sum. (Source: "The Government's Proposed Budget for the Military Organizations," *Tasnim News Agency*, (December 10, 2017), retrieved from <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/09/19/1596>)

Iran has many competitors and rivals: Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. However, it has become a regional power with military investment in various countries. Deutsche Welle analyst Kirsten Kneip looks at Iran's allies in the Middle East and Iran's strategy in those countries. Syria. The relationship between Syria and Iran dates back to the years before the Revolution of 1957 in Iran. After the revolution, Syria remained an ally of Iran and was the only Arab country to stand by the Islamic Republic of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. After Bashar al-Assad came to

power, Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah became the main supporters of the young Syrian president. Assad's dependence on Tehran increased with the start of the Syrian unrest in 2011. In the spring of that year, Iran first stepped up its support for the Assad regime by sending security software and then military equipment (Tolouei and Haghshenas, 2021). Sending combat troops affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards and IRGC military advisers to Damascus was Iran's next step in supporting Assad against the uprising of the people of this country.

The Iranian leadership has paid a heavy price in recent years to keep Assad in power (Khatib, 2021). Iran may have spent \$ 105 billion to support Assad. The State Department says that figure is about \$ 21 billion.⁸⁴

Iran's goal in this large investment to support Assad is to stabilize its superiority in the region over Israel. "Today, the path of resistance against Israel starts from Tehran and reaches from Mosul to Damascus and Beirut," Ali Akbar Velayati, Ayatollah Khamenei's adviser in 2017, told IRNA.

3.5 Iran's Military Expansions – the Case of Lebanon

Iran is also present in Lebanon through Hezbollah (Tari, 2022). The militant group was formed in 1982 during the Lebanese civil war to counter the Israeli army, which had entered southern Lebanon the same year. Shortly after its founding, Iran reinforced the group by sending 1,500 IRGC fighters. The purpose of this action was to export the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1957 to Lebanon. Three years later, the group was renamed Hezbollah. In 2006, during the Hezbollah-Israel war, the Middle East newspaper reported that Iran had provided about 11,500 missiles to the militant group. In addition, about 3,000 Hezbollah forces have been trained in Iran (Booyesen, 2021).

The Israeli army announced in 2007 that Iran was on the side of a militant group in Lebanon, which is a special unit of the Iranian army. The United States estimates that Iran supported Hezbollah in the following years, paying about 200 million euros a year. This amount has increased significantly since the start of the Syrian war (Steinberg, 2021). The head of the US

⁸⁴ Nadim Shahadi, a professor at Tufts University in the United States

Treasury Department's counterterrorism office puts the figure at about \$ 700 million a year (Levit, 2021). This financial support is supposed to be used to pay for Hezbollah's war missions in Syria. Many members of this group have been injured or killed in Syria. Hezbollah spends part of this money on weapons. Hezbollah's arsenal is such that it is one of the most powerful non-governmental groups in the world.

3.6 Iran's Military Expansions – the case of Iraq

Iran also has a significant presence in Iraq. After the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003, Iran took advantage of the collapse of power in that country to expand its influence. On the one hand, the Iranian leadership seeks to prevent a repeat of the eight-year war with Iraq and to fight jihadist terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq. At the same time, Iran is trying to counter the US presence in Iraq as much as possible. At the same time, maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity is very important to Iran. The disintegration of Iraq will disrupt the unstable stability of the region and pose a serious threat to Iran's security. Moreover, the protection of the cities of Najaf and Karbala, which are sacred to Shiites, is important for Iran. Millions of Iranians travel to Iraq every year for pilgrimage (Azizi, 2022).

Iran expanded its influence in Iraq during the presidency of Nouri al-Maliki, who lived in exile in Iran for several years during Saddam Hussein's rule. But now, after the change of government, it has lost part of its influence. After the 2015 elections, Muqtada al-Sadr has distanced himself from Tehran, Iraq's most influential Shiite politician. Sadr seeks to satisfy the demands of many Iraqis who are dissatisfied with Iran's influence in their country (Selvik and Amirteimour, 2021).

3.7 Iran's Military Expansions – the case of Yemen

In Yemen, too, Iran's influence cannot be ignored. In this country, Houthi Shiites paved the way for Iranian influence. The Houthis have been at loggerheads with the Yemeni central

government for about 15 years, saying they have been marginalized and their rights violated (Juneau, 2021).

Iran supports the Houthi Shiites in Yemen and is standing up to its biggest regional rival, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in a power struggle. Saudi Arabia has formed a coalition, mostly Arab, to suppress the Houthis and support the Yemeni central government.

The cost of the coalition's operations - including air operations and the payment of Sudanese troops - is borne by Saudi Arabia. Iran's cost, on the other hand, is much lower. Iran has largely focused on the military equipment of the Houthi rebels. In 2018, a group of independent experts representing the United Nations, after examining the wreckage of a drone that crashed in Saudi Arabia, concluded that the aircraft was made from parts assembled by a foreign country and sent to Yemen (Juneau, 2021).

One of the models of this drone, which is called "Qatif", is almost identical to the "Ababil-T" drone made in Iran in terms of design, dimensions, and capacity. The important point is that Iran does not have a direct presence in Yemen. As a result, Iran cannot be ousted militarily, which is why the Saudi coalition has entered a war of attrition.⁸⁵

3.8 Iran's Military Expansions – Hamas in the Gaza Strip

Iran has close ties to Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip. It has supported Hamas financially and militarily for the past few years. In a speech in the spring of this year, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar acknowledged that the Grad and Fajr missiles fired at Tel Aviv and Birshaba were either given to Hamas by Iran or built in the Gaza Strip with Iranian financial and technical support. Although Hamas is a Sunni-religious organization, Iran supports it in infiltrating the Gaza Strip and threatening or at least threatening Israel, and Hamas welcomes this assistance. Yahya Sinwar has admitted that without Iran's support, he would never have had the current capabilities. "The

⁸⁵ For details see: "Iran – regional power in the middle East". Available on: "<https://allinfo.space/2019/08/27/iran-regional-power-in-the-middle-east/>"

Arab nations left us alone in difficult times, but Iran has always supported us with weapons, equipment, and expertise," he said.

Of course, Iran's presence in the Gaza Strip has not only benefited Hamas, but an organization also close to the Muslim Brotherhood. Tehran now supports Islamic Jihad, a more radical organization than Hamas, which has repeatedly attacked Israeli territory without Hamas's intervention.

3.9 Iran's Military Expansions – Strait of Hormuz

In the recent past, Iran has demonstrated its military might in the Strait of Hormuz. Tensions between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz have risen since US President Donald Trump pulled out of a nuclear deal with Iran. This sea crossing is one of the most important energy transportation routes in the world. Since the presence of the US aircraft carrier in the region, several foreign tankers, including Saudi tankers, have been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi recently stressed with confidence that Iran will retaliate against any US attack and will respond decisively to any US aggression or threat.⁸⁶ Although Iran is not militarily capable of confronting the US military, it can disrupt transportation in the Strait of Hormuz in part or in full and challenge the global economy. For such an action, the Revolutionary Guards can play an important role. "Iran can build shipping lines in the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Caspian Sea with its vast arsenals - such as submarines, smart torpedoes, remote-controlled mines or "Pre-installed and anti-ship from within its territory or the islands of this country - to threaten." Iran has supplemented its arsenal with speedboats and drones and could be a tough opponent in military combat with guerrilla tactics. Iran was a country in the Western camp before the revolution, which had gained the position of regional gendarmerie at a heavy political and economic cost.

⁸⁶ Please see: "US-Iran escalation looms after Soleimani killing: Latest updates". Available on: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/5/us-iran-escalation-looks-after-soleimani-killing-latest-updates>. Accessed 22-1-2022.

3.10 Iranian Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

After the 9/11 attacks⁸⁷, it became clear that the components of power were not as they had previously been in the classical literature of international relations, and that the components of power had expanded and, in some cases, even been redefined.

However, among analysts and international relations experts, the issue of what are the factors of a country's strengths and what can be a country's weaknesses has always been a point of contention. Population, military power, geographical location, economic superiority, superior technologies, and even information have been introduced as components of power (Teixeira , 2021; Altwaiji, 2014). Li et al., (2022) observe that, Since the time of the great voyages, "the core indicators for measuring national power have constituted the accumulation of capital and the expansion of armaments." They add that "national power is fundamentally dependent on the creation of multiple public values," and that the trend of "weak countries getting weaker and strong countries getting stronger" has intensified among nations. Although there are key points and outstanding improvements, the expansion of national power in various forms of value power does not occur simultaneously.

Because most Iranians believe that Iran presents itself as a powerful regional nation seeking a share of the balance of power in the region's political geography because it possesses some of

⁸⁷ The USA established with most Arab and Islamic countries was based on whether those countries were under American or Soviet influence, but after September 11, American policy towards the Arab and Islamic world became based on the principle of "condemnation until proven." Innocence," although most of those countries have suffered more from terrorism than the US. The America's "often unjust" suspicions of Arabs and Muslims exacerbated tensions with peoples around the globe, and added that its invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq did not achieve the desired results. As for the administration of former President Barack Obama, it focused on withdrawing from Iraq, and soon returned to refocusing its attention on Afghanistan after the emergence of the Islamic State on the scene. While former President Donald Trump put aside the phrase "war on terror", he and current President Joe Biden did not offer an alternative to addressing terrorism other than conducting drone strikes against specific targets. It does not seem that Washington learned from the mistakes of the past two decades - according to Mina Al-Araibi - who believes that the danger of "extremist" groups still exists, claiming that despite the change in the leadership of these groups, their principles have not changed.

these elements in addition to ideology. Iran's position in the region and the world before and after the Islamic Revolution is important.⁸⁸

Iran's foreign policy is based on an ideological framework, just like that of any other nation.

⁸⁹ Due to the perception of Iran's influence, political developments, and the emergence of a religious identity distinct from the rest of the Islamic world, Iran is one of the most contentious Middle Eastern nations.⁹⁰ "To gain a structural understanding of Iran's foreign policy, one needs first to understand what ambitions and motives lie behind it," as noted by Cohen and Shamci (2022). In his insightful analysis of the situation in the "Shi'i Crescent," Uzi Rabi maintains that Iran has planned out how the current circumstances in the region can benefit it and advance its fundamental ideology. "Iran views the current circumstances as its hour of opportunity, so to speak, and it is a chance to establish a firm foothold in the heart of the region," Rabi States. The Islamic Republic of Iran behaves accordingly because it considers itself to be the regional hegemon. Rabi asserts that Iran's objective is to revive the "dreams of the Safavids." (Cohen and Shamci, 2022). However, despite the significance of the geopolitical factor, religious ideology may play a role in shaping Iran's relationship with Arabs. It is impossible to discuss Iran and the Arabs, as well as the areas in which the two sides agree or disagree, without addressing the issue of religion or sect. The first step in the interaction between Arabs and Iran is the Shiite sect's rise in Iraq. The Iraqi people's move to Iran to escape the Umayyad, then Abbasid, policy is merely an illustration of the significance of the sect factor and its close connection to political geography.

⁸⁸ For details, see for example, "Barzegar, K. (2008). Iran and the Shiite crescent: myths and realities. *Brown J. World Aff.*, 15, 87".

⁸⁹ foreign policy of all countries is defined, regulated, and pursued in the form of an intellectual system. Especially in the field of explaining national goals and interests, what is referred to as "ideology" forms the basis of foreign policy of all countries. The Islamic Republic of Iran is not an exception to this rule; Therefore, it cannot be said that only the Islamic Republic of Iran has an ideological foreign policy. For example, the foreign policy of a country like America is based on the ideology of liberalism or liberal internationalism. Although the foreign policy of the United States towards a country like the Islamic Republic of Iran pursues political, economic, security and diplomatic goals, the basis of the approach and behavior of the American foreign policy towards Iran or any other country is based on the same liberal thought system. At all, one of the national interests of America, according to the definition of the theorists of this country, is ideological interests; Therefore, it is not correct to say that a foreign policy like Iran's foreign policy, because it is ideological or ideological and is based on an ideology, has no space for the formation and growth and development of economic diplomacy.

⁹⁰ "Hale, W. (2009). Turkey and the Middle East in the 'new era'. *Insight Turkey*, 143-159".

Iraq is one of the most important points of convergence between the Arabs and Iran, due to its historical legacy associated with the emergence of the Shiite sect in the history of the region and Islamic history, and because of its political geography. Therefore, it is found that the fall of Baghdad in 1258⁹¹ marked a turning point in the history of the Arab-Iranian fraction. Since that time, Persia began to gradually move away from the Arab demographic, and the emergence of local governments in Iran that tried to unify the Iranian plateau. During that era, and before the sixteenth century AD, the Arabs did not have that clear influence on Iranian affairs. However, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and over the next two centuries, the scholars of Bahrain, Jabal Amel, and Qatif formed the culture of the new Twelver Ja'fari school of thought in Iran, and the Arab influence at that time strengthened. But with the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the European control of both the Iranian and Arab nations, this led to the stagnation of the Iranian-Arab interaction, the domination of the tribe, and the method of traditional rule over the political system on both sides. This stagnation began to move with the beginning of the twentieth century, the emergence of the modern state, and the formation of what is called today the "Middle East".

For its part, history appears to be a major factor during that era. Modern countries have taken history as a means to strengthen their legitimacy and form their identity. Therefore, relations between Iran and the Arabs have not escaped the presence of history with its full weight.⁹² The Arabs ended the Sassanid Empire, which was the last stage of the Iranian Empire before the advent of Islam. As for the Iranians, they see themselves as the empire that reached the Mediterranean before Islam in the era of the Achaemenid Empire, and then they returned to that in the era of the Islamic Republic, according to the statements of the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran.

⁹¹ As described by (Fancy, N., & Green, M. H. (2021). Plague and the Fall of Baghdad (1258). *Medical history*, 65(2), 157-177), "evidence both from Song China and Iran suggests that plague was involved in major sieges laid by the Mongols between the 1210s and the 1250s, including the siege of Baghdad in 1258 which resulted in the fall of the Abbasid caliphate".

⁹² As noted by ibidium, ".....the Islamic Republic's founders and stewards have a positive view of the Arab conquest. In their opinion, the arrival of Islam rescued pagan Iran from the age of ignorance; hence, Islam, rather than the bygone Persian empires, serves as the anchor of Iran's national self-image. However, many more-secular and more-nationalist Iranians who are wary of the Islamic Republic view the Arab conquest of Iran as a time of humiliation and subjugation. They believe that the Arab armies destroyed the thriving pre-Islamic Zoroastrian civilization that had defined Iran and much of the Middle East for hundreds of years. Although Iran experienced renewed periods of national greatness and regional power after the Arab conquest, especially under the Safavids (1502-1736) and, some might argue, under the Pahlavi dynasty (1925- 1979), it never regained the unquestioned status of a regional superpower that it had enjoyed before the Arab conquest".

There are many complications surrounding the future of Iran and the Arab Gulf States and affecting national security and the importance of studying the security environment in the Gulf region.⁹³ There is always a need to reveal the nature, shape, size, and direction of international and regional relations. There is also a need to foresee the future regarding the security of the Arab Gulf region, and the forward-looking visions can present alternatives to decision-makers in the Gulf States that can be used as guidance in managing such files, and the impact of Iranian armaments on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries from the security and political sides, and studying the danger posed by the Iranian nuclear program. In the Gulf region and knowing the future of the Iranian nuclear program, which created a regional crisis in the region.⁹⁴

3.11 The Basis of Iran's Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is seen as a set of behaviors that defines the relations of a country with other countries within a particular perspective of political, economic, or ideological interests.⁹⁵ The decisions that determine the goals of the foreign state and the actions taken to implement those decisions and the policies of States are not made by the States themselves but are made by individuals who represent the state and are known as decision-makers. Decisions in foreign policy are taken based on objective considerations and knowledge of the factors that determine the general framework of the state's foreign policy such as location geography, natural resources, population, leadership, and facilities. Distinguished official behaviors are followed by official decision-makers

⁹³ As noted by (Hokayem, E. (2014). Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian civil war. *Adelphi Papers*, 54 (447-448), 39-70.), "...in the case of Iran and the major Gulf states, 'spill-in' – an effect in which a growing security vacuum attracts external interference – is a more apt description of the dynamics at play than 'spillover'. As none of these countries border Syria, they have so far largely escaped the direct consequences of the war that have over-whelmed its immediate neighbors, such as refugee flows and threats to security. While they had not yet occurred at the time of writing, it was likely that Iran and the major Gulf states would at some point experience spillover effects in the form of jihadist activity or regional security aftershocks".

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⁹⁵ "Levy, J. S. (1994). Learning and foreign policy: Sweeping a conceptual minefield. *International organization*, 48(2), 279-312".

in the government or their representatives, which they mean to influence the behavior of foreign international units.⁹⁶

Within this background, the foreign policy of Iran toward the regional States may easily be understood. Iran seeks to play a pivotal regional role in the Middle East, directly and indirectly, and by various means. Therefore, the importance of this study comes within the framework of studies concerned with international and regional relations in general, and the Middle East studies, and the relations between Iran and the Arab Gulf, as well as the importance of the study in an attempt to shed more on relations between Iran and the Arab Gulf and contribute to the events of scientific accumulation on the issue.⁹⁷

The study of Iran's foreign policy deals with the roots of the nuclear program, its various stages of development, the economic, political, military, and strategic motives behind Iran's move to own the nuclear program, and the analysis of Iranian goals from the nuclear program and their impact on the emergence of Iran's regional role.

3.12 Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Iran

⁹⁶ Rowhani, former "national security advisor and chief nuclear negotiator under Khatami, has observed that the Iranians: "still have not reached an agreement on many problems, on how to conduct our foreign policy, on how to deal with our interlocutors, on how to present our policies to the world opinion" and "are still debating whether we should place development or justice at the center of our focus— i.e., whether to behave as a state or as a revolution." Taking the view that Iran's state interests should be paramount, he argues that development, to be sustainable, requires security and self-confidence and, therefore, a moderate foreign policy: In our foreign policy, do we want to be ambiguous or clear, do we want the region and the world to be afraid of us or to be our friends, do we want to become every day more fearful or more attractive? . . . If we consider the Islamic Revolution as the top priority, then we should be aware that we will be carrying an extremely grave responsibility on our shoulders. In other words, we are the Islamic Revolution and we want to spread this culture across the region and the Islamic world as a whole. However, if we seek to be primarily the Islamic Republic of Iran, our foremost mission and priority will be the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that means we will traverse a different path." See Hassan Rowhani, interview with Iranian Student's News Agency, 22 November, 2008, in BBC Monitoring, November 27, 2008.

⁹⁷ As noted by (Fancy, N., & Green, M. H. (2021). Plague and the Fall of Baghdad (1258). *Medical history*, 65(2), 157-177): "Iran's foreign policy has often been shaped by the political and ideological conflicts between various factions, particularly since the death of Khomeini in 1989. This process has produced both periods of pragmatism and moderation in Iran's approach to the outside world and, conversely, periods of confrontation and defiance. (The presidency of Ahmadinejad has ushered in the latter type of environment.). Two important foreign-policy case studies put flesh on these observations. The Middle East issue is the touchstone of Iran's foreign relations, reflecting the country's insistence on serving as a role model for the Islamic world and, in particular, for Iran's Arab neighbors. The nuclear issue has been called the most difficult-more difficult even than Iran's war with Iraq-ever faced by the Islamic Republic".

The foreign policy of Iran is affected by a set of internal dimensions that positively and positively affect the foreign policy, whether direct or indirect, and the multiplicity of these determinants and intertwining and based on which the state determines its goal and strategy, and from these determinants (the geographical determinant - the political determinant - the religious determinant - the military determinant - the economic determinant - national determinant).

3.12.1 Geographical Determinant

The geographical determinant is considered one of the most important determinants necessary to understand the nature of Iranian foreign policy toward the Arab Gulf States, because the relations between the neighboring countries are more interactive than the countries that lie outside the regional system (Warnaar, 2013). The country is surrounded by a huge mountainous chain (Zagros chain), which has been a natural protection to the borders of the Iranian state in the northwest of Iran and extends within the borders of Turkey and the Caucasus (Oskouei et al., 2022; Ehteshami, 2002).

Iran has a distinctive feature in terms of its extended geographical location with common borders between it and the former Soviet Union, overlooking the Gulf and the Sea of Oman, as well as its control over the vital strategic waterways in the Gulf, which overlook all the coasts opposite to the Arab Gulf States, in addition to the Strait of Hormuz, which separates it from the Sultanate of Oman. Where Iran is united within a large geographical entity governed by one central authority, which is an ancient feature to a large extent since the Safavid dynasty (Cohen and Shamci, 2022; Ehteshami, 2002).

The Iranian policy in the Middle East was based on a fundamental dimension, which is its conflict with the Ottoman Empire, due to the attempt to control the Gulf trade and the closure of the Basra-Aleppo Road and diverting trade through Persia and Russia and the Cape of Good Hope. But Persian diplomacy took an interest in the Arabian Gulf, especially after 1726 AD, when Nader Pasha failed in his naval policy aimed at controlling the Arabian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and one of the reasons was the lack of Persian sailors needed to keep pace with the political ambition, as most of the sailors were Indians and Portuguese (Cohen and Shamci, 2022; Marschall, 2003).

Britain continued to play an influential role in the Gulf regional system and for some time remained the force influencing the course of events in the region. During the British presence in the Gulf region, Iran did not play an active role, but when the British withdrawal from the Gulf began, it was eager to exercise its power and influence, and this is what made the United States The United States decided to choose Iran to play the role of the Gulf policeman following Nixon principles, especially the security aspect of it. He announced to Shah that Iran was the new power in the region and this matter was very sensitive, as well as feelings of tension in the Arab region, and this is what led the Shah in 1966 to make a diplomatic tour in the region to calm the atmosphere, which resulted in A joint statement between the Shah and King Faisal talking about Arab-Iranian friendship and Arab cooperation in the Gulf (Cohen and Shamci, 2022; Marschall, 2003).

3.12.2 Political Determinants

The Iranian revolution in 1979 led to the overthrow of the Shah's regime (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) at the hands of Khomeini, who laid the foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran⁹⁸. One of the results of this revolution was that it affected all local and regional events inside Iran and the Middle East, which upset the balance and security arrangements (Marschall, 2003). This regime was born From a mixture of originality and modernity between the "Islamic political" thought and Western democracy, in the words of a famous argument by Hunter and O'Brein⁹⁹: "as a compromise and an attempt to reconcile the Islamic currents that demand the application of a pure Islamic system in which the clergy determine the aspects of political, economic and social life, and a democratic current that demands a republican system in which an elected republican president rules, assisted by ministers, and an elected Shura Council that monitors the executive authority, taking into account that the parliament is not dissolved according to the orientations of the Islamic state and the opinion of the hard-working scholars who consider the religious references of the Islamic system to be republican."

⁹⁸ For more details, see for example, "Zweiri, Mahjoob (2012), "Revolutionary Iran and Arab Revolts", Arab Center For Research and Policy Studies, Available in: <http://www.dohainstitute.org/>"

⁹⁹ Hunter, S., & O'Brien, S. (1998). *The future of Islam and the West: Clash of civilizations or peaceful coexistence?*. Greenwood Publishing Group.

The source of authority in the Islamic leadership and in the constitution that governs is not the nation but God Almighty.¹⁰⁰ As for the authority of the infallible deputy and the guardian in the era of occultation, it is also not derived from the nation, but rather from divine authority as well, so that the response to the imam is infallible as the response to God, and the guide of the revolution is considered the main institution In the Islamic Republic, he is the highest effective authority in the country, and he is like the awaited Mahdi. It is his authority to stop the work of any of the principles of the state, and he can suspend the constitution, dismiss, or relieve the president from his position for the republic, and dissolve the elected parliament (Marschall, 2003).

"Leader of the Revolution" is the Guide of the Republic and has broad powers that do not define legal limits. Therefore, an important role of foreign policy decisions falls directly and/or indirectly within the framework of the powers of the Leader. Article 110 States that: "the Supreme Leader sets the general policies for Iran in consultation with the Diagnostic Council, the interest of the regime, so the foreign policy is part of these policies, which must obtain the approval of the Leader."¹⁰¹

The President of the Republic. The 1989 Iranian Constitution refers to the functions of the President of the Republic, the conditions required to be fulfilled therein, and the term of his rule in Articles 113 to 132 other than two general references, one of which is a preamble and the other in Article 60 concerning the executive authority in general, which States that it carries out executive tasks according to what the Constitution has established under the supervision of the Guide and other references mentioned in Its position is due to its connection with the detailed powers of the President of the Republic. Article 113 States that, "the President of the Republic is the highest official position in the state after the position of leadership and is responsible for implementing the constitution and the presidency is an executive authority except for matters related to leadership." The President of the Republic is elected directly by the people for 4 years and may not be elected for more than two consecutive terms (Marschall, 2003).

¹⁰⁰ "Zweiri, Mahjoob (2012). "Revolutionary Iran and Arab Revolts": "Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Available n: <http://www.dohainstitute.org/>."

¹⁰¹ Keddie, Nikki R. "Class structure and political power in Iran since 1796." *Iranian Studies* 11, no. 1-4 (1978): 305-330.

The Assembly of Experts consists of elected religious scholars. This council has the authority to dismiss the leader if it finds that he fails to fulfill his constitutional duties, or if he suffers from a terminal illness or becomes incapacitated. But from a practical point of view, this vote is unexpected and not easy. Neither it is permissible to vote in Parliament on any kind of constitutional amendment before a recommendation is issued by the Assembly of Experts in this regard. In addition, its recommendations and decisions are binding on all state agencies (Marschall, 2003).

The Council for the Protection of the Constitution consists of 12 members. The guide chooses 6 members and the other 6 by the Council. The main task of this Council is to monitor legislation and laws and the extent to which they are applied to Islamic principles following the reforms of this Council contained in the Constitution under Articles 94 and 96. It also plays a role in monitoring foreign policy.¹⁰²

The Shura Council is elected by secret ballot every 4 years to select 290 members, the executive authority consists of an elected president and the cabinet. The Council works in the interest of the Regime in resolving disputes between the “Shura Council” and the “Constitutional Council” over the legitimacy and legitimacy of legislation. The Council has 31 members. These broadly represent various Iranian political issues. It is considered an advisory body to the Supreme Leader (Marschall, 2003).

3.12.3 Religious Determinants

The Iranian revolution is considered the last social and religious revolution in the contemporary political era. It carried the meanings of independence, freedom, and republicanism, but it was a revolution that relied on its religious reference. Religious interpretation had a prominent role in directing foreign policy as well as its role in the social and cultural structure of Iranian society. Khomeini views that the best government ever is one based on religious ideology or an Islamic government. This virtue is based on three basic considerations that he identified in a book entitled “Islamic government.” The first of these considerations relate to the application of the provisions of Islam in the shadow of the great since 256 AH and liberating its lands from the

¹⁰² “Zweiri, Mahjoob (2012), “Revolutionary Iran and Arab Revolts”, Arab Center For Research and Policy Studies, Available in: <http://www.dohainstitute.org/>”

hands of the colonialists and overthrowing the puppet governments for them unless it is taken seriously to establish an Islamic government.

The Iranian revolution made political work linked to the orientations and visions of the clergy, and those who doubt this support as a source of religious authority are deprived of any role in the political authority of the country, while it is found that the clerics before wealth were reluctant and tended to stay away from political work. The two religions present Islam to the people in its true form, and the slogan of separating religion from politics and the demand of Islamic scholars not to interfere in political and social affairs has spread because of colonialism (Marschall, 2003).

There have appeared in Iran voices in favor of velayat-e faqih and others opposing it and believe that the loyalty of the faqih should be given the final authority until the legitimacy of the entire system derives from the leader himself. In the Iranian perspective, the government, the Shura Council, and government officials are all subject to the authority of the guardian jurist in that they derive their legitimacy from him, and they do not have the right to do anything against his will.¹⁰³

3.12.4 Military Determinants

Military force is considered one of the components of countries that seek to strengthen and support it, although this force has reduced its use due to the development that followed it and made it focus on the deterrent side. In protecting national security and asserting sovereignty over the country's territory. About Iran, during the reign of the Shah, Iran was one of the main focal points for the region's security and a strong ally of the West to besiege the Soviet Union. Therefore, the

¹⁰³ As observed by (Thaler et al., (2010). *"Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: an exploration of Iranian leadership dynamics"*, (Vol. 878). Rand Corporation): "the Iranian system is one in which the informal trumps the formal, power and influence derive as much (if not more) from personality as from position, and domestic factional dynamics drive policy debates and policymaking. The system is much more than just the institutions authorized in the country's constitution. A peculiarly Iranian style of checks and balances; one that is undergoing change in the aftermath of the 2009 election—ensures that no one faction becomes so dominant as to challenge the Supreme Leader, Khamenei. There are purposeful bifurcations between the elected and the unelected and between the formal and the informal. The Supreme Leader traditionally has stood as a powerful arbiter over competing power centers, ensuring his stature by demonstrating his apparent aloofness from the fray yet entering that fray when required." Further, "however, Khamenei's decisive declaration of support for Ahmadinejad after the 2009 election has irreparably harmed Khamenei's position as an arbiter and may have significantly decreased his credibility among Iran's diverse power centers."

to assume the coordination tasks between the guard, the Shura Council, and the executive authority.¹⁰⁶

3.12.5 Economic Determinants

The Second World War produced spillovers and repercussions on all events, both at the international and regional levels, and one of its results was the erosion of British influence in the Gulf region, which increased the importance of oil in Iranian economic activity and formed a mainstay in the structure of development and united the Iranian government from popular power to the abolition of institutes. The signing between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Shah of Iran in 1949, forcing the Shah to hold new elections, which resulted in the success of the Popular Front, and a government headed by Dr. Mosaddegh¹⁰⁷ was formed in 1951 to work on the nationalization of oil.

The Iranian constitution has laid down rules for the economy, including the elimination of usury, bribery, theft, and gambling, confiscating the wealth arising from it, redistributing it to its legal beneficiaries, and not imposing a tax or exempting from it except under the law according to articles (43-47-049-519) (Buchta, 2000). The constitution also imposed the state's obligation - all the citizen's demands such as clothing, food, housing, health care, and the development of their personality to contribute to the country's leadership, according to Articles (44-46-47). As for what affected Iran's relationship with abroad, the constitution refers to preventing foreign control of the Iranian economy and returning to work on self-sufficiency in all fields. Not to employ foreigners except in cases of necessity and with the approval of the Shura Council (Buchta, 2000).

3.12.6 National Determinants

Also, the Arab world has ethnic extensions inside Iran, represented by the Arabs, the Kurds, and the Shiites. Iran also has national and factional leeway with the Arab Gulf States, mainly

¹⁰⁶ Lynch, Marc (2011), "American and Egypt", *After the Uprising, Survival*, vol.53, no.2.

¹⁰⁷ Iranian political leader who nationalized the huge British oil holdings in Iran and, as premier in 1951–53, almost succeeded in deposing the shah.

represented by the Persian labor, which constitutes fairly a significant proportion of the multiplicity of the population of the Gulf countries in addition to the Shiites and Arabs, who exist in the Arab social drapery. Thus, the change of the Iranian regime or the ruler in Iran leads to a focus on achieving Iranian goals of making the “Arabian Gulf” a closed “Persian Gulf”,¹⁰⁸ even if it adopts the Islamic approach to the official discourse. Building positive relations with foreign countries overlooking the Arabian Gulf President Rafsanjani’s statement has been received, which confirms the Iranians’ adherence to calling the Arabian Gulf the Arabian Gulf.¹⁰⁹

3.13 Iran’s Foreign Policy and the Arab-Iran Relations

Historically, Iran has long had close ties with the Arab world (Hunter, 2019). During the second Pahlavi period, relations between Iran and the Arab countries expanded (Chehabi, 1998), and Iran and Saudi Arabia, in the form of Nixon’s friendly policy, played an important role in securing the Arabian Gulf. With the Islamic Revolution and the change of positions in Iran, these relations changed, and the Arab countries became concerned about the spread of the ‘Iranian Islamic Revolution’ to their countries. The outbreak of the Iraqi war against Iran and the support of Arab countries for Saddam were aimed at curbing the waves of the Islamic Revolution. Of course, during this period, Syria, Libya, and Algeria refused to support Iraq. With the end of the imposed war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the past alignments of the Arab world were shattered. Subsequent developments, such as 9/11, the US invasion of Iraq and the ouster of the Shiite majority with the fall of Saddam, and Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, changed the position of the Arab world vis-a-vis Iran.

Due to the lack of unity in the Arab world, the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken different positions in the face of the Arab crisis. Iran, a decisive position in the Iranian-Arab issues, relative neutrality in the crises within the Arab world, in the internal crises of the Arab world, of which the Shiites were a party, and in the face of the crises of the Arab and non-Arab world, solidarity and cooperation Has taken over with the Arabs.

¹⁰⁸ The Iranians like to call the “Arabian Gulf” as the “Persian Gulf”

¹⁰⁹ For more details, see for example, “Alosairi, Y., Imberger, J., & Falconer, R. A. (2011). Mixing and flushing in the Arabian Gulf (Arabian Gulf). *Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans*, 116(C3)”.

United States established military cooperation with it and supplied it with advanced weapons, which made it become the Gulf policeman. Because of its distinguished military position and strong capabilities and capabilities, but after the revolution and the detention of American hostages in the American embassy in Iran, American support for it declined without this development pushing the United States to form the joint command of the rapid deployment forces.¹⁰⁴

From another angle, it may be that many reasons have led to Iran playing an active role in the security of the Gulf, including the high allocations from the general budget for military armament, regarding the sudden shift in the direction of reducing the number of weapons in the early nineties in favor of the development of the quality of these weapons. Since 1991, Iran has imported main battle tanks from T-72, MiG-29, and Sukhoi-24.¹⁰⁵

Iranian military capabilities are divided into:-

Regular forces (Army): The army is responsible for defending the country's independence and territorial integrity and the system of the Islamic Republic and benefiting from it in times of peace in relief work, education, production, and building efforts based on military readiness with full consideration of the balance of Islamic justice.

Mobilization Forces: These forces include in their ranks young men under 17 years of age, in addition to retired civil servants, usually coming from rural areas and small cities.

The Revolutionary Guard enjoys a great place in the system of government in the Islamic Republic, and its importance is increasing in the military establishment, because it called for the establishment of an independent ministry for the Revolutionary Guard in 1982 and transformed from a revolutionary militia to a traditional structure, as in the armies of the world, where the tasks of this ministry were determined to secure the financial support it needed. Administrative and legal

¹⁰⁴ For more details, see for example, "Zogby, James (2012), "Looking at Iran: How 20 Arab and Muslim Nations View Iran and Its Policies", Arab American Institute Foundation".

¹⁰⁵ "Zogby, James (2012), "Looking at Iran: How 20 Arab and Muslim Nations View Iran and Its Policies", Arab American Institute Foundation".

In particular, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic has always been anti-Western, which has significantly limited the possibility of its participation in the world arena. Iran's dual approach to the Arab Spring is not a new issue, as the framework of the Islamic Republic's political ideology has not prevented Iran from taking sides with non-Muslim countries in regional conflicts. Examples of such contradictory policies can be seen in favor of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or the silence over the massacre of Muslims in China or Chechnya. However, according to a poll by the IBOPE Zogby International Institute¹¹⁰, the move, along with sectarian intervention and the fact that Iran appears unwilling to promote peace in the Middle East, has severely damaged its credibility in the Arab world. The Islamic Republic is watching the recent events in the Arab countries with fear and concern. The Arabs' eagerness to participate in their country's political affairs has raised hopes that the era of tyranny in the region will come to an end, and this is likely to pose fundamental problems for the Iranian regime. In addition, the resistance of the people in the Arab countries can inspire the people of other countries in their struggles against dictatorships and totalitarian regimes.

In the new wave of the Arab awakening, every country that has risen against injustice has its special circumstances. In general, however, even if these movements do not lead to democracy, they promise the beginning of a new era of popular participation in which governments will act more responsibly and responsibly - a product that the Islamic Republic is not ready to accept.

The Islamic awakening and the subsequent change in political systems and the emergence of crises in some countries in the region have had a wide impact on the political and security interactions in the Arabian Gulf region so that axes of regional and trans-regional actors shape developments in their favor against each other. They are lined up. This incident marks a turning point in the formation of the new structure of the Middle East regional system, because on the one hand, it has led to a change in the role, influence, and interests of regional and international actors, and on the other hand it has led to new coalitions in the region.

¹¹⁰ For more details, see for example, "[Zogby Poll: 'Shocking' Drop in Iran's Popularity in Arab World](http://www.zogby.com) | [Newsmax.com](http://www.newsmax.com)".

In the meantime, what is important is that although the uprisings of the Arab world in all these countries are related to the interests and foreign policy of Iran, however, the degree of connection and impact of developments in each country on Iran's foreign policy is different. Some of the developments in the Arab world have taken place in the immediate security environment or the neighborhood of Iran, such as Bahrain, and certainly have a more direct and far-reaching impact on Iran's security interests. In the meantime, structural theory can justify and analyze the events in North Africa and the Middle East (Arab Spring) and Iran's foreign policy in the face of developments in Bahrain - because the foreign policy of Iran in the face of recent developments in the region is primarily based on identity, security, and national interests can be explained. Therefore, considering the importance of the issue, the present research intends to use a descriptive-analytical method to explain the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the developments in Bahrain. In the meantime, structural theory can justify and analyze the events in North Africa and the Middle East (Arab Spring) and Iran's foreign policy in the face of developments in Bahrain; Because the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic in the face of recent developments in the region is primarily based on identity, security, and national interests can be explained.

3.14 Effects of the Iranian Revolution on its Foreign Policy

The Iranian revolution represented a turning point in the foreign policy of Iran towards the Arabs.¹¹¹ As argued by Ehteshami: "It is the event that had the greatest impact on its foreign policy due to the changes taking place inside Iran and its view of the outside world and the change in the map of allies and opponents in the international and regional environment. Since this historical moment, the Iranian decision-makers have suffered from confusion and confusion between the

¹¹¹ For more details, see for example, "Soltani, F., & Amiri, R. E. (2010). Foreign policy of Iran after Islamic revolution. *J. Pol. & L.*, 3, 199".

dictates of the national interest and the requirements of ideological goals that have changed the sources of threat to the Iranian state and the opportunities available to the Iranian regime.”¹¹²

Iran's foreign policy in the post-Khomeini era, and especially after the Iran-Iraq war, aimed to support economic goals by encouraging trade and foreign investments, which Iran desperately needed to rebuild what was destroyed during the war in a developing country of Iran. As a result, Rafsanjani's main slogan was "construction,"¹¹³ and opening up to the outside world became a key strategy for attracting foreign investments that would aid in halting the economic decline and ensuring the regime's continued existence. Under Khatami's administration, the focus remained primarily on technology transfer and trade development. However, this was done under a more comprehensive concept of development that must include not only the political framework but also the cultural dimensions. The Khatami administration made excellent use of this more comprehensive concept to keep the vast bridges of dialogue that were extended with the nations with which it wished to fade.

Iran's foreign policy is now based on taking a considerate stance and conducting its analysis of the international community rather than rejecting or supporting anything. To put it another way, the goals of Iranian foreign policy have shifted from simply opposing emergency home conditions and meeting needs in light of the situation at hand to meet those needs. Additionally, the Iranian foreign policy was based on a calculated position and its examination of the international community rather than denial or sustenance for anything. This indicates that it was for knowing the international conditions. This is a new trend that stands out from the Rafsanjani era and aims to present an Iranian perspective on the international system and Iran's role in it. As a result, Iran's foreign policy has progressed from a series of reactions to the actual formulation of its plans for the future. In this very setting, Iran came up with the idea of a dialogue between civilizations, which worked to return foreign policy to its specific cultural path instead of focusing solely on the economic aspect, as was the case in the past. To achieve greater success in the policy of directness to the world, for which Iran has no substitute in this historical moment that

¹¹² “Ehteshami, A. (2002). The foreign policy of Iran. Lynne Rienner”.

¹¹³ “Rajabloo, G. A., & Kiasarai, H. M. (2021). EXPERIENCE OF PRIVATIZATION IN HASHEMI RAFSANJANI'S GOVERNMENT IN IRAN. *PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology*, 18(7), 3270-3281”.

the international system is going through - and indeed this call for "dialogue between Civilizations," the Iranian decision-makers slant toward the outside world is based on a cultural plan.

Khatami took advantage of the good image presented by the Iranian elections,¹¹⁴ especially the recent parliamentary elections, for the democratic development in Iran and sent his positive signals to the outside world. Undefined hence, Khatami's reformist speech posed a major question about the fact that Iranian foreign policy and the Iranian vision of many of the international issues at stake, such as human rights, the nature of dealing with international organizations, joint relations with Europe, and the outlook toward the Arab world, have changed.

And the definition of national security, and whether it is a fundamental change or just a kind of keeping pace with the tone of Khatami's reformist government as it appears to the outside world, and perhaps most importantly monitoring the real shifts in the policies themselves that expressed this reformist discourse. Hence, it must be pointed out that despite the strength of the conservative movement, headed by the Supreme Leader, Khatami has become a reformist phenomenon that transcends his person and the strength of its opponents.

¹¹⁴ For more details, see for example, "Alam, S. (2000). The changing paradigm of Iranian foreign policy under Khatami. *Strategic Analysis*, 24(9), 1629-1653".

CHAPTER 4

The Arab World, Power Potentials, Intra-state Problems and Military Capabilities

5.1 Need for Rethinking

The years after the Arab Spring and the longer history of the Middle East before the Arab Spring witnessed an intense presence of various players with a wish to control the Middle East. For Arab countries, more than ever, this called for the inevitability of serious and actual thinking to confront the growing Iranian threat in the Arab Gulf region and the Middle East. The Iranian influence is growing, and its expansionist policies are growing on more than one front, and the logic of the intersection of interests has created a new and disturbing international balance. Despite the availability of the ground for Arab work and cooperation, represented by the League of Arab States, which is supposed to be an entry point for the umbrella of Arab national security, it remained unable to confront threats and cope with challenges, and the smaller umbrellas represented by regional councils and regional unions remained far from the size of the imminent Iranian threat. Therefore, several attempts and initiatives emerged to establish new, more effective mechanisms to reduce the Iranian threat and threat. Accordingly, this chapter aims to monitor the security initiatives and arrangements aimed at confronting this danger, which has escalated sharply during the last decade, especially after the revolutions of the so-called “Arab Spring.” Iran agreed to the nuclear agreement with Western powers in 2015, to evaluate these initiatives and discuss the stages at which they stand and their effectiveness in confronting Iranian threats.

5.2 Middle East and the Major Powers

The Arab revolutions and their aftermath, including proxy wars in the region, rivalries for leadership, and geopolitical maneuvers between regional powers, have been closely followed by Middle Eastern journalists and foreign policy experts over the past decade. Russia and China sought greater influence in the Middle East during this time, as the United States debated its role there. In this regard, a study was published in March 2021 by the US Council on Foreign Relations.

¹¹⁵ In it, Cook discusses how great power competition is altering the prospects for conflict management in the Middle East and how Washington should avoid conflicts and strategic mistakes that have allowed other major powers, particularly Russia and China, to undermine US policy. India and the European Union, to a lesser extent, have also sought greater regional influence. While the opposition between the significant powers has not yet prompted a head-to-head conflict, the strong contenders try to lay out, grow and solidify impact and renown to the detriment of one another. In the meantime, cooperation is still sporadic and incidental.

Cook¹¹⁶ adds that the Middle East's geopolitics are still changing and that developments further away from the region, like Europe and the South China Sea, may change power networks and partnerships in ways that make people more competitive or make it easier to work together. Given the flightiness of occasions, it is difficult to figure out which factors or changes will add to one or the other result. One thing is certain despite this uncertainty: When no nation or group of nations hoped to challenge the United States power and influence, the American moment of regional hegemony is over.

The Middle East is now prepared for a variety of regional powers and external actors, including the United States, to take control. The void diminished the area's safety. Actors in the region: The study demonstrates that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a significant player in the region because it is a security partner of the United States, shares interests with Russia, and has strengthened its economic ties with China. Economic growth and social stability are currently Egypt's leaders' top priorities.

Although Cairo has attempted to strike a balance between its growing ties with Washington and its long-standing relationships with Beijing and Moscow, the way the Egyptian leadership has pursued these objectives is in line with their perspectives and objectives.¹¹⁷ As Turkish leaders seek a more independent foreign policy from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to consolidate Turkey's position in the Middle East, the study considers

¹¹⁵ Cook, S. A. (2021). "*Major power rivalry in the Middle East*. Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action".

¹¹⁶ *ibid*

¹¹⁷ *ibid*

Turkey's relations and interests to be the most dynamic in this context. As a consequence of this, Turkey has been a major player in conflicts in the region, such as those in Libya and Syria. These conflicts have resulted in disagreements and cooperation with major powers, particularly the United States and Russia. Lastly, Iran has attempted to undermine the United States and its regional partners because it wants to be a regional leader as well.

In addition to developing economic ties with China, the Iranian leadership has promoted this objective through geostrategic collaboration with Russia, particularly in Syria. Russia's return: According to the study, Russia is the Middle Eastern major power with the greatest public profile. Although Moscow's impact in the locale wound down fundamentally after the breakdown of the Soviet Association, Russia recharged its job when President Vladimir Putin requested his military to mediate in Syria in 2015. The battlefield was stabilized by Russian military might, saving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from defeat. With the assistance of Russia, the regime forces have been successful in retaking the majority of the Syrian territory since then. The Russian Air Force established a presence at the Syrian Hmeimim Air Base, and the Russian Navy constructed its long-term base in Tartus. In this context, the fact that Egypt and Russia are on the same side of the conflict in Syria and Libya has contributed to the expansion of their bilateral relations.

The Russians didn't necessarily want to alienate the Egyptians and put them in Moscow's orbit; rather, they wanted to distance Egypt from the United States long enough to make it more difficult for the United States to do its work in the region. especially in light of the disagreement that existed at the time between Washington and Cairo regarding the establishment of Arab-Israeli peace initiatives and the sanctions imposed by the United Nations on Iraq. Moscow had the opportunity to present itself as at least a partial alternative to Washington as a result of all of these issues, which increased the level of mistrust between the two nations.

Similar dynamics have emerged in Turkey, where relations with the United States have been harmed by a long list of geopolitical issues. The conflict in Syria is a major factor in Turkey's anger toward the United States. There is also the issue of Fethullah Gulen, a cleric from the United States who lives in Ankara and is a permanent resident. Turkish officials say that Gulen was the mastermind of the failed 2016 coup, and the Turkish government wants his extradition. Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system and Turkish assistance in helping Iran

circumvent international sanctions damaged trust between the two governments for the United States. Moscow reached a deal on the S-400 by taking advantage of the tensions in their bilateral relationships.

Ankara and Moscow have divided their differences in ways that have allowed them to establish diplomatic, economic, and defense relations despite having divergent interests in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Israel is perhaps the most significant of the US allies in the region who have developed relations with Russia, according to the study. Due primarily to Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict, Moscow has emerged as an essential partner for Israel in security matters over the past five years. Israel, like Turkey, needs Russian help to protect its interests in Syria. Specifically, Israel needs Russian help to stop Iran from having a permanent military presence in Syria and to stop the flow of advanced weapons from Iran to Hezbollah. By exploiting American blunders and Washington's apparent desire to reduce its commitments in the Middle East, Moscow can also advance its overall geostrategic interest in weakening the Western alliance. Russian leaders have done this by presenting themselves as effective, non-ideological, and coherent alternatives to the United States at a time when Washington appears to be the complete opposite of its regional allies.

Cook's¹¹⁸ research also focuses on the expanding Chinese presence in the region, which is a significant factor in the region's transformation because of Beijing's vast economic resources and its overall military progress. As the United States of America reduces its presence in the region, many commentators believe that China may become the next superpower to play a stabilizing role. In this context, despite divergent opinions regarding China's Middle East strategy, Beijing's approach is widely regarded as a significant departure from the past, when China was only a minor player. The Chinese government, on the other hand, had few diplomatic ties to the Arab world, Israel, Iran, and Turkey and supported anti-colonial and national liberation movements from afar. For instance, diplomatic ties between Beijing and Riyadh were only established in the 1990s. Since then, the entire region and China's relationship with Saudi Arabia have expanded at an exponential rate. Due to the country's need for energy resources, China's rapid economic development, which began in the 1990s, has pioneered the strengthening of Beijing's presence in the Middle East.

¹¹⁸ *ibid*

Between 1990 and 2009, China imported 47.8 million tons of Middle Eastern oil annually, up from 4.8 million tons in 1990. In this context, China's relations with the Middle East have expanded beyond energy over the past thirty years. Although oil remains Beijing's primary interest in the region, trade between China and the region has significantly increased, and Beijing has begun to invest in Middle Eastern infrastructure. China is now the eleven Middle Eastern nations' largest trading partner and regional investor. The Chinese authority comprehends that fostering Beijing's part in the Center East is basic to the outcome of the Belt and Street Drive. Consequently, China and 21 Middle Eastern nations agreed to projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. The Chinese Foreign Ministry classifies countries of particular importance as having "comprehensive strategic partnerships" with China, which also includes Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, China has designated Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey as strategic partners. It also has a "comprehensive innovation partnership" with Israel and a "strategic cooperation relationship" with Turkey.

India's Efforts: The study emphasized that over the past two decades, India has invested more of its diplomatic resources in developing and expanding its relations with the Middle East, particularly with Arab Gulf States. Narendra Modi has worked to broaden these ties away from the Chinese and Russians ever since he became prime minister in 2014. There are several reasons for this: such as Pakistan's close relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council, particularly with powerful nations like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

In this sense, New Delhi's outreach to Israel and the Gulf States was significantly influenced by the confluence of Hindu nationalists' electoral victories in India and the threat posed by Islamic extremism in the 1990s and early 2000s. After Saudi Arabia encountered a rush of al-Qaeda assaults, Bay pioneers found that they had a typical interest in India in fighting this danger. According to the study, China is the primary impediment to India's influence and the primary motivation for India's interest in the region. With China's clear ambition to become a naval power in the region, the Indian leadership has become increasingly concerned about China's influence in this crucial part of India.

Union borders: The study examines the role that the European Union plays in the region and demonstrates that the rule of consensus governs the EU's foreign policy, making it challenging for the bloc to implement a consistent strategy. In addition, the EU's primary goals in the region are to prevent waves of refugees from conflict areas in the Middle East, maintain

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, and seek a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this context, the study explains that while Brussels was successful in keeping the JCPOA after the Trump administration withdrew from it, it was unable to stop the United States from making that bold move or stop Iran from enriching more uranium.

In its efforts to bring an end to the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the European Union has not performed any better than other significant players. The study concludes that few Middle Eastern leaders see the European Union as an alternative to other major powers. The European Union does not have the capacity or interest to expand its involvement in the region. The European Union is frequently viewed as a source of investment by leaders in the Middle East, and specific European nations like France and Germany are dependable sources of arms in the Middle East arms market.

The Syrian crisis is the beginning of a new period because it revealed the weakness of the dominant power and showed other active roles. The major countries began to abandon "proxy wars" in favor of the "strategic partnership." Turkey has achieved successes that qualify it to be the focus of the major countries' attention as a strategic partner. The new period ends Washington's hegemony and is known as the competition of the major powers. The competition between the major countries rages between the United States of America, Russia, and China

Despite the end of the United States' hegemony, there is still a lot of debate and disagreement about the global and regional order.¹¹⁹ According to researchers and thinkers, the Syrian crisis is the beginning of this period because it was an example of the weak influence of the dominant power in contrast to the emergence of other active roles. In general, these discussions depend on developing perceptions and concepts for the new period and its dynamics. The Russian intervention in Syria in September 2015 marked the beginning of this phase. This had direct effects not only on the dynamics of Syria but also on those of the region and the world. Additionally, Moscow's involvement in the Syrian crisis had a significant impact on international and regional discussions of change.

¹¹⁹ For more details, see: "Sheppard, B. (2022). Biden's middle East trip a failure. *Green Left Weekly*, (1354), 13."

From the time of former US President Barack Obama until the present day, China's international and regional activities have also supported this stage.¹²⁰ In addition to becoming a hub for investments and cutting-edge technology for Israel, a long-time ally of Washington, Beijing also developed its relationships with the Gulf States and served as an external source of military support for Iran, a US foe. Since the axis of the three great poles—the United States, China, and Russia—formed the new period, it was referred to as the period of great power competition in this context.

Interaction between the United States, Russia, and China in a variety of areas, particularly the military, political, economic, and technological ones, occurs during the period of competition between international powers¹²¹. On the other hand, democracy versus autocracy is at odds in the ideological context of the competition between the major powers. Due to the competition between the powers, this conflict is a defining factor for regional and international alliances. Moreover, the rivalry between significant powers seems in areas of head-to-head a conflict, yet in numerous different regions connected with key interests.

The Middle East has a significant value and position for the major powers in the region, regardless of the consequences. Many countries in the region are both focal points for determining the strategic interests of the major powers and sites of conflict between them. The Middle East is comprised of significant regions for the United States that, in times of crisis, offer the country valuable opportunities and have the potential to effectively confront other major powers. The United States of America changed its strategy for the new period as a result of China's and Russia's growing presence in the region. The United States of America must put into action strategies that are appropriate for the circumstances of the competition between major powers. As a result, the "partnership strategy" can be evaluated as an option that can satisfy the requirements of the new phase as a sensitive priority for the United States. Learning from previous regional policies and

¹²⁰ See: "Balasubramanian, P. (2022). China's Approach to Mediating Middle Eastern Conflicts. *Central Asia*."

¹²¹ Although a new phase has begun after unilateral control, the regional influence of the United States continues. We cannot talk about a period in isolation from the American role, even if Washington loses its hegemonic power internationally and regionally. The definition of the period of great power competition, as understood by the name, depends on the competition between the United States, Russia, and China, as it was established to describe the framework of the possible interaction between these powers. The period of great power competition also includes the influence that can become the main center of international and regional alliances.

the conditions imposed by the new phase is perhaps the most crucial component of the "partnership strategy." The United States will continue to look for ways to attack and defend against the major powers in this context, which will necessitate changing its previous strategy of "proxy wars." This is because the "proxy wars," in which proxy forces serve as the primary weapon, are unable to achieve the principle of confrontation and take offensive positions against the major powers. It is possible to say that the "partnership strategy" has taken the place of the proxy powers' priority in this setting, and developments on a regional and international scale point to this change. What's more, advancements for the 25-year participation understanding in essential regions among China and Iran are among the delicate outcomes of rivalry between significant powers.¹²²

The New Alliance of Democracies was announced by the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as a positive development, in which he emphasized the need for democracies to work together to combat autocracy.¹²³ One of the most significant practical examples of the United States changing its strategies in its regional and international alliances is this statement, which serves as a statement of the period of great power competition. In other words, these results played a significant role in the emergence of competition between the major powers and the emergence of new regional changes and alliances. All these developments can be addressed in light of the results that were formed within the framework of the competition of major powers.

One of the main parts of the partnership strategy was originally a way to use it when major powers were fighting. During a time when the major powers are competing with one another, they will need useful strategic tools and means to aid them in this conflict. This is because countries will try to get into positions where they can attack and face the major powers. The partnership strategy is a solution that emerged to meet the requirements required to achieve the desired goals because of the influence of major regional powers and their desires for hegemony and control. As a result, the partners' enjoyment of transparency, trust, evaluability, and accountability serves as the fundamental criteria for each partnership strategy when we examine its central points. A new regional strategy cannot function without the tools and means of the partners who have proven to

¹²² See: "Khanmohammadi, S., & Sun, D. (2022). China-Iran strategic cooperation agreement in the changing international system. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 16(1), 27-45."

¹²³ "Zemánek, L. (2022). Russia's Sovereignty and Emergence of Pragmatic Polycentrism. *Governance and Politics*, 1(1), 63-99".

be the most productive and effective, particularly at the regional level. Because of this, the advantages and features of this strategy refer to the forces that allowed it to maintain its stability and complete its tasks during the Corona virus's spread phase. To put it another way, the United States' regional presence will not be achieved through a costly permanent military presence or the forces of proxies that cause a lot of problems. Instead, it will be accomplished directly through representatives who are more efficient and effective and who, as States, can replace all of these tools. The idea that efficiency in completing the required tasks, rather than quantity, is what matters was emphasized in this change. Washington has recently stated that it intends to reduce its military presence in Germany. The United States intends to maintain its regional presence in strategic priority areas through representatives from active nations, as demonstrated by this decision. Through the connections that will be made between these strategic areas, Washington will also guarantee the trust of its partners. As a result, the potential system won't be a system of blocs like it was during the Cold War. Instead, it will be an alliance of forces that connects important regional points and centers in different areas. As a result, rather than the organizations and formations that were the primary component of the proxy wars that resulted from the previous regional strategy, the "partnership strategy" prioritizes state actors that comprise strategic areas of value. This circumstance is one of the most significant distinctions between the partner power and the proxy power because, to resist the other major powers involved in the regional conflict, representatives from States with greater expertise are required. This demonstrates that the United States is considering what might happen to proxies in other regions as it prepares to give up its Middle East proxy powers.

5.3 Middle East is a Complex Situation

Even though the paths of conflict in the Middle East appear to be very intense and complicated, and its circles widen to include numerous international and regional parties, efforts have been made to restore order (Mohammad et al., 2020; Maleki et al., 2020). First, there is a global war on terrorism in the Middle East, in which major powers with opposing interests and regional powers violently alter their priorities and policies to compete with ISIS and other terrorist groups. Their brutality and bloodshed surpass the Arab atrocities, crimes, and blood maps that

have been accumulated over the years, and they live on the structure of religious extremism. The facts of tyranny, injustice, and marginalization are getting worse every day in Arab countries.

Second, this is the middle of a horrendous conflict in Syria¹²⁴ between a criminal tyrant and rivals, some of whom are no fewer lawbreakers, and a large number of the components of cash, weapons, and individuals utilized in the conflict are driven by either intermediary clashes between significant powers and provincial powers or direct military mediations by a portion of these powers.

Thirdly, there are blood-spattered maps, whose causes are connected to appalling varieties of tyranny, sectarianism, tribalism, civil strife, the absence of societal peace, the struggle for power, the collapse of national state institutions, and proxy wars between regional powers with the crimes of terrorists in Iraq, Yemen, and Libya (Maggiolini et al, 2020).

Fourthly, security and intelligence agencies whose primary purpose is to protect rulers rather than the security of nations and peoples are wreaking havoc on Arab citizens through oppression, injustice, and violations of rights and freedoms by both old and new authoritarian regimes. As is the case in Iraq, which is also plagued by terrorism, some of these authorities are involved in violent power struggles that pose a threat to the stability of society. Other places, like Sudan, saw bloody clashes between the government and groups that represented underprivileged areas until the former dictator was overthrown.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ In 2021, the armed *conflict in Syria* passed its ten-year anniversary. Reportedly, “What started as a domestic uprising soon turned into an intractable civil war where no less than five foreign countries and multiple militias are militarily involved today? The last bouts of significant fighting were in the northwest province of Idlib in March 2020 and in southern Syria in the summer of 2021. Currently, the conflict has reached a violent protracted stalemate where several different armed confrontations are present at the same time, overlapping with regional security concerns about Turkish, Iranian, Israeli, Kurdish and jihadi activity. While the United Nations-led process is struggling to make progress, Western states have largely downgraded their engagement and several Arab countries are exploring ways to re-engage with the Assad regime”. Details available on: [Conflict in Syria: protracted stalemate, regional security and catastrophic impact \(iiss.org\) https://www.google.ae/](https://www.google.ae/conflict-in-syria-protracted-stalemate-regional-security-and-catastrophic-impact-iiss.org)

¹²⁵ In some of the latter, an apparent calm prevails based on the improvement of economic and social indicators, the accumulation of wealth and the developmental investment of some of its components. Behind the calm are societal tensions that have sectarian, sectarian and tribal causes, and muffled conflicts over power and wealth and the definition of national identity, as is the case in the Gulf.

Fifthly, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people whose land has been usurped, and whose land the current US administration is working to legalize the usurpation of land by Israel and to liquidate the issue, which is intractable to negotiated solutions and which international and regional powers collaborate to turn them into disregard, continue with us. The whole issue of Palestine, including Kurdish self-determination, which has been unfairly denied for a long time, and border disputes between some regional parties.

Sixth, despite the absence of a regional system capable of peacefully managing the numerous conflict tracks in the Middle East (Anderson and Shannon, 2021), the active roles of some countries with historical, geographical, demographic, and civilizational weight, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, are severely regressing, and other countries are floundering between proxy wars and foreign policies that are either violent or unstable, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. However, the areas of action and influence of non-

Although some of the current conflicts in the Middle East existed when Western armies' terrorism in September 2001 reached Afghanistan and Iraq (Roy et al., 2020), the current tracks' comprehensiveness, intensity, and complexity continue to be unmatched. It is also difficult to ignore the fact that the unilateral use of military and security tools to combat terrorism over the past few years has only led to the decline in the effectiveness of one "generation" of terrorist gangs, which was followed by another "generation" of brutal and bloody terrorists, from Al-Qaeda to ISIS. Meanwhile, crises in societies and national States have grown as a result of the absence of justice, truth, and progress.

By ignoring the fact that confronting terrorism solely militarily will inevitably fail, the priority remains to win the rights of the oppressed and to achieve balanced community development whose foundation is the adoption of freedoms and initiative in serious democratic transformations, Major and regional powers are rushing to a new tragic moment of error in our region and to a new moment of absent-mindedness. Certain questions must be answered immediately: 1) Who harmed the Middle Eastern situation? Israel and the USA? Or just the Arabs and Iranians as a whole? Who benefits from creating and maintaining a tense situation between

Arabs and Iranians in the Middle East? Who wishes to fracture the Muslim community? These are crucial inquiries, and the responses to them are crucial for defining the issue and proposing practical solutions.

The Middle East, more than any other on the planet, is characterized not just in terms of professional career relations, conciliatory associations, or territorial associations, but by hard power and military ability. This has been the case in recent times in the region and will continue to be the case in the foreseeable future. However, the Middle East has not experienced the same level of tension, internal conflict, and regional turmoil since the Ottoman Empire's demise a century ago. The ongoing civil wars in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq appear to be insurmountable issues amid this decline in regional order. The competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, is widely regarded as adding to the complexity of the situation. Even though these rivalries are very important, the larger dynamics have made them last longer and worse.¹²⁶

The escalation and persistence of these conflicts can be attributed to four factors. The first is that since the uprisings in 2011¹²⁷ and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003,¹²⁸ the regional power balance has become shaky and erratic. The second factor is that ongoing regional rivalries in the form of larger, more lethal conflicts have emerged from local conflicts. Thirdly, the United States and its European allies are actively competing for arms deals that have seen a sharp increase in supply to the region. The fourth factor is that, in comparison to other parts of the world, the Middle East lacks significant standards for war and conflict resolution mechanisms. As a direct consequence of this, military interventions resulted in the entire region becoming a wasps' nest.

Regional and global policymakers face a daunting challenge in overcoming these factors. It is possible, even in the most hopeful situations, that advancement in the space of quiet and reclamation will be progressive, slow, and discontinuous. However, actors at the regional and international levels can extrapolate some concrete steps that can be taken to reduce the likelihood

¹²⁶ For more details, see for example, "Mather, Y. (2014). The fall of the Ottoman Empire and current conflict in the Middle East. *Critique*, 42(3), 471-485".

¹²⁷ For more details, see for example, "Malmvig, H. (2013). *Ambiguous endings: Middle East regional security in the wake of the Arab Uprisings and the Syrian civil war* (No. 2013: 23). DIIS Report".

¹²⁸ "Feldman, N. (2009). *What We Owe Iraq*. Princeton University Press".

of these factors escalating into conflict. The distinguishing characteristics of each conflict as well as the interests of the intervening parties should also be taken into consideration, which will be discussed after this chapter.

5.4 Conflict Escalators - Dynamics of Regional Powers

The state of provincial power circulation was one of the consequences of the strife that followed the Arab Spring in 2011. Once thought to be regional strongholds, nations like Tunisia under Zine El-Din Ben Ali,¹²⁹ Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, Syria under Bashar al-Assad, and Libya under Muammar Gaddafi¹³⁰ became nothing more than flimsy shells that gave way during internal strife or turmoil. Washington was traumatized by its Middle Eastern conquests after the 9/11 attacks and was unable or unwilling to uphold the existing regional order. The administrations of Barack Obama and previous US presidents have been more influential than the current administrations when it comes to attempting to mediate these conflicts; Additionally, they adopted separate strategies for Israel and Iran that the Middle Eastern nations considered to be startling in multiple ways.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has had a minor impact on the political landscape of the region since its inception. On the other hand, an "axis of resistance" against Israel and the US-led regional security system¹³¹ had long existed between Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.¹³² Despite having only a minimal connection to the initial phase of the upheaval in Syria and Yemen, Iran unquestionably sought to profit from the institutional rift and subsequent sectarian schisms. These developments have alarmed Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, whose fears of these threats have been steadily convergent and intersecting in recent years. However, these emerging alliances were transformed into something resembling regional blocs because of the

¹²⁹“Shukri, S. F. B. M. Arab Uprising: A comparison of political system before and after uprising in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya”.

¹³⁰ “Bhardwaj, M. (2012). Development of conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From revolution to civil war. *The Washington University International Review*, 1(1), 76-96”.

¹³¹ “El Hussein, R. (2010). Hezbollah and the axis of refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria. *Third World Quarterly*, 31(5), 803-815”.

¹³² For more details, see for example, “El Hussein, R. (2010). Hezbollah and the axis of refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria. *Third World Quarterly*, 31(5), 803-815.”

actions of these two global powers, the United States of America and Russia. As a direct result of its military intervention in support of the Assad government in September 2015, Russia entered a military partnership with Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. The Obama administration has attempted to ride the wave of regional divisions while maintaining cooperation with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates while negotiating a comprehensive plan of action regarding Iran's nuclear program. However, the anti-Iran faction grew stronger after the hawkish Trump administration came to power and withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 due to the administration's inability to translate this plan into a new mode of operation with Iran over its regional activities. There are inside logical inconsistencies in every one of these blocks. Syria is the center of Russian-Iranian cooperation, despite Iran's use of sectarian militias that undermine state cohesion. However, Russia is attempting to negotiate with the Syrian military establishment, which purports to be non-sectarian. He was suggesting that Russia didn't even try to decrease Iran's tactical limit in Syria by contrasting Russia's muffled reaction with the huge scope of Israeli airstrikes on Iranian offices within Syria in May 2018 to its vociferous fights over the exceptionally restricted airstrikes by the US on thought compound weapons a month sooner.

In contrast, the US-led bloc appears more like a fundamental mobilization against Iran than a conventional military alliance. Even if there is talk of a Palestinian state, Israel will continue to lack basic diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Additionally, the blocks cross-pollinate one another. Despite its partnership with Iran in Syria, Russia has maintained practical relations with most of the region's nations, including the United States' security partners. Turkey continues to be a member of both NATO and the coalition led by the United States against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. However, relations between Washington and Ankara have begun to deteriorate recently, in part because of the United States' ongoing support for the Syrian Kurdish rebels.¹³³ Turkey has also collaborated with Russia and Iran on the Astana process.¹³⁴ While allowing Russia to increase its political influence in Syria, this process has supported many ceasefire agreements between rebel groups and pro-Assad Syrian forces. While this was going on, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Assembled Bedouin Emirates continued their resistance to

¹³³ For more details, see for example, "West, H. M. (2019). *The Historical Backdrop to the United States*' (Doctoral dissertation, The University of Victoria)."

¹³⁴ "Talukdar, I., & Anas, O. (2018). The Astana Process and the Future of Peaceful Settlement of the Syrian Crisis: A Status Note. *Nova Deli: Indian Council of World Affairs*".

Turkey. This only led to negative outcomes for Qatar and Turkey in the areas of philosophy and the struggle for control, which led these two former partners to sue Iran.¹³⁵

Amid this complicated background, these four competing dichotomies stand out: Saudi Arabia and Iran, Israel and Iran, the United States and Iran, and Russia and the United States appear to have a significant impact on the new regional security balance. It is interesting to note that none of these conflicts are likely to be resolved, as some of them have a quasi-existential quality and others result in political benefits for the leaders. Then, it doesn't look like most of these axes can agree in the near future. However, it is of the utmost importance to find out if this inevitable competition can be made to be less deadly. By doing so, governments in the Middle East could have a chance to provide their citizens with social and economic well-being while also saving some nations, like Syria and Yemen, from destruction.

Researchers in international security politics warn of security dilemmas, in which a state's actions cause an adversary to take the opposite action, putting them in danger and starting a series of interactions that end in conflict. This animated series accurately portrays the current situation in the Middle East. Israel and Saudi Arabia's observers understand Iran is a very destructive force in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. Israeli security officials emphasize the significance of establishing a credible military deterrent considering decades of Iranian hostility. However, these actions are justifiable from the Iranian perspective as a defensive response to Israel's threats of military raids and the American military installations close to the Iranian border.¹³⁶

Plans to form a strategic alliance in the Middle East with Egypt, Jordan, and other Gulf Cooperation Council members have been announced by the US government. This union will undoubtedly assist its members in the planning of efforts to combat psychological oppression and defy Iranian influence, even though the prospects for progress appear to be slim due to the Middle Eastern divisions and the result of previous drives.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ "Charap, S., Treyger, E., & Geist, E. (2019). *Understanding Russia's Intervention in Syria*. Rand Corporation".

¹³⁶ As discussed in "The Challenges to Middle Eastern International Society: A Study in Disorder" by Onur Erpul, ".....when assessing the development of regional peace and cooperation, few areas are as challenging and ambivalent as the Middle East. Europe, the birth place of the modern global international society, enjoys a stable peace. Latin America is characterized by a "long peace;" and most of Africa has witnessed very little interstate war".

¹³⁷ For details see, " The Middle East Strategic Alliance Has a Long Way To Go" available on: <https://www.google.ae/>. Accessed on 22-11-2021

The absence of diplomatic protocols and mechanisms for resolving regional disputes in the Middle East may limit the conflict's scope. In almost every other region of the world, this is the situation. Although NATO's rivalry with the Warsaw Pact has been referred to as the Cold War, both sides have increasingly felt the need to establish comprehensive institutional mechanisms to lessen tensions. Every American president, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush, met with a Soviet counterpart. Additionally, during the most volatile periods, the highest levels of communication between the US and the Soviet Union took on special significance. A few of the institutions that were established over time to improve confidence-building measures and increase transparency included the Open Skies Agreement, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a series of arms control agreements, and so on. which allows flights of unarmed surveillance aircraft to fly over the airspace of nations that have signed the Convention, thereby enhancing disclosure regarding nuclear and military weapons. ¹³⁸

In this instance, the actions that a nation deems necessary to maintain its security, such as the formation of alliances, military intervention, etc., are the means that a nation considers important to keep up with its security. When these kinds of mechanisms or organizations don't exist, security problems get worse from all sides, especially at a time when military conflicts are getting worse. will be viewed as the primary threat by another competitor. To achieve peace between Israel and the Palestinians, efforts were made in the 1990s to establish mechanisms for regional communication and cooperation. The attendees of the Madrid Conference in 1991 established five multilateral working committees to address regional issues. Each committee includes Israel and a group of Arab nations. The main group dealing with "arms control and regional security" was the first step in developing a multilateral systemic framework for addressing regional security issues. It held six rounds with all participants, which were jointly facilitated by the United States and Spain. During these rounds, a series of plans were developed before the working board gradually stopped in 1995 due to rising territorial threats and execution challenges. Only one of these measurable outcomes is still in existence, although all these working committees have long since passed away; The "Desalination Research Center in the

¹³⁸For more details, see for example, “ Khalidi, R. (2013). *Brokers of deceit: How the US has undermined peace in the Middle East*. Beacon Press”.

Middle East in the Sultanate of Oman" was established in 1995. The center studies development projects and issues about transboundary waterways and has members from Israel, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, and a few European nations.

5.5 Public Policy Recommendations

As long as internal conflicts continue to rage, the Middle East is likely to remain unstable.

¹³⁹ At the moment, it appears impossible to establish trust between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Supporting regional and international actors in their efforts to better manage these conflicts to lessen the likelihood of an escalation at the regional level is, however, the objective that comes closest to being accomplished. In this scenario, neither party will benefit in any way. Instead, establishing mechanisms for the exchange of information has the potential to lessen the likelihood of miscalculation or miscalculation and may offer ways to lessen the impact of crises when they do arise. Some options for acting include the following.

5.5.1 Bilateral Arrangements

Sometimes, popular perceptions portray diplomatic communications as an indication of weakness. However, if routine diplomatic contacts with partners are important, it may be even more important to have reciprocal diplomatic contacts with adversaries. In the Middle East, bias against adversary communication is counterproductive, and moving in the opposite direction may be one of the key components that will help create a less turbulent environment in the region. There are several options for policymakers to consider, such as resuming diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia; allowing Arab diplomats from nations that have not recognized Israel to meet in secret on neutral territory with Israeli counterparts, and reopening the diplomatic channels that were established between Iran and the United States under the Obama administration. Albeit these means are probably not going to bring about any fast-forward leaps, they might limit the possibilities for additional heightening when emergencies emerge. The United States and other regional and international actors ought to have made parallel efforts to expand mechanisms and

¹³⁹ For more details, see for example, "Beck, M. (2020). The aggravated struggle for regional power in the Middle East: American allies Saudi Arabia and Israel versus Iran. *Global Policy*, 11(1), 84-92".

forums for dialogue on pressing regional issues even as Trump continued his efforts to establish a strategic alliance in the Middle East. Transparency regarding non-proliferation and military issues will be enhanced by the establishment of a Middle Eastern organization to fulfill the same function as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe did during the Cold War. On the other hand, the record of the Arms Control and Regional Security Committee exemplifies the nature of the challenges to success. The Desalination Research Center's model could be used by other multilateral initiatives that focus on urgent non-security issues like earthquakes, disaster preparedness, and climate change. Governments may be motivated to establish forums for professionals like epidemiologists, seismologists, or first responders to share information, experiences, or best practices because increased international cooperation makes national-level responses to these issues infinitely more effective.¹⁴⁰

5.5.2 Supporting Neutral Countries

In the recent turbulent regional space, several nations, led by Kuwait, Oman, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, and most recently Iraq, have attempted to forge independent paths for themselves.¹⁴¹ However, the internationalization of conflicts and the hardening of regional blocs are putting more and more pressure on it to take a side. Iran has put pressure on Iraq to support its policies in Syria, while Saudi Arabia has persuaded smaller Arab nations to support its policies toward Qatar and Yemen.¹⁴² However, neutrality has a significant potential role to play in the region, either as a potential mediator for future intervention or as a geo-strategic barrier to withstand pressure. Supporting these nations' independence would be prudent on the part of regional and international players.

5.5.3 Second Track

The Middle East has a long history of "Track two" diplomacy, which involves informal back channels of communication between private sector citizens. Even though there may be mixed results, diplomatic breakthroughs like the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords of 1995 in Oslo and

¹⁴⁰ "Limbert, J. (2010). The Obama Administration. *The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and US Policy*, 146, 148".

¹⁴¹ "Alblosi, H. H. (2017). Iran and Kuwait. In *Security and bilateral issues between Iran and its Arab neighbours* (pp. 123-148). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham".

¹⁴² "Rezeg, A. A. (2021). Demystifying Qatar's Pro-Revolution Monarchy: Old Rivalries, New Geopolitical Motives. *Insight Turkey*, 23(3), 181-207".

the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany) frequently draw on a wealth of experience in informal communications and negotiations.¹⁴³ For influential participants to explore alternative horizons in the future, international actors should support Track Two efforts on all lines of the Middle East conflict, particularly when the possibilities for formal diplomacy appear limited. Given the elevated degree of partisan and revolutionary propensities, including more strict pioneers and youth in these endeavors is vital.

5.5.4 Conflict Escalators - The Spread of External Interventions

While the Iraqi civil war is inextricably linked to the American-led invasion of 2003, three of the four civil wars in the region—in Libya, Syria, and Yemen—have local roots. Even though each conflict has its unique characteristics, the four cases share some characteristics: corrupt rentierism, brutal authoritarianism, and crumbling socioeconomic systems (see the two chapters of this report on political economy and governance in Arab countries). Each of these conflicts got worse over time and simultaneously turned regional and international.

Regional and international powers have attempted to fill the void left by the United States' decision to withdraw from the Middle East, regardless of whether it was a flagrant error, a reversal of course, or a financial necessity. Politically, economically, and militarily, States are now interfering in the affairs of their neighbors at a rate never seen in the region. Both US partners and rivals have taken steps to expand their roles in the region. Local leaders, like their international partners, believe they can achieve their strategic goals through equal military victories, which is why the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen continue. However, as the fifteen years of US suffering in Iraq demonstrated, they may be wrong in this belief. In less than three weeks, the United States of America overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003. However, the overwhelming military victory of the United States paved the way for a nearly ten-year military occupation and a shift in American voters' votes against these interventions, resulting in the gradual deterioration of "American peace" in the Middle East. Although the United States of America is still the

¹⁴³ "Weinberger, P. E. (2007). *Co-opting the PLO: A critical reconstruction of the Oslo Accords, 1993-1995*. Lexington Books".

undisputed military power in the region, Washington has struggled in recent years to serve or even define its interests, and its attempts to transform its military capabilities into long-lasting political achievements in the Middle East have failed.¹⁴⁴

Early evidence suggests that States that are now intervening in regional conflicts may experience similar outcomes, particularly when they are intended to achieve broad political goals rather than just defensive ones. In cooperation with Russia, Iran carried out a brutal military intervention in Syria that helped tighten the Assad government's grip on the levers of power at the cost of horrifying human sacrifices, serving Iran's security interests as well. In addition, Iran expanded its influence on the ground to reach Israel's doorstep in the Golan Heights and maintained the land bridge that connected it to Hezbollah. However, Syria may now be beyond repair, and Iran's populace appears dissatisfied with its experience, like the American populace a decade ago. The growing discontent over what could be the equivalent of \$20 billion spent to support Assad militarily and economically has served as a permanent incentive for the popular discontent that has gripped the Iranian people since December 2017.¹⁴⁵ The smaller sums spent on the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other terrorist organizations in Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and elsewhere are not included in this figure. In the meantime, the nation's major economic imbalances are the result of hyperinflation and high unemployment.

Since 2015, the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthi rebels in Yemen has made some modest interim gains.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the decisive victory remains elusive and significant. Several cities, including Aden, Mocha, Mukalla, and Taiz, have been formally retaken by pro-government forces, but they are still attempting to take control of them. The result was Yemen's gradual and steady fragmentation, which came while the humanitarian situation catastrophically collapsed. Knowing the end after almost four years of the campaign is troublesome. Saudi Arabia's defense budget, like Iran's, is kept secret, but monthly spending on Yemen has been estimated to be between 3 and 5 billion dollars. When one considers the objectives that Saudi Arabia and Iran have

¹⁴⁴ "Wedgwood, R. (2003). The fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council mandates and preemptive self-defense. *American Journal of International Law*, 97(3), 576-585".

¹⁴⁵ For more details, see for example, "Habibi, N. (2018). The Iranian Economy Two Years after the Nuclear Agreement. *Crown Center for Middle East Studies*, (115)".

¹⁴⁶ For more details, see for example, "Hill, G. (2017). *Yemen endures: Civil war, Saudi adventurism and the future of Arabia*. Oxford University Press".

accomplished in Yemen and Syria, respectively, these will merely amount to losses. All of this does not imply that there are straightforward answers to the question of whether external interventions in local conflicts are justified or effective. It is generally accepted that the 2003 US military intervention in Iraq resulted in significant domestic and regional issues in the Middle East and internal political unrest in the United States. However, the US-led intervention in Kuwait in 1991 to stop the Iraqi invasion is generally regarded as justified and successful. Part of the reason for this is that its military goals were limited.

On the other hand, the locals' opinions regarding the outcomes of NATO's intervention in Libya and the anti-IS intervention in Syria and Iraq are unknown. This is in part due to the uncertainty surrounding the outcomes. Was the mediation in Libya an infringement of basic liberties, destabilization of the nation, and a preface to the way of jihadists? Or was he the one who saved the Libyans from a massive massacre of civilians like what happened in Syria? Was it prudent for the United States to stay out of a domestic conflict in Syria and focus on defeating an international terrorist organization instead? Or, by ignoring horrendous brutality and paving the way for the expansion of Iranian and Russian influence in the region, did it violate international norms? Instead, is the US decision to maintain its military presence in eastern Syria still necessary and unabated to prevent a perilous power vacuum in the region, or has it begun to gradually transition into an open intervention with unattainable objectives? Every war needs to end. However, belligerents are likely to question whether these agreements can be respected and adhered to unless accompanied by some kind of international enforcement mechanism when civil conflicts end with political settlements rather than assured military victories. As a result, even if political solutions to Middle Eastern conflicts are found, they are unlikely to be successful without the support of a peacekeeping force. In this instance, there is a possibility that, in the not-too-distant future, the current conflict settlements will rekindle embers that could lead to the emergence of new conflicts and new belligerents. This is especially true for Syria, where there are a lot of side conflicts coming from all directions.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ For more details, see for example, "Hatahet, S. (2019). *Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in Syria* (p. 3). Royal Institute of International Affairs".

5.6 Way Forward

A regional security track can address transnational challenges of mutual interest, such as maritime security threats, piracy, and terrorism, despite the Arab World and Iran's ongoing proxy conflicts. Piracy and terrorism pose a common threat to sea lanes for the Gulf Arab States, Iran, and regional powers nearby. As a result, large-scale oil transportation operations could be disrupted by attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, two crucial shipping lanes, potentially causing significant damage to the economies of the region and the world. Three joint task forces on maritime security, counterterrorism and piracy, and security and cooperation in the Arabian Gulf have been established with some success by the United States. To upgrade certainty, the standards of the power ought to be safeguarded, however, its command and mission ought to be extended to remember discourse for oceanic certainty building measures, and expanded participation in battling the unlawful medication exchange and carrying of different merchandise.

Collaboration on issues related to climate change and renewable energy sources is a project that is in everyone's best interest and is relatively low-cost and low-risk. The countries of the GCC have already begun working together on these issues, particularly in nuclear energy. Another area in which Iran and the Gulf Arab States share a common interest due to its environmental issues and water scarcity is the formulation of a joint strategy on environmental disasters, which has emerged as a priority for the GCC nations. As a result, food security and the provision and protection of clean water are additional topics in this group.

The Arab Gulf States have devised ambitious strategies to move away from the rentier state model, which heavily depends on revenues from extractive industries like oil and gas, considering the fluctuations in oil and gas prices. Given the demographics of the region and its high proportion of young people, these issues have become even more pressing. As a result, expanding state welfare in Iran and the Arab Gulf States will not be sufficient to prevent unrest. However, real knowledge-based economies that attract the necessary investments to enhance economic diversification and, as a result, provide more job opportunities for skilled workers, as well as the renewal of stagnant domestic educational systems, remain elusive goals.

As a result, if the new security forum includes a basket related to economic development, it can simultaneously encourage the free flow of ideas and strategies and build trust among its members. Iran appears to be ready to participate in this area already. The question of whether a new regional security forum should have the authority to discuss internal political reforms, human rights practices, and other political, social, cultural, and economic issues would undoubtedly arise. When discussing issues related to better governance (in contrast to democratic governance) and human security, which is generally defined as the capacity of the government to meet the basic needs of the population, these are issues that are extremely sensitive for the States that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council—Iran and Iraq. To advance its democracy and human rights agenda in a new security forum, the United States will have to accept that the conditions are not yet in place. Instead, to move forward with its plan to reform the political and security sectors, it will need to use bilateral diplomacy and military aid more aggressively.

Major Findings

The Middle East has historically served as a "model" for human civilizations; however, the region's security has become a "quagmire" in the world because of the conflicts and turmoil that have lasted for a considerable amount of time in the modern era. The Middle East is the property of its people, and getting rid of the major countries' geopolitical interactions is the main way to turn the region from chaos to stability.

The current equations will shift, and new ones will emerge depending on the political climate in the Middle East, which will fundamentally alter the region's map. The American circles presented their vision, or project, for a new Middle East more than a decade ago. These circles referenced the job of the new players, noticing the job of the Bay States as a significant and compelling player in the guide of the new Center East. At the time, those circles also said that traditional decision-making centers in the Arab world like Egypt, Iraq, and Syria will lose influence as new countries like the Arab Gulf States rise in power. Strong tremors have been felt in the Arab region since the beginning of the third millennium as if preparing the way for a new era. It all started with the 2003 war in Iraq against Saddam Hussein's regime and the subsequent political unrest in the region.

One of its outcomes was the 2011 Arab Spring. Armed groups like ISIS emerged in the years that followed that disruption, taking control of significant portions of Syria and Iraq and causing havoc throughout the Middle East. The Kurdistan referendum came to add another brick to the chaos and pave the way for the division of Iraq and the emergence of a new Middle East based on dividing the Arab world into small parts and paving the way for the acceptance of the Zionist entity and recognition of the entire State of Israel as soon as the Arab region woke up from the effects of these chaotic successive crises and was able to defeat one ideological organization after another.

The Gulf States have relied on their role as a mediator to resolve crises at times and an influential player to stir events at other times considering this tense atmosphere in the Arab world, paving the way for consensual solutions to the Middle East's problems. The Gulf States have played this role not only because of their strength and wealth but also because of a variety of other factors and elements. The first is the new tasks and responsibilities that have been assigned to them to protect the security of the Gulf region from the political, military, and ideological interference of neighboring nations, particularly Iran.

Three distinct concepts and types of framing emerge about Iran. In neo-conservative circles, Iran is more of a political and ideological threat than a clear geopolitical threat. Instead of focusing on what Iran is doing, this viewpoint emphasizes the Iranian regime. Political, ideological, and historical factors inform this position. The country where the revolution took place was vehemently pro-American. In addition, in November 1979, student revolutionaries carried out a raid on the US Embassy in Tehran and held over 60 embassy employees' hostage for 444 days. The US security establishment's long-term vision and foreign policy toward Iran were greatly influenced by this. The second perspective reduces Iran to merely discussing its bombs and nuclear program. Bombs are equated with Iran in this perspective, and bombs are also positioned ideologically. Iran was making "Islamic bombs," not nuclear bombs. Regarding the third position, it examines Iran from the perspective of its alleged effort to dominate the region. In the Middle East, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, this point of view has a large following.

The demand that Iran and Turkey refrain from interfering in Arab affairs is one manifestation of this opinion. In any case, political history in the Center East doesn't give an uplifting image of an extremely durable class order between States in the locale. It will be difficult for any Middle Eastern power to sustainably assert hegemony due to the Middle East's current fragmentation and polycentricity. The precariousness of "hegemons" in the region is evidenced by the dramatic shifts in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria as well as the changing perception of Turkey's position in the Middle East over the decades. Iran functions not only as a state but also as a defining organization and security network. The most stress and anxiety in the region are caused by Iran's security network operations. However, outside of Iran, particularly in the West, there is little appreciation for Iran's concept of "security." State and non-state actors are included in the security network: the Iraqi government, especially the Iran-adjusted Shiite Famous Preparation Units, a skilful Iraqi state-upheld association made of countless Shiite Muslim-greater part local army gatherings, and the Assad government, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen. This organization works as a state inside a state, as well as a transnational organization. As a result, there is a gap between what we know about Iran's security and how Iran sees it.

Iran's political and material ties with Syria and Hezbollah, according to the pragmatic and conservative sides, are essential to Iran's national security. However, Iran's perception of its security in this manner creates unease in its neighbors. Without jeopardizing the security of other actors and nations, it is impossible to arrive at a comprehensive concept of security like the Iranians'. Accordingly, a resistance alliance of States and gatherings tries to oust Iran's territorial organization and coalition design and cut off its impact. There are three pillars to this policy. First, countries in the Gulf, are becoming more supportive of Israel and the US administration's strategy for reducing Iran's influence in the region. On Israel's side, this work could be twisting crazily in Syria, particularly assuming the US pulls out totally from the country. By recently admitting that it targeted the Iranian presence in Syria, Israel has broken its usual policy of denial. To separate Arab Shiite communities from the Iranian orbit and toward an Arab framework, Gulf Arab States are reconsidering their previous approach. In the past, these nations placed a greater emphasis on these Shiite (sectarian) communities than on Arab (national) identities. The Gulf Arabs appear to be becoming increasingly aware that this policy is achieving the opposite of what is required due to decades of discriminatory policies against these societies and this sectarian approach. It

naturally created Iranian support networks throughout the Arab world, including the Gulf, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. Naturally, there has been a shift. These nations are rejecting Iran as an intrusive Persian nation with hegemonic ambitions rather than concentrating on the sectarian (Shiite) identities of these societies. Instead, they are emphasizing their common Arab ties with these groups. Accusations of Iran's (Persian) imperial ambitions in the Arab world have replaced previous debates about the Shiite crescent to emphasize this shift. This shift in policy is also evidenced by Saudi Arabia's recent outreach to Shiite political actors in Iraq, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, and the opening of its embassy in Baghdad after more than a quarter of a century of severing ties.

Third, the US is looking to make an enemy of Iran's systematized coalition in the locale as an essential partner in the Center East, alluded to for straightforwardness as the Arab North Atlantic Settlement Association. This alliance, which included Egypt and Jordan in addition to six Gulf States, was essentially doomed due to disagreements among the parties regarding the risks. The various actors' positions on Iran and the Iranian question are closely linked to their search for a new regional order. This is one of the reasons why these nations and Turkey are unable to agree on a common issue regarding Iran, despite their opposition to Iran's expansionist regional policy and its concept of network security.

Iran possesses all the political and social characteristics of an ideological state, and there is a significant gap between the state and society. However, neither the significance of the Iranian issue nor its significance should be overstated. However, there is still one clear point: The issue of Middle Eastern order is intimately linked to Iran's situation.

The moderate Gulf States now have major responsibilities because of the consequences of fighting terrorism in the Middle East as a whole, the most important of which is to stand up to countries with suspicious agendas in the region, stop the financing of terrorism, and dry up its sources. In this regard, the countries of the Gulf have formed many alliances with major nations that share their interests, such as the United States, France, and others. In addition to altering the current political map, the new Middle East also marks the emergence of new influential players in the region's political and strategic landscape. Based on their new national responsibilities and

obligations to the Arab world, the wealthy and relatively stable Gulf States are destined to play this role.

Public decisions were influenced by the internal and external policies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman, and Bahrain, not only in the Gulf region but also in the Middle East. Today, the world is taking a gander at the progressions occurring in the Center East and expects the Arabian Gulf States to play a reasonable and positive strategy because of giving a hand of help in tracking down consensual recipes for various hot records in the Center East. Observers anticipate that the Gulf States will play a significant role in determining the general policies of the region in the coming decades in return for this position. The Arab Gulf States are at the beginning of a new era in which they will play a significant role not only in shaping the new Middle East but also in maintaining international peace and security. The moderate Gulf States will face new responsibilities and play a crucial role in shaping the region's future as the traditional role of the old players is diminished and new players with political fitness, modern military capabilities, and political acceptance by the international community and major powers emerge. As a result, the future of the Gulf and the Arab world requires not only a well-thought-out development strategy that reaffirms the Middle East's role in resuming global civilization but also a soft power that shifts the priorities of the region. A more prominent and influential Gulf role on the international stage to safeguard the region and the Arab world from any threats to world peace is paved by the alliances that currently exist between moderate Gulf States to combat terrorism and suspicious agendas.

Iran's nuclear agreement with the P5+1 group—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany—in addition to Germany raises the possibility of establishing a new security order in the Gulf that could help reduce the American military commitment and improve relations between Iran and the Arab Gulf States. This has come about simultaneously with the rise of a more powerful bloc that includes Arab Gulf States. While these States still lack self-sufficiency and use their resources recklessly in the case of Yemen, they may usher in a new era of trust between these kingdoms, which have had a turbulent history.

The possibility of establishing a new security order in the Gulf region is increased by the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group. Rivals and defenders of the Iran atomic arrangement exhibited a polarity going from a technique to overcoming Iran or coordinating the country into the worldwide framework. However, this is not regarded as a second choice. The nuclear deal would indeed give Iran's hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which implements Iran's regional policies, more strength. However, it could also open up more opportunities for the United States and Iran to have more bilateral interactions. Therefore, if Tehran continues to engage in harassing behaviors that pose a threat to fundamental US interests, the United States ought to make an effort to promote Iran's integration into regional structures to encourage more responsible Iranian behavior while imposing costs. It will be difficult to strike a diplomatic and political balance between restricting Iran's reconciliation and maintaining that balance.

Whether the United States and its Gulf Arab partners can agree to establish a more inclusive forum for multilateral discussions of Gulf security issues is one immediate test for that strategy. Be that as it may, there are points of reference for this thought, as provincial security associations have arisen in Africa, Asia, and Latin America fully intent on lessening pressures, settling clashes, overseeing emergencies, and forestalling clashes. However, these organizations have conflicting track record. The failures have been particularly pronounced in the Middle East. The Arab League, which includes nations from the Middle East and North Africa, lacks a real capacity for conflict prevention. The Gulf Cooperation Council, the only multilateral security forum in the Arabian Gulf, has several flaws. First, this council, in its current form, is nothing more than a *de facto* alliance for collective defense against Iran. Iran, Iraq, and outside powers with a strong interest in

the security of the region, such as China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States, are not included. Second, the Gulf Cooperation Council lacks a multilateral platform for crisis management, conflict resolution, and stability promotion. Additionally, Gulf States are unable to openly discuss security concerns or threats through the Council's mechanisms. This is problematic because the GCC States are confronted with numerous cross-border issues that necessitate increased international cooperation. In a broader US strategy that includes incentives and pressures to help influence Iranian behavior, opening a new multilateral framework to Iran could be an additional tool. However, this openness has direct advantages that cannot be overstated. The incentives rooted in Tehran's policies will not outweigh the modest benefits this structure provides to Iran.

A combination of ideological enthusiasm, strategic deterrence, domestic partisanship, ideological enthusiasm, and senior leaders' firm belief that the Islamic Republic should remain the indispensable state in the region is driving Iran's intervention in the region. Despite this, the low-level dialogue that the Arab States and Iran are having could be a significant first step toward lessening tension and changing Iran's perspective. In addition, this brand-new multilateral forum may develop into a more systematic discussion of Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. A long-term US vision for a more rules-based, stable, and predictable security order in the Middle East should include the new regional security forum. The United States will likely continue to play the role of the fire department in the region in the absence of this system, having to deal with the majority of the issues that countries in the region must solve on their own, with the United States playing a secondary role.

The appropriate time and setting are provided for the development of these arrangements by the post-nuclear agreement with Iran, which imposes the dual requirements of engagement with Iran and containment. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations would feel less anxious about withdrawing from the region if the United States participated in a stronger regional security institution.

The interests of both the United States and the Gulf States will benefit from the establishment of a security system in the region that is more extensive, legitimate, and efficient. A

security system that is based on rules and standards of behavior that are acceptable would also greatly benefit the Arab States and the United States. This would increase stability and lower the likelihood of tension and conflict. The US administration's strategy in the Middle East is based on six main hypotheses: To begin, the United States must maintain the bare minimum of engagement in the region to safeguard its core interests and to do so for a reasonable amount of time while minimizing costs and risks. Second, the nations of the Middle Eastern Bay locale should take care of their protection, to some extent to diminish the expenses and dangers of weighty security troubles in the US around here. Thirdly, because many of the problems in the Gulf go beyond national boundaries, multilateral cooperation is the only way to deal with them. Fourth, rather than direct Iranian aggression, the greatest long-term threat to the stability of the GCC States is escalating domestic pressure. However, Iran indirectly exacerbated these internal difficulties. Sunni extremism was fueled by Arab governance failures and its meddling in the region. Fifth, Gulf Arab States should implement internal reforms to lessen the appeal of extremist ideologies, reduce Iranian interference, and provide their citizens with longer-term security.

Despite this, the United States' ability to support these reforms is constrained. Sixth, Iran and Saudi Arabia's sectarian and geopolitical rivalry should not be sided with the United States. Instead, it ought to work toward restoring a new equilibrium between the two nations. The United States' influence with other nations in the region may rise because of the establishment of a framework for a more constructive and long-term engagement with Iran. America's way to deal with Bay security has excluded a promise to work with States in the district to fabricate a more comprehensive security design that would incorporate the Bay Collaboration Gathering States, Iran, Iraq, and other significant outer powers. However, the current US security strategy for the Arabian Gulf and many of its fundamental assumptions will be supported by an effective multilateral security forum. It would encourage responsible stakeholders outside the region to share a greater share of the burden for security while also transferring more responsibility for resolving the issues in the region to local States.

Conclusion

A comprehensive work plan that involves all the region's actors, from the Arab World to Iran, is necessary in light of the escalating political scene in the Middle East. In today's international relations, the real solution is peaceful engagement, especially when the opposing parties have equal

power and regional influence. Both Iran and the Arab World possess enormous capabilities that are one-of-a-kind, as well as unparalleled power potentials. Because of this, any conflict, whether it takes the form of actual wars or proxies, is pointless, as both the short and long histories of the Middle East demonstrate. With the assistance of regional States and the international community, particularly the United States, this situation calls for a new regional security initiative-centered peaceful resolution of the issues.

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