

Ph.D. Thesis

**Doctrinal Transformation in India: Traditional and Non-
Traditional Security Threats for Pakistan**



Researcher:
Kokab Al Saba
Reg No: 36-FSS-PHDIR/F18



Supervisor:
Dr. Noor Fatima

Department of Politics and International Relations
Faculty of Social Sciences
International Islamic University, Islamabad.

2023

~~PH~~
K

Accession No. TH-26784

PHD
320.954
KOD

India - Politics and government

Pakistan - " " "

National security - India

" " - Pakistan

Security, International - South Asia

Conflict management - India

" " - Pakistan

India Foreign relations - Pakistan

Pakistan " " - India

Doctrinal Transformation in India: Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threats for Pakistan

Kokab Al Saba

Reg No. 36-FSS-PHDIR/F18

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. Degree in Discipline) Social Sciences with specialization in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences
International Islamic University Islamabad.

Supervisor

Dr. Noor Fatima



July 6, 2023

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Dedication

*I dedicate this Ph.D. thesis to my beloved Husband and my
Parents for their unparalleled inspiration and endless
support throughout my studies.*


Their selflessness will always be remembered.

Thank you for enabling me to achieve this feat.

Certification


Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled "Doctrinal Transformation in India: Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threat for Pakistan " submitted by Kokab al Saba Reg#36-FSS/PhDIR/F18, have been found satisfactory for the requirements of the degree of PhD International Relations.

Supervisor:




Dr. Noor Fatima
Assistant Professor
Department of Politics & IR,
International Islamic University, Islamabad

Internal Examiner:




Prof. Dr. Muhammad Khan
Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad

External Examiner:




Prof. Dr. Saima Ashraf Kiyani
Professor
Deptt. of Defense & Diplomatic Studies
Fatima Jinnah Women University, Islamabad


External Examiner:



Dr. Summer Iqbal Baber
Assistant Professor
School of Politics & IR
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad



Prof. Dr. Muhammad Khan
Chair
Politics and International Relations
International Islamic University, Islamabad



Dean
Faculty of Social Sciences
International Islamic University, Islamabad

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	I
List Of Abbreviations	II
Abstract	IV
Introduction.....	1
a. Rational Of the Study	7
b. Statement of Problem	8
c. Objectives of the Study.....	8
d. Research Questions	8
e. Significance of the Study	9
f. Delimitations of the Study.....	9
g. Operational Definitions of Major Terms	9
h. Literature Review.....	10
i. Research Methodology	27
j. Theoretical Framework	28
Chapter 1 Changing Strategic Dynamics in South Asia: Doctrinal Shift in the Indian Military	
1. Introduction	34
1.1. Critical Analysis of the Cold Start Doctrine: Limited War Options.....	39
1.2. The Indian Maritime Strategy: Supremacy at Sea	44
1.3. Joint Armed Forces Doctrine 2017: Surgical Strikes	47
1.4. New Land Warfare Doctrine: Lean and Agile Force.....	50
Chapter 2 Renewed Indian Hybrid Warfare Strategy: Non-Traditional Security Threats	
2. Introduction	59
2.1. The Concept of Hybrid Warfare and its Theoretical Roots: Arthashastra	61
2.2. Renewed Hybrid Warfare after 2008: Doctrinal Shift	62
2.2.1. Technical Support Division: Secret Cell.....	62
2.2.2. Aggressive Defensive-Offense Doctrine: Covert Ops in the Enemy Territory.....	66
2.2.3. Indian Covert Ops/Proxy War: BLA/TTP/ISKP	66
2.2.4. Offensive Diplomacy under Modi Regime: Diplomatic Isolation	69
2.2.5. Media Warfare/Propaganda/Fake News: Psychological Warfare	70

2.2.6. Cyber Warfare.....	72
2.2.7. Surgical Strikes: Punitive Response	74
2.3. Implications for Pakistan's Security	78
2.3.1. Instability and turmoil in Tribal Areas and Balochistan	78
2.3.2. Economic Challenges: Threat to CPEC	80
2.3.3. Strategic Vulnerabilities: Two Front War Dilemma.....	81
2.3.4. Engineered Social Movements: Igniting Ethnic Fault lines	82
Chapter 3 India's Strategic Alliances and Military Modernization	
3. Introduction	85
3.1. The Indo-Russian Strategic Collaboration: Deep Rooted Ties	86
3.2. Indo-French Defense Collaboration in Rafale Aircraft: <i>Air Dominance</i>	87
3.3 Indo-US Defense Ties: <i>Filling the Operational Gaps</i>	88
3.5 Indo-Israel Strategic Partnership: <i>Network Centric Warfare Capabilities</i>	88
3.6 Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capabilities in the Indian Army	91
Chapter 4 Indian Strategic Thinking: Challenges for Pakistan	
4. Introduction	103
4.1. Threat to Conventional Deterrence: Arms Race.....	109
4.2. Indo-Pak Symmetries in Main Battle Tanks: T90S MBT vs Al-Khalid MBT	110
4.3. Indian Air Defense Capabilities: Threat to Pakistan Air Force.....	110
4.4. The Indian Army's Anti-Tank Missiles: Threats to Pakistan's MBTs	112
4.5. Modern Artillery in the Indian Army: Offensive Punch.....	112
4.6. Pakistan's Artillery Options: Balancing of the Firepower	113
4.7. Possibility of Limited War: Doctrinal Shift in India	116
4.8. The Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Cold War Experience	118
5. Conclusion	127
Findings and Discussions	141
References	147
Appendix I	166
Appendix II	168

FORWARDING SHEET

The thesis entitled '**Doctrinal Transformation in India: Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threats for Pakistan**', submitted by Kokab Al Saba is partial fulfillment of Ph.D. degree in Social Sciences with specialization in International Relations has been completed under my guidance and supervision. I am satisfied with the quality of student's research work and allow him to submit this thesis for further process as per IIU-rules & regulations.

Date: July 6th, 2023

Signature: _____

Supervisor:
Dr. Noor Fatima

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am highly grateful to my supervisor **Dr. Noor Fatima** for her consistent help and support throughout my Ph.D. process. Without her backing Ph.D. would have been a distant dream. I am blessed to have a supporting husband who always pushed me to finish my PhD work within timeframe. His support and encouragement has been a great force behind my success. I am extremely thankful to my lovely family & friends for their consistent support and encouragement throughout my Ph.D. Journey. Without consistent help and support of my friends and family PHD would have been a distant dream.

I am greatly appreciative to Pakistani, Indian and Western scholars/experts (acknowledged below) for their highly valuable (emailed/in person and telephonic) interviews.

Air Marshal M. Ashfaq Arain (Retd) (Advisor to CAS, PAF On CASS Affairs), **Michael Kugelman-** (Wilson Institute DC), **Toby Dalton-** (Co-Director, Carnegie Endowment Washington DC), **Rajesh Basrur-** (Senior Fellow in the South Asian Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies- (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore), **Bharat Karnard-** (Distinguished Fellow at the United Service Institution of India), **Dr. Adil Sultan,** (Dean Faculty of Aero Space and Strategic Studies, Air University, Islamabad), **Brigadier retd Tahir Mehmood-** (Former Director Hilal Magazine, ISPR), **Ambassador retd Ali Sarwar Naqvi-** (Executive Director CISS), **Walter C Ladwig,** (Associate Professor, Kings College London), **Kamran Hamid Hashmi,** (Deputy Director, Indian Ocean Region, Nima), **Commodore (retd) Asif Saleem,** (Retired Senior Officer Pakistan Navy).

List of Abbreviations

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEW&C	Airborne Early Warning and Control
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
ASW	Anti-submarine Warfare
ATAGS	Advance Towed Artillery Gun System
ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BLA	Baloch Liberation Army
BFSR	Battlefield Surveillance Radar
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSD	Cold Start Doctrine
DRDO	Defence Research and Development Organization
EW	Electronic Warfare
FMCP	Force Multiplication Command Post
HIMAD	High and Medium Altitude Air Defense System
HWS	Hybrid Warfare Strategy
IAC	Indigenous Aircraft Carrier
IAF	Indian Air Force
IBG	Integrated Battle Group
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICV	Infantry Combat Vehicle
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
LoC	Line of Control
LOMADS	Low to Medium Range Air Defense system
LR-ADS	Long Range Air Defense System
LR-SAM	Long Range Surface to Air Missile
MBT	Main Battle Tanks
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
NCW	Network Centric Warfare

NIA	National Investigation Agency
NSA	National Security Advisor
R&AW	Research and Analysis Wing
SHORADS	Short Range Air Defense System
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SLOC	Sea Lanes of Communications
SPD	Strategic Plans Division
S-WLR	Swathi Weapon Locating Radars
TNW	Tactical Nuclear Weapon
TSD	Technical Service Division
TTP	Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan
UAV	Unarmed Aerial Vehicle

Abstract

India is facing massive doctrinal transformation in its military and overall strategic thinking in the region. The idea is total dominance in South Asia and overwhelming ascendancy in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. In this context, this study would deal with primarily major shift in the Indian military's doctrinal shift from defensive to offensive posture against Pakistan. The study would briefly analyze the previous conventional limited war doctrines (cold start, proactive military operations) but the thrust will be on the New Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018 which needs more consideration and emphasis. Secondly, the study would also discuss the non-traditional security threats of the Indian doctrinal transformation for Pakistan. Indian strategic thinking faced huge setbacks after the nuclearization of South Asia. Pakistan established balance of terror vis-à-vis India to deter any aggressive move against the latter. Indian military's consistent doctrinal maneuvering and rapid military modernization motivated the Indian policy makers to devise limited war strategies to maintain strategic dominance over Pakistan. India's aggressive Kashmir policy failed and invited wider criticism and alleged militants frequently carried out attack in the Indian Held Kashmir- (IHK) to avenge the Indian military's brute force and alleged human rights violations. India used offensive diplomacy against Pakistan and tried to malign Pakistan over her political failures in IHK but also endangered the global security, because any conflict in this region would have far reaching implications for global security as well. India is trying to capitalize on Pakistan's conventional vulnerabilities/asymmetries to execute her offensive military doctrines against Pakistan. Whereas Pakistan on the other hand is trying to deter India with her conventional capabilities as first option but if conventional asymmetries increases then Pakistan military would rely on her nuclear weapons to deter any aggressive limited war strategy or surgical strike by the Indian side.

Introduction

South Asia has become the most dangerous region in the world because of the changing strategic dynamics in India. Since Pakistan shares border with India, anything takes place in India directly impacts Pakistan. Since 1947, India is at loggerheads against Pakistan. Both states are continuously fighting against each other over many unresolved issues. India and Pakistan fought three major wars in 1947, 1965 & 1971 and a limited skirmish or sectoral operation at Kargil in 1999. Three wars were before nuclearization and Kargil war was after the overt nuclearization which opened the gates for limited war under the nuclear overhang. Kargil conflict was in response to India's annexation of Siachen in 1980s. However, such a skirmish under nuclear umbrella was a serious threat to regional peace and stability Any escalation from limited to total war would have been devastating. At the same time this limited conflict gave India the impetus for future limited war options under the nuclear shielded. Therefore, there are many unresolved issues between both states which may trigger a conventional war which may turn out to be a nuclear war. Such a scenario is dangerous for not only South Asia but also for the global peace and security. According Rajesh Basrur, Rajesh Basrur who is a Senior Fellow in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies-(RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, "In a nuclear weapons environment, total war is ruled out because it is self-destructive. Limited military action may be possible between nuclear powers, but still generates a degree of risk" (Basrur, 2021).

The study aims to highlight the changing strategic dynamics in India and how it impacts Pakistan's security. India is \$3.8 trillion economy and huge population of about 1.44 billion. Which means that without any doubt is huge market for global powers like the US, Russia, European Union and even China. There is only one hurdle for India's domination in South Asia and that is Pakistan.

Pakistan is the only country in South Asia which has the ability to challenge the Indian hegemony. India wants regional control to maintain dominance over the Indian Ocean region- (IORs), undermine Pakistan's strategic position in the region and establish its dominance to become a net security provider in South Asia (Brewster, 2018). In this context, there is only one country in the region which may challenge the Indian hegemony and that is Pakistan.

India's rapid military modernization is creating security dilemma for Pakistan which may push Pakistan for countermeasures. India's rapid military modernization is aimed at China will result in Pakistan receding from its radar until soon New Delhi will begin treating Pakistan as more a nuisance than a serious military threat. As far as traditional security is concerned Pakistan is trying to deter India from any misadventure against Pakistan. But on the Non-Traditional security side the Indian policy makers are imposing serious losses on Pakistan. India's support to terrorist groups in Pakistan is a serious concern which may undermine Pakistan's internal security. The study analyzed India's role in subversion in ex-Fata region and Balochistan. There is now conclusive evidence to prove that the Indians have been nurturing, funding, training and unleashing terrorist groups like TTP and BLA on Pakistan, which imposed huge losses on Pakistan's +economy. Meanwhile, the Taliban has not curbed the TTP, which has gained strength. The combination of India's continuing strategic and economic presence in Afghanistan—despite the Taliban takeover—combined with a strengthening Afghanistan-based TTP will understandably raise concerns for Islamabad. It is expected that this trend would continue, India is again back to Afghanistan after the US withdrawal. They opened their embassy again and Afghan Taliban have also welcomed them. It is obvious that India is there in Afghanistan for two primary reasons. First is economic, because being almost 3 trillion-dollar economy and a population of about 1.44 billion India needs resources to sustain her economic growth and feed her huge population. India financed

problems from Afghan soil and created subversion in ex-FATA region and Balochistan by supporting, nurturing and funding militants. India's renewed hybrid warfare is a serious threat for Pakistan. This area needs more investigation, because India cannot go out rightly a total war with Pakistan because of the nuclear weapons. India is also reluctant of execute her limited war strategies because of tactical nukes. However, surgical strike by India in 2019 also turned out to be sheer embarrassment for India. It is unwise for India to engage a nuclear weapon state directly. That's why India is putting more focus on engaging Pakistan indirectly through use of spies, proxy wars and covert operations etc. There is no risk involved of nuclear escalation or any other military losses. In this strategy Indian policy makers would simply deploy their intelligence operatives in Balochistan or tribal areas, provide them with required funds and intelligence support and they will execute the task by attacking Pakistan security forces, civil or military installations. Chinese workers and sectarian attacks to create a sense of insecurity in Pakistan and create such an environment to dissuade any foreign direct investment and also pressurize the local businessman to shift their investment abroad. Such a scenario is frightening for Pakistan. It is necessary for Pakistani policy makers to gauge the situation and devise comprehensive strategy to overcome these emerging threats to Pakistan's traditional and non-traditional security.

The study would focus on the Indian aggressive approach in the Indian Held Kashmir- (IHK) and how it impacts Pakistan's national security in the long run. The Indian military's brutal oppression in the IHK has ignited the local resistance which has gained momentum in the post 2016 situation. The intensity of attacks has also increased which has created serious concerns for the Indian government. Now to tackle the insurgency in IHK, the Indian government used brutal force in IHK in which they have killed hundreds of young Kashmiris. The people of IHK are resisting the illegal occupation of Indian Army. It is believed that people of IHK attack the Indian Army because of

her appalling behavior towards Kashmiris. Therefore, Indian army deceitfully link it with Pakistan. However, many times their own investigations gave clean chit to Pakistan and accepted that Pakistan had no role in those attacks (NIA says no Pak role in Pathankot attack, 2016). Now to woo their public and overcome their own failures India found a scape goat in Pakistan. Instead of giving Kashmiris their due right, it has imposed brutal oppression on innocent Kashmiris, which would definitely invite response from the victim party. Many times over India suffered alleged militant attacks since 2001 and all the time it had blamed Pakistan for supporting militant groups. After facing shortcomings in tackling Pakistan with her military muscle because of nuclear weapons, the Indian military introduced many limited war doctrines- (Cold Start/proactive military operations, Sub-conventional warfare-2012, Hybrid Warfare and Surgical Strikes) which were one way, or the other countered by Pakistan.

The study aims to highlight all those strategic changes which has taken place in the last two decades. It has been observed India is ready to fight a limited war with Pakistan because of her military and economic muscle. Whereas Pakistan cannot afford even a limited war because of her volatile economic conditions and political instability. The Indians since the 2001-02 have been working on limited war options to maintain their strategic edge vis-à-vis Pakistan. The idea was to deter any alleged proxy war from Pakistan or to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold of Pakistan to avoid any escalation. But after the miniaturization of nuclear weapons in 2011, India's limited war strategy Cold Start Doctrine faced serious setbacks. The Al-Nasr- or Hatf- IX was a battlefield nuclear weapon with limited range, limited objectives and with low yield warhead aimed to deter any division sized armor attack against Pakistan. So far it worked, it is almost a decade since the inception of TNWs in South Asia by Pakistan, since then India did not try to execute her CSD against Pakistan because of the fear of a Hatf-IX (Ahmed M. , Pakistan's Tactical

Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability, 2016). After the induction of TNWs it was risky for India to operationalize her limited war options. In 2012, the Indian policy makers brought shift in their strategy and started working on surgical strikes option under a new doctrine of the Indian Air Force. The IAF doctrine of 2012 focused on sub-conventional warfare operations in which the IAF would be used to take out target across the LoC. After 2012 the IAF started working on sub-conventional operations or surgical strikes and during this period conducted many war games in which mainly those concepts were practiced which are required for surgical strikes. For example, the IAF practiced behind the enemy lines operations, Heliborne operations, special forces were used for quick and swift raids in enemy territory, precious guided munitions were also used to practice sub-conventional warfare operations (Army-IAF joint drill along western borders for deployment of special forces behind enemy lines, 2023). In 2017, India introduced another doctrine with a name Joint Armed Forces Doctrine-2017, in which again it was emphasized that India may resort to surgical strikes. "India has moved to a pro-active and pragmatic philosophy to counter various conflict situations. The response to terror provocations could be in the form of 'surgical strikes' and these would be subsumed in the sub-conventional portion of the spectrum of armed conflict" (IDS, 2017). In continuation to doctrinal shift spree, the Indian military introduced New Land Warfare Doctrine in 2018, which needs thorough investigation and an effective response from Pakistan. In this doctrine India reemphasize that to counter proxy wars India would carry of punitive responses which means surgical strikes (Katoch L. G., 2018). In February 2019 India tried to execute this strategy and took risk under the nuclear shadow and carried out failed surgical strike against Pakistan in Balakot (Botched Balakot airstrike still haunting Indian Air Force, 2023). Though it has been tackled effectively by Pakistan but in future if the Indian government acquire modern weapon and equipment and try to humiliate Pakistan then situation

may get worse because Pakistan may respond again, which may escalate the conflict and create serious challenges for the South Asian security. However, on the question of future surgical strikes Dr. Toby Dalton replied that, “future surgical strikes are as plausible as future attacks in India by Pakistani-based militant groups. S-400 should have little bearing on that scenario, given that Pakistan has many response options beyond air strikes” (Dalton, 2022). However, Pakistani analysts analyse this development in other way. “Such inductions can lead to a heightened sense of security which may prompt Indian military leadership into undertaking some sort of offensive venture. The sense of invincibility can thus lead to deterioration in strategic stability and thus lead to an arms race to regain balance” (Arain, 2023). The study also discussed, India’s strategic alliances with other major powers like the US, Russia, Israel and EU. How these alliances would help the Indian military to fill the gaps in her operational capabilities and execute its aggressive policies against Pakistan.

In addition, the study would discuss the new mode of warfare in the region. The hybrid nature of warfare in which India is trying to capitalize on Pakistan’s socio-economic weaknesses in Balochistan to disrupt mega project of China Pakistan Economic Corridor. According to Lt Commander (retd) Kamran Hamid Hashmi India’s Hybrid Warfare would unleash serious implications for Pakistan in many domains. He was of the view in these words, “Such a situation would trigger ethnic conflicts (Bloch, Muhajir, etc.). It would try to create environmental conflicts over water, agriculture, and other issues of nature affecting the local population’s health, security, and sustenance” (Hashmi, 2023).

According to a CJCSC General Zubair Hayat the Indian government has allocated \$500 million to disrupt CPEC (“RAW running \$500 million cell to sabotage CPEC,” says Gen Zubair Hayat”, 2017). The study would explore how the Indian government is trying to create security challenges

for Pakistan in tribal areas and elsewhere through her hybrid warfare strategy. All these strategic changes in South Asia are taking place rapidly which may create serious challenges for Pakistan in future. India's hybrid warfare poses non-traditional security threat to Pakistan. In this domain the Indians are carrying covert operations through Kulbushan Yadav type of secret operatives and also carrying out proxy war through TTP or BLA type of terrorist groups. The hybrid nature of warfare also entails offensive diplomacy, cyber-attacks, fake news/propaganda and engineered social movements. The purpose of the study is to highlight these new dimensions in South Asia and come up with solid recommendations for Pakistan to counter these challenges effectively. India's doctrinal transformation pose serious challenges for Pakistan's traditional and non-traditional security and entails far reaching implications for regional and global security.

a. Rationale of the Study

Pakistan is situated in South Asia which is considered to be the most volatile region in the world because of nuclear factor. Because Pakistan is grappling with an aggressive Indian military on the eastern front and their hybrid warfare activities in Balochistan and tribal areas through volatile Afghanistan on the western front. The rationale of the study is to analyze Pakistan's traditional and non-traditional security threats emanating from India. The study would emphasize on the drastic change in the Indian strategic thinking in the current scenario. The study focuses on the rapid doctrinal shift in the Indian strategic outlook vis-à-vis Pakistan, which analyses the Indian military's doctrines since 2003 to date and their implications for Pakistan's security. The study examines threat scenarios emanating from changing strategic thinking in India and looks towards tangible counter measures and recommendations for Pakistan to overcome this existential threat.

b. Statement of the Problem

The study highlights the major strategic shift in India and how it is going to impact on Pakistan's traditional and non-traditional security. The changing strategic dynamics in India are real threat to peace & security. India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states and equipped with modern weapon and equipment. Any attempt to look for the gap between conventional and non-conventional capabilities would be a dangerous phenomenon. In that context the study analyses the changing strategic environment in India and how it impacts the security of Pakistan.

c. Objectives of the Study

The research is aimed at achieving the following objectives:

- To examine the changing strategic dynamics in India, which may include the doctrinal shift (Limited War Doctrines/CSD/Proactive Military Ops, Surgical Strikes, Land Warfare Doctrine-2018) vis-a-vis Pakistan.
- To analyze renewed Non-Traditional Security threats from India in the shape of hybrid warfare.
- To evaluate the emerging threats in the shape of Indian strategic alliances with foreign powers and its impact on Pakistan's security.

d. Research Questions

The following questions have been formulated keeping in view the statement of problem and objectives:

1. In what ways the changing strategic dynamics in India (doctrinal transformation) impact Pakistan's traditional security?
2. How the rejuvenated hybrid warfare strategy of India undermines Pakistan's Non-traditional security?

3. What are the implications of the Indian strategic alliances with foreign powers on Pakistan's security?

e. Significance of the Study

Strategic stability in South Asia is in danger because of the changing strategic dynamics in India. The study is significant because of the nuclear factor and many unresolved issues between India and Pakistan. India's doctrinal maneuvering from total war to limited war and from limited to surgical strikes or sub-conventional operations would push Pakistan for countermeasures. In this scenarios there would be greater stress on Pakistan. In this context the study is significant and demands greater emphasis, analysis and examination.

f. Delimitations of the Study

The study faces limitations in terms of official Indian documents as well as access to archives in India. Therefore, it would rely solely on open source material i.e. books, journals, online repots and published material related to Indian strategic thinking and changing dynamics. Moreover, there would be a limitation to seek interviews of the retired Indian military or foreign office personnel. But this limitation would be partially managed through online emailed interviews. The study is bounded by an era which covers only development since 2001, because doctrinal transformation takes place after 2001.

g. Operational Definitions of Major Terms

Strategic Stability: Strategic stability is concept that deals with the issues related to survivability of first strike by an opponent and provides an opportunity to retaliate with second strike. This term was coined in the cold war era by the US and its rival Soviet Union. But it is still prevalent in South Asia between India and Pakistan.

Security Dilemma: The security dilemma deals with the insecurities of a state because of the increase in the military muscle of other state. In other words, enhanced security of a state creates security dilemma for other states because other state takes it as offensive and proactive.

Network Centric Warfare: Seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, into a competitive advantage through the robust networking of well-informed geographically dispersed forces.

Deterrence: Deterrence is a situation where two potential enemies deter each other from any aggressive action. To achieve this, belligerents must possess enough capability to inflict heavy damages on one another.

Nuclear Deterrence: The main aim of Nuclear weapons is to deter enemy from taking any undesirable action. Nuclear deterrence depends on major factors, which are Capability, Communication, Credibility, command, control and intelligence.

Cold Start Doctrine (CSD): is an Indian military's offensive limited war doctrine which focusses on multiple thrusts inside Pakistani territory in case of an alleged terrorist attack in India. Its main features are quick and robust operations, surgical strikes with Special Forces. The purpose is to cause damage to Pakistan under nuclear threshold.

Land Warfare Doctrine-2018: LWD-18 is Indian Army's new doctrine to fight a limited war under the nuclear overhang with shallower quick and swift operations with greater speed, maneuverability, intensity and ferociousness.

h. Literature Review

Two schools of thought now exist in security studies: traditionalists want to restrict the subject to politico-military issues; while wideners want to extend it to the economic, societal and

environmental sectors. The book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* sets out a comprehensive statement of the new security studies, establishing the case for the broader agenda (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, 1998).

Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Issues, Challenges and Framework for Action examines the critical security challenges faced by states and societies in Asia including health, food, water, natural disasters, internal conflict, forced migration, energy, transnational crime, and cyber security. Through the development of a comprehensive analytical framework that establishes the key ingredients to policy evaluation, Mely Caballero-Anthony and Alistair D.B. Cook draw on a wide variety of experts to collaborate in investigating these crucial issues. This inclusive framework ensures that all voices are heard including those oftentimes under-represented and marginalized in society to ensure that academic and policy debates are well informed about the often complex and nuanced nature of these non-traditional security challenges. The book undertakes an issue-specific chapter study of how Asian states and societies address these non-traditional security concerns from environmental adaptation and mitigation measures to conflict resolution. For each issue area, it identifies and explains the concerns of various policy communities, identifying the motivations behind some of the key decisions made to affect change or stabilize the status quo (Mely Caballero-Anthony, Alistair D.B. Cook, 2013).

As one important outcome of a three-year research project, this collection provides a comprehensive and extensive analysis of the emerging non-traditional security challenges in Asia. It explores the complex processes of how and why these issues emerge and how they are defined and responded to by governments and non-state actors (Mely Caballero Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya, 2006).

With the end of the Cold War, threats to national security have become increasingly non-military in nature. Issues such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, drug trafficking, information security and transnational crime have come to the forefront. *An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies: A Transnational Approach* provides a comprehensive introduction to Non-Traditional Security concepts (Caballero-Anthony, 2015).

Understanding Security Practices in South Asia: Securitization Theory and the Role of Non-State Actors explores the ways in which non-state actors (NSAs) in South Asia are involved in securitizing non-traditional security challenges in the region at the sub-state level. South Asia is the epicenter of some of the most significant international security challenges today. Yet, the complexities of the region's security dynamics remain under-researched. While traditional security issues, such as inter-state war, border disputes and the threat of nuclear devastation in South Asia, remain high on the agendas of policy-makers and academics both within and beyond the region, scant attention has been paid to non-traditional or 'new' security challenges. Drawing on various case studies, this work offers an innovative analysis of how NSAs in South Asia are shaping security discourses in the region and tackling security challenges at the sub-state level. Through its critique of securitization theory, the book calls for a new approach to studying security practices in South Asia - one which considers NSAs as legitimate security actors. This book is relevant to existing study, Asian security, Asian politics, critical security studies, and IR in general (Barthwal-Datta, 2012).

'Non-traditional' security problems like pandemic diseases, climate change and terrorism now pervade the global agenda. Many argue that sovereign state-based governance is no longer adequate, demanding and constructing new approaches to manage border-spanning threats.

Drawing on critical literature in political science, political geography and political economy, *Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation* is the first book that systematically explains the outcomes of these efforts. It shows that transboundary security challenges are primarily governed not through supranational organizations, but by transforming state apparatuses and integrating them into multilevel, regional or global regulatory governance networks. The socio-political contestation shaping this process determines the form, content and operation of transnational security governance regimes. Using three in-depth case studies - environmental degradation, pandemic disease, and transnational crime - this innovative book integrates global governance and international security studies, and identifies the political and normative implications of non-traditional security governance, providing insights for scholars and policymakers alike (Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, 2015).

Asia is challenged by a number of non-traditional security issues including the food energy water nexus, climate change, transnational crime, terrorism. disaster relief and economic performance. *Non-Traditional Security Challenges in Asia: Approaches and Responses* categorizes and clarifies some key emerging issues in the area and looks at their interconnectedness and implications. The essays explore how non-traditional issues can manifest as security challenges, and the role of the state and military in dealing with these. Issue-based and area-specific, they rely on facts and interpretation of data, avoiding alarmist predictions. A nuanced and analytical approach into an uncharted area, this book will be essential for policymakers, researchers and students of security and strategic studies, foreign policy, sociology and political economy, as well as the general readers (Dadwal, 2017).

Fully revised to incorporate recent developments, this third edition of *Understanding Global Security* analyses the variety of ways in which people's lives are threatened and/or secured in

contemporary global politics. The traditional focus of Security Studies texts: war, deterrence and terrorism, are analyzed alongside non-military security issues such as famine, crime, disease, disasters, environmental degradation and human rights abuses to provide a comprehensive survey of how and why people are killed in the contemporary world (Hough, 2018). Greater coverage of the evolving theoretical literature on security, including more analysis of critical theory perspectives and emerging schools of thought to address the underlying problem. A revamp of the sections examining the causes of inter-state war and counter-terrorism strategies. Analysis of key recent developments including the global economic recession, Haiti earthquake of 2010 and Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011. New quantitative analysis of the impact of global crime and environmental change. Greater evaluation of the divergences in how human security is interpreted and the future prospects for this way of thinking and acting in international relations in a subtler way.

The end of the Cold War era marked a watershed in India's strategic history as it began to shift its strategic worldview from that of a relatively weak player with a defensive worldview to that of a more confident emerging power. The pros and cons of India's power potential have been debated at length in terms of its economic capacities, its expanding strategic horizons, and its internal strengths and weaknesses. But there has been relatively little detailed investigation of its military forces and the ways in which they have responded to the changing environment. The book *India's Military Modernization: Challenges and Prospects* aims to look closely at the modernization of the Indian armed forces and to ask: How have the Indian armed forces sought to mould themselves in response to the demands of an entirely new strategic setting? How do they view their roles in an increasingly complex world marked by a tightening web of interactions and its attendant frictions? Is the process of modernization under way in tune with the needs of the armed forces

and the overall strategic approach of policy makers? (Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeer Singh Pardesi, 2014).

The Indian Army is the third largest army in the world in terms of size, based on the number of personnel. But this description obfuscates the fact. It is not as strong as it appears, in terms of its capacity to undertake military operations optimally in the multi-domain, technology dominated battlefields of the future. The developments in India's immediate neighborhood over the past decade have led India to take a close look at her foreign and security policies. There is a widely sensed need for the rapid modernization of the Indian armed forces, which is being reflected in some of the key initiatives that have been taken up by the Indian government so far (such as Make in India), so as to address to the complex security challenges that emanate from its hostile neighborhood. India seems to be modernizing its military and its nuclear capabilities keeping an eye on China. India's declared policy is of nuclear deterrence and no first strike. However, the modernization program, particularly the ballistic missiles program, shows that India is intent on bringing the whole of China in its strike range. India's threats and challenges in the military realm primarily emanate from the historically inherited territorial disputes involving its two nuclear armed neighbors, over which five wars have already been fought. The growing nexus on military and nuclear matters between our potential adversaries suggests that, unlike in the past, India may face a 'two front threat', the next time round. The fact that the existing territorial disputes are 'land-centric' highlights the pre-dominant role of the army in the Indian security context. The present defense setup, have critically analyzed all the factors and suggested ways to fully modernize our defense structure in order to make the book a guiding tool for the defense authorities as well as students at large (Rudolph, 2018).

The Rise of Indian Military Power: Evolution of an Indian Strategic Culture: Evolution of an Indian Strategic Culture is a monumental & epic work on India's Military History. It seeks to answer the seminal question – 'Is there an Indian Way of War-fighting and an Indian Strategic Culture?' The author has traced the history of war-fighting in India from the Vedic & Mahabharatan period to the Mauryan & Mughal Eras and thereafter the British Period. It is a comprehensive audit of India's combat performance in the ancient, medieval, modern and post-modern periods of Indian history. The focus of this work however, is on India's Post-Independence Military History. G.D. Bakshi has analyzed each of India's wars with China & Pakistan as also its CI and CT campaigns in meticulous detail, to draw lessons for the future. The path-breaking contribution is the author's thesis that there have been three local Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) in India, which shaped the course & flow of her history. Each of these RMAs helped to unify India under a great Empire and transformed it from a civilizational entity to a strong empire state. The first was the Mauryan RMA of using War Elephants in mass to generate shock & awe. This politically unified the whole of India and Afghanistan for the first time (Bakshi, 2015).

Indian Ocean and Maritime Security: Competition, Cooperation and Threat provides a synoptic view of the Indian Ocean and maritime security in its contested waters. Using a historical approach, it reveals vital links to events in the present day. The volume: Highlights the competition between major Asian powers to control the 'String of Pearls' — a reference to the Chinese attempts at controlling the Indian Ocean periphery. Shows that cooperation amongst the major powers of the region could abate the threat of the potential of conflict becoming global and inviting external intervention. Discusses India's Look-East policy and the deepening relation between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Argues for the need of Indian Ocean states and particularly the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) members of the

Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to look afresh at their political and security issues and common interests. Suggests measures for evolving a robust mechanism of maintaining the Indian Ocean as a sustainable zone of commerce, energy, security and peace rather than threat for littoral states. A major contribution on a critical area in Asian geopolitics, this volume will be useful to scholars and researchers of international relations, politics, defense studies and maritime security studies, along with strategic affairs experts and think tanks (Bimal N. Patel, Aruna Kumar Malik and William Nunes, 2016).

India has the world's fourth largest military and one of the biggest defense budgets. It asserts its political and military profile in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The nation has been in the midst of an ambitious plan to modernize its largely Soviet-era arms since the late 1990s and has spent billions of dollars on latest high-tech military technology. This handbook: canvasses over 60 years of Indian defense policy and the major debates that have shaped it; discusses several key themes such as the origins of the modern armed forces in India; military doctrine and policy; internal and external challenges; and nuclearization and its consequences; includes contributions by well-known scholars, experts in the field and policymakers; and provides an annotated bibliography for further research. Presented in an accessible format, *Handbook of Indian Defense Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines* will be an indispensable resource for scholars and researchers of security and defense studies, international relations and political science, as well as for government think tanks and policymakers (Pant, 2015).

Transformation should lie at the heart of our new approach to defense. The development of transformational capabilities, processes, and force structures should be given strategic focus to meet the principal challenges under our defense strategy. India is already seized with the necessity of transformation albeit without any documented national security guidelines or operating

instructions, which are legislated or have the validation of at least the 'Cabinet Committee on Security'(CCS). In other words, the first step would be to create a draft security strategy based on many assumptions, like the foreign policy or the cumulative emerging threat scenario as appreciated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). *Transformation of the Indian Armed Forces: 2025* is a result of the project allotted by the USI under the Field Marshal K. M. Cariappa chair. This book is therefore more as an idea or a theoretical construct, basically to bring in more clarity to the various options available for this great transformation of the Indian military. Maj General (R) AK Lal has deliberated upon various landmarks of transformation milestones achieved so far by the three services and given recommendations to further build upon ongoing modernization plan and shift to a higher plane of transformational activities (Lal, 2012).

What ails the Indo-Pakistani relationship? Rivalry between the two states has persisted since the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947, and despite negotiations, four wars and multiple crises, India and Pakistan remain locked in a long-standing dispute. Evaluating relations from 1999 through to 2009, Sumit Ganguly seeks to understand this troubled relationship and why efforts at peace-making and conflict resolution, which have included unilateral Indian concessions, have not been more fruitful. Charting key sources of tension throughout the decade, including the origins and outcomes of the Kargil War in 1999, developments in the Indian-controlled portion of the state of Kashmir, the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 and the onset of the 2001-2 crisis, *Deadly Impasse* sets out to discover whether the roots of this hostile relationship stem from security dilemmas or reflect the dynamics between a status quo power and a predatory state (Ganguly, 2016).

India's emergence as a nuclear weapon state gave birth to the concept of limited war and therefore, the feasibility of conventional war under the nuclear shadow informs India's military preparations.

But is achievement of substantial political objectives possible through war? What are the dangers of escalation caused by what Clausewitz described as the friction and fog of war? In the context of Indo-Pak conflict, can force application by India provide an answer to resolving the contentious issue of Pakistan supported terrorism? Or would it only lead to a temporary change of status quo? This incisive analysis, made by one of the most distinguished military thinkers of India, doesn't just raise these pertinent questions but also brings great clarity to the strategic options available to India. For the Indian military, the author recommends a doctrinal shift from capture of territory to stand off destruction with a concurrent rebalance from west to north which must be accompanied by political leadership understanding that alerting nuclear weapons is a red line which once crossed, has potential for conflict to spiral beyond their control. Nuclear deterrence stands on the loose sands of nuclear strategy that has not been able to answer the query, 'What happens when nuclear deterrence fails? (Menon, 2020).

The Evolution of Military Power in the West and Asia: Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era investigates how states in both the West and Asia have responded to multi-dimensional security challenges since the end of the Cold War, focusing on military transformation. Looking at a cross-section of different countries, this volume assesses how their armed forces have responded to a changing international security context. The book investigates two main themes. First, how the process of military 'transformation'- in terms of technological advances and new ways of conducting warfare has impacted on the militaries of various countries. These technologies are hugely expensive and the extent to which different states can afford them, and the ability of these states to utilize these technologies, differs greatly. Second, the volume investigates the social dimensions of military transformation. It reveals the expanding breadth of tasks that contemporary armed forces have been required to address. This includes the need for military forces to work with

other actors, such as non-governmental agencies and humanitarian organizations, and the ability of armed forces to fight asymmetric opponents and conduct post-conflict reconstruction tasks. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplified how important the relationship between technological and social transformation has become (Pauline Eadie, Wyn Rees, 2015).

The balance of power in South Asia is tenuous. Neighboring states with nuclear weapons pose a serious threat in times of conflict and the danger of escalation into a nuclear holocaust in South Asia is always there. *India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia* locates the change in India's war doctrine at the turn of the century, following the Kargil War in 1999 between India and Pakistan. It examines how war policy was shaped by the threat posed by India's neighbors and the need for greater strategic assertion. It also reveals that this change was forced by the military's need to adapt itself to the nuclear age. Finally, it raises questions of whether the Limited War doctrine has made India more secure (Ahmed, 2014).

India's nuclear profile, doctrine, and practices have evolved rapidly since the country's nuclear breakout in 1998. However, the outside world's understanding of India's doctrinal debates, forward-looking strategy, and technical developments are still two decades behind the present. *India and Nuclear Asia* will fill that gap in our knowledge by focusing on the post-1998 evolution of Indian nuclear thought, its arsenal, the triangular rivalry with Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's nonproliferation policy approaches. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell show how India's nuclear trajectory has evolved in response to domestic, regional, and global drivers. The authors argue that emerging trends in all three states are elevating risks of regional inadvertent and accidental escalation. These include the forthcoming launch of naval nuclear forces within an environment of contested maritime boundaries; the growing employment of dual-use delivery vehicles; and the emerging preferences of all three states to employ missiles early in a conflict.

These dangers are amplified by the near-absence of substantive nuclear dialogue between these states, and the growing ambiguity of regional strategic intentions (Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell, 2018).

The overt nuclearization in South Asia brought peace and closed the doors for any major conventional war between India and Pakistan. But the Indian military's doctrinal transformation after 1998 threatened the deterrence stability in South Asia. The idea of limited war under the nuclear umbrella which was also known as CSD or proactive military operations compelled Pakistan to develop nuclear tipped low yield battlefield nuclear weapons to deter shallow maneuvers by the Indian army. Later, the Indian military realized that the idea of limited war is risky and it may escalate into a major war. Then, the Indian military came up with sub-conventional warfare strategy in 2012 and later in the 2017 joint armed forces doctrine, India emphasized on the possibility of surgical strikes. The Indian military has also revamped its maritime strategy in 2015 and declared to achieve assured second strike capability at sea. The second strike capability would provide a cushion to the Indian air and land forces to carry out limited conventional Ops against Pakistan. The Indian and Western strategic community widely surmise that there is a possibility of surgical strike or limited war in South Asia between India and Pakistan. However, Pakistani policy makers firmly believe that any attempt to carry out surgical strike will be massively retaliated within few hours, which may escalate the conflict. There is greater risk of escalation in any limited or total war with Pakistan. This is the reason that Indian military avoid any direct confrontation with Pakistan and focus on hybrid warfare strategy in which India indirectly capitalize on the socio-economic, religious, cultural, ethnic, strategic and political vulnerabilities of Pakistan (Khattak, 2019). Commodore (retd) Asim Saleem of Pakistan Navy believe that,

India's hybrid warfare strategy is accentuating Pakistan's diplomatic and security challenges on account of, above all, defiling our image at every possible avenue such as recent tirades at the UN, labeling Pakistan as the 'epicenter of terrorism'. India also continues to sponsor acts of terrorism through proxies, especially in Afghanistan, which is aggravating the security situation along the Pak-Afghan border (Saleem, 2023).

Strategic stability in South Asia is fragile because of India's massive military build-up, doctrinal shift, and change in its strategic thinking. The Indian government has allocated billions of dollars to transform its tri-services with network centric and electronic warfare capabilities. This is likely to create a huge strategic disparity vis-à-vis Pakistan. Against this backdrop, the possibility of a limited war warrants countermeasures by Pakistan. India and Pakistan must show restraint and resolve their issues amicably through peaceful dialogue for the long-term peace and stability of South Asia (Khattak M. U., 2019).

The Integrated Defense Staff released the first-ever public joint doctrine for the Indian armed forces (JDIAF-2017) in April 2017. Absent a publicly articulated national security strategy, the joint doctrine presents important clues about what that strategy might be. "India's Joint Doctrine: A Lost Opportunity" examines JDIAF-2017 in conjunction with other Indian military doctrines, public writings of leading Indian strategists, as well as foreign military doctrines and strategies that influence Indian military thinking. Opening with a comparison of Indian defense planning and the American structure in order to tease out the broader role of the joint doctrine in the Indian system, the paper proceeds to examine the continental view of threats enunciated in JDIAF-2017, and connects it to India's recently-avowed proactive, limited-aims Pakistan strategy. A consequence of this continental view of threats is an army-centric joint doctrine that fails to pay sufficient attention to the role of the other two services, and appears considerably influenced by the US Army's Air Land Battle doctrine. The paper explicates JDIAF-2017's treatment of nuclear

issues and their relationship to conventional war, and deals with the near-absence of force-projection and other issues in the joint doctrine. The paper also discusses the Joint Training Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces that was published as a follow-up to JDIAF-2017 (Rej, 2018). “India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn” is an article by Shashank Joshi which asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects (Joshi, 2013).

India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, with at least five new weapon systems now under development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems. India is estimated to have produced enough military plutonium for 150 to 200 nuclear warheads, but has likely produced only 130 to 140. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities. India's nuclear strategy, which has traditionally focused on Pakistan, now appears to place increased emphasis on China (Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda, 2018).

The article “From Denial to Punishment: The Security Dilemma and Changes in India's Military Strategy towards China” argues that China's rise and its growing military power have intensified the Sino-Indian security dilemma. For a long time after the 1962 war, India's military posture along the India–China border was mostly defensive in nature and could be characterized as imposing “deterrence by denial.” However, over the last decade, China's growth trajectory coupled with rapid modernization of its military called into question the efficacy of this approach. India now feels much more vulnerable to China's increasing military power both on the land frontier as

well as in the maritime domain. The increasing intensity of this security dilemma has informed a consequent shift in India's military strategy vis-à-vis China to one of "deterrence by punishment." Theoretically, this article examines how changes in the severity of a security dilemma can lead to changes in military strategy. While doing so it explains India's current military strategy to deal with the challenge posed by China (Mukherjee, 2019).

The article "Personalities, organizations, and doctrine in the Indian military" explains when, why, and how Indian Army doctrine has changed since 1947. It traces Indian Army doctrinal evolution from defensive defense from 1947 to the mid-1960s, toward maneuver warfare after 1971, greater mechanization in the 1980s, and an emphasis on rapid, limited offensive strikes after 2002. It argues that in the absence of civilian intervention, the Indian Army has followed patterns predicted by organizational theory. The Indian Army has tended to avoid major doctrinal evolution and when doctrinal change has taken place it has consistently moved away from defensive orientations in favor of doctrines that maximize the initiative available to future Indian Army leaders to undertake offensive action. Doctrinal innovation has also been hampered by high turnover and apolitical selection of Indian Army chiefs, which inhibits continuity in efforts at doctrinal reform and modernization (Clary, 2018).

The Indian Army (IA) first came up with its declassified official doctrine in 1998, and then again with a revised version in 2004. Subsequently, the IA came up with a sub-conventional warfare doctrine in 2006. The latest iteration of the IA doctrine has been christened the Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD)-2018, and is a follow up to the first-ever Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF) released in 2017 (Mitra, 2019).

Nearly three decades after the Cold War, the present-day hostilities between India and Pakistan have shifted the focus of the threat of nuclear escalation to South Asia. It is in this context that this

article seeks to assess the legality of India's military nuclear doctrine under international law. Academic literature on the use of nuclear weapons has largely shied away from discussing the legality of specific military doctrines or 'policies of deterrence' of the nuclear weapon states, treating them as issues of military strategy that are beyond the realm of international law. The article "India's nuclear force doctrine: Through the lens of jus ad bellum" hopes to challenge that dichotomy. Though several branches of international law are relevant to any discussion on nuclear weapons, this article shall only examine India's nuclear doctrine through the lens of jus ad bellum. Specifically, this article shall focus on whether India's nuclear doctrine constitutes a threat to use force, and if so, whether such threat is lawful. The article concludes that India's nuclear doctrine can be construed to be a specific threat to use force against Pakistan, and that such threat may be unlawful for contemplating the disproportionate use of force (Seth, 2019).

India faces a very challenging strategic environment, with its immediate opponents possessing significant capabilities and militaries that are modernizing rapidly. The article "India's national security: challenges and dilemmas" explores the opportunities, challenges and constraints confronting the Indian state in building its military strength to deal with its variegated threat environment. It examines how India has dealt with the use of force and how it seeks to shape its armed forces in the face of new threats and emerging capabilities. This article explores six key areas of enquiry and is correspondingly structured. First, how does the Indian state view the use of force? Second, what has the Indian state's recent experience been with conflict and to what extent has it influenced its thinking? Third, how does the Indian state view the future character of conflict? Fourth, what conclusions has India drawn about the role of alliances and strategic partners in dealing with the nature of the conflict it faces? Fifth, how does the Indian state intend to configure its forces to deal with this evolving nature of conflict? Finally, what do all these factors

mean for its defense acquisitions? As an emerging power, India has to contend with these questions and the measures it has put in place are still a work in progress. There remains a fundamental need for greater integration across the Indian security sphere—in inter service arrangements, in procurement processes, and in broader strategic thinking and planning (Bommakanti, 2019).

Since the early 2000s, Indian strategists have wrestled with the challenge of motivating Pakistan to demobilize anti-India terrorist groups while managing the potential for conflict escalation during a crisis. The growing prominence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's national security strategy casts a shadow of nuclear use over any potential military strategy India might consider to strike this balance. However, augmenting its nuclear options with tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to bolster Indian deterrence in convincing ways (Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, 2016). According to Rajesh Basrur, "TNWs are always destabilizing because they make military conflict more likely" (Basrur, 2021). Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce (Narang, 2018/19). There is not much literature available on the doctrinal shift in the

Indian military. The existing work will try to fill that gap and add new knowledge to the existing knowledge.

i. Research Methodology

This study is based on a qualitative research method. Both primary and secondary data were used to investigate and elaborate different aspects of the study. The methodology for this study involved in-depth interviews of retired military officials, diplomats, researchers from different think tanks/academicians linked with Strategic Studies and International Relations. These interviews provided an opportunity to understand under-lying problems, key concepts and clarifying the strategic issues and debate related to the subject matter which fall in the literature gap. Moreover, the research used snow-ball sampling to collect further information. The snow-ball sampling was helpful to locate experts on the issue. The secondary data was also used in which official documents and other published work including books, research articles and reports were consulted.

Research Design:

The study is based on a qualitative research and qualifies in the Descriptive, Exploratory, and Predictive data analysis approaches. Both primary and secondary data was used to investigate and elaborate different aspects of the study.

Population:

The methodology for this study involved in-depth interviews of diplomats, researchers at different Think Tanks/Academicians linked with Strategic Studies and International Relations special focus on South Asia. It clarified the strategic issues and debate related to the subject matter. These interviews provided an opportunity to the scholar to understand under lying problems, key concepts and help in formulating a Pakistani perspective/narrative on this issue which falls in the literature gap.

Sampling:

In this research, the researcher used snow-ball sampling to collect further information. Only relevant, qualified and highly professional people took part in this study. Therefore, snow-ball sampling was used. Through snow-ball sampling target audience was approached for interviews.

Instrumentation:

Structured and un-structured interviews were conducted from retired military officials, diplomats, academicians of Strategic Studies and International Relations and member from think tanks while close ended questionnaires were filled.

Data Collection:

In this study, both primary and secondary data was collected. Primary data was collected through in person interviews of retired military officials, diplomats, academicians of Strategic Studies and International Relations and members from think tanks from India, West and Pakistan while secondary data included the official documents and other published work including books research article and reports.

Data Analysis:

The qualitative data collected through primary sources is analyzed through “Discourse Analysis” as it focuses on researching the underlying meanings and developing relationship among the information and its context.

j. Theoretical Framework

The relationship between India and Pakistan is complex and fragile. Both of these states consider each other as enemies because of many unresolved issues of high importance. The nuclear factor and hardcore strategic competition between the two belligerent potentially invite theoretical approaches envisioning the classical concepts of power politics. India and Pakistan are locked up

in continuous hostilities which seriously impede regional development. Therefore, to understand the nature of conflictual relationship between both the belligerents, the study revolves around theory of realism.

TH. 26784
In the modern times the Indian strategic culture is reflection of offensive realism. The main protagonist of offensive realism John Mearsheimer believe that a country's power is measured through the 'material capabilities' that a state possesses. He denotes a country's military muscle is measured through its conventional and nuclear forces. Apart from military muscle a state must also build its economic clout to maintain its dominance in international politics. The study focusses on the doctrinal shift in the Indian military and rapid modernization to execute those doctrines. Such an aggressive approach comes under the ambit of offensive realism. The Indian military buildup depicts that India is aiming for a global power status which may undermine Pakistan's geo-strategic and economic interests in South Asia. Mearsheimer further argues "that great powers fear each other. They worry about the intentions of other states, in large part because they are so hard to divine. Their greatest fear is that another state might have the capability as well as the motive to attack them. This danger is compounded by the fact that states operate in an anarchic system, which means that there is no night watchman who can rescue them if they are threatened by another country. When a state dials the emergency services for help, there is nobody in the international system to answer the call" (Mearsheimer, 2006).

In these circumstances, Pakistan also fears that India may achieve capabilities to harm the national security and territorial integrity of the state. Pakistan fear that continuous shift in the Indian strategic thinking along with massive military modernization would jeopardize the strategic balance in South Asia, opening the avenues for a limited conflict which may not remain limited for the longer period of time and result in the devastation of both states.

According to offensive realists, status quo powers are seldom found in world politics, because the international system creates great enticements for states to look for prospects to increase power at the cost of adversaries, and to take benefit of those circumstances when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system. The Indian military's approach is in line with the offensive realists. The Indian strategic thinkers believe it must become a hegemon in South Asia. India wants to maximize its political, military and economic influence in South Asia to an extent where no other power in the region question its hegemony. However, on the other hand Pakistan is struggling to maintain balance with India in South Asia. Pakistan is working under the defensive realism paradigm. The defensive realists never go for power maximization. But they maintain their position in the system. Kenneth Waltz call it "survival" (sufficient security) can be secured with power well short of the "hegemonic" extent proposed by Mearsheimer in offensive realism (Snyder, 2002). This is the reason that we don't see power maximization by Pakistan in the context of establishing hegemony in the region. The acquisition of nuclear technology and conventional power is the result of continuous threats by the Indian military since 1947. The Indian military buildup has created security dilemma for Pakistan. The concept of security dilemma was coined by John H. Herz in 1950, since then this concept has become part of the debate whenever we discuss security maximization of one state leads to the insecurity of other state (Dowding, 2011). The essence of security dilemma is that, steps a country takes to augment its own security undermine the security of neighboring state. In such a situation a state suffering from security dilemma take all necessary steps to ensure territorial integrity and sovereignty of that particular state. In the South Asian context. Pakistan is facing security dilemma because of the Indian military's maximization of power in the region. The conventional asymmetries would create a gap which may be exploited by the Indian military at some stage.

The study revolves around offensive realism approach to understand the doctrinal shift in the Indian military. The above table clearly show that how this study incorporates the theory of offensive realism. The table clearly explains that all states possess some offensive military capability and try to increase their power keeping in view their strategic calculations, doctrines and strategic goals vis-à-vis their enemy.

India's National Security advisor Mr. Ajit Doval came up with an idea of defensive offense in 2016. His doctrine was seen as offensive in Pakistani policy circles. He was of the view that we meet the enemy at three levels. First mode is offensive-offensive in which you go all-out war with the enemy. For example, World War-I- II, Korean War, 1965 and 1971 wars. Ajit Doval says that in nuclear scenario offensive-offense strategy is not viable. However, in Indo-Pak context he rules out this mode of warfare. The second mode of engaging the enemy is defensive- defense which means that you meet the enemy on your door steps. This approach is defensive in nature which Ajit Doval says cost India a lot in last few decades and resulted in numerous terrorist incidents across India and IJK. Therefore, Ajit Doval was of the opinion that such an approach is redundant and India needs an overhaul in her strategic approach in meeting the enemy. However, Ajit Doval suggested that India must adopt the third approach which is defensive- offense in which you meet the enemy at his soil. This means that you have to go the territory from where the threat is originating and eliminate that threat right there. So far the Indian policy makers have adopted defensive-offense approach in which India is pouring money from Afghanistan and Iran to nurture, fund and train militants to undermine Pakistan's security (Neelakantan, 2016).

Moreover, the offensive realism also revolves around a very important fact that states can never be certain of the intentions of other states, the elements of mistrust is always there. If it is applied on the Indo-Pak situation, then it will not be wrong to ascertain that both South Asian nuclear

power does not trust each other. Whenever there is any alleged militant attack, the Indian policy makers would point fingers towards Pakistan without any verification or evidence (NIA says no Pak role in Pathankot attack, 2016). That creates animosities and further accelerates hostilities between the two belligerents. Pakistan like any other state in the international system would aspire to protect her sovereignty, territorial integrity and strategic interests. The offensive realists rightly emphasize the survival as their primary goal and most of the States are rational actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival. This is the reason that India is coming up with new strategies and doctrines to undermine Pakistan's security whereas Pakistan also carries out effective counter measures to dissuade India of any strategic edge in South Asia.

Chapter-1

Changing Strategic Dynamics in South Asia: Doctrinal Shift in the Indian Military

1. Introduction

Indian aggressive posture towards Pakistan is not new thing. Since 1947 India has been up against Pakistan. Both countries fought many wars and are still engaged in issues like Kashmir, water distribution, Terrorism & Extremism, Proxy Wars, Hybrid Warfare and psychological warfare against each other. Both states evolved their strategic thinking against each other to maintain strategic supremacy in the region. India being the largest country in South Asia is very strong in terms of military, economy and global political and strategic connectivity with major powers like the US, Russia, Israel and European Union. Indian aggressive posture took a new shape after 1971 when Pakistan was dismembered and India played a very important role in the fall of Dhaka. India supported Mukti Bahini militants in East Pakistan and later on moved its forces towards East Pakistan and fought a war with Pakistan in 1971, which led to Pakistan's defeat and dismemberment.

After that India developed its military capabilities at rapid pace and focused on mechanization of forces and put lot of efforts in the development of Main Battle Tanks- (MBTs), Armored Personnel Carriers- (APCs) collaborated with Russia to improve its overall military machine. India also established its three Strike Corps vis-à-vis Pakistan. In the mid-1980s, India came up with the idea of Sunderji doctrine. The idea was to cut Pakistan into two and carry out deeper attacks inside Pakistan. At the same time India also planned to take out Pakistan's nuclear program. For that matter India collaborated with Israel and they hatched a secret plan to carry out strikes on

Pakistan's Kahuta laboratories, to destroy Pakistan's nuclear program as well as to carry out a conventional strike on Pakistan under Brass-tacks exercises (Khan, 2012). So both countries worked together to destroy Pakistan's nuclear program or at least damage it to the extent that Pakistan could not develop nuclear weapons for at least in near future. (The attack never took place because Pakistan was vigilant and responded back effectively through active diplomacy and other counter measures which involved massive air maneuvers). At that time India focused on Sunderji doctrine which had two prong strategy, one to conventionally defeat Pakistan and second to destroy Pakistan's nuclear program so Pakistan can never become a nuclear weapon state (Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers, Michael Raska, 2015). Sunderji doctrine was deterred by Pakistan when General Zia Ul Haq asked A.Q Khan, Chief nuclear scientist of Pakistan to give interview to Mushahid Hussain Syed and A.K Nayyar. In that interview which took place on 28 January 1987, A.Q Khan categorically declared that Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state and if any country try to mess with Pakistan or try to attack Pakistan, we will use nuclear weapon to defend ourselves (Nayar, 2012). So this was the first strategy of Pakistan to deter India from any attack on its nuclear and conventional site. On the other side Pakistan also carried out military exercises with the name Zarb-e-Momin to deter India from attacking Pakistan in conventional attack under Brass-tacks exercises (Michael Krepon, Nate Cohn, 2011).

These two strategies were employed in the 1980s to deter India from attacking Pakistan conventionally and non-conventionally. Both countries prevented war in 1980s and later on Pakistan developed its conventional and nuclear capabilities which deter India from attacking Pakistan. After 1990s, uprising started in Indian held Kashmir. Renewed violence in IHK resulted in the deaths for thousands of innocent Kashmiris, there was huge violence in 1990s but India could not attack Pakistan because of the nuclear deterrence as Pakistan developed a nuclear device

by that time and Pakistan had the ability to carry out nuclear strike (Rudra Chaudhuri, Shreyas Shende, 2020).

To avoid a nuclear war India did not attack Pakistan. In 1998, Pakistan tested its nuclear device as Pakistan carried out six nuclear tests in Chaghi Balochistan and declared that it as a nuclear weapon state and before that India carried out 5 nuclear tests in Prokhran Desert and a new era ushered in South Asia (Krepon, 2004). Now this new era is called overt nuclearization era when both India and Pakistan tested their nuclear devices and declared that they are nuclear weapon states. So it was a new beginning in relationship between both the countries. After the nuclearization Pakistan covertly tried to capture Kargil to take revenge of Siachen glacier which India captured in 1984 (Bommakanti K. . 2011).

But after a brief conflict over Kargil, India and Pakistan restored to peace but the main element was nuclear weapon which prevented India and Pakistan from attacking each other. After Kargil war there was a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament which was carried out by Al-Qaeda because they were fighting in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda was in extreme pressure because Pakistan and the US were hitting hard these people in tribal areas. Al-Qaeda wanted a sigh of relief, they planned an attack on the Indian Parliament to divert Pakistan military's attention from Afghan border to the Indian border. They believed if they attack Indian parliament so automatically there might be a war between India and Pakistan. So definitely Pakistan would move its forces from Afghanistan to Indian border. So that was the motivation behind and when Al-Qaeda carried out attack on Indian parliament, India brought about 800,000 troops on the border with Pakistan under operation Prakram (Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann, 2017). It was huge mobilization and it took almost 27 days to bring its troops because Indian Strike Corps were deep inside India in Ambala, Mathura and Bhopal, so it took a lot of time to reach at the border.

Almost three weeks were enough for Pakistan to carry out counter mobilization on the border with India. Pakistan's strike corps are in (I-Corps) Mangla and (II-Corps) in Multan and they need only 3 to 4 days to reach at the border so Pakistan quickly mobilized its forces and established its defenses. India lost element of surprise, it wasn't possible for India to attack Pakistan. In addition to that other factors also deterred Indian from crossing the border. Other dynamics included the **(i)- nuclear factor and (ii)- external mediation**. It has been proven from the previous experiences that nuclear weapon states never fight conventional wars. India's mobilization was meant to attract the international diplomacy because when nuclear states fight that is very dangerous for regional and global peace. This is the reason that the US played an important role in defusing the tensions between both states. India achieved a few objectives from 2001-02 standoff,

- i. Pressurized Pakistan over Kashmir policy and supporting militant outfits
- ii. Internationalize the Kashmir conflict and linked it with terrorism
- iii. Pakistan had to ban many alleged Kashmir based militant groups and support to such groups was also condensed
- iv. Kashmir Policy was put back burner and both countries started work to amend ties

After successful international diplomacy and nuclear factor, ultimately India had to withdraw its forces from the border and Pakistan also accepted certain demands of India to carry out action against Kashmir based militant organizations. But the main factor of de-escalation was of course nuclear weapons and large scale conflict was not possible in this region which was serious threat for the nuclear deterrence in the region. If a conventional large scale war takes place between India and Pakistan, automatically it would have the tendency and risk to escalate into a full blown conflict between India and Pakistan (French, 2016). After 2003, there were rumors that India is developing a cold start doctrine which is a different strategy and cold start doctrine believes in limited, quick

and swift operations under nuclear umbrella. Now the idea of CSD was simple, without mobilization of large scale military from deep inside India why not deploy a certain defensive force on the border with Pakistan with offensive elements in it and whenever there is any terrorist attack occurs in India or IHK, Indian Army would have quick time to carry out swift attack on Pakistan.

This was a very ambitious plan and after 2004, India started working on this plan to refurbish its military capabilities and carry out many military exercises to incorporate this particular thinking (Ahmed, 2014). So CSD was very dangerous development in South Asia and under this strategy India was planning to reform its forces for example the forces which were deployed on border holding Corps would be transformed into Pivot Corps, which may have offensive and defensive elements in it. Those offensive elements include air support, long range air defense, Modern MBTs, Gunship helicopters, close air support of Surveillance, reconnaissance & armed UAVs, spy satellites and backup of the long range artillery to slow down advance of enemy armored vehicles or Tanks. So these Pivot Corps or Independent Battle Groups- (IBGs) would have been deployed on the border with Pakistan to carry out quick and swift attacks within 45-48 hours.

India kept on practicing this concept on the border with Pakistan just to master this particular strategy. But a very serious blow to cold start doctrine was witnessed in 2008 when Mumbai attacks occurred. More than 177 Indian citizens were killed in Mumbai attacks which was a serious blow to India and Pakistan's relationship (Polly Nayak, Michael Krepon, 2012). These attacks were carried out by independent Kashmiri group (Hizbul Mujahideen) which had no links with Pakistani secret agency or Pakistan army but it was planned by some Kashmiri groups just to bring focus on Kashmir because India and Pakistan were trying to divert attention from Kashmir and trying to focus on bilateral ties under Aman Ki Asha (Rajiv Kumar, 2016). But because of Mumbai

attacks India and Pakistan again cut off their bilateral ties and again both countries started blame game against each other. During 2008, CSD was exposed because India could not operationalize this particular strategy against Pakistan because they did not have enough arms, offensive elements to operationalize Cold Start Doctrine against Pakistan. They were not ready and were short of weapons, were short of aircraft, tanks and artillery and modern weapons. All those weapons which were required for under Cold Start Doctrine. India because of the shortage could not attack Pakistan in 2008 but later on it kept on improving its forces just to operationalize this doctrine against Pakistan (Cohen, 2011). Pakistan also carried out reciprocal military exercise on the border starting from 2009, Azm-e-Nau exercises. now these exercises basically focused on counter attacks on India, if India try to attack Pakistan under cold start doctrine, Pakistan will respond first of all conventionally. Azm-e-Nau basically focused on Indian cold start doctrine and to counter this attack they carried out such exercises (Nawaz, 2019). but the main development took place in 2011 when Pakistan developed tactical nuclear weapon which was a great development in South Asia.

1.1. Critical Analysis of the Cold Start Doctrine: Limited War Options

Due to the Indian Military's Cold Start Doctrine's growing militarization and operationalization, deterrence in South Asia is precarious. CSD has the ability to not only operationalize the aggressive pre-emption-based doctrine of the Indian army, but also to start a nuclear battle. Cold Start's primary goal was to respond "punishingly" to Pakistan in the event of any suspected terrorist strike on Indian soil by completely shifting the Indian armed forces' defensive to offensive posture (Stephen P. Cohen, Sunil Dasgupta, 2010). Under CSD, the Indian army will engage Pakistan in fast, aggressive coordinated operations in case of any alleged terrorist attack in India or IHK. The main goal of such operations is to surprise the Pakistani military and prevent it from responding.

The offensive capability of the army would need to be reconfigured into eight smaller, division-sized Integrated Battle Groups with mechanized infantry, artillery, and armor (Indian army's division size is around 23,000 troops). These IBGs would be self-sufficient and extremely mobile, with modernized T-90S MBTs as its main components. They would also be well-supported by air cover and artillery fire assaults for quick thrusts into Pakistan within 72–96 hours. The Punjab and Rajasthan sectors, which are close to Pakistan's border, would be potential locations for the deployment of these IBGs (Khattak M. U.-R., 2011). In 2005 the Vajra Shakti Exercise, brought flexibility in its Holding corps or defensive corps. These holding corps were designated as Pivot Corps. Pivot corps can initiate offensive if required in the battlefield. It would have offensive punch in it and could be used as mixed corps (Ray, 2013). According to the then Chief of Army Staff, Gen JJ Singh, ‘‘They (Pivot Corps) have assigned roles, which are offensive as well as defensive and the doctrine does not spell them out in detail. The decision making has been left to theatre commanders, depending upon their assessment and evaluation of the situation. These pivot corps have an infantry division, armored regiments and an independent mechanized brigade. Such a reformation in the Indian army shows its intentions to operationalize Cold Start Doctrine against Pakistan (Ray, 2013). The Indian military has conducted nearly ten significant exercises along the Pakistani border in order to operationalize this notion. The main goal of these exercises was to strengthen the Indian armed forces' unity and synergy in order to conduct coordinated operations against Pakistan. The Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System, which would improve its surveillance, observation, and targeting capabilities, was introduced by the Indian Army in these drills. Force Multiplication Command Post was developed by the Indian military in 2005 to combine real-time information flow as a key instrument for decision-making and NCW capabilities in the Indian Army (Zulfqar Khan, 2021).

The Indian Army has also put a lot of effort into enhancing its ability to provide logistics in the tough terrain. The Indian military has been honing its ability to conduct quick and swift operations without any time constraints over the past few years. In the Ashwamedh war game in 2007, the Indian military displayed its capacity to wage war in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment. This shows that India is prepared to use nuclear weapons to fight a small-scale conflict. The Indian military tested its ability to conduct heli-borne operations behind enemy lines between 2004 and 2010 while training offensive operations with its special troops. In terms of surgical strikes, such capabilities are crucial. In 2009, the Indian army carried out an exercise called Hind Shakti (Khattak M. U.-R., 2011), on that occasion the Indian army's former Chief General Deepak Kapoor claimed that, "this exercise is another step in army's continued venture to fine tune its Cold Start Doctrine" which shows Indian military's continued efforts to operationalize this doctrine against Pakistan.

When it comes to the CSD's operationalization, the years 2009 and 2010 were crucial. In these years, the Indian military developed and put to use equipment for surveillance, helicopter-borne operations, satellite images, and intensive electronic and information warfare. Battlefield Surveillance Radars and Weapon Locating Radars were significant additions to the Indian military's arsenal. The national security of Pakistan is seriously threatened by all of these inductions (Pant, Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines, 2017). In addition to practicing tremendous firepower blitzkriegs and precision strikes during both day and night operations, the Indian Air Force also worked on joint operations with the army and mechanized forces. For the quick and efficient operations, such integration and synergy are required. Despite all of these factors, India is making efforts to fill gaps in its military apparatus. Over the next 12 years, India will spend over \$ 200 billion on new defense purchases to close this

imbalance. It intends to purchase 278 Russian Sukhoi-30 MKI fighters by 2015 and 1,000 T-90 tanks by 2020. The 2011-12 Indian Defense Budget has surpassed the 34-billion-dollar threshold (News, 2010). According to the SIPRI research group, India is now the country that imports the most weapons worldwide and has become the third highest on military spending of 76.6 billion dollars (SIPRI, 2022).

Under the Indo-US agreement, India will be able to obtain sizable stocks of nuclear weapons. India now has 11.5 tons of spent nuclear fuel and 500 kg of reactor-grade plutonium. Some predictions state that India could boost its nuclear arsenal from the present 100 warheads to 300–400 warheads in the next five years, undermining the strategic stability of South Asia (Kanwal, 2016). A Cold Start doctrine is an aggressive strategy by an Indian army which is going to create serious challenges for Pakistan. India spent lot of money to refurbish its overall military machine. Cold start doctrine suffered a huge blow when Pakistan developed tactical nukes in 2011 (Ahmed M. , 2016). After the tactical nuclear weapon, it was dangerous for the Indian army to take risk of nuclear escalation and try to execute Cold Start doctrine or proactive military operations against Pakistan. According to Rajesh Basrur, “I do not think it likely there will be full-scale war between India and Pakistan, but there is always a risk that a limited clash will turn unexpectedly into a major one” (Basrur, 2021).

India has changed its strategy and now they want to revamp their military strategy and now they are focusing on restructuring of troops under new land warfare doctrine to carry out shallower military maneuvers below the nuclear threshold of Pakistan. Moreover, India is also aiming at surgical strikes against Pakistan to create new normal in South Asia vis a vis Pakistan. In that context India carried out a failed surgical strike on Balakot after Pulwama attack in 2019. India’s new land warfare doctrine talks about punitive responses in case of any alleged terrorist attack in

IHK or beyond (Khattak M. U., *The Indian Army's Land Warfare Doctrine 2018: A Critical Analysis*, 2020). After Balakot strike Pakistan carried out successful counter surgical strikes and dropped six H-Weapons on important strategic sites of the Indian army in Indian held Kashmir. Pakistan establish its conventional deterrence in South Asia which prevented India from any aggressive moves against Pakistan. But India is continuously modernizing its military machine which may undermine Pakistan's conventional deterrence in near future specially after the induction of long range air defense S-400 from Russia and Barak-8 from Israel (India, 2018) would seriously undermine Pakistan's conventional deterrence vis-à-vis India which may create room for more Balakot type misadventures.

However, the Indian scholars thinks otherwise. Eminent Professor of India, Bharat Karnad was asked a question whether India would try surgical strikes again after inducting S-400 long range air defense system, to which he replied, "Balakot type strikes will be triggered by terrorist acts sourced to Pakistan, as the Indian PM has repeatedly stated. The S-400 is meant to deal with the far more potent threat from China" (Karnad, 2021). In that scenario, Pakistan would rely more on its tactical nuclear weapons to dissuade India from any operationalization of cold start, proactive or new land warfare doctrine against Pakistan. However, Michael Kugelman believe that,

Pakistan's rapid development of tactical nuclear weapons in recent years may serve an important Pakistani interest to strengthen its nuclear weapons capacity-and especially keeping in mind its lack of a no first use policy. But this development is viewed as concerning by India for that very reason. Nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing so long as the countries that possess them refuse to commit to never using them. Neither Pakistan nor India has made that pledge. Not to mention, they are bitter rivals with a disputed border. Combine all that with the development—and potential deployment--of tactical nuclear weapons, and you have a major recipe for stability concerns (Kugelman, 2022).

Therefore, it is advised for Pakistan to take proactive measures to protect its national security interests in light of the geopolitical realities of South Asia. Additionally, it is essential for the international community, especially the US, EU, OIC, and SCO members, to step up and resolve the unresolved issues between India and Pakistan; only then will the area be able to enjoy long-term peace and stability.

1.2. The Indian Maritime Strategy: Supremacy at Sea

India is leading economy on South Asia and likely to become \$5 trillion dollars by 2025. India's rapid economic growth is dependent on India's maritime trade. India has a huge Exclusive Economic Zone- (EEZ) that is two million square kilometers in size and a maritime boundary that is roughly 7500 km long. Currently India's most of trade is through sea, which may increase in near future. India is heavily relying on the seas because the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Bay of Bengal account for 90% of its volume and 70% of the value of its global trade. India seeks a blue water navy with greater outreach, maneuverability, and firepower for this reason (Anit Mukherjee, C. Raja Mohan, 2016). To protect its maritime trade India is investing a lot to refurbish its Navy. The most dangerous naval asset is the Indian Nuclear Submarines. Due to their range, durability, strategic reach, and devastating weaponry, Indian nuclear submarines will pose a serious threat to Pakistan in future.

The INS Arihant and INS Chakra-II are the two nuclear-powered submarines that the Indian Navy currently operates (Joachim Krause, Sebastian Bruns, 2016). In December 2017, the Indian Naval Chief Admiral Sunil Lanba during a press conference said that, "We have launched the project to make six SSNs- (nuclear-powered submarines). The Indian Navy's strategic reach in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, and Bay of Bengal would be improved by these inductions. Because of their extended endurance, stealth capability, subtlety, and capacity to carry long-range nuclear tipped

ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines would substantially exacerbate the strategic imbalance in South Asia. The Indian Navy would benefit from the nuclear subs' increased range, firepower, and certain second strike capability at sea (Bawa Singh, Aslam Khan, Parvaiz Ahmad, 2022). By deploying nuclear submarines, Pakistan would be discouraged from using its tactical or strategic nuclear weapons against India, allowing the Indian military to conduct conventional operations against Pakistan without really engaging in a major fight.

These submarines would, in Pakistan's view, pose a threat to the country's maritime interests, but Pakistan is also capable of responding. It is bit risky for the Indian Navy, one action by their submarine against Pakistan's maritime assets would obviously indicate their positions. The moment there is an offensive operation or attack against Pakistan, there will be retaliation by Pakistan against the Indian Maritime assets. It is easier for Pakistan to protect its coastal areas because of small maritime boundaries, whereas for India it is necessary to protect its huge maritime boundaries. Another important induction which may threaten Pakistan's naval assets is the newly inducted, P8-I long-range surveillance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft (Bawa Singh, Aslam Khan, Parvaiz Ahmad, 2022). For Pakistan's conventional submarines operating in the Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean, the purchase of P8-I aircraft would pose a serious threat. The strategic stability in South Asia has been jeopardized by the Indian Navy's aspirations for a blue-water navy. Pakistan has been forced to seriously reconsider how it will safeguard its maritime interests in the IOR and Arabian Sea as a result of the deployment of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, long-range P8-I maritime surveillance aircraft, stealth frigates, destroyers, and anti-submarine warfare corvettes. Pakistan's navy is quite small compared to the enormous 200 plus ship Indian Navy. With China's assistance, Pakistan has started a significant CPEC project. The Gwadar port's economic activity will be essential to Pakistan's future development. The deployment and

operation of the Indian Navy's nuclear submarines from its facilities in the Arabian Sea, Mumbai and Karwar, as well as IORs, would pose a severe danger to Pakistan's maritime economic and strategic interests.

In order to combat this trend, Pakistan and China must strengthen their defenses around the port of Gwadar, increase their joint patrols in the Arabian Sea and beyond, and deploy cutting-edge surveillance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft and warships to find and sink enemy submarines before they can launch an attack. Pakistan have developed some air bases in Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Masroor and Bolari, they are all facing the sea front and they are backed up by Turbat, Khushab and others. To find and destroy any Indian nuclear or conventional submarines near its most important assets in Karachi, Gwadar, or elsewhere, Pakistan must strengthen its anti-submarine and maritime surveillance capabilities. Pakistan must also go for nuclear submarines to achieve assured second-strike capability.

Pakistan Navy must acquire a nuclear submarine because a conventional submarine has to come up to charge its battery, to freshen the air quite often, while a nuclear submarine is powered by nuclear systems, it doesn't have to come up for days. So, it stays down, remain hidden. In a submarine warfare 90% of the submarines are gone when they are carrying out snorkeling or they are on surface or they carried out a transmission. If you don't do any of these three, you are down and low at your station, quietly working and observing everything in a range of about 300 nautical miles' radius, it makes lots of difference. You are depending on your detection and engagement systems. Although Pakistan tested the Babur-III from a traditional submarine (Roy, 2017), that cannot be regarded as an assured second strike capability and would only offer a short-term fix to our long-term problems. To attack India's most valuable assets, Pakistan must introduce a nuclear submarine as well as missiles with increased speed, range, and accuracy. By doing this, Pakistan

will be able to maintain deterrence stability in South Asia while also ensuring its ability to launch a second strike against India and sustain its "first use option" and "full spectrum deterrence" policies. The "Joint Indian Armed Forces Doctrine of 2017," which describes the Indian military's desire for a "surgical strike" because the Indian military was unable to operationalize their previous doctrines, would be the subject of the following section of the study.

1.3. Joint Armed Forces Doctrine 2017: Surgical Strikes

The Indian military is looking for a gap that will allow for brief, focused, and intense combat with increased speed, flexibility, and strategic reach. The Indian military established a Joint Warfare Doctrine in 2017 after studying previous Army, Air Force, and Naval doctrines. The prospect of a surgical strike against Pakistan is the element of the new combined combat strategy that poses the greatest threat (Zulfqar Khan, 2021). First introduced in the IAF doctrine of 2012, the surgical strike concept. The Indian policy makers are certain they can launch a surgical strike against Pakistan in the event that a militant attack occurs in IHK or in India with the alleged complicity of the Pakistan Army or Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate after years of evaluation and groundwork. They will definitely cross again, according to the current Indian Army Chief (Times, 2020).

Such a proactive approach would increase the risk to South Asia's security, whether it is for the benefit of the populace or electoral support. The security situation in the area would become more complicated if the Indian military insisted on conducting surgical strikes or special operations. Political will and predetermined, specific objectives are needed for proactive military operations, unconventional warfare operations, or surgical attacks to be operationalized. The current political and military leadership in India has expressed a desire to launch surgical attacks inside Pakistani territory in order to destroy LeT and JeM alleged hideouts in AJK. The Modi administration has

incited war hysteria in India and associated every incident in IHK with Pakistan, displaying an aggressive stance toward Pakistan and a deliberate effort to associate the genuine independence movement with militancy. Along with the Modi administration, the Indian Army Chief has warned Pakistan that they will take revenge on them at a time and location of their choice. Without any concrete evidence or proof such a statement by an army chief is considered as offensive. Use of force against a country with nuclear weapons is insane. It will be disastrous and force Pakistan to take protective measures. In the event of any terrorist occurrence in India, a surgical strike may be considered.

The Indian viewpoint is based on the idea that because it is a major power, it must use surgical attacks in the future. However, the idea of surgical strikes is completely dismissed from the Pakistani perspective. In order to carry out a surgical attack in its actual meaning and spirit, you would need to deploy airplanes, gunship helicopters, and Special Forces; you would go to a certain region, accomplish your intended targets, and then return safely. Given the close proximity, Pakistan's air defense capabilities, the heavily militarized Line of Control, and the constant watchfulness, it appears improbable that India will ever develop the capability to execute surgical strikes within Pakistani territory.

The Indian military's change in doctrine has significant security ramifications for South Asia. They believe they will execute a precision strike because they have the diplomatic and strategic backing of the US, Russia, and Europe. However, they disregard the notion that India will incur costs because to Pakistan's conventional capabilities. Any surgical attack would be met with a large backlash, which would lead India to escalate the fight in order to prevent domestic shame, and ultimately, a small-scale conflict could turn into a major one. (Mofa, 2019).

Both nations are capable of fighting a limited conventional war, although it would be very expensive. India needs to understand that any unconventional operation—regardless of how little or comprehensive—will elicit a hostile response from Pakistan. This is the rationale behind why the Indians relocated to Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks, set up their network, and started waging hybrid warfare against Pakistan (Times T. E., India financed problems for Pakistan in Afghanistan: Chuck Hagel, 2013). Director of South Asia Centre in Washington, Michael Kugelman also confirmed India's negative role in Afghanistan. He opined that

Afghanistan has long been a battleground for India-Pakistan competition, and each wants to reduce the presence and influence of the other there. India had a deep overt presence in Afghanistan during non-Taliban rule (2001-2021) through its diplomatic and aid-focused activities. But indeed anti-Pakistan actors like the TTP and Baloch separatists have been based there, and those groups could certainly serve a useful purpose for India (Kugelman, 2022).

Indian Hybrid warfare played havoc with Pakistan's non-traditional security. Pakistan had to deploy huge force on the Afghan border to mitigate threats emanating from Afghanistan. To manage and foment insurgency in Pakistan and assist anti-Pakistan activities and initiatives, India has been deepening its ties with Afghanistan. The India-Afghanistan strategy led to the recent attack against the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the national Counterterrorism center at Banu (Dawn, Militants seize CTD police station, take hostages in Bannu district, 2022). Pakistan must successfully negotiate all issues with Afghanistan and ensure that Indian influence is diminished. Apart from that the Indian military consistently improved their war fighting doctrines and after the failure of Cold Start Doctrine and proactive military operations, the Indian military came up with New Land Warfare doctrine in 2018 to overcome their operational deficiencies and maintain strategic dominance in South Asia.

1.4. New Land Warfare Doctrine: Lean and Agile Force

The Indian Army after learning from the previous doctrines introduced new land warfare doctrine in 2018 (Mithra, 2019). According to this doctrine India will restructure its force, make it lean and agile, equip them with latest weapons & equipment and launch limited strike or punitive strikes- (surgical strikes) to maintain strategic dominance in South Asia vis-à-vis Pakistan. Most of the Indian military's deployment is against Pakistan. This military doctrine is aimed to equip the Indian military to fight a multi front war against China and Pakistan. But reality their most of the deployment, doctrines, weapon acquisition and strategy is against Pakistan. Most of their force posture is focused on Pakistan especially the II-Corps in Chandigarh, Punjab. It has got the 50% of strike capability of the Indian Army which gives an idea that their future strategy would be against Pakistan. On a question to Indian military's interplay with limited war doctrines since the nuclearization of South Asia, Toby Dalton was of the view that,

These were predictable responses to the challenges of military strategy in a nuclearized environment – driving down the level of conflict and risk-taking owing to escalation probability of large maneuver warfare. Just as Pakistan's development of TNW was a predictable response given perceptions that India was seeking to exploit a deterrence gap (that probably never actually existed (Dalton, 2022)).

The South Asian region is nuclear flash point and dangerous region because of many unresolved issues, territorial disputes and mistrust. If we talk about the Indian military doctrines, Pakistan always came up with the additive answers, so if we quickly analyze, previously in the 80s they had a doctrines named Sunderji doctrine which forced with the mechanization of rapid thrust to cut the Pakistan into two, now that was the doctrine and Pakistan countered it through nuclear signaling and that was the time when Pakistan came up with conventional answers also whether they are Zarb-e-Momin exercises or offensive-defensive strategies. But in 2003 overt

nuclearization after the Indian parliament attack, India brought about 800,000 troops on the border (Azad, 2016). Now that was the time when Pakistan also carried out counter mobilization within no time but India took almost 3 weeks to mobilize their 3 cores which were deployed deep inside India.

Indian policy makers realized that fighting a total war in a nuclear environment is the thing of a past and now we have to look for a limited war under the nuclear overhang (Azad, 2016). So that was the time when the idea of Cold Start doctrine emerged. Basically it emerged in 2001 but in 2004 it got more force and got more supporters in India and they came up with the notion that now fighting a total war is not possible so we must go for limited or quick strikes, so that was the time when Indian army came up with the idea of cold start doctrine which they never accepted officially but in 2017 their army chief said that they have come up with some doctrines which is kind of some proactive military operations or cold start doctrine which is limited war doctrine under nuclear overhang and within 72 to 96 hours they are going to attack Pakistan on multiple locations (Joseph F. Pilat, 2015). So this was the idea behind that. And this doctrine would be operationalizing through integrated battle groups which could be deployed on the border and they will be equipped with offensive weapons so that they could initiate quick operations within no time but they could not operationalize it after 2008 Mumbai attacks because of the limited strike capabilities and lack of adequate military muscle. According to Lt. Commander (retd) Kamran Hamid Hashmi of National Institute of Maritime Affairs- (NIMA), "The Indian doctrinal shift from total war to limited counter-force adventures is highly detrimental and is unlikely to achieve any lasting superiority over Pakistan since it is practically impossible to disarm Pakistan completely. Furthermore, Indian temptation for a limited war would spark an interminable arms race in peacetime, making the region's strategic stability more fragile" (Hashmi, 2023). So after 2008 they

came up with another idea and that is the hybrid warfare. They are engaged against each other since 1947 in this type of warfare in which we try to capitalize on the socio economic capabilities, internal insecurity and other issues like ethno nationalism etc. According to Bharat Karnad, the hybrid warfare is not new thing in Indo-Pak context. He was of the view that “India’s gradual military reorientation majorly towards China will result in Pakistan receding from its radar until soon New Delhi will begin treating Pakistan as more a nuisance than a serious military threat” (Karnad, 2021).

In 2008, they came up with a new form of hybrid warfare which imposed severe losses against Pakistan. In 2011 Pakistan came up with tactical nuclear weapons and Pakistan linked it to the cold start doctrine and also said that full spectrum deterrence can also come in place so the idea of cold start became shaky for India. In 2012 they introduce another doctrine which talks about sub-conventional warfare operations like surgical strikes in which their air-force can go to the certain area and carry out strikes and then come back unhurt. So the idea of surgical strikes was coined in 2012 officially. In 2017, in their joint armed forces doctrine they reemphasize this idea again that since India cannot go for total war and for shallow maneuvers under the cold start doctrine, so they came up with an idea of surgical strike and they build it up and ultimately in 2018 they came up with the new Land warfare doctrine in which they reemphasize on all the previous things. It’s basically a blend of all the previous doctrines.

The first thing which they talk about in this doctrine is the multi-front scenario. Indian army chiefs and air chiefs have claimed that Indian military is capable to fight two-front war against China and Pakistan. But when it comes to reality, their army deployment is mainly against Pakistan. So it means that this doctrine is aimed and focused against Pakistan which we must understand. They are going to operationalize this doctrine with the help of IBGs again as they came up with this idea

in 2004 which they practiced in 2005 Vajra Shakti exercise and they named it pivot corps previously and the idea according to the General J.J. Singh at that time was to equip the Holding Corps which were deployed on the border with offensive capabilities so they can initiate quick operations backed by their strike corps. Previously IBGs were a division size force, now they have reduced the size and said that these IBGs would be 8000 to 10000 troops equipped with all the offensive capabilities, air-defense, artillery and integrated command & control (Kajal, 2022). So they reduced the size of the force and want a quick force which can carry out multiple incursions within no time. So in modern times the war has become intense and quick.

Another important point in this doctrine is the force modernization. Without adequate forces the doctrine could not be operationalized. This is the weakness of Indian military. Force modernization says that if you want to operationalize this doctrine, you must modernize your overall military machine. If we analyze their force modernization pattern, they are adding up new technologies slowly and gradually. For example, they currently possess 33 squadrons but for air superiority against Pakistan they would require 42 squadrons which means they need more aircrafts to maintain air supremacy against Pakistan. Currently their backbone is Russian aircraft SU-30 MKI, which has potent range of about 3000 km but with refueling it can achieve 8000 km range. The IAF possess 200 right now and have already ordered 53 more. At the same time, they have 36 French Rafale aircraft which is also highly sophisticated aircraft but they are not enough for total air dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan. So how it is going to create threat for Pakistan or how Pakistan is going to counter them is another thing.

Logistics and supplies are necessary in cross border attacks in enemy territory. So they are adding up new technologies with the help of the US like Hercules, Chinook and Globe-master supplies and logistics aircraft. These capabilities are going to fill their operational gaps. Any quick warfare

operation under land warfare doctrine, proactive military operation or cold start doctrine, would be jointly integrated with helicopters/air force along with their tanks. The acquisition of Apache helicopter would help the Indian Army in its quick and swift operations under nuclear umbrella. They have ordered about 22, they are going to add 11 specifically for their army, and the other 22 will also be available when it comes to the offensive operations (Khattak M. U., Indian Military Modernisation: Implications for Pakistan, 2021). Apache Gunship Helicopters along with the modern tanks would be a lethal combination for Pakistan to counter. Another important factor in force modernizations is Network Centric and Electronic warfare capabilities. The Indian military is adding up these technologies since 2004. They came up with Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System- (LORROS) Israel (Gloria Center, 2011).

LORROS is used to track the cross border movement of people, it is potent capability for long range reconnaissance and observation at LoC. They can provide reconnaissance and observation at about 16 km of distance. It can give advance information about enemy. Along with that they have practiced Network Centric Warfare capabilities, in 2005 they initiated this program and named it Force Multiplication Command Post- (FMCP) in which the Indian military integrated the information from Satellites, Aircraft, AWACS and UAVs with the commander in his bunker or his room. Since 2004, they have practiced all these things in their military exercises. Battlefield surveillance radar which can provide good tracking against walking or crawling enemy on the border. Along with that Indian Army also developed indigenous Swati-Weapon Locating Radar- (S-WLRs) which can provide the accurate locations of the enemy's Artillery Guns, Mortar sites and Rocket sites, currently they have placed 40 such types of latest radars on LoC, which are creating problems for Pakistani security forces deployed on the LoC or International border.

In line with that the indigenous AEW&C, although they are having others as well but this one is their indigenous and they are trying to fill their gaps with such capabilities (DRDO, 2021). Advanced UAVs are another important factor which is there for surveillance and reconnaissance. India is in deal with Israel since 1999, they have bought many others, but the most important deal recently is the Heron TP, this drone has the ability to carry out the armed strikes against Pakistan, these capabilities are again threatening Pakistan and it needs to come up with an effective response. Another induction by India is Harpy missile. This UAV is a suicidal type of drone which targets the enemy radars also called as a radar killer. In that category, they came up with another missile which is a Harop missile and it is advance version of Harpy missile which has a range of 1000 km and payload of 15 kg. This missile is threatening thing for Pakistan, it can hover over the target for 6 hours. It can take out Pakistan military's bunkers and strategic assets/sites on the field. Indian space program is also in advance stage, much better than Pakistan. In 2009 they came up with RISAT-II Spy satellite (Lele, 2013). This can provide 24/7 observation of the enemy. In that category they also added the designated satellite for their Navy, Army and Air Force in last few years. So all these capabilities are going to boost their own capabilities and they can easily look in for the strategic information. So these things are going to give India an information edge against Pakistan. Pakistan have also got some surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in its F-16 JF17 Thunder aircraft but it could not be compared with the spy satellites which provide round the clock information in all weather conditions.

Indian Army is also modernizing their foot soldiers with modern weapons, light guns, high tech modern gadgets for better communication. These developments would improve their soldier's abilities in the battlefield. The backbone of the Indian Army is T-90S Tanks. Currently Indian Army possess about 900 T-90S MBTs and are adding more. Currently they have 18 regiments

equipped with T-90S Russian Tanks (Dubey, 2016). Indian Army is planning to add 32 more regiments with T90S Tanks. Slowly and gradually they are going to replace all their old vintage Tanks. Chinese Army's all main battle tanks have night vision capabilities, Pakistan's 80% tanks possess night vision capabilities, whereas India's 50% tanks possess night vision capabilities. India is facing acute shortage of modern Tanks which is major hurdle in their way to operationalize any warfighting doctrine against Pakistan.

In addition, India is also facing weakness in Long Range Air Defense. Without impeccable air defense capabilities, India cannot operationalize any proactive or quick and swift operation against Pakistan. India is in deal with Israel and Russia to add Barak-8 and S-400 respectively. These capabilities will give Indian military a confidence which it is lacking today so that they can easily neutralize Pakistan's F-16, JF-17 thunder aircraft and Missiles. Another important development in the Indian Army is development in artillery field. Strong artillery is necessary to stop enemy's advance and also to provide cover to own armor incursions. India is revamping its artillery with the South Korea and US. Moreover, India's indigenous Dhanush ATAGS program is also helping the Indian army to add muscle.

Another important thing under land warfare doctrine was the idea of surgical strike which was reinforced again. In this particular doctrines, it is said that India will retain the punitive response which means they are going to deter these attacks through surgical strikes and after few months, they carried out failed surgical strikes against Pakistan in Balakot in which Pakistan also responded, shot down two Indian aircraft and killed one pilot and another was captured. The idea of surgical strike in this new land warfare doctrine is not new. As discussed earlier this strategy has been there since 2012. India slowly and gradually worked on this concept and ultimately tried against Pakistan in which India had to face embarrassment. India can never get away with its

misadventures against Pakistan. Pakistan military will never accept new normal. It is going to reply with more than “Quid Pro Quo” (Kidwai, 2020).

Pakistan’s conventional capabilities will ensure that such misadventures are dealt effectively. But Indian military’s force modernization is a serious challenge for Pakistan. India is in process of getting S-400 and Barak-8 Air Defense Systems. At the same time Indian Air Force has also inducted advance French Rafale Aircraft. Moreover, India is also in deal with Israel to acquire armed UAVs. All these capabilities would undermine Pakistan’s security. It would be a tough call for Pakistani Air Chief to order counter surgical strikes with Aircraft keeping in view S-400 and Barak-8 inducted in the Indian inventory (Mundhra, 2022). Another important thing is India’s strategic alliances. Indian is already well connected with the US, Russia, EU and Israel through its Military diplomacy, and trying to improve its operational capabilities with their help. The strategic stability of South Asia and the precarious balance of power in the region have been threatened by India's military modernization. A South Asian arms race will also begin as a result of India's national goal in regional hegemony, modernization of its armed forces with western assistance, and construction of a nuclear submarine to contain China. South Asian nations find India's role as the dominant nation in the Indian Ocean to be unsettling.

India is following up Chanakya Kautilya’s six-fold policy. In that policy a country forge alliance with major powers to fill the operational gaps and induct offensive weapon and equipment. Indian Army also emphasized on the regular military exercises in this doctrine. Indian military carries out regular military exercises each year to operationalize all these concepts. Any conventional asymmetry would push this region towards instability and turmoil. Pakistan will never accept any surgical strike or limited war options (Kidwai L. G., 2020). Any Indian misadventure under new

doctrine would be a dangerous development which may have unwarranted consequences for South Asian security.

Chapter-2

Renewed Indian Hybrid Warfare Strategy: Non-Traditional Security Threats

2. Introduction

Hybrid warfare between India and Pakistan is not a new phenomenon. Both countries have been involved against each other since 1947. But after 2008 India launched renewed hybrid warfare against Pakistan to undermine Pakistan's internal security and to establish its strategic dominance in the region. According to Former Ambassador and Executive Director of an Islamabad based think tank CISS, Ali Sarwar Naqvi, "The Indian military has repeatedly failed to support its country's ambitions for regional hegemony, such as the Indian Army's defeat against China in 1962 and its adventures against Pakistan in 1965 and 2019. Considering their Army's incompetence, Indian leadership has long pursued a "hybrid warfare" policy against Pakistan to achieve its national interest. The hybrid threat that Pakistan is currently facing from India includes economic and political blackmailing via different institutions, as well as its sponsoring of terrorism, extremism and separatism through fake news and false propaganda. However, through its effective diplomacy, robust security and defense mechanism, Pakistan has managed to counter India's hybrid warfare strategy at global, regional, and domestic levels" (Naqvi, 2022).

Pakistan and India fought three wars and a skirmish at Kargil in 1999, in all these wars Pakistan did not lose more than 15000 men in total but after 2001, Indian hybrid warfare strategy Pakistan lost more than 80,000 innocent civilians, 6000 soldiers and economic loss of up to \$150 billion USD (Akram, 2021). Hybrid warfare proved to be more effective than direct war. Direct war entails greater risk and cost. Escalation of direct war in a nuclear environment is dangerous phenomenon which every nuclear state would like to avoid. According to Former Ambassador and Executive Director of an Islamabad based think tank CISS, Ali Sarwar Naqvi. "Skirmishes and hit

and run strikes could be expected. But, with Pakistan's quid pro quo plus strategy, India would not want to engage in such sneaky air strikes as it did in Balakot in February 2019. However, things could escalate beyond anyone's control. A large-scale war is in no one's interest. With the restructured battle groups, India cannot launch a massive attack through land or air. Pakistan has got a battlefield nuclear weapon, the Nasr missile, to counter land attacks. A massive attack would always involve nuclear weapons, which naturally deter an adversary from engaging in such an adventure since the costs of such action can be disastrous for both countries" (Naqvi, 2022).

This is the reason that India introduced many war fighting doctrines after 1971, including Sunder Ji Doctrine of the 1980s and Cold Start Doctrine or proactive military operations after 2001 failure of Operation Prakram. India could never attack Pakistan after the nuclearization of South Asia. It is believed that Pakistan developed nuclear deterrence in between 1982-86. During this period Pakistan conducted almost 24 cold tests to check its nuclear device (Futter, 2015). It is also believed that two nuclear crude bombs were ready by 1986 and Pakistan Air Force also modified its F-16s to deliver those weapons (Douglas Lovelace, Kristen Boon, Aziz Z. Huq, 2011). The pre 1998 era is considered as covert nuclearization in which Pakistan deterred Indian aggression on many occasions.

But after 1998 overt nuclearization strategic dynamics changed in South Asia. Both countries fought a small scale limited war on LOC in 1999 and introduced the concept of limited war under the nuclear overhang. Indian policy makers after 2004 worked on limited war concepts of Cold Start Doctrine and Proactive military operations which aimed at quick, swift limited operations within 48-96 hours to attack Pakistan on multiple fronts in case of any alleged terrorist attack in India or in IHK (Pant, Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines, 2017). India could not operationalize the same concept in 2008 Mumbai attacks. Indian military's

operational weakness, lack of offensive elements, inadequate air fire power, MBTs, air Defense and other offensive weapon and equipment for any quick operations required for CSD or proactive military operations (NDTV, 2010). This was a major turning point in the Indian strategic thinking. This study would focus on post 2008 Indian military's renewed hybrid warfare strategy, how it evolved after 2008 and how it impacted Pakistan's overall security.

2.1. The Concept of Hybrid Warfare and its Theoretical Roots: Arthashastra

The concept of Hybrid warfare is as old as the human race. The Indian strategic culture and thinking is influenced by Chanakya Kautilya's *Arthashastra* which talks about statecraft, war and diplomacy. In this masterpiece Kautilya says that war is of three types. First is open war, which means all-out war in which either you win or lose (Boesche, 2002). In a nuclear environment of south Asia this type of warfare is risky and may destroy both countries. However, both states would avoid direct clash because of the nuclear factor. Second type of warfare Chanakya Kautilya mentioned in his book is secret war which focusses on surprised, sudden attack, quick and swift warfare. It focusses on multi front attacks without specifying time or place. This type of warfare in modern times could be linked with Cold Start, proactive military operations or surgical strikes. India through these secret war operations wanted to undermine Pakistan's security but after the induction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons- (TNWs) in 2011 this option was also not feasible for India (Ahmed D. M., 2016). Third kind of warfare mentioned in *Arthashastra* by Chanakya Kautilya was 'Undeclared Warfare'. This warfare emphasizes on "use of secret spies and occult practices against the enemy" (Leavitt, 2022).

This concept of undeclared warfare is directly linked with the concept of renewed hybrid warfare by India, in which it is using spies and covert operations to subdue Pakistan. The pertinent example of Indian hybrid warfare against Pakistan is dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. Indian Research

and Analysis Wing- (R&AW) executed undeclared war against Pakistan, carried out fake propaganda, trained, nurtured and funded 150,000 Mukti Bahini militants and ultimately capitalized on Pakistan's political, economic, geographic, ethnic and strategic vulnerabilities (Islam, 2019). Later on India also carried out hybrid warfare in Balochistan in the 1970s to further dismember Pakistan (Khetran, 2017). In the later years many Indian spies were captured in Pakistan which clearly depict that Indian hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon in Indo-Pak context. The next part of the study would discuss in details that how the post 2008 renewed hybrid warfare is different from part and how it is undermining Pakistan's internal security.

2.2. Renewed Hybrid Warfare after 2008: Doctrinal Shift

Mumbai attacks in 2008 were triggering point for the Indian policy makers to revisit their strategy against Pakistan. Indian policy makers believed that terrorist outfits based in Pakistan carried out Mumbai attacks and would continue to do so if not stopped. The Indian strategic planners after 2008 experience revised their military strategy and took some steps to launch renewed hybrid warfare strategy to maintain their strategic dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan. "Indian Hybrid Warfare against Pakistan has been going on for a very long time. In the present politico-economic conditions of Pakistan, this is the biggest threat as waging hybrid war in such a situation is very easy and already existing fault-lines can be conveniently exploited. Unfortunately, our actions in the present time seem to be providing fertile ground to India. Unless we put our house in order and take concrete steps, this threat will continue to grow and damage and threaten Pakistan's internal security" (Arain, 2023).

2.2.1. Technical Support Division: Secret Cell

Technical services division was a secret unit in the army to execute three operations. First operation with the code name 'operation seven sisters' was launched to tackle Naxalite insurgency in the

eastern belt of India. Second operation with the code name operation *Rehber-I* and *Rehber-II* was in the Indian Held Kashmir- (IHK) to buy the loyalties of Kashmiris. Third operation was code names as 'Operation Deep Strike' which was against Pakistan. The idea was to exterminate the core leadership of Lashkar-I-Tayyaba including Hafiz Saeed and his inner circle (Baweja, 2013). Allegedly, the TSD got success in 2013, when Indian agents abducted security chief of Hafiz Saeed in 2013 and killed him after getting necessary information (Jafri, 2013). Indian Navy's senior serving officer disguised as a civilian carried out covert operations from Chabahar, Iran and undermined Pakistan's internal security.

He accepted in his confession that he was involved in many heinous crimes which included funding, arming and nurturing BLA militants, sabotaging peace in the financial capital of Pakistan Karachi, and ultimately planned to disrupt CPEC. The presence of a Navy Commander in Chabahar, Iran depicts that he was planning to carry out maritime attacks on Pakistan bound oil tankers, merchant ships, or Gwadar port. It is assumed that apparently BLA would accept the responsibility for such attacks but in reality it would have been work of Indian R&AW. But luckily he was captured in 2016 from deep inside Mashakhel area of Balochistan. India denied that he was active navy officer. Indian government said that he was a mere businessman working in Chabahar Iran.

- i. First if he was innocent civilian, why he was carrying two passports with fake name Mubarak Hussain Patel. Whereas his real name was Kulbushan Yadav?
- ii. Secondly more than 4000 Indians are living in Iran, but what was so special about him that he was allegedly kidnaped by Pakistan?
- iii. Why he travelled to Balochistan more often?

In fact, his confession, call records, evidence on ground clearly show that he was high profile operative officer of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing. He was deployed in Chabahar to undermine peace and security in Balochistan, equip and fund BLA militants and create volatility in Karachi to disrupt maritime interests of Pakistan in the Arabian sea to fail Gwadar port. This was the example of modern hybrid warfare by India in which Pakistan faced huge losses in past few years. The Indian Renewed hybrid warfare was not just confined to Kulbushan Yadav only. According to Commodore (retd) Asif Saleem, "the Indian intelligence footprint in Afghanistan is quite evident as Pakistan has rendered numerous dossiers to the UN and the international community documenting Indian involvement with hostile and separatist elements such as TTP, BLA, BLF, etc. India as part of the US-led China Containment Policy has a strategic interest in fend-off Chinese growing influence through its BRI initiative and its Flagship CPEC Project by abetting attacks on Chinese nationals and locals associated with this project, such as in Gwadar and the Chinese Consulate in Karachi in recent times (Dawn, RAW running \$500 million cell to sabotage CPEC,' says Gen Zubair Hayat, 2017). India also seeks ingress and egress through the Iranian port of Chah Bahar to advance its economic interests in Afghanistan and the Central Asian States. It spares no efforts to carry out sabotage activities through its operatives/moles such as Kulbhashan Yadav and the likes" (Saleem, 2023). In 2021, R&AW allegedly orchestrated another bomb blast outside the residence of Hafiz Saeed of JuD, in which 3 people were killed and many got injured. According to Pakistan's National Security Advisor Dr. Moeed Yusuf, Pakistan possess irrefutable evidence of the Indian involvement in this attack. He said,

The whole drama about some mysterious drones flying in Jammu and Kashmir" was a "deflection tactic" in the face of Pakistan gathering proof of the alleged Indian hand in the bombing.....We have concrete evidence and intelligence, including financial and telephone records, of this particular incident in Lahore, which point towards direct Indian

sponsorship of these terrorists," Yousaf said at a joint presser with information minister Fawad Chaudhry and Punjab police chief Inam Ghani.....Soon after the briefing, PM Imran Khan appreciated law-enforcement agencies for "unearthing evidence" of the bombing and urged the world community to take note of India's "rogue behavior (India T. T., 2021).

In the post 2018 situation, Indian government wanted to seek revenge and impose heavy damages on Pakistan, whereas Pakistan has always categorically denied of any involvement in terrorist activities in India. When BJP led government came in power after 2014, the Indian government's approach got further momentum. The Indian policy makers pursued aggressive policies towards Pakistan and appointed hawkish Ajit Doval as their national security advisor. After his appointment India's ingress increased not only in Pakistan's surroundings like Afghanistan and Iran but also in Tribal areas and Balochistan. But the Indian perspective differs from Pakistani perspective. India's renowned scholar responded to a question that what are India's strategic interests in Afghanistan and Iran and why India supports BLA and TTP. He replied that

Long, historic relations with Afghanistan provide the context for India's continued interest in Afghanistan as the interface with the Central Asian Republics, with whom India has intimate political and military relations. Iran is important to India in the main because it is an energy source and because, via the Chabahar port, it provides India land access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, and will help India maintain a naval presence in the North Arabian Sea and the oil-rich Gulf (Karnad, 2021).

Professor Bharat Karnad had positive overview of India's ties with Afghanistan and Iran. But he ignored the other side of the coin. India through Afghanistan has been supporting and financing militancy in Pakistan. There is now undeniable evidence available which proves India's support to terrorist groups in ex-FATA region and Balochistan (Mukherjee A. , 2013). India through Iran tried to destabilize Pakistan. In 2016, Pakistan nabbed high profile Indian operative from

Balochistan who accepted in his confession that he has been involved in notorious activities inside Pakistan. He confessed of supporting BLA militants with funding and nurturing, planned terrorist attacks on Pakistan's maritime installations, destabilized Pakistan's financial capital Karachi with target killing and criminal activities (Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan's confessional statement, 2016). So far during Ajit Doval's tenure Pakistan have suffered huge losses. The National Security advisor of India, Ajit Doval came up with the idea of Defensive- Offense. The next portion of study would elucidate on this topic.

2.2.2. Aggressive Defensive-Offense Doctrine: Covert Ops in the Enemy Territory

Ajit Doval has been twice appointed as national security advisor of India by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Ajit Doval is well known for his aggressive approach towards Pakistan. Ajit Doval in one of his interviews said that there are three ways to meet the enemy. One is offensive- offensive, in which you go out rightly and carry out open war against the enemy. Which means a total war which is not possible vis-à-vis Pakistan now because of nuclear weapons. Second option is defensive-defense approach in which you improve your defenses at home and meet the enemy at your door steps. This is defensive approach and mostly entails no benefit. However, third approach is defensive-offense in which you go the area from where the threat is being originated and mitigate that threat (Doval, 2015). India's National Security Advisor, Mr. Ajit Doval asserted that India must pursue defensive-offense strategy to capitalize on Pakistan's political, social, economic and ethnic vulnerabilities. The next section of the study would focus on India's covert operations under this doctrine.

2.2.3. Indian Covert Ops/Proxy War: BLA/TTP/ISKP

India is actively pursuing its nefarious goals in Pakistan through BLA, TTP and or ISKP terrorist groups. India's involvement in Balochistan is not new. India has been interfering in Balochistan,

supporting and funding BLA militants and giving them shelter in New Delhi. There had been many reports about Baloch insurgents getting treatment of asylum in India. According to the confession of Kulbushan Yadav, he funded BLA militants and subversion in Pakistan. According to former CJCSC Zubair Hayat, India has established a \$500 million worth secret cell to disrupt CPEC. It was Indian funding, training and support which enabled BLA to carry out high profile attacks against Pakistani installations in Balochistan. Through BLA India wants to achieve a few objectives.

- Undermine Pakistan's internal security
- Curtail Political and Economic Efforts by Pakistan in Balochistan
- Attack Pakistan Army/FC/Police and installations
- Fund, Nurture, and provide intelligence support to BLA militants
- Attack Chinese Workers, Engineers and Nationals to reduce and ultimately remove their footprint from Balochistan
- Ultimate goal is to disrupt/delay/curtail CPEC Project
- India want to see Pakistan as economically Fragile/Dependent state
- India don't want China in Gwadar so it can dominate Arabian sea and beyond as India want maritime dominance in the region.

India's support to Tehrik-I-Taliban was also exposed when TTP senior commander Latif Mehsud was arrested in Afghanistan by NATO while having a meeting with R&AW and Afghan Intelligence Khad. Later on after a few months he was handed over to Pakistan. During his confession he accepted that India and Afghanistan are funding militant groups in Pakistan and destabilizing tribal areas (Pirzada, 2016). According to Former Ambassador and Executive Director of an Islamabad based think tank CISS, Ali Sarwar Naqvi, "Every country wants to have

border security and stands against terrorism. At the same time, a state also wants to have good investment opportunities in another country, not least a neighbor. India has similar interests in Afghanistan and Iran. But since India and Pakistan are pitted against each other, it adversely affected each other's strategic, security, and economic interests. As an enemy, India does not shy from supporting destabilizing elements in Pakistan. As for itself, India has also tried to invest in Afghanistan's infrastructure and provided it with humanitarian assistance, military training and so on. These efforts are meant to gain popularity among the populace. Iran is a sanction-hit country. India has tried to build Tehran's seaport in Chabahar to conduct trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia through Tehran. But due to sanctions on Iran, that has not materialized. India would naturally want to use its consulates in Iran's bordering region with Pakistan to support militancy in Pakistan by sponsoring Baloch rebels" (Naqvi, 2022).

Same narrative was accepted by Former Spokesperson of TTP, Ehsan Ullah Ehsan. He surrendered to Pakistani security forces after operation Zarb-I-Azb in tribal areas. In his statement to media he said that India does support militant groups in Pakistan from Afghanistan (ISPR, 2017). After 9/11 India came to Afghanistan started its effective renewed hybrid warfare against Pakistan. According Professor Ladwig of Kings College London,

The role of the Haqqanis in the new Afghan government (controlling key ministries like interior and intelligence) raises concerns for India given their past relations with groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. India doesn't want to see Afghanistan become safe haven for anti-Indian terrorist groups (Ladwig, 2022).

From Afghan soil India managed to fund, train and nurture militants in tribal areas and elsewhere. Because of the Indian funding and support militant groups were able to establish Safe Heavens, Network, Command & Control Center. In last two decades TTP militants with Indian support and transnational affiliates like Al-Qaeda, IMU, ETIM and others seriously impede Pakistan's security.

In the war against militancy Pakistan faced huge economic and human losses. Thousands of soldiers of Pakistan Army, FC, Police perished. Overall economic losses were more than \$150 billion which seriously crippled Pakistan's economic growth (Ahmed K. , 2021). Indian cronies TTP carried out attacks on Pakistan's key military bases, intelligence headquarters, even GHQ Rawalpindi was not spared. Another important step India took was diplomatic boycott at regional and global level.

2.2.4. Offensive Diplomacy under Modi Regime: Diplomatic Isolation

The Indian government declared many times over to diplomatically isolate Pakistan at regional and global milieu. Modi government tried utmost to malign Pakistan and build consensus that Pakistan is country that harbor militants. In continuation to this aggressive approach former foreign minister of India once categorically said that we will isolate Pakistan. In practical terms India boycotted SAARC summit in Pakistan. Due to Indian political influence Afghanistan, Bangladesh and some other countries from South Asia also boycotted SAARC meeting in Pakistan. In addition, Indian government used its political, economic and strategic influence over US, EU and Russia to build an anti-Pakistan narrative. After the attacks on Indian Army, PM Modi threatened Pakistan of diplomatic isolation.

We will isolate you. I will work for that.....Terrorist attacks in Bangladesh and Afghanistan were also being instigated from Pakistan. This is the only country that is exporting terrorism in all corners. Wherever there is news of terror, there is news that either the terrorist first went to this country or later, after the incident, like Osama Bin Laden.....India would continue to push to make Pakistan a pariah state in the eyes of the international community.....We will intensify our efforts and force you to be alone all over the world (Dawn, 2016).

In 2016, Sushma Swaraj former Foreign Minister of India accused Pakistan of terrorist attacks in Pathan Kot and Uri and asked the world powers to take action and isolate Pakistan (George. 2016).

India's baseless allegations and vicious campaign seriously hampered Pakistan's ties with regional and global powers. In reality India was involved in terrorist activities in Balochistan and Tribal areas. Their senior Naval Officer Commander Kulbushan Yadav is still under the custody because of his involvement in terrorist activities in Pakistan (BBC, 2019). Diplomatic isolation by India would have far reaching implications for South Asia as a whole. Regional connectivity from Mumbai to Central Asia would suffer. Pakistan is the geo-graphical pivot of the world. Interregional connectivity between South Asia and Central Asia would be difficult to achieve if Pakistan is isolated at regional level. It is imperative for India to understand that Kashmir and other related issues are paramount for long lasting peace and stability in South Asia. In line with its hybrid warfare strategy, India has also launched media warfare against Pakistan. Next part of the article would discuss this aspect of the study as well.

2.2.5. Media Warfare/Propaganda/Fake News: Psychological Warfare

Media is fourth pillar of the state. India is effectively utilizing this platform and carrying out fake media campaign against Pakistan. The Indian Sponsored Srivastava Group launched an operation to discredit Pakistan and China not only at regional level but also at global level. The Indian objectives were in India, to reinforce pro-Indian and anti-Pakistan (and anti-Chinese) feelings in India. Internationally, to consolidate the power and improve the perception of India, to damage the reputation of other countries and ultimately benefit from more support from international institutions such as the EU and the UN. To do so, the operation consists of: The support to minority and human rights NGOs and think-tanks. The use of Members of the European Parliament to create a mirage of institutional support from the European institutions to these minority groups, in favour of Indian interests and against Pakistan (and China). An active presence in Geneva and the United Nations' Human Rights Council by: organizing side-events and demonstrations in support of

minority rights; to impersonating extinguished UN accredited NGOs or using the speaking slots of various NGOs whose original missions seem totally unrelated. The creation of fake media in Brussels, Geneva and across the world and/or the repackaging and dissemination via ANI and obscure local media networks – at least in 97 countries - to multiply the repetition of online negative content about countries in conflict with India, in particular Pakistan (Gary Machado, 2020).

This is just an ice berg of India's media warfare efforts. The Indian media more often behave irrationally for example after Balakot Strike by Indian Air Force the Indian media falsely claimed that IAF killed more than 200 people in an alleged Madrassah run by Jaish-E-Muhammad (Pratik Sinha, Pooja Chaudhuri, Priyanka Jha, Mohammed Zubair, 2019). However, reality was different from the said claim. No major damage was reported after the Indian Air strike. Only a few trees in Jungle were hit. On the next day when Pakistan carried out successful surgical strike across the LOC and on return destroyed two Indian aircraft and captured one pilot. But the Indian press continued to falsely report that Abhinandan the captured pilot shot down Pakistani F-16 (Gaurav, 2021). But reality was different from the Indian claims. Many international scholars and organizations refuted the Indian claim of shooting down Pakistani F-16 aircraft (Seligman, 2019). According to Foreign Policy Magazine report, "Two senior U.S. defense officials with direct knowledge of the situation told Foreign Policy that U.S. personnel recently counted Islamabad's F-16s and found none missing" (Seligman, 2019). Even the top Indian media's anchors never shy away from stating lies on TV Channels. One such example is Arnab Goswami, who is senior anchorperson of Indian Leading News Channel. He claimed in his one program that Pakistani Army officers on fifth floor of Serena Hotel in Kabul are busy in hatching conspiracies against India and Afghanistan. His lies were exposed when it was revealed that Serena Hotel in Kabul

only had two floors (Times T. F., 2021). Such misinformation by the leading Indian media could help the government to secure their vote bank but sowing hatred and anti-Pakistan sentiments may lead to unwarranted consequences.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi used same rhetoric against Pakistan after Pathan Kot and Uri incidents and put all blame on Pakistan without any independent investigations. Later on their own investigation proved that Pakistan had no involvement in Pathan Kot terrorist incident (Arunima, 2016). Media warfare, propaganda, fake news and psychological warfare are key components of the Indian hybrid warfare strategy. With this strategy India is using the print, electronic and social media for fake news onslaught against Pakistan to undermine Pakistan's soft image at regional and global level.

Such an onslaught would continue in the near future as well because this strategy is working for Indian government. Based on false claims after Balakot Strike, the Modi Government secured second tenure and won decisive political victory by raising political slogan of "Chokidar"- (Watchman)" (Times H. , Hindustan Times, 2019). India's fake news reporting is part of its propaganda warfare against Pakistan. As per 2021 record India got 392 news channels (Krishnan, 2021). Most of these channels are influenced by the state and considered as mouthpiece of the government. Fake news and propaganda is part of India's media and psychological warfare. It is a powerful tool to shape public opinion. Such approach by Modi regime is dangerous and would have far reaching implications for regional security.

2.2.6. Cyber Warfare

Cyber warfare is a modern warfare in which countries target other countries through computer networks and disrupt their Electricity Grids, target nuclear installations, civil military networks and facilities. In modern times the cyber warfare has become a serious threat to countries because

of the airlines, trains, electricity grids, nuclear reactors, military facilities, governmental institutions even banking system is linked with computers. Any disruption in the above facilities would be a disastrous thing for a country. In recent times many developed nations suffered cyber-attacks by alleged rival states. It has been alleged that Chinese hackers hacked the America Stealth Aircraft F-35 and F-22 Raptor's Design. Moreover, also hacked about 614 GB data related to of American submarine's weapon, sensors and communication systems (Sonne, 2018). It was huge breach into the elite defense programs of the United States. In another example more than 20,000 computers of the German parliament were hacked by the hackers and they asked for huge ransom to give access to data (Jowitt, 2020). Russia recently hacked Ukrainian grid stations which resulted in total blackout for few days (Majkut, 2022).

Many times over Iranian nuclear sites faced cyber-attacks which resulted in disruption and losses (BBC, 2021). In Indo-Pak context cyber domain is slowly and gradually trying to create space. According to a Chinese cyber security experts, Indian government has officially authorized some state level cyber firms to carry out continuous cyber-attacks against China and Pakistan's civil and military installations. India's Cyber War against neighboring states would have far reaching implications for regional security. Any major cyber breach against Pakistan or China may create unwarranted situation for India (Tribune, 2021). In an another incident the Indian hackers targeted mobile phones and other digital devices of Pakistani government officials and military personnel. According to ISPR, the cyber-attack by Indian intelligence agencies involved a range of cybercrimes including deceitful fabrication by hacking personal mobiles and technical gadgets. Various targets of hostile intelligence agencies are being investigated. Pakistan Army has further enhanced necessary measures to thwart such activities including action against violators of standing operating procedures (SOPs) on cybersecurity.....an advisory is being sent to all

government departments so they may identify security lapses and enhance cybersecurity measures.

Senior officials advised to stop using WhatsApp (News T. , 2020).

India is using Israeli Software “Pegasus” and “Chat Line” to hack into the mobile phones both IOS and Android and sneak into the WhatsApp to get access to crucial information. As per reports,

The alleged targeting was discovered during an analysis of 1,400 people whose phones were the focus of hacking attempts in a two-week period earlier this year, according to the sources. All the suspected intrusions exploited a vulnerability in WhatsApp software that potentially allowed the users of the malware to access messages and data on the targets’ phones (Kirchgaessner, 2019).

India’s cyber-attacks may increase in near future and undermine Pakistan’s security. It is necessary for Pakistan to take effective measures to counter such attacks. Pakistan is a credible nuclear weapon states, if US and China can face cyber threats to its strategic installations, same could happen to Pakistan. India and Israel are closely collaborating with each other in Network Centric and Electronic warfare capabilities. It would be dangerous for Pakistan to ignore this emerging threat to its civil-military sensitive installations.

2.2.7. Surgical Strikes: Punitive Response

Hybrid Warfare entails direct and indirect attacks against the enemy. Indian hybrid warfare has many shapes and surgical strike are also part of this strategy. Surgical strike is an air force concept in which you go to a certain area, conduct a raid or operation and come back unhurt. In 2016, the Indian army claimed to have carry out surgical strike against Pakistan, (Hindustan Times, 2021) which was rejected by Pakistan (AlJazeera, 2016). There was no evidence to prove that India carried out any operation across the LoC. In 2018, the Indian Army introduced a New Land Warfare Doctrine- (LWD) in which it was reasserted that India would carry out “punitive

responses” in other words India will carry out surgical strikes across the LoC or deep inside Pakistan in case of any alleged terrorist attack in the Indian Held Kashmir or elsewhere in India (SSRI, 2018). According to Commodore (retd) Asif Saleem of Pakistan Navy, “The overt nuclearization of Pakistan precipitated by Indian nuclear detonations in 1998 has closed the window of an All-Out War with Pakistan. This has put the Indians in a bind to seek some avenues to apply military muscle. They were emboldened by the Kargil Operation and coined the Limited War concept to try various manifestations such as the Cold Start/ Proactive Strategy, and lately Surgical Strikes. It is my considered opinion that while Indian Forces will not venture into a broad-front military confrontation, they will continue to show military ascendancy through so-called, Surgical Strikes to gain political mileage” (Saleem, 2023).

After Pulwama incident, India blamed Pakistan for complicity and support to JeM. However, there was no proof to establish this propaganda. Pakistan categorically rejected Indian allegations and offered full support in investigation. However, after a few weeks, Indian Air Force crossed the border and conducted failed surgical strikes inside Pakistan. No loss of life was reported on Pakistani side (Yusuf, 2019). On the next day Pakistani air force conducted successful surgical strike and locked down targets across the LOC but intentionally dropped the payload in nearby deserted place (Dawn, 2019). The idea was to establish conventional deterrence against India. During the raid two Indian aircraft were shot down and one pilot was captured and later on released by Pakistani authorities. Now the idea of surgical strike is still there in the minds of Indian strategic thinkers. Because total war is not possible because of the nuclear factor. Limited war (Cold Start Doctrine- Pro-active Military Ops) was also checkmated by Pakistan because of the tactical nukes. Now there is only one option left with the Indians to conduct surgical strikes to woo their public and gain political mileage in India. Indian military is acquiring required capabilities to conduct

successful surgical strikes against Pakistan. For a successful surgical strike Indian military must have impeccable air defense which they are in process to acquire from (S-400)- Russia (Walia, 2021) and (Barak-8)- Israel (Tan, 2020). These capabilities would improve India's air defense and give Indian policy makers a sense of invincibility. Such a thinking would allow India to carry out misadventure against Pakistan which may invite quid pro quo response. No doubt these systems would shore up Indian military's air defense but at the same time it cannot guarantee that these systems would cover each and every part of Indian territory. In addition, India is also acquiring more Rafael aircraft from France (Sharma, 2022) and may finalize a deal with the US to supply F-16s for IAF and F-18 for the Indian Navy (Ashley J. Tellis, 2017).

These aircraft along with Russian SU-30 MKI would improve the Indian Air Force and fill the operational gaps. The IAF will be confident to engage PAF in future. Such a scenario would push the region into an unending arms race. Obviously Pakistan would do the needful. Pakistan may acquire long range air defense, add more MIRVs, increase the quality and quantity of warheads, add more ALCM and SLCMs and procure fifth generation aircraft with the help of China to offset any Indian air superiority in the region. Another dangerous development is the acquisition of Israeli armed drones by India (Negi, 2022). India has already acquired Harpy and Harop UAVs which could be used to take out targets inside Pakistan (Arkin, 2021). However, in recent times India is in negotiation with Israel to acquire Advance Heron TP UAVs which could be used for future surgical strikes against Pakistan (Philip, 2021). It must be noted that any surgical strike by India would meet quid pro quo response because Pakistan has the ability to find the gap and penetrate the Indian defenses.

The combination of longstanding tensions, mistrust, a border dispute, ongoing conventional military modernization in both countries, and other policies that each considers destabilizing

(Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons, India's new doctrine and its relentless acquisition of heavy conventional arms), along with nuclear weapons, mean that the risks of a limited war are very much there. They nearly went to war in 2019, and, had Pakistan not reacted with restraint, they could have gone to war in 2022 after an errant Indian missile ended up in Pakistan. All it would take is a single provocation or miscalculation to start a limited—or worse—war: A terrorist attack, a move on Kashmir, some type of preemptive strike, or even a case of misinformation or disinformation that wrongly reports a provocation. Any Surgical strikes by India in future may invoke a limited war between the two belligerents. Any conflict, limited or total, would have far-reaching implications for regional security. Nuclear South Asia cannot afford any such misadventure. Michael Kugelman believe that India and Pakistan must improve their bilateral ties for long lasting peace and stability. He was of the view that,

It all starts with building more trust, through realistic confidence building measures. I don't see talks on Kashmir as realistic, given India's intransigence. More realistically, we have to look at possibilities for bringing back more people-to-people engagements (through cultural exchanges and business ties). Increasing border trade could be a big help, as well as more frequent discussions around less controversial issues, like river flow data and air pollution figures. If the two sides can develop a mechanism for regular talks around water insecurity and climate change, for example, then that could build more trust for more difficult conversations around security issues focused on finding ways to achieve more strategic stability in the region (Kugelman, 2022).

It is imperative for India to avoid any misadventure and resolve all issues with Pakistan in an amicable way through meaningful dialogue. Bharat Karnard in regard gave some remarks to resolve issues between India and Pakistan. He was of the view that, "The basic problem is

Pakistan's close alignment with China, which is India's primary security concern. For Pakistan, on the other hand, China is its military anchor, which it cannot give up. This makes for strategic instability. If there's to be enduring peace, something has to give. In my books (Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet) & Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India's Global Ambition) and other writings I have suggested that because Pakistan cannot ever be a credible military threat, India should take two unilateral military measures to inspire confidence and build trust in Islamabad, namely (1) removing all forward deployed nuclear missiles on its western front, and (2) rationalizing and reconstituting its three strike corps into a single composite corps for Pakistan contingencies, and otherwise shifting resources to three offensive mountain corps against China. To complement these steps India should offer generous economic and trade incentives. Such as tariff-free access to the Indian market of all commodities and goods wholly grown and produced in Pakistan.

The study examines that India and Pakistan must overcome their trust deficit and work for long lasting peace because there is no way to peace but peace is the only way in south Asia. A nuclear south Asia cannot afford any misadventure in the name of CSD/Proactive military operation, Surgical Strikes or New Land Warfare doctrine. It is necessary for both states to sit together and carry out consistent meaningful dialogue to establish peace in South Asia for a bright future of coming generations. The next part of the study would analyze the implications of Indian Hybrid warfare strategy against Pakistan.

2.3. Implications for Pakistan's Security

2.3.1. Instability and turmoil in Tribal Areas and Balochistan

India's renewed Hybrid warfare strategy after 2008 seriously hampered Pakistan's internal security. Indian strategic thinkers were cognizant of the fact that direct war is not going to serve

the purpose because of nuclear factor in South Asia. This is the reason India planned hybrid warfare in tribal areas and Balochistan to undermine Pakistan's internal security, ignite ethno-political issues, capitalize on the political and economic vulnerabilities. Ex- FATA faced serious challenges and it will continue to do so because this area is bordered with Afghanistan, it is tough terrain and underdeveloped area. It is easier for the militant groups to sneak inside Pakistan despite border fencing and deployment of Pakistan troops. According to Brigadier (ret'd) Tahir Mahmood, Former Director Hilal Magazine ISPR, "As far as India's hybrid warfare strategy is concerned, I think they are quite successful, although Pakistan successfully get back to its position but still Pakistan was defensive for few years" (Mehmood, 2022). It is difficult to man almost 1600 km Tribal areas. Militants, drug traffickers, smugglers make their inroads some way or the other and create problems for Pakistan. for a country like India it is not at all difficult to establish sleeper cells of TTP or ISKP in tribal areas. Despite Pakistan's huge counter terror efforts after 9/11 situation in some corners in tribal areas is volatile. After the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan suffered many attacks on its security forces in tribal areas in which dozens of Pakistan Army's personnel were martyred. Which shows that secret sleeper cells of terrorist organizations are still working and they cannot work without patronage of any external element.

On the other hand, situation in Balochistan is also volatile but under control. Balochistan has been on target by India since inception. There is huge evidence available of Indian funding, nurturing and training of BLA insurgents. In recent times a common trend was noted in tribal areas and Balochistan. In both these areas there was surge in attacks on Pakistani security forces. Which clearly indicates that after a brief pause India has activated its proxies in Balochistan as well. There were coordinated IED attacks, guerrilla ambushes, and first suicide on Chinese citizens by female

suicide which shows a new phenomenon in Balochistan insurgency. The intensity of attacks in Pakistani security forces in tribal areas and Balochistan would increase if not properly checked. These groups are getting external help with funds and intel which makes it easy for them to conduct such high profile attacks against Pakistani security forces in tribal areas and Balochistan. It is a matter of grave concern for Pakistan that Taliban in Afghanistan are not taking effective steps against TTP and other terrorist groups. These terrorist groups are enjoying safe heavens in Afghanistan, from where they are managing and controlling their sleeper cells in Pakistan.

2.3.2. Economic Challenges: Threat to CPEC

India's hybrid warfare is also threatening Pakistan's economy. The main thrust of India is now on Balochistan to disrupt CPEC. Gwadar port is considered as jewel of CPEC mega project. Instability and turmoil in the area, attacks on Chinese citizens and workers may delay the project but it cannot stop this venture between Pakistan and China. But the most dangerous development is India's renewed efforts to sabotage this project. Deployment of high ranking intelligence officer with expertise in maritime warfare raised a few questions in Pakistan's strategic community.

- Is India aiming to plan attacks on Pakistan's maritime traffic e.g. Cargo Ships, Oil Tankers/ships/vessels?
- Is the Indian intelligence planning to carry out renewed attacks on Pakistan's maritime assets e.g. Ports, facilities or bases?
- Is India going to equip BLA with modern weapon and equipment e.g. IEDs, VBIEDs, anti-aircraft Guns, SAMs to target Pakistan's security forces, Chinese engineers and workers or low flying helicopters in the area?
- Who will invest in Balochistan if the situation is volatile?

All these above questions are valid and creates sense of anxiety in Pakistan. It is necessary that India and Pakistan must work together and resolve their issues amicably. According to Rajesh Basrur, “They need to work toward a political understanding that (1) avoids supporting cross-border violence in all forms; and (2) builds up relatively neglected areas of mutual gain, especially with respect to trade and investment” (Basrur, 2021). But it doesn’t look like this issue would be resolved in near future. It is imperative for Pakistan to improve its security apparatus in the area, enhance human intelligence in Iran and Afghanistan to as well to locate safe heavens and hideouts of the mainstream terrorist organizations and hunt them down with the help of local authorities. India has multiple interests in both these countries. Its presence in the two countries helps it surround Pakistan, enables it to easily support anti Pak elements, keep these countries from establishing good ties with Pakistan. Additionally, they also offer passage to CARs which helps Indian economic interests. Indian influence in Afghanistan can deny Pakistan an easy access to CARs. This can also be used to provide alternate route for trade and scuttle CPEC (Arain, 2023). Local policing and intelligence network must also be improved to eradicate sleeper cells of TTP, ISKP, BLA and their affiliates.

2.3.3. Strategic Vulnerabilities: Two Front War Dilemma

Pakistan’s main threat perception always revolved around India on the eastern front. But after 9/11 India came to Afghanistan and established its network to destabilize Pakistan. After years of struggle Pakistan established peace in its tribal belt. But the cost was great. Pakistan had to deploy more than 200,000 troops on Western front which created two front war dilemma for Pakistan. Western border is equally dangerous for Pakistan and even today this border is not stable as it should have been. Allegedly, India backed militant groups and criminals are active and try to sabotage Pakistan’s security. In recent times Pakistan army faced many terrorist attacks and

suffered huge casualties since 2021. Indian hybrid warfare is creating serious challenges for Pakistan to manage its security and allocate more funds, men and resources to safeguard huge eastern and western borders.

2.3.4. Engineered Social Movements: Igniting Ethnic Fault lines

Another important facet of the Indian Hybrid warfare is to capitalize on Pakistan's political and ethnic vulnerabilities. This trend will not stop and it will continue. Previously, India, Russia and Afghanistan backed greater Pakhtunistan movements in the post 1947 situation. Later, these states supported ethnic groups in Balochistan and ignited insurgencies in the 1970s. In recent times again we have observed that some engineered social movements are trying to undermine Pakistan army and launched a vicious campaign to create ethnic divide in Pakistan.

The Indian hybrid warfare strategy is serious and pertinent threat to Pakistan's national security. Although, hybrid war by India is not new phenomenon but it gained after the nuclearization of South Asia and specially in the post 2008 Mumbai attacks. The Indian hybrid warfare is hurting Pakistan on many fronts. India is capitalizing on Pakistan's geopolitical vulnerabilities, ethno-nationalist susceptibilities, diplomatic weaknesses, economic woes, internal & external security fault-lines. The Indian government realized its operational readiness and lack of offensive capabilities in their military machine after 2008 which prevented the Indian Army from any limited war strategy- (proactive military operations or Cold Start Doctrine) against Pakistan. Lack of overwhelming conventional superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan and threat of nuclear escalation imposed limitations to India to execute these strategies against Pakistan. this is the reason that India relied more on hybrid warfare options to make it difficult for Pakistan to manage its overall security. The Indian Hybrid Warfare mainly relied on Covert Ops and proxy wars. The Indian strategic planners applied defensive-offense strategy against Pakistan to subvert peace and security in Pakistan. This

strategy of India actually worked and it imposed serious damages on Pakistan. India's covert support to terrorist and insurgents in tribal areas and Balochistan seriously hampered Pakistan's security and it took almost two decades for Pakistan to somehow manage its security after 9/11. India also used its political and economic clout to coerce regional and international powers to impose diplomatic isolation and create troubles for Pakistan. Apart from covert ops the Indian policy makers are also challenging cyber security of Pakistan. The indo-Israel strategic partnership is growing and creating new challenges for Pakistan. In recent times India is using an Israeli software to hack into electronic gadgets of key civil military officials in Pakistan which may undermine Pakistan's national security (Deep, 2023).

Pakistan must take concrete steps to counter cyber-attacks on its civil-military installations, nuclear sites and personnel etc. The Indian Hybrid warfare has opened up multiple threats for Pakistan which also include quick and swift operations or surgical strikes. India resort to surgical strikes options because it was unwise to fight a limited or total war with a nuclear weapon state. The IAF has tried a surgical strike in 2019 but it failed because of operational weaknesses whereas Pakistan carried out successful surgical strikes with greater precision and accuracy which established conventional deterrence vis-à-vis India. But Pakistani policy makers must be cognizant of the fact that India failed in 2019 because of three weaknesses, (i)- Deficiencies/discrepancies in military preparedness & effective strategy, (ii)- Absence of long range air defense system and (iii)- Lack of clear cut air superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan Air Force.

Now Indian government is seriously working on all these aspects and trying to fill the gaps in all these domains. They are buying modern aircraft along with long range air defenses with the help of Russia and Israel. After the induction of these capabilities, it would be a tough choice for Pakistani military commanders to cross the LOC and carry out counter surgical strikes on the

pattern of Operation Swift Retort-2019. Keeping in view all these developments Pakistani decision makers must plan according to the Indian military's capabilities and fill the operational gaps in its own military machine and strategy. The Indian Hybrid warfare is serious and pertinent threat for Pakistan, it is necessary for policy makers in the country to assess these emerging threats and strategies an effective response to mitigate these threats and challenges.

Chapter-3

India's Strategic Alliances and Military Modernization

3. Introduction

The Indian government has forged strategic alliances with major powers to revamp its overall military machine to execute its doctrines against Pakistan and China. However, Indian scholars opines that these doctrinal transformations are useless because it does not focus on China. Bharat Karnard opines that “Long overdue because as I have for long been advocating that these so-called military doctrines are irrelevant because they have not reflected the real threat, China” (Karnad, 2021). India is in deal with the US, Europe, Israel and Russia to induct highly sophisticated weapons to overcome deficiencies in its military. Most of the Indian military modernization ventures with other states are under *make in India* initiative which may boost the indigenous defense industry of India. However, Indian scholar Bharat Karnard replied to a question that how Indian defense collaboration with major powers impact on Pakistan. He said, “minimal impact on Pakistan because the Indian military modernization and capability buildup is meant for the growing China threat” (Karnad, 2021). The Indian government has allocated billions of dollars to induct modern Main Battle Tanks- (MBTs), highly advanced aircraft SU 30 from Russia. The IAF has already purchased 275 and in deal with Russia to induct more in near future. Other than that the Indian government also inked a deal with Russia to acquire lethal BMD system S-400 which may become nightmare for Pakistan's aircraft, UAVs, Missiles and Helicopters. Therefore Dr. Adil opines that

ABM systems between India and Pakistan are not likely to be effective due to several reasons.

However, the possession of the capability can give false sense of confidence to the Indian decision makers and hence the possibility of India embarking on an adventure against Pakistan.

This could be in the form of a limited war, aerial surgical strike or under some new doctrine (Muhammad, 2022).

3.1. The Indo-Russian Strategic Collaboration: Deep Rooted Ties

The Indo-Russian strategic collaboration is exemplary and growing day by day. Apart from that the backbone of Indian army is T90 tanks. Almost about 900 tanks they have purchased from Russia. They have ordered 464 more worth 2 billion dollars. 18 regiments of T90 tanks are deployed in Punjab and Rajasthan border areas with Pakistan. India is to replace all aging fleets with T90 tanks. The tank is lethal because of such attributes like night vision thermal imaging, greater fire power with 125mm gun, anti-tank missile which has the capability to hit its target in 11 seconds from 100-4000 meters of distance, while its range is 550 km and speed is 60 kmh. all these things are supported by S-400 and Barak-8. Both these systems are very potent. The S-400 can take out aircrafts, UAVs, drones, missiles at the range of 400 km. Barak 8 range is 70km and its missile travels at a speed of 17000 km/h so an aircraft can never be missed from this. India is buying this from Israel. Basically this creates a shield around the assets and no aircraft can sneak in. Despite all these development Indian military is still facing shortage of essential military capabilities.

According to Professor Walter C Ladwig,

I would question the assertion that the Indian military is “rapidly modernizing.” At best it is simply recapitalizing and slowly replacing substantial amounts of obsolete equipment. There are numerous shortcomings in platforms and modern equipment across all three services and key areas like fighter aircraft and submarines are currently on trajectories to shrink, not grow (Ladwig, 2022).

The Indian government has also purchased modern Rafale fighter jet from France recently and in process to add Russian SU-30 MKI which may transform the IAF into an agile and lethal force in

future. Both these aircraft will be crucial for India's strategy to carry out sub-conventional operations in future. In line with Indian military's doctrinal transformation from offensive to limited war operations under the nuclear umbrella. "Indian doctrinal transformation has been the result of nuclearization of South Asia and the resultant international fear of a full-fledged conflict between two nuclear armed rivals, comparatively longer mobilization time and technological developments. As a consequence, it opted for CSD / PAOs along with changes in its land warfare doctrine. However, the surgical strikes appear to be the latest choice as it gives flexibility and speed to engage some alleged terrorist hideouts / training camps and embarrass Pakistan. Post 27 Feb, this also does not seem to be as lucrative option for India as it used to think about it, especially if there is a strong government in Pakistan" (Arain, 2023).

3.2. Indo-French Defense Collaboration in Rafale Aircraft: Air Dominance

Rafale is a potent fighter jet which can carry conventional and nuclear warheads, and can travel up to 1800 km of distance, which makes it Pakistan specific aircraft. The Rafale can easily penetrate Pakistan and launch an attack and come back without refueling. It has got max speed of 2000 km per hour which makes this aircraft highly effective capability (Bhandari, 2020). The Indian Air Force has inducted 36 Rafale aircraft so far but this may not be enough. Because most of the Indian aircrafts are vintage Russian MiGs, who have completed their life. In next few years the IAF will retire many of its old aircraft, which is going to create serious gaps in the IAF. For air superiority against Pakistan the IAF would need 42 squadrons but at the moment they have only 33 squadrons only (Sebastian, 2020). Which means the IAF would require to add at least 300 to 400 new aircrafts to replace the flying coffins- MiG-21 and MiG-29. In this way they are going to achieve air superiority against Pakistan. But modernization process is very slow in India due to bureaucratic hurdles. On the other hand, Pakistan Air Force is also continuously improving and

transforming with the help of China. PAF is regularly upgrading its JF-17 Thunders and F-16 aircraft and also in process to acquire 5th Generation aircraft from China in near future.

3.3. Indo-US Defense Ties: Filling the Operational Gaps

Moreover, India is also acquiring modern transport and logistic aircrafts to move its military from one place to another without any time barrier. So quick and swift transport and logistics is needed for limited war operations, which makes it easy to transport fuel and logistics. The IAF and Indian Army will induct the most advanced Gunship Apache Helicopters from the US. These helicopters are crucial for the Indian military to execute its limited war options seamlessly. The Apache is a lethal machine and also known as a flying tank because of deadly capability, armaments and maneuverability. These helicopters could be a serious threat for Pakistan's air defense, bunkers, armor personnel carriers, advancing MBTs and mechanized infantry. The Indian military's new land warfare doctrine aims at quick and swift incursions which requires such capabilities to maintain strategic edge against Pakistan.

Apache is used in close operations, to give close air support to land forces and tanks in case of quick and swift operations. It is used in destroying air defense, radars and bunkers of enemy. It is a very potent aircraft. It carries about 16 hellfire missiles. It is very lethal machine. Having such offensive capabilities would give India confidence to operationalize its aggressive doctrines. Limited war offensive doctrines need such type of capabilities. India is acquiring all these capabilities with the help of major powers, which may help the Indian military to operationalize its limited war offensive operations under the nuclear overhang.

3.4. Indo-Israel Strategic Partnership: Network Centric Warfare Capabilities

Indo-Israel Strategic partnership is also very old and getting strong day by day. The main collaboration between both states is in the realm of Network centric and Electronic Warfare

capabilities. Surveillance and reconnaissance domain is also very important when it comes to any quick and swift operations under New Land Warfare Doctrine. India is continuously improving its surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities with the help of Israel. In this regard India acquired Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation system- (LORROS) from Israel in 2006 (Mohan V. , 2006). In 2021, the Indian government planned to induct more such surveillance systems to check the cross border infiltration from China, Pakistan and Myanmar (Tripathi, 2021). The LORROS is high capable land based Radar system which has the ability to track incoming men at a safe distance of about 16 km. The LORROS is deployed on LoC to detect cross border movement (Tripathi, 2021). This radar has the ability to work without any time barrier at day and night, which makes a potent surveillance system. It can relay information to its snippers and artillery which can easily take down any threat. Moreover, the Indian army has also acquired battlefield surveillance radars. It is used in battlefield to detect group of walking or crawling men. It has sophisticated, inbuilt software algorithms to detect, track and classify targets like crawling men, light and combat vehicles, and low flying helicopters. Such capabilities are essential in modern warfare with limited but offensive orientation in nuclear environment. The Indian army is revamping its capabilities to maintain strategic edge against Pakistan. Apart from that India is acquiring modern drones from Israel. These drones are significant because have the ability to carry out targeting. These UAVs are equipped with hellfire missiles and GPS system which has the ability to detect take out the target with greater precision. Israeli UAV Heron TP is highly advanced and has the capability to fly in air for 45 hours and possess a range of about 7,400 km.

Indian army is going to procure four Heron TP drones to enhance their observation and surveillance at China and Pakistan border (Times T. E., 2021). This drone would give India an offensive capability to carry out surgical strikes in future which may undermine strategic stability

in South Asia. This UAV will be threatening for Pakistan's security because India may use these drones for surgical strikes in future. Because the IAF lost two of its aircraft by Pakistan after Balakot Surgical Strike. It was riskier for India to send its aircraft against Pakistan. It will be cost effective for the Indian Air Force to send next time a UAV for surgical strike, because even if the drone is shot down by Pakistan, it won't bring any adverse implications. A drone is much cheaper than an aircraft and it also saves the life of pilot. So it is expected that India may utilize Israeli armed drones for targeting purposes against Pakistan.

Moreover, India have acquired Harpy missiles from Israel and its advanced version is Harop missile. It has a range of about 1000 km while the range of Harpy was 500 km (Katoch, 2020). It can carry 15 kg warhead. India has ordered 10 more Harop from Israel. The worst thing is that it can take out Pakistan's radar sites, strategic installations, arms depot, Bunkers, Missile Sites, C4I vehicles in battlefield. India have also added spy satellites as well which is also called Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance- (ISR) capabilities. These are provided by Space Satellites. RISAT-II satellite which they acquired from Israel in 2009 and it can sneak inside Pakistan for 500 km which is weather friendly as well and its observation is for day and night which is a threat for Pakistan's strategic installations, troops movement and installations and missile sites. This gives India an information edge which is obviously very important for them because it amplifies India's surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

Moreover, they have added GSAT-7 Rukmini in 2013 which work in domain of navy. It provides surveillance in Indian ocean region and beyond. About 3000-4000 km footprint. GSAT-6 another military exercise they launched in 2015 which is in use of Indian army. GSAT-7 A launched in 2018 is used for Indian air-force. So India launched its satellite for army, navy and air force which is an important thing and would give an information edge to India in future. Pakistan don't have

such capabilities. Pakistan still relies on AEW&C which are acquired from china and Sweden, but Pakistan must have to add these capabilities in future otherwise India would always have an information edge against Pakistan.

India is bringing transformation in its army. Initially they launched a program named FINSAS in which they wanted to provide their soldiers a light helmet, light armor, special suits, night vision capabilities and advanced rifles. But unfortunately the Indian Army had to scrap FINSAS program because it was not possible on such a large number of soldiers but at the same time they introduce two new alternative programs in which they will buy all these weapons and equipment or capabilities for their infantry but it will take a time to equip such a huge number of soldiers. So it is a long term process.

3.5. Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capabilities in the Indian Army

In 2017 the Indian Army introduced Swathi- Weapon Locating Radar- (S-WLRs) (Dhananjayan, 2021). It has an effective range of about 50 km which makes it destructive weapon against Pakistan because it has the ability to automatically detect the exact position of the enemy artillery, mortar shells, and short range rocket sites and gives information to its command center. It is quite dangerous capability in the Indian Army, because of this Pakistan Army lost more than 138 soldiers of Pakistan in 2017-18. Another important thing in surveillance and reconnaissance is indigenous AEW&C. It has a range of about 200 km which has the ability to track enemy missiles, UAVs, Aircraft etc. and relay information to its command center and the command center for effective countermeasures.

India is also getting modern artillery. Previously they had 4 guns' artillery which they used in Kargil which had a limited range of 27 km but the advanced towed artillery gun system range is 45 km. they bought some from US and some are made with international companies in India named

Dhanush. ATAGS is having a very lethal capability which supports the tanks minimizing the speed of enemy's tanks and artillery as it launches attack on them. So it's a very lethal capability which India is launching against Pakistan.

The Indian new land warfare doctrine of 2018 re-emphasis on the hybrid warfare strategy. In this type of strategy state and non-state actors can be used. The adversary maybe fluid or flexible. It can't be determined that which shape the enemy is. Moreover, offensive diplomacy and media campaign or fake propaganda or news comes under it. Proxy wars through Iran and Afghanistan in Balochistan and Fata. Engineered social movements such as Pakhtoon movements in 50s, 60s, 70s. PTM can be linked with them. Moreover, terrorism and insurgencies, covert operations also come under hybrid warfare. Cyber-attacks are also part of hybrid warfare in which the strategic installations of enemy can be targeted. It's not a new thing. India is engaged in such activities since 1947 against Pakistan. The classical example of hybrid warfare is east Pakistan in 1971 where India utilizes Mukti Bahini terrorist group against Pakistan. They trained almost 150,000 people and used against Pakistan. Moreover, some secret operatives have been working in Pakistan. For example, Ravinder Kaushik served in Pakistan military from 1979 to 1983 and he used to provide information to India. He was caught and died in Kot Lakhpat jail afterwards. Many others like Sarabjit Singh 1970-2012 in jail in Pakistan, Sarabjit Singh 1990 was also killed in Pakistan. Kirpal Singh 1992 and Kashmir Singh 1973-2008 and Kulbushan Yadav recently. In 2008, technical service division was launched by general VK Singh and the purpose was to finish the Lashkar e Tayyaba. So they launch technical service division and named the operation as operation deep strike and launched against Pakistan and carried out many bomb blasts and many people were killed. Under this operation on 15th May 2013, Khalid Bashir who was the security chief of Lashkar Tayyaba, was abducted from Lahore. After two days' dead body was found from the upper

Chenab canal in Sheikhpura. According to reports the plot was to assassinate Hafiz Saeed and his close aides was hatched in Dubai allegedly by a raw agent. The sources said that raw engaged two local jihadi activists through an unidentified Pakistani handler for the job. Kulbushan Yadav who was commander in Indian navy was captured in Pakistan. The Indian express has reported that between 2010-2012 Yadav made three separate attempts to join RAW. The paper suggests that he also tries to join the TSD. It was the biggest success in intelligence warfare to capture Yadav by Pakistan. Ajit Doval who is national security chief of India, he gave a doctrine named offensive defense in which he talks about the funding to militants against Pakistan, socio economic vulnerabilities, proxy war in Afghanistan, political vulnerabilities, international isolation of Pakistan and create threat to internal security of Pakistan. Many militants later like Latif-Ullah Mehsud and Ehsan-Ullah Ehsan confessed that India is using afghan soil to carry out terrorist activities inside Pakistan.

Further in New Land Warfare Doctrine, India talked about surgical strikes. This doctrine was given in 2018 and in 2019 they carried out surgical strikes against Pakistan. Surgical strike is basically a concept of air force in which aircrafts, UAVs, special forces gunship helicopters are used. They used aircrafts in 2019 against Pakistan but were captured. In counter response Pakistan carries out strikes in six important areas such as KG top, Bhimber Gali, and Naryan sector arm depots and positions were targeted. So this means that Pakistan has the ability to carry out counter surgical strikes. So India must have to think before carrying out such strikes again or they will have to add such weapons like Barak-8 and S-400 to neutralize Pakistan's aircrafts. This is a major debate for sure—and specifically, will India use these in some way against Pakistan, or will it focus on using them to strengthen its deterrent capacity vis a vis China? India arguably has a greater need to focus on the latter, given that it has had no answer for China's repeated incursions on territory that India

considers its own. India also views China as a bigger long-term strategic threat than it does Pakistan, and that suggests it would want to position these new long range and expensive weapons systems to address that big, long-term strategic need. India seems to have no shortage of capacity to carry out another Balakot-like operation.

Moreover, the Indian military is forging strategic alliances with major powers. It was also emphasized in Indian Army's New Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018, that India must establish strategic alliances with major powers like Israel, US, Russia, Europe. The ties with these countries are already deep rooted as they are buying all sorts of modern weapons and equipment from these countries. According to Dr. Adil Sultan, India's strategic alliances with major powers would undermine strategic stability of South Asia. He was of the view that,

India has emerged as a major strategic partner to the US with a stated objective to help contain China. This has enabled India to acquire advanced technology and equipment that can possibly help modernize its defense capabilities. India is also incorporating doctrinal changes to deal with what it perceives to be a "two-front" war scenario. The doctrinal transformation coupled with military modernization would complicate regional security matrix and affect Pakistan's traditional security (Muhammad, 2022).

Moreover, India is carrying out military exercise since 2004 to train their forces for that type of operations. So they are working hard and equipping all these weapons and equipment and by practicing the forces in the battle field. So they have been using all those modern equipment and capabilities in their military exercises whether they are airborne helicopters or transport logistics, drones or LORROS Radars, special forces operations or joint operations, hence utilizing all those things in military exercises to prepare its military. Pakistan is also carrying out exercise in counter response such as Azm-e-Nau exercises, and improving its capabilities so that the threats from India can be met. So the exercises are part of military doctrines.

If we see the implications for the deterrence stability of Pakistan. It will create conventional disparity in South Asia. Renewed arms race between India and Pakistan will be created. On the impact of military modernization by India on Pakistan, Dr. Toby Dalton- (Co-Director and Senior Fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment) replied that, “probably minimally, though it no doubt can reinforce the cult of the offensive and continue to require expenditures that would be far more effective if directed at human development than military development. This is true for both India and Pakistan” (Dalton, 2022).

There would be risk of limited war in South Asia and automatically the reliance on nuclear weapons would increase. Pakistan needs to work on its conventional capabilities to counter Indian aggression and need to take some concrete steps. For example: Pakistan needs to improve the survivability of its command and control system. Pakistan must acquire second strike capability which means to absorb the first strike of enemy and then strike. For that Pakistan must have deep underground tunnels for the security of its weapons. Secondly nuclear submarines can be bought through which the nuclear weapons can be kept in sea but that is expensive. So Pakistan rely on deep underground tunnels and mobile ground based capabilities because most of the missiles are truck mounted so can easily be moved from one place to another. In this way the second strike capability is achieved and the nuclear deterrence became more credible and the enemy will think before attack. Secondly the indigenous defense industry has to be improved. Research and development must continue in the high technology areas and add modern capabilities like network centric and electronic warfare capabilities. Pakistan and China strategic collaboration must be enhanced. For satellites and long range air defense system and 5th generation aircrafts, Pakistan can take help from friendly countries like China as they are very supportive with Pakistan throughout and sharing their technology with Pakistan as recently Pakistan got LY-80 air defense

system and are ready to share their long range air defense system, their 5th generation aircraft in future. Secondly Pakistan must carry out regular military exercise with China and other friendly countries. This is how Pakistan is going to improve and to counter the Indian strategic thinking in this region. The first and foremost thing is that we have to understand the strategies of our enemy. As according to Sun Tzu “it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle”. Indian civil nuclear doctrine started in 1944 even before the independence which is regarded as PNE and the idea of this test was hegemony not only in South Asia but to become a major power just like Nehru thought about it. So India acquired nuclear weapons in 1974 and exploded its 1st nuclear device and nuclearized South Asia at that time. Indian strategic thinking compelled Pakistan to go for nuclear weapon. After the overt nuclearization in 1998, India proposed its draft nuclear doctrine in 1999 and in 2003 it got recognition as an official document (David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath Raghavan, 2015).

The first thing which they talk about is no first use. By this heading we analyze that the Indian strategy is no first use, they are not going to use nuclear weapon at first. But by reading the official document we get to know that it was actually the first use as it said that “nuclear weapon will only be used as retaliation against the threat of a nuclear, chemical and biological attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere” (Kanwal C. G., 2001). This is basically based on threat perceptions of India. If they face imminent threat from Pakistan for instance, so before Pakistan use nuclear weapon, they may use nuclear weapon which means this is first use. Secondly if India is attacked with chemical or biological weapon other than nuclear weapon, in that as well case India will use nuclear weapon. So basically this doctrine is based on their own threat perception which

is very dangerous. That perception could be wrong. Basically this is first use option which is creating serious troubles for Pakistan or it will be really threatening for the regional security as well. So the first thing which they called as no first use is ambiguous and it would be really critical for Pakistan's policy maker. Secondly, nuclear retaliation against biological or chemical weapon attack which is against international norms, this is what the Indian nuclear doctrine says. Element of restraint is actually missing from this strategy.

The second point of the doctrine says that India is going to have credible nuclear deterrence which means of having limited nuclear warheads but their command and control would be credible and creditability of nuclear deterrence could be acquired by second strike capability (Kanwal C. G., 2001). Second strike capability provides an option to carry out strikes after absorbing first strike from the enemy. The second strike capability is acquired through nuclear submarines because on nuclear submarines the warheads can be placed and can put them on sea and they are secured. Secondly it is acquired through deep underground tunnels or mobile warheads. But the ideal second strike capability comes from the nuclear submarine which India has already acquired. So this is something which makes India's nuclear deterrent as credible. But this strategy is ambiguous because we don't know what is the minimum for India, that how many nukes would be enough to deter its enemies. For example, if China has got about 434 nuclear warheads, so will India follow the Chinese path? Are they going to acquire 400 plus nuclear warheads just to make sure that they are equal to china? Or are they going to get 160 plus nuclear warheads just to deter Pakistan? This would be really very critical for Pakistan's strategic thinkers and is going to be a difficult situation for the South Asian security.

The third point of the doctrine says that the nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage (Kanwal C. G., 2001). So what is their unacceptable

damage? Are they going to attack Karachi? Are they going to take out Pakistan's capital Islamabad? Or are they going to attack Lahore? So this is again an ambiguous strategy. The fourth point says that the nuclear command and control will be controlled by the civilian political leadership led by the prime minister (Kanwal C. G., 2001). If we analyze the Indian command and control structure, the Prime Minister is the commander and the final authority for the nuclear strike but he is going to take decision on the advice of the national security advisor. Along with that they are going to have a committee as well. That committee would involve cabinet committee on security like prime minister, deputy prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister and finance minister. These key ministers would be there in decision making. Along with that they are going to have all security chiefs like army chief, air chief and naval chief. So at the end of the day the different commands which are there at the bottom are going to execute the order by the prime minister office. So actually the civilians are controlling things in India.

The fifth point is that India will build and develop Triad forces which means that India is going to deploy their nuclear weapons and going to develop their nuclear weapons for army, air force and navy (Kanwal C. G., 2001). Currently their air force like Su 30 aircraft and also acquired Rafale from France are quite capable and the MIGs are old and outdated and they are going to phase out those aircrafts in the coming years. They are also considered as flying coffins. Currently India possess around 275 SU-30 aircrafts. Its Russian aircraft which has the range of about 3000 km and technically it covers each and every part of Pakistan. So it has the capability to take out Brahmos which is a cruise missile and is a very important missile and India is looking for hypersonic missile as well. So air force has the ability to carry out nuclear strike. Secondly if we talk about their navy, India possess nuclear submarine like currently they have arahant and according to Indian maritime strategy, they are going to acquire 5 more nuclear submarines in future by 2030 most probably.

These submarines would be equipped by Sagarika missile which is submarine launched ballistic missile which has a range of about 3000 km which means they can take out any part of Pakistan from Indian ocean region. So this is technically going to give India an upper edge against Pakistan as Pakistan don't have second strike capability at sea.

Pakistan have conventional submarine in which nuclear missile is fitted but it does not provide 100 percent assured second strike capability. Thirdly their army in which they have got Prithvi missiles, they have got Surya missiles and Agni series and have recently tested 5000 km warheads which technically covers every nook and corner of china and Pakistan. So they are going to have nuclear weapons on Triad forces and this is what they have already acquired according to their nuclear doctrine. Sixth point of the doctrine states the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. India states that they are not going to use nuclear weapon against a country which does not possess nuclear weapons but at the same time they say that in the event of major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons (Kanwal C. G., 2001). So this again an ambiguous strategy.

Moreover, the doctrine says that research and development will continue (Kanwal C. G., 2001). They are going to acquire more and more nuclear warheads and this has been obvious from the nuclear strategic partnership with the United States of America and other major powers. Now because of that partnership the nuclear deal which they have got with the US, they are going to get fuel for the civil purposes and the fuel which they produce in their own country, as they have got 24 nuclear plants and out of those 8 are solely for the military purposes and others are for the civilian purposes. India is going to acquire civil material fuel from other countries like Australia, USA or Canada and the fuel which they produce in their own country they are going to allocate

that for the weapon development. So technically India have the ability to produce 300-400 nuclear warheads in future which means that research and development will continue and they are going to acquire more and more nuclear warheads and they are going to improve qualitatively and quantitatively which is going to impact Pakistan's security. Pakistan would definitely expand its own nuclear program and this is what Pakistan is doing.

The next point says that India will work towards the disarmament (Kanwal C. G., 2001). This also needs critical assessment because in reality if we see they have not yet signed the NPT, no CTBT, they have also not signed FMCT, they have also denied Pakistan's offer for nuclear weapons free zone which Pakistan have offered them in the 80s as well to make South Asia a nuclear weapon free zone but the never listen to it. Pakistan also offered them zero missile zone in this region in the 90s but they rejected that as well. The BMD program which is going to impact on the conventional symmetries which is there in Pakistan and India. For example, the S400 and Barak 8 which are long range air defense systems which India is going to acquire from Russia and Israel. These air defense systems have the ability to take out Pakistan's aircraft, missiles and any other thing which is there in the air. S400 is very potent air defense system and India has bought it from Russia recently at the cost of about 5 billion dollars. Its missile travels at the speed of 17000 km per hour which means any aircraft in the world cannot evade the missile of S400. For Pakistan its very dangerous. So this BMD program is a real threat to Pakistan.

Pakistan navy must induct nuclear submarine if it wants to acquire assured second strike capability at sea. But that looks bit tricky at the moment. A nuclear submarine would cost about \$3 billion USD which is beyond Pakistan's financial means. However, Pakistan can overcome this issue with the development of Deep underground silos, nuclear tipped conventional submarines or quantitative increase of nukes. This can't give Pakistan assured second strike capability because

of the conventional submarine which is a diesel submarine actually, so it cannot remain under water for longer period of time. So we need to have a nuclear submarine for assured second strike capability. Second option is to get second strike capability is deep underground tunnels like US and Russia and many other countries have built these underground silos and protected their nuclear warheads under these tunnels. According to CRS report. Pakistan in 2009 built such kind of silos in northern part of Pakistan. Through this capability Pakistan can deter India from any aggressive attacks against Pakistan.

Pakistan has to improve its overall capabilities. For example, India possess spy satellites, RISAT-II which they bought from Israel. G-SAT-1, G-SAT-5, G-SAT-7 are dedicated satellites for their air force, army and navy. This is the area where Pakistan lack such capabilities and don't have space satellites but Pakistan do have AWACS which provide limited surveillance over India and also got some surveillance in the F16 and JF thunder but what a space satellite can do, they can't do it. So there is a need to improve air borne warning and control system so a threat can be detected at a distance and can counter that before it hit.

Apart from that Pakistan must also increase its warheads qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, the S400 and Barak 8 are long range air defense systems which India is going to acquire. To counter these systems Pakistan has developed Ababeel in 2016. Ababeel is a MIRVs and is a simple rocket and one rocket can carry multiple rockets. For example, previously Ghouri had one rocket and one warhead but now one rocket can carry multiple warheads in Ababeel. This is a very potent MIRV and very few countries have developed that. That capability can counter the Indian air defense system like S400 and Barak-8. Other than that Pakistan can also invest in cruise missile capabilities like air launched cruise missile like the one Ra'ad which Pakistan has developed recently. It has a range of about 600 km and is a very potent missile. Other than that Pakistan has

also developed Babar which is again a cruise missile which has a range of about 300 km and is a potent cruise missile. The importance of the cruise missile is that it evades the radars of the enemy as it flies at the lower frequency of the radar. So this is the best system which can evade the Russian and Israeli air defense system in India. Pakistan has already acquired it and is inducting more and more to maintain strategic stability in South Asia (CSIS, 2022).

Moreover, Pakistan should communicate its credibility and capability effectively to counter Indian aggression. Communication is very important in deterrence. For example, recently when India was planning a surgical strike on Pakistan so Imran Khan declared that if India attacked us, we are not going to think, we are going to reply. This is what he did. So the credibility of the communication is very important that who is communicating. So Pakistan army and political leadership conveyed to India that they are going to reply and they did it. In a nutshell, Indian strategic thinking is based on aggressive and intentionally ambiguous doctrine and this particular strategic thinking is going to impact on South Asian security so it's imperative for Pakistan to counter the Indian strategy through adequate steps, tangible steps, things which Pakistan can afford. Furthermore, this doctrine is based on compellence rather than deterrence. Moreover, they are looking for regional hegemony and Pakistan is the only country in South Asia which is challenging the regional hegemony in this region as Pakistan is quite efficient in its conventional and nuclear capabilities and India can never surpass or overrun Pakistan in future.

Chapter 4

Indian Strategic Thinking: Challenges for Pakistan

4. Introduction

The induction of highly advanced weapons and equipment as well as a change in doctrine would put Pakistan in a precarious security situation in South Asia. The conventional imbalances in South Asia would result in a strategic imbalance, allowing the Indian military to take advantage of Pakistan's lack of both conventional and nuclear military capabilities to conduct swift, limited offensive military operations. Such aggressive strategy could rather further destabilize the area and cause chaos. In order to ensure strategic stability in South Asia, Pakistan will also accelerate the induction of latest weapons and gear to compensate for deficiencies in its overall capabilities against Indian military.

The Indian military's shift in doctrine raises the likelihood of a minor skirmish between both nuclear belligerents in South Asia. The likelihood of a total war has decreased since the induction of nuclear weapons. According to Former Ambassador and Executive Director of an Islamabad based think tank CISS, Ali Sarwar Naqvi, "India has been following aggressive military doctrines against Pakistan, especially since the time of the Sunderji doctrine. The transformations in Indian military doctrine have been tactical and operational, but overall objectives have remained the same. Due to Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons and failure of mobilization, India had to move towards a cold start and later land warfare doctrine to prove that they could strike inside Pakistan at will. After failure, in this context, they resorted to a surgical strike, but that also failed after Pakistan's responded in an operation of swift retort" (Naqvi, 2022).

Now, it looks that the Indian military plans to use its Special Forces, cutting-edge helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, or highly modern aircraft to wage an unconventional war or conduct

surgical strikes. India's current administration has made clear that it wants to isolate Pakistan internationally, has succeeded in designating a number of Kashmiri figures as militants, and has vowed to use force if any alleged terrorist action occurs there or in contradiction of Indian forces in Indian held Kashmir (New Land Warfare, 2018).

All of these scenarios would result in a minor or major clash between India and Pakistan along the Line of Control, the Working Boundary, or the International Border. With India's aggressive ideologies in place, the threat of conflict looms over South Asia. The economic situation in Pakistan is getting worse day by day, it does not allow Pakistan for a reckoning arms race with India. Pakistan may overcome this conventional asymmetry through its domestic arms development. Pakistan would require an overhaul, before it can compete with India's military capabilities, which include spy satellites, nuclear submarines, fifth generation aircraft, Long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, Maritime Surveillance aircraft and HIMADS for superior Air Defense capabilities from Russia and Israel.

Pakistan should not engage in an arms race with India. Due to their larger economy, India can afford the force multipliers that were highlighted in the study. According to Michael Kugelman who is Director of South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C, "Pakistan has struggled to attain parity with India's conventional military power, so this means that any evolution in India's strategic thinking is significant for Pakistan. Any change in Indian strategic thinking- and the operational impacts of that-could have implications, and deleterious ones at that, for Pakistan's traditional security" (Kugelman, 2022).

However, If India violates Pakistan's territorial integrity in any way (air strikes, special forces raids, surgical strikes, etc.), Pakistan will first try to dissuade them with conventional means before resorting to nuclear means, especially TNWs which are having the short range and low yield to

counter the Indian army's shallow maneuvers. A risky development in South Asia would be Pakistan's military's heaviest reliance on nuclear weapons. In other words, if the Indians cross the ill-defined red lines, Pakistan will use it. The full spectrum deterrent strategy adopted by Pakistan does not specify when TNWs will be used. The persistent use of CSD, surgical strikes, and an aggressive military buildup by the Indian military, together with regular large-scale military drills, instils doubt and dread in Pakistan.

According to Walter C Ladwig who is the Professor of Kings college London,

By their nature tactical nuclear weapons raise several concerns around early use (i.e. when national survival is not at stake), command & control issues in the midst of a conflict when the “fog of war” descends, as well as the worry that they could be confused for short-range missiles with conventional warheads. Given the prevailing military balance on the Indo-Pak border and the dynamics of Sino-Indian nuclear interactions, tactical nuclear weapons are not needed for deterrence in South Asia (Ladwig, 2022).

By escalating the battle, the Indians might launch similar or significant nuclear strikes that may destroy both states. Due to the fact that the nuclear doctrine of India does not explicitly distinguish between nuclear warheads with tactical and strategic capabilities. The Indian nuclear doctrine also envisages that if Indian forces are attacked anywhere in the world, India would retain the option of nuclear strike. This ambiguity cast doubt on Pakistan's justification for creating and using nuclear weapons for use in war. What if India uses its strategic nuclear weapons to counter Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapon? Such one instance paints a gloomy picture of South Asia's deterrence stability. The doctrinal transformation of Indian military's doctrine and extensive military upgrading and the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons as part of full-spectrum deterrence posture of Pakistan would pose a significant threat to South Asia's deterrence stability. Michael Kugelman- (Director of South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in United States) replied

to a question that how the Indian Military's doctrinal transformation from total war-(Sunderji Doctrine) to limited war-(Cold start/proactive military Ops/New Land warfare doctrine of 2018) and now Surgical Strikes- (post Pulwama situation) would impact Pakistan. He replied that,

It's a logical evolution, given the factor of nuclear weapons. Since both countries went nuclear, India has had to adjust its conventional war strategy, especially as Pakistan has never adapted a no-first-use policy. It is notable however that India has been willing to use conventional force, albeit in limited forms (such as through surgical strikes), under the nuclear umbrella. Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, in other words, did not serve as a deterrent against Indian cross-border activities and surgical strikes" (Balakot most recently). So India has adapted to both countries going nuclear, but Pakistan still has work to do to continue to strengthen its nuclear deterrent against India (Kugelman, 2022).

It is crucial for both India and Pakistan to show restraint, avoid any direct confrontation and cooperate to settle bilateral disputes on friendly terms. The development of both countries would be severely hampered if a confrontation occurred. Limited or total war in South Asia would have significant effects on both the security of the region and the world. The study's next section will look at the potential effects of strategic competition between India and Pakistan on South Asia's deterrence stability. India's ongoing military modernization holds major implications for South Asian security, given that India arguably has the strongest conventional military power of any country in the region. It's also especially impactful for Pakistan, because this Indian military modernization is mostly meant to strengthen India's capacity to build a stronger long-term deterrence against China—Pakistan's close ally—and to build India's overall military capacity, which is an inherent concern for Pakistan, its rival neighbor. India's ongoing efforts to make qualitative and quantitative increase in its military capabilities would adversely impact strategic stability of South Asia. Pakistan faces a security dilemma as a result of the Indian military buildup.

The idea of security dilemma and maximizing security in one state can result in increased insecurity in another state has been discussed by John H. Herz, 1950, since then this idea is being discussed in academic discourses of security dilemma. The core of the security dilemma rests on the assumption that strengthening one country's security can threaten the security of its neighbor. When a country's efforts to strengthen its own security endanger the security of its neighbors. In such a case, a state experiencing a security crisis must take all appropriate measures to better protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because of the concentration of power in the region by the Indian military, Pakistan's security is threatened in the perspective of South Asia. The imbalances in conventional capabilities would produce a gap that the Indian military might at some point exploit. Hence Pakistan was pushed into an arms race due to the security situation.

According to Former Ambassador and Executive Director of an Islamabad based think tank CISS, Ali Sarwar Naqvi, "Clearly, it's going to affect South Asian security stability badly. Pakistan is also trying to use its meagre resources to counter these developments by modernizing its conventional and strategic forces through arms supplies from China and elsewhere" (Naqvi. 2022). This is why the Pakistani military developed battlefield nuclear weapons to counterbalance India's conventional capabilities and prevent any aggressive moves by India's armed forces under their promised Cold Start doctrine or proactive military operations.

Conventional arms race is a serious concern for Pakistan. The Indian military is in close strategic partnership and defense collaborations with major powers like the US, Israel, Russia and EU. This defense collaboration is not only going to boost the Indian military's overall operational capabilities but also to revamp their indigenous defense industry. Any conventional asymmetry and imbalance would create security dilemma in South Asia and force Pakistan to take some steps to balance the Indian military's prowess. The Indian military is rapidly acquiring modern MBTs,

advanced Aircrafts, Gunship Helicopters, Warships, Nuclear and Conventional Submarines, Spy Satellites for Army, Air Force and Navy. All these capabilities would shore up the Indian military's operational preparedness, agility and performance in any conflict with Pakistan. Pakistan would have to rely more on its tactical and strategic nukes to dissuade India from any aggressive move against Pakistan. According to Dr. Adil Sultan, "the advent of TNWs deterred India from embarking on its limited war fighting doctrine, and therefore these could be termed as stabilizing in the region" (Muhammad, 2022). So TNWs are stabilizing factor in South Asia, because it had prevented India from operationalizing its limited war strategies against Pakistan.

Pakistan is primarily dependent on the sea now that the Gwadar port and other CPEC type mega projects have been developed. The Indian Navy would become a deadly force once new weapons and equipment are introduced. Such a large, technologically advanced, and well-equipped Navy with greater reach and devastating fire capability would be a challenge to Pakistan's maritime interests. Keeping in view the present economic challenges, Pakistan navy may face challenges to meet arithmetic arms race with India but at the same time it must protect Pakistan's maritime interests either with indigenous capabilities or with the support of China.

Pakistan has a coastal navy which is aimed to protect its coastal areas only. Pakistan has no aspirations to operate beyond its sea shores. On the other side the Indian navy is aiming to be a huge naval force so they can operate in deep waters, other regions away from their coastal areas. In order to protect its strategic interests in the Arabian Sea, Pakistan has to develop a smaller, sharper, quicker, agile and formidable navy. Second strike capability at sea is must for Pakistan. Although Pakistan nuclearized its submarines with short range Sea Launched Cruise Missiles but that is not going to provide Pakistan with assured second strike capability. A conventional submarine is run on diesel engine which has limited outreach and endurance. However, it has to

come up on surface for refueling and battery recharge. It has to come up after sometime for snorkeling which makes submarines vulnerable for detection and attack by the enemy. Pakistan ultimately needs a nuclear submarine for assured second strike options against India.

As far as arms race in the IAF is concerned, Indian government is mainly relying on French Rafale aircraft and Russian SU-30 MKI aircraft. Both these aircrafts are backbone of the Indian Air Force for any aggressive operations against Pakistan. But at the same time IAF is facing acute shortage of modern aircrafts. The IAF is facing the burden of Russian vintage MIGs and other aircrafts which are likely to retire in near future. That is going to create serious challenges for the IAF to maintain its air superiority against Pakistan and balance of power against China. On the other side Pakistan's position is encouraging. Pakistan in collaboration with China is producing latest aircrafts JF-17 Thunders, J-10s and in future both states would also work for 5th generation aircraft. Such a development would help Pakistan to maintain its conventional deterrence against India.

4.1. Threat to Conventional Deterrence: Arms Race

Conventional deterrence in South Asia is in danger because of the Indian military's mad rush for modern weapons. According to John Mearsheimer, conventional deterrence is aimed at denying the adversary any advantage in the conventional battlefield and make it costly for the aggressor any attack (Mearsheimer, 1983). For Pakistan, an arms race with India is both costly and detrimental to the country's interests. Pakistan must prioritize indigenous defense capabilities while balancing them with nuclear capability in order to maintain strategic parity with India. However, some scholars believe that with Chinese assistance, Pakistan can maintain its arms race with India. There are certain areas where Pakistan is effectively maintaining conventional

deterrence vis-à-vis Indian military. Next part of the study would analyze Pakistan's conventional response to the Indian military's modernization and doctrinal transformation.

4.2. Indo-Pak Symmetries in Main Battle Tanks: T90S MBT vs Al-Khalid MBT

The Indian Army is in contract with Russian government to acquire highly sophisticated T-90S MBTs. These MBTs would give the Indian army an offensive capability against Pakistan and help the Indian army to execute its offensive doctrines against Pakistan. India is mainly relying on Russian Tanks for offensive punch against Pakistan. To offset the Indian Army's conventional superiority in MBTs, Pakistan is developing Al-Khalid MBTs. Al-Khalid MBTs are indigenous and highly sophisticated tanks with night vision capabilities and lethal weaponry. Pakistan upgraded these tanks with the Ukrainian assistance and these MBTs serve as backbone of Pakistan's army. Al-Khalid MBTs can fire eight rounds with greater precision and exactitude. These MBTs would give Pakistan's army offensive punch in case of any land warfare with India.

4.3. Indian Air Defense Capabilities: Threat to Pakistan Air Force

The Indian military is in deal with Russia and Israel to acquire long range air defense systems to maintain dominance against Pakistan Air Force. The S-400 and Barak-8 would shore up the Indian military's air defense capabilities. These capabilities would create serious challenges for Pakistan's conventional capabilities and create a gap for India to carry out surgical strikes against Pakistan or execute its offensive limited war fighting doctrines like CSD, Proactive Military Ops and New Land Warfare Doctrine- (LWD). To counter the IAF's air superiority and HIMADs, Pakistan is in deal with China to induct LOMADs and fifth generation aircraft in future. Any gap in between Nuclear and Conventional capabilities of Pakistan would give the Indian military chance to conduct limited offensive operations or surgical strike which may invite aggressive response from Pakistan.

Pakistan requires flawless air defense capabilities to counter incoming high-tech aircrafts. The Pakistan Army deployed the highly sophisticated air defense system LY-80 on March 12, 2017 to deter any aggressive moves by the Indian Air Force. With increased precision and accuracy, the LY-80 can detect and destroy incoming aerial threats. The advanced features of the LY-80 allow it engage incoming threats at altitudes ranging from 400 meters to 10000 meters, which makes it a serious threat for the Indian Air Force. LY-80 has the attributes to interdict incoming aerial threats at a distance of about 40 kilometers. It is a terrifying weapon for enemy forces, with an 85 percent success rate against combat aircraft and a 60 percent success rate against cruise missiles. The Indian military is planning rapid, intense operations against Pakistan. Any aggressive moves by India would be hampered by such an addition to Pakistan's inventory because of its 12-second reaction time and the ability of each LY-80 unit to intercept four targets at altitudes ranging from 15 to 20,000 meters. Chinese military tested advance version of HQ-16 in 2016 which has the ability to take out targets at a distance of about 70 kilometers which may give Pakistan with greater capabilities to deter any limited intrusion or so called surgical strikes against Pakistan. With these characteristics, LR- SAM would be Pakistan's preferred weapon for deterring Indian military aggression in the region. HIMADs would deprive India of any air superiority while providing credible conventional deterrence. Conventional deterrence, on the other hand, would be detrimental to Pakistan's social welfare. These weapons would have cost money that could have been used for reconstruction, development, education, or human resource development. Because of India's rush to modernize its military, Pakistan has been forced to acquire advance air defense and modern aircraft with the help of China to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

4.4. The Indian Army's Anti-Tank Missiles: Threats to Pakistan's MBTs

India is currently in deal with Israel to induct Anti-Tank missiles to dissuade Pakistan's armor incursions. Israeli Spike Anti Tanks Missiles are highly sophisticated and can seriously harm Pakistani MBTs in case of any conflict situation. Pakistan must also acquire ATGMs to deter the Indian Army's rapid incursions under New Land Warfare Doctrine. In the field of ATGMs the Chinese Army have developed HJ-12 Anti-Tank missiles with greater precision and strike capabilities. The HJ-12 ATGMs is modern capability to deter the Indian Army's rapid incursions under its aggressive doctrines like CSD or proactive military operations. The HJ-12 Anti-Tank missile has the ability to can take out highly advanced moving MBTs at a distance of about 4 kilometers.

4.5. Modern Artillery in the Indian Army: An Offensive Punch

India is equipping its land forces with offensive punch and aggressive capabilities. In this context the Indian army is inducting modern artillery with support of US and South Korea. Indian army is also developing its indigenous Dhanush and ATAGs for an offensive punch. These capabilities would give the Indian army an edge over Pakistan at Line of Control and international border. It would be a grave threat for Pakistan's MBTs, Armor Personnel Carriers and mechanized infantry. Another significant induction is the Dhanush, a locally developed indigenous 155 mm/45 caliber artillery gun that will fill operational gaps in the country's artillery guns. The DRDO is also developing a more advanced Dhanush Artillery capable of 155 mm / 52 Cal. After nearly six years of development and testing, the ATAGS is expected to be ready for production in 2019. The Indian army would benefit greatly from ATAGS long range, light weight, advanced electronics, and computing capabilities. Such weapons are designed for use in mountainous and rugged terrain, such as the Indian Occupied Kashmir- (IOK).

4.6. Pakistan's Artillery Options: Balancing of the Firepower

Pakistan is in process of revamping its artillery to add offensive capabilities and to counter the Indian Army's Artillery fire power. In this regard Pakistan is in collaboration with many friendly states. Pakistan is in deal with South Africa to acquire modern T5-52 Caliber Artillery Guns with potent range of 600 km which has a speed of 85 km. The T5-52 is modern Artillery Gun, which can hit targets at 42 km range. This Artillery would be India specific and could be potent weapon to deter the Indian Army's artillery fire power. The T5-52 artillery system has a capacity of 27 projectiles and 26 charges. It only takes four people a minute to turn this gun on or off. Pakistan's firepower along the Line of Control and the international border would be enhanced with such a system in place. These capabilities would put a stop to India's offensive maneuvering. Pakistan has approached the Siberians for advanced artillery modernization efforts.

The NORA B-52 Siberian Artillery Gun is also being considered by Pakistan's Army. Major General Farhan Akhtar led a high-level Pakistan Army delegation to Serbia recently to discuss areas of mutual interests with his counterpart. Both states agreed to collaborate on the development of advanced weapons and the transfer of technology. Despite the lack of additional information, Pakistan is expected to be negotiating highly advanced Serbian artillery (NORA B-52) for the Pakistan Army. This Artillery Gun is 155 mm 52 Caliber and possess an effective range of about 41 km. The most important feature of this gun is the rapid mobility, shoot and scoot attributes. The NORA Artillery Gun possess 90 km speed with a maximum range of about 1000 km which makes it a lethal weapon against India. The quick mobility, greater firepower and outreach makes this gun a nightmare for the Indian Army's Weapon Locating Radars, because it would quickly change its location after firing shots at Indian Army's outposts. The induction of these guns would add

offensive punch in the Pakistan Army and help Pakistan to maintain balance of power in South Asia vis-a-Indian army.

Pakistan is in process to acquire highly advanced KH179-155 mm howitzers to boost its artillery fire power vis-à-vis India. This artillery has the ability to fire four rounds in one minute at distance of about 30 km. Indian military's rapid modernization drive forced Pakistan to acquire modern artillery guns to maintain strategic balance at the Line of Control and International border. Pakistan will allocate \$855 million dollars on self-propelled howitzers to add lethality in its artillery to dissuade any amour incursion by the Indian Army.

On the maritime front India is leading the race in second strike capability with its nuclear submarines. This is one area where Pakistan is facing challenge. Assured second strike capability at sea provides a country with confidence to launch preemptive strikes against its enemies, pursue its aggressive doctrines/policies, undermine security of its opponent and maintain hegemony in the region. In Indo-Pak context India had acquired nuclear submarines and planning to induct five more in next decade which means that Indian Navy would control the IOR without any hurdle. Now to counter the Indian Naval modernization and acquisition of nuclear submarines, Pakistan has developed Babur-3 submarine launched cruise missile. The Babur-3 has an estimated range of about 700 km which may take out coastal cities of India including Mumbai the financial capital of India. Babur-3 SLCM fitted in a conventional submarines of Pakistan may not be considered as an assured second strike capability but at the same time it may target premium assets of India close to Arabian sea. India can never ignore nuclear tipped Babur-3 SLCM. But for assured second strike capability, Pakistan navy must acquire nuclear submarine with the assistance of China or Russia. A nuclear submarine on lease could be an important step forward in the Indian Ocean Region. The induction of nuclear submarine would give Pakistan an option of assured second strike capability

against arch rival India. On the other hand, it would improve Pakistan's strategic outreach in the IORs and beyond and maintain balance of terror vis-à-vis India.

Indian Army's New Land Warfare doctrines aims at rapid thrusts inside Pakistan with quick and agile force. To give close air support, the Indian ground forces, MBTs, APCs and Mechanized infantry would require highly sophisticated gunship helicopters. In this category the Indian army has acquired highly modern gunship helicopters Apache to support their ambitions to launch limited, quick and swift operations against Pakistan. Pakistan army is also rapidly modernizing its gunship helicopters fleet. Pakistan is in deal with China to induct Z-10 modern helicopters to replace ageing cobra helicopters of the US. Pakistan started acquisition of Z-10 gunships in 2015, these helicopters are equipped with highly advanced HJ-10 anti-tanks missiles and a 23 mm gun with 600 rounds in one-minute ability. These helicopters are also equipped with night vision capabilities which means Pakistan army will be ready for any contingency and will respond to any incursion in befitting manner. The Z-10 helicopters would help Pakistan army to provide close air support to MBTs and APCs. Moreover, it would also limit the advance of Indian mechanized forces. In an overall scenario, the Z-10 helicopters would improve Pakistan army's ability to carry out offensive operations against the adversary. Pakistan army is also looking for other options as well in the category of gunship helicopters.

The Russian MI-35 is another choice for Pakistan. Recently Pakistan army inducted highly sophisticated MI-35 Helicopters from Russia to boost its overall operational capabilities. Pakistan ordered four MI-35 helicopters from Russian in 2015 and in two years' time, Pakistan received all four. These helicopters are used for multi-purposes which includes special operations, rescue missions, surveillance & reconnaissance missions and for close air support of the ground forces. The MI-35 has the ability to carry out missions in all weather conditions which makes it a lethal

machine against enemy. Because of its lethal weapons, superior firepower and highly advanced specifications, it is also known as flying tank in strategic circles.

4.7. Possibility of Limited War: Doctrinal Shift in India

Doctrinal shift in India is primarily focusing on limited war under the nuclear overhang. The nuclearization of South Asia does not allow India to go for all-out war options against Pakistan. Balance of terror prevents India from any total or major war against Pakistan. This is the reason that India is now resorting to limited war options, but after the induction of tactical nukes by Pakistan, India shelved CSD/Proactive military operations. But India's eagerness to carry out surgical strikes well below the nuclear threshold of Pakistan created serious challenges for the strategic stability of South Asia. India's surgical strike in Pakistan would invite befitting response, which may start a limited war between the two nuclear weapon states. A limited war may not remain limited if one side faces more losses, which may force the losing side to add more troops and firepower. A limited war can become a total war within no time which may escalate into a full blown nuclear conflict. Such a scenarios are terrifying and may create serious challenges for the nuclear deterrence in South Asia. According to Walter C Ladwig who is the Professor at Kings College London, "The most likely trigger for a military clash between India and Pakistan remains a major terrorist attack in India that is linked back to Pakistan. In so far as terrorist groups are prevented from acting, military doctrines and force structure changes are of minimal relevance" (Ladwig, 2022). India always blame Pakistan for its failures in IHK. The Indian military's strategic thinking is aggressive and creating serious troubles for deterrence stability in South Asia. The Indian military's rapid modernization would force Pakistan to go for countermeasures. Indian military modernization would fill the operational gaps in the Indian military, allowing it to carry out quick and swift operations in accordance with its aggressive doctrine. According to

Commodore (retd) Asif Saleem, “Indian canny diplomacy and its propping up as a bulwark against China have given India unprecedented access to Western technology besides its traditional sources of military supplies from Russia and Israel. This has allowed India to accumulate military hardware at will, making it a lucrative market and fueling its jingoistic ambitions. This is further complicating the security situation in South Asia where this build-up is primarily directed against Pakistan and even beyond, China. The frequent and deadly Indo-China clashes in Laddakh over the last two years have had one mitigating effect; the India-Pakistan LOC truce has been held and the Indians have calibrated to focus on the India-China LAC situation. Violence along the LOC likely will resurface, once the Indians are able to stabilize the situation along the LAC” (Saleem, 2023). The Indian political and military leadership has agreed, and there has been a significant shift in their overall strategic thinking toward Pakistan. To avoid protracted wars, the plan is now to conduct shallow amour thrusts or hot pursuit sub-conventional operations in order to evade global diplomatic backlash and also not to cross Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Any limited or total war would be disastrous for South Asia's security. A limited war in South Asia is possible. As a result, waging a limited war would be a risk for both South Asian nuclear powers. Pakistan may not regard a limited war with India as such. What if Pakistan's response endangers the Indian military even more? Under public pressure, the Indian military may escalate the conflict, potentially leading to a nuclear exchange. According to AMB Naqvi, “They could show flexibility on the core issues that have served as brakes on any progress in ties. Reduce the toxicity in the political atmosphere. Try to work on common challenges that cut across borders, such as cooperation on climate change. The real problem is the Kashmir issue which must be resolved to bring about real strategic stability in South Asia” (Naqvi, 2022). Confrontation between India and Pakistan would lead this region to further instability and turmoil. Because one's friends can be

changed but one's neighbors cannot, both states must learn to coexist as good neighbors. Pakistan is prepared to go to any length to avoid a conventional South Asian war. According to Dr. Adil Sultan, "The possibility of a limited war cannot be completely ruled out between the two countries due to the nature of their relations and the unresolved disputes. However, between two nuclear armed neighbors any conflict would have the possibility of escalating to an all-out war" (Muhammad, 2022). Pakistan cannot afford an expensive arms race with India after losing more than \$150 billion in the war on terror over the last 20 years. Pakistan's fragile economic situation precludes an arithmetic arms acquisition. This is the reason that Pakistan developed TNWs to deter Indian military's aggression, whether through CSD or proactive military operations. It is the first time that TNWs have been developed and deployed in South Asia. Because the region's two nuclear weapon states share a vast border as well as long-standing animosities and unresolved issues dating back to their 1947 independence.

4.8. The Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Cold War Experience

The tactical nukes were developed during the cold war by the Soviets and US led NATO to deter each other from any limited war. There was parity at top level but the possibility of limited nuclear strike pushed the US and Soviets to develop short range with limited yield power and limited objectives. The idea of TNWs worked during the Cold War and gave an impetus to India and Pakistan to follow suit and develop such a capability to deter the adversary of any conventional edge. Indian military's conventional edge against Pakistan prompted TNWs induction. The TNWs would help Pakistan to deter the Indian military's aggressive CSD/Proactive military Ops or quick incursions under the New Land Warfare Doctrine. According to Former Ambassador and Executive Director of an Islamabad based think tank CISS, Ali Sarwar Naqvi, "Tactical nuclear weapons are a stabilizing factor in the South Asian nuclear equation. They were developed only

in the wake of the Indian cold start doctrine. Indian strategy of attacking Pakistan and taking enough territory to keep it as a bargaining chip without crossing the nuclear threshold showed the Indian willingness to escalate the crisis and destabilize regional stability. TNWs are aimed at deterring enemy forces and thus maintaining stability and neutralizing the threat posed by the cold start doctrine” (Naqvi, 2022).

Pakistan's TNWs may deter India from engaging in CSD or proactive military operations, what about surgical strikes'? To deter such operations, Pakistan must counter this emerging strategic challenge with superior conventional military capabilities. Apart from these difficulties, the South Asian region would face a plenty of threats. Indian expert Bharat Karnad also viewed that tactical nukes played an important role in deterring a conventional war in South Asia. He was of the view that,

Pakistan has so far successfully used tactical nukes to deter India from waging a full scale conventional war. But there's always the danger of Pakistan Army relying overmuch on tactical nukes because India can always call Pakistan's bluff. Any engagement, as I have argued, that starts with tactical nuke use will end in a nuclear conflagration in which Pakistan's survival would be at stake. So, I do not see the very professional Pakistan Army ever risking that kind of catastrophe for any reason (Karnad, 2021).

The induction of tactical nukes by Pakistan deterred India from executing its limited war doctrines against Pakistan. Battlefield nuclear weapons in South Asian context serve only one purpose to avoid limited incursions into Pakistan's territory. It serves no offensive purpose, however, the Indian scholars believe that it would threaten the deterrence stability in South Asia. Because any miscalculation, accident or preemptive strike may ignite conflict between India and Pakistan which may escalate into a full blown conventional or nuclear war. Such a scenario is dangerous and risky.

It is necessary that India must avoid any aggressive posture or doctrine against Pakistan and resort to regular peace talks to resolve all issues amicably.

A big change came in 1971 when India defeated Pakistan and after that they came up with the idea that we have to now develop three Strike Corps and we have to develop overwhelming mechanized forces so we can again penetrate into Pakistan and cut it into two. This was the idea after 1971. In 1980s this idea was called as Sunderji doctrine. Sunderji was an army chief who wanted to execute this idea. In 1986/1987 India carried out large scale military exercises on the border with Pakistan and those war games were known as brass-tacks exercises. The idea was to attack Pakistan and penetrate deep inside and to cut Pakistan into two. Sunderji doctrine had two aspects. One was to defeat Pakistan militarily, and the other was to destroy Pakistan's nuclear program with the assistance of Israel. Pakistan survived both situations because it countered the threat in both conventional and unconventional ways (Cohn, 2011).

Pakistan conducted Zarb-e-Momin exercises across the border with India in response to India's Brass-Tacks exercises. These were large scale military exercises which actually prevented India from any unconventional attack against Pakistan. Secondly the non-conventional response was that AQ Khan on the direction of President General Zia gave an interview to AK Nayyar and Mushahid Hussain Syed in which he declared that Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state and let it be clear that if any country tries to attack Pakistan, Pakistan will respond with full might. Pakistan developed nuclear weapon by that time and had the capability also to deliver the nuclear weapons. In 1998 Pakistan and India became nuclear weapon states. In 1999 Pakistan initiated a conflict in Kargil. Kargil conflict was a response to 1984 India's intrusion of Siachen glacier. India captured Siachen glacier and violated Simla agreement between India and Pakistan. In 1999 Pakistan did the same and captured Kargil. The plan was to put pressure on India to leave Siachen and negotiate

a solution to the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. The mistake on Pakistan's side was not to involve the political leadership at large and whole military in the matter and because of that India manipulated that particular weakness of Pakistan because Pakistan declared that they are Mujahideen and not regular forces because of which Pakistan could not deploy air defense or air force. After 1999 general VP Malik came up with the idea in 2000 in a seminar in which he said that limited war under nuclear umbrella is possible in South Asia. This was the start of thinking that if you can't fight a large scale conventional war against Pakistan, then you should go for a limited war. So the idea of Cold Start originated from there. In 2003/2004 India came up with the idea of Cold Start doctrine in their strategic community and they carried out numerous military exercises to test this doctrine.

After 2004 India officially focused on this but they never declared that they got such type of limited war strategy against Pakistan. So they kept on improving Cold Start until 2008 when Mumbai attacks occurred. The idea of Cold Start was simple that if any terrorist attacks occurred in India, India will carry out multiple attacks against Pakistan and those attacks would be limited and under the nuclear overhang. For Cold Start to execute, India would need overwhelming air superiority, good mechanized forces, high speed mechanized forces for example modern tanks like T-90S and APCs etc., modern helicopters, modern aircraft for backup, air defense, artillery. So all these capabilities would be required to execute this strategy. India had no such capabilities by 2008. After Mumbai attacks they could not execute Cold Start doctrine against Pakistan although they wanted to carry out surgical strike against Pakistan which Pakistan categorically conveyed clearly to India that Pakistan is not involved in Mumbai attacks so don't try to attack us in a surgical strike manner. After 2008 India started working on Cold Start more seriously. They added more and

more weapon and equipment and carried out many deals with US, Europe, Israel, Russia, just to improve their overall military capabilities.

After 2009, Pakistan came up with the response to Cold Start doctrine of India. The idea was basically that India would shrink their forces from large scale course to small IBGs and these would have around 25000, a division size force in every IBG to conduct quick and swift i.e.; decisive operations against Pakistan. In 2011, Pakistan came up with the counter response to Cold Start doctrine. Pakistan introduced tactical nuclear weapons after that and in which Pakistan clearly conveyed this message to India officially that this tactical nuclear weapon with a range of 70 kilometers with shoot and scoots attributes having a yield power of 0.5 kilo tons to 5 kilo tons is only to counter Indian offensive Cold Start doctrine which India always rejected. Senior officer of Pakistan Navy, Commodore (retd) Asif Saleem also emphasized that CSD or other Limited War strategies were effectively deterred through TNWs. He was of the view that, “with the Cold Start/ Proactive Operations Strategy, the Limited War option was repeatedly cited in Indian strategic circles as a credible means to teach Pakistan a lesson while remaining below the nuclear threshold. The advent of TNWs (NASR) has in effect put a lid on this kind of Limited War military option in the rational domain, giving a boost to strategic stability” (Saleem, 2023).

Pakistan gave this particular statement that why we developed tactical nuclear weapons, because of the Cold Start doctrine/doctrinal transformation in India, because of military modernization which is going to help India to operationalize their doctrine. CSD or proactive military operations. Moreover, India’s involvement in Afghanistan which was creating a two front dilemma for Pakistan. This was Pakistan’s rationale that we don’t want war in this region, a limited even, that’s why we developed tactical nuclear weapons just to deter India from carrying out any sort of attack against Pakistan.

In 2012, India came up with the idea of air force doctrine of 2012 in which India said that if US can do it then why not us. If US can carry out surgical strikes against Osama Bin Ladin, why not India can carry out surgical strikes against the alleged militant groups across the line of control. This was the idea which India wanted to execute and India introduced this doctrine of sub-conventional warfare in 2012 that now India may carry out surgical strikes. Surgical strike which is an air force concept in which the air force would go to a certain area and will carry out an operation and will come back unhurt without any casualties and achieve the targets. So this was the idea behind surgical strikes which US did against Osama Bin Ladin. US can do that because they have got the capabilities but India cannot do that. However, India insisted on this idea, and after 2012, they continued to work on it because large-scale conflict was not possible due to nuclear weapons. Pakistan also neutralized limited war by two means.

The first was conventional, when Pakistan began military exercises Azm-e-Nau in 2009 to practice the concept of offensive defense. For example, if India tried to attack Pakistan, Pakistan will respond in a same manner. Secondly the non-conventional response was NASR-IX. According to Dr. Toby Dalton, "The supposed stability benefits of TNW have been oversold in Pakistan –India was (and remains) extremely unlikely to do a Cold Start operation, especially if there is no conflict catalyst originating from Pakistan. The escalation risks have probably also been overhyped, given the very low probability of an operation that would require their use. That said, the nuclear security risks of TNW and overall expansion of nuclear arsenals are significant" (Dalton, 2022). With this Pakistan countered India's limited war doctrine after which India was compelled to carry out sub-conventional warfare doctrine in 2012. After 2012 India improved its overall capabilities and they kept on improving carrying out military exercises. In 2017 India came up with another declared doctrine called as joint armed forces doctrine in which again India emphasize on the idea of

surgical strikes and greater coordination among all forces. But the most important doctrine was Land warfare doctrine of 2018 in which India came up with the idea that India is going to reform its military and they are going to change the military's orientation, for example, previously the size of IBGs were of 25000 soldiers in Cold Start doctrine. In this particular doctrine, they are going to have a smaller force, well equipped and quick and swift force and a modernized force and the size would be of 8 to 9 battalions which is equal to 8000 to 9000 troops. So they are trying to shrink the warfare. First Pakistan thought that it would attack with tactical nuclear weapon on 25000 force. Now on 8000 to 9000 force, Pakistan have to engage India conventionally first and then at the end will use nuclear weapon if it is needed. But nuclear weapon is only for deterrence and is a weapon of last resort, so Pakistan have to beat them conventionally. Senior officer of the Pakistan Navy opined on the restructuring of the Indian Army's IBGs, that "threatening postures and aggressive doctrines such as Cold Start with 8-9 IBGs may be a useful war gaming and coercive tool, but its actualization has been rendered untenable as discussed. This, however, must be deemed to exist in a rational decision-making process, barring any miscalculation!" (Saleem, 2023).

Now the challenges in that are that India will become a 5 trillion dollars' economy by 2025. Secondly India is well connected with US, Russia, Israel and even Europe. The economy is strong, alliances are in place, is well connected to the rest of the world, and can afford a limited war in South Asia, whereas Pakistan cannot. As a result, Pakistan would be forced to rely on nuclear weapons. Secondly in Land Warfare doctrine India talk about surgical strike which is of punitive responses which means to counter proxy war from Pakistan, India will carry out punitive responses against Pakistan which means that India will conduct a surgical strike to counter alleged Pakistan's proxy war in the IHK or in the region. Senior Pakistan Navy officer commodore (retd) Asif Saleem,

“I reckon Surgical Strikes would continue to be a real challenge in Pakistan-India military scenarios, more so, because the last such attempt by the Indians had ended in a devastating blow that they would undoubtedly seek to redeem” (Saleem, 2023).

In 2019 India wanted to operationalize its New Land Warfare doctrine by conducting surgical strikes inside Pakistan. But Pakistan’s effective response on Indian side of LOC established conventional deterrence in the region. Now the current situation is that the doctrine has been published by India and there is no upgraded version still. Most probably this will remain there for the longer period of time. India is now trying to execute this doctrine in which India is modernizing its military force. They are buying new weapons, S-400, Barak-8, buying new aircrafts, even dealing with US for F-16 plant in India. They are going to have all these capabilities. Buying new artillery, weapon locating radars, gunship helicopters, apache, T-90s tanks, so these are all the things which are required for quick and swift operations which are required to execute the new Land Warfare doctrine. Although, Brigadier (ret’d) Tahir Mahmood believe that

Pakistan is not facing any traditional security threat from India because there no major imbalance of power. He was of the view, that “As far as threat to Pakistan’s traditional security is concern, despite that they have changed their doctrines like you know from total war to limited war and now surgical strikes, till the time Pakistan maintains the force ratio and capability ratio vis-à-vis India and it’s not overwhelmingly in favor of India. As such there is no fatal, lethal or very dangerous threat to Pakistan’s traditional security because Pakistan can mount a matching response to India in case of war (Mehmood, 2022).

The surgical strike concept is still there but they are not having the capabilities yet through which they can go for surgical strikes. Surgical strike is possible between India and Pakistan. If India can do that, Pakistan can also do that. But in future if India acquire modern aircrafts like Rafale, SU-30, advanced version or F-16 plus S-400 and Barak-8 which is long-range air defense. Then India

can carry out surgical strike again in Pakistan and Pakistan's air defense can't cover the whole territory and they can shoot down Pakistan's air force. So because of such changes the strategic stability is in danger. So we had no other option than to response if India carried out any attack.

5. Conclusion

The Indian Military's rapid and continuous doctrinal transformation is a serious threat to the strategic stability of South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. The Indian military's threat perception revolves around China and Pakistan but their military deployment is largely against Pakistan, which clearly depict that India will be reluctant to execute any of its doctrine against China because of its strategic prowess vis-à-vis India. Indian military doctrinal shift took place mainly after the nuclearization of South Asia. Previously India focused on large mechanized thrusts to penetrate deep inside Pakistan and challenge the territorial integrity of the country. But after the nuclearization and failure of operation Prakram the Indian military had to rethink and introduced new strategies and doctrines to maintain strategic edge against Pakistan. This was turning point in the Indian strategic thinking and they reluctantly introduced Cold Start Doctrine and proactive military operations to add new flare into the nuclear South Asia. This time India came up with the idea of limited war under the nuclear overhang which posed serious ramification for South Asian security.

Pakistan countered CSD with some effective counter offensive conventional strategies under Azm-I-Nau exercises. But the most important step by Pakistan's strategic thinkers was Tactical Nuclear Weapons. The Cold War experience of the NATO and Soviet Union motivated Pakistan to add full spectrum nuclear deterrence at lower level to deny India any conventional superiority and deter it from any limited conventional operations under the nuclear umbrella. The adequate answers to Indian military's doctrinal shift from Pakistan frustrated the Indian strategic doers and they resorted to undermine non-traditional security of Pakistan. Soon after the Mumbai attacks India alleged that Pakistan was involved in this heinous crime and wanted launch surgical strikes. But neither India could execute its limited war Cold Start doctrine nor it could carry out surgical strikes.

The reason was lack of offensive capabilities for the execution of limited war operations and lack of element of surprise in case of surgical strikes. Frustration in the Indian camp was obvious during that period which resulted in the formation of Technical Support Division under former Indian Army Chief General (retd) V.K. Singh. The idea of TSD was to launch covert operations inside Pakistan, ignite local insurgencies specially BLA in Balochistan and fund, nurture & train TTP and their affiliates to create subversion in Pakistan.

Chapter three of the study discussed this issue in detail that how the Indian policy makers undermined Pakistan's non-traditional security through their hybrid warfare against Pakistan. A hybrid war can hurt Pakistan in different ways. Misinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and other non-military tactics all have the potential to impact various non-traditional security spheres in Pakistan, and a variety of important spaces on the whole. Sensitive information on Pakistan's government websites, for example, could be hacked or otherwise compromised. Critical online infrastructure, such as air traffic control systems, could be at risk. Misinformation and disinformation campaigns, presumably those that make false allegations or make Pakistan look bad, are also dangerous as this could impact public opinion in Pakistan and public opinion more broadly. They could also raise tensions between India and Pakistan and raise the risk of reactive escalatory tactics in Pakistan that make conflict more likely.

The hybrid war strategy of India actually proved to be successful. Since the establishment of TSD in 2009, Indian covert operations inside Balochistan and KPK (ex-FATA) region intensified and Pakistan suffered heavy human and economic losses. However, Indian military's doctrinal transformation also continued even after the induction of TNWs by Pakistan in 2011 and forced the Indian policy makers to think out of the box now. In 2012 India brought shift its IAF doctrine and introduced sub conventional warfare strategy which emphasized on surgical strikes. The

Indian Air Force introduced new doctrine in which they emphasized on one point that the IAF may conduct sub-conventional operations or in other words may carry out surgical strikes across the Line of Control or international boundary of Pakistan. Such a change was obvious because of Pakistan's lowering of nuclear threshold. It was riskier for India to execute its limited war doctrines against Pakistan while knowing the fact that TNWs are deployed on the border. The induction of battlefield nuclear weapons actually forced India to focus on surgical strikes options because it would serve a few purposes, it would help to woo the Indian public, in case of any alleged terrorist attacks, improve the standing of Indian government and increase their vote bank. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi used surgical strike drama to garner votes in upcoming elections. In reality it is a well-known fact that if India can carry out surgical strikes, Pakistan has the ability to do quid pro quo plus. This was demonstrated by Pakistan Air Force after Balakot Surgical Strike by the IAF. Indian military's insistence of surgical strike will only serve political purpose back home; it won't have any strategic benefit unless India overcome deficiencies in its overall military capabilities.

The study analyzed that India lacks an effective air defense capabilities and also short of few squadrons to maintain air superiority against Pakistan. Indian military is in process of procuring long range air defense systems which may undermine Pakistan's future aerial operations against India. It would be riskier for any commander in Pakistan to send his aircraft across the border knowing the fact that the Indian side has deployed highly sophisticated lethal air defense systems, which may destroy incoming aerial threats with greater precision and accuracy. Such a development would be a serious challenge for the strategic stability of South Asia. In continuation to the doctrinal shift the Indian military published Joint Armed Forces doctrine in 2017, in which again the emphasis was on surgical strikes with greater coordination among all the forces.

Ultimately in 2018 the Indian Army introduced Land Warfare doctrine which envisaged India's strategic approach in the region towards Pakistan.

The Land Warfare doctrine of 2018 has been focus of the study, because no major studies have taken place so far on this issue. The LWD mainly focus on India's warfighting options and priorities against China and Pakistan but their main focus is Pakistan because of its military deployment against the country. The LWD is actually mixture of all previous doctrines in last two decades which emphasizes not only on limited war options but also talks about surgical strikes, force modernization, restructuring of the integrated battle groups etc. This doctrine is significant because India soon after this doctrine tried surgical strikes in Pakistan but failed. The study discussed in details about the LWD and its implications for Pakistan. The study considers that doctrinal shift in the Indian military is real and entails serious implications for nuclear South Asia and beyond. India's persistence with aggressive military policies would push this region towards further mayhem and turmoil.

The Indian military wants to capitalize on Pakistan's political, economic, and strategic vulnerabilities to maintain hegemony in the region. However, any aggressive posture by India would invite severe backlash and response from Pakistan military which may push India to go farther surgical strikes or limited war operations. Any escalation between the two nuclear belligerents would have serious consequences for South Asian security. For China they have got only two mountain divisions. Pakistan's deployment is also against India and the strategic thinking is also against India.

The change took place in the Indian strategic thinking when India came up with the idea of Sunderji doctrine after 1971. The idea of Sunderji doctrine was that India wanted to cut Pakistan into two in 1980s and conducted Brass-tacks war-games in 1986-87 to attack Pakistan and brought about

340,000 troops on the border with Pakistan which Pakistan countered with the visit of General Zia-ul-Haq and the interview of AQ Khan. That was the first step which Pakistan took and deterred India in the 80s. Later on India tried to execute their Sunderji doctrine again in 2001 and 2002 after the Indian parliament attack. At that time most of their strike corps were deep inside India for example, Mathura, Ambala and Bhopal and they brought these forces to the border with Pakistan which took almost 27 days, so the element of surprise was gone and Pakistan also brought their forces. It was not easy for India to attack Pakistan. India had to de-escalate. During this India lost their 1800 soldiers. This was the turning point in Indian strategic thinking and India after that came up with the idea of Cold Start doctrine in 2004. The idea was of limited war under nuclear overhang. Cold Start doctrine is a very simple doctrine in which India believed that if anything happens in India or Indian held Kashmir i.e., any sort of terrorist attack, India will carry out quick and swift operation against Pakistan and these operations would be limited so Pakistan cannot use nuclear weapons. Moreover, these operations would be synergetic i.e., army, air force, navy and would be launched by integrated battle groups which would be deployed on border. Now India will be able to carry out attack against Pakistan within 4 to 5 days. In response Pakistan also came up with the idea of counter measures and develop two things. First was that Pakistan developed its conventional capabilities during Azm-e-Nau exercises and secondly Pakistan developed tactical nuclear weapons in 2011 because of which India could not operationalize its limited war option against Pakistan.

The second idea was of hybrid warfare of 2008. India introduces this new strategy and tried to launch it against Pakistan. Although Hybrid war is not a new phenomenon and has been an integral part of war from the very beginning. The term 'hybrid' has mainly been used for political reasons. to deflect focus from own failures. I don't see much substance in the narrative of hybrid war or the

5th generation warfare. The socio-economic vulnerabilities, ethnic vulnerabilities, political vulnerabilities, economic vulnerabilities, geo-strategic vulnerabilities of a country on which the enemy capitalize is called hybrid warfare strategy. They spread fake news, propaganda, diplomatic onslaught, offensive diplomacy, try to regionally isolate, covert operations, proxy wars, all these elements are part of hybrid warfare. After 2011 Pakistan came up with the idea of tactical nuclear weapons and deterred Indian military from any aggressive move under CSD. After that in 2012 India came up with the idea of another doctrine the Air Force doctrine of 2012 according to which India can carry out sub-conventional warfare against Pakistan which means that Indian air force may carry out sub-conventional warfare across the border with Pakistan in which they may carry out joint operations and special heli-borne operations etc. Since 2012 they practiced it and again in the Joint Armed Forces doctrine of 2017, India emphasized on surgical strikes with greater coordination among all the forces. So the evolution in the strategic thinking of India came with time.

Indian military in 2018 introduced new doctrine which was the mixture of all previous doctrines. The New Land Warfare Doctrine of 2018 is the most dangerous thing for Pakistan in which the first thing is multi-front scenario which means that India will develop capabilities to take on Pakistan on the western front and China on the northern front which means that India will develop its capabilities against Pakistan and China at the same time which cannot be happen because China is way ahead of India politically, economically and strategically. So it is obvious that Pakistan is the main target. Mainly all the deployments are against Pakistan. India is going to deploy its smaller forces on the border with Pakistan and they are going to develop these capabilities to take on Pakistan in future.

The second thing in this doctrine is likely composition of IBGs which are integrated battle groups in which units of army, air force, special forces, helicopters, artillery, air defense are included. The size of IBGs also shrank in this doctrine. Previously the size of IBG was of division size which comprised of about 25000 of troops. But now in this doctrine the size shrunk to 8000 to 9000 troops would definitely be a question mark for Pakistan that whether Pakistan will use tactical nuclear weapon in counter response. Basically India wants to engage Pakistan in a conventional war and that will be way costly for Pakistan because India can afford weapons, can afford war and is well connected with US, Israel, Russia, European Union when it comes to force modernization. Apart from that India has got the economy of about 3.8 trillion dollars. So basically India wants to engage Pakistan in conventional war and further cripple its economy. Another point which comes under this doctrine is the modernization of its military. They are going to modernize their overall military machine and this is what they are doing in the recent past. If we look at the air force, they are improving their air force. If they want to create air supremacy against Pakistan, they need 42 squadrons, they are having 33 squadrons right now. But in future they are going to buy more and more air crafts for example, today they have got Sukhoi MKI aircraft which is very important aircraft and India have about 275 of these aircrafts.

The second important thing in this category is Rafale which they are buying from France. They are also in negotiations with US for F-16 and F-18 and are also with negotiations with European firms for aircrafts. All these things may create gap between India and Pakistan. India is also acquiring transport and logistics aircrafts for quick mobilization of troops and weapons etc. In this category India is buying aircrafts from US for example, Hercules, Globe Master and Chinook are all US made. Another important thing is Apache helicopter. For quick and swift operations, there is a need of close air support and this helicopter which is also called as flying tank will provide

India a greater punch against Pakistan. The tanks would have a greater cover. These helicopters fly at low altitude and they can take out Pakistan's air defense as well. So in this situation it's going to be a serious challenge for Pakistan in the coming years.

Moreover, India is also improving its overall Network Centric and Electronic Warfare capabilities in which they are buying modern weapons and modern radars. Radars are important because it detects the incoming aircraft for surveillance and reconnaissance. In this category they are buying different things with the help of Israel and other major powers. For example, LORROS is deployed on the LOC and can detect anything at the range of about 16 km and is with the night vision capability also because of which India effectively cover the movement in Kashmir. Another example of network centric warfare capability is that a commander sitting in a room with his laptop is connected with satellites, aircrafts, helicopters, tanks in the field and also commandos in the field. This is such a capability which improves the synergy and integration of the forces.

Another important thing in this category is battlefield surveillance radar to detect, track and classify target. Recently India also added weapon locating radar which detects incoming artillery, mortar shells and short range rocket sites and they can carry out precision strikes on Pakistan's areas and because of such capabilities several Pakistan's soldiers have lost their lives in recent past on LoC. India is also developing AeW&CS which has the ability to detect incoming missiles, drones and aircrafts with a range of 200 km. In this category India is also getting armed UAVs from Israel. India is buying Heron TP drones from Israel which has a range of about 15 hours and can carry out surveillance, reconnaissance, and observation on targets and can take out the target without any problem. In future India can carry out drone strikes against Pakistan which can be a serious concern for Pakistan. India is also buying another important drone from Israel known as Harpy missile. Harpy actually detects the radars and destruct itself on that particular radar. It's a

suicidal drone basically. The advance category of Harpy missile is Harop missile which is also Israeli made and India is buying this missile which is the advanced version of Harpy missile having the range double of it and can hover over the target for 6 hours. Harop basically targets the radar sites, strategic installations, arm depots, bunkers, missile sites, command and control vehicles which are deployed in the field etc. India is also improving its ISR capabilities i.e., intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. In this category they are buying spy satellites with the help of Israel and other countries. Pakistan does not have spy satellites but India has them. It can provide them with 24/7 observation against the targets, positions, troop movements, missile sites, deployment, strategic installations. All these things are under observation and it can easily take out those targets. It can be a dangerous thing for Pakistan.

India is buying more satellites for example, previously they had RISAAT-II satellite which they bought from Israel but in modern time India is buying other designated spy satellites for their army, navy and air force. For navy the satellite is known as Rukmini in 2013 having about 4000 km of footprint. It would link the information flow among its warships, aircrafts, submarines, land based communication systems synergy and integrations. For army India has launched GSAT-6 which have an utmost strategic importance given that Indian soldiers operating in diverse terrain. It provides quality and secure communications. It would free the soldiers to carry bulky communication equipment in the battlefield. For air force India has launched GSAT-7 in 2018 which is a geostationary satellite with a life span of 8 years. It will also boost the Indian air force network centric warfare capabilities and enhance its global operations. This satellite was launched essentially to cater to the requirements of Indian air force. Apart from that India is also improving its overall capabilities in army by making it as a modern force in which their weapons, gadgets and the light armor etc. would be added. India is also buying T-90 tanks which is definitely one of

the most advanced tanks in the world and they are buying this tank from Russia and they will provide about 2000 tanks to India. India is going to deploy these tanks against Punjab and Rajasthan border areas with Pakistan. It has got night vision capabilities-thermal imaging and it's also equipped with lethal anti-tank missiles and has a range of about 550 kilometers. India is also getting long range air defense capabilities with the help of Israel and Russia. India is getting S-400 from Russia which has a maximum range of about 400 km and Barak 8 from Israel which has a range of 70 to 100 km. These systems basically are going to create a virtual shield and Pakistan's missiles, air force and UAVs will be unable to penetrate the Indian air space. Moreover, India is buying modern artillery like the ultralight Howitzer artillery, the Dhanush artillery system, advanced towed artillery system from US and also manufacturing itself which is also going to create a serious challenge for Pakistan.

Hybrid warfare is also part of this new strategy. Basically it's a mixture of different strategies in which the enemy is attacked directly or indirectly through different strategies. Sometimes state actors are involved and sometimes non-state actors are involved. For example, Kulbushan Yadav was a state actor who was an officer of Indian Navy. And if they are using TTP so it comes under non-state actor. Apart from that flexible or fluid adversary, offensive diplomacy in which the enemy is undermined at international level. Media campaign, fake news, propaganda is done in hybrid warfare. Proxy wars, engineered social movements, cyber-attacks, terrorism and insurgencies, covert operations all these comes under the category of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare was launched on Pakistan by India since 1947. Mukti Bahini is the classical example of hybrid warfare in which India carried out propaganda. India supported proxy war there, did terrorism and extremism and provided them funds and ultimately Pakistan was dismembered. In 1980s the top spies of India were sent to Pakistan like Ravinder Kaushik, Surjeet Singh and Sarabjit

Singh etc., but hybrid warfare after 2008 was worse than ever after Mumbai attack in which India lost about 177 people. India carried out secret and covert operations against Pakistan and made a secret unit known as Technical Support Division in 2009 under the supervision of General V.K Singh and the main objectives were to take out core leadership of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and avenge the Mumbai attacks, to buy loyalties of the Kashmiri leaders and to tackle the Naxalite movements. So India carried out three main operations. The first one was operation deep strike which was against Pakistan. Second was operation Rehber in the Indian occupied Kashmir and the third one was operation seven sisters against Naxalite movements. Under operation deep strike, in 2013 the security chief of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba Khalid Bashir was abducted from Lahore by India and later on after getting the information from him, he was killed. Kulbushan Yadav joined technical services division between 2010-2012 and then came to Pakistan as an Indian spy.

Another important point in this new strategic thinking is surgical strikes. India tried a bogus surgical strike in 2016 by Indian army but that was rejected by Pakistan because surgical strike is an air force concept. In this new doctrine India talked about punitive responses which means surgical strikes, which means that India may carry out surgical strikes inside Pakistan. In Surgical strike aircrafts, armed UAVs, special forces gunship helicopters can be used. The recent surgical strike of 2019 which India carried out inside Pakistan was by their air force but India could not have achieved its target and ultimately the pilot was captured by Pakistani forces. The next day, Pakistan in response carried out successful surgical strikes inside India and engaged 6 targets in K.G top, Bhimber Gali and Naryan sector. India in future may carry out surgical strikes through their drones, special forces etc.

Another important point in this doctrine is the strategic alliances i.e., India is carrying out military diplomacy with other countries. For example, with Israel, as it's a nuclear weapon state leading in

network centric and electronic warfare capabilities, radars and acquire other modern capabilities. India have also deep rooted ties with USA, Russia and Europe and is buying modern weapons and technologies from them. Moreover, India talks about military exercises. India carried out several military exercises with its strategic alliances and independently as well. It's true that the Indian armed forces are rapidly modernizing with support from the US and other allies. While India apparently is getting all this support to counter China, fact remains all such assets would be employed against Pakistan. Even the disposition of forces also suggests the same. Changing force ratio will make India arrogant. Since 2004 India is massively carrying out its military exercises close to the border with Pakistan to make its forces stronger and to achieve its goals because for successful limited war they must practice their doctrines. India use all the modern weapons and technologies which it got from its strategic alliances in these military exercises. They conduct special heli-borne operations and joint forces operations as well. The massive military modernization of India is going to create conventional disparity in South Asia because India will soon become a 5 trillion-dollar economy by 2025-26 and is well connected with US, Russia, Europe along with Israel and is buying modern weapons from them.

Pakistan's economy is suffering in the current situation and can't have arithmetic arms race with India so Pakistan is going to rely on nuclear weapons to fill that gap. Otherwise Pakistan will try to get more and more weapons. So in conventional disparity India may get edge and because of which the shift in balance of power may get in the favor of India. So that is going to provoke arms race in South Asia because Pakistan would definitely try to mitigate these threats conventionally because if India is going to do a surgical strike with aircraft so Pakistan cannot reply with nuclear weapons. Pakistan have to buy aircrafts. Pakistan is also in deal with China to get J-10, J-20 in future to get air defense and to get other capabilities like modern tanks etc. to match India to some

extent. In this way Pakistan will indulge in arms race and it will be going to impact on socio-economic well-being.

Another important thing is that if Pakistan will not be able to counter India in arms race, there will be a gap, so there will be a threat for Pakistan and risk of a limited war in South Asia will be there. India can afford the limited war because they have bigger economy and bigger population, bigger military, bigger resources and well connected in the world as well. Pakistan can't afford any kind of war whether it's limited or total. This would increase the reliance on nuclear weapons for Pakistan and may create some more capabilities like nuclear artillery which NATO and Russia had developed short range nuclear shells for their tanks, or may develop short range nuclear missiles or nuclear land mines but it may create an escalation between both the countries. Pakistan has to improve its nuclear deterrence to deter India from any aggressive steps against Pakistan, it must be credible and survivable. The survivability of C4I system is must. Pakistan must have second strike capability. If Pakistan can't get nuclear submarine, Pakistan can go for deep underground silos. According to reports Pakistan have got this capability. So Pakistan got the second strike capability when it comes to silos. Pakistan has equipped the conventional submarine with nuclear missile Babar which is a short range nuclear missile so to some extent it can be helpful for second strike capability.

Moreover, Pakistan cannot indulge itself in arithmetic arms race because of the economy so for that Pakistan have to expand its indigenous defense industry, must carry out research and dialogue in high technology areas, just like Israel is way ahead in network centric and electronic warfare capabilities, so Pakistan must invest in these to improve such areas, in this way there will be no or less need to purchase from other countries. Pakistan must enhance its human intelligence, there is a need to improve the capabilities and add modern techniques to its intelligence agencies like air

intelligence, naval intelligence, ISI etc., so they can grab an information easily from its enemy. Pakistan must improve its overall surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Pakistan needs to revamp its capabilities so that it must not rely on other countries so Pakistan must have its warship industry of its own. Pakistan must improve its air defense as well. Pakistan must enhance its strategic collaboration with China because it can provide Pakistan with long range air defense system and can provide nuclear submarine as well, and is also helping Pakistan in different areas like tanks, air defense, space and AeW&CS etc. Synergy and integration in armed forces is important. Regular military exercises with China is must. Joint military exercises will be helpful for both countries.

So in overall scenario, Pakistan need to work on these areas to overcome the emerging challenges from the Indian strategic thinking. Both the countries must realize this fact that both are nuclear weapon states and both cannot defeat each other. So if India try to impose any kind of limited war against Pakistan, this limited war would always have a danger of getting or escalating into a total war and which may lead to a nuclear war between these two states which may lead to destroy this region and may impact on the global security. There is a wide gap between the ambitions and aspirations of the two countries. India considers itself a rising power and global player and intends to be a regional hegemon. Pakistan desires relationship with mutual respect. Additionally, unless various disputes between the two countries are resolved, they cannot live in peace. India is not interested in resolving the issues as it considers itself in an advantageous position. Pakistan's internal turmoil and economic condition further encourages India. Therefore, in the near future, things don't seem to be improving.

Findings and Discussion

i. Surgical Strikes and Limited War: Offensive Operations

The study examined that after the nuclearization of South Asia it has become riskier for the Indian military to initiate any total war against Pakistan because of the nuclear factor. Therefore, to avoid any nuclear escalation the Indian military has focused on limited war options and surgical strikes. Previously the Indian Army focused on limited war operations under CSD/Proactive military Ops and planned division sized shallow thrusts below the nuclear threshold. But under CSD Limited war options also became dangerous because of the tactical nuclear weapons of Pakistan. TNWs were made in response to Indian CSD, and thus, they are a factor towards regaining balance to ensure strategic stability. TNWs have been providing strategic stability, However, it is yet to be seen what will be impact of newer technologies and changing balance of military power on strategic stability. But under LWD-18 the Indian Army has focused on to pitch a smaller force, may be 8 to 9 battalions which makes roughly 8000-9000 troops. Pakistan TNW policy was against a division sized forces, but now the Indian Army has reduced the size. Such a force restructuring has created little doubts in the policy circles in Pakistan, whether to use TNWs against a small force or counter it through conventional capabilities. It is obvious that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons as last resort and engage the advancing 8 to 9 battalions with conventional force. In this way there will be threat of escalation which may undermine security of Pakistan as well as South Asia. Pakistan cannot afford any conflict in modern times because of its economic fragility. India can afford a limited war because of its stable economy, diplomatic connectivity, political clout and conventional asymmetries vis-à-vis Pakistan. "The chances of a limited war in future cannot be ruled out, Kargil is a good example. Additionally, Indian CSD as well as New Land Warfare Doctrine suggest Indian endeavors to address their geographical disadvantage through

employment of IBGs to conduct limited operations. However, at this time in point, IAF is not in a position to support 8-9 IBGs” (Arain, 2023). The study examines that India’s aspiration for limited incursions would continue and pose serious challenges for Pakistan’s security in near future. Another important change in the Indian strategic thinking is a surgical strike or hot pursuit operations. Though, this thinking was previously there in the Indian military but this after 2018, it has become official policy of the Indian military to conduct punitive strikes across the Line of Control or international border of Pakistan. Such a thinking is provocative and dangerous. Pakistan Air Force countered the Indian surgical strike in 2019 but after the induction of modern weapons, long range air defense, advance aircraft, Israeli armed Heron TP UAVs and spy satellites India would have an edge over Pakistan in this domain. In future the IAF would carry out surgical strikes inside Pakistan with a confidence that their long range air defense and superior aircraft would deter PAF to conduct counter surgical strikes. Such a scenario would be dangerous for South Asian peace and security, because if Pakistan launches multiple conventional missile strikes to avenge the losses of Pakistani lives, that may escalate the conflict and a surgical strike turn out to be major conflict between the two nuclear arch rivals. Indian military doctrinal change is threatening the regional peace & security, undermining Pakistan’s security and pushing the region towards quagmire of instability and turmoil.

ii. Force Restructuring: Agility & Suppleness

The study examined that the Indian military is restructuring its forces to make it smarter, quicker and agile. The age of large scale mobilization is over now because of the nuclear factors. In modern times forces are small, supple and well equipped with Network Centric and Electronic Warfare capabilities for quick and swift operations. The idea of restructuring the Indian force is simple, to deny Pakistan rationale to launch a nuclear strike and engage a smaller Indian force in conventional

battles. In this way it will be costly for Pakistan to fight a conventional war. However, the Indian military can afford because India is a multi-trillion-dollar economy and can afford conventional conflict under nuclear umbrella. The study finds that India's aim of restructuring its force from large scale strike corps to a smaller agile force equipped with modern weapon and equipment would create serious challenges in near future. The strain on conventional capabilities of Pakistan would push the country to rely more on nuclear weapons to offset Indian military's conventional asymmetries.

iii. Rapid Military Modernization: An Offensive Punch

The study analyzed that Indian military is rapidly modernizing and adding offensive punch. These capabilities are needed for the operationalization of limited war doctrines or strategy of surgical strike against Pakistan. Indian military's doctrinal shift mainly focusses on two things first to initiate a quick, swift and limited war under the nuclear umbrella and second option is to carry out an effective surgical strike with the help of air force. Both these strategies require an effective military capability to execute these options. Indian military would require modern tanks on ground, mechanized infantry, long range air defense to offset Pakistan's Air Force, spy satellites for real time information, Apache Helicopters for close air support and swift joint operations, an effective SU-30 MKI and Rafale Aircraft for air superiority. The Indian military is in process to acquire all these capabilities and have already incorporate many of them. These inductions would help the Indian military to fill the gaps and execute its doctrines against Pakistan. Such a development would create security dilemma for Pakistan. Pakistan will be compelled to indulge in costly arms race to offset any conventional superiority of the Indian military. It would have serious impact on Pakistan's economy because Pakistan's economy is reeling these days. Pakistan may not sustain a reckoning arms race and may rely more on its nuclear weapons to deter India from any aggressive

move in future. The study examines that the Indian military's modernization would have unwarranted ramifications for the security of Pakistan and invite harsh response in case of any offensive operation.

iv. Strategic Alliances: Boost to Indigenous Defense Industry

India is major economy and huge market for the world. This is the reason that major powers are in strategic alliances with India. The Indian government is closely aligned with Russia for SU-30 MKI modern Aircraft, Nuclear submarines, S-400 Long Range Air Defense System, T-90S MBTs and many other capabilities which may help the Indian military to revamp its overall offensive capabilities in South Asian strategic milieu. The Indian military is also in close strategic ties with Israel to refurbish aircraft & MBTs, induct modern air defense for tri-services, RISAT-2 spy satellites, joint intelligence cooperation and most importantly both countries collaborate in Network Centric and Electronic warfare capabilities. In addition, Indian government has also forged closer ties with the US and France. The Indo-US strategic partnership is also deep rooted, both states are collaborating in civil nuclear field. Apart from nuclear cooperation, the US is supplying India with modern transport and logistics aircraft to enhance its war fighting preparedness and operational readiness. In addition, the US has also carried out deal with the Indian government to supply modern Apache helicopters for close air support and enhanced firepower to execute offensive doctrines against Pakistan. The US inked a deal with India to supply highly advanced armed UAVs for surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting. The study observed that India's military diplomacy is successfully seeking deeper ties with major powers and improving its indigenous defense industry. Most of the arms deals are under make in India initiative in which India would receive technology transfer as well. In this way Indian military

would overcome its operational deficiencies and assimilate modern capabilities which may undermine Pakistan's security in the long run.

v. Covert Operations: Defensive-Offense Strategy

The study observes that the Indian government after nuclearization of South Asia avoided direct military clash with Pakistan except small scale skirmishes on the line of control or botched surgical strikes. The Indian government is putting more focus on the non-traditional security of Pakistan and trying to undermine Pakistan's internal security specially in Balochistan and KPK. The study analyzed the Indian military's covert operations after 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which the Indian Army officially established secret unit with the name TSD to jeopardize internal security of Pakistan. According to Dr. Adil Sultan, "India is exploiting Pakistan's internal weaknesses to its advantage like all adversaries who indulge in such covert activities against each other. It is not unusual, and India indeed is using the prevalent dissatisfaction in Balochistan to instigate insurgency and destabilize the country" (Muhammad, 2022). The study concluded after careful assessment that India and Pakistan may not fight a nuclear war because the balance of terror would prevent both states from mutual suicide. Both countries would also avoid large scale conventional war because losing side may use nuclear weapons. The induction of tactical nuclear weapons also put cold water on India's Cold Start Doctrine type of limited war strategies. As far as surgical strike option is concerned, the Indian Air Force already tried that as well in 2019 and faced shocking results. PAF not only shot down two aircraft of the IAF but also dropped H-Weapons in counter surgical strikes on the Indian strategic installations, including arms depots and brigade headquarters across the line of control. Surgical strike option is also risky and would invite quid pro quo plus response from Pakistan. But covert operations, use of spies, proxies entail no such threats or challenges. All you have to do is to just pour money, capitalize on enemy's fault lines

that could be religious, ethno-political, socio-economic or geographic vulnerabilities. Pakistan is facing all these challenges at the moment. It is easier for India to capitalize on Pakistan's political, economic, social, ethnic, religious and geographic vulnerabilities in Balochistan and KPK- (ex-FATA). It is assessed that India's covert operations would continue in near future as well and may undermine Pakistan's non-traditional security.

India and Pakistan can overcome their differences and work for the strategic stability of South Asia. This will require a seismic shift in the policy of the two countries where they will have to step back from their stated positions and reconcile, albeit with back-channel facilitation. Revocation of article 370 by India would have serious implications for the regional security. The CBMs such as returning of top diplomats to their designated capitals, and the restoration of rail, and road links can act as catalysts toward this goal. Durable Strategic Stability, however, will only be possible only through an incremental approach by resolving smaller disputes first, such as Sir Creek, Siachen, and water disputes, progressing towards the intractable and core issue of Kashmir. It is necessary for Pakistan to revamp overall security apparatus, assimilate modern gadgets, strategies and techniques in contemporary intelligence warfare to overcome these emerging challenges in future. Moreover, India and Pakistan must develop confidence and agree to start a meaningful dialogue to resolve all outstanding disputes through consultations.

References

- "RAW running \$500 million cell to sabotage CPEC,' says Gen Zubair Hayat". (2017, November 14). Retrieved from DAWN: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1370463>
- Ahmed, A. (2014). *India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia*. New York: Routledge.
- Ahmed, D. M. (2016). *Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment.
- Ahmed, K. (2021, September 12). *Arab News*. Retrieved from Arab News: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1927131/world>
- Ahmed, M. (2016). *Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment.
- Ahmed, M. (2016, June 30). *Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability*. Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-impact-on-stability-pub-63911>
- Air Marshal Anil Chopra, Vice Admiral MP Muralidharan, Rajiv Malhotra, Lt Gen JBS Yadava, Gp Capt AK Sachdev, Lt Gen NB Singh, Ivaylo Valchev, Col Tej K Tikoo, Lt Gen Sanjiv Langer, Danvir Singh. (2021). *Indian Defence Review*. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors.
- Akram, M. (2021, October 6). *United Nations*. Retrieved from United Nations: https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/76/pdfs/statements/int_terrorism/02mtg_pakistan.pdf.

AlJazeera. (2016, September 30). *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved from Al-Jazeera:

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/9/30/surgical-strikes-pakistan-rejects-indias-claims>

Anit Mukherjee, C. Raja Mohan. (2016). *India's Naval Strategy and Asian Security*. Oxon: Routledge.

Arain, A. (. (2023, January 21). Emailed Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)

Arkin, D. (2021, January 10). *Israeldefense*. Retrieved from Israeldefense:

<https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/47634>

Army-IAF joint drill along western borders for deployment of special forces behind enemy lines.

(2023, May 25). Retrieved from The Tribune India:

<https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/army-iaf-joint-drill-along-western-borders-for-deployment-of-special-forces-behind-enemy-lines-511202>

Arunima. (2016, June 2). *News 18*. Retrieved from News 18:

<https://www.news18.com/news/india/no-evidence-of-pakistan-govt-hand-in-pathankot-attack-dg-nia-1251256.html>

Ashley J. Tellis. (2017). *The AmericansAre Back: F-16 for the IAF and F/A-18 for the Indian Navy*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment.

Azad, T. M. (2016). Nuclear Powers and Terrorism: Challenges for Indo-Pak Strategic Stability. *Strategic Studies*, 59-73.

Bakshi, G. D. (2015). *The Rise of Indian Military Power: Evolution of an Indian Strategic Culture: Evolution of an Indian Strategic Culture*. London: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd.

Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Barthwal-Datta, M. (2012). *Understanding Security Practices in South Asia: Securitization*

Theory and the Role of Non-state Actors. New York: Routledge.

Basrur, R. (2021, October 7). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)

Bawa Singh, Aslam Khan, Parvaiz Ahmad. (2022). *New Great Game in the Indo-Pacific:*

Rediscovering India's Pragmatism and Paradoxes. Oxon: Routledge.

Baweja, H. (2013, September 21). *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved from Hindustan Times:

<https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/army-spook-unit-carried-out-covert-ops-in-pakistan/story-4j1WTCxyj8ObRmktfl3zWN.html>

BBC. (2019, July 17). *BBC*. Retrieved from BBC: [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-48932951)

48932951

BBC. (2021, April 12). Retrieved from BBC: [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56722181)

56722181

Bhandari, S. (2020, July 28). *India TV*. Retrieved from India TV News:

<https://www.indiatvnews.com/fyi/why-rafale-most-powerful-fighter-plane-defence-price-top-speed-delivery-637690>

Bimal N. Patel, Aruna Kumar Malik and William Nunes. (2016). *Indian Ocean and Maritime*

Security: Competition, Cooperation and Threat. London: Taylor & Francis.

Boesche, R. (2002). *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and His Arthashastra* . New

York: Lexington Books.

- Bommakanti, H. V. (2019). India's national security: challenges and dilemmas. *International Affairs*, 835–857.
- Bommakanti, K. (2011). Coercion and Control: Explaining India's Victory at Kargil. *India Review*, 283-328.
- Botched Balakot airstrike still haunting Indian Air Force*. (2023, February 25). Retrieved from The Express Tribune: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2403233/botched-balakot-airstrike-still-haunting-indian-air-force>
- Brewster, D. (2018). *India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Docklands*: oxford university press.
- Caballero-Anthony, M. (2015). *An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies: A Transnational Approach*. London : SAGE.
- Clary, C. (2018). Personalities, organizations, and doctrine in the Indian military. *Journal India Review*, 100-121 .
- Cohen, S. P. (2011). *The Future of Pakistan*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Cohn, M. K. (2011). *Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences*. Stimson Center: Washington DC.
- CSIS. (2022, June 30). *Missiles of Pakistan*. Retrieved from CSIS: <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan/>
- Dadwal, S. (2017). *Non-Traditional Security Challenges in Asia: Approaches and Responses*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Dalton, T. (2022, December 1). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)

David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath Raghavan. (2015). *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dawn. (2016, September 24). *Dawn*. Retrieved from Dawn:
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1285839>

Dawn. (2017, November 14). *RAW running \$500 million cell to sabotage CPEC, 'says Gen Zubair Hayat*. Retrieved from Dawn: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1370463>

Dawn. (2019, February 27). Retrieved from Dawn: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1466347>

Dawn. (2022, December 18). *Militants seize CTD police station, take hostages in Bannu district*. Retrieved from Dawn: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1727008/militants-seize-ctd-police-station-take-hostages-in-bannu-district>

Deep, A. (2023, April 5). *Indian defence agency bought spyware from Pegasus 'rival', trade data reveals*. Retrieved from The Hindu:
<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-defence-agency-bought-pegasus-rival-trade-data-reveals/article66701489.ece>

Dhananjayan, B. A. (2021, December 6). *Chanakya Forum*. Retrieved from Chanakya Forum:
<https://chanakyaforum.com/swathi-wlr-aatmanirbhar-in-elusive-weapon-locating-capability/>

Douglas Lovelace, Kristen Boon, Aziz Z. Huq. (2011). *Catastrophic Possibilities Threatening U.S. Security*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Doval, A. (2015, January 7). You do one more Mumbai, you lose Balochistan. Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu, India.

Dowding, K. (2011). *Encyclopedia of Power* . London: Sage Publications.

DRDO. (2021, April 1). Retrieved from DRDO:

https://www.drdo.gov.in/sites/default/files/technology-focus-document/TF_April_2021.pdf

Dubey, A. K. (2016, November 1). *India Today*. Retrieved from India Today:

<https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/indian-army-defence-arms-russian-t-90-tanks-make-in-india-pakistan-threat-349472-2016-10-31>

French, R. (2016). Deterrence Adrift?: Mapping Conflict and Escalation in South Asia. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* , 106-137 .

Futter, A. (2015). *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons* . London: Sage.

Ganguly, S. (2016). *Deadly Impasse*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Gary Machado. A. A. (2020). *Indian Chronicles*. Brussels: EU Disinfo Lab.

Gaurav, K. (2021, November 22). *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved from Hindustan Times:

<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/when-abhinandan-varthaman-shot-down-pakistan-s-f-16-fighter-jet-how-it-happened-101637573096733.html>

George, V. K. (2016, September 26). *The Hindu*. Retrieved from The Hindu:

<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Isolate-Pakistan-Sushma-tells-UN/article14670997.ece>

Gloria Center. (2011, December 22). Retrieved from Gloria Center: <http://www.gloria-center.org/2011/12/indo-israeli-defence-cooperation-in-the-twenty-first-century/>

Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda. (2018). Indian nuclear forces, 2018. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 361-366 .

Hashmi, K. H. (2023, January 5). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)

Hindustan Times. (2021, September 29). Retrieved from Hindustan Times:
<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/surgical-strike-day-here-s-how-the-2016-operation-was-carried-out-101632882272993.html>

Hooda, L. G. (2022). *Three Years After Balakot: Reckoning with Two Claims of Victory*. Washington: Stimson.

Hough, P. (2018). *Understanding Global Security* . New York: Routledge.

IDS. (2017, January 1). *IDS*. Retrieved from IDS:
https://www.ids.nic.in/IDSAdmin/upload_images/doctrine/JointDoctrineIndianArmedForces2017.pdf

India, T. o. (2018, October 25). *Times of India*. Retrieved from Times of India:
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/from-russias-s-400-to-israels-barak-8-missiles-how-india-is-fortifying-its-defence/articleshow/66362137.cms>

India, T. T. (2021, July 5). *Times of India*. Retrieved from Times of India:
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pak-blames-raw-for-blast-outside-hafiz-home-imran-lauds-proof-hunt/articleshowprint/84124214.cms>

Islam, M. R. (2019). *National Trials of International Crimes in Bangladesh: Transitional Justice as Reflected in Judgments*. Boston: Brill Nijhoff.

ISPR. (2017, April 26). Confessional statement of Ehsan Ullah Ehsan. Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.

Jafri, O. (2013, May 19). *Tribune*. Retrieved from Tribune:
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/551375/mysterious-death-hafiz-saeeds-security-chief-murdered>

Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers, Michael Raska. (2015). *Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross-Regional Perspectives*. Oxon: Routledge.

Joachim Krause, Sebastian Bruns. (2016). *Routledge Handbook of Naval Strategy and Security*. Oxon: Routledge.

Joseph F. Pilat, N. E. (2015). *Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy*. Oxon: Routledge.

Joshi, S. (2013). India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 512-540.

Jowitt, T. (2020, May 14). *Silicon Technology Powering Business*. Retrieved from Silicon Technology Powering Business: <https://www.silicon.co.uk/e-regulation/governance/merkel-outrageous-russian-hacking-343959>

Kajal, K. (2022, September 22). *Janes*. Retrieved from Janes: <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/indian-army-commences-integrated-battle-groups-trials>

Kanwal, C. G. (2001). *India's Nuclear Doctrine and Policy*. New Delhi: Strategic Analysis.

Kanwal, G. (2016). *India's Nuclear Force Structure 2025*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment.

Karnad, B. (2021, October 18). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)

- Katoch, L. G. (2018, December 20). *Indian Army Land Warfare Doctrine 2018*. Retrieved from SPS Land Forces: <https://www.spslandforces.com/story/?id=570&h=Indian-Army-Land-Warfare-Doctrine-2018>
- Katoch, L. G. (2020, May 4). *Indian Defence Review*. Retrieved from Indian Defence Review: <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/loitering-munitions-advantage-plus/>
- Khan, F. H. (2012). *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Khattak, D. M.-R. (2019). Evolution of New Indian Military Strategy: Implications for Pakistan. *Margallah Papers*, 139-149.
- Khattak, M. u. (2016). Strategic Significance of Indo-Israel Defence Collaboration: Implications for Pakistan's Security. *IPRI*, 49-69.
- Khattak, M. U. (2019). Indian Military Modernisation: Implications for Pakistan. *Strategic Studies*, 20-40.
- Khattak, M. U. (2020). The Indian Army's Land Warfare Doctrine 2018: A Critical Analysis. *IPRI*, 105-134. Retrieved from <https://www.ssri-j.com/MediaReport/Document/IndianArmyLandWarfareDoctrine2018.pdf>
- Khattak, M. U. (2021). Indian Military Modernisation: Implications for Pakistan. *Strategic Studies*, 20-40.
- Khattak, M. U.-R. (2011). *Indian Military's Cold Start Doctrine: Capabilities, Limitations and Possible Response from Pakistan*. Islamabad: SASSI.

- Khetran, M. S. (2017). Indian Interference in Balochistan: Analysing the Evidence and Implications for Pakistan. *ISSI*, 119.
- Kidwai, K. (2020, February 6). Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Keynote Address. London, London, United Kingdom.
- Kidwai, L. G. (2020, February 20). *Detterence, Nuclear Weapons and Arms control* . Retrieved from Youtube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bInVdvk39e0&t=6s>
- Kirchgaessner, S. (2019, December 19). *The Guardian*. Retrieved from The Guardian: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/19/israeli-spyware-allegedly-used-to-target-pakistani-officials-phones>
- Krepon, M. (2004). *Escalation Control and the nuclear option in South Asia*. Washington: Stimson Center.
- Krishnan, A. (2021, June 23). *Reuters Institute*. Retrieved from Reuters Institute: <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2021>
- Kugelman, M. (2022, December 27). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)
- Ladwig, D. W. (2022, November 28). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)
- Lal, M. G. (2012). *Transformation of the Indian Armed Forces: 2025*. New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd.
- Leavitt, N. (2022). *Rabindranath Tagore, Amartya Sen, and the Early Indian Classical Period: The Obligations of Power*. London: Lexington Books.
- Lele, A. (2013). *Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?* New York: Springer.

Majkut, J. (2022, November 8). *CSIS*. Retrieved from CSIS:

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/responding-russian-attacks-ukraines-power-sector#:~:text=In%202015%2C%20Russia%20hacked%20the,of%20further%20disruption%20has%20remained>

Masood, Y. (2018). Why India Opposes CPEC. *Pakistan Observer*, 1-2.

Mearsheimer, J. (2006, July 31). *structural realism*. Retrieved from uchicago.edu.

Mehmood, B. (. (2022, December 31). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)

Mely Caballero Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya. (2006). *Non-traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitization*. England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Mely Caballero-Anthony, Alistair D.B. Cook. (2013). *Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Issues, Challenges and Framework for Action*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Menon, L. G. (2020). *The Strategy Trap: India and Pakistan Under the Nuclear Shadow*. Washington DC: Wisdom Tree.

Michael Krepon, Nate Cohn. (2011). *Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences*. Washington: Stimson Center.

Mithra, J. (2019, January 3). *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from The Diplomat:

<https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/indias-land-warfare-doctrine-2018-hoping-for-the-best-preparing-for-the-worst/>

Mitra, J. (2019, January 3). *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from The Diplomat Web site:

<https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/indias-land-warfare-doctrine-2018-hoping-for-the-best-preparing-for-the-worst/+&cd=20&hl=en&ct=cl>

- Mofa. (2019, February 19). *Prime Minister Imran Khans Address on Pulwama Incident*. Retrieved from Ministry of foreign affairs: <https://mofa.gov.pk/prime-minister-imran-khans-address-on-pulwama-incident/>
- Mohan, S. (2022). *Complex Rivalry: The Dynamics of India-Pakistan Conflict*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Mohan, V. (2006, November 3). *Times of India*. Retrieved from Times of India: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/israeli-night-vision-device-to-help-bsf/articleshow/299729.cms>
- Muhammad, D. A. (2022, December 31). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)
- Mukherjee, A. (2013, February 28). *NDTV*. Retrieved from India financed problems for Pakistan in Afghanistan: US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel: <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-financed-problems-for-pakistan-in-afghanistan-us-defense-secretary-chuck-hagel-514594>
- Mukherjee, Y. J. (2019). From Denial to Punishment: The Security Dilemma and Changes in India's Military Strategy towards China . *Journal Asian Security*, 25-43.
- Mundhra, S. (2022, January 21). *The Eurasian Times*. Retrieved from The Eurasian Times: <https://eurasianimes.com/challenging-s-400-missiles-pakistan-says-its-stealth-drones-india/>
- Naqvi, A. A. (2022, December 8). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)
- Narang, C. C. (2018/19). India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities. *International Security*. 7-52.

- Nawaz, S. (2019). *The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood*. Haryana: Penguin Random House.
- Nayar, K. (2012). *Beyond The Lines: An Autobiography*. New Delhi: The Lotus Collection.
- NDTV. (2010, December 2). *NDTV*. Retrieved from NDTV:
<https://www.ndtv.com/wikileak/wikileaks-us-on-indian-armys-cold-start-doctrine-440802>
- Neelakantan, S. (2016, October 4). *When NSA Ajit Doval outlined India's new strategy-defensive offense - perfectly*. Retrieved from Time of India:
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/when-nsa-ajit-doval-outlined-indias-new-pakistan-strategy-defensive-offense-perfectly/articleshow/54670600.cms>
- Negi, M. (2022, September 9). *India Today*. Retrieved from India Today:
<https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/indian-firms-to-weaponise-israeli-drones-under-iaf-project-cheetah-2001829-2022-09-18>.
- (2018). *New Land Warfare*. New Delhi: Indian Army. Retrieved from <https://www.ssri-j.com/MediaReport/Document/IndianArmyLandWarfareDoctrine2018.pdf>
- News, D. (2010, February 14). *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved from Hindustan Times Web site:
<https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/india-to-spend-200-bn-on-defence-systems-by-2022/story-K2MzbLCRGranHRysii5SJ.html>
- News, T. (2020, August 12). *The News*. Retrieved from The News:
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/699597-pakistan-army-identifies-major-cyber-attack-by-india-targeting-mobile-phones-of-govt-military-officials>

NIA says no Pak role in Pathankot attack. (2016, June 3). Retrieved from Deccan Herald:

<https://www.deccanherald.com/content/550215/nia-says-no-pak-role.html>

NIA says no Pak role in Pathankot attack. (2016, June 3). Retrieved from Deccan Herald:

<https://www.deccanherald.com/content/550215/nia-says-no-pak-role.html>

Pandit, R. (2022, July 30). *Times of India*. Retrieved from Times of India:

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/iaf-to-finally-retire-four-existing-mig-21-squadrons-by-2025/articleshow/93220311.cms>

Pant, H. V. (2015). *Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines*.

Routledge: London.

Pant, H. V. (2017). *Handbook of Indian Defence Policy: Themes, Structures and Doctrines*.

Oxon: Routledge.

Pauline Eadie, Wyn Rees. (2015). *The Evolution of Military Power in the West and Asia:*

Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era . New York: Routledge.

Peri, D. (2022, July 16). *The Hindu*. Retrieved from The Hindu:

<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/france-has-delivered-all-36-rafale-jets-to-india-french-envoy/article65643887.ece>

Philip, S. A. (2021, May 26). *The Print*. Retrieved from The Print:

<https://theprint.in/defence/indian-army-will-soon-get-4-heron-tp-drones-on-lease-from-israel-plans-to-deploy-them>

Pirzada, M. (2016, February 6). How Latifullah Mehsud was captured and India is helping TTP.

Islamabad, Islamabad, Pakistan.

- Polly Nayak, Michael Krepon. (2012). *The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks*. Washington: Stimson Center.
- Pratik Sinha, Pooja Chaudhuri, Priyanka Jha, Mohammed Zubair. (2019, March 14). *National Herald*. Retrieved from National Herald: <https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/india/did-pak-army-admit-200-killed-in-balakot-indian-media-runs-video-without-verification>
- Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeer Singh Pardesi. (2014). *India's Military Modernization: Challenges and Prospects*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Rajiv Kumar, O. G. (2016). *Thirty Years of SAARC: Society, Culture and Development*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Ray, A. (2013). *The Soldier and the State in India: Nuclear Weapons, Counterinsurgency, and the Transformation of Indian Civil-Military Relations*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
- Recognition, A. (2019, February 13). *Air Recognition*. Retrieved from Air Recognition: <https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/news/defense-aviation-news/2019-news/february/4839-india-appraisal-for-54-attack-drones-harop-from-israel-for-indian-air-force.html>
- Rej, A. (2018, January 1). *India's Joint Doctrine: A Lost Opportunity*. Retrieved from Observer Research Foundation Website: http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ORF_Occasional_Paper_Joint_Doctrine.pdf
- Roy, L. (2017, January 10). *Naval Technology*. Retrieved from Naval Technology: <https://www.naval-technology.com/uncategorized/newspakistan-conducts-successful-test-fire-of-babur-3-sbcm-5713985/>

Rudolph, J. (2018). *Modernisation of India's Defence: Power and Policy*. New York: Alpha Editions.

Rudra Chaudhuri, Shreyas Shende. (2020). *Dealing With the Taliban: India's Strategy in Afghanistan After U.S. Withdrawal*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment.

Saleem, C. (. (2023, January 5). Personal Interview. (K. A. Saba, Interviewer)

Sebastian, W. C. (2020, August 22). *Deccan Herald*. Retrieved from Deccan Herald:
<https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/main-article/how-many-does-iaf-need-876291.html>

Seligman, L. (2019, April 4). *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from Foreign Policy:
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/04/did-india-shoot-down-a-pakistani-jet-u-s-count-says-no/>

Seth, I. J. (2019). India's nuclear force doctrine: Through the lens of jus ad bellum. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 111-130.

Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones. (2015). *Governing Borderless Threats: Non-Traditional Security and the Politics of State Transformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sharma, S. (2022, November 09, 2022. 9). *India TV News*. Retrieved from India TV News:
<https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/india-to-receive-its-last-rafale-fighter-jet-by-december-15-rafale-fleet-indian-air-force-dassault-aviat>

SHM. (2018, July 26). *SHM*. Retrieved from SHM:
<https://www.shmgroup.com/blog/modernization-of-indian-naval-forces-the-past-present-and-future/>

- Singh, S. (2022, November 4). *Times of India*. Retrieved from Times of India:
<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indias-first-spy-satellite-risat-2-re-enters-earth-after-13-5-yr-job-lands-near-jakarta/articleshow/95286968.cms>
- SIPRI. (2022, April 25). *SIPRI*. Retrieved from SIPRI Web Site:
<https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time>
- Snyder, G. H. (2002). Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security. *International Security*, 152.
- Sonne, E. N. (2018, June 8). *Washington Post*. Retrieved from Washington Post:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/china-hacked-a-navy-contractor-and-secured-a-trove-of-highly-sensitive-data-on-submarine-warfare/2018/06/08/6cc396fa-68e6-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html
- SSRI. (2018, December 3). *SSRI*. Retrieved from SSRI: <https://www.ssri-j.com/MediaReport/Document/IndianArmyLandWarfareDoctrine2018.pdf>
- Stephen P. Cohen, Sunil Dasgupta. (2010). *Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Tan, A. T. (2020). *Research Handbook on the Arms Trade*. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar.
- Technology, A. (2021, October 25). *Army Technology*. Retrieved from Army Technology:
<https://www.army-technology.com/projects/apache/>

- Times, E. (2022, February 24). *The Economic Times*. Retrieved from Economic Times:
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/boeing-delivers-12th-p-8i-maritime-patrol-aircraft-to-indian-navy/articleshow/89795896.cms?from=mdr>
- Times, H. (2019, March 17). *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved from Hindustan Times:
<https://www.hindustantimes.com/lok-sabha-elections/chowkidar-narendar-modi-pm-top-bjp-leaders-change-twitter-handles/story-RgLzeCFBSH2224r5OQu2wL.html>.
- Times, H. (2020, June 3). *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved from Hindutan Times Web Site:
<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pakistan-says-army-chief-gen-naravane-s-comment-on-strikes-across-loc-reckless/story-eJDv67R5haycZxH5C398uM.html>
- Times, T. E. (2013, Feburary 26). *India financed problems for Pakistan in Afghanistan: Chuck Hagel*. Retrieved from The Economic Times:
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-financed-problems-for-pakistan-in-afghanistan-chuck-hagel/articleshow/18693617.cms?from=mdr>
- Times, T. E. (2021, May 27). *The Economic Times*. Retrieved from Economic Times:
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-shortly-deploy-new-israeli-heron-drones-in-ladakh-lac-sector/articleshow/82973127.cms?from=mdr>
- Times, T. F. (2021, September 20). *The Friday Times*. Retrieved from The Friday Times:
<https://www.thefridaytimes.com/2021/09/20/arnab-goswami-says-pak-army-officers-staying-on-5th-floor-of-kabuls>
- Toby Dalton and George Perkovich. (2016, May 1). *Carnegie Endowment*. Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment Web site:
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_273_India_Nuclear_Final.pdf

Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann. (2017). *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan's confessional statement. (2016, March 30). Retrieved

from DAWN: [https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786/transcript-of-raw-agent-](https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786/transcript-of-raw-agent-kulbhushans-confessional-statement)

[kulbhushans-confessional-statement](https://www.dawn.com/news/1248786/transcript-of-raw-agent-kulbhushans-confessional-statement)

Tribune. (2021, November 24). *Tribune*. Retrieved from Tribune:

[https://tribune.com.pk/story/2330871/india-launched-cyberattacks-against-china-](https://tribune.com.pk/story/2330871/india-launched-cyberattacks-against-china-pakistan-report)

[pakistan-report](https://tribune.com.pk/story/2330871/india-launched-cyberattacks-against-china-pakistan-report)

Tripathi, R. (2021, September 29). *Economic Times*. Retrieved from Economic Times:

[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-enhance-observation-](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-enhance-observation-system-lorros-at-china-pakistan-borders/articleshow/86623105.cms?from=mdr)

[system-lorros-at-china-pakistan-borders/articleshow/86623105.cms?from=mdr](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-enhance-observation-system-lorros-at-china-pakistan-borders/articleshow/86623105.cms?from=mdr)

Walia, S. (2021). *Unbattled Fears: Reckoning the National Security*. New Delhi: Lancers

Publisher and Distributors.

Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell. (2018). *India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and*

Dangers. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

Yusuf, M. W. (2019). *The Pulwama Crisis: Flirting With War in a Nuclear Environment*.

Washington: Arms Control Association.

Zulfqar Khan, Z. K. (2021). *India's Evolving Deterrent Force Posturing in South Asia:*

Temptation for Pre-emptive Strikes, Power Projection, and Escalation Dominance.

Singapore: Springer Nature.

Appendix-I

Questionnaire for Interview

Topic

DOCTRINAL TRANSFORMATION IN INDIA: TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS FOR PAKISTAN

Kokab Al Saba

PhD Scholar International Relations

Department of Politics and International Relations

International Islamic University Islamabad.

Note: Sir/madam you **don't** need to answer **all** the questions. You can answer as per your own convenience. I am also not expecting **long answers** keeping in view your **busy schedule**. You may answer in 2 or three lines. I will be more than happy for your intellectual input.

Q. 1. In what ways the **changing strategic dynamics in India** (doctrinal transformation) will impact Pakistan's traditional security?

Q.2. How the rejuvenated hybrid warfare strategy of India would undermine Pakistan's Non-traditional security?

Q.3. What are Indian Interests in Afghanistan and Iran? Pakistan alleged that India supported TTP and Anti-Pakistan elements in Tribal areas and Balochistan. What is your opinion on this issue?

Q.4. How do you assess the Indian Military's doctrinal transformation from total war-(Sunderji Doctrine) to limited war-(Cold start/proactive military Ops/New Land warfare doctrine of 2018) and now Surgical Strikes- (post Pulwama situation)?

Q.5. The Indian Military is rapidly modernizing with the help of US, Israel, France and Russia. How it is going to impact on South Asian security?

Q.6. How do you see the **deployment and development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia?** Are TNWs threat to the Strategic Stability of South Asia or a stabilizing factor?

Q.7. Will there be limited war in future between India and Pakistan. Because India is revamping its Army under new doctrine and coming up with restructured IBGs i.e. 8-9 battalions?

Q.8. How do you see the induction of long range Air Defense Systems- **S-400, Barak-8 by India?** **After the induction of such weapons will India try another Balakot type surgical strike in future?**

Q.9: How India and Pakistan can overcome their differences and work for the strategic stability of South Asia?

Appendix- II

Interview Schedule Guide

Designation

1. Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi	Executive Director CISS, Islamabad.	Emailed Interview	December 8, 2022.
2. Dr. Walter. C. Ladwig-III	Assistant Professor in International Relations, Kings College London	Emailed Interview	November 28, 2022.
3. Rajesh Basrur	Senior Fellow South Asia, Programme at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies- (RSIS) Nanyang, Technological University, Singapore.	Emailed Interview	October 7, 2021.
4. Toby Dalton	Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program and Senior Fellow Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	Emailed Interview	December 1, 2022.
5. Bharat Karnad	Research Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi	Emailed Interview	October 18, 2021
6. Michael Kugelman	Director, South Asia Institute The Wilson Center 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington, DC 20004-3027	Emailed Interview	December 27, 2022.
7. Brigadier (retd) Tahir Mehmood	Former Director Hilal Magazine, ISPR	Personal Interview	December 31, 2022. Islamabad.
8. Dr. Adil Sultan Muhammad	Dean Faculty of Aerospace and Strategic Studies (FASS), Acting Chair Department of Strategic Studies (DSS), Air University Islamabad	Emailed Interview	December 31, 2022. Islamabad

9. Kamran Hamid Hashmi	Deputy Director Indian Ocean Center, Nima Islamabad	Personal Interview	January 5, 2023. Islamabad
10. Commodore (retd) Asif Saleem	Retired Senior Officer, Pakistan Navy	Personal Interview	January 5, 2023 Islamabad
11. Air Marshal (Retd) M Ashfaq Arain	Advisor to Chief of Air Staff, PAF on CASS Affairs at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.	Emailed Interview	January 21, 2023 Islamabad

