

IMPACT OF BENAZIR INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMME (BISP) ON THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR

**A Dissertation
For Partial Fulfilment of the Degree of
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FINAL APPROVAL

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Dedication

To
My Parents

(to the toil sweat and sufferings of my father Dr. Safdar Ali Khan, and the unequivocal love and prayers of my mother Anwar Begum whose magnificent soul must be very happy in the heavens seeing his son thriving...)



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ABSTRACT

The main objective of this study was to analyze the impact of Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) on the beneficiaries' voting behaviour. This study examined the impact of BISP on beneficiaries' voting behaviour in the selected districts. The study employed quantitative study design using sample from eight districts of Pakistan. The selected districts are: Lasbella and Naseerabad from Balochistan; Kohistan and Lakki Marwat from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; Rajanpur and Kasur from the Punjab; and Thatta and Nawabshah (Shaheed Benazirabad) from Sindh. These districts were selected from the poverty profile maintained by National Socio-Economic Registry (NSER) with the help of proportionate random sampling technique. A sample of 400 respondents was proportionally allocated and 396 respondents actually participated in this study. A well-structured questionnaire was administered to measure the response of the respondents using an attitudinal scale of (dis)agreement. The scale was pre-tested from 30 respondents and the values of Cronbach's Alpha was ranging from 0.730 to 0.933 and overall was 0.904. The collected data was analyzed in line with quantitative data analysis technique using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Further, univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses were employed to show the trend of data. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was employed to confirm the factors for further analysis. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was employed to measure the direct and indirect effects of the model. The study findings revealed that the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries vary from respondents to respondents across the selected districts. The tested model showed that BISP cash transfers along with political awareness and empowerment had significant effects on voting behaviour through the mediation of change in local politics and political participation among beneficiaries. Further, media had also been contributing towards voting behaviour among the beneficiaries.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

This study attempted to examine and explore the impact of Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) on the voting behaviours of its beneficiaries. The study aims to advance the existing scholarship and debate on the social protection programmes such as BISP and its effects on beneficiaries' political behaviours. The study is divided into six chapters. This introductory chapter outlines the study context/ background, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study and organization of the thesis (see organization).

1.1 The Study Context

This study aims to explore the effects of Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) on beneficiaries' political behaviours in Pakistan. Among others, BISP is the main and core Social Protection Programme (SPP) in Pakistan, which has maintained National Socio-Economic Registry (NSER) database comprising information on the socio-economic status of over 27 million beneficiaries throughout the country. It is one of the largest social safety nets in South Asia serving 5.4 million registered beneficiaries (BISP NSER, 2017). The programme was launched in July 2008 with the objective to provide a minimum income package to the poorest of the poor segment of society and protect them against chronic and transient poverty. BISP provides unconditional cash transfers (UCT) to its registered beneficiaries, initially fixed at a value of Rs. 3000 (per quarter) in 2008, and increased to Rs. 3600 (per quarter) in 2013. The programme's annual disbursement grew from Rs. 34 billion in fiscal year 2008-09, to Rs. 42.9 billion in fiscal year 2013-14. It was further increased to Rs. 116 billion in fiscal year 2017-18. In 2019-20, the budget of BISP was revised and further increased to Rs. 180 billion. The budget of the programme was Rs. 194 billion in fiscal year 2020-21.

The quarterly cash grant has also been gradually raised by the Government of Pakistan to Rs. 4,834 in fiscal year 2017-18, to Rs. 6,000 in fiscal year 2020-21. Vast majority of the beneficiaries receive the cash grant through online transaction.

The BISP uses the Nationwide Poverty Scorecard Survey, the first of its kind in South Asia, to identify target beneficiary households. The scorecard consists of about 25 indicators under six dimensions including demographics, education, dwelling characteristics, durables, productive assets and geographic location. Calculated in 2010 with the support of the World Bank, the scorecard enabled the BISP to identify eligible households through the application of a proxy means test that determined the welfare status of households on a scale between 0 and 100. The programme, however, over the period of time, is both applauded and criticized by opposition and governments' own allies.

There have been allegations of favoritism. The allegations come both from the opposition as well as government's associates. It is asserted that the initiators of Benazir Income Support Programme has recruited supporters and followers of Pakistan People's Party. Many people from government and civil society accuse the founders of BISP for using the programme as a political tool to gain popularity and keep their vote bank intact since its inception in 2008. It is argued that the BISP should have focused on the social protection, and not the political popularity. These assertions, accusations and speculations lead to serious questions i.e. does the cash-grant flow to blue-eyed voters?

BISP as a cash-grant of the Federal Government, has undertaken impact evaluation studies through third parties to determine the effectiveness and performance of the programme in delivering its broader aims. Its third-party evaluations have largely focused on programme's impact on per-adult equivalent food (not non-food) consumption expenditures, reduction in the percentage of households living under the food energy intake poverty line, and women empowerment as BISP beneficiaries. However, there has always been a lack of academic sophistication and absence of academic research, especially on the impact of BISP on the voting behaviours of the beneficiaries.

The main goal of this research is to observe the impacts of Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) on the voting behaviour of its beneficiaries across Pakistan. The study examined the relationship between social class of the beneficiary, associated rewards in the form of BISP, and political outcome as a result of voting behaviour of the beneficiary. The study has explored the effects of cash transfers on the political behaviour in the General Elections of 2008, 2013 and 2018. Moreover, this study particularly focused on the effects of BISP's cash grants on local politics.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Social protection programmes and their impact on electoral behaviours and political participation is an established area of social research in Political Science and Political Sociology (Baez, 2012). A number of studies have been carried out on the topic in different socio-cultural and political context (Bonoli, 2005; Bond, 2012; Hickey, 2008; Ana, 2013). Studies in this domain have uncovered a number of explicit and implicit effects of social protection programmes, including people's political participation and electoral behaviours in different parts of the world (Robinson & Verdier, 2002; Camacho & Conover, 2011; Drazen & Eslava, 2012). It is argued that impact of social protection programmes on the voting behaviour has received little academic focus in Pakistani context. This study, therefore, is an attempt to explore the direct and indirect effects of BISP on people's political participation and voting behaviours in Pakistan. From its very outset, BISP has been criticized from different corners to gain political mileage. Using the title 'Benazir' as programme name has been viewed by many as personal political business on the states' expenses. It is worth mentioning that little or less has been written and researched on the topic – Impact of Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) on the voting behaviours of beneficiaries. This work, therefore, was conducted to know the impact of BISP on beneficiaries' voting behaviour in the unique socio-cultural context of Pakistan.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

- i. To study the socio-economic background of the respondents;
- ii. To examine the impact of Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) on beneficiaries' voting behaviours in the general elections of 2008, 2013 and 2018;

- iii. To analyze the effects of BISP's cash grants on local politics in Pakistan.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. Do socio-economic backgrounds of the respondents' affect their voting behaviours?
- ii. What are the various impacts of BISP on the voting behaviours of the beneficiaries?
- iii. Do BISP's cash grants have effects on local politics?

1.5 Significance of the Study

BISP is largest social safety programme of the country, which has maintained National Socio-Economic Registry (NSER) database comprising information on the socio-economic status of over 27 million beneficiaries throughout the country. With huge annual budget of Rs. 194 billion per year (2020-21) for 5.4 million beneficiaries of BISP, some political parties are under criticism from different quarters that the programme is meant to gain political mileage and oblige political workers. In such a state of affairs, it is really important and significant to examine the voting behaviours and political participation of the beneficiaries of Benazir Income Support Programme.

Since Political Scientists recognize that active political participation of the people is essential for strengthening democracy and establishing social justice, this work has both practical and theoretical value especially in the context of Pakistani society. Academically, the research adds to the local and global body of knowledge in the area of political science and political sociology. It is an opulent source of reference for teaching inside classroom and also for more work on the social security programmes and their impacts on people behaviours. The findings add to the current body literature on impact of social security programmes on people voting behaviours. Practically, the study's findings provide good insight to policy makers, both in the government and non-governmental organization to allocate the resources of social protection programmes for larger socio-economic and political benefits of the poor families as well as the nation at large.

1.6 Operational Definitions of Major Terms

1.6.1 Political Participation

Political participation has been defined in many ways (Brady, 1998; Conge, 1988; Fox, 2013; van Deth, 2001), ranging from restrictive understanding to a very broad approaches by referring to political participation as “a categorical term for citizen power” (Arnstein, 1969) or to all activities aiming to influence existing power structures. As per the definition given by Milbrath and Goel, it is the “actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or support government and politics” or as “all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system” (Milbrath & Goel, 1977:2).

A frequently cited definition by Verba and his associates testifies to the focus on the election of political leaders and the approval of their policies. “By political participation we refer to those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take” (Verba, Nie, Kim 1978:1).

H. McClosky has defined the political participation as “those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy” (McClosky, H 1968: 252)

Keeping in view the above, Political participation is supportive in nature and is said to take place when citizens take part by expressing support for a political party as its member, or by attending its meetings, political gatherings, and marching parades, and by participating in youth groups organized by the government or any political party.

1.6.2 Voting Behaviours

Berelson and Lazarsfeld have described voting behaviour as “social conditions and ethnic relationships, family tradition, personal relations, attitudes on these significant problems, [and] membership in formal organizations” that determines a person’s voting behaviour. (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944: Berelson et al., 1954)

Abrams and Butkiewicz have defined voting behaviour as “the role of citizen to involve in the process of participating in all activities ranges from voting to contesting election (Abrams & Butkiewicz, 1995)

Edlin and associates have argued that voting behaviour is the decision of the voters “whether to vote and how to vote, based on maximizing an expected utility with both selfish and social terms” (Edlin, Gelman, Kaplan, 2007). They may vote for the person or party based on the expectations they have for their performance on major issues such as economic growth and lack of corruption (McGann, 2016).

According to Plano and Riggs “Behaviour in voting is a field of study regarding how people tend to vote in public elections and the reasons why they vote the way they do” (Plano, Riggs, 1982)

We can safely say in the light of above definitions that voting behaviour is the final phase of political participation, and it refers to the action of voting or casting ballot during election.

1.6.3 Social Protection

A report by the World Bank appraises that the main objective of the social protection is to reduce poverty, risk and bring an increase in growth” (World Bank, 2011; World Bank, 2001)

Asian Development Bank (ADB) defines social protection as a “collection of policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by promoting efficient labor markets, diminishing people’s exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against hazards and interruption/loss of income” (ADB, 2003).

The United Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF) has defined the social protection as “a set of policies and programmes aimed at preventing or protecting all people against poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion throughout their life-course, with a particular emphasis towards vulnerable groups” (UNICEF, 2012)

Europe Aid's (EA) defines the social protection as "a specific set of actions to address the vulnerability of people's life through social insurance, offering protection against risk and adversity throughout life; through social assistance, offering payments and in-kind transfers to support and enable the poor; and through inclusion efforts that enhance the capability of the marginalized to access social insurance and assistance" (European Report on Development, 2010).

From the above definitions, we can safely conclude that social protection is a set of actions by the Government(s) that support vulnerable, poor individuals and families and enhance their capacity, to escape from poverty, or avoid falling into poverty, and better manage risks and shocks.

1.6.4 Social Status

The common usage of social status invokes its socio-centric meaning and refers to an individual's relative access to contested resources within their social group (Weber, 1922; Davis and Moore, 1945; van den Berghe, 1978).

Status is an index of the social worth that observers ascribe to an individual or a group (Chen et al., 2012), and, as such, it is the outcome of observers' subjective evaluative process, which constitutes a critical part of the status conferral process (Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000)

Social status includes, but is not limited to, constructs such as socio-economic status (SES), social class, resource-holding potential, and social influence. Broadly defined, it refers to the influence one has over group decisions and over the distribution and use of valuable resources, such as food, territories, mates, and coalition partners (reviewed in Cheng et al., 2010)

Social status is defined as the amount of informal respect enjoyed by the individual, but not just the position on any important hierarchy (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Social status is usually based on one's occupation, level of education and income (Treiman, 2013).

From the above, we can extract the idea that social status is the relative rank that an individual occupies, with all related responsibilities, and lifestyle, in a social grading or ranking, dependent on respect. Similarly, there are two types of status i.e ascribed or achieved. Ascribed status is assigned to us by birth and achieved status is achieved by individuals' capability and efforts.

1.6.5 Development of Instrument

On the basis of control variable, background variable, independent variable, dependent variable and the definitions extracted of the major terms, questionnaire shall be prepared that will cover socio-economic characteristics, political awareness, political empowerment, change in local politics, political participation, voting behaviours, and BISP as social protection programme etc.

1.7 Organization of the Study

As mentioned in the start of this chapter that this research is categorised into 6 chapters. *The first chapter* discussed the study background, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions and significance of the study. It also gave operational definitions of various concepts and categories engaged in the study such as political participation, voting behaviour, social status, and social protection.

Chapter two presents a comprehensive literature review on the topic. The literature review chapter is divided into two sections: section one encompasses empirical studies. Section two of the chapter engages theoretical and philosophical debate on the relationship between social protection programmes and people's voting behaviour. This section also outlines a theoretical framework for the informed analysis of the data. The chapter engages three model of voting behaviours: Sociological Model of voting behaviour, Psychological Model of voting behaviour and Rational Choice Theory in political science.

Chapter three is methodology. This chapter outlines the methods and procedures adopted for conducting this study. The study is quantitative. It was carried out under the broader positivist paradigm. The chapter outlines universe of the study, the study

population, sampling technique and sample size, tool and method of data collection and analysis. It also describes ethical consideration adopted in this research.

Chapter four is related to analysis of primary data. The analysis consists of univariate, bi-variate and multi-variate analysis. The data has been presented in tabular form. Each table has been explained and described. The chapter also outline the normality of data, Conformity Factor Analysis (CFA), co-relation and structural equation modelling techniques to measure the direct and indirect effects of the model.

Chapter five presents key findings and debate. It gives a very succinct account of the major findings. **Chapter six** presents summary of the argument, conclusion and recommendations of the study. This chapter sums up the study by critically engaging the findings with the existing scholarship in the field.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of Literature

2.1 Introduction to the Chapter

The first chapter presents empirical and theoretical review on the effects and impacts of social protection programmes on people's voting behaviour across different societies of the world. The review, both empirical and theoretical, encompassed books, journals, articles and newspapers. The chapter is divided into two parts: part one is empirical review whereas part two is theoretical review. In empirical review, I have researched and included studies on the impacts of various programmes for the betterment of people and its link with individual's political participation, especially their impacts on the voting behaviours. Part two is theoretical debate and theoretical framework that has been utilized for the informed analysis of field data.

2.2 Part One: Empirical Review

This part of the literature reviews the published empirical studies on the relationship between cash transfer/ social security programmes and their impact on beneficiaries' voting behaviours. Over the past three decades, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) have become the main strategy for poverty reduction and social protection in the world, especially in developing countries (Machado & Neto, 2017). Numerous studies have explored the effects of social security programmes (SSP) and CCTs programmes on reducing poverty, social and political inequalities in democratic society. In a report published by the World Bank (2009), covering a range of low and middle-income countries, the authors conclude that CCTs programmes have been successful in both reducing current poverty and encouraging parents to invest in the health and education of their children. It is noteworthy to mention that despite extensive literature on the effects of SSPs and CCTs programmes, political economy issues are often overlooked in these studies. Theoretically, SSPs and CCTs programmes can affect the political behaviour of voters and politicians through several channels (Baez et., al., 2012). Many studies have found correlation between CCTs and its effects on beneficiaries' voting behaviours.

Zucco (2013) studied the Brazilian Bolsa Família (BF) programme by analyzing municipal-level electoral results and survey data with matching techniques. He found that the BF programme is associated with an improvement in the incumbent candidate's performance for presidency in the elections of 2002 and 2010.

Voting behaviour is considered an important component of political participation in the democratic countries (Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010). For example, as they have mentioned in their studies that in a democratic country, political participation enables people to secure their rights. Their study maintained that engaging people in public affairs tend the voting behaviours which is crucial to political participation. They concluded their study arguing that voting behaviour plays important role in political participation of the people (Norris 2004). Scholars define political participation from different aspects with different meanings, and there is very little agreement on the definition of political participation. For example, it refers to the participation of people in different activities such as voting, campaigning, contesting elections, political meetings and so on. Similarly, it also refers to all those actions and responsibilities that are political in nature (Parry, Moyser, & Day 1992).

On the other hand, according to Agbalajobi (2010), political participation is an active participation of the workers in the activities such as casting vote, contesting election and protesting. For example, the participation and easy access to all available activities that are political in nature (Gutiérrez, 2014).

It is important to discuss that both political participation and voting behaviour are inter-linked concepts and people use these in same context but both are different. It is reflected from the fact that no one can imagine election in democracy without political participation. Thus, all this participation explains both willing and forceful participation of the public in political environment of a country. This signals to an important aspect that political participation only believes in willing participation and not the forceful one. Similarly, Riley, Griffin and Morey (2010) consider this a body of rights and duties that are carried in organized way.

In a similar fashion, Verba et al. (1995) considered political participation as a process that may affect and influence all the spheres of government, both directly as well as indirectly. It is further discussed that political participation also have impacts on the decision and policy making process of the governments. Political participation and voting are extremely important parts of political engagement. However, the important and most dominant form of it is to exercise the right to vote (Flanigan & Zingale, 1998).

Similarly, one of the key aspects is mentioned in a study on social protection programme in Brazil. The study pointed vital relation between all the grants and political choices of the poor people (Hall, 2006, 2012; Hunter & Power, 2007). For instance, there are evidences that augment Brazilian Bolsa Família programme as handy and very beneficial in da Silva's re-election in 2006 (Hunter & Power, 2007; Hall, 2012). It is also argued by Hunter and Power (2007), that jobless and poor are easily managed to change their ideology by providing cash money (Zucco, 2013).

It should be noted that one voting preference and choice is influenced by many factors, which are discussed in various models of voting behaviour such as sociological, the rational choice, party identification and clientelistic models (see Chandler, 1988; Catt, 1996; Sanders, 2003; Van de Walle, 2003; Brooks, 2006; Szwarcberg, 2013). So voting behaviours are based on various social factors such as ethnicity, race, class, gender, religious affiliation, educational background, occupation, social status, geography and regional ties or identities (Lever, 1979; Horowitz, 1985; Catt, 1996). Similarly, this frequently used model offers people to make their choices on purely and originally rational and logical foundations (Chandler, 1988; Brooks et al., 2006).

Several researchers have argued that voter decision making operates in a comparable way, especially in multi-party and multi-candidate elections, and that electoral choice can therefore best be modelled as a two-stage process (Oscarsson et al., 1997; Shikano, 2003; Steenbergen and Hangartner, 2008; De Vries & Rosema, 2009).

In other way, preferences of voter's party model of identification are also playing an important role where voters with the idea of self-identification and affiliated political

groups offer their loyalties by backing and supporting it (Miller, 1991; Peele, 2004; Kovernock & Robertson, 2008).

However, it is still dubious whether political outcomes are evaluated by the choices of voters or these determined by the political parties (Colomer & Puglisi, 2005). The uncertainty furthermore concerns the proposed indicator in this bond. It is argued here that huge body of scholarship are available that explain the mechanism of voting behaviours. The simplest model among all models give stress to the interest of voters that are materialistic in nature (Manza et al., 1995). The voters, therefore, are determined to advocate all those parties that only represent a little economic interest. This in many aspects is similar to the economic theory where all the choices and political decision of the people are rational and logical (Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf & Ultee, 2000).

The importance of geographical environment cannot be denied while discussing voting preferences. The literature exhibits that choices of the people vary from one region to another region. For example, choices and preferences of the people of rural areas are different from the choices and interests of the voters in urban structure (Resnick, 2012). There are numerous studies conducted on voting behaviours in some regions of the India that argues that politics today is more materialistic in nature (Manor, 2010; Thachil, 2010).

It is argued that making a valid and correct future prediction regarding the voting nature of the public, both residing in rural and urban areas, is not possible. There are a number of factors such as class, gender, race, ethnicity and age that make it difficult. It is to be noted that despite ambiguous nature, the clear picture can be drawn on the basis of secondary data, as governments have already given some established patterns that can easily predict voting behaviour.

2.3 Impact of Welfare Programmes with Election Commitments on Voters' Voting Behaviour

Preceding research has revealed that welfare programmes and even promises bring effect on the people political nature (Towns, 2010; Austen-Smith & Banks, 1999; Johnson & Ryu, 2010; Corazzini et al., 2014). For instance, Towns in his study has argued that the

political party's election commitments, promises and even certain welfare programmes like poverty alleviation has a very close relation with people's voting behaviour. He concluded his study that such programmes may change common people's behaviour regarding vote and even influence their political participation.

The study conducted by Austen-smith & Banks (1989), emphasized on the authenticity and importance of fulfilling the election promises during re-election. Similarly, research study of Ryu and Johnson (2021) shows that any defiance and not meeting people expectations can affect the results negatively. Similarly, Corazzini et al. (2014) also depicted that politician in many societies of the rural areas are more serious in fulfilling their words as compared to politicians who belong to urban areas. He also mentioned that expectations of the voters, if not fulfilled, can affect voters' voting behaviour. In this backdrop, some of the scholars have pointed out effective use of the media, which cause huge effect on this whole process. Kartik & McAfee (2007) found in their research that majority of political groups use election-platforms to connect and make promises to voters by building a one-dimensional election competition model.

We can conceptualize individual turnout behaviour as being shaped by internal and external causes related to motivations, abilities, and barriers to vote (Harder & Krosnick, 2008). Corazzini et al. (2014) in his study highlighted the importance of voters' motivation to win any election. Similar study has been conducted by Born et al. (2017) wherein they argued that motivation largely affects the people voting behaviours. In another study conducted by Downs et al., the results were based on voters' non-interest due to selfish motives of the candidates. The study says that in most circumstances, no or low turnout should be expected when purely selfish motives are at work (Downs, 1957; Riker & Ordeshook, 1968). Motives related to civic duty were among the first drivers invoked to counter the low turnout predictions. Theoretical work that came after explored reformulations of the original rational choice models and some of these efforts were able to achieve high-turnout equilibria, though often under hard-to-meet assumptions (Ledyard, 1984; Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1983, 1985)

A majority of voters, including the voter holding the median policy preference, value core welfare programs such as public pensions and unemployment benefits and prefer to uphold the status quo rather than cutting back these programs (Boeri et al. 2002; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Brooks and Manza 2007; Van Groezen et al. 2009).

Voters' feelings of safety, stability and comfort within the economy have become increasingly important in predicting voting behaviour with voters using the ballot to reward government for good economic performance and to punish them for bad (Nadeau et al 2012, Bratton et al 2012). It is also argued that candidates often use their sources to provide economic benefits or other material favours to voters in return for their political support in elections (Wantchekon 2003, Stokes 2007, Vicente and Wantchekon 2009, Szwarcberg, 2013).

2.3 Part Two: Theorizing Voting Behaviour and Theoretical Framework for this Study

There are several theoretical approaches that attempt to explain voting behaviours and how are these influenced by various factors. The most important theoretical approaches towards behaviour are: a) Sociological approach b) Psychological approach and c) Rational Choice theory.

2.3.1 1 - Sociological Model of Voting Behaviour

The theoretical assumptions of the sociological model of voting behaviour have been discussed and argued in the following three ways: The People's Choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944), Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954) and Personal Influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). The central hypothesis of Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) was that voting is an individual act affected mainly by personality of the voter and his exposure to the media. The key aim of the sociological approach is to 'understand how voters arrive at their voting decisions and what factors influence their decisions?'. The fundamental assumption of the sociological model is that voters' preference is largely influenced by individual membership in a particular social group, as well as the economic and social position of the group (Anderson and Yaish 2003; Thomassen 1994; Heywood 2002).

During the case study, an attempt was made to find out whether the voting behaviour of beneficiaries were affected by cash transfer under BISP programme or otherwise.

2.3.2 Psychological Model of Voting Behaviour

The origin of psychosocial model is traced back to the University of Michigan where survey research was conducted during the 1948, 1952 and 1956 US presidential elections, later recoded and analyzed in the book: *The American Voter* by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes. The central concept of this model of voting behaviour is partisanship, which is designed as a psychological affinity, stable and lasting relationship with a political party that does not necessarily translate into a concrete link, namely registration, or consistently voting and systematically militancy with this party (Antunes, 2010). This model is considered a foundational in describing the voting behaviour of the voters in different contexts. The notion of partisanship, introduced in the study of voting behaviour by Campbell et al. (1960), was influenced by the concept of reference group (Hyman & Singer, 1968) and has similarities with the idea of anticipatory socialization introduced by Merton and Kitt (1950) to define the situations in which individuals choose a reference group to which they do not belong and begin to act according to what they perceive as the rules of that group. In this study, the researcher has attempted to see whether BISP cash transfer affected beneficiaries voting behaviour or they move into the reference group influence.

2.3.4 Theory of Rational Choice

Rational choice, also known as rational choice theory remained the most powerful and influential theory in the discipline of political science in the late 20th century. According to rational choice theorists, culture and history cannot explain peoples' political behaviour. They argued that to understand actors' interests in politics and voting behaviours, one should pursue them rationally (Arrow, 1951; 1986). In *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), an early work in rational choice theory, Anthony Downs claimed that significant elements of political life could be explained in terms of voters' self-interests (Downs, 1957). The underlying assumption is that voting is a conscious rational act, where individual voters weigh the pros and cons of the available

options when determining their vote choice. Consequently, upon careful evaluation of the costs and benefits, a person will vote for the party or candidate with programs and policies that best serves and reflects one's own self-interests (Catt 1996; Andersen and Heath 2000; Downs 1957). While knowing the importance of this work, the researcher has specifically focused on rational aspects of citizen behaviours.

The crux and synthesis of the discussion is that the systematic study of voting behaviour is guided by three major research schools: The Sociological Model which stresses on the influence of social factors (see Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944); The Psychosocial Model which assumes that the party identification is the main factor behind the behaviour of voters (see Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes; 1960); and Rational Choice Theory, also referred to as a model of economic voting, which puts emphasis on variables such as rationality, choice, uncertainty and information (see Downs, 1957). This study has utilized all the three approaches to make sense from the field data and informed analysis.

2.4 Voting Behaviour in Pakistani Context

Economic activities have, many a times, remained down with recession and stagflation in Pakistan, making the provision of social safety nets all the more importance. Even during the periods of high economic growth in the country, various regions remained neglected and affected by poverty and other social issues. Social protection programmes and safety nets, during the time, benefited a large number of households (Nayaab & Farooq, 2012).

There are studies that have analyzed voting behaviours in Pakistani context and in Pakistan's electoral perspective, but the focus remained limited and to specific constituencies (A. G. Chaudhry et al., 2014; Jamil Ahmed et al., 2010). This study is first of its kind wherein the impact of country's largest social protection programme, in terms of its huge budget and large number of beneficiaries, has been evaluated for any changes in the voting behaviours of its beneficiaries. Comparison has been studied while examining the results of elections (2008) that were held before the launch of BISP, and elections after the programme was launched (2013, 2018).

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

3.1 Introduction

In chapter two, the researcher has presented relevant empirical and theoretical literature on the impacts of social security programmes on peoples' political behaviours in different socio-cultural and political environments across societies. This chapter outlines the steps and procedure adopted for conducting this research study. The research was conducted in-line with positivistic research paradigm in social sciences. With an inspiration from positivistic approach, quantitative methods such as large-scale surveys, structured questionnaires and official statistics were utilized to get an overview of political behaviours of the beneficiaries of BISP as a whole, and to uncover voting behaviour trends, such as the relationship between financial incentives and voting behaviours of the beneficiaries. The large-scale survey and associated quantitative methods were used to have good reliability and representativeness. This chapter, therefore, gives succinct account of the study universe, population of the study, sampling procedure, and sample size, tool of data collection and method of data analysis. The data analysis procedures have been discussed in detail. The chapter also include ethical consideration of the research.

3.2 Universe of the Study

The selection of the locale is very important aspect in any research project. In research, universe is a place from where the data is collected. In this research, the universe is restricted to eight districts of Pakistan. These included District Lasbella & District Naseer Abad from the Province of Balochistan; District Kohistan and District Lakki Marwat from the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; District Kasur & District Rajanpur from the Province of the Punjab; and District Nawabshah (Shaheed Benazirabad) & District Thatta from the Province of Sindh. The rational to select these districts was based on the poverty profile maintained by BISP National Socio-economic Registry (NSER) and the data received thereof.

3.2.1 Population of the Study

The concept of population refers to any collection of people or things. The population of this research is individuals getting cash-grant from Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). It is important to mention that BISP is providing cash-grants to selected needy and marginalized individuals (beneficiaries) all across Pakistan. As such, these BISP beneficiaries getting cash-grants constitute the population of the present study.

3.2.2 Target Population

Eight districts of Pakistan were included in the targeted population of this study. The target populace for study constitutes 520,683 individuals in number from eight districts of Pakistan. These individuals were targeted to collect information for the study purpose.

3.2.3 Unit of Analysis

Individuals getting cash as a grant from BISP constituted the unit or element of the study. Following inclusion criteria was adopted for the element of the study;

- Female and males
- Receiving cash from the BISP
- Living in selected districts
- Rural and urban area
- Participated in previous general election/s

3.3 Sampling Procedures

Sampling procedures consisted of the procedures of selection of the respondents from the total elements from the target population. The following procedures were used for the selection of sample size for this research:

3.3.1 Sampling Technique

The researcher used main type of the non-random sampling technique i.e. proportionate random sampling to calculate representative sample from the population. The coherent to choose this method was to draw a descriptive sample from the above-mentioned districts on the basis of proportional allocation.

3.3.2 Sample Size

A sample size of 400 out of 520,683 beneficiaries was selected by employing proportionate random sampling technique. The sample size has calculated by using sample size determination formula (Yamane, 1967):

$$n = N/1+N(e)^2$$

$$n = 520683/1+520683(0.05)^2$$

$$n = 399.69 \text{ (Say 400)}$$

This 400-sample size was further proportionately allocated to eight districts along with their beneficiaries by using the weighted means of the district as under:

Table 3.1

Sample Size Allocation to Districts

Province	District	Sample Formula	Sample
Sindh	Nawab Shah	$n_1=N_1*n/N$	19
	Thatta	$n_2=N_2*n/N$	289
Punjab	Kasur	$n_3=N_3*n/N$	23
	Rajanpur	$n_4=N_4*n/N$	40
Balochistan	Lasbella	$n_5=N_5*n/N$	01
	Naseer Abad	$n_6=N_6*n/N$	02
Khyber	Kohistan	$n_7=N_7*n/N$	20
Pakhtunkhwa	Lakki Marwat	$n_8=N_8*n/N$	06
Total	8	$n = 520683/1+520683 (0.05)^2$	400

3.4 Technique of Data Collection

A survey method was opted as a technique of data collection to conduct the present study. The rationale to use survey as a technique of data collection was based on the

quantitative study and cross-sectional study design. The survey method was used to collect substantial information from the beneficiaries of the BISP.

3.5 Tool of Data Collection

A wide range of methods such as observation, in-depth interviews and survey etc. are used in social sciences to collect primary data from respondents. Similarly, interview guide and questionnaire are among the popular tools of data collection. A well-structured questionnaire was used for the data collection from the respondents. This measurement tool was consisted on different sections including identification of the respondents, socio-economic profile of the respondents, BISP cash transfers, political awareness, political empowerment, change in local politics, media influence, voting behaviour in general election 2008, voting behaviour in general election 2013, voting behaviour in general election 2018, and political participation.

3.5.1 Coding of Values

All the close-ended questions were coded before collection of data and open questions were coded after the data collection. The scale of (dis)agreement was used to measure the response of the respondents to each statement as mentioned in the questionnaire (Strongly Agree = 6 to Strongly Disagree =1).

3.5.2 Pre-testing

After the development of measurement tool, it was pre-tested from randomly 30 respondents. The data was computerized after editing, coded and assigned numbers of identifications to each questionnaire. The calculated values of Cronbach's Alpha were provided in table 3.2. The values of Cronbach's Alpha were ranging from 0.730 to 0.933 with overall as 0.904. Based on these values, the measurement tool was finalized for final data collection.

Table 3.2*Reliability Statistical Test*

Sr.	Variable Name	Codes	No. of Items	Cronbach's Alpha
i	BISP cash transfer	BCT	8	.920
ii	Political awareness	POA	8	.933
iii	Political empowerment	POE	8	.782
iv	Change in local politics	CLP	8	.826
v	Media influence	MEI	8	.822
vi	Voting behaviour in general election 2008	VB08	8	.764
vii	Voting behaviour in general election 2013	VB13	8	.796
viii	Voting behaviour in general election 2018	VB18	8	.730
ix	Voting behaviour (vi+vii+viii)	VOB	24	.904
x	Political participation	POP	8	.897
Overall			72	.904

3.6 Data Collection

After finalization of the measurement tool, final data collection was started. It was very difficult and lengthy process since population was geographical wide and scattered. It is important to mention that only ten questionnaires were to be filled in a day as an average. The researcher visited selected districts of the target population and the data collection was completed in almost two months.

3.7 Steps taken to develop Rapport

For the purpose of data collection from the beneficiaries of BISP, the researcher used the following procedures to develop rapport and friendly environment to gain the confidence of the responds and collected data from the field:

- The researcher visited the residences of the respondents in the respective districts;
- Showed them university student's card and introduced himself as a student of International Islamic University Islamabad;
- Also showed them university permission letter and discussed the main purpose of the study;
- While visiting each selected district, the researcher ensured to have accompanied by a local resident to get required facilitations;
- After creating friendly environment, they took interest to provide information in detail.

3.8 Editing and Computerization of Data

The collected data was edited carefully to manage the errors and ambiguities in the data. After screening and cleaning of data, it was computerized for further analysis purpose.

3.9 Data Analysis Software

For the purpose of data analysis, MS Excel, Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24, AMOS, and Statistica was used. MS Excel was used for data entry, SPSS was used to analyze data, AMOS was used to measure the direct and indirect effects of the models. It is important to mention that the researcher used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the data. CFA allowed the researcher to test his hypothesis that a relationship between observed variables and their underlying latent constructs exists.

3.10 Data Analysis

After data collection and data entry, data analysis was employed. This section was based on different sub-sections including univariate analysis containing frequency distribution and percentages, confirmatory factor analysis to confirm the items, descriptive statistics of the variables to show the ranges, normality test to show the distribution of the data, and Kendalls' tau-b statistical test to measure the correlation among variables. Similarly, Chi-square statistical test was employed to measure the association between variables and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to measure the effects of the model.

3.11 Ethical Consideration and Consent Form

The researcher used and followed ethical considerations during his research. He prepared consent form and provided to each respondent before data collection. He informed the respondents about the aim and objectives of the study. The researcher also assured them of their withdrawal anytime they wish during data collection/ interview or may refuse to provide any of the information. They were also assured that their information has to be used for academic purpose and would be kept confidential as per research ethics.

3.12 Field Experiences

Initially during the data collection from the field, it was hugely hectic and highly difficult due to severe weather and long travellings. Almost all the respondents were economically weak, and were not aware of the research and data collection purpose. Based on the researcher's strengths and trainings, the field visits turned into pleasant and satisfying experience. The researcher focused on to develop a time-frame for data collection and tried to gather it as early as possible. During the data collection in the field, it was warmth to see many of the respondents, despite poorer backgrounds, offered tea, food/ lunch to the researcher, as well stay with them but he politely refused since it was against the research ethics. To sum up, field experience for this study was amazingly great and wonderful to the core. It strengthened field expertise and developed skills to manage the interviews from strangers with different socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds.

3.13 Limitations of this Research

This study was limited to quantitative study design in nature. Survey method as technique of data collection was used. Similarly, this study was limited to eight districts of the country and one social safety network programme i.e. Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP).

3.14 Definitions of Concepts and Variables

This section provides the definitions of basic concepts and variables used in the study. It consisted of the conceptual and operational definitions in terms of defining and measuring the concept and variables:

BISP: The Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) is a cash transfer federal institute working on poverty reduction in Pakistan established in July 2008 (Waqas & Awan, 2018). It works similar to other social safety network programmes (Mumtaz & Whiteford, 2017; Waqas & Torre, 2020). For the present study, BISP was operationalized as the cash transfer programme providing cash-grants to its registered beneficiaries living under poverty line in Pakistan.

Cash Transfers: Cash transfers is defined as a transfer of money directly to the eligible individuals that is conditional or unconditional made by funding agency or government institutes (Lawlor, Handa, & Seidenfeld, 2019). For the present study, cash-transfer/ cash-grants was operationalized in terms of receiving of cash-grants from the government of Pakistan, receiving cash-grants timely or late, through political worker(s), received BISP cash-grant by giving a vote, received BISP cash-grant by using reference(s), received BISP cash-grant after a deducted amount, received BISP cash-grant at doorstep, and received BISP cash-grant by local agent or broker.

Political Awareness: Political awareness is conceptually defined as the attention of individuals paid to understand politics and familiarity towards political issues (Goren, 2012; Khare, 1975). Further, it has also been stated that it is an important assent for the people to determine the engagement with politics, participation and active citizenship (Jackson, 1972; Witherspoon & Phillips, 1987). Political awareness was operationalized for this study consisting on the different items including awareness about all political parties working in the area, familiarity about the political manifesto, identification of the flags of political parties, awareness about the best political party, awareness about corner meetings, awareness about political campaign strategies, awareness about political leaders of different political parties, and exposure of the respondent towards change in politics.

Political Empowerment: It is defined as the process of transferring of different elements of power including positions, capabilities, and resources to those individuals who do not have it (Besnier, 2020; Longwe, 2000). Political empowerment requires inclusion in decision-making process in democracies (Goltz, Buche, & Pathak, 2015; Pospieszna, 2015). For the operational definition of political empowerment, different items/ statements

were constructed including joining a political party with choice, casting of votes with free will, participation in a political party as per own decision, strong political affiliation, raising or placing flag of political party at home, making political decision(s) in the area, participation in local politics, and arranging political meetings at personal place.

Local Politics: It is defined and elaborated as being based on local activities related to political matters (Fox, 1995; Stucky, 2005). It involves the choice within boundaries of the local government unit that is relative to selection of members and preparation of public policy (Choi, 2007; Hamzeh, 2000). Local politics was operationalized with the help of different statements including change in local politics with the passage of time, change in local politics as normal in routine, political leaders changing their political party, political party affiliation through financial benefits, change in political affiliation under pressure, welfare-oriented work resulted change in local politics, development work changed local politics, and local politics changed day-by-day.

Media Influence: Media influence is defined as the controlling of individuals emotionally, mentally, and physically in a positive and negative way that pressurize and persuade society as well (Gene Zucker, 1978; Goodall, 2012; Tham, Mair, & Croy, 2020). The study operationalized media influence with different items and statements including media depicting a true picture of local politics, media biasness in showing strong political party, media changing the political behaviour, media creating propaganda regarding politics, media generating a public opinion about politics, media changing political awareness, media influencing on voting behaviour, and media highlighting political issues of the area.

Voting Behaviour: The concept of behaviour is defined as a form of electoral behaviour, explaining and understanding voters' behaviour, decisions made by public decision makers and is also the central concept used by political scientists along with electorate (Balogun & Olapegb, 2007; McAllister & Kelly, 1982; McKay, 1989, 1990). Voting behaviour for the present study was operationalized with the help of the statements including casting vote according to family choice, casting vote along with bradhri (community), bounded to cast vote by a specific party, casting vote to the local leader, casting vote freely, casting vote

based on welfare work, casting vote based on financial benefits, casting vote to get personal gains.

Political Participation: Political participation is defined in social sciences as the procedures of expressing opinions by public and exerting influence in terms of social decisions, management, economic and political (Andersson, 2017; de Leon & Daus, 2018; Kim & Hoewe, 2020; Rumley, 1985). For this study, political participation was operationalized with different items and statements including attending corner meetings, raising political slogans, participating in election campaigns, holding a flag of a political party during the campaign, contributing funds to a political party, participating in the political walk, organizing political corner meetings, and actively taking part in political decisions of the area.

CHAPTER FOUR

Data Analysis and Presentation

4.1 Introduction

This section provides data analysis and its interpretations. It is divided into univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses. Univariate tables contain frequency distribution along with percentages. Bivariate and multivariate analysis are based on statistical and hypothesis testing.

4.2 Scio-economic Characteristics

People with poor economic backgrounds, and low socio-economic status encounter multiple problems including food, health, education and others. They also suffer a greater incidence of adverse psychosocial characteristics, such as low self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-mastery and increased cynicism and hostility (Blacksher, 2002). In this study, socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, who were BISP registered beneficiaries, has been measured through a set of dimensions.

Table 01 below depicts the geographic location, province, gender, and family type of respondents. It shows that 86.9 percent of the respondents were from rural & 13.1 percent of them belonged to urban geographical locations. Moreover, 72.2 percent of the BISP cash-grant receivers were from Punjab, 11.4 percent were from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and 18.4 percent of them were from Sindh province. It is pertinent to mention that 98.7 percent of the respondents were female and only 1.3 percent of them were male. This table further explains that 59.6 percent of the respondents were residing in a joint family system, 26.8 percent of them had nuclear family and only 13.6 percent of them were living in extended family type. It shows that most of the respondents were from rural geographical backgrounds, majority were from Punjab province, followed by Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Most of the families were belonging to joint family type, followed by nuclear and extended.

Table 01*Distribution of the respondents by their area, province, gender, and family type*

The residential area of the respondent			Gender of the respondent		
Area	Frequency	Percentage	Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Rural	344	86.9	Male	05	01.3
Urban	52	13.1	Female	391	98.7
Total	396	100.0	Total	396	100.0
Province of the respondent			Family type of respondent		
Punjab	278	70.2	Nuclear	106	26.8
KP	45	11.4	Joint	236	59.6
Sindh	73	18.4	Extended	54	13.6
Total	396	100.0	Total	396	100.0

Table 02 indicates the occupation, number of children, monthly income, and marital status of the respondents. It shows that almost half of the respondents (49.5 %) were housewives and only 1.8 percent of them were working in the field of handicraft, and running Thara (Kiosk) for their livelihood. Moreover, a smaller proportion of the respondents were doing agricultural work, private jobs, and labour activities in their respective fields. It was observed that 87.4 percent of the respondents were earning upto Rs. 10,000 per month. Data in the table also reveals that 59.1 percent of the respondents had three to four number of children and only a small proportion of the respondents had no child. Similarly, data also shows that 57.6 percent of the respondents were married and only a small proportion of them was single and divorcees. The data shows that 26.0 percent of BISP beneficiaries were widows.

Table 02

Distribution of the respondents by their occupation, children, monthly income, and marital status

Main occupation of the respondents			No. of children of the respondents		
Type	Frequency	Percentage	Number	Frequency	Percentage
Agriculturist	24	06.1	No child	02	00.5
Private empl.	06	01.5	1 - 2	93	23.5
Labourer	93	23.5	3 - 4	234	59.1
Unemployed	70	17.7	5 - 6	54	13.6
Housewife	196	49.5	7 - 8	12	03.0
Hand cart/Thara	07	01.8	8+	01	00.3
Total	396	100.0	Total	396	100.0
Monthly income of the respondents (Rs.)			Marital status of the respondents		
Up to 10000	346	87.4	Single	04	01.0
10001 - 20000	28	07.1	Married	228	57.6
20001 - 30000	05	01.3	Separated	45	11.4
40001 - 50000	01	00.3	Divorced	16	04.0
50001 & above	16	04.0	Widow	103	26.0
Total	396	100.0	Total	396	100.0

Table 03 describes the family size, age distribution, and educational qualification of the respondents. Data reveals that half of the respondents (50.8 %) had seven to nine family size and only 3.3 percent of them had more than 12 family members. The age distribution of the respondents show that 59.3 percent of the respondents were among 41 to 50 years of age bracket and only 2.5 percent of them were 21 to 30 years of age distribution. The qualification of the respondents show that most of the respondents (55.3 %) had a primary level of education and 37.6 percent of them were illiterate. It shows that respondents had a low level of educational qualifications.

Table 03

Distribution of the respondents by their family size, age bracket, and educational qualification

Family size of the respondents	Frequency	Percentage
Up to 6	51	12.9
7 – 9	201	50.8
10 – 12	131	33.1
12+	13	03.3
Total	396	100.0
Age distribution of the respondents		
21 – 30	10	02.5
31 – 40	99	25.0
41 – 50	235	59.3
51 & above	52	13.1
Total	396	100.0
Educational qualification of the respondents		
Illiterate	149	37.6
Primary	219	55.3
Middle	16	04.0
Matric	07	01.8
Intermediate	05	01.3
Total	396	100.0

4.3 BISP Cash Transfers

Table 04 describes the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table shows that 50.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement ‘you received cash-grant from the government’. Similarly, 30.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 10.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 0.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement ‘you received cash-grant from the government’. It is,

therefore, argued that more than 50 percent of the respondents were in favor of the statement.

Data presented in the table shows that 16.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant late'. 17.7 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 24.2 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Furthermore, only 13.4 percent of the respondents strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant late'. It is, therefore, summed up that more than 50 percent of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Table 04*Distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers*

		Strongly Agree = SA to Strongly Disagree = SD					
Sr.	Statements	SA <i>F</i> (%)	A <i>f</i> (%)	SLA <i>f</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>F</i> (%)	SD <i>F</i> (%)
i	You received cash-grant from the government	121 (30.6)	201 (50.8)	40 (10.1)	22 (05.6)	09 (2.3)	03 (0.8)
ii	You received BISP cash-grant late	70 (17.7)	67 (16.9)	96 (24.2)	70 (17.7)	40 (10.1)	53 (13.4)
iii	You received BISP cash-grant through any political worker	56 (14.1)	79 (19.9)	24 (6.1)	106 (26.8)	65 (16.4)	66 (16.7)
iv	You received BISP cash-grant by giving a vote	75 (18.9)	50 (12.6)	59 (14.9)	50 (12.6)	58 (14.6)	104 (26.3)
v	You received BISP cash-grant by using any reference	61 (15.4)	110 (27.8)	39 (9.8)	50 (12.6)	65 (16.4)	71 (17.9)
vi	You received BISP cash-grant after a deducted amount	138 (34.8)	38 (9.6)	37 (9.3)	39 (9.8)	78 (19.7)	66 (16.7)
vii	You received BISP cash-grant at your doorstep	106 (26.8)	52 (13.1)	20 (5.1)	59 (14.9)	87 (22.0)	72 (18.2)
viii	You received BISP cash-grant through local agent or broker	125 (31.6)	41 (10.4)	23 (5.8)	44 (11.1)	82 (20.7)	81 (20.5)

Data in the table reflected that 19.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant through political worker'. Correspondingly, 14.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 6.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposite to it, only 16.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed in concerning the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant through political

worker'. It is, therefore, argued that more than 50 percent of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data elaborated in the table shows that 12.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant by giving a vote'. Similarly, 18.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 14.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. On the other side, only 12.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant by giving a vote'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data analysis illustrated in the table shows that 27.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant by using any reference'. In the same way, 15.4 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 09.8 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Furthermore, only 12.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant by using any reference'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Tabulated data in the given table shows that 09.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant after a deducted amount'. By the same token, 34.8 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 09.3 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 09.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant after a deducted amount'. It is, therefore, concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data depicted in the table shows that 13.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant at your doorstep'. Similarly, 26.8 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 05.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposite to it, only 14.9 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant at your doorstep'. Consequently, it is argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement. The

doorstep here denotes the Point of Sales (POS), the banks, the ATMs, and in some cases, the postal services at a walking distance from the beneficiaries' residences.

Analyzed data presented in the table shows that 10.4 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant by a local agent or broker'. Similarly, 31.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 05.8 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. On the other hand, only 11.1 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you received BISP cash-grant by a local agent or broker'. It is, therefore, concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

4.4 Political Awareness

Table 05

Distribution of the respondents by their response towards political awareness

Sr.	Statements	SA <i>f</i> (%)	A <i>F</i> (%)	SLA <i>F</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>F</i> (%)	SD <i>f</i> (%)
i	You have a familiarity with political parties of the area	49 (12.4)	46 (11.6)	89 (22.5)	92 (23.2)	98 (24.7)	22 (5.6)
ii	You have a familiarity of the political manifesto	43 (10.9)	15 (3.8)	51 (12.9)	146 (36.9)	123 (31.1)	18 (4.5)
iii	You easily identify the flags of political parties	59 (14.9)	83 (21.0)	66 (16.7)	94 (23.7)	82 (20.7)	12 (3.0)
iv	You know about the best political party	44 (11.1)	17 (4.3)	69 (17.4)	142 (35.9)	107 (27.0)	17 (4.3)
v	You are aware of corner meetings	43 (10.9)	24 (6.1)	57 (14.4)	95 (24.0)	141 (35.6)	36 (9.1)
vi	You are aware of political campaign strategies	41 (10.4)	13 (3.3)	45 (11.4)	111 (28.0)	144 (36.4)	42 (10.6)
vii	You are aware of political leaders of political parties	41 (10.4)	26 (6.6)	64 (16.2)	111 (28.0)	128 (23.3)	26 (6.6)
viii	You have exposure towards change in politics	44 (11.1)	10 (2.5)	45 (11.4)	113 (28.5)	138 (34.8)	46 (11.6)

Table 5 describes the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table shows that 11.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you have familiarity with political parties of the area'. 12.4 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 22.5 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 05.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you have familiarity with political parties of the area'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data presented in the table shows that 03.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you have familiarity with the political manifesto'. Likewise, 10.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 12.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposing to it, only 04.5 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you have familiarity with the political manifesto'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Analyzed data reflected in the table shows that 21.0 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you easily identify the flags of political parties'. Similarly, 14.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 16.7 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it, only 03.0 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you easily identify the flags of political parties'. Consequently, it is argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data elaborated in the table shows that 04.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you know about the best political party'. Similarly, 11.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 17.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 04.3 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you know about the best political party'. It is, therefore, concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Primary data illustrated in the table shows that 06.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you are aware of corner meetings'. 10.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 14.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Different from it, only 09.1 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you are aware of corner meetings'. As a result, it is argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data given in the table informs that 03.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you are aware of political campaign strategies'. Similarly, 10.4 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 11.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the

statement. Contrary to it, only 10.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you are aware of political campaign strategies'. It is, therefore, concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

The data in the table further explains that 06.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you are aware of political leaders of political parties'. Similarly, 10.4 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 16.2 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposing to it, only 06.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you are aware of political leaders of political parties'. Consequently, it is argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Primary data presented in the table showed that 02.5 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you have exposure towards change in politics'. Similarly, 11.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 11.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 11.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you have exposure towards change in politics'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

4.5 Political Empowerment

Table 06

Distribution of the respondents by their response towards political empowerment

Sr.	Statements	SA <i>f</i> (%)	A <i>f</i> (%)	SLA <i>f</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>F</i> (%)	SD <i>F</i> (%)
i	You join a political party as per your choice	44 (11.1)	24 (6.1)	51 (12.9)	91 (23.0)	133 (33.6)	53 (13.4)
ii	You give vote freely in every election	51 (12.9)	49 (12.4)	54 (13.6)	124 (31.3)	88 (22.2)	30 (7.6)
iii	Participation in politics is your own decision	49 (12.4)	21 (5.3)	68 (17.2)	102 (25.8)	120 (30.3)	36 (9.1)
iv	You have a strong political affiliation	31 (7.8)	18 (4.5)	46 (11.6)	107 (27.0)	140 (35.4)	54 (13.6)
v	Political party flag is placed at your home	06 (1.5)	34 (8.6)	52 (13.1)	103 (26.0)	114 (28.8)	87 (22.0)
vi	You made a political decision in your area	05 (1.3)	10 (2.5)	34 (8.6)	108 (27.3)	144 (36.4)	95 (24.0)
vii	You participate in local politics	00 (0.0)	17 (4.3)	30 (7.6)	104 (26.3)	149 (37.6)	96 (24.2)
viii	You arrange political meetings at your place	02 (0.5)	11 (2.8)	31 (7.8)	86 (21.7)	144 (36.4)	122 (30.8)

Table 6 describes the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table shows that 06.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you join a political party as per your choice'. Similarly, 11.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 12.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 13.4 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you join a political party as per your choice'. Consequently, it is argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data presented in the table further shows that 12.4 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you give vote freely in every election'. In the same way, 12.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.6 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposing to it, only 07.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you give vote freely in every election'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data reflected in the table explains that 05.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'participation in politics is your own decision'. Similarly, 12.4 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 17.2 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 09.1 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'participation in politics is your own decision'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data highlighted in the table further explains that 04.5 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you have a strong political affiliation'. By the same token, 07.8 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 11.6 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Different from it, only 13.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you have a strong political affiliation'. It is, thus, concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data illustrated in the table informs that 08.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'political party flag is placed at your home'. Similarly, 01.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 22.0 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'political party flag is placed at your home'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data showed in the table reveals that 02.5 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you made a political decision in your area'. Likewise, 01.3 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 08.6 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it, only 24.0 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed

concerning the statement 'you made a political decision in your area'. It is, therefore, concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data depicted in the table explains that 4.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you participate in local politics'. Similarly, 00.0 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 07.6 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 24.2 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you participate in local politics'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data presented in the table highlights that 02.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you arrange political meetings at your place'. Equally, 00.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 07.8 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Disagreeing to it, only 30.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you arrange political meetings at your place'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

4.6 Change in Local Politics

Table 07

Distribution of the respondents by their response towards change in local politics

Sr.	Statements	SA <i>f</i> (%)	A <i>f</i> (%)	SLA <i>f</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>f</i> (%)	SD <i>f</i> (%)
i	Local politics is changed with the passage of time	14 (3.5)	67 (16.9)	61 (15.4)	78 (19.7)	102 (25.8)	74 (18.7)
ii	Change in local politics is normal routine	52 (13.1)	44 (11.1)	68 (17.2)	100 (25.3)	106 (26.8)	26 (6.6)
iii	Political leaders change their political party	56 (14.1)	34 (8.6)	51 (12.9)	129 (32.6)	101 (25.5)	25 (6.3)
iv	Your political party affiliation is because of any financial benefits	27 (6.8)	23 (5.8)	57 (14.4)	104 (26.3)	120 (30.3)	56 (16.4)
v	People change political affiliation under pressure	54 (13.6)	37 (9.3)	62 (15.7)	101 (25.5)	98 (24.7)	44 (11.1)
vi	Welfare-oriented work results in change in local politics	50 (12.6)	48 (12.1)	97 (24.5)	86 (21.7)	76 (19.2)	39 (9.8)
vii	Development work changes local politics	50 (12.6)	56 (14.1)	87 (22.0)	79 (19.9)	77 (19.4)	47 (11.9)
viii	It is always good to see change in local politics	22 (5.6)	39 (9.8)	76 (19.2)	94 (23.7)	95 (24.0)	70 (17.7)

Table 07 has described the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table explains that 16.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement ‘local politics is changed with the passage of time’. Similarly, 03.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 18.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed in with reference to the statement ‘local politics is changed with the

passage of time'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Primary data presented in the table shows that 11.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'change in local politics is normal routine'. Likewise, 13.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 17.2 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 06.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'change in local politics is normal routine'. It is, therefore, concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data reflected in the table shows that 08.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'political leaders change their political party'. 14.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 12.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 06.3 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'political leaders change their political party'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Analyzed data elaborated in the table shows that 05.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'your political party affiliation is because of any financial benefits'. In the same way, 06.8 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 14.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposing to it, only 16.4 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'your political party affiliation is because of any financial benefits'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data illustrated in the table shows that 09.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'people change political affiliation under pressure'. Similarly, 13.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.7 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 11.1 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'people change political affiliation under pressure'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Tabulated data shown in the table reveals that 12.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'welfare-oriented work results in change in local politics'. In the same way, 12.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 24.5 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Disagreeing to it, only 09.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'welfare-oriented work results in change in local politics'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data exhibited in the table explains that 14.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'development work changes local politics'. Similarly, 12.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 22.0 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 11.9 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'development work changes local politics'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Tabulated data presented in the table shows that 09.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'It is always good to see change in local politics'. Likewise, 05.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 19.2 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 17.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'It is always good to see change in local politics'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

4.7 Media Influence

Table 08

Distribution of the respondents by their response towards media influence

Sr.	Statements	SA <i>f</i> (%)	A <i>f</i> (%)	SLA <i>f</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>f</i> (%)	SD <i>f</i> (%)
i	Mass media is depicting a true picture of local politics	10 (2.5)	44 (11.1)	63 (15.9)	105 (26.5)	112 (28.3)	62 (15.7)
ii	The media is biased to show strong political party	52 (13.1)	34 (08.6)	49 (12.4)	138 (34.8)	106 (26.8)	17 (04.3)
iii	Media changes political behaviour	10 (2.5)	51 (12.9)	82 (20.7)	89 (22.5)	109 (27.5)	55 (13.9)
iv	The media create propaganda regarding politics	47 (11.9)	29 (7.3)	63 (15.9)	116 (29.3)	119 (30.1)	22 (5.6)
v	Media generate a public opinion about politics	18 (04.5)	25 (06.3)	76 (19.2)	87 (22.0)	126 (31.8)	64 (16.2)
vi	Media changes political awareness	19 (04.8)	41 (10.4)	71 (17.9)	86 (21.7)	104 (26.3)	75 (18.9)
vii	Media influences voting behaviour	21 (05.3)	51 (12.9)	73 (18.4)	104 (26.3)	94 (23.7)	53 (13.4)
viii	Media highlights political issues of the area	19 (04.8)	35 (8.8)	55 (13.9)	137 (34.6)	98 (24.7)	52 (13.1)

Table 08 describes the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table highlights that 11.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'mass media is depicting a true picture of local politics'. Similarly, 02.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 15.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'mass media is depicting a true picture of local politics'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Primary data presented in the table shows that 08.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'media is biased to show strong political party'. Likewise, 13.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 12.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposing to it, only 04.3 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'media is biased to show strong political party'. So, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data reflected in the table showed that 12.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'media changes the political behaviour'. Similarly, 02.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 20.7 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 13.9 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'media changes the political behaviour'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Analyzed data elaborated in the table shows that 07.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'media create propaganda regarding politics'. In the same way, 11.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 05.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'media create propaganda regarding politics'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data illustrated in the table explains that 06.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'media generate a public opinion about politics'. Similarly, 04.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 19.2 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 16.2 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'media generate a public opinion about politics'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Tabulated data shown in the table informs that 10.4 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'media changes political awareness'. By the same token, 04.8 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 17.9 percent of them slightly agreed

in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it, only 18.9 percent of the respondents strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'media changes political awareness'. It is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data depicted in the table informs that 12.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'media influences voting behaviour'. Similarly, 05.3 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 18.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 13.4 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'media has an influence on voting behaviour'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Primary data presented in the table shows that 80.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'media highlights political issues of the area'. In the same way, 04.8 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it, only 13.1 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'media highlights political issues of the area'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

4.8 Voting Behaviour

4.8.1 Voting Behaviour in the General Elections of 2008

Table 09

Distribution of the respondents by their response towards voting behaviour in the general elections of 2008

Sr.	Statements	SA <i>f</i> (%)	A <i>f</i> (%)	SLA <i>f</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>f</i> (%)	SD <i>F</i> (%)
i	Your vote is based on your family choices	85 (21.5)	68 (17.2)	62 (15.7)	56 (14.1)	105 (26.5)	20 (5.1)
ii	Your bradri pressurize you to cast vote	80 (20.2)	67 (16.9)	47 (11.9)	111 (28.0)	82 (20.7)	09 (02.3)
iii	You were bound by a specific party to cast vote	71 (17.9)	43 (10.9)	46 (11.6)	101 (25.5)	112 (28.3)	23 (05.8)
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	59 (14.9)	57 (14.4)	49 (12.4)	107 (27.0)	101 (25.5)	23 (05.8)
v	You cast vote freely	14 (03.5)	71 (17.9)	55 (13.9)	67 (16.9)	111 (28.0)	78 (17.9)
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	16 (04.0)	62 (15.7)	71 (17.9)	94 (23.7)	82 (20.7)	71 (17.9)
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	08 (02.0)	27 (06.8)	66 (16.7)	111 (28.0)	97 (24.5)	87 (22.0)
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	14 (03.5)	20 (05.1)	52 (13.1)	97 (24.5)	132 (31.1)	90 (22.7)

Table 09 described the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table explains that 17.2 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'your vote is based on your family choices'. Similarly, 21.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.7 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 05.1 percent of the respondent strongly

disagreed concerning the statement 'your vote is based on your family choices'. Therefore, it is argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Primary data presented in the table shows that 16.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'your bradri pressurize you to cast vote'. Likewise, 20.2 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 11.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 02.3 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'your bradri pressurize you to cast vote'. It is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data reflected in the table explains that 10.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you were bound by a specific party to cast vote'. Similarly, 17.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 11.6 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 05.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you were bound by a specific party to cast vote'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Analyzed data in the table explains that 14.4 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote as per local leader'. Also, 14.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 12.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it, only 05.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote as per local leader'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data illustrated in the table shows that 17.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote freely'. Similarly, 03.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 17.9 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote freely'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Analyzed data shown in the table informs that 15.7 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote based on welfare work'. By the same token,

04.0 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 17.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it, only 17.9 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote based on welfare work'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data depicted in the table reveals that 06.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote based on any financial benefits'. Similarly, 02.0 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 16.7 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 22.0 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote based on any financial benefits'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Tabulated data presented in the table explains that 05.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote to get any personal work benefits'. In the same way, 03.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it, only 22.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote to get any personal work benefits'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

4.8.2 Voting Behaviour in the General Elections of 2013

Table 10

Distribution of the respondents by their response towards voting behaviour in the general election of 2013

Sr.	Statements	SA <i>f</i> (%)	A <i>f</i> (%)	SLA <i>f</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>F</i> (%)	SD <i>f</i> (%)
i	Your vote is based on your family choices	76 (19.2)	74 (18.7)	66 (16.7)	66 (16.7)	75 (18.9)	39 (09.8)
ii	Your bradri pressurize you to cast vote	60 (15.2)	66 (16.7)	62 (15.7)	100 (25.3)	88 (22.2)	20 (05.1)
iii	You were bound to cast vote by a specific party	55 (13.9)	37 (09.3)	63 (15.9)	106 (26.8)	110 (27.8)	25 (06.3)
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	46 (11.6)	51 (12.9)	65 (16.4)	110 (27.8)	89 (22.5)	35 (08.8)
v	You cast vote freely	23 (5.8)	52 (13.1)	56 (14.1)	116 (29.3)	87 (22.0)	62 (15.7)
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	28 (07.1)	52 (13.1)	75 (18.9)	110 (27.8)	77 (19.4)	54 (13.6)
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	08 (02.0)	24 (6.1)	52 (13.1)	141 (35.6)	107 (27.0)	64 (16.2)
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	13 (03.3)	16 (4.0)	47 (11.9)	127 (32.1)	117 (29.5)	76 (19.2)

Table 10 described the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table explains that 18.7 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'your vote is based on your family choices'. Similarly, 19.2 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 16.7 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 09.8 percent of the respondent strongly

disagreed concerning the statement 'you received cash-grant from the government'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Primary data presented in the table exhibits that 16.7 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'your bradri pressurize you to cast vote'. Correspondingly, 15.2 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.7 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 05.1 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed in concerning the statement 'your bradri pressurize you to cast vote'. It is, thus, concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data reflected in the table informs that 09.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you were bound to cast vote by a specific party'. Similarly, 13.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 06.3 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you were bound to cast vote by a specific party'. Hence, it is argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Analyzed data in the table shows that 12.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote as per local leader'. In the same way, 11.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 16.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it, only 08.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote as per local leader'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data illustrated in the table explains that 13.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote freely'. Similarly, 05.8 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 14.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 15.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote freely'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Analyzed data shown in the table reveals that 13.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote based on any welfare work'. In the same

way, 07.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 18.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposing to it, only 13.6 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote based on any welfare work'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data shown in the table depicts that 06.1 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote based on any financial benefits'. Similarly, 02.0 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 16.2 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote based on any financial benefits'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Primary data presented in the table shows that 04.0 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote to get any personal work benefits'. In the same way, 03.3 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 11.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Disagreeing to it, only 19.9 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote to get any personal work benefits'. It is, therefore, concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

4.8.3 Voting Behaviour in the General Elections of 2018

Table 11

Distribution of the respondents by their response towards voting behaviour in the general election of 2018

Sr.	Statements	SA <i>f</i> (%)	A <i>F</i> (%)	SLA <i>f</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>F</i> (%)	SD <i>f</i> (%)
i	Your vote is based on your family choices	74 (18.7)	67 (16.9)	62 (15.7)	52 (13.1)	88 (22.2)	53 (13.4)
ii	Your bradri pressurize you to cast vote	60 (15.2)	45 (11.4)	71 (17.9)	92 (22.2)	87 (22.0)	41 (10.4)
iii	You were bound to cast vote by a specific party	49 (12.4)	34 (8.6)	53 (13.4)	98 (24.7)	123 (31.1)	39 (9.8)
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	39 (9.8)	45 (11.4)	60 (15.2)	104 (26.3)	97 (24.5)	51 (12.9)
v	You cast vote freely	47 (11.9)	53 (13.4)	52 (13.1)	88 (22.2)	90 (22.7)	66 (16.7)
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	54 (13.6)	50 (12.6)	61 (15.4)	84 (21.2)	82 (20.7)	65 (16.4)
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	34 (8.6)	15 (3.8)	55 (13.9)	118 (29.8)	102 (25.8)	72 (18.2)
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	34 (8.6)	10 (2.5)	45 (11.4)	108 (27.3)	114 (28.8)	85 (21.5)

Table 11 described the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table showed that 16.9 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'your vote is based on your family choices'. Similarly, 18.7 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.7 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 13.4 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'your vote is based on your family choices'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Primary data presented in the table explains that 11.4 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'your bradri pressurize you to cast vote'. Likewise, 15.2 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 17.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 10.4 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'your bradri pressurize you to cast vote'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Data reflected in the table informs that 08.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you were bound to cast vote by a specific party'. Similarly, 12.4 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 09.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you were bound to cast vote by a specific party'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were in favour of the statement.

Analyzed data elaborated in the table shows that 11.4 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote as per local leader'. By the same token, 09.8 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.2 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 12.9 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote as per local leader'. It is, thus, concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data illustrated in the table further explains that 13.4 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote freely'. Similarly, 11.9 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 16.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote freely'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Primary data shown in the table indicates that 12.6 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote based on any welfare work'. In the same way, 13.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 15.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Varying from it, only 16.4 percent of the respondent

strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote based on any welfare work'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data shown in the table depicts that 03.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote based on any financial benefits'. Similarly, 08.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 13.9 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 18.2 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote based on any financial benefits'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Analyzed data presented in the table shows that 02.5 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you cast vote to get any personal work benefits'. By the same token, 08.6 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 11.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Opposing to it, only 21.5 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you cast vote to get any personal work benefits'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

4.9 Political Participation

Table 12

Distribution of the respondents by their response towards political participation

Sr.	Statements	SA <i>f</i> (%)	A <i>f</i> (%)	SLA <i>f</i> (%)	SLD <i>f</i> (%)	D <i>f</i> (%)	SD <i>f</i> (%)
i	You are attending corner meetings	05 (01.3)	14 (3.5)	19 (04.8)	70 (17.7)	178 (44.9)	110 (27.8)
ii	You raise political slogans	02 (00.5)	21 (05.3)	26 (06.6)	110 (27.8)	151 (38.1)	86 (21.7)
iii	You participated in election campaigns	01 (00.3)	19 (04.8)	30 (07.6)	87 (22.0)	162 (40.9)	97 (24.5)
iv	You hold flag of political party during the campaign	13 (03.3)	31 (07.8)	41 (10.4)	90 (22.7)	136 (34.3)	85 (21.5)
v	You contribute fund to a political party	02 (00.5)	11 (02.8)	18 (04.5)	88 (22.2)	174 (43.9)	103 (26.0)
vi	You participated in political walk	08 (02.0)	18 (04.5)	26 (06.6)	89 (22.5)	161 (40.7)	94 (23.7)
vii	You organized political corner meeting	04 (01.0)	06 (01.5)	24 (06.1)	80 (20.2)	169 (42.7)	113 (28.5)
viii	You actively take part in political decisions of your area	04 (01.0)	06 (01.5)	37 (09.3)	93 (23.5)	144 (36.4)	112 (28.3)

Table 12 described the distribution of the respondents by their response towards BISP cash transfers. Data presented in the table shows that 03.5 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement ‘you are attending corner meetings’. Similarly, 01.3 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 04.8 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 27.8 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement ‘you are attending corner meetings’. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Primary data presented in the table shows that 05.3 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you raise political slogans'. In the same way, 00.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 06.6 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Different from it, only 21.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you raise political slogans'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data reflected in the table showed that 04.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you participated in election campaigns'. Similarly, 00.3 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 07.6 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 24.5 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you participated in election campaigns'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Analyzed data elaborated in the table explains that 07.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you hold flag of political party during the campaign'. By the same token, 03.3 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 10.4 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Disagreeing to it, only 21.5 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you hold flag of political party during the campaign'. It is, therefore, concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data illustrated in the table finds that 02.8 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you contribute fund to a political party'. Similarly, 00.5 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 04.5 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 26.0 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you contribute fund to a political party'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Tabulated data shown that 04.5 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you participated in a political walk'. 02.0 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 06.6 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Dissimilar to it,

only 23.7 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you participated in a political walk'. Hence, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Data depicted in the table explains that 01.5 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you organized political corner meeting'. Similarly, 01.1 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 06.1 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Contrary to it, only 28.5 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you organized political corner meeting'. It is, therefore, argued that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

Analyzed data presented in the table shows that 01.5 percent of the respondents agreed in favour of the statement 'you actively take part in political decisions of your area'. Likewise, 01.0 percent of the respondents strongly agreed and 09.3 percent of them slightly agreed in terms of the statement. Differing to it, only 28.3 percent of the respondent strongly disagreed concerning the statement 'you actively take part in political decisions of your area'. As a result, it is concluded that more than half of the respondents were against the statement.

4.10 Inferential Statistics

This section is consisted of the inferential statistics based on the primary data collected from BISP cash-grant receivers (beneficiaries). It comprised of the confirmatory factor analysis, described statistics of the variables, normality test, Kendall's tau-b statistical test, chi-square test, structure equation modelling (SEM) and independent sample t-test.

4.10.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

Table 13

Confirmatory Factor Analysis of BISP cash transfers

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	You received cash-grant from the government	0.024	0.050	0.470	0.639
ii	You received BISP cash-grant late	1.303	0.067	19.305	0.000
iii	You received BISP cash-grant through any political worker	1.358	0.070	19.341	0.000
iv	You received BISP cash-grant by giving a vote	1.286	0.083	15.463	0.000
v	You received BISP cash-grant by using reference	1.600	0.069	23.131	0.000
vi	You received BISP cash-grant after a deducted amount	1.798	0.076	23.702	0.000
vii	You received BISP cash-grant at your doorstep	1.615	0.078	20.672	0.000
viii	You received BISP cash-grant through any local agent or broker	1.847	0.077	24.045	0.000

The model estimates of BISP cash transfers were consisted of eight items. The results of CFA in table 13 shows that item (i) 'you received cash-grant from the

government' was not confirmed and excluded for further analysis based on the p-value i.e. 0.639. However, all other seven factors were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'you received BISP cash-grant by giving a vote' had low parameter estimates (1.286) as compared to other items of BISP cash transfers. The results also indicated that the item 'you received BISP cash-grant through any local agent or broker' had highest parameter estimates (1.847) as compared to other items of the variable. It is, therefore, concluded that the p-value of seven items was significant that reject the null hypothesis. Resultantly, alternate hypothesis accepted those seven items, which were significant, based on the calculated p-value, and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

Table 14*Model Estimates of CFA Analysis of Political Awareness*

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	You know each political party working in your area	0.971	0.065	14.992	0.000
ii	You have a familiarity of political manifestoes	1.102	0.054	20.254	0.000
iii	You easily identify the flags of political parties	0.875	0.067	12.987	0.000
iv	You know which is the best political party	1.066	0.055	19.257	0.000
v	You are aware of corner meetings	1.211	0.059	20.362	0.000
vi	You are aware of political campaign strategies	1.248	0.056	22.477	0.000
vii	You are aware of political leaders of political parties	1.177	0.057	20.744	0.000
viii	You have exposure towards change in politics	1.227	0.058	21.285	0.000

The model estimates of political awareness were consisted of eight items. The results of CFA in table 14 revealed that all eight items were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'you easily identify the flags of political parties' had low parameter estimates (.875) as compared to other items of political awareness. The results also proved that the item 'you are aware of political campaign strategies' had highest parameter estimates (1.248) as compared to other items of the variable. It is, therefore, clinched that the p-value of eight items was significant that reject the null hypothesis. Consequently, alternate hypothesis accepted those eight items, which were significant based on the calculated p-value and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

Table 15*Model Estimates of CFA Analysis of Political Empowerment*

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	You join a political party as per your choice	-0.314	0.078	-4.001	0.000
ii	You cast vote freely	-0.316	0.077	-4.112	0.000
iii	You participate in a political walk as per your decision	-0.158	0.077	-2.049	0.040
iv	You have a strong political affiliation	0.299	0.071	4.179	0.000
v	Political party flag is placed at your home	0.736	0.062	11.964	0.000
vi	You made a political decision in your area	0.876	0.047	18.730	0.000
vii	You participate in local politics	0.946	0.043	22.029	0.000
viii	You arrange political meetings at your place	0.914	0.045	20.383	0.000

The model estimates of political empowerment were comprised of eight items. The results of CFA in table 15 presented that all eight items were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'you participate in a political walk as per your decision' had low parameter estimates (-0.158) as compared to other items of political empowerment. The results also indicated that the item 'you participate in local politics' had highest parameter estimates (.946) as compared to other items of the variable. It is, therefore, decided that the p-value of eight items were significant that reject the null hypothesis. Resultantly, alternate hypothesis accepted those eight items, which were significant based on the calculated p-value and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

Table 16*Model Estimates of CFA Analysis of Change in Local Politics*

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	Local politics is changed with the passage of time	0.654	0.074	8.888	0.000
ii	Change in local politics is normal routine	0.712	0.073	9.726	0.000
iii	Political leaders change their political party	0.621	0.074	8.436	0.000
iv	Your political party affiliation is based on any financial benefits	0.397	0.072	5.529	0.000
v	People change political affiliation under pressure	1.075	0.070	15.287	0.000
vi	Welfare-oriented work results in change in local politics	1.339	0.061	21.895	0.000
vii	Development work changes local politics	1.353	0.064	21.062	0.000
viii	It is always good to see change in local politics	0.713	0.070	10.138	0.000

The model estimates of change in local politics were consisted of eight items. The results of CFA in table 16 revealed that all eight items were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'your political party affiliation is based on any financial benefits' had low parameter estimates (.397) as compared to other items of change in local politics. The results also indicated that the item 'development work changes local politics' had highest parameter estimates (1.353) as compared to other items of the variable. It is, therefore, determined that the p-value of eight items was significant that reject the null hypothesis. Resultantly, alternate hypothesis accepted those eight items, which were significant and based on the calculated p-value, and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

Table 17*Model Estimates of CFA Analysis of Media Influence*

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	Media is depicting a true picture of local politics	1.058	0.057	18.665	0.000
ii	Media is biased to show strong political party	0.192	0.074	2.584	0.010
iii	Media changes the political behaviour	1.057	0.058	18.188	0.000
iv	Media create propaganda regarding politics	0.193	0.074	2.585	0.010
v	Media generate a public opinion about politics	1.030	0.059	17.486	0.000
vi	Media changes political awareness	1.142	0.062	18.474	0.000
vii	Media has an influence on voting behaviour	0.953	0.064	14.817	0.000
viii	Media highlights political issues of the area	0.928	0.059	15.661	0.000

The model estimates of media influence were consisted of eight items. The results of CFA in table 14 informed that all eight items were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'media is biased to show strong political party' had low parameter estimates (.192) as compared to other items of media influence. The results also indicated that the item 'media changes political awareness' had highest parameter estimates (1.142) as compared to other items of the variable. It is, therefore, clinched that the p-value of eight items was significant that reject the null hypothesis. Resultantly, alternate hypothesis accepted those eight items, which were significant based on the calculated p-value and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

Table 18*Model Estimates of CFA Analysis of Voting Behaviour in the General Elections of 2008*

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	You cast vote according to your family choice	0.122	0.085	1.430	0.153
ii	You cast vote along with your bradri	0.108	0.079	1.379	0.168
iii	You were bound to cast vote by a specific party	0.118	0.082	1.434	0.152
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	0.120	0.079	1.507	0.132
v	You cast vote freely	0.859	0.072	11.971	0.000
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	0.933	0.068	13.807	0.000
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	1.211	0.052	23.121	0.000
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	1.093	0.056	19.498	0.000

The model estimates of voting behaviour in the general elections of 2008 were consisted of eight items. The results of CFA in table 13 displayed that first four items (i-iv) were not confirmed and excluded for further analysis based on the p-value. However, all other four factors were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'you cast vote freely' had low parameter estimates (0.859) as compared to other items of voting behaviour in the general election of 2008. The results also indicated that the item 'you cast vote based on any financial benefits' had highest parameter estimates (1.211) as compared to other items of the variable. Hence, it established that the p-value of four items were significant that reject the null hypothesis. Resultantly, alternate hypothesis accepted those four items, which were significant based on the calculated p-value and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

Table 19*Model Estimates of CFA Analysis of Voting Behaviour in the General Elections of 2013*

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	You cast vote according to your family choice	0.374	0.085	4.381	0.000
ii	You cast vote along with your bradri	0.313	0.078	4.022	0.000
iii	You were bound to cast vote by a specific party	0.267	0.077	3.447	0.001
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	0.246	0.077	3.182	0.001
v	You cast vote freely	0.671	0.071	9.448	0.000
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	0.859	0.069	12.518	0.000
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	1.107	0.050	22.224	0.000
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	1.005	0.054	18.550	0.000

The model estimates of voting behaviour in the general elections of 2013 were consisted of eight items. The results of CFA in table 19 indicated that all eight items were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'you cast vote as per local leader' had low parameter estimates (.246) as compared to other items of voting behaviour in the general election of 2013. The results also indicated that the item 'you cast vote based on any financial benefits' had highest parameter estimates (1.107) as compared to other items of the variable. Consequently, it established that the p-value of eight items was significant that reject the null hypothesis. Resultantly, alternate hypothesis accepted that eight items were significant based on the calculated p-value and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

Table 20*Model Estimates of CFA Analysis of Voting Behaviour in the General Elections of 2018*

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	You cast vote according to your family choice	1.510	0.070	21.701	0.000
ii	You cast vote along with your bradri	1.483	0.060	24.634	0.000
iii	You were bound to cast vote by a specific party	1.271	0.062	20.401	0.000
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	0.971	0.068	14.183	0.000
v	You cast vote freely	-0.137	0.084	-1.639	0.101
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	-0.097	0.085	-1.143	0.253
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	-0.124	0.074	-1.676	0.094
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	-0.135	0.074	-1.821	0.069

The model estimates of voting behaviour in the general elections of 2018 were consisted of eight items. The results of CFA in table 20 indicated that the last four items (v-viii) were not confirmed and excluded for further analysis based on the p-value. However, all other first four factors were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'you cast vote as per local leader' had low parameter estimates (0.971) as compared to other items of voting behaviour in the general elections of 2018. The results also indicated that the item 'you cast vote according to your family choice' had highest parameter estimates (1.510) as compared to other items of the variable. It is, therefore, decided that the p-value of first four items was significant that reject the null hypothesis. Resultantly, alternate hypothesis accepted those first four items, which were significant, based on the calculated p-value and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

Table 21*Model Estimates of CFA Analysis of Political Participation*

Sr.	Statements	Parameter Estimates	Standard Errors	T Statistics	Prob. Level
i	You are attending corner meetings	0.670	0.050	13.360	0.000
ii	You raise political slogans	0.786	0.049	16.144	0.000
iii	You participated in election campaigns	0.809	0.048	16.969	0.000
iv	You hold flag of any political party during the campaign	0.717	0.064	11.215	0.000
v	You contribute fund to any political party	0.732	0.044	16.743	0.000
vi	You participated in the political walk	0.976	0.048	20.120	0.000
vii	You organized political corner meeting	0.794	0.044	18.256	0.000
viii	You actively take part in political decisions of your area	0.861	0.046	18.867	0.000

The model estimates of political participation were consisted of eight items. The results of CFA in table 21 revealed that all eight items were confirmed and had significant p-value. Moreover, the item 'you are attending corner meetings' had low parameter estimates (.670) as compared to other items of political participation. The results also indicated that the item 'you participated in the political walk' had highest parameter estimates (.976) as compared to other items of the variable. Thus, it concluded that the p-value of eight items was significant that reject the null hypothesis. Resultantly, alternate hypothesis accepted those eight items, which were significant, based on the calculated p-value and selected for further analysis i.e. SEM.

4.10.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

Table 22

Descriptive Statistics of the Variables (n=396)

Variables	Range	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
BISP cash transfers	35	7	42	24.95	11.138	124.048
Political awareness	40	8	48	25.63	9.218	84.967
Political empowerment	36	8	44	21.78	5.782	33.429
Change in local politics	40	8	48	25.70	7.934	62.943
Media influence	38	8	46	24.18	7.293	53.182
Voting behaviour in general elections 2008	18	4	22	11.23	4.637	21.499
Voting behaviour in general elections 2013	40	8	48	25.66	7.324	53.648
Voting behaviour in general elections 2018	20	4	24	13.34	5.525	30.524
Political participation	35	8	43	18.23	6.719	45.139
Voting behaviour (2008-13-18)	71	16	87	50.23	13.690	187.418

Table 22 shows descriptive statistics of the variables. It reveals the range, minimum, maximum, mean value, standard deviation and variance of the variables. Data in the table reflects that one item of BISP cash transfers was not confirmed by CFA and it was excluded from further analysis. Moreover, four items of voting behaviour in general election 2013 and also four items of voting behaviour in general elections 2018 were not confirmed by CFA. Hence, these non-significant items were excluded for further analysis. Moreover, the voting behaviour variables were indexed by adding the score of voting behaviour of three elections a) voting behaviour in general elections 2008, b) voting behaviour in general elections 2013, and c) voting behaviour in general elections 2018. Moreover, the variable change in politics got highest score (48) that is similar to the score

of voting behaviour in general elections 2018 (48). The table also showed the mean-value and variances of the variables used for further analysis.

4.10.3 Normality Test

Table 23

Normality Test

Variables	Kolmogorov-Smirnov ^a			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
BISP cash transfers	.131	396	.000	.920	396	.000
Political awareness	.166	396	.000	.835	396	.000
Political empowerment	.060	396	.002	.986	396	.001
Change in local politics	.065	396	.000	.983	396	.000
Media influence	.090	396	.000	.962	396	.000
Voting behaviour in general elections 2008	.089	396	.000	.961	396	.000
Voting behaviour in general elections 2013	.123	396	.000	.979	396	.000
Voting behaviour in general elections 2018	.081	396	.000	.959	396	.000
Political participation	.118	396	.000	.946	396	.000
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction						

Table 23 described the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk normality test. The results of the statistical data rejected the alternate hypothesis as the data was following the normal distribution. Hence, the null hypothesis was accepted since the data was not following the normal distribution. Therefore, the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk normality test proved to use the non-parametric statistical test for further analysis. As a result, Kendall's tau-b and chi-square statistical test were employed for checking the relationship and association among variables.

4.10.4 Kendall's tau-b Statistical Test

Table 24 described Kendall's tau-b statistical test between variables. Data has shown that political empowerment had weak significant correlation with voting behaviour in general elections 2018 (.111*) and highest with (.486) among the variables as depicted in table 24. Similarly, change in local politics had highest correlation with voting behaviour (.639**) and lowest with political participation among variables. Moreover, voting behaviour in general elections 2008 had significant relationship with political participation (.506**). Furthermore, there had been observed high positive significant correlation of voting behaviour in general elections 2013 (.911**) and voting behaviour in general elections 2018 (.756**).

Table 24*Kendall's tau-b Statistical Test*

Var. Code	POE	CLP	VB08	VB13	VB18	POP	VOB
POE	1	.486**	.221**	.233**	.111*	.147**	.244**
CLP		1	.433**	.584**	.446**	.197**	.639**
VB08			1	.418**	.125*	.506**	.613**
VB13				1	.580**	.159**	.911**
VB18					1	.057	.756**
POP						1	.280**
VOB							1

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

4.10.5 Chi-Square Statistical Test

Table 25 explains the Chi-square statistical test. Data in the table reflects that there was an association between BISP cash transfers and voting behaviour among cash-grant receivers of the programme. The results were also supported by the calculated value of Chi-square (2623.542^a, df= 2046, p-value = .000). Consequently, the hypothesis was accepted since there was an association between BISP cash transfers and voting behaviour. Similarly, statistical results in the table also reflected that there was an association between political awareness and voting behaviour among cash-grant receivers of the programme. Moreover, the results were also supported by the calculated value of Chi-square (2670.103^a, df= 2046, p-value = .000). Consequently, the hypothesis was accepted, based on the association between political awareness and voting behaviour.

Table 25*Chi-Square Statistical Test (Dependent Variable = Voting Behaviour)*

Independent Variables	Pearson Chi-Square Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2 sided)
BISP cash transfers	2623.542 ^a	2046	.000
Political awareness	2670.103 ^a	2046	.000
Political empowerment	2317.938 ^a	1922	.000
Change in local politics	3968.447 ^a	2418	.000
Media influence	3398.721 ^a	2170	.000
Political participation	2989.196 ^a	1922	.000

Tabulated data also reflects that there was an association between political empowerment and voting behaviour among cash-grant receivers of the programme. Moreover, the results were also supported by the calculated value of Chi-square (2317.938^a, df = 1922, p-value = .000). Consequently, the hypothesis was accepted since there was an association between political empowerment and voting behaviour. Furthermore, statistical outcomes in the table also reflected that there was an association between change in local politics and voting behaviour among cash-grant receivers of the programme. Moreover, the results were also supported by the calculated value of Chi-square (3968.447^a, df = 2418, p-value = .000). Consequently, the hypothesis was accepted based on the association between change in local politics and voting behaviour.

Data presented in the table also depicted that there was an association between media influence and voting behaviour among cash-grant receivers of the programme. Moreover, the results were also supported by the calculated value of Chi-square (3398.721^a, df = 2170, p-value = .000). Consequently, the hypothesis was accepted because there was an association between media influence and voting behaviour. Likewise, statistical outcomes in the table also described that there was an association between political participation and voting behaviour among cash-grant receivers of the programme. Moreover, the results were also supported by the calculated value of Chi-square (2989.196^a, df = 1922, p-value = .000). Consequently, the hypothesis was accepted since there was an association between political participation and voting behaviour.

4.10.6 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM)

This section of the research presents the results of SEM. It is divided into two sections: a) model-1, and b) model-2. It is important to mention that this model is employed to test the direct and indirect effects of the model among different exogenous and endogenous variables.

Model 1: Model-1 consisted of eight variables. Among these, three were independent variables such as a) voting behaviour in general elections 2008, b) voting behaviour in general elections 2013, and c) voting behaviour in general elections 2018. There was one dependent variable i.e. political participation. Moreover, the model used three path variables named as a) political awareness, b) political empowerment, and c) change in local politics. Whereas, BISP cash transfers was used as intervening variable in the model. These all variables were measured using an attitudinal scale of (dis)agreement. The confirmed factor from CFA was used to test the mode-1. Furthermore, the direct and indirect effects of the model depicted in conceptual framework model-1.




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Model-1

Direct Effects of the Model-1: The direct effects of the model-1 were presented in table 26. Moreover, the following five hypothesis were tested based on the direct effects of the model-1.

Hypothesis 1: There was direct effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2008 and 2013 on political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers.

The results supported hypothesis-1 that the voting behaviour in general elections 2008 and 2013 had direct effects on political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers. The statistical results showed in the table 26 confirmed the hypothesis. The calculated value of voting behaviour in general elections 2008 ($\beta = .150$, p-value = .005) and voting behaviour in general elections 2013 ($\beta = .170$, p-value = .001) proved the direct effects on political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Hypothesis 2: There was direct effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2018, 2013 and political empowerment on change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

The results in the table asserted that voting behaviour in general elections 2018, 2013 and political empowerment had direct effects on change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers. The results presented in the table 26 illustrated the confirmation of the hypothesis. The values described in the table showed voting behaviour in general elections 2018 ($\beta = .175$, p-value = .000), voting behaviour in general elections 2013 ($\beta = .394$, p-value = .005) and political empowerment ($\beta = .375$, p-value = .000) had direct effects on change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Hypothesis 3: There was direct effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2008, 2013 and political empowerment on political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Statistical data presented in the table 26 also revealed that voting behaviour in general elections 2008, 2013 and political empowerment had direct effects on political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers. The results confirmed the alternate hypothesis and proved that there was direct effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2008 ($\beta = -.481$, p-value = .000), voting behaviour in general election 2013 ($\beta = .322$, p-

value = .000) and political empowerment ($\beta = .475$, p-value = .000) on political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Hypothesis 4: There was direct effect of political awareness and change in local politics on political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data presented in the table 26 reported that political awareness and change in local politics had direct effects on political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers. The results supported alternate hypothesis. It is stated that political awareness ($\beta = -.363$, p-value = .000) and change in local politics ($\beta = .199$, p-value = .000) on political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, hypothesis 4 was accepted.

Hypothesis 5: There was direct effect of BISP cash transfer and political empowerment on political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

The results in the table 26 favoured that hypothesis 5 that BISP cash transfer and political empowerment had direct effects on political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers. Therefore, hypothesis 5 was confirmed. It is stated that BISP cash transfers ($\beta = .112$, p-value = .015) and political empowerment ($\beta = .228$, p-value = .000) on political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Table 26*Regression Weights, Covariances, and Variances of Model 1 (n = 396)*

Variables			Standardized Regression Weights	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
VB08	--->	POE	.150	.187	.066	2.807	.005
VB13	--->	POE	.170	.135	.042	3.196	.001
VB18	--->	CLP	.175	.252	.063	3.978	***
VB13	--->	CLP	.394	.427	.049	8.760	***
VB08	--->	POA	-.481	-.957	.086	-11.115	***
VB13	--->	POA	.322	.406	.055	7.423	***
POE	--->	POA	.473	.755	.064	11.702	***
POE	--->	CLP	.375	.515	.051	10.160	***
POA	--->	POP	-.363	-.262	.037	-7.059	***
CLP	--->	POP	.199	.166	.044	3.757	***
BCT	--->	POP	.112	.067	.027	2.439	.015
POE	--->	POP	.228	.261	.065	4.034	***
Covariances							
VB13	<-->	VB18		23.422	2.348	9.975	***
VB08	<-->	VB13		14.154	1.847	7.662	***
VB08	<-->	VB18		3.194	1.296	2.465	.014
Variances							
VB08				21.445	1.526	14.053	***
VB13				53.513	3.808	14.053	***
VB18				30.447	2.167	14.053	***
e2				30.918	2.200	14.053	***
e4				123.735	8.805	14.053	***
e1				50.807	3.615	14.053	***
e3				31.963	2.274	14.053	***
e5				36.705	2.612	14.053	***
Chi-square = 194.009, df = 13, p-value = .000							
Model fit summary = GFI =.909, AGFI .903, CFI = .901, RMSEA = .068							
Total number of observations = 396							

Table 26 also describes that there was significant covariances between voting behaviour in general elections 2013 and voting behaviour in general elections 2018. Similarly, results also supported that there was significant covariances between voting behaviour in general elections 2008 and voting behaviour in general elections 2013. Moreover, the covariance was also confirmed between voting behaviour in general elections 2008 and voting behaviour in general elections 2018. Likewise, the variances of the variable also confirmed the hypotheses and covariances in the table 26. In addition, the Chi-square value (Chi-square = 194.009, df = 13, p-value = .000), GFI (.909), AGFI (.903), CFI (.901), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) (.068) confirmed the model-1.




Figure 2. Model Fit Diagram of Model 1

Indirect Effects of the Model-1: There were five indirect effects of the model-1 presented in table 27. The indirect effects of the said model were presented as following:

Hypothesis 6: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2018 on political participation through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

The results presented in the table 27 shows the indirect effects of the model-1. Data in the table revealed that voting behaviour in general elections 2018 had an indirect effect on political participation through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.042) was significant with p-value (0.005) confirmed the hypothesis 6.

Hypothesis 7: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2013 on change in local politics through the mediation of political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data in the table shows that voting behaviour in general elections 2013 had an indirect effect on change in local politics through the mediation of political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers. Henceforth, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.069) was significant with p-value (0.002) confirmed the hypothesis 7.

Hypothesis 8: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2013 on political awareness through the mediation of political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Statistical data in the table revealed that voting behaviour in general elections 2013 had an indirect effect on political awareness through the mediation of political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers. Therefore, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.102) was significant with p-value (0.002) confirmed the hypothesis 8.

Hypothesis 9: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2013 on political awareness through the mediation of political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Analyzed data in the table describe that voting behaviour in general elections 2013 had an indirect effect on political awareness through the mediation of political participation

among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.035) was significant with p-value (0.001) confirmed the hypothesis 9.

Hypothesis 10: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2013 on political awareness through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data in the table reveals that voting behaviour in general elections 2013 on political awareness through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.071) was significant with p-value (0.008) confirmed the hypothesis 10.

Hypothesis 11: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2013 on political awareness through the mediation of political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Analyzed data in the table reveals that voting behaviour in general elections 2013 on political awareness through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (-0.106) was significant with p-value (0.001) confirmed the hypothesis 11.

Hypothesis 12: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2008 on change in local politics through the mediation of political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data in the table also explains that voting behaviour in general elections 2013 on political awareness through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hereafter, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.096) was significant with p-value (0.010) confirmed the hypothesis 12.

Hypothesis 13: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2008 on political awareness through the mediation of political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Analysed data in the table informs that voting behaviour in general elections 2008 had an indirect effect on political awareness through the mediation of political

empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.141) was significant with p-value (0.010) confirmed the hypothesis 13.

Hypothesis 14: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2008 on political participation through the mediation of political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data in the table reveals that voting behaviour in general elections 2008 had an indirect effect on political participation through the mediation of political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers. Henceforth, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.049) was significant with p-value (0.005) confirmed the hypothesis 14.

Hypothesis 15: There was an indirect effect of voting behaviour in general elections 2008 on change in local politics through the mediation of political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Analysed data in the table describes that voting behaviour in general elections 2008 had an indirect effect on change in local politics through the mediation of political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers. Thus, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.250) was significant with p-value (0.001) confirmed the hypothesis 15.

Table 27*Indirect Effects of Model-1*

Indirect Path	Unstandardized Estimate	Lower	Upper	P-Value	Standardized Estimate
VB18 --> CLP --> POP	0.042	0.016	0.081	0.005	0.035**
VB13 --> POE --> CLP	0.069	0.037	0.112	0.002	0.064**
VB13 --> POE --> POA	0.102	0.051	0.167	0.002	0.081**
VB13 --> POE --> POP	0.035	0.016	0.070	0.001	0.039**
VB13 --> CLP --> POP	0.071	0.029	0.116	0.008	0.078**
VB13 --> POA --> POP	-0.106	-0.158	-0.067	0.001	-0.117***
VB08 --> POE --> CLP	0.096	0.031	0.167	0.010	0.056*
VB08 --> POE --> POA	0.141	0.048	0.243	0.010	0.071**
VB08 --> POE --> POP	0.049	0.015	0.109	0.005	0.034**
VB08 --> POA --> POP	0.250	0.158	0.359	0.001	0.175***
POE --> CLP --> POP	0.086	0.035	0.138	0.009	0.075**
POE --> POA --> POP	-0.198	-0.272	-0.137	0.001	-0.172***

Significance of Estimates: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.010$, * $p < 0.050$, † $p < 0.100$

Hypothesis 16: There was an indirect effect of political empowerment on political participation through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data in the table reveals that political empowerment had an indirect effect on political participation through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-

grant receivers. Henceforth, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.086) was significant with p-value (0.075) confirmed the hypothesis 16.

Hypothesis 17: There was an indirect effect of political empowerment on political participation through the mediation of political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Tabulated data explores that political empowerment had indirect effects on political participation through the mediation of political awareness among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (-0.198) was significant with p-value (0.001) confirmed the hypothesis 17.

Model 2: Model-2 consisted of seven variables. Among these, three were independent variables such as a) political awareness, b) BISP cash transfers, and c) political empowerment. There was one dependent variable i.e. voting behaviour. This variable was based on the indexing of three variables such as a) voting behaviour in general elections 2008, b) voting behaviour in general elections 2013, and c) voting behaviour in general elections 2018. Moreover, the model used two path variables named as a) change in local politics, and b) political participation. However, media influence was used as an intervening variable in the model. These all variables were measured using an attitudinal scale of (dis)agreement. The confirmed factors from CFA were used to test the model-2. Furthermore, the direct and indirect effects of the model depicted in conceptual framework model-2.




Figure 3. Conceptual Framework of Model 2

Direct Effects of the Model 2: The direct effects of the model-2 were presented in table 28. Moreover, the following five hypotheses were tested based on the direct effects of the model-2.

Hypothesis 1: There was direct effect of political empowerment and BISP cash transfers on change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

The results buttressed hypothesis 1 that political empowerment and BISP cash transfers had direct effects on change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers. The results in the table 28 supported the hypothesis 1 that there was direct effect of political empowerment ($\beta = .477$, $p\text{-value} = .000$) and BISP cash transfer ($\beta = -.075$, $p\text{-value} = .090$) on change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Hypothesis 2: There was direct effect of political awareness, BISP cash transfers and political empowerment on political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Statistical analysis in the table 28 reveals that political awareness, BISP cash transfers and political empowerment had direct effects on political participation among

BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the results supported the hypothesis 2. It asserted that there was direct effect of political awareness ($\beta = -.354$, p-value = .000), BISP cash transfers ($\beta = .098$, p-value = .053) and political empowerment ($\beta = .316$, p-value = .000) on political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Table 28

Regression Weights, Covariance, and Variances of Model 2 (n = 396)

Variables			Standardized Regression Weights	Estimate	S.E.	C.R.	P
POE	--->	CLP	.477	.654	.061	10.785	***
POA	--->	POP	-.354	-.258	.041	-6.323	***
BCT	--->	POP	.098	.059	.031	1.936	.053
BCT	--->	CLP	-.075	-.053	.031	-1.697	.090
POE	--->	POP	.316	.368	.060	6.128	***
POP	--->	VOB	.123	.226	.072	3.121	.002
POE	--->	VOB	-.077	-.164	.094	-1.739	.082
BCT	--->	VOB	-.147	-.163	.044	-3.729	***
MEI	--->	VOB	.354	.600	.064	9.335	***
CLP	--->	VOB	.537	.837	.068	12.339	***
Covariances							
POA	<-->	BCT		-41.314	5.556	-7.436	***
POE	<-->	BCT		-8.468	3.260	-2.598	.009
POE	<-->	POA		23.507	2.925	8.038	***
Variances							
POE				33.345	2.373	14.053	***
POA				84.752	6.031	14.053	***
BCT				123.735	8.805	14.053	***
e3				53.048	3.775	14.053	***
e1				47.580	3.386	14.053	***
e2				38.019	2.705	14.053	***
e4				86.513	6.156	14.053	***
Chi-square = 160.258, df = 8, p-value = .000							
Model fit summary = GFI = .921, AGFI = .901, CFI = .904, RMSEA = .072							
Total number of observations = 396							

Hypothesis 3: There was direct effect of political participation, political empowerment and BISP cash transfers on voting behaviour among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data presented in table 28 also shows the results of hypothesis 3 that political participation, political empowerment and BISP cash transfers had direct effects on voting behaviour among BISP cash-grant receivers. Moreover, the statistical results support the hypothesis 3. It revealed that there was direct effect of political participation ($\beta = .132$, p-value = .002), political empowerment ($\beta = -.077$, p-value = .082) and BISP cash transfers ($\beta = -.147$, p-value = .000) on voting behaviour among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Hypothesis 4: There was direct effect of media influence and change in local politics on voting behaviour among BISP cash-grant receivers.

The result reveals that media influence and change in local politics had direct effects on voting behaviour among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the results in the table 28 confirmed the hypothesis 4. Moreover, it illustrated that there was direct effect of media influence ($\beta = .354$, p-value = .000) and change in local politics ($\beta = .537$, p-value = .000) on voting behaviour among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Table 28 also describes that there was significant covariances between voting political awareness and BISP cash transfers. Similarly, results also supported that there was significant covariances between political empowerment and BISP cash transfers. Moreover, the covariance was also confirmed between political empowerment and political awareness. Likewise, the variances of the variable also confirmed the hypotheses and covariances in the table 26. In addition, the Chi-square value (Chi-square = 160.258, df = 8, p-value = .000), GFI (.921), AGFI (.901), CFI (.904), and RMSEA (.072) confirmed the model 1.




Figure 4. Model Fit Diagram of Model 2

Indirect Effects of the Model-2: There were five indirect effects of the model-2 presented as following:

Hypothesis 5: There was an indirect effect of BISP cash transfers on voting behaviour through the mediation of political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

The results presented in the table 29 showed the indirect effects of the model-2. Data in the table explains that BISP cash transfers had an indirect effect on voting behaviour through the mediation of political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers. Henceforth, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.013) was significant with p-value (0.038) confirmed the hypothesis 5.

Hypothesis 6: There was an indirect effect of BISP cash transfers on voting behaviour through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data in the table reveals that BISP cash transfers had an indirect effect on voting behaviour through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant

receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (-0.045) was significant with p-value (0.113) did not confirm the hypothesis 6.

Hypothesis 7: There was an indirect effect of political awareness on voting behaviour through the mediation of change in political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Tabulated data depicts that political awareness had an indirect effect on voting behaviour through the mediation of change in political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (-0.058) was significant with p-value (0.003) confirmed the hypothesis 7.

Hypothesis 8: There was an indirect effect of political empowerment on voting behaviour through the mediation of political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Data in the table reveals that political empowerment had an indirect effect on voting behaviour through the mediation of political participation among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.083) was significant with p-value (0.003) confirmed the hypothesis 8.

Hypothesis 9: There was an indirect effect of political empowerment on voting behaviour through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers.

Analysed data in the table describes that political empowerment had an indirect effect on voting behaviour through the mediation of change in local politics among BISP cash-grant receivers. Hence, the calculated value of unstandardized estimates value (0.547) was significant with p-value (0.001) confirmed the hypothesis 9.

Table 29*Indirect Effects of the Model 2*

Indirect Path	Unstandardized Estimate	Lower	Upper	P-Value	Standardized Estimate
BCT --> POP --> VOB	0.013	0.002	0.035	0.038	0.012*
BCT --> CLP --> VOB	-0.045	-0.094	0.002	0.113	-0.040
POA --> POP --> VOB	-0.058	-0.101	-0.026	0.003	-0.043**
POE --> POP --> VOB	0.083	0.036	0.145	0.003	0.039**
POE --> CLP --> VOB	0.547	0.450	0.663	0.001	0.256***

Significance of Estimates: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.010$, * $p < 0.050$, † $p < 0.100$

4.10.7 Independent sample t-test

Table 30 reveals the independent sample t-test. The results support the hypothesis that there was significant difference of political awareness among the BISP cash-grant receivers in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Moreover, the calculated value of independent sample t-test is significant at p-value of .008. Furthermore, the results also support the hypothesis that there was significant difference of political empowerment among the BISP cash-grant receivers in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Similarly, the results of independent sample t-test also support the hypothesis with p-value of .068. Likewise, the results of independent sample t-test confirmed the hypothesis that there was significant difference of media influence among the BISP cash-grant receivers in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Statistical results in the table confirmed the hypothesis based on the p-value of independent sample t-test i.e. .074.

Table 30

Independent Sample t-test (Reference = Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)

Variables	Levene's Test		t-test for Equality of Means						
	F	Sig.	T	Df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
								Lower	Upper
Political Awareness	Equal variances assumed	7.106	.008	1.987	321	.048	3.041	1.531	.030 6.052
	Equal variances not assumed		2.709	83.227	.008	3.041	1.123	.808	5.274
Political Empowerment	Equal variances assumed	3.382	.067	2.776	321	.006	2.367	.853	.690 4.044
	Equal variances not assumed		3.179	66.613	.002	2.367	.745	.881	3.853
Media Influence	Equal variances assumed	3.208	.074	1.741	321	.083	1.749	1.005	-.227 3.726
	Equal variances not assumed		2.099	70.480	.039	1.749	.833	.088	3.411

CHAPTER FIVE

Key Findings and Debate

5.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the key findings and debate on the issue under discussion. It is divided into sub-headings: socio-economic characteristics, BISP cash transfers, political awareness, political empowerment, change in local politics, media influence, voting behaviour in general elections of 2008, 2013 & 2018, and political participation.

5.2 Socio-economic Characteristics

The study findings reveal that the sample size was split over rural and urban, male and female and eight districts of Pakistan. Similarly, the distribution of the beneficiaries was also varying along with educational qualification, occupation, monthly income in Pakistani rupees, and marital status was also distributed to single, married, separated, divorced, and widow. Further, the number of children, family size, and family structure was also varying from respondent to respondent.

5.3 BISP Cash Transfers

The analysis asserted that beneficiaries were receiving the cash-transfers from the government of Pakistan as per schedule. The study's findings also reported that a number of respondents were receiving the BISP cash-grants through some political workers who incentivized it to give vote to respective political parties. It is important to mention here that the results also illustrated that the respondents were receiving cash-grants using several references. The study further explored that some of the respondents were receiving cash-grants with some deductions by the agents, brokers or political workers. This study findings are aligned with the study findings of Stucky (2005) and Khare (1975). Similarly, several studies have also been conducted on social safety networks (Behrendt, Lietaert, & Derluyn, 2021; Dawar & Farias Ferreira, 2021). This study findings are also similar to the study findings of Fenimore, Jennings, and Taylor (2021) and Amanatidou, Tzekou, and Gritzas (2021).

5.4 Political Awareness

The study findings explored that the beneficiaries had familiarity with political parties of the area. The analysis of data showed that beneficiaries had familiarity with the political manifesto of the political parties. The respondents (beneficiaries) had good understanding of the flags of different political parties in their areas. The results also revealed that they have had good understanding of the best political party in their political jurisdiction or political area [dominantly associated with benefits they were receiving]. The analysis provided insights that beneficiaries were aware of the corner meetings of the political parties. It had also reported that respondents had familiarity in terms of different political campaign strategies in their political circle. It is worth mentioning here that beneficiaries had awareness about priorities of their political leaders. At the end, the analysis described that the respondents had exposure towards the changes in the local politics. The results of this study are similar to the results of Jackson (1972). Similarly, several study findings are aligned with the study findings of a number of researchers in terms of political awareness including Soontjens (2021), Rasul and Raney (2021), Jenkins, Poloni-Staudinger, and Strachan (2021), Shino and Smith (2020), Birger, Nadan, and Ajzenstadt (2020), Kim, Jones-Jang, and Kenski (2020), and Owoeye (2021).

5.5 Political Empowerment

The data in the chapter 4 of this study pointed out that the BISP cash-grant beneficiaries had choice to join a political party in their area and gave vote freely in every election in the selected eight districts. This showed political empowerment of the beneficiaries in their respective areas. Similarly, respondents exhibited that they freely participated in the political activities. They claimed their political participation and choices as their free will and their own decisions. It is worth mentioning that respondents displayed their strong political affiliations with respective political parties and political leaders in their [rural and urban] areas. The study findings also indicated that some of the respondents placed political party flag at their homes to show political empowerment and display political affiliations. Similarly, some of the BISP beneficiaries also confirmed that they had been contributing in political decisions concerning their areas. The results also

supported the argument that respondents were participating in local politics actively (see chapter 4). Further, the calculated data also unpacked that the respondents had arranged political meetings at their respective places in the area. Moreover, these results had also been supported with the findings of Barnes and Kaase (1979). Further, the study findings of several researches also supported the argument that cash transfers under social security programmes, including BISP, have favourable effects on political empowerment of the beneficiaries including the study of Hornset and de Soysa (2021), Su, Wall, Ma, Notarianni, and Wang (2020), Mody, Woosnam, Suess, and Dogru (2020), Nguyen et al. (2020), and Besnier (2020). However, this study findings are dissimilar to the study findings of De Siano and Chiariello (2021).

5.6 Change in Local Politics

The statistical results also unpacked the change in local politics. The study findings revealed that local politics was changed with the passage of time in the areas of the BISP beneficiaries. Similarly, they also reported that the change in local politics of their areas had been a normal routine. The study also pointed out that political leaders often change their political parties. The results further explored that some of the respondents got themselves affiliated with respective political parties for the purpose to gain financial benefits. It is important to mention that some of the respondents pointed out that people in their respective areas used to change political affiliations under some pressure-tactics. The results also depicted that some of the welfare-oriented work in respective areas resulted in change in local politics and voting behaviour. Furthermore, the analysis also unpacked that some development work had brought change in local politics, and highlighted this change as gradual phenomenon. This study findings are aligned with the study findings of Mumtaz and Whiteford (2017). Several studies have explored that local politics has been changing rapidly. The results of this study are aligned with the study findings including the study of Whiting and Kaya (2021), Zelinska (2021), Vanhala, Robertson, and Calliari (2021), and Lesnikowski, Biesbroek, Ford, and Berrang-Ford (2021). However, the study findings in terms of change in local politics, are dissimilar to the study findings of Warganegara and Waley (2021), de Mello (2021), and de Sousa, da Cruz, and Fernandes (2021).

5.7 Media Influence

Analysis in chapter 4 informed that mass media was depicting a true picture of the local politics in the area of BISP cash beneficiaries. The results also pointed out that media were also biased to show strong political party in the area. Similarly, data also asserted that mass media had been influencing and effecting political behaviour in the area towards changing patterns. Primary data also described that media created propaganda regarding politics in the area. Further, media also generated a public opinion about the regional politics in the vicinity of BISP cash beneficiaries. It is important to mention here that media changed political awareness in the areas that results in influencing voting behaviour. The study findings also indicated that media highlighted political issues and problems of the area of cash-grant beneficiaries. The results of primary data were similar to the results of Longwe (2000). It has been observed that mass media has become a powerful tool to disseminate information regarding politics (Koens & Gunawardana, 2021; Langenkamp, 2021; Wang, 2021). Similar to the study findings, several studies have been conducted and are aligned with the current study findings including Shomron and Schejter (2021), Wahlström and Törnberg (2021), Bouvier and Way (2021), and Zheng and Lu (2021). Further, the study findings are opposed with the study findings of Hunt and Gruszczynski (2021) and Lloyd and Kay (2021).

5.8 Voting Behaviour

Primary data indicated that the vote was based on the family choices of BISP cash-grant beneficiaries in the general elections of 2008, 2013, and 2018. Similarly, the study findings also reported that the *Baradri* was another factor to pressurize some of the respondents to cast their vote in the said elections. Analysis pointed out that some of the BISP beneficiaries were bound to cast vote through/ to specific political party in their respective political region during the above-mentioned elections. Further, it was also explored that some of the respondents had cast their votes on the choices of local leaders. The study also explored that, in many cases, casting of votes was through free will of the local people. It was also revealed by some of the respondents that the aspect of welfare-oriented work in the area was the major motivating factor behind voting to the local leaders,

as it elevated the financial conditions of the respondents and the personal benefits were achieved by the local people while casting the votes to the specific political party. The study also indicated that the voting behaviour was changing gradually from the general elections of 2008 to 2013 and till the 2018. Furthermore, the study results were aligned with the several researches conducted in developing and developed countries (Jackson, 1972). It has been observed that voting behaviour changed with the passage of time as beneficiaries receive cash transfers (Berry, Ebner, & Cornelius, 2021; Krawczyk, 2021; Yu & Shen, 2021). Several studies have been conducted and their findings are aligned with the study findings of Coates, Fahrner, and Pawlowski (2021), Braghiroli (2021), Thijssen, Reuchamps, De Winter, Dodeigne, and Sinardet (2021), and Vestergaard (2021). However, this study findings are different to the study findings of Arkilic (2021) and Hohendorf, Saalfeld, and Sieberer (2021).

5.9 Political Participation

The results indicated that some of the BISP's beneficiaries were attending corner meetings with reference to their political parties. Similarly, some of them were also raising political slogans during political gatherings. Analysis also explored that many of the respondents (BISP beneficiaries) participated in election campaigns of general elections held in 2008, 2013, and 2018. It is important to mention that some of the BISP beneficiaries held flags of political parties during the campaigns of said elections. Similarly, few of the respondents reported that they had contributed financially to the political parties of their choice and participated in different political walks in respective areas. Among BISP cash-grant receivers, some of them organized political corner meetings during the above-mentioned elections. The study findings also asserted that some of the BISP beneficiaries took active political decisions in their political regions. Furthermore, the study findings are aligned with the study findings of Stucky (2005) and Khare (1975). It has been observed that political participation has been increased through mass media and social safety networks (Coates et al., 2021; Koens & Gunawardana, 2021; Thijssen et al., 2021; Zaslove, Geurkink, Jacobs, & Akkerman, 2021). Several studies have been conducted and their findings are similar to the current study findings including Ohme, Hameleers, Brosius, and

Van der Meer (2021), Koens and Gunawardana (2021), Langenkamp (2021), Zaslove et al. (2021), Wang (2021), and Yu and Shen (2021). However, this study findings are different with the study findings of Krawczyk (2021) and Berry et al. (2021).

5.10 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

The results of confirmatory factor analysis showed to confirm the items to each sub-variable of the study. The analysis revealed that first item of the BISP cash transfers was not confirmed with p-value of 0.639. However, all other seven factors were confirmed. Similarly, the eight items of sub-variable named political awareness was confirmed for further analysis. In the same way, the eight items of political empowerment were also confirmed along with the eight items of change in the local politics and media influence variable. Contrarily, first four items out of eight of sub-variable named voting behaviour of general election of 2008 were not confirmed for further analysis. It was also reported that the eight items of voting behaviour in the general elections of 2013 was confirmed for further analysis. It is important to mention that item number v and vi of voting behaviour of general elections 2018 was not confirmed out of eight items. At the end, all the eight items of political participation were confirmed for further analysis.

5.11 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

The descriptive statistics of different variable were presented in chapter 4. It consisted of the range, minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation and variance of the attitudinal response variables. It is important to mention that the response of the BISP beneficiaries was measured with the help of attitudinal scale of (dis)agreement.

5.12 Normality Test

The results of normality test were based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov^a and Shapiro-Wilk. The results indicated that the data was non-parametric and not normally distributed. Therefore, the researcher moved towards employing non-parametric statistical techniques named as Kendall's tau_b statistical test.

5.13 Kendall's tau_b Statistical Test

The results of primary data indicated that there were weak, moderate, and high positive significant correlation between the variables named as political empowerment, change in local politics, voting behaviour in general elections 2008, 2013, & 2018, political participation and voting behaviour.

5.14 Chi-Square Statistical Test

The results of chi-square statistical analysis revealed that there was an association of independent variables including BISP cash transfers, political awareness, political empowerment, change in local politics, media influence, and political participation with voting behaviour. Further, the results were significant with the p-value of 0.00.

5.15 Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)

Model-1: The result of model-1 was based on eight variables. Among these, three were independent including voting behaviour in general elections 2008, voting behaviour in general elections 2013, and voting behaviour in general elections in 2018. There was one dependent variable named as political participation along with three path variables including political awareness, political empowerment, and change in local politics. The model fit summary showed that the model was good fitted with the value of chi-square value of 194.009 with df of 13 at p-value 0.000. Further, the value of GFI was 0.909, AGFI 0.903, CFA, 0.901, and RMSEA 0.068 also confirmed the model.

Model-2: The analysis of model-2 was based on seven variables. Among these three were independent including political empowerment, BISP cash transfers, and political empowerment. One independent variable named voting behaviour in general elections 2008, 2013, & 2018 and two path variables including change in local politics and political participation. The results of model fit summary depicted that the model was best fitted with the value of chi-square 160.258, 8 df, and p-value of 0.000. Furthermore, the model fit summary also confirmed the model with the value 0.921 GFI, 0.901 AGFI, 0.904 CFI, and 0.072 RMSEA.

5.16 Independent Sample t-test

The results of independent sample t-test revealed that there was significant difference of political empowerment among BISP cash-grant receivers in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Similarly, there was also significant difference of media influence and political awareness among the BISP cash-grant receivers of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.

CHAPTER SIX

Summary of the Argument, Study's Implication, Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Summary of the Argument

Large scale cash transfer programmes have been established in many developing countries in the last three decades with an attempt to improve human capital outcomes among the poor. The results of many studies, including this study, indicate that cash transfers affect the most basic form of behaviours such as beneficiaries' voting behaviour and their participation in election (see Machado and Neto, 2017). It has been found that in many countries, including Pakistan, the cash transfer programmes are federal in nature, even then it affects the political participation and behaviours at the grass-root levels. These programmes have created awareness among the beneficiaries and have empowered them in exercising their most basic political right - voting in democracy - and "have reduced inequalities in civic participation" (Machado and Neto, 2017). This empowerment, followed by voting-rights, have prompted change in the local politics. This study findings show that Benazir Income Support Programme as a UCT has resulted in change in voting behaviours in terms of 2013 and 2018 general elections in Pakistan. Exploring the impact of BISP on the voting behaviours of the beneficiaries', this study's findings show that in in these elections (2013, 2018), the BISP programme triggered a positive change in the beneficiaries' voting behaviours.

6.2 The Study's Implications

The study has been new of its kind in terms of usage of variable in carrying out the research in Pakistan on the subject. The findings of the study imply that financial support under BISP had affected beneficiaries' voting behaviours. The study has resulted in political and financial empowerment of BISP beneficiaries. The programme has been contributing in reducing income inequality and increasing beneficiaries' choices and decision-making power in terms of political participation. The study's findings, which are

under publishing in national and international journals, extends the existing scholarship and literature on the relationship between cash transfers, beneficiaries' behaviours, political and economic institutions. The study contributes to the existing body of knowledge regarding the political effects of BISP on both national and local levels political behaviours in Pakistan.

As mentioned earlier and reiterated here that social safety-net / cash transfer programmes in the country can benefit from assessments of cash transfer programmes by evaluating their impact on reducing inequalities in demonstrating basic civil rights (decent living, education, free choice in voting and selecting their respective leadership etc). Generally, most of the poor people in traditional and feudal societies, such as Pakistan, do not have free choice in their voting right. In such societies, it is mostly feudal who decide what the poor people will do in elections. However, improvement and socio-economic status enable and liberate poor people from the influence and clutches of the rich and feudal. Thus, poor and disadvantaged people are enabled through such programmes to make their political decisions, including the decision of casting the vote. In addition to poverty reduction, these programmes should be aimed to encourage political, social and cultural empowerment among the beneficiaries.

6.3 Conclusion

This research study is based on the impact of the largest social safety net programme - BISP - on the voting behaviours of beneficiaries in Pakistan. Using survey data from eight selected districts (see methodology) the researcher presented a set of preliminary findings on the possible effects of BISP on the voting behaviours of beneficiaries in the three (2008, 2013 and 2018) general elections in Pakistan. The overall conclusion that the researcher met from the data analysis is that BISP cash transfers have favorable effects on the voting behaviours in two (2013 and 2018) general elections. Similarly, the analysis of data revealed that political awareness among cash receiving beneficiaries have been increased in general elections held in 2013 and 2018.

This programme also has favorable effects on political participation and change in local politics. Local political actors, even though the programme is federal, has got political benefits from the programme. Further, it is also noted that political awareness and participation contributed towards political empowerment among the cash receiving beneficiaries. The overall study concluded that BISP cash transfers to beneficiaries have favorable effects on voting behaviour in general elections through the mediation of change in local politics and political participation among them.

6.4 Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the suggestions/ recommendations have been made as follow:

- 1) Along with BISP cash transfers to the beneficiaries, awareness campaign strategy should be prepared and implemented to enhance political awareness that may result in favorable and neutral voting behaviour;
- 2) Social security programme should be apolitical and should not be named after leading figures of any political parties. This will encourage the beneficiaries to have free and fair participation in democratic process of the country through voting in elections;
- 3) Future research may be conducted using mixed method research approach to examine the voting behaviour using another set of variable i.e., caste influence, local leader influence, family background, etc;
- 4) Further, Artificial Neural Network (ANN) may be used as an advanced statistical technique for the purpose of analysis.

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IMPACT OF BENAZIR INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMME (BISP) ON THE VOTING BEHAVIOUR

(Interview Schedule)

A) Identification

i) Residential area

a) Rural

b) Urban

ii) Tehsil

iii) District

vi) Province

Socio-economic Profile

Q.1 Gender:

i) Female

ii) Male

Q.2 Age: _____

Q.3 Education:

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	16+
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Q.4 Main occupation:

Sr.	Occupation	Code	Sr.	Occupation	Code
i	Agriculturist	1	vi	Housewife	6
ii	Govt. job	2	vii	Businessman	7
iii	Private employee	3	viii	Hand cart/ Thara (Kiosk)	8
iv	Labourer	4	ix	Old/ retired	9
v	Unemployed	5	x	Any other	10

Q.5 Monthly income:

Sr.	Income (PKR)	Code	Sr.	Income (PKR)	Code
i	Up to 10000	1	iv	30001 – 40000	6
ii	10001 – 20000	2	v	40001 – 50000	7
iii	20001 – 30000	3	vi	50001 & Above	8

Q.6 Marital status:

i) Single

ii) Married

iii) Separated

iv) Divorced

vi) Widow

Q.7 Number of children:

0	1 - 2	3 - 4	5 - 6	7 - 8	8+
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Q.8 Family size:

1 - 3	4 - 6	7 - 9	10 - 12	12+
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Q.9 Family:

a) Nuclear

b) Joint

c) Extended

B) BISP Cash Transfers

Strongly Agree = SA to Strongly Disagree = SD

Sr.	Statements	SA	A	SLA	SLD	D	SD
i	You received cash-grant from the government	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	You received BISP cash-grant late	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	You received BISP cash-grant through any political worker	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	You received BISP cash-grant by giving a vote	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	You received BISP cash-grant by using any reference	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	You received BISP cash-grant after a deducted amount	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	You received BISP cash-grant at your doorstep (nearest POS, ATM, Bank, Post Office etc)	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	You received BISP cash-grant through any local agent or broker	6	5	4	3	2	1

C) Political Awareness

Sr.	Statements	SA	A	SLA	SLD	D	SD
i	You have a familiarity with political parties of the area	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	You have a familiarity of the political manifestoes	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	You easily identify the flags of political parties	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	You know about the best political party	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	You are aware of corner meetings	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	You are aware of political campaign strategies	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	You are aware of political leaders of the parties	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	You have exposure towards change in politics	6	5	4	3	2	1

D) Political Empowerment

Sr.	Statements	SA	A	SLA	SLD	D	SD
i	You join a political party as per your choice	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	You give vote freely in every election	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	Participation in politics is your own decision	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	You have a strong political affiliation	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	Political party flag is placed at your home	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	You made a political decision in your area	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	You participate in local politics	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	You arrange political meetings at your place	6	5	4	3	2	1

E) Change in Local Politics

Sr.	Statements	SA	A	SLA	SLD	D	SD
i	Local politics is changed with the passage of time	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	Change in local politics is normal in routine	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	Political leaders change their political party	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	Your political party affiliation is based on any financial benefits	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	People change political affiliation under pressure	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	Welfare-oriented work results in change in local politics	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	Development work changes local politics	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	It is always good to see change in local politics	6	5	4	3	2	1

F) Media Influence

Sr.	Statements	SA	A	SLA	SLD	D	SD
i	Mass media is depicting a true picture of local politics	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	Media is biased to show strong political party	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	Media changes the political behaviour	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	Media create propaganda regarding politics	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	Media generate a public opinion about politics	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	Media changes political awareness	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	Media has an influence on voting behaviour	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	Media highlights political issues of the area	6	5	4	3	2	1

G) Voting Behaviour

Sr.	Statements	SA	A	SLA	SLD	D	SD
G.1 Voting behaviour in the general elections of 2008							
i	Your vote is based on your family choices	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	Your bradri pressurize you to caste vote	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	You were bound to cast vote by a specific party	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	You cast vote freely	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	6	5	4	3	2	1
G.2 Voting behaviour in the general elections of 2013							
i	Your vote is based on your family choices	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	Your bradri pressurize you to caste vote	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	You were bound to cast vote by a specific party	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	You cast vote freely	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	6	5	4	3	2	1
G.3 Voting behaviour in the general elections of 2018							
i	Your vote is based on your family choices	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	Your bradri pressurize you to caste vote	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	You were bound to cast vote by a specific party	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	You cast vote as per local leader	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	You cast vote freely	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	You cast vote based on any welfare work	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	You cast vote based on any financial benefits	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	You cast vote to get any personal work benefits	6	5	4	3	2	1

H) Political Participation

Sr.	Statements	SA	A	SLA	SLD	D	SD
i	You are attending corner meetings	6	5	4	3	2	1
ii	You raise political slogans	6	5	4	3	2	1
iii	You participated in election campaigns	6	5	4	3	2	1
iv	You hold a flag of any political party during the campaign	6	5	4	3	2	1
v	You contribute fund to any political party	6	5	4	3	2	1
vi	You participated in the political walk	6	5	4	3	2	1
vii	You organized political corner meeting	6	5	4	3	2	1
viii	You actively take part in political decisions of your area	6	5	4	3	2	1

Suggestion(s) to improve political awareness and political participation

Suggestion(s) to improve voting behaviour

Respondent name (Optional) _____

Date _____

