

**Transformative Leadership in Religious Parties: A Comparative Analysis
of Ennahda of Tunisia and Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan**



Submitted By:

Atif Iqbal

Reg# 3-FSS/PHD-PS/S14

PhD (Political Science)

Department of Politics & IR (IIUI)

Supervisor

Dr. Husnul Amin

Department of Politics & IR (IIUI)

Co-Supervisor

Dr. Sadaf Farooq

Department of Politics & IR (IIUI)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD

2020

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ATIF IQBAL

Registration No. 3-FSS/PHD-PS/S14

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science with Specialization in, “Transformative Leadership in Religious Political Parties: A Comparative Analysis of Ennahda of Tunisia and Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan” at the Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University Islamabad.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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2020

Dedication

To My Parents

MR and MRS MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND SHAHIDA IQBAL,

To My Siblings

ASIF, HASEENA, AZHAR & MAZHAR

Last but not the least to my wife Beenish Khan (Advocate)

and my son Shershah Khan

This humble work is the sign of my love to you!

Table of Contents

Abstract

Introduction

1.1.1. Rationale of the Study	1
1.1.2. Statement of the Problem	3
1.1.3. Objectives of the Study	3
1.1.4. Research Questions	4
1.1.5. Significance of the Research	4
1.1.6. Delimitations of the Study	5
1.1.7. Operational Definition of Major Terms	5
1.2. Literature Review	10
1.3. Methodology	16
1.4. Theoretical Framework	19
1.5. Organization of the Study.....	20

Chapter Two: Theoretical Perspectives and Conceptual Framework

2.1. Introduction	24
2.2. An Overview of Theoretical Perspectives in the field of Religion and Politics.....	25

2.2.1. Culturalists & Essentialists Explanations	25
2.2.2. Rational Choice Theory	28
2.2.3. Social Constructivists Explanation	34
2.2.4. Moderation through Inclusion and Exclusion Hypotheses.....	39
2.2.4.1. Moderation through Inclusion Hypothesis.....	39
2.2.4.2 Moderation through Exclusion Hypothesis.....	42
2.2.5. Charismatic Leadership Theory	44
2.2.6. Transactional and Transformational Leadership Theory.....	47
2.2.6.1. Transactional Leadership.....	48
2.2.6.2. Transformational Leadership.....	50
2.3. Theoretical Framework	54
2.4. Islamism/Political Islam: An Explanation and Conceptualization.....	58
2.4.1. Conceptualization of Islamism/Political Islam.....	61
2.5. Explanation of Hypotheses	64
2.6. Conclusion.....	70

Chapter: Three: Ennahda and Rachid Ghannouchi Path to Transformation

3.1 Introduction	71
3.2. Political Developments in Tunisia and the Role of Leadership: An Analysis.....	73
3.2.1. Post-Colonial Political Developments in Tunisia, and Leadership Role.....	74

3.2.2 Bourgiba Era (1956-87), and Assertive Secularism.....	74
3.2.3. Authoritarian Era of Ben Ali (1987-2011).....	78
3.3. Historical Developments and Transformation within Ennahda: An Analysis.....	81
3.3.1. Emergence of Islamism and Policies Shifts: From Engagement to Confrontation.....	83
3.3.2 Transformation from Al-Jamaat Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), MTI, and Ennahda...	87
3.4.1. Transformation, Ennahda, and the Post-Arab Spring.....	97
3.4.2. Ennahda measures, Moderation, and The Post-Arab Spring Scenario.....	102
3.5. Transformation within Ennahda: An Analysis.....	106
3.6. Conclusion.....	116

Chapter: Four: Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan, Leadership Role, and Transformation

4.1. Introduction.....	121
4.2. An Historical Overview.....	124
4.2.1. Jamaat-i-Islami Ideological Foundation, Evolution, and its Objectives.....	127
4.2.2. Emergence of Jamaat-i-Islami.....	127
4.2.3. Post-independence Role of Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan and Struggle for Islamization.....	134
4.2.4. Jamaat-i-Islami under Mian Tufail leadership (1972-1987).....	149
4.3. Qazi Hussain Ahmad Leadership Era and his Transformational Efforts in the JI (1987-2009).....	155

4.3.1. Transformational Efforts of Qazi Hussain Ahmad in the JI.....	157
4.4. An Analysis of Transformation of Qazi Hussain Ahmad within JI through Transformational leadership Theory.....	170
4.5. Conclusion.....	175

Conclusions

Conclusions	180
Bibliography	195

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

With adoration and devotion, I offer my humblest gratitude to Allah Almighty, Who blessed me with an opportunity to take this study and provided me with strength to complete this dissertation. One persona without whose kindness and cooperation I think my thesis might not have gone through the process of completion. Of course, that persona is none other but my supervisor Dr. Husnul Amin whose guidance and thorough knowledge of the field made the thesis a possibility. During his supervision, I found him humane and friendly. I present my special felicitation and thanks to him. I also feel obliged to pay my compliments to my co-supervisor Dr Sadaf Farooq for co-operation and guidance despite her busy schedule. I am also indebted to my teachers Prof Dr. Amna Mehmood, Dr. Manzoor Khan Afridi, Dr. Noor Fatima, and Manzoor Nazir for their help and cooperation. Whenever I approached them, they sorted out the problems that I faced.

I also offer my special gratitude to Dr M. Ilyas Khan who not only helped me but also forwarded his valuable suggestions regarding the study. Moreover, I present my heartfelt thanks to my nephews and nieces Khwaja, Rani, Sultanat (Sunny), Essa, Musa, Saad , Aliza, Reham, Sanobar and Anadil. To my friends Muhammad Naeem, Fawad Aziz, Muhammad Naeem Advocate, Muhammad Javeed Janjua, Musa Khan Sherani, Anajam us Saqib, and Naseer Khan for their moral support and encouragement. I also present my special thanks to my uncle Mr. Mustafa Kamal for his unbound love, encouragement, and prayers. Last but not least, I pay special homage to my family members for their unparalleled sacrifices and services. Moreover, they provided me with an opportunity to pursue higher studies. In the end, I salute to all those who, one way or the other, helped, prayed and wished me a success.

Atif Iqbal

October 2020, Islamabad

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANP	Awami National Party
CFR	Council for Foreign Relations
CPR	Congress for the Republic
CPS	Code of Personal Status
DG	Director General
IAF	Islamic Action Front
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Itihaad
ILP	Islamic Liberation Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	India National Congress
IPPs	Islamic Political Parties
IPT	Islamic Progressive Tendency
ISC	Islamic Shura Council
JI	Jamaat Islami
JUI	Jamiaat Ulema Islam
JUIP	Jamiat-i-Ulama Pakistan
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
ML	Muslim League

MMA	Muttahida Majlis Amal
Morocco PJD	Justice and Development Party
MQM	Mohajir Qaumi Movement
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
MTI	Islamic Tendency Movement
MYK	Milli Yakjehti Council
NCA	National Constituent Assembly
NDF	National Democratic Front
PDP	Progressive Democrats
PIF	Pakistan Islamic Front
PM	Prime Minister
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPP	Pakistan People Party
RCD	Democratic Constitutional Rally
Turkey AKP	Justice and Development Party
UDF	United Democratic Front
UGTE	General Tunisian Union of Students
UGTT	Tunisian General Labour Union

US

United States

Abstract

The studies about Religious/Islamic Islamists Political Parties (RPPs)(IPPs) are overwhelmingly dominated and conducted under the framework of Culturlist Approach which labels these organizations to be static in nature and have one point agenda that is to establish theocracy based on the principles of Islamic Law (Sharia Law) in their respective states. But the role of religion in politics went through various transitional phases since its reemergence. Soon after the introduction and rapid expansion of the ideology of globalization as a dominant phenomenon across the world most of the Islamic Political Parties alter their conservative stances and adjusted their ideological outlook under the framework of Islamic teachings according to the modern patterns of the world. This study aims at highlighting the major aspects of this change. Moreover, it will also explain the causes and reasons that promote and resist these changes. The thesis argument reason that the presence of transformative leadership supported by the pro-reform organizational culture and liberal ideational framework results in a successful transformation of the IPPs. The comparative analysis of the two prominent and contemporary leaders from the Muslim World and their political parties i.e. Qazi Hussain Ahmad of Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan and Rachid Ghannouchi of Ennahda Tunisia are selected to conduct this study. Ennahda of Tunisia under the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi represents a case of a successful transformation process as he enjoyed the status of charismatic leader, accompanied by the moderate organizational culture of his political party and the liberal ideational framework that supported his idea to work with opposing ideological school of thoughts of their country. Whereas, the efforts of Qazi Hussain Ahmad to transform Jamaat-i-Islami not succeeded for the reasons as he lacked to subdue the powerful rigid organizational culture of his political party, and lastly on many occasions his proposed policies were strongly resisted by the conservative ideational orientation of the JI. Besides, highlighting the possibilities and urge of the RPPs to transform

and making adjustments in accordance to the modern trends the study also finds out the tools that ensures the successful ideological transformational process of the RPPs.

Keywords: Transformational Leadership, Islamic Political Parties, Transformation

Introduction

1.1.1. Rationale of the Study

Islamic Religious Political Parties are often perceived as hard to accept any change in the light of their conservative and revivalist ideologies. Many think that these religious political parties want to implement their ideologies in their respective states. Over and above, they seek to establish theocracy based on *Sharia* (Islamic Law). Moreover, they strive to bring reformation in the social institutions, to frame constitution based on *Sharia* law, to limit women's role in politics, to promote violence against the religious minorities, and sectarianism in their respective states. Huntington (1996) and Lewis (2002) are prominent in this school of thought. They and their followers applied culturalist's approach to study all Islamist organizations both political and religious. According to culturalists perspective, there is no space for the transformation of such religious socio-political organizations. They are of the opinion that they are not compatible with the democratic norms of the modern world.

The perception that all the IPPs are fundamentalist, intolerant, believe in communalism, and sectarianism is over-generalization. However, most of the IPPs adjusted themselves with the Western liberal political ideologies and with the changing dynamics of globalization in recent times across the Muslim World. This process of transformation is evident in the presence of the

fact as they actively participate in the democratic processes. They provide opportunities to the women, representation rights to the religious minorities, make alliance with the leftist political forces, believe in the freedom of media, and peaceful co-existence with neighbors. This transformational process of the IPPs is known as “*Progressive Political Islamization*”. According to the phenomena of “*Progressive Political Islamization*” the IPPs incorporate and institutionalize ideas such as democratic processes, women’s participation in politics, religious tolerance, peaceful co-existence, and freedom of media.

Transformative leadership is an independent variable in this study. The study attempts to study its role and its efforts in the organizational and ideological transformation of its respective organizations that changed their conservative and fundamentalist nature to liberal and progressive one. Leadership is the core element in the rise and fall of any movement as it enjoys the popular support of the followers. However, what makes difference between a successful and unsuccessful leader. The former possesses the qualities that include the vision to foresee the future, the scholarship to interpret and incorporate the emerging ideas in the movement in such a way that their followers and the movement both may not be disturbed. In addition to this, the leaders should be capable of braving the criticism of the party members and of the external forces of the society with respect to the implementation of these ideological changes.

The case studies, Qazi Hussain Ahmad of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) Pakistan and Rashid Ghannouchi of Ennahda Tunisia represent the popular Islamic Political Parties of their respective countries. Furthermore, they also occupy the status of transformational leadership and have worked hard to utilize their leadership skills to transform the outlook of their respective organizations. Besides, the study also attempts to analyze factors such as the organizational culture, and the ideational framework of the IPPs that either helped or resisted this whole ideological transition. By

examining the case studies and their transformation process help us in exploring the tools that support and oppose the transition.

Both the IPPs are selected as they have gone through transformational process from conservative to a progressive ones and had faced resistance within their ranks as well as from outside. Furthermore, the study also contribute to the literature on leaders' role in transforming IPPs by highlighting the tools for the successful transformational process of these organizations from a conservative and static outlook to a progressive and evolutionary one.

1.1.2. Statement of the Problem

In the study of religion and politics, IPPs are popularly portrayed as conservative forces that resist the norms of the modern world. But religion after its reemergence into politics since the Iranian Revolution (1979) has gone through various transitional phases. In the light of the realities of globalization, most of the IPPs have adjusted their outlook accordingly for the purpose of survival and for the maximization of their public support. In this research, two popular IPPs from the Muslim World have been selected (i.e. Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan and Ennahda of Tunisia). Qazi Hussain Ahmad of Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan and Rachid Ghannouchi of Ennahda Tunisia, the two popular leaders of their respective IPPs and their role in the transformational process of their movements have been analyzed in detail. Furthermore, the opposing as well as the supporting forces within these movements are also studied.

1.1.3. Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study are:

- To highlight the possibilities of change/transformation in the Islamic Political Parties.

- To examine the role of leadership in these organizations.
- To understand the organizational cultures of these organizations, that either they support or resist transformation
- To differentiate between theologically moderate and fundamentalists organizations.

1.1.4. Research Questions

The central questions that guided this research are:

- What determines the possibilities of transformation among religious political parties? i.e.; Ennahda of Tunisia and Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan
- Why Ennahda was able to successfully transform while Jamaat-i-Islami could not do so?

In order to answer aforementioned questions, the following specific questions are also explored.

- How did the presence of transformative leadership influence the process of transformation in Ennahda in mobilizing popular support in favor of its reforms within the party while the absence of the same resulted in the unsuccessful transformation in Jamaat-i-Islami?
- How did the pro-reform organizational culture in Ennahda facilitate the job of the transformative leader while the rigid organizational culture in JI resisted the efforts?
- In what way the accommodating ideational framework facilitates the process of reformation in Ennahda while the same resisted the process of reformation in the JI?

1.1.5. Significance of the Research

The purpose of this research is to find out the influence of transformative leadership in the transformation process of IPPs according to the changing needs of the time. The study is focused

on two popular IPPs and its leaders Qazi Hussain Ahmad of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) Pakistan and Rachid Ghannouchi of Ennahda Tunisia. It highlights the basic factors that helped either in successful or unsuccessful transformation of these IPPs. Besides, the role of leadership, the organizational culture and the ideational framework of these IPPs have also been studied to pinpoint that how they resist or support the whole transformational process.

1.1.6. Delimitations of the Study

The focus of the research is on the role of leadership and the transformational efforts they did to change the outlook of their respective political parties from conservative to a moderate ideology. Besides, the study is also focused on the impacts of the organizational culture in favor or against the changes introduced by the leadership.

1.1.7. Operational Definitions of Major Terms

1.1.7.1. Transformative Leadership

By transformative leadership, in this study, is meant a leader followed with extreme devotion. Such a leader possesses intellectual authority, genealogical links within his organization as well as charisma. Through these features, he develops the relationship of influence with his followers and uses this relationship of influence to make real changes in the organizational culture and the ideational framework of their political party. This results in the transformation of the Islamic political party (IPPs) from a theologically conservative and traditionalist outlook to a moderate and progressive political party.

1.1.7.2. Islamic Religious Political Parties

Islamic Political Parties are those religious political parties that believe in engaging themselves in the political process of their respective countries and use legal means –under the constitution of their respective countries–to establish their political as well as religious ideology. Unlike other Islamic fundamentalist and radical organizations that strongly reject and oppose such engagements and label the political system of their respective country to be the ideology of the West that has no compatibility with the Islam.

1.1.7.3. Transformation Process of the Islamic Religious Political Parties

The process of transformation requires the presence of transformative leadership who introduces new ideas on the basis of their vision, and intellectual authority. It is because of these attributes accompanied with their charisma that make followers stand by their ideas. Besides, the personal attributes and followers’ support, the facilitation provided by the organizational culture and the Islamic Political Parties relations with the state authorities are the key determinants in the process of success or failure of any transformation.

Measurement and Operationalization of Variables

Table 1.1 (Independent Variable Transformational Leadership)

Variable	Measurement	Operationalization
(Independent Variable) Transformational Leadership	Intellectual Capabilities	Academic Background (Religious and Formal Education). Oral and written expertize over religious and political issues. Abilities to analyze issues


	Leadership Attributes	Charisma, Popularity within organization, Intensity of followers attachments
	Roots in the Organization(IPPs)	History in the organization(IPPs)

Table 1.2 (Dependent Variable Islamist Political Parties)

Variable	Measurement	Operationalization
(Dependent Variable) Islamists Political Parties	Leadership	Presence of transformational leadership
	Organizational Culture	Organization officials and followers reactions in favor or against the new theological ideas. (Tolerant or Rigid behavior)
	Ideational Framework	Nature of Relationship with the state authorities, nature of political alliances in the past. women participation and their role in political process within the organization, behavior towards addressing the issues of other sects and minorities


Source: Author’s Own Contribution

Figure 1.1 (Successful Transformation Process of Islamic Political Parties)



Source: Author's Own Construct

Figure 1.2 (Unsuccessful Transformation Process of Islamists Political Parties)



Source: Author's Own Construct

1.2. Literature Review

The literature on the topic is abundantly present. Some of the authors work is discussed here.

Humeira Iqtidar (2011) has identified the impact of the two Islamists Organizations upon the religiously dominated society of Pakistan. Describing Jamaat-i-Islami as a transnational organization, she has labeled it as an inspirational model for other Islamist organizations. She further explains its political stances and policy shifts in different time and periods. In the beginning, the Jama'at had radical stance against the leftist forces in the country but, later on, allied with them against Ayub Khan. Similarly, it extended support to military dictator General Zia as well as his policy of supporting United States (US) in the war of Afghanistan against the United Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR). The author holds that Jama'at made alliance with IJI (Islami Jamhoori Itihaad) under Nawaz Sharif. During 1990s Jamaat-i-Islami under the leadership of Qazi Hussain made major shift in policy with regard to the USA by adopting a hostile behavior against it. In addition to this, the organizational transformation also took place. The change in leadership according to the writer was the major factor in the transformational process.

Seyyed Veli Reza (1994) presents a comprehensive and analytical study of the Jamaat-i-Islami. It explains the role of this Islamic revivalist movement that how it conveyed its religious, social, and political message to its respective society. Moreover, the writer justifies the selection of his case study by developing the argument that the scholarships over Islamists Revivalists Movements are overwhelmingly Iranian and Arab centric. Moreover, the South Asian perspective which possess different political, social, and religious context regarding such movements is completely missing. On the basis of these diversities the writer put his effort in

building a completely different theoretical approach for the study of such organizations. Furthermore, he signifies the role of Jama'at-i-Islami in the light of the fact that the movement has its roots is not only in South Asian region but also beyond the region. Besides, giving the historical background of Islamic revivalist movements in South Asia, by highlighting the efforts of Shah Wali Ullah and others, the writer focuses his analysis upon the activities of Jamaat-i-Islami as a movement. He further widens the scope of his study by analyzing the role of leadership as well as its impacts over the decisions of the movement in different time and space.

Azzam S. Tamimi (2011), attempts to answer the philosophers and thinkers who propagate and believe in the assumption that Islam and democracy are incompatible. Basically, the book is about Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia, a prominent thinker, philosopher, scholar, and political figure in the modern Muslim world. It is almost a biography of the personality as it explains in detail each and every aspect of the personality of Rachid Ghannouchi. Besides, explaining the ups-and-downs of his life, the most important issue that the writer brings to discussion is Ghannouchi's theory of space. In this theory Ghannouchi made a clear distinction between what is religious and what is political in Islam. Furthermore, the writer has also made a detailed commentary over Ghannouchi's thoughts over the issues including democracy, secularism, modernity, civil society, and liberalism etc. Moreover, the writer also scrutinizes Ghannouchi thoughts that why Muslims are against these philosophies.

James A. Beckford (1986) signifies the role of new religious movements in the transformation of different society across the globe since the reemergence of religion into politics. This study covers almost all major religious movements and their impact on their respective societies. The writer is of the opinion that these religious movements are the result of rapid social change in the era of globalization. The writer supports his statement by giving examples of various religious

movements, and their role as well as the rising numbers of recruits in such organizations. Moreover, the author also highlights some of the basic reasons that why people's support tilted in favor of these movements. First of all, people are attracted to such movements because of the specialized slogan of spirituality of these organizations. As a result, on religious slogans sentimentally the masses feel connected to such slogans. Secondly, people participate and join these movements as they are ensured their participation in all the activities of these movements. As a result, they feel more connected to these organizations. Lastly, these movements not only bear positive impacts upon the individuals rather it also helps in the reformation of the whole society on the fact that these movements work as laboratories where societal issues, ideas, thoughts, and social relations are experimented. The author concludes that, the ideal societies for the proliferation of such movements are the where religion dominates.

James M Burns (1978) is considered as an authority over the subject of leadership worldwide. He put his efforts to cover all the aspects of leadership as he defines leadership as the realization as well as adjusting to/with the basic needs and values of the followers. He further elaborates his argument as power according to him as an integral part of the leadership, but the difference between power holders and leader is that the former prioritizes his/her own aims before anything else while the later adjust to the needs of followers as well as his/her own. Moreover, the writer explains different types of the leadership i.e. transactional, transformational, and moral leadership on the basis of their qualities and priorities. Besides this categorization, the other important aspect he brought to discussion includes the power and leadership relationship. He concludes this debate by developing an opinion that despite concentrating power in the hands of leadership only, it is ideal to distribute it that will ultimately result in the maximization of power as well as leadership.

Joseph C. Rost (1993) is basically a critique of the leadership literature of 20th and 21st century. The writer has made an indebt analysis and scrutinized the existing literature on the issue of leadership. Moreover, he also highlights that how the meanings of leadership kept on evolving during the past century. He criticizes the definitions as well as explanation of the term leadership in that whole era on the basic factor that majority of the scholars failed to draw a line of difference between the two completely different phenomenon i.e. (leader and leadership). By applying this hypothesis, he nullifies the definitions of his predecessors. Besides, highlighting this confusion, the author also bring to discussion another major deficiency in the present literature that is, it misses the core ingredient which is the role of followership in the whole process of leadership and in his opinion leadership and followership relationship is based on the principle of influence. While criticizing the works of past scholars, Rost floor his concept of leadership i.e. *Post-Industrial Leadership* which according to him perfectly covers all the aspects of leadership for the present times.

Monica L. Marks (2014) brings to discussion an interesting issue related to the constitution making process in post Arab Spring Tunisia. The main focus of the study is Ennahda -the Islamist Political Party- of the country. The selection of the case is justified upon its past ideologies that include the issues over implementation of Sharia, status of women, and legislations on blasphemy law. According to the writer, the post Jasmine Revolution, transitional phase not only transformed the Tunisian society but it also has influenced organizations like Ennahda to revise their approach. The organization adopted an approach based on the principle of gradualism and compromise during the constitution making process for the country which had earned independence from dictatorship. Furthermore, the writer has highlighted the issues confronted by the leaders of Ennahda. They had faced criticisms from within their organization

for surrendering their ideological demands. But the leaders succeeded in keeping the organization intact by convincing its members that they should focus on maximizing their support on societal and political level rather than disputing over religious legislation. She has also highlighted the popular slogan of Rachid Ghannouchi -the founder of Ennahda- which is to convince not coerce people to adopt Islamic way of life.

Oren Kessler (2012) raises serious questions regarding the status of Ennahda as a Moderate Islamist Organization. Moreover, to strengthen his argument, he quotes the past statements of Rachid Ghannouchi over the issue of jihad, support for Saddam's Regime, denial of freedom of expression, women's status, Islamists subversion of democracy, Anti-Israel statements, supporting Hamas etc. The writer demonstrates his opinion that Ennahda has done well in satisfying the Western Powers as all these powers speak volumes about the successful democratic transition in Tunisia. Moreover, they also rewarded Ghannouchi and Marzouki with the prestigious award of Chatham House Prize for their contribution in this whole process especially Ghannouchi's efforts in promoting the idea of compatibility between Islam, democratization, and modernity. His efforts resulted in developing the present culture of peaceful coexistence within the society which is highly appreciated in the West. In addition to that, the U.S has also sanctioned millions of dollars as a grant and loans in favor of Tunisia. But the writer suggests to the Western authorities to keep check as well as compel Ennahda to implement the legislation it had promised.

Sarah J. Feuer (2012) presents a wide picture of Post Arab Spring scenario in the whole Arab World. According to the author, this event provides room for the suppressed political forces especially IPPs to play their role and actively participate in the political process of their respective countries. The writer mentions that the participation of these Islamists political

organizations in the democratic process gave rise to popular debates that revolves around two opinions. First and foremost, by allowing these organizations in the political activity will help not only in transforming themselves but will also result in the political liberalization of the Arab world. However, the second school of thought hold fears about these organizations that their participation may not reverse the whole process after acquiring majority. In most of the cases, the right wing parties were succeeded in gaining the majority during elections but surprisingly, most of them fail to translate their electoral majority into effect because of the long era of undemocratic culture leftover by their predecessors. However, the Tunisian transition process led by Ennahda - an Islamist Political Party - according to the auther, is considered to be a successful one as compared to Egypt and Morocco. The writer also highlights the challenges confronted to Ennahda these challenges includes the pressure from secular coalition partners in the parliament as well as from the society. Similarly, on one hand it had to counter the voices from within the organization over surrendering the ideology of the organization, Whereas, on the other hand, it also confronted the demands of Salafi's for the implementation of Islamic law as a state law. Despite these challenges Ennahda remained committed to democracy. The author's concluding argument is that the future of Ennahda in Tunisia is rested on a fact that how it counters these challenges.

The writers discussed above presented their respective viewpoints regarding the issue involved in the study. However, they over emphasized some of the aspects while fail to discuss other aspects appropriately. It is therefore, the present study attempts to fill these gaps.

1.3. Methodology

1.3.1. Research Design

The application of an appropriate methodology is an important step in guiding any research work towards right direction. This research is qualitative in nature and the basic method that is used in this study is of the case study approach. This approach is defined by John Gerring (2004) as, “the intensive study of a single case for the understanding a large class of cases” (Gerring, 2004, p. 645). The case study method is mostly used in qualitative research and its basic purpose is to find out causality between variables, as compared to quantitative research which focuses on identifying correlation between the variables rather than causes. The reasons that qualitative case study is an appropriate methodology for this study are the following. The topic suggests that main focus of the study is upon leadership role in the transformation of Islamist Political Parties so it helps in determining the links between the independent variable (Transformative Leadership) and dependent variable (Islamic/Religious Political Parties). So the case study is the most suitable methodology as compared to others because it is the primary aim of a case study research to find out the causal mechanism that establishes causality between variables. Secondly, the purpose of the study is to investigate this process of transformation beyond leadership role as it also highlights the intervening factors that consist of the organizational structure, the ideational framework of the Islamic Political Parties, and their role as facilitators as well as obstructing factors in the path of leadership with regard to transformational process. Keeping in view these considerations, the researcher considers the case study method as the most suitable research methodology for conducting this study.

1.3.2. Instrumentations

The instrumentation portion consists of the processes used in data collecting. The research is a qualitative one that uses both primary and secondary data. The instruments used in the collection of primary data include, the interviews of both leaders in a renowned newspapers of their countries. Furthermore, it also includes the video, audio and written transcripts of their speeches and lectures on various forums i.e. seminars, conferences, and their party gatherings regarding the issues that comes under the domain of this study. Similarly, the instruments also include their interaction with the local as well as international media persons. The data from secondary sources is collected through the instruments of books, academic research, reports, archival records etc. related to the study.

1.3.3. Data Sources

The study is comparative analysis of the two leaders and their efforts in transforming their respective political party from conservative outlook to a progressive and liberal one. Comparative analysis defined by David Collier (1993) in these words, “this approach sharpen our powers of description and plays a central role in concept formation by bringing into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among cases” (Collier, 1993, p. 106). The data used for conducting this study consists of both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources consist of the texts written by these leaders including their articles, essays, papers, and books that promote their political as well as theological point of views on various issues. Furthermore, it also includes policy statements and other official documents published by their respective political party. Lastly, the primary sources also include the speeches of these leaders and other officials of the party on various issues and occasions. A bulk of the above discussed materials in

English, Urdu and Arabic languages are present on internet and archival records of these political parties.

The secondary data on both the case studies consist of the previous academic studies conducted by the social scientists and religious scholars include books, published academic studies, articles, newspapers, periodicals, and other materials related to the study. Most of the previous studies deal with leaders or their political parties as an individual case study. These previous works will provide a detailed insight about the study. Furthermore, the bibliographical sources of these previous studies are also a great help.

1.3.4. Data Analysis

The purpose of data analysis in a qualitative research is to move from the raw data that have been collected as a part of research study and used it to provide explanation, understanding, and interpretation of the phenomena people and situation which we are studying. Furthermore, it is also the aim of data analysis in qualitative research to examine the meaningful and symbolic content of that which is found within. The approach used for data analysis in this study is content analysis that is the intellectual process of categorizing qualitative data into clusters of similar entities or conceptual categories to identify consistent patterns and relationship between variables (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 75). Moreover, it is a method of reducing data and making sense of the deriving meaning. The qualitative content analysis is helpful in answering “why” questions and analyzing perceptions as compared to quantitative content analysis which is helpful in answering what questions.

1.4. Theoretical Framework

An eclectic theoretical framework is adopted to conduct this study, using the Transformational Leadership theory of Burn (1978) and Bass (1985). The Transformational Leadership Theory of both Burn and Bass signifies the role of leader in the process of transformation process. Moreover, it emphasizes on the vision of the leader as a core element to the whole process of transformation as it strengthens not only the beliefs of the followers but also attracts new ones. Furthermore, the leaders continuously present their vision before the masses which some accept immediately, while the others take time in becoming accustomed to their ideas. So the leaders let no opportunity pass to convince the people to follow their path. Besides, the personal attributes of the leaders, both the scholars are convinced that working in collaboration with followers as well as the support of the organizational machinery are also the key elements to any successful transformation.

The transformational leadership theory model adopted to conduct this study is a mixture of Weber's Charismatic Leadership Theory, Rational Choice Theory, and Social Constructivist Theory. Using the principle of Weber's theory, the charismatic leader, in religious political party must have the moral authority in his group, the leader proposes new ideas. Being a religious authority, genealogical links in the party and having the feature of charisma, his ideas are devotedly followed by the followers. Similarly, using the cost and benefit principle of Rationale Choice Theory, the leaders and their followers uses each and every means of interests to increase the support for their reforms both within and outside of their organization. This includes relations with state authorities, like-minded as well as ideologically opposed-religious and political groups of their respective countries in order to minimize the anti-reforms voices. In the end, the adaptation from the Social Constructivist Theory is that the moral authority leader brings

ideational change within the organization which tends to transform the theological outlook of the organization.

1.5. Organization of the Study

The following chapter deals theoretical explanations that include literature review of the basic theoretical approaches which has been used in the study of religion and politics with reference to Islamists and their politics. The theoretical approaches been reviewed in this study are of Culturalists /Modernists theory, Social Constructivism, Rational Choice theory, Moderation through Inclusion and Exclusion Hypotheses Approaches, Charismatic Leadership Theory, and Transactional and Transformational Leadership Theories. The study explains theoretical framework based upon the transformational leadership theory. Furthermore, it is justified that why this approach is being adopted to understand the process of change within the religious political parties. This chapter consists of a detailed analysis of key concepts and their conceptualization used in the study. The concepts political Islam, modernization, Islamism, post-Islamism, Islam and democracy, Islam and modernity, and Islamists and politics are analyzed. In the end, the chapter explains in detail, the hypotheses which guide this research.

The chapters that follow consists of an empirical analysis of the two case studies i.e. Ennahda and the JI. Chapter three analyzes the process of successful transformation that occurred in Ennahda under the transformative leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi. It shows how the trilateral alliance of the transformative leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi (human agent), the pro-reform organizational culture (structural factor) and the liberal ideational nature (ideational factor) resulted in the successful transformation of Ennahda and turned out to be a popular party. It is the trilateral alliance of the three interlinked variables that helped in the successful transformation of Ennahda from a traditionalist and conservative party to a progressive and

liberal party. On the contrary, chapter four brings forth a critical analysis of the JI. The JI is an unsuccessful case of transformation in this study. It elucidates the unsuccessful transformation process within Jamaat-i-Islami. The party went through transformation. Qazi Hussain Ahmad made transformative efforts to transform the ideological and political orientation of the party. These reformist efforts were resisted by the traditionalist faction within the party through strong organizational structure of the party and through ideation framework. The traditionalist factions within the party posed serious challenge to these transformation efforts and blocked its path towards its implementation and institutionalization within the party. The chapter five consists of conclusion. This chapter enumerates the main findings of the research, contributions of the research and future policy implications of this research. The chapter analyzed comprehensively the transformation of Ennahda and of the JI. Both the parties went through various transitional phases and obtained distinct theological and political orientations. Ennahda is a modernist, progressive and theological political party whereas the JI is a traditionalist theological political party. They had the history to influence the socio-political spheres of their respective countries. Leaders in both these two parties had continuously advocated the structural and ideational re-adjustments in the light of their theological and political approaches in order to transform socio-economic and political trends in their country. Both these parties started as pure traditionalist organizations. They worked to implement *Sharia* Law and strived to establish an Islamic state. However, with the passage of time, both the parties started to reconstruct their theological and political approaches to meet the needs of the time. As a result, they synchronized Islamic principles with the Western socio-political ideas like democracy, religious plurality, and universal human rights. Both the parties adopted different causal reform-path ways due to distinct socio-political settings, leadership attributes, institutional culture, and ideational beliefs.

In this process of transformation, Ennahda of Tunisia turned out to be a successful case of transformation under the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi whereas Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan turned out to be an unsuccessful case of transformation under the leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmad. The process of transformation in Ennahda was successful on account of the transformative leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi. He introduced progressive reformist ideas. His charisma, theological expertise, and genealogical links helped him incorporate his ideas, and earned him the status of a transformative leader. As a result, he obtained the support of the majority of the party. On the basis of this transformative stature, he successfully overcame the opposing group within the party. On the contrary, the process of transformation in the JI remained unsuccessful as Qazi Hussain Ahmad had no theological expertise and genealogical link with the party. The researcher claim that this study made the following contributions to the knowledge. First and foremost, it highlighted that the theological and ideological beliefs of Islamic political parties are not static in nature. Rather, they are subject to the processes of reconstruction, transformation, and reorientation through the trilateral alliance of human agents (transformational leaders), structural factor (organizational culture), and ideational factor. Adopting this mechanism, a religious political party could transform its conservative and traditionalist orientation into a liberal and progressive orientation in the light of the trilateral alliance of the factors. It also identified that the theological and political beliefs of the religious political parties can be transformed according to the needs and requirements of their socio-political settings. Secondly, the study brought forth the importance of leadership in the process of transformation. Moreover, it also highlighted the basic qualifications i.e. theological expertise, genealogical link needed to attain the status of transformative leaders in a religious political party. It brought forth that how those quail his party. These measures help transformative leader

earn the confidence of the followers, and the members of his party in favor of the reforms he wants to implement and institutionalize in his party. The causal mechanisms developed in this study showed that the successful transformative process occurs in a religious political party if the pro-reformist institutional culture and liberal ideational nature of the party lends support to the. On the other hand, the transformation process fails in the organization where there is no transformational leader, or an intolerant institutional culture, or rigid ideational structure.

Thirdly, the researcher claims that the study categorized the religious political organizations into theologically rigid and conservative organizations and theologically liberal and progressive organizations. It would help the researchers as well as the policy makers to distinguish among the religious political parties to ascertain why transformation occurs in some religious political parties and why does not occur the same in others. Lastly, the study contributed to the literature on leadership studies as it highlights the role of leaders that how it brought about a change in a conservative and traditionalist organization to adopt a liberal and progressive approach mainly out of leaders' charisma, intellectual capabilities, and genealogical link. The framework developed to conduct this study can be used to analyze the process of transformation in other Islamist political organizations.

Chapter: Two

Theoretical Perspectives and Conceptual Framework

2.1. Introduction

This chapter consists of a detailed analysis of the conceptualization of key concepts and theoretical framework being discussed in this study. The first section of the chapter consists of the theoretical explanations which include the literature review of the basic theoretical approaches have been used in the study of religion and politics with reference to Islamists and their politics. The theoretical approaches being reviewed in this study are of Culturalists/Modernists theory, Social Constructivism, Rational Choice theory, Moderation through Inclusion and Exclusion Hypotheses Approaches, Charismatic Leadership Theory, and Transactional and Transformational Leadership Theories. The study then explains theoretical framework based upon the transformational leadership theory. Furthermore, it justifies why the said approach is being adopted to understand the process of change within the religious political parties being studied under this study. This section consists of detailed analysis of key concepts and their conceptualization used in the study like. The concepts are related with Political Islam, Modernization, Islamism, Post-Islamism, Islam and Democracy, Islam and Modernity, and Islamists and Politics. In the end, the chapter explains in detail, the hypotheses which guide this research.

2.2. An Overview of Theoretical Perspectives in the field of Religion and Politics

This section of the chapter includes an overview of theoretical approaches which are popularly used in the field of religion and politics to explain the political behavior of Islamist political parties all across. It includes Culturalists/Essentialist theory, Social Constructivism, Rational Choice theory, Moderation through Inclusion and Exclusion Hypotheses approaches, Charismatic Leadership Theory, and Transformational Leadership theory.

2.2.1. Culturalists and Essentialists Explanation

The Culturalists theorists derive their inspiration from the modernization theory which had remained a popular theory from the 1950s to 1970s in the study field of comparative politics used by a renowned scholars like (Deutsch, 1961; Lerner, 1958). However, its used continued as the scholar like SP Huntington (1993) has used it in his seminal work “The Clash of Civilization” in the 1990s. One of the basic assumptions of Cultural theory says that culture is the basic factor that determines politically the behavior and attitude of an individual or a group. In addition to, it also labels culture as static in nature and is not accommodative immediately in changing political trends. Furthermore, it assumes that each culture possesses some distinctive features which make it different from the other and also help it in determining its socio-economic and political aspects (Huntington, 1993). In short, the basic assumption of Culturlist theorists says that cultures have some permanent and unchangeable characteristics which are easy to identify.

Culturalists theorist’s predominantly use culture as a traditional approach to explain the behavior of religious political parties and social movements within Islam. In the light of this approach,

societies are categorized on the basis of their members' different perspectives on various issues as well as on the relationship between state and society in their culture, and their commitment to specific ideological and religious beliefs. They use religion and culture interchangeably in the context of civilization (Wilson, 2000). In order to measure the socio-political impact and the behavior of a particular religious political group within a society, they use the literal meaning of the religious nomenclature of that particular group (Kuru, 2009). The concept Political Islam under culturist/essentialist approach is based upon the divine set of rules. These rules are beyond human capacity to think of. Besides, these rules are mandatory for its followers to be implemented in all aspects of their lives both social and political (Gellener, 1983).

The culturalists approach perceives Islam as a homogenous entity in order to explain the political approach of religious political parties in the Muslim World. They assert that religion "Islam" is static in nature as well as is dominated by the ancient and outdated traditions. Its political aim is to Islamize the Muslim societies upon the traditional Islamic lines. Besides, they portray the role of Islam in the Muslim societies as dominant and is applied in totality to the socio-economic, and political domain in the lives of the people (Ayubi, 1991). Furthermore, Islam is labeled as an anti-western ideology which resists ideas like, modernization, liberalization, and democratization. While using the rationales of such arguments the culturalists/essentialists question the compatibility between Islam and liberal democracy. They assume that the democratization process in the Muslim world would be a tough task to materialize. As a result, they conclude that Political Islam is not only a major obstacle in the path of democratization in the Muslim World but also a potential threat to the established democratic setup of the West (Gellener, 1983; Huntington S. P., 1996; Lewis, 2002).

On such as parsimonious explanation of Islam, the Culturalists theorists note a great deal of criticism from different scholars of the field. As noted by Arkoun (1995) that the culturist/essentialist approach the scholars have adopted a hegemonic intellectual position about Islam. They perceive Islam as monolithic and a static. They label it as a major obstacle in the path of development, freedom, progress, and democratization (Arkoun, 2003, p. 57). Similarly, Dale F. Eickelman and J. Piscatori (2004) also argue that the debatable point in the culturist/essentialists concept of “West versus the Rest” is that they use culture as an independent variable, and label Islam as a monolithic entity. (Eickelman & Piscatori, 2004, p. 123). They both criticize the Culturalists perspective on the basis that no such thing like monolithic Islamic culture exists.

Edward Said (1935-2003) is the most prominent critique of this school of thought. He encountered the argument culturalists and essentialists built against Islam. In his opinion, they shrink Islam to a set of certain rules, and notions. Besides, they over generalize the religion of Islam, its founder, and all of its aspects. Furthermore, he adds that Islam as a religion is portrayed as an irrational and violent religion and its followers are labeled as rigid and uncompromising in their thinking. He criticizes such kind of scholarship based upon presumed truths about Islam. He, further, considers such conclusions as an unexamined supposition produced without any evidence. The culturalists/essentialist explanations, based upon the reductionist approach, ignore the diversity in the religion of Islam and consider it as an independent actor that is in conflict as well as threat to a democratic system of the West. In Said’s opinion, such explanations are not only the demonization of Islam but also dehumanization of the Muslims (Said, 1978, pp. xvi-xxxii).

Culturalists/Essentialist theorists consider the extremist groups across the Muslim world as the primary and sole representatives of the Political Islam. They overlook and ignore the majority of

those Islamic groups both social and political that utilize moderate means to pursue their political and social objectives while participating like other political groups in the political setup of their respective states and using welfare activities to increase their influence among the masses. In short, culturalists/essentialists adopt a narrow approach towards political Islam and portray it as an ideology or a philosophy being followed by the groups or individuals who have an identical set of beliefs based upon extremist and revivalist tendencies. They are labeled as an anti-Western groups who do not believe in democracy, human rights, and religious plurality. Besides, they are also labeled as the groups who are willing to use violence in order to achieve their ultimate aim that is the implementation of Sharia (Islamic Law) in their respective societies. While conceptualization of Islamic social and political movements they completely ignore the element of diversity in the theological interpretations, ideological beliefs, and geographical variations in the Islamic groups across the Muslim World (Wilson, 2000, p. 256). On the basis of their narrow assumptions, that existence of diversity and possibilities of changes among the groups of the same religion, culturalists/essentialist theorists have faced a lot of criticism. It is the reason why the researchers of the field come with their approaches. Theorists of the field of religion and politics came-up with alternative explanations based upon rational choice theory had built their assumptions that religious social and political groups had the tendency to readjust their ideological positions in order to achieve their material and instrumental gains. This approach is discussed in detail in the following title.

2.2.2. Rational Choice Theory

Rational Choice Theory approach is another popular theoretical approach used to explain the actions and political behaviors of political actors or groups. The major assumption of this theory points out that it is the individual or a group needs and desires which determine their preferences.

However, there is no strict content layout of these preferences under the rational choice theory. Rather they have left it open for the researchers to categorize the nature of these preferences either as material, ideological, or both (Gill, 2008, p. 27).

On the basis of its plain and simple explanation, many researchers in the field of social sciences utilize the theory since last three decades. In the course of time, the theory has evolved a great deal as it now includes the context of history, culture, and other structural factors of the society while explaining the choices and behavior of the human actors and groups. Furthermore, the theory views the role of ideas in influencing the choices and behavior of the political actor and a group that has also been evolved a great deal.

The mechanism used by the former rational choice theorists in order to conceptualize the process of change in the political behavior of an individual actor or a group while using the material and instrumental gains/interests as the primary rationale behind such motive is the desire to gain political power and material gains. They opine that the hegemonic social structure and international system also of great help to shape the political behavior of these groups/individuals. It is this domination which undermines the role of the ideational beliefs of the group. Moreover, this generation of rational choice theorists had thought culture and ideas as secondary drivers used only by the leaders and groups to help them cover up their material interests (Gill, 2008, p. 57).

In short the first generation of rational choice theorists conclude that religious and political actors acquire and maintain their powers and instrumental gains by using ideational rhetoric and narratives. Philpott (2001) argues that in the light of the explanation by the first generation of rational choice theorists the support for the Protestant Reformation by the Protestant Rulers in

the 16th century was motivated by the desire to gain power and wealth of the Catholics in their respective territories (Philpott, 2001, p. 13). This rationalist approach faced a great deal of criticism by those theorists who endorse the role of ideas in the political behavior of individual actor or a group. They labeled their explanation as narrow based upon a pre-determine assumption that materiel and instrumental gains are the key determinant of any political change. Besides, they completely overlook the role of ideas, traditions, culture, norms and values in process of political transformation. Furthermore, the critiques argue that there might be the possibility in some of the cases where leaders or groups may have used ideational means to conceal or hide their material interests. However, all of them do not use it for the same purpose. There are leaders and groups especially among the religious domain who have had used ideas in its true spirit. Besides, has also helped them a great deal in achieving their objective of transforming themselves as well as of their respective political group. Despite these criticisms the scholars of the first generation of rational choice theory deny any such possibility (Philpott, 2001, pp. 86-87).

The second generation of rational choice theorists takes this criticism a challenge and attempt to refine their explanation. They think ideas as the potential factor which helps in determining the choices of an individual or a group. It also complements the material preferences of the actors. As noted by Goldstein and Keohane (1993) notes that ideas are used as a roadmap by the political actors in order to frame strategies to achieve their goals. In the light of this explanation, ideas are used as a causal mechanism which helps political leaders in choosing what to include and what to exclude while making their choices (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993, p. 12). These scholars came up with a more suitable theoretical explanation as they include ideas as one of the potential factors in articulating group decisions and choices. They minutely observe the

importance and roles of the historical backgrounds, ideological orientations, and leadership preferential choices of the religious political groups and leaders. Unlike their predecessors, they do not develop their argument out of the predetermined notion that is the material interest as the only primary source in the choices made by the actors.

While using the contemporary rationalist approach, Gill (2008), in his study, makes an in-depth analysis and identifies the causal mechanisms and conditions under which different approaches and strategies have been adopted by the religious groups to achieve their political objectives. He studied comparatively democracy in three Latin American states Argentine, Brazil and Chile in the light of Catholic Church approach. He analyzed how the diverse social structures of these states paved the way for different choices adopted by the Catholic Church in each country. He concludes that Catholic Church has supported democracy in Brazil and Chile to encounter the majority of the Evangelical Protestants. Whereas, in Argentine, they supported dictatorship where there was minimum protestant opposition. Similarly, in his analysis of colonial America, Russia, and Mexico he concludes that a multi-ethnic and religious society have more tendencies towards religious liberty in order to obtain economic growth and increase in trade (Gill, 2008, pp. 42-45). In comparison to the explanations made by the former rationalists, who conclude that material interests are the only preferences that motivate religious political actors, the explanation made by Gill seems more delicate and refined one.

While using the same approach Carlyon Warner (2000) in her research, analyzes the decisions made by the Catholic Church regarding its alliances with the Christian Democratic Parties in Germany, France, and Italy in the Post-second World War scenario. In her analysis, she concludes that the Church made their decisions primarily on the basis of cost benefit analysis. It made its alliances out of the perception that which political party could best serve its interests as

well as of Church policies in the respective country. Nevertheless, these Churches also kept in their minds their historical political relations with the state authorities and also the hierarchical structure and leadership of their respective Church (Warner, 2000, pp. 35-38). Consequently, a different set of alliances were formed between the Catholic Church and Christian Democratic Parties in their respective country in the Post-second World War scenario. However, no alliance was formed with the popular Democratic Party in France. A consensus has been developed over the alliance with the Protestants in Christian Democratic Party in Germany. In the same way, a strong alliance with the Christian Democratic Party has been established in Italy. Warner study provides a causal mechanism for those researchers who want to conduct research under the framework of rational choice theory and of comparative historical analysis in the field of religion and politics. In comparison to their predecessors, the above discussed explanation of rational choice theorists gives better explanation of how political and religious groups set and pursue their objectives based upon the material aims. He also includes the role of social structure and ideational preferences as a secondary factors in their decision making process. Despite the fact that contemporary rational choice theorists consider the role of culture, traditions, and identities in their explanations but even then this school of thought is in minority to those who give preference the role of instrumental and material interests.

Philpott (2009) notes the dominance of this trend and argues that the rational choice theorists ignore the role of ideational preferences. Besides, the theory suffers from the shortcomings while explaining the state policy with respect to religion. In such policy, ideology is the key driving force which determines the behavior of the individual (leaders) in either expanding or restricting the role of the religion in the political sphere of the state (Philpott, 2009, p. 195). The critics have acknowledged the efforts of contemporary rational choice theorists, who include the role of

norms, traditions, ideology and other ideational variables in their explanations. They also suggest that these variables should be more regularly included in their explanation especially regarding their analysis about the political actions and behavior of the religious political groups. They assume that these variables in their explanation it will provide better means of understanding for them as well as for the scholars of the other theoretical approaches to understand the process of transformation in the religious political groups (Philpott, 2009, p. 198). A balance between material and ideational factor is necessary for the rationalists as well as other theorists while making their analysis.

In short, the framework of rational choice theorists that explains the transformation process in the religious groups is based upon the cost-benefit measures. These measures include material incentives, as well as strategic calculations of these groups. They ignore and overlook the role of theological and ideational preferences. They consider the role of religious leader within these groups as strategically calculated. Such a leader has certain sets set of preferences. Furthermore, the majority of the rational choice theorists use material interests as the primary factor in their explanation. There also exists a group of contemporary rational choice theorists, who is in minority. They include the role of ideas in their explanations. They acknowledge the role of religious traditions, cultural identity, and leadership within these groups as important factors while making their analysis (Warner, 2000). On account of this, the rational choice theorists fail to make a detail analysis of the theological outlook, doctrinal facts, and organizational structure of the religious political group. The given elements play a crucial role in framing the political behavior and choices of these groups (Philpott, 2009, p. 193). Despite the fact that it is necessary for the scholars to examine the material interests, which is the key factor in the political behavior

and choices of these groups. They also need to include the theological and ideational factors in their explanation in order to achieve full theoretical understanding of these groups.

The Social Constructivists theorists came up with their own explanation in order to counter the culturalists/essentialists approach to the religion and politics. They conceptualized culture as a flexible idea. The idea is subject to transformation in order to gain material or instrumental gains. Moreover, ideational factor is also the primary factor of transformation in order to incorporate structural, cultural, and socio-economic changes in their respective societies/cultures.

2.2.3. Social Constructivists

In response to the assumptions hold by both culturalists/essentialists and rational choice theorists, the researchers in the field of political science responded to it that in order to get better understanding of the study of religion and politics. They opine that the researcher must have to include the role of human agents, norms, traditions, and culture in the choices made for themselves within their respective societies and cultures. Social constructivists criticize both the theories that ignored and failed to incorporate in their analysis. The adjustments and the evolutionary process these religious political groups and actors of the society had gone through during the changing course of time.

In their criticism with respect to rational choice theory, they question the oversimplification that religious political groups and actors are primarily motivated by the material and instrumental interests. Similarly, culturalists are criticized. On the basis of, their predetermined approach. They are of the opinion that there is no possibility of change in the behavior of religious political groups and actors and their compatibility with the modern democratic principles. In their assumption they overlook the tendency within these groups towards the adaptation of modern

norms as the case of culturalists stood for. Moreover, the rationalists underestimate the role of social norms which should have played an important role in the choices made by the religious groups and leaders (Checkel, 1998, p. 324). The social constructivists responded to these explanations and suggested that by understanding and including the role of social fabrics such as customs and traditions, norms, and ideas in explaining the behavior and choices made by these groups and their leaders a better and more meaningful understanding of their political understanding can be obtained (Checkel, 1998, p. 326).

Social constructivists theorists build their assumption on the question that how the inter-connectivity/collaboration of the individuals, social structures, material and instrumental interests, and ideational beliefs construct the outlook of the social life? (Burch, 2002, p. 61). There is width and diversity among the constructivists. However, there are some common ontological propositions existed among them. First, the major determinant of their explanation is based upon certain social facts that include identity, traditions, and ideas. These determinants are the primary variables of identity formation and political actions of the individual actors or groups within religious or political groups. Secondly, there is a consensus over the fact that actions of these actors are the results of the social norms shared by these religious and political actors within their respective cultures. Lastly, they also agree on the principle that the cause or occurring of any political outcome is the result of collaboration between the individual actors and societal structures of the societies. (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 8).

In short, social constructivists consider that significant transformational efforts of the leaders both religious and political are possible if it is framed in accordance with the social context of that particular society. Of the decisions based upon the individual choices they suggest that a meaningful effort is possible if the preferences and choices are directed towards the betterment

of an organization as well as a society on the whole (Hopf, 1998, p. 173). The main social factors that help in shaping the preferences and choices of the individuals are customs, traditions, language, religious and political ideology and culture. Social constructivist believes that on account of difficulties in the conceptualization of these social factors the rational choice theorist avoided to include these primary factors in their explanation (McCann, 1996, p. 463).

Unlike the social constructivists explanation that is based upon the fact that social structures and individual actors both articulate their preferences in such a way that facilitate the efforts of one another, the rational choice theorists give preference to the role of agency (individual actors and groups) over the structure in their explanation. As far as, the culturalists and essentialists are concerned, they prioritize the role of structures over the agencies in their explanations. Social constructivists argue that even though social factors are complex phenomena to conceptualize but its inclusion and understanding as a constitutive determinant is necessary to analyze the process of transformation (McCann, 1996, pp. 463-464).

The other primary factor that social constructivists have included in their investigation process is to analyze what role does identity play in influencing the local as well as the international politics. They believe that the identity of any political entity is the major source behind the choices, priorities, and objectives of the political actors. Moreover, they also consider identity as a social connector that bridges the gap between the political actors and social structures which tend to transform with time as well as new developments. They conceptualize both identities and relationship between individual actors both political and religious leaders and structures which are evolutionary and continuously make adjustments in their choices as result of their dealings with other groups and individuals of their social setup. Consequently, social constructivists conclude that the formation of new identities could be erected. Such formation might be

successful in reforming or replacing the outdated through the active collaboration among the political actors and those who have the capacity to institutionalize these ideas within their organizational setup (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 65).

Subsequent studies have found that social constructivists face a plethora of criticisms from the scholars in the field. One of the major criticisms they have is upon their overemphasis on the role of social structures as a primary source of their explanations with reference to transformation within a political group. They either overlook or consider the role of human agents (leaders) as secondary. On account of the high preferential ranking of social norms in constructivist explanation of state actions and of other political institution within a state, this ultimately resulted in the negligence towards the role of individual actors who play a crucial role especially during the initial stages of institution formation. They suggest that constructivist must include the role of human agents along with the social structural factors to have more balanced explanation (Checkel, 1998, p. 340).

In the absence of thorough investigation with respect to exploring the causal link between the actions of political actors and the role of ideas in the constructivists' explanation, they are criticized. On the basis of such rationale, the scholars of rational choice theory build their critique against the social constructivist theory. They argue that ideas might be used by the political actors but its role is secondary as political actors selectively choose those ideas which can support their primary motive of material and instrumental gain. Hence, they conclude that ideas are used as a supporting factor to achieve the primary motives of material gains. They suggest that social constructivists' need to develop a proper causal mechanisms to overcome this deficiency. Besides, it must clearly outline the circumstances under which the political actors frame their preferences with respect to material and instrumental interests. Besides, what are the

conditions that compel these actors to give preference to ideational framework in their choices (Checkel, 1998, pp. 344-346).

Despite the fact that the theory of social constructivism is utilized by the political scientists in the various fields of the discipline, however a limited amount of work have been done in the field of religion and politics. This provided room for the scholarship conducted under the secularist approach to prevail in the field. A large amount of work is available on account of the secularist approach. In such research religion is taken as a private entity based upon the divine set of beliefs that has nothing to do with political activity in public sphere. As a result, most of the political scientists and international relations scholars overlook the potential role of the religion as an important social order in the domestic as well as in the international affairs (Thomas, 2000, pp. 820-822).

In short, the analysis that social constructivism theory does has both strength and limitations. The primary focus of the theory is to know that whether the political choices of the leaders within the religious political groups are based upon their ideological beliefs or vice versa. Furthermore, the theory concludes that it is the mutual cooperation among the leaders (individual actors) and social structures that successfully institutionalize or restrict an idea within their respective organization. Some of the limitations of social constructivism theory that gives preference to structure over agency as they primarily focus on ideational over material or instrumental factors. Besides, this weakness of the social constructivism theory has the potential to contribute in the field of religion and politics studies on account of its primary focus over the social facts such as theological ideas and doctrines of the religious political groups. Furthermore, it analyses the role of the religious ideas being a motivating factor in the religious political groups in order to adopt, alternate, and reform of their outlook. Besides, it provides a better explanation in comparison to

the culturalists and essentialists' static approach as well as to material and instrumental approach of the rational choice theory.

2.2.4. Moderation through Inclusion and Exclusion Hypotheses

2.2.4.1. Moderation through Inclusion Hypothesis

To answer the question how to moderate the Islamist, scholars came up with a wide range of explanations. However, there is absence of consensus over the conceptualization of moderation and of the causal mechanism for the process of moderation. Due to the diversity in the approaches of the scholars, a generalize theory for the explanation of moderation process for the Islamists is yet to be achieved. Scholars utilize different approaches to conclude their arguments. According to Schwelder (2011), moderation is “the movement from relatively static and rigid worldview to a more flexible and tolerant towards other approaches” (Schwedler, 2011). Moderation through inclusion is one of the popular modern trends used by the scholars to analyze the process of moderation among the religious social and political groups especially within the Muslim World. The key assumption of this approach is based upon the argument that a religious group tendency towards moderation increases once it is included in the political process of their respective country. In a detailed comparative study of religious political parties of Yemen and Jordan, Schwelder (2006) explores in her study that both the Islah Party of Yemen and Islamic Action Front (IAF) of Jordan were allowed to participate in the electoral process of their respective countries. As a result, the IAF of Jordan succeeded in moderation whereas the Islah Party of Yemen failed to adopt moderation. This difference according to the auther was on account of the different structures and ideational frameworks of both the parties (Schwedler, 2006). The structural factors were consisted of the following. First and foremost was the

relationship between the state and political party. Secondly, the internal organizational culture of decision making processes in both parties towards the reform process of transforming the Islamists ideology, ideationally and attempt to make it compatible with the modern democratic trends (Schwedler, 2006, p. 197).

Schewlder (2011) critically examines the current trends of debates with reference to Political Islam and to the process of moderation before suggesting moderation through her inclusion hypothesis. She highlights two major pitfalls in these studies. First and foremost, there is a point of disagreements on what has been explained. Secondly, what are the mechanisms used by these authors and what should be the order or sequence of the measures toward the moderation of Political Islam. As the previous studies differ in their conclusions either to focus on the change of behavior or to focus on the transformation of the ideologies of the religious political actors. Similarly, they also differ on the point that either to group behavior, and individual actors (leaders or followers) or to include the behavior of both in their analysis. This point of disagreement between the scholars resulted in the emergence of a diverse set of patterns to explain the process of moderation within the Islamist groups. As a result, a generalized causal mechanism for the process of moderation in these groups has not been drawn on account of these different varieties of explanation; Schwelder identified three causal mechanisms to conduct the study in the field. First and foremost, the analysis is based upon the behavioral moderation of the religious groups, secondly, the transformation of the group through ideological moderation process, and lastly, the moderation within the individuals (leaders and followers) is through ideological thoughts. She concludes that any study conducted under these three frameworks falls in the theoretical framework of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis (Schwedler, 2011, p. 348). Furthermore, she added that the measurement of moderation within the Islamist Political Groups

only through their inclusion or participation within the political process of their respective countries is not sufficient. Rather, there might be a possibility that a group has adopted the moderate approach in order to gain strategic and material purposes and ideologically they might still pursue its radical agenda. She opines that this strategic moderation may leads to the ideological moderation of the radical group, but of this might not work all the time (Schwedler, 2007, p. 59).

Similarly, Karakayaa and Yildirim (2013) have adopted the same approach to conduct their study. They have developed a framework by using a two stages approach that is tactical/strategic moderation and ideological moderation. They conceptualize tactical/strategic moderation approach as the one in which the radical groups make a choice to participate in the electoral process of their country in order to achieve their ideological aims without making any compromises (Karakayaa & Yidirim, 2013, p. 1322). In this approach, the group did not make an alteration in their ideological position. Whereas, in ideological moderation approach the radical groups have to make ideological adjustments in their position according to the societal and political needs of their socio-political structure. These processes according to the authors have the ability to convert these groups from a policy driven group into a vote seeking groups. To counter the inclusion-moderation hypothesis approach, scholars came up with an alternative approach known as moderation through exclusion hypothesis. Cavatorta and Merone (2013), in there analysis conclude that on account of repressions and societal marginalization by the state and society tend to shift their policy towards moderation (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013) this approach is discussed in detail under the following title.

2.2.4.2. Moderation through Exclusion

Most of the studies use moderation through inclusion hypothesis in order to explain the transformation process within the Islamic/Religious political parties. According to these studies, it is due to the inclusion of these political parties in their respective countries political arena that now they accept and support the principles of the modern democratic norms, human rights trends and market driven economy. These claims of the scholars seem valid as the process of the inclusion did helped and bound these groups to transform their political approach. However, Cavatorta and Merone (2013) came up with alternative approach in their analysis of the process of transformation. They are of the opinion that it is the process of exclusion that helps in transforming the political approach of religious political parties it is not the inclusion. They studied Ennahda of Tunisia as a case study to support their argument. They argue that transformation of Ennahda was not through the process of inclusion but rather it was its exclusion from the political sphere of its country which paved its path towards moderation (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013, p. 861).

They explain that Ennahda formerly known as MTI (Islamic Tendency Movement) since its creation, have been the victim of state repression and social marginalization during the regimes of Bourgiba and Ben Ali. This state sponsored repression and social alienation compel it to reevaluate and reconsider its anti-system approach to a pro-system approach. As a result, Ennahda projected itself to be the supporter of democratic approach. This was evident when it had been the part of the political process of Tunisia in the Post-Arab Spring scenario. The authors are of the opinion that this change of the behavior in Ennahda was not on account of its inclusion in the political process but rather it was because of its exclusion from the whole process.

The comparative study of these authors makes a distinction between the process of moderation in Ennahda and of Turkey's AKP (Justice and Development Party) and Morocco PJD (Justice and Development Party). The scholars explain that how the former uses different reform pathway from the latter. For instance, the transformation pathway of Turkey's AKP and of Morocco PJD was based upon the adaptation of pragmatic approach. They followed the issues of their allies' interests (West). As a result they participate in the democratic process of their countries, accepted universal human rights principles, and market oriented policies consequently this resulted in the moderation of these political parties. As far as Ennahda of Tunisia is concerned, it was never allowed by the state to participate in the political arena of its country till January 2011. However, it was recognized as one of the political parties of Tunisia afterwards. The process of Ennahda transformation started in the early 1990s. Ben Ali's regime started crackdown against the organization this resulted in the exile of its leadership as well as members. Besides, some were either detained or went underground the Call for Tunis of 2005 paved the way for its policy of cooperation with the other ideologically different political groups of the country (Chamkhi, 2015, p. 155). The change in Ennahda approach to collaboration with the secular political forces of the country, according to Cavatorta and Merone was the result of the strict state repressions as well as majority of the people in Tunisia had disagreement with the former rigid ideological stance of Ennahda. All these factors compelled it to adopt moderate approach (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013, p. 871).

Some of the empirical evidences that show Ennahda adopting a moderate approach are evident from the statements of its leadership after his arrival in Tunisia. Similarly, in his visit to United States in 2012, Rachid Ghannouchi clearly stated that, the majority of his party in the parliament does not mean that it would dominate the state and society. He had of the opinion that ours is a

democratic party not an authoritarian one. It is not the duty of the state to impose the way of how to live upon its citizens. We will follow the process of dialogue to sort out our differences on various national issues (Ghannouchi, 2012). This commitment was fulfilled when Ennahda surrendered its demand to include the word 'Sharia' in the new drafted constitution of the country as consensus over its inclusion failed to achieve. Similarly, in the internal debates of the party, most of its members supported the leadership policy to surrender a revolutionary approach and adopt a pragmatic and moderate approach as the party had suffered a lot on account of the former approach in the past. These are the reasons that the scholars have noted that the case of Ennahda process of transformation is the result of its exclusion from the social and political sphere of its country (Chamkhi, 2015, pp. 153-154).

2.2.5. Charismatic Leadership Theory

A German Sociologist Max Weber (1864-1922) presented this theory. Since then, this theory has dominated the studies regarding the concept of leadership across the world. In his explanation of charismatic leadership theory Weber identified three types of authorities. He was of the opinion that leaders use their authorities to earn legitimacy and support from their followers within their respective society. These three types of authority are comprised of charismatic authority, traditional authority, and rational legal (bureaucratic) authority. Weber conceptualized charismatic authority it is based upon the personal quality of an individual that makes him/her unique as he/she is considered as superhuman, and supernatural with exceptional qualities. No other leaders do not possess such features within a group occupy (Weber, 1978). The traditional authority is conceptualized as the belief in the rules of customs and traditional values and to accept the legitimacy of those who exercise the authority under these rules. As far as, the rational

legal authority is concerned, it is the belief in the legality of certain set of rules, which confers upon the person an authority in order to exercise these rules upon others (Weber, 1978, p. 215).

In comparison to the other two types of authorities that by Weber mentions, charismatic authority is significant in a sense that it is neither confined to the powers of the office which the leader holds nor the authority that the leader holds out of inheritance. In case of charismatic authority it is gained by the ability of individual personal traits. This is how he/she earns legitimacy for him/her selves from the followers (Willner, 1984, p. 4). Weber concludes that this kind of leadership emerges on account of the personal traits of the leaders, rather than on the basis of the official status of the leaders or any other legal rule. In addition to that, he argued that the only legitimacy in this case is the leader's charisma. It lasts till he/she enjoy the support of their followers and remains charismatic because it is only their charisma which enables them to earn the devoted support of their followers in comparison to the other leaders within the leadership hierarchy of their religious or political groups (Weber, 1978, p. 245).

The ideas presented by the charismatic leaders are accepted by their followers simply out of their leader's charisma. It is the characteristic of charismatic leadership theory in which relation between the leader and follower is based on the principle in which the former is considered to be infallible on account of his special personal attributes that none possess in the group. On the basis of this belief in the abilities of charismatic leader, he/she obtains an unqualified support from his/her followers (Willner & Willner, 1965, p. 80). A diverse set of causative measures has been used by the scholars to explain the emerging processes of the charismatic leadership. First and foremost, a situation of a crisis may help to result in the emergence of charismatic leadership. Secondly, there is increasing social unrest among the masses or followers. Lastly, the emergence of individuals, who comes with the solutions to resolve the issues and brings

prosperity to his/her society or group (Willner, 1984, p. 78). Being the child of the situation of the crisis charismatic leaders has the tendency to become revolutionary leaders within their respective group or societies. Hence, they are enabled and empowered to lead their followers towards the transformation of the traditional values and norms of their groups or societies (Weber, 1978, p. 116). The possibility of the success and influence of the charismatic leadership is more possible in a newly formed or a reformed group/institution on account of the reason that such groups or institutions either have weak or not well established power structure which could have the ability to restrict or challenge the proposed reforms introduced by the charismatic leaders (Grindle, 2007, p. 88).

As far as its utilization in the field of religion and politics is concerned, charismatic leaders play a crucial role in shaping the behavior and actions of the religious political groups and social movements. Scholars have used this theoretical approach in the analysis that how a charismatic leaders have played an important role in the transformation process of the Islamic social and political groups. In their study, they study or prefer non-violent means to violent means to show deradicalization process of Islamic groups in Algeria and Egypt, Ashour (2009) find out that the process is more likely to be successful if the deradicalization project is introduced through the charismatic leaders within these groups. Moreover, he concludes that collective efforts of charismatic leadership having support of other factors such as, employment opportunities and the elimination of state repressions against the Islamists, facilitate the deradicalization process. But the primary factor that helps in transforming the political discourse of religious, social, and political groups from radicalization to moderation one is the role of charismatic leadership (Ashour, 2009).

Despite these positive aspects of charismatic leadership theory, there are some shortfalls of this approach. The scholars who utilize this approach most of the times try to ignore the role that ideas and doctrine play in the emergence of charismatic leadership. There is emphasis on the personal attributes of the individual (charismatic leader) such as, his/her behavior, personality, and rhetorical speeches. It is the primary reasons of their increase followership. It is not the ideological approaches that are significant (Willner, 1984, pp. 58-63). Furthermore, they also ignore to theorize if ideology plays any role in earning the support of their followers. Moreover, the scholars using charismatic leadership theory also ignore to include in their explanations the leaders strategic approaches to achieve their instrumental objectives. The inclusion of various strategies used by the charismatic leaders in order to gain material as well as ideological aims is also required to be included in the theoretical explanation. By involving these factors in the theoretical explanation of charismatic leadership theory, the theory will be in better position to measure and analyze all the preferential goals setup by the religious and political leaders.

2.2.6. Transactional and Transformational Leadership Theory

The credit goes to J.V Downton who categorized the transactional and transformational leaderships into two categories in 1973 (Downton, 1973). However, James Macgregor Burns presented an in depth analysis and theorization of the concepts in 1979 in his seminal work on leadership. In his study, he identified two types of leadership transactional as well as transformational. Transactional leader is the leader who gains and ensures the loyalties of his/her followers through rewards and incentives. On the other hand the transformational leader is as the one who tries to resolve the basic needs of the followers. Burns' introduction of transactional and transformational leadership categories provided new paradigm in the leadership studies. Prior to this introduction, the leadership studies are mostly conducted under the charismatic leadership

theory. The introduction of these two categories provided a new framework for the students of leadership. In his explanation of transformational leadership, he defines it as a two way process. Both leaders and followers motivate and raise each other to a high level of morality and goals. Furthermore, transformational leaders set high objectives, values, and goals to motivate the followers' leaders themselves observe and follow those values they use their charisma to attract their followers to do so (Burns, 1979). Burns' work in the field of the leadership is considered as the cornerstone in the development of leadership studies as a new area. The concept of transactional and transformational leadership was further explained by Bernard Bass (1985). He was greatly influenced by the work of Burns. Bass came up with his explanation that both these categories are of the same continuum which should not be categorized separately (Bass, 1985).

2.2.6.1. Transactional Leadership Theory

Transactional leadership as a concept was first mentioned in the socio-economic conceptualization by Max Weber in his work. His explanation of the concept (transactional leaders) was later on accepted by the experts and scholars in the field after the publication of his work posthumously (Weber, 1947). In the light of James M. Burns explanation of transactional leadership, B. Bass identifies two basic elements necessary in transactional type of leadership situation, and behavior. Both help in building relationship between leader and his followers in which each one gets something from the other. In transactional leadership, the factor which built the relationship among the leader and the follower is the principle of exchange. The followers know that they would reward for their performances after achieving of certain standards. On the other hand, leaders use the tools of punishments and rewards to motive their followers. Transactional leadership is a type of traditional approach as they want to maintain status quo. According to Bass, the explanation of transactional type of leadership can last for a short time of

period. It can only last for long if the leaders have the ability to adapt to the changing circumstances (Bass & Avolio, 1993).

In transactional leadership model, the power of the leaders comes from the authority, and from responsibility they possess in their organization/group. The duties of the followers are to follow and obey the orders, instructions, and ideas of their leader. Followers are rewarded and punished by their leader on the basis of their performance in the given task. The relationship between the leader and the followers is based upon the following three principles. First and foremost, the followers may possibly receive rewards if he/she is successful in achieving the goals assigned to them. Secondly, the role of the leader in transactional leadership is more of monitoring on their followers' activities. They observe the level of efficiency and inefficiency of their followers in the accomplishment of their task. Lastly, the level of engagement from the leaders side is passive one; they only participate when the standards of the work matches (Smith, 2014).

In short, in transactional leadership, the directives and orders of the leaders are strictly followed by their followers. The followers are motivated and feared by the leaders through the tools of rewards and punishment. The attachment and motivation of the followers are not of personal but rather controlled by their leaders. In transactional leadership, the principle of rationality dominates the principle of emotion. In the discussion above, transactional leadership is based upon the principle in which followers are motivated and controlled by the tools of rewards and punishment. Furthermore, leaders follow the patterns of set policies and traditions. They use a narrow approach and do not encourage, support, or promote new ideas and process of transformation within their respective organizations. Transactional leadership approach is successful in those organizations or groups which have limited, and clearly defined tasks (Bass, 1985). The nature of the leader in this approach is inflexible and any effort of transformation is a

difficult task to achieve. On the basis it becomes the personal characteristic of the leaders and their organizational culture to resist and accept any possible effort towards the transformation both on individual as well as organizational level.

2.2.6.2. Transformational Leadership Theory

Earlier the, leadership approach was covered and explained under the framework of charismatic leadership theory. J.M Burns (1979) was the first one to devise the framework of its own for the transformational leadership in his analysis of two types of leaderships transactional as well as transformational leadership. He made fundamental distinction between both types of leadership styles. In his analysis of transformational leadership, he concludes that the basic purpose of the transformational leaders is to transform the traditional values, patterns, and aims of their respective organization by introducing new innovative ideas that encourage the intensity in the follower commitment towards their organization. It also helps in the overall growth of their organization or group (Burns, 1979). Furthermore, he explains transformational leader the one who identifies and recognizes the needs and requirements of their followers. The leader articulates his ideas in such a way that they meet the needs and demands of their followers. As a result, the inclusion of followers as partners in the process of leaders' decisions helps in developing a mutual relationship between leaders and followers. This whole process transforms followers into leaders and leaders become as a moral agents (Burns, 1979).

Similarly, another prominent figure in the field of leadership studies is B Bass (1985, 1993) who is greatly influenced by the work of J.M Burns. He highlighted four key elements of transformational leadership based upon moral foundation. First is charisma. It is considered a necessary element for transformational leadership. The leader is perceived in the group as an

ideal, confident, and a role model. He helps in giving motivation, and is a pride to their followers as they believe, in crisis situations, their leader is the savior. Besides, charismatic features Transformational leader also help in increasing loyalty, faith, and trust among their followers about their leaders. Another element is motivation through inspiration Transformational leaders do their efforts to inspire and motivate their followers in order to implement their ideas and achieve their set goals. They build an attractive future scenario by using their intellectual abilities, emotional rhetoric, arguments, and symbols (religious and political) to motivate their followers to accept their proposed vision with full loyalty, commitment, and optimism. Bass argues that leaders provide an interesting vision of the future and set high principles of values and standards for their followers and motivate them that such vision can be achieved (Bass, 1985; Bass & Avolio, 1993). Third element is intellectual stimulation. In the light of which the leader attempts to develop a new approach based upon the creativity and innovative perspective that explain the vision of the leader. Lastly, they must have the element of individual consideration to provide support to their followers both socially and politically so that they may remain focused on the cause of organization and their leader's vision.

In transformational leadership approach, leaders are like mentors as they council, educate, help in grooming the abilities and aspirations of their followers. They listen carefully to the demands and needs of their followers (Burns, 1979). The success of transformational leader is measured when leaders are able to increase the interests of their followers, create the sense of awareness among them, build the nature of acceptance for the vision, and when the group/organization interests are prioritized then the individual interest. To build such spirits within their follower the leader must have charisma, and moral authority within their organization to successfully inspire their followers emotionally and intellectually (Bass & Avolio, 1993). The leaders who know how

to make balance between the short term approach, solutions for the present issues and long term approach, the vision of transformation are considered as the transformational leaders. The successful transformation of their respective organization/ political party is final test of transformational leadership. It require the skills of the creation of the vision and building of coalition which is to involve other members including members and followers of their organization/political party (Kotter, 1996). The success of transformational leader is measured through leaders' abilities to increase the interests of their followers, create the sense of awareness among them, build the nature of acceptance for the vision, and to prioritize the group/organization interests as well as the individual interests. To inculcate such spirits within their followers, the leader must have charisma, and moral authority to successfully inspire their followers both emotionally and intellectually (Bass, 1985).

The leaders who know how to make balance between the short term approach (solutions for the present issues) and long term approach (the vision of transformation) are considered as the transformational leaders. The successful transformation of their respective organization/ political party is the final test of transformational leadership. It requires the skills for the creation of the vision and building of coalition to involve other members including members and followers of their organization/political party transformational leaders approach towards transformation is step by step. These steps include the establishment of urgency within their organization, the creation of a vision, the promotion and communication of that vision, earning the support of the followers to accept the vision, making short term arrangements, and finally the institutionalization of their vision within their organization (Burns, 1979).

The reason behind transformational leadership belief is to work in collaboration rather than work individually as this whole process of transformation is a complex process which requires leaders

collective approach based on leadership vision, his courage, will to share his thoughts and listen to the thoughts of their followers, and openness towards followers' point of views and respect the values being observed by their followers. This ultimately results in building of a mutual cooperation between the leader and his followers. It also helps in raising the level of morality and motivation between them. Burns has noted that it is better to work in collaboration than work individual (Burns, 1979). Both Burns and Bass have worked extensively on the subject of leadership especially on the transactional and transformational leadership approach. Burns, who categorizes transactional and transformational leadership, is of the opinion that both these styles of leadership are completely two different types of leadership styles. A leader might be transactional or transformational in his/her approach. However, B Bass opines differently. He believes that transactional or transformational approaches are two different aspects or dimensions of the leadership. A leader may be simultaneously transactional as well as transformational (Burns, 1979; Bass, 1985). A majority of the present leadership scholars are in line with the Bass explanation of the concept.

Burns define three basic characteristics of transformational leaders which help in drawing demarcation between transactional and transformational leadership. These characteristics as follow: purpose, morality, and time framework. He explains that one should be careful in defining the leadership styles with regard to individual personalities and to their purpose. By citing the example of Adolf Hitler (1933-1945), who transformed Germany in 1930s, do not qualify under the category of transformational leader as his purpose and path towards transformation was immoral. Hence, Burns labels such leaders as pseudo-transformational leaders. Morality, according to Burns, is one of the key characteristics of transformational leaders. Furthermore, in his explanation of the term, he considers it a two way process in which

leaders and followers engage in such a way that both raise the level of their respective motivation and morality towards the cause of transformation (Burns, 1979). Besides, the role of leaders, in transformational leadership approach, followers are also allowed to perform certain tasks independently regarding the issues in which they (followers) have skills. It is different from the transactional leadership style where followers are not allowed to work independently. According to Burns' explanation, it can be concluded that transformational leaders have more potential to produce social change as compared to the transactional leaders as the goals of the former are more ambitious, and followers are community oriented (Burns, 1979). Transactional leadership style is more of an autocratic style. It is successful in an organization where followers are inexperienced and they lack the element of responsibility. On the other hand, the transformational leadership has democratic approach as followers are engaged in the process of decision-making. They are independent, and are allowed to add their inputs which not only help in the progress of their organization but also in the creation of new vision for their organization. The conceptualization of transformational leadership in this study is as, a devotedly followed leader, who possesses intellectual authority as well as charisma. Utilizing these features, he develops the relationship of influence on his followers and on the basis of this relationship of influence, he presents new ideas to make real changes in the organizational structure and ideational framework of his political party in this case religious political party. This process results in transforming their political party from a theologically conservative to a moderate and progressive political party.

2.4. Theoretical Framework

The main purpose of this research is to highlight those conditions which help in making Islamic religious political parties to transform into a progressive and modern outlook. This study

develops its argument based upon the following questions. First and foremost, what are the reasons which compel these political groups to transform their outlook from a revivalist theological orientation to a moderate religious and political approach? This approach support the argument that attempts to find out compatibility between Islam and modern western ideas of democracy, human rights, and a pluralist approach toward religion? Secondly, what is the role of leadership in the introduction and implementation of these ideas within their respective political group? Lastly, what are the conditions that help facilitate the efforts of the leader in successfully transforming the religious and political orientation of their political party and what are the conditions under which the process of transformation may not occur?

As the primary focus of this study is to analyze the role and efforts of the leaders in the process of transformation, hence, the theoretical framework of this study is based upon the transformational leadership theory. The theory emphasizes on the role of ideas and awareness about the task as an important factor to motivate followers to bring about transformation. As far as the religious political parties are concerned a reformed religious and political ideas the leaders present and attempt to create awareness about those ideas among the followers of the party are the key determinants in the successful process of religious and political transformation of the religious political party. In the light of this assumption of the theory, I argue that the transformational leadership, in these groups, also uses ideational preferences in the transformation process. They articulate and present these ideas to their followers and earn their support for the implementation and institutionalization of these ideas within their respective parties. The leadership and followers believe that these are the most viable solution to the challenges and problems their parties are confronting with in the socio-political sphere of their country. Moreover, they also believe that these reformed ideas also have the potential that would

ultimately, transform the theological and political orientation of their political party. The process of reconstruction is taking place in these religious political parties during this process of the introduction and implementation of new ideas of the leaders. This study suggests that the success or failure of the process of transformation in the religious political parties is determined by the relations among human agents (transformational leaders), structure (organizational culture of the party and socio-political of the country as a whole) and ideational preferences (ideational approach of the party towards new ideas). Hence, transformational leadership theory provides a suitable framework to explain the role of leaders in the transformation process of the religious political parties.

The transformational leadership theory contains some elements of social constructivism theory of rational choice theory and of charismatic leadership theory which had been explained in detail in the previous section. Transformational leadership theory suggests that ideas are the key driving force in bringing about any change in the outlook of an organization. Similarly, social constructivists also have the opinion that introduction of new ideas is the causative determinant in the theological reorientation of religious (Islamic) group both social and political. In this study, the researcher argues that the reformed religious and political ideas of the transformational leaders are the first step towards the process of transformation of their respective political party. They promote these ideas on different platforms of their party and attempt to implement and institutionalize these ideas in the organizational structure of their respective party. Moreover, they firmly believe that these ideas are the most viable solution for the challenges their parties confronted with both socially and politically. Moreover, these transformational leaders also have charisma and theological expertise to motivate and earn the support of their followers and

members of the party which further facilitate the job of transformational leader. As a result of this whole process, theological and political reconstructions of their IPPs result.

Although the presence of transformational leadership is an important factor in the introduction of these reformed ideas but the successful transformation process also needs the support of organizational culture (structural factors), some kind of rational measures, and ideational framework (ideational factor). Both transformational leaders and their followers use various means in order to maximize the support for their reformed ideas in their organizational power structure and also outside for their organization. They try to build consensus within their own ranks and also make alliances with the other religious and political actors of their respective country. Sometimes, they also use coercive measures to restrict the opposing voices against their reformed project either to expel them from their respective ranks in the organization or to give them some material interests.

In short, the ultimate aim of the transformational leaders is to change the ideological outlook of their respective political party from former traditional outlook to modern one which has the potential to deal with the changing trends and demands of their society. However, both the leaders and their followers use various strategies to achieve this long term objective. For instance, they take short term measures based upon compromises and concessions to ensure smooth path towards transformation. Despite these compromises and concessions, both leaders and followers focus on their objective that is to implement and institutionalize their reformed ideas within the institutional structure of their organization. Although, transformational leadership is an important factor in the process of theological transformation of the IPPs, but it is not the only factor as these leaders have to encounter various constraints both internal and external in this whole process of transformation. Internally they have to encounter the opposing

conservative voices from within their own ranks. This opposing faction (conservatives/traditionalists) did not want to replace organization's traditionalist and conservative stance and resist the liberal and progressive ideas promoted by the transformational leader. Besides, these internal threats transformational leaders also have to encounter the criticisms and resistance of other religious and political actors of their respective countries. Because those religious actors believes that by the introduction of these reform ideas in one religious group might have a snow ball impact on other religious groups and they might lose their authoritarian grip within their own organization. Whereas, the other political parties criticize the reform project of transformational leaders out of the fear that these reforms might increase the political sphere of the religious political party and they have to divide their vote bank with them. These challenges confronted to the transformational leaders can be successfully overcome once the organization has a tolerant institutional culture and liberal ideational approach.

2.4. Islamism/Political Islam: An Explanation and Conceptualization

The predominant approach that explains Islamism/Political Islam is concerned with, any social and political groups/organizations/political parties that use the reference of Islam as a source of inspiration for their actions are labeled with different phrases like Islamic fundamentalists, Islamists, Islamic traditionalists, and radical Islamists. These terms explain different variants of social, political and extremist organizations across the Muslim World. However, like all other phenomena, Political Islam/Islamism also went through various evolutionary processes and took different shapes. This is the reason that like any other phenomena, a standard or precise definition for the term it is hard to find. It is a universal practice that academicians conceptualize the terms on the basis how the politicians and the media use such terms in the context of both for

and against. As far as the importance of the concept of Islamism/Political Islam is concerned, it started in the period 1970s and 1980s (Kramer, 2003). The occurrence of Iranian Revolution in 1979 was considered as the first practical expression of Islamism. The revolution inspired various religious social and political movements all over the Muslim World. Moreover, it was also for first time that Islamism/Political Islam got currency especially in the political discourse in the West as it had the potential to pose threat to the Westernization process. In order to encounter this threat, Western scholars and academicians responded quickly and started to alert their policy makers to counter this emerging phenomenon. For this purpose, various conferences were held to understand and explain this emerging phenomenon. The word ‘fundamentalism’ was coined to explain Islamism /Political Islam and with the passage of time transformed into Islamic fundamentalism. However, the usage of this term has been largely criticized by various Muslim democrats, religious scholars, and various observers in the field (Kramer, 2003). Before conceptualization of the term in this study, the explanation of the different aspects of the phenomenon is necessary. As a political phenomenon a generalize explanation came from M. Ayoob (2008). He conceptualizes this as political phenomenon as any mobilization of the masses in the name of the religion Islam (Ayoob, 2008). However, his explanation is generalized. Similarly, a question is who should be considered as an Islamist. In this regard, Fuller (2004) asserts that, an individual who believes in the implementation of the Quran and Traditions, thinks both as important factors for the development of the Muslim society and its governance (Fuller, 2004). Similarly, Rachid Ghannouchi’s explanation of Islamic movement is also based upon the comprehensive approach of Islamism (el-Fatih, 2005).

Despite the fact that the concept of Political Islam/Islamism is labeled as the response of Islamists to counter the emerging trends of westernization and modernization within their

societies, Islamism/Political Islam itself shares a complex nature of relationship with modernity. Under the traditional and conservative approach modernity has been considered by Islamists as the basic factor that has caused societal decadency among the Muslims. On the other hand, the technological advancement of modernity has not only been accepted but also utilized by the Islamic groups both social and political. It is an irony that one aspect of the ideology is demonized while the other is not only accepted but also utilized.

Islamism as an ideology by itself is the product of modernity. A question is raised how? It emerged as the religious and political leadership of the Muslims came up with an alternative approach in order to reply to the socio-political developments of the West. They built theory based on the Islamic principles with the purpose to develop the Muslims politically and socially. Although they labeled it as an Islamic but they had incorporated the Western socio-political norms in their approach (Roy, 1994, p. 3). Islamism, as an ideology, worked as a modernizing agent in transforming the traditionalist and conservative societies in the Muslim World. With colonialism, the societies of the Muslims became acquainted with the modern socio-political trends of the West. As a result, social political organizations, political activism, mass mobilization, protests techniques all these gave birth to the emergence of new intellectual ideas. Consequently, new public sphere had been established. Religious organizations were in the forefront to adopt these trends. The leaders and the members of the religious organizations attracted a religiously inspired mass toward their organizations through their rhetoric and persuasive speeches (Fuller, 2004).

During the same era, printing press was introduced in these societies. This increased public awareness about the diverse interpretations of the religious texts as well as political ideas in the Modern World. Prior to these developments, religious scholars were in majority. They were the

sole sources to interpret religious and social issues of the community. Both secularists and traditionalists used print medium to increase their sphere of influence. Both these schools of thoughts started to present their own interpretations of religious and political issues confronted to their societies. As a result, they succeeded to earn the support of their respective masses. Moreover, they succeeded to break the monopoly of the *Ulema's* over the religion and gave opportunity and legitimacy to the educated/knowledgeable people of the community (Chamkhi, 2015, p. 29).

Islamism was being promoted as an inclusive ideology and was presented as alternative to the competing ideologies of secularism and Westernization (democratization). Islamism model sought to establish the governance of Sharia. Keeping in view, its inclusive approach, it covers the social, economic, religious, and political aspects of the society. The Islamists believed that that the relationship of religion and politics in Islam coexisted since its time of emergence. Consequently, they concluded that nature of Islamic movements and organizations could be explained in that context of Islam that it had been emerged as a religion as well as a socio-political movement. This inclusive approach is significantly observed in Hassan al-Banna's conceptualization of Islamism. He was of the view that Islam was the system that covered all the aspects of life consisting of social, economic, cultural, moral, and the governance of the society (Patrick, 2010). He promoted and supported the gradualism approach, and overstretched the political and religious spheres of Islam

2.4.1. Conceptualization of Islamism/Political Islam

This study analyses the explanations made by the scholars who use essentialist and culturalists' frameworks with reference to Political Islam. These scholars build their argument on a narrow,

parsimonious and generalized approach based upon the framework which they use to analyze the behavior of the radical and extremist organizations in the Muslim World. The very approach is stretched to explain all the IPPs and social movements as a whole in Muslim World. Their main argument is based upon the principle that all Islamic groups both social and political have identical aims that is the implementation of Sharia Law in their respective states through any means available either violent, social, or political. However, this study suggests that there exist a wide range of diversities in their origins, local cultures, theological interpretations, political objectives and strategies in the IPPs. Furthermore, the study also utilizes the arguments of the scholars who use the framework of former rational choice theorists, who have conceptualized the parties that use religion (Islam) as a tool to achieve their instrumental interests and material objectives after acquiring the control of the state machinery. As far as the explanation of social constructivist scholars are concerned, they are somehow in line with the argument built in this study that is, the role of structural factors including the role of culture and traditions, religious identity in the decision making process of the IPPs.

Nevertheless, the introduction of these ideas needs the presence of transformational leadership in the IPPs who present these ideas before followers and the party members. It is with their support, he/she implements and institutionalizes these ideas within the organizational structure of his/her respective political party. The leaders and their followers promote these ideas as the most viable solutions to the challenges that their party and society are confronting with. This effort of the leader that transforms the theological and political orientation of the IPPs under the rational choice theory is labeled as the struggle for material interests and strategic adjustments. Religious identities and theological interpretations are the major determining factors in shaping the political actions of the IPPs. At the same time, it also affects these IPPs on account of these

political actions. They are judged and criticized by their political opponents, society, and even sometimes are victimized by the state authorities on account of their political beliefs/actions which are being discussed in detail in the following chapters. The leadership within these political parties makes these adjustments in order to encounter these challenges. These are the factors which the rational choice theorists failed to discuss while explaining the overall developments within IPPs.

This study also suggests that a wide range of diversity exists in the ideological and political foundation of the IPPs. Moreover, they also use different techniques to achieve their ideological and political objectives. For instance, some of the IPPs do want to establish in the state system based upon the principles of Islamic Law (Sharia Law). However, this necessarily does not mean that they want to achieve it through violent means and do not want to work under the political settings of their respective country to establish their aims. On the contrary, there are also IPPs who want greater role of Islam in the society, but they do not support or endorse the idea to implement Islamic Law as the law of the state. Rather they support the secular identity of the state under which religious freedom and equality are ensured to everyone. Moreover, these groups also support the liberal and Western democratic principles of human rights under which religious identity is considered as the private entity of the individual. Besides, religious beliefs should not be the reason to curtail the political and social rights of any individual. These different approaches of the IPPs with respect to religion and politics resulted in the emergence of diverse varieties of theological interpretations and legal frameworks in Political Islam. Consequently, this whole process gave birth to two schools of thoughts, revivalist and conservative IPPs on one side and liberal and moderate IPPs on the other.

The revivalist and conservative IPPs use the interpretations of religious text on traditional patterns. They believe that the solution lies in the implementation and institutionalization of Islamic Law for all social and political problems of the Muslims. Despite this belief, these IPPs are not static as they make some adjustments according to their domestic needs (local cultures, and traditions). However, they do not compromise on the principle of the implementation of Islamic Law on the state level. Besides, those IPPs which follow the liberal and moderate approach towards religion and politics, believe in the pluralist interpretation of religious texts. The theological foundation as well as the legal jurisprudence of Islamic thoughts and the Western socio-political thoughts including democratic norms, liberal human rights principles, and independence among individual are synthesized under this approach. The synthesis goes through continuous process of reinterpretations and reformation to address the challenges they confront with. The leaders articulate their ideas in these groups promote them with the support of their followers. Besides, these ideas are institutionalize and implemented in the organization with the support of their followers and organizational structure. These ideas in turn transform the ideational belief of their respective political group. In this study, the liberal and moderate approach of the IPPs towards Political Islam is used to measure the process of transformation within such political groups. In the opinion of the researcher, the IPPs with such approach are more likely to be transformed successfully as they are open to articulate and implement the reformed ideas within their organizational structure as compared to those IPPs that have revivalist and conservative approach.

2.5. Explanation of Hypotheses

The basic purpose of this study is to highlight the possibility of change within the Islamic Political Parties. The hypotheses, for this study, are based upon the three basic factors that are

required for the process of successful transformation within the Islamic Political Parties as well as to analyze this process of change or transformation. The factors included are human agents (transformational leaders and their followers), structural (tolerant organizational culture of the party), and ideational (liberal ideational framework). The analysis of this study is based upon the following three hypotheses. First hypothesis of the study suggests that, “the process of transformation within an Islamic Political Party from a conservative theological outlook to a moderate and pluralist theological and political outlook requires the presence of transformational leader within that political party. Through their intellectual capability as well as charismatic attributes they not only compel their followers but also the other member of the party to support the ideas they are promoting. These reformed ideas of the transformational leader articulate the future preferential choices made by their party.”

In an Islamic Political Party, transformational leader also need to have moral authority, intellectual expertise of the theological norms, and charismatic attributes that enable them to introduce new reformed theological and political ideas. Furthermore, it also helps not only in earning the support of their followers but also in overcoming the opposing voices within their organizational structure. The research attempts to measure either leadership is transformational or vice versa in Islamic political party. First and foremost, the leader must be recognized as theological expert in Islamic jurisprudence not only within his party but also in a society. This feature is measured in the preceding. The educational background of the leader that he earns from either a religious institution or any other educational institution is significant to mention. Secondly, the scholarship of the leader with respect to his writings and commentaries in the field of religion and politics is another yard stick to measure his intellectual capabilities. Besides, the transformational leader should also have the moral authority that is earned either through

genealogical link of the leader with party (he might be the founding father himself or may be his forefathers had been remained), or through his personal character, and contributions to the party.

Besides, intellectual capabilities, and moral authority transformational leaders also need to have charismatic attributes that helps them while, convincing their followers and other members of their party that the reformed ideas they are promoting are the most viable solutions for the challenges their party as well as society are faced with. The charismatic leader has the following features. He must have an attractive personality, good communication skills so that he might be able to present and promote his new ideas in such a way that could earn him the support of his followers as well as the members of the party. Moreover, the transformational leaders also must have to be a good listener to the opposing voices against their transformation process. They build consensus through debates and discussions with the members of their party. By utilizing all these attributes, transformational leaders introduce new ideas and try to institutionalize and implement these ideas in the organizational structure of their political party with the support of their followers.

The presence of transformational leadership is an essential condition to successfully transform the theological and political orientation of the political party formerly famous as conservative or traditionalist approach to a moderate or pluralist one. Nonetheless, it is not the only condition required for the successful transformation process. Transformational leader and his followers have to encounter various constraints in order to achieve their objectives. The other members of their very political party challenge their transformation process within the party out of ideological as well as instrumental reasons. Ideologically, the transformation process is challenged as the opposing faction believes that first and foremost, the reformed ideas promoted by the transformational leader and their followers are contradictory to the traditions of Islamic

teachings and are influenced by the western social and political thoughts. Secondly, they also have fear that they would pollute the ideological foundation of their organization/party. On the instrumental level the opposing faction in the party considered it as a threat to their influence and authoritarianism, within the party decision-making process. Besides, with these internal factors, there are also some external factors that also play their role in order to blocking the transformational leader's path toward transformation. These external factors consisted of the state machinery religious, social, and political actors who resist this change. They are of the fear that this might not result in the increase of the sphere of influence of that very religious political party.

In the presence of transformational leadership the success of transformation also need the support of the structural element. It is the pro-reforms culture within the organizational structure of the Islamic Political Party that provides support. The second hypothesis of the study, is concerned with "the process of transformation promoted by transformational leader within an Islamic Political Party has more chances of success if it has the pro-reforms organizational culture that is open to accept and implement new theological and political ideas in the institutional structure of their party as compared to those groups that has intolerant organizational culture towards new ideas and thoughts". The organizational culture of the IPPs is the structural factor that might help in facilitation or resist the process of transformation initiated by the transformational leader. To understand the history of organizational culture with respect to new ideas is an important factor as it helps to conclude that either the party has the tendency towards inclusion and institutionalization of new reformed ideas or they reject such ideas labeling them nothing more than mere unconventional innovations.

The level of acceptance towards new theological and political ideas within IPPs is different. Some of the key determinants that influence the theological interpretations of IPPs consists local culture, traditions, and customs within the party and in the society as a whole. As a result, some of the IPPs as an organization might consider certain theological interpretations and political ideas in line with the Islamic framework whereas others consider the same interpretations and ideas contradictory with the teachings of Islam. This study suggests that a pro-reformed organizational culture within the IPPs facilitate the job of transformational leaders to transform the theological and political orientation of their respective political party as compared to those IPPs that have intolerant organizational culture towards any transformative ideas. The tolerance level of the IPPs is measured by the fact that how much accommodative as an organization/political group is to the new theological and political ideas. Its behavior operates within to extremes that are free support and complete resistance approach. Historically, in IPPs two different approaches towards transformation have been emerged in the IPPs. First approach consists of the groups which are open to accept the fusion of Islamic thoughts and the Western political thoughts. Second approach consists of the groups which have revivalist tendencies. The IPPs consists of this group reject any individual innovations that are not mentioned in the texts of the Quran and of Traditions. This study suggests that the IPPs that have the former approach are more likely to successfully transform.

In short, the discussion on the organizational culture within the IPPs attempts to pinpoint that an organization either support or oppose the process of transformation. Some IPPs have the culture of accommodating new theological ideas. Its members and followers accept and support the process of transformation initiated by the transformational leaders. The leaders might not face serious resistance from the organizational structure of the party. On the contrary, the

transformational leader may struggle or even fail to successfully implement and institutionalize their reformed ideas within the IPPs that as an organization have the culture to resist new theological ideas and interpretations.

The third and last hypothesis of this study addresses the ideational factor involved in the process of transformation. It assumes that, “the successful transformation of the IPPs requires the ideational element along with the human agent (transformational leader) as well as structural factor (pro-reforms culture within organization). The IPPs that have the capability to accept and incorporate new theological and political ideas on organizational as well as on individual level (followers), have the potential to transform successfully. In contrast, the IPPs as compare to those that are not open to inculcate new theological and political ideas”. Ideational choice is the key driving force to determine the preferential choices made by the political parties and leaders. Moreover, it also helps in contextualizing and increasing the credibility of transformational leader. The observance of this ideational preference results to facilitate the purpose of transformational leaders to transform the ideological outlook of their respective IPPs. The main purpose of the introduction and promotion of these ideational preferences is as is believed by the leaders that on organizational level, these ideas have the potential of making their respective IPPs compatible with the modern patterns of democracy and with religious tolerance. Moreover, it is also believed that the implementation of these reformed ideas would also help address the socio-economic and political crisis of their respective societies.

2.6. Conclusion

To sum up, the transformational leaders use a mechanism to promote their ideas. It is explain in the given link. They initiate and promote new theological and political ideas through the

interpretations of the religious texts and through academic writings in order to synthesize modern political ideas and Islam. They try to convince their followers and members through their respective charismatic status, theological, and political expertise in order to implement those ideas in the institutional structure of their respective political party. They use different platforms that consist of sermons, meetings, and media sources for the promotion of their respective reforms ideas. As a result, it helps these leaders to have the support of the potential followers in their favor. Consequently, the organization is bound to incorporate the demands of the transformational leader.

Chapter: Three

Ennahda and Rachid Ghannouchi Path to Transformation

3.1. Introduction

This chapter attempts to analyze the process of successful transformation in the Islamic political party Ennahda of Tunisia. Like any other Islamic Political Party, Ennahda too started purely as a religious organization like any other religious political party. It transformed its orientation from traditionalism to conservatism through the process of evolution. In the end it adopted a complete liberal and progressive outlook by proclaiming a complete separation of religion and politics. It is a case of successful transformation in this study. The key driver in this successful transformation of Ennahda is the trilateral cooperation among the transformational leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi (human agent), the pro-reform organizational culture (structural factor) and the liberal ideational nature (ideational factor). Three interlinked variables I argued and further substantiate by empirical evidence that helped in the successful transformation of Ennahda from a traditionalist and conservative approach to a progressive and more liberal one.

As a matter of fact, leadership is the key factor in any transformation process but as far as religious political parties are concerned, a leader must have charisma as well as moral authority to bring about any change. Moreover, such attributes it provide assistance to the leaders while changing the outlook of their respective political party according to the modern patterns of politics. Ennahda successful transformation is evident when we analyze its history since its inception. As an organization it continuously went through the process of evolution time and again it in its thirty six years of history. It has made ideological adjustments according to the need of the time. The organization started purely on religious grounds in the name of the Islamic

Tendency Movement (MTI) in 1981. Its aim was to implement *Sharia* on individual as well as state level i.e. the Islamization of Tunisia. However, the regime change from Habib Bourgiba (1956-1987) to Ben Ali (1989-2011) in Tunisia resulted in not only brought about change in its name from MTI to Ennahda but also transformed its political agenda from fundamentalism to conservatism so that it may become eligible for contesting election in the then regime of Ben Ali.

The second and major ideological shift in Ennahda came after the Arab Spring. The Post-Arab Spring political scenario compelled Ennahda to completely denounce its slogan of the struggle of *Sharia* and the establishment of Islamic State. Furthermore, it proclaimed the separation religion from politics in the 10th grand party convention held on 20th May, 2016. Rachid Ghannouchi rationalized this separation as he and majority of his party members believed that there was no need of political Islam in Tunisia. They supported the concept of Tunisification rather than of Islamization. Besides, on the basis of this official separation of religion and politics, they openly announced that mosques or any other religious place should not be used for any political purposes. Although a large number of Ennahda members of the legislative assembly *Imams* in the mosques but they were directed by the party to surrender one post in the light of this declaration. Ennahda after its tenth convention in 2016 turned into a complete liberal political party. However, the foundation of this transformation process had roots in 1990s when it started taking part in the political process.

This chapter deals with the successful transformation process of Ennahda from a conservative political party to a moderate and liberal one. Besides the role of state repressions in the process of transformation in the political orientation of Ennahda, the focus of this study is to analyze the role of Rachid Ghannouchi and his transformational leadership features. It also looks into detail the pro-reform organizational structure as well as liberal ideational framework contributions in

the successful transformation of Ennahda from conservative political party to a moderate and liberal one.

3.2. Political Developments in Tunisia and the Role of Leadership: An Analysis

Geographically, the present day Tunisia is considered to be a bridge that links the Arab *Maghreb* and *Mashriq* (West and East). Besides, linking the Western and Eastern Arabs, it is also labeled as the crossroads, among Europe, Africa and Middle East. Tunisia historically through Mediterranean Sea has always attracted the attention of the conquerors as well as of the visitors on account of its geostrategic location. The Roman Empire conquered the region and established its rule for almost five hundred years till the Muslims in the 7th century took the region. As a result, the local Berber population of the region converted to the religion of Islam. The region remained under the Muslims rule till the late 19th century. It was in the year 1881 when the region came under the French Colonial Rule (LaVerle and Rinehart 1987, 79).

The present day boundaries of Tunisia are the same as it was under the rule Hafside Dynasty (1229-1574). It came under the direct rule of Ottoman Empire in the leadership of Barbarboosa Hoyreddin Pasha (1538-1571) Ottoman rule was replaced by the emergence of Muradi Beys (1675-1705). The last of the royal families' rule was of Husanid Beys (1705-1881) which had lasted till the French takeover in 1881. Muradi and Husnaid Beys dynasties were both self-governing in allegiance to Ottoman Caliphate. They maintained close ties with the Caliphate throughout their period of reign. During this whole period of limited autonomy they established the relations that are considered the first friendly relationship among the Arab World (Abun-Nasr, 1987, pp. 2-5).

The French Colonial Era (1881-1956) lasted for 75 years had far reaching impacts on Tunisian society socially as well as politically. A faction was existed who strongly condemned those colonial values. However, by and large, French were successful in indoctrinating their thoughts and values in the local Tunisians especially in the urban population. Besides, French role in the introduction of these liberal values among the locals historically Tunisia itself has remained liberal and progressive country in the Arab World. The empirical evidence in support of such claims slavery can be quoted. As a matter of fact, it was abolished in Tunisia in 1846 two years prior to France and nineteen years earlier than US (Stepan, 2012).

3.2.1. Post-Colonial Political Developments in Tunisia, and Leadership Role

Since its independence in 1956 till the emergence of the Arab-Spring of 2010, Tunisia is governed by the two strong Presidents, Habib Bourgiba (1956-1987) and Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011). The policies of the State almost remained the same during both these authoritarian rulers. The era of Bourgiba stood for the policy of assertive secularism. As a result, state successfully kept religion under its control both on governmental level as well as in public sphere (Kuru, 2013). Bourgiba successfully detached himself and his state from the concept of *Ummah* and Pan-Arabism which were the popular slogan and ideologies at that time in the Arab World and was on the rise. He chose the other side and focused on consolidation of Tunisian nationalism. He tried to establish Tunisian version of Islam under the project of Tunisification (Khalil, 2012).

3.2.2 Bourgiba Era (1956-87), and Assertive Secularism

To rebuild country after independence is a daunting task and was how Bourgiba was faced with challenges in post-independence period. He opted to build Tunisia on the pattern of his colonial

masters (France). His attention was on the implementation of the Tunisification project. The major aim of the project was to build Tunisia as a unique society not only in the Arab world but also as a model for the whole Muslim World. To achieve his aim, he devised his own version of Islam while utilizing state apparatus to impose upon the Tunisians. However, Bourgiba project got mixed reaction. Some idealized his idea while other considered it to be radical (Salem, 1984). He derived his inspiration of secularization/laicism from Turkish and French models. Both models strictly denunciate the role of religion in state as well as in public life. Furthermore, the implementation of such thoughts earns him the support of foreign powers. His promoters and supporters acknowledged him and his project and said that flourished in education and tourism sectors. They also have the claim that the status of women was improved during his era (Allani, 2009).

He started to marginalize the role of religion after independence in order to achieve his aims of tunisification. He implemented the Code of Personal Status (CPS) in 1956. It was based on the patterns of western family laws and was unique in the whole Arab World (Torelli, 2012, pp. 67-68). He imposed limitation on religious teachings in schools and allowed such teachings for one hour a week in wake of minimizing the policy of following the role of religion. Furthermore, it was made mandatory for school teachers to be fluent in Arabic and French languages. The basic purpose behind this action was to curtail the role of Zaytouna Mosque graduates and teachers in the education setup of Tunisia. The funds of Zaytouna Mosque were cutoff and all its education activities were strictly restricted. Moreover, mosques were confined to prayers only. Those were the prior measures taken by Bourgiba's administration to eliminate the role of religion from political and social spheres of Tunisia (Chamkhi, 2015, pp. 104-105).

The termination and dismantling of Zaytouna Mosque activities, which was a centuries old traditional institution of religious education is considered to be the reason for the emergence Political Islam in Tunisia. These restrictions and bans resulted in direct clash between Ulemas and Sheikhs. Bourgiba himself humiliated and made fun of the students of Zaytouna by calling them publically the followers of outdated version of Islam. However, Ghannouchi compared them with the soldiers of defeated Army. Further under his tunisification project Bourgiba spoke on the holy month of *Ramdhan* (the month of fasting). It was in 1960, in his public speech, he announced that work rather than any religious obligation should be the top priority of the Tunisians. He was of the opinion that the working efficiency of an individual is decreased on account of fasting and Tunisia, being a newly born state, cannot afford such ignorance and inefficiency in its way towards progress (Allani, 2009; Salem, 1984). Moreover, his version he issued a Presidential Decree known as “*Manchor-108*” (Decree-108) in order to impose his version of modernization. Under such decree women were prohibited from wearing *Hijab* (Veil) in any governmental buildings including, public offices, schools and universities. He was so radical in his approach that once he himself removed the veil of a woman in public. Besides, her images were telecasted on state television. He also called the veil as an “Odious Rag” (Cavatorta, 2012).

Bourgiba’s ways of radical secularization and westernization upon Tunisians, provided a perfect launching-pad and mass support for the emergence of political Islam and Islamists in Tunisia. The MTI came in full confrontation with Bourgiba’s autocratic rule. This resulted into repressions, state-sponsored propaganda, torturers, imprisonments and the exile of its members and leadership (Salem, 1984). Bourgiba’s rule lasted for almost 31 years. Some of the factors that caused the downfall of his regime were the following. First and foremost, it was his radical

approach to implement his concept of Tunisification. In order to achieve his desired results he excessively used state machinery against the opposing voices. He faced serious threats from the scholars of Zaytouna during his early days. The scholars of Zaytouna were significant in the struggle for the freedom of Tunisia. After independence, Bourgiba sought of them to surrender their demands of Pan-Arabism, Islamism and slogans of Ummah in favor of his ideology (Salem, 1984, pp. 178-179). Saleh Ben Yousaf (1907-1961) was prominent among the scholars. He also was a candidate for the leadership of Neo Destour Party. He was traditionalist in his approach towards the future of Tunisia after independence. Besides, he also enjoyed the support of Muhammad Lamine Bey(1881-1961) who was the last king of the Hysnaid dynasty of Tunisia (King, 2009). He was vocal and opposed 1955 French Internal Accord. He started guerilla war in the southern part of Tunisia against the French in reaction to the Accord. However, he was soon neutralized by the French with the support of Bourgiba. In the end, he was assassinated in Germany in 1961 (King, 2009; Salem, 1984).

Second threat to Bourgiba was from the UGTT and Marxist group who used to criticize his regime over economic crisis. As a result, he banned the Marxist Group of Tunisia, in 1963 and restrictions were imposed on its activities. A series of state repressions started against its members. The opposition, later on, resurfaced on account of the emergence of economic crisis in 1974. Moreover, it got momentum when Bourgiba declared himself as the president elect for life. Besides, the increase in unemployment rate as well as the failure of socialist economic reforms of Ahmad bin Saleh, the then minister for planning and finance, further aggravated the situation for Bourgiba administration. Amid such developments, UGTT declared country wide protests and resistance. The call was received warmly by the masses. This call resulted in the occurrence of the Black Thursday of the 26th January in the history of Tunisia. The Army was pitched in

battle against the protestors. As a result, hundreds of casualties of the Unionist were reported. Besides, also the government trailed their members. Last but not the least, the “Bread Uprisings” of 1984 in the last years of Bourgiba regime further weakened his status as a president. In reactions to these uprisings, some of the cabinet ministers were sacked. Besides, Habib Achour the prominent leader of UGTT was also jailed. These measures were taken to control the state of affairs, but the opposition against Bourgiba’s regime was getting stronger day by day (Sadiki, 2000, p. 71).

Besides, this crisis, Bourgiba stature as the father of the nation was on decline on account of his authoritarianism and lust for power. Moreover, the emergence of young Tunisians in the society who had not witnessed the freedom struggle started to question Bourgiba economic policies as the country economic conditions were in the worse shape and was at the verge of bankruptcy. In addition to that, Islamists were emerging and were gaining mass support against the Bourgiba version of Islam in Tunisia. This political uncertainty came to an end when a board of doctors was constituted by the then Prime Minister Ben Ali. The board of doctors declared the mental and physical health of Bourgiba unfit to further continue and perform the duties of the president. Ben Ali immediately after this report invoked “Article 57” of the constitution after the report. The said Article allows prime minister to assume the powers of the president under such circumstances. It was on 7th Nov 1987 that the 31 years of Bourgiba authoritarian rule came to an end as a result of what is called as the Doctor Coup (Sadiki, 2002, p. 128).

3.2.3. Authoritarian Era of Ben Ali (1987-2011)

This section will analyze the era of Ben Ali’s regime and its impacts on the future political developments in Tunisia. Furthermore, it will also briefly analyze his professional experiences

and emergence to power. Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was born in 1936 in the small town of Hamma Sousse of Tunisia. It was on account of his political association with the Neo-Destour party of Bourgiba that he had been expelled from the school. He actively participated in the political as well as arms struggle against the French colonial rule. Later on, he was rewarded for his struggle when he had been sent to France to get training for building National Security Army for Tunisia. He completed his military trainings both from France and America (Hoffman, 1994, p. 31).

The professional experience of Ben Ali is diverse. He was appointed an Attaché of defence forces in Morocco and Spain in 1974. In 1974, he was appointed Director General of National Security forces in Tunisia. In 1978, he was in command of both military and police affairs by and coordinated both these institution as Director General (DG) of National Security to counter the Labour Crisis of UGTT. Later on, Ben Ali was appointed as an ambassador to Poland but was called back to Tunisia on account of the bread crisis in 1980. He was appointed as a Brigadier General. In 1984, he was promoted and assigned to perform the duties as a Secretary of the State to look after the affairs of National Security and Defense. He also acted as a Minister of Interior in order to encounter the mass resistance on account of the worst economic situation of the country. Lastly, Ben Ali was appointed as the Prime Minister in 1987 and held the portfolio of the Ministry of Interior (Ware, 1988; Waltz, 1991).

As a person, Ben Ali was a complete opposite of Bourgiba in Nature. He was considered as an unpredictable person as he was a listener more and was not vocal like his predecessor in the person of Bourgiba. He belonged to military bureaucracy. Moreover, on the basis of his personal traits and democratic measures made earlier he was considered as a person who believed in democratic principles and had the sense to separate of state affairs, party politics, and civil liberties for the citizens (Zartaman, 1991). He himself acknowledged these traits which he

believed developed during his stay in United States (US). About the experience of his stay in the US, in his interview, he stated that. “I listen, I think, I act but I don’t like to talk. I learn that in the US you learn about analysis and how to use analysis in political situations” (Hoagland, 1988).

In politics, the introduction of National Pact in 1988 earned him the popularity and respect from all the community in the country. Besides, he was also applauded by the Western observers (Gasiorowski, 1992, p. 91). Some of the major objectives of the National Pact were consisted of ensuring free and fair democracy, and commitment to human rights. Moreover, it emphasizes on the rights of the women, and was committed to revive the country Islamic identity and ensure political freedom. In comparison to Bourgiba’s Code of Personal Status (CPS) of 1956 which proposes the promotion and development of modernization through radical secularism, by targeting Islamists and minimizing the opposition voices in favor of his Tunisification policy. Apparently, Ben Ali’s National Pact was based on inclusiveness and was therefore overwhelmingly accepted by all the stake holders of Tunisian politics (Gasiorowski, 1992, p. 88).

Ben Ali had a past track record of violence and ill-treatment of Tunisians as a minister of interior during Bourgiba Era. This baggage of his history compelled him to make such political stunts that could earn legitimacy and the confidence and support of Islamists, UGTT, and human right activists. The democratic opening was merely seen, in practice, as the mechanism for elections. However, it was articulated in a way which supported the establishment of one party system. In theory, it had to establish a multi-party system but in practice, it was to establish the ruling party system and to keep maintained the old regime in the name of stabilization (Anderson, 1991; Waltz, 1991). Later on, after elections his opinion and attitude changed about the status of

Islamists (Ennahda). The new regime of Ben Ali declares the members of Ennahda as extremists who wanted to convert Tunisia into a theocratic state. Ben Ali in his interview stated that, *“Their (Ennahda) intention was clear, it has always been to create an Islamic State. These men are intolerant and undemocratic. I broke off dialogue with them when I became aware of their double-talk”* (Hoffman, 1994, p. 39).

The leadership of Ennahda completely rejected such statements of the government in their official statements. They proclaimed Ennahda is committed to democracy and democratic means to achieve a tolerant and democratic Islamic state. The Islamist’s commitment to democracy during Ben Ali administration is evident from as the movement changed its name from MTI to Hizb Al-Nahda (Ennahda) to meet the criteria set for electoral participation under Ben Ali’s National Pact (Gasiorowski, 1992, p. 91). Like his predecessor, Ben Ali also went back on his words after assuming power. He followed the footsteps of Bourgiba and misused all means at his disposal to strengthen his authority and eliminate any opposition that had come in his way. He was removed from the office as a result of popular Arab Uprisings in 2010-11.

3.3. Historical Developments and Transformation within Ennahda: An Analysis

It is necessary to explore how Ennahda emerged in order to find out its political origin in Tunisia. What are the sources of its influence? And how was it able to successfully transform and renew its religious and political orientation? This section deals with the theoretical and practical approach of Ennahda throughout its political history. Furthermore, it will also explore the role of Rachid Ghannouchi, whose revolutionary work in the fields of religion and politics

has been remained a guiding factor and influenced Ennahda overall development during Bourgiba's regime, and Ben Ali's regime and the Post Arab-Spring scenario.

Ennahda is an Islamist political party based in Tunisia. It was the first religious political party to acquire majority through the first free and fair elections held on 23rd October 2011 (Gauthier-Villars, 2011). Since its inception is labeled and considered as a conservative religious political party that seeks to Islamize Tunisia and *Sharia* Law as the primary source of the Tunisian Constitution. It included *Sharia* as the primary source in the Constitution in 2014. It completely denounced its religious activities in its 10th Grand Congress in May 2016. However, the party is still led by leaders who have religious background Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdul Fateh Morou are significant to mention. Moreover, some label it as the Tunisian branch of Muslim Brotherhood and is considered to draw its inspirations from the Muslim Brotherhood like the other Islamists groups of the Arab World (Wright, 2012; Alexander, 2012). As far as the present day Ennahda is concerned, there is hardly any kind of ideological inspirations or political affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. These are some of the empirical evidences that put Ennahda in the category of a conservative religious political party/movement in the pre Arab-Spring scenario. It succeeded to earn the reputation of prominent opposition political party in Tunisia. It was a strong force both the dictators, in order to keep intact the Islamic identity.

Since last 50 years, one of the most important issues in Tunisia has been to determine the relationship between Islam and politics. There has always remained uncertainty on the question to either involve religion in the political sphere of the country or vice versa. Historically, Islamic inclination remained so influential. It was one of the major paved the way for Bourgiba's departure from the office as he continuously insisted upon the death sentence of Rachid Ghannouchi (Allani, *The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation: 1980-*

2008., 2009). Beside, Ennahda's conservative ideological orientation, historically it has always adopted a pragmatic political approach in order to show its willingness to work with the secular authoritarian rulers as well as political and social forces of the country. The relations between the Islamists and the state have not always been hostile. The religious political leadership of Ennahda did their efforts to have harmonious relations with Bourgiba's regime both during in the early days of its foundation 1970s and later in 1980s. However, such efforts were short lived. Similarly the normalization of relations was again significant in the early years of Ben Ali's Era. However, it also met with the destiny ending up in hostility. Despite the fact that the cooperation among the state authorities and Ennahda were short lived but still it gives the impression of being compatible with the political arena of Tunisia. Its history continuously went through ideological evolutionary processes and became successful to incorporate the changes if any on account of the transformational leadership in the person of Rachid Ghannouchi, its pro-reforms organizational structure, and the development of liberal ideational frame work.

3.3.1. Emergence of Islamism and Policies Shifts: From Engagement to Confrontation

Political Islam took birth in Tunisia in reaction to Bourgiba's radical secularization approach towards Tunisian society. The Islamists of that time completely rejected his approach (Esposito, 1999). In the state, various Islamist organizations emerged as opposing forces to counter his de-Islamization project. Some of these included, the Islamic Progressive Tendency (IPT), the Islamic Vanguard, the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP), the Islamic Shura Council (ISC) and the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) were significant (Boulby, 1988, p. 608). Among all these organizations the MTI led by Rachid Ghannouchi was the only one to have a political bend. The

MTI, emerged officially in 1981 while declaring its political objectives. However, historically the roots of the organization can be traced to the economic crisis, that resulted as, a result of the efforts of transition from socialism to economic liberalism in the late 1960s in Tunisia (Hamidi, 1998).

Ennahda ideological foundation can be found in the Quranic Preservation Society under the auspices of Tunisia. The society worked under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In theory, it was an apolitical society with the aim to counter the growing influence of Westernization which was on the rise in Tunisia during post-independence era. But, in practice, the basic purpose of its establishment was to counter the leftist student wings (Marxist) and UGTT. These groups used to criticize the authoritarianism of Bourgiba's regime and its consequent economic instability (Allani, 2009). Initially, the leadership of Islamists focused their attention on criticizing the westernization process which was dominating and influencing the youth. Secondly, they tried to develop Islamic ideological conscience among the masses (Boulby, 1988, p. 599). The struggle by the young Islamists and its leadership in order to gain mass appeal for their group was successful as it draws the attention and interests of most of the university students in their favor. They went out of the university campus and conveyed their message of Islam as a solution to all the evils of their society using the popular Islamic literature and audio recordings of that time. They were successful in conveying their message. Wearing of Hijab trend increased among the women especially among the university students was one indicator in this regard. Meanwhile, the number of *Al Maarifa* readers also increased from 6000 in 1971 to approximately 25000. It was suspended by the government in 1979. As a matter of fact, they actually started as a depoliticized force. They pursued social and religious issues. These issues were comprised of the

preaching of fundamental principles of Islam, the family issues and educational one via their magazine *Al Maarifa* (Tessler, 1988, p. 600).

The first step towards the formation of a political party was taken in September 1979 when a group of young Islamists broke off itself from the Quranic Preservation Society, as the government had thought of as their activities too enthusiastic (Hamidi, 1998). The splintered group consisted of Rachid Ghannouchi, Adbelfatteh Mourou and Hammida Effiner was established as a university based group *Al-Jamaat Al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Group) (Alexander, 2012). After the formation of the Islamic Group, Ghannouchi realized the degree of influence the group had among the masses. By employing the popular slogans of religion and identity (Islam and Pan-Arabism) of that time, he further got the support for his movement. Moreover, by using his *Daawa* skills, which he had acquired by his association with the Tabligh-I-Jamaat during his stay in France, he earned respect and strengthened his status as the leader of the newly born organization. As far as, his intellectual inspirations are concerned, he drew them from the prominent Islamic political thinkers of that time, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Syed Qutb (1906-1966) of Egypt, Maulana Maududi (1903-1973) of Pakistan and Malik Bennabi (1905-1973) of Algeria. All these thinkers were considered to be the prominent voices in the Muslim world against the increasing Westernization and Marxism influence among the Muslim World (Chamkhi, 2015).

Bourgiba's regime crackdown against the leftist's created a room for the Islamists to establish themselves. However, the state administration hardly considered them to be a threat to the regime. Rather the state administration was of the view that agenda to counter the leftists on the university campus considered to be in favor. It therefore, is concluded in the light of those events the Islamists emergence in Tunisia were initially state sponsored to counter its leftist opposition.

Later on, the Islamists became a source of appeal for the masses. The increase in the number of recruitment on the university campus was a significant example. This made the regime worried (Alexander, 2012). The socio-political crisis, in Tunisia in the 1970s, helped Islamists to develop as a social and political movement. It was during that era that these young Islamists felt the power and influence of the street politics (Ismail, 2006). The first political demonstration of the Islamists was on 26 January 1978 in reaction to what is now known as the “Black Friday”. The labor union (UGTT) called for the strike against the increased economic disparity in the country. As a result, the government deployed the army to neutralize the uprisings. This ultimately resulted in hundreds of casualties. The Islamists sided with the government as they considered the leftists to be the enemies of Islam (Hamidi, 1998).

Besides these internal factors, the external factors which transformed its approach into an inimical force as discussed in the preceding lines. The Egyptian government released the members of the MB from jails. After the release they scattered in the whole Arab World. Tunisia was not an exception to such developments. Some of them, who belonged to Tunisia, returned and carried with themselves the thoughts of Hassan Al Banna and Syed Qutb. They were averse to, like their predecessors, the Western thoughts and sought to go back to Islamic ideals. Such thoughts gave strength to the establishment of Islamism in Tunisia and they had of the opinion that Islam is the only way to counter the westernization after the failure of Arab Nationalism. Besides, they also criticized the reformist thoughts of the 19th Century Reformist Muslim philosophers like Khair Ud Din Tunisi (1820-1890), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1839-1897) (Black, 2001, p. 279). Secondly, the success of Iranian Revolution of 1979 not only gave strength and practical shape to the ideology of Islamism but also enriched the thoughts and writings of the pro-Islamism ideologues. Their subsequent

writings not only motivated the people across the Muslim world but also helped e broaden the outlook of the Islamists on the social, economic, and political issues (Alexander, 2012). *Al Maarifa*, in its publications, glorified and idealized Khomeini’s emergence in Iran as an Islamic model for all the people on the earth. Similarly, Ghannouchi also gave statements in the favor of Iranian Revolution. He overwhelmingly glorified the Iranian revolution in his address to followers he told them, “The example of Iranian revolution shows us the awakening has come. Fight against licentiousness and make sacrifices! To correct others and make our own revolution we have to correct ourselves and worship God” (Boulby, 1988)

Furthermore, he also drew the historical ideological links between the thoughts of Iranian and of the Muslim Brotherhood ideologues who had the same aims to establish the Islamic State (Allani, 2009). The movement became engaged direct confrontation with the state when they openly started to criticize the Western influenced policies of the Tunisian government. They had of the opinion that such policies had been the major cause of the under-development of Tunisia. As a matter of fact, it was the power struggle between the leftist’s opposition and the ruling party. This provided an opportunity to the Islamists to emerge. It started purely missionary movement that slowly and steadily transformed politically. The following section will analyze in detail the whole process of this transformation.

3.3.2 Transformation from Al-Jamaat Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), MTI, and Ennahda

The leadership of Islamic Group was focused on building the minds of the youth on the lines of Islam. After years of this loose bonding, unorganized activism and the focus on *Daawa* (call for Islam) in the university campus in Tunis, Ghannouchi realized that only *Daawa* could not serve

the interests of the Islamist in the political setup of Tunisia. He therefore, adopted the method of religious lectures and held secret meetings on the patterns of the MB. These all were considered as the primary source of inspiration for the young Islamists. It was on account of the changing scenario in the politics of the region as well as of the country that made the leadership of the Islamic Group decided to unite all its factions. As a result, Islamic Group was officially founded in August 1979 in its first congress meeting. Moreover, the future strategies of the organization as well as its organizational structure and political actions were discussed in the meeting (Allani, 1998). The Gafsa attack of 1980 was conceived by the Islamic Group as a great opportunity to come in the open against the government. It criticized the socio-economic as well as political policies of the government and presents itself as the only true opposition in the country. As a result, the state started repressions against the Islamists. Consequently the group suffered from division. The student wing of the group had rigid and radical approach and justified the Gafsa attacks. All these developments made the government apprehensive about the double standards of the group and its intentions (Allani, 2009).

The clandestine activities of the group remained continued until the police came to know about in December 1980. The Group decided to go public and ended its secret activities in its second congress at Sousse in April 1981. Furthermore, they had of the opinion that the ruling party was their primary target of its opposition. It built alliance with all the opposition forces to overthrow the regime. The government acted against the group as a pre-emptive strike. However, the increasing mass support especially among the youth ultimately resulted in the official formation of Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in Tunisia on 6th May 1981 (Allani, 1998). The MTI succeeded to emerge as the political party in comparison to others religious groups which had emerged in reaction to Bourgiba's radical secularization of Tunisia. It was distinct from others as

its founding leader Rachid Ghannouchi professed his commitment to democracy. He declared that true democracy was the only way to prevent the path of totalitarianism (al-Ghannouchi, 2014).

On its founding day, MTI announced/unveiled its manifesto main objectives in a press conference in 1981. These were consisted of, reviving the Islamic identity of Tunisia, the implementation of the principles of Islamic thoughts in order to counter the societal decadence of the country, following humanitarian guidelines to ensure economic equity in the country, and the revival of Islamic identity (concept of *Ummah*) on national as well as international level (Boulby, 1988, p. 604). The objectives of the MTI manifesto were completely in contrast and to denouncement of Bourgiba's regime policies and its entire institutional system. They questioned the legitimacy of the regime, and declared it as the legacy of the Colonial power (French) upon the local Tunisians. Although they stood to show their commitment to democracy but the intentions of the then MTI were clear that it wanted to reestablish the Islamic and Arab identity of Tunisia as compared to Bourgiba's vision of secularization and Westernization (Torelli, 2012, p. 70).

The leadership sought to register the MTI as a political party but they were never allowed by the state authorities. The relations between the MTI and Bourgiba's regime were strained throughout (Chamkhi, 2015, p. 135). The state authorities had of the opinion that Islamists wanted political power by force. As a result, the relations between the MTI and the state suffered from confrontation. Consequently, the state started crackdown against them and hundreds of its members were imprisoned. In response to this crackdown, the leadership, outside the prison, started to re-evaluate the strategy as well as ideology of the movement. The group that had left the movement was headed by Hammida Enneifer who was one of the founding members of the

Islamic Group. This departed group sought to prioritize ideology over all other issues. They labeled themselves as the Progressive Islamist group of Tunisia (Allani, 1998). Two popular strands emerged in the MTI. Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdulfatteh Morou led the moderate faction whereas; Saleh Kakar led the radical and traditionalist group. The MTI immediately after its official declaration became the major stakeholders and competed with the liberals to gain an influence and control in the social constituencies. The membership of the newly formed Islamists in the trade union was on the rise. As a result, the numbers of elected members of the MTI in the Union General Congress elections were 70 out of the 220 members in 1984 (Ismail, 2006). The members of the MTI, who had been imprisoned earlier were released by the government to avoid any further confrontation with them as a result of the Bread Riots Crisis in Tunisia in the mid of 1984 (Al-Khawas, 1996). Muhammad Mzali (1980-1986), the Prime Minister of Tunisia removed his Minister of Interior Habib Achour, and sentenced him over the allegation of his anti-government activities. This all spoiled his relations with the governmental as well as with the Unionists. In order to control damage, he opened the process of dialogue with the MTI leadership. Abdulfatteh Morou, who represented the moderate faction of the movement, led the process of this engagement. In response to the government good gesture, the MTI responded and extended its support to modernity as the way to progress, and discouraged the use of violence from within or by any foreign actors as the way for change in Tunisia. Similarly, the government of Mazli ensures it to safeguard the identity and religious sanctity of Tunisia. All these developments resulted in the release of the MTI members who were in prison earlier. A number of unofficial meetings were held between Mazli and Morou during this time period and finally, an official meeting in the government Palace was held among Mzali, Morou and Ghannouchi in 1985. Ultimately, the MTI considered Mzali as their major ally in the government (Allani,

2009). The people in the government and in the opposition were surprised at by this development they had of the view that the MTI must get legal recognition this time. However, this recognition was not realized. All these developments made the MTI change its attitude about the government. As a result it showed its will to participate and denounce confrontation (Al-Khawas, 1996).

Mzali was committed to build bridges among the Islamists and the government during this period of normalization in the relations. He was of the opinion that the legal recognition of the MTI needs to have surrendered in its approach of politicization of Islam (Political Islam). The moderates in the movement were willing to fulfill the demand. However, the traditionalists were apprehensive about the government intentions. As a result, they sought to keep their structure and policies intact. Bourgiba denied its request of legal recognition. As a result of this development the movement decided to go back to the policy of confrontation in its fourth convention held in 1986. Besides, it was of the opinion that the time of Bourgiba's fall is near. As a result, the relations of cooperation again ended. Moreover, the MTI leader Ghannouchi was sentenced to life imprisonment (although Bourgiba wanted death sentence for him). The eighty nine of its members were sentenced invariably ranging from two years to life imprisonment (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). All this came to an end when Ben Ali took over the command as a result of famous Doctor Coup on 7th November 1987. Following his takeover he started his appeasement policy by announcing free and fair elections and to abolish the president for life condition of his predecessor. Moreover, he also released all the political prisoners including Rachid Ghannouchi. Soon after his release from the prison in May 1988 Ghannouchi declared that, *"Ben Ali refused to obey Bourgiba's orders to kill me and my colleagues in prison and dared carry out the famous change; in doing this, he not only saved one person but the whole*

nation” (Allani, 2009, p. 263). Similarly, Ben Ali invited Ghannouchi to the Presidential Palace in Carthage. After the meeting Ghannouchi made statement in favor of Ben Ali’s that, “*The MTI trust in God and Ben Ali is great:it hopes the new step will be effective beginning of a solution to the Islamic Tendency problem as a whole so its proponents can find a suitable place within a united, harmonious, cooperative Tunisian family inspired by great motives in facing the future*” (Elgindy, 1995, p. 104).

This whole period of state repressions in 1980s made the MTI developed into an organized political and social movement. This also earned it the mass appeal especially among the youngsters and the lower middle class population of Tunisia. The regime change provided the MTI with the opportunity to work. Ben Ali, being new in the office of Presidency, adopted the policy of engagement in his initial days in order to earn legitimacy as well as stability. He opened the dialogue process with all the opposition forces of the country including the MTI of the state. They were also given representation in the High Council of National Pact and Islamic High Council. The representation in both the High Councils provided the MTI leadership an opportunity to work and coordinate with their opponents. Furthermore, they were allowed to establish their student union called (UGTE) and were also allowed to publish a magazine called *Al-Fajr* in 1988. Besides, they were also permitted to participate in the upcoming 1989 elections with certain conditions (Chamkhi, 2015, pp. 112-113).

The MTI responded to these goodwill gestures of Ben Ali’s regime and accepted the modern political regime, in the light of the Islamic concept of *Shura* “Consultation” to sustain its support. Secondly, they also supported the women rights as determined in the CPS. They rigorously opposed them in the past during Bourgiba’s Era. At last, MTI changed its name to Ennahda on 8th February 1989 in order to meet the criteria determined for the 1989 elections in the National

Pact and made its opponents realize that it was not monopolizing Islam for political ends (Alexander, 2012). Although, they knew that they would never be allowed to win in the current environment, but the basic purpose of such compromises they of the view was participation not domination at that time. This strategy was successful. The popular support for Ennahda was significant in the 1989 state controlled elections. According to the state figures Ennahda secured 14% of the votes whereas claimed 19% of the votes (Elgindy, 1995). Ben Ali became apprehensive about the political strength of Ennahda and perceived it as the future threat for the regime. This spoiled the relations between Ben Ali's administration and Ennahda. Its leadership became aware of the wave of repression by the state. As a result, Ghannouchi, along with several members of the party, went into exile across the Europe in order to preserve the voice of the organization. Some of its leadership decided to remain in the country and faced the trying times (Allani, 1998).

However, Ennahda, as a political party, showed its complete commitment to democracy in the era of 1990s. Its members had to face allegations of serious nature including plotting of coup and various terrorist activities. Such allegations Ennahda out rightly rejected. Despite its denial of such activities, thousands of its members were victimized, arrested, tortured, and were trailed in military courts. Some even went into exile (Chamkhi, 2015, p. 135). The attack on the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) office in 1991 that resulted in the killing of a civilian whereas those in the office received severe injuries on account of acid attack on their faces was linked with Ennahda. Its leadership denounced their involvement and declared it as the act of miscreants. Ben Ali's administration was quick to respond as this situation provided him with an opportunity to destabilize and demonize Ennahda. The state declared it as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the state machinery repeatedly telecasted the images and videos of

the victims on the media to build public opinion against it (Usher, 2011). Moreover, it was blame for the plan in order to overthrow the government in 1991. In the light of such allegation, the state legitimized to launch a major crackdown against the movement. Hundreds of its members were arrested. Some went into exile. The military courts trialed these arrested members on the charges to plan to overthrow the government, assassination of the President, and to establish theocratic state in 1992 (Hoffman, 1994, p. 42). As a result, of the trial, 265 members of Ennahda were convicted. According to Amnesty International, approximately 9000 Ennahda members were detained by the state authorities during the period of (1990-1992). Moreover, it also reported the death of others due to the tortures during detentions (1993, p. 344)

The Gulf War, and the worsening economic conditions provided Ennahda with the opportunity to respond to these repressions through building public opinion against Ben Ali's regime. It built its opposition against the regime on the subject of the Gulf War that was conceived among the masses across the Muslim world as the war between Islam and the non-believers. Such activities of Ennahda made the government banned its student union UGTE as well as its magazine *AL-Fajr*. The government also prosecuted its members. Besides, the military personals, who were accused of affiliation with Ennahda were also prosecuted. It was an era of complete abeyance for Ennahda as most of its members were either in prison or in exile (Allani, 1998, p. 265).

Rachid Ghannouchi started to take advantage of his period of exile and focused his attention on to device a mechanism to reorient the political and religious outlook of Ennahda. As a result, he wrote extensively on the subject of compatibility between Islam and democracy in his book "Public Liberties in the Islamic State 1993" (Miller, 2014, p. 20). Ben Ali condemned his proposed visit to the US. As a result, was not allowed to enter there. Consequently, he travelled all over the Europe and delivered lectures on various forums. The first meeting in exile of

Ennahda was held in Belgium amid such activities in 1996. It was decided to revise the policy of confrontation and revive of the policy of engagement with the other opposition forces of Tunisia in that very meeting. Similarly, the second meeting in exile was held in London in April 2001. The party decided to open dialogue process with the leftists and the liberal forces in Tunisia, and made some political compromises with them in order to start the process of National Dialogue (Elgindy, 1995).

The occurrence of 9/11 changed the whole trends of the politics of the world. As a result, the War on Terror spread all over. Consequently, the militant Islamists were mainly targeted in the war. This also influenced Tunisia Ben Ali's administration sought to take advantage of these anti-Islamists sentiments. Resultantly, it launched a new wave of repression against Ennahda. He successfully propagated the fears and threats of terrorism by the Islamists and earned domestic as well as foreign support for his agenda, and authoritarian rule (Ayeb, 2011). Ben Ali waged his personal war against the Islamists and all other opposition systematically. He enacted anti-terrorism laws without fear of accountability. These measures were transformed into repression that closed the doors for any kind of political opposition. In addition to that, he also imposed strict censorship on media. Ultimately, the incident of 9/11 provided him with an opportunity to neutralize his opposition with the help of Western powers. Rachid Ghannouchi was portrayed as the person who had been truly dedicated to Islamic fanaticism (Willis, 2012, p. 191).

Throughout this era, any person suspected either on account of physical appearance, political thoughts or religious inclinations could be taken into the custody and was tortured. All these pseudo anti-terrorism laws lasted throughout Ben Ali's rule (Ayeb, 2011, p. 469). Despite these constraints, Ennahda continued its struggle to build alliances with the opposition forces against Ben Ali's authoritarianism. It signed a document called "Call for Tunis" with the Congress for

the Republic (CPR), Ettakatol, and Progressive Democrats (PDP) in June 2003. The basic agenda was to ensure the principle of popular sovereignty, to safeguard freedom of other religious communities, and to ensure the equality of men and women in Tunisia (Stepan, 2012).

Similarly, in Ennahda also took part in the commission along with its allies including the Unionists, Leftists, and Socialists in 2005. They were demanding freedom of media and political liberty from Ben Ali's regime. Moreover, the violent confrontation between the newly emerged radical Islamic group known as Salafi Group of Tunisia and the government made the in government took all out action not only against the Salafists but also against the members of Ennahda in 2007. Rachid Ghannouchi responded to these developments and published an article in 2007. He criticized both the Salafi Group and the Government on account of constraints over the liberty and fundamental human rights and Salafi Group was criticized for its radical approach against the government. Furthermore, it also declared the Salafist Group as a major obstacle to the process of democratization in Tunisia (Allani, 2009).

Ennahda leadership in the person of Rachid Ghannouchi worked rigorously to reevaluate the ideological orientation of his party during the whole period of exile. He reevaluated its approach towards the modern concepts of democracy, rights and liberties. There were existed the differences of opinions within the ranks of Ennahda leadership about the utilization. Abdulfateh Morou had of the opinion that the emergence of radical Islamism in Tunisia was the result of Ennahda policy of confrontation in the early stages of Ben Ali's Era. Moreover, he had also of the belief that the exiled leadership of Ennahda also failed to utilize the period of exile in order to earn the support of the Western political forces in their favor. However, the leaders like Saleh Jourchi opined differently as he believes that the exiled leadership helped not only maintain the movement alive but also provided the Western World with the option to encourage and support

the moderate Islamic political forces in the political spheres of their respective countries (Chamkhi, 2015). The occurrence of the Arab Spring in 2010 paved the way for the ouster of Ben Ali. It also provided Ennahda with the opportunity to participate in the political arena of Tunisia. The following section will analyze the political approach and the practical implementation of the ideals, and Ennahda's transformation in the Post-Arab Spring were trying to promote during its banned period.

3.4.1. Transformation, Ennahda, and the Post-Arab Spring

Ennahda did not participate as a party during the whole process of protests in 2010-11. However, its members participated in their individual capacity (Wright, 2011). Rachid Ghannouchi's political thoughts have always been a source of influence for the party decisions in the past and continued to influence them. The post-Arab spring scenario provides us with the opportunity to empirically analyze this influence as well as Ennahda's transformed political behavior. Ennahda not only gained legal recognition in the period but also successful in gaining majority in the first free elections held in Post Ben Ali's fall. However, it lost its majority in the second elections and became the major opposition party role following this development in 2016. Ennahda made a big stride in its political history in 2016. It left its *Daawa* duties and drew complete demarcation between its religious and political duties. As a result, it became a pure national political party. This section of the chapter analyzes in detail the process of ideological reorientation of Ennahda in Post-Arab Spring period. The major questions to investigate in this portion are: What was the role of Rachid Ghannouchi leadership in institutionalizing the changes given above? What were the organizational constraints that he had to encounter in the process of transformation?

Ennahda has supported the process while adopting a pragmatic approach during the whole period of democratic transition in Tunisia. Since beginning, its leadership has recognized the importance of conciliation and of pluralist approach for the success of democratic transition. After getting legal status as a political party in March 2011, Ennahda along with other opposition political parties of Tunisia immediately officially refused to join the interim setup as it was consisted of the members of the previous regime (Chamkhi, 2015, p. 137). Rachid Ghannouchi, on his arrival from the exile, addressed a large public gathering. He out-rightly rejected the offer to join the interim setup. He believed the setup as the legacy of Ben Ali's regime. Moreover, he opposed the interim government as, in his opinion, it was impossible to develop the process of democratization with the representatives of dictatorship. He was of the view that "only God can bring life from death, and we cannot bring a democratic system out of a corrupt dictatorial system" (Usher, 2011).

In the era of transition, Ennahda supported the approach of inclusiveness based upon democratic consensus and concessions. Although the hardliners, in the party, opposed the strategy of inclusiveness but majority supported the proposal of the moderate leadership (Guazzone, 2013, p. 32). The elections manifesto of Ennahda was concerned with to establish presidential system, to ensure people liberty, and freedom. The election slogan of the party, in 2011 elections was freedom, justice, and development in Tunisia. Furthermore, it successfully used its victim-card to gain the support of the people as most of its members and leadership were either in prison or in exile during the previous regime. It was succeeded in conveying its message across. The result of October 2011 elections stood witness to the success of the message as it emerged as the majority party in the elections while gaining 41% of the total votes and 89 seats out of 217 in the Constituent Assembly of Tunisia (Pecastaing, 2012, p. 52).

The key determinants that helped Ennahda to emerge as the majority party of the Tunisia were consisted of the use of religion in its election campaign, the split among the opponents especially among the secular parties, rejection of ex-ruling elites by the voters, people desire for change, Ennahda commitment to respect, and keeping intact the family code which it opposed in the past (Allani, 2013, p. 133). Similarly, Rachid Ghannouchi visited US in the month of October. He clearly explained to the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) the future strategy of his party for Tunisia in his address. He told the council that Ennahda completely rejects the use of any kind of violence. He ensured them that the people in Tunisia would be free to what they seek. He was of the view that freedom requires training and Tunisia is going through the phase of training in this era of transition (Ghannouchi, 2014).

Since Post-Arab Spring, Ennahda has been playing a crucial role in the process of democratization. It has shown its commitment to build the political system of Tunisia on the basis of pluralist democratic principles that would ensure freedom, liberty, and human rights in Tunisia (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013, p. 859). Despite being a majority party in the National Constituent Assembly, Ennahda rejected the policy of domination in 2011 and demanded to form a government of national unity consisting of the Ettakattol and CPR the secular parties of Tunisia. Ennahda showed its commitment to frame a political system based on coexistence out of Islamists and Secularists after gaining majority. It succeeded in its aim by making compromises and concessions to resolve the crisis during the whole process of constitution making (Ghannouchi, 2014). However, its journey was hazardous in this whole period of transition as it had to encounter the internal issues. The party was divided between moderate and hardliners over the issue of its political approach. It has compromised on various ideological issues

regarding women status, the criminalization of blasphemy and the inclusion of Sharia as a source of legislation throughout constitution making process.

The majority in the moderate faction including Ghannouchi and Morou fancied the pragmatic approach within the party based on the features of the modern state and governance. They supported the policy of inclusiveness based on concessions and compromises with regard to the opposition in the era of democratic transition in Tunisia. On the other hand, the hardliners, the conservative group consisting of Habib el-Louz, Sheikh Sadok Chourou rejected the policy of concessions as they had of the belief that people had given mandate to the program that party stood for rather to the opposition. They therefore, sought the party to keep its primary focus on the issues relating to religion, morality and identity. They believed that Ennahda should follow their own policy rather than entertain the demands of the opposition. They even labeled Ennahda as the party of concessions (Wolf, 2014). On the politics of concessions, Abdel Meguid Al-Naggar, a senior member of Ennahda, was of the view that *“There are a number of actions that we could have taken outside of consensus. We could have passed a constitution on our own. We could have passed the number of pieces of legislation on our own, but we chose to engage other parties.”* (Lang, Awad, Juul, & Katulis, 2014). Similarly, another Parliamentarian, Ferida Labidi, supported the argument of the former and said, *“We had constitution ready months ago, but we decided not to push it through with our majority. We did not try to force our will. Ennahda wanted the democratic process to succeed and so [we] gave concessions.”* (Lang, Awad, Juul, & Katulis, 2014).

Furthermore, the young hardliners challenge and questioned the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi. They challenge and questioned his long rule and philosophical thoughts. Rachid Ghannouchi considers democracy as an important part of the Islamic teachings. However, his

opponents think otherwise about doubt the Islamic status of the democracy. Moreover, the opposing leadership, within the party, continuously demanded for the implementation of the Shura Council supremacy over the party leadership in order to minimize the role and influence of Ghannouchi (Alexander, 2012). Besides, this ideological difference, the party was also divided in two groups. One group was consisted of the leaders and members who had remained in Tunisia and faced state repressions. The other comprised of those who had gone abroad to avoid state repressions (Wolf, 2014).

On external front Ennahda had to encounter the unified leftist political bloc in the parliament as well as the strong Unionist group of UGTT. The unified agenda of the opposition, since Ennahda's emergence to power had been to discredit it in the masses. The opposition used Anti-Islamist tools and constantly attacked and built suspicion among the masses while accusing Ennahda of pursuing the hidden Islamization agenda. Despite its compromises and commitments, the opposition charged Ennahda for their Islamist ideology and questioned its commitment to pluralism and democracy. They labeled its commitments and compromises as tactics to avoid the fear of national and international opposition. The leadership of Ennahda continuously came under fire for their thoughts and statements regarding the issue of Sharia and of Salafist Group. The member of Ennahda, Habib el-louz, in National Constituent Assembly (NCA), was consistently criticized by the opposition for his statements regarding the including of the Sharia as the main source of the new constitution and for having soft corner for the Salafis. Similarly, they labeled Salafist Group in Tunisia as militia of Ennahda. They built their argument on the basis of the statements of Ennahda senior leadership in favor of Salafist Group (Wolf, 2013; Alexander, 2012). Ennahda leadership did their best to convince and persuade the Salafis to give up their violent approach and adopt the gradual and pragmatic approach for Islamic

reforms during the period of 2011-12 but it failed. The leaked video of meeting between Rachid Ghannouchi and Salafi leaders provided the opposition with a ready evidence to solidify their claims (Marks, 2012). The opposition ignored and rejected Ennahda approach of inclusion with regard to the Salfist Group.

3.4.2. Ennahda, Moderation, and the Post-Arab Spring Scenario

Despite these internal and external challenges, Ennahda compromised with the opposition over major issues. That posture was the key determinant that helped in the promulgation of Tunisian constitution. At the same time, it was also successful in pursuing its path towards moderation while keeping the party intact. Some of the measures towards moderation process are explained in the given lines. It provided the women members with an opportunity to rise after acquiring majority in the parliament. Ennahda got 89 seats out of 217. It gave forty one seats to women in the NCA. It outnumbered CPR and Ettakatol that had awarded five and three to the women respectively. This signifies its commitment to the statements it made during its electoral campaign. It practically followed the rule that women membership should be half of the total candidates of the NCA. Besides, it also provided the females with leadership opportunities. Two female members of the party were made the presidents of the sub-committees whereas three of them had been given the role of speakers in the NCA. It also provided historically, and traditionally marginalized group of the country with representation in the NCA (Affan, 2016). Rachid Ghannouchi reinforced the party commitment to give opportunity to the women in Tunisia in the 10th congress meeting of the party during his address in 2016. He said, “The Tunisian state is our ship which must carry all Tunisian men and women without any exception, exclusion of marginalization” (2016).

Secondly, the inclusion of Sharia as the major source of constitution was the next major issue that came under discussion during the constitution making process. The opposition consistently accused Ennahda of demanding *Sharia* to be included as the basic principle of Tunisian Constitution. However, Rachid Ghannouchi repeatedly denied those allegations on various occasion during election campaign. He said that his party had no intention to include Sharia in the constitution. Finally, that claim became evident in 2014 when Tunisia promulgated its Constitution Ennahda supported the Article 1 of the Constitution which states that “Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system is republican”_(2014).

About his willingness to compromise his party stance over the inclusion of Sharia in the constitution, Ghannouchi acknowledged that he and his party opted to adopt an Anglo-Saxon State-Church model. Wherein the state is neutral to religion but is not unfriendly to it either in public or in private spheres. (Marks, 2014). Moreover, he elaborated his point of view on *Sharia* and explained it before its implementation. *Sharia* needs a preliminary training wherein people have to be educated about its proper meaning. He explained *Sharia* as “*Islam is a philosophy, not rules. It deals with intentions and higher objectives—it is abstract and flexible. Sharia is not just about punishments... people must understand that first.... They are scared of the word sharia because they do not understand it.*” (Marks, 2014). Similarly, He dismissed the need of *Sharia* inclusion in the new Constitution on the basis of rationale that the parliament itself would translate *Sharia* according to its understanding via legislation process (Lang, Awad, Juul, & Katulis, 2014) of his efforts to convince his followers in 2016, he asserted that, “a modern state is not run through ideologies, big slogans and political wrangling, but rather through practical programs.” (Ennahda Party Conference, 2016)

Ennahda's Leadership used every platform to justify their stance in order to earn the support of the party and prepare ground for its decision about not to include the word *Sharia* in the constitution. In 2013, Ghannouchi, in his interview on Aljazeera, further elaborated his point of view about the whole issue of *Sharia* inclusion in the Constitution. He explained *Sharia* as all about justice and compassion. However, its implementation was made difficult on account of some regrettable acts such as restrictions on freedom of women, thoughts, and media had been committed in the name of *Sharia* in some Muslim states. He further added that the whole law was derived from the first clause of the Constitution which states that Tunisia is an Islamic state. So Ennahda was not bound to Islamize Tunisia as it is an Islamic state, rather we were struggling to correct the flaws (Ghannouchi, 2013). Consequently, the issue was resolved amicably and the word *Sharia* was not included in the Constitution.

Besides, the party had to take stand and encountered the emergence of Salafist Group role in the country. Ennahda claims as the sole representative of Islamic interests in Tunisia. The sudden emergence of Salafist Group challenged this claim in the country after the revolution. This group presented themselves as an alternate to Ennahda pluralist and inclusive approach. They had with a conservative and radical approach with regard to social and political life. Their emergence surprised both political forces in Tunisia and the foreign observers. They were considered as a serious threat to the whole post-revolutionary democratic transition process (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013; Torelli, 2012).

Surprisingly enough, despite their rejection of the concept of democracy they participated in the 2011 elections as independent candidates. They failed to secure a single seat in the elections. That was litmus test to their popularity level in the public (Hidde, 2013). Despite their electoral defeat, they were a serious threat to Tunisia's modernity, democratic transition, and consensual

system. The ICG report of 2013 noted that the emergence of Salafists in Tunisia was the result of reaction against Ben Ali's regime repressions against all the Islamists especially against Ennahda. The young Islamists, who had less awareness about Ennahda, were attracted towards the Salafists Ideology that believes in radical approach and promotes jihadi components: the ideology also advocates arm resistance in achieving its goals (ICG, 2013). They targeted the disorganized youth consisting of, the downtrodden, humiliated, and disgruntled youth, the discriminated migrants, and the politically repressed groups (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013).

Ennahda approach towards the Salafis group was an attempt to convince them and to defuse their radical approach in favor of a pragmatic and politically correct approach during the whole period of 2011-12. It initially followed the policy of accommodation and of integration towards them. As the followers of the Salafi Group in Tunisia at the times of 2011 elections had no political party and most of its members voted in favor of Ennahda or of their independent candidates during the elections of 2011. As a result, it sought to include the Salafis in the political fold of the country. The leadership of Ennahda consistently tried to convince them to adopt a gradual approach with respect to Islamic reforms in the said period (Marks, 2012). Besides, its efforts to convince the Salafis, Ennahda also tried to convince the opposition secular parties in the parliament to accommodate the Salafis in the new democratic setup (Torelli, 2012). It had of the view that their inclusion in the setup would be a way to reject autocracy, oppression, and dictatorship of the past. This would strengthen the moderate political culture in Tunisia. On assumption of charge Ennahda led coalition government in the parliament soon after legalized four Salafi parties in 2012. They were consisted of Jabhat al-Islah, Hizb al-Tahrir, Hiza al-Asla, and Hizab al-Rahma. All of them were denied legality by the former interim government (Zelin, 2012). All of these groups denounced the use of violence and committed themselves to

democracy. They kept themselves committed to the demand of inclusion of Sharia as the major source of legislation in Tunisian Constitution (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013).

Ennahda proposed to include Salafis in the democratic process in 2011-2012. This created worst position. Its proposal worried the non-Islamists. As a result, they criticized Ennahda religious tendencies and its pragmatic approach. This divided the constituency and created room for the Salafis to flourish. As a result, Ennahda reconsidered all its attempts to include Salafis as they failed to follow its demands and continued to follow their radical approach. The Salafi group attacked the US Embassy and American International School in Tunis in September 2012. Ennahda distanced itself from the Salafis and from their inclusion as a result of the assassination of leftist opposition leader Chokri Belaid and the member of the assembly Mohammad Brahmi in February 2013 and in July 2013 respectively. Consequently, Ennahda led government in the person of the Prime Minister Ali Laraid declared the largest Salafi Jihadi group “*Ansar al Sharia*” as terrorist group in 2013. It focused its attention to integrate itself in a moderate and democratic institution of the governance (Angrist, 2013, p. 562).

3.5. Transformation within Ennahda: An Analysis

Before analyzing Rachid Ghannouchi’s role in the process of transformation within Ennahda, it is necessary to use Quentin Skinner’s approach. The approach is based upon the principle that emphasizes upon of the importance of historical circumstances in order to understand the prevailed ideas. He is of the view that it is beyond scope to understand any idea as a separate entity. He believes that the developments of the ideas are the result of the man reaction to the circumstances, and of their lives (Skinner, 1969, p. 33). Consequently, a brief analysis of Rachid Ghannouchi’s life is necessary to understand the evolution of his thoughts.

Rachid Ghannouchi was born on 22nd June, 1941 in a remote village. The village is closed to Hamma city in the province of Gabes in Tunisia (Miller, 2014, p. 21). He was brought up in a traditional society that had not yet experienced the features of modernity. His father, Sheikh Muhammad was one among the few in the village who had memorized the Quran. Although he was not a religious scholar yet he was recognized as a learned man in his community. Most of the villagers used to send their children to Ghannouchi's house. His father thought them the Quran. Like other children of his age, Ghannouchi also started to memorize Quran in the guidance of his father. At the age of eleven, he came across the independence struggle of the locals against the French Colonialism in 1952. Young Ghannouchi saw the dead bodies of four Tunisians guerilla fighters while returning from school. They were thrown in the market for all to see and were guarded by the French Army men to prohibit their burial. This incident implanted an extreme hatred for the French within him (Tamimi, 2001, pp. 6-7).

Later on, he had to discontinue his formal education as his elder brothers left the village for further education. As a result, he was bound to work in the fields to support his father. Besides, his father was not satisfied with the curriculum that was taught in the school. Moreover, his father had observed the distraction in young Ghannouchi's attitude towards the memorization of the Quran (Tamimi, 2001, p. 8). At the age of fourteen, he resumed his studies in the preparatory school *Az-Zeytouna* in Tunisia as his labor was no more required in the fields. He became more concerned about the issue of the identity of Tunisians during studies at Zeytouna. It is important to note that the identity of Tunisians was tempered by the French and Bourgiba through their policy of secularization in their respective periods. Bourgiba followed the policy of modernization in the post-Independence era and started to eliminate the Islamic Arab identity of the Tunisia. He was of the belief that Islam was the past and the only path towards progress for

Tunisia was possible through modernization and following the Western Model (Thaib & al-Gharibeh, 2014, p. 60). Ghannouchi summarized this identity crisis in these words, “I remember that we used to feel like strangers in our own country. We had been educated as Muslim and Arabs, while we could see the country totally molded by the French culture” (al-Affendi, 1987).

It was hard for him to continue his education at home on account of his Arabic background. In 1964, he went to Syria to study philosophy. During his initial days of stay there, he was inspired by Gamal Abdul Nasser’s (1956-1970) policy of Pan Arabism. However, his interest towards Syrian Muslim Brotherhood started to increase after completing his degree in 1968. He went to France for further studies, but he had to return back to Tunisia on account of some family issues. On his return to Tunisia in 1969, he started teaching at a secondary school (Tamimi, 2001). During his teaching period, he revised the curriculum according to the patterns of Islam. He introduced his students to the belief that Islam had the solution to all the socio-political issues confronted to the Muslim societies of that time (Thaib & al-Gharibeh, 2014).

The political thoughts of Ghannouchi also evolved on different times and occasions. It started to transform for the first time when he came to Az-Zeytouna where he practically experienced contradiction between the traditional Islamic teachings and a modern, secular, and urban life in the city of Tunis. Similarly, during his stay in France, his inclination towards the thoughts of Hassan al Banna and Syed Qutb started to increase. His progressive thoughts on gender equality were the result of Hassan Al-Turabi (b.1932, d.2016) and of his Islamic movement in Sudan. Similarly, the Iranian Revolution also inspired him and produced in him anti-authoritarian and anti-Western tendencies. He disagreed with its policy of centralization of religious and political authorities in the hands of clergies (Tamimi, 2001; Thaib & al-Gharibeh, 2014). The next section will explain Rachid Ghannouchi’s transformational efforts in Ennahda.

i) Human Agent Role (Transformational Leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi)

Since its foundation, Ennahda had been the victim of the state repressions during Bourgiba's and Ben Ali's authoritarian regimes. Moreover, it also had to encounter the opposition of the secularist forces in the country in the past as well as in the Post-Revolution Era. Historically, it had not been allowed to operate independently in the political arena of the country. These restrictions and uncertainty provided Rachid Ghannouchi's leadership with an opportunity to play an influential role in the affairs of the party. Besides, these factors, Rachid Ghannouchi's personal traits consisted of his intellectual capabilities (expertise in Islamic theology, Islam and democracy), charismatic attributes, and historical linkage with the party (one of the founding member of the party). These traits earn him the status he had commanded in the party (transformational leader).

Ennahda, historically took its start as a pure Islamic movement. Its aim was to implement Sharia in the country as a supreme law. It gradually transformed into a pure political party which sought to separate religion and politics (Affan, 2016, p. 5). In this section of the chapter, the researcher argues that, Rachid Ghannouchi's transformational Leadership is one of the important factors that helped Ennahda transform from a religious movement to a religious political party. In the end, it became a pure national political party. His leadership traits both religious and political thoughts helped institutionalize successfully the progressive political ideas within the party that resulted in the reconstruction of the political orientation of his party.

The popular support to Ghannouchi's moderate approach is evident from the fact as eighty percent of Ennahda members voted in favor of the changes he proposed to restructure its ideological orientation in the tenth national congress of the party held in May 2016. This popular

support signifies the strength and respect he commands at the grassroots of the party. Besides, the mass support, Ghannouchi also earned support for his reforms of the prominent leadership of Ennahda. Abdulfateh Morou the vice president and also one of the founding father of the party is worth mentioning. The support of the senior leadership of the party further strengthened his position as these leaders often lent their support in favor of Ghannouchi's theological reforms in their public speeches, religious sermons, discourses and narratives.

The hard liners of the party opposed reformation process within Ennahda in the early stages. They considered these reforms as against the founding ideology of the party. However, Ghannouchi succeeded earn the support of the prominent leadership as well as of the workers that helped him implement and institutionalize his transformation project. Moreover, it is important to note that the task of those who were against transformation was hazardous. First and foremost, they failed to come up with an alternative approach. Secondly, they also failed to earn the support of the majority within the party ranks and file. Last but not the least, the opposing voices failed to match Ghannouchi's theological expertise, moral authority, and his stature the founding father of the party. The popularity of Ghannouchi within the ranks of his party is evident from the fact that he was re-elected as a party leader with absolute majority in the 10th convention of the party held in May, 2016.

ii) Structural Factor (Pro-Reform Organizational Culture in Ennahda)

Besides Rachid Ghannouchi's transformational leadership as the key factor in the successful transformation of Ennahda, his reformation project was also facilitated by the pro-reform organizational culture within Ennahda. It encouraged and helped Ghannouchi and his followers to promote as well as institutionalize the proposed reforms. In addition to, its role as a facilitator

also helps them counter the anti-reform voices within the party, who were trying to stop the institutionalization of these reforms.

Despite the fact that the leadership of Ennahda had propagated its Islamization project, they also kept in mind the local customs and traditions that had influenced Tunisian society during the colonial period of France as well as under the secularization projects of the previous regimes of Bourgiba and Ben Ali. The moderate leadership of the party incorporated these local trends of Tunisian society within their reform project. They modify their stance on the issues of blasphemy, gender equality, Sharia inclusion in the constitution, separation of religion and politics on the basis of public opinion. Rachid Ghannouchi endorses his Tunisification project on different platforms of the party as well as on various national and international platforms. He was of the opinion that, “a modern state is not run through ideologies, big slogans and political wrangling, but rather through practical programs” (Ennahda, 2016).

Despite being the victim of the state repressions in the past Ennahda went through continuous evolutionary process. It had the tendency towards reforms. As an organization it evolved in three phases. Rachid Ghannouchi identified them in his speech in the 10th National Congress of the party in May 2016. He summarized the evolutionary process in such words. Since emergence, it has evolved as an ideological movement focused on identity issues. With the passage of time it transformed into a protest movement against the authoritarian regimes of Bourgiba and Ben Ali. In the end it became a pure national democratic party focused on reforms (Affan, 2016). Ghannouchi utilized the receptive culture of the organization in his favor effectively and successfully incorporated his reformed ideas within the party. Ennahda receptive institutional and his transformational leadership skills (charisma and theological expertise) helped him to reconstruct and reinterpret the theological ideas in order to meet the modern socio-political

issues. Moreover, he also succeeded to earn the support of the workers and of the senior leadership that helped him incorporate his reforms within the party. In his writings, he continuously asserted that democracy has its roots in Islamic traditions. He is of the belief that the concept of democracy is present in the roots of Islam and it should not be considered as an idea imported from the West. That was how he successfully rationalized his initiative to transform the organization. As a result, the organization emerged as a political movement out of an Islamic movement while encountering the traditionalists' opposition to democracy. The formation of the MTI was a significant example in early 1980s.

Similarly, the implementation and inclusion of Sharia on societal level as well as in the constitution of Tunisia has always remained the major demand of Ennahda throughout its history. However, the changing dynamics of Tunisian politics in the Post Arab Spring scenario restricted Ennahda's action to implement one of its core demands. It was another hard task for the leadership to compromise on their ideological base of the organization. It was a complete departure from the past. Since the foundation, the politics of Ennahda has always been revolved around the demand for the implementation of *Sharia*, and the Islamization of the Tunisian society. Historically, through his writings, and lectures, Ghannouchi has always propagated the importance of *Sharia* to the society as well as to his organization. As he commented on Aljazeera in 2013, "*We believe in Sharia and believe that is all justice and compassion. But the implementation of Sharia was marred by some vices like restrictions on freedom of women, thought, and fine arts, as regrettably happened in more than one Islamic country*" (Voll, Mandaville, Kull, & Arief, 2012, p. 30). In the same way, presented his views on *Sharia* on another occasion, "people gave Ennahda their confidence based on the program it presented. This program is what we understand from the *Sharia*" (Ghannouchi, 2013). Despite its majority

in the NCA, it was difficult for Ennahda to include the word *Sharia* in the constitution. It was also difficult for the leadership to go back on the demand as it was against party ideological base. Despite such challenges Ennahda succeeded to resolve an issue of such magnitude. Until it was its status was finally resolved after the implementation of 2014 constitution. As an organization Ennahda remained right behind the decisions of its leadership.


iii) Ideational Factor (Liberal Ideational Culture in Ennahda)

On ideational front, Ghannouchi succeeded. This was empirically evident in the light of the fact that eighty percent of the votes were casted in favor of the party decision to separate religion from the politics in the 10th convention of the party. Similarly, he was re-elected as the chairman of the party with ninety percent votes casted in his favor in the very meeting. Besides, he succeeded in strengthening his leadership authority in the party on ideational front. His continuous interaction with the grass root workers, with the members, and the promotion of his ideas on different party platforms helped him earn their support in favor of his reforms.

Ghannouchi adopted gradual approach to transform the ideological beliefs of the worker and the members. He used his intellectual capability, historical linkage, and charisma in the party to promote his reform ideas that reinterpret the theological beliefs of party rank and file. The Post-Arab Spring scenario resulted in the democratic opening provided Ghannouchi with an opportunity to implement and institutionalize his reform ideas. The party started to compromise its ideological position on various issues including, inclusion of the word *Sharia* in the constitution, ratio of women participation in the parliament, blasphemy law, declaration of Salafist organization *Ansar al Sharia* as a terrorist organization, and last but not the least as the party leader declare to separate the political from the preaching and transforming Ennahda into

one of a national democratic party of Tunisia. The correlation between the transformational leadership, pro-reform organizational culture, and liberal ideational orientation resulted in successfully transforming Ennahda from an Islamic movement to a pressure group, and finally ended up as pure political party.

Pattern of Successful Transformation in Ennahda



Source: Author's Own Construct

Process of Transformation in Islamic Group/MTI/Ennahda

Time Period	Leader	Dominance on intra-party decisions	Political outlook of the Country	Nature of the Organization & Political Approach
1970-1979	Ghannouchi	Leadership	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Social Movement
1979-1981	Ghannouchi	Leadership	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Socio-Religious Movement
June-July 1981	Abdur Rauf Bouabi	Leadership Cadre	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Religious & Political Movement
1981-1984	Hamadi Jebali	Leadership Cadre	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Religious & Political Movement
1984-1987	Ghannouchi	Leadership	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Religious & Political Movement
1987-1988	Saleh Karker	Leadership Cadre	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Religious & Political Movement
April-Oct 1988	Jamal Aoui	Leadership Cadre	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Religious & Political Movement
1988-1991	Sadek Chourou	Leadership Cadre	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Religious & Political Movement/Exile
1991-2011	Ghannouchi	Leadership	Authoritarian/Dictatorship	Religious & Political Movement/Exile
2011-	Ghannouchi	Leadership	Parliamentary Democracy	Mass based Political Party

Source: Author's Own Contribution

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the process of transformation within Ennahda. It transformed itself from a conservative, traditional, and religious political party to a moderate and progressive political party. It also supports the argument of the thesis that the presence of transformational leadership along with pro-reform organizational structure and of liberal ideational framework lead to the transformation of a religious political party. Ennahda a case study serves as an empirical evidence for the causal mechanism of successful transformation. Rachid Ghannouchi was able to

successfully transform the ideological orientation of his political party that was founded on the slogan of the Islamization of Tunisia. It became a party that endorses political pluralism, human rights, women equality, and politics and religion in line with modern western political thoughts.

Ghannouchi was succeeded to convince his followers to implement and institutionalize his thoughts on account of his intellectual expertise in the topic of Islam and democracy relations. Moreover, he also had the qualities of transformational leadership with respect to moral authority and charisma within the ranks and file. Last but not the least, the feature that earned him reverence and strengthened his status within his party was that he had been among one of the founding members of the party. It is on account of such attributes that helped him organize the party despite state repressions, the era of exile, and life imprisonment of its leadership. Besides among his own party workers, he had popularity among the ordinary Tunisian across the country. Tunisian people were inspired and bought his ideas that stood for democratization, religious plurality, human rights, and inclusive democratic approach in Post-Arab Spring in Tunisia.

Besides Ghannouchi's leadership, the other important factor in the process of Ennahda transformation was its pro-reforms organizational culture. Historically, on organizational level it tolerated and supported the new reforms. It changed its name and separated religion from politics. The leadership promoted and endorsed that change. There were some opposing voices within the ranks of Ennahda against the reforms. However, with the organizational support, those differences were successfully encountered. Last but not the least, the factor that helped in the process of successful transformation is the present of liberal ideational framework. It helped change the narrative and conceptualized the religion and politics relations as well as cooperation and coordination with the opposing ideological political forces of the country. This process occurred through public addresses, T.V interviews, academic writings and lectures of Ennahda

leadership. These efforts immensely helped indoctrinate new ideas within its followers towards the renew approach of Islam and democracy.

Ennahda represents the successful transformation model. It also highlights that how and why the transformational leadership theory is better to explain the change in the theological orientation of the religious political parties as compared to the approach of the rational choice theory or of the culturalists/essentialists theory. Culturalists/essentialists theorists completely reject the possibility of change in Islamic Political Parties in the light of applying the reductionists approach. They consider the transformation of Ennahda's political philosophy to manipulate political opportunity in the democratic opening in Post-Arab Spring scenario. Moreover, they suspect Ennahda's transformation as a political trick to fill the political vacuum that increased its mass popularity. The rationale they use to support their argument is that they do not believe in the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Modernists are of the opinion that once Ennahda acquires the political hegemony, it would revert to its original agenda that is the implementation of *Sharia* as the law of the state. They suspect and reject the possibility that Ennahda is genuine in its support towards liberal democracy, human rights, women equality, and in the politics of inclusiveness. Besides, the modernists are of the view that Ghannouchi still gets his inspirations from the Islamic sources that he interprets, adjusts, and correlates with the socio-political thoughts of the West. As a matter of fact, he does not draw his inspiration from the West for his transformation project. Rather, he synthesizes and constructs his model in the light of Western as well as Islamic ideas. Eventually, this approach helps Ghannouchi successfully inculcate and institutionalize his transformation process.

On the other hand, the rational choice theorist uses different lenses to measure the process of transformation within Ennahda. First and foremost, they use the exclusion hypothesis paradigm

to measure the process of transformation in Ennahda during Bourgiba's and Ben Ali's regimes. They build their argument on the facts that the transformation of Ennahda was to avoid the state repressions. It was Ben Ali's strict restriction in the light of his National Pact that compelled the then MTI to change its name to Ennahda to avoid political alienation. The second approach inclusion mainly focuses on Ennahda's Post-Arab Spring transformation. They consider the inclusion of Ennahda in the political process of Tunisia on account of its transformation from conservative to a progressive and liberal political party. Both these explanations use rationale choice theory to measure the transformation within Ennahda. They argue first and foremost, that Ennahda as well as Rachid Ghannouchi's thoughts and political approach are the result of to avoid state repressions. Secondly, this provided it with the way to involve in a mainstream politics of the country that bound it to adopt the liberal approach.

Both modernists and rationalists ignored and completely overlooked the internal struggle, and leadership contributions in cultivating and promoting that new ideas the resulted in the process of transforming Ennahda political orientation from traditionalist and conservative to a progressive and liberal orientation. The exclusion and inclusion hypothesis arguments can be accepted as it also played role in this whole development. However, the struggle of Rachid Ghannouchi on both political as well as intellectual fronts, is the major factor in the current orientation of Ennahda. His struggle to redefine the relationship of Islam and democracy in accordance with the modern patterns and successfully institutionalizing his thoughts are the main indicators to understand the transformation process within Ennahda. The researcher's argument is based upon the transformational leadership theory that emphasis that leadership compels to promote new ideas and on account of leader's charisma, moral authority, and intellectual capabilities he is devotedly supported by his followers to implement the changes he has suggested. Besides, the

presence of transformational leadership, the study is of the view, the presence of pro-reform organizational structure and building of liberal ideational framework is also necessary for transformation. Rachid Ghannouchi was successful in transforming Ennahda on account of his leadership as well as its organizational flexibility that complement each other. The successful transformation process discussed in this chapter revolves around Rachid Ghannouchi's role in Ennahda transformation. It also revolves around the liberal ideational nature and the organization receptive structure's role in transformation.

The next case is of Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan and Qazi Hussain Ahmad. The process of transformation in this case failed to occur on account of the presence and resistance of strong organizational structure within the party. The leadership who was working for the transformation process faced strong and fierce resistance within his party ranks. The rigid and conservative ideology of the party was successful in blocking the efforts of reforms. As far as the intellectual status of Qazi in Jamaat-i-Islami is concerned, He did not match the likes of Ghannouchi and Ennahda on the basis of intellectual and organizational levels. Moreover, Qazi's charisma within Jamaat was overpowered by the presence of towering personality like Maulana Maududi who was not only the founding father of the Jamaat but also a well-recognized Islamic scholar all over the Muslim world. The next chapter will analyze in-depth the process of transformation within Jamaat-i-Islami as a whole and especially under the leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmad.

Chapter: Four

Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan, Leadership Role, and Transformation

4.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with the case study of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) a religious political party which emerged in the subcontinent as a modernist and revivalist socio-political movement founded by Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) a reformist and religious leader in 1941 (Nasr, 1994). JI is considered to be one of the oldest and most influential religious-political movements not only in South Asia but all across the Muslim World along with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Egypt. JI role in the political history of Pakistan is important for various reasons. Pakistan came to existence in the name of Islam however, the party which propagated this slogan was consisted of the leadership that is mostly foreign qualified and they have no framework for the institutionalization and establishment of an Islamic state. Moreover, the traditional *Ulemas* (religious scholars) also were confined or limited to an inexplicit or ambiguous ideas of Islamic state. In this whole era of confusion JI under the leadership of Maududi came up with the theory of an Islamic state. Throughout its history JI has kept alive the issue of the implementation of Islam alive in the political arena of Pakistan. Nonetheless, in order to achieve this objective JI went through the phases of policy shifts, compromises, reevaluation of its theological and political approaches according to the changing socio-economic and political developments of the country. The emergence of Qazi Hussain Ahmad (1939-2013) as the new Leader (Amir) of the party (1987-2009), is noted to be the era in which efforts had been done to transform the ideological and political orientation of the party. These reforms efforts of Qazi has been criticized and blocked by the revivalist and traditionalist faction within the party by using the strong

organizational structure of the party and also ideationally. The case study of JI and the transformation efforts of Qazi Hussain Ahmad leadership represent the unsuccessful reform pathway. Under this reformation pathway process the process of transformation within religious political party has been blocked by the opposing forces from within the party internally. The traditionalists and revivalist factions within the party poses serious challenge to these transformation efforts and blocked it path towards its implementation and institutionalization within the party.

The JI emerged in Indian Sub-Continent as a modernist and revivalist religious and social movement with the aim to represent and voice the issues confronted by the Muslims at that time in the country. Although there were other political and religious organizations including Muslim League (ML) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind (JUI) who were using different approaches to address the political future of the Muslims in the country. However, JI under the leadership of Maududi emerged as an alternative voice which played an important role in the politics of Muslims in pre and post partition era. The focus of this study is upon the process of transformation within Jama'at-I-Islami in Pakistan. The party is influenced ideologically form the thoughts and teachings of its founding father Maududi. The election of Qazi Hussain Ahmad as the leader of the party was noted as the party shift in favor of populist approach rather than ideological one. Qazi and his likeminded in the party gradually started to transform the party approach from revivalist and traditionalist approach to a pragmatic and political approach. He along with his supporters tried to implement and institutionalize these new trends within the party. Initially he was successful in gaining the support of the members as well as the grass root supporters. Moreover, his political rhetoric and personal charisma also helped him in increasing the mass

support for the party. Qazi believed that it was necessary for JI to adopt and respond to the changing socio-political and economic conditions of Pakistani society.

Qazi Hussain Ahmad during his time as the leader of the JI continuously did his struggle to implement and institutionalize his proposed ideas within the institutional culture of the party. However, these efforts of reformation have been blocked by the traditionalists and revivalist faction of the party consisted of the main ideologue of the party, this group through their theological expertise blocked the process of transformation within JI. The reasons that Qazi was not able to successfully transform JI like Ghannouchi's Ennahda. Firstly, Qazi did not enjoy the status of transformational leader that Ghannouchi has within Ennahda, Qazi was considered as a charismatic leader, but he lacked the status of ideologue that Ghannouchi in Ennahda as well as within JI the status of Maududi. Secondly, as mention in the theoretical framework of transformational leadership genealogical link (either founding member for ancestors affiliation) with the party is an important feature for transformational leader within religious political party (RPP) which is also missing in the case of Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Thirdly, the institutional culture of JI predominantly consists of traditionalists and revivalists theological experts which made the job of the leader tough to institutionalize and incorporate the innovative ideas he proposed that might have resulted in transforming the puritan nature of the party. Moreover, these anti-reforms group were not only blocking the path within organizational level but were also successful in igniting the anti-reform sentiments among the grass root workers ideationally through their writings and public sermons.

Qazi Hussain Ahmad ended his tenure as an Amir of JI in 2009 with which also ended the an era for JI during which he did his struggle to transform the revivalist and idealistic (utopian) approach to a pragmatic one, after his departure from the party leadership the party once again

went under the control of traditionalists and revivalist cadre within the party. The composition of this chapter consists of the following sections. In the first part the emergence of JI will be discussed in detail including its historical backgrounds of Maulana Maududi, pre and post partition developments within JI. The second part covers the emergence of Qazi Hussain Ahmad as the party leader, his efforts of transformation under the framework of transformational leadership theory developed for this study. The third part highlights the viability of theoretical explanation of transformational leadership theory as the appropriate theory that explains the process of transformation within JI. Lastly, the summarization of the chapter is conducted under the conclusion part of the chapter.

4.2. An Historical Overview

Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) is one of the religious political party of Pakistan founded by Moulana Abul Ala Maududi in 1941 Kalim Bahadur asserts that it is “the product of diffused romanticism that permeated the middle class Muslims mind and which gave rise to *Ijma* (consensus of opinion) and modernism (Bahadur, 1978, p. 1). At the same time it also gave birth to fundamentalism. The distinct feature of JI fundamentalism was that despite its opposition of the modernization in its approach and method both its leader and organizational structure was apparently influenced by the phenomenon of modernism. Furthermore, it not only limited its sphere of criticism to modernists but it also criticizes the traditionalists’ approach of Ulema, on account of their static and rigid approach towards *Taqlid* and *Ijma* (Bahadur, 1978). Maududi emerged as a religious and political reformers/thinker in Muslims world with a modernist approach to answer the questions confronted which posed confusion in the Muslim minds in the emerging modern world. But before explains the political and religious thoughts of Maududi a biography of him is necessary to explain.

Maulana Abul Ala Maududi was born at Aurangabad in the state of Hyderabad Deccan on 25th December 1903 his family was settled near Delhi, Maududi father Sayyed Ahmad Hassan Maududi was practicing lawyer in Meerut before his arrival at Hyderabad Deccan (Farooqi, 1968, p. 19). His father himself was the graduated from Aligarh University. But he never allow his son (Maududi) to acquire a Western education rather he had been taught at home where he was introduced to Arabic, Persian, and English literatures because of the death of his father Maududi did not completed his religious education because he had to earn living for himself and family. As a result, at a young age he along with his brother joined the field of journalism. But soon, he returned to Delhi in 1919 where the participated in *Khilafat* Movement (Binder, 1963, p. 78). In 1920 Maududi joined magazine Muslim as an editor one of the important organ of *Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind* (JUI (*Hind*)), where he worked till 1923. While staying in Bhopal for 18 months it was in 1924 when he came back to Delhi where he took over as an editor of *Al-Jamiat* which was one of the primary critiques of British Colonialism and strong supporter of *Khilafat* Movement. Although he confessed that he knew about the fate of *Khilafat* Movement, because this issue of the Muslims that was beyond the control of Indian Muslims and additionally office of the *Khilafat* no more existed after ablation of it after the collapse of Ottoman Empire. His editorship in *al Jamiat* lasted till 1927, and in same year he published his books *Al-Jihad fil Islam* (Jihad in Islam) and *Daulat Asafya Hukmul-i-Bar Tanva*. The first book Jihad in Islam was written in the context of *Khilafat* Movement and its failure in establishing unity among Hindus and Muslims. This failure resulted in, backing out of the Muslims elite leadership who were inclined towards secularist approach and move towards religious loyalty (Smith, 1961, p. 270). Maududi in this book used a theoretical framework of traditional *Ulamas* who conceptualize Jihad (Holy War) as a mechanism to defend Islam, its honor and Muslims from the infidels, and

the willingness to perform it as it is considered to be the test of the individual true belief. Maududi conceptualization of jihad was that the basic purpose of jihad is to disseat the nonbelievers' (other than Muslims) from the status of authority. He analyzes the concept of wars in other religions and defines the concept of wars in other religions and then conceptualizes the concept of jihad in Islam as the purpose to defend and established truth against the oppressors, and jihad in only valid if it is for the establishment of truth. One of his important books came in 1930 'Towards Understanding Islam' which gave his recognition as a religious scholar in India. This book was translated into English and was also thought in the institution where religion was thought as subject. In 1932 Maududi come back to Hyderabad and started *Tarjuman-al-Quran* with the purpose to share his understanding of Islam with the others, and since 1932 the monthly magazine has been published regularly (Bahadur, 1978, p. 11). Using the platform of it Maududi wrote extensively on the diverse issues, and some of his writing were published in the form of book "*Muslim Aur Mujoda Siyasi Kashmakash*" "Muslims and their current Political Endeavors" in 1942 these collections of essays he framed his political philosophy. The main themes of his thoughts were to establish separate identity among the Muslims of sub-continent and secondly, he presented his concept of Islamic state and how to establish it.

Maududi writings were influential on mass level as well as in intellectual circles. Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938) a prominent poet, teacher, lawyer among the Muslims was also impressed from the writing of Maududi and during their meeting in 1937 he advised him to shift to Punjab to increase his influence, by following the advice of Iqbal he came to Gurdaspur in 1938, on an endowment of 80 Acres of land, having a mosque which after words become Islamic Academy (Dar-al-Islam) Maududi moved to Lahore in December 1938 where he served as a Dean of theology in Islamia College Lahore. But soon, he felt that he has lost his freedom in this new job

of his and within one year he left the job and come back to Pathankot and started his writing in *Tarjuman-ul Quran*. In Pathankot he laid the foundation of Jamaat Islami in 1941 on 25 August (Joshi, 2003, p. 6).

4.2.1 Jamaat-i-Islami Ideological Foundation, Objectives and Evolution

4.2.1.1. Emergence of Jamaat-i-Islami

Jamaat Islami was founded on 25 August 1941 at *Pathankot*. The formation of JI was not accident, rather Maududi time and again in his writings and lectures emphasized on the fact that an organization is require which must be different from the other religious political parties of the Muslims. He build his narrative for the new party on the argument that all the established and emerging political ideologies of that time capitalism, communism, socialism and fascism are moving toward their fall and this might result in pushing the people into the dark age or their might be the emergence of a group that should give direction to these people because of their potential, qualities, and ideology. The ideology that can guide the people in this chaotic situation is none other than Islam. Hence he was portraying that very future of humanity depends upon the triumph of Islam as an ideology needs a group/party of righteous people individuals besides these ideological rationales, some of the ground realities of Indian Subcontinent also pushed him to establish JI (Mawdudi, 1955, p. 50). The elections of 1935 under the Government of India Act 1935 Maududi come up with his critique of this whole process. He criticizes the role of Muslim League for diverting the direction of the Muslims from religion (Islam) towards nationalism. Similarly he criticizes both India National Congress (INC) and ML for adopting the modern democratic participatory process of the West. In his criticism of nationalism he labeled it to be the Western phenomenon which undermines the Muslims commitment towards their religion.

Religion should be priority of Muslims loyalty rather than nationalism (Bahadur, 1978, p. 15). The 1st conference of JI was held on 26th August 1941, in Lahore & was attended by 75 individuals most of them belong to Jamaat while few independent individuals also came. Maududi presided over the meeting and in his detailed speech he set forth the objectives of JI as follow. It was declared in his speech that JI will adopt Islam in its totality within its approach unlike other Muslims political parties and groups who use the name of Islam for their worldly gains. Secondly the organizational setup of the party will be structured on the principles laid down by the Prophet for an organization. Third objective of the party was based on the principle process *Tarbiyah* (religion training) unlike other Muslim political parties or groups who includes persons within their party only because they claim to be Muslims. However a member of JI should be person who must understand the true spirit of the *Kalima*, and must also have at least the minimum understanding of Islam. Last objective of Jamaat included its internationalization Universalist project, which was that the activities and message of JI will not be limited to the geographical boundaries of the sub-continent, rather its message is universal and for all humans Muslims and non-Muslims (Bahadur, 1978, p. 13). The constitution of JI was presented in the same meeting and after discussion and proposed amendments it was approved unanimously. This was followed by the recitation of *Kalima* by Maududi and proclamation that he had renewed his faith and entered JI (Bahadur, 1978, p. 13). He was followed by Muhammad Manzur Naumani. The next day meeting has been held to elect Amir (Leader) of the party, as a result Maududi was elected as the first Amir of JI by the seven member committee and he then selected his *Majlis-e-Shura* (consultative body). The committee of JI consisted of 11 articles. The constitution was kept short because the authority of the Amir occupied the center of power in organizational affairs as well as in ideological one. Same pattern of the election of Amir's

were adopted at provincial and district levels but the consent of central Amir was required. In his concluding remarks at the conference Maududi stressed on the point the new member should be determine and loyal to the task they are assigned with. It was made mandatory for the members to read all the publish material of Jamaat on weekly basis and to give their review. Secondly the member must have to understand Quran and follow the basic principles of Islam. Thirdly personal character of the member should be exemplary for the society so that they must be distinct from others in morals and character. They should alienate themselves from elections, assemblies, communal issues. Similarly, members also have to distance themselves from political parties, religious sectors, tribal affiliations and religious funds meeting of consultative body should be held on annual basis (Raudad Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan, 1958, pp. 5-6).

The centralized organization like JI which is composed of different branches of the organization should be managed and will also help in training the calves of the party. A detailed framework had been devised for the training of the cadres that included, educational training, research work, and *Dawa'a* (religious preaching and appeal).The first rift in the party erupted in 1942. The point of difference occurred on the personal life and economic issues of Maududi he was criticized for his living standard which according to the dissident group was not according to rule of *Sharia*. Maududi called the meeting of consultative body and offer his resignation. Moreover, he also suggested the dissolution of JI, but the opposing members being in minority were over ruled by the majority member of consultative body. This resulted in the withdrawal of four prominent member of the party included, Maulana Manzur Naumani, Maulana Sayid Ahmad Jafar, Qamar-ud-Din Khan and Atta Ullah (Naumani, 1950, p. 9) .

Furthermore, the outgoing group also declared Maududi not fit for the leadership of the organization. Maududi nullified all these allegations, and counter attacked the dissident group,

by declaring them the members who are not interested in the work of JI (Jilani, 1962, p. 309). After clarifying his position before consultative body he unanimously received the vote of confidence because the dissident group was removed from the party. The magnanimity of the rift was so serious the circles of the party was dissolved at provincial level and *Shura* came to the conclusion that individuals who were not fit for the membership should be removed and future scrutiny for the membership was made rigid. The next annual conference of the party was held in Oct 1943 in which Maududi in his inaugural speech claimed that the party had gone through its first evolutionary process. He elaborate his future vision and goals for the party that included, the implementation of sovereignty of God rule, and made criticism on other political parties (Muslim League) that how other Muslims parties using lips service to the implementation of Islamic state. Moreover, he emphasized over the point that Jamaat rather than expansion will focus on creation of a cadre having an Islamic personality which in the future will perform the duties of leadership of Muslim *Ummah* (Raudad Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan, 1958, pp. 57-58).

In 1944 annual meeting of the party main highlights of this meeting were firstly, to explain the role of leadership, Maududi emphasizes over the importance of strong leadership and obedience of his followers and members towards its leadership. He expressed in his speech that the weak leader will result in a weak party. Second major point of the meeting was the report of Tufail Muhammad the general secretary of the party the main agenda of his report was based upon ideological foundation of the members. In his detailed report Tufail Muhammad added new recommendations by including that a members of JI should not only have to understand the purpose and objectives of Jamaat but they must have the understand the difference between Jamaat and other movements of united India. Moreover, members are required to go through probation period prior of becoming full members. Resultantly, many of the members withdrew

their membership and joined other Muslim political movements of the Subcontinent. In this report it was also highlighted that Muslims with traditional education background were criticizing Jamaat approach whereas, Muslims having modern educational background are influenced by its program (Raudad Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan, 1958, p. 10).

In the Allahabad annual conference of 1946 Jamaat along with their routine agenda, for the first time in their annual organizational report included the detailed analysis of political developments in the country. Before 1946 the main focus of the meetings was to take notice of lack of Muslims commitments towards their religion. This development occurred firstly, because the independence movement and anticolonial sentiments were getting momentum in the region. Secondly, the proposal for the establishment of Constituent Assembly by the British government firm the belief of JI along with other British withdrawal from the region was just in the corner. Maududi through his writings criticized the division of the region religious ground. Tufail Muhammad also highlighted this issue in his report that because of the religious leaders tilt towards the support and promotion of territorial nationalism rather than religion unity resulting in not only developing Muslims into conflict with other religious communities but are also in conflict among themselves (Bahadur, 1978, p. 23). Later in the same year in August JI labeled the Direct Action Resolution passed by the Muslim League (ML), as the cause of communal violence in the country. In that meeting three basic questions, were addressed. Firstly, Jamaat should co-operate the strikes announced by either Muslims or non-Muslims in order to avoid provocation. Secondly, the Jamaat should also co-operate with no taxation and non-cooperation policy if launched by ML because of JI believed that it is, prohibited in Islam to cooperate with the any non-Islamic government. Lastly, about the issue of breakout of communal violence *Majlis-Shura* (Consultative body) of Jamaat concluded that members of JI should not be

provoked and remained above the national or any racial prejudice but they are allowed to react in case of their self-defense. However, in case of protecting the victims everyone should be refuge irrespective of their religious identity (Raudad Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan, 1958, pp. 147-148).

In 1947 no annual meeting of Jama'at was held because of the turmoil. However zonal session of the party was held in *Rajistan*, under this session amendments regarding the election of *Majlis-Shura* had been discussed. In April 1947 a conference was held at *Madras*. Maududi addressed the issues of Muslims in India because it was confirmed that region is going to be divided in near future. In his speech he laid the guidelines for the party and criticized the overall situation developed in the country where diverse nationalities were trying to annihilate each other. While Maududi was presiding the *Madras* conference at the same time another zonal meeting of the party had been held in *Patna* (East India) which was presided by Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-1997). The main highlight of this meeting was the Mahatma Gandhi attending that meeting although Gandhi was advised not to attend the meeting but he attended it and appreciated the speech of A.A. Islahi, Gandhi was invited to read the Jamaat literature which he accepted and did (Mawdudi, 1955, p. 47). This meeting was followed by an immense rage against the Jamaat both India National Congress (INC) ML used it to defend their versions. The former projected it as Jamaat stand is against the two nation theory of ML whereas the later blamed both Jamaat and Maududi for supporting INC. However, the party was actually against the stance of both these parties (Raudad Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan, 1958, p. 254).

As a result of the partition in August 1947, *Pathankot* the headquarters of JI became the part of Indian Punjab. Maududi migrated to Lahore in order to avoid communal violence and JI was fragmented into JI of India and JI of Pakistan. JI in Pakistan under the leadership of Maududi started to enlighten and awaken the masses about the basic purpose of creation of Pakistan which

was to create an Islamic state (Bahadur, 1978, p. 27). The history of JI in the pre-partition phase consisted of two phases, first phase 1933-1941 and second phase 1941-1947. The first phase consisted of the ideological foundation of the party, in which religious problems of the Muslims were highlighted and the then political threats to the Muslims were highlighted by Maududi. The second phase of 1941-1947 consisted of JI organizational consolidation, and individual character building. Muslims community was divided into the different political blocks of INCs India Nationalism Concept, MLs Islamic state concept, Maududi came up with the third alternative force to the Muslims by giving the concept of sovereignty and rule God as the path towards establishment of an ideal state and government. The organizational structure of the party was designed on the patterns of communist party (Mawdudi, 1955, p. 58).

The members of the party composed of a devoted workers having strong ideological commitments character building & full devotion to the party. For this purpose various training camps were organized, understanding and studying of party literature was made mandatory for the member, annual conventions and zonal meetings were used as the platforms to train the members of Jamaat in Islamic literature, building of discipline and political awareness. Moreover, party used tools of propaganda and publicity to increase its popularity. A vast number of literatures have been produced in various local languages as well as international languages (English & Turkish) to expand the message of the party. Maududi utilized public speeches as a source of propaganda. Members were asked & trained to develop their skills of public address. Members with the good communication skills were promoted to preach the party policy in their public address. Despite the fact that Maududi know the importance of women participation in any movement, yet the traditional *Ulema* approach was adopted by Maududi regarding women. In this said period women were given the role to look after the home and bringing up of their

children access to Islamic way of life, their sphere of influence were expected to be confined to the boundaries of their houses, this was the reason that only few women joined Jamaat in the early stages (Binder, 1963, p. 89).

4.2.1.2. Post-Independence role of Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan and its struggle for Islamization.

In the post-independence period JI of Pakistan started its struggle for the Islamization of Pakistan, contrary to the Jamaat Islami of India which started to support the concept of secular India. JI of Pakistan built pressure on the ML to build the constitution and political system of Pakistan on the principles of Islam laid down in *Quran* and *Sunnah*. Although the secular elite of the newly born country wanted to build the country's constitution and political system on a secular line but they had to counter the stiff challenges posed by JI and traditional *Ulema's* of the country (Joshi, 2003, p. 49).

Although Maududi was against the concept of the creation of a Muslim State (Pakistan) yet in the post-partition era his mass appeal and influence among the middle class Muslims increased significantly. However, he was against the ability of ML leadership to lead an Islamic revolution which would establish an Islamic state and society. JI being an opponent of the creation of Pakistan, it initially lay low in the early stages of the Independence. However, with time transformation in the stance of Jamaat was evidently observed both in its ideology as well as in its political policies (Engineer, 1985, p. 123). In the post-Independence Era as an organization JI started to accept the concept of ML Islamic State and as a leader Maududi started to devise a mechanism for the purpose to achieve the aim of building an Islamic state (Bahadur, 1978, p. 50).

In the initial days after the creation of Pakistan as an organization JI kept its focus on the social activities, rehabilitation of the migrants. It was in January 1948 when Maududi reenter in the political arena through his speech in Lahore Law College. He again raises the issue that Pakistan was founded on the name of Islam. But neither the Westernize elite nor the traditional *Ulema's* have the capacities to achieve this objective. He suggested that rule of law should be activated in accordance to the Islamic law (*Sharia*) and the persons who are making those laws should be qualified enough to do the task (Binder, 1963, pp. 100-101). By this declaration Maududi and JI as an organization reenter into the politics of Pakistan. Furthermore, he justify his move by using the rational that it is also crime to limit the massage of God only to the Mosque and alienate oneself from the social spheres of the society and left it to an irreligious forces and ideologies (Bahadur, 1978, pp. 53-54). In February 1948 Maududi launched his campaign for the establishment of Islamic constitution. His demands to the Constituent Assembly included, the implementation of God sovereignty, with state administer as his agent secondly law (legislation) should be based on *Sharia*, thirdly, the gradual revision of all the law contradictory to *Sharia* and no such law in the future should be made, Lastly, state in its legislation should not cross the limits determined in *Sharia* (Binder, 1963, p. 103).

Despite the fact that, ML leadership used the slogan of Islam to unite the Muslims of the Sub-Continent for creating Pakistan however, the leadership of ML had not device any framework for how to establish an Islamic State. Similarly no socio-economic mechanism under the Islamic framework has been device. In fact, the Muslim league mostly had been dominated by the Western educated leaders did not accepted the thoughts of traditional *Ulema's* created a great confusion, and vacuum for the JI to increase its sphere of influence in Pakistani Politics (Joshi, 2003, p. 50).

Maududi through his speeches reiterated that the dynamic feature of Pakistan which was to make an Islamic State and he asserted that there is no going back on this principle stance. He raised questions that if secular British codes of law were to be implemented than what was the need for creating separate state for the Muslims. Furthermore, he opined that Islamic laws are too much relevant, compatible and applicable in the modern times too. He argued that Islamic laws did not remained static its laws evolved with the time in accordance to needs of societies and it has built systems of rules and regulations under its framework. However, there are certain principles which cannot be changed or altered where as other can be transformed according to the needs of a given time. This is the reason that he believed that Islamic laws had have the potential to evolve, transform, and grow and its adoptable nature make Islam a progressive religion in nature. Similarly, addressing the issues of various schools of thoughts in Islam Maududi concluded that there has always been consensus among all the school of thoughts regarding the basic and fundamental principles of Islam (Khan, 1964).

During this whole time he propagated the implementation and development of Islamic constitution. Moreover, he was also aware that Muslims within Pakistan had went through the process where they were socially, culturally, morally, and educationally, far away from the Islamic ideals and that is the reason he proposed a gradual process to transform the society rather than an overnight transformation. Amid the struggle of JI for the Islamic constitution another issue erupted (Kashmir issue), Maududi adopted silence over the issue. His statement about the issue of Kashmir that if there is agreement with the country not to involve in the internal matters of each other than no action are justified against that country. His statement received a widespread criticism and reactions. Similarly, the *Majlis-i-Shura* also did not endorse Maududi stance over Kashmir Jihad and after the Foreign Minister Zaffar Ullah admission of the fact that

Pakistan Army was involved in 1948 Kashmir war. JI as an organization opined that after the declaration of Foreign Minister it is now permissible for the citizens of Pakistan to participate in Kashmir War (Nasr, 1994, p. 97).

Maududi statement regarding the issue of Kashmir gave rise to public uproar against him, and JI as an organization had encountered it by alienating itself from its leadership statement was considered as a retreat by the JI and at the same time showed its strength as an organization (strong institutional culture) (Binder, 1963, p. 141). Maududi statements about various issues including Kashmir War, the issue of oath to the government, and recruitment in the army created conflict among the state and JI. As an organization again JI regarding the issue of oath taking and recruitment into the army the *Majils-i-Shura* of the party again distance its self from Maududi's stance and declare it his personal opinion not party's policy or statement (Bahadur, 1978, p. 58). Although Maududi believed that through his statements he was pressurizing the government, however, the public sentiments were in favors of the government and it labeled these statements as disruption and anti-State sentiments of JI. The government responded to these provocations of Maududi and he along with, Mian Tufail and other top leadership of JI was arrested as state wanted to neutralize it. JI as an organization responded to the government actions by linking the arrest of its leadership to the reason that government wants to avoid JI demand for Islamic Constitution. In this whole period JI tried to convince the traditional *Ulema* of the country to support Maududi's four points declaration for meetings were conducted with Malana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani of Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) but consensus was not built because the traditional Ulemas did not want Maududi and JI to get the credit of the inclusion of Islamic provision in the constitution. Rather, they suggested that imminent Ulema of the country should prepare the draft of the constitution and present it to the Constituent Assembly (Afaq, 1971, p. 372).

Maududi remained in prison till 1949. On 7th March 1949 Liaqat Ali Khan the Prime Minister of Pakistan presented Objective Resolution before the constituent Assembly that consists of the basic principles on the basis of which the future constitution of Pakistan had to be formed. The introduction of the Objective Resolution was done to incorporate and neutralize the demand of the religious social and political groups a committee was formed to give its report regarding the inclusion of Islamic principles in the constitution. In response to these developments JI suggested that the implementation of the Objective Resolution require new leadership which must have the expertise of religious texts (Bahadur, 1978, p. 60). Maududi in his speech on 4th Oct 1950 at Mochi Gate Lahore criticize the report of the basic principle committee and declare those recommendations nothing more than an eye wash. The report also faced criticism from other political and religious organizations of the country as a result the considerations of the report were postponed by the Constituent Assembly. JI took credit of its withdrawal (Bahadur, 1978).

A process of transformation in the political approach of JI occurred when it decided to participated in the Punjab Provincial Assembly election of 1951. Prior to this JI approach was to distance itself from the political process (elections) because of its belief that the elections process used in Pakistan is an un-Islamic one and they do not want to indulge in any such activity. However, to legitimize its decision to participate in elections they used the rationale that since the implementation of the Objective Resolution in 1949 Pakistan has become in principle as an Islamic state (Raudad Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan, 1958, p. 86). This transformation of JI stance regarding its participation in the elections was not easily absorbed by the followers they were surprised. However, Maududi responded to this confusion among followers that JI will not put up candidates on its ticket. Rather, it is an effort from JI side to train the masses to choose the righteous people in the election. Because, he and his party believed that the elections of righteous

people to the assemblies will not ensure the Islamic way of life but it can only be achieved when the central leadership of the legislature has been changed (Joshi, 2003, p. 98).

However, it performed badly in the elections of 1951 out of 53 nominated candidates only one succeeded. The overall votes cast in the favor of Jamaat candidates were two hundred thousand. After the elections Jamaat accused government of massive rigging. Following these allegations the newspaper of JI was banned by the government. In the meeting of *Majlis-i-Shura* followers were advised to use the constitutional means in their struggle to put the country on right path and bringing Islamic reforms in the country. Moreover, it was also decided in the meeting that JI would not participate in the elections held in the country. The bad electoral performance in 1951 elections brought internal crisis within the party, as members of the party were of the view that JI should avoid the electoral process and focused its attention on social and educational activities (Afaq, 1971, pp. 454-455). Following the elections, the anti-Ahmadiya agitations erupted in Pakistan against the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835-1908). This agitation was led by Majli-e-Ahrar (1929) also known as Ahrar. The major demand of this moment included, the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims, removal of the foreign minister Zafar Ullah Khan (1947-1954) from the office (because he addressed the meeting of Ahmadi's held at Karachi in May 1952), removal of Ahmadis from all major posts in the country (Bahadur, 1978, p. 68). Maududi, response to anti Ahmadi movement, was equivocal because of his rivalry with Ahrar policies. But JI as an organization did not want to stay away from this anti-Ahmadi movement as well as it also not wanted that other religious groups to take credit of this whole issue. Although Maududi was against the direct action approach of the agitations however, he was not in a position to keep himself away from this whole issue (Jahan, 1972, p. 71).

The government was continuously under the fire for its policy. JI although being against the Direct Action approach, surrendered its stance out of the fear of becoming unpopular and to avoid public or mass criticism. . After the promulgation of Martial Law in 1953 Maududi and the leadership of JI in Lahore were arrested. Its newspapers “*Tasneem*”, “*Jahan Nau*” and “*Kausar*” and were told to deposit security. A large number of imprisonments of JI leadership were carried out in the Western Punjab. Maududi along with other leader of the JI were trailed in Military courts. On 11th May 1953 Maududi was sentenced to death by the military court for his writing of “*Qadyani Masala*” (Qadyani Issue). Moreover, he was also sentenced for the period of 7 years for his statements published in JI newspaper *Tasneem*. Sultan Ahmad JI Amir from Sindh was elected as JI Amir in Maududi’s absence. JI responded to its leadership arrest and declare it victimization by the government an account of JI struggle for the Islamic Constitution and their proposal of Islamic government before the Constituent Assembly (Mawdudi, 1956, p. 13). A widespread agitation started against the Maududi sentences. Moreover, he also refused to opt for the option of mercy appeal. As a result of mass agitation the government was pressurize and his death sentence was converted to 14 years imprisonment (Mawdudi, 1956, p. 35). Later in the year 1953, prisoner of Martial Law were started to release but Maududi was kept in prison however, Amin Islahi (1904-1997) of JI was released in March 1954 he was elected as the Amir of JI because the post was vacated by Sultan Ahmad after Islahi’s release from the prison (Qureshi, 1971, p. 46). The food crisis eruption in the country sidelined the anti-Ahmadis Movement. The increase corruption at the governmental level and food crisis created political crisis in the country. The Chief Minister of Punjab Mumtaz Daultana (1951-1953) resigned and Martial Law was imposed. The Prime Minister Nazim-ud-Din (1951-1953) was removed from the office by Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad (1951-1955), bureaucracy came to

fill the vacuum (Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1963, p. 301). The then Governor of West Punjab Mian Amin-ud-Din (1953-1954) appointed a bench of Justice Muhammad Munir and Malik Rustom Kiyani to probe the anti Ahmadi's riots. In their report they have conceptualize Islam from modernist perspective, it alerted the authorities that Religion (Islam) might be misused by the individuals to achieve their political objectives, opportunists could easily use it to motivate the masses in the name of religion and because the very creation of Pakistan was on religion base slogan so the religious authorities can use common man for their purposes in the name of religion. The report was rejected by *Ulema's* (Islamic Scholars) and labeled as a biased work. (Khan, 2012, p. 152)

Maududi was released from prison on 28th April 1955 as a result of Federal Court declaring the Indemnity Act void under which he was held. However, during the time period of imprisonment of Maududi JI as an organization suffered a lot. In his absence the JI leadership decided to focus their attention on issues of civil liberties rather than campaigning for Islamic Constitution (Ahmad, 1956, p. 240). The Constituent Assembly was dissolved by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad on 24th of October 1954. On April 28th 1955 Maududi was released from the prison during his time in prison. He reevaluates his stance over the concept of an ideological state. His struggle for Islamic constitution had not provided any fruitful results and JI as an organization was victim of state repressions. Maududi after his imprisonment started to realize that it was the time to change his stance. Democracy to him now became acceptable and for this he used even *Quran* and *Sunnah* references. He endorsed the concept of democracy by admitting that there might be some shortcomings of democracy however, it is the only mechanism present to address the issues of the people and make a nation mature (Maududi, 1960, p. 380).

He opined that it is democracy that that builds in individuals the sense of responsibility that their choices serve in the good and bad of the country. He rejected the argument that democracy has failed in the country, he argued that what was established in Pakistan was quasi-democracy and quasi-dictatorship that is why it failed in achieving the advantages of the both. He was pragmatic in his approach because of his belief that Islamic constitution has the possibilities of acceptance if the democratic system remains intact in the country. As military and ruling elite at that time were fully empowered and they wanted to neutralize or crush not only the leftist opposition but also any opposition which show any discontent (Maududi, 1960, p. 381). The second constituent Assembly held its meeting in July 1955 but it worked efficiently than the first one, by February 1956 the draft of the constitution was adopted and it was enforced on 23rd March 1956. JI responded quickly and accepted the constitution, by celebrating that an Islamic Constitution has been established because it except the sovereignty of Allah and legal supremacy of Islam (Ahmad, 1962, p. 562).

Prime Minister (PM) Chaudhry Muhammad Ali (1955-1956) shared close ties with Maududi since before partition, Maududi used the platform of JI to praise the personality of the PM. JI proposed some amendments in the draft but by and large it has accepted the 1956 constitution and supremacy of the parliament. Besides, Maududi close ties with the PM the other intension of JI was not to create any conflict with the government because the new constitution was implemented and it means elections will be held soon. So JI started its campaign by preaching the message that by electing pious people to the parliament will help in converting Pakistan into an Islamic state despite the presence of some inadequate provisions present in the constitution. It was indirectly advocating that only JI have such candidates that could transform country into an Islamic state (Binder, 1963, p. 371).

Despite the fact that there are some provisions like, Islam was not declared as the state religion and speaker might be elected any non-Muslim member to, who might act as the head of the state under some circumstances. JI started its campaign to celebrate the constitution of 1956. Maududi knew that the constitution had ignored most of his demands, but at that stage it was politically not rational to go in conflict with the government. He believed that it is his success that government had been prevented from enforcing a secular constitution in the country (Bahadur, 1978, p. 83). JI started its campaign for elections but amid these entire developments major crisis erupted within the ranks of the party. During the era from 1956-1958 party was struck with serious internal crisis over its compromises on the principal ideological positions and its increasing tilt towards practical politics. The opposing faction in the party was led by Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi, accompanied by Hakim Abdul Rahim Ashraf along with other senior members. In February 1957 a meeting of all the members of Jamaat was held in which the Maududi's pragmatic approach was endorsed by the members in Machi Goth Bahawalpur. The resolution was passed and only 15 members out of 900 of the party voted against it (Moin-ud-Din, 1963, p. 2). Maududi delivered an extensive speech to explain his and party position and its transformation by stating that JI will remain consistent to its principle, despite changing its tactics, and it is natural process that every party evolves with time and no party could remain stick to the same approach forever (Maududi, 1960, p. 381).

Furthermore, redrawing the involvement of JI involvement in politics, Maududi in his speech explained that it is compulsory to involve in politics after partition because without involvement in politics JI scope will be limited to preaching and academic activity. In this speech he had explained the transformation of JI since its inception. He justified his stand of opposition by proclaiming that it is not wise to leave the state apparatus to be held in the hands of secular

forces because the country was founded in the name of Islam. Furthermore, he cleared his stance that it is wrong perception by the opposing members that JI has surrendered its stance of revolutionary approach to establish an Islamic state. The dissident group was led by Amin Islahi, Abdul Jabbar Ghazi, Hakim Abdul Ashraf, Islahi and Jabbar. The status of Amin Islahi in Jamaat ranks was second to Maududi. He has such importance that Maududi had declared that Islahi should succeed him as an Amir of Jamaat after him (Bahadur, 1978, p. 92).

All these differences erupted when *Majlis-e-Shura* of JI passed resolution against its participation in elections and in support of Jamaat to focus its attention on constructive and reformation activities, this resolution was passed by the *Shura* despite Maududi's opposition. This event created internal crisis within the ranks of Jamaat and Maududi called all the Pakistan session of JI in Bahawalpur. Islahi remained stick to his stance he opined that neither participating in elections nor the idea of change in political leadership could bring about change. Moreover, he explained that participating and contesting election would mean compromises, and those acts which were formerly criticized by using the references of *Quran* and *Sunnah* (traditions) has now been accepted, and this according to him was the start of compromises that would not stop here. He charged Maududi of being power hungry and to achieve his objective would interpret *Quran* and *Sunnah* in accordance to his convenience. Maulana Islahi on January 13th 1958 resigned from JI by stating that he no more agrees with JI policies, constitution and leadership (Maududi). Islahi and Maududi leveled charges against each other in these entire crises Maududi emerged as a strong leader who had command over the party and majority of the members. This entire crisis determined that members of Jamaat identified JI with Maududi and religion of Islam with JI (Gankovsky & Polonskaya, 1964, p. 304).

In order to take control of religion dominant role in the society and to extend the influence of his military rule General Ayub came up with the plan to take control of religious interpretation in government hands. He assigned the task to devise mechanism for making religion (Islam) compatibility with politics to Khalifa Abdul Hakim head of Institute of Islamic Culture Lahore and Fazlur Rehman the head of Islamic Research Institute of Karachi. Actually, Ayub Khan utilized state sponsored institution in order to interpret Islam, to control its flow in the society and politics. These two institutes devise the strategy against the narratives of traditionalists *Ulema's* and Islamic Political Parties, they used various rationale to justify the political campaign of government against the religious political forces (Nasr, 1994, pp. 120-121). To minimize the role of political forces Ayub introduced Basic Democratic System of Electoral College in 1959, and later on he was elected as the President. After assuming power as a president constitution making process started headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan Shahab-ud-Din. JI along with other religion Ulema met and forwarded their proposal to suspend the Basic Democratic system that was monopolized by the bureaucracy and autocracy. State responded by arresting Maududi on account of his violation of Martial Law regulation which prohibited holding of any political activity (Nasr, 1994, p. 121).

He introduction of Family Laws Ordinance in March 1961 was the first step which draws the direct confrontational lines between the government and religious forces. This exposes the intentions of the government that it not only wanted to curtail the role of religious political forces but also minimizing the role of traditional Ulema in the society. Amidst these developments the constitution of 1962 was introduced in which Islam was declared a state official religion. However, the word Islamic was replaced from the official name of Pakistan and it became Republic of Pakistan. JI did not responded so actively because it wanted to wait till the

lifting of political parties Act which was lifted in July 1962, following this JI started to oppose both Basic Democrats System and 1962 constitution of Ayub Khan's regime and started its struggle for the restoration of democracy in the country. Maududi started to build his narrative on the fusion of Islam and democracy. He was determined that democracy is the only tool which could serve the interest of Islam against Ayub's secular authoritarianism (Niazi, 1973, p. 19).

For the purpose Jamaat along with the other political forces formed an alliance National Democratic Front (NDF) which also included the secular political forces of the country. There was resistance among JI members against its inclusion in the alliance but the decision of the leadership prevailed Maududi justify his position by stating that the danger to Islam posed by Ayub authoritarian regime demands compromises, and JI as a party had to act pragmatically under these situations. Soon Jamaat became the front line party to lead the political activism in the country. Government responded to this rise of JI and Maududi was invited by Ayub Khan in a meeting at Lahore he (Maududi) was offered the vice chancellorship of Bahawalpur Islamic University if he leave the politics. Maududi rejected the offer of the government because according to him he did not wanted to create space for those political or nonpolitical forces that have secular intensions for Pakistan (Nasr, 1994, p. 123).

Following this JI became in direct conflict with the government and it was on the top of the list of the government adversaries among the parties of NDF. A worker of Jamaat was killed during the clash that broke out in the open meeting of Jamaat held in 1963. Government had launched its campaign against Jamaat under the interior Minister Habib Ullah Khan (1962-1965), and during this period various books and pamphlets were published against the Jamaat ideas and philosophy. Its leadership remained in jail during this whole era. Amidst of all these development presidential elections were announced to be held on 1st Jan 1965. JI made alliance

with the opposition parties, combine opposition parties, which was headed by Muslim League Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, it was again an alliance of convenience with the past rivals. Fatima Jinnah (1893-1967) was nominated as the presidential candidate of combined opposition parties while Maududi was in prison. Maududi after meeting with Chaudhry Muhammad Ali accepted his proposal. This provided the government with an opportunity to criticize JI and divide the vote bank of Islamic parties (Afaq, 1971).

The govt was succeeded to win the support of traditional *Ulema's* in a bid to defeat the female candidate to rule the country. Furthermore, a strong criticism had been launched by the *Ulema* which denounced Maududi justification for the support of women candidate. The govt used Kausar Niazi to challenge the status of Maududi leadership within the party ranks in which they failed and Maududi started his campaign against the government. Ayub Khan was successful in the elections, and it was considered to be the start of the era of state repression against JI. However, the attention of the government was diverted as it got engaged in dealing the issue of Kashmir and 1965 war of India (Bahadur, 1978, pp. 112-113).

Maududi used the situation to his advantage by criticizing the leftist politics. His political narrative was revolving around the issue of Islamic constitutionalism which underscores party and his focus on country critical social economic issues. Amid all these developments Maududi fell ill and was taken for treatment to England. In his absence the party under the leadership of Mian Tufial proved to be inactive as he did not come up with new strategies or plans for the party. Maududi came back and attended the Round Table Conference. Ayub Khan resigned from the office of the Presidency on 25th March 1969, Maududi declare it a victory of Round Table Conference. However, he had also realized that in the present politics scenario at that time the

slogan of Islam and democracy was irrelevant and they had to accept the none democratic, (Martial law) of General Yahya Khan (Nasr, 1994, pp. 126-128).

JI made an alliance with General Yahya Khan against the nationalists in East Pakistan and leftists political force Pakistan People Party (PPP) of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. JI leadership was convinced that elimination of PPP and Awami League from the political arena will result in providing perfect ground for the party to enter in the power corridors. Maududi along with Mian Tufial conducted a meeting with General Yahya Khan, after the meeting General Yahya Khan was praised highly as the person who will put the Islamization of Pakistan on its top agenda. JI leadership was convinced that the country would be handover to them as the major political forces PPP and Awami League both were in hostility with the regime. A major policy shift occurred in JI strategy as the party shifted its focus from the formulation and implementation of Islamic constitutionalism to a confrontation with PPP and Awami League. Maududi started a confrontational campaign against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's slogan of Islamic Socialism. Maududi build his narrative that only Islam has the solution to counter the socio economic crisis of Pakistan. Similarly, in East Pakistan its campaign was built on the argument that the loyalties of East Pakistani's (Bengali's) should be for their religion (Islam) and country rather than, on ethnic or linguistic issues. The election campaign and manifesto was designed on the basis of Islamization and patriotism rather than socio-economic issues the country at that time was going through (Raudad-i-Jamaat-i-Islami, 1963-1974, pp. 18-19).

The leadership of JI was confident that it will acquire good amount of seats in the election so they field 151 candidates for the National Assembly. Amid these development the division in religious vote bank occurred as both Jamiat-i- Ulama Islam and Jamiat-i-Ulama Pakistan fielded their own candidates because they were opposed to the religious thoughts of Maududi. The

elections results of 1970 were shocking for JI as they only acquire four national Assembly seats out of 151 and 4 provincial assemblies' seats out of 331 total seats. They were nowhere near its main opponent PPP and Awami League JI performance in the elections was so embarrassing that it even acquire fewer seats than JUI and JUIP, by acquiring seven seats each in the national assembly. The election results were shocking for the leadership and its members. The leadership of Maududi came under question as well as its Islamization slogan for the election. But JI regrouped quickly to counter the issue of polarization between the East and West Pakistan (Awami League and PPP). This time JI utilized the nationalist approach by changing its strategy of Islamization. The nationalist uprising resulted in JI making an alliance with Army to eliminate the nationalist forces in East Pakistan (Bahadur, 1978, p. 133).

Under the leadership of Ghulam Azam the Amir of East Pakistan JI, the party went hands in hands with the Army against the nationalists by declare them unpatriotic and enemies of Islam. In this whole period of counter insurgency till Bangladesh independence about two thousand of its members were dead and about twelve thousand were imprisoned. Despite this loss the party was able to prove its nationalist credentials, as historically JI was accused by its opponents to be an organization that was anti-Pakistan. Moreover, JI which faced severe defeat in the elections of 1970 found new route to become relevant and major political stake holder in the politics of the country (Raudad-i-Jamaat-i-Islami, 1963-1974, p. 23).

4.2.4. Jamaat-i-Islami under Mian Tufail Leadership (1972-1987)

Bhutto's emergency as a political leader occurred in Pakistan political arena occurred on account of his commitment to bring about fundamental changes in Pakistan. However, he also fell prey to the dominant political reality of Elite politics in Pakistan. The changing political dynamics of the

country towards populist politics also tend to transform the political approach of JI. Moreover, it also required some structural adjustments. However, they failed to use the opportunities provided during Bhutto's era in its favor politically (Nasr, 1994, p. 134).

Bhutto autocratic approach to rule resulted in an increased opposition towards him. JI along with the other opposition was successful in bringing down the government. Religion remain the prominent factor in Pakistani politics despite its inability to keep the country united (disintegration of East Pakistan), but the role of religion increased in the politics. PPP a leftist party also raised the slogan to Islamize Pakistan. Despite Bhutto's effort to eliminate the role of Islam from the politics it has remained relevant in the political arena of Pakistan. Maududi even declare the disintegration of Pakistan because of the lack of devotion towards Islam. He even criticizes and balanced Yahya Khan for his drinking habits and womanizing character for the East Pakistan. This also influenced Army in which some of the junior officers under the brigadier FB Ali were accused to be revolting against the unIslamic acts within the Army, the conspiracy was named Attock conspiracy (Nasr, 1994, p. 135).

This also indicated that the Army was also gradually moving towards religion dominance. This trend within Armed forces further strengthened when Gen Zia-ul-Haq was selected as an Army Chief by Z.A Bhutto. Zia was greatly influenced by the work of Maududi he even distributed the copies of his work among the soldiers and officers. Moreover he also proposed to include Maududi book in the curriculum of Army for the promotion of captain and Major ranks (Cohen, 1984, p. 88). Mian Tufail succeeded Maududi as the second Amir of JI in October 1972. Despite leaving the office of Amir Maududi remained as influential figure in the decision making process of the party (Bahadur, 1978).

In 1973 an alliance of religious political parties, JI, JUI, and Markazi Jammat-i-Ahle Haadis under the name of United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed to pressurized the government, Bhutto counter them effectively by taking preemptive measures. Islam was declared as the state religion, Ahmadi's were declare non-Muslim minority, record number of persons were allowed to perform Hajj, Friday was declared as a national holiday, Holy Quran was introduced in the curriculum. The UDF which was built against the Bhutto's government started to become in favor of the government. Out of all these developments JI was satisfied by earning close ties with the Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it is also believed that the formation of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) also has the backing of Saudi Arabia the alliance which emerged in 1977 and challenged PPP in 1977 elections. JI supported the alliance organization as well as ideologically. Maududi presentation of Islamic revivalism provided it with an alternative approach and also helped in providing rhetoric and religious statement in the campaign (Esposito, 1980, pp. 341-342).

The Bhutto regime came to an end of 5th July 1977 as a result of Military coup, during his trial Bhutto confessed that it was his mistake to appoint Gen Zia as an Army Chief because he has strong connection with the JI Leadership (Maududi and Main Tufail). It was during Bhutto's democratic era that JI got a bargaining power role in Pakistani politics. The issue like Ahmadi's declaration as a non-Muslim community, and declaration of Islam as the state religion of Pakistan occurred under that period. Bhutto second tenure came to an end as a result of Gen Zia's military coup on 5th July 1977. Prior to military intervention JI had developed close ties with general Zia during PNA task with PPP from March to June 1977. JI fully endorsed and appreciated military coup as its leadership had belief that military establishment will provide political opportunities. Similarly Gen Zia also accepted JI alliance as He also wanted to strengthen his power base. In past, JI faced severe restrictions of Ayub Khan Regime, but it was

during Yahya Khan's rule that JI was included in the power structure of government. After remaining in opposition during Ayub's Era, the two tenures of Bhutto, and the crushing defeat in 1977 elections JI found a new ray of hope in the shape Gen Zia to enter power corridors. Gen Zia Islamization project was fully supported by JI under the leadership of Mian Tufial (Joshi, 2003, pp. 76-78).

It was on the suggestion of JI that Islamic penalties were enforced in July 1977. Such laws were used to eliminate opposition forces especially PPP. The institution like police was also observing such act as no complaints or reports were being field unless it has an oath certification from the religious authority of that locality. JI justified its support for Zia regime by claiming to put Pakistan on the track of its Islamic foundation because Bhutto had demolished the ideological foundation of Pakistan (Joshi, 2003, pp. 85-86). Amid all these developments Mian Tufail came up with a pragmatic approach by declaring in a press conference at Multan in July 1977 that PNA has become a united political force. Furthermore he said that previously JI had maintained its identity in the alliance because JI is not only a political party but also an Islamic movement the party is ready to merge itself in PNA and contest election. Mian Tufail was convinced the JI in an independent capacity could not attain a political response it is expecting. This pragmatic approach of Mian Tufail did not go well with the stance of Maududi. Maududi quickly responded by declaring such approach as an illegitimate one. Maududi asserted that JI has its own distinctive nature which cannot be merged into any political alliance. He added that by prioritizing political objectives will resulted in compromising the revolutionary approach of the party. However, Maududi because of his health problems remained inactive during that whole period he died on 22 September 1979 in the Buffalo state of USA (Nasr, 1994).

Following his death intra party discontent started to increase as Maududi's son Mohammad Farooq expressed his grievances and level serious charges against the party leadership and government of Pakistan. He blamed that the body of Maududi was also delayed because of the local elections of 25th September 1979, on the request of Mian Tufail and Gen Zia. After Maududi demise Tufail became powerful within JI and due to his close relationship with Gen Zia Tufail played an influential role during Zia's military rule in the country. JI gave full support to military rule and supported Zia during the early political crisis to his regime during the times of Bhutto's trial and prosecution and JI was rewarded for its pro government approach. After successfully dealing with serious political crisis Zia became powerful ruler and in October 16th 1979 he imposed a real martial law in which he banned all the political activities of the political parties and freeze their funds. Moreover, the elections of November 1979 were postponed Zia after Bhutto's execution seemed no serious challenge to his military rule. JI during that period also was in state of confusion the party had lost its chief ideologue, the moderate faction of the party headed by vice president Ghafour Ahmad was sidelined and Mian Tufail's narrative of conservatism prevailed during that era. Despite the fact that Tufail did not had the charisma or intellectual capabilities to match Maududi leadership stature and provide efficient leadership to the party. However, his close relations with Gen Zia helped and his group to get ascendance in JI. It was during this era that the party focused on strengthening itself in the province of Punjab the party started to sideline its ideological stance and started to focus on power grabbing process (Iqtidar, 2010).

Mian Tufail endorsement of Zia's Islamization project created clear cleavage between the Moderate Group represented by the Karachi faction of the Party and the conservative group headed by the Punjab faction of the party. The narrative of the later prevailed because of its

dominance within the party and also its access to the power corridors of Zia's regime. Both Gen Zia and Mian Tufail belonged to the same clan "Arryan" from East Punjab resulted in building close ties between them. During this whole era of cooperation with Zia the party went through serious intra party conflicts and serious organizational issues. The Karachi group within the party led by prominent figures of the party including Prof Ghafoor Ahmad, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, and Jam Muhammad Abbasi time and again proposed to develop relationships with the newly formed opposition front Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Ghafoor tried his best to make JI close to MRD. However, his efforts did not succeed because of Tufail's and his group (Punjab Group) dominance in the party. During this era the party also went through serious financial crisis because various industrialists and other business persons withdraw their financial support to the party as a new political group Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) emergence in Karachi. JI decision to support Zia's regime made serious dissensions in the party which were evidently seen in as in 1983 the Quetta branch of the party was disbanded on account of their criticism over party leadership. In order to reestablish the party political image and unity Prof Ghafoor reiterated that the party should rethink its policy and it should work with the opposition forces in trying to bring back democracy in the country (Nasr, 1993, pp. 272-273).

However, Mian Tufail and JI remained to continue its support for the military rule of Zia. The party leadership again in conflict over the issue of its support for Zia's referendum Prof Ghafoor abstained his vote because he suggested that the process of referendum would not fill the political vacuum existed in the country. The non-party based elections of 1985 and JI poor performance in it resulted in providing ground for the Karachi group of JI to demand for Mian Tufail's resignation and revision of party policy. However, Mian Tufail was satisfied with the elections results as he claimed that the party has improved its political position in comparison to

1970s elections. The frictions in the party started to increase during 1980s and by 1985 it was evidently observed as voices against Tufail leadership started to erupt continuously. His claims that party is intact remained doubtful. In response to the increased signs of bifurcation in the party Mian Tufail decided not to contest for the post of Amir for the third time (Joshi, 2003, pp. 122-123).

4.3. Qazi Hussain Ahmad Leadership Era and his Transformational efforts in JI (1987-2009)

Amid increased dissensions within the party ranks over the issues of its political and ideological approaches and Mian Tufail ouster from the race of party leadership intra party elections of JI were held in October 1987, which were contested among Prof Khurshid Ahmad one of the chief ideologue of JI, Jam Muhammad Amir of JI Sindh, and a relatively youthful and populist leader of JI Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Qazi Hussain was elected as the third Amir of JI on 15th October 1987 (Badar, 1988). His election to the office of Amir indicated the party wanted to inculcate populist trends within the organization and it wanted to reorient the political approaches of both Maududi and Tufail. Qazi success also indicated that the narrative of Karachi group prevailed among the party members because he represented the Karachi group of JI. Moreover, as the general secretary of the party in 1983 he had supported the idea to cooperate with MRD although later in the stage he also develop good relations with Gen Zia and became the chief advocate of Pakistan army role during Afghan Jihad (Iqtidar, 2011, p. 93).

Soon after assuming the office of JI Amir he started to draw new lines for the party to transform its political and ideological approaches. Unlike his predecessors (Maududi and Tufail) who did not give primary focus on socio economic issues of Pakistan and always prioritized cultural

issue like countering westernization impact over the society. Qazi on the other hand took populist stance starting to include domestic issues of the country in party policy. He highlighted the socio economic disparity in the society; raise his voice against the feudalism, criticized the capitalism, by doing so he tried to increase the party influence among the masses from the rural areas as well as urban lower middle class of the society. Moreover, He wanted to move JI towards an organization that is driven primarily by its political objectives along with its ideological one. The promotion of populist approach by the new Amir not only energized the Karachi Group of the party which remained under the shadow during Tufail's tenure, but it also helped in reorienting the political approach of the party which was damaged during the Zia rule (Nasr, 1993, pp. 75-76).

During Qazi tenure as a leader of JI serious efforts had been done to transform the political and ideological reorientation of JI but before highlighting those transformational efforts a brief background of Qazi Hussain Ahmad life and association with JI is necessary. Qazi H Ahmad was born on 12th of January 1938 in district Nowshera in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. His father Maulana Qazi Muhammad Abdur Rab was a religious scholar and had affiliation with (JUI Hind) and served as the president of it in KPK the then NWFP. Qazi H. Ahmad was named after the prominent figure of JUI(H) Maulana Hussain Ahmad. Qazi was youngest among his ten siblings. He got his early education from his father. However, he completed his Master's degree in Geography from university of Peshawar and started his career as a lecturer which lasted for three years and after that he started his own business of medicine. Although his father was affiliated with JUI he chose to follow the path of his elder brothers Dr Attiq-ur-Rehman and Qazi Atta-ur-Rehman and join Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT) during his college days. At the age of thirty two in 1970 he became the member (*Rukn*) of the party and

because of his devotion, and leadership abilities in 1978 he became the general secretary (*Qayyim*) of JI (Fayyaz, 1998, p. 110).

In JI he was representative of Karachi group one of the two powerful groups within JI. During the leadership tenure of Mian Tufail he actively raises the concerns of his group. However, later in the stage he also became in line with Zia's regime policies and was the chief advocate of his Afghan Jihad policy. It was in 1987 that frictions in the party was so immense that Mian Tufail refused to run for the office of Amir and it paved the way for Qazi Hussain Ahmad to emerged as the new leader of JI after his election to the office of Amir he started to transform the overall political and ideological approach of his party in accordance to the changing socio economic and political dynamics domestically as well as internationally (Nasr, 1993, p. 277).

4.3.1. Transformational efforts of Qazi Hussain Ahmad in JI

Qazi Hussain Ahmad election to the office of Amir was considered as the party moving towards populism rather than going back to its theological stance or continuation of alliance with the military regime. Despite the fact that Qazi emerged as a prominent figure in the JI ranks during Zia's military rule. However, soon after assuming the leadership role of JI he started his efforts to revise the party policy towards military rule in the country. Moreover, he also introduced some organizational changes within the party previous organizational structure and also tried to transform JI previous political and theological approaches. He introduced the category of member on organizational level as the party had an arduous and long process for the individual to become a member (*Rukn*). The rationale to introduce this new category was targeted with a purpose to increase the mass base of the party and with the aim to registered five million

members for the party from all across the country. The party at that time had twenty thousand members (*Arakeen*) in the country (Badar, 1988).

The changing socio political trends in the country tended new leader of JI to make some adjustments to benefit from these prevailing new trends. Qazi's move to make this structural adjustment within the organization was intended to increase and strengthen populist approach in JI. In post Zia era democracy was introduced in the country as well as Afghan War also came to an end now the party wanted to focus its attention on domestic issues and make space for itself in the democratic opening in the country and that required expansion of the party among the masses (Iqtidar, 2011, pp. 93-94). Besides this structural adjustment Qazi was also quick in changing the political and theological narratives of JI. He started to criticize the feudal system and prevailing neoliberal globalization trends within the country although JI itself also benefitted from these prevailing economic activities in the country. However, in his speeches Qazi continuously criticized socio economic policies of the governments and declared it to be the major reasons of increased disparity in the society. He directed party workers to highlight the issues of rural population, and lower middle class of the country.

Qazi's populist approach was very much in line with the Karachi group of the party and in his initial days he utilizes this support to the maximum. This transformation in JI approach resulted in building some common grounds with the opposition political forces headed by PPP who were also building their criticism over the same issues of Zia's regime. Surprisingly, he started to criticize Zia policies and declared that there is no justification for the dictatorship or abrogation of democracy in the country because of Afghan War or the implementation of Islamization. Furthermore, he criticize the government for providing only lips service to the process of Islamization as no practical steps had been taken to transform the judicial, bureaucratic, and

political structure of the country. This transformed political approach of the JI prevailed within the party as it refused to support government on 8th Amendment in 1973 constitution, and also on *Shariat* Bill introduced by the government because both these steps were aimed to increase the powers of the then president. The friction between JI and Zia started to increase because this new political approach was not only supported by the Karachi group but was also endorsed by the Punjab group as they also felt betrayed by the Zia's regime (Nasr, 1993, p. 278).

A complete ground for the breakup among the relations occurred when Qazi declared that the main architect of Afghan policy was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto a democrat rather than Zia ul Haq. The major drivers behind this revised policy of Qazi and JI was not only to adjust according to the changing political dynamics of the country but also to break ice with the political forces of the country. Because the party had remained in alliance with the military regime for almost a decade which had created serious dent to the political, social, and ideological status of the party. Despite the fact that party had enjoyed an easy access to the power corridors during as a result of its previous alliance however, it had lost its mass presence in Karachi that was the major power house of JI to Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and it also had made various compromises over its ideological positions (Joshi, 2003, p. 144).

Parting of path with Zia was evidently observed when the newly appointed Amir (Qazi) clearly declared that JI is open to cooperate with the political forces of the country. This shift of policy was aimed to normalize its relations with the PPP. For that purpose Qazi himself met with the leadership of PPP Farooq Laghari in Lahore. Whereas, Prof Khurshid conducted meetings with Benazir Bhutto in Karachi this normalization of relations resulted in invitation to JI to join MRD which was in formally accepted by Qazi. After the dismissal of Junejo government on 29th May 1988 Karachi group of the party declare this action of the government as the reversion to

autocracy/dictatorship by Zia. JI disassociated itself from this act of Zia and responded by announcing that it will join the opposition political forces against this action (Rehman, Sahibzada, & Ahmad, 1999).

The policy shift of JI and its new leader was initially supported by the party as an organization but once JI leadership and Karachi group of the party were determined to join MRD, the Punjab group which has sympathies with Zia started to back out and started its criticism over such transformation of the party and labeled it as the deviation from ideological position by join the left to the center opposition of the country. Besides, this internal organizational resistance against the Qazi's leadership different party platforms and likeminded people of the rightist and conservative groups including scholars and journalists started to criticize the political transformation process of Qazi. On the other hand PPP wanted to secure JI support because the elections were at the corners and the opposition wanted to increase its spectrum of influence. Finally, MRD and JI reached on an agreement on three point agenda that included first and foremost, the elections should be conducted on party basis, secondly, the elections must be schedule to be held within 90 days, and lastly, the elections must be held under the agreement of 1977 between PNA and PPP. Consensus over these three points agreement was aimed at the induction of JI in the MRD. However, when this proposal was put before the consultative body (Shura) of JI it out rightly rejected it. The Shura was predominantly composed of the members form Punjab and NWFP (now KPK) and they did not approve the proposal. The Shura was reluctant to JI inclusion in MRD because of the reason that JI did not wanted to be the part of an alliance that was led by woman (Benazir Bhutto) (Badar, 1988, p. 71)

Mian Tufail an ex-Amir of the party started to oppose Qazi suggestion to join MRD. Although during initial stages he supported Qazi and party decision of parting ways with the government

of Zia but the party decision to make an alliance with PPP made him uncomfortable and many other members of the party. Tufail used the support of these members against Qazi. Moreover, Tufail was also supported by the right wing political forces, individuals, and journalists. All those elements commonly started to criticize JI leadership leaning towards the leftists' political forces. *Takbir* a magazine widely read and platform for interactions among the JI members, workers and also by the other right wing political parties' workers provided a platform to these conservatives in the party to pressurize and reverse this new political approach of Qazi (Nasr, 1994).

Salah-ud-Din the owner of the magazine started to continuously remind in his writings the suffering of JI went through during Z.A Bhutto era. Besides, this also highlighted through his writings that by joining MRD JI would actually surrender its ideological position and it would result in diminishing the actual foundation purpose of it. In the past the magazine was used to propagate the JI agenda now it had come at odds with the new leader transformation policies. The impact of *Takbir* the magazine was important because it was not only read by the JI workers but also the masses that had inclinations towards right and right of the center politics. As a result of internal discontent in the party and criticism from majority circles JI withhold its decision to join MRD. On the other hand some of the party workers in Karachi attacked the office of the magazine and burned its copies. Similarly, the Punjab group of the party though shares the same narrative that is endorsed by Salah-ud-Din but still it was annoyed and unhappy by the after effects of this whole situation because it was considered by the party that it had influenced the party decisions and created divisions within the party ranks (Tufyal, 1988).

Qazi was quick to respond slowdown the pace of his transformational process of the party. Because of the people attention towards these developments, division within the party, and JI did

not wanted to lose its majority vote bank which belonged to the rural population of province Punjab and NWFP and they have strong religious sentiments. Besides the fact that the changing dynamics of Pakistani Politics required some radical changes in the political approach of JI however, at that point because of the fear of repercussions for the party and lack of organizational support Qazi had to hold his pragmatic approach and leadership started to rethink the pace of transformational process. Qazi in order to do damage control and counter the division within the party ranks also continue to criticize Zia's regime and on the other hand also started to revise early stance of joining MRD and expressed his reservations over joining the alliance. On one hand he started to criticize Zia's policy of engagement with the United States (US) and blamed him for creating ethnic and sectarian divide in the society, nurturing of corruption, and disaccord among the political forces of the country the party magazines and editorials were used to highlight these issues of Zia's regime. On the other hand, the party also finally decided not to join the opposition alliance of MRD and after few internal party meetings and the sudden death of Gen Zia in an air crash on 17th of August 1988 the Shura decided not to join MRD. Despite the fact that the new leadership of the party wanted to prioritize the pragmatic approach (Political approach) but because majority of the party rank and file was not with him, he was not allowed to surrender party religious tendencies in favor of its political interests (Nasr, 1994; Rehman, Sahibzada, & Ahmad, 1999).

However, the worse performance in 1988 gen elections and changing political dynamics in the post-Zia era Qazi was provided with the space to pursue his reorientation process. In this era a major shift in the socio political and economic structure of the country occurred. PPP govt under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto started to develop relations with the elite groups of the country. Moreover, some structural adjustments were made to facilitate the organizations of International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to pursue their policies. These initiatives of the new democratic government were welcomed by the elite groups of the country as they were the main beneficiaries of these policies. Both IMF and World Bank sanction loans to the new government in return of the privatization policy. In the era of 1990s the economic policies of both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif remained same although both were politically different as the former has center-to-the- left political approach whereas the later represented the center-to-the right politics but economically both adopted neoliberal globalization approach the dominant approach of that era (Iqtidar, 2011, p. 545).

As far as, both the leaders relations with JI is concerned it had predominantly remained a cold one. During these whole developments and democratic opening in the country the new leadership of JI started to transform the party into a pure modern political party that was open to all likeminded people the major objective behind this policy transformation was to give the people of the country the third political option. Qazi wanted that the party should adopt a modern political party structure and set aside its credentials as the purist organization. This proposal of Qazi was a move towards transforming JI into a pure political party which has religious reference. Moreover, JI had to create a fresh start for itself because during Mian Tufail tenure as the party Amir the party had remained under the clutches of Military and because of the transformed economic conditions of the country military also focused its attention to acquire the maximum out of it and keep on hold its political intentions (Nasr, 1994, p. 91).

Under the Leadership of Qazi a major political attitude of the party was evidently observed. Like it was never expected from JI leader to declare that ordained sins is a matter between God and the sinner (Joshi, 2003, p. 188). Resultantly, Jam Sadiq Ali publically confessed about his drinking. Moreover, Qazi also refused to support Muslim League in their campaign of character

assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Similarly, Qazi Hussain also demanded for land reforms in the province of Sindh this was also observed as the major policy shift in JI politics because in the past JI was against the land reform project introduced by Z.A Bhutto in 1970s. Furthermore, this demand was also included by JI in the manifesto of *Muttahida Majlis Amal* (MMA) a religious political parties alliance which also demanded the abolishment of feudalism and distribution of lands among the peasants and farmers. During his public speeches Qazi frequently raised anti-feudal slogans, by declaring them the legacy of imperialism (Iqtidar, 2011, p. 95; Joshi, 2003).

The democratic opening in the country forced the new leadership of JI to readjust the policies that it pursued during Zia's Era. In order to increase the mass presence of the party the new leadership was aware that it had to incorporate populist trends in the party political approach. Qazi's radical change in the party policy from previously anti land reforms to a pro land reform approach worked well for the party as the mass appeal for the party started to increase. By adding land reforms in their political campaigns that wanted to target the rural masses as Pakistan still is an agricultural dominant society and most of the parties were reluctant to include anti feudal slogans because of the fear of losing the strong feudal members in their parties JI came up and include this issue in their manifesto . Soon after Qazi Hussain appointment as Amir of the JI it was observed that pragmatic approach in the party policies prevailed as compare to the ideological one (Nasr, 1994).

Historically, the party has shared the worldview of US but during the Gulf War the party initially glorified the role of Saddam Hussain but later on after Saudi Arabia reservations JI withdrew its previous stance. In domestic politics various challenges emerged in front of JI which included, the frictions started deepen with its political allies in the IJI, its role was minimize in the NWFP by the reemergence of Awami National Party (ANP) Pashtun ethnic political group of the

province. Similarly, the JI also lose its strong hold in Karachi to another ethnic political group MQM. JI growing differences with Nawaz Sharif and JI leadership started to criticize the government as they felt betrayed over various issues finally it resulted in its disassociation from JJI on 1st of May 1992. And aiming the 1993 elections the party came up with the formation of Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) it was portrayed as the third political force of the country along with PML and PPP. PIF was a pure electoral force and its manifesto was based on following principles, the implementation of Islamic principles, provincial autonomy, development of the system of accountability, ensuring the rights of minorities, providing basic rights to women, abolishment of feudalism from the country (Joshi, 2003, pp. 190-191). These slogans attracted a large number of former civil servants, military personal, and businessmen from all across the country to join PIF platform. This time Qazi Hussain also earned the support of Vice President of the JI Prof Ghafoor Ahmad and General Sectary Khurram Jan Murad. A full fledge election campaign under the leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmad was launched in which PIF was presented as an alternative political option to the masses (Fayyaz, 1998, p. 44).

The election campaign was successful and it attracted the attentions of the masses as well as the observers as PIF was seemed to perform better in the elections. However, it failed to transcend in gaining the masses votes and results of 1993 general elections were worse than what was expected from it. PIF only succeeded in obtaining three national assembly seats and only six provincial assembly seats and it clearly indicated that the people of Pakistan has rejected the fundamentalist alternative for the country. The elections results also surprise Qazi Hussain and now he was convinced to make some structural as well as well ideational adjustments in the conservative approach of JI. Such proposal gave rise to opposition within the party ranks from the traditionalists' voices in the party and they strongly reject the proposal of Qazi

transformation of JI into a liberal political party or any reorientation in its ideological position. Earlier this group was also against the formation of PIF but because of the mass appeal for PIF during election campaigns and elections just in the corner their voice was not that much effective. However, the poor performance of PIF in the elections gave strength to their narrative. Despite these oppositions and organizational restrains Qazi was convinced that the only path for JI to play its role effectively and implement its program is only possible through its majority in the parliamentary politics and this objective according to him cannot be achieved until or unless these structural and policy adjustments are incorporate in JI (Keskin, 2009).

He was convinced that Islamization slogans alone cannot provide space for the party in the political arena of the country. JI conservative faction feared Qazi's intentions of bringing structural adjustments in JI. The intra party criticism also highlighted the electioneering campaign strategies of PIF that included the use of electronic instruments and playing of party anthems and slogans during the process which were considered completely against the party norms. However, the supporters of Qazi justify the use of these modern tools by giving the rationale that the party wanted to attract the non-urban masses of the society and it was necessary for PIF to incorporate all these modern means in their election campaign. It was for the first time that JI was independently participating in the elections of 1993. As a result of growing discontent in the party rank and file Qazi resigned from the office of Amir and Mian Tufail was reelected as an Amir of JI that indicated that as an organization JI wanted to block the path towards transformation. However, Qazi strongly believed that the party must have to adopt his proposed reform in order to create space for itself in the electoral process of the country (Joshi, 2003, p. 195; Fayyaz, 1998).

In the post 1993 era JI played the active role of opposition against both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif governments. During his second tenure as a Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif portrayed himself as a dedicated person towards the Islamization process of the country. In order to strengthen his political grounds and to gain the religious political parties under his fold in 1998 he proposed to implement Sharia in the country. However, his government was overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf. JI response towards military coup was neutral because in the past JI had suffered a great deal and its opponent often criticized it for the support it double-standards that on one hand they raised the slogans against US and promote itself as the supporters of democracy. Whereas in practice JI supports the military dictators backed by the US by giving reference of JI support to the Zia's regime (Keskin, 2009, p. 143).

The US invasion in Afghanistan after 9\11 attacks resulted in the increasing anti US sentiments as well as the increase in the religious sentiments of the people. These whole new developments provided religious parties with an opportunity to increase their sphere of influence and utilize these sentiments of the masses in their favor. Qazi Hussain started to unite the religious political forces of the country and he was successful when in 2002 the five religious political parties made an electoral alliance called Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and using the platform they contested elections. MMA was successful in using the public sentiment in their favor and it acquire sixty two national assembly seats and form government in the provincial assembly of NWFP and were the part of government in Balochistan assembly. It was for the first time that religious political parties got that much strength in the elections. Although the political alliance of MMA came to existence in 2002 however the roots of this organization belonged to another organization called "Milli Yakjehti Council" (MYK) which was also founded by Qazi Hussain

Ahmad and basic purpose of the organization was to build religious harmony among different sect of the Muslims (Fayyaz, 1998).

He was successful in diffusing the sectarian differences among the Muslims and it resulted in Shia's and Sunni's started to offer prayers commonly in different places. The alliance of MMA lasted for the period of six years as issues started to erupt among different leaders over different political interests and objective of the leader. Especially, the difference of opinion between Qazi Hussain and Maulana Fazl-ur- Rehman whose candidates were in majority as far as electoral results are concerned. Finally the decision of Qazi to boycott the elections of 2007 resulted in breaking the MMA alliance. He was criticized by the other groups of the alliance for his decision along within the party inner circles as well. However, he was determined and remained constant over his decision (Bhutto, 2012, p. 155). It was in 2009 that Qazi Hussain Ahmad refused to run for the office Amir because his health reasons and with that came to an end the era of his twenty two years of continuous struggle as the party Amir to transform JI into a modern political party that prioritize populist trends. However, the party refused to surrender its ideological and revolutionary approach as these trends were and still is supported by the strong organizational structure and traditionalist ideational trends within JI. As the party responded by replacing Qazi Hussain by electing Munawar Hassan as JI fourth Amir to the office which was clear indications that the party wanted to restore its traditionalist identity. He continued his struggle both from the party platform and various other to convey his vision and future of JI. Finally, his struggle came to an end when he died on 6th of January 2013 (Usman, 2014).

To sum up, Qazi Hussain emergence to the office of Amir was signified as the prevailing of populist tendencies within JI he responded to the challenge and started his struggle to transform the party political approach. Some of his steps included the introduction of easy membership

process in order to open JI for the masses in 1997 he conducted a membership registration campaign and 4.5 million people accepted JI program and registered with JI. It was the accomplishment of his objective of expanding the influence of JI among the masses and registration five million members in his newly introduced category. Furthermore, he was the first Amir of JI to lead the door to door election campaign of the party as well as he was also the first Amir of JI who remain the member of the lower house (National Assembly member in 2002) as well as the Upper House (in Senate in 1985, and 1992). Moreover, he was the one to introduce the concept of Road Carnegie, Million March, and *Dharna* (sit in) politics in Pakistani politics that was one of the important factors in bringing down Benazir's government in 1997 (Usman, 2014, p. 338)

However he did not confined his focus only to the party political activities he also tried to expand its presence in the social activities for the purpose he developed an organization like *Pasban* (Protector) a youth wing organization of the party which covers the social activities of JI. Basic purpose of *Pasban* was to address the issues related to human rights, social and economic injustices in the society. However this effort of Qazi was also criticized within the party inner circles because of internal conflicts within the *Pasban*. Moreover, another youth organization was formed by the name of *Shabab-i-Milli* which also carried out the same social activities and is the official youth organization of JI. Moreover, to build religious harmony among different sects of the Muslims he formed MYK to address the interfaith differences among the Muslims of all the sects. His transformational efforts although has some impact upon JI but he was unsuccessful in transforming JI into an organization which prioritize its political objectives over its theological one. The following section will explain under the hypotheses and causal mechanism formed for this study that how his lack of transformational leadership skills, strong organizational structure

culture within JI, and dominant conservative ideational approach of JI members played its role in blocking the path towards transformation.

4.5. An Analysis of Transformation of Qazi Hussain Ahmad within JI through Transformational leadership Theory

i) Human Agent Role (Transformational Leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmad)

The transformational leadership theory adopted to conduct this study is based upon the principles, that (human agents) leaders in religious political parties are considered transformational leaders who along with political charisma also have the recognition as theological expert both within the party ranks and outside the rank and file of the party. Moreover the genealogical links of the leaders are also requiring earning recognition as the transformational leader in religious political parties. In case of Qazi Hussain Ahmad he was recognized as a populist charismatic leader within the party ranks. Soon after his election as the party Amir He started to promote pragmatic approach for JI and wanted his party to completely focused and engaged in the political activities of the country and adaptation of the modern trends. As discussed in detail he took various steps to transform the political approach of the party as well as he made some structural and ideational adjustments in JI approach. His aim was to transform JI into a pure political party rather than a revivalist organization because the changing democratic culture and emerging socio-economic structures demanded that. His reform ideas attracted the average members of the party. However, he faced strong criticism and resistance from the intellectual core and conservative faction of the party and JI being a cadre party effectively blocked the path of Qazi transformation. Different party platforms were used to criticize the proposed transformation process. Moreover, these opposing voices were successful because of some of the leadership liabilities of Qazi Hussain

Ahmad. First and foremost the theological expertise of Qazi came to question. Despite the fact that he was successful in gaining the support of the grass root members, but because of his lack of theological expertise within the party cadre provided space to the opposing voices. The party historically owns the figure like Maududi who not only has been recognized on national level but is also recognized as one of the leading Islamic thinkers overshadows the persona of Qazi. It was hard for Qazi to transform the guidelines determined by the JI founder Maududi. The opposing faction against the transformation process of Qazi used the shelter of Maududi to strengthen their voice. Secondly, the genealogical link within a religious political is an important factor Qazi that link of him was also missing as his ancestors were not affiliated with JI his father was affiliated with JUI. Lastly, Qazi proposed pragmatic approach for JI to prioritize its political objectives also failed to achieve its desired objectives as the party failed to obtain electoral results and was not accepted by the voters further weaken his position to promote his transformational approach. Because of these liabilities on human agent level (Qazi as a transformational leader) the conservative and revivalist approach within JI prevailed in JI in the post-Qazi leadership Era.

ii) Structural Factor (Rigid Organizational Culture in JI)

Secondly, the efforts to implement progressive political approach in a revivalist and conservative political organization are to synchronize successfully the theological beliefs and political objectives of the group and it needs the support of structural factor (pro-reforms institutional culture) in the organization to facilitate the path towards transformation. One of the reasons that blocked the progressive reforms introduced by Qazi in JI was the strong resistance from the conservative theological core within the party which dominated the decision making process in the organizational structure of the party. Despite the fact that JI emerged as a result a modernist religious political and social organization in the twentieth century however with times and

various political and social developments within and outside the country transform it into an organization that is predominantly occupied by the conservative and traditionalist school of thought at decision making level (rigid institutional culture). Maududi founded JI with the aim to provide Islamic alternative to the people of Sub-Continent as they were indoctrinated and inspired by the Western political systems. Moreover, he also believed that no religious political alternative was available to the Muslims in the region. By using the references of Quran and Sunnah (Traditions of The Prophet Muhammad (SAW)) he started to motivate and make awareness among the people. Since its inception JI went through the crisis of difference of opinion among the powerful personalities within the group that transform JI into an organization that has strong organizational structure. In the politics of Pakistan JI portray itself as the sole promoters of Islamization in the country. JI along with other religious political forces did their effort to pressurize and convince different governments of the country to include Islamic provisions in the constitution that is discussed in detail in the previous section of the chapter. The revivalist tendencies in JI as a party and in Pakistani society started to increase in the post 1979 era. The Iranian Revolution followed by the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan work as a catalyst to increase religious fundamentalism within the country via religious social and political organization. In case of JI the chief ideologue of the part Maududi also passed away in the same year, Mian Tufail became completely empowered and JI became full time supporter of Zia's regime and started to promote his Islamization project. Being an active party in the promotion of Afghan War against the Soviets the traditionalist and revivalist tendencies started to strengthen its roots in JI. Moreover, the core of its organizational structure also was dominated by those members who endorse and support these tendencies. Under the leadership of Tufail who was supported by Zia's regime the Lahore group a traditionalist and conservative faction in the party

got strength and started to dominate the decisions of JI. Whereas, the Karachi group which support the pragmatic approach for the part in the country politics sidelined. Qazi in JI represented a Karachi group however, he played active role in Zia's Afghan Jihad policy. Later on, when he assumed the powers of Amir he was confronted on his various decisions as a party Amir by this conservative faction in the party and they successfully blocked his transformational efforts using the rigid institutional culture of JI.

In initial days of Qazi's leadership this traditionalist faction did not responded because they were recovering from the damages the party suffered because of following traditionalist approach during Zia's regime. However, after the emergence of new socio-economic and political issues this conservative group became active and used the strength of the organizational structure to block Qazi pragmatic approach, of incorporating populist tendencies, and prioritization of democratic approach rather than theological one. The traditionalist faction (Lahore group) was successful in blocking the path of Qazi efforts to transform JI into a pure political organization.

iii) Ideational Factor (Conservative Ideational approach of JI)

Lastly, the study analyzes the role of ideational factor and the process of transformation in JI. It was formed by Maulana Maududi with the objective to safeguard the interests of Muslims of the Sub-Continent. He believed that no Muslim political party could succeed in the socio-political setup of the country until or unless the Muslim community becomes morally virtuous and perform their duties in accordance to the true spirits and principles lay down by Islam. Moreover, he truly believed that a number of people in the party does not matters, what matters more is the party members is their actions and dedication towards the cause of their party. He was the great admirer of Prophet Mohammad (SAW) for His organizational genius. Maududi inspiration

comes from the fact that how in short span of time and limited number of devoted followers the Prophet Mohammad (SAW) triumphed. He believed that following this model JI could do the same in the Sub-Continent. He wanted to develop a community that is segregated from the larger community (of Muslims) yet it will inspire the other to follow them because of their moral character and practical actions. Hence JI started as a missionary organization composed of holy community with emphasis on character building and ideational development of its members (Nasr, 1994, p. 17).

The membership process of JI was a unique one, the membership is granted to those individuals once the party is convinced that the person qualifies the require needs determined by the party. JI portray itself as the vanguard of Islamization process in the country. The training of its members is conducted to inculcate strong ideational commitment to the party objectives and to resist any diversions from the ideological position of the party by any individuals within or from outside of the party. Resultantly, even Maududi the founder and chief ideologue of the party at different time and period faced severe internal resistance from the party rank and file when he tried to compromise the ideological position of the party and so did Mian Tufail his successor. When Qazi Hussain Ahmad took over as the party leader he started to make some structural adjustments in the party organizational structure to make it compatible with the emerging socio-economic and political trends (neo-liberal globalization) in the country. He wanted to prioritize the political objectives of the party to compete with the other political parties, because of the democratic opening in the country. To achieve his objectives he introduced and proposed various structural and ideational reforms in JI. However, JI ideationally is dominated by the conservative group and it was hard for Qazi to ideational transform and overcome these tendencies because of his liabilities as a transformational leader (lack of theological expertise and genealogical links

within the party). Moreover, the theologically conservative narrative also prevailed in the party because of their strength in the organizational structure of JI. All the above discussed human agent role, structural element, and ideational factor resulted in the failure of transformational process in JI.

4.6. Conclusion

Under the chapter analysis has been made to observe the process of transformation with in JI using the frame work of transformational leadership theory that is device for this study, it explains that why and how the leadership failed to institutionalize and implement their transformation project. Contrary, to the theological reorientation of Ennahda of Tunisia, the process of transformation in JI was not successful, because it failed to counter the anti-transformation narrative developed by its opponents. The process of transformation was successfully blocked by the traditionalist and revivalist faction within the party, who believe that the implementation and institutionalization of these reform ideas will result in changing the ideological and theological orientation of their political party as a revivalist and puritan religious socio-political party. The case study of JI in this study represents the unsuccessful reform pathway device under the transformational leadership theory. It highlight the reasons that result in the failure of religious political parties to implement the reform ideas, if the ideas conduct by the transformational leaders are resisted by the organizational structure of the party or either the ideational frame work of the party it remain static and conservative.


The process of transformation in JI started after the election of Qazi H Ahmad as the party Amir. His election as the leader was considered by many observers as well as within the party as the victory of populist approach within the party. As a party head Qazi did his effort to influence the

role of JI in the political sphere of Pakistan. He started his struggle for transforming JI into a pure political democratic party with Islam as a source of its influence. This vision of Qazi to change the political trajectory and ideological stance of the party earned the support of the followers. He started his efforts for the unification of religious vote bank under one plate form, elimination of sectarian divide among religious political parties, also did his effort to make alliance with the leftist political groups of the party . However, these efforts of Qazi and his likeminded supporters did not went well with hardliners in the party ranks, they made periodic interventions in blocking the path of Qazi's proposed reforms . This study highlights following reasons responsible for the failure of the transformation in JI.

First and foremost, human agent factor in the process of transformation, in spite of Qazi H Ahmad recognition as a charismatic leader in the leadership cadre of JI, in religious political party theological expertise for the leader, is a mandatory feature to be recognized as a transformational leader that was lacking in the case of Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Moreover, the genealogical link of Qazi in JI was also missing, his predecessors were never the part of JI whereas, the group who were supporting the revivalist and traditionalist position for the party, might not matched the political charisma of Qazi but in theological expertise and genealogical links of those leaders were strong. In addition, the presence of Maududi the founding father and chief ideologue of JI compromised the position of Qazi to challenge his thoughts. The second factor is the structural one (pro-reforms organizational culture) the reform efforts of Qazi and his supporters was neutralized by the structural factor the longstanding conservative and traditionalist approach in JI. As an organization JI was not ready to transform from its conservative theological position and by having the support of rigid and dominant organizational structure they succeeded in blocking the path of transformational efforts of Qazi. The third, and

last factor is ideational one (liberal ideational framework) Qazi and his supporters also failed to overcome the conservative ideational framework of JI revivalists political approach. Ideational JI is predominantly represented in its rank and file by the theologically conservative members. It was hard for the Qazi to compromise JI ideological stance on certain issues so on ideational front he also was not successful. The reform efforts of Qazi in JI represent the unsuccessful reform pathway devise for this study.

Pattern of Unsuccessful Transformation Process in Jamaat-i-Islami



Source: Author's Own Construct

Process of Transformation in Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan

Time Period	Leader	Dominance on intra-party decisions	Political outlook of the Country	Nature of the Organization & Political Approach
1941-1947	Mawdudi	Leadership	Colonialism	Ideological Movement
1947-1954	Mawdudi	Leadership	Parliamentary Democracy	Pressure Group/Revivalist
1954-1958	Mawdudi	Leadership	Parliamentary Democracy	Cadre Party/Revivalist
1958-1972	Mawdudi	Leadership	Military Rule	Cadre Party//Revivalist
1972-1977	Mian Tufail	Organizational Structure/Consultative Body	Parliamentary Rule	Cadre Party//Revivalist
1977-1987	Mian Tufail	Organizational Structure/Consultative Body	Military Rule	Cadre Party//Revivalist
1987-1992	Qazi Hussain	Organizational Structure/Consultative Body	Parliamentary Democracy	Cadre Party/Conservative
1992-1997	Qazi Hussain	Organizational Structure/Consultative Body	Parliamentary Democracy	Mass based Political Party//Conservative
1997-1999	Qazi Hussain	Organizational Structure/Consultative Body	Parliamentary Democracy	Revolutionary Movement
1999-2007	Qazi Hussain	Western Educated	Military Rule	Mass based Party /Conservative
2007-2009	Qazi Hussain	Organizational Structure/Consultative Body	Parliamentary Democracy	Mass based Party/Conservative

Source: (Amin, 2010, pp. 133-134)

In the following chapter summarization of the many findings will be conducted and will arranged and explained under the theoretical framework device for this study. In the end the main contribution of this study will be highlighted.

Conclusions

The basic purpose of this study was to explore the role of leadership in the transformation process of religious political parties. It empirically focused on two Islamist political parties Ennahda of Tunisia under the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi and of Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan under the leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmed. The main focus of the study revolved around to inquire the possibility of change among the Islamic religious political parties. Moreover, to ascertain under which conditions, they could successfully transform themselves from one ideological position to another. The study analyzed that the successful transformation of an Islamist political party depended upon the presence of three important factors in these parties. These factors are human agent factor (transformational leader), structural factor (pro-reforms organizational culture), and ideational factor (liberal ideational framework). The trilateral alliance of the given three factors helps in the successful transformation of a religious political party and vice versa. It is maintained that a transformative leader in a religious political party needs intellectual capabilities (theological expertise) and genealogical links in alliance with organizational culture and ideational framework in order to introduce, promote, institutionalize, and implement his/her reformist ideas.

The research questions that had substantiated this research of the two case studies i.e. Ennahda and the JI were the following: what are possibilities in religious political parties to transform its theological and political orientation; why and how are some religious political parties are able to successfully transform while others failed to do so?; how does the presence of transformational leadership influence the process of transformation in these political parties that enable them to mobilize popular support in favor of their reforms?; how does the pro-reform organizational culture of these parties facilitate the job of the transformational leader?; in what way, the liberal

ideational framework of the organization facilitates the job of the transformational leadership in their reformation process?

The study attempted to bring forth that religious political parties are capable of change that transforms its theological and political orientation. This change is possible in the presence of a transformative leader. He must have the ability to synthesize theological ideas and modern emerging trends. As a result, he would be able to implement and institutionalize transformation in his respective organization. Such a transformative leader introduces and proposes new ideas in the light of his view that his party needs to be transformed its theological and political orientation. Such ideas help to address the challenges his organization has been faced with on account of the emerging socio-economic and political trends.

The transformative leaders obtain successfully the support for the process of their reformation process as soon as the majority within the party circle realized their intellectual capabilities. This is one of the important factors in the successful transformation of an organization. In the promotion of these new ideas, they work as trend setters and synchronized the theological beliefs with the modern socio-political trends of their respective societies. As a result, new frameworks are constructed and developed which replace the traditional and conservative orientation of their respective parties. The study attempted to find out the possibility of change in the Islamist political parties. Consequently, it highlighted the compatibility among Islam, modernity, democracy, and religious plurality. The process of transformation is successful when the transformative leader is able to earn the support of the majority of his organization convincing them through his leadership skills that these transformations were necessary in order to encounter the challenges they are faced with. The support of the majority helped leaders to overcome the internal institutional constraints against his process of transformation. As a result,

the support of organizational structure and of ideational strength successfully transformed the theological and political outlook of the party. Consequently, the party becomes liberal and progressive, and dispenses the conservative and traditionalist orientation.

The study analyzed the case of Ennahda of Tunisia and of Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan in the light of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs. Both the parties had a theologically conservative and traditionalist orientation. The leadership of both the parties has had various challenges. They faced resistance from within the parties and from the opposition and the state apparatus in their efforts towards transformation. The history of Ennahda stands witness to the state repressions at the hands of the authoritarian regimes of Bourgiba, and of Ben Ali. The JI also suffered from state repressions during Maududi's leadership. However, in the last days of his leadership and during Tufail's era, the situation was not so much bad. The JI allied itself to the military regime during this time. In Qazi's era, the JI too did not face any state repression.

Both the parties i.e. Ennahda and the JI underwent through the process of transformation. The transformation was the logical result of the state repression. The leadership in both the organizations justified their process of transformation as the best possible solutions to the challenges faced to their organizations as well as to the society. The leaders of both the parties emphasized on the importance of the implementation of the reformed ideas and the reconstruction of the theological and political approach of their organizations in order to meet the challenges that had been faced to both these organizations. The leadership in both the parties strived hard to overcome the challenges within their respective parties. As a result, they either succeeded or failed to succeed to institute transformation in their respective parties i.e. Ennahda and the JI.

The leadership of Ennahda kept intact the support of the religiously conservative quarters, of the conservative members in its organizational structure. They successfully obtained the vote bank of the secular section in Tunisian society that ensured its electoral success. On the other hand, the JI under the leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmad also maintained its political influence among the religious quarters of the country. Moreover, it increased its vote bank among the right-to-the-center section of the Pakistani society that strengthened its position in the parliament. However, the presence of dominant, rigid organizational structure in the JI did not allow him to transform the party fully. The traditionalist and conservative members of the party strongly resisted and rejected the implementation and institutionalization of Qazi Hussain Ahmad's transformative efforts. They had of the opinion that his transformative ideas were contravene to the ideological foundation of the JI.

The transformative leader attempts to use his intellectual capabilities (theological expertise), charisma, and negotiating skills to overcome resistance to his transformative efforts. On ideational level, he uses rhetoric and delivers persuasive speeches in favor of his transformative efforts that help him strengthen his position among his followers. As a result, he earns the support of the voters. Lastly, it also successfully overcomes the opposing faction within the group, and enables leaders to earn the support of organizational factor in their favor. Rachid Ghannouchi's and Qazi Hussain Ahmad's distinguished leadership, institutional cultures of Ennahda and the JI, and ideational responses towards the process of transformation put varied influences on the parties under research. The study revealed that Rachid Ghannouchi successfully implemented and institutionalized his transformative efforts. On the contrary, Qazi Hussain Ahmad failed to implement and institutionalize his reformative efforts in the JI. The study further brought forth that how the transformative leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi put its

influence on Ennahda and of Qazi on the JI in alliance with organizational structure and ideational framework.

Transformative leadership must be a religious expert and a political thinker. He is known not only in the party but also outside. Rachid Ghannouchi had intellectual capabilities, charisma, and also had genealogical link. He was one of the founding fathers of Ennahda. On the other hand, Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the JI had charisma but he did not possess intellect at par with the founding father and towering personality of Maulana Maududi. Moreover, Qazi had no genealogical link with the JI. He was not the founding father of the party. All these overshadowed Qazi's transformative efforts within the JI. The study further brought forth that transformative leaders employ leadership skills to convince the workers of their parties in order to obtain their support for the process of transformation. They use organizational structure as well as ideational measures and theological expertise to have institute transformation according to the demand of the situation. They make their party members believe that this transformation was necessary to achieve their objectives despite not in line with the ideology of their party. The JI made this kind of transformation in its eventful history. Maududi joined alliance under the leadership of Fatima Jinnah against General Ayub Khan in the elections. Similarly, MianTufail made alliance with the military regime of General Zia in order to enter directly to the power corridors. However, Qazi took anti-Zia stance and wanted to make alliance with the MRD. The MRD was a left-to-the-center opposition alliance. Benazir Bhutto of the PPP was the president of the alliance.

In the same vein, Ennahda changed its name in order to contest elections during Ben Ali's regime. The party even surrendered its demands of incorporation of *Sharia* in the constitution in the Post-Arab Spring democratic era in Tunisia. It made flexible its stance on women status in

the constitution. Moreover, it also made a coalition government with the secularist political party Nida Tounes of Tunisia. This shows that the leaders of both the parties made ideological compromises in order to execute their transformation project. They wanted to implement and institutionalize their long term objectives. They were of the belief that their transformative ideas had the potential and most viable solutions to the challenges faced to their parties and could transform the ideological outlook of their respective organization that would help in the socio-economic and political development of their respective country.

The study analyzed the questions that what are the essential conditions under which transformational leaders are successful in the re-orientation of religious political organization, and under what conditions the transformation process fail. The study attempted to bring forth that the successful implementation and institutionalization of theological and political transformative ideas depend upon the existence of human agent (transformative leader). This kind of transformative leader possesses characteristics that consist of intellectual capabilities (theological expertise), genealogical links with the party, and charisma. The process of transformation becomes certain if the structural factor (pro-reforms organizational culture) supports this. As a result, he is able to incorporate his transformative ideas in the party. The second factor that plays a crucial role in the success of transformative process is the ideational factor (liberal ideational approach) of the organization. A transformative leader uses his charisma and attempts to indoctrinate his thoughts through his persuasive speeches to the members and workers of his party. This is how structural and ideational factors facilitate the job of the transformational leaders and their efforts to transform the theological and political outlook of their respective organizations.

The study analyzed comprehensively the transformation of Ennahda and of the JI. Both the parties went through various transitional phases and obtained distinct theological and political orientations. Ennahda is a modernist, progressive and theological political party whereas the JI is a traditionalist theological political party. They had the history to influence the socio-political spheres of their respective countries. Leaders in both these two parties had continuously advocated the structural and ideational re-adjustments in the light of their theological and political approaches in order to transform socio-economic and political trends in their country. Both these parties started as pure traditionalist organizations. They worked to implement *Sharia* Law and strived to establish an Islamic state. However, with the passage of time, both the parties started to reconstruct their theological and political approaches to meet the needs of the time. As a result, they synchronized Islamic principles with the Western socio-political ideas like democracy, religious plurality, and universal human rights.

Both the parties adopted different causal reform-path ways due to distinct socio-political settings, leadership attributes, institutional culture, and ideational beliefs. In this process of transformation, Ennahda of Tunisia turned out to be a successful case of transformation under the leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi whereas Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan turned out to be an unsuccessful case of transformation under the leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmad. The process of transformation in Ennahda was successful on account of the transformative leadership of Rachid Ghannouchi. He introduced progressive reformist ideas. His charisma, theological expertise, and genealogical links helped him incorporate his ideas, and earned him the status of a transformative leader. As a result, he obtained the support of the majority of the party. On the basis of this transformative stature, he successfully overcame the opposing group within the

party. On the contrary, the process of transformation in the JI remained unsuccessful as Qazi Hussain Ahmad had no theological expertise and genealogical link with the party.

Ennahda had the culture that was conducive to the process of transformation. As a result, it adopted and incorporated new theological and political ideas. The role of the ideational element was also important that helped bring about the transformation of Ennahda. Ennahda had liberal ideational orientation and was conducive to incorporate secular trends prevailed in Tunisian society. As a result, both the followers and leadership of Ennahda were comfortable in incorporating modern political ideas in their organization. This alliance of the factors facilitated the path towards the successful transformation of Ennahda. In this whole process, Rachid Ghannouchi's transformative leadership in collaboration with the pro-reformist institutional culture and liberal ideational approach of his organization were worth mentioning in the successful transformation of Ennahda.

Ennahda since its inception went through various phases of transformation. It was a religious clandestine group that started struggle for identity. However, as a result of severe state repressions by Bourgiba and of Ben Ali regimes, it transformed into a protest and political movement. In the end, the movement became a national democratic party committed to reforms. It separated religion from politics. In the beginning, it started as a religious organization by the young university graduates. Its purpose was purely *Daawa* (preaching) at university campus and mosques on the pattern of *Tabligh-e-Jamaat* of Pakistan. Later on, it expanded its preaching activities to the social and religious issues of society through its magazine *Al-Maarifah* (the Knowledge). It also inculcated the local Tunisian customs and traditions in its interpretation and implementation of its religious thoughts under inspiration obtained from different emerging intellectual trends across the Muslim World.

The first transformation that Ennahda had undergone took place after bloody clashes erupted among the UGTT and the government authorities in order to counter the public pressure. Bourgiba regime announced democratic openness for all in Tunisia. The then Islamist Group (Ennahda) responded to this gesture of the government and openly started its activities. The group registered itself in the name of the MTI in 1981. Besides these domestic developments, the external developments in the Muslim World e.g. the Iranian Revolution (1979) also put effects on the MTI. As a result, it became politically active. It included socio-economic issues of the society in its agenda. It became more open to co-operate and make alliances with the social and political groups despite their opposite social, political ideologies. Similarly, Ghannouchi was greatly inspired by the Sudanese Islamic Movement especially by the importance of women involvement in the movement. This was the going out of the party from the influence of the *Salafi* and *Ikhwani* (Brotherhood). Despite under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, the MTI (Ennahda) blended different intellectual ideas and local traditions with its theological approach. Similarly, the party once more transformed during the initial days of Ben Ali's rule. The party also changed its name. It adopted new name Ennahda Movement Party in the light of Tunisian political party laws that prohibited parties with religious name to contest elections. Moreover, the party accepted the National Covenant of Ben Ali despite internal differences, and its secular nature. However, the post-elections era of Ennahda was marked with severe state repressions. As a result, the party went underground. A majority of its leadership and members were in prison and charged with severe penalties. Its other members left the state and went into exile. Ghannouchi was also in exile. It was during this period that Ghannouchi's thoughts started to transform. He started to accept more liberal ideas of the Western socio-political thoughts and successfully institutionalized his reformist ideas within his party. They were evident in Ennahda

10th National Congress held on 6th May 2016. The party leadership announced in the congress that the party had rebranded itself as a political party and separated preaching activities and the political activities. It had become a national political party.

The study further analyzed that Rachid Ghannouchi was of the founding father and the chief ideologue of the party. He successfully reconstructed the religious and political orientation of Ennahda. He transformed the traditionalist and conservative outlook into liberal and progressive one. He successfully synthesized islamic socio-political ideas with that of the Western ideas. He separated religion and politics. He accepted Western democratic norms, promoted religious plurality, and incorporated universal human rights principles. Under his leadership, Ghannouchi successfully transformed Ennahda's ideological stance to implement *Sharia* law. He sought the implementation of secular constitutional laws in Tunisia. He succeeded to convince the majority of the party over the inclusion of word *Sharia* in the constitution of Tunisia. It was one of the prime historical demands of Ennahda. However, the party surrendered its demand in order to make progress towards the democratization of the country.

Ghannouchi succeeded to implement and institutionalize in the party his reformist ideas on account of his transformative leadership, a leading Islamic scholar in Tunisia and in the world, his charisma, and genealogical links. He promoted his reformist ideas through his writing, lectures, and public sermons. He continuously kept in touch with his followers and the members of the party. As a result, he earned the status of a transformative leader. Consequently, this provided him a position to introduce liberal theological and political ideas, and successfully transformed Ennahda. Besides, a pro-reform institutional culture also facilitated the job of Ghannouchi. Ennahda started as a religious movement in order to preach. It slowly and steadily transformed into a protest movement. In the end, it became one of the national democratic

political parties of Tunisia. It historically adopted reconciliatory approach towards a democratic process within Tunisia. Moreover, it also made alliances with the secular political forces and social movements in order to restore and established democracy in the country. Similarly, ideationally it had the history of blending Islamic theological ideas with the Western socio-political trends. Ideationally it accepted the reformist ideas introduced by its leadership. All these three factors consisting of human agent, structural, and ideational factors collaborated and ensured the successful transformation of Ennahda.

Qazi Hussain Ahmad and Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan represent an unsuccessful case of transformation. The reformist efforts failed to transform the organizational setup of the JI and maintained traditionalist and conservative status. This process of transformation failed due to the following reasons. First and foremost, there was the absence of transformative leadership in the JI. Qazi Hussain Ahmad did possess the political charisma but he lacked the intellectual status (theological expert) and had no genealogical link as the founding father of the JI. Secondly, the party had a strong organizational structure and was dominated by members who had high intellectual status. Besides, a majority of the members had fundamentalist tendency. As a result, they developed a culture that resisted and rejected liberal and progressive ideas. They considered liberal and progressive ideas contradictory to the basic ideological principles of the party. Last but not least, the traditionalist members of the party let the rigid ideational approach dominate the party. This made the process of transformation difficult for the leader to transform the party. Qazi Hussain Ahmad when became the *Amir* of JI started his efforts to transform the party. He adopted a pragmatic approach to deal with the emerging socio-political trends emerging in Pakistan. He was of the belief that the JI must have to make some structural and ideological adjustments in its approach in order to create and strengthen its political presences among the

masses. He promoted and pursued populist approach. He knew that this was the time appropriate to the party. It should re-act pragmatically giving importance to its democratic objectives rather than to theological beliefs. That was why he wanted to part with the theological regime of Zia and of the IJI. However, he failed to transform the party.

First and foremost, Qazi lacked the qualification needed for a transformative leader in a religious political party. Although Qazi had charisma but he lacked theological expertise, and genealogical links with the JI. As a result, he faced severe criticisms and resistance from organizational structure in his efforts towards transformation. The anti-reformist faction used its intellectual skills and structural factor to build counter-narrative against the Qazi's reforms. These rigid tendencies started to dominate the JI in the Post-Maududi era. Various domestic and international developments resulted in the development of rigid traditionalist/revivalist approach within the JI during MianTufail's era. Under his leadership, the JI became the ally of Zia's Regime in order to implement its project of Islamization. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also helped increase the religious fundamentalism within the society. This occurrences also put effects on the JI. As a result, it became the chief supporter of Zia's Afghan Jihad policy. This provided an opportunity to the traditionalists to increase their influence and dominate the party structure.

Qazi succeeded Mian Tufail and became the *Amir* of the JI. He started his efforts and introduced popular approach. He introduced some structural adjustments to increase the JI sphere of influence among the masses. However, organizational structure and rigid ideational framework blocked his transformative efforts. He continued his struggle to convert the JI into a political party driven by populist objectives for 22 years. After his refusal to become the Amir, Munawar

Hassan became the party leader. Munawar Hassan represented the traditionalist faction within the party.

The findings of this study are in line with the theoretical assumptions of the transformational leadership theory. The causal mechanism developed to conduct this study provides better understanding to analyze the process of transformation in the religious political parties as compared to the explanations of culturalists /essentialists theoretical approaches. Both these approaches nullify the process of transformation within religious political organizations. They assume that the theological and political orientations of religious groups are static which cannot be transformed. As far as the Islamist socio-political groups are concerned, both theoretical approaches conclude that such groups have traditionalist theological ideologies which they cannot reorient or compromise despite the changing socio-political needs of their respective societies as their ideologies revolve around the implementation of *Sharia*, the rejection of modern democratic norms, incorporating universal human rights and liberties.

The transformational theoretical model is used in this study. It consists of the elements of social constructivism and charismatic leadership theory. One among the key assumptions of this model reads that religious political groups are the creation of human minds and they have the capacity to reorient, modify, and make adjustments in its ideological and political principles at the hands of human agents (transformative leaders) in accordance with the need and requirement of the time. The theoretical model also consists of ideational factor in the explanation of transformative process. It highlighted that how an introduction, promotion, and incorporation of new reformist ideas facilitated the job of a transformational leader. The culturalists/essentialists theoretical models had limitation to analyze the successful transformational process that occurred in Ennahda and unsuccessful in the JI. Rational Choice Theory negates the role of a leader,

structural, and ideational factors in the process of transformation and give primary focus to the material interest of the organizations. However, the trilateral alliance of leader, structural and ideational factors is very important in the process of transformative of a religious party. The presence of a transformational leader, a pro-reforms organizational culture, and liberal ideational framework pave the way for the successful transformation of a religious political party and transformed formerly conservative and traditionalist party into liberal and progressive party. Trilateral alliance of human agent, structural, and ideational elements help earn the support for the reforms as well as help overcome the potential threats. On the other hand, the transformative leadership, an intolerant organizational culture, and rigid ideational nature result in the unsuccessful transformational process within the organization. These causal mechanisms have been empirically tested on the case studies i.e. Ennahda and the JI in this study.

The researcher makes the following contributions to the knowledge under the study. First and foremost, it highlighted that the theological and ideological beliefs of Islamic political parties are not static in nature. Rather, they are subject to the processes of reconstruction, transformation, and reorientation through the trilateral alliance of human agents (transformational leaders), structural factor (organizational culture), and ideational factor. Adopting this mechanism, a religious political party could transform its conservative and traditionalist orientation into a liberal and progressive orientation in the light of the trilateral alliance of the factors. It also identified that the theological and political beliefs of the religious political parties can be transformed according to the needs and requirements of their socio-political settings.

Secondly, the study brought forth the importance of leadership in the process of transformation. Moreover, it also highlighted the basic qualifications i.e. theological expertise, genealogical link needed to attain the status of transformative leaders in a religious political party. It brought forth

that how those quail his party. These measures help transformative leader earn the confidence of the followers, and the members of his party in favor of the reforms he wants to implement and institutionalize in his party. The causal mechanisms developed in this study showed that the successful transformative process occurs in a religious political party if the pro-reformist institutional culture and liberal ideational nature of the party lends support to the. On the other hand, the transformation process fails in the organization where there is no transformational leader, or an intolerant institutional culture, or rigid ideational structure.

In the third place, the researcher mentions that the study categorized the religious political organizations into theologically rigid and conservative organizations and theologically liberal and progressive organizations. It would help the researchers as well as the policy makers to distinguish among the religious political parties to ascertain why transformation occurs in some religious political parties and why does not occur the same in others. Lastly, the study contributed to the literature on leadership studies as it highlights the role of leaders that how it brings about a change in a conservative and traditionalist organization to adopt a liberal and progressive approach mainly out of leaders' charisma, intellectual capabilities, and genealogical link. The framework developed to conduct this study can be used to analyze the process of transformation in other Islamist political organizations.

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