


**CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY AND RESHAPING THE REGIONAL
ORDER: A CASE STUDY OF ASIA-PACIFIC**



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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

**In the name of Allah, the Beneficent,
the Merciful**


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**To all my family members especially my brother Muhammad Abdul Qayyum
and Uncle Nazar Hussain.**


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
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
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I, Saima Manzoor, do solemnly declare that the research dissertation title as China's Grand Strategy and reshaping the regional order: a case study of Asia-Pacific is hereby submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I also declare that this dissertation is original and has never presented in any other institution. Moreover, I declare that any secondary information used in this dissertation has adequately acknowledged. I also state that it has not been previously or concurrently submitted as a whole or in part for any other degree at IIUI or any other institutions.

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Saima Manzoor

Abbreviations

A2AD	Anti-Access/ Area- Denial
ADIZ	Air Defence Identification Zona
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIMSTEC	Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BOP	Balance of Power
BRF	Belt and Road Forum
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CMEC	China-Myanmar Energy Corridor
COC	Conclusion of the code of Conduct
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPICEDC	Chinese-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation
DOC	Declaration on Conduct
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPP	Democratic Progress Part
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA	Energy Information Administration
ES	English School

EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GP	Great Power
GS	Grand Strategy
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IL	International Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMTTH	India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway
IR	International Relations
KORUS FTA	Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement
LOC	League of Covenant
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDLESC	Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation
MSG	Melanesia Spearhead Groups
MSR	Maritime Silk Road
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB	New Development Bank
OBOR	One Belt One Road
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLAAF	People's Liberation Army Air Force
PLAGF	People's Liberation Army Ground Force

PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
PLASSF	People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific
ROC	Republic of China
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communication
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNCLOS	UN Convention of the Law of the Sea
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNO	United Nations Organization
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WPNS	Western Pacific Naval Symposium
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Abstract

For the last two decades, China's economic transformation has changed the strategic landscape of the Asia Pacific region. This change made the Asia Pacific one of the most important regions of the world. Due to economic advancement in the region, the Asia-Pacific has the potential to drive the current international order. The US has emerged as the single most dominant actor at the world stage as well as in the Asia-Pacific region, since the cold war has ended. In 2011 the US announced its policy of Strategic Shift (Rebalancing) toward Asia-Pacific. This policy shift got China, a regional power by that time, worried. Chinese viewed this US policy as China centric and came up with their own counter strategy which can be called the Grand Strategy of China.

The term Grand Strategy is used to achieve long term goals of national interests by using all available means. It determines state's vital interests, identifies threats to those interests and utilizes all available economic, military and diplomatic means to achieve those interests and shield them from the threats. Chinese viewed national security, territorial integrity, sovereignty and national reunification as their most important interests. They also understand that to achieve that goal, they have to achieve sustained economic and social development in the country. The research focuses on the Grand Strategy that China is using as a tool to determine its relations with the US in the Asia-Pacific region. Three main dimensions of the Grand strategy are the focus of analysis. First, it looks at how China uses its economy as a weapon for foreign soft balancing. Secondly, how China is utilizing its hard power policies for maximizing its security interests in the region. Thirdly, the study explores how China can steer the US and China to avert any conflict in the Asia-Pacific region which may jeopardize China's national interests. It concludes that, in future China will reshape the regional order, this region will witness new developments and China will utilize its Grand Strategy to safeguard its interest and avoid violent conflict with the US.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Asia Pacific is now a new global center for geopolitical, economic and military competition of great powers (Chen J. , World Socialist Web Site, 2013). Admittedly the Asia Pacific is facing a number of structural challenges but Asia still has a good chance of achieving this century a greater degree of progress and development to other regions (Pu, 2013). It is a region of stunning economic growth with emerging powers like China, having expanding markets of trade, investment and strategic maritime shipping routes connecting Pacific with the Indian Ocean. China is the only country widely seen as a possible threat to US predominance. Indeed, China's rise has led to fears that the country will soon overwhelm its neighbors and one day it would dislodge the US as a global hegemon. The US and China are playing a geopolitical chess game in the Asia-Pacific region (Glaser J. , 2012). The US and China are indirectly tackling each other for the influence and presence in the Asia Pacific. Both states are equally engaged in engagement and amalgamation policies while also applying a realistic approach to balancing, whether it be through security cooperation or military development plans. Interestingly none of the countries is open about such hedging policies specifically about security balancing while pursuing them with devotion.

United States and China both have a wide range of vital interests in Asia Pacific region. Given that the United States has made a strategic change in favor of Asia Pacific, it is giving China and the region its full focus. The strategy, "Pivot to Asia" initiated by the US, to assure its partners, friends and other states in the region that US has never been paralyzed by a decade of conflict; to assure that US has never been slowed by domestic political and economic difficulties; and, last but not least, to convey to the world that the US does not want to withdraw from the Asia Pacific region's issues (Asari, 2012).

There is an intense competition between Beijing and Washington in the region. US-China relationship has become an important factor in world politics and especially in relations among other Asia-Pacific states. It is complicating the prospects for peace and risks of conflict in the region. The future of International politics is depending upon the relationship between US and China. Although US-China power transition will take time to become accurately international, it has been of influence over Asia Pacific relations. Most of the regional conflicts involving China have taken on new importance due to emerging trends US-China power balancing in the region (Edelstein, 2009).

Chinese strategy rather Grand Strategy is drive by all these sudden developments at the Asia-Pacific states. Recent change in Chinese economic, diplomatic and security policies attained the attention of world. It has become imperative to know about Chinese Grand Strategy as it is not a democratic country. So, it doesn't have the tradition of revealing its policies to the world.

The term Grand Strategy use to achieve long term goals of national interests by using all available means. Grand Strategy has three stages: determines the state's vital interests, threats to those interests and using the available economic, military and diplomatic means to achieve those goals and protect state interests. In case of China, China's first core interests is its internal social and political stability, second its sustained social and economic development and last but not the least is its national security, territorial integrity, sovereignty and national reunification (Dzung, 2000).

China has now the economic and technological influence all over the world. The factors that contribute to China's rise are China's economy, its military and its diplomatic enlargement. It is expected that seven of the world's ten largest economies will be located in Asia till 2025. Economic power will increasingly move away from Western Europe and North America to the Asia Pacific. China is one of the leading states with 9% average annual growth rate and it is

anticipated that its economy can overtake Japan's by 2015 and of the US by 2039 (Pu, 2013). The Chinese military is deploying huge number of missiles, hard to find submarines, long range sensors to track and target US forces, anti-satellite weapons, digital networks to coordinate attacks and cyber war weapons to catch US networks. All of these strategies are a part of China's Grand Strategy, particularly the one that has to do with restraining or displacing the United States in the Asia-Pacific.

On the other hand, the US as a global hegemon now produces more than a quarter of the world's total economic output and accounts for nearly half of the world's total military expenditures. No other state in modern history has achieved such a preponderance of wealth, might, and influence. The People's Republic of China, on the other hand, is a rising power with the potential to compete with the US in international affairs. In a world in which US holds a preponderance of power, how does China design a Grand Strategy to advance its interests in Asia Pacific region?

1.1 Rationale of the Study

21st century is known to be the Pacific century because of its growing economy and competition between major powers. As the common perception about the economic growth is that: economy is the driving force behind domestic and global political landscape. So, in this context Asia-Pacific has the potential to drive the current international order. On the other hand since World War II, US is the dominant power of the Asia-Pacific but now China's emergence as a regional power is creating threat to the dominance of the US in the Asia-Pacific region. As in response to the US Pivot heading for Asia Pacific, China has given its Grand Strategy. So, to know how China is replacing or containing the US in the Asia-Pacific region through its Grand Strategy is of great importance.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

China's Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific aims to contain US China is positioned in a delicate and complex international environment wherein the US endeavors to dominate the Asia Pacific region. The region is passing through a transitional process which involves the mixing up of traditional hard power politics with soft power. Given this complex regional situation, it needs to be seen as what Grand Strategy China has adopted to counter US in the region and how it is avoiding direct military confrontation while safeguarding its own interests in the region.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

- To analyze China's Grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific region to contain the US and create its dominance
- To investigate the ways through which China is using economy as a tool of external soft balancing
- To analyze Chinese hard power policies for maximizing its security interests in the region
- To examine policies China can adopt to avoid a direct conflict in the Asia Pacific region while safeguarding its interests as well

1.4 Research Questions

Primary Question

What Grand Strategy China is pursuing to establish its dominance in the Asia Pacific region?

Secondary Questions

- 1) How China is utilizing its economic influence over the Asia-Pacific states to contain the US in the region?
- 2) How China is protecting its security interests in the Asia Pacific region?

- 3) How China is avoiding a direct conflict with the US in the Asia-Pacific region while using external soft balancing to safeguard its interests at the same time?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The twenty first century hailed to as pacific century as it is cardinally centered on China's rise due to its economic development, military modernization and use of external soft balancing. This has given way to serious challenges to the US primacy in the Asia Pacific region. Moreover, new trends in the region's economy is emerging primarily because of China's rise. The study analyzes Chinese Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and how China is utilizing its Grand Strategy to steer the US and China towards the aversion of conflict. This study opens further avenue of research and also helps policy makers in devising future policies for not only China but other powers in the Asia Pacific region as well.

1.6 Research Delimitations

This study focuses on the part of China's Grand Strategy that deals with Asia-Pacific region only and within that pinpoints on countering the US in the region, not on other regional states. In 2011, US President Barak Obama announced US rebalancing towards Asia Pacific. Thus, this study focuses on US-China relations in Asia Pacific region from 2011 to 2017.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The English School of International Relations Theory would be the best to explain this phenomenon. English School (ES) of international relations is also known as the Liberal Realism, British Institutionalists or international society school. This theory maintains that there is a 'society of states' at the international level, despite the condition of anarchy. The English school stands for the conviction that ideas, rather than simply material capabilities, shape the conduct of international politics, and therefore deserve analysis and critique. ES is

considered as the way between realism and liberalism as realism only focused on the conflict, war and maximizing the material capabilities while liberalist on the other hand focused on the cooperation via good economic relations and international governmental and non-governmental organizations among states. But English School does not only deal with the conflict or cooperation among states rather it provides a holistic approach towards the world affairs and built around the three concepts: international system, international society and world society. This distinctive approach of English School open up new space in international relations theories and offer a middle way between Realism and Liberalism.

In this sense it is similar to constructivism, though the English School has its roots more in world history, international law and political theory, and is more open to normative approaches than is generally the case with constructivism. In case of China's Grand Strategy and Reshaping the Regional Order: A Case Study of Asia-Pacific, the concept of international Society of English School by Hedley Bull is the best to explain this phenomenon. According to the Hedley Bull states share a certain common interest that lead to the development of a certain set of "rules". He thus defined an international society as existent when: "a group of states which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements". So the existence of both conflict and cooperation that informs China's Grand Strategy towards US as well as regional states is the best explain through the concept of international society by Hedley Bull.

1.8 Operational Definition of the Major Terms

Grand Strategy

Grand strategy is a term used for overall application of national power to attain desired ends. At the highest level grand strategy is the way a state intends to pursue its national security goals. From this, several other policies are designed that are focused on specific regions or issues. Thus we have military strategy, diplomatic strategy, political strategies etc.

The DOD gives this definition: “national security strategy- the art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instrument of national power in terms of military, economic, informational and diplomatic to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy.

Asia-Pacific

Asia-Pacific or Asia Pacific is the part of the world in or near the Western Pacific Ocean. The region varies in size depending on context, but it typically includes at least much of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. The term may also include Russia and countries in the Americas which are on the coast of the Eastern Pacific Ocean; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation for example, includes Canada, Chile, Russia, Mexico, Peru, and the United States. Alternatively, the term sometimes comprises all of Asia and Australasia as well as small/medium/large Pacific island nations - for example when dividing the world into large regions for commercial purposes. Though imprecise, the term has become popular since the late 1980s in commerce, finance and politics. In fact, despite the heterogeneity of the regions' economies, most individual nations within the zone are emerging markets experiencing rapid growth.

Containment

Containment is the action or policy of preventing the expansion of a hostile country or influence. This policy aimed at controlling the spread of communism around the world, developed in the administration of President Harry S. Truman. The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 was an important step in the development of containment.

Soft Power

It is a concept developed by Joseph Nye of Harvard University to describe the ability to attract and co-opt rather than by coercion (hard power), using force or giving money as a means of persuasion. Soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction.

2. Literature Review

Peter Feaver explains Grand Strategy as Grand Strategy is an academic word which refers to the state policies including all available economic, political, diplomatic and military means to secure its interests (Feaver, 2009). Even though Grand Strategy is the new term but even before this term Great Powers were used to integrate their economic, political and military means to secure their long term interests not only in war but in peace too (Kennedy, 1992). Amy argues that a successful Grand Strategy involves the calculation of state's advantages and disadvantages. He further adds that calculation of these factors can turn the conflict into the multi-player game with other states (Zagat, 2014). But in contrast of the above mentioned argument Brands argues that Grand Strategy is not just setting the national goals and calculating or deploying the available means or resources to achieve them rather he explains Grand Strategy as an intellectual architecture to structure the foreign policy of states (Chen D. , 2017)

Avery states that Chinese leaders felt the need of Grand Strategy during the mid of 1990s. He further added that international environment, post-Cold War world order and sanctions against China followed by the Tiananmen Square incident drove the Chinese leaders to think about the Grand Strategy. China's domestic development also played an important role to make a broader strategy (Goldstein A. , 2017). After the Cold War, In 1997 China introduced the new concept of security strategy against the US military presence and US-Japan security alliance in the Asia-Pacific region (Shulong, 1999).

Jyotishman argues that China's Policy of Grand Strategy gave tremendous attention to their policy of "Peaceful Rise" because China can only sustain its economic growth in the peaceful environment (Bhagawati, 2016). Wang also favour this argument by arguing that China will not prioritize the military modernization over the economic development as they have seen and know the reason behind Soviet disintegration (Wang, 2006). Kuo and Tang in their work considers the economic and geographical factor as the most crucial element of Chinese Grand Strategy in 21st century, they added that because of economic development China is having more close ties with not only the regional but other states plus they are getting more influential role in world trade and other institutions (Kuo & Tang, 2016).

Kaplan highlights the four factors as a driving force behind Chinese Grand Strategy. First he argues the militarization of states in the Asia-Pacific region second the geopolitics of the regional sea, China's interest towards nationalism and controlling population at home and last but not the least is to secure Chinese energy needs (Kaplan R. , 2005). Wang argues that China want to balance US power through both "internal balancing" and "external soft balancing". For instance as a part of internal balancing China is enhancing its military capabilities and focusing more on the economic development and using its diplomacy as a mean to secure Chinese interests in bilateral and multilateral relations (Yunling & Yuzhu, 2017)

Throughout the history different Chinese regimes either they were Han-Chinese or non-Han Chinese, they tried to maximize the Chinese influence and control over the strategic periphery. They established their control through economic, geographic, strategic and political-military constraints. They secured all of their interests because of the established domestic order, first they made internal progress and then became able to making good external relations and securing their interests because their peripheral interest were depending upon the unified strong state (Barfield, 1989).

Different school of thought having different opinions regarding Chinas' Grand Strategy and US interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast to the popular notion in the west that China is emerging superpower, China has the potential to be a world power; it is not yet such a power. He added that domestic resources are driving China's emerging Grand Strategy of a peaceful development (Zicheng, 2010). Export towards Asia-Pacific and consumer market in Asia for American business are the most important elements on which US economic recovery is highly dependent, also stresses on the US regional partnership with other nations and states will help to protect its interests in the region and for this US

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region and try to improve human right democratic values in the Asia-Pacific region (Clinton, 2011).

China's rise is one of the most significant developments in international relations. As a result of more than three decades of phenomenal economic growth, since the initiation of economic reforms in 1978, a strong China now stands before the world for the first time in over a century. As China may rival the US in the material capabilities, recent discussions on Chinese role in the world politics has been gradually shifting from a focus on material characteristics of China rise to a growing concern with the impact of Chinese power on regional and international order (Zhang F. , 2015).

There are so many schools of thoughts in international relations but the most prominent are realism and idealism. This literature review will provide a summary of existing literature relevant to this topic. Different school of thoughts like realism, liberalism and constructivism are having their own opinion. So many scholars of International relations considered more approaches of international relations. Since the relationship of great powers influenced the international system, realism is the most appropriate theoretical frame work to analyse the international affairs (Dzung, 2000). But in contrast of the realism and liberalist views English School plays the middle way between realist extreme views of the international relations and revolutionist or liberalist views that's why it is called as the via media between them (Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, 1994).

After so many meetings and inquiries, scholars of E.S. describes international relations is not only about the power, wealth, increasing the capability, completion and war etc. but it includes equality, recognition, offence, rights, disputes, interests, association, conventions, customs, damages, reciprocity and reparation etc. (Jackson, 1992). But Almeida is not in the view that British committee was just thinking about the construction of the via media, rather under the

Wight's leadership they established a different theory with its roots in the Grotius, Burke, Hume and de Tocqueville work (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014).

Realist or western scholars who advocates or stress the strategic competition among dominating and rising powers are having the hard realist view of Asia-Pacific. War in Asia seems close to unthinkable today because of the understanding and acting on the balance of power relationship among dominating and rising power (White, 2008).

In terms of political, economic, geographical and social capacity, China is the only emerging power which can compete strategically with US in Asia-Pacific (Sutter, 2003). In a workshop on "Assessing China Rise: Power and Influence in the 21st century" David Edelstein shares his views about the relationship between rising and great powers in the context of history. He says, that throughout the history both rising and existing powers go for cooperation first and then towards the confrontation (Edelstein, 2009).

China itself has the capacity to disturb the international order. So China becomes an ally or rival of US it will badly disturb the existing order (Xuetong, The Rise of China and its Power Status, 2006). There are different of opinions regarding China rise, whether it will be peaceful as China label it "peaceful coexisting" or rise of China is an early stage and will cause structural transformation in the region, which depend on the security dilemma (Goh, The U.S China Relationship and Asia-Pacific Security: Negotiating Change, 2005). States went for expansionism as they grow stronger. First they went for regional hegemony and China will do same and challenge US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region (Elman, 2004).

Not only Mearsheimer many other realists are also very pessimistic about China's rise. China is expanding diplomatic relationship, economic growth and specially spending more on military. They are spending on military just to deter Taiwan and stop US in a possible conflict

with Taiwan. More than these Chinese leaders seem China as a sole super power of East Asia (Vaughn, 2007).

US navy presence in the region even after cold war is a symbol of commitment to protect its major allies and interests in the region. They will and want to play a regional balancer role and save or protect the region from a single regional hegemon (Yoon, 2003). Obama's readjustment policy is to line up its allies in China's neighbouring just o counter China on serious issues as South China Sea, China territorial claim and currency issues (Chan M. L., 2010).

US presence in Asia-Pacific is just to contain China. There are so many purposes but the main is containment but at the same time one can see that world is more integrated in terms of economic. So policies like containment don't make any sense (Asari, 2012).

Rising of China to the status of superpower will clash with the interests of US so; military standoff through the region will create a cold war situation again. To avoid any confrontation with China, US will have to make allies, coalitions and balance China (Kaplan R. , 2005). US deputy secretary of state made a speech. He addressed at the centre for a new American security and in his addressed, he offered a new term for US-China relationship which is "Strategic Reassurance". For him strategic reassurance must be at the core of the policy at both sides. US and its allies must assure and welcome China and China on the other hand must make it clear that her development and rising status at international level will not be a threat for existing international order (Steinberg, 2009).

These two powers have differences but despite of these differences they both can strategically cooperate with each other for their common interests (Shambaugh, 2000). Balance of power is necessary in Asia-Pacific. Because, only having balance of power both US and China can gain the fruits of cooperation and avoid the unnecessary cost of conflict (Lampton, 2012).

What are the reasons of peace, why world leave in peace and what are the occasions which became the reason of war and how war starts? It is a good work to understand the changing order at international level and also agree that one condition is necessary for major wars which is "Parity" (Lemke, 1996). Every great power emerged from the great wars (Knutsen, 1999).

Both US and China are engaged in a transitional process. This is the most important issue not only for two states but for international system too. And, if they both could not tackle their issues carefully, they can lead the world in to another world war (Lai, *The United States and China in Power Transition*, 2011).

The strong military power of US is undoubtedly a safe guard for its role of champion in the region but at the same time US will face great economic challenge in the region because of the growing economic power in Asia-Pacific and crisis in US economy. Asia-Pacific security challenge will be a great challenge to US administration in the region (Tang X. , 2012).

Growing economy is also a challenge by China to US in the Asia-Pacific region but military modernization is the most serious threat posing by China to US in the Asia-Pacific region. China wants to replace or end the US domination in the region and to reach its goal China is going for military modernisation (Broomfield, 2003). China spends much resources on its military but it became little when relatively compare with the US (Liu, 2010).

One of the most important realities in the world today is the fast growing power of China. Admittedly, gauging Chinese power is not easy, much less projecting its future growth. But the fact is that China has been experiencing a massive growth in the economic power and other material capabilities for the past two and half decades is beyond doubt. From 1979 to 2003, the Chinese economy grew at an annual rate of 8 to 9 percent, three to four times faster than the economies in the west and double the average growth rate of the developing nation (Deng & Wang, *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World*, 2000).

After many crisis and agreement Chinese leaders has learn to live with the hegemon. Chinese leaders are realist in nature and they have adopted many policies which were based on the US hegemonic system. It is the most predicted view that China will adopt the same behaviour in the future but Taiwan is a factor which can create problem between US and China and can lead to a military confrontation between both of them (Qingguo, 2005).

US rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific has political, security and economic goals. US not only wants to save its interests but also want to contain China. Because growing China in the region has potential to effect or challenge US economic, political or military goals (Szczudlik-Tatar, 2012). US has large interest in promoting peace and stability in the region and Chinese help to US in achieving this goal can make US task more easier. At the same time he argues that US in maintaining the global dominant power and China has some significant elements of global power but remains as a regional power of East Asia (Jisi, 2004).

Despite the political, economic and strategic transition in the region, Asia-Pacific is enjoying more harmony than ever before in the history because of the globalization and interdependence. China's military expeditions are just to expand the military domination in the region. Mutual interests between states have been stronger than ever before due to which old rivalries or conflict remains below the surface (sadleir, 2005).

So this study addresses the following gaps in the existing literature regarding China's grand strategy and its implication for the region. First, very limited study has been done on China's Grand Strategy and its implications for the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, research studies hitherto done on this subject do not explain the implications of China's Grand Strategy and how China would counter the US in the region while safeguarding her interests through soft power as well. Lastly, very limited studies have been done over certain pattern of conflict and cooperation in case of Asia-Pacific have been done.

3. Research Methodology

This study is qualitative for several compelling reasons. Qualitative method is used for discovering the meaning of particular phenomenon given by people on the basis of their experiences. So, the purpose of this study is to explore the tools of Chinese Grand Strategy through which they are creating their dominance and containing the US in the Asia-Pacific region, analysis of the whole situation and use the findings of this study for devising future policies. Questions used in qualitative approach require descriptive and exploratory and thus starts with what and how. Questions with what and how directed the study towards the in-depth understanding as what Grand Strategy China is adopting and how it is effecting and reshaping the current regional order. This study explores how China is pursuing its economic, diplomatic and military means of Grand Strategy to establish its dominance and containing the US in the Asia-Pacific region while safeguarding its own interests and steer the US and China towards the aversion of military conflict along with this, this study mainly focus on how the conflict or cooperation between the powers is reshaping the regional order. Qualitative research emphasizes on the participants active role especially in data collection and interpret of the findings.

Qualitative “Case Study” design is the best methodology to explain this phenomenon. For the purpose of this study, primarily focus was on the definition offered by modern case study design. In case study methodology, cases are bounded by time and activity as in this study, data was collected over a sustained period of time. This case study is investigating China’s Grand Strategy and reshaping the regional order of Asia-Pacific region since 2011-2017. So, detailed information of this phenomenon (2011-2017) is collected through a variety of data collection tools which includes primary and secondary resources.

In case study research, multiple resources of evidence are used and these multiple sources ensure that the case study is as robust as possible. In this study both primary and secondary data was used. For secondary method of data collection the researcher focused on the books available in different libraries along with the articles published in different journals and news which deals with China's Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. For the collection of data through internet there is no barrier in locating a single site to gather data on Chinese Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific region.

For primary sources, interviews were conducted as a data collection technique. Interviews were semi structured with open ended question. Convenient based sampling method was used.

Academician, experts on US, China and Asia Pacific working in different think tanks and diplomats of both US and China posted in Pakistan have been chosen as a universal population of this study.

Since it is not possible to conduct the interviews from the whole population. So, a sample of eight participants have been chosen from the total population. These participants include: Experts working in different think tanks in Pakistan like Benish Sultan Qazi, and Abdul Rouf Iqbal from Institute of Strategic Studies and Research Analysis Islamabad. Academicians especially expertise of foreign policy of great powers Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema from National Defence University and Scholars from other countries like Shaun Breslin from University of Warwick, UK, Prof Franklin from Oxford University, UK, Prof William A Challahan from London School of Economics, and Prof Paul Evan from University of British Columbia have been accessed through Skype. Face to face interviews have been conducted from the Pakistani scholars. During face to face interview hand written notes and audio was recorded by the permission of the participants to ensure the accurate transcription. Besides the interviews,

official documents of US (DOD and Congressional Paper) and China (White Paper) were reviewed as well, as a source of primary data.

Interviews were used as an instrument to get the opinion of the sample population.

As China's Grand Strategy and Reshaping the Regional order: A Case study of Asia-Pacific is a new phenomenon so limited literature is available on it. So, this study uses the interviews of experts as a source to get information. Secondly this research is descriptive and explanatory in nature that deals with what and how questions.

To analyze data related to the "China's Grand Strategy and The Reshaping of Regional Order: A Case Study of Asia Pacific" content analysis was used as a data analysis technique in this study. So, an analysis of expert's interviews on China's Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific region with special focus on US and China's interests, areas of cooperation and conflict between them have been done through content analysis.

In content analysis two type of methods does exists: conceptual analysis and discourse analysis. This study follows the conceptual analysis. So, before analyzing the data, regional level was determined as the level of analysis. During the analysis of data, focus was on three main themes: China's (1) diplomatic, (2) military and (3) economic relations with other regional states. These were the main themes of the study to be focused on. During the data analysis all irrelevant data was excluded and relevant data was divided into the three above mentioned themes. To distinguish between the meanings of concepts, operational definitions of the main concepts have been mentioned as well.

4. Structure of the Study

The study is divided into seven chapters which are mentioned below:

- **Introduction**

The introduction briefly highlights the main theme of Thesis i.e. China's Grand Strategy and the Reshaping of Regional Order. The first chapter provides literature review. It identifies the gaps that this study is going to fill.

- **English School and the Concept of 'International Society'**

Chapter two is related to the theoretical frame work in which international relation's theory English School has been applied especially the concept of international society by Hadley Bull.

- **Historical Perspective of Chinese Grand Strategy**

Chapter three understands the strategic culture and tradition of Chin's Grand Strategy during different concepts and traditions which have influenced Chinese Grand Strategy in the past and how they continue to effect in the present and what policies was adopted by China to counter those threats.

- **Evaluating China's Grand Strategy through the Lances of English School**

Chapter four provides an analysis of contemporary Chinese Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, it covers the rise of China and its Grand Strategy and how English School analyses this situation.

- **China's Grand Strategy and United States in Asia Pacific**

Chapter five analyses the China's Grand Strategy and US presence in the Asia-Pacific region. It explains the regional situation and China's policies for becoming a regional power and measures adopted by China to counter the US in the region.

- **China's Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific: a Regional Perspective**

Chapter six gives an overview of Chinese Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific and how regional states are perceiving it along with their reaction. This Chapter also discuss the policies, regional states are adopting to balance between US and China and maintaining the regional order.

- **Conclusion**

Last but not the least section deals with the conclusion, analysis of the effects of Chinese Strategy on the regional situation recommend some policies to both the US and China for securing their interests and ways to avoid any direct confrontation.

Chapter Two

THEORATICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The historical development of the English School, as well as its core ideas, methodology, and epistemology, are going to cover in this chapter. The fundamental ideas, presumptions (ontological, methodological, and theoretical), and distinctive inquiry techniques that set the E.S. apart from the earlier schools, progressively evolved. The interpretivist approach, pluralist methodology, and trinal conceptualization that E.S. used to analyse the reality of international relations is its most salient feature. The international system, international society, and world society make up this triadic notion. The idea of an international society has grown in importance as English schools have developed, and became the primary focus of ES's analysis of global politics. This English school approach has become so prevalent in theory and literature that it is now also referred to as the "international society approach."

The most crucial component of the chapter is the research methodology used by the English school. This chapter is concentrated less on the arguments or ideas of E.S. and more on historical readings on how these concepts evolved. The historical methodology employed in the E.S. would also be used in the subsequent parts of this dissertation. Along with the five English School institutions, the chapter also covers the historical context and Hadley Bull's idea of an international society. He viewed the state as a sovereign political community with a defined population and an independent government to rule over under the concept of an international society. According to his concept of international society, states are the most significant actors at the international level because without a higher power to oversee and guarantee the common laws, which are dependent on the human variables residing in societies/states and are thus simple to change or interpret. As norms cannot be regulated

without a mechanism, so autonomous institutions must play the role of that mechanism and uphold order in international society. Institutions in international society play a crucial role in adapting to or protecting these rules. States voluntarily agreed to follow the customs and procedures represented by the institutions.

The second section of this chapter covers the structure of the English School of International Relations' institutions, their capabilities, and the role they play in upholding "order" in global society. Despite opposition and doubts about their reliability, these institutions were crucial to keeping the peace in global politics. The foundation for further examination of the politics of the Asia-Pacific region, with a primary focus on the area covered by China's Grand Strategy, is thought to be five institutions: international law, diplomacy, balance of power, war, and great power management. This chapter provides a thorough explanation of these institutions' definitions, roles, and contributions to upholding the "order" of the world, but exclusively from Hedley Bull's perspective. Throughout the chapter and discussion about the role of institutions in the world politics, Bull emphasize on the fact what role states can actually play as compared to the one they play in world politics.

2.1 Evolution of English School

English School is the theory of International Relations developed by the British inspired writers. The term English School (ES) was coined in the 1970s to describe the predominant British group as they considered International Society as the primary object of analysis in international relations (Burchill, et al., 2009). Committee of the British scholars met for the first time to discuss the theory of international politics, in 1959 (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014). But this is not the exact starting point of the theory but an arbitrary median point, just like the association between 1648 and the sovereign state system (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014).

The organizational origin of the ES can be traced back to the mid of 1950s but the conceptual origin is different one. As the idea of “international society” is seen as the front runner but it’s not the original concept of ES (Vigazzi, 2005). Discussion on the state-system by German Historian influenced the early thinking of ES. And the term was intrinsic to the international law from nineteenth century (Schwarzenberger, 1951). In 1981 Roy Jones coined the name “English School” which got accepted by both within and outside scholars of the school (Suganami, British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years on, 2003).

Most of the founding fathers of English school were not English as Hedley Bull was from Australia, Charles Manning from South Africa so like so many other labels as “realism” or even the “international relations” English School (ES) doesn’t fit with what it represents. English school had nothing to do with the British foreign policy rather the idea of English school is just the combination of history, sociology, law and political theory or global theories of international relations as the founders of E.S. were having the background of different disciplines ranging from history to journalism. But the question is why they added “SCHOOL”? Dunne justifies this term on the basis of shared intellectual foundations, external recognition and self-identification (Dunne, 1998). Suganami describes the ontology of English School in the most helpful way of thinking by unfolding the difference between the club and a network and between the grouping and succession of scholars (Suganami, British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years on, 2003). In the beginning, international society was the only idea included in the E.S. but after the Second World War, in the USA, the idea of international system became the most influential in the field of IR (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014).

Weaver summed up the evolution of E.S. in to the four different phases, in the first phase which started from the initiation of the committee and ended up with the publication of the Diplomatic Investigation in 1966, he argues that in this period, scholars fully concentrated on the concept

and theorizing the international society. The Second phase started from 1966 and lasted till 1977, during this period Bull wrote *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* and Wight worked on the *System of States* in which they investigate the existence and nature of the international society. During the third phase (1979-1989) writers like Wilson and Jones discussed the capacity of E.S. along with the further analysis on international relations by using the framework of Bull and Wight theory (Jones R. E., 1981). Fourth phase of E.S. started in 1990s with the publications of special issue of *Millennium* journal about English School, during this phase they decided to tackle the new challenges with the E.S. school approaches (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1998).

English School plays the middle way between realist extreme views of the international relations and revolutionist or liberalist views that's why it is called as the *via media* between them (Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, 1994). After so many meetings and inquiries, scholars of E.S. describes international relations is not only about the power, wealth, increasing the capability, completion and war etc. but it includes equality, recognition, offence, rights, disputes, interests, association, conventions, customs, damages, reciprocity and reparation etc. (Jackson, 1992). Even before the first meeting, scholars like Schewarzenberger, Martin and Charles were thinking on these lines (Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, 2014). But Almeida is not in the view that British committee was just thinking about the construction of the *via media*, rather under the Wight's leadership they established a different theory with its roots in the Grotius, Burke, Hume and de Tocqueville work (Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*, 2014).

2.2 Basic Concepts of English School

On the basis of above mentioned historical context/evaluation, E.S. gradually evolved the basic concepts, assumptions (ontological, methodological and theoretical), and different inquiry methods which distinguished the E.S. from the previous schools. The most important

characteristic of E.S. is that it adopted the interpretivist approach along with the pluralist method with the triadic conceptualization. This triadic conceptualization consists of the international system", "international society and "world society" (Little R. , 1995). This triadic conceptualization can be seen in the Wight's work on the epistemology. His three epistemological paths "realism", "rationalism" and "revolutionist" are known as the three R's (Wight, Wight, & Porter, International Theory-the three traditions, 1991). As per the E.S. point of view, the reality of international relations reproduce by the coexistence, cross-fertilizing and interact of these three systematic framework with each other, which functions in the interstate, transnational level and between inter-human domain (Little R. , 1995).

E.S. began its investigation with the work of Wight's concept of state system. The term "State System" initially associated with the writings at the end of 17th Century when Pufendorf defined state system as different states connected under one body but all the member states remain sovereign (Little R. , 1995). After the treaty of Westphalia this term "state system" used for the German states but with the start of 19th Century this term came to refer the European State System. Later, E.S. considered this concept as the fundamental importance as European State System extended across the globe and provided the origin of the international system (Little R. , 1995).

2.3 Level of Analysis and its Critiques

The concept "state system" has been extended by the E.S. and they established three core elements (international system, international society and world society) which are particularly associated with the framework to analyse the state system at in international politics (Little R. , 1995). In the international system states interact with one another at regular basis and each state plays an important role in the behaviour of others. International society is a society of states where they contact with each other's, having certain common interests and values in their mind. But at the same time they conceive themselves to be work under the common institution

and bound by the common rule. On the other hand, these are the humans who made the world society not the states, they imply that a “world common good” recognize the common values (Little R. , 1995).

The analytical framework of E.S. has been criticized by the critiques such as James, Shaw and Buzzan. James argued that E.S. failed to draw the line between international system and international society because states only interact if they share common rules, interests and institutions (James, 1993). For Shaw, E.S. not only failed to differentiate between the international system and international society but from a world society perspective they gave more importance to the state centric approach which was a tool of Cold War and E.S. along with the neorealist try to propagate the Cold War ideology (Shaw, 1992).

Just like James, Barry Buzzan also argued E.S. has failed to distinct between the international system and international society but at the same time argued that E.S. failed to describe how a multi-cultural global society emerged. In response to this distinction issue, Buzan gave the solution by draw the sociological distinction between “Gemeinschaft” and “Gesellschaft” societies. As per Buzan, Gemeinschaft societies based on the common experience, identity and sentiments and this concept is adopted by the E.S. but in contrast Gesellschaft societies are based on the sentimental and traditional links which are made up of from the common culture between individuals in different states. Based on this distinction Buzan showed that how states interact with each other’s in this competitive world especially when they don’t have common culture as well, if they don’t trade with each other they can’t formulate rule or establish institution for common goods and this development leads the international system to the international society. But on the other hand, he argues that states at international level sometimes don’t have common culture so they have to be together on the Gasellschaft society structure and adopt the common culture which ultimately leads them to adopt the structure of

Gemeinschaft societies ultimately (Buzan, From international system to international society: Structural realism and regime theory meet the English school, 1993).

2.4 Methodology and the English School

Not only the E.S. but all the theorists ignore the study of methodology. Undoubtedly methodology is not an easy term to define but it is necessary to inquire the truth. And for these methods of inquiry has been divided into two different modes (“reconstructed logic” and “logic-in-use”) by Abraham Kaplan (Kaplan A. , 1964). Reconstructed methods involve the philosopher’s self-conscious attempt to explain and formalize the definite method. In contrast logic-in-use method mean: method which has been involved and used during the imperial investigation. Even though Kaplan tried to make the distinction between two methods but international relations no acknowledgement does exist (Kaplan A. , 1964). E.S. is associated with the “classical approach” of methodology. At the time of discussion between “classical” and “scientific” approaches/methods, Bull argued that “classical method” plays the role in the method of judgement. Because of this argument he is being considered as the defender of classical approach (Bull H. , International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach, 1966).

Bull explains his statement and left the duty on Richardson to explain his statement (Little R. , 1995). Classical approach has two different directions to explain the methodology. First method includes “particularistic approach” and second stresses upon the “philosophical directions” and “generalized propositions” (Little R. , 1995). The methodology of international relations can be reconstructed on the bases of E.S. procedure and level of analysis. E.S. starts from the methodological perspective not on the ontological ground that’s why relationship between international system, international society and world society by E.S. has been defended on methodological ground. But critics of E.S. like James, Shaw and Buzan define these terms on Ontological bases (Little R. , 1995).

Secondly E.S. considers historical readings as an important tool of research methodology. E.S. focus on the societal and historical dynamic, Buzan summarizes it as:

“Much more so than either realism or liberalism, it opens the door to the studying international and the world history in term of the social; structure of international order.”

He adds that E.S. considers history or knowledge of history as a necessary tool in order to understand the international relations. E.S. gave more importance to history because most of the dominant scholars during the evolution period of E.S. were having the background from history like Martin Wight, Michael Howard and Herbert Butterfield etc. They accept that let alone future, history cannot even explain the present but it surely helps in analysing the present or future on the basis of historical analysis (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014).

As international relations is a complex subject to deal with, not only interms of practical relations but on the analytical ground as well. So, because of such complexities E.S. decided to work on the methodological ground and examine/analyze the situation from the contrasting perspectives. In E.S. methodology anarchical international system, rule-governed international society and transnational world society play the role as an important element working at international arena and E.S. perspectives are designed in a way to collect the aspects from these elements. As E.S. gave much attention to methodology not the ontology so it shows that all of these elements are operating under the same reality (Little R. , 1995). Methodology of E.S. doesn't allow the analyst to conceptualize the only one element from the above mentioned as Bull argues, it would be ridiculous if the analyst consider only one element like international society or system is the sole or the most dominant element at international arena. He also added that undoubtedly attention could be shifted to one element but analysts must remember that

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this element is not the only one, without the influence of others (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2012).

E.S. gave more importance to methodology rather than ontology to separate the elements as if the analysts are giving more importance to international society, it must not be done at the expense of recognizing either the anarchical features of international system or the other features of world society. Watson concludes this discussion as it is useful to differentiate between the international systems and the international societies because this distinction not only simplified the complex reality of international relations but the reality can be considered from a specific point of view (Watson, 1987).

Systematic level of analysis in mechanistic terms has been used by the E.S. They used the above mentioned three elements as the level of analysis. Systemic pressure works mechanically as it doesn't work accordingly to the will of the community (Watson, 1992). Other theorists consider this pressure as structural and argue that structural pressure emerges when states account other's economic and strategic actions while calculating their own. In contrast of the other theories E.S. take the identical view as the Neorealist concept on international society. They accept that States are pushed by the structure of the international system but at the same time they do have the view that states are not pushed by the invisible hands or powers rather they are directed by their rational assessment of the economical and military resources distributed among the international system. They also added that international anarchical structure pushes states to maintain the military resources/relations (Little R. , 1995).

Like neorealist, E.S. agrees that international structure does exist but despite this they also argue that system has the power to encompass the international society. E.S. does not suggest that international relations can only be understood in systemic term or development of

international society would eliminate the systematic forces rather they do believe that international systems and societies are coexisting with each other but obviously in the complex international arena. These elements can be separated from each other through methodology but it doesn't mean that they possess the different reality rather they are different by nature but working under the same reality (Watson, 1992).

Finally E.S. talked about the third level of analysis, in the third level of analysis their focus has been shifted from states to the individuals, living in different states but interlinked with each other on the basis of common culture and they formed the world society. This level of analysis draws the clear line between neorealist and E.S. approach to the world society but E.S. does argue that this level of analysis is necessary to explain the formulation of international society (Little R. , 1995).

E.S. use this trilogy for analysing the international relations. As Wight states:

"The three traditions are not like three railroad tracks running into infinity. They are not philosophically constant and pure like three stately, tranquil and independent streams flowing. They are Streams, with eddies and cross-currents, sometimes interlacing and never for long confined to their own river bed. They are, to vary the metaphor, interwoven in the tapestry of western civilization. They both influence and cross-fertilize one another, and they change, although without, I think, losing their inner identity" (Wight, International theory: The three traditions, 1996).

E.S. is known as the middle-way or the via-media because it opens up the innovative ways of analysing the international relations beyond the traditional discussion of realist versus liberalist. This approach helps to cover the dual understanding of the reality like national interest versus international, war versus peace, sovereignty versus globalization (Friedrichs, 2004). This middle-way or via-media approach was much inspired by the work of De Tocqueville, Hume,

Lock, Burke and Grotius (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014). Grotius is one of the most dominant scholar from the above mentioned list, he was a Dutch scholar who wrote “De Jure Belli ac Pacis” emphasized on the “society of states”. In his writings he chooses the way between realist and revolutionist thoughts by arguing that states are not as in struggle of power as described by the realist not as utopian as reflect by the revolutionist rather he focused that in international society states are not free from legal or moral boundaries (Bull H. , “Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations: The Second Martin Wight Memorial Lecture, 1976). This view provides the middle way and claiming the order while analyzing the international relations under anarchy.

2.5 Concept of “International Society” and Hadley Bull

E.S. focused more on the concept of international society while developing the understanding of international relations (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014). Scholars who initiated the first meetings of the British Committee like Wight and Butterfield admitted that during the theory formulation, they focused more on the state system, international society and diplomatic community as compare to the limits and use of the theory or about the foreign policy formulation (Wight, Wight, & Porter, International Theory-the three traditions, 1991). International Society is a sort of the club to cooperate under the anarchical characteristics of international relations argued by the dominant scholars of E.S. of thought. Wight and Butterfield consider international system and society almost interchangeably but in contrast Bull draw the distinction line before conceptualizing and operationalization of these terms (Watts, 1987). Bull argues that states contacts in two different modes, international system is when two states contact with each other and consider other's decision while acting at the international stage and international society is: when two or more then two states interacts with each others for securing interests and common values but side by side they are bound to obey the certain norms and values under the common institutions. For

Bull international system can exist without international society but international society can't be established without international system (James, 1993).

Bull choose the middle-way approach to conceptualize the international society, he added that the concept I have in my mind can be called as the Grotian concept (Bull, Wight, & Butterfield, Diplomatic Investigations: essays in the theory of international politics, 1966). Bull argues:

“society of states exist when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2012).”

In 1959 Bull wrote “What’s the commonwealth?” in which he states that international relations are more complex than power competition- ‘everyone against everyone else’. So it seems like for analysis, he borrowed system’s practice from the commonwealth (Bull H. , What is the commonwealth?, 1959). Bull gave more importance to the structure and functions of commonwealth which shows his intellectual way towards the concept of international society. Bull set commonwealth’ systematic and functional structure as the model for conceptualizing the English School’s world society. Commonwealth states are linked with each other’s by common interests and objectives but their dependency totally dependent on their own choice. For analysis, Bull concentrated on the two main characteristics of the commonwealth first is common interests and objectives on the basis of which states cooperate with each other’s and second is common culture, he added that common culture is not necessary for cooperation and in support of his argument he gave the example of India and Pakistan relations as they do have contrasting military, economic and cultural interests but despite of all these elements they are not only cooperating under the umbrella of commonwealth rather they are sharing intelligence with each other’s as well (Bull H. , What is the commonwealth?, 1959).

In support of his analysis's framework, Bull gave the examples of five different international societies from the history: Greek City state system, international system by the Hellenistic Kingdoms, international system of China, state system of ancient India and current world order (Bull H. , *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2012). Stanley is in the view that *The Anarchical Society* by Bull draws the attention towards the element of cooperation among states (Bull H. , *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2012). In Bull's theory of international relations 'state' is the most important actor as it provides the base to the inter-state domain of international relations and for him 'state' is when it has the specific independent part of the earth along with the particular chunk of the population (Bull H. , *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2012). Bull's framework is described as:

"The master concept and distinguishing marker of the E.S. is 'international society', conceived of as a now-global society in which states are the primary actors, collectively producing the rules and accepted practices by which they manage their inter-relations (Navari & Green, *Guide to the English School in International Studies*, 2014)".

Bull considers anarchy as the central characteristic of international relations and plays an important role in theorizing the world politics. He further explain anarchy by making a comparison between the individuals living in a sovereign state and states working at the world stage, he argues that anarchy is just like men living in one state in which they are subject to the common government but in contrast in world politics sovereign states are not subject to the only one government (Bull H. , *Society and anarchy in International Relations*, 1968). By making such arguments, Bull tries to explain that the condition of order and laws is different from the one observing at the domestic level. So, he disagrees with the point that at international level the notion of everyone against everyone might eliminate if sovereign states and the citizens of the states are subject to one supreme authority. This argument leads the attention

towards the state of nature that at international level states interact with each other's without binding under any obligation (Bull H. , The Grotian Conception of International Society, 1968). On the other hand he argues that realist theory doesn't fit with the world realities as he argues that no doubt international system is anarchic but despite of the anarchic states can cooperate with each other's (Bull H. , Society and anarchy in International Relations, 1968).

Bull's concept of international society concentrates on the concept of order so he added that cooperation at international system in anarchic world can possible because of the order but order cannot exist without specific goal or objective. Because for him a same order can't be apply in the all situations but every situation would have different order accordingly, for applying the order goal and objectives must be set from the beginning, without a clear goal or objective the concept of order would be meaningless (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2012). Bull added that in international society, order is not the result of any fact rather it's the consequence of the common interests based on the goals and objectives, establishment of rules to prescribe the behaviour for sustaining these goals and institutions to make these rules effective (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2012). International society by Hedley Bull is based on the common interests as he argues that states are the central figure in the international society and they work with each other's to secure their interests and as long as their interests are not in contradiction with each other's they cooperate and work voluntarily to sustain the order but if their interests get contradict with one another states can't provide the order. On the basis of above mentioned explanation, Bull states that international society has different goals, the first is to preserve the system of international society, second is to maintain the sovereignty of the states, third to maintain the peace in international society and last but not the least it deals with the social life's goals (Bull H. , Order versus Justice in World Politics, 1977).

In a nut shell, Bull's writings gave overriding status to the order to analyse the world politics and this status somehow influence the functional mechanism of the international politics. He also argues that states are the main actor in the international relation, those cooperate with each other's on the basis of the common interests and set few rules under the common institutions and at the end they provided order via these rules and institutions. These common goals and interests give a way to cooperation, it decrease the violence and securing the property rights for individuals (Buzan, Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International Society, 2006).

2.5.1 Institutions of the International Society

E.S. considers I.R. as a distinct subject to study in which states are the most important actor. E.S. theorists argue that despite the anarchy at international level, states are not bound to act under any supreme authority. In their point of view states are sovereign and independent to establish the world society in which they make order and enjoy it rather than brutality/violence. They also added that 'order' must be place on the relationship's structure between the sovereign nation-states (Jones R. E., 1981).

Bull describes states as a sovereign political community, having designated population along with the independent government to rule over (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2012). States are the most important actors at international level to monitor and assure the common rules without any higher authority. They also added that rules depend on the human factors living in societies/states so they are easy to change or interpret. E.S. argues that institutions plays a vital role in adaptation or to protect these rules because rules can't be regulate without a mechanism and independent institutions can only play the role of that mechanism. States voluntarily bound themselves to obey the habits and practices consisted by (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2012). In

international relations, organizations like UNO, NATO are considered to be as the international institutions. But Wight and Buzzan considers such organizations as the Pseudo and secondary institutions respectively (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014). On the other hand, E.S. is having the totally different opinion from the regime theories as in liberal theory of international relations, cooperation does exist between states even under anarchy, so in regime theory States are the more rational actor as they cooperate under such organizations to maximize their gains (Buzan, Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International Society, 2006). E.S. does not considers such organizations as the institutions referred by them rather they argue that primary institutions are those recognized by the historians and sociologist and utilize for governing the relations between states, groups or individuals (Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, 1994).

In contrast Suganami defines institutions as a set of social rules and conventions which guide their members about what they should do and what shouldn't in their relations with each other's (Suganami, British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years on, 2003). These institutions are the functioning mechanism and evolved with the passage of time from throughout the history of international relations. Robert Keohane in his article gave different perceptions about the institutions in international relations. He states that institutions in international relations are either the organizations like UNO or WB (World Bank) or regimes as international monetary or trade regime etc. or a specific institutional structure of sovereignty by Stephen Krasner (Krasner, 1988) or the established institutions discussed by Bull. For Keohane institutions are the connected set of rule which determines the behaviour, lemmatize or regulate the activity of the member states along with the shape of the expectations (Keohane, 1988).

E.S. is different from the rest of the theories of the international relations on the basis of Bull's point of view regarding 'order' in international society and mechanism adopted for maintaining

order is not designed particularly rather it has been evolved throughout the history. He argues that common goals and interests of the states in international society drive them to set or follow the common rules under particular institutions and as a consequences ultimate goal 'order' is provided. For Bull, BOP, IL, GP, war and diplomacy plays the role of institutions (Bull H. , *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2012). Institutions described by the Bull are interrelated and supplementary and these institutions provide the ground for co-existence to the states. During the historical events these institutions didn't work independently but collaboratively. Suganami argued that Bull borrowed this concept by the Hart's Theory of Law. Hart define his theory on the basis of different rules and claims about the function of the legal system in a complex society based on these rules. In his theory Hart argues that legal system dependent on the primary rules and he define primary rules as "how people ought to behave". For him secondary rules are for "how to identify, manage and change" them accordingly (Hart, 2012).

Suganami added that Bull's define the institutions based on the secondary rules, these institutions interact, manage, change, interpret, enforce protect and legitimize the rules. He states that "states interact with each other's on the basis on the expectations that their problems can be managed by following the set of rules under the above mentioned institutions (Suganami, *The Structure of Institutionalism: an Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations*, 1983). In contrast, Buzzan argues that E.S. considers institutional structure of IR as a defining feature of their theory. He considered institutions as the core idea of English School (Buzan, *Not Hanging Separately: Responses to Dunne and Adler*, 2005) and this feature of E.S. differentiate it from the other schools of IR like realism, rationalist, neo-liberalist etc. (Buzan, *Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International Society*, 2006). Above mentioned institutions have some common characteristics as a whole as they are durable plus their practices revolves around the shared values. These institutions and values are not permanent or

fixed but play an important role in the game of international relations. He also agrees that no one can identify any institution or a list of institutions which can be considered valid for all the time and in all situations (Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, 2010). He sketched out the institutions discussed by E.S. as below:

Candidates for primary institutions of international society by author (Adopted by Buzzan 2004)

Wight	Bull	Mayall	Holsti	James	Jackson
Religious sites and festivals					
Dynastic Principles					
Trade			Trade (P)		
Diplomacy	Diplomacy	Diplomacy (I)	Diplomacy (p)	Diplomacy	Diplomacy
Alliance					
Guarantees					
War	War		War (P)		War
Neutrality					
Arbitration					
Balance of Power	Balance of Power, Great Powers management	Balance of Power (I)			

International Law	International Law <u>The States</u>	<u>International Law</u> (I)	International Law (F) The State (F)	International Law	International Law
Sovereignty		Sovereignty (P) Territorial Integrity (P) Non-intervention (P) Self-Determination (P) Non-Discrimination (P) Human-Rights (P)	<u>Sovereignty</u> (F) Territoriality (F)	<u>Sovereignty</u> Political Boundaries	<u>Sovereignty</u>
			Colonialism (P)		Colonialism

For Mayall (I) = Institutions, (P) = Principles

For Holsti (F) = Foundational Institution, (P) = Procedural Institution

Words underlined are where the author identifies an institution as 'principal', or 'master' or 'bedrock'

Just like Bull, many scholars like Wight, Mayall, Holsti, James and Jackson have also identified number of institutions during their work on international society (The English School and Institutions, 2013). Wight notes few institutions like festivals, congress, messengers, trade, diplomatic language, messenger, arbitration, alliance and war etc. as for the pre-modern period

(Wilson, 2012). As far as institutions presented by Bull are concerned, it seems like they have failed to reach at any single point. On the one hand, it seems to be a commonality between the institutions such as war, diplomacy and international law and on the other hand it seems like the institutions like nationalism, colonialism etc. are challenging the primary institutions. At the same time great power consensus lacks the consensus while BOP is strongly supported and contested as well (Buzan, Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International Society, 2006). Bull argues that institutions work ideally but sometimes they can't match or catch the realities most likely due to the two main reasons, first rationality of state might play the role and secondly it could be because of the unexpected or uncontrolled social events and their surprised events.

Bull added that a determined hypothesis for state's rationality doesn't reflect the historical aspect. As he doesn't believe on the hypothesis related to the ordinary rationality of states. He doesn't believe on the perception of state rational action but believe that miscalculations and folly decisions were always possible in states actions (Hoffman, 1986). Secondly he argues that as there is high potential in changing of social sciences so international or national events are unpredictable. Human factor in his writings also plays an important role as human factor is less stable and changeable so it criticizes the automated process with the same outcomes. Even though E.S. focuses more on the continuity in the international politics rather than changing dynamic but in this case E.S. gave a special margin to such factor and events. At one side unexpected consequences could be possible but on the other hand history of International Relations treats them exceptional cases. These explanations of Bull institutions have to face so many criticisms, few scholars only targeted the five institutions discussed by the Bull but others also criticized the international structure. This criticism by the scholars can be summarized as the complex conceptualization of the term 'institution' which is not clear along with its pluralistic and minimalist nature. Bull's definition of institutions also got criticism because of

the inadequate number, lack of the subdivision and information regarding history, evolution and changes in the institutions.

Before moving towards the detail of institutions presented by Bull in his work, few points regarding criticism must be discussed before. In his work Bull did not argue that institutions presented by him have the capacity to explain the international relations as a whole. His minimalistic approach having an overriding status in the society as it has just focused on the order of international society. He did not argue or make answers to all the questions while remaining in the reality of international relations. Bull did not claim that his institutional structure would act same in all the situation rather he claims that his structure of international institutions free the states from taking automatic decision or action, on the other hand under this structure state can play on both rational or irrational grounds. His structure allows states to act against the any institutions if their core interests are to be challenged and even they can change or make the alternative policies against their interests or they are allowed to switch to other institution For instance, if their BOP mechanism fails, they can alter it or turn to other institutions like war, diplomacy, the great power system, international law, etc.

As Wight suggested, the idea of an institution needs to be further developed or it must have a clear cut definition. Bull states that structure on international institution is 'evolved' not 'designed'; this structure was initiated to discuss the reality of international relations within the context of E.S. so at the initial level they established a general conceptualization which needs further elaboration. As Bull gave more importance to state, sovereignty, and policy of non-intervention his work attracted criticism for its minimalistic and pluralistic nature. Plus his focus on the only one aspect 'order' and 'international society' provides the biggest source for criticism. But, Bull welcomes this criticism as well by saying that there is no need to explain each and every reality of international relations. Bull considers sovereign states as the main actors in international society but he did not consider states, territoriality or sovereignty as the

institutions. On the other hand when it comes to the economy, Bull incorporates it under the institution of BOP.

Next criticism on Bull's writings is on its division of the institutions. By cooperating with the other subjects like political science, sociology and philosophy, Bull made an effort to divide institutions into simple categories, but despite his best efforts, this strategy ended up being more complicated. This institutional debate of English School seems like continue even when theorizing the other primary institutions to explain or understand the reality of international relations. Bull theorized the institutions by adopting the minimalistic approach (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014). In the nut shell, criticism on Bull's institutions started from the initiation of this concept but despite of all the criticism these institutions have their own impact while analysing the reality of international relations. Before analysing the China's Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific on the basis of English School's assumption, next part of this research will deal with the institutions of English School in detail as their definition, role, types and their connection with the states relations.

2.5.1.1 Balance of Power

In the discipline of international relations the concept of balance of power is one of the most important concepts and impacted the state relations throughout the history of IR. As it is one of the most influential concepts vast literature is available on balance of power in international relations. Many scholars of international relations pay attention towards the historical context and role played by the BOP mechanism as Kenneth Waltz argues that BOP concept is practicing since long and has been adopted by different type of governments, either they were ancient China to Indian rule or Greek city states or Italian city states system to the modern state and even in the contemporary international relations (Waltz, 1986). The biggest contribution of Chinese School in to the discipline of international relations is mostly related to the concept

of BOP and they claim that the origin of the balance of power can be traced back to the early ages of Chinese history (Zhang Y. , 2013).

English School pays more attention towards the concept of balance of power politics. Wight and Butterfield wrote two distinct chapters on the diplomatic investigation deals with the concept of balance of power. Martin argues that the concept of balance of power has been used throughout the history but with distinct meaning or in different context. From a bundle of definitions he chooses only one which he thinks would be best to explain this phenomenon in the context of international relations. Balance of power is:

“When no power is more powerful or dominating and an equal distribution of power” (Wight, The Balance of Power, 1968)

Bull explains the balance of power is almost the same way during building up his own assumptions of the theory/concept. Bull in his book wrote a chapter specifically dealing with the concept of balance of power in which he define and explain the BOP, its contribution in the world politics and international order along with its role in maintaining the contemporary international order (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). After defining the BOP as a concept, he explains its types and role played by the balance of concept in maintaining the international order. He took the cold war period as an example with his special focus on the nuclear arms, just to explain how this concept is working even in the current or existing system of international relations. Bull strongly agrees that automatic existence of balance of power is impossible so he emphasized on the states to adopt the BOP mechanism when it is needed. And, for Bull this institution work only when states voluntarily participate, bound themselves and follow the particular rules and regulations at international level. He explains his argument by states that:

“Doctrines which assumed that an international system do automatically have the tendency for BOP are drive from the ‘power political’ theory. The argument that if a state at international level try to dominate other, the next state will prevent it and defend its interests, assuming that all state at international level are working to maximize their relative power. But in contrast, doctrine by Bull, doesn’t have any tendency for BOP rather it focus on the maintenance of ‘order’ at international level and all the states will have to only follow that order for balance of power at international level (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977)”.

Little argues that the common goal presented by Bull’s balance of power is just to provide the uneven distribution of power among states; states will have to secure their interests and defend themselves against any raising or existing power (Little R. , 2006). In this regard, the historical notion of nationalism and sovereignty by Little is seems to be important during the Bull’s evolution of institutions. As Little in his work states that when there was no such term to explain everything thing a phenomenon differently, either it was territory or populations occupied a specific territory were used to be consider as the property of the leader who was ruling them and the leader did have the right to exchange them if he/she wanted to do so. He added that the idea of sovereignty was not even consolidated as a principle even during Vienna congress (1815). Even during the congress of Vienna, no attention was paid towards the territorial sovereignty or rights rather territory was to be considered as a part of negotiation which can be join or divided into pieces just to balance or establishing equilibrium. During the 19th century and after that the strong consolidation was presented by bringing together the concept of balance or power and sovereignty (Little R. , 2006). Bull agrees that the idea to present balance of power as a common goal in international relations was initiated during the 17th and 18th century (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Since then BOP has been played an important role in international society as a well-functioning mechanism. If it was working since then, so what would the function of BOP as a central institution in international society?

Bull answer this question by adding that function of balance of power as a central institution is to prevent the system to turn into the universal empire. It also guarantees the independence and territorial sovereignty to states. On the basis of the above answer, the primary function on BOP institution is not to guarantee peace and stability to states rather protects the state-system. When there is no option left with, in such situation war can be the option for preserving the BOP (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Bull considers BOP as the primary and the most important institution (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Bull argues that balance of power plays an important role in preventing the powers to dominate the international system. He added that BOP supposed to work as the institution in preventing the aggression as well. Bull notes:

“The diplomatic system, war, international law and management of the international system make a situation or system in which no single power is the sole dominant actor. The stability of such institutions are dependent upon the behaviour of the member states, if any actor (state) break the rule then other actors (states) have the rights to take action in response to secure their interests. In such situation the powerful state can ignore the international law or the diplomatic relations”.

But he disagree with the Lord most famous saying that “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Janosi, 1940). As he has the different perspective on BOP, he argues that if a power can pose threat to the existing international order is impossible to contain by the treaties rather counter power is necessary to contain it (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Bull divided balance of power into four different types: a simple versus complex BOP, local versus General BOP, subjective versus objective, and contrived versus fortuitous BOP.

For him in simple BOP only two actors/powers compete with each other's while in complex BOP more than two actors have an interaction with each other's. He mentioned the clash between France and Habsburg as an example of the simple balance of power. World politics

during Cold War period and USA- USSR's relations are seen by him as a perfect example of complex balance of power. He considers the 'détente' period (1967-1979) as the best example during which the tension decreased between the USA and USSR, during this era the trade and cooperation increased between USA and USSR, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) was signed and China gain the power or capacity to join the group of great powers. In his book 'Anarchical Society' (1977) he considers Western Europe or Japan as the fourth or fifth powers following the list of the great powers. He added these powers into the list of great power on the base of his analysis and calculate their capabilities not only politically but military, economically and diplomatically as well. He admitted that throughout the history there are very few chances of have the example of perfect simple or complex balance of power. He also argues that a great power has the ability to disturb the mechanism of BOP and make it more complicated.

After simple and complex balance of power he defines the local and the general balance of power. Not the general but local BOP mechanism can exist and apply in any part of the world just like in Asia, Western Europe or even in Caribbean. He clarifies that local and general Bop should not be confused with the concept of dominant and sub-ordinate concepts of balances. If a great power plays its role in the local or regional politics, this could be explained as the great power involvement in the matters of the subordinate ones. For him matter between great powers as USSR or USA can be rename as the dominant BOP but Middle East and Asian states were sub-ordinate to them during the Cold War (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

He argues that for objective material capabilities and capacities it is necessary to believe on the existence of the BOP subjectively. In Bull's point of view BOP can't be exist without the belief and capacity and for achieving the balance of power articulation of both subjective and objective capabilities are necessary. Bull gave the example of 1930s politics in Europe, before the German expansion it was believed that there was general BOP, but this believe collapsed

when German made territorial expansion during the WWII but later it came to know that during that period the BOP was subjective in nature not the objective one. This example makes his argument stronger that BOP can only exist if both elements are there (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Last but not least he explains contrived and fortuitous balance of power. As the terms showing contrived balance of power is not a natural or spontaneous rather created deliberately and in contrast the fortuitous balance is happened by accident or chance rather than design. Contrived BOP is the consequence of an organized act or effort. History of international relations is based on the balance of power concept and those balances are based on the model of both contrived and fortuitous balance of power. He added that balance of power mechanism is not a robotic one that it happened or exist automatically without state's constants, efforts, their will and intentions of all the member states as single state can't design, produce or practice balance of power internationally (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Bull's explanation of the balance of power as an institution doesn't end here rather he added that there is another complex characteristic of the balance of power is the concept of 'power'. Bull explains the complexity of international politics as 'many chessboards', he elaborates as there are so many chess-boards and the connection of all these chess-boards make the concept of overall power (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). One of the most common chess-board in international society is 'economy', Bull consider it as a part of the BOP institution. While reading his book, Bull was much clear about the role played by economy in the states relations and how it influences the international society. Bull considered economy as a much influential factor but not as much to establish it as a main institution in the international society but undoubtedly economy holds a special place in his BOP institution. Bull considers economy as one of the most influential components to establish main maintain the bilateral relations. For instance Anglo-American bilateral relations were based on the five themes (economy, defence,

history, commonwealth and the non-European world) and economy was one of them. This example shows that Bull consider economy as one of the most essential element/component of bilateral relations (Louis, Louis, & Bull, 1986). In Bull point of view balance of power actually prevent the powerful state/sole super power to dominate the international society and drive the world politics as a single, most influential emperor.

2.5.1.2 International Law

Bull defines international law as a body of rules at international level which bounds states to behave accordingly in their relations with other states and world politics (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). As definition by Bull gave more important place to international law in the world society so this phenomenon is need to be more elaborated. Bull argues that in the international society international law constitute rules and works at the normative level (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). International law define by Bull are having the authoritative and effective instructions which leave their impact on the state's behaviour in the world politics and relations with other states. But here the status of international law is more questionable without the capacity of sanctions. As for as 'sanctions' in international law are concerned, Bull agree with the Hans point of view. He argues, according to the rule of international law if any state violate the norms of international law, it ought to be followed by the sanctions. Characteristic of international law is having 'coercive order' as Hobbes said "where there is no common power, there is no law" Because 'law' is different from religious or social order where supernatural sanctions and voluntary obedience matters a lot (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Another point of discussion over here is how the institutions like international law are being followed by the states under the anarchy. There is a perception that states not only follow the rule of international law voluntarily but international law has its own coercive power as well.

As per Bull point of view, to drive the international society international law has its own sanctions. This elaboration of international law shows that international and municipal law are different in terms of their structures as municipal law is a law practicing within a state, it applies only on the defined territory and backed up by the state author along with the threat to use the power if not followed properly but in contrast, international law is quite opposite, it doesn't apply on the specific territory, is not backed up by the powerful authority and there is no threat of force present as well (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Despite the fact that there is no central authority to produce or apply the sanctions upon the states, as an institutions international law has evolved enough to contribute in maintaining the order in international society.

Even though in municipal law there is a supreme power like state to force people to follow the rules or punish them if they break it, but the right of self-defence does exist. People use the right of self-defence under certain circumstances; same is in the case of international law where state does have the right of self-help. According to the principle of self-help, sanctions in international society are applied by the individuals including wars and reprisals (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). In such situations balance of power institution plays an important role within the international institutions in general and to run the international law in particular. International law can only be maintained if all the states get the same power to uphold certain rights if they are undermined at international society (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Balance of power is the only mechanism to maintain the rules of international law as it is common that powerful states always ignore the rights of weak states (Oppenheim, 1905). Bull also doesn't consider international law as world's one of the most powerful agent to force its rules or decisions (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). One of the biggest weaknesses of international law as an institution is, it can't produce order itself. International law is an

institution at international level which operates with the help of other institutions especially balance of power and it works on specific issues within the international order.

International law an institution has three fundamental functions. First is to maintain the international society in which states are the main actor. So the most important function is to promote and consolidate the 'statist' nature of international society (Bull H. , The State's Positive Role in World Affairs, 1979). Second is to establish the basic rules for the cooperation and co-existence between states and other international actors. The rules about cooperation covers the areas such as restriction on the use of violence against states or other actors, maintaining independence or sovereignty and agreements between them (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Last but not the least function of international law is to help complains within the rules of international society (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). On the basis of these three functions Bull concludes that international law has nothing to do with the strengthening of international order rather it works only for above mentioned functions.

Despite the fact that states only obey the most agreed rules on international law, and they somehow don't follow the rules of international law but only in particular cases otherwise Bull argues in their peaceful engagement they are bound to follow the rules such as establishing good diplomatic relation, exchanging visitor, money and trade with each other. So if states don't follow or break the rules of international law it doesn't mean international law as an institution is not sufficient enough to play its role in international society (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). States obey international law not only for the stability of international system but to secure their interests as well, so breakdown or refusal to obey the certain rules by states in the particular situation is not the collapse of the whole system (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). It is usual that states disregarded the rules of international law if their interests get conflicted with others and either it's rational or irrational but states do

have rights too, to disregard the certain rules in particular situation and adopt the alternate policies (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Despite the fact that international law is one of the most important institution or pillar of international society to maintain the order, in modern era international relations there will be hardly any period in which states maintain order without the international law. But still there are few limitation for the international law as during Greek city-state, Hellenistic Kingdom and ancient Indian states system international system was existing and maintaining the international order with the international law and international law as an institution was not existing (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Second limitation of international law as an institution is insufficiency to bring the 'order' within international society. It only works for the coexistence between the states and this way help to maintain the international order. International system is complex as there is no single institution to manage everything rather states make rules for the common interests and for sustaining the peace and stability at international level. International law is also works as an essential institution in international society against the other institutions for the stability of international order. For example international law prohibited the use of force or intervention in the domestic policies of any state but if any powerful state ignores the rules of international law against the weak state, then in that situation BOP mechanism plays its role and interfere to maintain the international order (Bull H. , Intervention in World Politics, 1988). In the nut shell, as an institution international law even don't have capacity to stop violation of its own rules.

International law plays a complex role in international society. Despite all the loopholes, international law tries to manage state relations and regulates the rules even during the war time. Even though states violate the rules of international law and go to war but despite of this international law provides the regulation and try to restrict states to wage a war according to

the rules and regulation, and what the behaviour states should adopt in the post war scenario (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). International is seeking to restrict the legitimate use of violence among nations because till now it is not clear which side is right. Every state considers itself on the right side, securing their territory and interests as the legitimate right and complains about the other side (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Non-state actors emerged on the world stage after the WW II, But Bull consider international law is the law between states, it only deals with the coexistence between states and considers states as the core actor at international level. In short it is clear like crystal that institution on international law is the core reality of internality of international law and plays an important role in states relations and maintaining peace in the world politics.

2.5.1.3 Diplomacy

Diplomacy is one of the most important pillar of international society, it plays crucial role in world politics. Wight considers diplomacy as the most important institution of the world politics (Wight, Power Politics, 1978). Adam Watson explains the diplomacy as:

The diplomatic mission in any country not only represents their country but they share certain common interest with their colleagues as well. They protect their privileges and immunities together which they can't do alone and secondly this professional solidarity plays much important role when consular deals with the regional authorities. He also added that embassies represent their host and native countries. Neutral embassy acts for the international society and always provides the communication line to the world society (Wight, Power Politics, 1978).

Bull defines diplomacy as its important tool to conduct the relationship between not only the states but the other non-state entities at the world stage. Official agents play their role in conducting relations with peaceful means by using the diplomatic platform. Diplomacy is an institution just like war, both institutions carries out by the different professionals, agents but

in opposite ways (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Diplomats use different means to achieve their goals for instance negotiation as a tool to manage the states relations and their performance is also much necessary and tactful to defend the state interest (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

The most essential characteristics of diplomacy are to facilitate the communication between the political leaders and the non-state actors in the world politics. Diplomats play the role of messenger and convey their states messages to other states and non-state entities (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Bull added that sometimes political leaders of different states have direct communication without any professional diplomat or mediator. He further states that cable, telephone, letter, radio etc. are the techniques to convey the message other than one to one meeting (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

The second function of diplomacy is to negotiate the agreements between the states. States have to negotiate on the agreements to secure their interest, without negotiation the ground of international relations would most probably be full of hostile activities. Bull considers the final agreement between head of states or foreign ministers is basically the consequence of a long process including proposals, meetings, and negotiation by the diplomats (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

The third function of diplomats to gather the information from the host country in the interest of their native country. As states are the member of the international society so it is the duty of the diplomat to inform the opinion and policies of the components of the international society to the policy makers of their own country. Even though states don't like to reveal their policies or intentions to their counterparts but they always try their best to know more because if they will not get their target, their country can't make the good decisions or external policies to secure maximum interests (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Fourth function of diplomacy as an institution is to prevent the war, and minimize the friction and tension among states because war or friction sometimes do not represent the true interests of the states. But at the same time diplomacy is always try for the win-win situation for all the participants. To get their desired results diplomacy doesn't use the force or threat rather they always persuade and resonate. Diplomacy as an institution of international relations focus more on the rules related to the rights of the parties involves as diplomatic institution speaks about the rights rather than demands (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Last but not the least function of diplomacy is to play the symbolic role in the international society. In the modern state system, establishing the diplomatic enclaves in the capitals of the states shows the peaceful, cooperative relations between the states in the international society of international relations (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

In sum for Bull argues that in 20th century diplomacy is highly institutionalized and working as an established institution. He further added that diplomacy plays an important role among states to establish and maintain peaceful bilateral relations; economy is the biggest tool to of diplomatic intuition of international relations to conduct the peaceful relations between two or more than two states. In the history diplomatic relations could not get as much importance as they got in 20th century because in contemporary break up of diplomatic relations between states are to be considered as the hostile relations but this was not the story of the past. Further he adds multilateral institutions as UNO, WHO, WTO etc. as the multilateral institutions of diplomacy and for him methods of diplomacy has been changed as well, if we look at the history of international relations only ambassadors are to be considered as the diplomats but now scholars, writers, special intelligence agent and exchange of visitors are also playing the role of diplomats in the word society.

2.5.1.4 War

Bull explains war is the use of organised violence by a political unit against the other. But if such activities are not conducted by the political units, that use of organized violence even, can't be claim as a war. At the same time if political unit is carrying out the any violent activity but it is not against the other political unit, that use of organised violence can also not be considered as war. In contemporary time war is the use of violence or force by sovereign states against the other states and considers it as their legitimate right (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). For Bull war is directly link to the international law followed by states and balance of power mechanism among them (Jones C. A., 2006). Bull doesn't consider war as a crime in international society rather a temporary state's policy to secure their interests (Hoffman, 1986).

As for as institution of war's role in international society is concerned, it has two characteristics, first it has great contribution in maintaining the international society at the same time it pose threat to the order in international society. On the one hand state use war as an instrument of their policy to shape the international order and on the other hand war is a threat to the status of "all against all" as it contains the state to do hostile activities (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

These two different characteristics play an important role in the world politics. International recognized organizations such UNO, League of Covenant (LOC) and Kellog-Briandt Pact not only limit but restrict the institution of war. Even international society put the restriction on war in different ways; it doesn't allow to wage a war among the sovereign states, pose limits on the conduction of war, and full fledge war is restricted and lastly it confines the causes of war (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

On the other side of the picture, international society claims that institution of war plays positive role as well. War can be seen as an important mean to enforce the international law for

instance when there is no central government or when a state break the international law and attack on the other state, the other state use the war as an instrument in their self-defence to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty. They also force other state to enforce the international law through the institution of war. Institution of war is also considered as mean to preserve the BOP among states. Balance of power means no state is as much powerful that it can break any rule or violate any states sovereignty (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Use of force or threat to use the force under the institution of war in the international society is sometimes contemplate as just. As history shows that along with the just order war also acted to protect the legal order, preserve the balance of power (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Bull concept of 'just war' has been criticized by so many scholar as Oppenheim argues that it's not the duty of war to decide what is just or not rather it lies under the premises of international law to decide that weather the war process was just or not, it was according to the law or not and what states should do after the war, what must be the international order to follow after the war is over. Same like Oppenheim, Grotius also argues that there must be a 'just' reason to wage a 'just war' and for him 'just' reasons are: territorial defence, punishment, and to get back the territory (Bull H. , The Grotian Conception of International Society, 1968). Even for Bull state is the most important actor at the world stage and plays most important role in case of any unjust situation. Despite of this argument he still considers institution of war as a tool or means to maintain the balance in the world politics and only intervene when justice has not been given to all the participants (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Either it is rational or irrational, just or unjust but states have been and used to use war as an instrument to secure their interest. Sometimes states wage war to achieve their objectives but at the same time state can't go into war because of the miscalculation or irrational decisions. War was a tool of history now in modern state system states don't always go to war against

each other's but occasionally or accidentally (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Bull highlight few reasons of waging wars by states, he argues that state go for when their national security would be on stake. But here security is a difficult term to explain because this term can be explained in terms of defence, economy or ideological security. To justify his argument states don't wage war only because of the economic reason as they were used to do during the colonialism but also for ideological reasons as Napoleonic wars or for security reasons such as Peloponnesian war (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

But after the invention of nuclear weapons doctrine of war has been changed. Because nuclear war can bring much destruction as compare to the conventional warfare. So in the era of nuclear weapon the mechanism of balance of power has been changed as well. Because of the nuclear invention states don't go for the full flagged war rather they wage limited wars but the threat of nuclear war produce the deadlock between the states for instance the deadlock between US and USSR during the cold war. Limited wars on the other hand don't change the existing international order (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). In sum for Bull war is one of the influential institutions in the reality of international relations. Either it is rational or irrational but states go to war and institution of war along with the institution of balance of power are the influential components of international society for producing the order between states.

2.5.1.5 Great Power Management

After the end of WWII the term 'great power' was replaced by the 'super-power' by William T. R. Fox. He used the term 'super-power' for that time powers like Britain, USA and USSR (Fox, 1944). For Bull 'super-power' term represents the powers same as by the 'great power' (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). These definitions of great or super power raised the question; on the basis of this definition which state could be asked as a great power? Bull answered this question as "USA, USSR and China are the great power, Japan is the potential

great power and as Western Europe can't be consider as a single state, that's why it is not a great power" (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Great power management is one of the important institutions of international society by Hadley Bull. Bull defines this institution of international society having three basic characteristics as he first states that great power must be great in nature not the unique one in international society, secondly great powers must have superior military capabilities and last but not the least is great powers doesn't mean only having the capabilities but the recognition for certain rights and duties in the international society (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Bull considers states as unequal at international society, he argues that because of the unequal status at international society, the demands of the strong get considered but the interests of the weak or not, mean relative power game does matter a lot too in the international society.

In other word story of international relations somehow revolves around the great powers relations, in which interest of great powers get more importance as compare to the small states issues. For instance during the Cold War, world was divided into two blocks, one was leading by the USA and the driver of the other was USSR. During that particular time opinions and decisions of the great powers were more crucial as compare to the small states in their campuses (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). The great power relations are important and plays crucial role in maintaining the world order.

Great powers contribute to international society or in international order in two different ways, first they try to manage their relations by preserving the balance of power, just by avoiding issues in their relations with each other's, by containing the wars, by respecting each other's interests or areas of influence etc. (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). And secondly they exploit the dominants just to give the central direction to the affairs or order of international society as a whole (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). While using the balance of power

mechanism they recognize each other's rights to use certain rights and duties. Under the balance of power mechanism they not only collaborate with each other rather avoid wars and conflicts to maintain the existing order. No doubt BOP plays important role in maintaining international society but sometimes states deliberately produce crisis to achieve certain goals (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Great powers contribute to the international society by avoiding intervening into each other's sphere of influence. They don't influence other's national interest. They also avoid to play the third party role in someone else issues. And for maintaining the order they sometimes try to avoid the tension during crisis time even (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Great powers also contribute to the existing international order by avoiding or limiting the war. For avoiding wars, they try to focus more on the negotiation and adopt other measures to resolve their issues rather than war. They also don't pay much attention of the misunderstandings between them or if they do exist already than they would tend to reduce the misunderstanding and miscalculations. They are supposed to control the arm competition and resolve the political differences but if they fail and war accrued than great powers try not to expand but control it and for this they first they draw clear line between the conventional and nuclear war along with the creation of the effective communication channels and then they took effective control of the forces to reduce the danger (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Another function of the great powers is not to intervene in to the others sphere of influence and interests. By avoiding the each other's areas of interest great powers are supposed to play their role in the stability and peace of international order. For instance during Cold War world was divided into two groups leading by USA and USSR. During that critical time USA and NATO bloc did not interfere into the other group's affairs or interest as when Soviet occupied the Hungary, USA or NATO did not interfere then for international order (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Great powers also contribute to the international society for promoting the

common policies. For example during the Cold War, despite the conflicts both US and USSR had few common policies as they signed Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

Great powers don't always serve for the equal rights or justice to all the states. Great powers see their interests first; they sometime manage their relation not to provide the justice to secure their rights (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). Great powers shape the structure on international relations and they do have the capacity to see the international relations from their perspective. States are assumed to manage their bilateral and personal relations along with their status of great powers. Institution of great power management works effectively because of the state's acceptance and their consent for the legitimacy of this great power management as an institution. Without the states support, this intuition lack the capacity to shape the international order (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977).

On the other hand for management, great powers have to seek the support from their partners. But if the political power of great powers is weak especially in other region then they have to seek the support from the secondary powers. It is the responsibilities of the great powers to manage the order and justice issue in the international society as sometimes international society might have the might have the order not justice (Bull H. , Order versus Justice in World Politics, 1977). So in such situation great powers will have to shift more focus towards the demands or needs of the poor states (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 1977). In sum great power institution plays important role along with the balance of power institution in international society. The primary function of great power management is to balance the international relations. Secondly great power management influences the states interaction and shows respect for the sustainment of international order.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter overviewed the historical evolution of English School, key concepts, methodology, and epistemology of English School of international relations. E.S. gradually evolved the basic concepts, assumptions (ontological, methodological and theoretical), and different inquiry methods which distinguished the E.S. from the previous schools. The most important characteristic of E.S. is that it adopted the interpretivist approach along with the pluralist method with the triadic conceptualization to analyse the reality of international relations. This triadic conceptualization consists of the international system, "international society and "world society". With the evolution of English school concept of international society has become the main point of ES to analyse the world politics. This approach of English school has become as much dominant within the theory/literature that the 'English School' is also known as the 'international society approach'.

The most significant point in this chapter is the research method adopted by the English school. This chapter did not deal much with the arguments or concepts of E.S rather it dealt with the historical readings about the process in which these concepts evolved. This historical method of the E.S. would also be applied further in the coming chapters of this dissertation.

Not only has the historical perspective rather the concept of international society by Hedley Bull been discussed throughout the chapter along with the five institutions of English School. Under his concept of international society, state as a sovereign political community, having designated population along with the independent government to rule over. States are the most important actors at international level to monitor and assure the common rules without any higher authority and rules depend on the human factors living in societies/states so they are easy to change or interpret. Institutions in international society play a vital role in adaptation or to protect these rules because rules can't be regulated without a mechanism, independent institutions can only play the role of that mechanism and maintaining the order in international

society. States voluntarily bound themselves to obey the habits and practices consisted by the institutions.

Next part of this chapter discussed the framework of institution by English School of international relations and about the capacity of institutions and role played by them in maintaining the 'order' within international society. Despite the criticism and questioning about the credibility, these institution played important role in maintaining the peace in world politics. Five institutions: international law, Diplomacy, Balance of power, War and great power management are considered as the base of further analysis of the politics of Asia-Pacific region with the main focus on region under China's Grand Strategy. This chapter explain these institution in detail with regard to their definition, functions, types and their role in maintaining the world 'order' but only from the Hedley Bull's point of view. Throughout the chapter and discussion about the role of institutions in the world politics, Bull emphasize o the fact what role states can actually play as compare to the one they play in world politics.

Chapter Three

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY

Introduction

This chapter would provide the historical context of Chinese Grand Strategy. On the basis of historical context it would evaluate the current policies and analyse what could be the possible future and behaviour of China in the Asia-Pacific region.

Since 1,000 years ago, China's security behaviour depends on few core objectives. And, these core objectives define China's current and future security strategy. First objective is to: when China is weak and unable to use force and dominate the periphery then China would use non-coercive means to secure its interests. Second is: China would try to protect its heartland through their border defence and controlling the long strategic periphery. Third is: China will not use much power against its external competitors or entities but for the peripheral control and defence of its heartland. Fourth is: if there is civil war, re-emergence of unified state or fluctuation in the state capacity then China would periodically expand.

This chapter helps to analyse the current Chinese security policies through the perspective of Chinese historical developments. It also argues that the current policies are overlapped with the previous policies of the Chinese heartland. A self-sufficient and defensible Chinese heartland could be traced back to the Han-Chinese era, when they were having clear boundaries, sufficient in agriculture and strong nomadic tribes to deter the external threats. Han Dynasty is considered as one of the golden age of Chinese ancient time but before that, China not only established its society but also achieved internal order and prosperity to maximize their influence over the immediate neighbours. Throughout the history the domestic political system of China played an important role in order to make China an influential country along with helped to maximize its power both at regional and world level.


During the imperial era vulnerable borders along with the presence of internal and external security threats forced China to adopt defensive and oppressive policies. The most important fact is security behaviour of China did not remain the same throughout the history rather they adopted the policies according to the need of the time, but one thing almost remain common throughout the history that China first tried to strengthen its society and then went for abroad. So, even during the 21st century, China is following the same pattern as before adopting its Grand Strategy, China made China strong enough at internal level and adopting the policies (defensive, offensive) according to the need of the time. China followed and still following this pattern because of the two main reasons: first, the geographical centrality could not be achieved without establishing the domestic order and secondly preservation of domestic order and peace was a tougher task to achieve as compare to the external influence, that's why states put more efforts to achieve the other goal first.

Just like other continental powers China too is a multi-ethnic empire but during the modern era China was neither fully protected nor fully limited which made the clear difference between China and other continental empires. As compare to the ancient time, China adopted different approaches in order to resolve its border disputes with the regional countries, it adopted not offensive but appeasing policies. China's geographic progression is primarily caused by the strategic advancement of the country. As during imperial era China's strategic periphery was consisted of the inland region and its adjoining borders but during the modern period it was consisted of both maritime and continental regions. With the passage of time, China made more progress as it has included dual land sea power, outer space and cyber security. This Chinese progress in every field has proved China as a great power having more influential Grand Strategy. Chinese history shows that it would not go towards the active conflict in order to achieve its interests and implementing Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific region but it is in the better position to force the regional actors and secure China's interests.

3.1 Border Defence and Periphery Control

The Chinese heartland emerged over 1,000 years ago, as a consequence of different historical developments (Figure 1). Since 1,000 years China's external security behaviour could be determined by security of its cultural, political and geographic interests of the heartland. This area comprises present day North and South China, which is rich in agriculture, small and medium mountains, centred on tributaries and flood plain of the Yangtze River in the south and Yellow in the north. Southwestern, Southern and Eastern boundaries of the heartland could be determined by the geographical barriers while in the north, boundaries can be defined as the combination of both human and geographical factors. (Figure 2, 3)

Figure: 1



Source: <https://www.slideserve.com/vinson/imperial-china-589-1368-ad>

Figure: 2





Figure: 3



Source: <http://www.wu.wien.ac.at/usr/h0151669/map-shanghai.jpg>


Historically, China had to defend, control and influence a large region (Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1996). During the imperial era China's strategic periphery was consisted of island region adjoining its continental borders (Figure 4) but during the modern era China's periphery was extended and covered both continental and maritime region. Throughout the history China was trying to create its dominance on the periphery for securing the heartland from the external threats, and to provoke the attacks on the heartland along with the Chinese dominance over the important nearby trade roots etc. (Figure 5). Chinese establishment or control over the periphery, either in terms of "actual" or "symbolic" was considered most important during most of the imperial era. This control over the periphery was used as a tactics of affirming the historical, Sino-centric international order. Symbolic maintenance of the Sino-centric order in the region was used as a core objective even during the weak China.

Figure: 4



Source: <https://www.slideserve.com/vinson/imperial-china-589-1368-ad>

Figure 5



Source: <https://www.slideserve.com/vinson/imperial-china-589-1368-ad>

In addition to control and maintain the periphery, China also frequently employed the massive means of defence to protect the heartland along with the territorial frontier, coastlines and static defences. These massive Chinese defences were usually based on the military garrisons etc., for instance China constructed the Great Wall at the northern frontier against nomadic attacks and other fortification and garrisons to protect Southern maritime borders from pirates attacks

respectively (Swanson, 1982). At that time those attacks considered as the biggest threat to the Chinese heartland (Kwan-Wai, 1975). So, a debate emerged in this situation that either China should adopt more expensive military tactics to protect its heartland or it should maintain the relations as were used to in the history.

During the first part of the 19th and 20th century, most of the current northern and western parts of China had been merged into Chinese heartland either through military force and occupation or through the sensitization of the region. They occupied and created their dominance over present day Tibet and Xinjiang through military and use of force while in case of Mongolia and Manchuria they controlled through the acceptance of the Han Chinese, their migration, settlement and cultural assimilation. As a consequence of such developments, China extended its borders till the established states, and secured maximum strength. But, despite of all this control, in the early era of 19th century China could not increase the overall size of the territory as Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet and Xinjiang were the only dominated areas. Most probably there could be only two reasons behind this situation, either the state could not see the need to control the periphery or they were materially unable to attain the control of much area. But in response Communist state was searching for more territory to control and enhance its influence.

Throughout the modern era geographical description of the Chinese heartland remained constant for different reasons. For example, major geographical formation of Chinese heartland determined the outer limits of the heartland in the pre-modern era as these physical boundaries provoked for both economic and geographic reasons (Lattimore, 1979). Secondly, periphery areas of the Chinese continental borders were occupied by different tribes of marauding and kingdom of the northwest, southwest, north and northeast. As in early times, these included Xianbi and Xiongnu of north and northeast of China, then Mongols of the north, Manchus and

Jurchens of the northeast, Turkic and Tibetan of the southwest and northwest desert and plateau areas (Barfield, 1989).

Later during the imperial era, these tribes and people posed serious threats to the security of the Chinese heartland and resisted the efforts of the rulers to dominate or control their land. These nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, confederation and kingdom continuously harassed the inland continental boundaries controlled large portion of Chinese territory and conquered the entire Chinese heartland (Hucker, 1975). Non-Chinese people ruled China even more than from Chinese ruler during the 1000-1911 (Oxnam, 1975). Nomadic tribes were more powerful as compare to the any other tribe, so they posed more threat to the Chinese interest with their warfighting capabilities. Their biggest tactic of war was horse skills, they were used to overwhelm China's static defence with horsemen skill of bow and sword. Because of this skill they were able to protect themselves even better than the larger, heavily armed Chinese forces. As China was relying more on long supply trains which were unable to chase their force (horse) in the barren areas and at critical points along the border (Barfield, 1989).

There were no significant powers centred outside of China during the imperial era to provide her with an alliance against potential dangers to Chinese interests. Major empires or powers of the time were concentrated in places like modern-day India, Italy, and Russia, which were physically far from the Chinese empire and, secondly, they had no interest in participating in the internal security issues of an empire. China was unable to expand its territory in order to defend against the rising challenges from the established countries as a result. Imperial China was self-sufficient political and economic power and they enjoyed the status of fixed heartland and periphery even during the period when they had to hosted people from different ethnicity and religious believes. Despite, having interact with different culture and trade with other nations, China remained as sustain economic and political entity.

Unlike other strong and small powers China did not rely on the external resources to get flourish, but to counter the major threats. Neither China went for the external alliances against the political or military, long standing alliance nor did they rely on the external resources as commodities or raw material etc. External economic interests did not play a much bigger role in the imperial China's security calculation but a little bit. External economy played the role in different ways: imperial Chinese court subjugate the different parts of South-Asia especially Vietnam to secure its interest in different precious materials like ivory and pearls etc. Secondly China wanted to secure the trade routes passing through the Central Asia to the Middle East and beyond which supported Chinese effort to control and dominate the Xinjiang. Thirdly China was interested to secure tax revenues from the Southern Song Dynasty. And last but not the least; a major blue water naval force was established by the Ming Dynasty to expand China's tributary trade relations (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

None of the above mentioned Chinese developments/interests were subject to the Chinese external security behaviour. Controlling the Xinjiang was a strategic and reactive in nature, as it was to defeat the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes plus did not let them to use the resources of that area. China dominated the present day Southeast Asia because of the Han Chinese population's migration, cultural reasons and to secure Chinese interest from external threats. During the Song Dynasty, the importance of trade through the sea was just a temporary phenomenon as it could be witness by the act of nomadic people to push out the Song Dynasty from the North China. But after the decline of Song Dynasty, Mongol Yuan Dynasty came into power, they established their control over the entire Chinese heartland and started the traditional method of imperial China to rely on the land taxes and internal grain transport (Hucker, 1975).

Politically, Chinese leaders were focusing more on the internal problems, creating and maintenance of balance, internal law and order situation and establishing relations with the

tributary to make China more stronger internally as compared to the external expansionism, that's why Chinese did not go for the external control of the territory and create their dominance over there especially those areas which were beyond from their periphery (Kierman & Fairbank, 1974). During the Chinese imperial history, for many times ruler decided to control the land beyond from their territory to maximize their territorial interest but they had to face the resistance from the imperial advisors, bureaucrats for the conceptual and bureaucratic reason (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). Along with all these, religious foreign beliefs such as Buddhism was taken as the threat to the Chinese cultural and societal harmony, but such beliefs always got the defensive reaction from the state not the offensive one.

After the creation of the modern state system and industrialization, China had to face this too because their policies were based on the Confucian concepts, but during the modern era, interacting with the industrialized nation-states, interstate relations, increased demand of military and economic modernization pressurised Chinese ruler to change their policies and means, through which they were used to control the periphery. But despite all of these developments China could not be able to expand its territory beyond its historically captured area. Security challenges by the modern industrialized western countries, internal political changes and the emergence of a unified China under the communist leader could also be the reason of such developments.


During that period, Chinese leader were busy in maintaining the internal order and strengthening its dominance over the traditional periphery and controlling their heartland. Before 1980s they were not interested in expanding their territory or in the international affairs but after the mid of 1980s Chinese leaders started to speak about not only the need of spending their strategic borders to expand current Chinese periphery but also about the new areas like cyber-space and outer-space (Li, 1996).

3.1.1 Fluctuations in Periphery Control and Regime Boundaries

Different Chinese regimes throughout history, whether they were Han-Chinese or non-Han Chinese, attempted to extend Chinese influence and control to the furthest reaches of the strategic periphery. They established their control through economic, geographic, strategic and political-military constraints. They secured all of their interests because of the established domestic order, first they made internal progress and then became able to making good external relations and securing their interests because their peripheral interest were depending upon the unified strong state (Barfield, 1989).


During the imperial era, regimes usually went to control the periphery but internal maintenance and consolidation of the regimes remained at the top of the priorities. They took several decades to establish their regimes internally and in creating the domestic order. They were used to serve their energies on elimination of the internal threats and resistance. During that time, in the matter of external policies they were mostly relying on the non-coercive measures. Because they did not want to indulge in any nearby external security related issues before getting strong internally. Most of the imperial regimes were practicing this pattern of rule except few like Qin and Sui (221-207 B.C., 581-618) respectively (Figure 6, 7). Both regimes adopted the coercive policies towards the expansion of periphery and unite the China in their earliest period of the rule. They did not only adopted aggressive policies in case of external expansion but in case of domestic maintenance as well. These policies resulted in the demise of the both regimes and left a negative lesson for the followed (Han and Tang) dynasties.

Figure: 6



Source: <https://www.chinahighlights.com/travelguide/china-history/the-sui-dynasty.htm>


Figure: 7



Source: <https://www.asiaculturaltravel.co.uk/qin-dynasty/>

Once China became internally strong enough that they were able to maintain the rule of law, regimes unity and ultimate authority has been assured then all the Chinese regimes either they were imperial or modern, they would go for the external expansion and control the territorial boundaries at the maximum level. During the era of imperial regime, many attempts were carried out by a series of “founding” rulers having interest, resources and experience in the military affairs. For instance, in the time of Han Dynasty under the Han Wudi rule, they went for the “founding” efforts to dominate the periphery people, Tang Dynasty under the Tang Taizong, Ming Dynasty under Emperor Ming Hongwu and Ming Yongle and Qing Dynasty under the rule of Kang Xi and Qianlong. But these attempts doesn’t mean that they all were successful rather there were so many failed attempts as well for example Ming effort to incorporated much of present day Vietnam could not get fruitful results after the death of the Emperor Ming Yongle (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

Figure: 8




Source: <https://www.timemaps.com/civilizations/the-han-dynasty-of-ancient-china/>

Figure: 9


The Tang's Ruling Area Map

Land under the rule of the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD)



Source: <https://www.chinahighlights.com/map/ancient-china-map/tang-dynasty-map.htm>

Figure 10




Source: <https://www.chinahighlights.com/map/ancient-china-map/ming-dynasty-map.htm>

Figure: 11

The Qing's Ruling Area Map

Land under the rule of the Qing Dynasty
(1644–1911 AD)




Source: <https://www.chinahighlights.com/map/ancient-china-map/qing-dynasty-map.htm>

After imperial regime, during modern era, Republican and communist both took similar efforts to re-establish Chinese influence and enhance its control along the periphery. Following the imperial regimes, nationalist China sought to capitalize the prior Qing success by absorbing the periphery territories. In 1912 Yan Shikai, former prime minister of defunct court proclaimed in an article that the former territories either they were under the Qing Suzerainty or under the other Qing rulers (Mongolia, Manchuria, Xinjian and Tibet) are now to be considered as a part of the Republic of China (B & Neill , 1987).

Even before the article, the Yan Shikai had already integrated Xinjiang and Manchuria as Chinese provinces, but the quasi-independent nations rejected them. Tibet on the other hand, acknowledged the Qing Dynasty under the Qing Suzerainty but later on rejected the nationalist claim to the kingdom. Not only the Tibet but Inner and Outer Mongolia also rejected the nationalist claim. But after the establishment of the Republic of China, Chinese leaders sent

military force in both Mongolia and Tibet to confirm their claim (Goldstein M. C., 1989). But because of the weak ROC regime, these efforts could not brought any fruitful results. Taiwan was an exceptional case as it had incorporated and became the part of Chinese heartland during the Han Chinese migration (Shepherd, 1993). (Figure 12)




Source:

<https://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/images/warlords-1925.jpg||China%20History%20Map%20-%20Warlords%201925>

At the beginning of the communist regime in 1949, Chinese leaders used the military and political means to reaffirm their control over the above-mentioned areas. In 1950 Taiwan refused to absorb in to the People's Republic of China with the intervention of the United States but all other areas like Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and former Manchuria were incorporated into People's Republic of China as an autonomous region or as a province. (Figure: 13) Throughout

the history, Chinese regimes attempted to control or create their dominance over the periphery to prevent the threats, posed by the different tribes, kingdoms or by the foreign states to the Chinese trade or security threats, they also created their dominance to threat to neighbouring states to accept the Chinese Sino-Centric world view and last but not the least to reinforce, among the new regimes, leaders, personal authorities and Chinese population. These policies ultimately lead towards the Chinese leader's ambition to expand territory, create their dominance, legitimacy, authority and balancing status at both domestic and external level, but the most important desire was the security of heartland from the perceived external threats.

Figure: 13



Source: <http://totallyhistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/china-map.jpg>

During the imperial era, imperial leaders were dominating the periphery for security concern primarily and for legitimacy and status as a secondary interests. But in case of southern and southwestern periphery, mostly imperial regimes focused more on the establishment of regime legitimacy and status concerns but they did not ignore the security factor, they paid more attention towards defence especially when it comes to the relations between Tang Dynasty and Tibet etc. During the Ming and Qing Dynasties Southern and Southwestern boundaries of the Chinese heartland became increasingly unstable that's why they had to involve more in security activities then the adoption of other security strategies. After the imperial era, Chinese security concerns dominate the Chinese political, economic or diplomatic policies, resulted into the collapse of the Chinese Confucian world view (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

Since Han Dynasty, Chinese peripheral control or domination was defensive in nature as they just wanted to re-establish regime within their established heartland along with the prevention of the external threats to the existing established heartland. Almost all the imperial era was practicing such policies except Mongols, they had different policies as compared to the other Chinese imperial regimes. During the Mongol Yuan Dynasty they conquered India, Burma, Japan, Java and entire Korean Peninsula to extend China's direct control across the Chinese traditional territory. Mongol conquered many territories of the world, Chinese heartland was one of them, and they used Chinese territory as a stepping stone for further conquest which was totally opposite from the former Chinese nomadic/imperial regimes. They treated China as the core and most important territory but Mongol treated China as one among different conquered territories (Barfield, 1989).

After Mongol, only Manchu Qing Dynasty went for the further external expansionism, they controlled many inland peripheral areas along with the establishment of the strategic policies for the maritime and offshore areas. For instance, Taiwan was to be considered as the first strategic periphery of the existing Chinese heartland under Qing Dynasty. Taiwan was

considered as the biggest potential threat to the Chinese heartland's security as it had been occupied for several years by the imperialist powers, it played the role of the strategic heaven for the Ming rulers, who used to harass the Qing Dynasty rules. Last but not the least Qing Dynasty found Taiwan as a venue to attack on Chinese heartland by rebels in near future, that's why they occupied Taiwan and considered it as a strategic territory. But except these two dynasties, almost all other dynasties paid more attention towards the domination and balancing existing territory of Chinese heartland (Shepherd, 1993).

Imperial dynasties control over the China's traditional territory started to decline at the one-third of the established regime. Regime decline gradually started as a result of systematic decline. Because of the different factors like taxation on land for the benefits of the ruling class along with the decreasing capabilities of the leaders and corruption became the reason of the slowly decrease in the imperial revenue and governments effectiveness. This situation lead towards the unrest within the territory, as burden increased on the common man in the form of taxation which ultimately pressurised the rulers to spent more resources on the domestic order and people's well-being. So because of the low attention by the Chinese leaders, they had to lose the control over the internal and external matters (Fairbank & Goldman, China: A New History, 1992).

Imperial regimes used to practice non-coercive means to achieve their national interests and to ensure the peace and stability initially. First they tried to get and use all the non-coercive available means like subsidies, gifts, establishing trade relation, diplomacy to sort out the internal problems and became internally strong but even after adoption such policies state was not able to establish its effective control on all over the heartland so eventually they had to lose the control over the areas like northern and north-western borders. Internal uprising, nomadic revolt, independence among the regional leaders and military played an important role in the wholesale or partial collapse of the Chinese heartland.

If the Chinese heartland collapsed for once, it would be divided between several competing states especially between nomadic tribes and Han Chinese (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). This disintegration might lead towards the establishment of the new unified state, ruled by the formal regional military leader or may be by any nomadic invader (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). In case of new unified regime, that regime would be established from the ashes of the previous regime so initially it would pay more attention towards the internal stability but when it would get enough power, that strong regime would again follow the same policies of the previous regime and go for the expansion of the heartland.

After imperial era, both nationalist and communist regimes during the modern era adopted the same policy as they re-established the internal political-social order and then went for the expansion of the Chinese heartland. But in case of nationalist regime, they couldn't well managed the internal order. But throughout the history of establishment, maturation, declining, and expending the peripheral control, no regime get full course in either case. In case of nationalist regime, they could not maintain the national development along with the recovery of the lost areas from the foreign imperialists and ultimately had to lose their power to Japanese military and then toppled by the communist (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). As compare to the nationalist power, communist regime made progress at both national and international level.

Because of the homogenous culture, Chinese people are more motivated towards the reunifying the Chinese heartland and regain the control of the region rather than the acceptance of the division of the Chinese heartland into different areas or states as they are having common set of believes regarding the social and political set up which plays an important role towards the ambition of peace, stability and prosperity under a unifying state. During the imperial era, Chinses were having the homogenous set of beliefs regarding the "Confucian" order, under which they were used to fellow the single imperial ruler, bureaucrat and educated social intellectuals and administrates. Not only in imperial era but during the modern era, Chinese

follow the same pattern of unifying the China under a single political system but they did adopt the alliance system as well, through these alliance system they established alliance between Han Chinese, non-Han Chinese and other minority tribes of the heartland (B & Neill , 1987).

Chinese history shows that China's peace and stability is associated with the unity of the Chinese nation and disunity lead towards the civil war and insecurities among both elite and common man (Fairbank, Introduction: The Old Order, 1978)

3.2 Use of Force

As per Chinese historians, students, and strategic analysts, throughout the history Chinese leaders either political or military, they always criticized the use of force, rather they used force or military means as the last resort to attain their interests. In case of securing interests they usually used non-coercive means as subsidies, gifts, establishing good relations with neighbours, diplomacy and trade etc. Behaviour of Chinese military and political leaders about how and when to wage a war is generally determined by their theorists and philosopher as Sun Tzu, Confucius, and Mencius, they were in favour of peace instead of war and their writing are all about the moral suasion, favour of accommodation and eliminate war (Kierman & Fairbank, 1974).


To understand the Chinese history, it is necessary to understand the difference among the above mentioned writers and their writing. As for as both Confucius and Mencius theories are concerned, they both were interested about the creation and maintenance of the civil government which ultimately lead towards the importance of the moral values and establishment of peace and stability over the use of force (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). But in case of Sun Tzu's writing or thinking, he focused on the art of waging wars and military campaigns. In his theory (The Art of War) he actually guided about the waging a war, in theory he divided the strategies into three part as how to wage a war, during war and after war effects and dealing

with them. He talked about the tactics of waging a war, that having a proper strategy to wage a war rather than the adoption of simple coercive measure.

What policies leaders should adopt, during and even after the end of war, related to the dealing with the opponent. As per Sun Tzu, as a last resort, leaders must go to war, and even then, they must refrain from using more coercive tactics to further their own objectives. Even though Sun Tzu did not appreciate war not even the use of force but as compare to the Confucian and Mencius, he was more willing to use of force and war against the foreign states or enemies (Boylan, 1982).

Chinese strategic decisions had been largely effected by the Confucius and Mencius view point that how much force should be deployed and whether it should be employed are not. Even studies have been showed that throughout the Chinese history, Chinese leaders did not use much force to attain their national interests, it was just like a curse so leaders did not like to go for the use of coercive means rather non-coercive one. Even during 1100 B.C. to 1911 Chinese fought only 3,790 wars, with both internal and external enemies. During the Ming Dynasty, China fought approximately average of 1.12 external wars per year (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

Figure 14



Source: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12665-017-7194-4/figures/6>

Both Imperial and modern Chinese regimes have been used the force against periphery people and the external forces. During the first one-third of the regime existence, Chinese ruler fought more wars and all were directed towards the periphery peoples. Lain Johnston view use of force by the communist regime especially in the begging of their rule has been viewed as intense as compare to the other external powers and this use of force directed towards the resolution of the territorial boundary issues (Johnston, 1998).

As for as use of force is concerned, a large number of soldiers have been deployed by the both imperial and modern era's leaders which resulted in the large number of casualties. During the imperial and modern era, approximately 100,000 and over million soldiers have been deployed respectively (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). As per Johnston, Chinese elimination of the security threat was relying on the strategic culture of *realpolitik* through which they used force but adopted less coercive methods. But he argued that after getting much economic and military power, China would rely on offensive method of warfare to secure its interests not for the static defense (Johnston, 1998). Chinese history shows that Chinese cultural differences does not determine the Chinese security behaviour rather it is material or cultural condition which confronted with the Chinese regime and resulted into the offensive policies.

Throughout the history of Chinese regimes, China's decision of using the coercive or non-coercive means was dependent on the China's calculation of the military and economic resources and any unstable situation at foreign or domestic level. Calculation of these measures/means were used to drive China's strategic policies. China's strategic history or culture shows that in the past China fought wars or used other coercive measures, just to control and dominate the heartland and to eliminate the potential threat to the security of the heartland's core periphery. From the establishing till decline, Imperial Chinese regimes had use the violence against the external forces (Fairbank & Goldman, China: A New History, 1992). Especially during the early stage, imperial regimes first control and maintain the domestic order

and then use the violence to reclaim the lost territory of Chinese heartland or just to increase the Chinese influence over the periphery. Imperial regime also used the violence during the middle stage of their existence, either to punish the nearby people or powers who were having offensive policies against Chinese people or against those who adopted armed incursion from the periphery.

But before the decline of the imperial regime, they had to face the internal unstable society, which was divided into different tribes and areas so because of the domestic situation they couldn't fought any external war or maintain their control over external territory. There is no other opinion that once imperial regime established their rule domestically, they went for the external expansion either to regain the Chinese territory or to enhance the periphery of Chinese heartland through expansion or for securing the Chinese borders by the potential security threats. These regimes would sometimes extended over decades as enemies were more powerful in term of military as compare to the China. Most of these attempts taken by the imperial powers were against the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes on the northern and northeaster borders of China (Barfield, 1989).

At the beginning of the Chinese imperial regime, southern, eastern and southwestern borders of China were saved from the imperial's offensive strategies. These areas were safe because China did not considered these areas as the biggest threat to their security, either foreign states at these borders were weak, not able to fought with Chinese imperial regime or they were not interested to enhance their state territory but the situation was total opposite in case of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the early period of imperial regime, China took very few military action in above mentioned (eastern, southern, southwestern) areas, to acquire resources or expand the heartland. Most important examples of such attacks can be found during the Qing, Han, Song, and Ming Dynasties as they attacked on the present day Vietnam and other

minority tribes leaving in present day southwest of China. Even earlier imperial rulers attempted to absorb the present day Korean state (B & Neill , 1987).

During the earlier period of the Ming Dynasty, Chinese ruler for the first time used maritime military power against southern and southwestern part of the periphery. Under the empire of Ming Yongle, imperial regime established the naval force to fulfil the economic purposes, the purpose of establishing this force was also involved the unification of the new Ming regime along with the, pacifying the new maritime roots, establishment of the political relations with other nations and to maintain the Chinese influence in the South China Sea. They adopted this policy as a part of Ming strategy to counter the growing Muslim influence in the Central Asia. Later on through this naval forces Ming became able to fought and defeat not only the Mongols but the other local pirates as well.

They also defended those local kings who gave gifts and tribute to the empire. Ming's naval force spent a lot of effort and time to save the Strait of Malacca from the potential threats as Strait of Malacca was one of the most important trade route of early Ming Dynasty which linked the Indian Ocean with the East Asia (Swanson, 1982). This all progress was made by the Ming ruler, and his supporters but after the death of Ming Yongle and his supporter's decreasing influence in the court became the reason of immediate end of this progress (Swanson, 1982).

During the middle period of the imperial regime, they used force but occasionally, against the tribes or people who tried to capture the Chinese heartland. They often used force against those who posed threats to the Chinese heartland or to those who were used to have negative statements towards the Chinese authorities. Strong imperial regime adopted the offensive policies against not only nomadic tribes and established southern and southwestern powers but also the one who were violating the Sino-centric structure of the tributary relations and

demanding the equal status to the Chinese emperor (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). Generally strong imperial regime had very low intervention to directly control or influence the periphery.

They employed forces only when they felt threat from the established power to the Chinese heartland or if they had the intension to removing or lowering the Chinese influence from their area, they also used force when internal rebellion posed threat or attack the loyal vassal ruler. But just for enforcing peace only, imperial regime never used the military means, for instance in case of Korea and Vietnam, Imperial rulers had very limited interventions (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). At the end of imperial rule, very few cases could be evident of imperial use of force against the outside of the periphery. As for as weak Chinese dynasties are concerned, they did not used military means to secure Chinese heartland against the internal or external threats rather they rely on the tributary relations to secure the interests and defence of the heartland (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

Domestic unrest posed far greater threat to weak Chinese regimes as compare to the external security challenges. In fact, to maintain the tributary relations, large nomadic tribes had to assist Chinese court to secure Chinese interests and against the internal challenges (Barfield, 1989). Usually, declining Chinese regimes used the force against the external forces as a result of the internal political pressure, especially when external enemies attacked on their territory and they had to compete with them and went for the defensive strike. Southern Song and Qing rulers against the Mongols and the foreign imperialist ruler respectively are the notable examples of the defensive military attacks (Hucker, 1975).

As per Thomas Barfield, because the majority of Chinese rulers lacked the military might to destroy an opponent, they established their dominance on nomadic tribes and paid a high price. They were unable to comprehend like other foreign kingdoms even during the Han Chinese era of rule, that's why they could not fully exploit the internal organizations, strength and weakness

of their nomadic enemies (Barfield, 1989). As a result, Chinese rulers relied on the massive military means to deal with the northern and north-western periphery, but these attempts could not secure much fruitful results, few of them were relatively successful but their consequences were not long lasting (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). This situation lead towards the worst scenario as Chinese rulers could not even defeat inner Asian people.

Han and non-Han Chinese used very limited force against the external enemies. Han's and non-Han officials and advisors were not in favour of using the force as they considered the use of military means as an expensive tool to secure the interests, as a result would ultimately lead towards the weaken of their power and most importantly they were in the view that these military invasions could divert their attention form the domestic civil administration, would serve to enhance the power of the military leaders and increase the power of the ruler over the other officials. But on the other hand, few officials were having different views as they believed that constant use of force, undermine the legitimacy and rule of the imperial power. They argued that use of military is not necessary for the proper rule and order as it could be achieve through virtue and benevolent policies (Barfield, 1989).

Before the Mongol Yuan Dynasty, there were some Han-Chinese regimes who did not consider northern and north-western tribes as the potential threat to the interests or security of the heartland, so did not persist the use of force against them. As for as intentions of the northern and north-western tribes were concerned, they did not have intention to conquer China or even pose threats to its security rather they just wanted material and riches from the ruler to establish a unifying and maintain nomadic alliance within periphery. But a unified and a large nomadic alliance could only be achieved if there is a relatively strong and unified imperial regime to provide them essential resources. Only when the Chinese regime was completely overthrown and unable to provide for the basic needs of the nomadic tribes, or when it was completely overthrown and conquered by the non-Chinese nomadic groups and they had appeasement

policies towards the nomadic neighbours, as in the case of the Manchurian and Mongol conquests, respectively, did nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes conquer the Chinese heartland (Barfield, 1989).

Such situation lead towards the conformation of the view that weak internal situation invited the external powers to attack and dominate. Before Ming came into power, Chinese leaders were not frequently using military force against the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes because they were not posing threats to the security of the heartland. Some of the very successful military leaders and emperors of the Chinese heartland were nomadic which shows that nomadic had the potential to harm military more than destabilizing the frontier areas. Later on, because of the internal weakness, they occupied the major part of the Chinese heartland (Hucker, 1975).

Most probably, because of the domestic, political, economic and military factors, Han Chinese regime did not use force against northern or north-western nomadic tribes. As compare to the non-coercive security strategies, coercive strategies were much costly in terms of military, economically, diplomatically and politically, which prompted both weak and strong dynasties to avoid coercive methods. As compare to the Chinese regimes, nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes were more successful in dominating the periphery people. They were much expert in handling the tribes as they better understood the tribal and personal relations along with their social norms, beliefs and dynamic of the formation of nomadic confederation. Those regimes were maintaining well trained military force, able to disrupt the nomadic tribes along with the conducting warfare on arid steppe (Barfield, 1989).

The armies of Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing were more effective against the periphery. Mongol defeated and controlled the more area even beyond the periphery, for instance they conquered Eurasian continent as well. As they conquered the area far beyond the territory and

adopted different domestic rule with their non-Chinese approach, thus Mongol were not considered as the typical Chinese rulers. But Manchu Qing at the other hand, did not conquered the area beyond the territory, they just maintained their domination over the traditional peripheral area. As they adopted aggressive and successful policies in contrast to the previous regimes so they controlled the periphery beyond the limits. Qing used hybrid military force, through which they combined Han Chinese and nomadic tribes to control the Tibet, Korea and both Outer and Inner Mongolia as their vassal states, occupied the Nepal and Burma successfully, enhanced the Chinese border till the north of Amur River, while absorb the Taiwan and Xinjiang as the provinces. They did also considered nomadic tribes and Mongols as a security threat and eliminate them from the Chinese heartland (B & Neill , 1987).

Even after their rule nationalist and communist both claimed sovereignty over Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, based on these invasion and control. At the beginning, Qing just wanted to maintain these areas as the buffers against the powers like Japan, France, India, Great Britain, Russia etc. that's why they were not in favour of Chinese immigration to those areas (Shepherd, 1993). In 1700s, western imperialist powers began to pose serious threats to the security of Chinese heartland then Qing started militarily and administratively efforts incorporate these areas. Most importantly during the Ming dynasty, Tibet and Mongols established good relations based on their political and religious affiliations, this element actually derived the Ming to control the Tibet for maintaining their influence on the Xinjiang and Mongolia (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

Both Qin and Sui Dynasties first used force against the heartland and reunite the Chinese heartland after the centuries of disunity, after the successful unity of the Chinese heartland they used force to overcome the nomadic tribes (B & Neill , 1987). But these experiments could not brought fruitful results and Dynasties had to pay both economic and political costs along with the negative lesson for the successors. In the earlier period of Ming Dynasty, they adopted the

oppressive policies against the nomadic tribes in the North but these policies were not successful in securing Ming's interest, so during the mid and at the end of their rules they followed the policy of static defense, as a result of this policy, they raided constantly on the nomadic tribes which consequently lead towards the weaken both economic and political strength of the Ming Dynasty (Barfield, 1989).

In the beginning when the Ming power started to decline, they thought to adopt the policy of "pay-off" as adopted by the previous regimes, but their strategy of accommodation allowed the Ming Dynasty first to strengthen their power and make offensive policies as effective as possible so that they can use offensive tactics to protect their interests in an emergency. During modern time, rulers did not adopt much aggressive policies towards the periphery, use of force towards periphery was limited as compare to the imperial regimes. They involved in military actions against states like Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia to establish a strong buffer, just to avoid the security threats posed by the imperialist powers especially Russia and Great Britain. These efforts of the modern regime were not much successful but showed the weakness of the regime plus security threats to the heartland emerging from the communist revolt or by the Japanese invaders (B & Neill , 1987).

In contrast of the modern era, nationalist regime during 1920s-1930s was most effective in establishing and managing good diplomatic relations and securing their national interests. Through these diplomatic relations they couldn't manage and control over the most of the area but became able to reduce the foreign influence (Kirby W. C., 1997). After the 1920s and 1930s People's Republic of China again took the military actions against the periphery, as Chinese were in much stronger position now so these attacks brought the states (Xinjiang, Tibet, Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia) in to the incorporation again as they were during the Qing and early Republican period (Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Polic, 1996). People's Republic of China's control over these areas was unprecedented. They took

the control of these areas through the military actions (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). PRC did not stop over here, they also deployed forces to counter the threats by the United States and the Great Britain to their nearby areas and heartland borders.

PRC decided to attack Taiwan and gain control over the area, they wanted to incorporate Taiwan into the heartland and re-establish their influence over the Taiwan. But because of the superior military capabilities of the opponents, these plans of PRC could not meet with success (Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 1996). Since 1960s PRC is using less force as compare to its earlier time. But this situation does not lead to the conclusion that China has got enough power to compete with the other regional and international powers or they are satisfied from their expansion, even though they had incorporated many areas but still unable to control the periphery borders as other regional and international forces are much capable of deploying forces along with its borders. So as a result China is not as much stronger yet as the Qing rulers were to maintain their control over the heartland and along the borders as well.

In the nut shell, Chinese history shows that China did not use much force throughout its history. They only used military force when China was strong enough to deploy the forces and secondly they adopted the coercive means only when they considered a possible threat to the Chinese heartland by the nearby or from the distant power. When they were unable to secure their interest through military means or China was not strong enough to deploy forces then they adopted the non-coercive measures to ensure the heartland security. But when Chinese ruler could not establish their influence over the periphery through military means as if it threatened the internal order or the interest of the elites the Chinese regimes, they went for the political arrangements which somehow relaxed Chinese leader from the security challenges and provide them enough time to able themselves against the security challenges.

3.2.1 China and Non-Coercive Strategies

Throughout the history most of the Chinese rulers rely on non-coercive means like economic or diplomatic tools to deal with the external threats, to ensure China's defense and save its interests. Through these measures /tools China secured its interests without indulging in war as they established Sino-Centric diplomatic relations, accepted relations on equal basis with other regional or external states, maintenance of hierarchical while using tactical alliance and political balance. On the other hand China focused more on its internal progress, their diplomatic, economic or political tools permitted the rulers to focus more on energies and internal progress, because they were less costly as compare to the military-centred security policies (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

During the imperial era, China was a weak state as it was confronting with the internal problems like regime decline or formation (Fairbank, A Preliminary Framework, 1968). So in that particular situation these measures gave a short period of relief to the state from the external threats or attacks and due to which rulers were able to focus and fix their internal problems and work for the well-being of their nation. In case of dangerous semi-nomadic or nomadic people Weak China was mostly relying on the combination of giving subsidies, appeasement via trade, lavish gifts and payments (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). As far as the less dangerous Sinitic powers on its southern and eastern borders were concerned, Weak Chinese state were used to use hierarchical or cultural aspects to maintain their differences by managing the increasing trade relationship (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). These tactics were even adopted during the late Qing Period to the Imperialist power. Especially during the Qing rule, initially they tried to pressure the foreign traders to accept and perform the traditional tributary based trade relations (Fairbank & Goldman, China: A New History, 1992).

Even if throughout the period of regime decline, these techniques were unable to hide the weakening of the Chinese regime or even protect China from escalating external threats, those risks would have only grown worse if such strategies had not been employed like balancing, cooperation, diplomatic measures, and collaboration and alliance system. Especially at the end of the Qing Dynasty and the start of the imperial regime, China relation with nomadic and semi-nomadic entities were at the very dangerous point, Weak China adopted these strategies internally and became able to involve in the world affairs to play a stronger role and maximizing its interests (Fairbank & Goldman, China: A New History, 1992). As weak regime adopted the policy of appeasement and diplomatic measures, could be seen during the period of politically destabilize weak state. For example during Song Dynasty (960-1279) weak China give up even the symbolic hierarchical tributary relations and started treating their worst enemies as political equals (Rossabi, 1983).

During this dynasty, even the control over the Chinese heartland was divided into different nomadic regimes and Han Chinese imperial state. During that particular time China adopted the policies of appeasement, diplomatic manoeuvre, alliances along with the occasionally use of force to keep their biggest advisors like potential nomadic at the bay (Fairbank & Goldman, China: A New History, 1992). Song on the other hand were particularly relying on the appeasement policy along with the increasing payment subsidies to the nomadic states. Song power was gradually break down after internal disorder and was defeated by Mongols (Rossabi, 1983). Not only weak state but strong imperial regimes were also used to practice non-coercive means to achieve their national interests and to ensure the peace and stability.

First they tried to get and use the available non-coercive means to sort out the internal problems and became internally strong but even after getting enough power and internally stabilize state, to secured their borders and maintain the relations with nomadic and semi nomadic regimes, they usually did not go for the use of force rather used non-coercive measures. After becoming

internally strong they sought to maintain their differences and order with the neighbour's states. One of the most established and strong Chinese regime is Han Chinese, but they even avoided to adopt the policy of coercion and took the non-militant approach to maintain their relations with the other regional states (John E. Wills, 1968).

Especially their relations with the aggressive, disrespectful neighbouring power, they mostly used the measure of trade and static defence to handle them, maintain the relations, creating the balance among them and securing Chinese border. On the other hand they adopted the policy of "play barbarian off against one another" along with the above mentioned tactics to control semi-nomads and nomads in the north western and northern frontiers of China. These Chinese behaviour played an important role in Chinese progress and maintain good political, diplomatic and economic relations with the periphery states. So because of such policies rather foreign policies China gain much more and made much progress over the other regional states.

Strong China established good economic relations with tributaries by providing them economic benefits and recognized them politically, so in return these tributary relations gave China the status and legitimacy within the region of East Asia as one of the dominate state of the region. Sometimes these tributary states helped China in the protection of their diplomatic and military interest but not directly against the other non-tributary aggressive powers (Hunt, Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective, 1984). On the other hand when needed strong Chinese regime sought to bring the weak or tributary states on ground and established the military based relations and adopted hierarchical power structure order (Shepherd, 1993).

In that particular situation, weak tributary states were sometime coerced or pressured by the strong China to accept what is more in favour of Chinese interests just to enhance the chance of Chinese peripheral security. The local leaders were allowed to rule their land according to their wish but they would have to assist China when there will be external enemy against the

mainland of China (Hucker, 1975). In response to show the more support and loyalty, China was used to offer them gifts like trade concessions and subsidies etc. (Barfield, 1989). They often gave these gifts to provoke the escalation of tension or formation of nomadic confederation among the tributaries (Jagchid & Symons, 1989).

During the early period of contact even a complaint vassal state such as Korea would also agree to establish good relations with imperialist China and avoid other foreign powers. In response China considered it as their responsibility to provide the security assurance to the vassal states against the external threats (B & Neill , 1987). Establishing such type of vassal-suzerain relationship was not a big task for the states having similar Sino-Centric cultural and diplomatic approach, agreed to bear the military pressure as compared to the nomadic and semi-nomadic tributaries and less aggressive as well, in southern, eastern and southwestern region (Kirby W. C., 1994). So many of these regimes were enjoying great economic and diplomatic incentives just by maintain good relations with a strong state like imperial China. For instance some regimes not all, established the tributary based trade relations with strong imperial China to just become an economical wealthy state like Malacca during Ming (Wolters, 1970).

As per the history, Imperial Chinese leaders were more willing to use non-coercive measures, based on the tributary relationship with the peripheral states to save their interests in the region and these entities posed less threat to the stability of the heartland then the semi-nomadic and nomadic people (Wolters, 1970). At that time many Chinese ruler started to believe that in case of southwestern, southern and eastern periphery relations could not only be explained in terms of military or economic power but through the lens of tributary relations as well (Wolters, 1970). Modern era effected the foreign policy and external vision of Chinese leaders. Even though factors of modern era effected the foreign approach of Chinese leaders but they could not effect or change the basic, core objectives on which the internal and external policy was based.

First threat to the heartland from the powerful state mean China could no longer in the position to protect itself from external threats through suzerainty relationship. So to deal with such threats Chinese leaders would have to adopt direct policies to control over the traditional states and to sustain their diplomatic relations not regionally but globally too.

Secondly, approach towards the modern China undermined the previous attractiveness of the imperial Confucianism and replaced it with the unified, maintained and established prosperous Chinese regime. In the era of modernism nationalism, the monolithic, totalitarian regime was forced to contend with educated scholars and with the poorly educated, more bureaucratic, and totalitarian staff, who were driven by social transformation ideology and had incredible power. In the imperial era, Chinese nationalism was defined by the alliance between minority people of the traditional periphery and the Han Chinese, as well as the monolithic, totalitarian state with a strong military (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

Thirdly, emergence of the modern state system forced China to discard the hierarchical tributary relations with the peripheral states and follow the rules of European interstate system. So China shifted from traditional foreign and internal alliance system to the new European system enhanced stress not only on the China but on the other states as well who were enjoying good military, economic and diplomatic relations with China (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

Because of the above mentioned developments, China got more power and strength over the Chinese state and society along with the broadened geographical scope. These factors intensified the Chinese sensitivity and threat of international system which lead China towards making more progress and enough strength that they could redress the nation-state system which was dominated by the great powers. During the modern era the biggest challenge for China was to maintain the domestic order which became worst because of the huge increase in population as approximately it was double during the last 150 years of Qing Dynasty and then

again get doubled after the 1949 communist victory. Later, due to economic collapse and armed strife in the 19th and 20th centuries, China saw a slight fall in its population. Slowed agriculture and industrial production, with hunger for land and dropped man-land ratio per household were the most observed results of increasing population (Fairbank & Goldman, China: A New History, 1992).

These pressures added more in Chinese perceived threats and need for making more progress to save their national interests as modern era which not only changed Chinese diplomatic relations but the security policy as well (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). Just to ensure its rule and control over the periphery, Chinese state was much needed of having conceptual and material capabilities along with the sophisticated organizational model of the industrialized nation-state. However it was a hard task for China to cope with all the internal problems and compete with the western industrialized states. Despite its reconstitution by highly determined and disciplined people, it took long time for China to become as much stronger state as western industrialized states were. So throughout the history China remained a weak states as compare to its adversaries but strong in its immediate region.

In the early modern era, Chinese rulers could not recognise the threats to their heartland and the tactics to deal with them, later on, these were Qing rulers who identified this threat and started to adopt the policies like establishing tributary relation, making trade relations, give subsidies, gifts to the tributary states and obviously use of force too, when needed. This use of force resulted into the defeat and belated need of a defined military force to protect the Chinese diplomatic, political and security interests against the both strong-industrialized western states and the weak states of the region. So both regimes; late Qin and early nationalist rulers were relying more on cooperative relations, following the international law, external balancing and enhancing the modern military capabilities to control the long standing periphery areas (Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Polic, 1996).

After the emergence of Chinese communist regime in 1949, China became stronger to attain high level of state capacity as compared to the weaker nationalist regimes. As a consequence of its development, political affiliation with communist Russia and control the heartland, People Republic of China (PRC) was able to absorb the weak periphery areas. Despite of all these developments, the economic and military capabilities of China was far behind from the western developed industrialized states. Mainly there were two factors behind this inferiority, first was obviously Qing and republican period's legacy of underdevelopment and the other was the disastrous effect of the Maoist socioeconomic policies. However, Chinese eager to become strong enough to protect its heartland from the external attacks proved a complicated task especially in the presence of two great powers: USA in the south and east and USSR in the north and west (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

In such critical situation China again adopted the policies of "weak-state" or "weak-China" to maximize the Chinese interests. They adopted the policy of formal and informal alliance, establishing diplomatic relations etc., by adopting such policies they first developed the relations with Soviet Union, then with United States of America and at the end with the weak regional states for securing strategic interests. During this time period, China presented itself as a model of peace, progressive developing state who deserve emulation by other developing states (Armstrong, 1977). China's successful adoption of the diplomacy and balancing good relations with the two politically, economically and militarily superior states was the biggest target to achieve. So for balancing the relation and deter the direct attack by the super powers, China had to established good diplomatic relations with the other weak regional powers too. So it could play the role of a junior partner between two great nations.

China before 1949 was having a capable massive standing army, which was able to counter the technological superior enemy with guerrilla warfare etc. Later on small crude nuclear weapons and long-range nuclear ballistic were acquired by China till 1960s and 1980s respectively

(Whitson, 1972). In the nut shell, in 20th century China adopted the “weak-strong” security strategy to secure its core interests. This strategy drives from the “strong-state” effort to control the periphery, to “weak-state” in which diplomacy, trade and tributary relations were the main source of survival. But after 1949 to till the disintegration of Soviet Union, China’s shifted its focus towards the balancing external relations between two great power (USA and USSR) to secure its heartland (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

Today’s China’s security approach is the combination of the modern day strategic needs along with the imperial Song security strategy. In recent years China changed its security strategy again, they just added economic factors in their “weak-strong” security strategy. Through which they emphasized on the market-led, amicable international relations along with the relative restraints on the use of force but more effort to create a more modern army. They designed this strategy for the domestic social transformation and ideological development of the country so that they can construct a prosperous and strong nation to interact at international level.

3.3 Leader’s Role

Throughout the history China is having very realistic approach towards its security policy. Their security policy dependent on the external changes plus on the lesson, they have learned from their history. But sometime domestic factors played an important role in influencing the Chinese security strategy, especially their leader’s personalities or policies towards the international order are the biggest factors to effect the Chinese security strategy. Chinese history is full of the examples where Chinese leaders were having the desire to use both domestic measures and foreign policy to defeat their enemy. Just to get a person’s stamp on the event, Chinese leaders put all their effort to gather and maintain the individuals along with all the bureaucratic power in a personalist system of governance. Chinese leaders influence on

the foreign and domestic policies increased especially when Chinese regimes indulged in any particular conflict or when this particular conflict led by a charismatic or powerful leader. For instance, in history there were so many times when China was much needed to adopt the passive foreign policy but because of the leaders interest (to get political, domestic support) they opted for the aggressive policies (Liao, 1976).

Some analysts argues that Chinese use of force at external level can be attributed by the existence of the conflict and competition between the political leaders at the domestic level along with the absence of the legal, institutional norms. So these analysts do believe that for less aggressive and more cooperative Chinese security behaviour, China must have a less personalised political system along with the institutions to mediate their conflicts and well organized legal structure (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). Even though a well-managed and institutionalised system will play an important role in reducing the adoption of aggressive policies but on the other hand changing international order, material capabilities and domestic competition between the leaders to have alternate policy approaches are still the most important factors which will influence the Chinese security strategy. There is no other opinion that either China's security policy has been effected by the leadership role or not as they were used to effect the policy in a most predictable and regular manner for securing their political interests.

Throughout the history China's security policy dependent on the two main debates that either China should only focus on the internal balancing and establishing good relations, close involvement with the external powers or China should adopt the coercive measures/strategies against the periphery along with the policy of static defense. Both are these two polices are interlinked as internal balancing is close to the static defence while external balancing with other powers stressed upon the use of coercive measures and use of military capabilities. But it does not show that for internal balancing state will have to go for the static defense rather a state can manage internal balancing through the use of offensive force. During the modern era

the biggest tension between Chinese leaders and society was the introduction to foreign ideas and extensive involvement on the external world as they were dividing into two groups: one who wanted to interact with the external world and get new ideas because they believed that it would increase Chinese capabilities and second who were having fear of the foreign involvement and dependence upon the external world (Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 1996).

During the imperial era, Confucian advisors and officials expressed a policy involving the autonomous approach for both domestic development and external security behaviour. They viewed external “barbarians” as the biggest threat to the domestic stability, economic progress and harmony as they did not accept the Chinese Confucian policies so extended diplomatic or political relations with them could weaken the Confucian order (Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 1996). This was just reason otherwise imperial leaders were not in favour of external involvement as they believed that establishing or involvement at the external level have the potential to divert leader’s attention from the internal development, political strength and maintenance to the external issues. Even during the Ming Dynasty, these factors forced many leaders just away themselves from establishing the trade relations even, and these factors lead Chinese foreign policy towards the limited interaction with the external world during imperial regime (Fairbank & Goldman, *China: A New History*, 1992).

Chinese defeat by western industrial powers and by Japan during the imperial era also played the negative role in developing Chinese argument in favour of foreign involvement (Hsu, 1970). Not only during the imperial era but even during the communist era, collapse of China’s and Soviet Union alliance also strengthen their views (Hsu, 1970). Both the communist and nationalist regimes in China are critical of western capitalism. They view their governmental, cultural, and economic practises as a new form of imperialism. They do believe that corrupt businessman from the west brought western concepts of cultural, economic, political and

religious pluralism which ultimately pose threats to the Chinese cultural, economic and political beliefs.

They argues that western search for profit and rights of individuals above groups and features of western industrialized society are the biggest threat to the Chinese cultural identity along with the Chinese nationalist believes and effort of constructing a powerful and wealthy nation-state. In contemporary era, many Chinese intellectual and leaders do believe that western in institutions and ideas in general and US in particular should be rejected by the people because through these institutions and ideas US is creating its dominance at international level. China must not adopted the western system of institutions or the ideas derived by the US because if China accepted this system then China will have to be the subordinate of the US but for becoming a great power in coming future China will have to maintain its own unique system of developments at the international level, not be the subordinate of any state or system.

This attitude of leaders and Chinese intellectual led towards he exaggeration of the Chinese believe that Chinese political, economic and social developments will remain same if they did not pay attention to get rid of these problems by establishing good relations with other states or through copying the western method of creating dominance (Spence, 1990). To secure China from external threats mainly from the US or western powers, China should adopt the same policies as their Confucian leaders adopted; they must rely on the Chinese industry, man power, genius and nationalism. As they insist that open the Chinese heartland to the foreign states would pose threats to the Chinese cultural, social beliefs and political stability and will ultimately halt Chinese ability to become a great power.

As far as China's contacts with other countries go, they discourage China from developing ties with any economically superior nations because, in their opinion, doing so would compromise the country's independence. They will not only lemmatize its freedom rather international states

will influence its political, economic and social values. They also argued that China must have defense pacts for ensuring the state security but without the one which posed any limitation on China (Kirby W. C., 1994).

Throughout the imperial to the modern and even in contemporary era, China had to face and is still facing opposition of such views. But it was most prominent during the Qing Dynasty and in recent era with the name of the economic reforms movement. Opponents of the above mentioned views argued that, policy of “neo-isolationism” is not the accurate one in such a globalized world. China should adopt the policy of interaction at international level, established its political, economic and diplomatic relations with the other nations and try to establish its own dominance in the rapidly developing world. They argue that a weak and isolate China cannot maintain its external security, if they don't establish good diplomatic and security relations with other states (Spence, 1990). The other group which gives views in favour of the involvement at international level, emerged in the 20th century, they are less in number but can be considered as the growing minority.

They actually present a western oriented critique on both having anti-foreign involvement approach plus on those who are in favour of limited external relations. They believe that in such a globalized and modern world, China will have to adopt the western institutional system, their norms, establishment of the quasi-autonomous social, political and judicial system, not only this they have to support the multilateral and international regimes (Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy, 1990). They added that to maintain the domestic order, avoid the external threats, sustain the well-being of the society and ultimately great power status, China will have to fully involve in the international affairs not only when it is weak rather even after becoming stronger as well (Swaine & Tellis, 2000).

During the period of regime changes, weak China adopted the policies of foreign involvement, they established diplomatic relations and allow foreigners to access the Chinese society. But mostly these developments brought corruption, economic collapse in to the Chinese society which resulted in to the favour of anti-foreign involvement policy. In this situation, these individuals suggested China to adopt proper strategies of economic and political self-reliance. But historically this argument resulted mostly inappropriate foreign strategy for China as they adopted the use of force which decline the China and weaken the overall Chinese security. For instance, during the end of the Qing Dynasty, they adopted this policy but failed (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). During the cold war era, in 1960, China adopted the self-reliance/self-dependence security strategy against the both great powers, United States of America and Soviet Union.

Because of the Mao influencing leadership, despite the threat from the both states and military inferiority, China continued with that policy (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). Even though logic behind such conditions would suggest China to adopt the strategy of weak-state. So, instead of choosing weak-state strategy, Mao adopted “dual adversary” and then isolationism during the 1960s Cultural Revolution. Mao was used to defend this policy as a strategy of political, social development and security autarkic. Mao viewed foreign ideas like Soviet led “Social Imperialism” or US led imperialism as a threat to independence, unity and development of the Chinese progress. In reaction of the international environment (where world was divided into two campus: Communism and Capitalism) Mao introduced the policy of self-reliance and motivated its public. But his this approach could not bring the fruitful results and weaken the Chinese security system which ultimately lead towards the clash between US and China in 1969 (Barnett, 1977).

Throughout history there was a continuous debate that either China should adopt the coercive measures to establish external relations or it should go for the Static-Defense. As during the

imperial period, use of force or coercive strategies was ultimately replaced by the Confucian advisors and civilians. There were so many reasons behind this, the first was as there public was not in favour of extending external involvement but the most important was, they were in the view that because of the extensive external involvement, leaders' attention diverted from the domestic developments to the international affairs. They also argued that more spending on military means also enhance the power of the leaders over the authority of the state. For instance during the late Tang dynasty, Chinese leaders became more powerful but the military defense and function of administration became a lodge for other officials (Fairbank & Goldman, *China: A New History*, 1992).

For them, heavy reliance on the coercive means weakened the Confucian order which led towards the heavy reliance on the state monopolies, punitive central controls, heavy taxation etc. these practises did not only undermine the power and authority of the Confucian officials but the social status as well (Fairbank & Goldman, *China: A New History*, 1992). On the other hand, Confucian officials were not entirely against the use of military force, for them there was no contradiction between both virtue and use of force because leaders who go for the use of force mainly have virtue nature as they don't rely on the coercive means and maintain a harmonious and stable society with their heavy reliance on the non-coercive means (Swaine & Tellis, 2000). Many of the Confucian leaders were in favour of the use of force specially when it comes to the interest of the heartland like to subdue the periphery people or to punish the foreigner even if they view any symbolic insult against the emperor's position in a tributary relationship (Barfield, 1989).

During the Qing Dynasty, some of the Confucian officials were in the favour of using of force against the imperialist powers who were posing threats to the Chinese heartland as they wanted to eliminate the foreign influence over the Chinese society. But the pragmatic Confucian officials also recognised the value of the establishing diplomatic relations with the other states,

they considered it as a need of time for China to diplomatic involve in the affairs of the other states. Because of the above mentioned reasons, Confucian officials opposed the excessive rely on such practices as they believed that these policies could erode Chinese existing political and social order. Opposite of the Confucian officials were either from military, imperial leaders or imperial advisors, they were in favour of use of force against the periphery powers or to extend the Chinese borders. These were having their political motives or they wanted to increase the power of the emperors not only domestically but at international level as well.

The debate between the use of force and the use of non-coercive means dependent upon the material capabilities of the state and mind-set of the national leaders. Even despite the protest by the Confucian officials, strong emperors break this balance by using coercive means to secure their interest.

3.4 The Rise of China

End of Cold War brought significant development in the world politics, before 1990s great powers were fighting to dominate the world politics and establishing their sphere of influence. During this period China served at the world stage just like any other Asian State. Before the 1960s, China was not an independent power in real sense as till the end of 1950s China was a part of Eastern bloc by having the policy of “leaning towards the Soviet Union” (Mochizuki, 2007). De-Stalinization in 1956 made the Chinese leaders realize that Soviet Union and China diverged in their application and interpretation of Marxism. In early 1960s cordial relations between Soviet Union and China ended and in October 1964 China detonated its first nuclear device. This successful test by China grabbed the world attention and changed the perception of world politics by “bipolarity” to “multipolarity”.

In 1971 a drastic change came in to the Asian politics with the US – China rapprochement and China became more prominent and influential member of the Asia-Pacific region. From 1971

to 1980s China remained in the US camp and opposed the Soviet Union policies. China joined the US camp just to avoid the threats by Soviet Union. After the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping adopted the policy of “open door” to revolutionize the Mao policy of “self-reliance”. Rebuilding China's economy, which had been decimated by the Cultural Revolution, was the goal of this approach. This policy altered the direction of the Chinese economy and created opportunities for China to strengthen its position in the world.

In 1980s China started to perceive Soviet Union as a less threat to their national security. Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan and Reagan elected as the new US president plus China's policy of Taiwan altogether uneasy the situation for China. This new Cold War structure along with the China-Vietnam War forced China to think again and reset its foreign policy goals. China put a certain distance in their relations with US and replaced its policy of rapprochement with the “an independent and autonomous foreign policy” (Mochizuki, 2007). China defeated in Vietnam War realized that China should pay more attention towards the national security issues as compared to the economy.

After adopting the neutral policy, US - USSR rivalry posed little threats to China. For instance when China was on US side, it might be seen as a threat to USSR and on the other side because of the presence in the USA camp, China could be unable to speak the policies of Taiwan. In that particular environment Deng's policy of opening up the markets was at the forefront of China's foreign policy to increase its national strength. For achieving its policy goals China peaceful international environment is much needed but Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989 played negative role to the China's peaceful intentions of the international environment and China found itself isolated at international level. The other factor behind China's isolation at international level was China's insistence that Communist Party rule would be maintained at any cost.

End of Cold War drive the world to think about China from a different perspective. Most of the states wanted to convert Chinese political and economic system in to the democratic model of government but US and Japan disagreed as they perceived this idea as a threat to their interests as it could lead towards the chaos in their countries that's why they found normalization of relations with China is the best policy to adopt. As China went back to the normalization of relations with the great powers, Deng again started to dictate the policy of liberalization of economy and this time it brought the fruitful results and China's economy experienced rapid growth once again (Mochizuki, 2007).

Even though it was still a weak state at the start of 1990, China's image began to alter as a result of a number of events that occurred in the middle of the year. This was the first time when not only the US and the regional states but the experts, leaders, public, analyst around the world shocked from the Chinese development and considered China as a rising power which has the potential to effect the world or at-least regional order. China was surprised by the world's behaviour as it was perceiving itself as a weak and developing country, they tried to find the point from where world started to perceive them as rising or regional power. Few suggested that world built this perception right after the China's aggressiveness in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea (Mochizuki, 2007) but others argued that this perception was built before these even events.

China's economic growth in 1990s allowed her for the first time to hold the position as an important member in the international society without the assistance of any-other great power. At that time world observed the dramatic boost up in Chinese economy which started to grow up more than ten percent annually. In 1992 IMF and World Bank released the per capita GDP of individual countries by using the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) as a tool/metric to measure the economic growth (Bank, 1992). The results surprised the world because previously they measured the economic growth by using the exchange rate accounting and China's economic

growth was less than \$500 but after PPP measurement it was 2-5 times bigger than the last results. This GDP of China was almost equal to the Japan and the other powers and it was expected that if the growth remains continue, someday China would surpass the even US In 1993 China's GDP suddenly increased to 400 percent and again in 1995 it was 4.7 percent large as compared to the measurement by the exchange rate (Xuetong, The Rise of China and its Power Status, 2006).

This was a huge development in the world politics, the country which was about to collapse a few years ago, now turned as the biggest economic power of not just at the regional level but at the world stage as well. China's economic growth or China's status of rising power shocked the world because it was an overnight change and China won this status without fighting or winning any war which was the tool of history for becoming a great power. But China did not make progress only economically rather there were other factors as well which generated concerns. They annually increased 15 percent of their defence expenditures. After the end of Cold War Russia sold the weapons and China was one of the biggest customers. On the other hand 1992 experienced China's promulgation of its law on China's Territorial Seas and Adjacent Zones, China also started activities in the Spratly Island which sparked anxiety in the regional states. China did not stop here rather PLA naval personnel made the frequent proclamations that their first and foremost duty is to secure the national interests and maritime rights (Mochizuki, 2007).

3.4.1 China's Rise in 21st Century

Since 1978 to 2004 China was enjoying the world's highest growth rate in GDP, China's GDP averaged was about 9.5 percent per year. In recent years China improved its macro-control policies and sustained its rapid economic growth even during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and 2001-2002 issue of slowdown in global economic growth (Bi, 2005). China

confronted these external shocks by adopting the wise and proactive fiscal and monetary policies along with the restructuring measures to keep the rapid economic growth rate in the line with expanding domestic demands. In 2003 when world faced the SARS and this epidemic deteriorated the world's economic growth but despite this crisis China's economy recorded 9.3 percent growth, with total US \$1.4 trillion GDP and GDP per capita surpassed the US \$1,000. In order to avoid the increasing inflationary pressure especially over-expansion of fixed assets investment and price hikes of farm produce and raw materials, China shifted its policy focus and took a series of macro-control measures. In real terms GDP rose to 9.5 percent (Bi, 2005).

China's greater integration with the outside world was a result of its opening up to the outside world, which also gave Chinese products access to new markets and resources, skills, and knowledge. Because of the opened-up policy, between 1978-2004 China's external trade volumes increased to 56 fold which included US \$9.8 billion to US \$593.4 exports and US \$10.9 billion to US \$561.4 billion imports. After such developments China became the world's second largest recipient of FDI and third largest trading partner. From 1984-2004, the total stock of FDI in Chinese amounted to US \$562.1 billion, with the annual inflow increasing from US \$2.7 billion to US \$60.6 billion over the same period. Not only this China has also started encouraging its companies to invest abroad and because of this policy in 2004 China's foreign investment reached at the value of US \$37 billion (Bi, 2005).

Above mentioned economic developments along with the Chinese government programmes made possible for China to improve the living standard of Chinese people and reduce the poverty level in China. In about 25 years, the poverty line in rural areas decreased from 250 million to 30 million. In 2002 China's goal was to achieve most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the biggest goal was to reduce the poverty from 1990s situation. In 1990, almost 31.3 percent population was living on an income below the US \$1 per day which reduced to 11.5 percent in 2002 (Bi, 2005). Even though China made enormous

economic progress and achieved its goals in a very well manners but still about 30 million rural population is living in poverty and 20 million of urban population was experiencing minimum living standards. China had achieved the target of proving the basic needs to almost every one. Not only economically but China has progressed in other sectors as well. China experienced the structural transformation as well which includes the shift from central to the market oriented economy, agriculture to manufacturing and from closed to global-integrated economy. While rapid economic growth and structural changes have solved so many problems but still China is facing many challenges related to economic growth and social development which will have to be deal carefully in a globalized world.

In short, since the beginning of 21st century, China's economy and societal development has moved to a new stage that world started to consider China as a game changer not at the regional level but globally too. Third stage of China's economy was to develop a strategy for modernization under which they can establish a prosperous society in the first twenty years 21st century. GDP growth rate in general and GDP per capita reached to an unprecedented level. In the nut shell, it was expected that till 2020, the living standard of Chinese would be equal to the people of the upper-middle income countries defined by the World Bank. To build a prosperous society other dimensions of China's economic and social developments like optimizing economic structure, enhancing productivity, completing market oriented economic reforms, making economy more dynamic and open, advancing the modernization and urbanization, improving the social security system, strengthen education and public health etc. are necessary to be work on along with the economic growth and increasing average income.

Establishing a prosperous society will definitely advance the China's economic growth and social developments. In 2003 president Xi Jinping stated that till 2020 is a "period of strategic opportunity" for Chinese growth and development. He added that during this time period China will have to maintain a stable internal plus external environment and to achieve this goal China

will have to establish good relations with regional countries and make neighbouring countries “more friendly in politics, economically more close to each other’s, deeper security tied and closer people to people relations”. He further added that China should develop friendly relations and make neighbouring countries to feel free and help them to develop (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014).

3.5 Conclusion

In the nut shell China’s policies of national security are based on the historical patterns and geographical layers of the heartland. Current Chinese national security policies overlaps with the previous policies of the heartland. A self-sufficient and defensible Chinese heartland could be traced back to the Han-Chinese era, when they were having clear boundaries, sufficient in agriculture and strong nomadic tribes to deter the external threats. Initially all Chinese regimes tried to achieve the internal order and prosperity to maximize their influence over the immediate neighbours. China adopted such policies because of the geographical vulnerable borders of the heartland, presence of both internal and external threats and above all the domestic political system of China played an important role.

Imperial China’s security strategy was highly influenced by the external threats posed by the presence of the continental empires. Throughout the history China’s security behaviour had been changing according to the need of the time to made Chinese heartland strong enough to counter the external threats. There were two reasons to prioritize the domestic order and well-being over the establishment of external influence. First, the geographical centrality could not be achieved without establishing the domestic order and secondly preservation of domestic order and peace was a tougher task to achieve as compare to the external influence, that’s why states put more efforts to achieve the other goal first. Just like other continental powers China

too is a multi-ethnic empire but during the modern era China was neither fully protected nor fully limited which made the clear difference between China and other continental empires.

During the Qing era, leaders were confused about prioritizing the external territorial threats and continental directions but they had to face both external threats along with the internal upheaval. As for as strategies during Cold war era are concerned, Chinese leaders adopted different approaches. They overcome the previous limitations and adopted more appeasing policies to border disputes. China's geographic progression is primarily caused by the strategic advancement of the country. As during imperial era China's strategic periphery was consisted of the inland region and its adjoining borders but during the modern period it was consisted of both maritime and continental regions. With the passage of time, China made more progress as it has included dual land sea power, outer space and cyber security. This Chinese progress in every field has proved China as a great power having more influential Grand Strategy.

Chapter Four

EVALUATING CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF ENGLISH SCHOOL

Introduction

This chapter explains China's Grand Strategy in detail. First it conceptualizes the Chinese Grand Strategy by focusing on the main objectives and interests of China in Asia-Pacific region. In addition to that it analyse the basic components of Chinese Grand Strategy and identifies the way, China is utilizing its economic, political, and diplomatic and security means to secure its interests in the Asia-Pacific region and maintains the regional order. After analysing the Chinese rise and components of its Grand Strategy, it highlights the domestic and international threats to the China's rise and analyse its foreign policy according to the English school's theory of international relations and implications for the stability of Asia-Pacific regional order.

This chapter explores the interests and objectives of Chinese Grand Strategy. The most important goal of Chinese Grand Strategy is the accomplishment of the Communism, the other goals are; to bring China into a prosperous society, increase the GDP per capita income to the equal level of the developed countries and realized modernization (Norton, 2015). In 2013, Xi Jinping (General Secretary of CCP), announced China GS. He stated that period extended to 2020 is the era of "strategic opportunity" for China. For achieving long term goals, China must be stable and develop domestically and externally, Xi said China should first establish good relations with neighbours by close economic ties, establishing good political relations, through diplomatic relations along with the security cooperation (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014). In short China should treat its neighbouring or regional states safer and treat them like a friend.

As for as China's Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific is concerned it has three core objectives; regional economic integration, control over the Near Seas and China's sovereignty claim. This chapter analyse these core objectives of Chinese Grand Strategy along with the explanation of internal and external threats to Chinese Grand Strategy through the perspective of the concept of international society of ES by Hadley Bull.

4.1 Conceptualizing China's Grand Strategy

Term Grand Strategy has evolved over the period of time but not is defined properly. Obviously few definitions of GS exist but they are different from each other's and demonstrate different meaning of the term (Brands, 2014). It is often confused with the term "strategy" in international relations but GS is different from "strategy" as Grand Strategy determines states ultimate goals and interest, policies to achieve them, diplomatic, economic and military strategies to deal with the opportunities and challenges and interact with the other states and non-state actors (Brands, 2014). In a broader term; GS has long term effects on states policies and interests, GS shows the states policies which should exist not for years but for decades (Kennedy, 1991). Policy makers prioritise the states interest and long term goals to secure states interests with the available resources. They determine the states policies or capabilities to secure the long-term goals instead of reacting on day by day or case by case issues (Brands, 2014).

But that does mean that Grand Strategy involves only applying the available resources rather it changes with the period of time. And the most important characteristic of Grand Strategy is it doesn't have to be written formally or be labelled as a GS rather it can be the decision of the state leader, they deliberately make some policies which are in the best interest of their state relations (Brands, 2014). Either state has an announced Grand Strategy or not, all leaders set some goals and make strategies achieve them, and avoid the confrontation with the other states

as well (Brands, 2014). To support the previous argument, strategist like Edward Luttwak argued that all the states have the GS either they know it or not (Lutwak, 2009). William further suggest that all states must have a GS, clear goal and resources plus the guideline to implement those resources (Martel, 2015).

4.1.1 Objectives and interests of China's GS

The first step to analyse China's Grand Strategy is to know about the interests and objectives of GS. State's interests remain at the top of the policies and objectives or goals are the ends which ultimately states want to achieve. But GS doesn't include each and every interests or objective of any state as they could a lot in number so leaders includes only most important in GS and make policies to achieve them (Martel, 2015). In case of China's Grand Strategy, their leadership clearly announced its objectives and specific time frame as well, for instance Communist Party of China states that accomplishment of communism is the highest goal of the party but they also argue that China is at the primary level of socialism and will remain so in coming years.

With the beginning of the 21st century China emerged as the new emerging regional and global power. After entering into the new era of development, China set few goals and decided to achieve them between 2021-2049, those goals are; to bring China into a prosperous society, increase the GDP per capita income to the equal level of the developed countries and realized modernization (Norton, 2015). In 2013, Xi Jinping (General Secretary of CCP), announced China GS. He stated that period extended to 2049 is the era of "strategic opportunity" for China, China's relations with the Asia-Pacific states can be articulated by his speech in Beijing. For achieving long term goals, China must be stable and develop domestically and for making progress externally, Xi said China should first establish good relations with neighbours by close economic ties, establishing good political relations, through diplomatic relations along with the

security cooperation (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014). In short China should treat its neighbouring or regional states like a friend.

But on the other hand, he clearly stated for so many times that friendly neighbouring policy doesn't mean that China would sacrifice its national interests, as per Xi, sovereignty, territorial integrity can never be compromised and would remain at the top of the Chinese priorities (Jinping X. , Xi vows no compromises over China's sovereignty, 2013). According to China's policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, in the future years, China's military and economic development will persuade its neighbours to build friendly relations with it and accommodate its interests in the region rather than oppose them.

4.1.1.1 Core Objectives of GS

China's GS has many long and short term goals to achieve but China's economic integration, defending China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and control over near seas are the main objectives of China's Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific region (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014). The biggest objective of China is to save its national interests by maintaining good relations and avoid confrontation with the existing power (US) in the Asia-Pacific region.

4.1.1.1.1 Regional Economic Integration

In October 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang visited Southeast Asian countries to promote the establishment of new Maritime Silk Road. This move clearly shows China's biggest GS object is to maintain the regional economic integration. China's Belt Road Initiative links the Pacific and Indian Oceans and creates free trade zone along with the Chinese periphery. China officially presented the BRI as the regional economic and trade strategy. Not only had this China also called for the multilateral regional infrastructure development led by China for the economic prosperity of the region. Along with the BRI and other economic

development, China funded \$100 million to initiate the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to develop the infrastructure within the region. China established the Silk Road Fund with the \$40 billion assets for regional infrastructure development. In addition to all these developments China also managed to provide the development funds to the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and BRICS/ New Development Bank contains the asset of \$100 billion (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014).

China did not only funds for the BRICS countries rather Belt and Road countries will also be financed under Belt and Road Forum. China funded for the major infrastructure projects in the region to connect China with the other regional countries like Nanning Singapore Economic Corridor would link China with Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore via both road and railway transportation (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014). The other project established links between Yunnan province of China and six nations of the Mekong River Basin, actually under its economic and trade policy, China want to connect with the region. On the other side China established Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), at the initial stage when dialogue started in 2012, it included 10 ASEAN countries plus Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, India and China but till the final dialogue in February 2020 15 Asia-Pacific countries have been added too. China wanted to make RCEP a forum to integrate the trade agreements between the ASEAN nations and their dialogue partner into a single agreement (Reinsch, Caporal, & Murray, 2019).

China is also promoting free trade agreements between China and South Korea along with the trilateral between Japan, South Korea and China. China's policy to develop economically and involve regional states in to the China-led regional economic forums is just to help the regional states in making progress but at the same time not to pose threats to Chinese interests in the region in other words they are adopting the carrot stick diplomacy pattern to secure their

interests. This strategy of China was successful between 1990s and early 2000s, China set aside the political differences with the regional states and emphasized more on the economic cooperation and put little pressure on the regional states to secure the core interests. Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in his interview explain the objective of Chinese Grand Strategy as dual approach strategy, for him the visible side of China's Grand Strategy is economic but at the same time would gain much more political influence (Prof D. P., 2019).

4.1.1.1.2 Control over the "Near Seas"

China is making progress not only economically but militarily too. The biggest objective of China under military modernization is to prevent the foreign powers especially US to intervene in any conflict in the near seas of China. So because of this reason China's military modernization is focusing more on enhancing the capability to conduct the counter intervention or regional military operations. China wants to secure East China Sea, South China Sea and Yellow Sea from the foreign intervention. In order to support this counter-intervention strategy, China developed Anti-Access/ Area- Denial (A2AD) weapons. These A2AD weapons included ground and air launched cruise missile, short and medium term ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, advance fighter aircraft, air re-fuelling capabilities and integrated defence system etc. China can utilise these capabilities anywhere in the region like in case of Senkaku/Diaoyu Island where China and Japan are conflicting. China might be the main economic partner for most regional states, but is also the main security threat too for many of the regional states as well (Breslin, 2020). China's top priority is to use these weapons to slow or contain the US intervention in the Taiwan Strait conflict (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014).

4.1.1.1.3 China's Sovereignty Claim

Since the dynasties rule in China, China considered sovereignty or territorial integrity as one of the most important goal of their foreign or domestic policies. In present day after becoming a regional power or rising global power, China is actively asserting the territorial claim in both East and South China Seas. They claim Senkaku/Diaoyu as the integral part of China, Japan claims the same (Den, 2018), this is the disputed area, they are having the conflict over and consequently in 2008 China for the first time dispatched the vessels into the 12nm water around the islands (Burke, et al., 2018). In 2012 after Japan step of purchasing three islands, China seized the opportunity for conducting protocols not only in the contiguous zone but in territorial waters too. Just to establish Chinese jurisdiction and challenge Japan control, China increased its presence. In 2013 China announced East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zona (ADIZ) to increase pressure on Japan and force them to officially acknowledge it as the territorial dispute between both of them (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014). China took these steps just because of its rising power and a relative decline in Japanese power.

On the other hand in South China Sea, China broke the verbal agreement with Philippines and not only seized the control over Shoal but also closed the entry of foreign fisherman in that particular area. Before 2012 they both were agreed on the peaceful withdrawal of both nation's vessels from Scarborough. But, after 1995, this was the first time in history when China broke the status quo and took the Mischief Reef from Philippines. China also put hydrocarbon blocks up for bid in between the Chinese claim area and EEZ under 200nm of Vietnam, Interfering in the area of other countries EEZs, announcing the military and administrative districts in the contested areas of South China Sea, updated fishing regulations in the disputed areas etc. also shows China's dedication towards the oath to maintain the national interest and defend the Chinese interest in the South China Sea (Torode, 2013).

China want to change the East and South China Seas status quo and to turn it in its favour, China is adopting the "Salami Slicing" strategy and taking small steps to achieve its interests.

Through such steps China just want to stop others to interfere into Chinese claim territory and to keep China as a strong and sovereign and independent state (Glaser B. S., “Seapower and Projection Forces in the South China Sea”, 2016). China sometimes use the economy as a mean of coercion for instance in 2010 when Japan arrested the Chinese fishing board captain in response they had to face the restriction for exports of rare earth minerals from Chinese side. And in other case China forced Philippines to withdrawal its vessels from Scarborough Shoal by barred the imports of fruits from Manila (Glaser B. S., China's Grand Strategy in asia, 2014). China’s growing economic and military capabilities allows China to secure its interests in the region.

4.1.2 Threats to Chinese GS

Chinese Communist Party considered itself as a fragile regime facing different economic, political and social challenges so to understand the Chinese GS one must have to understand both domestic and international challenges to Chinese Grand Strategy and its rise. Foreign policy of any country is meant to serve the domestic interests at the international level. Chinese scholars do considers that China’s GS is facing domestic threats as well along with the international ones (Deng, China's Struggle for Status, 2012). Before analysing the Chinese GS on the model of institution of English school by Hadely Bull examined how China is trying to coup with them, this section will briefly discuss the domestic and international threats to the Chinese GS.

4.1.2.1 Domestic threats to Chinese Grand Strategy

Most of the foreign analysts on Chinese foreign policy even don’t pay much attention on the domestic threats to the Chinese interests, they pay much attention on the international threats to Chinese goals and ignore the domestic threats as they don’t exist even (Shirk, 2007). Even Chinese experts spend much time on analysing the foreign relations and ignore the domestic

issues but it is the fact too that while analysing the events like China's rise or its Grand Strategies, both Chinese and international scholars pay attention towards the domestic issues too because without counting the internal problems or threats, analysing the present or future of any strategy is just impossible. Zheng Bijian delivered a speech in 2004 and stated that China is facing three biggest development challenges: first is natural resources, second is about the environment and last but not the least is lack of coordination between economic and social development.

Premier Wen Jiabao once explained China's economic growth as unbalanced, unsustainable and unsteady (Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy, & Mitchell , 2009). The most difficult challenge to handle is "unbalanced" as China is making enormous economic growth but uneven benefits or wealth distribution is dividing country into two classes as Karl Marx suggested. The less well off or proletariat class is unhappy with this regime and became the reason of different incidents which can cause the social instability in the country, Chinese leaders are more concerned about this situation and making policies to handle such issues because it can lead towards not only the social but political instability and ultimately an unstable society would have bad impacts on the foreign policies or GS of China.

The other domestic threats to Chinese Grand Strategy are corruption, under-provision, unemployment, environmental degradation, and social welfare goods etc. American scholars argued that the difference between the educated and uneducated, urban dwellers etc. could trigger the political and economic disruption in China. They also added that China one-child policy became the reason of gender imbalance, unstrained economic growth of China is behind the environmental degradation of China, so if China at the moment don't handle such issues, it can create a great hurdle in future growth and achieving China's objectives of GS (Keller & Rawski, 2007).

4.1.2.2 International Threats to Chinese Grand Strategy

International threats are the international factors which Chinese leaders see as the biggest hurdle in achieving Chinese objectives. In the history world have faced wars especially two great wars which brought nothing but destruction, China has also faced Cold War and other limited wars with the regional states. So because of such events war is being considered as the biggest potential threat to international environment, China also considers war as the greatest threat to its progress, Chinese officials are optimists that China do have the ability to avoid the war or confrontation with great powers but if war broke-out or even the escalation of conflict between China and other regional powers would damage Chinese modernization process. Even though war seems unlikely in this globalized and more integrated world but still conflict does exist and China should avoid them for securing the objectives of China's Grand Strategy.

Speeches of the Chinese officials and the documents suggest that China considers US and its allies as the biggest threat to Chinese Grand Strategy. But this is not to say that any Chinese leaders or officials openly stated that the US is either the enemy or the biggest threat to Chinese foreign goals. To achieve its objective, cordial relations with US are important but still China is not much clear about the US intentions. The first perception about the US intentions is because of the ideological differences US wants to undermine the CCP rule in China and second is China thinks US wants to maintain its power status in the East Asian region (Nathan & Scobell , *How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears*, 2012). Because of these perceptions, it seems like US along with its alliance wants to contain China as US did with USSR during Cold War. At this time most of the Chinese neighbours are US allies and they are confused about the Chinese rise as the regional power and what policy China would adopt towards them after having enough power. China don't want to play the Cold War power politics and at the same time against the hegemon conception (Hu, 2012).

In addition to this opinion Dai Bingguo directly said, we don't want to be hegemon and will not compete with the regional states to become a hegemon or to dominate the regional states for becoming more powerful, further adds that we don't want to follow the pattern of "Monroe Doctrine" or the concept of "Joint Hegemony" (Bingguo, 2011). At the same time it shows that China wants to warn the US and its allies to contain China and even Chinese are also not in favour of adopting the Cold War mentality and expect the same from the regional states to avoid confrontation. Dai favours this argument by criticizing the US by stating that "those who still have the Cold War mentality and in opposition of China they sell weapons to Taiwan" He also added that "we hope that other countries in the region will not adopt any policy to harm or contain China" (Bingguo, 2011). Chinese are very much aware that hostile relations with any great power especially US would be the great threat to Chinese interests and especially in achieving the strategic goals of Chinese Grand Strategy. Hostility would first lead towards the war and secondly if it wouldn't, it will obviously divert the Chinese attention from the modernization to arms race. For instance Soviet-Chinese confrontation during Cold War gave nothing but led to the arms race and damaged the economic growth.

Any instability at Chinese periphery could affect Chinese GS, as since ages any hostile activity at Chinese periphery ultimately harmed Chinese interests and brought instability to China either in terms of Chinese involvement in the international conflict or caused instability in Chinese territory. In recent years, researchers and officials are focusing more on the non-traditional threats to Chinese GS instead of traditional ones and how they can influence Chinese GS.

4.2 China's Grand Strategy and Asia-Pacific

In 1960s and 1970s a new term "Asia-Pacific" was established for the first time (McDougall, 2006). This term is used for the region which links the Pacific region to the East Asia. Many

countries like Japan, Australia, and US supported this term as it legitimize the US presence in the region otherwise US can be a Pacific but not the Asian power. Other countries like Canada, New Zealand and Australia also had the similar reasons to support this term. Asia-Pacific covers Southeast Asia (Brunei, Burma, East Timor, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand), Northeast Asia covers (Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia), countries like US, Australia, Canada, Mexico, New-Zealand, India, Chilli and Peru can also be called as the Pacific countries in different perspectives (McDougall, 2006).

Currently, Asia-Pacific is one of the world most stable parts of the global landscape. It is stable as a whole and has a strong momentum for peace and development. States are also solving their mutual disputes through consultation and negotiation. Despite the existence of disputes, this region is developing and having relatively fast growth as compare to the other regions of the world. Despite the regional integration, cooperation etc. this region is still facing multiple threats to the security of the region as nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and disputes between the regional states on the territorial sovereignty and maritime rights etc.

China is one of the great power in Asia-pacific region and very well aware of the reality that maintaining the order and stability in the region is closely link with the Chinese interests and for regional peace Chinese peaceful policies also plays an important role. That's why China has taken the responsibility to maintain the regional order and they have adopted the policies of cooperation and mutual benefits for all. In 2013 Chinese president for the first time announced the Chinese intentions towards the regional politics, in his speech he emphasized on the "friendly neighbour policy" but he also added that friendly neighbours doesn't mean that China will compromise on its interests but will cooperate with the regional states for peace and stability.

4.3.1 Geo Economics of China's Grand Strategy

Geo-Economics of China's Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific region revolves around the Maritime Silk Road initiative and energy security.

4.3.1.1 Maritime Silk Road (MSR)


In October 2013 China president proposed MSR during his speech in Indonesian Parliament (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). This MSR relates with the ancient Chinese Silk Route (Schinas & Westarp, 2017) Ancient Chinese Silk Rout stretched from Fuzhou to the Southeast Asia through Chinese Sea and via Strait of Malacca, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, Europe (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). The purpose of the ancient and current MRS to connect Chinese people across the waters like South China Sea and Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. The purpose is not only to connect the people but the trade and commerce as well, like China export its silk, tea and ceramics from the same route (Blanchard & Flint, 2017).

China's contemporary Maritime Silk Road



Source: Xinhua.

Maritime Silk Road has become one of the most important tools of establishing Chinese foreign relation. Chinese media claim Maritime Silk Road as the “geo-economics plan” of China (Zongyi, 2014). Now the MSR will also connect with the different transportation corridors like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, UN Economics and Social Commission Trans-Asia Railway which connects Kunming to Thailand, China-Bangkok-Laos and Kunming-Vietnam-Cambodia, The Mekong River Development initiative, the China-India-Bangladesh-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the multilateral Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Programme (Blanchard & Flint, 2017).



Source: Belt and Road News, August, 2020

Chinese scholars argue that China's MSR initiative shows its intention of peaceful rise and its effort to create a harmonious environment for cooperation with the regional states. Naval craft of Chinese together with the legal status under international law can be used for diplomatic purpose and through this they can promote the Maritime Silk Road (Yen-ChiangChang, 2018). However this is the only Chinese intention or perception but world looks it from the different perspective and it generates worldwide apprehension. Chinese claim over most of the South China Sea and other dependency issues in the infrastructure of MSR also have not helped in China's image across the region. Maritime Silk Road in the region serve to pacify the tension over Chinese claim in the South China Sea as MSR initiative was extended from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and the other part has been extended into the Southern Pacific, it promote the cooperation rather than unsettle naval expansionism. Chinese Ambassador Xiaodong explained the Maritime Silk Road as:

“MSR will help China and the regional states to solve the differences caused by the South China Sea disputes” (Xinhua, Xi’s trip to help build foundation for China-ASEAN community of common destiny, 2015).

On the basis of above mentioned statements, China established the MSR not only for securing its economic and security interests but also want to counterbalance the negative image of Chinese policies or action in the Asia-Pacific region as China’s official slogan is “Deeping trust and enhancing connectivity” (Jiechi, 2015). In 2014, a report was given by Xinhua in which he explains the MSR as Maritime Silk Road would involve the infrastructure construction and development in the states along the road and this project also include the ports of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. China would coordinate, supervise and facilitate the project, which is also likely to contain attempt to build free trade zone (Xinhua, China accelerates planning to re-connect Maritime Silk Road, 2014).

For the purpose of MSR construction and for other infrastructure developments China has created the fund of \$40 billion (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). China also has established the \$50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, one of the purposes of establishing this bank is also to fund MSR projects. Other funding sources like China Development Bank made plan to invest about \$890 billion and China Administrative of Foreign Exchange injected \$90 billion into China Development Bank and Export- Import Bank of China to support the MSR projects (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). China’s white paper of 2017 emphasized on the win-win situation, talked about the pragmatic cooperation involves solving the differences and building consensus (Xinhua, Full text: China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, 2017). In 2017, Xi Jinping announced that China would put additional RMB 100 billion into the Silk Road Fund.

Most of the countries in Asia-Pacific took this initiative as a positive step towards the regional integration and development but despite this fact China has to deal with the rivals of this project

too. In July 2018, Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State announced the infrastructure initiative and China considers it as a counter to the Belt Road Initiative (Washington's Investment in Indo- Pacific Won't Cripple Belt and Road, 2018). Another counter to Chinese project was Australian announcement in November 2018, when they announced "The Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific" mechanism. India on the other hand did not attend both China's Belt and Road Forum in 2017 and 2019 respectively. India boycotted it because of the China-Pakistan economic Corridor, which links the Eurasian Belt route and the Indian Ocean Silk Route crossed the Kashmir, which is a disputed area between India and Pakistan. India is anti of MSR because it considers it as a threat to Indian interests in the region.

4.3.1.2. Energy security

China is facing energy security issue. Before 1995 China was exporting oil, but after the modernization and industrializing China, it has become one of the biggest importers of oil and gas (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). Middle is the biggest market of energy for China, China use the route through the Strait of Malacca to the South China Sea and up to China. This route plays an important role in resolving China's energy security issue. In 2004, a Pentagon's study was published on the future of energy security in Asia, in which the author argued that China is establishing good strategic relations along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea not only to secure China's energy interests but for other security objectives as well (MacDonald & Hamilton, 2004).

4.3.1.2.1 Threat to Energy security

China is facing various traditional and untraditional threats to its energy security across the region especially the fight for the maritime route is posing serious challenges to China's energy security. Chinese consider US, India and Japan as a threat to their interests, they claim that US and India look jealous to their projects in the Persian Gulf as Middle supplies almost half of

the Chinese oil imports via Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, to South China Sea and then up to China so dangers does exist there (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). India, Japan and especially US tried to control the some important straits by using all political, diplomatic and economic means (Wang L. , 2015). US aimed at controlling the 16 straits in 1986 when they declared war; these 16 straits were including the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca (Wang L. , 2015). For US there are three ways to control the important maritime transportation ways, first to make its naval presence strong there and establish some overseas military basis, the second way is to put weight on the strategic islands and disturb/destroy the other countries development in the particular area and last but not least is to establish the maritime and security cooperation with relevant countries (Wang L. , 2015). Because of the piracy threats China has started anti-piracy developments and enhanced ability of its navy (Yuandan, 2019).

The other country which is posing threat to China's energy security in the Asia-Pacific region is Japan. Japan considers Strait of Malacca as the "Lifeline" to Japan that's why they give priority to the Maritime Self Defense and Maritime lane security (Wang L. , 2015). Japan officially authorized Self Defense Force after 9/11 and now Japanese military presence in the Indian Ocean posing threats to other regional states (Wang L. , 2015). Third country which is posing serious threats to Chinese energy interests is India. India want the control of Ocean not only to deprived its rivals to use it but to secure Indian interests as well and even to achieve their target since 1990s they have intensified the Oriental Maritime and Indian Ocean Control Strategy (Wang L. , 2015).

Not only above mentioned three states but there others factors in the Asia-Pacific region also posing threat to Chinese development and its energy security like political deterioration in these countries, disputes between the states and regional turmoil are those factors. For instance if the conflict escalate between China and the ASEAN countries in South China Sea and in response, ASEAN countries may use the Strait of Malacca as a threat or China take any step which can

trigger the Malaysia and Indonesia to block the Straits (Wang L. , 2015). Second is Indian Ocean, any escalation of conflict in Indian Ocean even can disturb the stability of the region and as for as the Middle Eastern region is concerned, Strait of Hormuz lies there, social situation in region and terrorist activities may have negative impact on the maritime lane security as well.

Non-traditional security challenges such as piracy and maritime terrorism poses serious threats to Chinese energy security. World witnessed a rapid growth of piracy incident after Cold war and secondly new developments and trends in the maritime terrorism are challenging the world shipping and trade. Because of such development China considers piracy and maritime terrorism as the biggest non-traditional threat to their energy security (Wang L. , 2015). Experts also argues that in contemporary period, West African Coast, Somalian Peninsula, Red Sea, Gulf of Adan, Bay of Bengal and the South Asia area are mainly under the concentration of the pirates (Wang L. , 2015). These areas are important for China and even in recent years China is facing a lot, they are encountering the pirates and suffered a lot in returns. Such type of pirates and maritime terrorist activities are posing threats to Chinese energy security.

4.3.1.2.2 Counter-Measures

Chinese want to avoid the “Malacca Dilemma” and this desire of Chinese led them to construct the other ways. China’s diversions are: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China-Myanmar Energy Corridor (CMEC). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor connects Xinjiang and Gwadar, it also links the Maritime Silk Road to Eurasian Belt (Blanchard & Flint, 2017). On the other hand, in 2017 they opened China-Myanmar Energy Corridor, it’s basically a gas line and oil pipelines project which connects Deepwater Port of Kyaukpyu and Kunming in South-western China. It is to be seen that how much these projects would secure and help China in fulfilling their energy needs. China claim in the East and South China Sea is linked with the

China's energy potential. In the nut shell, China's energy security is the driver behind the China's Grand strategy for Asia-Pacific.

4.3.2 Geopolitics of China's Grand Strategy

After the announcement of Chinese Grand Strategy, the geopolitics of Asia-Pacific is changing rapidly. China's Asia-Pacific geopolitics policies revolve around the South China Sea and the Pacific Oceans. China is an important factor in Asia-Pacific region and want to secure its interests and regional order without the escalation of conflict, to achieve its goals China adopted the strategies for South China Sea and Pacific Ocean to secure its objectives.

4.3.2.1 Pacific Ocean

Pacific Ocean plays the crucial role in securing Chinese interests, even under GS China has adopted the strategies for Pacific Basin too (Yang, 2011). China's policies for Pacific Ocean reflect different intentions of Chinese. First it seems like China want to push past, and second view could be, China adopting these policies for "Island Chains", third People's Republic of China want recognition as a legitimate government, that's why they are pushing, Taiwan claims that China wants the access and control the resources of deep water along with the sea beds which are rich in mineral resources. Last but not the least perception about Chinese policies is, as a part of increasing geopolitical rivalry with US (Scott, 2019).

China is taking diplomatic steps to engage with the regional states. China is enjoying formal diplomatic relations with only eight regional/Pacific Island states out of sixteen, in recent years they are taking measures to establish good relation with the regional states and because of the Chinese efforts, it reportedly deploys more diplomats than any other country in the region. Not only this, they are conducting the senior level visits too as in 2006 Wen Jiabao visited Fiji and announced the establishment of Chinese-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum (CPICEDCF) (Yang, 2011). China is also an active member of different

regional institutions to maintain the bilateral relations. Since 1989, China is a dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum but in recent years it is paying more attention as they are sending their officials to attend the meetings (Scott, 2019). In 2000, China not only set up China-PIF cooperation fund but in 2002, they also sponsored PIF trade office in Beijing (Yang, 2011).


China did not only join PIF rather they have developed good relations with the other sub-regional groups as their close ties with the Melanesia Spearhead Groups (MSG), even China funded the establishment of Melanesia Spearhead Groups' headquarter in Vanuatu (Yang, 2011). Chinese establishment of good relations and involvement in the various infrastructure projects under OBOR is increasing concerns in US and Australia. Especially China's ties with Fiji and their participation in various OBOR infrastructure projects in Papua New Guinea as a memorandum of understanding created a lot of suspicion in US and Australia and in response they both announced plans to develop the naval base facilities at Lombrum to counter Chinese presence there (Scott, 2019).

China is not only developing and maintaining good bilateral and multilateral relations on diplomatic basis rather it also has been always concerned about the maritime security. Since 1988, China has been a member of Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). In 2018 Chinese were withdrawn from the RIMPAC, world's largest international maritime warfare exercise hosted by US. US did not approve Chinese actions in the South China Sea and this reason lead towards the Chinese withdrawn from RIMPAC in which Chinese have been participated in 2014 and 2016 (Scott, 2019).

4.3.2.2 South China Sea

China's claim over the South China Sea is increasingly treated as its "core interest". Even China's U shape line claim that the Pratas Island, Paracel Island, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Island as a part of China's territory in the Sea (Miyoshi, 2012). China does not

recognise the sovereignty of other nations over the island in the South China Sea, including Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia. Chinese claim that these Islands had been stolen from China during different conflicts by the great powers. So Chinese claim that China would get back these stolen parts of China at any cost.



Source: <https://undertheangsanatree.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-nine-dash-line.html>

Hainan Island is one of the most important islands as it provides China geopolitical and power projection advantages at the top of the South China Sea and submarine base at Yulin enables Chinese development into the South China Sea and West Pacific (Scott, 2019). Hainan

department of commerce announced to set a new port facility at Sanya for the purpose of deep sea research vessel in 2018. This starting point of this project is linked with the Maritime Silk Road and this set would be a free trade zone by 2025 (Tang & Zheng, 2018). Woody Island was captured by the Chinese in 1974 from Vietnam, now Taiwan and Vietnam claim over the chain of Woody Island which is one of the hot issue in South China Sea between China and these countries. China also announced to spend 10 billion Yuan for the purpose of military and infrastructure development and this development would further enhance the Chinese control (Chan M. , 2012).

China claims that Spratly Island was a part of China since centuries. Spratly Island is rich in natural resources and fishing area. They believe and their government stated that not only the Spratly Island but almost entire South China Sea including the other Islands came under its influence (Pletcher, n.d.). China claims on Sea indirectly direct towards the control of estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil plus natural gas resources (Council on Foreign relations, 2020). Countries especially Vietnam and Philippines are having dispute with China over this claim. In 1988 China first time establish its presence in Spratly Island by removing Vietnam's garrison from Johnson South Reef and in 2014 China start building artificial land on certain reef (Pletcher, n.d.). In recent years, china is increasing its physical size of the islands and reclaiming them all. China has constructed airstrips, ports and military installations in Spratly and Parcel Islands (Council on Foreign relations, 2020).

As for as foreign intervention is concerned in South China Sea, China avoid the sovereign talks at any regional or international level as they don't want to make it as an international issue rather they keen to localize it that's why discourage the foreign intervention (Scott, 2019). China argues that under the international law, foreign countries are not allowed to conduct the intelligence-gathering activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone (Council on Foreign relations, 2020). But US on the other hand, have a different perspective, they claim that under

the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) all the claimant countries should have the navigation freedom through the EEZs (Council on Foreign relations, 2020). In 2016 Philippines brought claim against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the decision came in favour of Philippines but as a signatory to the treaty China refused to accept the Court's authority (Council on Foreign relations, 2020). Even after the decision of Permanent court of Arbitration, the new administration of Philippine is enjoying good economic relations with China.

4.3.2.3 China's Maritime Grand Strategy

This section examines the maritime strategy of China, how it is securing Chinese interests and impacting the overall regional order. China has shifted the world's attention towards Asia-Pacific. After the end of the Cold war, China transformed its strategic approaches/policies and since then maritime security has become the important factor/element to influence its policies. As a result, most countries are turning their attention to the maritime economic competition, including China, and China's quest for sea power has now become its primary concern. China claims that they are changing their policies due to the evolving regional security environment, which is pushing them to shift from land power and control to the control of territorial waters and strategic resources.

Because of the above mentioned Chinese perspective, China has changed its policy from Maoist maritime strategic approach "coastal defence" to "offshore and far sea defence". (Figure 1) Even though China was not having an impressive maritime strategy in history but they always remained as an important maritime country in the Asia-Pacific region which possessed 18,000 km mainland coastal plus 14,000km island coastline (Chandramohan, 2014). China in 2015 official defence strategy stressed upon the adoption of the "open-seas protection" strategy under this strategy they claimed that protection of "offshore defence" and "open seas defence"

is and will remain at the top of the Chinese maritime strategy (Saito, 2017). China stress that their maritime strategy only focus on the enhancement of the Chinese Sea capabilities, their naval presence will not disturb the existing order rather would leads towards the “harmonious ocean” (Xiaoyan, 2014). In 2017 Xi announced that for establishing to be a great maritime power, China adopted the pivot policy of “strong navy” (Xi calls for "strong, modern" navy, 2017).

Figure: 18

1950s to 1970s	Coastal defence/ Inshore defence	Main area of operations: Coastal and Inshore areas not far from the mainland. Main Objectives: Supporting Land engagements, preventing enemy infiltration from sea etc.
1980s to the beginning of 2000s	Offshore defence	Main area of opportunities: Yellow Sea, East China Sea and South China Sea. Main Objectives: Prevention of enemy invasion, national unification, safeguarding of territory, protection of sea lines of communication, protection of maritime rights and interests.
Beginning of 2000s	Offshore defence/ Open seas defence	Main area of opportunity: open seas in addition to offshore waters. Main Objectives: While maintaining and strengthening offshore defence strategies, safeguarding China’s interests overseas and being ready to counterattack with nuclear weapon,

		participating in international security cooperation etc.
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Source: NIDS China Security Report 2016

Hugo Grotius changed the world perception about the sea power. In 1609 he wrote *Mare Liberum* he convinced the policy makers that Oceans can be used as a channel of communication between states. After this development, world’s leaders started to think on different lines and made rule and law for the peaceful use of the sea. China since its foundation not only recognized UN but also participated in United Nations Conventions on the Law and Sea (UNCLOS). China made a rule and requests other countries to inform China before passing its territorial water but China itself did not follow it when in 2014 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) passed the US territorial water. After this incident US scholars argues that US should withdraw the Chinese rights of moving freely in the South China Sea and this status must remain till the Chinese don’t accept their mistake and follow the international law (Saito, 2017).

Not only this they also claim that China enjoys the peaceful passage without any restriction even while passing through the territorial water or from Exclusive Economic Zone of other countries but when it comes to the Chinese turn, they always behave as they are dominating the sea near its shore so China obstruct the passage of other countries from its territorial waters (Saito, 2017).But when it comes to the other countries seas, China follows a total different policy, China considers neighbouring seas “national maritime land” and for China territorial and Contiguous water came under this concept along with the Exclusive Economic Zone so China can not only have a peaceful exercise in these areas rather they can even ban the military exercise in these areas (Saito, 2017).

4.3.2.3.1 Classical Approach of China's Maritime Strategy

China adopted the "String of Pearls" Policy under this strategy they attempted to increase their access to different ports and develop good diplomatic relations with the regional states to fulfil the China's energy needs. Even though US was busy in two other conflict in Afghanistan and Middle East but despite this fact and opportunity, China did not adopt the offensive policy rather it was a defence move by China. Even today it seems like that china is almost adopting the same strategy as they are utilizing diplomatic and economic means to develop good bilateral and multilateral relations with the regional states under its Grand Strategy. In 2003, China started to talk about the Malacca Dilemma, as it is just 2.7 km wide at its narrowest point and China had to pass through its oil from Strait of Malacca so they were having the fear that it could be block any time by a terrorist attack or natural disaster etc. and as a consequence China would have to pay. So to avoid such conflict China adopted the "String Policy" and

4.3.2.3.2 Current Approach of China's Maritime Strategy


After adopting the GS, China divided its People's Liberation Army into five different branches:

1) The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), The People's Liberation army Rocket Force) and The People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) (Koda, 2017). China's ground force and air force both are tasked to conduct defensive operations along with the offensive as well when needed, they both are not only focus on the Taiwan but on the other regional states as well like India, North Korea, Vietnam and many others.

With the rise of China as a regional state, PLAAF has also expanded the area of its operation. They started to operate over the extended waters too. This gave the clear message of expansionist policy of China to the world. And secondly it clarified that PLAAF is not only

operation in the air rather it is helping PLAGF operations. Not only this PLAAF's fighter and bomber force are also tasked now to attack on the enemy naval in the distinct sea areas. In addition to the other developments, China also built artificial island in the Spratly and Parcel Islands. Since 2015 China has started to reclaim the 3200 acres, China is not only reclaiming rather satellite images of Subi Reef and Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Island are showing unusual activities of China over there, as a possible construction of airstrips, helipads, piers etc. (China's Maritime Disputes, 2019) (Figure: 2,3). And this development will help PLAAF to fly over the South China Sea for conducting defence exercises and attack on the other states if they attack on China or create hurdle in Chinese interests (Koda, 2017).

Figure: 19




Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35216579>

At the moment China can have robust operation only in and around the Chinese territory, they are not able to compete US forces yet as US used to carry operation worldwide and support its allied around the world but if Chinese plan to militarize the Spratly and Parcel Islands gets

fruits for China it can disturb the regional order and would be a threat to US interests as well. People's Liberation Army Navy became a major player after the Chinese rise in the mid of the 1990s even it played important role and supported the Chinese A2/AD strategy (Koda, 2017). Chinese PLAN also has planned to turn from "brown water" to blue water" force/navy, with the extraordinary abilities to operate in the high seas in the Asia-Pacific region (Koda, 2017). Since last few years China is spending more on the development and strengthening the PLAN than any other force, this Chinese priority is showing that they are serious to make it the "blue-water" navy. But the biggest hurdle in this regard is Chinese relations with the other states as it doesn't have strong alliance which can provide functional military bases and full support to PLAN. This is the biggest difference between US navy operation and PLAN and China knows it too that's why they have started to build the base in Djibouti and their Grand strategy for maritime security (Koda, 2017).

Figure: 20



Source: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-17/south-china-sea-subi-reef-in-2012-compared-to-2016/8128816?nw=0>

4.4 Institutions by Hedley Bull and Chinese GS

Asia pacific future is much linked with the China's rise. China's Grand Strategy is showing that China has taken the responsibility of development and prosperity of Asia-Pacific region all along. It seems like China is ready to pursue the economic development along with the security of the region through dialogues and wants to work with the regional states to get mutual benefits. China's behaviour towards regional politics is the result of the interpretation of the new regional political environment, which they actually have learned from their own cultural

legacies. China's perception of international society is neither like the realist nor like the idealist rather do they want to secure Chinese interests along with maintaining the regional order as described by Bull. China's adoption of the institutions or maintaining the order is not the simplistic one rather it is the consequences of the historical events.

4.4.1 Hedley Bull and International Society

English School focused more on the concept of international society while developing the understanding of international relations (Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, 2014). International Society is a sort of the club to cooperate under the characteristics of international relations argued by the dominant scholars of E.S. of thought. Wight and Butterfield consider international system and society almost interchangeably but in contrast Bull draws the distinction line before conceptualizing and operationalization of these terms (Watts, 1987). Bull argues that states interact in two different modes, international system is when two states contact with each other and consider other's decision while acting at the international stage and international society is: when two or more than two states interact with each others for securing interests and common values but side by side they are bound to obey the certain norms and values under the common institutions. For Bull international system can exist without international society but international society can't be established without international system (James, 1993).

Bull's concept of international society concentrates on the concept of order so he added that cooperation at international system in anarchic world can be possible because of the order but order cannot exist without specific goal or objective. Because for him a same order can't be apply in the all situations but every situation would have different order accordingly, for applying the order goal and objectives must be set from the beginning, without a clear goal or objective the concept of order would be meaningless (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society: A

Study of Order in World Politics, 2012). Bull added that in international society, order is not the result of any fact rather it's the consequence of the common interests based on the goals and objectives, establishment of rules to prescribe the behaviour for sustaining these goals and institutions to make these rules effective (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2012).

According to Hedley Bull, states are the main actors in international society and they cooperate with one another to protect their interests. As long as their interests do not conflict with one another, states cooperate and work voluntarily to maintain the order. However, if their interests do conflict with one another, states are unable to maintain the order. On the basis of above mentioned explanation, Bull states that international society has different goals, the first is to preserve the system of international society, second is to maintain the sovereignty of the states, third to maintain the peace in international society and last but not the least it deals with the social life's goals (Bull H. , Order versus Justice in World Politics, 1977).

In the nut shell, Bull's writings gave overriding status to the order to analyse the world politics and this status somehow influence the functional mechanism of the international politics. He also argues that states are the main actor in the international relation, those cooperate with each other's on the basis of the common interests and set few rules under the common institutions and at the end they provided order via these rules and institutions. These common goals and interests give a way to cooperation, it decrease the violence and securing the property rights for individuals (Buzan, Rethinking Hedley Bull on the Institutions of International Society, 2006).

4.4.2 Hedley Bull and Institutions

E.S. is different from the rest of the theories of the international relations on the basis of Bull's point of view regarding 'order' in international society and mechanism adopted for maintaining

order is not designed particularly rather it has been evolved throughout the history. He argues that common goals and interests of the states in international society drive them to set or follow the common rules under particular institutions and as a consequences ultimate goal 'order' is provided. For Bull, Balance of Power, War, Great Powers, International Law and Diplomacy plays the role of institutions (Bull H. , *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2012).

4.4.2.1 China and Balance of Power

Balance of Power is one of the most important institution of international society. Balance of Power has been an important institution of European international society as well and China used this as a tool to secure its interests and make her survival possible. For instance using one barbarian off against another has been an important tactic and the second example could be taken of the Spring and Autumn period when Yan survived in a competitive world (Hao, 1980) During the European state system, states were used to adopt the same measure to protect themselves in the complex international systems. During the European state system, states were independent in deciding their military and civilian affairs but still they had promised each other's that they would not cause troubles between neighbours in securing their interests. They did had the pact between weak and strong that they would form a balance of power. Warring states also adopted the same concept for peaceful friendly alliance. Yen-P'ing Hao claims that during the Qing Dynasty China adopted the Western International system (Hao, 1980).

Either China is adopting the BOP as an institution of international society or not, it is a debateable matter especially after China's Grand Strategy and its intentions to secure its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Li Hong Zhang states that during the European international society, great powers signed the treaties to help the small powers and same could have been adopted in case of Korea, a small state in East Asia (Hao, 1980).If regional powers

signed a treaty to protect Korea, Korea can peacefully continue with its trade activities and in return will give a handsome benefit to all the states especially China. China also showed interests to adopt balance of power as an institution to secure its interest while cooperating with the other regional states. Because China also knows that its interests especially security interests are interlinked with the Korean Security. China adoption of balance of power as an institution is showing that they want to maintain the balance in which they would protect and respect the independence of other regional states and would play a role in maintaining the order through institutions cooperating with the other regional states.

China's Policy for Asia-Pacific states that China should focus more on building the partnership and to strengthen the political foundation for the peace and stability of Asia-Pacific region (China, 2017) In that report they also added that we should reject the Cold War mentality and work together for the stability of region, big states should respect the others interests and concerns and show positive behaviour at the same time small states should not be a part of any camp. All states in the Asia-Pacific region should put effort to pursue partnership rather alliance, dialogue instead of confrontation etc. China adopted the different pattern as compare to the policies of other Great Powers in history, China wants to establish a new model of international relations which focuses more on the cooperation instead of competition. China has committed to work with all the regional states in different fields as in case of US they have committed to build and enjoy the cordial relations centred on the mutual benefits, non-confrontation and mutual respect etc. on the other hand China also wants to establish good strategic relations with both Russia and India. China is also working on Sino-Japanese relations. China under its Grand Strategy is trying to construct a community of shared future which includes the Asia-Pacific region as well.

4.4.2.2 China and War

War has been an important tool in the history, Chinese perception about the war is as same as the rest of the countries. During the European international society, China has remained a victim and did not get anything constructive from war. As war has been destructive all the time but still as per Grotain concept, war can play the role in maintaining the justice as well:

“Peace in the norm and war is the violation or exception; peace is logically prior to the war and war is the necessary evil, to be minimized as for as possible. War is necessary element because it is the only means of justice when there is no political superior” (Wight, Wight, & Porter, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, 1992).

According to the above mentioned statement war somehow is an important element to maintain the justice in international society. But it depends how much a country is strong enough to protect the international law as well. China in the Asia-Pacific region is facing more threats and challenges to its national security. China’s most important strategic task is to build a strong defence line, which not only provides security to China rather it maintains, the regional peace and stability. In case of China’s military modernization, they are following the principles of “coexistence”, military exchanges, non-aligned, non-confrontational etc. China increased cooperation with other state’s armed forces based on the equality and mutual benefits (China, 2017). They also have intensify cooperation in border areas, cooperation on maritime security, participated in UN peacekeeping mission, international counter terrorism cooperation, and conduct relevant joint exercise and training with the other regional countries to maintain the peace in Asia-Pacific and avoid war but if necessary they would use this institution to maintain the international order.

4.4.2.3 China and Great Power Mechanism

Chinese views of the role played by the great power has been mixed throughout the history. They have witnessed the great power role from both sides. During the European international society, European great powers hold the position to balance the relations between other states. By holding the position of balancer they have benefited to the detriment of other weak states like Turkey. But on the other hand China has seen great power as a danger to their survival not the guarantor of peace for China. China considered the actions of European international society not morally justified as they were securing maximum profit from China by using force. Any analysis of Chinese behaviour as a regional or rising power would be premature, but their official statements and their General Survey (GS) towards the Asia-Pacific region demonstrate that China clearly views the institution of the great power and is actively contributing to the stability of the region by working with other regional powers and weak states. They are cooperating not only economically but militarily and diplomatically too for securing Chinese interests and to make the region and regional states more prosperous and developed (China, 2017). China is balancing between the regional states and if needed most probably they would use force too for the peace and stability.

4.4.2.4 China and International Law

China contacted international law in 1864 for the first time as an institution (Teng & Fairbank, 1979). After this first experience China acknowledged the efficiency of international law as an institution. But when China's dispute with Europe got managed and China got diplomatic victory then China actually considered its efficiency. This development changed Chinese perception and they started to consider international law as an important institution which can play a vital role in maintaining world's peace and stability. Dong Xun explained the Chinese perspective about international law as an institution as: "so many nations are existing outside

the China, if there is no law to regulate them, how this notion of nation can be possible” (Hsü, 1960). But despite such belief China could not enjoy the international law as an institution, mainly two factors are behind it: firstly they did not consider European unequal treatment as a threat rather they took few steps to make further use of international law to improve China’s position in the international society. Secondly, at that time China was not able to compete with the European states, so they avoided to have any further conflict with the European states.

Even though China don’t have good memories of international relations and had little faith on international law as an institution as they considered this institution was just securing the interests of great powers but after rising up as great power and then regional power China admitted that to live in peace and for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, states should follow the rule of law. They also believe that norms and rules of international law are according to the charter of UN and widely accepted as well. As per Chinese perspective, rules of international law must be formulated after the consent of all states before implementing at regional or international level. In 1954, China, India and Myanmar initiated the principles of peaceful coexistence to practice the rule of international law. In this regard China has got access to almost all the inter-governmental international organizations along with the 400 plus treaties.

As China has a commitment to maintain the security and order in the Asia-Pacific region. So in 2014 China was able to chair the meeting at Western Pacific Naval Symposium for the adoption of the advance code for unplanned Encounters at sea. Not only have this China with ASEAN countries decided to continue for the implementation of Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and on the basis of DOC consciences they will try their level best for the earlier Conclusion of the code of Conduct (COC). China is not showing concerns only about the rules about the regional integration or stability rather they are focusing on the rules related to the Cyber and Outer Space as well (China, 2017).

4.4.2.5 China and Diplomacy

China's perception of the diplomacy was quite different from the one they are facing and having in current period. During the European International Society, at that time diplomats were having the coercive policies to secure their nation interests. They were contributing less towards maintaining the peace, because of such situation China considered diplomacy/diplomats as Realist perceived which is something related to the *Realpolitik* and securing state interests at any cost. At that time diplomacy or diplomatic activities were meant as a tool of war instead of peace and this notion of diplomacy is totally different from the Grotious school of thought. Wang about the diplomats stated that:

“Diplomats use their brushes to battle, tongue to battle and their mind to battle as well” (Suzuki, 2004).

After the recent developments at international level, diplomacy in recent time is playing an important role in maintaining the peace and order at international level. So China's perception of diplomacy has been changed as well, they are adopting the bilateral and multilateral tracks of diplomacy to maintain and stabilize the Asia-Pacific region. China is not developing bilateral relations but it is trying to maintain the multilateral talks as well. To make the region more stable and peaceful, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Six Party Talks, China ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation, Xiangshan Forum etc. to establish the relations and sort out the problems diplomatically (China, 2017). Not only this China has made a lot of other proposals to cooperate and dialogue through. China took this responsibility of maintaining the peace in Asia-Pacific and very much concerned about the regional stability and peace.

4.5 Conclusion

China is having a clear and coherent Grand strategy for Asia-Pacific region. Chinese leaders have adopted the Grand Strategy with strategic guideline to achieve its interests and long-term goals. The main objectives of Chinese Grand Strategy are: to ensure the power to Chinese Communist Party, economic and social development of the country, and reunification with Taiwan but the most important is the territorial integrity and state sovereignty. China considers US and its allies as the biggest threats to Chinese interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese Grand Strategy has evolved over time as during the Deng Xiaoping era Chinese Grand Strategy was; hide its capabilities and keeping a low profile but it has been changed now. China is now more powerful and willing to use its power to secure its interests by enhancing its capabilities and influence the external environment.

Under its new Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific, China is spending more on military modernization and maritime security to defend its security interest in the region. Security is not the only goal of Chinese Grand Strategy rather maritime territorial claim too. And to achieve such goals China is trying hard to maintain the peace and stability in the region by avoiding the escalation of military conflict. Diplomatically, China has successfully convinced the regional states that a powerful China would not harm their interests rather a strong China will play an important role for the regional peace and stability.

China is using economy as a toll to attract and influence the regional states. China's one Belt one Road initiative is a part of Chinese Grand strategy, which not only strengthening Chinese economic and domestic progress but also helping China in bypassing the potential threats in Strait of Malacca and South China Sea and provides alternative roots to fulfil the Chinese energy needs. There are so many factors which can influence the current Chinese Grand Strategy just like other states response towards the grand Strategy, shift in balance of power,

change in international order, and leadership influence over the policies. Previously Chinese Grand strategy has been continuously influenced by the leadership role so one can expect that Xi Jinping can also change or influence the Chinese Grand Strategy in coming years.

Chapter Five

CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY AND UNITED STATES IN ASIA PACIFIC

Introduction

Since the turn of the twenty-first century and rise of China shifted the world attention from the European politics to Asia-Pacific. Upheaval in Middle East on the one hand and developments in Asia on the other are influencing the international security structure greatly. Asia-Pacific region is changing rapidly as compare to the any other region at the world stage. Now it has become the centre of the world economy, military and geopolitical competitions among great powers (Chen J. , Chinese strategic review warns of “big power competition” in Asia-Pacific, 2013). As economy is the most important driving force behind the domestic and international politics so states in Asia-Pacific are struggled hard and became the most economically developed states in the world.

This chapter explains what policies China can adopt to avoid a direct conflict in the Asia Pacific region with US while safeguarding its interests as well? Bothe US and China are the great powers in the Maritime sphere of Asia-Pacific region. They both have desire to protect their legitimate interests because good relations between both of them would not only bring mutual benefits rather it will promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. So, further this chapter analyse how US and China are managing their relations in the Asia-Pacific region, how they are maintaining the peace and stability of Asia-Pacific region and how English school of international relations explains this phenomenon?

US-China signed Wang Xia Treaty in 1844 (Nagashybayeva & Blarcom, 2010). Since then the relations between US.-China have undergone the process of development and they enjoyed this

session for about one and half centuries. During this period the world was transforming greatly so for the US-China as well. US had developed itself as a strongest nation in the world, following the capitalized economic system. On the other hand, China transformed as one of the greatest Asian nation with socialist form of government. China did not stop there rather it is continuously making progress and has proved itself as the growing power which is playing important role in world affairs and threatening US interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Both US and China are playing important role in the Asia-Pacific region, as one is the strongest nation in world and other is the emerging power of Asia so their role cannot be replaced with any other nations.

As for as US and China's relation is concerned, they both can't be spare as they are economically interdependent and security of Asia-Pacific region is somehow dependent on their bilateral relations. Their relations determine the regional order. So, conclusion from the historical events can be draw as; existence or escalation of conflict between both states would result only in loss, they both can't gain anything from conflicts, secondly security of the world especially Asia-Pacific region is somehow dependent on the mutual relationship of US and China but they can't force each other's to establish good relations and ignore the differences rather they can only achieve this target by mutual consciences. Economy can play an important role in developing their mutual relations which can develop the region as a whole.

To understand the future order of Asia-Pacific region and the relationship of US and China, it is necessary to learn from the history, this chapter would analyse the future of US and China in Asia-Pacific by analysing the diplomatic, political and economic relations of both countries along with the geographic importance of the region.

5.1 Sino-US Relations in Asia-Pacific

5.1.1 Significance of the Asia-Pacific

The term “Asia-Pacific” links wider Pacific region to the East Asia. Many countries like Japan, Australia and US supported this term as it legitimize their presence in the Asian region, without devising this term US can’t be consider as the Asian power but the Pacific only. Other states such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia also have the same reason to support this term. Asia-Pacific includes Southeast Asia (Brunei, Burma, East Timor, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand), Northeast Asia (Japan, China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia and Russia) and other countries like US, Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, India, Chilli and Peru can also be called as a part of Pacific in different perspectives (Lai, Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessmen, 2013).

Geo strategically Asia Pacific region approximately covers 22 present of the total global land and also provides ideal roots for trade which passes through the Ombai-waters, Combok, Strait of Malacca, Lombok and South China Sea described by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) (Administration, 2021). World’s three biggest economic shares holder countries are also from the Asia-Pacific, as China’s, Japan and India’s rapid economic growth and shares in the world economy, International Monetary Fund states that Asia-Pacific region is growing economically and holds \$6 trillion plus foreign exchange assets (Dept, 2012).

After the Asian crisis of 1997 and 1998, the notion of Pacific age re-entered into the discipline of the international politics. Asia-Pacific region is changing rapidly as compare to the any other region at the world stage. Now it has become the centre of the world economy, military and geopolitical competitions among great powers (Chen J. , Chinese strategic review warns of “big power competition” in Asia-Pacific, 2013). As economy is the most important driving

force behind the domestic and international politics so states in Asia-Pacific are struggled hard and became the most economically developed states in the world.

The most important factor behind driving the world attention towards Asia-Pacific is “Rising China”. US considers China as a biggest threat to its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Especially after the Chinese announcement of the Grand Strategy increased the tension in US and its allies. This chapter of the dissertation analyse the US-China relations in the Asia-Pacific region and how they both will tackle the mutual issues to make the region more peaceful.

5.1.2 Sino-US Relations: An Historical Analysis

US-China signed Wang Xia Treaty in 1844 (Nagashybayeva & Blarcom, 2010). Since then the relations between US.-China have undergone the process of development and they enjoyed this session for about one and half centuries. During this period the world was transforming greatly so for the US-China as well. US had developed itself as a strongest nation in the world, following the capitalized economic system. On the other hand, China transformed as one of the greatest Asian nation with socialist form of government. China did not stop there rather it is continuously making progress and has proved itself as the growing power which is playing important role in world affairs and threatening US interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Both US and China are playing important role in the Asia-Pacific region, as one is the strongest nation in world and other is the emerging power of Asia so their role cannot be replaced with any other nations.

If we analyse critically the relationship between US and China, either in term of political, economic or diplomatically, the era of cooperation is longer than the period of confrontation. Because cooperation and mutual benefits were the only way to secure their mutual interests, confrontation always halted their good relations and brought great loss to both countries. Scholars and analysts divided the relations between both countries into different phases and

eras. This section of the dissertation analyse their diplomatic, political and economic relations from Wang Xia treaty to Chinese announcement of Grand Strategy. Since the US was a major Western power and coerced the Chinese Qing to sign the unfair treaties, it benefited from the Wang Xia Treaty, which was signed between the US and China in 1984. Under Wang Xia Treaty US adopted different policies for China as compare to the policies adopted by the other Western Countries. For instance, US first did not use force to secure its interests and secondly, for a long time they followed the policy of cooperation towards China. Under the policy of cooperation US played the role of mediator between China and other Western countries which ultimately increased the Qing trust on US and gave strategic benefits to US.

Somehow the policy of cooperation played the base for Open Door policy. The intention of US non-military intervention and policy of cooperation towards China was to expend its sphere of influence in Chinese market and to protect China from the entire breakout by the foreign powers. But at that time US was not the sole super power, so had to share the benefits with the other great power to avoid the complete occupation of the Chinese land and market. To secure its economic interests in Chinese market, US had to struggle against both Japan and USSR. This confrontation between both Japan and US for establishing influence in Chinese market disturbed the existing international order in Far East. Not only the Qing government but till the beginning of 20th century, the goal of Chinese foreign policy was to secure China from the external threats and occupation. US was supporting China with all the possible ways, US treaty of Nine Power along with the Doctrine of Non-Recognition not only temporarily stopped Japan for further expansion but also opposed the Japanese act. As US did not went for the military action against Japan so it couldn't stop Japan invasion.

During 1937- 1949, US became major Chinese ally and got important place in Chinese foreign policy. During this period both US and China got important place in each other's strategies. But this honeymoon period ended soon after the broke out of the Cold War. US reshaped its

security and foreign policies for the Asia-Pacific but forgot about their interests in China. They supported only Nationalist government not the Communist Party of China and as a consequence, lost huge market and an important strategic partner like China. During this period China and USSR were on the same page, because of their ideological interest. This situation arose the concerns in US and tension for US policy makers. They then found Japan a strategic partner in Asia-Pacific region. But US had to pay the heavy price for this decision. Both states (US and China) suffered a lot as a consequence of adopting not an appropriate policies during Cold War.

In 1971 a drastic change came in to the Asian politics with the US – China rapprochement and China became more prominent and influential member of the Asia-Pacific region. From 1971 to 1980s China remained in the US camp and opposed the Soviet Union policies. China joined the US camp just to avoid the threats by Soviet Union. This period marked as the period of reconciliation and cooperation between both of them. After the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping adopted the policy of “open door” to revolutionize the Mao policy of “self-reliance”. The aim of this policy was to rebuild China’s economy which had been devastated by the Cultural Revolution. This policy changed the course of Chinese economy and opened the doors for China to expand its national strength. This policy pushed the bilateral relations between US and China. The period of honeymoon is also evident of many ups and downs, they both were enjoying good relations but still issues of conflict were existing there, for instance the Taiwan issue which later played a negative role in developing the relations between both US and China.

Despite the existence of the conflicts, they both were making progress in developing the bilateral relations in terms of economy, diplomacy, cultural exchange programmes and military differences. After the Cold War, the US emerged as the only superpower on the global arena, while the USSR began to fall apart. During the Cold War, the world was divided into two ideological groupings, each led by the US and the USSR. This former Cold War world order

along with the Tiananmen Incident and Taiwan crisis disturbed the US-China relations. After such crisis negative sentiments against China got new place in US, status of Most Favoured Nation to China also got effected, US changed its trade policies and shifted its policies towards strengthening the relations with other states in Asia-Pacific region especially towards Taiwan. As much as the US-China relations were getting weak, the Taiwan-US got strengthened. On the other hand, China started to make progress as a developing nation in the region which posed threats to US interests in Asia-Pacific and US considered Taiwan a measure to contain China.

Above mentioned factors are the basic reasons behind the decline of positive development between US and China's relations but it was impossible for both of them to go back to the pattern of Cold War, as it was a tool of history, now interdependence on each other and globalized world order, war is almost impossible. As for as US and China's relation is concerned, they both can't be spare as they are economically interdependent and security of Asia-Pacific region is somehow dependent on their bilateral relations. Their relations determine the regional order. So, conclusion from the historical events can be draw as; existence or escalation of conflict between both states would result only in loss, they both can't gain anything from conflicts, secondly security of the world especially Asia-Pacific region is somehow dependent on the mutual relationship of US and China but they can't force each other's to establish good relations and ignore the differences rather they can only achieve this target by mutual consciences. Economy can play an important role in developing their mutual relations which can develop the region as a whole.

The economy is one of the most important factor to consider when examining US-China relations because the US government and political elite have long placed a high priority on the Chinese market. Beside economy, other objectives of US foreign policy like security, political interests etc. played an important role too but they always superseded with the economic interests, even the treaty of Wang Xia between the US and China was also concerned more

about the trade relations of these two countries. There were about 34 articles of the particular treaty and from 34, 15 were about the trade and economy. After that treaty US was being offered the status of most favoured nation in China. According to the Wang Xia treaty, both US and China both agreed that if China later offer benefits to other nations, US shall have the rights to do so. US took the advantage of present situation and entered into the Chinese market after the Nanjing Treaty between China and Great Britain.

In 1843 US secretary of State Daniel Webster sent a congressman, Caleb Cushing to China to negotiate a treaty with the Qing, but Qing refused to allow Caleb to enter into Beijing, Cushing lost hope to negotiate and he was about to leave the Macao to go back to US but then Qing agreed with the all terms and conditions proposed by the US and gave more privileges to the US. During this visit, the major task Caleb was having to obtain the same position for American ships and businessman as Great Britain enjoyed before Opium War (David, 1979). This treaty showing that US was more concerned to obtain the same position in Chinese market as the other foreign countries were enjoying (Monroe).

After the treaty of Wang Xia, the trade between both US and China started to increase day by day, in 1847, Chinese labours known as coolies started to reach Cuba first and after the gold discovery in 1949 they reached California. Almost 100,000 Chinese arrived US within the first twenty years of gold rush to work as labours in mines, sugar plantations and on railroads. Grave demand and labours immigration to the US became an important factor of economic relations between these two countries. Chinese labours were most efficient and skilful, they worked hard in the development of the US, which can't be underestimated, and even they sacrificed their lives during the construction of railroads and working in mines. With the arrival of large number of Chinese labours in US, and reached on the point of initial success, US people including officials started to perceive Chinese as inferior. They started campaigns against Chinese labours and immigrants in the US. Ultimately these campaigns were used by the

political parties and as a result they started to place restrictions on the Chinese immigration. In 1875, 1882, 1888, and 1892 US congress signed different Bills against Chinese people and for prohibiting Chinese people to enter into the US (Zhongli & Renwei, 1996).

After the treaty of Wang Xia, both US and China were enjoying good trade relations but due to the political chaos, American Civil War and other such factors, their trade relations begun to decline. Labours were playing an important role in developing the trade relations between both countries so the restriction on the flow of labours played negative role in the healthy, bilateral relations. Later in 1890s, US made economic progress and developed rapidly, these developments lead towards strengthening the trade relations between US and China. About 50% of the total US exports went to the Chinese market which doubled the amount of US trade with China (Zhongli & Renwei, 1996). US exports were heavily dependent on the Chinese market, but the expansion of Chinese markets along with the western intentions to divide the Chinese market, posed threats to the US interests in China.

So again in 1890s, the focal point between US-China relations was the status of most favoured nation. This development showed that throughout the history, Chinese markets have been much important for US goods and interests. In 1898, US envoy to China emphasized “US has considerable interests in the Chinese markets so carving up china will ultimately eliminate our markets and Pacific Ocean has the potential to undertake more commercial changes as compare to the Atlantic Ocean” (Zhongli & Renwei, 1996). This development derived US towards the adoption of Open Door policy. The aim of Open Door doctrine was to get access to the Chinese markets first and then demanded for the fair trade with the each part of China. In the first note of Open Door Policy, secretary of State John Hay emphasized on the preserving interests of US citizens and wrote that interests of US citizens shall not be undermine by any other nation in the Chinese sphere of influence (Zhongli & Renwei, 1996). Even during the second note of Open Door policy, US again emphasized more on the protection of US interests in the Chinese

markets. Despite the Open Door policy, anti-foreign sentiments continued to rise among Chinese people which later on turned into the anti-American sentiments (Monroe). Nationalism started to begin in China and American businessmen and products were boycotted in the major cities of China. After the uprising Qing dynasty came to an end and Republic of China was established. 1900s were a great time of China's transition and participation into world affairs, when WW1 also broke out at the world stage.

China maintained neutrality in the first four years of war until the escalation of confrontation with Japan. As US-China trade increased with the start of twentieth century which in other words posed threat to Japanese status in the Chinese market because Japanese were enjoying the largest trade volume with China. US considered Japan as its biggest competitor and engaged itself to control the different markets of China like textile, construction of railways and railroads to compete with Japanese in China. Even when Japan issued document to Chinese government for territorial and trade privileges, Chinese accepted it but US did not as it was effecting the Open Door policy. This US policy did not stop there rather it continued to dominate the US policy towards China even before the WWII. So before WWII Chinese government was not posing threat to US interests in the Chinese market rather it was Japanese capital in the China. This development prompted the US to put pressure on Japan to give China the area it was claiming as its own part. But the US gave little thought to Chinese growth or interests when it came to its own national interests.

As the twentieth century begun with the good trade relations between US and China but soon they met with the opposition which ultimately lead to pass another Chinese Execution Bill from Congress and as a consequence American goods were boycotted by Chinese in all major cities of China which reduced half of the US shares in the Chinese market (Monroe). By facing different ups and downs US and China again entered into an agreement on currency reforms and US became the main supporter of Chinese currency. US had to adopted different strategies

to deal with different issues at once US was encountering opposition from Chinese people, on the other hand competition with Japanese goods in Chinese market and last but not least cooperation with Chinese government was also on the agenda of US policy makers. As it proved hard task for the policy makers but they tried to manage the situation well.

US policy makers and officials adopted both hard and soft power policies to tackle with the opposition from Chinese people, with the consciences of Japanese government they reached on the conclusion to divide the Chinese market accordingly and they also had to offer small benefit to Chinese government for cooperation in trade. So in the beginning of 1930 US had become the largest trading partner of China and this development derived the US-China alliance against Japan, US sided China during war against Japan. As US was the beneficiary of US-China trade relations and was providing material support to China during the WWII so there was a perception that US is supposed to dominate the Chinese market. During the WWII just like U.K, France, and Australia US also extended its support to China against Japan. They not only limited their relations with Japan by placing a complete embargo on it rather they supported China with loan and lend-lease assistance as well (Zhongli & Renwei, 1996).

Both US and China's economic relations were based on the strategic cooperation, because of such positive vibes US abolished all anti-Chinese Bills and signed new Sino-American treaty. After the end of WWII, USA and Soviet Union got involve into the Cold War, largely based on political and economic reasons. Cold War brought changes on the world stage as well as into the interests of the countries, medium of competition changed from politics to the economy and ideology. US changed its policies towards China, they started to focus more on the expansion of markets as compare to the cooperation as they found the relative change in the East Asian structure and realized it is the best time to occupy the Chinese market. During the Cold War the world was divided into two camps, one was leading by communist ideology and

the other by capitalist. US was a capitalist economy so was focusing more on Chinese economic policies, which should not go against the US interest.

US was not only concerned about the Chinese economic policies but about the commerce and finance as well. US had to deal with the two main challenges; first one was convince/drive China to make free trade policies as those were before the WWII and secondly China should grant the status of national treatment to US companies and most favoured nation status to US. Because of the political, economic and military support from the US, China was agreed to give the most favoured nation status plus unconditional support to US but in response, they were not getting the same treatment from US for Chinese goods and people. US was enjoying all the fruits which they actually thought at the time of signing the treaty of Wang Xia, they gained access to the Chinese market plus most favoured nation status even after the WWII. Because of the cooperative relations between both of them, US and China signed the treaty of Friendly Trade and Navigation in 1946 (Zhongli & Renwei, 1996), under this treaty they both decided to give the rights to each other and not to disturb the interests of other country in their markets.

This treaty was about giving equal rights to both countries in other's markets, but in practise it did not bring as much fair results as it was written on papers, it was granting more rights and securing more interests of US investors and traders in Chinese markets. US was supporting China not only in clashes with other countries but during Civil War as well and in return was getting benefits from the China, on the other hand Chinese leaders were only happy because of the US support, they did not focus on the term of the treaty and benefits to Chinese economy but when the nationalist government lost the Civil War, Chinese experienced the disappearance of the US investment from the Chinese market as it was never before. Even though, US played smartly and tried to get more from the treaty but in long term their policies were not successful as after Chinese Civil War, on the one side they lost the Chinese market and on the other they lost a strategic partner. Korean War also played negative role, after Korean War situation got

worst when US controls Chinese goods in US market and western countries imposed embargo on strategic goods of China through UNO.

The above mentioned policies were partially to close the Chinese market. This economic embargo brought great hurdle in Chinese development and China had to face the consequences for almost thirty years. And during this time period China was not able to interact with the outside markets and to fulfil the needs of Chinese people. Not only China did survive but the US as well, first US lost its strategic partner, secondly Chinese market; as US was enjoying the largest trading partner of China but this status lost after these crises. As Cold War brought different changes at the stage of world politics so same in the case of Asia-Pacific. Scholars and analysts started to state that next century would be the Pacific century, so US then had no choice but to expand its trade relations with Japan. US had to pay more and put greater efforts to maintain its position in the Pacific region and secure its national economic interests. To secure its interests US had to invest in Japan, they helped Japan to develop its market in the Asia-Pacific region. US not only invest in Japan but also transformed its market according to the Japanese needs and technology, they also asked Japan to take part in non-governmental trade with China.

At that time, US policy makers were divided into two groups, one were in favour of normalizing the trade relations with China as they considered Chinese market would help US economy to make progress and to share the burden of investment in Japanese market but the other group was anti of such suggestions as they believed that any kind of soft policy or normalizing the trade relations with China would be at the cost of containment policy. US interests were most important to US policy makers and officials so despite the opposition US policy makers suggested to resumption the trade relations between Japan and China but because of this policy initiated, they couldn't stop China from being an active actor of Asia-Pacific market. This

policy also raised question on US policy towards Asia-Pacific, as first they were putting restriction on China but later they derived Japan to restart the trade with China.

WWII in Asia-Pacific also started because of the Japanese desire to compete with the US and other western countries in the region. As Japan was not having sufficient natural resources of raw material, they were looking for external markets to create its dominance and fulfil their needs in the Asia-Pacific region. They found that western Pacific and Asia could be the best to fulfil their demands. Japan invaded China and in response they had to face the pressure from western countries including US to leave the Chinese market. But after WWII, US changed its policy towards Japan and offered the Chinese market to Japan just because to secure the ideological competition with the other great power (USSR). Following a few incidents in 1965, ties between the US and China began to improve, firstly, US congress passed the Immigration and Naturalization act which allowed more immigrants from Asia (Zhongli & Renwei, 1996). As a result the number of Chinese immigrants in US increased dramatically. Secondly, US halted the economy aid to Taiwan and the most important factor was Ping pong Diplomacy between US and China (Monroe).

Ping Pong were basically the Tennis teams of both US and China met in Japan first than China invited the US team to play in China. US team accepted this invitation and visited China. This invitation and visit gave the world a message that both countries want to normalize the relations between them. US president eased the restriction on trade with China and same happened from the Chinese side. But the turning point in the history of US-China friendly relations was Henry Kissinger and President Nixon's visit to China respectively. Nixon's visit to China served as dual purpose, it improved the political and economic relations between both of them along with the leverage against the United Soviet Socialist Republic. They also agreed on normalizing the diplomatic relations and as a consequence, US established United States Liaison Office in Beijing and Chinese office in Washington, DC.

Since the Ping Pong Diplomacy, the economic relations between US and China has been opened and couldn't close again. The friendly economic relations also brought positive political changes between two nations. In 1980 Deng Xiaoping gave the Open Door Policy and announced the economic and social reforms to improve the living standard of Chinese citizens. They also open China for foreign investment and allowed Chinese citizens to own businessmen. After this initiative, international companies rushed towards Chinese market to get more benefits from the new established market. To engage with the world community, China did not only opened its market to the international community but also joined the international organizations including International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank and World Bank etc. US-China economic cooperation along with the economic reforms led China towards the economic development. Their honeymoon period ended up with the Tiananmen Square incident, not only US but the international community condemned this incident too. As US was not only the champion of free market but democracy and guardian of human rights, so after this incident they had to imposed the sanctions on China which halted their trade relations.

After Tiananmen Square incident tension increased between US and China, their cooperative economic relations turned into interdependence. They were interdependent but not enjoying the supportive relations because of the change in world politics and domestic circumstances. The world began to consider a new Cold War between these two nations because they believed that in order to protect its interests, the US would restrain China because of the threat that China's rapid economic expansion posed to those of the US. During this time period their relationship was based on the mistrust and lack of confidence on each other's intentions which effected the trade relations ultimately. For instance, When Taiwan's president visited US in 1995, China cancelled a number of agreements with US along with the US concerns about the

human rights issues in China plus China's approach to Nuclear Non-Proliferation also effected their trade relations.

Despite the escalation of tension between both of them, they were bound to take the measure to normalize their relations as their economies were interdependent on each other's. China wanted to preserve the most favoured nation status in US along with their interests in US market. To secure these interests China had to give concessions to US in many strategic goods like weapons and other trade goods etc. Trade played an important role between their relations, it prevented the escalation of conflicts and paved the way for the cooperation. Despite all the issues, they both never wanted to break their relations. Because of the economic development, world started to consider China as a great regional power, it started to influence the regional order so hostile relations with China would ultimately destabilize the regional order which was against the interests of both US and China, so they put aside their differences and mutual distrust issues and chosen to improve their relations.

Trump administration brought new shift in US-China trade relations, their slogan was "Make America Great Again" (staff, 2015). Trump's trade policy was focusing more on the importance of the trade balances, currency manipulation for gaining the unfair trade advantage, and last but not the least was about the disastrous trade agreements (Noland, 2018). As the consequences of the above mentioned priority, US started to renegotiate the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement) and withdrawal from the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) (Noland, 2018). President Trump also criticized the major trading partners including China for practicing unfair trade and increased the US trade deficit. As a result of the above mentioned policies, US president not only opposed the status of market economy to China but also countervailing duties on Chinese imports at WTO (World Trade Organization) (Lawder, 2017).

They also blamed Chinese government for influencing the Chinese economy. Under Trump administration, US not only imposed tariffs on Chinese exports but on imports too. Trump administration adopted more policies against the Chinese imports as they imposed restriction on Chinese goods to consider it as a national security issue.

In response to the Trump's trade policies, China also imposed heavy trade tariffs on US goods in the Chinese markets. China did not avoid even a single chance to retaliate over US policies, they adopted the tit for tat policy against US. These policies escalate the tension between both of them and world started to perceive another "trade war" which will not only effect their relations but the other states as well. China did adopt the policy to counter US strategies but with different measures as their intention was not only to counter US policies but to "Make China Great Again". As compare to the US policies of withdrawal from the world responsibilities China adopted the policies of connectivity with the world and regional states, "One Belt One Road" initiative is the best example.

5.1.3 Security Issues

5.1.3.1 The US-China-Taiwan issue

In 1949 Peoples Republic of China (PRC) came in to power and established its government. But after establishment both US and China did not enjoy good relations for a long period of time. US was expecting that China will support US against communist Soviet Union in Asia pacific region but that was just a story of past and they both met with conflict in Korea and Vietnam War. But almost after 30 years of establishment, both US and China established diplomatic relations (Chai, 2010). In Feb 1972 President Nixon visited China and both countries decided to have cooperation in different fields like security, trade etc. The formulation of "Shanghai Communique" was actually an acceptance that they both faced a lot of problems to enter in a new phase of friendly relations (Chai, 2010). After this shift they both

realized that the actual problem in the normalizing relations was not the difference in ideology or rather that was Taiwan issue.

The main issue between Peoples Republic China (PRC) and Republic of China (ROC) is that China considered Taiwan as a Chinese part and claims that there is only one China which is PRC. On the other hand Taiwan has a sovereign legitimate government. US is having diplomatic relations with both Peoples Republic of China and Republic of China. So the issue of Taiwan has become on the most dangerous issue in current international relations. And this issue can lead both great powers towards conflict. From US stance, Taiwan has a legitimate government and enough territory to remain as a sovereign state. Economically it is a strong state and has higher level of per capita income along with the democratic political system, so Taiwan has no need to live under or merge in a communist China. At the same time China has a large territory, one of the biggest economic power. So China too don't have any need to control over Taiwan (Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, 2011).

China, meanwhile, views the situation from a different angle. They view this issue differently than Taiwan would; rather, they see it as a part of their history and as lost territory that major powers controlled when at war with China. They claim that throughout the history different great powers attacked and occupied some territory of China. They claimed that since the first Opium War to the foundation of PRC, different powers had conflict with China and as the consequences of losing wars China had to sign treaties forcefully. As a result of these treaties China lost different parts like Macau to Portugal, Hong Kong to United Kingdom and territory from Northern China to Russia. They have the view that China has world's longest civilization and this nation also have the capacity to reunite themselves because when they lost their territory they were not united internally because of the foreign invasion (Lai, The United States and China in Power Transition, 2011).

After came into power the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has three main national goals to achieve; modernization of economy, protection of global peace and the most important is to get back their stolen parts. They followed these goals especially “get back” stolen parts, they got their parts back successfully from different states like Hong Kong from United Kingdom, and Macau from Portugal in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Now they left only with the unification of Taiwan, and without getting it back they can’t write a good history. In 2001 China signed a treaty with Russia, called as “Good Neighbors and Friendly Cooperation” to solve border disputes. Under this treaty China gave some area to Russia and did not get anything in return, they enhanced economic and trade relations with Russia too. And China’s aim to sign treaty, surrender some area and established strong relations is just to have good relations with Russia so that if China face any conflict with Taiwan and US, it should not have any heat from Russian side.

5.1.3.1.1 Political Perspective

Before the establishment of PRC, The government of Taiwan was an enemy of CCP. And as result of their conflict, Civil War broke out. They fought for the legitimate representation of China. In 1979 US established diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan stopped Civil War in 1990s. But Taiwan transition to democracy and initiatives of independent movements were two biggest threats to PRC by ROC. As a consequences of such events pro-independence forces of Taiwan came on the surface as many of them were disagree with the current political system. In 2002 and 2004 presidential elections, Democratic Progress Part (DPP) won and challenged China. They also took many offensive steps for unification under President Chen Shui Bian (Chai, 2010). These steps highlights the Taiwan issue at the world stage.

5.1.3.2 The Sino-US conflict over Exclusive Economic Zone

China claim over Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is another area of conflict between two great powers. The conflict between the two governments and the military activities by the US near China's claimed EEZ have complicated the situation in the western Pacific. Another development of power transition between US and China made this issue more litigious.

5.2 Great Power Competition in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is one of the most significant zone in Asia pacific, it is situated at the junction of both Indian and Pacific Ocean (Schaller, 1979). These two oceans have very important sea routes for trade like Strait of Malacca is also situated here which is important not only for Japan but for South Korea, China and others countries too. Different scholars have different perspectives about this region either in near future it will be an area of conflict or cooperation. But Nicholas J.Spyman described this region as a main area of conflict for great powers. As it has 10 states and about 600 million individuals, its land stretches across 4.6 million square kilometers and economy of 1.5 trillion GDP. Not only this it also covers vast ocean stretch over 7.5 million square kilometers (Spykman, 1944).

During the Cold War era Southeast Asian states developed not only politically but economically too. Politically they adopted democratic model of politics and for economy they went for open market and made remarkable developments. For US interests it was necessary to have ties with the Southeast Asian states and US did sign treaties with them. Now there are some other developments in the region like rise of extremism, terrorism and emergence of China as a great dominant power in the region which is challenging US interests. So in this situation US will have to remain in ties with its allies in the region. Southeast Asia is not only important for US but for China too.

Chinese officials will need to change some of their foreign relations strategies that they have been unable to implement up to now due to their dependence on other countries in Southeast Asia. The most important issue with China is their refusal to accept ideology as a biggest hurdle in relationship with other countries. Most of the Southeast Asian countries have moved towards the democratic model of politics. So they don't have political understanding with Chinese model especially when it comes to human rights, rule of law and governance. This is may be not a big issue for few scholars but according to social constructivist common values brought common interests. For them, those states who have shared values, culture, ideology, cooperate with each other's and enjoy friendly relations as compare to those who don't have shared values. So cooperation based on common interests and at the end of the day states shared common values always bind true friends together.

Second biggest issue is Chinese expanding nature. They don't believe that they have enough power to become a region power. They want to achieve more and for this purpose they are making alliances (Tyler, 2000). On the other hand small states in the region consider it as a biggest threat and they are adopting the same policies as small or weak states in the past have been adopted. This situation is known as Balance of Power (BOP). Balance of Power is basically absence of a dominant power. Power Relations According to theory, weak states seek alliances with other strong powers or form strong bonds with one another in order to become as powerful as the powerful state is when it tries to dominate them. So states in the region adopted the same policy and making alliances with the outside great powers like US or they are tying knot with ASEAN. In other words weak states in Southeast Asia don't want to be a direct part of great powers competition in the region (Goh, Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies, 2008). They want to remain neutral and getting benefits from the Sino-US rivalry in the region.

5.2.1 South China Sea dispute

China don't accept the others states' rights over South China Sea Island. They claim that these island have been stolen from China during different conflicts and wars with China by great powers. China have the policy to "get back". They adopted this policy as a core value of their foreign policy. Under this policy they claim that they will get back their "stolen" territories from other states. They also accept that they have and will get that much power to get back their territory without any hurdle.

5.2.1.1 Status of Disputed Islands

- Spratly Island: this is a dispute among Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippine, Brunei, Malaysia and China.
- Paracel Island: they are under control of China but Vietnam claim it as dispute.
- Pratas Island: they are under the control of Taiwan but it is disputed by China.
- Macclesfield Band: it is a dispute among Taiwan, Philippines and Chinese authorities.
- The Scarborough Shoal: it is again a dispute among China, Taiwan and Philippine.

5.2.1.2 China's Claim

Since the creation of PRC, China is trying to get back its stole parts from different states. They signed treaties to resolve border disputes between China and other neighboring countries. But still China have unresolved territories issue and most important of them are Chinese claim over different islands of South China Sea. China tried their best to get back and for this purpose they even had to face serious conflictual situation with other disputants. In 1974 China had dispute with Vietnam and as a result they got very important location of Paracel Island from Vietnam. Not only this they again deployed forces against Vietnam in 1988 for Spratly Island. Philippine is also one of the victim with which China had conflicts over island issues. US have alliances

with different states in Southeast Asia because of its own interests. For saving her own and alliances interests US has different stance as compare to China on island disputes. China has concerns over US stance. They argued that, it was a regional issue but US publicized it at San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951.

China also claim that during Vietnam War US openly used South China Sea for the transportation of troops, sea and air space for attacking Vietnam, which was not a legal act. After Sino-US rapprochement in 1972, US reconciled with the disputes. During that period of time China had operations against Vietnam: in 1974 China-Vietnam naval clashes over Paracel Island, in 1979 China- Vietnam border conflict, and in 1988 China- Vietnam naval clashes over Spratly Island but the most important thing during these disputes was, US did not react against China or in favor of any state. But again in 1994 USA took stand against PLA conflict with Philippine (Lai, Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessmen, 2013). They also signed defense treaty with Philippines. And China got frustrated because of this treaty. Because for them this treaty would enhance Philippines claim over South China Sea.

Even though US openly declared that it has a neutral stance over South China Sea disputes because it is a regional dispute between regional states, still China claimed that US don't have any intentions to remain neutral or rather US directly support the disputants of Southeast Asia. China is making progress not economically but military too. This Chinese progress is increasing concerns of US and its allies over Chinese status. Some anti-Chinese in America forced president Obama to follow proactive approach in the affairs of Southeast Asia. Regional states and few in USA emphasized that US should revise its policy towards China because its military modernization is not only threatening regional states but will also be a hurdle in the way of US freedom in Southeast Asia.

5.2.2 East China Sea Disputes

Northeast Asia is one of the most important region of the world because world five powerful states like USA, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea are the part of this region. China, Japan and USA are the world's biggest economies. China, US and Russia are having the largest defense forces. Not only this, this region is politically important too. Its political significance can be analyze by the political system in the region as China is having authoritarian rule, Japan, South Korea and US are enjoying democratic style of government and Russia is a blend of both authoritarian and democracy. The main issue of this region is the territorial disputes, especially Japan disputes with South Korea, Russia and most important is with China. On the other hand US is a great power and a major stake holder in this region. So US presence in this region made this issue more complicated.

5.2.2.1 Sino Japan Dispute

In East China Sea, China is facing a great challenge because major issue of Northeast Asia is the Maritime boundary dispute between China and Japan. On the other hand Japan has signed treaties with US, so China has to deal with the two great powers because of defense pact between US and Japan. Between China and Japan there are basically two interlinked conflicts and one of them can't be resolved without resolving other. First dispute is over Sankaku/Diaoyu Island in East China Sea, this is a chain of eight small islands, located 120 nautical miles away from northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles from south west of Okinawa and 200 nautical miles away from east of China and covers the areas of only 7 square kilometers.

East China Sea is rich in fossil deposits and because of these there is a conflict between China and Japan, the ownership of these island will increase their undersea natural resources. Both countries (China and Japan) have political reasons too to fight for these islands. First one is their unresolved historical territorial disputes, and for this they both are facing threats even till

today and these issues can lead towards a full fledged war between them and the second one is obviously their uncertain future, without resolving these disputes they both can't make progress and enjoy peaceful rise or relations with neighboring countries. On Chinese side, China will have to face retaliation not only from Japan but from US too, as US is committed to help Japan in any conflict under the treaty of defense with Japan.

5.2.2.2 China's Stance

According to the Chinese perspective from centuries they discovered these land and used for navigational purpose. They claim that the issue of Sankaku/Diaoyu island is not a matter of discussion or it is unquestionable because it is a part of China as Chinese fisherman were used to go this area for fishing purpose and during their journey of Ryukyu island to United Kingdom, Chinese emissaries were used to stop here. Chinese also claim that these islands are an extensive part of Chinese continental shelf, and are included in "Potsdam Proclamation and Cairo Declaration" and Japan stole them under the treaty of "Shimonoseki", so they should be given back to China.

China also condemned US policies for these islands, they claim that it was US who included these island in trusteeship and respectively in 1951 and 1972 handed over these islands to the Japan. China claim that they are following the policy of good relations with all states and put their disputes on holds but they will charge Japan if it take any advantage from Chinese policy. Along with this it argues that Chinese continental shelf end at Okinawa through.

5.2.2.3 Japan's Stance

Japan agreed that China is absolutely right in their claim that historically these islands were a part of China but they also argues that China don't have any physical connection with these islands and even in history they did not control it very well and since 1972 these islands are official parts of Japan. And they also have the view that they got this land through a combine

decision and at that time any country did not claim their rights over that. US on the other hand have their own view point that US is and will remain neutral because it a regional disputes between two powers in the region, so they should solve their disputes peacefully. But if they both met in any conflict and use the force to settle their dispute then as a great power US has the responsibility to enter this conflict and will support Japan because they have signed mutual defence pact.

5.2.2.4 Sino-Japan EEZ Dispute

Dispute over exclusive economic zone is another bone of contention between two great powers. The main issue is the hostile military activities in China claimed EEZ. Additionally, both nations' actions are the cause of the conflict, or rather the hostile conflict, in the western Pacific region. China and Japan are maritime neighbours and having eastern coastal line of China from its Fujian province to the Shanghai and lies towards east is the chain of Japanese Ryukyu Island. For a long period of time there was no demarcation of boundary between them but after the establishment of UNCLOS, both China and Japan demanded the demarcation of boundaries in the sea. Chinese claim that UNCLOS has established 200nm between the territorial water and high seas, China also holds that “freedom of navigation and over-flight in the EEZ have certain restrictions, as the activities must be peaceful and nonthreatening to the coastal nations. China charges that US military surveillance ships and reconnaissance flights in the Chinese-claimed EEZ have hostile intent against China and therefore do not fall in the scope of peaceful and innocent passage. China has repeatedly asked the United States to reduce this activity and eventually put a stop to it. In 1998 China claimed 200 nautical miles along with Chinese coastal line which included its offshore island with its coastal shelf act and EEZ in response to the Japanese declaration of 200 nautical miles EEZ through its own laws about continental shelf and EEZ. They both have overlapped claim over EEZ and this claim laid both countries to the

conflictual relations and because of these relations they both could not get benefit from the natural resources of disputed waters.

5.3 US Grand Strategy: Sustain the Hegemonic Status

US became the only superpower following the end of the Cold War, and it has since promoted a global order based on principles such as democracy and market capitalism (Alagappa, 2003). Different theories of international relations try to explain the US status through their perspective and most of them explain that the world order led by US is not only supporting US but the other states too as most of the theories are given by the US scholars. After the end of unipolar, US adopted the GS to extend the US dominance, US also use the international institutions to promote US values, and they also use these institutions against the potential threats to US interests plus the rise of great power challengers (Mastanduno, 1997). Europe and Asia are the most important regions for sustaining the US status of global power that's why these regions occupy special place in US Grand Strategy. In EU, US invested on the maintenance of NATO while in Asia, establishing and maintaining good relations with the regional states like Japan, Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and India etc. is the main objective of the US (Alagappa, 2003).

After the demise of USSR and became the sole super power, all the US presidents are trying hard to maintain the status of "Hegemon". Their philosophies mirror their goals as the current president of the United States, Donald Trump is having the policy of "America first", since the end of the Cold War he is the first president who talks about the cost and burden rather than benefits for US because of this hegemonic status. His "America First" policy doesn't emphasize on maintaining the US super power status, he seems like to shift the current world order to a "Post American World" where US would not be a super power (Zakaria, 2017) But at the

moment it is not clear yet that what would be the US policy, Trump would actually change its current Grand Strategy and status of the US or not.

5.4 China in Asia Pacific and English School

China's GS correlates with the English school of International Relations as China is not having a doctrine of liberal hegemony rather their foreign policy does not exactly is as realist or idealist explains the world politics. China's objectives of GS are much related with the ES explanation of world politics, as it is a via-media between realism, liberalism and the extreme of balance of power. West China's GS as a projection of realpolitik as it has been described by the Machiavelli but this dissertation analyse the China's GS through a different perspective of English School because many themes of ES are relating with the current China's GS. The core concept of ES is "international society" which Bull defined as a community of independent states/political communities followed common rules under the international institutions (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 2012).

Both the ES and China considers states are the primary actor to maintain the international order. Bull considers states as the principle institution of international society/society of states (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 2012). Bull argues by making the difference between formal and actual sovereignty that for him, sovereign states are independent both in their internal and external affairs (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 2012). China's foreign policy is based on the five principles of coexistence and respect for each other sovereignty and territorial integrity is the first principle of Chinese peaceful coexistence doctrine (Stokes, 2019). Not only the state centric approach, Bull identifies that there are five institutions of international society like balance of power, great powers, international law, diplomacy and war which actually plays an important role in maintaining the international order.

Bull explains the concept of balance of power through the definition given by Emer de Vattel “balance of power is the state of affairs in which there is no dominant power which can suppress the law of other/weak states” (Bull H. , The Anarchical Society, 2012). He also added that general balance of power system stop a state to become a hegemon or a universal power. China also in favour of balance of power as they don’t want to be a hegemon rather wants to secure their interests and maintain the regional order through cooperation with the other regional states in Asia-Pacific. ES considers diplomacy as their third biggest institutions through which they suggest to communicate at international level and sort out the problems without the escalation of conflict. China is establishing bilateral and trilateral relations with the regional states to make the region more peaceful and stable. China’s “Friendly Neighbour/Good Neighbourly” policy, establishment, development and participation in the new regional institutions such as SCO, ASEAN, and AIIB etc. are the examples of China’s intension to maintain the peaceful regional order, where all the states remain and act as an independent political community.

ES claims that international law plays an important role in maintaining the existing international order. China also admitted that for the stability of Asia-Pacific region, states should follow the international law. They do agree that rules of international law must be formulated after the consent of all states. Next institution of ES which grab the attention of the world’s scholars is the role of the great powers. China also considers the role of the great powers and even claims that as a great power its China’s responsibility to maintain the regional order and create balance among the regional states. And last but not the least institution to explain the international society by the Hadley Bull is the war.

War has been an important tool in the history, Chinese perception about the war is as same as the rest of the countries. During the European international society, China has remained a victim and did not get anything constructive from war. As war has been destructive all the time but still as per Grotain concept, war can play the role in maintaining the justice as well:

“Peace in the norm and war is the violation or exception; peace is logically prior to the war and war is the necessary evil, to be minimized as far as possible. War is necessary element because it is the only means of justice when there is no political superior” (Wight, Wight, & Porter, International Theory: The Three Traditions, 1992). China also have intensify cooperation in border areas, cooperation on maritime security, participated in UN peacekeeping mission, international counter terrorism cooperation, and conduct relevant joint exercise and training with the other regional countries to maintain the peace in Asia-Pacific and avoid war but if necessary they would use this institution to maintain the international order.

5.5 China’s Policies to Counter US in the Asia-Pacific

China is much aware of the US presence and capabilities to intervene in the Asia-Pacific region and especially in the areas which they considered as the most crucial to secure interests and to achieve the objectives of their Grand Strategy. This awareness made China more conscious about their security and they adopted GS, under which they are spending more on PLA to enhance their capabilities and counter or complicate the US intervention if the conflict escalate. Chinese military plans like Anti Access and Area Denial A2/AD is not the only strategy to counter the US in the region rather other policies like operational space in the Asia-Pacific region, freedom of action and most importantly pre-emptive strike to destroy the US influence are all included in Chinese GS (Bergerson, 2016).

Book published by the PLA Academy of Military Science, stated that “war is not just about the competition of military forces of two or more than two states rather it basically involves all the forces like political, economic, diplomatic etc. Because factors like economic, political, cultural, diplomatic etc. are interlinked with the military operations and no military force can only achieve their target without the help of these factors” (MING, 2005). David Berteau and Michael stated that “China is not only adopting the military strategies like A2/AD to counter

US presence in the region but they are also using economic, diplomatic and other non-traditional sources against the US and other weaker regional states just to create complications for US to intervene in any regional conflict such as Taiwan and South China issue or any other conflict which can create hurdles against China” (Bergerson, 2016). Mr. Berteau and Green also stated that China just want to weak the US in the Asia-Pacific region and for this matter they are using trade and diplomacy as an instrument (U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region:An Independent Assessment, 2012).

English School of international relations analyse the world politics differently as compare to the realist or liberalist perspective that’s why it is known as the middle way or via media between them. As it has been discussed earlier that English School presented by the Hedley Bull has five main institution on which he believes that international order is based on or states should behave accordingly to maintain the international order. Regarding China's policies against the United States in the Asia-Pacific, China is adopting the same policies as devised by the ES to counter the US, protecting Chinese interest and maintaining regional order. They are enhancing their military and economic capabilities as suggested by the war and balance of power institutions of ES to counter the US in the Asia-Pacific region. China is adopting these policies not only to counter the US but to maintain the regional order.

5.6 Conclusion

After China’s rise as a great power and later on announcement of Chinese Grand Strategy create suspension about Chinese behaviour in Asia-Pacific, especially when US and Chinese interests are contradicting with each other’s in the region. China under its Grand Strategy is investing more on enhancing Chinese military, economic and political capabilities to secure Chinese interests, countering/avoid the conflicts with the US and maintain the regional order as well. China as a regional power considers that the maintaining and development of the regional states

is the responsibilities of China. China's moves under Grand Strategy clearly indicates that China not only focusing in the regional development and stability rather countering US to secure Chinese interests is also one of the objective Chinese policies in the Asia-Pacific region.

Chapter Six

CHINA'S GRAND STRATEGY IN ASIA-PACIFIC: A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

The world has become increasingly aware of the enormous changes taking place in Asia-Pacific regional order, especially in the wake of China's emergence as one of the region's most significant and powerful developing powers. China made progress not only economically but militarily and diplomatically too, in terms of economy, China overtook the Japanese economy and became second largest economy at the world stage after US. China is not the only power which is making progress in the Asia-Pacific region rather the region is getting more attention because of the active role of other regional states too. Asia-Pacific is facing the transitional period, as the politics in the region is facing dramatic change, so it raises the concerns and question that how regional actors will behave towards the China's rise and it's Grand Strategy in the Asia-Pacific region? What regional order China is proposing for the stability and peace of the region? And what expected regional order would be in the coming years? To answer these question, this Chapter will have an overview of the proposed Chinese Grand strategy with its focus on the goals to achieve in Asia-Pacific region along with the regional states reaction towards China's rise, its Grand Strategy and New Regional Order.

Different techniques can be used to carry out China's grand strategy for the Asia-Pacific states, but it is not as simple as it might seem given the regional governments' misgivings about Chinese objectives. Through Chinese GS, it is also difficult to coordinate with regional nations and China. Despite their worries, all of the states in the region are backing Chinese GS because they believe Chinese projects can satisfy their infrastructure demands as well as other security and economic requirements. China is attempting to coordinate with the regional states through

bilateral and international mechanisms. States are expressing strategic and security concerns despite having less reservations about OBOR. China is attempting to downplay the strategic ramifications of its economic efforts, but the majority of Asia-Pacific nations see them as a weapon to increase China's influence in the region. As a result, they must be prepared to take action if China threatens their regional interests. On the other hand, countries that share a dispute in the South China Sea with China are wary of relying too much on Chinese-proposed economic initiatives. The US, India, and Japan are expressing their reservations about China's grand plan, which has not only caused conflict among regional governments but also among the region's main powers. Other powerful nations, like the US, are providing alternative options to the regional states so they may meet their needs and avoid falling under Chinese hegemony.

6.1 Overview of Chinese Grand Strategy

There are two main objectives of Chinese Grand Strategy, to become a well moderate society plus a complete developed nation till 1949. Even though China is world's second largest economy but still it is consider as a developing nation not the develop one because of its low GDP per capita. So, economy is the top priority of Chinese Grand Strategy and to achieve this strategy, a peaceful Asia-Pacific along with the international markets is in the interests of China. For a peaceful regional order, China's relations with neighboring countries play an important role. China on the other hand is committed to work for maintaining the peaceful regional order by collaborating with the regional states. And to achieve this goal China is even managing its regional disputes with the neighboring states by using diplomacy and economy as a tool to resolve the bilateral and multilateral issues between them.

China is also interested in replacing the existing regional order with the cooperation and friendly relations between the major actors. On the basis of English School, it can be predicted

that China is going to play a more active role is reshaping the regional order to make it more prosperous and developed one.

6.1.1 National Rejuvenation

Since the Chinese modernization, China has a dream of National Rejuvenation (Jinping X. , 2013). Especially the success of Chinese Open Door Policies by Deng, made the dream of Chinese wish (national rejuvenation) more achievable. Chinese president Xi Jinping attended the foreign delegates meeting at New Economy Forum and said that achieving the Chinese dream of rejuvenation, does not mean that China want to be a hegemonic power (Xi, 2019).

6.1.2 Peaceful Development

China's rise and its military modernization created anxiety in the regional states, they were not sure about the Chinese intentions but China with the other regional states worked hard to manage their disputes peacefully. And still negotiating the code of conduct for developing their economic cooperation (Beeson, 2016). As in the history powerful states were used to settle their disputes and divergent issues aggressively so the regional states perceived China's rise a great threat to their interests in the region. But China on the other hand is committed to maintain the peaceful and stable regional order and claims that China doesn't have any such intentions to dominate the region or to resolve the regional issues aggressively. China gave the policy of "Peaceful Rise" under its Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific. Peaceful rise mean China will not challenge the US dominance or current regional order. China will not adopt the process of power transition as it has been adopted by the other great power in the past.

China is getting more benefit from the policy of peaceful rise undoubtedly but the biggest hurdle China is facing while adopting this policy is China's relations with neighboring and great powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, even though the regional order is currently tranquil, China's emergence as a great power in the region would inevitably lead to changes in

it, so Chinese relations with the other regional actors especially how China will handle its relations with US is of great importance. To avoid the confrontation and manage the regional order peacefully, China proposed a new model of relationship which is different from the historical model of clashes and confrontations (Jinping X. , Ministry of foreign Affairs of People's republic of China, 2016). China on the one hand is proposing the new model but mutual trust between the states is playing important role on the other hand, so only policies like peaceful rise can't manage the regional issues but the narrowing the trust gap can. To build the trust between the states, economic, diplomatic, political, cultural and military relations have been established and playing an important role in managing their relations and conflicts (Zhao, 2015). China's economic position in the region is playing most important role to managing their disputes and establishing the most harmonious and peaceful regional order. China is the largest economic market in the region along with the important source of FDI for its neighboring countries. China signed different free trade agreements with its neighboring countries like China-Japan-Korea FTA, China-Australia FTA, China-Pakistan FTA, China-New-Zealand FTA etc. For a peaceful, harmonious regional order China is not only engaging the region through economic agreements rather it is using the other forums as well like SCO, China-Japan-Korea summit etc. along with the good diplomacy to resolve the conflicts with the neighboring countries (Jinping X. , QIUSHI, 2013).

6.1.3 China's Constructive Role

World politics is changing rapidly, economic relations and active conflict among nations demanding for the new institution or reforms in the existing international institution according to the current scenario. China as a great emerging power should also have a great say and active role in establishing the new norms or institution at the world stage in general and at regional level in particular. As a regional power China came up with the new model of cooperation and put more contribution to make the region more peaceful and harmonious. BRI is one of the best

example to understand Chinese model of cooperation and connectivity. Silk Road Fund and the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Bank are the other examples of the Chinese awareness of making BRI more active and beneficiary for the regional states. BRI is one of the Chinese model of win-win situation for all the states not only in the region but it includes the world in large. But BRI is not the only initiative taken by China to narrow the gap and promote connectivity at the world stage rather it also plays an important role in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the G20, association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) to promote the harmonious regional order and narrowing the trust gap between the states. China is working hard to for defending the positive trends and keep its economy on the right track to make the region more stable (Garrett, 2010).

6.2 US Response to Chinese Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific

China emerged as a great economic power at the stage of Asia-Pacific region which on the one side helping the regional states to improve their economic conditions and to make the region more peaceful and stable but on the other sides regional states showed their concerns regarding Chinese intentions, so China's progress is threatening the regional states including the great powers in the region. Asia-Pacific powers/states respond differently and adopting different policies to counter China in Asia-Pacific region especially after the Chinese announcement of CPEC/OBOR and defense policies. Powers in Asia-Pacific try to make their defense stronger along with the diplomatic approach to balance China and secure their national interests. US is also one of the biggest stake holder in the region and enjoying the status of hegemonic power at the world stage, so Chinese GS also created anxiety in the US as well. US policy makers and officials are much concerned about Chinese intentions in the region.

US respond to Chinese GS in the Asia-Pacific region by adopting the diplomatic means, strengthening its military capabilities and by making the relations with its allies more strong.

These US policies for the region, ignored the geo-economics condition of the region and US policy to encounter through military means enhanced the security threats in the region. So to maintain its dominant position in the world in general and Asia-Pacific in particular, US will have to more focus on the economy, the way China is doing through OBOR to connect the region and world which ultimately helping China to become more powerful and getting the status of rising power in the Asia-Pacific region. China's aim is to connect the Eurasia via BRI, and as a result expecting to have a stabilize western periphery, gain more influence in the region, proposed a new model of connectivity different from the western proposed model and linked its economy with other regional states. How successful China's GS would be is the question of investigation but the most important question here is how US respond to Chinese GS and what strategies US is adopting to maintain its dominant status in the region?

China's naval spending is one of the most important factor which derived the world attention especially the US. China's naval spending increased the geostrategic value of the region as in response to such policies US is spending more on defense to secure its national and the alliance's interests in the Asia-Pacific region. China is spending more in East Asia and to secure its interests in the South China Sea, is another factor which got the world attention. China changed its maritime strategy just to counter or in response of US interests in the South China Sea (Cavanna, 2018). China is spending either on military or developing the peaceful diplomatic relations with the regional states is to secure its economic interests and got more influence in the region through economic strategies. China is posing threats to the US hegemonic status, after the End of Cold War and disintegration of USSR, US faced another challenge on the name of GWOT (Global War on Terror) in Middle East and Afghanistan, as a consequence of the War, US lost its resources and ability to tackle the deep-rooted challenges (Cavanna, 2018). But this time China is challenging US status in the Eurasia and appeared as

a new competitor in the Asia-Pacific region and the biggest challenge for US policymakers is to handle this situation peacefully and turn the benefits towards the US and its alliances.

To fulfill its energy needs, China is working on maintaining the bilateral and multilateral relations with the Middle Eastern countries. But good relations with Iran are at the top priority of China. Both Iran and China enjoying good relations since decades as they both have the common interest against the western dominance in the region. As Iran is rich in gas and oil reserves so it can help China to resist the US attack on its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). In 2015, Iran signed the nuclear deal which as a result minimized the risk of a new regional war in the Middle East but this deal could not normalize the relations and repair the legacy of rivalry between the Tehran and Washington. But on the other hand China took advantage of this deal and not only increased its oil and gas imports from Iran but invited Iran to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as well. China is also utilizing the Iran roots to trade with the other regional states.

Global War on Terror increased US stack in the South Asian region. US established military to military relations with the regional states on the one hand and build strategic partnership with India and other regional alliances on the other. To create its hegemony and increased influence in the South Asian region US tried to build the Silk Road between South Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. US was adopting such policies to counter the China and other such competitor in the South Asian region. In response to such policies China adopted the GS to extend its influence in the South Asian region. China- Pakistan Economic Corridor is one of the best example of Chinese policies of connectivity, securing its interests and create its dominance in the region. Such policies of China, threatened the US dominant status in the region which alarmed the situation in Washington and US in response upgraded its relations with the regional powers like Australia, Japan and India put the strategy of “helping the South Asian states to maintain their freedom against the Chinese sphere of influence” at the top

priority (Cavanna, 2018). US policies are mainly focused on the military based while China is focusing more economically and they are increasing their influence on Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and other regional states by utilizing economy as a mean to achieve their national interests. Both US and its allies think that China's Grand strategy is posing threats to US interests in the Asia-Pacific region and to counter the Chinese policies, US will have to play more active role and should utilize the economic means as compare to the spending more on military.

6.3 China's Grand Strategy in Asia-Pacific: Japanese Perspective

Japan is one of the most important actor in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years observers noticed two big developments in the Japanese foreign policy, first they are fighting with the challenges posed by the Chin's rise and secondly they are continuously changing their security policies according to the regional order. Despite the dispute over Senkaku Island, Japan has managed to balance its relations with China. What diplomacy Japan is having and how they perceived the Chinese influence in the region can only be analyzed by exploring the historical relations between Japan and China and the way Japan managed balance between both US and China.

6.3.1 Historical Evaluation of Sino-Japanese Relations

Before Cold War Japan was enjoying good political and economic relations with the mainland China but this period end soon after the Japanese recognition of the Republic of China, Japan not only recognized the new government there but established the cooperative relations as well. This tension was not a permanent between both of the states, it just only made small distance between both of them, but they both focused more on the cooperation then on conflicts, and in the early years of Cold War they both were enjoying good relations. Japan and China even managed their partial trade and humanitarian cooperation during the time of full embargo of

China by US. On the other hand, Vietnam War and Sino-Soviet border dispute brought US and China together as their interests were same, and then Kissinger visit to China in 1971 was another step towards Sino-US rapprochement which created anxiety in Japan, as Japanese ambassador in US a long ago stated that “normalization of relations between US and china would suddenly change the international politics” (Sahashi, 2020).

Even though it was an alarming situation for Japan but they came out of this shock soon and considered it as an opportunity to established diplomatic relations with China and took the benefit of this situation. In Honolulu, Japanese leader had a meeting with President Nixon to secure the approval for normalizing the relations with China after the lifting up of embargo (Mori, 2013). On the other hand China neither demanded to US nor to Japan to review their security policy regarding China, which proved as an important turning point for Japan, as indirectly China recognized the US alliance system in the region and decreased the tension of Japan about balancing between two states in the Asia-Pacific region. This diplomatic step of China, relaxed the Japan in maintain its relations with both US and China and playing an important role in preserving the regional order peacefully.

After 1972 both Japan and China strengthen their relations without any hesitation and support each other in establishing good diplomatic and trade relations, Japan supported China's modernization was also a part of their effort to establish good relations. They supported each other's not only diplomatically but gave assistance in terms of technology, human resources and financial aid too. Western countries showed their concerns regarding China's modernization as they were not sure about the Chinese intentions and secondly about the human right issues in China increased theirs worry but Japan on the other hand took Chinese modernization positively and despite the domestic pressure, Japan was the first country of G7 which normalize the political, diplomatic and economic relations with China. Japan supported China on other forums as well like in the discussion of extending G7 members, it also pushed

China ahead to become an observer in 2000 Okinawa Summit (He, 2013) but China did not accept this proposal because of their official stance. Japan considered a developed and strong China would ultimately be in the favor of Japan. Japan continued its effort to favor China at international level as, Japan was the country which welcomed China's integration in the international market and gave official development aid to China. But this aid to China by Japan was suspended after Chinese attack on the Japan's EEZ (Takamine, 2006).

In 1990s a new discussion emerged at the stage of regional politics, analysts, observers and policy makers started to perceive China as a game changer in the Asia-Pacific region, which alarmed the situation and countries started to deepen their relations and decided to take steps together to counter the Chinese rise in the region but soon after this US met with another challenge with the name of Global War against Terror, so US had to normalize its relations with China but on the other hand Sino-Japanese relations at the beginning of twentieth century was not so good, their relation were dominated by the historical confrontations between them. But these Japanese policies towards China were against the Japanese grand design for China, so their diplomatic personals were continuously making policies to normalize the relations with China, they were very much aware of the threats posed by the Chinese rise to Japan in the Asia-Pacific region but they considered good/cordial relations between two countries are of much important as compare to the break in their relationship. So, they adopted the policy of "adaptation" towards a rising China (Smith, 2015).

Chinese leaders were in favor of normalizing their relations and end the tension between them. As they wanted to re-establish the good relations based on the common interests so as a consequence of these efforts, they both issued a China-Japan statement, promised each other to cooperate in the South China Sea and East Asian region. Aso Taro the Prime Minister of Japan described Japan as its "eternal neighbor" and showed willingness to cooperate with China (Sahashi, 2020). In 2009, The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power in Japan and

changed Japanese foreign policy towards a new dimension, they emphasized on adopting the diplomatic means to change the politics of the region and Japan should balance between US and China and keep an equal distance between the emerging and existing power. Absence of conflict between both and China, did not served much but just the put more in stabilizing the regional order of Asia-Pacific. But 2010 changed the regional order dramatically when China overpass the Japanese economy as the world's second largest economy which ultimately increased the rivalry between both China and Japan (Pempel, 2015).

Some of the scholars and observer perceived "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy by Japan is just to contain China in the region as at that time Japan was the biggest critique of China's rise and was making alliances to strengthen its security against China. Japan was more concerned about Chinese military spending then about its economic progress and just to kept this in mind, Japan suggested US to keep China in mind while making policies for Asia-Pacific. In contrast to Japanese policies towards China, China did not paid much attention towards the relations with Japan only, it was looking beyond Japan and was more concerned about the regional balance of power and new emerging regional order. These events brought change in Chinese foreign policy, they started to focus more on deterrence policy against Japan as they strengthened their defence policy. But after the escalation of conflict between US and China, Japan increased its efforts to improve their relations with China. After the announcement of Chinese OBOR, Japanese Prime Minister sent one of the senior politician to attend the roundtable, he himself visited China and promised to work with the Chinese government for cooperation and stabilization of the regional order (Satake & Sahashi, 2020). China's Grand Strategy caused anxiety in Japan so they are focusing more on their security to make sure Japan's defence more strengthened and Chinese containment. On the one hand they are collaborating with US to secure Japanese defence but on the other they are using diplomatic means to make the region stable and peaceful.

6.3.2 Japan Contemporary Policies to Balance China

After the end of Cold War, Japan's position in Asia-Pacific changed dramatically but now China's economy and military spending is more than Japan and it has become second after US in economic progress. As Japan is one of the most important state in the region, enjoying good relations with US and China as well, despite the presence of conflicts. Japan resources are quite less as it was used to have as compare to the regional countries but found itself crucial for stabilizing the regional order. Japan spent twice as much on defence as China did at the conclusion of the Cold War, but China has since caught up to Japan in terms of both military investment and economic growth. China's economic growth is two and half times larger and military spending is more than five times larger than Japan, after this development Japan is having the status of world's third largest economy. But China on the other hand has appeared as the biggest competitor to US in the Asia Pacific region. Now the competition between both of them is not only about the geopolitical in nature but it now it is more about the trade and technological advancement.

Japan on the one hand is the biggest ally of US in the Asia-Pacific region and having conflict with China over the Islands but at the same time China provides the biggest market to Japanese import/export goods. All of such moves by Japan shows how Japan's foreign and security policies are changing according to the current scenario because for Japan, securing the national interests and stabilizing the regional order is much important. Japan is very well aware of Chinese rise and its intentions and policies for Asia-Pacific region along with the US (a sole super power) presence in the region so it's just securing its national interests through balancing between both great powers. In 2013, Japan established the National Securing Secretariat and their first security strategy was focusing more on the Japan's proactive role in maintaining peace along with the spending more on enhancing the Japanese alliance system with the other regional allies like India, Australia and US etc. Japan is maintaining the peaceful relations with

China just to get more for their mutual benefits and to play a constructive role for the peaceful regional order.

Japan official government and policy makers issued new policies for enhancing Japanese national security and as a deterrence against the China in Asia Pacific region. Japan's Prime Minister issued a new defence policies in 2013 and revised them in 2018 respectively, in which Japan emphasized on the defensive posture in southwest along with the new strategies to shift the defence and technological equipment and establishment of new agency for the weapons development. In 2015, a new security law was passed by Japanese parliament under which they allowed Japan's security forces to exercise for the collective self-defense but in limited circumstances. Was is the sovereign right and states can use it in favor of its national security and to deter the other states to resolve the international disputes is also mentioned in the Article 9 of the Japan's constitution (Shiraishi, 2020). Following the Chinese GS for the Asia-Pacific rather for Asia, Japan has shifted its focus and started to pay attention towards the Indo-Pacific as well, where they felt that China is increasing its influence and trying to achieve China's dream of becoming more powerful and regional hegemon. Japan along with its allies in the region like Australia, US, India and ASEAN countries working hard to abundant China for creating its sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region and to keep region free and open for all the regional states.

This move of Abe is showing Japanese intentions towards the China's influence or rise in the Asia-Pacific region, before 2012, Sino-Japanese relations were not friendly because of the tension at Senkaku Island but Abe administration changed the status and brought the relations back to an even keel. Abe administration restored the friendly relations between both Japan and China, Japan senior politician along with the Abe's secretary participated in China's summit on Belt and Road Initiative, in response to such a positive step, Chinese Prime Minister Li also visited Japan in 2018 and Abe visited China in 2018 as well. Japan is utilizing its

Foreign policy as a tool to make Japan strong enough to counter any regional threat including the threats posed by China's rise. Abe also concluded the free trade agreement with TPP and Australia, even after the Trump announcement of withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership, Japan and Australia were the powers to save it. Japan not only concluded the TPP but US-Japan FTA and EU-Japan FTA as well. As for as China is concerned, Japan decided not be a part of AIIB but they would definitely fund BRI project with certain conditions.

All of these policy initiatives by Japan is showing Japan's concerns, intentions and their behavior towards China; a rising great power in the Asia-Pacific region. Abe security, diplomatic, economic and foreign policies moves are showing that Japan is changing its policies to meet the challenges, posed by China's rise and changing balance of power order in the region. On the one hand Japan is strengthening its security alliance and expanding its regional policy from Asia to Indo-Pacific on the other. Japan and its allies are very well aware of the reality that China can't be contained via military means only, that's why they are trying their best to engage China in the multi forum organizations so that China itself could not be able to change the regional order unilaterally.

6.4 China's Relations with ASEAN

After WWII multiple factors played negative role in maintaining good relations between China and Southeast Asian countries. And this trend remained continue even after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 but in 1991 they entered into the new era of relationship, where they decided to forget their issues and decided to work for the mutual benefits and forget about the differences. But 1997, brought actual dramatic change in their relations when Southeast Asian countries, met with the crises and China was there to help them out of the crisis, China provided them the financial assistance against the decision of devalue their currency, this policy of Chinese government built confidence in ASEAN countries about Chinese intentions and they

considered China as a true partner which help them to get out of the crises. Both China and ASEAN countries did not stop here but they also signed cooperative partnership for the coming 21st century along with the Chinese participation in the regional institutions known as ASEAN 1=ASEAN + China, ASEAN 3= ASEAN +Japan, Korean and China (Yunling & Yuzhu, 2017). 21st century brought another change in their policy, they both focused more on the building of institutions and cooperation through institutions, China with mutual consensus of ASEAN, established FTA and signed DOC (Declaration on Conduct) in the South China Sea, where they both decided to resolve their issues on South China Sea with mutual consensus and in a peaceful manner.

Strategic partnership between China and the ASEAN countries was established in 2003, and they both set up the comprehensive pattern of dialogue and with each other's in almost every field of life. In 2008, China officially recognized ASEAN as an important regional actor (Yunling & Yuzhu, 2017), this gave benefits to China on both fronts on one hand they established relations via ASEAN and on the other established bilateral relations with the ASEAN member states. ASEAN proved as a good medium to develop good relations between China and Southeast Asian nations. 2013 is marked as a year of changing foreign policy in Chinese history. China announced the BRI as a part of their Grand Strategy for 21st century, so Chinese leader XI Jinping also announced the Maritime Silk Road which would strengthened the Sino-ASEAN relations along with the Chinese effort to proposed a different ideas including signing the Treaty of Good and Friendly Neighboring Relations and China-ASEAN community of common destiny for deepening the Sino-ASEAN relations (Yunling & Yuzhu, 2017).

China also believes that Southeast Asian nations better understand and supports China's rise in the region (Severino, 2008). China since establishing good relations, considers ASEAN as a good partner, China was the first country to established strategic relations with ASEAN, first

partner of ASEAN which negotiated the FTA with ASEAN and China was also the first country to sign the ASEAN protocol to the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (Yunling & Yuzhu, 2017). Since 25 years both ASEAN and China have built and enjoying the good economic relations, economy is the important factor to develop the bilateral relations between China and ASEAN countries. Trade between China and ASEAN countries increased from US\$ 8 billion to US\$ 472.2 billion in just 25 years, after 2015 China became the largest trading partner of ASEAN. China has become the largest FDI source for Southeast Asian countries (Keqiang, 2016). However China's rise as a great power in the Asia Pacific region and its adoption of GS raised questions in ASEAN states regarding China's stance and behavior towards the South China Sea dispute, some of the analysts believes that China adopted maritime strategy just to create its dominance in the region and ASEAN countries should be more careful in dealing with China and securing its own interests in the region (Yunling & Yuzhu, 2017).

6.4.1 ASEAN's Response to Chinese Grand Strategy

Due to their lack of understanding of China's goals and actions regarding its expansion in the Asia-Pacific area, ASEAN nations are expressing their concerns about China. They are even expressing reservations about Xi as the leader of China; they are attentively examining Xi's personality in order to learn what China really aspires to be. Regional states have become the sandwich between the great powers like US and China and they are trying their level best to create the balance of power between the great powers to maintain the order and stability in the region. They are equally trying to understand the Chinese intentions or policies towards the region along with the US commitments and capabilities to remain a regional leader. ASEAN leaders are calculating China's policies differently but there are some common factors which are driving all of them on the same lines.

There is a common factor about the Xi Jinping in ASEAN countries is, he is one of the most influential leader in Chinese history after Deng Xiaoping. They argued that that the way Xi changed its foreign policies and adopted new economic and military policies and his diplomatic approach is the evidence of his ability to take actions and then put effort to prove them right. They also believed that Xi is a nationalist and for him China's sovereignty and security is above all. He can't compromise on such issue, not even ignore them or put them at the second level. Xi's adopted the policy of friendly neighbors for ASEAN nations but they are not sure about the future intention of China especially for ASEAN, ASEAN leaders considers Xi as a threat in the Asia-Pacific region as they believes that to secure its national inters and to counter US in the Asia-Pacific region Xi can go at any level and if in any case US and China met with any conflict, that would be a worst scenario even especially for the ASEAN states as it will destabilize the region and force the ASEAN states to be at one side.

But despite of all above mentioned concern, ASEAN states are unable to resist the benefits of joining AIIB or OBOR. And for security reasons they can't ignore China again, China is managing security issues through bilateral agreements as well as using ASEAN as a regional forum (Parameswaran, The Diploamte , 2017). China has adopted the "pull and push strategy" by utilizing all its economic, diplomatic and military means to attract the ASEAN states and secure its own national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese premier also announced in his speech that China is looking for strengthening its business relations with the Southeast Asian nations and will try to increase our people-to-people contacts as well. China's growing influence in not only be seen by Chinese allies in the region but US partners also acknowledged Chinese increasing influence in the South East Asia, so they are enhancing their military, economic and diplomatic ties with China. For instance Thailand is boosting its defence relations with China and even it has agreed to purchase the China's submarine (Parameswaran, The Diplomate, 2015).

While the other regional states also want to settle-down the South-China Sea dispute just like the Philippines president stance over this issue. He wants to downplay the South China Sea issue within the ASEAN (Parameswaran, The ASEAN Forum, 2016) structure and start a new phase in Sino-Philippines relations. Regional states are very well aware of the importance of the South-China Sea dispute but they are reluctant to let this dispute undermine the regional order. Myanmar and Laos both are admitting their good relations with China, as far as Laos is concerned, not a dramatic change in Laos could have been observed about Chinese rise or relations/shift towards China except few. Malaysia is the China's largest economic partner in Southeast Asia and even still good economic relations with China are at the top priority of Malaysian policies. Despite the good relations, China's rise also raised concerns in Malaysia, some of the official, people from opposition, scholars, policy makers are not sure about the Chinese intention, they are worried about Chinese rise that it can disturb the Malaysian sovereignty and peaceful regional order (Parameswaran, Malaysia's Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States, 2015).

China's strategy of "push", sometimes proved as a negative move for China, as in response of such policies states in South Asia sometimes pushed themselves away from Chinese sphere of influence and had to take the balance of power measures to counter China. Just like clash between China and Vietnam in Hanoi Waters played a negative role and Vietnamese still refer it back as "loss of Strategic Trust" and as a consequence of such policies Vietnam has shifted its policies more towards US and signing security agreements with US (Parameswaran, The Diplomat, 2016). Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia, it also feels the effect of Chinese rise in the region specially its growing influence on the South China Sea. They are aware of the Chinese policies and influence in South China Sea but still reluctant to say anything against Chinese policies because of China's economic rise and Indonesia dependency

on Chinese market. Indonesian presence in the Natuna Island and showing cool reaction on Chinese proposed defence is showing clearly that how Indonesia is resisting China's policies.

Singapore is known for its ability to balance between great powers, Singapore is not spare from Chinese influence as well. Government officials including policy makers and diplomats from Singapore are playing an important role to create balance and maintaining the regional order in the Asia-Pacific region. They are trying hard to preserve unity in Southeast Asia on South China Sea dispute. On the other hand they are strengthening their relations with the US in the Asia-Pacific region to balance the Chinese influence in Asia-Pacific (Parameswaran, RSIS Commentary, 2016). Thailand is one of the most important country in the Southeast Asia which has signed the BRI to cooperate with China in different projects including the transportation networks and economy (Punyaratabandhu & Swaspitchayaskun, 2021). Thailand and China signed agreements for constructing the Nong-Khai-Veitiane railway project, cooperation for the actions against corruption, they also met with mutual consensus to cooperate in the field of scientific research too etc., but unfortunately they somehow could not meet their target which increased the negative perception about China in Thailand. Scholars, observers, policy makers and even politicians started to talk against China and showed lack of confidence on Chinese promises and intentions.

They considered Chinese GS/OBOR is just to dominate the Thailand and to create its influence in the region as well. Scholars having the background of international relations and Chinese studies are also not sure about the Chinese intentions and future of the Asia-Pacific region, they stated that Thailand must be careful in signing the agreements under BRI as China is a great power so it is difficult for the small countries like Thailand to balance the and negotiate with such a great economic power. In addition to the above mentioned reasons they added that BRI is a part of Chinese Grand Strategy which may change the existing regional order not only economically and military dominance rather it may disturb the cultural order of the region as

Chinese works are migrating into different countries which may cause the conflict between Chinese and local people and such type of conflict in Thailand will disturb the internal security of Thailand (Piriya, 2017). But private sectors businessmen consider it beneficial, they consider it as an opportunity to get more benefits and opportunity to interact with the other economies of the region. They argue that a private businessman will get more benefits from the direct investment and being a part of different projects, as they added that BRI will expend the industry and as a result it will create consumption and then jobs for the lay man. They believe that such strategies will ultimately strengthen the trade relations between China and Thailand. As BRI will enhance the regional integrity and bring prosperity, Thailand must welcome it.

On the other hand government official from Thailand reviewed the Chinese OBOR strategy time and again and consider it beneficial for both China, Thailand and even for the stability of the regional order. Official from Thailand hope that to cooperate with Chinese strategy will upgrade its industry, will promote the infrastructure development, would develop the Thai industry, will support in utilizing and managing the digital data, and last bit not the least it will promote the cultural exchange programs including the exchange of students (Punyaratabandhu & Swaspitchayaskun, 2021). Officials from Thailand calculated the benefits from the Chinese strategy very carefully so that it should be resulted as a positive-sum or win-win game. Thailand's officials negotiated the agreements with great care which can be witnessed during the progress and signature of Thai-Chinese railway agreement.

Despite all the above mentioned responses and concerns, no sector suggested the government not to be a part of BRI. All of them are agree that Thailand can't ignore the benefits of BRI and cooperation with China will undoubtedly bring prosperity in Thailand. China and Thailand is enjoying very close and smooth good relations since long. So Thailand must pay attention towards a clear status between both countries as their size of economic and other progresses are not the equal so it may cause tension in future. So Thailand must considers other great

powers as well, as in case of any tension between China and Thailand it can negotiate with other countries.

India is an important player in the Southeast Asia but it's not an economic power as China is. Its economic integration is progressing well as India is continuously making efforts to establishing good relations and resolving issue with Southeast Asian countries, so that they can counter China and through connectivity in the region (Gong, 2018). China's increasing power in the region alarmed India and push it to take more active part in regional activities. India is very well known of Chinese military and economic rise in the region and to face the China's economic and military rise in the region India even has moved from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAAR) to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) (Pant, 2018). To counter the Chinese hegemonic status in the Asia-Pacific region, India has joined other projects as well. For instance Asian Highway Network sponsored by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) along with the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMTTH).

To connect the Indian ports to the Sittwe port in Myanmar, India also has initiated the Mekong-India Economic Corridor. India did not stop here rather they do have policies to connect the Northeast India to Sittwe via inland waterways and roads. Despite the attractive projects of BRI, India don't want to be fully dependent on China by joining the BRI as they have a fear that after being more powerful China would influence the India (Yu, 2017). Lack of trust between India and China is playing negative role and because of the trust building issue India is reluctant to join BRI and have different perceptions about China's rise as compare to the other countries in the region. India erroneously believes that China's Maritime Silk Road is part of its plan to strengthen its position in the Indo-Pacific region and the South China Sea. India openly refused to be a part of BRI after China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Chinese naval

activities in South Asia. The most recent military standoff between both of them increased the tension and make it even more difficult for China to get support from India.

6.5 China's Grand Strategy: A View from South Korea

After China's rise as an economic power and its military modernization in the Asia-Pacific region, world attention have been shifted from Europe, Middle East or other regions to the Asia-Pacific. This situation increased tension in the regional states as they are not sure about the up-coming regional order especially when two or more great powers are confronting to save their interests in the region. This situation increased the burden on the shoulders of the regional states, they are confused about balancing their relations between two great power (US and China) same is the case with the South Korea. Both US and China putting great pressure on SK to choose between them as United States is the guarantor of the Chinese security in the Asia-Pacific region while economically it is dependent heavily on China.

After China's announcement of OBOR and MSR strategies, it has raised anxiety in the regional states as they are not sure about the Chinese intentions, US has also showed its concerns regarding Chinese increasing influence in the region. So escalation of conflict between China and US would ultimately harm the South Korean national security as well. By keeping all the scenario in mind, South Korea is suffering most from the ongoing conflicts in the region, as it considers China as the second most favored nation after US but at the same time it perceived threats from China's rise and it is posing threats to South Korean interests in the region. Argument regarding South Korea's view of China seems like contradicting as at one side it is the second most favored nation but on the other they perceive it as a threat to their national security as well. But this is what which not only have been observed in Korean people behavior towards China or rather it has been mirrored in Korean official policies towards China as well. Park administration worked hard to strengthen the South Korea trade relations with China,

Seoul administration also did the same but on the other hand, even though it is not balancing against the rise of China but hedging. South Korea is one of the most important player in the Asia-Pacific so understanding the South Korea's policy towards the great powers is of much importance too because any policy shift in Korea's foreign policy can disturb the regional order and balance of power in Asia-Pacific.

Seoul attended the summit in Washington in 2013, in which they reassured that South Korea foreign policy must remain the US centric (Johnson, 2014). This policy shift ended the honeymoon period between South Korea and China. Regional states including China are not sure about the South Korean strategies towards the China and to understand Seoul policies for China one must have to understand the Seoul perception about the Chinese Strategies in the Asia-Pacific region. China is an emerging great power which is posing threats to it neighboring countries. South Korea Shares 880 miles border with China and China overshadow South Korea in all the aspects which contribute in enhancing the Korea's national power. China's power in the region and strategic competition between both countries are the reasons behind Seoul's worry about China's rise. Such threats are driving the Koreas security strategies, Korea is spending more of its GDP on defence budget but it is far from the Chinese military spending. The other factor which is effecting the South Korea relations with China is their political system of the government. South Korea is practicing the democratic form of government since long and known as one of the most successful democratic country in the world but China on the other hand is a communist country, Seoul also feels threat by the rise of a communist state in the neighborhood which can disturb their governmental system too. After Korean War, people from South Korea considers China as the second greatest threat to their national security after North Korea. Although South Korea is enjoying deep trade and economic relations with China, still majority of the Korean public shares the lack of trust towards Chinese intentions (Johnson, 2014).

China and South Korea established their diplomatic relations in 1992, and since then their trade is increasing day by day, it increased even more than 35 times (Johnson, 2014). And as a result China became the largest trading partner of South Korea in 2004 and in 2013 trade with China was about 26% of its total exports (Matthew, 2014). Korea is heavily dependent on Chinese economy and this factor is forcing Korea to strengthen its economic ties with China. They both are negotiating different trade agreements including the FTA between them. They both are negotiating on different agreements including China-led Free Trade Agreements between ASEAN and its FTA partners and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Despite the close economic relations, they both met with trade disputes frequently, even though they did not complaint against each other in WTO or any other organization but it often disturb their bilateral relations. South Korea is very well aware of its economic dependence on China but they still perceive threats from Chinese rise (Johnson, 2014). There is a general consensus that cooperation with China is the base to resolve the security issues with North Korea. Majority of Korean people have a perception that cooperation with China would ultimately result in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue along with the Korean re-unification.

But on the other hand it is clear like crystal that, despite the fact that China support the denuclearization but it will never stop North Korea against the nuclearization. Both North Korea and China are enjoying good relations since long, not only economically but politically too as they both are communist countries. Even during Korean War, China provided economic and military assistance to North Korea against the South Korea. A unified Korea is not in China's best interests since it would force China to share its borders with the US and its democratic friends in the area. So, China can only prevent the US and its ally in its neighbor through the North Korea. To secure its national security, China is providing, political and economic assistance to the current North Korean regime. Between the 2007-2013 China's trades with North Korea was reached at the record, it was almost tripled then in 2007 (Johnson,

2014). China want to stabilize the, it want peace and priority but it would not take any punitive action against current regime in North Korea. North Korea and China shares security and strategic interests and they are witnessing such partnership since long, so broken their ties is not as easier task. Strategically North Korea is much important for China so despite the growing strain in both countries, China is trying to manage the relations with North Korea which is increasing anxiety in the regional states especially South Korea. But cracks between North Korea and China are providing opportunity to South Korea to get more engage and close with China.

Historically South Korea's foreign policy was revolving around the balancing between US and China for both economic and security reasons. But now the situation has been complexed for South Korea as on one hand, they considers China as a biggest threat to their security but at the same time China is their largest trade partner. So China's growth or tension in Chinese periphery directly affect the South Korea. South Korea can't avoid China in any case. Even despite an ally of US and having anxiety about Chinese intentions and relations with North Korea, South Korea can't resist China or balancing against her. South Korea hopes that OBOR will bring the economic prosperity in the region. But North Korean nuclear test is increasing anxiety and escalation of conflict between both countries and effecting the Chinese OBOR project in the region too. Both South Korea and China is optimistic to cooperate with each other in many other ways under OBOR in which they can avoid the North Korean factor. Construction of the Trans-Korea railway is not the only project rather they can cooperate in development of new industries, building infrastructure in developing countries too. And ultimately cooperative relations between China and South Korea will bring peace and prosperity in the region, and helping in making the Northeast Asia as an economic zone.

6.6 Taiwan Perspective on China's Strategies in the region

This section of the dissertation will deal with the Taiwan perception about China's rise and adoption of new strategies in the Asia Pacific region. This part will analyze Taiwan's behavior towards Chinese strategies in Asia-Pacific region, how they perceive Chinese rise and region order along with the policy option for their country to maximize their interests in the region. People of any country played an important role while formulizing the Country's foreign policy. People, scholars and policy makers in Taiwan considers China as a biggest threat to their security and national interests in the region, they believe that historical relations between Taiwan and China are playing negative role in maintaining peace and prosperity between them. People from Taiwan shows distrust on Chinese intentions and believes that through OBOR China wants to build its own financial structure, don't want to be dominated by the existing economic system of the region (Hsueh, 2016). Despite the second largest economy at the world stage, China couldn't enjoy the financial power because of the US veto power in organization like World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its influence in Asian Development Bank (ADB).

China wants to increase its financial influence, which could lead to conflict with the US in the Asia Pacific (Drezner, 2009). So to avoid the conflict with US and to create its dominance China introduced its own financial organization. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. As China is the 30 percent shareholder of AIIB, so it has veto power too and it's the first time, China is enjoying the veto power in any financial organization. Taiwan's scholars also added that, the first intention of China is to be the regional hegemon economically but they adopted OBOR as a part of their GS is just to avoid the west, because if they would not adopt this policy, China was having the only option to became a part of western model and being a part of that model, confrontation between China and Taiwan was inevitable. US announced its Rebalancing Strategy towards Asia-Pacific is also a factor behind Chinese adoption of the GS

as they don't want to have a political, economic or military conflict with the US, so they adopted this policies to avoid conflicts in the region. They further adds that China adopted the GS to compensate the Chinese loses as a result to not be a part of TPP. China did not join TPP as it was demanding the more liberalization of economy, a fairer tax system, private economy, freedom of information, human especially labor rights etc. and to avoid such demand China was reluctant to join TPP. In the nut shell, China would never agree to accept the demands of TPP, as these are totally opposite from the CPP's manifesto. For Taiwan, China want to dominate the developing countries via Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Chinese allies in the region are tend to vote against the US in UNO (Stahler, 2014). So they think that Chinese OBOR/GS will have negative impact on the regional order, it will disturb the current regional order and peace in Asia-Pacific. These scholars are actually divided into two groups, the first group is arguing that China adopted this policy to avoid a direct confrontation with US and save Chinese interests in the region but the other group thinks that this policy would destabilize the current regional order. So for them China adopted a complicated Grand Strategy which in not easy to analyze.

6.7 Conclusion

China's Grand Strategy for the Asia-Pacific states can be implemented through different strategies but it is not as easier as it seems like, because of the regional states reservation over the Chinese intentions. Coordination between regional states and China is also a difficult task to achieve through Chinese GS. Despite of the concerns, all the regional states are supporting Chinese GS as they consider Chinese projects can meet their infrastructure and other security and economic needs. China is trying both bilateral and multilateral mechanism to coordinate with the regional states. Although states have less reservation about OBOR but they are showing strategic and security concerns. China is trying to downplay the strategic implications of the economic initiatives but most of the states in Asia-Pacific states considers such

development as a tool to enhance Chinese influence in the region and in response they must have some policy options to counter China if it threatens their interests in the region. On the other hand, states who are sharing the South China Sea Disputes with China, are also worried to rely too much on Chinese proposed economic projects. China's Grand strategy not only sparked tension in regional states but the within the major powers too in the Asia-Pacific region for instance US, India and Japan are showing their reservation as well. Other major powers like US is offering the alternative options to the regional states, so that they can fulfil their needs and to keep themselves out of the Chinese influence.

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATION

7.1 Findings

China adopted its policy of Grand Strategy right after US policy of Rebalancing to Asia-Pacific, these policies are bringing a lot of changes at the regional level. China is using all its military, economic, diplomatic and political means to secure its interests in the region. But both US and China are the great powers in the region and competing for their own interests, so this dissertation found their different strategies and strengthens to compete in the Asia-Pacific.

- Despite Chinese emergence as a great Pacific power, regional states still considers US is the most dominated power of the Asia-Pacific. They argue that US is having more military and diplomatic influence while China is far more economically stronger and using economy as a tool to influence the Asia-Pacific.
- Asia-Pacific countries are more concerned about Chinese economic progress, they consider Chinese economic progress as a threat to their interests in the region. Even after Chinese adoption of Grand Strategy and their policy to enhance its military and economic capabilities, countries are still worried about their economic initiatives.
- Asia-Pacific states rank Chinese economic development higher than their security initiatives but for them China can use and is using its economic influence to counter US security strength in the region. And US can't contain China through military means rather they have to focus more on the diplomatic and economic relations.
- China is influencing the current regional order through their diplomatic, military and especially economic initiatives. Although regional states are having more shared interests with US and they consider China as a potential threat to their strategic interests

in the region but China on the other hand is having more tools to influence and reshape the regional order.

- As two great powers are competing with each other in the Asia-Pacific region to secure their interests and reshaping the regional order accordingly. So in this situation weak regional states are having pressure to align with any powerful state but they prefer not to be a part of any one group rather they are trying to balance their relations between both great powers.

7.1.1 Areas of Competition

7.1.1.1 Rise of China and Asia-PACIFIC

China is rising and challenging US interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Asia-Pacific is increasing in long term importance to the United States of America and for the world. Asia-Pacific region approximately covers 22 percent the total global land and also provides ideal routes for trade which pass through the Ombai- Waters, Lombok, Strait of Malacca, Lombok and South China Sea, described by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). World's three economic superpowers' countries are also from Asia Pacific. Because of India, China and Japan rapid economic growth and shares in world's economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that Asia Pacific region is growing economically and it holds \$6 trillion plus foreign exchange assets. Asia Pacific region is changing more rapidly than any other region in the world. Now it has become the center of world economy, military and geopolitical competitions among great powers. As economy is the main factor of domestic and international politics so states of Asia Pacific struggled hard and became the most economically developed states in the world. Now they are the center of Geo-economy and politics of the world. They controls 1/4th of the GDP annually of the world.

Asia-Pacific is playing almost the same role for US as it faced during Cold War. For instance great power competition along with the role of institutions to govern the security and economic relations among states. China is only state in the Asia-Pacific region which is posing threats to US hegemonic status in the region. As a result of China's ascent and adoption of the Grand Strategy, not only the US but also other regional states are concerned about China's ambitions and the future of the Asia-Pacific region. Both US and China are adopting different policies creating their own sphere of influence in the region. Realism is one of the most dominant theory of international relations which suggested that states are always prone of war but resolving the issues through the war has become the tool of history and now states are following the model of international society proposed by Hadley Bull under the theory of English School. Given Asia-Pacific of great importance, China's behavior towards the region has even been more crucial for US and the regional states.

7.1.1.2 Security

The other factors which are effecting the US-China relations and increasing competition between them are security, economic competition, technology and the ideas of governance. US and China both are competing with each other's on security and economic ground since long but technology and governance are the new phenomenon. But at the same time the nature and role of security competition have been changed from the past. Both of them having the divergence of interests over the issues of Chinese military modernization, US alliance system in the region, nuclear proliferation, Taiwan's status, and maritime territorial disputes along with the other regional security issues are playing negative role in stabilizing the regional order. In the past, both US and China were used to resolve their security differences through modifying demands as well as expectations, sometimes by tolerating the issue with the hope that these would disappear soon, and in some cases they met with the common security challenges but now the story has been changed, new areas of conflicts are emerging, they have

anxiety about other intentions and the regional order, divergence of interests and security dilemma etc. All of the above mentioned issues are mainly because of the China's rise as a regional power and its willingness to reshape the Asia-Pacific regional order through its Grand Strategy.

The increasing security competition is because of the US-China behavior and their perception about the others intentions. Several developments in the Asia-Pacific region has increased the tension and competition between great powers, for instance China's military modernization since the mid of 1990s had made the situation worst. US got worries of this development not only because Chinese military development is narrowing the gap in military capabilities but it is also eroding the US military advantages in the Asia-Pacific region and containing the US in the Asia-Pacific region. China's investing in commercial technologies and emerging defence like it is focusing more towards the artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles and hypersonic weapons is increasing the security dilemma. On the other hand, China was used to tolerate the US alliances in the region but now China is seems like more willing to take actions against those who will undermine the Chinese interests in the Asia-Pacific region. China is utilizing its economic and diplomatic means to put pressure on the US allies like South Korea, Japan and Philippines and this can be witnessed during the South Korea decision to deploy the US defence missiles system and Japan's action sin East China Sea. China is also somehow interfering in the domestic politics of US allies to pressurize them in their policy making process.

One of the largest threats to regional stability is the Taiwan issue, which is also raising friction between the two major regional powers. China is utilizing all its military, economic and diplomatic means to influence the Taiwan as Taiwan's security agreement with US is increasing anxiety in China. 2010 is marked as the starting of new era in the Asia-Pacific security paradigm, China started to take the maritime disputes differently, and it enhanced its military capabilities to protect China against the perceived threats. China also took various

steps to merge its territorial and judicial claim over South and East China Sea. China's created seven quasi-military bases in the South China Sea which enhanced the frustrations and concerns not only in US but between the other regional states too as they are confused about the future armed conflict and freedom of navigation through the South and East China Sea. China is also doing Gray-Zone activities which has further enhanced the tension the Asia-Pacific region, US, its allies and including the other regional actors still have no answer about how to tackle such developments.

7.1.1.3 Economic

As XI hinted at market changes during his speech to the 18th Central Committee, China does not have a market-based economy but rather one under state control. Instead, XI made numerous decisions that demonstrate his preference for state control of the economy. And later on during his speech, Xi has announced the greater role of state in the economy especially in development projects and economic governance. On the other hand to save China from the crisis in financial sector along with the need to meet with Chinese desire to access the foreign technology and expertise, Xi to some extent opened the space for private and foreign investors. In the not shell, in the coming future, Chinese economic activities will almost remain close. Xi economic decision are intensifying the competition in the Asia-Pacific region. China's economic policies under its Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific, including its bilateral economic relation in the region and focus on innovation led growth is increasing tension between US-China and other regional states.

China's announcement of One Belt One Road Initiative shifted the world attention from security to economic diplomacy. There are multiple views regarding China's economic development especially after the announcement of BRI. It can be seen as the Chinese attempt the reshape the external environment, and they suggested the idea of prosperity and stability of

the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly it is seen as a tool to enhance the geostrategic and geo-economics competition between China-US and their allies in the region. Both US and China are also differ over the agreements such as TPP and FTAs. But the best solution for the regional states is that they do not have to choose between US and China rather all parties should cooperate on those areas where they can avoid the confrontation. China through OBOR demonstrate that China too can be innovative in handling the investment initiatives, multilateral trade issues and liberalizing the Chinese trade according to their needs. So Chinese new model of economic projects is different from the previous one. Chinese led AIIB is offering a deeper integration with the regional economies and BRI on the other hand is bold. So the biggest challenge for China is to prevail in competing scenario or the Asia-Pacific region. As for as challenges to the Chinese economic progress are concerned, they are still in the phase of domestic reforms and opening up to the world. China is taking some bold steps to introduce new opportunities to the world, institutional changes etc.

7.1.1.4 Technology

Technology is not new phenomenon for Chinese policy makers. They were used to take technology only as a medium to compete with West, to generate prestige and build human capital. But Xi emphasis on the technological advancement, he just have a dream to be a technological leader too at the world stage. He put technology at the center of his “China’s Dream” policy. In his speeches, he has mentioned China as to be a Cyber-Superpower. Chinese private companies had already made steps in the above mentioning areas especially they focused on the information and communication technology. This development by China is also caused competition among two great powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese policy makers are much concerned about the US efforts to hinder the Chinese technological development. US did not consider Chinese technological advancement only as a threat to dominate the high-tech

sectors rather they do believe that China will use this technological in iniquitous ways to promote their China model or their national agenda.

7.1.1.5 Governance

The other area of competition between US and China is about the model of domestic and global governance. Xi has a dream to see China as an international leader in coming decades and CCP to lead the political, social and economic governance at the domestic level, which is on the other side is increasing tension in the Chinese competitors. But on the other hand, US president Donald trump is showing his own concerns about the US role in the international institutions, its relations with allies and policy towards the institutionalism. So this shift in policy emerged another debate that whether US should continue its hegemonic role in the Asia-Pacific region or play a role of balancing between major players. As compare to the predecessors Xi is more active and determined about Chinese role in shaping the regional order. Even in 2013, he pushed China to play more active role in existing regional institutions along with the new ones. He also put his effort to draft new rules for resolving the regional disputes. He also created the seven quasi-military stations on South and East China Sea to secure Chinese maritime interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Senkaku Island is another area of conflict between Japan and China in the Asia-Pacific region, where he deployed an air defense identification zone to assert the Chinese claim over that area. This move raised concerns in US, Japan, South Korea and other regional states and they are not sure about the Chinese intentions and policies for the South China Sea conflicting areas that either China would adopt the similar policy in the South China Sea or would have a different one is a question to answer about. Xi also rejected the ruling of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea by the UNOCLOS as its decision was in favor of Philippines not Chinese claim over the South China Sea. Not only politically but China is also want to be an economic

leader in the Asia-Pacific region, they established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2014 as a part of their Grand Strategy for Asia-Pacific region. Around the same time, China announced OBOR, which gradually expended and rename as IBR. Xi has mentioned in his speeches that China is looking for the options to become a regional and global leader in terms of both domestic development, by creating international influence and making its world class military force by 2050. He even has mentioned during a conference that China should take an active action role in leading the reforms for world governance system. These statements are clearly showing his intentions about the role of the leading actor at the world stage.

In the nut shell both US and China want to maintain the current international order but in their own ways and trying to drive the world according to their own interests. China want to change the existing order as to China it seems like the US dominated world order and it is effecting the Chinese economic and security interests. US on the other hand want to change the existing order according to their evolving global interests and capabilities. They both not only have divergent views regarding global governance or world order rather differences about Chinese political and economic system are not new as well. Although governance is also an area of competition between both of them but still they are finding the way to come out of this crisis. As at 19th party congress Xi talked about the promotion of “China alternative”, after this announcement, US supported this Chinese views along with the changing perception about Xi providing technological and economic support to developing countries. Scholars and analysts in US don’t consider China as a threat to their democratic values as they argue that Xi dos not have the intention to promote authoritarian regime and against democratic model of government rather Xi just want to make Chinese model of government as legitimate as the western order is. US scholars and many officials consider it only as a competition of ideas not ideology but still they are not sure about the Chinese intentions and threats to US interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

7.1.2 Areas of Cooperation

7.1.2.1 Hedley Bull and Chinese Way to Cooperation

Asia pacific future is much linked with the China's peaceful rise. China's Grand Strategy is showing that China has taken the responsibility of development and prosperity of Asia-Pacific region all along. It seems like China is ready to pursue the economic development along with the security of the region through dialogues and wants to work with the regional states to get mutual benefits. China's behaviour towards regional politics is the result of the interpretation of the new regional political environment, which they actually have learned from their own cultural legacies. China's perception of international society is neither like the realist nor like the idealist rather do they want to secure Chinese interests along with maintaining the regional order as described by Bull. E.S. is different from the rest of the theories of the international relations on the basis of Bull's point of view regarding 'order' in international society and mechanism adopted for maintaining order is not designed particularly rather it has been evolved throughout the history. He argues that common goals and interests of the states in international society drive them to set or follow the common rules under particular institutions and as a consequences ultimate goal 'order' is provided. China's adoption of the institutions or maintaining the order is not the simplistic one rather it is the consequences of the historical events.

7.1.2.2 China and Balance of Power

Balance of Power is one of the most important institution of international society. Balance of Power has been an important institution of European international society as well and China used this as a tool to secure its interests and make her survival possible. Either China is adopting the BOP as an institution of international society or not, it is a debateable matter especially after China's Grand Strategy and its intentions to secure its interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

During the European international society, great powers signed the treaties to help the small powers and same could have been adopted in case of Korea, a small state in East Asia. China also showed interests to adopt balance of power as an institution to secure its interest while cooperating with the other regional states. Because China also knows that its interests especially security interests are interlinked with the Korean Security. China adoption of balance of power as an institution is showing that they want to maintain the balance in which they would protect and respect the independence of other regional states and would play a role in maintaining the order through institutions cooperating with the other regional states.

China adopted the different pattern as compare to the policies of other Great Powers in history, China wants to establish a new model of international relations which focuses more on the cooperation instead of competition. China has committed to work with all the regional states in different fields as in case of US they have committed to build and enjoy the cordial relations centred on the mutual benefits, non-confrontation and mutual respect etc. on the other hand China also wants to establish good strategic relations with both Russia and India. China is also working on Sino-Japanese relations. China under its Grand Strategy is trying to construct a community of shared future which includes the Asia-Pacific region as well.

7.1.2.3 China and War

War has been an important tool in the history, Chinese perception about the war is as same as the rest of the countries. During the European international society, China has remained a victim and did not get anything constructive from war. As war has been destructive all the time but still as per Grotain concept, war can play the role in maintaining the justice as well.

China in the Asia-Pacific region is facing more threats and challenges to its national security. China's most important strategic task is to build a strong defence line, which not only provides security to China rather it maintains, the regional peace and stability. In case of China's military

modernization, they are following the principles of “coexistence”, military exchanges, non-aligned, non-confrontational etc. China has intensify cooperation in border areas, cooperation on maritime security, participated in UN peacekeeping mission, international counter terrorism cooperation, and conduct relevant joint exercise and training with the other regional countries to maintain the peace in Asia-Pacific and avoid war but if necessary they would use this institution to maintain the international order.

7.1.2.4 China and Great Power Mechanism

Analysing Chinese behaviour as a regional or rising power, any conclusion would be before time but China’s intentions as per their GS towards the Asia-Pacific region and their officials statements are clearly showing that China considers role of great power as an institution and they are playing too in making the region more stable by cooperating with the other regional powers and weak states. They are cooperating not only economically but militarily and diplomatically too for securing Chinese interests and to make the region and regional states more prosperous and developed.

7.1.2.5 China and International Law

After Chinese first experience with international law, China acknowledged the efficiency of international law as an institution. They started to consider international law as an important institution which can play a vital role in maintaining world’s peace and stability. But despite such belief China could not enjoy the international law as an institution. Even though China don’t have good memories of international relations and had little faith on international law as an institution as they considered this institution was just securing the interests of great powers but after rising up as great power and then regional power China admitted that to live in peace and for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, states should follow the rule of law. They also believe that norms and rules of international law are according to the charter of UN and widely

accepted as well. As per Chinese perspective, rules of international law must be formulated after the consent of all states before implementing at regional or international level. As China has a commitment to maintain the security and order in the Asia-Pacific region. So in 2014 China was able to chair the meeting at Western Pacific Naval Symposium for the adoption of the advance code for unplanned Encounters at sea. Not only have this China with ASEAN countries decided to continue for the implementation of Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and on the basis of DOC consciences they will try their level best for the earlier Conclusion of the Code of Conduct (COC). China is not showing concerns only about the rules about the regional integration or stability rather they are focusing on the rules related to the Cyber and Outer Space as well.

7.1.2.6 China and Diplomacy

China's perception of the diplomacy was quite different from the one they are facing and having in current period. China were used to consider diplomacy as a tool to secure the national interests at any cost. After the recent developments at international level, diplomacy in recent time is playing an important role in maintaining the peace and order at international level. So China's perception of diplomacy has been changed as well, they are adopting the bilateral and multilateral tracks of diplomacy to maintain and stabilize the Asia-Pacific region. To make the region more stable and peaceful, China initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Six Party Talks, China ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation, Xiangshan Forum etc. to establish the relations and sort out the problems diplomatically.

7.2 Recommendations

China's Grand Strategy towards Asia-Pacific is bringing is changing the regional order. China is using its economic, diplomatic, military and political means to secure its interests in the

region. Despite the existence of territorial disputes and strained relations between US and China relations, both states should not only focusing on competing with each other's rather they should have clear policies to balance each other's in the Asia-Pacific region. China should resist framing engagement with US in the Asia-Pacific region as an instrument of geopolitical contest only. This dissertation suggest the following recommendation for the stability prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Following are the recommendations;

7.2.1 Demilitarization of the region

Powers in Asia-Pacific like US and China should adopt the non-military tools to resolve the regional disputes. They should communicate and offer different packages to maintain the regional order. First step towards the region stability is just to demilitarize the region like reduction in defence budget and decreasing of defence forces and adopted the policies like USAID to boost up regional connectivity and avoid the use of military means. This action will enhance the military transparency in the region and further shall pave way for pacific settlement of all pending territorial disputes.

7.2.2 Avoiding Zero Sum competition

In Asia-Pacific both US and China are competing with each other's to secure their interests. But they must adopt the policy of positive sum game instead of zero sum game, along with securing their own interests they must take in to account the regional security and interests of the weaker states in the region.

7.2.3 Disputes Resolution Mechanism

Absence of an appropriate forum / mechanism for resolution of disputes in the region left the disputants countries with no other option but to adopt a cautious approach in view of engagement in a set up since they consider that the set up may not render them justice. Nevertheless Defence Ministers Meetings at ASEAN provides a stage where the opportunity

can be created for discussion on pacific settlement of disputes. Moreover, all six disputant countries should carry on their active participation in Indonesia led workshop for Management of potential disputes in South China Sea and thereby developing a consensus on resolution of disputes.

7.2.4 Multilateralism or Mini- lateral Dialogues

From the very beginning of the relationship both US and China are not enjoying very good relation and the reason behind this is their struggle to secure their national interests. But now it's is the global world order and states are highly dependent on each other so in this scenario they can't afford any war, they have to cooperate despite of the existence of the conflicts, and for cooperating with each other both states should try their level best to establish a mechanism for cooperation and discussion of sensitive issues. They must go for bilateral or multilateral dialogues between them.

Not only bilateral but multilateral approach is one of the best approach to resolve the issues. Like China can't make progress and sustain its dominance in Asia-Pacific without in the help of the regional states as the same case is with US, if the regional states are not benefited with the Chinese economic growth, China can't be a powerful state at regional level. So in this situation Asia-Pacific can play a best role for multilateral integration between the states through ASEAN, ASAN 3, SCO, ARF etc.

7.2.5 Increasing Maritime Security and Decreasing US activities in China's EEZ

Both US and China should decide together for the enhancement of the maritime security. Both states should take steps and adopt a mechanism to deal with their national security concerns. They must reach on the conclusion to reduce US intelligence activities beyond Chinese air and territorial waters. Because of reducing US activities in and beyond the Chinese territorial water and air space, risk of incidents would reduce between two major powers.

7.2.6 Addressing the Divergence of interests

Both China and US are having divergent of interests' especially in Asia-Pacific region. So, in this global order they both must think about their national interest along with the interests of the weak states in the region and stability of the region. There are some issue between both of them that if they don't pay attention these issue, it can derail the positive relations within the states. Top leadership of both US and China should reached at the point to resolve the issues like military competition, Taiwan issue, intellectual property concerns etc. in a nut shell both countries would get more benefits if they address and respect each other's interests within and beyond the Asia-Pacific.

7.2.7 Reducing Future possibilities Over Taiwan

Both US and China should work for the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue because Taiwan issue have the potential for destabilizing the region in near future. They should come up with the new proposal through which they both resolve their differences on Taiwan strait and not only this they reach on a point under which they decide to demilitarize the region and stop selling arms to Taiwan and other states. They both only can resolve the issue through discussion and bilateral and multilateral talks and lacking in such discussion this issue can drive the region towards the destabilization.

7.2.8 Indo Pak Pacific Settlement of Dispute – ASEAN Model

Asia-Pacific states should strive for improving their relationship by keeping in view the ASEAN model of setting aside all disputes and work for the regional development irrespective of the final outcome of dispute status. This model maintains pacific settlement of all disputes without employing force and reiterates comprehensive dialogues for all pending disputes. In case of mere possibility of dialogue, it accentuates mediation or referral to overarching international body.

7.2.9 Regional Diplomatic Engagement

Both US and China need to change their diplomatic approach towards the Asia-Pacific region. They should make the policies to less about responding each other and to more about engaging with Asia-Pacific states to resolve their conflicts.

7.2.10 Region Wide engagement in Energy Cooperation and Cultural Diplomacy

Asia-Pacific is a rich region with diversity of cultures and natural resources. So at regional level an intergovernmental cooperation for energy resources can provide useful model for the regional development. Not only would this they should adopt the cultural diplomacy because through this region would be more integrated as people of different countries be allowed to visit the other countries of the region. People will not only present their culture in other countries or rather they will adopt something from opposite countries too, will share their experience and learn from each other's. Through this cooperation they will be able to get benefit in research field too, so they will research on the exploration of the joint ventures in technological fields and this will lead the region towards the cooperation.

7.2.11 Immediate steps for institutional reforms

Institutional reforms may take years of deliberation but the Asia-Pacific leaders can boost up this process by recommending the establishment of a high level committee to develop and strengthen the organization. This high level committee must be consisted of the official members from each member state and they must consider the proposal from the members to reform the rules or process. These proposals must be related not only to the strengthening of the organization but about the resolution of regional security issues. They must proposed the ideas to bring more prosperity in the region and how new established organizations can cooperate with the other regional institutions.

7.2.12 Special Group to Response the regional Confidence-Building Measures

The establishment of a non-governmental organization to address the trust gap issue in the region should be agreed upon by regional authorities. They should not wait for the formal institutional reforms to address this issue rather should propose the confidence building measures members states to pursue them. There are different ways to establish and develop the CBMs in the region, for instance air to air agreement between China and US can be expand into a regional agreement. There is no need to introduce the new mechanism rather, regional states can modify the existing one. No matter what states have been decided to choose so far but the actual problem is states should recognize this issue as soon as possible and work on such proposals as these proposals can help in minimizing the escalation of conflict in the region and would enhance the cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

7.2.13 Support Multilateralism

Promote the multilateral relations and discussions can also be a solution for the security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Region can't make progress until they don't trust on the multilateral approach as a most benefited and affective mechanism to resolve their disputes and achieving their goals in the region. China must put more effort to promote the multilateralism in the region, China must engage the regional states in a frank discussion with other nations to talk about the importance of the multilateral and discuss the economic, political and security issues through multilateral mechanism. To make this approach more effective one, leaders must prioritize the problems they do have with the existing system and must discuss it with the other states to find out the solution. Not only China but US will have to put its effort to make this proposal more effective one as this institution would not only help China to reach its goal rather it will secure the US interest and bring a peaceful order in the region. As both US and China are the most influential powers in the region so they must add their input to resolve the issue but it must not be through the bilateral talks rather they should also discuss this issue during the multilateral talks.

7.2.14 Track II Diplomacy- Moving Away from Military solutions

In history states were used to resolve their conflicts through using military means but now the trend has been changed or rather states will have to change their patterns of resolving conflicts, as for as China relations with US in the Asia Pacific are concerned both states should adopt the bilateral and multilateral talks along with the use of the track II diplomacy. Both states can't gain their national interests through the use of military in the Asia-Pacific region, or rather for securing their interests and regional stability they should go for track II diplomacy and bilateral and multilateral talks between them. So policy analysis, research and track II dialogues must be encourage between the regional states.

Discussions on the issue of sovereignty, consensus and non-interference etc. will remain continue but these issues must not create hurdle in finding out the solutions. Regional states are agreed on the rule of law, they do share the common principles of not increasing tension in the region but the issue is there interpretations of such approaches, the problem is how stats should follow them in practice and what mechanism they should adopt to enforce their implementations. Asia-Pacific member's states should promote Track-II dialogue/diplomacy bilaterally or multilaterally. Through Track-II dialogue, officials of the member states should have a meeting with each other's and build understanding about the practical implementation of rules and laws in the Asia-Pacific region.

7.2.15 An Integrated Policy

Growing economies of Asia-Pacific are highly independent on the energy resources of the Middle East. So economic powers in the region like China are very much concerned about the safety of navigation in the Middle Eastern maritime. For this reason great powers will have to adopt the integrated policy for both Asia-Pacific and Middle East.

7.2.16 Market Economy

Policy of protectionism played negative role in the regional integration. States in the Asia-Pacific should tackle such issues through cooperation and mutually recognized regularity measures. While making new rules and regulations related to the market economy, states should consider the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements between the states. As those agreements were signed to pave the way of market economy for its signatories but complex rules and rapid proliferation have somehow burdensome and divert the trade from the economy. Regional states in Asia-Pacific must play their role in promoting the trade facilitation and paperless trade. To boost up the regional integration, the existing international investment agreements must be consolidate as well. Market economy will increase the cross-border people interaction, and benefits to labour market. Great powers in the region should play role in developing the regional harmonized qualification frameworks to facilitate jobs, create the regional labour market and introduce common procedures for social benefits across the states.

7.2.17 Connectivity through Energy, Transport and Information Technology

Regional states especially US and China must pay effort to utilizing the existing intergovernmental platforms and agreements to increase the delivery capabilities of the states. Over the years states have signed different agreements bilaterally or multilaterally to connect via roads or railways etc. but after few time they did not coordinate with each other's, so now states must put effort to develop the existing one or proposed new for establishing the physical connection between states. Development of the physical infrastructure between the regional states will effect more rapidly in a cost efficient manner. It may not only reduce the cost of trade rather it helps in promoting the regional peace and development. It will also provide help in planning and implementing the projects which is a tougher task to achieve as an individual state because of the amount of time and cost it would require. Regional connectivity through roads, railways, by sharing the energy resources and ICT would increase the revenue generation and bring prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. For cross borders connectivity, operational

rules and consensus on technical standards are the essential factors. Mutually accepted fair and transparent rules would be the first step towards the facilitating cross-border connection. A strong political will and shared vision among the regional governments will play the most effective role in coordinating the infrastructure development. Not only the governments but the regional institutions are also important for monitoring the projects. Last but not the least, States can only get benefits for the long run if they connect the small states too, so they should connect the small and geographically distant countries through such initiatives.

7.2.18 Shared the Vulnerabilities and Risks

For creating a peaceful order in the region it is necessary for the states in the region to cooperate in the areas of emerging transboundary conflicts. If they make strategies to tackle such issue and a proper mechanism to implement those strategies it will safeguard the people and economy from the expected conflict. States especially US and China should develop the institutions which can prevent the complications resulted from the lack of natural resources, natural disaster, food security and Climate change etc. States should cooperate and share the information for sustainable food production, managing the transboundary resources and pooling the food security risks.

7.2.19 Regional Financial Cooperation

Regional Financial cooperation can also bring prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, it is an important tool to maintain the regional peaceful order. And they can cooperate only by strengthening and extending the current regional frameworks for financial surveillance and macroeconomics. Along with expanding the financial markets, they should try to make it possible for emergence to land. The feasibility of this concept depends in large part on the resources that are available for infrastructural improvements.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEWS

This appendix contains the interviews of scholars which have been conducted to fulfill the requirement of pilot study to analyze the reliability and validity of the instrument of research (interviews).

Topic: China's Grand Strategy and Reshaping the Regional Order: A Case Study of Asia-Pacific

Participant 1 Data

Scholar: Andrew Korybko is a political analyst, member of the expert council for the institute of strategic studies and prediction at the people Friendship university Russia.

Specialization: In Russian affairs and geopolitics, specifically the US strategy in Eurasia.

Interview was conducted through Skype. It was a semi-structured interview with open-ended questions. As there was no time constraints so the interviewee gave very detailed answers.

This study includes only relevant information.

Q 1: What is your opinion about the statement that China is becoming a world power?

China exerts global influence, but isn't a world power in the traditional sense like how the US is conceived of being. Beijing relies on economic power, whereas the US utilizes that element plus military force in promoting its international agenda. China's rise has been marked by peace and stability, with the only regional disruptions being due to American connivance in trying to form various coalitions to "contain" China. If OBOR is successful in its global vision of building New Silk Road connectivity, then it would be natural for China's economic influence to evolve into political, and possibly even military, forms, though nevertheless being exercised in a different manner than the US does.

Q 2: Do you agree that China has the ability to compete the US in Asia-Pacific?

China can only compete economically, it cannot do so militarily. The American Navy is much too powerful to be totally opposed by China. Anti-ship missiles could become “carrier killers”, but this is only useful in the sense that it could create an A2AD “bubble” near the country’s coast. It still cannot exert itself on the America-Pacific in the Western Hemisphere in the same way as the US can in the Asia-Pacific in the Eastern one.

Q 3: How do you see, China’s rise at the regional level and might this lead to a war?

The Thucydides’ Trap is a well-known concept when discussing China’s rise, but it’s not inevitability. The US wants to create a ring of tension all around China’s Eastern and Southern peripheries in order to “contain” it via a coalition of shared interests comprised of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and India, but it may not be successful in convincing them to go to war against their larger and more powerful neighbor.

Q 4: Do you think that China has the potential to reshape the current regional order?

Yes, so long as OBOR is successful. China’s New Silk Roads are creating the backbone of the emerging Multipolar World Order, across which new international relations are being strengthened. The prevailing idea is to reroute global trade away from the West and to the East, strengthening “Global South” interconnectivity to form the basis for new international institutions and ultimately a more equitable global system.

Q 5: How do you analyze China’s commitment of peace in its neighborhood policy?

China is sincere in this commitment, but it also has red lines that it won’t allow to be crossed. The US is exploiting this by encouraging its Indian and Vietnamese partners to provoke China so that the perception can be formed that Beijing is “militant”, “aggressive”, and eager to

“invade” its neighbors, thereby “justifying” the grand East-South “containment” coalition ring against the country stretching from Japan to India.

Q 6: Do you think that China has a Grand Strategy?

Yes, insomuch as it's OBOR, for the reasons explained above in question 4.

Q 7: What Grand Strategy China is perusing to replace the US in Asia-Pacific region and create its dominance?

China can't replace the US in the traditional military sense because it's simply incapable of challenging the American Navy on equal footing. Instead, it is seeking to pioneer new trade roots and relationships (New Silk Roads) in order to lay the basis for the comprehensive expansion of multidimensional win-win partnerships throughout the region. Economic relations could lead to political, and even military, ones with time, and this creeping expansion of influence could ultimately allow China to compete with the US without doing so directly. However, the US will probably never be fully replaced, but it can be challenged, and that's what China is trying to do.

Q 8: How China is utilizing its economic influence over the Asia- Pacific states to contain the US in the region?

Per the above answer, China's OBOR is creating the foundation for building more robust relations with its partners, and the “ASEAN Silk Road”, formally known as the Kunming-Singapore High-Speed Railway, is Beijing's primary project in ASEAN.

Q 9: How China is protecting its security interests in the region?

Unlike the US which usually resorts to direct military intervention, China is much more reticent in this regard because it doesn't want to be drawn into a disastrous quagmire, so it's instead “outsourcing” security responsibilities to its regional partners who are hosting various OBOR

projects. To this end, China improves their military capacities through arms sales and joint military drills so that they're able to more adequately confront their country-specific security challenges that might end up posing threats to their OBOR projects.

Q 10: How China is avoiding a direct conflict with the US in the Asia-Pacific region while using external soft balancing to safeguard its interests at the same time?

OBOR is the epitome of China's grand strategy, both in its hard and soft forms. Per the former, it wants to construct physical infrastructure, which leads to the conceptually inevitable latter element of advancing political relations between Beijing and its said host-nation partner. This is designed to incrementally improve China's influence in the region without totally disrupting the existing state of affairs, given how Beijing is doing so peacefully and in a mutually advantageous manner. The US has difficulty competing with China in this regard because it lacks the regional connectivity prospects that its rival has, hence why it's lately taken to building up the relevant capacity of its Indo-Japanese partners in helping them forge the so-called "Asia-Africa Growth Corridor" to challenge China instead.

Participant 2 Data

Scholar: Professor Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema is the political scientist in Pakistan. He has been a teacher for almost 28 years both inside (Pakistan) and abroad. Currently he is serving as Dean (FCS) at National Defence University Islamabad.

Expertise: Foreign policy of great powers (US-China) and politics of South Asia.

Q 1: Do you think that China has the Ability to be a super power?

Yes, China has the ability and in near future will take the China would be a super power. Although, they don't claim themselves to be a super power, they would like to maintain the soft image of third world country but they will certainly have the ability, which means, their

economic prudence will eventually lead to military, expansion and sophistication of weapons and obviously then they would be playing much larger role.

Q 2: In 2011 US announced its strategic shift towards Asia-Pacific and in response to that China announced one belt one road policy, and this Chinese shift is been considered as one of the part of Chinese Grand Strategy, So, do you think China is adopting policy of Grand Strategy to create its own dominance in the Asia-Pacific region?

It's a hidden objective, basically they are linking China with more or less European advanced countries, at the same time when the road passes through all of them, they will be linked up, I think this it is having dual objectives as visible side is economic but at the same time would gain politically much more influence.

Q 3: Does China have the ability to replace or contain the US in the Asia-Pacific region?

Not at the moment as their navy is relatively weaker as compare to the US but if this kind of competition continues, eventually I think they will probably have to expand their navy. So every country which does economically impressive progress, eventually leads to the military progress as well especially when the country is as big as China, they defiantly would go for the influential leadership role.

Q 4: Do you agree that China does have a Grand Strategy?

Yes, they do have.

Q 5: If they have the Grand Strategy, then what tools they are using as a part of Grand Strategy?

At the moment they are using just economic tools.

Q 6: Then what's about the political, military and diplomatic means of Grand Strategy?

They are using diplomatic tools as they are very good in diplomacy, but military tools will come after economic and diplomatic tools.

Q 7: In Asia-Pacific two powers are having the clash of interests, one of them is the rising or regional power and the other is the hegemonic or sole super power at the world stage, so how would you see the future of Asia-Pacific region?

Wars and conflicts have their own consequences late, so I think they will avoid them, I don't see the violent but economic competition in this region.

Q 8: How do you analyze China's commitment of peace in its neighborhood policy?

China has fourteen neighbors and managed to sign border treaties with almost all of them, which mean by sign the treaties they have removed at least one cause of conflict with them. So, neighboring countries are not facing any threat from China rather it's the establish power (US) which is facing threat because of Chinese economic rise.

Q 9: Do you think that China has the potential to reshape the current regional order?

They would like to reshape the regional order to the extent it helps to Chinese rise.

Q 10: How do you analyze the future scenario of Asia- Pacific?

In future China will be a power just like a single largest party but not with the majority in parliament.

Participant 3 Data

Scholar: Abdul Rouf Iqbal is the X Director of Global Studies ISSRA, currently working as the associate researcher at Institute of Strategic Studies and Research Analysis.

Expertise: Foreign policy of great powers (US and China) with special focus on Asia-Pacific.

Q 1: Does China have a Grand Strategy?

No, Grand Strategy means state use all the assets of power to maximize its national interests. In the case of China, China doesn't have any soft power except economy. Till today Chinese Grand strategy doesn't exist and the biggest reason behind this is their internal problems as it's a close society and close society can't make any Grand Strategy.

Q 2: How do you analyze the regional perception about the US and Chinese competition in the Asia Pacific region?

Today's international society is neither following realism nor liberalism but pragmatism. Economically, Asia Pacific states are having interdependence with China but militarily they are dependent on US that's why regional complex interdependence order does exist in Asia-Pacific region.

Q 3: Both states (US-China) are having clash of interests in Asia-Pacific so do you think this clash can lead towards the escalation of conflict between them?

Conflict will exist but not violent, diplomatic tools would be used to resolve the issues and steer both countries towards the aversion of violent conflict.

Q 4: Can China steer the US and China towards the aversion of conflict through its Grand Strategy?

If we analyze the Chinese Strategy on the basis of economy, military and diplomatic tools would lead us towards a different perspective as economy like Chinese economy never wanted to go for the violent conflict because they don't have as much military strength as US does have so in the case of violent conflict, US military industry will flourish while Chinese economy will deteriorate. Because of such consequences China will never go for the escalation of conflict.

Q 5: Can China have the ability to reshape the regional order?

Undoubtedly economy plays an important role but just an economic power can't shape or reshape the regional order. China can't reshape the current regional order until and unless it develops its military as well. So, right now China can't reshape the regional order and seems very difficult in near future as well.

Q 6: How would you analyze the future of Asia-Pacific?

Status quo will be maintained but not with the positive consequences. Negative status quo would prevail because of the tensions between them. Confrontation between them would lead to the polarization in the Asia Pacific region and this polarization will halt the harmony process.

Participant 4 Data

Scholar: Benish Sultan Quazi (PH. D scholar), associate researcher at Institute of Strategic Studies and Research Analysis (ISSRA) and visiting lecturer at National Defence University Islamabad.

Expertise: Global studies and regional studies and foreign policy of great powers.

Q 1: What is your opinion about the statement that China is becoming a world power?

World power itself is a delusional idea because China in its overall strategy from day one to its opening up to the world never stated that it actually wants to be a world power. China is not trying to be a world power but it is actually trying to become a hyper power. Hyper powers basically go along with economic development, economic integration and searching out of markets which is not related to militarily dominating idea.

Q 2: Do you think that China is reshaping the regional order as it is shifting from military to economic base relations?

China is opting for the liberalist perspective, challenged by the neo-realist while using the constructivist tools. In my opinion the entire three models are being applied and current strategic security paradigm is not going to change.

Q 3: Does China have the ability to challenge the hegemon (US) in coming years?

China is going with the liberalist model not realist so they won't go to war. They are economically integrated with so many countries not only in the region but at global level as well. Undoubtedly China is challenging US economically not militarily so, China will not go to any war to challenge the US as hegemon.

Q 4: Do you think that China does have the ability to compete with the US in the Asia Pacific region?

China would not like to compete with any one. They confidently say that we have a new order. In new order one doesn't have competition but cooperation, configuration and integration. So China would like to maintain its presence.

Q 5: How do you analyze China's commitment of peace in its neighborhood policy?

Mostly neighboring countries don't like China, as they are having clash of interests with China. These countries think that what China doing is just to hurting our markets. In my opinion these countries are just propagating. These countries should get benefit from China through bilateral agreements instead of propaganda.

Q 6: How do you analyze the implications of One Belt One Road policy for the Asia-Pacific region?

Per the above answer, China's OBOR is creating the foundation for building more robust relations with its partners, and the "ASEAN Silk Road", formally known as the Kunming-Singapore High-Speed Railway, is Beijing's primary project in ASEAN.

Q 7: Is there any cold war going on between US and China?

No, not the cold war but there is a fear of campus developing. Camp formation always has positives and negatives. And this camp formation will have positive impact on the region.

Q 8: How China is avoiding direct military conflict with the US in the Asia-Pacific region?

China doesn't have any experience of war, throughout the history China did not go to war. US has a far superior naval power, far superior weapons as compare to China. Although China is making progress but still it is not at the US level. So, in my opinion China would never go for war with the US China's strategy would be to develop the ports like jabuti, Gwader etc. They will try to maintain their economic development and avoid any kind of military confrontation with the US

Q 9: Do you think that there would be any bipolarity in the Asia-Pacific region?

No, I don't think so. Neither China would be the most dominant power neither the US

Participants Five Data

Scholar: Shaun Breslin is a professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom. He is an Associate fellow of the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University. He is also working as the Co-Editor of the Pacific Review and the member of the Editorial committee of the review of International Studies, the China and World economy.

Expertise: Chinese Politics and Economy, Regionalism, International Political Economy, Globalization.

Q 1: What is your opinion about the statement that China is becoming a world power?

Depends what you mean by world power. I think it is clearly A world power already but not THE (only) world power. What happens in china impacts on others and resonates around the world; be that intentional action or the collateral global impact of things done in china for other reasons. So I think it passed the boundary of being a world power some time ago now – some time after the global financial crisis.

Q 2: Do you agree that China has the ability to compete the US in Asia-Pacific?

In economics, certainly. In terms of attraction – despite everything that trump is doing to undermine international support for the US, I'm still not convinced. China might be the main economic partner for most regional states, but its also the main security threat to many of them as well. So overall, yes it can compete but its not even across all types of activity.

Q 3: How do you see, China's rise at the regional level and might this lead to a war?

Possibly. I think china's aim is to make regional economies so dependent on what happens in China that they won't challenge china on security issues. But there is no guarantee that this will work. The biggest danger, I think, is an accident escalating into something bigger. The second potential danger is Taiwan, as I think Xi is very keen on AT THE VERY LEAST not letting Taiwan make any more progress in being treated like an international actor – and ideally would like to have his reunification moment.

Q 4: Do you think that China has the potential to reshape the current regional order?

Primarily through finance and dependency as I've hinted at above.

Q 5: How do you analyze China's commitment of peace in its neighborhood policy?

It means "peace on our terms". So peace as long as everybody accepts china's definitions of its core interests. If they don't, then all bets are off. This is actually very clear in the various speeches statements and policies – even those that go on and on about the community of common destiny say that there are limits and these are china's core interests.

Q 6: Do you think that China has a Grand Strategy?

Q 7: What Grand Strategy China is perusing to replace the US in Asia-Pacific region and create its dominance?

Q 8: How China is utilizing its economic influence over the Asia- Pacific states to contain the US in the region?

Q 9: How China is protecting its security interests in the region?

Q 10: How China is avoiding a direct conflict with the US in the Asia-Pacific region while using external soft balancing to safeguard its interests at the same time?

Participant six Data

Scholar: Peter Frankopan is a professor of Global history at Oxford University, Senior Research Fellow at Worcester College Oxford. Director of the Oxford Centre for Byzantine Research and working also as the Associate Director of the Silk Road Studies Programme at King's College, Cambridge.

Expertise: History of the Mediterranean, Middle East, Russia, Central Asia, Iran and China.

Q 1: What is your opinion about the statement that China is becoming a world power?

It depends on what a 'world power' is. I think such concepts are rooted much more in European orientalist ideas about power and about how the world works. It requires ideas about

geopolitics, status and ranking systems that do not seem to be very helpful to me – and perhaps even counter-productive and misleading.

Q 2: Do you agree that China has the ability to compete the US in Asia-Pacific?

Again, I am not sure what this terminology really means. Where, exactly, is ‘Asia Pacific’? Does this include Sri Lanka? The Gulf? Central Asia? Or is this a polite way of saying South China Sea? What, then, about Russia? Etc. And again, the idea of ‘competitor’ seems more useful for as a label that simplifies without actually engaging with what/how/why such competition means – let alone how one ‘wins’ or ‘loses’.

Q 3: How do you see, China’s rise at the regional level and might this lead to a war?

Wars are usually fought from defensive perspectives and calculations. Sometimes, states launch pre-emptive strikes because they believe they are about to be attacked. I am not sure that I can see a realistic context, at the moment anyway, why an aggressor would start a war either against China or led by China. But history teaches that fragility and erratic decision making can escalate very quickly.

Q 4: Do you think that China has the potential to reshape the current regional order?

Yes. Although presumably this only means that China is able to advance its own economic, political, military and security interests, rather than create a new ‘order.’ In this respect, all states, surely, are trying to do something similar. The key, then, is about ability and competence to deliver outcomes – and to plan what these should be.

Q 5: How do you analyse China’s commitment of peace in its neighbourhood policy?

I start by asking what the incentive are of choosing options that are not peaceful. I do not think states make ‘commitments to/of peace’; rather than they try to protect, enhance and advance

their own interests. Clearly, doing so within a co-operative framework is greatly preferable to the alternative.

Q 6: Do you think that China has a Grand Strategy?

Yes and No. There are some elements and aspects to China's engagement with the outside world, as well as domestically, that are clearly highly strategic; but also multiple elements that are haphazard, less well thought through and less impactful.

Q 7: What Grand Strategy China is perusing to replace the US in Asia-Pacific region and create its dominance?

There are a few leaps of faith in this question so I am not quite sure how best to answer. Perhaps better questions to reflect on are why is the US in Asia-Pacific, and how does it create 'dominance' (if it does so); how/why does it seek to sustain this role; and how/why/when might this change?

Q 8: How China is utilizing its economic influence over the Asia- Pacific states to contain the US in the region?

I think there are real risks in seeing the world exclusively through a Chinese or a US prism; and dangers too in seeing the world as a binary choice between these two. There are many 'Asia-Pacific states': their past, present and futures are not shaped or defined by decisions made in Beijing and/or Washington

Q 9: How China is protecting its security interests in the region?

In multiple ways: traditional and non-traditional intelligence and information gathering; heavy time investment in creating ties and co-operation with senior officers in the military in other states; conducting joint military exercises – and similar.

Q 10: How China is avoiding a direct conflict with the US in the Asia-Pacific region while using external soft balancing to safeguard its interests at the same time?

I think both China and the US are keen to avoid a direct conflict. Because if one develops, we could all die. That usually serves to focus the mind.

Participant Seven Data

Scholar: Professor William A Callahan is the Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the London School of Economics.

Expertise: Global Politics of China, Theories of International Relations, Documentary Filmmaking and Visual International Politics.

Q 1: What is your opinion about the statement that China is becoming a world power?

China already is a world power. In the PRC they are careful what term they use: daguo-Great Power has become popular. They rarely use superpower.

Q 2: Do you agree that China has the ability to compete the US in Asia-Pacific?

Economically, definitely.

Militarily: soon.

Politically: not yet clear. The backlash against BRI and Covid-19 shows problems.

Q 3: How do you see, China's rise at the regional level and might this lead to a war?

It could lead to a war because 1) Beijing thinks that the US is weak; 2) Taiwan is successful and thus needs to be controlled; 3) Beijing is trying to expend its power in the South China Sea.

Q 4: Do you think that China has the potential to reshape the current regional order?

It has the potential, but it will be very difficult. Various countries are lining up to defend the world order of multilateral governance, which goes against China's multipolar governance model.

Q 5: How do you analyze China's commitment of peace in its neighborhood policy?

Everything the PRC is by-definition peaceful, even when it is violent. Neighbors know this.

Q 6: Do you think that China has a Grand Strategy?

Yes, to build a Sinocentric world order that refashions global norms and practices.

Q 7: What Grand Strategy China is perusing to replace the US in Asia-Pacific region and create its dominance?

BRI

Q 8: How China is utilizing its economic influence over the Asia-Pacific states to contain the US in the region?

You can't contain a country outside its region: i.e. containment would be to keep the US in the Americas.

Q 9: How China is protecting its security interests in the region?

Not sure

Q 10: How China is avoiding a direct conflict with the US in the Asia-Pacific region while using external soft balancing to safeguard its interests at the same time?

Right now, Beijing is testing how far it can go in terms of political and military conflict.

Participant Eight Data

Scholar: Paul Evans is a Professor of Asian and Trans-Pacific International Relations at University of British Columbia.

Expertise: Asia

Q 1: What is your opinion about the statement that China is becoming a world power?

It is already a global presence in virtually every domain and has already become a world power in most respects especially in Asia.

Q 2: Do you agree that China has the ability to compete the US in Asia-Pacific?

Compete, certainly. Dominate, possibly in a decade or so. Rule, never.

Q 3: How do you see, China's rise at the regional level and might this lead to a war? It is the reaction to the rise, the fear that it is creating in other countries, especially the United States that will lead to conflict unless something big and innovative is done to forestall it.

Q 4: Do you think that China has the potential to reshape the current regional order? It is already is in several but not all areas, generally in a responsible and constructive way but also with some misplaced ideas for managing people and territories on its periphery and its maritime frontiers.

Q 5: How do you analyze China's commitment of peace in its neighborhood policy?

Unlikely to use force but has the capacity and increasing will to use coercion of other sorts to force compliance.

Q 6: Do you think that China has a Grand Strategy?

No, but there are the elements of one that may coalesce when circumstances warrant. The pandemic combined with America's efforts to contain, constrain and decouple may push it into

a new form of nationalism and external ambitions to make the world safe for its national agenda and internal domestic values and institutions.

Q 7: What Grand Strategy China is perusing to replace the US in Asia-Pacific region and create its dominance?

Military and technological self-strengthening, deep economic connections with its neighbors.

Q 8: How China is utilizing its economic influence over the Asia- Pacific states to contain the US in the region?

The US can't be "contained" but its alliances can be loosened, in part through effective Chinese diplomacy, and its military assets challenged to the point where the outcome of a direct military clash would be unpredictable.

Q 9: How China is protecting its security interests in the region?

By every means possible, though not by instituting regime change in other countries.

Q 10: How China is avoiding a direct conflict with the US in the Asia-Pacific region while using external soft balancing to safeguard its interests at the same time? Economic integration and common prosperity, active diplomacy, and the bet that overtime US relative power will decline over time. Time is on its side.

The biggest fear—that China will come to the view that it can replace the United States or learn to act like the United States in seeking maximum spectrum supremacy.

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