

MS THESIS

**EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER: DEBATING
POLARITY IN GLOBAL POLITICS**



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EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER: DEBATING POLARITY IN GLOBAL POLITICS



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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has neither as whole nor part thereof been copied from any source. It is further declared that I have prepared this thesis entirely on the basis of my personal effort, made under the sincere guidance of my respected Supervisor and Colleagues. No portion of the work presented in the thesis has been submitted in support of any degree or qualification of this or any other University or Institute of Learning. **Taimoor Shah, Reg. No. 224-FSS/MSIR/F22** Department of Politics & International Relations, International Islamic University Islamabad Pakistan.

DEDICATION

I dedicate my research work to My PARENTS and My Brother LIAQUAT ALI who always supported me financially and morally. And I dedicate my Thesis to My TEACHERS, and Colleagues and to those who are sincerely working for the entire humanity!

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List of Abbreviation

A2/AD Area-Denial and Anti-Access

ADB Asia Development Bank

AI Artificial Intelligence

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ALBA: Bolivian Alternative of Americas

AMCA Advance Medium Combat Aircraft

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

AUKUS Australia, United Kingdom & United States

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BDN Blue Dot Network

BECA Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement

BRI Belt & Road Initiative

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa

BRICS-Plus Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa-New Members

CN Clean Network

COMCASA Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement

CSGs Carrier Strike Groups

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization

DOD US Department of Defense

DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization

EEU Eurasia Economic Union

EU European Union

G7 Group of Seven

GATT General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade

GDP Gross-Domestic Product

GNP Gross-National Product

IADS Integrated Airborne Warning and Control System

IAF Indian Air Force

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IMEC India Middle East Economic Corridor

IMF International Monetary Fund

INF Nuclear Force Treaty

IOR Indian Ocean Region

IPEF Indo-Pacific Economic Framework

ISR Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance

LEMOA Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement

MENA Middle East North Africa

MIC 2025 Made in China 2025

MNCs Multi-national Corporations

MoD Ministry of Defense

NDB New Development Bank

NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OTH Over-The-Horizon

PCR People's Republic of China

PLA People's Liberation Army

PLAA People's Liberation Army Army

PLAN People's Liberation Army Navy

R&D Research & Development

RIC Russia, India & China

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

RMB Renminbi

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SLBMS Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles

SSBNs Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

STI Science, Technology and Innovation

TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership

TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

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ABSTRACT

This research study is exploratory and argumentative by nature, as it explored the polarity in global politics. The rise of new great powers in the global politics has challenged and waned the US dominancy in global politics as well as enrooted to change the existing polar structure. The scholarly literature and arguments lack consensus on the existing and emerging polar structure. The objectives of this study are to explore the existing polar structure, investigate its challenging forces, and find the emerging polar structure in global politics. Qualitative research methodology and thematic analysis were adopted for analysing primary and secondary data to answer the research questions. The results of study showed that the existing polar structure is partial unipolar where the US is still at the top in power capabilities, but its dominancy has reduced and still reducing. The rising power China, Russia and India are challenging forces to the US unipolarity because their growing material power capabilities are narrowing the power gap. The revisionist China and Russia are the main challenging forces to the US primacy because both rising powers are enhancing power capabilities and intend to change the polar power structure. India is economic rising great power but not a serious threat to the US primacy due to its balanced multilateral relations with the US and rising powers, and not a revisionist state. The emerging polar structure is more possible to be balanced bipolar system where the US and China will be leading powers but this transition takes more than two decades. Another possible emerging polar structure is weak multipolarity where the US, China and Russia will be leading powers and India plays role of major power. Polar structure and power distribution are two of the main areas of International Relations and this study will contribute in the field by exploring the evolving dynamic nature of international order in global politics.

Keywords: Polarity, Great power, Unipolarity, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, Rising Great Powers, Emerging polarity, RIC, US, Distribution of power capabilities, Neo-realism.

1 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The international order has been in the complexities of relations of states over the centuries. These complexities have been in the debate of scholars after the Second World War that how to measure the power distribution in number with the presence of preponderant powerful countries, in other words how to distinguish the polarity with the presence of different countries with different number of powers in the world politics. In the era of post-Second World War theorists of International Relations have long been assumed that the distribution of power internationally plays an important role in the world politics. The structural effect of what is called in International Relations as the 'Polarity' of any given moment has been a central theme in mainstream theories of IR. For understanding the nature of international system have led scholars to use some terminology such as empire, hegemony, imperial power, hegemonic power, great power and colossus among others. The long time efforts of scholars for instance Bull (1977) for looking terminology that could describe the power structure of the world historically and comparative perspective in different periods. Therefore, the study of polarity of world politics within the international system and comparative analysis of the unipolar, bipolar and multipolar power structures became central debate of IR theories, not only the polarity, scholars have also debated hegemonic and anti-hegemonic balancing coalitions those highlighted the fact that role of state is a defining paradigm in the international system (Okolie & Ezirim, 2018).

The polar structure of international politics has direct relationship with power capabilities of great powers. The transition in polar structure occurs when the power shifts from existing great power to another great power. The current unipolar structure created by the United States

prior to the end of Cold War when it possessed sole superpower position in the world in terms of material power capabilities. However, since early 21st century new literatures of IR scholars have argued of changing power structure because of new rising great powers. The emerging powers have challenged the existing unipolar world order through the growing material power capabilities. Moreover, the contemporary literature of IR scholars have contradiction over present polar structure and emerging. Therefore, this study will debate on the polar structure of international politics in the international system to clarify the existing and emerging polar structure.

The collapse of Soviet Union and the shift in international order into unipolar were important moment because of its influence in the studies of International Relations and many explanations had given on polarity. Several scholars were unprepared in the end of Cold War except small number who predicted that the power structure of the world could be unipolar. Furthermore, a lot of research work conducted on unipolarity, its peace that emerged from it and its maintenance as well as failure. Similarly, the new international order have been in the scientific debates to understand the new emerging dominant states and their threats to the existing world power structure, and their capabilities to transform the international order from unipolarity to multipolarity (Jervis, 2002, p.7). If the emerging powers strongly correlates to uneven growth rates, similar effects and balancing against the present hegemonic power then it can be expected the unipolar will be replaced by multipolar in future.

It is hard to predict the future of international order in 21st century whether it revert to multipolarity or remain in unipolarity. History is evident that the emergence of new great powers always have shifted the international order and changed the status quo of hegemonic power (Layne, 1993). There have two prior events in the history which is similar to today's unipolar moment. In addition, in 1660 France emerged as a superpower and then Great Britain in 1860 emerged as dominant power in the international system as the US (United States) is

today. The superpower status of France ended when Great Britain and Austria emerged as great powers in the world and shifted the unipolarity to multipolarity as well as when Germany, Japan and US achieved great power status then Britain unipolar moment ended.

The end of the Cold War in 1990 shifted the international order from bipolarity to unipolarity, as the US became the only winner of the war and gained sole superpower status on the earth as well as democracy and liberalism became winner against socialism (Fukuyama, 1992). Besides, United States enjoyed being the sole superpower in the world without any war, but for following ten years, till the incident of 9/11. Because from that event onward the US has been in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, deployed troops in other countries and also engaged in war via proxies. The wars US have been engaged are still continue and there is anarchy of US in intervened countries (Engelhardt, 2018). Dr. Ibrahim Karats argued that US is the only superpower of the world who struggling for its end (Karatas, 2021), the fact is that US policies never been accepted by the victimized countries and by the damage of her soft power because of excessive use of hard power.

On the other hand, the emergence of new great powers in the world politics have created alarming situation for US [who are raising as great powers in international system] such as the region of Eurasia has built alternative institutions and positioning itself to lead the region against the crises of US led global governance and lead the world politics toward multipolarity, more specifically China and Russia are raising player in Eurasia that leading the world toward geopolitical multipolarization. The analysts of international relations have highlighted that the growing interests of new great powers is to destabilize the US led unipolarity and to establish multipolar international order (Acharya 2014; Alcaro, Peterson and Greco 2016; Amin 2006; Campbell 2016; Mandelbaum 2016; McCoy 2017; Murray and Brown 2012; Stuenkel 2016a, 2016b; Tozzo 2018; Woodley 2017).

Furthermore, history is witnessed that whenever other powers emerged then hegemonic power declined. There are many claims on the decline of US power after twelve years of disappearance of Soviet Union and the fall of Berlin wall and the sole superpower has been facing a violent multipolar international order as well as the threats of terrorist extremists are also increasing (Mansbach & Taylor, 2017). The scholarly discussions increased and their voices have become loudest when President Dolan Trump's election campaign slogan was "Make American Great Again" (Tumulty, 2017). It has emerged the idea that US is not great currently. In addition, the peaceful raise of China, revival of Russia thanks to oil and Putin governance, EU (European Union) and its member states such as Germany, France and others, including the growth and development of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as well as the relationship of Beijing and Moscow have reduced the hegemony of United States (Muzaffar, et al. 2017a).

To the reference of debate of multipolar international order is increasingly being heard from international summits, conferences, and congresses and also being seen the writings of scholars, politicians, political economists and journalists (Katehon 2018). Scholarly debate of multipolarity have been an ongoing feature of the decades since early 21st century in the international politics. The rise of new great powers in the world and scholars of international politics have claimed that hegemony of US has been eroding and its global leadership is declining by the soaring influence of new great powers (Layne, 2009). The rise of RIC countries have built a discourse or narrative of multipolarity in the international politics by argument of augmenting power of emerging countries, on the other hand some American scholars denied that by claiming that unipolar will sustain because the emerging countries do not have adequate capabilities to alter the international order (Keersmaecker, 2015).

Establishing multipolar international order is one of the main agendas of Russian foreign policy and also it is found in the foreign policy of China. The prominent rise in the influence

of middle powers such as India and Brazil also challenged the unipolar order. Furthermore, the foreign policy of US in the Asia-Pacific of containing China which shows that US is heading towards balance of power against China in Asia-Pacific and against Russia in Eastern Europe where NATO is expanding against Russian Federation by giving membership to Finland and Sweden (Alkanalka, M, 2023). In the 2022, US National Security Strategy report stated that US is “in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order,” and US is confronting threat from China and Russia which are characterized as revisionist powers in military, economic and political term in the context of geopolitical competition (The White House, 2022). The analysts of international relations believe that they are observing periodical changes in term of power cycle dynamics by the rise of new great powers which are commonly known as RIC countries. The power structure is in transition; the relative power of the world is shifting from Atlantic to Asia-Pacific in the shape of multipolar international order.

The current international order is unipolar but it is declining by the emergence of new great powers in the world politics. The emerging regional powers struggling to strengthen their sovereignty to build a strong stake on world politics due to their capabilities. The present period of transition of balance of power has showed the rising powers trend to achieve their position in the world such as the peaceful rise of Beijing as the fastest economic growth which is influencing the international system and the re-emergence of Moscow as well as emergence of other countries will displace the hegemony of US (Paul, Wirtz & Fortmann, 2004). The international order is in transition, the international power structure has transformed from bipolar to unipolar and it will revert from unipolar to multipolar international order in future (Serfaty, 2008). It required an investigation whether the international order is changing or not, and if it is changing then what are those factors that altering the existing polar structure as well as what type polarity is emerging. This debate of polarity explored and investigated the existing polarity, its challenging forces and the emerging structure.

1.2 Rational of the Study

The international order has been in the debate of scholars since the early 21st century. The history is evident that there is correlation between polarity and rising powers. The long period of international relations has dominated by the European powers 1648 to 1945. In addition, the era of post-World War II was bipolar due to the US and USSR engagement in power balancing game, since 1990. The disappearance of former Soviet Union ended the bipolar international order and US emerged as sole superpower in the world which is known unipolar international order. United States have gained the title of superpower due to its solid economy, political power, and overwhelming military as well as its capabilities in technology and science. The US engagement in long and costly war in Afghanistan and Iraq and its intervention in other countries as well as the financial crises of 2008 was showed that US dominancy has been waning. Moreover, the hard line policies of US have created a security dilemma among other countries such as invasion of Iraq in 2003 and declaration of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as “axis of evil” have threaten the security of other countries. In response the rising powers have been enhancing their material power capabilities against US led unipolar international order to balance the power in the international system. The revival of Russia under Putin governance, rise of China, and India (RIC) have challenged unipolarity. These are the states which possess the lion’s share of global material capabilities such as economic, science and technology and military including the US. Therefore, the debate of polarity studied polar structure to understand the contemporary and emerging polar structure in the evolving dynamics of global politics.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

International order is a significant area in the domain of International Relations which deals with the powerful countries in the international system. A debate of scholars has taken place in the world regarding the emerging international order with different opinions who

argued that future international order will be bipolar, multipolar and some believes that unipolar will sustain. The US has remained superpower state in the world after the collapse of USSR and succeeded to establish unipolar international order. However, the rising players of international politics have challenged the current international order with their economic, military and technological capabilities, as well as their growing political influence in the global politics. The increasing power of emerging countries challenged the unipolar international order and struggling to change the power structure by gaining superpower position through their power capabilities in the world. Therefore, this study is going to focus on existing and emerging international order and it emphasizes on the debate of polarity in global politics that what kind of international order is emerging whether the world will revert to multipolarity, bipolarity or unipolar will sustain, and factors behind the transition of polar structure. This study explored the power structure of global politics by the use of neorealism theory to gain deep insights about existing and emerging international order. This study carried in depth analysis on the debate of polarity to understand the emerging polar structure. So, researcher believed that there was existed a knowledge gap on this topic and researcher carried-out in-depth analysis on this topic; therefore, this research study filled this gap.

1.4 Research Objectives

This study aims to achieve the following objectives

1. To explore existing polar structure of global politics.
2. To investigate challenging forces to the existing polar structure of global politics.
3. To find out emerging polarity in the global politics.

1.5 Research Questions

This study sheds light on the following research questions

1. What is existing polar structure of global politics?

2. How the rising powers have challenged the unipolar international order despite US being a superpower state in the world?
3. What kind of polar structure is emerging in the global politics?

1.6 Significance of the Study

The distribution of power is a significant topic in the field of International Relations. A new debate has emerged among the scholars of IR in contemporary global politics by the new rising powers which are challenging the existing international order through their military, economic, and scientific and technology capabilities as well as political influence in the world. This debate on polarity in global politics found the existing and emerging polar structure of global politics and factors which are challenging the existing power structure of global politics. This study provides knowledge and information to policymaker, scholars, teachers and students of International Relations, and other relevant fields about the complex and evolving nature of polar structure in the contemporary global politics.

1.7 Delimitation of the Study

This study is delimited to the international order and United States who is leading the current international order as well as the emerging powers which are challenging the power structure of the world. The emerging powers are RIC (Russia, India and China) countries and some other challenging forces. The target users of the study were economic, military, technology and political powers of emerging countries, including United States since last decade (2013-2023) for the better understanding of existing and emerging polar structure.

1. Contemporary and emerging polar structure in global politics.
2. The United States, RIC (Russia, India and China) and other challenging forces to existing polar structure in global politics.

3. The time frame of the study was last decade (2013 to 2023).

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW

The foremost purpose of undertaking the literature review is to find out the other written documents on the emerging international order. However, the review of the available information or scholarly works are correlated to the topic sometimes turn out to be very worthwhile in fixing the objectives and pick up the methodology and to evaluate the data with authentic facts and evidence. The work already done by others and available appropriate information about the selected topic and it also helps the researcher to enhance the knowledge to produce new thoughts regarding study program. Therefore, the researcher deliberately has reviewed previous scholarly literatures (books and articles) which are written by different writers at international and national level on emerging international order to understand different author's opinions and their methodologies which was used in the investigation of polar structure in global politics.

1.9 Review of Related Literature

Suporn, T (2021) argued that today's international system is divided into two blocs where great powers and medium-powers are aligned together to counter one another. United States and China have leading the two groups with their alliances to balance power such as US alliance group contain NATO, Quad, and Japan, South Korea, Australia in the Asia-Pacific. On the other side, China established SCO, BRI and increasing formal and informal regional alliances such as Russia, South Asian, and littoral states of Indian Ocean and Central Asian countries. The regional influence is altering in today's world such as China's influence is increasing in Latin America which was under the influence of US, NATO expansion shrunk in Eastern Europe because of resurgence of Russia and its influence is increasing in the region which can be assumed by the annexation of Crimea. Thus, author argued that the current bloc system is leading the world toward cluster-bipolarity where the countries are divided in two main blocs led by US and China.

O’Keefe (2018) argued in book that many realists believed that the US global hegemony is in uncertainty in future. Realist argued that (but not all) the United States is still hegemon power might be not at global level but her hegemony remains in the world and further claimed that in international system there are signals that US hegemonic days are in numbered. In addition, he claimed that during the Bush administration US entered in the declined period. The unilateral decision of invasion on Iraq in 2003 bypass the UN Security Council and the financial crises of 2008-2009 showed that the American model of capitalism is failed and the turmoil reduced the weight of US international economy. However, US isolation increased from those international organizations such as UN and WTO which supported US global liberal order and her global hegemony. As a result, US policies deinstitutionalized her own hegemony in the world politics.

Stares, Jia, Jaishankar, and Kortunov (2020) wrote a book ‘*Perspectives on a Changing World Order*’ argued that “the great powers decline not because rising powers defeat them but because the cost of maintaining world order drains their resources”. The United States maintained the world order through the other expense but Trump administration altered the policies of previous governments and his actions categorically different and US decline to maintain world order. Furthermore, the western countries always played vital role to maintain current world order and always supported US but they are declining economically after Cold War, such as Group of Seven (G7) countries economy dropped from 68 percent in 1992, 47 percent in 2015, Further it dropped again 30.15 percent in 2018 and also estimated that it further drops to 27.26 in 2023. The US also decline in military capabilities in the world affairs such as the NATO expansion also became shrunk from two-thirds of global defense and its expansion became too little in 2017.

Sutter (2021) he argued in his book “*US-China relations: Perilous past, uncertain present*” that the duration of 2005 to 2014 was the period of US decline which impacted the

balance of power and provided opportunity to China to enhance its influence and interests. US was involved in prolonged and costly war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and clashes with North Korea on its nuclear program and continuously relied on China's support. The economic crises of 2008 was failure of US economic model and the rapid return of Beijing in response of economic recession increased the confidence of China that US is weak to contain her. However, during that period China was in developing phase and known that it could not stand against US directly rather China maintained friendly relations and chosen muted and peaceful rise to counter the US hegemony to get success in establishing multipolar world.

Stares (2020) argued that the current world order is unipolar but it is declining and the upcoming international order would be multipolar because of the emerging new great powers and the decline of US power as well as the failure of US to maintain the current world order (unipolarity). The emergence of unipolarity begun in post-Second World War when US established international institutions and alliances, later these institutions and alliances were used by US to establish and maintain its unipolar world order after collapse of USSR. However, under the Trump administration US relationships became controversial in the world politics such as US withdraw from UNESCO, Trans-Pacific Partnership and Paris Agreement on climate change. US also violated the rules of WTO by taking unilateral actions against other countries on trade disputes.

Ikhenberry (2011) stated that international order is changing by new rising powers and US seemed weakened to maintain unipolar international order. The rising powers are would not change the international order rather to lead the international order because emerging powers have deep interests in open and ruled-based order which took centuries to reach this stage. The rising powers have benefited from this liberal order and rising powers such as China is not in a position to create new order. US will not be able to rule emerging international order but it can lead.

J. Mearsheimer (2019) stated that the post-Cold War liberal international order was doomed to decline because of the United States's own policies. The policies of the United States to spread democracy, strengthen international institutions in domestic consideration and promote hyper globalization in the world. The emerging multipolar world will be comprised of a realist principle-based international order, and it will be crucial in managing the global economy, dealing with arms control issues, and dealing with commons issues like climate change. In addition to this new global order, China and the United States will be in direct conflict with one another in both the economic and military spheres.

Parsi Vittorio. E (2021) argued in his book *"The Wrecking of Liberal World Order"* that the liberal world order is declining by the mistakes of US and the rise of China and revival of Russian power. US has deteriorated norms and values of its own created liberal order by interfering in internal affairs of the countries in the name promoting democracy, counter terrorism and promoting peace and stability. However, China and Russia know that US is the only beneficiary of liberal world order; therefore, they enhanced their economic power to capture the international market, and enhanced multiregional influence to counter US through the use of soft power as well as increase military capabilities with advanced weapons.

Rapanyane (2021) argued that the Asian Tiger China has the capability to transform the structure of international politics and economies. The Pentagon also recognized that China is challenging the US international order. China believes that the US is engaged in monopolizing the international lending system through the IMF and World Bank to counter US lending policies. China introduced the AIIB in 2015. BRI, which connects China to international markets in different regions through maritime and continental routes, as well as Chinese MNCs countering MNCs in the US and other international areas such as medicine, tourism, life arts, health care, and cooking, BRICS countries are also emerging as a challenging force to the US

international order from a financial perspective, such as the NDB, which is emerging as an international financial institution. It is estimated that the BRICS will overtake the economies of the G7 by 2030. China signed trade agreements with Latin America to counter US hegemony over trade, such as ALBA (the Bolivian Alternative of the Americas). Besides, the EU is also a threat to the US because the euro' is emerging as a trade currency that can weaken the dollar in international trade.

Sinem Unaldilar Kocamaz (2019) argued in his paper that Russia and China decided to balance power with US through the use of soft power rather than direct confrontation. Russia has tried to establish geopolitical pluralism, to promote the multipolarity through the different inter-regional organizations such as SCO, CSTO and EEU. China also in the same page because it always benefited by regional organizations to gain economic power such as ASEAN, SCO to augment its connectivity, bilateral ties, mega free-trade agreements and strategic loans and credit. He claimed that regional institutions are used as instrument to counter US hard power through the soft power such as managing relations with great powers, deepening the military cooperation, neighborhood diplomacy, enhance trade blocks, regionalism and multilateral diplomacy. Both have tried to prevent regional powers to become US ally. Moscow and Beijing signed a joint statement in 2005 which seemed that both countries using regional organizations against US unipolar world and create multipolar international order.

Tarine Flockhart (2016) argued that change is coming in international system which required new primary and secondary institutions for managing complex and composite relationships. By the raise of new powers, the movement of international liberal order is being replaced by multi-order system rather than multipolar system because in multipolar system all components are similar among the entities (states) except power, but in multi-order system there is no similarity among entities in component parts. For instance, in previous multipolar

order there were only European which were similar but future world order will be multi-order because different entities will be different such as China, Western European, Latin America, Russian, Asian and others.

Muzaffar (2017b) argued the emergence of new great powers (China, Russia, Japan, India and Brazil), and their neo-conservative and imperialistic policies are transforming the world order from unipolarity to multipolarity. US has no further capacity to maintain the current world order (unipolarity) for long period. However, the emergence of new economies such as BRICS, EU and Japan, which achieved the economic power status because of advanced technology, growing economies, and greater population, and their emergence became a challenge for US. Some other countries also plying important role in the world politics that have been influencing world politics such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela and member of African Union because of their energy capabilities.

Grieco, J. M., Ikenberry, G. J., & Mastanduno, M. (2015) argued in book that US emerged as a superpower after the collapse of USSR but now the world has shifted and continuously in shift toward multipolar international order. The US, once a superpower, has shifted towards a multipolar international order, with great powers balancing power through internal and external efforts. These powers include the US, China, Russia, Germany, and Japan, who engage in a complex combination of cooperation, competition, peace, and hostility. US hegemony is declining due to prolonged and costly wars and soft balancing strategies of rising powers against US after 9/11. Multipolarity emerged after the end of the Bush administration in 2008, with the US military's failure to pacify Afghanistan and Iraq and the economic crises of 2008-2009. The rapid growth of China and other powers is building a multipolar international order, reflecting the global shift towards a multipolar world.

1.10 Research Gap

After analysing the above literatures, many scholars and authors had given opinions on polar structure and emerging polar power states. However, by reviewing above literatures researcher found different opinions of different scholars with using different methodologies and theories for the analysis of emerging international order. The lack of consensus on the current state of polarity in the international system and there is no clear consensus among scholars on whether the current international order is unipolar or bipolar. Some argued that US remains the sole superpower, some argued that China is now just a peer competitor to the US and still others opined that rising powers, RIC countries, are challenging the US-led international order. Moreover, scholars have different opinions regard emerging polar structure of global politics such as some claimed that it will be multipolar, some argued that it will be bipolar and some opined that unipolar will sustain in future. Scholars also believed that the world is in non-polar era and some argued that the world is moving towards multi-order. Therefore, researcher believed that there existed a research gap which was explored in this study. Researcher used different theory and methodology for analysing the existing and emerging polar structure with in depth analysis. Researcher adopted neorealism theory for the exploration of existing and emerging polar structure in global politics.

1.11 Theoretical Framework

While studying the polarity in global politics then neo-realism theory is suitable theory for this study to get insight on power structure of international politics. Neorealism theory is one of the dominant theory in the discipline of International Relations in contemporary approaches that also known as structural realism. It has founded in the writing of Kenneth Waltz, who is considered the founding father of this significant theoretical work within the discipline of International Relation. There are further tenets of this theory such as John Mearshamer, Randall Swechleler, Robert Gilpin, Stephan Walt, Barry Buzan, William

Wohlforth and Robert Jervis, who have provided number of literature on this theory with the changing dynamics of global politics (Spindler, 2013a). Neorealism theory provides a useful framework for understanding the dynamics of the emerging international order and the debate on polarity in global politics. The theory emphasizes on polarity in different angles such as defined the polarity itself, how it is established, preserved in the global politics and the role of balance of power between great powers for maintaining power structure and the role of great powers altering the structure.

The main assumptions of neorealism are as follows, state is rational and the primary actor, international politics is anarchic, structure of international politics constraints and determines the behavior of state, states have some offensive behavior the leads to change the balance of power (revisionist) or would remain satisfied with the international order and own status-quo policy. The most of the great powers acts as revisionist state might be some satisfied with their status and position in the international system. Another assumption is that the main goal of states is survival to preserve its territorial integrity and ensure security. However, states are rational actor which main agenda is to ensure its survival in circumstances of not knowing the intentions of another states that pushes states towards power politics (Stephen Walt, 1997).

In examining the polarity in the global politics through the lens of emerging power structure of international politics, the neorealism theory proposed by Kenneth Waltz elucidates the evolving dynamics of polarity in the global politics. The neorealism theory is mainly based on polarity or power structure in the international system. According to neorealism the distribution of power among the great powers determine the polar structure and emphasized on state power capabilities and policies towards the polar politics which are crucial for shaping and reshaping the polar structure in the global politics. It believes that the main actors of polar politics are great powers and it focuses on the material capabilities of great powers because that is the significant element of any state that makes a state a great power in the global politics.

According to Waltz, the international structure is established by the interactions or coactions of the states, and it can be changed by organising principles or the transition of the capabilities of the states. The states that create the structure of international politics are major powers that have strong military and political power. The military and political powers are means to gain economic developments, and the economic power means to gain military and political powers; therefore, the states that have strong military power, influential political power, and developed economies are known as major powers that shape the structure of international politics (Waltz, 1979b, p. 94).

The states are the primary actors in international politics, and those are the great powers that shape the structure in the international arena within the system through their coordination and coactions. The major powers are those that have strong powers, where different states have different capabilities. The capabilities vary from state to state, and for figuring out great powers, then has to compare the capabilities of states to find out great power and smaller power because capabilities are the attributes of the states. The structure changes with changes in the capabilities of states or the transition of power from one state to another. Therefore, the transition of capabilities among states changes the polar structure of international politics (Spindler, 2013b).

Moreover, Waltz defined polarity, or power structure, as the presence of a number of great powers in international politics. The capabilities of states are measured by comparative studies: when there is one great power, it will be unipolar; when there are two great powers then it will be bipolar; and if there are more than two great powers then it will be multipolar. The polar structure of the international system could be defined by counting the number of great powers, which are distinguished according to their material capabilities. Therefore, the study of polarity in international politics needs to study the capabilities of states in order they are distributed among the states. (Waltz, 1979b, p, 97-99).

According to neorealism theory unipolar structure is unbalanced structure in the global politics it possesses threats for other states. A single great power creates an environment of security dilemma for other states and becomes a threat for their national interests. Therefore, Waltz claimed that power keeps check on power. The states strive to balance the power with existing great to secure their interests and position in the global politics (Robert Keohane, 1998). However, if the existing world order would not succeed to satisfy rising powers then as a result, they desired to transform the existing polarity and international order to achieve their interests and position in global politics.

Neorealism is based on power structure and it well defined the whole aspects of structure in the global politics. The polar structure of international politics always be created by great powers that possessed the most material power capabilities in the world. The theory determines the role of great power in the game of polarity and distribution of power among the great power states (Stephen Walt, 2009). It also provides scientific way of measurement of power capabilities of states. Furthermore, the behaviors of states determine by the structure, which is changed by the distribution of power. The power capabilities of a state starts growing then it becomes a challenge to the existing power because power defines the role of a state in the global politics. A rising power becomes a challenge to the existing power when its material power capability increases and have the intention to alter the power structure of international politics (Schweller & Pu, 2011).

The contemporary unipolar structure was created by the US after disintegration of Soviet Union in early 1990s, till today US has maintained its hegemony in the global politics. However, the rise of new great power in the global politics have challenged the US hegemony in the world (Stephen Walt, 2011). The rise of China, Russia and India have challenged the unipolar structure by augmenting their material power capabilities. These rising power have

been most growing countries in terms material power in the world with the intention of altering present polar structure through the balance of power.

In short, neorealism theory is applied to this study, because the theory provides a valuable lens through which to analyze the debate on polarity in contemporary global politics. It emphasizes the role of power distribution, power competition, and inter-state relations in shaping the polar structure of international politics within an international system. By understanding these dynamics, policymakers and scholars can better navigate the challenges and opportunities presented by the evolving global landscape. The main purpose of applying this theory is to understand the emerging international order through the debating on polarity in international politics. It is appropriate theory to answers the research questions, to get the research objectives and reach an appropriate conclusion.

1.12 Research Methodology

This research is qualitative and exploratory by nature. The qualitative research approach is applied on this study which involves gathering and analyzing data such as interviews, official documents, books and research papers. This is because the qualitative approach allows for a more in-depth exploration of the topic, taking into account the different perspectives of stakeholders and experts. The qualitative method was helpful to answer the research questions. The data was analyzed by using thematic analysis, which is a method for analysis of interviews, focus group discussions, observations, or document analysis in the qualitative research. The qualitative research approach is a valuable tool for studying the emerging international order and debating on polarity in international politics. It allowed for a more in-depth exploration of the topic, taking into account the different perspectives of stakeholders and experts. The qualitative method is used to gather a rich body of data to understand the complex dynamics of existing polarity, its challenging forces and emerging polar structure in the global politics.

1.13 Research Design

This study is designed as a study of polarity focusing mainly on existing polar structure which is being led by US, and the role of emerging countries to alter the contemporary polarity and emerging. The research is mainly based on exploratory using argumentative, and analytical approaches to reach solid conclusion.

1.14 Data Collection

The primary and secondary data both are used in this study. The primary data are included semi-structured interviews of different think-tanks and academicians who are expert in the relevant area and official documents and speeches of government's officials. Researcher also focused on existing knowledge, in other words secondary data to analyse new emerging international order and debate on polarity in global politics. Secondary data was collected from the various sources such as government official reports, published institutional reports, research

articles, thesis, books, and internet sources were focused for the data collection in this study. Secondary data was collected on the basis of their quality and authenticity. Hence, this study is relied on primary and secondary data.

1.15 Data Analysis

Data analysis carries a great importance in the research field including the methods of analysis. Thematic was used for the data analysis in this study. The thematic method is a qualitative data analyzing tool which is used in the qualitative research. Thematic analysis is widely used in qualitative research which offers a systematic approach to identifying, analyzing and interpreting patterns or themes within qualitative data. This process involves organizing and categorizing the data based on its content and identifying prominent recurring themes or patterns across the data set. Thematic analysis can be applied to various types of qualitative data such as interviews, focus groups, field notes and document-based data. The primary data and secondary data were analyzed through thematic analysis in this study because it was useful tool to analyse the data. Thematic analysis was used for data analysis to carry in-depth analysis on emerging international order and the debate on polarity in global politics. Thus, the thematic analysis tool was used for data analysis in this study.

1.16 Operational Definition of Major Terms

International Order: set of principles rules, norms and mechanisms to govern the relationship, interactions and behavior of states in the international system. It encompasses various components, including international law, diplomacy, international institutions, cooperation agreements and the balance of power among the nations.

Emerging International order: represents the shifting power dynamics, norms, and institutions that are emerging in response to changing geopolitical, economic, and societal factors. New order may be characterized by the rise of new powers, changes in alliances and

partnerships, the reconfiguration of international governance mechanisms with new norms and values.

International System: refers to the regular interactions of two or more sovereign states at global arena and have impacts on one another.

Polarity: refers to the distribution of power among countries in the international system. It measures the relative power and influence of states which is comprised of their capabilities and alliances in different levels. It is distributed in three categories, Unipolarity (single superpower), Bipolarity (two superpower) and Multipolarity means more than two powerful countries in the international system.

Emerging Powers: refers the nations with rapid advancement in economic growth, political stability, technology, industry, and military capabilities which often possess geopolitical ambitions and have impacts in international affairs. They may challenge the traditional power structures and dynamics of the established world order as they seek to reshape the global political and economic landscape.

1.17 Organization of the Study

This study is comprised of five chapters and conclusion. They are as follows.

1. Introduction.
2. Theoretical Framework.
3. The Existing Polar Structure of Global Politics.
4. The Challenging Forces to the Existing Polar Structure.
5. The Emerging Polarity in the Global Politics.

Major Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations

2 CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

While studying the polar structure of international politics in the international system, neo-realism is the best framework to understand the polarity in international politics. Polarity attracted the intellectuals of international relations during the Cold War period to understand the power structure of international politics because the interests of great powers and their policies have intense impacts on the behaviour of states in international politics. The polar structure of international politics is defined by the great powers, which are identified by the distribution of powers among the states that create the power structure in international politics within the international system. The theory goes around the power structure of international politics, the capabilities of great powers, the distribution of powers, and the balance of power. Neo-realism provided the most suitable lenses to understand and study the polarity in international politics. Thus, neo-realism theory is adopted as the theoretical framework for this study.

Adopting neo-realism theory for the study of polarity in international politics because it is old and most influential paradigm of International Relations, and it believes that we do not need to understand the internal politics of a state to understand its behavior. It focuses on structure of international politics, power competition among great powers and role of great powers in shaping and reshaping the polar structure in the international system. Moreover, the theory examines the distribution of power capabilities among the great powers and provide tools for the measurement of power capabilities of great powers to understand the present and future of polar structure of international politics.

The power structure of international politics has been created by great powers through the relative material capabilities. Neorealism school of thought believes that the state is unitary

actor in the international politics because it acts rationally and makes rational choices. State acts according to its national interests and seeks to maximise its relative power for security threats and to ensure its survival in the anarchical international system, and “anarchy is the ordering principle of the international system” that means there is no higher authority than state and there is no watchman in the international politics to keeps check and balance on state’s behavior. States’s almost do same things in the international politics because they all have to ensure their survival through their relative material powers, and internal structure does not matter whether they are ‘democracies or autocracies’ or ‘capitalist or communist’. The significant feature of international system is polar structure that determines by number of great powers, which persistent and change depends on the present of great powers.

Kenneth Waltz claimed in his book ‘*Theory of International Politics*’ that structure of international politics is not ordered and organized because of the absence of central authority, therefore, the international system is anarchic. The structure defines the behaviour of the units (states) because it emerged from the coaction of states. Neorealism theory emerged from Waltz’s writings in 1967, 1975, and 1979. It is also called structural realism because its main assumptions revolve around power politics, balance of power, distributions of capabilities, and the polar structure of international politics within the international system.

Unipolarity is an unbalanced power structure in the international system because there is no other power to contain the only great power. The United States is the only great power in international politics. However, according to structural realism, unbalanced power in international politics imposes a threat on the weaker states because power without checks and balances becomes dangerous for others. The unbalanced power structure leaves the weak states uneasy and gives them reason to enhance their own power capabilities or make alliances to balance the distribution of power because power only keeps checks and balances on power (Waltz, 1997). For instance, when France emerged as the only great power, then Britain,

Austria-Hungary, and Prussia formed coalitions to preclude Napoleon's rise through balancing power (Elrod, 1976), and when Great Britain was the superpower, then Germany, Italy, and Russia strengthened their capabilities to balance power because international politics hate unbalanced power.

Therefore, today, the rising powers are enhancing their capabilities to create a balance of power with the United States because it has become a threat for other states, and the policies the US has owned against Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war on terror have created security dilemmas for other states (Walt S. M, 2009). Furthermore, the efforts of North Korea and Iran to gain nuclear weapons aim to deter US invasion and pressure (Takehy, 2003). Similarly, China's enhancement of its military power desires to counter the US in the Far East (Brooks, Wohlforth & Lieber, 2005). Thus, imbalances of power constrain other states to strengthen their power capabilities to ensure their survival by balancing power, as they did against the US to limit its influence.

According to Waltz, "structures emerge from the coexistence of states" the 'structure' the interaction of states, which he called 'primary units of politics' such as city-states, empires and nation-states. In the international system, states can ensure their own survival, prosperity or destruction through their own efforts because, in the structure of international politics, all states have to ensure their own survival and interests, and according to the principles of the structure, states have to rely on self-help. Furthermore, survival is the prerequisite of all states, but some states after strengthening security, desire to achieve larger goals, which are more valuable than survival. Some states strive to run the system according to the policy of reward and punishment. Waltz argued that "patterns of behaviour nevertheless emerge, and they derive from the structural constraints of the system" actors may perceive that they have known that how structure serves their interests, but it is structure that defines the winner of the game in the

system. The state may win and stay at the top but it defends the acceptance of successful practices (Waltz, 1979, pp. 91–93).

According to Waltz, the international structure is established by the interactions or coactions of the states, and it can be changed by organizing principles or the transition of the capabilities of the states. The states that create the structure of international politics are great powers that have strong military and political power. The military and political powers are means to gain economic developments, and the economic power means to gain military and political powers; therefore, the states that have strong military power, influential political power, and developed economies are known as great powers that shape the structure of international politics (Waltz, 1979, p. 94).

The states are the primary actors in international politics, and those are the great powers that shape the structure in the international arena within the system through their coordination and coactions. The major powers are those that have strong powers, where different states have different capabilities. The capabilities vary from state to state, and for figuring out great powers, then has to compare the capabilities of states to find out great power and smaller power because capabilities are the attributes of the states. The structure changes with changes in the capabilities of states or the transition of power from one state to another. Therefore, the transition of capabilities among states changes the polar structure of international politics.

Moreover, Waltz defined polarity, or power structure, as the presence of a number of great powers in international politics. The capabilities of states are measured by comparative studies: when there is one great power, it will be unipolar; when there are two great powers then it will be bipolar; and if there are more than two great powers then it will be multipolar. The polar structure of the international system could be defined by counting the number of great powers, which are distinguished according to their material capabilities. Therefore, the

study of polarity in international politics needs to study the capabilities of states in order they are distributed among the states. (Waltz, 1979, p, 97-99).

In addition, for the creation of a power structure or to preserve the structure and sometimes to change the structure of international politics, states have to create a balance of power with threatening states. States are the unitary actors in international politics because they are rational actors who minimum seek their own preservation and maximum desire to become dominate power in international politics. However, for shaping the balance of power, states have to do two categories of efforts: internal power maximization (military strength, economic capability, and political or diplomatic influence) and externally to enlarge their alliances to weaken competitors. In an anarchic system, states always strive to ensure their security; for that, it depends on the states whether they maximize their power by collating with weaker states to enhance more benefits for power maximization or make alliances with powerful states to become more powerful. Waltz claimed that for maintaining their position in the international system, major powers mostly seek to make coalitions with weaker states because from them they get more benefits, and there are no threats from weak states, but there is a threat, making alliance with another major power. The first concern for major powers is not to ensure their security but rather to maintain their position in the international system (Waltz, 1979, Chapter 6).

2.1 Measurement of Power Capabilities

In world politics, great powers always create the polar structure of international politics because they are the strongest states in the world. The capabilities figure out the power of states by different numbers of powers in different areas, but there is a question mark about how to measure the capabilities of states to know whether it is a great power or a superpower. Another question is: what must be included in the measurement of state capabilities to find out the polar structure? These are both basic questions that one must be aware of while studying the polarity

in international politics because, in international politics, states are in the self-help system and have to exercise combined capabilities to gain their national interests. According to neorealism theory, for measuring the capabilities of great powers, one must study the military strength, economic capability, political stability, size of population and territory, resource endowment, and competence. However, to know the actual power of a state, one has to measure these capabilities, which must be measured combinedly because these capabilities combinedly make a state powerful (Waltz, 1979, p. 131).

To distinguish the power gaps between the great powers, one has to measure the material capabilities of the great powers, because without measurement of the power capabilities of states, one could not define the status of a particular state in international politics. Mearsheimer believes that there are two kinds of power capabilities that states possess, latent power and military power. Latent power refers to the wealth, size of population, and technology, which are the raw potential of a great state to build military power (Mearsheimer, 2001a, p. 55).

In order to know the power of a state, one must measure its material capabilities, such as latent and military power, and in latent power, one must focus more on wealth than size of population because a greater population cannot make a state great power, but greater wealth makes a state great power. However, the size of the population does not ensure a greater economy, but a greater economy requires a large population. In addition, he claimed that for measuring state wealth, one must measure “a state's mobilizable wealth and its level of technological development. Mobilizable wealth refers to the economic resources a state has at its disposal to build military forces” because it is more important to determine how much wealth a state spends on military building or defence than total wealth (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 62). Another way of measuring the economy of a state is to look at its GNP (Gross-National Product) which provides the yearly output of the state's economy, but this is not a good

indicator for measuring two different kinds of the state's economy because it measures the overall economy of the state.

However, there are differences in mobilising the wealth of states, such as industries and technological sectors. The GNP might be the same in advanced industrialized states and semi-industrialized states, but there is a difference in the production of quality and sophisticated technologies in both states. He claims that GNP would be a good measuring tool when two relevant great powers have similar levels of economic development (Mearsheimer, 2001a, p. 62). However, he claimed that GNP would be a good measuring tool for the measurement of the latent power of a state if there are whole and accurate data on a state's GNP and the major decline of the role of steel in major industrial economies; therefore, GNP is good to use to measure the economies of great powers (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 67).

Furthermore, the latent power determines the military strength of great powers because wealth is connected to military power. As Waltz argued that "moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength" and it is internal power balancing strategy of great powers (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). If you look at the history of rise and fall of the great powers, then there is a clear connection between their economy and military power. For example, the rise and fall of Russia from 1800 to 2000 shows that its position was in transition in terms of the balance of power because of ups and downs in its economy. Similarly, the rise and fall of Napoleonic France, Great Britain, and the United States as a great power and then superpower (Zubok & Pleshakov, 1997, p. 139). Mearsheimer believes that the latent power of great powers builds its military power, which makes a great power more powerful in material capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2001a, p. 67–75).

Furthermore, he argued that not every case of latent power makes a state great power because great power has both latent and military capabilities; however, some states have

developed economies but weak military forces. It depends on the state; if it succeeds in converting its wealth power into military power and establishing balance power, then it might get great power status (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 75–76) because, after the Cold War, Japan was the second largest economy but not a great power due to the weak military power. So, wealth is essential power element to make a state a great power, but it depends on its own efficiency that how much it spends on the military and how it makes its military powerful with well-equipped equipment and technologies to change the balance of power and most importantly, state efficiency to convert its wealth into military power.

Mearsheimer argued that the main power capability of a state is its military, which determines the power capabilities of the state. There are four kinds of military power of states: which are land army, naval force, air force, and nuclear weapons capability. He claimed that for measuring the great power military capabilities then one must measure its land army capabilities and has nuclear deterrence in the competitive world, but nuclear capabilities don't determine the actual military power; rather land power determines the actual military capability (Mearsheimer, 2001a, p. 83–84). Moreover, for establishing balance of power, a great power must build a strong military power because military power is the most significant power capability in an anarchic international system. The kinds of military power must be strong, such as land, naval, and air power, along with nuclear capabilities but the most important is land army power, and it does not mean that air force and navy are not important; they are because most of the wartime support land army (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 85–86). The naval power plays an important role in controlling significant strategic points in the sea, which help to control lines of communication, transport troops and products, and trade of rival great power to damage its wealth but it cannot seize rival territory that needs a land army. The naval power is measured by its control of the command of the sea, the submarines, and sophisticated technologies (Mearsheimer, 2001a, p. 87–96).

Similarly, the air force determines military power through its command of airspace control. The air force supports the land force in the war between great powers, and a state gains air superiority than land force easily achieves its objectives. The air force power measurement includes the superior capabilities of the air force (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 96–99).

Thus, Mearsheimer believes that great power can create balance through latent and military power capabilities. These two are the most important factors determining the great power capabilities of states, which need comparative measurement to determine their power strength. He believes that if one wants to measure the actual power capabilities of great powers, then one must measure their military power, which is the most crucial element of power in international politics. Economy and technology of a state are other important elements of the power capabilities of great power, along with the size of the population, because these elements determine the strength of military power.

In addition, Schweller suggested the Waltzian concept of power measurement, who argued that for measurement of state capabilities one must measure the “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capacity, military might, and political stability and competence” (Schweller, 2017a). “To qualify as a great power, a state must possess greater than half the military capability of the most powerful state in the system” (Schweller, 1998, p. 17). The major powers are also great power of second rank, they have large share of power capabilities but have inferior power capabilities as compare to a great power. However, a major power is considered the regional powers because it is dominating state in the region and possess capabilities to be global hegemon if it plays the role of ‘spoiler state’ in the international politics, means have intentions and competence to change the power structure (Schweller, 2017b).

The scholar of neorealism tried to differentiate power capabilities between superpower and great power to understand the polar structure of international politics. The scholars debated the distribution of capabilities that how to measure the power capabilities of states to know which states possess the status of superpower and great power. Waltz used the superpower and great power terminologies as synonyms; however, Buzan argued that the superpower is more powerful than the great powers in terms of their capabilities. Buzan argued in his writing '*The United States and Great Power: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*' that the concept of great power is Eurocentric because it was the centre of international politics where a number of great powers emerged and declined for 500 years. In Europe, the principle criteria for gaining great power status were military power and victory in war, as well as recognition from the peer group at the top table, such as the naval and continental power of Britain and the land power of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Distinction emerged in European-centric power when the US and Japan were raised as great powers from different regions, and both states had strong military, economic, and political power in their respective regions and became regional hegemons.

Furthermore, the measurement of power capabilities showed that Japan, Italy, and Austria-Hungary were great powers in 1937, and the US, USSR and UK were superpowers because their economic and military capabilities were higher than theirs. "I will for the moment call superpowers possessing and using intercontinental military-political reach and regional great powers largely confined to their own continental or subcontinental area" (Buzan, 2004a, Pp. 47–50).

A state could be ranked in the category of a superpower when it has strong material power capabilities (top-class military-political capabilities and a developed economy to support these capabilities) and has exercised its power in the whole international system. A state could be ranked as a great power when it has higher relative capabilities in the region as compared to

others and has prospects to emerge as a superpower by enhancing its actions beyond its respective region. Buzan argued that to know the polar structure of international politics, one must measure the material power capabilities of states along with how states calculate their own behaviour and significantly how respond to others (Buzan, 2004b, Pp. 68–70).

The Brooks and Wohlforth method of measuring power capabilities is to measure the distribution of capabilities among states by comparing their material capabilities, such as military, economy and technology. For the measurement of military power, one must focus on the capacity of the state that how quickly it recovers its military power gap instead of measuring the expenditure of states on the military because some countries have the ability to convert other resources to military capabilities. A state's military capability measurement includes its command of the sea, space, air, and infrastructure which are considered elements of military capacity.

Furthermore, for the measurement of technological capabilities, one must measure the input and output distinctions of technologies. Input measurement includes investment in infrastructure for technological development, the stock of human capital, skills, education, and tacit knowledge, and investment in Research and Development (R&D) as well as technological innovation. The output shows the state's technological capabilities, which include technological invention, competitiveness, royalty and licence fees, and the distribution of noble prizes in science and technology, including the comparison study of technological imports and exports.

In addition, economic development is another capability of a state which shows its power strength in the world. The economic measurements must include the internal challenges of the economy, such as environmental pollution, an ageing population, rising demands of the middle class, social safety, state enterprises, and the middle-income trap (which most states fail to escape), along with its GDP growth. In the globalization era, the number of multinational

corporations also be included in the measurement of the economic capability of a state (Brook & Wohlforth, 2015).

Similarly, the current debate of polarity needs to be investigated through the way of measurement of distribution of the capabilities of states, as Waltz suggested in his theory 'theory of international politics' in the Cold War period. In order to know today's power structure of the world and the emerging, one needs to understand the systematic distribution of power capabilities. If we look at today's power capabilities, then one must analyse the power gap between the rising great powers and the United States. Secondly, the speed of reducing gap of power capabilities between rising powers and existing great power, and thirdly, if one compares the contemporary distribution of power among the rising great powers with the United States, one can reach a solid conclusion that whether the rising powers such as China, Russia and India should be considered great powers or not, this could be known by measuring the relative material power capabilities of the countries through the Waltzian concept of measurement.

2.2 Challenge to Existing Great Power and Polar Structure of International Politics

The power structure changes when the capabilities of states change. The United States established a unipolar international order after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and has enjoyed sole great power status in international politics. The US created a unipolar structure because it had the strongest military strength, a developed economy, a stable political system, and a skilled population with huge territory. The US had no competitor in the world in terms of power. However, the situation for the US has changed with the rise of new great powers in the race of power competition in international politics, such as China and Russia. They have challenged the existing polarity structure through their augmenting capabilities in terms of military strength, economic development, and political influence.

Moreover, they have vast territory with a huge population and are competent to change the power structure. As neorealist thinkers believe that the behavior of states changes when international system changes that changes by the change in distribution of power, the rising powers changes their behavior because their power capabilities shifts, which challenges the existing structure of international system when it does not favor their interests (Aytekin & Mikail, 2016).

Today, the world is moving from a unipolar world into a multipolar world with three great powers in international politics because these three countries are dominating international politics with their capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2017). However, it needs investigation to know that the rising powers have adequate capabilities to dominate global politics, and the rising China, Russia and India have capabilities to gain great power status. If rising countries have enough power capabilities to transform the unipolar structure into a multipolar structure, then needs to understand the emerging polar structure through the measurement of material power capabilities of RIC countries comparatively with the United States.

Throughout the modern history, international politics has remarkably evident different changes in the framework of the polar structure. In the history of IR, international politics had mostly been in a multipolar system for nearly 500 years, dominated by Europe. The last multipolar structure ended with the defeat of Germany and Japan, which ended the Second World War. In the post-second world war period, polar structure was transformed into bipolar structure having two great powers US and USSR, which was come into end by abrupt fall of Soviet Union. Through the history of international politics, states have strived to maintain a balance of power in the international system, such as Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, which balanced the power against Napoleon of France. The rise of Germany, Italy, the US, Japan, and Russia balanced the power against Great Britain. The anarchic nature of the international system constraints states to compete relentlessly with one another to maximise

power or make alliances to ensure balance of power because their greatest capabilities guarantee the state's survival and security.

The assumptions of neorealism clearly defined the power competition between existing great power and emerging great powers. Neorealism theory believes that great powers are the main players of international politics, which are operating in an anarchic international system and states have offensive military capabilities that can inflict harm to other states. The great powers do not know the intentions of one another, whether one own the policy of force to change balance of power by acting as a 'revisionist state' or accept the status-quo of balance of power. Further, states are rational actors, which come up with strategies to ensure their survival in the self-help international system (Mearsheimer, 2007a). A state increases its power capabilities because structure of international politics compels to do that for the survival because no states can know the intentions of other state's power maximization, this situation creates a fear among the great powers. The fear of threat, fear of survival and fear of transforming polar structure in the international politics pushes states to enhance their material power capabilities, and that power maximization creates security dilemma for others. These circumstances put great powers in power competition because one power maximization challenges another security and position in the international politics (Mearsheimer, 2007b).

As per the prerequisite of state survival is dependent on its power capabilities and balance of power (whether through balancing or bandwagoning) in the self-help system, states have to fight the war of survival of the fittest. The US became the sole superpower, and its offensive policies towards terrorism and nuclear proliferation have threatened others. Therefore, other states have tried to increase their power capabilities to deter the US. Neorealists believed that a single great power means unbalanced power, which international politics abhors. Unbalanced power constrains the state's ability to strengthen their power capabilities. Strengthening power capabilities means to change the status-quo of the existing

international system and challenging the existing great power hegemony in international politics.

If a state challenges the existing superpower, then how will the existing superpower behave? According to neorealism, a superpower will try to preclude challenges to its status, treat those challenges as security threats, and strive to preserve material power to maintain its status. Secondly, it will avoid war and engage with another great power rival through delay tactics or prevention because it is a superpower and wants to be. Thirdly, it will try to prevent it from balancing against it and contain it as an emerging superpower (Buzan, 2004, p.89).

In the present time, the rising powers are acting as according to the logic of neorealists as well the United States. The growing material capabilities of China such as highest growing economy, rapid military modernization, enhancing political influence (in East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and North America), and development in technology. Furthermore, Russia is another revisionist power with strong military power, growing political influence (in Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia), science and technology, and a growing economy. India is another rising country in the world that is modernizing its military, growing its economy, and developing in the technological sector. Furthermore, Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, and turning to Ukraine in 2022, including its active role in the Middle East and Africa, have brought it extraordinary direct power competition with the US (Erdemir, E, 2023).

Brazil and South Africa are not that much capable in material powers but they are regional powers in their regions, and the way they are rising will be proven as challenge to the United States in future. However, the United States is the sole superpower state today in material capabilities, being challenged by China and Russia. The United States actions towards China in Asia-Pacific evidencing that it is striving to contain the rise of China in its respective

region (Zhao, 2015), for example, trade war, making alliances, Quad (an informal alliance of Japan, Australia, India and the US), AUKUS (Australia, UK and the United States) and IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) and strengthening economic and security bilateral relations with Japan, South Korea and Australia (Kang, D.C, 2022). Similar attitudes of United States towards Russia to contain it by expanding NATO, putting economic sanctions on Moscow (Bloomberg, 2022) and its full support to Ukraine clearly shows that US wants to degrade Russia's capabilities to make it non-competitor (Gvosdev, N. K, 2023).

According to Mearsheimer, if the great power does not confront other rival states as a threat to its hegemony, then it always desires to maintain the status-quo of power in international politics and preserve the existing distribution of power (Mearsheimer, 2004a, p. 42). The United States was the only great power hegemon in international politics from the early 1990s until the late 2010s, and in that period it had no competitors in the world. Therefore, in that period, the United States had no containment policy towards its rivals and tried to maintain the status-quo of power.

Furthermore, if other states rise as great powers, then there will be no policy of maintaining the status-quo of existing great power because the rising great powers emerged as a challenge to the hegemony of existing great power. In this situation, both the existing and emerging great powers create a security dilemma, which compels the existing great power to stop them and the emerging power to enhance its material capabilities to counter it. As Mearsheimer claimed, "if a regional hegemon is confronted with a peer competitor, it would no longer be a status quo power. Indeed, it would go to considerable lengths to weaken and maybe even destroy its distant rival" (Mearsheimer, 2004b, p. 42).

However, since the last decade, China and Russia have emerged as rising powers whose power capabilities have threatened US hegemony in different regions. Both rising states have

proven themselves as peer-competitors to the United States in terms of power capabilities. The anarchic international system with self-help principles constrained the US to weaken its rivals by containing their rise and strengthening its own material capabilities, along with promoting alliances against the rival states. Because in international politics, if a state tries to dominate, then it becomes a threat to another state.

The great powers become challenge to each other when they increase their power capabilities. The more power enhancements of great powers, create more fear among them. Because in anarchic system there is no central authority to ensure the security of states then in that situation, more power possession means creating more fear of security threats among great powers (Mearsheimer, 2004b, Pp. 42–43). Great powers always want to ensure their survival and position in international politics, which constrains them to enhance their relative powers to counter the challenge. However, the threat of increasing power capabilities of great powers differs from state to state and it is not constant to every state. For example, today, the rise of RIC countries is more threatening for the United States than the rise of the European Union (EU), and the rise of China and Russia is more dangerous for the US than the rise of India, Brazil and South Africa.

The facts behind these two different cases are that China and Russia both have strong military power, nuclear capability, authoritarian, and enhancing their latent powers. On the other hand, the US has good relations with India because both have a common rival (China), both are collaboratively countering it, and both are democratic countries. But the role of India would be spoiler to the existing power structure due to its uneven growth of military, nuclear and latent power capabilities. Therefore, India would play a role of revisionist state as well support US in emerging multipolar, but it is complicated to know the exact role of India in future because it reckons on circumstances.

Brazil is another rising power that accounts largest military power, economic growth, large population, and huge territory, which ranks it the most powerful state in its region in terms of power capabilities. It has higher economic growth and population than Russia. The behavior of Brazil towards the United States seems it is revisionist state because it mostly condemned the US policies and its attitude towards other rising states. For example, it blames US have used NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) as political tool to controlling and waning power of weaker states through these laws (Matias Spektor, 2010, p. 2) and it also opposes US sanctions on Iran nuclear development when in the same region Israel developed nuclear warheads without sanctions. It also believes that the rising powers have right to engage with world politics such as president Lula refused to condemn the role of rising powers (Mesquita, R., & Almeida Medeiros, 2016). Therefore, it is considered a 'revisionist state' among the rising powers, but it is still not that much capable to challenge United States position in international politics as compare power capabilities of both. If it succeeds to maintain its growth, then will be a serious challenge to the United States in terms of power and geographic location.

South Africa is another rising power among the BRICS countries that have growing latent and military capabilities. South Africa is most influential actor in its region by its diplomatic and political engagement in regional affairs as well as world politics. It has highest economic growth, military modernization, technological transformation and active role militarily and economically in regional issues. But South Africa's material capabilities still weak to challenge unipolar international order as compare to other members of BRICS such as China, Russia and India.

Thus, the variations in states capabilities become a threat to the existing polar structure, as today the rise of new great powers in shape of RIC countries have stood as challenge to the US unipolar world order. The existing great powers shape their policies to preserve the status-

quo through the maximization of power and create a balance of power to use that as a containment tool against the rising powers. Today, the policies of America clearly show that it is in competition with China and Russia to preserve its position in international politics. However, the history of rise and fall of great powers point out that the burden of maintaining position might wane the economic capability of leading great power (Gilpin, 1981 & Kennedy, 1987). But not in every case, it depends on the leading power whether it be able to gain profit from its position or sustaining position erode its economic development. Today, the US is running in deficit with 34.4\$ trillion national debt (Michelle, 2024) and its spending almost parallel to its GDP, which shows that for securing its position draining the US economy.

On the other side of coin, BRICS countries are largest growing economies which have challenged the US position as sole superpower in the world politics. Neorealism believes that the existing power structure would be challenged by the redistribution of power and shrinking power gap in material capabilities between the existing and rising powers that reduces the hegemony of existing great power. In power politics as rising powers enhance their material capabilities it becomes more and more challenging to the existing great power. The rising powers accumulate power capabilities to create balance of power with aim to hold a prestige and position in the world politics that would not be acceptable existing great which strive to halts the rise of emerging countries to secure its own position. However, if rising power would not have satisfied by its position then strive transform power structure by the use of force that probably results war most of the time (Mearsheimer, 2010). In present time exactly happening according to neorealists assumptions in the case of United States and emerging RIC countries.

2.3 Emerging Polar Structure of International Politics

The modern history of world politics has witnessed different polar structure in different time period. The polar structure of international politics changed with the rise and fall of the great powers in international arena. The most of time of polar structure remained multipolar

with several great powers in different centuries, it is also worth to mention that different great powers dominated polar structure and declined with the emergence of new great powers and Europe remained the power centre of world politics.

However, the history of power structure of international politics witnessed two distinct events in 20th century. First, the emergence of the United States and Japan as great powers from different part of the world, secondly, the transition of polar structure into 'Bipolarity' for the first time with two great powers the United States and Soviet Union.

Moreover, several great powers emerged, dominated the international politics, reached at the top in power capabilities and changed the polarity but the behavior of great powers have never changed. As Nicholas Spykman argued that great powers priority remained same "to operate within the same fundamental power patterns" (Nicholas, 1942, p. 461). The neorealist believes that international politics in the synonym of power competition where great powers desires to acquire more power, as Waltz noted that "the behaviors of states, the patterns of their interactions, and the outcomes their interactions produced had been repeated again and again through the centuries despite profound changes in the internal composition of states" (Waltz, 1993a, p. 45). The constant behavior of states leads them towards power competition in different aspects of power such as military, economic, political and technological. The power competition brings variations in power capabilities that changes the status of the states. The more powerful a state becomes assert more pressure on the existing great power and strive to dominate international politics, which results change in polar structure of world politics.

Furthermore, the structural change is directly proportional to the power capabilities of states and its behavior towards the existing great power polar structure in the international system. A state increases its power capabilities and act as a great power by intervening in

international issues or has ability to influence the policies of existing great power then it leads towards the structural changes in the international system.

As Waltz argued that “Structural change begins in a system's unit, and then unit-level and structural causes interact” (Waltz, 1993b, p. 49). The structure of international system affects the behavior of states and its interactions with other states within the international system, which results would be reshaping the structure of international politics. For example, the rise of France as great power in 16th century compelled Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy to counter rise of France to establish balance of power, however, the enhancement of internal power capabilities of France made it capable to act like a great power. The rise of Germany, Italy, Russia and the United states also changed the polar structure in early 20th century through internal and external power balancing. Thus, the structural changes emerge by the rise of power capabilities of a state and its interactions with other states which affects the structure, but it depends on that state whether it acts as revisionist or accept the status-quo.

Today, the RIC countries are rising powers in the world with rapid growth in their material capabilities and acting as revisionist actors in the international system. RIC countries are already in power competition, particularly China and Russia, to change the polar structure of international politics (Denisov, etl, 2019). The material power capabilities of rising state determines the ‘power shift’ in the international politics because rising powers have ability to challenge the status-quo (Gilpin. G. R, 1981a) and strive to creates an environment to exert pressure on existing power to ensure their influence in the international politics.

On the other hand, existing power adopts the containment policies and enhancing its capabilities to secure its superior position. John Mearsheimer argued that state’s first goal is to ensure its survival through the maximization of power because structure of international system constrains it to compete for its security, secondly, desires to be hegemon power in the

international system because the ultimate goal of every great power is to dominate the international system (Mearsheimer, 2014).

In contemporary power politics China and Russia both achieved their first goal because they have enough capabilities for their security, however, neither Russia's neighbor states are that much capable to contemplate a war with Russia nor China's neighbors. But it does not mean that they do not strive to be stronger because the ultimate goal of China and Russia is to be hegemon power, not just to be secured. Therefore, they are acting as revisionist emerging states which are leading the world towards new polar structure with aim to overthrow the United States from its superior position.

In addition, the rise of RIC countries possesses more threats to the present polar structure because they are rapid growing economies at present time and also Goldman Sachs argued that they will be largest economies in future including the United States by 2040 (Sachs, G. 2003). The polar structure change emerges by the change of number of great powers in the international politics, and great power emerges by the rise of their material capabilities, however, the rapid growth of RIC economies with military modernization particularly China, Russia and India have taken path to transform polar structure. As Robert Gilpin noted that power capabilities of states's grows with incremental and minor level but rapid growth in economy and military results the structural change in the international politics (Gilpin. R, 1981b, p. 13).

Moreover, neorealist believes that power capabilities of states determine the polar structure, but rising powers must have intention and competence to bring structural change. A question arises on the intentions of new rising players of international politics that whether they are revisionist or status-quo, and how to distinguish between state-quo and revisionist states? According to defensive realist the existing great power have to look at the policies of rising

power deliberately and check their military policies, as well as calculates the threats perception for its own position and allies (Ross, 1999, Friedberg, 2005, & Christensen, 2006).

While offensive realist argued that although small number of states are revisionist but leaders must assume that all states are revisionist and act correspondingly because it is almost impossible to know the intentions of states (Elman, C. 2009, p. 73). However, toady, the policies of BRICS countries clearly shows that they are coveting to change the polar structure, especially China, Russia and India, because they are developing their economy, modernizing their military power, technological competition, increasing political influence in different parts of the world such as South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. And several times they openly have challenged the United States by claiming to transform unipolarity into multipolarity. Hence, the new rising great powers are undoubtedly revisionist states and aspire to shift present power structure of international politics.

In neorealist perspective the behavior of rising powers have consequent outcomes for the stability of international system due to the dramatic shift in distribution of power. The change in distribution of power, which is triggered by rising powers would become capable to change the international power structure. However, according to John Mearsheimer neorealist perspective, rising great powers reach in a point where they have to take a decision whether they are satisfied with existing polar structure and international order in terms of their 'national interests' or need to transform existing international structure according their satisfactions of achieving their national interests (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 73). The decision of rising powers is the reflection of their share division of power capabilities, which determines the attitude of rising powers to be revisionist states or status-quo. The present rising powers indicating the RIC countries whose adopted revisionist attitude to reshape the existing polar structure of world politics.

As Waltz noted that, the regularities and patterns of state's behaviors are driven by structural forces in the international system and the patterns have been repeated again and again for centuries (Waltz, 1993, p. 45 & Mearsheimer, 1990). The world might be changed by emergence of democracies, globalization, free market economy and multinational trade among the states, and the presence of international and regional institutions and organizations, but history repeated itself. However, despite above innovative concepts in 21st century, the behavior of states has never changed. Today, world might be in progressive era in terms politics, economy along with extraordinary innovation in science and technologies, but the patterns of states are reverted familiar to the history. For example, the rise of authoritarian as alternatives to democracy, outbreak of global pandemic (COVID-19), return of nationalism, inflation and significantly power politics between major powers in the global politics (Serchuk, 2020; Sitaraman, 2020).

In great power competition context, the behavior of states have reverted at present time, because the intensity in the game of great power politics is augmenting. Early 2022, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin called themselves “old and dear” friends with “no limits” friendship, after Russian invasion on Ukraine February 2022, which is called ‘axis of autocracy’ by the West. The Sino-Russian informal alliance has rejected the US and her allied unipolar international order that also can be observed in their foreign policies (Galston, 2022, p. 15). Both countries are in power competition with West to creates balance of power as Waltz argued that imbalance power trigger other states to counter the existing polar structure because he believed that unipolar is unbalanced power structure (Waltz, 2000, p. 13), as currently RIC countries are in route to change the power structure of international politics.

According to neorealist theory, in self-serving international system states have to focus on internal balancing which is more reliable in power politics rather than allies, because power capabilities of states determines the fate of polar structure. The BRICS countries are building

their internal capabilities to compete with West such as developing their economy, seeking alternative currency against dollar for international trade and enlarging the membership of their group to gain more economic benefits. They are also increasing their military annual spending and modernizing their military capabilities with equipping advance technologies, as well as building more nuclear warheads to maintain nuclear deterrence with West. Today, China is more challenging competitor to the US unipolar international order in terms of power capabilities with its zero-sum balancing strategy to displace US from Asia-Pacific and also global level with its internal power capabilities (Doshi, 2021, p. 10).

Thus, neorealists believe that polar structure of international politics changes with the change in power capabilities of states. However, a state's power capabilities increase with revisionist behavior or intention mostly emerges as challenge to the existing international order which results shift in polar structure in the international system. The reason behind the enhancement power capabilities of a state is to ensure its survival and security, also to become hegemon power in the world politics because as neorealists believe that the ultimate goal of state is to be hegemonic power. The existing great power always resist against the rising power with different policies to create hurdles towards its rise because the existing great power desires to preserve the status-quo of power structure to secure its position in the world politics, which begets the game of power competition. Neorealists mostly focuses on great powers because they believe that international politics is the game of great powers where small states have very little role.

The whole debate of neorealists is around the great powers, power competition and material power capabilities because that defines the polar structure in the international system. The soaring capabilities of rising powers create challenging environment of power competition and history evident that whenever new states rise then had transformed the polar structure of international politics. The existing power structure is unipolar which neorealists believe that it

is imbalanced power structure that creates security dilemma for other states and dissatisfaction for their interests which constrains them to enhance power capabilities and establish balance of power to transform power structure.

3 CHAPTER THREE

THE EXISTING POLAR STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL POLITICS

3.1 Definition of polarity

In the discipline of International Relations, the term polarity is used to identify the number of dominating great powers in the international system. The great powers are identified by their enormous power capabilities, which have been divided into different poles in different periods. According to Goedele De Keersmaeker (2017, p. 232) “Polarity is about the number of great powers or polar powers.” Commonly, there are three types of polarity in the International Relations which are unipolarity means one great power, bipolarity means two great powers, and multipolarity means more than two great powers.

Furthermore, there is discussion about the concept of polarity, including disparity between the great powers and other states in terms of power capabilities. In a unipolar system, there is a huge disparity between the only great power and all other countries. In bipolarity, there are two great powers, which almost have equal power capabilities and positions in global politics, and also a huge power gap with fewer powers. In multipolarity, there are more than two great powers that approximately have equal power capabilities and also have power disparity with other states. (Levy 1985 cited in Mansfield 1993).

The great powers are known by their power capabilities that is a significant element for identifying a great power in global politics. The power capability distinguishes a great power from fewer power. There are some indicators that use to measure power capabilities: military power, economic power, political influence, population, resources, and technology. These capabilities have an important role for changing existing power pole to new pole (Kohout F, 2003, p. 58).

3.2 Significance of polarity in global politics

Polarity is a concept emerged from the theories of International Relations to define the power of states in global politics. The neorealists define it as ‘power polarity’ which emerged from the material power capabilities of great powers. The concept emerged in post-second World War when it was bipolarity, where the US and Soviet Union were leading global politics in opposite directions of each other. The US and Soviet Union were both superpower states that had different ideologies, economics, military and blocs to enhance their influence over global politics (De Keersmaeker, 2017b).

The polar structure plays an important role in global politics because it gives direction to other states and has deep consequences for the behaviors of states. The polar structure determines the foreign policy of great power and the major and middle power states. Polarity is the main feature of the international system which determines the global politics, and the changes in polarity impact global politics. The polarity does not affect the states behaviour directly; rather, it effects global politics through the thinking and decisions of the main actors of polar power. However, only polar powers decisions do not bring change in the behaviour of states, structure itself also brings transformation in polar power behaviour because structure itself determines the behavior of states. And the decisions of states bring changes in polar structure in the international system (Wendt, 1987, p. 342).

The states that alter the polar structure are the rising great powers, which have strong material capabilities and intentions of change in the status-quo power. Such rising states are called ‘revisionist’ states, which are outcomes of the international system. The shift in power structure determines the state’s behaviour and the distribution of power pushes states to act differently, such as by providing opportunity to rising powers to continuously enhance their material power capabilities in peaceful manners (Baylis&Smith, 2001, p. 128). At that point, rising powers strive to gain a great power position in global politics with a courageous policy

of change, if they do not find an international system in favour of their national interests (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 73). The decisions of rising powers and polar power have a significant role in global politics because both have consequences for polar structure, which is a determinant of states behaviour in the international system.

3.3 Historical Background

3.3.1 Evolution of global power dynamics throughout history

In the modern history of power competition and acquiring power to dominant the regional and global politics have been coming for immemorial. Historically the political power is directly linked with the economy because wealth helps to establish strong military power, and both combinedly create political power. During the dark age of Europe, the church was the most powerful institute that defined the external strategies and relations of states.

In the age of empires, the Dutch Empire was the most powerful empire in the world because of its strong economy that shaped its political power over the world. The Dutch Empire had most advanced technology ‘ships’ in that time which helped her to explore and establish colonies to boost its economy. During the 15th century, Dutch Empire established first international trade transition bank which extended its economic influence over the world, and the currency of Dutch empire became international trade currency that helped her to take its economic growth in upwards. Dutch empire also established East Indian Company in 1602 as a business centre and international market where exchange of goods and products supplied to other regions from Asia (World History, 2023). The wealthy Dutch Empire strengthened its military power to protect its trade routes and international trade. At that period, the Dutch Empire was most powerful in the world because of its economy and military power, which shaped its political power and held strong hegemony over global politics.

The Napoleonic France became a superpower with its strong economic, military and political influence over the region. As Napoleonic France fought against the entire Europe successfully until 1812 with no need of approval or support of any kind. France fought against the whole Europe without any alliance and support because it was the most powerful country in the world at that period. After Dutch empire France became superpower country because of its material power capabilities (Interview Anastasiya Fedorova, 2024). After the defeat of Napoleon in the war of Waterloo through the alliance of other European great power countries that were Britain, Austria-Hungary, Prussia, and Russia, which is commonly known as the 'congress of Vienna' (Hglund, D. G, 2019).

After the industrial revolution a huge shift emerged in human history when agriculture was replaced by industries. The British Empire had a huge amount of raw material extracted from its colonies, which boosted up the British economy. After the Dutch Empire Britain became master of modern ships which enhanced the British Naval capabilities to make colonies and extract raw materials to boost the economy. The economic power surged British military power and political power over the world till the rise of new great powers of that time such as Germany, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, the USA and France.

The rise of these countries snatched the British position of only superpower and unipolar international order was transformed into a multipolar power structure till the end of the Second World War. In every period the power transition had taken place through the distribution of power among the great powers and history evident that in every age a state raised became at the top position and declined. During the decline period there were other countries that are rising such as during the Dutch Empire unipolarity, the British and France were rising, and during the France unipolarity, the British, Austria-Hungary, Prussia and Russia were rising. Besides, when Britain became a superpower, Germany, United States, Italy were rising, and they altered the power structure. So, in every age of power politics none country remained at

the top for a long time, historically there are many examples of great powers that rose, became so powerful, got the position at the top and then declined.

3.3.2 Transition of previous polar structure to the existing polar structure

The concept of polarity emerged the in post-Second World War when different scholars of International Relations tried to understand the international system. The interactions of states and their foreign policy bring changes and maintain status-quo in the international system. The ‘polar power’ is part of the international power structure within the international system. The polarity is determined by the interactions of main actors (great powers) through their material power capabilities, such as economic, military, technological and political power.

The previous polar structure was bipolar, where the US and Soviet Union were two great powers that almost had equal power capabilities. In the post-Second World War, both polar powers were in power competition and had confronted each other in different issues. From 1945 to 1991, the world remained bipolar because global politics was influenced by two great powers and was divided in two blocs West and East (Costigan, Cottle and Keys, 2019). The Soviet Union was disintegrated in 1990 and lost its great power position and its capabilities to compete with the United States. After the downfall of the Soviet Union the US remained the only superpower state in the world and gained the position and further enhanced its influence and order accordingly. The unipolar international order is defined in an order “organized around open trade, cooperative security, multilateralism, democratic solidarity, and American leadership. Regional and global institutions were established to facilitate cooperation, enshrine shared norms, and bind societies together” (Ikenberry, 2020, p. 1).

The international system was created by the United States, and it has provided “hegemonic leadership” (Ikenberry 2018, p. 7; Jervis et al., 2018). The US was also supported by its other allied countries for the establishment of a unipolar international order. As well, the

international institutions played a significant role in the existing international order and organizations that were created from the Bretton Wood system such as the WTO, GATT, IMF and World Bank. These institutions also contributed to maintaining the US-led unipolar system through the support of financial issues of third-world countries, and they were also used as political tools by the United States to establish its hegemonic leadership over the global politics. Similarly, in this context the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also played a significant role in the process of unipolarity. The well-developed economy, well equipped military with advance weaponry, and huge influential political hegemony of the United States succeeded in establishing a unipolar power structure.

A narrative of emerging international order has emerged since the early 21st century with the rise of new great powers. The argument of changing polarity fastened after the 9/11 incident when a terrorist group attacked three significant places of a superpower state, the US. Those places were the Pentagon (for security), Twins Tower (economic), and the White House (political centre), which remained safe from the attack. The debate of changing the unipolar international order surged further when the US confronted a failed economic system in 2008, Russia in Syria, Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea; and on the other side, economic rise of China and its military modernization. The increasing trend of changing current polar power and the confrontation of great powers for creating a new international power structure in global politics have increased. This chapter explored the existing polar structure and measured power capabilities of emerging great powers and the US to identify the existing polar structure.

3.4 Comparative Analysis on the US and RIC Economic Dimensions

The United States created a unipolar liberal international order in 1991 after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The main factor behind the decline of the Soviet Union was financial downfall, which weakened the country and the government could not maintain its integrity. During the Cold War, the world was divided in two blocs where both great powers

were in competition, and both states financially supported their blocs and alliances to maintain their power dominance over the different regions. However, the external expenditure of the Soviet Union exceeded its revenue, and the unstable economy vanished the power of the Soviet Union.


The economy is the significant power element of any state because it makes the state's military and political power. Today, the argument of the end of unipolarity is mostly based on the economic analysis of different scholars, who believed that the world is in a bipolar international order where the US and China both are great powers (for recent takes, see Graeger et al. 2022, pp.1-20; Ashford and Cooper 2023; Bekkvold 2023; Brooks and Wohlforth 2023a). The factor behind that argument is the continuous growth of China's economy, which is rapidly growing and left behind the US in purchasing power. According to the recent poll of Foreign Affairs, 65% of IR scholars believed that the world is more like bipolar and multipolar than unipolar; on the other hand, 23% believed that the world is still unipolar (Foreign Affairs, 2023). Josep Borrell, the high representative of the European Union argued that the current polar structure is "messy multipolarity" (EEAS 2022), and recently the national security strategy of Germany stated that "the world in the 21st century is multipolar" (The Federal Government 2023; also see Scholz 2023).

This section analysed the economic strength of rising powers such as RIC (Russia, India and China) and the United States. The economic ascending of China really became a threat to the US economic superiority, as China has maintained its economic growth since last decade and has the highest GDP growth in the world (Look figure 1). The US is the largest economy in the world by having a \$27.36 trillion economy, and China is the second largest economy in the world after US by having \$17.79 trillion economy in the year 2023. India and Russia are both far behind the US and China with a \$3.55 trillion and \$2.02 trillion economies in 2023 (World Bank, 2023a). According to the World Bank, China surpassed the US in terms of Gross

Domestic Products in Purchasing Power Parity (GDP-PPP), where China’s GDP was \$34.64 trillion in 2023 and followed by the US \$27.36 trillion in 2023. India and Russia lag far behind from the US and China both, such as \$14.54 and \$6.45 trillion, there is a huge gap among them (World Bank, 2023b).

Today, the US is the largest economic power in the world by having the largest economy, followed by China which comes second. India and Russia are far behind in this economic race between the US and China. However, RICs economic growth is stable but still they take decades to surpass US economic superiority. It might be China snatching it early as compared to India and Russia, but still it takes almost more decades to take the top economic power position.

(Figure 1)



Source: World Bank <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG>

India is another rising country in contemporary global politics. India is the second largest growing economic country in the world, which has maintained its GDP growth from 5-7% since last decade (Figure 1). In the last three years, India’s economic growth surpassed China’s economic growth such as 8.8% in 2021, 6.3% in 2022 and 6.7% in 2023. On the other hand, China had 8.4%, 3% and 5.3% in the last three years (Figure 1). Russia is also a rising great power, but the economic performance of Russia is the lowest as compared to the US, China and India. The Russian economic growth is in fluctuation due to different international

financial sanctions. The economic growth of Russia was 1.5% in 2013, but after the war in Ukraine in 2014, it pushed its economic growth in negative till 2016 (Figure 1). However, last year the GDP growth of Russia rose to 5.5% which shows that the Russian economy is still growing (Figure 1).

The RIC is an informal alliance of three rising countries. Russia and China are both clear revisionist states who are striving to change the international order and aspire to establish a multipolar world order. The position of India is not clear at this point because India has good relations with US and Russia. China is the main threat to the US position, where India has established alliances with the US to counter China's growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region such as QUAD.

India is also a member of the BRICS countries, which is a group of countries against the US dominance over global politics. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China and India avoided criticizing this act and also remained neutral in the UN. The RIC is using the platforms of BRICS and SCO to launch a new currency against the US dollar's dominance after Russia-Ukraine war, where India seems to be the part of this act (Liu, 2022). The BRICS holds 24% of the global GDP of the world, and it has 16% trade worldwide. The initiative of BRICS to launch a new currency against the dollar, which will reduce the US dominancy. Russia and China both are targeting the soft power tool of the US 'dollar' through which the US has maintained its influence by sanctioning other countries, but after recent Russian sanctions pushed the BRICS countries to launch an alternative currency against the dollar.

In 2020, China and Russia both waned their dollar-based exchanges by around 50% and sought alternative SWIFT system. Russia also started trading in local currencies with India, where both are trading in rupees and rubles. The local currency trade between Russia and India rose from 6% to 30% from 2014 to 2022 (Shagina, 2022). The sanctions on Russia after the

invasion of Ukraine have accelerated the de-dollarization process, where China and Russia are both deliberately working on new international trade currency, and the Indian government also seems willing to participate in this trend (Caldararo, 2022). But at this stage, the US holds economic superiority over global politics.

To analyse the economic capacity of China, for instance, consider the proportion of worldwide profits in a given industry that one country's firms account for, Sean Starrs is political economist who found that the firms of US are ranked "first in global profit shares in 74 percent of sectors from the top 2,000 corporations in the world, whereas Chinese firms are ranked first in just 11 percent of sectors." The high-tech sectors data showed that the US firms have 53% profit share and others have very less as compare to the US. For instance, Japan has 7% comes second, China has 6% comes third and Taiwan has 5% comes forth. However, the US firms are uncatchable at this time neither by China nor other countries.


In addition, at this point in today's economic giant is the United States which maintains its economic superiority. The US is the largest economy in the world, which followed by China. It might be China snatched the top economic position from the US in future, but in contemporary times the US is the largest economy in the world. India is another emerging economic power, which has maintained its economic growth since the early 21st century, and since the last decade Indian GDP has been growing. In year 2023, India had the highest GDP growth of 6.7% followed by China 5.5% growth. Russia's economy is also growing, but after the war on Ukraine and the sanctions of the West slow down the Russian economic growth, and since last year its GDP has been surging. So, in present time the US is the largest economy in the world; it might not to be in future if China succeeds to maintain its economic growth (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2023b).

3.5 Comparative Analysis on the US and RIC Military Power

The military power is the main power of any country in the anarchic world, where none know the intentions of any state that what it is going to do. In the anarchic international system, military plays the most important role as the queen plays on the chess board for the protection and survival of the king; similarly, the military plays the queen role for the state, where it protects its existence. In contemporary times the rising powers are enhancing their military capabilities to abolish the US unipolar international order and wane its hegemony over global politics. In this section, author measured the military power capabilities of Russia, China, India and the United States to know their military power. For measuring military capabilities, the annual military expenditure and other military capabilities are adopted in order to identify their military power.

The military power of the United States is far more capable than China and India. Although Russia's military is more capable than India and China but it is still behind the US military power ranking. Russia has the most advanced and sophisticated weapons and military equipment with advanced technology but is still not as much powerful as it was during the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the US and Soviet had equal military power but after disintegration the Soviet Union lost its military power. But still Russia is the second largest military power in the world just behind the United States.

(Figure 2)



Source: World Bank <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD>

Today, the United States is the largest military power in the world, whose expenditure is two times bigger than China and four times bigger than Russia and India. The US is the top military spending country in the world by spending \$916 billion in the year 2023 (Figure 2). The US has uncatchable military spending from the last decade and it is increasing year by year; for instance, look at Figure 2, it shows that from 2016 to 2023 the US military spending is increasing, which has reached \$916b from \$639b in 7 years. The US is followed by China, which has the second largest military expenditure in the world by spending \$296 billion in the year 2023 (Figure 2). China's military spending has been constantly growing since the last decade, if you look at Figure 2 that shows that China's military expenditure is increasing every year. Furthermore, Russia's military expenditure was \$109 billion in 2023, followed by India whose expenditure was \$83.6 billion last year (Figure 2).

Meanwhile, most scholars claim that China is far from being a peer global competitor of the US in terms of military power despite the rapid modernization of all forces. But still, China is far behind in military power from the United States, because China is still having less military expenditure and dependent on Russia for acquiring sophisticated weapons such as the S400 and S500 surface-to-air missile defense system. China's weapons military production is

not developed as much as the United States defence industries are advanced. India is also modernizing its military and increasing military expenditure but still weak military power when compared with the US military power. However, Russian military have that capabilities compare to the US because after the US, Russia has the most powerful military in the world. Russian military defence production and hypersonic technology have enhanced its military capabilities such as the S500 surface to air defense system, long range missiles, and other advanced military equipment. China's military power is increasing, but today the US is the most powerful country militarily. The US has more than 700 military bases around the world with advanced technologies.

To analyse the military capabilities of rising powers and the United States, the data collected from the global firepower database to measure their military capabilities. Today, China has the largest military active personnel in the world, which is followed by the US and then India and Russia (Figure 3). However, in terms of the military equipment, the US is the most capable military strength in the world. For example, the US has 13,209 aircraft and 1,854 fighter aircraft which are larger than RIC countries (Figure 3). The US is followed by Russia which has 4,255 aircraft, China has 3,304 aircraft, and then India, which has 2,296 (Figure 3).

Furthermore, the land military capabilities of US are more powerful, such as it has 4,657 tanks, 1,267 towed artilleries, 606 Aerial Tankers, 5,735 Helicopter in which 1000 are attack helicopters and 360,069 armored vehicles. Russian military is also powerful but not as the US and followed by China. Look at the (Figure 3) which shows that China is still far behind from US military power except China's naval capabilities have considerable capabilities where it can compete with the naval force of the US. As compared to these three countries military capabilities, India has weak military power because the capabilities and strengths of the US, Russia and China are more powerful (Figure 3). The United States has the most powerful military in the world, but Russia is also near power to the US in terms of military capabilities.

(Figure 3)

USA	Military Capabilities	China	Military Capabilities	Russia	Military Capabilities	India	Military Capabilities
Active Personnel	13,28,000	Active Personnel	2,035,000	Active Personnel	1,320,000	Active Personnel	1,455,550
Total Aircrafts	13,209	Total Aircrafts	3,304	Total Aircrafts	4,255	Total Aircrafts	2,296
Fighter Aircrafts	1,854	Fighter Aircrafts	1,207	Fighter Aircrafts	809	Fighter Aircrafts	606
Tanks	4,657	Tanks	5000	Tanks	14,777	Tanks	4,614
Towed Artillery	1,267	Towed Artillery	1,434	Towed Artillery	8,356	Towed Artillery	3,243
Aerial Tankers	606	Aerial Tankers	10	Aerial Tankers	19	Aerial Tankers	6
Helicopter	5,735	Helicopter	913	Helicopter	1,547	Helicopter	869
Attack Helicopter	1000	Attack Helicopter	281	Attack Helicopter	559	Attack Helicopter	40
Armored Vehicle	360,069	Armored Vehicle	174,300	Armored Vehicle	161,382	Armored Vehicle	151,248
Fleet Strength	472	Fleet Strength	730	Fleet Strength	781	Fleet Strength	294
Aircraft Carriers	11	Aircraft Carriers	2	Aircraft Carriers	1	Aircraft Carriers	2
Submarines	64	Submarines	61	Submarines	65	Submarines	18
Destroyers	75	Destroyers	49	Destroyers	14	Destroyers	12
Frigates	0	Frigates	42	Frigates	12	Frigates	12


Source: Global FirePower. <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.php?country1=russia&country2=india>

In addition, many analysts believe that China is still not a peer competitor of US in military power context, despite the China's efforts of rapid modernization of its forces. The considerable military capabilities that made the US top global military power are what the Barry Posen called "command of commons" that made the US capable to have control over the air, the space, and the open sea. The 15 categories of military capabilities where China is behind the US in these abilities, everything from aircrafts, fighter aircrafts to helicopter and attack helicopter, from aerial tankers to armored vehicle and from aircraft carrier to submarines and destroyers, in all these capabilities China is behind the US (Figure 3). China only surpassed the US in active personnel, tanks, towed artillery, frigates and fleet strength. Similarly, the US military abilities compared with the military capabilities of Russia, the US also have more capabilities expect tanks, fleet strength, submarines and frigates (Figure 3). If look at (Figure

3) on the Indian military capabilities than also found that India have less military capabilities from the US, China and Russia.

The military capabilities of China and India are dominating in regional context where they have powerful military capabilities, but if you compare with the US at global level then both needs decades more efforts to surpass the US military capabilities at global level. The US military capabilities are far ahead from China and India at present time because Washington devoted several resources for the development of its military strength in the world with decade long efforts. The reduction of this gap takes decades and costs billions of dollars because the US capabilities are far ahead in number and quality. For instance, US has 68 nuclear submarines which are too quit under the water to track, on the other side China has 12 nuclear submarines, which are noisy and easily can be tracked advanced technology of US navy's antisubmarine warfare sensors.

(Figure 4)



Source: SIPRI https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf

According to the report of SIPRI, the US is the 1st ranked country in the world which has the highest military spending, which has a \$916 billion expenditure last year and has 37% world share in military spending (Figure 4). After the US, China comes second in military

expenditure, which has 12% world share of military spending, and China is followed by Russia, which has 5% and India has 3% of the world share in military spending in the year 2023 (Figure 4).

According to the UCSER annual report (2017), the US is still ahead of China in military power, including naval power capabilities and modern aircraft. For example, the US has 11 deployed aircraft carriers and China has 2, and the US has decade long experience of operating and organizing large naval forces in external territory (IISS, 2018 & New York Times, 2018). The US Naval and Air force are deploying thousands of fifth generation fighter aircraft when China was “unable to produce a reliable jet engine, and China’s home-grown fighters are reportedly less capable than their US counterparts.” (Ankit Panda, 2018). The US also has an advanced constellation of satellite intelligence systems and communication networks, which provide significant intelligence and operational advantage to the US, while China has no such advanced system (DoD, 2017).

Russia is a powerful country in terms of military power in the world, and Russia is the top nuclear power state in the world. In present time Russia has the largest nuclear army in the world with several nuclear weapons equipment, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). In order to compare nuclear capabilities than Russia is more powerful than the United States. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) report of 2024, Russia possesses more nuclear inventory than US, such as 5,580 and 5,044. Russia and China are rising military power, but still there is a gap among them because US is more powerful than both countries in both terms in number and quality. The US has more fighter jets, bombers, military bases and the nuclear arsenal of the US B83 with an explosive yield of 1.2 megatons is the world’s most powerful nuclear arsenal (Oleksandra Mamchii, 2024).

During the Trump administration, the US quit the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) in 2019, and Russia is developing ground-based weapons while already having sea and air missile strike capabilities, which threatens the US and its allied countries security. According to the report of the US Department of Defense (2023), China also developed long range missiles, such as China's rocket force developed 2300 missiles, which have range from 300km to 3000km and also developed further long range missile which range is 500km to 5500km. Such missiles of rising powers have threatened US interests due to that factor, the US has taken steps to deploy middle-range weapons in Asian allied countries (Mark Trevelyan, 2024).

In order to compete with the United States, China has responded with a strategy to enhance its military capabilities to create balance with US military capabilities through the focusing area-denial and anti-access (A2/AD) by doing efforts for combining anti-ship and anti-airfield ballistic missiles, diesel submarines, integrated air defence systems and cruise missiles. China's such efforts are intended to increase the cost of US military campaigns in areas of China's periphery (Montgomery, 2018). However, China's efforts to balance the military power with the United States still need more advanced strategies and investment to reach in a position of US military capabilities because US military equipment has top quality.

In short, the United States is the largest military power in the world at this time, and it has far ahead in terms of power capabilities than her rivals. The Russian military capabilities and its advanced weapons and sophisticated military equipment can be near the US military capabilities, but still there is a gap in their military power. China is lag behind the US in military power now, but China's military modernization and its increasing defense budget and military expenditure will make it a powerful military state in the future. As the Xi is modernizing the Chinese forces to make it the world's first most modernized military force in the world.

However, at the current time China's military power is far lacking from the US. India is also modernizing its military and creating a powerful military force in the world but the arms and weapons exports of India came from Russia, the US and Israel, which will not allow India to be more capable to them. Indian defense production is still low and has a low Research and Development (R&D) budget for the production of complex weapons. The United States has a \$140 billion annual budget for the R&D for the production of competitive and dynamic technological military weapons, which is the highest budget as compared to RIC.

3.6 Comparative Analysis on the US and RIC Political and Diplomatic Power

The political and diplomatic power is an important element in global politics because it processes all events and triggers several diplomatic engagements, which lead the states to pursue their national interests. The political power is mainly determined by the state's economic and military power, which open the ways for political engagements to gain economic, military and other interests in different regions with different countries.

In the era of Cold War, the global politics was dominated by the United States and Soviet Union, where they had political influence in their sphere or blocs. For, instance, the Europe was divided in two blocs the Western and Eastern, where the Western bloc was dominated by the US and the Eastern bloc was dominated by Soviet Union. After disintegration of Soviet Union, the global politics has been dominated by the US. The developed economy and strong military force paved the way for the US to dominate the world. The political influence of US started expanding during the Cold War for containing the influence of Soviet Union. After being only superpower in the world the US deepen its diplomatic engagements in different regions and the roots of political influence. The United States had unopposed growing political influence almost all over the world till the counter measures of Russia in the Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

The United States political influence has been widening almost every region of the world. But at the current times, the US is confronting Russia and China as competitor players against its political hegemony in different regions. The US geographic location is far from different regions but still holds a stringent political hegemony over different regions such as the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe, and neighbouring countries such as the Latin America region. Such widening political influence of the United States never exploited by other nations in the world. The US has been involved in everything from small issues to regime change in the internal affairs of other countries because of its strong political and diplomatic influence.

In contemporary global politics, the rise of RIC has become a threat to the US hegemony in global politics. The harsh acts of the United States compelled other nations to counter US hegemony in the global politics because some US actions created security dilemmas for other states. For instance, the US unilateral decision of invasion to Iraq in 2003 without achieving a majority vote in the UN general assembly has been condemned by most European countries except the United Kingdom (Boswell, 2004). The aggressive policies of the Bush administration have threatened the security of other states, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the declaration of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as rogue states, its economic sanctions on the countries and the policy of 'War on Terror' have led emerging countries toward the soft power balancing policy (Robert, 2004).

In addition, the US military expansion in different countries in the name of establishing peace and security, such as the presence of NATO forces in the Middle East and Europe (Paul, 2005). However, the US forces have failed to maintain peace and security in the region, despite that many violent non-state actors have emerged from the Middle East with hundreds of affiliates and crushed the peace in the region (Dallas-Feeney, 2019). The war of US and allied forces in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the abolishment of the Taliban government in

2001; after 20 years of war, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the takeover of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2021, demonstrate the fall of US hegemony in the world (Peters, 2021).

The emergence of new economic countries in the 21st century has increased their political influence in global politics and raised a challenge to the current unipolar system. The rapid technological transformation and economic growth have led to the emergence of new powers such as China, Russia, India, and other rising countries of the 21st century who challenged the leadership of the West (Jones, L., 2020). The emerging countries have established their own international institutions to pursue their national interests and counter the western influence through soft power balancing policies such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Cunliffe, 2019).

The SCO was established in 2001, and its main objectives are to promote mutual economic cooperation, security, and technological fields among the member states. However, SCO has also been used as a tool to counter western influence in the region (Ahmad, 2018). China has established SCO to promote multilateralism and increased influence in the region through this organization as well as to achieve its ascending geo-economic and geo-political interests in Central Asia (an energy-rich region) and strengthen ties with Russia (D. Peihua, 2006; Aris, 2009; Jing-Dong, 2010). The membership of the SCO is increasing, and it has reached the Middle East region, where the SCO is deepening the roots of China's political influence and diplomatic engagements.

Furthermore, the establishment of AIIB in January 2016 and the Asian Development Bank created in 2015 to promote a new financial and economic order and as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank to increase Chinese influence in the region and in global politics, such as Chinese influence in East Asia, Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and others.

(Hanlon, 2017; Cooper, 2017). The foundation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on 15 September 2013 aims to promote connectivity, financial and economic cooperation, policy communication, unimpeded trade, infrastructure connectivity, people-to-people ties, or culture exchange in the Eurasia region through the land roads and railways from China to eastern Europe, which are known as 'Belt', and through the maritime route from China to different regions of Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific area. (Rahman, 2020). The BRI connects three continents and more than 160 countries in the world to encourage mutual growth and regional cooperation. The BRI is also being used as a political tool to increase the Chinese political influence in global politics (Gong, 2019). For instance, the expansion of BRI in the Middle East region, where 23% of BRI investment is given to regional states (BRI Investment Report, 2021).

BRICS is another group of countries with the ideology of creating a multipolar international order, and it is being used as a tool by Russia and China to reduce US hegemony in different regions such as the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. The Middle East region has remained under US influence since the end of the Cold War, but after confronting Russia in Syria, now China's influence is increasing in the region. The role of China in the Saudi-Iran peace deal and its increasing economic and strategic partnership with regional countries became a serious threat to the US's two-decade-long influence over the region.

The superpower Russia has been on the path of revival since the early 21st century under Vladimir Putin's governance. Putin's national and foreign policies have led Russia toward development and maximization of power to regain its superpower position in global politics (Tsygankov, 2010). Russian influence on international affairs has been growing since the Putin government and its efforts once again gave Russia the status of great power because of its developing economy, military capabilities, and its influence in global politics (Rutland, 2008).

The Russian foreign policy has changed since the Putin government established government in 1999 and strengthened ties with non-western countries such as China and India, and its policies have seemed against the western world order (unipolarity). For instance, Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, where he openly talked about establishing a multipolar world order.

Additionally, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, its intervention in Syria to protect the Asad regime and deployment of Russian troops in Syria, the annexation Crimea in 2014 (S. Lavrov, 2019), and once again the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 show the growing Russian influence in international affairs. Russia has maintained its influence on Central Asian countries to protect this region from western influence and NATO forces. For example, the agreement of 2014 in the fourth Caspian Summit among the five bordering countries of the Caspian Sea (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran) to protect the region from foreign troops, such as the closure of Manas Transit Centre in Kyrgyzstan on 4 June 2014, which was established in 2001 by the US (Nichol, 2014).

India is another emerging state in international affairs that is increasing its influence in the world through its foreign policies to achieve the status of great power since the early 21st century (Bastos, 2014). According to the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) report “India: The Next Super,” former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said when visiting India in 2009, India is the next superpower in the world due to its growing economy since the 1990s and its increasing influence in the region and international affairs. India flourished strong relations with the USA and Russia, both of which are rival countries to one another. India’s military exports mainly come from Russia and also from the USA and Israel, and it has maintained neutrality in US and Russian issues. China and India have more than \$100 billion in trade but also have border issues and recently military clashes between them in

border areas. India is a member of BRICS, which supports multipolarity, and on the other hand, India is a member of Quad-four, whose major aim is to contain China's influence in the Asia-Pacific region (Singh, 2013).

Furthermore, Indian political and diplomatic influence is increasing in global politics. The hosting G20 summit and increasing influence in neighbouring countries. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan shows the shift in the US foreign policy focus from South Asia to Asia-Pacific to curtail China's growing hegemony. The Washington policymaker suggested establishing close ties with India and support for its increasing power capabilities because Washington believes that India will be a capable country in the region and stand side by US to counter China. The factor behind the choice of India for countering China is convergence interests between China and India in the Indian Ocean and their border dispute. And as the scholar argued, "a more powerful India will help the United States directly oppose worrisome Chinese policies, indirectly balance China by drawing away Beijing's attention and resources, and provide net security benefits in South Asia and beyond." (George G.J., Heginbotham E., 2013).

At this stage, it is complicated to define Indian foreign policy direction and whether it will be an ally of the US to counter China in the Asia-Pacific and global politics. And the informal alliance of RIC will resolve the bilateral issues between India and China to oppose the US in global politics. India is supporting Russia in global politics even against US policies, such as that its trade is still continuing with Russia after US sanctions on Moscow for invading Ukraine. And India remained neutral against the West's policies towards Russia, such as voting resolutions in the UN general assembly against the Russia-Ukraine war. India is opposing Chinese policies regarding border issues and Indo-Pacific policies, but there is more than \$100 billion in trade between New Delhi and Beijing. Therefore, at this stage, it is complicated to

define the proper direction of India and which group it will support in the future, whether it becomes revisionist and supports China and Russia or supports the US against these states to rejoice in the in the status quo power structure.

It is true the political influence of RIC is increasing in regional and global politics, but still the US has maintained its hegemony over regional and global politics. The US entered into different agreements and established new alliances to counter the rise of China and Russia and also to maintain its influence in different regions. For instance, Quad-Four to contain China's growing influence in Asia-Pacific and the AUKUS agreement providing nuclear-capable submarines to Australia increase the alliance and partnership in the region (Karatiuk B, 2023). The US policies focused on the rise of China and Russia to curb their influence and standstill their growing influence to secure its position and interests. The US expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe and making alliances and strategic agreements to promote US partnerships in the Asia-Pacific aims to exert pressure on China and Russia to limit their rise. The United States is still the largest hegemonic power in the world because of its widening influence in the different regions, and it is providing security to several countries and working on peace building missions in different regions.

The US strategic and non-strategic alliance is growing in the Asia-Pacific to contain China, and US assurance to Asia-Pacific bordering countries from threat to China's rise shows the growing influence of the US in the Asia-Pacific through cooperation, competition, and containment (Brattberg and Le Corre, 2019; Pompeo, 2019; Tellis, 2010, 2014; US Department of Defence, 2018; White House, 2017). The grand strategy of US 'pivot to Asia' and 'offshore balancing' is empowering the allies of the US in the region (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2019; Silove, 2016). The US and Indian strategic partnership in containment of China and the Indian economic and strategic relations with Russia and China proved the neo-realist argument of

exploitation of one another for the maximisation of power to get the right opportunity to become great power (Jervis, 1999). The US redeployment of troops and using other techniques to contain China in the Asia-Pacific.

Thus, in contemporary times, the US has more strong political and diplomatic influence over global politics and regional politics. The re-focusing of East Asia and engaging Indo-Pacific region in the grand strategy of US foreign policy have maintained its influence in the region (Joshua Shiffrin, 2020). The rise of China and Russia posed a threat to US hegemony in global politics and challenged its position in global politics, but still, both Russia and China are not as powerful as the US is today. If the rise of China and Russia continues constantly, then it might surpass the US hegemony in global politics in the future.

3.7 The Technological Capabilities of US and RIC

Over the past decade, the rivalry between the US and the rising power has become more intense and multi-faceted. The rising China, Russia and India have been more assertive in the military and economic front to compete with the United States and also increased their diplomatic engagements in different regions to surge political influence in the regions and in global politics with the aim to reduce the US hegemony. The United States declared China and Russia both are challenging to its unipolar world order and its position in the international system. Therefore, Washington has shaped different strategies to contain their rise through the support of its allies and alliances, such as G7 countries, NATO, and the Quad-four. However, the competition exceeded from economic, military, and political to technology, which is becoming intense competition between the US and the rising power.

The US-China technology competition is becoming intense and now a key sector for power projection in contemporary global politics. China's technology is a fast-growing sector

under the BRI of Xi's signature policy since 2013. China's information and communication technologies presence is expanding over the regions, such as fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications, smart city projects, and artificial intelligence, which have been actively inking agreements with different regional firms (Chwee C.K, 2021). The 5G telecommunication technology is promoting Chinese technology adaptation and China's technology standers in the regions (Emmerson, Donald K, 2020). For countering rising China's technology power, the US promoting allies' technology such as the Blue Dot Network (BDN) with Quad-four countries, the semi-conductor chain issue, and the Clean Network (CN) with East Asian countries and Europe to prevent China's technology (Harwit Eric, 2023).

The rising China is developing its technological sectors to compete with the US to reduce the technological power gap between them. The competition of technology has deteriorated the relationship between Washington and Beijing. In November 2018, the vice president Mike Pence said, "China not to gain entry to the world's most advanced sectors, including robotics, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence" (Incekara, R. 2020).

The Trump administration started a trade war with China and high-tech controversy between both countries spoiled their ties and put them in high-tech competition. For preventing the transformation of US technology and China's advanced inventions, the Trump administration shortened the student's visa duration for those students who studied robotics, aviation, and high-tech areas for returning to their mother country. In May 2019, the Trump administration declared a state of national emergency to protect the telecommunications network of the US by halting Huawei 5G technology, which is the third largest mobile phone company after Apple and Samsung.

China launched the project "Made in China 2025" for the development of Chinese technology in its economic and security sectors to bring China's technology into the

international market through invention and innovation. China invested \$350 billion in R&D sectors to transform its technology in 2015, which was one of the top countries that invested such an amount in R&D activities in 2015 (DEIK, 2016. Pp. 3-4).

According to the World Population Review, the United States was the second technologically advanced country in 2024, just behind South Korea. The US is in second position in the area of inventive and aeronautical technology. China comes in ninth position that is far behind the United States, as well as Russia and India also lag behind the US. Russia comes in 11th position among the most technologically advanced countries in the world, and India is in 17th position (World Population Review, 2024). Russia comes in 7th position in the most technological advancement in the field of aerospace, such as fighter aircraft, fighter jets; for example, the Sukhoi Su-57, which is the first twin-engine stealth multirole fighter in the world (Mirror Review Blog 2024). China is actively increasing investment in R&D to compete with other nations, such as its spending of \$458.5 billion in 2023 and increasing year to year by around 8.1% (The State Council, 2024).

For the measurement of the technological capacity of a country, the best way is to measure their investment in intellectual property technology. If you look at China's investment in R&D, then it has been increasing since the last decade, such as in 2014, when it invested \$1 billion but it has grown to \$12 billion in 2021. Today China is the second largest spender in R&D sectors after the US, which is the largest spender in R&D among the US and RIC. The United States is the largest spender in R&D sectors, and it has the most advanced technology in the world. China's growing investment still lags far behind the US investment, which is tenth of what the US spends in each year, such as \$125 billion in 2021. Russia lags far behind the US and China, both in spending in the R&D sector.

According to the Statista report 2023, Russian spending is 1% of its GDP, while China is 2.64% (Statista, 2024) and the US is 2.8% pending in R&D, and Russia is placed 30th in comparison with other countries ranks in spending R&D. India is another rising country in the world having the second largest growing economy and also modernizing its military power to compete in the world. However, if you look at the Indian spending in R&D, then it has low spending as compared to the US, China and Russia. India's spending in the R&D sector was 0.65% in 2022 (Statista, 2024), while compared to BRICS countries than India has the lowest spending in R&D. For instance, Brazil is 1.2%, Russia is 1.1%, China is over 2.1%, and South Africa is 0.8 percent, and the average rate of R&D spending in the world is roughly 1.8% (Joshi, P. L. 2023).

According to the above data, the United State is the world first largest spender in R&D sector and also has the title of most invention and innovator of the high-tech sector in the world. The US companies are the world's top investing companies in R&D such as Tesla, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon and Facebook Meeta. After the US, China comes in second position, but still it is lagged far behind the US in R&D activates, and there is a huge gap between them in high-tech production and their number and quality. Russia and India are far more behind the US in technological competition, because from them Germany, Japan, Finland, Sweden are ahead. The US, Japan and Germany have the leadership position in the technological world since 1960, and their technologies have grabbed the modern era of technology.

In short, in the 21st century, where technology became the most significant sector of every state because it boosts the economy, enhances the military capabilities, health, and science, modern technological warfare needs the most advanced technology in the contemporary era. In order to achieve technological top position then states need to invest in R & D to produce more advanced technologies. Today, the United States has the top position in

high-tech in the world and more powerful than the RIC countries. The US high-tech products and industries covered the international market with high demand because of their innovation and quality. China is a growing country in the high-tech sector but still there is a huge gap between China and the US.

3.8 Conclusion

The United States was raised as the sole superpower country after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of Berlin Wall in 1990. The US was succeeded in establishing unipolar liberal world order when communism was defeated and the Soviet Union lost its superpower position. However, since the early 21st century, scholars of International Relations started a discussion on the emerging world order, which got speed after the 9/11 incident and the financial crisis of 2008. The rising countries, such China, Russia and India and others called for emerging powers that change the unipolar international order into multipolar. Some scholars also claim that today we are living in a multipolar world where the US, China, Russia, India, EU are great powers. Some Scholars also argued that today's polar structure is bipolar, where the US and China both are superpower states.

However, the above debate of polarity between today's great power, the US and the rising powers of RIC countries shows that the world is still unipolar. The comparative study of power capabilities between the US and the emerging countries (China, Russia, and India) highlighted that there are still huge gaps among them in terms of material power capabilities in four major power indicators, such as the economic, military, political, and technological sectors. The United States still has the 1st rank state in all indicators, and there is a huge power gap among them. The US power has become weaker as compared to its first two decades of rule over the world, and the hegemony that the US established over global politics has reduced, but still, the US is the most powerful state in the world.

Yes, in contemporary times, the US has become a less dominant power in global politics as compared to its previous decades but still maintains its top position in the global power hierarchy above all the rising countries in the world. Today, the international system is neither bipolar nor multipolar, but it is still a unipolar world, where the United States is the most powerful country in the world. Emerging countries growing power and their competition with the US cannot be ignored, especially the rise of China in all power indicators and the resurgence of Russia militarily, technologically, and in their growing role in global politics. The US primacy over global politics is still maintained, but it has become weak due to these rising countries. The power capabilities of the US are on top, but the way RIC countries are rising will end the US primacy and the unipolarity. Today's distribution of power shows that the unipolarity of the US became weak, and it is not 'total unipolarity' but what Broke and Wohlforth called "partial unipolarity" because it does not remain the same as after the Cold War. The distribution of power among the US and rising countries is shrinking, especially between the US and China, which reduced the US dominance.

The current polar structure is partial unipolar, which means the unipolar structure that the US established at the eve of the post-Cold War was 'total unipolarity' where the US had massive dominance over the global powerhouse. Today the polar structure is unipolar, but it is 'partial unipolar' because the US dominance has been reduced by the rising powers, and its position is being challenged by the new rising revisionist states, which intended to change the status-quo.

4 CHAPTER FOUR

THE CHALLENGING FORCES TO THE EXISTING POLAR STRUCTURE

4.1 Growing Influence of New Rising Powers in Regional Dynamics

The United States has been the most influential hegemonic power in different regions where it maintained its hegemony through economic and military reward and punish strategies. The US was the only country in the world that could rescue any state from any destructive situation because of its military and economic capabilities. For instance, after the Second World War, the US introduced a Marshall Plan for the western European nations to tackle the consequences of the war, which destroyed their economy, infrastructure, and military strength. Another example is the Middle East, where the US provided economic aid and deployed its military in the region for security concerns and to counter terrorism in the region. The Africa region is another example where the US military and navy have fought against terrorism and sea piracy to protect international trade and maintain peace in Africa.

The United States is a superpower country in the world, and it has taken the burden of several issues in different regions, and at this point no state is ready to take such responsibilities, neither China nor Russia. Yes, the United States took on these responsibilities to maintain its hegemony over the regions and global politics with the aim to ensure its position and primacy in the world. The US provided economic aid and security for its dominant power and hegemony over the regions, and it also destroyed many countries for its interests, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and others. Washington has used excessive force for two decades to maintain its hegemony over the world by deploying the military in the name of countering

terrorism and providing economic aid to install a technocratic government to maintain its influence over the state's policies.

The US hardline policies in different regions created security dilemmas for the states in different regions. In order to secure their interests and sovereignty, many countries have taken the path of soft power balancing policy against the US in the decade of 2000 to 2010, such as establishing regional organizations and different agreements (SCO, BRICS, BRI, etc.). These organizations have been used as tools to counter the US hardline policies through soft power strategies to avoid direct confrontation with the US. After the financial crises of 2008, the US and its allied economic growth went downturn, and the new rising power economy took the path of stability.

In the decade of 2010 to 2020, the rising powers also started enhancing their hard power, especially military power, such as China, Russia and India. These countries increased their military budget and launched a policy of military modernization, and used hard power to counter US hegemony in different regions. For instance, the military intervention of Russia in Syria to protect the Assad regime and counter US-supported groups and the deployment of military forces in Syria. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and the annexation of Crimea and the expulsion of US military bases from Kazakhstan in 2016. The increase of China's naval deployment in the South China Sea, surging naval activities in the Asia-Pacific region, and establishing the Djibouti military base in 2019, which is the first Chinese military base in external territory.

It is true the United States has been the most dominant power in global politics since the early 1990s, and still it is a dominant power but not as influential as it was before. The regional influence of the United States is reducing by the growing influence of rising countries in different regions, such as China's growing influence in Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, South

Asia, Central Asia, and Africa, and even in the neighbouring region of the US (Latin America). As Mearsheimer said, the international structure determines the distribution of power in regional dynamics because of the fear of security and survival of the states, which pushes the states to create a power-balancing coalition (Mearsheimer 2014a, pp. 44–45). Therefore, the rising powers are increasing their influence in regional dynamics to counter US hegemony, and the regional countries are also looking for new partners to reduce their dependency on the US. For example, the influence of China and Russia is growing in the Middle East region, and the Arab nations are diversifying their foreign policies by making partnerships with different emerging countries (Nkobi Madziba, 2024).

The change in foreign policy of Middle Eastern countries is the result of US excessive use of hard power, pressure tactics, and intervention in internal affairs. In regional dynamics, when there is one dominating power over the other regional great power and exert pressure on them to get its national interest, then such hardline strategies create fear among the regional countries and push them to form a balancing coalition (Mearsheimer 2014b, pp. 44, 45). In this situation, the regional countries approach external countries and form coalitions and partnerships to create a balance of power. The external country “steps in the region as an offshore balancer,” which reduces the dependency of regional countries and ensures their security through the balance of power (Mearsheimer 2014, pp. 42, 170).

The rise of China and Russia has become a threat to the regional hegemony of the United States because these rising powers have increased their influence over the regional dynamics and are shifting regional politics from the US influence. The Russian resurgence is prevalent, China is peacefully rising, and India is also on its trajectory. However, the hegemony of these manifests the rise of the East in world politics, which is a power shift (Interview Farhat Khonen, 2024). The rising countries are increasing their regional influence in different ways

on the basis of their regional politics and intentions, but it is sure that all are striving for regional supremacy (Interview Amir Wali, 2024). Russia has owned hardline regional politics such as the use of military; the invasion of Ukraine and intervention in Syria are the best examples. China is using soft power for increasing its hegemony over regional politics, such as economic partnerships, investment, military exercises, tourism, and people to people ties. The Indian influence is growing in regional affairs, but not like China and Russia. India has not shown revisionist intention against the US superiority, and it maintains its friendly relations with Russia and the US. India is a partner of the US against China's growing regional hegemony but aspires to increase its hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. So the rising countries are increasing their hegemony in the regional dynamics, which is waning the US hegemony in different regions.

The United States know the impacts of increasing hegemony of China, Russia and India in regional politics. The rising influence of these emerging powers have compelled the superpower US to make alliances to contain their rise and ensure its global supremacy. As Dr Greg Simon responded during the interview that, "They interact as a team to complement and also balance each other, within the wider context of hedging against the subversive actions of the US that seeks to contain them and play them off against one another." The US is supporting the rise of India because she believes that India will play the role of 'queen' in the chess board of Asia-Pacific against the China and break the RIC alliance (Greg Simon, 2024). These states need to be perceived and considered separately as they are very different.

Russia has started an aggression war in Ukraine, and attacks Europe with hybrid means. China makes territorial claims and has aggressive behaviour in relation to Taiwan. India is, at least in theory, committed to democracy and does not threaten anyone, at least not to that extent (interview respondent). These rising countries are increasing their regional influence with

different strategies and areas. However, the rise of these countries has emerged as a challenge for the regional influence of the United States. For instance, China's growing influence in the Middle East has posed a serious challenge to the US regional hegemony, which has remained for more than two decades (Interview, Rizwan Ghani, 2024). China's growing influence in the Middle East is reducing US influence, such as when US closest ally Saudi Arabia became a member of the BRICS group, which is working on de-dollarization, and Saudi-China cooperation in weapons is waning US influence over the regional great power that will harm US influence over the region.

4.2 Emergence of New Central Powers

The rising countries, growing economy, military power, and development in technology are increasing the role of rising countries in global politics. After the Cold War, the United States was the only centre of power in global politics and maintained its hegemony over global politics, whether that is nuclear policy, environment policy, or other small and big issues in the world. The US had a significant role in shaping global politics, but at present time the US is not the only primary player in global politics because now the US is facing China, Russia, and India against her policies and actions.

The rise of China, Russia, and India as great powers is challenging the dominance of the US-led unipolar international order in several ways. China and India are emerging as major economic powers, challenging the economic dominance of the United States. China, in particular, has become the world's second-largest economy, and it is rapidly expanding its global influence through investments and trade. India is also growing rapidly and is poised to become one of the world's largest economies in the coming decades. Russia and China are challenging the US-led order by modernizing their military capabilities and expanding their diplomatic influence (Interview, Abdul Rab, 2024). Both countries have invested in advanced

weapons systems and have formed alliances and partnerships with other countries to counterbalance US influence.

India, Russia, and China are promoting a multipolar world order where power is distributed among multiple countries rather than being concentrated in the hands of a single superpower (Xinbo, W, 2020a). They are pushing for reforms in global governance institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund to reflect the changing distribution of power. Alternative Development Models: China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India's Act East Policy are examples of alternative development models that seek to promote connectivity and economic cooperation across regions.

These initiatives challenge the traditional Western-led development models and promote alternative approaches to globalization. China, in particular, is emerging as a leader in technology, particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence, 5G networks, and quantum computing. Its technological advancements are challenging the US lead in critical areas of strategic importance. China, Russia, and India are promoting alternative ideological frameworks that challenge the liberal democratic values upheld by the United States. China's model of state-led capitalism, Russia's version of "illiberal democracy," and India's Hindu nationalist ideology all offer different perspectives on governance and international relations. The rise of these powers is leading to a more multipolar and contested international system, where the US-led unipolar order is being challenged on multiple fronts (Interview, Michal A Peters, 2024).

Mostly, these challenges can be seen in economic trade and development, although also the development of strategic technologies like AI, genomics, biotech, space tech, quantum tech, materials science, and clean technologies, which are likely to lead to hyper development in the next generation, is also a critical concern. RICs and BRICS can demonstrate new levels of

international cooperation, including alternative financial institutions such as the New Development Bank, to tackle the pressing global issues facing humanity within an international or global goods framework currently utilized by the UN system (Xinbo, W 2020b).

The rise of new great powers, such as China, India, and Russia, is significantly developed in the global politics that have the potential to reshape the existing international order. The rise of these new powers contributes to the shift toward multipolarity, where power is distributed among multiple centres rather than being held in the hands of one. These challenges previously dominant unipolar or bipolar systems and could lead to a more balanced global power structure. As these nations grow in influence, other countries may choose to balance against or bandwagon with these powers (Interview Farhat Khonen, 2024). Balancing involves aligning with other states to counteract the influence of a potentially threatening power, while bandwagoning involves aligning with a rising power to gain benefits from its ascendancy. The new great powers have the potential to influence the norms, rules, and institutions of global governance. They may push for reforms that better reflect their interests and those of their regions, which could lead to a more inclusive and legitimate international order (Interview, Michal A Peters, 2024).

These powers often drive economic integration and trade agreements that can create new poles of economic activity, influencing global economic dynamics and potentially reducing the influence of established economic powers. The rise of new great powers can lead to increased military spending and the development of new security partnerships. This can create new points of tension or conflict, as well as opportunities for cooperation on issues like counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, and cyber security. Great powers also shape the global discourse through cultural exports, educational exchanges, and ideological persuasion. The

new great powers are investing in projects that enhance their cultural soft power, which can influence global perspectives and values.

In the realm of technology, these powers are increasingly players, with China in particular leading in the development of new technologies and standards, which can become a new source of global influence. The new great powers will play a crucial role in addressing global challenges such as climate change and environmental degradation. Their approach to sustainable development could either lead to a more aggressive stance against these issues or exacerbate them due to their significant contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions (Interview, Michal A Peters, 2024).

The rise of new great powers can also lead to increased geopolitical rivalry, as existing powers may feel threatened and respond by safeguarding their interests and status. This can lead to strategic competition, arms races, and proxy conflicts. Many of these rising powers come from the Global South and may align with other developing nations to promote south-south cooperation, offering an alternative to traditional north-south development assistance and conditionalities. The new rising great powers are pivotal in shaping the new polar structure in global politics. Their growth and influence are creating a more complex international system with opportunities for cooperation and competition alike. The outcomes will depend on the policies and strategies of these powers, as well as the responses of the existing great powers and the wider international community (Interview, Michal A Peters, 2024).

Rising powers such as China, India, and Russia have experienced significant economic growth, which has increased their influence in global trade and investment flows. They have become important destinations for foreign direct investment and have also increased their investments abroad (Rapanyane, M. B, 2021). These nations have been modernizing their military forces and increasing their autonomy in military operations. They have been more

willing to use their military forces in international operations, sometimes in contradiction to the interests of the United States. Rising powers have pursued more multipolar foreign policies, engaging with multiple actors and avoiding exclusive alignments. This has reduced the United States' ability to dictate outcomes in various regions and international issues.

Rising powers have also increased their cultural soft power, through exports of culture, education, and language. This can shape global perspectives and challenge the dominance of Western culture, which has been a significant aspect of the unipolar order. Many rising powers come from the Global South and have aligned themselves with other developing nations. They promote south-south cooperation, offering an alternative to traditional north-south development assistance and conditionalities.

In the realm of technology, some rising powers are becoming leaders, with China in particular leading in the development of new technologies and standards. This can become a new source of global influence and challenge the dominance of Western technological paradigms (Bade, 2022). Rising powers have sought to reform or create new international institutions that better reflect their interests and those of their regions. This challenges the dominance of institutions that were created or influenced by the United States during the unipolar period. The rise of new powers can lead to increased geopolitical rivalry, as existing powers may feel threatened and respond by safeguarding their interests and status. This can lead to strategic competition, arms races, and proxy conflicts, challenging the stability of the unipolar order. The rising powers have challenged the unipolar international order by increasing their economic, military, and cultural influence, pursuing multipolar foreign policies, and working to reform international institutions. These developments have reduced the United States' ability to unilaterally shape the international system and have led to a more balanced and complex global power structure (Interview, Michal A Peters, 2024).

4.3 Comparative Study of Power Capabilities of Rising powers and the US

4.3.1 Economic Development

The United States is the largest economic power in the world at present. Today, the United States has the largest economy, but as per its economic growth, it will not be the largest economy because the emerging countries will replace it. The emerging economies like China and India have serious threats to the US economic supremacy. Both India and China have the largest GDP growth, and both countries are the top two populated countries with young age citizens. The economic rise of Asian countries has posed a serious challenge to the Western nations, which have been dominant powers for centuries. The Asian economic giants like China and India have the fastest-growing economies, and many economic experts and institutions like the IMF and World Bank have predicted these countries will be future economic superpowers in the world (Interview, Rizwan Ghani).

The US triumphed in the Cold War and became the only superpower state in the world. Then Francis Fukuyama wrote “The End of History and Last Man” (Francis Fukuyama, 1992) and claimed in his book that humanity has reached its final form of government. After a few years, Samuel Huntington (1996) wrote ‘*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*’ and argued in his book that new rising powers will shape the existing power structure, especially he highlighted the rise of Asian countries as great powers, whose growing power will become a challenge for the United States and reshape the world order. The US economic supremacy is under threat, which is being replaced by the new rising powers, especially China and India. Russia’s economy is also on the rise, but due to war, international conflict, and sanctions, the Russian economy is in fluctuation, which may not defeat the United States economically, but it is rising enough economically to get its position in global politics as a great power.

The rise of RIC is generally perceived as anti-western informal alliance that is against the western domination and might be it emerged as strategic alliance in future and they all are member of BRICS and SCO which are being used as tool to counter US hegemony in the global politics. Russia and China both are acting as revisionist states to transform the current power structure and end the US hegemony over the global politics to establish new world order. India has developed close ties with all three big countries and at this point Indian clear stance deteriorate its relations with other states whether it could be US or Russia and China. Moscow is striving to make RIC as trilateral alliance to transform unipolarity into multipolarity and India plays an important role establishing multipolar world order (Hsiung, 2019a).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 led Russia to face Western economic sanctions, and Russian banks were also removed from the SWIFT system. Such sanctions compelled Russia to take the initiative of creating its own SWIFT system, which got the attention of other nations that were seeking an alternative to the US economic system and the countries that are facing economic sanctions (Hsiung, 2019b). And RIC countries are members of BRICS and SCO, which have developed the new institutions against the US alternative economic institutions through the use of two organizations. For example, the New Development Bank proved funding for the development of infrastructure and provided loans to developing countries without any rigid process as the western institutions do (Bratersky & Kuttyrev, 2019). NDB has approved \$30 billion in loans for the development of water and transport infrastructure since its establishment in 2015, and it has five funding countries, which increased in 2021 by joining Bangladesh, Uruguay, Egypt, and the UAE (Yan Liang, 2024). BRICS members also developed the Asian Infrastructure Initiative Bank (AIIB), which also provides funds for development and loans to developing nations.


These two institutions are built as alternatives to the IMF and the World Bank to counter US financial hegemony in global politics and to alter the power structure because these institutions have played a significant role in establishing US hegemony. Russia, India, and China are members of BRICS and SCO and the most powerful members of both organizations, which are covering issues regard establishing multipolar world order and increasing discourse of non-western global governance (Dongxiao & Shuai, 2016).

Another economic challenge to the United States is the trend of de-dollarization, which started in 2000 when Vladimir Putin said the world needed alternative currency to protect the economic sovereignty of states. Later, Russian Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov and the Chairman of the Board of VTB Bank Andrey Kostin declared in October 2018 that the world needs economic reforms to separate from the dollar and its dependency. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US and its allies put sanctions on Russia and frozen nearly \$300 billion (Reuters, 2023). The recent sanctions accelerated the process of de-dollarization among the BRICS countries. In the last summit, the South African Brazilian president called for a new common currency for international trade (Reuters, 2023).

Therefore, there is possibility of further development on common currency in the upcoming October 2024 BRICS summit in Russia. According to the Statista database, the global GDP in terms of PPP of BRICS countries has been rising and the G7 countries are declining since 2017. Currently, BRICS countries hold 35.43% of global GDP in 2024, as compared to G7 countries, which hold 29.64% (Statista, 2024). The intra-trade between BRICS countries rose 56% from 2017 to 2022, which was \$614.48 billion in 2022 (Statista & Samantha Arias, 2023). The BRICS countries global trade is raised to 18% in 2022 (Gouvea, R., and Gutierrez, M., 2023); if they started trading in new currency, then dollar dominance will be declined.

According to the IMF, dollar trade payment has been declining since 2022, and at the same period, the RMB trade doubled, such that it rose from 4% to 8% in the world. The dollar finance payments have declined among China’s leaning countries, which are using RMB and local currencies for the trade. The dollar has been in decline since 2010, such as in 2010 when the when the dollar share was 80%, but in late 2023 it declined to 50% in the world (IMF, 2024). The bilateral trade between Russia and China has surged 26.3% in 2023 as compared to 2022, and their bilateral trade has reached \$240.1 billion in 2023, compared to \$190 billion in 2022, and trade settlements in Rubles and Yuan have reached approximately 92% in the year 2023 (Global Times, 2024).

(Figure 5)



Source: World Bank <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG>

The expansion of BRICS in different regions of the world and extending its membership as such created an alert situation for the US and its allies economically. The expansion of BRICS to BRICS-Plus and the announcement of launching new international trade currency will enhance the burden of the West. The US closest allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both joined BRICS along with other MENA region countries. If BRICS succeeded in launching a new international currency and all the members started giving payments in the new currency, then the dollar will remain in US-leaning countries. The expansion of BRICS put the US and

its allies, especially European nations, in difficulties because their expansion emerged as a huge economic challenge to them (European Parliament, 2024).

The RIC economic growth is also a huge challenge for the US economic supremacy in the future. At present, the US is the largest economy in the world, but it will not be because the GDP growth of RIC is greater than US. The annual GDP growth of the United States is around 2-5% from 2013 to 2023, and China's GDP growth is around 5-8%, followed by India, whose GDP growth is around 5% to more than 8% (Figure 5). India is the first-growing economy in the world at the present time because India has the world's largest GDP growth since 2021. Russia's economy is also growing, but it is in fluctuation due to international sanctions, but still it maintained 5.5% GDP growth in 2023 (Figure 5).

Furthermore, according to the IMF report, world economic growth will decline in the running decade, US economic growth will decline to 1.5%, and the economic growth of India and China will be around 6% and 5% in this decade. The IMF also forecasted that India and China will be the two largest economies till 2030 (Malcolm Scott and Cedric Sam 2020; Janet Henry and James Pomeroy 2018).

The US is a superpower state in the world at present, but despite it, it is facing several challenges from the rising countries, which are serious threats to its position and status in global politics. The RIC economic growth is larger than the US, and the constant economic growth of RIC would replace the US as an economic power. Today, the debt is increased to \$34.83 trillion (Statista, 2024), which shows the economic decline of the United States. The increasing debt and declining dollar use for international settlement will further deteriorate the US economic power. When foreign debt increases, then there are two options for the state: accept the default or print more money, which both options are harmful for the state.

However, there is another option that is to cut off its expenditure that also harms the US supremacy in the world because there are 750 military bases of the US in 80 countries approximately (Al Jazeera, 2021), and it is funding for proxies and providing aids and grants to maintain its hegemony, which are reducing the US economic power. According to the US government Treasury, in the year 2023, the total federal revenue was \$4.44 trillion, the expenditure was \$6.13 trillion, and the deficit was \$1.70 trillion (US Government Fiscal Data Treasury, 2024).

The increase in debt created several problems that the US is enduring today because the plummeting economy leads to political gaps and internal conflicts such as religious and racial. Today the US is fighting with the above three issues internally, and the government is increasing tax, which also further surges the conflict between 'Have and Have Not' because increasing tax compelled the rich to shift their wealth to other countries for safety that further harm the economy. Furthermore, the declining economy of a superpower state also effects its production because of the less labour force and hollowing-out, which reduces the production and economy. For instance, the US industrial base manufacturing contribution has reduced 11% in 2021 as compared to 1953; industrial manufacturing exports share in GDP reduced to less than 60% in 2022, compared to 80% in the early 21st century (Daniel Gros, 2023).

4.3.2 Military Power

The military's strength and its capabilities determine the power of the state. The most important thing is military power, which is the main power of any state in the world. Global politics is the survival of the state, which is ensured by the military power. Military power is the main power of any state in the world. For being a great power state, a state must possess a great military power because it enhances its economic power and political power through strong foreign policy and diplomacy. In the anarchic international system, every state has to

protect its existence, sovereignty, and integrity, which it can only achieve through strong military power capabilities. The state desires to be a great power and polar power rather than have to have a strong military power. In this section, the military power of RIC and US are analyzed to identify how RIC is challenging US polar power through their military capabilities.

The United States is the largest military power in the world. In terms of military power capabilities, the US is the top military power equipped with modern advanced technologies and wide range influence in global politics because of its military bases around the world. Today, the US is the largest military spender on its military capabilities, such as \$916 billion in the year 2023. No doubt, the US is the top military power in the world at present, but the emerging countries growing military capabilities and modernization have stood as a strong wall against the US. China is modernizing PLA to compete with the US and maintain balance of power through the surging military capabilities. The Chinese air force has developed to reduce the power gap between them, such as the development of ballistic and cruise missiles that have threatened the US military bases with their long range. China has developed 1400 ballistic missiles and hundreds of cruise missiles. China has developed short-range systems and intermediate-range cruise missiles that have a range from 500 km to 5,500 km and that reach the US (RAND, 2024). The growing Chinese military power has created challenging situations for the US ability in forward bases such as Kadena Air Base, which is closest to the Taiwan Strait. China's growing airpower challenged the US air force in the Asia-Pacific.

The US air force and navy have enough capabilities to blunt any Chinese attack in the Pacific region because the US improved its aircraft and deployed 5th generation aircraft along with F-22 and F-35. China also changed its second-generation aircraft to fourth-generation, of which half of the PLA constitute. The changes in the capabilities of the air force and modernization have narrowed the gap between China and the US, but still China lags behind

in quality (RAND, 2024). For instance, China's 500+ long-range surface-to-air missile systems are duplicates of the Russian A-2 missile, whose range was roughly 35 km, but now it is changed to a sophisticated missile with a range of 200 km. It was further developed with a new integrated airborne warning and control system (IADS). However, to deter China's air force, the US also, at the same time, improved its penetration capabilities, such as by adding stealth aircraft and a new Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) system (RAND 2024).

China is putting US aircraft carrier strike groups (CSGs) in danger by adding robust over-the-horizon (OTH) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability to neutralize the US ground-based air power. China is constantly developing its space and electronics sectors by enhancing its satellite launches and deployment of long-range sophisticated ISR satellites (RAND, 2024). Moreover, China has developed anti-ship ballistic missiles, which are the first type of such weapon to be developed in the world and pose a serious threat to US naval command. China is also developing and enhancing its submarine capabilities, which show a more certain challenge to the US military capabilities. China has developed its submarine capabilities, such as from 1996 to 2015 it has increased 2 to 40 diesel submarines (RAND, 2024).

China's nuclear force modernization has started steadily since 1996 by surging their quantity and enhancing quality. It has enhanced survivability by the introduction of road-mobile DF-31 (CSS-9) and DF-31A ICBMs and the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine, which is capable of carrying 12 modern JL-2 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), whose range is nearly 7,400 km (RAND, 2024). According to the US Department of Defence (2015), "China has added multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles to some of its DF-5 missiles, and China is currently developing next-generation road mobile ICBMs, SSBNs, and SLBMs." China's such capabilities emerged as a threat to the US, and the

US was allocated major funding for modernizing its nuclear arsenal, but the START and New START commitments of agreements have reduced the deployment of a number of operational warheads and strategic delivery systems such as heavy bombers, ICMBs, and SSBNs. However, the US is still more powerful in terms of nuclear capabilities, such as having more nuclear warheads than China, at least 13 to one.

Russia is another resurging military power in contemporary global politics as a challenge to the US and its allied countries. Russia, under the Putin presidency, is maximizing its military power to make Russia great power and gain the lost status of the former Soviet Union in the world. The Western nations ignored the military rise of Russia till 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, which was a surprising moment for the US and her allies (House of Lords 2015). After Soviet downfall, the western pundits did not pay attention to resurging Russian military capabilities, and the Russian war in Chechnya had created the thought that Russia was no longer a military power, but the annexation of Crimea put the West in shock. For instance, in January 2014, NATO Defense College held a conference with the title “Does Russia Matter?” It was concluded that Russia less mattered to the NATO alliance as it mattered in the past, and it was to be “considered neither a threat nor a partner” (Reisinger 2014). A retired general expressed to the UK Parliamentary Defence Committee with evidence in June 2014 that Russia re-established its military capabilities to carry out large conventional military operations and they are much ahead in conventional power (House of Commons 2014).

However, later the US kept eyes on Russian military capabilities and reportedly believed that “within five years Russia could run multiple Ukraine-sized operations in Europe” (Blank 2015, Pp. 68–69). Soon a US senior official opined that Russia is a “near-peer adversary” (Cunningham, 2022). In 2016, SACEUR General Curtis Scaparotti of NATO

warned that “a resurgent Russia is striving to project itself as a world power. To address these challenges, we must continue to maintain and enhance our levels of readiness and our agility in the spirit of being able to fight tonight if deterrence fails” (quoted in Bodner 2016).

The surprised and quick annexation of Crimea and then intervention in Syria to back the Assad regime against the West had put the Western nation in deep thought that they underestimated the Russian military capabilities. These two military actions of Russia highlighted that the conventional capabilities gap had become narrow and made Russia able to project global military power. However, the operation of the Russian air force in Syria showed the advancement of Russian weaponry and also revealed “the limitations of its new capabilities” (Gorenburg 2016). After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been quickening its weapons production, and the microelectronic chips that are used in Russian weapons—around 75% come from US companies through third parties such as China (Nikkei, 2023). Russia had produced weapons that were enough to fight war for three years without any weapons production (Jamestown Foundation, 2022). But after the invasion of Ukraine, its weapons production has quickened to decrease the impact of the Ukraine war on military capabilities. The imports of microprocessors and semiconductors from Russia surged from \$1.82 billion in 2021 to \$2.45 billion in 2022 (Free Russia Foundation, 2023).

According to the RAND report, the Russian military capabilities have surged with advanced technologies and developed equipment, which is helping Russia to project power at the global level. Russian priority to ground forces has made it a strong ground force, which includes large-scale force employment and high-intensity ground warfare that consists of two main capability fields: manoeuvring ground forces and indirect fire. Manoeuvre ground forces include “units that operate tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armoured personnel carriers, as well as integrated air defense,” and indirect fire involves “artillery and rocket systems with

less than 100 km range that directly support manoeuvre ground forces at the tactical level” (RAND, 2019). Further, it includes long-range strike conventional systems such as cruise and ballistic missiles, which have a longer range than 100 km. The Russian ground force has elite ground units that are employed in short time in conventional and nonconventional conflicts, and these forces are used in Ukraine and Syria (Rand, 2019). Russian forces also have C4ISR, air defense and EW, which make forces capable of long-range strike and command and control, and the information systems of Russia make Russia a competitive military power to the West. The C4ISR system maintained the US military superiority; Russia also spent a lot on this, but still there is a quality difference. However, the growing expenditure of Russia and production of advanced weapons and being the largest nuclear country make Russia the most powerful military in the world. Russia’s increasing military power and military partnership have become a challenge to the US and NATO forces.

Russian military modernization became a challenge to the US by adding sophisticated weapons to enhance its military capabilities. Russia is the second largest arms exporter in the world after the US, and it aims to overtake the US and be the largest arms exporter. Russian arms production industries employ 2 million people, or around 5% of the Russian population, who are working in arms industries. Russia is the leader of the air defense system, particularly in information technology, high precious weapons systems and radar technology. According to the report of the European Parliament 2020, the Russian military modernization plan of 2011 was completed in 2020 when Putin announced that in December 2021. However, Russia modernized its nuclear capabilities (86%), air force 65%, navy 64%, and ground force 51%, respectively, which cost around 21 trillion roubles and 515 billion euros (average exchange rate of 2011).

Russia has contributed to innovative weapons production in many areas, such as creating new generation nuclear missiles, which, according to Putin, are virtually unstoppable by NATO defenses systems (European Parliament 2021). Avangrad is a hypersonic glide vehicle that travels at 20 times the speed of sound and is launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles, which were deployed in 2019; however, it made Russia the first country to have such a weapon in the world (European Parliament 2021).

According to the U.S. Department of Defense Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization program for 2009–2034, plan to launch numerous deployments of “ground-based mobile robotic systems” to enhance conventional capabilities and reduce military actualities in the future (Rudianov, N. A., & Khrushchev, V. S., 2013). Similarly, the Russian recent R&D has revived and added the program of AI and robotics technology in its military modernization for the enhancement of artillery. The robotics technology will be added to the Russian ground forces, which provide depth fire impact on enemies and enhance the ability of quick dispersal of artillery and massing fires (McDermott, R.N., 2023).

India is another military surging power in the world. India is modernizing its military to compete with great power and make India a military power at the global level. India’s conflict with Pakistan, border dispute with China, rising military deployment of China and political influence in the Indo-Pacific, and the ambition of India being a great power in global politics have put India in a position to modernize its military capabilities. India is one of the largest weapon importers, importing 10% of global arms from 2008 to 2023. However, according to the CRS report (2024), India's weapons production is less, and it mainly imports arms from other countries, such as Russia, where imports are about 62%, 11% from France, 10% from the US, and 7% from Israel since 2008. The US and India launched the Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) to enhance strategic technology and industrial

cooperation in defense field in June 2023. Ohio-based General Electric gave a proposal to produce an advanced F414 jet engine jointly in India in the same month. India accepted and approved the purchase of 31 armed MQ-9B SeaGuardian and AkyGuardian and aerial vehicles (UAVs), which cost more than \$3 billion. The US also offered “state-of-the-art capabilities” to India, which included f-15 Eagle two and g-21 Fighting Falcon combat aircraft for the Indian air force (K. Alan Kronstadt, 2024).

India is also increasing domestic arms production to maximize Indian military capabilities from domestic defense industries. According to the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) report 2023, the Indian domestic arms production budget has increased in Financial Year (FY) 2022-23 to one lakh crore for the first time in Indian history, and the previous FY 2021-22 was 95,000 crores (MoD, 2024). Domestically, India approved the development of fifth-generation fighter jets and advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) to be completed by Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). India is modernizing its military by developing new advanced weapons and emphasizing the enhancement of already available weapons domestically and through foreign partnerships. However, the Russia-Ukraine war decreased Indian dependency on Russian arms and enhanced arms exports with the US and France (Dinakar Peri, 2024a).

The Indian Air Force is enhancing its capabilities with advanced technologies and weapons such as fighter jets, transport aircraft, and helicopters. Indian Air Force (IAF) expects maintain fighter strength at 32-33 fighter squadrons by 2023 and 35-36 by 2040. IAF is also investing in light combat aircraft numbers to surge its fighter squadron strength and striving to enhance their foreign fighters to be manufactured locally. The presence fleet like MiG-21 fighter squadrons might be phased out by 2025, while Jaguars, Mirage-2000s, and MiG-29s

will be phased out by 2030 and mostly by early 2040, as well as the Sukhoi 30s, which will also be phased out (Dinakar Peri, 2024b).

The United States is the largest military power in the world at present, but its military supremacy has been challenged by the rise of China, India, and the resurgence of Russia. Russia has responded militarily to the United States in 2008 in Georgia, 2011 in Syria, 2014 in Ukraine, and again in 2022 in Ukraine. The resurgent Russian military power has emerged as a serious threat to the US and its closest allies, European nations and NATO countries. The expanding military budget and modernization of the military with sophisticated and hypersonic missiles and other equipment.

China is another rising military challenge to the US supremacy in contemporary global politics. China's growing military power in the Asia-Pacific region has challenged the US position as superior military power and threatened its interests at home and abroad (DoD, 2018). Chinese modernizing the military with new strategies will reduce the US influence in the Asia-Pacific and other regions. China has invested billions of dollars in A2/AD capabilities to keep the US forces within arm's reach, and new military advancements have made China further project military power. In addition, India is another rising country in the world and enhancing its military capabilities to be a great military power in the world. But India's military strength would not be a serious challenge to the United States because India has kept middle ground in this strategic competition and possesses less threat to the US-led unipolar world order. India's growing military power can emerge as a serious challenge to the US if the partnership of RIC gets place in the future, but still, it is complicated to determine the exact position of Indian foreign policy.

4.3.3 Technological Capabilities

The great power states are known by their relative power capabilities, which transform a state into a great power state. In contemporary global politics, technology has become a significant area of power projection. Technological capabilities surged the state's material power capabilities, and they also enhanced the state's latent power and military power capabilities. The technological revolution in the 21st century has brought the world into competition in several high-tech areas. At the present time, the United States and the rising countries like RIC are in technological competition to get the most advanced technology and develop technological power in the age of the technological world. Technology is being used in every sector, such as economics, military, space, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, robots, cyber security, and several others. The below section analyzed the technological capabilities of Russia, India, and China's technological capabilities and explored how their technological advancement is challenging the United States position in contemporary global politics.

The United States is the most advanced technological country in the world by producing the most advanced technology. The US is in the top countries in high-tech innovation and invention. It also has the highest budget in Research & Development (R & D) as compared to RIC. No doubt, the US is far ahead in the race of technological capabilities, but the rapid transformation in rising countries technological capabilities and their increasing R&D budget are advancing the rising countries technological capabilities. Such rapid transformation in areas of technology has emerged as an intense challenge to the United States technological position in contemporary global politics as well as in future power projection.

In the 21st century, the global technological revolution is intensifying great technological competition. The ongoing technologically growing tension between the US and

China enhances great power competition with changing dynamics of power structure. According to a report on US digital policy (2023), the growing technological advancement of China and Russia has challenged the US and its allies' technological capabilities and aims to surpass the US as a technological power, and its allies are already behind in technological competition. The US urged its allies to enhance their technological sector competitiveness to compete with China and Russia in filling the digital power gap (Karen Kornbluh and Julia Tréhu, 2023). The US is supporting its allies for high-tech advancement and challenges posed by Russia and China.

Russia is empowering and enhancing the effectiveness of the Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) field in the context of current geopolitics and great power competition. Russia domestically increased its high-tech advancement for international competition, and Russia has performed relatively well in the area of software development and computer science (Markotkin & Chernenko, 2020). However, at present time Russia is not a technological innovator and powerhouse of high-tech exports but has well used several new technologies for its own advantage and interest by converting them (Saari & Secrieru 2020, p. 12). Russia's R&D is concentrated on the strategic industrial sector, nuclear advancement, comprising of the defense, aerospace, and hydrocarbon industries (Dezhina & Ponomarev 2016). At present, Russia has the 4th largest R&D workforce in the world and holds high level cyber security capability as well as being competitive in oil, gas, and nuclear power production.

The technological strategy of Russia is overall concentrated on its competitive strategy, which aims to build its relative power strength, which is in strategic sectors; for example, the military, nuclear, space, and hydrocarbon sectors. These all are backbone state-dominated areas such as geo-economics that flexibly combine commercial and political interests. Furthermore, Russia also focused on Information and Communication Technology (ICT), cyber security

technology, artificial intelligence, and biomedicine fields to strengthen its global competitiveness. These areas are essential for the innovation of military technology. Besides, Russia has focused instead of renewable energy on areas where it is already leading, such as gas, oil, and nuclear products, to maintain its position as a top exporter through the development of new production technologies and digitalization (Country insight Russia, BP, 2021). The hydrogen technology is the only green energy sector that is focused by Russia (CSIS 2021).

In contemporary global politics, the technological advancement competition between the US and rising great powers has become intense. The US, the technologically top advanced country in the world, is facing threats to its position in the current geopolitical trends. China is a peer competitor of the US in the race of high-tech, and Chinese increasing technological capabilities have challenged the US in global politics (Fitch, A., & Woo, S. 2020). The rise of China as an economic great power by surpassing the US in terms of PPP in 2016 and fast-growing GDP growth have quickened China's technological advancement. China filed the largest number of international patent applications in the World Intellectual Property Organization in 2019, which demonstrated the gain of China in R&D (Bateman, 2022). A recent study highlighted that China was dependent on US innovation and technology in the first decade of the 21st century, but after the financial crises of 2008, China's dependency has reduced (Han et al., 2022).

The growing economy enables China to enhance military and technological capabilities as the United States did in the 19th century. There are five areas where the US and China have intensive high-tech competition, which are artificial intelligence, 5G, semiconductors, quantum computing, and self-driving vehicles (Fitch & Woo, 2020). China has the advantage in the area of 5G, artificial intelligence (the US has more advantage but the gap is reducing), and quantum

computing over the US. Quantum computing has an advantage, but the gap is reducing, and China has an advantage in quantum communication and semiconductors.


The increasing investment of China is narrowing the technological gap, and China is expected to become the largest auto market in the world in the upcoming time (Zhang, K. H. 2023a). China's plan 'Made in China' 2025 (MIC 2025) focusses on technological and innovation to increase growth of productivity to gain the position as a global powerhouse in high-tech industries. MIC 2025 includes new energy vehicles, high-tech chip components, new and renewable energy equipment, industrial robots, high-performance medical devices, mobile phone chips, wide-body aircrafts, advanced information technology, aerospace and aeronautical equipment, and advanced information technology (ISDP, 2018 & Zhang, K. H. 2023b).

China revealed its plan in 2017 to become the global leader in the in the high-tech sector of artificial intelligence by 2030. The productions highlighted that China will gain this goal sooner because it has invested nearly \$10 billion in quantum technology, which is nearly ten times the investment of the US. China is also striving to get global leadership in semiconductor manufacturing by 2030, in which China is just behind the US, Taiwan, and South Korea. Companies of China have command 85% of processing rare-earth minerals usage in chips and other electronic elements, which is provided leverage point to its competitors (Abdikarov, R. 2023a).

The rise of China technologically has posed threats to the US global position, which is eroding US influence and narrowing the power gap between the two most powerful countries. For containing China's rapid technological rise, the US has strived to limit China's access to critical technologies and capacity to gain innovations from Western nations. For instance, the Biden administration enacted the 'CHIPS and Science Act' in August 2023 to enhance research

and production of semiconductors in the US; for that, it announced \$52.7 billion for the industrial policy (Abdikarov, R. 2023b). Furthermore, the US also introduced its comprehensive restrictions on China’s chip manufacturing sector, which was the first such kind of restriction put in China. The aim of such a restriction by the US is to limit advanced chip production in China and deprive China of the trading of artificial intelligence because it requires large-scale chips for computing power.

(Figure 6)



Source: Compiled by author from different sources, from 2013 to 2021 data collected from World Bank.

The research and development budget is a significant method to measure the technological capabilities of countries. According to Figure 6, the US is the biggest spender on R&D from 2013 to 2023. In 2013, the US expenditure was 2.7%, and it has been growing. In 2021, the US budget was 3.46%, while in 2023 it was decreased to 3.1% (Figure 6). The US is followed by China, which comes in 2nd position compared to RIC and US, whose R&D expenditure has also been growing since 2013 (Figure 6). In the year 2013, China had 2% expenditure, and it increased to 2.64% in 2023 (Figure 6).

The data clearly shows that China's technological capabilities are growing, and it is narrowing the high-tech capabilities with the US. The Russian R&D budget is very low as compared to the US and China, as its R&D expenditure was 1.03% in 2013 and remained at 1% expenditure till 2019 (Figure 6). However, in 2021, Russian expenditure declined to 0.96% but again surged to 1.9% in 2023 (Figure 6). India has the lowest R&D expenditure as compared to the US, China, and Russia. Data shows that India has less than 1% R&D expenditure from 2013 to 2021 by having 0.64% to 0.69% expenditure on R&D (Figure 6). India's 2023 R&D data is not available.

India is an emerging country in contemporary global politics that has the largest economic GDP growth at present time. India is also modernising its military capabilities to establish modern military power in the current great power competition to make its position in global politics. Along with growing economic growth, India is also strengthening its internal military industries to be capable of making advanced military equipment for the enhancement of military power. However, India is also focusing on its technological sector to boost its technological capabilities and competitiveness to match itself in the current competition of great power. The technological sector is vital for boosting up other national powers such as the economy and military.

In current technological competition, India is still far behind the US, China, and Russia. India's technological priorities are in traditional strategic technologies that are defence, space, nuclear, and digital technologies that include electronics, semiconductors, and telecommunications, and in the emerging technologies that are artificial intelligence, drones, quantum computing, and biotechnologies (Jaishankar D & Sirkar T, 2024). However, India is enhancing its capabilities in these high-tech sectors to make India capable of competing with

present-day great power competition. India is facing several challenges in technological advancement, which are less R&D spending, climate, and pandemic.

India has the lowest investment in the high-tech sector than the US, China, and Russia, as Figure 6 shows that India's R&D investment has been less than 1% since last decade. However, India also has the lowest expenditure on R&D as compared to BRICS countries. For instance, Brazil is 1.2%, Russia is 1.1%, China is over 2.1%, and South Africa is 0.8 percent, and the average rate of R&D spending in the world is roughly 1.8% (Joshi, P. L. 2023). The Indian technological capabilities are mostly dependent on other countries, such as the US, Russia, and Israel.

According to the recent report of the UN, India's technological capabilities are increasing, such as innovation and diversification of technologies, and the report also highlighted that India's technological capabilities have been doubled since the last two decades. The World Intellectual Property Organization also highlighted that the rising countries are diversifying their technological capabilities, and the technological innovation production has been quickened since the last two decades where the high-income economies are boosting their technological capabilities, such as South Korea, Japan, the US, and Germany. Along with these, China and India are both active in this race (Janifha Evangelin, 2024).

In contemporary global politics, the rising powers are emerging as challenges to the US and its allied countries technologically. No doubt, the US is the most advanced technological country in the world at the present time, and it has the largest R&D expenditure as compared to RIC countries, but the rapid technological transformation of rising great powers is emerging as a challenge to the US position in global politics. The surging technological capabilities of Russia in defence and aerospace, cyber security, nuclear, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing have become peer competitors in these sectors to the US. China is a more

challenging country for the US in the technological sector because its rapid modernization and technological transformation have emerged, which is a huge challenge to the US in global politics. China's growing expenditure in R&D and fast speed of technological innovation and production have posed serious challenges to the US.

4.3.4 Political and Diplomatic Influence

The rising powers like China, Russia, and India are growing political power in global politics, and they are interfering in other regions and projecting their political power. The rising great powers have been expanding their political power in different parts of the world since last decade. During the interview, Anastassiya Fedorova argued that “I think at this point, the table is already set with China, Russia, and India being the only viable great powers in terms of political power in global politics. The dreams of a great power Brazil are just that—dreams—they have never been able to project power, have geographic limitations, and are separated from the Spanish world by their Portuguese heritage (which will impede alliance-building). The Europeans are incapable and unwilling to play the great power game in fact, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has actually brought them more under America's wing.”

The United States hegemony is declining with the rise of new great powers, especially in Asia, where different regions, China and Russia, are creating hurdles for the United States, such as Asia-Pacific, South Asia, the Middle East, and central Asia. China is expanding its political and diplomatic influence through the regional organizations (SCO, ASEAN, and APEC), BRI, and BRICS, and China is also using regional organization as political tools for establishing alliances (Alexander Korolev, 2018). These organizations, plus China's economic power, are strengthening its political power in regional and global politics; they are also avoiding direct intervention in the internal affairs of states. Russian political activities also have surged in different regional and global issues.

Russia is increasing its political influence through its diplomacy and the use of the military for direct intervention and internal affairs. For instance, Russia's stance in Syria, political interference in Central Asian countries, invasion of Ukraine, and the military and economic ties of Russia are strengthening its political influence in different regions (Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia). The rising great powers (RIC) have increased their political influence in global politics and regional politics as a challenge to the US position and world order (Gaskarth 2016).

As Waltz argued, the unipolar structure is an unbalanced power structure that creates security dilemmas for other states in global politics and pushes the state to increase their material power capabilities and to deter that security, rising powers start making alliances against the United States (Layne, 1993, 2006; Waltz 2000; Friedberg, 2011; Wang, 2020). At present, in global politics, Russia and China have established informal alliances against the West to create balance power (Goldstein, L., & Kozyrev, V., 2023). After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US claimed that China is providing weapons to Russia, and Russia is also being supported by North Korea and Iran. These countries that are supporting Russia in Ukraine are anti-US countries that aspire to make military alliances against the US and NATO. Still, there is no formal military alliance among these countries, but the support of China, North Korea, and Iran paved the way for military alliances in the future. The fact is that Iran and North Korea have been enduring the hard policies of the US and Russia's war in Ukraine, and China's dispute over Taiwan will bring these countries into a security alliance to counter the US and NATO countries.

According to T.V. Paul's recent literature, there are three forms of balancing strategies against threats, which are hard balancing, limited hard balancing, and soft balancing. These three balancing strategies are used by states to create a balance of power with rival states and

create deterrence. The limited balancing means enhancing military power in a limited manner and making partnerships and semi-alliances (Robert A. Pape, 2005; T.V. Paul, 2004).

In contemporary global politics, the rising great powers are following limited balancing and soft power balancing strategies. For example, the military buildup and alliance partnerships, such as the Sino-Russian partnership and the US-Indo alliance in the Asia-Pacific. However, to face the US like a military power with the world's strongest military alliance (NATO), then the limited balancing would not be enough to deter the US. The rising great powers need to enhance their material power capabilities, as Mearsheimer said that there is no limit to the power maximization of rising states because no state knows the actual power capabilities and intentions of others. However, along with soft and limited hard balancing strategies, China and Russia both have adopted hard balancing strategies since the last decade by maximization of their military power capabilities (Han, Z., & Paul, T. V., 2020).

The rising great powers (RIC) have enhanced their diplomatic and political influence over their respective regions and global politics. India's influence is growing in South Asia (in Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives), East Asia (quad alliance and partnership with Australia, Japan, and the US in regional affairs), and somehow in the Middle East, such as the India-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC). Furthermore, the resurgence of Russia in regional and global politics also became a challenge to the US and its Western allied countries. The growing influence of Russia in Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America has challenged the US political influence and its position in the international system. Russia's major means of power projections are arms sales, use of military powers (such as in Ukraine and Syria), political intervention (interference in the 2016 US presidential election), and military exercises (RAND, 2022).

China's political influence is also surging in the regional dynamics and global politics. China has posed a serious threat to US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. The BRI initiative has expanded China's political and diplomatic engagements in different regions and several countries. The BRI has surged China's political influence in global politics. The growing diplomatic engagements and partnerships between China and Arab nations have challenged the US hegemony in the region. As analysts argue that the rivalry of the US with Russia and China has polarized the global politics and diversified the foreign policy of states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East region, that are getting closer to China (Modern Diplomacy, 2023).

The United States also responds with a counter strategy to the growing influence of new rising great powers in different regions with economic and strategic partnership and establishing alliances. For instance, economically, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) aim to counter China's economic rise in the region. Strategically, the US is strengthening its alliances, such as Quad, AUKUS, redeployment of forces in the Asia-Pacific, and enhancement of capabilities of deployed troops of the US in different military bases in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the expansion of NATO and the provoking of Russia for the invasion of Ukraine as a whole are US strategies to halt Russian resurgence in the region. As professor Ambrosio argued during the interview, "We have sought to assert our global dominance in part by trying (unsuccessfully, it turns out) to 'get out of' the Middle East.

Nonetheless, Washington has made a commitment to reinforcing its capabilities in East Asia and strengthening its relationships with eastern nations to counter China. In Europe, the U.S. rallied NATO against Russia" (Interview Ambrosio, 2024). The US strategy seems to be bilateralism, diplomacy, and military rather than multilateralism and negotiation because the

growing challenge to the US position in global politics is leading the US to seek counter- and containment policies against the rising powers. The Trump administration admitted in 2017 that the rising China is a serious challenge not only to US security and interests but also to its international order (White House, 2017).

The new rising great powers have created major strategies for the existing polar structure, which are to alter the status quo through the increasing latent and military power to establish balance of power. The main factor contributing to the rise of new powers in international relations is the attempts by the US to render other powers as objects of international relations that work for US interests and continued hegemony. The system of vassal and client states has no choice but to be objects, but powers of the Global South wish to be subjects of international relations, free to pursue their 'self-interest and foreign policy goals that benefit them (Interview Greg Simon, 2024). As neorealists believe that when a rising powers status and interests are not satisfied by the existing polar structure, then rising powers own the revisionist strategies to gain their position in global politics through the change in the international system.

4.4 Implication to the Existing Polar structure

The polar structure refers to the number of great power states or polar power states that have significant influence on global politics. Unipolarity is a concept that analysts generally use to define the US position in global politics after the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the post-Cold War era, the US remained the only superpower state in the world; therefore, the polar structure is known as unipolar because there was a single 'pole power' in the international system. However, the rise of new great powers and the tumbled position of the US have produced new literature that argues of a changing polar structure in the 21st century (Posen B. R., 2011).

The rise of new great powers has reduced the US power capabilities and made it less impactful in contemporary global politics because the US position has become weak today as compared to the period of the 1990s and 2000s. The rise of new great powers has waned the US hegemony in global politics because, in the first two decades of unipolarity, mainly the US determined the global politics and how it works, but today the US is facing strong opposition. The rising great powers have shaken the base of unipolarity by their growing latent and military power (Amit Acharya, 2014).

The realist theory determined that the power capabilities of states defined the position of a state in the international system, and it also determined the polar structure. The power capabilities plus the intentions and strategies of rising powers also determine how much the rising powers are challenging or impacting the polar structure. Today, the rising great powers have stern impacts on the existing unipolar structure by the growing material capabilities and with the revisionist behaviour or intention. The rise of China, India, and the resurgence of Russia have weakened the unipolar structure at the present time, and they have posed a severe challenge for its further durability (Interview, Abdul Rab, 2024).

4.5 Conclusion

The rising powers have emerged as a challenge to US supremacy in global politics, and these countries have revisionist policies against the US-unipolar international order. In contemporary global politics, the new rising great power challenged the US economic, military, and political hegemony in the world. The rise of new great powers, such as China, India, and Russia, has brought significant development in global politics that has the potential to reshape the existing international order. Rising powers have pursued more multipolar foreign policies, engaging with multiple actors and avoiding exclusive alignments. This has reduced the United

States ability to dictate outcomes in various regions and international issues (Interview, Abdul Rab, 2024).

The new rising great powers have posed different challenges to the US due to the different regional geopolitics of the world. China emerged as a serious challenge for the US in terms of economic development, military strength, surging technological capabilities, and expanding political influence in global politics. China is the most challenging power for the US unipolar international order at the present time and future (Brett Samuels, 2019; Michael Burke, 2018). China's rapid economic growth and military modernization have seriously threatened the US position and interests in current global politics (Xinbo, W., 2020). China's growing power capabilities have challenged the US position today, and it will surpass the US economy in the coming two decades and also establish the world's first-class modern military.

US foreign policy elites revealed that in modern history China is a peer competitor of the US, and its growing power capabilities have posed an intense challenge to the US position in contemporary global politics more than the combination of the Soviet Union and Japan during the Cold War (Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, 2018; Westad O.A., 2019). In contemporary global politics, China is the most challenging player to US interests and its position in the world.

The resurgence of Russia also emerged as a serious threat for the US because of its growing military capabilities and political influence in global politics. Economically, Russia is a weak country as compared to US economic power, but the military capabilities of Russia have emerged as a serious threat to the US and its allied countries. At present, Russia is the second-largest military power in the world after the US, and its military capabilities have created adequate deterrence to balance the military power with the US. The Russian military also has war experience strategies because, since the last decade, its military activities have

surged in the world, such as the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and Syria. However, today the US is the largest military power, but in conventional military power as to come on nuclear capabilities, Russia is the largest nuclear power with a greater number and quality of nuclear arsenal. The Russian nuclear capabilities are far ahead of US.

India is also a rising great power, with a growing economy and surging military capabilities that have significantly enhanced Indian position in contemporary global politics. India's growing economy might be a challenge to the US economic supremacy in the future and its military power. However, at the present time, India is not a serious challenge to the US in terms of power capabilities and also India's foreign policy regard shift in power structure. Because India has friendly relations with the US and Russia and trade relations with China. India's intention with regard to the existing power structure is not clear because it has taken a middle path between the competition of Western power and rising Asian power.

India is supporting the US in containment of China's growing power in the Asia-Pacific, and it is also a member of BRICS countries, which is a serious threat to the US economic supremacy and the unipolar international order. India's power capabilities still have not developed to challenge the US position because the Indian military is mainly dependent on Russia, the US, France, and Israel for its military equipment and weapons. In terms of technological and political capabilities, India still lags far behind the US, China, and Russia. Therefore, India's fast-growing economy is a threat to US economic supremacy. If India takes the side of Russia and China against the US, then it will play a significant and effective role in shifting the power structure. Today, India is an important player in global politics because of its growing power capabilities, and its position in the great power competition can impact the power transition in the future.

5 CHAPTER FIVE

EMERGING POLAR STRUCTURE IN THE GLOBAL POLITICS

5.1 Historical Transition of Previous Polarity

The polar power in the international system changes by the plus/minus number of great powers in global politics. Historically, the polar structure was determined by the number of great powers, whether it was pre-modern history or post-modern history of global politics. The anarchy has existed for centuries and put great power in competition for their survival. After the treaty of Westphalia, a nation-state came into existence, and for the security, states always went for power maximization. From the period of imperialist empires (Dutch, Roman, British, etc.) to the Napoleonic France and the emergence of Germany and Italy, till today the process of power politics and power maximization is still continuing to ensure the sovereignty and integrity of states in the anarchic world. Throughout history, the basic principle of power maximization has been safeguarding the state to ensure its survival; however, some states, known as great powers, have maximized their power capabilities to maintain their hegemony over global politics and be the determinates of how global politics should work. The great power maximizes their power capabilities for security threats in an anarchic world, but if its power exceeds that of others with a huge power gap, then it becomes ruler of the world and runs global politics according to its principles.

In modern history, the polar structure has been determined by the number of great powers, and great powers are determined by their power capabilities. Europe had been the centre of great powers for centuries and experienced different polar structures, such as unipolar and multipolar. After the First World War, the international system was transformed from

unipolar to multipolar till the end of the Second World War. Europe was destroyed by two devastating great wars, and their power capabilities went down.

In the interwar period, the rise of the US and Japan as great powers from other regions brought change to the power centre that was Europe-centric, and after the Second World War, European nations lost their great power positions due to the downturn of the economy, the destruction of military power, and losing their influence over global politics. A new clash was emerging on the eve of the end of the Second World War, later known as the Cold War.

In the post-Second World War era, the Cold War was started between two superpower states, the United States and the Soviet Union. The era of the Cold War was known as a 'bipolar' power structure, and global politics was ruled by these two pole-power principles. There was an ideological clash between pole power, which was communism and capitalism; both states were in competition to run global politics according to their principles, which resulted in the division of global politics into two blocs. The polar structure was bipolar because the United States and Soviet Union were both the most powerful countries in the world in terms of material power capabilities and almost equal in power capabilities (Interview, Anastassiya Fedorova, 2024).

The Soviet Union's power capabilities when started reducing, such as its economy, became the major reason for its downfall. The military power of the Soviet Union was also waned as compared to the US, and it also lost war in Afghanistan. The internal disputes and division further created issues for the Soviet Union, such as the rise of the liberation war and economic and political issues that weakened the Soviet Union, which resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. In polar politics, power capabilities are the main element of the state. It has been historically happening in polar transitions such as the rise of Germany, Italy, the US, Russia, which ended the British unipolar world, then their destruction

ended the multipolar world. Similarly, the rise of Russia and its downfall during the Cold War changed the polar structure. The power capabilities of states define the polar power in the international system.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world was once again evident of a new transition from bipolarity to unipolarity. The United States remained the sole superpower state with excessive latent and military power. The unipolar world has changed several aspects (economic, military competition, political, rise and countermeasures of terrorism, globalization, technological revolution, rise of international and regional institutions and organizations, etc.) of global politics since the last three decades. However, in contemporary global politics, the rise of China, India, and the resurgence of Russia have reduced the United States hegemony in the world.

The rise of new great powers has posed a severe challenge to the US-unipolar world order through enhancing their power capabilities, which is reducing the power gap between the US and rising powers, and revisionist strategies of China and Russia for the change of the existing polar structure. History makes it evident that whenever new power rose, they transformed the polar structure from one to another. History is repeating itself again in contemporary global politics because the rise of RIC has become a threat to the durability of the unipolar power structure.

5.2 Theoretical Perspective on Transition of Polarity

Unipolarity is an unbalanced power structure in the international system because there is no other power to contain the only great power. The United States is the only great power in international politics. However, according to structural realism, unbalanced power in international politics imposes a threat on the weaker states because power without checks and balances becomes dangerous for others. The unbalanced power structure leaves the weak states

uneasy and gives them reason to enhance their own power capabilities or make alliances to balance the distribution of power because power only keeps checks and balances on power (Waltz, 1997). For instance, when France emerged as the only great power, then Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia formed coalitions to preclude Napoleon's rise through balancing power (Elrod, 1976), and when Great Britain was the superpower, then Germany, Italy, and Russia strengthened their capabilities to balance power because international politics hate unbalanced power.

Therefore, today, the rising powers are enhancing their capabilities to create a balance of power with the United States because it has become a threat for other states, and the policies the US has owned against Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war on terror have created security dilemmas for other states (Walt, S. M., 2009b). Furthermore, the efforts of North Korea and Iran to gain nuclear weapons aim to deter US invasion and pressure (Takehy, 2003). Similarly, China's enhancement of its military power desires to counter the US in the Far East (Brooks, Wohlforth & Lieber, 2005). Thus, imbalances of power constrain other states to strengthen their power capabilities to ensure their survival by balancing power, as the rising powers are doing today against the US to limit its hegemony.

According to Waltz, "structures emerge from the coexistence of states" the 'structure' the interaction of states, that he called 'primary units of politics' such as city-states, empires and nation-states. In the international system, states can ensure their own survival, prosperity or destruction through their own efforts because, in the structure of international politics, all states have to ensure their own survival and interests, and according to the principles of the structure, states have to rely on self-help.

Furthermore, survival is the prerequisite of all states, but some states after strengthening security, desire to achieve larger goals, which are more valuable than survival. Some states

strive to run the system according to the policy of reward and punishment. Waltz argued that “patterns of behaviour nevertheless emerge, and they derive from the structural constraints of the system” actors may perceive that they have known that how structure serves their interests but it is structure that defines the winner of the game in the system. The state may win and stay at the top but it defends the acceptance of successful practices (Waltz, 1979, pp. 91–93).

According to Waltz, the international structure is established by the interactions or coactions of the states, and it can be changed by organizing principles or the transition of the capabilities of the states. The states that create the structure of international politics are great powers that have strong military and political power. The military and political powers are means to gain economic developments, and the economic power means to gain military and political powers; therefore, the states that have strong military power, influential political power, and developed economies are known as great powers that shape the structure of international politics (Waltz, 1979, p. 94). The polar structure of the international system could be defined by counting the number of great powers, which are distinguished according to their material capabilities. Therefore, the study of polarity in international politics needs to study the capabilities of states in order they are distributed among the states. (Waltz, 1979, p. 97-99).

The modern history of world politics has witnessed different polar structure in different time period. The polar structure of international politics changed with the rise and fall of the great powers in international arena. The most of time of polar structure remained multipolar with several great powers in different centuries, it is also worth to mention that different great powers dominated polar structure and declined with the emergence of new great powers.

Moreover, several great powers emerged, dominated the international politics, reached at the top in power capabilities and changed the polarity but the behavior of great powers have never changed. As Nicholas Spykman argued that great powers priority remained same “to

operate within the same fundamental power patterns” (Nicholas, 1942, p. 461). The neorealist believes that international politics is the synonym of power competition where great powers desire to acquire more power, as Waltz noted that “the behaviors of states, the patterns of their interactions, and the outcomes their interactions produced had been repeated again and again through the centuries despite profound changes in the internal composition of states” (Waltz, 1993a, p. 45). The constant behavior of states leads them towards power competition in different aspects of power such as military, economic, political and technological. The power competition brings variations in power capabilities that changes the status of the states. The more powerful a state becomes assert more pressure on the existing great power and strive to dominate international politics, which results change in polar structure of world politics.

Furthermore, the structural change is directly proportional to the power capabilities of states and its behavior towards the existing great power polar structure in the international system. A state increases its power capabilities and act as a great power by intervening in international issues or has ability to influence the policies of existing great power then it leads towards the structural changes in the international system. As Waltz argued that “structural change begins in a system's unit, and then unit-level and structural causes interact” (Waltz, 1993b, p. 49). The structure of international system affects the behavior of states and its interactions with other states within the international system, which results would be reshaping the structure of international politics.

Today, the RIC countries are rising powers in the world with rapid growth in their material capabilities and acting as revisionist actors in the international system. RIC countries are already in power competition, particularly China and Russia, to change the polar structure of international politics (Denisov, etl, 2019). The material power capabilities of rising state determines the ‘power shift’ in the international politics because rising powers have ability to challenge the status-quo (Gilpin. G. R, 1981a, pp. 12-15) and strive to creates an environment

to exert pressure on existing power to ensure their influence in the international politics. On the other hand, existing power adopts the containment policies and enhancing its capabilities to secure its superior position. John Mearsheimer argued that state's first goal is to ensure its survival through the maximization of power because structure of international system constrains it to compete for its security, secondly, desires to be hegemon power in the international system because the ultimate goal of every great power is to dominate the international system (Mearsheimer, 2014).

In contemporary power politics China and Russia both achieved their first goal because they have enough capabilities for their security, however, neither Russia's neighbor states are that much capable to contemplate a war with Russia nor China's neighbors. But it does not mean that they do not strive to be stronger because the ultimate goal of China and Russia is to be hegemon power, not just to be secured. Therefore, they are acting as revisionist emerging states which are leading the world towards new polar structure with aim to overthrow the United States from its superior position.

In addition, the rise of RIC countries possesses more threats to the present polar structure because they are rapid growing economies at present time and also Goldman Sachs argued that they will be largest economies in future including the United States by 2040 (Sachs, G. 2003). The polar structure change emerges by the change of number of great powers in the international politics, and great power emerges by the rise of their material capabilities, however, the rapid growth of RIC economies with military modernization particularly China, Russia and India have taken path to transform polar structure. As Robert Gilpin noted that power capabilities of states grow with incremental and minor level but rapid growth in economy and military results the structural change in the international politics (Gilpin. R, 1981b, p. 13).

Moreover, neorealist believes that power capabilities of states determine the polar structure, but rising powers must have intention and competence to bring structural change. A question arises on the intentions of new rising players of international politics that whether they are revisionist or status-quo, and how to distinguish between state-quo and revisionist states? According to defensive realist the existing great power have to look at the policies of rising power deliberately and check their military policies, as well as calculates the threats perception for its own position and allies (Ross, 1999, Friedberg, 2005, & Christensen, 2006).

While offensive realist argued that although small number of states are revisionist but leaders must assume that all states are revisionist and act correspondingly because it is almost impossible to know the intentions of states (Elman, C. 2009, p. 73). However, toady, the policies of RIC countries clearly shows that they are coveting to change the polar structure, especially China, Russia and India, because they are developing their economy, modernizing their military power, technological competition, increasing political influence in different parts of the world such as South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. And several times they openly have challenged the United States by claiming to transform unipolarity into multipolarity. Hence, the new rising great powers are undoubtedly revisionist states and aspire to shift present power structure of international politics.

In neorealist perspective the behavior of rising powers have consequent outcomes for the stability of international system due to the dramatic shift in distribution of power. The change in distribution of power, which is triggered by rising powers would become capable to change the international power structure. However, according to John Mearsheimer neorealist perspective, rising great powers reach in a point where they have to take a decision whether they are satisfied with existing polar structure and international order in terms of their 'national interests' or need to transform existing international structure according their satisfactions of achieving their national interests (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 73). The decision of rising powers is

the reflection of their share division of power capabilities, which determines the attitude of rising powers to be revisionist states or status-quo. The present rising powers indicating the RIC countries whose adopted revisionist attitude to reshape the existing polar structure of world politics.

As Waltz noted that, the regularities and patterns of state's behaviors are driven by structural forces in the international system and the patterns have been repeated again and again for centuries (Waltz, 1993, p. 45 & Mearsheimer, 1990). The world might be changed by emergence of democracies, globalization, free market economy and multinational trade among the states, and the presence of international and regional institutions and organizations, but history repeated itself. However, despite above innovative concepts in 21st century, the behavior of states have never changed. Today, world might be in progressive era in terms politics, economy along with extraordinary innovation in science and technologies, but the patterns of states are reverted familiar to the history. For example, the rise of authoritarian as alternatives to democracy, outbreak of global pandemic (COVID-19), return of nationalism, inflation and significantly power politics between major powers in the global politics (Serchuk, 2020; Sitaraman, 2020).

In great power competition context, the behavior of states has reverted at present time, because the intensity in the game of great power politics is augmenting. Early 2022, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin called themselves "old and dear" friends with "no limits" friendship, after Russian invasion on Ukraine February 2022, which is called 'axis of autocracy' by the West. The Sino-Russian informal alliance has rejected the US and her allied unipolar international order that also can be observed in their foreign policies (Galston, 2022, p. 15). Both countries are in power competition with West to creates balance of power as Waltz argued that imbalance power trigger other states to counter the existing polar structure because he believed that

unipolar is unbalanced power structure (Waltz, 2000, p. 13), as currently RIC countries are in route to change the power structure of international politics.

According to neorealist theory, in self-serving international system states have to focus on internal balancing which is more reliable in power politics rather than allies, because power capabilities of states determines the fate of polar structure. Therefore, today the rising powers enhancing their national power capabilities to create balance of power with the US. China and Russia's growing power capabilities reduced the US hegemony in the global politics. The RIC countries are building their internal capabilities to compete with West such as developing their economy, seeking alternative currency against dollar for international trade and enlarging the membership of their group to gain more economic benefits. They are also increasing their military annual spending and modernizing their military capabilities with equipping advance technologies, as well as building more nuclear warheads to maintain nuclear deterrence with West. Today, China is more challenging competitor to the US unipolar international order in terms of power capabilities with its zero-sum balancing strategy to displace US from Asia-Pacific and also global level with its internal power capabilities (Doshi, 2021, p. 10).

5.3 Comparative Analysis of Power Capabilities of Rising Great Powers and Existing

In the early 21st century, a scholarly discussion emerged and produced literature on the power transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, and some also believed that the world was reverting to a to a bipolar structure. These discussions emerged with the rise of new great powers, and the growing power capabilities of rising powers have reduced the gap between them and the US. The growing latent and military power of China, Russia, and India became a major concern for the US, and it's allied because these states challenged the supporter of unipolarity with their enhancing material power capabilities. It is true that the growing power

capabilities of China, Russia, and India have weakened the unipolarity and challenged the US position in the international system.

The polar power transition took place when European great powers lost their power capabilities after the Second World War and the world became bipolar. During the bipolar world, the US and Soviet Union were two superpowers because they had the most powerful latent and military power. There were also two ideological clashes between them, and they decided to divide the world into two blocs, as well as a nuclear and arms race between them, which neither country was able to compete with. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world became unipolar, which meant that where one superpower fell, then just the US remained in the world as a single superpower state. However, in unipolar order, the US hegemony expanded from Western Europe to the Eastern, Middle East, East Asia, South Asia, and Africa; in other words, most of the world became under the US influence, which was divided into two blocs during the bipolar world.

It is true the power capabilities of China, Russia, and India are increasing and narrowing the power gap with the US. China and India are both the largest growing economies in the world, with the largest population and a cheap labour force that are enhancing their production and exports in the world. The Asian economic giants like China and India have the fastest-growing economies, and many economic experts and institutions like the IMF and World Bank have predicted these countries will be future economic superpowers in the world. Russia's economy is also on the rise, but due to war, international conflict, and sanctions, the Russian economy is in fluctuation, which may not defeat the United States economically, but it is rising enough economically to get its position in global politics as a great power. Russia's economic growth has been affected by the sanctions of the West, but as per its last-year GDP, which was 5.5% (Figure 5) would further stabilize the Russian economy.

The US has always used the dollar as a soft weapon and attacked many rival countries as a pressure tool, and recent sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine invasion in February 2022 have quickened the de-dollarization trend in the Russian and Chinese-leaning countries. The rising power China, Russia, and India are prominent members of BRICS-Plus, which are in debate to launch new currency as an alternative to the dollar, and also non-dollar trade has augmented among the BRICS countries (Mic, D. A., 2021). China and Russia are also strengthening the new institutions, such as the New Development Bank and the Asia Infrastructure Development Bank, as alternative institutions against the IMF and World Bank.

According to the IMF, dollar trade payment has been declining since 2022, and at the same period, the RMB trade doubled, such that it rose from 4% to 8% in the world. The dollar finance payments have declined among China's leaning countries, which are using RMB and local currencies for the trade. The dollar has been in decline since 2010, such as in 2010 when the when the dollar share was 80%, but in late 2023 it declined to 50% in the world (IMF, 2024). The bilateral trade between Russia and China has surged 26.3% in 2023 as compared to 2022, and their bilateral trade has reached \$240.1 billion in 2023, compared to \$190 billion in 2022, and trade settlements in Rubles and Yuan have reached approximately 92% in the year 2023 (Global Times, 2024).

The US was the only superpower in the world and still maintained her superiority in terms of economics, according to the World Bank. The US is the largest economy in the world by having \$27.36 trillion (World Bank, 2023a). However, the US economy has been in decline since the 21st century; according to Daniel Gross (2012), the US economy has been decelerating since 1999 due to the external wars and Bush administration's foreign policy of 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Africa, as well as US spending on proxy wars, especially wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Mahdi, 2010). The United States had spent 2.26 trillion dollars

of 20 years of war in Afghanistan since 2001 (Al Jazeera, 2021). Additionally, the collapse of the US established capitalist economic system in 2008-2009 and the financial crises have affected the world economy along with the US (Choonara, 2018), and since 2000, the US GDP has dropped from 34% to 24% in 2012 (Luce, 2021).

The economic crises of 2008 further led the US economy toward the decline, and on the other side, emerging countries such as BRICS countries have raised, particularly China, which emerged as the main challenger economically of the US unipolar power structure (Chkili, W., 2016). Furthermore, the US is still positioned as the world's largest economy, followed by China's second largest economy, but China crossed the US in terms of PPP by having \$34.64 trillion in 2023, while the US was \$27.36 trillion in 2023 (World Bank, 2023b). According to the World Bank, China is on track and may overtake the US and become the largest economy of the world in the coming years (World Bank, 2021).

The richest and economic leading countries have been declining since the early 21st century, commonly known as the G7 countries (group of seven countries), which were established in 1975 by the most industrialized countries, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. In 1997, Russia became the official member of the G7; then it was known as the as the G8; however, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia is no longer a member of the G7 (Mingst, K. 2019). The G7 countries are the biggest supporters of unipolarity, and these countries are satisfied with the status quo power structure and supporting the unipolar world, but they are declining economically. According to the Statista database, the global GDP in terms of PPP of BRICS countries has been rising and the G7 countries are declining since 2017. Currently, BRICS countries hold 35.43% of global GDP in 2024, as compared to G7 countries, which hold 29.64% (Statista, 2024). The intra-trade

between BRICS countries rose 56% from 2017 to 2022, which was \$614.48 billion in 2022 (Statista & Samantha Arias, 2023).

The financial crises of 2008 have affected all countries, but the BRICS countries have recovered their economies very quickly and have the highest economic growth rate, while the G7 economies are still managing themselves from financial crises (Naik, 2018). Furthermore, according to the World Bank data base, China and India have maintained their economic growth in the last decade of 2013 to 2023, while Russian economic growth was in fluctuation due to the Western sanctions and had the lowest GDP growth as compared to China and India (Figure 1).

Furthermore, in economic terms, the rising countries are growing without any doubt, but at present and in the near future, the RIC could not transform the power structure. Russia and India are far behind the US in terms of economic power today, such as the economy of the US at \$27.36 trillion, India's at \$3.55 trillion, and Russia's at \$2.02 trillion. The US economy is unreachable for India and Russia in the coming more than one decade. China's economy is \$17.79 trillion, and it surpassed the US in terms of PPP but is still behind, and it takes a decade to snatch US economic supremacy. The launch of BRICS currency is still not clear, and they are going to launch it. It faces several challenges to make it a stable international trade currency; it also seems to take time. And creating alternative institutions like the IMF and World Bank takes a decade to be stable and accessible institutions for the third-world countries, and these banks have little balance and funding state as compared to the IMF and World Bank.

The RIC economic growth is also a huge challenge for the US economic supremacy in the future. At present, the US is the largest economy in the world, but it will not be because the GDP growth of RIC is greater than US. The annual GDP growth of the United States is around 2-5% from 2013 to 2023, and China's GDP growth is around 5-8%, followed by India, whose

GDP growth is around 5% to more than 8% (Figure 1). India is the first-growing economy in the world at the present time because India has the world's largest GDP growth since 2021. Russia's economy is also growing, but it is in fluctuation due to international sanctions, but still it maintained 5.5% GDP growth in 2023 (Figure 5).

The rising China is a severe challenge for the US economic supremacy at the present time and in the in the near future. The rapid-growing economy of India is quite challenging for the US in the future, but it takes more than two decades to surpass the US economy. But India is supporting the US for containing China's rise in the Asia-Pacific, which shows that India is still not clear whether it goes with status quo power or supports Russia and China in power transition. Russia is economically weak at the present time, and it will also take more than three decades to surpass the US economy if it continues its GDP growth of more than 5%. In contemporary global politics and in the near future, there is one threat for the US position economically: China.

According to the report of SIPRI, the US is the 1st-ranked country in the world that has the highest military spending, which had \$916b in expenditure last year and has a 37% world share in military spending (Figure 4). After the US, China comes second in military expenditure, which has a 12% world share of military spending, and China is followed by Russia, which has 5%, and India, which has 3% of the world share in military spending in the year 2023 (Figure 4).

China is modernizing PLA to compete with the US and maintain balance of power through the surging military capabilities. The Chinese air force has developed to reduce the power gap between them, such as the development of ballistic and cruise missiles that have threatened the US military bases with their long range. China has developed 1400 ballistic missiles and hundreds of cruise missiles. China has developed short-range systems and

intermediate-range cruise missiles that have a range from 500 km to 5,500 km and that reach the US (RAND, 2024). The growing Chinese military power has created challenging situations for the US ability in forward bases such as Kadena Air Base, which is closest to the Taiwan Strait. China's growing airpower challenged the US air force in the Asia-Pacific.

According to the US Department of Defense report, China is developing its military power and the capabilities for modern warfare and will be the world's largest military power by 2049. The report shows that China is facilitating her PLAN with advanced equipment such as Renhi-class guided-missile cruisers, which are deployed in China's islands, and they are also deployable on surface platforms. The H-6K bomber flights, DF-26, which can be used in conventional and nuclear strikes and maritime and ground targets, are deployed in the western Pacific that covered the range of US military bases in Guam. Furthermore, the PLAN achieved the maritime superiority of being the world's largest naval power, and its capability was also growing with advanced equipment such as DF-21D ASBMs and DF-26 IRBM, which covered a 400 km range. Moreover, the capability of PLA also being enhanced numbers of modern long-range SAMs such as CSA-9 (HQ), HQ-9B, Russian SA-20, and IADS that early is radar network that covered 556 km range. The PLAAF have facilitated with J-20, J-16, and J-10C fighters operating with KJ-500 AEW & C aircraft (US, DOD report, 2021).

The PLAA is rapidly developing its capability for national security and sovereignty, as the 2019 PLA defense White Paper showed. The Chinese's government is facilitating the PLAA with advanced equipment, for instance, the PLC-171 assault vehicle, the PCL-181, the 3rd generation Dongfeng Mengshi assault, and the Z-8L wide-body transport helicopter. Moreover, according to the US DOD report, China's aim is to modernize and expand its nuclear forces and enhance the number of nuclear delivery platforms for maritime, ground, and air bases to help expand its nuclear forces. The PCR aims to have more than 700 deliverable

nuclear warheads by 2027 and an increase in its number (1000) by 2030 that is projected in the 2020 DOD report (DOD, 2020).

According to the Statista report (2021) on the global most nuclear reactor, the report shows that the US has the most number of operational nuclear units (93), followed by China in third (52), Russia in 38, and India in 21. The report shows that US operational nuclear unit development decreased 11 percent, and on the other side, China has increased 39 percent. Russia increased 6 and India has increased 1 percent since 2011 (K. Buchholz, 2021).

According to the Statista report (2021) on world nuclear warheads, the report shows that Russia has the most nuclear warheads in the world by having 6,255 nuclear warheads. The US has 5,550 nuclear warheads, and in second position, in third position is China, which has 350 nuclear warheads, and India has 156 nuclear warheads. Furthermore, according to the Statista report (2020), China has increased nuclear warhead deployment despite the COVID-19 pandemic by raising 30, India by 10, and on the other side, the US nuclear warhead deployment ratio is -385, and Russia by -125 since 2019.

China's nuclear force modernization has started steadily since 1996 by surging their quantity and enhancing quality. It has enhanced survivability by the introduction of road-mobile DF-31 (CSS-9) and DF-31A ICBMs and the Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine, which is capable of carrying 12 modern JL-2 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), whose range is nearly 7,400 km (RAND, 2024). According to the US Department of Defence (2015), "China has added multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles to some of its DF-5 missiles, and China is currently developing next-generation road mobile ICBMs, SSBNs, and SLBMs." China's such capabilities emerged as a threat to the US, and the US was allocated major funding for modernizing its nuclear arsenal, but the START and New START commitments of agreements have reduced the deployment of a number of operational

warheads and strategic delivery systems such as heavy bombers, ICMBs, and SSBNs. However, the US is still more powerful in terms of nuclear capabilities, such as having more nuclear warheads than China, at least 13 to one.

Russian military modernization became a challenge to the US by adding sophisticated weapons to enhance its military capabilities. Russia is the second largest arms importer in the world after the US, and it aims to overtake the US and be the largest arms exporter. Russian arms production industries employ 2 million people, around 5% of the Russian population, who are working in arms industries. Russia is the leader of the air defence system, particularly in information technology, high-precious weapons systems, and radar technology.

According to the report of the European Parliament (2020), the Russian military modernization plan of 2011 was completed in 2020 when Putin announced that in December 2021. However, Russia modernized its nuclear capabilities (86%), air force 65%, navy 64%, and ground force 51%, respectively, which cost around 21 trillion roubles and 515 billion euros (average exchange rate of 2011). Russia has contributed to innovative weapons production in many areas, such as creating new generation nuclear missiles, which, according to Putin, are virtually unstoppable by NATO defence systems (European Parliament 2021). Avangrad is a hypersonic glide vehicle that travels at 20 times the speed of sound and is launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles, which were deployed in 2019; however, it made Russia the first country to have such a weapon in the world (European Parliament 2021).

According to the U.S. Department of Defence Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization program for 2009–2034, plan to launch numerous deployments of “ground-based mobile robotic systems” to enhance conventional capabilities and reduce military actualities in the future (Rudianov, N. A., & Khrushchev, V. S., 2013). Similarly, the Russian recent R&D has revived and added the program of AI and robotics technology in its military

modernization for the enhancement of artillery. The robotics technology will be added to the Russian ground forces, which provide depth fire impact on enemies and enhance the ability of quick dispersal of artillery and massing fires (McDermott, R.N., 2023).

India is another rising country that is modernizing its military power in the contemporary great power competition. India is enhancing its naval power due to the tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, where the US and China are competing, and India is enhancing its naval capabilities to increase influence and contain China in the region. It has formed three naval commands at “Vishakhapatnam, Kochi, and Mumbai” to maintain control over these regions, and India is also investing \$8 billion to modernize its naval fleet. In addition to more over 250 aircraft and 16 submarines, it maintains 171 warships. India intends to retain three aircraft carriers, by 2020 in order to preserve its dominance in maritime. South Asia consists of just one country “India” that possess an aircraft carrier (Hassan, 2019).

However, the Indian Navy plans to build five nuclear submarines, increasing its mobility and allowing it to mount a second strike against Pakistan and China in the future. These nuclear submarines will carry Sagarika-K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a range of 3,500 km. In addition to nuclear submarines, India and France are contemplating a contract for the acquisition of US\$3.5 billion in highly sophisticated Scorpene submarines furnished with cutting-edge armaments and technology. For dominance in the IOR, these submarines feature an improved command and control system, a greater detection range, and stealth capabilities. (Khan and Khan, 2021).

The Indian Navy also introduced the BrahMos cruise missile, which has a range of around 290 km. The enhanced range of BrahMos would be around 450 km. Delhi's methods for building the hypersonic BrahMos-II missile, capable of reaching speeds of 8,575 km/h and

destroying subterranean bunkers containing weapons. BrahMos-II is significantly enhancing Indian naval capability in the region (Haider, 2023).

The Indian Air Force consists of two support commands for maintenance and training, as well as five regional air commands: Western, Southwestern, Eastern, Central, and Southern. Wings, stations, and squadrons are other divisions of these regional commands. In 2016, the IAF had 36.5 squadron units; by 2027, it expects to reach 42–45 squadrons. A squadron typically consists of 16 to 18 aircraft. In comparison to the 42 authorized fighter units, the IAF has 30 fighter squadrons as of 2020. As a result, the IAF's fighting capability has deteriorated. The IAF today has 776 combat-equipped aircraft. There are ten Su30MKI Flankers, six MiG-21 Bison, five Jaguars, one MiG-27 ML, three Mirage 2000, and one Tejas squadron. IAF is acquiring 36 Rafale aircraft from France (Sagar, 2018).

Signing defence agreements with the United States, such as LEMOA and COMCASA, has transformed the Indian military and increased its deterrent against China and Pakistan. As previously stated, the LEMOA is meant to constrain China in the Indo-Pacific. It enables the United States and India to use each other's infrastructure, ports, and air bases. In contrast, COMCASA offers India encrypted communication technology, allowing the Indo-US air and sea forces to join and communicate safely in both peacetime and crisis (Roy, 2020). In addition, on October 27, 2020, India and the United States signed the BECA, which aids India's military modernization and allows the nation to exploit US geospatial intelligence, resulting in enhanced weapon accuracy. All of this will let you navigate ships, locate targets, fight battles, and acquire geospatial intelligence. BECA allows the United States and India to exchange advanced satellite images and telephone intercepts. The introduction of the aforementioned cutting-edge technology into the Indian military would increase concerns about China, upsetting the region's power balance (Roy, 2020).

The rising countries are also surging their technological capabilities because, in the 21st century, technology became so important for state security, modernization of the military, and amplify economic growth. Today, the US is the most advanced country in the world in terms of technology and also in number of fields and quality. Russia and China are both enhancing their technological capabilities to balance the technological gap with the US. India is also enhancing its technological capabilities by developing its domestic high-tech industries, but India is mainly dependent on Russia, the US, and Israel for advanced technology. Technologically, India is far behind the three powers.

The research and development budget is a significant method to measure the technological capabilities of countries. According to Figure 6, the US is the biggest spender on R&D from 2013 to 2023. In 2013, the US expenditure was 2.7%, and it has been growing. In 2021, the US budget was 3.46%, while in 2023 it was decreased to 3.1% (Figure 6). The US is followed by China, which comes in 2nd position compared to RIC and US, whose R&D expenditure has also been growing since 2013 (Figure 6). In the year 2013, China had 2% expenditure, and it reached 2.64% in 2023 (Figure 6). The data clearly shows that China's technological capabilities are growing, and it is narrowing the high-tech capabilities with the US. The Russian R&D budget is very low as compared to the US and China, as its R&D expenditure was 1.03% in 2013 and remained at 1% expenditure till 2019 (Figure 6). However, in 2021, Russian expenditure declined to 0.96% but again surged to 1.9% in 2023 (Figure 6). India has the lowest R&D expenditure as compared to the US, China, and Russia. Data shows that India has less than 1% R&D expenditure from 2013 to 2021 by having 0.64% to 0.69% expenditure on R&D (Figure 6). India's 2023 R&D data is not available.

China's plan 'Made in China' 2025 (MIC 2025) focusses on technological and innovation to increase growth of productivity to gain the position as a global powerhouse in

high-tech industries. MIC 2025 includes new energy vehicles, high-tech chip components, new and renewable energy equipment, industrial robots, high-performance medical devices, mobile phone chips, wide-body aircrafts, advanced information technology, aerospace and aeronautical equipment, and advanced information technology (ISDP, 2018; Zhang, K. H. 2023b).

China revealed its plan in 2017 to become the global leader in the in the high-tech sector of artificial intelligence by 2030. The productions highlighted that China will gain this goal sooner because it has invested nearly \$10 billion in quantum technology, which is nearly ten times the investment of the US. China is also striving to get global leadership in semiconductor manufacturing by 2030, in which China is just behind the US, Taiwan, and South Korea. Companies of China have command 85% of processing rare-earth minerals usage in chips and other electronic elements, which is a leverage point to its competitors (Abdikarov, R. 2023a).

Russia is empowering and enhancing the effectiveness of the Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) field in the context of current geopolitics and great power competition. Russia domestically increased its high-tech advancement for international competition, and Russia has performed relatively well in the area of software development and computer science (Markotkin & Chernenko 2020). However, at present time Russia is not a technological innovator and powerhouse of high-tech exports but has well used several new technologies for its own advantage and interest by converting them (Saari & Secrieru 2020, 12). Russia's R&D is concentrated on the strategic industrial sector, nuclear advancement, comprising of the defence, aerospace, and hydrocarbon industries (Dezhina & Ponomarev 2016, 9). At present, Russia has the 4th largest R&D workforce in the world and holds high-level cyber security capability as well as being competitive in oil, gas, and nuclear power production.

The US is promoting an ideological competition in the contemporary great power competition between the democratic West and authoritarian East. The US and NATO countries are expanding their alliance and partnership with democratic countries to counter the rise of authoritarian revisionist China and Russia to protect a West-backed unipolar world order (Emma Ashford & Evan Cooper, 2023a). The US is building this ideological narrative to strengthen its alliance power to contain the rise of China and Russia (Mearsheimer J.J., 2021a). However, in this great power competition, middle powers like Iran and North Korea are against the US primacy and supporting the change, and the US is strengthening democratic countries alliances to protect its primacy. The US again brought Cold War-era strategies to contain revisionist states to protect its primacy.

For containing China's rapid technological rise, the US has strived to limit China's access to critical technologies and capacity to gain innovations from Western nations. For instance, the Biden administration enacted the 'CHIPS and Science Act' in August 2023 to enhance research and production of semiconductors in the US; for that, it announced \$52.7 billion for the industrial policy (Abdikarov, R. 2023b). Furthermore, the US also introduced its comprehensive restrictions on China's chip manufacturing sector, which was the first such kind of restriction put in China. The aim of such a restriction by the US is to limit the advanced chip production of China and deprive China of the trading of artificial intelligence because it required large-scale chips for computing power. Similarly, the US also put restrictions on chip exports to Russia and other technological elements to contain Russia's military and technological growing capabilities.

5.4 Behavior of RIC towards Existing Polar Structure

In the international system, structural changes occur when there are opposite rising countries that maximize their power capabilities internally and externally. The internal

balancing is most important for a state to get the status of great power because the national power of the state highlights its real power capabilities (Paul, T. V., Wirtz, J. J., & Fortmann, M., 2004). Along with power capabilities, the behaviour or intention of the state is also important for structural change in the international system. As John Mearsheimer argued, rising great powers reach a point where they have to take a decision whether they are satisfied with existing polar structure and order in terms of their 'national interests' or need to transform existing international structure according to their satisfactions of achieving their national interests (Mearsheimer, 2007, p. 73). The decisions of rising powers are determined by their power capabilities and satisfaction with the existing structure. Therefore, the decision of rising power plays a significant role in structural change because some rising powers support status quo rather than change.

The rising powers enhance power capabilities and act as revisionists, which is determined by their power capabilities. The revisionist powers strive to change the power structure and order to gain their prestige and position in the international system to influence global politics with the aim of achieving their interests in global politics (Schweller, 1998, p. 24). The revisionist states that increase power capabilities and aspire to change the existing structure always face containment from the present great powers because the present great powers contain the rising power to maintain their position in the international system and influence on global politics. Today, the US containment policy towards the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia is the best example of proof that China and Russia are both revisionist states and both are striving to change the status-quo.

The behaviour of states is determined by the structure of the international system, whether states react as revisionists or support the status-quo. The US policies and unbalanced unipolarity threatened the interests of China and Russia; in response, they enhanced their

material power capabilities. China and Russia are raised as major regional powers when their status is not respected, then react as revisionist states to change the power structure to gain status in global politics through the maximization of power capabilities. The domestic political hierarchy and structure do not matter in great power competition because it is the international structure that determines the state's behavior. For instance, China was neither a democratic nor a capitalist state in 1970 when the US accommodated China. Therefore, when the revisionist states rise, the present great power does not see the domestic structure but tries to contain the rising state to protect its prestige.

However, today the US containing policies towards China and Russia proved that they are revisionist powers that desire to change the status quo power structure. The rising great powers like Russia and China have openly criticized the US role in the existing international order, and their decisions show that they want to change the power structure. The white paper of Russia clearly mentioned that it has adopted a policy of change in polar structure and liberal order. China is another revisionist state that is trying to change the power structure to get its status as a great power in global politics. The US Department of State report highlighted that Russia and China are both revisionist states, and their growing power capabilities have threatened the US internet and position in the international system (DOS, 2020).

According to Robert Schweller, all rising countries are not revisionist and a threat to the existing great power position because rising power capabilities do not change the existing power structure; rather, they support strengthening the status quo (Schweller, R., 2015). Today, India is rising power because its material power capabilities are increasing, but the US is supporting the rise of India instead of containing. The fact behind this support is that India is a rising power, not a revisionist state, and India is the main player of the US in the Indo-Pacific

region to contain China's growing influence. The Quad is the best example of this because it was established to contain China.

However, the behaviour of India also seems different on the Russian side, where India has taken a neutral position in the competition and conflict between Russia and the US. Despite the US and its allied sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine invasion in 2022, India has maintained its trade with Russia and taken a neutral stance on the issue. Therefore, today India's position is not clear whether it is a revisionist state or status-quo.

The existing great power seems to see rising powers as a challenge to its position and built order, then it assists another major or rising power from that particular region to contain its growing power to protect its primacy. For instance, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Russia emerged as the third-largest naval power and it was expanding towards the Korean Peninsula, Far East, where Britain has mountains, its primacy was threatened by the rise of Russia. To protect its primacy, Britain supported Japan for its 'naval reinforcement' to contain Russia in the region (Claar & Ripsman, 2016, p. 158; Paul T.V., 2016, pp. 150-172). However, later Japan's decision was changed, and it emerged as a great power and reduced Britain's primacy along with the US and other European great powers, and they transformed the polar structure to multipolarity. Similarly, today India is being supported by the United States to crush China's rise in the region, but there is possibility that India may change its decision and become a revisionist state in the future and support Russia and China for changing the exiting power structure, and it may support the United States to maintain status-quo (Slobodchikoff, M., & Tandon, A. A, 2022, pp. 4-5).

5.5 Scenarios for Emerging Polar Structure

5.5.1 Trend of Multipolarity

According to some scholars, the unipolar moment is ended and the world is multipolar, where different countries are stakeholder in polar power and have taken their position as great powers, and America is no longer the only superpower state in the world (see Emma Ashford & Evan Cooper, 2023; Mearsheimer, 2019; David Blagden, 2015). Some scholars also believe that the BRICS-plus countries are rising great powers, and China and the US are both great powers at present, and the world is bipolar. However, after measurement of the power capabilities of rising great powers like China, Russia, and India, the data showed that the world is still unipolar, but it is partial unipolar because the power gap has narrowed between the rising powers and the US.

The growing power capabilities of rising powers have posed serious challenges to the US position and status in contemporary global politics. The growing political influence and diplomatic engagements of Russia and China pose a serious threat to the unipolar structure that is already weakened by both rising great powers and has revisionist strategies to change the polar structure. India is a rising country, but it is not clear whether it has intentions of change or is satisfied with status quo power. After decades of supremacy, today US unipolarity is in threat and challenged by the rising countries by their growing power capabilities and strategies, which put them in route to power transition.

The rising power China, India, and Russia are on track to change the polar structure to get their position in the international system. The above measurement of power capabilities shows that the US power diminished after dominance of two decades on global politics. The intervention of the US in different countries and the costly war in the Middle East and

Afghanistan, destructive financial crises, and political polarization of the world, as well as Trump's isolationist policies, weakened the US dominance in global politics.

China's remarkable growing latent and military power and the Russian surging military, political, and technological powers have weakened the US dominance. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, deployment of the army in Syria against the US interest, and again the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 show that US primacy has reduced. The modernization of Chinese military and its expansion in Asia-Pacific and other regions seems China's expanding military power and deployment (Djibouti base and enlarge deployment in the South China Sea) highlight that China is projecting military power and waning US hegemony in the regions. (Cabestan, J. P., 2021).

The growing economy and political influence of China, Russia, and India enhanced their role in regional and global politics. Russia has used its military power to enhance its role in global affairs, and its political role has surged in different global issues, notably the policies that are against US decisions. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Western sanctions on Russia have not been accepted by China, India, Iran, Turkey, and other nations because, despite the sanctions, these nations are still trading with Russia, and even their trade with Russia has increased (Schott, J.J., 2023). It highlights that in contemporary global politics, emerging countries are no longer afraid of US reactions for denial of its decisions. The US also sanctioned Iran, but still China, Russia, India, and some other nations are trading with Iran, and China even signed economic and strategic agreements with Iran for strengthening their economic and strategic ties. These are the signs of US declining supremacy in contemporary global politics, where the US is unable to implement its built international order (Interview Greg Simon, 2024).

In the 20th century multipolar world, there were the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the US that almost had equal power capabilities, and there was competition among

them to surpass one another's supremacy. The power competition among the great powers resulted in two destructive World Wars, which diminished their power capabilities. The Europe-centric great powers, including Japan, lost their position after the Second World War because their economic and military power were destroyed by the devastated war.

Before the Second World War, the world was multipolar because they had created a balance of power and maintained almost equal power capabilities. For instance, the British had a great naval force and large colonial holdings, while the economy and army power of Germany were greater than those of the those of the British, and Russia also had similar power capabilities, and the US was an economic great power. However, in the contemporary world the situation is different because today there is a huge power gap between the US and rising China, Russia, and India. The most crucial powers of a state are the military, economy, and political hegemony, including technology. At the present time, none country has surpassed nor has equal such power capabilities as the US. Therefore, it is clear that the world is not multipolar.

In the previous multipolar world, rising countries like Germany, Italy, France, Russia, the US, and Japan ended the unipolarity of the British by acquiring almost equal power capabilities to the British. The military and economic power of all great powers of the 20th century created balance of power by the maximization of internal power capabilities and external alliances. But today the rising countries lag behind in internal power capabilities and also external balancing. The US is leading the present-time most significant military alliance in the world and strengthening external balancing through further alliances such as Quad-four and AUKUS. On the other side, rising powers still do not have such a formal military alliance.

In contemporary global politics, the power gap between the US and rising countries is narrowing, but still there is a huge gap in the internal and external balance of power. The trend

of multipolarity and the narrative it has built by the rising powers and scholars look like a myth in contemporary global politics and in the near future. As the growing capabilities of China, Russia, and India are growing, they may establish a weak multipolar structure, but it takes more than three decades to transform a power structure. Due to the growing power and influence of rising power, scholars argued that the world is multipolar or will be in the near future.

Another reason is the free foreign policy of anti-US nations and neutral rising powers such as Iran, Brazil, North Korea, and India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia (Emma Ashford & Evan Cooper, 2023b). Nations like Iran, North Korea, and Brazil are openly expressing the support of the multipolar world and accelerating the multipolar narrative. On the other hand, India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are rising powers that are shaping free and diverse foreign policy that was bound by the US in its two decades of supremacy. The sanctions and pressure became less effective in contemporary global politics due to the new rising great powers. But it does not mean that the power structure is multipolar because the real way of measuring polar structure is material power capabilities, in which there is a huge gap between the US and rising great powers.

In the multipolar system, the power is distributed equally among more than two countries that roughly have equal power capabilities, as it was in the 20th century, where the power was distributed equally among the British, Germany, Italy, and France, US, Japan, and Russia. Today, there is no country that matches the US in terms of power capabilities except China, which is rapidly narrowing the power gap. Undoubtedly, the US and China are the most powerful countries in the world at present. India is a rising economy but still far behind from both countries, and still more than half of the population of India is poor, and the military, technology, and political power of India are also not capable of becoming a great power in the coming three decades.

Furthermore, Russia's military power has surged, and it has influence on global politics, but economically, Russia is very weak. In the technological sector, Russia is still far behind the US and China; yes, in the defense sector and cyber security sector, Russian technology is considerable, but the overall technological performance of Russia is weak as compared to the US and China.

Therefore, the multipolarity is a myth in contemporary global politics, and the emerging trend of multipolarity is somehow true, but it will be a weak multipolar world, and it is not possible in the coming three decades because there is a huge gap in power distribution between the US and emerging great powers. It takes more than three decades to reach a roughly equal distribution of power between the US and rising powers. So, a weak multipolar system is emerging, which takes more than three decades to become in existence in real terms in global politics. In the multipolar system, the US, China, and Russia will be the main players (great powers), and India will play a major power role instead of a great power because India's military power, technological capabilities, and role in global affairs are too weak as compared to the above three countries (Interview, Anastassiya Fedorova, 2024). India is economically rising and will be an economic great power, but it still takes more than three to four decades to become a great power because the other power index of India is far behind.

5.5.2 Trend of Bipolarity

In contemporary global politics, many scholars, politicians, policymakers, and analysts claimed that today the world is bipolar (see Kupchan, C., 2021b). The US and China are two superpower countries in the present world, and both are leading global politics. However, as mentioned before, the best way of finding polarity is the accurate measurement of the power capabilities of great powers to know the distribution of power between the two states. After comparative analysis of power capabilities between the US and rising powers, especially

China, I found that there is still a huge gap between the two powers. China still lags behind the US in terms of military power, economy, technological capabilities, and political influence over global politics. Therefore, at present, the world is not in a bipolar system.

However, history evidently shows that the rising powers always shifted the power structure in the world, and there are many examples in the history. In contemporary global politics, China is the real rising great power that can ensure the polar transition in the future. The material power gap has been sharply declining between the US and China since the early 21st century, and data shows that it has become tighter since the last decade. Today China is the second largest economy after the US, which has \$17.76 trillion and the US has \$27.36 trillion, and in terms of PPP, China already surpassed the US in 2016. China has the largest GDP growth than the US, and its manufacturing and exports are also increasing rapidly. According to the IMF report, China also leads the United States in terms of trade volume and overall investment (IMF, 2020, 2021).

The rise of BRICS-Plus economies and their stance regard de-dollarization and strengthening alternative financial institutions to establish a more stable financial system in the world. Such initiatives are strengthening China's economy and position in global politics (Mic, D. A. 2021). However, BRICS countries are far behind in real GDP of the US, but China is not far behind, and it will end US economic supremacy within two decades (BBC, 2020). The rise of BRICS countries and their stance regarding changing unipolarity is more facilitating a bipolar system than multipolar.

The rising economy of China and its greater projects like BRI have expanded the Chinese economy and also its political influence in global politics. During the interview, Michal A. Peters argues that China's agreements and investments under the BRI projects have increased its influence in global affairs through economic agreements, investment,

infrastructure development, and connectivity through building ports, railways, and energy networks (Michal A. Peters, 2024). Today, China is the fastest-growing political power in the world, and its economy and geo-economic initiatives have amplified its political influence in global politics. China's growing political influence in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East is the best example of its growing hegemony in global politics. China's economic and strategic partnership brought it to US neighbouring countries like Brazil. The growing political role of China in different regions and in global politics has reduced US dominance in the present world.

In addition, the military and technological power gap is also rapidly reducing between China and the US. The data shows that China has been the second largest country in military spending, and it is rapidly modernizing its military to establish the world's most advanced and strong military. Today, Russia is the second largest military power after the US, and China comes in third, but establishing a strong military depends on a strong economy (Barry R. Posen, 2014), and Russia is a weak country economically, and possibly China will become the second largest military power in the near future because it has a huge economy. The way China is enhancing its military strength in terms of number and quality, it seems less than two decades China will be the largest military power in the world.

Today China has brought economic reforms and is rising economically and has a nearly five-times larger population than the US. The wealth and people of China are adequate to make it a great power because such national power boosts economic and military power. China's military expansion also has quickened since the last decade, such as the establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2019, which is China's first external military base. It also strengthened its naval power and expanded it in Asia-Pacific, which further quickened after the recent clash with the US over Taiwan (New York Times, 2021; Oriana Skylar Mastro, 2021).

China's military modernization has balanced the regional military capabilities, especially in East Asia, such as Chinese air power and sophisticated long-range missiles, adding new advanced equipment. In nuclear capabilities, China has 365 nuclear warheads at present, and according to the US Department of Defence report (2021), Chinese nuclear warheads will grow to 1000 by 2030 (Phillip C., Saunders, and Kevin M., 2020).

In the technological sphere, China is heading to reduce the power gap with the US. In the year 2013, China had 2% expenditure, and it reached 2.64% in 2023 (Figure 2). The data clearly shows that China's technological capabilities are growing, and it is narrowing the high-tech capabilities with the US. In terms of research and development, China has moved significantly closer to the United States. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Chinese expenditure accounted for 84% of total US spending in 2019, up from 47% in 2010. The third-ranked country, Japan, spends 36% of China's expenditure (OECD, 2021).

The US strategies of containing China's growing power capabilities include enhancement of its military spending, as SIPRI data shows that US military spending has increased, and restriction on chip supply to halt its technology and military advancement. The US is enhancing its internal power capabilities to make it unreachable and maintain its position, and it has also surged coalition balancing to contain the rise of China, such as Quad-four and AUKUS. For balancing power capabilities, China has developed internal balancing strategies instead of making alliances. According to Waltz, in the emerging bipolar system, the rising power emphasized its internal balancing rather than making alliances (Sebato, 2015). Today China has no formal military alliance with other countries because it is maximizing internal balancing rather than external.

The Sino-US intense rivalry and competition have surged tensions in global politics, especially in the Asia-Pacific region where both states are competing on the distribution of power. Such kind of competition between the US and China and its recognition by both states proof the emerging bipolar system where superpower America is striving to save its position and rising China is striving to get its position as a great power in global politics. Today's power competition and rivalry between the US and China are somehow similar to the previous bipolar system, where the US and Soviet Union were competing for dominance (Issayeva, G, et al., 2022), but they also emphasized external balancing that is missing today, particularly from the Chinese side.

The US and China both have strategies mainly based on internal balancing because both are enhancing their internal material power capabilities, which make a state a great power in global politics (Kupchan. C, 2021b). However, the external balancing of the US is strong, such as NATO and the Quad-four, while China still does not have such an alliance. China still does not have a formal military alliance, while Beijing and Moscow are supporting one another in all sectors but do not form any formal alliance. China is using BRICS and BRI for its external balancing, but those groups are not that competent militarily. For creating balance of power, China needs to establish external balancing because it supports power transition, as the US has been supported by its allies for establishing a unipolar system and for its strengthening. Therefore, China needs a formal military alliance to create a balance of power with the US.

The emerging polar structure in global politics is characterized by the rise of two major poles of power (Andreevich, D. D., 2019): The United States and China. This shift is often described as a transition from a unipolar world, where the United States was the sole superpower after the end of the Cold War, to a bipolar world, where the power dynamics are more evenly balanced between the two countries. The rapid economic growth of China,

particularly its integration into the global supply chain and its emergence as the world's second-largest economy, is challenging the economic dominance of the United States. Both countries are investing heavily in their military capabilities, with China modernising its armed forces and the United States maintaining its global military presence and technological superiority. The race for technological superiority, particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cyber security, is a key aspect of the emerging polar structure, with both countries seeking to lead in critical technologies (interview Michal A. Peters, 2024).

There is increasing competition between the two countries in various regions, including Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, as they seek to advance their strategic interests and influence. The two poles represent different ideological systems: democratic capitalism in the United States and authoritarian socialism in China, which adds a normative dimension to the polar structure. Both countries are actively building alliances and partnerships to support their positions. The United States has traditional allies in NATO and is expanding relationships in the Indo-Pacific region, while China is pursuing its BRI and fostering closer ties with countries in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere. The two countries are competing for influence in international organizations, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and International Monetary Fund, as well as in setting global standards and norms. While the United States and China are the two major poles, other countries and regions also play significant roles in the global political landscape. For example, European countries, Russia, India, and Brazil are among the other major players whose actions can influence the emerging polar structure (interview, Michal A. Peters, 2024).

Henceforth, the global political environment is complex and dynamic, with power dynamics shifting continuously where the power gap between the US and China is narrowing but still China is far behind from the US in material power capabilities; therefore, the emerging

bipolar system will take nearly two decades to become in existence in the global politics (Mearsheimer, J.J., 2021b; Xuetong, Y., 2020).

5.6 Conclusion

In the above debate on the emerging polar structure of contemporary global politics, the existing superpower, the United States, and the new rising great powers, China, Russia, and India (RIC), are in competition for a polar power transition. The rising powers are growing rapidly and enhancing their material power capabilities to achieve their prestige as great powers in global politics. The growing power capabilities of RIC are narrowing the power gap with the US through internal balancing. The new emerging great powers have reduced the US hegemony and weakened the unipolar world order, challenging US primacy in contemporary global politics.

The rising powers like China and Russia are serious threats to the US primacy at present and in the future because both are surging their material power capabilities to create balance of power and change the polar structure in the international system. India is rising in terms of power capabilities, but there is a huge power gap between India and the US, China, and Russia, except the Indian economy. In other power indicators like military, technology, and political influence, it lags far behind. India has also taken a position of neutrality in this great power competition because of its bilateral ties with the US and Russia. At present, India and the US are both partners to contain China's rise in the region and have taken a neutral position regarding the Russian resurgence, and the US is supporting India's rise because of their common regional interests, but the decision of India will impact this great power competition in the future.

The world is now at a crossroads: a first possibility of emerging polar structure is the balanced bipolarity between China and the US, which will be leading powers, and Russia and India will play a role of major power in the bipolar system. A second possibility is the move towards a weak multipolarity where the US, China, Russia, and India will be leading powers in global politics. An analysis of emerging polar structure: I found that the scholarly literature and leaders of new rising countries have built multipolar discourse, and their discourse made it possible to examine the current approaches in depth analysis. My exploratory debate, which is based on material power capabilities through the comprehensive analysis of several indicators of the hard power of the US and new rising great powers, allows me to reach the point that mainly the world is moving towards a new polar system. However, it is hard to predict the future because I do not know the intentions of rising great powers and situations that will develop in the future, which can affect global politics and the future intentions of policymakers in the White House. But according to the present data and this debate, there are two future scenarios: the first is an emerging balanced bipolar system, and the second is a weak multipolar system.

Major Findings, Conclusion and Recommendation

5.7 Major Findings

This debate of polarity in global politics is studied from neo-realism perspective because I believe that neo-realism is the best theoretical framework to study the polar structure in the international system to understand the current polar politics in global politics. The neo-realism theory is based on the polar structure, and it defines how polar structures are established, changed, and the role of rising power in the polar politics. This debate analyzed the material power capabilities of the US and the new rising great powers because theoretical findings showed that the best way to study polar power structure is to analyse the material power capabilities and their internal and external balancing to existing great powers.

The theoretical finding showed that unipolarity is an unbalancing structure that creates security dilemmas for other states for their survival and to protect their interests in the anarchical international system. States increase their material power capabilities and change the polar structure by creating balance of power through internal and external balancing, but mainly they emphasized internal balancing for increasing their material power capabilities to compete with existing great power. The rising powers are those that are rapidly enhancing their material power capabilities, such as China, Russia, and India in current time.

Rising powers are a serious threat to the existing polar structure because their growing material power capabilities create a balance of power, and then they asked for their prestige and position in the international system, which led the existing power to rise in great power competition and war to gain their position in the international system. Furthermore, the rising countries become a threat to existing polar power when they develop revisionist behaviour

along with growing capabilities. Because material power alone cannot ensure the power transition, it also requires revisionist behaviour to change the status-quo power.

China, Russia, and India are rising powers in contemporary global politics. The rising new great powers have been surging their power capabilities to get their position in the international system as great powers. The rising countries have emerged as new great power players in global politics and aim to change the polar power status-quo. In order to end the unbalanced unipolar system, new rising great powers are increasing internal power capabilities to ensure the polar power transition. Therefore, the increasing internal and external balancing of new great powers has threatened the existence of a unipolar international system and the position and interest of the US in global politics.

The rising powers main goals are to increase their internal and external balancing to create a balance of power with the United States to end the US supremacy and unipolar system. The growing material power capabilities of rising countries have reduced the US hegemony in contemporary global politics. The US today is not that powerful as it was during the last three decades of the unipolar system. Today the US power has reduced and influence waned in global politics due to the rise of new great powers that have surged their material power capabilities. Today, the rising great power created a balance power with the US, not equal, but somehow they succeeded in waning US influence in the world.

At present, the polar power structure is unipolar, and the US is the only superpower state in the world today. The existing polar power is unipolarity because there is no state that has acquired material power capabilities as the US has today. The US has maintained its position in global politics through its top supremacy in all power indicators such as economy, military, political influence, and technology. The US has the largest economy at \$27.76 trillion and military power because it has the largest military spending around \$916 billion. The US is the

most advanced country in terms of technology, and its R&D spending shows that it is still far ahead of rising countries, as its R&D spending is more than 3% of its GDP, while the rising power is far behind except China, which has more than 2% spending in the R&D sector. The US also has maintained its wide range of political influence in global politics.

The results of debate on the existing polar structure showed that the current polar structure is partial unipolar, which means the unipolar world that the US established on the eve of the post-Cold War was ‘total unipolarity’ where the US had massive dominancy over the global powerhouse. Today the polar structure is unipolar, but it is ‘partial unipolar’ because the US dominancy has been reduced by the rising power and its position is being challenged by the new rising revisionist states, which intended to change the status-quo. The power gap between the US and rising powers, especially with China, is rapidly narrowing, and this reducing material power gap and declining US hegemony have weakened the unipolar international system in contemporary global politics.

The new rising great powers have posed different challenges to the US due to the different regional geopolitics of the world. China emerged as a serious challenge for the US in terms of economic development, military strength, surging technological capabilities, and expanding political influence in global politics. China is the most challenging power for the US unipolar international order at the present time and future (Brett Samuels, 2019; Michael Burke). China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization have seriously threatened the US position and interests in current global politics (Xinbo, W., 2020). China’s growing power capabilities have challenged the US position today, and it will surpass the US economy in the coming decades and also establish the world’s first-class modern military.

US foreign policy elites revealed that in modern history China is a peer competitor of the US, and its growing power capabilities have posed an intense challenge to the US position in

contemporary global politics more than the combination of the Soviet Union and Japan during the Cold War (Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, 2018; Westad O.A., 2019). In contemporary global politics, China is the most challenging player to US interests and its position in the world.

The resurgence of Russia also emerged as a serious threat for the US because of its growing military capabilities and political influence in global politics. Economically, Russia is a weak country as compared to US economic power, but the military capabilities of Russia have emerged as a serious threat to the US and its allied countries. At present, Russia is the second-largest military power in the world after the US, and its military capabilities have created adequate deterrence to balance the military power with the US. The Russian military also has war experience strategies because, since the last decade, its military activities have surged in the world, such as the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, and Syria. However, today the US is the largest military power, but in conventional military power as to come on nuclear capabilities, Russia is the largest nuclear power with a greater number and quality of nuclear arsenal. The Russian nuclear capabilities are far ahead of US.

India is also a rising country in the world today, but India's rise is mainly economic, and somehow it is enhancing its military power capabilities. Today, India has the largest GDP growth, but the real economy of India is \$4 trillion, plus \$198 billion in military spending. In the technological sector, India is far behind the US, China, and Russia because today India's R&D spending is less than 1%, whereas the other hand US, China, and Russia have greater R&D spending, such as 3.1%, 2.4%, and 1.1%. India is enhancing its military capabilities, but it is still dependent on foreign exports for advanced weapons and also in the technological sector. India's growing economy and military power may become a challenge for the US in the future. However, at the present time, India is not a serious challenge to the US in terms of

power capabilities and also India's foreign policy regard shift in power structure. Because India has friendly relations with the US and Russia and trade relations with China. India's intention regarding the existing power structure is not clear whether it supports status-quo power or revisionism.

The rising powers like China and Russia are serious threats to the US primacy at present and in the future because both are surging their material capabilities to create balance of power and change the polar structure in the international system. India is rising in terms of power capabilities, but it has taken a position of neutrality in this great power competition because of its bilateral ties with the US and Russia. At present, India and the US both partners to contain China's rise in the region and have taken a neutral position regarding the Russian resurgence, and the US is supporting India's rise because of their common regional interests, but the decision of India will impact this great power competition in the future.

The debate on polarity highlighted that the current international system is partially unipolar because the rising power of China and Russia has reduced the US hegemony and shrunk the power gap, and surging power capabilities have increased their influence in global politics. Today, the US is not enjoying a total unipolar system as it had in the last two to three decades after the birth of unipolarity. US hegemony has declined because of the increasing hegemony of China and Russia in global politics. The growing capabilities of China and Russia are the most serious challengers to the US position today and in the in the future because, along with growing material capabilities, both are revisionist states in contemporary global politics.

The debate on emerging polar power systems in global politics showed that the world is now at a crossroads: a first possibility of emerging polar structure is the balanced bipolarity between China and the US, which will be leading powers, and Russia and India will play a role

of major power in the bipolar system. A second possibility is the move towards a weak multipolarity where the US, China, Russia, and India will be leading powers in global politics.

An analysis of emerging polar structure I found that the scholarly literature and leaders of new rising countries have built multipolar discourse, and their discourse made it possible to examine the current approaches in depth analysis. My exploratory debate, which is based on material power capabilities through the comprehensive analysis of several indicators of the hard power of the US and new rising great powers, allows me to reach the point that mainly the world is moving towards a new polar system. However, it is hard to predict the future because I do not know the intentions of rising great powers and situations that will develop in the future, which can affect global politics and the future intentions of policymakers in the White House. But according to the present data and this debate of polarity, it indicated two future scenarios: the first is an emerging balanced bipolar system, and the second is a weak multipolar system.

5.8 Conclusion

The international polar structure became unipolar after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which resulted in the losing position in global politics and the emergence of the United States as the only superpower in the globe. A decade later, scholarly literature has highlighted the new emerging polar structure and order in the 21st century. The rise of new emerging great powers has become in scholars' discussions and seen in writings that have been growing their material power capabilities to create balance of power with the United States to balance the polar structure through the transition of polar power structure from unbalanced unipolarity to bipolar or unipolar.

The rising countries have been increasing their internal power capabilities to create balance of power with the United States and change the power structure. The main players in this great power competition are the United States, China, Russia, and India. These countries are rapidly enhancing their material power capabilities to fight against the US dominance in global politics and striving to get their prestige position as great power in contemporary global politics. However, since last decade this great power competition has gotten speedy in practice, such as the Russia invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, which was the power show from the Russian side, and that action involved Russia actively in global politics. The BRI project of Xi was also an initiative that has rapidly increased Chinese power capabilities in global politics, and China is also actively involved in global politics.

The rising economy and military modernization of India also brought it into this great power competition, and its geo-strategic location enhanced its significance in the power politics. India is a rising country mainly economically, and it has owned a middle path in the great power competition. India has flourished strong bilateral relations with the US and Russia. The rise of India is being supported by the US because India has helped the US contain the growing power of China in the Indo-Pacific region. Today, India is the rising country but it is not revisionist. On the one hand, the US is supporting India's rise and, on the other hand, containing the rise of China and Russia because Russia and China are both revisionist rising powers that aspire to change polar power structures.

The rising countries have reduced the US dominance in present global politics through their active role in global politics and surging material power capabilities. The power gap between the US and rising power is reducing, especially China's rapid growth in all power indicators, which has waned the power gap between China and the US. The resurgence of Russia in terms of military power and in some fields of technology also reduced the power gap

and threatened the US position and interest in global politics. The economic rise of India also became a threat to US economic supremacy.

However, it is true that new rising great powers have increased their power capabilities, reduced the power gap, and weakened the US dominancy in the contemporary world. But after analysing all indicators of power, I reached the point that there is still a huge power gap between the US and the new rising great powers in all power indicators. Today, the US is the top military power and economy, most advanced in technology, and has maintained a wide range of political influence over global politics. Therefore, the polar power is a transition, and it has changed from 'total unipolarity to partial unipolarity'. The existing international system is partial unipolar because the new rising great powers reduced the US dominancy, and today the US is not as powerful as it was in the first and second decades of the unipolar international system.

Furthermore, the rising powers are increasing material power capabilities, and revisionist behaviour emerged as a serious threat to the existing polar structure, which is partial unipolarity. The reduction in power gap and enthusiasm of rising power, especially China and Russia, are the most challenging countries to the existing partial unipolar international system. India is a rising power, but it is not a challenging state for the current polar structure. There are two main factors behind this argument. Firstly, there is a huge power gap between the US and India. Secondly, India is not a revisionist state; at this point, India has maintained friendly relations with status-quo power and revisionist powers. India's decision will affect the polar structure transition in the future because it is a significant country in the current on going great power competition. Henceforth, the rising powers have reduced the power gap and continuously increased their power capabilities that have challenged the US dominancy and its built power structure.

It is hard to predict the future of polarity in global politics because it is the great game of power in global politics, and there is nothing permanent in global politics except the national interest, and states act according to the interests and structural effects. However, this debate on polarity reached the conclusion that the polar power is in transition and there are two possible emerging polar systems in global politics. First is the balanced bipolar international system, where the US and China will be the leading powers in global politics and Russia and India significantly play major power roles in the bipolar system. Secondly, a weak multipolar international system is emerging where the US, China, Russia, and India will be the leading powers in global politics.

The rise of new great powers in contemporary global politics has become a hot issue in the discipline of International Relations. The emergence of new great powers and the transition of polar power and new world order are the contemporary problems in global politics, which need to be highlighted through the research studies because the rise of new great powers has enhanced the debate of power politics and the changing dynamics of global politics that have deep impacts in international relations. This research study contributes to the discipline of International Relations to determine and define the changing dynamics of global politics. The rise of new great powers has impacted the nature of global politics, with new international issues such as the changing polar structure being one of the main areas of International Relations which has deep impacts on global politics. The rise of new great powers are impacting the international system and changing the nature of global politics. Therefore, this research study contributed to the discipline of International Relations to understand the evolving dynamic nature of global politics in the 21st century.

5.9 Recommendations

Kenneth Waltz distinguished the systematic features of distribution of power and alliances of states to create balance of power. The US has an eight decades long strong alliance that supported the US in establishing unipolarity and maintaining its supremacy as the most powerful state in the world. The US needs to strengthen its alliance with old major powers and also with rising middle powers to enhance economic and security cooperation because unipolar international was not established by the US alone; its allies played a vital role. Enhancing internal capabilities and external strong alliances of the US could protect the US primacy from power transition to bipolarity or weak multipolarity.

The United States should reconsider its economic and trade policies for the benefits of itself and its allies. Whether it be the Trump or Biden administration, both should consider what the US wants to return from its economic policies and what its allies want. The United States needs to make new trade deals with its partners in Europe and Asia to remove trade barriers and also shape proper market policies that benefit its own market and allies.

The US should avoid the excessive use of military power to maintain status-quo power. The use of excessive hard power by the US in Iraq, Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries that became victims of the US military. Such hardline policies of the US begot revisionist states, and now they are openly opposing US unilateral decisions of the past and present, and through this, revisionist states are strengthening their narrative in the world. The US should use military force wisely for preventing the rise of China and Russia because the use of force can erupt destructive wars in the world. The use of hard power further deteriorates the unipolar structure.

In the partial unipolar system, the US dominancy has weakened, and its built international norms and institutions have become weak at present. But still, the US can strengthen its norms and institutions to prevent the power transition and halt the rise of revisionist China and Russia by making its sanctions decisions more effective through the use of its own norms and institutions. However, in partial unipolarity revisionist states have emerged more willing to transform power structures, and they became more challenging for the US. For maintaining status-quo power the US also should use soft power to prevent power transition.

The US needs to strengthen its internal balancing, such as its economy, because the US still has strong power projections militarily, technologically and politically, but economically, the US is facing huge challenges that further wane the US other power capabilities. The US should tackle its economic issues, which are most important for the US to surge its economic growth and maintain its economic supremacy. In the contemporary great power competition, the US economic position is weak because its GDP growth is less than that of India and China, which are the most severe challenges to the US economic supremacy. The US needs more appropriate economic policies to resolve its economic issues. The US also should resolve its internal problems, such as racial issues, political polarization and inflation.

China should emphasize increasing military power capabilities in number and quality to balance the power with the United States. For achieving this goal, China should increase its military spending because there is a huge gap in military spending between China and the US. Large military expenditures will further enhance its military power capabilities by adding advanced military equipment. China also needs to expand its military presence in different areas for power projection to become a polar power.

China should increase its technological capability because there is also a huge gap between China and the US. China has to increase its investment in intellectual property or

research and development to balance technological power through invention, exports, and production. China is narrowing its technological gap with the US, but it still needs further development to compete with the US.

For gaining the position of polar power, China should strengthen its external balancing along with internal balancing. China is competing with the US, which has the world's strongest military alliance (NATO), and expanding its alliance to counter the rise of China. On the other hand, China does not have any formal military alliance to create external balancing with the US. China and Russia both should make a formal military alliance along with other rising middle powers and regional great powers.

China should show itself as a responsible great power state in the world, and for that, it should reduce its dependency on fossil fuels and emphasize new environmentally friendly technology and policies. China should prioritize cooperation and collaboration with other states, such as Arctic and Antarctica, to promote sustainable development and environmental protection. China also should build its image as a trusted and credible great power in the current great power competition of power transition.

China should engage in diplomacy multilateralism forums to promote its rules of governing as a responsible polar power. China should involve itself in international decision making, discussion, and negotiations to reveal its rules of governing global politics.

China and the US should avoid the war for changing or maintaining status-quo power because today China and the US are both the most powerful countries in the world; their direct confrontation or war destroys world peace. The conflict between China and the US will affect the economy, trade, production, and many other consequences that will come out that affect the whole world. Both countries should avoid war.

Russia should enhance its internal power capabilities to create a balance of power with the US. Russia is far behind in material power capabilities from the US except the military power, where Russia and the US are close to each other. The Russian economy is too weak, which needs proper economic policies to increase its economic growth.

Russia also should increase its spending on research and development to develop defense non-defense based technologies for the enhancement of military capabilities and economic growth, and to compete with the US technologically, Russia must increase in the R&D sector. In order to get a position of great power in contemporary global politics, Russia should increase its material power capabilities in all power indicators to create a balance of power.

Russia should establish a formal military alliance with China, Iran, North Korea, and other regional and middle power countries to create a balance of power against the West and to counter NATO. In the contemporary great power competition, Russia and China both have to establish military alliances to create a balance of power with the US and its allies.

India in the present time is in trouble about what kind of behaviour or policy it should adopt in the contemporary great power competition, which is dependent on India and what kind of policy it crafts in this great power politics. If India supports the US, then China may block its bid, and if India refuses the US policy of containment of China then it will lose US support. In such a troubled situation, India should adopt a policy of constructive engagement with both powers because such a multi-alignment policy will be prudent for it to strengthen its strategic partnership with the US and China on the basis of its interests.

Furthermore, China and India both must enter into a policy that should not turn their differences into disputes and become adversaries and enemies of one another. India should learn to avoid dispute provoking policies with greater powers when it itself rises in the same

period (Saran, 2017, p. 148). India should balance ties with Russia, China and the US that would benefit its national interest while being used for countering others. India also should balance its power capabilities with China in areas of economic, technological, political, diplomatic, and militarily, but should avoid expansion in East Asia to threaten China's interests, which would turn the differences into conflicts and adversarial ties into enmity.

Today, India is taking side of the US against China's rise; when their adversaries turn into enmity and if war emerges between India and China then the US can do little if fighting erupts in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh; India will be on its own' (Ghoshal, 2013, p. 118). India is a good market for arms sales for the US and a friend for containing China's rise, but India should keep itself balanced in this great power competition through the engagement of the great powers to gain its national interest.

5.10 Research Directions

In the light of study's findings and limitations, there are some avenues for future research studies that require further research studies to provide solutions to contemporary and emerging problems of global politics in relevant area. The polar structure is in transition but it needs to study whether it would be peaceful transition or can erupt wars between existing and emerging great powers. The scholars can conduct research studies on the challenges of rising powers would face for transforming the existing polar system. The rise of the East for the first time in modern history needs to be studied for their way of global governance or the nature of world order to highlight the difference between the previous polar structure and the emerging because the emerging world order seems to be dominated by the East in future. There are other research gaps, such as what kind of polar structure will be suitable for international peace and harmony and the difference between western-dominated bipolar and multipolar structures and emerging Eastern bipolar and multipolar structures.

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ANNEXURE I

Open-Ended Questionnaire.

Title: Emerging International Order: Debating Polarity in Global Politics

Respected Sir/Mam,

I am Taimoor Shah, student of MS International Relations at the International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI). I am conducting a research study on the emerging international order: debating polarity in global politics. My study is focused on the existing and emerging polar structure of international politics, which is in the scholarly discussion with the rise of new great powers (Russia, India and China). The aim of this study is to analyse the existing polar structure, challenges towards the existing polar structure and emerging polarity in the global politics. Your responses will help me to determine the contemporary power structure of international politics and its future dynamics. Your personal information, including interview answers will be kept strictly confidential and will not be shared with any person or group that is not associated with this study.

Name _____ Position _____

Research Area _____ Organization _____

- 1: How many superpowers are there in today's global politics?
- 2: What are your thoughts on the current polar structure of global politics?
- 3: What are your thoughts on the durability of unipolar international order?
- 4: How do you perceive the current balance of power among great powers?
- 5: What is existing polar structure of global politics?
- 6: What factors do you believe contribute most significantly to shaping the existing polar structure of global politics?

- 7: In your opinion, what are the potential consequences of maintaining or attempting to shift the existing polar structure of global politics?
- 8: How do you see the increasing hegemony of Russia, India and China (RIC) in regional dynamics?
- 9: Can you discuss the key factors contributing to the rise of new powers on the international arena in the contemporary global politics?
- 10: In What Specific ways do you see these rising powers (China, Russia and India) challenging the dominance of the US-led unipolar international order?
- 11: How do you perceive the role of new rising great powers in shaping new polar structure in global politics?
- 12: In your opinion, how the rising powers have challenged the unipolar international order despite US being a superpower state in the world?
- 13: In what extent the latent and military power of rising countries have emerged as challenge for the United States?
- 14: How has the United States responded to the challenges posed by rising powers to its superpower status?
- 15: What potential scenarios do you envision for the future of the international order in light of these challenges?
- 16: From your perspective, which countries do you consider as emerging power centers in future from the current global landscape?
- 17: How might the rise of new emerging power centers influence the distribution of power within international system?
- 18: What strategies do you believe the rising countries employ to transform the existing power structure?
- 19: In your thoughts, what kind of polar structure is emerging in global politics?
- Are there any additional insights or perspectives you would like to share on this topic?

Thank You

ANNEXURE II

Interview 1.

Name: Dr. Farhat Konain Shujahi

Designation: Assistant Professor

Organization: NUML, Islamabad

Mode of Interview: In-Person (Physical)

Place: Islamabad

Date: April 17, 2024

Interview 2.

Name: Anastasiya Fedorova

Designation: Assistant Professor

Organization: Kenzhegali Sagadiyev University of International Business Almaty Kazakhstan.

Mode of Interview: Zoom-Meeting

Place: Uthal, Balochistan

Date: April 27, 2024

Interview 3.

Name: Dr. Amir Wali

Designation: Assistant Professor

Organization: LUAWMS Uthal

Mode of Interview: In-Person (Physical)

Place: Uthal, Balochistan

Date: April 28, 2024

Interview 4.

Name: Thomas Ambrosio

Designation: Professor

Organization: North Dakota State University USA

Mode of Interview: E-mail

Place: Quetta

Date: April 30, 2024

Interview 5.

Name: Dr. Greg Simons

Designation: Senior Lecturer

Organization: Turiba University Latvia

Mode of Interview: Zoom-meeting

Place: Islamabad

Date: May 2, 2024

Interview 6.

Name: Michael A. Peters

Organization: Beijing Normal University, PRC

Place: Islamabad

Designation: Distinguished Professor

Mode of Interview: Email

Date: May 2, 2024

Interview 7.

Name: Dr Cornelia Baciú

Organization: University of Copenhagen

Place: Islamabad

Designation: Assistant Professor

Mode of Interview: Email

Date: May 4, 2024

Interview 8.

Name: Dr Abdul Rab

Organization: LUAWMS, Uthal

Place: Islamabad

Designation: Assistant Professor

Mode of Interview: WhatsApp

Date: May 4, 2024

Interview 9.

Name: Dr Syed Shahab Uddin

Organization: Federal Urdu University Karachi

Place: Islamabad

Designation: Assistant Professor

Mode of Interview: WhatsApp

Date: May 6, 2024

Interview 10.

Name: Dr Rizwan Ghani

Organization: University of Balochistan, Quetta

Place: Quetta

Designation: Assistant Professor

Mode of Interview: In-Person (physical)

Date: May 8, 2024