

# CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS PERTAINING TO PMLN

(2013-2016)



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## Certification


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## List of Abbreviations

All Parties Conference

Army Public School

British Broadcasting Corporation

Confidence Building Measures

Council for Defense and National Security

Central Intelligence Agency

Commander IN Chief

Chief Minister

Civil-Military Relations

Chief of Army Staff

China Pakistan Economic Corridor

Frontier Work Organization

General Head Quarters

Islami Jamhuri Itihad

International Security Assistance Force

Inter Service Intelligence



JI	Jamat-e-Islami
KHAD	Khadamat-e-Aetela'ate-e-Dawlati
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MW	Mega Watt
NAP	National Action Plan
NDS	National Directorate of Security
ND TV	New Delhi Television
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehreek
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e- Insaf
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
TTP	Tehreek- Taliban Pakistan
USA	United States of America

## Declaration

This thesis is submitted as a requirement of MS degree in Political Science to the department of Politics & International Relations. I solemnly affirm that this research is originally my work and none of the facts and data has been plagiarized. Any material cited from a secondary source is given with proper source and citation.

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Uzma Yasmeen

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Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## **Dedication**

This thesis is dedicated to my loving parents, who died two years ago but I believe that all success in my life is due to their prayers and these will be with me till the last moment of my life.

I am really thankful for everything which they have done for me.

## **Acknowledgement**

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## Abstract

Since the partition, military has been playing very influential and dominating role in the political affairs of Pakistan. Many times, military overthrew the civilian governments on the charges of mismanagement. Pakistan has experienced thirty years of military rule and even when not in government, the military has constantly sought to centralize and consolidate the political power. In Pakistan, control over governance has oscillated between the two; a decade of civilian supremacy followed by a decade of military rule. The reasons for this periodic shuffling are incompetent political leadership, weak political parties and institutions, rising power of civil-military bureaucracy, serious security threats to the country and frequent use of military in aid of civil power. As military is considered the most prestigious and strongest institution of the state and it became the substitute of civilian regimes. People look towards military when civilian machinery does not work effectively. People think that the military would be imbued with the norms and expectations of the society that created it and people look towards military for revolution when civilian leadership does not work effectively as we have seen in the past during Z. Ali. Bhutto period, when parties united against Bhutto and called military to overthrow Bhutto's regime. This study will discuss specifically PML's (Nawaz) present regime. In both previous regimes, Nawaz Sharif faced military intervention and failed to complete his tenure.

First regime of Nawaz was dismissed by the president of his own party (Ishaq Khan) and military was behind the scene. In the second regime, Pervaiz Musharaf, unconstitutionally, dismissed the civilian regime of Nawaz Sharif and imposed martial law and took charge. In this background, this study will explore how the previous experience of PMLN government influenced its present policies with respect to civil-military relations. What was the response of the military and Nawaz Sharif towards domestic and international affairs of the state, and why the outlook of the military towards domestic and international affairs has increased since December 2014. It also deals with the factors which paved way for the military to interfere in the political business of the civilians. In this background, this study will address why, once again, military dominated and influenced the political affairs of the civilian? Why does the military interferes in the domain of civilian rules in Pakistan and why have the elected political elite failed to establish civil dominance in the civil-military relations in Pakistan?

# Chapter 1

## Introduction and Theoretical Framework

### 1. Introduction

Military is one of the most fundamental institutions of the state that has the capability to influence the political process and policies of the state. During the cold war era, the political situation and civilian incapability in developing countries attracted the military to intervene. Most of the Latin American, Asian and African states have faced direct or indirect military intervention. In South Asia military intervention in Pakistan, Nepal and Sri-Lanka remains an important actor with certain institutional interests (Banerji, 2014).

In Pakistan, The military was expected to function within the parameters set out by the civilian authority and stay out of active politics. These traditions were accepted as the cordial principle of military organization in Pakistan. However, with the passage of time the military expanded its role and established its primacy to the political process (Rizvi, *The Military & Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997*, 2009)

Pakistan has experienced thirty years of military rule (1958 -1971, 1977-1988 and 1999-2008); even when not in government the military has constantly sought to centralize and consolidate the political power and the military exerts significant overt and covert control over the civilian authorities in both internal and foreign affairs. In Pakistan, control over governance has oscillated between the two; a decade of civilian supremacy followed by a decade of military rule.

In 1990s, Pakistan saw the period of civilian rule of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif came in power twice, Benazir rule (1988-1990), (Ziring, 1991) and (1993-1996) (Nasr, 2004). Both the times, Benazir's government was dismissed with the president of his own party while military was behind the scene. Nawaz Sharif's both tenures also faced military, first ruling period of Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993) was dismissed by President Ishaq Khan (Syed, 1998) and in 1997 Nawaz Sharif again came in power. Pervaiz Musharraf intervened unconstitutionally and imposed another martial law in 1999. Nawaz Sharif was exiled. Later in 2002, Musharraf legitimized his authority through referendum (Chani, 2008). Musharraf was succeeded by a democratic civilian government of PPP under Zardari. PPP relations with military remained dormant and it was the first civilian government who completed its tenure in the history of Pakistan.

In May 2013 general elections were held and PMLN won by a 2/3<sup>rd</sup> majority, despite, the smart political move to demonstrate that the prime minister enjoys complete trust and support of the military, the processes for political polarization has been unleashed in the insecurity-ridden country by both Azadi March led by Imran Khan and Inqilab March led by Tahir-ul-Qadri in Lahore on 14<sup>th</sup> August 2014 (Jaspal, 2015).

In this background, this study discusses the previous experience of PMLN and the way this experience is currently influencing the party policies with respect to civil-military relations. How the military and PMLN have been responding towards domestic and international issues.

### **1.1 Rationale of the Study**

The study is rationale in the sense that civil-military relations are one of the major issues of Pakistan. Since independence, there has been only one civilian regime that has completed its



tenure. This study specifically discusses PML (Nawaz). It explores how the previous experience of Nawaz influences his present policies with respect to civil-military relations. It also discusses the role of military and PML (Nawaz) in internal and external affairs.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

In Pakistan, the military is the most formidable and autonomous actor. Throughout Pakistan's history, military has remained the most powerful institution and has overthrown the democratically elected civilian governments on the charges of mismanagement and corruption. Even during civilian regimes, military has interfered in the affairs of government. Therefore, military influence in Pakistan's domestic politics and foreign affairs cannot be ignored. This study investigates the military influence in the context of civil-military relations in Pakistan during Nawaz Sharif's present era, along with the response of the military towards domestic as well as international issues.

## **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The objectives of the study would be

- To analyze the strategy adopted by the PMLN government to tackle the internal and external issues.
- To study the reasons behind the military interference in the domain of civilian rules in Pakistan
- To examine the response of the military during Nawaz Sharif's regime towards domestic and international issues

## **1.4 Research Questions**

1. How is the previous experience of PML (N) influencing its present policies with respect to civil-military relations?
2. Why has the outlook of military and Nawaz towards the affairs of governance increased since December 2014?
3. What was the response of military during Nawaz Sharif's regime towards internal and external challenges faced by civilian government?

## **1.5 Significance of the Study**

This study explores the nature of relationship between military and civilian government and the major factors behind military intervention in politics. And the role of military in domestic and international issues faced by civilian. This study explores the role of military in politics and factors which become the reason of military intervention in political affairs. This study is a good piece of knowledge in the form of research to understand the civil military relations in Pakistan. Finding of this research provides a better understanding of the role of military in the core political process of Pakistan. This study will be helpful for academicians and practitioners, future researchers and students to understand the civil military relations.

## **1.6 Delimitation of the Study**

This study focuses on PMLN's present era with respect to civil military relationship from 2013 to 2016.

## 1.7 Operational Definitions of Major Terms

Key Concepts	Definitions	Measurements	Data Source
<b>1.7.1 Civilian</b>	A person who is not a member of the military or of a police or firefighting force (Merriam Webster Dictionary) In political term it is used for the Political administrators of a state.	Verified from military	Secondary data source from website
<b>1.7.2 Military</b>	The armed forces responsible for securing and defending a country. (Your Dictionary)	Verified from 1973 constitution of Pakistan	Secondary data source from website
<b>1.7.3 Civil-Military Relations</b>	Describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. (Huntington)	Domains of both	Secondary data source from website
<b>1.7.4 Civil Military Relations in Developed Democratic States</b>	Civil-military relations can be defined in terms of a balance between the civilian and military organization and institutions and their internal cohesiveness (The Nation, 2012)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Military does not interfere in civilian domain</li> <li>● Civilian do not interfere in military affairs</li> </ul>	Secondary data source from website
<b>1.7.5 Civil-Military Relation in Underdeveloped Democratic States</b>	Civil-military relations can be defined in terms of inequity between the civilian and military organization (The Nation, 2012)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Power oscillated between the two</li> <li>● Rise of one, fall of other</li> <li>● Dominant over each other</li> </ul>	Secondary data source from website

## 2. Theoretical Framework

Samuel P. Huntington attempts his theory of civilian control through professionalism. He has provided his model of "Objective" and "Subjective" Civilian Control, in which Civilian control is maintained through entrusting 'professionalism' in military corps. Civilians are free to say military security policy, but would leave the military elites free to determine what military operations were required to secure the policy objectives. The real meaning of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism and independent military sphere. Huntington said that a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state. Huntington argues that a high degree of civilian control can be achieved in the modern state only by a high degree of differentiation of military institutions from other social institutions and the creation of a thoroughly professional officer corps. A professional officer corps, he argues, is jealous of its own limited sphere of competence but recognizes its incompetence in matters that lie outside the professional military sphere and hence is willing to accept its role as a subordinate instrument of the state. The less professionalized officer corps, on the other hand, the less differentiation there is between military and political roles and therefore the less justification for military obedience to political authority. (Huntington, 1957)

In case of Pakistan, military is dominating the core political process of PMLN. Huntington's objective and subjective civil control work put legal restrictions on them not to involve in politics. Civilians should be superior and capable enough to make authority on military and military should be subordinate to civilians.(Huntington ,1962)

Huntington contends that Praetorianism is a key component in a weak civil society-strong military relationship. He defines Praetorianism as the military's interference in a country's political system "A praetorian society is one in which there are no effective institutions, and in which social groups take direct political action to achieve their goals a free for all in which the army is likely to be most successful because it largely controls the instruments of force." Huntington said, "The military's presence is due to the absence of effective political institutions that are capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. This absence means that power is fragmented; it comes in many forms and in small quantities. Authority over the system is temporary, and the weakness of political institutions means that authority and office are easily acquired and easily lost." The military must acknowledge that they can leave the praetorian environment only if they use the political system to do so. This is an idealist view of military behavior. If the power that comes with leadership does not use them maybe they will do what is right and help their country create strong institutions and therefore build a healthier civil military relationship. (Samuel.P.Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, 1975)

In Pakistan, military is the strongest and the most prestigious institution and weaknesses of the civilians to deal with the political affairs of the state give space to military to interfere in civilian matters. In the specific case of PMLN, they were not strong enough to deal the matters emerging in their regime and called military to control the situation during PTI Dharna.

Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence; Convergence theory postulated either a civilianization of the military or a militarization of society. The military world would be imbued with the norms and expectations of the society that created it. He encouraged use of mobilization, which would bring a wide variety of individuals into the military. The more such

societal influences present within the military culture, the smaller the attitudinal differences between the two worlds and the greater the chance of civilians maintaining control over the military.(Janowitz, 1960)

Janowitz argues that the military world would be imbued with the norms and expectations of the society that created it. It applies in the case of Pakistan, as in the Pakistan military is considered a very effective substitute of civilian, and people look towards military for revolution when civilians are not working effectively.

### **3. Literature Review**

The phenomenon and practice of military mediation in political issues and the nature and progression of civil-military relations drew the attention of numerous western and Muslim researchers. There is a lot of literature on civil-military relations, numerous scholars wrote on civil-military, investigated their relations, tussles between them and their authority of one on another.

In the book *The man on horseback* writer composed that, "Neither the capacity for mediation, nor the motivation to do so, nor the temperament triggering off action would be adequate without providing chance to intervene, made by expanded civilian reliance on the military particularly in emergencies circumstance". In addition, nature and chance to the levels of political culture i.e. developed, mature, negligible and low. It is kept up that national political cultures could be positioned by the accompanying three criteria, the level of open support for the techniques used to exchange political power and for the relating conviction that those methods are honest to goodness. The level of open mindfulness in regards to the individual and organizations holding

sovereign expert and furthermore how much the populace trusts that no other individual or group really hold that power. Regardless, his own work short falls of being reasonably and even observationally comprehensive. For instance, there is little reference made to the social, monetary and institutional structures connected with the distinctive sorts of political societies and to the routes in which these variables 'thusly' influence the result of military mediation.(Finer, 2002)

Shafqat adopts an explicitly comparative theoretical strategy and exhibits a thorough investigation of civil-military relations in Pakistan. He starts by portraying the historical backdrop of military dominion in this unpredictable South Asian nation and after that inspects the breakdown of military control, surveying the ascent of the Pakistan People's Party and the changing setup of party-military relations giving a detailed investigation of civil military relations. Great is that he additionally gives a research about the breakdown of military control. (Shafqat, 1997)

In the *Military, State and Politics* Rizvi comprehensively investigated the elements of civil-military relations in Pakistan. He discusses how and why the Pakistani military has obtained such a notability in the country and how it keeps on affecting decision-making on foreign and security policies and key domestic political, social and monetary issues. He also looks at the progressions inside the military, the effect of these progressions on its nature towards the state and society and the implications for peace and security in nuclearized South Asia. He critically analyzed the role of the military and how it interferes in polity. (Rizvi, 2000)

Kichi, in his article, composed that Upsets in Civil-Military connection has enormously harmed

Pakistan's social, political, monetary, social texture and in particular the procedure of democratization. The conflict between the Civilian administration and military has extraordinarily damaged Pakistan's picture in worldwide discussions. It has prompted to anarchy and chaos. It is the need of the time to overcome any obstacle between the Civilian initiative and Military foundation. The military has no room in domestic political issues. Military meddles just the times of crisis or during natural calamities on the call of government under constitutional provisions. Moreover, it is the obligation of the non-civil government to guarantee rule of law to control and strengthen law and order situation, to check for defilement, to guarantee meritocracy and attempt ventures to moderate all outstanding issues. it is their job to constrain the institutions in their circles and ensure their obligations to not accede from their limits. The time has come to assemble positive picture of Pakistan and abrogate all contentions. This research gives an extensive study about both the organizations. (Khichi, 2012)

Jaapal in his article wrote that the inability to illuminate the present emergency and the powerlessness of civilian law enforcement organizations to implement peace progressively debilitate the position of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif. The Pakistani political system and political culture don't seem to be developed enough for the rise of the civil strength model of the policy because of the weakness of the political system to military upset. To finish up, the political weakness and inadequacy of the civil law enforcement agencies to keep up law and order have enhanced the power of the high authorities of the military that they believe that it is advantageous to extend its part in the nation. Particularly after the militant attack at the Peshawar Army Public School, on 16 December 2014, present the correct perspective of Pakistani government officials that they are not sufficiently skilled to manage domestic issues and call



military in the times of crisis. Naturally, military interference in political issues can't be shrunk because of the incompetent image of the civilian government.(Jaspal, 2015)

In the book *Transition from military to civilian rule*, it is specified that, the military's intervention under Ayub Khan is legitimized due to the "inherited" feeble and inadequate political leadership with addition to weak political groups. The author, who has generally composed some adjusted records on constitutional developments in Pakistan, has failed to take hold of the significance of the democratic process and the harm that is done to it by progressive military mediations. He legitimizes the military coup driven by General Zia-ul-Haq. In the author's view, Pakistan advanced under his "Military Law" in all regards. Moreover, Zia is viewed as the ideal individual to make the nation "swap" from dictatorship to democratic system. One miracle what has been deliberately ignored to brutal substances is that the general population of Pakistan confronted i.e. (constrained) Islamization, concealment of fundamental human rights, Afghan Jihad, wilderness, an enormous frequency of poverty etc.(Choudhury, 1988)

Shah in his article expressed that since Pakistan gained freedom in 1947, just once has a civil government finished its term and gently exchanged power to another civil government. Pakistan's feeble national solidarity, exacerbated by an attitude that saw war with India devastating around each corner, enabled the military to take national security and ultimately government into its own particular hands. He explains the controversial military relations with Pakistani civil government and distinguishes steps for improving Pakistan's military and diminishing its impedance in governmental issues, and sees lessons for weak democratic governments endeavoring to bring the military under civil control (Shah, 2014).

#### **4. Research Methodology**

This study will examine the relation of civil-military by investigating the factors and causes behind the influence of military in the domain of civilians. Qualitative research method is used to explore descriptive and exploratory dimensions of civil-military relations. For collection of data both primary and secondary sources are utilized. Primary sources such as semi-structured interviews from such as politicians and retired military officers, parliamentary debates and reports of nongovernmental Organizations are included. Secondary sources such as Journals articles, books and Newspapers are used.

#### **5. Organization of the Study**

Chapter one gives overview of the whole study and it also includes theoretical framework. Chapter two discusses a detailed history of civil-military relations from 1947-2013. Chapter three addresses internal and external challenges to PMLN and military's response in this regard. Chapter four explores civil-military relations in previous and current regimes of PMLN and further gives a detailed analysis of all the three regimes. Chapter five is followed by conclusion with a few recommendations.

## Chapter 2

### Historical Background

The military in Pakistan holds a vital part in basic leadership and is assuming a fundamental part in the Pakistani establishment and persuasive of the nation. Since 1947, regardless of the way that, Pakistan was established as a democratic nation after its independence from the British Rule, yet the military has stayed one of the nation's strongest foundations and commonly ousted justly chose non-military government personnel on the premise of mismanagement and defilement. Progressive governments have ensured that the military was consulted particularly when those choices identified with Kashmir struggle and foreign polic,. Political pioneers of Pakistan's developing majority rule government realize that the military has ventured into the political field in the season of emergencies through rebellion to set up military autocracies and can do as such once more.

At the time of freedom, Pakistan had just one single stable institution that was military; the organization was allocated the obligation of state and country building. Muhammad Ali Jinnah turned into the Governor General and Liaquat Ali Khan went about as Prime Minister. The pre-Partition Constituent Assembly was to make the constitution. (Banerji, 2014)

The Secretary General of Pakistan, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, was a bureaucrat who made a "planning committee" to make the nation state. He bypassed the leader and his bureau, among the procedure of country state development, in this manner preparing for the bureaucratic oppression. The military, a very much disciplined and stable association was still commanded by colonial officers; Jinnah being wiped out was subject to his secretary general, whereby the Prime

Minister Liaquat Ali Khan did not regularly go to the bureau meetings because of powerlessness. Thus, the secretary general as a leader of the administration dealt with the military undertakings (Banerji, 2014).

And in addition, India went mix of princely states into the Indian union, In a geo-deliberately critical condition of Jammu and Kashmir, it was the tribesmen from the Frontier region of Pakistan who attacked the valley obviously to discharge the persecuted Kashmiri's from the Dogra run, in October 1947. Later, there was an all-around arranged military operation by the Pakistan Army to supposedly liberate Kashmir from the Indian occupation. The resulting occasions provoked Indo-Pak war (Ali 2002:235;Chadda 2000:196). The religious parties particularly Jamat-e-Islami (JI) bolstered the military activity against "socialist India" (Cohen 1984:37). From 1951-58 the officials and the military dominated in a joint venture. (Javed, 1997)

## **2.1 First Martial Law Regime**

Iskandar Mirza, President of Pakistan (1956-1958), had a military background and had great relations with General Ayub. Nevertheless, incomprehensible political demonstration drove Ayub Khan to request that Iskander Mirza revoke the constitution and pronounce martial law on October 7, 1958. Iskander Mirza made a request to designate his resignation by the Army high command. All through his residency, Ayub Khan got himself noticeable to the rank of Field Marshal and designated General Musa as the Commander-in-Chief. The most enormous Political relations practice among the Ayub Khan administration was the 1965 Indo Pak war. In spite of what is instructed in school reading material, Pakistan did not win the war nor was it India who began it. The 23-day war can, in the best case scenario, be known as a tie, however, it was anticipated as a noteworthy achievement. Actually, the Tashkent understanding denoted the

starting of ruin of Ayub Khan as the general population accepted what the Army had won on the battleground, Ayub lost on negotiations table. By the by, the picture of the military ruled on 6 September 1966 which was announced a national occasion; nobody realized that 5 years after the fact it would hit it's debilitate under another military despot.

## **2.2 Second Martial Law Regime**

With the quick decrease in the prevalence of Ayub Khan's rule, General Yahya, who had turned into the commander-in-Chief in September 1966, proclaimed military law on March 25, 1969 (Javed, 1997). After the December 7, 1970 elections, which were viewed as free and sound, East Pakistan was involved in political disorder. General Yahya saw no political answer for the issue and a military activity was propelled in East Pakistan. Serious press confinements were presented and the general population was sustained off base data. India began helping the uprising and went into a war with Pakistan. "The Defense of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan" doctrine failed and East Pakistan separated to be Bangladesh. The resolve of the country was at a record-breaking low and the Army and officers were openly criticized.

## **2.3 Regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the Civil-Military Relations**

Yahya had no other solution yet to surrender control to Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ironically, Bhutto at first assumed responsibility as a non-military personnel Chief Martial Law Administrator. Later, he delivered power of president to Fazal Ilahi and became the prime minister. He made new constitution. Bhutto considered this to be the ideal chance to control the forces of the military. A few senior officers were resigned from the three administrations. Lt Gen Gull Hassan was made the Commander-in-Chief, in a similar rank. Nevertheless, he soon cut

down with Bhutto (Choudhury, 1988). The outcome was that Bhutto forced him and the Air Chief to resign from their posts. Perhaps, this was the only time in the historical backdrop of Pakistan when the civilian government forced its power over the military along these lines, totally. It would not have been conceivable had it not been for the 71 war catastrophe which humiliated the Army, with somewhere in the range of 90,000 men as the Prisoners of war in India. With General Tikka Khan as a Commander of Army staff, Bhutto kept on getting a magnificent control over the military. In 1976, he advanced Lt Gen Muhammad Zia-ul Haq over several officers and made him the Commander of Army staff. (Arif, 1995) Bhutto's elections of March 1977 were supposed to be fixed by his political rivals. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) involving nine political parties rioted. Law and order situation was failing rapidly. Political officials themselves were requesting military law. Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Ret.), one of the prominent opposition politicians, kept in touch with the service chiefs and requesting that they mediate (Rashid, 1996).

## **2.4 The Third Martial Law Regime**

On July 5, 1977, the third direct military law was forced in the nation under the Operation Fair Play. General Zia assumed responsibility as Chief Martial Law Administrator, suspended the constitution and accordingly started what was to become distinctly the nation's longest military rule. General Zia surprisingly presented the component of Islamic ideology system in the Army, as was planned by its new maxim of 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad Fi sabilillah'. This belief system of "Islamization" helped Zia to acquire the support of the Islamic parties among Pakistan's clergy and the middle class. Bhutto was hanged and the elections deferred. To legitimize his lead, he led a referendum in 1984, which has been labeled as a farce. A Judge of the Supreme Court got the

result of the referendum from Joint Staff Headquarters and approved them. One instrument that was utilized by General Zia to keep up hold over the military, his supposed 'constituency', and hence over the managerial apparatus of the state was expansions in administration and pre-develop retirements. His nearby partners were allowed advancements and expansions beyond the retirement age (Shafqat, 1997). On retirement, they were given excellent posts in the military's various business concerns, for example, the Fauji Fertilizers. On the other hand, improved proficient officers whom he considered a risk to his administration either resigned themselves or were sidelined in promotion sheets. (Hussain, 1993).

In 1985, General Zia lifted Martial law although after presenting the infamous eighth amendment in the 1973 constitution that gave him the ability to dismiss governments. Prime Minister Junejo attempted unsuccessfully to practice some control over the military. For instance, he needed General Akhtar Abdur Rehman and Lt Gen Hamid Gul to leave in connection to the Ojhri Camp disaster. Zia did not permit this and along these lines broke down the National Assembly in the principal ever utilization of the eighth amendment in May 1988.

## **2.5 Civil-Military relations during 90's**

The credit goes to the Vice Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, that he did not take control after General Zia's demise in the C-130 crash. However, later as Commander of Army staff General Bag's part was to become distinctly controversial. (Ask, 1993). Benazir held her first term in office from December 1988 to August 1990 and second term from October 1993 to November 1996. Benazir and military did not have trustworthy relations in spite of that military allowed her government to flourish. PPP emerged as the largest party in the general elections. Benazir tried to impose authoritative control over the military, which created contentions

between both pillars. The ISI's General was changed and replaced by a retired Major General instead of a serving servant which led contradiction amongst them and the involvement of government in the retirement and appointment of the army top brass created more conflicts. Further, meeting with Indian prime-minister Rajiv Gandhi lead the military commanders to view her as unreliable on security matters.

Besides, when President Ishaq dismissed the first Benazir Bhutto government, she blamed the Military Intelligence for masterminding the move and was sure that her expulsion orders had been set up by the Judge Advocate General branch of the General Head Quarters. Pakistan Peoples' Party blamed the media for connecting with intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence and Inter Services Intelligence; their daily papers paid the cost next time she was in power as their ads had been cut. Ms Bhutto, additionally, guaranteed that she was kept unaware as to details of Pakistan's atomic program. However, General Beg denied this. On the other hand, the way Benazir Bhutto reported the testing of Hatf I and Hatf II rockets indicated that Beg needed to keep civilian impact over the military to a minimum. (Khan, 1963).

The 1990 elections were believed to be fixed. The Inter Services Intelligence under Lt General Hameed Gul guaranteed Pakistan Peoples Party's defeat in the polls formed the Islami Jamhoori Itehad party. In spite of the fact that Hameed Gull denied this claim and said that the Inter Services Intelligence political cell, which was made by Z. Ali Bhutto, just "observed" the elections. Still the role of the Inter Services Intelligence is questionable, instead of participating in counter intelligence, which remains its primary role; it was wasting the nation's assets by monitoring the elections. Later on, General Beg became furious on the foreign office and put Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in an awkward position when he made his displeasure over the



government's Gulf War public policy (Ahmed, 1996). Openly criticizing America and supporting Saddam and remarking on foreign policy in press gatherings was not the work of Commander of Army Staff. This demonstrated the military was still into the play. Daily papers instituted the term 'ruling troika', involving the Commander of Army Staff, President and the Prime Minister, in a specific order of impact over the nation (Gul, 1995). General Asif Nawaz assumed control from General Beg as Commander of Army Staff on 18 August 1991. He was drawn into the clean-up operation in Sindh and created differences with the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. General Abdul Waheed Kakar succeeded Asif Nawaz after his passing. Directly after General Waheed accepted charge, differences between the President and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif created. National Assembly was broken up and later, reestablished by the Supreme Court.

This brought about a political tie between the Prime Minister and the President. Speculations of a military assume control were large. In any case, although military did not mediate directly by assuming control over the nation, there was shuttle diplomacy between the President, Prime Minister and the services chiefs. Military made a deal, where both the President and Prime Minister resigned and new elections were held in October 1993. (Hassan, 1993) The most noteworthy occasion identified with the military, during Benazir Bhutto's second regime was the failed coup by some lesser officers including a Major General. General Waheed was offered an expansion in his regime but he rejected. There are a few reports that there was a conflict between Ms. Bhutto and the President Leghari over the appointment of the new Commander of Army Staff. In fact, the President utilized his unlimited powers to select a respected and expert officer General Jehangir Karamat as the Commander of Army Staff. (Nasr,2004)

President Leghari dismissed the government of Benazir Bhutto in November 1996. This time

she did not directly accuse the armed forces of being behind the move. During the overseer government, the President set up a Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS), a body initially envisaged by General Zia. It includes the army chiefs and can advise the government on defense and fiscal matters. It was viewed as military law in civilian clothes. ( Alam, 2014)

Elections were held on February 3, 1997 and Mr. Nawaz Sharif was elected as the Prime Minister with an exceptional mandate. One of his first political moves was to cancel the sections of the eighth amendment in the constitution which gave the president unlimited powers to dissolve the National Assembly and to select army chiefs. It was speculated that the Council for the Defense National Security will be disbanded. This event got the supremacy of the Parliament as set down initially in the 1973 constitution. The military stayed nonpartisan all through this work out, its administration reestablishing its confidence in the Parliament. (Choudhury, 1988)

Many people in Pakistan blamed Sharif for losing ground from Kargil under American pressure and rising economic shortfalls and debt services installments essentially because of American sections after Pakistan tried its Nuclear Weapons in May 1998 as a reaction to India that had prompted to a money related crisis. When questioned about his purposes behind backing down from Kargil, Sharif said that Pakistan had just fuel and ammunition for 3 days and the nuclear missiles were not prepared at that time. This remark made many Pakistani's image Nawaz Sharif a deceiver as Army doctrine called for having no less than 45 days of fuel and ammunition and to have remained by nuclear missiles prepared. (Banerji, 2014)

## **2.6 The Fourth Martial Law Regime**

Expecting that the Army may assume control, Sharif attempted to dismiss his own designated Chief of Army Staff and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Pervaiz Musharaf

and appointed an Inter Services Intelligence director-general Lieutenant-General Ziauddin Butt as Chief of Army Staff. General Musharaf, who was out of the country, boarded a business flight to come back to Pakistan. Senior Army officers declined to accept Musharaf's dismissal. Sharif ordered the Karachi airplane terminal to prevent the arrival of the airline, which was over the skies of Karachi. In a return, the officers expelled Sharif's organization and assumed control over the air terminal. The plane arrived with just a couple of minutes of fuel, and Musharaf expected control of the administration. PM Nawaz Sharif was put under house imprisonment and was later exiled. (Hussain, 1993)

The overthrow in Pakistan was criticized by most world pioneers however was generally bolstered by Pakistani people. The new military government of Pervaiz Musharaf was intensely condemned in the United States, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom and when President Bill Clinton went on his land mark outing to South Asia, he just made a last minute stop in Pakistan for a couple of hours but however spent over five days visiting and going by India. Pakistan was also suspended from the Commonwealth Nations while Musharaf promised to wipe corruption out of politics and balance out the economy. (Javaid, 1997)

## **2.7 Zardari's Regime and the Civil-Military Relations**

On 18 August 2008, General Pervaiz Musharaf resigned from the post of president under impeachment pressure from the coalition government. He was succeeded, on 6 September 2008, by President Asif Ali Zardari as Pakistan's eleventh elected President since 1956. Civil-military relations were not appropriate as PPP linked Benazir's murder with the army. Moreover civil administration tried to hold power over ISI and wanted to place under ministry of interior which

faced large resistance from the military's side. PPP was forced to take back their decision to avoid confrontation with armed forces. There were many hiccups regarding domestic problems, suspension of judges, swat operation, security measures inside the country, foreign policy related issues were dealt unanimously by both pillars. Further, USA raided Abbottabad for the search operation of Osama bin Laden which created a debate on state security and its connections with the terrorists. At that time, civilians came to rescue and defended the position of armed forces and intelligence agencies at all fronts including UNO and rest of the world.

On the other hand, General Kayani realised the bad marks of his forerunner (General Musharraf) that he was not being regarded extremely well. There was a requirement for the Army to reclaim its lost dignity and it effectively did. This has to be distinctly one reason that no endeavor of the overthrow was made during the government of Pakistan Peoples' Party, and it completed its regime of five years. (Alam, 2014) and this was the only civilian government who enjoyed full authority without barrier of military and kept civil dominance and completed its term. No other civilian government, since division, had completed its regime.

In May, 2013 PML (N) won the elections. Regardless of the more intelligent political move to demonstrate that the Prime Minister enjoys complete trust and support of the military, the procedures for political division have been loose in the insecurity ridden nation by both Azadi March (freedom movement) drove by cricketer-turned-government official Imran Khan and Inqilab March (revolution movement) drove by Canada-based Sunni cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri in Lahore on 14 August 2014. The demonstrators requested the resignation of the Premier Sharif and demanded new elections in the country. (Jaspal, 2015) They brought about the affirmation of

rigging in elections not just ruined the legitimacy of elected government of Premier Sharif, additionally, expanded the part of the military in the Pakistani polity.

Currently, Pakistan is confronting a considerable measure of internal and foreign difficulties, militants, anti-state elements and non-state actors are getting favorable advantage of continuous contention between the civilian and military authority. Military intervention has incredibly harmed democratic setup and principle of rule of law. Military has dependably undermined the command of non-military personnel government. At whatever point military came into power by unlawful means, it set up fake democratic setup and political parties which provoked to conflict of organizations. On the other hand, civilian leadership needs to guarantee the rule of law with the goal that military must not have any opportunity to interfere in the civilian government. To solve the danger, supremacy of constitution is the best solution. There are three aspects of rule of law, which are executive, judiciary and the legislature. Political parties must be resistant to hold military's seek for power. Media and civil society needs to play their part in reinforcing the democratic system. The prime service of the military is to secure the frontiers from outside threats. There is no place for the military in the political system. Military gets involved just in the times of crisis or during natural calamities on the call of civilian government under constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the civilian government to guarantee the rule of law, to control and strengthen peace circumstance, to check for defilement, to guarantee meritocracy and take steps to reduce every single remarkable issue.

situation". Nawaz's choice to go to Modi's function and hold bilateral talks with him would have conveyed more weight if he had taken the parliament into confidence. Nevertheless, to take all the praise and a general approach of disregarding parliament stood in the way. The generals were disappointed with the way in which the PM had continued with the peace exchange in spite of their reservations. Armed forces believed that we can never figure friendly relations with India without sorting out the Kashmir issue and water dispute. (Ashraf, 2016)

Kashmir is Pakistan's jugular vein; India is attempting to transform it into a desert by taking/hindering its share of the waters. The Kashmir debate is being set aside for later, while matters like exchange and CBMS are conveyed to the fore from India. Tragically, the political executive has neglected to recognize the dangers to Pakistan's existence. It does not have the ability to counter them. (Ikramullah, 2012). But, the armed forces do not allow to play fools, as they lost their family and friends in the war against India. Brig. Zubair in his interview said that he lost two siblings and his Dad lost three in war, after that it solicited him what is the meaning of Pakistan. He liked one thing about Musharaf that he said Pakistan first. Then how is it possible to formulate friendly relations with India. He additionally said that politicians are the fools. How can they assume that we build benevolent relations with our most exceedingly bad adversary, who simply wishes to destroys. He said we never get to be friends and it is a propaganda to make us trick with love and that's it.

Gen. Raheel was not satisfied with the Prime Minister's India's policy. He had lost his family in war with India and had a lot of dislike against India. Indian security powers made a fool-proof case against Pakistani association in terrorist attack on Pathankot Airbase. Subsequently in striking back, the ISI captured Kulbhushan Yadav and asserted that he was Research and

Analysis Wing (R&AW) operator and was helping the separatists in Baluchistan.

### **3.2.2 Pakistan Afghanistan Relations**

On the western front, in spite of Pakistani cooperation, lodging a large number of Afghan refugees and provision of logistic support to Afghanistan, Afghan spying network NDS is abetting the TTP activists for advancing terrorism in Pakistan. Indeed, being its adviser, NDS (National Directorate of Security) has solid association with RAW, in this manner they follow its dictates to damage Pakistan. While, Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani was helpful to Pakistan, but the NDS and some of its ministers are toeing the Indian lines. A year ago in November 2014, when Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made his first visit to Pakistan after being elected, he drove straight from the airport to see Gen. Sharif at Pakistani armed forces headquarters in Rawalpindi before going to Islamabad to meet the non-military personnel leadership. Visit of head of State of any nation to Army Headquarters is unusual, but General Sharif needed to make it clear that Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan would be chosen by him and not by the civil government. (Varma, 2016)

Additionally, later he decided to proceed with enhancing relations with Afghanistan. He even recommended that Pakistan armed forces would bolster the Afghan security powers, in spite of long-held reservations about the size, reason and reasonability of the foreign-subsidized Afghan National Army. (Banerji, 2014).

### **3.2.3 Pakistan USA Relations**

Gen. Sharif has a prominent profile abroad. In the U.S., he met Secretary of State John Kerry and other senior authorities and was awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit for his contribution to "peace

rigging in elections not just ruined the legitimacy of elected government of Premier Sharif, additionally, expanded the part of the military in the Pakistani polity.

Currently, Pakistan is confronting a considerable measure of internal and foreign difficulties, militants, anti-state elements and non-state actors are getting favorable advantage of continuous contention between the civilian and military authority. Military intervention has incredibly harmed democratic setup and principle of rule of law. Military has dependably undermined the command of non-military personnel government. At whatever point military came into power by unlawful means, it set up fake democratic setup and political parties which provoked to conflict of organizations. On the other hand, civilian leadership needs to guarantee the rule of law with the goal that military must not have any opportunity to interfere in the civilian government. To solve the danger, supremacy of constitution is the best solution. There are three aspects of rule of law, which are executive, judiciary and the legislature. Political parties must be resistant to hold military's seek for power. Media and civil society needs to play their part in reinforcing the democratic system. The prime service of the military is to secure the frontiers from outside threats. There is no place for the military in the political system. Military gets involved just in the times of crisis or during natural calamities on the call of civilian government under constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the civilian government to guarantee the rule of law, to control and strengthen peace circumstance, to check for defilement, to guarantee meritocracy and take steps to reduce every single remarkable issue.



## Chapter 3

### **Internal and External Challenges to PMLN's Government and Military's Response**

In the history of Pakistan, it was just once that a non-military personnel government completed its whole five-year term in power, disregarding many dangers from anti-state militants. This has been a major victory for Pakistan which has confronted by four military interventions and has seen numerous non-military personnel governments, which were toppled before finishing their terms. (Nambiar, 2014) On May 11, 2013, new elections were held and PML (N) got triumph for the third time. Immediately after holding power, the new government confronted numerous internal and external difficulties, which include Load shedding and terrorism. In pre-election speeches, PML (N) guaranteed to blackout the energy shortage and terrorism from the nation. People were extremely happy that new government would bring changes and reforms.

#### **3.1 Internal Challenges and Military's Response**

##### **3.1.1 Poverty and unemployment**

We have problems in legacy. When Pakistan got autonomous against Hindus, there several issues which were to be faced by the Government. Unemployment and poverty was one of them. Unluckily, even after many years, we still haven't escaped from these issues. About a half populace of nation is enduring with poverty. With the passage of time poverty rate has increased rather than diminishing. It was a major challenge for the new government. Individuals were

enduring with the economy crises. They had no food, no education and no jobs. Nepotism has supplanted qualification and merit. Expanding populace has brought about boundless poverty, absence of education and unemployment. As indicated by multidimensional record (MPI) report 38.8 % populace lives in misery. A large portion of poverty issues have been confronted in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in Sindh and Punjab poverty rate has been lesser than rest of territories, exceptionally Punjab is very developed. New government won the elections with the guarantee to decrease neediness, wipe out nepotism and corruption from the nation. What's more, give jobs to unemployed, as in their last regimes they began yellow taxi scheme, loan schemes etc., to facilitate the needy individuals. In current term, PMLN started a great deal of improvement projects and activities to take out poverty and illiteracy from the nation, similar to, metro transport, laptop scheme, indigenous scholarships, youth internship programs, loan to poor people etc. Government of Pakistan has proceeded with some advantageous plans including laptop scheme, Yellow Taxi scheme for self-employed and proceeding with a plan of the PPP term, i.e. the Benazir Income Support Program for the welfare of poor people. Various local and global scholarships have been given to skilled students for higher education (MPhil, Masters and PhD and so on). Loans are being given to students and doctors.

In the last two years, government made considerable measures for the improvement of the public. Macroeconomic markers have impressively improved. As a matter of fact, terrorism, poor law and order and energy shortfall were worst thing about financial development. Advanced China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been touted as a major accomplishment of the government, which is getting \$47 billion or more investment. It has been an extraordinary activity for improvement of the nation. (Haq, 2016)

### 3.1.2 Energy crises

At the time of elections, nation was confronting enormous energy crises. There was load shedding around 12 hours in rural areas and 8 hours in urban territories, industries and business were affected seriously, moreover, there was an increase in unemployment and poverty rate. The energy crises began in Musharaf administration and got distinctly higher in PPP government. At the time of elections, as per planning development report; the nation delivered around 16,000 MW and faced a deficiency of around 6,000 MW. The new government's real task was to lessen the load shedding from the country. PML (N) guaranteed to blackout the electricity crises and gave a due date of December 2017 to beat the energy shortfall. PML (N) minister Ahsan Iqbal in a meeting said, "To address the energy shortfall in the nation would be the top priority of PML (N) and would be succeed to decrease the time-span of load shedding to the bottom level". He, additionally, said that power robbery would be managed strictly. Punjab CM Shahbaz Sharif guaranteed that, "The poorest areas of the general public won't be charged in an indistinguishable way from the wealthiest class. This system is unreasonable we will impose the rich and encourage poor people, they ought not to pay the bill at a similar rate, when they live in two distinct universes". Government work in energy section is appreciative; they decreased the load shedding although they did not totally overcome the problem. However, to the fulfillment of its claim of totally end load shedding by year 2018, and eliminate the power related problems, various little and mega projects have been started by the administration. The span of energy blackout has already been diminished both in rural and urban zones of the nation in wake of some solid steps taken by the government.

"In a proposition to improve power generation and wipe out load-shedding, the administration has propelled many power projects and that power generation would be expanded to 18,000 MW before the end of 2016." State Minister for Water and Power Abid Sher Ali stated, "load shedding had been limited to six hours in urban zones, while eight hours in rural ranges thus of strong actions by the government. Masses have additionally expressed satisfaction over the measures being taken by the administration to end load shedding. "The situation is far finer than it was three years back when PML N came into power as not just the time of load-shedding is lessened also unannounced load-shedding has also been decreased," said Jameel Ahmed, a retired government officer. (Md, 2016)

### **3.1.3 Terrorism Operation (Zrb-e-Azb)**

One of the major issues of the country is terrorism. Since 9/11, Pakistan has confronted numerous terrorist assaults because of the residency of activist groups in northern regions. The image of the country has turned to be awful, universally. Internally, individuals are enduring with terrorist assaults particularly a lot of insurgency has confronted in militancy emanating FATA and Baluchistan. The terrorist activities are being abetted and helped by a Mossad-CIA-RAW-KHAD nexus situated in Afghanistan. Extremist networks exist, which assert they were battling for the authorization of the Sharia. Sharif did not endorse the violence they utilized. He has stressed that terrorist attacks discourage investors and damage the economy. For Kayani, the different TTP groups were partners who had gone astray.

Sharif and Kayani agreed that there was a requirement for an all Parties meeting to make national agreement on converses with the TTP. It was apparently on Kayani's encouragement that Nawaz Sharif called the APC on TTP in the second week of September. Kayani and DGISI were present

in the meeting to brief the members on the internal and regional circumstance. The solution adopted had a solid hostile to American angle. It maintained, "We pronounce that we should ourselves decide the methods and mode of battling this war to our greatest advantage and might not be guided by the United States of America or whatever other nation in this regard." The talks continued for the next 10 months. These suited the TTP, as it was not required to stop terrorist assaults. In fact, the terrorists conducted the most extremely terrible assaults during the period. (Ahmad, 30May, 2015)

TTP kept assaulting both, the civil and the armed force, staff however, the administration did nothing to stop the assaults. The armed forces got tired of the discussions. Increasingly, it was being understood that the TTP was utilizing the discussions to pick up time. The armed forces administration was convinced that North Waziristan was the place of safety from where the militants continued to conduct the attacks and returned after playing out the job. In March 2014, the armed forces cleared it to Nawaz that there would be no more negotiations with the Pakistani Taliban and took matter in its own hands. A military authority advised to Reuters "We will get revenge for the blood of each and every soldier. Talks or no discussions, the armed forces will get revenge. TTP won't be offered a bit of margin to relax." Major operation was critically required and was consented to send away the disease of terrorism.

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The attack on Karachi airport, in June, by terrorists coming from North Waziristan drove the armed force to choose to launch a major operation against TTP, putting aside the PML-N reservations. The PML-N administration was simply advised to support operation. Zarb-e-Azb. The operation was appreciated by the people of the country and Americans were satisfied with it. Military launched operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan on 15 June 2014. The military had

effectively ruined the Tehrik-i-Taliban's operational havens situated in North Waziristan. Thusly, Taliban and their partners moved in the neighboring areas of Afghanistan. Militants lost their hideouts, arms, stores, vehicles etc.

### **3.1.4 Karachi Operation**

Insecurity in Karachi is higher than rest of the country. There are more terrorist attacks in Karachi than in other areas. People are exceptionally scared of getting out of the houses because of the militant attacks. So finally, the armed forces landed to help the poor people of Karachi; they did not consider the reservations of the PM and led the operation in Karachi. The rangers made a move against the MQM, propelling attacks on nine zero, capturing and torturing number of MQM activists. Strangely, even the PPP supported the operation. Somewhat later came the turn of the PPP, PPP authorities and the party's supporters in bureaucracy were captured on charges of collecting cash through unlawful means to support the Taliban's. It was specified that billions of rupees was collected from the residents. PML-N supported the armed forces stand, which drove the PPP update its state of mind from an agreeable resistance to an adversary. The annoyance against Nawaz kept on developing in PPP.

PML-N supported the armed forces until it found that the armed force needed to dispatch an intensive operation in Punjab too. The claim was that the terrorists had set up no go regions in the biggest territory too. It was additionally said that there was a need to grab the terrorists, their assistants and financiers. PML-N was exceedingly stressed over the interest for utilization of Rangers with the same forces as in the Karachi. PML-N authorities thought it was the thin end of the hold. While the Punjab government has declined to call the rangers to help the non-military personnel government with extra power, the armed forces has concocted another approach to

lead operation in the region without the need of the administration's authorization. It has declared to dispatch operation in no go territories. This puts a great deal of pressure on the administration, as some of its locale level pioneers were known to have had associations with the militant groups. Besides, a few understood figures in the party are included in shady deals including land grabbing. Saqib Khursheed said it is a propaganda against PMLN workers, no minister was named with terrorists.

Whether the thought behind the attacks was to put the administration under more pressure to make it follow the armed forces dictates aimlessly or to finally send it home stays to be seen. Whether the result of the administration's demonstrations of charge and blunder are responsible for much of its inconveniences (Ahmad, 30May, 2015). Since Zarb-e-Azb demonstrated very positive outcomes in controlling the terrorism, the COAS got the world consideration for capably driving this war. As war on terror has worldwide impacts and implications, rest of the world has demonstrated enthusiasm for the progression of war directed by him. Albeit non-military personnel authority may apparently not be seen to involve the driving seat, leaving numerous territories of NAP unattended, yet results could have been not up to desires without their participation and support (Ali, 2016). Under Raheel Sharif, the armed forces have accepted a tight control over the fight against Taliban, including establishing military courts that have sentenced many individuals to death. Legal advisors and families of defendants for denying fundamental rights have condemned the courts and some are challenging the court's' decisions through the civil judiciary. (Reuters,2016)

### **3.1.5 PTI and PAT Dharna**

PTI pioneer Imran Khan began Dharna in the name of Azadi March in August 2014 and Tahir-

ul-Qadri in the name of Inqilab March. They demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister on the claim of rigging in the elections of 2013. Government tried to consult with the parties but did not succeed. Mian Muhammad Saqib Khursheed said that many members went to stop this garbage flow, however they did chicanery, situation was wild for the government that was the reason Nawaz Sharif argued for settlement by the COAS, in the light of the fact that Sharif failed to settle the situation. Numerous representatives from the NA were furious over the choice of PM to call military in civil affairs. Senator Raza Rabani said that, "my head was down, the political pioneers appear to be stressed over the result, the association of military would not just move the balance of power in the support of military in the country's policy, also shrink back their political administration space and weaker the fair political framework." Senator Farhatullah Baber said that "undoubtedly it is a moment of a collective disrespect for the country and more for the parliament," opposition bashing on PM. As opposition pioneer of Punjab assembly Mr. Mian Mehmood-ur-Rashid (PTI) specified in their interview "that our executive is weak, and his incompetence give space to military to prosper its energy amid the Dharna in Islamabad", he additionally said "just our government officials utilize the name of vote based system, in reality democratic system has no presence in Pakistan. In special conditions once again military's part expanded in civil issues". As indicated by PML (N), Chief assumed part as a middle person, called Imran and Qadri independently in armed forces house Rawalpindi and conversed with them. Further, Chief sent troops for the help of police to secure government buildings. In spite of the fact that Nawaz was guaranteed that there would be no overthrow, but in return he must "share space with the armed forces". Meanwhile, the administration was advised to avoid the use of power against the exceedingly charged PTI-PAT activists who had blocked the PM house. The PPP authority, however, went to the administration's discharge, restoring fearlessness in the



upset Sharif. It was, at last, the opposition's support in parliament which guaranteed the administration's survival. PPP gave unequivocal support to PML (N) under the charter of democracy (political fraternity) which was marked by Benazir and Nawaz, on 14 May 2006, in London. For instance, the deployment of rangers and armed force under the Article 245 of the constitution of Pakistan in Islamabad showed the political inadequacy of the administration of Prime Minister Nawaz to resolve the political emergencies in an opportune way, and the weakness of non-military law agencies to handle a crowd in the red zone of Islamabad. These weaknesses of the government made a space for the head of armed force staff. (Jaspal, 2014)

Further, part of the military expanded in governmental issues, the high-level state gatherings which occurred later were held in a manner which demonstrated that both the PM and COAS were together leading the place. This showed the situation of diarchy where a portion of the federal subjects were taken care of by the non-military personnel, other by the armed forces. A resigned officer Brig Irfan Ali said that "military by itself couldn't request joint gatherings with foreign dignitaries. It is a civil authority, which probably believes that Pakistan's stance and response on security and terrorism could be better clarified by military administration. Once civil administration and bureaucracy get better equipped with information on subjects like security and terrorism. They would be confident enough to consult with foreign dignitaries, at their own".

### **3.1.6 Peshawar Attack**

Terrorists attacked army public school Peshawar on 16 December 2014, and killed 144 innocent children. This attack shocked the whole country. Military and political executives rushed to Peshawar. On the next day, Imran Khan announced to stop Dharna and return home. Most of the

martyred children belonged to the families of the armed forces. Armed forces made quick moves. The Chief, rather than Defense Minister or the National Security Advisor, visited Kabul on 17 December 2014. He held separate meetings with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Andgen John F Campbell, ISAF officer. Matter that went under discussion identified with the security situation along the Pak-Afghan border. The armed forces strengthened the hold over the system and requested to form military courts to guarantee fast equity. Civil and Military administration built up (NAP) in January 2015, to crackdown the militant oppression. The political elites of the country agreed to set up the special military courts under the military officers for handling the terrorist cases in the country. The armed forces got additional powers after the tragic episode. Brig. Zubair Ali said that, while no single occurrence can customarily be an attributor. Yet, occurrences like APS get to be "Tiffing point" for decision-making. This specific episode united civilian and military establishment for the formulation of "National Action Plan" which warrants translation by Federal, Provincial government, state foundations and not military alone.

### **3.2 External challenges and the role of military**

Because of the terrorists' presence in North Waziristan and threatening vibe with India, the country has confronted numerous external difficulties; the image of the country has been ruined because of the fear of terrorism. Since 9/11, military's participation in formulating the foreign policy has been very high. When Sharif was elected as the Prime Minister in May 2013, many expected it to be a period when civil leadership could affirm themselves and those military pioneers would be pushed away in the background. In an indication of his goal to run foreign and security policies, Nawaz Sharif kept both those portfolios for himself after elections; he still has not appointed a foreign minister. While, after the Peshawar attacks, Raheel Sharif surely took

over the charge in regard of taking key decisions on India policy, Afghanistan, nuclear issues and relations with United States. Brig. Zubair Ali opposed and stated that this may not be very valid, "We have foreign minister with experienced and trained bureaucracy, headed by foreign minister, consultants who oversee the procedure of foreign policy formulation under the direction of Prime Minister. However, input from relevant quarters is taken and given due consideration. Without a doubt, out of all inputs, one from the military coherently turns out to be more critical when nation is stood up to with new sorts of fighting and terrorism at large scale". Further, he stated, "we don't have full time foreign minister. PM might be too busy to oversee foreign issues himself. Which are presently taken care of by two guides Mr. Sartaj Aziz and Mr. Fatami, with no clear division of duties, besides lacking the desired will and direction from the top. As a long-term solution, the parliamentary advisory groups on foreign affairs need to play a dynamic role, properly upheld by "think thank" for appropriate input for policy formulation." Besides all this, Chief role in foreign affairs has been expanded most probably after Peshawar incident. Furthermore, armed forces began to handle all the external matters personally, which lessened the authority of the civil leadership in foreign policy.

### **3.2.1 Pakistan India Relations**

Nawaz came to power by declaring that his government would cultivate friendly relations with India, while the Pakistani armed forces did not allow Nawaz to have agreeable relations with India. Gen. Raheel was hostile to India as his forerunner Gen. Kayani. Aqil Shah says, "Raheel Sharif, similar to his ancestors, considers it his obligation to do "what he thinks is correct regardless of its constitutional or democratic suitability." Gen. Sharif said, "If Nawaz tries to arrange a line at distinction with the armed force agreement; he could tread in a dangerous

situation". Nawaz's choice to go to Modi's function and hold bilateral talks with him would have conveyed more weight if he had taken the parliament into confidence. Nevertheless, to take all the praise and a general approach of disregarding parliament stood in the way. The generals were disappointed with the way in which the PM had continued with the peace exchange in spite of their reservations. Armed forces believed that we can never figure friendly relations with India without sorting out the Kashmir issue and water dispute.(Ashraf, 2016)

Kashmir is Pakistan's jugular vein; India is attempting to transform it into a desert by taking/hindering its share of the waters. The Kashmir debate is being set aside for later, while matters like exchange and CBMS are conveyed to the fore from India. Tragically, the political executive has neglected to recognize the dangers to Pakistan's existence. It does not have the ability to counter them. (Ikramullah, 2012). But, the armed forces do not allow to play fools, as they lost their family and friends in the war against India. Brig. Zubair in his interview said that he lost two siblings and his Dad lost three in war, after that it solicited him what is the meaning of Pakistan. He liked one thing about Musharaf that he said Pakistan first. Then how is it possible to formulate friendly relations with India. He additionally said that politicians are the fools. How can they assume that we build benevolent relations with our most exceedingly bad adversary, who simply wishes to destroys. He said we never get to be friends and it is a propaganda to make us trick with love and that's it.

Gen. Raheel was not satisfied with the Prime Minister's India's policy. He had lost his family in war with India and had a lot of dislike against India. Indian security powers made a fool-proof case against Pakistani association in terrorist attack on Pathankot Airbase. Subsequently in striking back, the ISI captured Kulbhushan Yadev and asserted that he was Research and

Analysis Wing (R&AW) operator and was helping the separatists in Baluchistan.

### **3.2.2 Pakistan Afghanistan Relations**

On the western front, in spite of Pakistani cooperation, lodging a large number of Afghan refugees and provision of logistic support to Afghanistan, Afghan spying network NDS is abetting the TTP activists for advancing terrorism in Pakistan. Indeed, being its adviser, NDS (National Directorate of Security) has solid association with RAW, in this manner they follow its dictates to damage Pakistan. While, Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani was helpful to Pakistan, but the NDS and some of its ministers are toeing the Indian lines. A year ago in November 2014, when Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made his first visit to Pakistan after being elected, he drove straight from the airport to see Gen. Sharif at Pakistani armed forces headquarters in Rawalpindi before going to Islamabad to meet the non-military personnel leadership. Visit of head of State of any nation to Army Headquarters is unusual, but General Sharif needed to make it clear that Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan would be chosen by him and not by the civil government. (Varma, 2016)

Additionally, later he decided to proceed with enhancing relations with Afghanistan. He even recommended that Pakistan armed forces would bolster the Afghan security powers, in spite of long-held reservations about the size, reason and reasonability of the foreign-subsidized Afghan National Army. (Banerji, 2014).

### **3.2.3 Pakistan USA Relations**

Gen. Sharif has a prominent profile abroad. In the U.S., he met Secretary of State John Kerry and other senior authorities and was awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit for his contribution to "peace

and security. The U.S. cautioned Gen. Sharif that it will withhold \$300 million in military aid if Pakistan does not accomplish more to limit the Haqqani organization, because The U.S. sees the Haqqani's as an arm of Pakistan's military intelligence agency. While, the Pakistan armed forces maintain it is going against all activists. The U.S. has additionally been taking part in exploratory talks with Pakistan about a conceivable arrangement to confine the country's developing nuclear weapons program, seen as particularly dangerous due to the country's history of political instability and jihadist assaults on army bases.

In any case, after the White House meeting a senior Pakistani authority said that Mr. Sharif told the U.S. president that Pakistan would not surrender its strategic nuclear weapons — a recently created expansion to the nation's arsenal that is a specific concern towards the Washington—as long as the length of the danger of attack from India remained. The USA is encouraging India to assume a noteworthy part in Afghanistan, while denying it to Pakistan especially to contain China. The strategic partnership recently ended up amongst Afghanistan and the US and Afghanistan and India uncovers their goal to control over the South Asian region. Henceforth, peace and stability in Afghanistan may remain an inaccessible dream that, thus, could destabilize the area, particularly Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear weapons have long been a sore point for the USA, Israel and India.

### **3.2.4 Pakistan China Relations**

Pakistan is the only country who has wise relations is China. However, in the wake of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the foes of Pakistan have ventured up their exercises to make insecurity inside Pakistan (Khan, 2015) In Pakistan, China is called all climate companion

of Pakistan, Pakistan armed force is continually inevitable to show its backhanded cooperation in the civil administration of the country. Even before Nawaz Sharif visited China on November 7, 2015, in the midst of political uncertainty in Pakistan. Gen. Sharif sent Gen. Rashad Mohd. Muhammad Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee to China on November 5, 2014, apparently to convey it to China about Pakistan armed force's support to Nawaz Sharif, which averted a mess between the two neighboring nations. (S.C.Kohil, 2015) Various militant groups, including Indian government proxies, are busy in subverting CPEC. While a few assaults have been effective, thousands of warriors and many intelligence officers are attempting to deal with the security circumstances all around the western route and in Gwadar.

Pakistan military has a huge number of civil, mechanical and electrical specialists with many years of attachment in building extensive infrastructure projects, and according to the experts, armed force is well placed to manage the corridor. Pakistan Army's Frontier Works Organization (FWO) is building huge parts of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Frontier Works Organization (FWO) has built streets with 502 kilometers length on the western alignment of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to link Gwadar with different parts of the country. The FWO took up the challenges to increase the advantages of Gwadar port to rest of the country by building streets in rough sloping region and profoundly difficult to reach areas. The huge task was embraced on the directives of Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif. Armed forces Chief General Raheel Sharif has made his institution's loyalty loud and clear by various articulations. He has said, "We will do everything to make it a win". Also cautioning, "Terrorism is a worldwide issue and warrants worldwide reaction. All must check the financing of all terrorists associations. We are against utilization of proxies and won't permit it on our soil".

### 3.2.5 Saudi/Yemen Crises

In the earlier days of 2015, the problems began amongst Houthi and Yemeni government. The Yemeni government asserted that the Houthis wanted to topple the administration and make a Shia state in Yemen while the Houthis consider themselves to be battling religious. (Panda, 2015) Saudi Arabia proposed Pakistan to join Saudi driven forces against Yemen. PM Pakistan guaranteed support for the political targets of the Saudi driven coalition forces for reestablishing the government in Yemen and expelling Houthis from regions they have seized, including Yemen's capital Sana'a. (Panda, 2015) On the other hand, Pakistan also offered assistance in giving humanitarian services to Yemenis. Later, he backed out because of the pressure of the parliament. PM needs to bolster Saudi Arabia because of retrieval of Saudi Arabia's trust for the secure life before and the long-term budgetary help. While the members from both Houses of Parliament expressed distinctive perspectives when talking about Pakistan's part in the Yemeni emergency, the greater part of which was that there was no compelling reason to send ground forces, air forces and marine vessels to the contention zone in the Middle East. Pakistan understands that air strikes on the Yemeni region controlled by the Houthis is not good for the regional integrity of Saudi Arabia, which is not threatened by anything: the civil war is occurring in a third country and Islamabad ought not to participate in it. (Zamarayeva, 2015) The preference not to commit any military components to the Saudi government's Yemen venture was made by the armed forces and Sharif was required to acquire it. Later, COAS went to Kingdom in March-April thrice not like PM who went just once on April 24, 2015 to express Pakistani support to the Kingdom. In this way, COAS took lead from the civil leadership of Pakistan over guaranteeing Pakistan armed forces' elite support for the protection of Kingdom's



regional integrity. However COAS declined to participate in Yemen because of armed forces' engagement in the war against terrorism in Pakistan.

"Nawaz cooperated with the military amid Raheel Sharif's period", Talat Masood, a renowned general and political investigator said. Nawaz has been quiet on the issue of the military's predominance out in the open. An announcement from his office, before the end of last year, issued after the military asked the administration to match its endeavors in battling terrorism, stated, "All institutions need to play their part, while staying inside the ambit of the constitution."

## Chapter 4

### **Civil-Military Relations during Previous and Current Regimes of PMLN: A Comparative Analysis**

Amid 1988 to 1999 there was a shuffling of power. One party assumed the power and opposition started campaigns to topple the administration. Armed forces were utilized to destabilize the administrations. The popular stance requested that the armed forces' Chief meddles and plays his role. The opposition led secret meetings with the COAS and tried to persuade him to topple the administration. All the four governments from 1988 to 1999 were ended either by the president or by the immediate mediation of the armed forces. This was the real burst to the democratic system because of inefficiency of the government officials. However, at the end, they set an entire fault on the armed forces that they did not permit democratic system to boom. (Amicus, 2009)

#### **4.1. First Term of PML (N) (1990-1993)**

First term of Nawaz began in 1990 and the IJI (Nawaz Sharif's party) stood up as the leading party in the National Assembly of Pakistan. Mian Nawaz was appointed as the prime minister. (Kashif, 2013). Armed forces warmly respected the new government. While, Nawaz started his term, many things went against him in his first year of government. The twelfth constitutional amendment (set up fast trial courts), the privatization of few organizations and a bank resulted in the outrages and gossip about secret deals against Prime Minister. While, Nawaz Sharif remained quiet and continued gushing his philosophy in the way that the administration ought to invest

more energy in economy than on governmental issues. In fact, Sharif just made orders that drove clear polarization with opposition, with the then COAS, Jamaat-e-Islami (cooperation accomplice) and others including PPP and MQM. It brought about internal contention and chaos on the political set-up (Amicus, 2009). In 1991 the succession of General Aslam Baig, the COAS, turned into a prominent media issue far reaching with lots of risk and misconception. However, the controversy has been settled through the advance declaration of the successor General Asif Nawaz. (Ghauri, 2013)

In the next year, the polarization amongst government and opposition expanded steadily. Political soundness was still hard to characterize for government, as the opposition did not stop the battle for power. Besides, opposition called a "LONG MARCH" on the capital in November. The diminishing law and order situation in Sindh asked the administration to deploy the armed forces to clean up the affected area. (KzKashif, 2013) Armed forces indulged in political issues, at the same time, and it was the most exceedingly terrible situation for the civil dominance. In the case of action against urban terrorism in Sindh, in spite of undoubted actualities, that MQM had practically settled a state inside the situation through terror, fear and militancy. The things had exacerbated to a level that the officers of the military were also targeted. (Noman, 1990, p. 118).

The Armed forces were aggressive and thus they wanted to pull back from Sindh and it was publically communicated by COAS General Asif Nawaz. While the administration's perspective was that it ought to expand its stay in the area which drove conflict between them. Sindh was not the only bone of contention between the General Head Quarter and Nawaz Government, as there were different sources of friction between the two. Amid 1992, clashes had begun in this

relationship by a number of different problems, which included Prime Minister's change of Guard at the ISI and GHQ's perspective of 'Political Accessions' into its internal affairs. Moreover, the Army's efforts to hit a state of mind of political neutrality left the government icier. This implied that despite the Army Chief's open affirmation that "the Army completely bolstered the democracy," Nawaz Government lived an anxious year thinking about GHQ's goals. (The Herald.1996)

In September, floods covered huge areas of the country bringing in its wake substantial number of deaths, human misery and destruction of crops and properties and rendering thousands homeless. The government officials, as usual, turned it into a source of media attention instead of administering and helping out the people. And, as usual, Army rose to the occasion and did the best to supply help to the masses and saved many lives. Armed forces' patriotism and work for the general population made them legends in the eyes of public. People trusted them more than civil leadership.

Then again, problem was created amongst President and Prime minister. President Gulam Ishaq Khan began conveying sharp signals for looking for a second term in office. A lot of doubt was created between the Presidency and PM House. It reached to a degree that the priorities of the Army changed and instead of going for the operational targets the primary purpose turned into the sustenance of the administration by any methods. The armed forces made it obvious that it was to its greatest interest that it would be permitted to pull back. That did not suit the self-serving government officials as they realized that if the armed forces pulled back the tumbling down political structure in the Sindh region would crumble like a house of cards, which neither the President nor the Prime Minister could manage the cost of from their narrow self-serving and

selfish points of view. (*The Newslite*, 1996)

Once again, the armed forces did their best to exploit the above situation. It could restore a conviction that all is good among the general population of Sindh. The general population of interior Sindh, after a long period of confinement, spilled their hearts out for the armed forces and stretched out aggregate support to the guards of its frontiers. There was a moan of improvement came in Urban Sindh, as well. The general population got distinctly positive and the terrorist networks had been destroyed. (Yasmeen, 1994)

On the other hand, civilian image got worse. Their lack of ability gave space to military in internal issues of the country and it's undeniable when you simply need to give orders and are not competent to do anything. Same happened later with Nawaz, president ousted his government by the support of armed forces.

The arrival of 1993 did not screw the wood well for Pakistan as it lost one of its best child on 8/1/1993. General Asif Nawaz, the then Chief of Army Staff, died to a cardiac arrest. It was an irreversible misfortune to the country and especially to the armed forces. In him, we lost a respectable man, a sound person and an expert. In January 1993, an issue broke out between the Prime Minister and the president. PPP; Benazir Bhutto took advantage of the situation and turned the heat on Mian Nawaz Sharif from London by flagging her support for Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Mian Zahid Sarfaraz requested dissolution of National Assembly. Situation made a difference for Nawaz and on 27 March 1993, Mr. Hamid Nasir Chattha and three different ministers resigned from Federal Cabinet. On March 31, one more Federal Minister resigned and 16 MNA's and Senators from FATA reported their support for Gulam Ishaq Khan. (Abbas, 1993)

On April 18, the President dissolved the National Assembly. A guardian government was built

up under Mr. Balakh Sher Mazari. Mian Nawaz Sharif requested resignation of the president. In April 19, the then speaker of the NA dissolved the assembly and the dissolution was challenged in Lahore High Court. On April 25, Nawaz Sharif went to the Supreme Court for the reclamation of National Assembly. Court announced it unlawful as the Court ruled, 10-1, that the president could dissolve the assembly, only if there is a constitutional breakdown and the administration's incompetence or defilement was unessential. (Rizvi, 1993)

In this way, on April 26, Supreme Court reinstated the National Assembly. After huge political upheavals, dealings occurred among the Troika and in the wake of being thoroughly discredited, the PM and the President agreed at a method to hold midterm polls. On July 1993, Sharif resigned under the pressure of the Pakistan Armed Forces and however arranged a settlement that the evacuation of president Ghulam Ishaq Khan too. In July 1993, Chief of Army Staff General Abdul Waheed Kakar and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Shamim Allam forced president Ishaq Khan to leave from the administration and thusly finished the political battle. (Saeed, 2016) Non-serious conduct of Nawaz Sharif and his absence of ability to bargain the matters opened the streets for the military to thrive and ineffectiveness of the government made them untrustworthy for the general population. Consequently, he failed to end its term period and resigned by military force.

In addition, under the close enquiry of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the new delegate government was shaped and new parliamentary elections were held after three months. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) came to power and Mr. Moin Qureshi was affirmed as the Caretaker Prime Minister. Mr. Moin Qureshi completed numerous crucial financial reforms and took necessary authoritative measures to enhance the proficiency of the administration. Most importantly he, as

guaranteed, quit on end of his term of office. Many in Pakistan wished he hadn't. (Siasat.pk, 2014)

#### **4.2 Second Term of PML (N) (1997-1999)**

Mian Nawaz Sharif was re-elected as Prime Minister in February 1997, with a clear cut majority. Exploiting the position, he included a land-mark decision in the constitutional history of Pakistan by omitting the controversial Eight Amendment and made himself safe from the military encounters. From the past experience Nawaz got distinctly alert and to maintain a strategic distance from any negative activity from military he talked to the military Chief and top officers who gave approval and respect to Sharif's constituent order. The thirteenth Constitutional Amendment stripped the President of his powers, under Article 52(b) of the Eight Amendment, to dismiss the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. He added another development to the constitution when his parliament accepted the anti-defection Fourteenth Amendment Bill. Which gave unlimited powers to the party pioneer and he could dismiss any of their members if they talked or voted against their party.

Later on, his working relationship with the Supreme Court cut off and his disparities with the Chief Justice turned out in public. Moreover, he built up an uneasy relationship with the president Farooq Leghari, the president was on a direct conflict path with the Prime Minister. A couple of months later, the dramatic encounter with the judiciary ended in the removal of the Supreme Court Chief Justice, Sajjad Ali Shah and, on December 2, 1997, the resignation of President Farooq Leghari. While military attempted to control Nawaz against President and Chief Justice, however, it did not succeed. The President requested the military to expel the legislature and after the refusal from military to reject the administration, Farooq Laghari

resigned. (Pakistan, 2003)

Moreover, the policies of Nawaz Sharif's administration were challenging for the integrity of the armed forces as an institution. It was initially Sharif's displeasure that he did not appreciate the institutional dynamics of the military. The silly authority committed by Sharif for this situation was his attempt to select General Khawaja Zia-ud-din (who headed the intelligence corps, and was not from any of the customary military line expert, but instead professionally from an engineering corps) as Chief of Army Staff. Moreover, the army as a whole was bound to react. This movement was unacceptable not exclusively to different corps commanders of battling corps but also for the armed forces at large. It conflicted with the institutional standards of the armed forces and it had been converted into more serious threats and risks for organizational harmony. General Musharaf himself acknowledged this, "Our concerns again were passed on in distrustful terms", but the government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif ignored all these, attempted to politicize the armed force, de-stabilize it, and attempted to make conflicts inside its authorities. Since he attempted to break the institutional standards, the leaders of the battling corps were unanimous in demonstrating him in exit. (Malik, 1997)

Ayesha Jalal puts it, "politicians are excessively anxious and worried of the military and the bureaucracy, consequently, the government officials drain much energy in endeavoring toward them off and the main way they know how to do this is in a self-assertive and customized manner." Being driven and deceived by his past self-assertive, however, fruitful political experiences, for example, tossing out the president, Chief Justice, Naval Chief of Staff, and even the Army Chief, Sharif valued to keep on operating similarly. (Amicus, 2009)

Brig. Hamid Saeed said in an interview, "the overthrow occurred primarily in light of the fact that Nawaz Sharif attempted to bring the armed force inside the space of his customized rule.



Reflecting on Sharif style of legislature. Since February 1997, when he started his term as head administrator, Nawaz let go four administration Chiefs who declined to have a 'price tag' on them. This drove him to play divisive governmental issues to spread contact among the administrations, and break down their unity of command. A similar factor applies to General Musharaf also, whereby he took the issue at a personal level." This has been additionally verified by Abdul Shakoor khakwani and General Musharaf himself said, as he told the BBC, "Nawaz Sharif would have remained the leader if he had not dismissed me. (Pakistan, 2003).

Kargil zone was occupied by India in 1971. There was no violation from Pakistan. But an answer to Indian violation was given in Siachen. In 1990's, amid visit to Pakistan Rajiv Gandhi committed with Benazir Bhutto that India will pull back from Siachen, however, when he did a reversal he called Benazir and refused his guarantee on the supplication that armed forces' Chief was not agreeable to pull back from Siachen. That demonstrated that Indian PM also did not take decisions without the approval of the armed forces. In 1999, armed forces moved in Kargil and drove a conflict amongst Chief and Prime minister. Nawaz attempted to replace Musharaf when he was out of the state. Musharaf returned immediately and Sharif did not permit him to land in Pakistan. There was left with just 15 minutes of fuel when armed forces took control and Musharaf landed. He sealed the government workplaces, froze their accounts, forced direct martial law and toppled the legislature of Mr. Nawaz Sharif.

On accepting the power of COAS in 1999, Gen. Pervaiz Musharaf went to India. On a brief meeting directed on NDTV of India by a female host she asked Musharaf, "Do you have any regret on Kargil now that you are such an appreciated guest in India?" Musharaf smilingly gave her an exceptionally fitting answer, "do you expect that me will ever say that 'yes, I regret it? If somebody asks Indian executive, 'do you regret having isolated Pakistan and made Bangladesh?

Would he say yes we are extremely sad? How might you expect that I would lament?" (Pakistan, 2003)

Kargil is not the sole reason for intervention, his discretionary expulsion of Jehangir karamat and Personalismo style of legislative issues were also responsible of Nawaz Sharif's dismissal from the post of executive. Musharaf group of officers had snatched control from a chosen head administrator on 'gun point'. Moreover, it was said by General Musharaf himself in his takeover discourse, "The general or armed force's state of mind to mediate expanded as high certainty at the personal and corporate levels were jeopardized". Thus, the open door was also there as expanded reliance of civil administrations on the military. (Amicus, 2009) Nawaz, again, went on with his Personalismo style of government and did not respect armed force's institutional integrity. His silly decisions let the armed force to remove him. Moreover, he again neglected to guarantee civil authority and efficiency of the work.

#### **4.3 Current Term of PML (N) and Military's Response (2013- 2016)**

It was the first time in the historical backdrop of Pakistan that an elected government finished its term of power and conveyed it to another civil government. Elections held on May11, 2013 and Nawaz Sharif was elected as the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the third time with a high mandate. Armed forces warmly welcomed the new civil government. This time, Nawaz Sharif changed the approach of his Personalismo style against armed forces. He seeked normal relations with the Army, tried not to defy with them. Pervaiz Kayani was the COAS of that time and was about to retire in a couple of months.

Amid the five months of the Kayani's period, Sharif attempted to be on the best of relations with the armed forces' boss. He knew that the time for the appointment of the new COAS was coming

soon in four month's period. He was cheerful of expanding the civil impact on the armed forces when Chief of his own choice was in place. Kayani secured no chance to declare the armed forces' power. At that time, the country was confronting serious terrorist attacks. Sharif favored bilateral talks with the extremist networks, which asserted they were battling for the implementation of the Sharia, he did not support the violence they utilized to accomplish the end. He was concerned that the militant exercises discouraged investors and made losses to the economy. The armed forces, under Kayani, considered TTP as a potential resource against India. However, he was against its violent exercises inside Pakistan that included attacks on the armed forces. For Kayani, the different TTP partners were partners who had gone astray.

Finally, Sharif and Kayani concurred that there was a requirement for an all Parties Conference to make national agreement on converses with the TTP. It was probably on Kayani's support that Nawaz Sharif called the APC on TTP in the second week of September. Kayani and DGI ISI were also present in the meeting to brief the members on the internal and external situations. The resolution adopted, "We pronounce that we should ourselves decide the methods and modes of battling this war to our greatest advantage and might not be guided by the United States of America or whatever other nation in this regard."The talks continued for the next 10 months. These suited the TTP as it did not require them to stop the terrorist attacks. In fact, the terrorists conducted, noticeably, bad attacks amid that period. (Ahmad, 30May, 2015)

Few months of holding office, Sharif got the chance of delegating the new COAS. In November 2013, he chose Gen. Raheel Sharif as the COAS and again disregarded Gen. Haroon Aslam, who was the senior most broad in the Army, took after by Gen. Rashad Mehmood. Media was a bit surprised over Nawaz Sharif's decision as Raheel Sharif was not the most senior one and Nawaz Sharif had many times said that he would make the senior most General as Chief of Army Staff.

Raheel Sharif's Dad, Major Sharif, and PM's Dad Mian Sharif had close contacts. He assumed an extremely dynamic part against Taliban and hit the ground running as substitution of Kayani. (Pak 101.com)

Nawaz may have deliberated to convey a message that, as a PM, he needed to remain his own man; this may not cut much ice with the armed forces' authority. Raheel Sharif had already demonstrated the usual consent of the armed forces. As armed forces' boss, he did not shake the boat too early; his next phase of connection included posting officers of his own choice in key positions, particularly Corps Commanders and in ISI.

Raheel Sharif took charge of the vital decisions on India policy, Afghanistan, nuclear issues and relations with United States. The year 2014 saw the government ineffective in regards of experience with the military, which was a dangerous practice because of the developing distance with the opposition. Some loudmouthed ministers indulged in armed force bashing on the media. This brought outrage among the Army officers who were not satisfied when Musharaf and needed to face disfavor while appearing before the courts. Raheel Sharif expressed the concerns publically when he told special armed forces in Tarbela that Army "will persistently save its own dignity and institutional pride". (Reuters, 2016)

At the point when a Geo anchor was shot passed on in Karachi and the media houses pointed a denouncing finger at the ISI, the PM was required to intercede and assume the part of an authority. What happened was the opposite. Nawaz and a portion of the key ministers supposedly were taking side of the media house. The tension reached the level that the defense minister was avoided by the military pioneers and was not invited to conferences with them for various months.

The continuous talks with the TTP were another source of friction. TTP kept on attacking both,

the civil people and the armed force staff, and the administration did nothing to stop the assaults, the armed force was getting tired of the discussions. It was increasingly understood that the TTP was utilizing the discussions to pick up time. Furthermore, the army was convinced that North Waziristan was the place of safety from where the terrorists proceeded to launch the attacks and returned after doing the work.

Army cleared it to Nawaz that there would be no more talks with the Pakistani Taliban and took the matter in its own hands. The attack on Karachi airport by terrorists coming from North Waziristan drove the armed forces to choose to dispatch an undeniable operation against TTP, putting aside the reservations of PML-N. The PML-N executive was essentially advised to launch operation Zarb e Azb. (Siasat, 2014) Gen. Raheel was hostile towards India as his antecedent Gen. Kayani. Nawaz's decision to go to Modi's swearing-in function and hold talks with him would have conveyed more weight if he had taken the parliament into confidence. However, to assume all credit and a general approach of disregarding parliament stood in the way. The commanders were disappointed with the way in which the PM had continued with the peace discourse regardless of their reservations. The Army trusted that, "we would never be the companions, without settling critical issues, e.g.; water and Kashmir, there is no chance to get for good relations with India." Raheel Sharif chose to improve relations with Afghanistan. As Afghani president was agreeable with respect to war against Taliban. He even recommended that Pakistan armed forces would bolster the Afghan security powers, regardless of long-held reservations about the size, reason and practicality of the foreign-subsidized Afghan National Army. (Banerji, 2014)

The Islamabad march by the PTI and PAT changed the idea that civil leadership becomes successful to guarantee civil dominance. The demand made by Imran Khan at the start of the

march was the resignation of the PM who was responsible for rigging of the 2013 elections. It has been asserted that, previous ISI Chief Gen. Shuja Pasha arranged the march. There was also no love lost between his successor Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam and the PML-N government. There were reports that a portion of the corps' authorities who were going to retire, additionally, supported Imran Khan's protest. Brig. Hamid Saeed said that the retired officers are free for their exercises, they are retired so what they do is their own worry, it's not the military as an establishment who is responsible for their actions. Thus, he did not blame military for it.

Nawaz Sharif failed to settle the situation. He looked upon the COAS for the settlement. Consequently, he was guaranteed that there would be no overthrow, however, he should "impart space to the armed forces". In the meantime, the administration was advised by the armed forces to stay away from utilization of force against the exceedingly charged PTI-PAT activists who had blocked the PM house. Armed forces' boss assumed part as a mediator and called the pioneers independently in the armed forces' house in Rawalpindi. Opposition was not cheerful on the contribution of armed forces for the settlement between the civil leadership. Some ministers also condemned it in the house. Later, it was the PPP authority who went to the administration's discharge, reviving self-assurance in a disheartened Sharif. The administration survived the higher-state meetings which occurred later in a manner which showed that both the PM and COAS were leading the place, together. This showed a condition of diarchy where a portion of the federal subjects were taken care of by the civil government and by the army. In the wake of the assault on the Army public school, the armed forces' grip over the system was further strengthened. Under the National Action Plan (NAP) the armed force got additional powers, including setting up of the military courts and foreign policy.

The armed force launched the operation in Karachi. The PML-N government looked the other

way as the rangers made a move against the MQM, propelling raids on nine zero, capturing and torturing number of MQM activists. Strangely, even the PPP supported the situation. Somewhat later came the turn of the PPP. PPP authorities and the party's supporters in bureaucracy were captured on charges of gathering cash through unlawful means to fund the terrorists. Billions of rupees therefore gathered were taken out from the party. The PML-N bolstered the armed forces' stand, which drove PPP to revise its state of mind from a kind opposition to a rival. The outrage against Nawaz kept on developing in the PPP.

The PML-N bolstered the armed force until it found that the armed force needed to launch an operation in Punjab too. It was claimed that the militants had set up no go ranges in the biggest province as well. It was also mentioned that there was a need to grab the terrorists and their financiers and assistants. PML-N was very stressed over sending of Rangers in Punjab with the same powers as it happened in Karachi. The PML-N authorities thought it was the thin end of the hold. So, the Punjab government declined to call the rangers to help the non-military personnel government with extra power. The armed force concocted another approach to lead operation in the region without the need of the administration's authorization. It declared to launch an operation in no go territories. This put a great deal of pressure on the administration, as some of its local level ministers were known to have had associations with the militant groups. Besides, a few renowned figures in the party were involved in shady deals which included land grabbing cases. (Reuters, 2016) Saqib Khursheed said, "It is a propaganda against PMLN workers, no minister was included with terrorists."

Whether the thought behind the attacks was to put the administration under more pressure or to make it follow the armed forces' dictates aimlessly or to finally send it home stays to be seen. (Ahmad, 30May, 2015). Army chief did a lot of for the security and development of the country.

Many in Pakistan wished him to take an extension but he refused to go against constitutional provisions and resigned on the specified date in November.

#### **4.4 Analysis**

##### **4.4.1 Similarities between previous and Current Regimes**

There are some similarities between Nawaz Sharif's previous and current regimes like;

###### **4.4.1.1 Personalismo Style of the Government**

Commonly, Sharif has been reprimanded for its Personalismo style of government. He wished singular authority and to be obeyed by all the institutions (Judiciary, military, parliament too). This authoritative conduct of Nawaz made a great deal of conflict with the army in the past. As, in all terms, Nawaz Sharif had picked Army Generals of his own choice regardless of the rank of Generals. Later he confronted problems with them. In the current government, many times, he repeated on media that armed force Chief would be picked on the basis of seniority, however, what he did was opposite. Sharif underestimated the military's administrative ability and their institutional pride. He did not learn from the past and repeated same mistakes with respect to officer's appointments, utilized additional forces against party members and president amid past administrations. In all terms, he changed the constitution as per his own convenience. In the first term, he made the twelfth amendment in the constitution. In the second term he, again, made two alterations thirteen and fourteen, as indicated by which he gets to be distinctly predominant than all and no party member or president can go against his entrusts. They simply follow the orders of PM otherwise they would be dealt with in a critical situation. In addition, in his third term, he



changed the law which prohibited anybody to be appointed as the prime minister for the third time. Sharif learnt from the past, however, it's not that adequate. He needs to take in more lessons.

#### **4.4.1.2 Internal Security**

The polarization amongst government and opposition expanded constantly in 1992. Political strength was still hard to characterize for government, as opposition did not cease the battle for power. Opposition called a "LONG MARCH" in the capital in November. The weak peace situation in Sindh asked the government to bring in the army to tidy up the grieved region. (KzKashif, 2013) It was against the democratic system and it reflected the inability of the civil leadership to provide security to their people inside the country. Further, people were undermined by their own masses. It was the most noticeably awful condition for the civil government's self-respect and superior authority. In addition, army worked their best against urban terrorism in Sindh, despite undoubted realities that MQM had practically settled a state inside through fear, militancy and terrorism. The things had exceeded to a level that the officers of the military were also being targeted. Although, lately armed force got distinctly fruitful to clean the territory and reestablished trust among people of Sindh.

In the present term, 2014, he also faced the continuous decay of the administration's blow against the army. The administration exerts its energies in unnecessary meetings with the military, which was an unsafe practice in view of the developing differences with the opposition. As the security, issues in the country forced him to take help from the military and included them in legislative issues. Before PTI Dharna and the unfortunate attack on the Army Public School, Peshawar, the

situation was under control. It got worse for the civil government after that and it became difficult for them to control the situation and they called military as an arbiter amongst PMLN and PTI. Along these lines, they demonstrated their inability to control the situation in the time of emergencies and called military to facilitate them.

Moreover, in the present administration, Karachi once again is under the control of MQM and people are enduring with terrorists' attacks and some of the high positioned government officials were also backing them. Army made a move against the system and effectively cleaned the greatest city of Pakistan. Furthermore, it brought confidence that all is good among the general population of Karachi.

Moreover, the army conducted operation Zarb-e-Azb to put an end to terrorism. With the military operation, the army that had so far stayed limited to objections picked up the initiative and replaced the legislature at the focal point of Pakistan's security policy.

#### **4.4.1.3 Foreign Policy towards India**

Nawaz Sharif has always been in a knot with military, on India, as he preferred peaceful relations with India while the army generals have been hostile towards Indian policies. As indicated by the perspectives of the army generals, we have battled three wars against India, Kashmir is still a cause of conflict with them and Water issue as well; how we can plan trade relations with them and how can peace come when the real issues have not been resolved. Moreover, they said peaceful relations with India could never be conceivable until they do not consider Kashmir. In 1999, PM and Musharaf had a disagreement on Kargil. Gen. Raheel, likewise, has been hostile towards India like his forerunners Gen. Kayani and Gen. Musharaf. While Nawaz has close

terms with Indian executive as he welcomed him on her granddaughter's wedding function, which was a cause of army's hostility towards him. In addition, Sharif went to Modi's swearing-in ceremony which drove conflict amongst the army and Nawaz. The commanders were disappointed with the way in which the PM had continued with the peace exchange in spite of their reservations against India. Later, India reprimanded Pakistan for the attack on Pathankot and Pakistani army captured, operator of Indian RAW, Kalbushan Yadav. This affected the relations of both the countries but not like they were in October 1999 on Kargil issue. The peace discourse might have conveyed more weightage if PM had taken parliament into confidence. Indeed, even in 2014, PM went to just a single session of the senate and was rarely found in the National Assembly.

#### **4.4.2 Dissimilarities**

There have been additionally a few differences amongst past and current administrations of Nawaz Sharif.

##### **4.4.2.1 Military coups**

In both his regimes, Nawaz drove conflicts with the military and both the times army was forced to dismiss of executive. In first administration, Nawaz had conflicts with the president, military attempted to control them yet both sides needed the expulsion of other. Military was behind the scene and bolstered the president because they were also tired of the authoritative and wrong policies of the head administrator, so they made a settlement between both sides as both had resigned and subsequently new elections took place. In his first term, army did not attempt to take power for itself. While, in his second term, military straightforwardly ousted Nawaz government because of his direct encounter with the Musharaf. Conflict on Kargil and Nawaz

substituting Musharaf in his absence made thin ice amongst the army and PMLN. Musharaf returned and was not permitted by the government to arrive in Pakistan, which turned into the last straw of Nawaz's expulsion. Along with this, Musharaf's team of officers had snatched control from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on a gunpoint. Albeit unlawful, takeover of Musharaf forced a terrible image of the army, universally, and it was criticized all over. While, in the present administration, CMR is not quite the same as any past administration.

Nawaz Sharif and the army have always been in unbalanced relations; military did not aim to take over the chosen government. They are recently concentrating on reestablishing their image, globally, which was ruined by the unlawful takeover of Musharaf. In a meeting, Gen. Sharif stated that the army is quite recently working on their own nobility and pride and covert no role for themselves in civil leadership. On the contrary, Nawaz learned a few lessons from the past encounters, so he is avoiding any confrontation with the military. So, both are pleased with the friendly and relaxed relations. In spite of the fact that the army did not explicitly keep aside any part of administration for themselves, their role in political affairs has expanded and they enjoy an upper hand in defining policies and taking action against terrorists. Nawaz completely follows their orders. Military has assumed the driving role at national and global level, which proves that military is in power as opposed to the civil leadership. Military has made exceptionally solid actions like they battled the war against militants and propelled operation Zarb-e-Azb against Taliban to diminish terrorist activities from the state. Moreover, COAS has been in numerous gatherings with PM which reveals that it is a co-seat power. While Nawaz has been quiet on the armed forces, part in civil affairs and does not give any statement about it. Just an announcement discharged from his side that everybody is performing their duties under the ambit of constitution

and nothing is past that.

#### **4.4.2.2 Mediatory role**

Military assumed part as an arbiter between the parties amid PTI Dharna. Armed force Chief called both sides in the armed force house, Rawalpindi, and made a settlement between them. In spite of the fact that he did not decide any part for himself, but Nawaz knows that, consequently he should impart some space to the armed force. Besides, to ensure government's survival in the office and did not fight with the civilian leadership, as held in past administration, Raheel Sharif was an extremely proficient soldier. In this way, he worked in his own circle and avoided governmental issues. While the past administrations, military's behavior against Nawaz was also different. They offered cash to party ministers and bolstered the friction against the government. Additionally, in both the past administrations, army had a solid hand behind the evacuation of Nawaz. Furthermore, in the current administration, common military relations have been relatively much better than the past administrations. Gen. Sharif did not need part in legislative issues. In a meeting, he stated, "Armed force is only working for their own particular nobility and pride". He wished to remain in his own circle and abolish terrorism from Pakistan. Moreover, he was extremely ambitious about foreign policy and did not compromise on honesty of Pakistan and military.

#### **4.4.2.3 Military role in Foreign Policy**

Gen. Raheel was very much involved in formulating the Foreign Policy on account of the India, USA and Afghanistan. Raheel Sharif chose to proceed with improving relations with Afghanistan for the dynamic war against Taliban since they had shelters in Afghanistan. He even

proposed that Pakistan army would bolster the Afghan security strengths, regardless of long-held reservations about the size, purpose and practicality of the foreign-supported Afghan National Army. PM affirmed every decision blindly. (Banerji, 2014) They chose not to confer any military components to the Saudi government amid Yemeni chaos and Sharif was required to accept it. The armed force keeps on directing on foreign related issues and inner security problems. This has prompted to a perception that the armed force, despite of civil administration, is in control. This shows a situation of diarchy where a portion of the federal subjects are taken care of by the government, other by the armed force.

## Chapter 5

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Since the establishment of Pakistan, civil military relations have remained a major issue of the state. Pakistan faced four longer martial laws in the state. And even when military was not in power, they influenced the country politics from behind the scene. Civilians are not as strong as military and they are always frightened from the military takeovers and their strength. Moreover, after the demise of Quaid-e-Azam, we failed to find a sound political leader. Politicians just focused on their own self-centered interests and took many wrong decisions which were wrong for the interests of the state. Although, currently, the state of affairs between civil and military is comparatively better than ever before.

If all the pros and cons are analyzed in a compact, it won't be wrong to state that, today Pakistan is more stable as compared to its condition few years ago. Threats persist but, politically, the country has performed better under the current civil-military friendship than during any purely civilian or purely military rule. Both institutions worked in a very cooperative way. Despite years of negative press and deteriorating security situation, army launched operation Zarb-e-Azb without the discrimination of good and bad Taliban and compelled the terrorists to look for new shelters outside Pakistan. National Action Plan has been launched with broad Strategic vision.

The criticism of establishment of military courts and ceding more space for the troops may be legitimate, but these schemes have expiry dates at the accomplishment of the stated aims. With the arrival of Nawaz Sharif, civil-military relations seem to have seen paradigm shift from

animosity to cooperation. The Government of Nawaz Sharif understood and accepted the role of military as co-partner in state affairs. Likewise, under the leadership of Raheel Sharif, the military accepted the significance and necessity of political institutions. Both leaders realized that neither military nor political parties can efficiently run the affairs of the country alone. Further, military's role was unique during PTI's Dharna. Even on the issues of foreign policy both institutions take decisions cooperatively. Nawaz Sharif did not try to impose civil authority on military as well as military did not contribute to the anti-government sentiments, at that time. He easily could have. In short, the cooperation of Nawaz Sharif and Raheel Sharif is positively contributing to the civil-military bipolarity. If this cooperation and 'power sharing' approach between both pillars continues, it will greatly help Pakistan in getting out of its precarious situation.

Current civil-military relations are very different from the past regimes. As never in the history of Pakistan did any elected prime minister meet the army chief so frequently. Never during any civilian government did foreign government functionaries call on the COAS so often. The current civil-military relations are comparatively more relaxed. Both, military and civilian, institutions are doing the job in their own sphere. Both the institutions working together against the national problems which lead the country towards betterment and progress.

Moreover, internationally, image of Pakistan has improved due to successful operation against terrorist networks and cooperation in Civil-Military Relations. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Army Chief General Raheel Sharif, despite difference of opinion on certain matters, had a cordial relationship. Moreover, Raheel Sharif retired on the due date and he did not take extension as his ancestors did. Although, many in Pakistan wished an extension of his services



but he refused. In addition, it was imagined that civil-military relations would be changed once again but all worries went wrong after the appointment of Gen. Qamar Bajwa. Moreover, Bajwa seems to take ahead the policies of Gen. Raheel.

It is a positive change for the country's betterment and it must be continued. Both the institutions should understand the role and dignity of other institution and must give respect to each other according to the privileges defined in the constitution. Supremacy of the constitution must be upheld. When both institutions work under the provisions of the constitution, the differences among the two decrease to a minimum level. Moreover, institutions should give space to each other. Military should work in its own sphere and civilians should be powerful enough to not need the military in the times of internal crises. Basic education of politics and training should be given to politicians before they start their duties. A fully trained foreign minister and defense minister should be present in the office, all the time. The selection of politicians should be on merit and efficiency. Corruption and nepotism should be completely abolished from both military as well as civil sector. Serious measures should be taken against those who do not follow the constitution and laws.

Cooperation between civil and military organizations is the requirement of the time, when the country is facing a lot of internal and external security problems, then the mid-way is better for Pakistan rather than adopting a side in its unusual shape. Countries need to be realist when it comes to its national security and interest. Pakistan is doing it right. Keeping in view the history, there have been multiple factors that have dictated the animosity between civil and military relations in Pakistan. According to Huntington, strong civil institutions can dictate the military institutions and have a potential to eliminate the possibility of military encroachment in

government affairs. In the case of Pakistan, we have the lack of strong civil institutions. First of all, we need to build strong civil institutions which would be capable enough to deal with internal and external problems, personally. Moreover, do not call military in preventable circumstances. In this way military's encroachment in the civil authority can be minimized and a strong civil-military relationship be established in the country.

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## Interviews

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