

**NEW EMERGING ALLIANCE (QUAD AND AUKUS) BETWEEN
INDIA AND US: INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MODI
ADMINISTRATION.**



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SUPERVISOR CERTIFICATE

This is to calrify that the thesis entitled “ New Emerging Alliance (QUAD and AUKUS) between India and US: Indian Foreign Policy under Modi Administration” is the original work submitted by Ms. Zoha Mushal , a student of MS in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences. Thi research has successfully done under my supervision. She has fulfilled all the requirements for the award MS at the University. This is important to certify that this thesis has not been submitted for attainment of any Degree, Diploma, Associateship, or Fellowship from any other University.

Lecturer, Mrs. NadiaAwan

DECLARATION

By submitting this dissertation, I declare that this thesis entitled “ New Emerging Alliance (Quad and Aukus) between India and US: Indian Foreign Policy under Modi Administration ” is my original work. This research work was completed under the supervision of Lecturer Mrs. Nadia Awan and submitted to the Department of International Relations as satisfying the requirements for the degree of Master’s in International Relations. I have properly referenced and cited the sources of information in my thesis. This dissertation has not been submitted before for any degree.

Zoha Mushal

238/FSS/MSIR/F22

Dated -----

DEDICATION

To my mother,

(Aziz Fatima), for your unwavering love and support.

With heartfelt gratitude and profound appreciation, I dedicate this thesis to you. Your unwavering support and unconditional love have been the bedrock of my academic journey. Through every challenge and triumph, you have stood by me, instilling in me the values of perseverance and resilience. Your encouragement has been my guiding light, and this work is a testament to your sacrifices and belief in my dreams.

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List of abbreviations

AUKUS	Australia-United Kingdom-United States
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IFA	India-France-Australia
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IPEF	Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity
NSA	Network for Strategic Analysis
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCRI	Supply Chain Resilience Initiative
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
GCFS	Global Corporate Finance Society
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
IFA	Institute of Financial Accountants
IMEEC	India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor
IPEF	Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity
EU	The European Union
IST	Institutional Status Theory

SCO	The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
FDI	A foreign direct investment
IO	International Organizations
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
SSN	The Social Security Administration
SCRI	Supply Chain Resilience Initiative
UN	United Nations
GDP	Gross domestic product
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
NSS	National Security Strategy
APEC	The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
INC	India National Congress
ACFTA	ASEAN China Free Trade Area

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ABSTRACT

The implications of the emerging alliance between India and the United States within the frameworks of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) pact on Indian foreign policy under the Modi government. Against the backdrop of a shifting geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, marked by growing strategic competition and assertive behavior from China, India's engagement with these alliances holds significant implications for its strategic autonomy, regional security dynamics, and economic interests. The study aims to explore the motivations, objectives, and potential consequences of India's deepening cooperation with the US within the Quad and its alignment with AUKUS partners. Beyond security considerations, the Quad and AUKUS alliances offer economic opportunities for India under the Modi government. Strengthening ties with the US, Japan, Australia, and other members can facilitate trade, investment, and technology collaboration, contributing to India's economic growth and development agenda. The Quad, in particular, has explored initiatives in areas such as infrastructure development, supply chain resilience, and clean energy, aligning with India's domestic priorities and economic reforms.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the geopolitical landscape has witnessed significant shifts, marked by the emergence of new alliances and strategic partnerships. One such development is the burgeoning relationship between India and the United States within the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership. This alliance has drawn considerable attention due to its potential implications for regional security dynamics and global power balance, particularly in the context of Indian foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (Hemmings, 2022)

The Quad, initially established in 2007 and revitalized in 2017, comprises Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, aiming to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on shared democratic values and strategic interests. Meanwhile, the AUKUS agreement, announced in 2021, seeks to deepen cooperation among the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom in areas such as defense, technology, and strategic capabilities, with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific region. (HEMIN, 2021)

Against the backdrop of these developments, India's strategic alignment with the US-led alliances under the Modi government has garnered attention from scholars, policymakers, and analysts worldwide. The Modi government's foreign policy approach has been characterized by a proactive pursuit of strategic partnerships and a recalibration of India's role in the evolving global order. The decision to engage closely with the Quad and AUKUS reflects India's growing assertiveness and its aspiration to play a more significant role in shaping regional security architectures. (carlson, 2021).

The Quad and AUKUS alliances hold significant implications for India under the Modi government, representing a strategic shift towards deeper engagement with major powers in the

Indo-Pacific region. For India, these alliances offer avenues for enhancing its security architecture, countering shared challenges such as maritime security threats and assertive behavior from regional actors. Additionally, they provide opportunities for expanding economic cooperation and technological collaboration, aligning with India's aspirations for modernization and development. Moreover, participation in these alliances strengthens India's position as a key player in regional security affairs, bolstering its efforts to assert its influence and maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific. Overall, the Quad and AUKUS alliances present a platform for India to pursue its strategic interests and contribute to shaping the evolving geopolitical dynamics of the region under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (Ali, 2022). The Quad and AUKUS alliances are viewed as responses to China's assertive behavior and growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. For India, which shares unresolved border disputes and strategic competition with China, strengthening ties with the US and other Quad members provides a counterbalance to Chinese assertiveness. Under the Modi government, India has sought to bolster its military capabilities, enhance interoperability with Quad partners, and deepen defense cooperation to address common security challenges posed by China's rise. (Behera, 2021). As India pursues its 'Make in India' initiative and seeks to modernize its armed forces, cooperation with AUKUS members, especially in areas such as maritime surveillance, cybersecurity, and defense innovation, can bolster its defense preparedness and technological capabilities. (cries.org, n.d.). The Quad and AUKUS alliances hold significant strategic, economic, and geopolitical implications for India under the Modi government. By deepening engagement with like-minded partners, India aims to safeguard its strategic interests, counterbalance China's influence, pursue economic opportunities, and enhance its defense capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region.

1.1 Rationale of the Study

The amount of research conducted on this topic of the “New emerging Alliance (QUAD and AUKUS) between India and US: Indian Foreign Policy under Modi Administration” is relatively adequate. The rationale for exploring the implications of the emerging alliance between India and the United States within the context of the Quad and AUKUS agreements on Indian foreign policy under the Modi government is multifaceted and compelling. The study of Indian foreign policy under the Modi government in the context of the Quad and AUKUS alliances contributes to broader debates within international relations theory, particularly concerning alliance dynamics, great power politics, and the role of emerging powers in shaping global order. By examining the drivers and implications of India's alignment with the US-led alliances, this research aims to provide insights into the evolving dynamics of international relations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Overall, the rationale for this study lies in its potential to enhance understanding of the strategic imperatives, opportunities, and challenges confronting India as it navigates the complexities of the contemporary geopolitical landscape and seeks to assert its interests on the global stage. By exploring the implications of the Quad and AUKUS alliances for Indian foreign policy under the Modi government, this research aims to inform policy discourse, academic scholarship, and strategic decision-making in India and beyond.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Given the recent emergence of strategic alliances such as the Quad (comprising India, the US, Japan, and Australia) and AUKUS (comprising Australia, the UK, and the US), alongside India's evolving foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi, this study aims to investigate the potential ramifications of these alliances on Indian foreign policy objectives,

decision-making processes, and strategic alignments. Specifically, the research seeks to examine the extent to which the Quad and AUKUS agreements influence India's strategic priorities, its engagements with other global powers, and its overall pursuit of national interests within the context of regional and global geopolitics.

1.3 Significance of the Study

This research seeks to explore the multifaceted implications of the emerging alliance between India and the US within the context of the Quad and AUKUS frameworks. By examining the motivations, objectives, and potential consequences of this alliance, the study aims to provide valuable insights into the trajectory of Indian foreign policy under the Modi government. Additionally, the thesis will analyze the domestic and international factors shaping India's strategic choices and assess the implications of the alliance for regional security dynamics and power relations. Understanding the implications of the Quad-AUKUS alliance for Indian foreign policy is essential for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners alike. As India seeks to navigate a complex and rapidly evolving geopolitical environment, a comprehensive analysis of its strategic engagements with the US and other key partners is indispensable. By shedding light on the drivers and consequences of this emerging alliance, this research aims to contribute to scholarly debates on international relations, security studies, and Indian foreign policy.

1.4 Research Objectives

1. To understand the Indian participation in the Quad and AUKUS diplomatic and economic repercussions of both AUKUS and the Quad in the Asia-Pacific Region.
2. To explore AUKUS and Quad defense and technology partnership and their implications on the overall security framework.
3. To evaluate factors affecting Indian foreign policy under the Modi government

1.5 Research Questions

1. What are the key drivers behind India's participation in the Quad and AUKUS alliances, and how do they align with its strategic objectives?
2. How does the emerging alliance impact India's strategic autonomy, regional security dynamics, and relationships with other major powers?
3. What are the domestic and international factors shaping India's foreign policy choices under the Modi government in the context of the Quad and AUKUS alliances?

1.6 Delimitations of the Study

The study of the Emerging alliance between India and the US regarding Indian Foreign policy under the Modi government Quad to AUKUS faces several limitations. Firstly, the evolving nature of international relations introduces uncertainty, making it challenging to predict the long-term consequences of these strategic partnerships. Another limitation lies in the diverse perspectives of regional actors, each with its unique interests and responses, influencing the overall dynamics. Furthermore, the study may focus specifically on the period since the establishment of the Quad and AUKUS alliances, typically starting around 2020 or whenever these alliances were

formed, up until the present time. The research may concentrate solely on the implications of these alliances on Indian foreign policy and may not delve into the broader geopolitical implications for other countries or regions. Changes in leadership or shifts in public sentiment can significantly impact the trajectory and success of these initiatives. This may focus specifically on the implications for Indian foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi and may not extensively explore the implications for future governments or leaders. Mitigating these limitations involves adopting a multi-method approach that combines official documents, public statements, and expert interviews to provide a more comprehensive understanding.

1.7 Operational Definition of Major Term

- QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) informal strategic forum considering the US, India, Australia, and Japan. It refers to the strategic diplomatic pact. (Merriam-Websters, 1999)
- AUKUS is an acronym for the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The term 'Indo-Pacific' emerged at about the same time that China is viewed as the major actor in the great-power contest and Beijing's more assertive approach to external relations. China's center-piece Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) allows Beijing to further the PRC's standing in the larger Indo-Pacific region. Others which include other major powers in the region could be impacted by this which is deemed to alter the power balance in the region. This led to the formulation of the United States' Indo-Pacific policy, as people viewed it as an attempt to slow down development in China and to create a unified coalition of nations under a solitary spectrum to help realize the expansion of China. (Deb & Wilson Nathan, 2021).

The complicated and catastrophic nature of withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes a virtually impossible foreign policy choice until the arrival of Biden's administration in January 2021. In anticipation, it was expected that the US would continue to re-orient as per the Pivot to Asia policy with a more reinforced focus on constraining the extent of China's action in the open and free Asia-Pacific Ocean, and at the same time, increase the global muscle of the United States. The US bluntly dismantled her arguments of losing power in Asia-Pacific to the emerging powers with its erroneous approach towards her allies. Hence, came the Asia-Pacific strategy which did not come as a shocker to many. (Singh, 2022) As mentioned in Quad Leaders' Summit 2021 Joe Biden said that the future of each of its members and indeed the world lies in the Asia-Pacific region that remains free and open to make the required breakthrough in the next decades. The message, however, could not be any clearer. Indeed, after getting its hands off Afghanistan, America is stepping into Asia-Pacific full force and focus. The two consecutive bilateral actions

with regional partners demonstrate that the Biden administrations has laid strategies for at least half a century deployment in Asia-Pacific. The summits held in 2021 are the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the Australia, UK and US trilateral new security partnership (AUKUS), and Sydney Dialogue, three of which are viewed to have dynamics linking back to the formulation stages from the 1990s to the present and considerate strategic implications for the region. (Zarrar & Ahmed, 2022).

The news on AUKUS came as a surprise to many political and policy stakeholders from several countries across the globe. France reacted aggressively because the three parties' decision-making process to develop diesel-powered submarines for Canberra was not disclosed to it, and because the project was going to be axed. On the change of a new security partnership, Chinese authorities resorted to scorning. As stated by the representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cooperation of the SSNs of the three countries "is extremely irresponsible", increasing regional tensions and the race for nuclear weapons while hindering global non-proliferation endeavors. (Li, 2022).

The Quad has made great progress in recent years: The two summits held in 2021 (and a brief leaders' phone call in March 2022) reconfirm it as the anchor of the designed political-imperialist agenda of all four countries. On the other hand, the establishment of AUKUS has emerged as a new concern for China's diplomatic venting out. For now, and up to March of 2022, China is attempting to categorize the Quad, AUKUS, Five Eyes as well as various bilateral alliances of the US as what it claims is a 'united front' '5432' strategy. This is an example of China's desperate move to know that it cannot launch a credible diplomatic attack against the Quad. (Medcalf, 2022).

Indeed, when AUKUS, the new security pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom was announced, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla was quick to play it down stating that the deal is ‘neither relevant to the Quad nor will it impact the Quad’. This was in a bid to avoid shifting focus from the first-ever in-person Quad Summit which Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was soon going to embark.

But when in June 2023, US President Joe Biden metaphorically rolled out the red expanse for the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi referring to the bilateral relations between the two countries as among the most important in the world, it looked like the US had the solidity of India that the world’s now much feted strategic theatre, the Indo-Pacific as a strategic ally. To the same extent Washington’s move towards Delhi can be seen as fitting into the scheme of building a Quad, the country’s entreaty to the other willing peripherals alike fits Biden’s strategy of operation. A similar situation can be observed with respect to the GDP: though India is fifth in place now, it is predicted that it will be third one by the beginning of the late 2020s, it is the most populous country in the world. In the American and the Indian papers, it was clear that Modi’s visit was dramatically successful and several business and military agreements were signed.

For every action, there is always an equal and opposite reaction. China has started to expand cooperation with allied areas after the formation of AUKUS and signed a military cooperation with the Solomon Islands. The ASEAN countries have been establishing themselves not to take sides between the American power and the substantially increasing Chinese power and they have been making efforts to diversify their foreign policy. For instance, the first-ever Russia-Indonesia naval exercises happened in December 2021. As the relations between Russia and the Western countries worsened, the vector of Asian relations is the most significant for Russia nowadays. It is rather

clear that the geopolitical and commercial struggle between China and the anti-Chinese alliance led by the USA is rising dramatically. It is quite reasonable to expect this political conflict to grow more acute and, perhaps, less determinable in the near future in the Asia-Pacific region. (Martynova, 2023)

China's endorsement of several principles of the BRI viz independence, openness, development, and cooperation has led to the integration of decisive policies for the region's growth in 2022. This collective bilateral trade has seen the figure rise to nearly one trillion, while with the start of the third phase of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (ACFTA), the cooperation is expected to record growth, to the advantage of the people of both regions. Now, already 90 percent of the goods that China and ASEAN trade are attached to a zero tariff. The ACFTA will continue to lower duties and improve trade and investment liberalization and ease and develop the Asia-Pacific region's high-quality regional development including digital economy and green transformation as well as roll on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for open and inclusive regional development. The most recent ASEAN summit hailed the efforts made on the ongoing ACFTA Upgrade talks. During the same year there have been several meetings between China and ASEAN states in which the parties affirmed to guard and promote multilateralism, enhance their economic cooperation and relations, respect and foster ASEAN's centrality and neutrality, and reject the Cold War mentality and geopolitics bloc confrontation. In such talks, the Southeast Asian regional diplomats laid down that the regional countries did not want the China-U. S. conflict and wished to sustain a robust economic tie with Beijing and others. (Azam, 2023)

This brings India diplomatically balance its security threat between US and China especially after it's reduced role in Afghanistan. India has sent its troops to Russia's exercises in

Belarus that were staged at Zapad and is a member of the SCO led by China. But Delhi now faces a new situation where (or as soon as) it is virtually impossible for any country to balance diplomatically antagonistic loyalties because of heightening Sino-American animosity. It is now expected that Delhi is getting set to further strengthen its naval partnership with Washington DC. India not only brought Nuclear weapons into South Asia but has equally populously brought a nuclear element onto the IOR. (uzair, 2021) Delhi desperately craves to be a 'blue water navy' and its enormous naval procurement improves the Indian war-fighting, surveillance, and anti-subsurface capabilities transforming India's Navy into a strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region. The nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean region is dangerous to all the countries bordering the region and more so for Pakistan which is in search of a nuclear umbrella. Beijing- Islamabad naval security bonds have been advanced through the years through a series of arms purchases, for instance, Pakistan is in the process of revamping its naval warfare fleet with technologically advanced armament manufactured by China. Just like the Afghanistan withdrawal before it, the AUKUS security pact is a part of the Biden administration's rapidly increasingly shrill tone in its foreign policy in an attempt to climb to the top of what is likely to become a new long-term period of geo-political contest and instability over the seas, both literally and figuratively. South Asian countries need to wake up fast.

ASEAN has in fact strictly adhered to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other member countries. In the APEC's (The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) charter, which was published in the Bangkok Declaration in 1976, the partners affirmed that they would do everything possible to protect their region from outside meddling. It was reinforced by Article 2 of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which enshrined the principle of recognition of the sovereignty of every nation and every person's right to conduct his life without outside

intervention, bribery, and coercion. It still controls access to restrict external interferences to intrude into its security. India did not want to abandon the ‘strategic autonomy’ traditional policy and remained wary about the anticipation of excessive friendly relations with the US. From India’s perspective, new approaches of Washington such as the increase of its military power in the Indo-Pacific region and organizations that seen to counter China, such as AUKUS, and the Quad, are concerning. Delhi is wary of angering Beijing, and consequent to this, of China’s fast-deepening cooperation with Russia, which is a key strategic partner of India that dates back to the Cold War. As for any policy stance that might harm China-India trade, Modi is extremely cautious. It thus can be concluded that strategic autonomy has become a permanent feature in India’s diplomacy. Nonetheless, security is of concern to Delhi and it is in search of novel means that would define the order transition in the regional system that is favorable to upgrade the status of Delhi and safeguard its uniqueness.

AUKUS will be viewed in Beijing as another zonal provocation by the western powers. Chinese strategic thinkers will likely complain that the Australians first provoked China by claiming that the latter started the Covid-19 and then, after China responded to the hysterical Canberra’s call by launching a trade and tariff campaign against Australia, enlisted assistance of its bigger cousin, the US, to encircle Beijing. Indeed, a clear muscular response will be launched by AUKUS in no uncertain terms. Even now it has been seen that Chinese warplanes have over flown the skies of Taiwan. There can be increases in activities from China in the South China Sea and expected that the concept of wolf warrior diplomacy will get busier. China will probably not perceive itself as an attacker but as a protector. These tensions will continue to exist and erupt in the frames of the ASEAN domain. Even as China has managed to split ASEAN on two major issues concerning the South China Sea and involved Cambodia and Laos in its camp, AUKUS will

intensify the divide among the 10-member block which is already struggling with Myanmar's military coup. However, both Malaysia and Indonesia, unlike the Philippines for instance, are against AUKUS. Thus, the trilateral deal may pose some challenges for related cooperation arrangements under the auspices of such mechanisms as Five Power Defence Arrangements that involve Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.

The event that became a critical juncture for the shift of India's grand strategy was the border skirmishes that occurred in June 2020. Although occasional fights had been taking place in this poorly demarcated borderline before this one, this fight proved to be the first to claim lives in the area for the last 45 years; twenty Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers were killed. For Delhi, this was a rude alert of its military disadvantage with Beijing, not only was it unable to protect the shared border it was also still without a credible sea-nuclear threat. However, in the case of the border issue India responded very cautiously if this caused border skirmishes to persist. It aimed at not deepening because of concern that the fighting may get coupled with coordinated Sino-Pakistan operations, and second, China was a trading partner. Calling himself a pragmatist, Modi avoided confrontation in domains other than the military level, and bilateral trade has been successfully unfolded and constitutes roughly 11% of the global turnover with China. (tzinieris, 2023)

ASEAN centrality will thus be put to a more significant test under AUKUS which sees Australia as an intermediary that is countering China in Southeast Asia's backyard. ASEAN needs to be more united and uniform in order to maintain its central position in regional cooperation for peace and security. Alas, disunity and discord have plagued ASEAN more and more in recent years. Indeed, the reaction of the Quad and its moves, the formation of AUKUS, is the result of

ASEAN's inaction and the inability of the association to offer structure and leadership within its sphere. It does not mean that ASEAN will cease to exist but rather the importance and core position of this organisation will continue to erode. There are also related outcomes arising from AUKUS. The idea is far from over, the recent incident complicates the mission to prevent making ASEAN and New Zealand a nuclear weapon state. The frame of reference known as Asia-Pacific is now much less relevant, relegated to behind the curtain and replaced by the Indo-Pacific; it is a move from realism to securitism. (THITINAN, 2021)

Such consequences of fluctuations in geopolitics include an increase in the cost of marine war insurance. For example, S&P pointed out that that “marine hull war rates for ships going to the Gulf increased mid-2019 after attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz in May and June 2019 and seizure of British-flagged vessel Stena Impero in July the same year.” Now we continue on explaining why geopolitics continues to form the center of modern sea security. Maritime rivalry of great as well as regional powers has historical antecedents. For instance, it is possible to discuss the distribution of force during the World War I and II to understand that great and ascending powers equipped themselves with powerful fleets in order to seize new sources of revenue. (iftihar, 2022) Today, we can see that political geography contrary to cross currents like the US-China and the US-Iran confrontation has posed a serious threat to the sea trade and the freedom of navigation. As the UNCTAD Secretary-General Mukhisa Kituyi explains the tendency of decline in the maritime trade growth concerning tensions between the US and China in 2018-2019, “The decline in the growth in maritime trade is due to several factors, including a weak multilateral trading system, and escalation of protectionism”. Although AUKUS is still in long-term planning, however when Australia obtains nuclear-powered submarines in the future, the maritime security of the APAC region may be exposed to certain political risks. Gareth Evans –

former Australian Foreign Minister says “From one vantage point, it is not adverse that China gets the message – as it has also learned from the formation of ‘Quad ‘expanding from the United States, Japan, Australia, and India– that there is a shifting intention among some other important regional actors to enhance the development of their defense strength and coordination. There is ample literature in the field of social sciences that can help to explain the maritime security problems in traditional context including drug trafficking, fishing, piracy and environmental crimes. However, in the vein of the broader policy analysis, the understanding of geopolitics in regards to the spheres of marine security in the present day epoch still lags behind. The recent security partnership agreement called AUKUS involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and United States has geopolitical connections to maritime security. Quite simply, the most pressing problem that was announced as the AUKUS is a new round of strategic rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region. Besides this, it is also the issue of economic stability at the regional level where seaborne trade is still a subject to question. Of utmost importance it is necessary to note that the Asian region supplied 41 percent of total loaded goods in the global maritime trade in 2020. In addition the overall importance of port in the Asian region is comprised of eight out of the ten most important ports among them five belong to China. Therefore, the security and safety of the SLOCs would be an important factor for the states in the region in Asia.

When bringing up the name South China Sea, pointing an accusing finger at China and seems to be very keen to remind the Chinese about how they have no regard for international laws and norms. In AUKUS, ‘maritime’ is placed before democracy; however, they are defining their plan to develop nuclear-powered submarines. Here, all leaders of AUKUS are also diplomatic and do not want the focus to be placed only on the word ‘nuclear’. Thus, they say “maritime democracy” so that the taboo, associated with ‘nuclear’, will be lifted. This is why the term

“democracy” is purposeful to stress that despite the business being nuclear in its nature, there is no necessity to take the tensions in the region to a whole new level. At the same time, the USA is effective in conveying the signal to Beijing that America wishes to stay and even increase its profile in the Indo-Pacific.


Lt Gen Retd, Khalid Tiamoor stated:

THE Indian Ocean presents Pakistan with immense opportunities for trade, economic growth and strategic partnerships. However, securing our maritime domain remains a significant challenge. From piracy and illegal fishing to the ever-present concern of terrorism, securing our coastline running across more than a thousand kilometres demands constant vigilance. As such, India’s seriously expanding naval presence, strategic alliances, and investments in neighbouring countries are a matter of concern related to regional balance. Currently, Pakistan has to invest in its maritime infrastructure and naval capabilities because, owing to our location, any disruption in the region may have severe implications. (Centre for global, 2024)

QUAD provides a liberal outlook towards the Pacific Region which is based on liberal principles such as “rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful settlement of dispute, democracy, and respect of territorial integrity of states”. They encourage regional integration among countries with similar perspectives in the region. However, what AUKUS offers is a realistic view of the Indo-Pacific as it directly concentrates on developing the capacities for confronting the threat. AUKUS which is set out to create nuclear-powered submarines attempts to create balance in the Indo-Pacific region. In fact, as the leaders describe it as an “enhanced trilateral security partnership” it is a balancing act of the new age. (Mohan, 2022)

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical frameworks and theories that can be applied to analyze the transition from Quad to AUKUS which emerged as a new alliance in the context of the Indian region encompass several aspects of international relations and geopolitics.



Neorealism, also known as structural realism, is a theory in international relations that emphasizes the role of power and the structure of the international system in shaping state behavior. This theory suggests that states are primarily motivated by self-interest and seek to maximize their security in an anarchic international system.

The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States Security Agreement) are both related to international relations and security, but they

represent different geopolitical initiatives. Offensive realism and defensive realism are two variations of neorealism, a theory in international relations that focuses on the impact of the international system on state behavior. Both perspectives share the assumption that states are primarily motivated by their security and survival in an anarchic international system, but they differ in their predictions about state behavior.

3.1 Quad (Defensive Realism):

From a defensive realist perspective, the Quad can be seen as a response to shared security concerns among its member states. The Quad countries may be forming this strategic partnership to collectively address common security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, such as maritime security, regional stability, and the rise of China. (salil, 2021)

3.2 AUKUS (Offensive and Defensive Realism)

AUKUS, particularly the decision to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, can be analyzed from both offensive and defensive realism perspectives. The acquisition of advanced military capabilities like nuclear-powered submarines could be viewed as a defensive measure by Australia to enhance its security and deter potential adversaries. It aligns with the idea of states seeking to ensure their survival. At the same time, the increased military capabilities provided through AUKUS could be interpreted as an effort to balance against the perceived strategic challenges in the region, which aligns with offensive realism's emphasis on maximizing

3.3 Implications of emerging alliances for Indian Foreign policy

Security Dynamics: Both the Quad and AUKUS contribute to shaping the security dynamics. The Quad focuses on diplomatic and security cooperation, while AUKUS involves the enhancement of military capabilities.

Regional Balance of Power: These initiatives can impact the regional balance of power, potentially influencing the strategic calculations of other actors, including China. The reactions of other states in the region will depend on their perceptions of the evolving power dynamics. (Nguyen, 2022)

Stability and Cooperation: The success or challenges faced by the Quad and AUKUS will have implications for regional stability and cooperation. The extent to which these initiatives foster a stable and collaborative regional environment will depend on the responses of other states and the ability of the Quad and AUKUS members to effectively coordinate their efforts.

In summary, offensive and defensive realism provide lenses through which we can analyze the motivations behind the Quad and AUKUS. Both theories highlight the centrality of state security concerns and the pursuit of power in shaping international relations, including the dynamics concerns of Indian Foreign Policy. India's participation in the Quad and AUKUS alliances can be viewed as part of its broader strategy to balance against China's rise and ensure that no single power dominates the region. By aligning with like-minded countries such as the US, Japan, and Australia, India aims to bolster its position and counterbalance China's influence. In summary, neo realism provides a theoretical framework for understanding India's engagement with the Quad and AUKUS alliances in terms of power dynamics, security concerns, and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. By analyzing the implications of these alliances through a new

realist lens, researchers can gain insights into India's foreign policy under the Modi government and its responses to the evolving geopolitical landscape. (arzan, 2023)

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this research is based on secondary sources collected from books, articles, and the internet. The methodology for studying the transition of new emerging alliances with regards to Modi government involves a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods. Given the complexity of the topic and the need for a comprehensive understanding, an interdisciplinary approach is beneficial.

Case Studies

Examining specific instances or events related to the Quad, AUKUS, and Indian foreign policy to deepen understanding and draw insights. Case studies could focus on key moments such as official meetings, policy decisions, strategic interactions, or geopolitical developments to analyze their implications and effects on Indian foreign policy under the Modi government.

Content Analysis

Analyzing media reports, news articles, opinion pieces, and scholarly literature related to the Quad, AUKUS, and Indian foreign policy to identify themes, trends, and discourses surrounding these alliances. Content analysis can help contextualize the debates, narratives, and public discourse surrounding these issues.

Comparative Analysis

Comparing India's engagement with the Quad and AUKUS alliances with its relationships with other regional and global actors, such as China, Russia, and neighboring countries. Comparative analysis can shed light on the strategic choices, priorities, and implications of these

alliances within the broader context of India's foreign relations. This approach helps in understanding the similarities, differences, and advancements brought about by the transition.

4.1 Research Design

The methodology used to carry out this research is very descriptive in nature. All the literature with the help of which this research has been developed is examined and analyzed in detail. Secondary sources i.e. media publications, reports, research papers, and books are used for study.

4.2 Sampling

For sampling, interviewer sampling techniques would be used. Where the people relevant to the research are approached.

4.3 Data Collection

Data will be collected from secondary sources such as Scholarly journals, media publications, reports, research papers, books, and articles used for the study. In the Research analysis, qualitative research is conducted on qualitative data.

4.4 Data Analysis

In data analysis, the developed data will be interpreted and then summed up with the mentioned sources in the References.

4.5 Ethical Considerations

Prioritize the well-being and safety of research participants, minimizing any potential harm that could arise from the research. Uphold academic honesty by giving credit to the works of others through proper citation and referencing. Avoid plagiarism, fabrication, and falsification of data. Present research findings accurately and transparently. Communicate research findings accurately and responsibly to the public, policymakers, and other stakeholders. By incorporating these ethical considerations into the thesis, researchers can ensure the highest level of ethical conduct throughout the research process.

5. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

The details about the content of each chapter are as follows:

Chapter One

This chapter will cover a Brief introduction of the topic, and existing literature related to the history and how it has evolved over time and also highlights the significance of the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, and methodology.

Chapter Two

This chapter will describe the diplomatic and economic consequences of the AUKUS and Quad partnerships.

Chapter Three

This chapter is based on examining the emerging alliance impact India's strategic autonomy, regional security dynamics, and relationships with other major powers.

Chapter Four

The fourth chapter is based on the findings of the study and also provides the conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

In this chapter Diplomatic and economic consequences of AUKUS and QUAD are being discussed also are the key drivers behind India's participation in QUAD and AUKUS. India's strategic goals and interests in the Indo-Pacific area are reflected in its involvement in the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and its interest in the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US security cooperation). India's participation in these alliances is motivated by a variety of factors that support its larger strategic objectives, including The introduction of AUKUS signifies a seismic shift in the geopolitical competition between China and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. It could not have come at a better time for India, which is facing growing hostility from China on its northern land borders and strategic encirclement in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), for the three major democratic nations to unite in a strategic technology pact to counter the authoritarian China in the Indo-Pacific. This article explores India's membership in the Quad, its naval policy, and the possible effects of AUKUS on the country. I argue that, on balance, AUKUS's benefits for India far outweigh its costs. (Behera, 2021)

2.1 Security Concerns

- **China's Rising Influence:**

India's involvement in these alliances stems mainly from worries over China's growing military might and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region. India can establish its own strategic objectives and offset China's influence by using the Quad and AUKUS as venues.

- **Maritime Security:**

The Indo-Pacific is crucial for India's trade and energy routes. Ensuring freedom of navigation and maritime security in this region is a priority for India, and the Quad, with its focus on maritime cooperation, directly supports this objective.

2.2 Strategic Autonomy and Balance of Power

- **Multi Alignment Strategy:**

India seeks to balance its relations with big powers in order to preserve its strategic autonomy. In light of its historically complicated relations with the US and Russia, India can diversify its security alliances and lessen its reliance on any one nation by engaging with the Quad and AUKUS.

- **Regional Balance of Power:**

India can support a multipolar Asia and keep a single nation from taking the lead by joining various alliances and maintaining a balance of power that serves its geopolitical objectives. The Quad was redesigned at the ASEAN Summit held in Manila in November 2017. The four guiding principles of the strategy are described as follows: The aim of the strategy is now to 'build a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region for the benefit of all,' with respect to all countries in the region and beyond. It was unveiled amid increasing strained relations between the US and China under the Trump presidency. It appears timely for New Delhi also, given especially that the developments came only a few months after its standoff with China's People's Liberation Army over possession on the Doklam plateau and following the official establishment of China's lasting military base in Djibouti on 1st August, 2017. To avoid turning the Quad into an anti-China military group the Quad countries avoided stressing this fact. As some of the analysts have pointed

out it would be Effective if one could mention that it is India's reluctance that hold this cooperation to a noticeable minimum. Nonetheless, the Quad, provides its member the required forum to express their solidarity which therefore sends a strategic signal to China which is 'not provocative enough to tilt the relationship significantly negative from Beijing.' When the first (online) QUAD summit of heads of states was held in March 2021 and the new US president Joe Biden was setting the course for the 'free and open Indo-Pacific', it appeared that India had a strategic Quad at its core. Nevertheless, with the announcement in early September 2021 of creating AUKUS — a trilateral security partnership of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, a new figure to what extent could such an announcement in the Quad and, in particular, for India in this organization? (Chalivet, 2022)

In June of 2023, when Biden invited Modi for a state visit and referred to relations between their countries as being among the most important in the world, it appeared that the US had finally locked in India as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific, or Asia-Pacific for the Cold Wars that started in 1980s as part of the contemporary quadripartite alignment. Washington's approach to Delhi in Biden's geopolitical vision may be seen as a part of the 'systems-integrative' concept of building sets of overlapping coalitions of the willing. India ranks fifth largest economy on this globe today though expect to rank third by the late-2020s and is the biggest country in the global demography. Modi visit was greeted with much success by the American and Indian press by generating commercial and military diplomacy deals. Only a few strategic shifts had been in fact apostilled. Indian had no desire to abandon its long-standing policy of strategic autonomy and continued to safeguard against the development of activism in the relationship with the US. That is why from Indian's point of view, Washington's increasing military presence in South Asia, as well as the construction of minilateral structures like AUKUS or the Quad, which are aimed at

China by their very nature, are dangerous. Delhi is worried about triggering Beijing's and relatedly so, over the catalytic threat of entrenchment of Sino-Russian relations, New Delhi has been strategic partner of Moscow during the Cold War period. He is most cautious to take any stance or policy position which threatens China-India trade relation. Such clientelistic statecraft does not spoil strategic autonomy, which is here to stay in India as the country deals with its own South Asian region. However, security is also an issue of concern to Delhi and its searching for a new strategy to manage the order shift taking place in the regional system so as to enhance the status of the former and consolidate its new identity.

Exploring why India is comparatively permissive towards the Quad – a group the country belongs to alongside the US, Japan, and Australia – but highly resistant towards AUKUS – a trilateral security partnership between the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom. It also tries to know if these US-led minilateral architectures aid or compromise the order they want in the region that India wants in the long run—and how Delhi is managing it. While India takes a relatively receptive stance on the Quad, it remains significantly wary of AUKUS Drawing from the work and premises of earlier scholars who have used such concepts such as legitimacy, rule-setting and status to describe the emerging powers and great power contestation, this analysis is done. (Athanasiadou, Chahun, & Tzinieris, 2023)

In its place, it asserts that externally initiated efforts such as the AUKUS to force a maritime architecture unfolding new regional order raise challenges for Delhi not merely due to interferences with the Indo-Pacific region power asymmetry, inherent antagonism to change as calcified by the Anglo alliance but simply because it been unfazed by legitimacy and the imperative for inclusion to construct a regional order that will be supportive of its ascendance. In doing so,

the article delves into the following themes: Indian self-perception as a rising great power, the dynamics of India's bilateral relationships with other regional powers, and India's geopolitics in this evolving security environment.

We first examine why India has rebalanced its grand strategy, and what the recalibration means for India's identity as a rising power; second, we discuss the role that legitimacy and inclusiveness play in India's foreign policy alongside hard power considerations. This is then succeeded by a section that explores how AUKUS as well as Quad, as the two American-centered minilateral architectures, pose both threats and potential benefits for India. Here, while India has reacted to the formation of AUKUS most cautiously, and Delhi's support for the Quad has certain constraints, it is embraced way more assertively. Analyzing the Indian approach to multiple unbalances of the world order it is safe to say that while India avoids direct confrontation with the actors of the new unbalances – such as those emerging in the context of the Quad or the AUKUS – it endeavors to harvest from this legitimacy based on soft power, while it silently allows Australia to develop its naval might vis-a-vis China. However, while India is in a position to reap the advantages of AUKUS and Quad, this argument holds truly if only Delhi manages to maintain and sustain balancing the Former against the latter – an unstable proposition in the making. These benefits will be derived only in the short run as India is investing in its own defense systems and indirectly it is not the regional architecture that Delhi prefers.

Arguably, in the post-Cold War world, India has transitioned from being a developing country with one of the world's most closed economies to an emerging global power and potential super-power. The territorial size, geographical position, economic performance and demographic indicators that provide for steady increase in the number of middle class, capable of contesting the

world's leading countries, allow Delhi take a place among the top players in the international relations and become a challenge to the unipolar tendencies of the liberal international system, upset the balance of power in Asia. India's transformation into an Asian giant has also begun the shift in foreign policy orientations, currently the most clearly expressed in the diminishing of the non-alignment concept, which was originally a post-colonial principle, and then became a necessity in the bipolar world order.

However, there has also been continuity, or, more accurately, 'dual continuity,' within-dow 'traditional' non-alignment principles and objectives – supporting the formation of a multi-polar and 'reformed' multilateralism/Global South and the 'Established' non-alignment priorities – the market economy and the rules-based international order. Still, these efforts have been overshadowed by a deteriorating liberal democratic regression of India under Modi most overtly to the politicization of religion which somewhat tempers Delhi's stated democratic liberalism. Sifting through its position where it grapples with its rise as the world fails to figure the existence of such a role for itself, has made India seek what we define as the 'bridge builder' strategy in the Indo-Pacific. (Athanasiadou, Chahun, & Tzinieris, 2023)

The key foundation for the behaviour of Delhi in international relations was a principle, known as now, 'multi alignment' renamed in 2020 by India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar though is equivalent to the prior 'strategic autonomy'. Even today's global player India continues to display British imperialism's impact on the nation on the international level; a hundred years of occupation left scars that are still clearly visible today, and even as a nuclear power with the fourth largest economy, the old fear of foreign intervention is still present and slightly visible evoked every time a policy is made. Non-alignment furthermore influences the foreign policy of

India, formulated by its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. As India considers sovereignty as a priority, it has in the past and even today, avoided any deep integration with the rest of the international players, having strategic affiliates rather than allies, and even affiliates were only allowed to provide limited assistance. The country came out of the Cold War to preserve its status rather in fact to enhance it, a reason stated by Miller as due to “reticence”. It also aimed to preserve the ‘order’ as liberal, and in some way American-led order as the post-Cold War order formulation, despite being unjust from India’s past standards, which had rejected all types of imperialism during the Cold War.

Exceeding expectations, India in the past decade has transformed into a rising power—and potential superpower—but this has brought changes to the very fabric of its political identity: In this sense, we are dealing with modernity achieved through the destruction of tradition, free markets at the cost of protecting home industries, internationalism over parochialism, and, the most provocative of all, a rapprochement with the West as opposed to the policy of non-alignment. India’s grand strategy has come to focus on developing what researcher Sumitha Narayanan Kutty terms a “networking” response to its most obvious strategic challenge: China, a near-hegemonic regional power. Modi’s networking has included the recruitment of a diverse spectrum of conventional and non-conventional actors, thereby mobilizing partnerships that enhance the instruments of statecraft to defend and promote free-floating power that does not pivot on China’s economy.

2.3 Legitimacy and Rule Setting

Over the past few decades or so, a line of literature has developed which rejects the power politics which stems from realist philosophy focused on military strength and security needs of

nation states. But there is greater comprehensibility that legitimacy, rule-making and standings also shape great power competition, and the process of graduating, which is pivotal for India, as its grand strategy carries a profound normative load. Especially relevant to the Indian case, Rohan Mukherjee has primarily produced a theoretical construct termed ‘institutional status theory’ (IST) and regarding the impact of great power status striving and the legitimacy of international institutions on the relations between emerging powers and international systems. (Chalivet, 2022)

India as a rising power makes judgments about either challenging or cooperating with international institutions based on legitimacy and inclusiveness: the extent to which it assesses the decision-making process within these institutions as proceeding rather fair or otherwise, and the level of favoritism towards rising powers on leadership roles. These values, however much they may mimic the notion of gain for the larger society, thus portraying positivism, still contain judgment in themselves and this judgment is subjective. This framework helps to understand why Delhi has so far had issues with AUKUS – an externally induced means of ordering the Anglosphere cannot be aligned with values that India seeks to uphold – but, at the same time, welcomes the Quad, even though its support of the latter is not unconditional. India’s various options that it has chosen strategically are not only within the domains pertaining to the issues of national security based on the material capabilities agenda but also about how it wants to be seen by other great powers as deserving and equal. How India perceives and responds to AUKUS is therefore not simply about cold strategic assessments of power, but about the nature of the Indo-Pacific that is being cultivated as a regional system and whether it creates a place for India as an emergent great power to participate in norm-setting for the region. (Behera, 2021)

The position envisioned for India within the IFP is of a legitimizer, networker, and builder of bridges as well as enforcer, if necessary, for a similar reason. In particular, Modi has been especially effective in obtaining such roles in the manner in which India partakes in regional institutions, and other forums through “institutional balancing.” This is well in line with the role that Delhi envisions itself to play within the Quadrilateral framework. (Chalivet, 2022) In the case of AUKUS, there are a limited number of occasions where Delhi could exercise strategic influence, though there is a possible role for Delhi as a mediator between the objecting China and AUKUS, for instance when AUKUS objects to China within international forums. However, we cannot but stress that status is arguably the most definitely both relational and perceptual phenomenon. The regional order that Delhi is aiming to stabilize is also the one abetting its ascent and to which this part of the world will be at least partially amenable; this helps to constitute a region that of necessity stands at least in part for India and its strategic priorities.

Delhi has manifested very little activity related to AUKUS but that does not mean the country is not interested. The development maps one of the three countries that participate in India’s strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific area (Australia, France, & U. S) & the fourth country that is contemplating a strategic partnership in the same region (U. K) (Madan, 2021). New Delhi views these nations as useful assistants for maintaining a balance of power and a rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region and the wider world. When we discuss AUKUS and a subsequent family drama related to it, India will view this through its lens of impact on these Indian strategic goals. (Madan, 2021)

In this regard, AUKUS is useful for India as it shows Washington and Canberra’s sustained and increasing vigilance in China’s regard. Furthermore, it is intended to enhance their capacities

within the region, which will also enhance, overall, the capacities of the entire Quad cumulatively. This will, in turn, strengthen both the Australian and the American capabilities to check China or to counter them in the event of a conflict. They therefore complement what the Quad is doing in that way. As for the future, a question arises – would India recognize and pursue opportunities for a new type of defense and security cooperation with AUKUS members that the arrangement might provide? This is related to another potential benefit India may have with AUKUS. Over the past decade or so, on balance, Indian commentators and policymakers have shifted from the belief of excessive attention being given by a greater power to this region coupled with investment from the US to the opposite, where Washington is seen to lack sufficient interest in the Indian Ocean region. AUKUS could help in its mitigation in the same manner as the improved American rotary deployments and other actions planned in the course of the recent AUSMIN talks. As Chinese incursions get more frequent in the region, the Indian government will consider this a dividend that outweighs the risks over an increased American presence that some ultra-conservative bureaucrats or strategic thinkers in South Asia and Europe may conceive as threatening. There is one more advantage from India's point of view – AUKUS provides a clear sign of the U.K's intent to shift towards the Indo-Pacific region. More importantly, this engagement will be in areas that would suit India's interests and initiatives broadly. It also welcomes the fact that the British see a change in how they perceive the China threat. Since London has had a friendlier approach to China than India would like to see, plus other European partners, then AUKUS can also be a vehicle for the U. K. to be socialized even further to the severity of China threat. (Behera, 2021)

In general, India cares about the Quad and, despite some concerns, inclusive of it a significant player. It can offer a sustainable way for GCFS to counter China in the region, leaving aside the fact that Chinese strategy, up to now, isn't about constructing a security arc of deterrence

but forming economic networks. China, for example, is involved in feeding the supply chain through BRI and in global distribution through some tools for the importation of vaccines, critical minerals, and people-to-people knowledge networks. Hence, India can have more influence as a member of Quad in framing the international order and checking on China through the institution. On the same note, the Quad ensures that it does not shut the doors on India for balancing defense collaboration without joining a security compact. (Madan, 2021) India is also very key in the Quad collaboration. India's absence from this formation would make it a less potent organization, would tarnish its Asian legitimacy, and remove the 'Indo' from the Indo-Pacific straight away, The Quad is a win-win in nature and for further Quad's bolstering besides conveying to India that it is as much an integral partner as Japan and Australia the US should start considering certain institutionalism of this form where a Secretariat that would enable co-operation and the outlining of what exactly Quad. (Miller, 2021)

2.4 Economic and Technological Cooperation

- **Access to Advance Technology:**

With a primary focus on cooperation in naval and defense technologies, AUKUS provides India with future prospects in terms of modernizing its defenses and access to some of the most sophisticated weaponry and technologies available in the world.

- **Economic Partnerships:**

QUAD with its more extensive outreach that encompasses the economic cooperation as well as infrastructure related goals helps India in advancing its strategic economic goals pertaining to a stable economic order of the region leading to the establishment of economic interconnectivity.

2.5 Diplomatic Leverage

- **Enhanced Diplomatic Standings:**

A membership in these alliances helps the country to be an active member in the diplomacy and open up more opportunities in determining security and economic structures within the region.

- **Global and Regional Leadership:**

Participation in Quad and the potential membership in AUKUS help to cement India's position as a significant actor within the Indo-Pacific region and a reliable global actor willing and capable to contribute to regional security. Due to the historical enmity between its state and India, and its tense relationship with the United States, Pakistan has become more sensitive towards the geopolitics of AUKUS and Quad. Such changes in the IOR politics have the following course of action for Pakistan to achieve the balance of power.

First, aligning with China and Russia might be deemed necessary in an effort to protect regional security interests and respond to political shifts in the regional balance of power prompted by AUKUS and Quad. Second, Multilateralism, Pakistan also needs to actively engage regional organisations especially SCO and OIC and believe in multilateralism as this ensures that all risks and benefits are taken and enjoyed by all parties involved. Third, it is indispensable for Pakistan to enhance its maritime strategies in the Indian Ocean, enhance the naval capacities, increase surveillance over sea activities, and encourage cooperation with regional countries to secure its interests. Fourth, there should be a focus on developing relations with non-Quad member and non-AUKUS member countries; building relationships, seeking collaboration, and advancing a balanced security architecture in the region. Last, there is the one that can be interpreted as a strong

conclusion that Pakistan can enhance stability in IOR by providing grounds for dialogue and such confidence-building measures among all states in the region. Instability in this region affects world politics since the major Bee Line Channels including the straits of Malacca and Hormuz, and the Suez Canal are located in the Indian Ocean region. Such actions as AUKUS and Quad can create tensions with other countries and force the latter to build political military unions and blocs as during the Cold War. (Ali, 2023)

As per the agreement signed in the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership, the inbound FDI to Japan has grown rapidly and they have tried to link this partnership with Australia's Pacific Step-up program. Therefore, this contributes to meaningful cooperation between Australia, Japan, and the United States in achieving the like-minded Pacific's objectives. For instance, the Palau cable was US, Japanese, and Australian funded that advanced their interest concerning the BDS and the Blue Dot Network. Several approaches in the concept of partnerships adopted under the Pacific Step-up initiative can offer Australia the chance to embrace the third-party partnership. United States-Japan-Australia is a type of third party cooperation; another group that has been formed is the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative which comprises of Australia, Japan, as well as India. In fact, the SCRI was established to maintain balanced and continuous growth in the Indo-Pacific region in a bid to lessen reliance on China. The Japan-India Business Co-operation Platform for sustainable growth in the Asia-Africa region also known as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor is gradually stretching towards the Pacific Island extending assistance from Australia in connectivity projects. Earlier, the existence of the India-Australia bilateral partnership did not make much sense and was referred to as the 'weakest link' in terms of bilateral and trilateral cooperation in the Quad. Nevertheless, there was some structure in these relations during the year 2020 when Australia augmented its PACIFIC-STEP UP with indigenous Indian ventures of the

IO. All these are measures and projects in conformance with the Indian action plan, the Act East Policy, which entails measures and projects such as Project Sagarmala and Project Mausam, as well as Security and Growth for All in the Region; Australia has supported this coastal route of import good as 17 percent of goods were moved through this route. India and Australia are now partners across all major fields, as well as signing new historical treaties to obtain mutual access to each other's military facilities. India also falls under Australia's first-line trading partners with mutually invested trade of approximately AUD twenty-two billion.

As for one aspect of it, the Pakistan-China Axis is actually detrimental to China more than it is helpful and India's continual actions towards-warning China of what counter-terrorism looks like could indeed be used to remind those two yet again what they are getting themselves into. One of the positive effects that may be linked to the emergence of China in the region for India is the efforts to upgrade connectivity in South Asia. Hypothesis one posits that higher density leads to economic growth; based on the East Asian model and India has the capability to work in South Asia. Outcomes are also expected to provide a better option than China, which seeks to establish regional hegemony using debt diplomacy to its neighbors to ensure compliance with all its demands. As against the protectionism policy of America, India has to not only persistently convey its viewpoint, as it has effectively done, but also try to draw the Trump regime's attention to the fact that such ruthless tariff rates hold the potential to overshadow the nascent strategic partnership India and US are shaping. There is need that India does not completely turn a blind eye to Russia, Russia is not completely devoid of Raw materials, political might, and military and economic might; as exhibited by the recent acquisition of the S-400 missile system. Still, India could afford getting into this game because it would diversify its strategic vectors, when seen through the prism of India's own pivot to the United States. In the case with regard to its neighbors, India has a

problem of stagnation, which advice on the policy with regard to its neighbors is to push it harder. First, India can begin by addressing the Teesta water-sharing issue which can greatly enhance the relations between both countries thus establishing more strengthened relationship with Bangladesh. This means we need a strong diplomatic service with personnel ready to work in any part of the world and an array of skills to undertake the tasks that accompany being a world power. (Singh, 2014)

2.6 G20 Summit

The G20 - or Group of Twenty - is a club of countries that meets to discuss global economic and political issues. The G20 members are the EU plus 19 nations: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK and the US.

The holding of the G20 summit had potentially important repercussions for India's relations with both the Quad and AUKUS. India's inclusion in Quad and AUKUS was viewed as an important component of the nation's policy in ushering in a free and open Indo-Pacific region and check the increase of the 'China factor' in this region. It also focused on the fact that India has its relationships with the other members of the Quad, including Japan and Australia, in the enhancement of collaboration as well as security stability of the region.

2.6.1 G20 Summit and QUAD

The second pertained to the distinction made at the G20 summit in 2021 which underlined the Quad as an essential participant in creating an open Indo-Pacific. Grouping as the Quad, India, Japan, Australia, and the United States stressed on upholding the principles of free, open and rule-

based order in the Asia Pacific region and managing challenges in climate change, critical technologies and in infrastructure for the Indo-Pacific.

2.6.2 G20 Summit and AUKUS

The downside of the G20 summit for Australia was that it brought the AUKUS deal in a different context and raised awareness of the necessity of a more complex and, certainly, more multilateral approach to global security. At the summit, AUKUS partners, namely the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom sought to underline the significance of sustaining a stable power/force equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific and collaboration on matters like cybersecurity and technologies.

2.7 Impact on India

The recent G20 summit had major consequences for the bilateral relationship of India with Quad and AUKUS, respectively. In regard to the Grand Strategic context, both The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Agreement referred the strategic realignment of India to contain the China' rise. This issue was also highlighted during the summit convened mainly because of the necessity of the India's relations with other countries participating in the Quad that includes Japan and Australia for promoting cooperation and stability in the region. It was assumed that India became one of the members of the Quad and joined the AUKUS since such steps are suitable for outlining its policy in the sphere of a free and open Indo-Pacific region of the Pacific Ocean. India's involvement in the Quad and AUKUS was considered as facilitating cooperation and ensuring optimum stability in the region to counterbalance the Alibaba of the region, China. The summit also underlined the role of India in relation to other Quad members, namely, Japan and Australia, in creating a positive environment in the region.

2.8 Future Cooperation

Prime minister's speech at the G20 summit also brought focus on India's future cooperation with other Quad members in works such as climate change, technology, and development of infrastructure. The summation Quad members focused on Free and Open Indo-Pacific and advancing cooperation in an area of cyberspace, emerging technology, etc. China's rapid economic growth and political influence have led to two options for countries in the Indo-Pacific: it looks as if people are actively trying either to stop its expansion or to neutralize its influence. The first option is dismissed as utopian due to the trade relations that many regional countries have with China. China's rapid and domineering rise poses greater challenges, measured in rates of increase and naked power, this demands a brake upon the economic self-interest of countries in the region that risk appearing to defy China to exist. This leaves one practical solution to balancing China's power: to ensure Willy's policy of bringing India to the Indo-Pacific as the counterpoise of China in political and economic terms. The role of the Indian economy is very important now and it has growth rapidly as well as offers an effective opportunity instead of China in this region.

Besides, attracting people within close physical reach of the Indo-Pacific, Australia and the US must comprehend other European actors within the same region. This is largely because of the force called complexity: the more entities which remain concerned with the Indo-Pacific the easier it is to contain China's further increase and the ongoing power rivalry with the US. Furthermore, countries in the Indo-Pacific want an active involvement of Europe which brings much confusion for Chinese formation, which is important for building security in the region. From the future perspective, the role and function of the alliances in the Indo-Pacific completely depend on how active regional countries are. The US presence is not very significant and China's growth is

becoming more vigorous; therefore, countries have to unite in the context of their interests as there will be a shift in security in the new century in the Indo-Pacific region. (Nguyen, 2021)

2.9 Impacts on the strategic Alliances and the Regional Security

The US considers China as a rival in the sense that China is or may soon become a rival power or a threat to the hegemonic powers of the US-dominated liberal democracy. On the world through economic diplomacy, diplomacy for domination, and application of military might and hegemonic special brands and styles in Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. To maintain rule-based order, especially in the Asia Pacific, democracy changed the map of the world and India evolved as prominent friend for United States of America to counterbalance the powers of threat posed by the emergence of an assertive power (China) and to protect the stakeholder's liberal-democratic worldview order because of its democratic state, emerging market, warfare capability, ambition for a large population, economic growth potential as a developing country, and geographical position in the Indo-Pacific. A democratic and the distant pluralist India indeed seemed poised to meet China's challenge as both the US and India substituting a strategic relationship which, as it is has been enhanced over the period in question. However, in 2014 the Indian government in order to bring about major reforms passed a path-breaking bill for the liberalization of the retail food business.

Gradually evolved from a secular party to a rightist Hindu fanatic party under Narendra, a ruler whose policies brought India closer to polarization and democratic erosion. It has begun affecting India's economic strength and relationships with neighbors. Prolonged further continuation of such policies, and an India whose internal preoccupation includes issues and conflicts. While managing small neighbours will alter the fortunes of stability and peace in the

region, it will also spell out the place of India, in the role of net security provider and a counterweight to China and as a participant in the new great power contest. In this paper, the subject emerges in relation to the possible consequences of economics being shaped by Hindutva: threats to the international normative order associated with liberal democracy and the rule of law. (Ashraf, 2022)

Thus, whereas Indians are increasingly concerned about upsetting the Chinese through a closer relationship with the US, the Chinese effort to strengthen its strategic partnership with Pakistan no longer has the same worry for Indians. Domestic critic can no longer convincingly claim that for cooperating with Washington they will suffer high political cost and eventually an increasingly youthful and pro-American electorate is powering the regional country. As Moscow deepened a more substantial economic and security entente with Beijing especially after 2014, India no longer holds Moscow in similar high regard as it does the United States, or as it did in the past, towards its geopolitical allies. Trade between India and the United States has become near-normal activity that would have been unimaginable at the earliest years of the twenty-first century. Modi has used the term ‘natural partners’ several times to describe relations with the United States. After years of high-profile meetings have signed arms deals as well as signed military cooperation documents; has inked joint vision statements on the Indo-Pacific, and has begun a spectrum of multifaceted military exercises. While hunting submarines the Indian and the U. S military conduct live firing exercises in the Indian Ocean. The warships of both the navies modify their exercise and re-fuelling as well. In separate interviews with Indian diplomats, the two sides have been polishing their strategies for dealing with several flashpoints in the past several years, including Sri Lanka and Maldives ordeal.

As for the nature of changes in the Indian perceptions of alignment towards the US, it increases with multiple factors wherein the worsened relations with China arguably have been the most significant reason. Commenting on this, the columnist Mihir Sharma puts it succinctly: ‘Years of behavior have worn down India’s cherished commitment to non-alignment — or ‘strategic autonomy’, as we are supposing to call it in the post-cold war’. “If finding a China dove these days is a task not very different from trying to find a needle in a haystack, one might have to carry out the search in Delhi as well as in Washington, D. C.” While a decade ago, people believed Russia was the nation limiting Indian sovereignty, the number of analysts stating that China is the nation increasing pressure on the Indian autonomy is gradually increasing. This is what makes India extremely cautious when it comes to issues to do with China, including not deepening relations with Taiwan, conducting military drills with friendly nations, or allowing the Tibetans in exile to speak their minds and engage in protests. It is China that has aggressively begun asserting its control over the seas on the South China Sea passage, tried to protect Pakistani based terrorists from the U.N sanction, and eyes-over thousands of square kilometers of Indian territory. What is causing concern in New Delhi is not China’s ‘String of Pearls’, but its political, economic, and military expansion into South Asia and Indian Ocean region.

This is a provocative thought: “When a country is in danger, alignments can indeed add to the Strategic Autonomy,” as splendidly put by Rajesh Rajagopalan. According to him, ‘For India, the idea of China’s hegemony over Asia would be a direct security threat that would seriously fence New Delhi’s operation space.’ Harsh Pant made it clear stating that ‘when India participates in the so-called ‘Quad,’ it actually gains more strategic autonomy over China.’

Ashley Tellis, a former U. S. government official, and leading strategic analyst, bemoans the fact that the logic of non-alignment “fails to appreciate the central paradox of our times: Accordingly, ‘strategic autonomy’ is perhaps ‘best served by a system of profound strategic relationships among friends and allies’. In fact, Raja Mohan synthesizes the Indian foreign policy debate by suggesting that it is ‘less metaphysical’ if it pays less heed to ‘non-alignment’ and ‘strategic autonomy’ and moves more towards planning the tangible Indian interest and the ways and means to ensure them.

CONCLUSION

The transition from non-alignment to strategic autonomy, seen in the contemporary world of, say, Indian foreign policy, is more a case of rhetoric coming home to roost. Realist considerations of national self-interest and especially growing synchronized concerns over China have been pulling the USA and India progressively closer for twenty years, on the practical level, regardless of what was happening in India ‘philosophically’. However, it is high time that non-alignment headed for its demise as it is a principle that was designed for one epoch, yet still practiced in another. The last time India faced such a superpower rivalry it was a recently liberated country, in the process of developing stay in one of the most testing of the twentieth-century democracies. It was not irrational to be afraid of entangling with each other back then – India was a developing country and neither of the superpowers offered themselves as a menace or a potential ally. Today, India is no longer a middleweight in the strategic sense of the term. There are media needs that are unmet and it is already a nuclear-armed power that has the third largest military spend and the fifth largest economy in the world. India may well emerge as the only country whose size and power are comparable to the two behemoths by mid-century. More importantly, the rival great powers of the 21st century occupy much clearer positions on India’s strategic horizon: one

of the most severe security threats, the other a most promising source of new alliances. For decades after gaining independence in 1947, Indian foreign policy was guided by one overarching principle: stand as neutrality. Described as the spearhead of Indian foreign policy during the Cold War era, it advised India not to align with either the US or Soviet Union blocs and aspire to be the leader of the non-aligned nations. Non-alignment actually may have been a subtler and two-dimensional Cold War concept than its critics would like to admit, India began to tighten her links with both superpowers in the sixties and seventies when the Chinese factor showed some more teeth. However, non-alignment was also less principled than its publicists may wish to believe, to degenerate later into anti-Americanism which had more to do with India's domestic politics than with international interests.

But what all this has to do with the U. S policymakers, it is hard to tell. On the one hand, it means that encountering with a new generation of Indian elites, who have no lived experience of the dynamics of the US-India relations during previous decades, India is closer to entering a new epoch of changing the approach that would open new opportunities for building a meaningful strategic partnership with America if the latter is ready to take into account the specificity of India's vision of an emerging multipolar world and its focus on the principles of sovereignty. Academic argumentation aside, it is noteworthy that the U. S government appears to acknowledge this. "India has a long-standing and justifiably boastful tradition of maintaining strategic independence, and we here in America get that," said Biegun during a speech at a digital forum in October last year. "We do not want to alter the India's traditions in any way; instead we hope to find out how to enhance them and India's capacity to protect its own persons, property and polity". (M.Smith, 2020)

However, the current structure also implies that India will continue to be concerned with the threats posed by entrapment, perceived dependence, and formal alliances. Building this kind of strategic partnership still calls for more time and compromises than which Washington is normally ready and willing to invest, however, the gains will on the same note continue to be more than worthy of the price out there in the international system. From such a perspective in Washington, India may even be construed at times to be moving slowly or dilatory. When compared to such a flexible approach and, apart from the formal, decades-long treaty obligations toward Japan or Australia, India-US ties can be widely described as being not as good as they could be, or even outright failing. Such an assessment is quite reasonable, but still does not reflect the history, the maturity of both parties, and how the cooperation process looks from the other side. From the Indian point of view, the bipolarity with the United States is already emerging as an anachronism, the new chimera of exceptional cooperation signaling a paradigm shift in strategic alignment. It is, in fact, the largest strategic partnership that India has inked since its independence; currently, it has escalated the level of defense ties between the two nations to reach Soviet-era levels on all fronts of cooperation excluding weapon sales. (M.Smith, 2020)

The issues are especially acute for India since the onset of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, because, among other things, Moscow and New Delhi have a strategic partnership greater scope in the expansion of new relationships. which clearly emphasizes that the management of strategic the autonomy doctrine, India has decided to stick to its historical ally and not let go. However, contrary to the invasion's impact on other countries – Russia-India relations in particular – the relations between Moscow and Delhi have only intensified. Most notably, much cheaper Russian oil is buyers' delight and India has rampantly upped the import of such crude to around almost half of the total imported oil Every year. All this has led to some squirming diplomatic

attempts by India to avoid come down heavily on Russia, as has been stated by vague language when hosting the G20 summit as president in the month of September 2023. One of the main drivers that define the networking strategy of India with respects to Russia is the threat posed by the ‘no-limits’ partnership established by Beijing. India is also becoming conscious of its military weakness as for years it has depended on second-rate Russian (often Soviet) arms. Ironically, all of this has taken place and is still taking place, with the rather passive endorsement of Washington, which seems adamant not to risk the diplomatic accomplishments of the past few years made with Delhi. Such complex dynamics between this growing collection of “global southern,” migrants and other subjects within the context of global neoliberalism, regimes fighting for supremacy distort the prevailing paradigm, which is most often associated with the west. The conflict of great power rivalry being only between Washington and Beijing was too simple. The assertion that India’s rise is based on physical computation of power relations only.

CHAPTER THREE

India's election debate rarely touches on foreign policy, but Modi has been an exception. His party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has emphasized Modi's catchphrase of presenting India as a global leader, or "Vishwa guru," in the lead-up to the election. When India hosted the G-20 last year, the world made its debut on the international scene. Imposing banners of Modi and the G-20 many sessions were subsequently put up all throughout the nation. India's foreign policy has been marked by an ambitious and proactive strategy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with the goal of advancing India's economic interests, security, and global standing. The "Neighborhood First Policy," which prioritizes connections with South Asian neighbors through increased economic and strategic cooperation, and the "Act East Policy," which strengthens links with Southeast and East Asian countries, have both been highlighted by Modi's administration. Stronger defense pacts and more economic cooperation have strengthened strategic ties with major world powers, especially the United States. India has also pushed for changes and a permanent seat in the UN Security Council in an effort to strengthen its position in international multilateral organizations like the UN and G20. One major area of attention has been economic diplomacy, with programs like "Make in India" (zeeshan m. , march,2024)

In the Book "Flying Blind: India's Quest for Global Leadership" the writer argues in his book that India needs a more coherent strategy for its relations with the outside world and how India has limped to preserve its luxury by being a democratic state towards where it is with the foreign policy and what India needs to do to move faster. (zeeshan, 2021) India's desire to maintain stability and security in the Indo-Pacific by counterbalancing China's increasing aggressiveness is the driving force behind both its membership in the Quad and its strategic congruence with

AUKUS's goals. The main motivator is China's geopolitical moves, which have made India more focused on improving its maritime security and defending important sea lanes that are essential for trade and energy imports. India's strategic partnerships with the US, Japan, and Australia are strengthened by its engagement with the Quad. It also gains access to cutting-edge military technology and intelligence sharing, both of which are essential for enhancing India's defense capabilities. Additionally, these partnerships demonstrate India's dedication to democratic norms and principles by supporting its support for an Indo-Pacific international order based on rules. Financially speaking, protecting trade routes

Based on economic success, style of governance, and public opinion, the governments of Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi can be distinguished from one another in several important ways:

3.1 Financial Results

3.1.1 GDP Growth

The COVID-19 pandemic affected the GDP growth under Modi, which averaged 5.25% after it had averaged 7.03% during the first eight years of Manmohan Singh's administration.

3.1.2 Health and social indicators

Child Mortality: Both governments have made equal progress in lowering the rate of baby and under-five deaths, with the Modi administration claiming major accomplishments in this area.

Health Data: When comparing health data from the two governments, it is evident that the UPA government did better in 17 out of 29 categories, including women's education, women's health delivery, and the control of anemia.

3.1.3 Governance style

Modi's Branding: Modi is personally popular and has charismatic political persona and PD skills as well as the capacity to market himself to the masses.

Singh's Technocratic Approach: Manmohan Singh was perceived to be one among the political elite, who was better known for his technical prowess and administrative efficiency, and thus, had lesser attention towards the symptomatic political considerations or trend and more towards systematic and sensible approaches and economic courses of action.

3.1.4 Public perception

Modi's Popularity: Modi continues to enjoy a certain popularity despite being quite polarizing, a leader who is powerful and efficient in delivering outcomes promised prior to the elections; however, he receives much criticism for policies that erode the power of the federal government and exclusion of minority politicians.

Singh's Legacy: Singh has been known for the knowledge he has regarding the economic issues as well as policy making in India and the US-India nuclear deal.

Before his government started foreign policy initiatives, Dr Singh had built an intellectual containment that was used to guide its actions. Civil nuclear cooperation with USA, Free trade between India and ASEAN, Mechanism of border dialogue with China and dialogue on Kashmir issue with the then President of Pakistan, Gen. Pervez Musharraf are some of the significant measures which were there during his reign. Actually, in Japan, Shinzo Abe who was instrumental in the improvement of the bilateral relationship was out of power for some time, but now in power

again if India can understand Abe's desire for an improved relationship with India then India-Japan relations could once again become a powerful and growing relationship which should become the main focus of Abe government's diplomacy with India. On the basis of early "Nehruvian Realism" Dr. Manmohan Singh used to avail and on this basis, he said, "Whatever policy we may lay down, the conduct of the foreign affairs of a country depends upon the discovery of what is most advantageous to." He also believed that growth in India's economy and profile or India in regional and international systems would enhance its status in the comity of nations. Be that as it may, Dr Singh also emphasized a need for foreign policy to dynamically change from time to time in the light of the current world reality. Not only in the case of South Asia, his approach toward the economic interest of India and the economic relations of India with other East Asian economies and other developing and developed nations while defining Indian Foreign Policy became the leitmotif of what is being called the 'Manmohan Singh Doctrine'. (sanjya & Baru , 2014)

Mr Modi's decision to invite India's neighbouring countries because he knows it that India's standing in the world as a country is always associated with the neighbourhood. This is a good way to view India's future it has to be said. On the same note, Modi's focus must be complemented by a similar fixation on the economy as well. It is necessary to mark that one of the main foreign policy priorities of India is seeking closer economic relations with the developed countries and, first of all, the further development of its trade economic relations with the EU countries; According to the major defining principles of India's foreign policy, Modi is likely to focus mostly on the five Ts –trade, tourism, tradition, technology, and talent. The main actors for India may also be replaced under the new government or regime as it was mentioned earlier. In the last few years, there has been a change in the nature of the relations between India and the US. Dr. Singh's half of his current term and Mr. Barack Obama's first half nullify all the progress made

from the first term of Dr. Singh and the second term of Mr George Bush. Japan might become the future partner of India as such change is likely to bring a more favorable positioning. The domestic economic political scenario is the highest priority today regarding nearly almost every leader globally and Mr. Modi must follow it in foreign policy undertakings.

Having been in office since 2014, Narendra Modi has transformed India into a competent strategic actor that operates within a well-coordinated foreign policy. This has been done by Modi moving New Delhi from the actual anatomy of consistent non-alignment to form strong rapport with the great as well as middle-power nations. Under Mr Modi's leadership, India opened its arms to the United States and its Indo-Pacific strategy to counter a rising China and keep the seas open for commerce, not threat.

Modi has also stiffly dealt with the arch rivals of India namely Pakistan and china. Modi ordered the Indian Army not to back down in fatal face-offs with China in 2020 and Indian forces regained some of the territory it lost. In 2019, some Pakistan-based terrorist group threatened the identity of India's erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir; in reaction, New Delhi responded cautiously to avoid a war that could escalate beyond the South Asian region. It is interesting to note that there has been no transfer of any major act of terror post this event, involving Pakistan-based terrorist outfits. (Grossman, 2022)

The BJP Goa government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the UPA government led by Dr. Manmohan Singh have adopted different policies. Modi's foreign policy provides hostility to neighboring countries through diplomatic measures in an attempt to assert India's position in the world in terms of economic benefits including trade, tourism traditions, technology,

and talents. However, what started as a thaw in the relations with the US under Dr.Singh's governance has been followed by later governments reversing many of the positive moves made FDI-wise. Mr Modi's Japan can turn a new leaf and come out as an important ally of India in the future. The following is the evaluation of Modi's external management policy with three characteristics: The first is managing a multifaceted system of power; the second, recognizing the United States and the Indo-Pacific strategy as a counterforce to China; and the third, skilful handling of conflicts with Pakistan and China. On the other hand, Dr.Singh's foreign policy approach encompasses civil nuclear energy cooperation with the US, a Free Trade Agreement with the ASEAN region, and boundaries policy with China and Pakistan. Additionally, they have examined the Hindutva and pragmatism in Modi's Foreign policy towards Pakistan presenting how continuous Indian hostility towards Pakistan has increased amid the restructuring of Hindu nationalism under the Modi government. This situation is different from the pragmatic approach to relations with neighbors and the Muslim world that follow Modi's government, except for Pakistan. Therefore, when comparing the two leaders' foreign policy orientations, one can identify that Modi prioritizes economic diplomacy, partnerships, and engagement across regions and global concerns, whereas Dr. Singh's term centered on individual diplomatic strategies and delicate relationship building with key states such as the US and China and a contentious neighbour, Pakistan. (Grossman, 2022)

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had expected the Summit to showcase his country as one of the world's leading nations and him as the leader of one of the global powers before the general election scheduled for spring 2024. (what is G20 and what was achieved at the Delhi Summit, in 2023) "Mr. Modi has very strong friends and very strong enemies. There is no in-between, you either like him or dislike him", says political analyst Ravindra Reshme. (Hrishikesh,

2024) Mr Modi's popularity far surpasses all his antagonists and BJP is predicted to easily capture the next Indian government.

During his term in as the head of government of India PM, Narendra Modi, has been recognized for his unique way of conducting of diplomacy. This approach has been characterized by several key elements:

High-Level Engagements: In the second position, there is Modi's focus on meeting world leaders and leaders of other countries directly; he conducts more than one of such a meeting at such forums. Some of the things he has done include building good individual relations with heads of states, the current and former presidents of the United States of America, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, the Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Diaspora Diplomacy: Modi has now carried out a lot of interactions with the Indian expatriates across the globe since the later recognizes the latent power to consolidate the Indian influence across the globe. The interactions in large gatherings of Indians residing in the US, the UK, Australia and the UAE as well as other countries are noteworthy. Such events usually attract much attention, and give the people of India more visibility in the world.

Strategic Partnerships: The latter has counted on Modi to deepen and broaden India's bilateral partnerships with all of the major world and regional powers, to strategic cooperation. These relations include enhancing cooperation in the America, Japan, Israel, and in the Asia-Pacific region. India has also enhanced cooperation in a multilateral platform under Modi's regime

such as the Quad comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, and the BRICS grouping encompassing Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

Neighborhood First Policy: Modi's foreign policy has focused on the strengthening of Indian links with countries in the neighborhood. His invitation to the leaders of the organization of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for his administration's swearing-in in 2014, as well as inviting leaders of member states of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in 2019, exemplified this policy.

Act East Policy: Expanding the Look East Policy, the Modi's Act East policy is to focus on the improved cooperation with the members of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations). All the three leaders have sought to expand economic and security cooperation with these countries understanding the strategic location of the Asia-Pacific region for India.

Economic Diplomacy: Modi has worked very actively to sell India as the place for investments through various schemes such as "Make in India" and "Digital India". He has invested his time during the foreign diplomatic assignments to conduct diplomacy and woo investors by emphasizing on economic diplomacy, trade relations.

Soft Power Initiatives: The Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi has used such features of the country as cultural opportunities and soft power. On a similar note, Cultural outreach practices such as International Yoga Day adopted in 2014 by the United Nations and celebrated across the globe are evidence. He has also offered the global community with Indian traditional system of medicine food and other cultural items during his foreign tours.

Crisis Diplomacy: In diplomacy, regularity and stability are also notable, especially during crises as seen in the bilateral Doklam face-off with China and the Balakot strike on Pakistan. These events are always met by His government relying on both military preparedness to provide security and diplomatic relations to mobilize support from other countries.

Through such approaches, Modi's diplomacy has sought to set commercial relationships and secure strategic partnerships to advance India's position on the international stage using soft power as well as powers military muscle reliably.

India's general elections of 2014 that delivered Narendra Modi led BJP to power granted the adept politician a sweeping mandate to redesign the country's diplomacy. What has taken many analysts by surprise is his mastery of the same – the current Indian foreign policy cannot be solely attributed to him but is moderated by structuralized domestic factors that have been in existence long before his administration and new entrants into the system who would like to wield more power or be allocated more responsibilities. In terms of assessing the direct influence of domestic factors on the creation of India's foreign policy, this paper analyses the general trends of integration between domestic factors and Indian foreign policy ambitions. It discusses five newly emergent domestic factors responsible for shaping foreign policy decisions after the BJP's victory in the general elections in the year 2014. It also highlights five main threats domestically provided India can convert its dreams into external realities. These factors suggest that even before getting mandates in foreign policy where Modi himself has obviously scored quite high this mandate may not be enough to immunize the government of India from domestic forces – or friends and foes – who want to influence foreign policy decisions. The last section of the report discusses ideas related to the fact that these concerns and visions define the context of contemporary decision-

making in foreign policy in India and how these trends might be presented in the sphere of policy. Intentional vote bank politics, regional ambitions, and pressure from groups and lobbies always push the government to come up with such foreign policy decisions even if they may not be in the best interest of the country. For instance, Indian writing on Pakistan terrorism is not very stiff, partly due to internal political pressures.

There can be no better way of getting an understanding of how at present India is situated on the international map, and where it is predestined to hurry to, than knowing the internal forces in action influencing its foreign policy. However, within hundreds, if not thousands of articles that conceptualize India's relations with the rest of the world, only several articles address the nature of internal actors, and most of the existing literature examines internal forces as premises and little more. As it has been noticed, controversies regarding Indian politics are addressed through the lens of the centralization of power (New Delhi) and key factors that have been identified as priorities, namely: the prime minister, the Prime Minister's Office, the central ruling party, the ministries dealing with foreign politics, the highest stratum of the population, and key opinion-shapers. This approach lacks an understanding of the very significant role that domestic actors play within the context of India's foreign relations and its ideas about the 'national interest'. It is possible to mention several good reasons for the existence of this gap. The dynamics of how Indian foreign policy was conducted when India was still a developing state support the argument that for at least several decades after the country got independence, the formulation and the execution of its foreign policy were still a New Delhi affair. It is therefore possible to mention that the analysts noted that the country's foreign policy and its international relations, on the one hand, Delhi centric on the other hand, focused on South Asia (Buzan 2011, Acharya 2014, Naik 2014, Sahni 2007). However, other than these factors, cultural diplomacy in India enjoys vast cultural and social relations with

regional neighbors, Indian domestic policies, popular emotions, and developmental requirements, different political ideologies and visions potentially influencing the nature and future of leaders and regimes, have historically been marginalized more or less where the foreign policies of the government were concerned in preference to this kind of maneuvers in foreign policies. (mishra & miklian, 2016)

Lack of coherence in foreign policy formulation and implementation is also occasioned by the inability of the ruling party to assemble a cabinet that shares the same ideology due to partisan politics. For instance, on the issue of the India-US nuclear deal, though the BJP supports a better relationship with the US, it initially opposed the deal. The formation of a federal system in a democracy and the presence of multiparty coalition governments give rise to several questions as to how regional parties will make their imprint in the formulation of foreign policies. There is already much written on contentious issues arising from foreign policies subnational actors and the central government, in multinational states. This we propose indicates that depending on the prevailing conditions, central governments may actually prefer or seek to negotiate with small regional parties over their foreign policies, or even compel the regional parties to fall in line with the central government's foreign policies. Several researchers focused on the nature of decentralisation, and the ways that federal power relations dynamics give sub-political entities increased control over the foreign affairs of a state. Some of the other pieces of research pointed out that some formations of coalitions were instrumental in trumping the worries of the small parties and incorporating these into the debate on foreign policy. In bridging these two literatures, we propose that whilst both structural and agential factors play an influential role in the coalition formation processes at regional and national levels, behind the observed federal settings, they do impact foreign policy-making differently, and not always in the direction of generating

disagreement and obstruction. To illustrate these hypothesized mechanisms, we look at two case studies in the Indian context: this project analyzes the behavior and viewpoints of regional political parties regarding the US- India nuclear deal of 2008 and analyses the behavior and viewpoints of regional political parties in India towards the Sri Lankan civil war from the year 2009 to the year 2014. (blarel, 2020) This is one of the most crucial questions to answer in light of recent and past practices and trends because foreign policy-making has been traditionally considered highly centralized, especially in the context of the tasks related to international security and the regulation of inter-state relations. Similarly, policy-makers and scholars have also assumed for long-haul, that there had been the permissive consensus on the way in which foreign policy was made. It has therefore been assumed that a handful of individuals in government have sui generis control over foreign policy to safeguard the proclaimed interest in national security (Lobell et al., 2016).

Before the General Elections held in April and May 2019, Indian politicians and their parties are applying Social media heavily for ideologically promoting their causes, creating public opinion and setting the policy trend of their interest negatively Campaigning against the contenders. Both the B.J.P, presently in control of the coalition government, and the I.N.C, presently in opposition and the party that was prominent during the pre-liberalization era Two major political parties of India have adopted digital political communication in recent years after the 2014 general elections.

It is necessary to understand that political parties interact with the voters through social media platforms on a direct and constant basis. Unlike other media, SNSs can reinforce political positions and actively engage in disseminating them regardless and reach the most isolated places in the world. One of the benefits that could be attributed to social media, is that it that it is possible

to message to a large audience as well as a small target group. Leveraging its strong grassroots activism, its reach to influence the public sentiment in India and indeed the rest of the world is extremely strong. On one hand, social media serves as a useful tool to enhance civic engagement leading to increased pluralism which is crucial for the functioning of democracy in India, on the other hand, social media is employed for propaganda, hatred speech, and disinformation campaigns that go against the pluralistic core of democracy of India. The Indian news channel NDTV surveyed the incitement to hatred and extreme ‘dog-whistling’ content (coded appeals aiming at caste and religious prejudice) and revealed that the top Indian officials’ adversarial language has grown four and a half times since 2014 (Jaishwal, Jain, and Singh 2018). The Observer Research Foundation, on the same note, tried to document hate speech on social media and identified that ‘Religio-cultural practices’ were the stated reason for hate comments expressed most of the time, particularly in regard to the Muslim community (Mirchandani 2018). While the opposition parties criticize the BJP for playing the religious card and creating animosity in an attempt to hide the weakening economy in India, the INC (Indian National Congress) has also adopted an appeal to fear as its political strategy. Thus, one of the most pronounced trends in India’s political communication that has unfolded with the 2019 electoral campaigns is the escalation of polarising content in the respective social media campaigns of the leading political parties.

This is after an armed incursion that the two countries have been involved in with regards to the border issue in the year 2017. This factor helped explain why New Delhi decided later in the same year to join a brand new and much more holistic form of the quadrilateral dialogue with Australia, Japan, and the United States commonly referred to as the ‘Quad’. India’s readiness to engage with the US and two of its treaty partners in this ‘multilateral’ format created for the

purpose of pursuing a specific, limited set of strategic goals is a rare shift from the country's carefully weighed diplomacy that originated in India's policy of nonalignment during the Cold War era when the world was split into two camps with the Soviet Union on one side and the United States on the other. At a virtual summit held on 15 September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States disclosed they formed a new multilateral organization known as AUKUS, devoted to the security of the Indo-Pacific region. Australia kept New Delhi informed of the partnership announcement in advance as the ones from New Delhi gave a low reaction because it could have negative diplomatic, political, and security impacts on India and reduce the Quad's importance. Australia and the United Kingdom signed the AUKUS pact, while Japan, the other on-looking member of the Quad, applauded the move and stated that AUKUS would be an opportunity for 'enhancing an engagement in the Indo-Pacific region'. (blarel, 2020)

Thus, the AUKUS agreement outlined a framework for intelligence sharing and the sharing of sensitive military technologies as well between the three countries including cyber and quantum technologies and nuclear propulsion capabilities. In the latter area, cooperation shall enable the Royal Australian Navy to get up to eight nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in the future. Australia was delighted to be involved in the deal and had to abandon a US\$66-billion contract it had signed with the French company for procurement of submarines, while Paris which was once a significant diplomat and security ally of New Delhi reacted vehemently on the announcement. (Hrishikesh, 2024) Australia's decision, according to the Chinese foreign ministry, poses a threat to regional peace and stability for worsening the arms race and encroaching on global non-proliferation standards set by the international community.

The worry with this partnership for New Delhi appears to be that the structure will result in an increase of the number of SSNs from 2030 and a source of concern because the Indian Navy would like to use them not getting political clearance to do so. Another critical domain that has also suffered the setback of slow operational tempo in submarine acquisition is the navy, where only one-third of the total number of the submarines that was expected to be procured within the frame work of 2000 to 2030 has materialized. Still, the new AUKUS partnership is likely to press India to decide over SSNs, prompt it to step up defense ties with France and ramp up work on the ongoing projects to indigenously build new diesel-electric attack subs or SSKs to renew the antiquated fleet. (sanjya & Baru , 2014)

3.2 Aftermath of AUKUS

India aimed at enhancing the defense and security cooperation with Australia, France, Japan, the UK, the US and others in July 2020 following the scuffle. For instance, in the recent past in October, 2020, not only the arms assistance agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the USA but also the fourth Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement was signed by both the countries. This attention credited on America's geospatial intelligence to India, whereby Washington provided New Delhi with defense technologies comparable to those provided to the most strategic US allies and partners. The first of the four agreements had been signed in 2016, when the two nations issued a 'Joint Statement on Global Cooperation,' under which Washington acknowledged Delhi as the 'Major Defense Partner.'

India and the United Kingdom signed an ambitious ten-year diplomatic and economic roadmap in May 2021 to further enhance the strategic partnership, Within the framework of which, defense and security cooperation is one of the five key development vectors. So India committed

to forging this strategic partnership with Australia in June 2020, and on 11 September 2021, they conducted their first '2+2' meeting involving ministers of defense and foreign affairs. India and Japan have agreed to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to provide mutual supplies and services since September 2020 to boost the operation of the two armed forces. The Quad countries held the meeting of the foreign Ministers virtually in the month of March 2021 and there was also a French-led naval exercise conducted in April 2021. This led to another virtual summit held in March 2022 and it concerned Russia 's invasion of Ukraine. FDI out of Japan has risen to new heights under the agreement signed in the Japan–Australia Economic Partnership Agreement and has also sought to connect the Economic Partnership Agreement to Australia's Pacific Step-up program. This enhances cooperation between the three countries, especially Australia, Japan, and the United States, in achieving Pacific goals. For example, the Palau cable has been funded by the US, Japanese, and Australian investors who have even advanced their blue Dot Network agenda. Through partnerships within the limited framework of the Pacific Step-up initiative, Australia has the ability to accept third-country participation. Another example of third-party collaboration is United States–Japan–Australia partnership; as another example can be the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) which consists countries like Australia, Japan, and India. It formed a new entity known as SCRI to continue and achieve balanced development in the indo-pacific region besides breaking the dependence of the world's supply chain on china. The Japan–India business cooperation that works in the Asia–Africa region, often referred to as the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor is gradually shifting towards the Pacific Islands which means that Australia can contribute more towards connectivity projects. (Vijaya, 2021)

Indications of AUKUS were inversely proportional to the extent of diplomatic engagements and security discourses that India set into motion. In response, south-east Asia has

been angered by Australia for cancelling an order for 12 SSKs from France and also recalled its ambassadors to Canberra and Washington, canceling a France-UK defense minister meeting, and declining a trilateral meeting with India and Australia. The latter would have been the second in a series of planned plenary between India's foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and his French, and Australian counterparts – a minilateralism described by Jaishankar as 'a coalition of the enthusiastic' and Macron 'the new Paris–Delhi–Canberra axis'. One cannot even imagine what these trilateral meetings may discuss even if they begin again, all rights as a new distrust has emerged between Australia and France. Plans made to hold the first-ever trilateral naval exercise among the navies of Australia–France and India were being processed but have been initially put on hold. As far as the bilateral relations between India and the UK are concerned, AUKUS was a wake-up call for New Delhi that London was indeed weaning itself of China as a security threat. India's security establishment pointed out that the UK's Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021 operates under the proposition that China is the 'biggest state-based threat to the UK's economic security,' even as it seeks to expand engagement with Beijing. However, owing largely to the new perception that the post-Brexit UK intends to make a long-term roller coaster ride of Australia's military power, and having dispelled earlier concerns in New Delhi that a post-Brexit UK might return to the so-called 'golden era' of Sino-UK relations proclaimed in mid-2010s by the then UK Chancellor, George Osborne. The author further notes that this places the two countries in a better standing to successfully pursue the intended comprehensive strategic partnership they are planning on implementing.

India's foreign policy choices under the Modi government in the context of the Quad and AUKUS alliances are shaped by a combination of domestic and international factors. Here are some key factors:

3.3 Domestic Factors

Hindu Nationalism and Hyper-Nationalism: The aggressive policies of Hindu nationalism by the Modi government have been clearly reflected in India's international relations as seen in their relationship with the Quad as well as the AUKUS. This has led to a more "assertive, even "nationalistic posture", which is evident from India's entry into the Quad and condemnable of AUKUS.

Domestic Politics and Polarization: Ideological controversy within the political system of a country directly affects that country's foreign policy outlooks and decisions — this is equally true for India. For instance, while the BJP had opposition to the US-India civilian nuclear agreement, while some of it stemmed out of political concerns, this made for a rather Begin-End' approach to moving forward on the agreement.

Regional Influence and State-Level Actors: The regional states and subnational levels have been provided a larger role in the decision-making concerning foreign policies such as the Quad and AUKUS. Some of the world's political leaders opine that Modi's strategy of decentralization of the foreign policy to the regional states can be viewed as a strategy of empowering the regional players.

Business Interests and Economic Development: Geopolitical and economic self-concerns and human development goals and objectives define the context of India's foreign policy in the Quad and AUKUS. As a result of India's shifting goal to economic progress and prosperity, the country has begun to rely more on regional structures such as India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor IMEEC.

3.4 International Factors

China's Rise and the Indo-Pacific: China and the Indo-Pacific have played a significant role in the formulation of India's foreign policies, including the Quad and AUKUS mechanisms. Such a geopolitical realignment of India is notable because India has had concerns with China's expansive influence in the region that it has sought to improve relations with other Quad members and increase direct involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

U. S. Influence and Strategic Partnership: From the four perspectives of alliance, trade, arms sale, and the Quad, The US has played a monumental role in India's foreign policy strategy, notably through the recent formation of AUKUS. There are more defense and security cooperation initiatives with India wherein the Indian government under the Modi government particularly has enhanced the defense cooperation with the United States.

Regional Security and Stability: This has been noted where Indian grand strategies have been mainly anchored on regional security and stability, especially within Quad and AUKUS. India's involvement with these groupings is considered a means of stabilizing the regions and as a way of checkmating the rising influence of China in the regional grouping

Global Governance and International Institutions: Another factor that foreign policy has been influenced by is the global governance structures and institutions such as Quad and AUKUS alliances. India has thus interfaced with these institutions because of the sheer need to advance its interests as well as to mold the required governance of the world as it wishfully perceived it.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it could be stated that there is a certain association between Indian domestic politics and international factors that define Indian foreign policy in the context of Quad and AUKUS. They range from issues such as Hindu nationalism and hyper-nationalism, internal politics and increasing polarization, regional sway and state players, commercial and economic actors, Modi, Indo-Pacific, US, and China, security dynamics in the region, and international organizations. (Miller, 2021) In this regard, there has been a line of literature studies in the past few years that seeks to do away with power politics that are grounded on realistic perspectives that put a lot of attach on the capability and security interests of nation-states. It is recognized that in addition to power, legitimacy, rules, and status shape the nature of the Great Power Contest and states' ascending which is important for India since there is a significant normative element to its strategic vision. More specifically, Rohan Mukherjee has produced a theoretical framework known as the institutional status theory (IST) which analyses how desire for great power status and the international norms of institutions define the interaction between emerging powers and the international systems.

CHAPTER FOUR

If one follows the logic of IST, India as a rising power makes judgments about either challenging or cooperating with international institutions based on legitimacy and inclusiveness: the level of procedural justice with which it regulates decision-making in these institutions and the extent to which these institutions are receptive to emergent powers accessing decision-making power. Despite the fact that the aforementioned values appear to be quite noble and good-natured in essence, the question of judgement in regard to them is inherent in subjectivity. This knowledge helps shed light on how Delhi has so far failed to comprehend AUKUS – an externally imposed vehicle of Anglosphere order engineering that would seem antithetical to such values – but has embraced the Quad – though support for the latter is not without limits. India’s various strategic options are not simply related to anxieties for one’s national security based on material capabilities but create a form of demand for acknowledgment of worth and equivalence by the other great powers. Thus, how India reacts to AUKUS is not only about the balance of ends and means but if the Indo-Pacific is being built as an open and fair system affirming India’s emergent primacy and enabling it to co-shape rules of the relevant architecture.

India’s ambition for the Indo-Pacific is to become a legitimiser, a connector and a mediator and if the need be a coercer as well. There is also plausible to address the extent of the success that exists specifically under Modi in securing these types of roles with an approach India has deployed towards regional institutions and other platforms, in the form of an ‘institutional balancing’. This essentially correlates with the role that Delhi has reserved for itself within the Quad formation. About AUKUS, the scope for providing strategic influence is much more constrained, but there is

the place for Delhi as a regional mediator, for example in case when China does not like AUKUS and expresses it in international organizations. However, status is classified with characteristic features like a relational as well as perceptive concepts. The Pacific order that Delhi is hoping to create will be one that would not only accommodate India's ascendance but would also be partially built on India's moniker and its dynamics.

4.1 Shaping US Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific

The announcement of AUKUS in September meant that a new strategic partnership came that Delhi did not foresee. Foreseeing the delicate diplomatic dance that India would need to perform as it related to the Quad, then-foreign minister Harsh Vardhan Shringla said at the time: "The Quad is plurilateral the vision of these nations and the attitude towards their qualities and values is positive proactive agenda developed by some countries to address some of the challenges of the current period of time." On the other hand, AUKUS is a tripartite security partnership. This author is not part of this partnership. From our viewpoint, this is irrelevant to the Quad format and will not have

AUKUS is part of a new generation of minilateral formations, enacted under the Biden administration that targets China and its military technological looming presence and imperialistic tendencies. Other projects of order-engineering include; Build Back Better World and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) that also involves the US. They are based on America's 2022 National Security Strategy in which the United States has acknowledged that attaining its national interests cannot be achieved "alone" and, therefore, needs to embrace an "integrated deterrence" approach.

However, India has been quite cautious in overtly acknowledging any convergence of interests of AUKUS to the Quad formats, as the country has kept a certain geographical distance from this Anglosphere-based security agreement. Hence, one could say the position of India has been rather elusive on AUKUS up to this point, and very calculated public statements were made by policymakers and officials, including regarding the relationship between the two multilateral structures. Thus, while India's traditional non-alignment discourses would indicate that it will not side with AUKUS, however, deepening the strategic rivalry with China may point towards the fact that engagement with the Quad could become more tense for India if partners of the Quad are to push on the Quad's securitization logic. However, it is more intricate to analyze the dynamics due to the fact that India and China, while being competitors, still are economically connected, and Delhi does not wish to disrupt its favorable economic and, consequently, political trend. Thus, as it will be described below, there are both threats and opportunities for India in these US-led Indo-Pacific mini lateral formations.

4.2 Setting out the drawbacks of India

One of the things India finds hardest to deal with is the foundation of both AUKUS and the Quad primarily to counter China. The emerging multilateral partnerships led by the USA have the effect of bringing multiple layers of security structure in the Indo-Pacific region is a security in-depth model. Such activities have also seen an increase in what may be referred to as the 'military drills' among the US and its allied partners, including regional actors such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines in a bid to boost the forces' readiness as well as form as a show of force. India realized it dearly that when any part of the region is securitized, Beijing will let in India an impression of being surrounded and this has the propensity to reactive to aggression. This is a situation India does not like given its own troubles with china.

Similar is the question about the possibility of provoking an arms race connected with AUKUS. Yet, fears of arms racing are not a new phenomenon, and they invariably emerge as soon as states obtain new weaponry; Still, there is justification for this anxiety in the actions that Australians and other parties took in the framework of AUKUS against the backdrop of growing tensions in the South China Sea. Like several ASEAN countries, India apprehends that AUKUS could contribute to the continuing growth of this cycle, thus posing risks of conflict escalation. Given that there is hardly any country in this region that does not possess a nuclear arsenal or at least collaborate with other nuclear nations it is not a small matter.

Another issue that India faces to comprehend is how AUKUS contributes to building orders of power based on exclusion, which is diametrically opposite to the Indian paradigm. Still within these regional forums, Delhi seeks to encourage and uphold the membership's diversity, albeit partially comes with an aim of garnering acceptance of the uniqueness of its identity, thereby pushing for its own agenda. Emphasizing how it considers these concepts as consonant with the Quad, the speech given by Prime Minister Modi at the Shangri-La Dialogue of 2018, with reference to the Quad being revived only nine months ago, used the terms "inclusive" or "inclusiveness" and "diverse" or "diversity" four times each. By contrast, AUKUS has a fundamentally Anglo-Saxon character: Anglosphere partnership of states is what it is. Although, there has been an anticipation of AUKUS expanding, at the current stage, it enshrines a limited and ceremonious formation that is in the best interest of Anglosphere primarily. In this case, AUKUS as an alliance of the Anglosphere countries directly opposes India's pluralistic vision of the world.

The Anglosphere construct also has colonial implications associated with it, firstly, because the Indo-Pacific area was headed by Britain during the apogee of the Empire. It is only a fact that

France, one of the states that most suffered with the birth of AUKUS, reinforces the Anglo-Sphere tone of the pact. A particular issue for India is that France, while not part of AUKUS (or the Quad), tried to cultivate India in the same way. The day after AUKUS was announced, the European Union, led by Paris, issued its own regional strategy: the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, as the EU strategy reflects the emerging gap between Europe and Anglo-Saxon states regarding the Indo-Pacific Region. It gave Delhi cause for concern given that AUKUS has the capacity to initiate a split between the western allies and this will complicate the issue by altering the regional status quo.

Every subsequent change that occurs to the region's security structure has a disproportionately larger effect on Delhi. Due to this, India which has a leveraging relationship with China in terms of its economy and which has shallow military layers of security would arguably be affected more by conflict escalation than any regional state. A biologically aggressive border dispute with China that often threatens to intensify and increase bilateral cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad makes Delhi's decisions more difficult. And despite India being prophesied to be the third largest economy in the globe, a substantial part of the country remains a nation of poverty and lacks proper infrastructure and social amenities, thus, it lacks any form of elasticity of conflict contagion.

Therefore, the Anglosphere dimension is already influencing the dynamic of the Indo-Pacific security actor spectrum. While the acquisition of a new class of nuclear-propelled submarines under Pillar I of AUKUS is in about thirty years away, there are other things done under the AUKUS pact that shift the regional balance-of-power in the shorter term. This also entails the complex capabilities detailed under Pillar II; the establishment of Australia's fleet of

between 3 to 5 Virginia-class submarines; and the rotational deployment of American and British SSNs to Western Australia from as early as 2027. In addition, the fact that the two partners' forces achieved deep interoperability and exchanged extraordinarily classified technologies points to a long-term strategic aspiration of the two like-minded states to operate side by side in the region.

Another less direct effect of the AUKUS formation is that it will create the seventh country with submarines powered by highly enriched uranium; India was the sixth to launch an SSN in 2016. When more militaries obtain such capabilities, as seen in the case of France and other countries, this sort of novel acquisition reduces India's naval competitive edge. Though nuclear-propelled submarines do not contribute to a state's nuclear status, however, it gives undersea power, which is becoming crucial as the sea domain in the Indo-Pacific region emerges more during the great power competition. However, there are vibes that AUKUS may expand in the near future, and most likely in the domain of Advanced Capabilities under the second pillar. Speaking in June 2023 US official said that Washington is "in conversation with a variety of countries who are interested." The added new members as for example Canada, Japan and South Korea would deepen up the AUKUS competencies but at the same time it is going to be isolating for India as the latter would not become a part of AUKUS even with the expanded membership.

Despite the fact that their strategic objectives are almost congruent, encompassing primarily addressing China's rise, AUKUS might undermine the role of the Quad as the other primary US-centered multilateral in the region based on possible overlap in certain activities. Inter-quad relations have been also significantly damaged by Delhi's relation with Moscow, firstly in terms of the non-censure of the Ukrainian invasion which indicates that there are varied perceptions in sovereignty and the rules-based system of the Quad countries. However, such

variations in world outlook are not as vast as they seem as Delhi's diplomacy towards Moscow is more about ensuring security from China than shared long-term strategic interests.

Moreover, if AUKUS moves on to expand to include Japan the very formation of quad becomes useless. The other three Quad members (the US, Australia, and Japan) may have attempted to redefine their relationship within the framework of the AUKUS if there were a large divergence of the interests with India. Thus, the more AUKUS expands itself, the less the Quad will be required. On the other hand, the expansion of AUKUS to the Asian states of Japan and South Korea would increase the legitimacy of the pact which was identified as Anglosphere, which appears to be an asset that India should appreciate. In the meantime, the Anglosphere partners might be interested in reshaping the Quad's focus in line with their regional security interests, while it would be virtually impossible to adapt the Quad for AUKUS or vice versa, experts believe.

Still, regarding the prospective future situations, it is important to admit that AUKUS has created some issues for India regarding the advancement of its naval forces. India has an old submarine fleet; as of mid-2023 India has had sixteen operational conventional submarines nine of which had been in service for over thirty years and three for over twenty years. Submarines that India has previously imported include those from Germany, France and Russia but of recent years has sought to develop local manufacturing. However, it is moving very slowly and their nuclear-power attack submarines are still not available. In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed the formation of the India-France-Australia (IFA) trilateral which could be a chance for new forms of enhancing Indian and French cooperation in the defense industry including purchase of the equipment. The diplomatic collapse with Paris pursuing the AUKUS declaration undid the IFA structure, but no footing was assigned to it.

Based on the declared intentions of the Chinese authorities, it can be stated that both AUKUS and the Quad are causing significant concern in Beijing. However, China's thoughts process of its foreign policy is somewhat obscure for outsiders and it is still premature to assess how China would react to the formation of AUKUS as a lot of provisions of this agreement would be realized in the future, several decades down the line. However, there are already a number of likely outcomes that could be predicted, for example, China may try to find an ally for the formation of an opposite military union, AUKUS to help alleviate the diplomatic isolation of China.

Supporting the idea of another 'rival AUKUS' with China at its helm, an August 2023 working paper published by the US Naval War College described how Russia could help China with submarines. At the same time, China could possibly come up with an offer to Pakistan through defending relations. According to Manpreet Sethi of Delhi's Centre for Air Power Studies, Pakistan would be thrilled to equip its naval Strategic Forces Command with SSNs; Anjum Sarfraz of Islamabad's National Institute of Maritime Affairs has said that Pakistan could use AUKUS to develop its own nuclear propeller submarines. Though it is less probable, China could extend the same deal to Iran, which will be another provocation to world order with India vulnerable to its impacts given the latter's position between the two countries and as an importer of Iranian oil.

Far more profoundly, a new security partnership under AUKUS challenges the very core of India's South Asia grand strategy design whereas AUKUS is arresting more directed towards near-sea neighborhood instead of gigantic Indo-Pacific. Partnership in which India is not involved results in rebalanced power relations within the region and in which the Anglosphere enlargement remains an extra factor that limits India's longer-term opportunity for the strategic impact.

Especially, AUKUS poses threats to the Indian strategic trajectory of transforming into a proficient naval power to augment the status of an emerging/ascendant great power. However, the mere formation of Quad and AUKUS places India in a rival category to China, which increases conflict and tension in the bilateral relations.

4.3 Setting out the Benefits for India

Despite not reacting sharply on AUKUS with Delhi going to the extent of not mentioning it in its official statements, this is what AUKUS is all about i.e., to prevent China from overstepping its bounds and to preserve the balance of the power in the Indo-Pacific region aligning with India's perception of the free and open Indo-Pacific. The most informative episode related to India's strategic reflections on AUKUS transpired at the 2022 General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The event in question rises to the level of an annual conference of IAEA's member states at which China tried to impose a resolution against the acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines of Australian beef as a violation of the NPT. The Indian Mission to the IAEA exerted a diplomatic effort in other countries as the journalist Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury depicts; that China was not likely to anticipate the condemnation of its proposal. Not having the support of the majority of states, Beijing had to withdraw the resolution on the last day of the conference.

From the long-term strategy, the AUKUS vision is almost in tune with the vision of Quad and other alliances that India participates in. Thus, by focusing on the innovative and apparently 'farming' sectors of Quad cooperation such as climate change, critical technologies, infrastructure, Covid-19 vaccines, and humanitarian aid, among others, Delhi could be seen to contribute positively to the goal of the regional development and prosperity through this mini-lateral, leaving

AUKUS partners, and potential future members, to cover hard naval power projection. This is an effective approach for India as it emphasizes the strengthening of military capacities; particularly it is the necessity of the development of naval forces in the Indo-Pacific region and ground forces in the Himalayan borders. Since the Indian grand strategy has never been about becoming a military power AUKUS is good news for India as it allows for convenient passivity to other strategic objectives of the country like economic well-being among others.

4.4 Findings:

The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) and AUKUS (Australia, UK, and US security pact) are relatively recent trends in the international relations between India and the US. These alliances express the grounds and the foreign policy objectives of the Modi government. Here are the key findings and perspectives on these topics:

4.4.1 QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)

1. Strategic Significance:

- The QUAD on the contrary is a grouping of the United States of America, India, Japan and Australia and focuses on the open Indo-Pacific region.
- In this regard it plays the role of balancing power against the increasing assertiveness of China in South-East Asia.

2. Military and Security Cooperation

- The ability of member navies to integrate is did further by the conduct of exercises such as the Malabar naval exercise.
- Coordination and cooperation in the fields of maritime security, cyber security and counter-terrorism.

3. Economic and Technological Cooperation:

- Proposals that enhance supply chain dependability, especially when focused on sensitive industries such as chips and rare earth metals.
- Collaboration in construction of infrastructure and technology such as 5G and Artificial Intelligence.

4. Diplomatic Engagement:

- Summits and Forums that are held with counterparts from other countries frequently to deliberate on current issues.
- Joint declarations and policies which contain such elements as democratic orientation, human rights and the rule of law.

4.4.2 AUKUS (Australia-UK-US Pact)

1. Strategic Objectives:

- Designed towards bolstering the defense and security cooperation in the space of the Indo-Pacific.
- Emphasizing the delivery of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia to improve its capabilities in the ocean.

2. Impacts on Regional Security:

- Solidifies the military presence and sends a signal of force and proof of determination to antagonizes in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Gives rise to proliferation concerns and the balance of power in the nuclear severed region.

3. Implications for India:

- While India is not too involved in AUKUS to some extent, the country backs other architectures that counter-check China in the region.
- Ability to engage much more with AUKUS partners in terms of defence and security treatments.

4.4.3 Indian Foreign Policy under the Modi Government

1. Act East Policy

- Building and expanding Australian's economic and strategic relationships with Southeast Asian states and other countries.
- Focus on improving connectivity, trade, and cultural ties with ASEAN nations.

2. Neighborhood First Policy

- Mutual cooperation with the neighboring countries in order to ensure established good relationships thus promote regional security and economic cooperation.
- Mixed success with challenges in relations with Pakistan and China, while improving ties with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

3. Global Partnership

- Building up cooperation with major players of the global Arena & extending cooperation with USA, Russia, Japan & European nations.
- Multilateral membership such as participation in the UN, BRICS, G20, SCO, etc.

4. Strategic Partnership

- Balancing relations with multiple global powers to maintain strategic autonomy and independence in foreign policy.

- Emphasis on self-reliance in defense production and reducing dependence on any single country.

5. Economic Diplomacy

- Making demands in Foreign Affairs to advocate the Indian economy, FDI, and international business relations as well.
- Schemes like Make in India, Digital India and Startup India to spur the economic wheel for faster and sustainable growth.

6. Partnership Implications on the Region

The strengthening of ties between India and alliances such as the Quad and AUKUS can have several implications for Pakistan in the Region.

- Participation in AUKUS could potentially lead to advancements in India's defense technology and capabilities, such as submarine technology and cyber defense. This could prompt Pakistan to invest more in its own military modernization and strategic capabilities.
- Pakistan might experience diplomatic isolation or decreased support from major powers if India's alliances shift the regional focus. This could affect Pakistan's ability to gain international support for its positions, particularly concerning issues like Kashmir.
- Pakistan may seek to strengthen its own alliances and strategic partnerships, potentially aligning more closely with China and other nations countering the Quad and AUKUS.
- If India leverages its strategic partnerships to gain economic advantages or impose trade restrictions, Pakistan might face economic pressure or disruptions in trade and investment flows.

These alliances and policies reflect India's evolving strategic priorities and its efforts to navigate the complex geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. India's strengthened ties with the Quad and AUKUS can significantly impact Pakistan by altering regional security dynamics, influencing military and diplomatic strategies, and potentially affecting economic and trade relations.

4.5 Recommendations

Based on the search results, here are some key recommendations related to India's approach to the Quad and AUKUS under the Modi government: Based on the search results, here are some key recommendations related to India's approach to the Quad and AUKUS under the Modi government:

1. Maintain Strategic Autonomy

- India should redouble its efforts to remain aware of this core interest, especially in relation to the AUKUS case, which means that New Delhi should not get bogged down in formal strategic frameworks.
- It is advised that Quad should be a loose arrangement of four nations on non- traditional security threats, so that India can maintain its existed relations with other powers.

2. Strengthen Partnerships Selectively

- India needs to diversify its relations with these countries in the field of defense and security cooperation; thus, New Delhi should pay more attention to the development of its bilateral relations, especially with France.
- India needs to be cautious in participating in the Quad formation and the AUKUS, avoid being trapped and over-participate while being careful in the areas of interest.

3. Manage Regional Dynamics

- India could strive to mitigate its regional rivalry and do not escalate an arms race in the Indo-Pacific region, and instead of doing so should encourage diplomacy and dialogue with other countries which includes multilateralism as well as measures to build confidence.
- India has to use their membership in the Quad as an adequate influence on the development of the regional situation and present an analog to the Belt and Road Initiative.

4. Enhance Domestic Capabilities

- India should further devote resources on building up indigenous capabilities in military and technology in order to minimize the level of cooperation with foreign allies.
- India should also concentrate on its domestic matters in political and economic front in an effort to boost its strategic stance in the world.

5. Engage with ASEAN

- India needs to remain much more active in ASEAN so that stance of the Quad and AUKUS does not seem as exclusionary blocs.
- India requires building a favorable climate in ASEAN countries with respect to regional security and ensure that ASEAN feels comfortable to identify itself with Indian suggestions of regional security architecture.

6. Communicate Effectively

- India could do a better job explaining the Quad and AUKUS to both its own people and the global community to ensure correct assumptions and reduce misconceptions.
- India should also try to coordinate the Quad and AUKUS as its objectives and messages are compatible and seamless.

- Maintain a balanced defense posture that avoids unnecessary escalation and focuses on defensive rather than offensive capabilities in the region.
- Actively promote peace and stability initiatives in the region, demonstrating a commitment to resolving conflicts through peaceful means.
- Ensure that the Quad and AUKUS initiatives focus on regional stability and economic development, rather than solely military aspects, to avoid exacerbating tensions with Pakistan.

If implemented, these recommendations will assist India in managing the uncertainty of the emerging geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific and utilizing both Quad and AUKUS to advance its stake while at the same time, preserving its sovereignty and Soft Power influence in the region. India can manage the impact of its strengthening ties with the Quad and AUKUS on Pakistan and contribute to a more stable and cooperative regional environment.

CONCLUSION

The “Quad” and “AUKUS” are two critical alliances that have been forged in the recent past that depict global realignments, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Such partnerships also bear consequences to the stability of the area and global politics with specific reference to India with the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The Quad which is also known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is an idea-driven concept of the four countries which include United States of America, Japan, India and Australia. The organisation was first established in 2007 however did not come into focus again until approximately 2017 primarily due to increasing worries about China’s escalating power and aggression in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad has the aim of ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific region, improve security cooperation and cooperation in various areas including maritime security, infrastructure, and disasters.

AUKUS is a defense alliance of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States which was unveiled in September 2021. The main focus of AUKUS is to deepen security and technology partnerships among the three countries including in fields like cyber, AI, and quantum. The other aspect of AUKUS is that the deal also allows for Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines, which is regarded as a security measure to check China's naval ambitions in the region. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration, India has actively engaged with both the Quad and AUKUS: Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration, India has actively engaged with both the Quad and AUKUS, Since the formation of Quad, India has been vital for its strong participation. Modi's government considers Quad as important to help strengthen security and economic collaboration in the Asia-Pacific region. India has cooperated through mega naval exercises and operationalizing the key initiatives of Quad that espouse a principled global system. Stating this, it can be asserted that Quad's areas of operation, infrastructural investment, and climate change agenda are of particular importance to India in terms of its national security and developmental priorities.

In conclusion, analyzing all the aspects of Modi's foreign policy, what is evident is a pragmatic approach of India that wants to become a part of powerful alliances while also making sure that the country has full control of its foreign policy. This is the approach that makes it easier for India to gain from the general security and technological developments resulted from such partnership alliances without being a formal member thus makes India's foreign policy become more favorable and sensitive to international changes. Neo-liberalism, which was founded on free markets, deregulation, and integration, is a major factor for the new emerging Quad and AUKUS alliance, and accord with Modi's foreign policy. The Quad which includes the United States, Japan, India, and Australia focuses on the economic partnership and defense in the Indo-Pacific region,

while AUKUS which is Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States also formed to give importance to the same area. These alliances like other regional cooperation also follow the neo-realist ideology of free trade and synchronized economic cooperation through a collective strength embarking on economic regional stability and against regional threats.

As an international relations theory, structural realism commonly referred to as neorealism provides one with all the necessary tools that can help explain the formation of such emergent formations as the Quad or AUKUS and shifts in US-India relations under the hawk-eyed Narendra Modi. In a nutshell, there is a balance of power and the nature of the international system is assumed to be anarchic in structural realism. In this system, the primary focus is the maintenance of the individual state and its security and therefore, the formation of an alliance system as an act of containment.

This balancing behavior is evident through the formation of organisations like the quad that group the US , India, Japan, Australia and AUKUS that includes the US, Australia, & the UK. These alliances are mostly viewed as measures toward increasing the influence and assertiveness of China in the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, in terms of structural realism, the creation of such groups is a pragmatic effort to address the emergence of China's power in order to retain the power balance. Quad is planned to act as an Indo-Pacific's Free and Open Indo-Pacific region whereas AUKUS is going to focus on defense and technological security advancement.

Since Modi assumed civil power in India, this nation's foreign policy has become somewhat aligned with the US interests especially in the context of containing China's influence in the region. Modi-led government has tried to strengthen Indian strategic configuration by courting American connections and by participating proactively in Quad. This alignment can be

seen in the light of structural realism's perception of states as being in a constant search for power and security and hence states forming alliances to counterbalance a perceived threatening power. These alliances are also beneficial for India in that they not only enhance the country's security but also contributes to a collective effort to uphold regional stability and counterbalance China's influence.

In other words, structural realism provides an understanding of why India under Modi wanted to join these new alliances and embrace the US foreign policy. This brings out the importance of cooperating in power over other nations with interests in a competitive system that is anarchical, coupled with issues of security, why states factor in, hiring the Quad and the AUKUS as tools of dealing with threats.

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