

The Civil Society–Democracy Co-Relationship: A Comparative Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan




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2017

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Thesis submitted for the partial fulfillment of the requirements of PhD degree in the discipline of Politics and International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences International Islamic University, Islamabad

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December, 2017

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis, neither as a whole nor as a part thereof, has been copied out from any source. It is further declared that I have prepared this thesis entirely on the basis of my personal efforts made under the guidance of my supervisor and co-supervisor.

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Samina Batool


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
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All errors, omissions and inadequacies in this research project are attributable to the author. The views and comments are my own and does not reflect the International Islamic University or represent Pakistan position or policy.

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ABSTRACT

The Civil Society (C.S) in Pakistan though has developed over the years and gained vibrancy and strength to some extent. But it could not achieve much success as compared to its counterpart in Turkey. This research study involved primary as well as secondary sources as a part of this exploration. The methodology used in this study is a mixture of Quantitative and Qualitative Methods and mostly used traditional historical approach. Sampling involved people from different sections of C.S comprising of lawyers, teachers, parliamentarians and students regarding relationship and impact of civil society on democratization in Pakistan and Turkey. This is a pioneer study to use the Liberal Democratic Model as the frame work for addressing the subject. Liberal Democracy is practiced in most of the countries of the world. Its' important elements are: representative democracy, electoral choice and competition. There is a clear division between the C.S and the state. One to one interviews have been conducted from different people belonging to different areas in Pakistan. After analysis of the data the themes were presented to the participants for them to verify or refute. According to the researcher incompetent and corrupt leadership along with lack of influential middle class are responsible for a weak and fragmented civil society. In case of Turkey the civil society was also fragmented and weak but there has been a shift from ideologically centred activity towards issue oriented activity and assistance from external actors. By examining different reasons why civil society in Pakistan has not been able to achieve the level of democratization and success as compared to that achieved in Turkey, viable solutions and suggestions to improve the situation have been proposed.

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AKP	Justice and Development Party
CBO	Community Based Organizations
CHP	Republican Peoples'
CIVICUS	An alliance of Civil Society Groups
COD	Charter of Democracy
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DLD	Liberal Democratic Democracy
EU	European Union
FAFEN	Free and Fair Elections
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GNA	Grand National Assembly
HDP	Peoples' Democratic Party
KPK	Khyber Pakhtun Khwah
LGTP	Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender Persons
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PILDAT	Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency
PLD	Protective Liberal Democracy
SPDC	Social Policy Development Center
TBMM	Members of Turkish Grand Assembly
TI	Transparency International
TOBB	Turkish Union of Chamber and Stock Exchanges
TUSSAID	Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists Association

INTRODUCTION

The system in which people have the power to choose their leaders to govern them and also a process to make their leaders answerable for the acts and policies during their tenure in office is known as democracy. The general public decide that who will be their representative in parliament, and who will be heading the governments at different levels, i.e. national and local. The process of choosing representative is made by means of open elections among the competing parties. Government is founded on the consensus of the people ruled. In democracy, people are independent and sovereign; they are also the utmost form of political authority. Power flow is directed from the governed to the governors in the government, who grip power only on temporarily basis.

Laws, policies and other constitutional changes require majority vote in parliament, however the rights of the minorities are sheltered in various forms. The people have the right to criticize leaders and elected representatives by observing the conduct of their business which is entrusted to them. The representatives at different levels of the government have the duty to listen, consider and to care for the needs and the desires of the governed. In Democracy the elections occur as prescribed by law and within the given time frame. The power holders do not have the power to extend their term of office without taking the consent of the people in the form of general elections. In order to conduct fair elections it is necessary that they should be overlooked by neutral and professional bodies. The administrator of the election should treat all the political parties and contesting individuals on equal footings (Hirst, 2013).

Political Democracy is successfully working in few countries of the world like Great Britain, United States of America (USA) and Australia while in others it is

unproductive and unstable. For example, in Latin American, African and Asian countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and many others democracy has failed to produce the desired results. Among many, lack of a vibrant and strong Civil Society (C.S) is one of the factors in its failure.

When the concept of C.S is taken into consideration in a historical manner, three central elements of the concept emerge as under: Firstly, C.S represents a realm of public interest which is clearly distinguishable and different from the state. The modern understanding emerged with coming up of the idea of a nation with distinct people, cultural entity with its constitutive values, beliefs, and ideas. Culture as a self-sorted out whole portrays that the state is no longer taken as the sole fountain of social unity. We can say that society and politics came to be seen as separate from each other (Ehrenberg, 1999).

Secondly, an essential feature of C.S is that it proceeded with reliance on the state. In the event that political and social societies are distinctive, then this does not infer that political organizations are assuming a key part in controlling, arranging and directing people in general their life. Withering away of the state institutions: results in loss of autonomy for the institution of C.S. Instead of disappearing, the state may exist both to regulate social life and to serve the interests of C.S (Mervyh, 2002).

These two features of C. S; its interdependence with the state and its separateness from the state, are conceptually distinct. Some writers have emphasized that autonomy of C.S may try to weaken the role played by the state while some others have indicated that dependence of society on state may incline to reduce the difference between them.

The issue between two schools of thought that liberal and Post Marxists both have recognized the importance of C.S but with this above-mentioned emphasis.

Thirdly, the essential feature of C. S is the pluralism ¹of its institution. It is yet to be noted whether deeper understanding of the idea of pluralism itself may help to maintain together the distribution and interdependence between society and state. The perception regarding existence of legitimate ideals, values and customs of life is factually linked to the current concept of C.S. (Carter, 1998).

The idea of the general population of every country as a social substance grabbed hold in response to the logic of the French illumination². Inferred in the acknowledgment of distinction between countries was a renunciation of the possibility of widespread responses to the issues of life. Pluralism fundamentally characterises the sole denial of enlightenment which asserts that single answer to the question of how to live is yet unknown. Thus C.S and pluralism had a common foundation. Nowadays, cultural life within a single nation is considered as a dominant feature of pluralism as compared to some other nations. Hence we may consider C.S as a diversity of ways of life within a modern nation state (Arts, 2003).

Thus, any definition of C.S can never be finalized without the understanding that it is the domain inside which free individuals may appreciate assorted qualities of true legitimate values, goals and lifestyles. It is subsequently proposed that the contention between the different advocates of C.S might be settled by judging what school of thought can most properly suit a pluralist origination of C.S, while adjusting together the

¹A condition; or system in which two or more states, groups, principles, sources of authority, etc., coexist.

²The collections hold 11 medieval manuscripts illuminated in France. The most remarkable example of French illumination is found in a fragmentary Parisian book of honours.

self-sufficiency and reliance of the foundations. The part of C.S establishments to affect the lower and lower middle class can be summarized as follow;

- Non-Governmental Organizations have only limited presence Community Based Organization usually work as significant resources for deprived and poor
- Kinship and neighborhood networks or associations give social and economic help
- The rich and poor, men and women are organized differently
- Redistributing power is not high on agenda (Delviel, 1997).

After having a historic overview of the concept of C.S, next comes the definition of C.S. It is quite problematic, as the use of this term in many cases is dependent on the place, time and country and the prevailing legal framework for registration of Civil Society Organizations (CSO). CSO can be depicted as a sorted out activity having no relationship with major institutional frameworks: government and organization, industry and business, instruction and wellbeing delivery (Judge, May, 2010).

Richard Halloway (2001) calls the term C. S .O as a constructive descriptive term and defines it as citizens' associations built neither for profit nor power, are considered as the third pillar in a social setup, complementing business and government, and people are the entities who constitute CSO (Halloway, 2001, p.35).

May be the most straightforward approach to see C.S is as a "third segment," surprisingly not quite the same as business and government. Keeping this view one might say that C.S alludes basically to the supposed 'delegate establishments' i.e. religious gatherings and worker's guilds, proficient relationship of national backing associations.

These institutions enrich public participation in democracies and give voice to the several sections of the society (White, 2016).

In a democracy, C.S bunches have respect for the law, for the benefits of individuals, and for the benefits of various groups to express their interests and appraisals. Part of what "civil" recommends is strength and the agreement of pluralism and differences. Democracy is a highly complex political system. It is not only a concept; it's a culture, a code and a way of life. Democracy or "Majority rule system" can be portrayed as

A competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that public can participate in the decision making process (Schattschneider, 1960, p.35).

Whereas Vanhennen defines democracy as;

A political system in which different political groups are legally entitled to compete for power in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people (Vanhennen, 1997, p. 43).

According to the Heywood (2007), the meaning of word democracy vary from person to person, this promiscuousness has endangered the provisos undoing as an important political concept (Heywood, 2007, p.34).

The present study has examined different reasons that why Pakistan has not been able to achieve the level of democratization and successes as achieved by Turkey. For this purpose, the study group was composed of teachers, lawyers, parliamentarians and military personnel regarding relationship and impact of C.S on democratization in Turkey and Pakistan.

0.1. Civil Society in Turkey

The scrutiny of C.S in Turkey and Pakistan reveals that Turkey also possessed fragmented and frail C.S. However, two processes have played role in shaping a fragmented and fragile C. S. There has been a change from ideologically focused action towards issue focused movement and an expanded remote help from foreign assistance. The second procedure brought about an expanded number of associations and their institutional limit was enhanced while the principal procedure has changed their character. In recent past, C.S in Turkey was divided along ideological, ethnic and political fault lines which rendered it segmented and least agreeable to dialogue or cooperation. This fragmentation ran along all CSO across social, political and ethnic lines (Gonzales, 2011).

During 1980s, when Turkey was about to submit its application for European Union membership, at that point the general public talk was fixated on majority rule government and human rights and vote based system. It drove the rhetoric among activists changed from obscured, ideological sayings towards persuading strategy suggestions for vote based changes that could draw in more extensive gatherings of people, particularly from Europe (Heper and Sayan, 2002).

In this situation common gatherings drove the way yet Islamists likewise looked after the suit. In spite of the fact that Justice and Development Party is ordinarily given the credit for change of Turkish Islamism. On the off chance that we widen our view; then even before the rise of Justice and Development Party in 2001 we can locate various human rights and women organizations were made by Islamists in 1990's. Those

associations followed worldwide standards of human rights and secular vote based system along with human rights. In addition other than lessening in ideological fanaticism, a progressive exchange started among differing reformists, and a few unions were developed between liberal CSO and change oriented Islamists. In this situation, Turkish initiative has assumed a key part in alleviating pressures and crossing over the social and cultural gaps that partition different sectors of C.S. However, external actors also contributed a lot in development of C.S in Turkey (Sunar, 2004).

It is clear that there is a parallel relationship between the weakening of historical military dominance through empowerment of C.S and the strengthening of democracy in Turkey. There is a socio-political climate in which income is fairly distributed, the middle class is growing and CSO are more active. In these conditions, democratization and liberalization of society is guaranteed, in Turkey (Akboga, 2012).

0.2. Civil Society in Pakistan

The increasing understanding of CSO is not limited to that of non-profit and non-state voluntary organizations created by the people in their social sphere. However the term is used in describing a wide range of networks, organizations, associations, movements. They also come together often for advancement of common interests through collective action. But C.S in Pakistan has been used over the years by self-serving vested interest groups (Sattar, 2012).

The shortcoming of democracy in Pakistan is taken from numerous points of view by various observers. As indicated by a gathering of viewers, various arrangements among institutional components have undermined, responsive and mindful government.

Though as per other gathering, the in charges of feeble democratic practices in Pakistan were corrupt political figures motivated by material gain and their selfish ambitions let down a high level of democratization in the country. Economic arguments are likewise best in class to clarify the troubles of social orders like Pakistan to acknowledge and support democracy. Numerous analysts also brought up issue regarding the similarity of Islamic teachings with more liberal origin of democracy (Weinbaum, 1996).

In Pakistan, C. S has not completely or reliably been acknowledged over almost 70 years of freedom. Societal powers in Pakistan are weak; and they are in primordial structures challenges in changing degrees of achievement against the Pakistani state. Moreover, democratic political openings have been grasped by anti-democratic forces (Gilani, 2001).

In contrast to many other political systems which have been currently involved in a transition from authoritative to democratic institutions, Pakistan does not need to create constitutional and representative institutions. In the same way, C.S, even if partially formed, always remains a potential force, and it only needs to be stirred and strengthened.

To understand the shortcomings of C.S in Pakistan, analysis of the country's political culture is needed. Specifically, it appears to be a framework of practically autonomous and stable values and beliefs inside Pakistan that have vital impact over political as well as societal spheres. Popular expectations towards the leadership must be understood and largely transformed into a kind of system that allows a sustainable democracy in Pakistan. Along with enhanced people looking for public office,

advancement in building high calibre public is also needed. Factional³ anarchy and authoritarian rule flourish in the absence of such a culture (Alagappia, 2004).

0.3. Research Questions

The major question is:

How far the development of Civil Society is weaker in Pakistan in comparison to Turkey? If yes: then why and how?

Other related questions are:

1. To what extent civil society is affecting democracy in Pakistan and Turkey?
2. What are the factors that have contributed in strengthening or weakening civil society in Pakistan and Turkey?
3. If Turkey's experience can be applied in the case of Pakistan in order to strengthen democracy?

0.4. Objectives of the Study

The objectives of present research are:

- To analyze the development of civil society in Pakistan as compared to Turkey.
- To know about the extent/degree to which civil society is affecting democracy in Pakistan and Turkey.
- To examine factors that have contributed in strengthening or weakening civil society in Pakistan and Turkey;
- To apply Turkey's example for strengthening democracy in Pakistan.

³ A faction is an organized group of people within a larger group, which opposes some of the ideas of the larger group and fights for its own ideas.

0.5. Justification of the study

The findings of the study focus the international community think tanks to develop strategy and contain lessons for other countries to follow. It is also useful for countries who are devising strategies to deal with undergoing massive restructuring in terms of democracy, policymaking and development. This study has special significance as Turkey can serve as best role model for Pakistan which has emerged as an economic power in the world. The political resolve of its leadership to make their country prosperous and adoption of appropriate economic policies in international system is a secret recipe for its success. Turkey is the only Muslim country which has shown by its practice that Islam and secularism can go a long way.

Turkey has shown to the world how it has managed its relations with the neighbours, strong economies and its commendable stature in EU which have made it an exceptional precedent for Pakistan in particular and Muslim countries in general. Most of the researches, in Pakistan have not focused the present topic and there is much need for the current research as democracy can become representative only in the presence of an effective and vibrant C.S, otherwise it remains only an electoral one.

0.6. Statement of Problem

Civil Society is growing in Pakistan but is still not strong enough to bring about any substantial change in political setup for strengthening democracy, while in Turkey it has become relatively strong and vibrant stimulating higher level of democracy.

0.7. Hypothesis

In Pakistan new political classes have emerged because of capitalistic development. The religious and political elites have compromised with military. The military administration for the most part has dominated Pakistan's political settlement. Quality of leadership and lack of middle class are also responsible for a fragmented, dismal and fragile C, S in Pakistan.

In Turkish case, C.S has become stronger because of a shift of ideological activity to issue oriented activities. Moreover, external donors have contributed towards strengthening of C.S and consolidation of democracy. Above all, the leadership has played a vital role in lessening the tension and bridging the gap which divides the various sectors of C.S.

0.8. Research Methodology

This research involved primary as well as secondary sources. A primary source of information incorporates a report or record containing original data on a subject or a work made at the time of an event or by an individual who straight forwardly faced an occasion. The primary sources to be utilized as a part of this exploration incorporate journals, interviews, diaries, letters, government archives, unique written by hand original copies, magazine clippings, and others. The auxiliary or secondary source of data incorporates any unpublished or distributed work. A work which is at least one stage lateral as compared to the first source, for the most part, outlining, assessing, dissecting, depicting or in analysis of vital resources. It is a source that provides or interprets or criticises the primary source of data. The secondary sources used in this study include;

review articles, text books, biographies, music, historical films/pictures and articles regarding actions and people from past.

The methodology used in this study is a mixture of Quantitative and Qualitative Methods. The study has mostly used historical approach based on an, objective and systematic location, analysis and evaluation of proof/evidence with an intention to establish facts for drawing conclusions regarding past events.

Data collection comprised of documents (bulletins, magazines, policy, newsletters policy statements, etc.) and responses in interviews. The study through sampling involved people from different sections of C.S comprising of lawyers, teachers both male and female, aged between 25-40 years and research may show varying attitudes and expectations of C.S depending upon their profession. It also looks for participation of past and current stakeholders, parliamentarians from ruling party and opposition members of parliament from different political parties comprising of genders (both), and age group (30-50 years), etc. The table below shows a sample size and variety;

Figure Table 1.0: Sample size of Research Study

Sr. No	Respondent	Age Group	Number
1	Politicians	30-50	10
2	Military	25-40	10
3	Teachers	25-40	10
4	Lawyers	25-40	10
5	Students	20-30	10

The sampling in this study relied on recruiting respondents based on personal contacts and knowledge. All the interviews were conducted over an 8 month period during which the researcher made number of visits to the homes, offices of interviewees in the cities and villages. Questionnaires were prepared for different sections of C.S and government stake holders to get their opinions about importance of C.S in Pakistan and Turkey.

0.9. Theoretical Framework

Few of the scholarly and semi-scholarly works have used theoretical framework to explain impact of C.S on democracy in Turkey and Pakistan. In most of the work, theories such as Dependency Theory, Developmental Theory, Realist Theory and Neo-Realism have been used. This is a pioneer study to use the Liberal Democratic Model as the framework for discussing and addressing the subject. The various models accepted in the world-widely are:

0.9.1. Various Models of Democracy

Democracy is an intricate thought that spotlights on ensuring flexibility for all nationals inside a country. To offer setting to prominent government, researchers of Political Science made reasonable models that got societal ideals considered integral to democratic governments. The very hypothesis concentrates on free engagements in the political procedure, utilizes method of reasoning for government association and clarifies that how it interfaces with societal needs.

Developmental Democracy Model is the best and finest accepted about society. According to this model the people are concerned with city issues and are mostly focused

on the matters which serve the society in a better way. Ethical quality and majority rule government are inter-connected with each other. Subjects get to be distinctly required in the legislature and they obtain a comprehension and understanding about what is expected to enhance administrations and communities. Responsible group of individuals are engaged people. The development hypothesis recognizes the requirement for chosen representatives yet believes that individuals are in charge of determination and oversight of their work (Cunningham, 2008).

0.9.2. Historical antecedents and Assumptions of Participatory Democracy

This hypothesis can be found in the writings of Rousseau, Bakunin and Marx and, mid nineteenth century communists as well just like an unmistakable propensity inside Classical Liberalism, which was further exemplified by J.S Mills. John Stuart Mills (1873) receives an ideology of self-advancement and concurs with the conflict of Morris and Marx that the privatized individual occupied with focused greedy and without any feeling of group will be profoundly devastated (Hilmer, 2010).

Development of the participatory majority rules system happened to be in practice in the 1960s and spotlights the government to bolster consideration of increased participation. It was amid this time when students' activism was customary and issues like Vietnam War and social freedoms allowed to engagement. Promoters of participatory government bear on those non-government workplaces, for instance, organizations have a considerable measure of control over the welfare of their representatives. Substance of this speculation is to give more incorporation and control

over all administration laws and non-government rules with respect to American constitution (Keller, 2015).

Different connotations of Classical Democracy are:

1. A kind of government having direct rule of the people.
2. A form of government which by placing a high check on the powers of majority secures the interests and rights of all the minorities.
3. A culture and society made on basis of individual merit and equal opportunities rather than privilege and hierarchy (Ober, 2007).

Classical Democracy model depends on the “polis”; a small city states of Athens (Greece). The style of direct majority rules system is considered as a perfect system of mainstream interest or that of popular participation. It can be depicted as a government by mass gatherings. All the important decisions and choices were generally made by the “*Assembly*” of which every one of the native individual was a member. All the officials were elected by the citizen. Decisions at the Assembly were taken according to the majority principle (Cartwright, 2014).

The significant suppositions of the model were that every resident ought to have the privilege of voting and that of holding offices. Every one of the subjects ought to satisfy obligation of taking part actively in the framework. Choices were to be made by the voters under majority vote system (Pritchard, 2008).

Protective Democracy concept of majority rules system was racked in the 17th and 18th century with an attention on shielding natives from encroachment by the administration. The idea of Protective Democracy got to be distinctly prevalent.

It is rooted in liberalism and proposes that government exists to ensure the privileges of the individual subjects. Legislative inclusion in the life of subjects ought to be centered on ensuring security of wealth and keeping up a free market. Protective Democracy recognizes that there will be an unequal distribution of wealth and accept the elites to be ruling. Increased expenses on infrastructure are discouraged unless they are meant for the welfare of general public (Cohen, 1971).

John Locke, in seventeenth century, contended that the privilege of voting depended on the common rights. As per Locke, if the administration, through tax assessment, has the ability to confiscate property then citizens were qualified for controlling the structure of the governing body (Marini, 1969). In this manner democracy was normally known as an arrangement of government by consent working through an agent Assembly.

At that point in the 18th century Utilitarian scholars, James Mills and Jeremy Bentham projected a radical loom and displayed their contention for supporting of individual intrigue. In the supposition of Bentham, individuals look for joy and maintain a strategic distance from agony, which was a method for advancing the best joy for the best number.

James Mill's general concern was with the self-advancement, and free enterprise strategies appeared to give the extension which was key prerequisites for individual flexibility (Browne, 2006).

The assumptions are;

1. It aims at providing general public a bigger range to live according to their choices.
2. This independence must be sheltered by a means of the separation of power with the help of separate executive legislature and judiciary.
3. Inequality in society (Sen, 1999).

Developmental Democracy was provided by Rousseau as an alternative view to democratic theory. The pivot of Rousseau's theory is common will: the authentic interest of whole, analogous to the advantage of every single individual; the spirit of all gave every person expression selflessly. Neither a citizen shall be poor enough to be forced to sell neither him nor rich enough to buy others. Economic equality was integral to Rousseau's arrangement of radical improvement. Self-advancement can be accomplished just when public take an interest in decision making to shape their lives. Rousseau's views are similarly informative because he also advocates the most noteworthy and concordant improvement of limits placed on individual. By participation, the individuals fortify their sensibilities and upgrade their understanding and accomplish the most noteworthy self-improvement (Sklar, 1987).

The term 'people democracy' is taken from the conventional communist administrations. It has different precursors as under: According to Pluralist view, Karl Marx believed in the standards of majority rule government in light of the use of its populist prospects. He thought about a general public in which there would be a typical responsibility for each. He trusted the toppling of capitalism would make ready thriving of a bona-fide majority rules system and bourgeois democracy would replace proletarian democratic setup. He anticipated about the class hostilities to shrink away and also the

industrialist state be disintegrated. So the society will be left with only one class (Revai, October, 1949).

Power is an extraordinary intrigue which is associated with majority rule government by the pluralist's hypothesis. Pluralists are of the view that subjects are neutral in inclusion. Government proposal mostly rests in few hands, the chosen elites. By and large an essential part is played by specific vested parties and they jockey for power in regions identified with unique issues and values (Burtenshaw, 1968).

The Pluralists hold the opinion that society is led by contending groups in which people are spoken to a great extent through their participation, and all groups have access to the strategy procedure. There is a significant difference of political power among contesting parties. There is an abnormal state of responsiveness with social occasion pioneers being answerable to individuals. There is an unbiased government machine that is satisfactorily isolated to offer parties different reasons for access (Simon, 2013).

Pluralistic Democratic Theory is not appropriate for present research study; rather liberal democratic model is more suitable for making a comparative study of civil society and democratization in Pakistan and Turkey.

The advocates of elitism view it as an opponent of populist thoughts, for example, democracy and communism (Heywood, 2007). Classical Elitists contend that popular government is a silly delusion; as indicated by them; the special minority in a general public dependably rule political power. It is this minority which is sorted out, organized and decides, in all kinds of democracy.

Corporatism or Neo Corporatism or Liberal Corporatism offers rise to a tripartite government in which government is driven through affiliations, state powers, get-togethers of bosses and unions to deal straightforwardly with each other (Crouch, 2006).

0.9.3. Theories of Social Movements

Activists argue sometimes that sociological theories of social movements are academic parasitism and that is what is needed, if theory is required. The theory for social movements fashioned by people committed to social movements: and designed to be useful to movement activists rather than to further the careers of theorists (Castles, 1978).

Theorists tend, understandably, to believe in utility of the theory. They are for the most part, true children of the Enlightenment; they believe in reason and believing in reason, they believe is pre condition of theoretical knowledge and effective action to achieve desired result. Thus theory has generally been the justification of formal political organization (Eyerman, 1984).

Western European countries have generally been more accommodative to trade union organizations and have presented fewer obstacles to voter registration or voting itself than have many of the United States. The cost of political organization to the poor in relation to the benefits derived from it has as a result, generally been lower in Western Europe and Australasia than has in the United States (Hannigan, 1985).

It would be wrong to imagine that such patterns are permanently fixed. States change and political climates change more often and more abruptly. What was true of a country in one year or decade may much less true in another. Indeed there is abundant

evidence that it is the political will of the authorities, effective much more temporally variable than a countries political, institutional structure, or political culture, that is the key factor in determining success or otherwise. A strategy effective in one place and one time may relatively in effective or counterproductive in another place or at another time (Jenkins, 1981).

On balance, it is most likely that the cost of action will be minimised and the benefit maximise if action is strategic. Strategy, of course, is necessarily based on knowledge and all knowledge is rooted in and laden with theory. It follows that theory may be useful to movements and not merely to their more personally ambitious members (Jenkins, 1985).

Activist and theorist alike tend to have grand and exclusive conception of theory. Not fully all social theory is grand theory. Indeed what Merton (1957) recommended to sociologist as an escape from paralysing impasse of the confrontation between Marxism and functionalism is no less good advice for social movement activist: focus attention instead upon theories of middle range (Dun, 1972)

Amongst recent contributions to the social movements, one that has the highest aspiration to being a general theory of social and political change is also the one that makes the strongest claim to be useful to social movements themselves (Hannigan, 1985).

Resource Mobilization Theory perhaps is most viable approach to the study of social movement, at least in English speaking world. At its most general, this theory start from the very straight forward observation that all political action is socially structured

and that the resources available to activist are patterned accordingly. It makes the assumption that movement activist are at least as calculatedly rational as are more conventional political actors and that they will accordingly, devise strategy of action which makes best use of the resources they have and which minimise the requirement for resources they do not have (Cofgrave, 1980).

If much attention has been paid to the way social situations structures the resources available to social movements, less has been invested in elucidating the way knowledge and perceptions are structured (Kitschelt, 1986).

0.9.4. Application of Liberal Democratic Model in Present Case Study

Liberal Democracy is practiced in most of the countries of the world. Its' important elements are:

1. Representative or indirect democracy in which the office bearer win political office by success in regular elections.
2. Electoral choice and competition is the base for it.
3. Moreover, a clear cut division between the C.S and the state (Ware, 1992).

In Pakistan and Turkey regular elections takes place except when there have been interruptions in political process because of military interventions. There exists multi-party system in Turkey as well as in Pakistan. Thus in both countries electoral choice is provided to the voters and there exists competition among the voters. Above all in both countries state and C.S are clearly distinct and separate.

It is not necessary that all of the liberal democracies should be democratic in nature. In order to decide that which form of liberal democracy might be more democratic, one must define the essence of liberal democracy.

As indicated by David Beetham, liberal vote based system depends on two standards: Firstly, well known control of open choices or decisions and secondly, equity between natives in connection to those choices and decisions. These two principles are made up of following core components.

Firstly, popular control includes participation, responsibility and accountability referring to the capacity of the general people to engage in political decision making, choose their leaders and ensure their leaders actually do according to the bidding of the majority of the population.

Secondly, political equality involves a combination of political representation, information, transparency and availability over all equals in the political framework. Political equity is fundamental as various segments of the general public must be spoken to in the political procedure and be occupied with the educated exchange all together for political pioneers to recognize what the general population needs and to achieve arrangements that can be gainful for however many individuals as could be allowed (Beetham, 1992).

The next question then comes about five essential determinants of democratic depth. Firstly democracy is a system of government, according to Abraham Lincoln, “of the people, by the people and for the people” (Currier, 1842). In a democratic system, ordinary people play a very important role. Democratic profundity should essentially be

looked at on record for the interest or incorporation or prohibition of ordinary individuals in political decision making. Secondly, there is a significance of representation, because of the strategic impediment of empowering a huge number of people in a cutting edge state to be personally required in each progression of the political procedure. Thirdly, equality in political procedures and installations is important for sustaining both equal representation and participation.

Fourthly, data transparency is significant to majority rule extending on the grounds that it empowers both pondering and responsibility. This stands true for Turkey and Pakistan, where both the countries have had been ruled by military dictatorships for most of the time. Governments become more democratic when level playing field is provided in a way that representing parties don't have more prominent access to political data through control over the media, any vital crusade resources or fund.

Lastly, accountability, when elected representatives carry out the will of the citizens. Liberal model of democracy has gained wide recognition in most countries of the world (Macpherson, 2011).

According to Held's terminology, the two variants of liberal democracy can be described as developmental liberal democracy, the thicker version and thinner version as protective liberal democracy. Formative liberal democratic systems can likewise be eluded as social vote based system as larger part of society is in the democratic procedure. The more defensive liberal popular government is often marked moderate or "libertarian" since it will likely minimize the size and extent of the administration.

Protective Liberal Democracy (PLD) and Developmental Liberal Democracy (DLD) are based on different political goals. The PLD finds inspiration in the republicanism of ancient Rome. Fearful of pardon and totalitarianism, its concentration is more on compelling political pioneers instead of on enabling natives or utilizing state power to advance aggregate gains. This theory was developed in the 18th century. The supporters of this theory thought of freedom and negative freedom, or the absence of state led violence and predation. Especially advocates of PLD needed neither the government nor the masses to take away abundance of the elites. Consequently, the state power is partitioned among the executive, legislature and judiciary. In the PLD, there are different legitimate securities for the right to speak freely, affiliation, voting and conviction and normal decisions, rivalry amongst groups, and opportunity frame subjective treatment.

The DLD form of liberal democracy developed in the nineteenth and twentieth century as a reaction to certain apparent imbalances displayed in the PLD, thinking about flexibility as something for all to appreciate, not only inheritors of wealth. Its advocates needed the state to advance both negative opportunity and positive freedom. Firstly, the DLD meant to augment political participation, opportunity of data, and association of the masses in administration of elections and basic leadership. Secondly, it intended to think and create sufficient limit inside the state so it could utilize its assets for the welfare of its subjects. The PLD on the other hand makes no special efforts to neither maximize participation of the public in the government, promote an especially broad diversity of thought and information: or increase citizen involvement in politics. Thirdly, the PLD deliberately limits and divides state authority to be more like a night watchdogs working

to preserve public wellbeing and security, in a belief that is not the suitable role of the state to maximize citizen's wellbeing.

Critics of PLD hold the opinion that PLD is a passive citizen and passive state model; whereas DLD represents a dynamic citizenry and dynamic state one. In the PLD show, the residents give less of their time and assets to the state. Though in the DLD, natives give a greater amount of their time and assets to governmental issues and to the state, while additionally as far as anyone knows receiving more open products and ventures consequently. As per David Held, Developmental Democracy affirms that political cooperation is a describable end in itself and is an (if not the) focal system of the improvement of a dynamic, educated and included citizenry (Joshi, 2013).

In the view of researcher Liberal Democratic Model is most suitable in case of present study. It is applicable in both Turkey and Pakistan indirect or representative democracy prevails in periodical elections. In both countries, electoral choice is open and there is open competition. A clear differentiation is found between C.S and state in both countries.

0.9.5. Conceptual Framework

The present research study has examined two variables civil society and democracy and their relationship and impact in Pakistan and Turkey. Analyzing why Pakistan has not been able to achieve success comparable to Turkey and factors like role of military, leadership, middle class and feudalism that thwart C.S initiatives and comparatively higher level of democratization achieved by Turkey have been taken into account.

0.10. Literature Review

It explains/covers scholarly and semi- scholarly works addressing C.S and democracy in Pakistan and Turkey and points out the gaps which are to be filled by this research study. The names of some of the researchers who have worked on above topic include C. S and Democracy in South East Asia and Turkey by Ganesan and Durkop, The Societal Roles of CSO: Evidence from Turkey by Doyle and Turkey's Political Trends in 2016 by Tol.

The present research study has taken into account following literary works and has tried to critically analyse those research studies and answer previously mentioned research questions of the researcher. Taimur-ul-Hassan and Sabir (2011) in *Civil Society-Democracy nexus in Pakistan* while expressing their views on civil society and democracy say that C.S has got the potential to speed up development and foster democracy and speed up development, but in Pakistan its potential needs to be utilized with a purpose of meeting the objective of democracy and sustainable development (Sabir, 2011).

It is a useful contribution to literary work done with reference to Pakistan. However, the current study also throw light on the ways Turkey has been able to benefit from its relatively vibrant and strong C.S which the above mentioned literary work lacks.

Whereas, Pervez Hassan (2008) in *The Role of Civil Society in Protecting Rule of Law in Pakistan* writes that the actions of Pervez Musharaff, support of media, leadership of the Legal Community, support of International Community, heritage of the Rule of Law, National and International Supremacy of Human Rights were the different

facilitating factors in backing catalytic part of civil society in Pakistan for about a decade (Hassan, 2008).

Holding of free and fair elections and freedom of media are important support to a vibrant C.S. Vital to connection of C.S and media is also the essential for them to be given entrance to information. A parallel theme that comes up as a backdrop of the success of C.S is empowering women in particular. The very recent developments in of Pakistan proved that the participation of women was dynamic in solidification the voice of C.S. Finally to develop, foster and liberate genius of its judiciary is also necessary. It is a useful contribution by the author but he has laid emphasis only on rule of law which is only one aspect of democratization. The present study intends to address other aspects as well. Moreover, the present study also took into account role played by C.S in democratization in Turkey.

Zaidi (2011) in his book, *Military, Civil Society and Democratization in Pakistan* expresses the views that even after the democratic transition in Pakistan, democracy, real or formal, is still a long way from being established. The writer has pointed out how C.S was suppressed by the military regimes in Pakistan. Zia had estranging Bhutto's supporters could draw bolster from other political segments and fabricated his own standard political constituency. Musharaff as well, could work with majority political groups and parties who felt that supporting military would pave the way for them to get power. The military game, once in control, is to rapidly recognize groups and such clusters that are willing to work with it. Most of the time, many political forces are co-opted and become collaborators. This collaboration allows them a semblance of autonomy and authority in a political structure which is largely under the military's

domination. These forms of praetorian cooptation, which turned to be praetorian democracy which later on functioned very well for both Musharraf and Zia.

Zia's Islamization to fulfill Pakistan's supposed Islamic destiny was inverse of Musharraf's central goal of control vision, again attempting to satisfy Pakistan's assumed direct and enlightened fate. In both the cases, as anyone might expect, there were some group actors and other factions, who were ready to lead Pakistan to a destination described by both the military rulers. It has never been difficult for regime to find allies in Pakistan (Zaidi, A. 2011).

It is no doubt a great literary work and the author has discussed military interventions in Pakistan in detail and its impact on C.S. However, this thesis will try to emphasize role of C.S in more detail and will take into account Turkish case as well keeping in view the writer's point of view.

Then coming to Cohen (2011) in his book *The Future of Pakistan* expressed his views about human rights associations, CSO and legal counsellors' movement, which have squeezed for more prominent adherence to democratic or equitable practices and have constrained base of support all over Pakistan. By their nature, CSO attend to deeply localized issues and their constituents. According to Cohen, economic growth in Pakistan has been exceptionally restricted yet in Pakistan new working class has developed, invigorated and given a voice by growing of electronic media, which have made the normal Pakistani significantly more mindful of the world than past.

In spite of the fact that development of working class can be considered a vital condition yet it is not a sole prerequisite for Pakistan's democratization. The scholar has

brought up difficulties for C.S in Pakistan. In Pakistan, the society and economy remains very primitive, financial base for a developing middle class does not exist, and socio-economic versatility is kept down by a culture of feudalism. Most importantly, desires for another and growing middle class must be tempered by financial unavoidable issues faced by everyone; expansion in Pakistan over most recent couple of years undermines a substantial number of residents, making their lives monetarily unreliable due to terror attacks, floods of 2010 and other natural calamities.

Finally, according to Cohen, displacement and threatening of middle class have additionally shaped reason for progressive development all through history. These sorts of upheaval have never been tranquil or democratic. Any expectation of change drove by middle class is only a hope, not a guaranteed procedure. Indeed, even the historical backdrop of Pakistan demonstrates that underprivileged and furious middle class can without much of a stretch move into a progressive course dismissing huge numbers of Pakistan's strategies, and grasping some type of fanaticism. This whole situation puts Pakistan on the way of dictatorship or even crumbling (Cohen, P. S. 2011).

However, the researcher does not agree with Cohen's argument; a strong and vibrant middle class is the back bone of democracy and it diminishes extremism instead of breeding it and is a source of unity instead of disintegration.

Then, Vali Nasr in *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism: Why the New Muslim Middle Class is the Key to Defeating Extremism* relies on the examples extending from Turkey to Iran. According to him in the Muslim world there is a business upheaval or

commercial revolution fuelled by a number of elements and versatile working class reformers and business people.

Nasr has additionally demarcated another edge to the fate of religious radicalism in the Middle East. He is of the view that the emerging working class is keener on financial and economic accomplishment as compared to avid religiosity. His synthesis is based on sound arguments and must be given attention (Nasr, V. 2009). According to the researcher Nasr has done remarkable work but the present study while taking into account his work has paid special attention to Pakistan and Turkey.

Then moving on to *Democracy Rising: Assessing the Global Challenges* by Munoz (2007) according to the researcher it is a great collection of essays which brings to light the fact that democracy is more widely spread today than at any time in human history. It also illustrates that why each nation must promote its own democracy. At the same time we can and we must work together as an international community to support democracy around the world (Munoz, 2007).

Global Security Watch: Pakistan is a very informative literary work by Hasnat (2012). In this book, he showed that over spilling of events in Afghanistan had promoted uprisings in Pakistan which led to its destabilization. Moreover he added that Pakistan has also suffered a history of quarrels and differences with India and as a country it is situated in a region which is extremely unstable (Hasnat, 2012).

According to the researcher this piece of literary work examines issues of most extreme significance for Pakistan's stability, dependability and strategic balance and

clarifies the need from the worldwide point of view to address specific domestic and international security challenges of Pakistan.

Weinberg, (2013), *In Democracy and Terrorism: Friend or Foe* has examined the relationship between political terrorism and democratic government. Since the 9/11 attacks, the USA and many of its allies have initiated "war on terror". Motivation for this struggle lies in the belief that by promoting democracy they will curtail terrorism. When blessings of liberty are enjoyed by the people, they normally find serene outlets for the statement of their political perspectives. On the other hand, fear based oppression is seen to a great extent as an outcome of restraint. People are not offered flexibility to pick their rulers openly and opposing voices are stifled by the state powers (Weinberg, 2013).

In Pakistan: Democracy, Terrorism and Building of the Nation Malik (2010) explain that consequences of the US led "War on Terror" carry on to destabilize the countries of the Indian subcontinent. Therefore, Pakistan and its fate are seldom out of the headlines though it's an open secret that how Pakistan reached this critical state (Malik, 2010).

According to the researcher this comprehensive book describes complex issues being faced by Pakistan, while remaining optimistic about future of a pluralistic nation caught between civil and military imperatives. Professor Malik makes analyses of the country's geo-political position, legacy of partition, main actors who have shaped the nation and role of C.S as a vehicle of change. He has also discussed the *jihadis* extremism and role played by political Islam, and West by using Pakistan as a shock absorber state.

In his book *Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of Middle Class and the World wide Decline of Representative Government* Kurlantzick (2013) gives a very well informed global exploration of political development over the past decade, with special emphasis on the state of democracy (Kurlantzick, 2013). The author has synthesized all this in a unique and persuasive way.

Khaled Ahmed (2002) in his book *Pakistan: The State in Crisis* has discussed repeated democratic collapses in Pakistan because of military takeovers and role of ISI. He has also discussed Pakistan as a security state, possibility of Pakistan living next to India without fighting unsuccessful wars, and what would Pakistan be like in next 25 years (Ahmed, 2002). The present study has also discussed Turkish case in detail.

In Pakistan: From Rhetoric of Democracy to the Rise of Militancy Kalia has described how Bin Laden was killed by the US Navy Seals near Pakistan's Capital city where there are many military facilities. Evolution of Pakistan from its independence from the British in 1947 until today has also been discussed. Pakistan has conflicting history with serious challenges from religious extremism, ethnic differences, and wide differences in wealth. Pakistan is a nation in search for identity and a rightful form of governance (Kalia, 2011).

Ayesha Jalal (2014), in her book *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics* give a careful analysis of the nation's governmental issues from its creation till present. The book gives a valuable comprehension of Pakistan's present military, religious, territorial and international politics (Jalal, 2014). The research has also given special attention to the Turkish case.

Democracy against Itself: Sustaining an Unsustainable Idea by Chou (2014) according to the researcher is a very important literary work on politics and democracy. What makes it both interesting and brilliant reading is not Chou's rejection of democracy but his glowing analysis of how democracy is misrepresented- the corruption and cheating made in its name against its real promise (Chou, 2014). The present research study has specially thrown light on the prevailing cases of democracy in Pakistan and Turkey.

Gonzales (2011) in *Building Civil Society after Arab Spring: Lessons from Turkey* expresses his views that Turkey likewise had divided and frail civil society. Two procedures, however, added to a more dynamic civil society: a move from ideologically focused action towards issue focused action and help from external actors. The last expanded the quantity of associations and enlarged their institutional limit and the previous changed their character (Gonzales, 2011). The present study also analyzed the above mentioned processes keeping in view Pakistan's case.

Usul (2010) in *Democracy in Turkey: The Impact of EU Conditionality* has discussed the function of a robust C.S in the process of democratic consolidation, often underscored by the literature of consolidation. Regarding the Turkish case there is strong state tradition in Turkey that has historically hindered the development of vigorous and democratic C.S (Usul, 2010).

The present research study also took into account Pakistan's case as well.

Aknur (2012) in his book *Democratic Consolidation in Turkey* examines the question that why consolidation of Turkish Democracy has taken so long and has

analyzed various factors in this regard including state, C.S, civil-military relations, political parties, European Union, socio-economic development, separated Kurdish Nationalism and rise of political Islam (Aknur, 2012).

Yavuz (2009) in his book *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* has called contemporary transformation in Turkey a conventional revolution for two reasons: the current revolution is led and shaped by C.S and social changes have preceded political change (Yavuz, 2009). The writer has beautifully explained all the stages of transformation in Turkish society.

The present research study according to the researcher while benefitting from the above mentioned literary works: was the first one to make a comparative analysis of dual relation between C.S and democracy in Turkey and Pakistan and make a comparative analysis between the two states.

It has been observed by the researcher that Pakistan has not been able to strengthen its democracy because Pakistan since it was created has faced many internal and external challenges because of which Pakistan was unable to establish a true democratic system.

The internal challenges include social, political and religious have resulted in weakening of democracy in Pakistan as compared to Turkey. There has been dearth of honest and dedicated leadership, there has been imbalance between different organs of the state, feeble centre and province relation, corruption, strong and organised bureaucracy have threatened democracy in comparison to relatively strong democracy in Turkey.

In addition, according to the researcher there has been a serious constitutional crisis in Pakistan. Terrorism, energy crises, ethnicity/sectarianism, domestic violence, economic instability, natural disaster, religious intolerance has challenged democratic governments in Pakistan.

According to the researcher external factors which include foreign intervention in our national affairs have stained image at international level. There has been weak diplomacy which has destabilised democratic setup showing incapability of government to solve the problems faced by the people has caused frustration among the masses posing serious threat to the democratic process.

0.11. Study Plan of the Present Study

Introduction

It includes historical background of concept of C.S and democracy, research questions, statement of problem, and purpose of study, hypothesis, methodology and significance of study. This chapter also includes the review of literature related to research study.

Chapter No.1

Comparative study of the development of Civil Society in Turkey and Pakistan

This chapter includes comparative development of C.S in Turkey and Pakistan.

Chapter No.2

Impact of C.S in strengthening Democracy in Pakistan

In this chapter role of civil society in Pakistan discussing how civil society can contribute to democratization of state by limiting and controlling power of the state by exposing corruption of public officials and by supporting good governance. It promotes political participation and developing democratic values. It can also help to promote democratic civic education in school. It may also strengthen democracy by providing new forms of integrity and solidarity. It resolves conflict and monitors elections.

Chapter No.3

Impact of C.S in Strengthening of Democratization in Turkey

Case Study of Gezi Park Protests in Turkey has been discussed.

Chapter No: 4

Factors influencing C.S in Pakistan

The undemocratic steps of General Pervez Musharaff in 2007, declaration of highly sensitive situation and concealment of judiciary and media prompted to protests in favour of democracy. Therefore nation's prosecutors and common society groups developed as imperative actors in power progression of Pakistan which previously has been dominated by the military.

Chapter No: 5

Factors influencing C.S in Turkey

The present study has analysed factors influencing C.S in case of Turkey in this chapter.

Conclusion

C.S in Pakistan has strengthened but was not able to produce desired results because of concerted politics. The political elites have compromised, collaborated or combined with military being the strongest and most organized institution in Pakistan. Various arrangements have been made to include or accommodate civilian actors, but for the most part, military usually with increased support of US administration, dominates political settlement of Pakistan. According to the researcher role of leadership and lack of middle class are also responsible for a comparatively feeble and fragmented civil society. In Turkish case the C.S was also fragmented and weak but there has been a move from ideologically focused action towards issue based action and help from external actors.

CHAPTER NO: 1.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF C.S. IN PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

In this chapter the researcher looked at the definitions, history of the concept of C.S. and discussed its main elements. Then, the researcher made comparative analysis between development of C.S in Pakistan and Turkey comprehensively.

C.S is formed by groups and affiliations working in light of a true sympathy toward the inhabitants however working outside of the authoritative and income driven benefit rationale segments. Associations and establishments that make up C.S fuse labourer's unions, non-profit organizations, religious icons, and other organization workplaces that give a fundamental organization to society in any case for the most part request next to no favours.

C.S is now and then referred to a common division, a word which is used to distinguish it from various sectors of society which shows it as working class. For example, the United States have three divisions: the general public, which is the lawmaking body and its branches; the private part, which includes associations and organizations; and the civil segment, which includes the affiliations and groups which work for the welfare of general public without any monetary considerations (White, 2016).

The expression "C.S" evokes numerous implications in the modern cutting edge time, a parleying space between an individual and the state, the universes of non-benefit affiliations and thought, the arrangement of worldwide NGOs, social relations of shared

respect, and, various others. Fundamental to these suggestions are two central considerations: pluralism and socially favourable position. Together these contemplations reflect the high interests and identities display in contemporary society and the task of endeavouring to improve conditions on the planet.

1.1. Key elements of Civil Society

The modern development of the C.S thought is extremely complex. The story rises out of the steady mixture of seven strips of verifiable improvement in the sphere of thoughts along with development of foundations that surfaced in the present day European as well as its early evolution. Roughly from the early sixteenth century, these strings got to be distinctly woven into the texture of another social frame that had traversed scholarly and national borders (Til, 2004).

Every single string among the seven in this story is befuddling in its own specific right and has its own specific speculative support. Four reflect institutional structures that have progressed through the course of Western history to make the essential arrangement of normal society of advanced. Two of these various levelled structures i.e. lawful and generous organizations have existed through the past two centuries, while the other two i.e. private affiliations and a course of action of free expression, created in later periods. The other three strands reflect social living standards e.g. obligations to the banquet of all, to individual rights, and to strength, that showed up game plan through a long developmental process (Cohen, 1994).

1.1.1. Non-profit and voluntary institutions

A generally imparted idea distinguishes C.S as the group of non-benefit (in the United States) or nongovernmental (around the world) associations. As recommended by Lester Salamon and Brian O'Connell, this tradition reflects a long history of social theory in institutional terms. Private deliberate institutions have, since past, expected a central part in fulfilling social purposes. The contemporary "non-benefit area" implies the space of society possessed by such wilful relationship, instead of both open part governmental substances and revenue driven organizations. Notwithstanding the clarity and absoluteness of this very definition of C.S, in any case, its analytical and descriptive power is restricted. Comparing C.S with the non-profit part rejects imperative institutional and regulating measurements that are of basic significance to comprehend its focal part in social and political life (Howard, Dec, 2005).

Political Scientists have conceptualized the third sector as an intermediary zone between market and state, and which, and have analysed the way in which third sector organizations act as mediators between the organized economic interests of market forms, labour and the political interests of state agencies and their constituencies on the other. Whereas, most non-political science research on the third sector is in tradition of either macro-economic sectors, micro-political functions (Anheir, 1990.).

1.1.2. Individual rights

Another important string of diverse understanding among advanced scholars concentrates on the rising of the individual and of individual rights as an unmistakable nature of C.S. For example, John Keane, Ernest Gellner, and Adam Seligman stay C.S

particularly in the advancement of a hover of private action and individual rights that is ensured against the state. Keane, uniquely, stresses the steady division from the state in an exemplary research of the improvement of C.S deduction since the seventeenth century.

1.1.3. The common good

A parallel and most old deluge of belief is the reasonable convention of the "common good." The present day scholars who stretch the importance of this part are Helmut Anheier, Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, and Amatai Etzioni, every one of which is more focused on the focal significance of urban standards went for accomplishing common closures versus the Lockean philosophy that emphasizes the protection of individual rights.

The idea of public good appropriate to a civil democratic society should be one that acknowledges even the rights of individual persons who live according to values different from those of society in general, a society that needs to accept diversity in its various communities. The idea of the common good should be one general and foundational enough to embrace both the rights of individual citizens and differences in morality and politics between communities (Seckinelgin, 2002).

1.1.4. The rule of law

Inevitably associated with the protection of individual liberties and rights and as well as the quest for the benefit of everyone is the "rule of law." Ralf Dahrendorf (1997), specifically, has underlined the rule of law as a characterizing normal for C.S in its ability to build up reasonable and unsurprising standards for the practice of public power.

In spite of the fact that laws and rules are made and implemented by legislative bodies, they require a pre-political authenticity that inheres in C.S and outperforms the force of a given administration. As Dahrendorf and others suggest years, the rule of law is key to ensure diverse segments of C.S, especially the security of individual rights, from the optional routine of drive (Dahrendorf, 1997).

1.1.5. Philanthropy

Robert Payton and Kathleen McCarthy battle, from exceptionally different hypothetical perspectives, the essential significance of altruistic values and practices to the constitution of C.S. nearly related with the conventional individuals' activity in the interest of the benefit of all, philanthropy turns into a basic medium to understand this aim. Payton is of the view that philanthropy is the focal estimation of C.S and McCarthy depicts how an extensive variety of groups energized by a humanitarian motivation moulded the development of American C.S in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Kumar, 93).

One might look at philanthropy as an institution dedicated to pursuit of public benefit and guided in part by the norm of common good, to help restore the balance in C.S. in favour of a public mission. But, modern rebirth of both non-profit organizations and philanthropy took place when there was an assertion of private against the public; they have developed a vague relationship of the market to the powerful ideological and economic forces (Sievers, 2010).

1.1.6. Free expression

Free open correspondence has admired into the surge of the change of C.S since the early current circumstances. This thought, most prominently stranded in Jürgen

Habermas' considered "public sphere," is a precondition for the free improvement of famous notion that engages C.S to work sufficiently, i.e., to make a "retribution open." Charles Taylor similarly portrays that an uncommon character of early modern C.S is the ascent of an arrangement of free expression. Individual freedom is a necessity of every human being. It gives every individual to make choices on their own and helps them to widen their thinking and imagination. It depends on the proportion that to what extend an individual uses his/her freedom (Taylor, 2015).

1.1.7. Tolerance

Not as most often argued, however generally comprehended as fundamental to the improvement of the C.S thought, is the standard of resistance and tolerance. A result (but unintended) of the religious wars of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, this coordinating segment is gathered in the improvement of considered respectfulness. Dominique Colas passes on resilience at the focal point of making C.S (contradicted with "fanaticism"), delineating its ascent in seventeenth century philosophical hypotheses as "*the essential, defining virtue of C.S.*" The considered resistance is also an essential part of depiction and depict of C.S in Ernest Gellner's "*modular man*," Edward Shils' concept of awareness, and John Hall's clarification of social change in accordance with "*multi-polar pluralism*"(Edwards, M. 2011).

1.1.8. Synthesizing the seven strands

The seven essential components which supplement and strengthen each other in the operation of C.S, for example, private affiliations depend on individual rights (especially the benefit to relate and to energetically advocate perspectives), an honest to

goodness security of those rights, commitment to regular purposes, generosity, philanthropy and resistance of coinciding relationship to complete their motivations. Along with this the arrangement of free expression entails lawfully authorized human rights and a code or ethic of enduring different perspectives. Humanitarian foundations depend on a pledge to seek after the common good, the benefit to express that devotion through the dedication of money or conceivably time, a honest to goodness protection that a humanitarian reason will be finished, resistance for contrasting and despite negating generous purposes, and the limit to make a private relationship to do charitable mission (Ehrenberg, 1999).

What gets to be particularly clear in the way the seven segments partner is the midway fundamental relationship among the three constitutive guidelines. Given C.S's basic responsibility and obligation to individual rights and to the banquet of every one of the a dualism that can make essential strain amongst individual and collective motivations which permits the two esteem frameworks to find similarity in a clear social arrangement. The third standard, tolerance has transformed into the affiliation that permits contending individual vision of the general population to coincide and to accommodate the private and the general population in C.S (Sievers, 2009).

1.2. Civil Society and Democracy in Pakistan

Pakistan's C.S has been defined by CIVICUS, an alliance of groups as,

Collection of inherent voices, conflicting world and opposing interests characterized by unresolved struggle between practices and values of pre-capitalistic society and new modes of social life, between authoritative legacies and democratic aspiration (Sattar, B. 2001, p. 4).

As indicated by its report there are ten to twelve thousand dynamic and enrolled NGO's in Pakistan; Up to 60000 NGO's and 80000 trade unions are unregistered groups (Sattar, B. 2001).

Due to long military rules in Pakistan, political space given to NGO's is limited and they have constrained impact on arrangement making and its implementation. However, they are ascending as an imperative parties or groups. However when there is crackdown by government or there is military upset, they are the first to be tested by these activists.

1.2.1. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

It is one of the fundamental affiliations engaging for human rights and law based progression in the state. They have prominently denounced the acts of major political groups and parties. Hina Jilani was made the UN Secretary General's first uncommon agent on human rights in 2000. Asma Jahangir, having close liking with UN Human Rights Commission and I. A. Rehman are notable names in Pakistan who have grabbed obviousness in global arena.

1.2.2. Political Organizations

Election commission of Pakistan has enlisted more than 90 political factions and parties, prominent being Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) PML(N), Pakistan Tahreek e Insaf (PTI), Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and numerous others like Jamat-e-Islami (JI), Jamist-e-Ulma-e-Islam Fazal-u-Rahman (JUIF) and Nationalist parties in Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtoon Khawah (KPK).

1.2.3. Media Organizations

Pakistan has a foundation set apart by private, dynamic and also free print media such as English daily papers, (Post, Daily Times, Dawn, Frontier Post, and so on). Exactly when Musharaff accepted control of office, he changed the scene for private convey media in the state. An extent of T.V, sites and radio outlets were opened as 15 more private players got licenses to work; like Geo-TV, Aaj - TV and so on. They began contending with state run news channels.

Three fundamental groups overwhelm Pakistan: the Jang Group, the Herald Group, and the Nawae-Waqt Group. Jang Publications is the greatest media assembling and holds a virtual limiting framework of Urdu material in Sindh Rawalpindi-Islamabad government space, and critical partakes in Lahore and Quetta. Jang in like manner conveys the greatest hovering after a long time magazine in Urdu, Akhbare-Jehan, and two evening papers, the Daily News and Awam. The News, the most importantly Pakistani day by day paper to use PCs in all method for creation, is again a paper of the Jang Group.

Pakistan Herald Publications Ltd. disseminates Dawn, which has had an overwhelming hold over Karachi readership. The Herald Group moreover disperses the Star (an English night paper) and The Herald successful English month to month). The gathering moreover began another month to month that spotlights on the Internet, entitled as "spider". Distributions of the Herald Group concentrate on the advantaged and the better-showed section of Pakistani society and hence take after a liberal production approach.

1.2.4. Stock Market and Economy

Pakistan confronts long term maintainability, particularly regarding item costs, high worldwide oil and internal, political, instabilities (Bajoria, 2008). The C.S groups, political parties, rulers and pioneers in Pakistan support vote based system at the basic conceptual and regularizing level. The politically dynamic circles request participatory basic leadership, decision making and delegate administration in the monetary and political fields. They highlight the rule of law, reasonable and free discretionary process, socio-financial equity and responsibility of those practicing state control as the essentials for a political framework (Eberley, 2000).

There is a perception that if the stock market is booming the economy must also be doing well and vice versa or stock market is a good barometer of state of economy. The argument proceeds that the drop of stock prices recently has more to do with sentiments soured by political uncertainty: and not because economic fundamentals have suffered.

1.3. Historical Overview

Pakistan received the Government of India Act, 1935 as Interim Constitution with some changes to meet the prerequisites of a newly free state in 1947. Parliamentary System of Government was given, in spite of the fact that Governor General appreciated exceptional forces and the government figured out how to practice superseding controls over territories. Pakistan's initial political leadership paid no attention towards democratic political framework on the grounds that their significant concentration was to guarantee the survival of the state in perspective of the outside and as well as challenges.

The dread of the crumple of the state prepared for legitimate administration and political management (Khan, 2012).

The degeneration of political parties, acute administrative problems and powerlessness of the political pioneers to get far reaching political support, empowered the Governor General to concentrate all the powers. Controlling the separated political powers, he continued choosing about the making or unmaking of government. President Iskander Mirza (1955-1958) had a consolidated military and regular bureaucratic foundation where as Governor General Ghulam Mohammad (1951-1955) had a bureaucratic background. Thus the military and the top bureaucracy could be relied by them for support at the cost of civil society. This resulted in the ascent of the bureaucratic-military high class in Pakistani governmental issues, which furthermore undermined prospects of popular government (Junejo, 2010).

By 1954-55, the military got to be as the key arrangement and chief alongside organization. They gave real commitment to system making on security, remote and household arrangements .By October 1958, the Army Chief General Ayub getting support from Iskander Mirza ousted the democratic government. The latter was thumped out of government control within 20 days after military assumed control. Since then the military is interfering in the affairs of the government directly in the form of governing and indirectly by directing the policies (Joseph, 2015).

Ayub Khan the first Military General ruled the country under Martial Law from October, 1958 to June 1962 and he displayed a presidential constitution. Notwithstanding conclusion of the prompt military government in 1962 Constitution tried to give holy and

a true blue cover to Ayub's fascism and his power concentrated brought together rule which upset the development of self-overseeing normal subject association and strategies. Regardless of the reality: that the state media meant it as the beginning of another time of participatory administration framework. His organization's money related approaches and political organization increased economic inequalities among different areas of the country and individuals. It also resulted in distancing people of the country, which also included East Pakistan (Sheikh, 2009).

Yahya Khan, another general, in 1969 replaced Ayub Khan, who annulled Ayub's 1962 Constitution and Martial Law was forced in the nation. The military government was unable to meet the requests from East Pakistan in regards to political representation, social share and economic equality. The government on one side resorted to extreme levels of military operations in East Pakistan which took place in March, 25, 1971 onwards and on the other side engaged in war with India in November-December, 1971. Military failure and defeat of Pakistan because of India prompted to the foundation of Bangladesh in the wake of separating of Pakistan. This extraordinary political and military setback constrained Yahya Khan to stop and handover control on December, 20, 1971 to Z .A. Bhutto, a regular citizen pioneer, whose political party PPP had won larger number of seats of the National Assembly in the West Pakistan (Taj, 2009).

Z.A. Bhutto advanced non-military superiority and supremacy over military in the period of his regime from December, 20, 1971-July, 5, and 1977 in contradiction of the situation of greater damage to the respect of armed forces in the wake of military debacle of 1971. Initially he changed the military order structure and forced few senior Officers to resign from their posts. However, his capacity to practice matchless quality

In the post Zia period (1988-89), the top commanders used to monitor the functioning of elected civilian government closely and give their opinions on security and political matters known to them. The generals were prepared to stay on the sideline keeping in view their corporate and professional interests.

Hence, new regimes of Benazir Bhutto (Dec. 88 - Aug. 90, Oct. 93 - Nov. 96) and Nawaz Sharif (Nov. 90-July. 93, Feb. 97 - Oct. 99) were sensitive and careful in bridging the gap between the high ranks of the military and popular government. The autonomous political activities by the democratic leaders depended upon their capability to keep up cheerful association with the top military commandants. However, the power vacuum was loaded with C.S and military proved temporary (Gare, 2006).

Such types of C.S neither can shield the general environment from degradation: or assets from being over misused nor can provide good governance. With a powerless and partitioned C.S, will have grave troubles in ensuring and advancing common good (Rehman, 2015).

General Musharaff assumed control after his top generals ousted the chosen government of Nawaz Sharif on Oct 12, 1999. General Musharaff then carefully customized the move to regular citizen and protected government in 2002. The fundamental objective was his staying on with an effective continuation of the legislative measures made by his military administration. This very step was intended to impart power with only few of the chosen political elites (Shah, 2014).

Pakistan in this way came back to constitutional administration with elected Parliament and provincial assemblies at provincial and federal levels. However, the

President dominated the political arrangements. President Musharaff not just practiced improved powers under Legal Framework Order (LFO) but also proceeded as Army Chief, a mix not common in elected governments which gave him an abrogating clout in the nation (Rizvi, H. A.2007)

The higher officer corpse's professional socialization, launched by the National Defence University (NDU), stressed on activist, governmental role for military during the era as the only option for reconstructing the political body to establish a true democracy defined by the so called devolution of power.

In 2007-8, military extricated itself from power in the face of anti-regime protests that had deepened officers' anxieties about and badly eroding the institutions public standing and prestige. Since 2008 up till now, political democracy has been tolerated because direct military rule has been opposing to the military's image and interests.

However, the military's interventionist inclinations should not be taken as a counsel of despair. In fact, the arguments in favour of the military's expansive protective role are quite similar to those of authoritative militaries in Latin America and East Asia. But experience of these regions also indicates that real changes in such attitudes are possible under favourable circumstances, though perhaps not likely in the near term in Pakistan. Optimistically taken Pakistan may now be departing from its long and tortuous authoritative path (Afridi, 2014).

With no surprise the military's departure to the barracks has once again masked deeper authoritative applications including the right to veto the policies and initiatives of

democratically elected government. In almost pendulum like fashion, it appears the military has gone from "govern ship" back to "guardianship."

For instance, military behaviour and public statements revealed that it had accepted political subordination only conditionally, and it continued to consider itself the ultimate definer and defender of national security. The military intervened to preserve its institutional autonomy, maintain control over national security, and resolve perceived political crises.

Typically of its own making, such as the March, 2009 deadlock over restoration of the Chaudhry-led court that Musharaff had sacked by employing the threat of force. During civil-military conflicts, the military mostly prevailed over the PPP leadership. Examples of the deadlock over the judges who were sacked in 2009 Or the memo-gate episode in 2011-12 can be quoted in this respect. The latter however accepted military preferred outcomes to avoid losing power (Tseten, 2013).

In May 2013, Pakistan reached the important benchmark of the first interchange of force from one impartially chosen government that completed its term to another. Constitutional reforms, including the 18th Amendment, root out the authoritative legacy of presidential powers to dissolve consensus on the rules of the game. It provided a firm basis for the completion of the transition, as did the mostly democratically loyal behaviour of the two noteworthy political parties, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), in spite of political rivalry.

The elections were relatively free and fair although more for right of centrist parties like Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf(PTI) and PML (N) than for PPP and Awami

National Party (ANP), whose election campaign were marred by targeted violence because of their opposition to the Taliban. Most significant fact was that the ruling party accepted its defeat and opposition PML (N) was sworn into office, thus lifting Pakistan's curse of zero democratic alternation in power (Shah, 2014).

1.4. Dismal Civil Society in Pakistan

It can be concluded from above mentioned facts that the Civil Society in Pakistan is fragile, disconnected and taking into account its own particular advantages and political and ethnic perspectives. It fears repercussions and backfire, not just from the picked government, additionally from various groups. It has little capacity to get together for aggregate acts. Its distinctive gatherings have been publicizing changed belief frameworks and belief systems to such an extent that the distinctions among them have ended up being too wide and they go up against a non-attendance of authenticity, legitimacy and trust. A solitary or set of issues are missing which can be adequately utilized as force to extension of services, furthermore move them to illustrate "national behaviour". Above all, their capacity and will to decrease brutality, violence and look for discourse is seriously constrained (Mirhamadi, 2015).

Generally, Pakistan had a couple of movements historically, where politicians were able to motivate and mobilize C.S. During the different Martial Law rules, small scale movements were started which were led fundamentally by radical components (leftist), dynamic intelligent people, writers and scholars. These were rapidly and fiercely controlled, by out casting (exiles), restraining in prisons and even killings by state powers (Khan, A. 2004).

The movement based on language in East Pakistan and the compelling controls by the state were instrumental in growing the general doubt and uncertainty for West Pakistanis. This came about in civil war and the 1971 war with India took after by the division of East Pakistan. This was a sort of resistance, *"based on explicitly political ideologies, expressed in underground movements and violent resistance"*, leaving to open insubordinate, rebellious and revolutionary attitude (Mussarat, 2010).

There was no criticism from any non-military personnel groups in West Pakistan, perhaps because the honest to goodness condition was kept mystery, or possibly there was little understanding of the reasons which caused revolt. Post 1971, the nation was in bedlam and chaos, resulting in a worth mentioning tussle amongst leftists and religious groups. It concluded in the governance of elite landlords and military, with solid religious feelings. Extraordinary perspectives picked up unmistakable quality, narrow mindedness and common freedoms were extremely curtailed. The male dominated and "anti-women" culture was further forced to suppress already suppressed class of the society (Malik, 1999).

In the 1980s, a women's movement failed to grapple its roots. Female activists drove strikes and came out in the form of rallies against what they thought as segregation yet neglected to get prominent consideration. Absence of consideration with respect to social issues was further bothered by the strategy and role of Pakistan in the Afghan war (1979), propelled the flood of arms and ammunitions in the entire society; the disappearance of social and cultural activities, institution of religious fanaticism in each stroll of life and loss of common stages for verbal confrontation. Benazir Bhutto, who returned propelled Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) however the

unnatural political conspiracies showed weak and powerless next chose governments which could not maintain hold for long. The ethnic gap alongside brutality, terrorizing of public and utilization of state machinery for public tormenting proceeded unabated and was cultivated and supported by famous and powerful groups of traditional landlords, political groups, religious components and military (Zunes, 2009).

Public protests have been used to exhibit common agitation with particular activities or policies have been constrained to merely strikes called or authorized by ethnic and political groups. As a general rule, these look after brutality both by the law enforcement agencies as well as strikers. Small, localized agitations have been organized against the repeated power break downs, on the other hand singular demos and suicide risks happen when police or medieval severity compelled an issue out transparently. Efficient and dynamic gatherings had dug in into their energy and personality focused legislative issues, and the usage of ruthless strategies of terrorizing, to propel into compliance and acknowledgment, not to agitate or remain quiet and enforced environment of fear was uncontrolled (Shafqat, 1998).

While the entire country has been driven by severity and fear, an East Pakistan-like situation had been seen in Baluchistan. No genuine tries had been made to bring the grieved and disillusioned Bloch nationalists to the table, and individuals had continued to be added to the summary of missing individuals. Karachi, once the city of lights and the business heart of the country turned into hub of crimes as arson and killings rapes, battering of women in marriage to resolve family and tribe fights and the state justice punishing the women were frequently practiced in the city. Every day, the ranks of uneducated and illiterate people is increasing and the unemployment rates are increasing,

cities overflow with drains sewerage and daily garbage as a result the poor have to face illness resulting in high death rates due to declined and expensive health services; any man can be charged and executed by a self-guaranteed devotee and trustee of religious factions and no one is allowed to hold up against them (Afridi, 2014).

After effective lawyer's movement in 2007, and the course of a free media, there was greater hope that C.S would begin assuming more critical part in, reducing violence and radical belief systems along with opening diplomatic table. The same was anticipated from NGO's and different groups including educational institutes. Unfortunately, each of these three primary social actors has terribly failed the general population. NGO's are as yet concentrating exclusively on welfare or services provided; have still to play out a transforming part for society. Meagreness of financial assistance, donation motives and doubts are similarly great obstacles in their performance. Although, even they do make sense of how to deal with a little presentation or advancement event, they can't bring it through to any substantive size for impact. All the showing centers are included in corruption and political affiliations are doing combating with non-attendance of assets and limit of the institutions. The media have not showed its development objectivity, and aggregate codes of morals, ethics and respect. Without a doubt, numerous TV channels have been actively engaged in flaming the sectarian sentiments, spreading propaganda and offering space to narrow minded and brutal activities (Cheema, 2011).

The variations between C.S in Pakistan run down deep into the esteem and cultural systems and structure which have created or dissolved after some time (Lewis, 2011). Rural society in Pakistan is smothered because of poverty and is denied of any power. They are just involved with everyday survival, or transient interests which can be

accomplished by their affiliation with the wealthy elites or political leaders. Hardly like other South Asian nations, has barely any group from the smothered country regions turned out to be socially dynamic and achieved legitimacy to represent real wishes and needs of the large population (Rashid, 2015).

In Pakistan, feudal lords, extreme rightist groups, corrupt politicians and military have kept a tight grip on power. C.S has barely been permitted to take free breath, left alone to become self-sustaining as well as vibrant. People in Pakistan are faced with huge deficits of basic social services and welfare. This situation is devastating because *"inert, indifferent, alienated, radicalized citizen crush the very basic structure of the democratic system"*. The primary motive of social activism and to develop and carve out shared identity, are to unshackle, to share and contribute social chances and opportunities and power. All this requires civil groups and citizens to be free of fear, have formed a basic social structure of democracy and to have then basic needs met (Sultanat, 2003).

1.5. Anguish or Hope

According to Nadvi and Robinson (2004), to work for positive change in Pakistan there is a need for:

- a. Increased social sector spending to increase social development;
- b. Market driven growth without government interference;
- c. Measures and practical steps to eliminate the political and economic dominance of vested elites;
- d. The emergence of and interest groups and new classes.

- e. Political stability as an essential condition for private investment and progress towards pro-poor change;
- f. Cultural changes that advance, openness modernization and correspondence (Nadvi, 2004).

However, in recent years of majority rule government had achieved a minimum level of hopefulness towards acknowledgment of previously mentioned six components. Government obstruction, between times of nepotism, and financial and political favours, proceeded with no blockades; social segment spending has turned out to be even less; the pace of social program has backed off; the force of a couple of individual groups (military, landlords religious groups generally partisan and politicians) have been upgraded with the deferral of decentralization process. While there has been rebirth of the white collar class, it appears to have been rendered incapable practically weak as taxes and inflation on the salaries new statutes; a widely inclusive feeling of dread of repercussions has limited free articulation of thoughts and social exercises (Rashid, 2015).

These must be kept strong and initiated through different social conditions. The open doors for change as indicated by Nadvi and Robinson (2004) are new political powers decentralization, the ascent of white collar class, worldwide components and the media (Nadvi, 2004). In this background, C.S can prove it a democratic force if they overcome their particular affiliations and interests; indicate solidarity against bad form of justice, brutality, narrow mindedness, religious fanaticism and ethnic control (Sattar, 2011).

In nations like Pakistan, where liberal popular government is operational, although only in shape, the venture of civilizing is extensively thriving. Here, it is in the domain of 'civil society' that popular government and opportunity are solidified. Undoubtedly, the state is considered as a major impediment to social transformation rather as a vehicle. An enabled citizenry, working in the space amongst state and family is the main guarantor of, financial flourishing individual freedom and social amicability (Cavatorta & Durac, 2010).

Civil society took shape in this country during the anti-Musharraf agitation. Indeed, it had been supported and celebrated by the foreign groups of donors since the mid-1990s, and in the post-Musharraf period the relation between foreign donor community and civil society became more obvious (Ali, 2015).

It might not be right to say that the numerous activists working in gender, minority and other human rights associations have scarcely desired to change Pakistani society. The key idea is that genuine opportunities, instead of rights as imagined these days must be ensured to all Pakistanis only by acknowledging and directly confronting with, the powerful and rich at all levels of society and beyond (Mirhamadi, 2015).

Only in the recent past, progressives discussed overtly about mistreated countries and classes and the need to update the structures of class and national abuse. C.S speaks about progress over these recent talks of the left in that capacity as other significant blame lines in the public arena (Malik, I. 1999).

In various spheres of social life civil society has been growing for past two decades. Its focus recently has been on rule of law, representative government and democracy as a universal social value (Bibi, S. 2015).

1.6. Civil Society and Democracy in Turkey

Looking at Turkish politics it is seen that after of the Second World War has been under the influence of rapid democratization as well as social mobilization. Turkish efforts at democratization instituted multi-party politics and introduced popular influence on political decision-making. It also precipitated the delivery of services to the neglected periphery of society. Roads that were built to connect the remotest settlements to the cities seem to have facilitated a major migration from the countryside (Tocco, 2014).

Hence, seems to have been the most essential result of the democratization procedure. The development of industry, private business and trade in the sprouting industrialist economy of the 1950s also incited rapid social mobilization, which gained pace by the late 1950s and further intensified through to the 1980s. Although it has slowed down from the late 1990s, social mobilization vigorously continues. In any event, the relationship between the periphery and the centre of Turkish society has changed once and for all: the country has increasingly become urban, industrial and democratic (Kuzmanovic, 2012).

In the meantime, the one-party rule of the Republican People's Party (CHP), established before the announcement of the Turkish Republic in 1923, ended in 1945. New political parties were established to enter the electoral contest, among them the Democrat Party (DP) that won the general elections in 1950. Electoral races since the

1950s among the political parties representing various ideological positions across the left-right range and the border versus the centre – eventually produced an overwhelming prevalence of the periphery, and simultaneously of the right and even far right ideologies in Turkish politics (Tocco, 2014).

In Turkey, eleven of the fourteen elections held since 1946 were won by political parties representing the periphery⁴, and various combinations of right-wing ideologies and perspectives like conservatism, liberalism, conventionality, prejudice, and religious reaction. A sharp cultural divide, inherited from the Ottoman era, dominated the early Republican period of 1923–1946. In this era, a rational, modernizing and progressive centre that comprised elites who assumed an image of superior society built around ‘science and reason’, versus a culturally diverse periphery whose masses believed in a contrasting ‘Image of Good Society’ built on tradition as represented at its core by religion (mainly Sunni Islam). In the aftermath of democratization and quick social activism of the 50 years or so, the division persists in Turkish society. However, the cultural divide in question has become less pronounced in that period. Thanks to democratization, many members of the periphery gained political power and social recognition by serving in such capacities as deputies of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), cabinet ministers, public prosecutors, judges, undersecretaries of the cabinet ministries, and general managers of the State Economic Enterprises (SEE). Rapid social mobilization also provided more opportunities for the agents of the periphery. They had better opportunities of attending school and of being employed as professionals in the urban centers of Turkey (Zweerde, 2004).

⁴A marginal or, secondary: position or aspect of, a group, subject, or sphere of activity.

1.7. Social state and Civil Society in Turkey

The ideology of the governing parties in Turkey that emphasised the application of liberal economic policies in a capitalist economy contributed to the emergence of an economic space for private entrepreneurial initiative. Democratization additionally made ready for the foundation of a massive measure of social and political affiliations and an assortment of political groups. Hence, it became possible, since the 1950s, for individuals to take civic and political initiative in establishing associations with other like-minded individuals. A growing civil society emerged with the drive to democratise the political system. But this process was neither easy nor smooth. C.S in Turkey has experienced periods of extreme backslide and fast bounce back (Kamali, 2006).

1.7.1 The State: Traditional Strength or its Delusion

Turkish political culture is done with references to the “all-powerful state” that limits as a relentless urge, framing and moulding the political system and society alike. This boundless perception of the state by the public as well as the elites launched a scholarly tendency to depict Turkey as having a robust state tradition, inherited in part from the Ottoman Empire (Aras, 2000).

In Turkey there seems, by all accounts, to be an observable statist way that anxieties a comprehension of law that benefits aggregate reason group over the individual and uniformity over diversity, Such an orientation toward the state lends itself to an understanding of politics as authority and instruction of the "ignorant" masses through the mediation bureaucratic elites and in addition the state. Along with a concentration its abilities genuinely consolidated the target of quality over every alcove

and corner of social life, through its control of the state. Indeed, the centre viewed the periphery as a launch pad of rebellious activity, and hence acted to forestall or suppress every dissenting opinion and movement (White, 2002).

Under those circumstances, a popular image developed of the state as an all-powerful control mechanism. It was not necessarily an image of a Leviathan that alarms society, yet rather of an alarming device in the hands of the central power. All things considered, it was to be kept away from at most circumstances; yet it was likewise expected to have interminable means and resources available in its power that could be appropriated to the subjects of the state through sympathetic donations (Nochmani, 2007).

This is an unsure image, both rewarding and punishing. It is little ponder that the Turkish state has come notably to be alluded to as the “Papa State” (Baba Devlet). Whenever tested, it transforms into a dreadful and unfeeling mechanism of concealment; yet when socio-political strengths co-work with it, there is much to be picked up from its generosity. In any case, it is not the mainstream picture of the state alone that outcomes in a style of administer damaging for the advancement of common society in Turkey. It is additionally the mentality of the officials and managing the outskirts and serving in the state mechanism. Too often that attitude has been patronising and humiliating, with the periphery too harassed to build up an open intrigue and rise as “civil-society-as-public”. Under these conditions, one doesn't hope to discover much confirmation of the underlying foundations of civic activity, of the deliberate activism important to draw in and re-shaping the state (Mardin, 2006).

It is little considerable, then, that the state tradition in Turkey does not sit well with the normal society. But such a "hereditary" clarification of state-civil society relations, which is profoundly established in history and culture, does not so much do value to the real power for change in the political system, or in certainty inside society itself. First through, however customs matter, yet political structures and conduct have a tendency to modify after some time.

Second, although the state tradition is depicted as strong, the very might of the state in itself is a matter of debate. Indeed, if a strong state is assumed to be one that possesses high potential to control the behaviour of those coming in its jurisdiction, to take out and allocate resources effectively and efficiently from the society and territory over which it is presumed to have power, and to create and declare symbols that elicit awe and deference, then the state does not seem to have much strength in Turkey.

Third, the Turkish political regime has deviated towards democracy since the 1940s. However imperfect that drives, election campaigns and electoral contests among different political parties have had their impact on state- civil society relations. The periphery has found plenty opportunity to make its impact on the state through the processes and institutions of the democratic regime, which rolled the state back and provided for greater breathing space for the periphery as well as civil society (Kadioglu, 2005).

Common society alludes to a social setting that is controlled by structures, methodology foundations and associations which, in itself, originate from the thinking, and private exercises of every unique individual. In this way, approachable society

indicates the nonappearance of interruption of the state or bound together national power in the issues of private persons. It is the consenting, independent and self-propelled exercises of each individual that choose the pith of the matter that constitutes C.S. The general concentration of such a definition is on the careful flexibility, fundamental basic leadership at nearby level and social agreement uninterrupted by the state.

Table: 2.1 indicate that the average membership size of voluntary associations in consolidated democracies tends to be smaller, indicating the plenitude of voluntary associations there. Among the countries included, the United States hosts the highest number of voluntary associations and Turkey the lowest. If one examines the overall trend of growth of the number of voluntary associations in Turkey, the difference between Turkey and the post-industrial liberal democracies may indeed be narrowing. In 1938, there were only 205 formally enlisted deliberate associations in Turkey. In 1950, that figure expanded to 2011, and by the mid-1950s there were around 11,000 honest to goodness enrolled such associations – extending to some place in the scope of 3636,000 in the mid-1960s, to 38,000 in the mid-1970s and to 53,657 by 1981. At last, as of now specified, the voluntary organizations formally enrolled with the Directorate of General Security touched the peak of 112,000 by the mid-1990s. Co-operatives established in the urban areas also seemed to have followed a similar pattern (Zaman.com, 2015).

Table: 2.1

Associability of Comparative Perspective

Country	No. of Citizens per Voluntary Associations
Canada	429
France	84
Sweden	44
UK	436
US	172
Turkey	543

Source: State and Civil Society (Kalaycioglu, 2005. p.65).

About 50 percent of the voluntary organizations in Turkey are co-operatives and unions, around 12 percent are religious, (the larger part of which are associations for mosque development and construction), around 13 percent are provincial or local solidarity organizations, roughly 12 percent are for the purpose of education, and 9 percent are for sports. Environmental, self-improvement, recreational, human rights, welfare and philanthropy associations are very few in number. Interestingly, it appears that a large portion of the intentional associations referred to here were built up in the most recent two decades.

Most remarkably, associability is by all accounts firmly identified with urbanization in Turkey. Significant metropolitan ranges have a large portion of the voluntary associations. The mega polis of Istanbul tops the list with 12,733 associations, followed by the second most populous city, Ankara, hosting 8,541, and Izmir with 5,235 associations; among the least populous provinces, Ardahan hosts 88, Batman 210, Bartin 218, and Hakkari only 52 voluntary associations. While the number of voluntary

associations does not seem to indicate a weak civic culture, this information alone is not enough to determine whether civil society is a vigorous and effective part.

Table 3.1

Membership in Voluntary Associations in Comparative Perspective (Percentage)

Type of Voluntary Association

	Rel.	Sports	Culture /Art	T.Union	Pol. Parties	Env	Prof	Welfare/ Charity	Overall
Turkey	3.7	5.7	3.1	4.8	9.7	1.9	8.6	4.1	7.0
World									
Mean	15.5	16.8	11.3	19.8	9.1	4.7	8.8	6.2	
Median	11.2	15.7	9.3	14.0	7.4	2.9	6.2	5.8	
S.Dev	14.5	10.3	7.6	18.1	6.8	4.7	5.9	3.7	

Source: Civil Society in Turkey (Kalaycioglu, 2005. p.87).

1.8. Analysis

C.S seems to have flourished in Turkey along with democratisation and rapid social gathering as the result of World War II. Urbanization, industrialisation and the democratization of society and nation prompted the foundation of a huge number of voluntary associations. Religious associations, local and regional solidarity groups, civic and cultural initiatives were already becoming part of Turkish society by the 1950s In particular, economic associations, such as TOBB and TÛSIAD, and trade unions and co-operatives grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s.. However, mass participation has not matched the increasing growth in the number of such associations. A relatively small

minority of Turkish society appears to be committed to organising and mobilising, while the overwhelming majority fail to do so at all. The demeanour of the state to C.S in Turkey is one of neglecting and aloofness as public activism keeps away from holding rallies and protests which are promptly thought to be conspiracy and agitation against the *raison d'etre* of the Republic. In the latter part, the defence forces and judiciary have acted viably to control, manage and even resist such strikes and movements. Ethnic and religious affiliations that are made to challenge the supremacy of Republican fundamentals and laws are seen as the most undermining to status quo and are accordingly eagerly opposed, smothered and prosecuted by the state. Other solidarity, monetary, patronage, self-improvement, philanthropy and recreational organizations are by and large neither discouraged nor encouraged by means of social activism because of common catastrophes (like the 1999 tremors) is emphatically upheld by the state (Tezcur, 2010).

Therefore, a fairly disarrayed picture has been created of consideration and terrorizing with respect to the state in its relations with voluntary associations. Associational life in Turkey is still impacted by blood ties, conjugal relations, and regional or local solidarity securities made among men during their military tenure and through religious requests. Successful and effective relations mostly develop from such older ties among individuals. Besides, successful linkages in the course of political power are still started through ties of this kind. Urbanization and social enactment have deteriorated some of those primordial/standard ties, yet their closeness is perceptible in every inquiry into political corruption, where links fostering underhand deals between powerful politicians and their family members, religious brothers, and local/regional

affiliates are often unearthed (Eligur, 2014).

Finally, the lack of mass support, or of the capacity to mobilise large-scale popular participation, often under estimates voluntary associations in their relations with the state. Some of the organizations have such limits, or access to political assets like votes, resources or data. The under resourced majority in the public is not much significant to effect the political elites and parties. Their major chance to influence relies upon the ability to frame persevering coalitions with other voluntary organizations, and in this manner upgrade their entrance to political assets.

In any case, this makes us face another crippling obstacle: C.S by all means is made up of smaller factions and such fractionalised voluntary associations facing consistent and long standing contention among them. This permits the state to have a latent restrictive disposition towards the affiliations. This allows the state to have a passive-exclusive attitude towards the associations. In response, some voluntary associations express their demands for recognition and representation through protest behaviour aimed at effecting serious systemic change. Under these circumstances, the Turkish state abandoned its tameness and kindly neglected turns, with the collaboration of the security and judicial organs, to aggressive exclusion (Stepan, 2012).

Since the mid-1980s, Turkey has experienced a rapid socio-cultural, economic, and political changeover. One of the significant dimensions of this transformation is the progress of the civil society organizations both in terms of quality and quantity. The 1990s represented a turning point when economic activities, social groups, and cultural identities obtained relative autonomy within the public space. The revolutionary, future-oriented massive political movements of 1970s were, by 1990, replaced by the

politicized issues of everyday matters. For the first time, animal rights, environmental protection, healthcare problems, family violence, which were private concerns of individuals were brought into the political agenda.

From 2000s on, and especially with the EU accession process, the politicization of ethnic and religious identities, natural disasters, and economic crisis revealed the fact that the state sponsored modernization process did not generate effective solutions to social problems. The Turkish State faced a legitimacy crisis in the realms of politics, economy, and culture. Public support for the political parties weakened. All these developments increased the significance of civil society in Turkish life.

This fact puts C.S in direct confrontation with the government that it is a promoter of democracy as well as a development agency. C.S thus faces stiff resistance from the ruling elite in a semi democratic or in an un-democratic set up. This situation in Pakistan exists where true democracy has not taken roots. There is short coming of consideration of the idea of C.S due to which, NGO's have become synonymous with this term, which has provoked harsh criticism. On the other hand, there has been a failure of media to bring to full public view the entire concept of C.S and its role in democracy. The researcher in the next chapter has discussed about 'Impact of Civil Society in Strengthening Democratization in Pakistan.'

CHAPTER NO: 2.

IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIZATION IN PAKISTAN

This chapter explains how civil society in Pakistan has been silent and inactive in comparison to a very vocal, energetic and vibrant in Turkey. In addition how it has been cowed in Pakistan during different military rules, which extends for almost half of her life, i.e. more than 30 years.

First in the 70's and then in the 90's even in the short spells of so called democratic governments there had been state suppression of freedom of speech, excessive use of force and restrictions on social and cultural activities were common. Strong coalition between far right parties and the Military were brought about in the 80's. It resulted in legislation which was neither subjected to analysis for background and importance to general public that was promised to be provided an open and free society; nor was it debated within the parliament. Several writers, intellectuals and human right activists were jailed, whereas some had chosen self-exile. A structure of moral policing was started through cruel, un-educated and dishonest police force (Malik, 1999).

It was during tenure of Zia-ul-Haq, that the NGO movement started protests in major urban communities against some of the rules, regulations and laws which were considered as opposing to human rights. In 90s NGOs developed quickly which were involved in the development and improvement sector of the society. There was additionally development of *community based organizations* (CBOs) and also the growth of issue focused and oriented forums and coalitions (Rashid, 2011).

The C.S although speaks to show power of the general population, yet it has confronted continuous resistance from non-elected state actors, especially from Military governments. The flexibility of the media & NGO's were curbed through limitations on their freedom even in the short phases of popularly elected governments. The much contested NGO bill remained in the parliament since 1996. It could be seen as a direct attempt to consolidate the non-profit sector in the control of the government & under its regulation. Several other attempts were done to control the action of the NGO's (Qadeer, 1997).

The role played by non-profit organization in mobilizing help of civil society to greater extent on problems like honour killing, freedom of the press, violence against women, corruption and accountability, etc. increasingly threatened successive governments. In attempts, at penetration of various non-profit organizations the resultant hostility is reflected. Attempts at closure through deregistration is reflected in extreme cases (Adil, 2015).

In Pakistan the attitude of the government towards NGO's was described as doubtful in a research by *Social Policy and Development Centre* (SPDC) in 2002. At times it was supportive where as it was resentful and repressive at others. As per the research at the policy and arrangement level the government was steady whereas at the operational level, it was obstructionist. The governmental offices considered NGO's to basically focus competition, having cutting into capacities and responsibility and expanding impact of the line offices (Khan, 2004). The government was by and large observed to be openly antagonistic to their exercises in political and social promotion whereas was helpful towards the service providing and welfare role of the NGO's.

Although General Musharraf inducted many well-known C.S workers into his cabinet; well beyond into the mid 2000's, this dichotomy continued. In Pakistan more NGO's started working, whereas others extended their philanthropy work gradually to adopt development strategy. Financial gifts to NGO's for Programs, for example, the country support programme were given by the provincial and local governments. It was organized on comparative lines as Agha Khan Rural Support Program in the Northern Areas. Service conveyance was taken by both the private business sector and the NGO's because of the continued disappointment of the state to convey educational and wellbeing facilities to the people of rural areas. The Government was cheerful to give them a chance to accept this role. Although by nature neither the private business sector: nor NGO's have been capable to develop effective models of development in rural areas. Which have been attempted previously (Rehman, 2006).

Ayesha Khan and Rabia Khan (2004) in *C.S and Social change in Pakistan* wrote,

In this country social movements traditionally have been built upon local issues and remained at that level. Although evidence of public support is there, but they, have been unsuccessful to broaden their base and challenge the powers that be of great effect. According to suggestions of the researchers movements for social change are now being built upon a newer model of coalition building which may have potential in the future to grow (Khan, 2004).

The NGO's have produced little in support of social mobilization the adjustment and remain activity or Project oriented. Hostility continues between NGOs and religious groups towards each other. The former takes absolutely opposite direction i.e. often secular or liberal views supporting the abolishment of laws like blasphemy law and the Hadood Ordinance. They also support women rights. The NGO's pursue a Western oriented agenda aiming at transforming Pakistan to a Western enlightened state using support from C.S groups and ample funding from external donors. There the lurking

suspicion is that of influence and funds to the religious political parties. The NGOs on the other hand are of the opinion that the religious groups are major cause of speedy increase in *Madrassahs* (Zahid, 2011).

According to SPDC (2002) conducted study of the number of *Madrassahs* which had increased from 700 in 1980 to nearly 16000 in 2005. According to some sources claim that their number had reached 27000 in 2010. The Pakistan's government, the international donors and C.S are suspicious to some extent. They are alleged to be teaching extreme narrow mindedness on one hand and, boiling terrorists and suicide bombers, on the other hand. In most of these institutions especially those in FATA, KPK and Punjab traditional sectarian based religious teachings continues (Khan, A.2004).

Individuals have minimal choice yet to send their youngsters to the *Madrassahs* due to lack of alternative educational institutions and extreme poverty. According to a review, the most noteworthy rate of NGO's was dynamic in services matters of conveyance wellbeing, health matters and education. The largest group is formed by those providing religious education that is operating *Madrassahs*. It is also running big welfare and philanthropic associations. It frequently included an alleviation and rehabilitation programs after natural calamities and dealing with poor people and underprivileged in a nation, where social services of the state are almost non-existent. The private sector services are not affordable for the majority. Various studies reveal that *Madrassah* students are not the master minds for plotting the terrorist attacks. The opposing view is evenly accurate that a very parochial world view is created by *Madrassahs*. The students are likely to be cut off and are also intolerant of the view of

others. They are emotionally and mentally convinced of the religious authority and validity of violent acts like suicide bombings (Mirhamadi, 2015).

If the same study was undertaken today, it is likely that the same results would likely be shown with larger numbers. 34 percent contributed in terms of revenue sources, fees and user charges, while 37 percent contributed indigenous philanthropy of the total revenue. Six per cent was the contribution of public sector and the foreign funding was also estimated at 6 percent contrary to common awareness the bulk of financial support to NGOs and finances from foreign donors were a minute share which was derived from fees and national philanthropists (Nadvi, 2004).

Today no information is accessible on arrangement of money related support to NGOs. Yet, it won't be defective to predict that foreign contribution has been on the expansion. It has primarily been stimulated by showing of the work C.S completed after the earthquake. There has also been rising concerns over the transparency and accountability being used as assets by government intelligence agencies. The general conclusion is negative about NGOs. Maybe it is a direct result of how they have permitted themselves to be anticipated, contributor driven and aid dependant. In Pakistan organized C.S has often been used against groups which are, against the state and have come to be viewed with suspicion. Indeed, C.S has turned out to be partitioned along religious and ethnic lines and has indicated little limit with regards to social activation, aggregate activity and mass liberation (Gottschling, 2014).

Societal agencies in Pakistan, according to Khalid Nadvi and Mark Robinson (2004) equipped for advancing social, political and financial change is generally

unsuccessful and powerless. In numerous territories, organizations of the poor are well settled but have not demonstrated competency for articulating voice or giving an avocation to joint activity on an extensive scale. Some success has been achieved by CSO in upholding and protecting human rights and specially women rights. Yet, they have had little impact on greater financial and political issues which critically affect destitution. A portion of the special cases which are imperative, for example, endeavours of a portion of the non-governmental urban and rural bolster programs, yet regularly capacity of such activities to grow is constrained. Their general effect on poverty levels are indistinct and the conveyance of state systems frequently are deficient (Nadvi, 2004).

2.1. The Power of Civil Society-the Case Study of Lawyer's Movement in Pakistan.

Since its inception Pakistan has been struggling to establish functional democracy. The successive military regimes have intervened to dwindle democratic institutions and crush pro-democratic forces.

Moderate political parties and civil and social society groups have truly assumed a noteworthy part in the battle for vote based system, in two periods especially, the time between October 1968 and March 1969 saw the principle development in masses against military oppression in Pakistan. It compelled Ayub Khan to resignation, yet it did not re-set up well known government. Power was essentially traded to General Yahya, who assumed the powers of Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan until 1971, when parliamentary choices re-set up a majority government. The political improvement that constrained Ayub to leave was one of a kind around then. It was not

planned, did not have any specified course of action and unconstrained. The power and extent of the development left few foundation and ideas untouched. It flopped, in any case, to create a substitute leadership to Ayub. They were battling against the Ayub administration, as well as attempting to out manoeuvre each other. The armed forces in comparison remained cohesive and organized, which facilitated its take-over in 1969 (Rehman, 2012).

The second largest movement was from March 2007 to February 2008, when C.S and political groups joined against Musharaff. The counter General Musharaff movement empowered media driven C.S combined the general population battling for the institutional restoration of judiciary and the political parties battling for majority rule system. This raised trusts that Pakistan was entering a time in which majority rule combination and institutions would not be debatable (Traub, 2008).

2.2. Background of the Movement

First indications of a composed opposition raised in 2005 with the advancement of the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), which resulted in the union of fifteen political parties, including PML-N and PPP, the two paramount. The union attempted to concede to a political methodology which was powerful for the rebuilding of genuine popular government and the rule of parliamentary establishments. Basic defining moment came in May 2006 when two previous Prime Ministers and pioneers of PML-N and PPP, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, endorsed a Charter of Democracy (COD). Both were estranged abroad, and their parties were subjected to harsh constraint in Pakistan. These staunch political adversaries arranged an understanding that set out a guide for the nation's arrival to popular government (Qadeer, 1997).

The opening for the gatherings of parties to dispatch their hostility to General Musharraf battle went ahead on March 9, 2007, when General Musharraf asked Iftikhar Chaudhry, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, to leave his office. Chaudhry's refusal unleashed a deluge of resistance that had been persistently creating and afterward found a cause that rose above factional contrasts: the freedom of the judiciary. The development was driven by retired judges and pioneers of nation's bar affiliation. The alleged lawyer's movement was joined by college students, human rights and social activists, philosophers and writers, and the resistance parties.

From March 2007, to February 2008, a confined improvement of an immense number of Pakistanis undermined Mushraff's power and broke down his support. In the huge show of dispute, thousands lined the road side to reinforce past Chief Justice Chaudhry as he drove from Islamabad to Lahore to address lawyers. Implied as the long walk, Chaudhry's caravan expected to bit by bit move inch from inch, from town to town as the amazing number of supporters waved party signals and gave the road bloom petals (Zaffar, 2010).

The political parties were soon in the settle and tied the mission for the entry of majority rule with the explanation behind institutional inimitable quality. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif returned from exile, adding force to the advancement. Scenes of administrative backfire were confronted by the restriction development. The mobilizers in support of support Chief Justice including more than 65 PPP and ANP activists were butchered and various more hurt by heavy guns in Karachi and a suicide attack in Islamabad. Numerous lawyers and diverse activists were beaten, hurled in the detainment facilities, or restrained. General Mushraff's vicious reaction to political

dissenters just spread hostility to Musharaff suppositions and gave more prominent force to the development. On November 28th, 2007 in what was viewed as a triumph for the powers of majority rule government. General Musharaff was compelled to surrender his role as Chief of Army Staff (COAS). General Musharaff had previously made an open guarantee that on the remote possibility that he was re-picked as president, he would surrender his position as COAS and quit wearing his uniform (Munir, 2009).

The constitutional fight called by General Musharaff on Nov.15, 2007 ceased out of the blue on Dec. 27, 2007 when Benazir Bhutto was murdered on at a political rally at Liaquat Bagh. Spouse of Benazir and new leader of the party, Asif Ali Zardari asked that the rally ought to proceed. The party declined to permit Bhutto's murder to wreck the chance to re-establish vote based system to the nation, referring to her regularly rehashed revelation that *'Democracy is the best revenge'* against fascism. The choice may have been uninfluenced by foresight of sympathy vote. Nawaz Sharif completely upheld the PPP request to continue with the elections, leaving General Musharaff without any reasons to stop them.

The result of the elections held in 2008 and most local and global observers recognize that there was some gear in the races, particularly in the crusade time frame paving the way to election day, the political parties generally acknowledged the outcomes. General Musharaff PML-Q of General Musharaff alongside the religious groups endured a huge thrashing and lost power at the centre and in every one of the regions. The PPP secured enough votes to outline a coalition government at the elected level and shape or be a bit of coalitions in each one of the four common place governments. The PML-N won the most seats in Punjab, greatest and majority areas of

the country. Musharaff attempted to adhere to the organization even after the choice; finally instead of sit tight for a vote on reprimand, he surrendered as President on Aug 18, 2008. On Sep 6, 2008 PPP Co-Chairman Asif Ali Zardari was picked President of Pakistan by the Legislative Assemblies and Senate (Faqr, 2013).

2.3. Key Features of the Movement

In these circumstances, the mass movement 2007-2008 was not the main run through when political groups, university students, lawyers and other normal society regions compelled the surrender of a military autocrat. Be that as it may, it was the main run through when a mass advancement winning in both expelling an autocrat and picking prevalence based government.

2.3.1. Common fight for institutional supremacy

Retired General Mushraff's blatant attack on the judicial independence unified the fragmented Pakistani society in a battle to maintain institutional supremacy. Protecting a central democratic esteem, an extensive variety of C.S and political groups united in a way that might not have happened somewhere else. While Musharaff confronted political restriction prior to the resistance development, essentially after the Chief Justice was constrained to leave, different gatherings of Pakistanis joined the attempts to remove Musharaff. The majority of the protestors were joined by a run of the mill grievance that allowed them to streamline the development as showed by the repealing objective of guarding institutional strangeness against a military dictator. This was a colossal differentiation from the counter Ayub improvement, which was mass based however not joined just around a lone issue. It started as students uprising for issues concerning

students especially, which did not claim a wide area of society. The interest of the counter Musharaff developments encouraging cry guarding Pakistani's right to lead by a majority rule – rose above all areas of society. Fanatic limits were broken down briefly until Musharaff surrendered control. The Pakistanis from all areas of society assembled behind the suspensions of the judicial freedom and majority rules system suitable with the core esteems of Pakistani society (Dalrymple, 2007).

2.3.2. Return of Influential Political Leaders

The nation's two popular political leaders filled the power vacuum in their individual gatherings, and collecting party people in ways that would not have been possible. It similarly raised the profile of the progressive battle. After her entry, Benazir Bhutto mounted a powerful campaign against him that took care of her under house limit, encompassed by spiked metal and many furnished personals for a couple of days. Fearless, she held a news meeting to pull in worldwide respect for Mushraff's merciless and oppressive procedures using reasonable pictures as a piece of development in activating her claim specific supporters. After Sharif's entry, supporters who had crossed the floor after 1999 overthrow to join Musharaff started to leave the general and flagged their restored bolster for the previous prime Minister. Military sponsored PML-Q was isolated and new energy was restored in PML-N. Mushraff's losing off control over the political environment was unmistakably motioned, since the previous P.M he had sent to exile expelled was returning to the country against his desires.

The arranging of Bhutto's and Sharif's entry from outcast was gigantic, as the lawyer's movement had been building hostility to Musharaff force for a few months all through the nation, and their arrival fortified the developing observation that Musharaff

was losing control. They likewise guaranteed that in a chaotic period guidance of strong leadership would be available to the party supporters. In anti Ayub Movement there were no political leaders with the same stature in the anti-Ayub movement. It was only beginning by Zulifqar Ali Bhutto to establish his independence from Ayub, though finally became the only accepted and popularly elected leader of the country. His political party was just getting off the ground politically, held prisoners and their families; displaced communities and ex-combatants.

Though he was a frightening force at that time, the way PPP could mobilize under Musharaff, he did not have that capacity or membership. Other political leaders like ANP's Khan Abdul Wali Khan were imprisoned alongside Z. A. Bhutto. The conditions around then did not give the prominent open doors as they did later for Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto. The stature enjoyed by Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto when they returned from exile was found lacking in both Khan Abdul Khan and Z. A. Bhutto. Moreover, both were also not prime ministers. During Ayub's regime there was additionally no private media to give presentation to the restriction offer or any contrasting option to it (Siddiqa, 2012)

2.3.3. Strong leadership from judiciary

Additionally the avid political leaders and senior individuals from the bar who had power and experience to assemble and keep a large number of lawyers sorted around expansiveness of the nation for around two years. These pioneers of the lawyer's movement were settled and exceptionally regarded retired judges at that time.

Alongside these judges, there were some activists and office bearers in the lawyer's wings of major political parties, which encouraged great correspondence and made solid connections among the political parties and rest of the movement. Fundamental motivation behind the lawyer's movement was defined as not only restoration of judiciary but also as institutional revival. It was unprecedented in Pakistan's history that civilian institution struggled for reclaiming its space. The movement was able to assemble public sensitivity and a wide base of open support, when it became the objective of viciousness, with many murdered and injured (Zahid, 2015).

The reclamation of Chief Justice and Supreme Court's different judges was considered as a triumph of the lawyer's movement. Seek after another time of rule of law and judicial independence was brought by the success of movement. It was thought by some that breaching the constitution through outright meddling by politicians and military coup had been made not possible.

That view might be changing already, many in civil society and some senior lawyers maintain that actions of Chief Justice since his restoration were hyperactive and potential for judicial dictatorship were raised. Some commentators find the use of power of suo-moto by Iftikhar Chaudhry, former Chief Justice of great concern. Some politicians also consider him to go beyond his jurisdiction and seemingly interfere in political matters. It was insisted by him that an old case against former President Zardari be opened in Swiss courts. Whereas other insisted that under the constitution the President enjoyed immunity from prosecution. When the Chief Justice was hearing a case against unanimously adopted 18th amendment by the parliament, such fears were fuelled.

The supremacy of the parliament was upheld by the decision on this hearing. All the quarters took the decision well. The problems continued to arise, like ordering the dismissal of the DG of FIA, the examining into the legitimacy of government contractual appointments by the court, namely appointment of the Chairman of NAB as invalid. The relations between judiciary and executive were strained by this appointment.

Towards the tail end of the Mushraff's era, the Chief Justice was observed even more vigorous. On the missing person's case *suo-moto* action was taken and decisions against the government were rendered by him, like privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills was reversed. According to many, Musharaff sent the Chief Justice wadding once again and imposed emergency on Nov 03, 2007 due to fear of being decreed as ineligible by Chief Justice.

In order to establish a workable balance between other branches of government and the judiciary some jockeying may be necessary. A "clash of institutions" was forecasted by the media and different quarters. Politicians and lawyers were giving hostile expression. Fuels of old fears of a dubious role played in the judiciary by the hidden forces and the looming demise of the government is unfavourable for the feeble change over process. The democracy could be destabilized by them. Rizvi has observed that military has an important role in making and toppling of the governments. Under the pretext of judicial activism now the un-opposed judiciary is increasing its power and venturing into the sphere of lawmaking body or the law implementing bodies. The likelihood of conflict of state organization cannot be discounted and political eventual fate of the president will be in uncertainty; unless the military and judiciary perceive that the constitutional energy to expel the president just lies with the parliament.

For the more prominent reason for administration of law and popular government the lawyer's movement made new chance to transcend partisan's contrasts and cultivated the solidarity of reason. On one side: spreading the government and the other the judiciary which are reminiscent of the historical methods used by the military to rule over forces of democracy by dividing them and leading into aggressive partisan attacks. The Chief Justice drew line in the sand which might make another take over by military and especially one backed by judiciary, as it had been the practice in past difficult. In 2007 he refused to bow down before the military (Lau, 2009).

2.3.4. Political Unity

Though the solidarity amongst PPP and PML-N after the movement was fleeting however was quite strong.. It prepared for re-establishing the Constitution of 1973 to its law based starting point. The anti-Ayub movement marks a significant difference from movement during Musharaff period in demonstrating managed solidarity of the major political parties over a long stretch amid the last time frame. In the Popularity based Movement and later the Democratic Alliance, each gathering had its own specific arrangement which kept them from joining for a single reason. In the midst of the Ayub period, there was some solidarity between the parties through the cooperation they had moulded in Pakistan. Coordinate elections and parliamentary set up were their two main demands agreed by Ayub.

Thus their differences grew sharper because the only basis on which they agreed was removed by him. After a number of months of aggressive demonstrations in opposition to his government, Ayub resigned from of Presidency in March 1969. Instead of the fact that the powers must be transferred to the Speaker of National Assembly as

per Constitution of 1962, still he handed over power to General Yahya. Hence once again an Army Chief General Yahya, became Pakistan's President and CMLA and the country was returned to another Martial Law. He ensured the opposition would not come into power, although opposition forces succeeded in making Ayub to resign.

Ending of Musharaff rule through fair and free was the greater goal of the main members in the ARD, who had their disparities however the principle individuals figured out how to overcome them. Dissimilar to Ayub who declined to hold elections after his resignation, Musharaff was compelled to evacuate his uniform and hold choices as a condition for residual president of the country. Musharaff had struck a deal with Benazir Bhutto, who was a popular leader at that time. But Benazir Bhutto reneged on the arrangement and pulled back her contingent support for Musharaff. After the murder of Benazir in 2007, the opposition triumph in the 2008 elections eventually prompted to his ouster as President soon after (Shafqat, 2015).

2.3.5. Media

During Ayub regime, the only source of information was state owned and government-controlled media. But in Musharraf regime, a bulk of private channels erupted. The emotional occasions unfurling in a nation that was at that point the subject of grave international consideration were communicated, to the world and inside the country by private media organizations. There was a considerable international support for the lawyer's movement in 2007-2008; as a result opposition to status quo was exposed. The popular anchors around Islamabad hosted talk shows. The private and local television channels created creative ways to disregard the blackout; after their transmissions were blocked from airing the unfolding events, which drew large crowds

opposing Musharaff. The media became part of the movement and freedom of mass media and press became tool of the struggle, with restrictions on media.

The media exposed violent attacks on the opposition by General Musharaff which led to a spiky decline in his general public support. The claim of Enlightened Moderation was belied by levelling criminal charges against lawyers and the footage of politicians being shot and heads being smashed. An alternative narrative was provided which falsified Mushraff's version of events by putting the ban on opposition, members, lawyers and others. There was qualitative contrast in the movement's capacity to convey its message to the whole country.

During the highly sensitive situation their basic part was reinforced; but Musharaff felt the need to ban their broadcasts. Pressure had to be faced from Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) because of discrimination and exploitation of media through assaults on individual reporters, communicate offices and their workplaces, notwithstanding media owners. This indicated the degree of threat which was posed by media to the establishment.

The electoral rigging in election 2008, historically related to vote casting on the election's day was directly limited by media playing 'its watch dog role'. The private media had permitted the opposition movement to compete the official account of story. In addition also provided information to viewers and readers, mobilized supporters and promoted a different message. Hence in the success of the civilian government, media was considered to be a powerful factor (Joseph, 2008).

An opposition role was played by the private media in the pre-Musharaff resignation period, obscuring the line between affecting them. The brutality of Musharaff regime were exposed by providing outlets for voice of dissent and breaking line coverage of attacks on civilians by the media partly because it was being targeted for exposing Musharaff.

An important factor in building public awareness was unprecedented coverage and reporting of the movement to re-establish civilian rule by media. A corresponding level of responsibility to provided factual reporting and well informed analysis resulting in a new level of confidence in media. But the media segment has not made shift to its proper role of opposition as a public watchdog adhering to a set of journalistic practices, like objectivity and balance found in developing democracy; though there are various examples of the responsible journalism. The allegations were widespread about fabricated stories which were said to be made by the TV anchors and influential reporters about the PPP government (Mehmood, 2014).

2.3.6. The Charter of Democracy (2003)

The prospects were raised for a total jump in the level of collaboration for which the political icons were ready to work together. The Charter of Democracy (COD), which was an achievement, has no precedent in Pakistan's political history.

Among other things, the COD included criteria to elect an Election Commission: a promise to never bolster the military to topple a chosen government. A procedure to delegate judges; reforms for FATA and Northern Areas; lifting of the prohibition on political gatherings, parties elections of neighbourhood government and measures to

address requests for more political autonomy. The political party's recognition of the need to start an impartial battle for the safeguard of majority rule government was implied by the COD.

The anti-Ayub movement was different from anti-Musharaff movement as maintained solidarity of primary political parties appeared for a protracted period amid Musharaff time, when contrasted with Ayub's period. During Ayub's time, there was some collaboration among political groups and parties yet every party had its own plan that over-shadowed their aggregate reason. Whereas during Musharaff era the main political powers indicated surprising solidarity in understanding their more noteworthy objective of ouster of Mushraff's lead through democratic elections despite their partisan differences (Khan, 2009).

2.4. Hurdles and Opportunities in way of Democracy

Many obstacles have been created in the way of transitioning to a full-fledged democracy from a military dictatorship by the fraught history of democracy's consolidation in Pakistan. Hopes were raised of a likely clean split from the history by the events which led to the 2007 Long March against Musharaff. The fight for institutional supremacy, the strong leadership and guidance from the judiciary and lawyers, extended responsibility of the media, the timely return of key political leaders, the political elite's single mindedness of commitment and purpose to COD, along with other powerful mobilizing elements forced Musharaff to resign and usher a new era of democratic government democratic government.

Democratic transition such as that was first in Pakistan. History in Pakistan suggests many times negative steps in the progression to a consolidated democracy. Successful coalitions among civilians are not necessarily built by factors responsible for ousting dictatorship. In the long run deep rooted anomalies many times frustrate such efforts.

2.4.1. The Military and Intelligence Agencies

In post 2008 elections period; the new Army Chief, General Kayani ordered to withdraw all the military officers from all civil and public institutions; announced support for new government and declared army would stay out of politics. In this changing scenario the two pages of 2008-9 defence budget was presented before the Senate for first time in history of Pakistan.

Since then, the military is by all accounts guarding its hegemonic position. The popular government needed to face intense resistance with a specific end goal to bring the intelligence agencies under non-military personnel control according to COD. Former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani issued a request to put the ISI under the ambit of Interior Ministry, which could have helped authoritative, budgetary and operational control of the office to the regular citizen government. In any case, within hours, the Prime Minister was compelled to turn down his request in light of resistance from the military. The move of the government showed lack of planning or might have been ill-timed; imbalance in the civil-military relationships was clearly shown by backing out and military reflection.

The original promise of keeping army away from politics was not kept by General Kayani. US Kerry Loggers aid bill granting \$2.5 billion aid package over 5 years period was opposed by a press release in October 2009. The provisions relating to US administration monitoring of progress on civilian oversight of army was strongly opposed by army. Although, Army still received millions of dollars in military assistance from US government, the angry outburst set off created political crisis and media turmoil. The Kerry Loggers bill was, though passed, but it conveyed a message that it was still the army which mattered in fields of defence and foreign affairs whatsoever was said by the elected politicians. Then, General Kayani called the civilian heads of major government departments to his army headquarters, and not cabinet ministers, in a lead up to launch US-Pak strategic dialogue in March 2010. In media of both countries, how Kayani drove the agenda despite the fact that Foreign Minister of Pakistan was the so-called head of Pakistani delegation (Grare, 2009).

The army still operates outside the realm of civilians reinforcing concern is another disturbing issue. During the Musharaff regime, an estimated people numbering 400-6000, were missing majority of who were from Baluchistan nationalist parties and were political activists. Based on accounts from returned victims some of the missing persons were thought to be in detention of the Pakistani's intelligence agencies. After over five years of deliberate hearing of case related to missing persons, even the powerful Supreme Court had been unsuccessful, to elicit any information that was useful. Serious concerns were raised about the continuous interference and intrusion in the matters of government by military because of failure of General Kayani as per his public statements (Mughal, 2013).

Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda head, was surprisingly killed at a residential compound in Pakistan which was very near to premier training academy of military in Abbottabad by US on May 2, 2011. It under scored army's supremacy more than ever: in the days taking after the assault, open civil argument solely centered on US infringement of Pakistan's sovereignty and in the disappointment of intelligence agencies and grave security role of military was ignored. The reaction by the non- military or civilian leaders was low, deferred and military was in power to hold and mould the public opinion. Regardless of the way that military conceded its deficiencies in development of intelligence organizations on the presence and issue of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.

General Kayani however made it very obvious that he was not content with the inadequate formal reaction of the civilian government yet the joint session of the parliament was held by Kayani and not the Prime Minister. The ISI Chief General Shuja Pasha and General Kayani gave in camera instructions at the last moment. This prompted to a joint resolution which affirmed full trust in barrier powers of Pakistan in shielding autonomy of Pakistan. The resolution also affirmed that defence forces of Pakistan were fully capable of overcoming any challenge to security and safeguarding territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan with full assistance of government and people of Pakistan. The resolution also condemned the US intervention.

The short coming of responsibility to take blame for defence and ongoing foreign policy by the civilian government was admitted by former Minister of Defence, Ahmed Mukhtar. The ISI chief disclosed the fact that there were no written agreements with United States at the joint session held in parliament relating to security, when Mukhtar was questioned about that, he answered,

He never knew that the present counter terrorism cooperation between Pakistan and US; was without any written agreement (Nasr,2012, p. 231).

In his meeting with US officials and President Clinton, then he had never asked about it. Keeping in view the public thinking and reaction over US drone attacks, such statement was quite surprising. It was also revealed by him that as he was on a mission with the President to Russia and he had no knowledge about the joint session of the parliament. The former governing coalition did not use Abbottabad attack as a rare opportunity to hold military publically accountable and to exercise oversight over the military. The government was forced to expand the commission investigating US raid by PML leader Nawaz Sharif by including non-military representatives like members of judiciary. A full parliamentary debate of the military was also called for by him.

Whether the affair of Bin Laden would lead to any fundamental rebalancing of civil military relations is too soon to say. Any dramatic changes are not expected to be made by the government. Democratic consolidation will remain out of reach and democratic institutions will remain frail without initiation of any explicit process and clear commitment (Hussain, 2014).

2.4.2. Civil Society

Civil Society in Pakistan is facing problems in paving its foundations. Thousands of lawyers formed the lawyer's movement and then it was joined by thousands from other sectors of civil society including human activists, students, journalists, trade unions, and other professional groups along with women groups.

Except some; these groups' role in fortifying the transformation from dictatorship to democracy very less as compared to the assumed and expected. They failed to fill the

political vacuum after the elections, which they had themselves helped to create. Another level of straight forwardness, transparency and responsibility is included by the courts. In the work place C.S in Pakistan has been effective to the degree of passing new enactment on sexual harassment. A new law to ensure females which was generally acknowledged worldwide in all parties came about on the grounds that of advocacy endeavours by campaigning, female groups and working with the parliament and the administration on approach advancement. The parliament must be more responsive to the requirements of the citizens for which much more advocacy is required to help the parliament.

With the help of donor support some organization like *Free and Fair Elections Network* (FAFEN) and PILDAT involved themselves in the parliamentary supervision providing accountability, enhancing transparency and beneficial monitoring role. In the process of democratic consolidation such oversight is also needed over important institutions like courts, police and military which have an equally critical role. The needs of the people have not been addressed by the politicians for whom they have been criticized a lot. But once during the elections the citizens also have democratic right beyond voting and also have responsibilities. Democracy becomes harder to be overthrown, if more individuals practice their duty and the underlying foundations of majority rules system would be reinforced. The parliament and the administration must comprehend the positive part which C.S can play in offering strategy choices and upholding changes. The shared doubt in them must be supplanted by the basic understanding that each needs to have a critical impact in a government.

The May 2, attack by the US in which Laden was killed in Abbottabad raised an opportunity which is without any precedent to initiate a public debate on the matter of

civil-military relationships which was much needed and fundamental, but there was little response from the civil society which was unexpected (Stephan, 2010).

2.4.3. The Government

The elections 2008 took place; however Pakistan People's Party was still facing effects of the recent loss of Benazir Bhutto, the leader who had international stature, political and personal experience which had no parallel. Nonetheless, PPP was prompted by the election results to form a coalition government with parties who rather than cooperating within office were more used to competing for votes.

If we look back then an agreement was reached between PML-N and the PPP to form a government on the basis of mutual cooperation which ultimately resulted in creation of the COD(2003), that survived long enough for ouster of Musharaff. During the state of emergency, large number of judges, detainees, including lawyers arrested were released. Over delays in restoring 50 higher court judges and the Chief Justice the coalition was broken. Hope was given to many of new political chapters in history of the country because of positive unity on this issue which was also an important factor in the post Musharaff equation.

Yet once again the outcome of coalition formation reinforced that it is not the same consolidation. The Chief Justice was restored by the PPP after almost a year, but why this was made, it remains unclear. According to speculation, the Chief Justice was expected to initiate all the old cases of corruption against President Zardari. The lawyer's movement was transformed for another year because of this delay which in addition led to breaking up of coalition with PML-N. The key issues including severe shortage of

power and water, economic crisis, the escalation of conflict in Baluchistan, and rise of militancy all over the country were over shadowed. The perceptions of dishonesty and corruption in People's party's government overwhelmed the government; in addition there was enormous corruption in enterprises owned by state which can be linked to Musharaff regime.

Nevertheless, some progress was achieved by the former government in strengthening the federation itself, the parliament and the judiciary. All Supreme Court judges and the Chief Justice were restored who were fired by Musharaff. For the first time in ten years (National Finance Commission (NFC) award all the provinces accepted and agreed with the federal government. For elimination of grievances in Baluchistan a package was implemented, name of NWFP was changed to KPK and Province of Gilgit-Baltistan was established. The eighteenth amendment, a most significant achievement for consolidating the democratic institutions, was unanimously adopted by the parliament consolidating democratic institutions. The distortions of successive dictators were cleared by this comprehensive amendment in 1973 Constitution which relies heavily on the COD.

The restoration of original powers of the Prime Minister which were subverted by Musharaff and Zia; a transparent method for appointing members of Election Commission was incorporated and was supported by all parliamentary parties, though they were not the signatories of the charter. In order to be implemented like civilian oversight of the military are the remaining points which need to be established but would require broad based support (Nelson, 2009).

2.4.4. The Official Opposition

In an act of good faith, PML-N joined the coalition after the 2008 elections, depending on a condition to restore the removed judges. Also claimed it as matter of principles, the PML-N resigned, when the agreed deadline expired in May, 2008. Hence the chance of PML-N support with the government was missed by the PPP, as PML-N resigned from the coalition because the government had failed to implement entire road map the two parties had jointly agreed in the COD, in addition also to restore the judges.

Besides the fact of an official and strong opposition in the parliament, PML-N had played more of an extra-parliamentary role after resigning from the coalition. The party joined hands with the lawyer's movement, in March 2009, to organize the long march to Islamabad. The Chief Justice was restored to avoid the threat of disturbing the capital. However, military did not support call of the government asking to stop marching troops.

The PML-N also established its success such as the PAC and the PCCR, working under their parliamentary leader's chairmanship inside the parliament. Though PML-N's leader's assured promise about parliament's supremacy, confusing message were sent by PML-N which instead of using parliamentary forum itself to voice opposition apparently preferred for threatening mass disruption (Rehman, 2012). Since Nawaz Sharif Government took over in 2013 it has been facing threats of Long March from PTI.

2.4.5. Political parties

Democratic reforms were opened to all the institution after elections of 2008. However lack of strengthening democratic practices within the organizations was

observed in the two major political parties. Even they changed and reversed the policies which ensured democracy within the parties. As per 18th amendment requirement already existed in the political parties act. However, it was generally interpreted as an attempt by the present leaderships to perpetuate unquestionable hold on their parties (Fruman, 20011).

2.5. Analysis

A broad spectrum of political parties and civil society were brought together by the Long March against Musharraf. For restoring democratic rule in Pakistan and ensuring institutional supremacy, they ultimately united under the common agenda. The violations by the executive branch were widespread covering different fields. In addition undermining independence of judiciary, the executive branch seriously attacked rights and freedoms granted by the constitution which ultimately led to ouster of Musharraf. In the next chapter the researcher has discussed about the impact of C.S. in strengthening democratization in Turkey.

CHAPTER NO: 3.

IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN TURKEY

The greatest challenge to authority of Turkish President, Erdogan, began as a small environmental rally during more than a decade in power is quite startling but, as in the streets across Turkey were poured in by thousands of Turks. It became quite obvious that there was something bigger than the destruction which had taken place at Gezi Park of Istanbul (Letsch, 2014).

3.1. Case Study of Gezi Park Protests in Turkey

The Turkish police responded with tear gas during the Gezi protests in which demonstrators shouted to the government and the ruler Erdogan to resign from his post, were unbelievable. The growing popular discontent over the Turkish politics recent direction was at its height. Justice and Development Party (AKP) remain within democratic lines represented a pattern in which the ruling party slowly strangled whole opposition. The real issue being that a shopping mall could replace a park but within six square blocks by the government. Turkey became the text book case of a hollow democracy under the AKP. To many in Washington, the police response and the intensity of protests in Gezi Park, Istanbul was no doubt a great surprise. As many put it, Turkey being an excellent model is more democratic as compared to few decades ago.

The often contradictory and the complex political processes underway in Turkey are misrepresented though there is a small truth to these allegations. An unprecedented number of Turks have become prosperous and politically organized under the

charismatic Erdogan and the AKP. From 2002 to 2011 the Turkish economy tripled in size, and in most recent parliamentary elections 87 percent of Turks voted in comparison with the 2002 elections where 79 percent brought AKP to power.

Paving the way to turn Turkey into a single-party state and AKP to strengthen its hold on power, thus opposite is the case in fact. It was AKP which was structuring a system which was backward-looking. An open deliberation started in Europe and the United States (US) about whether Turkey was leaving the West soon after the AKP came to control in 2002, it was also not true that in the immediate post-9/11 era quite a bit of this was the consequence of the gracious Islamic phobia or phobia of Islam. Turkey was playing Judas on its decade of joining and collaboration with the West.

Turkey's new reformist-minded Islamists from the beginning utilized its all resources to dismiss this concept by idea of their election. Turkey's commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was re-affirmed by Ankara and also with many of the totalitarian legacies from history, such as reforms in the judicial system and placing the military under civilian control thereby, undertaking wide political reforms (Lepeska,2015).

It was the first instance any party had got more than 45 percent of the general vote since 1983 and Erdogan was aided by the new monetary, social and political openness to ride a coalition of huge business, cosmopolitan elites, Kurds, normal Turks and pious Muslims to re-elect with 47% of the general vote in the mid-year of 2007. In Turkish politics this was unparalleled. The political charm of Prime Minister was

reinforced with 49.5 percent of popular vote in 2011. By 2012, the Turkish PM Erdogan was a trusted conservative of nobody else than the president of the US.

Turkey has turned into a persuasive performing artist in the Middle East and presided over the seventeenth biggest economy on the planet .A tyrant turn was in progress, in spite of the fact that the AKP was winning elections at home and applauses from abroad. The party (AKP) held upon a plot to silence its critics and sought to overthrow the government with the help of so called deep state of Turkey that is, criminal underworld military operatives and military officers in 2007. Turkey has turned into a nation where the columnists are sent to prison in routine on flawed grounds. State machinery has been utilized against private business issues as their proprietors did not concur with the government; and in all ways their freedom of expression is under pressure.

A variety of explanations have been offered by apologists and spokesmen for the AKP about different deficiencies. The AKP revealed a simplistic view of democracy and under scrutiny these excuses are tailed off. They also sound and look much similar to the self-serving legitimizations which removed the Arab potential that once used to organized the force of families and parties and narrow the political field. Yet somehow, Turkey was seen as an appropriate partner or model to create a soft landing in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and somewhere else by the Washington's foreign policy elite (Pavey, 2013). The modern dynamic of Erdogan's Turkey is captured perfectly by this, where large margin of victory in elections has been used by the government to validate all sorts of activities and actions that are against the opposition (Yuksel, 2014).

In the debate over the new Turkish Constitution, this pattern has been manifested in the most obvious way. For establishment of Presidential System in the country, Erdogan was firm to use it as a vehicle, in which he could serve as first empowered President of Turkey. Such a plan was loudly opposed by opposition parties and the constitutional commission dead locked in the end of 2012; omitting its deadline to submit its recommendations. Threat to ram through his own constitutional plan and disregard the commission entirely was given by Erdogan. When it became obvious that even within AKP, there is huge opposition to his idea of Presidential System, so he softened his position, though he had floated the idea in early April 2013. According to new Law of alcohol, certain restrictions were imposed on sale issuing new liquor licenses from places near schools and mosques; diminish advertising which can be quoted as another example of majority turn of AKP. The law was passed debated and written just in two weeks despite vocal opposition. The response by Erdogan to the critics of law has been to state that they ought to just drink at home (Parkinson, 2014).

Similarly, building of another air terminal, the development of a third extension over the Bosphorus and including redesign of Taksim Square, are some of the massive construction projects undertaken by the AKP. These all are restricted by far reaching coalitions of various interests and are disputable. However the opponents of undertakings have been run unpleasant by the administration in a pretentious way for each situation. Affirming that any individual who dislikes what is occurring ought to not forget when elections roll around that how popular AKP has been. Warning was given by Erdogan to main opposition party that if they can gather thousands of people, he could gather a million, in a distinctive attempt to employ the AKP's vote margin as a yard stick.

Without much notice from the outside world, anti-democratic turn of Turkey has taken place. Washington wilfully ignored in support of a sunnier description about the "*Turkish miracle*." But there were also coercive measures, investigations, arrests, imprisonments and tax fines which were overlooked perhaps. It is not as clear as it is thought, a powerful and informal coalition of party affiliated media and businessmen has been built by the AKP over the last decade whose livelihoods depend on a political order that has been built by Erdogan. Those who resist they do so at their own risk. This current uproar over the Gezi Park re-development that is why runs deeper than merely bulldozing of green area.

As regards media, Erdogan has harassed or encouraged changes in ownership, so that there is no coverage as in the case of Gezi Park protests. CNN Turkey, the system's Turkish-dialect subsidiary was indulged a cooking show as the notable focal point of biggest city of Turkey was in extraordinary change while at the same time CNN International was covering the protests live in Taksim. This matter of press harassment and censorship was applied to only those media channels are targeted for revenge which are critical of the government. Talented journalists like Hassan Cemal, Ahmet Altan and Amberin Zaman have been dismissed for defying the dictates and criticizing the government. In an allegedly democratic or democratizing society this type of implicit government intimidation is not reasonable (Gungor, 2015).

Turkish governmental politics is not really as open as it was 10 years prior under these conditions. When in request to meet the European Union's prerequisites for participation and membership the AKP was seeking equitable reforms. It is simply shut in an altogether extraordinary way. One party has basically emerged in Turkey. Turkey's

weak opposition has helped the AKP in this matter. The Kemalist leaders which had no meticulous commitment and loyalty to democracy, which stumbled in Turkey's lost narrow-mindedness and mourns hardliner Kemalist elite's passing off. In successful democracies the citizens are provided with scenarios in which to express their disappointments, desires and frustration that are beyond elections, and Turkey in such manner has flopped tremendously. The AKP's awkward strategies and an inept resistance's joined tactics have at last reached a crucial stage. Turkish legislative issues will be reset in another direction, and this scene won't result in failure of the government. Yet, whether the AKP will continue to forgo on the hypothesis that election award upon the government the privilege to do anything it loves or will take in some vital lessons from the general population accumulating in the avenues is question to be answered (Starr, 2014).

Both Washington and the AKP need to reassess its policies and not just the AKP only. Perhaps the Obama administration has considered it good to encourage Erdogan privately or does not care about deterioration of Turkey. Extending of the term for another year of Ambassador Ricciard one has got under the skin of government over freedom of press, which was one of the quite act of defiance by US administration.

It is time White House realized that reality has far outstripped about Erdogan's rhetoric on democracy and this long game has not worked. Less has to be offered by Turkey to the Arab world than the US government seemed to think, instead of simply affecting the Arab governments focus on their nationals' requests. Allies of US may be encouraged to do likewise also in Turkey. In the course of the most recent decade Prime Minister Erdogan and the AKP may have been chosen with an expanding offer of

prevalent vote. Yet, the activities of government make it progressively appear that Turkish vote based system does not develop more distant than voting stall (Cook, 2013).

Turkey might have entered into a very disturbed phase which was very uncertain. Till the recent events of 16th July, 2016 the military had been returned to barracks and as such terror of coup gone for ever. The events which took place on 15th July, evening suggest that there was adequate section inside army which does not support legal role of an elected government and that continue to believe it is their obligation that they must protect that state from elected representatives of the people.

If it threatens to create more instability in the region and country which is already war trodden, is fighting against terrorist violence and has frightening sectarian disputes. The response of Turkish people, the civilian apparatus of the state and complete spectrum of Turkish people is historic. The nation witnessed a polity and divided nation to meet up with regard to its vote based process.

3.2. Analysis

The fizzled overthrow in Turkey certainly has some critical lessons for military administration. A few segments of people in general, media and political class censuring the chose government, its enticement to legitimize diminishing political and administration space of PML-N or to mull over unbelievable and take Pakistan back to the dim days of military run the show. Pakistan being a Constitutional Democracy for a reason it is the only way to find lasting and sustainable improvement and finding in the way of quality of governance. The next chapter proceeds to discuss different factors in influencing C.S. in Pakistan.

CHAPTER NO: 4.

FACTORS INFLUENCING CIVIL SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN

In this chapter different factors are going to be examined which are responsible for a fractured C.S, a dysfunctional and relatively incapable civil government, and a far more organized, military and intelligence agencies being most capable state institutions in Pakistan, as compared to a vibrant and much strengthened C.S and comparatively consolidated democratization in Turkey.

The relations between the executive, the military and the judiciary have not been ideal and fear and mistrust continued. In the past years, Pakistan has managed to rise out of the quagmire and in the fact, has paved the way for a democratic system, which has to date suffered because of a number of factors. For Pakistan, the biggest challenge is to maintain balance between institutional pillars and allow the executive to take ascendance, as its constitutional right (Mahmood, 2013).

If political history of Pakistan and Turkey is analyzed keeping in view civil-military relationship, there are definitely some similarities. But the conditions on the other hand are different. There is a vast difference in the historical role of armed forces of both countries. Present armed forces in both countries are far apart. Role played by both forces in their respective countries has been explained in 'If I am assassinated' by Bhutto in detail while he was in Pindi jail that the people in Pakistan who give example of Turkey must remember that Turkish army fought war of independence for Turkey, but Pakistan army did not. The civil society is important watch dog of activities of legislature, executive and judiciary (Iqbal, S. 2015).

Leader of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kamal Pasha united distorted and disunited nation. He gave them constitution and parliament which his government abrogated in 1960. Pakistan's case is different; its independence movement was not fought by a General but a politician. In Turkey and Pakistan, four Martial Laws have been imposed. In Turkey, army has acquired power to do decision making during civilian rule with the help of NSC. In Pakistan as well, with the help of NSC the army generals tried to rule directly and sometimes indirectly (Gamascu, 2014).

Turkey's present leadership tried to diminish role of army by first organizing themselves. On one side amendment was made by the parliament to limit the role of the army and on the other side AKP on the basis of its ideology acquired support of the people. In 2009, Erdogan gave his perspective on shelling by Israel on Gaza making him hero of the Muslim world. It was because of people which turned minority of civilians to majority in NSC. Then on Defence Budget was created check and balance of the Parliament. In the military courts trial of civilians was stopped and in civilian courts trial of military personals was stopped. In 2010 Turk civil government was stopped to do secret operations without prior permission (Hussain, 2013).

In 2013, Erdogan initiated cases against military personals of sabotaging democracy and former Army Chief faced punishment for life. After this punishment a new series of punishments started. In December, 2013 discussions were uploaded on Y tube. Propaganda was started in Turkey which made the media to create hike.

In Turkey, suicide bombings started. Many restrictions were laid on the journalists and many journalists were jailed. Taking advantage of this distress in the

society attempt was made to derail democracy. This same media became saviour of democracy. When state run TV was under control of rebels, Erdogan telephoned CNN Turkey and requested the people to come on streets. When people saw their leader was ready to go on streets they came in front of tanks.

This failed coup attempt reveals that these tanks which are bought from the taxes paid by the people are not to attack the people. One brave soldier for saving his nation lies in front of the tank becomes a martyr but when he violates the constitution he becomes a *ghadaar*. That is why in Turkey after failure of coup Turkish army laid down their arms in front of their nation. Erdogan came to know some army men hate supremacy of the constitution. Turkish police while taking help from rebellious army men were arrested. Turks definitely deserve to be congratulated but being Pakistani we need to learn lesson and not claim win or defeat. Those people who are very happy of this defeat or success, army must stop interference in politics, organize our political parties and make our political parties democratic and make our state institutions stronger (Esen & Gamascu, 2017).

Regarding this, Turkey is a very good model to emulate for Pakistan. Firstly, it is a Muslim state which has managed to develop a balance between secularism and ideology. Secondly, it is also a regional power broker and is one that has successfully democratized its own political system and integrated the military by subsuming it within the political fabric. Still Turkey has not designed the new system and civil military relationship has not been defined as yet. But surely, the overemphasis of the army has gone. Putting the adventurist to task has surely created an environment where holding a coup is accountable (Ernest, Dec, 2013p.32).

Traditionally a heavily military inflexed system, Turkey can now proudly proclaim success in democratization and a healthy relationship between its political wing and the military (Malik, 2013). Main causes of existing reforms-orientated Turkey were accession to the European Union (EU) and the decision to shift to a market economy. This has not been easy, several hard steps are needed in order to use the right of the political education, but however the current set up has proven both sceptics and critics wrong (Tol, 2010).

Contrary to Turkey, Pakistan is unfortunately beset with a host of issues that continue to cast a pall on the democratic process and also places a burden on the civil military relations. The institutional setup is relatively weaker even though it has managed to come out stronger after decades of interrupted civilian rule and a number of military governments. There is a subversive “fear” that can only go if both institutions work together to rebuild that trust and gain lost ground in paving the way for a system that could with stand future attempts to derail the democratic process. However, such relations are not something that should be attributed to the military leadership’s penchant to play the power broker (Ali, 2015).

The civilian leadership has not been able to live up to its own responsibilities. Another reason is politician's collusion in the past with the military regimes to pursue their own interests. We all need to own up to this factor, whether it is politicians, military leadership, bureaucracy or judiciary. The civilians play a contributing factor and this role must be understood in greater depth to bind the potential and help the country move forward. It has been beautifully commented, "We control the army within the limits of

constitution. Being open, transparent: and committed constantly is the answer to our civil- military relations" (Gupta, 2004).

4.1. Institutional Challenges

Pakistan has been beset by a number of challenges that have endangered democracy and have been the major cause of institutional deadlock. This has also led to a rise in inter-institutional antipathy and clashes that from time to time resulted in downgrading of political institutions, principally the executive branch. It also had a deep impact on the political mind set leading to the growth of encouraging affinities among the military top cadres with certain political groups, a practice that only the military cannot be accused of, but one that mainstream political parties have indulged in to abet their own political survival and strength. There is no doubt that the collusion of civilian leadership with the military has fostered, encouraged and developed this practice. In Turkey, "There was an understanding between the military and the civilian elite. In the past, the judiciary has also been part of collusion mechanism, often sanctioning military rulers to continue their rule after the expiry of the preliminary emergency period" (Alagappa, 2004, p. 42).

But moving on the recent resurgence of political leadership is an encouraging development. Credit for this must also be given to military that wisely stayed away from politics and resisted the temptation to oust civilian set up of PPP government despite poor performance by the government. The PPP was able to complete their five years in powers. It had to suffer a defeat in 2013 polling, when the PML-N swept to power (Narishman, 2012).

The 2013 election were hailed as the first election following achievement of a democratically elected government to complete its tenure for the first in the independent life of Pakistan. It has also set a precedent that successive regimes and military leadership are likely to follow. The fact that the people have clearly lost appetite for a military takeover is also apparent (Narishman, 2012).

The other integral factor is that the evolution of this democratic pattern has received a major boost from a robust and vibrant media which has led to the development of a democratic society. Though may not be ideal but thanks to its vigilance the media has unintentionally provided a check and balance. But the Pakistan's media has still a long way to act in more responsible manner and not becoming proxy for different political factors to target each other (Mayfield, 2013).

Judiciary is another strong pillar of democracy. Non-partisan Judiciary can play critical role in balancing state power and maintaining a neutral platform that can provide justice whether it is deciding matters related to government decision or civilian affairs. The re-assertion of authority exercised by the C.S of Pakistan following the tussle with former president, Pervez Musharaff, is a testament to the fact that public support for ousted judges and their consequent reinstatement after a country wide popular movement was actually an exercise of people's will in the sanctity of the constitution. More importantly, it symbolized the hope invested in changing the system Pakistan had sunk into.

Even at this moment the institutional relations are weak. Trust has to be rebuilt and worked on but this is something all three state branches can work in cycle on and

achieve. In order to achieve this Turkish model is appropriate to the study which has managed to ensure a smooth and integrated process in which all branches of government work in close coordination and harmony. More institutional contact between the two countries and workshops to understand how to overcome any obstacles may help Pakistan learn from its close ally. How Turkey overcame the challenges and paralysis within its institutions, mainly the military and executive, is important because of three reasons; firstly, it is successful; secondly it is not too remote geographically and thirdly culturally it can be compared to Pakistan (Kaya, 2011).

First major Turkish pattern to follow is forum like National Security Council. It is the highest level body where the rationalized balance of civil and military leadership openly talks things over regarding all aspects of security including armed conflict, terrorism, energy, logistics, education, cyber security, food security etc.

Turkish people are still reforming and stabilizing the system and feel strongly that communication among all stakeholders and feedback is critical whether it is the masses at the grass root level or institutions like the military (Aknur, 2012, p. 39). This Council is the real strength of the Turkish democracy.

4.2. Domestic Crisis

Pakistan is facing many crises and not just in one sphere. Gul, while elaborating his feeling of being a friend and well-wisher of Pakistan said that,

We needed to treat our country like our child and if we didn't put our house in order, there would be uproar within our country and thorough foreign interventions (Heper and Sayan, 2002, p. 45).

He said that when in 2002 the AKP took over, similar conditions were faced by it to what Pakistan is facing now.

According to Aydynly (2002),

Leadership represented, religion technological advancement, economic prosperity better institutional presence end nationalism had helped Turkey in the last 11 years to get where it was (Heper and Sayan, 2002).

Looking at Pakistan, the downfall suffered by the economy as a result of global economic crisis, dwindling economic investments, and severe energy shortages which have had a highly adverse effect on industry and production and inflation and lack of coordinated strategy to address the key concerns. The current efforts underway since the new government took charge seem to be on the right track but delivery and results would take considerable time (Aknur, 2012).

What will have an immediate effect is to start countrywide small scale projects principally in provinces that have been neglected by previous government will provide employment to local population investing into the water sector to secure the life line of Pakistan and setting up schools and vocational and skills training centers that also offer employment to local communities will have positive impact. Eliminating administrative machinery of corrupt officials is another good precedent, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government undertook by dismissing three provincial ministers This should be emulated in other provincial set ups and at the center as well (Akboga, 2012).

Blaming administrative structures or lack of resources is not enough. Every government especially democratic government has adequate resources to allocate for this purpose. It is incumbent upon Pakistan to provide these basic facilities for its people. For

Pakistan, there is a point well embedded in the Turkish model, is more budgetary allocation to health and education (Nasr ,V. 2012, p. 239).

For, the human resource capital is something that can impact the economy and develop a well-educated and active C.S that can strengthen democratic institutions and contribute towards nation building. The knowledge based human resource is important for Turkey to transform into a high income country. Good governance, democracy, and systems in society are important for people to think, innovate and develop.” (Arat, 2005, p. 29)

In this context, the role of women is very important. In Pakistan, unfortunately girl's education has suffered because of rise in radicalism and militancy not only in tribal belt but even in settled areas. The government needs to ensure security and access to facilitate this to the best of its capability. The more this is neglected, the more militant elements will take this as a measure of their success and get the upper hand in developing a fear psyche in areas they have managed to establish some influence. The success achieved in Swat and other tribal agencies constituting FATA must not be wasted. Emphasis is also laid on the Information Communication Technology infrastructure to targeted subsidy programs and education. It should also be mentioned that lower female representation in the labor force in Turkey was due to their lower educational qualification and that it needs to be rectified (Staniland, 2008).

In Pakistan, the civil and military cooperation to bring development to militant controlled areas has seen the start of progressive educational programme is indeed an accomplishment. A number of schools and colleges have been set up, including girls'

schools and skills learning centers in South Waziristan are providing tribal boys from different agencies and ideal platform to learn and imbibe different disciplines and take part in sports and extracurricular activities. Just to provide another example of how well the civil- military cooperation works in previously conflict hit areas and where development work has been undertaken. It can be seen in the extensive road infrastructure, the development of village and town community centers and commercial hubs providing local population shops, tea shops and rest places to boost their earning capacity and start small businesses. All this is being done with round the clock support of the military stationed in the area that also provides help in civil projects through its engineers and civil work personnel (Ahmed, 2003).

While a lot is being achieved, which is unfortunately not given as much media coverage as it deserves, militancy remains a crucial aspect which is one of the major challenges which the country is facing today. It requires joint efforts by the civilian political set up and military. Pakistan's problem has been the lack of both development and application of a fully integrated and aggressive anti-militancy policy. Efforts have either been missing or avoided targeting militancy earlier. As a result, allowing such groups knowledge of changed tactics and proliferation under new guises. This is also the reason why US has been pointing fingers at Pakistan's "dual policy" of targeting some militants while allowing others to sustain in the state to be used at some other point. We need to ask ourselves, whether such a policy is benefitting us in any way, as part of our strategic doctrine pertaining India and Afghanistan or it has brought us only condemnation, to make matters worse and created a potent anti-state force within.

Pakistan should look at and tailor the Turkish guiding principles for targeting terrorism to suit its requirement (Singh, Spring 2013).

Turkey has also been trying hard to keep the critical balance between security requirements and the need to preserve and even enhance freedom concurrently. This is the guiding norm according to which counter terrorism activities are conducted in Turkey. This formula is missing in Pakistan's counter terrorism doctrine. No doubt, Pakistan's counter terrorism challenges are far bigger than Turkey's because of its geo-strategic position and the proximity to Afghanistan and in the historical context of being a front line state for *ihadists* who had been coming to the country since the time of the Afghan *Jihad* against the Soviets. Turkey's experiences and strategy in dealing with terrorism is something that should be shared and practiced (Bonfield, 2014).

4.3. Foreign Policy Issues

The problems which are being faced by Pakistan regionally have been on rise since its participation in war on terror led by the US. This involvement was largely circumstantial and the decision to become allies more or less was dictated by lack of another alternative.

US - Pakistan relationship has been uneasy despite being allies. They face an abysmal distrust and this is clearly apparent in the cooperation both countries engage in Pakistan's standing. On the other side, Afghan insurgents and Al-Qaida leadership taking refuge in Pakistan and establishing their bases raised doubts about transparency among the Pakistan's political and security establishment. Often the state apparatus, especially the military and intelligence, has been alleged to provide safe havens and

logistical help to the Afghan insurgents /Al Qaeda remnants. While the FATA belt particularly North Waziristan and some pockets in other agencies were under control of Pakistani Taliban which extend help to their Afghan country parts, and foreign militants. It is clear in the rest of the areas, such charges remain to be leveled. Pakistan's army has launched military offensive *Zarb-e-Azab* (counter terrorism strategy) and has achieved substantial success in taking control over these areas (Zahid, 2015).

As per Turkish model, engagement and development is equally important as use of force in order to defeat insurgencies. Unfortunately both Washington and Kabul fail to understand the need to do this and have been pressurizing Islamabad to take this offensive. They deem it as the panacea for the war in Afghanistan and the pivotal factor that will help them to crush the insurgency which is rather making things too simplistic. But Pakistan will have to speed up efforts and take a critical decision timely in order to extend operations in the remaining areas as well (Aydinli,2012).

Pakistan's relations with India also depend on the security factor. The long standing issue of Kashmir that has often been shelved aside while dealing with India; needs to be tackled at an international level. The fate of Kashmiri people as per the United Nations (UN) plebiscite is to be decided by them. But India has refused to implement the agreement and allowed for a free and fair decision by the Kashmiri's in Indian held Kashmir continues to fester. International community should support and pressurize India to initiate the process of resolving this dispute with Pakistan if it refuses to have any outside mediation on this issue. If it is resolved, it will continue to effect the relations between the both countries and also an impact on regional stability in view of the regional developments particularly the Arab spring. In view of the Iranian nuclear

deal, instability in Middle East vis-à-vis Syria, the continued unrest in Iraq, China's increased interest in Southwest Asia, Pakistan needs to evolve its position in keeping with its national interest and its solidarity with Arab states and promote regional stability and cooperation (Shah, 2014).

There is a proposal of starting a regional security organization on the lines of NATO for Islamic states in the wider Middle East, Gulf and Southwest Asia that will also have Turkey as a member state. It can serve a more comprehensive agenda; can look at regular cooperation to fight terrorism, drug and human trafficking and organized crimes. Besides terrorism, these issues continue to be cause of instability and pose a threat to all regional states' economies and security. An interesting observation has been made by Saadat Party (a right wing conservative in Turkey) which called for the formation of an organization for the Muslim *Ummah* on the lines of the UN. Although they are considered to be extreme right wing Islamists, their understanding of an Islamist society was that of tolerance and not imposing ones will on another.

They considered France to be an oppressed secularist state, while UK as respectful of all religions as it believed in letting people to have the freedom to live the way they wanted to. This was the lesson of tolerance and balance that most religious parties in our part of the world need to learn, whether they are Hindu extremist in India or radicals and extremists in Pakistan (Wuthrich, 2012).

Considering Pakistan's strategic position and being a nuclear power, it will continue to be in the limelight and will have to formulate its position in the region in line with the evolving dynamics. Afghanistan's growing strategic relations with India are a source of concern for Pakistan. Diplomacy and strategic foresight to work out its

relationship with Kabul is required from Pakistan as it enters a new phase in finding its own feet after the pullout of international forces. It is quite unfortunate that because of mistrust with Islamabad, Kabul has preferred to seek help from New Delhi to train its security officers and is also reported to be seeking weaponry and defense systems from India. Kabul will have to be careful in playing its cards against direct neighboring Pakistan and should avoid getting involved in any sort of proxy power flexing (Juris, 2012).

Similarly with China, since Beijing has made investments around billions of dollar in Afghanistan and has also signed a strategic pact that involves forming of Afghan police men, Kabul must be careful in maintaining a balance between regional rivals India and China seeking regional influence (Siddiqi, 2013).

In Turkey, improved services delivery and economic stability are perhaps prime factors which resulted in a subsequent balance in civil military relations and political stability. Without any doubt Turkish model could be beneficial for Pakistan, but current developments over there need to be studied also.

These views were shared by members of a delegation in Turkey on democratic consolidation at a public forum, which was on a visit to Turkey in November, 2013. The delegation comprised of journalists, former diplomats, retired army officers, politicians and C.S representatives. During its visit the delegation met with *“think tanks, the Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, opposition leaders, academia as well as members of National Security Council of Turkey”*. Somewhat similar to the coups in Pakistan, Turkey also had a history of interventions of military. But Turkey has been successful in strengthening

and consolidating its democracy over the past decade as compared to Pakistan (Atli, 2013).

It was revealed by the speakers that an important part was played by Turkey's bid to join European Union in achieving economic stability. Later on the economic growth resulted in a stable democratic government and a better service delivery (Durac, 2015).

The Chairman National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Awaiz Leghari, said that it was capable of taking its people on board in making governance decisions and strengthening its financial discipline.

According to Shaista Pervez Malik (2010),

The Turkish Government had made lives comfortable for its people before winning support for structural reforms, which Pakistan can learn from (Malik, 2010, p. 89).

Farhatullah Babar, Pakistan PPP Senator said that there are some significant differences and similarities in the Military coup of Pakistan and Turkey.

The Turkish military helped in Turkish independence movement, which did not happen in Pakistan. In Pakistan the military has systematically and irretrievably established its influence over the political economic and landed power centers in the country which did not happen in Turkey (Ahmed, 2002, p. 139).

According to Babar,

The Turkish government appeared to have helped in winning the confidence of the people because of success in delivering services to its people. The trial for previous coups of army officers: also acted as prevention against any interventions of military in future (Jalal, 2014, p. 107).

While commenting on current situation in Turkey Senator Mushahid Husain said that because of the resignation of the members of the Turkish ruling party in 2014, the political parties couldn't reach consensus for drafting a new constitution. The breach in

the veneer of democratic stability of Turkey might be revealed by these developments (Tribune, 2014).

Since independence Pakistan has endured an alternating cycle of military and democratic rules. Due to the strength of intelligence agencies and military, compliant judiciary, western support for dictatorships of Pakistan, support of political parties and religious groups to military at the cost of democracy are different factors responsible for provision of stable democracy elusive (Sunawer, 2015).

In the relatively short history of Pakistan, the number of military interventions reveals that politicians have had a rare chance to receive message from the voters about their performance, rather often before that the summary the military stepped in (Khan, 2012).

A report, which depended on a countrywide opinion supervised by PILDAT and led by Gallup Pakistan, on the views on State of Democracy in South Asia: 2013 (Pakistan Report), showed that:

- (i) Almost 50 percent of the general population of Pakistan is happy with the working of democracy in Pakistan
- (ii) Legislation, opportunity express individual views understanding of general public, etc. had turned out to be better
- (iii) If the procedure was not derailed people's belief in vote based system would further increase.

Ijaz Shafi Gillani said (a prominent Social Scientist and the founder/chairman of Gallup Pakistan) on the premise of this report popular government had all the more brilliant future in Pakistan. Keeping in view the single religion populace, Prof Hassan Askari Rizvi (Pakistani political scientist, military/defence analyst) who was a major contributor in this report, accentuated that popular government was a long procedure and would demonstrate its effectiveness in the wake of holding of four to five successive elections. According to him, Political parties had not been provided a fair opportunity because of military interventions to strengthen democracy (Saeed, 2014).

Prof. Rizvi (2012) had pointed out five major and important challenges that Pakistan is facing in order to achieve the ideals of equal citizenship, constitutional liberalism, political and civil rights without any discrimination, and rule of law. Democracy in Pakistan is facing the following challenges which are directly related to:

- i) Those specific groups and individuals who want to take advantage of the elections and democratic procedures by using them as a means to employ their hard line Islamic order or peculiar political ideas in form of;**
- ii) non-elected state institutions like the judiciary, military and the bureaucracy**
- iii) unrestrained competition between the political players**
- iv) terrorism and religious extremism which causes the break-up of the society and**
- v) Poor governance by and provincial governments, and the federal government.**

Thus Pakistan government needs to adopt policy-measures to reduce socio-economic pressures on the common people and assure them security of their life and property. Some scholars suggest continuity of civil government policies to bring consolidation of democracy in Pakistan. Cohen stated that Pakistan must have real political parties in order to have a real democracy. The civilian leaders will be required to display a level competence and fact in order to become a stable democratic country. In rebalancing the civil-military relationship, gradual, staged retreat from politics by the army and in the demonstration of increasing competence by the civilians lays finally the effective restoration of full democracy in Pakistan (Rizvi, 2012).

Prof Tahir Amin (2014) revealed that he believes *"democracy is not only slow, but lengthy and gradual process"*, and that he is much positive and hopeful *"after holding three to four consecutive elections, Pakistan will make a successful transition to 'stable' democracy"*. He is of the view that *"viability of democracy"* in Pakistan relies upon both domestic and international factors, and the part played by armed force, which has in post-Musharaff time *"stepped back"* to some extent, is also important in implementing *"effective democracy"* in Pakistan. Coincidentally, Rizvi and Amin are practically of same view to the extent of Pakistan's transition to "stable" popular government system is concerned (Amin, 2014).

A mass movement of C.S and political parties in 2007-2008 was successful in ousting General Musharaff and opening the path to democratic consolidation in Pakistan. The achievement of movement can be linked to different factors; strong administration from the judiciary and lawyers, a coalition of C.S and political groups/parties having same objective of protecting freedom of judiciary, the return of compelling political

icons from exile, an assertion among political icons on a COD setting out an arrangement for administration of Pakistan after the end of dictatorship, activate supporters and the promotion of private, independent and powerful media that could challenge official form of occasions (Jones, 2015).

Several obstacles have emerged to consolidate democracy, since ousting of Musharaff. Short coming in generating information of the presence of Osama bin Laden despite admission of its weakness by the military. The intelligence agencies seem, by all accounts, to be firmly guarding the control of remote strategy and resistance and working in different regions under non-military personnel control. As they worked out the balance of power between them, a slow pace of reforming party practices and parliament, apprehension among the political parties persisted as their negotiations were going on the coalition government and there was weak participation by C.S; the friction between judiciary and the government continued. Allegations of corruption have surfaced by which the past civilian governments were plagued (Rumi, 2014).

The move towards democracy that began with the mass movement of 2007-2008 was built on C.S and general public in creating healthy legislative plan to deal with basic issues which are faced by Pakistan, the civilian government should emphasize influence over the intelligence agencies and the military and corruption be prosecuted and investigated upon. In democratization of practices political parties should be strengthened.

Media and C.S should likewise be advocates for reformation and be made more effective watch dogs. The international community on its part could become more

involved in intensification of democratic norms in government. The C.S with the help of donor support, by maintaining long term assistance for especially efficient civilian organizations and institutions and through expanded consultations might encourage democratization (Brown, 2009).

4.4. Past Factors in Failure to Consolidate Democracy

In 1947, when Pakistan was partitioned, primacy of consultation was underlined by political leaders of Pakistan. However, establishment of a viable political system proved to be a daunting task after facing death blows at the time of its creation in the form of death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, and assassination of the patriot P.M Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. In order to strengthen their political position the ruling elites began to cultivate the military.

4.4.1. The Military

The first constituent assembly was dismissed in 1954 by the Governor General Ghulam Mohammad with military support, who included in the cabinet senior military personnel. It signaled important shift of political power from the parliament to the Civil Service and also the Governor General with the help of army. General Ayub, the army chief became the first dictator of the country and led a military coup d'état in 1958. The Disqualification Order of Elected Bodies, 1959 was also sidelined, all political parties were banned and political icons were punished (Kayani, 2015).

This act left no room for parliamentary democracy which the father of the nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah had envisioned when army formed an alliance with civil bureaucracy. As per H. A. Rizvi (2015), the nominal democratic institutions were

removed from the scene by military when it took over in 1958. It gave full power and authority to bureaucracy and army to run the country. The President General Ayub Khan also kept a tight rein on political parties. Unless permitted by an act of the parliament Article 173 of 1962 Constitution laid bar on contesting elections. Only limited activity was allowed by the political parties' act, which was passed in 1962. Extreme measures against political parties in the form of different rules were sustained to boycott or limit political parties which undermined their lead (Jaspal, 2015).

Greater part of the constitution was set in abeyance after Pakistan's second upheaval by General Zia in 1977, including fundamental rights and article 17, '*the freedom of association*'. Zia furthermore proclaimed the Martial Law Order No. 31 in June 1978, acquainting exclusive tribunals with solicit charges of tragic conduct against the people who had agitated against the 1977 general elections. Any difference was managed with brutality under specially designed laws and all types of political activities were effectively controlled (Noman, 1989).

Retired General Musharaff, who remained in power for 9 years, utilized the same tactics of rigging local and national elections and suppressing democratic forces. 17th amendment opened a way to legitimate his powers in Dec. 2003. In this way too many powers were granted to President as compared to the P.M. It additionally included the ability to expel the head of the government (Bell, 2014).

4.4.2. Intelligence Agencies

Pakistan's military used intelligence agencies very tactfully to deal with the emerging opposition. In this way the role of agencies can be seen in the form destabilizing, hassling, controlling, and screening Pakistan's media, political parties and

different institutions. The operations against targeted intellectuals, disagreeing government officials and different activists were helped out through, disinformation, harassment, invented trials, torment, kidnappings, and assassinations (Weinberg, 2013, p. 83).

With Ayub Khan's 1958 rebellion, the political part of ISI started. As an office it became in charge of checking the media, Pakistani political icons and politically dynamic part of the society. Social organizations having potential for political impact, for example, trade unions, labour unions, students were controlled tightly. The Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), likewise called the inner wing, made particularly to assemble political knowledge, was the biggest division of the organization. The intelligence agencies turned out to be all the more profoundly involved in domestic political issues under the nation's next military dictator, 'Yahya Khan'. He suspected that the politicians of East Pakistan were maneuvering a secessionist uprising, and hence were Inter Services Intelligence's (ISI) first victim (Garare, 2009).

Civilian leaders could not get any benefit by reinforcing of the old practice of keeping a close watch on the opposition. Z. A .Bhutto paid special importance to strengthening civilian administrative apparatus to minimize dependence on the military in worse law and order conditions and made Federal Security Force (FSF), he created the political Cell of ISI (Nawaz, 2011).

Gen Zia disbanded the FSF yet additionally extended the ISI power to gather residential insight on religious and political associations that restricted the administration. After Zia's period, the military over and again disturbed democratic working from 1988 to 1999, when popular citizen governments were in power. At behest

of military, various presidents dismissed successive civilian governments. Indeed no civilian government was permitted to finish its full five years term. The ISI under General Musharaff was given the errand, assets, freedom and flexibility to debilitate the governing party and guarantee dependability of the government (Khan, 2013).

4.4.3. The Religious Groups

In a deliberative procedure of de-politicization, government officials and political parties were disparaged; majority rule norms and vote based system were addressed and depicted as inadmissible to the social customs of Pakistan and the Muslim character of the state. During Field Marshal Ayub Khan's Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (MPO) of 1960, moderate politicians who opposed dictatorship were main targets. Then General Zia -ul- Haq in late 70's, stepped forward and based Pakistan's legal and educational frameworks on a strict Sunni elucidation of law (Hussain, 2013).

At that point the military and General Musharaff were of the view that, not the religious groups, rather secular leaders were their adversaries for political power and they kept on utilizing religious groups for their own favorable position against the secular political rivals (Akhtar, 2012).

4.4.4. Submissive Judiciary

The military hold on power was legitimized at an early stage by an agreeable judiciary. The Supreme Court of Pakistan put its "blessings" on the military administration on Oct 27, 1958 in a decision that a fruitful rebellion is a globally perceived legitimate technique for changing a constitution. The judiciary attempted to disclose its inability to ensure the constitution through what they called the "doctrine of

necessity", which depended on the questionable contention that the armed forces takeover could be legitimized as a result of the requirement for political dependability (Khalid, 2012).

4.4.5. Political Parties

The major political parties have endured on account of the military in the struggle for democracy under dictators. In any case, they have been blamed for not meeting vote based models when they framed governments. All Pakistani elected governments have been alleged of incompetence, corruption, partisanship and patronage (Khalid, 2012).

Despite the passion for such reforms, the Party leaders couldn't even implement basic democratic norms within their own parties. Party leadership tend to be dominated by small elite, instead of serving their party or the people, they are utilizing their positions to collect individual wealth. Instead of being transparently challenged, nominations to run from party are sole decisions of their leaders. Party position holders are not elected as per law rather are selected by nepotism, and party policy and forum hardly consider views of the common members (Zain, 2010).

A few political leaders have helped in toppling civilian government for meager amount of bribery offered to them. They also helped in fragmenting the parties and had become a reliable source of intelligence (Johnston, 2005). The key to the military's capacity to debilitate prominent parties and keeping control of the political system has been conceivable in light of the willingness of some political parties to conspire with the intelligentsia and military against their political opponents (Ahmad, 2005).

4.4.6. Western Support for Pakistani Dictatorships

Intense animosity towards the West has been engendered because of Western support for undemocratic regimes in Pakistan. Mrs. Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of the state had acknowledged the US support of progressive dictatorial administrations, under which Pakistan experienced long spells of merciless dictatorial rules. After and before the assaults of Sep 11, 2001 US strategies reinforced religious fanatics in the military regime. The military despots weakened victimized all forms of demands for democracy. A recent example of Mushraff's rule can be quoted, when he confirmed his eagerness to take an interest in the US proclaimed war against terror after the Sep 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In 1999 US sanctions forced on Pakistan were lifted and cash started to stream again from US to Pakistan treasury. Moreover, the 2002 general elections, which legitimized Mushraff's control, despite the fact that domestic and worldwide spectators proclaimed that these were hugely fixed, had no repercussions for the regime. Mushraff's view that Pakistan was not yet fully prepared for democracy was strictly accepted by almost all foreign governments and political forces. His policy of "*Enlightened Moderation*" disguised the suppression of fundamental rights in Pakistan. Containment of political parties during this period was considered as internal issue by international community. They believed the political parties were corrupt, feudal and not capable of handling war on terror as Musharauff could (Zunes, Nov, 2007).

Musharauff played a double game from 2002 till his ouster from power in 2008, accepting billions of dollars form Bush regime while turning bake on, if not approving it right; Ongoing military support for religious radical entities that were known to be involved in militant actions was continued (Siddiqa,2013).

4.5. Ethnic Violence

Ethnic Violence has additionally been on the climb since the 1980's and touched its top in the 90's. In 1948 the declaration of Urdu as the national language achieved a language gap that was exacerbated by the accepted prevalence of Punjabis on viable and elitist posts in the police, equipped constrain and business undertakings (Sirohi, 2015).

Altogether all the more focusing on, especially after the mass development of non-Bengalis from East Pakistan, was the ascent of an ethnic group called the "*Mohajirs*". These are the people who had migrated in 1947 to Pakistan and viewed themselves as to be seriously maltreated by neighbourhood occupants particularly in Sindh and Punjab. The ethnic segment is unnecessarily an aggravating and new face. Over the previous decades, the vast majority of the general population now recognize themselves and their neighbours by common affiliation as opposed to Pakistanis and ethnic starting point. Government officials utilize ethnic "cards" to incite, outrage and for inconvenience between adversaries. Ethnic clash has been controlled and encouraged to make ethnic violence, especially in Karachi, where "*target killings*" is a daily routine, for the rival groups. Neighbourhoods and zones are named as being of a specific ethnicity, and other ethnic communities are either not permitted, or refrain from going to because of fear. In Baluchistan the term "Punjabis" is beyond any doubt to bring about security issues and unpleasant recall of the circumstance in past East Pakistan, and similarly, is utilized to imply any person who conveys in Urdu or Punjabi and he may have lived in the major urban groups (Johnston, Sarbahi, 2015).

It would be appropriate here to clarify ethnicity, ethnic clash and ethnic violence, and attempt to set up an association between ethnic brutality and C.S corporations. Ashutosh Varshney (2001) is of the view that the structure of regular frameworks in a multiethnic culture chooses the degree and nature of ethnic savagery. Ethnicity is quite recently the set to which distinctive religious requests, vernacular, religion and race, have a place. Ethnic clash is the weight which is made by having complexity of viewpoints and suppositions by different ethnic gatherings in perspective of their unmistakable ethnic back grounds. Albeit some ethnic groups; could have been compelled into ethnically precluded class through quality from securing others. But it is altogether different from class based clash. In any ethnically plural society which allows free enunciation of political requests, it may not really prompt to violence, though some ethnic conflict is pretty much inevitable. There are probably going to be clashes over character, financial resources, approaches and patronage, when there are distinctive ethnic communities or groups which are allowed to be organized (Varshney, 2001).

The real issue is whether ethnic conflicts are savage or pursued by means of the standardized channels of the strategy. If by any chance those ethnic challenges take a systematized shape in assemblages, parliaments, in bureaucratic entries, and as tranquil activities in the city, it is not violence yet rather a contention. Such controlled conflict must be isolated from a condition in which disagreement takes rough and fierce forms, revolting breaks out in the city, and in its most crazy shape common war is started against some ethnic group with the commitment of state powers. For all useful purposes, ethnic peace should be conceptualized as a systematized coordinating and assurance of

ethnic requests and clashes not as non-appearance of contentions but instead as non-attendance of violence (Majeed, 2000).

While explaining ethnic or civil engagement, Varshney(2001) recognized difference between engagements among ethnic associations or formal groups and regular engagement as in social engagements in neighbourhoods, playing together, having social joint celebrations, and making social calls, and so on (Varshney, 2001).

In this way everyday types of engagement comprise of basic, routine communications of life; like whether families from various groups eat together frequently, visit each other, allow their youngsters to play together in the area and mutually participate in celebrations. Both types of engagement, if enthusiastic, advance peace: But in turn around, their nonappearance or shortcoming opens up space for ethnic brutality. However among these two, the associational shape end up being sturdier than reliably engagement, especially when stood up with attempts by legislators to separation of people along ethnic lines. Vigorous associational life, if interethnic, goes about as a real constraint on government officials, even in the event that when ethnic polarization is to their most noteworthy advantage. The harder it is for politicians to divide groups, the more the associational systems divide over ethnic grounds (Varshney, 2001, p. 63).

The self-serving vested interest groups have exploited C.S in Pakistan. These groups are projected by external benefactor financing and prey to impulses and trends of improvement help. The massively different ethnic mosaic in Pakistan has been utilized to make few fractions, with minimal formal or casual affiliations. The effectively existing *biradari* (clan) and tribal framework that has brought on a great part of the dependable

rivalries and feuds in rustic zones have been fortifying by partisan (sectarian), religious, lingual and 'place of birth groupings' (Hassnain,2007).

Besides, students and trade unions, political affiliations, affiliations are formed on the preface of ethnicity, and contrasts between "us and them" have been perceived and opened up to the level of bias of each other and technique for living. Perhaps, what starts off as a look for singular space identity and, is changed rapidly into gatherings falling back to violence and battling. C.S bunches have truly transformed into a bit of this splintering, far from raising their voice against the incredible polarization of society (Nayani, 2015).

C.S has no doubt played a key part in progressing and developing ethnic viciousness by bracing ethnic contrasts; keeping social associations obliged to people of their own groups; staying noiseless when assertions and gossips adequately partaking in the savagery which is created. Starting late, the single 'urban move' taken by one single group, lawyers, that later joined the media and NGOs, was the lawyer's movement to rebuild up the influentially ousted Chief Justice of Pakistan. The movement, accomplished paying little heed to political disguise at the most lifted sum, had all the earmarks of being the silver lining. Better trust was given to the coming C.S in Pakistan. This trust is in no time beginning to diminish. Frightful deeds have been accomplished for religion and respect, individuals have been lynched by crowds, females have been tormented, ambushed and executed, essential and unskilled individuals have been confined for giving saw impiety and those testing to stand up have been lauded, primitive rulers have kept poor men, women and adolescents for constrained work. However, there are some individuals who take up these issues (Adil, 2015).

Notwithstanding numerous years of mishandling of a large number of the landless and poor by few landlords, rising desperation and difference, non-appearance of essential preparing, prosperity and social organizations, and overpowering and twisted expense evaluation of the already stacked salaried class, no social development has started in any huge way. Isolated quiet differences have been moved by number of activists however most difficulties have been as unlawful plunder, loot, fire related crime and shootings (Siddiqui, 2012).

Significantly all the additionally irritating is the non-attendance of any group and vocal social movement against the savagery and cruelty which occurs over all provinces crosswise over Pakistan; flighty and detached voices are heard detesting viciousness. Regardless, the nation has yet to witness a flooding of the profundities of agony and torment that solely a couple of occupants express face to face. There are a couple calls for peace and a conclusion to viciousness, yet these are every now and then smothered by the louder and odder indications of support for radical and biased exercises (Mirhmadi, 2015).

While Nadvi and Robinson (2004) saw the media as a creating wellspring of trust, they in like manner highlighted its youthfulness. The free print and electronic media is likewise creating as fit and a basic voice in propelling open deliberation, propelling obligation and updating principles of impartial administration. The media is moreover revealing Pakistani society and culture to a broad assortment of worldwide qualities. The media has yet to end up distinctly a crucial figure progressing and scattering an arrangement on expert poor developmental goals. Powerless ethics, stunning news scope, and non-attendance of arranged writers have added to contention

between TV channels over the 'breaking news' disorder. This keeps most TV channels away from expecting a suitable part in the objective examination of issues, spreading resistance and antagonism to brutality conclusions, and tending to tranquil ways of conflicts. More often than not, the media has impelled general society and often times uses sketchy and uneven individuals to air their own specific viewpoints. Print Media is similarly at fault in a country where only a small population read and compose English; the fundamental media bunches which do display some level of ethics and restrictions are essentially the English ones (Tinnes, 2013).

4.6. Terrorism in Pakistan

Since the 1980's terrorism has been gradually increasing in Pakistan and has resulted in psychological disorder, social and financial recession. Since Sep. 9, 2001 it has taken another most obvious face .Terrorism and militants have made a 'mixed bag' of ideologically determined obsession, sectarian violence, outrageous prejudice and political wars. Terrorism has adopted an ethnic face in the business hub of Karachi since the late 80's and sectarian violence have expanded in a few sections of the nation. Baluchistan has been agitated for long, while prior to that circumstances was a blend of political issues and ethnic, it is clear that this is a rich ground for militants to operate (Schneiderman, 2015).

Militant groups are to a great extent made up of diverse groups including some female supporters. These incorporate religious groups helped by sectarian and political, terrorist associations, ethnic groups having fanned ethnic violence and gangs, including illegal drugs and also land mafias. A significant number of these have been prospering and their dynamic focuses being KPK, South Punjab, Lahore, Karachi, Quetta and

Islamabad. They keep on being regularly upheld by some political support. They are very much supported and considered as 'strategic assets' by a portion of the intelligentsia (Zaman, 2013).

4.7. Causes of Terrorism

The important role of armed forces and other security agencies, terrorist religious associations in supporting and encouraging "non-state actors," fanatics, jihadis, Taliban and activists cannot be dismissed (Ahmed, 2015). The Taliban, who adequately set up a whole deal resistance and guerrilla war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, were distinctive, however, ideologically spurred individuals from Afghanistan, diverse central Asian republics especially Chechnya, Arabs and Pakistan. Likewise, there were the psychological militants who were offered support to the constant resistance in Kashmir (Irshad, 2015).

Along with them were the warlords, smugglers, criminals, lawbreakers, runners and partisan groups that had developed. They were taught in thought of violence, narrow mindedness, prejudice and mutilations of religious genuine lessons. Logically, among these are disturbed and disillusioned ethnic gatherings that imagine that they have been precluded from securing rights and resources for a truly long time by dynamic governments, as in Baluchistan. As a rule, Swat had home-developed Taliban, while FATA and Baluchistan have numerous foreigners. Karachi has both ethnic and politically inspired groups, and those in Punjab are more sectarian (Syed, 2015).

Until the army started operations in Swat, nexus amongst military and those non-state performing actors, fuelled by each other's activities and actions, had not changed.

Many reports ensured that the nexus existed to date regardless of the way that to a lesser degree. Questions have been raised continually, about government endeavours to wipe out the frameworks of psychological oppressor relationship in Pakistan, particularly those in FATA, KPK, Baluchistan and the Punjab. There are signs that a substantial bit of these have supporters inside the organization, resistance, coalition accomplices, the establishment, and religious affiliations (Reidel, 2015).

Since 2001, there have been many records of the moves made to cut down on terrorist and militant organizations, their centers, camps and groups. Pakistani's society, driven by religious sentiments and political groups, stayed isolated over the diversion of an outfitted compel operation against Pakistanis, and bolstered by the especially questionable 'drone attacks'. This is the supposition held by the people who believe that utilizing military was the fundamental way out for the civilian government to get control over individuals, for example, the aficionados of Sufi Mohammad and Maulana Fazlullah. They had started the drive to present their own form of Sharia Law in Swat, started diplomacy with the rulers and government and after that disregarded the terms of the understanding. The individuals who hold this perspective likewise say that the war is for survival of Pakistan and is longer the ward of the US. Sadly, it is a typical common war and is being battled consistently against groups who are still Pakistanis. General notions and feelings, fuelled furthermore by the media, is climbing against the U.S hypothesis of majority rule government, in the wake of Raymond Davis activities in Lahore and the butchering of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad.

The other point of view is that the Taliban are exemplary, God dreading bunches attempting to authorize the laws of Islam, and that the government is taking the headings

of the West. The administration is doing this by executing and hurting its own regular people and permitting drones to kill the natives. Without any doubt, even individuals who are against the systems selected by the Taliban are of the view that stories of these methodologies have been twisted and bended, or that it is not the Taliban who have done the reported criminal activities, yet components guaranteeing to have a place with Taliban groups (Saeed, 2012).

Militant groups make dread, create fear, tumult, chaos and uncertainty in the public eye. These groups contrast in their ideology and philosophical inspiration and source of origin. They incorporate the remaining parts of the Afghan "*Mujahidin*" who were created, and upheld mutually by the US and Pakistan to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Among them, religious radicals and devotees who thought that all the people who differ with their ideology should be killed. Sectarian groups with hatred for those having no place with their order: ethnic groups avenging assumed real rivalries and competitions; political groups; land and drug mafias and criminals. A large number of them are Afghans, recruited from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and a portion of the Central Asian states (Zainab, 2012-13).

At the point when the Soviet war finished, a huge number of these people prepared and exceptionally trained who had been motivated by the sentiments of Islam were left without a contrasting option to channel their guerrilla war abilities. Their energies and attention was reinforced by extensive quantities of youthful enlisted people from the large number of Madrassahs prospered in the 90s, who were inspired to fight the Indian armed force in Kashmir. Therefore, the quantity of extra Mujahidin extended

to incorporate more youth, along with this ideologically determined and well-prepared people from a few regions, particularly the Punjab and KPK (Masood,2012).

The increase in militancy owes much to the Afghan intrusion by the Soviets in the 70s, and the resulting strategy utilized by both Pakistan and the US, though for altogether different reasons. The US needed to keep the Soviets from advancing forward and gaining grounds and in this way geo-political advantage including access to Central Asia and the Pakistani government likewise needed to hold a solid future role in Afghanistan. Pakistan was reliant on help from the US and bolstered the then Zia administration in its endeavours to "Islamize" Pakistan. Both the nations teamed up in enlisting, preparing and recruiting a huge number of militants, predominantly healthy and strong men, from Afghanistan and Pakistan (Murphy, 2013).

The guerrilla strategies included and the commitment showed by these warriors, to be called Afghan 'Mujahidin', and afterward the Taliban, brought on the Russians to pull back after over five years of war. The Taliban came to hold in 1996 and stayed in power and decided Afghanistan until 2001. After that, they were ousted by a NATO and US driven military fights and operation after 9/11 in World Trade Centre in America offensive after 9/11 (Shahbaz,2013). According to several reports and personal records, the reign of Taliban was noticeable by their attitudes towards female and adherence to ethics and religious beliefs (Cordesman, 2014).

During this reign, their supporter's claims, the crime rate had gone down. Their commentators denounce their bigotry, fear and general sense of terror they figured out how to make. The Taliban have regrouped since 2004 and restored as a solid revolt

development representing nearby Pashtun blocks and are engaged in a guerrilla war against the rulers and government of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the NATO-drove International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). They have set up their gatherings in Pakistan, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan(TTP), said to have a deep roots in South Waziristan and also spread out in Baluchistan and the Punjab. It is trusted that countless Taliban are currently made of students from *Madrassahs* under the patronage of political and religious parties (mainly Sunni) group inside Pakistan (Rani, Aug, 2015).

In the 80's because of the Afghan war, Pakistan likewise endured the worst part of a huge number of Afghans getting away from the hardships, along with Taliban supporters alongside arms and ammunition. Pakistan within 10 years had turned into an equipped society with cheap, however complex, weapons easily accessible. In a nation torn with self-serving rulers and politicians, neediness and minimal social or monetary advancement, weapons approached to men who could now review their apparent or genuine wrongs through furnished violence.

Pakistan had not been injured by inward militancy and clashes it confronts now. Had the nation been administered by powerful popularity based institutions and had the state satisfied its obligations in guaranteeing assurance of life and property. Obliging individuals' needs as opposed to outside clear security dangers are shown by an Indian focused foreign policy.

After couple of years into a stumbling majority rule government, both Parliament and politicians have yet to exhibit effectiveness to what the general population required in the nation. Individuals require access to quality training and education at all levels,

lower cost, chances to vast scale investment, raise income, low cost and easily available health services, perceived security and actual and an equitable distribution of national resources. (Rid 2010).

Militancy, in the nation has added to the carelessness in managing the components that have reared an atmosphere helpful for militancy and violence. Militancy is not kept to KPK, and FATA and is not honed just by the group named as the Taliban. It is a significantly more comprehensive wonder, and exists in major urban areas of different regions and provinces including Sindh, the Punjab and Baluchistan. It has spilled into AJK and Gilgit Baltistan Province also (Genesan, 2013).

The Taliban are no more drawn out the activists who had accumulated and regrouped their thrashing of the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now they are mixed with the land grabbers, criminals, drug mafias, ethnic and sectarian groups, tribal factions, political and ideologically based groups, offended youth and people with personal stakes. These assorted groups have supported the TTP. Added to this is the disdain against the arrangements and activities of Western governments towards Palestine, Iraq and Kashmir and Muslims all over the world (Hussain, 2003).

Far over the rates cited in government records many accuse extreme poverty to be the basic reason for the offense among militants. Baiting the youthful to guarantees of a superior future: whether in the form of wealth in heaven in the great beyond: or in this world. Others refer to the spread of misjudged religious and rigid doctrines to be fundamental cause. Both are legitimate, however the purposes behind the board

destitution and religiosity, the nature of it, and any cures for the same requires additional understanding and examination if militancy is to be countered viably (Siddique, 2012).

Poverty in Pakistan is multifaceted and is the immediate consequence of the absence of premium and readiness to build up the nation as an agrarian economy, bolstered by industrialization and investment in human capital improvement. Primitive land rulers have overwhelmed farming in Pakistan and keep most of the country populace as free workers, giving small amounts as a sign of kindness (food, garments and shelter) as an end-result of working the grounds. Primitive proprietors don't pay any charges, have demoralized individuals from sending their kids to schools and have not contributed the immeasurable wages from their homesteads in the advancement of the villages from where the work comes.

A significant part of the wages is invested into setting up profitable businesses away from rural areas or is either deposited in foreign accounts. Many feudal lords have arrived in assemblies and Parliament and rule among the more elite classes of government officials and the groups named the "elite" of Pakistan's society. Pakistan proceeds with a primitive society, dissimilar to what happened in India not long after partition, alongside the medieval rulers, the third Pillar along with the armed forces and religious segments have figured out how to keep the nation prisoner to inside strife and insecurity (Maleckova, 2003).

Feudalism has turned out to be more strong and has survived, giving ascent to expanded disparity, forestalling access of chances to poor people, maintaining status quo in education availability to the elite class. The control over Pakistan's assets is in a couple

of families, and majority deprivation has had a vast influence in increasing the poverty and in fairness levels, and in giving prolific ground to psychological militant belief systems to flourish. This has been upheld by high absence of education, low quality of education and the practically total disappoint among the populace about people in public sector. Government schools and universities surely can't plan youngsters for a helpful part in financial advancement and society. They likewise incite prejudice, and empower and disdain and violence through bended adaptations of history, religious extremism and the utilization of illicit intends to acquire affirmations and pass examinations (Kristof, 2009).

Not just are lack of education and destitution at alarmingly abnormal rates, an extensive number of individuals are jobless. Many are unemployable, lacking fundamental abilities, whether business, technical or specialized jobs are concerned. Others can't discover openings, aside from on the off chance that they move to substantial urban communities where cities are overburdened by expanding populace. Absence of chances to enhance their skills combined with high rate of unemployment has made the youth, and particularly the urban population to lose hope and look for all the sources of livelihood whichever employers they can find. Militants, terrorists, criminals, tranquilize traffickers and dope sellers enrolled them, and depend on violence and demonstrations of hostility against both state and society (Zaman, 2013).

Reliably oppressive arrangements, state control over social and social exercises and absence of consolation to sharing of information and open deliberations have added to unbending nature, and bigotry to any perspectives other than one's own. It has not been a priority to provide justice and the strict implementation of laws. The criminals,

the police, powerful politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen, have developed many alliances between them, resulting in crimes against humanity, frauds, and social evils (Feldman, 2010).

Pakistanis have a short memory as a nation. Not many people remember the lessons from the breakup of the country in 1971 nor we have the culture to do after-action reviews. In fact as a nation we don't like analysis and reviews. Regardless of the possibility that they did, the everyday issues of survival, exacerbated by high inflation, keep the "ordinary" man excessively drained, excessively occupied and excessively discouraged even didn't care to mind. Separatist perspectives have picked up force in Baluchistan and Sindh is not a long ways behind. The inability to convey Baluch nationals to the table is proved to be costly, and is probably going to incite distress and proceed with turmoil, with expanding militant assaults. Analysis of the figures on the overall militant attacks demonstrates that Baluchistan rank among the three most violent unpredictable areas, alongside FATA and KPK (Afzal, 2012).

The interior of Sindh has been a safe haven for dacoits and different law breakers yet is considered moderately free of militant assaults. It is laden with issues of viciousness against Haris and females. Viciousness against females is very common in different areas as well, and in numerous such cases, the capable feudal who additionally possess key positions inside the government utilize their clout to secure the individuals who have carried out such violations. South Punjab is thought to be a standout amongst the most savage territories socially, with occurrences of exorbitant severity executed by both the police and common citizens, with nobody yet conveyed to equity (Iqbal, 2015).

Social events of minorities, sacred places of worship and significant urban areas, have been focuses for sectarian and ethnic violence. In Karachi alone, a blend of partisan killings and ethnic conflicts cause many deaths and injuries each year. Sufi shrines, Sunni and Shia mosques, chapels and churches, spots of worship of Ahmadis and Hindu worship places have been focused on often. Opponent and Political parties have blended with ethnically inspired people to do the much-feared "target killings" that is common now in Karachi, and to which there is by all accounts no down to earth arrangement so far (Orakzi&Others, 2009).

With such a scathing blend of social: political and financial issues; and the obvious absence of readiness or; capacity and responsibility from progressive governments. One may contend that C.S has been controlled, confined and kept from building up a group and intelligent discouragement, from accomplishing more, if not keep the spread of militancy and violence. However, C.S itself is likewise incompletely in charge of the change. It has been excessively consumed in individually determined motivation, contending for resources and funds as opposed to putting resources into coalitions and systems for better backing, abandoning troublesome issues not withstanding resistance, and has held an elitist method of operations. Parts of profound quality have gradually been dissolving. C.S has been not able to convey groups with contrasting suppositions to a similar table, and has kept on acting in segregation of each other, either copying endeavours, or ignoring real issues for need of will or financing. The lack of a noteworthy development against feudalism is an illustration, albeit some grass root NGOs have proceeded with their desolate fight in Punjab and Sind. It has also partly been because of lack of major focus on sports that as a nation we do not have

sportsmanship. In the household also it is seldom that view of weak is taken or appreciated in any manner whatsoever (Gondane, 2006).

4.8. The Spread of Terrorism

The nation has seen a reliable ascent in the intensity, and seriousness of harm to and pulverization of human life and property identified with militant incidents since 2001. After Lal Masjid Operation they reached their peak in 2007. In all major cities suicide bombings have increased consistently. The Incidents amid in the nine months of 2010 demonstrate no decline (Majeed, 2012).

Since the intelligentsia and security forces have propelled operations in FATA and KPK, the quantity of dread attacks and the losses have expanded. For a more far reaching photo of the different clashes Pakistan is confronting, every single related issues, including ethnic and sectarian conflicts, political violence, fringe conflicts and drone assaults are contemplated (Orakzi&Others, 2009).

4.9. Analysis

A discussion on terrorism and militancy related incidents is not complete without taking a look at the effect of drone assaults and particles actions of the so-called allies in Pakistani region. Ramble assaults, focused on bombings by remote-controlled "drones" have executed a huge number of common people. While the US keeps on highlighting these injuries as a basic part of an endorsed strategy by the government of Pakistan, the Pakistani government kept on denouncing the drones, with no obvious activity to diminish or keep their recurrence. The researcher took into account different factors influencing C.S. in Turkey in the next chapter.

CHAPTER NO: 5.

FACTORS INFLUENCING C.S IN TURKEY

This chapter has discussed about various factors influencing C.S. in Turkey. Since November, 2013 prospects in Turkey have become ugly. The police assaults that uncovered a corruption scene on December 17, and the affirmations of gigantic offer, rigging and money laundering by individuals at the most elevated amounts of the government officials, have started a mad crackdown by the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party. Many journalists have been removed from the scene for standing up and speaking against them. A large number of corps and prosecutors have been removed or moved to other parts of the country. Revisions to the Internet law and regulations proposed by the legislature made it workable for authorities to block sites without court orders.

The administration additionally undermined the separation of powers by putting the judiciary, including criminal examinations and investigation, under direct control of the Ministry of Justice. The democratic crisis in Turkey is critical at this moment. This provides details regarding the media perceives that is going on in Turkey is a long history. Media has been playing a strong role as it was close to the government. In 1997, extensive media associations were co-selected by the military to subvert a chosen government. The AK Party was shaped in the wake of those occasions. In any case, even as it has subdued the military, the AKP has been not able to oppose the enticements of authoritarian thoughts inserted in the state. In the course of recent years, the

administration has progressively utilized an assortment of solid arm strategies to stifle the media's legitimate part as a watch dog of power (Edelman, 2015).

The absolute most exasperating endeavours incorporate the following:

- **Intimidation:** President Recep Tayyip Erdogan habitually pressurized journalists by name after they wrote critic columns. In a few surely understood cases, similar to those of Hasan Cemal and Nuray Mert, writers lost their occupations after these open assaults. Intolerant courts pass out feelings in maligning cases for criticism.
- **Mass firings:** About 59 writers and journalists were removed or constrained out in striking back for their coverage of Executive Summary. In November 2013, a Freedom House delegation visited Turkey to meet with columnists, NGOs, business pioneers, and senior government authorities about the weakening condition of media in the state. Its goal was to explore reports of government endeavors to weight and threaten columnists and of excessively cozy connections between media proprietors and government, which, alongside awful laws and excessively forceful prosecutors, have suppressed target reporting in Turkey. Opportunity House and Freedom House approached the government of Turkey to perceive that in a popular government, a free press and other autonomous bodies assume a vital part. There are clear and solid strides the Turkish government must take to end the terrorizing and debasement of Turkey's media. Important among these are the accompanying (Cook, 2015).
- **Cease dangers against writers and journalists.**

- Repeal the criminal defamation law and excessively wide antiterrorism and "criminal organization" laws that have been utilized to prison many columnists.
- Comply with European and universal benchmarks in procurement practices keeping in mind the end goal to decrease the incentive for media proprietors to carry support by twisting the news. Turkish media proprietors themselves must roll out a guarantee to changes in procurement procedures so that they can win back the trust of Turkey's people. Despite the fact that building a flexible popular government is on a very basic level up to Turkish subjects, the global group can't bear to be observers. The European Union and the OSCE have raised solid worries about government pressure on Turkey's media, and the EU's notices against legislative overreach have been pointed. Lamentably, the same can't be said for the United States. The Obama government has been very lazy to understand the earnestness of the risk to Turkey's popular government. U.S. feedback of the Turkish government's late activities has originated from the State Department representative and White House information secretary, not from the high-positioning authorities who should be occupied with reacting to an issue of this scale. Where European governments and institutions have been particularly and openly connected with the government over the emergency, the Obama government has maintained a strategic distance from the troublesome issues. The time has come to talk honestly and with earnestness about the developing danger to majority rules system in Turkey, and to place flexibility of expression and popular government at the focal point of the policy relationship. Gezi Park

dissents, the corruption and debasement scandal has created another series of firings of innocent journalists (Graham, 2017).

- **Buying off or driving out media tycoons:** Holding companies tolerant and sympathy to the mainstream government get billions of dollars in government contracts, frequently through government bodies housed in the PM's office. Organizations with media outlets denouncing of the legislature have been center of expenses, constrained to pay far reaching fines, and likely upset without trying to hide tenders.
- **Wiretapping:** The National Security Organization has wiretapped writers covering national security stories, using false names on the warrants with a specific end goal to maintain a strategic distance from judicial examination.
- **Imprisonment:** Dozens of writers stay detained under comprehensively characterized antiterrorism laws. Most of those in jail are Kurds, and a few analysts are of the view that the government is utilizing them as negotiating tools as a part of arrangements with the Kurdish PKK. These strategies are unsatisfactory in a democratic setup. They deny Turkish residents full access to data and restrain them from political debate. Columnists and government authorities alike recognize that correspondents and news agencies have drilled self-censorship to abstain from irritating the government, and President Erdogan. The purposeful debilitating of Turkey's institutions, including endeavors to spook and censor or blue pencil Turkey's media, needs profound sympathy toward of the U.S and the European Union. As the AK Party's inside coalition has developed to be more powerless and delicate, Erdogan has used his impact over

the media to push issues of open moral quality and religion and to squelch open debate of the obligation and responsibility of his organization. The outcome is an obviously enthralled political field and society (Ozcetin, 2015).

5.1. Strengths

At the point when the information was analyzed in detail in Turkey, it was difficult to overlook the expanding powers of the sectors and the rich gathering of activities, achievements and amazing endeavors of CSOs to address social and monetary issues. In Turkey, contrasted with a simple 15-20 years back the rate at which C.S and CSO are showing developments is impressive and inspiring. Despite of obstructions C.S and constrained space, has seen and exhibited essential strengths (Gunter, 2012).

5.1.1. Diversity of CSOs Activities

The research shows an abundance of rich examples of CSOs working in imaginative routes in various areas, for example, ecology and farming, summer camps for extremely introverted kids, gay and lesbian rights, women's safe house, education, immigration and EU policy reforms. Furthermore, CSOs shows at any rate some action and even effect on a various issues which are considered to be of most extreme significance for the Turkish populace, for example, democracy and health, freedom of speech and of thought. The rising quality of certain sub segments is likewise worth specifying, for example, the movements for protection of environment and fundamental rights, which has empowered huge commitment from C.S to key changes (Isiksel, 2013).

5.1.2. Dedication to Voluntarism and Giving

Given the somewhat restricted level of interest and support from Turkish general population everywhere, clearly little CSO staff and voluntary groups, in rather unassuming and modest measure of resources accessible for CSO programs, it is very obvious that the accomplishment of numerous CSOs to date lies on the shoulders of a fairly smaller group of individuals. The devotion and diligence of these people is really rousing as they willingly give their own resources and time to their sentimental organizations. Despite the fact that streams levels of support of overall public are fairly low, late reviews demonstrate that one in two individuals are of the view that CSOs can make a positive commitments in the public arena. This shows a potential for CSOs to create a noteworthy level of donators, individuals and volunteers (Aras, 2000).

5.1.3. CSOs and Social Service Provision

A pro-longed list of CSOs: right now give basic services to address education, wellbeing and health needs of the general population. From clinics, schools to proficiency programs and after school educational centers for youth. Turkish CSOs are conveying amazing projects to targeted populace. CSOs are all storing up specialized abilities of experts and educationalists.

They even provide important services to various offices of government which are in desperate need of specialized training to meet the needs of modern changes in the administrative systems and new techniques of processing, for example, training of judges on human rights and police working on the border to deal with the refugees. The specialized and technical abilities CSOs can achieve because of basic needs whether it be

school setup, a dormitory, safeguard missions and help endeavors for common catastrophes or authoritative changes which require master audit and info is amazing (Akboga, 2012).

5.1.4. C.S Relations with the State

Relations amongst C.S and the state have an exceptionally admirable. However, in a somewhat brief timeframe: critical measures have been brought for better relations with C.S. An expanded number of government offices at the local and national levels are coordinating with CSOs in administration conveyance and strategy change. These measures and noticeable cases of participation and incorporation joined with authoritative changes have contributed altogether to enhance relations amongst C.S and the state at the local and national levels (Argun, 2003).

5.2 Weaknesses (Limitations)

C.S and CSOs in Turkey are confronted with a number of difficulties in their situation to address new orders realized by a period of social and financial advancement. A portion of the key constraints are summarized below.

5.2.1. Individual Participation

Respective to the span and size of the Turkish general populace, the quantity of CSOs (77,000 foundations and associations in a nation of 70 million people) and their geographic assorted qualities (much higher density in urban territories) is very restricted. This passes on the somewhat low level of associational life in Turkey. While a solid group of CSOs are developing, Turkish subjects remain fairly detached from the present movement of well-organized C.S. While subject show a proclivity to bolster each other

inside their nearby systems of family relationship, they are more averse to give funds to CSOs or take an interest through formal CSO enrolment or as volunteers (Howell, 2002).

5.2.2. Organizational Capacity

Many CSOs try and struggle in building abilities for essential administration, basic management, automatic conveyance, programmatic delivery and raising funds to work programs. CSOs with some limit confront challenges with scaling up and maintainability. While various late training programs have been propelled to impart training and bolster, requests still exceeds supply.

Likewise, programs have a tendency to be centered around new or developing associations, leaving more experienced CSOs without support on the most proficient method to propel their associations to the higher level. Last but not the least, absence of funds and resources and authoritative administration limits capacity of CSOs to enrol and repay proficient staff, bringing about a problem of impediments of abilities and capacity (Keeper, 2015).

5.2.3. Collective Action and Cooperation among CSOs

Although the previous couple of years have demonstrated an ascent in the quantity of new CSO platforms, fundamentally connected to reforms, CSOs stay worried about the small level of participation and correspondences at domestic and national level.

5.2.4. Low Levels of Trust

Whether among residents, or amongst nationals and the state, low levels of trust negatively affect C.S's improvement. Despite the fact that CSOs express concern, they

don't really shows particular cases of how they plan to address this issue through their individual exercises.

5.2.5. Relations with the State

The atmosphere of change has positively affected relationship amongst C.S and the state. Nonetheless, there are still many concerns, which force themselves to a fairly alarming feeling about to what extent the good weather will last. C.S stays subject to self-assertive impulses of government directions, for example, unnecessary constrain on nonconformists, unannounced reviews and audits and other optional activities of government authorities which damage not just the privileges of citizens about usage and systemic misuse of equity and rights. They are likewise worried about the mechanics of participation and exchange as such, guaranteeing same level of access for all CSOs (Kilmurray, 2013).

5.2.6. Good Governance: Transparency and Accountability of CSOs

The accountability of CSOs expresses worries about how much organizations take part in inner and outside transparency, responsibility and accountability. Although it is well known fact that the CSOs are not indulged in the corrupt practices, but CSOs are quick to guarantee that their associations cling to measures of good administration (Atli, 2013).

By 2013, previous P.M of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan, at that moment President, communicated that in the latest decade, extensive and expansive offices and administrations were given by the legislature, unfathomable scale speculations were rolled out and radical improvements were grasped, as a result of their un-failing

friendship and responsibility to the nation and country. No ifs ands or buts, fair changes were of exceptional and particular significance among the administrations that they provided for our country in the latest 10 years (Ozcetin, 2015).

On the off chance that we consider the latest changes inside Turkish limits, it is obvious that without a doubt, changes were a requirement for the legislature. It fundamentally took after the method for majority control government and human rights' motivations, the security perspective and the need of legal reforms. It propelled the execution and fortifying of the improvement of social prospects, along with training and budgetary fields which at a similar time were a need and a need change for governments at neighbourhood level.

In fitting its local matters with the European Union's necessities and criteria and other overall slants, steps that were taken forward were including the Turkish Penal Code, war on terror, strengthening the standards of flexibility of press, securing chance of alliance, development of the privilege to tranquil gatherings and assemblies, augmentation of flexibility of association concerning political groups and parties, fortifying the right and privilege of defence, abolishment of capital punishment, just to give some examples (Murphy, 2012).

The most noteworthy components that were under the critical scope of progress were firstly the issue of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and the issue of the wearing of headscarf, as it likewise incorporates religious nuances. In this extraordinary circumstance, it is sensible to recognize that there was legitimate political will to convey underlined changes inside Turkish points of confinement for better collaboration and

better open entryways for the overall population. As needs be, since 2002 when the middle right, social traditionalist political groups, AK Party spoke to the state by securing votes equivalent to around two third of the aggregate turnover, Turkey began to be all the more enduring and this inside quality conveyed with itself a monetary blast which took the country to the status of equalling the most continuously developing markets around the globe, the MINT countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey). However, not sufficiently steady (Tocci, 2011).

However, lately an important move has been observed about Erdogan's policies which drove the nation to insecure situations, a mess that put into uncertainty was actualized on local matters implementation. However, in contemporary circumstances, there is a genuine debates on whether Erdogan is getting to be distinctly dictator and authoritarian administration in disagreement to just accomplishments achieved so far (Burmeo, 2000).

Thus, Erdogan has lost all genuineness and authenticity with his glaring flippancy for the rule of law, and separation of powers, his settling of the judiciary and losing the confidence on essential rights alongside flexibility. Today the PM has a fairly anomalous point of view of what fame based represent is. In his eyes, majority control government seems to begin and end at the election box. Therefore with each choice triumph over his 11-year government the PM has felt progressively capable (Keeper, 2015).

The thing that must be nearly followed up is the absence of political pivot, rotation and political aggressiveness. For instance, late elections held at local levels in Turkey that were witnessed on 30 March 2014, did just upgrade perceived ability of AK

party. This year, the AKP expanded its votes from 38.8 percent in the local elections in 2009 to 44.1 percent. This achievement may appear to be begging to be proven wrong, considering late instances occurred in Turkey and for the most part the violent policies that Erdogan made as elections proceeded (Burnell, 2004).

By March 20, 2014, Erdogan chose to boycott Twitter's action in Turkey. The following step was banning YouTube by 28 of March 2014, amidst "national security concerns". Turkey beforehand banned YouTube in 2007, however lifted the boycott for a short period of three years (Tabachnik, 2016). In February, Istanbul and further on the national and overall society was flabbergasted by Erdogan's reaction towards the death of Berkin Elvan, a posterity of 15 years old who was for all aims and purposes the loss of military's intervention in Gezi stop questions. Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan added fuel to formally high weights in Turkey by proposing that young individual was a person from an "Activist Organization" and secured police who executed him (Kuper, 2013).

The striking Gezi Park difficulties and challenges themselves addressed a reminder for the overall society. The authoritatively dynamic structure of Istanbul experienced, by December 2013, a champion among the most illustrative defilement outrage in which Erdogan and government's key people were appeared to be included, the greater part of the involved persons were members of the AK party itself (Yildirim, 2011).

After winning the presidential elections held in August 2014, Erdogan's disposition won much more appreciation in the form of global headlines, in assessing Turkey's stance and actions towards Syrian crises and the large number of refugees at

present living as "guests" inside Turkey's territory, and in addition its position towards the emerging threat in the form of ISIS (Caha, 2016).

It is very difficult to choose between point A and B generally. Similarly selection between traditionalism and modernity become a problem. On the same grounds hesitant politics or hipper - inclusion generally propelled with continually tyrant criticism is again something that Turkey tries to handle in a manner that the present balance will be kept up on a supportable stage. Now, for Turkey's situation, each choice the state's ruler make has noteworthy repercussions on a bigger scale, covering a greater wave first on a provincial level given its vital strategic position and similarly on global level, given the shared border and the practical network built between all the concerned actors.

Choosing for the sake of majority rules system is considerably harder when there is no guarantee that it will be the best and for the most part since mainstream government seems to have new interesting components under Erdogan's parameters. Vote based framework itself, generally speaking at this point, is by all accounts taken new importance, is by all accounts adjusting to new accessible devices of activity, yet that does not imply that its fundamental trademark must be overlooked (Akboga, 2012).

As an outsider or foreigner who has been living in Istanbul for one year now, The analysts would accept that the most critical, for all intents and essential component that characterizes the disruption and bungle of the present domestic circumstance could be spoken to by a solitary word: mixture.

An exceptionally divided mixture, generally because of the distinctive sights on Turkey's profile and the way it ought to be going towards. It is about division in

connection to which sort of changes need to be taken, by understanding real priority and need. It is about division between the supporters and the individuals who restrict PM Erdogan and the majority party. As stated above, one can't disregard the commitment that the PM conveyed to the nation. It would not be reasonable to show the contributions of AKP party to Turkey's legacy. However, he appears to have felt the advantages that power carried with itself. Still, control carries with itself awesome obligation too. It's called beneficial interaction (Aymes, 2015).

5.3. Failure of recent Military Coup in Turkey

Turkey under the leadership of Erdogan has become one of the most suppressive states when it comes to internet freedom. It has been marked by Freedom House as 20th most oppressive country in the world. On the occasion Erdogan government imposed complete bans on social media services such as Twitter, Face book and you tube. He has personally filed charges against dozens of Turkish citizens for wounding him online. In a meeting with an internet freedom group in which he said that he was against the internet available. Thus internet played a central role in saving Erdogan presidency.

The plotters of the coup made some mistakes; they were unable to capture Erdogan at the seaside resort where he was vacationing the coup attempt night. While: they also did some things right. Bridges were blocked by the tanks. Parliament was assaulted by the troops and the air chief was detained and the plotters took control of important means of communication of media, in which TRT, the state broad caster and capable channel, CNN, Turkey (Eisenach, 2016).

After the coup began, it was reported by internet censorship monitors that traffic on Face book, Twitter and You Tube had been blocked. When: these blocks were removed a full-fledged. Social media campaign was initiated to call Erdogan supporters into the streets.

This included a direct text message from Erdogan to every mobile phone in the country what might have been the turning point in the whole affair. Erdogan was able to use his i phone to broad caste a message to the Turkish people or face time demonstrating that he was still alive and fighting back. Ten thousands of people came out in the streets to confront the army and sparking scenes superficially reminiscent of Tiananmen Square (Lucas, 2016).

The Turkish coup is, of course the first time social media for enabling the protests that led to the Arabic Spring. However, the Erdogan government's offensive use of social media may be the first time it has played a determinative role in saving a government from overthrow.

Erdogan government and the judiciary blocked social media who saw it as dangerous and provocative. Turkish courts barred you tube since 2007. The ban was lifted in 2010. But briefly it was re-imposed on several occasions. Twitter and face book have also been restricted over material deemed politically sensitive (Healy, 2016).

The wonder of 21st century social media as shown by Erdogan is that you can both embrace and suppress it. You can treat it both as a threat and as an asset. You can use it to proclaim democracy in a crackdown and a state of emergency. The Turkish

President quoted in his twitter account Turkey has a history full of democratic victories and it will always uphold democracy.

In the most chaotic sequence of events in the interview in a video-chat service on his i-phone in which he asserted the legitimacy of his government's authority and called on the Turkish people to take to the streets against the coup. His picture on face time is already one of the iconic images of the night. The face book's real time map of its live video stream showed large members of users in Turkey, mostly streaming either the events of the moment or showing people out on the street protesting the military takeover (Poole, 2016).

The irony was immediately apparent as all of this was a rather large departure from Erdogan previous attitudes to both social media and public protest. It also set off a little side debate about the role of these technologies in preventing the coup. That trapped Zeynep Tufekii, who was in Antalya at the moment and her exasperated response to a satirical tweet mocking the idea that technology mattered in any decisive way.

But Erdogan successfully made his broadcast, nothing was settled. It is easy to imagine that, if the coup succeeded it would have different image. But it seems modern media, social media, played a very important role in the failure of the coup. The fact that it helped re-assert the authority of someone with such contempt for civil society and a free press only reinforces the much repeated lesson that general purpose technologies do not conform to moral vision of anyone in particular (Lucas, 2016).

The coup failed because of a number of reasons: Mainly, the organizers lacked broader military backing and failed to gain public and political support. The troops also

stormed CNN Turk during the night, its Face book time feedback left showing an empty desk and chair. They broad casted until the last minute, as one of their anchor said that they thought it is important for Turkish democracy and the future of the country.

It was Mr. Erdogan message, however, that proved most important and which combined with similar statements from the other senior Turkish, politicians, showed the country's democratic leadership was safe and well. Even those who were behind the coup had been able to control the traditional media, they could not stop people assessing news on Twitter, Face book, What s App and other platforms. Monitoring sites Turkey blocs said key sites including Face book and You Tube had been blocked when the uprising began. Later they added that they had seen two hours period of social media blockage but no evidence of full internet block out. It is quite possible the government wanted to keep them up as this worked to their advantage (Eisenach, 2016).

Turkey no doubt has a vibrant social media community and one that knows how to avoid any restrictions. Those behind the coup never appeared in full command of the situation and that was enlarged in line. Mr. Erdogan even sent a nationwide text out asking people to stand up for democracy, a trick lost on the faction responsible. If the plotters had owned a text book on over throwing a government, it was out of date and from an era before internet. What was needed was something for the 21st century. For some of the observers, the big irony of the night was that tool that has come under attack from Mr. Erdogan government helped save him.

Mr. Erdogan once vowed to wipe out Twitter after the mass movement protests of 2013 were mobilized by the platform Zeynep Tufekci, of the University of

North Carolina but was in Turkey during the week, tweeted this during the night, Erdogan took to the Twitter and Face Time as a coup attempt in Turkey was thwarted by government's supporters using social media (Poole, 2016).

It must be noted that the individuals who have the power, with both rights and duties, would rethink their position and decide better policies on domestic and international level and also on individual decisions.

5.4. Analysis

It must be remembered Turkey is not a nuclear state whereas Pakistan is and has more enemies than Turkey. They are ready for an opportunity when our people confront our army and our enemies start their work. Therefore, it must be learnt from this incident that our army and our political leadership must face such conspiracies together.

CONCLUSION

Pakistan from its inception in 1947 to 2016 throughout its history like a pendulum has vacillated and oscillated between dictatorship and democracy or between military and civilian rule after a long struggle for governments, constitutions, and the structure of the state.

Starting from Ayub Khan in the 1960s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, Gen Zia ul Haq in the 1980s, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s, Gen Pervez Musharaff in 2000s, the Military and Civilian rule had taken turns alternatively. Numerous researchers have over decades had given their analysis on this very issue. On political history of Pakistan such views are shared by many Western and Pakistani writers equally like Safdar Mehmood and Aqil Shah.

This political fight reveals that Pakistan's administrative structure has over the decades confronted many troubles and problems which did not let the laws, establishments and procedures of democracy to grow firm roots in the nation.

0.1. Crisis of Democracy in Pakistan

Popular governments in Pakistan, since its inception, have faced many difficulties to set up an honest majority rule that could ensure its survival and steadfastness. Each time majority rule system has been derailed by the military government. Thus, popular government could not make its firm hold in the country. This is the reason that democratic government in Pakistan is slanted to numerous dangers.

These dangers include both internal and external elements. Interior dangers included political, social, financial, and also religious which injured democracy in

Pakistan. Absence of well-developed administration, rivalries between the pillars of the state, poor relations between the federal and the provincial governments, wild debasement, mild corruption, susceptible nature of the politicians, well rooted bureaucracy and poor governance are the incited risks to larger part manages framework in Pakistan.

Moreover, interfering with the constitution has in like manner dealt with an outrageous blow to democracy in Pakistan. Close to this, psychological oppression and militancy, energy shortfall, ethnicity and sectarianism, violent conduct at home, religious prejudice, monetary trickiness, unemployment, and regular disaster is speaking to a threat to majority rules system in Pakistan. Alongside this, international interference in our national issues, our country's tricolored picture over the world, and weak strategy is an expansion in destabilizing rule of vote based system. Fuelling the fire, Government's indifference towards people and its frailty to decide these issues is mounting frustration among the masses.

Lacking truthfulness and solid leadership is one of the greatest risks to popular government in Pakistan. Since the shocking downfall of the Quaid Muhammad Ali Jinnah, we have been without a solid pioneer. Lacking visionary leader has been the best test for the country. Our leaders have constantly served their own specific individual stakes and have stripped the nation of the fundamental right and even from life. In such conditions, vote based system has persevered through an incredible arrangement is so far persevering. The unsafe desires of our political forces have not only quite recently sullied the picture of Pakistan before the globe, yet have additionally demonstrated savage for the survival of popular government. For a strong political environment, the similitude

and conformity among governmental departments is essential. Without created and sensible leader, the confrontation between state institutions is winning. For instance, the organization's defiance with execution of the choice of the Supreme Court on various matters of national centrality (tallying the National Insurance Company Limited (NICL) corporation case) involves concern. In this way, there is surfacing an authoritative judicial perplexity. By obstructing an oversight of the court, the organization is endeavouring to bear on its issues, in which the most imperative need is to complete the term/residency. The contention between the ruling organs of the state has been inciting to the debacle of the fame based state.

Poor relations among the federal and provincial government are likewise a danger to majority rules system. Coordination between them is basic to run the state machinery. In fact the federal and provincial governments have been dagger drawn on each other. Disharmony over natural resources and different issues has held vote based system under strain. The lamentable fall of Dhaka was the outcome of such disagreeable relations. That is the reason Pakistan has constantly been experiencing political precariousness. These conditions have every time provided armed forces a chance and reason to topple the popularly elected government.

The progressing turmoil has started another common contention about the military's part in the fair majority rule framework. Due to non-appearance of political comprehension, our politicians themselves have invited and welcomed the military more than once to topple the fair government through unlawful means. In this way our bumbling leaders have imperilled the survival of political and democratic norms and

values of the country. Resultantly, the seed of an unprecedented dominant part lead culture sowed by the dictatorial governments never appeared to change into a strong tree.

Alongside this meddling with the constitution has made grave harm to majority framework. A constitution is considered as a watchman and gatekeeper of vote based system. Unfortunately, the constitution which was drafted taking after nine years of the self-sufficiency in 1956 was gagged after military topple by Ayub Khan in 1958. An honest to goodness constitution was nitty gritty in 1973; however every tyrant trimmed this constitution as per his own advantages.

Besides, our political forces have also accepted a terrible part in going into disrepair of main draft of the constitution. Resultantly, we have remained not capable to secure the solid democratic customs.

Administration and primitive feudal framework are another peril to democratic framework. Their riddle coalition is hindering the improvement of democracy effectively. Their exchange off with each different has realized the aggregation of force with few people. Indeed, even the general suffrage could not have been fruitful. Along these lines, the collection of force in unobtrusive pack families is making the structure shaky. Today we scarcely watch people from common labourers and middle class in government or even legislative issues. In perspective of sheer propel and impact of these legislators, such classes could not get free hand to appreciate administrative issues that is totally against majority rule requirement.

Political disharmony ended up being hazardous for the just government. All the major political forces are involved in point scoring and constant triviality. They are

smallest stressed with offering to the issues of the nation, and accordingly, a sentiment hardship among the all-inclusive community is repeating tremendously. Without support between the political exclusive classes, the dream for an intense law based state would remain a fantasy.

Stoking the fire, massive corruption is exhibiting sad for government to survive. Debasement remains a hindrance for Pakistan and dominant part administer framework. Transparency International (TI) has positioned Pakistan 34th most declining nation on the planet. To start with legislature of PPP in 1988 was sacked in perspective of charges of debasement. Along these lines, elections held in 1997 were alleged to be fixed, the late exchange off on defilement as National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) has raised many issues in the brains of individuals against the believe ability of political elite classes. The threat of corruption is purging the basic establishments of effectively feeble vote based system.

The apparition of corruption is becoming more rooted without certifiable obligation. Obligation which goes for strengthening the underlying establishments of prevalent government is lacking in our country. The epic hostile to debasement office of the country, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) which was made in 1999 and improved with the powers of looking at and prosecuting the assortments of proof against the leaders, has fail to accept its part adequately. Along these lines, the absence of responsibility is a sort of tempest which is crippling the dominant controls framework to its underlying establishments and speaking to an exceptional hazard.

Absence of responsibility joined with awful administration is speaking to a test to smooth running of the structure. Pakistan is going up against a steady difficulty of poor organization. It has delivered doubt and has undermined the proficient and straightforward movement of administrations and the use of undertakings in a compelling way. Neediness and dejection has been creating in the country at an exasperating rate and in just latest three years of non-military personnel organization, it has come to 40 percent from 17.13 percent in 2008. Due to extending poverty, individuals get themselves tried even to acquire Basic things, for instance, flour and grains. Pakistan's level of human capital improvement is low and its proficiency rates are the most exceedingly terrible in South Asia. Despite having immense common assets, our country has gone into stagnation, which is the most recognizably awful/ FDI is rapidly flying from Pakistan in view of troublesome money related environment in the country which is not a better than average sign for majority rules system.

Attributed to poor organization, the legislature is losing control over law and order circumstance. Exactly when individuals place themselves before institutions, they set a horrendous case. Suicide ambushes, target killing, burglary and distinctive other wrong doings have been able to be standard of the day. Pure people have been butchered on ethnic preface and government gives off an impression of being frail in such way which is in like manner a dangerous sign for majority rule administration.

The current disgraceful condition of contentions, conflicts and doubt are solely the after effects of a feeble popularity based setup. Media accept a crucial part in moulding and reshaping the feelings of a layman. Shockingly, the media climb in association with the political activities has irritated the condition. Media's biasness has

lighted a fire of political inconsistency and disharmony which in this manner has been incapacitating the hidden establishments of just culture in Pakistan.

Another genuine risk to majority rules system is the weak judicial structure of Pakistan. Now and again when the vote based system was supplanted with military ruler, the feeble judiciary assumed a negative part in sustaining the hands of military autocrats. The slight legal framework has given every military a legitimate cover under the presence of comfort. In current circumstances, there is again a hazard that history could repeat itself if the watch dogs of democratic government continued insulting the democracy and judicial system.

Previously mentioned perils to dominant part administer government relate to the political circle which is on huge scale offering rise to social threats. Neediness ridden society, uneducated masses, social imbalance and bad form, domestic violence, feeling of slightness and disappointment among the masses are sowing the seeds of hatred for democratic framework.

Frail and Poverty ridden society brings forward disdain. An overall population lacking nourishment security is last thing to be forgone in the fundamental rights. Fraternity and unprejudiced nature couldn't be the indication of such a culture where the larger part of the total populace of the country is living underneath the poverty line. Hence equitable patterns can't win in such an area where the all-inclusive community are paying taxes even on the purchasing of a match box and getting grain is a thing of high desire for them.

Also, uneducated masses have moreover contributed in coming apart the political setup of the country. A nation with such a low literacy rate can simply breed a fragile political and law based culture. An educated and informed individual thinks about his rights and can remain for the standards, and resultantly, his voice can't remain unheard. Contrary to this rationale, an unskilled society weakens the even handed democratic values.

The political personality of the overall public is in like manner extraordinarily antagonistic because of low level of political and professional foundations, peers and public gatherings from fusing political awareness into the general population. The masses are not ready to oppose the Martial Laws, and the C.S dependably surrendered to the military lead.

In Pakistan social treachery is pervasive; people are ignorant of social equity and justice ideas and its consequences for society. Pakistan's longsighted common and military rulers and primitive exclusive class have been assaulting this country since their autonomy. Social value is a standard, esteem and control of the sound society and personality of a prosperous tranquil country. One should comprehend the way that social inappropriate behaviour does not simply impact the life of a run of the mill man moreover jeopardizes national mechanical assembly and machinery. The entire system relies on it and if it's insecure then the nation would be in a state where Pakistan stands today.

Increasing abusive behaviour at home, generally known as domestic violence, is likewise demonstrating hindrance for majority rule government to succeed. Increased

target killing, coercion, abducting for payment and ransom, and different violations make people weak. Sentiment precariousness is extending and people feel uncertain even inside their own home. Affirmation of the life and property of the common residents involves first imperative commitment of the legislature. The organization's disappointment is reproducing dissatisfaction among the masses which thus is putting forth climb to troublesome conditions for democratic government and clearing course against popularity based qualities to turn into an integral factor.

Economic soundness and stability is an indication of a democratic consolidation. It expect the piece of spine for well-known government. Notwithstanding, money related trickiness additionally serves as a hazard to vote based framework. Regardless of having force and assets, the administration has not possessed the capacity to manage the economy adequately and compose appropriate techniques to improve the lives of normal people. Our economy which has been persisting seriously because of militancy is hit hard by late turmoil in Karachi and common catastrophes of 2010 and 2011. Agricultural business is experiencing a most exceedingly terrible circumstance ever. Rather than demonstrating upward turn GDP is ceaselessly going down. Each one of these components is driving Pakistan to the edge of political insecurity.

Energy shortfall is further stoking the fire. Energy is much the same as fuel for the economy. Similarly, nearness of energy deficit makes the economy exposed and inimically impacts the industrial creation. For instance, the material business of Pakistan is extremely hit by the energy setback. Various material units in Faisalabad have been closed down. The whole country is encountering the arranged and unscheduled power outages, which as a general rule have exasperated both domestic and business exercises

in the state. People have started instigating in streets and hurting open property. In this manner, the energy unbalance has transformed into a peril to the money related advancement and flourishing of Pakistan.

Along with this energy shortfall is also increasing the unemployment in the country. Falling apart states of agriculture and industries also, government's inability to offer work to its masses is round about weakening the establishments of majority rules system. The advancing turmoil in various Arab countries is the eventual outcome of the failure of the rulers to give business and diverse necessities of life to their civilians.

Never-ending inflation combined with food shortage is additionally a risky sign for vote democracy. Food products are getting far away from the reach of ordinary citizen. The world's financial experts have put Pakistan on a summary of 36 countries that face an authentic food shortage, advised that if the conditions intensify individuals may strike store rooms for sustenance. Reasons for food deficiency and insecurity are the same number as its outcomes however government's disappointment and botch has made this issue complex that is undermining the lives of more than 83 million Pakistanis.

The late ordinary catastrophe is the type of surges, which has practically weakened our economy, is honest to goodness test for the legislature. Every one of the zones of our economy, especially horticulture, cultivation and industry, has been to a great degree hampered by decimation. Under the above said surrendered conditions, the disappointment of the governance to handle this test would be a disappointment of democratic framework itself.

The present stream of enthusiasm, radicalism and militancy has conveyed another theory. This new logic is also the most prompt hazard to prominent government in Pakistan today. These parts of devotee similarly inform and control the organization and the general population. Their own particular variation of Islam has transformed into a strategy for playing with the emotions of the successfully denied masses. From now on, the bearers of this new conviction and belief system of government framework consider democratic government non Islamic and thus absolutely vain for an Islamic state. The current conditions in the country and the enthusiasm for use of Sharia (their own adjustment and form), is a statement to this philosophy. For these segments, the thought of religious preference and sectarianism are further conveying a generous mischief to just setup in Pakistan. The seed of religious bias, that took its establishments in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, has now formed into a strong tree. Every dynamic government has failed to offer security to minorities. The unequivocal killings of the overall public of Shia group have furthermore revealed the organization's disappointment in securing the minorities. In a report as for religious open door issued by Washington Pakistan was alluded to among 10 states, *"failing to sufficiently protect religious rights"*. The report consolidates a long list of logical people of violence and discrimination against Ahmadis, Christians, Sikhs, Hindus and other Muslim gatherings (sects).

Rehashing remote and outside intervention into our national and local issues is similarly exhibiting dangers for well-known government to keep up and support. A country, with solid vote based standards, does not allow any outer power to intercede into its matter of inner and universal interest. Countries, especially the US, are more inspired in mediating into Pakistan's strategy approach than that of its own. Our national

trust worthiness and honesty is being referred to in view of our political disharmony and breaking down majority rule government. The US has dependably applied effect on every administration, whether it's a law based or military, to serve its covert preferences. Its staunch support to every military ruler has made an imbued damage to majority rules system and has never given a sensible chance to picked government of survival.

At last, Pakistan's stained picture over the world as an honest to goodness vote based country is no less than a threat in itself. Above all, the military and semi military manage stifled the notoriety based control in the country. World Bank and other monetary associations have determinedly laid confinements and assents upon Pakistan. These budgetary disciplines and breaking endless supply of goods or trade is the result of weedy non-democratic norms and successive military overthrows.

0.2. Pakistan its Future prospects on the path of democratic stability

Election held in 2008 and PPP formed its government and it's finished his term effectively in 2013, which was without precedent for the historical backdrop of Pakistan that a fairly chosen government finished its full term of five years. In spite of many obstacles and an unstable way and despite being beset with charges of incompetency and corruption, it was a "landmark achievement" for a popularly elected government indeed.

Ian Talbot(2012)narrated sagaciously; post-2008 period in Pakistan, i.e., the Asif Ali Zardari time (2008-13), who came to control through 2008 elections, the 'most fair elections' since those of 1971 was much in the same manner as that of 1990s (1988-1999), which is also known as the 'decade of democracy' in Pakistan). To the extent issues confronted by Pakistan, e.g. economic recession and poor governance are

concerned, yet the difficulties of "democratic union" were more intense and unique as compared to 1990s.

Nawaz Sharif assumed the powers of prime minister on June 5, 2013. Thus Pakistan is going back towards a big "transition" from the current semi-presidential framework to parliamentary democratic system, the fifth civilian government period in its history.

In Pakistan eventual fate of popular government has always remained an open question. Thus, many journalists, diplomats, political scientists and analysts, Pakistani and Western, Pakistan studies experts have advanced numerous suppositions forecasts and recommendations, and predictions, for future prospects of majority rule stability in Pakistan. The assumptions, expectations and propositions for the smooth achievement of second successive popular government: or democracy (in post-Musharraf time) and of monetary and political steadiness in nation in the coming years.

Briefly, despite facing different external and internal challenges, ranging from socio-politico-economic to violence, democracy (a moderate and progressive process which needs resilience and tolerance) and democratic foundations and institutions in Pakistan in their original form, will achieve the level of solidness and smooth accomplishment in the wake of holding 3 to 5 consecutive fair elections and obviously with smooth working of governments-in-power for their full term. Subject to condition that the present government, the second consecutive democratic regime in post-Musharaff era, Khakan Abbasi as a Prime Minister and Mamnoon Hussian as President, delivers on public expectations, resolves Pakistan's pressing problems, and together with

the opposition, respects democratic-cum-constitutional norms, then democracy obviously has a better chance of consolidation and stabilization in Pakistan in the coming years. The researcher believes that Pakistan no doubt faces enormous challenges, but it has enough potential too; so the need is that Pakistan realizes it's potential.

0.3. Challenges Regarding Turkey

In Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan led his AKP party to three supreme parliamentary majorities as PM, and founded his own party. Then last year became the country's first directly elected President by securing more than half of the electoral votes.

He surrendered his broadly natural feel for the well-known thinking of people on his failure in the 2015 elections. He mis-judged during his election campaign and as a result had to pay the cost. Regardless of the possibility that his Justice and Development party (AKP) was the second majority party (41% of the votes), huge numbers of his longstanding supporters detached him, presuming that he was withdrawn from their lives and the inclination of the nation and in what transformed into an unanticipated festival of pluralism and radicalism. Voters planning to get control over the president swung to another pro-Kurdish political party that overflowed energetic eagerness and positive thinking in the time of election campaign crusade.

The disappointment of the AKP to secure majority seats in parliament, the reaction against Erdogan and the electorate's grip of the radical pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) under its attractive leader, Demirtas, shows a defining moment in Turkish domestic politics.

Erdogan's election campaign to make himself a very powerful President which he denoted as "the new Turkey", the election's result delivered new Turkey, yet not the one the President needed.

Forcing for introduction of executive based presidency by Erdogan viably transformed the elections into a referendum according to his own plan: rather than a decision between political parties. The HDP took no less than one million votes from the [main opposition] CHP. A considerable lot of those voters selected to change keeping in mind the end goal of stopping Erdogan.

The party's effective endeavour to break out from ethnic based politics and widen its allure well past the Kurdish issue owes much to Demirtas' interest and his message of effort. In any case, the "mass protest development", which was conceived in central Istanbul Park two years back and rapidly developed into national dissents that Erdogan stifled mercilessly, additionally helped the HDP's support.

In the Gezi uprising, many people realized for which Kurds had to work for a considerable length of time: and the treacherous arrests, the constraint and violence. It opened our eyes to the Kurdish enduring, commented Dogan. In the meantime, we perceived how the expert government press attempted to turn our authentic and peaceful protests into demonstrations of militancy.

Similarly as Erdogan considered the dissenters two years back, "militants, "terrorists" and "foreign actors", in the electoral campaign he stirred division and disdain by constantly spreading his HDP rivals as "terrorists, gays and sceptics atheists". He

asked religiously traditionalist voters not to vote for "such individuals who have nothing to do with Islam".

The strategy exploded backward the same number of religiously traditionalists Kurds moved their votes from the AKP to a political party that guaranteed to speak for everybody's interests. In the religiously moderate eastern town of Batman, Burhan Saran, local influential politicians, diverted from the AKP to the HDP. He said he was "not annoyed" by the way that the HDP sent Yezidi, Christian and gay applicants into the elections for the parliament. This political party invites everybody, and this is the thing that we require now, he said.

Erdogan's hostile response to protests held in 2013 exposed a leader to the odds. The change in the mood of the people was also confirmed by the elections. However this time the president's response towards his annihilation was altogether different to the mob police and teargas strategies of two years prior.

In spite of the fact that he will negatively perceive the outcome, the president can likewise assume a portion of the praise for making a Turkey that let it happen. Erdogan is generally compared with Russia's Vladimir Putin. However, there is zero chance under Putin of Turkey's election result being reproduced in Russia. In spite of fears of vote rigging and the greater advantage delighted in by the governmental machinery in the national press and media, recent elections continued easily, peacefully and relatively free.

Turks and Kurds are thought to be more vigilant and can move ahead of the political leaders, and they have a great deal of desires of the democratic process that they

have chosen for themselves; said Emma Sinclair-Webb, senior scientist for Human Rights Watch in Turkey. This is an extremely noteworthy result; it demonstrates that Turkey is experiencing a vital maturity process in the field of politics, and that an expanding number of individuals are keen on a pluralistic culture.

One such individual is a 30-year-old mentor or teacher and ethnically Kurd from Diyarbakir, the principle Kurdish city in the south-east. He requested that not to mention but rather underlined that in his view the HDP was the main party that did not look to set certain groups against others.

It is the first occasion when that a political party transparently discussed the privileges of LGBTs. It is by all accounts persuading that they will have the capacity to push through many rights for them; even gay marriages could be considered. In the event that somebody had informed five years back, none would have ever trusted that it was conceivable. It is still extremely bewildering; however the confirmation was in that point.

None of the four major parties in the new parliament can shape a majority party government, showing Turkey is entering a time of insecurity. Erdogan approach towards politics is a paired challenge amongst champs and failures or in other words winners and losers in which the conclusive point is to secure a greater part or majority.

The outcome of poll would choose the eventual fate of Turkish governmental issues and politics for quite a long time to come. These elections, regardless of some voting inconsistencies, were considered by and large free and reasonable. However, the individuals who take after developments in Turkey would have seen declining democratic capital in the nation once hailed as a vote based model (or example) for the

Middle East to take after. Such claims are made by very few people in these days. Turkey is generally known for its absence of fair rights; particularly those relating to the opportunities of free expression and gathering since the Gezi Park uprising precisely two years back.

This obviously brings up the issue that why would that be a democratic setback in Turkey? In reply to this question, three interconnected elements could be distinguished. They are;

- 1) The legacy of a dictator style of administration and, belatedly, an elite thinking of what constitutes great citizenship;
- 2) The legacy of the military's association in legislative issues and politics;
- 3) The political framework as a battlefield for Turkey's cultural-social divisions in their battle to characterize Turkish identity. These components together clarify a significant number of difficulties faced by democracy.
- 4) A tyrant and authoritarian thinking of citizenship. Turkey has a legacy of pioneers and leaders with dictatorial propensities. Its first leader and pioneer, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was a reformer, a visionary and a state developer; but still he was not democrat in nature. He attempted and neglected to deliver a two party system. Rather he led a single party state. Kemal Atatürk was the first of numerous political figures in a nation where personalities have conveyed more weight than political projects or strategies. The long list incorporates, however is not restricted to, İsmet İnönü, Adnan Menderes, Bülent Ecevit, Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller. Turkey's

present President Tayyip Erdogan, hailing from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is just the most recent illustration.

A valid example is Adnan Menderes, PM around 1950 and 1960. Menderes had a comprehension of democracy based on majority principle where the general populations will was recognized only through the outcome of national elections instead of general participation by civilians. He smothered the media, focused on minorities and pounded organizations that were against the government. The main thing that ceased him was a military upset in 1960, after which he was terribly sent to the scaffold tree. Erdogan has publically compared himself with Menderes yet the similitude is not so simple. Erdogan additionally observes the voting booth as the main instrument of responsibility (accountability) and the main wellspring of political legitimacy. He too has pounded the press and various attempts to smother his opposition while utilizing propaganda to point out critics unpatriotic or a part of a vast intrigue, a reference to the Hizmet Movement of Fetullah Gulen.

For these sorts of leaders, natives ought to be indebted to their office holders. For instance, President Erdogan responded forcefully to demonstrators at a rally in eastern Turkey. Erdogan guaranteed that the administration had tended to some of their worries and issues. The workers were vexed about the absence of rights connected with sub-contracted labourers. Likewise, a little more than two weeks prior a proprietor of a hair salon in Istanbul was ambushed for not shaking the hand with AKP deputy.

This tyrant thinking of citizenship goes far in clarifying the absence of flexibility of expression. Dissenting the administration is viewed for instance as act of bad

citizenship. The police fiercely clip down on such exhibits and demonstrations. Consider Gezi Park, May Day uprising and protest or even students from the Middle East Technical University battling against a highway being constructed through their university.

Although the thinking of government which support the protests have never faced any kind of violence or even hindrance. For instance, a huge number of Muslims supplicated outside of the memorable Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, while calling to change over it into a mosque. A week prior they had organized a rally requesting the same. The Hagia Sophia was erected in 537 by Byzantine King Justinian, had been a congregation for a long time and afterward, taking after the victory of Istanbul had been transformed into a mosque for an additional 500 years. Kemal Ataturk announced it as a historical center in 1934 and it has been one from that point onward.

Not like anti-government dissents, Hagia Sophia demonstrators did not confronted tear gas, water gun, police batons or fisticuffs. A rally that praised the 562nd commemoration of the Ottoman victory of Istanbul was not stifled. The reality is that the inverse of it was observed. Thousands of individuals attended it, activists were provided with banners and pennants by municipalities or NGOs partnered with the AKP.

0.4. Legacy of military rule in Turkey

Throughout its history, Turkey's civil military relations have been disorganized. There were military intercessions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and a latest overthrow of 1997. The 1980 overthrow was particularly bleeding with thousands going 'missing'. Also,

thousands were confined and tormented and hundreds were executed. The legacy of the overthrow and the 1997 mediation has enduring repercussions right until now.

Recall that the 1990s was the highest of the Kurdish revolt in the South Eastern area of Turkey. So as to invalidate the insurgence, the Turkish state established emergency law. In the protests and civil fights no less than 40,000 Turkish nationals, most of them Kurdish, were slaughtered. A great many towns were obliterated and several thousands were forced to migrate from their regions (internally displaced people. Still today there are issues that stay uncertain, for example, the state's part in death squads and extrajudicial killings and additionally torment and disappearing people. The contention has likewise yet to be forever settled. In spite of peace suggestions, violence returns on a sporadic premise. Finding a long lasting solution is a vote based objective or democratic imperative, yet at the same time pending.

Turkey's high parliamentary limit of 10 percent in its corresponding representation framework is a consequence of the post 1980 military period. It was intended to forestall Kurdish party representation. However since 2002, the net impact of the bench mark is that it has given the main party an excessively high number of seats in parliament in contrast with the prevalent vote.

Remember that Turkey's present constitution, with some recent amendments, was drafted under the sponsorship of the military. Although when Turkey came back to non-military government in 1983, the military, through the National Security Council and backhanded channels inside the administration and bureaucracy figured out how to impact governmental affairs. It even arranged an off camera upset in 1997 that prompted

the exit of Erbakan and his Islamist Welfare Party, an early leader of the AKP, something its pioneer, for example, Erdogan could always remember.

It was just around the time (AKP formed in 2002) that the military continuously lost some of its capacity to intercede in regular politics. This was a consequence of EU situated changes. Still what truly prompted to the military's decrease in Turkish politics were inquiries from 2010 onwards into evident 'profound state' plots to topple the government. Several resigned and existing military and security officials were captured, tried and prosecuted as a rule sentenced.

While this may seem like a positive improvement for Turkey's popular government, it was really a twofold edged sword. While it reduced the force of the military's inclusion in non-military personnel affairs, the path in which the inquiries were led disturbed numerous Turks. This resultantly prompted to doubt as it was seen that it was not only military as assumed, but also regular citizen secularists including daily paper editors and university vice chancellors. Hypotheses were predominant that what was truly occurring was a wash out of AKP rivals from places of power. Late court decisions have demonstrated that no less than one of the bodies of evidence against the military was fake and even falsely created.

0.5. Democracy as a social-cultural battleground in Turkey

Democracy in Turkey is a necessary chore; the redesigning of past shameful acts and to satisfy a fanatic vision of the way of Turkish identity. This is precisely what Erdogan implied by his remark well over 10 years prior that majority rules system resembled a bus ride, one gets off when the goal is come to. Erdogan and the AKP are of

the view that they speak to the politically minimized Turkish majority whose birthplaces are from rural Anatolia, the urban poor and additionally individuals who think that their social identity, including an Islamic character, has been stifled by the secular elites with support from the military. The AKP is persuaded that on the off chance that it is to satisfy its vision of Turkey, any odds and ends of the old request must be killed or hazard being expelled by these secular powers. Keeping in mind the end goal to do this, it has disintegrated the nation's fragile arrangement of governing rules.

Since the 2010 referendum, the government impact on judiciary has increased as it might choose judges to the constitutional courts. The AKP government has additionally held the office of the Presidency since 2007. Once a stylized part expected to be above party politics, the position now has more noteworthy political powers as the present president Tayyip Erdogan has no doubts about being dividing and controlling the constitutional delineations of the worthy office. Still, it ought to be noticed that when Abdullah Gul was president he was considered as rubber stamp AKP legislation and take after the partisan loyalty.

The crumbling of balanced governance has prompted to unaccountability. The administration could whitewash debasement and corruption which assimilated the nation from December 2013 onwards. At last it wasn't those blamed for defilement that paid the cost, but instead the individuals who did the exploring.

But all is not well in Turkey. The nation's vote based deficiency is a consequence of the legacy of dictator type of leaders and their undemocratic origination of what makes a decent resident. It is additionally a result of the legacy of the military's inclusion

in politics. In the interim, the political framework is casualty to cultural-social divisions over the way of Turkish identity. What is disastrous is that the more youthful era of Turks are encountering and transitioning in this hostile and anti-democratic era prevailing in Turkey. Yet, they don't review military government. They didn't grow up underestimated or marginalized. On the off chance that anything they are is the result of social-assembly. However, the youth is seeing their political arousing and awakening in an exceedingly separated Turkey and being compelled to take sides in a framework where majority rules system and its institutions are the battlefields.

0.6. Findings

- Political parties in Pakistan are organized and active in popular politics like those in Turkey. However they do not use this potential for consolidation of democracy. Their sit-ins are for their own interests or personal gains of leadership.
- C.S. in Pakistan holds no candle to the strength of C.S. in Turkey.
- Leadership has played a vital role in reducing tensions and bridging the gap which divided the different sectors of the C.S. Recently, C.S in Turkey was responsible for failure of coup attempt by military.
- Where as in Pakistan's case, C.S has not come of age as yet; external donors have used their assistance for their vested interests while the leadership in Pakistan has not played its required role in reducing the differences which exist among different sections of the society.
- Dominant feudal class and fragile middle class in Pakistan as compared to Turkey also results in fragile and dismal C.S and unconsolidated democratization.

- Income distribution between different sections of the society is comparatively better in Turkey as compared to Pakistan;
- The state institutions are more organized and strong in Turkey as compared to Pakistan

0.7. Recommendations

After analyzing the whole scenario of democracy and presence of C.S in Pakistan and Turkey there are some recommendations for betterment of democracy and C.S; Some of the practical solutions to strengthen the democracy in Pakistan and Turkey are given as under;

Political parties must be fortified to develop and promote political culture and reduce political disunity; and influence of parliament must be guaranteed to shield democratic government from dangers postured by people's rule.

Independent Judiciary should be ensured and the judicial decisions should be accepted and respected to strengthen institutions which would have a direct impact on performance of civil society.

Moreover, educational system should be reformed and educational policies should be revised by the government making them effective in letter and spirit; political education should be imparted for the awareness of the general public thereby resulting in a vibrant civil society.

The feudal lords and bureaucrats should be discouraged from entering in politics in order to promote true democratic culture; and economic stability should be guaranteed by making viable economic policies.

The focus should be placed on improving the living standard of the people; and there is a critical need of developed and mature leadership. Participation, especially of youth must be encouraged in politics. A transparent and well defined foreign policy should be formulated which clearly indicate the level of relationships with the international world; and a powerful and proficient arrangement of checks and balances is the desperate need and of great importance to fortify the democracy and civil society.

In light of the arguments presented above it can be stated that democracy is facing many threats in both the countries. Some of these threats are internal while the remaining is external. Commitment and sincerity to the purpose is the basic need of the hour.

To conclude, one might say that democracy doesn't simply spring out of nowhere; it is a continuous procedure taking decades and in some cases centuries hundreds of years. Our leaders and rulers must understand the significance of popular government and must regard the power assigned to them through vote.

In spite of the fact that democracy is confronting multi-dimensional dangers yet they can be handled effectively if it is desired. Our leaders must avoid their personal stakes and hold hands to battle against all the counter political powers. They should arrange and use open power in right heading to make people aware of the facts. The

establishments and institutions must work in collaboration with each other to fortify vote based system. All the disagreeable issues amongst regions and focus must be settled on the basis of needs. Great administration must be guaranteed to support vote based system. Democracy can be supported by able authority that acknowledges and comprehends the genuine reason for fragile popular governments in Pakistan.

The foreign policy makers should make transparent and fruitful policy which may clearly define its limits of co-operation with the concerned countries in the world. In order to make things right for democracy and also for the advocates and believers of the democracy it is necessary to make it fruit full but fully participating and properly using the entrusted powers.

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