

**THE POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND
MULTILATERALISM: A CASE STUDY OF BRICS**




Researcher

Beenish Sultan Qazi

Reg. no.24-FSS/PHDIR/F16

Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Amna Mehmood



**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN
2021**

Accession # TH25792¹⁴⁷

PHD
327.172
BEP

cold war
military policy
Nuclear warfare
world politics

The Post-Cold War International Order and Multilateralism: A Case Study of BRICS



**Thesis Submitted in the Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
International Relations**

Researcher

Beenish Sultan

Reg. No. 24-FSS/PHDIR/F16


**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD

2021

Declaration

I, Beenish Sultan Qazi, hereby declare that this Dissertation is written by me in its entirety on the basis of my research work under the sincere guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Amna Mahmood, Professor Department of Politics and International Relations, Female Campus, IIUI. No portion of this Dissertation is copied from another source. No portion of the research, presented in this Dissertation, has been submitted before for any degree or qualification in this or any other university or educational institution.



Beenish Sultan Qazi

Registration No. 24-FSS/PHDIR/F16

Department of Politics and International Relations,

Faculty of Social Sciences,

International Islamic University,

Islamabad

Dedication

To the love I feel for my son!

Acknowledgement

ALL PRAISE TO ALLAH ALL MIGHTY!

I am indebted to a number of people who facilitated me in the completion of this dissertation. Firstly, I sincerely owe to Prof. Dr. Amna Mehmood, for her guidance and support during my research discourse and writing phase of this dissertation. She led me with commitment from the very beginning of my research, during the brainstorming sessions on the subject, until its completion, with utmost patience. Secondly, there are also a number of acknowledgements due to some of my patrons and teachers who carved me in to what I am today. Some from the National Defence University, Islamabad, where I worked as Research Associate for six years and others at the International Islamic University, Islamabad, which also happens to be my *Alma Matar*. My humble gratitude to Dr. Muhammad Khan, my M.Phil. Supervisor, Dr. Musarat Jabeen, Dr. Noor Fatima and special mention merits of Prof. Dr. Saif-ur-Rehman, who continues to be my inspiration and guide.

Meanwhile, I would also like to thank the staff of Department of Politics and International Relations, Woman Campus. In addition, the staff at the libraries of International Islamic University, National Defence University, Quaid-e-Azam University and Army Library deserve appreciation for their support. On the other hand, I would also like to thank Lord Jim O' Neill the pioneer of the idea of BRICS and his team. His timely response over email and guidance in polishing the concept of this dissertation was commendable. In addition, it is worth acknowledging the support provided to me by the Chinese Embassy, Islamabad who facilitated my visits to various think tanks in China which allowed me to widen my horizon on the subject. Special appreciation is due to Mr. Andrew Kryobko, from a think tank named Sputnik, Russia, for continuously inspiring me on various subjects of mutual interest. Lastly, I would also like to acknowledge my parents, siblings and particularly my husband for their utmost support, love and affection, without which I would not have been able to achieve anything!

Abstract

The central idea of this dissertation is to discuss the role of multilateralism in the Post-Cold War international order, with BRICS as its case study. It examines commonality of interests amongst BRICS countries as a feature providing incentives for internal cooperation. Whereas, four issues impede BRICS growth: Corruption, Bilateralism and lack of synergy, anti-US sentiments and China centric notions. After its institution in the year 2009, BRICS was expected to send ripples across the traditional Western led international order. This in scripts both the regional and global characteristics of member countries, where on one hand, every country enjoy a regional status of influence and on the other hand, China's phenomenal growth process has led to attain the status of the second largest economy of the world. Conversely, BRICS is yet to achieve the expected magnitude of global influence guided through the notion of multilateralism. The most considerable factors to BRICS dilemma owes to domestic corruption in member countries, bilateralism and lack of synergy due to diverse global and regional interests, impression of BRICS being an anti-US block and overwhelming influence of China. Generally, the countries remain connected owing to their individual interests for attaining more geopolitical influence, which are viewed in this study through the assumptions of 'spill-over' in Neo-Functionalism. This is applied due to the deepening of their trans-regional cooperation in sectors other than economy. Hence, the study is qualitative in nature, with analytical and descriptive underpinnings. Data was collected from open sources and deliberated with a two-fold focus: content analysis of agendas of BRICS summits and open-ended interviews with subject specialists. Its core construct envisages analysis of Post-Cold war international order heralding the 'rise of rest viz-a-viz the West' and also to understand multilateralism with BRICS as a case study.

Contents

Declaration	i
Dedication.....	ii
Acknowledgement.....	iii
Abstract.....	iv
List of Figures & Tables.....	vi
Abbreviations and Acronyms.....	vii
Introduction.....	1
 CHAPTER 1: Literature Review, and Methodology.....	18
1.1 Evolution of Literature on BRICS: The Three Phases	22
1.2 BRICS: Themes and Issues	36
1.3 Stage I: Qualitative Content Analysis of BRICS Agenda's	40
1.3.1 Stage II: Semi- Structured Interviews	43
 CHAPTER 2: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework	53
2.1 Neo-Functionalism and Multilateralism: The Debate	56
2.2 BRICS and 'Spill-over'.....	70
 CHAPTER 3: Post-Cold war international order and multilateralism	77
3.1 The Disintegration of Soviet Union and the United States.....	82
3.1.1 Internal Factors for the disintegration of Soviet Union.....	84
3.1.2 Intervening Factors for the disintegration of Soviet Union....	87
3.1.3 The Post-Cold war scenario.....	89
3.2 Post 9/11 and the United States	95
 CHAPTER 4: The BRICS Countries: A Prism of Multilateralism.....	103
4.1 Country's Approach towards BRICS and US	106
4.1.1 Brazil.....	106
4.1.2 Russia	114
4.1.3 India.....	120
4.1.4 China.....	128
4.1.5 South Africa.....	135
4.2 The Next-Eleven (N-11).....	149
4.2.1 Pakistan and the N 11.....	150
 CHAPTER 5: Looking at the World BRICS by BRICS.....	156
5.1 BRICS: Opportunities and Challenges	159
5.1.1 BRICS: Opportunities.....	161
5.1.2 BRICS: Challenges	166
5.1.3 Intervening role of US	179
5.2 Future of BRICS as a coherent actor	182
 Findings, and Conclusions.....	187
 References	197
 Annexures	229

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Deductive reasoning as a top to down approach.....	20
Figure 2: The Future of Global Multilateralism is regional.....	45
Figure 3: Future of BRICS.....	49
Figure 4: Features of Multi-polarity.....	58
Figure 5: Features of Multilateralism.....	64
Figure 6: Theoretical Relationship between Multilateralism, Neo-Functionalism and BRICS	69
Figure 7: Fifteen states emerged after the disintegration of Soviet Union.....	90
Table 1: Seven levels of China's forty year reform.....	51
Table 2: Comparison between Regional Integration Theory and Neo-Functionalism	68
Table 3: US military engagements 1990's to 2000's	93

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CPC	Communist Party of China
CPEC	China- Pakistan Economic Corridor
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
ECSC	Coal and Steel Community
FTAA	Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
G7	Group of Seven Developed Countries
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G20	Group of Twenty
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Association
IDB	International Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
LIC's	Low Income Countries
MDG's	Millennium Development Goals
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB	New Development Bank

PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
RIO	Regional Integration Organization
RIT	Regional Integration Theory
SAARC	South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDG's	Sustainable Development Goals
SEZ's	Special Economic Zones
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SSC	South-South Cooperation
UK	United Kingdom
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization



Map of BRICS countries

Introduction

There were innumerable ramifications of Cold War on the international order. Soviet Union demise in the year 1991 augmented the American global power, which remained unrivaled for decades. However, in the outcome of Twin Tower attack on 11 Sep' 2001, in New York, popularly known as 9/11, several other countries attained unprecedented economic might. These states, particularly China, in turn enhanced cooperation with other developing countries by maximizing partnerships. This dissertation focuses on the rise of countries other than the US, and their integration, branding an era of multilateralism. In this context, the combination of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, also called BRICS, offers an example for evaluating the degree of global multilateral cooperation. However, after it was formed in 2009, BRICS is yet to achieve the expected global influence which apart from other reasons also owes to bilateral underpinnings and lack of synergy amongst member states, particularly between China and India.

Multilateralism did not evolve as an organic consequence of fading Uni-polarity in the latter half of the Post-Cold War international order. In fact, it transformed through a process of multi-polarity, which envisaged the rise of few nations, other than the US, after the demise of Soviet Union. Fareed Zakaria (Zakaria, 2011) in a book titled: *The Post American World and the Rise of the Rest*, termed this as 'the Rise of the rest'. He refers to the shift of Uni-polarity to multi-polarity quoting China's annual growth rate of 9 percent and 4 percent of 85 other countries in the year 2010. Bertr and Badie (2019) in a chapter for a book titled: *New Perspectives on the International Order*, describe this concept of multi-polarity as power polarity entailing competition among

states that claim power status, by having the objective resources and are also perceived as such by others.

Significantly, the Post- 9/11 era, ushered a new set of foreign policy priorities in the economic domain for numerous States. Worthwhile were the set of goals illustrated in China's designs (Sen, 1995). In fact, once economic considerations assumed more significance globally, China routed its interests towards growth through technological advancements. The discourse of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) at the fourteenth National Congress of the Party expressed that: "the embodiment of current worldwide rivalry is a far reaching rivalry in public strength, in light of monetary, logical and innovative qualities, the financial contemplations have accomplished a more prominent need in the Post-Cold War period" (bjreview.com, 2011). In the midst of worldwide monetary interests, certain Asian countries additionally rose to certainty as well (Henry Kissinger, 2014). There was an ascent of the 'Asian Tigers'-, The Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Thailand.

In the year 2007, Japan built an economy with the help of reform in democratic institutions which had the potential to surpass Western nations. Meanwhile, policy makers in India had changed their responses specifically in the economic domain (Ganguly and Pardesi, 2007). Stephen Cohen (2000), wrote in an article for Brookings that: since its birth India was poised for a dramatic future, either collapse or greatness. That dramatization has finished and another one has started. The specter of breakdown has passed and India has passed as a significant Asian force, joining China and Japan. The 1998 atomic tests in the Rajasthan desert underscored the country's new height.

Meanwhile, after the Soviet Union disintegrated in the year 1991, Russia set out on an emotional cycle of financial change. The early post-Soviet period was a period of relative political receptiveness. In the era of 2000, Russia persistently moved away from the West in an attempt to regain its global standing. Russian President Putin's efforts to push this intention forward, was coupled with his domestic political standing. Russia's economic recovery played a major role in driving its resurgence. The country experienced strong economic growth with an average of 6.7 percent improvement in areas of transport, retail and trade (Oliker et al. 2009). Primarily this recovery owes to its oil and gas sector. During the era of 2000's Russia's oil industry progressed rapidly (Hill, 2004). The income from this sector saw a rise from \$28 billion to \$217 billion (Oliker et al. 2009). High energy costs allowed Russia to build up its cash saves and started repaying its new commitments (Trenin, 2006).

On the other side of the world, Brazil in Latin America slowly and carefully carved a niche for itself in the international community: that of a regional leader in Latin America. Brazilian diplomats set out to lead South America and the global south without actively claiming leadership or incurring the associated costs. They did so to protect Brazil's national autonomy in an ever-changing political climate.

Considerably, the Post-9/11 era was not a 'post-American world order', but a system in which 'the rest' had gained substantial space as established international actors. In the order of global relations (IR), an incredible force is a state which dominates in "size of populace and region, asset blessing, financial ability, military strength, political steadiness and capability" (Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 131). These qualities, additionally alluded as force capacities, guarantee an incredible force the capacity to apply its monetary, military, political and social effect on a worldwide scale. The distribution of power capabilities in the international system

determines the number of the great powers and, consequently, the polarity of the international system. The rise of the rest phenomenon was at the heart of economic growth and the system evolved as multi-polar. The states were in their own spheres busy progressing economically, and gaining considerable regional and global standing.

At the same time, the world was hit with a period of remarkable pressing factor in overall money related business areas and banking systems between mid-2007 and mid 2009 referred to as the global financial crisis (GFC) (Kevin Rood, 2009). Amid the GFC, with a decrease in the dwelling market of US, a wave of financial crisis spread from the US to the other parts of the world due to major linkages of international monetary structure (Peters, 2011). A lot of people also lost their investments and money, once many major economies suffered (Crotty, 2009).

As a consequence, China and rest of countries that had attained a steady growth rate, started integrating through multilateral arrangements and institutions, diffusing power to actors other than states. In fact, it was not hypothetical to say that, eventually multilateralism evolved as a norm of diplomatic practice (Muldoon, 2014). Hence, 'the rise of the rest' which had once branded multi-polarity, shifted the international discourse towards shared growth and multilateralism. To recall, the term multi-polarity denoted global distribution of power, concentrated in different countries, while multilateralism branded a process in which several states worked together as a matter of practice (Scott, 2013).

Globally, China was at the heart of multilateralism (Wade, 2011), while many states gained space as influential regional players with their ambit of influence widening at the global level (Chin, 2015). Especially, the monetary emergencies of the

mid-1990s clarified that the administration of the world request couldn't keep on overlooking the advances of the arising nations.

BRICS, a gathering of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa established in the year 2008, represented ideas of concurrence and multilateralism (Coning, 2014). Although, the construct of this grouping was subject to much scrutiny; as to whether it had a multilateral foundation and ability to become a leading body in global politics (Panda, 2013). Yet, the emergence of BRICS was ascertained as a 'premier' economic and political forum for addressing various issues of global governance issues and politico-security concerns (Panda, 2013).

To recall, earlier the acronym BRICs (without South Africa) meant nothing but a 'clever investment jargon', referred to by Lord Jim O' Neil, when he was the chief economist at the Goldman Sachs (O' Neil, 2001). He forecasted in his very popular paper: 'Building Better BRICs', the probability of BRICs countries to surpass G7 economies by the year 2020. This prediction was monumental especially amid the GFC.

However, they demonstrated restraint in materializing this calculation due to numerous reasons. It is noted through deliberation that, in the principal decade the nations' individual presentation stayed perky (till the year 2010). In the year 2009, when the primary BRICs culmination was held, the GDPs of Brazil, Russia, India, and China positioned eighth, twelfth, eleventh and third, separately (Ballard, 2020). Eminent monetary organizations were figured specifically the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement, permitting incomplete satisfaction of BRICs' center *raison d'être*: to offer dependable options in contrast to the Atlantic arrangement of worldwide administration (as demonstrated in the fifth BRICS Summit).

However, they demonstrated restraint in materializing this calculation due to numerous reasons. It is noted through deliberation that, in the first decade the countries' individual performance remained upbeat (till the year 2010). Conversely, aggregately toward the year's end 2017, the size of the BRICS economies was around \$19 trillion (16 trillion euros; £ 14 trillion), just underneath the size of the United States and fairly bigger than the size of the European Union (O' Neil, 2012). The rankings of the four establishing individuals were eighth, twelfth, 6th and second, separately, with China and India driving the development (The Role of BRICS in the World Economy and International Development, 2017). The combined GDP grew by 179 percent, and total trade of the member nations expanded by 94 percent (World Trade Statistical Review, 2019). Furthermore, in the year 2019, the combined GDP of this organization surpassed (using PPP-adjusted GDP) that of G7 economies (World Trade Statistical Review, 2019).

Critically observing, in the second decade, the economic growth of individual BRICS countries, particularly that of Russia, South Africa and Brazil remained slow. However, the combined growth rate illustrated impressive figures. Notwithstanding, the consolidated development rate delineated noteworthy figures. This was because of two main considerations: China's remarkable development measure and the sketchy significance of the G7 gathering itself. Firstly, according to Lord Neil himself, BRICS is still on track of progress due to China's growth process, which will allow the group to achieve the desired standing till the year 2035 (O' Neil' 2018). China has shifted growth leadership from exports and government-backed investment toward more domestic private consumption. This is extremely impressive and beyond this decade, from 2021 to 2030. Still it can be assumed that China will slow down to around 5

percent growth, but this will be consistent with the BRICS dream, as well as China individually becoming as big as the US, perhaps by 2027.

Also, during the time of 1990 and 2010, the normal genuine GDP development rate for the BRICs was 5.38 percent (drove by China and India, with normal development paces of 10.41 and 7.65 percent, individually), while it was just 1.41 percent for the G7 over a similar period (World Trade Statistical Review, 2019). In addition, for a similar period, the BRICs (except for Russia and Brazil in 2009) noticed no negative development rates, while the G7 nations experienced steady negative development rates (Aggarwal, 2013). Truth be told, the genuine GDP development paces of the BRICS have been expanding consistently and at essentially higher rates than those of the G7 during the most recent 30 years. There is a high likelihood that these patterns will persevere, and the BRICS will keep on presenting more genuine monetary dangers and difficulties to the G7 in the coming many years (Wilson et al., 2011).

Therefore, these theories for the coming many years additionally stay dependent upon the idea of connection among China and India. Authentically, both the neighbors seek after different territorial and worldwide plans. These distinctions are full of two-sidedness in the BRICS gathering. China divulged its driven Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the year 2014, of which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a lead project. India on the other hand, is apprehensive of this initiative and also remains hostile towards its traditional rival, Pakistan. Incessantly, India has prompted anti-Pakistan sentiments during the BRICS summits, which China vehemently subdued. Meanwhile, India remains a staunch supporter of US interests in the overall Asia Pacific region. Hence, it will be critical for both these countries to promote an aura of collective growth through the grouping, in order to achieve the desired success.

Meanwhile, it is also important to assess how BRICS gradually shifted its focus towards sectors other than economy (Xing, 2016). Initially, the grouping focused on economic cooperation only, but as the Summits proceeded, strategic, military and political issues were also focus of their attention. This indeed owes to the status of every country as influential regional players with their own strategic global interests (Wade, 2011). Regionally, they were the flag bearers of multi-polarity but not multilateralism. China and India struggled to attain a position in the global supply chain, whereas, Brazil, Russia and South Africa proposed to sell their abundant resources for taking advantage of Globalization (Bremmer, 2017). However, it was interesting to note how after eleven summits and two decades later, they managed to bring both their individual and global interests in line with the basic agenda of BRICS and multilateralism. They are not just a spectrum of “regional emerging powers”, but also explain a “new wave” of multilateral practice, which is cross-continental in character taking its thrust from “multi-polar” world politics (Panda, 2013).

Despite of the fact that BRICS was not able to achieve the expected status as determined by Lord O'Neil in 2001. Their rise in the following decade will fundamentally rely on how they let go of individual interests and also exploit the US misadventures. Its military adventurism in the Middle East and Afghanistan, alongside want of Pan-Americanism, end up being counter-gainful for its in general 'super force' status. The US has experienced a time of fundamental lacks that has laid to a huge bit of dependence on new financing to back superfluous private and public use. This has limited its lofty part on the planet allowing to the creating financial business areas of various countries to make an engraving in the overall structure (Fergusson, 2004). BRICS should bring fringe nations in their particular areas; or, more than likely it will

likewise bring about making squares of United States and China. Which is against the soul of multilateralism and shared benefit arrangements

Problem Statement

In practice, across a wide range of areas, it can be viewed that the BRICS have frequently been less, as opposed to more helpful in supporting global organizations and their appeal. This component addresses its pertinence as a multilateral entity amid the current global economic and political structure. Especially, in the context of its qualities and shortcoming of as a multilateral entity, just as how the rising powers, primarily China, India and Russia, use BRICS as a multilateral gathering to accentuate their individual global vital interests. The notion lays on the idea that, while the ascent and progress of BRICS is a fascinating political development of the 21st century, multilateral world appeal and shows the force change from North to South, the impact of the BRICS in forming different global economic and political administration endeavors will intensely rely on the unity of these nations. This will depend upon how these countries will accommodate each other's global interest and concerns of the countries in their proximity for shaping a stronger region, which is able to cooperate globally.

Significance of Study

It is pertinent to analyze at this point of history, the impacts of shift of power axis from the West to East. Particularly, an assessment is required on individual rising states and multilateral organizations like BRICS. Deliberation is essential in order to map the evolution, main contours, key contributions, gaps and the future of this organization. This is imperative amid the transformation of the world order in the 21st century and the evolution in traditional power circle of the West. Undoubtedly, the

preferences of individual rising states have considerably changed in the post-Cold War era. They are pursuing regional designs and are concurrently incorporated in multilateral organizations with global agendas. By comparing their individual foreign policies, it is important to measure whether the rising powers are behaving as 'status quo or revisionist'.

Objectives of Study

The primary objective of the study is to examine the evolution of the Post-Cold War era, from multi-polarity to multilateralism. This rests in the examination of BRICS, which was being considered as a flag-bearer of multilateralism. In this regard, it aims to evaluate the relevance and level of influence attained by BRICS as a multilateral entity within the current global political structure. Alongside it also evaluates the shortcomings in BRICS related to bilateral underpinnings and contradictory regional designs of individual states, particularly India and China, which impedes the growth of BRICS

Research Questions

Key questions that guide this study are as following:

1. How far has the international order transformed in the political, economic and strategic domains in the Post-Cold War era?
2. What level of political influence BRICS has achieved as a forum to address various global governance and political-security issues?
3. How the rising pre-eminence of the South, mainly the BRICS countries, exerted pressure on the North and the Western countries?

4. What are the future contours for BRICS to sustain as a considerable multilateral entity?

Delimitations of Study

Most of the data for the study was collected from local sources, however for more credible study visits to think tanks in China and office of the World Bank in Islamabad were conducted. In addition, reports of previous eleven BRICS summits were analyzed for deliberating on its course of direction. There are no limitations for understanding these reports as they are available in English with no language barrier. Whereas in China, the experts consulted were proficient in English.

Operational Definitions of Major Terms

I- Global Power Reconfiguration: Generally it is taken as a shift of power in terms of wealth, military might and influence, from the West to the East (Achin Vanaik, 2015). With the end goal of this investigation it will be considered as the financial ascent of arising Southern powers, for example, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS), and how might existing international and monetary relations change because of their ascent.

II- Power Struggle: In the international arena it is considered as an unpleasant or violent competition for power (Charles P. Kindleberger, 1970). The study will consider power struggle as a competition between status-quo power (mainly the US) and a rising one (China).

III- Multilateralism: Process of organizing relations between groups of three or more states (James A. Caporaso, 1992). Past the essential quantitative perspective, as per the

examination multilateralism is for the most part considered to involve certain subjective components or rules that shape the character and game plan or establishment. Those standards are a resoluteness of interests among members, a pledge to diffuse correspondence, and an arrangement of contest settlement expected to implement a specific method of conduct.

IV- International Order: **International** means: 'the game plan of individuals or things comparable to one another as indicated by a specific arrangement, example, or technique.' Order implies: "Existing, occurring, or carried on between nations." Hence, International order is 'The pattern of activity that sustains the elementary goals of international society' (Hedley Bull, 1977).

V- BRICS: BRICS is an acronym for the grouping of the world's leading emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The BRICS Leaders' Summit is accumulated yearly with discussions addressing circles of political and monetary coordination, in which part countries have perceived a couple of business openings, financial complementarities and areas of cooperation. The Chair boat of the conversation is rotated yearly among the people, according to the shortening B-R-I-C-S. Well past the finish, BRICS joint effort in the earlier decade has stretched out to fuse a yearly program of in excess of 100 sectorial social events. (BRICS Information Portal).

VI- Post-Cold War: Post-Cold war era is branded with 'distributive' and 'regulatory' settlement of the international order (Ian Clark, 2001). It included political and regional changes as indicated by the new conveyance of force, and furthermore reformulation of the standards of world request, for example, the multilateral association of the worldwide economy and the development of agreeable security organizations. This

investigation sees this request with a three-overlap center: The initially was U.S. power. The second was the ascent of China and different nations as the focal point of multi extremity. In the interim, third, was the joining of rising nations marking the period of multilateralism.

Variables of Study

The rise and integration of major countries in the latter half of post-Cold War era, has resulted in the evolution of the global order from multi-polarity towards multilateralism. The process is facilitated through the deepening of interdependence and not through confrontation between the established and new actors.

Research Methodology

I- Design

This study is qualitative in nature and based on the deductive, analytical and case study framework. The analysis is divided over phases of the evolution of multilateralism through the case study of BRICS. Phase I- is very broad, entailing analysis of the positioning of contemporary group of rising states in relation to the established multilateral arrangements and the global order. Despite the onset of pessimism about the economic prospects of BRICS, through this methodology it was ascertained that the grouping will continue to attract significant attention as a potential source of concerted counter balancing policies vis-à-vis the developed world. Hence, it prove that BRICS members will manage to position themselves as aspiring nations capable of sustaining high levels of economic growth without excessive dependence on developed countries.

Following which, phase- II delved more deeply into the preferences of the individual rising states to assess whether, or to what degree, the rising powers will

actually want to be incorporated into the existing global multilateral arrangements. However, for the phase- III, an analytical shift from the attempt of (re)shaping some global norms and rules while selectively internalizing some of the established global rules was observed. Hence, this study endeavored to conduct a sequential mixed method research. This is significant because it allowed the study to evolve by overcoming the limitations of a single design and addressing the questions raised at different levels. The study entailed four mixed method designs: determining implementation sequence of data collection, alternating priority to methods in data collection and analysis, deliberating on the implementation stage of findings of study and viewing the study through the theory of 'Neo-functionalism'.

II- Data Collection

The study is qualitative, based on analytical and deductive reasoning. It comprises of two main stages; Stage I entailed content analysis of the agendas officially released after the 11 BRICS Summit's, this was corroborated with the agenda and themes of ministerial meetings conducted along with the main summit. Hence this stage involved a qualitative thematic content analysis of the agenda's. In this regard, four parameters were used to analyze the agendas: economic, political, social and security. This helped in identifying the magnitude of interests as it evolved since the year 2008 in these four critical parameters and how BRICS has the tendency to become an illustration of multilateralism.

For Stage II, a series of interviews were conducted with subject specialists both in Pakistan and China. Particularly, economists, analysts, academicians and technocrats were approached in both the countries in order to corroborate the data deduced from the content analysis stage. The interviews were conducted in a semi structured format where questions were derived from the data and analysis of the Stage-I. The responses

were used to simultaneously strengthen the concept of how BRICS as a consortium of major evolving powers is shifting from just being economic centric to multifaceted which in turn is an illustration of multilateralism in the international arena.

Organization of the Study

The present study consists of five chapters. The introduction of the study discusses its structure, including significance, rationale, problem statement, objectives of study, research questions, delimitation of study, variables of study, and operational definitions.

Chapter 1 discusses in detail the literature available on the subject and the Methodology adopted for intercepting the data. As there is dearth of literature on the subject it will delve upon the agenda of the first 11 BRICS summits, alongside the bilateral interactions between the member countries. Hence, the chapter will be divided in to two parts: First, BRICS and its evolution viewed through the literature available and the analysis of agendas of BRICS summits and second understand the conceptions of subject specialists consulted for the purpose of this study.

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework of the study and discusses various conceptual dimensions of neo-functionalism. Particularly concept of ‘spillover’ is perhaps the most important part of the theory of neo-functionalism that can be applied to the post-Cold war World order and evolution of BRICS as a multilateral forum. This concept is hence referred to the mechanism by which integration in one area for countries like China, Russia and India create the conditions and incentives for integration in another related policy area. A comparative analysis will be given on regional integration theory and functionalism.

Chapter 3 focuses on the reconfiguration of the global power in the post-cold war scenario. An era ended when the Soviet Union collapsed on Dec. 31, 1991. With the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, a major era ended. The tussle between Soviet Union and US was a defining factor of the era of Cold War, and the fall of Europe actually framed that confrontation. Meanwhile, the world was amidst uni-polarity and there was no other state which was able to challenge this hegemony. However, after the 9/11 twin tower attack, numerous countries, particularly China attained a global standing, with almost the formation of 'poles' in the international arena. Following which, after the GFC in the year 2009, some countries integrated through various consortiums bringing an era of multilateralism to the world.

Chapter 4 focuses on the underpinnings of BRICS countries from the prism of their individual standing and multilateral interests. Initially BRICs was presented as an economic forum, and BRICS countries perceived as developing economies. At the same time after 2008 GFC, the traditional focus of the world economy in the West have rendered moderate financial development or even deteriorated. Consequently, the talk around BRICS has been principally financial. In a manner BRICS themselves have given extra focus on monetary perspectives. The key BRICS report by experts from BRICS countries is basically about economy and economies of the part countries. Notwithstanding, the BRICS interests have also shifted from being economic focus, towards strategic, political, cultural and social. Moreover, the chapter also mentions, how regional/peripheral countries like the Next-11 have a role to play in BRICS growth. Highlighting the concept of BRICS Plus.

Chapter 5 evaluates the future role of BRICS as an organization in international relations. The major question is whether emerging states, fast economic growth and interest for a multilateral system and antipathy against the US lead unipolar

international system are factors enough to make BRICS a coherent and relevant international actor. It is apparently evident that all BRICS countries have their own favorable circumstances and they have perceived that BRICS is a significant idea for driving those interests. Of course the five BRICS countries make a varying mix of countries with different civilizational and social backgrounds. Therefore, it is not easy to assume that BRICS would be an organization for changing the international system while BRICS members have different kind of expectations about the future world order. In this respect the most important BRICS countries are China and India which also have contradictory interest and expectations about the future of the region as well as world order.

The concluding part wraps the overview of the study, enlists the main findings and recommendations for further improving the interaction in the world which is witnessing emergence of many countries

Chapter 1

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter entails discussion with a two-fold focus: First, methodology adopted for collecting and interpreting data is deliberated in view of the research title and questions. Second, literature available on multilateralism and BRICS is analyzed and data is interpreted in two stages: Stage I entails content analysis of the agendas officially released after the 11 BRICS Summits, (after a decade since its inception). Hence this stage involves a qualitative thematic content analysis of the BRICS agenda's. In this regard, four parameters are used to analyze the agendas: economic, political, social and strategic. This helped in identifying the evolution of BRICS in view of the interests of states.

At the end of Stage I, for Stage II, a series of interviews were conducted with subject specialists. The main feature includes interview with Lord Jim O' Neil (over email) who initially coined the term BRICs (without the inclusion of South Africa), when he was chief economist at the Goldman Sachs. Alongside interviews were conducted of Mr. Andrew Kroybko- from a think tank named Sputnik, Russia and other think tanks in China during a visit by the researcher to Beijing, Chengdu and Nanjing, China. Their responses were corroborated with the data deduced from the content analysis stage. The interviews were in a semi-structured form where questions were derived from the data and analysis of the Stage-I. The responses were used to simultaneously strengthen the concept of how BRICS as a consortium of major evolving powers is shifting from just being mere economic centric to multifaceted; which in turn is an illustration of multilateralism in the international arena.

Data is collected from secondary sources for the purpose of this dissertation. The literature on Multilateralism and BRICS has interestingly evolved on a steady path based on a chronological order. It is viewed in three stages, and is presently considered to be in the center of the third stage. Stage I being expansive, will involve examination of BRICS states according to the international monetary setup. Following which, the stage II will focus more significantly in the leanings of the individual rising states. In order to check, whether these rising powers were 'revisionist or standard'. The issues of how they will be able to blend in the overall international framework will also be discussed.

For the Third Phase, a logical move will be found in the point of convergence for member states. Despite the fact that initially the association was overwhelmed by China's overall rise and BRICS. However, the literature on this aspect, did not cover the aspect of how these countries desire to shape or reshape the global rules, particularly for the BRICS countries. Particularly, it becomes important to understand once the focus of the group shifted from being agenda specific, i.e. economic integration, to exploring multi-sectoral themes, like security, Globalization and political notions.

Nonetheless, this study analyzed the evolution of BRICS as an illustration of multilateralism in the Post-Cold war international order through a thematic content analysis. The key unit of analysis is BRICS as an illustration of multilateralism. This study is different from the ones used earlier because it views the evolution of BRICS countries collectively, in two stages and through four perspectives. This allowed to fill in gaps that were left in numerous other studies conducted for the subject. Particularly, the results were corroborated with the theory of neo-functionalism, which satisfies numerous answers in the realm of the changing dynamics of the international arena. It provides a thorough analysis of how the interests of BRICS countries have evolved

from being merely economic to political and strategic. These countries and the consortium may not be looking towards attaining their hegemony but are more interested in being considered as credible major countries in the international arena.

For this study, the case study method is appropriate since it features how the BRICS nations took a consistent way of development in the midst of advancing multilateralism in the Post-Cold War. The focal point of this thesis is a detail investigation of both the internal elements of BRICS and its global outlook. Due to the intricacy of subject, one method of exploration would not be sufficient to investigate it appropriately. Subsequently, deductive examination has additionally been used alongside contextual investigation. Examination in the area of International relations additionally includes the progressions and cycles that happened throughout the timeframe of Post-Cold War.

A deductive approach is concerned with “developing a hypothesis (or hypotheses) based on existing theory, and then designing a research strategy to test the hypothesis (E. Babbie, 2010). It can be ascertained that deductive reasoning proceeds from particular to the general. The figure below explains this relationship as a top to down thinking approach.



Fig 1: Deductive reasoning as a top to down approach (J.Wilson, 2010)

It starts with a normal example "that is tested against observations". In this regard, there are also peculiar advantages of a deductive approach. Foremost, it explains causal relationships between concepts and variables, by measuring them quantitatively. It also

generalizes research findings to a certain extent. In this regard, for the purpose of this study, deductive approach helped to deduce causal relationships between the member countries of BRICS since its inception in the year 2009. This design was employed to analyze the changes in particular variables. It was interesting to find that since the inception of BRICS, the bilateral issues among China and India created constraints in the progression of BRICS. Apart from other factors, this constraint also played a role in impeding BRICS growth and hindered its expected scale of development in the year 2020. Hence, this study hypothesizes that the integration of rising countries in the Post-Cold war period, resulted evolution from being multi-polar to multilateral. However, the deepening of integration depends upon persistent cooperation and avoiding confrontation at all levels.

A detailed analysis of the literature revealed that, considerable research is available on the Post-Cold war international order and multilateralism but only from the prism of economy. However, the existing literature ignored the way political and other factors play a significant role in further integrating countries for achieving win-win solutions. Hence, the present study will contribute in the existing stock of literature as follow: Firstly, with the help of case study of BRICS, the study will indicate how a consortium of major developing countries with the potential to send ripples across the Western led world order, lagged behind because of diverse political motivations of participating countries. Secondly, China and India bilateral underpinnings are also analyzed which slow down the pace of development of BRICS. They actually figure out how to stay in the consortium dependent on the concept of 'Spill-over' within Neo-Functionalism.

Thirdly, this study will investigate the stance of US in the Post-Cold war world and how it gave space to different nations creating challenges for its uni-polarity.

Fourthly, the nature and also the shift in the posture of the World order after 9/11 will also be analyzed. Nations particularly China understood that multilateralism and not multi-polarity will permit to challenge the many years old Western drove world. At last, this study is one of a kind in investigating the consortium of BRICS and Multilateralism from the point of view of different areas and not simply from the aspect of economy. In such manner, the development of literature is seen in three stages. Lastly, this study is an endeavor to fill the gap in previously existing literature.

1.1 Evolution of literature on BRICS: the three phases

BRICS indicates an association of rising global economies coupled by being regional political forces. The abbreviation was initially created in the year 2001 by Lord Jim O'Neil in a paper written for Goldman Sachs, once he was Chief Economist, in order to feature significant economies that were rising and had the potential to challenge the G7 in the long run (O' Neil, 2001). In his investigation paper named: 'Building Better Global Economic BRICs' he foresee that, ' within the next decade, the standing of BRICs particularly that of China in the World GDP will considerably rise. As per these prospects, he suggested that the world policymaking patterns should be upgraded and explicitly the G7 should be accustomed to combine BRICs (O' Neil, 2001). For Lord O' Neil, the characteristics of BRICs countries included: strong improvement rates, standing in world economy, outstanding size of economy and the desire to attain political voice in international organizations (O' Neil, 2001). Hence, initially it just included BRICs and South Africa was added later by member countries.

Subsequently, considering the paper by Lord O'Neil the principal period of writing on BRICs nations developed. Generally speaking the literature saw its part in the worldwide financial setup without procuring reliance on the established forces. Hamish McRae in his book: *The World In 2020*, recommends that 'the achievement or

disappointment of any nation throughout the years will depend on development' (McRae, 1996). The highlights of development as per him incorporate three measures: the extent of GDP, accessibility of assets for venture and the extent of youngsters in advanced education. The unit of investigation for Lord Jim O' Neil, was also development, he additionally recommended that, 'the greater part of the world's financial aggravations since the last part of the 1990's (post-cold war) and its greatest changes have generally elaborated nations outside the G7 (except for the innovation driven decline in the US in 2000-2001). This shows the favorable political circumstances achieved by such nations both in their region and globally. Along these lines, writing in this first stage can be apportioned into two focus issues: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) improvement and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Initially, the GDP development aspect envisaged various indicators of macroeconomic level during the 1990's. The information gathered from the World Bank Data include:

- i- **Demography.** Taking a look at the demographics of the BRICS nations, it can be seen that China and India's populations have increased enormously compared to other nations in the group. India is the second largest country in the world, and China being the first, give tremendous business opportunities. The five BRICS states are around 40 percent of World's population and 25 percent of overall GDP (foreseen for 2020 were 33 percent) (Wilson, 2003; Armijo, 2007 and Wade, 2011).
- ii- **Economy.** China and India were ahead of other BRICS nations as far as the GDP yearly development rate is concerned during the period 1990–2015. Both the nations have kept a steady development since the 1990s (Herd and Dougherty, 2016). Despite the fact that China's financial development rate was

higher, India won as far as steadiness was concerned. Russia experienced negative financial development from its beginning in 1992; nonetheless, it has kept up high monetary development from that point onwards, although both South Africa and Brazil are comparatively normal in GDP development patterns (Siddiqui, 2016).

- iii- States and markets.** The Multi National Enterprises (MNE's), give significance to political strength, business climate, government responsibility, and a sound monetary arrangement of the host country. As far as Brazil is concerned, the number of days required to start a business in the year 2016 was an estimate of 80 days, which was the most prominent of the BRICS economies. In the year 2017, in Russia, the least number of days were required to start a business which was 10 days (World Development Indicators, 2017). In terms of enrollments for property the most number of days were required in India and the least was in Russia (CNUCED, 2017). The divulgence list for ensuring financial specialists indicated that China and India had the most elevated position with Brazil being the least (Kearney, 2016).

China is the only country in BRICS with positive macroeconomic markers. Pritchett (2015) specifies that because of the help of system of financial security, China spearheaded the foundation of a BRICS monetary organization. It determined dependability from accomplices for building a framework and accomplishing feasible turn of events. Western establishments are presently focused to less development centered advancement plans, for example advancing popularity based social orders; however these arrangements regularly miss the objective. Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer (2014), exactly examine the effect of global exchange on this way of life. They propose an elective instrument for exchange; nation's geographic attributes can be

utilized to acquire instrumental factors. They discover that these geographic qualities are significant determinants of nations generally speaking exchange.

Notwithstanding, what might be said about geographic qualities of BRICS nations? Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer (2014) look at the connection between exchange, pay and geographic attributes of financially practical nations. They propose that, nations' geographic qualities affect exchange, and are conceivably correlated with different determinants of pay. Further, they propose that exchange has a quantitatively enormous however just reasonably genuine beneficial outcome on pay. Notwithstanding, huge nations do have an edge over other more modest nations. Alberto Alesina, Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg (2016), in *A World of Trade Restrictions*, propose that, huge nations appreciate monetary advantages, on the grounds that political limits decide the size of the market.

Ross Levine and David Renelt (2018) in their examination "An affectability assessment of cross country advancement backslides", also perceive a positive, solid relationship among turn of events and interest in GDP. They recommend that money related progression may not be a moderate pattern of blending by all countries, it rather incorporate countries moving sequentially from vulnerable countries to the get-together of rich countries.

During the early 1900's, which is almost synonyms with the 20th century, the way individual BRICS countries were rising allowed their steady interface with the established powers like the EU. Lars Nilsson, Dan Ben-David and Michael B. Loewy (2015) examines that the intra-business exchange between the EU and the agricultural nations somewhere in 1980 and 1992 significantly expanded. In such manner, during the 1980s, the Chinese system stepped toward financial progression. Especially, with

the scenery of Deng Xiaoping's strategy of 'China's opening up' monetary changes in 1978. This cycle quickened during the 1990s. Jianhong Zhang and Arjen in 'Monetary Openness and Trade Linkages of China: An Empirical Study of the Determinants of Chinese Trade Intensities from 1993 to 1999' similarly ensure that, during 1993 and 1999 Chinese trade expanded. This pivotal activity changed the nation, diverting it from a helpless society to the second-biggest economy on the planet. These monetary changes allowed the country to become part of the world's leading organizations. Today, the country is putting resources into its neighbors through the trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Meanwhile, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor-CPEC, is also being developed by China in Pakistan as a regional harbinger of growth. Regardless, the issue is, will Pakistan's economy develop at the same time? Mohamed Akbar and Zareen Fatima Naqui proposed in, "Are Exports an Engine of Growth in Pakistan?", that in Pakistan, there has been an undertaking to seek an improvement strategy. Contrary to what exactly is generally believed in Pakistan, imports don't accept any relationship between work and pay.

So, how did the BRICS countries manage to sustain development and growth by improving GDP through international trade? Karolina Ekholm and Bo (2015) in *Growth and Trade versus Exchange and Growth, Small Business Economics*, suggest that these agricultural countries either worked in regions with requirement of growth, or they sorted out some way to continuously improve quality inside regions. George K. Zestos, Xiangnan Tao, Abhifit Sharma and Theodore Apangiotidis, investigate the wellsprings of advancement for the time frame 1971-2001 for India by developing Ferer's (1982) model. While, Castro in his paper inspected the reason for the snappy improvement of BRICs nations by using trade power record among BRIC countries

during the time frame 1995-2009. BRICs economies were seen as significantly consolidated in overall trade. Their trade with the world extended in abundance of various occasions since 1999 and a great deal of world trade the earlier decade practically duplicated, as of now being around 14 percent. BRIC to BRIC yearly advancement speed of trade was around 32 percent. Russia stayed the most genuine trade associate for the EU. Neil MacFarlane in 'The 'R' in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power, suggest that initially Russia payed little heed to resurging, and remained overwhelmed by efforts to alter the events of the 1980s and 1990.

As a consortium, the BRICS countries developed a strong financial and political relationship with the African, Latin American and Asian countries. Prabhakar in his paper suggests that the BRICS countries and the G20 superseded G7 in the overall monetary crisis of 2008. This shows a general lessening in the power of the US and other advanced business countries.

Meanwhile, Seema (2014), in an assessment of India's trade with other BRICS Nations, Roopa Purushothaman and Mathur and Dasgupta (2003) and Roopa Purushothaman (2003), in her paper Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050 all express points of view on the GDP of BRICS countries. They suggest that the once major economies of the world may look exceptionally uncommon in 2050. The greatest economies on earth (by GDP) may by and by don't be the most lavish (by pay per capita). The yearly extension in US dollar spending from the BRICS could be more critical than that from the G6 and more than twice as much in dollar terms as it is as of now. By 2025 the yearly extension in US dollar spending from the BRICS could be twofold that of the G6, and on different occasions higher by 2050.

Then, besides, where the BRICS economies attempted to rise consistently when seen through the perception of GDP development the other part of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is additionally critical. FDI permits a lot of specialized and administrative information, which is probably going to overflow to homegrown endeavors in a particular economy. The FDI literature on BRICS economies perceives the way that FDI carries capital for advancement to the host economy.

In terms of FDI, the importance of BRICS escalated in the first decade of its institution. Significantly, the monetary administrations have been the beneficiary of global interests in these nations as they supplement their general capacities (Stephen, 2014). FDI is considered as a major impulse for monetary development. It can wind up being a basic asset for adapting to overall competition and market necessities, Thus, BRICS endeavored to progress with the help of FDI to show up at the level of major economies (Nistor, 2015). Trade streams between BRICS countries and the rest of the world filled astonishingly in the key decade of foundation, with China being the world's snappiest. It was set to develop its economies by improving structure, and creating headway of private endeavor. Considered as the most unlucky areas on earth, Latin America and Africa indicated generous advancement rates, depicting growing inside endeavor (Ho, 2013).

Cheng, Gutierrez, Mahajan, Shachmurove, and Shahrokhi (2007) reflect that while the BRICS are not guaranteed to obtain financial supremacy, the joint effort between BRICS economies and other agrarian countries is viewed as a fundamental element of globalization and dependence. McDonald, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2008) used a wide congruity trade model to take a look at the impact of the sensational augmentation of trade by India, China, and a fused East and Southeast Asia. China with East and South East Asia has strong associations through trade center information

sources, while India being a part of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade alliance, and incorporates six ASEAN nations.

Jadhav (2012) used data from 2000-2009 for calculating the financial, institutional and political elements of BRICS economy through FDI. The work revealed that, the market size, law and order, and responsiveness in trade were key features that attracted FDI to BRICS countries. Meanwhile, only negative impact was created by less resource availability which implied that the FDI is all orchestrated by the market.

Jadhav and Katti (2012) saw that organization, federation, and authoritative issues decidedly influenced FDI inflow in BRICS, while political feebleness, voice and duty, and control of corruption had negative effects. Basically, using data from 1975 to 2007, Vijayakumar, Sridharan, and Rao (2010) also examined broadly the elements of FDI to BRICS by looking at the size of market, cost of work, the system, and capital advancement. The examination assessed major data and found the factors of market and gross capital course of action as the potential determinants of inflows of FDI in BRICS countries.

Carp and Popa (2013) from their investigation of data in the era of 2001-2007 highlighted that the BRICS economies have become, a symbol of change of power in the global economy and an important representative of the developing world in terms of development and cooperation at bilateral, regional, and even multilateral levels. The BRICS states are increasingly dependent on foreign trade. The BRICS states are dynamically dependent upon new trade. More or less, it tends to be thought that the writing on BRICS (Phase-I) as it developed after Jim O Neil, authored the term in 2001, was mostly centered first around the monetary variables. All the more explicitly, the

TH 25792.

BRICS nations rise was seen with a two-overlay center: GDP development and expansion in FDI.

The literature in Phase-II of BRICS looked even more closely into the tendencies of the individual rising states. Particularly, how much the rising powers truly should be consolidated into the current overall multilateral plans. Getting into assessments of their worldwide designs, it measures whether the rising powers were following the pattern of established powers or of their own. Looking at the global plans of individual BRICS countries since the mid 1990's it also looks in to their designs at the regional level. Andre's Malamud in his paper named: Foreign Policy Retreat: Domestic and Systemic explanations behind Brazil's International Rollback, highlights Brazil's rise as a global phenomenon which happened under two consecutive Governments: Lula (2003-2010) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). Its rise was that of South America and not Latin America. Particularly, once examined through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), initiated by the US and brought forward through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). What brought forward Brazil's rise was a mixture of its domestic change and a popular global strategy, along with a suitable overall atmosphere. Bethel (2010), Burges (2007) and Reid (2014), in fact suggested that between the era of 1995-2015, Brazil appeared to develop as a regional player and overall power.

Simultaneously, after the fall of Soviet Union, Russia has been in a process to undo the negative impact of its disintegration. For major portion of the Post-Cold War era, the United States and Europe gave little thought to Russia's undertakings to broaden its political, monetary, and military influence abroad. The West considered these to be as relics of the Cold War, essentially limited to Russia's nearby area yet generally missing or possibly insufficient somewhere else. The impacts of the disintegration of

the Soviet Union, Russia's inside difficulties, and Moscow's expressed longing for coordination with the West pointedly obliged the Kremlin's advantage and ability to extend its effect on a worldwide scale and decreased the West's advantage in Russian international strategy and its worldwide exercises.

However, with its consistent persuasion, Russia started to attain a status which was popularly termed as 'resurgent'. Paul Stronski (2017), in his paper at Carnegie Endowment Russia and Eurasia program, alludes to it as a modern, well-resourced and effective mission. Moscow has sought after a large group of destinations, for example, discoloring majority rules system and subverting the U.S.- driven liberal global request, particularly in spots of customary U.S. impact. While partitioning Western political and security organizations it exhibited Russia's return as a worldwide superpower; supporting Vladimir Putin's homegrown authenticity; and advancing Russian business, military, and energy interests. This was to the detriment of the United States and other Western nations, who left void pockets of impact in the global field, permitting Russia to fill in the vacuum.

Scott Wilson (2014), in "Obama Dismisses Russia as 'Nearby Power' Acting out of Weakness," in a Weekly of Washington Post suggested that, already most of Russian undertakings had focused on guarding Moscow's interests around its periphery. Its new mission is to hurt the overall image of Western democracies.

With respect to India, its international strategy changed from being a 'local hegemon' to the endeavors of being a universally acclaimed significant force. Aseema Sinha (2017), in her paper Understanding India as a Rising Power: An Open Economy and Interdependence Framework, recommends that, India was dodged by major global powers during the Cold war, and in fact it was happy in being isolated. It found a way

to boast ability to defy the US. Around at that point, India was working on a nonalignment path. Nevertheless, in the post-cold war time frame India, stressed to be a rising power. It exercised at the global level to be a moderate yet enhanced financial power with ability to attract partners. Today, India is a more confident part of international organizations, like the WTO (World Trade Organization), IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and IMF (International Monetary Fund). It is in fact interesting to proclaim that in the Cold war era, India behaved as a 'free-rider' and now has the standing of an arbitrator and interacts on various case to case basis.

In the year 2018, India was considered as a "critical power" in the Lowy Institute's new Asia Power Index. The Index sifts through more than 100 indicators across eight different measures to create a unique ranking of the relative power of 25 Asian countries. This owes to India's changing behavior concerning greater overall changes and also by perceiving how India's local requirements have moved and end up being even more distantly orchestrated. Interestingly, the US openly admits to the rise of India as a power. Stephen Cohen (2000) who is well known for his inferences on the South Asian politics and power cycle, admits to this fact in his Article for Brookings Institute, titled: India Rising. He recommends that for a large portion of those 53 years, the United States and India have kept a stressed relationship-a relationship that has not been helped by long periods of American disregard and misjudging.

Presently there are indications of progress. In spite of the organization's indignation regarding India's atomic tests, Bill Clinton in March turned into the primary American president to visit the subcontinent in over twenty years. Tending to the Indian Parliament, he recognized the lavishness of Indian human advancement, noticed the nation's financial and logical advancement, and lauded its adherence to vote based standards. "India is a pioneer," Clinton stated, "an extraordinary country, which by

ideals of its size, its accomplishments, and its model, can shape the personality within recent memory." Yet he carefully noted territories of American concern and communicated caution about Kashmir, India's relations with Pakistan, and atomic expansion. Talking less guardedly before his visit, he had called the Indian subcontinent "maybe the riskiest spot on the planet."

Hence, what was happening in the neighborhood of India, was of much concern for the major powers like the US and EU, while India desired to attain a major regional and global power position. For the US, its inclinations in the biggest majority rule government were on one side, though, then again, the capability of 'checking China' in the locale and at the worldwide level was additionally recognized by the US. This owes to the incredible ascent of China first as a significant financial force after its opening up approach and afterward by its major provincial and worldwide political force status. In the post-Cold war era, China did not enjoy reasonable terms with the US. The relations were on the low. A bestselling book in Chinese titled: *Zhongguo keyi shou bu* (*A China That Can say No*), gave a message in 1996 for the Chinese foreign policy that: we do not need extreme nationalism but we do need nationalism.

Quansheng Zhao in his paper 'Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era', recommends that, the post-Cold war time for China can be seen through three words: Modernization: focused on monetary development, Nationalism: which was the main philosophical current behind China's arrangement of modernization, especially involving patriotism with Chinese qualities and Regionalism: it focused on that despite the fact that China had stayed a territorial force thinking its financial, political and military endeavors in the Asia Pacific just, it has worldwide yearnings. This course was asserted by the 28 character technique of Deng Xiaoping in the wake of the Tiananmen

Square event in 1989 when China was defying money related approvals from the West, crumbling of Soviet Union and breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe.

The aforementioned system alongside Deng Xiaoping's four cardinal principles, permitted China to rise diligently. Today, it is seeking major monetary and political advances through the Belt and Road Initiative. As much as some other single unforeseen development, China's climb through the ongoing years has raised its voice in global administrative issues as well. Beginning with its inclusion into the World Trade Organization in December 2001, China immediately changed its economy from a negligible point to an overall pioneer in front line developments. In transit, it has changed overall worldwide interaction methodology, using its success to transform into a fundamental trading and progression assistant for emerging economies across Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Meanwhile, South Africa looks to reshape the world that suits its requirements and vision. Notwithstanding, possibilities for successful multilateral participation on worldwide and transnational issues unavoidably mirror the unmistakable public interests and objectives of the most persuasive forces. South Africa's rise over the span of few years gave it a more significant voice in global organizations yet the country's current and future ability to change the current world solicitation depends upon local objectives and the exercises of various countries, including the United States. Since the end of politically-sanctioned racial segregation, South Africa has settled, if in some cases hesitant, pioneer on the landmass.

In a nutshell, the second phase of literature entails the study of individual rise of BRICS states and their evolving interests from being merely economic agenda focused to rise as major political powers in the international arena. This by and large

owes to both the adjustment to their greatest advantage and furthermore to the vacuum made by the mishandlings of the US and EU and their interests inwards. The individual strategies of BRICS prompted the consolidated strategy of conjunction and thus going about as a stabilizer toward the Western driven worldwide administration framework.

Regardless, while the progress of BRICS is a captivating political progress of the 21st-century multipolar world it also exhibits the power change from North to South. The effect of the BRICS in framing diverse global interests will strongly depend on the fortitude of the emerging forces and their constituent trade. This will depend on how countries within BRICS interact with each other and strengthen the consortium. In a paper titled *Multilateralism in South-South Cooperation* (2014), Adriana Erthal Abdenur, proposes to evaluate the association of BRICS as a multilateral entity inside the current global framework. It discusses the characteristics and weakness of BRICS as a multilateral component. Similarly, also elaborates how the countries, essentially China and India, use BRICS as a multilateral stage to pursue both their individual and global plans. The paper elaborates the rise of BRICS in the current North-South divide, and follows its development from a Western speculated idea to a solid Southern agent in worldwide issues.

Hence, where the strength of BRICS laid in their integration for mutual economic development, its weakness rests in how the countries, specifically China and India are politically divided. In the second decade of its evolution, BRICS did not show the same standards of growth as it did in its early years. Despite the fact, that the consortium was able to institute a Bank and attract immense amount of FDI. This also owes to how India remains tilted towards the US and tries to pursue individual designs instead of collective interests. The next section of the chapter provides insight in to how the issues have changed over time in BRICS agendas from being economic specific

to other domains. For the purpose of this study the agendas of first decade i.e. 11 BRICS summits are analyzed.

1.2 BRICS: themes and issues

The coordination between BRICs started in the early 2006, through the initiation of work between Governments of the four countries, amid the UN General Assembly session (BRICS information portal). In 2007, Brazil chaired the organization. It was felt on this event, that closer talks were required between the countries in order to move forward and let go of differences. A Summit of the BRICs (without the consolidation of South Africa), was held formally in the year 2008, in a Russian town of Yekaterinbur (BRICS Information Portal). Following which in the year 2011, South Africa joined the association at the Sanya Summit.

The First Summit held at Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June 2009; set up a Head of State and Government level cooperation of BRICs. It was instituted in prism of the global economic crisis 2008, hence focusing on global financial issues. Meanwhile, it also focused on the association of G20, for the revival of global economy and discussed issues of strategy, like focusing on the reform of United Nations (UN) (Chen, 2020). Despite the Declaration, the First Summit gave an ensuing document named: 'Opportunities for Dialogue among BRICs'. It essentially upheld expanded presence of rising economies in worldwide monetary establishments, requesting a more open, straightforward and merit-based cycle of arrangement

The Second Summit was held in Brazil in 2010. It had a focus on political interaction and people to people contact of BRICs. This envisaged coordination of Heads of Statistical Institutions and two joint quantifiable appropriations by member countries; the social affair of the Ministers of Agriculture; the get together of the

Presidents of Development Banks; the Think Tank Seminar; the get-together of Cooperatives; the Business Forum; and the Second Meeting of High-Ranking Security Officials. Amid this Summit, a call for reform in global financial institutions like IMF and World Bank was also enforced.

At the Third Summit in China, in the year 2011, South Africa was also added in the BRICS consortium, after which it was pronounced as BRICS. Meanwhile, this addition was acknowledged as a critical step in recognizing the monetary standing of South Africa in the landmass of Africa. This summit acknowledged some breakthroughs of political nature, calling for reform in Security Council and affirmation towards commitment of Millennium Development Goals of the UN. It also considered an action plan in form of a declaration, calling for broad joint efforts to coordinate the social maneuvers of Foreign Ministers of BRICS countries.

The Fourth Summit, was held in New Delhi, India-March 2012. The subject was "BRICS relationship for overall reliability, security and achievement". The event called for specialists of developing countries to be chosen for the organization of the World Bank, rehashing that the highest points of the IMF and the World Bank should be assigned through an open, direct and merit-based procedure. It set up the structures in order to establish BRICS bank, which was a drive by all of the five member countries and also focused on improving projects of BRICS countries in economic domain. Moreover, the BRICS Development Bank agreed to plans in order to support credit underwriting in close by financial guidelines.

The Fifth Summit, was held at South Africa, in March' 2013. It was a Summit held for the first time in South Africa after its inclusion in BRICS and focused on enhancing partnership between Africa and BRICS. It basically focused on establishing

a Contingency Reserve Arrangement with the inclusion of US\$ 100 billion. It focused on the decisions of the BRICS Leaders (Declarations of Sanya, 2011; Durban, 2013, and Fortaleza, 2014), which confirmed that the association has drawn-out bondage for non-member countries and, openly, emerging economies.

The Sixth Summit was held in Fortaleza, Brazil, in July 2014, before the Summit, exploration associations Council and Academic Forum gatherings were held in Rio de Janeiro, which focused on the course to be adopted by the Summit. It was agreed in the summit to establish a New Development Bank.

The Seventh BRICS Summit held in Ufa, Russia, in July 2015, pioneered agreement on Economic Partnership. It brought forward a declaration on enhancing trade practices between member countries. In addition, it also focused on supporting the Development Bank and New Development Bank.

The Eight BRICS Summit, was held in Goa, India, in October 2016, under the subject of creating responsive solutions. It brought forward deliberations on overall global economic recovery. The major issues discussed were economic maneuvering, and all social and money related obligations of the New Development Bank. This summit saw signing of Declarations on joint understanding between BRICS bank and political establishments.

The Ninth Summit was held in Xiamen, China, in September 2017, focusing on BRICS forum for building better partnerships. This was a Summit held with the initiation of second decade of BRICS with outcome of financial and political nature. The highlight of Summit was the affirmation to the Sustainable Development Goals SDG's and following its agenda to 2030. It also updated commitment between New Development Bank and BRICS Business Council".

In 2018, the 10th summit was gathered in Johannesburg, South Africa, and its subject was "BRICS development in fourth Industrial Revolution". At the conclusion, an organization was marked with respect to the setting up of the Regional Office for the New Development Bank, which was to be situated in São Paulo. Furthermore, the update of comprehension on the Regional Aviation Partnership was agreed upon. Likewise, the making of BRICS Innovation Network (iBRICS) was also affirmed

The Eleventh Summit was held in Brazil, in November 2019. The subject of the Summit was innovative future and monetary growth. It historically pushed for global multilateralism, and respect for law. It was discussed that there is a need to reinforce and change the United Nations and other multilateral affiliations, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In any case, it was discussed that Multilateralism is vital for rising nations in order to ensure their own advantages

It may be viewed from the significant topics of BRICS Summits that its plans and interests have never been static. It has changed not just in light of its advantages incurred by five member states, but also as a response to international order. From its underlying urge of handling the 2008 global financial crisis, to its endeavors to change worldwide administration, control psychological warfare, give more space to non-industrial nations in global foundations and upgrade social cooperation, the subjects have indeed widened.

Simultaneously, the individual members have sought separate advantages through various methodologies. At home, they keep on pursuing financial stability through internal policymaking. Abroad they follow different techniques encompassing monetary strategy, and a considerable place at the global platform. The following

segment will provide an analysis of the way interests of member states of BRICS have changed since its inception.

1.3 Stage I: Qualitative content analysis of BRICS agendas

BRICS has gradually developed by fortifying coordination and collaboration within the organization in monetary, financial and political terms (Golam Md. Mostafa, 2015). It can be viewed from the first eleven BRICS agendas that, interests of participating countries have evolved over the years in three key parameters starting from economy to security and also political. They are discussed in detail as follows:

i) Economic: In the beginning of 21st century, Brazil, Russia, India and China gradually emerged as countries with immense economic potential (O'Neill, 2001). When BRICS encompassed South Africa as well, it covered three billion people, with a total evaluated GDP of nearly \$US 16 trillion and around \$US 4 trillion of new exchange reserves (Daniel Flandes, 2014). On July 2014, the New Development Bank was formed, which was instituted for helping in the long run for unprecedented development. The BRICS New Development Bank was hence founded with respect to South-South investment and to satisfy need of money necessities of Southern countries.

The principles that underpin BRICS are written in the declarations of the Heads of State Summits and summarized in the Five Pillars of the BRICS long Term Strategy. Which was endorsed by the Heads of States at the Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil in July 2014. An impressive range of guidelines resonated with the BRICS voice counterbalancing the impacts of the current western prevalence of monetary dominance. Various countries and emerging economies outside of the BRICS believe it to be a victor for supporting and propelling changes for emerging countries. They get themselves frail regardless of overwhelming strength of the West in global financial

establishments. For example, organization of the IMF is by and large directed by a sum system for distributing votes amongst major countries. In the current structure, the US holds 17.4 percent of irrefutably vote, giving it an incredible dismissal. The EU's 27 nations hold 30.9 percent. So far western powers continue to contradict any huge changes in the overall system, with the IMF and World Bank overpowered by Brussels and the US: the major standing of IMF and World Bank are still focused on the West. BRICS instituted its own Development Bank and Reserve Arrangement in an undertaking to clearly challenge the current global structure, convincing the West to consider more significant changes in the worldwide financial system. This bearing is clearly an impressive decision for some developing and emerging economies.

ii) Security: As seen from various summits, after their inclinations in global monetary establishments and economy, the BRICS nations resolved to guarantee and keep up global harmony and security. They needed to expect a section in thwarting and supervising public and regional conflicts. Both the Durban and Fortaleza and expressly the Sanya Declarations conveyed stress over ensuing conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa and West Africa. Additionally, they communicated that the use of force should be sidestepped and that opportunity, courage, territorial integrity and fortitude ought to be kept up. Moreover, another area of joint effort was kept up in maritime prosperity and security as all the nations approach the other option and explicitly India, Brazil and South Africa share the obligation of keeping up and ensuring about the Southern seas. The ideal intercession of the BRICS in the UNSC to prevent the assault of Syria was an outline of the impact of BRICS in worldwide relations, winning it various partners at the same time (Oliver Stuenkel, 2014).

iii) Political: The group's posture allowed it to be perceived globally as the international counterbalance to unipolar dominance. In a short span of time the organization structured new types of instruments for supporting the execution of its interests. A BRICS Think Tank Council was established along with the Academic Forum and Business Council. Along with others, the BRICS Bank visualized support from various countries which was a big step. Moreover, other agricultural nations in the periphery of BRICS member states were also incorporated. Nonetheless, according to other countries the collaboration of BRICS in the financial and political arrangements were quite significant politically.

BRICS have strived to seek benefit from their economic impact for more political effect. This effected the Low Income Countries (LICs), through financial endeavors like trade and investments. Subsequently, this challenged customary western countries, for instance, the EU, US and Japan. These relations conferred the vision of South-South-Cooperation (SSC), which relied upon determination, shared experiences and freedom of the South. The cooperation focused on trade and monetary advancement as the crucial vehicles of progress that can be cultivated by methods for neighbors' particular support.

Since their first summit, the BRICS countries have sought for a more multilateral world, particularly in financial institutions like IMF and World Bank. Hence, since its first summit, BRICS has enhanced its focus from economic to political and other multilateral efforts. Earlier, BRICS focused on the need to synchronize efforts within the G20. Later BRICS also advocated for the reform of United Nations and Security Council, with focus of enhancing representation from BRICS member countries.

It is without doubt that the presence of BRICS is a test to the established World order which is US led and driven. This is illustrated in the Russian notes for BRICS. In fact, the idea of BRICS was supported by Russia transmitted in the year 2006 in New York during a luncheon of RIC (Russia, India, and China). South Africa became part of BRICS in 2011 and illustrated a strong worldwide substance of cooperation. This is in fact branding the South-South cooperation in every field other than economy.

1.3. 1 Stage II: Semi-structured interviews

For the purpose of this study, the researcher conducted a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews where the respondents answered preset open-ended questions. The interviews were conducted once only, with subject specialists and individuals only; generally covering the duration of 30 min to more than an hour. The interviews were based on semi-structured interview guide, being a schematic presentation of questions needed to be explored by the interviewer. The questions in the interview guide comprised of the core question of 'how BRICS is in an illustration of multilateralism' and many associated questions related to the central research questions, which in turn, improved further through pilot testing of the interview guide, which entailed the change of interests of BRICS countries from being economic agenda specific to being multi-sectoral.

In order to have the interview data captured more effectively, recording of the interviews was not possible but the researcher made hand written notes and later got it approved from the interviewee. Respondents were selected carefully each from the World Bank Group- Islamabad, Analyst from a think- tank named Sputnik- Russia, think tanks in China including: and most importantly, interview of Lord Jim O' Neill

the pioneer of the term BRICS was conducted electronically over email. The “verbatim transcript” of the interviews are at Annexure.

The thematic analysis was in fact critical in deducing inferences from semi-structured interviews. Boyatzis described various ways in order to deduce qualitative data, from coding to a structured form of interviews (Boyatzis, 2009).

The researcher’s approach followed the following basic structure:

- i) **Iterative review** of interview transcript. Analysis was done through the transcription, along with the repeated re-reading of interviews. This technique developed a deeper understanding of what respondents described in the interviews. In this way, coding was iterative, in that the exposure to data helped identify data and themes with each subsequent interview.
- ii) **Design analysis:** Key data points extracted from the interview. From this deep understanding, key pieces of data were noted relating to multilateralism in the post-cold war order. Data was extracted in the form of direct evidence, such as a quote, or an action.
- iii) **Design synthesis:** Grouping of evidence into themes. There was no limit to the number of themes that could be generated. In some cases, some pieces of data resisted theme. In which case it was left outside of a theme, so as to remain visible and not forgotten.

There were also a few issues faced with the research, most of which reflect the research being of an evolving subject, and each subject specialist had his own way of looking at the future of BRICS. On the other hand, the other issue was related to overall

sample size being very small, which resulted in 1 respondent each from the identified area. More work is needed to see if this thematic analysis represents any greater qualitative understanding of multilateralism in the Post-Cold war order and BRICS as its illustration. Nonetheless, the major themes as discussed with the respondents are discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

Theme 1: Multilateralism in the Post-Cold War International Order

It was agreed by all of the respondents that with the rise of major states in the post-Cold war world, multilateralism has become a reality. In this world numerous states have emerged to the level of being ‘critically’ relevant. These states do not pursue the policy of confrontation but facilitate environs of understanding with each other and believe in creating win-win solutions for all. It is the world of multilateralism and not multi-polarity, in which gathering of like-minded states are pursuing to facilitate each other in development at the global level. However, it is also agreeable that, the future of global multilateralism in the post-cold war international order is regional



Fig no 2. The Future of Global Multilateralism is Regional
In other words, emerging states are intrinsically faced by complex bilateral relationships in their respective regions. This in turn facilities them in growing and

developing.. On the other hand, they cannot also totally disregard the influence of United States at the global level. In words of Lord Jim' O Neil 'Multilateralism and particularly the Rise of China is a reality. However, we cannot entirely disregard the US and its influence at least in this decade. Multilateralism will remain symbolic if bilateral issues between emerging states at the regional level are not dealt with sooner'.

However, it is worth mentioning that, for China, Multilateralism may not indicate its thrust for becoming the ultimate global leader. During meeting at China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and Discussion with Dr. Rong Ying- Vice President of CIIS, main subject of The Belt and Road Initiative and Asian community of shared future was of interest. He believed that 'the BRI is not an imposition but entails a two-way traffic. It is in fact a worldwide platform for international cooperation. It entailed the wisdom of China to open up and reform for the common development. It aims at building a community of shared future for mankind'.

Interestingly, he gave the Chinese perspective on the idea for putting China on a trajectory of economic, political and cultural cooperation with the rest of the World, which is only possible if a favorable environment is provided by creating a win-win strategy for countries in the periphery and then it is sustained'. The concept in this opinion was put forward in the ambit of the global financial crisis, where anti-globalization was held. It is opposed to the established international order based on Sustainable Development Goal's- SDG's of the United Nations. It is not a Marshal plan which led to the Cold war and aims at wining productive gains.

Meeting at the Academy of Macroeconomic Research of National Development and Reform Commission entailed Discussion with Vice President AMR- Mr Wang Changlin on 'The Experience of China's 40 years of reform and opening up' in a

nutshell, he asserted that, 'Today nations are inseparable, it is an era where every country has the tendency to influence the other; therefore an integrated model of development is necessary for the common prosperity of the world. Development and peace are the core cardinals for today's world'.

During the Meeting at the School of International Relations, Sichuan University On "China's Foreign Policy and Neighboring countries", a key point arose about how this post-cold war era is witnessing an 'end of Pax-Americana and is pioneer to Pax-Asiana. The example rests in improvement of relations between China and Japan and also the probability of third party involvement in BRI'. However, it was also asserted that, the world should let go of its obsession with the Cold War analogy and look towards creating a favorable environment of development for all.

The economists at World Bank Group- Islamabad also believed in multilateralism in its emergence in the current era, but in their opinion emerging states still had a long way to go if their goal is to shadow the US influence at the global level. Their future rests in taking states in their region along. In their words: there may be many states emerging either individually or collectively, still they are yet to be considered equal to established institutions, financially and politically both. Particularly, now we see the talk about the Next-11, of which Pakistan is also a part. This commits to the understanding of Pakistan from the World Bank's perspective that Pakistan@100 would be one of the major countries. Hence, emerging countries should provide a role to countries like Pakistan in the future.' Hence, the future of global multilateralism is regional.

Theme No 2: BRICS as an Illustration of Multilateralism in the Post-Cold War Era

BRICS is a consortium of high-sounding emerging states and is considered as an illustration of multilateralism in the post-cold war international order. These countries are regularly meeting since the year 2009 and have just concluded the 11th summit. It is encouraging to note that this consortium has moved its discussion agenda from merely being economic focused to issues on security, technological development, research and other political matters.

However, for the grouping to remain relevant and to be the illustration of win-win cooperation in a multilateral world, bilateralism should be dealt with sooner. Bilateral agendas of Russia-China, Russia-India and India-China may prove counter-productive in the long run in the way of the rise of BRICS. On the other hand, BRICS should not be just China centric and not pursue agenda of becoming an 'anti-US block. Nearly all of the respondents agreed that, the positive future of BRICS rests in letting go of bilateralism, not becoming an anti-US block and not just remain China centric.

The fig explains the relationship:




Fig No 3: Future of BRICS rests in letting go of bilateralism in the group and not being China-centric

Lord Jim'O Neil being the pioneer of the term BRICS asserted on the notion that, this grouping was formed in the backdrop of mis-steps of the US and dislikes of the respective countries of the prevalent international order and with the aim of gaining more space. However, the future of BRICS and organizations like UN, G20 is not straightforward and primarily depends on avoiding bilateralism and looking at the common good. The question remains that will BRICS remain relevant without inclusion of US?

On the other hand, Mr. Andrew Kroybko from Sputnik-Russia asserted that, Multilateralism and International Organizations such as BRICS may have a bright future if their key goal remain that to' challenge the US collectively, and not to break down into smaller working groups, which are comprised of states that just bandwagon along emerging ones. He came up with a very significant argument that, in the result of bandwagoning, there can be a counter-productive move of the US to use smaller states against bigger ones, which can result in the formation of US and China blocs.

Hence, International Organizations like BRICS, should not be objects of 'New-Cold War' between China and US instead should be independent of such notions. In other words, the future of BRICS rests on regionalism and letting go of prevalent bilateralism.

Meanwhile, economists from World Bank Group-Islamabad, who requested to remain anonyms denoted BRICS as 'CRIBS'. Who are a group of countries in the habit of cribbing about the World Order being US centric and international institutions being rather unfair towards them. They believed that, there may be many states emerging either individually or collectively, still they are yet to be considered equal to established institutions, financially and politically both.

The question here rests in what China actually wants in the post-cold war era. Will it like to use its economic position in overwhelming the BRICS or also use it for anti-US designs as considered many scholars? Mr. Wang Changlin- Vice President AMR talking about 'The Experience of China's 40 years of reform and opening up', in a meeting at the Academy of Macroeconomic Research of National Development and Reform Commission asserted that, 'China's forty years reform involved seven main levels as illustrated in the table

Table 1: seven levels of China's forty years reform (Wang Changlin in discussion with researcher)

- Socialism with a nation state economic development focus with reform of encouraging people
- satisfaction and interest of people with gradual growth
- Macro Management from villages to cities,
- prioritizing market reform and spread it at the national level with stability, reform and development drive for reform,
- organically combine reform to policy some at the top level which may trickle down to the locals,
- reforming state owned enterprises as a first step; and
- Legalizing successful reforms

He remarked that, China learnt a major lesson about how 'opening up' to the world brings progress and isolation results in seclusion. Hence the core theme of reforms was to introduce an integrated model of development which can influence from top to bottom at the national level.

With this vision, China pursued its achievements at the international level and joined Global Financial and other institutions, first for advancing a favorable financial environment. On the other hand, the Asian Development Bank allotted special funds for policy adjustment of regional coordination and development.

Primarily, China's core and primary goal was economic development. Its national reform was based on people and tapping the potential of their creativity and agencies that have been supporting and encouraging the people. He asserted.

However, within BRICS, China believes that economic prosperity should be coupled with political maximization, in order to deal with the unfair practices of the Western led international order. Within BRICS, China pursued three principles:

- i) Sustainability and reliance on exports and foreign debts. At that time foreign loan consisted of 50% of China's development and China only exported primary products. Therefore, China started exporting manufactured products, and promoted investment and realized investment values, amongst BRICS countries.
- ii) Introduced foreign capital, which did not only bring technology and investments but also modern ideas of management.
- iii) By the increase of manufactured products and their exports, China increased its trade in BRICS countries and therefore lost the major risks aligned with investments.

Meanwhile, with regards to China's regional issues, during meeting at the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies (CICSCSS) with Prof. Zhu Feng on 'The Belt and Road Initiative, Asian community of shared future', it was asserted that, 'China which has earlier been a continental power is now looking towards being a peaceful maritime power. In this regard, there is a possibility of constructing islands in the South China Sea. Hence, reclamation will facilitate cooperation between China and ASEAN countries'.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter discusses the dimensions of theory and concepts of the study, which is based on the neo-functionalism theory of international relations. It takes case study of BRICS and evaluates how causal factors in the grouping interact with one another leading towards multilateralism in the Post- Cold War international order. In this regard, the theoretical framework of the study entails a two-fold focus

- i- Whether multilateralism emerged as a global norm in the latter part of the Post-Cold War international order? (The analysis of neo-functionalism theory)
- ii- Whether BRICS evolved as a multilateral organization aiming to gain considerable space in the said world order? (The application of neo-functionalism theory through its concept of ‘Spill-over)

The epistemological view on both the dimensions mentioned above will be explained by focusing on commonality of interests amongst the BRICS countries. Particularly amid the process of global integration in the Post-Cold war era triggered by the erosion of uni-polarity. In the first part of this chapter it would be argued that, neo-functionalism well defines the evolution of World order towards multilateralism in the Post-Cold war international order. The second part envisages analysis of the concept of spill-over of which defines interaction amongst the BRICS countries. The theory of regional integration falls short of this understanding as it draws its parameters from the liberalist perspective. Kenneth Thompson suggests that the purpose of a single theory is to order data appropriately. This helps the reader in distinguishing uniqueness and

uniformities. It is in fact a tool for understanding the course of events in the phenomenon. Meanwhile, it also helps in making explicit the implicit assumptions, hence significant facts are not overlooked. In contrast it may also help in understanding the irregularities. Altogether a single theory and its application allows accumulation of true knowledge (Kenneth W. Thompson, 1955).

In order to understand the evolution of Post-Cold war international order and how BRICS managed to evolve as a flag-bearer of multilateralism, it is imperative to deliberate on the concept of theories in international relations (IR). It is key fact that, a portion of theories can be found in various wide ranged disciplines. In some cases this can be confusing as, authenticity in IR is not equivalent to authenticity in other disciplines. Additionally, the word 'liberal' is used to portray somebody's very own perspectives, yet in IR it implies something very particular. Hence, in IR, theories are continually evolving and rivaling each other.

Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) perceives how and why certain theories are legitimized and comprehensively recognized. He recognized the cycle that occurs when theories do not remain critical and new ones emerge. For example, people were once convinced on the earth being flat. With the progress of science, individuals discarded this as of some late recognized conviction. At the point when such a disclosure occurs, a 'viewpoint change' emerges and the past point of view is changed with another. This is basic to recall when we consider how theories of IR accept an aspect in explaining the world and how, taking into account different perspectives and our own special conditions is significant.

In the book named: *International Relations theory* (2017), IR theories are seen through a three-fold focus: customary theories, focus ground theories and fundamental

ones. Usually there have been two central theories of IR: Liberalism and Realism. Its theory involves the idea of a society of states existing at the international level. English school is regularly seen as a middle ground among liberal and realist theories. Its theory incorporates the chance of an overall population of states existing at the global level. Hedley Bull, one of the middle figures of the English school, agreed with the regular theories that the overall structure was anarchic. Regardless, he contemplated that this does not construe that there are no principles, thus ensuring there is a sense of belonging in the world community and its administrative issues. In this regard, states may make a society which is anarchic (Bull, 1977). Where such an understanding exists, considering shared norms and practices. In light of its central explanation, the English school is every now and again depicted as having an overall societal approach to manage IR. This depicts a world that isn't actually realist and not actually liberal – yet rather a world that has parts of both.

Essential philosophies indicate a wide scope of speculations that have been set up considering standard systems in the world, predominantly realism and liberalism. Essentially, fundamental researchers share one explicit trademark they confine routinely held doubts in the field of IR that have been central since its establishment.

Thus, evolved conditions call for new philosophies that are abler to appreciate, similarly question the world we live in. Fundamental theories are significant because they perceive places that have ordinarily been ignored or dismissed inside IR. They similarly give a voice to individuals who have consistently been limited, particularly women and those from the Global South. Neo-Functionalism once considered as a middle-ground theory, have presumptions that lead towards its grand nature. The subsequent section of this chapter delves upon this aspect and enunciates how this theory is applicable on the phenomenon of this dissertation.

2.1 Neo-functionalism and multilateralism: The Debate

Neo-Functionalism was first introduced by scholars like, Joseph Nye, Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, and Philippe Schmitter in the mid 1950's. Ernst Haas, the chief contender of neo-functionalism, followed the magnum opus of the "Joining of Europe" from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) also, the movement of the Common Market. Various amounts of his different books and articles checked on other Western European relationship in evaluation with one another and with relationship of different district (Haas and Schmitter, 1964). It was in correlation with Joseph Nye's "Peace in Parts" (Nye, 1971).

It is noteworthy that, the advent of Neo-Functionalism was a consequence of decolonization after the Second World War, and merged with the wave of Regional International Organizations (RIO's). This not being a European phenomenon did not specifically focus on the communities of Europe, but just considered Europe as a example of advanced regional integration. The theory follows three main hypothesis: Spill-over, elite socialization and supra-national interest groups. Spill-over is concept that refers to the process of integration creating incentive for integration of one sector to others (Hooghe and Marks, 2007). Elite socialization views the role of political and interest groups other than governments, for maximizing integration between states; and supra-national interest groups facilitate integration through functional and technocratic needs and not necessarily through democratic and accountable governance. The concept of spill-over is discussed in the latter part of this chapter from the perspective of BRICS cooperation. The other two are viewed through a historic and evolutionary prism amid the changing world order in the Post-Cold war, from uni-polarity to multi-polarity and finally towards multilateralism.

Ernst Hass's book titled: *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957* (Hass, 1958). Promulgated the theory of Neo-Functionalism (Hass, 1958). His explanation in the book envisaged explanation of how new form of supranational cooperation was instituted by six West European countries after Second World War. While theorizing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) he presented an objective and scientific explanation of regional cooperation. It was in fact a grand theory able to describe cooperation and integration in other parts of the World as well. However, due to the magnitude of European integration, it was conveniently perceived as a theory dedicated to this part of the world, which may be misleading in certain situations. This is true because historically, the theory lost its relevance in the year 1970 once the world was overwhelmed by state supremacy. Its importance revived only in the Post-Cold War era after processes of integration were geared yet again.

As the outcome of demise of Soviet Union in the year 1991, US enjoyed an unprecedented sole global significance. Popularly referred to as uni-polarity, numerous other states like China and Japan were on the path of self-actualization. Ernst Hass's neo-functionalism found its roots in this era once states other than the US started gaining considerable global space. As a consequence of 9/11 twin tower attack, the world witnessed a wave of multi-polarity. However, it is also a fact that international system is not linear. It is far more complex, and does not in any way justify a systematic pattern of evolution from Uni-polarity to multi-polarity. A simple Webster dictionary definition of multi-polarity indicates 'characteristics of more than two centers of power and interest'. Hence, multipolar world is deemed to be the one where several poles of power replacing the unipolar one. Generally, the realist tradition encompasses the concept of polarity (Donnelly, 2000). It is also a significant part of the theory of balance

of power, which postulates that the state behavior is determined by distribution of power. The figure below describes the concept of multi-polarity:




Fig 4. Features of Multi-polarity

The phenomenon of power is considered as a tool for change in international order since quite a while now (K. J. Hoslti, 1964). It was different from the concept of neo-functionalism of Ernst Hass, which was influenced by the Regional Integration Theory (RIT), which surfaced in the 1950's when the world was amid a bi-polar moment and heading towards the Cold War. It focused on the theories of functionalism envisaging the cooperation at the international level driving impetus from IR. Generally, it also suggested means to deal with the behavior of balance of power and subsequent warfare which was the core of realist tradition during the Cold War. Hans Morgenthau (1960) being the foremost advocate for the concept of power, claimed it to be a desire to dominate and interest of it being a 'constitutive of every association'. In this prism, Morgenthau views the interest of every state in maximizing its power internally, while at the international level, independent units seek to dominate others persistently.

However, Morgenthau also leads the concept towards ambiguity, where on one hand he declares power to be the main goal of policy, and on the other hand, he also claims it to be 'means to an end'. Subsequently we should have a look at Max Weber (1947), as he proposes power to be the way one actor may play on his own will despite of resistance in a relationship. This likely is by all accounts the most powerful recommendation. As per Weber, power is a lose-lose situation and is a characteristic that comes from the assets and capacities of one subject. Be that as it may, the Weberian definition pulled in various reactions. Martin (1971) brought up that Weber didn't characterize power, but instead gave the premise to an examination between the properties of entertainers. Also, he contended that, by incorporating the component of contention into his definition and review power exclusively in lose-lose terms, Weber dismissed the chance of commonly helpful force relations (Martin, 1971).

Conversely, Talcott Parsons (1967) offered a conceptualization of force, which didn't characterize it regarding struggle, yet rather sees it as an asset of a framework. Parsons (1967) contended that power is a capacity to ensure about the show of confining responsibilities by units in a plan of total affiliation, when responsibilities are legitimized concerning the total targets, and where in case of willfulness, there is a supposition of negative approvals. In such manner, Anthony Giddens (1968) expressed that, in addition to other things, the Parsonian definition doesn't consider that force is practiced over somebody and by regarding power as fundamentally authentic and expecting an agreement between power holders, Parsons overlooks the various leveled character of force.

Another approach to conceptualize and 'quantify' power in International Relations is through the force cycle system. Force cycle hypothesis attests that the capacity of a state to impact global governmental issues and assume a main job is

resolved in huge part by its phase of advancement, which includes a summed up, recurrent example of rising, development and plummet (Hebron, James, and Rudy, 2007). The force cycle scholars guarantee that the origination of force, as communicated in force cycle hypothesis, can represent and clarify struggle in the worldwide framework or sub-framework. As indicated by Doran (2000), who began writing during the 1980s, the force cycle system permits reflecting at the changing structure of the framework and the state's ascent and decay as an incredible force.

After some time we can observe evolving polarities, explicitly bipolarity, unipolarity, and multi-polarity. Notwithstanding, in pragmatist investigations of the elements of extremity, the EU will is in general nonconformist, particularly on the grounds that such examinations are significantly state-driven, and as the EU isn't a state, it is viewed as unessential for overall influence investigation (Posen, 2004). The nearby connection among extremity and authenticity suggests that investigations of changing extremity will in general accompany other pragmatist credits, for example, overall influence or force augmentation. It conceptualizes the vision of competing countries rather than cooperating ones.

Interestingly, it was the very aspect of supremacy of state and its impact that was proposed by RIT to clarify a significant part of the foundation and improvement of regional global associations (RIO's) in the Post-Cold war. It hypothesized on inquiries of why and under which conditions states choose to move political position and capacity to local associations; how local associations extend their assignments, skills, and individuals; and what sway they have on states and social orders in their districts. Thinking about RIT, a significant part of Regional Integration Organization (RIO) has four fundamental credits: members of state, capacity, multilateralism, and topographical proximity. In any case, RIOs are set up by states and have states as their

kin. Second, RIOs are affiliations. They have a genuine central command and their own staff; they have ordinary structures, for example, get-togethers of their part states; and they can settle on choices and to return again to them. Territorial courses of action or close by social affairs alone don't qualify. Third, RIOs contain in excess of two segment states. At last, their selection is geologically broad and restricted.

RIOs are different from the international organizations and associations, for example, the UN associations and from associations with restricted enrollment if part states are geologically inaccessible from one another, (for example, the Commonwealth). Particularly in the beginning of RIT, scholars recognized combination from (basic) worldwide association or participation. For instance, the term compromise separated supranational regional relationship.

Nevertheless, the ascent of economic supranational integration in the Europe of the 1950s seemed to refute the questions about the incomparable nature of state self-organization and force. At the point when mix at local level decayed or slumped elsewhere, RIT came to zero in dynamically on the European Communities. Here the Ernst Hass time saw the ascent of Neo-functionalism in RIT (Hoffmann, 1966). The critical discussions in the theories of regional integration have occurred between variations of governmentalist and neo-functionalists mixed hypothesis. The inter-governmentalism expects public governments to be the vital entertainers in integration at regional level. Governments utilize locale to boost their public security and financial interests with regards to territorial association. Incorporation result from intergovernmental negotiating and depict the territorial inclinations. Governments delegate power to territorial associations in order to make sure about their negotiating results yet stay in charge of provincial associations and the coordination cycle.

The second surge of the foundations of RIO got more international attention, particularly in the era of 1980's (Hettne et al., 1999; Solingen, 1998). Under the name of "new regionalism", in any case, various makers broke with the supposedly Euro-driven, state-driven or affiliation driven convention of RIT and made elective speculative techniques more fitting to conditions in various bits of the world with other multilateral associations (Acharya, 2016; Söderbaum, 2016).

The historical backdrop of multilateral foundations can be viewed into four stages. The fundamental stage (1865–1947) is depicted by both the European-maintained idea of overall relationship with world administrative issues correspondingly as the specified 'move to establishments' that is, the essential overhaul that occurred after the First World War (Kennedy, 1987). Both Japan and China were central for this idea of foundations, regardless of whether Japan later pulled out from the League of Nations, and China encountered the undesirable farthest impacts of its aggregate security (Burkman, 2008).

The second phase (1947–1991) is characterized by a largely US-sponsored upgrade of multilateralism, although strong differences existed between US strategies vis-à-vis Europe (multilateral strategies) and Asia (bilateral strategies), respectively. The third stage (1991–2003) is truly short and without question best portrayed by the explanation 'the lopsided second', yet also portrayed by a third update of multilateral affiliations. We are as of now in the fourth stage, and analysts essentially contrast whether multilateralism is going up or down. To spread it out basically, we have seen three redesigns of multilateralism, the entirety of the three unmistakably after significant conflicts (the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War).

Moreover, the multilateral construction was presented during the breathtaking period of the nineteenth century. There was a move which acquired spotlight on organizations the shadow of First World War encounters. Incalculable multilateral affiliations were made particularly beforehand or during bipolarity, some genuinely as a reaction to the arising development of force. In the guideline years after the Second World War, examiners were likewise befuddled by the dissipating of force and saw whether there were two, three or four forces, remarkable or super. The US and the Soviet Union, truly, then again, shouldn't something be said about Great Britain and France? As both were busy with colonialism. In like manner, China being a UN Security Council P5 power, yet addressed until 1974 as Republic of China, not the People's Republic of China. In that capacity, past events have not actually been less difficult to 'read' with respect to dispersal of power. Despite weakness about power plan, multilateral establishments were made and started to work inside (and clearly outside) their domains. In a general sense, 'the unipolar moment' was in like manner portrayed by both shortcoming and a truly essential expansion in the number and level of multilateral establishments. The UN was dispatched as the foundation it was relied upon to be. The Uruguay Round on in general exchange at long last showed up at a goal, and the World Trade Organization was dispatched. That the UN could at long last become what it was intended to be likewise suggests that power and institutional segments are not absolutely irrelevant.

Additionally, the EU rose not long after the Cold War, illustrating the diminishing of bipolarity from the world. The unipolar second besides showed how varying US political pivotal targets interceded as a variable between power game-plan and multilateralism. It was the Clinton Administration that was occupied with multilateral methods of reasoning, while the Bush Administration had a solid

inclination for multilateralism freely or explicit multilateralism; that is, underlining its instrumental assessment and minimizing multilateralism as an objective in itself.

Regardless, the contrasting liberal world trade has an opportunity to endure, if multilateral affiliations are changed to serve modern endeavors. Furthermore, Ikenberry recommends that, rising powers have so far been connected into the current overall trade system – instead of attempting to challenge it, by building up an order to satisfy their own inclinations. Then again, John Kirton (2010) contends that contemporary exceptional forces show declining interest in customary overall affiliations. The framework guarantees every one of the likely gains of agreeable plans and, at any rate from a fluttering point of view, one can permit oneself the advantage of pardoning the loads. All coming together as a non-linear process of uni-polarity- bi-polarity-multi-polarity- multilateralism. The figure below explains the central proposes of multilateralism.




Fig 5. Features of Multilateralism

There are a few explanations behind discontinuation in theoretical underpinnings as discussed above. The inspirations driving the conditions empowering, and the results

characterizing European coordination remain uniquely not quite the same as other world areas. The blend of a force controlling framework, a liberal-fame based, pluralistic, and financially made interest, and the supranational features of EU mix limit how much EU-centered speculations are helpful in explaining various regionalisms (Acharya, 2016).

De Gaulle era also saw the rise of inter-governmentalism, the major contender of neofunctionalism in regional integration theory. De Gaulle's vision of a "Europe of countries", his dismissal of Northern augmentation, and his assurance from additional plan and pooling of public impact appeared to shame the opportunity of a reformist. In underlining the central occupation of governments, state influence and public character, inter-governmentalism carried doubts of IR legitimacy to RIT. The accompanying "disheartening time" (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995), which was portrayed by the non-reconciliation, reoriented unmistakably research on the European Community (EC) away from RIT.

In the interim Ernst Haas pronounced RIT as "old" (Haas, 1975). Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) pushed toward analyzing the EC as a (stand-out) political construction. Others zeroed in on the individual strategies of the Community and technique making inside the current institutional development (Wallace et al., 1983). The amazing improvement in European coordination since the mid-1980s restored RIT. The Internal Market Program and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) vanquished the unanimity fundamental of dynamic in the Community, joined different new system spaces, and provoked uncommon influence moves to supranational establishments.

Conversely, neo-functionalism questions that administrations can handle the process of integration. Transnational companies and vested parties just as supranational

entertainers are engaged by the combination cycle and shape it to their greatest advantage. In addition, integration creates a variety of “spillovers” and path-dependencies that push integration beyond the intergovernmental bargain.

These enhancements were aptly followed by another surge of speculating on integration of Europe during the 1990s, which rehashed the neo-functional-intergovernmentalist segment, however in an adjusted design. The various sides began from various strands of institutionalism in political theory (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Hall and Taylor, 1996) and investigated European mix only. Neo-functionalism, as of now consistently named “supra-patriotism”, drew firmly on obvious institutionalism to clarify the force in European wire (Pierson, 1996; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998), anyway Andrew Moravcsik's “Liberal Inter-governmentalism” (LI) (1993, 1998) applied focal ideas of neoliberal or reasonable institutionalism, which had set up itself as the basic challenger to IR genuineness.

Liberal or pragmatist viewpoint, between governmentalist explanations of the rise of RIOs, have the best ability of going past Europe, since they encompass everything considered by IR. They start from low existing degrees of territorial joint exertion, and expect a solid part for states, autonomy targets, and public interests (Börzel, 2016). Though, while EU-centered RIT spins unequivocally around endogenous investigation measures, assessments of non-European regionalism underline crafted by exogenous and interregional dispersal measures. In this way, hypotheses of European trade off have not been applied adequately and moreover past Europe; nor have speculative strategies made external the European setting made huge advances into the examination of European joining.

There has been developing consciousness since the 1990s, in the Post-Cold War time, that European coordination and vote based governmental issues were getting always entangled. Not just had the effect of territorial mix on public strategy and people groups' lives become more grounded and more noticeable. What's more, territorial integration was transforming into a challenged issue of homegrown governmental issues. Libertarian parties started to set up the cash related and social frustrations of joining, and choices on EU plans and selection gave a setting to standard discontent with the EU. Against this establishment, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009) point a post functionalist hypothesis of European joining zeroing in on wide examination, party designs, and constituent managerial issues as states of coordination (or rather stagnation and slowing down). Quite a while prior, Stefano Bartolini (2005) had brought considerations and theories from the hypothesis of country state arrangement to European combination. This near governmental issues is exceptional as local incorporation hypothesis had never gone through such sort of examination.

Regardless of the way that post-functionalism revolves around criticisms to the regional integration, it depicted how integration had effected European states. For a comparable clarification, notwithstanding, post-functionalism is clearly the theory that is least cordial to the general appraisal of territorial reconciliation. As prior events of dynamic change in European coordination, the new emergencies of European joining from the euro emergency through the explorer emergency to Brexit have refueled the insightful interest in and chat on RIT. The hypothetical discussion on the emergency of incorporation of Europe vouches for the kept significance of old dualism of neo-functionalism and between governmentalism (Ioannou et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2016).


The table below illustrates the key features of neo-functionalism and regional integration which will facilitate in understanding the suitable linkages with multilateralism

Table no 2: Comparison between Regional Integration and Neo-Functionalism

	Regional Integration	Neo-Functionalism
Main Actors	States	States are not the only important actors on the international scenario supranational institutions and interest groups main driving force of integration
Central Mechanism	Codified Agreements	Spill over
Domain	Regional	Region and Intra-Regional
Level of Analysis	Macro level analysis	Elite socialization along with micro and macro level of analysis

Basically, neo functionalism speaks for a restoration of the prospect of Talcott Parsons by Jeffery Alexander who considers it to be multi-dimensional and incorporates small and large scale levels of investigation. It contends for a certain popularity based push in utilitarian examination and join a contention direction. It additionally underlines vulnerability and interactional creativity. On the other hand, although popular, even dominant, after World War II, structural functionalism is today generally of only historical interest. Arising as a branch of organisms, structural functionalists were mostly cultural functionalists who were keen for enormous scope social structures and

foundations inside society, how they interrelate, and their obliging consequences for entertainers. There are various reactions to structural functionalism: it is ahistorical; it can't manage the cycle of progress or struggle; and it is moderate. It is seen as equivocal and ailing in sufficient techniques. In this manner, neo-functionalism stays the most applicable to comprehend the course of occasions in the post-cold war global order and development of the Regional Integration hypothesis. The figure below explains this linkage with a reference to the consortium of BRICS as a flag-bearer of multilateralism (it is discussed in the next section).



**Fig. 6: Theoretical Relationship between Multilateralism, Neo-Functionalism and
BRICS**

2.2 BRICS and spillover

The concept of 'spillover' is perhaps the most important part of the theory of neo-functionalism that can be applied to the post-Cold War World order and evolution of BRICS as a multilateral forum (as discussed above). This thought hence implies the instrument by which integration in one area for countries like China, Russia and India make the conditions for consolidation in another associated course of action area (the essential point raised already). Concerning early European joining it was contended that participation in center domains, for example, coal and steel (while significant) couldn't be completely developed without moreover solidifying in different zones, for example, transport for instance, that were major to the combination of coal and steel (Rosamond, 2000). Consequently, in the point of view of BRICS, spill-over itself, in any case, lays two thinking (Rosamond, 2000). One is a far reaching thinking that in a general sense contends as imparted above in the coal and steel case, how coordination in one zone can make inspiring components to merge in other adjoining zones (Rosamond, 2000).

The second logic refers to deepening of integration in the same sector for all the countries in BRICS (Rosamond, 2000). Rosamond gives the example of a custom union that would work even more effectively if states yielded to transformation gauge objectivity. Regardless, consenting to a change scale uniformity framework would likely form sparks for more broad cash related interest, (for instance, a money affiliation). While neo-functionalism offers a convincing rationale of reconciliation, the two failings of combination in different pieces of the world and deteriorating political incorporation in the BRICS nations is additionally moves looked to this hypothesis.

For sure, Neo-functionalism's analysis for expecting a level of automaticity in integration cycles and neglecting to represent expanding protectionism constraints

conditions of BRICS occasionally (Sangiovanni, 2006). The most unmistakable critique of neo-functionalism comes from a gathering of researchers who essentially focused on the association between governments. It recommends that this 'inter-governmentalist' study of neo-functionalism lays on various contentions.

i) Firstly, inter- governmentalist excused the consideration put on non-state actors in neo-functionalism (Sangiovanni, 2006). They contended for proceeding with regard for states and their origination of the public interest; for them the main actors of international relations. To be sure, inter- governmentalist contended that states, especially through their unfamiliar workplaces, remained definitive experts on incorporation and had the option to oppose joining when they desired (Sangiovanni, 2006).

ii) Secondly, they argued that member states have coherent unified negotiating positions and were thus able to resist efforts from organized interests both at the domestic and European levels (Sangiovanni, 2006).

iii) Thirdly, inter- governmentalist couldn't help contradicting spill-over. For them there was no automaticity in patterns of mix. In actuality, it was states that made the decisions to facilitate or stay standoffish (Sangiovanni, 2006) Some Inter-governmentalist researchers, for example, Stanley Hoffman contended that neo-functionalists were too idealistic about reconciliation.

Surely, inter- governmentalist frequently felt that neo-functionalists set an excessive amount of weight on internal factors and neglected to investigate the more extensive setting that the area ended up in and how this more extensive setting and states 'relations with outsider actors and within themselves may affect (contrarily) on integration (Sangiovanni, 2006).

There are strong suppositions supporting BRICS and neo-functionalism; that the cycle of integration will occur inside a structure of human opportunity, information and aptitude. The application of this approach in the study of subject matter is more relevant, as BRICS organization has asserted its dominance by injecting multilateralism. This interaction of world's south economies under the umbrella of BRICS has made other countries to form similar organizations with aim to protect their convergence of interest in multilateralism.

In short, the theory of Neo-functionalism explains the dimensions of integration and interaction between states in the later part of the post-cold war international order which is majorly dominated by the rise of major powers other than the United States, particularly China. It's paradigm of spill-over addresses the questions of how states manage to remain integrated through a consortium like BRICS despite of being miles apart from each other. In a highly multilateral world, the grouping of BRICS remains the most relevant case study for understanding the space gained by major states both individually and collectively. Hence, in order to explore the questions raised in this dissertation from a theoretical perspective, the assumptions of neo-functionalism were used as the parameters. Theoretical perspective, the assumptions of neo-functionalism were used as the parameters.

Under the state of expanding multilateralism, states are accordingly liable to utilize existing multilateral foundations all the more deliberately to acquire relative space in the momentary points of interest just as rely more upon the adaptability of two-sided or three sided arrangements. State rivalry inside a more powerful climate will play out both along and against customary collusions and the created creating states partition.

In order to delve in to these concepts, the study analyzed literature available on the subject along with reviewing the agendas of the eleven BRICS summits. This owes to the idea of the subject of multilateralism, its developing nature in the post-cold conflict worldwide request and furthermore to how individual states are acquiring space in a specific order in their own circles and aggregately, especially through BRICS. The next chapter provides a detailed analyses of the literature on the subject and the agendas of the BRICS summits which all facilitate the understanding on how multilateralism as a norm of global practice has evolved in the later part of the cold war era and also how BRICS is its most relevant case study.

According to neo-functionalism and its concept of spill-over, integration between these rising states and their consortium BRICS, develops its own internal dynamics, as they would integrate in limited functional, technical and economic areas (Schmitter, 2002). The benefits acquired by the functional agencies have the tendency to appeal loyalty from the locale and also facilitate participation from them by expanding the areas of integration.

It is in this regard, this chapter presents a case study underpinning Multilateralism, BRICS and neo- functionalism. It entails viewpoint on the processes geared from internal coordination between the BRICS states taking it to the level of international integration, within a framework of human freedom, knowledge and expertise. Through this approach it is ascertained that, multilateralism dawned on the international arena in the latter part of the Post-Cold War world order. In this portion, BRICS can be considered as its most relevant example. Although his interaction of world's south economies under the umbrella of BRICS, is not alone and there are other countries who had formed similar organizations, i.e. G-7, however, due to significance

of the size of economies and strategic relevance for the established powers, BRICS may be considered to be the most credible example of multilateralism.

To recall, the theory was an endeavor by researcher Jeffery Alexander among others to restore the grounded standards of primary functionalism by organizing pieces of fundamental functionalism with different speculations (Arne Niemann, Johannes Gutenberg, 2009). Basically the hypothesis contends that, Firstly, when nations consent to collaborate in a given area this participation makes motivations to coordinate in other comparable and additionally related territories. Without a doubt, the full advantages from coordination in area A can now and then just be acknowledged by likewise participating in areas B and C, this is hypothesized as the spill-over impact. Also, neo-functionalism holds that financial reconciliation quite often prompts increment in collaboration in different territories between actors in the incorporating area. In this manner, sub-state entertainers start to encourage politically across cutoff points to fight their political bosses. Vested get-togethers start to thrive at a territorial level and secretly vested social occasion's battle their Governments to additional consolidation. All making a mutually advantageous arrangement and invalidating the likelihood of contention. In this framework, Neo-functionalism and its idea of 'overflow' stays the most applicable. . All making a mutually beneficial arrangement and invalidating the likelihood of contention.

The idea of 'overflow' is maybe the main piece of the hypothesis of neo-functionalism that can be applied to the post-Cold Conflict World request and advancement of BRICS as a multilateral discussion. This idea subsequently alludes to the instrument by which joining in one zone for nations like China, Russia and India makes the conditions and motivations for combination in another connected

arrangement zone (the principal point raised previously). For the purpose of this study the theory of Regional Integration was not adopted for a number of reasons.

According to Ernst Haas, incorporation was the cycle whereby political entertainers in a couple of public settings are persuaded to move their loyalties and activities towards another center association that have neighborhood impact (Hass, 1950). It tries to expect political outcomes; it appears to anticipate what it obviously needs. On the other hand, as demonstrated by Neo functionalism, certain limits are best performed at a level higher than the state. Supranational cooperation requires both a supranational position and some kind of open dedication to that level all together for that ability to be effectively applied. At the point when one limit has been dispersed to a supranational body this deliveries certain squeezing factors that make an impetus for extra abilities to be given up to that level-flood. Overflow takes different designs.

There is a flood of limits as the creation of one supranational limit makes it more effective for another ability to moreover be performed at the supranational level. As limits are relegated to the supranational level so political development starts to track down that level making another political territory with political devotion for that level. All of these factors unite to make factors for a consistently expanding number of abilities to be allotted to the supranational level and for political commitments to be arranged to the supranational level. As capacities are appointed to the supranational level so political movement begins to find that level making another political local area with political devotion for that level. Every one of these elements consolidate to make twisting like pressing factors for an ever increasing number of capacities to be appointed to the supranational level and for political loyalties to be pulled together to the supranational level.

Neo-functionalism takes a stab at joining social requesting among people and relationship of society to grant rules and qualities to the target that the general populace may work appropriately. Precisely when social change happens it isn't brisk rather it is controlled which guarantees adaption reasonably and that each associated piece of the development serves to guarantee that social requesting proceeds and society works appropriately. It incorporated the interactional arranging of the fragments that contain society managed both activity and requesting, seen as a chance as opposed to as truth and followed the example of social change that came to fruition because of separation inside activity structures. Thus, its highlights best clarify the idea of multilateralism in the post-cold conflict time. Nonetheless, the ontological viewpoint of neo-functionalism considers the factors that drive integration between states, and supranational institutions, particularly interest groups and role of governments. These altogether facilitates states who are aiming to attain a regional role which enhances their influence at the global level. After the Cold war many states started gaining momentum in their growth process which systematically started shifting the world order from unipolarity to multi-polarity and then in the current phase of multilateralism. BRICS provides a supreme case study in understanding these phenomena.

However, in the past few years both BRICS and multilateralism have fallen short in their expected momentum. Other than numerous factors, the foremost remains that of bilateral issues between China and India in BRICS and reoccurrence of global competition between rising states like China and the US.

CHAPTER 3

POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND MULTILATERALISM

This chapter discusses the course of events in the Post-Cold War international order with a two-fold focus: first, the global scenario shortly after the disintegration of Soviet Union in the year 1990 up to the twin tower attack, on Sep 11' 2001 (popularly known as 9/11). Secondly, the world order in the after math of 9/11. Apart from the 'sole super power' status attained by US, generally the era of 1990's had a dual impact internationally: On one hand, the withdrawal of Soviet military from Eastern Europe, facilitated the evolution of democracy in different countries; while on the other hand it also resulted in a considerable drop in East-West tension which was a consequence of the ideological rivalry amid the Cold War (Jan Nijman, 1992). Meanwhile in the aftermath of 9/11, the foreign policy preferences of the US to maintain foot on ground in different regions of the world, along with the upsurge of terrorism globally, brought forward a security centric approach.

Apparently, the end of the cold war also redefined the structure of the world order three-fold: First, it marked the collapse of bipolarity, based on United States-Soviet Union rivalry. Second, enforced redefinition of national interests on all states and in some cases reshaped the States themselves. Third, modified the role of international organizations. Amid the cold war, it was bipolarity which prompted confrontation as a global norm at the nation-state and international organizations level. Even larger countries had to shape their policies in order to accommodate the recurrent bipolar threat, while the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was marred by a

virtual split on cold war lines. In the post-cold conflict world, progressives saw the finish of bipolarity as the start of another time of security and development (Fukuyama, 1989), while pragmatists on contending lines imagined confusion, strife and further crumbling.

However, where the US was more concerned about security issues, other countries, particularly China shifted its foreign policy preferences towards economic considerations. C. Fred Bergsten who was the Director of the Institute for International Economics, and previous Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (1977-81), wrote for an article in the *Foreign Affairs* in the summer of 1990, predicting that: the global transformations underway after the demise of Soviet Union, will include a sharp decline in concerns of security issues and economics will move much closer to the top of the global agenda. He also asserted that the global position of a country will also depend on its economic capability instead of the military one.

After the demise of Soviet Union, US increased its military might with semi-permanent foothold generally in the Persian Gulf, Iraq and the Middle East (John C. Campbell, 1972). After 9/11, this presence was reinvigorated, with major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US also got further embroiled in conflicts across the Greater Middle Eastern region.

However, it is misleading to believe that the US approach in Post-Cold war era was only security centric. Certainly, the US had also shaped the overall economic global design after the breaking down of Soviet Union. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) set up the framework for the after war by and large money related sales, and overall exchange (Matthew P. Goodman, 2017). To ensure its authority after the Cold War, the US

maintained economic advancement of its accomplices by means of aid, for instance, the Marshall Plan focused on Western Europe and immense financing to Japan during the Korean War (Stephen McGlinchy, 2009).

Following which, it was in the era of 1970s, particularly after the collapse of Bretton Woods system in 1973, that started to wane away U.S. economic hegemony (Michael D. Bordo, 2017). The fixed exchange rates of the gold standard provided by the Bretton Woods system had in fact become a 'gold dollar standard', providing privilege to the US economy. (Michael D. Bordo, 2017). Dollar had in reality become a 'private international money (McKinnon, 1988). The system collapsed when President Richard Nixon detached dollar and gold, hence by the year 1973 most of the major countries allowed their currencies to float freely against the dollar (M. J Stephey, 2008).

It was in the beginning of the 21st century, that various developing countries also attained a rapid and steady growth rate. During which many developing countries after the National Liberation Movement postwar, also gathered in the United Nations, calling for a 'New International Economic Order' which was in favor of countries of the third world (He Fan & Ye Qianlin, 2017). This rise of developing countries was expected to reorder the architecture of global economy. Particularly, the combined strength of some countries was expected to approach that of the Group of Seven industrialized countries, the G7. The most prominent being that of BRICS. According to IMF in 2001 G7 nations were practically 43.4 percent with respect to purchasing power parity of the world's GDP. In 2015 they declined to 31.5 percent. During a comparable period, the share in economic terms held by BRICS countries extended from 19.3 percent to more than 30.8 percent of the world's GDP (IMF report for selected country groups and subjects, 2017).

Over the span of years, developing countries have acquired another central purpose in the overall economy. Besides, they have begun to check in at elevated level of overall global authority and thus expect an unquestionably major job in certain institutions (Ruth Gordon, 2009). The current situation is reflected above all in the rising of the Group of Twenty (G20), which encompass major developing economies, and goes probably as the principle stage for overall financial cooperation.

Meanwhile, in the after math of surge in US military expeditions provided enough room for China's economic development. Truly, when the United States practiced military activities in Kuwait, Afghanistan, Iraq and somewhere else, it mentioned giving the expenses of the endeavors to other gigantic forces or material nations (William W. Burke-White, 2015). Hereafter, the overall game-plan of the post-Cold War time really mirrored a multipolar framework in which in any event five tremendous forces, the United States, Europe, China, Japan, and Russia, governed unfamiliar relations. At the beginning, the post-cold war multipolar order was dreaded to be damaged with instability and turmoil (Mark. E. Pietrzyk, 2001). Notwithstanding, regardless of fears of pragmatists, the end of bipolar structure of the Cold War time didn't prompt significant shakiness, yet presented a generally pacific global framework, yet with flare-ups. As per the British school of 'worldwide society' 'turmoil isn't equal to mayhem'. Peace inside disorder is conceivable through the development of an assortment of standards, foundations and understandings which control strife. The central wellsprings of the multipolar request were: hardening of state borders, standardization of standards of power and hostile to colonialism (Michael J. Mazarr, 2016).

Naively, the dynamism of US link in each conflict of the world, deteriorated its financial base to the level that, numerous different states figured out how to create and

get relevant in the post-cold war framework. Subsequently, in the wake of 9/11, the world moved from simply military driven to being monetary and political driven. The global framework moved from being unipolar to multipolar. The United States irrefutably remained an incredible monetary force, at any rate was by all record not using any and all means the solitary force. Other force networks rose, most strikingly, the European Union, the Organization of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, comparably as different country states outside of these breakers or affiliations (Harrison, 2004).

Amid this evolution, the past decade has become multilateral then just being multi-polar. At the second yearly Russia-China Conference (2016), Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, proclaimed that "global relations have gone into a thoughtfully new recorded stage that comprises in the rise of a multilateral world request and mirrors the fortifying of new focuses of monetary turn of events and force". It has become an era of win-win cooperation and development for all as opposed to forming alliances and creating poles in the international system.

While these manifestations reveal a general acceptance of the notion that, multilateralism has become an inescapable concept to understand in contemporary international dynamics, there is by all accounts less concurrence on how unavoidable or irreversible is the progress to multi-polarity. Truth be told, a portion of the declarations show a hesitance to recognize the total vanishing of uni-polarity. This was the secret message in Hillary Clinton's determination of words when she talked about a "more multipolar world". It is protected to accept that a lot more grounded protection from forego uni-extremity pervades mottos that promise to "make America extraordinary once more". Sergei Lavrov, thusly, talks about a powerlessness with respect to some to perceive that today "a unipolar world request is illogical". Could it

be that we are encountering a specific cover of uni and multi-polar real factors? Or then again could it be on the opposite an acknowledgment of a multilateral world? (Anthony W. Pereira, 2017).

Doubtlessly the US will stay a significant awe-inspiring phenomenon for quite a long time to come. In military terms, the US is likely going to remain superior for a significant long time, even as China takes on the primary monetary position. Other major made economies will continue utilizing enormous effect around the planet. All things considered, the set up powers are not to be limited as bringing down powers. China and Russia, albeit once in a while depicted as arising powers, as of now appreciate extraordinary force status as perpetual individuals from the United Nations Security Council. An extra gathering of countries, regularly alluded to as rising forces, are obtaining worldwide effort, impact and new strategic abilities: Brazil, India and South Africa are take these examples. Nonetheless, their part in forming global plans through multilateral systems and associations like BRICS, cannot be miscalculated. Therefore, this chapter intends to show that albeit the talk about worldwide multilateralism in the Post-Cold War request lays on the ascent of nations other than US and their combination; anyway the fate of this world request relies on how these nations let go of their two-sided issues. For this purpose, the chapter will first discuss the evolution of world order in the post-cold war scenario to the present decade of multilateralism and second, discuss the future of global multilateralism.

3.1 Disintegration of Soviet Union and the United States

The time of 1900's, described by the fighting of United States and Soviet Union, is recognized as bi-polar (Modieski, 1974). The countries remained embroiled in a global tussle for quite some time, which finally ended with the disintegration of Soviet

Union in to fifteen independent States, including Russia, on 25th December, 1991. The United States won as the sole worldwide force, with the capacity to impact the world request through individual and aggregate demonstrations, especially through worldwide foundations. This was the beginning of the uni-polar moment for the world, with no other country, economically or politically strong enough to challenge its dominion (Charles Krauthammer, 2002).

Polarity is a hypothetical idea. John Ikenberry, Mastanduno, William Wohlforth attempt to decipher it as a thought that brings an estimation of the exchange of abilities (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, Wohlforth, 2009). According to them, polarity implies a starting point with relation to the expected capacity to be reached by states. The question is, how can one understand whether or to what extent a particular state has met the necessary requirements of distribution of capabilities, in order to turn the international system into a unipolar, bipolar or multi-polar one. As per the ordinary meaning of the expression "pole", worldwide framework is unipolar if a state has the limit which unequivocally place it in a different classification contrasted with any remaining states in the framework (Wohlforth, 1999). This idea has been broadly examined among researchers of global relations, accordingly making a plentiful writing on extremity, where Kenneth Waltz merits referencing. As per him, for states to qualify as posts, they ought to have power parts, for example, size of populace, region, characteristic assets, monetary force, military and power (Waltz, 1979). He writes in *The Theory of International Politics* that "polar actor" is the one that: (a) appreciates impressive degree of assets or occasions to accomplish its objectives; (b) surpasses different states in each component of state limit expectedly characterized as, the size of populace and domain, normal assets, monetary limit and military powers, just as authoritative institutional "skill" (Waltz, 1979). The unipolar framework is the

framework, whose structure is dictated by the way that just one state meets these standards. Then, in a bi-polar framework two states would meet this standard.

Close to the start of the year 1991, Soviet Union was the largest country in the World (Peter Kenez, 2017). It covered, 8,650,000 square miles (22,400,000 square km), close to one-6th of Earth's surface. Its overall public numbered in excess of 290 million, and 100 identities lived in it (Encyclopedia Britannica). Likewise, it practiced impact through devices like the Warsaw Pact, reached out all through Eastern Europe and furthermore kept up substantial armory of atomic weapons (Encyclopedia Britannica History). However, it was the same year which witnessed its disintegration, owing to numerous reasons and causes, which are far too complex to understand through a single prism. However, it remains a fact that both internal and external factors geared the process (.Anuradha M. Chenoy, 2017). In the post-World War II situation the Soviet Union was dominated by a delicate economy, which had led to weakening of its military might. The public was dissatisfied by the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's political and economic policies (Henry E. Hale, 1999). Altogether, coming down to its disintegration rooted in both political and institutional discrepancies, coupled with geo-political compulsions (Stephen Kotkin, 2001).

3.1.1 Internal Factors for the disintegration of Soviet Union

Inside, there were different components that drove towards the crumbling of Soviet Union which included political, economic, military and social.

Firstly, *The Political Factor*: It was popular mobilization and lack of faith in the old ideology that ignited the process of decentralization in Soviet Union (Ronald Grigor Suny, 1993). On 11 March' 1985, at the point when Mikhail Gorbachev was named General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), he

wanted to kick off the Soviet economy. He also organized strategies of glasnost which implies transparency and perestroika significance rebuilding (R.G. Gidadhubli, 1987). The previous was proposed to cultivate exchange, while the last acquainted semi unregulated economy arrangements with government-run enterprises. However, these policies proved to be cumbersome and unworthy. The state lost mainstream public help and supportive of majority rule government developments acquired energy across the Soviet coalition. Perestroika showed the most recognizably horrible of the industrialist and socialist frameworks: controls on cost were lifted in certain business regions, yet existing regulatory constructions were left, suggesting that Communist specialists had the choice to face those game plans that didn't benefit them really. At last, Gorbachev's movements and his passive consent of the Brezhnev Doctrine hurried to the breaking down of the Soviet region (Vladislav M. Zubok, 2017). Before the fruition of 1989 Hungary had squashed its cutoff fence with Austria, strength had cleared into power in Poland, the Baltic States were wandering toward a promising circumstance, and the Berlin Wall had been chopped down (Paul Betts, 2019).

Secondly, *The Economic Factor*: Owing to different factors, the Soviet economy happened to be the second largest in the era of 1990's (Matthew Johnston, 2020). However, domestically, the economy suffered from stagnation since years dealing with economic stagnation and hoarding (Nicholas Stern, 1997). Gorbachev's perestroika reforms had only exacerbated the problem. Due to the mismanaged fiscal policy the oil prices suffered a sharp drop as well. Although during the era of 1970-1980's, Soviet was positioned as the top makers of worldwide energy assets (Richard Sakwa, 2013). Oil costs jumped from \$120 a barrel in 1980 to \$24 a barrel in March 1986, and in spite of the transitory spike in the wake of Iraq's attack of Kuwait in August

1990, the breakdown of Soviet Union economy was well under way (David M Claborn, 2020).

Thirdly, *The Military Factor*: The defense spending of Soviet Union had dramatically hiked as a response to the Reagan regime and proposals like the Strategic Defense Initiative- SDI (Pavel Podvig, 2017). The SDI was a US missile defense program that happened to pose technological challenges to the Soviet Union. In order to cope with the challenge, the Soviet military budget trended upwards since the early 1970's. The SDI was a US rocket protection program that ended up presenting innovative difficulties to the Soviet Union To adjust to the test the Soviet military spending plan moved upwards since the mid 1970's. Outside evaluations of Soviet military spending headed off to some place in the scope of 10 and 20 percent of GDP, and, even inside the Soviet Union itself, it was difficult to convey a cautious appraisal considering the way that the military monetary arrangement incorporated a combination of taxpayer driven organizations, each with its own fighting benefits (Mira Duric, 2003). What can be said totally, regardless, is that military spending was dependably unsure of all around monetary examples: regardless, when the Soviet economy loosened, the military remained a lot of upheld. Additionally, the military took need when it came to imaginative work capacity. Mechanical pioneers and would-be business visionaries who may have upheld Gorbachev's fragmentary change to a market economy were fairly directed into watch adventures (David Holloway, 1985).

Fourth, *The Social Factor*: Gorbachev's central guide, Aleksandr Yakovlev, portrayed the social test: "The principle issue today isn't just economy. This is just the material side of the cycle. The core of the matter is in the political framework... and its connection to man." (Aleksandr Yakovlev, 1989). The Soviet public was sickened with the broad defilement and Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika was nothing not exactly

a change of the Soviet soul. There was upgraded strain between recently engaged populace and Soviet state, which had demolished its believability. The public had commonly felt the soul of Western free enterprise and estimations of majority rule government. In 1984 Eduard Shevardnadze had told Gorbachev, "Everything is spoiled. It must be changed."

3.1.2 Intervening factors leading towards the disintegration of USSR

Internally, there were various factors that led towards the disintegration of Soviet Union which included political, economic, military and social, incorporated the issue of Afghanistan and the nuclear tussle between the US and former USSR.

Firstly, Afghanistan: The involvement of Soviet Union in Afghanistan (1979–89) was a key military factor in its separation (Rafael Reuveny, 1999). 1,000,000 Soviet soldiers took part in the 10-year occupation, and roughly 15,000 were murdered and thousands more were injured (Pavel K Baev, 2012). The battle in Afghanistan was the most enormous in scope, long and disastrous of the neighborhood wars that the soldiers of the USSR had fought. One reason the Soviets completely misinterpreted the circumstance in Afghanistan was that the Soviet chiefs saw the world from the "prism of communism", where no difference by people in general is permitted or acknowledged (Paul Dibbs, 2010).

Inside the USSR, the dictator systems of Poland and Chechnya pushed out the system of communism, since they couldn't rely upon the Soviet government to save them against predominant capture (Aron L, 2006). The monetary misfortunes were determined as 9 billion rubles were spent towards Afghanistan (A. J Hyder, 2004). These sorts of expenditure were incredible for a nation, where a shortfall was developing. Not simply was the war squandered many billions of rubles consistently,

with the exception of it moreover redirected the activity from more basic issues and was an obstacle to improving relations with China and Iran, the later country being especially vital since Soviet-Iranian relations had been at a depressed spot (Minkov, A., and Smolynec, G. 2010) The Afghanistan War cost the weak Soviet economy countless dollars, killed around 15,000 Soviet troopers, and incited key detachment of the Soviet state as the US reacted by conclusion truce (G. Collins, 1986). Taken together, these parts undeniably didn't invigorate the USSR. As political, military, monetary and inner disintegrations were created because of the intrusion of Afghanistan, the breakdown of the Soviet Union was inescapable (P. Dibb, 2010). The Soviet outfitted force, maybe undeniably the most extraordinary adversary of Gorbachev's change endeavors, ended up back-footed by the impasse in Afghanistan, and it lost whatever sway it may have had in checking the headway of perestroika.

Also, The Nuclear Factor: During the Cold War, a wild nuclear standoff persisted between the Soviet Union and the United States (Smith, 1985). Where they rapidly expanded their nuclear stock pile, this arms race also bore a heavy burden on the USSR economy (Council of Foreign Relations nuclear arms control timeline). When the US launched its first nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, just four years after in the year 1949, USSR successfully exploded its first nuclear weapon in a test range in Kazakhstan. In this race, both the countries acquired immense thermonuclear arsenals of almost unimaginable destructive power (Stewart M. Patrick, 2019).

The nuclear arms race somehow also ignited the disintegration process of USSR. Particularly, with Gorbachev in power, the state had lost the trust of its constituencies. On April 26, 1986, a Unit 4 reactor at the Chernobyl power station in Prypyat (in Ukraine) detonated. The effect was in overabundance of the extent in

radioactive aftermath as the nuclear bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. The reaction to the fiasco was a primer of Gorbachev's rule of straightforwardness, and, in such way, glasnost was found mortally requiring. Socialist Coalition experts acted rapidly to cover data about the truth of the disaster, setting out to coordinate that May Day strolls and good times in the affected area ought to continue as coordinated in spite of the known danger of radiation straightforwardness. Laborers were at last set up to manage the radiation spill on May 4, in any case Gorbachev didn't give a position revelation to everybody until May 14, 18 days after the calamity. He portrayed the scene at Chernobyl as a "disaster" and marked Western media thought as a "essentially intense mission" of "threatening lies." Over time, Communist Party statement was legitimately at chances with the reliably encounters of those in the corruption zone who were managing the genuine impacts of radiation harming. Whatever trust stayed in the Soviet framework had been broken. Various years subsequently, Gorbachev meant the recognition of the debacle by conveying, "Amazingly more than my dispatch of perestroika, Chernobyl was maybe the genuine clarification behind the breakdown of the Soviet Union five years in a little while." (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report).

3.1.3 The Post-Cold war scenario

On 25th December 1991, the dissolution of Soviet Union was announced by President Mikhail Gorbachev, using the words, "We're now living in a new world," (Michael Dobbs, Washington Post, 1991). He in fact agreed to end the forty yearlong Cold War, during which the USSR and US were amid a major nuclear standoff. In the evening at 7:32 p.m, the flag of Soviet Union was then replaced with a flag of Russian Federation, and Boris Yeltsin was its first President (David Remnick, Washington Post,

1991). As a consequence, once the world's largest communist state broke into fifteen independent republics. The image below identifies the states.



Figure no. 7: Fifteen states that emerged after the disintegration of USSR (Guardian, 2014)

Meanwhile, on one hand where the Soviet Union was disintegrated resulting in the formation of fifteen independent states, on the other hand, amid the larger structural framework of the post-cold war world a triumphant US was reinstated (David Remnick, 1993). This was a development neither anticipated nor foretold by the strategists in the era of 1980's. In fact, the US was once bashed even by famous English historians like Paul Kennedy and Richard Rosecrance of University of California as a country towards the verge of becoming 'ordinary' (Ken Booth, 2011). The post-cold conflict time not just reclassified the worldwide status of the US in financial terms yet in addition made it progressively certain with its worldwide delicate force movement. There was evidently no other country with the possibility to challenge the developing US impact which bit by bit unfolded a worldwide unipolar second (Eric Li, 2018).

Thus, three things characterized the post-Cold War world. The first was U.S. power collapse of bipolarity, in view of United States-Soviet Union contention. Second, implemented redefinition of public interests of states and at times reshaped the actual states, especially China as the focal point of worldwide modern development and Europe as a monstrous, coordinated monetary force. Third, altered job of worldwide associations.

The finish of the Cold War in the mid-1990s was a two sided deal for the US. On one hand, the Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Third World cleared route for majority rule government in numerous states and prompted goal of a few clashes, that had gotten drawn out during the Cold War (Mark L. Hass, 2007). Between state clashes were likewise decreased as the strain among East and West died down. Which was essentially because of competition on philosophical standing during the Cold War. As an issue of realities numerous nations had likewise chopped down military consumption in its result (United States, Government Accountability Office, 2008).

Then again, with the breakdown of socialist systems in Eastern Europe the bipolar overall construction overwhelming the Cold War time vanished, leaving a unipolar framework under the authority of the United States (Haynes Johnson, 1992). The previous adversaries of the United States, either fell or deserted the focal highlights of their conviction that were antagonistic to the United States (Peter Schweitzer, 1994). Different nations went to American military certification. The American's were seen operating in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and the Middle East, in general, where the armed forces of the United States established a semi-permanent foothold and thousands of soldiers deployed at bases kept a watch on Iran, Syria, and other "possible foes" (Congressional Research Service, 2020).

The US unipolar moment was not devoid from reminiscences of its military commitment in the Greater Middle Eastern area and furthermore from the simultaneous ascent of different states, especially China (Yasemin Oezel, 2015). Truth be told, the finish of cold conflict was not just set apart by the course of occasions in Eastern and Central Europe, but on the other hand was described with the progressive reinforcing of China as far as its monetary and political may (Baghat Korany, 2005). Then, nations like Russia, Japan, United Kingdom and France had likewise begun to acquire force towards monetary movement and development. The UN was practicing in a satisfactory design and worldwide collaboration systems like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were overseeing rather very steadfast. The environs were to the degree that a few specialists even characterized this period as a multipolar second in the construction of the post-cold conflict time (Louise Fawcett, 2005).

For the most part, the wish of the US in the post-Cold conflict world was to keep the state of affairs, which was beneficial to its hegemony (Charles Krauthammer, 1991). Hence, it increased international cooperation, as evident with the rise of peace keeping missions. In specific terms, from the years 1948 to 1978, only 13 peacekeeping missions were set, while in the subsequent decade, none were prepared. In May 1988 to 1993 October, twenty were made. However, in 2008 December, 63 peacekeeping missions were made, out of which 18 are functional, which involves 112660 military personnel and civilian police (Joseph S Nye. Jr, 1992). However, this was not maintained for long and the trend of the US getting in to international agreements and activities were then coupled with long standing wars in the greater Middle Eastern region (Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, 2005). The table below indicates this trend:

Table no 3: Military activity of the US 1900's-2000

Sr no	Year	Activity by the US
1.	1992	Conference for the Assistance of New independent states
2.	1994	NAFTA formed and Secretary UN sanctioned an international inquiry on Genocide in Rwanda
3.	1997	G8 summit brought together the Presidents of US, Russia and France
4.	2000's	Start of the War on Terror, twin tower attacks in the US brought the war to Afghanistan and Iraq

Therefore, in the post-cold war time, public interests of states were likewise re-imagined, especially that of China (Abdul S. Qaseem, 2013). From the hour of mid-1980s through the last piece of the 1990s China's economy made at a speed of commonly 10% reliably. From the period of the 1990s until 2005 its economy stayed at 8% to 9 percent reliably. In 2006 China's yearly improvement rate was in excess of 11%, as it was projected to be for 2007 (China Overview, World Bank Group Report). It was China's monetary improvement that drove it to significance as a profound power.

The economic power of states develops at different rates, which meant that some states were always gaining power and some were losing power relative to others. As Paul Kennedy described in his 1987 book *'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers'*, reliably this overall economic development "broadcasted the rising of new phenomenal powers which one day would conclusively influence the military/local setup of the world" China's ascent influenced the United States due to what global relations

researchers call the "power progress" impact: Throughout the historical backdrop of the advanced worldwide state framework, climbing powers have consistently tested the situation of the predominant (authoritative) power in the global framework and these difficulties have as a rule finished in war (Ian Clark, 2011). Despite Beijing's discussion about a "tranquil ascent," is a consolation system utilized by Beijing trying to alleviate others' apprehensions of developing Chinese force and to thwart the United States from acting preventively during the hazardous progress time frame when China is getting up to speed to the United States (Carsten Rauch, 2017). Consequently, in the post-cold war era, national interests of states were also redefined, particularly that of China (Abdul S. Qaseem, 2013).

Consequently, international organizations also evolved dramatically in the post-cold war international order. For the United Nations (UN), decrease in ideological clashes of the US and USSR, manifested itself as the decline of veto at Security Council. Ever since the UN was instituted, conventionally its failure was perceived as an issue in its charter. However, like Lord Caradon mentioned on many occasions, 'there is nothing wrong with the charter just with the members' (Sir Anthony Parsons, 1992).

During the Cold war, the UN and its function was strongly influenced by East-West divisiveness. In the years of 1945 to 1990, the Security Council permanent members casted Veto as UK- 30, US- 69, China- 3, and USSR- 114 (John Walsh, 1995). Following which after the end of Cold war, between June 1990 and May 1993, there was no single veto (Ibrahim J. Gossama, 1994). Just with one exemption in May 1993 when Russia hindered a target on financing the peacekeeping power on Cyprus. With this special case, the post-Cold War limit of the Security Council to appear at seeing in some way or another continue through and included a basic explanation behind the advancement in the measure of peacekeeping activities (Yılmaz, 2005).

In the economic sector, the former US President Bush administration augmented America's commitment to liberalizing international trade through the ongoing Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by launching negotiations for a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico (Nicola Philips, 2007). The Clinton relationship, in its basically for the most part doctrinal assertion to date, given up to fortifying and expanding the neighborhood basic market vote based systems (Richard N. Hass, 1997). Likewise, it suitably wrapped up the two approaches of exchange dealings started by its models. In security issues, in any case the Clinton social affair's fundamental intensity for "concluded multilateralism" was soon tempered by reality on the ground in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, U.S. asking actuated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to utilize power unexpectedly in its whole history by dispatching limited airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets (Foreign Policy editors, 2009). Then, such military campaigns were reinforced further after the episode of 9/11.

3.2 Post 9/11: The World Order and the United States

The twin tower attack in New York on 9th September' 2001, evolved the US foreign policy dramatically. On one hand, through military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the United States perpetuated its dominance in these regions (Philip H. Gordon, 2001). Meanwhile, with the formation of allies, the US also managed to enter many former USSR influence regions, for example the region of Caucasus and countries like Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Georgia (Meena Bose, 2002). Although Russia resisted this turn over but its ability to prevent it remained limited (Kurt M. Campbell & Yuki Tatsumi, 2010). Likewise, US also supported expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Eastern Europe, a region also under Soviet influence in the past. Russia, in the beginning, also tried to resist NATO expansion, even though the

creation of a counter defense organization, but it finally opted for peaceful partnership with the US. Through which it preserved many of its privileges in Eastern European countries (US Department of State, 1996).

Subsequently, the developing Western strength in the East, post-9/11, was additionally looked for with numerous difficulties. In the underlying period of the post-Cold War era, it was expected that the United States will diligently stay a predominant political and military force (Melvyn P. Leffler, 2005). Post-9/11 the US significant military commitment in different regions, begun to impact its economy. Then again, with the economic rise of different nations especially China, financial aspects were the new core interest. Where the US accepted dominance to reshape the world through military activity, China and Europe resolutely centered on monetary interests (Marc Koehler, 2013).

The US military engagements post-9/11, popularly termed as ‘the global war on terror’, allowed China to in fact come out as a victor (Anatol Lieven, 2011). China extraordinarily rose to incomprehensible force status, both militarily and financially. In the money related space, the International Monetary Fund anticipated that a lot of world GDP (15%) will move for all intents and purposes even with the U.S share (18%) by 2014. (The U.S. share near the finishing of World War II was for all intents and purposes a large portion of) This is especially disturbing given that a piece of world GDP was just 2% in 1980 and 6 percent in 1995 (Department of Defense Annual Report, 2000).

Until the late era of 1960s, the US was dominating the global manufacturing industry. With China's financial ascent, it basically turned into a rentier economy, and was overwhelmed by China (Christopher Layne, 2012). A Financial Times study

proclaimed in 2014 that 58 percent of inside and out remuneration in America came from advantages and interest parcels (Chris Giles, 2014). Since the Cold War's end, America's military benefit has not permitted different nations to overwhelm in this area. However, the country's capacity to keep up this block was confronted with obstruction in the last 50% of the post-Cold conflict situation.

With the economic rise of China, the international system slowly moved towards multi polarity and challenged the unipolar moment. Then, there were other force communities like EU, Organization of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (OAPEC), and different countries other than these associations that arose to be a significant standing (Harrison, 2004). Consequently, the global framework really mirrored a combination of both unipolar and multipolar frameworks in which in any event five significant forces, the United States, Europe, China, Japan, and Russia, ruled foreign relations.

What is at present more apparent is the unusual tenacious factor between the old style models of world relations subject to uncommon power competition. from one viewpoint and a for the most part changed overall system that is fused and financially dependent in genuinely sensational habits on the other. Up until this point, the early contention between the US and as of late rising powers has seemed to work for the most part from the circles of multilateral organization and financial globalization. This doesn't mean the United States will go the methodology of Great Britain during the focal part of the 20th century. As Harvard's Stephen Walt wrote in a magazine, it is more exact to say that the "American Era" is advancing toward its end (Benjamin Zala, 2013).

Further, there is a basic linkage between an excellent force's military and money related overabundance, according to one perspective, and its notoriety, touchy influence and plan setting limit, on the other. As the hard-power establishments disintegrate, so too will the US ability to shape the overall requesting through impact and model. This was especially genuine for America in the wake of the 2008 monetary emergency and the ensuing Great Recession. At the apex of its military and cash related influence after World War II, the United States had the material ability to outfit the overall construction with sufficient cash related help expected with keeping up financial and political strength. As of now, this cutoff is largely diminished.

The amount of this will convey difficulties to the Old Order from arising neighborhood powers, for example, China, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Indonesia. Given America's overall loss of standing, arising forces will feel constantly encouraged to test a ton the current requesting with an eye toward reshaping the general framework in propensities that mirror their own good conditions, standards and attributes. This is especially significant for China, which has climbed out of its "hundred years of disgrace" because of the West to at long last accomplish awesome force status. It is a jump to imagine that Beijing will at present grip a segment as "cautious assistant" in a general sales worked by the United States and proposed to advantage American interests, rules and attributes.

The current change from multi-polarity in multilateralism is perhaps really heavy. With respect to organization, it has quite recently combined of the BRICS, among others, into the G20 easygoing social event of driving economies. In spite of the way that plan as of now can't be reached on enlistment of the UN Security Council, an understanding has existed since the finish of the Cold War that its association isn't enough illustrative of contemporary global genuine entertainers. At the same time, it is

possible to fight that such acclimations to multilateralism – some beforehand happening, others yet to occur – will not actually incorporate a test to the all-encompassing scene as formed over the span of late years, with the UN Charter and the Bretton Woods foundations at its middle. The alleged "American-driven world request" is believe it or not at risk to bear the finish of the unipolar second and seems, by all accounts, to be proper to shape the justification another multipolar request.

In the viewpoint of scientists, these world trade standards are known as multilateralism. There is unavoidable irregularity in depicting this term, which should be explained if its part in frivolity US worldwide philosophy is to be completely respected. The weakness several roots. In any case, the word reference importance of the term multilateral - relating to relations among in any occasion three social events - wraps the essential yet not good state of its importance in the direct of generally relations. The good condition concerns the standards subject to which relations are encouraged among those get-togethers. In its unadulterated development, a multilateral requesting encapsulates picks of lead that are typically fitting to nations, rather than detaching among them, considering situational exigencies or particularistic propensities. In like manner, such a sale incorporates a more observable level of unification among the explained interests of nations than its elective plans, making it less hard to seek after those interests through joint development. Moreover, it allows every nation to find its benefits and difficulties from overall exchanges the total, across a wide gathering of relations and collaborators, instead of requiring extraordinarily made correspondence.

Much more explicitly, in its unadulterated development of a multilateral security sale would incorporate indistinguishable certification under a typical security umbrella - a blueprint reliably suggested as absolute security. Sir Arthur Salter more

than a half-century ago described collective security as a potential universal alliance "against the unknown enemy." And he should have added, in behalf of the unknown victim. The accessory norm in cash related relations accepts an overall money related sales where most excellent associations or differential treatment of exchanging collaborators monetary standards are unlawful, and in which inspiration driving area preventions to exchanges are limited. A promise to public certainty and thorough fundamental opportunities changes the unadulterated kind of the multilateralist vision. Not simply definitional, yet moreover taking everything into account, these sorting everything out rules are obviously more unequivocal than the subject of numbers alone. For instance, money related understudies of history consider the different monetary plans that U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull closed during the 1930s to have separated essentially from those of Hjalmar Schacht, the modeler of Nazi Germany's money related requesting.

In short, the substantive meaning of multilateralism in the context of universal security organizations changed to reflect historical experience. Honestly, the term multilateralism has never had a lot of appeal in political circles to depict security relations. After World War II, absolute security was the sensitive locution from 1945 into the Eisenhower years - in any case it all around recommended plans far looser than an unadulterated complete security structure, and as accumulated by John Foster Dulles to portray the "pactomania" of the 1950s, it was by and large verbal window-dressing. The Clinton affiliation was unordinary by showing up in office as self-announced 'multi-lateralists', even in security issues.

By and by, resulting to harming cases of having "sub-contract, the United States over the long haul has helped with setting up different multilateral affiliations, beginning with the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization in 1919,

and the United Nations in 1945. Support in these affiliations, almost by definition, propels uneven degrees of chance fairly and over some extent of issues. In any case, without a doubt, very only here and there has America's multilateral world solicitation plan included providing formal multilateral relationship with basic free powers. Woodrow Wilson's conclusive assumptions for the League may have come closest. Franklin Roosevelt held no such longings for the United Nations. George Bush used the United Nations effectively to develop arrangement and validness before the fight against Iraq, anyway genuine military exercises in the Gulf war remained under the US request.

The Clinton administration tried to assign certain coercive peacemaking efforts to the United Nations but scaled back its objectives with alacrity when the UN proved unprepared and domestic support faltered. Moreover, inside the multilateral affiliations that have had an effect, the United States has reliably hoped to guarantee its tendencies. In like manner, it requested a dismissal in the United Nations Security Council similarly as. Projecting a voting form in the critical worldwide financial establishments - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank - was and remains biased, with the United States really having the greatest single bid.

The GATT has barely existed as a legitimate affiliation, anyway it is ordinary, at last, bound to be imploded into a World Trade Organization. Likewise, the "O" in NATO is a conversation, a secretariat, and a U.S. controlled military request structure, not an independent body offering security to its people. None of this should occasion stun, given the strength of power the United States has utilized reliably. More unobtrusive countries, for instance, Canada or Denmark, and to some degree even a greater anyway more shocking country like India, perceive multilateralism altogether more personally with making strong multilateral affiliations. Casting a ballot public

holding that view have existed in the United States, anyway they have never been in a circumstance to shape the US methodology.

In any case, there are new stages ever, yet not new world solicitations. Economies rise and fall, there are cutoff focuses to the best military power and a Great Power needs sensibility in both advancing and assaulting. The United States has ascended out of the post-Cold War time period with one rising above effort: However, engaging military intercession is, it by and large looks more straightforward close to the beginning than around the end. The best military power on earth can subjugate others through military means. In fact, the future of global multilateralism rests on regions, where emerging countries along with the ones in the periphery create a conducive environment for shared growth and development.

CHAPTER 4

THE BRICS COUNTRIES: A PRISM OF MULTILATERALISM

This chapter analyses the BRICS grouping amid the evolving multilateral world order. It delineates separate portfolio of each country from the prism of their collective and individual compulsions. The analytical underpinnings of this chapter are viewed with a three-fold focus: domestic, regional and global. This will facilitate in identifying the magnitude of their individual desire of regional standing and how it effects the overall coherence in the grouping. Collectively, the BRICS countries ought to substantiate both the theoretical and analytical underpinnings of 'rising' regions once viewed through the prism of Neo-Functionalism.

Numerous intercontinental cooperation agreements between the BRICS, represent a heterogeneous diplomatic activism of the South. Meanwhile, allegiance with US and EU by countries like India, projects the perseverance to maintain a separate ideational presence. Altogether, an indication of how this grouping has the potential to send ripples across the traditional Western led world order, but lags behind due to numerous reasons including personal interests of states, and particularly bilateral underpinnings of India and China. In this regard, the individual standing of these states, and resultant exasperation ought to be discussed in detail. Hence, the foundation of this chapter lays down both the individual and collective compulsions of the BRICS grouping viewed through the prism of multilateralism.

According to the World Bank Group, in the early 2001, the world moved from being less overwhelmed by the G7 (Robert. H. Swim, 2011). As per a WikiLeaks link,

it was surprising how BRICS nations became global, and set up the US and EU to contend with one another (Wade, 2013). It was the main decade of BRICS organization, wherein alerts rang in G7 capitals about loss of impact in worldwide multilateral order.

In any case, it is also a reality that, study with regards to the strength of BRICS countries is significant than ever. Former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, during the 2011 BRICS Summit recommended that, there was "no uncertainty that the BRICS together address a possibly huge political and financial power on the worldwide stage. (...) However, the BRICS have spelt out regular concerns as opposed to a plan of normal activity. This isn't astounding given the nature of the gathering" (Devraj, 2011). A report of the European Parliament based on the position of these countries in the United Nations until 2011 also argued that the intensification of relations between the BRICS and the achievement of some success should not mask the fact that the BRICS countries constitute a "political club", but to not systematically form a bloc (European Parliament, 2011).

BRICS cohesion seemed even more limited with regard to resolutions related to disarmament and international security, as compared to the assessment of the overall association in the General Assembly. The highest degree of cohesion was in fact found in the IBSA format, which also reflects different nature of these three countries in comparison with China and Russia. The fact remains that, BRICS nations are profoundly different and these differences have been recognized in the grouping's summits and forums, even before the attempt of building upon the convergences. Despite of the edifice of a common identity and the formulation of common concerns, economic and political relations within the BRICS are irregular. These countries altogether represent diverse political systems and pursue divergent individual goals.

Meanwhile, this also downplays collective growth of the grouping as a multilateral flag-bearer.

As discussed in the previous chapter, a multilateral world order indicates a vision of countries seeking win-win solutions. It is in contrast to a multipolar system where states play zero-sum games. In short, the idea of multilateralism is interdependence. The present decade has witnessed phenomenal growth in both developing and transitional countries, which has resulted in change of world economic weight. Today, China an upper-middle-income-country and second major global economy, is just catching up with Japan and also the United States (World Bank Country Review' 2019). Hence, in the previous decade, China advocated multi-polarity but after its growth process now seems to be embracing multilateralism.

Meanwhile, Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa, all embrace the ideals of multilateralism. Other than BRICS they have been part of various multilateral arrangements and pursue integration with developing states in their periphery. It was also this aspect that facilitated Lord Jim O' Neil in the year 2007, to present the idea of the Next-Eleven or N-11. He identified in a paper written at the Gold man Sachs, eleven countries, other than BRICS, with the potential to impact the G7 (Jim O' Neil, 2007). The result was a very diverse grouping that included Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam. The main criteria to choose the N-11 countries were mainly demography and market development along with investor focus.

Nonetheless, it remains a fact that, for BRICS or N-11, a disadvantage remains in understanding their cohesion. As there is no simple framework to take in to account all the specific factors that a country expert would like to see. It can be viewed in the

case of BRICS and also that of N-11. Countries pursue individual global goals which sometimes also effect the cohesion process. India was once considered as a 'face' of the US in Asia and the main player in the US 'pivot to Asia' policy (Kenneth G. Lieberthal, 2011). It was a policy pursued by the US to curtail China's growth process by getting closer to India. Meanwhile, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is also criticized by India, as it integrates peripheral countries specifically India's traditional rival Pakistan, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Nonetheless, such arrangements indicate the fear of resurgence of camps in the region, which is against the vision of multilateralism and win-win solutions. Hence, the chapter will explore the individual compulsions of BRICS countries, which will allow in understanding the interplay of cohesion in the grouping. It will also identify the concept of N-11, with a specific focus on Pakistan. Picking up threads from the discussion, the future of BRICS as a cohesive multilateral grouping will be discussed in the next chapter.

4.1 Country's approach towards BRICS and US

4.1.1 BRAZIL

The 7th largest economy in the world, Brazil started acting with greater confidence and authority in the early twenty-first century (Paulo Sotero, 2010). When the speech of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro at the 74th United Nations General Assembly, Sep 24' 2019, indicated towards a 'resurgent' Brazil, ripples were felt in the developing world. His bold remarks about 'absurd' suggestions by the G7 summit to apply sanctions on Brazil without getting their point of view, and calling the rest colonists was enough to give the world a hunch of a strong and assertive Brazil (UN News, 24th Sep' 2019).

Brazil remained confident about the world's balance of power shift towards multilateralism inclining in its favor. The leaders realized that owing to Brazil's strategic significance, it will not require to adapt with the posture of US and Europe (J. Cason, and T.J, Power, 2009). In this regard, the leaders also sometimes challenged the status quo of international financial institutions and pressed for a reformed Security Council along with other global governance institutions (F.H. Cardoso, 2007). This epic decisiveness truth be told cleared route for a more prominent job of the country in multilateral organizations, in the Western Hemisphere, and assisted with supporting the more extensive changes in the worldwide request which has seen a force move from the old G7 to the BRICS and other rising forces.

The Federative Republic of Brazil is South America's generally compelling and geologically huge country, with more than 208 Million individuals (BBC Brazil Country Profile, 2019). Its distinctiveness rested in the notion of a steady economic and related political rise in the early twenty-first century and also in its historical relationship with international regimes (M. Galvão, 2010). From its participation in the BRICS to its position of authority in the elite club of G20 nations, Brazil has somewhat recently had to be sure arisen as an essential part in worldwide administration (Par Engstrom, 2014). Particularly, in the post-Cold War time, two examples orchestrated the departure for Brazil. Asunción Treaty at the territorial level, delivered Mercosur, a financial union that updated past concurrences with past enemy Argentina, carried Paraguay and Uruguay into the social affair and ensured about Brazil's help in the locale. At the worldwide level, the breaking down of the USSR suggested the remembrance of bipolarity and opened the way, after the unipolar second, for regional and focus powers to wander into the spotlight (Robert Crane ed., 2011).

At the domestic level, Brazil's policy to rise can be highlighted under two consecutive administrations: Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula (2003-2010). During these periods, Brazil cheered one of the world's most prominent nearby business avenues. From the years 2001-2011 Brazil was graded on 53rd position of the Global Competitiveness Index, and had outpaced the rest of BRICS countries in terms of economic transparency (Nathaniel H. Leff, 2011). Brazil's upwardly adaptable people and its best elite got a handle on the liberal globalization structure, progressed by globalization. Hence, since the 1990's Brazil was unmistakably enthusiastic to attract global attention, and recognize transnational rules and guidelines (A. Fraga, 2010),

In sharp distinction to Brazil's foreign policy which was reactive, former President Lula da Silva's era (2003-2010) merits reference. He methodically fortified the country's standing as an overall player using the South American locale as a springboard (L. Bethell, 2009). Lula government also set forth endeavors to strengthen nearby investment inside Mercosur (the Common Market of the South), the monetary and political comprehension between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Regardless, due to trade questions, Mercosur joint effort eased back down and rather UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations), became an important regional mechanism in Brazil's project to assert itself internationally.

UNASUR opened up opportunities for Brazilian industry by propelling the compromise of regional energy and transportation associations (Sandra Bodra, 2014). Its military branch, the South American Defense Council, gave it a security estimation. Specifically, UNASUR joint effort helped structure a regional power alliance that gave Brazil, a more essential clout. It was a deliberately outlined consortium signified to deny the US, put a watch out for Venezuela's neighborhood, and set up Brazil as the prevalent power in South America.

As a component of the new south-south system, Lula similarly began strengthening complementary ties with African nations. The opening of 68 new embassies and Lula's various journeys to Africa underlined the importance provided to this south-south link (Christine Stolte, 2015). Significantly, Brazil additionally turned into a significant contributor of help to Africa. The new guide exertion assisted it with contending other significant forces for impact among agricultural nations and gather uphold for its mission for a lasting seat on a conceivably extended United Nations security council (UNSC).

Hence, at the global level there were numerous local patterns of progress which projected Brazil abroad. Where Brazilian associations demonstrated mining interests in Africa, the Government furthermore extended optional activities and joint endeavors through various country groupings like IBSA and BRICS. Under Lula's drive, the IBSA Dialogue Forum was made by Brazil, India and South Africa in 2003. In any case called the G-3, it was molded to make "southern strategies" to overall issues, for instance, natural change and trade, counterbalancing the "northern procedures" driven by the US in overall conversations. In its main goal to fortify multilateralism, IBSA has in like manner attempted to develop a trade with the EU. Delivering "south-south" association with China, India, Russia and South Africa through BRICS, helped Brazil proclaimed its political self-rule from the US and pushed for changes to the world monetary solicitation. It also helped Brazil with getting overall effect. Consequently, joined with its undertakings to outline a South American coalition under Brazilian position, Brazil furthermore hoped to strengthen connections with other emerging forces to help its worldwide clout.

Regionally, in the mid 1990's, Brazil's relations with its neighbors were an outcome of having outlined every one of its lines toward the start of the 20th century

(Andrés Malamud, 2017). It became a satisfied country facing no territorial claims. However, the regional scenario remained far from peaceful. After President Lula left office, the Brazilian administration met with glaring opposition from large numbers of its neighbors. On one hand, under Hugo Chávez, Venezuela attempted to broaden its effect in South America, at that point, trade questions and undeniable disputes with Argentina moreover jumbled Brazil's undertakings to create organization in the locale. (David Baldwin, 2013). Associating Brazil with shielding authoritative goals, Argentina tested a portion of Brazil's new territorial activities and savagely contradicted the nation's journey for a perpetual seat on an improved UNSC (Jorge Battaglini, 2013). Brazil's impact in the region began to additionally lessen by Colombia's cozy relationship with the US.

Brazil's neighbors stayed worried about Brazilian Capitalism (Sean Burges, 2007). They were skeptical of Brazil's regional endeavors as a means of securing its own benefits. (Harig, Christoph and Kai Michael Kenkel, 2017). For Brazil to acquire a leading role in the region, it will have to go through a regional compromise. It moreover remains huge for Brazil to help its association with Argentina. Without Argentina, achieving further coordination between South American countries under Brazilian power will be problematic.

Meanwhile, in April' 2019, Brazil officially denounced the membership of the UNASUR. It was the US supported 'Gathering of Lima' achievement, which was made to counter UNASUR in March 2019. The provincial coalition deadened since mid-2017 after an absence of agreement on picking another General Secretary in progression of the Colombian Ernesto. Ecuador, Argentina, and Paraguay have likewise upbraided the Constitutive Treaty. Then, Uruguay, Venezuela, Suriname, Guayana, Bolivia, Chile,

and Peru are still important for the gathering, despite the fact that the two last countries suspended their cooperation in April 2018.

i) Brazil and The US: Policies of Brazil at the domestic, regional and global level caused chafing of its relations with the United States. President Lula assumed stances that made both the US President Bush and Obama administrations uncomfortable. Brazil intensely voiced against one-sided interventions of the US, for example, that in Iraq and Afghanistan. It likewise scrutinized the plans of US to grow military presence in Colombia and Haiti with the end goal of catastrophe recuperation, and wouldn't uphold the US position over the Honduras undertaking following the removing of President Zelaya in June 2009 (Riordan Roett, 2010). In the interim, activities like grasp of Iran's atomic arrangement and stances, for example, the seeking of Cuba's Castro siblings, and coordinating the activity for Latin American nations to perceive Palestine as a sovereign state as per its 1967 boundaries additionally angered the US.

President Lula's outrageous policies were sought to promote multilateralism and pave an autonomous role for Brazil in international politics. Both Regional and worldwide multilateralism were being considered as an instrument for controlling US authority and improving Brazil's general standing in the global force structure. Brazil's provincial endeavors purposely avoided the US. Lula dismissed the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) looked for by the US. All things being equal, activities, for example, UNASUR and the extension of Mercosur to incorporate nations like Venezuela were intended to avoid prohibitive economic deals and US authority in the district. Brazil's self-assuredness was planned uniquely to achieve a specific degree of self-sufficiency for the country.

Then again, the US was additionally conscious of the way that it could acquire colossally from a cozy relationship with Brazil. It could go about as a rewarding fare industry for US because of its huge buyer market. Then, Brazil's possibilities of turning into an energy major part later on was detected by the US. Curiously the confidence of Brazil could likewise be a stabilizer Chávez's Venezuela in Latin America just as to a rougher China in the more extensive Global South. As the US impact is lessening in the emerging scenario, looking for a more grounded respective collusion with Brazil appeared well and good. The US unfamiliar policymakers could presently don't stand to overlook Brazil as China previously become Brazil's principle exchanging accomplice and unfamiliar financial specialist. This is why former US President Obama in a visit to Brazil explicitly recognized it as a regional leader and an emerging global power (Former US President Obama visit, March' 2011). However, the Obama administration remained conscious of not officially endorsing Brazil's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC.

After President Lulu, under new president Dilma Rousseff, relations among US and Brazil improved. Rousseff unmistakably wanted to improve US-Brazil relations. She removed herself from Lula's Iran strategy and vowed to take a more basic line on common freedoms infringement in Iran and somewhere else. These signs were properly gotten by the US organization, who raced to put together an authority visit to Brazil by President Obama, which occurred on March 2015. While presidents Obama and Rousseff didn't declare any significant arrangements, they concurred on a system for reinforcing financial and security collaboration (Joint Communique among Obama and Rousseff, 2015).

After President Rousseff was indicted in year 2016, Jair Bolsonaro expected office with a 'affection' for US President Donald Trump (President Bolsonaro comment

to Trump while going to an UN General Assembly meeting in 2019). In spite of the fact that he indicated incredible reverence for President Trump, still he couldn't accomplish a triumphant ground for Brazil. In the interim, Brazilian strategy which tried to build up nearer attaches with rising forces, for example, China and Russia, stays unblemished. This weighs vigorously on the US strategies and interests.

ii) Brazil and BRICS. As a feature of the BRICS gathering Brazil has utilized its 'developing business sector' character and hyphenated from its Latin American personality. Its participation of BRICS fulfilled three needs: First, BRICS fortified the character of Brazil as a rising force, both monetarily and politically past South America. Second, the BRICS filled in as an upgrade for Brazil's more grounded exchange relations with emerging economies. Third, it provided Brazil with room to interact with China by being equal (Guilherme Casarões, 2018). Hence, BRICS provided room to Brazil for engaging with the international system progressively. It could explore the general arrangement, with more basic haggling force and quest for more observable portrayal in foundations of by and large monetary and political association. Utilizing the BRICS character, Brazil now don't prerequisites to drive a wedge between its unexpected turn of events and improvement objections. It can protect its poor from by and large principles, and can share at the general high table, while at the same time obliging nuanced provincial targets.

Close by the adaptability, BRICS give Brazil a considerable space for completing great plans, gotten advancement rights and homegrown improvement. Brazil is home to for all intents and purposes half of the world's biodiversity; the generally speaking feasible improvement plan isn't unbelievably a public need (Paulo Sotero and Leslie Elliott Armijo, 2007). Furthermore, Brazil can utilize the exchange of BRICS for bringing in assumptions. Meanwhile, the present framework allows

scholars to exchange cross-recorded prospects archives, if there is political will, the fragment could in the end consolidate various things with different concealed assets including values. Another significant region unequivocal model is business flying joint effort, where Brazil incorporates unrivaled capacity inside the social event.

There are without a doubt various possibilities for Brazil inside BRICS, not confined to the money related circle. From various perspectives, the BRICS consortium allows it to be on the center stage of the world, where the scenario is by and large unique. At any rate there are 2 Brazilian administrations that ought to be checked: first is to not request plans, for instance, interventionist show 'obligation to guarantee' (R2P), with a tentatively portrayed elective 'commitment while making sure about'. For BRICS, influence is important, while such organizations will take their time to gain global popularity and weightage. Second to not be dubious of the BRICS driven developmental bank, as it can as time goes on assistance the south being created as a counter to Western drove money related associations.

4.1.2 Russia

After the demise of Soviet Union, Russia for the most part remained overpowered by its domestic monetary and political impulses. At the local level, it was profoundly receptive to patterns in its area and looked for restricted targets in the worldwide political cycles (Dmitry Suslov, 2016). The result was of mixed bag in Russian outlook entailing partnership on matters of vital importance and competition on issues deemed central to Russia but peripheral to US interests (Volkan Tatar, 2018).

It was during Former President Yeltsin's time that Russia played with multipolar adjusting instruments as methods for managing its new standing in global relations (R. W. Davies, 1997). He had answered to the Federal Assembly in the year 1998, that

Russia without precedent for 10 years was entering a time of monetary development. As in the year 1997, Russia's GDP rose by 0.8%, which was considered a little advance towards the correct course (The finish of the Yeltsin Era, Strategic Survey, 1998). All things considered, this development permitted Russia to revamp its industry permitting a repair of its social and military strategies. These were afterward on shown as a solid position advancing multi-polarity on the planet request.

The orientation towards a multipolar world persisted in the first years of the Putin presidency as well. The essential major doctrinal attestations of the Putin association saw the updated openings for highway investment in the Post-Cold War time, and all the while uncovered gigantic concern over the overall allotment of power (Bobo Lo, 2018). Russia's foreign policy concept paper published in the era of 2000, outlined the US led unilateralism as a threat to Russia. It categorically suggested that Russia is in favor of a multilateral world (Dmitry Trenin, 2019). These considerations were moreover reiterated in the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, gotten prior the particular year, which depicted the toward the east advancement of NATO as a danger to the Russian Federation (Angela E. Stent, 2008).

Under President Putin, Russia was guided towards a strategy of revolution and restoration which indicated guidelines of multilateralism (Angela Stent, 2008). It searched for legitimization as a critical monetary power on the world stage and fixed its effect at the commonplace level. Consequently, Russia's global methodology is overpowered by the work to switch the impressive rot of the 1980s and 1990s and to lay the inward purpose behind a re-appearance of certified (instead of agent) status as an uncommon power. This incorporates enabling by and large conditions steady for permitting this reconsolidation to continue without outside hindrance. Its second enormous need in overall strategy is neighborhood: to reestablish Russian impact over

the past Soviet states-or maybe to foil the obstruction of outer forces into that space, to restrict the headway of their impact, and to control affinities in the zone that may pass on negative repercussions in Russia itself.

In the larger international system, Russian policy is pragmatic. Conscious of its own weakness and vulnerability, Russia strongly support a traditional understanding of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, resisting the dilution of these concepts on human rights or governance grounds. It also desires for the UN to be a multilateral organization in its true sense. Particularly the UNSC, should follow a rule based system of international governance. This unmistakable quality mirrors the value Russia puts on its status in the Security Council, both for emblematic reasons and considering the way that interest gives a confined capacity to hinder exercises by the United Nations that may catch achievement of the Russian government's local objections.

In the decade since Putin assumed the President office in Moscow, Russia has entered an era of resurgence. The political disassociation of the 1990s was supplanted with something additionally relative; the economy changed from a backwardness and insecurity into a model for a steadier, traditional framework. Unpleasant components inside the Russian state, however are still a danger, and have been liable to all the more likely control; a feeling of Russian public pride is returning; and the Kremlin has indicated more self-assuredness on the world stage, as both a helpful and dangerous specialist.

The plan opted domestically had a firm effect on the international strategy. Appropriately, the drawn out objectives of Russian international strategy are situated inside the Russian state. What makes Russia a particularly intriguing case, nonetheless, is the genuine idea of these homegrown and unfamiliar plans, which actually frustrate

a lot of flawless political-logical estimating. Inside, Putin's mission to reestablish the matchless quality of the express, the focal authority of Moscow and the autocracy of the law have driven some to blame him for dictatorship, statism and, without a doubt, of sabotaging Russia's majority rule change for the motivations behind force for the wellbeing of its own.

Externally, Kremlin's conduct shows up now and again as expansionist and neo-imperialist, especially in the event that we limit our examination to the international affairs of Eurasia. Yet, these inside and outside plans can be followed to various significant components, including the scholarly demeanor of the Russian authority, the relevant circulation of force in Russia when the current system entered office, the crucial disguised and externalized interests of the Kremlin and the outer political and vital setting where these variables work.

i) Russia and the US: US-Russia relations remain a blend of participation and rivalry yet additionally at times end up being ill-disposed (Angela Stent, 2020). Truth be told, their reciprocal relations can be considered as the most basic in the World (Olga Oliker, 2019). Russian policy opted soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union was that of multipolar balancing. However, with President Vladimir Putin in office, it turned out to be overwhelmed by desire of fitting in the current power configuration. In spite of the fact that Russia isn't as strong as the US, both militarily and financially, still it has the capacity to impact US interests around the world (Angela Stent, 2020). It is because of the very explanation that it ponders multilateralism and has extensively improved its relations with its neighbor China. In this specific situation, Russia draws in serious competition with the US over issues that are integral to its own needs while being less fundamental in American international strategy and technique.

Majorly, Russia's understanding of the relations with US have been conceptual. All Russia desires is to resurge as a major power in the current global system. However, Russia's aggressive designs in the region, particularly in Ukraine, Syria and Georgia brought the relations on the lowest ebb since the cold war. In fact, even during the cold war, both the countries were engaged a dialogue which is far from being replicated in the current decade. Hence, the rift between Russia and US soon started off after the disintegration of Soviet Union. Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin 'extended a hand of friendship to the American people' (Russian President Speech to Joint Session of Congress, 1992) but Former US President Bill Clinton talked of strategic alliance with Russian reform' (President Bill Clinton Address, 1993). Both the countries had great expectations with each other, but were dashed because of Russia's adamant behavior towards accepting Western norms and on the other hand American broken promises towards NATO expansion in Russia's neighborhood. The Presidents of both the countries have time and again criticized each other at various forums injecting adversarial sentiments in the long run of relations. In a debate organized by the Brookings Foreign Policy program, in partnership with the Charles Koch Institute, on 9th January, 2020, Brookings Nonresident Fellow Molly Montgomery, speculated a critical view of Russia's regional and global intentions. She described that Russia was left with an opportunity to join the West after disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, but instead it isolated itself by dodging Western geopolitical norms. She remarked that the rift between both the countries is not because of how America broke its promises and expanded NATO presence in Russian neighborhood, but because of Russia's invasions and annexations in places such as Transnistria, Crimea, and South Ossetia.

As a matter of fact, the lowest ebb in the bilateral relations of Russia and US has a psychological background. The stereotypes of Cold War have been persistent

despite the disintegration of Soviet Union. In the early 1990's US economy went through a booming period and Russian's were recovering from humiliation. This cycle was reversed particularly in the early days of Putin Presidency. In the decade of 2010-2020, a Russia has refurbished itself. Despite US threats of sanctions and international isolation, Russia remains resilient. It has opted for improving relations with its neighbor China and has achieved many milestones. These include discarding the dollar in the year 2019-20, as according to the central bank of Russia, in the first quarter of 2020 only 46 percent of goods were bought and sold in dollar by China and Russia (Julia Chapman, 2020). Meanwhile, Russia has also focused on enhancing south-south cooperation of which BRICS is given extra significance in Russian foreign policy.

ii) Russia and the BRICS- Although it was Goldman Sachs that published the rise of major economic powers prediction of Lord Jim O'Neil in form of BRICs (originally without South Africa). However, the formal initiation of this grouping was brokered on Russia's initiative (William E. Pomeranz, 2013). The main BRICs design ecclesiastical gathering without South Africa was hung on suggestion by President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, along with the General Assembly meeting of UN in the year 2006 (Rachel S. Salzman, 2019). On 16 May 2008, the headliner of the BRICs ministers was organized in Yekaterinburg by Russia. Meanwhile, the leaders of the BRICs had a meeting along with the G8 meeting in 2008 in Japan. The regular full-plan BRICs highest point was hung by Russia's initiative in Yekaterinburg in 2009 (Sergey Kulik, 2015).

Through chairmanship of BRICS by Russia in 2015 to 2016, a huge development was made towards lifting, expansion and relationship of the nations' correspondence. BRICS has displayed its significance and pertinence for dealing with standard undertakings in different fields of participation. The seventh culmination of the

gathering (Ufa, 8-9 July 2015) was supported by the Declaration of Ufa and an action plan was instituted for enhancing economic partnership amongst BRICS countries. Along with, an agreement calling for cooperation in culture and improving people to people contact was also formalized which incredibly improved communication between part nations. This illustrates the importance rendered by Russia to the grouping of BRICS. It also strengthens the maxim of Russia's belief in multilateralism and rising above the Western led international system.

4.1.3 India

During the Cold War, India's foreign policy posture remained that of non-alignment, which it was forced to redefine in the post-cold war era (Arijit Mazumdar, 2011). In Dr. Kalyanaraman's words "The arrangement of elevating harmony to acquire security neglected to acquire footing in a world overwhelmed by security quandaries and public, philosophical and power contentions. An advising passes up the conflict that China forced on India in 1962". In the years that followed, India made a course-amendment by developing military abilities as likewise marking a security agreement with the USSR (S. Kalyanaraman, 2010).

Set apart by the changed real factors of the finish of Cold War, India was given a chance to renew its engagements with the major powers of the world as well as with key countries in its extended Asian neighborhood. The advanced impact of America in the international guide of Asia particularly after the 1991 Gulf war, was a critical element in India's evolving needs (James Chiriyankandath, 2004). India all the while drew in with nations like Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar. Then it has likewise attempted to flex its relations with Afghanistan. In the background of ascent

of China, India started strategy of cooking it as a test. This was sponsored by India's advancing economy and military-atomic ability (Sanjaya. Baru, 2006).

In the Lowy Institute's Asia Power Index' 2020, India was Ranked 4 of 26 for far reaching power, with a general score of 39.7 out of 100 (Lowy Institute Index, 2020). For the clarification of this Index, power is portrayed as the requirement of a state to shape their outside climate and to direct or influence the lead of different states, non-state entertainers, and the course of overall occasions. Generally essential, power is the ability to oblige costs and give benefits that shape the decisions of others. The Index channels through in excess of 100 markers across eight specific measures to make an entrancing arranging of the general force of 25 nations. India was seen as the area's fourth most stunning nation in general. Regardless, it legitimizes taking a chart of how India collects as shown by the Asia Power Index.

India is ranked closer to major powers like Japan, China and even the US. It like way charges well in a large portion of linked assessments. It also comes in the extent of social impact to a third degree, comparatively as on the "future models" measure. These two segments of when in doubt influence mirror the discernible nature of Indian brands, social costs, data and individual's streams, comparably as its section, cash related, and military models anticipated to 2030.

The country comes fourth in terms of "economic resources", "military capability", and "diplomatic influence". These action the size of India's economy, improvement, availability, screen spending plan, military arranging and size, despite its worldwide spots of shelter and act of global multilateralism. Similarly, it stands in terms of versatility on number fifth, backed by its financial strength and varsity of its

institutions. These are all good rankings for a country which was developing slowly quite a while ago.

In any case, some deficiencies were also acknowledged by the Index as far as India's worldwide methodology was concerned. These were related with associations, or the force of impact through affiliations. The areas where India came low connected with its longstanding shortcoming on overall exchange, likewise as its inclination to make neighborhood associations. India positions seventh for "financial relationship" after countries like South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Australia and also US and China. To allow it to be understandable, the Lowy Institute's Index pack took a gander at exchange and theory along with the region, and financial underpinnings of each nation. It is without doubt not a mistake to place India after many Asian nations, India has progressed basically since its past critical stretches of major financial tactics and still, countries in the neighborhood like China and Sri Lanka are considered as much open economies. Fundamentally, it has quite a while earlier endeavored to guarantee its freedom and possibility of activity in its new and public security plans.

Hence, in an assessment of regional networks, regional alliances, regional non-allied partners, and global arms transfers, India is not favored in the Index. It is placed at number ten after many nations like Japan, New Zealand, US and Australia. India remains low in this assessment because, it does not interact much with its neighbors like China, that too constructively.

For this the Index, provides a force illustration in Asia. Meanwhile, in the year 2040, India is being expected to surpass the US in terms of PPP, and also reach to the level of China, of being a second major economy of the world just after China. In this backdrop, newer realities of the global order are also managing to attain a major

position in the global order. Power has turned out to be more diffused and states seem to benefit from this feature for individual and collective gain.

These degrees of progress can organize India as the world's most momentous vote based structure in the 21st century, appealing it to contour the Indo-Pacific locale and the consistently making in general requesting. This strong case has come extremely close to both making monetary chance and creating key inconveniences for the area. There are just no dependable twentieth century plans to deal with a particularly concurrent ascending of different entertainers. China, being the only essential agent, bargains being moved back by India, as it shapes some portion of different activities, for example, the "Quad" gathering of major states like Australia, Japan, US and India, aiming to make the future of the region that endeavor to organize the areas future

.i) India and the US- India's relationship with the US can be seen from the prism of four affiliations: First, India's 'China strategy'. At IISS Shangri-La exchange Singapore, Indian Prime Minister Modi clarified that there was no state with the ability to firmly shape and then secure the region of Indo-Pacific (Prime Minister Modi Speech at Shangri-La Dialog Singapore, 2018). India recognizes that the predetermination of Asia can't be written alone by China. It is regardless of overall framework or other security related concerns. Hence, the future of business, trade and development of this region will depend on how strong or weak Indo-Sino relations turn out to be.

Second, India-US connection. India was seen as a 'face of the US' in the more noteworthy Asian area, through an arrangement known as the 'Asia Pivot Policy' (Beenish Sultan, 2013). Regardless, India was hesitant towards expecting this part as it further respected it's close to area with most exceptional centrality. Regardless of, Indo-US relations made in to 'in general vital alliance' (MEA Government Portal). This

fundamentally owed to the blend of interest of both the States in countering developing China's worldwide and territorial impact. The comparing relationship encountered a huge change when the US from the outset consented to 'work to accomplish full thermal power composed exertion' with India in July 2005. India was allowed a waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to begin typical atomic exchange September 2008, and the accomplishment India–US essential atomic facilitated exertion understanding ('the 123 arrangement') was appeared at the next month, changing the corresponding relationship (Antoine Levesques, 2020).

Third, India's obligation in the area. The relationship of India with its neighbors turn especially on two major models: SAARC- the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and BIMSTEC- The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Actually, India being huge for both the affiliations have a fundamental endeavor to do in their profitable satisfaction of fundamental targets. Regardless, especially considering its standard contest with Pakistan, India winds up hindering the ideal job these affiliations should play.

At long last, India and Global Financial affiliations. In a World Economic Forum PM Modi, lectured about how it is important to open up the old friendships and deal with requirements of various agrarian nations", reiterating Delhi's significant set up complaint with the Atlantic affiliations and another tendency that India should help close this 'opening' (Samir Saran, 2018). India's essential part in the Indo-Pacific will be reinforced through its co-commitment in regards to global establishments and allowing them to flourish amid newer foundations.

Moreover, India's larger vision and relations with the US are flawed. It pits China against the Quadrilateral Initiative in a zero-sum competition. It also rejects the

Chinese proposition, of regional connectivity, and deems it as economic statecraft and military coercion in a manner better suited to the Cold War era. India tries to orchestrate itself as the provincial chief and seeks after relations with the US and West with a near reasoning. The vision of India for the Indo-Pacific is based on have rule and power. Keeping in view everything, it may be an initiation of a framework instituted by India and most noteworthy majority rule economy.

ii) India and the BRICS: India turned into a piece of BRICS as an outcome of its extensive strategy and to be identified with significant forces of the world (Alyssa Ayres, 2017). It expected enormous worldwide and monetary benefits from its relationship with other rising states in a multilateral social occasion. India viably checked out the BRICS Summits and has contributed inside and out to its arrangement setting and guideline. By going into a supported club, India hopes to overhaul its position and status (Rajan Kumar, 2018). Since self-administration, Indians has regularly often felt that its standing is contradictory with their self-facts as a spectacular development and a developing nation. (Narlikar 2013; Nayar, Paul 2003).

Owing to its essentiality for BRICS, India tries to be subsidiary with major arising powers and furthermore have the option to voice worries in worldwide administration issues (Wolf 2011). Following which India was given a relationship by BRICS of correspondingly astounded states with whom to collaborate in multilateral associations. Changing the establishments of generally speaking association to give arising and agrarian nations a more basic state has been a center key goal for the BRICS. This was in contrast to India's IBSA forum of three countries (Roberts 2014).

India has molded the discussion along with the BRICS countries of WTO towards a bargaining approach. As a traditional critic of the dominance of Western

countries in the multilateral trade regime, India has deftly exploited coalitions with other developing countries to receive integration in negotiations of the major trade powers (Efstathopoulos, 2012).

As a depiction of mutual interests, India has been sharing its reservations against the Western led order with the BRICS countries (Stephen, Parizek, 2015). In this scenario, India is close to Brazil, as they have been coordinating in the Uruguay Round of GATT, in which they also instituted a non-present day nations outlandish of the new exchange development plan (Hopewell, 2014). India remained very conscious in its dealing in the WTO with regards to China, and as a result, the BRICS countries were jointly able to remark about WTO policies.

In the year 2009, the concern of IMF and its policies had become a major subject for BRICS. The declaration of 2009, had also announced about the evaluation of IMF policies. They moreover asked for changing the subject of World Bank towards a friendliness among front line and arising nations, likewise as most noteworthy places in the World Bank and IMF are picked,

Paying little notice to character or provincial considerations". Security from the reasonable liberal inclination within the Bretton Woods was frowned upon especially by China and India, and was considered as injustice towards the countries other than the West. More simply, both India and China along with BRICS nations were not comfortable with the working of World Bank and wanted it to pursue policies which are more multilateral in nature.

Brazil and India have a long time desire to be considered for a permanent seat in the UNSC. With the noticeable uncommon case of the UNSC, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India is somewhat not backed by the BRICS nations as

well. It is also pursuing far reaching contrast in multilateral foundations. While this has been as of late genuinely amazing, it underlines the crucial disappointment rising forces have with affiliations reliably made by some time earlier noteworthy nations who engrave their central focuses on the principles of institution (Stephen, 2017).

A contrasting picture is viewed domestically for India. An enormous degree of vulnerability and geo-basic debate truly portrays the relations between India and China (Rehman, 2009). Illustration of these worldwide contentions review invigorated increases of military spending for the two nations (Rehman, 2009). Indian worldwide procedure have arranged China and its traditional rival Pakistan as bone of contention in the regional scenario (Khilnani, 2012). India has in addition looked on tediously as China has kept up attaches with Pakistan, and maintained its binds with nations in India's nearby locale, for example, Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal, (Rehman, 2009).

Given China's economic standing, its capability in military terms, along with its permanent seat in the UNSC, India has as a counterweight enhanced relations with Russia and US. On the other hand, have also improved its relations with countries like Indonesia and Japan in the East Asian region (Blank, 2007). The relationship with Russia is strong, in the year 2015, PM Modi also remarked that Russia is an important friend for India.

Likely the major reaction to China's global strength and standing has resulted in the form of solidification of Indo-US relations. On the other hand, for the US, China's rise and the relations of Russia and China are disturbing factors, for which friendship with India is fruitful (Tellis, 2005). The relations got on good pattern from being worse in the year 1998 when US was against India's Pokhran-II tests, to the closure of Civil Nuclear Agreement between the two countries. Under this agreement, the status of India

was recognized as a nuclear power, irrespective of the fact that India is not a signatory of NPT or CTBT a treaty for Comprehensive Test Ban. (Narlikar, 2013). Similarly, accepting India's global political status was a win-win both for US and India, as due to which US could keep a check on China's rising global standing. Rehman, 2009).

Irrespective, India also stayed away from an intentional part in any US-drive against China. The atomic strategy of India with the US was discussed in the Parliament of India called as Lok Sabha, while it looked at making a trilateral regional grouping with Russia and China (Blank, 2007). India's technique creators keep fastening a solid significance to the chance of self-rule and self-administration in world undertakings, the center idea driving its conventional circumstance of non-game-plan (Khilnani, 2012). Appropriately the main association with the US is sought after meanwhile as monetary coordination with (China is India's most vital exchanging accomplice) and political obligation in terms of other BRICS countries. In this way, BRICS is indeed a beneficial forum for India, as it allows India to rebalance its relations with all the countries like US, China and Russia. It also provides India room to pressurize Pakistan in the SCO- Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Regardless, if these trends continue, India may face increased pressure, but also increased incentives, to side with one camp over the other. The choices that India currently faces may endure well into the future.

4.1.4 China

The end of the cold war changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. Amid the Cold war period, Chinese leaders viewed the aspect of national security from the prism of its comprehensive impact and its basic relationship with Russia and the US (Chu Xiaobo, 2010). For China, it was favorable

to maintain three-sided relations with the US and Russia. Soon after the Cold war period, and the disintegration of Soviet Union, this framework was changed. China out of the blue wound up in a scenario of reorienting and reviving its strategy to another fundamental alternate.

In the post-Cold war era, the national security strategy of China was reoriented, focusing on creating new financial associations. Meanwhile, the newer realities in the regional security dynamics brought forward more defence issues in territorial domain. Simply put, the strategy changed from being war oriented to economic specific. Beijing's instinct on open security got extensive, unique, and frustrated. The extent of threats from the outside also evolved. Economic relations and financial concerns with respect to the world, reoriented China's respect for money related anxieties. Hence, China realised quite early that, security alone is not a concern for the international community, but also issues like economy, and politics are also equally important.

The accomplishment of China's methodology rests in the way it rose in the current structure instead of bringing changes. This has all the reserves of being one critical segment of China's "grand methodology". Another improvement came in the way the Chinese Government got interested in 'China'. It enhanced interests in participating proactively in multilateral arrangements. As a result, China had become part of various multilateral forums like BRICS.

Fundamentally, to evade the injustice and frustration caused by the policies of IMF and World Bank, China endeavored to be active in the regional and multilateral domain. This paved way for viewing authenticity of current associations, for instance China isn't leaving or is not radical against the current foundations. Surprisingly, while suggesting newer stages, it still continuously demonstrates a promise to further newer

ones. The hallmarks achieved by China remain continuous, for instance they instead of replacing multilateral organizations suggest to make newer ones. The BRICS Bank does not aim to in some way disturb the system of World Bank, but it simply aims to bring forward a parallel system. Meanwhile the AIIB, also does not aim to disconcert the Asia Development Bank, but intends to provide a platform to Asian countries for infrastructure development. Hence, the characteristic of China's strategy is not to displace the current system but to provide a newer one in contrast to the existing one. At whatever point possible, China won't plan to directly disturb the global structure, yet rather make new space in which it will have more effect. As a general rule in case one can consider the Cold war period as an initial sector of China's expedition to achieving a multilateral order. In the years to come we are seemingly going to witness the growing of new multilateral relationships and stages truly beginning with China at the founding table.

i) China and the US:

The response of the US to the rise of China by and large revolved around supporting its military capacity, standards, and improving relationship in the Asia-Pacific (Thomas P. Cavanna, 2018). This strategy exaggerated the security risks instead of the economic one. Beijing dispatched to broaden in Eurasia its strategic impact that is lofty in terms in economic opportunities. Today, the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), illustrates the global effects of the rise of China. (Flynt Leverett and Wu Bingbing, 2017). It is a series of critical structure and progression projects proposed to interface Eurasian regions together. It is a more than \$3 trillion investment in more than 65 countries of the world, influencing more than 70 percent of the world population (Tim Summers, 2015). The BRI plans to settle the areas of West of China, and restoring the economy and also facilitate the non-Western global money related foundations, gain

sway in various states and also elevate trade meanwhile, dealing with the Asia Pivot policy of US (Beenish Sultan, 2013).

Notwithstanding the way that the US still has major assets for keeping up its primacy, including military incomparability, alliances, noteworthy Western-driven establishments, and an unrivaled sensitive power. Anyway it is expected that, after its completion, BRI would be able to affect the influence of US led world order. (Michael Shuman, 2015). There are various factors leading to this presumption, Firstly, its naval force helps in the exercises overland in areas of significance in geostrategic domain, particularly in the Rimland of Eurasia. Meanwhile, the US has always focused on China's interests in the East Asian region and the South China sea (Wang Jisi, 2015).

Secondly, Beijing hopes to adjust the incomparability with the US. Its influence is increasing in the East Asian region and South China Sea, meriting thought as it is arranged due to the US oceanic presence and to the associations that America has supported in the South of China, since the Cold war era (Wang Jisi, 2008). Irrespective, this concern may not engage all of the resources of US. In order to achieve a military upper hand, China desires to make strategic advancements through its loftier geo-economic related assets: colossal and rapidly creating business, influence over domestic economy and gigantic economic stores (Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, 2011).

Third, to drive its tendencies, China handles the inadequacies of US in the post-cold war era. US's interests in Iran and Russia's sphere of influence in intervention in the Greater Middle Eastern region, has in turn effected US economy. The endless military engagement in these areas, has effected the economic strength of US persistently. Meanwhile, they have also effected the national security of US and

diminished its capability to deal with the more significant basic establishments of those multi-dimensional troubles (Simon Norton, 2015).

Immediately, China arose as a challenger to the US and began to project geo-economic sway past its region. The war on terror initially increased U.S. hegemony over the region. The military engagement in Afghanistan, and Middle East, and even Central Asia was closer to both China and Russia's sphere of concern and interest. The US invested heavily in its relationship with India, a struggle that conveyed a couple of benefits despite requirements and uncertainties on the various sides. Meanwhile, US also started improving relations with Myanmar, which is situated on the South of China. It went to the extent of proposing a counter to BRI, in form of a road between Central Asia, South Asia and Afghanistan (Stephen Roach, 2014). Anyway China put vivaciously in structures and other key territories of littoral states in Indian Ocean. It started constructing, major infrastructure through Pakistan and Myanmar. In Pakistan, the China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) is now being linked to Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan, and Central Asia (Muhammad Tayyab Safdar and Joshua Zabin, 2020).

The former US President Trump's Administration National Security Strategy endeavored to "help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region." (US National Security Strategy, 2017). Among various exercises, Washington refreshed the Quad, which is comprised of Australia, India, Japan and US. Irrespective, the US stumbled due to the overextension of its military, effect on economy, and domestic slowdown of politics. In comparison, China used its noteworthy geo-economic impact to confirm its fundamental effect over various countries in the region like, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Experts contemplate that this may in the long run grant China to transform into an "inhabitant power" in the district. The

US desired to deal with this influence of China, by getting into partnerships with its European counterparts and invigorating deals like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Schweller and Pu, 2015).

In the long run, China's geo-economics offensive across the Eurasian continent could threaten the very foundations of the United States' post-WWII hegemony. This is due to the US engaged in military interventions across various regions in the world, it is yet to deal with the strategic influence of China.

ii) China and BRICS- In the Forbes Magazine, Kenneth Rapoza (2017) wrote 'BRICS is owned by China, Face it!'. He suggests that all the countries in BRICS, need China for their development and progress. Brazil needs China, as it is the critical market for its Soybean and Iron Ore, Russia and China share two things all things being equal, generally: items market revenue, and a hankering for a multilateral world. China and India have deep trade relations, and India is one of the biggest regional importer of Chinese products. In the year 2015, Chinese imports of worth \$59 came in to India more than, Sweden and US. Trade volume also rose by 21.5 percent between China and India, which was in the year 2017 almost \$47.52 billion. Meanwhile, South Africa is also a strong trade partner of China, especially of raw materials.

It is no exaggeration to say that BRICS emerged when China opened up its first Special Economic Zones (SEZs) between 1978 and 1985 in the provinces of Guangdong (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou), Fujian (Xiamen), and Hainan. It is also the fundamental buyer of raw materials like nickel, zinc, aluminum, and copper. In terms of food, it has world's 23 percent of soybean grain and soybean oil (ECLAC, 2011). BRICS has benefited tremendously due to China's requirement of raw material; this has considerably allowed BRICS to benefit in money related accomplishment.

Corresponding requirement for trade for these countries, has in fact added on China's economic strength.

Up until this point, China has assumed a critical job in driving advancement toward genuine collaboration among the BRICS nations. As of late, its individuals have each sworn \$10 billion to their New Development Bank, which should begin loaning one year from now; delivered a typical procedure for financial and exchange collaboration; and consented to a \$100 billion possibility asset to give transitory help to individuals confronting balance-of-installments pressures. The Chinese government is currently going further, asking the remainder of the BRICS to standardize their participation, not simply seek after homegrown change. China fights that a more grounded BRICS gathering would assist with defending the interests of every single agricultural nation. With that in mind, the nation is additionally initiating the work to change the worldwide financial design, including by pushing for changes to the International Monetary Fund's weighted democratic framework.

China is currently the most important buyer on of aluminum (42 percent), pewter (45 percent), zinc (43 percent), lead (42 Percent), nickel (41 percent), copper (38%), primary steel (35 percent), and so on. As to food, it monopolizes 28 percent of world consumption of soybean oil and 23 percent of soybean grain, among other foodstuffs (ECLAC, 2011). The BRICS group has found its origin and synergy precisely in China's overwhelming need for raw material and food, which has significantly benefitted BRICS economies by contributing to their economic success. Reciprocal need and trade among these countries have become a binding force that will unite them as long as China continues to grow.

China in this way is standing away from its legitimacy (a yearly ordinary of 10 percent for the time frame being alluded to). It doesn't differentiate and the rest of the get-together people showing a less speed in improving as for Brazil it is 4 percent, Russia 6.2 percent, and India 8.4 percent. Hence the GDP of China addresses in overabundance of half of that of the get-together (2009), has in abundance of 70 percent of its cash related stores, in richness of partial compensation acquired from the FDI some place in the scope of the years 2000 to 2009 and holds the best positioning in world force in 2010 stood out from India (51st spot), Brazil (58th spot) and Russia (63rd spot).

Point of fact, the rise in political and military power of China is considered as a threat to the interests of India. Both the countries have also engaged in a fight for their all-inclusive limit question. The multi day military stop in the year 2014 in Ladakh further effected the relations of both the countries. Meanwhile, India's global underpinnings has also created various successful inroads. However, its capacity to overpower China in the long run remains limited (Mansingh, 2010).

Consequently, other regional countries like Japan and Pakistan, are interacting with their neighbors like China and India for their own interests. On the other hand, they also have issues with these countries (Smith 2013). The troublesome setting of the region, presented to India, asks for a more proactive role for India and other regional countries, in order to locate some sort of concordance between neighborhood interests and its overall cravings – considerations that are hard to oblige" (Raghavan, 2013).

4.1.5 South Africa

In the apartheid era, South Africa's policy followed a hard core military approach, aiming towards coercing neighbors in order to preserve its national security.

After the year 1994, democracy triumphed and became part of its regional approach. This prompted the acknowledgment for South Africa to accept certain obligations for its region. Prior, the region was exclusively bound to South Africa. The nation rehearsed politically-sanctioned racial segregation at home, and in its region. South Africa acted cruelly against encompassing states associated with imperiling white principle. It had the choice to oblige, contain and forestall adjoining countries way back when it was started to be noticed as a major African power. This impression was predominant also in Africa, given the strength of its economy and military.

As part of the revival at global level, after the politically-authorized racial isolation period after the year 1994, the relations of South Africa with other African countries in the region brought forward a totally new synthesis. Enmity offered way to deal with concordance and separation was displaced by integration. This reorientation moved from an adjustment in context in South African global methodology. The previous realist approach of South Africa learnt through the realities of the competitive world, was overpowered later by a newer liberalist visionary system where vote based South Africa would propel a forceful reformist arrangement abroad reliant on its internal experiences and characteristics.

After the year 1994, a great economic impetus was injected in South Africa. In the more modest regional setting, it was being considered as a superpower. The weight of its economy was the 80 percent of all the African region (Flemes, 2007). However, it is also a fact that Nigeria is also another country in Africa which has the potential of being considered as an African super power, but the fact remains that after the year 1994, South Africa evolved from being a reluctant country to a self-actualized regional power. The impression given by Aziz Pahad, former Deputy Foreign Minister of South Africa

in the year 1996, was that of the country being a big brother of the region and not otherwise as a hegemon (Adebajo, 2007).

Concerning the world as a whole, a position discussion on South African global standing during the 1990s was likewise careful: 'South Africa ought to oversee African assistants as counterparts and avoid all hegemonic ambitions' (Vickers, 2003). Meanwhile, on the other hand 'South Africa can't tolerate remaining uninvolved', Pahad requested more than ten years back (Adebajo, 2007). Not simply has 'a persuasive position... been constrained on South Africa', he explained, yet the five overall neighborhood 'unbelievable presumptions' from the work of South Africa (Landsberg, 2004). This impression was given by Jackie Selebi the former Foreign Affairs Director in the year 1999, when he said South Africa had experienced 'time and again' how other countries and organizations 'have looked to us to provide leadership, new ideas and breakthroughs in deadlocked situations' (Schoeman 2000). There was little evidence of a hesitant hegemon in Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's assertion in 2003 that 'South Africa has both a responsibility and an obligation to contribute to the continent's renewal in building a peaceful and prosperous continent' (Schoeman, 2007). The sensation of 'obligation' and 'responsibility' referred to is gotten through South Africa's newer realities. As they give credit of success to politically-endorsed racial isolation to help, and strength coming along the African continent. In the year 1998, Thabo Mbeki-former Deputy President, remarked about how it is the responsibility of South Africa to take on a larger than life role for the future of the entire region (Mbeki, 1998).

The new found strength for Africa also helped it in dealing with the issues in the African region as a whole. It was 2003, the year in which a South African official gave remarks about how the power gained by South Africa is sensitive as compared to

the other Africa. (Prys, 2008). In addition, he was mainly also conscious about shining elevated structures, highways, tremendous, all around provided retail outlets and verdant country zones take after a bona fide paradise. The land of Africa, was empowered by the Cultural Revolution in South Africa (Prys, 2008). These impressions give a sense of attainment to South Africa (Schoeman, 2000). In the year 2007, EU became a partner of South Africa, and considered it to be a country that is the face of Africa (Prys, 2008).

i) South Africa and the US: Some African states, however, seem ambivalent about South Africa's role as a regional power. The fundamental truth of its factual inescapability causes anxiety among subtler nations and commercial contenders. Alden (2005) featured significant divisions of appraisal inside course of action making floats and among investigators regarding South Africa's creating monetary existence in Africa. The uncertain solicitation is either South Africa is 'a attentive hegemon providing unrestricted item to a district seized of cash related accomplishment', or then again 'a manipulative power successfully subverting (Schoeman, 2000). The markets of its nationals in the association of open and in general capital. Various African nations may comparably despise South Africa's restricted enlistment to the EU and G8. There is besides been examination of South Africa being pointlessly certain for West and trying the last's commitment in Africa

At whatever point saw deliberately, standing of South Africa's as a local influence rests on stable unequivocal establishments, explicitly its cash related power, military cutoff points and individuals size. Its 'zone' incorporates two spheres, Southern Africa and the remainder of Africa. In the fundamental South Africa is an authentic superpower. In the region around South Africa despises a comparative unipolar leftover because of the existence of Africa's other provincial force, Nigeria as that moreover

shows superpower standing in its sub-region of West Africa. Also South Africa highlights in the social event of arising center forces, portrayed by their substantial credits similarly as their ideational assets.

In addition, South Africa features in the league of emerging middle powers, characterized not only by their material qualities but also their ideational resources. Whereas a regional power need not pursue an idea-driven foreign policy, the new middle powers (like the traditional ones) are known for their ideational foreign policies – South Africa perhaps even more than the likes of India and Brazil. Regardless, even without the standing with a center or local force, South Africa may have chosen a thought driven overall strategy with a democratic system and essential freedoms, an African Renaissance and impact as a responsibility at its center.

It is unlikely, regardless, that South Africa would have had the choice to move these considerations on a particularly incredible expansion without the twofold status of territorial cum-center force. Its domain pre-obviousness and by and large presence give South Africa the gravitas to recognize ideational association at the close by and in general levels. For South Africa the last incorporates two sub-positions or concentric circles, Global South and the remainder of the world. In these both, South Africa tries to acknowledge the piece of a specialist of Africa, chatting with the authority of a territorial force supported with critical delicate force assets. South Africa's typical and generally speaking movement has keen, innovative and execution parts, all of the three bearing President Mbeki's tough individual drawing. The focal thoughts being advanced through its worldwide framework are not really novel yet reformist in an African setting and to be sure altogether strong. South Africa has been staggeringly incredible, through its bold association, in getting its considerations got a handle on in Africa; witness the new foundations of landscape association.

Still, South Africa's grand ideas are not universally welcomed in Africa and its mere status as a regional power inevitably provokes suspicions and jealousies from some other African countries. Nearby use association South Africa requires to fight with a prominent test resisting 'safeguards of the assurance', expressly moral irregularity. Zimbabwe is a propelling framework of the strain between high feelings and basic characteristics, for instance, strength among pioneers and the influence of states

In the year 1999, Former President of South Africa, Mbeki offered a stream of responsibilities of the African Rebirth, that fused the establishment of prominence based political circumstance, the confirmation of basic freedoms, the achievement of sensible financial turn of events, dealing with the scourge of HIV/Aids, making terrain foundations to oversee requests of dominant part rule government, concordance and adequacy, the expansion of Africa's circumstance in the world financial setup and upgrading its work in 'picking the general strategy of association taking all things together fields' (Mbeki, 1999). He additionally desired for steps to guarantee that 'both Africa and the remainder of the world depict the new century as an "African Century"' (Mbeki, 1999). This essentially powerful course of action, which appears to stream no cynics and protesters, has been formally advanced as 'the new African game plan' and 'the reformist African course of action' (Adebajo, 2007). The centrality of this course of action in South African worldwide framework was reiterated in a 2007 system review: 'The relationship of the African Agenda fills in as a fragment whereupon our duty with the overall neighborhood made sure about' (Overview, 2007). Mbeki has sorted out some way to carry a specific space related to the Renaissance.

A third radical idea underpinning South African foreign policy is a conceptualization of sovereignty, with state impunity making way for responsibility.

South Africa is just getting a handle on an overall standard that has procured cash since the completion of the Cold War. In 1991 dynamic UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, for instance, discussed an emerging public conviction 'that the gatekeeper of the aggrieved for moral quality should beat edges and legitimate records'. States could now don't use the local domain rule as a 'guarded limit' behind which fundamental opportunities could be mishandled with no possible repercussions, he suggested to the United Nations. Every organization deemed to be clear on the idea of not being secretive to the UN, and also being answerable to the commitments of Charter of UN and its essential opportunities courses of action (Geldenhuys, 1998). Such thoughts were filled further in a couple of unique solicitations, strikingly

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's 2001 yearly report was given The Responsibility for Protect R2P, the report of the year 2004, stressed on the need of collective responsibility, and the Secretary-General of UN's Panel on Threats and Challenges along with the British-oriented Commission for Africa report of year 2005, certified the responsibility of individual states and the overall neighborhood 'shield masses from demolition, outrages, ethnic cleansing and infringement against humanity'.

Such ideas, were mooted during Mandela's presidency, and can be depicted as the foreign policy of democracy. It relied upon the twofold sentiments that 'our new relations ought to reflect our critical obligation to the solidifying of a egalitarian South Africa', and also that 'just and languishing reactions over the disputes of mankind can essentially move beyond the progress of larger part drives system, around the planet'. In mission for these standards, as the ANC's overall framework outline of December 1994 called them, South Africa would 'bless fundamental opportunities in our overall relations' and desire to be a 'focal part' in a 'general fundamental freedoms crusade'.

Ordinary freedoms concerns would also influence South Africa's two-sided relations. 'In this we will not be explicit nor, absolutely, be hesitant to raise basic freedoms infringement with 8 nations where our own and different interests may be inimically influenced', the ANC framework document strikingly announced (Foreign Policy Perspective 1994).

Mandela other than saw the exhaustiveness of normal opportunities, consequently pardoning thoughts of social relativism: 'There can't be one construction for Africa and another for the remainder of the world' (Vickers, 2003). In any case, regularly depicted as a remarkable logical thinker not close as hitched as Mandela to a moralistic overall methodology, Mbeki has without a doubt pushed basically equivalent principles of state lead as his model. A technique report of the Department of Foreign Affairs started with the striking opening explanation that 'South Africa's worldwide procedure mirrors the country's huge obligation to the solidifying of bigger part runs system in our country' (Overview 2007). Consider besides Mbeki's discrediting of one-party rule, military governments and individual radicalisms in Africa and his advantage that associations must 'understand their position and realness from the yearning of individuals' (Landsberg, 2004). The President likewise struggled that 'the fantasy of understanding and power, of larger part administers framework and normal freedoms' were totally interwoven. Mbeki estimated to view the role of Southern Africa altered into a established dominant part rule governments' (Landsberg, 2004).

This moralistic approach has been coexisting rather uncomfortably with a more pragmatic impulse that emerged early in the life of the 'new' South Africa. Looking at the statement of Aziz Pahad- the Deputy Foreign Minister in the year 1995: (Vickers, 2003). A 1998 worldwide strategy survey depicted 'abundance creation' and 'security' as pushing South Africa's public inclinations. The development of central opportunities

and well known government abroad was not deserted, at any rate would be required after multilaterally, cover alia through regular affiliations (Vickers, 2003). Jackie Selebi- The Director-General of Foreign Affairs, in all actuality left space for uneven standard help, in any case: 'We feel that fundamental opportunities are critical as the African states are one family. The role South Africa can play is that of discussing the major issues, he suggested in the year 1998. 'Irrespective, we may have the alternative to communicate respect for regular freedoms in case we separate fundamental independences from requests of trade' (Vickers, 2003). South Africa's rulers in this manner presumed that they would continue to ride their moralistic elevated self-assessments, anyway get off when entering business area. Of course, they all would come together in the organization standing beneath the flag of multilateralism.

The announcements of interest in multilateral affiliations were plot in the chance of Renaissance of Africa, first brought forward by Former President Mandela at a party of the Organization of African Unity in the year 1994 (Alden and Soko, 2005). At a SADC most raised point three years in a little while Mandela inferred 'our fantasy of Africa's refurbishment as we enter the new thousand years'. That 'rebuilding', Mandela fought, was on a very basic level subject to African countries buying in to 'the norms of vote based framework, respect for regular opportunities and the fundamental statutes of good organization' (Gumede 2005). Mbeki, who had already as Deputy President under Mandela (1994-9) established himself as the key political and intellectual force behind the Renaissance idea, emphasized the same political values – but went much far off. He contemplated in the year 1998 about the Renaissance that, the feature of its framework will provide lion's share rule government, amicability and strength, reasonable unforeseen development and an unrivaled existence for the African people (Mbeki, 1998).

For Mbeki, 'the start of our rebuilding as a Continent should be our own rediscovery of our spirit' and the reproducing of Africans' 'sureness'. The require Africa's reclamation was for Mbeki 'a call to rebellion' to a mishmash of despots, tyrants, convicts, discouragement, indiscretion and backwardness. Mbeki thought of it as a grave responsibility of Africans to join 'the mass mission for Africa's resuscitating'. He even declared, in August 1998, that 'to be a genuine African is to be a reformist in the clarification behind the African Renaissance' (Mbeki, 1998). On a later event Mbeki broadcasted that 'it is required that we generally help the vision of an African Renaissance' – 'we' suggesting the general public of Africa similarly regarding the remainder of the world moreover (Mbeki, 1999).

Mbeki saw the European basic establishments of the chance of a renaissance (Mbeki, 1998) and also surrendered that the thought had been spread before 'by different activists for a promising circumstance' in Africa. Precisely when prior requires the recovery and reclamation of the landmass had been introduced, notwithstanding, the conditions were not ready for their assertion. With the last liquidation of government in Africa (in the wake of South Africa's own chance), the finishing of the Cold War and the speeding up of globalization, Mbeki recognized, conditions were phenomenal for the distinction in the possibility of an African Renaissance 'from a fantasy imagined by visionaries to an objective program of development for reformists' (Mbeki, 1999).

It was the possibility of multilateralism that, as yet, South Africa's worldwide procedure has been skimming constantly from a request to Western forces towards the foundation of new companionships in the Global South, particularly with Asia and Latin America. In like manner, the preferring of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) connection and a rising tone of against Western assessments

have powerfully been asserted in South Africa's contemporary overall method, which are of tremendous monstrosity to the nature and course of its financial optional procedure.

ii) South Africa and BRICS

BRICS is viewed as a cooperative movement, underscoring a trans-regional stage for the countries. Each country in BRICS has, by one way or another, reflected improvement through its economy and developmental pursuit. In any case, South Africa was portrayed by specific researchers as lagging behind, when compared with other BRICS countries. As a result, South Africa's enlistment of BRICS, generated considerable discussion with many believing the African phenomenon to be as 'nobody significant' in the grouping.

In populace terms South Africa is behind Russia (56.5 versus 144 million individuals). On the other hand, different blueprints of figures put South Africa in an unparalleled spot. Conversely, other sets of figures put South Africa in a better place. For example, it is the country that has less public debt (only 157,102 million US dollars in comparison to Russia that has 206,960 million US dollars). Moreover, we ought to think about that South Africa's GDP, however not in a decent condition inside BRICS, wholes as of now to a 16 percent of the entire African GDP. This proposes that South Africa, with an overall public of around 56 million individuals, is making one 6th of what 54 sovereign States and 1,228 billion individuals absolutely produce in a year (Expansión, 2018). Potentially this was the fundamental motivation driving BRICS to perceive South Africa's consideration in such exceptional association. Notwithstanding, South African money related authority inside the landmass is a long way from being clear. Considering everything, striking nations like Nigeria and Egypt have begun to arise. They entire freely to the 17% and 11 percent of the entire African GDP. The

shock for South Africa's idea in the BRICs was twofold. From one point of view, since South Africa's cash related and individual's potential was misinformed the engraving to that of the remainder of nation adornments. Then again, considering the way that there were various countries that could have well fitted the BRICs gathering in case it really was essential to join any African country.

Nigeria overpowers South Africa by funding with 17%, being the best African economy. Additionally, South Africa makes over bit of all African conveyed power and gives more hypothesis than China, the UK or the US (Vivar, 2015). Other than that, their particular GDPs are truly same: that of Nigeria is around 350 billion US dollars, and that of South Africa is around 376 billion US dollars. Notwithstanding, subtleties duplicate between the two nations, particularly when we take a gander at the manner by which they secure such degrees of GDP. All around, the Nigerian economy has not been enlarged. Then again until the 1980s its economy was for the most part subject to oil. Notwithstanding the money related development that was started after the despicable ramifications for the Nigerian economy of the oil emergency of 1973, actually these days Nigerian oil trades truly sum to 89.6 percent of its absolute fares.

It is possible that this reliance protected Nigeria from accomplishing a more huge cash related level around the years that South Africa was perceived in the BRIC gathering, that is, 2011, a period where South African GDP added up to 60 percent the absolute African GDP. In any case, all flipped around when Nigeria stimulated its figuring base (a bookkeeping exercise) which, in opposition to UN principles who course to resuscitate it at common ranges, had never been restored since 1990. That way, Nigerian GDP raised from 293.760.400 to 425.560.800 US dollars in 2014.

Regardless of the recalculation, South African per capita pay keeps beating that of Nigeria (6,850 versus 2,280 US dollars) yet whenever stood apart from the Gini Index by some coincidence, South Africa is the most extremely horrendous country on earth, which infers that it is the most conflicting country around the globe. This thusly places Nigeria in an overwhelming position. By then, from a social viewpoint Nigeria has an all-inclusive community of 191 million individuals, being African pioneer in this field (Naranjo, El País, 2014). Their particular improvement for 2050, which was from the outset sight the fundamental to be associated with the BRICs similarly present inquiries on the sensibility of South Africa's joining. In any case, when diverged from Nigeria, South Africa is apparently falling to pieces.

According to an analysis of Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC), South Africa will escalate only 2 positions in 2050 compared to the 2016 figures, specifically from being the 29th economy in the world to being the 27th (measured by GDP at Purchasing Power Parity). Nigeria, however, will escalate 8 positions, that is, from being the 22nd economy to being the 14th.

The South African economy is needy overall on the fares of critical metals (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2017). Another report places South Africa in an intangibly better position. It makes accentuation on the more grounded cash related improvement nations like Angola, Nigeria and South Africa are encountering because of "the political change and financial change practices [which] kept up scholar sureness and added to more grounded action (in 2018)." Moreover, the World Bank has check Nigeria's headway as being not really imagined. Among the causes this report, circled in June 2018, makes reference to reasons identified with the decrease on oil creation because of "limit targets." Still, the relationship with Nigeria leaves South Africa in a frightful circumstance notwithstanding the way that better than that of different assessments.

From 2018 to 2020 Nigeria's genuine GDP will outmaneuver that of South Africa by at any rate 1 percent (2.4 percent versus 1.9 percent in 2020) (World Bank, 2018).

South African concerns around 4 percent with for all intents and purposes each country in Africa. This model keeps concerning their various imports. With everything taken into account, South Africa is besides higher put by volume of exchange. Its affirmations add up to 13.6 billion US dollars while Nigerian ones basically sum to near 5 billion. South African imports are worth 9.5 billion while Nigerian ones basically 1.5 billion. This gives South Africa an excess of 4.1 billion and to Nigeria basically 3.5 billion. Basically, South African exchange is both higher in numbers and buyers when appeared differently in relation to Nigerian trade inside The single reality that South Africa serves as a gateway for BRICs in to Africa is a pivotal reasoning for South African consolidation into the organization. Without a doubt, beside

China, India are progressing in the East of Africa and Brazil is growing its influence in Angola along with different other countries (La Información, 2016). It ought to be seen that in Africa the market of 1,200 billion individuals, is recognized to increase at practically 2,500 billion till the year 2050 (Villar, 2015). From an economic perspective it turns out that whereas Nigerian trade with Africa tends to be focused on several countries (such as South Africa), South African trade was more diversified into both different countries and products. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe amount to half of South African exports to the African continent, being the main destination countries.

Lord O'Neil, was in fact quite amazed after South Africa joined BRICS. His argument against its inclusion was that, there are many other markets that have more potential to be included in the BRICs club than in South Africa' (Brooks Spector, 2011).

As discussed about Nigeria being one of the country in Africa with a similar potential. Hence, Lord Neil also coined another concept of the N-11 as discussed earlier in the chapter.

4.2 THE NEXT- ELEVEN (N-11)

Prior to Lord Neil's revelations about the N-11, there was also a considerable media hype about other countries reaching the level of BRICS. Few countries like Turkey and Korea had a slower but persistent pace of economic growth, which may in the near future facilitate them in reaching the status of a major economic power (Will Kenton, 2021). Jim O'Neil's paper in the year 2007 intimated those nations which would almost certainly have a comparative effect as the BRICs. However, he did not consider South Africa also their part. Egypt was the only African country to be considered as a part of N-11.

N-11 abbreviated structure, included countries like Vietnam, Iran, Mexico, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria among others. Meanwhile, the fundamental ground for their inclusion their demography and related economic potential (Wilson and Stupnytska, 2007). The authors of the paper created a Growth Environment Score (GES) to help them rate the countries and their potential for growth into world economies. The components of the GES are macroeconomic stability, macroeconomic conditions, technological capability, human capital, and political conditions. According to the paper, "...strong growth is best achieved with a stable and open economy, healthy investment, high rates of technology adoption, a healthy and well-educated workforce, and a secure and rule-based political environment." Countries were examined, and the next eleven were chosen. The authors of the paper used mathematical modeling to create charts of which countries could have

the strongest economies 20 and 45 years after the paper was published, measuring income per capita and the largest economy.

4.2.1 PAKISTAN AND THE N-11

In his book titled: *The Growth Map: Economic Opportunity in the BRICs and Beyond*, Jim O'Neill reiterated Pakistan's long term growth prospects as part of the N-11 group of nations. Goldman Sachs also launched an N-11 equity fund (GSYAX) to enable investors to take advantage of growth in the Next-11 group of nations in the year 2012. While the primary criterion used by Goldman Sachs for membership of a developing nation in BRIC and N-11 is the size of its population, the firm also considers what it calls Growth Environment Score (GES) of each nation. The thirteen variables which make up growth environment score are inflation, fiscal deficit, external debt, investment rate, openness of the economy, penetration of phones, penetration of personal computers, penetration of internet, average years of secondary education, life expectancy, political stability, rule of law and corruption.

Goldman Sachs has given Pakistan a low GES score which puts the country among the bottom third of Next-11 nations. However, this score is rising, and Goldman forecasts that Pakistan will be among the top 20 world economies by 2025. It seems that Goldman Sachs' assessment of Pakistan's growth prospects are conservative and does not fully reflect its future potential based on the nation's young population and its geographical location. With half of its population below 20 years and 60 per cent below 30 years, Pakistan is well-positioned to reap huge demographic dividend, with its workforce growing at a faster rate than total population. This trend is estimated to accelerate over several decades. The average Pakistanis are now taking education more seriously than ever. Youth literacy is about 70% and growing, and

young people are spending more time in schools and colleges to graduate at higher rates than their Indian counterparts in 15+ age group, according to a report on educational achievement by Harvard University researchers Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee. Vocational training is also getting increased focus since 2006 under National Vocational Training Commission (NAVTEC) with help from Germany, Japan, South Korea and the Netherlands.

On the other hand, it neighbors major growing economies, particularly China, where a massive reduction in poverty has fueled higher aspirations and demands for better public goods. There are people, tourists, job seekers, students and academicians, who are travelling across regions. Pakistan being at the juncture is the most convenient destination and conduit for maximizing this goal. This also becomes predominant once Pakistan's efforts to deal with elements of instability and challenges related to security are also recognized by the international arena.

Meanwhile, the boom of economic activity particularly under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and consequent enhancement of world's interest in the country for investment has also cast encouraging impact on erstwhile dwindling tourism industry of the country. States of South Asia, Central Asia and East Asia need more regional economic connection to make the 21st century the Asian century setting aside the perennial political issues to start a new beginning. This will certainly prove Pakistan as a country with improved security evolving towards SUSTAINED stability. In this regard, there lies an opportunity of inferring cooperation from conflict, particularly when the Indian Ocean Region is considered as a center stage of rivalry

Hence, the core vision of Pakistan will be to enhance cooperation in Infrastructure, Ideological linkages and Institutional growth. However, limitations in

the past demand a scrutiny of the policies adopted by Governments which were damaging to its security and sovereignty. A Report published by the World Bank Group, Pakistan was titled: Pakistan@100-shaping the future, is indeed a considerable analysis of such policies. However, it is also important to outline that Pakistan has all the ingredients to become a middle-income state, and it can achieve the indicators flagged by the World Bank Report.

Pakistan's security challenges have subdued over the past decade and the country is ready to play a pivotal role in the regional integration endeavors, particularly brokered by China. Pakistan positioned at the cross roads of Central, South and West Asia has prevailed amid a troubled neighborhood. Particularly, this region is considered to be the least integrated regions of the World, primarily owing to the political uncertainties. Due to which, although, Pakistan was placed at a prime geo-strategic location, this virtue in the past proved to be more of a reason of challenges rather than opportunities. This raised a specter of challenges for Pakistan pertaining to its national security. Today Pakistan is being viewed as a major destination for investors, tourists and students alike. Through CPEC, and CPEC+ Pakistan will be playing a greater role, of a conduit of connectivity and of a 'Zipper' of the region. To achieve a success in defending its internal values and benefitting from the geo-graphic dividend, there lies an opportunity.

In a book titled: 'The Warrior State' author T.V. Paul contended Pakistan's Hobbesian world view which he calls in his book as the 'Geo-strategic curse'. He in fact suggests that this curse flows essentially from Pakistan's geographic location which is coupled with the idiosyncrasies of its history. According to him, Pakistan emerged on the face of the globe amid regional insecurities. A Cold war was already in the making along with bitterness from its eastern neighbor- India. In addition, it was

divided in uncomfortable Western and Eastern wings which profoundly created gaps in the policy formulation process of the country.

It is this feature through which Paul and analysts like him remain oblivious about is the flip side of the coin. Pakistan is a country which remained in the eye of the storm amid the regional interests of major powers. It has faced the brunt of evolving discrepancies from both external (as a baggage of history) and internal fronts. It remained busy in dealing with the fallout and was not able to facilitate its own socioeconomic growth. In addition, Pakistan remains a target of 'engineered perception'. It was viewed through the prism of instability and interests employed in the region particularly Afghanistan. These circumstances led Pakistan in to a 'security dilemma'. It was twice that the country was given a significant role in the region, i.e. in Cold War era and the post 9/11 US led war in Afghanistan. However, both these roles were from the prism of security. The regional strategic compulsions of the major powers remained narrow and counter-productive. Pakistan cannot be compared with any other country due to the peculiar nature of challenges it was posed. It is a country which has been a victim of 'Fiction guiding Facts'. It was placed at a region whose horizon was volatile due to continuous instability. At the internal front, lingering Afghan issue had effected Pakistan in every sphere of life, particularly through proxy infiltration and perpetual instability. Meanwhile, Pakistan's issues were known but not understood by the outside world. The discriminatory trends, despite of its efforts for dealing with instability and regional asymmetry created a hurdle in its growth pattern.

However, Pakistan's future is inextricably bound to advancing the CPEC+ concept of trans-regional and pan-hemispheric connectivity within Afro-Eurasia and functioning as the pivot of Silk Road integration and civilizational convergences alike.

Islamabad must take the lead, and now, in tangibly actualizing this long-term vision in order to distinguish itself as the subject of International Relations that it is and grow out of its former passive role as an object of other Great Powers. Forward-looking and visionary proposals are needed in order for Pakistan to survive and thrive throughout this century, and with the right amount of political will and the proper managerial structures in place, there should be no doubt that Pakistan will seize this historical moment to fulfill its destiny as the center of the emerging Multi-polar World Order. However, this will only be possible if cooperation instead of competition is adopted as a principal for global relation.

Hence, in order to provide enabling environment for investment, three factors will be critical: social/legal security, policy consistency and law and order. That is why today amid the evolution of power structure with rise of countries like China and Russia, Pakistan is ready to play the role of a regional connector and in turn benefit domestically. It is time to highlight what Pakistan has done to come out of the era of darkness and instability towards a shining future of development and growth. However, unfortunately, in the past, its efforts have remained under-reported and not understood both in scale and scope by the World. Nevertheless, as much as Pakistan has been criticized, the fact remains that it has shown resilience and commitment against factions of instability.

Today, it has an ensuing role to play in the region due to its geo-strategic location and diplomatic trajectory for growth. This is possible through a whole of nation approach, and to rise against challenges. Particularly, it is important to work towards regional solutions to issues like the Afghan quagmire. Hence, at the regional level the shared nature of challenges should be understood and not just be guided by real politick. Investment alone in Pakistan is not enough. It should be corroborated with

a regional vision. Pakistan should revitalize the agriculture sector or create SEZ's for smart industrialization. On the other hand, regional initiatives and organizations like SAARC should be rejuvenated. In this regard, there is an opportunity through CPEC which may be used for regional cooperation by connecting Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Turkey. This is vital as Central Asia is full of energy while South Asia is energy deficit. The inclusion of Iran in CPEC could bring a drastic change. Today trade of Iran with China is almost of \$ 6 Billion with vision of increasing it to \$600 Billion in next 10 years; meanwhile, Chabahar as a sister port of Gwadar has increased this trade potential. Thus regional connectivity will generate economic activity within Pakistan. It is worth mentioning that, CPEC is a regional initiative, as written in its documents it is not a bilateral agreement. However, there is need to gear some strategies to benefit from its potential.

In a nutshell, where Pakistan as an important regional actor has the potential to play part in the global economic activity, similarly, there are other peripheral countries which can play an even more significant role. Looking beyond BRICS is the key to understand how other countries can play their part in strengthening the South and materializing the concept of the 'rise of the rest'. The next chapter looks at the future of BRICS and other countries in the upcoming global order.

Chapter 5

LOOKING AT THE WORLD BRICS BY BRICS

This chapter while picking up threads from the discussion of study, entails a view on the evolution of BRICS and its future from the prism of multilateralism and the concept of 'spill-over'. As discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, the intra-BRICS interests have evolved to be multi-sectoral since its inception. Meanwhile, globally the concerns of the organization have developed glaringly in multilateralism. In the 11th BRICS summit, held in Brazil (14th Nov' 2019), the member states called for commitment to 'multilateralism' and 'reforms in global institutions, for instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN Security Council (UNSC), World Trade Organization, and World Bank (WB). This reinstated the understanding that at the outset although BRICS policies were economic oriented but subsequently its horizon widened and encompassed security, health, science and technology, culture and civil society (Official Declaration of the 11th BRICS Summit, 2019). On the other hand, it also reestablishes the commitment of this organization towards global multilateralism and ensuring a voice of the 'South' in the Western led World order and institutions.

It is a fact that, the global significance of BRICS owes to the growing individual economic might of the member States. The size of their economies, demography, Multi-national Enterprises, GDP rate and FDI indicators, all supported their combined strength as a multilateral forum. BRICS have spoken from around 27 percent of the world GDP, 2.88 Billion, almost 42 percent of global population, while

26 percent of global space is covered by them (International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 2010).

The cooperation in economic terms by BRICS is illustrated in the founding of New Development Bank- NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. It has \$200 Billion funds, not just providing major economic support but also an example of their global economic strength (Hukil, 2014).

Meanwhile, a report published in the year 2017 by NDB, quoted that the volume of BRICS countries in world economy nearly tripled over the past twenty years and the connectivity between Emerging Markets and Developing Countries EMDC's and BRICS has also increased. This constitutes their importance as one of the main driving force of economic development of respective regions as well. Hence, the faster BRICS countries grow, the more other connected countries and especially the EMDC's will grow (New Development Bank Report, 2017).

Notwithstanding, this likewise remains a reality that, BRICS has an impressive political impact, as the member states illustrate authority both at regional and global levels. They participate inside the UN and at other local and global stages on countering oppression and terrorism both, threats from drugs and settling clashes and guaranteeing worldwide data security (Sudip Chakraborty, 2018). Intra-BRICS relations depend on the UN Charter, the all-around perceived standards and standards of worldwide law, just as such standards as: receptiveness, sober mindedness, fortitude, and peace as to outsiders. BRICS is a glaring illustration of smoothing out aggregate endeavors in world undertakings. The States are particular in culture and human headway. They have developed their relations on the guidelines of consistency, thought for each other's' preferences, basic respect and openness to the rest of the world.

However, despite impressive standing in the first decade of its institution, BRICS did not manage to fulfill the suggestions of Lord Jim O Neil, in his pioneer paper for BRICS, which speculated that this organization will surpass the G7 in the year 2020. Also since the time of the making of BRICS, various spectators have also imparted questions about the BRICS and critics inside the BRICS possibly predominate the others. One of the reason is away from customary rationale behind the meeting up of these nations. They are scattered geologically, their economies are in various phases of advancement and there is a reasonable level of philosophical discord among them and dissimilar to other financial affiliations, BRICS doesn't look to set up any normal political or security design.

On the other hand, the issue of lack of synergy and bilateralism inside the organization may have made obstructions for it to have a position of supremacy. Each state from BRICS moreover has their own inspiration to seek after this two-sided plan. For Russia, BRICS may be an augmenting forum of the Atlantic system and also a preservative for the east. For South Africa, this is platform for showing muscle in the landmass of Africa. Brazil is facilitated through BRICS, for becoming an important part of the Asian century, despite it being so geographically far off. Meanwhile for China this is one of the vehicle in which it is both politically and financially superior and hence has the driving force, whereas for India, this forum provides a link between its desire to emerge as a major power and not the one which is still struggling. Meanwhile, the individual growth of BRICS countries has also hampered due to massive issue of domestic corruption, which also effected their combined growth. On the other hand, the organization also gives anti-US vibes and massive China-centric notions.

In any case, the intentions of participating countries cannot outshine the basic purpose behind the formation of BRICS: facilitating a durable relation in the 21st

century, which connects people beyond border (Alyssa Ayres, 2017). With a world overpowered by multilateralism, both political and economic power is swiftly disseminating and the BRICS desire to benefit from these changing dynamics. As referred to by the respondents in Chapter 2 of this study, particularly for BRICS, multilateralism has become a reality (Chapter 2). Be that as it may, the planned part of BRICS is yet to be accomplished even following a time of its foundation. As the respondents concurred, BRICS can profit in full blossom, on the off chance that they let go of two-sidedness, don't be a China-driven square and doesn't give anti-US vibes. They ought not to separate into more modest working gatherings like Russia-China, Russia-India, Brazil-Africa. BRICS, at that point, is a meeting up of country states at a specific international second to accomplish a bunch of objectives. The subsequent part of this chapter discusses the opportunities and challenges in way of BRICS.

5.1 BRICS: Opportunities and Challenges

As discussed in the study earlier, multilateralism evolved as a global norm in the latter part of era after cold war due to integration of major states (chapter 1). This integration was not restricted to one area, in fact it 'spill-over' to various areas of cooperation (postulate of neo-functionalism). According to the study, multilateralism is a non-linear process which conceptualizes interdependence, complementing interests and the creation of win-win solutions (figure 2 chapter 1). BRICS is a classic example of this form of integration. In the first decade of BRICS (up to 09 Summits) each member laid ground work for cooperation, and identified areas of convergence starting from economic to security issues (summit 2). The magnitude of interaction amongst the BRICS member states, started from meetings at ministerial level and came down to level of conferences and working groups, which later on integrated cooperation further (summit 4). 11 summits later, the cooperation has evolved to the extent of explicitly

declaring this era as the flag bearer of multilateralism (Declaration of the 11th Summit held in 2019). In the year 2020, a major level of cooperation was viewed, specifically in the backdrop of the novel Corona virus that halted the world economic and political integration. The 12th BRICS summit held online under the chairmanship of Russia, ended on a note of enhancing cooperation for a mutual response to COVID-19 (Danil Bochkov, 2020).

Meanwhile, the significance of the financial organizations established by BRICS cannot be ignored. This is due to the message it gives to the world about the seriousness of BRICS initiative. More importantly it fulfills the core *raison d'être* of BRICS, which was to provide an alternative to the Atlantic system (Declaration Summit 1). It is also a fact that the BRICS financial institutions may not be able to replace the World Bank or IMF in the near future, but they illustrate a strong alternative. With their promise of equal voting right and reliance on local currencies and not dollar, BRICS institutions are indeed strong contenders.

In this regard, the aim of BRICS can be viewed as two-fold: first, to highlight the lack of global financial surveillance, as the IMF model instead contributed towards global financial crisis. Interestingly during the financial crisis 2008, BRICS member states remained resilient. During that time not just the reduced legitimacy of the global financial order allowed the BRICS to use their bargaining power, but it also enhanced intra-BRICS trust and cooperation (Oliver Stuenkel, 2013). In the year 2008, Euro monitor international reported that, the notion of decoupling of BRICs economies in the global financial crisis 2008, proved to be wrong. However, when the global economy slowed down in the year 2009, the BRICs did feel the consequences. Especially from the shortage of exports towards Europe and US and services sector, which was oriented towards developed economies. Russia was vulnerable as it relied

heavily on hydrocarbon exports. However, despite of issues BRICS remained resilient, owing to the trade surplus and foreign exchange reserve. (Euro Monitor International, 2008).

Second, political orientation was drawn by BRICS, due to its global economic output and weight of population. Although BRICS was brought to limelight through its relevance in the financial international order during the financial crisis 2008. However, this significance was used by BRICS to raise international skepticism against the global governance altogether. This crisis gave BRICS the motivation to challenge Western rule based governance and highlight the central role emerging markets could play amid the challenge. On the other hand, the international role acquired by BRICS was exemplified in the way their interests 'spill-over' and expanded from merely economic specific to political and to sub areas. This is because the BRICS members integrated in newer realms other than just economic. Hence, BRICS is not a narrow visional forum and gives importance to other sectors of mutual importance. Hence, owing to these aims, both opportunities and challenges can be deduced for BRICS in its future discourse. They are discussed below

5.1.1 BRICS: Opportunities

After the first decade of its institution in the year 2009, BRICS achievements lay considerable opportunities to un-tap in order to promote its international influence. However, this is only possible if the partnership is deepened and a long-term mechanism is invigorated with a two-fold: First in the economic domain the NDB can be the main promoter of BRICS mechanism. It is in fact a way to convert BRICS from being a forum to a major institution of the world. In this bank, the five member's funds are equal and so are the voting rights with no veto power residing with any member. It

does not have the mechanism to impose harsh conditions and in fact provides finance to develop infrastructure to member states and also to other developing countries. In the year 2016, the NDB administered around US\$ 1.5 billion in establishment projects and reasonable headway in BRICS countries. Till the year 2018 NDB had eleven undertakings with affirmed loaning (BRICS Policy Center Report, 2018).

What's more, NDB likewise gives securities to bring assets up in neighborhood economy. This is especially in diminished trade risks to indigenous investors. In the year 2016, the bank gave obligations of 3 billion yuan which is equal to US \$ 448 million in China's securities market which developed in five years and loan fee of 3.07 percent (China Daily, 2016). Agents of the bank announced the goal of expanding the issuance of bonds in nearby cash in China and before long extended it to other establishing members, especially India in rupees and Russia in Rubles (Business Standard, 2016).

The BRICS did deliver on some of its promises, between the years 1990 to 2014, these countries went from accounting for 11% of the world's GDP to almost 30 percent. Yet, the global financial crisis inflicted lasting damage, and Goldman Sachs shut down its BRIC investment fund in late 2015 after its assets plunged in value by 88% from their 2010 highpoint.

First thing, the overall stock chains are their most prominent illustration of defeating affliction: China is as of now the second largest global economy in terms of GDP and is ready to overcome the US. In the year 1990 China had only 3 percent of global GDP worth, by the year 2015 it was 25 percent. Meanwhile, India, developed on the basis of its IT organizations and Brazil and South Africa because of their raw materials. In the year 2016, a sum total of US \$ 1.5 billion was given away by the Bank

for projects pertaining infrastructure and sustainable growth for BRICS member states. Until the year 2018, it had already approved to lend eleven various projects (BRICS Policy Center Report, 2018).

In addition, NDB also issues bonds to raise funds in local currency. This is particularly in form of reduction in risks of exchange particularly for local investors. In the year 2016, the bank gave bonds of 3 billion yuan which is equal to US \$ 448 million in bond market of China which developed in five years and loan fee of 3.07 percent (China Daily, 2016). Bank announced the goal of expanding the issuance of bonds in nearby cash in China and before long extended it to other establishing members, especially India in rupees and Russia and Rubles (Business Standard, 2016).

The BRICS did deliver on some of its promises, from the years of 1990 to 2014, they rose to being 30 percent of world GDP from a mere 11 (Ian Bremmer, 2017). In any case, the organization continues to talk together on an ambitious agenda, with two groups, China and India that desire to be part of the global stock chain and the rest with their ample raw materials.

Firstly, the BRICS major haul is the supply chains of the globe. China is as of now the second greatest global economy in terms of GDP and is ready to outperform the US in the coming years. (World Bank China Overview, 2020). In the year 1990, China was at 3 percent in terms of GDP of the global yield, in the year 2015, it was 25 percent (NSBC, 1990-2005). India developed in terms of GDP through its IT organizations (Stephen Merrill, David Taylor, and Robert Poole, 2010) and Brazil and South Africa sold their raw materials like crude oil and iron (Braga Luciana, 2018). As a group, Brazil's poor are apparently the greatest beneficiaries of globalization in the Western side of the equator.

Internally, for enhanced coordination and integration, the NDB is major platform. Externally, the NDB brings the member states and other developing countries closer, and enables mutual development. At the same time, the NDB may become a direct competitor of those present international financial institutions under the Bretton Woods system, thus, it has the opportunity to increase its voice in global governance.

Secondly, a major opportunity lies for BRICS in the political domain through the "BRICS +" model. The BRICS + concept was introduced in the Xiamen, China Summit held in the year 2017. This also complemented with Goldman Sachs identification of the Next-11 in a paper written in March' 2007. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Next-11 or N-11, was a concept introduced about the countries having the potential to influence the world almost like the BRICs countries, particularly in rivaling the G7 (Goldman Sachs, 2007). Hence, in the Xiamen Summit, it was articulated that the BRICS countries should expand their "friends circle", and increase integration especially developing countries. It is true that the international influence of the BRICS countries has already been significant, but under the haze of the trade war and the financial war, it may be a wise choice to turn the BRICS mechanism into an open platform to forge regional cooperation across continents, in which the BRICS countries have a leading role. The model is not only beneficial to the trade and economic development of the countries, it may also help to build a new world order, in which it is possible for the emerging developing countries to compete with the traditional developed ones.

The idea rested on the notion of member countries of BRICS being a major financial hub in its region and being a source of financial growth for the countries in the periphery (satisfying the essential theorize of Neo-Functionalism). This is considered to be a circle of BRICS that is privy to various techniques for joint effort

(not just by methods for trade movement) on a separate or nearby reason (satisfying the second Postulate of Neo-Functionalism). Along these lines, instead of developing the middle game plan of BRICS people, the BRICS action attempts to make another stage for creating regional and separate arrangements across landmasses and targets joining the neighborhood (third Postulate of Neo-Functionalism).

Similarly, other territorial blocks like South African Customs Union (SACU), SAARC, EEU and Mercosur, can integrate in BRICS coordination channels. This will in turn enhance framework of BRICS (fourth Postulate of Neo-Functionalism that considers neighborhood of elites. The basic question is related to how will this integration be possible? The answer rests in accommodating all the countries together with a de-centralized approach. Most suitable is allowing coordination in terms of trade. This will allow the global economy a considerable opportunity to revitalize global supply chains (fifth Postulate of Neo-Functionalism suggesting end of Ideology) (Sultan and Mehmood, 2020).

Notwithstanding, the possibility of BRICS + is to allow numerous countries and territories that have an urge to integrate enhance cooperation first in economic terms and then in other areas. This is possible by allowing discussion between the BRICS and other countries on an equilibrium, enhancing people-to-people contact and regional integration. In this way, the persistent constraints in BRICS can also be dealt with accordingly. Meanwhile, facilitating less dependence on dollar. Particularly, agrarian nations can get in to major relationships across the globe (He Wenping and Hisham Abu Bakr Metwally, 2018). This likewise gives space for BRICS to arrange in the N-11. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is truth be told an indication of this idea. In any case, there are some significant difficulties in progress for the BRICS gathering in approach to profit by the chances over the long haul. This likewise gives space for

BRICS to arrange in the N-11. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is truth be told an indication of this idea.

However, there are some major challenges underway for the BRICS grouping in way to benefit from the opportunities in the long run.

5.1.2 BRICS: Challenges

Despite the success story articulated with BRICS, the question is, why is it still not able to achieve the desired goals as set in the Goldman Sachs paper published in 2003. Lord Jim O' Neil, the creator of BRICS concept, puts the answer in simple terms: countries other than China and India have not been able to catch up with expected pace individually which effected the momentum of the collective growth of BRICS. He suggested that BRICS is still on track just because of China and will be able to surpass the G7 in 2035. Who would care about BRI or BRIS anyway? (Lord Jim O' Neil, 2018). The fact remains that the first decade of the institution of BRICS was quite impressive, as they had also sailed through the global financial crisis 2008. However, in the second decade they slowed down in a number of areas, including economy and global politics. An examination of the challenges posed to their development reveals four major areas. They are discussed below.

Firstly, Corruption. The five member countries of BRICS face the issue of corruption which impacts their growth process. Especially, Brazil, and South Africa. In Brazil, Former President Dilma Rousseff was also impeached on grounds of corruption. Although this also illustrates the upholding of rule of law in Brazil, but poses serious questions on its credibility. In South Africa, Former President Jacob Zuma was convicted for receiving almost annually \$34,000 from a firm of French origin, named Thales, for shielding them from a \$2 billion inquiry of arms deal. Zuma later on denied

the allegations and was facing more than 17 charges of fraud, corruption and money laundering (Reuters, 2019).

Zuma from the year 2009 to 2018 was the President of South Africa and was overcome by severe legal trials all through his tenure. His organization also persevere through different no-assurance votes and an assaulted prosecution attempt. Regardless, Zuma finally ended up being upset to the point of being inspected by his administration which resulted in his resignation in the year 2018. His blames envisaged misplaced resources of the government with a normal damage to South African economy to be 1-trillion ZAR (\$60 billion) (Guardian, 2019).

Meanwhile, the two India and China additionally confronted significant defilement at home. The Prime Minister Modi, brought 1000 and 500 rupee notes (which was of 86 percent accessible cash) to dispose of expense shirking and contraband market. He also introduced course of action of biometric ID, to evade degradation and distortion by scattering public allocations and joblessness benefits direct. Prime Minister Modi in his campaign for office had chanted a famous slogan: Na khanuga na khanay doun ga'- meaning I will not accept bribe nor allow anyone to accept it (Milan Vaishnav and Sandip Sukhtankar, 2015). However, after being in Government for the first fifteen months, Transparency International estimated Indians paying bribes of Rs.21,000 crore every year to access government services (Transparency International, 2015).

On the other hand, President of China Xi Jinping, also announced a major drive against corruption, almost 300,000 CPC officials were punished for corruption in the year 2015. It was imperative to root out corruption for China like any other developed or developing country, as it may hinder China's growth and development in the long

run. It was in the year 2014, that the perceived corruption was at its highest. As per the Perception Index of Corruption (CPI), which is published by Transparency International, globally China was ranked 100th in the CPI with a score of 36. However, this went down from the years 2015 to 2017, as China also slightly improved in CPI, as its score came down by 2 points and its position came down from 77th place in 2017 to 87th in 2018 (Transparency International, 2018). In the year 2015, President Xi Jinping opted for the anticorruption drive. The Government introduced new laws and also provided lengthy interpretations to existing ones (Daniel C.K.Chow, 2015). It was successful because it rooted deep in the working of Multinational companies and even individuals.


Although such a drive was not new and was a concern for the Central Communist Party, but it was reinvigorated by President Xi Jinping, by attacking both 'tigers' and 'flies'-which meant to target both officials of higher and lower cadre (Tania Branigan, 2013). Meanwhile, in a case against Glaxo Smith Kline subsidiary of China, the record fine was that of \$492 million, due to hospitals and doctors being bribed for medications to be prescribed by them (Bradsher & Buckley, 2014). Hence, the Government chose not just to punish the recipients of bribe, but also the MNC. Five top officials of GSK, which also included Mark Reilly, who was a national of the UK, was suspended and convicted (Bradsher and Buckley, 2014). China's laws were successful because of targeting both the receiver and lender of bribe, making it quite comprehensive.

Secondly, Bilateralism and Lack of Synergy. For any association to flourish, the basic maxim of 'letting go of bilateral designs' is indeed inevitable. For BRICS, one major challenge in way of its development is rooted in probable breakdown of interests amongst the members. Simply put, there may be a concern of groupings within

the group itself. A cursory view of China and India explains this issue, as these countries growth rate was fast and are considered as major economies of the world. However, owing to China's standing as the second major global economy, its growing global political might, it naturally acts as a 'leader' of the group. Due to this, the Indo-China association suffers a paradoxical situation. Despite of being neighbors and members of BRICS, both the countries went through a border standoff in the year 2017, just months away from the BRICS summit in China. Although they managed to let go of the differences and India attended the summit. Still the tensions remain persistent and in the year 2020, border skirmishes, trade conflicts and information war were paramount (Kester Kenn Klomegah, 2020).

Lately in the year 2020, the border strains also ended as a fist fighting in the Galwan valley, remotely located along the Line of Actual Control (BBC News, 2020). This border was instituted after a China-India war of 1962, which was ended in an uncomfortable deal (Dawn News, 2020). Punsara Amarasinghe, argued about the irony of border tensions between China and India, owing to their shared civilizational past and both effected by colonialism of West (Kester Kenn Klomegah, 2020).

India's ambitions within the BRICS are shaped by the rhetoric of its bilateral aspirations (Sultan and Mehmood, 2020). It competes with China in various theaters of Chinese influence, including the African continent, South East Asia, South and South East



Asia. Meanwhile, it also critiques the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China, and

its major channel the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). All these reservations in fact allow India to converge with US on strategic terms. To recall, the BRI is a Chinese initiative presented by the President of China Xi Jinping in the year 2013. The image below illustrates its route. It was proposed as a long term transcontinental investment policy, aiming to develop infrastructure and accelerate integration in economic terms in the countries on the old Silk Road. Previously referred to as the One Belt One Road- OBOR, formally the framework of BRI was presented by the National Development and Reform Commission of China-NDRC, whose authorization was given later by the State Council (Jonathan Hillman, 2018).

As per the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in Asia there is a gap of USD 26 trillion through 2030, in infrastructure funding. In order to deal with this gap, numerous initiatives at regional and sub-regional level have purpose to improve connectivity of transport in Asia. The BRI is among the considerable projects that can fulfil this aim, in coordination with ASEAN, Central Asian cooperation association- CAREC and sub-regional cooperation for South-Asia- SASEC.

Within the BRI, CPEC serves as its harbinger for growth (Khursheed, 2019). It was proposed by China's Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan in the year 2013 (Sial, 2014). Following which, China's President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan in the year 2015, and contracted a MoU to formalize the project along with fifty-one agreements to boost economic cooperation. He stated on the event that it is as if I am visiting my own brother's home (Tharoor 2015).


It was owing to Pakistan's geostrategic position that China formalized CPEC with Pakistan (Nogales, 2014). On one side it has countries without coast, and on the other it has the world's major countries that produce oil. Additionally, Pakistan is the

gateway to major continents (Bilal 2014). Hence, CPEC is a regional win-win along with being for Pakistan and China. China is expected to save on annually millions of dollars by this shortened route of CPEC, particularly for its energy imports from the Middle Eastern region by about 12000 km and will also get entrance to the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, Pakistan will also take advantage from the enhancement of infrastructure and reduce its energy crisis. Whereas, India views CPEC not as a gateway to economic prosperity but to terrorism and misadventures' (Marwat, 2020).

In fact, India challenges Chinese interests in other regions, particularly Africa. Chinese President Xi Jinping conducted a long tour in the year to energy rich countries like Senegal, Rwanda and Mauritius, prior to coming to South Africa, and promised monetary support, particularly for projects of infrastructure related to BRI (Bridges Africa, 5 July 2018). Investments in central and eastern Africa were called to be increased and a dozen bilateral agreements were signed of more than \$126 million as loan for two road projects (South China Morning Post, 2018). China also financed highway projects in Senegal and also pledged in support for anti-terror activities, peacekeeping and major developmental areas (Shannon Tiezzi, 2018). Meanwhile, China and Mauritius also signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was the first amongst nations in Africa, to be signing this agreement (TRT World, 2021). President Xi Jinping also pledged in South Africa, US\$14.7 billion with an undertaking of import surge imports (Ayaz Wani, 2020).

On the other hand, Prime Minister Modi in the year 2015 also went on a trip to Uganda and Rwanda before the summit of BRICS and gave loan for projects of infrastructure of US \$ 200 million (Abeshiek Mishra, 2019). India has also planned to develop eighteen new embassies in Africa. In fact, India became the fifth largest investor in Africa with an investment of \$54billion (The Hindu, 2020). These steps on

the other hand, are being dubbed as a potential source of conflict between China and India. As an example, of Indian Ocean, both have many bases in the maritime domain, which are considered as a source of competition. India claims that China is pursuing a 'string of pearls' strategy in order to choke India's maritime routes. Whereas, China asserts that India also creating naval bases in order to reinstate the 'Malacca Dilemma'. The image below illustrates the situation:



Thirdly, China-Centric notions: Previous Foreign Minister of Germany Gabriel Sigmar, said that, China is the only country in the world with a true global strategic idea (Freddie Reidy, 2019). The global financial institutions post-second world war, were under the influence of the US. The policies followed by IMF and World Bank was unquestioned and dollar being the global currency reserve. All this was challenged with China's steady global rise. However, China's global dominance coupled with its standing as the second major one in the world, is considered as the one overpowering the entire concept of BRICS.

It is a common phenomenon that the countries participating in an organization outline its function. They collect, disseminate and study information material and make

internationally acceptable laws (Beenish Sultan, 2018). In words of Lord Jim O'Neill 'Who would care for BRIS' anyway?' explains the importance of China for BRICS. This organization has in fact served to be a 'force multiplier' for China (Minghao Zhao, 2015) and China has in turn driven it towards considerable cooperation. The Xi Jinping administration in China has consistently urged the member states to invigorate cooperation and facilitated domestic reforms in member states. With its status as a veto member of UNSC and part of the WB, China seeks to pull the BRICS grouping towards a higher pedestal.

Meanwhile, it would not be an exaggeration to note that BRICS was conceptualized when the first Special Economic Zone- SEZ was opened by China in the years 1978 and 1985 in provinces of Hainan, Fujian, and Guangdong (Paul Kennedy, 1994). It later proceeded to construct a venture to pull in unfamiliar capital and set up Financial Zones (FZ), Export Processing Zones (EPZ, etc. New and High-Tech Industrial Development Zones (Touch) (Jean Mandelbaunn and Daniel Haber, 2005). As per Chi Fulin, a famous Chinese scholar, the making of SEZ's was the main character of China's approach to change and transparency which is the positive indication of change in front of the rest of the world (Arturo Oropeza Garcia, 2007).

Deng Xiaoping imagined the SEZs, as a tool for uplifting the 400 million population in rural areas of China. That populace was eager to participate in the country's development journey. (Oded Shenkar, 2005). Through this, China acquired dollars 8.5 billion from FDI in the years 1995 to 2009, which made it the second most noteworthy positioning objective for FDI on the planet, only after the US (Jonathen Pearlman, 2009). The mechanical area of China, the year 1990 previously made up of GDP a wholesome 41 percent of its GDP, advanced to 46 percent by the year 2009 (Pearlman, 2009).

In the year 1980, 10 billion dollars were traded annually in China, which facilitated it to be the major global exporter, having almost 1.1 trillion dollars in the year 2009, ahead of US and Germany (Jing Gu, John Humphrey, Dirk Messner, 2008). Since the year 1980, China became a conduit of connectivity for the East and the West. Its model of advancement depended on the way it thought of disentangling and bringing modern form of FDI. This way it got an expanded GDP per capita.

China is now the best developer on the planet in 9 of the 16 most significant modern areas. For example, in 2007, in the materials, articles of clothing, cowhide and calfskin items, China held 37 percent, 29 percent and 39 percent, individually, of the area on the planet while in essential metals, electric apparatus and transportation, 27 percent, 31 percent. Amongst the items made in China there are also the ones made of plastic, mineral items which are non-metallic, important metals and China as the second largest producer of global food and refreshments, (ECLAC, 2011).

Most possibly the results of using model of China globally have seen in the business balance of China itself, which was continuous from the year 1995 till now. Majorly in the years 2000- 2009, China got benefits of business of \$ 2.2 trillion, from EU and from Japan of \$ 1.6 trillion. In this period, there were another \$2 trillion added in China for foreign exchanges from US (ECLAC, 2011)).

The BRICS group has found its origin and synergy precisely in China's overwhelming need for raw material and food. Mutual need and trade among these countries have become a binding force that will unite them as long as China continues to grow. The results are viewed in the way Bretton woods system is discussed against the Asian model. Other than numerous issue a similar mechanical concentrator measure has had the foreknowledge to get ready for a lot of crude materials and normal assets

required for creation. This thus has prompted boosting financial and business movement, either straightforwardly or in a roundabout way, in many nations on the planet, that consider themselves to be having profited by China's prosperity. All these countries have raw materials and also can provide food to China's big population.

Today, China is the main purchaser of elements and metals like aluminum and essential steel. As to food, it has 28 percent of global use of soybean oil and 23 percent of soybean grain, (ECLAC, 2011). They will keep on developing as long as China is developing. Thus, the level of imports in BRICS countries is particularly noted. For instance, in the years 1990-2010, Brazil imports from China majorly increased, while in India and Russia it increased manifold. During this corresponding era, China consumed from Brazil crude material worth of 133 billion dollars, from Russia, 180 billion dollars and from India 103 billion dollars, turning China into a significant part of BRICS business. While China imported from the BRICS countries majorly raw materials. (Comtrade, 2010).

China's energy asset is primarily coal, and is hence progressively turning into the biggest oil purchaser on the planet considering its present normal 8 million barrels a day requirement for it to support a yearly development of 10 percent. Like Brazil, Russia is likewise straightforwardly profiting by the "Asian model." Although it's anything but a really wares send out country, India is remarkable for its innovative administrations and mechanical items. Accordingly, India is likewise profiting by the Chinese model by sending out oil-determined items, pearls and valuable stones, food, medications, etc. Accordingly, India's fare support has expanded 1.7 percent somewhere in the years of 1996 to 2000. From the years 2001 to 2010, the market of China developed a major 14 percent (UN/Comtrade). Owing to the similarity between India and China, India too has tried to follow the model of Asia of SEZ's as a way to

provide food to its needy populace in far flung areas. India has now settled in excess of 400 SEZs, a significant number of which are now in activity.

Meanwhile it is also a fact that some Chinese specialists also claim that in contrast with the G20, the significance of BRICS is more dubious. Particularly whenever contrasted with provincial establishments and groupings, for example, APEC, ASEAN-in addition to designs or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS seems to have less existential significance for China. They suggest that it is significant for China to be an individual rather give importance to BRICS (Eleanor Albert, 2019). Associations that incorporate a few or large numbers of China's immediate neighbors have a higher positioning from the Chinese point of view, since China's turn of events and modernization measure necessitates that adjoining nations at any rate shun framing a union against China. China's administration has detailed another great neighborhood strategy (mulin youhao) which underlines this point. BRICS, in this manner, is more a "ideal to have" than an outright should.

From the Chinese point of view, BRICS is fundamentally held together by the comparative advancement phases of the nations in question and their emphasis on improvement issues (with the outstanding special case of Russia). Formally, the fundamental mission of BRICS was introduced as an undeniable coordination stage, a system to facilitate its individuals' monetary, political and viable participation to construct nearer ties among the BRICS nations. "Worldwide regular merchandise" was introduced as the fundamental driver of BRICS. While respective contrasts and differences amongst the nations of BRICS persistently is present, however, they don't emerge at the highest level, as all the nations of BRICS have interest in cultivating participation, particularly since monetary development has eased back down taking all things together BRICS nations. (This log jam was predominantly credited to outside

variables without which primary changes altogether BRICS economies would be well under way.)

BRICS is fragmenting at two major schemes: NDB and CRA. The reserve is considered to be more critical than the advancement bank. As indicated by one meeting accomplice, it is additionally significant inside the setting of the internationalization of China's cash. Strangely, the BRICS Bank was established in the equivalent time period as the Chinese-driven Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was declared by Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 2013. The two new banks are promoted as supplements not contenders to the customary organizations, for example, World Bank and ADB.

Meanwhile, the meaning of including South Africa for BRICS might be essentially because of the way that it is viewed as the entryway or passage to the remainder of the African mainland. The contention was made that China's exercises in the creating scene would be more satisfactory whenever directed inside the system of BRICS, as such BRICS would give more authenticity to China's activities. China is assuming a less emphatic part in BRICS than in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). For China it is an important way to come out of isolation). Nonetheless, it is also a fact that, China is critical for BRICS growth and this sends China centric notions to the rest of the world. Hence, a factor for the fate of BRICS may be the improvement of US-China relations.

Fourthly, Anti-US sentiments: The main thrust towards BRICS cooperation was perhaps a mild form of anti-Americanism (F. Joseph Dreson, 2011). This was not a notion against America itself but a probable awakening against the American led international order which was dominated by Western powers altogether. The question is, do the BRICS have an intention to challenge the US hegemony? The answer lies in

individual relations of BRICS member states with the US in Former US President Obama's term in office. In the second term of former US President Barack Obama, Washington had lost BRICS. Each one of the members of the organization was at loggerheads with America, or more terrible (Edward Luce, 2014). Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, who is considered as an ally of US in strategic terms, also contended that, he had no interest in going to America, only if he has to visit the UN (Edward Luce, 2014).

Initially, former US President Obama desired to review America's relations with Russia. Dmitry Medvedev was keener on this than Vladimir Putin of Russia. After Putin assumed office in Russia, things went downhill from that point forward. Meanwhile, the direction of US relations with China has likewise been off course. In Obama's first year, he famously conducted a 'G2' China visit, offering China a global organization in order to deal with the global issues like climate change to economic lopsidedness. The Chinese were however not prepared to deal with such issues at global level which were also major ones at home. In the following year, the charm of G2 was exchanged with a notion of 'explanation from Asia'. The US called it the Asia Pacific area, and used countries like India to encircle China. Later Obama also visited South Korea, Japan, Malaysia and Philippines in order to prepare them against China.

Meanwhile, the US-China relations were at their lowest in the former US President Trump's era. They were in fact being termed as a 'neo-cold war' in the making. The after events with Brazil were more overt than with China. On the other hand, Former US President Obama, tried to charm the Latin American countries for strategic gains. However, their relations also deteriorated due to many reasons. Brazil's then ruler Dilma Rousseff, visited US and argued about the spying of US in its neighborhood. Hence, the relations almost froze.

Same is the case for India, as the warm interaction with Manmohan Singh of India, was not copied. The former US minister to India, Nancy Powell, was a persona non grata in New Delhi since she took over the position in the year 2014 (David Brunnstrom, 2014). Meanwhile, Prime Minister Modi was denied a visa to visit the US, because of his horrifying 2002 Gujrat killings. Among BRICS, only South Africa had what could be shown as anticipated relations with the US. However, after a matter of time they did not also turn out to be close.

Each one of the crumbling relations of BRICS countries and the US had explicit accounts. However, there are two bigger subjects connecting them together. To start with, the world is now more prone to a US power that is declining. The US has the largest military power, but it also is being questioned ever year. China is also increasing its defence spending. (Liu Xiaoming, 2018). Meanwhile, US public was feeling burnt out on its country's worldwide obligations.

Now, BRICS are more comfortable in talking amongst each other. They agree with the general monetary decrease of the West and hence setting out a freedom for non-Western forces, for example, China to shape in worldwide administration structures up to this point overshadowed by the US and West. Albeit, the individual interactions amongst member of BRICS and the US now vary. BRICS is the only major organization without the inclusion of America or G7.

5.1.3 Intervening Role of the United States

Irrespective of US acknowledgement a new world order has already established. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 and US military adventures in the Middle East, emerging powers like BRICS had room to strengthen themselves globally. It was an established system of the global South. This new framework spoke to around

four billion individuals, the greater part of mankind. Most of humankind has risen up to be checked, declaring for all the world to hear that the best abundance that mankind has, is its own developing populace, and their imaginative personalities. The current world request won't keep on existing in its current structure. The future worldwide request is certainly not a simple augmentation of the current trivial international affairs of thin nationalistic personal circumstance and rivalry for one-sided authority over the planet, however an altogether new requesting of relations among people groups. Humanity should join as a solitary imaginative animal varieties to overcome basic difficulties which face us all, and extend our job and impact all through the nearby planetary group and past. Public societies and dialects will in any case be exceptional and separated, however they should combine towards a singleness of goal for a typical brought together mission.

The philosophy of the United States that "the champ bring home all the glory" should be supplanted with one in which "all are victors," as Chinese President Xi Jinping has so expressively said. This mission-direction characterizes the BRICS framework. Countries which have recently been pulled separated along ethnic or geological lines by royal maneuvers, are presently putting contrasts behind them and building up an altogether groundbreaking thought of collaboration for the shared advantage of all. They are expressly making a comprehensive (instead of select) system of association to construct another model of relations among countries, one dependent on the standards of non-showdown, non-conflict, shared regard, and mutual benefit participation, as the Chinese President has expressed.

The United States has been welcomed by these pioneers to be a piece of this new framework. Amusingly, the insurgency presently being affected by the BRICS countries and their accomplices, is the aftereffect of that framework which the United

States initially battled for in its own American Revolution against the British Empire. The economic framework being established by the BRICS is dissimilar to the traditional global system. The US has accepted until recently that China is a major threat to its national security. On the other hand, it also pressurizes Russia through economic sanctions. Hence, the US is not ready to allow any country to challenge its established system. The US is in the midst of a battle of endurance of being an extraordinary force. It is attempting to forestall the ascent of whatever other force which would challenge it. It is absolutely the kind of international affairs that prompted the First World War 100 years back. The United States should profoundly change its way, if rest of humanity are to endure. The heads of the BRICS have straightforwardly and over and again expanded their hands of participation, offering solid chances for the United States to join this organization, while likewise making extremely certain that they will protect themselves no matter what and don't expect to give up even with global threats.

A new economic framework reported itself to the world on July 16, 2014, in Fortaleza, Brazil, when the heads of the BRICS announced that they were making another global financial setup with the arrangement of the New Development Bank—an immediate reverberation of Lyndon LaRouche's concept of an International Development Bank (IDB), which he initially proposed in 1975. In the days following this declaration, a culmination between the BRICS and Unasur (Union of South American Nations), notwithstanding various respective gatherings with the heads of Ibero-America, decidedly carried South America into the BRICS partnership. The BRICS nations alone speak to 43 percent of the world's complete populace; when Ibero-America is added in, they speak to 48 percent of humankind, and 33 percent of the Earth's property territory.

At a BRICS summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping summed up the BRICS strategy as history being a teacher which has taught the BRICS countries the law of the wilderness. The highlight of this law is human amalgamation. Each country ought to comply with the rule of correspondence, shared trust, gaining from one another, collaborating and looking for joint advantages... for the development of an agreeable world, supported harmony, and joint success. Over the span of time Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, a close partner of the BRICS, explained that the appeal to all countries is to unite in this genuine campaign for another global political, economic and economic association.

5.2 Future of BRICS as a relevant and Coherent International Actor

BRICS should play a positive global role as the five members are relevant regional and global actors. Not be a China-centric bloc, not break down into components and also not radiate anti-US sentiments. In the past decade, since the year 2009, as a major multilateral and global governance initiative throughout joint declarations, the leaders of BRICS countries have reiterated commitment to organizations of global governance, meanwhile have also called for reforms that would lead to acknowledging major role for developing countries and a multipolar world which is just and fair.

BRICS yet again refurbished its desire for a global system which is transparent and non-discriminatory, leading to a multilateral system of global trade. The declaration of BRICS talked about concerns on the dispute settlement mechanism of WTO and urges the members to deal with this challenge. The leaders of BRICS also called the developing countries for engaging in international forums like G20.

The leaders of BRICS also reinstated their support for the 2030 UN agenda of Sustainable Development, (SDGs). They also stressed on the developed countries to come up with their commitments of foreign aid and also increase support to developing countries. Similarly, they also reinstated commitment to UN Climate change Paris agreement, and considerable process of climate change discussions of UN. In the fields of energy efficiency the BRICS called for enhancing cooperation in BRICS, and move up sustainable systems of energy.

Hence, in order to persistently be relevant, in the next decade, each member should realistically assess the opportunities and challenges of BRICS. It performed well in the first decade of institution, and also created viable institutions. However, the newer political realities, required BRICS nations to reassess their approach.

Firstly, in the geo-political domain, UN, UNSC, Regional institutions and domestic politics. The BRICS countries, was committed to a world with multilateral underpinnings (Summit 11). This facilitated the process of democratic decision making. Only by doing so they will be able to address the asymmetry of power within the group and in global governance generally.

Second, economic prospects rests on BRICS institutions as a major counter weight to international ones. They must support NDB success and also facilitate other institutions. They can make a research wing which is institutional along lines of OECD, it can bring forward solutions different from the ones provided by western knowledge bank. They should incorporate an effort to facilitate Paris Agreement and UN SDG's. NDB can be a facilitator in helping achieve the SDG's. The nations may also expand cooperation in global governance in the Global commons.

Third, social, the people to people interaction and coordination of BRICS can be enhanced. The member should facilitate interaction amongst each other. In this era of technology, academic and business interactions can be enhanced to increase relationships across BRICS. In the first decade of institution, the BRICS forum was over powered by an approach of top-to-down, facilitating major political investments. The second decade is looking forward to a much energetic public of BRICS countries.

Fourth, uphold multilateralism, BRICS rose up for upholding global multilateralism. The Brazil declaration issued a statement for WTO to deal with its protectionist and unilateral measures. President Putin repeatedly slammed against unilateral designs of WTO. The trade war between US and China and the threat of sanctions to Russia by US is a big turn off in relations of these countries with the West. Hence, this declaration looked towards dealing with the challenges that multilateralism faced, and asked for a more proactive role of the UN. The 11th BRICS Summit ended in Brazil with a strong commitment to multilateralism, a subject essential to improving global economic growth, cooperation among countries and its industries as well as to enhance financial tools that would help to build a less unequal world. On its closing speech in Brasília, host city of this year's event, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that there is a concern about rising protectionism and unilateralism, giving developing countries like BRICS more responsibility to strengthen stable and multilateral global governance.

It has been a summit where the role of business and industries was cheered as a tremendous force for the economy. Essentially, the message that has emerged is that the public sphere should work hand in hand with productive sectors. Innovation and digital economy were other points highlighted those days in Brasília, and all governments promised to make efforts to discuss and implement the best policies, a

commitment that would mean a lot to the future. The countries of BRICS make up 50 percent of the growth of the world, China has a share of 30 percent for five years. At a time when the world faces many changes, such a powerful multilateral group could lead to a more balanced and shared path to development.

In the first decade that has just ended, BRICS had offered examples on how to build pragmatic and institutionalized tools. Just to mention two of them, after intense technical and political exchanges among business, academic and official communities from all the five countries, two institutions had emerged. One is the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a shared fund of \$100 billion that offers protection against liquidity pressures to any of its members. And the other is the New Development Bank (NDB), which is already financing projects and building its portfolio alongside other traditional multilateral institutions.

Curiously, the CRA and the NDB were first drafted at the Fortaleza Summit, in 2014, in northeastern Brazil, giving that edition a special importance to the group. This year, the joint declaration has 73 paragraphs, any of them preparing a new institutional tool among the five countries. But it's impossible to skip the idea that the document actually reinforces the importance of coordinated work for the global agenda, with commitments especially on environment protection.

On the sideline of the 11th summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping was the first to have talks with Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. "China is part of the Brazilian future," said Bolsonaro at the Palácio do Planalto, the official national government building. The cordial ambience was celebrated in Brazil. In all the talks with business people, academics or observers of Sino-Brazilian relations, the message was clear -- the moment is very special to amplify the cooperation. This was the second bilateral

meeting, when the Brazilian president spent three days in Beijing. In both opportunities, Xi and Bolsonaro had signed documents aiming to promote exchanges on trade, investments, education and culture, to mention some sectors. The support of multilateralism was present once more, expressing not just a political commitment but a constructive relationship. This is fundamental, not just because both sides are working hard to put their economies on a good track, but also because the new Brazilian administration had taken power less than one year ago, in January.

China is the biggest Brazilian trade partner and a heavy investor in the Brazilian economy. A close and smooth bilateral relationship would bring positive outcomes for both sides. Xi also expressed that China aims to open its economy, expanding the share of its exports and

GDP Growth in BRICS & G7 2016-2021 – IMF Projections in Inflation Adjusted Prices		
	Annual Growth	Rank in Growth
BRICS		
Brazil	1.6%	164
Russia	1.5%	168
India	7.7%	4
China	6.1%	22
South Africa	1.8%	155
G7		
US	2.1%	143
Japan	0.7%	182
Germany	1.4%	173
UK	1.8%	158
France	1.7%	161
Italy	0.8%	181
Canada	1.9%	152

Source: Calculated from IMF World Economic Outlook April 2017

imports. This is a good option for Brazil, as it is still low in terms of trade with China. As there are less than 50 Brazilian enterprises working in China.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

Later half of the Post-Cold War era is that of multilateralism and not multipolarity. In this era, both individual states, particularly China and trans-regional organizations, like BRICS, have somehow managed to alter the discourse in the Western led World order. The grouping of BRICS, was an intelligent jargon formulated by Lord Jim O'Neil while he was Chief Economist at the Goldman Sachs in the year 2008. Although South Africa was not part of his formulation, it still became a permanent member of BRICS in the year 2009.

BRICS is a consortium of major rising powers from across various regions. Brazil in South America, Russia in Eurasia and Asia, India in South Asia, and South Africa in the African region are all major countries of their respective regions. As for China, it is not only a regional power but has also managed to become the second major country of the world. Hence, it is a major grouping which illustrates the characteristics of multilateralism. The standing of this grouping became more evident in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis that struck the world. Following which, BRICS started voicing its concerns about a world and its financial institutions to be more democratic and law abiding. Regardless, while the progress of BRICS is a captivating political progress of the 21st-century multipolar world it also exhibits the power change from North to South. The effect of the BRICS in framing diverse global interests will strongly depend on the fortitude of the emerging forces and their constituent trade. This will

depend on how countries within BRICS interact with each other and strengthen the consortium

The BRICS states have become more relevant than ever, and wish to evolve not just as an economic forum but also as a political and strategic one (as illustrated from the change of themes in its agendas). It may be viewed from the significant topics of BRICS Summits that its plans and interests have never been static. They have changed not just in light of its advantages incurred by five member states, but also as a response to international order. From its underlying urge of handling the 2008 global financial crisis, to its endeavors to change worldwide administration, control psychological warfare, give more space to non-industrial nations in global foundations and upgrade social cooperation, the subjects have indeed widened. Its interests have evolved as multi-sectoral and have experienced a spill-over effect (as postulated in the theory of neo-functionalism). However it was the cooperation in the financial domain that illustrated the manifestation of integration amongst the BRICS. With regards to cooperation in the multi-sectoral domain, the activities amongst BRICS almost cover more than thirty areas like culture and innovation in agriculture. However, it is also a fact that, BRICS was not able to achieve the level of influence as speculated by Lord Jim O'Neil for the year 2020. This was due to numerous reasons but most prominent ones were: Lack of Synergy and Bilateralism, Corruption, Anti-US Sentiments and China centric notions.

The embodiment of multilateralism is that foreign relations ought to be tended to through broad conference instead of chose by one country or a couple. At the eleventh BRICS culmination held in Brasilia, Chinese President Xi Jinping approached the BRICS nations to attempt their due commitments in advocating and rehearsing multilateralism. Subsequently, the eleventh Summit of BRICS infused driving force

into multilateralism during a period of urgent developments occurring on the world economy and global scene. The evolution of various countries in economic domain was changing the global economic underpinnings. The marvel reflects changes in the worldwide overall influence and gives all around grounded rationale to the unavoidable change and change of the worldwide administration framework. Prospering South-South Cooperation and multilateral organizations include unmistakably in this cycle. The multilateral components advanced by arising economies, then, show monstrous essentialness, and play a consistently more prominent part in territorial and worldwide undertakings.

However, it is also agreeable that, the future of global multilateralism in the post-cold war international order is regional. In other words, emerging states are intrinsically faced by complex bilateral relationships in their respective regions. This in turn facilities them in growing and developing.. On the other hand, they cannot also totally disregard the influence of United States at the global level. In words of Lord Jim' O Neil 'Multilateralism and particularly the Rise of China is a reality. However, we cannot entirely disregard the US and its influence at least in this decade. Multilateralism will remain symbolic if bilateral issues between emerging states at the regional level are not dealt with sooner'. The multilateral partnerships can flourish if complex bilateral relationships are dealt with at the regional level. In fact, multilateralism will remain symbolic if bilateral issues between emerging states at the regional level are not dealt with accordingly. This can be achieved by creating environs that facilitate win-win solutions amongst like-minded regional states and also create opportunities of integration for other peripheral states.

Particularly, how much the rising powers truly should be consolidated into the current overall multilateral plans. Getting into assessments of their worldwide designs,

it measures whether the rising powers were following the pattern of established powers or of their own. Looking at the global plans of individual BRICS countries since the mid 1990's it also looks in to their designs at the regional level.

What brought forward Brazil's rise was a mixture of its domestic change and a popular global strategy, along with a suitable overall atmosphere. Bethel (2010), Burges (2007) and Reid (2014), in fact suggested that between the era of 1995-2015, Brazil appeared to develop as a regional player and overall power. After the fall of Soviet Union, Russia has been in a process to undo the negative impact of its disintegration. For major portion of the Post-Cold War era, the United States and Europe gave little thought to Russia's undertakings to broaden its political, monetary, and military influence abroad. The West considered these to be as relics of the Cold War, essentially limited to Russia's nearby area yet generally missing or possibly insufficient somewhere else

With respect to India, its international strategy changed from being a 'local hegemon' to the endeavors of being a universally acclaimed significant force. Hence, what was happening in the neighborhood of India, was of much concern for the major powers like the US and EU, while India desired to attain a major regional and global power position. For the US, its inclinations in the biggest majority rule government were on one side, though, then again, the capability of 'checking China' in the locale and at the worldwide level was additionally recognized by the US. This owes to the incredible ascent of China first as a significant financial force after its opening up approach and afterward by its major provincial and worldwide political force status. In the post-Cold war era, China did not enjoy reasonable terms with the US. The relations were on the low.

As for China, Multilateralism may not indicate its thrust for becoming the ultimate global leader. Today, it is seeking major monetary and political advances through the Belt and Road Initiative. As much as some other single unforeseen development, China's climb through the ongoing years has raised its voice in global administrative issues as well. Beginning with its inclusion into the World Trade Organization in December 2001, China immediately changed its economy from a negligible point to an overall pioneer in front line developments. In transit, it has changed overall worldwide interaction methodology, using its success to transform into a fundamental trading and progression assistant for emerging economies across Asia, Africa and Latin America. It believes that the world should let go of its obsession with the Cold War analogy and look towards creating a favorable environment of development for all. In this regard, China's BRI aims to be a platform for international cooperation. It entails the wisdom of China to open up and reform for the common development for building a future that is for all of the mankind. This was brought forward in the realm of global economic crisis, and is not a Marshal plan which initially led to the Cold war and aims at wining productive gains.

South Africa looks to reshape the world that suits its requirements and vision. Notwithstanding, possibilities for successful multilateral participation on worldwide and transnational issues unavoidably mirror the unmistakable public interests and objectives of the most persuasive forces. South Africa's rise over the span of few years gave it a more significant voice in global organizations yet the country's current and future ability to change the current world solicitation depends upon local objectives and the exercises of various countries, including the United States.

Amid the aura of rising states, one should not disregard the influence of United States at the global level. Apparently, the end of the cold war also redefined the

structure of the world order three-fold: First, it marked the collapse of bipolarity, based on United States-Soviet Union rivalry. Second, enforced redefinition of national interests on all states and in some cases reshaped the States themselves. Third, modified the role of international organizations. Amid the cold war, it was bipolarity which prompted confrontation as a global norm at the nation-state and international organizations level. Even larger countries had to shape their policies in order to accommodate the recurrent bipolar threat, while the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was marred by a virtual split on cold war lines. In the post-cold conflict world, progressives saw the finish of bipolarity as the start of another time of security and development (Fukuyama, 1989), while pragmatists on contending lines imagined confusion, strife and further crumbling.

However, where the US was more concerned about security issues, other countries, particularly China shifted its foreign policy preferences towards economic considerations. C. Fred Bergsten who was the Director of the Institute for International Economics, and previous Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (1977-81), wrote for an article in the *Foreign Affairs* in the summer of 1990, predicting that: the global transformations underway after the demise of Soviet Union, will include a sharp decline in concerns of security issues and economics will move much closer to the top of the global agenda. He also asserted that the global position of a country will also depend on its economic capability instead of the military one.

Hence, although the rise of China is a reality, one may not entirely disregard the US and its influence. Emerging states still have a long way to go if their goal is to shadow the US influence at the global level. Their future rests in taking states in their region along. In their words: there may be many states emerging either individually or collectively, still they are yet to be considered equal to established institutions,

financially and politically both. Particularly, now we see the talk about the Next-11, of which Pakistan is also a part. Hence, the future of global multilateralism is regional.

As far as BRICS and multilateralism is concerned, for the consortium to remain relevant it needs to illustrate win-win cooperation and deal with bilateral agendas particularly triggered by India towards China. It is important for BRICS to cease indications of being a 'China-centric' block and also not pursue an agenda of becoming an 'anti-US' block. Although in words of Lord Jim'O Neil, the term BRICS asserts on the notion that, this grouping was formed in the backdrop of mis-steps of the US and dislikes of the respective countries of the prevalent international order and with the aim of gaining more space. However, the future of BRICS and organizations like UN, G20 is not straightforward and primarily depends on avoiding bilateralism and looking at the common good.

In any case, the intentions of participating countries cannot outshine the basic purpose behind the formation of BRICS: facilitating a durable relation in the 21st century, which connects people beyond border (Alyssa Ayres, 2017). With a world overpowered by multilateralism, both political and economic power is swiftly disseminating and the BRICS desire to benefit from these changing dynamics. As referred to by the respondents in Chapter 2 of this study, particularly for BRICS, multilateralism has become a reality (Chapter 2). Be that as it may, the planned part of BRICS is yet to be accomplished even following a time of its foundation. As the respondents concurred, BRICS can profit in full blossom, on the off chance that they let go of two-sidedness, don't be a China-driven square and doesn't give anti-US vibes. They ought not to separate into more modest working gatherings like Russia-China, Russia-India, Brazil-Africa. BRICS, at that point, is a meeting up of country states at a specific international second to accomplish a bunch of objectives.

The multilateral future of BRICS depends on working collectively and not breaking down in to smaller working groups, which includes countries that bandwagon along emerging countries. In fact, as a result of bandwagoning, there can be a counter-productive move of the US to use smaller states against bigger ones, which can result in the formation of US and China blocs. Hence, organizations like BRICS, should not be objects of 'New-Cold War' between China and US instead should be independent of such notions. In other words, this study concluded that the future of BRICS rests on regionalism and letting go of prevalent lack of synergy and intra-BRICS bilateralism, along with dealing with corruption in member countries and not giving notions of being a China centric block.

FINDINGS

While discussing the Post-Cold War era and multilateralism and BRICS as its case study, the following major findings can be drawn from the analysis of this study:

- The true global nature of world order in the post-cold war era, is viewed through the prism of multilateralism. However, due to the issues prevalent between China and US, fragmentation of the system will also remain in parallel.
- Despite the rise of China, in the near future, US will persist as a great global power, although its economic might is declining.
- The future of global multilateralism is regional
- In the years to come we are likely to witness major competition of countries for natural resources. Meanwhile, the North- South divide will persist to be a source of global conflict.

- Despite lacking geographical proximity, the BRICS member states have managed to attain considerable integration. Collaboration under the BRICS system opens new ways for states to take part in global economic and political notions.
- BRICS was not able to achieve its desired goal in the year 2020, because of four major issues: Lack of Synergy and Bilateralism, Corruption, Anti-US Sentiments and China centric notions.

Meanwhile, there is also room for further research in this area, particularly after the deadly wave of COVID-19 hit the world in the year 2020. Viewing how the BRICS countries coped with the crisis due to the virus individually and collectively will be an interesting case for research in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

BRICS can endeavor to emerge an effective part of the global system by adopting the following path:

- Perceive that a multilateral framework is both practically essential and socially attractive for a global collaboration.
- Promote and perceive in this setting that the development of compelling, responsible states is a crucial regular interest and a zone for collaboration, with fortified help for harmony building and peacekeeping joined by local financial activities.
- Meanwhile, it is significant for China as one of the major arising state in BRICS to illustrate a process of shared benefit for all.
- Acknowledge that the new multilateral advancement financing establishments address a significant part of a bigger, inventive and intelligent improvement financing framework, attracting speculation from the undertaking area, and working through

straightforwardness and participation at both multilateral and respective levels. Collaboration existing between already established economic institutions is indispensable.

- More endeavors can likewise be made to develop useful collaboration inside the gathering, for instance, by setting up more mini organizations under the structure to advance and standardize practices of multilateralism.

REFERENCES

- Aaron Friedberg, (2002), "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations," *Survival* 44, no. 1
- Andrew Kryobko (2020), Russia's Interest In Pakistani Power Projects Could Portend CPEC Investments, obburtunity.org
- Adriana, E. (2014). China and the BRICS Development Bank: Legitimacy and Multilateralism in South-South Cooperation. *IDS Bulletin*, 45(4), 85–101. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1759-5436.1209>
- 'As global headwinds batter countries in BRICS, can it stay the course?' *The Conversation* (2018), available at: <https://theconversation.com/as-global-headwinds-batter-countries-in-brics-can-it-stay-the-course-100470> accessed: 17th June 2020.
- Allen S. Whiting (1996) "The PLA and China's Threat Perceptions," *The China Quarterly*, no. 146, Special Issue: "China's Military in Transition"
- Amrita, N, Daunton, M & Stern, M.R. (2012), *the Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization*, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.
- Abbott, Kenneth and Snidal, Duncan (1998), 'Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42/1.

Adler, Selig, (1961), *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction* (New York: Collier Books).

Aravena, Francisco Rojas (ed.), *Argentina, Brasil y Chile: integracion y seguridad* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1999).

Augelli, Enrico and Murphy, Craig, *America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis* (London: Pinter, 1988).

Anatol Lieven, "China the Quiet Winner in War on Terror," *The Australian*, August 29, 2011.

Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: Norton, 1997), 43.

Ann Compton et al., "Bush Vows Taiwan Support," *ABC News*, April 25, 2001

Andrew Korybko, 'Pakistan's Foreign Relations and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)', *Global Research*, 2nd Dec' 2019, available at: <https://www.globalresearch.ca/cpec-future-your-foreign-policy/5696549>

Abdelwahab El-Affendi (2009) *The Perils of Regionalism: Regional Integration as a Source of Instability in the Horn of Africa?*, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080/17502970802608118

Abhijnan Rej, 'BRICS 3.0 and India: making the world safe for bilaterals and trilaterals'

Alyssa Ayres, 'How the BRICS Got Here', Council on Foreign Relations, 31st August' 2017.

BRICS Information Center, available at: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/about.html>

Badie B. (2019) Bipolarity, Unipolarity, Multi-polarity. In: New Perspectives on the International Order. The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy.

Baldwin, Robert E., The Political Economy of US Import Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).

Barkin, J. Samuel and Shambaugh, George E. (eds), Anarchy and the Environment: The International Politics of Common Pool Resources (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 1999).

Beckerman, Wilfred and Pasek, Joanna, Justice, Posterity, and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Bhagwati, Jagdish, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

Beenish Sultan & Amna Mehmood (2020) Pakistan and the BRICS Plus in the New Era: A Perspective of Neo-Functionalism, *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, 14:3, 447-463, DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2020.1808380

BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation
eThekweni Declaration Durban, South Africa, March 27, 2013

Bonnie Glaser, "First Contact: Qian Qichen Engages in Wide-ranging, Constructive Talks with President Bush and Senior U.S. Officials," *Comparative Connections* 3, no. 1 (April 2001),

Bremmer, I. (2017, September 1). The Mixed fortunes of the BRICS countries in Five Facts. *The Times*, Retrieved from <http://time.com/4923837/brics-summit-xiamen-mixedfortunes/>

Balazs Ujvari, Sven Biscop and others, *The EU global strategy : going beyond effective multilateralism?* European Policy Centre. ; Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations, 2016

Blum, G. (2008). Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the architecture of international law. *Harvard International Law Journal*, 49, 323–379.

BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration September 4, 2017, Xiamen, China

Chin, G.T. (2015). *The State of the Art: Trends in the Study of the BRICS and Multilateral Organizations*, *International Political Economy Series*, 443(10), 4–14. Palgrave Macmillan, London. doi: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397607_2

Caroline Bouchard and others, *Multilateralism in the 21st century : Europe's quest for effectiveness* Abingdon : Routledge, 2013

Cooper, Andrew F. (2014). "The G20 and Contested Global Governance: BRICS, Middle Powers and Small States," *Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy* 2(3): pp. 87-109.

Carpenter, Ted Galen (ed.), *Delusions of Grandeur: The United Nations and Global Intervention* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1997).

Cavarozzi, Marcelo, et al., *Comunidad Andiana y Mercosur* (Bogota: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998).

Child, John, *Unequal Alliance: the Inter-American Military System 1938–1978* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

Cox, Robert W. and Jacobson, Harold K. (eds), *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (London: Yale University Press, 1974).

Cox, Robert and Sinclair, Timothy (eds), *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Cooper, F.A. (2015), *The New BRICS Bank: Challenging the International Financial Order?*, Global Policy Institute Policy Paper, 28 (6), 1–13. doi: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12458>

‘Chinese String of Pearls Surrounds India from Pakistan, Srilanka and now Myanmar’, ‘Eurasian Times,’ 10th Nov’ 2018. Available at: <https://eurasianimes.com/chinese-string-of-pearls-surrounds-india-myanmar/>

Cooper, Andrew F. and Asif B. Farooq (2015). "Testing the Club Dynamics of the BRICS: The New Development Bank from Conception to Establishment." *International Organisations Research Journal* 10(5)

Cai, Chunlin (2009). *Research on the Economic and Trade Cooperation Mechanism among BRICs*. Beijing: China Financial and Economic Press.

Cooper, Andrew F., and Ramesh Thakur (2012). *The Group of Twenty (G20)*. Oxford: Routledge.

Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke and Timothy Nordstrom, ‘Do Intergovernmental Organizations promote Peace’, *World Politics* Vol. 57, No. 1 (Oct., 2004), pp. 1-38

Cooper, Andrew F., and Asif B. Farooq (2016), *The Role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: Commonalities or Competitive Behaviour?*, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies and Declaration of the 11th BRICS Summit, available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5458> Hamburg University Press., 45, 3, 73–106.

Casella, Paulo Borba (2011). *Brics — Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul — Uma perspectiva de cooperação internacional (BRICS — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — A Perspective of International Co-operation)*. São Paulo: Editora Atlas.

Cormier, Ben (2012). "Why the Values of the BRICS Matter." Paper prepared in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MRes International Politics, University of Glasgow, September.

Diana Panke, *The European Union in the United Nations: an effective external actor?* *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2014, Vol.21 (7), p.1050-1066

David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 416–417.

Dailami, Mansoor, and Paul Masson (2010). "Toward a More Managed International Monetary System." *International Journal* 65(2): 393-410.

David, B. W, & Papa, M, (2013), *The Rise of the Corporate Legal Elite in the BRICS:*

David, S. (2005), *China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order*, *International Security* 29 (3), 64–99. doi: Daudelin, Jean and Dosman, Edgar (eds), *Beyond Mexico* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995).

Deng, Francis M. and Lyons, Terrence, *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998).

DeSombre, Elizabeth R., *Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, Environmentalists and US Power* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).

Destler, I. M., *American Trade Politics*, 3rd edn (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995).

Dickson, D. A., *United States Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Change, Continuity & Constraint* (New York: University Press of America, 1985).

Dobell, Rod and Neufeld, Michael (eds), *Beyond NAFTA: the Western Hemisphere Interface* (British Columbia: Oolichan Press, 1993).

Dowie, Mark, *Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). 10.1162/0162288043467496

Declaration of the 11th BRICS Summit, available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5458>

Dailami, Mansoor, and Paul Masson (2009). "The New Multi-Polar International Monetary System." Policy Research Working Paper 5147, December. Washington DC: World Bank

Delhi Declaration, New Delhi, March 29, 2012

Elena Lazarou, *The future of multilateralism: crisis or opportunity?* Brussels: European Parliament, May 2017

Esther Barbé and others, *EU policy responses to a shifting multilateral system*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016

Frank Ching, "Why China Needed Bin Laden," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2011

Fortaleza Declaration July 15, 2014, Fortaleza, Brazil

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., "China Arms the Rogues," *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1997.

Goa Declaration: Goa, India, October 16, 2016

Guillaume Devin, Franck Petiteville, Simon Tordjman, *L'assemblée générale des Nations unies : Une institution politique mondiale* Presses de Sciences Po, 2020

Gardner, Lloyd C., *A Covenant with Power: American and World Order from Wilson to Reagan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

Gardner, Richard, *Sterling Dollar Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

Gilbert, Chris and Vines, David (eds), *The World Bank: Structure and Policies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Goldstein, Judith, 'International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American "Unfair" Trade Laws', *International Organization*, 50/4 (1996).

Gowa, Joanne, *Allies, Adversaries and International Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Graham, Otis L., Jr. (ed.), *Environmental Politics and Policy 1960s–1990s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).

Grinspun, Richard and Cameron, Maxwell (eds), *The Political Economy of North American Free Trade* (Montreal: McGill–Queen's University Press, 1993).

Grubb, Michael, Vrolijk, Christiaan, and Brack, Duncan, *The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment* (London: RIIA, 1999).

Fan, Qimiao, Michael Jarvis, José Guilherme Reis, Andrew Beath and Kathrin Frauscher (2007). *The Investment Climate in Brazil, India and South Africa: A Comparison of Approaches for Sustaining Economic Growth in Emerging Economies*. Washington: World Bank.

Hampson, O. & Heinbecker, P. (2011). The 'New' Multilateralism of the Twenty-First Century, *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 17(3), 299–310 doi: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23033749>

Haglund, David G. (ed.), *Latin America and the Transformation of US Strategic Thought* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1984).

The France–US Leadership Race: Closely Watched Allies (Kingston: Queen's Quarterly Press, 2000).

Harbeson, John and Rothchild, Donald (eds), *Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).

Harris, Paul G. (ed.), *The Environment, International Relations and US Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1994).

Climate Change and American Foreign Policy (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000).

Hoekman, Bernard and Kostecki, Michel, *The Political Economy of the World Trading System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Hopgood, Stephen, *American Foreign Environmental Policy and the Power of the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Hurrell, Andrew and Kingsbury, Benedict (eds), *The International Politics of the Environment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

Harmer, A, Xiao, Y, Missoni, E & Tediosi, F. (2013). BRICS without Straw'? A Systematic Literature Review of Newly Emerging Economies' Influence in Global Health." *Globalization and Health*, 9-15. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1186/1744-8603-9-15>

Hill, C, & Smith, M. (2011), *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.
<http://journals.riener.com/doi/pdf/10.5555/1075-2846-17.3.331>

Hurrell, A. (2006), *Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would Be Great Powers?*, *International Affairs*, 82(1), 1–19. doi:
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00512.x>

Hooijmaaijers, Bas (2011). "The BRICs at the UN General Assembly and the consequences for EU Diplomacy." Policy Paper 6, September.

Hurrell, Andrew (2006). "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?" *International Affairs*. 82(1): 1-19.

Implications for Global Governance, *Boston College Law Review*, 54(20), 11- 49.

Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2010). *Joint Statistical Publication by BRIC Countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China*. Rio de Janeiro.

Jakob, W, & Wade, H.R, (2014), *Out of the Woods: Gridlock in the IMF, and the World Bank Puts Multilateralism at Risk*, *Global Policy* 6 (1), 1–12.

Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 16.

Jürgen, R. (2012), The Rise of 'Diminished Multilateralism': East Asian and European Forum Shopping in Global Governance, *Asia European Journal*, 9(2), 55–70.

John Erik Fossum & Markus Jachtenfuchs (2017) Federal challenges and challenges to federalism. Insights from the EU and federal states, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24:4, 467-485, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1273965

Jim O'Neill, 'Building Better Global Economic BRICs', Global Economics Paper No: 66, Goldman Sachs, 30th Nov' 2011.

John Trent and Laura Schnurr, 'Evolving International organizations: the UN past and present In: A United Nations renaissance: what the UN is, and what it could be, Opladen; Berlin; Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2018

José E. Cassiolato and Maria Clara Couto Soares; ed, ' The Role of the State- BRICS National Systems of Innovation', Routledge- Taylor and Francis Group, 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, OX14 4RN, UK, P. 38.

Kolodziej, Edward, and Roger Kanet, eds. (2008). *From Superpower to Besieged Global Power: Restoring World Order After the Failure of the Bush Doctrine*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Kanti Bajpai, Jing Huang, Kishore Mahbubani, e.d, *China-India Relations: Cooperation and conflict*, Routledge, New York, 2016.

Keukeleire, Stephan, and Hans Bruyninckx (2011). "The European Union, the BRICs and the Emerging New World Order," pp. 380-403 in Christopher Hill and

Michael Smith, eds., *International Relations and the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kammen, Michael, 'The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration', *American Quarterly*, 45 (March 1993).

Kapstein, Ethan B. and Mastanduno, Michael (eds), *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

Kapur, Devesh, Lewis, John P., and Webb, Richard, *The World Bank: Its First Half Century Volume 1* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997).

Karns, Margaret P. and Mingst, Karen A. (eds), *The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

Kaul, Inge, Grunberg, Isabelle, and Stern, Marc A. (eds), *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century* (New York: UNDP, 1999).

Keohane, Robert O., *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

Keukeleire, S & Hooijmaaijers, B. (2014), *The BRICS and Other Emerging Power Alliances and Multilateral Organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the Global*

South: Challenges for the European Union and Its View on Multilateralism. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(3), 82–99. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12102>

Kirton, John (2015). "Explaining the BRICS Summit Solid, Strengthening Success." *International Organisations Research Journal* 10(5): 9-38

Khanna, P. (2014), New BRICS Bank a Building Block of Alternative World Order, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 31(4), 46–48. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/npqu.11490>

Kotkin, Stephen. (2001), *Armageddon Averted- The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000*. USA, Oxford University Press.

Kirton, John (2020). "BRICS Climate Governance in 2020." Paper prepared for presentation at the "BRICS at Ten: Challenges, Achievements and Prospects," Gaidar Forum, RANEPA, Moscow, January 15, 2020.

Kirton, John and Marina Larionova with Yoginder Alagh, eds. (2012). "BRICS: The 2012 Delhi Summit." London: Newsdesk.

Kramarenko, Alexander (2009). "Russia and the Rise of the Dialogue Mechanism in the BRIC Format," January 16.

Kulik, Julia (2011). "Russia's Global Health Governance Gap: A Strategy for Summit Success." Paper prepared for the Conference on Emerging Practices in Global

Health Co-operation, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, December 6.

Kulik, Julia (2013). "Reducing the Economic Burden of Non-communicable Diseases in the BRICS: Lessons from Brazil." BRICS Research Group, January 25, 2013.

Kumar, Sanjeev (2011). BRICS Health Ministers' Meeting: A Welcome Development. Indian Council of World Affairs, July 29.

Korybko A. (2017, March 9). India's freaking out over China's "BRICS-Plus" proposal. Regional Rapport. Retrieved from <http://regionalrapport.com/indiasfreaking-chinas-brics-plus-proposal/>

Li, X, (2016), The BRICS and Beyond: The International Political Economy of the Emergence of a New World Order. UK, Routledge Publishers.

Lima, Maria Regina Soares de, et al. (2009). Os Brics e a Ordem Global (The BRICS and the Global Order). São Paulo: Editora FGV.

Li, Dan and Wang Yunhui (2010). Decline and Rise: BRIC Construct the New World. Beijing: Enterprise Management Press.

Larionova, Marina (2012). "Supply-Demand Model for Developing a Presidency Proposals for Reform Agenda and Priorities in Informal International Institutions (G20, G8, BRICS). International Organizations Research Journal 2012, No. 4. Pp. 7-17

Lake, David A., *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Leifer, Michael, *The ASEAN Regional Forum*, Adelphi Paper 302 (1996).

Lieber, Robert J. (ed.), *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century* (New York: Longman, 1997).

Lipset, Seymour Martin, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).

Litan, Robert E., 'The "Globalization" Challenge: The US Role in Shaping World Trade and Investment', *The Brookings Review*, 18/2 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000).

Luck, Edward C., *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 1919–1999* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press for the Century Foundation, 1999).

Lyons, Gene and Mastanduno, Michael (eds), *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

Lin, Yueqin and Zhou Wen, eds. (2011). *Blue Book of Emerging Economy: Annual Report on BRICS Social-Economic Development*. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.

Li Yang (2011). *BRICs and the Global Transformation*. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.

Larionova, Marina, Mark Rakhmangulov, Andrei Sakharov and Andrey Shelepov (2014). "BRICS: Emergence of the Health Agenda," *International Organisations Research Journal* 9(4): 73-88.

Larionova, Marina, Vitaly Nagornov, Mark Rakhmangulov and Andrey Shelepov (2012). "Global Risks Governance and G20, G8, BRICS Capabilities." *International Organisations Research Journal* 9(3): 42-91

Larionova, Marina, Mark Rakhmangulov and Andrey Shelepov (2012). "BRICS Cooperation: A Resource for Forging BRICS and G20 Decisions in the Key Areas of International Financial and Economic Architecture." *International Organisations Research Journal* 2012(4): 199-238.

Larionova, Marina, Luca Scaffardi and Veronica Federico (2015). Special issue on the BRICS. *International Organizations Research Journal* 10(5).

Lukov, Vadim (2012). "A Global Forum for the New Generation: The Role of the BRICS and the Prospects for the Future," January 24

Mandrup, T & Odgaard, L. (2014). *The BRICS and Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order*. Milton Park, Routledge Publishers.

Modak, Purvaja (2021). "The New Development Bank Turns Six: Evaluating Successes, Failures and Challenges," July 2

Michael W. Doyle, Dialectics of a global constitution: The struggle over the UN Charter
European Journal of International Relations, 2012-12, Vol. 18(4), pp. 601-624

Marc Koehler, The Effects of 9/11 on China's Strategic Environment Illusive Gains
and Tangible Setbacks, issue 68, 1st quarter 2013

Matthew, D.S, (2014), Rising Powers, Global Capitalism and Liberal Global
Governance: A Historical Materialist Account of the BRICs Challenge,
European Journal of International Relations, 20(4), 12–38.

McDougall, Walter A., Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with
the World Since 1776 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

Mack, Andrew and Ravenhill, John (eds), Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and
Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1995).

MacKinnon, Michael G., The Evolution of US Peacekeeping under Clinton (London:
Frank Cass, 2000).

Malone, David, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti,
1990–1997 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

(p.276) Maynes, Charles William and Williamson, Richard S., U.S. Foreign Policy and the United Nations System (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).

Mearsheimer, John J., 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19/3 (1994/95).

Milner, Helen, *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

Ming, L. (2016), BRICS Development: A Long Way to a Powerful Economic Club and New International Organization, *The Pacific Review*, 29(3), 43–53.

Mingjiang, L. (2011), Rising from Within: China's Search for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-US Relations, *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 17 (3), 31–51.

Moreland, Will, The purpose of multilateralism: a framework for democracies in a geopolitically competitive world, Brookings, September 2019

Micheal G Plummer, Ganeshan Wignaraja ed, 'Connecting Asia, Infrastructure for Integrating South and South East Asia', Asian Development Bank Institute, UK, 2016.

Ninth BRICS Summit – BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration – Xiamen, China, September 4, 2017, available at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/press->

releases/17427-9th-brics-summit-brics-leaders-xiamen-declaration-xiamen-china-september-4-2017, accessed: 17th June 2020.

Niu Haibin (2015). "Is There a Role for the BRICS in Asian Affairs?" *International Organisations Research Journal* 10(5).

National Bureau of Statistics of China (2012). *BRICS Joint Statistical Publication*. Beijing.

O'Neill, Jim (2001). "Building Better Global Economic BRICS," *Global Economics Paper No. 6*, November 30.

Newman, Edward, *A crisis in global institutions? : Multilateralism and international security*, New York: Routledge, 2007

O'Neill, Jim (2011). *The Growth Map: Economic Opportunity in the BRICS and Beyond*. London: Penguin.

Philip Nel, 'Bugger thy Neighbour? ibsa and South-South Solidarity', *Third World Quarterly* 34(6) · July 2013, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2013.802507.

Prof. James Petras, 'China-Rise Fall and Reemergence as a Global power', *Global Research*, 10th Oct' 2019.

Panda, P.J. (2013). *Emerging Powers: China and India in BRICS*, New Delhi, Pentagon Press.

Prantl, Jochen (ed.), *Effective multilateralism: through the looking glass of East Asia* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013

Philippe C. Schmitter (2005) Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12:2, 255-272, DOI: 10.1080/13501760500043951

Ramesh, T, (2014), How Representative Are Brics? *Third World Quarterly* 35(10), 79-80.

Randall, L.S. (2001), The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay', *International Security*, 26(1), 61–86.

Russian International Affairs Council (2012). "G20, G8, BRICS Development Momentum and Interests of Russia." Report No. 2.

Russian Analytical Digest (2011). "Statistics: The BRIC Economies in International Comparison." No. 91, February 14.

Ramses A. Wessel; Jed Odermatt (editors), *Research handbook on the European Union and international organizations* Northampton : Edward Elgar Publishing , 2019

Robert G. Sutter, *U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 95.

Robert M. Hathaway, "The Lingering Legacy of Tiananmen," *Foreign Affairs*, September/ October 2003.

Reisman, Michael W., 'The United States and International Institutions', *Survival*, 41/4 (1999/2000).

Rhodes, Carolyn, *Reciprocity, U.S. Trade Policy and the GATT Regime* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Rielly, John E., 'Americans and the World: A Survey at Century's End', *Foreign Policy*, 114 (Spring 1999).

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U. S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Robinson, William, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Rochlin, James, *Discovering the Americas: the Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy towards Latin America* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1994).

(p.277) Roett, Riordan (ed.), *Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

Rogowski, Ronald, *Commerce and Coalition: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

Roussel, Stephane, *North America's Liberal Order: The Impact of Democratic Values, Norms, and Institutions on Canadian-American Security Relations, 1867–1958* (Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy Studies, 2002).

Ruggie, John Gerard (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Robert, H. W, (2011), *Emerging World Order? From Multi-polarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF*, *Politics & Society*, 39 (3), 47–78.

Reisen, Helmut (2015). "Alternative Multilateral Development Banks and Global Financial Governance." *International Organisations Research Journal* 10(5).

Robert, L. J, (2014), *The Rise of the BRICS and American Primacy*, *International Politics*, 51(2), 37–54.

Robinson, James. A. (2012), *Why Nations Fail- The origins of power, prosperity and poverty*, London, Profile Books.

Richard Gowan and Anthony Dworkin, *Three crises and an opportunity: Europe's stake in multilateralism*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019.

Ruan Zongze, "Sino-U.S. Ties Back on Healthy Track," *Chung kuo jih pao* [China Daily], February 11, 2002

Radhika Desai, 'The Brics are building a challenge to western economic supremacy', *Guardian*. 2nd April 2013.

Sabena Siddiqui, 'The BRICS Plus Paradigm', *China.org.cn*, 26th March' 2017.

Sven Biscop, *The EU and multilateralism in an age of Great Powers*, Egmont, 2018

Sen, Sumita, (1995), Political and Economic Reforms in China in the Post-Cold War era, *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, Volume: 1 issue: 1, page(s): 181-195 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0973598495110016>

Schattschneider, Elmer Eric, *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics, As Shown in the 1929–1930 Revision of the Tariff* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935).

Schechter, Michael, *Innovation in Multilateralism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).

Schott, Jeffrey J. (ed.), *The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1996).

Schoultz, Lars, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

Schraeder, Peter J., *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). "Forget the Rhetoric and Boost the Geopolitics": Emerging Trends in the Bush Administration's Policy towards Africa', *African Affairs*, 100 (2001).

Schreurs, Miranda A. and Economy, Elizabeth C. (eds), *The Internationalization of Environmental Protection* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Strong Europe, better world: defending global cooperation, multilateralism and democracy in turbulent times European Political Strategy Center Luxembourg: Publications Office, 2019

Sebastian Forsch , *The European Union's changing approach towards multilateralism*, College of Europe. 2017

Sekine, Eiichi (2011). "The Impact of the Third BRICS Summit." *Nomura Journal of Capital Markets*, volume 3, number 1.

Snetkov, Aglaya and Stephen Aris (2011). "Russia and the Narrative of BRIC." Russian Analytical Digest no. 91, February 14.

Skak, Mette (2011). "The BRIC Powers as Soft Balancers: Brazil, China, India and Russia." Paper prepared for the 11th annual Aleksanteri Conference, "The Dragon and the Bear: Strategic Choices of Russia and China," Helsinki, November 9-11, 2011.

Sun, Xingjie (2010). *The Road of BRIC: Brazil — Samba Dancing*. Changchun: Changchun Press.

Sun, Xingjie and Wang Wenqi. 2010. *The Road of BRIC: India — Giant Elephant Stride Forward*. Changchun: Changchun Press.

Sharma, Ruchir (2012). "Broken BRICs: Why the Rest Stopped Rising," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December, 2-7.

Sevasti, E.V, (2013), *The United States and Rising Powers in a Post-Hegemonic Global Order*, *International Affairs*, 89 (3), 35–51.

Summit 7 2015 Ufa Declaration Ufa, Russia, July 9, 2015

Suresh, S, & Dube, M, (2014), *BRICS and the World Order: A Beginner's Guide*, Social Science Research Network

Summit 1: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 16, 2009

Summit 2: BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement Brasília, April 15, 2010

Summit 3: Sanya Declaration Sanya, Hainan, China, April 14, 2011

Sutter, 105–107, 187. 14 Department of Defense (DOD), Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2000 (Washington, DC: DOD, 2000),

Theodor, T, (2012), Conceptualizing BRICS: OPEC as a Mirror, *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 20(1), 23–45.

The Economics Times (2013), setting up BRICS Bank not going to be Easy: Takehiko Nakao, online: (14 January 2014).

The past and future of multilateralism: The challenges of multilateralism, pp 245-264 Kathryn C. Lavelle Yale University Press, 2020

The United Nations: before, during and after 1945 Thomas G. Weiss In: *The United Nations at 70, Special Issue, International Affairs*, v. 91, n. 6, 2015, p.: 1221-1235.

The Indian Express (2015), SCO Decides to Include India as Full-time Member, online: <<http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indiaothers/after-over-a-decade-sco-decides-to-include-india-as-fulltime-member/>> (11 July 2015).

The News, 18 June' 2020, available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/608100-africa-likely-to-use-gwadar-port-pec-to-have-access-to-cars-china>, accessed on 18 June 2020.

The Times of India (2008), Obama Has a Larger World-view Than Bush, Says FM Chidambaram, online: (2 February 2011).

The Times of India (2012), BRICS Summit: Member Nations Criticizes the West for Financial Mismanagement, online: (28 November 2016).

V.K. Aggarwal and K. Govella (eds.), Responding to a Resurgent Russia: 1 Russian Policy and Responses from the European Union and the United States, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-6667-4_1, © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Veneroni, Horacio, Estados Unidos y las Fuerzas Armadas de America Latina (Buenos Aires: Periferia, 1973).

Victor, David G., The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Vig, Norman J. and Kraft, Michael E. (eds), *Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan's New Agenda* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984).

Vogler, John and Imber, Mark F. (eds), *The Environment and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1996).

Van Agtmael, Antoine (2012). "Think Again: The BRICS." *Foreign Policy*, November.

Vieira, Marco Antonio, and Chris Alden (2011), *India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA): South-South Cooperation and the Paradox of Regional Leadership*, in: *Global Governance*, 17, 4, 507–528.

Wade, Robert H. (2011), *Emerging World Order? From Multi-polarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF*, in: *Politics & Society*, 39, 3, 347–378.

Watt, Nicola, Eduardo Gomez and and Martin McKee (2014). "Global Health in Foreign Policy — and Foreign Policy in Health? Evidence from the BRICS." *Health Policy and Planning* 29(6): 763-773

Wang, Wenqi. 2010. *The Road of BRIC: China — Peaceful Rise of the Eastern Dragon*. Changchun: Changchun Press.

Wallace, William, 'Europe, the Necessary Partner', *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (May/June 2001).

Walter, Andrew, *World Power and World Money: The Role of Hegemony and International Monetary Order* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

Weiss, Thomas G., Forsythe, David P., and Coate, Roger A., *The United Nations in a Changing World*, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

Wohlforth, William C., 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', *International Security*, 24/1 (1999).

Wolfgang Weiss and Cornelia Furculita, 'Global politics and EU trade policy facing the challenges to a multilateral approach', Springer, 2020

Wade, Robert, (2013), *The Art of Power Maintenance: How Western States Keep the Lead in Global Organizations*, Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/41719367>

Waheguru, S.P.S, Mehta, P.B, &. Jones, D.B, (2013), *Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press.

Wang, Wenqi (2010). *The Road of BRIC: Russia — The Quietly Recovered Polar Bear*. Changchun: Changchun Press.

Wang, Y. (2017). "BRICS Plus" pattern to fully release vitality of BRICS cooperation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Available at:

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1489003.shtml, accessed: 16th June 2020.

Zhang, J. U.S.-China relations in the post-cold war period: A Chinese perspective. *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 14, 47–61 (1995).
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03023433>

Zhongzhou Peng and Sow Keat Tok, 'The AIIB and China's Normative Power in International Financial Governance Structure', *Chinese Political Science Review*, December 2016, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp 736–753

Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

Annexure A- I

Summit 10

BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution

10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration Johannesburg, South Africa, July 26, 2018

I. Preamble

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met from 25 — 27 July 2018 in Johannesburg, at the 10th BRICS Summit. The 10th BRICS Summit, as a milestone in the history of BRICS, was held under the theme "*BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution*".
2. We are meeting on the occasion of the centenary of the birth of Nelson Mandela and we recognise his values, principles and dedication to the service of humanity and acknowledge his contribution to the struggle for democracy internationally and the promotion of the culture of peace throughout the world.
3. We commend South Africa for the Johannesburg Summit thrust on development, inclusivity and mutual prosperity in the context of technology driven industrialisation and growth.
4. We, the Heads of State and Government, express satisfaction regarding the achievements of BRICS over the last ten years as a strong demonstration of BRICS cooperation toward the attainment of peace, harmony and shared development and prosperity, and deliberated on ways to consolidate them further.
5. We reaffirm our commitment to the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, democracy, inclusiveness and strengthened collaboration. As we build upon the successive BRICS Summits, we further commit ourselves to enhancing our strategic partnership for the benefit of our people through the promotion of peace, a fairer

international order, sustainable development and inclusive growth, and to strengthening the three-pillar-driven cooperation in the areas of economy, peace and security and people-to-people exchanges.

6. We recommit ourselves to a world of peace and stability, and support the central role of the United Nations, the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter and respect for international law, promoting democracy and the rule of law. We reinforce our commitment to upholding multilateralism and to working together on the implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals as we foster a more representative, democratic, equitable, fair and just international political and economic order.
7. We reiterate our determination to work together to strengthen multilateralism and the rule of law in international relations, and to promote a fair, just, equitable, democratic and representative international order.
8. We recommit our support for multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations in international affairs and uphold fair, just and equitable international order based on the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, respect for international law, promoting democracy and the rule of law in international relations, and to address common traditional and non-traditional security challenges.
9. We welcome the hosting of the BRICS-Africa Outreach and second BRICS Plus Cooperation with Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs) during the Johannesburg Summit.
10. We express satisfaction at the outcomes of Ministerial Meetings that have been held ([Annex 1](#)) and look forward to the remainder of meetings to be held under the 2018 BRICS Calendar of Events.

II. Strengthening Multilateralism, Reforming Global Governance and Addressing Common Challenges

11. We reaffirm our commitment to the United Nations, as the universal multilateral organisation entrusted with the mandate for maintaining international peace and security, advancing global development and promoting and protecting human rights.
12. We reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and support for the United Nations as the universal intergovernmental organisation entrusted with the responsibility for maintaining international peace

and security, advancing sustainable development as well as ensuring the promotion, and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

13. We reiterate our commitment to the strengthening of multilateral institutions of global governance to ensure that they are able to comprehensively address global challenges.
14. We also recognise the inherent strength of regional initiatives in support of the objectives of the broader multilateral system.
15. We further reaffirm our commitment to the centrality of the universal collective security system enshrined in the UN Charter. We recognize the importance of working towards an international system based on international law, with the UN Charter as its fundamental cornerstone, which fosters cooperation and stability in a multipolar order. We note the long overdue outstanding task of ensuring the adequate representation of African States in the UN, especially in peace and security matters.
16. Faced with international challenges requiring our cooperative efforts, we reiterate our commitment to shaping a more fair, just and representative multipolar international order to the shared benefit of humanity, in which the general prohibition of the use of force is fully upheld and which excludes the imposition of unilateral coercive measures outside the framework of the UN Charter. We emphasise the indivisible nature of peace and security and reiterate that no country should enhance its security at the expense of the security of others.
17. We recall the 2005 World Summit Outcome document and reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, and to increase the representation of the developing countries so that it can adequately respond to global challenges. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status and role of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.
18. We underscore the importance of sustained efforts aimed at making the United Nations more effective and efficient in implementing its mandates. We encourage further collaboration amongst the BRICS countries on a better resourced UN, on its administration and budget, on preserving the UN's Member State-driven character and ensuring better oversight of and strengthening the Organisation.

19. We express our support for continued cooperation of BRICS members in areas of mutual interest including through regular exchanges amongst their multilateral Missions.
20. We reaffirm our commitment to fully implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to provide equitable, inclusive, open, all-round innovation-driven and sustainable development, in its three dimensions — economic, social and environmental — in a balanced and integrated manner, towards the ultimate goal of eradicating poverty by 2030. We pledge our support for the important role of the United Nations, including the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), in coordinating and reviewing global implementation of the 2030 Agenda, to reform the UN Development System with a view to enhancing its capability in supporting member States in implementing the 2030 Agenda. We urge developed countries to honour their Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments fully in time and to provide additional development resources to developing countries.
21. Regarding Climate Change, we welcome the progress towards finalizing the Work Programme under the Paris Agreement and express our willingness to continue working constructively with other Parties to conclude its related negotiations at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) towards the 24th Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC COP24) to be held in Katowice, Poland in December 2018. We call upon all countries to fully implement the Paris Agreement adopted under the principles of the UNFCCC including the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and urge developed countries to provide financial, technological and capacity-building support to developing countries to enhance their capability in mitigation and adaptation.
22. We undertake to strengthen BRICS cooperation in energy, especially in transitioning to more environmentally sustainable energy systems supportive of the global sustainable development agenda, balanced economic growth and the collective socio-economic wellbeing of our citizens. We continue to strive toward universal energy access, energy security, energy affordability, reduced pollution and environmental conservation. We reaffirm that the diversification of energy supply sources, including renewable and low carbon energy sources, investments in energy and energy

- infrastructure, energy industry and market development and intra-BRICS collaboration for access to primary energy sources will continue to underpin our energy security. We recognise the need to accelerate energy transition including in transportation, heating and industry uses.
23. We acknowledge the importance of energy efficiency and the popularisation of an energy efficient life style in virtue of its potential contributions to energy security, industrial competitiveness, emissions reduction, economic growth, job creation and other areas when introduced.
 24. We acknowledge that the BRICS Ministers of Energy agreed to establish the BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform and to develop its Terms of Reference, and note the ongoing discussions for that purpose.
 25. We reaffirm and support the establishment of the BRICS Agricultural Research Platform (ARP) initiated by India in 2016. We appreciate the fundamental importance of research, development and innovation in global sustainability and competitiveness. We endeavour to strengthen the agricultural research collaborative networks among the BRICS countries to enhance the resilience of the collective agricultural and food systems in the face of the changing climate. We recognise the need for follow-up steps in implementing the aims and objectives of the ARP. We commit to step up intra-BRICS collaboration including within the frame of the Agriculture Research Platform and the Basic Agriculture Information Exchange System (BAIES).
 26. We acknowledge the outcomes of the 4th BRICS Environment Ministers Meeting which was held under the theme "*Strengthening cooperation amongst BRICS on Circular Economy in the context of the Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP)*". We note that the circular economy approach represents enormous potential to reduce waste, to forge more environmentally sustainable processes, diversify our economies whilst contributing to economic growth and job creation.
 27. We acknowledge the outcomes of the successive BRICS Environment Ministers' Meetings including the implementation of the Environmentally Friendly Technology Platform, Clean Rivers Umbrella Programme and the Partnership for Urban Environment Sustainability Initiative. The progress in the establishment of the BRICS Environmentally Sound Technology (BEST) Cooperation

Platform is acknowledged, which is intended to be practical and results orientated, and would include partners, science organisations, civil society, private sector and financial institutions.

28. We welcome the commitment to enhance cooperation in the field of water on the basis of sustainable development in an integrated way, addressing the themes of water access flood protection, drought management, water supply and sanitation, water and climate, systematically facilitating water pollution prevention and control, river and lake ecosystem restoration and preservation, ecosystem conservation, and water resources management.
29. We acknowledge the BRICS Meeting of Heads of Disaster Management in Buffalo City, wherein the Action Plan 2018-2020, was adopted and the first meeting of the BRICS Joint Task Force was held to further enhance our cooperation in this field.
30. We reaffirm the intention to enhance cooperation and collaboration amongst BRICS countries in the field of biodiversity conservation, sustainable use and equitable access and benefit sharing of biological resources, and also undertake to promote our cooperation in biodiversity-related international conventions and fora including on endangered species and amongst our National Parks authorities.
31. We recognise the vast potential in cooperation and collaboration in advancing the Oceans Economy amongst BRICS countries, which encompasses multiple sectors, including the strategic areas of maritime transport, shipbuilding, offshore oil and exploration, aquaculture, port development, research and technology, conservation and sustainable use of marine resources, marine and coastal tourism, financial and insurance services, as well as coastal industrial zone development.
32. We remain committed to the continued implementation of the Agenda for BRICS cooperation on population matters 2015-2020, which was agreed to by the Ministers responsible for Population Matters in 2014, because the dynamics of population age structure changes in BRICS countries pose challenges and present opportunities, particularly with regard to gender inequality and women's rights, youth development, employment and the future of work, urbanisation, migration and ageing.
33. We deplore the continued terrorist attacks, including in some BRICS countries. We condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations wherever committed and by whomsoever. We urge concerted efforts

- to counter terrorism under the UN auspices on a firm international legal basis and express our conviction that a comprehensive approach is necessary to ensure an effective fight against terrorism. We recall the responsibility of all States to prevent financing of terrorist networks and terrorist actions from their territories.
34. We call upon the international community to establish a genuinely broad international counter-terrorism coalition and support the UN's central coordinating role in this regard. We stress that the fight against terrorism must be conducted in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international refugee and humanitarian law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. We reaffirm our commitment on increasing the effectiveness of the UN counter-terrorism framework, including in the areas of cooperation and coordination among the relevant UN entities, designation of terrorists and terrorist groups and technical assistance to Members States. We call for expeditious finalisation and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) by the United Nations General Assembly.
 35. To address the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, we support and emphasise the need for launching multilateral negotiations on an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism, including at the Conference on Disarmament.
 36. We firmly believe that those responsible for committing, organising, or supporting terrorist acts must be held accountable. We call upon all nations to adopt a comprehensive approach in combating terrorism, which should include countering radicalisation, recruitment, travel of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, blocking sources and channels of terrorist financing including, for instance, through organised crime by means of money-laundering, supply of weapons, drug trafficking and other criminal activities, dismantling terrorist bases, and countering misuse of the Internet by terrorist entities through misuse of the latest Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).
 37. We reaffirm the importance of the elaboration under the UN auspices of rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States in ensuring security in the use of ICTs.
 38. We embrace the undeniable benefits and new opportunities brought about by the advances in ICTs, especially in the context of the 4th industrial revolution. However, these advances also bring with them

new challenges and threats resultant from the growing misuse of ICTs for criminal activities, the increasing malicious use of ICTs by state and non-state actors. In this regard, we stress the importance of international cooperation against terrorist and criminal use of ICTs and therefore reiterate the need to develop a universal regulatory binding instrument on combatting the criminal use of ICTs within the UN. We acknowledge the progress made in promoting cooperation according to the BRICS Roadmap of Practical Cooperation on Ensuring Security in the Use of ICTs or any other mutually agreed mechanism. We also acknowledge the importance to establish a framework of cooperation among BRICS member States on ensuring security in the Use of ICTs and, in this regard, BRICS member States will work towards consideration and elaboration of a BRICS intergovernmental agreement on cooperation on this matter.

III. Strengthening and Consolidating BRICS Cooperation in International Peace and Security

39. We reaffirm our commitment to collective efforts for peaceful settlement of disputes through political and diplomatic means, and recognise the role of the UN Security Council as bearing the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.
40. We express our concern over the ongoing conflict and heightened tensions in the Middle-East region and our conviction that there is no place for unlawful resorting to force or external interference in any conflict and that, ultimately, lasting peace can only be established through broad-based, inclusive national dialogue with due respect for the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of each of the countries of the region. We agree that, in each of the countries in the region, citizens have legitimate aspirations to fully enjoy civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and fundamental freedoms, especially with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian situation.
41. We agree that the conflicts elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa should not be used to delay resolution of long-standing conflicts, in particular the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. We reiterate the need for renewed diplomatic efforts to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to achieve peace and stability in the Middle East on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions, the Madrid Principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and previous agreements between the parties,

- through negotiations with a view to creating an independent, viable, territorially contiguous Palestinian State living side by side in peace and security with Israel. We reiterate that the status of Jerusalem is one of the final status issues to be defined in the context of negotiations between Israel and Palestine. With regard to the situation in Gaza, we reiterate our support to the UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/ES-10/20) on the protection of the Palestinian population and call for its full implementation.
42. We reiterate our support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). We commend its vital role in providing health, education and other basic services for almost 5.3 million Palestinian refugees and underscore its relevance to bringing stability to the region and the need for ensuring a more adequate, sufficient, predictable and sustained funding for the Agency.
 43. The ongoing conflict and major humanitarian crisis in the Republic of Yemen are also causes for further concern. We call for unhindered access for the provision of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Yemen and urge the international community to expeditiously provide the necessary assistance. We urge all parties to fully respect international law, to cease hostilities and to return to the UN brokered peace talks, leading to an inclusive Yemeni-led dialogue towards the achievement of a political solution to the conflict.
 44. We also call on all parties directly involved in the current diplomatic crisis in the Gulf region to overcome their dissensions through dialogue and welcome the efforts of Kuwait in this regard.
 45. We reaffirm our support for the process of an "Afghan-led, Afghan-owned" national peace and reconciliation process. We express our concern over the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan particularly the increase in the number and intensity of terrorist-related attacks on the Afghan National Security Forces, the Government and civilians. We call on the international community to assist the government and the people of Afghanistan with the objective of working towards the realisation of peace. We also welcome the Parliamentary elections that are scheduled to be held in October 2018 and the Presidential elections in 2019.
 46. We reaffirm our commitment for a political resolution of the conflict in Syria, through an inclusive "Syrian-led, Syrian-owned" political process that safeguards the state sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria, in pursuance of United Nations Security

Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and taking into account the result of the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue in Sochi. We reiterate our support for the Geneva process and the mediation offered by the UN, as well as the Astana process which has been showing signs of positive developments on the ground, and stress the complementarity between the two initiatives. We reaffirm our commitment to a peaceful resolution in Syria and our opposition to measures that run contrary to the UN Charter and the authority of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that do not contribute to advancing the political process. We also highlighted the importance of unity in the fight against terrorist organisations in Syria in full observance of the relevant UNSC Resolutions. We reiterate our strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by any party, for any purpose and under any circumstances and renew calls for comprehensive, objective, independent, and transparent investigations of all alleged incidents. We call for enhanced efforts to provide necessary humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people, bearing in mind urgent reconstruction needs.

47. Recalling the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme we call upon all parties to fully comply with their obligations and ensure full and effective implementation of the JCPOA to promote international and regional peace and security.
48. We welcome recent developments to achieve the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and maintain peace and stability in North East Asia. We reaffirm the commitment for a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation.
49. We express our serious concern about the possibility of an arms race in outer space and of outer space turning into an arena for military confrontation. We reaffirm that the prevention of an arms race, including of the placement of weapons in outer space, would avert a grave danger for international peace and security. We emphasise the paramount importance of strict compliance with the existing legal regime providing for the peaceful use of outer space. We also reaffirm that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce this regime. We welcome the newly established Group of Governmental Experts to discuss possible elements for a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space including inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. We stress that practical transparency and confidence building measures may also contribute towards non-placement of weapons in outer space.

We reiterate that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

50. We welcome South Africa's hosting of the Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations in Pretoria on 4 June 2018. The Ministers exchanged views on major global political, security, economic and financial issues of common concern and on strengthening BRICS cooperation. We look forward to the forthcoming Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations on the margins of the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
51. We welcome the 8th Meeting of the BRICS High Representatives for Security held on 28 and 29 June 2018 in Durban, and commend them for enriching BRICS' dialogue on the global security environment, counter-terrorism, security in the use of ICTs, major international and regional hotspots, transnational organised crime, peacekeeping, as well as the linkage between national security and development issues.
52. We emphasise the important role of United Nations peacekeeping to international peace and security, and the contribution of BRICS countries in this regard. We recognise the need for BRICS countries to further enhance mutual communication and cooperation on peacekeeping matters at the United Nations and the South African initiative for a BRICS working group on peacekeeping in this regard.
53. We commend the African Union for its efforts aimed at resolving and managing conflicts on the continent and welcome the strengthening of the cooperation between the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. We commend the African Union's commitment to the "Silencing of the Guns by 2020" and support efforts to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture.

IV. BRICS Partnership for Global Economic Recovery, Reform of Financial and Economic Global Governance Institutions, and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

54. We welcome that the global economy has continued to improve, while noting that growth has been less synchronised and that downside risks still remain. This is reflected in a variety of

challenges including rising trade conflicts, geopolitical risks, commodity price volatility, high private and public indebtedness, inequality and not sufficiently inclusive growth. We understand the critical importance of ensuring that the benefits from growth are shared in a more inclusive manner. We further stress the importance of a favourable external environment for sustained growth of global trade.

55. BRICS economies continue to support global economic expansion and outlook. We advocate continued use of fiscal, monetary and structural policies in concert, to forge strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth. We express concern at the spill-over effects of macro-economic policy measures in some major advanced economies that may cause economic and financial volatility in emerging economies and impact their growth prospects adversely. We call on major advanced and emerging market economies to continue policy dialogue and coordination in the context of the G20, FSB and other fora to address these potential risks.
56. Recalling the Johannesburg Summit's focus on the 4th Industrial Revolution and the outcomes of the BRICS Meetings of Science and Technology and Industry Ministers, we commend the establishment of the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR). To commence the full operationalisation of PartNIR, an Advisory Group will be set up, comprising of respective representatives of BRICS Ministries of Industry, in consultation with appropriate Ministries, to develop, as a first step, the Terms of Reference and a Work Plan aligned with the 4th Industrial Revolution priorities, to be submitted to the BRICS Chair. The PartNIR aims at deepening BRICS cooperation in digitalisation, industrialisation, innovation, inclusiveness and investment, to maximise the opportunities and address the challenges arising from the 4th Industrial Revolution. It should enhance comparative advantages, boost economic growth, promote economic transformation of BRICS countries, strengthen sustainable industrial production capacity, create networks of science parks and technology business incubators, and support small and medium-sized enterprises in technology intensive areas. We believe that the initiative to establish the BRICS Networks of Science Parks, Technology Business Incubators and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises is a promising step in that direction.
57. We recognise the critical and positive role the internet plays globally in promoting economic, social and cultural development. In this regard, we commit to continue to work together through the existing

- mechanisms to contribute to the secure, open, peaceful, cooperative and orderly use of ICTs on the basis of participation by all states on an equal footing in the evolution and functioning of the internet and its governance, bearing in mind the need to involve the relevant stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities.
58. We recognise the importance of BRICS scientific, technical, innovation and entrepreneurship cooperation for sustainable development and to enhance inclusive growth. We welcome the dynamic development of BRICS cooperation in science, technology and innovation and attach special importance to the advancement of our joint work in this area. We affirm the value of implementing coordinated BRICS scientific projects aimed at promoting BRICS science, technology and innovation potential as a contribution to our combined efforts in addressing the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
 59. We commend the progress of ongoing BRICS IPR cooperation. We recognise the importance of the development and transfer of technologies, including to developing countries, contributing to long-term sustainable and balanced global growth, and in this regard stress the importance of strengthening cooperation in intellectual property rights which contributes to innovation and the advent of new technologies to the benefit of society as a whole.
 60. We are convinced that trade and technology are vital sources of inclusive growth, including through economic integration and consolidation of global value chains in sustainable and equitable ways. Technological progress will have wide ranging implications for production of goods and services as well as incomes of people. Appropriate policies and measures need to be taken to ensure that the developing countries benefit from the advantages of technological progress and do not suffer from lack of its early adoption. It is essential to develop effective policies to bridge the digital divides, including through supporting people to learn and by adopting new technologies and ensure effective mechanisms for transfer of relevant technologies.
 61. We strongly acknowledge that skills development is critical to addressing the emerging mismatch between the new skills demanded by an increasingly technology-and knowledge-driven global economy and the older skill set of many workers. The pace, scale and scope of present-day economic change make it that more challenging. In this regard, we support measures including policy recommendations proposed in the G20 Initiative to Promote Quality

Apprenticeship and the BRICS Action Plan for Poverty Alleviation and Reduction through Skills, to further facilitate vocational training, lifelong learning and the training that is relevant to the fast-changing demand of growing economies and world of work.

62. We reaffirm the centrality of the rules-based, transparent, non-discriminatory, open and inclusive multilateral trading system, as embodied in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), that promotes a predictable trade environment and the centrality of the WTO, and recognise the importance of the development dimension, and will make all efforts to strengthen the multilateral trading system.
63. We recognise that the multilateral trading system is facing unprecedented challenges. We underscore the importance of an open world economy, enabling all countries and peoples to share the benefits of globalisation, which should be inclusive and support sustainable development and prosperity of all countries. We call on all WTO members to abide by WTO rules and honour their commitments in the multilateral trading system.
64. We recall that the WTO Dispute Settlement System is a cornerstone of the multilateral trading system and is designed to enhance security and predictability in international trade. We note with concern the impasse in the selection process for new Appellate Body Members that can paralyse the dispute settlement system and undermine the rights and obligations of all Members. We, therefore, urge all Members to engage constructively to address this challenge as a matter of priority.
65. We acknowledge the need to upkeep WTO's negotiating function. We, therefore, agree to constructively engage in further developing the current legal framework of the multilateral trading system within the WTO, taking into consideration the concerns and interests of all WTO members, including in particular the developing members.
66. We acknowledge the importance of infrastructure development and connectivity in Africa and recognise the strides made by the African Union to identify and address the continent's infrastructure challenges, inter alia, through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). We support the importance of stimulating infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We therefore reaffirm our support for

- sustainable infrastructure development in Africa, including addressing the infrastructure financing deficit.
67. Keenly aware of the need for Africa's industrialisation and the realisation of the African Union's Agenda 2063, we commend African countries and the African Union on the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA is an important step to economic integration on the continent and the unlocking of the tremendous potential of intra-African trade and in addressing its socio-economic challenges. In this regard, we reiterate our support for Agenda 2063 and efforts to promote continental integration and development.
 68. We advocate for a strong Global Financial Safety Net with an adequately resourced, quota-based International Monetary Fund (IMF) at its centre. To this effect, we reaffirm our commitment to conclude the IMF's 15th General Review of Quotas, including a new quota formula while protecting the voice of the poorest countries by the 2019 Spring Meetings and no later than the 2019 Annual Meetings. Governance reform of the IMF should strengthen the voice and representation of the poorest members of the IMF, including Sub-Saharan Africa.
 69. We welcome and congratulate Governor Lesetja Kganyago of the South African Reserve Bank on his appointment as the Chair of the International Monetary and Financial Committee.
 70. We note the steps undertaken on strengthening and ensuring the operational readiness of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and welcome the completion of a successful test run of the de-linked portion of the CRA mechanism. We encourage cooperation between the CRA and the IMF.
 71. We note with satisfaction the progress achieved on establishing the BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund, and look forward to starting its operation.
 72. We agree to further strengthen cooperation on convergence of accounting standards and auditing oversight of BRICS countries in the area of bond issuance, and to further cooperation in these areas.
 73. We welcome the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Collaborative Research on Distributed Ledger and Blockchain Technology in the Context of the Development of the Digital Economy. We believe that this work will contribute to our cooperation in adapting to the evolving internet economy.

74. Infrastructure, investment and international development assistance projects are the bedrock for sustainable economic development and growth; boosting productivity and enhancing integration. We stress the significance of infrastructure development and integration to foster closer economic ties.
75. We underscore the role that Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), in particular, the New Development Bank (NDB), are playing in catalysing private sector financing for public infrastructure and investment.
76. We draw satisfaction from the progress made by the NDB in providing resources to contribute to the social, economic and environmental prospects of our countries and expect the Project Preparation Fund to be put into operation soon. We welcome the upcoming establishment of the Americas Regional Office in São Paulo, Brazil, which, alongside the Africa Regional Centre, will help the NDB consolidate its presence in those continents. We note the NDB's Board of Governors' discussions on Innovative Approaches for Development Finance at its 3rd Annual Meeting on 28-29 May in Shanghai, China, that deliberated on the NDB's future development in the changing global environment.
77. We stress the importance of enhancing BRICS financial cooperation to better serve the real economy and meet the development needs of BRICS countries. In the regard, we reaffirm our commitment to facilitate financial market integration through promoting the network of financial institutions and the coverage of financial services within BRICS countries, subject to each country's existing regulatory framework and WTO GATS obligations, and to ensure greater communication and cooperation between financial sector regulators. We will continue to enhance currency cooperation, consistent with each central bank's legal mandate, and to explore more modalities of the cooperation. We will also further expand green financing, so as to promote sustainable development in BRICS countries.
78. We reaffirm our commitment to support international cooperation in combating illicit financial flows, including cooperation within Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) and World Customs Organisation. In this regard, we underscore the importance of increasing mutual exchanges and data sharing. We emphasise the importance of upholding and supporting the objectives of FATF and to intensify our cooperation to implement and improve its Standards

on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation in FATF.

79. Corruption remains a global challenge with long-lasting impact, including the undermining of legal systems of states. It also presents a threat to economic growth by discouraging the necessary local and foreign investment in a country. We reaffirm our commitment to international cooperation as envisaged in Chapter IV of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In that context, we commit to strengthening international cooperation within the context of the BRICS Working Group on Anticorruption Cooperation. Subject to our domestic legal systems we will cooperate in anti-corruption law enforcement, extradition of fugitives, economic and corruption offenders and repatriation in matters relating to assets recovery and other related criminal and non-criminal matters involving corruption and call on the International community to deny safe haven to corrupt persons and proceeds of corruption. We regard experience sharing and exchange as key to increasing mutual understanding and enhancing BRICS anti-corruption cooperation and will continue our efforts in this aspect as we have done in previous years. We will further offer each other support in the implementation of the UNCAC by creating platforms for exchanging information and exploring convergences in multi-lateral platforms. We commend the African Union on choosing 2018 as the year of combating corruption.

80. In operationalising the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership, we welcome the positive outcomes of the 8th BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting as supported by the ongoing activities of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI). We also welcome the good progress made in the implementation of the BRICS Action Agenda on Economic and Trade Cooperation. We encourage measures that support greater participation, value addition and upward mobility in Global Value Chains for our firms, particularly in industry and agriculture, especially Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), including through the preservation of policy space to promote industrial development. In recognising the importance of increased value-added trade amongst BRICS countries, we commend the Ministers of Trade for reconvening CGETI's Trade Promotion Working Group as well as the BRICS E-Commerce Working Group. We welcome the commissioning of the review of the BRICS Joint Trade Study on promoting intra-BRICS Value Added Trade. We welcome the positive outcomes of the 8th BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting on cooperation on the IPR, e-

commerce, trade in service, and further enhancement of cooperation in E-commerce, on standards and technical regulations, MSMEs and model e-port.

81. We welcome the signing of the BRICS Memorandum of Understanding on Regional Aviation. We believe it is an important milestone in strengthening BRICS cooperation in the fields of connectivity and infrastructure.
82. We appreciate the outcomes of cooperation between BRICS Customs Administrations in implementing the Strategic Framework of BRICS Customs Cooperation, and welcome its long-term objectives, including the early conclusion and entry into force of the BRICS Customs Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement so that the BRICS Authorised Economic Operator Programme is functional by the end of 2022, including mutual recognition of controls and economic operators. In this regard, we further welcome the BRICS Customs Action Plan, which identifies actions that will be taken collectively by the BRICS Customs Administrations in the short, medium and long term to achieve the stated goals and the establishment of BRICS Custom Training Centres. We recognise the potential of the BRICS Customs Cooperation Committee and call for enhanced intra-BRICS cooperation and at relevant multilateral fora, including in trade facilitation, law enforcement, use of advanced information technologies and capacity building.
83. We acknowledge the continued support provided by the BRICS Revenue Authorities for all the international initiatives towards reaching a globally fair and universally transparent tax system. We will continue our commitment to deal with the implications of the digital economy and, within that context, to ensure the fairness of the international tax system particularly towards the prevention of base erosion and shifting of profits, exchange of tax information, both on request and automatically, and needs-based capacity building for developing countries. We commit to deepen exchanges, sharing of experiences, best practices, mutual learning and exchanges of personnel in taxation matters. We welcome the establishment of the Capacity Building Mechanism between BRICS Revenue Authorities.
84. We acknowledge the contributions of the BRICS Business Council and its 5th Annual Report, as well as of the BRICS Business Forum, to enhancing trade and business cooperation in infrastructure, manufacturing, energy, agribusiness, financial services, regional aviation, alignment of technical standards and skills development.

We welcome the establishment of Digital Economy Working Group within the framework of BRICS Business Council.

85. Recognizing tourism's great potential to contribute to sustainable economic and social development, we welcome the initiative to establish a BRICS Working Group on Tourism, to foster greater cooperation between the BRICS countries and increase economic development and people-to-people relations. The BRICS Tourism work stream will exchange knowledge, experience and best practices in the areas of travel trade, air connectivity, tourism infrastructure, culture and medical tourism, barriers to tourism marketing, tourism safety and support — financial, insurance and medical. We note with satisfaction that Intra-BRICS Tourism has grown despite the global economic downturn.

V. People-to-People Cooperation

86. Emphasising the centrality of people in BRICS and its programmes, we commend the steady progress and exchanges in the fields of sports, youth, films, culture, education and tourism.
87. We reaffirm our commitment to a people-centred approach to development that is inclusive of all sectors of our people.
88. We acknowledge the 8th World Water Forum held in Brasilia, the world's major water-related event, held in the Southern Hemisphere for the first time, which contributed to establishing water as a priority at the global level.
89. We stress the importance for the BRICS countries to cooperate in matters related to outer space and we confirm our support to strengthening current initiatives in this field.
90. We commit to strengthening the coordination and cooperation on vaccine research and development within BRICS countries, and welcome the proposal to establish a BRICS vaccine research and development centre.
91. We welcome the 1st WHO Global Ministerial Conference on Ending Tuberculosis in the Sustainable Development Era: A Multisectoral response, in Moscow in 2017, and the resulting Moscow declaration to End TB and stressed the importance of the upcoming 1st High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly on Ending Tuberculosis and the 3rd High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly on the Prevention and Control of non-communicable diseases, to be held in September 2018.

92. We recognise the importance and role of culture as one of the drivers of the 4th Industrial Revolution and acknowledge the economic opportunities that it presents.
93. We commend the organisation of the 3rd BRICS Film Festival and recognise the need to further deepen cooperation in this field. We acknowledge South Africa's proposal regarding a draft BRICS Treaty on Co-Production of Films to further promote cooperation in this sphere and to showcase the diversity of BRICS cultures.
94. We emphasise the guiding role of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Agreement between the Governments of the BRICS States on Cooperation in the Field of Culture (2017-2021) for creative and sustainable cultural cooperation, and we note the various ongoing activities and initiatives of the BRICS culture experts.
95. We acknowledge the 2nd BRICS Seminar on Governance 2018 in Johannesburg, while recognising the intention of Brazil to hold the 3rd meeting in 2019 with greater and more diverse participation of academia and thinktanks of all BRICS countries.
96. We acknowledge with satisfaction the progress made towards strengthening cooperation and interaction amongst our people, through exchanges including the Think-Tank Council, the Academic Forum, the Civil BRICS Forum, the Young Diplomats Forum, the Youth Summit and the Young Scientists Forum.
97. We acknowledge the South African initiative regarding a BRICS Foreign Affairs Spokespersons Engagement.
98. We welcome the successful hosting of the 3rd BRICS Games by South Africa and we further note the progress that has been made in establishing the BRICS Sports Council.
99. Emphasising the importance of BRICS parliamentary exchanges, including of Women Parliamentarians, we look forward to further strengthening of BRICS exchanges in this regard.
100. Emphasising the role played by women in promoting inclusive development, we note the work being done to consider the establishment of the BRICS Women's Forum and the BRICS Women's Business Alliance.
101. Brazil, Russia, India, and China commend South Africa's BRICS Chairship in 2018 and express their sincere gratitude to the

Government and people of South Africa for hosting the 10th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg.

102. Russia, India, China and South Africa extend full support to Brazil for its BRICS Chairship in 2019 and the hosting of the 11th BRICS Summit.

Annexure A- II

Summit 11

Brasília Declaration

Brasília, Brazil, November 14, 2019

Preamble

1. We, the Leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa met on 14 November 2019 in Brasília, Brazil, at the Eleventh BRICS Summit, which was held under the theme "BRICS: economic growth for an innovative future".

2. As leaders of vibrant nations, we reaffirm our fundamental commitment to the principle of sovereignty, mutual respect and equality and to the shared goal of building a peaceful, stable and prosperous world. These concepts, values and objectives provide a solid foundation and clear guidance for our mutually beneficial and pragmatic cooperation. Building on the work of successive summits in the pillars of economy, peace and security and people-to-people exchanges, we will continue to strengthen BRICS cooperation for the benefit and welfare of our peoples and enhance the traditional ties of friendship amongst our countries.

3. We are pleased with the outcomes of the 2019 BRICS Chairship (Annex 1). We recall the more than one hundred meetings held this year (Annex 2). We welcome the Ministerial and other high-level Meetings held this year in the areas of finance, trade, foreign affairs, national security matters, communications, environment, labor and employment, science, technology and innovation, energy, agriculture, health and culture. We also note the Meeting of New Development Bank Board of Governors.

4. We welcome, among other achievements, the establishment of the Innovation BRICS Network (iBRICS); the adoption of the New Architecture on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), which will be implemented through the BRICS STI Steering Committee, and the Terms of Reference of the BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform. We also welcome the holding of the BRICS Strategies for Countering Terrorism Seminar, the Workshop on Human Milk Banks and the BRICS Meeting on Asset Recovery. We commend the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding among BRICS Trade and Investment

Promotion Agencies (TIPAs), and the establishment of the BRICS Women Business Alliance (WBA). We further appreciate the approval of the Collaborative Research Program for Tuberculosis, and other initiatives promoted by the 2019 BRICS Chairship.

Strengthening and reforming the multilateral system

5. We remain committed to multilateralism, cooperation of sovereign States to maintain peace and security, advance sustainable development and ensure the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and build a brighter shared future for the international community. We reaffirm our commitment to helping overcome the significant challenges currently facing multilateralism, as well as upholding the central role of the UN in international affairs and respecting international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, its purposes and principles.

6. We reiterate the urgent need to strengthen and reform the multilateral system, including the UN, the WTO, the IMF and other international organizations, which we will continue working to make more inclusive, democratic and representative, including through greater participation of emerging markets and developing countries in international decision-making. We reiterate our commitment to shaping a more fair, just, equitable and representative multipolar international order. We also underline the imperative that international organizations be fully driven by Member States and promote the interests of all.

7. We recall the 2005 World Summit Outcome document and reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective, and efficient, and to increase the representation of the developing countries so that it can adequately respond to global challenges. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status and role of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.

8. We express our commitment to sustainable development in its three dimensions - economic, social and environmental - in a balanced and integrated manner. All our citizens, in all parts of our respective territories, including remote areas, deserve to fully enjoy the benefits of sustainable development. International cooperation in this field, as in all others, must

respect national sovereignty and domestic legal and institutional frameworks and arrangements, as well as practices and procedures.

9. We reiterate the importance of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and call for redoubled efforts for its timely implementation. We call on developed countries to fully implement their Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments and to provide developing countries with additional development resources.

10. We reiterate our commitment to the implementation of the Paris Agreement adopted under the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances. We urge developed countries included in Annex II to scale up the provision of financial, technological and capacity-building assistance to developing countries to support mitigation and adaptation action. We expect that the first replenishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) by the end of 2019 will significantly exceed the initial resource mobilization, ensuring that financial contributions by donors match the ambition, needs and priorities of developing countries. We are also committed to working for the success of UNFCCC COP 25, particularly with regard to achieving a balanced and comprehensive outcome on all remaining items of the Paris Agreement Work Program.

11. We recall the BRICS MOU on Regional Aviation and value the cooperation among BRICS countries in the field of civil aviation. Acknowledging the critical role played by the aviation sector in emerging markets, including in BRICS countries, and considering the potential impacts of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) on the growth of the aviation sector, we reiterate our commitment to work together on the review process of the framework.

12. We are committed to contributing to and supporting the development of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and to the successful outcome of the 15th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, to be held in Kunming, China, in 2020. We will deepen our dialogue and cooperation on the respective positions concerning biodiversity. We expect that the CBD's three objectives are considered in the Framework in a balanced manner, so as to avoid overlooking the often disregarded sustainable use of biological diversity components and Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) pillars.

13. We are committed to implement the outcomes of COP 14 UNCCD with an aim to achieve SDG 15.3 by 2030 to combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world. We welcome enhancement of South-South Cooperation through the establishment of the Centre for Sustainable Land Restoration by India for capacity building, exchange of database and information regarding the Land Degradation Neutrality Target Setting Programme. We acknowledge the New Delhi Declaration on "Investing in Land and Unlocking Opportunities" and the Ordos Declaration.

14. We express serious concern over persistent threats to international peace and security and commit to work for lasting peace for all, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and all applicable international obligations. We reaffirm our commitment to the principles of good-faith, sovereign equality of States, non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, and the duty to cooperate, consistently with the Charter of the UN. Implementation of these principles excludes imposition of coercive measures not based on international law.

15. We emphasize the importance of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) as a pillar of the international security system. We underline the need to comply with and strengthen the BTWC, including by adopting a Protocol to the Convention that provides for, inter alia, an efficient verification mechanism. We reaffirm that the BTWC is the core instrument for biological and toxin weapons. Its functions, including in what concerns the UN Security Council, should not be duplicated by other mechanisms. Efforts aimed at the resolution of implementation issues should be consistent with the BTWC.

16. We reaffirm support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to the preservation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as an effective disarmament and non-proliferation instrument. We stress the need for the States Parties to the CWC to stand united and be engaged in constructive dialogue with a view to restoring the culture of consensus in the OPCW.

17. We express our serious concern about the possibility of an arms race in outer space and reaffirm the need to carry on activities in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. We emphasize the urgent need

to negotiate a legally binding multilateral instrument that could fill the gap in the international legal regime applicable to outer space, including on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. We stress that practical transparency and confidence building measures may also contribute towards this goal. In this connection, we welcome the relevant work carried out by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and regret that it was unable to reach consensus on its report. We underscore that any instrument on this matter should be non-discriminatory and contain operative provisions on the right to develop technology for peaceful purposes.

18. We underscore the importance of an open, secure, peaceful, stable, accessible and non-discriminatory environment for information and communications technologies (ICTs). We emphasize the importance of universally agreed norms, rules and principles, under the auspices of the UN, for the responsible behavior of States in the realm of ICTs, and uphold the centrality of the United Nations in their development. In this connection, we welcome the establishment of a UN open-ended working group on this matter, as well as the launch of a new edition of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). While supporting both mechanisms, we underline that the dual-track process can provide complementarity and synergies in the international efforts in this matter.

19. We reaffirm our commitment to tackling the misuse of ICTs for criminal and terrorist activities. New challenges and threats in this respect require international cooperation, including through discussions on possible frameworks of cooperation, among which a UN universal binding regulatory instrument on the criminal use of ICTs. We recognize the progress made by the BRICS countries in promoting cooperation through the Working Group on Security in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies (WGSICT), which approved its revised Terms of Reference, and through the BRICS Roadmap of Practical Cooperation on Ensuring Security in the Use of ICTs. Bearing in mind previous BRICS Summits, we reaffirm the importance of establishing legal frameworks of cooperation among BRICS member States on ensuring security in the use of ICTs and acknowledge the work of the WGSICT towards consideration and elaboration of proposals on this matter. We take note of both the proposal by Russia on a BRICS intergovernmental agreement on cooperation on ensuring security in the use of ICTs and of the Brazilian initiative towards bilateral agreements among BRICS countries on the matter.

20. We condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, which should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization, and recognize terrorist acts as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivations whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed. We urge for concerted efforts to fight against terrorism under UN auspices in accordance with international law, recognize the primary role of States and their competent authorities in preventing and countering terrorism and express our conviction that a comprehensive approach is necessary to ensure effective results in combating terrorism. We recall the responsibility of all States to prevent financing of terrorist networks and terrorist actions, including those from their territories. We also call for an expeditious conclusion and adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism within the UN framework. We emphasize the importance of preventing and combating the financing of terrorism, implementing relevant UNSC resolutions and welcome in this regard the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2462 (2019). To address the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, we emphasize the need to launch multilateral negotiations on an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism, including at the Conference on Disarmament.

21. We recognize progress made in BRICS cooperation in counter-terrorism and welcome the results of the Fourth Meeting of the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group, including the establishment of thematic sub-working groups and the holding in Brasília of the Seminar "BRICS Strategies for Countering Terrorism".

22. We reaffirm our commitment to combating illicit financial flows (IFFs) and to closely cooperating within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs), as well as in other multilateral, regional and bilateral fora. We emphasize the importance of upholding and supporting the objectives of the FATF and of intensifying our cooperation to implement and improve FAFT Standards. We value and encourage the dialogue among BRICS countries in key issues of the Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) agenda, bearing in mind the proposed institutionalization of the AML/CFT BRICS Council. We underscore the importance of the work of national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).

Economic and Financial Cooperation

23. Since our last meeting, global economic growth has weakened, and downside risks have increased. Trade tensions and policy uncertainty have taken a toll on confidence, trade, investment and growth. In this context, we recall the importance of open markets, fair, just and non-discriminatory business and trade environments, structural reforms, effective and fair competition, promoting investment and innovation, as well as financing for infrastructure and development. We stress the need for greater participation of developing countries in global value chains. We will continue to cooperate within the G20 and advance the interests of EMEs and developing countries.

24. While noting that the BRICS countries have been the main drivers of global growth over the last decade and currently represent close to a third of global output, we are convinced that continued implementation of structural reforms will enhance our growth potential. Trade expansion among BRICS members will further contribute to strengthening international trade flows. We further advocate for continued use of fiscal, monetary and structural policies to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth. We call on major advanced and emerging market economies to continue policy dialogue and coordination in the context of the G20 and other fora to advance these objectives and to address potential risks.

25. We reaffirm our commitment to a strong, quota-based and adequately resourced IMF at the center of the global financial safety net. We are deeply disappointed that the 15th General Review of Quotas (GRQ) failed in increasing the quota size of the Fund and realigning quota shares of member countries, including in favor of emerging markets and dynamic economies (EMDEs), which remain under-represented in the Fund. We also support protecting the voice and representation of the poorest members. We call upon the IMF to start work on quota and governance reform on the basis of the principles agreed in 2010 under the 16th GRQ in right earnest and within a tight timeframe.

26. We reiterate the fundamental importance of a rules-based, transparent, non-discriminatory, open, free and inclusive international trade. We remain committed to preserving and strengthening the multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organization at its center. It is critical that all WTO members avoid unilateral and protectionist measures, which run counter to the spirit and rules of the WTO.

27. We recognize the importance of necessary WTO reform, including in the lead up to the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference, to ensure the effectiveness and relevance of the Organization and its capacity to better address current and future challenges. Our countries will work with all WTO Members to advance a process for necessary reform that is balanced, open, transparent and that promotes inclusivity and development. The reform must, *inter alia*, preserve the centrality, core values and fundamental principles of the WTO, and consider the interests of all members, including developing countries and LDCs.

28. We emphasize the importance of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, with its two-stage binding adjudication system. The Appellate Body is essential to the regular and effective functioning of the Organization and the fulfilment of its rules. We underline the urgency to overcome the impasse in the appointment of members to the Appellate Body, and call upon all members to agree to initiate the Appellate Body selection process promptly.

29. We will explore in appropriate fora ways to promote and facilitate investments in productive sectors, e-commerce, MSMEs, infrastructure and connectivity, which will help to promote economic growth, trade and job creation. In so doing, we will take into account national imperatives and policy frameworks, with the aim of enhancing transparent, effective and an investment-friendly business environment.

30. We note with appreciation the role of the New Development Bank (NDB) in infrastructure and sustainable development financing. We stress the need for enhanced efforts to build a strong, balanced and high-quality portfolio of projects. We also note with pride the 5th anniversary of the signing of the NDB's Articles of Agreement in Fortaleza, Brazil and welcome the upcoming mid-term review of NDB's General Strategy.

31. We welcome the opening of NDB Regional Offices and their activities in member countries. We welcome the establishment of the Americas Regional Office in São Paulo, along with its sub-office in Brasília, and look forward to the opening of the two remaining NDB Regional Offices in Russia and India in 2020. Building upon the core functions of the Bank's headquarters, its Regional Offices shall contribute to expanding its operations and striving for a more robust project portfolio for all member countries.

32. We acknowledge the progress made by the New Development Bank towards expanding its membership. The expansion of the NDB membership in accordance with its Articles of Agreement will strengthen the Bank's role as a global development finance institution and further contribute to the mobilization of resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other EMDC's. We look forward to the Board of Governors concluding the preparatory work with the aim of taking timely and considered decisions on the expansion of the membership in due course.

33. We also attach great importance to other key cooperation initiatives, encompassing the BRICS Task Force on PPP and Infrastructure, which facilitates dialogue on infrastructure, including the G20 infrastructure agenda, the NDB's Project Preparation Facility, the effectiveness of which will be enhanced by launching its first set of projects at the earliest, and our cooperation with a view to enhancing the representation of developing countries and emerging economies in the Multilateral Development Banks.

34. We note with satisfaction further steps undertaken to ensure the preparedness of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and welcome the conclusion of a second test run, with added elements of complexity, of the de-linked portion of the CRA mechanism, including encashment.

35. We note the progress achieved in establishing a BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund and look forward to its operation. We support the on-going collaboration to develop our local bond markets. We will continue to communicate on other possible areas of currency cooperation, consistent with each central bank's mandate.

36. We acknowledge the importance of the BRICS Survey on International Payments System.

37. We positively assess the progress achieved under the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership including ensuring innovative, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and look forward to its review under the Russian Chairmanship in 2020. We applaud the progress that members have made in the implementation of the BRICS Action Agenda on Economic and Trade Cooperation, promoting several activities for policy sharing, information exchange, trade and investment facilitation and promotion, and development of trade studies. We welcome the conclusion of the BRICS Joint Trade Study Review, which identified trade and investment potential between BRICS countries, and instruct our ministers

to continue to take actions that give support for joint initiatives of cooperation between our countries.

38. We welcome the holding of the BRICS Business Forum and acknowledge the efforts of the BRICS Business Council (BBC) in promoting trade and investment among its members by fostering cooperation in areas such as infrastructure, manufacturing, energy, agribusiness, including biotechnology, financial services, regional aviation, alignment of technical standards, skills development and digital economy.

39. We welcome the establishment of the BRICS Women Business Alliance (WBA), which aims at increasing the role of women as drivers of economic growth, contributing to the economic empowerment of women in our countries and bringing a distinctive perspective on issues of interest for the BRICS business community. The WBA's agenda, working methods and other matters related to its functioning will be determined by its members. We look forward to the selection of five members per country and the holding of the first meeting of the WBA to take place as early as possible in 2020.

40. We call on the WBA and BBC to cooperate actively and coordinate their activities in order to be mutually reinforcing and strengthen the participation of women in all BRICS business initiatives, including in the BBC.

Regional Situations

41. We reaffirm our commitment to collective efforts for peaceful settlement of disputes through political and diplomatic means, and recognize the role of the UN Security Council as bearing the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

42. Regarding the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, we reaffirm our strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the country. We express our conviction that there can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict. We also reaffirm our commitment to advancing a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned, UN-facilitated political process in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015). We express our support to the creation of the Constitutional Committee, thanks to the efforts of the UN, the Astana Guarantors and all states engaged in efforts to address the conflict through political means. We call on all parties to allow for unhindered humanitarian aid and to fully

implement a sustainable ceasefire in the Idlib region, which does not encompass terrorist groups and entities that are designated as such by the UN Security Council. We reaffirm the international obligations to fight terrorism in all its forms and highlight the importance of unity in the fight against terrorist organizations in Syria that are designated as such by the UN Security Council. We also express concern with the suffering of vulnerable ethnic and religious communities and minorities. We remain deeply concerned with the humanitarian situation in Syria and the risks of dispersion of terrorists. We urge all parties to facilitate humanitarian aid to all Syrians throughout the country without preconditions. Bearing in mind the need to protect civilians under international human rights law and international humanitarian law throughout the territory of Syria, we welcome the efforts to de-escalate the crisis in northeastern Syria, in particular the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Russia and Turkey on 22 October 2019.

43. We reaffirm our concern about the ongoing conflict and the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the Republic of Yemen and call on the parties to facilitate the rapid, safe and unhindered access to humanitarian personnel and supplies across the country. We recognize that the Yemeni conflict has a significant impact on the security and stability of the whole region and reiterate our support of the Stockholm Process and the efforts of the United Nations towards a peaceful Yemeni-led resolution to the conflict, under the auspices of the United Nations.

44. We are unanimous in our resolve that the conflicts elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa should not be used as pretext to delay resolution of the long-standing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Guided by the international framework in place, such as the relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid principles and the Arab Peace Initiative, we reiterate that the two-state solution will enable Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side, in peace and security. In this context, we express, furthermore, the need for new and creative diplomatic efforts to achieving a just and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian- Israeli conflict, in order to achieve peace and stability in the Middle East.

45. We express our serious concern about the ongoing crisis in the Gulf region, including one-sided actions and reaffirm our support for the resolution of the existing disagreements through negotiations and diplomatic engagement. We stress the need for promoting a positive, constructive agenda in the region, in which all countries jointly respond to

common threats and challenges. We underscore that UN member states are obligated under article 25 of the UN Charter to accept and carry out the Security Council decisions.

46. We reiterate our continuous support to the people of Afghanistan in their effort to build a stable, inclusive, peaceful and prosperous country. We firmly believe that there is no military solution to the situation in Afghanistan. We reaffirm our support for a process of peace and reconciliation that is Afghan-owned and Afghan-led. We express concern over the persistence of terrorist-related attacks.

47. We reaffirm our support for a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation in the Korean Peninsula, as well as for its complete denuclearization. We underline the importance of maintaining peace and stability in North East Asia.

48. We commend the efforts of the African Union and sub-regional organizations in addressing regional issues and managing conflicts in the interest of peace and security in the continent and reiterate the importance of collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union. We urge all parties to cease immediately all military action in Libya and to engage with the United Nations and the AU High Level Committee on Libya and relevant stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive and sustainable solution through a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process.

49. We congratulate the Sudanese people for the signing on 17 August 2019 in Khartoum of the Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, which we consider an important step towards the stabilization of the political situation in Sudan. We acknowledge the efforts of the African Union and the Ethiopian government, whose mediation contributed to the conclusion of negotiations.

Intra-BRICS Cooperation

50. We welcome Brazil's hosting of the Stand-alone Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations in Rio de Janeiro on 26 July 2019. The Ministers exchanged views on major global political, security, economic and financial issues of common concern and on ways to strengthen BRICS cooperation. We also welcome the Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations on the margins of the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly as part of continued cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including through our permanent missions to the UN.

51. We welcome the 9th meeting of BRICS High Representatives for Security, held in October 2019, and commend them for enhancing BRICS dialogue on counter-terrorism, security in the use of ICTs, major international and regional hot spots, peacekeeping and transnational organized crime.

52. We highlight the importance of science, technology and innovation (STI) as one of the main drivers of economic growth as well as a key element to shape the future of our societies. We welcome the results of the 7th Meeting of the BRICS Science, Technology and Innovation Ministers and cooperation initiatives which have been fostering collaboration among researchers, young scientists and government bodies and bringing closer together our innovation ecosystems. We express satisfaction at the results achieved by the Innovation Action Plan, such as the creation of the iBRICS Network. We welcome the new BRICS STI Architecture aimed at streamlining and intensifying STI joint activities, to be implemented through the BRICS STI Steering Committee.

53. We welcome the outcomes of the 5th Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Communication. We will continue to strengthen joint activities among BRICS countries, create new cooperation opportunities and expand and intensify partnerships already in progress including taking necessary steps for early setting up of the Digital BRICS Task Force (DBTF). We note with appreciation the outcome of the first meeting of the BRICS Institute of Future Networks (BIFN) Council.

54. We recognize the New Industrial Revolution (NIR) as a critical development opportunity from which all countries must benefit equally, while acknowledging the challenges it brings. We note with satisfaction the progress in the implementation of the Johannesburg Summit decision to commence the full operationalization of PartNIR. We also welcome the adoption of the PartNIR Work Plan and the Terms of References of PartNIR Advisory Group. We will continue to take mutually beneficial initiatives in the six cooperation areas identified in the Work Plan, as agreed at the BRICS 2nd PartNIR meeting held in Brasilia in September 2019, including establishing BRICS industrial and science parks, innovation centers, technology business incubators and enterprises network.

55. We take note of the progress made on the negotiation of the Agreement on Cooperation on BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation and look forward to its early conclusion.

56. We acknowledge the crucial role of energy in promoting social and economic development, as well as environmental protection. While recognizing that the energy transition of each country is unique according to national circumstances, we underscore the importance of securing access to clean, sustainable, affordable energy to our populations. In this regard, diversification of energy sources is paramount to achieve energy security. To that end, we commit to continue to pursue the efficient use of fossil fuels and to increase the share of renewable energy in our economies, including biofuels, hydro, solar and wind. We welcome the ongoing cooperation among our countries in the field of energy. We welcome the holding the 4th Energy Ministerial Meeting in Brasilia and the adoption of the Terms of Reference for the BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform, which will further advance our mutual cooperation, allow for deeper exchange of views and best practices and significantly contribute to global research on energy.

57. We welcome the 9th Meeting of BRICS Health Ministers and the Collaborative Research Program for TB, developed by BRICS TB Research Network in 2019, aimed at promoting new scientific, technological and innovative approaches to tackle the TB burden, by supporting scientific projects in a wide range of relevant issues related to TB. We also welcome the creation of the BRICS Network of Human Milk Banks as proposed in the 1st Workshop of Human Milk Banks. We emphasize the importance of our collective action in promoting research and development of medicines and diagnostic tools to end epidemics, to combat communicable diseases and to facilitate access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines, as well as activities to strengthen non-communicable diseases prevention.

58. We welcome the outcomes of the BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meetings, in April and October, on the margins of IMF/WBG Meetings. We note with satisfaction the ongoing development of cooperation on financial issues. We stress the importance of enhancing BRICS financial cooperation to better serve the real economy and address the development needs of our populations.

59. We note the progress achieved by the BRICS Customs Administrations regarding the draft BRICS Customs Mutual Administrative Assistance Agreement and direct our respective appropriate authorities to work towards its early conclusion and entry into force. We also welcome the substantial progress made in the implementation of the Strategic

Framework of BRICS Customs Cooperation, especially with regard to the BRICS Authorized Economic Operator Program, which should be functional by the end of 2022, including the mutual recognition of controls and economic operators. We also acknowledge the positive practice of establishing BRICS Custom Training Centres and direct the pertinent authorities to continue this approach in the future. We recognize the potential of the BRICS Customs Cooperation Committee and call for enhanced intra- BRICS cooperation at relevant multilateral fora, including in trade facilitation, law enforcement, use of advanced information technologies and capacity building.

60. We support efforts to increase trade and recognize that actions such as under- invoicing have a negative impact on trade and industrial policy and tax collection, and need to be addressed.

61. We acknowledge the continued support provided by the BRICS Revenue Authorities towards the implementation of the global standards on transparency and exchange of information and the minimum standards against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). We remain committed to addressing the tax challenges of the digitalization of the economy. We look forward to further progress in the discussion of the two-pillar approach developed by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS. We welcome the recent achievement on tax transparency including the progress on automatic exchange of information for tax purposes. We call on all jurisdictions to sign and ratify the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. We remain committed to enhancing our efforts on the prevention of base erosion and profit shifting, exchange of tax information, and needs-based capacity building for developing countries. We commit to deeper exchanges and sharing of experiences and best practices, as well as to mutual learning in taxation matters.

62. We appreciate the positive results of the 9th BRICS Trade Ministers Meeting, supported by the work of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI) and their efforts to further our cooperation on topics such as investment, e- commerce, micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and intellectual property rights in cooperation with specialized BRICS IP Offices. We also welcome the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding among BRICS Trade and Investment Promotion Agencies (TIPAs)/Trade Promotion Organizations (TPOs).

63. We support the conclusion of the BRICS Trade Ministers that bold, coordinated international action is required to increase economic growth

and sustainability. Increased trade can help with global growth, but the demand deficit in the global economy requires additional sources of growth, which could include infrastructure investment, including in digital infrastructure, skills development, particularly for young people, sustainable investment, investment in local basic services, and outward investment to areas of high potential growth, including on the African continent.

64. We reaffirm our commitment to fight corruption, inter alia, through the strengthening of domestic legal frameworks, as appropriate, to more effectively address cases of corruption. We remain committed to adopting integrity measures in the public sector and promoting integrity standards in private enterprises and to build a stronger global commitment to a culture of intolerance towards corruption. We will maintain our ongoing efforts on anti-corruption law enforcement cooperation and returning of assets, including on civil and administrative proceedings. We will make full use of the BRICS Meeting on Asset Recovery and strengthen experience-sharing and case-cooperation on asset recovery among BRICS countries. We will enhance our exchange of views within multilateral frameworks such as UNCAC and the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, with the aim of joining efforts in denying safe haven to economic and corruption offenders and to facilitate the repatriation of proceeds of crime.

65. We recognize the outcomes of the 5th BRICS Ministerial Meeting on Environment, held under the theme "Contribution of urban environmental management to improving the quality of life in cities". We underline the importance of BRICS environmental cooperation initiatives that contribute to the quality of life in our cities, through the sharing of knowledge and experience on important issues such as waste management, circular economy, in the context of sustainable consumption and production, sanitation and water quality, urban air quality and urban green areas. We welcome the proposal of the Russian Federation on the new dimension of the Clean Rivers of BRICS Program on combining our efforts on combating marine litter.

66. We welcome the outcomes of the 9th BRICS Agriculture Ministers Meeting. As world leading producers of agricultural goods and home to large populations, we underscore the importance of BRICS cooperation in agriculture. We recognize the importance of science-based agriculture and of deploying ICT to that end. We underline the need of ensuring food

security, food safety, addressing malnutrition, eliminating hunger and poverty through increased agricultural production, productivity, sustainable management of natural resources and trade in agriculture among the BRICS countries.

67. We welcome the outcomes of the 5th Labor and Employment Ministers' Meeting on the theme "BRICS: economic growth for an innovative future". We note the transformation in the labor market driven by globalization, technological innovation, demographic change and other phenomena, as well as the opportunities and challenges they bring. We note with satisfaction progress in BRICS cooperation with regard to the future of work, quality and productive employment for a sustainable system of social security, and labor market data exchanges. We underline that labor markets need to become more adaptable and inclusive.

68. We acknowledge the role of cultural cooperation in enhancing understanding between peoples. We welcome the outcomes of the 4th Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Culture and their efforts to further strengthen cultural exchanges. We look forward to continued collaboration on cultural affairs, including the initiative on BRICS films and film productions. We commend the organization of the 4th BRICS Film Festival.

69. We reaffirm the importance of BRICS people-to-people exchanges in enhancing mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation among our peoples and express satisfaction at the holding of several meetings and activities in the fields of culture, governance, arts, sports, media, films, youth, and academic exchange.

70. We welcome the exchanges in parliamentary cooperation among the BRICS countries, and take note with satisfaction of the meeting of the BRICS Parliamentary Forum held on the margins of the Inter Parliamentary Union Assembly in October. We recognize the importance of its contribution to strengthening BRICS partnerships.

71. We also note the holding of the Seminar of high-level authorities and experts of the Judiciary, aimed at the exchange of good practices for the modernization and improvement of Judiciary systems in BRICS countries.

72. Russia, India, China and South Africa commend Brazil's BRICS Chairship in 2019 and express their gratitude to the government and people of Brazil for hosting the 11th BRICS Summit in Brasília.

73. Brazil, India, China and South Africa extend full support to Russia for its BRICS Chairmanship in 2020 and the hosting of the 12th BRICS Summit in Saint Petersburg.

Annexure B

Complete list of Interviewees

S/N	Name	Post and Affiliation	Email
1	Andrew Korybko	Expert on Russian Affairs, Sputnik, Eurasia Future	Korybko.1@gmail.com
2	Lord Jim O' Neil	British Economist who coined the acronym BRICs, Member of House of Lords, UK	
3	Dr. Rong Ying	Vice President China Institute of International Studies- CIIS	
4	Mr. Wang Changlin	Vice President Academy of Macroeconomic Research of National Development and Reform Commission	
5.	Prof. Zhu Feng	Professor at Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies- CICSCSS	
6	Anonymous	School of International Relations, Sichuan University, China	

Annexure C

Questionnaire

The Post-Cold war international order and Multilateralism: A Case study of BRICS

Open-Ended Questionnaire

I am Beenish Sultan, a P.h.D candidate, International Relations Department of Politics and International Relations of International Islamic University, Islamabad. I will be obliged if you share with me your expert opinion through this Questionnaire. The objective of this questionnaire is to investigate the phenomenon of Multilateralism in the post-cold war international order and how BRICS, a consortium of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa can serve as its case study. In addition it also examines the reasons of BRICS plight in achieving its objectives ever since its inception in the year 2009. Particularly focusing on lack of synergy and bilateralism between the member states as a reason for slow progress of BRICS. Meanwhile, this questionnaire focuses on the significance of China for BRICS and its future. It is hoped that the respondents are able to freely express their opinion, which will help the researcher in testing the hypothesis.

1. **What in your opinion is the future of ‘multilateralism’ and the rise of major powers like China and Russia against the US?**
2. **Can BRICS as an organization be the champion of multilateralism in the post-Cold War order?**
3. **What is the future of international organizations in the post-Cold War world order, particularly when it comes to BRI?**
4. **What in your opinion is the future of ‘multilateralism’ and the rise of major powers like China and Russia against the US?**
5. **Can BRICS as an organization be the champion of multilateralism in the post-Cold War order?**

6. What is the future of international organizations in the post-Cold War world order? Pakistan is the 'zipper of the region' (one of my proposition in the Dissertation), do you agree?
7. What in your opinion is the impulse behind China's Belt and Road Initiative?
8. How did China's economy reform in its famous 'Forty Year Reform'?
9. What in your opinion is the shared future of Asian Community?
10. How has China's foreign policy changed in the past few decades?

Thanks for your valuable input

Supervisor: Dr. Amna Mehmood, Professor Department of Politics and International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad

Reseracher: PhD Candidate (International Relations)

