

**BRITISH FRONTIER POLICY IN INDIA: A CASE
STUDY OF KHANATE OF KALAT, 1830-1892**



Submitted by

Fida Ahmed

MS History

Regd. #: 57-FSS/MSHIS/F14

Department of History & Pakistan Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences

International Islamic University, Islamabad

2017



Accession No TH 17875 V₂



MS
954.915
F1B

Balochistan (Pakistan) - History -
Nationalism - Pakistan - Balochistan - "
Anglo-Afghan war

**BRITISH FRONTIER POLICY IN INDIA: A CASE
STUDY OF KHANATE OF KALAT, 1830-1892**



Submitted by

Fida Ahmed

MS History

Regd. #: 57-FSS/MSHIS/F14

Supervised by

Dr. Abdul Zahoor Khan

Assistant Professor

Department of History & Pakistan Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences

International Islamic University, Islamabad

2017



Approval Sheet

British Frontier Policy in India: A Case Study of Khanate of Kalat, 1830-1892

By

FIDA AHMED

Reg. # 57-FSS/MSHIS/F14

Accepted by the Department of History & Pakistan Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences,
International Islamic University, Islamabad in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of

Master Studies (MS) in History

Supervisor _____

Dr. Abdul Zahoor Khan

Internal Examiner _____

Dr. Akhtar Hussain

External Examiner _____

Professor Dr. Samina Awan

Dated: June 01, 2017



Chairman

Department of History & Pakistan Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences, IIU, Islamabad




Dean

Faculty of Social Sciences
IIU, Islamabad

Certification

Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled, “**British Frontier Policy in India: A Case Study of Khanate of Kalat, 1830-1892**” submitted by **Fida Ahmed**, Registration # **57-FSS/MSHIS/F14** have been found satisfactory for, in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **Master Studies (MS)** in History.

Supervisor:



Dr. Abdul Zahoor Khan

Assistant Professor

Department of Politics & International Relations
International Islamic University, Islamabad

Internal Examiner:




Dr. Akhtar Hussain

Assistant Professor

Department of History & Pakistan Studies
IIU, Islamabad

External Examiner:



Professor Dr. Samina Awan

Professor of History/Dean

Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities,
Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad

Dean:



Professor Dr. Nabi Bux Jumani

Faculty of Social Sciences

International Islamic University, Islamabad

DEDICATED TO

The SUPPRESSED AND

OPPRESSED SOULS OF ALL THE

SOCIETIES

Contents

FIGURE ONE.....	III
FIGURE TWO.....	IV
FIGURE THREE	V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	VI
GLOSSARY	VII
INTRODUCTION.....	1
SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY/RESEARCH.....	3
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.....	4
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	8
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY/RESEARCH.....	12
RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	13
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	13
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY/RESEARCH OUTLINE	14
CHAPTER NO. 1	15
1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE KHANATE OF KALAT, 1830-38.....	15
1.2 A SKETCH OF GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF KHANATE OF KALAT	15
1.3 BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE BALOCH CONFEDERACY OR KHANATE OF KALAT (1666-1838)	18
1.4 BIRTH OF THE BALOCH CONFEDERACY.....	23
1.5 BRITISH CONTACT WITH KALAT	32
1.6 EXTERNAL SITUATION SURROUNDING KHANATE OF KALAT.....	35
1.7 AUCKLAND'S SCHEME (AUCKLAND FOLLY)	40
REFERENCES	46
CHAPTER NO. 2	49
2.1 THE FIRST ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR AND THE KHANATE OF KALAT, 1838-54	49
2.2 BACKGROUND OF FIRST ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR	50
2.3 INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN	52
2.4 THE INVASION OF THE KHANATE OF KALAT.....	53
2.5 EVENTS LEADING TO THE INVASION OF KALAT	54
2.6 OCCUPATION OF KALAT.....	56
2.7 AFTERMATH OF KALAT OCCUPATION	59
2.8 INSTALLATION OF SHAH NAWAZ	60
2.9 FIRST BALOCH RESISTANCE AGAINST BRITISH	60
2.10 AFTERMATH OF FIRST AFGHAN WAR.....	64
REFERENCES	68
CHAPTER NO. 3	71
3.1 BRITISH 'CLOSED-BORDER' POLICY IN THE KHANATE OF KALAT, 1854-1878	71
3.2 THE TREATY OF 1854	72
3.3 DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN BRITISH OFFICIALS OVER THE KHAN'S RELATIONS	84
REFERENCES.....	88

CHAPTER NO. 4	89
4.1 ROBERT SANDEMAN AND THE FORWARD POLICY, 1877-1892	89
4.2 THE 'FORWARD POLICY'	90
4.3 THE TREATY OF KALAT 1876	95
4.4 THE SANDEMAN SYSTEM IN KALAT STATE	97
4.5 JIRGA SYSTEM (NIZAM)	99
4.6 THE LEVY SYSTEM	101
4.7 IMPACTS OF THE SANDEMAN SYSTEM ON BALUCH SOCIETY	104
REFERENCES	113
APPENDIX 1	123
APPENDIX 2	124
APPENDIX 3	126
APPENDIX 4	128
APPENDIX 5	130
BIBLIOGRAPHY	133

Figure One




Figure 1: Genealogical Table of Ahmadzai Khans of Kalat (Khan Baloch, 1975, p. 76)

Figure Two




Figure 2: Map of Balochistan showing the approximate boundaries of the Khanate during the reign of Mir Naseer Khan I within the present boundaries of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan (Dashti, 2012, p. 186)

Figure Three



Figure 3: Map showing British Baluchistan, Source: www.mapsofindia.com. (Dashti, 2012, p. 297)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Numerous are the individuals to whom I am indebted for this research, without whose support and encouragement it would not have been possible to carry out the study.

Firstly, I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Abdul Zahoor Khan whose generous interest in my study, valuable advices and discussions, extremely supportive attitude and valuable feedbacks, made me to complete this research project. The day when I met him for the selection of the topic, I found his updated knowledge and deep understanding over the history and politics of Balochistan remarkable, widespread and extraordinary.

Special acknowledgements are due to the teaching and administrative staff at the Department of History and Pakistan Studies especially, Dr. Mujeeb Ahmad, Dr. Akhtar Hussain, Dr. syed Akmal Hussain Shah, Dr. Safi Ullah Khan Marwat and others. I am also under great obligations to my MS class fellows and department fellows who have encouraged me during the study of my research work. I offer special thanks to the Baloch friends, university fellows and buddies particularly Mr. Sameer Dashti, Mr. Zahoor Malang Baloch, Mr. Athar Zaman, Mr. Habib Ur Rahman Khan, Mr. Javid Raza Naseem, Mir Mohamad Jan, Mr. Qamar Jan, Mr. Mohammad Ozair, Mr. Lallah Khan, Mr. Musddiq Yaqoob, Mr. Amjid Bojir, Mr. Niaz Betab and Mr. Aslam Abid Nazar Baloch and lot more whose precious cooperation, affectionate behavior and continuous inquiry of the Thesis progress, encouraged me to cling to the research work.

I am ever grateful to my family members especially to my younger brother Habib Ameer Baloch without whose moral, financial, and sincere and exceptional support endowed to me with enough energy and encouragement to complete my research.

Finally, I alone am responsible for all the shortcomings, errors and omissions.

Fida Ahmed

Glossary

<i>Khanate of Kalat:</i>	<i>Ahmedzai Dynasty in The Khanate of Kalat *¹</i>
<i>Kalat:</i>	<i>The Capital City of Kalat States (Head Quarter)</i>
<i>Sewai:</i>	<i>Indian Hindu Dynasty</i>
<i>Sardar:</i>	<i>The Head of the Tribe</i>
<i>Mir:</i>	<i>Head of a Community (Head of a Tribe)</i>
<i>Rind:</i>	<i>A Tribe Name once they Ruled in Balochistan 16th Century</i>
<i>Lashaar:</i>	<i>A Baloch Tribe Name (opposite of Mir Chakar Rind)</i>
<i>Sei Salli Jang:</i>	<i>The Thirty Years War (Between Rind and Lashaar Tribes)</i>
<i>Moathabreen:</i>	<i>The Elders of a Society</i>
<i>Jirga:</i>	<i>Council</i>
<i>Semi-Military:</i>	<i>Tribal Army</i>
<i>Khanship:</i>	<i>The head of Baloch State (head of the Kalat State)</i>
<i>Qambarani:</i>	<i>A Tribe Name once they ruled over the Khanate of Kalat</i>
<i>Diwan:</i>	<i>Court</i>
<i>Shal:</i>	<i>The Old Name of Quetta</i>
<i>Magsi:</i>	<i>Name of A Baloch tribe</i>
<i>Turan:</i>	<i>Modern Day Kalat Division</i>
<i>Derajat:</i>	<i>Modern day Dera Ghazi Khan & Dera Ismail Khan</i>
<i>Brahui:</i>	<i>The Second Language of Baloch</i>
<i>Buledai:</i>	<i>Name of a Baloch tribe who had ruled in Makkuran</i>
<i>Kalhora:</i>	<i>A Dynasty who ruled in Sindh</i>
<i>Khan-e-Baloch:</i>	<i>The Head of Baloch Nation</i>
<i>Kohistan:</i>	<i>Mountainous Area</i>
<i>Dasta-e-Darbar:</i>	<i>Army of Khanate of Kalat Capital (City Army of Kalat)</i>
<i>Dasta-e-Doem:</i>	<i>The Second Regiment of Kalat Army</i>

¹Genealogical Table of Ahmadzai Khans of Kalat. See Figure 1

<i>Dasta-e-Some:</i>	<i>The Third Regiment of Kalat Army</i>
<i>Khan-e-Kalat:</i>	<i>The Head of Kalat</i>
<i>Bandeen:</i>	<i>Port (Costal Area)</i>
<i>Pandal:</i>	<i>Conspiracy</i>
<i>Vizir:</i>	<i>Minister</i>
<i>Dal Khalsa:</i>	<i>Name of the Ranjit Singh's Army</i>
<i>Wanton:</i>	<i>Country</i>
<i>Mirri Fort:</i>	<i>The Palace of the Khan</i>
<i>Lashkar:</i>	<i>A group of People or a group of Troops</i>
<i>Domki:</i>	<i>Name of a Baloch tribe</i>
<i>Nizam:</i>	<i>System</i>
<i>Shahi Jirga:</i>	<i>Grand Council (council of Tribal heads)</i>

Introduction

Balochistan was vital to the Portuguese, the Russians and the British from the point of view of both strategy and trade as it lay on the crossroad of the routes linking Central Asia, Middle East and the South Asia. Also, the Geography has played perhaps the most important role in shaping Balochistan's political structure as it also holds command of the "Bolan Pass" a gateway to India alike to the "Khyber Pass" to the north (Davies). However, the most punitive attempt to colonize Balochistan and to realize its geo-strategic and economic interests in the region comes from the British. The "Great powers rivalry" in Central Asia often termed as the "Great Game" resulted the British engrossment in the Afghanistan and brought its forces into Khanate of Kalat's region (Noraiee, 2015). Likewise, the British-India official did not give any especial consideration to the British Indian affairs toward the Kalat State until the First Anglo-Afghan War.

Owing to the strategic position of Balochistan, the British established relations with Khanate of Kalat to secure a line of trade communication with the Afghan onward to central Asian countries. Later, as a case of the interruption of British supply line in the Kalat areas and with the British withdrawal from the Afghanistan in November 1839; a punitive mission of Kalat occupation is undertaken. However, the Khan's refusal to surrender before the British Indian authorities causes his death in the battle field to safeguard the Baloch State from occupying forces, thus Balochistan comes under the British Raj's rule (Dupree, 1976). Moreover, after the British defeat in first Anglo-Afghan war, British establishments in India worked towards redefining Kalat's role in the frontier policy. Indeed, the British Indian frontier policy toward Khanate of Kalat passes through various stages, in which British approach towards the Kalat State

(Balochistan) as part of "Buffer state of Afghanistan (1838-41)", treating Balochistan as a 'buffer-an independent ally (1841-93)' than start treating Balochistan as a part of Indian Subcontinent (1894-1947).

Initially, the British does not have any ambitions to establish permanent relations with the Khan of Kalat, it was the only after the British annexation of the Sindh and Panjab in 1844 and 1849, when imperial border got advance toward the Kalat State and the British makes treaty bound to protect line of trade communication through the Baloch land and the Khan accept British management off his foreign relations; after this period the British became actively involvement in Balochistan. However, the British Frontier Policy in India (especially toward Khanate of Kalat) went through many phases which is called 'Closed Border Policy (1854-76)' (Dashti. S, 2016. P, 3). Nevertheless, the post-1876 period of the British Indian rule in Balochistan, as known as famously 'forward Policy' is very critically important due to which not only transformed the geo-political structure of Balochistan but also shook the very foundations of the social, Political and economic structure of the Baloch society. Under the forward policy under the supervision of Famous British Political administrator Robert Sandeman, which primarily espoused direct interference in the Kalat's internal affairs then the Kalat State became totally dependent on the British administration. Major Robert Sandeman was deputed in Balochistan to look after the line order situation and establish peace and order and to reorient the socio-political dynamics of Baloch society. Per the new administrative system in Balochistan under the supervision of Robert Sandeman Quetta became the new head quarter with *Tribal Governance, Levy System, Jirga System, etc.*, Moreover, the territorial readjustment and the distribution of the Baloch land among the Persian and the Afghan under the guise of boundary commissions headed by McMahan and Goldsmith is also the hallmarks of the British Colonial Policies in Kalat

State. The so-called colonial modernity, introduction of new structures (social and political and economic) and other works under the British rule pushes the traditional social and economic frontier to the background and the populace ended up in a premature conformation with an unfamiliar socio-political structure, new to the nomadic and tribesmen of Balochistan.

Nevertheless, the Khanate of Kalat is divided into British Balochistan (Quetta and mainly Pashtun belt), Agency territories (Zhob, Bolan etc.,) native states and the tribal areas with the colonial attention on the only first two reshaped complete economic structure of Balochistan, eclipsed the traditional caravan transportation and created a lasting imbalance in the Baloch areas whose obvious affects could be seen even today. In fact, the 'Sandeman system' (administration under Sandeman in Khanate of Kalat) produces politically fragmented Balochistan with many centers of powers, the khan being just one. However, the colonial rule also faces several resistances, although ineffective, from tribal areas such as Marri-Bugti belt, Sarawan, Jhalawan and from peripheral areas such as Makkuran; also under the British involvement in the Khanate of Kalat and owing to the policies of British Indian Government during this period discusses the policies of British Indian officials toward the Baloch State. However, the research is aimed exploring the British relations with the Khanate of Kalat in view of the British Frontier Policy in India.

Scope and Significance of the Study/Research

British period is generally considered to be a well-documented period in the history of Khanate of Kalat. However, despite this, no systematic research (with few exceptions) has been carried out on the status of the Khanate of Kalat as an integral part of the British Frontier Policy in India. Furthermore, the existing literature on the period under

discussion does not describe the role of the Khanate of Kalat in the British Indian Frontier Policy in a holistic manner. The present research aims at highlighting the British relation with the Khanate of Kalat in the context of the British Frontier Policy in India. It investigates how the Raj became interested in Khanate of Kalat and in what ways dominated the affairs of the Kalat sate. The research also explains the dissimilar policies and mechanisms adopted by the British to exploit geo-strategic status Khanate of Kalat, Balochistan. Moreover, different British Policies ranging from 'Close Border Policy' to 'Forward Policy' would be discussed in detail. Sandeman, whose influence and policies are unprecedented in the Khanate of Kalat, constitute a substantial portion of this research. Finally, the study explores the development of the social structure of the Baloch society during the colonial rule and examines how tribal setup was reoriented and transformed by the British authorities in Khanate of Kalat.

This research will serve as a contribution in the history of the Anglo-Kalat relations and would pave the way for the future researches to explore the British policies towards the Khanate of Kalat.

Statement of the Problem

By the end of eighteenth century and during the first half of the nineteenth century, the British became interested towards the northwestern frontier of the British India and launched a systematic campaign to explore the region. owing to the 'Great Game' the British became interested in Balochistan and dispatched various missions to explore the area as a strategic asset, buffer zone and a potential base for the Russian invasion of the British Indian Empire. The period from 1830 to 1838 marked the beginning of the British interests in the Khanate of Kalat. On the onset of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-42), Kalat State gained significance in the British Indian Frontier Policy.

Keeping in view the Strategic importance of the Khanate of Kalat, British established relations with Khanate of Kalat to secure a line of communication with the Afghans and Central Asia. However, later, as a case of disruption of British supply line in the Khanate of Kalat and with the British withdrawal from the Kandahar in November 1839, a punitive expedition was undertaken to Kalat and the later was occupied. Moreover, the Khan's refusal to surrender before the British authority caused his death in the battle with the British and thus, Balochistan came under the British sphere of influence.

after the British defeat in First Anglo-Afghan War, British Indian authorities worked towards redefining Kalat's role in the British frontier policy. Initially, it was decided that no permeant relations is to be developed with the Khanate, but with the British annexation of Sindh (1843) and Punjab (1849), the British view towards the Kalat change in the first place, the security of the borders of Sindh and Punjab from the Marri Bugti raiders became a prime concern for the British authorities whereas in the second place, the Defence of the British Indian Empire from the Russian invasion emerged as a matter of serious concern for the British Indian officials. In this regard Kalat became important for the British in two ways. First, Kalat should be brought under British Influence to ensure the security of the borders along the Sindh and Punjab from the raiders who come under the jurisdiction of the Khan. Second, British wanted to make Kalat a separate buffer and an independent ally and to prevent Kalat from falling under the influence of the Russians.

British dealt the Khanate of Kalat through the Close Border Policy from 1854 to 1876 and the Kalat affairs were put under the command of the Sindh administration during this period. The 'Close Border School' was of the view that the British Indian Empire could be best defended by cultivating friendly ties with the neighboring regions and

installing local rulers to serve as allies in the defense of British Indian Empire. (Axmann, 209, p. 28) The advocates of this policy were strongly opposed to the British expansion to the North West and emphasized on the indirect relations mainly based on treaties. (Swilder N. , 2014, p. 52) Under this policy, Balochistan was considered a separate buffer, independent of the influence of Afghanistan, and the Khan was advised to behave as an authoritarian ruler with centralized powers. The centralization of power by the Khan on the instruction of the British disrupted the traditional political structure of the Khanate and culminated into a long-drawn-out conflict between the Khan and the Sardars stretching over a period of almost twenty years roughly from 1855 to 1875. Khan's efforts to centralize powers resulted in the estrangement of the sardars as their traditional powers and functions were curbed and their lands confiscated. During the Close Border years, Khanate of Kalat was under the sway of the British administrators of Sindh under John Jacob and Merewether until 1875. However, Punjab's administrators were following a different course of action to counter the raids along the border. With the help of pacification measures, they established direct relations with the Marri-Bugti raiders and somehow succeeded in controlling the raids. This strategy of dealing with the Marri-Bugtis was questioned by the Sindh administration who considered it as a grave violation of the "Close Border Policy" which was against any sort of one-sided settlement without taking Khan into confidence. Thus, the Forward Policy School became dominant in the affairs of Kalat and became the key principle of British rule from 1875 till 1892.

Forward Policy School advocated the expansionism, interventionism and indirect rule. The supporters of the policy insisted on establishing a network of friendly states in the north-west of British India, mainly reliant on the British protection. Under this policy, the Khanate of Balochistan was brought under indirect British rule to protect British

Indian Empire against the Tsarist intrusion (Axmann, 209, p. 28). The main architect of this policy was Robert Sandeman who systematically employed it in Balochistan. The British sway was built on strong foundations under the Forward Policy and the Khan was made a mere puppet whereas the Agent to Governor General, Political agents and other British officials became the real repository of powers.

The strategies and policies of Sandeman transformed the social, political, economic and geographical structure of Balochistan. Indeed, he was appointed to establish peace and order and to restructure the socio-political fabric of the Khanate. Balochistan Agency was formed with Quetta as its headquarter in 1877 and a new administrative system was pursued with Tribal Governance, Levy System, Jirga System etc., as its key components. Sardars and the indigenous people were engaged in the administration to serve the interests of the Raj. The so-called colonial modernity, introduction of new structures (social, political and economic) and other works under the British rule pushed the traditional social and economic frontiers to the background. Also, the Khanate was divided into British Balochistan (Quetta and mainly Pashtun belt), Agency Territories (Zhob, Bolan etc), native states and the tribal area. In fact, the 'Sandeman System' (administration under Sandeman in Balochistan) created a politically divided Balochistan with different centers of powers, the Khan being just one.

Review of the Literature

There is a corpus of literature available on the British relations with the Khanate of Kalat, ranging from primary to secondary sources. Therefore, the British period is rightly called an extensively covered epoch in the annals of the Balochistan history. This abundance of literature can be grouped into three categories. One that is purely written by the colonial administrators and travelers-turned authors, mainly consisting of official reports, travelogues, district gazetteers and surveys; the other two are written by the Baloch and British scholars whose works are primarily dispassionate authorial study or research dissertations. Moreover, the Baloch scholars works can be called the Baloch nationalist perspective and the later non-Baloch and foreign scholars' works are mainly academic scholars whose works along the Baloch authors' can be regarded as the most magisterial works on the British-Indian Empire's policies towards the Khanate of Kalat (Balochistan).

For convenience, I have arranged these works thematically.

Pottinger, H (2003), *Travels in Balochistan and Sindh*, basically a geographical survey undertaken by him as a mission under the commands of the East India Company, is a significant work which presents precious information on the Khanate of Kalat and the 18th century Balochistan. Equally important is Charles Masson's (1844), *Narratives of various Journeys in Afghanistan, Balochistan and the Punjab*.

Bruce, R.I. (1900), *The Forward Policy and its Results* has been Published by Longmans, Green and Company. This work is a primary source about the period under research. The Bruce was assistant and right hand of Sir Robert Sandeman and hence, he discusses polices of Sandeman in the context of the Forward Policy.

Holdich, T. & Hungerford, Sir. (1901), "*The Indian Borderland 1880-1900*" by Methuen and Co. Publisher is a source of utmost importance in exploring the British frontier policy in the India. The British relations with the Khanate of Kalat constitute a major portion of the Book. Moreover, the book *Sir Robert Sandeman: Peaceful Conqueror of Balochistan* by A. L. P, Tucker is a great and primary source of the Sandeman era in Balochistan.

Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India (1908), has been published by Government of India which gives us a lot of information about British Indian relations with Afghanistan with especial context of Khanate of Kalat. However, the section on the Anglo-Kalat relations under the heading *Balochistan and the First Afghan war* is a primary and a very significant source on the topic under study.

Naseer, G. K. (1977), *Tarikh-e-Balochistan (Balochistan History)* has been published by Kalat Publisher & Book Saler Rustan Jee Jinnah Road Quetta. This book is an Urdu account which had been written with the Baloch Nationalistic perspective. It can be utilized to portray the Baloch Historians' perspectives on the period under study.

Thornton, T. H. (1977), *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman* has been published by Gosha-e-Adab Quetta. This book is important in the regard of British Policy making as well as gives us British Indian Officials' perspective regarding the Anglo-Kalat relations. In the present research, it is utilized as primary source.

Thornton, H. T. (1977), *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His life and Work on the Our Indian Frontier* has been published by Gosha-e-Adab Quetta. The work is enriched with valuable information on the frontier policy of British India. Likely, it would be helpful in the first part of research in a way or other.

Baloch, H. (2011), *Annals of Balochistan* has been published by Sayad Hashmi Reference Library, Karachi. His work, *Annals of Balochistan* with five Vol. book and serve as a primary and significant source on the period under study. This work is basically a collection of various reports, proceedings, treaties, letters and agreements concluded during the British period.

Baloch, I. (1987), *The Problems of Greater Balochistan* has been published by Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH Stuttgart. This book can by no means be neglected as it is a systematic and well-researched work on Balochistan. Inayatullah discusses that how the fate of the Baloch state was sealed by the British annexation of Balochistan and subsequently led to the National awaking among the Baloch. Besides, the works of Gul Khan Naseer, Saeed Muhammad Dehwar and Justice Khuda Bakhsh Marri are of primary importance regarding the British period.

Kalayil, A. P. (199). *British Relations with the Khanate of Kalat, Balochistan: 1838-1882* has been published by UMI Dissertation Information Service. This book is basically a Ph.D. Dissertation at the University of Wisconsin-Madison which widely covered the British relations with the Khanate of Kalat. However, it can be helpful in the present research due to its academic worth especially at the early period of British colonial dominations and its relations with the Khanate of Kalat or Kalat State.

Scholz, F. (2002), *Nomadism & Colonialism; A Hundred Years of Balochistan 1872-1972* has been published by Oxford University Press. Any research on the colonial period in Balochistan remains incomplete without citing his worthy work on the British period. The book is an important source. Scholz has discussed the impact of British colonialism on the nomadic society of Balochistan and its economy as well as on infrastructure.

Axmann, M. (2009), *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955* has been published by Oxford University Press. The Book is worth mentioning, although not directly dealing the period under study, but in the initial chapters Axmann gives a vivid picture of the development of British rule in Balochistan and argues that the British rise and its policies disrupted the traditional social, economic and political structure of the Baloch society and the Quetta eclipsed Kalat as a trade and administrative center.

Dashti, N. (2012), *The Baloch and Balochistan: A Historical Account from the Beginning to the fall of the Baloch State* has been published by Trafford Publishing. The Book is of considerable importance regarding the British relations with the khanate of Kalat, Balochistan.

Swilder, N. (2014), *Remotely Colonial: History and Politics in Balochistan* has been published by Oxford University Press. A pioneering work and of the great importance on the British rule in Balochistan. She describes British engagements in Khanate of Kalat, Balochistan with the theory of 'remote Colonialism.' To Swilder, Kalat was 'remotely colonial' in two ways. It was remote from the British Indian Empire and she explains that the British interests were geostrategic rather than economic. The British designated Kalat a native state, but proceeded to sideline the ruler in favor of sardars (chiefs) and tribal governance through Jirga (tribal court) deliberations.

Heathcote, T. A. (2015), *Balochistan, the British and the Great Game: The Struggle for the Bolan Pass, Gateway to India* has been published by Hurst. The book is among the latest researches on the British period in Balochistan. It is a history of the Khanate of Kalat and of the British operations against the Baloch hill tribes who raided frontier settlements and the Bolan caravans. Its themes include rivalry between British officials

in Sindh and Panjab, high profile disputes between British politicians over frontier policy and organization, and the British occupation of Quetta, guardian city of the Bolan, in the run up to the second Afghan War.

The literature produced under the British administration such as administration report of the Balochistan Agency, District Gazetteers of Balochistan, and Imperial Gazetteers of India: Balochistan etc., hold a profound and primary significance for exploring the British rule in Balochistan and serve as the primary sources on the colonial period.

The discussed books and sources do not portray a complete picture of the British policies in Balochistan and essentially describe British period partially or from a specific perspective. The present research is an attempt to discuss the British policies towards the Khanate of Kalat in the context of British Frontier policy.

Objectives of the Study/Research

To elucidate the geo- Political scenario of the Khanate of Kalat in the first half of the nineteenth century and explore different factors which prompted British intrusion in to Kalat in 1839.

To explore the British policies' ups and downs and analyze the nature of the British-Khanate relations.

To illustrate British Policy by changing the existed socio-political structure of the Baloch society and reshape the relationship between the British Imperial state and the traditional social-political elite of the Baloch society operate.

To investigate the new introduced structures of British (social, political and economic) in Khanate of Kalat the British administration works in the various regions of the Khanate of Kalat.

Research Questions

What was the geo-political scenario in the Khanate of Kalat in the first half of the nineteenth century and what were the different factors which prompted British intrusion into Kalat in 1839?

How the British policies passed through different phases and what was the nature of British-Khanate relations?

To what extent the British rule modified the existing socio-political structure of the Baloch society and how the relationship between the British Imperial state and the traditional social-political elite of the Baloch society was operated?

To what extent the British introduced new structures (social, political and economic) and how the British administration worked in the various regions of the Khanate of Kalat?

Research Methodology

The present study "The British Frontier Policy in India: A case study of Khanate of Kalat, 1830-1892" employs narrative, exploratory as well as analytical approaches within discipline of History. Also, efforts were made to utilize to the maximum the archival sources present on the period under study. Moreover, the work employed both primary and secondary sources consisting of different books, surveys, research articles, officials reports and documents, travelogues, treaties and agreements. It is noted that this research does not deal with the British officials and administrators individually rather the British policies are discussed broadly.

Organization of the Study/Research Outline

This study is divided into the following four chapters excluding the introduction and the conclusion. Chapter one describes the emergence and the history of the Khanate of Kalat, the development of British interests in the Khanate of Kalat and discusses how the British resorted to reconnaissance and diplomatic intrigues to explore Balochistan. In this regard, various missions were dispatched to Khanate of Balochistan from 1830 to 1838 to examine the political, geographical, social, topographical and economic conditions of the region. Chapter two addresses the first Afghan war and its implications on the khanate of Kalat. It presents a picture of the British policies and engagements in the Khanate from 1838 to 1854. the third chapter is a portrayal of the British Close Border Policy in the Khanate and describes the British strategies from 1854 to 1876. The impact of the British policies on the internal politics of the Khanate also constitutes a substantial portion of this chapter. The chapter four depicts the arrival of Sandeman in Balochistan and the application of the Forward Policy from 1877 to 1892. The direct British rule and its active engagements in Balochistan are also the subject matter of this section of the study. This chapter discusses the impact of the Sandeman System on the socio-political structure of the Khanate of Kalat. It is followed by a conclusion and a bibliography.

Chapter No. 1

1.1 Development of the British Interests in the Khanate of Kalat, 1830-38

The first chapter will give a brief account of the state of Kalat and discuss the internal and external unfolding situation surrounded the khanate of Kalat that provided ground for the rise of the British Imperial interests in the Khanate of Kalat state affairs.

Much of the nineteenth century was the time of obsession for the British-Indian government. After the loss of America, the apprehension of an invasion of Indian Sub-continent from the external rivals like France and Russia haunted the officials and strategic thinkers in Bombay and London alike. India was one of Great Britain's most 'prize-worth possessions' – the possession of which qualified Britain as a great power. Famous for her immense potential of wealth, India was also important in another sense that she had provided bases from where Britain established political and mercantile relationships with many states in Asia, Africa and most importantly with Central Asia. Thus, losing Indian-Empire would put the very existence of the British Empire in danger. For this very reason the protection and security of the "Golden Sparrow" (Harper, 1930 , p. 20) became the most 'dominating component' of the British foreign policy.

1.2 A Sketch of Geographical location of Khanate of Kalat

Geographically, the khanate of Kalat held an important geo-strategical position on the regional map of Asia. The khanate of Kalat (Balochistan) shared borders on the north to Afghanistan and Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (presently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) on the other hand, Kalat State boundary touched the Indian ocean in

South: likewise, on the east side Khanate of Kalat shared borders with Panjab as well as Sindh too. Similarly, linked it with Iran on the west. The Vast land of Khanate of Kalat historically divided in to four (Physical) parts, Plains, Lower Highlands, Upper Highlands and Deserts. (Swidler, the Development of the Kalat Khanate, p. 116)

However, these four divided parts of Land such as plains land comprised of Kachi with its Capital of Gandava (which was the winter Capital of Khanate of Kalat too) northeast to the foot mountains, and further extended to the Dasht river area of Makkuran and ended from Las Bela in south. Likely the Lower Highland (Jhalawan) consists the slopes of Sulaiman Mountainous range, the Range of Makkuran, Kharan and Chagai. On the other side it also includes the Mulla, Hab and river of Loralai which flow through area. Likewise, the part of Land also had some fertile land suitable for cultivation like Sohrab, Kharan, Baghwana, Khuzdar, Nall as well as Wad Valley too. Despite the fact of being the fertile land for cultivation Khuzadar and Jahlawan had been used as Garrison town by the ruler of Ghaznavids to attacked Sindh Again and again.

Upper highland or Sarawan, is situated on the northwest of Jhalawan which include the Nushkai up to Sibi. Quetta, Mastung, Pishin and Dadur. Some of the lands are crucially important for strategical as well as the trade purposes Mulla and 'Bolan Pass' linked Balochistan to Kandahar also provide trade communication with Afghanistan onward to Central Asia

'Jhalawan and Sarawan waterless and several mountainous areas with elevations as high as 12,000 feet'. these peaks are extension of mountains range found in Afghanistan and Iran. This vast track of land also consists open plain with sandy soil uncultivable land with less populations of nomadic.

Khanate of Kalat with immense natural resources situated on the strategic location with trade communication overland in between Afghanistan, Iran and India. Balochistan's geostrategic location had worth considering significant for military and traders linking India with Khanate of Kalat onward to Kandahar and to Central Asian Countries through the 'Bolan Pass' which is known to be the "Gate Way to India" like, 'Khyber Pass'. (Shah & Khan, 2013, p. 24)

Khanate of Kalat also had a Geo-strategic and maritime coastline seven hundred seventy-one kilometers long fronting the Indian Sea. Apart from this, the famous 'Bolan Pass', a traditional gateway to India which was very important for overland trade between India and Central Asia, was also under the command of the khanate of Kalat. Due to the geostrategic location of the khanate, the Baloch people always led a strenuous life. where the interests of the major empires were always clashing, thus the Baloch land was always coming under their feet for various purposes, whether they were passing to reach India or defending India, Afghanistan and Central Asia. It is on record that the Baloch were at war one time or another of their history with the Shah of Iran, King of Afghanistan, the Sikhs of the Punjab, and the rulers of Sindh, and last but not the least, the British (Khan, 1975, p. 74).

Several factors caused the development of British interest in the somewhat obscure Khanate of Kalat. In the early nineteenth century, Iran and Afghanistan were experiencing a significant geopolitical change (Ade, 2005, p. 471). On international level, the British and Russian empires were involved in the 'Great Game', thus trying to spread their sphere of influence in Afghanistan as well as to the Indus region. Having Afghanistan in the Russian sphere of influence was alarming for the British policy-makers in India. The British tried to maintain Afghanistan as a 'buffer state' with a King friendly towards them. At the same time, the affairs of Kalat State headed by Mir

Mehrab Khan were far from satisfactory, there was an unending civil-war going on between the forces of Khan and the tribal chiefs. Because of such internal and external strife, the Baloch land became the victim of the rivalry and competition for colonial possessions of the two major empires – the Russian and British. (Syed, 2007, pp. 55-56) Although, the British had realized the importance of Balochistan much earlier when they started sending their political agents to accumulate information regarding the region, but their interest was accelerated by this uncertain situation. Particularly, the British desperately needed the support and cooperation of the khanate of Kalat to install British's puppet King, the deposed Afghan Amir, Shah Shujah, on the throne of Afghanistan (Naseer, 2010, p. 138).

Before discussing detailed account of those external circumstance and political forces that given birth to the British interest in the Khanate of Kalat, it is crucially important to give a brief account of the Khanate of Kalat or the Baloch Confederacy and its various vicissitude.

1.3 Brief account of the Baloch Confederacy or Khanate of Kalat (1666-1838)

It is always said that the native people of Balochistan were warlike tribes, and formed a formidable concentration over there. Around that time, their future confederacy, the town of Kalat, was under the rule of the Hindu dynasty of Sewai rulers (Naseer, 2010, p. 6). However, soon some adventurous tribes occupied parts of Sindh. Meanwhile, other Baloch tribes were patiently waiting for a chance to attack and oust the Sewai Hindus from Kalat. Eventually the opportunity presented itself when the Moghuls started their invasions of India through Balochistan towards the end of the thirteenth century. The Sewais were an obstacle and the Moghuls knew about the characteristics

of Baloch and their “fighting prowess”, therefore, they sought their help to dispel the Hindu-Sewai rulers from Kalat (Khan, 1975, p. 69).

The Moghuls in collaboration with the Baloch fought the Sewais out of the land which came to be known as Balochistan. The Sewais fled to the interior Sindh and the Baloch signed a ‘bond of friendship’ with the Moghuls and became the owner of the land once ruled by Hindus (Dashti, 2012, p. 91).

Sardar Miroo Khan, the chief of the Mirwani tribes was the first man who organized and united the Baloch into a tribal unit. Such a ‘self-reliant’ and ‘self-disciplined’ unit was to prove very helpful in later years in the making of a khanate of Kalat/ Baloch state for the Baloch people (Naseer, 2010, p. 6). Therefore, many Baloch gave the credit of organizing and uniting the Baloch to the Mirwani tribe (Naseer, 2010, p. 6). Sardar Miroo was a noble man of good character and the people respected him for his integrity and courage. After his death, his son, Mir Omer Khan was selected as the Sardar of the tribe (Naseer, 2010, p. 7).

When Mir Omer Khan became the chief of the Mirwani tribe, Kalat was under the influence of the Moghuls. Meanwhile, there was a struggle for power between the Moghul Emperor Humayun and Prince Mirza Khan (Khan, 1975, p. 70). Mir Omer Khan exploited this ‘family discord’ to the Baloch benefit and driven the Moghuls out of Kalat. After the Moghuls were gone, he tried to merge the surrounding Baloch areas into Kalat and consolidate it as an independent state but migrating powerful tribal from Makkuran under the leadership of Chakar ² the Great Father Shayhaq³ Rind – invaded Khanate of Kalat and Mir Omer Khan got killed in the ensuing battle (Naseer, 2010, p.

² Chakar Rind was one of the great ruler in Balochistan under his rule Baloch hand been divided into two main groups. Rind under the leadership of Chakar Rind and Mir Guhran Lashaari.

³ Mir Shay Haq the Father of Mir Chakar Rind under his headship almost the entire Baloch nation was united.

7). With this not only the dream of the Baloch statehood was shattered but also an age of 'fraternal feuds' began – an era which came to be regarded as a blemish on Baloch history by posterity. The invasion of Rind tribe on Kalat was purely based on mutual enmity, the Rind tribes considered themselves superior and did not like to be ruled by, what they thought, a somewhat inferior tribe like Mirwani (Naseer, 2010, p. 8).

However, they had not been settle down in Kalat, as they wanted to advance to other areas to in quest of pasture and spoils and journeyed towards Kachi but they did leave behind Mir Mando, their man, to rule over Kalat. Gul Khan Naseer maintain that one reason behind their leaving Kalat was their nomadic way life, the other reason was the mutual feuds between the two powerful Baloch tribes – the Rind and Lashaar⁴ (Naseer, 2010, p. 8). The later mutual history and relations of these tribes itself prove Naseer's second contention that they could stay in Kalat because of mutual inharmonious relations. After invading and occupying Kachi, these two tribes became ensnared in a mutual conflict, which later on was transformed into a '*Sei Salli Jang*' (thirty-year long war) (Dashti, 2012, p. 162). Thousands of the tribesmen died, and countless became injured and disabled. The consequences of this war proved fatal for the Baloch – they became disintegrated and never regained unity and harmony in their ranks, and these two particular tribes lost their strength forever. As a result of this tragic and futile long war, the Baloch, especially Rind tribe, became disappointed and dishearten and left the green fields of Kachi and Sibi and migrated to Sindh and Punjab. Mir Chakar Rind moved towards Satgarah which is now known as Sahiwal. He ruled there in affiliation

⁴ The tribe name emerged while Son of Mir Shay Haq Rind Chakar Rind became the Head of Rind tribe and his cousin Mir Guhram Lashaarri proclaimed that the head of his tribe. Became reviler each other due to those rivalries they had fought *Sei salli Jang* (thirty years' war)

with the Moghuls and died there and lies buried over there (Heather Bolton, 2007, pp. 179-196).

Meanwhile, Mando's rule was overtaken by Mir Bijar Khan, the son of the late noble Sardar of Mirwani tribe, Mir Omer Khan (Bakhsh, 1974, p. 228). Mir Bijar Khan has witnessed the brutal and meaningless tribal war between the two leading Baloch tribes of the time – Rind and Lashaar. He saw with his own eyes the destruction and disintegration of Baloch tribes which was against the wishes of his late father. He realized that such feuds would likely happen between two tribes and could likely transform to unending civil wars. The only possible solution to stop any such future war was tribal integration and a moderate system of administration. Therefore, he started working towards that end. He merged the adjoining areas with Khanate of Kalat to redeem the idea of his father as well as the tribal unit of Kalat State. He developed a system of administration through dividing and sub-dividing the residing tribes into Moatbareen and Sardars, thus creating a semi-military set-up. He also instituted Jirgas and a functional system of governance (Khan, 1975, p. 72).

But after the introduction of these noble reforms which proved positive and stabilizing, Mir Bijar retired from active administration and devoted himself to religious contemplation. After his death, the Baloch become involved in mutual jealousies, thus undermining whatever efficiency, whether political, administrative or military the former ruler has achieved. Soon, the Moghul prince, from whom Mir Bijar's father has snatched Kalat, invaded and occupied the degenerated and invulnerable Kalat State once again. (Khan, 1975, p. 73).

By now prince Mirza Khan has got an idea about the Baloch character. After re-occupation of Kalat, he did not try to rule by force. Instead, he signed an unwritten

agreement with the Baloch promising that under no circumstance they will harm the Moghuls by taking up arms of any sort. Thus, the Baloch were defeated and subdued as they were not so clever and diplomatic (Naseer, 2010, p. 15). Later on, the British Col. Sandeman would use the same tactics to bring the Baloch under the British imperial thumb peacefully.

Once established, the Moghuls used every sort of brutal measure to contain and confine the Baloch. They unleashed oppression and injustice and tyrannized the Baloch. The Baloch were bound by the oath they accepted and could not go back on their words. Thus, they could not resist the oppression committed upon them by the unjust Moghul prince. But soon they realized that enough was enough and planned to drive out the Moghuls from their Land. Two chiefs of Dehwar tribe along with the Mirwani Sardar, Ibrahim Khan, planned to kill the Moghul Governor and regain the throne of Kalat. Accordingly, they attacked the Moghul Governor, killed him and retrieved Kalat. Subsequently, the throne was offered to the Mirwani Sardar but he declined to involve himself in worldly affairs. Instead, he recommended his grandson Mir Hassan Khan to ascend to the throne of Kalat with the consent of the tribes (Khan, 1975, p. 75).

The rule of Mir Hassan Khan was effective and impressive. His policies and maneuvers brought Baloch together once again, and a feeling of brotherhood and unity among all tribes. Unfortunately, his life proved short and he died in the year 1666 (Naseer, 2010, p. 17).

After the death of Mir Hassan Khan, the rule of Mirwani tribe came to an end, as he had no son to take his place. Therefore, the Baloch tribes agreed upon choosing Mir Ahmad Khan as the Khan-e-Baloch-II (Bakhsh, 1974, p. 228). He belonged to the Qambarani tribe, and the long and famous Ahmadzais Dynasty was named after him.

Thus, with this change, a new era of Baloch history under the Khanship of the Ahmadzais began (Dashti, 2012, p. 160).

1.4 Birth of the Baloch Confederacy

Mir Ahmad was a man of foresight, wisdom and ambition. When he was selected as the chief of the Baloch confederacy, he tried hard to change the fate of the nomadic Baloch by transforming the tribal unit or chieftdom into the first Baloch confederacy (Dashti, 2012, p. 160). The reign of Mir Ahmad was inaugurated with an 'oath of loyalty' for the first time. This has never happened previously. This oath was:

"we (the Baloch) shall accept the orders of the Khan-e-Baloch unreservedly without any reservation and objection; and we (Baloch) must not hesitate to sacrifice our lives and properties to protect the throne from its enemies" (Khan, 1975, p. 76).

With the establishment of the Khan confederacy, Mir Ahmad introduced the necessary reforms and formed the 'Baloch Confederation' comprising of smaller tribal units. He established a Diwan (Court) of the Sardars and dignitaries representing their tribes. The members of this Diwan were given the responsibility of managing and administering the affairs of their respective tribesmen without any undue interference (Khan, 1975, p. 78). He also formed a judicial body to administer swift and effective justice. The judicial system was known as the Baloch Jirga and its members were the Sardars representing their respective tribes. The work of the Jirga was to decide feuds and cases. Like modern judicial system, the disputant had the right of appeal against the Jirga's decision and the Khan himself would listen to his case. Then the decision would be revised or overruled accordingly (Khan, 1975, p. 78).

The first test Mir Ahmad and the Baloch nascent khanate faced was once again from the Moghuls. As Mir Ahmad came to power, the Moghul chieftain, Shah Abbass-II

conquered Kandahar and the existing ruler Agha Jaffer fled to Shal (Quetta). His occupation of Shal was not liked by the Baloch and they went to war against him and eventually defeated him and occupied the region consisting of Mangochar, Chagai, Shal, Pishin, and Mastung in 1667 (Dashti, 2012, p. 160). Later on the Baloch fought and defeated the Moghul Governor in Kachi too who had fixed his eyes on Kalat and tried several times to capture it but failed. With the inclusion of Shal and the above-mentioned regions, the boundaries of the Baloch Khanate extended from Naushki to Kachi, bordering Sindh and the Punjab (Khan, 1975, p. 78). Dashti quoting Naseer says that around this time the powerful Baloch tribes of Rind and Lashar had lost their power and confederacies. When Kalat attacked the Barozais who were ruling Kachi under the protectorate of the Moghul Governor in Multan, the Rind and Magsi supported the Barozia ruler (Dashti, 2012, p. 163). However, during this time, there were three Baloch confederacies operating with a semblance of sovereignty in Turan, Makran and Derajat under the Brahui, Buledai and Dodai tribes respectively (Dashti, 2012, p. 161). The expansionist ambitions of Mir Ahmad continued and in 1694 his forces occupied Jhalawan, thus enlarging the boundaries of Kalat up to Zehri and Wadh (Dashti, 2012, p. 163).

The founder of the Baloch confederacy, Mir Ahmad, died in 1695. His rule (1666-95) was nonfederal and democratic in nature. During his reign, the Baloch state experienced little turmoil and disharmony. He ruled the people according to their wish and fought the enemies of the Kalat with the whole strength of his people.

Upon his death, his son Mir Mehrab Khan-I was enthroned as the new ruler of Kalat confederacy (Bakhsh, 1974, p. 228). However, Mehrab Khan died, shot mistakenly by one of his own men, while he was mediating between the Governor of Multan and the Kalahora brothers of Sindh (Dashti, 2012, p. 164). However, Khan writes in his

biography that he was killed while fighting the Kalahoras of Sindh (Khan, 1975, p. 78). After his death, the tribesmen approved his Nephew, Mir Samandar Khan (1695-1714) as the next ruler of Kalat. Mir Samandar Khan ruled in Kalat as the Khan-e-Baloch-III from 1695-1714. (Dashti, 2012, p. 164). Samandar Khan was a generous man as well as a bold man of noble and lofty ideas. He was highly respected for his subjects for his piety, uprightness and boldness. It was during his time that the imperial army of Iran planned an invasion of the newly acquired regions of Shal and Mastung. But this brave son of soil stood like a rock in front of the army of General Tahmasef of Iran, commanding his forces, killed the invading General Tahmasef and thus shattered the Imperial dream of occupying the territory of Kalat (Khan, 1975, p. 80). However, Mir Samandar Khan died after his 19 years long reign in 1714.

Mir Samandar Khan was succeeded by Mir Abdullah Khan as Khan-e-Baloch-IV (1714-34) (Khan, 1975, p. 80). According to the Baloch historian Gul Khan Nasir, Abdullah Khan became the ruler of Kalat by force; he was neither selected by the Baloch chiefs nor recommended by the former Khan. After Samandar Khan's demise, Mir Ahmad Khan-II, son of Mir Mehrab Khan-I was ascended to the throne of Kalat. But he was a very lazy, carefree and luxurious ruler as a result of his bringing up and training by Mir Samandar Khan. He was not fit to rule. This was the main reason that when Mir Ahmad was the Khan, most of the military responsibilities and handlings were under Abdullah. Therefore, fed up of the khan's way of life, he planned to overthrow him and become the Khan himself (Naseer, 2010, pp. 30-33). With a commanding personality and the qualities of a military strategist he became famous as the 'mountain hawk' or "the Royal Eagle of Kohistan" (Baloch, 1984, p. 79). Like his predecessor, he also ruled for a long time – 15 years. Like Mir Ahmad, he was ambitious and entertained expansionist policies. When he died, while fighting Kalahoras, the

boundaries of his state touched the territory of Kandahar to the north, Makkuran to the south and Port Abbas to the West. As a ruler, he captured Derajat also checked the advancement King Ashraf Khan, towards Kalat (Khan, 1975, p. 81).

With the death of Abdullah Khan, his eldest son, Mir Mohabat Khan ascended to the throne of Kalat as the Khan-e-Baloch-V in 1734. But after sometime, his own younger Brother, Iltaz Hussian, dethroned him. With this started a chain of fraternal feuds and disunity which led the Baloch to disown Iltaz Hussain, the illegal Khan and hand him over to the Shah of Iran as a prisoner and restore Mohabat Khan to the throne as the selected and legal Khan of Kalat in 1737 (Khan, 1975, pp. 82-3).

But by now, as a result of disharmony and disunity, the situation was changed dramatically as well as the Character of the Baloch Khanate. Some of the subordinate regions had ceded from the Khanate and there was internal rupture and turmoil inside the remainder.

The internal as well as regional political landscape was changing against Mir Mohabat Khan. It is said that for no plausible reason, Mohabat Khan had sent his stepmother Bibi Maryam and his stepbrother Nasir Khan to Kandahar as captive to Nadir Shah. After the death of Nadir Shah in 1747, his General Ahmad Shah Durani proclaimed independence and founded the Afghan Kingdom (Bakhsh, 1974, p. 237). During these uncertain times, Nasir Khan escaped from Kandahar and came into contact with the Baloch Sardars with the help of Shah Wali Khan, the prime minister of Afghanistan. The Baloch Sardars were fed up of Mir Mohabat Khan and his oppressive policies and were ready to betray and dethrone him. In this way, Mohabat Khan was deposed as the Khan of Kalat and Nasir Khan was enthroned as the Khan-e-Kalat-VI in 1749 (Kalayil A. , 1997, p. 37).

Mir Naseer Khan Noori, also called Naseer Khan, 'the Great', was well-educated and well-informed about the rise and fall of nations. During his 'captivity' years in Kandahar, he read extensively the history of nations and the religions of the world and also educated himself about military strategies. His readings transformed him into a multi-talented and multi-natured personality (Khan, 1975, pp. 83-4). He was aware about different approaches, concepts and ideologies as well as foreign relations, and knew well the place of religion in politics and state. In short, he was an enlightened ruler and was the "lord of the soil" (Kalayil A. , 1997, p. 42).

During his time, the state of Kalat started building diplomatic, strategic and commercial relations with other nations. Apart from that, he started a program of restructuring and brought the factions of tribal units together and consolidated and stabilized his khanate of Kalat internally as well as externally (Kalayil A. , 1997, p. 41). Kalat was no more an isolated chieftain in the region. In the judicial and legislative areas, he merged Baloch traditions with Islamic Shariat Laws. (Khan, 1975, p. 84).

Mir Nasir Khan also brought to the Baloch the idea of a permanent army. Before him, the Baloch Khans did not maintain a standing army, thinking that the Baloch, by nature, was a well-trained soldier and ready for any emergency call on the condition that he was willing to back the Khan. However, Mir Nasir thought the old concept, does not worked, and looks inappropriate when it came to the modern sense of warfare. Therefore, he worked hard to maintain a 'well-disciplined and organized' standing army (Baloch, 1984, p. 84). He formed the first Baloch standing army, called Dasta-e-Darbar (Palace Regiment), initially comprising of 1,200 men. To tackle any external threat, he proposed the formation of three additional divisions – Dasta-e-Khas, Dasta-e-Doem, and Dasta-e-Soem – which used to be recruited from among the tribes (Khan, 1975, p. 89). s

In short, Mir Nasir Khan's tenure, i.e. the second half of the eighteenth century, is lauded as the "golden age of Baloch nation" (Dashti, 2012, p. 183). During his time, the Baloch was respected and feared. He was the ablest of all Khans-e-Baloch and the most advanced and versatile leader of Baloch people and an imminent socio-economic reformer. His time saw the khanate of Kalat transformed from a mere tribal state to a well-organized state at par with the Kingdoms of Afghanistan and Persia, with a fine military organization and economic system (Bakhsh, 1974, pp. 239-41). The prosperity, might and unity the Baloch enjoyed under his rule was never attained afterwards by any succeeding ruler (Kalayil A. , 1997, p. 48).

When Nasir Khan died in 1795, the British were the virtual ruler of India. Political scenario was changing rapidly around the time when Nasir's successor, Mir Mahmood Khan-I ascended the throne of Kalat as the Khan-e-Baloch-VII. By now the East India Company has become a military and political complex; and a commercial adventure has turned into an Imperial one. The whole of India was under the rule of British Empire except the regions across Indus River (Khan, 1975, pp. 97-98).

Meanwhile, serious developments were taking place in the northwestern countries of Afghanistan and Persia. From times, immemorial, Afghanistan has been a 'gateway' to India, and the British grew concerned about the political situation over there. At this time, Mir Mahmood Khan was a minor and Akhund Mullazada was appointed to rule on his behalf till he was able to rule himself (Khan, 1975, pp. 98-99). Mehmood khan was the replica of Ahmad Khan-II. He was also lazy and involved in luxury and debauchery. He neither had the courage and philosophic mind of his father, nor the statesmanship. Owing to his weakness and inability, the glory, might and achievements that Naseer, the Great has left behind, were soon in oblivion (Baloch, 1984, p. 88).

His tenure saw Kalat weakening and losing territory. Due to internal disputes and skirmishes, there was instability and turmoil. At the same time there was revolt and rebellion against the state. However, one such rebellion led by Mir Behram Khan was curbed by the Afghan ruler. But Kalat lost Karachi, given to Kalat by Moghuls, to the powerful Talpurs of Sindh (Khan, 1975, p. 99). The state of Kalat could do nothing to protect its territory. On the other hand, the Jam of Lasbela, and the Bugtis of Kachi were also revolting against the state of Kalat. Kalat was in this turbulent situation when Mahmood Khan died in 1831 (Dashti, 2012, pp. 201-2).

By the time Mir Mehrab Khan-II was ascended to the throne of Kalat, things were in a bad shape internally and externally. As the Khan-e-Kalat-VIII, he had to fight on two fronts to steer his ancestral state out of turmoil. On the one hand, he had to fight the Sardars and curb the local uprisings and conspiracies, and on the other hand, he had to deal with the situation rising in Afghanistan. His situation was made more difficult by the interests of the British in this region because of its strategic and commercial importance (Khan, 1975, p. 100). Strategically the region could prove a barrier against the Russian advancement and commercially, the Indus valley and the 'Bolan and Khyber Pass' were highly useful for providing market to the British goods in the Central Asian Muslim Khanates.

The civil-war that he inherited from the reign of his father had created internal rifts and the Baloch Sardars had been further alienated by Mehrab Khan's policies (Dashti, 2012, p. 200). He had so many opportunists surrounding him as well as several foreign advisers hatching conspiracies against him inside his own court. Being ill-advised by his cunning advisers, he killed the revolting Mir Ahmad Yar, son of late Khan Mir Mahabat Khan, along his cousin Mir Sarfraz who had the support of Magsi tribe of Kachi. He also curbed rebellion of the Gichki tribe of Makkuran by marching an army

TH/7874

and threatening them as well as a major rebellion of Zehri tribe who were revolting against the treacherous and dishonest murder of Sardar Qadir Bux Zarakzai (Dashti, 2012, p. 202).

By now the internal intrigues within the court of the Khan have alienated the Khan from the tribal chiefs. Though, Mehrab Khan had tried to cull their influences and tricky policies but to avail (Baloch, 1984, p. 91).

Meanwhile, in 1819, the relations with the Afghanistan grew sour as the khanate gave asylum to the fugitive and deposed Shah Shujah. To avenge this, the forces of the Afghan king marched towards the Khanate of Kalat, however, the threat was soon averted through traditional diplomacy and the Afghan forces returned home (Dashti, 2012, p. 202).

While the Khan was busy countering the revolting chiefs, the situation was getting worse in his court. His Prime Minister Daud Mohammad was murdered on his own order influenced by the advices he received from his courtiers. With this, Mullah Mohammad Hassan was appointed the new Prime Minister. He was a man of 'dubious character' and conspired against the Khan with the British invaders and brought his final downfall (Kalayil A. , 1997).

Mir Mehrab Khan inherited a lot of problems from the former Khan, Mir Mahmud Khan, an ineffective and unintelligent ruler. During his time, Mahmud has given authority to Prime Minister Akhund Fateh Muhammad. The Prime Minister managed the affairs badly and tried to bring internal stability by eliminating the enemies of Khan. Due to his policies, the court became a center of conspiracies rather than sound and healthy advice. Mahmud Khan's rule also proved harmful for the state itself as Karachi was lost to Talpurs and some tribal confederacies including Makkuran, Bela and Kharan

were left to run on their own. The result was lawlessness, revolts and rebellions. Kachi and Derajat were experiencing the worst kind of instability and turmoil. Derajat was lost to the Punjab (Dashti, 2012, p. 204).

Unfinished internal turmoil, power struggles and conspiracies of foreign advisers and loss of important territories to Sindh and Punjab were the unfortunate circumstances and events that caused the Khan to lose power, prestige as well as become weak militarily and economically. Though Mehrab Khan was a brave man of great qualities but the policies formulated by his court officials and their implementation without any revision by him proved disastrous. Dealing with serious issues and the relationship with the Sardars in such a manner proved disastrous. Naseer Dashti rightly points out that: "His inability to curb the nefarious activities of his foreign advisers was the main factor responsible for the final downfall of his rule and the occupation of the Baloch land by the British" (Dashti, 2012, p. 205). In 1839 when the British forces invaded Khanate of Kalat, the khan had completely alienated and angered most of the powerful and influential tribal Sardars. Therefore, when he cried for help, no effective answer came from them, as a result, he failed to engage the British army, thus losing both his life and the state.

In the year 1838, the British Deputed Sir A. Burnes to arrange a treaty with the Khan of Kalat, Mir Mehrab Khan, about the safety of British troops route to Kandahar (Afghanistan), while supporting and accepting Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk as the King of Afghanistan and his khanate as a vassal state of Afghanistan. After a lot of discussion, the treaty was signed but the Khan could not honor the terms of the treaty as the bandit hilly tribes were not under his control. On the other hand, his courtiers like Muhammad Hussain bribed and instigated the tribes to attack and tease the British troops. He also misrepresented and conspired against the khan because of an old enmity and

misinformed the British officials, telling them that the unfortunate incidents that the British faced were because of Mehrab Khan. On their return from Kandahar, the British troops under the watch of Sir John Keane marched on Kalat to teach a lesson to their 'implacable enemy', the Khan of Kalat (Baloch, 1984, p. 92). At this point, the Khan rallied his faithful soldiers to fight the British troops but his were no match to the British superior artillery. Fighting the invaders, he got killed with his ministers (Kalayil A. , 1997, p. 82). While searching the Khan's, royal quarters the British officers discovered the 'counterfeit epistles' secretly authorized by the Khan's royal seal – these were the letters communicated back and forth by Mullah Muhammad Hassain with the British officials as part of conspiracy against the Mehrab Khan (Baloch, 1984, p. 92).

1.5 British Contact with Kalat

By nineteenth century, India had completely become under the control of British Empire. The borders of the Indian-Empire have extended to the Indus. However, these regions and the polities in these areas were little known to the British Company at the start of the nineteenth century, thus fueling a major intelligence project to map the borderlands. The Government of India recruited ambitious young men, usually with some facility in local languages, to serve as envoys to the rulers. Beginning in 1809, the British sent a number of political agents throughout the border region, and by the 1830s they had mapped the major trade routes and topographical features of the region. Though many scholars suggest that their reports were controversial because they obtained information from agents and double agents who represented their local rulers, as Yapp points out, they had "a vested interest in inducing their governments to look beyond the frontier" (Yapp, 1980, p. 183).

The nineteenth century was by all accounts the age of travelers in the context of history, and the traveler tended to be one of the century's 'scientific and cultural heroes' (Howse, 1990, p. 134). These "scientific heroes" (Howse, 1990, p. 133) were in search of "scientific frontier" than an urge to define themselves and their culture in contradiction to some "other". British contact with the Khanate of Kalat was also established by such travelers in the early nineteenth century who were financially sponsored by the Royal Society to explore foreign lands, to interview "seamen, travelers, tradesmen, and merchants", and also to answer the questions about the foreign countries' ambitions and also to discover possible business routes through which the British Empire could expand her commercial interests by connecting the British Indian Empire with the Central Asian countries. Another more central aim was to search routes through which the British possessions could be attacked by external powers (Howse, 1990, p. 144). Mainly, points out Dolan, "travelers' exploration of these regions was guided by questions of whether Russia posed a threat to British Empire Indian Subcontinent. (Dolan, 2000, p. 84). Subsequently, these travelogues were used as the principal source to formulate the British Indian Frontier Policy, especially towards the Khanate of Kalat, Kandahar (Afghanistan) and Central Asian Countries.

In 1809, Captain Grant was sent to survey the Coastal areas (Makkuran) of the Khanate of Kalat from Bandar Abbas to Karachi. Captain Grant travelled through Makkuran to Persia and gathered information about the possibility of an invasion route from Persia and Afghanistan to India. At the time, there was a perception that the French will persuade the Persian King and launch an attack on the British possessions in Asia (Kalayil A. , 1997, p. 63). Later on, in the British Indian Government given the task of surveying to two army intelligent officers Captain Charles Christie and Lt. Henry Pottinger in disguise of travelers, horse-traders and holy men. They were given

instructions to gather information about Balochistan, especially the coastal areas, and Persia. They travelled all over Balochistan and collected information. Pottinger remained in the town of Kalat for several days and analyzed the psyche of the people as well as checked for external influence, especially Russian. He also collected general information about the culture, nature and behavior of people in order to save his main motive from disclosing. According to his mission, he also prepared written and drawn maps of different important and essential passes and routes. Apart from gathering intelligence and collecting sensitive information, he also recorded the local people's feelings, emotions and opinions and about the Khan of Kalat, as well as the Khan's influence over his people and armed forces for future use and exploitation. In short, he prepared a full record of the vulnerabilities and routes for the possible future invasion of the Khanate of Kalat. Indeed, the British officials used his information and exploited mutual feuds and relations of the tribesmen against them. Lt. Pottinger's report was thus the first detailed description of Baloch and Balochistan.

By 1830s the British grew more concerned of a possible external invasion of India. These travelers disguised as merchants and traders collected information regarding different areas of interest and sent to the British Government. In the coming days, Elphinstone, Fraser, and Alexander Burnes also travel through 'Khyber Pass' and 'Bolan Pass' to collect information about a possible route of invasion.

But among these travelers, Charles Masson was the most impressive. A deserter from the Indian army, he exercised the greatest impact on the British public opinion by criticizing the political agents who were the British policy makers towards the empire's northwestern frontier. Masson's agent Lt. Henry Pottinger finally published his Monograph, entitled *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan and*

Sindh, and the final volume on the Khanate of Kalat captured the attention of the British policy makers (Kalayil P. , 1997).

1.6 External situation surrounding Khanate of Kalat

The fate of the khanate of Kalat was under the looming clouds since the 'Great Game' (Syed, 2007, pp. 53-54). in which France, Russia and the Great Britain were involved. Since the time of Peter the Great, the Russians were desperately in search of Warm waters to fulfill their colonial and commercial ambitions. After some failed attempts to reach the warm waters, the Russians turned their attention towards the Muslim khanates of Central Asia to find a route to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. This would be the "gateway to the Indian Ocean" (Syed, 2007, p. 53). After occupying some Central Asian Khanates, the Russians policy-makers began sending envoys to Iran, Afghanistan and the Indus Valley. This caused much alarm among the strategists of the British colonial administrators in India. The British perceived the Russian advances in the Central Asia and their diplomatic maneuvers in the borderlands of British-India Empire as a direct threat to their Indian possessions – the Crown jewel of the British Empire (Dashti, 2012, p. 206).

The situation was further complicated by France. France had lost her Indian territories and was planning to regain her prestige in India. Before this, the pre-revolution France had tried to diminish British power by supporting the American colonies to gain independence (Scott, 1976, pp. 2-6). That was not enough. When Napoleon emerged as a successful General, the French thought that now is the time to challenge Britain's authority in India, therefore, turning India and Indian Ocean into their next battleground. Napoleon realized that "the Mediterranean route to East was of vital consequence to the British in India" (Syed, 2007, p. 54), thus he planned to attack Egypt

and create difficulties for the British Empire (Plumb, 1975, pp. 65-81). Accordingly, he launched the French Campaign in Egypt and Syria (1799 – 1801) in the hope to “defend French Trade interests and undermine Britain’s access to India”. Though Napoleon failed in his goal and the immediate French threat was over but he stirred the minds of the British strategists in London. They were alarmed that ‘the ultimate French intention was to invade India’ (Evans M. , 2010, p. 116).

After his initial failure, however, Napoleon’s vision of India was not over. In 1804, Napoleon started to make overtures to the Shah and in 1807 he showed his hand, following his military successes in Eastern Europe earlier that year and the opportunity they seemed to provide for the passage of an army overland to India. In May 1807, he concluded the Treaty of Fars, (Dupee, 1977, p. 363) which offered the Persians support against Russia in return for undertakings to make troops and facilities available should the French decide to march on India, and he quickly followed this up by sending a strong mission to Persia under General Gardane with instructions to undertake the necessary investigation. At the same time, Gardane was to assist with the training and equipping of the Persian army. Gardane acted vigorously and within a few weeks produced a plan that envisaged the dispatch of a combined Franco-Persian force of some 40,000 to 50,000 by the way of Teheran, Herat, Kandahar and Kabul to Peshawar. While a diversionary force would sail to India from the lie de France (Martin Evans). These efforts by French to engage Iran, they thought, would not fail the way their efforts and aid to Tipu Sultan to expel the British out of India in 1799 (Dashti, 206).

The relations between Persia and France turned in 1807 when the Russian defeated at Arpatch and subsequently humiliated them with the signing of the “Treaty of Fars” and losing more territory (Syed, 2007, p. 54). The French did not come to their help, thus the Persian lost faith in their claims of helping them against the Russians. The British

policy-makers exploited the situation by providing timely help to the Persians to fight the Russians. In 1809, London sent their emissary, Harford Jones who secured the so-called 'Preliminary Treaty' bounding the Persian Shah to safeguard the British interests against any European aggressor. In the same year, the British envoy Mountstuart Elphinstone signed a mutual defense agreement with the Afghan King, Shah Shujah, although this was frustrating as Shujah lost his throne only a few weeks later (Tytler, 1967, p. 80). A mission to the emirs of Sindh also obtained little of substance, but another official, Charles Metcalfe, secured a treaty with the Sikh leader, Raja Ranjit Singh, which was to cement Singh's relationship with the British over the next thirty years (Evans M. , 2010, p. 10).

Although with the downfall of Napoleon, the French threat disappeared for once and all, the Russian threat remained (Poppowell, 1995, p. 17). Indeed, after the French losing its prestige, the Russians emerged as the major rivals of the British Empire in Asia and their expansionist ambitions continued towards southwards (Dashti, 207). In 1826, Shah Abbas Mirza tried to restore their fortunes, and Russia and Persia again went to war. The Russians proceeded to capture Tabriz and in 1828 the Persians were forced to sue for peace. Under the terms of the Treaty of Turkmanchai, (Syker, 1915, p. 419) they lost further territory and rights of navigation on the Caspian Sea, and had to accept "a crippling indemnity" (Serebrenniko, 1884, pp. 196-201). The Russians not only received extra territorial rights but also reduced Persia to little more than a Russian protectorate.

During the early nineteenth century, Afghanistan was entangled in a power struggle. In 1809, as mentioned earlier, Shah Shujah was deposed. He fled to Lahore in 1813 and sought help of the East India Company. Around 1818, the Sikhs in Punjab have become powerful and the British asked for his help to restore Shah Shujah to the throne of

Kabul. During the Civil War, because of disunity in their ranks, the Afghans lost Peshawar to the Sikhs in 1834. In 1836, Dost Mohammad tried to regain Peshawar. He defeated the Sikhs but wanted British help and approval to reoccupy Peshawar. The British, preferring the friendship of Sikhs, did not extend their approval. Disappointed, the Afghan Amir started negotiations with the Russian representative, Capt. Ivan Vitkevich (Adamec, 2003, p. 17).

Nevertheless, during all the early years of nineteenth century constant intrigues and wars occurred in Persia, Afghanistan and central Asia but the British interests were not affected. By 1836, the situation in Afghanistan began to exercise a powerful influence as regards the British policy on the North-West frontier.

After Dost Muhammad leaned towards the Russians, he found himself at odds with the British India government. At that time, Alexander Burnes, a British East India Company representative, was also in Kabul, and he advised Dost Muhammad to abandon any hopes of getting Peshawar back from the Sikhs and to make peace instead (Adamec, 2003, p. 18). From this demand, it appears that Dost Mohammad was not hostile towards the British. His move was purely a diplomatic one to gain a little from the British but the British were on a zero-sum game (Adye, 1897, p. 4). Adye further claims that "Sir Alexander Burnes' reappearance at the present momentous crisis was hailed [by Dost Mohammad] as a favorable omen of the friendly intentions of the British Government". He argues that Burnes would succeed in his mission but it was not to be so because Lord Auckland's officials and advisors "had conceived an inveterate distrust of Dost Mohamed for the difficulties of whose position they failed to make due allowance" (Eyre, 1879, p. 34). They had meanwhile conceived a favorite policy of their own; entirely opposed to that so earnestly recommended by Burnes, and

the result was his summary recall from Kabul in early 1838, and the temporary triumph of Russian and Persian interests in the councils of Kabul and Kandahar.

This was the first direct attempt of the British-Indian empire to provide against a distant and unsubstantiated danger, and it failed according to some accounts, and was deliberately rendered failed by the British policy-makers to invade Afghanistan and develop their sphere influence and presence in that country.

In the meantime, the Shah of Persia, instigated by Russia, besieged Herat and all India looked on wonder and alarmed at the eventful drama enacting at her distant portal, in the north-east. The siege lingered on from November, 1837, until September, 1838, affording ample time for intermediate action on part of the British. After months of unproductive efforts but now at a critical juncture, the Shah took alarm at some open hostilities of the British on the Persian coast, and suddenly withdrew his forces. Strong representations were also made in St Petersburg, with the result that Simonich and Vitkevich were both disowned and recalled. It has never been clear precisely what Simonich's and Vitkevich's instructions were, and hence what the Russians' motives were at the time. While it seems that commercial ambitions existed, it is more possible that the Russians were fishing in troubled waters and hoping to extend their influence within the territories contiguous to India. Certainly this is how Auckland saw the situation; with the result that he decided during the summer of 1838 that he should invade Afghanistan (Syed, 2007, p. 56). Then followed the disastrous "First Anglo-Afghan War", when a British army was annihilated as it retreated from Kabul in the winter of 1841-42 (Evans M. , 2010 , pp. 13-14).

1.7 Auckland's Scheme (Auckland Folly)

After Burnes left, Dost Muhammad to open negotiations with Captain Vitkevich over assistance for Afghanistan, but the Russian government repudiated these moves. Bayly Martin's comment that "The courting of Vitkevitch can thus be read as a negotiating way to bring the British back to the contact with a more favorable offer. By that time, says Bayly, it was too late to do anything", (Bayly, 2016, p. 15). Perhaps the Russians knew the intentions of the king.

With the failure of the mission of Sir Alexander Burnes, the Governor-General of British-Indian Empire Auckland came up with his own plans by which the future and safety of the India's north-west frontier was to be secured against the designs of Russian and Persian Empires' ambitions. This consisted originally a tripartite treaty, wherein the British Indian Government, Ranjit Singh, the ruler of Punjab, and Shah Shuja, the long dethroned ruler of Afghanistan, were the principal parties concerned. Though it was clear to the British Indian Government that Shah Shuja's return to power will not be welcomed by the subjects, but any how the British Indian officials continued the plan to suit their own policy by dispossessing the King Ameer Dost Mohamed, and restoring the Shah Shuja as the head of Afghanistan State, in Eyre's words "without any real difference to the wishes and the aspirations of the people" (Norris, 1967, pp. 81, 138, 175).

Meanwhile, the prevailing circumstances – the Russian and Persian aspirations and the hostility in Afghanistan – have created great confusion in the Indian Government circles and the authorities differed widely in their opinions regarding the Auckland's plan. On the other hand, in December 1838, Auckland issued his manifesto which included the claims of the former ruler of Afghanistan, Shah Shuja and the determination of the

Indian Government and the ruler of Punjab to put him back on his throne in Kabul, dethroning Ameer Dost Mohamed (Adye, 1897, p. 6).

At the same time, the British in India were negotiating with the deposed Shah Shuja and Ranjit Singh, ruler of the Sikh nation, and they concluded the Simla Manifesto of 1838, which recognized the independence of the Sikhs from Afghanistan and was to become effective once Shah Shuja had regained the Afghan throne. In effect, the manifesto was a declaration of war against Dost Muhammad, the Amir of Afghanistan, (Adye, 1897, pp. 6-7).

After the failure of Burnes' mission, the British planned to depose Dost Mohammad and install Shah Shujah, the deposed King of Afghanistan, in his place. But for the implementation of the new plan, the British needed safe passage through the Khanate of Kalat (Chima, 2015, p. 125).

Though the British had recognized the importance of the Khanate of Kalat and Sindh much before, but in 1838, the importance of these two territories greatly increased for their Afghan and Central Asia policy. For the invasion of Afghanistan, safe passage through the Baloch state Khanate of Kalat made its integral part and parcel of British Indian frontier policy. The geostrategic and logistic importance of Balochistan attracted the attention of the British for accomplishment of their forward policy westward. They required a suitable port and their eyes were fixed on the Jiwani 'Bandeem' (port), situated on a few days cruising from Bombay. Thus, they sent many diplomatic missions to secure various treaties with the Khan of Kalat to reinforce their position in the region. The first emissary the British sent was Lt. Leech and he failed to secure any treaty. The Khan's reluctance to sign a treaty with the British had reasons. The Khan had longstanding relations with the king of Afghanistan as well as the Khan was bound

to honor the treaty of friendship signed by 'Naseer Khan' the Great and Ahmad Shah Abdali' in the year 1758 (Appendix I) (Naseer, 2010, p. 70). However, the khan of Kalat was internally alienated and weak and had no choice but to sign an agreement. In March 1839, Alexander Burnes arrived in Kalat with a treaty that required the Khan "to provide safe passage of British troops and furnish the necessary supplies as it passed through his territories" (Appendix II). In addition, Mehrab Khan was "to recognize Shah Shuja's suzerainty by visiting him in his resident camp nearby. In return the British would pay the Khan 15,000 Rupees" (Naseer, 2010, pp. 141-42). Meanwhile, the Khan also impressed upon Burnes that to impose Shah Shuja's supremacy over Kalat was contradictory to the 'Afghan-Kalat Treaty of 1758', (Appendix No1) which stipulated that Afghanistan recognized Kalat's independence. Furthermore, this treaty prevented the Khans of Kalat from meddling in each other's political as well as State internal affairs. Mehrab Khan did not want to violate the terms of the treaty, and feared the wrath of the Barakzais in Afghanistan (Naseer, 2010, pp. 138-143).

Even though Burnes realized that Mehrab Khan was correct in his analysis, the Khan was cornered into signing the treaty. In fact, Mehrab Khan signed the treaty because of his weak position also when he smelled a British and Baloch "*Pandal*" (conspiracy) being hatched up to invade Kalat. The conspirators included his Vizir and his cousin, 'a pretender of the throne' – Shah Nawaz Khan (Swidler, 2014, p. 50).

Apart from the Anglo-Russian rivalry, three other factors that developed British interest in the Khanate of Kalat were the invulnerability of India to outside invasion because of her feminine quality and permissiveness, her potential wealth and her geography.

The main point of British India's vulnerability had long been identified as the north-west Frontier. It was here that the British were most militarily vulnerable and it was

also where India had faced invasion in the past from Afghanistan and Persian. Thus the colonial narrative on India's vulnerability came to constitute an important part of British policy, giving it an air of geopolitical destiny and 'common sense' that put it above critical scrutiny. Prior to the colonial period, the northwest frontier was a business Centre and a major commercial pathway. The British, to accomplish their ambitions, named it northwest frontier – a region inhabited by barbarous and unwieldy tribesmen. In the earlier times, it was a pure economic, cultural and political zone that had stretched for two thousand years. The linear separation of a north-west frontier by the British was thus an entirely new innovation that destroyed traditional and historical links (Chacko, 2012, p. 82).

There was no direct threat from Persia and Afghanistan. Rather, their relations with Russia were considered crucial to India's security since, from early in the nineteenth century, Britain's main preoccupation was the threat posed by Russia. It was thought that if Persia and Afghanistan were weak and amenable to Russia, this would pose a serious danger to the integrity of India's borders. For this reason, the British attempted to keep both Persia and Afghanistan friendly and independent, even intervening militarily when the opportunity arose, as it did in 1856 when the Shah of Persia sought to gain control of Herat in Afghanistan.

As rival hegemony of the post-1815 world, Britain and Russia saw themselves as enemies primarily because of Britain's perception of Russia's threat to its Indian empire – the position of which qualified it for the status of a great power. This Anglo-Russian rivalry played out in central Asia and was famously termed "the Great Game" by Rudyard Kipling in *Kim*, a fictional story inspired by Kipling's own experiences as a journalist in the North-West provinces. The Frontier in Kipling's *Kim* emerges as a barrier between the civilized and the barbarous – a masculine, homosocial space in

which both Indian and British men would fight to defend a benevolent empire. As such, the Frontier was a marked contrast to the urban centers where British was coming under heightened challenge. Hence, not only did the “Russian threat” turn India into an object of geographical desire, it also served to perpetuate the politics of colonial masculinity and helped to keep alive the myth of Britain’s civilizing mission.

While the ‘Great Game’ was being played out in central Asia, back in Great Britain, the ‘founding father’ of the discipline of geopolitics, Halford Mackinder, was busy trying to fulfill the Royal Geographical Society’s (RGS) goal of turning a collection of practices into a coherent, scientific, academic discipline (Geography). Geographical education in Britain came to be seen as vital to giving the British Empire territorial and commercial meaning. His lectures on “the New Geography” part of the adult education programs were very popular and successful.

The specialization of India and the articulation of its strategic importance to British formed an important part of Mackinder’s theories. He argued that “India’s existence as a ‘wealthy civilized community’ and its appeal to ‘the conqueror’ was due to its geography”.

In his 1904 address to the RGS, which was entitled, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, Mackinder argued that

‘Euro-Asia’ was the strategic pivot on which world written history has turned. Likewise, once it was controlled by the Mongol empire, this Pivot region, which he later named the Heartland, came to Russia’s grasp. the Anglo-Russian rivalry than became an inevitable clash of sea power and land power and the British colonial occupation of India was imparted with a sense of destiny and intentionality. Britain, he argued, was ‘compelled to make a steady advance in India’ to end off the Russian

advance which was 'knocking at the landward gates of the India' "Kalat Bolan Pass". India's strategic function in the British Empire was thus to act as a 'bridgehead' in Britain's military front against Russia (Mackinder, 1910, p. 43).

The British interest in the Khanate of Kalat developed mainly due to the regional geopolitical changes. Furthermore, it was further influenced strengthened by the betrayal of Ranjith Singh and the prospect of Shah Shujahas an unpopular ruler.

References

- Adamec, F. C. (2003). *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.
- Adye, J. (1897). *Indian Frontier Policy: an historical sketch*. London : Smith, Elder, & Co. .
- Alan Sharp, G. S. (2000). *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation*. London : Routledge .
- Axmann, M. (2009). *Back to the Future: the Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism, 1915-1955*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Baer, G. W. (1994). *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The US Navy, 1890–1990*. California : University of Stanford Press .
- Bakhsh, M. K. (1974). *Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan* . Karachi : Royal Book Company .
- Baloch, M. S. (1984). *History of Baloch Race and Balochistan* (3 ed.). Quetta: Khair-un-Nisa.
- Bayly, M. (2016). *Taming the Imperial Imagination: Colonial Knowledge, International Relations, and the Anglo-Afghan Encounter, 1808-1878*. New York : Cambridge University Press.
- Belmessous, S. (2015). *Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600-1900*. New York : Oxford University Press.
- Bryant, G. J. (2013). *Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation*. London : Boydell Press.
- Burnes. (1839). *Pol. no. 53 - "Report From Alexander Burnes of his visit with the khan of Khelat"*. (April 20,). Shaal: Foreign Department .
- Chacko, P. (2012). *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947-2004*. New York: Routledge.
- Chima, J. S. (2015). *Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia: Identities, Interests and Challenges to State Authority*. New York : Routledge.
- Connolly, A. (1834). *Journey to the North of India, Overland from England, through Russia, Persia and Afghanistan, 2 vol.* London: R. Bentley.
- Dashti, N. (2012). *The Baloch and Balochistan: a historical account from the Beginning to the fall of the Baloch State* . Trafford : Trafford Publishing .
- Davis, H. (1926). *The Great Game in Asia: 1800-1844*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Dolan, B. (2000). *Exploring European Frontiers: British Travellers in the Age of the Enlightenment*. london: Macmillan.
- Evans, L. (1829). *On the Practicability of an Invasion of British India*. London: Comhill.
- Evans, M. (2010). *Securing the Indian Frontier in Central Asian: Confrontation and Negotiation, 1855-95*. New York : Routledge .
- Eyre, V. S. (1879). *The Kabul Insurrection*. London: WM. H. Allen & Co.

- Foreign Department – Secret No. 126: "Correspondence to Maddock from Macnaghten".* (March, 18, 1839). Bombay .
- Harris, J. (1996). *A Scientific Frontier for India: Background to the Forward Policy of Nineties* (Vol. 1). Canadian Journal of History.
- Heather Bolton, S. S. (2007). *New perspectives on Pakistan: visions for the future*. Karachi : Oxford University Press .
- Howse, D. (Ed.). (1990). *Background to Discovery: Pacific Exploration from Dampier to Cook*. University of California Press.
- James, T. G. (2003). *Napoleon and Egyptology: Britain's Debt to French Enterprise*. London: British Museum.
- Jayapalan, N. (2008). *Economic History of India: ancient to present day* . New Delhi : Atlantic Publishers & Distributors Pvt Ltd.
- Kalayil, P. (1997). *British Relations with the Khanate of Kalat, Balochistan: 1838-1882*. Michigan: A Bell & Howell Information Company.
- Khalifin, A. (1964). *Russia's Policy in Central Asia: 1857-68* . London: Central Asian Research.
- Khan, M. A. (1975). *Inside Balochistan: a Political Autobiography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi:Khan-e-Balochistan-XIII*. Karachi: Royal Book Company.
- Lambert, M. (2007). *Afghanistan and Northwest Frontier*. Kabul : Military Press.
- Leech, R. (1843). *A Brief History of Kalat, Brought Down to the Disposition and Death of Mehrab Khan, Braho-Ee*. Bengal: Asiatic Society of Bengal.
- Mackinder, H. (1910). *India: Eight Lectures*. London: George Philip & Son.
- MacNeil, J. (1836). *The Progress and Present Position of Russia in East* . London: R. Bentley .
- Malcolm, J. (1801). *Dispatch to Lord Elgin, British Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte Factory Records* . London: British Library.
- Masson, C. (1844). *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, The Punjab and Kalat, during a Residence in those Countries, in four volumes* . London: Richard Bentley.
- Mathur, Y. B. (2008). *British Administration of Punjab, 1849-75*. Delhi : Surjeet Book Depot .
- Naseer, G. K. (2010). *Tareekh e Balochistan (History of Balochistan)* (5 ed., Vol. 1). Quetta: Kalat Publishers and Book Salers.
- Norris, J. (2010). *The First Afghan War, 1838-1842*. London : Cambridge University Press.
- Paget, M. a. (1884). *Expeditions versus the Northwest Frontier Tribes* . London: Naval Military Press.
- Plumb, J. (1975). *The Impact of the American Revolution on Great Britain. In L. o. Congress, The Impact of the American Revolution Abroad* . Hawaii : University Press of the Pacific Honolulu .

- Popplewell, R. (1995). *Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-1924*. London : Frank Cass.
- Riddick, J. F. (2006). *The History of British India: A Chronology*. London : Praeger .
- Romanovsky, M. (1870). *Notes on the Central Asian Questions*. Calcutta: Government Press.
- Rudé, B. G. (1985). *Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Aristocracy and the Bourgeois Challenge*. Harvard : Harverd University Press .
- Sayed, J. H. (2007). The British Advent in Balochistan. *Pakistan Journal of History and culture* , xxviii (2), 51-76.
- Scott, S. F. (1976). *French aid to American Revolution: An Exhibition in Commemoration of a Victorious Alliance*. Michigan : William L. Clements Library.
- Serebrenniko, G. (1884). *Turkestan Lands: A Collection of Papers for the History of its Conquest*.
- Spielvogel, J. J. (2013). *Western Civilization: A Brief History* (8th Edition ed.). Pennsylvania : Cengage Learning.
- Swidler, N. (2014). *Remotely Colonial: History and Politics in Balochistan* . Karachi : Oxford University Press.
- Thornton, E. (1842). *The History of the British Empire in India. London*. London : W. H. Allen & Co. .
- Wellesley, A. (1877). *A Selection from the Despatches, Treaties and Other Papers of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G., During His Government of India*. London : Clarendon Press.
- Wilson, R. (1817). *A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Yapp, M. (1980). *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850*. London: Clarendon Press.

Chapter No. 2

2.1 The First Anglo-Afghan War and the Khanate of Kalat, 1838-54

The First Anglo-Afghan War was a disastrous conflict in which the British-Indian Empire sought to extend its 'sphere of influence' and 'control' over Kandahar (Afghanistan) and check the Russian expansion and ambitions of warm waters. (Haider, 2007, pp. 53-86) In historical process of change it is hard to believe that only a cause cannot change the history of a nation. As a historian, it must be one's most important duty to prioritize all nearest causes of an event which contribute for happening or causing change in the realm of history. Likewise, in the history of British frontier policy toward the Khanate of Kalat, the most dominant cause of this 'conflict' was the 'fear' of Russian sphere of influences over the region (Shahvar, 2006, p. 330). The British were alarmed by the Russian moves in Central Asia. They thought that the presence of Russian Empire, mostly in Persia and Afghanistan, will help to provoke instability inside India which so dear to them due to her wealth and geopolitical location. To secure her 'so called' security, the British Empire tried to befriend with the Afghan King of that time Amir Dost Mohammad, but he was only ready to accept British friendship if they were ready to help him achieve his lost territory to Sikhs – the city of Peshawar. The British could not fulfill his condition; therefore, as a diplomatic move to frighten the British to accept his conditions, Dost Mohammad invited the Russian representative. (Sayed, 2007, pp. 53-86)

This chapter (2nd Chapter) of the research tries to explain the British invasion of Afghanistan because of Russian fears and discuss the impacts of first Anglo-Afghan war on the Khanate of Kalat and the political situation of the days. The first Anglo-Afghan war was not that much disastrous for the Afghans, as much it was disastrous

and destructive for the Baloch and the Khanate of Kalat politically. The Baloch Khan of those days Mir Mehrab Khan was killed in the Battle of Safeguarding Baloch State and its sovereignty from foreign invader British India (Janmahmad, 1989, p. 193). In the aftermath of the Afghan War on mere accusations which later had been proved conspiracies and that the Khan was not aware of any such trickery. After the death of Mehrab Khan, the Baloch State was occupied by the British. The impacts of Anglo-Afghan War can be felt even today. This chapter will show that how the British strategist, to obtain the control of the state of Kalat, played different games to invade and occupy the Khante of Kalat and the reasons behind their occupation of the Baloch State too.

The First Anglo-Afghan War was fought between the British and Afghanistan from 1839 to 1842. It was one of the first military conflicts during the “Great Game”, a treacherous game played out between Russia and the Great Britain for influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. This war is also known as ‘Auckland’s folly’ as 4,500 British forces plus 12,000 of their camp followers was killed by the Afghan tribal fighters – it was one of the first disastrous defeat the Great Britain Empire ever faced (Norris J. I., 1967, p. 14).

2.2 Background of First Anglo-Afghan War.

The nineteenth century was a period of colonial competition between the Russian and British Empires for creating their ‘sphere of influence’ in Central and South Asia commonly referred to the “Great Game”. In 1837, the British policy-makers were alarmed by the civil-strife in Afghanistan and Sindh and the rising power of Punjab raised the threat of Russian advance to India through Afghanistan. Russian moves in Central Asia and their diplomatic missions in Afghanistan and Persia were seen as a

possible danger to the British Indian-possession. To counter the rising threat Russia, the British sued to send her emissary Sir Alexander Burnes to secure an agreement with Dost Mohammad, the Afghan Amir, against Russia.

Dost Mohammad was ready but on the condition that the British to retake his lost territory of Peshawar against the powerful Sikh ruler of Punjab Ranjit Singh, but the British could not agree to his demand on two condition: one the Ranjit Singh was an ally, the second that the British feared Dal Khalsa, the Sikh army more than the Afghan tribal levy. The British could not have an alliance with both the Sikh and the Afghans at the same time, and they preferred the latter (Sayed, 2007, p. 56).

The unsuccessful attempt to gain the British support to fight the Sikhs, the Afghan Amir turned to the Russian Representative Count Vitkevich. The British did not like his move. In fact, Dost Muhammad's move was a purely diplomatic tactic to force the British to make alliance with him against Ranjit Singh (Duggal, 2001, p. 70). The proof was that the Russian and Afghan talks ended in 1838 without any result and the Russians engaged the Persian Shah to regain the possession of Herat.

However, the Russian move toward Iran was alarming for the British policy-makers; they thought the Russians were now definitely coming to India via Herat. Their fears were substantiated by a combined Iranian-Russian siege of Herat. But soon the siege of Herat was lifted when the British threatened the Qajar Shah of military action. Though, later on, it became clear that the Russians were not involved in this strategic move. (Sayed, 2007, pp. 53-86)

At this time, Lord Auckland planned to dethrone Dost Mohammad by force and place the Shah Shujah on the throne of Afghan Kingdom because he was more in favor of British. To achieve this, the British along with Shah Shujah, signed a treaty with the

ruler of Punjab, Maharaja Ranjit Singh. However, the British did not disclose the news to public. When they were asked about their intentions, they declined to comment, or simply said that they were supporting righteous claims of Shah Shujah, not interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan. On October 1, 1838, the Governor Lord Auckland issued the "Simla Declaration" which was a clear attack on the Kingdom of Dost Mohammad. The pretext was that Dost Mohammad has attacked the Kingdom of Ranjit Singh, their old ally. Auckland spread the perception that Shah Shujah was popular in Afghanistan and his subjects were passionately awaiting his return (Perry, 2005, p. 112). Though after the end of Herat Siege, there was no justification to invade Afghanistan but Auckland was committed to not stop short of installing his favorite King and turning Afghanistan completely into the British 'sphere of influence' (Perry, 2005, pp. 112-113). The Sepoy of East India Company and the well-trained Sikh troops were assembled in 'Ferozpur' on 25 November, the 'Grand Army of Indus' was ready to March to Afghanistan restoration of the dethrone legitimate ruler of the Afghans, in the words of Lord Auckland, but in fact, to establish the British 'sphere of influence' (Naseer M. G., 2000, p. 62).

2.3 Invasion of Afghanistan

In December 1838, the 'Grand Indus Army' which included 21,000 British Indian troops set out from Punjab to Afghanistan under the command of Sir John Keane, subsequently replaced by Cotton and Elphinstone. McNaughton marched along as the selected would-be representative of the British-Indian Government in the Kingdom of Shah Shujah. The army also included 38,000 camp followers and an immense number of camels (Evans, 2002, p. 63).

By late March, the British troops had reached the Khanate of Kalat, securing a treaty with Mehrab Khan, marched towards Kandahar (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.). After almost a month, they stationed at Kandahar and began their march in June 1839 towards the Ghazni fortress (Perry, 2005, p. 116). Before they reached the fortress, they were attacked by a group of Ghazis whom the British forces laced with modern weapon caught and brought to Shah Shujah. One of them had a knife hidden under his pants and stabbed a minister of Shah Shujah. What followed was horrific and rightly called by the famous British Historian Sir John Kaye as an act of “wanton barbarity” (Perry, 2005, p. 117). Shah Shujah had all them beheaded.

On 22 July 1839, the British forced attacked and took the Ghazni fortress. With the city gates broken, the British troops marched in a jubilant mood. They lost 200 men and murdered 500 Afghans and wounded and imprisoned an unknown number. The Afghan Amir, Dost Mohammad, seeing that his troops were defeated, fled to Bukhara. After thirty years, with the British power, Shah Shujah was once again enthroned in Kabul in August 1839 as the Amir of Afghanistan (Perry, 2005, p. 121). The Afghan War became a turning point for the British Indian army to have almost authority over the Khanate of Kalat official affairs, and the Khan of Kalat Mir Mehrab Khan proved himself as a brave, courageous, and great leader of his ancestor by sacrificing his live for the safeguard of traditional state of Kalat.

2.4 The invasion of the Khanate of Kalat

After the successful installation of Shah Shujah, on November 13, 1838, the Indian column of the British troops was ordered to leave for India. On their journey back to home, the Bombay Division was ordered to punish the Khan of Kalat for his dishonoring the treaty of 1839. (Appendix III) These orders were issued by Sir John

Keane as a form of reprisal, as according to him and his officials; the Khan had been disloyal to the British. Though, the British had already abolished the treaty, even without informing the Khan of Kalat. According to the British officials, this punitive action against the Khan was taken because of several reasons. They blamed the Khan for inciting the unruly tribes to tease and create troubles for the British troops while they were passing through "Bolan Pass"; to loot the provisions stored for British troops as well as ordered his men to attack Burnes and take away the treaty from him while he was returning to his camp; that he had also ordered the shopkeepers not to trade with the British for necessary goods and demanded the Karachi port be returned to him.

2.5 Events leading to the Invasion of Kalat

After defeating Dost Mohammad and deciding to leave some 'regular troops' at Shah Shujah's service, Keane and McNaughton were also considering "the steps to be taken against Khan of Kalat Mir Mehrab Khan." (Norris J. I., 1967, p. 134). When the British troops began the March towards Afghanistan in order to replace Dost Mohammad with Shah Shujah, they faced logistic problems while in Kachi, and passing through 'Bolan Pass', they were attacked by the Baloch tribesmen. And the British think tanks were up the view that this attacked had been taken under the suggestion and supervision of khanate of Kalat Khan Mir Mehrab Khan. Later on, it became clear that the attacks were instigated and arranged by Akhund Muhammad Hassan (He was a high official of Khan of Kalat) to create mistrust between the British and the Khan. The British held Mehrab Khan responsible for the violation of the treaty. The British Commander Burnes and Shah Shujah wrote to the Khan about the difficulties the Army of Indus was facing while travelling through his territory and accused the Khan with harsh words about his complacency in the matter. The Khan tried to diffuse the situation by sending Mullah Muhammad Hassan to British camp in Shikarpur. Instead of defending the

Khan, Mullah Muhammad Hassan tried to incite the British against the Khan of Kalat. He made the British officials and Shah Shujah believe that the Khan was secretly asking the tribes to make hurdles for the Army of the Indus. He also assured the British of his full support if they took any action against the Khan, and according to Naseer and Dehwar, it was to avenge the murder of his father and brother who had been killed on the orders of the Khan. While returning to Kalat, he reported the Khan that the British were planning to install Mir Shahnawaz, a pretender to the throne, replacing him as the ruler of the Khanate. He advised the Khan that the best way of dealing with them was to confront the British forces while they were passing through Bolan Pass. In the meantime, he circulated orders with the official stamps to various tribal chiefs to stop the British advance towards Quetta. This was done without the knowledge and information of the Khan of Kalat Mir Mehrab Khan. Khan of Kalat was completely unaware of his official Mullah Muhammad Hussain "Secret Plan" of overthrowing the Khan from the throne which resulted his death.

The Khan, despite the provocations of his prime minister, decided to visit Quetta to meet the British officials and Shah Shujah to diffuse the situation arising after the attacks on the British convoys in Kachi and Bolan areas. However, to subvert any reconciliation effort, the conspirators headed by Mullah Muhammad Hassan, meanwhile, arranged an attack on the camp of Alexander Burnes while he was returning to Quetta from Kalat. This event was the watershed *vis-à-vis* the relationship between the British and the Khanate of Khan as the conspirators assured the British that this act of vandalism was on the orders of the Khan of Kalat. Reacting to this event, the British unilaterally annulled their agreement with the Khan and decided to deal with him once they were done with Afghanistan (Masson, 1844, p. 99).

2.6 Occupation of Kalat

After Shah Shujah was restored, the Bombay division of the 'Grand Army' of the Indus was ordered to leave for India, meanwhile, Major-General Thomas Wilshire was ordered to undertake "a punitive expedition to Kalat town" (Swidler, 2014, p. 51). Before reaching Kalat, the British demanded the surrender of the Khan in a humiliating letter, which was rejected by the Khan immediately (Naseer, 2010, p. 143). The Khan tried to mobilize, but as the chiefs were already antagonized, he could not assemble sufficient troops to defend the city. Instead, some of the tribal chiefs in Sarawan welcomed the invading army and supplied the British forces with provisions. Some of the tribes from Jhalawan and Kharan indeed mobilized in support of the Khan, but it was too late.

On November 5, 1839, the British troops assaulted the Mirri Fort in capital Kalat after intensive bombardment. Mir Mehrab Khan II and his limited force offered stubborn resistance against the invaders. The Khan embraced death fighting with British Lashkar (Troops) typically according to the "Balochi Way" by walking in full view toward the enemy firing lines. Every member of his besieged force perished under heavy shelling and hand-to-hand fight with the British forces. The misinformation and distortions have created a hateful image of the Khan in the eyes of the Britain. N. J. Norris sketches by noting an account given by one Emily Eden:

"The Khan of Kalat was by way of being our ally and assistant, and, professing friendship did himself the pleasure of cutting off the supplies of the army, when it was on its way to Kabul; set his followers on to rob the camp, correspond with Dost Mohammad, etc.". She adds: "The Khan and his principal chiefs died sword in hand, which was rather too fine a death for such a double traitor as he has been."

But by defending his country and sacrificing his life in a heroic way and not surrendering to the enemy when death was inevitable, Mir Mehrab Khan II became one

of the revered personalities in the Baloch history by Safeguarding the Baloch State on the cast of his life from foreign invaders. The Baloch forgot all his mistakes and rallied around his son to revenge his death. However, with the martyrdom of Mir Mehrab Khan II and occupation of Kalat by the British, drastic changes occurred not only in the Baloch politics but the long colonial rule changed the fabrics of a tribal society beyond recognition.

While the external situation surrounding the Khanate of Kalat developed the interest of the British in the Kalat state, the internal factors of instability and strife made easy the occupation of Kalat. After Naseer Khan, the Great, all the succeeding Khans-e-Baloch failed to integrate the tribal chiefs and tribesmen in the state machinery. Beginning with Mir Mahmud Khan, the policies of the state were formulated thus by the foreign advisors, especially vengeful Afghans, that the tribal chiefs, the main strength of the Khan, were deliberately antagonized and alienated. They were never consulted on the external and intersnal matters of vital interest. Shortsighted as they were, they not only approached the foreign powers to weaken the position of Khan but also supported them physically and economically. Also by blindly trusting and following his advisors, the Khan found himself alone when the British invaders knocked at his door. Had he been wise and not angered his tribal chiefs, his backbone and strength, the British forces could not have conquered the Khanate of Kalat so easily. The proof of this claim is the later resistance under the command of Naseer Khan II, son of the deceased Khan, when the Baloch tribal chiefs and tribesmen, on realization, passionately participated and stubbornly resisted the British and dethroned their installed Khan.

The British blamed that the Khan was disloyal to the British; he had not honored the agreement he had signed and provoked his tribesmen to loot and plunder the British troops while passing through the Bolan Pass. They also blamed him for staging the

attack on Burnes and snatching the treaty signed between the two. But a thorough analysis proved that such accusations were unfounded. McNaughton was already up against the Khan, as Norris argues, even before the attack on the camp of Burnes. He writes that when Sir. A. Burnes returned from Kalat with the new agreement, what he found was startling for him. He found that:

“McNaughton had already lodged an official complaint to the Governor-General about the conduct of Mir Mehrab Khan and had made argument for dealing with him. By this time McNaughton had clearly stated that his mind Mir Mehrab Khan was the ‘cruel enemy’ of the British” (Norris J. L., 1967, p. 264).

This account is proof enough that the British officials held differing views. Some of them wanted an agreement but some others like McNaughton favored the occupation of Kalat. By now, argues Norris, “it was useless for to plead that Mir Mehrab Khan’s subjects were themselves short of food due to poor harvest in 1838, and that there was little or no grain to be found in the Khanate of Kalat. It was useless to argue that the Baloch tribesmen without any order of Khan would plunder and murder the traders went through the area” (Norris J. L., 1967, p. 264). So, it proves that the allegations against the Khan were not the underlying reason that prompted the British to invade and occupy the Khanate of Kalat but the geostrategic location of the Baloch state that attracted the British defense policy makers. They had others reasons to wage a war on the Khanate as it was in their interest to have a foothold in the Khanate to manage the lines of communication smoothly. McNaughton wanted a quarrel with Mehrab Khan for another reason. The reason was as Norris claims: “Kalat, Shal, Mastung and Kachi commanded the lines of communication between Sindh and Kandahar”. It is not surprising, therefore, to observe McNaughton, at the beginning of April urging “the annexation of the last three and an operation of retribution against the first. The

occupied territory would be given to the domains of Shah Shujah and a friendly ruler would be established in Kalat" (Norris J. I., 1967, p. 265).

From the above account, it is clear that the reason for British invasion of Kalat were not the conspiracies hatched up by his Vizir, Mullah Muhammad Hassan though they had played an important part in the process, these distortions and intrigues were secondary reasons. Furthermore, the occupation of Kalat was important as long as the British were in Afghanistan, till the treaty of 1854, its role as "an independent player in the unfolding 'Great Game' between Imperial Britain and Czarist Russia was ignored" (Axmann, 2009, p. 29). The British interest began in Kalat only to open 'lines of communication with the Afghans'. After they were defeated in Afghanistan, they found it unnecessary to consume time and energy in the Baloch Khanate. They claim that the 'betrayal' of Khan forced them to take military action against him was baseless misleading and manipulative. They had already planned the invasion of Kalat to secure their lines of communication as they did not trust the Khan and his authority to do the same for the British.

2.7 Aftermath of Kalat Occupation

Once the Kalat was occupied, the British policy-makers took several measures to strengthen their hold over the Khanate directly or indirectly. These measures included installation of Shahnawaz Khan as the ruler of Kalat State, the appointment of a regent, and a treaty to legitimizing their actions. Meanwhile the Baloch recovered from the shock caused by the brutal and humiliating murder of the Khan and rallied under the command of Naseer Khan II against the occupiers. Many tribes rebelled against the British and rejected their puppet Khan, Mir Shahnawaz Khan. Through stubborn resistance, the Baloch liberated Kalat, though minimally, and forced the British to

recognize Mir Naseer Khan 2nd as the legitimate ruler of Kalat. Though, with the signing of the treaty of 1841, the Khanate formally became a British protectorate.

2.8 Installation of Shah Nawaz

After the occupation of the Khanate of Kalat, the British installed their favorite and puppet, Mir Shah Nawaz Khan and appointed Loveday as the regent having the actual powers. Predictably, under the so-called Khan the division of Kalat began. Over here the British allegations and claims that they invaded Kalat to punish the Khan for his disloyalty and dishonoring the treaty of safe passage appear mere excuses. As Inayatullah Baloch rightly claims that even though the British discovered the conspiracy hatched by Mullah Muhammad Hassan for revenge, still, they occupied the Kalat, they installed Shahnawaz Khan, a rival pretender to the throne, as the ruler of Kalat. Logic, morality and justice, as they claimed to held, demanded that the British admitted and made due redress to Mir Mehrab Khan's family and nominated Shahnawaz Khan as the rightful ruler of the Kalat state (Baloch, 1987, p. 131). By ignoring all reason and morality, the British proved that the invasion of Kalat was pre-planned.

2.9 First Baloch Resistance Against British

Once on the throne, Shahnawaz Khan surrendered the most important territories of Kachi, Mastung and Shal in favor of Shah Shujah as a sign of gratitude to the British. He also signed an agreement with the British which declared Kalat as a vassal of Shah Shujah, the newly British-installed Afghan Amir (Dashti, 2012, p. 220). Dismembering Kalat was the most unjust act of Auckland, also a disaster. Not only "Shal, Mastung and Kachi had been most abruptly lost away from Kalat State territories and given to the Afghan newly enthroned ruler Shah Shujah in 1839" (Norris J. I., 1967, p. 328) but

also “the states of Kalat which the Brahui chiefs held rent-free (except for feudal military obligations) under Mir Mehrab Khan had been made subject to rent under Shah Shuja” (Norris J. I., 1967, p. 333). The occupation of Kalat, and the subsequent division of Baloch land plus the ‘rent’ demanded by Shah Shuja caused a huge resistance against the British and Shahnawaz headed by Mir Naseer Khan II, the son of the slain Khan. Almost all of the powerful and self-respecting tribes were with him. By now the British officials recognized that the Baloch considered him their ruler and were ready to offer any sacrifice for him. Therefore, the British officials tried to eliminate this popular fugitive. They bribed other tribes friendly and cooperative with them and also made several direct attempts on his life but could not harm him. When his movement spread across Balochistan, he finally established his camp in Mastung and started arrangements for a final cut on Kalat (Dashti, 2012, p. 221).

By 1840, the whole Balochistan was up against the British and their puppet Khan. The stubborn and mighty Marri tribe despised the Baloch territory to be ruled by Afghanistan. There was a full-pledged revolt. The British retaliated by using modern artillery but to no avail. Though many Marri tribesmen were put down and an unknown number got injured or disabled, they did not give up engaging and fighting against the British forces. The British forced occupied the Kahan Fort and its immediate areas. The Marri forces used the guerrilla tactics of ambush and hit and run. Near Filiji, they ambushed a British convoy and killed almost whole of it. In the end of August, the Marri forces engaged the incoming contingent near Nafsuk Pass in Filiji and caused heavy casualties to the British. Ill-equipped, the Marri forces suffered a lot in the hands of British troops. Major Brown started negotiations with the Marri tribes’ chiefs to let the British forces leave the Kahan, realizing their weakness; they agreed (Naseer, 2010, p. 212).

The people of Sarawan and Kachi also mobilized forces and formed a 'formidable opposition'. The Dombk is of the Kachi used their traditional tactics of hit-run and night raids. They were successful in teasing and damaging the morale of British troops to some extent but soon Mir Bijar Domki, their leader, was deceived and arrested. Thus, their opposition ceased to be effective. The people of Sarawan whose chiefs had extended support to the invaders were ashamed by the general revolt against the invaders, therefore, against the decision of their chiefs, they stood up to have a share in the uprising equally. They attacked a British convoy near Mastung and it was destroyed (Dashti, 2012, p. 223).

Finally, Mir Naseer Khan 2nd after mobilization proceeded towards Kalat. The British regent Loveday organized the Baloch soldiers who were loyal to British and prepared to defend Kalat from falling into the hands of Mir Naseer Khan. On 25 July, 1840, Mir Naseer Khan attacked Kalat. The British soldiers put up a fight, after three days, Loveday, option-less and helpless, surrendered the Fort as well as the city. He was imprisoned along with the British traveler Charles Masson and Naseer Khan was formally proclaimed the ruler of Kalat by the tribal chiefs at Miri.

Hearing the news, the British officials dispatched a contingent under the command of Lt. Hamersley. They failed to reach on time in order to stop the fall of Kalat, as they were delayed by a Baloch force near Mastung. By the time they suppressed this obstacle, they were informed about the fall of Kalat. They returned to Quetta.

After capturing Kalat, Mir Naseer Khan tried to mobilize and attack Quetta and end the British presence in Baloch State but failed to get the required sources and forces, as the Sarawan chiefs were not willing to go so far in their resistance against the British.

Therefore, he asked for peace. But the conditions the British offered were humiliating and unacceptable, the initiative for peace failed.

Failing to secure a deal, Mir Naseer Khan proceeded towards Kachi and Gandava – the regions integral for the sustainability of his government. Many confrontations took place but no force could overpower or completely defeat the other. In this stalemate, the British offered for negotiations. However, the khan was deceived; all the British wanted was to distract him from mobilizing his tribal forces and eliminate him in a surprise attack. Fortunately, the Khan escaped but this battle proved extremely disastrous for the Khanate forces caught unaware. More than seven hundred tribal fighters and elites were treacherously murdered by the cunning British officials. Around this time, when the communications between the Khan and the tribesmen disconnected, Mr. Loveday was killed in the prison by his bodyguards.

By November 3, 1840, the Khanate of Kalat was re-occupied by the British forces and Col. Stacey was appointed as the political agent in Kalat. In hindsight, Col. Stacey realized that peace and stability was not possible without a permanent settlement. The protracted uprising would continue till adjustment. Therefore, he began a serious peace process with Mir Naseer Khan. After successful negotiations, a treaty was eventually signed on October 6, 1841. This was a total agreement of submission to the British and their protégé Shah Shujah. According to this treaty, the British recognized Mir Naseer Khan as the legitimate ruler of Kalat and, in return, he agreed to proclaim himself a vassal of Shah Shujah. The areas annexed with Afghanistan were given back to the Khanate of Kalat and Sibi was retained by the East India Company. Last but not least, it was agreed that the British government would station troops in Quetta and that the British political agent would control the foreign relations of the Khanate as well as help to run it (Baloch, 1987, p. 131).

The treaty of 1841 was a treaty sufficiently stringent – a death blows to the freedom of Balochistan. It was a Carthaginian peace (Baluch, 1984, p. 98). With the signing of the treaty, the Baloch Khanate lost its independence and came under the semi-direct rule of the British-Indian Empire, and the Khan of Kalat also lost his authority to the representative of the British Empire, as the decisions of minor or major importance were taken by the British agent.

After resolving the issues with the British, the Khan of Kalat took some initiatives to give strength to his authority over the state and made efforts to normalize the law and order situation in the state. Perhaps, on the initiative of the British, he began to reconcile the rebellious Marri tribe. He visited Kachi to meet the Marri chief who pledged to respect the Khanate regulations and support the Khan militarily in case it was asked to do so.

Meanwhile, the dethroned Khan, Mir Shahnawaz Khan, had been busy gathering assistance among the Baloch tribes and from the rulers of Sindh. Despite that he failed to assemble enough force to challenge Mir Naseer Khan II in a meaningful way. He was arrested and later killed in prison on the orders of the Khan.

2.10 Aftermath of First Afghan War

After restoring Shah Shujah, the British sensed that only through the presence of the British army he will remain King. Therefore, they stationed 8,000 British troops in Afghanistan. Such overwhelming presence of the British troops in Afghanistan gave rise to a feeling of resentment in Afghan society, and they rose against both the British and Shah Shujah (Macrory, 2002, p. 203).

Situation deteriorating day by day, the British troops started their withdrawal on January 1, 1842. All the departing troops and camp followers were attacked and

massacred by the Ghilzai tribesmen, only one doctor William Brydon made his way back home (Blackburn, 2008, p. 121).

After this destruction and the death of Shah Shujah, the treaty of 1841 with the Khan of Kalat lost all value, therefore, Lord Ellenborough instructed Outram, the British Political officer in charge of Kalat affairs to inform the Khan that the October 1841 treaty was abrogated but that a policy of friendship and non-interference had been adopted towards the Khanate of Kalat (Baloch, 1987, pp. 131-132).

The British had invaded the Khanate of Kalat to secure the lines of communication to Kandahar. After their defeat in Afghanistan, they had no immediate need of the Khanate as no longer they required maintaining any contact with that country. With that, they curtailed their interference in the affairs of Kalat. Now all they required was a peaceful and stable Khanate working under the orders of the British-Indian Government. By now Afghanistan and the Khanate of Kalat had lost their importance and now they were abandoned completely on their own, as they've already turned their 'forward policy' towards Sindh and Punjab because of their commercial and strategic importance.

Sir Charles Napier, the agent of Ellenborough's government in Sindh, adopted an aggressive policy towards the Amir of Sindh, demanding control over the areas of Karachi, Sakkur and Shikarpur. Napier's policy led to the war of Miani where 2,800 British forces fought and prevailed over a host of 20,000 followers of the Amirs of Sindh, thus conquering Sindh without any difficulty. Though the resident Outram lambasted Lord Ellenborough's policy and he was recalled soon but Sindh remained under the British rule. By 1843, the conquest of Sindh was completed. With this, the British were brought into direct contact with Balochistan.

By now the principal target of the British 'forward policy' was Punjab, an ally that has refused passage to the British troops in the final hours. For the British, the "Khyber Pass" was more appropriate and practical to reach Kabul. At that time, Ranjit Singh was the ruler and powerful enough to threaten while going to war with the Afghans. By this time, Ranjit Singh was no more and the state of Punjab was in internal turmoil. British policy-makers were divided over the issue of Punjab. Some were in favor of making a Punjab buffer but McNaughton, the advocate of an Afghan buffer, favored the occupation of Punjab and checking her expansion towards Kalat, Afghanistan and Tibet. Eventually, the situation in Punjab solved the dispute, and the British occupied the state. The occupation of Punjab brought the British-Indian Empire in direct contact with Afghanistan (Baloch, 1987, p. 132).

With the merger of Sindh and Punjab, the borders of the British Empire were extended to Kalat and Afghanistan. By 1851, John Jacob again took up the Kalat question. The hill tribes had thrown off the reins; the Brahui chiefs were again laboring to undermine the Khan's integrity. The Court of Directors after ripe considerations, approved that a light interference should be made so as to develop trade, but were not prepared to hear of any military advance. On receiving the minute, Jacob wrote to the Commissioner:

"With regard to supporting the Khan my opinions are unchanged. If the fire consuming our neighbor's house did not – would not spread to ours, we might perhaps let it burn disregarded, but as matters are, it might be sensible, in my opinion, to assist in extinguishing it".

By 1854, the war between England and Russia was highly expected and with the possession of Sindh and Punjab, the borders of the British-Indian Empire were extended to Kalat and Afghanistan. As obvious in the words of John Jacob, the British had to renew and redefine their policy towards the Khanate of Kalat and treat it as a separate link in the chain of buffer states the Indian administration hoped to establish, therefore,

they signed a new treaty with the Khan and adopted a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Khanate of Kalat. Under the terms of this treaty, the Khan was recognized as an independent ruler, but was also obliged to remain an ally and protect the British interests from external powers and allow the British to station troops anywhere in Kalat when need arose. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

References

- Adamec, F. C. (2003). *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.
- Adye, J. (1897). *Indian Frontier Policy: an historical sketch*. London : Smith, Elder, & Co. .
- Alan Sharp, G. S. (2000). *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation*. London : Routledge .
- Axmann, M. (2009). *Back to the Future: the Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism, 1915-1955*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Baer, G. W. (1994). *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The US Navy, 1890–1990*. California : University of Stanford Press .
- Bakhsh, M. K. (1974). *Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan* . Karachi : Royal Book Company .
- Baloch, M. S. (1984). *History of Baloch Race and Balochistan* (3 ed.). Quetta: Khair-un-Nisa.
- Bayly, M. (2016). *Taming the Imperial Imagination: Colonial Knowledge, International Relations, and the Anglo-Afghan Encounter, 1808-1878*. New York : Cambridge University Press.
- Belmessous, S. (2015). *Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600-1900*. New York : Oxford University Press.
- Bryant, G. J. (2013). *Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation*. London : Boydell Press.
- Burnes. (1839). *Pol. no. 53 - "Report From Alexander Burnes of his visit with the khan of Khelat"*. (April 20,). Shaal: Foreign Department .
- Chacko, P. (2012). *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947-2004*. New York: Routledge.
- Chima, J. S. (2015). *Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia: Identities, Interests and Challenges to State Authority*. New York : Routledge.
- Connolly, A. (1834). *Journey to the North of India, Overland from England, through Russia, Persia and Afghanistan, 2 vol*. London: R. Bentley.
- Dashti, N. (2012). *The Baloch and Balochistan: a historical account from the Beginning to the fall of the Baloch State* . Trafford : Trafford Publishing .
- Davis, H. (1926). *The Great Game in Asia: 1800-1844*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Dolan, B. (2000). *Exploring European Frontiers: British Travellers in the Age of the Enlightenment*. London: Macmillan.
- Evans, L. (1829). *On the Practicability of an Invasion of British India*. London: Cornhill.
- Evans, M. (2010). *Securing the Indian Frontier in Central Asian: Confrontation and Negotiation, 1855-95*. New York : Routledge .
- Eyre, V. S. (1879). *The Kabul Insurrection*. London: WM. H. Allen & Co.

- Foreign Department – Secret No. 126: "Correspondence to Maddock from Macnaghten".* (March, 18, 1839). Bombay .
- Harris, J. (1996). *A Scientific Frontier for India: Background to the Forward Policy of Nineties* (Vol. 1). Canadian Journal of History.
- Heather Bolton, S. S. (2007). *New perspectives on Pakistan: visions for the future*. Karachi : Oxford University Press .
- Howse, D. (Ed.). (1990). *Background to Discovery: Pacific Exploration from Dampier to Cook*. University of California Press.
- James, T. G. (2003). *Napoleon and Egyptology: Britain's Debt to French Enterprise*. London: British Museum.
- Jayapalan, N. (2008). *Economic History of India: ancient to present day* . New Delhi : Atlantic Publishers & Distributors Pvt Ltd.
- Kalayil, P. (1997). *British Relations with the Khanate of Kalat, Balochistan: 1838-1882*. Michigan: A Bell & Howell Information Company.
- Khalfin, A. (1964). *Russia's Policy in Central Asia: 1857-68* . London: Central Asian Research.
- Khan, M. A. (1975). *Inside Balochistan: a Political Autobiography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi:Khan-e-Balochistan-XIII*. Karachi: Royal Book Company.
- Lambert, M. (2007). *Afghanistan and Northwest Frontier*. Kabul : Military Press.
- Leech, R. (1843). *A Brief History of Kalat, Brought Down to the Disposition and Death of Mehrab Khan, Braho-Ee*. Bengal: Asiatic Society of Bengal.
- Mackinder, H. (1910). *India: Eight Lectures*. London: George Philip & Son.
- MacNeil, J. (1836). *The Progress and Present Position of Russia in East* . London: R. Bentley .
- Malcolm, J. (1801). *Dispatch to Lord Elgin, British Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte* *Factory Records* . London: British Library.
- Masson, C. (1844). *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, The Punjab and Kalat, during a Residence in those Countries, in four volumes* . London: Richard Bentley.
- Mathur, Y. B. (2008). *British Administration of Punjab, 1849-75*. Delhi : Surjeet Book Depot .
- Naseer, G. K. (2010). *Tareekh e Balochistan (History of Balochistan)* (5 ed., Vol. 1). Quetta: Kalat Publishers and Book Salers.
- Norris, J. (2010). *The First Afghan War, 1838-1842*. London : Cambridge University Press.
- Paget, M. a. (1884). *Expeditions versus the Northwest Frontier Tribes* . London: Naval Military Press.
- Plumb, J. (1975). *The Impact of the American Revolution on Great Britain. In L. o. Congress, The Impact of the American Revolution Abroad* . Hawaii : University Press of the Pacific Honolulu .

- Popplewell, R. (1995). *Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-1924*. London : Frank Cass.
- Riddick, J. F. (2006). *The History of British India: A Chronology*. London : Praeger .
- Romanovsky, M. (1870). *Notes on the Central Asian Questions*. Calcutta: Government Press.
- Rudé, B. G. (1985). *Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Aristocracy and the Bourgeois Challenge*. Harvard : Harvard University Press .
- Sayed, J. H. (2007). The British Advent in Balochistan. *Pakistan Journal of History and culture* , xxviii (2), 51-76.
- Scott, S. F. (1976). *French aid to American Revolution: An Exhibition in Commemoration of a Victorious Alliance*. Michigan : William L. Clements Library.
- Serebrenniko, G. (1884). *Turkestan Lands: A Collection of Papers for the History of its Conquest*.
- Spielvogel, J. J. (2013). *Western Civilization: A Brief History* (8th Edition ed.). Pennsylvania : Cengage Learning.
- Swidler, N. (2014). *Remotely Colonial: History and Politics in Balochistan* . Karachi : Oxford University Press.
- Thornton, E. (1842). *The History of the British Empire in India*. London. London : W. H. Allen & Co. .
- Wellesley, A. (1877). *A Selection from the Despatches, Treaties and Other Papers of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G., During His Government of India*. London : Clarendon Press.
- Wilson, R. (1817). *A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Yapp, M. (1980). *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850*. London: Clarendon Press.

Chapter No. 3

3.1 British 'Closed-border' policy in the Khanate of Kalat, 1854-1878

After the disastrous defeat in Afghanistan, British realizing that no westward expansion of colonial rule was warranted, the British policy-makers abandoned their expansionist policy for time being and treated the Khanate of Kalat at par with Afghanistan. From 1843 to 1851, their actions in the Khanate of Kalat “were largely those of a stronger neighbor concerned about its borders with the weaker and politically instable Khanate” (Kalayil, 1997, p. 144). Around 1851 two factors compelled the British-Indian Government to reconsider and redefine their Indian frontier policies towards the Khanate of Kalat. One was the internal unstable political situation of the Kalat State and the other one was the ever-worsening Crimean Crisis where a direct confrontation between the Imperial Britain and Russia was highly expected (Baluch, 1984, p. 98). Matters were in this uncertain state that the British-Indian Government felt the need to enhance their influence on the volatile and unchecked ‘western frontier’; hence, they modified the already dead treaty of 1841 and signed a new treaty with the Khan of Kalat on May 14, 1954 – which had been known as the Treaty of Mastung (Appendix IV) (Dashti, 2012, p. 228).

During this period, the British efforts to ‘solidify’ their influence over the Khanate of Kalat led them to rearrange the existing political order, and with this followed a series of events which not only led the Khanate of Kalat to the brink of anarchy and precipitated direct British interference but also played an important role defining the tripartite relations between three stake-holders – British-Indian Empire, the Khan and the tribal chiefs. Therefore, these, so far underrated events, deserve special analysis and

attention, which in return, help to understand the subsequent British conspiracies and manipulations in the Khanate of Kalat.

This chapter, (third Chapter) will describe and will try to explain different means and policies employed the British officials from Sindh and Punjab to expand and deepen their influence in the Khanate of Kalat which eventually paved the way for their intervention in the internal affairs of the Kalat State. To achieve their objects and goals, the British adopted the policy of strengthening the Khan at the expense of the Sardars in order to guarantee a 'buffer state' and have their commercial interests easily guarded. In the process, they went so far that a gulf between the traditional Sardars and the Khan widened so that no stone could bridge it. The Sardars revolted against the ruler of Kalat and in return received harsh treatment from their deviated Khan who with the backing of British, instead listening to their grievance and addressing them, crushed them with his hired mercenaries. The chapter will argue that though the British presence was already permeated but with the treaty of 1854 and the 'closed-border' policy, the British colonial rule extended to the Khanate of Kalat.

3.2 The Treaty of 1854 ⁵

Many factors unitedly compel the British thinkers to turn their focus on the northwest frontier once more. These included the less severe issue of 'raiding tribes' and anarchic situation in the Khanate of Kalat, and the reemerging problem of Russia threat in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Khanate of Kalat onward to the British Indian Empire in India. However, there were problems going on between the Noshervani chief and the Khan of Kalat, Mir Nasir Khan-II. The particular Sardar was helping those who had cooperated with the British during the years of resistance. They were trying to

⁵ for the treaty of 1854 checked Appendix, IV.

undermine the authority of the Khan. On the other hand, the unruly Marri and Bugti tribes of Kachi and border areas were involved in looting and raiding on the Punjab and Sindh border. These developments, coupled with the 'Russian fear' were disturbing for the British-Indian Government. They were also suspicious of Dost Mohammad, thinking that he might fall into the trap of Russians and cooperate with them to invade or destabilize the Indian possessions of the Great Britain (Awan, 1985, p. 62).

By 1851 when these problems were emerging, the borders of British Empire were extended to the Khanate of Kalat on one side, and to the Afghan Kingdom on the other side. Initially the British officials were not ready to entangle themselves in any permanent relation with the Khanate of Kalat, but the abovementioned developments, and the enlarged new borders and their security, force them to review their policies (Swidler, 2014, p. 51). With the occupation of Sindh in 1843 and the Punjab in 1849, the control of the 'legendary' "Khyber Pass" and some other Afghan areas formerly under the administered by Afghans came under the British administration. The annexation of these regions of commercial and strategic importance "meant that Kalat ... [was] now part parcel of the sensitive borderlands of British imperial India where the possibility of Russian meddling was induced a permanent state of imperial neurosis" (Tyogi, 2009, p. 14). Furthermore, with this extension, scores of Pashtoon and Baloch tribes came to the vicinity of British-Indian Empire.

It was then that the British policy of creating a frontier zone between Afghanistan and colonial directly administered areas came into force. This so-called "close border" policy, also known as "masterly inactivity," provided that no further westward expansion of direct colonial rule was possible or warranted, and therefore British sovereignty should not be extended to areas and tribes that could not be subdued and governed effectively i.e. "to keep the unwieldy tribes of the Frontier out of the British

territory” (Hopkins, 2014, p. 55). First implemented in Balochistan and later further north, the ‘closed border policy’ created a peculiar frontier zone—a narrow stretch of territory inhabited by Pashtun tribes (Tayub, 2010, pp. 33-34). The pioneers of the ‘closed border’ held that Frontier men ‘need to learn to fear the British Raj to be peaceably governed by it’.

To tackle the above problems, the British officials were compelled to secure a new treaty with the Khan of Kalat – Mir Nasir Khan-II. Under this treaty, the British-Indian government recognized the khan as an independent ruler and helped finance the reorganization of his military and civil institutions so that he could consolidate his authority over the tribes (Naseer, 2010, p. 193). It was also agreed that there would be continuous friendship between the British Government and the Khan of Kalat and that the Khan was to act in subordinate cooperation with the British Government. The Khan also agreed to protect the safe, to and for, passage of merchants between the British dominion and Afghanistan whether by way of Sindh or the “Seaport of Somyani” or other “Seaports of Makkuran”. The aims of the treaty were not to interfere in Kalat affairs directly; it rather allowed the Khan of Kalat to maintain peace in his territory for the safe passage of the British forces and their movements, (Khan, 2014, p. 174).

Treaty of Mastung stated that

“Whereas the course of events has made it expedient that a new agreement should be concluded between the British Government and Mir Naseer Khan, 2nd Chief of Kalat, the following Articles had been agreed on between the said government and His Highness”. (Dashti, 2012, pp. 228-30) – (for the detail of the treaty can see the Appendix)

This treaty was a disaster for the Khanate of Kalat and the Khan Mir Naseer Khan and his successors generally and for the Baloch State particularly. For the British policy-makers, the treaty was advantageous; they extracted whatever benefit possible from this

treaty. Months after the treaty, they started construction of a “cantonment in Khangarh (later renamed Jacobabad), and “the Khanate lost the territory forever” (Dashti, 2012, p. 230).

However, the only better side of this treaty was that the Khanate’s boundaries were redefined and the state of Lasbela was brought under the khanate of Kalat. Mir Nasir Khan, notwithstanding, severely disliked the invader’s policy and mostly the loss of Khangarh. Later on, he tried to raise a standing army like Nasir Khan the “Great” to regain full power and limit British influence and reclaim the important area of Khangarh. The British smelt the rat and planned to put him out of the arena. Mir Nasir Khan II died mysteriously in 1857. Sardar Khan writes that “One of the antagonists of the Khan let the cat out of the bag. In 1857, this heroic prince of Balochistan was poisoned through one-eyed, palsied, Rebec-faced Darogha, Gul Mohammad, who was conspired by Beebee Khadija, the mother of Khudadad Khan” (Baluch, 1984, p. 98). Mir Nasir Khan was traveling to Kalat from Gandava that he felt severe pain in his bladder. Gul Mohammad passed him some medicine which he took immediately. He suffered for two days and died in pain. Every time a strong personality trying to strengthen his state was murdered by his own treacherous people, thus impeding the national growth and power (Baluch, 1984, p. 99).

Nasir Khan’s death, through British diplomacy, showed that the British could not favor a strong and independent Khan – a Khan who could stand for his own national interest instead of British interests was considered an obvious threat. It also showed that the British could act out of the treaty, using double games and diplomatic tactics. The main purpose of the treaty of Mastung was succinctly and precisely summarized by Martin Axmann in the following words:

“Therefore, its political strategies consisted of not letting any military power [reads Khan of Kalat] arise in Balochistan comparable to the former Khanate of Kalat that could effectively counter their interests. In the endeavor to make the Khan, as the representative of [Kalat], dependent upon Great Britain, it was attempted to isolate him from the tribes by stimulating resistance [and disharmony] among them but, simultaneously, to protect him against the tribes’ larger numbers and, by means of treaties, bind him to the British Indian Government. This gave the British Empire the legitimate right to intervene in the event the Khan violated the agreements” (Axmann, 2009, p. 28).

Nasir Khan was ambitious, loyal, just and nationalistic. He had every quality that makes a great leader and Khan. Clearly, he was perceived a threat by the British because of the steps he was taking to restore national pride and reclaim national heritages. However, in the history such kind of courageous political head of the State had not been beneficial for the colonial ruler because ruler like Nasir Khan II had been reluctant to come under the foreign invaders influence through their ambiguous policies. His activeness and instinctiveness like a brave and loyal soldier of his land; therefore, he was to be eliminated. Naseer Khan II, fought against the rebelling Sardars, but did not commit any injustice. He never confiscated their estates and never charged them out of justice. Rather, he tried to accommodate them and win them over and bring them together to work for a greater national cause, every time, each time he encountered them.

After his preplanned death, the British helped the election of the immature Mir Khudadad Khan, who after ascending the throne took every step with British consultations. However, before discussing the state working under Khudadad, a little mention of the initial phase of ‘colonial engagement’ will be doing justice. During the first phase of colonial engagement in Balochistan the British sought a cheap, efficient, and centralized political structure in Kalat. They helped Nasir Khan (1841-1857) and Khudadad Khan (1857-1893) in their efforts to centralize power. The treaty of 1854 required the khan to maintain better control over the marauding Bugti and Marri tribes

that raided neighboring British-Indian districts. Sindh and Punjab had been conquered and annexed to British India in 1843 and 1846 respectively, and instability along the common border annoyed the British. In order to enforce his authority in more outlying areas of the khanate, the khan needed an independent military and political infrastructure (Aitchison, 1892, pp. 351-52). British subsidies were given and utilized to this effect. The khan raised and equipped a small mercenary force that was independent from the tribes and Sardars. He appointed officials loyal to him, tried to place members of royal family in Sardars ranks, attempted to regain land formerly granted to Sardars, and adopted measures to monopolize revenues.

From 1858 to 1868, the conducting of Kalat affairs was in the hands of Major H. Green, who regarded the khan as an absolute monarch of the "khanate of Kalat". He urged the khan to re-establish his authority, like his father, who had exerted it over all Balochistan. He pointed out to the khan that if the Iranian advances in Western Balochistan were not checked, the area of Makkuran would soon be lost. He observed that an enemy from Central Asia or Southwest Asia could threaten British India and the Perso-Oman Gulf. On his request, Mir Khudadad Khan went to Makkuran to consolidate his authority. With the help of the British Government, the Khan reorganized his army (Baloch, 1987, p. 133).

With the help of an organized army, the khan decided to check the influence of the Sardars. He resolved to confiscate all 'jagirs' from those Sardars who had failed to help Mir Mehrab Khan in 1839. He also decided to confiscate all those fiefs which had been taken by the tribal chiefs without a royal decree (Naseer, 2010, pp. 212-213). The Khan's actions resulted in unrest among the tribal chiefs and finally in a civil war between the khan and his chiefs. The British officials supported the khan against the rebel chiefs. Merewether the Commissioner in Sindh, instructed Col. Phayre, the

political superintendent for the Upper Sindh Frontier: "As long as the Khan of Kalat remains a free and independent sovereign, our great object is to increase his influence and strengthen his power within his country as much as we can". In his lengthy letter, the Commissioner wrote: "As long as the Khanate of Kalat is in the hands of one person, and that as at present only desires to act in accordance with the wishes of the British Government, we need feel no concern about the safety of our Indian frontier from north to south" (letter) (Naseer, 2010, pp. 240-241). Merewether's policy of non-intervention, even in grave internal disorder, was opposed by his subordinates.

"Col. Phayre wrote to the authorizes that the time had come for a reconsideration of the British frontier policy towards Kalat State in order to handle the valid grievances of the rebel chiefs: The Khan of Kalat was not an autocratic sovereign, but merely the head of a confederacy of chiefs and bound by the unwritten constitution of Nasir Khan Noori; yet the present Khan had throughout his reign been striving to make himself independent of the chiefs... without the countenance of the British Government the Khan's rule would be quickly overturned; ... it was, consequently, the duty of the Government, which virtually kept him on the throne, to see justice done between him and his discontented chiefs; ... apart from the question of duty, the chiefs were too powerful to be ignored" (Naseer, 2010, p. 240).

He warned the British Government that civil war in Kalat could harm British interests.

Phayre's immediate superior, Merewether, instead lending a listening ear to his views, lectured him in a lengthy letter:

"The Khan may be nominally the head of Baloch confederacy, but practically he is a sovereign head. At any cast, he is the sole representative with whom we have to deal, according to the treaty of 1854, was executed with him and him alone, and we have no right to interfere between him and his under ruled subjects. The Khan may not be a sole ruler ... but he has done his best to fulfill his treaty duties and it is not for us to criticize his behavior by raising a standing army for his State protection. The fact is Kalat is going through a phase which must inevitably occur when, in the progress of good government, feudal institutions come into collusion with the central power. Our policy should be to strengthen, not to weaken, the Khan's hand; above all we should carefully abstain from listening to representations from his rebellious subjects, and no intervention on their behalf should ever be thought of, unless preceded by their absolute submission" (Naseer, 2010, p. 241).

The interesting outcome of the tricking and deceiving the Sardars was 'a coalition of some stability and duration' under the effective leadership of Mullah Mohamad Raisani, a high ranking Sardar of Sarawan, to regain the lost estates of Kachi areas. Mullah Mohamad Raisani made a favorable impression on the administrator of Sindh, Sir William Merewether, perhaps because of his positive role of securing a safe passage for Khudadad Khan when he was deposed and later on recalling him to the throne. Merewether was himself a supporter of the institution of Khanate, unlike other officials, thinking that peace and security in the Khanate of Kalat is possible only when the traditional Khan has power over the local chiefs.

Owing to the disputes between the Khan and the local chiefs, there was 'anarchy and instability' in Makkuran, Kachi and Lasbela. There was underproduction and the Sardars and tribesmen were 'hard-pressed'. They could not continue their traditional way of posh life. To address these issues, the Sardars sought British assistance and asked for intervention in the year 1868. Under the administration of Merewether, the British officials were ready on the condition that the Khan should also ask for British mediation. The problems presented to the Political Superintendent of Upper Sindh, Col. Phayre, when he finally met Mullah Mohamad in March 1869. These complaints put the reality before us. When the official met to record the Sardars grievances, they made:

"A number of complaints against the Khan: he had failed to consult with the Sardars as was the custom; he had confiscated lands and other property and used them to support his mercenaries; he had suspended their allowances; he had failed to give compensation for the deaths of several notables", (Swidler, 2014, p. 54).

After listening to their complaints, Col. Phayre turned sympathetic towards these local chiefs and wrote to the authorities to reconsider the policy towards the Khan as he was committing injustice and barbarity on his own people but Merewether, a strong supporter of 'closed-border' policy, was untouched. Someone always recommending

the use of force, he thought the Khan did the right thing by confiscating the assets of the rebels. He did not agree to provide the role of the mediator and left the problem to the Khan to solve according to his own local ways. He did the same when the Sardars asked him again to mediate between them and the Khan after looting Quetta, Mastung and some other areas (Swidler, 2014, pp. 54-55). Merewether, a non-interventionist administrator, but one who believed in the use of force if the tribesmen resort to rebellion, refused their request as it was 'rewarding their rebellion'. He was opposed to outright rebellion; he thought the better way for the revolting chiefs was to talk directly but submissively with the Khan, instead of challenging his writ and power, however wrong and cruel he was. Merewether was in favor of using force against such chiefs and Sardars, and strongly against the methods of pacification employed by officials used in Punjab. He "contended that the Khan of Kalat was an independent khan of Kalat and that no interference should be allowed between Khan and under ruled chiefs, who should not be listened to unless they made unconditional surrender" (Bruce, 2002, p. 56).

Treating the khan as the sole political authority of the Kalat state was at the cost of the Sardars and the principle of tribal federation. Accordingly, the early decades of British intervention were marked by intense internal conflict, instigated by Sardars who saw British policy expanding the khan's position at the expense of their own. The Sardars staged numerous revolts and the khanate of Kalat faced internal divisions that led to numerous revolts, and the khanate faced internal division that led the brink of anarchy. Khudadad Khan, torn between establishing central authority in the khanship and preserving the traditional federation of power, had to expend much of his resources against these tribal revolts. The British began to assume the status of power broker between the Khan and his Sardars, and Anglo-Kalat relations increasingly defined

internal politics of the Khanate [Kalat]. By entering into the treaty of 1854, the Khan had put himself in a position [in] which he was acceptable to the British more than to the Sardars. The consequences of this policy manifested themselves in general insecurity which led to a permanent quasi-state of war among the tribes and, in process, weakened both them and the Khan militarily and economically, (Axmann, 2009, p. 29). The consequences of this policy manifested themselves in general insecurity which led to a permanent quasi-state of war among the tribes, and in the process, weakened both them and the Khan militarily and economically.

Though the colonial officials were well-aware that the concept of 'territorial border' was alien to Baloch and that there were only 'ill-defined tracts and zones of contestation' rife with factional disputes and raiding but they did not care about this fact. They also knew that 'the authority of local chiefs rose whenever the Khan's rule weakened'. As a historical lesson, they also had the example of Naseer Khan Noori – a powerful Khan under whose rule there was calm, prosperity and stability because he had power and authority over his chiefs and tribesmen. But they ignored all these historical realities for their own vested interests, (Swidler, 2014, p. 52).

The British, in fact, did not want a peaceful neighbor, as claimed, but one, divided, subservient and dependent upon their decisions and orders; not just a stable country that would 'defer to their regional interests and respect state borders'. On the other hand, what the British wanted was served on a plate by the enemies of the Khan: the excuse of 'instability and unruliness' was always there for the British to exploit and interfere in the internal workings of the Khanate. The fact that Khan had never exercised hold over the unruly and wild tribes of Marri and Kalpars (Bruce, 2002, p. 35) and the vast landscape and the scattered population was enough proof of his inability and helplessness for any official but the British thinkers did not care, they had their own

plans to be executed. Combined with the mentioned problems was the lack of the required resources to control these tribes and provide security. This was the reason that the Khan had failed to maintain peace in his Khanate. The eastern tribes of the Baloch, inhabiting the foothill, such as the Marri and the Bugti, were in revolt and often targeted the British conveyances on their way to Afghanistan and onward to Central Asian Countries and back during the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars (Graham, 1967, p. 344). The British did not provide the required resources to the Khan to maintain his hold on the tribes but started to treat the tribes like Marri as independent. (Dashti, 2012 and G.K. Naseer, 2010). According to the 'closed border policy' the British diplomacy, was to weaken Khan of Kalat to meet the interest of the British Indian-Empire in the area.

The British insistence that the Khan is the sole sovereign and independent in the Khanate of Kalat and should centralize power at the expense of the local Sardars proved divisionary and left the Khan himself isolated and powerless. The Khanate was a confederation and not an autocratic state. The Khan as understood by the British officials did not have power to rule over the Khanate without the willingness of the local chiefs and tribal Sardars. By design and tricks, they were consciously betraying the Khan by persuading him to become independent of the local chiefs and unruly tribesmen as you are the sovereign ruler of Kalat. Slowly they were becoming successful in their policy of 'divide and rule' as soon they were going to be called by the Sardars to deal with them directly, surpassing the Khan of Kalat. Eventually, pursuing the evil policies, the Khan became totally dependent on the British; lost confidence and strength provided by the local chiefs and tribesmen and became a despicable object.

Nonetheless, Axmann (2009) says that the British officials were wrongly influenced by the writings of Pottinger. The traveler-agent, misjudging and misunderstanding the character of Baloch Khanate, made it famous that the Khan was the 'sole authority' in

Kalat. He could make war and peace on behalf of the state independently. Considering the long diplomatic contact of the British officials with the workings of the Khanate, Axmann's assertion makes no particular sense. In fact, the British officials were not misguided, as they were themselves judge of the later events and could realize and modify their attitude. On the other hand, they were distrustful of the locals, particularly of their rebel-and-warlike temperament. In the wildest dreams, they wanted to rule over them, but were afraid from their past experiences with Baloch. They were aware that through direct invasion, they could not maintain their rule in the Khanate. Past lessons were still fresh in their minds by understanding the learnt listen past experiences the British officials became diplomatic to create a political denomination over the State affairs of Khanate of Kalat and tribal Sardars too. Now they were creating the circumstance through political designs so that the locals' chieftain and tribal Sardars would ask for them to come and support them to overcome anarchy in their land, and subsequently give their consent to be ruled over, and they did.

However, by 1866, the Punjab government moved from the closed border to a new approach of frontier governance when Sandeman crossed the border and met with the Marris and Bugtis, (Bruce, 2002, pp. 18, 23, 25). He favored the interventionist British 'forward policy' and informed the government of Punjab about the affairs of Balochistan in terms similar to those of Col. Phayre and suggested an interventionist policy to settle the civil war between the khan and his chiefs.

With the internal disorder escalating day by day in the Khanate of Kalat, the British administration was forced to change its policy towards Kalat. During 1872, the internal situation of Kalat was frighteningly dangerous for the British Indian government. Such unruliness and instability was not what they wanted or expected; all they needed was a moderately stable neighbor, one functioning with intermittent and mild British

interventions. But around this time the situation was getting out of control of the Khan of Kalat. Fearing that this situation might encourage Russian advancement and encroachment the most disrupted area, which, of course, would be counterproductive for the colonial administered Frontier Zones, the British administration decided to 'take an active role in resolving the conflict between the Khan and his subordinate Sardars'. But there were problems as the officials, especially Sir William Merewether, in Sindh were against interfering in the internal affairs of the Khanate. He recommended a policy of empowering the Khan and letting him to do his job without any dependency. But the Government was against strengthening the Khan, as already mentioned; a strong Khan could be a threat for their interests. Merewether's position became weak when the Punjab government also proposed a direct interference and a 'more aggressive policy towards Kalat'. The Punjab administrators argued about surpassing the Khan and establishing direct contact with the tribes and areas' Sardars would be in the interest of British Empire (Bruce, 2002, pp. 57-58).

To settle the problem, the British government instructed the government of Punjab and India official to call for a joint conference of the British officers – some British officials like Merewether were in favor of a strong central power, and others like Sandeman were in favor of federation and interference -- who held different views and find a way out.

3.3 Disagreement between British Officials over the Khan's relations

The conference was held at Mithankot on February 3, 1871 between the representatives of the two viewpoints. This conference was meant to defeat those who favored a 'forward policy'. Indeed, they were officially defeated as the British-Indian government

rejected the recommendations forwarded by the conference. The central government thought that these policy recommendations were against the khan of Kalat and authorized the Sindhi-view to continue. But the advocates of forward policy did not stop there. Sandeman with the help of Punjab government carried on his method of pacification. Meanwhile, the 'centralists' have miserably failed to end the civil-war in the khanate. In 1875, Sandeman went to Kalat to bring an end to the civil war. He did not inform the Sindh Administration of his visit and his intentions. But the khan refused to deal with him. He informed him of his constitutional position as an absolute ruler of the khanate of Kalat, like the Amir of Afghanistan and should be dealt that way.

In 1876, while the conflict between the Merwether and the Punjabi school of thought was still unresolved, there was a change at the White Hall and the advocates of the 'Forward Policy' came into power. Lord Lytton was appointed Viceroy of India in order to improve the British relations with the Khanate of Kalat and Afghanistan. The same year Sandeman revisited Kalat State. He had given impression to Khan of Kalat that the new British Government did not regard him an autocratic ruler but the head of a confederacy. At this point the khan became afraid knowing his position, the opposition of his chiefs and the position on the British Government on the worsening situation of Kalat. Thus, he did not contest the confederacy theory and agreed to accept the British rule as the mediator between him and his Sardars.

By now the khan was ready to agree with Sandeman's method but there was another problem. Sandeman knew that the Viceroy will object to his activities. Therefore, he convinced both parties to write an application to the British-Indian Government requesting to accept the status of a supreme 'referee'. With this request, the khan was accepting that he was chief of the chiefs, not an absolute ruler like the king of Afghans. By this, Sandeman preempted the objection of the Viceroy that they should regard the

khan and the Amir of Afghanistan similarly and should follow one policy with them. At the same time, the Viceroy wished to visit Jacobabad and clear the matter.

In the same year, Lord Lytton visited Jacobabad and on 8 December 1876 signed a new treaty with the khan (Appendix V). The first three articles of the new treaty reaffirmed the treaty of 1854: recognizing the khan as an independent ruler but subordinate in external affairs to British-Indian government. The khan of Kalat agreed to allow British troops to be stationed in the khanate. The treaty of 1876 was a great victory of the advocates of the 'forward policy' and the Sardars. That made dramatic change in the history of Kalat State, likewise this treaty became a panic for Khanate of Kalat and his subjects which had not been healed since today.

Indeed, this was not a victory for the one and a defeat for the other as both parties, the Sindhis and the Punjabis wanted the occupation of the khanate of Kalat. The difference was that the Sindhis helped the khan to rule the khanate against the 'unwritten constitution' of Naseer Khan, the Great while the Punjabis wanted him (the khan) to share powers with the Sardars and the British-Indian government. The supporters of the 'forward policy' regarded the Khan as the head of the 'confederacy' and recognized the chiefs as feudal lords or hereditary chiefs in tribal areas, thus depriving the tribes of their traditional and democratic right to elect their chiefs. Also, the Jacobabad Treaty paved the way for the "peaceful" occupation of Balochistan and the rise of a 'middle man' and the "Sardari System" in the Baloch society.

In fact, this was the imperial drama put into play like the way it is portrayed in a recent movie named Jason Bourne (2016). The British was presenting Lieutenant Sandeman as the moral force of the British Empire, the processor of James Bond. He has been following a policy of pacification against the orders of his superiors in the Dera Ghazi

Khan, a Baloch district on the westernmost frontier of the Punjab since 1867, (Bruce, 2002, pp. 18, 23, 25). His system proposed and used a more intimate knowledge of the tribesmen, not recommending leaving them alone. Much of the thinking underlay this new system was personified by the man himself, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. From the beginning, his ways were appreciated by the Punjab as well as Central authority in Calcutta, (Bruce, 2002, p. 45). For sometimes the Indian government allowed the 'dual-management' – of Merewether's non-intervention and of Sandeman's pacification – to continue. When results favored the new system, the government owned it and left the other policy. In the words of Sandeman's assistance R. I. Bruce, Sandeman's actions proved 'coup de grace' for the closed border policy – the reason behind the previous spat between him and Merewether, (Bruce, 2002, p. 26).

References

- Axmann, M. (2009). *Back to the Future: the Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism, 1915-1955*. Karachi : Oxford University Press .
- Baloch, I. U. (1987). *The Problems of Greater Balochistan* . Heidelberg : Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden .
- Baluch, M. S. (1984). *History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan* . Quetta : Nisa Traders .
- Bruce, R. I. (2002). *The Forward Policy and its Result* . Lahore : Sohail Ahmad & Rohail Ahmad .
- Dashti, N. (2012). *The Baloch and Balochistan: a historical account from the Beginning to the fall of the Baloch State* . Manchester : Trafford Publishers .
- Hopkins, M. M. (2014). *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier*. London : Hurst & Co. .
- Kalayil, A. P. (1997). *British Relations With the Khanate of Kalat, Baluchistan: 1838-1892*. Madison : University of Wisconsin .
- Khan, G. (2014). *Politics of nationalism, federalism, and separatism: The case of Balochistan in Pakistan*. Michigan : Online version .
- Naseer, G. K. (2010). *Tareekh e Balochistan* (5 ed., Vol. 2). Quetta: Kalat Publisbers and Book Salers.
- Swidler, N. (2014). *Remotely Colonial: Historical and Politics in Balochistan* . Karachi : Oxford University Press.
- Tayub, M. (2010). *Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending War along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier* (Vol. 20). Seattle: Brooklyn Journal of International Law.
- Tyogi, V. (2009). *Martial Races of Undivided India*. Delhi: Kalpuz.

Chapter No. 4

4.1 Robert Sandeman and the Forward Policy, 1877-1892

It has been witnessed that from 1858 onwards, the Khanate of Kalat was marked by increasing instability because of an intermittent confrontation between the Khan and his tribal Sardars because of the British policies towards the Khan State. The reason behind these conflicts was the singular aspiration of the British officials who dreamt of having a powerful Khan with centralized state machinery. As the conflicts accelerated, from 1870 onwards would be discussed in detail in this chapter (Chapter No. 4)

An establishing their influence in the affairs of the Khanate of Kalat, uprooting the power of Khan and replacing him as the major power holder and mediator in his state.

This chapter, (Four) the research will explain the different colonial 'control strategies' that the British officials employed to deal with the Khan and his rebellious Sardars. It will try to explain how the British officials experimented and applied different tribal governance systems in the Baloch state in the wake of the 1876 treaty and how the tensions between the Sardars and the Khan of Kalat were used to expand British rule and strengthen it without using any military means. The Treaty of 1876 left far-reaching impacts on the Baloch society and state. During this period, the Khanate was passing through a worsening phase of anarchy which was arguably against the British interests as the overland trade routes passed through the Khanate of Kalat. An unstable state, with a ruler unable to protect the routes and provide safety, prompted the British to take an active interest in the management of the internal affairs of the Khanate. Having learnt from their past experiences that these people cannot be subdued through force and power, or such an adventure will be 'protracted and costly', the British officials applied the typical 'divide and rule' (Baloch, 2006 , p. 107) policy to secure their 'vital

interests'. Not only British commercial interests were at stake, but the situation in the Khanate also left the western frontier vulnerable to foreign influence – a frightening situation for the British policy-makers. These exaggerated concerns presented an opportunity to those officials who were arguing for British intervention in the affairs of the Khanate of Kalat and they lost no time to adopt the more expansionist 'forward policy' abandoning the previous policy of non-intervention for once and all.

4.2 The 'Forward Policy'

After the First Anglo-Afghan War and the prevailing perception that the Russian 'threat' was receding, the British Policy-makers abandoned their infamous 'forward policy' and adopted a somewhat duplicitous 'closed border' policy towards the regions west of Indus Valley. With the occupation of Sindh in 1843 (the Press List of Old Record in Punjab Government Secretariat) and the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the British changed their policies towards Punjab and adopted the 'forward policy' to occupy Punjab on the contention of their strategists instead of trying to make it a 'buffer state' (Jain, 2003, p. 211) After the defeat in Afghanistan and Balochistan, British turned to annex the Punjab and Sindh. The route through Punjab was much practical, safer and shorter than "Bolan Pass" for trade and strategic purposes to Afghanistan and Central Asia. After the death of Ranjit Singh, the Punjab become internally divided and turned anarchic. McNaughton, the proponent of the "forward policy" attacked and occupied Punjab to check the Sikh expansionist endeavors and also to turn her into a buffer state (Baluch, 1987, pp. 135-37).

The 'forward policy' meant more than just British interference, it was a new and experimental system of governance hatched up by the officers in Punjab, especially Robert Sandemen that, how to govern the unruly tribes and how to rehabilitate peace

and stability on the British-Indian Frontier, (Hopkins M. M., 2014, p. 51). When the British came, an “mysterious system of administration” was put in place. The frontier was equally divided between the Punjab government and the authorities of Sindh, both under the control of Bombay. These two bureaucratic bodies developed their own systems of tribal administration and management.

Later on, this section of frontier would become “the site of so much rancor between Merewether and Sandeman”. The area where Sandeman was governing was a meeting place of different ecological worlds (deserts and arid mountain tracts) and different ethnic types (Pathan and Baloch), and this ‘rare combination’ presented knotty problems and rendered the standard frontier governance deficient and invalid. All these complexity and invalidity of the old governance system that provided a chance to Robert Sandeman ‘to incubate and new form of governability’. Apart from this, from late 1840s onwards the frontier had become ‘a side for policy experimentation’. Writing about this, Martine J. Bayly notes that:

“In Hazara, for example, the Commissioner Major Abbott ... had established a more efficient system for the use of troops in his district. This involved smaller, more mobile units and the reduction of Sikh-era land taxes, thereby reducing the need for punitive raids. Elsewhere, Dumsden developed the idea of controlling the ‘Khyber tribes’ by restricting their access to salt markets and establishing Rahmat Khan Orakzai ... as a guardian of the Khyber Pass... Perhaps most famous was the ‘Sandeman System’ on the Baloch Frontier, established later on in 1876 by Captain Robert Sandeman. It was the epitome of what Hopkins and Marsden term ‘frontier governability’, the assertion of state suzerainty ‘through the administration of difference’ (Bayly, 2016, p. 232).

When the situation was getting out of control in Kalat, the British Directed Major Robert Sandeman – one who was always recommending this policy and sometimes even ignoring the orders of his superior, Sir William Merewether, to go the Khanate and look into the matters. He was given specific instructions to increase British

influence and bring the Sardars closer and render the suzerainty of Khan weaker. To accomplish this, he had

“to establish and maintain peace and order; to administer justice promptly, with as little interference as much as possible with innate usages; to strengthen the good feeling of the Sardars (chiefs) and tribesmen by associating them with us as far possible in the work of government; and to advance communications, promote trade activities, provide medical assistances for the betterment of indigenous people, develop irrigation, preserve forests”, (Thornton, 2009, p. 188).

The ‘forward policy’ that was to be redirected towards Kalat consisted of three central elements which become the common feature of indirect empire. The first rule was the all the tribes have their natural ruler and trust and follow him. The British required to ally with him, provide him financial support, linking the interests of the empire with his, and using him for the best of the empire. The second was a system of tribal levies consisting of tribesmen integrated into the colonial state. The work of the levies was protecting trade routes. As they were tribesmen, they knew better about the tactics used by their fellowmen and could stop them. The third element was the use of traditional institutions of tribal governance, most importantly the community councils, Jirgas. Sandeman system worked through ‘converging’ interests of the Indian-empire with the interests of the Sardars and then exploited their sentiments to arouse loyalty for the British. Sandeman used the tradition as a tool to enslave these people and make them serve his goals with their own consent without using any force and spending lots of expensive resources – the reason his ways of dealings with the tribesmen as well as his new system became so successful for the Empire and earned him accolades. Sandeman has built his system while he was dealing with the Marri and Bugti tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khan Frontier, a district of Punjab, (Hopkins M. M., 2014 , p. 57).

With the internal disorder escalating day by day in the Khanate of Kalat, the British administration was forced to change its policy towards Kalat. During 1872, the internal

situation of Kalat was frighteningly dangerous for the Indian government. Such unruliness and instability was not what they wanted or expected; all they needed was a moderately stable neighbor, one functioning with intermittent and mild British interventions. But around this time the situation was getting out of control of the Khan. Fearing that this situation might encourage Russian advancement and encroachment, which, of course, would be counterproductive for the British colonial administered areas, the British administration decided to 'take an active role in resolving the conflict between the Khan and his under ruled Sardars'. But there were problems as the officials, especially Sir William Merewether, in Sindh were against interfering in the internal affairs of the Khanate. He recommended a policy of empowering the Khan and letting him to do his job without any dependency. But the Government was against strengthening the Khan, as already mentioned; a strong Khan could be a threat for their interests. Merewether's position became weak when the Punjab government also proposed a direct interference and a 'more aggressive policy towards Kalat'. The Punjab administrators argued about surpassing the Khan and establishing direct contact with the tribes would be in the interest of British Empire (Bruce, 2002, pp. 57-58).

The later view prevailed and a new British policy, initiated by the Disraeli government to build a new strategic line of defense against Russian pressure in Central Asia, led in 1876 to the abandonment of the "close border" policy in favor of the so-called "forward policy" (Baloch, 1987).

After the disastrous adventure to Afghanistan, the British policy-makers, especially the commissioner of Sindh under whose responsibility were the affairs of Kalat, resolved to follow a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the state. Occupation of Sindh and Punjab brought the British Empire about Kalat and the affairs of the border areas were to be managed by Sindh and Punjab respectively. Officials in Sindh and

Punjab followed different paths to deal with the marauding tribes. Merewether, the Commissioner of Sindh, followed the 'close border' policy thoroughly and opposed any action that violated the Khan's authority. When the tribal chiefs stood in rebellion against the Khan, Merewether proposed to strengthen him against the revolting chiefs. He favored the use of 'force' against the Sardars who were openly challenging the writ of the Khanship. On the other hand, the Punjab officials were dealing with the Marri, Bugti and Mazari tribes as independent of the Khan. Prominent among them was Captain Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, the western most district of the Punjab. He followed a policy of 'pacification' since 1867, yielding quite fruitful results. The Punjab Government and the Government in Bombay initially rejecting his approach, eventually came to terms with him and after the failed Mithonkot Conference 1871, he was authorized, though indirectly, to deal with the tribes. Being successful in most of the cases, he won over the Governor-General on his side and got formal permission to bring peace in the Khanate whatever way possible but under Merewether, the Commissioner of Sindh (Bayly, 2016, p. 59).

During 1870s, the tensions between the Khan and the Sardars were escalating. Around this time, the British withdrew their political agent and the subsidy promised under the 1854 treaty was suspended, further making the position of Khan difficult. In the year 1875, Cap. Sandeman visited Kalat and tried to end the crises but his mission failed (Baluch M. S., 1984, p. 106). Soon the British realized that the Sindh officials have failed to address the situation in Kalat properly and the Mithonkot agreement between the officials was proved a failure. By now they depended on Robert Sandeman and sent him to Kalat. In 1876, he brought the Sardars and the Khan together for 'final reconciliation' and succeeded in renewing the old treaty of 1854 and signing a new

agreement, the Treaty of Kalat, per which the Khan and the Sardars accepted the rule of British as the final mediator whenever an issue surfaced (Baloch, 1984, p. 106).

4.3 The Treaty of Kalat 1876 ⁶

Initially, Robert Sandeman was in-charge of the affairs of Baloch tribes bordering the Punjab. After his successful management of these tribes, this young officer was directed to control the affairs in the state of Kalat too (Dashti, 2012, p. 247). After his initial failure in 1875 to reconcile the warring tribes, he revisited the Khanate in 1876 and succeeded in signing a tripartite agreement. In other words, to give a 'legal cover' to the policy of intervention in the Khanate of Kalat, the British signed the Treaty of Kalat which extended the British direct rule to the Kalat State. The articles of the treaty included (Dashti, 2012, pp. 247-251):

“Article 1

The Treaty concluded between the British Government and Meer Naseer Khan, Khan of Kalat, on the 14 May 1854, is hereby renewed and reaffirmed.

Article 2

There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government and Meer Khudadad Khan, Khan of Kalat, his heirs, and successors.

Article 3

Whilst on his part, Meer Khudadad Khan, Khan of Kalat, binds himself, his heirs, successors and Sardars, to observe faithfully the provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of 1854, the British Government on its part engages to respect the independence of Kalat, and to aid the Khan, in case of need, in the maintenance of a just authority and the protection of his territories from external attack, by such means as the British Government may at the moment deem expedient.

Article 4

For the further consolidation of the friendship herewith renewed and reaffirmed between the two Governments, it is agreed on the one hand that British Agents with suitable escorts shall be duly accredited by the British Government to reside permanently at the Court of the Khan and elsewhere in His Highness dominions; and on the other hand, that a suitable representative shall be duly accredited by His Highness to the Government of India.

⁶ For the detail of this treaty see the Appendix No V

Article 5

It is hereby agreed that should any disputes, calculated to disturb the peace of the country, arise hereafter between the Khan and the Sirdars of Kalat, the British Agent at the Court of His Highness shall in the first place use his good offices with both parties to effect by friendly advice an amicable arrangement between them, failing which the Khan will, with the consent of the British Government, submit such dispute to its arbitration, and accept and faithfully execute its award."

(For further articles of this Treaty see Appendix V)

The Treaty, whereas, acknowledged formally the Khan of Kalat as an independent sovereign authority over the Khanate of Kalat in words, unfortunately, in practical rendered himself to the subordinate an even a subordinate officer on the 'external affairs'. He was bound to follow his advice on external as well as internal affairs. The double policy was obvious the articles of the treaty where the British officials signing an agreement with the ruler mentioned the Sardars too. With this treaty, which was literally forced upon the Khan of Kalat by the Agent of the Governor-General, the British took total control of Balochistan, changing the state's existing societal and political setup along Imperial lines (Historical Background of the Tribal System in Balochistan, p. 55).

With the treaty secured, the British started construction of a network of telegraph and railway lines through the Khanate territory to connect it with other British administered areas. They also stationed a permanent 'military garrison' at Quetta, per the treaty terms – a long cherished dream of Sandeman becoming a reality (Imperial Gazetteer Of India (Balochistan), 1984, pp. 317-19). Robert Sandeman was appointed as Agent to the Governor-General with his headquarters at Quetta (Baluch, 1984, p. 109). A year was passed that he laid the foundation of the 'Balochistan Agency' (First Administration Report of the Balochistan Agency, 1886, pp. 8-9) which later was renamed as 'British Balochistan'. In this way, the British successfully extended their influence around

Quetta, and the "Bolan Pass" and the Khan of Kalat was turned into a 'nominal' ruler. Predictably, they divided the Khanate of Kalat into four parts:

- a) The British Balochistan, comprising Shahrag, Sibi, Duki, Pishin, and Chaman
- b) Agency territories consisting of Mari-Bugti areas
- c) The Khanate territories of Arund and Dajal (areas in Rajanpur) were cut off and incorporated into the Punjab
- d) Khanate proper with its dependencies of Kharan, Makkuran, and Las Bela

4.4 The Sandeman System in Kalat State

Sandeman was a practical man. His previous achievements made him the most admired and adored man in the Government circles. Therefore, in 1877, he was appointed the British Resident and the Agent to the Governor-General in Balochistan by Lord Lyton. The AGG was the head of colonial administration in Balochistan Agency. He exercised judicial powers under the Frontier Crimes Regulation and conducted political administration of the Agency. He was also the ex-officio Inspector General of the Police and Levies Forces. The AGG reported to the Viceroy through the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Sandeman established his administrative headquarters in Quetta instead of Kalat and set up a military garrison or cantonment to support the political administration. At that time, Quetta was a small town near the Kalat-Afghanistan boundary at a distance of 100 miles from Kalat. Initially, the AGG's staff comprised an Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General (AAG) and a Personal Assistant. Mr. Richard Isaac Bruce was the first AAG in Balochistan and R.B. Hittu Ram was the first Personal Assistant to the AGG.

He was given the task of looking after the British strategic and commercial interests in the Khanate of Kalat. Later on, in 1878, when the British incursion of the Afghan Kingdom happened, Sandeman played a key role in “keeping open the military passage ... and enjoyed the full assistance of the Khan” (Baluch I. U., 1987, p. 140). It should be reminded that whenever Afghanistan was invaded by an external power, the Baloch tribes had done everything possible to help the Afghans but during the Second Anglo-Afghan war, they could not do anything. Under the influence of British policies, they were bound to remain peaceful and neutral. This was a great benefit for the British and the credit went to the ‘peaceful conqueror’ of Balochistan. The ‘Sandeman Policy’ had bound them and without the permission of the British, neither the Khan nor the Baloch tribes could have taken a step, if they would, they were to face the aggression of British Government.

Through the Treaty of Gandamak, this ended the first phase of Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British Afghanistan to cede several frontier areas to the British Government. These newly occupied areas included “the Afghan tribal areas of Zhub and Loralai and consolidated British authority there, (Baluch I. U., 1987, p. 140). The Afghan areas occupied by the British were incorporated and named as British Afghanistan, later on become known as “British Balochistan”.

By now the agent to the Governor-General “was the real and practical head” of the Baloch state. The Khan was maintained as the ruler by name. He was confined to performing only the court and Durbar rituals like a president in any parliamentary system. With passage of time, the AGG strengthened his influence and gained trust of the tribesmen. His power was increasing with each passing day. In the presence of Kalat, he started calling Jirgas “for the settlement of inter-tribal quarrels and the general observation of law and order in the country” (Dashti, 2012, p. 255). Once he

consolidated his position, he modified the existing social and administrative system, basing it on bribes coupled with force when necessary. Unlike the Baloch Khan who used to say that “treated them hard, then pat them on the back or Punch their heads, before you pamper them”, Sandeman thought it was better to “First a word, then the stick,” meaning “Reason before you strike” (Thornton, 2009, p. 87). Therefore, he introduced a system of ‘bribe and force’ to secure his interests the Sardars themselves by giving them every responsibility (Baluch I. U., 1987, p. 140). His reforms were few but very effective, they included.

4.5 Jirga System (Nizam)

Naturally the Baloch were against any foreigner, this was known to the British officials. They nursed anti-British sentiments but their closeness to the British was because of the cruel and brutal Khan who did not listen to their real grievances, instead opted for force partly on the advice of the British policy-makers and partly because of his own despotic streak. Khudadad thought that “soft words and courteous treatment with regard to the chiefs were unsuited to unruly race like the Brahuīs, if unaccompanied by a real power to compel obedience at times demanded”. This was the reason once he asked Robert Sandeman to pursue this punitive policy. “I have an office” he said to the British agent, “filled with letters advising me to pursue the policy I am engaged’ – the abovementioned policy of crushing the chiefs – “but if the British Government, after hearing my representative, give me directions to change this policy, I will do so”. As a result, his policy, the Sardars were ready to conspire and cooperate with any outsider against him.

Though the Sardars were clearly in favor of British, Sandeman still maintained that there “might be anti-social elements” among tribes, and therefore introduced the Jirga

system. The Jirga was to function the way British wanted. Its members were selected and appointed by the British officials. There were two kinds of Jirga – the Sardari Jirga and the Shahi Jirga. The Sardari Jirga was introduced in the tribal areas and its members were the ‘tribal elders’ chosen by the British district officer (Baluch I. U., 1987, p. 141). The Jirga could give a decision but could not enforce it, their decision was “subject to the approval of the district officer,” called the political agent. The Sardari Jirga system was local in nature and was given the task of resolving local cases.

Shahi Jirga or Grand council was different in nature and setting. The task of the Shahi Jirga was of a state level. Its work was to solve disputes between Sardars, Sardars and the Khan or the Government. Shahi Jirga used to hold twice a year and the venues were specified already: Quetta, Sibi and Fort Munro. During the Shahi Jirga, not only the disputes were heard and decided upon but also the salaries and Jagirs promised to the Sardars for their respective services were distributed. The Sardars were given different powers – the powers once held only by the Khan of Kalat. They were given “judicial powers” to hear and solve different disputes – from petty to disputes. The Sardars were also given the power to establish their own jails under the “Balochistan Penal Code” and the “Frontier Crimes Regulations”. Apart from this, the chiefs and official Jirgas were permitted officially “to pronounce a death sentence, life imprisonment, the forfeiture of property, and whipping” (Baluch I. U., 1987, p. 141). By pronouncing this system of Jirgas and empowering the Sardars, Sandeman had successfully managed to make the tribesmen and Sardars their own oppressors. He had won their hearts and minds by bribes and respect. Various Baloch resistance movements were crushed by these Jirgas, at times unwillingly as the Sardars have enslaved themselves and were bound to do what they were ordered to do.

The Sandeman System by increasing the powers of Sardars and introducing a new Royal Jirga, undermined the traditional Jirga system and deepened class divisions and deprivation. Royal Jirga changed the character of traditional Jirga, which used to be a communal court delivering participatory justice in the past. In the new Royal Jirga only Sardars and aristocrats could sit, giving sardars unlimited powers over lives and belongings of the masses. They showed a total disregard for welfare of the people (Khan M. N., 2014, p. 43). The colonizers of course did not invent these divisions, but before them, such divisions were not so hard and unsolvable. They were fluid and were bridged through talks and dialogues. But the colonial officials used such division in their interest and widened small rifts into wide chasm in order to impose their classical 'divide and rule' policy.

4.6 The Levy System

Another Imperial innovation of Robert Sandeman was the introduction of a "levy system". We have seen that prior to 1876; the Baloch tribes used to loot and plunder the trading Caravans. They also used to enter the British administered areas like Sindh and Punjab for plundering. These activities were unstoppable by force. Robert Sandeman was exercising a different governing system or approach towards these tribes – new to the Imperial British Empire and its officials. Though there were various new approaches in work, some failed, and some succeeded, as the British officials were using these areas as experimentation sites (Bayly, 2016, p. 232).

Sandeman had vast experience of managing the affairs of the tribes along the Punjab borders. As the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi, through pacification and conversation, he obtained the services of some Mazari tribal chiefs and influential tribal elders and settled various disputes. When he was deputed to the Khanate of Kalat, he

drew largely from the storehouse of his experiences. Knowing that the looting tribes are the Baloch tribesmen, he founded the “levy system” and recruited tribesmen as ‘levies’. The work of these men was to check the recurring “raids” and inform the raiders and their chiefs about the intentions of the British authorities. Sandeman used to threaten the raiders of dire consequence and leave them. He believed that this was better than the use of sheer force. First talks with them, if they don’t understand the power of the British, then go after them, Sandeman thought. His method worked, and the raids began to subside slowly and gradually (Bayly, 2016, p. 58).

When he became the AGG in 1877, he extended his system throughout Balochistan. This was a truly new method of crushing the “anti-social elements” or better, the anti-British elements by the same tribesmen. By showering money, Sandeman successfully bought the services of the tribal chiefs and used them to ‘eliminate’ those who were imminent threat for the British trade and diplomacy. By throwing the responsibility of law and order on the shoulders of the tribal chiefs, Sandeman caught the offenders and criminals easily, as the tribal levy men and the chiefs knew well the culprits.

What Sandeman was doing was truly against the spirit of the existing Baloch societal set-up and the Jirga systems which were the product of centuries-experience and modifications. By his actions, Sandeman was introducing a new concept in the Baloch society with far-reaching effects. Even today the implications of Sandeman’s actions severely felt in the Baloch society. Sandeman was in reality converting the “written constitution” of the Baloch people which was in use from the time of Naseer Khan, ‘the Great’. He founded the “Sandeman or Sardari System” which had no precedent in the Baloch society. Inayat Ullah Baloch writes that “He [Sandeman] recognized the Baloch Sardars as feudal instead of elected chiefs. In return, the chiefs agreed to protect the British interests”. Though the concept of tribal chiefs and Jirga system was not new to

the Baloch, but before this, the Baloch tribal chiefs used to be elected by tribesmen, the office was not hereditary. Accordingly, the Jirga system was totally different. In the past, the common people used to be part of the Jirga or, at least, were present whenever there was a Jirga, thus, the Jirga was more democratic and participatory in nature. But the one introduced by Sandeman, was more authoritative and despotic. The Sardars were authorized to settle cases; the commoners had no say in the proceedings. The Sardars were now independent, they had no need of their tribesmen, neither for selection and permanence nor for finance, the British elected and financed them. These few hut devastating changes altered the social and political structure of the Baloch society. Sandeman's system "succeeded where the Khan failed" (Baluch I. U., 1987, p. 141). With these changes, and their subsequent success, the British cemented their rule in Balochistan. By this time, the Khan became the 'nominal head' of the state; the actual powers were in the hands of the AGG. Sandeman was so effective that by 1892 when died, he had already 'perfected' the system whose brain child it was. Even the Khan of Kalat, Mir Khudadad Khan, became a victim of this system.

Unlike the Baloch scholars, the Western, especially the British scholars, have praised the achievements of Sandeman. They claim that the new system of governance "which Calcutta endorsed in the winter of 1876, and which Sandeman established a strong hold over the Baloch Frontier in the years following, was at once and the same time a system of preservation and a system of revolution, which partially invented, partially codified, and incompletely altered tribal 'custom' and 'tradition'." Mersden and Hopkins further write "by discovering the rise of the Sandeman System, as it came to be known, and its employment along the frontier, it becomes vibrant that the British Indian Government became both guardian and arbiter of tradition", (Hopkins M. M., 2014 , p. 51). This system called for 'direct interference' in the internal affairs of Kalat and an aggressive

expansion into and control over the frontier regions. Strong points in the tribal belt were to be captured, fortified, garrisoned, and connected with protected roads. This "forward policy," in its extreme, envisaged pushing the boundary as far west as the Hindu Kush mountain range in the middle of Afghanistan, with the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar arc forming the first line of defense for colonial India.

Such praise from the Western scholars, mostly those writing in the defense of the empire, is understandable. For them, the system was quite successful and beneficial. Through this system, the British ruled over the Khanate without any difficulty. But for the native people, the system had no benefits. The common people did not gain any positive advantage, thus it was not a benefaction as claimed by these scholars. It was instead an attack on their value and social systems. The new system enslaved the tribesmen; they literally become nothing but objects in their own state. They had lost their right of electing their tribal chiefs, thus deprived of their democratic right which had disastrous effects on their social and economic standards.

4.7 Impacts of the Sandeman System on Baloch Society

The new introduced system by Robert Sandeman had far-reaching effects on the Baloch social set-up and politics. The existing systems of the Baloch society were distorted and mutilated. Sandeman converted the tradition institutions of Jirga and Sardari system on imperial lines. By these activities, he weakened the traditional position of the Khan and the robbed the tribesmen of voting rights. Apart from this, his system installed and deposed the Khan whenever the British wanted. The British respected the traditional method, where the local chiefs used to elect the Khan through a formal procedure of election, of electing a Khan to the throne. Like the local chiefs, the tribesmen were deprived of their right of selecting their own chiefs; the Sardars were selected by the

British officials. After the reforms brought by Sandeman, Naseer Dashti argues that “The tribal chiefs (sardars) began to act like feudal chiefs, and the institution of Sardar became hereditary instead of being elective” (Dashti, 2012, p. 258).

Sandeman got in the way of Khan’s efforts to ‘centralize’ power and initiated building relations individually with ‘influential tribes’ like Marri and Bugti and thereby ‘compromising the Khan’s suzerainty over his subjects’. By now the Khan was powerless and could not exercise a quarter of his traditional power over his subjects. In the past, the Khan was the sole arbiter but now his place has been taken by the political agent of the British-Indian government. This is the reason that many historians consider him, Sandeman, the sole colonizer in case of Kalat (Balochistan) and consider 1876 as the moment when the Khanate was truly colonized, (Axmann, 2014, p. 30). One of the renowned political personalities of Baloch politics Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo noted in his autobiography explained in the following words the Khan and what power he held over his land and people:

“The Khan was ruler of Kalat in name only. Whatever nominal suzerainty he exercised was confined to the so-called non-tribal areas. In most parts of the state, Sardars held complete sway over the land and the people. Even in areas where the Khan exercised nominal control, Sardars very often interfered in administrative matters, (Bizenjo, 2009, p. 16).

The Sandeman system or the Treaty of 1876 was a British trap to weaken the power of the Khan, winning over the people by providing insignificant swift justice to a portion of people in order to consolidate the British rule in the Khanate of Kalat without trouble. After the treaty of Kalat, the British become the sole arbitrators in all cases of conflicts within the State of Kalat. It also prohibited the Khan from engaging in any type of foreign or treaty relations with the outside world other than the British. In return, for his utmost opposition to all the enemies of the British Government, the British agreed to respect the independence of Kalat and to aid the Khan in case of any need. By the

terms of this treaty, Axmann notes “the Khanate of Kalat was effectively reduced to function as a buffer state that modifiable to, and totally dependent on British administration”, (Axmann, 2009, p. 30).

Before 1854, the British officials had not the experience of directly seeing the power of the Khan. During the closed border policy years, they observed that the Khan got his power from the local chiefs. Once he was allowed to get rid of them and rule on his own, he failed to give results. Some shrewd officials like Sandeman were watching that the Khan was not the man who could guarantee a safe a secure Khanate which was necessary for their movements but the local chiefs; he came with the idea of shunning the traditional ruler for these chiefs. Though the British officials had given enough time to Khudadad Khan, a temperate ruler, to justify his rule and provide a safe neighbor but he failed. He was thoroughly dependent on the British advisors, thus giving them the chance to realize the reality very soon. Merewether was of course in favor of the Khan and tried his best to strengthen and enable him to maintain peace in the Khanate but failed to persuade the British-Indian government to provide the necessary means to the Khan to combat with the problems facing him.

When the British Officials realized that the Khan was not the ultimate power in the Baloch Khanate, they bypassed him and dealt directly with those Sardars who were involved in creating instability. Thus, the failure of the Khan provided the British strategists and policy-makers the much-awaited pretext and they ‘assigned the task of consolidating indirect British influence in [Kalat]’. Unlike Merewether, Sandeman gave the revolting chiefs “financial assistance and political patronage”. With this the era of a “distributed political structure emerged in the Khanate ... the traditional position of the Khan of Kalat and Sardars shifted, and the tribal chiefs started enjoying the financial and political support of the British Government and their dependency on

the Khan” for subsidy was no more. Subsequently, the Sandeman system reined their position and system. With their levies, bypassing Khan, they were responsible for law and order, (Shah & Khan, 2013, p. 25).

The British officials did not modify the existing socio-political structure of the Khanate, instead reoriented it. In the process, they strengthened and overhauled the old and primitive institutions like the Sardari-system and Communal councils (Jirga) on the imperial lines to advance British interests as a matter of policy. In place of introducing modern systems, British reintroduced and reshaped the Jirga system on Imperial lines. The responsibility of maintaining law and order was handed over to the Sardars and the tribal “levy” to help them in their cause under the newly introduced Sandeman System - an exploitative and oppressive system which had no precedent in history of tribal governance. The tall claims made by the British biographers of Col. Robert Sandeman and the reality of the Khanate were totally different. According to Tucker, the author of “The Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan”, when he came, the Baloch were savage and backward in every sphere of life, but when he left, he left behind a well-developed and completely transformed and prosperous people, (Tucker A. , 1921, p. 25).

Externally, the Khan was prohibited to establish any of relation with foreign country without the permission of the British Indian-empire. The violation of the Treaty of Kalat would cost him his Khanship, therefore he did not try indulge in any such activity.

Economically, also the khan was rendered weak. In past, the Khan used to receive taxes from his subjects i.e. from the local chiefs and their members but under the British indirect rule, he was no more able to get any revenue from his Sardars and his subjects.

The khan also lost his military might with the advent of British Empire. During the 'closed border' years, the Khan made an effort to get rid of his tribesmen and local chiefs. He did not consult them in any event or while deciding upon any political topics. After the death of Naseer Khan 2nd, his half-brother Khudadad Khan was raised to the throne of Kalat. With the British subsidy he built a mercenary force and unleashed cruelty on his own subjects under the backing and influence of British advisers.

The traditional capital of the Khanate of Kalat was shifted from Kalat to Quetta. Though the Khan used to sit on his throne in Kalat, but he was powerless. Every decision of political importance continued to be decided from Quetta under the administration of British officials. Likewise, such dramatic changes were necessary for the colonizer to stringently their rule over the native people of the Khanate without any internal disruption:

“The calamitous results of British rule should not have astonished us. Colonialism was rule by an alien, despotic authority, lacking local legitimacy, and utterly unaccountable before the local inhabitants. In such a situation, it was predictable that the rulers may use administrative instruments to weaken possible resistance, rather than to tutor in civic norms, and mask their assertions of power in the guise of “good governance.” Post-colonial pathologies were a natural consequence of normal colonial rule” (Chibber, 2005, p. 25).

In the late-19th century, the British fostered and exploited internal power struggles amongst Baloch tribes to consolidate colonial rule in the region—a classic imperial divide-and-conquer tactic.

These were the lands of “indirect rule,” where the British transformed select tribal chiefs (sardars) into the “eyes and ears” of the colonial administration. Through the granting of subsidies, institutionalization of inter-tribal councils (jirgas), and construction of a repressive apparatus drawn from tribal levies, the British succeeded

in establishing themselves at the head of “a politically fragmented Balochistan with many centers of power.” (Usmani, n.d., p. 95)

At best, the Sandeman system, as it became known, froze existing tribal law and practice in place, preventing the likely erosion of old customs with time. At worst, it gave added weight to reactionary institutions, “weakening the sardars’ dependence on tribal support” by making the British their primary patrons. As was true in much of British India, the colonial State’s reliance on these indigenous elites foreclosed significant economic or social transformation. (Axmann 2009, 33)

The Great Britain introduced a lot of reforms in the British-Indian Empire, but none in the Baloch Khanate. The oppressive and exploitative Sandeman System was kept in place when they finally left the Indian-Subcontinent in 1947. The British diplomacy of ‘divide and rule’ was the most significant feature of the Baloch society. Even after a lot of endeavors of Baloch enlightened and Nationalist individuals, the Baloch still could not come out of the tricky and exploitative chains of the British Empire. Overall, they were little influenced by the great Indian struggle against the brutal rule of the Imperial Britain in their neighborhood. They were still under the oppressive thumb of the late Sandeman. Many Baloch poets wrote eulogies and praised him for what he did for Baloch – a clear indication that how deep the late officer left an impression on the Baloch – the simple, plain and unsuspecting tribesmen. It is evidence that how he had conditioned their minds and hearts first, and then subjected them to serve the interests of British at their own expense.

The proof is that some other parts of British India progressed; this predominantly Muslim province remained backward educationally, economically and politically. British policies were harsh and hostile to the Muslims. In Balochistan the thumb rule

was to keep the Baloch backward and isolated. It will be noted that in an overwhelming Muslim majority area non-Muslims aliens, mostly Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Parsis, dominated business and trade and services.

In short, as said, Kalat was reduced to playing the role of a buffer state, and the forward policy of the British Government, called the Sandeman system, succeeded in overcoming most of the issues relating to the insecurities caused by possible Russian expansionism. The Sandeman system was a new experimentation. In the words of its founder, it was an attempt "to deal with the hearts and minds of the native people and not with their fears". What the Baloch scholars assume that this is what to use the same indigenous people against each other, like exploiting antipathy in the interest of British. In this way, the unruly Sardars could stand against each other or against the Khan and could guarantee stability and become loyal to the British, as the British was letting them to oppress them themselves, not by British forces. Sandeman in this way produced a very politically fragmented Khanate with many centers of power, the Khan being just one, and in actual practice, he (the Khan) lost his role as the Khan of Kalat. The situation of Kalat and the status of the Khan after the introduction of "Sandemanian system" can best be explained by the 1886 Administrative Report of the Balochistan Agency (British administrative report of the Balochistan, 1886, p. 9).

"The political Agent to the Governor General has almost taken the place of the Khanship as head of the Baluch confederation of Khanate of Kalat. His Highness [Khan of Kalat] is just remain as the nominal head, the Sarawan and Jhalawan chiefs still sit on his right hand and his left side in Durbars of Khan [court]....and till he [Sardar] is invested by the Khan with the Kalat [robe] or mantle of succession, a sardar [Sardar] is not to be legitimized as the representative of his tribe. But in essential questions of nomination of Sardars, the summoning of Jirgahs [a tradition judicial system] for settlement of inter-tribal disputes, and the general preservation of peace in the country, the Agent of the Governor General is recognized all over Balochistan as having taken all the place of the Khan, and his mandate naturally commands a great deal more respect and obedience than ever did that of His Highness", (Baluchistan., Department., & Government, 1886, p. 9).

After the endorsement of Sandeman by Calcutta, he worked independently and ruled the Khanate of Kalat indirectly. The position of the Khan was that of the nominal head. The interminable issue of marauding tribesmen was finally solved and the success of Robert Sandeman was reverberating all over the British empire and also being replicated all over the empire's frontier zones. The proof of Sandeman was the elevation of Kalat or British Balochistan to the position of an agency – the Agency of Balochistan – with direct responsibility to the central government, and Sandeman himself the first political agent to the Governor-General. He served in his capacity until his death in January 1892, (Finch, 2013, p. 15).

Thus, through the efforts and exploitations of Sandeman, the British not only gained full authority and established indirect rule in the Khanate and its feudatories but also overhauled the whole administrative set-up to rule effectively. The British Baluchistan was divided into three distinct zones:

“the settled areas, under direct British administration, the Khanate of Kalat and the tribal zones governed through various tribal chiefs. In 1877, the British established the northern area as the Protectorate of British Baluchistan. The southern districts, Kalat and the tribal states remained semi-independent, tied to British-India by treaties and resident British advisers.” (Minaham, 2002, p. 257).

Furthermore, the Frontiers between British and Persian, Afghanistan were settled or drawn; a considerable tract of the Baloch borderland areas was ceded or handed over to Iran and Afghanistan by the British Government in 1871 and 1892-3 under the Goldsmith and Durand Line Boundary Commissions respectively. The former divided the Baloch land and population into western and eastern Balochistan, while according to the Durand Line Boundary Commission, parts of the Baloch areas were handed over to Afghanistan and parts of the Afghan areas were cut off from Afghanistan and included in the larger British Empire. Later, the British amalgamated parts of Pashtun

and Baloch areas together and established British Balochistan, called the chief commissioner province of Balochistan.

References

- Axmann, M. (2009). *Back to the Future: the Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism, 1915-1955*. Karachi : Oxford University Press .
- Baluch, I. U. (1987). *The Problems of Greater Baluchistan: a study of the Baluch Nationalism*. Heidelberg : Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden.
- Baluch, M. S. (1984). *History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan* . Quetta : Nisa Traders .
- Baluchistan., Department., I. (., & Government, I. ((1886). *Administration report of the Baluchistan Agency*. Quetta : Delhi.
- Bayly, M. J. (2016). *Taming the Imperial Imagination: Colonial Knowledge, Internal Relations and the Anglo-Afghan Encounter, 1808-1878*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Bizenjo, G. B. (2009). *In Search of Solutions: The Autobiography of Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo*. (B. M. Kuttu, Ed.) Karachi: Pakistan Labour Trust and University of Karachi's (KU) Pakistan Study Centre.
- Bruce, R. I. (2002). *The Forward Policy and its Results*. Lahore: Sohail Ahmad & Rohail Ahmad .
- Chibber, V. (2005). The Good Empire: Should we pick up where the British left off? *Boston Review (Academic Journal)* , 30 (1), 30.
- Dashti, N. (2012). *The Baloch and Balochistan: A historical account from the Beginning to the fall of the Baloch State*. Trafford: Trafford Publishers .
- Finch, M. P. (2013). *A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Colonial in Tonkin and Madagascar, 1885-1900* . Oxford : Oxford University Press .
- Hopkins, M. M. (2014). *Frontier, Fragments of the Afghan*. London: Hurst & Co.
- KHAN, M. N. (2014). Security and Development in Balochistan. *Islamabad Policy Research Institute* , 16-21.
- Minaham, J. (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups Around the World* (Vol. 1). London: Greenwood Press.
- Shah, S. F. (2013). *Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakening and Merger* (6 ed., Vol. 13). Global Journals Inc.
- Thornton, T. H. (2009). *Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His life and Work on Our Indian Frontier*. London : Lightning Source.
- Tucker, A. (1921). *Sir Robert G. Sandeman, K.C.S.I, Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan* . New York : The MacMillan Co. .

Conclusion

This is a fact universally acknowledged that states decline and cease to exist with the passage of time – either from foreign invaders or the internal disputes. They experience their highs and lows and fall apart; some can regain their former glory and unfortunate ones lose their dynamic and independent identity or disappear from the world's map. The underlying reasons behind their extinction are usually internal clashes, lack of unity and ineffective leadership. Similarly, the Khanate of Kalat had went through its ups and downs.

The geography of a state plays an important role in determining its fate. Like physical geography has a direct impact on economic productivity of a state, similarly, it has a direct impact on its usefulness and existence in the comity of nations. The strategic geography of the Khanate of Kalat also played its part in determining her final fate. Geographically and strategically located between two rival empires, the Khanate of Kalat was considered a natural defense for the survival of British-Indian Empire and provided trade routes onwards to Afghanistan and Central Asia too. Besides, Afghanistan which was in effect lubricant for quarrels among the two great powers, also shared border and close relationship with the Khanate of Kalat. Apart from this, some traditionally important trade routes were also situated in the areas of Khanate of Kalat. Among them, the "Bolan Pass" was the most significant one. Owing to this great strategic and commercial significance, the powerful empires had always coveted for its possession, or at least, each one desired to bring it in their 'sphere of influence'. In the early nineteenth century, the Khanate grew significantly weak both economically and militarily and was under a weak Khan. This was going to be beneficial for one of the arch-rivals – the British Empire.

The British contact with the Khanate of Kalat was apparently the outcome of British struggle to safeguard their imperial and commercial interests against the ever-growing threats presented by two equally powerful rivals: one was France under Napoleon, and the other was Imperial Russian Empire. They played out mutual rivalry in the region between Russia and the British-Indian Empire which was famously called the 'Great Game'.

To counter these external threats, the British-Indian Empire taken several measures towards the Khanate of Kalat with the intention to establish a foothold in the strategically important region. These steps included: one, to establish contact with the indigenous people to understand the political and social psyche of both the common people and the rulers of Baloch State, two, to guarantee a safe passage to reach Afghanistan to safeguard their interests in Central Asia. Once they established contact with Kalat, they signed treaties which provided them a legal cover in the Khanate of Kalat. Subsequently, they pursued a 'closed border policy' through which the Khan of Kalat became stronger at the cost of tribal sardars, creating a rift between the Khan and his tribal Sardars. After sometime, the British abandoned this policy and pursued a different policy under the supervision of Robert Sandeman, called 'forward policy'. The new policy was mainly a pacification policy which bestowed complete support to the tribal Sardars at the cost of the Khan of Kalat. Through this policy, the political agent of the Governor installed his officials at district levels which rendered the Khan of Kalat a nominal head because all the internal and external government policies were handled by the political agent of the British Indian Empire.

In the beginning, the British-Indian Empire asked for safe passage to Afghanistan. For this, they signed an agreement with a reluctant Khan of Kalat Mir Mehrab Khan in 1839. The Khan of Kalat was unwilling to sign an agreement with a force that was

going to invade a country with which the Khanate had already signed a friendly treaty with Afghanistan Amir, Ahmad Shah Abdali, in 1758. But the British cornered his concerns and forced him into an agreement. After the First Anglo-Afghan war, and the subsequent disastrous defeat, the British policy-makers changed their minds and began to entertain ideas of converting the Khanate into a 'buffer state' to defend their British-Indian Empire – the “golden sparrow”. While returning home, the British forces stormed the port of Kalat, killing Mehrab Khan, occupied the Khanate. What is worth noting here that once again the head of the Baloch State had not surrendered before the foreign invader and proved himself to be a true son of sole and real ancestor of founding father of Khanate of Kalat. Under the leadership of Nasir Khan – II, the Baloch resisted, and forced the British to withdraw their puppet Khan and recognize Nasir Khan as the legitimate ruler. The British, knowing that they cannot stay for long if they had not compromise, gave in to their demands. But they also put their own conditions. The British signed a treaty with Nasir Khan making him thoroughly a nominal Khan, which had remained to be a land mark victory of the British Indian external policy makers to create space in the territory of Kalat State. On the contrary, the treaty of 1841 had become the first and worst step to bring the Khan of Kalat in British Indian's sphere of influence. Under the terms of this treaty, the Khan of Kalat was not allowed to establish any relations with any country without the word of British-Indian Government. Under this treaty, the Khanate of Kalat became a vassal state of Shah Shujah, the British Installed King of Afghanistan.

The British refusal of independent status of the Khanate of Kalat had its own reasons. They British assumed that the Afghans and the Persians were sovereign because they wanted to redefine Baloch political identity as the Baloch refused to be part of the

British-Indian Empire. Accepting them as independent would cause problems for the British-Indian Empire.

After a lapse of time the internal situation of the Khanate of Kalat became unstable as well as the Russian threat reemerged. The British-Indian Government exploited the internal turmoil as a pretext and renewed the treaty of 1841 and signed a new treaty in 1854. However, this treaty was the second most devastating step by the British India toward Khanate of Kalat which almost brought the Kalat State as a state under the foreigner. Though they accepted Khan of Kalat as a sovereign ruler of Khanate of Kalat theoretically but practically British Indian officials made all the important decisions in Khanate of Kalat, especially having relation with other regional countries. Under this treaty, they could install their political agent in Kalat to judge the external political scenario and the internal disputes too, besides the permission to station British Indian troops in the Khanate of Kalat whenever deemed necessary. From now onwards, the affairs of the Khanate of Kalat were to be looked after by the Chief Commissioner of Sindh, William Merewether. The Indian Government followed a non-interventionist policy, famously called 'closed border' policy or 'masterly inactivity'. Merewether strictly prohibited British military and political interference in the affairs of Kalat, at the same time recommending the Khan should be considered an autocratic ruler at the expense of the local sardars and the tribesmen. This policy unleashed a cruel Khan who antagonized the local chiefs by using an iron hand whenever they asked for their rights. This proved disastrous for the Khan of Kalat – around 1870, he became alienated from the local chiefs and thought it unnecessary to consult them on any matter of importance. The situation was slipping out of the hand of the Khan of Kalat. But William Merewether who was in control of the affairs of Kalat had not taken any effective measures. He recommended force against the revolting Sardars – a policy that was

proving disastrous, meanwhile forcing opposition from the officers in Punjab. Unlike Merewether, the authorities in Punjab believed in the policy of pacification. They recommended that this policy should be adopted in Sindh and Kalat. Seeing that the policy was successful and less expensive, the Calcutta Government set to apply it in the Khanate of Kalat.

In 1876, to provide legal cover to this interventionist policy, the British-Indian Government signed a treaty with the Khan of Kalat at Jacobabad. With this policy, the shrewd British policy-makers strengthened their hold in the Khanate. They have learnt a lesson that force will be of little use with the Baloch. Therefore, they came with a policy of letting the Baloch to become friends of British and govern themselves willingly under the British authorities. Sandeman was the main force behind this policy. Realizing that what happened during their first encounter with the Baloch was proof enough that Baloch will not give in to brute power and resist to the end an occupying power, they began exercising soft power and diplomacy.

On the other hand, they were helped in their task by the Khan of Kalat during the subsequent years. By 1876, the Sardars were totally against the Khan of Kalat and relying on the British. The British adopted two policies: on the one hand, they considered the Khan as the sole power in Kalat and on the other hand, kept providing the sardars financial as well as political support to win their hearts and minds. This dual policy had completely made the Khan as a nominal head of the State and almost all the Sardars became head of their areas. The Baloch Khan and Sardars were unaccustomed to such diplomatic tactics. The Khan perceived that the British is on his side, meanwhile the Sardars thought the British shared their concerned. The fact was that the British were neither with the Sardars nor with the Khan, they were on their own side. They were making the ground fertile for their own permanent presence.

Once they were invited, they put their policy in action. The British diplomacy proved to be the winner. By the treaty of 1876, the British-Indian Empire had cemented her presence in the Khanate of Kalat. But before entering Kalat, the British played another game: they made the Khan and the Sardars to invite the British to come and play the role of mediator between the autocratic Khan and the revolting Sardars in black and white. Once the British stepped in the Khanate, they were the 'peaceful conquerors'.

With this treaty, the concept of Baloch liberty and identity was crushed and the Khanate of Kalat became under direct rule of the British Empire. The Khan was neither internally independent nor externally. The internal major decisions were taken after taking the British political agent into confidence. The foreign relations were totally in the hands of the British-Indian Empire – i.e. the agent to the Governor-General was responsible for the external matters.

The arrival of British rule in the Khanate of Kalat shook the very basic structure of the Baloch society and tribal politics. The social, political and tribal setup of the Baloch never recovered from the tremors it received from the British policies. The aftershocks of the British reforms along imperial lines are still felt in the Baloch society. After these reforms, there emerged a new power structure in the Baloch society, thoroughly different from the traditional one.

After the British arrival, the Baloch power base was not one but three – the Khan, Sardars and the British. The most powerful and influential among them was the British political agent stationed at Quetta. Before the British rule, there was a single power base – the Khan of Kalat, and all others revolved around it. With the British rule, this power base declined and disintegrated. The Sardars emerged as another power with internal tribal liberties – even more powerful than the Khan as they enjoyed the British

backing in all affairs. In the traditional tribal structure of Baloch society, the local chiefs were supposed to be under the power of the Khan. Though they were pained by the central authority, they remained loyal only to the Khan. The Khan used to consult them in political and management affairs. By now, they have fallen apart from their centre, and were providing their services and loyalties to the British. Thus, with the British advent, the power structure totally evolved in the Khanate of Kalat.

Economic structure of the Khanate of Kalat also felt the tremors. Before the British, the Kalat town used to be the business hub or centre of the Khanate. The Khan used to collect tax money to run the affairs of his state. When the British rule started, the political capital of the Khanate was shifted to Quetta, with this the business activities. This was the first shock the Khan as the head of the state received. He was economically crushed and his finances depressed. He was no more able to run his office effectively. With this, his influence started to shrink, as he became unable to provide to his subjects with food and shelter. Any government will fail if it is unable to cater the needs of its subjects. Secondly, whatever jobs were available at Quetta were not provided to the Baloch.

In the social and tribal setup, the British introduced several reforms along imperial lines. For instance, before the British informal empire, the Baloch tribal system in nature was quite democratic. The tribesmen used to select an able and competent person from among their tribe to represent their interests. They maintained the power to the tribe to deselect the Sardar whenever felt necessary. Thus, an elected Sardar unable to defend the tribe's interest could be deselected. But after the British Imperial reforms, the Sardari institution became independent of the tribesmen. Now he was not selected by the tribesmen. With this, the Sardari system became hereditary. This system continues to exist in Balochistan unchanged.

The political and administrative system was also shifted from the Kalat town to Quetta. Ironically, there were two capitals in one state – one was run by the Khan of Kalat, and the other by the British Political Agent. And worse, the latter was more powerful than the legitimate capital of Baloch state. All affairs were administered and managed from Quetta by the Political Agent, the Khan was the nominal head of the state. All important political decisions were taken from Quetta whether internal or external. The Khan was to give his consent whether willingly or unwillingly.

Apart from this, the justice system was also changed dramatically. By now, there was a dual justice system prevalent in the Khanate of Kalat. One was under the British and one was under the Khan of Kalat. This was almost an unjust and biased system considering the Baloch code and conduct. It was a typical imperial propaganda against the Khan of Kalat to further isolate him. In the traditional court of the Khan, the judicial decisions took time. They were along democratic lines. The final judicial figure in the justice system of the British was the deputy commissioner. His version was not challenged anywhere. By this, the British demoralized the court of the Khan because of its time taking process. The people liked the execution of justice, however false or undemocratic or unjust it was. Unaware, the people favored the British judicial system and deserted the Khan and his court. The common people had no apprehensions that the reason behind swift execution of justice was not to facilitate them but to stand out and render the Khan of Kalat ineffective by portraying him lazy and inefficient as a ruler and judicial figure.

The British officials also defined the Baloch identity along imperial lines. The British Baloch policy which was solely based on the reports and understanding of the British agents disguised as travelers defined the Baloch identity as a geopolitical entity. Though their understanding of the Baloch identity was misled by the genealogical claims of

different tribes, they defined them on imperial lines to bring disunity and disharmony among their ranks by suggesting that the Baloch did not have a uniform origin. By forcing a geographical identity upon the Baloch, they distorted the very meaning of 'Baloch' to a representation of any 'Bedouin Tribe' living in the region between Iran and Afghanistan and the Indus Valley. Thus, they defined the Baloch as a regional-political group, rather than a racial and cultural group having a distinct origin.

In the final analysis, the traditional tribal-political structure and political identity of the Baloch was redrawn under the British rule. Such redefinition proved disastrous for Baloch, as they lost their tradition right of selecting their local Sardars and found their Khan undeservedly weak to run the state properly. The consequences of the British policies are even felt today. Simultaneously, the demarcation of Baloch geography minimized the geographical claims of the Baloch people. Today Baloch are divided among three countries – Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran – territorially because of the British redistribution of the Baloch territories through different treaties signed with Afghanistan and Iran. The creation of the British Balochistan was a *coup de grace* for the emerging Baloch state. Besides, this was a well-directed blow, as there was an emerging alliance of Baloch-Pashtun which the British vehemently opposed.

Appendix 1

The Treaty of 1758 (The Treaty of Non-Interference)

After three battles in the forty days blockade of Khanate fort a treaty was signed between the King of Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Abdali, and the Khan-e-Baloch, Mir Naseer Khan Noori.

Article 1

Khan-e-Baluch, Mir Naseer Khan will not pay any tribute to the Shah (king) of Afghan in future

Article 2

Khan-e-Baluch will not supply any *San* (military assistance) to Ahmed Shah. But provided he is at war against external enemies, the Khan will supply a military contingent as a token of help, on the condition that the Afghan King provide annually Rs. 100,000 and military weapons, and provide for the expenditure of the army as a reward

Article 3

Khan-e-Baluch will not provide any help or asylum to rebel princes of Sadozai or Afghan chiefs. On the other hand, the Afghan king also will not give any help or refuge to princes of royal family of Kalat-Ahmedzai.

Article 4

Shah-e-Afghanistan will not interfere in the internal affairs, disputes and other matter of Balochistan.

Article 5

Shah-e-Afghanistan will hand over those areas of Khan-e-Baluch which are in the possession of Shah-e-Afghanistan

Appendix 2

Articles of an Engagement concluded between the British Government and Mehrab Khan, the Chief of Kalat, --March 28, 1839

Whereas a Treaty of lasting friendship has been concluded between the British Government and His Majesty Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and Mehrab Khan, the Chief of Kalat, as well as his predecessors, has always paid homage to the Royal House of the Saddozais; therefore, with the advice and consent of the Shah, the under mentioned Articles have been agreed upon by Mehrab Khan and his descendants from generation to generation. As long as the Khan performs and good service, the following Articles will be fulfilled and preserved.

Article 1

As Nasir Khan and his descendants, as well as his tribe and sons, held possession of the country of Kalat, Kachhi, Khorstan, Makran, Kej, Bela and the port of Soumiani in the time of the lamented Ahmad Shah Durrani they will in future be masters of their country in the same manner.

Article 2

The English Government will never interfere between the Khan, his dependents, and subjects, particularly lend no assistance to Shah Nawaz Fateh Khan, and the descendants of the Mahhabbatzai branch of the family, but always exert itself to put away evil from his house. In case of His Majesty the *Shah's* displeasure with the Khan of Kalat, the English Government will exert itself to the utmost to remove the same in a manner which may be agreeable to the Shah and according to the rights of the Khan.

Article 3

As long as the British army continues in the country of Khorasan, the British Government agrees to pay to Mehrab Khan the sum of one and a half lakh of Company's rupees from the date of this engagement by half-yearly installments.

Article 4

In return for this sum the Khan, while he pays homage to the Shah and continues in friendship with the British nation agrees to use his best endeavours to procure supplies, carriage, and guards to protect provisions and stores going and coming from Shikarpur by the route of Rozan, Dadar, the Pass of Bolan, through Shal to Kuchlak from one frontier to another:

Article 5

All provisions and carriage which may be obtained through the means of the Khan, he prices of the same is to be paid without hesitation.

Article 6

As much as Mehrab shows his friendship to the British Government by service and fidelity to the Saddozai family, so much friendship will be increased between him and the British Government and on this he should have the fullest reliance and confidence.

This agreement having been concluded, signed and sealed by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, Kt., Envoy on the part of the Right Hon'ble George, Lord Auckland, G.C.B. Governor - General of India and Mehrab Khan, of Kalat, on the part himself, the same shall be duly ratified by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General.⁷

C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* relating to India and Neighboring countries, Vol. IX (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of the Government Printing, India, 1892), 388-9

Appendix 3

Treaty entered into between the Government of India and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat – October 6, 1841

Whereas Meer Nusseer Khan, son of Mehrab Khan, deceased, having tendered his allegiance and submission, the British Government and His Majesty Shah Suja-ool-moolk recognize him, the said Nusseer Khan, and his descendants as Chief of the principality of Khelati-Nusseer on the following terms: -

Article 1

Meer Nusseer Khan acknowledges himself and his descendants the vassals of the King of Cabool, in like manner as his ancestors were formerly the vassals of His Majesty's ancestors.

Article 2

Of the tracts of country resumed on the death of Meer Mehrab Khan, namely Cutehee, Moostung, and Shawl, the two first will be restored to Meer Nusseer Khan and his descendants through the kindness of His Majesty Shah Suja-ool-moolk.

Article 3

Should it be deemed necessary to station troops, whether belonging to the Honorable Company or Shah Suja-ool-moolk, in any part of the territory of Khelat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable.

Article 4

Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, will always be guided by the advice of the British officer residing at his Durbar.

Article 5

The passage of merchants and others into Afghanistan from the river Indus on the one side, and from the sea-port of Sourneeanee on the other, shall be protected by Meer

Nusseer Khan as far as practicable, nor will any aggression be practiced on such persons, or any undue exactions made beyond an equitable toll to be fixed by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan.

Article 6

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, not to hold any political communication or enter into any negotiations with foreign powers without the consent of the British Government and of His Majesty Shah Suja-ool-moolk, and in all cases to act in subordinate co-operation with the governments of British India and of the Shah; but the usual amicable correspondence with neighbours to continue as heretofore.

Article 7

In case of an attack on Meer Nusseer Khan by an open enemy, or of any difference arising between him and any foreign power, the British Government will afford him assistance or good Offices as it may judge to be necessary or proper for the maintenance of his rights.

Article 8

Meer Nusseer Khan will make due provision for the support of Shah Newaz Khan, either by pension to be paid through the British Government *on* condition of that Chief residing within The British territory, or by grant of estates within the Khelat possessions, as may hereafter be decided by the British Government.⁸

C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* relating to India and Neighbouring countries, Vol. IX (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of the Government Printing, India, 1892), 389-90.

Appendix 4

Treaty between the British Government and Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, concluded on the part of the British Government by Major John Jacob, C.B., in virtue of full powers granted by the most noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, K.T., etc. Governor-General of India – May 14, 1854

Whereas the course of events has made it expedient that a new agreement should be concluded between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, the following Articles

have been agreed on between the said government and His Highness.

Article 1

The Treaty concluded by Major Outram between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, on the 6th October 1841, is hereby annulled.

Article 2

There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Khelat, his heirs and successors.

Article 3

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to oppose to the utmost all the enemies of the British Government, in all cases to act in subordinate co-operation with that Government, and to enter into no negotiations with other States without its consent, the usual friendly correspondence with neighbours being continued as before.

Article 4

Should it be deemed necessary to station British troops in any part of the territory of Khelat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable by the British authorities.

Article 5

Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to prevent all plundering or other outrage by his subjects within or near British territory, to protect the passage of merchants to and for between the British dominions and Afghanistan. Whether by way of Sindh or by the seaport of Soumeecanee, or other seaports of Mekran, and to permit no exactions to be made beyond an equitable duty to be fixed by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan, and the amount to be shown in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty.

Article 6

To aid Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, in the fulfillment of these obligations, and on condition of a faithful performance of them year by year, the British Government binds itself to pay to Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors an annual subsidy of fifty thousand (50,000) Company's rupees.

Article 7

If during any year the conditions above mentioned shall not be faithfully performed by the said Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, then the annual subsidy of fifty thousand (50,000) Company Rupees will not be paid by the British Government.

Appendix 5

Treaty between the British Government and Kalat State, December 8, 1876

Whereas it has become expedient to renew the Treaty of 1854, between the British Government and Naseer Khan, Khan of Khelat, and to supplement the same by certain additional provisions calculated to draw closer the bonds of friendship and amity between the two Governments, the following additional Articles are herewith agreed upon between the Right Honourable Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton, Baron Lytton of Knebworth, in the County of Hertford, and a Baronet of the United Kingdom, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, on behalf of the British Government on the one hand, and His Highness Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, on the other: -

Article 1

The Treaty concluded between the British Government and Meer Naseer Khan, Khan of Khelat, on the 14th May 1854, is hereby renewed and re-affirmed.

Article 2

There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government and Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, his heirs and successors.

Article 3

Whilst on his part, Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, binds himself, his heirs, successors, and Sirdars to observe faithfully the provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of 1854, the British Government on its part engages to respect the independence of Khelat, and to aid the Khan, in case of need, in the maintenance of a just authority and the

protection of his territories from external attack, by such means as the British Government may at the moment deem expedient.

Article 4

For the further consolidation of the friendship herewith renewed and re-affirmed between the two Governments, it is agreed on the one hand that British Agents with suitable escorts shall be duly accredited by the British Government to reside permanently at the Court of the Khan and elsewhere in His Highness's dominions, and on the other hand, that a suitable representative shall be duly accredited by His Highness to the Government of India.

Article 5

It is hereby agreed that should any dispute, calculated to disturb the peace of the country, arise hereafter between the Khan and the Sirdars of Khelat, the British Agent at the Court of His Highness shall in the first place use his good offices with both parties to effect by friendly advice an amicable arrangement between them, failing which the Khan will, with the consent of the British Government, submit such dispute to its arbitration, and accept and faithfully execute its award.

Article 6

Whereas the Khan of Khelat has expressed a desire on the part of himself and his Sirdars for the presence in his country of a detachment of British troops, the British Government, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of 1854, and in recognition of the intimate relations existing between the two countries, hereby assents to the request of His Highness, on condition that the troops shall be stationed in such positions as the British Government may deem expedient, and be withdrawn at the pleasure of that Government.

Article 7

It is also agreed that such lines of telegraph or railway as may be beneficial to the interests of the two Governments shall be from time to time constructed by the British Government in the territories of the Khan, provided that the conditions of such construction be a matter of previous arrangement between that Government and the Government of His Highness.

Article 8

There shall be entire freedom of trade between the State of Khelat and the territories of the British Government, subject to such conditions as the British Government may, at any time, in concert with the Khan of Khelat, deem necessary for the protection of fiscal interests.

Article 9

To aid Meer Khodadad Khan, his heirs, and successors, in the efficient fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them under the Treaty of 1854, and the present supplementary engagement, the British Government hereby undertakes to pay to the said Khan, his heirs, and successors an annual sum of one lakh of rupees, so long as they shall faithfully adhere to the engagements heretofore and hereby contracted.

Article 10

The British Government further undertakes to contribute Rupees twenty thousand five hundred annually towards the establishment of posts and development of traffic along the trade routes in His Highness's territories provided such money is expended by the Khan in the manner approved of by the British Government.⁹

C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* relating to India and Neighbouring countries, Vol. IX (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of the Government Printing, India, 189s2), 396-7.

Bibliography

- A, H. R. (2007). *British Relations with Sindh, 199-1843*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- Abdullah, A. (1973). *The Historical Background of Pakistan and its People*. Karachi: Tanem Publishers.
- Adamec, F. C. (2003). *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.
- Adle, C. (2005). *History of Civilizations of Central Asia: Towards the contemporary period: from the mid nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century*. Turin: UNESCO Publishing .
- Adye, J. (1897). *Indian Frontier Policy: an historical sketch* . London : Smith, Elder & Co. .
- Ahmedai, M. N. (1995). *Tarikh-e-Baloch o Balochistan (in Urdu)*. Quetta: United Printers .
- Ahmedzai, L. C. (1992). *Balochistan: its Strategic Importance* . Karchi: Royal Publications.
- Aitchison, C. U. (1892). *A collection of Treaties (Vol. XI)*. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing India.
- Alan Sharp, G. S. (2000). *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation*. London : Routledge .
- Awan, A. B. (1985). *Balochistan Historical and Political Processes*. London.
- Axmann, M. (2009). *Back to the Future: the Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism, 1915-1955*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Azad, M. A. (2003). *Governance, Law and Customs in Balochistan*. Quetta : Kalat Publishers.
- Baer, G. W. (1994). *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The US Navy, 1890-1990*. California : University of Stanford Press .
- Bakhsh, M. K. (1974). *Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan* . Karachi : Royal Book Company .
- Baloch, H. (2007). *Balochistan Papers*. Karchi: Sayed Hashmi Reference Library.
- Baloch, H. (2008). *the Balochistan Chronicles: the archives of the Times, London and the New York Times On Balochistan, from 1842-20*. Karchi: Sayed Hashi Reference Library.
- Baloch, H. (2012). *Baloch, Afghan, Persion Boundary Commission: Goldsmith, MacMohan Line*. Karchi: Sayed Hashmi Reference Library.
- Baloch, H. J. (2006). *Balochistan: Statehood and Nationalism*. Michigan: J. Perek Academy of Social Sciences.
- Baloch, I. (1987). *The Problems of Greater Balochistan: A Study of Baloch Nationalism*. Germany: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH Stuttgart.
- Baloch, J. M. (1974). *Searchlights on Balochis and Balochistan*. Karachi : Royal Publications.
- Baloch, M. A. (1973). *Mukhtasar Tarikh Kaum Baloch Wa Khawanin-e-Baloch*. Karachi.
- Baloch, M. A. (1975). *Inside Balochistan*. Karchi: Royal Book Company.
- Baloch, M. S. (197). *A Literary History of the Balochis*. Quetta : Balochi Academy.
- Baloch, M. S. (1977). *Hitory of Baloch Race and Balochistan* . Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab.

- Baloch, S. (2002). *Political economy of Balochistan*. Quetta: Express Publications.
- Baluch, M. S. (1984). *History of Baluch Race and Baluchistan* (Third ed.). Quetta: Khair-un-Nisa, Nisa Traders.
- Baluchistan., Department., I. (., & Government, I. (. (1886). *Administration report of the Baluchistan Agency*. Quetta : Delhi.
- Bayly, M. (2016). *Taming the Imperial Imagination: Colonial Knowledge, International Relations, and the Anglo-Afghan Encounter, 1808-1878*. New York : Cambridge University Press.
- Bellew, H. W. (1874). *From the Indus to the Tigris: A Narrative of a Journey Through the Countries of Balochistan, Afghanistan, Khorasan and Iran*. London: Trubner.
- Belmessous, S. (2015). *Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600-1900*. New York : Oxford University Press.
- Bienjo, G. B. (2009). *In search of Solutions: the Autobiography of Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizanjo*. (B. M. Kutty, Ed.) Karchi: Pakistan Labour Trust and University of Karchi's (KU) Pakistan Studies Centre.
- Blackburn, T. a. (2008). *The extermination of a British Army: the Retreat from Cabul*. New Delhi : A. P. H. Publishing Corporation .
- Bray, D. (197). *The Life History of a Barhui*. Karachi: The Royal Book Company.
- Bray, D. (1989). [1913]. *Census of the India, 1911: Balochistan* (Vol. Volum IV). Calcutta: Government of India.
- Breseeg, T. M. (2004). *Baloch Nationalism: its Origin and Development*. Karachi: Royal Publications.
- (1886). *British administrative report of the Balochistan*.
- Brohi, N. (1977). *Studies in Brahui History*. Karachi.
- Bruce, R. I. (1900). *The Forward Policy and its Result*. London: Longmans, Green and Company.
- Bryant, G. J. (2013). *Emergence of British Power in India, 1600-1784: A Grand Strategic Interpretation*. London : Boydell Press.
- Buller, R. H. (2002). [1908]. *Imperial Gaeteeer of India . Provincial Series: Balochistan*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication.
- Burnes. (1839). *Pol. no. 53 - "Report From Alexander Burnes of his visit with the khan of Khelat"*. (April 20,). Shaal: Foreign Department .
- Centre, F. P. (2006). *Balochis of Pakistan: on the Margins of History*.
- Chacko, P. (2012). *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947-2004*. New York: Routledge.
- Chibber, V. (2005, Feb). *The Good Empire: Should we pick up where the British left off?* *Boston Review (Academic Journal)*, 30 (1), 30.
- Chima, J. S. (2015). *Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia: Identities, Interests and Challenges to State Authority*. New York : Routledge.
- Connolly, A. (1834). *Journey to the North of India, Overland from England, through Russia, Persia and Afghanistan, 2 vol*. London: R. Bentley.

- Dames, M. L. (1904). *The Baloch Race: A Historical and Ethnological Sketch*. London : Royal Asiatic Society .
- Dashti, N. (2007). *The Voice Of the Reason* . Quetta : Asaap Publication.
- Dashti, N. (2012). *The Baloch and Balochistan A Historical Account from the Beginning to the Fall of the Baloch Sate*. America: Trafford.
- Davies, H. J. (n.d.). *Kabul Rising: The Origins and Development of the Anti-British Rebellion During the First AngloAfghan War, 1839-42*. 1-6. Retrieved 8 18, 2016
- Davis, H. (1926). *The Great Game in Asia: 1800-1844*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Dehwar, M. M. (1994). *Contemporary History of Balochistan*. Quetta: Third world Publication.
- Dehwar, M. S. (2007). *Tarikh-e-Balochistan (in Urdu)*. Quetta: Balochi Academy.
- Dolan, B. (2000). *Exploring European Frontiers: British Travellers in the Age of the Enlightenment*. london: Macmillan.
- Duggal, K. S. (2001). *Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the Last to Lay Arms*. New Delhi : Abhinov Publications .
- Dupree, L. (1973). *Afghanistan*. New York : Princeton University .
- Dupree, L. (1976, September - December). The First Anglo-Afghan War and the British Retreat of 1842: the Functions of History and Folklore. *East and West*, 26(3/4), 503-529 . Retrieved 11 9, 2015, from East and West, Vol. 26, No. 3/4 (September - December 1976), pphhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/29756327
- Dutta, S. (2002). *Imperial Mappings--in Savage Space: Balochistan*. New Dehli : BR Publishing Corporation.
- Dyer, R. E. (1921). *The Raiders of the Sarhad* . London.
- Evans, L. (1829). *On the Practicability of an Invasion of British India*. London: Cornhill.
- Evans, M. (2002). *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its Poeple and Politics* . London : Harper Collins .
- Evans, M. (2010). *Securing Indian Frontier in Central Asia: Confrontation and Negotiation, 1855-95*. New York : Routledge .
- Eyre, V. S. (1879). *The Kabul Insurrection*. London: WM. H. Allen & Co.
- Finch, M. P. (2013). *A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Colonial in Tonkin and Madagascar, 1885-1900*. . Oxford : Oxford University Press .
- First Administration Report of the Balochistan Agency*. (1886). Culcutta.
- Foreign Department – Secret No. 126: “Correspondence to Maddock from Macnaghten”*. (March, 18, 1839). Bombay .
- Gankovsky, Y. V. (1971). *The Peoples of Pakistan*. Mascow.
- Global Security.org*. (n.d.). Retrieved 08 8, 2016, from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/baloch.htm>.
- Goldsmith, F. J. (1876). In St. John, Lovett and E. Smith. *Easter Persia: An Account of the Journey of the Persion Boundry Commission*. London: Macmillan and Company .
- Graham, G. S. (1967). *Great Britain in the Indian Ocean: A Study of Maritime Enterprise 1810-1850*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Haider, J. S. (2007). The British Advent in Balochistan. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, XXVIII(2), 1. Retrieved 06 13, 2016
- Harper, I. M. (1930). *The Golden Sparrow: A Course on India for Junior Boys and Girls*. New York : Friendship Press .
- Harris, J. (1996). *A Scientific Frontier for India: Background to the Forward Policy of Nineties* (Vol. 1). Canadian Journal of History.
- Harrison, S. S. (1981). *In Afghanistan's Shadow* . New York & Washington : Carnegie Endowment.
- Heathcote, T. A. (2015). *Balochistan, the British and the Great Game: The Struggle for the Bolan Pass, Gateway to India*. C. Hurst, Publishers, Limited.
- Heather Bolton, S. S. (2007). *New perspectives on Pakistan: visions for the future*. Karachi : Oxford University Press .
- Historical Background of the Tribal System in Balochistan* (Vol. Chapter II). (n.d.). Retrieved 8 18, 2016
- Holdich, T. H. (1996). *Indian Borderland: 1880-1900*. Asian Educatinal Services.
- Hopkins, M. M. (2014). *Fragments of the Afghan Frontier*. London : Hurst & Co. .
- Hosseinbor, M. H. (2000). *Iran and Its Nationalities: The Case of Baloch Nationalism* . Karachi: the Royal Book Co.
- Howe, D. (199). *James Howe and Alan Daniel. Bunnicul: A Rabbit Tale of Mystery*. New York: Anthem.
- Howse, D. (Ed.). (1990). *Background to Discovery: Pacific Exploration from Dampier to Cook*. University of California Press.
- Hughes, A. W. (1977). *Country of Balochistan: its Geography, Ethnology and History* . London: Oxford University Press.
- Hughes-Buller, R. (1989). *[1902] Census of India, 1901: Balochistan* (Vols. Volume V-B). Bombay: Government of India.
- I, N. J. (1967). *The First Afghan War, 1838-1842*. Cambridge.
- Imperial Gazetteer Of India (Balochistan)*. (1984). Lahore : Sange Meel Publication.
- Imperial Gazetteer of India: Provincial Series Balochistan*. (1999). Adegil Graphics LLc.
- Jain, H. (2003). *The Making of Punjab* . Chandigarh : Unistar books pvt Limited .
- James, T. G. (2003). *Napoleon and Egyptology: Britain's Debt to French Enterprise*. London: British Museum.
- Janmahmad. (1982). *the Baloch Cultural Heritage*. Karachi: Royal Book Company.
- Janmahmad. (1989). *Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan Emergence Dimensions Repercussion*. Quetta: Gosha- _E-Adab Jinnah Road Quetta.
- Jayapalan, N. (2008). *Economic History of India: ancient to present day* . New Delhi : Atlantic Publishers & Distributors Pvt Ltd.
- Kalayil, A. P. (1997). *British Relations with the Khanate of Kalat, Balochistan: 1838-1882*. Michigan: A Bell & Howell Information Company.
- Kausar, I. (n.d.). *Pakistan Movement in Balochistan*. Ialamabad.

- Khalifin, A. (1964). *Russia's Policy in Central Asia: 1857-68*. London: Central Asian Research.
- Khan Baloch, M. A. (1975). *Inside Balochistan A Political Autobiography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi*. Karachi: ROyal Book Company.
- Khan, G. (2014). *Politics of nationalism, federalism, and separatism: The case of Balochistan in Pakistan*. Michigan : Online version .
- Khan, M. N. (2014). Security and Development in Balochistan. *Islamabad Policy Research Institute*, 16-21.
- Kundi, M. (1963). *England, Russia and Central Asia*. Peshawar : Peshawar University Book Agency.
- Kundi, M. A. (1993). *Balochistan a socio- cultural and Political Analysis*. Qasim PronTERS.
- Kundi, M. A. (2002). *Balochistan Hope and Despair*. Quetta: New Quetta Book Stall.
- Lambert, M. (2007). *Afghanistan and Northwest Frontier*. Kabul : Military Press.
- Leech, R. (1843). *A Brief History of Kalat, Brought Down to the Disposition and Death of Mehrab Khan, Braho-Ee*. Bengal: Asiatic Society of Bengal.
- Luni, A. A. (2003). *British Balochistan 189-194*. Karachi: Fazleesons.
- Macgregor, S. C. (1882). *Wandering in Balochistan* . London : W. H. Allen & Co.
- Macgregor, S. C. (1882). *Wanderings in Balochistan*. London: W. H. Allen & Co.
- Mackinder, H. (1910). *India: Eight Lectures*. London: George Philip & Son.
- MacNeil, J. (1836). *The Progress and Present Position of Russia in East* . London: R. Bentley
- Macrory, P. &. (2002). *Retreat from Kabul: The Catastrophic Defeat from Afghanistan, 1842*. London : The Lyons Press.
- Malcolm, J. (1801). *Dispatch to Lord Elgin, British Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte Factory Records* . London: British Library.
- Malleson, G. B. (1978). *Hsitory of Afghanistan: From the Earliest Period to the Outbreak of the War of 1878*. London: W. H. Allen &Co.
- Marianna, M. P. (2003). *Travels, Tales and Encounters in Sindh and Balochistan 1840-1843*. London : Oxford University Press .
- Markovit, C. (2000). *The Global World of the Indian Merchants 150-1947: Traders of Sind From Bukhara to Panama* . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Masson, C. (1844). *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, The Punjab and Kalat, during a Residence in those Countries, in four volumes* . London: Richard Bentley.
- Matheson, S. (1999). *The Tigers of Balochistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Mathur, Y. B. (2008). *British Administration of Punjab, 1849-75*. Delhi : Surjeet Book Depot .
- Mengal, M. Q. (2003). *Comprehensive Balochistan General Knowledge*. Quetta: Balochi Academy.
- Minaham, J. (2002). *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups Around the World* (Vol. 1). London: Greenwood Press.

- Mojtahed-adeh, P. (1963). *Small Players of the Great Game: Settlement of Iran's Eastern Borderland and the Creation of Afghanistan*. London : Routledge Curzon.
- Nadiem, I. H. (1979). *Balochistan: Land, History, People* . Lahore : Sang-e-Meel Publicationa..
- Naseer, G. K. (2010). *Tareekh e Balochistan* (5 ed., Vol. 2). Quetta: Kalat Publishers and Book Salers.
- Naseer, M. G. (2000). *Tarikh-i-Baloch wa Balochistan (the Hisroty of Baloch and Balochistan)* (Vol. vi). Quetta: Gosha-E-Adab Jinnah Road, Quetta.
- Nauka, H. P. (n.d.). *The Great Game: on the Secret Service In High Asia*. John Murray.
- Naz, M. A. (2010). *The Baloch* (ed ed.). Quetta: Balochistan Volunteer Foundation.
- Nooris, J. A. (1967). *The First Afghan War 1838-1842*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Noraiee, H. (2015, 1 3). The Modern Routs of the Social and Political Fragmentation in Balochistan in Pakistan. *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 15-27.
- Norris, I. (1967). *The First Afghan War: 1838-1842*. New York : Cambridge University Press.
- Oliver, E. (1890). *Across the Border of Pathan and Baloch*. London: Chaman and Hall.
- Onley, J. (2007). *the Arabian Frontier of British Raj*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Paget, M. a. (1884). *Expeditions versus the Northwest Frontier Tribes* . London: Naval Military Press.
- Pehrson, R. (1966). *the Social Organization of Marri Baloch* . New York: Wenner-Gren.
- Perry, J. (2005). *Arrogant Armies* . Edison: Castle Books .
- Plumb, J. (1975). The Impact of the American Revolution on Great Britain. In L. o. Congress, *The Impact of the American Revolution Abroad* (pp. 65-81). Hawaii : University Press of the Pacific Honolulu .
- Popplewell, R. (1995). *Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-1924*. London : Frank Cass.
- Pottinger, H. (2003). *Travels in Balochistan and Sindh*. London: Longman Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown.
- Ram, R. B. (1907). *Tarikh-e-Balochistan*. (1st, Ed.) Lahore.
- Raverty, H. G. (1988). *Notes on Afghanistan and Part of Balochistan* . London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
- Redaelli, R. (1997). *The Father's Bow: The Khanate of kalat and British India 19th 20th Century* . Frenze: Italy: Manent.
- Riddick, J. F. (2006). *The History of British India: A Chronology*. London : Paeger .
- Roberts, J. J. (2003). *The Origins of Conflict In Afghanistan*. London : Praeger.
- Romanovsky, M. (1870). *Notes on the Central Asian Questions*. Calcutta: Government Press.
- Rooman, A. (1960). *The Brahus of Quetta-Kalat Region*. Pakistan Historical Society.
- Rudé, B. G. (1985). *Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Aristocracy and the Bourgeois Challenge*. Harvard : Harverd University Press .
- Saldanha, J. (1905). *Preis of Makkuran Affairs*. Calcutta: Government Printing Press.

- Samaddara, R. (2007). *The Materiality of Politics: The Technologies of Rule*. Anthem Press.
- Sarila, N. S. (2006). *The Shadow of Great Game: UNTold Story of India's Partition*. London: Constable.
- Sayed, J. H. (2007). The British Advent in Balochistan. *Pakistan Journal of History and culture*, xxviii(2), 51-76.
- Scholz, F. (2002). *Nomadism & Colonialism: A Hundred Years of Balochistan 1872-1972*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- Scott, S. F. (1976). *French aid to American Revolution: An Exhibition in Commemoration of a Victorious Alliance*. Michigan : William L. Clements Library.
- Serebrenniko, G. (1884). *Turkestan Lands: A Collection of Papers for the History of its Conquest*.
- Shah, M. A. (1992). *Sardari, Jirga & Local Government System in Balochistan*. Qasim: Parinters [Sic].
- Shah, S. F., & Khan, G. U. (2013). Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakening and Merger. *Global Journal of Human Social Science*, XIII(VI), 23-30.
- Shahvar, S. (2006, sep). Communication, Qajar Irredentism, and the Strategies of British India: the Makran Coast telegraph and British Policy of Containing persia in the East (Balochistan): Part I. *International Society for Iranian Studies*, 39(3), 320-351. Retrieved 03 26, 2015, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4311833>
- Siddiqi, F. H. (2012). *The Potitics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements*. London: Poutledge.
- Spielvogel, J. J. (2013). *Western Civilization: A Brief History* (8th Edition ed.). Pennsylvania : Cengage Learning.
- Swidler, N. (2014). *Remotely Colonial: Historical and Politics in Balochistan*. Karachi : Oxford University Press.
- Swidler, N. (n.d.). the Development of the Kalat Khanate. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 115-121. Retrieved 6 16, 2016
- Swilder, N. B. (1969). *Political Sturcture of a Tribal Chiefdom: The Brahui of Balochistan*. New York: Columbia University.
- Syed, J. H. (2007). the British Advent in Baloch. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, XXVIII(2), 5386. Retrieved 8 8, 2016
- Syker, P. (1915). *A History of Persia* (Vol. ii). London: Macmillan and Co., Limited.
- Syker, P. M. (1940). *A History of Afghanistan*. London: Macmillan.
- Tate, G. P. (1973). *The Kingdom of Afghanistan: A Historical Sketch*. Delhi: D. K. Publishing.
- Tayub, M. (2010). *Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending War along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier* (Vol. 20). Seatle: Brooklyn Journal of International Law.
- the Press List of Old Record in Punjab Government Secretariat. (n.d.).
- Thornton, E. (1842). *The History of the British Empire in India*. London : W. H. Allen & Co. .

- Thornton, T. H. (1895). *Colonial Sir Robert Sandeman: His life and work on our Indian Frontier : A Memoir, with Selections from His Correspondence and Official Writings* . London: John Murray.
- Titus, P. (1991). *Tribalism, ethnicity, and the State in Pakistani Balochistan: the Economics and Politics of Detribalization in an Urban Setting* . Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Riverside.
- Tucker, A. (1921). *Sir Robert G. Sandeman, K.C.S.I, Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan* . New York : The MacMillan Co. .
- Tyagi, V. (2009). *Martial Races of undivided India*. Gyan Publishing House.
- Tytler, F. (1967). *Afghanistan*. London.
- Usmani, A. (n.d.). *A Socialist, Feminist, Anti- Racist Organization: Solidarity*. Retrieved Augst 12, 2016, from <https://www.solidarity-us.org/node/3725#N1>.
- Wellesley, A. (1877). *A Selection from the Despatches, Treaties and Other Papers of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G., During His Government of India*. London : Clarendon Press.
- Wilson, R. (1817). *A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Yapp, M. (1980). *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850*. London: Clarendon Press.
- Yapp, M. (1980). *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850* . London: Clarendon Press.