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A CASE STUDY OF FETHULLAH GÜLEN

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
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
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
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In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Kind

Dedicated To

HAZRAT MUHAMMAD (PBUH)

Who guided us towards the path of

‘KNOWLEDGE’

For the betterment of mankind

ABSTRACT

The Gülen Movement is rising perceptible through the work of a variety of educational, economical and media institutions across the world. It is actively working as a non-political actor with having social and religious associations at national and transnational level. Each object of the movement is circling around the individual's life. Its main aim is to make the individual's life progressive and peaceful.

The thesis aims to examine the identity and the nature of the Gülen movement particularly in line with its influential role in education and civil society, consequently affecting the politics in Turkey. Secularism and the threat to Islamization are deep-seated issues signifying two conflicting discourses in Turkey. At this junction, the thesis also aims to examine whether in near future Islamization would overrun Secularism in Turkish social life and governance.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
ATV	Aktüel TV - a Turkish Private TV channel
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CC	Bicameral Legislature Constitution Court
CHA	Cihan Haber Agency (Cihan News Agency)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
DP	Democrat Party
DİSK	<i>Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu</i> (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union)
DİYANET	Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs
DYP	Doğu Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
DTP	Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Community Party)
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Leftist Party)
EPP	European People's Party
EU	European Union
FP	Fazilet Party
GM	Gülen Movement
GYV	Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (Journalists and Writers Foundation)
GAT	General Assessment Test
HSSC	Higher Secondary Education Certificate
ICEF	International Cag Educational Foundation

IMF	International Monetary Fund
İŞHAD	<i>İş Hayatı Dayanışma Derneği</i> (Business Life Cooperation Association)
JP	Justice Party
MP	Motherland Party
MUSİAD	Independent Industrialists and Business's Association
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
MNP	Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
NDP	Nationalist Democracy Party
NUC	National Unity Committee
NSP	National Salvation Party
NSC	National Security Council
NOC	Non-Objection certificate
NOP	National Order Party
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province
OEEC	Organization of European Economic Cooperation
PKK	Kurdish Worker's Party
PoW	Prisoner of War
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
RPP	The Republican People's Party
RPNA	Republican Peasants National Party
SP	Saadet Party
STV	Samanyolu Television Channel
SSC	Secondary School Certificate

TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
TUSIAD	Turkish Industrialists and Business Association
UNO	United Nations Organization
USA	United States of America
WP	Welfare Party
YÖK	Turkish Higher Education Council

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Chapter-1

INTRODUCTION

1.1-A Brief Statement of the Study and Hypothesis

The statement is a changing nature of the relationship between the State and Society in Turkey. Turkey is a very complex case such as the Islamic political actors are engaged with the secular state through negotiation, contestation and accommodation. However at present, as the society (especially Islamist conservative segment particularly including the Gülen Movement, various conservative business associations like the MUSİAD) are fast institutionalizing their influence almost in all sectors of life, within Turkey and the abroad. The state is under pressure by society but in an orderly form. The hypothesis of my thesis would be on this point that the *Islamists* (in a sense of being conservative as well) would pose a serious threat to the secular establishment. The Constitution of Turkey is secular but soon it may be rehabilitated into a conservative one.

1.2-Objectives of the Study

state institutions such as the Armed Forces and the certain segments of the Judiciary in Turkey have contradictory approaches towards the Islamic actors, and are very hostile toward the political representation of Islamic movements in the public sphere.

On the other hand, the society through many social organizations and on individual capabilities is institutionalizing its power almost in all fields. The growing power of society over the State may pose a threat for the secular establishment of the State.

1.3- Justification of the Study

Currently, the present scenario of the world undergoes a dynamic change. Turkey is an important state because of her geographical existence in the Europe. She is now facing a strong confrontation of the societal and the political change toward Islam. This change will throw a far-flung impact on other secular states having Muslim majorities.

1.4-Periodization

The period of 1895-1990 covers the historical background. While 1990 onwards covers the existing study topic.

1.5-Methodology

Qualitative research methods are used to investigate the above research topic, under which books, newspapers, and journals are utilized. All the approaches and the methods under the qualitative approach have one common objective is to understand the event, circumstances or phenomenon under study. While mentioned survey in the thesis is accomplished by using Quantitive research methods includes interviews, survey and data collection.

1.6-Literature Review

Literature regarding the changing nature of state and society relationship in Turkey, having its importance with many perspectives including social, political and economic aspects provides us a complete understanding to the relevant topic. Here our main concern for studying a literature is to study the impacts and implications, which are resulted in the changing nature of state and society relationship. Literature on this subject is taken from all qualitative sources including newspapers, journals, and books.

Berna Turam provides a better-quality aspect of literature about the relationship between the state and the Islamic political actors in Turkey. She analyzed such relationship in her book *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement*, published in 2007. The author threw light over the two different contradictory aspects of Turkey's politics, one is Islam and the other one is secularism. The active role of the well-organized Gülen Movement is also deeply elaborated in the fields of economy, education etc. The Gülen Movement is not limited to Turkey, has widespread networks. The most important thing, which has been described, is the over-emphasizing role of the Gülen Movement over the state machinery in economy, society, politics, and education etc.

Ira Marvin Lapidus, in his book *A History of Islamic Societies* provides a literature regarding the history of Turkish migrations and the Ottoman Empire, the modernization of Turkey, the partition of the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman reform and the state system and the politics of the Republican Turkey. Firstly published in 1998 it this book also covers in detail the political turmoils of the Turkish politics after the Ottoman Empire till now.

Gary Lyle provides a good literature in his book *Let's Visit Turkey* regarding history of Turkey, culture and traditions of Turkish people and moreover shares deep knowledge and information about Turkey's geography. This book is published in 1984. The writer deeply analyzed the abovementioned factors in the book and given a very clear picture of Turkey in visitor's mind.

Yücel Bozdağıoğlu provides a very detailed and fine literature in his book *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity* on Turkey's transformation process from an Islamic state towards secularization and modernization. The book was published in 2003. The writer described the abovementioned transformation period from the time period of 18th century and till Kemal Atatürk era, when Turkey had been completely transformed into a secular state. Most prominently, the reforms programs, the Ottoman Movement, the secular change in the constitution, Kemal Atatürk's ideology and his dominant role have been described.

Muhammed Çetin provides a detailed literature in his book *The Gülen Movement* about the establishment and mission of the Gülen Movement. He threw light on the life history of Said Nursi and Fethullah Gülen, who is known as the spiritual founder of the movement named after him. Besides this he has described the political history of Turkey since 1923 till present. In this part he threw light on the role of political parties, the role of the governments and the nature of the political systems. This book was published in 2009.

Wendy Kristianasen in *Le Monde Diplomatique* provides a good literature in her article *New Faces of Islam*. Published in July 1997, the article is about Turkey as a secular state and with evolving Islamic elements in it. It describes the role of the Islamists parties who pose a serious threat to the secular establishment. It also tells us the active role of MUSİAD (a business association representing the conservative

Islamic class) and Gülen Movement in education, media, society, politics and in projecting Islam and the Muslims. It threw light over the fast growing Islamic community and its increasing domination over all the fields such as education, employment, social and political fields etc. The author tells us about the growing influence and threat of Islam in Turkey in light of active role of Islamic political parties, Islamic movements and organizations, which are influencing the domination of state over state's affairs.

Ahmet.T Kuru provides a very detailed, clear and fine literature in his article *Changing Perspectives on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and AKP*. This article tells us about AKP's stance towards Islam and secularism, difference between passive secularism and assertive secularism, ideas and policies of AKP and the Gülen Movement. This article was published in 2007.

Mucahit Bilici provides a very detailed and clear literature in his journal article *The Fethullah Gülen Movement and its Politics of Representation in Turkey*. In the article, the writer threw light with his keen observation over those factors which are shaping the identity of the Gülen Movement. In the second and in the concluding part the basic fields of interest and the source of power of the Gülen Movement are described in detail.

Bill Park wrote an article *The Fethullah Gülen Movement*. In this article; he provides a fine literature in detail about Gülen and the Gülen Movement. The writer described in detail the Gülen ideas and threw light over the activities of the Gülen Movement and its growing progress almost in all around the world especially in education and inter-faith dialogue. This article was published in September 2008.

Bassam Tibi provides a fine literature about the Islamist danger to the Turkey's secular system in his article *Turkey's Islamist Danger*. He published this

article in 2007. It threw light on AKP (Justice and Development Party) closure case and analyzes all threats to the secular infrastructure. The writer, in detail, takes the whole overview of Turkey's society, nature of state, institutions and standards of democracy etc.

Yeşim Arat provides a very detailed literature on feminists' rights in Turkey and their struggle regarding it, in her article *Feminists, Islamists and Political Change in Turkey*. This article tells us about the discriminatory position of women under the secular state; their growing demands for Islam and in this regard the newly brought political change in Turkey. The all issues, which lie in domain of feminism, are described in detail. This article is published in March 1998.

Mehmet Küçüközer, provides a good literature in his article *Civil Society (A Proposed Analytical Framework for Studying Its Development Using Turkey As a Case Study)*. This article threw light over the changing interactions of state and society in Turkey since the Ottoman period. The writer expresses these changing interactions of state and society in Turkey within the framework of civil society. Such civil society has three changeable interacting elements such as state, autonomy, state capacity, and social structure or culture. This article was published in 2007.

Joshua D.Hendrick provides a fine literature in his article *Global Islam and the Secular Modern World: Transnational Muslim Social Movements and the Movement of Fethullah Gülen, A Comparative Approach*. In this article, the writer tells us, in detail, about the origin, role and influence of the Gülen Movement in Turkey and in the whole world. The writer takes a comparative approach to describe the far-reaching impact of transnational Muslim social movements especially of Fethullah Gülen Movement over the two opposite things, Islam and Secularism. This article was published in 2006.

Chapter-2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY AND OF HER POLITICS

2.1-The Seljuks and Their Dominant Position in the History of Turkey

The great Muslim empires including the Seljuks, Mongols and Timurids ruled for centuries over the current Western block, Iran and Iraq and almost rest of the known world. The Seljuks, the Mongols and the Timurids were basically tribes who migrated to their self-conquered areas from nearby areas. The Seljuks have a very dominant position in the history of Turkey. They belonged to the Turkish Oghuz tribe who migrated from the certain parts existed around the Central Asia. *Oghuz* was the name of an old man who was actually serving his duties as a leader of the tribe. When this tribe started to conquer different area, it got the name *Seljuk*. Later, with the passage of time, when the people of this tribe used to live in areas where Turkey is now, they got the name Anatolian Seljuks. The Seljuk Empire spanned over a vast area. They ruled over Iran, Iraq, Georgia, Armenia and Byzantine Anatolia.

In 1071, the Seljuks fought a war at Manzikert, Eastern Anatolia. In this war, they captured the Byzantine Emperor, Romanos I and spread across the Asia Minor¹ and established another state over there. The majority of the Seljuk migrants resided in Anatolia. They divided themselves into small bands of warriors, called as *ghazis*. They were working under the leadership of chieftains (*beys*) or Sufi holy men

¹Anatolia, which is the main area of now Turkey, is known as Asia Minor. Geographically, Asia Minor stretches from Asia towards Europe, and that is why it is known as Asia in Turkey.

(*babas*). The Greeks and Armenians in Anatolia already destroyed by previous invasions were further reduced due to warfare and migrations made by Seljuks and their conversion to Islam.

2.2-An Islamic Government in Turkey by Seljuks

At the end of the eleventh century, the Turkish State to some extent got a proper shape. The Seljuks formed an Islamic government in Central Anatolia and Southern Anatolia. They introduced an administrative system derived from Islamic dynamics, which got a status of a symbol for the next five hundred years in the Turkish history. Adopting Konya as their capital city, the Seljuks based the whole infrastructure of their state system upon the Sunni Islam. *Qadis* were appointed for providing justice. Money generated by donations through *waqfs* (foundations) were endowed to colleges. The income generated from waqfs and trusts were also augmented by the protection tax collected from non-Muslim inhabitants of the state. Sufis were highly instrumental in providing communal harmony by bringing order into a nomadic-warrior society like Seljuk Turks who then settled and became engaged with each other in the struggle of power.

Sufi masters and religious figures had always felt the pulse of the society and rulers had unofficially consulted these figures to counteract conflicts of power interest. In general, Sufis through their tolerant attitude toward Christians and other religious entities helped establishing a tradition of peaceful coexistence with Turks and non-Muslims; making convenient their conversion to or fellow feeling with Islam.

The Seljuks appointed governors at provincial level and also appointed officials as subordinate the provincial chiefs. The Seljuks had a very large army that was consisted of Turkish Muslims and Christian slaves.

2.3-Arrival of Mongols and the Power Struggle among Seljuks

In 1242-43, the Mongols defeated the Seljuks. All sections of the society including warriors, nomads, and immigrants fought against the Mongol invasion and against the Byzantine Empire that aspired to keep its existence intact. As a result of a series of survival battles, the Seljuks secured some areas such as Karaman *beylik* in Cilicia Province. In 1335, Konya was the capital of this area.²

2.4-Migration of Nomads Gave Birth to the Ottoman Dynasty

The Seljuks could not stop the migration of nomads into the areas that were existed outside the Eastern Anatolia. These nomads were also Turks but they belonged to another tribe. Osman, who gave his name to the prominent Ottoman State that lasted from 1301 to 1922, led one of these nomad groups. He, at last became the ruler of the Anatolia. Osman and his successors before capturing the whole Anatolia moved towards Europe.³

2.5-Timur's Invasion and Ottoman Empire in Conquests

In the meanwhile in 1402, Timur the Lame invaded Anatolia and laid a siege of the eastern provinces of the fledgling Ottoman State. Soon, he proclaimed himself as the defender of Muslim principalities in Anatolia. He defeated Bayazid I (1389-1402)⁴ and reduced the areas of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans bore this loss with a great pain but soon after they annexed other Turkish principalities in Anatolia

²Garry Lyle, *Let's Visit Turkey*, Second Edition, (London Burke Press, 1984), 9-53.

³Yücel Bozdağıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*, (the Great Britain: Routledge Press, 2003), 35-50.

⁴He was the third Sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

had a great flexibility and tolerance in their attitude for the Christians. They had a more respect and more relaxation for those Christians whom had a respect for Muslims and their laws. Those Christians were allowed to lead their life without harm and without much discrimination.

2.8-Janissaries: Army of the Ottoman Empire Turn Violent Towards the State

The infantry of Ottoman Empire was known as the *Janissaries*. These soldiers of the Ottoman Army were professionals and had an influential factor on the state machinery as well. As highly trained soldiers, Janissaries served as guards of the Sultan's Palace and as troops of his army. As time progressed, in order to achieve their own interests Janissaries got indulged in launching riots and killings to get control over the Sultan and the rule. More than once, they set fire on parts of Istanbul and in many instances they murdered sultans like Sultan Selim III in 1808, and viziers who was trying to disband them. Sultan Mahmud II, having established a new and modern army, disbanded Janissary troops in 1826 after a violent revolt.

2.9-Separation Movements and Other Reasons of the Ottoman Empire's Decline

Regardless of countless reform endeavours, Ottoman State headed down further into stagnation and decline. The minorities of the Empire began to demand separate homelands for themselves. Turks, albeit they were the ruling class, were indeed minority in population. In some regions, Turkish majority wanted to exercise more control to keep the Empire intact, and make their authority felt, thus they hard-pressed the Sultans for allotting them greater share.

Another main reason of the decline of the Ottoman Empire was that during its last years, leaving the 33-year reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II aside, it was governed with a weak leadership and myriad problems initiated by independence-seeking

nations. The leaders were unable to settle the internal affairs of the Empire in a well manner. Their wrong way to deal with issues by force usually brought along losses and widespread unrests like the violent riots in the wake of the abolition of the Janissaries.

2.10-The Russo-Turkish (Crimean) War

In 1853-56, Ottoman Empire sided with Britain and France in the Crimean War in order to keep Russia out of Turkish territories. In Ottoman Turkey's opinion, the foreign domination was affecting her economy and that was the main reason of her increasing poverty. As a result, Ottoman Empire defeated Russia and reclaimed territories. However, this success did not last to improve the poor condition of her economy, for during war economy, a great portion of its financial resources were mortgaged by foreigners.⁷

2.11-Ottomans' Inspiration from Western Civilization and Advancement

Even though Ottomans always considered the Islamic civilization superior to the Western civilization, by the 19th century and industrial revolution they had realized that technologically and scientifically, the West led in many fields.

Ottomans felt strongly about their low progress almost in all technological fields and they were eager to go to the West for obtaining technology and scientific developments. Until the French Revolution, the Ottomans as a state and society kept their distance from the influence of Western Culture and responded to Western advancements very slowly.

⁷Garry Lyle, *Let's Visit Turkey*, 9-53.

2.12-Ottoman Empire Under Western Inspiration: Initiation for Reforms

2.12.1-Sultan Selim III Initiates the Nizam-i-Cedid (New Order) Reforms

Sultan Selim III who reigned from 1789 to 1807 had a great enthusiasm of adapting European science and technology in the Ottoman context. He launched a reform program which was known as Nizam-e-Cedid (New Order). The main aim of his reform program was to increase the number of organizations in the wide-spanning state to combat the external and the internal enemies.⁸

2.12.2-Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) Initiated Western Social Reforms

After the assassination of Sultan Selim III, his successor Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) initiated another reform program to develop understanding and to introduce European technology, science and language into the Ottoman Empire. These reforms were radically launched in army, the central bureaucracy and the provincial administration, taxation, education and communication sectors. In result of these reforms, new military and medical schools were opened in 1827 and in 1836, and the faculty of administration sciences was established in 1859. These institutions had a secular curriculum. The prominent western languages like French and English were compulsory for getting admission to these schools. Foreign teachers were hired to teach there. These reforms gave birth to a military and bureaucratic class with secular and worldly ideas.

One another aim of this reform program was to stop foreign interventions. For this, it was necessary to remove the basic difference of the different sects of society,

⁸*External enemies* stood for any foreign element with any potential of invasion, while the phrase *internal enemies* stood for the state minorities who were struggling for their independent states.

which was the religion.⁹ In the name of providing further rights to the religious minorities like Armenians and counteracting rising waves of nationalism, institution with secular curriculum were brought to prominence and curiously, alongside Christian children, Muslim children too were admitted to foreign institutions.

In the nineteenth century, this reform program which was called *Tanzimat* made radical changes and left indelible marks on Ottoman society, initiating for the snowball effect of events that would lead the collapse of the Empire in 1900s.

2.13-The Young Ottomans Rise as Supporters of Islam

In about 1870s, the Young Ottomans strongly opposed the political system and scenario under the Reforms. They were against the *Tanzimat* Reform and its policies as design and implementations. The Young Ottomans based their view on keeping Muslim identity intact by Ottomans prevailing their own Islamic culture, history and traditions rather to follow blindly the European culture and traditions in place of the scientific and technical developments there. For them Islam promised and delivered a more valuable culture and tradition than that of Europeans. Since Islam was based on ethical values and no other religion had those qualities, switching the core values with a borrowed one would prove a disaster and therefore only Europe's technological advances should be imported and their culture should be rejected.

The Young Ottomans opposed the bureaucratic type of government in comparison of the democratic and parliamentarian form of rule. In their view, the democratic and parliamentarian rule should always be established. Only this form of rule could save the country from the opposition of the people. The government should

⁹Islam, as the religion, was marking the line of separation among the different cultures of the society with having its own ideas, culture, beliefs and traditions.

be run by following the Islamic laws in its constitution. The Young Ottomans influenced the making and implementation of the historic 1876 Constitution and opening of the first ever Ottoman Parliament.

2.14-Sultan Abdulhamid II Refined Reforms and Pan-Islamism Policies

During 1876-1909, Sultan Abdulhamid II refined the initiated reforms and channeled them to fruitful ends in different parts of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout his 33-year rule, Sultan Abdulhamid II placed special importance to opening vocational and technical institutions, which might be availed by the promising Turkish youth to obtain Western science and technological understanding to make a productive synthesis for the Empire's progress. This marks the difference of Sultan Abdulhamid II's reforms from the reforms made throughout the eighteenth and the nineteenth century.

In this way, the Western ideology, culture and traditions were prevented to grow in the Ottoman Empire as these described elements were considered as disruptive forces. He strongly advocated the localization of the Western military technology and education. Sultan Abdulhamid II rose to prominence by tapping the potential of the title of Caliphate as a policy to brace Western designs. Abdulhamid II's this Islamic policy was termed as *Pan-Islamism* because it was adopted in reaction to the western policies, which were highly influential in the Ottoman Empire in 1870s. The Pan-Islamism policy kept Western powers at bay during the reign of Abdulhamid II; however it also led Western powers to instigate further the ideas of nationalism to create disintegration within multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman society. The Pan-Islamism saw weak loyalty among the new generation of Ottoman bureaucrats and officers because they had liberal, secular and constitutional ideas.

The Movement of the Young Ottomans was founded firstly by four students of the Military Medical College in the name of *İttihad-i-Osmani Cemiyeti* (Society of Ottoman Unity). This Movement had a small committee named as *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress). The Young Ottomans later got the name of Young Turks, which was derived from French, since in France the group of the Young Ottomans came to be known as *Jeunes Turcs* (Young Turks). Almost all the members of this Movement were students.

2.15- Modernization Revolution of the Western-Oriented Young Ottomans

The Young Turks were the supporters and practitioners of Western ideas, culture and traditions. Their ideas grew rapidly. In 1908, these western-minded young officials launched a movement against the policies of Sultan Abdulhamid II. Initiating for a revolution, they led to the proclamation of the Second Constitutionalism. Under the Second Constitution, the judicial and the educational systems were secularized.

The curriculum of the highly religious schools was modernized and even the studies of European languages were being made compulsory. The position of the *ulema* was undermined. The modernization program of the Young Turks was not only confined to education. Its infiltration continued to affect every field of life. However, it was a much disorganized modernization and in a matter of years, the Union and Progress Society officials pulled the Ottoman Empire into the World War I alongside Germany, made her fight at various fronts, lost millions of people and thus collapsed due to their unplanned, sweeping policies.

2.16-Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the Father of Turkey and a Complete Secularization of the State

Having emerged victorious from the Turkish National Struggle (1919-1922) to expel intruders from Turkish homeland, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk led the proclamation of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, later in sequence, the law and the institutions were completely secularized. Mustafa Kemal was in favor of the complete adoption of Westernization with all its fundamentals, thoughts and practices. In his opinion, Islam was an *Ummat* policy and in absence of Islam, people only lost their national concerns and feelings.

The ideas of Mustafa Kemal were known as *Kemalist* Ideology, which had six principles such as Nationalism, Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Statism, and Revolutionism. Republicanism, Nationalism and Secularism constitute the most important place in the new Turkish establishment. These Six Principles became unveiled in 1931 and they were permanently incorporated and institutionalized into the 1937 Constitution.

On March 3, 1924, the Caliphate in the custodianship of the Ottoman Empire, the institution of *Shaikh ul-Islam*, the Ministry of Sharia, Sharia Courts, and religious schools were abolished. In line with the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* (Unification of Education) Law, co-educational secular schools were established. The Western dress code replaced the Muslim one, including all types of costumes and headgears that identified an Islamic identity.

On September 2, 1925, the new laws were imposed on wearing the religious dress. In November 1925, the use of *Fez* as headgear was declared a criminal offence and Western dress, the Western suit and hat were introduced. In December 1925, *Hijri* calendar was removed and replaced with the Gregorian calendar. Friday was replaced

with Sunday as the day for rest in a week. The twenty-four hour international clock was accepted as the only legal method of measuring time.

On October 4, 1926, the Swiss Civil Code¹⁰ was adopted and went into force to deal with the domestic family affairs of Turkish people. The second article of 1924 Constitution was abrogated in which, it had been stated that Islam was the religion of Turkish State. Now no religion was mentioned in the constitution and secularism was declared as national and official state conviction.

On May 24, 1928, international numerals replaced the Arabic ones. On November 3, 1928, the Turkish Parliament passed the law that the new Turkish script would be used in place of the Arabic alphabet. The use of Arabic alphabet was banned with the justification that it prevents the progress of education and culture. In the government's point of view, the elimination of the Arabic script was essential to bring unity in all the segments of the Turkish nation. Because, the Arabic script was the script of the Quran and it only represented the Islamic identity. The Law further stated that the Holy Quran would be translated entirely into Turkish language and all religious prayers, sermons, and rites were to be conducted in the national language i.e. Turkish, not in Arabic.¹¹

2.17-İsmet İnönü's Rise to Power after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died in 1938. İsmet İnönü, who was Mustafa Kemal's successor, consolidated the reforms left by Mustafa Kemal.¹² İnönü imposed Martial

¹⁰It was a Western legal charter.

¹¹Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 248-275.

¹²Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2009), 11-54.

Law in much of the country, in order to maintain the *Kemalist* structure and kept the Turkey out of World War I.¹³

During the World War II (1939-1945), Turkey faced certain problems such as shortage of basic goods, cash and inflation as well. In order to combat such problems, the Government of İsmet İnönü imposed very high taxes upon the civil servants and business community.¹⁴

A vast segment of society suffered a great because of inflation and then due to heavy taxes. In 1944, İnönü suppressed student protest movements against the policies. Prominent figures were arrested and charged with plotting to overthrow the government (CHP single-party establishment including the parliament and the government) and bring Turkey into the War on Germany's side.¹⁵

2.18-Political Party System in Turkey and Military Coups

The single party system in Turkey lasted for twenty-seven years until 1950. After World War II, the effects of domestic and foreign factors as well as social, military and economic aspects started the progress of transition to the multiparty system in Turkey.¹⁶ In the years of 1945-46 fifteen new parties were established. Earlier the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Republican Party were founded in 1924 and 1930 respectively but were liquidated on the orders of Mustafa Kemal. (Drink Trondle: Turkey's Party Democracy). Yet DP (Democrat Party) developed as the main opposition party in 1946.¹⁷

¹³Douglas.A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*, (UK: Greenwood Press, 2001), 23-241.

¹⁴Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 11-54.

¹⁵M.Temkin, *The Jewish World "The Jerusalem Report"*, May 24, 1999.

¹⁶As a world reaction towards any dictatorial regime, democracies were encouraged in the wake of the World War II. Owing to this fact, the usual single party rules in many countries ceased to establish multi-party democracies.

¹⁷Douglas.A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 40.

Four parliamentarian leaders; former PM Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, Fuad Köprülü and Adnan Menderes formally requested to the Government that the constitutional guarantees of democracy should be implemented.¹⁸ They raised their voice in the press. In result, these above leaders were expelled from the CHP. Only Bayar resigned from his membership.

However, later on, due to domestic and external pressures in 1946, İnönü allowed the four dissidents to form the DP. The DP served as an umbrella under which all those who mistrusted or opposed the RPP government took refuge and voiced the resentments that had been building up over previous years.¹⁹

2.19-Turkey under the Government of DP

When the DP fully organized its structure, the RPP called early elections in May 1946, and won it by a narrow margin. However, the victorious RPP indulged in a tussle between its single-party-statist and its reform-minded members. The RPP leader was forced to resign and the Party adopted a new development plan. This new plan highlighted the necessity of teaching religion in exclusive schools to be opened under the control of the Ministry of National Education and that a Faculty of Divinity to be opened in Ankara in 1949.

Within the ambience of the post-World War II conditions that brought the establishment of the UNO and as a result of international pressure based on Turkey's signing the UN Charter, the RPP also relaxed its attitude toward Islam. Even so, in the 1950 elections, it won only 69 seats as against the DP's absolute majority of 408.²⁰

¹⁸Ibid., 41.

¹⁹Ibid., 43-46.

²⁰Ms. Asma Jahangir, *UNHCHR Report "Civil and Political Rights"*, 2001.

1950 saw the transfer of power from the single party dictatorship to an elected democratic government. Celal Bayar became the President and Adnan Menderes the first-democratically-elected Prime Minister of Turkey.²¹

In 1950, in order to purge the revolutionary core in the Army General Staff, the DP discharged the top brass, who had ties with İnönü. Constitutional secularists and their electoral base considered the Democrats and the Democrat Party as a direct threat to the existence of the secular state. In 1950, DP ended the twenty-seven year ban on the religious content by introducing radio broadcasts of the Qur'an recitations for twenty minutes per week. The DP also kept its pledge with the public and introduced religion course into the public school curriculum.

More *İmam-Hatip* schools²² were opened and the call for prayer (*adhan*) was restored to Arabic after a ban since 1931. The unpopular People's Houses and Village Institutes were closed.²³ The DP-majority parliament passed a legislation declaring all acts or works violating Atatürk's Principles and Reforms as defamatory to Atatürk's memory and thus a criminal offence. The law about protecting the Turkish Currency against defamation was also passed during the DP rule.

²¹Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 54.

²²*İmam-Hatip* schools are secular state schools, devised to give religious education as per the policies of the State. Constructed in majority by the donations given by the public, the *İmam-Hatip* Schools were conferred to the care of the Ministry of National Education, which designed and implemented the national curriculum with additional basic courses on Islam for the training of preachers and *imams* as well as teachers by State trained, assigned and paid teachers.

²³A. Ertürk, "What goes up must come down", Features Section," *Turkish Daily News*, April 28 1997, Available from: www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/4-28-97/feature.html. (accessed on 5 May 2010). The Republic People's Party (RPP) established People's Houses (*halk evleri*) and Village Institutions (*köy enstitüleri*). By 1940, more than four thousands People's Houses had been founded to facilitate the development of Popular loyalties and to communicate to citizens, their mission and values as formulated by the regime. In 1935, Mustafa Kemal demanded a new strategy for education, which went nation-wide in 1940 through the Village Institutes. The inculcation of the fundamental ideology (secular ideology) of the Republic was an essential and foremost part of this above described education strategy.

An obvious resentment in the secular circles kept on growing against the DP, accusing it of using religion for political purposes. By the second half of the 1950s, the initial swift economic growth achieved by the DP slowed down, displeasing the business community as well as the academic circles. The Party began to lose support, and from 1955 and onwards, officers in the Turkish Armed Forces began noticeably to conspire against the Government.²⁴

A small number of army officers formed a reactionary movement against the elected government of DP. These military officers were incorporating revolutionary ideology into the training of cadets and junior officers.

2.20-1957 Elections, 1960 Military Coup and Fall of DP

In the 1957 elections, the DP won elections by taking 48 percent vote. This volume of votes showed that the DP lost majority votes and popularity as well. The RPP meanwhile found new support among intellectuals and businessmen, who were once, the supporters of DP.²⁵

Throughout 1958-59, the DP Government implemented some economic measures, rescheduled its debt, and received further loans from the USA, OEEC (Organization of European Economic Cooperation). A partial economic recovery began. However, a wave of dissatisfaction was present among state servants and elite class. The RPP went on the offensive. İnönü's tour of Anatolia broke out violence, as the Prime Minister Menderes ordered troops to interrupt the tour of İnönü. Students started protests and riots. On one occasion, police opened fire, killed five and injured

²⁴Douglas.A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*,66-74.

²⁵David Shankland , *Islam and Society in Turkey*, (UK:The Eothen Press,1999),25-240.

some more. The top military officers, cadets of the Military Academy staged protest against the DP government in solidarity with the Opposition Student Movement.

Some elements of the Armed Forces openly displayed their opposition to the elected civilian authorities. Martial Law was declared. On May 14, 1960, crowds demonstrated in the streets. On May 25, Parliamentarians fought within Parliament and fifteen were injured. Eventually on May 27, the Turkish Armed Forces took over the State.²⁶ DP parliamentarians were arrested and the Party was closed down.²⁷

2.21-1960 Military Coup Brings General Gürsel to Power

General Cemal Gürsel, nominal leader and the Chairman of the *Milli Birlik Komitesi* - National Unity Committee (NUC), assumed the portfolio of the President, Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief.²⁸ The military rule of General Gürsel passed a Constitution in 1961. This Constitution was known as the 'Compromise Constitution' made with the consent of NUC and some politicians.²⁹ The 1960 Constitution brought significant structural changes to society and government.

It established a bicameral legislature Constitution Court (CC), fifteen members of which were drawn from the judiciary, parliament, law faculties and Presidential appointments. The CC reviewed laws and orders of the Parliament at the request of individuals or political parties.³⁰ Hundreds of DP deputies were brought under the charges of corruption and high treason. Their trial and execution was started during

²⁶Bilge Criss, Pinar Bilgin, " Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East." *Meria Journal*, 1(1) (1997): 1-11 Available from: <www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria/journal/1997/issuel/jv1n1a3.html>

²⁷Douglas.A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 73-90.

²⁸Erik Jan Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: IB Tauris and Co Ltd, 1997), 173-215.

²⁹Douglas.A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 90-93.

³⁰H.C.Metz, *Turkey: A Country Study*.5th ed. Washington, DC, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,1996.

the National Elections of 1961. Celal Bayar, the deposed President was released due to his old age and illness whereas; the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan were sentenced to death in September 1961.³¹

2.22-1961 General Elections: İnönü's CHP Comes to Power

In the 1961 elections, İnönü's CHP (Republican People's Party – RPP) won 73 seats. The remaining members of DP formed the Justice Party, which won only three seats. Cemal Gürsel, the coup leader, became the 'elected' President.³²

İnönü's Government was victimized by political instability in the next several years. İnönü ran his government with many coalitions while he had the full support of the Armed Forces. His democratic government and the Armed Forces both wanted to maintain the implementation of the Constitution. Both sides did not want the rule of martial law. Nevertheless, in late 1961, workers began demonstrating in the streets demanding their right to strike.

Meanwhile Colonel Talat Aydemir from the Military Academy made a second coup attempt and failed. Aydemir was executed in May 1963. The local elections were conducted in which RPP lost and İnönü resigned. The victorious JP had fewer majorities, and they fell short of forming the government alone. Therefore JP formed a coalition government with İnönü's party RPP. This coalition government could survive for fourteen months. In 1965, the Government was brought down by budget vote and new elections were held in 1965.³³

³¹Douglas. A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 6-135.

³²Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 11-54.

³³William M. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, (London: Routledge Press, 1994),13-119.

2.23-1965 Elections: JP Comes to Power

In October 1965 elections, Süleyman Demirel's *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party – JP) won with majority votes. Demirel adopted the policies of the old democrats of the DP. He reconciled with the Military by granting them a complete autonomy in their affairs as well as shaping the defense budget. This brought the bifurcation of the JP into two factions: *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* (Republican Peasants National Party – RPNP) with a forthright nationalist agenda under the leadership of former Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, a key figure of the 1960 Junta, who had returned from exile abroad in 1963, retired and later took over the chairmanship of the Republican Peasants National Party.³⁴

The second faction, the *Milli Nizam Partisi* (National Order Party – NOP) was formed by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970.³⁵ It is important for its being the first Islamist party in Turkey. Erbakan – a prominent academic and engineer – gained a reputation of advocating a role for Islam in public and political life.³⁶

In 1967, leftists had formed the *Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* – DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Worker's Union). DISK was anti-capitalist and politically radical activist. It was encouraging street demonstrations and strikes to achieve its objectives. Proportional representation of the political parties brought such small parties into the Parliament, which influenced the politics and the public life by their extremist activities of these (above described) small groups of left and right.³⁷ The Leftist small political parties were in opposition to imperialism, influence of the

³⁴Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 11-54.

³⁵Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 9-137.

³⁶Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 11-54.

³⁷Ibid

West and American bases.³⁸ The Leftists in order to achieve their mission started demonstrations and strikes. They assumed they had a full support of every class of people including students and business communities.

In 1969, the whole country was in a war-like situation. The elections were expected in October 1969. The JP won elections and maintained a shaky parliamentary majority. The RPP was still in its identity crises. Six other parties entered into the Parliament. However, these six parties did not win even seven percent of majority votes. In 1970, JP dissidents forced Demirel to resign because of economic problems, unpopular corrective measures and a three-month late budget.³⁹

2.24-1973 Elections and Cyprus Crisis

In 1973, elections were held. The RPP and NSP formed a coalition government. In July 1974, Greek Cypriot guerrillas who were fighting for union with Greece, overthrew the Cypriot President in a coup and replaced him with a guerrilla leader, Nikos Sampson. Killings began all over the Cyprus. Turkey used its initiative as one of the guarantor countries and landed her troops in the Northern Cyprus to protect the Turkish-Cypriots and soon secured one-third of the Island.⁴⁰

By the end of 1974, PM Bülent Ecevit resigned in order to call elections. As in his point of view, after the Cyprus action, his RPP could win the majority of votes. However, leaders of the other parties did not allow election. Ecevit's RPP got an impasse to run the government.

³⁸H.C.Metz, "For more on terror organizations in Turkey (1960-70),"1996, 9-46.Available at: www.teror.gen.tr/english/turkey/leftist/1960.html.
(accessed on: 18 January 2010).

³⁹Douglas.A, Howard, *The History of Turkey*,7-145.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*,7-147

2.25-Reasons behind the 1980 Coup

Until 12 September 1980, RPP formed many coalitions with different parties.

All of these coalitions proved unstable because of their failure in managing the economic problems and controlling the political violence.⁴¹ By the last four years of the 1970s, the public order was completely out of control. A number of right-wing and left-wing political parties fostered armed youth to protect interests and eventually led the country into a civil strife.⁴²

These youth bodies be they left-wing or right-wing, emboldened by their party ideologies, launched extended violent campaigns, radical activities, demonstrations, and killings throughout the whole country against the government officials. The civil strife prevailed with time escalation between the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union (DİSK), the Turkish Workers Party and other leftist groups on the one hand and the Istanbul Police Force, on the other.⁴³

A large number of security personnel, journalists, intellectuals, party officials, labor union leaders and even government ministers were murdered until 12 September 1980. University students took a great participation in riots, striking, demonstrations, even in killings. A great number of students were killed during these violent activities. At Ankara University in 1978, a leftist student, Abdullah Öcalan formed the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and began a separatist war in the southeastern provinces.⁴⁴ PM Ecevit was forced to declare Martial Law in 1978.⁴⁵

⁴¹Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 11-54.

⁴²Douglas.A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 2-151

⁴³Ibid.,4-153

⁴⁴Asbe Ayata, "The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* (İstanbul: Pencere, 17 (Fall)1997): 9-67.

⁴⁵Douglas.A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 4-153.

2.26-1980 Military Intervention and Its Aftermath

As events escalated, the Turkish Armed Forces intervened on 12 September 1980 and liquidated the Parliament and the Government, placing the PM, party leaders, and parliamentarians in custody. The 1961 Constitution was suspended.⁴⁶ The provisions which contradicted the Martial Law were eliminated and the remaining provisions remained in effect until getting replaced or amended.⁴⁷ The Martial Law Administration commissioned the writing of a new Constitution, which was approved by public referendum in 1982.

The heavy civil and political rights were recognized in which the State's integrity and the national security were emphasized in the 1982 Constitution. The new constitution strengthened the post and powers of the President⁴⁸ and the role of the Military was formalized.⁴⁹ The coup leaders, the five Commanders of the Armed Forces, formed the National Security Council (NSC). They gave themselves indefinite and unlimited power. General Kenan Evren became the Head of the State and appointed an interim cabinet, which was composed mostly of retired officers, and like-minded state bureaucrats.

Martial Law Commanders in all the provinces were given broad administrative authority over public affairs, including education, the press and economic activity.⁵⁰

⁴⁶Ibid., 153

⁴⁷Henri J. Barkey, "The Struggle of a Strong State", *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), Fall 2000 :87-105

⁴⁸The President would appoint the Cabinet, the Constitutional Court, the Military Court of Cessation, the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, and the High Court of Appeals. He would chair the National Security Council (NSC), now made a permanent body with the right to submit its views on state security to the Council of Ministers, who were required to give priority to the NSC's views.

⁴⁹Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 11-54.

⁵⁰William M. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 13-119.

Surprisingly the bloodshed in the wake of the Rightist-Leftist street clashes ended immediately on 12 September 1980. However, within a month after the coup, the Army opened a new front against the Kurdish separatists. After the military coup, Turkey's civilian politicians could not succeed in gaining control of the Military's action in the Southeast.⁵¹ In 1983; the Army escalated the war against Kurdish separatism and suppressed Islamic political activism as well.⁵²

Universities were placed under the supervision of a newly created Council of Higher Education (YÖK).⁵³ Turgut Özal was retained in the post-coup Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economic Affairs.⁵⁴ In 1983, the National Security Council (NSC) permitted the formation of new political parties. Some new parties were formed which looked exactly the same with those banned in form, ideas and structure as well as behind-the-scenes management by their former leaders. Such parties were not allowed to contest elections and even closed down.

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The NSC only approved three parties such as the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), led by a retired General Turgut Sunalp; the Populist Party, headed by Necdet Calp, a former private Secretary of İsmet İnönü; and the Motherland Party (MP), formed by Turgut Özal.⁵⁵

⁵¹Henri J.Barkey, "The Struggle of a strong state",87.

⁵²Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*,11-54.

⁵³ Douglas.A.Howard, *The History of Turkey*,1-160.

⁵⁴F.O.Tutkun,An Historical Investigation on Birth of Turkish Higher Education. Pittsburgh. (thesis at the University of Pittsburgh,1998),P.29-109.

⁵⁵William M. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*,13-119.

2.27-1983 Elections: Turgut Özal Comes to Power

In 1983 elections, ANAP (*Anavatan Partisi* - Motherland Party) won 45 percent of the public vote and an absolute majority in the Parliament.⁵⁶ Serving as a Prime Minister for two-terms in 1983-1987, Turgut Özal became the President of Turkey in 1989.⁵⁷ Özal used his position to redefine Turkey's role in regional and the World politics.⁵⁸ He played an important role in giving a new direction to the Turkish Economic Policy. He gave a boost to the economy and eliminated its all-prevailing drawbacks. Due to the newly drawn economic policy, exports were encouraged and products were forced into a competitive position in the world market. Özal's policy instruments were high interest rates to combat inflation, gradual privatization of inefficient SEEs, wage control and to end the state industrial subsidies.⁵⁹

He believed that the solutions to Turkey's economic problems lay in close cooperation with the USA and the full membership of the European Union.⁶⁰ The economic liberalization did not bring a political liberalization with it. Özal introduced new faces into the political life in Turkey. However, he was not allowed to exert civilian control over the Military.⁶¹

Özal encouraged the role of Islam in public life. He understood that Islam was the source of the belief system and of values of most Turkish citizens.

⁵⁶Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 5-164.

⁵⁷William M. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 8-267.

⁵⁸H.C.Metz. (1996) Turkey: A Country Study. 5th ed. Washington, DC, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. P-4-63

⁵⁹Erik Jan Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 173-292.

⁶⁰A.Ficici, "Political Economy of Turkish Privatization: A Critical Assessment", Working Paper, (New Hampshire College, 2001) Available at: www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW3/Aysun_Ficici.pdf. (accessed on: 5 January 2010).

⁶¹Erik Jan Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 173-292.

With reference to work for Islam, Özal's Government emulated the dynamics of the Menderes Government⁶² and constructed 34 public *İmam-Hatip* schools in one year.⁶³ Özal's Government permitted the graduates of these schools to go on not only to the Faculties of Divinity but also to various other degree programs at Turkish universities. Some of the members of the Parliament and the Cabinet were visible in attendance at mosques on holy days and other religious observances. The Parliament permitted headscarf-wearing female students to attend classes without any ban.⁶⁴

Özal even called for a public referendum on whether banned party leaders should return politics; on receiving public acceptance in referendum he called for early elections in 1987. In elections; the Motherland Party won an absolute majority, 292 of the 450 seats. Erdal İnönü's *Sosyal Demokrat Parti* (Social Democrat Party – SDP) came into the Parliament with 99 seats.⁶⁵

On Özal's becoming the 8th President of Turkey, his ANAP (Motherland Party) suffered gradual decline due to mismanagement and 1990s saw a number of coalition governments, especially between Demirel's *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party) and İnönü's Social Democrat Party. President Özal died suddenly on 17 April 1993 right after returning from a Central Asia tour. Within a month, Süleyman

⁶²The period from 1950 to 1960 is called Democrat Party or the Menderes decade. During this time period, the three General Elections were held in 1950, 1954, 1957. As a result of these elections Adnan Menderes formed the Government five times as the Prime Minister. The Menderes Era will be considered under the following titles: the development of democracy, the economical growth and the changes in the domestic and foreign policies

⁶³Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 11-54.

⁶⁴David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, 8-27.

⁶⁵C. Aktaş, *Kılıç ve İktidar: 12 Mart'tan 12 Eylül'e*. (Gorb and Government: From 12 March to 12 September, 1990) 1 (İstanbul, Nehir Yayımları).

Demirel became the 9th President and Tansu Çiller, the first-ever woman Prime Minister of the country.⁶⁶

During the second half of 1993, the Armed Forces intensified their operations against the PKK. The Government could not stop the military machine fearing that the civilian rule would suffer from a threat to fledgling democracy. As the ball went on rolling, by April 1994, Turkey suffered a severe economic breakdown collapsing the stock market overnight. The inflation rate and costs peaked high,⁶⁷ leading to Tansu Çiller's Government lose a vote of confidence. The elections were held in 1995. Erbakan's *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party – WP) won the largest vote, 21.4 percent and Erbakan formed a coalition government with Tansu Çiller until his resignation in 1997.⁶⁸

The 1980 military coup in Turkey not only moved against the severe chaos in the country, it also encountered the growing and unchecked Islamic influence in public life. In following years, especially to limit Islamic influence out of secular check, plans were designated to minimize admissions to *İmam-Hatip* schools as well as to other faith-inspired institutions.

Even though these schools operated under the jurisdiction of the National Ministry of Education in a secular and state-inspected setting, by 1997, the graduates of state schools had been allowed to continue higher education in degree programs on social sciences and/or other post-secondary vocational institutions. These schools

⁶⁶Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 40.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸RP was closed down by the Constitutional Court. RP was succeeded by Fazilet or Virtue Party.

Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 6-175.

enrolled one-tenth of the eligible secondary education students.⁶⁹ The use of headscarves was banned from schools, universities and entire public sphere. In reaction, public protests and hunger strikes broke out all over Turkey, but to no avail. Police detained twenty leading Muslim businessmen on charges that they had provided funding for detrimental Islamic activities. In 1998, the Chief Prosecutor in Ankara's State Security Court asked for the closure of the MUSİAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association).⁷⁰

2.28-1999 Elections: MHP Comes to Power

After Motherland Party leader Mesut Yılmaz's resignation, the elections were held in April 1999.⁷¹ In these elections, the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP-Nationalist Action Party) won and established a coalition government with Bülent Ecevit's *Demokratik Sol Parti* (DSP – Democratic Left Party).⁷²

MHP brought nationalism in place of Islamism. The Islam and Turkism were two main factors that affected the political culture. Such differences were existed in the most conservative provinces of Turkey. MHP broke down all differences, which led towards the distraction in the unity of the Nationalism. As a result, the external and internal interventions into the Turkish Islamic lifestyle were stopped. The Kurdish Problem had been raised extremely since 1984. MHP's government sent military

⁶⁹Stephen Kinzer, "In Defense of Secularism, Turkish Army warns Rulers" *New York Times*, March 2, 1997.

⁷⁰I.Çevik, "What shall we gain if MUSİAD is closed? " Editorial, *Turkish Daily News*, May 26, 1998. www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=7283.

(accessed on: 12 January 2010).

⁷¹Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey*, 183.

⁷²MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and DSP (Democratic Left Party) had many commonalities. Both had negated the ethnic and the religious identities in Turkey. They did not deal or considered the Southern Anatolian problem as a Kurdish problem.

forces to different provinces and areas to get normalize the abrupt situation, and to keep the nation under the flag of nationalism.⁷³

MHP was the combination of three parties that had been banned in the past. It came out when in 1984 Turkish Nationalism had been gradually reactivated in opposition to Kurdish ethno-nationalism. A nationalistic discourse became dominant in the society. Over this, the powerful National Security Council clearly declared that Islamism and Kurdish separatism were the enemies of the State.

Meanwhile, MHP launched emotional demonstrations by projecting the people who were killed in clashes with PKK, in support of Turkish unity and for the Army. MHP's slogan of unity and nationalism as well as its support for the Army brought itself into the rule. Nationalism was not only the reason of MHP's victory in 1999 elections. Its policy agenda upon attacking corruption and charting new, effective economic policies too had a share.

As MHP came into existence by the legacy of previously banned parties, it contained nationalist, liberal and Islamic-minded policy-makers. When trusted with the key to run the country, MHP could not suppress its Islamic elements for a long run.⁷⁴

MHP Government failed in its anti-corruption drive. In the 2002 elections, the reasons behind MHP's – as well as its coalition partners' – failure were quoted as their soft belly towards indulging or turning a dead eye against corruption. MHP and its partners became more unpopular, when MHP implemented the International

⁷³In MHP point of view, nationalism means to revenge against cosmopolitanism and culturally different ethnic groups such as Kurds, Alevis and Christian communities and to bind them with a single rope of nationalism.

⁷⁴MHP had no longer, support the death penalty for jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and did no longer favors a ban on the wearing of Islamic headscarves in government schools and state officers.

Monetary Fund Policies. The coalition parties led by MHP bowed to the NSC's dominance and policies about governance. MHP failed to implement its new policy options for Turkey's social, economic and political problems.

2.29-Justice and Development Party: Policies and Role in Politics

The *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP- Justice and Development Party) was formed on August 14, 2001 by the reformist faction of previously-banned Islamic parties such as Refah Partisi (RP – Welfare Party)⁷⁵ succeeded into Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party). Virtue Party was split into two parties because of having certain differences over reforms and traditions. Justice and Development Party (AKP) defined itself with this reformist discourse, attracting popular support from young and middle-aged conservative base who wished for social change. Thanks to some of its members' past, AKP from the very beginning had been associated with an Islamic base and purported that they had the support of the Gülen Movement.⁷⁶ Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) always denied that his party was an Islamic party and had hidden Islamic agenda.

⁷⁵Refah Party was banned in 1998.

⁷⁶Gülen Movement is a non-political civil society movement with humble faith-based community roots encouraged by the teachings of M. Fethullah Gülen, a prominent Turkish Muslim scholar. As Fethullah Gülen and his voluminous adherents kept away from politics, the political scenario in the country post-1990s always assumed that election-victorious parties had it so due to the support of the Movement. Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and its *Milli Görüş* (National Vision) base had a straightforward attitude against Fethullah Gülen and his 'community' in 1980s and 1990s. However, it can be said that, the ubiquity and societal integration of the Gülen-inspired institutions across Turkey, as well as Refah Party's winning the elections to rule the country in 1995, led to the 'formal' interaction of these institutions and the Government. Be it the Refah Party or a party like CHP or DYP, the state-authority-respecting Gülen Movement had cordial but distant stance with the power. Erbakan's decades-long political presence and influence, and Gülen's positive activism have only been two factors among many that contributed to raising consciousness of Islam among young generations: while Gülen discouraged youth from politics and detrimental actions, Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) encouraged them to contribute to the social change through active politics.

In 1994 local elections RP's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the Mayor of Istanbul. In the local elections of 2004, AKP won by 42% votes. In the general elections held on July 22, 2007, AKP (Justice and Development Party) won with 46.6% votes. In parliament it secured 341 seats out of 550 available seats.

AKP has been criticized for its willingness to draw differential lines between the fields of religion and secularism on the grounds that it gradually brought anti-secular changes while showing itself in favor of free exercise of faith within the frames of the secular system. The attempt of banning the sale of alcoholic beverages in Ankara by the AKP-based Mayor of Ankara has been pointed out as an example to this claim.⁷⁷

In 2007, AKP passed a bill to lift the headscarf ban in all universities. As result of this, the Constitutional Court cancelled the lift of headscarf ban from universities by declaring that this step was a contradiction of constitution's articles 2, 4, and 148.⁷⁸ Turkey's Chief Prosecutor filed a case against the AKP that the party was involved in non-secular activities and it should be banned. The headscarf issue added fuel to fire. The case lasted for 2 ½ months. Seven out of eleven votes would be enough to ban the AKP from politics. However, only six members of the Court voted in favor of the motion, dropping the case against the party.

AKP's economic reform policies are found very successful since a rapid growth of economy has been observed. The usual two-digit inflation rate saw the

⁷⁷The ban was lifted up soon in result of a response by area's business owners. However, a license is still required for the sale.

⁷⁸Article 2 says that Turkey is a Secular Republic. Article 4 put forward the necessary conditions that the first three articles of the constitution are impossible to amend. These three Articles define the Republic's core values, including secularism. Article 148 describes the duties of the Constitution Court. With the headscarf issue, the Court declared its own body able to decide on any future constitutional amendments to ease the ban on wearing the headscarf in universities.

single-digit by falling to 8.8 % by June 2004. Financially speaking, AKP governments are the most successful in Turkish contemporary history in decades. AKP seems very active for getting European Union membership and to this end, in January 2005; AKP became an observer member in the European People's Party (EPP), the Conservative Party of the EU. If the EU rejects Turkey's membership, many fear that AKP itself might have a split between the Reformist and the Conservative faction, triggering yet another period of instability in Turkish politics.⁷⁹

⁷⁹Hasan Kosebalabani, "The AK Party Closure Case: Domestic Situation and International Relations," (Research Paper, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research Policy Brief.no 10,21 April 2008),2.

Chapter-3

SAID NURSI's LIFE, IDEALOGY AND WORKS

3.1-Negative Effects of Secular Establishment Provided Alternative Spaces

Turkey is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, and the secular state and establishment have narrowed its social and political legitimacy by excluding other sects of religions. In Turkish secularism, Islam and Kurds have been brought into view as the enemies of state security. As a tradition, the 'State' have supported only those groups which closely adhered to its *Kemalist* ideology; while the people or groups who did not accept *Kemalism* got themselves alternative places in cultural, political, financial and social spheres.

These alternative places have provided them with a new life with deserving identity. Conservative Muslims have used these alternatives to carve their own "parallel society" "to attract culturally and economically excluded groups. For instance, deregulation of broadcasting has empowered Muslims to express themselves on diverse radio stations, television channels, magazines and newspapers. Moreover, the Anatolian Bourgeoisie, who was also known as "Anatolian Tigers", has formed their first business and trade association MUSİAD² in the first half of the 1980s.

²MUSİAD (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* – Independent Industrialists and Businesspeople Association) was formed by those who were excluded from TUSİAD (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği* - Turkish Industrialists and Businesspeople Association) which is powerful and pro-establishment business association. Some secular groups claim that the "M" in MUSİAD stands for Muslim (Muslim) rather than müstakil (independent). Indeed many MUSİAD members do not hesitate to present their organization as an association of Muslim businesspeople.

3.2-Importance of Multi-Ethnic and Multi-Religious Society in Turkey

Alternatives like MUSİAD and various conservative TV stations have served to empower Islamic consciousness in Turkey. If these dynamic voices get excluded from Turkish social and political scene, chances are that there may be no lasting stability and democracy in Turkey. The multi-ethnic and multi-religious Turkish society force Turkey towards integration and insist her to maintain a secular establishment. If the role of Islam is keenly observed then it would become clear that Islam in Turkey is a source of social stability. Islam has not radical objectives there.

3.3-Introduction to *Nurculuk* Movement and to its founder Said Nursi

3.3.1-Life and Ideas of Said Nursi

Nurculuk, a large religio-social movement in Turkey, got its name from Said Nursi (1873-1960), an influential Muslim scholar. Highly elemental in reviving the awareness of Islam as a code of individual life, Said Nursi's ideas also contributed to promote democracy, human rights and the free market economy.

Nursi was born in the Eastern Anatolian Province of Bitlis. He was ethnically a Kurd. He was a great religious leader. Half of his life was spent in exile or in courts. He authored the most sophisticated and appealing interpretations of the Quran under the name of *Risale-i-Nur* (Treatises of Light), just in order to raise the religious consciousness of Muslims in Turkey and around. In his point of view, by raising the religious consciousness of Muslims, so that they (Muslims) could understand Islam and society easily. Through this he also wanted to overcome the influence of

secularism over the Muslims. The *Nurcu* Movement because of its text-based faith Movement⁸¹, strategies and reforms became very popular in Turkey than other Islamic movements. In 1909, Nursi was arrested over his alleged involvement in the Islamic “Reactionary” Rebellion. Soon he was released on being not guilty.

3.3.2-Nursi’s Ideas on Islam, Democracy, Muslim Community and Islamic Nationhood

Nursi argued that democracy and Islam were not contradictory concepts. The democracy and freedom are necessary conditions for the existence of a just society. Nursi identified that poverty as well as ignorance and internal enmity were the problems of Muslim community. He called upon the people of Eastern Anatolia that they should remove their narrow tribal and regional loyalties and they should understand the consciousness of Islamic nationhood.

3.3.3-Nursi Fought in the World War I as a Regiment Commander

During the First World War (1914-1918), Nursi as a regiment commander fought against the Russian and Armenian forces in the Eastern Front. In the heat of the battle and on horseback, he dictated a Qur’anic commentary in Arabic named *Isharat al I’jaz* (Signs of Miraculousness) to his students. During a clash, he was wounded and was taken hostage by the Russians. He spent two years as a PoW in Siberia. Eventually he escaped in 1918 and went to Istanbul through Europe. He

⁸¹Most Kurds in Turkey belong to the Shafi’i school of Sunni Islam, whereas most Turks belong to the Hanafi School. Some Hanafi Turkish *Nurcu* follow the Shafi’i rites during their daily prayers due to their loyalty to Said Nursi. Said Nursi was consciously Kurdish. Yet he always rejected Kurdish nationalism and considered Turkey the common homeland of the Ottoman nation. Due to the prevailing political situation since the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), many Turkish *Nurcu*s react strongly to any mention of Nursi’s ethnic origin. Some Kurdish Nationalists seek to nationalize the personality and writings of Said Nursi as “Kurdish.”

spoke and published on various issues, encouraging people to have awareness and adopt action against the intruding armies of the Ottoman lands. Even when Istanbul was invaded by the British in March 1920, Nursi openly and insistently supported with his articles and speeches the ongoing Turkish National Struggle (1919-1922) to expel intruders from the Turkish homeland.

3.3.4- Nursi's Ideas Changed after High Official Opposition to Islamic Rule

In 1922, he was invited to Ankara by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha to deliver speeches in the newly-established National Assembly. However, on visiting Ankara and witnessing the dismissive attitude of some deputies towards Islam and its tenets, he gave strong talks in the Assembly; consequently leading to burning exchanges with Ghazi Mustafa Kemal and other officials. Nursi, who till then believed in a political solution to the existing problems of Muslims and the Ottoman State, had a complete transformation of ideas, realizing that state institutions themselves are not instruments of change; rather, individuals could bring change.

3.3.5-Nursi's Ideas Regarding Islamic Law in Society and Its Effects

Nursi's understanding of Islam was based on his understanding of human nature. He saw the lack of religion becomes a source of conflict and wars. He extended this concept to the society that absence of God in public space is the source of man's problems. Nursi actually used a different way to guide the Muslims about Islamic rule of law or conduct. He did not offer an Islamic constitution or Islamic order but rather a mode of thinking about reconnecting with Allah.

3.3.6-Nursi's Works and Readings Banned by the State

Nursi's collection of written works is known as the *Risale-i Nûr Külliyyati*. (Epistles of Light)⁸² His all works and reading them in a community were banned by the state. A confidential system of people known as *Nur Postacılıarı* (the Postmen of Light) distributed Nursi's writings among the people. Those who were involved in the distribution and duplication of Nursi's commentaries constituted a unique network. The followers of the Nursi made more copies and distributed it throughout Anatolia.⁸³ When a core group of followers began to emerge, Nursi was arrested by a charge that he created a Sufi order which creation was considered illegal in the secular state. He was imprisoned for 11 months by the Eskişehir Court.

3.3.7-Dershaneler Established as Reading Circles of Nursi's Works

Later, the *Risale-i-Nûr* became the basis for the formation of a number of reading circles, known as *Dershaneler*. These reading circles evolved into a number of textual communities i.e. communities in which membership is attained by reading and internalizing the philosophy of the text. The reading circles gradually spread throughout Anatolia. These circles introduced Islam with the global discourses of democracy, human rights and science. The number of adherents to *Risale-i-Nûr* is in millions.

⁸²Nursi wrote some of his best work of *Risale-i-Nûr Külliyyati* in Eskişehir Jail in 1935.

⁸³Since Nursi wrote his all commentaries in Arabic script, his followers insisted on copying the writing by hand in order to perpetuate Arabic alphabet education in Turkey.

3.3.8-Nursi's Sources of Knowledge: The Quran, The Prophet and The Universe

Nursi's work was based on three sources of knowledge such as the Prophet, the Quran and the universe. This knowledge of these sources was referred to the Holy Quran. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was examined as a source of ethics and justice. Nursi's Qur'anic commentaries are different from other traditional commentaries in terms of their language and methodology. Nursi used a rich mixture of Persian, Arabic and Ottoman Turkish expression to articulate his ideas and create a brotherhood line among Muslims.

3.3.9-Nursi's Ideas Are Admired in Turkish Society

Nursi's ideas appealed to a large segment of Turkish society, partly his vibrant discourse as well as introducing reading circles, and transferring Islam from an oral-based tradition to a print-based medium and raising religious consciousness through education and reason. The raising consciousness of individual Muslim, in view of Nursi, was a first and an important step to establish a society where just and rule of law exists. The *Nurcu* Movement, therefore, is not a political Islamic movement but rather a faith-movement that seeks to raise religious consciousness.

3.3.10-Nursi's Ideas on Islam and Politics

Nursi always remained reluctant to become involved in politics. He considered politics a place where different groups with different identities, interests were indulged in conflicts. He believed that the religion should not be used as an instrument to advance particular interests. Because the religion is a basic thing of each society on which it survive. If religion were identified with one party or faction, it

would become impossible to represent the true Islam. Nursi, therefore, opposed the idea of an Islamic Party. In Nursi's writings, change is gradual. The Islamic ideas would spread from the individuals to the whole society then from society to the political sphere. He considered politics a reflection of society's values. Nursi avoided defining any religion against Islam.

Nursi, in the second stage of his life, carefully avoided politics and focused on raising the consciousness of Muslims.⁸⁴ When Turkey moved to a multi-party system, Nursi leaned towards the Democrat Party, for their cordial interest towards Islam and most importantly, for reverting the call to prayer (*azaan*) to its Arabic original in 1950 after 19 years of Turkish rendering.

3.4-Nursi's Death and Standing of the M. Fethullah Gülen Community

Nursi died in Urfa in 1960 at the age of 87. After the death of Said Nursi, the *Nurcu* Movement fragmented along ethnic, class and educational, generational and sectional lines. Since Nursi, through his works and life, had been a wide influence for the revival of Islamic considerations and interpretation of Islam in modern contexts, Fethullah Gülen's *hizmet* (service) community, started as a predominantly faith-based group and widely inspired from Nursi's works in addition to many other prominent Muslim thinkers, emerged as an exceptional component focusing on educating younger generations as versatile, resourceful individuals equipped with universal human values like love, tolerance, quest for knowledge, and coexistence which are

⁸⁴During the Republican period, Nursi wrote *Emirdağ*, *Kastamonu* and *Barla Lahikaları*. (The addenda or letters written from the towns of Emirdağ, Kastamonu and Barla where he was under house arrest.) These were collected by his students and include Nursi's communication with his students and followers. They are in conversational form including questions and Nursi's responses.

already ingrained in the universality of Islam and uplifting social harmony through establishing various institutions.⁸⁵

⁸⁵Tamer Balci, "'Turkish Islam and the Secular state': The Gulen Movement." *The Journal of American Oriental Society* 25(2)(2005) :331.

Chapter-4

M. FETHULLAH GÜLEN

4.1- Life, Education and Ideas of M. Fethullah Gülen

In 1938, M. Fethullah Gülen was born in a village in Erzurum, Eastern Anatolia. His parents took charge of his earlier education and religious instructions. At this time, there were few opportunities for ordinary Turkish people to get general secular education. Gülen's parents sent him to the nearest state primary school for three years. However, as his father was an official preacher and imam, he was posted to another town where there was no secondary school. Gülen was unable to progress to secondary education. Although at this time mosques and congregational prayer were allowed, all other forms of religious instructions and practice were not.

Even so, Gülen's parents like other ordinary Turkish people, kept up the Turkish Islamic tradition and had their children learn of Qur'an and other basic religious practices and prayers. They avoided confrontation with the authorities and the regime by concealing the fact that they were providing elementary Islamic instructions to their town and the neighbors' children.³ October 29, 1923 marked a revolutionary shift in the relationship between state and religion as well as of the position of religion in the public sphere. The abolishment of the classical Islamic educational institutions (*medreses*) was commented by Atatürk with the words "*The medreses established by the old Turks, are degenerated ruins, unable to be reformed*

³Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 17-24

*in the light of a modern academic mentality.*⁸⁷ Between 1933 and 1948, higher Islamic learning was not possible in a country with an almost 100 % Muslim population.⁸⁸

During the decade 1950-60, Gülen completed his religious education and training under various prominent scholars and Sufi masters who had a license to teach Islamic education. This education was provided almost entirely within informal system and was unsupported by the State. At the same time, Gülen pursued and completed his secondary level secular education through external exams. In the late fifties, he came across complications of the scholarly work *Risale-i-Nür* (Epistles of Light) by Said Nursi but never met its famous author. In 1958-59, he passed a State exam to become an imam and preacher. On the basis of exam result, he was posted to Edirne.⁸⁹

Throughout his service in Edirne, Gülen maintained good terms with common people and with civic and military authorities. There, he observed that the youth was fast attracting to extremism and radical ideologies. He tried to get them back from this way by preaching. He used his own money to buy and distribute his own published material to counter aggressive militant atheism and communism. He saw the erosion of traditional moral values among the youth and the educated sector of the society, which was indulged, into criminality and in political and societal conflict. These

⁸⁷Bekim Agai, "Discursive and Organizational Strategies of the Gülen Movement." (Article Presenté at dans le Rice University, November 12-13 2005),en.fgulen.com/.....Gülen movement.../2132_discursive-and_organizational-strategies-of-the-Gülen-movement.html. (accessed on : 21 April 2010).

⁸⁸Elizabeth Özdalga, " Redeemer or Outsider? The Gülen Community in the Civilizing Process." *The Muslim World* 95 (3) (2005) : 420-431.

⁸⁹Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*,29-49.

experiences put a great influence on his intellectual and community leadership and reinforced his faith in the meaning and value of human-beings and life.⁹⁰

In 1961, Fethullah Gülen began his compulsory military service in Ankara. He was not a Professional soldier in military.⁹¹ He had no contact with those military officers who were involved in the military coup of 1960. After the coup, Gülen was sent to Iskenderun, where he would do the second posting that completes his compulsory military service. There, his commanding officer assigned him the duty of delivering lectures to soldiers on faith and morality. By recognizing the intellectual ability of Gülen, his commanding officer gave him many western classics to read. Gülen also laid down the foundations of an anti-Communist association in Erzurum, in which he gave evening talks on morale issues.⁹²

In 1963, following military service, Gülen gave a series of lectures in Erzurum. Throughout his military service Gülen maintained his ascetic lifestyle as before.⁹³ In 1964; he was assigned a new post in Edirne, where he became very influential among the educated youth and ordinary people. The military authorities were displeased by his having such influence and wanted him dismissed. Before they could do so, Gülen obliged them by having himself assigned to another city, Kırklareli, in 1965. There, after working for many hours, he organized evening lectures and talks. In this Phase of his career, just as before, he took no active part in party politics and taught only about moral values in personal and collective affairs.⁹⁴

⁹⁰Ibid., 49-93.

⁹¹He joined the military as a preacher and imam.

⁹²Ibid., 68-73.

⁹³Ibid., 76-77.

⁹⁴Ibid., 83-94.

In 1966, Yaşar Tunagür, who had known Gülen from earlier in his career, was Deputy Head of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs. In those days, he was posted in Ankara. He assigned Gülen to the post that he himself had just vacated in İzmir. On March 11, Gülen was transferred to the İzmir region, where he held managerial responsibilities for a mosque, a student study and boarding-hall and for preaching in the Aegean Sea. He continued to live ascetically. For almost five years he lived in a small hut near the Kestanepazarı Hall⁹⁵ and took no wages of his services. It was during these years, when Gülen's ideas on education and his services to community began to take definite form and mature. From 1969, he set up meetings in coffeehouses, delivered lectures all around the provinces and in the villages of the region. He also organized summer camps for middle and high school students.⁹⁶

In 1970, as a result of the March 12 coup, a number of prominent Muslims in the region, who had supported Kestanepazarı Hall and associated activities for the region's youth, were arrested. On May 1, Gülen too was arrested and held for six months without charge until his release on November 9. Interestingly; the authorities released Gülen on the condition that he would not give more public lectures.⁹⁷

In 1971, Gülen left his post and Kestanepazarı Hall but retained his status as a state-authorized preacher. He began to deliver more lectures to students and to establish boarding-halls in the Aegean Region. Fund for the construction of these boarding-halls came from the local people. The group of these local people was about hundred in number to be visible as a service group, who had a complete understanding of Gülen's service to community.

⁹⁵Kestanepazarı Hall was a Qur'anic School in İzmir.

⁹⁶Ibid., 95-120.

⁹⁷Ibid., 120-158.

Between 1972 and 1975, Gülen served on the posts of preacher in several cities in the Aegean and Marmara regions. There he set up hostels for the students of high school and university. At that time, educational opportunities were fewer for ordinary Anatolian people and sometimes students who had an accommodation in state hostels were unable to continue their studies because of the political dominance over some of the educational institutions in cities. The extreme rightists and leftists political groups infiltrated their studies and tried to engage them in politics. The newly set-up private hostels for high schools and university students by Gülen-inspired philanthropists offered a chance to the parents to send their children to the big cities to continue their mainstream education.

These newly established hostels were also providing protection to students from the highly hyper-politicized environment. Philanthropists who were inspired by Gülen's service-ethic set up a system of bursaries (scholarships) for needy and deserving students in support of these educational efforts. The funding for the hostels and bursaries came entirely from local communities among whom Gülen's service-ethic idea (*hizmet*) was spreading steadily.

The ordinary people who were around Gülen's discourse of positive action and responsibility were starting to mobilize with Gülen's encouragement to counteract the effects of violent ideologies and of the ensuing social and political disorder on their own children and on youth in general. The students in the hostels also began to play a part in spreading the discourse of service and positive action. Periodically, they returned to their hometowns and visited surrounding towns and villages. There, they talked of their experiences and the ideas they had encountered in order to introduce Gülen's service-ethic (*hizme-Voluntary Service*) idea in the region.

From 1966 onwards, Gülen's talks and lectures had been recorded on audiocassettes and distributed throughout Turkey by third parties. Thus, through already existing networks of primary relations, this new type of community includes the students and the new technology which passes communication, the Gülen's service-ethic ideas (*hizmet* discourse) was becoming known nation-wide.⁹⁸ At present, the Gülen Movement is mainly based on two types of people: Those who directly participate and render the activities of the movement, whose participation is known as *hizmet* (service) and those whose do not directly participate but support the movement by their donations are known as *himmet*, a connotation for being service-based in the individual's donations.⁹⁹

In 1974, the first university preparation courses were established in Manisa, where Gülen was posted at that time. Until then, only the children of very wealthy and privileged families had an access to university education. The new courses in Manisa offered the hope that in future there might be better opportunities for children from ordinary Anatolian families. The idea took hold that if the children of ordinary families were being supported, they could take up and succeed in higher education. As result of Gülen's delivering lectures all over Turkey, the country-wide mobilization of people was taken place to support education and non-political altruistic services were known as a movement – the Gülen Movement.

In 1976, the Religious Directorate posted Gülen to Bornova, Izmir. In this area, there were major universities with a large number of students. The violent politics and extremism had been dominating these universities since 1970s. It came to

⁹⁸Ibid.,30-33.

⁹⁹Mucahit Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and its Politics of Representation in Turkey." *The Muslim World* 96(1) (2006):1-15.

his attention that leftist's political groups were protecting the blackmailers who were getting money from small businessmen and shopkeepers in the city under the serious threat. They (blackmailers) were disrupting the business and social life of the community. They also murdered a number of their victims. In his preachings, Gülen spoke out and urged those being threatened by the blackmailers neither to concede to threats and violence, nor to react with violence and exacerbate the situation. He urged them to deal these blackmailers through the proper channels by reporting their crimes to the police. This message led to threats being made against his life.

At the same time, he challenged the students of left and right to come to the mosque and discuss their ideas with him and offered to answer any question whether secular or religious, which they put to him. Many students took up this offer. So, in addition to his daily duties of giving traditional religious instructions and preaching, Gülen devoted every Sunday evening to these discussion sessions.

In 1977, Gülen traveled in Northern Europe, visited and preached among Turkish communities to raise the consciousness about values and education and encouraged them in the *hizmet*'s ethic action and altruistic service. He encouraged them both to preserve their cultural and religious values and integrate into their host societies.¹⁰⁰

In the age of thirty-six, Gülen had become one of the three most widely recognized and influential preachers in Turkey. For example, on one occasion in 1977 when the Prime Minister, other ministers and the state dignitaries came to a Friday prayer in the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, a politically sensitive occasion in Turkey,

¹⁰⁰Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*, 32-35.

Gülen was invited to preach to them and the rest of the worshippers.¹⁰¹ Gülen encouraged the adherents of his vision about the need of publishing. Some of his articles and lectures were published as anthologies and a group of teachers inspired by his ideas established the Teachers Foundation to support education and students.¹⁰²

In 1979, this foundation started to publish the monthly journal, *Sızıntı* (*leak or the broken plectrum*).¹⁰³ Started from humble grounds and minimal circulation, the monthly magazine grew to become the largest circulated in Turkey, rising to 800,000 nos by 2009. *Sızıntı* covered a spectrum of disciplines such as science, humanities, faith and literature. The mission of *Sızıntı* was to show that science and religion were not incompatible and the knowledge of both was necessary to be successful in this life. Each month since the very first issue of the journal, Gülen had written for its editorial section and for its section of spiritual or inner aspects of Islam, which were Sufism and the meaning of faith in modern Islam.¹⁰⁴

In February 1980, a series of Gülen lectures, attended by thousands of people, in which he preached against violence, anarchy and terror, were made available on audio cassette. On September 5 1980, Gülen spoke from the pulpit before taking leave of absence for the next twenty days because of illness. On September 12, on the day of the military coup, his home was raided. He was not detained, as he was not at home. He requested for another leave of absence for 45 days. Then the house where he was staying as a guest was raided and he was detained. After a six-hour interrogation, he was released. On November 25, he was transferred to Çanakkale.

¹⁰¹Ibid. .35.

¹⁰²Ibid , .36.

¹⁰³The Turkish word *Sızıntı* literally translates as “The Trickle”.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

However due to illness again, he was not able to serve there. From March 20, 1981, he took indefinite leave of absence.¹⁰⁵

By 1980 coup, Turkish people in general had appeared to have learnt a lesson. There was no visible public reaction to the military intervention. The faith communities, including the Gülen Movement, continued with their lawful and peaceful activities without drawing any extra attention to them. Gülen and the adherents of the Movement avoided large public gatherings.

However, they continued to promote their service (*hizmet*) through publishing efforts and by arranging small meetings. Gülen's talks were recorded and distributed on audio and videotapes in Turkey to a larger extent. In the years immediately following the September 1980 coup, the Gülen Movement kept on with the pace of growth. In 1982, the adherents of the Movement set up a private high school in Izmir, Yamanlar Koleji. The military coup favored the educational engagement of Fethullah Gülen and the adherents of the Movement. Their interpretation of Gülen's nationalistic and Sunni discourse as pro-junta Turkish State, anti-leftist and anti-Iranian that was in line with their Turkish-Islamic synthesis promoted by the State after 1980.¹⁰⁶

4.2-Gülen's Ideas on Nationalism

For some, Gülen is one of the foremost Turko-Ottoman nationalists in contemporary times. His notions on nationalism are not based on blood or race. For him, those people fall into nationalism that shared almost same historical experiences and has an agreement to live together within one society whether they belong to any

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 36-39.

¹⁰⁶Agai, "Discursive and Organizational Strategies of the Gülen Movement", 1-10.

religion, race and culture. In Gülen's opinion, there is no difference between a Bosnian and a Kazakh if they are inhabitants of a one country. Gülen hardly differentiates between ethnic and non-ethnic Turks and treats both as Turks and Muslims. Gülen always prefers that the Turkish people should keep Ottoman-Islamic legacy as their identity.¹⁰⁷

4.3-Gülen's Ideas on Islam

Gülen does not consider Islam limited to an ideology. Gülen's understanding with Islam could easily be judged from his broad and extensive educational, financial and civil society institutions inspired by him in Turkey and in various world countries. The adherents of the Movement are positively sensitivity towards the tenets of Islam and its practical aspects, as well as its being a universal religion encompassing various faiths within the frame of inter-civilizational and inter-faith dialogue, and according to Gülen, a religion could not be spread by force. That is why, dialogue and tolerance is essential tools to promote faith. These tools should be adapted to spread the bright message of Islam.¹⁰⁸ Gülen regularly paid visit and received many national and international religious leaders and personalities such as patriarchs, Rabbis (the Chief of Turkish Jewish community) and especially Pope John Paul II. Gülen's meeting with these leaders, made easy for other Muslims to start dialogue with Christians or Jews.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷Fethullah Gülen, "For more on Gülen views on Iran, Arabs and Turkish Islam",interview by Gülen,Published in Yeni Yuzyil (Turkish Newspaper),19-28 28 July 1997.

¹⁰⁸Muhammed Çetin, *The Gülen Movement*,27-57.

¹⁰⁹Fahri Karakaş, "Global Peaceful Social Innovation: The Case of Gülen Network," (Proceedings Conference Islam in the Contemporary World: The Gülen Movement in Thought and Practice,Southern Methodist University,DAUAS,TX,4-5 March 2006),en.fgulen.com/.../2242-global-peaceful-social-innovation-the-case-of-gulen-network.html.

A portion of Fethullah Gülen's basic ideas on Islam, the State and the place of secular education is rooted in the teachings of the Turkish-Islamic reformer Said Nursi.¹¹⁰ He (Gülen) always avoided the direct confrontation between Islam and secular establishment that could only harm one's own Islamic sensitivities. He states clearly that God judges each individual personally for the life that each one led. Any reform movement therefore must concentrate on guiding individuals along the right path. One must accept the State Order as framework of one's own dealing. Therefore, it should be the most important task to concentrate on the individual level.

This attitude opens the possibility for shifting the interest of Islamic activities from the state level to the level of society. Thus Gülen's religious guidance is not fixed. His religious service, *hizmet*, has progressed according to time and space and ought to be in a state of permanent transformation in order to be fruitful. The Gülen's school of thought, therefore, can be understood in result of above described interpretation.

This interpretation found a best path for Islam and this could be viewed by studying the specific historical context of Ottoman Empire. Gülen no doubt avoids confrontation between Islam and secularism but personally he idealizes Islam as a best source to maintain a relationship between the state and the society.¹¹¹

4.4-Gülen's Ideas on Islam as a Challenge to Modernity

Gülen argues regarding Islam as a challenge to modernity that man lives in an age of science and technology for which there is no alternative. The only options to

¹¹⁰Agai, "Discursive and Organizational Strategies of the Gülen Movement."5-7.

¹¹¹Bill Park, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement."Middle East Review of International Affairs 12 (3) (September 2008):1-14.

omit this Islamic challenge are to shape this technological and scientific age in a religious way or to forfeit the power to exert any influence at all. Gülen elaborates on this by saying that a person who is dissatisfied of having Islamic history and traditions; he can never shape the scientific age in Islamic way. He only seeks middle way between modernity and the Muslim tradition¹¹², which he can only get if modernity is shaped in an Islamic sense. This requires compromise. Gülen is strictly not in favor of using revolutionary approach.

He counters the idea of retreating from secular society. This idea is prevailing in religious circles under the notion of *hijra*, which is a part of progressive social reform. He (Gülen) believes that it is possible to separate science from materialism and positivism, as both are the enemies of the religion, through active participation in scientific discourse.

4.5-Gülen's Ideas on the Relationship of Science and Religion

Gülen emphasizes about the relationship of science and religion by saying that using an Islamic approach could combine the science and the religion. Science is based on rationality and through rationality; it (science) could comprehend God by studying His creation.¹¹³ This is the only way to preserve religion in the modern age, which is shaped-as indicated above-by science and technology. Such a concept enriches the rational study of the world, taught in a secular school, with a religious significance.

¹¹²Ahmet T. Kuru, " Searching for a Middle Way between Modernity and Muslim Tradition," in Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement,ed . by M.Hakan Yavuz and John L.Esposito (Syracuse New York: Syracuse University Press.2003),115-130.

¹¹³Agai, "Discursive and organizational Strategies of the Gülen Movement.", 5-7.

birth of peace needs love instead of science and rational means. The above mentioned analyzed study concludes that the love can only be attained through a comparative outlook similar to Rumi's as he (Rumi) is a well and largely accepted role model in eyes of the teachers and the students as well.¹¹⁶

4.6-Gülen's Ideas on Theology and Modernity

Gülen says on matters of theology and modernity that theological debate (discussion on religious matters in detail) should not be started in an era where religion itself is threatened. By putting situation in front, theology is required for those issues where consensus could be developed. While, very sensitive issues like gender relations, pluralism and religious obligations, ought not to be challenged in theological debates. Gülen considers the headscarf as an integral part of religious obligation and observation. However, he maintains that it is not among the very first issues. Unlike other reformers, he leaves it up to the individuals' conscience and sensitivities to consider that if a girl has to choose between the headscarf and access to higher education, the latter may bear a more important weight. Negating not *hijab* as an Islamic obligation, he suggests the urgent need of finding ways to solve female students' issue of attending schools wearing headscarf. He argues that it is important to add character to the educational system with Muslim-minded teachers, rather than attempting to create an Islamic State, which might bring Turkish society to civil strife and disturb the social and faith harmony.

After having discussed these foundations of Gülen's vision of Islam in the modern context, we come to know about his ideas behind this faith-inspired movement which is indeed his ideas in active practice. His sermons to jam-packed

¹¹⁶Fahir Karakas, "Global Peaceful Social Innovation: The Case of Gülen Network," 4-5 March 2006.

congregations at the largest mosques of various cities and the positive activism of the *cemaat*¹¹⁷ that he encouraged are termed as the major reasons of his wide-reaching influence.

4.7-Gülen Supports Synthesis of Turkish Nationalism and Islam

Gülen reconciles the Turkish nationalism, Islam, religious pluralism and globalization. A crucial factor behind the success of Fethullah Gülen is the fast growing synthesis of Turkish nationalism and Islam. His adherents in other countries have adopted this approach, expanding the nationalist principal which suit to local conditions and are developing it into local conditions of patriotism.¹¹⁸

4.8-Gülen's Ideas on Humanity, Love and Respect

Gülen does not talk about nationalism, strong faith and human-rights at only national level. His message does not differentiate among races, classes and even identities. He says that the people around the whole world should break their self-made boundaries of egos and pride. They should become one in love of Allah. They should love and respect the human-being. They should avoid discrimination which held on the basis of races, classes, faiths and nations. They should promote peace and happiness.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Once the term *cemaat* (community) was used to denote the students of Said Nursi (1877-1960), the author of the Risale-i Nûr Collection and a vital personality behind the contemporary revival of Islam in Turkey. The word literally means, 'congregation' and sociologically denotes any religious group. Said Nursi's emphasis in his works on the positive sciences being the stepladders to finding the Maker of the Universe and his expression of Islam's compatibility with modernity by Islam's being a time-transcendent faith inspired many in Turkey, including Fethullah Gülen who actually never saw Said Nursi in his life.

¹¹⁸Berna Turam, "National Loyalties and International Undertakings," in Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Global Impact of Fethullah Gülen Nur Movement, eds. Yavuz Hakan and Esposito John.L(New York: Syracuse University Press,2003),184-207.

¹¹⁹Fahri Karakas, "Global Peaceful Social Innovation: The Case of Gülen Network,"4-5 March 2006.

4.9-Gülen's Views on Globalization

Gülen and his followers accept today's world of nation-states and open borders and do not propagate a utopian *ummatist* state¹²⁰. Even though, he demanded the introduction of visas for foreign cultural exchange influence in the 1980s and early 1990s¹²¹ Gülen now advocates open borders, democracy and dialogue. In doing so, he hopes to regain validity for Islam, which had to be protected in past. As Gülen sees no way of halting globalization, it must be harnessed as an opportunity.¹²²

This task requires a secular background education rather than a theological one, as well as need the use of modern media and economic means. All other main Islamic groups in Turkey agree with Gülen that there is no need to discuss Islamic obligations and unanimously criticize any material or Ideological dependency on the West with its materialistic and positivistic orientation. For Gülen, however, the solution lies in education rather than politics. As education exerts influence on modern society. According to Gülen, national and cultural independence can only be preserved if Muslims succeed in shaping the modern world according to their beliefs, rather than rejecting modernity and losing all control over its developments.

4.10-Gülen's Views on the Secular State System

In this regard, he urges those who value his ideas to accept the secular state and to gradually change their own actions, thinking a state change. As their aims in

¹²⁰Utopia is the concept of an ideal state. The term utopian *ummatist* state was coined as a blend of Islamic and Western concepts to stand as a piece of expression emphasizing establishing the perfect Commonwealth of the Muslim *Ummah*.

¹²¹Agai, "Discursive and Organizational Strategies of the Gülen Movement.", 1-10.

¹²²Ramzan Kilinc, "Turkish Islam and the Secular State, The Gülen Movement," European Journal of Turkish Studies, ed . M.Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito (Newyork: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 256.

URL :<http://ejts.revues.org/index469.html>

society can only be achieved when they will perform their actions within a legal framework and will give value to the general desires. Gülen's schools are a good example of this, in that they do not stress the Islamic identity of the founders to begin with.

Gülen's earlier writings, based on conspiracy theories against Turkey, are full of anti-missionary and anti-western passages.¹²³ Today he accepts religious plurality as a fact and stresses the common factors of all religions wherever possible. Gülen is obviously aware that his own Movement can only succeed in an atmosphere of religious tolerance, as it may be with other religious groups. This change is very important within its own domain, due to direct contact with other cultures, caused by focusing on education. The research clearly showed that the younger generation who are well traveled and educated in foreign languages as well in secular subjects. They see the world differently from some of the first generation in the *cemaat*, who did not travel far and did not get any experience to learn western languages.

The contact with other cultures and religions has made strong the nationalism at national level. Dialogue and tolerance are key words in promoting the ideas of the Gülen Movement. It is important to stress how much time managed to shape Fethullah Gülen and his movement of volunteers. Gülen did not ever try to make a conflict between secularism and religion. The Gülen-inspired Journalists and Writers Foundation's Abant Declaration in July 1998 states that every individual has a right to lead his life by using his own reason to judge what's right or what's wrong.

The Government should survive without having any religion or secularism. It (Government) should not interrupt into her inhabitants' faith, beliefs, and

¹²³ Agai, "Discursive and Organizational Strategies of the Gülen Movement.", 1-9.

philosophical ideas. For Gülen, the Government should not make the religion a mysterious thing or something like so sensitive. In the meanwhile, the most important thing should be to give more and more freedom and rights to the public and to provide them equal opportunity of participation.¹²⁴

4.11-Gülen-Inspired Educational and Business Institutions, Media Networks

4.11.1- Gülen Inspired Schools/Education Network

The Gülen Movement is the one of the largest civil movements in Turkey, comprising of an outreaching educational and social network, working across Turkey and the world. This civil society's educational initiatives, which are termed as 'Gülen-inspired schools/educational institutions' center in on the aim of making pupils responsible citizens, courteous and good human-beings as well, competent to serve their country. For this purpose besides reasonable course work, dialogue exercises are being offered to develop pupils' sense of responsibility, cooperation and open-mindedness.

These schools are providing education from primary to secondary and to university level. The sympathizers and volunteers of the Gülen Movement play an integral role behind the function of the Gülen-inspired educational institutions. As the supporters have established many schools and colleges in Turkey and worldwide, even a large number of Gülen-inspired schools and student dormitories too have been established in towns of Turkey. The Gülen inspired educational institutions have been providing employment opportunities to thousands of people. Hence this educational

¹²⁴M Hakan Yavuz, " Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The *Nurcu* Movement and Fethullah Gülen." *Middle East Journal* 53(4) (Autumn 1999):585-605.

network besides offering standard education also provides financial support to the unemployed and the low-waged.¹²⁵

The Gülen-inspired education institutions operate very effectively in fragmented, violent and ethnically disturbed areas which are ridden with conflicts. They have risen to prominence as role models in defragmenting disjointed societies, by working on the common grounds of peace and progress in a non-violent stance. At state, regional and global level these educational institutions are preaching the perception of tolerance, dialogue, democracy and pluralism. These are the essential factors which keep the society unified and protract. Through elevating its educational activities at public level, the Gülen Movement is offering diverse and substitute political and social solutions to stop ethnic conflicts. These solutions maintain alleviating the growing differences of social, cultural and religious between or among the conflicting groups.

The Gülen-Inspired educational Institutions are currently working fruitfully in ethnic and religious conflict areas such as Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Philippines, Banda Ache, Northern Iraq, Darfur, Kyrgyzstan and South-Eastern Turkey. These educational institutions play an outstanding role in lessening the conflict in these above mentioned areas.¹²⁶

¹²⁵Talip Küçükcan, "Social and Spiritual Capital of the Gülen Movement," (Article presented in the conference, "Muslims world in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement." SOAS, London Schools of Economics, United Kingdom, 25-27 October 2007), 189-197.

<http://www.gulenconference.org.uk/userfiles/file/proceedings/prcd%20-%20kucokcan%20+.pdf>. (accessed on: 20 December 2009).

¹²⁶Ihsan Yilmaz, "Civil Society and Islamic NGOs in Secular Turkey and Their Nationwide and Global Initiatives: The case of the Gülen Movement." *Journal of Regional Development Studies*, 2010:115-128.

Here the Gülen inspired schools in Philippines can be described with reference of dominant role in reducing conflicts. Philippines are a religiously polarized area where half of the population is Muslim and half of the population is Christian. The Gülen inspired schools teach Filipino students tolerance, love, and to adopt positive ways rather to follow the violent attitudes and ideas lay down by their military and paramilitary forces. These schools have well relations with Christian educational institutions and are very popular in Philippines. Same like in Philippines, there are many Gülen-inspired schools in Iraq; especially the schools in Kurdistan region are working for developing trust and peace among different ethnic communities. Currently in Iraq, there are 10 Gülen-inspired Turkish educational institutions; three in Suleymaniye, five in Arbil and two in Kirkuk.

The Gülen-inspired schools were started to be established in 1980s. The total number of these schools is in hundreds along with seven universities in Turkey and abroad. These schools can not be distinguished from other schools in terms of material and curriculum. The schools bear a good name due to their standard education quality and its moral teachings based on love, respect and humanity. The education is on lines of new and modern patterns which follows the novelty and innovation.

In the case of the Gülen-inspired Turkish schools in Northern Iraq, every student has to study four languages: Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, and English. (Reference: Journal of Regional Development Studies). The students of these schools

are competent and have an excellent performance in academic competitions in the natural sciences, information sciences and languages.¹²⁷

Gülen-inspired educational and media institutions operate at national and international level. More than 300 hundred private schools in Turkey and 500 international schools have been operating in various countries across the continents.¹²⁸ In 2010, the number of these (private) schools (in Turkey) is increased to about 500 in Turkey. Currently these schools are educating about 325 students from Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Thailand and Ukraine.¹²⁹ These schools are benefiting the Muslims (throughout the world) as well as the Turkish population who are living in different states of the World.¹³⁰

In educational sector, by 2010, Gülen Movement has more than 1000 schools and fifteen universities in Turkey and in other states. The curriculums in these institutions are predominantly on social and scientific education, at times supplemented with moral points of reference.

In Gülen's opinion, religious education is necessary to make the faith of the people stronger upon Allah; otherwise they would go towards disbelief. On the other hand, only religion (without science) would make individuals bigot and unyielding,

¹²⁷Charles Nelson, Fethullah Gülen: A Vision of Transcendent Education, 12 November 2005, en.fguilen.com/.../gulen.../2133-fethullah-gulen-a-vision-of-transcendent-education.html. (accessed on :20 December 2010).

¹²⁸Geries Othman, "Fethullah Gülen: the neo-Ottoman dream of Turkish Islam," May 6, 2009, www.jihadwatch.org/.../fethullah-gulen-the-turkish-khomeini.html (accessed on 05 June 2009).

¹²⁹"*Imam-Hatip* Schools in Demand for Export," *Today's Zaman*, 3 January 2010. www.todayszaman.com. (accessed on 4 January 2010).

¹³⁰Geries Othman, "Fethullah Gülen: the neo-Ottoman dream of Turkish Islam," May 6, 2009.

and only science (without religion) would bring forth generations which are materialistic and blindly devoid of essence. Recognizing its importance as the lingua franca across the world, all school subjects are taught in English language and Turkish is taught as a separate elective course.¹³¹ Gülen also encourages the understanding of history as a critical study bridging the void between Muslim and non-Muslim communities and implementing studies to explore the common heritage of humanity be they religious or scientific.

What is most appealing about Gülen-inspired educational institutions is their policy which is not based on religion and politics. School atmosphere and teaching mood are not sacrificed to the imposition of any kind of religious and political ideologies. Administrators and teachers are role models for the students to avoid bad habits, anti-social ills such as backbiting, nepotism and the like to safeguard school community and the society. Concentration on keeping alive the universal human values, history, and beliefs that connect people around the world make Turkish schools rise to prominence in inculcating ethical values, which are recognized at universal level, regardless of any faith or tradition.

The teachers of these schools are of Muslim faith and profoundly inspired by Gülen. In their framework of being exemplary and true to their profession, they demonstrate sound characters, moral behavior and care to the human values, in addition to their high-qualifications in their professions.¹³²

The educational institutions of the Gülen Movement work within the jurisdiction drawn by the prevailing laws of the state. In these educational institutions,

¹³¹M Hakan Yavuz, "Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The *Nurcu* Movement and Fethullah Gülen." *Middle East Journal* 53(4) (Autumn 1999):585-605.

¹³²Fahir Karakas, "Global Peaceful Social Innovation: The Case of Gülen Network," 4-5 March 2006.

direct religious education and training is not given to the students. Even then derivative sections in Turkey claim that these schools transfer religious education by behavior in the way the teachers behave and treat students with smiling faces, teach them practically to respect elders and to love the young, to help others in the hour of need and in every problem and to be generous to others and try to forgive others for their mistakes. Such sections also dissimilarly paste a label of reactionary education over such morale education given by Gülen-inspired educational institutions. Not only all Gülen-inspired educational institutions (likewise all schools in Turkey) operate under the inspection of the Government, but also Turkish educational institutions worldwide are inspected by the intelligence agencies and the educational ministries of those states.

Turkey and the other countries where these educational institutions are located keep a check to minimize any threat from any reactionary education. The students who belong to different levels of the society are getting education in the same institutions, did not complain ever either they or their parents that they are getting reactionary education.¹³³

4.12-*İmam-Hatip* Schools – On Threat from the Secular Establishment

İmam-Hatip Schools¹³⁴ were established by the end of 1940s, introduced by the State as a legal alternative to the secular schools; later they had a great support of

¹³³fgulen.com, "Claim and Answers, " Friday, Interview by Fethullah Gülen, *Published* ,16 June 2006 : 5-23,<http://www.fethullahgulen.org/press-room/claims-and-answers/1216-claims-and-answers.htm> (accessed on:26 March 2010).

¹³⁴*İmam-Hatip* schools are providing religious and vocational education. Despite of having religious curriculum, these schools gave peaceful and democratic impression throughout sixty years after their establishment.

conservative Turkish community. These schools' religious education attracted the middle and the poor class of the society who wished education for their youth but were afraid to lose them spiritually. Urbanization as well as social events made these institutions places of protection for the children of the conservative minded. The numbers of *İmam-Hatip* schools were about 35 % of the total secondary educational institutions and the numbers of students were about 270,000 during the time period of military junta in 1980¹³⁵. The number of the students in the *İmam-Hatip* School had been increased fourteen times more since 1980 than the State's secular schools.

İmam-Hatip schools were termed as vocational schools and thus have provided a great advantage to people by giving them education as well as jobs. In the 1980's, these schools had become a part of a large number of vocational and technical schools.¹³⁶ The ascending number of vocational and technical schools played an important role in the development of economy by transferring technical education to the graduates. The graduates of these schools were also became a part of bureaucracy when they got jobs as official imams or preachers in the State's mosques. However, the *İmam-Hatip* graduates have not been allowed to join the Armed Forces. High authorities in the State have felt threat from these graduates as they become a part of bureaucracy by joining the posts of official imam or preacher.

Considering such a threat, back in 1997 the Ministry of Education compelled in its five-year recommendations report that the *İmam-Hatip* schools should be closed and the students should be integrated into the state's secular schools, with a notion

¹³⁵*Junta* is a word used in a military context standing for a group of military officials scheming to establish a government that is led by a committee of military leaders. This term is derived from the Spanish Junta which means committee, specifically a board of directors.

¹³⁶The *İmam-Hatips* as vocational and training schools in the end also provide jobs.

that the religious ambience of these schools pose a threat for the state's secular establishment, judiciary and that the graduates of these schools can also take part in detrimental activities. The former 5-year compulsory education was made into 8-year compulsory education, blocking the path to the junior high sections to the *İmam-Hatip* schools.

Later it has been made compulsory that the *İmam-Hatip* graduates could only attend Faculties of Divinity at higher education institutions. Especially, when they termed one-fifth of the graduates of the Faculty of Law at the Istanbul University had education at *İmam-Hatip* schools, the state officials considered it a major threat to the Establishment for the potential influence of these graduates as people of law working at the capacity of lawyers, judges, and prosecutors would be enormous.

In 1997, a law was passed declaring secular education compulsory for the first eight years. Under the law, the new enrollments for junior high sections of *İmam-Hatip* schools ceased and only those students who were near to complete their studies in these schools were allowed to continue their studies at the *İmam-Hatip* schools. Students were permitted that they could have education at any *İmam-Hatip* school only after completing their eight years secular education from a secular school. In addition, the students may get admissions in Koran classes only on weekends and summer vacations after completing five years education in secular schools.¹³⁷

¹³⁷US. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, International Religious Freedom Report: Turkey, September, 1998.

At present the curriculum of these *İmam-Hatip* schools at secondary level is same with the other secular schools of the State. Nevertheless with this secular study, some additional subjects on Islam are being taught.¹³⁸

Since the *İmam-Hatip* schools were termed as vocational and technical education institutions in the Ordinance, the entire system including the other technical and vocational institutions educating in fields like electronics and skilled degrees were punished too. The State did not heed protests for a long time until recently, the Turkish Council of Higher Education (YÖK) passed a decision to remove the discrimination and injustice done by applying low university-entry coefficient for vocational and technical education students. These activities at a great level lessened the entrance exam score of the graduates of *İmam-Hatip* as well as other vocational and technical high schools that requires for university admissions. The Constitutional Court termed YÖK's move as a salvage operation for *İmam-Hatip* schools and ceased its jurisdiction.

Regardless of this, YÖK's attempts have found great support among the public as an attempt to eliminate the impact of February 28, 1997, the postmodern military coup on social, economic, and especially education system of Turkey.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ "İmam-Hatip Schools in Demand for Export," *Today's Zaman*, 3 January 2010, www.todayszaman.com. (accessed on 4 January 2010).

¹³⁹ The military memorandum given on February 28, 1997 was an indirect coup on the increasing influence of conservatism and Muslim-mindedness in the shape of political and social movements. The prominent civil society movement, the Gülen Movement, owing to its growing global influence in the fields of human rights, multiculturalism and democracy was placed in the target. In the coup, many limitations and restrictions were imposed on the Movement due to which its educational setup went through difficult days, however coped with effectively. Since 1997 coup incident, by the new developments that revealed the coup as connected to various underground activities, the Gülen Movement became very out-spoken and sensitive especially on the democracy and it became more globalized in its educational and social activities.

Even though they have been termed as dangerous by a marginal, elitist group, *İmam-Hatip* schools have educated generations who are compatible with the society and the needs of the day.

4.13-Growing Demand for *İmam-Hatip* Schools in Turkey and Abroad

Especially recently, the system of religious vocational schools in the shape of *İmam-Hatip* schools find interest across the world. These schools are termed as role models for a number of countries wishing to counteract the rising extremism. In January 2010, Russia and Turkey signed an agreement under which it was decided that 100 students from Russia would get Islamic education in Turkey in 2011. Turkey would send some high profile professional teachers of theology to Russia as well. Russian government officials, after examining and observing the model and curriculum of *İmam-Hatip* schools asked Turkey to implement these schools in Russia to educate a large number from Russian population.

Pakistan made the same demand, when recently Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a visit to Pakistan. During the visit, Pakistan Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani expressed his will to Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and asked that they want to take *İmam-Hatip* schools as a role model for their own country. The one main reason behind the adoption of these schools as role model by Pakistan is that the ordinary religious schools that are currently working there (Pakistan) are considered a leading source towards the origination of fundamentalism and radicalism. While, though *İmam-Hatip* schools have also Islamic education, but still have a well reputation around the whole world. These schools gave a good name to their country by blessing well known imam and

preachers and humble and loveable persons¹⁴⁰ to own country and to the whole world by the Islamic education.¹⁴¹

The students of foreign states studying in Turkey's *İmam-Hatip* schools arrived in Turkey under an agreement, which was signed in 1993 between Turkish Religious Affairs Foundation and the particular states that were interested to send their students to Turkey. This agreement is still effective. Under the agreement, the Turkish Religious Affairs Foundation is bound to pay the accommodation cost of these foreign students. These students visit their countries once a year. These students study Turkish during the first year in the *İmam-Hatip* schools. After that, they carry on their studies by following the *İmam-Hatip* standard curriculum which is consisted of secular studies¹⁴² and additional subjects on Islam as well.

By the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gülen-inspired schools were also opened in Turkic-speaking areas particularly in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, the areas of the Russian Federation such as Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. A great number of educational institutions inspired by the Gülen Movement are available in this geography as well as in the places with Muslim-minorities like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and the Balkan States. The Gülen Movement as a civic initiative not only contributes to the educational welfare of these states but also efficiently rejuvenates economic activities by encouraging business

¹⁴⁰These schools helped to thaw public's general relations with Islam since the curriculum and system were charted by the State itself. Not only they helped to streamline the way Islam is comprehended in Turkey, they also bridged public and the state on the grounds of promoting religion as an integral part of life. The illustrious graduates from these institutions contribute to the *welfare* of the people on educational and social front as well.

¹⁴¹“*İmam-Hatip* Schools in Demand for Export,” *Today's Zaman* ,03 January 2010,www.todayszaman.com. (accessed on 4 January 2010).

¹⁴²The curriculum currently in use in the *İmam-Hatip* Schools is on same pattern of other secular schools of the State.

communities to have interactions with the respective states and the people. The main reason behind the Gülen Movement's active role in the areas of Turkic speaking and in the areas of the Muslims of the Ottoman era is that the Turkey's share linguistic, beliefs, traditions and ethnic affinity with these area's people.¹⁴³

Recently, the Gülen-inspired educational institutions have been flourishing in African states. These schools brought a great change in a sense that in these countries the black color people are considered more dominant than the people who do have white color. Paving the path of understanding among the students and the parents, these hubs of education broke the misconception that went as '*every white man is evil*' and provided areas of co-existence where people live happily without making any difference of skin color. The credit goes to the teachers of these schools who have been working there with a great sincerity and sacrifice. Trying their best to eliminate the poverty and destitute through education in countries of Africa, they make Africa beyond the reach of color differences.¹⁴⁴

A great majority of Kurdish population in Turkey lives in the Southeastern Anatolia, and the Gülen Movement has opened its schools over there too. Sponsored by the local philanthropists and business communities, these schools provide education to various segments of student community, give scholarships to needy talented students, gain them into improving the literacy level of the region, as well as bring pride and distinction in educational competitions across the country. In Northern

¹⁴³M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Gülen Movement: The Turkish Puritans,"*Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement*, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 19-47.

¹⁴⁴Bülent Keneş, "A Color-Blind Tanzania,"*Today's Zaman*, 28 October 2009, www.todayszaman.com. (accessed on 9 April 2010).

Iraq, Kurdistan area currently 15 Gülen-inspired schools are working and in November 2009 a university is opened.¹⁴⁵

4.14-Media Networks of the Gülen Movement

Encouraged by Gülen, there are various media institutions and organizations, as well as banks, television stations, newspapers, and websites in various languages.¹⁴⁶ The first ever publishing endeavors of this type were launched in 1980s in which Nil Publication Company, magazines *Sizinti*, *Yeni Ümit*¹⁴⁷ and daily *Zaman* were included.¹⁴⁸

Launched in 1986, daily *Zaman* is printed in approximately in fifteen countries and is the largest circulated newspaper in Turkey with almost 900,000 copies. *Samanyolu* TV channel as well as *Samanyolu Haber* news channel broadcast in Turkish at national and international level.¹⁴⁹ Bi-monthly *The Fountain* is the English language magazine published at international level.¹⁵⁰

Besides this, a weekly news magazine *Aksiyon*, radio channel *Burc FM*, news agency *CHA* and many other periodicals are available.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁵Turkey's Biggest Muslim Group Puts Kurds on Map, Nicholas Birch, Istanbul, The Irish Times 16 March 2009

¹⁴⁶Gerie Othman, "Fethullah Gülen: the neo-Ottoman dream of Turkish Islam," May 6,2009.

¹⁴⁷*Yeni Umit* has been published since 1988. It is a religious magazine and publishes articles in-depth on Islamic topics. The title literally translates as "New Hope".

¹⁴⁸Ahmet T Kuru, "Changing Prospective on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and the AKP Party "(Article Presented in Conference Muslim World in Transition:Contributers of the Gulen Movement,SOAS,University of London,UK,25-27 October 2007),www.gulenconference.net/index.php/library/articale/

¹⁴⁹*Samanyolu* TV (STV) broadcasts its transmission at national and international level since 1994. The word *Samanyolu* literally translates as "Milkyway".

¹⁵⁰Ahmet Kuru, "Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases," *Political Science Quarterly* 120 (2) (15 June 2006) : 253-274. The Fountain Magazine was firstly published in January 1993.

¹⁵¹*Aksiyon* is the largest-selling weekly news magazine published since 1995. It is an off-shoot of the Feza Media Corporation under which daily *Zaman* too is included. *Sizinti* is the largest circulated (about 850,000) popular,

4.15-Gülen-Inspired Journalists and Writers Foundation

By mid-1990s, Fethullah Gülen and his Movement moved into the limelight when the participation and support of the public increased to the great extent. In order to manage and organize the public activities to establish dialogue and national consensus with various segments of the society, the Foundation of Journalists and Writers (GYV)¹⁵² opened in 1994.¹⁵³ Gülen is the Honorary President of this Foundation.¹⁵⁴ The GYV remained successful to let know the ideas of the Gülen Movement on democracy, tolerance and dialogue.¹⁵⁵

In this way, GYV can be seen as the Gülen Movement's enterprise of introducing itself very transparently to let others know the nature of its activities. GYV has been a very successful initiative in presenting a clear image of the Gülen Movement to the minds of the people. Termed one of the most influential civil society platforms with various other subsidiary platforms under it, the GYV is in favor of initiating pro-dialogue measures to avoid conflicts, believing in democracy and tolerance. Supporting peace and friendship against hatred and division, besides publicizing the ideas of the Gülen Movement, the GYV does have an aim to transfer

scientific and religious magazine in Turkey. It has been published since 1979 and the lead article is penned by M.Fethullah Gülen. *Sizinti* means 'trickling' in Turkish. Burc FM is one of the earliest private radio channels in Turkey, operating since 1994 across Turkey and worldwide. CHA is one of the prominent news agencies in Turkey.

¹⁵²GYV and JWF both stand for the Journalists and Writers Foundation. But the original name of this Foundation is *Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı* (GYV).

¹⁵³Yavuz, Hakan, "Being Modern in the *Nurcu Way*.", *International Institute for the Studies of Islam in the Modern World* 6 (Leiden University) (October 2000): 7-14.

¹⁵⁴Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey, 1-15.

¹⁵⁵Yavuz, "Being Modern in the *Nurcu Way*", 7-14.

knowledge and awareness of different cultures in order to create humble and peace loving society.¹⁵⁶

Gülen Movement has a different niche among many faith-inspired groups in Turkey via its practical and positive activism embracing all segments of the society. The Movement's flagship dialogue platform GYV arranges conferences, Ramadan *Iftar* dinners and national consensus meetings such as Abant Platform as well as Dialogue of Civilizations in order to convey the positive message inherent with the Gülen Movement to the general people, especially to the educated, elite class of the Turkish society. To this end, GYV published many books, articles and papers and also introduced in the conferences to introduce and to promote the inter-cultural and the inter-faith dialogue. It sponsored the production of a film that was about the inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogue. Gülen's visit to the Vatican and his meeting with Pope John Paul II is considered one of the remarkable works of this Foundation.¹⁵⁷

GYV has been organizing official and informal dinners at five star hotels especially in Ankara and Istanbul where a large number of politicians, academics and journalists are invited. In 1994, at the first ever national consensus meeting organized by the GYV, Gülen delivered a speech, mentioning that all misunderstandings till then happened due to intentional or out-of-fear lack of communication between the different segments of the society, be they elitist, conservative, liberal or else. He underlined that the need of the hour was to meet at common denominators to provide

¹⁵⁶When people who belong to diverse cultures understand each other's cultures and traditions and become engaged with each other on the eve of different occasions and in different relations, then automatically their closeness increases their love and sacrifices for each other.

¹⁵⁷Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey," 1-15.

national consensus and to place human element in the centre before any other component. His speech received enthusiastic acknowledgment.¹⁵⁸

Yet another component in Gülen Movement's activities is charities. The Movement encouraged and inspired a large philanthropic business community, which wholeheartedly donate sums to the initiatives of the Movement. The educational, media, financial and charity aspects of Gülen-inspired movement are sponsored by donations from all walks of life including working class as well as businesspeople.¹⁵⁹

4.16-Business Institutions of the Gülen Movement

In 2005, a group of business people inspired by Gülen Movement spearheaded the establishment of a business community named the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON), which currently contains 124 different business unions and 9500 business people. Established as Asya Finans, an interest-free finance institution by a group of Gülen-inspired businesspeople, Bank Asya grew to become the largest participatory, interest-free bank in 2006. Bank Asya deals its trade of stocks with Turkish people as well as other international customers.¹⁶⁰

İŞHAD and İşık Sigorta are other business and financial institutions inspired by the Gülen Movement.¹⁶¹ İŞHAD is one of Turkey's well known business organization. It is laid down by a group of far-sighted businessmen in Turkey in 1993. As an government organization İŞHAD is not working to get profit while its most prior aims is to enhance business and trade relations of Turkey with other states and

¹⁵⁸Yavuz, "Being Modern in the *Nurcu* Way",7-14.

¹⁵⁹Geries Othman, "Fethullah Gülen: the neo-Ottoman dream of Turkish Islam," May 6,2009.

¹⁶⁰Hasan Kösebalaban, "The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity," *World Affairs* 168 (1)(2005) : 27-37.

¹⁶¹Bilici, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Its Politics of Representation in Turkey,"1-15.

with governmental and non-governmental organizations and to introduce and to inform foreign business community by the available business opportunities in Turkey and try to attract them by putting concrete business benefits before them.

Thus its role is to commercialized business information and opportunities to Turkish and foreign business communities. It (İŞHAD) at present has more than 550 members who have commercial relations with many countries. İŞHAD has been worked successfully since last 17 years by establishing productive relations with business organizations, chambers, unions, associations all over the world. That is why it (ISHAD) is considering so trustworthy business organization.¹⁶²

*Işık*¹⁶³ (pronounced as Ishik) Sigorta is one of the most prominent insurance companies in Turkey, established on 1 January 1996 in Istanbul. Presently 65 percent of *Işık* Sigorta's shares are owned by the Bank Asya, making the insurance company a contributory of the Bank Asya which too was established by a trust positively influenced by Gülen. *Işık* Sigorta has a set of diverse insurance covers such as automobile, earthquake, health, fire, and many more.¹⁶⁴

TUSKON – *Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu* - Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists – is a very important business organization, which explores new markets and increase Turkey's trade with the foreign countries. According to the reports of the IMF, Turkey is the fifteenth largest economy in the world and fifth largest economy in Europe. Her geographical location provides a significant importance to her, as she is located at the crossroads of East and

¹⁶²<http://www.ishad.org.tr/kurumsal/index.php?anahtar=hakkimizda>
(accessed on 30 March 2010)

¹⁶³The word literally translates as "Light".

¹⁶⁴<http://www.isiksigtora.com/>
(accessed on 30 March 2010)

West. Due to this location, she plays a role of business-bridge among the three continents Asia, Europe and Africa, as well as in the Middle East. TUSKON is an important pillar of the Turkish business enterprises which progress very fast at foreign level in trade by providing and accessing investment and market opportunities. Rizanur Meral is the Chairman of TUSKON. In 2009, during the global business crises, TUSKON's exports were higher than some other business organizations in Turkey.

TUSKON played an important role to combat with the consequences of the global economic crisis in Turkey. In result of this crisis the export markets were falling down due to less export. TUSKON held eight trade meetings with African and Pacific countries in order to boost trade with them and to offer them business opportunities.

Above all TUSKON has an influential and extended trade relation in about all over the world. It does have strong and deep trade relations almost with all the countries particularly with those in Central America, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific and Africa. Its spearheading of commencing trade relations with those countries that yet have no diplomatic relations with Turkey, opened up the country to new, unexplored countries such as twenty-one countries in Central and South America in which mostly have no or minimum diplomatic relations with Turkey. TUSKON is completely an independent business and trade organization that does not support by any other state's financial institutions.

The business participants of TUSKON also invest without return in the educational institutions and dialogue conferences arranged by the adherents of the Gülen Movement for multi-cultural, the multi-ethnic and the multi-traditional societies. TUSKON business conferences, meetings and summits are not specific for

its own business community to attend but open to all people who are interested in business just in order to alive their interest in business and to try to engage them in their business community.¹⁶⁵

TUSKON and İŞHAD both are indistinguishable business communities. The members of these associations participate in different conventions and events that establish business, trade and commerce ties with various countries where Turkish schools too are located.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵“Looking for new Global Suppliers? Or Looking to invest in a thriving Country?”,*Turkey World Trade Bridge 2009*, 3-5 June 2009, www.siad.org.au/userfiles/file/Tuskon%20WTB%202009.Pdf.

(accessed on 27 March 2010)

¹⁶⁶<http://www.ishad.org.tr/kurumsal/index.php?anahtar=hakkimizda>(accessed on 30 March 2010).

Chapter-5

GÜLEN-INSPIRED TURKISH SCHOOLS IN PAKISTAN

5.1-Brief Introduction to the PakTurk Schools

Gülen-inspired educational institutions in Pakistan are known as PakTurk International Schools & Colleges. These educational institutions were established in 1995 under the mutual signed educational agreements as per the NOCs issued by Pakistan's Ministry of Education and Foreign Affairs, and placed under the auspices of the PakTurk International Educational Foundation (PakTurk ICEF) through the MoU signed with the Economic Affairs Division (EAD), Pakistan Ministry of Finance on 30 July 1999.

PakTurk ICEF is a non-governmental organization, which is being funded by donations from Turkish philanthropists. There are 18 PakTurk branches across Pakistan in Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta, Multan, Karachi, and Khairpur Mirs, educating more than 5000 students from Pre School to College Level (inclusive of SSC and HSSC as well as O and A Levels).

5.2-Background of the PakTurk Schools in Pakistan

The first PakTurk School and College in Pakistan was established in April 1995 in Islamabad for boys only. In April 1997 Pre School and Junior Branch of the Pak Turk International Schools and Colleges was opened in Islamabad. While in August 1999 Girls Branch was opened in Islamabad in order to fulfill the growing demands. In August 1999, a PakTurk School and College branch was opened in Karachi.

In September 2000, Quetta Branch of PakTurk International Schools and Colleges was opened. In September 2001, Lahore Branch followed. On 16 April 2002, as per a mutual agreement with the local educational office, PakTurk ICEF opened the Khairpur Mirs branch of PakTurk International Schools & Colleges at the premises of the former Colonel Shah Hostel building. In 2003, a PakTurk International Branch was opened in Multan on Khanewal Road. This followed by the opening of the Lahore Islampura Branch in 2004.

Growing demands and number of students compelled PakTurk ICEF to seek the construction of purpose-built campuses for PakTurk educational institutions, which were predominantly operating at rented premises with limited facilities thus far. Starting from mid-2006, augmented by the donations of Turkish philanthropists, PakTurk ICEF commissioned the building of PakTurk's state-of-the-art educational campuses in Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, and by March 2010 in Quetta.

On 9 December 2006 Lt Gen (Retd) Khalid Maqbool, the erstwhile Governor of Punjab, placed the foundation stone during the construction of Lahore PakTurk International Schools and Colleges Campus. Lt.Gen (Retd) Ali Muhammad Jan Aurakzai erstwhile Governor of the NWFP placed the Foundation stone of the Peshawar Campus on 9 February 2007. On 15 February 2007 the erstwhile Federal Minister of Education Lt.Gen (Retd) Javed Ashraf Qazi placed the Foundation stone at PakTurk School and College Campus at Islamabad. This function was honoured Mr Ismail Alptekin, the Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly at that time. A number of well-known educationists, bureaucrats and executives from Pakistan and Turkey were present as well.

5.3-Supportive and Central Role of PakTurk ICEF in Promoting Education and Social Welfare Work

PakTurk ICEF has been working since 1995 with an aim to transfer education and social welfare to the people of Pakistan. To this end, it has established PakTurk International Schools and Colleges in seven cities of Pakistan¹⁶⁷ and as well launched cultural and humanitarian assistance programs. PakTurk ICEF played an important role when a devastating earthquake struck Pakistan on 8 October 2005. Just as this earthquake was a turning point in the history of Pakistan, it happened to become a defining moment in the history of the PakTurk ICEF. PakTurk ICEF had been the first foreign NGO to reach at the earthquake-affected region, providing swift health facilities, especially relief goods including foodstuff, tents, bedding and winter clothes, thus adding the humanitarian aspect to its educational welfare activities.

In the wake of the 8 October Earthquake, a generation of 18,000 young souls perished and this was a great blow to the county's future and literacy. Essentially an educational foundation, PakTurk ICEF collaborated with the Kimse Yok Mu Aid and Solidarity Association of Turkey with the purpose of assisting to the reconstruction and rejuvenation of educational facilities in AJK and NWFP. Utilizing donations by Turkish nation to give rise to the education and the social welfare of the students, and in order to fulfill its pledge with the people and the state of Pakistan, PakTurk ICEF in collaboration with the Kimse Yok Mu Aid and Solidarity Association re-constructed the ten completely collapsed buildings of the Schools in Muzaffarabad, Balakot and Mansehra. The entire furniture and equipment of these schools were imported from Turkey.

¹⁶⁷Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta, Multan, Karachi, and Khairpur Mirs.

The Former Prime Minister of AJK Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan and the Former Ambassador of Turkey Hasan Kemal Gür inaugurated these schools in April 2006, and PakTurk ICEF handed over these schools to the jurisdiction of the educational authorities in AJK and NWFP. In recognition of PakTurk ICEF's services in providing education and social welfare in Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan on 30 June 2006 conferred PakTurk ICEF with the prestigious civil award Sitara-e-Eisaar by His Excellency President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

PakTurk ICEF fosters the foremost mission of initiating and maintaining educational, humanitarian, cultural and medical facilities in order to raise the increasing level of education and social welfare transformation in Pakistan. Besides this, PakTurk ICEF undertakes the responsibility of maintaining and providing quality and affordable education for the students at PakTurk International Schools & Colleges across Pakistan.

Turkish philanthropists from various segments of the society sponsor PakTurk ICEF and its initiatives in Pakistan. Recently Pakistani philanthropists too have matched this example to give donations to PakTurk educational institutions. They set up scholarships for deserving students and most prominently, a group of Pakistani philanthropists have built a hostel adjacent to PakTurk Main Campus in Chak-Shehzad, Islamabad and donated it to PakTurk Foundation ICEF. The central point of PakTurk ICEF's agenda is the welfare of human beings. That is why PakTurk ICEF keeps the cost of education accessible to all the levels of the different segments of the Pakistani society.

PakTurk International Schools & Colleges are not running as commercial institutions. Here the charged fees are spent on the students and on the betterment of the schools' educational facilities. These educational institutions have already become

hubs of attraction due to have an international quality education and an understanding upon all types of education in Pakistan.

In the opinion of PakTurk ICEF, the promotion of education is necessary to avoid the prevailing ignorance and bigotry in the society. PakTurk educational institutions believe that science and faith are two different components but are the sides of the same truth. Both are essential for one another.

These educational institutions believe providing education to students in social and positive sciences to build them as educated, progressive, and resourceful human beings by teaching them about faith, virtue and moral values. Stating poverty, ignorance and internal schism as the most prominent problems across the world and in Pakistan, PakTurk ICEF educational institutions tackle these problems with knowledge, dialogue, unity and tolerance. Pak-Turk ICEF endeavors to bring forth composed and bright minded generations who have unity of mind and heart to the extent of never hesitating to serve their own nation and the entire humanity for the infusion of worldwide peace and harmony.

5.4-Type of Education

PakTurk International Schools & Colleges offer education from Pre-School to College level inclusive of SSC, HSSC, Cambridge International Examination O and A levels. Known for their outstanding achievements in national and international Science and for Project Olympiads,¹⁶⁸ PakTurk International Schools & Colleges also have scholarship drives that enable bright students with merit and/or limited means to

¹⁶⁸Students from all PakTurk International Schools & Colleges branches participate to national and international educational and science project competitions.

get quality education at PakTurk educational institutions and accommodation at well-designed PakTurk hostels in each city where the schools and colleges are located.

PakTurk educational institutions hold among the students of Class 6-8 a centralized examination titled General Assessment Test (GAT) twice a year in spring and winter semesters. GAT is comprised of English Language, Urdu, Islamiyat, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, Social Studies, History, Geography and Turkish. Heads of academic support departments at PakTurk ICEF sift and prepare test batteries for GAT, and design the syllabi and questions.

PakTurk International Schools & Colleges have teachers and staff consisted of Pakistani and Turkish nations. However, the number of Pakistani teachers is thrice as many than that of the Turkish teachers.

PakTurk educational institutions, since 1995, provide quality-oriented and human-centered education to the youth of Pakistan, establishing educational and cultural bridges that bring Pakistan and Turkey closer. PakTurk ICEF and PakTurk educational institutions' motto, "*Two Countries, One Nation,*" rings true when one observes the potential of the students who graduate from these institutions as unofficial ambassadors of their respective countries to contribute to a better Pakistan and world. Both Pakistan and Turkey agree that they can solve their regional, international and global problems through focusing and promoting on human element, by the unification of educational language and teachings of science, faith and moral education. Already closely bound in a time-tested love, affection, and fraternity to each other, Pakistan and Turkey have a very solid example in the presence of PakTurk ICEF and its institutions to further achievements.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹www.pakturk.org.

Chapter-6

CASE STUDY:

SURVEY OF GÜLEN-INSPIRED PAKTURK SCHOOLS IN PAKISTAN

6.1-Data Analysis of the Students' Profile

This chapter deals with the analysis of data collected for the study. Data has been arranged in the form of tables as follows:

Questionnaire for the Students of the PakTurk International Schools & Colleges

Students Profile

Part-I

Table 1.1 Father's or Guardian's Occupation

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Working Abroad	9	4.5 %
Doctor	16	8%
Businessman	64	32 %
Engineer	12	6 %
Professor	3	1.5%
Teacher	20	10 %
Bank Job	2	1%
District Nazim	1	0.5%
School Principal	1	0.5%
Government Official	31	20.5 %
Farmer	3	1.5%
Landlord	2	1 %
Private Job	7	3.5%
Army	1	0.5%
Driver	1	0.5 %

Mason	1	0.5 %
Laborer	2	1 %
Property Dealer	4	2 %
Police	2	1%
Journalist	1	0.5%
Jobless	2	1 %
Don't Know	3	1.5%

Table 1.1 shows that the parents of 32 % students belong to well-to-do families, meanwhile the parents of 20.5 % students are government officials.

Table 1.2 What thing motivated you to study in Pak-Turk schools?

Reason of Motivation	Frequency	Percentage
Good Science Subjects	2	1 %
High Standard of Education	54	27 %
Good Study Environment	54	27 %
Skillful and Experienced Teachers	47	23.5 %
Parents' Wish	11	5.5 %
To Learn English and Turkish	23	11.5 %
To Learn Only English	6	3 %
To Learn Only Turkish	12	6 %
Games and Extra Activities	17	8.5 %
Scholarship	11	5.5 %
No Opinion	9	4.5 %
Obtained Scholarship	2	1 %

Table 1.2 shows that in view of 27 % students, high standard of education and good study environment and according to 23% skillful and experienced teachers is a source of motivation for taking admission to PakTurk schools.11.5% of students were interested to study and learn Turkish language.

Table 1.3

Why did you give preference to PakTurk schools over other state/private schools in Pakistan?

Reasons of Preference	F	Percentage
Well Way of Teaching	22	11%
Extra Activities and Good Studies	18	9%
Parents' Wish	6	3%
International Level School	15	7.5%
Good Education	77	38.5%
Good Study Environment	69	34.5%
To Learn Turkish and English	5	2.5%
To Learn Only English	4	2%
To Learn Only Turkish	16	8 %
Making PakTurk Friendship Strong	2	1%
Situated in Beautiful Location and Buildings	2	1%
Better Hostel Environment	4	2%
Skillful and Experienced Teachers	41	20.5%
Scholarship	11	5.5%
No Opinion	5	2.5 %

Table 1.3 shows that 38.5 % students preferred PakTurk International Schools & Colleges over other state or private schools in Pakistan due to their good education standards, 34.5% because of their good study environment, and 20.5 % due to their skillful and experienced teachers.

Table 1.4**Which subjects are of your interest?**

Subjects of your interest	Frequency	Percentage
Science	104	52%
English	63	31.5 %
Mathematics	88	44 %
Islamiyat	43	21.5 %
Turkish	56	28 %
All Subjects	3	1.5 %
Arts Subjects	12	6 %
Computer	35	17.5 %
Urdu	27	13.5 %
Social Studies	20	10 %
Drawing	1	0.5 %
Economics	1	0.5 %

Table 1.4 shows that 52 % students were interested in studying science subjects. 44 % students were interested in Mathematics.

Table 1.5 Do you find these schools better in education than other schools of Pakistan?

Better than other private/state schools or not	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
	Yes		No	
	163	81.5 %	36	18 %

Table 1.5 shows that 81.5 % students considered PakTurk educational institutions better than other schools in Pakistan because of its good education, excellent study environment, experienced and highly educated teachers as well as the institutions' scholarship scheme on having higher education in Turkey.

Table 1.6**Which field would you like to choose in future?**

Future Profession	Frequency	Percentage
Doctor	44	22 %
Engineer	78	39 %
Teacher	5	2.5 %
Any Other	72	36 %

Table 1.6 shows that 39 % students were interested to choose engineering field in the future. While 22 % students wanted to become doctors. 36 % wished to join other respectable fields. The given figures and the views which were expressed by the students showed that they were quite satisfied on their study progress in these schools.

Part-II

Table 1.7**Do you have fear of going to school?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
39	19.5 %	161	80.5 %

Table 1.7 shows 80.5 % students feel comfortable while going to school; this shows that they study in a friendly environment.

Table 1.8**Do you have a favorite teacher?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
180	90 %	20	10 %

Table 1.8 shows that 90 % students had favorite teachers which threw light over the student and the teacher relationship. This result shows the teachers are kind towards their students and are adopted as role models by the students for being a good human being and a 'teacher'.

Table 1.9**Do some teachers favor certain students?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
112	56 %	88	44 %

Table 1.9 shows that 56 % students had an idea that their teachers were favoring certain students in the class. This figure indicates a bit unfair and unequal attitude of some teachers towards the students.

Table 1.10**Are games an effective way of learning?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
154	77 %	48	24 %

Table 1.10 shows that in view of 77% students games are an effective way of learning which put positive impact on the studies and helpful in the mental and physical growth of the students. 24 % students gave negative answer to this question.

Table 1.11**Are you taking part in games?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
160	80 %	40	20%

Table 1.11 shows that 80 % students of these schools were taking part in different games and programs.

Table 1.12**Is there any play ground/play courts at school?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
104	52 %	96	48 %

Table 1.12 shows that 52 % students said that they had playgrounds and play courts for various outdoor games.

Table 1.13**Is library available at school?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
176	88 %	25	12.5 %

Table 1.13 shows the opinion of 88 % students mentioning the availability of library facilities at these educational institutions. Students further stated that some of these libraries were very small and had meager book stocks.

Table 1.14**Are you satisfied with the study syllabus of your school?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
160	80%	40	20 %

Table 1.14 shows that 80 % students were satisfied with the study syllabus of these educational institutions.

Table 1.15**Are you consulting dictionary during class hours?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
65	32.5 %	135	67.5 %

Table 1.15 shows that during class study 32.5 % students were consulting the dictionary while 67.5 % were not using dictionary.

Table 1.16**Did you draw any book from your school library?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
96	48 %	104	52 %

Table 1.16 shows that 48 % students had been issued books from the library. 52 % have not yet borrowed any books from the library.

Table 1.17**Are you comfortable with your studies?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
171	85.5 %	29	14.5 %

Table 1.17 shows that 85.5% students did not feel any kind of discomfort with their studies and with the available study environment.

Table 1.18**Are you relaxed during the study hours at school?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
147	73.5 %	53	26.5 %

Table 1.18 shows that 73.5% students were relaxed during their study time at school and college. As the given figure was much high, it showed that the students were studying in a peaceful, friendly and good study environment.

Table 1.19**Are you taking participation in debates?**

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
121	60.5 %	79	39.5 %

Table 1.19 shows that 60.5 % students had taken participation in debates and 39.5 % were not taking part in it.

Table 1.20 Does your teacher encourage you when you feel disappointment because of your studies?

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
143	71.5 %	57	28.5 %

Table 1.20 shows that in opinion of 71.5 % students their teachers were encouraging them when they had felt disappointment on the studies.

Table 1.21 Does your teacher give you morale support when you need it?

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
163	81.5 %	37	18.5 %

Table 1.21 shows that in view of 81.5 % students their teachers were provided them morale support on their studies and for good future.

Table 1.22 Are your teachers' friendly towards you?

Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Yes		No	
165	82.5 %	35	17.5 %

Table 1.22 shows that in view 82.5 % students their teachers were very friendly to them.

6.2- Summary and Conclusion

The subject of the survey study was to evaluate the function, performance and societal impact of PakTurk International Schools & Colleges as the Gülen-inspired Turkish educational institutions in Pakistan. The main aim of the survey was to reveal the educational role of the Gülen Movement in Pakistan.

Regarding this, two separate questionnaires of 10 to 16 questions in each, were prepared for teachers and students respectively. There are 18 PakTurk branches across Pakistan, in seven large cities i.e. Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, Khairpur Mirs, Multan, Quetta and Karachi. Two hundred students and hundred teachers were selected as sample. The researcher personally delivered and collected the questionnaires. All the information was recorded on the survey sheets then it was tabulated and data was analyzed in the form of percentage.

The analysis of the survey findings shows that the PakTurk educational institutions provide a high standard education, a good study environment, as well as arranges games, festivals and debates for the students to enhance their mental and physical growth.

Besides, these activities are a source of novel and progressive learning that contribute to developing confidence. Almost 77% of students praised the school for arranging of extracurricular activities, stating that games are effective for learning. On the other hand, 8.5% of students claimed that games and other activities at PakTurk educational institutions motivated them to join these schools; in addition, 9% of students preferred these schools to other schools in Pakistan because of their

extracurricular activities schedule. 80% of students take part in games, festivals and debates.

The thing that makes PakTurk International Schools & Colleges different from other state schools of the country is their high standard education, experienced and educated teachers, and a good study environment. Majority of students opine that the Schools teach them in a superior way that even after study at school they have no need to get tuition to understand the course subjects. PakTurk educational institutions offer science subjects and a variety of arts subjects including history, economics, and geography.

English and Turkish are two main languages taught at these schools. English, the official language of Pakistan and the lingua franca of the world, enjoys popularity among the students. Owing to this, 31.5% of students have high interest in studying English as a subject. As far as Turkish is concerned, 28% of students are interested in studying Turkish.

PakTurk ICEF, the foundation under which auspices PakTurk educational institutions operate, offer higher education scholarships for students who wish to study in the degree programs of Turkish universities.

Not only PakTurk educational institutions encourage students for this, they also hold preparatory classes for the YÖS – Foreign Students Examination, the compulsory university entrance exam for Turkish universities. Facilitating students from all segments of the society, PakTurk educational institutions' scholarship program is an attractive incentive for most of the students to get admission in Turkish universities. In addition to higher education scholarships, PakTurk educational institutions also provide scholarships and incentives to deserving students in the form of gratis education and accommodation as well as subsidized fees proportional to

students' educational achievements. 5.5% of students prefer PakTurk schools to other state/private schools due to its scholarship facility.

The study environment is remarkably suitable for the students. Students are confident to share and express their feelings and problems with the teachers. Teachers' friendly and cooperative attitudes are source of morale for the students. According to 81.5% of students, their teachers give them morale when they need. In opinion of 82.5 % of students, their teachers are friendly to them.

A great majority of boarding students at PakTurk hostels praise the clean, good and suitable study environment of the hostels. 2% of students prefer these schools to other schools of Pakistan due to their hostel setting

PakTurk schools are distinctive among various other state/private schools in Pakistan by providing quality education, comfortable study environment, modern educational facilities like state-of-the-art and purpose-built campuses, well-stocked science laboratories as well as experienced and educated teachers making use of these facilities for the betterment of students. PakTurk educational institutions seem to have established friendly and cooperative relations between the students and the teachers, placing a competitive study environment by putting an incentive of scholarship to Turkey, by arranging extracurricular activities like games, festivals, and the like.

PakTurk International Schools & Colleges are instrumental for bringing the Turkish educational and literacy expertise, which most recently became more prominent in constituting the foundation of a worldwide volunteer educational initiative. Making use of this experience for providing a high-quality education to the young generations of Pakistan, these educational institutions place students in the center as individuals with good morals, keen insight and a competitive brain in the league of dynamic global challenges.

After analyzing the views on survey sheets of the students and the teachers, it can be concluded that these schools are working honestly and with sincerity, and their aim is not making money out of education. Whatever these schools shift in the minds of the students are worth than anything else.

In spite of much positive aspects, these schools also have certain negative qualities. The survey concludes that the monthly student fee is higher than many families with limited means can afford. 32% of parents are from the business community and can afford paying full fees; however, the scholarship and incentive-for-talent initiative of the schools provide financial alleviation to many families who admit their children to PakTurk educational institutions. The schools' high fee schedule is attributed to their pledge to assist as much as possible to the running the expenses of the institutions – which are predominantly sponsored by the donations from Turkish philanthropists - thus being as self-dependent as possible, and maintaining an institutional culture.

56% of students thought their teachers favor certain students during studies. In the light of his opinion, the potential imbalance and negative attitude of the teachers badly affects the studies and the personality grooming of the students.

52% of students endorse having play grounds or play courts. In addition, a majority of them commented that they wanted to have play courts for football and tennis. Except a couple of cities, the existing campus structures of the schools are generally not feasible for such demands.

PakTurk International Schools & Colleges are the symbols of time-tested and deep-seated friendship and mutuality between Pakistan and Turkey. The schools' motto, '*Two Countries, One Nation*,' is a summative expression of these emotions. Inspired by the non-political, volunteer Gülen Movement, these institutions truly work

for the cause of eliminating ignorance and division besides contributing to the social welfare in Pakistan.

Chapter-7

DATA ANALYSIS

7.1- Data Analysis of the Teachers' Profile

This chapter deals with the analysis of data collected for the study. Data has been arranged in the form of tables as follows:

Questionnaire for the Teachers of the PakTurk International Schools & Colleges

Teachers Profile

Table 1.1

Nationality?

Nationality	F	Percentage
Pakistani	89	89%
Turkish	13	13%
British	1	1 %

Table 1.1 shows that Pakistani teachers are in 86 %, which presents their majority over Turkish teachers who are 13 %.

Table 1.2

Sex?

Sex	Frequency	Percentage
Pakistani Male	67	67 %
Turkish Male	5	5 %
Pakistani Female	23	23 %
Turkish Female	4	4 %
British Female	1	1 %

Table 2.2 shows that the number of Pakistani male teachers is 67%. The Pakistani female teachers are 23%, Turkish male teachers are 5% and Turkish female teachers are 4%.

Table 1.3**Age?**

Age	20 years	Above 20 years	30 years	Above 30 years	40 years	Above 40 years	Above 50 years
Male	4	23	7	34	1	3	1
Percentage	4 %	23 %	7 %	34 %	1 %	3 %	1 %
Female		10	1	17			
Percentage		10 %	1 %	17 %			

Table 1.3 shows that the 34 % male teachers are above 30 years of age. 23% of male teachers are above 20 years. 17% of female teachers are above 30 and 10% are above 20 years.

Table 1.4**How long have you been here?**

Job Time Period in PakTurk School	Male	Percentage	Female	Percentage
Few days	5	5 %	4	4 %
One month	8	8 %	9	9 %
Few months	11	11 %	7	7 %
One year	9	9 %	0	0 %
More than one year	9	9 %	7	7 %
Two years	6	6 %	7	7 %
More than two years	9	9 %	0	0 %
Three years	5	5 %	6	6 %
More than three years	5	5 %	6	6 %
More than five years	0	0 %	1	1 %
Six years	1	1 %	0	0 %
Seven years	1	1 %	1	1 %
Nine years	1	1 %	1	1 %
Ten years	2	2 %	1	1 %

Table 1.4 shows that 5% of teachers have been working at PakTurk educational institutions for five years and 9% of teachers have been working there for more than two years.

Table 1.5 Why did you join PakTurk schools?

Reasons	Frequency	Percentage
To get skill and experience	20	20 %
Good educational environment and reputation of the school	31	31 %
No Opinion	5	5 %
Good salary package	8	8 %
Good method of teaching	1	1 %
Cooperative Administration and well mannered students	1	1 %
To help Pakistani educational atmosphere	1	1 %
Aim and Objectives	3	3 %
Good working environment	12	12 %
An International organization	10	10 %
Excellent educational institutional	2	2 %
Experience the knowledge	2	2 %
To serve the country	3	3 %
Working for a good cause	1	1 %

Table 1.5 shows that 31 % of teachers have joined these schools because of their good education and well-known name. The 20 % of teachers have joined to get

working experience and 12% of teachers have joined because of their good working environment.

Table 1.6

What is your Qualification?

Qualification	Male	Female	Percentage
B.A, B.Ed	1	1	2 %
B.A, Montessori trained		1	1 %
BSC, B.Ed	1		1 %
BSc		1	1 %
M.A, M.Ed	36	5	41%
MSc	40	3	43 %
M.A, M.Sc		1	1 %
M.Phil.	5		5 %
M.Phil. B.Ed	1		1 %
M.A, B.Ed	1		1 %
M.A, B.Ed, M.Ed	1	1	2 %
MSc, B.Ed,M.Ed		2	2 %
Triple M.A,B.Ed	1		1 %
M.A,M.Ed	1	1	2 %
Double M.A,MBA	1		1 %
M.A, different teaching courses	1		1 %
Ph.D, B.Ed	1		1 %
Ph.D	1		1 %
MSs,B.Ed,M.Ed		1	1 %
MSc,M.Ed		1	1 %
MBA,B.A,B.Ed		1	1 %
MBA		1	1 %
MBA,M.A	1		1 %
M.A	1	3	4 %
M.A,PGD Diploma One year	1		1 %

MSc,MBA	1		1 %
BCS,MBIT,MCSD	1		1 %
L.L.B		1	1 %
L.L.B ,T.E.F.L		1	1 %
L.L.B ,B.Ed		1	1 %
BSTS	1		1 %
M.A,B.Ed,MBA	1		1 %
M.A,M.Ed,M.Phil	1		1 %
MSc,B.Ed		1	1 %
M.A,MSc,M.Phil		1	1 %

Table 1.6 shows that 2 % of teachers hold Bachelor's degree with some additional teaching courses and 43 % teachers have an education up to Master's degree. 5% of teachers hold M.Phil degrees and 1% has a PhD. degree.

Table 1.7 Did you have any teaching experience before joining PakTurk schools?

Experience	Yes	Percentage	No	Percentage	To some extent	Percentage
Male	56	56 %	10	10 %	6	6 %
Female	16	16 %	6	6 %	6	6 %

Table 1.7 shows that 56% of male and 16 % of female teachers had teaching experience for more than 5 to 6 years before joining PakTurk Schools; 10 % of male teachers and 6% of female teachers had no teaching experience before.

Table 1.8 Are you satisfied with the teacher's faculty members if not then why?

Satisfied with teachers faculty	Yes	Percentage	No	Percentage	To some extent	Percentage
Male	92	92%	2	2 %	6	6 %
Female	27	27 %	1	1 %	—	—

Table 1.8 shows that 92 % of male teachers and 27% female teachers are satisfied with their other faculty members' attitudes and performance.

Table 1.9**Do you have in service training?**

Service Training	Yes	Percentage	No	Percentage
Male	65	55 %	35	45 %
Female	28	28 %	9	9 %

Table 1.9 shows that 65 % of male teachers and 28% of female teachers are in service training along with their teaching job. 35 % of male and 9 % of female teachers said they have not joined any service training yet.

Table 1.10**Which medium of instruction?**

Medium Of Instruction	F	Percentage
English	88	88 %
English and Urdu	11	11%
Urdu	2	2%

Table 1.10 shows that the 88 % of teachers' medium of instruction is English. 11 % of teachers use both English and Urdu language. 2 % of teachers use Urdu as they are teaching Urdu as a subject.

7.2- Summary and Conclusion

PakTurk International Schools & Colleges have more Pakistani teachers than Turkish teachers. All teachers are well educated and have teaching experience at different educational institutions. Prior to PakTurk, 72 % of teachers had teaching experience of more than five or six years, 14 % of teachers had no teaching experience and 12 % of teachers had teaching experience of a few months or a year.

The survey figures show that 20 % of teachers joined to PakTurk schools to enhance their teaching skills and experience. 31 % of teachers joined to these schools due to their good educational environment and good reputation and 20 % of teachers joined because of their good working environment. 17 % of teachers joined to PakTurk educational institutions for being the part of an international organization, which provides an opportunity of inter-service training within Pakistan and in Turkey. 8 % of teachers joined to these schools because of their good salary package.

As far as the teachers' educational qualifications are concerned, only 5 % teachers hold Bachelor's degree along with some additional teaching courses. 95% of teachers hold Master's degree with additional teaching courses.

88% of teachers deliver their lectures in English language; 11% use both Urdu and English during classes.

PakTurk Schools provide a satisfactory survey figure about the students and teachers. High-quality education and extensive experience of teachers give a good name to PakTurk schools in Pakistan. These schools in return provide their teachers many benefits such as in- and inter-service teaching training courses, workshops, and seminars as well as a good salary package at par with their qualifications and job ethics in a pleasant, cooperative and respectable environment.

Chapter-8

JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP)

8.1- 2007 Parliamentary Elections: Clear Use of *Islamist* and *Secularist* Terms

In April 2007, Turkey turned the attentions of the world towards her newly awaiting political change. This change was supposed to appear after the parliamentary elections in July 2007. Turkey's print, audio-visual and internet media gave a very keen coverage to these elections. These various media channels continuously throughout in their debate and analysis programs and news over elections used clearly the terms Islamists and secularists.⁴

The Turkish media channels and newspapers, especially those under the auspices of the Doğan Media Group like CNN Turk and *Hürriyet* gave their predictions in favor of secularists that they would be the winners in election, simulating that the secularist frame of mind had a support of millions of people besides its heavy dominance over the military and judicial bureaucracy.

8.2-AKP Wins the 2007 Parliamentary Elections

All predictions by national and international channels proved wrong when AKP won the July 2007 elections. The predictions especially made at national level

⁴The media channels used these terms in their discussion programs over election because AKP (Justice and Development Party) was considered as an Islamic Party. In Turkey, AKP is considered a threat for the secular establishment. For Turkey's establishment, secularism is an inheritance to them from their national leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

showed that a media group exclusively highlighted them to mislead the public opinion and applying psychological influence over them.

Held in the multi-party system of Turkey, the July 2007 elections saw the AKP win the elections with overwhelming majority of 47% of the national vote. Fourteen national parties participated in the election. The main opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party) which had an alliance with other small or medium size secular parties got 21% of the national votes.

8.3-AKP's Islamic Roots with the *Islamist Milli Görüş* Movement

The AK Party is not an Islamist Party. Profiling on the past positions of some AK Party leaders there is a disseminated idea that they harbor an Islamization agenda as usual.¹⁷¹

Although, in history some of its members were a part of Islamist *Milli Görüş* Movement, which was consisted of several Islamic groups, later this movement came in front as a source of transformation, which assisted establishment of various Islamic influences in the society. However, in time the break points of political differences developed with the *Milli Görüş* on the grounds of monopolization of Islamic politics by a single leader and the gross sacrifices rendered because of political mistakes that led to party closures, and censuring conservative populace in Turkey.

Drawing huge criticism from Erbakan and the base of *Milli Görüş* movement, AKP faced the censure that they were a splinter group and that they had passions in power play. AKP conceived itself as a conservative, yet all-inclusive political party

¹⁷¹Ahmet Kuru, "Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and Development Party," in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Islam, Democracy, and the AK Party, ed . M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), 136-159.

aspiring to unite various tendencies under one roof, thus making it not an 'Islamic' party. Such an approach brought flexibility and openness in their ideas regarding secularism where each one should have a freedom to express their faith according to one's own ways. More than this, the state should have tolerated public over the use of this freedom of expressing religion openly and should have not stopped accelerating visibility of someone's religion.¹⁷²

8.4-AKP's Interaction with the Gülen Movement

Besides the past involvement of several members of AKP in *Milli Görüş* Movement, AKP at present seems to interact with the Gülen Movement. This interaction also played an important role in the new prospective of AKP towards secularism.

8.5-Presence of Passive and Assertive Secularism in Turkey

Turkey is the first secular state that has a Muslim-majority populated society. There are two types of secularism: Passive and Assertive. Passive secularism emphasizes that everyone has a right to lead their life according to their own religion openly and with liberty. It does not separate religion from the society. Passive Secularism does not show slightest harsh attitude towards any religion which is becoming dominant.

¹⁷²AKP believes on the passive secularism under which the state does not possess any type of restrictions over all types the religions, which exist in the country. Moreover, the state does never become harsh towards those religions that are moving towards dominance over the state's official religion and have a chance to become more popular. It does not matter whether these religions in orientation belongs Islam, Christianity and Judaism or to another religion.

On the other hand, assertive secularism is rigid especially in terms of tolerance towards other religions. It completely separates religion from the society. Assertive secularism consists of keeping the religion as a private matter.¹⁷³

8.6-Assertive Secularism: A Prevailing Secular Ideology in Turkey

Assertive secularism is a prevailing secular ideology in Turkey since her independence. The main and major supporters of the assertive secularism are the largest political opposition party CHP, the military generals, majority of the high court members, and the major media supporters. The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSİAD) is also a sworn promoter of the assertive secularism. These all described supporters have a very influential and authoritative status in Turkey.

8.7- Islam is a Great Challenge to Assertive Secularism

In these days despite having assertive secularism as a dominant ideology in Turkey, the country faces Islam as a great challenge to it. If the state machinery once gives a freehand to the growing Islamic factor, then it will become clear that which ideology is more dominating either assertive secularism or Islam. Observing the social demographics of the country, most probably the answer will be Islam. In order to

¹⁷³General Staff Deputy Chief General İlker Başbuğ, "Politics and Religion in Secular states: The United States, France and Turkey" (Speech delivered on Academic year of Turkish Armed Forces in on May 27, 2004), accessed at <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/genelkumay/bashalk/2004basinbringleri/mayis2004/sempozyum1.htm>, june 1, 2004, In Turkey, assertive secularism is prevailing which separate religion from the matters of social life including education, family, economy, law, manners, dress, codes etc.

maintain the dominance of assertive secularism, the state keeps the all religious matters and social matters as well¹⁷⁴ which are relevant to Islam under its control.

8.8-The State Policies to Combat Islamic Challenges

In this regard, the state banned all private religious schools in Turkey. The only operating religious schools are the *İmam-Hatip* Schools, funded and monitored by the Turkish Ministry of National Education. The basic curriculum of these schools is consisted of secular education, as instructed by the State through a religious curriculum in the framework of an additional set of syllabus. The State streamlines religious affairs through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*).

Under this institution, the *imams* are civil servants and are paid salaries. *Diyanet*'s basic objective is to supervise and manage the religious activities in the mosques such as speeches and sermons on Friday prayers as well as the leading the daily and *Eid* prayers.¹⁷⁵

The ambition, which exists behind the control of religious schools by the State, is to privatize Islam and to bind Islam by imposing different restrictions just to stop it from becoming a dominant and practiced faith in Turkey. However, the *İmam-Hatip* Schools and the *Diyanet* institutions are exempt from these state restrictions.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴Within the frame of the assertive secularism, the State also deals with the social matters that belong to the religion. For example in Turkey, the Military which considers itself the owner of the legacy of the Kemal Atatürk and other state institutions oppose extremely at the wearing of headscarf at universities and public places. The use of headscarf has been banned in Turkey. Similarly, religious education is either banned even in the social religious schools of *İmam-Hatip*.

¹⁷⁵Ahmet T Kuru, "Changing Prospective on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and the AKP Party," in *Muslim world in Transition: Contribution to the Gülen Movement*, ed. Ihsan Yilmaz (London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007), 142.

¹⁷⁶Sami Selçuk, *Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, Türkiye Günü, 1999 (56): 45-49.

Recently, the State put ban upon the wearing of headscarves in all educational institutions. It is also prohibited for the children who are under or of fifteen years to get Qur'an education and the teachers are not taught these studies (Qur'an Studies) as well. Qur'an Studies are in the shape of summer courses under the control of the *Diyanet* and are only allowed for children above twelve years. Moreover, the state disallows the graduates of the *İmam-Hatip* Schools for further studies in university degree programs other than Divinity.

8.9-Pro-Islamic Conservative Movements Provide a Challenge to Assertive Secularism

From time to time, many political parties and pro-Islamic conservative movements have started to tackle with the assertive secularism in Turkey. Political parties like the Democrat Party (1946-1960), Justice Party (1961-1980), Motherland Party (1983-), and True Path Party (1983-2007) were banned either after the army coups or due to their opposition to the assertive secularism. In pro-Islamic conservative movements, *Milli Görüş* has been the most influential and publicized one. Started as a faith-based local initiative and later developed into a faith-inspired civic movement without borders, the Gülen Movement, though may not be strictly categorized as a pro-Islamic movement, has been influential in the way it cracked the shell of communal conservatism at national and global levels to make its influence felt in various fields.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷Kuru, Changing Prospective on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and the AKP Party, 143-145.

8.10-The *Milli Görüş* Movement: Historical Background and Role in Politics

The *Milli Görüş* Movement was completely an Islamic-oriented movement that tried to play an important role for Islam in Turkey and used political platform for this purpose. Under the banner of this Movement, many political parties emerged in the name of Islam. Prof Dr. Necmettin Erbakan initiated the *Milli Görüş* Movement in the early 1970s. He formed many Islamist political parties such as Milli Nizam (National Order) Party (1970-1971) and Milli Selamet (National Salvation) Party (1972-1980). These political parties were banned during the military interventions of 1971 and of 1980 because these had anti-secular policies and agenda.

In 1983, the lieutenants of the politically-banned Erbakan established the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). As Erbakan's political ban was lifted by Özal in 1987, in 1987's national parliamentary elections, RP got 7.2 % votes, which showed her progressive popularity graph. In 1994, RP won the local elections and got the posts of mayor in Ankara and Istanbul. In 1995's national parliamentary elections, the RP beat all the parties by getting 21.4% of the national votes and rose as the leading party. In 1996, Erbakan became the Prime Minister and established her government in coalition with DYP.

Erbakan's policies were completely based on Islam. He wanted to replace secularism with Islam. For this, he even mentioned that change would come with bloodshed if needed along with any type of sacrifices. This undertone in his sayings

which were uttered on different occasions provided an excuse to the military junta to conduct a military intervention on 28 February 1997.¹⁷⁸

After this intervention – which was termed by the Turkish Armed Forces as a *postmodern coup* – different sections of the society including several influential people and institutions put pressure on Premier Erbakan to resign. In June 1997, after seven months when RP was constitutionally dissolved, Erbakan resigned. Immediately after this, the non-banned members of the RP constituted another party namely Fazilet Party (Virtue Party). Within the FP, there were two groups. One group was known as the Elders or the Old Generation and the other was familiar as the Juniors or the Young Generation. Erbakan led the group of Old Generation.

Three dominant personalities Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç led the Young Generation. Both the groups soon fall into certain disagreements. The young generation was not too much in favor of showcasing Islam as a political agenda. The focus of their policies and agenda was not only revolving around Islam. In February 2000, Erdoğan and Arınç criticized the idea of an Islamic State in their separate interview to Today's Zaman.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸In February 1997, the Welfare-Party based mayor of Sincan, a suburb of the capital Ankara, commissioned the celebrations of the Jerusalem Day, marking the struggle of Palestinians to liberate al-Quds from the control of Israel. Speaking on the occasion, the Iranian Ambassador uttered anti-secular sentiments directed to initiate for Islamic law in Turkey. A large demonstration supporting Hezbollah and Hamas to liberate Jerusalem from Israel and in support to bring Islamic law in Turkey too took place during the celebrations. Owing to this, the nearest military garrison paraded a formation of tanks on the streets of Sincan, revealing their uneasiness about the developments. Soon, on 28 February 1997, the Turkish Armed Forces gave a memorandum to the Government during the meeting of the National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister Erbakan. During the meeting, Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of the different forces demanded to implement eighteen procedures in order to put a check on the growth of religious fundamentalism. Not long, Prime Minister Erbakan resigned due to the extensive force from the Military and the supporting Judiciary.

¹⁷⁹Ibid. , 145.

They favored the passive Secularism.¹⁸⁰

Despite of this ideological difference, the Young Generation was still labeled as an Islamic group by assertive secularists. Especially in the daily *Hürriyet*, their interviews and agenda were discussed as a threat to the assertive secular establishment. In 2001, the Constitutional Court dissolved FP over the charges of having anti-secular policies and of raising their voice to provide freedom to people to wear headscarves. After the closure of FP, the Elders and the Juniors were finally split into two different parties. Erbakan laid down the foundation of Saadet Party (Felicity Party) (SP) while Erdoğan, Gülen and Arınç established the Adalet ve Kalkınma (Justice and Development) Party (AKP).

After establishing the AKP, the Young Generation completely cut off all ties with the *Milli Görüş* Movement.¹⁸¹ SP had the same ideas and a policy that they contained in FP. It (SP) was an anti-secular and was not in favor of Turkey's membership in the EU. On 3 November 2002, the parliamentary elections were held and the SP got 2.5% of national votes. AKP came out as victorious by getting 34.3 percent national votes as the sole leading party, securing two third of the entire seats in the Parliament. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the Prime Minister while Abdullah Gülen was appointed as the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Bülent Arınç became the speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In the

¹⁸⁰The Young Generation emphasized democracy and dialogue, and supported Turkey's membership to the EU. On the other hand, the Old Generation was completely of the opposite view.

¹⁸¹Erdoğan: *Milli Görüş'ün Değil Demokrat Parti'nin Devamıyz* (Erdoğan: We Are Not the Continuation of the National Vision but of the Democrat Party), Zaman, May 17, 2003.

meanwhile, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a former Constitutional Court judge and an assertive secularist, was the President.¹⁸²

8.11-AKP Presidential Elections: Military Objection over the Nomination of a Non-Assertive Presidential Candidate

In April 2007, the presidential elections had taken place. The military intervened into the matter of the presidential elections and by a declaration published on the Chief of General Staff website indirectly forced the parliamentarians to elect an assertive secularist candidate. The Presidential elections for the first time in the country's history became an issue of high concern for the assertive secularist people. This was mainly because they deemed this post as very important to keep the assertive secularism dominant in Turkey and owing to the reason that the President had the powers to appoint high-ranking generals, high posted civil bureaucrats, high-court judges and the presidents/rectors of the universities. As per the rules, the President was to be elected for seven years by the Parliament. The assertive secularism was very dominant in the military and the judicial bureaucracy and the Presidency played a key role to keep the assertive secularism dominant in the State Institutions.¹⁸³

However this time it was so difficult to force the AKP-majority Parliament to elect an assertive secularist president for Turkey. The opposition by the military, judiciary and a segment of the Parliament i.e. opposition members took place in the shape of political crises and court appeals which lasted about a year. The assertive secularists gathered large groups of protestors in rallies and street protests in various

¹⁸² *Sezer Vakıflar Yasasını Lozan'a Aykırı Buldu* (Sezer Deemed Foundations Bill as Against the Lausanne Treaty), Zaman, November 30, 2006.

¹⁸³ *Ekrem Dumanlı, Medya Kendi Seçim Karnesine de Bakmalı* (Media Should See Their Election Report-Card Too), Editorial, Zaman, July 23 2007.

major Turkish cities to stop the AKP from electing the new President from their ranks. However, the AKP nominated Abdullah Güл to run for the Presidential elections.¹⁸⁴

Almost all the opposition parties including CHP, DYP and ANAP refused to take part in these elections. Güл required two third of the votes which in figures were 367 votes out of 550 in the first round to win the Presidential seat. In the third round, more than half i.e. 276 votes out of 550 were enough for winning. In the first two rounds Abdullah Güл got 357 votes out of total 361 cast votes. He was hopeful to win the third round.

On the other hand, the major opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party) appealed to the Constitutional Court with a claim against AKP that at least 367 parliamentarians should have been present in the first round to cast vote instead of 361 votes were fallen in their favor. Therefore, CHP claimed, AKP violated the rule of the Constitution. The Court supported the claim of CHP and cancelled the first round of the Presidential elections and gave decision that the vote of 367 parliamentarians would be the absolute majority to win the Presidential elections.

In this difficult time, the conservative media including the dailies Yeni Şafak, Vakit, and Zaman as well as televisions like Samanyolu TV gave their full support to Abdullah Güл. Zaman, the largest circulated daily in Turkey and a Gülen-inspired media organization, has been known to encompass a host of columnists of various schools of thought, and it has been trusted widely. During this phase, Zaman published many columns and interviews of well-known scholars who critically assessed the stances of the military, the CHP and the Constitutional Court towards the

¹⁸⁴At that time Abdullah Güл was serving his duties as the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister of Turkey.

Presidential elections. Various other prominent people of opinion voiced their ideas through the independent platform of the daily Zaman.

Openly criticizing the Court's decision and terming it wrong as the decision was based on contradiction of the text and the original intent of the Constitution, the CHP and other assertive secularist groups tried their best to stop AKP from electing the new President, to the extent if stopping them meant to provoke the military to conduct a coup. On the other side, prominent democratic institutions provided a great support to the AKP¹⁸⁵.

As a result of this support, in the July 2007 general elections the AKP got the 47% of votes and won the elections as the single party. The main opposition party CHP lost half of its parliamentary seats and the DYP, which later disintegrated as DP and ANAP, remained completely out of this new parliament. This has been widely interpreted as the declaration of Turkish people's resolve about the way they wished to be governed and their reaction to the opposition for those parties' unfair attitude during the April 2007 Presidential Elections. The new parliament once again held the Presidential Elections and all parties expect the CHP registered presence in the Parliament. As a result, on 28 August 2007, Abdullah Gül became the eleventh President of the Republic of Turkey.

8.12-AKP Believes in Passive Secularism

AKP believes in passive secularism, which tends towards peace among different religions and among different schools of thoughts and ideas. Passive secularism does not create any conflict against accreditation of any religion and it

¹⁸⁵The other most dominant institutions in media were Zaman and the STV along with Taraf and Yeni Şafak. Zaman is still the largest circulated daily in Turkey. Similarly STV is a quite popular family channel.

does not separate religion from the society. The ideology of AKP is based on conservative democracy and with the reference of AKP here, the word *conservation* does not mean imposing restrictions on religion, politics and society and thinking about things with a narrow framework. For AKP, the conservative democracy contains a different meaning that the party will provide protection to the important values and principles.¹⁸⁶

8.13- Reasons and Background of Interaction between AKP and the Gülen Movement

Besides democratic values and passive secularism, AKP has a fellow feeling with the Gülen Movement.¹⁸⁷ Before the AKP, Gülen himself and the civic initiative inspired by him had not been very much popular with the Islamic political parties of Turkey. Necmettin Erbakan was influenced by Mehmet Zahid Kotku, a prominent *Naqshbandi* sheikh, and he therefore had a large electoral base from the affiliates of the *Naqshbandi* Order (*tariqah*). A portion of politically-inspired members of the Naqshbandi Order stood apart from Gülen the same as they detached from his manner and understanding of religion and this reflected in their political dialogue, mainly represented by the parties under Erbakan's influence. Notwithstanding this fact, Gülen himself encouraged those who valued his ideas to adopt a life of Islamic practice with a special weight on the recitation of prayers and unity of action and thought, similar to that of a Sufi order while they were active in contemporary endeavors of life away

¹⁸⁶AKP will not the quest for progress for the State in any field and it (AKP) is not against the establishment of the State Institutions and developing relations with other world states. According to the AKP policies, the religion should not be used as a political tool bent to harm social peace and political stability, most importantly the religion itself.

¹⁸⁷Ekrem Dumanlı, *Medya Kendi Seçim Karnesine de Bakmalı* (Media Should See Their Election Report-Card Too), Editorial, Zaman, July 23 2007.

from political exploits. When AKP came into existence in 2002 as a conservative yet progressive party, the general atmosphere prevailing over the educated young and middle-aged society largely reverberated with a tolerant but active Islamic conduct.

The present Turkey Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and many other AKP members got introduced into the politics through the *Milli Görüş* which somewhat also associated with the aforementioned *tariqa* background as Islamic mindset. Having observed since their younger days from a distance Gülen's steadfast discourse based on positive action, non-partisanship and steady endeavors meant for building a better generation, and then witnessing the outcome of an enlightened and hope-inspiring generation, the current AKP leaders might have grown an affinity with the adherents and the workings of the Gülen Movement. This may be the reason behind the party members' active participation to the conferences, workshops, discussion seminars arranged by the foundations and charity associations of the Gülen Movement.¹⁸⁸

8.14- Compatibility in Ideas and Policies of AKP and the Gülen Movement

There are many similar ideas regarding many issues and matters between the AKP and Gülen Movement. However, terming GM as the '*brain-maker*' of the AKP will be a downright fault. Both sides pay special attention to solving social problems; GM invested on the human element through a value-based educational system with a vision to elevate individuals to the sky of perfection both in this world and the next. If one considers the development of conservative consciousness in the contemporary

¹⁸⁸Gareth Jenkins, "AKP Forming Closure Links with the Gülen Movement," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4 (20 November 2007), 1-2, http://www.Jamestown.org/single/?no_cach=1&tx.....33187 (accessed April 26, 2010).

Turkey, it can be seen that almost all conservative segments drew inspiration from the same sources.

A majority of AKP leaders like Erdogan, Gul, and Arinç are avid orators who move masses via their impressive well-read background drawn from various contemporary and classic Muslim intellectuals like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Dr Muhammad Iqbal. A larger trove of intellectual background is central to M. Fethullah Gülen who comfortably refers to various Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers including the aforementioned, as well as numerous philosophers and public figures in his speeches.

Both AKP and GM are audacious about going global, trusting in the strong values rooted in what shaped Anatolia culturally, socially and religiously, notwithstanding a glorious administrative and civilization heritage dating back to thousands of years. Both think globally in a sense for tapping extensive advantages from opportunities that can promote the wellbeing of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey and the entire world, removing isolation policies that shy away from challenges.

Further than any other Turkish government, AKP's endeavors since 2003 for getting permanent membership of EU since 2003 is somewhat a political oxymoron, when one considers the 'conservative' nature of the party. Moreover, the AKP government has an all-inclusive foreign strategy, which is termed as the '*zero-problem policy*' with Turkey's immediate neighbors, which also entails Turkey's active role in the Middle East and across the world. Turkey's membership to the UN Security Council because of the active lobbying of the first AKP government marks world opinion's interest in the new Turkish Foreign Policy.

That is why Turkey is very active to solve her problems with the neighbor countries like Greek Cyprus and Armenia. AKP also strives to further fruitful diplomatic relations with the countries in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Asia and even Americas, making theirs a world-inclusive foreign policy. At national level, for getting the permanent membership of EU as well as to secure national consensus, the current Government of Turkey wishes to solve the Kurdish Issue by a program of Kurdish Democratic Initiative.¹⁸⁹ Many judicial reforms and reforms to liberalize the political system as well are under process.¹⁹⁰

M. Fethullah Gülen, from the very beginning when they asked his ideas on popular issues back in 1990s, has expressed that Turkey should have nothing to fear about EU membership. At this junction, the discourse of the GM in a pivotal way overlaps with – rather precedes – that of the AKP.¹⁹¹ GYV¹⁹² in 2004 organized the Eighth Abant Meeting in the European Parliament in Brussels. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss Turkey's membership to the EU. In this meeting, certain politicians and academics from Turkey and the EU countries had active participation and signed a joint statement. In the same vein, the GYV set up another Abant Meeting

¹⁸⁹Once the Kurdish Democratic Initiative has been launched, the AKP Government currently strives to develop a consensus over this issue among different political parties, organizations, institutions, and the common citizens. Despite opening this issue for parliamentary and communal feedback, the current Turkish Government still faces confrontations from various sides.

¹⁹⁰Judicial reforms are under progress. These reforms are meant to make the judiciary independent and impartial. There sure is a package of judicial reports suggested by the EU and this judicial reform is a vital condition put forth by the EU for Turkey on their quest to enter into the EU as a Permanent Member.

¹⁹¹Daily Zaman and other TV Channels were and are operating at national and international level as well.

¹⁹²GYV stands for Journalists and Writers Foundation, founded in 1994 in Istanbul. A Gülen-inspired dialogue entity, GYV has various national and international dialogue and media platforms that organize periodical conventions, workshops, seminars and field trips meant to remove misunderstandings and lack of information existing among the members of national and international communities.

in Paris, France in order to discuss and highlight this issue before French scholars and intellectuals.

Besides these political issues, AKP and the Gülen Movement intersect in their global approach towards economy. AKP government follows an open-trade free economy for the economic sector. It supports public privatization and direct foreign investment. One main reason of the less affected Turkish economy during the global economic crises is the well-charted economic policies of the AKP.

Having a considerable base of philanthropists as sponsors from business and trade communities of Turkey, the Gülen Movement has indirectly been taken into consideration while negotiating financial tailspins and the national and international media channels, newspapers and educational institutions inspired by Gülen have been lent ears to sense the general public opinion about the economic and social reforms. GM inspired a large business community, which works at national and international level; TUSKON is the most dominant business community that has 124 bilateral business associations and 9500 business people.

The SP and the ultra-nationalist, anti-globalization advocates consisting of *Kemalists*, and leftists¹⁹³ strongly criticize the AKP and the Gülen Movement for their tilt towards globalization. According to their criticism, AKP is out to marketing Turkey and her interests under the banner of globalization to the global capitalists. They criticize the Gülen Movement on the pretext of its being a very vast influence, which slides modern Turkey towards an Islamic tendency, thus assisting the AKP to denounce secularism. No matter how much such accusations are refuted, the

¹⁹³Hasan Kösebalaban, "The Impact of Globalization on Islamic Political Identity." *World Affairs* 168 (1) (2005): 27-37

criticisms gain further dimensions and lead the extremely annoyed denigrates to adopt unfair means like involving the military and judiciary into civil politics.

The second common aspect besides globalization between the AKP and the Gülen Movement is their active participation and dominant role in the inter-faith dialogue.¹⁹⁴ AKP's encompassing foreign policy as well as initiating with Spain the UN Alliance of Civilizations; the presence of Gülen-inspired national consensus organizations like GYV, as well as the Gülen-inspired Turkish schools in various countries educating the youth worldwide with an education that promotes co-existence, peace, love, and dialogue shape social response to these issues in Turkish Domestic and Foreign Policy.¹⁹⁵

Highlighting the co-existence legacy of the Ottoman past, AKP initiated various non-judgmental and benevolent policies towards the non-Muslim population. Wronged during a number of sections in the contemporary history of Turkey, some sections of the non-Muslim population were denied of their rights of identity, education, property right and even religion.¹⁹⁶

AKP initiated a number of reforms to overcome the woes of the non-Muslims.¹⁹⁷ In 2003, the AKP government made changes in the Constitutional law, and the expression, '*place of worship*' replaced the word *mosque*. Under this law, all

¹⁹⁴ Interfaith dialogue refers to a supportive and a positive interaction between the people of diverse religions, traditions, cultures, faiths, holy and humanistic beliefs in order to get a common ground in belief through focus on similarities between faiths, understandings of values and commitment to the world.

¹⁹⁵ Ekrem Dumanlı, *Medya Kendi Seçim Karnesine de Bakmalı* (Media Should See Their Election Report-Card Too), Editorial , Zaman, July 23 2007

¹⁹⁶ Kuru, Changing Prospective on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and the AKP Party, 147-148.

¹⁹⁷ Gareth Jenkins, " Muslim Democrats in Turkey?" *Survival*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies 45 (Spring 2003) : 45-66

religions were allowed to open their places of worship freely whether they are mosques or temples.¹⁹⁸

In 2004, the AKP Government removed the sub-committee for minorities in order to abolish the watching eye of the Government over the minorities. These sub-committees for minorities had been working for forty-two years.¹⁹⁹ In addition, the Prime Minister Erdoğan paid a visit to Jewish synagogues and Christian churches in Turkey to show that AKP believes in the equality of all communities whether they are in majority or minority.²⁰⁰

AKP's belief in passive secularism lies behind their supporting and benevolent policies for the non-Muslim population. The affiliates of the assertive secularism like the current major opposition party CHP never supports such type of issues, on the pretext that if they provide religious rights to the Jews and the Christians, it will come to mean that they are to give rights and freedoms to the Muslims who have a large majority in population. The identity-religious rights to the Muslims will mean the abolishment of the secularism. Therefore, the sympathizers of the assertive secularism will never favour freeing Muslims in their religious identities.²⁰¹

An example of this is available in recent history when assertive secularist President Sezer in 2006 vetoed a bill that was passed by the Parliament. In this bill, the legal position and full property rights of the non-Muslims foundations were

¹⁹⁸Kuru, Changing Prospective on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and the AKP Party, 148.

¹⁹⁹Şükrü Küçükşahin, *Sessiz Azılık Devrimi* (The Revolution of the Silent Majority), *Hürriyet*, 23 February 2004.

²⁰⁰Ermeni Cemaati Seçimlerde AK Parti'yi Desteleyecek (The Turkish Armenian Community Will Support AKP in Elections), *Yeni Şafak*, 4 June 2007.

²⁰¹Ismet Berkan, *AB ve Din Özgürliğine Eksikliği* (EU and the Lack of Religious Freedom), *Radikal*, 26 May 2004.

recognized. In Sezer's opinion, the acceptance of this bill would lead the non-Muslims towards the expansion of the economic activities and the social progress.²⁰²

8.15-Headscarf Ban Issue - AKP Closure Case

The wearing of the headscarf always remains an issue in Turkey. Nevertheless, the public polls show that the majority of population in Turkey favors wearing the headscarf.

Current opposition parties²⁰³, the Military, the Judiciary and a part of Turkish media, numerous intellectuals, scholars and a particular class of the society strictly opposed and resisted against the wearing of the headscarf based on their belief in assertive secularism. They consider the headscarf as a *political symbol* of Islam and realize it as a challenging threat to the secular establishment.

AKP is the first and only political entity in Turkey who has a soft corner for lifting the ban over the headscarf in line with its liberalization policy.²⁰⁴

The murder of a senior judge in an attack at the Turkish Council of State in May 2006 made the headscarf issue ever popular. Killing of a judge based on the pretext that the Council of State gave a decision against a headscarf-wearing student led to many surges in emotions across the country. Though by 2010 it was evidenced that the attack was instigated by the *Ergenekon* mob and that it had nothing to do with the headscarf issue, it further overwrought the relationship between the Executive,

²⁰²Sezer Vakıflar Yasasını Lozan'a Aykırı Buldu (Sezer Deemed Foundations Bill as Against the Lausanne Treaty), Zaman, November 30, 2006.

²⁰³There are fourteen political opposition parties in which the MHP and CHP have the largest political base.

²⁰⁴The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg issued a ruling regarding the ban on the headscarf issue in Turkey in 2005.

Judiciary, and Legislation. AKP faces a hard confrontation about initiating those reforms on the headscarf matter demanded by the European Union.

On the case of Leyla Şahin who was rejected from the Istanbul University's Faculty of Medicine for wearing a headscarf, the supporters of the headscarf raised their voices and demanded the support of the Strasbourg Court, the largest one in Europe. The headscarf-wearing is an important issue in Turkey and denial of its importance would be considered as ignoring an important principle of secularism.

Currently, there is a ban for female students wearing a headscarf besides for male students keeping full beard in Turkish universities. Hence, the headscarf case of Leyla Şahin and the discovery of on what pretext a Council of State judge was murdered further add to the support for headscarf-wearing in Turkey rather than discouraging it.

AKP favors the reopening of Leyla Şahin case. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan openly opposes the headscarf ban. Actually, the PM's own daughters study in the US in order to avoid this prohibition.²⁰⁵

AKP recently initiated a reform to allow female students to wear headscarf in the universities. Consequently, on 14 March 2008 the Judiciary intervened and filed a closure case against the AKP. The case indictment was of 162 pages. The main accusation was that AKP and its members violated the Article 2²⁰⁶ of the Constitution, the important principle of Secularism. The indictment consisted of speeches and statements made by the President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and some other officials of the Party.

²⁰⁵ Joost Lagendijk, "Secularist Paranoia Raises Tension across Turkey," *Today's Zaman*, May 9, 2007, Wednesday; Op-ed, www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=224 (accessed December 5, 2009).

²⁰⁶ The Article 2 of the constitution says that Turkey is a Secular Republic.

The State Prosecutor demanded the banning of 71 members of the AKP including the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as well as the elected President Abdullah Gül from politics. Demanding the stepping-down of a serving president and banning a large number of politicians on such grounds was unique in the Turkish legal and political history. The President is answerable only when he is accused of disloyalty to his country.²⁰⁷

The decision of the State Prosecutor needed seven out of eleven votes of the Constitutional Court to ban the AKP. Only six members of the CC cast their vote in favor of the Court's decision against the AKP. Therefore, the Judiciary failed to ban AKP, however gave a warning of closure when a similar offense repeats in the future.²⁰⁸

Just as the top officials of the AKP are associated with Islamic identity and vision, M. Fethullah Gülen and the civic initiative he encouraged too are highlighted as of Islamic nature. In the beginning of 1960s, Fethullah Gülen started his position as a state preacher (*imam*). His speeches on reviving moral values, necessity of bringing up an ethically and educationally sound generation, and love for the Holy Prophet (PBUH) echoed with various segments of the society, especially the youth. Among his influences was Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, who highlighted the centrality of belief in the current century and introduced a non-partisan revival of Islam in the social

²⁰⁷Hasan Kösebalaban,; The AKP Closure Case: Domestic Situation and International Reactions, SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, April 2008.

²⁰⁸“Turkey: Can the EU Believe Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan When He Says He Supports Turkish Secularism? ,” *EU-Digest* ,May 9,2009, www.eu-digest.com/2009/..../turkey-can-eu-believe-prime-minister-.html (accessed December 5,2009).

context of the contemporary Turkey. Nursi's sense of mission and the sacrificing life appealed to Gülen, even though he did not meet him for once in his life.

The civic initiative that bears the sociological nomenclature as the Gülen Movement is based on social welfare, democracy, and religious freedom, rejecting differences in race, nationalism, and ethnicity. In the wake of the 1971 military intervention, Gülen had been incarcerated for seven months in charges of delivering religious ideas and of expressing wish of creating an Islamic state. However, he had been acquitted and posted back to his position. On June 19, 1999, ATV, a national Turkish TV channel broadcasted two video clips apparently showing Gülen instructing his followers to intervene into Turkey's bureaucracy and wait for the opportunity until when they became more in number to implement their agenda. After the broadcast of these tapes – which was later revealed that they were '*engineered by cutting and pasting words out of context*' – an arrest warrant was released for Gülen. However then, he was receiving medical treatment in the United States.

This incident led to M. Fethullah Gülen's unplanned émigré which has lasted more than a decade in the United States as he underwent various health problems. During the years of his absence, the adherents of the GM kept on with their usual work, establishing media, charities, education, foundations, and business association²⁰⁹ networks in Turkey and elsewhere. According to some estimations, Gülen's influence numbers in millions.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹Such as ISHAD, and TUSKON along with its hundreds of smaller associated business and trade associations numbering to about 12,000 as of 2010.

²¹⁰Gareth Jenkins, "AKP Forming Closure Links with the Gülen Movement," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4 (20 November 2007), 1-2, http://www.Jamestown.org/single/?no_cach=1&tx....33187 (accessed April 26, 2010).

The Gülen Movement is ideologically conservative. While, it is predominantly represented by men, women's involvement is also significant. Gülen advocates the worth of women involvement, however highlights that the privacy in workplace and the family responsibilities should primarily be observed.

For the most part, in practical terms, Gülen Community is a religiously conservative community, and the women's role seems to be very limited in the workings of the Movement. Austerity is observed between men and women at workplaces, including the educational institutions. However, there are a number of female executives running Gülen-inspired educational institutions, and writing daily columns in English and Turkish dailies. The example of Ms Meryem Akbal, Managing Director of the *Yumurcak* Children's TV, demonstrates the top-level involvement of women in GM endeavors.

While the educational preference of the conservative segment of the Turkish society was thought to be sending their children either state *İmam-Hatip* Schools or Qur'anic courses, the encouragement of M. Fethullah Gülen to philanthropists for opening state-of-the-art schools teaching the state curriculum as well as providing services and ethical values to the students of co-educational state schools, changed a mindset. While there were separate *İmam-Hatip* Schools for boys and girls until 1997, the 28 February 1997 'postmodern' coup imposed on the civil government compelled a number of the *İmam-Hatip* Schools to go co-education. Currently, there are a few co-education-based *İmam-Hatip* Schools and a great number of *İmam-Hatips* have separate sections or blocks for male and female students.

Gülen Community works successfully with several limitations but it also accepts the changing patterns. For example, when the *İmam-Hatip* Schools were further secularized because of the 1997 intervention, Gülen encouraged people at

public and private level to educate their female and male children without keeping any difference of non-co-education and co-education schools, however by showing a special care. After this encouragement now at present many female and male students are getting education from co-education *İmam-Hatip* or other 'secular' state schools.²¹¹

Gülen never associates violence with Islam and always denounces that in the name of Islam violence can be unleashed on any being. When in Malatya, Eastern Turkey three young boarders of a charity hostel run by an Islamic group murdered three Christian missionaries in April 2007; Gülen was one of the first to give a statement saying that behind such killings may only be foreign elements that try to destabilize Turkey.²¹²

There is a wide recognition throughout the world regarding the Gülen Movement that this civic initiative is the first non-political movement in Turkey's history that has the support of the largest Muslim community²¹³. While the GM openly recognizes the legitimacy of the secular state and encourages its adherents to abide by the rules and regulations, it also accentuates the need of religious freedom under the Secular State.

In June 1998, Gülen-inspired *Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı* (Journalists and Writers Foundation) spearheaded a discussion group meeting in a hotel in Abant, a resort near Istanbul. In the meeting well-known theologians, Islamic intellectuals and

²¹¹ M.Hakan Yavuz, " Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The *Nurcu* Movement and Fethullah Gülen," *Middle East Journal* 53 (4) (Autumn 1999) : 584-605.

²¹² AKP Forming Closer Links with the Gülen Movement, Gareth Jenkins, 20 November 2007, *Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume, Turkey*.

²¹³ Islamic community does not only belong to Turkey as there are also another Muslims who live in different and distant corners of the world.

about fifty scholars of different disciplines made presentations and listened to the proceedings upon the Secular State and Its Compatibility with Islam. At the end of the platform meeting, a joint declaration was signed stating that the Secular State will be accepted by all other sects and sections of the society, who have different faiths and belong to diverse ethnic and racial groups.

This declaration concluded that only liberal democracy²¹⁴ could render secular state and Islam compatible. Islam as a code of life has no problem with the secular state if respect and freedom are provided to the religion and to the religious rights of the Muslim Community.

Abant Platform's promotion of scholarly discussion and the declaration of liberal democracy respecting and providing religious rights to the Muslims and non-Muslims under the banner of the secular state echoed with various segments of the society. Not only mainstream secular parties, but also the Virtue Party with an Islamic point of view took notice of the outcomes. Years later, the Young Generation/Juniors, which belonged to the reformist wing of this party, fell apart with the existing party administration, and formed their own party: Justice and Development Party (AKP).

AKP is termed as a post-Islamist democratic party²¹⁵. Received cautiously by the West and the assertive secularists of Turkey on the grounds of its founding by a

²¹⁴It is a democratic system free from any influence from any political ideology to derail the essence of governance for the people and by the people.

²¹⁵AKP is not a conservative Islamist party. It believes in passive secularism which pledges to remain neutral towards all religions and respect them. It has liberal policies almost in all spheres like economy, politics, and social and above all makes constant improvements compared to the previous governments in providing religious rights and freedom of expression to the ethnic and the religious minorities. AKP is currently very active to solve the Kurdish Issue by developing the consensus of the political parties, public and all other people. Under the Kurdish Democratic Initiative, AKP has provided linguistic and religious rights to the Kurds. The policy agenda of the AKP is based on democracy. AKP by itself came into the government two times by contesting elections and won each time by getting the majority public votes.

young school of reformers in the Virtue Party, AKP as the sudden and unexpected fallout from an ‘Islamic’ party has been firsthand, even as the vision and the sincerity of the AKP were questioned in line with their Virtue Party past.

By the beginning of the 2000s, the civic initiative encouraged by Gülen since 1960s reached a considerable segment of the society as an agent of positive and constructive non-political change. GM’s national and worldwide educational institutions, as well as media institutions like the largest-circulated national daily *Zaman*, *Samanyolu* TV, as well as a number of other social institutions had already garnered the trust and care of the society. When AKP was established, the existing state of affairs had compelled the party to shape themselves according to the public opinion, which was worn by economic crises triggered by political crises in the previous decade instigated by redundant clashes between the elements of the Establishment.

Keeping an agenda of liberal democracy, open economy, and other liberal policies towards the West especially regarding the cultural exchange programs, a struggle for the permanent membership to the European Union, and the like, AKP opened itself in and out of Turkey. GM’s non-political existence in and out of Turkey i.e. across the world overlapped with AKP’s outgoing and enterprising foreign policies, and gave some the impression that the civil activism of the Gülen Movement supported the AKP. On the contrary, what it really shows is the resemblance and compatibility between the policies of the AKP and the Gülen Movement.²¹⁶

²¹⁶Mustafa Akyol, “ The Context of the Gülen Movement :The Exceptional Story of Turkish Islam,” (Article presented in Conference at on Islam in the Age of Global Challenges: Alternative Perspectives of the Gulen Movement, Georgetown University, Washington, 14-15 November 2008).

8.16-Supportive Relations of AKP and the Gülen Movement

The non-confrontational relation between the AKP and the Gülen Movement contribute a lot to the democracy in Turkey. The Gülen Movement is an organized civic initiative, which started as faith-based and developed into a faith-inspired movement. As time progressed, the movement existed in various fields of human geography and produced extensive economic and educational networks and a far-reaching media network, publishing and broadcasting in Turkey and worldwide.

On the other hand, AKP is a very active and organized political party. What seem as a common point between the AKP and the Gülen movement are their transforming society in Turkey with respect to education, social and economic status and politics in the course of their active policies and initiatives. AKP and the Gülen Movement are not like other movements in the Middle East who are 'Islamic' in their ideology and practice.

By having an Islamic orientation, both the AKP and the GM pose a threat to the Establishment. AKP and the Gülen Movement do not create a direct challenge to the secular establishment, the most dominant ruling ideology²¹⁷ in Turkey. Both of them are national in their nature and conduct and have a priority to fulfill the needs of national scale. This renders the AKP and the Gülen Movement dominantly acceptable in the eyes of the Turkish citizens than other Islamic movements and political parties.

Both AKP and the Gülen Movement support open market and capitalist economic system. Both are extremely successful in their economic activities and

²¹⁷Secularism is the dominant ideology in a sense that Turkey's constitution is completely secularized and the Government and its other state institutions are bound constitutionally and nationally to maintain and keep stable the secular orientation of the government.

policies. Gülen-inspired institutions are considerable economic and social assets²¹⁸ within Turkey and outside the country, which operate successfully and help to fund the Movement's projects.

AKP brought many changes²¹⁹ under its liberalization policy towards the economic sector by maintaining close ties established on trust with the international financial institutions and implement necessary changes to attract the foreign investment in Turkey. After adopting such liberalization policy Turkey became more attractive for international economic institutions and for the foreign investment.

AKP advocates the improvement of domestic economic conditions among the middle conservative class in Turkey. Gülen-inspired financial institutions' focus on self-dependence and their mobilizing the means of middle-class conservative and elite individuals for the betterment of nation and society concur with the AKP's economic endeavors for uplifting the society as well as overcoming the problems regarding the morale values between the modern life, which is because of secularism and the middle class conservative.²²⁰

In this regard, GM's all-encompassing volunteerism has been involving participants from various classes and AKP's enthusiastic policies in bridging the divide among different classes paved the path towards fulfillment of a pluralistic

²¹⁸TUSKON business confederation is the largest business body in Turkey conducting national and international business connections. In addition, a great majority of Gülen-inspired educational institutions in Turkey self-sponsor, thus assisting GM philanthropists undertake the opening of new institutions in Turkey and elsewhere.

²¹⁹Under the liberalization policy the economic sector was made more open and global. The new developing policies were introduced.

²²⁰The middle conservative class has strong traditional belief in Islam, which shapes their lifestyle. In general, they shied away from seeking the compatibility of ideas and beliefs with modern life that usually based on the secular ideology. Current Turkish scene witnesses a breakthrough of middle class conservative class' carving a world of their own which is in peace with technological developments and adapts to changes without forfeiting their traditions.

society in Turkey based on democracy and equal representation. AKP, being a political party and the holder of the current government, is deeply associated with the society at social, educational, political and economic level. The non-political nature of the GM is prominent in educational, social, and economic fields. Both rather to take a confrontational position with the state and with the pluralistic society prefer to work at social, educational, political and economic for the State and the People, promoting the culture and tradition that asserts nationhood.

The military encounter over the presidential elections of AKP in 2007, the close examination of the Gülen Movement raise questions that whether the secular state institutions including military, judiciary and the political parties has fully accepted the legitimacy of these two actors or not.²²¹

8.17- Background of Islamic Reawakening in Turkey

Islamic reawakening now has a different meaning than the past. At present, it does not mean the people of one area or continent become more religious. It has a broader meaning as it stands for Islam reentering politics, government, society and economy more strongly and openly than many decades before. Islam is not a passive and limited faith or a fixed religious ideology. Islam constructs and shapes the culture and traditions of a particular Muslim community. Religious, spiritual, historical, social, economic, psychological, and emotional factors shape and boost the wave of Islamic reawakening.

In Turkey majority of the Muslim population are of Sunni sect. The religious scholars and preachers are not dominant over the state affairs, while they are very

²²¹Berna Turam, *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement* (California:Stanford University Press, 2007) ,240.

active in dealing with religious issues and as well economic and social matters. The religious situation is calm as scholars and religious preachers work as state employees and receive salary for their services.²²²

In line with the common scenario, Islamists and Secularists have an uncompromising attitude towards each other.²²³ Secularists are rather more antagonistic towards Islam as a faith and conduct.²²⁴

During the Ottoman Era, the religious scholars were completely dependent on the State because of two reasons. Firstly, the concept of Islamic revivalism was non-existent and secondly the State and the religious scholars both placed Islam in the centre and stayed active to maintain the Islamic identity as the norm. The policy of *raison d'état* by the Ottoman Empire prioritized the interest and the unity of the state just in order to make sure the preservation of Islam.²²⁵

By the first quarter of the 19th century, within the frame of a number of reforms, the Ottoman Turkish State got introduced to and partially adopted secularist policies from France and England. That was the time when the State and the religious class separated into two distinctive social institutions. As the State hoped that the current problems would be overcome through secularism, the religious authorities

²²²Joost Lagendijk, "Secularist Paranoia Raises Tension across Turkey," *Today's Zaman*, May 9, 2007, Wednesday; Op-ed, www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=224 (accessed December 5, 2009).

²²³İştar B. Gözaydin, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Politics in Turkey: A Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?," *Democratization*, 16 (December, 2009): 1214-1236.

²²⁴Joost Lagendijk, "Secularist Paranoia Raises Tension across Turkey," *Today's Zaman*, May 9, 2007, Wednesday; Op-ed, www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=224 (accessed December 5, 2009).

²²⁵During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, Islam was the ruling religion and had a large following across the Ottoman geography. The followers of other religions like Christianity and Judaism were granted religious freedom as integrated with the state's texture through different policies in order to facilitate unity and peace in the Empire. This large empire was ruled by the code of Islam; however, it was not an 'Islamic' Empire.

kept on sticking to the tenets and practices of Islam that was in the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.²²⁶

During the initial years of the Turkish Republic, the single-party regime strictly monitored or even banned religious activities to reinforce pro-republic reforms. By the end of 1940s, the latch on religious practice was loosened as multi-party democracy was put into test-drive. By 1946, CHP further loosened its grip over religious affairs and issued the establishment of *İmam-Hatip* Schools and a Faculty of Divinity in Ankara under the close supervision of the State.

Even though the conservative population received this gesture favorably, it would later prove that it did not come enough to win the hearts and minds of the public. Turkish public hoisted the idea of funding and establishing *İmam-Hatip* schools to provide religious education to young generations and bring forth religious personnel like *imams*, preachers and teachers of religious subjects. The *İmam-Hatip* Schools – allowed to open with the motive of bringing forth state-controlled religious personnel – have played an influential role in the revival of Islam in Turkey. By 1950, the single-party rule of the pro-secular CHP (Republican People's Party) was no more since the Democrat Party (DP) won the first free elections by landslide.

During the governance by the DP, religious practice were set free and that helped traditional Sufi orders like *Naqshbandis* and another post-republican Muslim communities like the students of Said Nursi and the students of Süleyman Hilmi Efendi to have freedom in practice. In years, especially by the mid-1960s, the surge of Islamic awareness and favorable policies added further influence to Muslim circles.

²²⁶In Ataturk's time, educational reforms were not initiated fully in the rural areas and consequently rural population remained deprived of education and grasping the ongoing sweeping social changes. By mid-1940s, this void had already been filled by the practice and learning of Islam.

Establishment of the National Order Party (NOP) as the first Islamic party of Turkey in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, who frequented the İskenderpaşa Mosque where the prominent *Naqshbandi* sheikh Mehmed Zahid Kotku used to give sermons, opened a new chapter in the contemporary history of Turkey. Banned in the 1971 military intervention, the NOP was resurrected as the National Salvation Party or NSP in 1972.

This was the first party in Turkish contemporary politics with a manifesto to introduce Islam into the state institutions, increasing the influence of Islamic activities especially at provincial level. NSP's pro-Islamic policy and its emphasis on the equal distribution of wealth initially attracted all sections of the society including conservative, merchants, secularists, and executives.

By 12 September 1980, NSP too was abolished. In 1983, NSP's legacy re-emerged as the Welfare Party. Necmettin Erbakan, though banned from politics for seven years, remote-controlled the new party and in 1987, took the helm of party affairs by himself. Because of the military memorandum given on 28 February 1997, the Welfare Party – True Path Party coalition government fell and Prime Minister Erbakan had to resign. Welfare Party was closed and Erbakan was banned from politics again. Virtue Party took hold of the WP legacy in 1998 and soon it was divided into two parties in 2001: Felicity Party and later Justice and Development Party.

In 1996 parliamentary elections WP had had a remarkable victory by getting 21.3 % majority public votes and 158 seats out of total 550 parliamentary seats and had already won municipal elections in March 1994, obtaining 19.7% public votes and securing the municipalities in 29 large cities including Istanbul and Ankara.

The overwhelmingly victory of WP in those electoral elections showed the influence and integration of Islam in the politics and the society. The election victory also declared the heavy support of society to an Islamic oriented party – which did not come to power (hence untried) since the proclamation of the Republic. The WP policies emphasized on justice, social and economic equality, the elimination of corruption, institutionalizing honesty, the reestablishment and the reawakening of culture and traditions as well as religious beliefs. Its policies mostly attracted the conservative middle and upper middle class as well as the lower class who suffered at the hands of economic conditions, the people who were migrants and were living in the slums of the urban cities.

After the military coup in 1980, Islamic reawakening in Turkey increased very fast and pulled Turkey into a new phase. The Armed Forces had a very autonomous and central position in state affairs, even cautiously marking the policies of civil governments. Despite lauded as the guardians of the *Kemalist* secular ideology, the Military initiated a post-coup policy known as Turkish-Islamic synthesis in order to combat with the inner and outer communism threats.

In 1970s too the same policy which combined the Turkish nationalism and the modern Islam was launched with the same name. The Military highlighted the essentiality of ethics and charted an educational curriculum with the addition of a Culture of Religion and Ethics Studies (*Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi*) course tinged with secularist elements in the 1980s. In result of these policies, the modernization

and the secularization of Turkish society began to move towards Islam and a national fashion of Islam was in vogue.²²⁷

Such Turkish-Islamic synthesis further accelerated with the election of Turgut Özal as the Prime Minister in 1983. Defined as a conservative technocrat with a Muslim consciousness equipped with a wide liberal vision in finance and development, Turgut Özal served his first term under the shadow of the newly-passed, military-checked 1982 Constitution that made the religious education compulsory in the public schools.

During the first half of the 1980s, the number of *İmam-Hatip* Schools remarkably increased by 59 percent. From 1983 to 1987, the number of the middle section *İmam-Hatip* schools increased to 347 and the number of high schools reached to 604. Making their influence felt since those days, *İmam-Hatip* Schools has played an important role in promoting Islam in the opinion of the State and the society. The liberal policies of Turgut Özal not only facilitated secular groups but also conservative segments of the society, giving a free hand to their ongoing expanded activities.

During this period, communities with various schools of thought including the conservatives launched private media institutions like newspapers and magazines, which later developed into television channels in 1990s. With the launch of various publishing houses, printing and distribution of religious literature considerably increased. Conservative segments of the society began to reap the blessings of the under-development democracy as well as pluralistic and open society of Turkey.

²²⁷Before these policies, Islam was gaining prominence within its own conservative sphere. Because of Turkish-Islamic synthesis policies, Islam rose into prominence in shaping electorates, thus the politics and the society. Enjoying a large support of the state, Turkish Islam had the importance and the dominant position at national level.

This restricted environment gave way to the civil society and to the non-governmental organizations including Sufi orders, different socio-cultural organizations, Islamic business associations like MUSİAD, trade unions like HAK-İŞ to make their own place to live accordingly to their own ideas and values. These non-governmental organizations and the civil society prospered, turned into hubs of influence and affected the political and the economic decisions over the destiny of the public. In result of this development of liberal democracy and secular ideology, the Muslim-minded non-governmental organizations and groups not only gained prominence and influence, but also had the opportunity to pass their message to all levels of the society including the poor, the middle and the rich class.

In the multi-party era, the liberal and developmental policies opened the doors of opportunities to many segments of the society, while the conservative segment remained close to the progressive interpretation of Islam, which consequently added to the influence of Islam in the society and the political spheres. They preferred mainstream co-educational schools as well as the *İmam-Hatip* schools as their educational choice, while sticking fast to the tenets and practices of their faith. They also educated their children as future-oriented, outgoing individuals; thus making an open-minded, skilled, cultured generation.

The reason of the sudden rise and success of the conservative or Islamic political parties in Turkey is the frustration of the people upon the policies of 'secular' parties. The constant economic downfall remained very dominant during the governance of secular parties, most dominantly the CHP. Even though they were associated with the times ripe with problems like inflation, corruption, and severe unemployment, 'secular' parties had been the single choice for many years. Likewise at times, economic conditions become more critical than religious, social and culture

values and ideas; in Turkey too economy is the main factor on which the Islamic political parties has remained dominant and successful than 'secular' political parties.

Besides the economic factor, the Islamist political parties have properly dealt with the political, social, moral, and cultural problems of the people. This explains why Turkish revival of Islam does not exclusively originate from the support of religious ideology by the Muslim majority population. Definitely, the current integration of Islam – or *Muslim-mindedness* as a polished-up term – in politics, society, education, and economy provides a complete satisfaction to the demands and to the life of each individual.

Similarly, like Islamic political parties, many traditional and current Islamic movements too have played and are still playing an important role in reawakening Islam by promoting religious education, projecting Islam through various means of communication networks and serving the society by means of welfare work. Along the lines of a reform back in 1924, all Sufi orders and lodges were banned in the Republic of Turkey.

Despite the absence of lodges and ceremonial conventions, Sufi orders like *Naqshbandis*, *Qadris*, *Rufais* as well as *Mawlawis* continued their private activities. Within the frame of the law, they had to forfeit the institutional nature of the Order; however, this opened way to smaller-circle, private practices.

Providing basic religious education in small-circle '*madrasahs*' the members of these orders kept the Sufi-tradition alive. In line with this tradition, they supported the poor and the needy, provided livelihood and established social and religious networks to facilitate the public about the Muslim faith as well as their socio-economic needs. The Naqshbandi Order, one of the most prominent Sufi orders in Turkey, had a number of followers who later rose to prominence in the political scene

of Turkey. In addition to Necmettin Erbakan, who frequented the sermons of M. Zahid Kotku, Turgut Özal too had fellow feeling with the Naqshbandi Order especially during 1970s.

Moving into the public limelight by the beginning of 1950s, the faith-based *Risale-i Nûr* Movement and the students of Said Nursi gained prominence especially in the urban and semi-urban areas. Though it cannot be simply termed as a protraction, an affix, or the literal continuation of the Nûr Movement, the faith-based initiative by M. Fethullah Gülen started in mid-1960s grew into a distinctive effort that partook the works of Said Nursi among its influences but regarded as separate from the various particular *Risale-i Nûr* communities in Turkey. What mainly pronounce the difference of Gülen's initiative are its manifestation through media and educational institutions, charity and business organizations as well as national and international dialogue endeavors that transformed the initiative from national level to the transnational one.

Giving education core importance, the endeavors of Gülen Movement assisted and are still assisting significantly to raising the religious and spiritual consciousness of the public. As a faith-inspired movement, the GM is a civic movement drawing references from Muslim consciousness and elucidating on the exemplar message of Islam for the contemporary times.

In addition to these social movements spearheaded by Muslims and their volunteer groups and organizations, the number of Qur'an courses and the societies for building mosques too has been increasing every year owing to the support of the public. They (societies) were 237 in 1951 and became 510 in 1967 in number.

8.18-The Claims of ‘Hidden Agenda’ of AKP and *Growing Threat* from the Gülen Movement

AKP does have Islamist roots, as once its leaders were a part of *Milli Görüş* Islamist Movement. However, AKP radically differs from its predecessor parties the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party in terms of its ideology, its political objectives, and progressive economic policies and in other policies regarding the society and culture, full-participatory foreign policy. Despite of having ‘Islamic’ roots, AKP does not identify as an ‘Islamic’ party and does have not a straight and blunt Islamic agenda. Notwithstanding this, the circles of assertive secularism who are sworn followers of the *Kemalist* ideology still consider the AKP as a major threat and challenge for secularism in Turkey.²²⁸

Accused of getting prepared for an Islamic takeover of Turkish state and society, AKP is the object of suspicion in the eyes of Turkish secularists. Among the reasons are its ‘Islamic’ legacy, contrary stance towards the headscarf ban, overwhelming support from the middle-class and upwardly mobile conservative and mainstream community, and an overt empathy with the Gülen-inspired social works especially on education.²²⁹

The Gülen Movement as a non-political civic society movement no matter how strictly it stays away from politics, its far-reaching scope and substantial popularity with the public in Turkey brings the Movement into the limelight as a strong locus of attention than any political party. That is why almost all political

²²⁸ *Kemalist* ideology defines as the principles and the reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkish state and society. The ideology has a definite overtone of secularism that locks religion out of state and social works.

²²⁹ Angel Rabasa, F.S.Larrabee; Rand National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, CA *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*.

parties seek to feel the ‘tendency’ of the Gülen-inspired community in order to secure the majority votes of the adherents.²³⁰

It is rather original to state that beginning from the 1990s, leaders representing a wide range of party-political affinities and viewpoints voluntarily met Gülen and if they came to power, the rumor had it that it was due to the support of the Movement. Even though Gülen himself terms such claims baseless and superficial for their disregarding the free will of individuals as voters, it is also worth noting that when AKP won the elections in 2002, a similar rumor circulated across the Turkish secular-minded media that the popularity of the Gülen-inspired civic initiative among public brought the Party a substantial success.

Therefore, for secularists, AKP’s success and achievements are associated with the influence and support of the Gülen Movement adherents. Segments of the Judiciary have doubts over the Movement that it does have an intention to harm the secular establishment of the State. While the Gülen Movement plainly manifests as a civil-society movement, it also exhibits the dynamics of a meta-political influence.²³¹

In 2000, Nuh Mete Yüksel, the State Security Court prosecutor alleged Fethullah Gülen of having an aim to establish a theocratic state in place of the secular establishment. He forwarded severe formal accusations in a long indictment stating that the Gülen Movement is one of the most influential reactionary movements in Turkey.

²³⁰Ihsan Yılmaz, “ Ijtihad and Tajdid by Conduct : The Gulen Movement .” *Muslim World* 95 (3) (2005): 329-340.

²³¹The politics of the State is relevant to the religion and to the public, which are the part of the society. Therefore, as far as the Gülen Movement is concerned it is the most popular and farthest-reaching social movement in Turkey. The GM-inspired national and transnational networks of education, media channels and business institutions evasively pose a sizeable prompt over political judgments.

In Yüksel's opinion, the GM was reactionary towards the secularism in a sense that it presented Islam with modernity and democracy, engaged the largest part of the public in Turkey in receiving and sponsoring education in and out of their educational institutions. He alleged that the GM created its spiritual leadership all around the world and ran large financial institutions, which ultimately took politics under its influence. Yüksel purported that the GM deteriorated the political system by accepting the political parties.²³²

Hence the ideas, the influence and as well the activities of the Gülen Movement which are based on the mixture of Islam, modernity and democracy were termed as potential threats for the secular establishment. In May 2006, the Court tried Fethullah Gülen in absentia on the abovementioned charges. He was acquitted from all charges against him, on the grounds of legal prescription, and because of the non-existence of offense as per the legal code – which was amended in the first years of the AKP by the parliament.²³³

AKP won the electoral elections two times with the remarkable public votes in 2002 and in 2007. It got victory in the 2002 elections because of having conservative roots and the political victimization of its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. When AKP became successful for a second term in July 2007 elections, it was mainly due to the progressive economic, social, cultural, political policies as well as the latest showdown during the Presidential elections. AKP's financial achievements dominated other breakthroughs. Having initiated a strict monetary policy and made the Central

²³²AKP's expansive policies usually intersect with the all-inclusive perspective of the initiatives already been taken by the Gülen Movement in terms of promoting national consensus through education, discussion platforms, media institutions, and charity organizations.

²³³İştar B. Gözaydın, "The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Politics in Turkey: A Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse?." *Democratization*, 16 (December, 2009): 1214-1236.

Bank independent, the AKP government adopted the liberal reforms policy under which they privatized a number of state companies. The most prominent privatized state entities were Turk Telecom and Turkish Petroleum Refineries.

During the first five years of the AKP government, the annual rate of the economic growth was 7 percent. In 2005, the government revaluated the Turkish currency as six zeroes disappeared from Turkish lira to introduce the new Turkish lira at par with the US Dollar.²³⁴ Moreover, AKP's economic policies opened Turkey towards the global Muslim geography. Currently, the Gulf States are the largest investors in finance, health care, media, and real estate sectors of Turkey. In addition, Turkey is for establishing and furthering economic relations with the Muslim states in Africa. Many Islamic-finance institutions successfully operate in Turkey.²³⁵

Some circles suspect AKP and the Gülen Movement of having a very close supportive business relationship. Gülen-inspired business communities through their exposure to various world countries where Turkish schools are located initiate for extensive business relations; this bolsters AKP's expansive objectives of boosting Turkish foreign trade by opening to new markets worldwide. AKP's foreign trade policy therefore facilitates such connections and contracts in business.²³⁶

Besides economic development, AKP took bold steps to provide more freedom to the minorities including education rights in their own language. Removing the death penalty and initiating for an expansive scope of reforms to bring betterment

²³⁴Ziauddin Sardar, "Message to the Military," *New Statesman*, 30 July 2007, 136.

²³⁵Antonio Guerrero, "Balancing Act," *Global Finance*, October 1, 2008, 22.

²³⁶Iştar B. Gözaydin, " 'The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Politics in Turkey': A Chance for Democratization or a Trojan Horse? ." *Democratization*, 16 (December, 2009): 1214-1236.

in its performance regarding human rights, AKP is far from fulfilling the requirements pressed by the EU.

During the Presidential elections of 2007, the military, opposition parties and the judiciary openly opposed the nomination of Abdullah Güll as the 11th President of the Republic of Turkey. Güll, who at that time was serving as the Foreign Minister, faced opposition for being a member of the AKP while the opponents wanted an 'outsider' Presidential nominee. The military, as the foremost guardian of the *Kemalist* ideology and the secular foundations of the Republic, extremely opposed Güll's nomination. As this political deadlock was happening, an electronic memorandum was published overnight on the web page of the General Staff, warning the AKP government of dire consequences if they did not comply with the 'sensitivities' of dynamic elements of the Establishment. Later, the erstwhile Chief of General Staff, Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt revealed that he himself dictated the contents of the memorandum out of concern for the state of affairs.

In this regard, the military ultimatum to the government that it might impose martial law at any costs strained civil-military relations further. AKP strictly protested such an intervention and the media with a common sense stated that the era for military interventions were over in Turkey. Military point of view saw President-designate Güll and Prime Minister Erdoğan as Islamic minds and openly took stance against the AKP on the pretext that the party had an Islamic agenda to abolish the secular constitution. The fact that the wives of the President and the Prime Minister were wearing headscarves and the way AKP emphasized the removal of headscarf ban led to their tagging as the threats for the secular ideology of the State. Besides

presenting Islam as a reason, the Military also opposed the AKP suspecting it to have an aim to neutralize the Military's role over civilian politics.²³⁷

AKP's public impression associated with Islam and their expansive policies centering in on removing artificial class divisions by occasionally using conventional rhetoric leads to the suspicion of its having Islamic policies through which it wished to abolish the secular constitution, culture, tradition, and identity. Presently the AKP government actively strives to develop consensus among all political parties, non-governmental organizations, and the entire society on the successful implementation and outcome of the Kurdish democratic initiative.²³⁸

AKP faces a severe opposition from the main opposition secular CHP as well as nationalist MHP and even from the representatives of the pro-Kurdish DTP (Democratic Community Party – currently closed by the decree of the Constitutional Court). According to the opposition, the Sunni Kurds are the largest minority population in Turkey and granting basic human rights and freedoms to the Kurds would make them strong to even claim and demand for a separate homeland.

AKP's language reforms by granting the right of using Kurdish and launching a state TV channel exclusively in Kurdish language received mixed responses. While a great majority of the public voiced their satisfaction, a fervent segment declared that under the 1982 Constitution, the national language of Turkey was Turkish and that the use of the Kurdish language was the clear violation of the secular Constitution of the Turkish State.

²³⁷Ziauddin Sardar, "Turkey: Message to the Military," *News Statesman*, New Statesman or Gale Groups. July 30, 2007,136.

²³⁸Under the Kurdish democratic initiative, the AKP Government wants to grant extensive human rights to the Kurdish population especially in the fields of language, education, religion, culture and traditional identity.

AKP government has developed cordial relations with the Muslim countries, especially with those in the Middle East. Its strong supportive stance towards the Palestine cause shows that Islam is the first priority of AKP's policy agenda.²³⁹

The opponents of the AKP points out to the fact that the PM's wife Emine Erdoğan wears a headscarf and has long dresses which covers her to the ankle. They state that during the establishment of the secular Republic of Turkey by Kemal Atatürk in 1923, the State banned such long dresses and headscarves in Arabic style. They term this as AKP's clear violation of the secular laws made by the Founding Father of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

In 1994, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. In line with the Welfare Party's Islamic policies, when Erdoğan banned the use of alcohol inside and outside the cafes and bars, he faced a massive protest from liberal circles even though he was widely popular due to providing far-reaching municipal facilities that drastically added to the urbanization of Istanbul. In 1999, at a public rally, Erdoğan recited a poem by the Turkish nationalist poet Ziya Gökalp and was sentenced to five months in jail. The poem, composed in the beginning of the 20th century when the Turkish National Struggle was at full steam, termed mosques as barracks, their domes as helmets, and the minarets as the bayonets. These words established evidence for Erdogan's sentence stating that they expressed the Islamic agenda of the Welfare Party.

As the newly established AKP was contesting elections in 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was serving his prison term. Despite all these, AKP continuously denies that it has any 'Islamic' policy and agenda.²⁴⁰

²³⁹“Poor Communication: Turkey Faces an Identity Crisis,” *The Washington Times*, Washington Times LLC, March 11, 2008, 17A.

CONCLUSION

The Gülen Movement is working actively as a non-political, social and religious association at national and transnational level. Its central point of concentration is an individual's life and the main aim of the Movement is to make the individual's life progressive and peaceful. The foremost emphasis of the Gülen Movement is on education, by which the Movement does not only develop the sense and the awareness of self-realization in the individual, but also teaches ethics and moral values which make their life more sound and peaceful. Education also brings change in their social economic status and solve their many other social relevant problems.²⁴¹

In view of M. Fethullah Gülen who has encouraged a non-partisan, volunteer civic initiative which is sociologically named after him, education is the main thing which can make society progressive and build the individual life better and peaceful. The individual can be Muslim, Christian, and Jew and belong to any religion and culture of the world. The making of an educated society is necessary, for education needs maintenance and dissemination in a willful community. In view of the Gülen Movement, self-realization and moral values are necessary to develop in each individual by education to lead integration for the making of a society. So the Gülen Movement assembles the whole society by providing education and ethics to the individual.

²⁴⁰Helena Smith, "Erdogan's Veiled Motives," *New Statesman*, 132, December 1, 2003, 14.

²⁴¹ Education provides them a new way of thinking and helps them in solving their many problems relevant to physiological and society. Education makes their economic conditions well which also decrease their tensions and problems.

Besides this on the whole the Gülen Movement is actively developing human qualities, good behavior, love for others, enthusiasm to improve one's self, and an active desire to serve others and in the face of setbacks and failures to keep desire to preserve oneself.

Initially Turkish society used to be a closed one; self-limited, meagerly-educated and in majority rural-based. In years after the initiative and encouragement of M. Fethullah Gülen for people to take civic initiative and establish social and educational institutions, in time along with literacy came the concepts of tolerant democracy, pluralistic and open minded free society to replace the old, rigid ideas. Albeit the state and society were based on secular guidelines and rules to mainstream different religions and cultures under a single agenda, the Turkish society tended to stay conservative in its ideas and dealings, venturing less into the unexplored area of globalization. Gülen Movement changed this profoundly.

As we read the conduct of Gülen's civic initiative of volunteerism without borders, it is observed that democracy and tolerance are advocated as the best way to rule the State. The Movement is comfortable with Turkey's relations with the Western states and her potential integration with the European Union, due to economic and political advantages. A number of Islamic groups oppose the idea of Turkey's EU membership on the basis that European influence can harm their Muslim identity and the Islamic way of life. Concepts of the Gülen Movement regarding democracy, pluralistic and open minded society brought a great change in thinking and approach of the society.

Moreover the Gülen Movement emphasizes to promote peace, tolerance and dialogue within the fellow Muslims and ethnic religious minorities in Turkey as well as throughout the whole world, between the Muslims and non-Muslims.

Nevertheless, the Gülen Movement advocates about democracy, freedom, equity, justice, human rights and rule of law. The influence attributed to the Gülen Movement originates from its positive mobilization of civic initiative to solve social problems and contribute to Turkey's social and economic development by encouraging adherents to open schools, hospitals, charity organizations, media institutions and business associations that voice traditional values of the citizens of Turkey and reflect on thinking and acting internationally.

The Gülen Movement has been contributing to the solutions for the current issues that relates to the state or society by arranging discussion forums and platforms. In these discussion debates or forums, academics, scholars, statesmen, thinkers and journalists take part and deliberate on possible solutions. These discussion platforms highlights the earnestness of the Gülen Movement to initiate change in the society without violating and making worthless the legality and power of the democratic state system itself.

The Gülen Movement is very dominant and influential in the lives of many young and educated individuals. While the GM is not a part of Turkish politics scene, its influence over the social life of the individual is more than the Turkish political parties. GM is not an ideological movement. It has humble grounds which started by placing the human element in the center and shaping the potentials of individuals by encouraging them to utilize their material and other resources to provide education, health-care, inter-religious harmony, inter-cultural interaction, charity and business initiatives to uplift the fellow citizens in their society and humanity as a whole.

Gülen's idea of 'serving humanity is indeed serving Allah,' highlights that GM has both national and transnational nature.

Encouraging a predominantly young population around the values like altruism, positive action, exemplary conduct, outstanding education and a lofty ideal to make the best out of one's ephemeral life, GM has been bridging many voids in Turkish society regardless of different sects and walks of life and advocate peace and harmony through the tongue of education in Turkey and worldwide. Upholding education as a means to attain peace, harmony, and economic prosperity, GM also initiates change in ideas, behavior and in the moral values of the each individual towards realization of their potentials.

In the inter-faith dialogue process the meeting of Fethullah Gülen with the late Pope John Paul II has been considered a milestone in contemporary history between Islam and Christianity. This informal meeting and the end declarations has been exemplary in establishing further interaction between the members of the world's two largely-followed religions to strive for bringing peace and tranquility in various societies worldwide.

The GM is not identified by any race, nationality and ethnic-group. Its identification is based on its services which it provides for the welfare of the human-beings without mentioning their cast, nationality and ethnicity. GM deals with the cultural and political diversity of the state. GM does not deny the identity of others; however the movement's very transparently proclaimed Islamic identity, which is based on inspiring and establishing peaceful co-existence at national and global scales in line with Islam's universality and interaction with various faiths worldwide, has been considered as a threat by a number of ultra-secular rigid elements in Turkey which directly confront the GM.

GM develops and promotes the feelings of love, unselfishness, respect, sacrificing their own substance and holy benefits and aspirations for the sake of others. GM does not confront secular establishment of the State and does not act destructive for secularism. Gülen promotes the memo of peace and tolerance as the original message of Islam and that of the Messenger of Islam. Such ideas give birth to peace and also provide a guarantee to the strong stability of the secular establishment. Gülen encourages everyone to respect the authority for the betterment of the country and governance.

The GM-inspired schools and media organizations contribute at a large scale to literacy and public awareness particularly in Turkey and worldwide. As a vivid example, Gülen's encouragement of local and national communities in Turkey to build schools in the Southeastern Turkey, where since 1984 Turkish armed forces have been fighting against the separatist PKK, contributed to saving a great number of youth from the clutches of the guerilla group and revitalized social, political and business life in the region with a considerable Kurdish population. GM's contribution to the rehabilitation and surge of literacy in this region is highly notable.

One does not need to be a professional sociologist to distinguish that the conservative Turkish society - a majority of whom reside in Anatolian cities and the suburbs of the major cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir – used to be marginalized and mocked by the elite for many years in terms of their image, schooling, means and resources. This silent majority who are the workforce of the country for a considerable time could not find foothold to practice the way they believe in a comfortable way.

The establishment of *İmam-Hatip* Schools could serve as a breather for the stifling atmosphere during 1950s to 1970s. However due to the constant injustice such

schools have not been admitted in the same league of other state schools, despite the fact that the İmam-Hatips have been operated under the control of the Turkish Ministry of Education from the very beginning.

Though sociologically categorized as a 'movement' and labeled after the name of Gülen, the GM has been defined by Gülen as '*the movement of volunteers who unite around a lofty ideal for the sake of humanity*', and Gülen mentions that naming such a genuine and incorporating civic initiative after his name would be a gross injustice to the countless heartfelt adherents to this ideal. Witnessing the active and positive involvement of the GM in the fields of education, media, charity, entrepreneurship, and inter-religious dialogue, according to an estimate, it may be correct to say that the changes and the progress which is relevant to social, cultural and economic fields in Turkey for more than the last 30 years is dominantly due to the civic initiatives undertaken by the adherents of the GM.

Regardless of Gülen's non-partisan stance and the adherents' non-political position, the GM is considered as a massive civil power in Turkey on account of having extensive public support and influence in the society. Actually the Movement dislikes any type of involvement in politics whether is direct or indirect. It has been mentioned that no single or combined political party/parties could take the place and assume the influence of the GM as the aims and objectives of any political party are dominantly based on self-interest and manipulation.

The expansive achievements and recognition of the GM in Turkish society brought along a positive influence as well as exposure to the GM, which lead to its interpretation as a 'pressure group'. Because of this, the GM is perceived as a threat to the interests of particularly privileged class of Turkish society which have been governing the affairs and awareness of the people almost since the very start of the

Republic. Considering the non-violent expansiveness of the movement, without making any hesitation one can express that this proves the success of the GM at Turkey and abroad as well. Playing an important role in easing the tensions and the conflicts of the fragmented societies, the GM works beyond the state boundaries without taking into account races, diverse cultures, religions and nationalities. Under GM, a large number of organizations are operating as transparent for the scrutiny of the state and across the borders in financial, political and culture fields.

The Movement helps to disseminate a synthesis of new ideas, cultures, collective actions and institutional services. Hence the adherents of the GM are with great success guiding people towards contributing to and taking advantage from education, cultural projects and international dialogue among faiths and beliefs.

While as far the GM influence is concerned over the Turkish politics in the way the country is governed and the current news platform mainly dominated by news on the AKP contains a great importance for the researchers. It will be better to say that the GM has inadvertent influence over the politics rather than to speculate that the GM has a close connection with the AKP.

Gülen served on state's authorized license for performing the duties of preacher and *imam* in various cities across Turkey for many years of his life. This thing provides a point to argue that the adherents of Gülen's ideas make a considerable figure in Turkish population. Certainly this part of population must have similar ideas, considerations and sensitivities as Gülen has.

Here an argument is raised to state that the adherents of Gülen and voters of the AKP belong to the same population. However it does not mean that the GM and the AKP are two different names of a common ideology or a movement. The nature of relationship which exists between the GM and the AKP is a spontaneous one.

Considering a number of AKP leaders' previous political backgrounds which has long been associated with Erbakan's Islamic politics, and his stiff criticism of several non-partisan conservative individuals including Gülen for many years, one cannot simply say that the AKP merged forces with the civic initiative of the GM. Rather, it may be said that the choice of the educated and in majority non-partisan youth and middle-age population (as voters) to center in on education and social development rather than getting indulged in civil conflicts like those until 1980s; thus witnessing various army interventions in social and political life, brought along the non-violent, harmonious co-existence in the Turkish society and the Gülen's contribution to this since 1970s has been widely acclaimed. AKP – burning bridges with their past legacy – made a new start in 2002, the educated middle-class population with various political and religious backgrounds elected them as the single ruling power.

AKP's soft stance and progressive outlook overlaps with the people's expectations of non-confrontational politics and GM's civic initiative which advocates positive action and encouragement of establishing educational and social institutions relieve the burden off the back of the State, thus making the GM seem wrongfully as an integral part of the ruling government. Indeed, Gülen's integrated and honest life has a great influence over a considerable portion of the current Turkish society.

Looking back in the history of 'Islamic' parties in Turkey, we see it as a retort by a conservative segment taking initiative of reversing the tide of isolation by establishing political parties. The most prominent Islamic party had once been the National Salvation Party (MSP) established in 1969, followed by the Welfare Party (RP) in 1984, Virtue Party (FP) in 1997 and recently the Felicity Party (SP). These all

parties were either conceived or initiated by Necmettin Erbakan and his lieutenants. Güll and Erdoğan and a part of AKP's top cadre from very young ages had been associated with Necmettin Erbakan and his political vision, *Milli Görüş* - "National Vision".

However in time they differed with Erbakan owing to his party discourse that led to many superfluous political confrontations and party closures, not to mention the heaviest stipulations imposed by the Military upon a civil government on 28 February 1997.

In time, Güll, Erdoğan and others forfeited their angst and fiery discourse which has once been a brand of the NSP, RP and FP and adopted an unswerving, uniting discourse. AKP was founded in 2002 and severing ties with the Erbakan legacy, Güll and Erdoğan moved into the political limelight with a penchant of uniting different political tendencies on a conservative political base. They kept their conservative mind and nature as is but adopted a coalescing and reconciliatory stance. Erdoğan though popular with many on account of being one of the most successful mayors in the history of Istanbul, was jailed in 2002 due to a poem he recited at a Virtue Party gathering, in the meanwhile AKP contested elections in 2002 without him and came to power.

Gülen never maintained any political association or loyalty with any political party. He, just like any other Turkish citizen, has an interest in politics as a voter and does have a concern about a firm-grip in Turkish politics. Therefore, he often discusses and shares his ideas and suggestions on being asked, maintaining a distance from all political parties.

The history reveals that Gülen had a very cordial relation with the former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit who represented a left wing political ideology.²⁴² Gülen never kept these relations hidden from the public. Ecevit played a pivotal role when he gave reply to the accusation that Gülen aims to destabilize the secular state had no realism. Recently the Court had declared Gülen clear of all charges which were actually imposed by those who were involved in bringing February 28, 1997 process.

In Gülen's view, it is not fair to divide people into groups according to their associations with different political parties. As for them, every individual is worth respect so should be respected and what matters the most is the humanity. In case of difference of mind and consideration, dialogue and discussion is essential to remove or minimize them. Gülen frequently encourages those who value his ideas to keep away from any type of involvement in politics which take them towards disturbance and destruction. He emphasizes that they should use their democratic right by casting vote in elections in spite of having different values and beliefs. In this regard no one should coerce one another to adopt a forced selection.

The political affairs of the state cannot be singlehandedly connected to the social influence of the Gülen Movement which is based on veracity, transparency and positive action. Nowadays, the class differences in Turkey are disappearing gradually in proportion with social change, increase in wealth and popularity of literacy. Similarly the middle class and the conservative population become wealthier and more educated than ever. A considerable segment of such social changes can be attributed to the positive influence of Fethullah Gülen and many similar Turkish scholars who channel pious and constructive minded Turkish citizens utilize their

²⁴²The politicians who belong to left wing political parties uphold an ideology of social-democracy, socialism and communism.

material and human means to make a progressive nation and state strongly based on an honest and progressive generation.

The current situation in Turkey has been shaped with civil-military at odds, judicial crises, *Ergenekon* terrorist mob and a military junta of which schemes of destabilizing the country were ripe by initiating a coup and punishing the religious and conservative Groups – most especially the Gülen Movement, its adherents and admirers. Gülen always cautioned peace of mind and sobriety to those who value his ideas about the current issues.

Shortly it can be said that the social, cultural and educational changes initiated by the Gülen Movement inspired enterprises without any intervention contributed to the current affairs. Such change affects the society in exercising their free will to choose and adopt. The general mindset of the Turkish people about religion is devotion, co-existence and tolerance, a central heritage from their Ottoman past.

Social Profile
PakTurk School Survey
(For Teachers)

- ❖ Please answer all the Questions.
- ❖ The Survey Papers should be stamped with the School/College Insignia.

Q1-Nationality _____

Q2-Sex 1-Male _____ 2-Female _____

Q3-Age _____

Q4-How long have you been working here?

Q5-Why did you Join Pak-Turk Schools?

Q6-What is Your Qualification?

- B.A/B.ED
- M.A/M.ED
- MSC
- M.Phil
- Any other (DO MENTION)

Q7-Did you have any teaching experience before joining Pak-Turk Schools?

Q8-Are You satisfied with the teacher's faculty members? If not then why?

Q9-Do you have in-service training?

Q10-Which Media of Instruction is being adopted?

Social Profile
PakTurk Schools Survey
For Students
Part-I

- ❖ Please answer all the Questions.
- ❖ The Survey Papers should be stamped with the School/College insignia.

Q1-Sex: 1-Male _____ 2-Female _____

Q2-Age: _____

Q3-Class: _____

Q4-What is Your Father's or Guardian's occupation?

Q5-Which areas do you belong? (Mention City or Village Name)

Q6- Why did you give preference to Pak-Turk Schools over other State Schools of Pakistan?

Q7-Which Subjects are of your interest?

Q8-Do you find these Schools better in education than other schools of Pakistan? If Yes then how?

Q9-Which field would you like to choose in future?

- Doctor
- Engineer
- Teacher
- Any other

Part-II

✓ Please mark this sign while answering the Questions in Yes or No.

Q1-Have you ever been afraid to go to School?

Yes No

Q2-Do you have a favorite teacher?

Yes No

Q3-Do some teachers favor certain students?

Yes No

Q4-Are games an effective way of learning?

Yes No

Q5-Are you taking part in games?

Yes No

Q5-Is there any Play ground/Play Courts at School?

Yes No

Q6-Is Library available at School?

Yes No

Q6-Are you satisfied with the study syllabus of your School?

Yes No

Q7-Are You consulting dictionary during class hours?

Yes No

Q8-Did you draw any book from Your School library?

Yes No

Q7-Are you comfortable with your studies?

Yes No

Q8-Are you feeling relax during the study hours at school?

Yes No

Q9-Are you taking participation in debates?

Yes No

Q10-Does your teacher encourage you when you feel disappointment because of your studies?

Yes No

Q11-Does your teacher give you moral support when you need it?

Yes No

Q12-Are your teachers' friendly to you?

Yes No

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
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
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk



Said Nursi (Ankara 1952)



Fethullah Gülen




Fethullah Gülen in study Room




Fethullah Gülen in Turkish Museum




Fethullah Gülen distributing candy among children on eid-ul-fitr




Fethullah Gülen in bed Room



PakTurk School




Pak Turk School Lahore



Pak Turk School Multan



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Pak Turk School Peshawar

