# THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND FRAGMENTATION OF

POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAKISTAN:

A CASE STUDY OF PML (1990-1999)

By

MUHAMMAD ILYAS KHAN

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
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① Political Parties in Pakistan

THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND FRAGMENTATION OF

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree of Master of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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2012

To

My sister

Prof. Yasmin Ali (Late)

If

It's any good

Certification

Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled **"The Political Instability and Fragmentation of Political Parties in Pakistan: A Case Study of PML (1990-1999)"** submitted by **Muhammad Ilyas Khan Reg # 51-FSS/MSPSIR/F09,** have been found satisfactory for the requirements of the degree of M.S/M.Phil Politics and International Relation.

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Islamabad

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Acknowledgements

List of Abbreviations & Acronyms

AIML	All India Muslim League
AL	Awami League
ALJ	Awami League Jinnah
ANP	Awami National Party
APML	All Pakistan Muslim League
BUG	Baloch Underground
COAS	Chief of the Army Staff
COJSC	Chief of Joint Staff Committee
COP	Combined Opposition Parties
EBDO	Elective Bodies Disqualification Order
IB	Intelligence Bureau
IDA	Islamic Democratic Alliance
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ittehad
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
JI	Jamat-e-Islami
JML	Jinnah Muslim League
JUI	Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam
JUI (F)	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal Rahman
JUP	Jamiat-Ulema-e-Pakistan
JWP	Jamhoori Watan Party
KESC	Karachi Electric Supply Company
KRL	Kahuta Research Laboratory
MA	Majlis Ahrar
ML	Muslim League
ML (Con)	Muslim League Council
ML (Conv)	Muslim League Convention
ML (F)	Muslim League Functional
ML (Q)	Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam
MQM	Mutahida Qaumi Movement

MUP	Majlis-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan
NPP	National Peoples' Party
NSC	National Security Council
OML	Old Muslim League
OML	Official Muslim League
PDM	Pakistan Democratic Movement
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PIA	Pakistan International Airline
PIF	Pakistan Islamic Front
PML	Public Muslim League
PML (J)	Pakistan Muslim League Junejo
PML (J)	Pakistan Muslim League Jinnah
PML (N)	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PML (Z)	Pakistan Muslim League Zia
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPP	Pakistan People Party
PRODA	Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act
PS	Pakistan Steel
SM	Sipah-i-Muhammad
SSP	Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan
TJP	Tahrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan
UDF	United Democratic Front
UML	United Muslim League
USA	United States of America
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In this study political instability means the premature dismissal of elected governments, lack of regular elections, absence of rule of law, rampant corruption, low economic activities and developments, uncertainty of situation, dismissal, coups, assassinations, cabinet changes etc. In the words of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, political stability does not mean that a certain regime continued for a decade but there must be smooth transition from one government to another.[1] Thus political instability is the situation where democratic norms and values are not honored. The political history of Pakistan is replete with instances of political instability, which have different causes and reasons. Pakistan took its start as free and independent democratic state in unfavorable circumstances. At the time of its establishment, it had to face various terrible problems the solution to which was imperative for its very existence but later circumstances proved that they were not tackled appropriately, which posed serious problems in the years to come. Among which political problems are pertinent to mention. Thus political instability from 1951 to 1958 was rampant and persisted subsequently. The major political parties were engaged in thine and mine business putting aside the real problems. So in such state of affairs, real politics was impossible to keep into practice. All these contributed towards delay in constitution-making, rampant corruption, low level of development, rise of anti-state elements, nepotism, absence of the consolidation of democratic norms etc. Therefore, Pakistan saw frequent changes and dismissal of governments surviving each not more than a year except Liaqat Ali Khan's. The situation at provincial levels also portrayed the same

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[1] Dr. P. Sharan, *Government and Politics of Pakistan*, New Delhi: Metropolitan, 1983, p.74.

situation. So in just eleven years, we had four Governor Generals and eight cabinets. In the subsequent years, the elected governments played hide and seek with powers from time to time especially in the years from 1988 to 1999 in which political instability was the order of the day and democratic norms were not permitted to take their roots.

In the same way, no regular elections were held. If some held, they were not devoid of state interferences. Besides, there was no democratic division of powers, which in simple words was one-man show in power paradigm. Therefore, apprehensions were bound to rise in the minds of the various sections of the society. Thus fractionalization gave birth to agitation and unrest, which sometimes had been dramatized into separatist movements paving the way for instability.

The earlier deaths of the Quaid-e-Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan gave birth to leadership crisis, which had never been coped with leaders of their statures. The later generation of political figures lacked that potential and devotion which was necessary to know the pulse of the circumstances facing the nascent state in the form of political, social and economic problems. Political instability in Pakistan was also deepened from time to time through the imposition of Martial Laws in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999 respectively.

Economic problems, which Pakistan inherited at the time of independence, are also thought to be a factor of political instability. Thus political history of Pakistan bears evidence to political instability which comprises frequent dismissal of governments, rigged elections, lack of regular elections, abrogation of constitutions, separatist movements, Martial Laws etc. Here now a question arises what are to be blamed for all these mess up which resulted into political instability.

1.2 Significance of the Study

The significance of the study lies in the sense that there is no direct work available on it. Besides, it will help determine the causes of political instability, which has remained a

perpetual thorn in the political history of Pakistan. Among its multi-facet reasons, the role of political parties could not be underestimated at all because their role is not praiseworthy right from the beginning. The topic under research, therefore, seeks to pinpoint the cause of political instability, which opens the gate for other reasons deteriorating democratic norms.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

The history of Pakistan bore evidence to a state of unparalleled political instability just after its birth. This uncertainty of the situation continued infinitely in the years to come which culminated into the dismissal of governments, delay in constitution-making, rampant military takeovers, rigged elections, separatist movements, and disintegration etc. Such state of affairs owed a number of reasons. So it is important to explore the reasons why political instability was so rampant. How has political instability prevailed? What were the forces behind political instability? To be more specific, what is the main reason behind the political instability in Pakistan? This research, thus, will revolve around the questions mentioned.

1.4 Thesis Argument

After studying the reasons of the political instability, there are many perceptions about it in the polity among which the role of political parties could not be ignored. Their existence in any democratic system is compulsory as they are the essence of democracy. The researcher thus comes to the assumption that if they themselves do not exhibit strict adherence to democratic norms and values, they are certain to suffer from internal conflicts which are often dramatized giving birth to fragmentation and the way for political instability is bound to furnish. Thus fragmentation of political parties is one of the major reasons of political instability in the polity, which is instrumental in opening up for other reasons.

1.5 Literature Review

The issue of political instability has been the focal point of many authors of repute in politics who have discussed various factors with regard to political instability worldwide and in the

polity. However, the topic under discussion has not been dealt directly by anyone else.

Saeed Shafaqat, in his book, *Pakistani Bureaucracy: Crisis of Governance and Prospect of Reform (1999),* is of the view that bureaucracy being at the delivery end mars the growth of institutions, undermines good governance and the consolidation of democracy which pave the way for political instability, although these generalizations are looking viable but not clearly addressed.

Similarly, Anthony Annet, in his paper, *Social Fractionalization, Political Instability and the Size of Government (2001),* views that states with divisions along ethno-linguistics and religious dimensions are prone to political instability at most. The writer's statement is overgeneralization and could not be applied at large as most states like India enjoy political stability with diverse social configuration.

Philip Nel, in his article, *Income, Inequality, Economic Growth and Political Instability in Sub Saharan Africa (2003),* is of the belief that low income, inequality, levy adverse and dire effects which give birth to political instability. Thus, low-income growth ensues. But it is maintained that in the absence of true political culture how one could expect high income, equality and economic growth.

Janathan Paris, in his book, *Prospects for Pakistan (2010),* opines that low economic developments, poverty, unemployment, military takeover, obscurantist Islamic trends are among the causes of political instability in Pakistan. The writer has beautifully pinpointed the problems; Pakistan is facing at the moment. But there is a need to highlight the major one which precedes the rest. Stephen Philip Cohen, in his book, *The Nation and the State of Pakistan (2002),* argues that army intervention, time and again, derailed popular governments on the assumptions held among Generals that politicians were unable to achieve Jinnah's Pakistan. Therefore, they are obliged to set Pakistan straight. Besides, General Zia ul-Haq used to joke that army takeovers in order to correct the politicians' Qibla. The writer's

thinking is self-evident of who provides the military with an opportunity.

Abiero Opondo, in his paper, *A Cause of Political Instability in Africa (2012)*, maintains that excessive pride in ethnicity remained to be the cause of political instability along with poverty and dictatorship. However, the writer fails to point out the real cause of it as people with diverse cultures, poverty stricken live in other states peacefully as in India etc.

Gbenga Lawal, in his paper, *Corruption and Development in Africa (2007)*, asserts that corruption is the biggest clog in the wheel of sustainable development in Africa. However, he underestimates other core reasons for development without which it looks a dream, which could not be fulfilled. Similarly, Nauro.F.Campus and Francesco G, in their paper, *Lobbying and Corruption and Political Influence (2006)*, believe that lobbying and corruption exert adverse impacts on political stability. Of course, it is so but who gives way to them to damage political fabric.

Hassan Abbas, in his book, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, America's War on Terror (2005)*, asserts that army, jihadist actors and America expedite the political crisis deteriorating the very political fabric of Pakistan through one or other pretext for fulfilling their respective interests. Now if one looks beyond the context of Pakistan, the same non-state actors failed to penetrate into the political fabric due to the presence of popular government as in Turkey, India etc.

Last but not least, Dr. Noor ul-Haq, in his book, *Transition to Democracy (2008)*, believes that fragmentation in political parties is due to the vested interest practised at the altar of principles. He, further, argues that in Pakistan blocs are formed not on the basis of issues but on political gains putting aside principles and violating the mandate of the people. His thoughts are appropriate but he did not link them with political instability. Similarly, Jayshree Bajona, in his article, *Pak's Institutions, Civil Society (2008)*, is of the view while quoting the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan that patch up pushed the major political parties away

from advocating the fundamental social change. However, the writer's argument needs elaboration. Besides, it is not related to the topic directly. In the same way, Veena Kukreja, and M.P. Singh, in their book, *Dilemma of a Nation, Pak: Democracy, Development and Security Issues (2008)*, argue that the elimination of the culture of landlordism and feudalism is the prerequisite of the day in order to establish democracy in Pakistan. Their thoughts, however, are convincing but they do not address the topic directly.

In short, it is held that most of the authors are not specific. They have discussed the issue generally. So this paper will seek to fill those lapses and gaps.

1.6 Objectives of Research

The objectives of the research are to find out.

- Causes of political instability.

- Fragmentation of political parties in Pakistan with special reference to the PML.

- Fragmentation subsequent impact on political instability.

1.7 Research Methodology

The researcher employs descriptive-analytical approach in order to get in-depth analysis of the topic in question. The research is of qualitative nature and depends mainly upon primary and secondary sources. The primary sources consist of newspapers, articles from journals, media whereas the secondary sources include books, official documents, internet, dissertations etc. The data thus collected are being analyzed on description-analysis-evaluation pattern.

Chapter 2

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of three sections. First section of the chapter is concerned with key concepts, their definitions and Operationalization at the end. The concepts, which are employed here, include political instability, fragmentation, political parties and the PML being thoroughly investigated and explained before reaching any final conclusion. Similarly, in the second section of the chapter, theoretical approaches with regard to political instability and fragmentation are explored. In the last section of the chapter, a workable framework is derived based on the approaches and concepts with somewhat modification for the purpose of the research in question.

2.2 Conceptual Framework: Definition of Key Concepts and Operationalization

Many scholars of political science think the phenomenon of political instability synonymous to political violence, coup d'état, regime change, frequent changes in government depending upon the context in focus. Besides, they considered them as the indicators of the political instability.[2] A number of definitions of political instability/stability are given here. S. Lipset defines political instability/ stability in these words in the context of regime change.

"Stability of democracy is uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since world war 1 …. "[3]

Similarly, Eckstein defines stability/instability in term of violence, internal war, as "the attempt to change, using violence or the threat of it, against policies, rulers, or organizations.[4]

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[2] David Sanders, *Patterns of Political Instability*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981, p 2.
[3] Ibid., p.3.
[4] Ibid., p.7.

In the words of David Sanders Instability is defined as "reference to a whole range of behaviors, from strikes and demonstration through to guerrilla warfare, constitutional changes, and coups d'état".[5] Similarly, Feierabend, Gurr, Paige, Snyder, Tilley and Hibbs, all equate political instability with violence.[6]

This plethora of definitions although guiding yet deepening the riddle i.e. political instability /stability with each step towards defining the term under discussion. It is, therefore, purported that political instability is an umbrella term which has been employed by political scientists to suggest different meanings best suited to the cases with regard to political instability. It, therefore, connotes a variety of definitions, which are one way or the other related with it, include regime change, government change, demonstrations, riots, assassinations, and what not.

Another concept which has been in use here is of fragmentation. It is a noun from the verb, fragment, which literally means "a part broken away from a whole, broken piece, break up, part"[7].There are many synonyms words which could be used for fragmentation i.e. faction, fraction, fission etc. In simple words, fragmentation means disintegration, break up etc. but here it implies division and re-division of political parties into separate groups called popularly factions of the parent party. In the same way, political party may be "thought of as organized social groups that seek to wholly or partially take over the government of a country, usually by contesting elections"[8]. Simply, by political party is meant a group of people who share same line of thought striving for political power through specific agenda called manifesto in popular terms.

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[5] Ibid., p. 54.

[6] Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[7] Victoria Neufeldt, *Webster's New World College Dictionary*, New York: Simon & Schustr Com, 1970, p.534.

[8] Stephend Tansey& Nigel Jackson, *Politics: the Basics*, New York: Routledge, 2008, p.191.

Here we are concerned with one such political party the PML by the name. By the PML, the researcher means Pakistan Muslim League which is the incarnation of All India Muslim League (1906). It was a political party which not only got freedom for the Muslim of India but also kept them alive throughout Pakistan Movement. It is the only party to which goes the credit for adopting the Resolution of Pakistan in its historic conference at Lahore on 23rd March 1940 which finally became a reality in the shape of Pakistan in 1947. But after the death of the Quiad-e-Azam, the party became a vehicle of exploitation at the hands of so called leaders for their personal gains and interests putting aside the spirit and objectivity of the principles of the party which resulted into anarchy, corruption, disorder[9]etc., thus paving the way for fragmentation. The party since then bifurcated many times into many factions like Jinnah League, Awami League and Conventional League, Council League, the PML (Qayum Group), the PML (Khawaja Khair din), the PML (Muhammad Hussain), the PML (Pir Pagaro), the PML (J), the PML (N) etc.

The problems which impede the analysis of definitions and operationalization of political instability are laid in theory and practice. To avoid those problems sometime assumed links are furnished connecting theory and practice of political instability. These links are termed as indicators which help in definitions and the operationalization of political instability.[10] Similarly, theoretical definitions set ground for analysis. It is, therefore, an attempt is made to analyze the definition of political instability. Theoretically, it is defined as" the extent to which a political system may be characterized as unstable at any given point in time varies in direct proportion to the extent to which the occurrence or non-occurrence of changes in and challenges to the government, regime or community deviates from the previous system specific normal pattern of regime/government/community changes or challenges; a pattern

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[9] Maher Noor Muhammad Thund, *Muslim League Kai Soo Sal: Sadi kI MukhtasarTarikh*, Punjab: Loke pub, 2007.p. 31,

[10] David Sanders, *Patterns of Political Instability*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981, p. 65.

which will itself vary over time".[11]

To see the operationalization of the definition of political instability given above, we need to analyze the various elements constituting the definition in detail before arriving at any particular conclusion. The definition could be divided into four elements: 1) the extent to which a political system may be characterized as unstable...2) unstable at any given time in point 3) varies in direct proportion to the occurrence of changes in and challenges to the government, regime or Community 4) the extent to which the occurrence or non-occurrence of changes and challenges deviates from the previous system specific pattern of changes and challenges. Taking into account the first element of the definition, it is completely out of rationality to label any political system as either completely stable or completely unstable at a particular period of time as political instability is necessarily a comparative concept in which two political systems are compared over a given period of time to make an assertion that so and so system is stable than that. Similarly, sometime political instability/stability of the same political system at different points in time is compared. In the same way, political instability of political systems is compared taking into account different points in time of the respective political systems. So to say a political system of so and so state is highly stable or unstable; the statement is not devoid of weaknesses as political instability is relative concept. In the same way, the second element of the definition of political instability is taken into account. The approach of a political journalist suggests the analysis of the political situation of any political system on monthly basis on the basis of data drawn from the World Hand Book data collection. Although his suggestion is commendable yet it is not cogent as some unstable political situations are short lived not more than a week.[12] Regarding the third element of the definition, an attempt is made to analyze the definitions of Blondel and Easton regarding

[11] Ibid., p.66.
[12] Ibid., pp.66-67.

regime change which do share similarities with the theoretical definition of regime change which goes as 'the legal and informal rules of a political system which govern or structure the resolution of conflicts within that system'[13]. There is a slight difference between Blondel's three-dimensional classification of regime norms and Easton's government, regime, and community dimensions of political system. As a matter of fact, the difference existed between their definitions is only of semantic as Blondel 'equates regime norms with goals (the radical-conservative axis), means (the liberal-authoritarian axis), and degree of participation (the oligarchic-democratic axis). In the same way, Easton also equates type of regime with goals, norms and structure of authority.[14] Besides, indicators of regime change identified by Blondel and Easton also consist of two other important elements i.e. party system and civil-military status which do have important role in regime changes and could be substitute for authority structure[15]. Thus 'change in regime consists of a change in goals, a change in means, and a change in the degree of participation, and a change in authority structure'.[16] The last element of the definition is important on two grounds. Firstly, it undermines the weaknesses of the previously held assumptions that high degrees of change and challenge events pose greater instability. Secondly, it also shows the loophole in journalistic notion of instability which is not predictable without taking into considerations the context of the previous instability a particular political system gone through.[17] Over and above, instability is 'consisting in deviation from normality'.[18] Thus instability/stability is a continuous, relative concept which varies from context to context. Besides, the behaviors which denote political instability could be divided into government, regime, community,

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[13] Ibid., p.67.
[14] Ibid., p.68.
[15] Ibid., p.69.
[16] Ibid., p.69.
[17] Ibid., pp. 71-72.
[18] Ibid., p.89.

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change and challenge. The concept of government change, violent challenges and peaceful challenges are operationalized through their respective indicators. The indicators of governmental change consist of changes in chief executive and executive adjustment or cabinet changes. By changes in chief executive is meant transformation in executive from one leader or ruling junta to another through traditional, constitutional or conventional processes. Whereas by executive adjustment is meant transformation in the member of national executive in which there is no transfer of power from one leader to another is necessary. In the same way, the indicators of violent challenge and peaceful change include riots, killings from political violence, attempted coups, demonstrations, and political strikes respectively. They both offer challenge to regime change and government change. Violent challenges are posed as regime challenges as they transgress legal bounds of the regime whereas peaceful challenges are posed as challenges to government as they respect legal bound. Simply, we could say violent challenges as regime challenges and peaceful challenges as government challenges.[19] But this over-generalization is not devoid of lapses as any event either violent or peaceful could be identified as either regime challenge or government challenge or both.

There are a lot of problems one has to face while defining the term i.e. political instability because there is no single agreed definition of it as it has been defined in different ways by different political scientists keeping in view the context in which they worked upon it. In this part, the researcher analyzes the definitions of various political scientists with regard to political instability and assesses their weaknesses and strength and tries to arrive at a workable definition of the term under deliberation. In this connection, it is learned that in the mid-1960s, political instability used to be considered in terms of stability of a particular political system. In words of Lipset, political instability could be defined as a political system

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[19] Ibid., pp.70-89.

which experiences uninterrupted democratic government or dictatorial government over given period of time is stable or otherwise.....Keeping in view his definition, a political system could be divided into stable and unstable democracies, stable and unstable non-democracies. But this type of continuity of government was criticized by Frequency School of Thought who emphasizes that instability is not only consisted of the discontinuity of democracy but also of coups, government changes, demonstration, riots, guerrilla activities, deaths that could not be overlooked .Thus stability depends upon the non-existence of all these activities which do have the potential of striking instability.[20] However, in Political Science, it has been defined in traditional way which goes as it is 'either discontinuity of system or the frequency of unstable events'[21].

There is entirely different approach adopted by journalists who define instability in terms of political situations a certain state faces at a particular time for a short while but it is not to intend that journalistic approach does not value long term instability but it is only to show the difference in the focus of journalists and political scientists. Besides, journalists also associate instability with uncertainty. In support of this association of political instability with uncertainty, a report by BBC correspondent could be quoted when he described the Portuguese political situation as unstable in March 1974. By saying so like others, he was not certain that what is going to happen in the days to come. Simply, he was uncertain about the instability of Portugal in 1974.The previous definitions regarding political instability though limited in nature yet they do carry a lot of importance. But now a question arises what should be the features of a satisfactory definition of political instability. It is, therefore, held that satisfactory definition of stability/instability should have included the following features: it must be considered as a continuous relative phenomenon; it should follow journalistic notion

[20] Ibid., pp.49-50.
[21] Ibid., p.50.

of instability. Despite making concerted efforts to define political instability, political scientists failed to produce any satisfactory definition through empirical studies.[22] Now an attempt is made to follow theoretical studies for defining the term. It is, therefore, necessary to ask what instability is. However, it is noted that we are concerned here with political system. Before defining political instability, we need to define what is political and what system is. In the words of David Easton, the father of system analysis in Political Science, 'system is a number of elements interacting within a defined boundary'[23]. By political is meant 'authoritative allocation of values'[24]. Thus political instability is the political situation 'in which interaction between or within the elements of a political system is unpredictable or uncertain'[25]. The given definition although does not provide a satisfactory answer to the definition of political instability yet it certainly helps providing some guideline for workable definition.[26]

If we use the term system, we need to know elements of which the system under deliberation is composed of. In case of political system, elements are comprised of political parties, pressure groups, legislature, executive, government, judiciary, values, etc. However, it is difficult to probe into the political behavior of each element. It is, therefore, inevitable to cluster them together in some group, so that the task of assessment might become easy. David Easton has actually purported three dimensions of political system which are political authorities, decision makers properly called the government; the regime rules governing the political system; political community which consists of the people within the political system.[27] David Easton's dimensions of political system provide basis for the

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[22] Ibid., pp.51-58.
[23] Ibid., p.58.
[24] David Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life*, New York: Wiley, 1965, p.21.
[25] David Sanders, *Patterns of Political Instability*, London: the Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981, p.58.
[26] Ibid., p.58.
[27] Ibid., pp.58-59.

operationalization of instability regarding instability of authority, instability of regime and instability of political community. It is the instability of the given dimensions of political system we are actually concerned with. Besides, we could not recognize the behavior related with each type (dimension) of political instability. It is, therefore, necessary to divide behavior into changes and challenges.

It is said that there are different types of behaviors which pose challenges to government, regime or community, thus paving the way for change which then effects political instability. These challenges are consisted of protest, strikes, riots, the opposition's motions of no confidence against the government, attempted coups and so on. All the given behaviors could not be recognized with each type of political instability easily due to the difference existed in their contexts. However, they could be justified keeping in view the dictum ends justify the means.

The gaps and lapses in the definition of stability-persistence of system- lies in its make up dividing system as stable or unstable democracies or dictatorship. But Post-Colonial Era bears witness to different types of political systems. This division of political systems could be best described by Blondel's three dimensional space which include oligarchic-democratic axis, radical-conservative axis and liberal-authoritarian axis. On the basis of this three dimensional space axes, he divides a political system into seven types which consist of authoritarian conservative, traditional conservative, liberal democratic, populist right, populist center, and populist left and radical authoritarian. Thus stability is not just limited to dictatorship and democracy but it is the situation which could be experienced in the given types of political systems. The second major limitation on the continuity definition of stability/instability is that it does not recognize other types of instability except the system instability. In this connection, Lipset's definition on stability which describes the British system stable needs to be mentioned here. But here a question arises what about the British

General Strike of 1926 which kept strains and division in the British circle at that time. So such kind of situation leads one to assume that the British political system of that time was not devoid of stress and strain which made the state unstable. Thus instability is not only associated with the continuity of institutions but also with challenges associated with the considerations of instability which a system experiences. Similarly, dimensions propounded by the Frequency School of Instability are rejected on the basis of unstable data analytic-technique. Although journalistic definition of instability is looking viable in every situation yet it carries somewhat deficiency which might have characterized by his personal biasness, reliability of contact for information gathering and nature of media with which he works. These definitions of instability thus are criticized on the basis of arguments leveled against each definition. It is, therefore, said that continuity definition overlooks other important behaviors which constitute instability. Similarly, Frequency approach although takes into consideration other behaviors yet it groups them together in complex manner. In the same way, journalistic approach is not sufficient enough to precisely define instability. Over and above, there are three major definitions of political instability which include: the continuity/discontinuity of system definitions of the political sociologists; the frequency definition of the empiricists; and the uncertainty definition of political journalist. However, we reach to the conclusion that a satisfactory definition of political instability should have realized 'the existence of at least five type of instability which includes government, regime, and community change, violent and peaceful challenges to government, regime or community.[28]

2.3 Theoretical Framework

There are different approaches made to explore political instability and fragmentation of

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[28] Ibid., pp.61-64.

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political parties. Therefore, theoretically, political instability has been viewed or approached keeping in focus divergent themes of different writers and scholars. These approaches include of the following: 1) The Empirical Analysis of Democratic Stability 2) Internal War 3) The Dimensional School 4) Psychologically Oriented Causal Approaches 5) Micro-Oriented Refutation of the Psychological Approach 6) Non-Psychologically Oriented Causal Explanation of the Sources of Domestic Conflict Behavior

1) The Empirical Analysis of Democratic Stability

In this regard, the research designed by Seymour Lipset given in his book, *Political Man*, is mainly concerned with the origin of democratic stability in Europe, and North America but it is important to note that it was the first attempt towards the study of political stability. Moreover, he defines stable democracies as

"Uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since WW1 and the absence over the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to democratic rules of the game"[29].

By the given definition, he wants to mean that polities are either completely stable or completely unstable thus discarding the idea that stability and instability could be conceptualized as a relative and continuous phenomenon. Moreover, his concept of stability is very much analogous to the Eastonian concept of system persistence. Lipset's works, however, is an important contribution which provided the later generation of political scientists with an opportunity to develop their theses which say why some political systems are more democratic than others; what are the bases for the analysis of political development; how and in what ways political instability and political violence are probed into. However, it is worth mentioning that although Lipset's analysis is commendable yet it fails to provide any theoretical basis for the difference existed among stability, democracy and development. It is mainly due to certain socio-economic variables related with stability

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[29] Seymour Lipset, *Political Man*, New York: Double Day, 1963, p.48.

and development as causal factors or correlates.[30]

2) Internal War

Eckstein attempts in his work, *Internal War*, to provide a certain paradigm for assessing stability-instability which a certain political system experiences in the form of violent conflict besides identifying correlates or causes which constitute the paradigm. However, it is extremely difficult to analyze it due to its abstract nature and to make any inference from it. Besides, it is also problematic in case of defining those causes which constitute it. Moreover, the revolutionary potential of a society is the basis of strain which paves the way for political violence. Therefore, there is no clear difference between political violence and strain as there is no transparent mechanism for their identification. The importance of Eckstein's analysis of internal war lies in that it provides guidelines for the research which later on conducted throughout the1960s and 1970s while attempting to answer Eckstein's main research question: what are the main types of internal war and what are its main determinants.[31]

3) The Dimensional School

In 1960s, a number of data which falls into three categories was collected by different research institutes in order to determine dimensions of internal war: political events which include assassination, elections, demonstration, acts of government coercion, outbreak of guerrilla warfare and coups d' etas; socio-economic characteristic of nation states which consist of levels of urbanization, communication, development, GNP per capita and industrialization; structural characteristics of regimes which include military-civil status, level of inequality, degree of ethnic cleavage and type of normative structure. In doing the analysis of data thus collected, a number of analyses were used as data analytic tool which had the potential of identifying variables highly interconnected and describing domestic

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[30] Ibid., p.5.
[31] Ibid., pp.9-10.

conflict behaviors. Similarly, Rummel and Tanter found in their analysis three dimensions or factors of domestic conflict behavior which include: 1) internal war which is an organized wide spread mass political violence affecting all characteristics of civil war i.e. guerrilla war, assassination, run and strike etc.; 2) Turmoil is an unorganized mass political agitation which does not characterized necessarily by violence but includes strikes, demonstrations and riots.;3) Conspiracy is an organized elite behavior which is characterized by coups, attempted coups and acts of governmental repression. However, other scholars of the said schools had offered very different factors with regard to domestic conflict behavior. Those scholars include Feierabend and Feierabend, Hoole, Hibbs, Morrison and Stevenson who pointed out nine, five, two, four factors respectively regarding domestic behaviors. Feierabend and Feierabend determined nine factors which include mass participation/turmoil, palace revolutions/revolt, power struggle/revolt, riot, elections, demonstration, imprisonments, civil war, and guerrilla warfare. Similarly, Hoole points out five factors which are demonstration, guerrilla warfare, riots, strike and change of office holders. In the same way, Hibbs identified two factors which are guerrilla warfare, assassination and death from political violence. Moreover, Morrison and Stevenson also marked out four factors of internal war which are elite instability, mass instability, turmoil and communal or ethnic violence.[32]

Although the Dimensional School of internal war could not succeed in presenting any specific definition of political instability/stability yet they succeeded in pointing out dimensions/ factors with regard to domestic conflict behavior which is one of the manifestations of political instability.

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[32] Ibid., pp.10-11.

4) Psychologically Oriented Causal Approaches

A number of theorists who after deriving inferences from Dollard's deprivation-frustration-aggression thesis agrees that domestic conflict behaviors are not tantamount to rational political strategies but such kinds of behaviors are the outcome of either deprivation or frustration or both. However, it is important to note that among these analyses the most important were those of Gurr and Feierabend and Feierabend. In this regard, Gurr views that violent political behavior is the result of deprivation, the moment people find gaps between their demand and supply, against a particular political setup. Similarly, Feierabend and Feierabend, also toes the same line of thought making deprivation to be the sole factor of political violence, thus paving the way for instability of the political system. They both pointed out government coercion, lack of modernity, socio-economic changes, and deprivation to be important factors of political instability. Huntington also opines in the same way as did Gurr and Feierabend and Feierabend. He believes that political instability is the result of gap hypothesis which shows the difference between want satisfaction and economic development at the hands of political authority. Thus he ensures the way for societal deprivation which affects the instability of a given political system. Besides, he exclaimed that social deprivation of the masses could be disposed of through giving best available opportunities to political participation, institutionalization etc.[33]

5) Micro-Oriented Refutation of the Psychological Approach

The conclusions arrived at by Gurr and Feierabend and Feierabend which were challenged later on by scholars who attempted to study Gurr's and Feierabend and Feierabend's conclusions at individual level rather than at system level. They maintained if deprivation and frustration is the cause of political violence then participants would be more prone to

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[33] Ibid., pp.12-13.

deprivation or frustration than non-participants. But, however, their propositions could not be materialized at large scale. Among the scholars, Paige who observed 274 Blacks participated in the riots in New Haven, New Jersey in 1968 comes to the conclusion that rioting is loosely organized form of political protest which is not related to personal frustration and deprivation for most of the time. Similarly, Sears and McConahay also maintain the same line of thought suggesting riots are not personally oriented deprivations or frustration. Thus micro-oriented investigation holds that participation in the violent political activities is not related to the deprivation-frustration thesis.[34]

6) Non-Psychologically Oriented Causal Explanation of the Sources of Domestic Conflict Behavior

Various attempts have been made by political scientists who dealt with political instability in their own ways while dealing with non-psycho-oriented causal approaches. In this regard, Madian makes an assertion that excessive social stability leads to political instability[35]. Similarly, Passos claims that close society leads to the possibility of instability[36]. In the same way, Weinert makes responsible the policies of the rulers for instability which are strongly despised by the ruled.[37] While Horowitz and Miller believe that low level of 'regime legitimacy' is the most important source of political instability.[38]Moreover, Cockcroft et al is of the view that economic disparity is the cause of political instability.[39]

There are some others who opine corruption, political participation, urbanization and development of economy to be factors of both stability and instability. It is, therefore,

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[34] Ibid., pp.13-14.
[35] Ibid., pp.15.
[36] A.Passos, *Development Tension and Political Instability: Testing Some Hypothesis Concerning Latin America, Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 7, 1968, pp. 79-86.
[37] R.S. Weinert, *Violence in Pre-Industrial Societies: Rural Colombia, American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60, 1966, pp.340-47.
[38] David Sanders, *Pattern of Political Instability*, London: the Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981, p.15.
[39] J. Cockcroft, A. Frank and D. Johnson, *Difference and Underdevelopment Latin America: Political Economy*, New York: Anchor Books, 1972, p.50.

Flanigan and Fogelman believe that economic growth reduces the possibility of political violence and instability. Similarly, Lerner, Cnudde and Mecrone claim that political participation also reduces the possibility of political instability.[40]

In this approach, the studies undertaken important to be mentioned are those of Flanigan and Fogelman, Snyder and Tilly and Hibbs. Snyder and Tilly argue that low level economic deprivation such as 'a food prices index, a cost of manufactured goods index and index of industrial products'[41] gives birth to political violence. Thus they reject the deprivation-frustration-aggression thesis on the basis that the ingredients of the said theory do not have any significant impact as compared to low level of economic deprivation. Similarly, Hibbs who conducted analysis of coups, political violence and internal war of 108 nations facing political instability came up with concrete findings which could describe political instability of the state in possible terms. It is maintained that although these approaches differ in pinpointing the determinants of instability yet they either reject or overlook deprivation-frustration-aggression thesis. However, the causal determinants of political instability/stability refer to different types of Instability/stability; which present problems in defining the term in precise manner.[42]

As regards the fragmentation of political parties, it is said that in any democratic set up, political parties are necessary institutions which do perform many functions. These functions consist of mass participation in political process, aggregation of different political interests, smooth transfer of political power, promotion of accountability and making the way for good governance and service delivery. It is generally agreed that the given function could not be achieved if the political parties do not themselves show democratic ideals within and outside

[40] David Sanders, *Pattern of Political Instability*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988, P. 15.
[41] Ibid., p.18.
[42] Ibid., pp.19-14.

while coming into contact with the masses. Thus intra-party democracy is inevitable for growth and functioning of democratic institution keeping in view that: it encourages culture of critical debate and discussion on various issues, thus promoting collective decision culture; it plays a vital role in furtherance of party unity, thus avoiding the chance of factionalism and fragmentation; it creates internal crisis management system; finally it reduces the authoritarianism in the party. If the party does not believe in intra-democracy, it would face institutional and operational challenges[43]. These challenges further go deep if a state does not enjoy 'ethno-linguistic homogeneity'[44].

In the case of Pakistan, political parties are scattered along with ethnic, regional, religious lines and are clan based. Therefore, they are highly prone to fractionalization. Political parties in Africa loosely identify themselves with a specific social group. The reason is that they could easily be driven for their purpose i.e. to have power while exploiting their problems. Majority of African political parties are suffered from weak institutional structure sharing power between respective leaderships and their wealthy members who funds the party. Similarly, personality cult and loyalty to the party leader are also the characteristics of African political parties. Top to down hierarchy which has been inherited from colonial legacy is found in East African political parties wherein decision making is highly centralized. There is no chance for an ordinary member to participate in deliberation regarding decision making.[45] It is, therefore, political parties are autocratic in nature and imposed their decision on party members without their consent. If we extend the given thought to Pakistan, it speaks volume about the party politics of Pakistan.

Similarly, Dr.Ibrahim El Amin forwards the following indicators for Sudanese political

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[43] Josh Maiya, *Political Parties and Intra-Party Democracy in East Africa: Consideration for Democratic Consolidation,* African Studies Collection, vol. 26, 2008, p.32.
[44] Ibid., p,32.
[45] Ibid., pp.33-37.

parties' fragmentation. These indicators include: lack of democracy and institutionalization in the political parties; unqualified political leadership; role of Military regime; absence of acceptable government/regime; elite struggle for power; economic conditions.[46] In the same way, internal democracy is essential for keeping the political party intact from fragmentation. It is not possible to flourish democracy in the state if the political parties do not themselves respect democracy as it is said that charity begins at home. All these factors constitute weaknesses of political parties which pave the way for their failure as agents of democracy.[47]

2.4 Eclectic Theoretical Framework

So far various thoughts reduced to writing by different political scientists constituting their respective approaches or frameworks in respect of political instability suitable to the particular context in sights have been discussed. On the basis of those approaches, different types of political instabilities have been discussed. Similarly, different thoughts about the fragmentation of political party also have been discussed. It is important to note that the researcher develops an eclectic framework based on the original sources with little bit modification there and then for the purpose of the current research. He derives intra-democracy in political party thesis from Josh Maiya's article, *Political Parties and Intra-Party Democracy in East Africa: Consideration for Democratic Consolidation,* in which the author is of the view that political parties are the essential element of democratic process. It provides the masses with an opportunity to associate themselves with the government and to have performed their respective role in the promotion of democracy. To have incorporated the stated function of the political parties, the author conceives of intra-party democracy to be the essential element for consolidation of democratic culture in the society. He maintains that

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[46]Alula BerheKidani, *Fragmentation of Political Parties,*
www.sudanvisiodail.com//modules.php?name=news&filw=artical&sid=33339, retrieved on 8th Oct, 2010.
[47] Josh Maiya, *Political Parties and Intra-Party democracy in East Africa: Considerations for Democratic Consolidation,* African Studies Collection, vol. 26, 2008, p.33.

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it ensures to create the atmosphere of debate and counter-debate which is finally helpful in making joint decisions. This is how unity among party members is promoted and the chances of factionalism are avoided. Besides, it also provides the party with an amicable solution of the crisis within. Moreover, it closes the door of authoritarianism. Given the party system of East Africa, he holds that the party system in East Africa is ridden with ethno-linguistic problems unlike their counterparts in the West. It is, therefore, they are faction ridden. Majority of the parties in East Africa have weak organizational setup. The parties concerned are virtually in the hands of the party leader and of his nears and dears. Decisions are centered in the party leader and his circles of wealthy members. This state of affairs is tantamount to internal conflicts, instability, change of loyalties and culture of factions. Consequently, it mars the basic purpose of the existence of the political party which is the essence of democracy. While suggesting intra-party democracy, he is of the view that it means democracy within the party which provides every member of the party with an opportunity to express his or her opinion freely while engaging them in party decision making. He concludes that the political parties in East Africa although in theory each claims to function according to rules and regulations but in practice they do not uphold the rules and regulations of the party constitution. The selection of the party candidates and leadership is not made through holding intra-party elections. They are mainly imposed from above. The author argues that intra-party democracy can ensure democratic culture within the society if once it has been inculcated within the structure of the party.[48] The researcher derives the basic spirit of the framework from Zahid Husnain's article, *The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentive for Patronage, 1988-1999*, in which the writer argues that despite democratic setup prevailed in most of the states across the world,

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[48] Ibid., pp32-55.

there is no significant development with respect to service delivery and governance. In Pakistan the period (1988-1999) stands witness to poor service delivery while taking all fields into account. He opines that politicians do not bother about the demanding worst situation and seek to improve the lot of the people. Rather they were involved in honoring their own nears and dears which results in the poor service delivery. The author thus attempts to point out those bottle necks under which the politicians function. He extensively examines the poor conditions prevailed in education and health fields across the provinces of the state as well as analyzes political economy which generates poor governance and finally he discusses how the party system of the state plays its role to add to already deteriorated conditions and poor governance. He holds if the party system is fragmented, there prevails the politics of interest and counter-interest and real politics becomes a farce.[49] The researcher also takes certain elements of the framework from the behaviors associated with the three types of political instability which are demonstration, coups, and dismissal of government etc.[50] Besides, self-innovation is also made. Thus a theoretical framework is made which follows the following line of thought. It is held if there is no intra-party democracy, political party is bound to fragmentation, fractionalization, and polarization which result into weak government setup as politics of convenience is the high water mark in such a fragmented party system of a particular political system. Such state of affairs breeds poor governance, decay of institutions, change in civilian attitude towards the nurseries of democracy i.e. political party and many other evils which finally opens the Pandora box and the way for political instability is furnished. It is said that more fragmented the party system, greater the incentive for patronage and poor governance, and weak service delivery ultimately ensues.[51]

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[49] Zahid Husnain, *The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political parties and the Incentives for Patronage 1988-1999, the Development Review*, 42(2), 2008, pp. 139-150.

[50] David Sanders, *Pattern of Political Instability*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981, p.199.

[51]Zahid Husnain, *The Politics of Service Delivery in Pakistan: Political Parties and the Incentive for Patronage, 1988-1999,the Development Review*, 42(2), 2008, p.129.

Diagrammatic Representation of the Argument

2.5 Conclusion

After studying political instability and party fragmentation at length, we come to the point that defining political instability into concrete and precise terms is not an easy job. A multitude of political scientists and sociologists have made attempts to define it accurately but nobody could succeed in delivering a single transparent thought out definition which might have received universal recognition and acceptance. They approached to define it keeping in sight the particular context in which it kept their attention engaged. However, they are agreed on the point that it is a Herculean task to define it accurately. Besides, they are divided on the factors (behaviors) of the political instability in their organization. Some have attempted to organize those factors (behaviors) in groups as indicators of general types of instability and some have studied those factors (behaviors) independently as indicators of a particular type of political instability. On the basis of this, it is pertinent to mention that political scientists are divided on types of political instability. Hence, majority believe that there are different types of instability except Lipset.

Although contradictions existed among them do worth of discussion yet it is rational to claim that we are dealing with political system. Therefore, Eastonian dimensions of political system consisting of regime and government instability which is either existed in changes in government or regime or challenges to government or regimes. Therefore, we can say that three dimensions or types of political instability which could be operationalized through their respective indicators are regime instability, government instability or community instability with changes in or challenges to each type either peaceful or violence in shape.

In the same way, political parties are prone to fragmentation or faction if they do not believe in democracy giving way to internal tension, which is dramatized in the form of forward bloc and finally a separate political party is floated. It is said that intra-party democracy is a

cohesive force that keeps a party intact. Besides, it strengthens other democratic institutions. If there is no intra-party democracy in the state, politics of convenience and horse trading become the order of the day in the state. Fragmentation multiplies political parties into multitude of small factions which could not stand on their own unless and until they inter into alliances with others similar parties. Such alliances are often made on compromises in power paradigm. In such kinds of situations, no real politics could be expected. Besides, they are exploited at the hands of non-political actors for their little political gains. As a result, they shatter the confidence of the public who begin to look for someone who might provide them with best alternative. It is, therefore, claimed that intra-party democracy is essential for the survival of political parties as well as of other democratic institutions.

Chapter 3

Political Instability in the Pre-1990 Era: An Historical Analysis

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, political instability in the pre-1990 Era is analyzed in detail. Pakistan was established in uneven circumstances. There was complete dearth of resources required to maintain the existence of the nascent polity. It received a huge influx of immigrants whose settlement posed gigantic problems. Besides, the polity had been faced with security problems in the presence of meager defense resources in men and materials. As a result of the early departure of the Quaid-e-Azam, the state suffered from the crisis of leadership. The late generation of the leaders possessed no stature of the Father of the Nation so that they could meet the challenges faced to the polity in terms of security, constitution-making, settlement of immigrants etc. Unfortunately, the conflicts and feuds among the leaguers and the collaboration of the civil and military bureaucracy put the state virtually on the brink of collapse. As a result of their failures, the state bore the brunt of the Martial Law in 1958 which became a tradition in the years to come. Consequently, democracy was not allowed to flourish in the state. The debacle of East Pakistan and the Balochistan crisis had been a blatant show of overriding democratic norms and principles. In 1970s, although democracy was given chance but the authoritarianism of the regime provided the military with an opportunity to derail democracy. In 1985, democracy was permitted to take breath but soon committed to death when it started asserting itself. In the pre-1990 Era, the elections held had not been devoid of rigging. In each election, the so called democratic forces in alliance with undemocratic forces violated the norms and principles of the elections. Similarly, the role of political parties had not been worth mentioning. They conspired with and supported the undemocratic forces to derail the elected governments. Besides, ethnic and sectarian problems had been of high magnitude in which thousands of people killed. In 1980s, the

polity saw unprecedented growth of sectarianism.

3.2 The Period of Uncertainty

Pakistan took its birth amid an atmosphere of chaos and uncertainty. The newly born state lost its leadership, the moment it was flapping its wings to take its solo flight. It was left at the mercy of situation. It had no one worth of the leadership who could bring it out of twilight into the broad daylight. In such state of affairs, it was rudderless. It was, therefore, destined to meet with despondencies and discrepancies. Since independence, the state was faced with an acute problem of nation-building necessary for consensus development on the establishment of parliamentary system with the federal set up. Moreover, this problem of nation-building was deepened by steep ethnic divide, the role of ambitious political and non-political forces and the influence of the external powers. In the same way, the military involvement, off and on, also made the circumstances drive from bad to worse. Thus in the polity, there always remained a perpetual struggle between the authoritarianism and the constitutionalism.[52]

Another problem that rendered the polity with uncertainty was of weak political party system. There was no well-organized political party which did have an impact on the state-building at the time of independence. It was stated that on account of the absence of national political parties, Pakistan had not been able to create stable and consensus based political culture necessary to solidarity.[53] The APML, which achieved Pakistan, had never been able to break the yoke of the nationalist movement and achieve the status of mass party. It failed to lead the nation towards democracy, constitutionalism, and institution-building. It did not promote the culture of intra-party debate, and was in the control of a group of few people who established it in 1906. Its claim of the sole spokesman of the Muslims of India was frequently challenged

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[52] Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, London: Sage Pub, 2007, p.xii.
[53] M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958*, Islamabad: NCHCR, 1976, p.79

by many other organizations which were fighting for independence but did not support the idea of separation. It was in 1937, that the AIML got popularity in the Punjab and Bengal which had been the Muslim majority provinces. A multitude of politician joined it from 1941-1947, but it is needed to be mentioned that those politicians never worked together as a team. As a result, the leaguers had been lacking in cooperation and discipline. It was stated that the politics of the Muslims during the Pakistan Movement was not devoid of intrigues, bickering, and personal rivalry among the groups and the individuals.[54]In addition to, parliamentary system is best suitable to the society which is homogenous in all respect but Pakistan was culturally, physically, and socially heterogeneous. It was, therefore, materialization of parliamentary system was a cry in wilderness in the initial days of the polity.[55]Moreover, the states which constituted Pakistan had been governed right from New Delhi during the British India. Therefore, there was no central government existed in the said provinces. It was, therefore, after the independence, Pakistan had no other option than to seek support from the civil bureaucracy which was well trained in British authoritarianism. Besides, the ill-organized machinery of the APML and the politicians with weak or no support at all from the provinces also helped the civilian bureaucracy play its role in the national politics. Despite extreme economic problems, administrative and political problems, and settlement of refugees etc, Pakistan sustained its very existence but failed to institute true democratic polity at the cost of civil-military bureaucracy support. Though, the support of the civil-military bureaucracy saved Pakistan from collapse in the early years of its existence but it proved fatal, later on, to the establishment and development of political institutions and political processes.[56]Furthermore, this weld up of the civil and military bureaucracy in the

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[54] K.J.Newman, *Pakistan Preventive Autocracy and its Causes*, Pacific Affairs, Vol. Xxvii, No.1, 1959, p.20.
[55] Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan*, the Middle East Journal, Vol. xiii, No.4, 1959, p.389.
[56] Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, London: Sage Pub, 2007, pp.3-4.

politics made the people ignorant of the process of institution-building and of inculcating a sense of participation in the diversified society which had been the high water mark in the last stages of the freedom movement.[57]

The demise of the Quaid-e-Azam in Sep 1948 created great vacuum of leadership. This vacuum was further widened with the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in Oct 1951 at Liaqat Bagh in Rawalpindi. In such state of affairs, the polity was in dire need of leadership which could steer her through the problems confronting her at the moment. The later generation of leaders had no stature of their predecessors. Besides, bureaucratic role in active politics also deepened the crisis of leadership. It is worth mentioning that bureaucratic role was not a novel phenomenon in the political history of Pakistan. They did play their role even during the time of the Quaid-e-Azam as there was no alternative available to him in the form of trained politicians who could administer the newly born state effectively. The only option was of bureaucrats who were thoroughly trained in administration and statecraft. Under such circumstances, the Quai-e-Azam had to make decision regarding substituting politicians by bureaucrats. The successive governments also followed the same traditions set by the Father of the Nation. Thus they had been provided with an opportunity to establish their hold on the politics of the polity.[58] Moreover, after the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan, the bureaucrats became the sole leaders of the state. As a result, a strong relation of civil-military bureaucracy emerged which virtually reigned the state in the days to come. Thus in the early two decades, the cynosure of power rested with the civil servants rather than with politicians.[59] The moment political forces and the political institutions became weak; bureaucracy acquired an edge over them. Thus reducing them to a point where they did not

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[57] Hasan Askari Rizvi, *State and Society in Pakistan*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, pp.57-58.
[58] Khalid Bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, Boston: Houghton Miffin Co, 1967, pp.62-63.
[59] Hamza Alavi, *Class and State*, in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (Edts), *Pakistan: the Roots of Dictatorship*, Delhi: the Oxford University Press, 1983, p.72.

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have any say in the affairs of the state. Consequently, the bureaucrats ruled in succession. Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat, became Governor General in Oct 1951, who was succeeded by Iskander Mirza, a bureaucrat, in Aug 1955. Thus they set a tradition for bureaucracy to perform its role on permanent basis in alliance with army.[60] Moreover, the bureaucrat-turned-politicians in alliance with military conspired with the landlords, industrialists, and feudals in order to exploit the differences among the political forces. As a result, the process of division among them further gained momentum.[61]Their malign designs had been exposed when in 1954 the political leaders attempted to curtail the powers of the Governor General as were envisaged in the draft of the constitution. According to which the Governor General would be reduced to nominal Head of the state. In retaliation, the Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly and dismissed government. The matter further presented a dismal picture when the act of the Governor General had been legalized by the Apex Court. This sad episode left scars on democracy in the polity.[62]Although, the polity aspired for democracy and struggled hard to establish it but it had never been left to implant democracy due to internal intrigues and personal biasness. Thus the spirit of democracy had been maligned or mutilated during the period (1947-1958) in the absence of general elections, viable political participation via political parties, and power virtually held by bureaucratic-military oligarchy.[63]

The foremost problem the state had to face in the early days of its existence was of delay in framing a constitution, a necessary document for the regulation of a state political system. In this connection, there were two main hurdles need a special attention. One was that of the

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[60] Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p.71.
[61] Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: the Origin of Pakistan Political Economy of Defense*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.296.
[62] Allen Mc Grath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, Karachi: the Oxford University press, 1996, pp.102-117.
[63]Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, London: Sage Pub, 2007, pp.1-2.

disagreement between the two wings of the state over representation of the respective wings whereas the other one was that of the question of whether the future constitution should be religious or secular in characteristics. Similarly, the factor of geography was also one of the problems in the way of constitutional development. The two wings of the state were situated at about one thousand mile away from each other. Besides, the eastern wing was a big province with a large population as compared to the provinces of the western wing. In the presence of such circumstances, the western wing was hesitant to succumb to the majority of the eastern wing in the parliament. These differences persisted for long. Resultantly, the state took nine years to frame a constitution. Thus the state framed its first constitution in 1956 after hectic efforts. However, a way for the domination of the western wing in quasi-federal structure had been furnished. This disparity finally paved the way for bifurcation.[64]

Another problem of high magnitude, the newly born state had been faced with in the early days, was the huge influx of refugees and their settlement that had virtually endangered its very survival with instability. To provide these homeless and penniless with shelter was an uphill journey. The migration was all of a sudden and nobody was prepared beforehand to receive the mass exodus of such level. As a result, a lot of sufferings were destined to escalate.[65]Up to 1955, about seven million immigrants migrated to West Pakistan and 5.6 million Hindus and Sikhs migrated to India.[66]To accommodate such a heavy influx of the immigrants was not possible for a state like Pakistan in the presence of scanty resources at its disposal.

In its formative phase, the polity was devoid of basic statecrafts inevitable for the state machinery. There was no secretariat for the proper transaction of the business of the

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[64] Dr. Noor ul-Haq, *Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects*, Islamabad: IPRI Journal x, No. 1, 2010, pp.5-7.

[65] Ibid., pp.3-4,

[66] Viqar Ahmad and Rashid Amjad, *The Management of Pakistan's Economy: 1947-1982*, Karachi: the Oxford University Press, 1984, p.71.

government. There was no Central Bank to dispense with the problems of the state. Besides, in the absence of strong military, the state was at the mercy of Indian aggressive policies.[67]Moreover, the presence of the democratic culture is inevitable for a stable polity. It could be possible only when the people of the state are educated or at least politically conscious. Unfortunately, literacy in Pakistan was not praiseworthy at the time of its independence and deteriorated even further when Hindus and Sikhs departed. It was held that 95% illiteracy in the polity was reckoned at the time of independence. It acted as a big obstacle to the development of democratic society. Besides, economic problems and feudalism were great hindrances in the way of education and its expansion.[68] Among the prime problems in those unfortunate years the state had been passing through, soaring poverty and dearth of resources were special to ponder upon. The areas that constituted Pakistan today had been situated near the borders during the British India and always used to be under the enemy's threat of invasion. It was, therefore, the government of the British India did not spend a penny on the uplift of the areas. Besides, the Hindus and the Sikhs, who possessed wealth, used to send their wealth to the central India. All these state of affairs contributed towards poverty of the areas.[69] In simple words, they could be better named as 'economic desert'[70.] Thus in the presence of an acute poverty, the region was at the brink of instability.

With the establishment of Pakistan on 14th Aug, 1947, the immediate problem the polity met with was the question of its survival and security. Indian leadership launched a severe propaganda campaign that Pakistan was the question of a few days. Most of the leaders of the

[67] I.H. Qureshi, *A Short History of Pakistan*, Karachi: University of Karachi, 1967, p.288.
[68] Noor ul-Haq, *Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects*, Islamabad: IPRI Journal x, No. 1, 2010, p.4.
[69] Ibid., p.5.
[70] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*, London: Yale University Press, 2007, p.101.

Congress particularly Nehru adopted a stern attitude claiming that Pakistan was not viable politically, economically, geographically, militarily, and soon it would reincorporate into India.[71] Moreover, internal and external threats to the polity very entity were of immediate concern at the time of its independence. The immediate threat it harbored was from Indian that tried her best to destabilize the state. Invasion on Kashmir was a step towards such motif. On internal front, the state was suffering from religious extremism, and ethnicity. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (1951), the Anti-Qaidani Movement (1953), and the declaration of the separation of the State of Kalat (1958) were cases in point which kept the polity at the threshold of instability.[72] Thus in the early years of its existence, the polity was faced with circumstances that had virtually kept it almost politically unstable.

3.3 The Doctrine of Necessity

The doctrine of necessity had been a decisive role in the demolishing and defacing the rule of constitution in the political history of Pakistan. It was an attempt under which the judiciary, the guardian of the constitution, validated frequently the unconstitutional acts of the military and civilian dictators in the name of national interest while extending rationale in support of their unconstitutional acts that so and so situation prevailed in the polity necessitated the act in order to defuse that very situation. It made its way into the legal and constitutional vocabulary of Pakistan during 1950s when the then Chief Justice Muhammad Munir in his judgment justified the unconstitutional act of Ghulam Muhammad while going against the verdict of the Sind High Court. In a way of explanation, it was noted that Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the National Assembly. As a result, the Speaker of the Assembly Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan challenged his act in the Sind High Court. The Court decided the

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[71] M. Ikram Rabbani, *Pakistan Affairs*, Lahore: Caravan Pub, 2007, p.120.
[72] Noor ul-Haq, *Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects*, Islamabad: IPRI Journal x, No. 1, 2010, p.13.

case in favor of the Speaker. Consequently, the Governor General challenged the verdict of the High Court in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Apex Court acted the other way round while declaring the decision of the High Court as null and void. It validated the act of the Governor General legal and constitutional on account of circumstances prevailed in the state which necessitated the very act.[73] In this way, the Governor General became able to thwart democratic norms and principles. Thus the doctrine of necessity became a practice in the polity while providing legal cover to the illegal and unconstitutional acts of the subsequent dictators and their turn and twist made to the constitution. Iskander Mirza, General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan, and General Zia ul-Haq took mileage of the doctrine while validating their undemocratic moves in their respective regimes in collaboration with Judiciary.[74] In the same way, the doctrine also provided legal cover to General Ayub Khan's coup on 7th Oct, 1958. It was for the second time when Justice Muhammad Munir validated the supra-constitutional act of the General. Similarly, when Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto challenged General Zia take over, the court once again gave its verdict in support of illegal and unconstitutional act while explaining what General Zia ul-Haq did on 5th July, 1977, was the demand of the time. It was, therefore, his act was constitutional and legal in the large interest of the nation.[75]

3.4 The Military Interventions

By democratic government is meant rule by the representatives of the people who bestow their mandate upon them through general franchise. Pakistan and India achieved their respective independence from the British adopting the Government of India Act (1935) as a system of rule erstwhile. Similarly, both of the states also inherited the same civil, military,

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[73] _____, *Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan V the Federation of Pakistan*, Sind: PLD, 1955, p.96.

[74] Iqbal.S.Hussain, *Pakistan: A Proud but Failing State*, Lahore: Meraj Printers, 2007, pp.132-133.

[75] Mirza Saleem, *Political Instability in Pakistan: Causes, Effects, and Solutions*, 26th Dec, 2010, http://www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compulsory-subjects/essay/42679-political-instability-pakistan-causes-effects-solutions.html, retrieved on 3rd Oct, 2011.

and legal legacies. Despite such similarities, Pakistan had never been remained a stable democratic polity. In the polity, power alternated between the civil and military. In such state of situation, military stands prominent ruled the state for almost 32 years.[76] In March 1953, Majlas Amal of religious parties launched a country wide movement against Ahmadis. The alliance was consisted of the JI, Majlas Ahrar, the JUI, the JUP, and many other religious parties. The Majlas Amal started its agitation in Karachi and later on took Lahore in its fold. It demanded of the authority Ahmadis to be declared Non-Muslim. Demonstrations and run and strike became the order of the day. The Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin sent Iskander Mirza, the then Defense Minister, to Lahore in order to see the situation prevailed in the city. He recommended to the government Martial Law to be imposed in the city after having consultation with General Azam Khan, Commander of the 10th Division. This Martial Law was only meant to help the civilian government through the crisis. But this brief military intervention in the civil affairs provided the military with an opportunity to meddle with the political affairs of the state in the years to come.[77]

Pakistan emerged out of the struggle of Muslims stretched over years against the British Raj. Since its creation, the Quaid-e-Azam, the founder of Pakistan, visualized Pakistan a democratic polity but the later generation of the politicians after his demise overlooked his aspiration and involved themselves in petty issues and feuds. They did not even hesitate to involve military in the active politics for personal interests. This involvement of the military foreboded the military coups in the polity. As a result, the state had borne the brunt of four military coups so far. The first military coup was imposed by General Ayub Khan in 1958, 2nd in 1969 by General Yahya Khan, 3rd in 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq, and General Pervez

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[76] Dr. Noor ul-Haq, *Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects*, Islamabad: IPRI Journal x, No. 1, 2010, pp.1-2.

[77] Lt. General Jahandad khan, *Pakistan: Qiyadat ka Buhran*, Lahore: Jang Publishers, 2002, p.46.

Musharraf comes fourth in the sequence of the undemocratic rule. However, it is a million dollar question why military intervention in Pakistan is so rampant. Among many reasons in the way of answer, there are two perceptions maintained in this regard. One is that of the failure of the political leaders who in thine and mine business did not allow democracy to take roots in the polity whereas the other one is that of the dominating role of the USA in the politics of the polity in alliance with the military in order to fulfill her strategic objectives. Right from General Ayub Khan through General Zia ul-Haq to General Pervez Musharraf, the military governments have been in alliance with her. Sometimes in cold war politics while another time in the name of Jihad against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and still another time under the label of war on terror.[78]Moreover, the period 1958-1971 under military rulers was of turbulent in which the state fought wars with India as well as lost its eastern wing. Similarly, the elected government was toppled and 3rd Martial Law was imposed on 5th July, 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq. He used religion as a vehicle in order to immortalize his rule. It was this period in which seeds of sectarianism is claimed to be sowed. After the demise of General Zia in an air crash, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif ruled alternatively but neither of them completed their respective tenures in office. At last democracy was once again rolled back by General Pervez Musharraf on 12th Oct, 1999.[79]

3.5 Bureaucratic Hegemony

Since independence, the state had been virtually ruled by civil-military bureaucracy for almost 45 years. The long chain of this civil-military rule starts with Ghulam Muhammad (1951-1955), Iskander Mirza (1955-1958), General Ayub Khan (1958-1969), General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969-1971), General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988),

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[78] Afor Pineapple, *Challenges to Democracy in Pakistan*, 19th Oct, 2010,
http://www.bukisa.com/articles/377332_challenges-to-democracy-in-pakistan, retrieved on 3rd Dec, 2010.
[79] ____, *the Question of stability in Pakistan*, ____, http://www.bbc.co.uk, retrieved on 4th Dec, 2011.

Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-1993), and culminated with General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). They used to conceive politician as incapable. It was, therefore, they thought themselves appropriate to rule the country specifically by their own whims. Moreover, the civil-military bureaucracy held responsible politicians for their incapability who failed to keep under control the movement against the Ahmadis in the Punjab in 1953. As a result, the Ahmadis and their assets were under attack in Lahore. The provincial Secretary ordered General Azam Khan, the Station Commander of 10th Division, to impose Martial Law in order to save Lahore from the religious obscurantism.[80]The imposition of Martial Law in Lahore was sort of warm up for the Martial Laws imposed in the history of the state. Thus since independence Pakistan had been in the grip of civil-military bureaucracy using political demigods as vehicles for ensuring their own way to power paradigms. The incapability of the politicians was witness to the fact that just in short period of seven years (1951-1958) the state had to replace seven Prime Ministers. Similarly, the period (1988-1999) had been a filthy scar on the political history of the state where political leadership failed in total on account of corruption, incapability, worst law and order situation etc. As a result, the state was virtually ruled by civil-military bureaucracy in the presence of weak political parties and inefficient political leadership. Finding the situation favorable, the civil-military bureaucracy became victorious in ousting the elected governments in their respective periods.[81] Thus the role of bureaucracy, since independence, had been hegemonic. Besides, its role had been the story of conspiracy, malpractices, nepotism and personal gains. The object i.e. functionaries of the government, which bureaucracy was supposed to play had been missing in the polity.

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[80] Dr. Noor ul-Haq, *Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects*, Islamabad: IPRI Journal x, No. 1, 2010, pp.10-11.
[81] Ibid., p.11.

3.6 The Crisis of East Pakistan

Although the East Pakistan played a vital role in Pakistan Movement but differences emerged between the East and West Pakistan. One thousand mile distance separated both the wings of the State. In between the state of the enemy existed. There was no people to people contact. Therefore, differences were bound to rise due to the incapability of the politicians and in the absence of constitution. Politically the people of East Pakistan were suffering from despondency and considering themselves colonized. Besides, the behavior of the officers of the West Pakistan was also dictatorial. There was no senior Bengali Officers in the armed forces. The dearth of democracy, historic backwardness of the region, the role of the leaders of the East Pakistan in presenting the facts in exaggerated way, the dictatorial behavior and cold bloodedness of the leaders of the West Pakistan, preaching of Bengali nationalism, mistakes committed on both sides were among the reasons of disintegration. Was political solution possible to the problem facing the united Pakistan? The answer was in the affirmative. But it needed selfless, patriotic and committed leadership. Besides, the elections of 1970 were in itself a political solution. If the results of the elections had been acknowledged and the democratic procedure had been adopted, the incident of 1971 could be averted. The leaders of the mandated parties of the East and West Pakistan thought only in terms of themselves putting aside the national interest. They adopted policy of confrontation rather than of reconciliation which finally resulted into the disintegration of the polity. A question arises. Was the military action inevitable? In a way of answer, there is a big no. If the political leaders of both the wings had acted upon the policy of love and sacrifice, give and take, there would not have been any need of military action. Military action gave birth to hatred. The President could take a decisive political action but he did not want to dishearten the leadership of the mandated political party of the West Pakistan. Without any argument, it could be said that the incident of 1971 was the failure of civilian leadership who upheld their

own interests at the cost of democratic norms and principles.[82]

The AL and the PPP were opposed to one another on account of the personality cult of their leadership. Both of them were of regional and afraid of one another's domination. They used to prefer their own party interests to national interests. In the presence of such pasture adopted by both the parties all means of reconciliation were far from materialization. With the passage of time, doubt and lack of trust upon one another went on to increase. As a result, both the parties failed to exhibit elasticity in their demands and adopted hard stances in the days to come which further aggravated the circumstances.[83]After the elections, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto declared that there had been three forces in Pakistan i.e. the armed forces, the AL and the PPP. Now it was the need of the time that there should be two Prime Ministers one for East Pakistan while the other one for West Pakistan.[84] His assertion was tantamount to separation and even more dangerous than Sheikh Mujeeb's Six Point. When the Indian army was about to encircle Dhaka, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Minister of General Yahya Khan, left for the meeting of the Security Council which had been called in lieu of Pakistan-India conflict. All the members of the UN were united except the USSR and India on ceasefire. The ceasefire could save the state from humiliation because Dhaka was not surrendered as yet. Poland with the support of the USSR moved the resolution in the Security Council on 10th Dec, 1971. The resolution could have saved Pakistan from surrender which was done six days later on. However, the Foreign Minister failed to attend the meeting on account of suffering from cold and preferred to stay at hotel in New York. The whole world was waiting for the appearance of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan but he made his appearance on 15th Dec, the day when India marched on to Dhaka. The time was not lost as

[82] General Rao Farman Ali, *Pakistan do Lakht Kaisay Hoa*, Lahore: Jang Publishers, 2000, pp.15-19.
[83] Sisson and Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh*, in, General Rao Farman Ali, *Pakistan do Lakht Kaisay Hoa*, Lahore: Jang Publishers, 2000, p.202.
[84] Muhammad Azghar Khan, *We've Learnt Nothing from History*, Karachi: the Oxford University Press, 2005, p.33.

yet but Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Speech had been more appropriated to the public meeting at Mochi Gate than a speech in the Security Council. He rejected the idea of ceasefire and said that Pakistan could fight for a thousand years tearing his speech while leaving the Security Council. This role on the part of the Foreign Minister was not befitting to circumstances where the state integrity had been at stake.[85]He was not prepared to acknowledge the majority of the AL. He went on to say that majority alone did not matter in national politics. He further said that neither any constitution could be framed nor any government at the center could be run without his party's cooperation. Besides, he elaborated that he would not sit on the opposition benches.[86] In such state of affairs, none of the politicians played his role purely in terms of national interests which finally culminated into the disintegration of the united Pakistan. In other words, the circumstances that led to the separation of East Pakistan were not tantamount to a conspiracy against the united Pakistan but to a conspiracy hatched out against democracy and democratic norms and principles which were not allowed to take roots in the polity.

3.7 Z.A Bhutto and Power Politics

Despite many landmarks i.e. the promulgation of 1973 constitution, putting the state on Nuclear path, the establishment of KRL at Rawalpindi in 1976, to his credit, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had been dethroned unceremoniously in a bloodless coup on 5th July, 1977. Thus the country once again was reverted to dictatorship after having experienced brief respite from autocracy. However, a question arises why Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's government was toppled down. In a bid of explanation, his ways of politics have been analyzed which made the people especially the politicians antagonistic across the polity. Authoritative in nature, Zulfiqar Ali

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[85] Ibid, pp.51-52

[86] Dr. M. Nazrul Islam, *Pakistan and Malaysia: A Comparative Study in National Integration*, Sterling Pub, p.164.

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Bhutto never possessed soft corner for non-PPP government. His authoritarianism reflected in his attempt of dismissing the government of the NAP in Balochistan and N.W.F.P simultaneously on charges of anti-state activities in collaboration with Kabul (Afghanistan) and New Delhi (India). Besides, the 1973 constitution was frequently amended in a bid to have unlimited powers.[87]In a way of strengthening his position, he did not tolerate the politics of opposition. It was, therefore, he banned the NAP and acquired its approval from the Supreme Court. Thus his regime was intolerable to democratic opposition for which did not matter what method needed to be employed.[88] Moreover, his decision regarding Khan Abdul Wali Khan to be trialed on charges of anti-state activities had been thought to be the carbon copy of Agartala Conspiracy Case instituted by General Ayub Khan against Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rahman.[89]His too much dependence on the military exposed his vulnerability as a politician. The operation against the Baloch in 1973-1977 proved decisive for his dismissal. Although the army carried out the operation at the directives of his Defense Minister General Tika Khan and him but it provided an opportunity to the army to return to the political arena as it became aware of the weaknesses of the civilian government.[90]

In a meeting with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in the beginning of 1970, Air Martial Muhammad Azghar Khan (Retired) was reported to have remarked that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, while offering him an invitation of joining his party, said if we joined hands, we both could perform wonders touring the state in different directions. The moment we reach Rawalpindi, General Yahya Khan would receive us at the station and we will then rule together. I asked him what his programme was. At this enquiry, he smiled and remarked 'the programme is to rule. The people are stupid and I know how to befool them. I will have the danta (stick) in my hand and

[87] Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, London: Sage Pub, 2007, p.38.
[88] Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1978, pp.324-330.
[89] Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia*, ___: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.123.
[90] Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive*, UK: Random House, 1998, p. 123.

no one will be able to remove us for twenty years'.[91]His exposition stands witness to his philosophy of politics. In the same way, the FSF (a forerunner of Peoples Guard) was another coercive measure adopted primarily to suppress the political opposition and invariably used to thwart the political meetings of the opponents. He himself exposed the black face of the FSF in a meeting with Muhammad Azghar Khan in 1969 at his own residence in Larkana (Sind) while upon the enquiry of the latter about the four persons standing close together with their heads down in the far corner of the lawn. He said that three among them were the potential candidates for the PPP new security force i.e. FSF, and added that the PPP had been a militant party and organization like FSF was, therefore, necessary.[92]

Another dangerous move made by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was his undue interference in bureaucracy. He dismissed four hundred civil servants without any inquiry and reason. By 1977, he thought himself strong enough, so he decided to have fresh mandate from the public. It was, therefore, he announced new elections. In the elections, his party, the PPP, emerged as the most mandated one. The combined opposition denied the results of the elections and tagged it to be rigged. As a result, they agitated against the government in every nook and corner of the state. The religious section of the society also joined hands with the opposition. In order to appease the Ulema, he banned alcohol and gambling. Besides, he declared Ahmadis Non-Muslims. But all these measures did not work and he did his best to contain the situation but failed miserably in his endeavor.[93]Last but not the least, his rule was significant not only that it was the first civilian government after the longest spell of the military but also the longest civilian government in power of the polity. Unfortunately, his authoritarian way of rule paved the way for the military to come into the power once again.

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[91] Muhammad Azghar Khan, *We've Learnt Nothing from History*, Karachi: the Oxford University Press, 2005, p.60.
[92] Ibid., pp.83-84.
[93] Roedad Khan, *Pakistan: A Dream Gone Sour*, Karachi: the Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.65-66.

As a result, the military coup, on 5th July 1977, derailed democracy once again and pushed the state into the gallows of dictatorship.[94]

3.8 Lack of Charismatic Leadership

Charisma, in simple words, is defined as the sum total of gestures or images made by a political leader to a receptive audience. The images may include the waving of a hand, rising of hands, a sweep of flag or chadder, throwing of cap or flowers etc. in order to exhibit an intimate relationship with audience. Thus charisma is a sort of psychological association in which the audiences, without any difficulty, understand the message which their leader wants to convey through employing visual images or rising specific slogan. This creates a sort of magical situation in which a leader and an audience share emotional unity i.e. assuming a figure whose aspirations and wishes become one. It removes the psychological barrier that keeps the leader and their followers apart. It finally paves the way for the glorification of the leader as a deity. It is, therefore, people extend their devotion to him or her and take his or her every word equal to religious revelation. They start looking in him or her Masihah who could fulfill their aspirations and desires. Thus they all envision their leader as a vision personified. Now a question strikes a mind how charisma could be scaled or measured. To make the question simple, the following three possible conceivable indicators could be employed for the determination of charisma in a leader. These indicators are consisted of incisive insight, infallible efficiency, and power to grasp and transform impossible into possible. By incisive insight is meant that sharp penetrating power of looking into matters while giving future vision to masses. Similarly, infallible efficiency is the ability to materialize what the leader promises to do without going back on his words. In the same way, the power to grasp the

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[94] Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, London: Sage Pub, 2007, p.2.

problems and aspirations of the people and possess the capability required to act for the materialization of those aspirations and objectives.[95]Thus within indicators given leadership of the unfortunate state would be weighed. It was the lack of charisma in the leaders of the polity which furnished the way for conflicts among the institutions rendered the state either with political chaos and instability or with dismemberment.

The history of Pakistan stands witness to political development where people expressed their aspiration through mass uprising while gathering around charismatic leadership. In this regard, the Quaid-e-Azam during Freedom Movement, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto during Anti-Ayub Movement and Mujeeb-ur-Rahman during East Pakistan Crisis are instances to be mentioned. All those leaders were followed blindly. It was their charisma which paved the way to lead such movements. Except the Quaid-e-Azam, the rest of the two leaders lost their charisma later on in their career and finally met with their tragic ends. Similarly, other leaders failed to show their charisma in the circumstances when the state was at loggerheads with festering problems. They, instead of seeking solutions to those problems, were engaged in petty parliamentary squabbles and thine and mine business. It was the dearth of charisma on the part of the leaders that the polity met with military coup d'états, dismemberment, economic meltdown and pre-mature dismissal of governments. It was said that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto possessed charisma and he knew how to create the charismatic relationship. During his speech, he used to put off his coat, unbutton his sleeves and once at Qaddafi Stadium (Lahore), he threw the urn of flowers at his audience and another time, he used to put a question to the audience and let them answer in loud roar. This was how Bhutto used to create symbiotic association which is the core of charisma. But after 1971, his charisma went on deteriorating while heavily depending upon the establishment and started ruling with

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[95] Akmal Hussain, *Charismatic Leadership and Pakistan's Politics,* Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24, No.3, 21st Jan, 1989, pp.136-137, http:// www.jstore.org, retrieved on 2nd Mar, 2011.

coercion putting aside the masses and their aspirations. In an interview on TV, he declared that he might be weak but his chair was strong. It signifies that how much he had become arrogant of his real power i.e. the masses. But his subsequent assassination at the hands of the military dictator regained his charisma and revived the support of the masses. His daughter, Benazir Bhutto survived with his charisma in the heart of the masses. But she failed miserably in her both terms as she had begun to depend heavily on her cronies who had no qualification other than flattery.[96]

From 1958-1969, the polity was ruled under Martial law by General Ayub Khan who had no mass support, depended heavily upon politics of social division and rewards in order to create support for his rule. Thus he shaped a political junta which supported the politics of inheritance in the state. But he miserably failed to check the agitation of the masses when people rose against him. Similarly, General Zia ul-Haq, who used to glorify himself as Amirul-Momineen and the Savior of Islam, also devoid of charisma which is the core of the genuine leadership. His rule had no legitimacy at any political definitions. It was due to this want of legitimacy that he took shelter in religion and used it as a strong device for the extension of his rule. Knowing the psyche of the common Pakistani who possesses deep devotion with Islam, he always presented himself as an embodiment of Islam. To give real shape to his tact, he played a great role in the Afghan war (1979-1988) in order to exalt himself as the savior of Islam and of the Muslim Ummah. The sole aim behind all this was to sustain his rule without rationalizing what consequences would emerge. In the same way, Benazir Bhutto who struggle against the military dictator proved herself having a little bit of charisma. But her both tenures ended in smoke as she did not deliver what she promised during her struggle for democracy. Similarly, Mian Nawaz Sharif failed miserably in both

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[96] Akmal Hussain, , *Charismatic Leadership and Pakistan's Politics*, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24, No.3, 21st Jan, 1989, pp.136-137, http:// www.jstore.org, retrieved on 2nd Mar, 2011.

terms in office. His government was tagged with corruption, judicial assault, authoritarianism, and confrontation among institutions. Thus both the civilian leadership failed due to the want of charisma and pushed the state into worse law and order situation, economic meltdown, corruption etc.[97]

3.9 The Balochistan Crisis

By democracy is meant such a governing system which is based on public representatives. In simple words, it is the government of the people, and for the people. But unfortunately, the democratically elected governments in Pakistan had been failed to implement the system with its full-fledge characteristics. Here an attempt is being made in order to determine those undemocratic means through which the issue of Balochistan had been tackled over the years. It is, therefore, essential to throw light on some historical facts so that undemocratic way of dealing the problem of Balochistan could be determined. Historically speaking, Balochistan had never been a part of the British Empire but under British Crown through various pacts in different points of time. Khan of Kalat had own Parliament known as Darul Ummara and Darul Awam as well as his own system of government. When the Cripps Mission was sent to India on 24th Mar, 1946 in order to have negotiated the mechanism for the transfer of power, Khan of Kalat after consultation with the Quaid-e-Azam, the Legal Advisor of the State, contacted the mission in order to determine the status of the State in the Independence Plan of India. Thus in conformity to the provisions of the 3rd June Plan, Khan announced the independence of Kalat in August 1947 and soon after he summoned the joint meeting of both the Houses. He proposed before the Parliament that he be given the authority regarding the accession of Kalat to Pakistan. The leaders of the Baloch were against the accession until the

[97] Abdul Qayum Khan Khundi, *Crisis of Leadership*, 22nd Mar, 2011, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C03%5C22%5Cstory_22-3-2011_pg3_5, retrieved on 12th April, 2011.

solution of the outstanding problems i.e. of the constitutional status, of the provincial autonomy, of the judicial system, of royalty on resources, of social and economic development etc. But the inclusion of years old regions of Kalat i.e. Karan, Lasbella, and Makran, into Pakistan further disheartened them. On 30th Mar, 1948, although Khan of Kalat signed the accession documents but he endorsed in his autobiography the accession as undemocratic and illegal as the accession had no validity without the consent of the Parliament of Kalat. Khan was dethroned and arrested on charges of treason. The members of his cabinet were either deported or arrested. Prince Agha Abdul Karim Khan, brother of Khan of Kalat, took refuge in mountains and encamped in Shorawak, a frontier region near Pak-Afghan border. He launched an armed resistance against the government which was the first ever resistance against the government of Pakistan. In 1949, a truce was established and peace was guaranteed under some promises. But unfortunately, the pledges were not honored. In Oct, 1957, some tribal leaders met the President Iskander Mirza and demanded the dissolution of one unit. Besides, basic rights that could best preserve the Baloch traditions were demanded. The President hailed their demands and promised to materialize them. Moreover, he promised of a referendum regarding the status of Kalat to be held so that the accession of Kalat might be made democratic and legal. However, in the meantime, Martial Law was imposed in the polity. As a result, Kalat was invaded and captured on 6th Oct, 1958. Their demands met with bullets and force. BUG, an organization established in1958 in retaliation to the government policy of one unit, embarked upon guerrilla war. Consequently, Nooroze Khan along with kith and kin took part in guerrilla war against the discriminatory policies of the government. Through his nephew, Brigadier Noor Khan furnished a truce with Nooroze Khan while taking the oath on the Holy Quran that the demands of the Baloch would be fulfilled and Nooroze Khan would be treated with grace. But the words of the truce were not honored and Nooroze khan was arrested and imprisoned who died during

imprisonment. His nephews were also arrested and awarded capital punishments. During the act of hanging, they demanded of the authorities the Holy Quran to be hanged around their necks because that was their guarantor. But their demand was not met. This was how the second Baloch resistance ended in humiliation. To fight the problem on political grounds, the NAP was established. After assuming power, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promulgated a new constitution and pledged that it would establish a real democratic system and would meet the demands of the provinces. Nawab Khair Bakhsh Mari did not signed the constitution and said that it did not fulfill the demands of the small provinces. As a result, the relations between the government of the NAP and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto suffered from deterioration. Consequently, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto went on finding reasons for the dismissal of the NAP government in Balochistan. In a bid, the federal government claimed to have identified a big cache of weapons at Embassy of Iraq in Islamabad. The weapons were brought to be used in the Liberation Movement of Balochistan. Bhutto sought to take political mileage of the matter and got the cache of weapons boarded on the train so that from Islamabad to Karachi the ill-designs of the NAP regarding the establishment of the Greater Balochistan could be proved to the public. At last, Bhutto dismissed the government of the NAP and imposed Governor Raj under Nawab Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti. As a result, a full-fledge resistance started against the government during 1973-1977, in which millions of people were killed and made homeless. Besides, the government arrested the leaders of the NAP on charges of treason who were released when second Martial Law was imposed in 1977. [98]During the period of General Zia ul-Haq, although there was no military operation in the province but no economic development was extended to the province. In order to defuse the rising demand of the Greater Balochistan, the government needed to provide the facilities which the Baloch

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[98] Sheikh Asad Rehman, Balochistan: *Jamhooriat, Mashrati wa Maashi Taraqi ka Fuqdan,___*, Sungi Foundation,__, pp.1-18.

viewed in terms of the Greater Balochistan. The stability of Pakistan had been depended only in doing so.[99]

3.10 Escalation of Ethnic and Sectarian Violence

Pakistan had been a state with multi-ethnic groups which consisted of the Punjabi, the Bengali, the Sindi, the Pakhtoon, the Balochi, and the Muhajir but the founders of the state did not take the trouble to realize the diverse social configuration of the newly born state as they had the belief that Islam does not recognize any ethnic division. It was, therefore, the APML did not pay any heed to the ethnic diversity of the polity. However, the immediate problem faced to the leaders of the APML was the growing ethnic divide between the Panjabi and the Bengali, and the Panjabi and the other ethnic groups like the Sindi and the Pakhtoon. This ethnic division provided the civil and military bureaucracy with an opportunity to take an advantage to the maximum while dominating the affairs of the state in the years to come. But the dominance of civil-military bureaucracy was meant the dominance of the Punjabi as they constituted majority in the bureaucracy.[100] Consequently, the dominance gave birth to despondency among the Bengalis. It was this despondency which provided the Bengali Separatist Movement with men and materials.

The polity of Pakistan was further pushed into the quagmire, the moment religious and secularist tendencies locked into conflict but it was noted that Pakistan had been established not to be a theocracy but a state where people would live independently in the light of democracy and its ideals; where no one would be discriminated against on the basis of religion, creed or caste.[101] In the way of justification to the above view, the Quaid-e-Azam's first speech to the first Legislative and Constituent Assembly is perceived to be highly

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[99] Ibrahim Luky, *Greater Balochistan ki Sada pir se Kaun*, Islamabad: the Daily Khabrain, 28th Feb, 2012.
[100] Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, London: Sage Pub, 2007, p.12.
[101] Dr. Noor ul-Haq, *Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects*, Islamabad: IPRI Journal x, No. 1, 2010, p.6.

appropriate. The Father of the Nation was quoted as saying 'religion or caste has nothing to do with the business of the state.'[102] His speech could be taken as an advice. Though in Objective Resolution, the demand of the religious parties was hailed but it disheartened the religious minorities. In the absence of capable leadership, a narrow minded system had been devised on the basis of supremacy of religion. Thus the system devised had been in conflict with the Quaid-e-Azam's dream of political system visualized for the polity. It was this adaptation of religion as a base in the constitution that motivated the escalation of sectarian violence.[103]Thus it virtually paralyzed the state at some points in time and created circumstances of instability.

Karachi was patterning with ethnic violence when the Muhajir (Urdu speaking immigrants from India) launched an armed struggle against the growing influence of the Sindhi and the Punjabis during 1960s. The growing influence of the Muhajir threatened the local people with identity problem on account of the active support of the government. This was also one among the reasons when mass agitation against General Ayub Khan during late 1960s was started. But the shifting of the capital to Islamabad and the introduction of quota system in Sind during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's regime, the Muhajir felt discriminated. As a result, they founded their own political party in the name of the MQM in 1985 in order to fight for their own rights. Consequently, in 1992 serious clashes erupted when they strove to have the control of the city. The army was called to flush out the miscreants. In the operation, as a result, 1500 people lost their lives.[104]

The unprecedented growth of sectarianism in the polity during 1979-1999, threw the two

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[102] ___, *Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan (1947-1948)*, Karachi: Pakistan Publications, pp.8-9.

[103] Manzooruddin Ahmad, *Islamic Political System in the Modern Age: Theory and Practice*, Karachi, Royal Book Agency, 1983, in Dr. Noor ul-Haq, *Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects*,

[104] Geoff Brown, *Pakistan: On the Edge of Instability*, 6th April, 2007, http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=84, retrieved on 11th Nov, 2011.

communities i.e. Shia and Sunni, into massive massacre killing one another in the name of religion. The SSP (1984), the TJP (1979), and the SM (1991) had been spearheaded the violence politically as well as militarily since 1979. The rival sects assured their respective adherents the safety of their lives and tried to exacerbate violence against the rival community through violence. Both the communities had linkages with Middle East, and extracted huge funds for the fight of their so called holy war against each other. The sectarian violence was the outcome of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. As a result, Saudi Arabia, threatened of the impacts, started to block its way through the mobilization of the Sunni and Shia conflict across the Muslim world. Pakistan also bore the brunt of Saudi attempt. The success of the Iranian Revolution emboldened the Shia of Pakistan to have struck similar revolution in Pakistan. In a bid, the TJP was established and started resistance against General Zia ul-Haq who had supported The Shah of Iran during 1978-1979 and had alliance with the USA during the Afghan War (1979). Moreover, his policy of Islamization was thought contravene to the Shia way of Islam. Besides, the military was perturbed over the mobilization of Shia and the emergence of Khomeini-like leader Arif Husaini had posed threats to the integrity of the state. Consequently, Sunnis and their organizations had been provided with funds during General Zia ul-Haq's regime. The intelligence agencies of the state sporadically extended their help to the seminaries of Sunni origin in the Punjab, NWFP, and Balochistan in order to block the way of Iranian support. In 1988, in Gilgit, Shia mosque was bombed killing 150 worshipers. Moreover, in the backdrop of the Afghan war, sectarianism went on rising. The emergence of Taliban, who had possessed Sunni background, openly challenged the Shia community. Thus during 1980s violent sectarian incidents took place and put the state on threshold of instability.[105]

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[105] Vali R.Nasr, *International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan 1979-1988,* New York: the City University, Vol. 32, No.2, Jan 2000, pp.171-179.

3.11 The Role of Political Parties

For effective functioning of any democratic system, disciplined and organized political parties are indispensable. But with regret to note, political parties in the polity present dismal picture of disorganization and indiscipline.[106] Moreover, it is the political party that keeps democracy safe from any kind of misadventure.[107] Pakistan, since independence, has weak and disorganized culture of political parties. The AIML, that spearheaded the Freedom Movement, failed to deliver after independence and fragmented into many factions. It had been all due to the presence of indiscipline and disorganization in the ML. Besides, those, who led the PML, had been feudal and wealthy businessmen in whose nature authoritarianism was highly abounded in. They did not believe in the ideals of democracy. Without constitution for nine years, the state was ruled. It had the reflection of their inefficiency and incapability. There had been strife within their ranks. The confrontational politics remained a favorite tactics of the so called political parties in the years to come. This mode of politics paved the way for the dissolution of elected governments before the end of their respective constitutional terms. In addition to, the first general elections in the polity had been delayed till 1970. It should have been held in 1951 as it was held previously in 1946. The reason behind this delay could be rested with the military-bureaucratic hegemony, incompetent politicians, and disorganized political parties. However, the second general elections were held on 7th March, 1977 but the opposition political parties declared the elections as rigged and unfair.[108]Moreover, the role of the ML had not been praiseworthy since independence. It did not help promote true and vibrant democratic culture in the polity.

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[106] Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Karachi: the Oxford University Press, 2001, p.852.
[107] Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, *Democratic Devices and Desires*, New York: the Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.185.
[108] Dr. Noor ul-Haq, *Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects*, Islamabad: IPRI Journal x, No. 1, 2010, p.9.

Rather it coalesced itself with the military junta and other non-democratic forces only to remain in power echelon. Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza, General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan, General Zia ul-Haq and Ghulam Ishaq Khan used the various factions of the ML solely for their own purpose in their respective regimes.[109]

3.12 Absence of Free & Fair Elections

Rigging is simply going against the laws and constitutional provisions of the state while embarking upon activities which are contravene to the norms and principles of the elections. Such activities are comprised of pre-poll rigging, polling-day rigging, and post-poll rigging. In the polity, free and fair elections had been a far cry. Since the general elections in 1970, elections had been tagged as rigged with high, moderate, and low level of rigging. An analysis of the elections held in 1970, 1977, 1985 and 1988, reveals that the elections were not free from rigging. By way of explanation, pre-poll rigging is meant employing illegal means to damage or malign the competitor during elections campaign before poll-day in order to furnish level playing field. The illegal means may include: partiality of the Caretaker setup; non-independence of the Election Commission; the illegal use of Media to side with one of the contestants; use of governmental funds in favor of one of the contestants. Similarly, by polling-day rigging is meant tempering with ballot boxes, impersonation and multiple casted votes by a single person, harassing or beating the voters of the opponents not letting them to cast their votes, tempering with counting of votes and results. In the same manner, by the post-polling rigging is meant the absence of fair play not allowing the majority to form the government. All the above helps determine high, moderate and low level of rigging during the phases of elections. Rigging during general elections in 1970 had been in function while rules for the elections were being made. The elections engineers sought to

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[109] Iftikhar H. Malik, State *and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology, Ethnicity*, New York: St.Martin's Press, 1997, p.31.

create a hung parliament so that they might be able to play their decisive role. Similarly, polling-day rigging was also observed but it was not of any significance that could modify the results of the elections. However, the post-polling rigging in the elections of 1970 was observed as high. The resources of the state, the intelligence agencies and the armed forces had been used sporadically to affect the results of the elections. Similarly, rigging in the elections of 1977 was not a novel phenomenon. The resources of the state had been used indiscriminately. The people had been coerced before and after the elections. In the elections, no respect for the rules had been observed. The results of the elections were believed to be highly rigged. This state of affairs resulted into popular agitation which finally culminated into the imposition of the Martial Law. Moreover, the elections of 1985 had been held on non-party basis. As a result, level playing field to the parties was denied. The PPP was kept out through a conspiracy hatched out by the government in collaboration with the establishment and intelligence agencies. Thus the pre-poll rigging provided the government with no opposition at all on polling day. The polling-day rigging had no decisive impacts on the results of the elections as there was no opposition at all. Moreover, the post-poll rigging in the elections of 1985 was out of question as those who contested the elections had been either the nominees of the government or independents who were not opposed to the government. As a result, the PML having the support of General Zia ul-Haq formed government in the center with Muhammad Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister and Syed Fakhar Immam as the Speaker of the National Assembly. Although he was the nominee of the Independent Group but he had been the former protégé of General Zia ul-Haq. Similarly, in the elections of 1988, under the active support of the intelligence agencies the alliance between the PML and the religious parties was formed under the banner of the IJI in order to keep the PPP out of the power. Poll-day rigging was low and had no potential to affect the result of the elections. However, post-poll rigging had been observed high. Confrontation

between the government of the Punjab and the government of Benazir Bhutto in the centre was encouraged by the establishment.[110]

3.13 Democracy under Restriction

Although Martial was lifted in1985 but the parliament which came into existence as a result of the non-partisan elections was a hang one. It was not free to assert its supremacy. Thus an era of controlled democracy was initiated in the polity. Muhammad Khan Junejo was sworn in as the Prime Minister as well as the President of the Official Muslim League. General Zia ul-Haq had contentment over the developments and thought his rule safe both in civil and military spheres. But when the Prime Minister sought to assert his own authority, the differences cropped up between the President and the Prime Minister. General Zia ul-Haq appointed Major General Agha Naik Muhammad as the Director of IB. It was the first time that a serving military officer was appointed as the Head of a civilian intelligence institution. Muhammad Khan Junejo thought the President's move as a military watch on the Prime Minister. It was, therefore, upon return from the visit to the USA in 1986, he removed Agha Naik Muhammad. In the same way, he also removed Lt. General Mujeeb-ur-Rahman, the Secretary of the Information Ministry. He was the close aide of General Zia ul-Haq. This act of the Prime Minister shook General Zia ul-Haq to his thinking. Besides, there also emerged differences over the matter of relations with India. General Zia ul-Haq wanted to revive relations with India which he asserted during his visit to India in Dec 1985. But Muhammad Khan Junejo was against the revival and got passed a resolution regarding the Kashmir issue from the parliament. This move of the Prime Minister shattered all hopes of the revival of relations. Towards the end of 1986, General Zia ul-Haq had been skeptical of Muhammad Khan Junejo's secret understanding with Benazir Bhutto. Besides, General Zia ul-Haq

[110] Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani, *Reflection on the Electoral History of Pakistan (1970-2008)*, Islamabad: Pildat, 2008, pp.9-25.

thought that Junejo had damaged his credential as the COAS through interference in his decision making. Junejo also sought to eliminate General Zia ul-Haq's influence on Foreign Ministry. As a result, he directed the ministry that no file should be sent to the President in future. The President was shocked as he did not want to lose control over the ministry as the Afghan war was going to enter into the decisive phase.[111]

The Prime Minister declined extensions to the COAS, General Arif and the COJSC, General Rahimuddin in their respective tenures despite the wishes of the President. Besides, Junejo and the parliament had adopted an attitude of criticism towards the military. Moreover, the Prime Minister's call to convene All Parties Conference also added to doubts already existed between the President and Prime Minister. This move of the Prime Minister was considered as a show of force.[112]The differences between General Zia ul-Haq and the Prime Minister mainly emerged over the latter's insistence on probe into the Ojhri Camp incident. Besides, General Zia ul-Haq was disheartened by the Prime Minister's assent to Geneva Accord.[113]The blunder that Muhammad Khan Junejo committed had been that he considered himself the Prime Minister in the real sense of the term. He must have known that he was only a figurehead and the real powers were vested in the person of the President. While protesting on the defense budget, he was reported to have remarked that he would put the Generals back into the Suzuki Cars.[114]Moreover, the USA also held complaint against Muhammad Khan Junejo. The American policy makers believed that Junejo's government had been weakened and ineffective in curbing the drug trafficking. Besides, the USA and the World Bank criticized deteriorating financial crisis of Pakistan. Moreover, there was difference of opinion existed between the President and the Prime Minister on Afghanistan

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[111] Ahmad Saleem, *Tooti Banti Assemblian aur Civil Military Bureaucracy*, Lahore: Jang Pub, 1998, pp.324-327.

[112] Dr. Safdar Mehmood, *Pakistan: Tarikh aur Siyasat*, Lahore: the Jang Publishers, 1999, p.305.

[113] Tahir Kamran, *Politics of Elections and Autocracy in Pakistan: Appraising the Electoral Process during Zia ul-Haq's Regime*, Islamabad: Pildat, 2008, p.37.

[114] Arshad Ahmad Haqani, the Daily Jang, 8th June, 1988.

crisis. It seemed that there was complete harmony in the thoughts of the USA and the military of Pakistan. It was, therefore, Muhammad Khan Junejo was sent home when he just returned from the visit of Philippine and South Korea after presenting his views in the Conference on 'Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy'. General Zia ul-Haq leveled the following charges against Muhammad Khan Junejo's government while using his discretionary powers under Article 58 (2-B) of the constitution.

1. Widespread corruption.

2. Deteriorating law and order situation.

3. Inactiveness in the implementation of Sharia.[115]

Whosoever was responsible for the blunders committed either the President or the Prime Minister, but it could be held that the violations had been committed against the public of the state who had paid a heavy price in the shape of 8th amendment for the lifting of Martial Law in Dec 1985. The amendment validated all that had been done during 1977-1985. The validation had been concerned with the referendum, Martial law courts etc. The amendment provided General Zia ul-Haq with those powers which he had not enjoyed under Martial Law. It was a tragedy that the representatives of the people had unanimously passed the amendment in the National Assembly. It was the worst example of undemocratic legislation in the disguise of democracy.[116]

3.14 Conclusion

After the foregoing analysis, it is held that political instability observed during the pre-1990 Era had a host of reasons to comment upon. However, it is important to note that after the demise of the Quaid-e-Azam, the political leadership failed to institute democratic culture in the polity. They had been engaged in thine and mine business only to promote their own

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[115] Ahmad Saleem, *Tooti Banti Assemblian aur Civil-Military Bureaucracy*, Lahore: Jang Pub, 1998, p.330.
[116] Muhammad Farooq Qureshi, *Pakistan: Jamhooriat ka Zawal*, Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1998, p.103.

stature. They even did not allow democratic norms and values to crop up within the ML. They were bent upon to support their own supporters in the League. As a result, the APML suffered from division and re-division. This state of affairs provided the civil-military bureaucracy with an opportunity to take the advantage to the maximum. As a result, the polity had been remained in the grip of bureaucracy in the early days of its existence. In the presence of weak political culture, the state bore the brunt of Martial Law in1958 and this became a norm in the years to come. 1969, 1977 had been the cases in point. The Judiciary also played its heinous role in validating the undemocratic developments in the polity. Since beginning, the discriminatory treatment of the politicians gave birth to despondency and hatred among the people of East Pakistan. If the crisis of the East Pakistan had been tackled on democratic lines, the disintegration of the polity could be averted. Similarly, in the case of Balochistan the democratic procedure had been violated by the rulers in their respective regimes. The authorities sought to solve the problems with iron-hand. Similarly, authoritarianism of both the political and military leaders did not allow democracy to take roots in the polity. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's interregnum (1971-1977) and the revival of democracy in 1985 are cases in point in which democracy had been showed its way. Besides, in those unfortunate years of 1980, there was unprecedented growth of sectarian violence in which thousands of people had been used as an instrument only to secure the interests of the others. Moreover, the polity also suffered from ethnic violence which paralyzed the state. In the same way, the political parties did not perform their role to sort out the solution of the problems. Their coalitions and alliances had been meant to prove their opponent a failure for which they did not hesitate to join hands with the military junta. In short, political instability in the pre-1990 Era was the result of the incapability of political leadership, the authoritarianism of politicians, the adventurism of the military, the supra-constitutional role of the judiciary, the bureaucratic hegemony, the undemocratic role of political parties, and

dearth of democracy.

Chapter 4

Political Instability in the Post-1990 Era: A Critical Analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with political instability experienced during 1990s in which the tenures of Benazir Bhutto as well as of Mian Nawaz Sharif are discussed in detail. The period in focus provides the sorrowful picture of the politics observed in the polity. Besides, it also analyzes the elections held during this period. Although, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had been given the chance of governing the polity two times each but the loopholes in their respective regimes paved the way for their dismissal. The PPP having been mandated with majority in the elections of 1988 became able to form government in the center but soon the relations with the troika vis-à-vis relations with the provinces especially with the Punjab went on deteriorating giving birth to confrontational politics. As a result, the government of the PPP had been dismissed on charges of corruption, mismanagement, worst law and order situation prevailed in the state. The new elections were held under the caretaker government in which Mian Nawaz Sharif clinched majority and formed government in the center. But differences with the President furnished the way for the dismissal of his government on 19th April, 1993. Although, the Supreme Court of Pakistan reinstated his government but the self-ego between the two did not allow cropping up working relations. As a result, both had to resign on the intervention of the then COAS. Although, the conditions in the second term of Benazir Bhutto were favorable but wide spread ethnic violence in Karachi, sectarian violence across the state, mismanagement of the economy, corruption, and extra-judicial killings were among the reasons quoted in support of the dismissal of her government on 5th Nov, 1996.Similarly, Mian Nawaz Sharif had achieved landslide victory in the elections held in 1997. As a result, he formed government in the center as well as in the provinces. But the

differences between the then COAS and him coupled with authoritarianism of the government set a stage for the military coup on 12th Oct, 1999.

4.2 The Democratic Blink (1988-1999)

Though Pakistan made a smooth transition from dictatorship to democracy in 1988 just after the sudden death of Genera Zia ul-Haq on 17th Aug, 1988, in an air crash but unfortunately the period (1988-1999) presented a dismal picture of political developments ridden with confrontational politics, corruption, mismanagement, politics for the sake of criticism rather than politics for the sake of reform. Every branch of the government was at loggerheads with each other. There was complete dearth of the rule of law while dispensing with the business of the government. Besides, the polity also met with an unprecedented growth of sectarian and ethnic violence. In this short wink of the revival of democracy, all the civilian governments in their respective terms in office had been dismissed on charges of corruption, mismanagement of economy, disrespect for rule of law, extra-judicial killings, and despotism disguised in democracy etc. Besides, the troika of powers used to be at loggerheads while managing the affairs of the state. Moreover, the elections although held in the period in question were often engineered.[117]Every leader of Pakistan has been remained a claimant to have extended support to democracy in his own capacity. In the constitution of Pakistan, it has been written that only democratic system would be established in the polity. Besides, this has also been remained to be the religion of all the political parties of the state pledging that they would instill democratic norms and traditions but despite all these pledges, no genuine democratic system has been implanted so far.[118]The elections of 1993 had conferred the responsibility to run the political system of the state upon the two major political parties of the polity. Consequently, it was hoped that political system would take roots but within two

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[117] M.R. Kazimi, *A Concise History of Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.238-241.
[118] S.M. Zafar, *Dictator Kaun*, Lahore: Ilmoirfan Publishers, 1996, pp.15-16.

years both the ruling party which could be a vehicle for the prosperity of the state gave way to despondency and confrontational politics. As a result, the polity was divided among warring parties and the parliament rather the abode of the constructive business became a place of abuse.[119]Thus the period (1988-1999) was of conspiracy and counter-conspiracy, rampant corruption, dismissal of governments, worse law and order situation, and economic disparity etc.

4.2.1 Benazir Bhutto's First Term in Office (1988-1990)

The circumstances in which the elections of 1988 held were tragic in the wake of certain incidents of national importance .i.e. The Ojhri Camp Disaster (April 1988), the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the demise of General Zia ul-Haq. However, optimism for better days helped the people to hope once democracy prevailed in the polity. In the elections, the PPP emerged as the majority party securing 93 seats of the National Assembly and the IJI captured 54 seats, however, it was mandated in the Punjab with 108 of 240 total seats. Thus the PPP succeeded to form government in the center while the IJI under Mian Nawaz Sharif formed government in the Punjab. In Balochistan, the JWP and the JUI (F) had the majority to form government in the province. Thus the government of the PPP had to work with the diverse composition of the governments in the polity. As a result, the confrontation among them led to the dismissal of the government of the PPP in less than two years. The year 1988 was important in the sense that it provided the state with an opportunity of transition from military government to the democratic one. The army was not happy with the results of the elections.[120]It was, therefore, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Machiavelli of Pakistan[121], took two weeks in consultation before calling the PPP to form the government.

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[119]Ibid, p.78.

[120]Sartaj Aziz, *Between Dreams and Realities*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p.97.

[121]Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, London: Sage Pub, 2007, p.242.

Besides, it was agreed that the PPP would not interfere in the appointment of the senior brass of the military as well as in the policy on Afghanistan. Benazir Bhutto made this reveal in her several interviews that in 1988 she was given the government with her hands tied behind, and when she sought to assert her authority, her government was dismissed there and then. But it was reported to have said that she could assert her authority if she did not devote herself primarily to strengthen the position of the party in the provinces as the PPP had no absolute majority in the rest of the provinces except in Sind. The mistakes which the PPP government committed were of the following:

1. The PPP tried to have the government in the Punjab while attempting to win over the members of the IJI. As a result, Mian Nawaz Sharif used the Punjab card and stirred up the Punjabi nationalism. If the PPP left the government of the IJI in the Punjab to rule, the PPP would have reigned in the center. Resultantly, democracy would thrive in the state.

2. She kept out the Chief Ministers of the Punjab, and Balochistan in the cabinet meetings. This trust deficit resulted into the politics of confrontation.

3. She also bypassed the government of the Punjab as well as of Balochistan in the implementation of the Peoples Works Programme which was being implemented and monitored by the party heads of the PPP at the districts level.

4. Attempts were made to weaken the role of the Senate as the PPP did not enjoy majority there.

This sort of affairs gave birth to the politics of confrontation. Consequently, Mian Nawaz Sharif did not use to comply with orders received from the center regarding the postings of the senior officers to and from the Punjab. Besides, he established the Bank of the Punjab as the National Banks in the province used to create either hurdles or sometimes deny financial assistance not only to Itefaq Group of Companies but also to the enterprises owned by the

members of the IJI. He also objected at the scheme chalked out for the implementation of the Peoples Works Programme and demanded the implementation of the programme through district and union councils elected in 1985. In Balochistan the government formed by Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali was fragile in nature as it was formed after neck and neck competition. The speaker's vote decided the fate of the contest. Although, Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali succeeded in the formation of the government with help of the member of the PPP who were three in number, but it was dismissed after twelve days of its formation by slipping away one member to the opposition bloc. Thus Nawab Akbar Bugti formed the government with help of the JUI (F) and soon joined hands with Nawaz Sharif in confronting the center. In Sind, although, the PPP had majority but it had to enter into an alliance with the MQM. But the alliance was broken down when ethnic violence over the matter of Sindhi and Non-Sindhi erupted in Karachi and Hyderabad. Besides, what the PPP promised to deliver during its elections' manifesto failed to reduce them to reality. The economy was not strong and the life of the common people went from bad to worse. Consequently, it gave birth to unemployment and price hikes. Such state of affairs was the result of the mismanagement of the government. She did not even appoint Finance Minister throughout her first tenure in office and kept the Finance Ministry with herself. It is worth mentioning that she even kept the portfolio with herself in her second term in office. Besides, she even created a new Board of Investment in order to issue permissions regarding the establishment of the new industries. She used to Chair its meetings by herself. Moreover, she had opened a cell for the placement of persons in the various departments. All its work used to be supervised by the party leaders of the PPP. In the words of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan that the PPP had broken all the records of corruption to such an extent that the word corruption and politics became synonymous in Pakistan while giving rationale to his own act of dismissing the government of the PPP in 1990. The dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government became certain when she tried to curtail

the role of the army in politics. She replaced the Head of the ISI, General Hamid Gul by a retired General Shams-ur-Rahman Kalu. Besides, she also tried to replace Chief of Joint Committee of Staffs, Admiral Iftikhar Sarohi. Ghulam Ishaq Khan refused to give his assent in this regard. As a result, the establishment acknowledged that Benazir Bhutto was not keeping her words which she made with Ghulam Ishaq Khan in Nov 1988. When in 1989, the MQM withdrew its support from the PPP; the government in retaliation launched an operation against its activists across Sind. In the crackdown, a lot of Urdu speaking people were either gunned down or sustained fatal injuries. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan while dismissing the PPP government in 1990 also cited the operation as one of the reasons of the dismissal of the government of the PPP. According to Statistics, 1187 persons were killed and 2491 sustained injuries in Hyderabad. In order to keep the situation under control, the government called the army to handle the situation but it was reluctant unless and until full-fledged power under Article 245 of the constitution granted. The government was not prepared to grant such powers. This state of affairs further aggravated the relations between the army and the government. In such a precarious situation, the COP launched no-confidence vote against Benazir Bhutto. The PPP had 44 seats out of 217 seats of the house. If the opposition succeeded in winning over three or four members out of the FATA who were supporting the ruling party, in addition to 14 members of the MQM, the government of the PPP would have been routed away. This game of winning over of three or four members gave way to Horse trading unprecedentedly. The ruling party went to such an extent that it kept its members in safe custody in Swat and brought back just before the voting day. Besides, it employed a tactics while showing some of the members of the opposition in a meeting with the leadership of the PPP on the state media in order to convey the message to the COP. Due to worse situation in Sind and wide spread corruption, the rumors of the possible military takeover were heard among the public. However, the President Ishaq Khan

overruled the rumors of the army coup in a meeting with his close associate Sartaj Aziz on 14th June, 1990 and said that the army only tookover when in public and in their own perception, the breakdown of civilian set up became imminent. At present, no such situation was prevalent in the polity. Besides, I had the power to dismiss the government under 58 (2-B) but there was no need of it so far.[122]

This sort of circumstances posed a danger to the democratic set up due to the lack of cooperation among the center and the provinces. Besides, it was expected that the protection of the democratic process should have been the foremost responsibility of the government at the center as well as at the provinces. But it was sorrowful that the national interest was put aside and the politics of confrontation was given air by the center and the government of the Punjab in the days to come. Leveling of accusation on one another became the routine of the day. The federal government was faced with the charges of corruption while the coalesced opposition was suffering from inaction and was thinkless. If one party had taken a positive step, the other one would have been bent upon to adopt negative behavior. Resultantly, both the parties held responsible one another for the deterioration of circumstances. The hatred touched the pinnacle, when the PPP moved vote of no-confidence against the Chief Minister of the Punjab. Although, Mian Nawaz Sharif survived the move, but it diverted energies of the both to malign one another rather than spending in developmental works. Moreover, differences between the President and the Prime Minister came to the surface when the latter failed to comply with the provision of the deal struck between the two. Besides, the government of the PPP was faced with the criticism of the alliance of the rightist parties which was mainly corollary of the enmity towards Bhutto. In this alliance, those religious parties were included which were against the leadership of a woman as well as those who

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[122]Sartaj Aziz, *Between Dreams and Realities*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.97-105.

were grown under the shadow of Zia and used to provide reason to keep General Zia abstain from the restoration of democracy. Now those elements were bent upon to sabotage democracy and its restoration. During the movement of no-confidence against the government of the PPP, horse trading was on the peak outshining every precedent in the past. Members of the assembly were taken to Murree (Punjab) and Mingora (Swat) with all necessary pleasures only to make humble one another. The MQM left the PPP on this critical juncture only to humiliate it. Moreover, the points given below could be the reasons for the move against the government of the PPP.

1. A few days before the Deputy Secretary of the USA was reported to have made a statement that 1990 was the year of the new elections and that the IJI wanted to oust the PPP in the elections. Besides, they wanted the elections under the interim set up which had been grown under the dictatorship of General Zia ul-Haq. But the PPP wanted to get rid of that interim set up.

2. During the period of General Zia ul-Haq and Muhammad Khan Junejo hundreds of people had acquired loans and also got them written off. Benazir Bhutto wanted to reimburse the loans granted. Her drive affected the members of the IJI who had been the beneficiaries.

3. The government of the PPP sought to launch a campaign for the collection of tax from the business community which was an influential segment of the IJI. As a result, it did strenuous efforts to dismiss the government.

4. The Presidential powers regarding the dissolution of the assembly were going to be disposed of roundabout in March 1990. After that the Prime minister would become the center of the power. It was, therefore, the IJI sought to dismiss the government of the PPP before the presidential power had been dispensed with.

It was the constitutional right of the opposition to move a vote of no-confidence but it should

use this constitutional right for the welfare of the nation not for the satisfaction of the personal ego. Although, the PPP survived the move but, in the meantime, the supporters of the IJI increased which was an eye opener for the PPP. In all that eventful year of 1990, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was active as a third party on the political horizon of the polity. The observers were of the view that there were some particular persons in the military and bureaucracy who had been instigating the parties in office on non-cooperation so that anarchy like situation might be continued and made the public agree to the verdict that only military government could be run successfully in the state. However, towards the end of April, Benazir Bhutto offered dialogues to the government of the Punjab in a way of reconciliation. On 3rd May, Chaudhry Shujat Hussain and Ghulam Haider Wyne called on Nawaz Sharif in connection with the proposed dialogues between the center and the Punjab. In the meeting, the proposal of dialogues from the center was held. On that very day a special committee of the Federal cabinet made initial contact with the government of the Punjab. Although, the dialogues were not a total success but it was hoped that a way of reconciliation would be sorted out between both the parties. Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, a trusted lieutenant and a member of the National Reconciliation Committee, met Nawaz Sharif in Model Town Lahore on 12th May and conveyed the message of Prime Minister. According to him, Nawaz Sharif was sincere in the establishment of working relationship. Consequently, he constituted a three-member committee consisting of Mian Manzoor Ahmad, the Speaker of the Punjab Assembly, Ghulam Haider Wyne, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, and Malik Naeem. The committee was tasked with responsibility of holding dialogues with the center on political matters. On 15th May, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan held while talking to the media that in the current scenario national reconciliation was the need of the day because the solution of all the problems had laid naked in its very existence. He further suggested that the centre and the Punjab should finish the differences keeping in view the

situation at borders. Besides, he added that a code of conduct had been going to be furnished in the immediate future so that horse trading and floor crossing might be finished. On one hand, efforts were underway to restore relations between the center and the provincial government, while on the other hand, the allied opposition held a National Convention in which charge sheet of corruption, nepotism, financial irregularities, and mismanagement against the government was presented. The conveners demanded direct action from the President for the interest of the nation. Many a problem, the center was faced with; the Shariat Bill was one of them. It was passed unanimously after amendments on 13th May, 1990, in the Senate. The Bill had been debated for the last five years within and outside the parliament. It had been stated in the Bill that every domain of the daily life would be put into Islamic frame. If the Bill had implemented, it would have been affected judiciary, economy, and mass communication. Besides, the Federal Shariat Court would acquire powers of ultra-vires. Thus it would be in a position to declare the decision of the court null and void if found un-Islamic. The resonance of the Shariat Bill posed foreboding tension to the government of Benazir Bhutto. It was a severe test to her government. If she had supported the bill, her office would have been in danger and if she had opposed it, she would have been accused of as an enemy to Islam. On 19th July, Benazir Bhutto, while responding to the questions of the media persons at Lahore airport, said that we would maintain the supremacy of the parliament and did not think appropriate cutting hands and ears of the human beings. She was criticized in the religious sphere over the statement. On 28th July, the COAS General Mirza Aslam Baig called on Benazir Bhutto in the Prime Minister House. Colonel Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, the Minister of State for Defense, was also present on the occasion. Detailed conversation took place between the Prime Minister and the COAS over the constitutional role of the military and operation against miscreants in the province of Sind. The COAS also apprised Benazir Bhutto of the details of the Corps Commanders Conference held the other

day in which detailed analysis of the situation prevailed in the polity had been discussed. However, the British newspaper " the Independent" in its report over the current situation of Pakistan, recorded that confrontation over policy in Sind between Benazir Bhutto and the military had acquired the form of conflict while taking in its fold all aspects of national and foreign policy. She would face many problems in the days to come. Many members of the party were rebelling against her authority. She was adamant to the demand of the army that it should be provided with infinite powers for eradication of law and order situation in Sind. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto was trying her best to keep the relation between Pakistan and India better while reducing the current tension between the two which had been created in the context of Kashmir.[123]It was in this context, that Benazir Bhutto provided information regarding those Sikhs who were involved in the Separation Movement helping their fellows engaged in the movement against India to her counterpart Rajiv Gandhi. This not only exposed the role of Pakistan intelligence but also caused damage to the self-determination of Kashmir. Besides, it made the intelligence agencies of the state against her regime and left no stone unturned to turn the table against her.[124]In this regard, her letter to the USA Senator Peter Galbraith in which she had discussed the current situation in the polity as well as her relation with the then Indian Premier, stands witness to her relation with the apropos.

Benazir was desirous of India to call back her three lac army deployed near Pakistan border. But the army of Pakistan was confident of its capability to meet the Indian aggression. It was, therefore, the military insisted that neither the government should bow against the Indian demand nor surrender against her mischief. The government of Benazir had the feelings that hopes of economic betterment in the state had been shattered due to the expenditures over army in a way of keeping it active for seven months. Moreover, she sought to have the

[123]Murtaza Anjam,*Kaun Kaisay Gia*, Lahore: Ali Farid Printers, 2009, pp.241-255.
[124] M.R. Kazimi, *The Concise History of Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University press, 2009, p.238.

foreign policy of the state taken from the army and given back to the foreign office and the government as soon as the foreign powers proceeded towards the solution of the Afghan problem. She enjoyed the support of the USA over Afghanistan and issues with India. According to the American Ambassador Robert Oakley, the support Benazir Bhutto had from the USA even further made the army angry. Besides, the USA had shown her reservations over the Pakistan army growing relationship with Iran which was supporting the Kashmiri freedom fighters against India. The senior Ministers of the PPP alleged the army that it was trying to destabilize the government and wanted to divide the PPP. This was how the gulf between the army and the government was kept on widening day by day. When circumstances were going towards a point of no return, the government of the PPP decided to have reconciliation with Nawaz Sharif. For this purpose, Mr. Happy Mannola, the closest associate of Benazir Bhutto, was deputed. But his efforts could not bear any results. As a result, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the National Assembly on 6th Aug, 1990, while using his discretionary powers under the Article 58 (2-B) of the constitution on the following charges.

1. The Federal government was not running according to the provisions of the constitution. It was, therefore, become necessary to have fresh trust of the public.

2. The culture of horse trading was rampant in the state.

3. Corruption was widespread in every institution of the government.

4. Senate and Judiciary were disrespected.

5. Interventions in the authority of the provincial governments through the Peoples Works Programme.

6. The government failed to establish peace, law and order situation in Sind.[125]

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[125] Murtaza Anjum, *Kaun Kaisay Gia*, Lahore: Ali Farid Printers, 2009, pp. 255-262.

The decision of the President was challenged in the High Courts of Peshawar, Karachi, and Lahore simultaneously. However, the High Court of Karachi and of Lahore upheld the decision of the President as valid. Consequently, a caretaker government was setup under Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, a dissident of the PPP, who founded his own party in the name of the NPP. This maneuver by the President was only to exploit the anti-PPP votes.[126]

4.2.2 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's First Term in Office (1990-1993)

Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif clinched majority under the banner of the IDA in the elections held in Nov 1990. His government was the first in the history of Pakistan enjoying two-third majority in the National assembly. Besides, it was also a surprise that the same party had been at the helm of powers in all the provinces. It was said that Nawaz Sharif had two advantages over Benazir Bhutto while in the power. Firstly, he had two-third majority in the Assembly as well as had governments in all the four provinces. This sort of winning combination Benazir Bhutto had been lacking in during her first tenure in office which was the main hurdle in her governance. Secondly, the IDA has controlled the situation in Karachi through the MQM. Besides, Nawaz Sharif had good relationship with the President and the Army, the final arbiter in the politics of Pakistan.[127] Even in the presence of such winning combination, government of Nawaz Sharif suffered from decline, eruption of ethnic violence and distrust among the organs of the government kept on widening.[128]

Nawaz Sharif assumed the office after clinching majority in the elections held in Nov, 1990 and was expecting to rule for five years. But differences between the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and him began to crop up when the President came to address the joint sitting of the Parliament in 1991 at the completion of the first year of the government, he was subjected to

[126]Sartaj Aziz, *Between Dreams and Realities*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p.105.
[127]Veena Kukreja, *Politics in Pakistan: Nawaz Sharif at the Helm*, Strategic Analysis, Vol. xxx; No.6, Sep, 1991, p.665.
[128]Mushahid Hussain, *Important Gains for Pakistani Democracy*, the Times of India, 9 Nov, 1990, p.6.

humiliation by the opposition and had to complete his speech amid sloganeering 'Go Baba Go'. Although, Nawaz Sharif termed the behavior of opposition as undemocratic and immoral but there was no active response from him and his party at the humiliation of the President at the hands of the opposition during the speech. According to Roedad Khan, the trusted associate of the President, the cracks in the relations between the President and Nawaz Sharif started appearing when the former's humiliation in the Parliament during speech created a rift between the President and him as in the thoughts of the President that Nawaz Sharif and his party had not responded positively to the behavior of the opposition. Thus a gulf between the President and Nawaz Sharif started widening. As a result, there emerged serious differences between him and the President over the appointment of the COAS in the wake of the sudden demise of General Asif Janjua and repealing of the 8th amendment.[129]On the appointment of General Asif Janjua, Nawaz Sharif was not even least bothered. It was, therefore, he sought to scrape up the 8th amendment and openly he used to remark in the meetings of the IDA that he had no need of so lengthy constitution rather he wanted a constitution comprised of twelve pages. Thus differences between the President and the Premier for the first time emerged on the appointment of the COAS on May, 1991 when the President appointed General Asif Janjua. Nawaz Sharif did not want him as the COAS on account of his role in Sind operation, in floods, and many other matters. However, the appointment of the COAS was the discretionary powers of the President under the Article 243 (2-C) of the constitution which he had acquired as a result of the 8th amendment, whereas, according to the original constitution of 1973, it was the right of the Prime Minister with the consultation of his cabinet if he liked. However, the President appointed General Asif Janjua purely on merit. The differences once again emerged on the appointment of the

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[129]Burhanuddin Hasan, *The Breaking Point*, Karachi: Royal Book Comp, 2009, p.201.

COAS in the wake of General Asif sudden demise on 8th Jan, 1993 when Nawaz Sharif called on the President in order to know his intention regarding the appointment of the new COAS. He got the impression that the President was going to appoint the COAS on merit. On this Nawaz Sharif protested that he was not going to neither cooperate with General Farakh nor acknowledge him as the COAS. Nawaz Sharif wanted either General Rahim Dil Bhati or General Javed Ashraf to be the COAS. Besides, he wanted also General Shamim Alam to be given the charge of the COAS. After the meeting, Chaudhry Nasir Ali Khan, the political adviser of the Prime Minister, met with Roedad Khan, a close associate of the President, and requested him to help in the matter. He, knowing the fragility of the circumstances, advised the President that General Farakh was not General Montgomery or General Rommel, if he had not appointed as the COAS, we would lose the 2nd World War. As a result, the President in order to defuse the situation appointed General Wahid Kakar as the COAS on 12th Jan, 1993.Although, the crisis was defuse for the time being but later incidents witness of the preparation for the final show down started. When the Prime Minister Inspection Commission under Lt. General Muhammad Shafiq (Retired) prepared a report against the son-in-law of the President Irfanullah Marwat and his associate Samiullah Marwat in the famous Veena Hayat Case in which their illicit activities were exposed, this created such a rift in the relationship of the President and the Prime Minister which persisted to the last day. In addition to this, Nawaz Sharif started resenting the 8th amendment in silent words. However, in his early days in rule, he had remained silent over it apparently because it was this amendment which provided him with an opportunity to come to power and he called it a miracle that time. Besides, he was the logical end of the net hatched out by the civil and military bureaucracy in the light of that amendment. But Nawaz Sharif's potent desire regarding to have had complete grip on the business of the state made public when he prepared the draft of the 12th amendment in the guidance of Chaudhry Ihsanul-Haq, his legal

advisor. The said amendment was even more dangerous than the 8th amendment. If it had been implemented in its real shape, the state would have struck in the grip of one man rule. According to the amendment, the Prime Minister had the power to suspend any provision of the constitution for an infinite period. When the draft reached to the President, he called Nawaz Sharif and asked if he had shown the draft to the members of his Parliament to which he nodded in negative and said if the President allowed it, the members would have no objection. In the meantime, the coalition parties of Nawaz Sharif government, the MQM, the JI, and the ANP met the president and registered their reservations against the amendment. Despite the objection of the President the said amendment was passed on 2nd July, 1991, which was resented on all forums.[130]

Initially, Benazir Bhutto sought to have alliance with Nawaz Sharif against the President but she failed to achieve her objectives. Consequently, she persuaded Roedad Khan to have her rapprochement with the President and told him that she would support him against Nawaz Sharif so that he might not be able to repeal the 8th amendment and acquired dictatorial powers. This is the sad aspect of the character of our politicians that how they compromise for their personal interests and work against democracy.[131]The crisis of 18th July, 1993, came not all of a sudden rather diverse forces under the influence of both political and military leadership played their own decisive role. The dismissal of Nawaz Sharif's government on 18th April, 1993, the resignation of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the dissolution of The National Assembly and its subsequent restoration by the Apex Court had further aggravated the crisis. There was not any neutral agency which could solve the crisis rather everybody was engaged in getting his own interest. Even the opposition asked the President to use his discretionary powers under the Article 58 (2-B) of the constitution. Besides, it threatened him

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[130]Ahmad Salim, *Toti Banti Assemblian aur Civil Military Bureaucracy*, Lahore: Jang Pub, 1998, pp.359-366.
[131]Burhanuddin Hasan, *The Breaking Point*, Karachi: Royal Book Comp, 2009, pp.201-202.

with the Long March. On 1st July, 1993, Nawaz Sharif in a meeting with the COAS proposed to have ousted the President and hold elections under the Prime Minister because in the presence of the President free and fair elections were not possible in his opinion. He himself knew that how he had been made the Prime Minister in 1990. But the COAS responded in negative because he had no constitutional right to dismiss the President. However, he assured Nawaz Sharif that the President would remain neutral in the elections and held the new elections to be the solution of the current crisis. There was agreement on the proposal of the new elections between the COAS and the President. However, Nawaz Sharif took time for thinking on the proposal and went to Lahore. In the newspaper, it was written that the military had been putting pressure on Nawaz Sharif to resign. The proposal for new elections was given by Nawaz Sharif himself but it was his tactics that if his government had been dismissed, a doubt would emerge in the mind of the public against the neutrality of the military. In this way, he would be able to have the sympathy of the masses. Even in certain newspapers, General Wahid Kakar had been tagged as the traitor of the nation. In such a situation, the COAS called on Nawaz Sharif and complained of the statements in newspaper. He denied flatly of having any relation with the statements but he promised to give an explanatory statement against those statements through the Ministry of Defense. However, the statement was issued from the Ministry of Information after some delay.[132]

On 17th April, 1993, the Premier Nawaz Sharif publically acknowledged while addressing the nation on TV and Radio that he had been pressurized from all quarters and he was not obliged with the way to serve the nation. He made it categorical that he would not resign and would not dissolve the Assembly as well as would not take any dictation. When things went to a point of no return, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the National Assembly on

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[132]Ahmad Salim, *Toti Banti Assemblian aur Civil Military Bureaucracy*, Lahore: Jang Pub, 1998, pp.348-349.

19th April, 1993, while using his discretionary powers under Article 58 (2-B) of the constitution. The verdict of the President was challenged in the Supreme Court which declared the verdict invalid and restored the government of Nawaz Sharif on 26th May, 1993. But the working relationship between the Prime Minister and the President did not established even after the decision of the Apex Court. As a result, both the Prime Minister and the President had to resign on the intervention of the COAS on 18th July, 1993.[133] The following events are identified with the differences between Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif.

1. Dissolution of the Punjab Assembly by the Chief Minister Manzoor Watto on the persuasion of Benazir Bhutto on 28th June, the Lahore High Court restored the Assembly but the Chief Minister advised the Governor to dissolve it again within seven minutes of the verdict of the Honorable Court.

2. In the NWFP Mir Afzal Khan dissolved the Assembly on 30th May.

3. Nawaz Sharif sought the removal of the Governor of the Punjab but the President responded in negative. As a result, Nawaz Sharif passed a resolution from the Parliament on 29th June to take over the provincial administration under article 234 of the constitution without getting the approval of the President and appointed Mian Azhar as Administrator-Designate of the Punjab.[134]

4.2.3 Benazir Bhutto's Second Term in Office (1993-1996)

Benazir Bhutto's Government was dismissed by the then President, Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari in 1996 on charges of corruption, mismanagement, maladministration, and inaptitude while using his powers under Article 58 (2-B) of the constitution. On several occasions, the President reiterated his power of dissolving the National Assembly but it fell hard on the ears

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[133]Burhanuddin Hasan, *The Breaking Point*, Karachi: Royal Book Comp, 2009, pp.201-203.
[134]Ibid, p.204.

of the government. Benazir Bhutto took no exception of such statements of the President as she used to consider the President as her all-time trusted lieutenant and least expect his role the other way round. It is noted that in the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's Government, the role of army could not be underestimated. Since the death of general Zia ul-Haq, although the army did not intervene directly in the affairs of the state but it played always the second fiddle. The role of General Aslam Baig in 1990 and General Abdul Waheed Kakar in 1993 in their respective tenures in toppling the governments are the examples to be quoted. Similarly, in Benazir Bhutto's second term in office, the then COAS General Jehangir Karamat acted in prompt while implementing the verdict of the President and deployed the personnel of the army on strategic points in Islamabad on 5th Nov, 1996 in order to arrest the spouse of Benazir Bhutto. It was a naked involvement of the army in the dismissal of the civilian government. Another reason quoted against her dismissal was the resentment of the USA over the deteriorating economic crisis vis-à-vis of keeping the portfolio of the Finance Ministry with herself. Still another reason that then President referred to in support of dismissing the government of Benazir Bhutto in 1996, was the deteriorating law and order situation in Sind in particular and elsewhere in general across the state. The situation went from bad to worse when the government empowered the state agencies, and the police to tackle the situation iron handedly. Under the active supervision of the then Home Minister General Nasirullah Babar, the law enforcing agencies committed unprecedented atrocities. There were widespread indiscriminate fake encounters especially against the activists of the MQM. Thus Karachi had been virtually made a cauldron. The Home Minister was reported to have said that fake encounters would continue unabated until the activists of the MQM dislodge themselves. The unleashed authority granted to the police and state agencies became naked when Mir Murtaza Bhutto, the brother of Benazir Bhutto, was killed in the broad day light by the contingent of the police in Karachi. In such state of affairs, the government of the

day was not serious to find a political solution to the situation prevailed in Karachi. Moreover, Benazir's Government miserably failed in checking out the sectarian violence across the state. The Sunni and Shia, the two chief combatants of the sectarian war, were locked in killing and torturing one another. They even did not hesitate to attack at one another's mosque during prayers. In such scenario, the government had no program or plan either to check or ban those organizations which were supporting the sectarian war. In addition to, there also emerged confrontation between Benazir Bhutto and the judiciary over the appointment of judges to the High Courts and The Supreme Court. The President criticized the government over this act of attacking at the independence of Judiciary. Similarly, the worst economic crises were proverbial of the last straw that broke the camel's back. The government was faced with hard circumstances. Despite, approving deficit budget last year while leaving burden on the people, there was no way out of the financial crises. Although the IMF was ready to extend help but it was at the cost of severe conditions. The help was due in April 1996. Moreover, the opposition was out to unleash a wave of criticism against the mismanagement of the government. As a last resort, Benazir Bhutto agreed to the IMF's offer. Besides, she had to withdraw disgracefully from the Finance Ministry while giving charge to Naveed Qamar. Such state of affairs exposed the government and its weaknesses. The PML (N) and the JI launched a massive agitation while highlighting the corruption and the mismanagement of the government. Besides, it is said that the establishment was also against the economic policies adopted by Benazir Bhutto. She was thought of a bulwark against authoritarianism, a hope for democracy, and people voted her generously during 1988 elections. However, she let down the people and their hopes while playing down the ideals of democracy. The caretaker government which was formed under Malik Miraj Khalid, if one analyzes its configuration, it was meant only to keep her out of the office in the next elections. Through a conspiracy, Mumtaz Bhutto, a Sindhi nationalist, was

taken in the caretaker government only to divide the PPP and its vote bank.[135]

4.2.4 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's Second Term in Office (1997-1999)

Nawaz Sharif once again made his own way to power corridors after gaining sweeping mandate in the elections held on 3rd Feb, 1997, while enabling him and his allies to form government in the center as well as in all the four provinces. The PPP met with humiliating defeat in the elections winning less than 20 seats out of the 217 seats of the National Assembly. Unfortunately, the trust and faith the public had reposed in his person had been thwarted with haughtiness through his authoritarian way of rule while disrespecting the mandate of the people. In the way of consolidating his rule, Nawaz Sharif decided to repeal the 8th amendment of which he had been a victim during his first tenure in office (1990-1993). Thus 13th amendment was passed and thought it to be a safeguard in case of confrontation with the President.[136] Nawaz Sharif in his second term became able to restore parliamentary system in the state while bringing out two important amendments in the constitution i.e. 13th and 14th amendments. With approval of these amendments, the Prime Minister became powerful and the President remained only a nominal Head with no powers which he had previously enjoyed. Both amendments bestowed too much power in the Premier and the party leader which could be dangerous if used arbitrarily and without any check.[137]But the critics were reported to have remarked that all these maneuvers were aimed at to strengthen his position as Prime Minister rather than to avoid derailing of the system in future. Despite favorable circumstances at his disposal, he committed a blunder while locking himself in confrontation with the judiciary. A case regarding Contempt of Court was being pursued in the Apex Court against him in Nov 1997. The President and the Parliament were

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[135]Kalim Bahadur, *Democracy in Pakistan: Crises and Conflicts*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Pub, 1989, pp.140-144.
[136]Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, New Delhi: Sage Pub, 2003, p.251.
[137]Dr. Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development (1947-1999)*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.401.

divided on the issue. One was supporting the Judiciary whereas the other one extended its support to the Prime Minister. It is noted that Judiciary was also divided into two blocs. Thus the three organs of the government were engaged in tussle with each other. In the process, the Chief Justice was dismissed and the President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari resigned from the post due to threats of impeachment. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif handled the situation emerging from judicial conflict undemocratically. As a result, his party workers invaded the premises of the Apex Court in 1997 when the proceedings in the Contempt of Court Case were underway against him. Although, he remained victorious in the conflict but his disrespect for rule of law left scars on his belief in democracy. Besides, there were resentments among the senior members of the party when he ignored their selection to the office of the President. They were not even consulted. It was said that the decision regarding Rafiq Tarar to have been nominated as the President was taken by Nawaz Sharif and his close cronies. He was so mesmerized in his person that he even underestimated the Parliament while reducing it to the status of a rubber stamp. Moreover, he outshined General Zia ul-Haq in his attempt of superseding the legislatures who even did not use to know what amendment was in the offing, forcing them to pass an anti-dissent law. Besides, he included in his kitchen cabinet senators from the Senate headed by his father. It was reported to have said that Nawaz Sharif and his family was of the belief that everything being an enterprise could be bought out including even politicians and officers etc. His autocratic nature of politics paralyzed the party while pushing it to the point of break up but the ruling factor was the only reason that kept the party intact. When he introduced Shariat Bill in 1999 without taking into confidence members of the party, there were reports to have been mini-rebellion over it in the party. Another factor that contributed heavily towards the downfall of Nawaz Sharif was the growing sectarian and ethnic violence across the state. The government failed in checking out the growth and sponsorship of the menace. Karachi in particular was in the grip of ethnicity.

The killings and torturing were rampant and at random. The PML (N) and the MQM had no soft corner for one another but the factor of the PPP being a common enemy yoked them into an alliance in order to keep Benazir Bhutto out of power. However, the alliance broke down when the MQM sought to have implemented the agreement made in Feb, 1997. It surrendered ministries both in the center and province over not paying any heed to it in the decision making. Moreover, it demanded an enquiry into the killings in Karachi by the United Nation (UN). Although the government managed to bring them back into coalition but the differences soon cropped up over the dwindling law and order situation in Karachi.[138]

Ethnic and sectarian problems in Karachi as well as in other parts of the state persisted and the government failed to control the problem. To the menace democracy could not be blamed for, rather it was the politicization of the issue as well as the dearth of good governance that pushed the state into the conundrum.[139]The government thus imposed the Governor Rule in Sind on 30th Oct, 1997, while alleging the MQM for the mess up prevailed in the province. Besides, the ANP also withdrew its support from the government when the government failed to meet its demand of renaming the province, the N.W.F.P as Pakhtunistan. Moreover, the unilateral support of the government to the Kalabagh Dam also widened the gulf between the both. In the same way, the 15th amendment also jeopardized the working relationships among the center and the provinces.[140]The deteriorating economic crises the state was faced with dramatized into failure of the government making it responsible for the widespread corruption and lavish expenditures. The business community succeeded twice in repealing the government attempt of imposing the sales tax. Moreover, shortfalls experienced in the federal

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[138]Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, New Delhi: Sage Pub, 2003, pp.252-253.
[139] Dr. Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development (1947-1999)*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.403.
[140]Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, New Delhi: Sage Pub, 2003, pp.253-254.

revenue collection compelled the government to curtail the revenue share of the provinces.[141]Wapda, KESC, PIA, PS Ltd, and Railway almost every department was pattering with economic problems. In addition to, international sanctions due to Nuclear Blasts and Kargil issue, it was reported that Sharif family had been involved in massive corruption. Besides, Nawaz Sharif unilateral decisions and underestimating the COAS' pledges regarding the fragile situation the state was passing through in terms of deteriorating economic conditions and external security threats and proposal of the NSC gave birth to differences between the two. The COAS' advices were unwelcomed and resented. It was, therefore, The COAS General Jehangir Karamat instead of apologizing preferred to resign. As a result, Nawaz Sharif appointed an Urdu speaking General, hailing from Muhajir background while superseding two senior Generals both of Pakhtun and Punjabi origin under the assumption that Urdu speaking General would pose no resistance to his authority. But what is fated cannot be revoked. The differences between the two emerged in the wake of Kargil issue while putting its responsibility on one another in a bid of public face saving. In such circumstances of alleging and counter-alleging, Nawaz Sharif played an ill-fated card while replacing the COAS by then ISI Chief Lt. General Ziauddin at the time when the COAS was on foreign visit. But the COAS' own intelligence network acted in time dismissing his government unceremoniously on 12th Oct, 1999. Nawaz Sharif thus himself paved the way for his own downfall and closed the door behind democracy once again. These all could be held to be the logical end of his despotic ways of rule.[142]

4.2.5 Absence of Free and Fair Elections: A Follow up

In the absence of free and fair elections, stable democracy could not be established in the

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[141] Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan in 1998: A Polity under Pressure*, Asian Survey, vol-1, 1999,pp.181-182.
[142]Veena Kukreja, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political Process, Conflicts and Crises*, New Delhi: Sage Pub, 2003, pp.255-257.

polity. Consequently, those who come into powers least believe in democratic norms and principles. The elections that held in Pakistan also present the sorrowful scenario in which the will of the people frequently had been stolen. The elections held in 1990 were not devoid of discrepancies and rigging. Pre-poll rigging was highly rampant during elections of 1990. The government including the President and Caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi along with the armed forces and intelligence agencies were engaged in the consolidation of the anti-PPP vote. It had been consolidated under the banner of the IJI. In the President's House a cell under General Rafaqat was set up to monitor all business of pre-poll rigging. The state media was being utilized for this purpose. Similarly, on polling-day rigging was not out of question as the PPP lost many seats in the Punjab which it previously won in the elections of 1988. Thus the PPP lost 39 seats out of 53 which it won in the elections of 1988. It was said that the IJI ballot boxes had been stuffed with unauthorized votes on the polling-day which made the way for clinching majority of seats. Similarly, post-poll rigging created a bit disagreement between the President of the IJI and the troika i.e. the President, the COAS, and the Caretaker Prime Minister, as the President and the COAS wanted Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as the Prime Minister but Nawaz Sharif being a President of the IJI was reluctant to surrender. Although, he was allowed to form the government but it was to have claimed that the post-poll rigging set a stage for his subsequent ouster from Premiership in April 1993. In the same way, the elections of 1993 were the logical end of the tussle going on between the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif sought to come out of the yoke of the President and his aides. This led to the dismissal of his government by the President using his power under Article 58 (2-B). Nawaz Sharif challenged the dismissal in the Apex Court, however, the Court restored his government but on account of their persisted differences both had to resign on 18th July, 1993, on the intervention of the then COAS. Thus the elections held in 1993 had the same script as those

of 1988 and of 1990 but this time the characters were different. Now the engineers of elections were engaged in breaking the anti-PPP vote, as a result, the IJI was dissolved. The vote of the JI was separated through the formation of a new alliance in the name of PIF (Pakistan Islamic Front). Factions in the Nawaz League were encouraged to assert themselves. One such faction was formed in the name of the PML (J) under Hamid Nasir Chatta. It weakened the vote bank of Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab. In N.W.F.P, the JUI was encouraged to strike alliance with the PPP while in Sind the MQM was encouraged to boycott the elections. Although, this alignment and re-alignment looked apparently normal business of the elections but undue interference by the state apparatus and intelligence agencies left a big question on the fairness of the elections. However, the polling day rigging was not as significant as it had no decisive impact on the results of the elections. Moreover, the post-polling rigging was also nominal as Benazir Bhutto chose Muhammad Farooq Laghari as the President who was her trusted lieutenant. In the same way, the PPP government was dissolved in 1996 on charges of corruption and mismanagement by the President Farooq Laghari. As a result, elections were held in 1997 under the Caretaker government of Malik Miraj Khalid as the Prime Minister. But this time the President did everything in the name of national interest. The objectives of the 1997 elections' engineers were not clear whether they wanted to support or work against either of the political parties i.e. the PPP and the PML (N). But one thing was clear that they wanted narrow competition between the two and sought to create a weak parliament. They also preferred to despise the ex-politicians and elevate technocrats and new faces as better alternative. The JI boycott the elections. The Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf was a new entrant in the elections. Although pre-poll rigging was moderate but the involvement of the President House and agencies was not out of question. Similarly, on the polling-day, rigging was not heard as the PPP (runner-up) never highlighted or term the elections as rigged. For the first time, the competition between the

PPP and the PML (N) was not a narrow one. The PML (N) got the sweeping majority in the elections. Thus there was no difficulty for the formation of government. Thus post-poll rigging had been reported to be low. But this mandate was disrespected in the days to come through undemocratic ways. Thus the post-poll rigging met with underestimation of the rule of law and constitutional institutions.[143]

4.3 Conclusion

It is a tragedy with the polity of Pakistan where none of the elected governments had completed its full constitutional term in office. Every government had to leave the helm ungracefully. For this state of affairs, democratic as well as non-democratic forces are held responsible keeping in view their role. The decade of 1990s also presents the same bleak picture and stands witness to how democratic norms and principles had been disgraced only for personal advantages. In the decade in question, the politics of confrontation, widespread corruption, mismanagement, economic bankruptcy, authoritarianism, as well as rigging of elections in which the government comprised of the President, the interim set up, and the intelligence agencies performed active role, had been widespread. Both the ruling and the opposition had been engaged in the so called politics meant only to promote their personal interests at the altar of democratic values. Moreover, the role of the opposition was not democratic one. It used to ally against the ruling party only to prove it a failure and welcomed frequently the undemocratic decisions of the Head of the state. The role of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during their respective periods in opposition speaks volume about the undemocratic behavior of the opposition. Moreover, in the decade of 1990s, none of the parties except the PML (N) in the elections of 1997, had majority of seats. It was, therefore, they had to enter into coalition with each other. If they had failed to compromise on mutual

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[143] Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani, *Reflection on the Electoral History of Pakistan*, Islamabad: PILDAT, 2008, pp.15-20.

interests, the dissident withdrew its support. As a result, the ruling party had to suffer from crisis. This was how the ruling party had been compelled to leave the helm.

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Chapter 5

Fragmentation of Political Parties: The Case of PML

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with Fragmentation of Political Parties with special focus on Pakistan Muslim League-the successor of All India Muslim League (1906)-which came into being when All India Muslim League (AIML) was formally bifurcated into Muslim League for Pakistan and Muslim League for Indian Muslims in a meeting held in Karachi at Khaliq Dina Hall on 15th December 1947. It is important to note, although other political parties except Jamat-e-Islami (JI) in Pakistan are no exception to the process of fragmentation but the PML is usually identified with the phenomenon making it a test case on account of division and re-division into a dozen of factions keeping in view its checkered history. Today one could find many Muslim Leagues with tags of their creators' names. It is, therefore, difficult to determine which Muslim League happens to be the real heir of the PML of the Quaid-e- Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Because there is no difference in the ideologies they profess. The chapter is thus divided into three sections. The sections A and B discuss in detail the fragmentation of the PML before and after Independence respectively. In section C of the chapter, the fragmentation of the PML is explored critically seeking to pinpoint those factors and reasons responsible for. At the end of the chapter conclusion is drawn on the basis of information provided with regard to the PML and its fragmentation.

5.2 Section-A: Fragmentation of the PML: Pre-Independence (1906-1947)

The PML was the successor of the All India Muslim League, the torch bearer of the Freedom Movement, which was founded at Dhaka in 1906 with exclusive purpose of safeguarding the rights and interest of the Muslims of India. The AIML tried hard to make its objectives a reality for which it did not leave any stone unturned but certain incidents compelled it to strive for separate homeland for the Muslims of India. It was this motivation that was finally

culminated in the form of the existence of Pakistan on 14th Aug, 1947. During all these eventful years, The AIML sometimes had been suffered from internal dissentions and conspiracies but such situations were defused there and then.

In 1907, Sir Mian Muhammad Shafi and Mian Fazal Hussain founded a separate Muslim League in the Punjab on account of some differences with the AIML. However, a meeting was arranged for sorting out the differences in the house of Muhammad Muzamal Allah Khan at Aligarh on 19th Mar, 1908. The meeting was presided over by Shah Din Hamayun, a known personality of the Punjab. Besides, Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar, Sir Ali Aman, Raja Ghulam Hussain were also present on the occasion. The differences between the two Leagues had been removed and sought to remain united keeping in view the demands of the contemporary circumstances prevailed around. Shah Din Hamayun, Mian Muhammad Shafi, Mian Fazal Hussain had been selected as President, Secretary, and Joint Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League respectively. Besides, launching a campaign of the Muslim League and public contact was also emphasized so that the message of the AIML might be reached to the other cities, small or big, of India. In 1927, the 19th meeting of the AIML under the presidentship of Sir Abdul Qadir was held at Calcutta. In the meeting, serious differences emerged over the Simon Commission. On one hand, Sir Mian Muhammad Shafi, the President of the Punjab Muslim League, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, and few other leaders were of the view that we, the Muslims, should not boycott the Simon Commission in all and sundry. They suggested a delegation of the Muslim League should see the members of the commission and present a memorandum suggesting appropriate changes to the Royal Commission keeping in view the demands of the Muslims. If the Simon Commission fails to uphold those demands, it would be appropriate to boycott while on the other hand, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the President of the AIML, Ali Brethrens, Raja Sahib of Mahmood Abad, and a lot of prominent leaguers from other provinces had the opinion that the Simon

Commission was a conspiracy to deceive Muslims and Hindus of India. It was, therefore, inevitable to boycott the Commission. As a result, the AIML was virtually divided into two hostile groups over the differences emerged out of the matter of the Simon Commission. One group was named after Sir Shafi known as Shafi Muslim League of which Sir Mian Muhammad Shafi, Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Maulana Husrat Mohani were President, General Secretary, and Joint Secretary respectively whereas the other one was known as Jinnah Muslim League of which Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Saifudin Khachlo, and Mr. Muhammad Ali Chagla were President, General secretary, and Joint Secretary respectively. Moreover, the AIML (Shafi Group) held its meeting at Lahore in Islamia Collage Habibiya Hall on 31st Dec, 1927 in which 354 members participated. Besides, many letters and telegrams were received from inland and outland in which the matter regarding the boycott of the Simon Commission had been discussed. In one such a letter, Syed Amir Ali emphasized that the boycott of the Simon Commission was not advantageous and useful for the Muslims of India. In the meeting cooperation with the Simon Commission was emphasized and the plea of boycott was rejected unanimously. The AIML (Jinnah Group) held its meeting on 30th to 31st Dec, 1927. In the meeting, Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq (Amratsar), while emphasizing on the early elimination of differences between the two Leagues, earmarked the unity in the Leagues to be the need of the hours. His suggestion was given heed and accepted unanimously in the meeting. Although both the Leagues were united putting aside their differences for the time being yet there still existed some differences among some of the Leaguers. Thus disagreements on certain issues arose between the Shafi League and the Jinnah League soon after the reconciliation made between the two in the recent past. In the 20th meeting of the AIML, which was held under the Presidentship of Maharaja Sir Ali Muhammad Khan on 29th to 30th Dec, 1928, the All India Jinnah Muslim League got passed a resolution in which a reply was sought from Sir Shafi and certain members of his League on their certain

objectionable activities and suggestions against the decision of the AIML which have not only damaged the prestige of the AIML but also put all Muslims of India on the threshold of disunity. If he fails to satisfy, the AIML should declare ultra-valid his League and substitute it with a new Muslim League under sincere leadership. However, Sir Ali Muhammad, in his brief address, said that it would be inappropriate to give his verdict without providing an opportunity to Sir Muhammad Shafi for expressing his mind in support of his line of action. The suggestion was accepted without any contradiction. The AIML once again suffered from anarchy and disunity after 1930. The leaders of the Muslims of India were divided into groups on Nehru Report, the Simon Commission and Delhi Proposal. In the meantime, Maulana Muhammad Ali Johar, a veteran leader, died, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah had gone to London disheartened over the disunity prevailed among the Muslims of India. It is important to note that the annual meeting of the AIML held in 1932 to look into the circumstances prevailed around but it failed to affect any bearing. In 1933, the AIML was once again divided into two factions in the names of Aziz Group and Hidayat Allah Group. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal identified all this disunity travelled into the ranks of the Muslims with their so called leadership. He presented a judicious analysis of the situation, with regard to the vested interests and mutual disunity among the Muslims leadership, in his presidential address in All India Muslim Conference in Lahore on 21st Mar, 1932. He advised the leader of the Muslims to remain united under the banner of a single political organization and discard all these so called personal differences. Only, in this way, they could lead the Muslims of India wholeheartedly. He suggested a single political organization for the Indian Muslims. He even further elaborated that to name such an organization in any way you want but it should lead the Muslims of India united. He concluded that, in his opinion, this was the only way out of the current mess up and could unite our shattered powers for the protection of the rights of Muslims in India. In such demanding circumstances, when the political base

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of the Muslims of India was about to break into pieces, a few kindhearted Muslims strove

hard to unite the Muslims of India once again under the banner of the united Muslim League.

As a result, both the Muslim League held a joint meeting on 4th Mar, 1934. In the meeting,

differences were allowed to evaporate and Muhammad Ali Jinnah was unanimously elected

as the President of the AIML in his absentia. Besides, Hafiz Hidayat Allah was also elected

as the General Secretary of the AIML. Moreover, Maulana Fazal Haq, who presented the

Pakistan Resolution (1940) in the meeting held at Lahore and was known as Shar-e-Bengal,

had been expelled from the AIML on charges of mustering up the support and cooperation of

the Congress and Hindus for making his way to the power in Bengal. It was, therefore, the

leaguers of Bengal called the meeting of the provincial Muslim League in 1942 at Saraj

Ganch to which the Quaid Azam was also invited. He held out in his address that Mr. Fazal

Haq had virtually founded a party in the name of the Progressive Group. Besides, he had also

launched a daily "Nawa Joog" in order to malign the AIML.[144] Moreover, the differences

between Jinnah and Maulana Fazal Haq reached to the point of no return. It was, therefore, he

was ousted from the AIML. During in 1945-1946, he isolated himself completely from the

AIML. Here, it is worth to be noted that a letter from the students of Aligarh University

sought of him the reasons of leaving the AIML. In a reply to the letter, he categorically

explained the reason and said that a conspiracy had been hatched out against him by Khawaja

Nazimuddin and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy. They sent a fabricated letter to Jinnah on

account of which he expelled and banned me for life long without any investigation.

Moreover, instead of writing to me, you should write to Jinnah asking of him to lift the ban

on me so that I might be able to rejoin the AIML and work for the interest of the Muslims of

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[144]Mehir Noor Muhammad Thund, *Muslim League ki Soo Sall: Sadiki Mukhtasar Tharikh*, Pakistan: Loke
Publishers, 2001, pp.60-61, 140-141, 144,148, 158,159, 212.

India wholeheartedly once again.[145]

5.3 Section-B: Fragmentation of the PML: Post-Independence (1947-1999)

The founding political party of Pakistan, the PML, without any second thought could be named after the starfish of politics. Everybody is well aware of the characteristic of the starfish if it is cut into pieces, every piece transforms into a complete organism (starfish). Like the starfish, the PML has given birth to infinite number of Leagues (infants). The PML went through starfish reproductions process soon after the existence of Pakistan. Hussain Suhrawardy Shaheed founded a new Muslim League after having been disheartened with Liaqat Ali Khan. Afterwards so many Leagues took their birth that they were out of counting. Among them are the ML (Conv), the ML (Con), the ML (Q), the ML (F), the ML (Fida), Chatta League, Junejo League, Nawaz League, Zia League and what not. There would not have been left any alphabet to be prefixed or suffixed to name a Muslim League.[146]

The Father of the Nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, said that there were some fake coins in his pocket but he used to say about the PML that Pakistan and Muslim League are integral part to one another. Both are a source of strength to one another and vice versa. After the sudden death of the Father of Nation, fake coins in Muslim League started spilling out. Political anarchy was rampant during the period 1951-1958. There were change of governments and formation of new Muslim League overnight. Jinnah Muslim League, Awami Muslim League, God knows only how many Muslim Leagues came into existence? Once the Indian Prime Minister Pundit Jawahar Lal Nehru remarked sarcastically that he put off not so many pajamas, the way governments changed in Pakistan.[147] The AML which was the handiwork of the discontented members of the PML, was the first ever faction of the PML. Its founding

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[145]S. Iftikhar Murshed, *In Memory of Fazal Haq*, Rawalpindi: the News, 27th April, 2011.

[146] Muhammad Bilal Ghauri, *Muslim League Internet*, Peshawar: the Daily Mashriq, 4th June, 2010.

[147]Gharib Ullah Ghazi, *Pakistan ki Khaliq Muslim League kai Jammato mein Taqseem*, Peshawar: Sunday Magazine, the Daily Awsaf, 17th Oct, 2010, P.3.

father Maulana Hamid Khan Bashani was the President of Assam Muslim League which he

left in 1947. Similarly, the General Secretary, Shamsul Haq and Mujeeb-ur-Rahman were student activists who took part wholeheartedly in Language Movement in 1948. However, Maulana Hamid Khan Bashani left the party over its joining hands with Suharwardy's Government which was bent upon to follow the foreign policy already planned by the PML. It was the same AL which spearheaded the Movement for the creation of Bangladesh.[148]

Jinnah Awami Muslim League was the fusion of Frontier Awami League, Awami League of Suhrawardy, Awami League of Bashani and Jinnah Muslim League of Iftikhar Hussain. It was founded in Dec, 1952 at Lahore. Later, it became Awami League when Jinnah Muslim League re-submerged in the PML in 1953. Frontier Awami League was founded in 1949 when the differences between Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the then Chief Minister of the province, and S.M Aminul Hasanat, the Pir of Manki Sharif surfaced when the latter opposed the Chief Minister's move to abolish the system of Jagirdari and seek to confer rights of the lands upon tenants. But he and his loyalists failed to stop the government from the legislation. Moreover, they resented when their suggestions were not given any heed in the party organization process in the province. As a result, he, along with his supporters, floated their own faction on 15th May, 1949 at Peshawar. He became the Chairman and Ghulam Muhammad Khan of Lundkhur as General Secretary. Awami Muslim League which was found on 18th March, 1950 at Lahore under the leadership of Suhrawardy, called a convention of the leaguers at Lahore in which Suhrawardy criticized the Old Muslim League and demanded of the league to organize itself on modern lines and to remain in congenial relationship with the neighbors especially with India and supported neutrality in case of war between the super powers. He held in the end that this all could be achieved through the

formation of a new party. This was how All Pakistan Jinnah Awami Muslim League was founded when the four leagues combined under the leadership of Suhrawardy in convention held in Dec, 1952 at Lahore. Jinnah Muslim League was established by Iftikhar Hussain, Khan of Mamdot on 31st Sep, 1950 when he was charged and trailed subsequently under PRODA in July 1949. Although, he was relieved of charges by Governor General in 1950 but he resigned from the league on 31st Oct, 1950 after leveling charges against the leaguers who upheld the own interests and ignored the interest of the masses for which the league was established. Soon the differences between Khan of Mamdot and Suhrawardy emerged over the report of the Basic Principal Committee which sought the equal representation of both the wings of the state. Khan of Mamdot resented the report and demanded of Suhrawardy a resolution to be moved in the convention of the party but he didn't give any heed to the verdict. Besides, the members of the West Pakistan chapter were also critical of Awami League's stance regarding Bengali to be one of the national languages, complete provincial autonomy, and separate army for the two wings. As a result, Khan of Mamdot was expelled on 21st April 1953. This was how he rejoined the PML and was made the governor of Sind and Jinnah Awami League became Awami Muslim League. Similarly, the differences between Bashani and Suhrawardy emerged over former reservations on foreign policy, corruption and the failure of the Suhrawardy's government in realization of 21 points program. He resigned from the party and floated his own party in the name of NAP in July 1957 at Dacca.[149]

PDP had a long story to have reached the current shape. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan kicked off his political career from the platform of the Indian National Congress. Later, in life, he changed many political parties from Congress to Tehrik-e-Khilafat, from Tehrik-e-Khilafat to

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[149] _____, Awami League, http://prr.hec.gov.pk/Chapters/277-4.pdf, retrieved on 24th March, 2012.

Majlis-e-Ahrar, from Majlis-e-Ahrar to Awami League and from Awami League to Awami League (Nasrullah Group) and in the end he floated his own political party in the name of PDP in June 1969.[150]

General Iskander Mirza became the first president of the state after the promulgation of the first constitution in 1956. Moreover, the PML was in coalition with Awami League and Krishak Saramik Party. Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, the then President of the PML, asked the leaguers to form a parliamentary group in the assembly. Thus the leaguers elected Sardar Bahadar Khan as the Head of the group. But the President Iskander Mirza wanted Dr. Khan Sahib to be the Head of the group. However, Dr. Khan Sahib in league with President formed United Group only to get the leaguers on his side. However, they met with defeat in their attempt. As a result, they formed a new political party in the name of the Republican Party with Dr. Khan Sahib as its President. Many opportunist leaguers joined the party. It set gigantic cracks in the very existence of the PML.[151]After the revival of political parties under the Political Parties Act during General Ayub Khan's Regime, the PML in such circumstances was divided into three distinct factions comprising of the Council Muslim League, the Conventional Muslim League, and a group called Non-Revivalists. It is important to note that both the Muslim Leagues i.e. the Council Muslim League and the Conventional Muslim League had been named after the organs of the original Pakistan Muslim League. The Non-Revivalists hailed from the East Pakistan headed by Nur-al-Amin. They decided to go against the Revival policy until the complete restoration of democracy. Moreover, the main reason behind the split was the absence of Khan Abdul Qayum Khan-the former President of the PML-who was banned under EBDO (Elective Bodies

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[150] ____, *Political Parties and Political Development in Punjab (1993-1999)*, http://prr.hec.gov.pk/Chapters/778s-5.pdf, retrieved on 24th March 2012.
[151] ____, pmln, http://www.pmln.org.pk/action retrieved on 5th Oct, 2010.

Disqualification Ordinance) and later on was exiled on account of his fiery speeches against the Martial Law. The current leadership of the PML had no potential to keep the party intact. It is claimed that General Ayub Khan although agreed to the suggestion of the revival of political parties and the formation of a political party of his cronies hesitatingly, but on the condition to have extended support to the programme and policies of his government. In the beginning, his supporters known as Ministerialists decided to make entirely a new political party but at the end resorted to revive the Pakistan Muslim League. For this purpose, they sought to exploit the support of Manzare Alam who had, along with Maulana Akram Khan, and Abul Qasim, announced the revival of the PML in the near past. After having consultation with the prominent leaguers, Maulana Akram Khan decided to revive the PML both at national and provincial level. General Ayub Khan and his cronies tried their best to make him relinquish the idea but they failed to do so. As a result, they formed a committee consisting of two central ministers, Habib Ullah Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and three Parliamentary Secretaries for the reorganization of the PML through Councils. But soon they acknowledged the futility of their efforts as none of the councilors was ready to provide them support until the restoration of the 1962 constitution, lifting ban on politicians and political parties, and the release of Khan Abdul Qayum Khan. In such state of affairs, the Ministerialists decided to hold the convention of the PML. To make it a total success, they sought the convention to be presided over by such a persona, who could enjoy the respect and confidence of the leaguers. It was, therefore, invitations to many prominent personalities like Raja Amir Muhammad Khan of Mahmood Abad, a close companion of the Quaid-e-Azam, Maulana Akram Khan, and Maulana Ihtesham-Ul-Haq Thanvi were extended. However, they declined the invitation. As a last resort, Chaudhry Khaliq-al-Zaman was chosen. In order to give real color to the convention not a single minister was included in the conveners. Besides, lists of invitation were minutely scanned with the sole purpose of avoiding any untoward

situation at the convention.[152]Thus the convention was held on 4-5th Sep, 1962. In the

beginning, there was some resistance found among the East Pakistan leaguers who were demanding the release of Khan Abdul Qayum Khan. The demand was met there and then. The convention succeeded in the formation of the Conventional Muslim League. Once it was established. Its leaders left no stone unturned to forge unity between the two Leagues. Even important party positions were offered to the members of the Council Muslim League.[153] Morerever, General Ayub Khan and the President of the ML (Con) corresponded with each other over the flood hit areas of the East Pakistan and collaborated unanimously in passing the first amendment of the constitution. These and other postures adopted by both sides made many think of the unification of the Leagues.[154]However, the efforts and good gestures failed to materialize the objective i.e. the unification of both the Leagues. It is worth mentioning here that the ML (Conv), soon after establishing itself in the National Assembly, fell prey to the intra-party conflicts. The party organizer hailing from Karachi and the organizers of the West Pakistan, supported by the chief organizer Khaliq-Al-Zaman, accused each other of playing dual role putting aside the real task of the reorganization of the party. Nawab Yamin Khan addressed the chief organizers in bad terms. Thus the party branch of Karachi, which was bridged up by a committee comprising of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Mian Amiral Din, and Jam Sahib of Lasbella, stay divided for three months. In the same way, the party was divided into two groups. One was led by Monem Khan, while Abdul Sabur Khan, Waheed Al Zaman and Qazi Qadir stood united behind him, whereas, the other one was led by Hashim who had enjoyed the support of Fazl al Qadir Chaudhry. Here, it is noted that Hashim's Group was commonly known as Dhaka group. The two rival groups used to accuse each other in order to

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[152] Muhammad Rafiq Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1958-1969*, Islamabad: NIHCR, 1998, pp.85-91.

[153] Habib Ullah Khan's statement, Karachi: Dawn, 22 Oct, 1962.

[154] Sir Percival Griffth, *Latest Development in India and Pakistan*, Asian Review, April, 1964, p.14.

prove their loyalty to the central leadership of the party. In this points scoring tussle, Hashim's Group got an edge over the other when Fazl al Qadir became the Speaker of the National Assembly. But Hashim's Group met with nosedive in party provincial elections of Nov 1963. In such circumstances, Monem Khan's Group sought to have complete control of the working committee as well as complete exclusion of the Dhaka Group from the working committee which culminated into conflict. Thus Monem Khan's Group was divided on the inclusion of Dhaka Group. As a result, Monem Khan's Group was bifurcated. Thus Monem Khan and Abdul Sabor Khan were heading their respective groups.[155]In short, General Ayub Khan used the Muslim League only to remain in power when he imposed the first Martial Law in 1958. He established Conventional Muslim League under the military umbrella. The leaguers enjoyed powers for ten years under the shade of the Martial Law. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto resigned from Muslim League (Conv) and floated his own party in the name of the PPP in Nov 1967.[156]

The other faction of the PML founded by the Ex-Members of the PML was known as the Council Muslim League on 28th Oct, 1962. It was the only opposition party at that time. Khawaja Nazimuddin and Sardar Bahadar were selected as the Chairman, and the General Secretary respectively. Among the other members of the party M.A Koro, Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, M.Doultana, and G.A Talpur were worth mentioning. It established its wings in East and West Pakistan. However, it was ill organized. Moreover, another faction of the PML was founded by Mumtaz Doultana and Khan Abdul Qayum Khan in the same name and joined Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM).[157]The PML (Qayum) was a breakaway splinter of the PML (Con). It was founded as a result of the conflict over the issue of party

[155] Muhammad Rafiq Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1958-1969*, Islamabad: NIHCR, 1998, p.96.
[156]Gharib Ullah Ghazi, *Pakistan Ki Khaliq Muslim League kai Jammato mein Taqseem*, Peshawar: Sunday Magazine, the Daily Awsaf, 17th Oct, 2010, p.3.
[157] __, *Democracy and Crisis of Political Parties*, http://kinzuleman.blogspot.com/2011/06/democracy-crisis-of-political-parties-htm/, retrieved on 5th Dec, 2011.

leadership when its first President Khawaja Nazimuddin died in 1964. The party in question was initially named as the Quiad-e-Azam Muslim League but later on renamed as the PML (Qayum).[158]Moreover, the PML (Qayum) suffered from rift dividing the party into two groups especially after its withdrawal from coalition with the PPP on 7th January, 1977.Qayum Khan was leading his own group, whereas the other was being headed by Sheikh Shaukat Ali-then Deputy in the PML (Qayum). The split was held to be the result of the differences existed between the two leaders. In a way of retribution, Qayum Khan expelled him from the party. Thus Shaukat Ali with his group decided to contest the elections of provincial assemblies separately.[159]

The Pakistan Muslim League was the logical end of the efforts when the factions of the PML i.e. the PML (Con), the PML (Q), as well as of the PPP and the devotees of Meher Umer Hayat and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan joined hands together just after 1971 Crisis with the sole purpose of striving to wield political powers. The newly established political party had the majority of the landlords, who specifically upheld their own interests leaving behind the stance of the party on the issues i.e. the end of emergency, freedom of speech, acquittal of political prisoners, transparent elections, and freedom of the press etc. Besides it was also accused of its dual role in supporting the policies of the government, if finding them in line with its interests. Later on, conflict cropped up within its ranks over the question of participating in PNA led opposition. However, the party was virtually divided into three factions on the issue of leadership. One group of the party was being led by Pir Sahib Pagaro, the other one was by Muhammad Hanif Ramay, and the third one was being led by Malik Muhammad Qasim. Although strenuous efforts were made to keep the party united, but failed

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[158]Haruhiro Fukui, *Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific*, England: Greenwood Press, 1985, p.923.
[159] , *Democracy and Crisis of Political Parties*, http://kinzuleman.blogspot.com/2011/06/democracy-crisis-of-political-parties-htm/, retrieved on 5th Dec, 2011.

to yield any bearing. Thus the party was finally broken in 1978. It was held that Ali Ahmad Talpur was the man behind the defection contrived in the party on account of his enmity with Pir Pagaro-the then PML leader.[160]

The PML (Functional) or Pir Pagaro Group was intially founded in 1973, when Council and Conventional Muslim Leagues united except the Qayum Muslim League, which was in alliance with the government of the PPP. Pir Pagaro was elected its President. However, he separated his own party in 1985 after having felt uneasiness with the Zia made PML.[161]Moreover, Pir Pagaro named his party as Functional because it was revived after the verdict of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The party was limited only to Sind. He used to claim to be the natural heir of the party but his claim became a cry in the wilderness, when he accepted Muhammad Khan Junejo as the President of the Party. Besides, he used to state that the constitution of his party was the carbon copy of the original constitution of the PML of the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.[162] The JML was founded by General Muhammad Azam on 29th Dec, 1977. He criticized the other factions of the PML alleging that they all had been failed to materialize the Muslim League of the Quaid-e-Azam. Instead they had been employing their respective Leagues as vehicles exclusively to clinch power. He claimed the JML to be the true representative of the Quaid-e-Azam's ideals. It would provide true democratic and prosperous Pakistan to the people. Another faction of the PML emerged when Hussain Imam founded a political party in the name of the OML on 12th Aug, 1978. He was chosen as the President of the party and Shujat Ali as the Honorary Secretary General. The party pledged of the establishment of Islamic democracy keeping in view its ideals of equality, unity, and liberty. Besides, it would strive to promote the true culture of politics,

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[160]Haruhiro Fukui, *Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific*, England: Greenwood Press, 1985, pp.918-920.
[161] Amir Nafees, *Muslim League: The Essential Part of Ruling Elite in Pakistan*, the Post, 8th July, 2008, http://www.opf.blog.com/2996/muslimLeague-%E2 retrieved on 5th Dec, 2010.
[162] Ashraf Mumtaz, *Pakistan Muslim League, in, The Political Parties in Pakistan*, Karachi: Royal Books, 2002, p.102.

integrity among the Muslim Ummah, and achieve the right of self-determination for the

people of Kashmir. It was also in favor of the amendments made to the constitution with the purpose of making it democratic and national. In the same way, Pakistan Muslim League (Forward Bloc) was founded in Dec 1978 by Raja Muhammad Akhtar and his followers after parting their ways with the PML (United). The split was mainly attributed to the disagreement existed over the distribution of party funds and portfolios in the cabinet. The party extended full support to Zia's regime. However, it had no independent policy or programme of its own. The PML (Qasim) emerged out of the PML (United) on account of conflict over the question of party leadership. The leader and the founder of the party Malik Muhammad Qasim challenged Pir Pagaro-the then President of the PML (United). As a result, he was expelled from the party in the middle of 1978. Later on, he submerged his party into another faction of the PML and founded the PML (Chatta). The PML (Chatta) was a breakaway faction of the PML (United). It was founded in August 1978 by Malik Muhammad Qasim. Chaudhry Muhammad Hussain Chatta was its first President. In 1979, he was replaced and Khawaja Khairuddin was given the rein. Malik Muhammad Qasim survived as its General Secretary till its existence. However, the party suffered from internal intrigues which paved the way for its division.[163]

In East Pakistan, Awami League (Jinnah) of Hussain Suhrawardy splited and gave birth to Awami League of Mujib-ur-Rahman. After General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan, who held elections in 1970 under the Legal Framework Order, imposed another Martial Law in the country. In the elections, all the factions of the Muslim League i.e. the Muslim League

elections from the platform of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Moreover, General Zia ul-

Haq when imposed Martial law in 1977, Muslim League was divided into three factions i.e. Muslim League (Khawaja Khair u Din), Muslim League (Muhammad Hussain) and Muslim League (Pir Pagaro). In 1985, non-partisan elections were held. General Zia ul-Haq established new Muslim League in the National Assembly under the presidency of Muhammad Khan Junejo.[164]After the nomination of Muhammad Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq allowed political activities across the polity. It is important to note that the Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo was elevated as the Head of the Public Group. Thus Public Muslim League (the PML) was established inside the Parliament which was afterwards renamed as Pakistan Muslim League (the PML). With the revival of the PML in the National Assembly the Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo directed all the Chief Ministers to revive the PML in their respective provinces. After the so called lifting of Martial law on 30th December 1985, the Prime Minister formally launched the PML on 18th January 1986.[165] Thus the PML was revived during General Zia ul-Haq's Regime. However, when Muhammad Khan Junejo's Government was dismissed, the PML once again split into two factions i.e. the Muslim League (Junejo) and the Muslim League (Fida). Later on, the Muslim League (Fida) was renamed as The Muslim League (Nawaz) when Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif became its President.[166]However, the split was bridged up after General Zia ul-Haq death in a plane crash on 17th Aug, 1988. The Muslim League stood united in the leadership of Muhammad Khan Junejo in Oct 1988. It was once again broken when Mian Nawaz Sharif founded his own party as the PML (N) in 1993. The PML (Junejo) was renamed as such but later on, the party submerged into the PML (Chatta

Group).[167] The PML (Chatta Group) was founded in 1993 by Hamid Nasir Chatta after having had differences with Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif over the election of the President of the party just after the death of Muhammad Khan Junejo. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif sought to be elected the President of the party before the challam of the departed President of the party. However, according to the constitution of the party, the new President could not have been elected before the period of 45 days. This haste on the part of Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif disheartened pro-Junejo elements in the party who did not want the successor of his late leader to be elected in such a hasty manner. Besides, it is important to note that like many other members of the party, Hamid Nasir Chatta also parted ways with Mian Nawaz Sharif on the dictations given by the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who was finding difficulty to work with Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. In such circumstances, Hamid Nasir Chatta held a meeting to which, Mir Balakh Sher Mazari (then caretaker Prime Minister), Mian Manzoor Watto (then Chief Minister of the Punjab), Mir Afzal Khan (N.W.F.P) were invited. In the meeting, Abdul Ghafoor Khan Hoti from N.W.F.P was desirous to be elected the President of the Party. But it was not met. As a result, he left the meeting and floated his own Muslim League in the name of the Muslim League (Hoti). Furthermore, one another faction of the PML emerged in the name of the Muslim League (Jinnah), when Mian Manzoor Watto parted his way with the ML (Chatta). His party was confined only to Okara, and Jehlum districts of the Punjab.[168] Similarly, another faction of the PML was founded in 1999 when Ijaz ul-Haq floated a political party in the name of the PML (Zia).[169]

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[167] Dr. Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development*, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1990, p.101.
[168] Ashraf Mumtaz, *Pakistan Muslim League*, as mentioned in, *The Political Parties in Pakistan*, Karachi: Royal Book, 2002, pp.95-97.
[169] Amir Nafees, *Muslim League: The Essential Part of Ruling Elite in Pakistan*, the Post, 8th July, 2008, http://www.opf.blog.com/2996/muslimLeague-%E2 retrieved on 5th Dec, 2010.

5.4 Section-C: Fragmentation of the PML: A Critical Analysis

5.4.1 The PML and the Military

The PML, the creator of Pakistan, has been playing in the hands of the military since partition. Many of the leaguers by one or the other pretext managed to become a part of the military regime. This is one of the causes of its fragmentation. It is, therefore, today one can see a number of the PML with the tag of its founder's name. Thus the military has been remained the decisive role in the politics of Pakistan sometimes directly while another time from behind the curtain. In such state of affairs, political parties are no exception to its decisive influence. They are not only influenced but also their helms are controlled. It is appropriate to be mentioned here that political parties which do not deliver their fundamental functions i.e. interest articulation, interest aggregation, and policy formation, frequently fall prey to the maneuvers of the civil and military bureaucracy.[170] In Pakistan, military dictators planted and had helped grow the siblings of the political parties rather in appropriate words factions while keeping in view their own needs and vested interests. In plain words, these factions or political groups had been happened to be a means to their ends after having assumed the shapes of the so called political parties. In return, they had been rewarded with bounties and kickbacks. It is a matter of great concern, if a political party, which strives to uphold the interests of the individual or a group, is not a party by any definition at all. It is, rather, a faction or cadre party which looks down upon the national interest as valueless and insignificant. Such is the tragedy with the politics of Pakistan where a multitude of political parties has been founded by the military dictators exclusively for the purpose of serving their malign interests.[171] The PML, which has been often labeled as the Martial League, is no

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[170] Grail Baxter, Yojendra. K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and Robert. C. Oberst, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1988, p.188.
[171] Zaiba Hussain, *Siyasi Jamthain aur Jamoohriath*, Rawalpindi: The daily Nawa-i-Waqt, 1st Jan, 2011.

exception to such a background of the political parties. In the words of Nawabzada Nasrullah

Khan, the PML had been remained the handmaiden and slave of the military dictators over

the years and it is an accepted reality that slaves and handmaidens are not free in their

opinions.[172]Thus the PML has been remained a vehicle for all military dictators during their

respective regimes. The PML (Conv) during General Ayub regime, the PML (Junejo) during

General Zia rule, and the PML (Q) during Musharraf regime had provided strength and

support to their respective masters. It has been observed that all the leaguers, who had been

united under the banner of the PML, had to face the split, the moment either their so called

demigods faltered or their bounties upon them became extinct.[173]

The PML is frequently prone to fragmentation, which is excessively identified with the non-

democratic forces in their respective regimes. It is not a matter of surprise that the PML has

been remained intact while in power and vice versa. While becoming inert or almost dead in

politics during 1970s after the resignation of General Ayub Khan and its subsequent

assimilation into the PML (United) in the early 1970s, the PML (Conv) is a case in point in

this regard. Similarly, the splitting of the PML into the PML (Junejo) and the PML (Fida),

later on, renamed as the PML (N) in 1993, founded during General Zia regime, speaks

volumes about the argument.[174]Most of the leaders of the PML have the hands of the military

behind their political stature. Muhammad Khan Junejo came to the power with the help of

General Zia ul-Haq who thought of him to be the best option to muster up the required

support to his government. It was, therefore, he was nominated the President of the PML

revived during General Zia regime and the Chief Ministers of the four provinces were

nominated as the Vice Presidents of the party. It is important to note that being the Chief

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[172] Muhammad Bilal Ghauri, *Muslim League Internet*, Peshawar: The Daily Mashriq, 4th June, 2010.
[173] _____, http://www.pmln.org.pk/action. retrieved on 28th Dec, 2010.
[174]Hussain Zaidi, *Why Muslim League is Prone to Breaks up*, ____,
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/cmnul/dawn.content-library . retrieved on 24th Dec. 2010.

Minister of the Punjab, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif was made the President of the

Punjab Muslim League. After having enjoyed the power as the Vice President of the PML of

the Punjab chapter, he sought to become the President of the party. When the differences

between General Zia ul-Haq and Muhammad Khan Junejo cropped up, the way for his ardent

desire was paved. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who had been a Finance Minister in the

government of the Punjab in 1981, had the blessings of General Zia ul-Haq who brought him

into politics. Later on, he was made the Chief Minister of the Punjab by then Governor of the

Punjab, General Ghulam Gilani Khan who told the members that he wanted to see Mian

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif as the Chief Minister of the Punjab. It is said that it was he who

welcomed the dismissal of Junejo's Government. This act of endorsing made him an apple of

eye for the military rulers. Thus he was made the Caretaker Chief Minister of the Punjab.

Besides, the establishment also tried hard to remove Junejo from the Presidentship of the

PML and wanted to install Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in his place. In this connection, a

meeting of the PML was arranged in Islamabad Hotel on 13th Aug, 1988, to remove Junejo.

In the meeting, a quarrel erupted among the participants in which the supporters of Junejo

and of Mian Nawaz Sharif beat each other ruthlessly. This sort of circumstances gave way to

emerge factions in the PML. One faction of the party was being headed by Fida Muhammad

with Mian Nawaz Sharif as the General Secretary, whereas, the other one was being headed

by Muhammad Khan Junejo with Iqbal Ahmad as Secretary General. It is worth mentioning

that even the sudden death of General Zia ul-Haq on 17th Aug, 1988, did not shattered the

plan hatched out by his successor Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and the COAS General Mirza Aslam

Baig. They were bent upon to implement the plan of the ex-President i.e. bringing Mian

Nawaz Sharif to the forefront, in true letter and spirit. When one month presidentship of

how he became more powerful than Muhammad Khan Junejo even though being the President of the party. In such a scenario, Muhammad Khan Junejo struck an alliance with Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and the Tehrik-e-Istiqlal of Air Martial Muhammad Asghar Khan (Retired) but in the meantime, the establishment did not want the vote bank of the PML to be divided. Consequently, Muhammad Khan Junejo was pressurized to join the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI); therefore, reconciliation was made between Mian Nawaz Sharif and Mian Muhammad Khan Junejo. As a result, Muhammad Khan Junejo was allowed to continue as the President of the PML. It all was supposed to defeat the PPP in the elections. After the death of Muhammad Khan Junejo, the PML split into the PML (Fida) and the PML (Junejo) over the differences emerged on the selection of the President of the party. Mian Nawaz Sharif became the President of the PML (Fida) and named it as the PML (N). He became the Chief Minister of the Punjab with all-out efforts of the establishment. Thus the period of confrontational politics between the PML (N) and the PPP commenced.[175]

If the history of the PML is analyzed, it would become crystal clear that the leaguers themselves were engaged in the multiplicity of the League. It was only to pursue their personal interests even at the cost of joining hands with the non-democratic forces. It is often asked who supported General Ayub regime from the platform of the PML (Conv).Besides, it is also echoed among the masses while asking who founded the PML during 1980s and supported General Zia ul-Haq.[176]In a nutshell, how the factions of the PML were engineered and had been in support of the military regime over the years. This was how political instability was brought into play in the polity.

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[175] Prof. Khalid Mahmood, *Pakistan Political Scene: 1984-1990,* Lahore: Rohtas Books Publishers, 1990, p.92.
[176] Dr. Inayat Ullah, *Pakistani Generals aur Seyasi Jamathain,* Peshawar: The Daily Mashriq, 30th Oct, 2010.

5.4.2 The PML and its Elitist Leadership

Although the PML worked for the interests of the common Muslims of India but it had been remained purely even after the independence the organization of the Muslims' elites.[177]Thus the PML failed to transform itself into a national party while coming into the yoke of its elitist leadership which was mainly divided and devoid of organizational skills. It was, therefore, unable to perform its dual duty i.e. nation-building and state-building. Here thus it could be assumed that the political instability in the state was caused mostly on account of the lack of devoted leadership and well-organized and disciplined political parties.[178] Thus the PML is a case in point in this regard. The elitist orientation among the leaguers caused rifts and dissentions. When Chaudhry Khaliquz Zaman was chosen as the chief organizer of the PML in Feb 1948, the League was organized at city, district and provincial level. He nominated office-bearers to the various chapters of the party. It was with the assistance of those office-bearers, he became the president of the League. His favors extended to his own group gave way to conspiratorial politics. As a result, protests, in the various chapters of the League, were destined to emerge. As the President of the party, he had to face the criticism of the leaguers. As he wielded no capability of the leader in true sense, it was, therefore, he abandoned the Presidentship of the League after protest by some refugees in front of his house in Karachi. In the same way, when Liaqat Ali Khan sworn in as The Chairman of the PML on 8th Oct, 1948, he assumed the charge of the President of the League as well as the Head of the government.[179]This is indicative of the behavior of the elitist leadership who used to combine in its person all the authority. This was how ill feelings were allowed to grow among the party members.

In Oct 19, 1948, Liaqat Ali Khan when succeeded Chaudhry Khaliquz Zaman, amended the

[177]Ponsmurev Yuri, *The Muslim League of Pakistan: 1947-1977*, Lahore: People Publishing House, 1986, p.23.

[178] Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1986*, Lahore: Progressive Pub, 1974, p .255.

[179] Dr. Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development*, Lahore: Vanguard Pub, 1990, pp.94 - 109.

constitution making his way level to the Presidentship of the League. His Presidentship even did not able to deliver the place to the League that once it used to enjoy in the eyes of the masses. Besides, his dual charges made the League virtually the handmaiden of the government. In addition to, he was also giving an air to factionalism while supporting his cronies against their opponents. He supported Doultana in the Punjab, and Qayum in N.W.F.P. His very act maligned the hearts of sincere and devoted workers who left the League in protest and floated their own political parties. The Khan of Mamdot, and Pir of Manki Sharif were worth to name among such disheartened workers. Furthermore, when Khawaja Nazimuddin became the President of the League after the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan, it is reported to have said that he was the weakest of the Presidents the League ever had. He did not use to take any interest in the affairs of the party. Whenever he wanted to take any decision, he never used to take the party into confidence. When Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dismissed his government and installed Muhammad Ali Bogra, the League had to accept the later as its President without any hue and cry. This was how his irresponsible attitude made the League the butt of ridicule.[180] Thus the leaguers used to feel no dejection if they changed their loyalties to the League. In the same way, the elitist leaderships' unbearable ways and actions made many think of dissentions. The PML remained in power for seven years both at national and provincial level while indoctrinating in the people that the League had been founded to rule forever. Moreover, Liaqat Ali Khan tagged all its opponents as traitors and enemies of Pakistan. In July, 1954, the League moved a resolution in the Assembly in which ban on all other political parties was sought for the next twenty years. Moreover, Liaqat Ali Khan said about the Constituent Assembly that the League had more weight than any parliament. It was the strength of Pakistan. I often used to

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[180]Ibid, p.94.

say and even now reinforce my verdict that I am the Prime Minister of the League, I am not the Prime Minister chosen by the members of the Constituent Assembly.[181]

The PML (Con) was another faction of the PML founded in Oct 1962. The party was mainly consisted of feudals, landlords, merchants, and professionals. The entire work of the party was in control of the few chosen ones. The rest of the members of the party had no role at all in the affairs of the party. This gave birth to intra-party conflicts and defections which finally divided the party. The conflict was mainly revolving around the issue of succession after the death of Khawaja Nazimuddin, the president of the party. Thus the party was finally divided into M.A Doultana Group and Qayum khan Group. Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, later on, transformed its group into a full-pledge party named it as the PML (Q). Similarly, many members of the party joined Ayub bloc while accepting government appointments. This all could be attributed to the elitist behavior of the party leadership. In the same way, the PML (Conv) was a party of landlords and industrialists who not only provided leadership to the party but also supported it financially. Although the party was heavily funded, yet it failed to implant itself in the masses. Those, who sponsored it, withdrew their support when its heydays came to an end in1969.[182] It was difficult for the party to remain intact and allowed itself to submerge into the PML (United). Thus it could be easily inferred that all the factions of the PML used to have elitist leaderships and their mutual conflicts and feuds rendered them with division and re-division. The PML (United), and the PML revived during General Zia regime are examples in this regard.

5.4.3 The PML and its Ideology

Ideology plays an important role in keeping a political party intact and providing guidance to its members. In the absence of it, the members of the party go astray and do not respect the

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[181] Dr. P. Sharan, *Government and Politics of Pakistan*, New Delhi: Metropolitan, 1983, pp.61-62.
[182] Haruhiro Fukui, *Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific*, England: Greenwood Press, 1985, pp.920-923.

norms and rules. They do not feel shy while switching over their loyalties against their own

party. In the absence of ideology, the PML had been suffered from dissentions and disloyalties on the part of its members whenever they found any outlet for the completion of their vested interests for which they even did not hesitate either to join the opposite party or float their own one. After the existence of Pakistan, it was the PML which wielded powers in the center as well as in the provinces. It was unchallenging during its long rule from 1947 to 1954. Despite, having had such circumstances, it had no programme for the welfare of the people. Its leaders used to give importance to their personal interests while putting aside the national interest. Most of their time used to consume in hatching out conspiracies against one another. This sort of attitude on the part of the leaguers put the party and democracy at stake which finally paved the way for the formation of many political parties in the days to come.[183]Moreover, it had been suffered from two major weaknesses i.e. lack of clear cut socio-economic programme and party organization. Since 1906, the AIML had no well-defined socio-economic programme for the Muslims of India except the demand of separate electorate. This demand even was not based on any socio-economic philosophy. In the same manner, the PML also did not chalk out a plan of socio-economic right after the independence i.e. would Pakistan be an Islamic state, would it be based on sharia, what kind of economic system would be implemented here? These and many other questions were not dilated upon by the leaders of the PML. It was always, therefore, exploited by non-democratic forces in the absence of vibrant ideology. During General Zia regime the Muslim League was a staunch believer in the Islam that he was supporting.[184]Consequently, binding and losing practice had been at work in the PML in order to extend support to the regimes in

their respective periods and in return, the leaguers were rewarded with bounties and blessings.

It was easy to pinpoint why the PML (Conv) failed to take its base in the masses. It was exclusively on account of having no ideology or a specific programme of its own. Rather it was created to support the programme and policies of the regime concerned i.e. General Ayub regime.[185]Although, it believed in the ideology of Islam sporadically yet it also allowed the inclusion of non-Muslims in its fold. Besides, it upheld nationalism, opposed provincial autonomy, and strongly supported central government under presidential system. It also made the part of its ideology those policies and programme which the military government upheld. In the same way, the faction of the PML (Chatta) had different ideological orientation. It was basically believed in the ideology of communalism. It opposed vehemently the introduction of progressive social and economic institutions.[186] Thus it could be admitted at all hands that ideology performs a vital role in welding up a political party cohesively. If there is no ideology, the party concerned is likely more prone to factionalism. The various factions of the PML emerged as a result of the absence of concrete ideology. Consequently, they had been exploited by the regime concerned and it had also provided an opportunity to the leaguers to switch their loyalties to the man on the spot while making a new political party exclusively for his support inheriting the name of the PML.

5.4.4 The PML and its Loose Organizational Setup

It is noted that organized political parties are inevitable for smooth working of democracy. If they are ill-organized, they could not perform their due role in the political system. It is said that the AIML had the tradition of launching primary membership but the moment it transformed into the APML, it wound this tradition. Besides, it set a precedent for its various

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[185]Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, Dacca: Dacca OUP, 1973, p.131.
[186]Haruhiro Fukui, *Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific*, England: Greenwood Press, 1985, p.920.

factions. The AIML presented a scene of dis-organization till 1936. There was no well-established coordination between its provincial and central command. The situation at provincial level was totally bleak. The leaders of the League had monopoly over the provincial wings of the League. In such circumstances, Muhammad Ali Jinnah tried hard to organize it with the help of Allama Muhammad Iqbal. It was due to this purpose, he arranged the Bombay Session in 1936. In this connection, he toured across the country and requested the local leaders of the Muslim League to forget their personal differences, and think only in terms of the Muslim League. Thus it was due to the charismatic leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah; as a result, the Muslim League was organized and transformed into a mass organization, while making it a sole organization of the Muslims of India.[187]Another major weakness of the PML was its loose organization, especially after the death of The Quaid-e-Azam; the PML became victim of intra-party intrigues and conspiracies. The party leaders used to conspire against one another in order to have the leadership of the party in their own hands. Pakistan, a multi-ethnic polity, needed a party which had roots in the masses so that it could be kept integrated. But the PML, after Jinnah, lost the popularity and respect among the masses that it previously used to enjoy. Most of the time, the leaguers had to seek the support of the establishment in order to wield power. It had to surrender before the Governor General when he dissolved the central government in 1953 and appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra as the Prime Minister. In the same way, when Governor General again dissolved the Central Assembly in 1954, the PML was not even apprehensive over his action. Thus it created an impression among the masses that the PML was pro-establishment and anti-masses. This break up between the PML and the masses was the result of the poor and weak relation which finally gave way to fragmentation of the party in the years to come. During Ayub regime, the

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[187] Keith Collard, *A political Study of Pakistan*, London: Oxford University press, 1957, p.26.

PML was in league with the military in the name of the PML (Conv) which was broken up the moment the regime concerned came to an end especially after 1970 when it merged into the PML (United). Organizationally, the PML (Conv) was weak and loose. The all-powerful President of the League was unchallenging while making appointments to the important slots in the party. It is important to note that such appointments used to be made not selected. The situation of the party in East and West Pakistan was not different as well. Moreover, the party organization suffered from further deterioration in the presence of inter-regional factionalism. The intra-party factionalism undermined the party in the local elections.[188] Similarly, the PML revived during General Zia regime, due to weak and loose organization, also suffered from fragmentation after the death of its founder giving birth to the PML (J) and the PML (N). It was all due to the loose organizational structure and no roots in the masses.[189]

After the achievement of Pakistan, the PML faced with crises and conflicts during 1947-1958. In this span of time, it was oblivious to its responsibility of guiding the newly born state through anarchy and problems. It did not have any strategy to combat lingual, social, economic, and political problems. Besides, the PML was to organize itself into mass party but it was oblivious to all these state of affairs. It had to do dual work i.e. running the state as well as organizing itself as a mass party. But with the passage of time, it failed to materialize all these in the presence of intrigues and feuds.[190]Here, it is appropriate to note that Muhammad Khan Junejo was not a politician of national stature before his nomination as the Prime Minister who could steer his way through odd circumstances. So it was difficult for him to organize the party which otherwise needed a time to grow. He depended heavily for this purpose on the Chief Ministers of the respective provinces who failed to organize the

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[188] Dr. P .Sharan, *Government and Politics of Pakistan,* New Delhi: Metropolitan Publishers, 1983, p.63.
[189]Hussain Zaidi, *Why Muslim League is Prone to Breaks up,*
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/cmnul/dawn.content-library , retrieved on 24th Dec, 2010.
[190] G.W Chaudhry, *The Emergence of Pakistan,* Lahore: United Publishers, 1988, p.374.

party properly due to their hectic official routine.[191]It lacked in discipline and organization due to the presence of disheartened members of the party who did not see any chance of their elections to the assemblies.[192]Therefore, Muhammad Khan Junejo tried his best to unite the wings of the party i.e. the PML (Junejo) and the PML (Functional of Pagaro). However, the party was faced with potential fragmentation at any point in the time.

5.4.5 The PML and its Struggle for Powers

The political history of Pakistan is witness to the various factions of the PML and the people who had been attached with its factions always used to prefer their personal interest to that of the faction and welcomed military dictators while supporting their governments. General Ayub Khan called a meeting at the house of Akram Khan, a seasoned politician, in which many former leaders of the PML participated and established a party in the name of Conventional Muslim League in 1962. Chaudhry Khaliq-uz-Zamanand Khan and Abdul Waheed Khan were chosen as the Chairman and the General Secretary respectively only to attract the general public and the old leaguers. Later on, General Ayub Khan became its chairman on 24th Dec, 1963. Many big landlords and leaguers joined the party and held important slots. It is noted that the Qayum League supported the central government only that it would help ban NAP in Balochistan and resultantly, it would enjoy power in alliance with the PPP and JUI in Balochistan during 1973. Similarly, the UML had weak position in power corridors having three members in the National Assembly and in the Senate respectively. Except in the Punjab Assembly, it had extremely weak position in the rest of the provinces. Majority of its members were desirous to join the ruling party. As a result, a group of leaguers headed by Khawaja Nazimuddin joined the PPP in 1973 while naming this change of loyalties as a Revolutionary Programme. In the same manner, on Sep, 1974, ten members

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[191] G.W Chaudhry, *Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule*, England: Scorpion Pub Ltd, 1988, p.63.
[192] Dr. Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development*, Lahore: Vanguard Pub, 1990, p.240.

of the Council Muslim League and one from the Qayum League joined the PPP. After disintegration of the state in 1971, the factions of the League were divided. The Qayum League was supporting the government of the PPP whereas Conventional and Council Muslim Leagues united under the presidentship of Pir Pagaro formed an alliance with other opposition parties known as United Democratic Front (UDF). Later on, the alliance transformed into the PNA, which protested against the policies of the PPP, and especially against rigging in 1977 elections. Thus finally a way was paved for another coup d'état in 1977. However, a faction of the Muslim League of Khawaja Khairuddin opposed it.[193]This shows that how Muslim League conspired against one another while making way for power. Moreover, when General Zia decided to form the national government, all other political parties consisting of the JUI, the PPP, and the MUP (Majlis-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan) opposed this move but majority of the Muslim leaguers joined his government.[194] In 1993, in order to destabilize Nawaz Sharif's Government, some members were separated from the Muslim League. It was those who had Ministries in the centers as well as in the provinces. Hamid Nasir Chatta, Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali, Manzoor Watto, and Mir Afzal Khan were prominent among the dissidents of the League. They conspired against the government. Besides, they were in league with the PPP and contested the elections held in 1993 from a joint platform. The group was named as the ML (Junejo) afterwards.[195]This all is indicative of how much leaguers had been interest oriented and disloyal towards their respective Leagues.

5.4.6 The PML and Intra-Party Democracy

Except the JI, there exists no intra-party elections in any political party of the polity including the various factions of the PML. In majority of the parties, systems of inheritance are in

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[193] ___, *Pml*, http://www.pmln.org.pk/action retrieved on 5th Oct, 2010.
[194] ___, *Democracy and Crisis of Political Parties,* ___,http://kinzuleman.blogspot.com/2011/06/democracy-crisis-of-political-parties-htm/, retrieved on 5th Dec, 2011.
[195] Hafiz Taqiuddine, *Pakistan ki Siyasi Jamaatain aur Tehrikain,* Lahore: Classical Pub, 2003, pp.400-401.

practice and are in the grip of certain individuals and families. The mode of elections is not short of royal enthronement. It is due to the undemocratic and coercive orientation of the party leadership and of the office-bearers. However, democracy does not mean holding and casting of votes only but in truth, it abounds in transfer of power and authority. It has been observed that party elections are conducted under the supervision of the Election Commission in civilized society. Besides, party workers do choose candidates for general elections. In the USA, real hustle and bustle, one could see at the time of the primary elections in which decisions regarding the distribution of the party tickets are carried out. But in the case of Pakistan, the trend is totally different. It is the party leader, who decides about the distribution of tickets. Thus tickets are granted on the basis of personal relationship with the leader of the party. Lack of intra-party democracy and presence of dictatorship virtually divide the office - bearers and the workers of the party. This sort of affairs gives way to dissention which is finally dramatized into floating of a new party.[196]

Political parties in Pakistan possess no specific mode for the election of their office-bearers. Richness and family background are the only qualifications to be reckoned.[197]After independence, Hussain Suhrawardy did not agree to naming the AIML for Pakistan as the PML on the basis that the name 'Muslim' had no more validity; therefore, it might be dropped, while suggesting that the AIML be named as Pakistan League. Thus differences were set to crop up between the leaguers and him. Finally a stage was set for partition. As a result, he floated his own party Awami League.[198]The leaguers, after the demise of the Quaid-e-Azam, were divided on issues like the form of federalism, place of Islam in the constitution, and the question of language. Thus the PML was prone to factionalism. Consequently, intra-party conflict created serious problems for the PML and its unity. In

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[196]Masood Abdali, *Partiyaon main Jamhooriath kuan nahi*, Rawalpindi: the Daily Nawai Waqat, 2nd Jan, 2011.
[197]____, *Challenges to Democracy in Pakistan,* __, http://www.bukisa.com/articles retrieved on 5th Dec, 2010.
[198]____, *PMLN*, http://www.pmln.org.pak/action/membership.pmln , retrieved on 6th Dec, 2010.

1954, it was defeated in East Pakistan by the United Front, an alliance of breakaway splinters. Similarly, the Republican Party was founded by some leaguers on account of differences existed among the leaguers. After revival of political parties during General Ayub regime, however, some efforts were made to unite the factions of the PML but no leader was prepared to leave his own party leadership. Such craze for leadership created distress among the workers and low office-bearers of the PML. As a result, they either joined other political parties or became inactive in politics.[199]

A cleavage set to appear in the ML (Conv) when differences between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Gen Secretary of the ML (Conv), and General Ayub Khan surfaced mainly on account of the former displeasure over the policies of the latter especially on his foreign policy. Consequently, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto formed a Forward Bloc in the party. He resigned from the cabinet and the party on 8th June, 1966. Afterwards, he formed his own party in the name of the PPP in Nov 1967.[200] Similarly, when differences between General Zia ul-Haq and Muhammad Khan Junejo cropped up on certain issues i.e. promotions in military upper brass, investigation of the Ojhri Camp incident, the former dismissed the government of the latter on 29th May, 1988. The General's undemocratic act was not resented by the members of the party. Rather they were divided into groups. One was pro-government which was blessed with ministries whereas the other one was pro-Junejo. The ML was further disintegrated when the Chief Ministers conspired to form the ML of their own in the name of Official Muslim League in their respective provinces.[201] On one hand, the Chief Ministers tried their best to remove Muhammad Khan Junejo from the presidentship of the PML, while, on the other hand, Pir Pagaro announced to revive his own Muslim League once again as the ML

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[199] _____, *PML History*, http://www.pml.org.pk, retrieved on 6th Dec, 2010.
[200] http://kinzuleman.blogspot.com/2011/06/democracy-crisis-of-political-parties-html, retrieved on 3rd Feb, 2011.

[201]Shahid Javid Barki, Carriage Baxter, *Pakistan under Military Rule*, London: Vanguard Pub, 1991, pp. 43-44.

(Functional). This was how the PML was drawn into tug of war. Pir Pagaro settled permanently in Lahore criticizing leaguers as well as Junejo and Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif tried his best to make agree Junejo for meeting with General Zia ul-Haq so that anarchy within the PML might be ended but Junejo had been considering the meeting as a political suicide. The General Council of the PML unanimously held the verdict that Nawaz Sharif and Junejo should work together. The joint meeting of the PML, sometime later, was held on 13th Aug, 1988, at Islamabad Hotel. In that meeting the supporters of Junejo and of Nawaz Sharif fought as a result of the differences. Begum Nusrat Bhutto was reported to have said that those who threw chairs upon each other in the meeting of their party hope for free and fair elections could not be held from them[202]Thus politics of authoritarianism, confrontation were given air within the PML while promoting undemocratic culture within which was finally dramatized into political instability and the failure of democracy at the cost of its own division and re-division.

5.4.7 The PML and its Base in the Masses

The basic problem with the political parties of Pakistan is that after coming into power, they become dysfunctional both at organizational and public level and contacts between the party and the general public seem a cry in wilderness. When they become unpopular, the non-democratic forces exploit their weaknesses and keep them out of the power corridors. It is impossible a political party could be able to take roots in the masses without having strong ideology, organizational structure, and popular but virtuous leadership. In Pakistan all political parties are devoid of the given prerequisites.[203]The various break away factions of

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[202]Salim Younus, *Siyasi Ithehad aur Pakistani Siyasath per unke Asarat: 1947-1990*, Lahore: Jang Publ, 1993, p.197.

[203]Aqeel Yousuafzai, *Siyasi Partian, Media aur Bacha Khan ka khath*, Peshawar: The daily Mashriq, 16th Nov, 2010.

the PML could not be commonly referred to as catch-all-parties[204] as none of them enjoys full mass back up. As the time went on, the PML lost its prestige and honor among the masses. The political scene in the Punjab was bleak. As a result, M.A Jinnah dismissed the Punjab Assembly in 1949 on the ground that the Chief Minister Iftikhar Hussain Khan did not use to take any interest in the affairs of the government as well as of the party and appointed Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar as the Governor of the province. Similarly, the political situation in Sind was also worth mentioning as the people of the province started raising the slogan 'Sind for Sindhis'. Although the people of the province actively participated in the Freedom Movement but on account of the policies of the PML, they wanted a separate existence. The status of the PML in Balochistan was not also concrete. The party, although, promised to develop the province politically, economically, and socially yet it could not deliver the pledges made. It did have branches across the province but they all were ill-organized. In 1950, Qazi Isa and Qazi Musa with the permission of the central government did their best to revive the PML. But actually speaking, they were not sincere towards the revival of the party. They wanted only to consolidate their own position across the province. The PML also did not enjoy the support of the people of the East Pakistan. It was mainly due to its policies. As a result, in Jan 1949, the members of the Muslim League floated their own party in the name of Awami Muslim League under the leadership of Maulana Abdul Hamid Bashani. In 1955, it dropped the word Muslim from its former name and became Awami League. It is worth mentioning that the former leader of the PML Hussain Suhrawardy played an important role in the formation of the Awami League. In early 1950s, the PML was faced with deepening crises of disintegration. Thus the PML was bent upon losing its popularity due to its undemocratic policies which paved the way for its formal cleavage. The cleavage was formally surfaced in 1958, when Ayub Khan introduced his own party, Conventional Muslim League dividing the

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[204] ____,http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Catch-all+party, retrieved on 2nd Dec, 2o10.

PML into the ML (Conv) and the ML (Con).[205]After making necessary changes to the constitution of the PML (Conv) in Dec 1963, General Ayub Khan announced that ministers would not be allowed to enjoy dual positions both as a minister as well as an office-bearer. His words failed to exert any bearing on the ministers because they not only used to enjoy their ministries but also hold important party positions. Such state of affairs gave birth to despondency among the party workers who wielded no powers and influence in the party. It was one of the reasons that the party failed to hold footing in the masses. Moreover, a large number of elites joined the PML (Conv) after the removal of EBDO on 31st Dec, 1966. They joined it chiefly on the ground that it belonged to the ruling junta as well as to avoid the suppression of the regime. Those who joined the PML (Conv) were Qazi Muhammad Isa, Sahibzada Hasan Mahmud, Maula Bakhsh Soomro, Alamdar Hussain Gilani, Qazi Muhammad Wassan, Syed Khair Shah, and Arbab Noor Muhammad. Many among them had been awarded with ministries at national and provincial level. It was, however, said that the inclusion of the elite in the party did not help it take roots among the masses. Besides, the feudal generous funding to the party also disheartened the workers of the party because they did not see any future for themselves in the party. They not only exploited the ruling regime for their vested interests but also acquired important positions in the party. Moreover, the party lavish spending on publicity and invention of novel kind of enrollment did not save it from intra-party conflicts. According to the new scheme of enrollment, anyone who enrolls fifty members would become automatically a councilor. So the leaguers filled the membership forms of the party with fake names only for the purpose of becoming a councilor. Thus this created a gap between the haves and the haves-not. Several steps were taken to organize the party but intra-party conflicts kept on to rise. As a result, it was

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[205] _, http://kinzuleman.blogspot.com/2011/06/democracy-crisis-of-political-parties-html, retrieved on 3rd Jan, 2011.

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seriously suffered from faction both in West and East Pakistan. In such state of affairs, when the workers of the party asked General Ayub Khan to lead the party, he showed cold shoulder and said that he was not a politician and politics was not in his veins.[206]Similarly, the PML revived during General Zia regime was mainly consisted of those whose positions in the masses were weak. Its main function was to provide strength and support to the ruling regime.[207]Moreover, it was said that the PML (Junejo) was the handiwork of the bureaucracy without having any roots in the masses. Besides, it was often used to be called as the test tube baby of bureaucracy.[208]As the factions of the PML had no roots in the masses, it was, therefore, prone to fragmentation the moment the hand behind their very existence was drawn.

5.5 Conclusion

The PML was the offshoot of the AIML, the only representative organization of the Muslims of India, which spearheaded the Freedom Movement for achieving separate homeland for the Muslims of India and succeeded in reducing their hopes to reality after a long struggle on 14th Aug, 1947, in the shape of Pakistan. But unfortunately, the PML, soon after the demise of the Quaid-e-Azam, suffered from internal conflicts and feuds which were finally dramatized dividing it into many factions. For this state of affairs, the leadership of the PML was responsible who failed to transform it into vibrant and organized political party. The failure was mainly centered on personal interest, lack of democratic norms within the party, lust for power, role of military, and its feudal leadership. The first ever break up the party experienced in 1949 when Maulana Bashani floated a new Muslim League in the name of Awami Muslim League on account of certain differences with the League. During 1950s,

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[206] Muhammad Rafiq Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan: 1958-1969*, Islamabad: NIHCR, 1998, pp.100-116.
[207]Muhammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989, p.417.
[208]Mazhar Ali Khan, *Pakistan: The Barren Years*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.596.

most of the leaguers due to their personal interests as well as the policies of the League gave birth to United Front (UF) and the Republican Party. The clear cut cleavage in the PML surfaced when it was formally divided into the PML (Conv) and the PML (Con). The PML (Conv) extended full support to the military regime and received bounties and rewards in return. When the regime came to an end, the leaguers started giving up their loyalties. In 1970s, some factions of the League were united but they suffered from fragmentation on account of their personal interests. Besides, one could see many factions of the League during 1970s. Similarly, the PML during General Zia regime was founded out of sheer purpose of providing strength to the regime. It also suffered from fragmentation after the death of the founder. It divided into the PML (Jinnah) and the PML (N). In a nutshell, the bottom line of the chapter is that the PML remained intact till independence but it fragmented afterwards giving birth to many Leagues. Moreover, being the handmaiden of the military, its elitist leadership, lack of intra-party democracy, its lust for powers, its loose organization, personality clashes among the leaguers, its weak roots in the masses, lack of specific ideology, and coercive behavior of its office-bearers are the reasons reckoned with the fragmentation of the PML and its factions.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

6.1 Findings

Political parties in Pakistan are loosely organized which is the real cause of the failure of democracy in the polity. Democracy and political parties are inevitable for each other. A political party, if does not believe in democratic norms and values, is bound to be fragmented. Democracy is the essence that keeps a political party alive and vibrant. In the absence of intra-party democracy, the political party is divided and re-divided while losing the very base which it had enjoyed among the masses. This is how, it becomes a vehicle of exploitation at the hands of non-democratic forces and the way for political instability is furnished. The history of the PML stands witness to lack of democratic norms and principles in its very body. As a result, it suffered from fragmentation giving birth to a dozen of factions which had been exploited by non-democratic forces. Their various factions became easy vehicles of exploitation for the regimes in their respective terms. They had frequently collaborated with the civil-military bureaucracy to pave the way for political instability in the polity. The ML (Convention) during General Ayub's regime, the ML (Junejo) during General Zia ul-Haq's regime, and the ML (Jinnah) during Mian Nawaz Sharif first term in office are the examples to support the argument.

The crisis of leadership was also the cause of political instability experienced in respective regimes. Leadership could not be created in vacuum. It is the political parties which have been the nurseries for the growth of genuine leadership. A political party, which has been fragmented into many factions, could not give birth to leadership because leadership has roots in the masses. The party, which has been fragmented, is devoid of the relationship which is necessary for the growth of leadership. Thus the leadership of such a fragmented political party is unable to face the time of adversity. In such circumstances, the leadership of a

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fragmented political party becomes a means to the undemocratic forces for the sake of personal gains. The PML soon after the death of the Quaid-e-Azam faced with the crisis of leadership. It had been divided into many factions on account of the engagements of the leadership in thine and mine business. They joined hands with non-democratic forces in the hope of so called interests. It was their active collaboration which rendered the state with political instability.

The lack of national political parties is also the cause of political instability. Political parties, which are divided across linguistic or regional lines, are unable to establish any genuine political culture necessary for vibrant democratic institutions. Such political parties think only in terms of their regional or lingual interests putting aside the national interest. For achieving their own goals, they did not even hesitate to join hand with non-democratic forces in their vested designs. This is how political stability of the state is put at the stake. The PML is a case in point that had enjoyed a status of the nationwide organization before the partition. But after independence it soon fragmented on regional and linguistic basis. The leaguers had been scattered on the basis of region and founded their own factions of the League. It was the loss of nationwide status, the PML easily fell prey to the exploitation of non-democratic forces. The various factions of the League had been employed against each other. The factions of the League frequently joined hands with the military and rendered the state with political instability.

A parliamentary form of system could be successful in a state which is linguistically, culturally, and religiously uniformed. As a result, such a state has two-party system which plays a vibrant role in the stability of the state. Unfortunately, the polity of Pakistan is divided along with linguistic, cultural, and sectarian lines. As a result, it has many political parties representing their respective class. Such configuration of the political parties in the polity often creates hurdles in the way of stability. The PML was also divided along those lines

which rendered its very existence with vulnerability. In such circumstances, the hidden forces had been at work to destabilize the state. The wings of the PML in East and West Pakistan had been divided on regionalism and linguistic basis. Thus it provided the anti-democratic forces with an opportunity to take advantage of the situation. The history stood witness to the situation which promoted despondency among the eastern wing of the state. It was this despondency which paved the way for the disintegration of the state in 1971.

The authoritarianism of the office-bearers of the PML disheartened the members of the party which had been dramatized into conflict and finally floated their separate faction of the League. Such factions of the League frequently became the part and parcel of non-democratic regimes. The ML (Conventional) and the ML (Junejo) had supported the regimes in their respective periods. They even conspired with non-democratic forces in ousting of democratic regimes. In protest against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the factions of the PML actively participated which provided the military with an excuse to dismiss the elected government. Similarly, the PML (J) extended its support to the non-political forces which was bent upon dismissing the government of the PML (N) in 1993.

Confrontational politics is also the result of the fragmentation of the parties into many factions. It is due to the phenomenon of factionalism rampant across the political parties that failed to acquire the majority necessary for the formation of the government. As a result, coalition government is formed on the basis of compromises and counter-compromises. If their interests are in clash, their coalition suffered from disintegration. Consequently, confrontational politics is encouraged and non-democratic forces are invited to intervene. This is how; the path for political instability is furnished. Confrontational politics in 1990s was the result of factionalism because no party had enjoyed absolute majority. So they formed alliances to form the government. When the partners of the alliances felt discriminated, they joined hands with non-political forces to dismiss the elected governments

in their respective periods.

The system of the political parties in the polity had not been stable since its beginning. The parties frequently suffered from division and re-division. The intra-party conflicts had been the cause of political instability. It had been the political parties that supported and provided the way to non-democratic forces. Their opposition had not been the opposition of responsibility. They did not even hesitate to invite the military to topple the elected government. The history of the PML had been the history of king's party, which wielded powers in the best interest of the non-democratic forces. It had always played in the hands of the military and the establishment. It had the tradition to unite under the dictator's umbrella and disintegrated when the shade had been drawn. It had supported every dictator in his respective regime. The Conventional Muslim League, the Muslim League of Pagaro, the PML under Junejo and the Jinnah Muslim League actively supported undemocratic forces during their respective periods.

In the polity of Pakistan, the multiplicity of political parties is not a novel practice. One could expect that a day would come that the polity would have more political parties than one could have shades of opinion. Most of the political parties do have identical policies but on account of inter-leadership rivalries, none amalgamates into each other. In such a situation, vibrant and stable democracy is Herculean task to materialize. On random survey, democracy is successful in those polities where two-party system is in practice. Because in the elections, one party is destined to clinch majority so there is no chance of the formation of a weak government. Moreover, the political party, which has low turnout, has no alternative to conspire against the ruling party except to play its role within strict democratic paradigms. In the case of Pakistan, in the elections, none of the party succeeds to clinch an absolute majority. Therefore, governments are made on the basis of coalition. If the interests of the partners are not meet, they are ready to provide political instability with way to travel into the

government. Thus multiplicity of a party does carry the seeds of political instability. The political instability in 1990s had been observed chiefly due to the presence of coalition governments.

Ideology performs the role of an anchor to keep the party intact. But in the polity, none of the party professes any specific ideology. Consequently, the members of the party comfortably switch their loyalties to another party without any hesitation. They do not think ideology to be the prime cause of inspiration for joining the new party. Keeping in view the various factions of the PML, none had professed a specific ideology. As a result, leaguers used to change their loyalties out of sheer personal interests. This was how they had permitted the undemocratic forces to play their role in the politics of the polity.

Still another reason to be pointed out with regard to the fragmentation of political parties in the polity was the presence of the strong and influential personality in the party. Personal charisma is the magic wand that opens new doors of possibility. In case of clash, the magic wand is dramatized into a separate party. This was how the PML fell prey to the magic wand and ensured the way for political instability. The factions of the PML stands witness to the influence of the personality cult that collaborated actively with the non-democratic forces and acquired the name of the King party, the handmaiden, Pakistan Martial League etc.

6.2 Recommendations

In order to avoid political instability in the polity the following points are recommended.

1. The culture of democracy should be developed within the political parties. The party, which had the tradition of intra-party democracy, does not prone to fragmentation and there is no room left for non-democratic forces to take mileage from its weak base.

2. There should be participatory democracy in which free and fair election should be held on regular constitutional intervals.

3. The party elections should be held on regular basis so that democracy within the party

kept alive. The Election Commission should chalk out certain mechanism so that it could be able to check the intra-party elections effectively. This would help genuine leadership grow who believes in democracy and its ideals. Consequently, democratic culture would be promoted in the polity.

4. In the elections of the party, the masses should be given an opportunity to elect their party office-bearers. This would provide an opportunity to the common worker to grow in the party. As a result, the party would establish its roots in the masses.

5. In order to maintain uniformity among the members and the workers of the party, the award of the party tickets for the elections should not be the sole authority of the leader of the party. Instead the tickets should be awarded to those who get majority in the primary elections of the party. This would help eliminate the dictatorship of the leader of the party and allow democracy to take roots in the polity. Therefore, the culture of the primary elections should be encouraged so that genuine leadership might come to the front who believes in the rule of law.

6. In order to eliminate the hegemony of landlords, feudals, business tycoons in the party, the culture of fund-raising should be promoted. It would help the party to come out of their influence and would work for promoting genuine political culture in the polity after coming into power.

7. There is dearth of contact between the party and the masses. In order to establish a real democratic atmosphere, the political parties should arrange public meetings at gross roots level so that the common worker of the party might have the feelings of being incorporated in the business of the party and should provide an opportunity to work for the party while assigning tasks. It would help make him politically responsible.

8. There should be a transparent mechanism to make accountable the members of the

party as well as the expenditure of the party. It would help check corruption in the

polity once the party comes into the power corridors.

9. There should be open dialogues and policy debates among the leaders of the parties so that the problems that pose threat to the survival of democracy could be eradicated beforehand and avoid confrontational politics.

10. The alliances and coalition should be made to promote healthy opposition. It should not be instituted with the sole purpose of proving the ruling junta a failure.

11. There should be independence of Judiciary with the power of judicial review. This would help check the undemocratic tendencies of the politicians as well as it would block the way of military.

12. Democracy should not be thought of the rule of majority. It should be the rule of majority with the consent of minority. Only keeping in view democracy as such, the real democratic culture could be promoted in the polity and authoritarianism could be eliminated. Once the politicians grasp this essence of democracy, they would work after coming into power for the progress of democracy in collaboration with the minority. Consequently, they would not permit any misadventure to derail democracy.

Appendices

Table 1 Rigging Score Chart

Assessment of National Elections held in	Pre-Poll Rigging	Polling-Day Rigging	Post-Poll Rigging
1970	Moderate	Low	High
1977	Moderate	High	N/A*
1985	High	Low	High
1988	High	Low	Moderate
1990	High	Low	Moderate
1993	High	Low	Low
1997	High	Low	Low

Source: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT)

Table 2 1988 Elections for the National Assembly

Party	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balochistan	ICT*	Total
PPP	53	31	7	1	1	93
IJI	44	-	8	2	-	54
Other Parties	4	15	7	6	-	32
Independents	12	-	3	2	-	17
Total	113	46	25	11	1	196

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan

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*Martial Law imposed.

*Islamabad Capital Territory

Table 3 1990 Elections for the National Assembly

Party	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balochistan	ICT/FATA*	Total
IJI	92	3	8	2	1	106
PDA	14	24	5	2	-	45
MQM	-	15	-	-	-	15
ANP	-	-	6	-	-	6
JUI (F)	-	-	4	2	-	6
Independents	6	4	3	-	8	21
Total	112	46	26	6	9	199

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan

Table 4 1993 Elections for the National Assembly

Party	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balochistan	Others	Total
PPP	47	33	5	1	-	86
PML (N)	52	11	9	-	1	73
PML (J)	6	-	-	-	-	6
IJM	-	-	2	1	-	3
ANP	-	-	3	-	-	3
PIF	-	1	2	-	-	3
Others	3	1	2	7	-	13
Independents	4	-	2	2	7	15
Vacant Seats	3	-	1	-	1	5
Total	115	46	26	11	9	207

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan

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*Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Table 5 1993 Elections for the Provincial Assembly

Party	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
PPP	94	57	22	3	176
PML (N)	106	8	15	6	135
PML (J)	18	-	4	-	22
IJM	-	26	-	-	26
ANP	-	-	21	-	21
PIF	2	-	4	-	6
BNM (H)	-	-	-	5	5
Others	3	3	2	17	25
Independents	17	6	12	9	44
Total	240	100	80	40	460

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan

Table 6 1997 Elections for the National Assembly

Party	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balochistan	Others	Total
PML (N)	107	12	14	3	1	137
PPP	-	18	-	-	-	18
MQM	-	12	-	-	-	12
ANP	-	-	8	2	-	10
BNP	-	-	-	3	-	3
Others	-	2	2	2	-	6
Independents	8	2	2	1	7	21
Total	115	46	26	11	8	207

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan

Table 7 1997 Elections for the Provincial Assembly

Party	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
PML (N)	212	15	33	4	264
PPP	3	34	4	1	42
ANP	-	-	29	-	29
MQM	-	30	-	-	30
BNP	-	-	-	9	9
Others	4	6	3	18	31
Independents	22	14	11	8	55
Total	240	100	80	40	460

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan

Table 8 Six Dimensions of Political Instability


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                          ┌─────────────────────┐
                          │   Political System  │
                          └─────────────────────┘
              ┌──────────────────┬──────────────────┐
              ▼                  ▼                  ▼
  ┌──────────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────────┐
  │Authorities/Government│  │ Regime/ Rule │  │Political Community│
  └──────────────────┘  └──────────────┘  └──────────────────┘
      │        │            │        │          │        │
      ▼        ▼            ▼        ▼          ▼        ▼
  ┌───────┐┌──────────┐ ┌───────┐┌──────────┐┌───────┐┌──────────┐
  │Changes││Challenges│ │Changes││Challenges││Changes││Challenges│
  │  in   ││    to    │ │  in   ││    to    ││  in   ││    to    │
  └───────┘└──────────┘ └───────┘└──────────┘└───────┘└──────────┘
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
Sources: "Patterns of Political Instability" David Sanders

Table 9 Indicators of Changes/ Challenges

|	
Regime change	Changes in the regime norms
	Changes in type of party system
	Changes in military-civilian status
Government changes	Changes in the executive
	Cabinet changes
Community change	Successful acts of secession
Violent changes	Assassination, acts of guerrilla warfare and political terrorism
	Death from political violence
	Riots
	Attempted coups d'état
Peaceful challenges	Political strikes or strike threats
	Protest demonstration
	Opposition motions of censure
	Anti-government speeches by opinion leaders

Source: "Patterns of Political Instability"   David Sanders, p 62

Benazir Bhutto's letter to Peter Galbraith

Source: http://www.4shared.com/photo/d2MRgxOT/benazir_bhutto_traitor.html

The Sketch Illustrating Fragmentation of the PML (1947-1999)

Political Transitions in Pakistan

S.No.	Heads of Govt/ Dictator	Type of Rule	Total Reign		From	To	Remarks
			Years	Months			
1	Governor General, M.A Jinnah (after Jinnah's death Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din) Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan.	Democratic	4	2	15th Aug, 1947.	16th Oct, 1951.	–
2	Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad Prime Minister, Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din.	Democratic	1	5	16th Oct, 1951.	17th April, 1953.	Liaquat Ali Khan assassinated on Oct 16th, 1951.
3	Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra (the Ambassador to the USA)	Democratic	1	5	17th April, 1953.	24th Oct, 1954.	Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din dismissed on April 17th, 1953.
4	Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra	Democratic	–	8	24th Oct, 1954.	6th Aug, 1955.	Ghulam Mohammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly on Oct 24th, 1954 and Bogra form new Govt without Parliament
5	Governor General, Major General Iskander Mirza Prime Minister, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali	Democratic	1	1	6th Aug, 1955.	12th Sept, 1956.	Iskander Mirza dismissed Mohammad Ali Bogra on Aug 8th, 1955. Iskander Mirza sworn in as the 1st President under the

							1956 Constitution.
6	President Iskander Mirza, Prime Minister, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy.	Democratic	1	1	12th Sept, 1956.	12th Oct, 1957.	–
7	President Iskander Mirza, Prime Minister, I.I. Chundrigar.	Democratic	–	2	12th Oct, 1957.	16th Dec, 1957.	Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy loses his support of the Republican Party and resigns on Oct 12, 1957.
8	President Iskander Mirza, Prime Minister, Malik Feroz Khan Noon.	Democratic	–	8	16th Dec, 1957.	7th Oct, 1958.	Malik Feroz Khan Noon replaces I.I. Chundrigar on 16th Dec, 1957.
9	Chief Martial Law Administrator and later the President, General Ayub Khan	Military	10	5	7th Oct, 1958.	25th Mar, 1969.	Iskander Mirza abrogated the constitution on Oct 7, 1958. General Ayub Khan became Chief Martial Law Administrator. Ayub Khan arrested Iskander Mirza on Oct, 27th 1958 and exiled him to Britain.
10	Chief Martial Law Administrator General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan	Military	2	7	25th Mar, 1969.	20th Dec, 1971.	Ayub Khan transfers power to Yahya Khan.

11	President and later Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto President, Fazal Ilahi	Democratic	5	5	20th Dec, 1971	5th July, 1977	Bhutto takes over power from Yahya Khan and becomes the Civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator and the President of Pakistan. He is elected Prime Minister on Aug 14, 1973, under the 1973 Constitution and Fazal Ilahi becomes the new President.
12	General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq	Military	11	1	5th July, 1977.	17th Aug, 1988.	General Zia overthrows Bhutto's Govt and imposes Martial Law.
13	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan	Democratic	_	03	17th Aug, 1988.	2nd Dec, 1988.	Interim Govt.
14 .	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto	Democratic	1	7	2nd Dec, 1988.	6th Aug, 1990.	Benazir Bhutto is elected as Prime Minister
15	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi	Democratic	_	2	6th Aug, 1990.	1st Nov, 1990.	Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the Assemblies on Aug 6, 1990 and formed a caretaker Govt.

16	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	Democratic	2	5	1st Nov, 1990.	19th April, 1993.	Nawaz Sharif is elected as Prime Minister.
17	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister, Mir Balakh Sher Khan Mazari	Democratic	_	1	19th April, 1993.	26th May, 1993.	Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the Assemblies on April 19, 1993 and formed caretaker Govt.
18	President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	Democratic	_	1	26th May, 1993.	18th July, 1993.	On May 26, 1993 the Supreme Court revoked the Presidential Order and reinstated Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister
19	President Wasim Sajjad, Prime Minister, Moin Qureshi	Democratic	_	3	18th July, 1993.	19th Oct, 1993.	Nawaz Sharif and Ghulam Ishaq Khan were forced to resign on 18th July, 1993. Moin Quershi, a World Bank official, was an unknown entity in Pakistan.
20	President Farooq Ahmad Khan Laghari, Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto.	Democratic	3	_	19th Oct, 1993.	5th Nov, 1996.	Farooq Laghari becomes President on Nov 13, 1993
21	President Farooq Ahmad Khan Laghari, Prime Minister, Malik Miraj	Democratic	_	3	5th Nov, 1996.	17th Feb, 1997.	Farooq Laghari dismissed Benazir Bhutto's Govt

	Khalid						in Nov 1996.
22	President Farooq Ahmad Khan Laghari, and later Rafiq Tarar Prime Minister, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif	Democratic	2	6	18th Feb, 1997.	12th Oct, 1999.	Farooq Laghari resigned on Dec 2, 1997. Rafiq Tarar becomes President on Jan 1, 1998. Nawaz Sharif Govt is overthrown by General Pervez Musharaf on Oct 12, 1999 and imposes Martial Law.

Note: In the analysis above, Military Rule includes periods of pseudo-democracies. Pseudo-democracy may be defined in the Pakistani context as comprising a civil government and elected parliament formed as a result of a controversial an unfair elections and having a military dictator as the de-facto center of power.

Type of Rule	No. of Regimes	Tenure of Regimes in years
Military Rule	04	32.4
Democratic Rule	19	27.9

Source: http://www.letsstartthinking.org/history/political-transitions-and-instability.asp

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