

Ph.D. Thesis

**DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES AS MEDIATING FACTOR
IN PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS:
(2008 - 2017)**



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
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
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
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
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
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Dedication

*I dedicated this PhD thesis to my treasured parents Abu jan & Ami jan
for their inspiration, spiritual guidance, prayers, and energy*

*To my beloved husband Bilal Ahinad for his unparalleled
support throughout the completion of this journey*

*Three of my gorgeous and adorable daughters Mahrosh, Hoorain, and Eshal
Industrious undertaking and love during the completion of my studies*

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List of Abbreviations

AAN	Afghan Analyst Network
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
AD	Anno Domini
ADB	Agriculture Development Bank
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AFS	Afghan Currency
AID	Agency for International Development
AITF	Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghanistan New Beginning Program
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANDSF	Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces
ANF	Anti-Narcotics Force
ANSC	Afghanistan National Security Council
AP	Associated Press
APAPPS	Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Stability
APP	Associated Press of Pakistan
APRP	Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program
APTTA	Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement
AQ	Al-Qaeda
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ATTA	Afghan Transit Trade Agreement
BC	Before Christ
BOMCA	Border Management Program in Central Asia
CAREC	Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation

CASA	Central Asia- South Asia
CIA	Central intelligence Authority
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Del	Delegations, Delegate
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Network
GCG	Quadrilateral Coordination Group
GoIRA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GOP	Government of Pakistan
HoA	Hearth of Asia
HoA, IP	Hearth of Asia Istanbul Process
HPC	High Peace Council
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IDU	Injecting Drug User
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
INCB	International Narcotics Control Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LDCs	Less Develop Countries

MAP	Military Assistance Program
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSA	Maritime Security Agency
MT	Metric Tons
NA	Northern Alliance
NA	Northern Areas
NACP	National AIDS Control Program
NAS	Narcotics Affairs Section
NATO	Non-Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCPJ	National Consultative Peace Jirga
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
NUG	National Unity Government
NWFP	Northwest Frontier province
PAJCCI	Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry
PATTCA	Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Coordination Authority
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PM	Prime Minister
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
RSM	Resolute Support Mission
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Agreement
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline
TUTAP	Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
UNCND	United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs
UNDCP	United Nation International Drug Control Program

UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nation General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nation Office on Drugs and Crimes
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
VOA	Voice of America
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

Abstract

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations always remained challenging, faced allegations and counter-allegations in the last seven decades for several reasons. Some of the early issues were the Pakhtunistan issue; Afghanistan's refusal to accept the Durand Line as the Pak-Afghan border and the latter's opposition to Pakistan's entry into UNO. Both states sought to lay a new foundation in their relations in the post 9/11 era, however mutual mistrust, and differences over various issues remained. Pakistan and Afghanistan strived to normalize their ties after the establishment of a democratic system in Pakistan in 2008. The New Democratic system in Pakistan wanted to have cordial relations with Afghanistan. On 20th August 2009, President Karzai took office for the second time. Earlier, he realized that after the US drawdown Afghanistan's foreign policy will depend upon friendly relations with its neighbors, in which Pakistan is on top list of friendly relations. Karzai's second term showed a level of improvement in bilateral ties of both countries as compared to his first term which engulfed Pakistan under the shadow of a blame game. The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were on a positive route during the initial period of President Ashraf Ghani. Nonetheless, within a short period, Ashraf Ghani started blaming Pakistan for every terror act in Afghanistan. Kabul generally blames Pakistan for its domestic problems and failure to address its internal issues. Afghanistan faces several domestic political issues, such as ethnic rift and struggles for power among competing political and racial groups, deep-rooted and widespread corruption, problems in national integration and reconciliation with different stakeholders, political instability, worsening law and order situation, presence of foreign forces, weak and unstable institutions, Taliban insurgency, a fragile economy, and border's security. This study will focus on how various domestic issues in Afghanistan affect its relations with Pakistan. Moreover, repatriation of refugees, drug trafficking, Taliban's activities across the border, and the security of the Durand Line also has an important bearing on the bilateral ties of both the states. Interstate relations have been affected because of the several domestic issues. This study will explore the domestic political issues and their underlying causes of influencing Afghanistan's foreign policy. The research will also focus on to investigate to what extent and how these issues affected the bilateral relations of both countries under the given period.

CHAPTER 1

1. Introduction

The Pak-Afghan relations mostly remained unfriendly for several decades due to quite a few reasons though both countries shared long historical, cultural, geographical, and political ties. The issue of Pakhtunistan and refusal of the Durand Line on the part of Kabul to accept the Pak-Afghan International boundary line has always been the bone of contention between the two countries, though it was recognized as a universal border by the previous Afghan rulers. Though many rulers of Afghanistan have recognized it as an international border still it remains a controversial border to them because in their view it has divided the Pashtun brethren into two different countries residing across both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. It is a fact that Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's entry to the United Nations Organization (UNO) was the main factors that worsened their relations in the early years. The two states' relationship observed conflict and cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s. When the Soviet militaries intervened in Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan declined to recognize the new regime in Afghanistan, instead supported guerrilla forces fighting against the foreign troops and its puppet government in the country. Soviet forces withdrew in 1989 because of the Geneva Accords signed in 1987, however, fighting continued between the Soviet-installed government in Kabul and opposition forces the crops of which are still harvested in the country till this day.

The relations between the two countries remained tense during this entire episode. Among the peoples of Pakistan and Afghanistan, there are several shared common religious,

cultural, and linguistic affinities and have centuries-old political and economic ties. Still, both countries generally did not enjoy good neighborly relations in the last seven decades. Their relations saw several ups and downs in this period but never developed to the level where they could fully trust each other. Occasionally and recurrently their relations were mirrored by mutual hostilities, distrust, tensions, border violations, and blame games.

Pak-Afghan relations saw some improvement in the 1990s. When in 1922, the government of Najibullah collapsed; Pakistan performed a key role in the formation of a transition rule in Kabul with the hope that the new establishment in Kabul will establish friendly ties with Pakistan. However, this hopefulness was fleeting as the parties to the Islamabad / Peshawar agreements that had paved the way for the creation of a transition régime in Kabul did not honor their commitment and instead started fighting each other. A civil war broke out in Afghanistan among the different Combatant factions in a result the Taliban captured most parts and major cities of Afghanistan in 1994. The Taliban rule on Afghanistan until the US attacks on Afghanistan and imposed strict laws throughout Afghanistan. Pakistan was one of the other three countries in the region along with Saudi Arabia and UAE which had recognized the Taliban set up in Kabul. It was during that short span of five years that the blame game between Kabul and Islamabad had halted.

Relations between the two neighboring countries worsened in the post-9/11 scenario when Pakistan decided to stand by the United States and her allied partners in the war against terrorism. During this war, Pakistan fought as a front-line state and hence this resulted in a blame game each accusing the other of cross border infiltration and insurgency. The change in Pakistan's Afghan policy aligned with the change in the global political environment and new regional dynamics. After the defeat of the Taliban government in Kabul, Pakistan became significant in the formation of a transition government and subsequent Afghan presidential elections. Islamabad extended her complete support to the new

government in Kabul with the hope that both countries would enjoy cordial relations. However, mutual mistrust and apprehensions undermined cooperation between the two governments. Internal political issues such as rise in the terrorist attacks, insurgencies, political instability, Power Politics, economic stagnancy, poverty, unemployment, inter alia their challenges put enormous pressure on the governments of both countries, particularly in the case of Afghanistan. To distract people's consideration away from the domestic problems and to find an outside "scapegoat" for internal failures, Kabul increasingly continues its allegations and blame-game against Pakistan for the resurrection of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Islamabad also held responsible Kabul for the rise of terrorism and anti-state activities in most parts of Pakistan. The allegation and counter-allegations in the framework of the wide-ranging new Great Game in the war-affected areas continued to erode the bilateral relationship between the two states.

After 2008, the successive governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan took several measures to improve the bilateral relations between the countries with varying degree of success. The democratic government established in Pakistan in 2008 had prioritized good and friendly relations with Afghanistan. President Karzai was invited to grace the occasion during the oath-taking ceremony of Asif Ali Zardari as President in 2008. After that, both leaders had expressed the resolve to establish friendly ties and fight jointly against the common threat of terrorism. Subsequently, the leadership of both sides exchanged visits to create the foundation for talks and extended hands of friendship to initiate a peace process. Pak-Afghan relations were strengthened during the second term of President Karzai and both countries signed several bilateral agreements. However, the growing Taliban attacks in Afghanistan and mounting terrorism in Pakistan again estranged cooperation and as an alternative increased tensions and accusations.

The new government in Pakistan under the patronage of Nawaz Sharif (June 2013) and Afghanistan under President Ashraf Ghani (September 2014) strived to rekindle hopes of peace in the region and the establishment of good neighborly relations between the two states. Both sides strived to allay each other's concerns and accommodate expectations. Pakistan assured Afghanistan of its support in the ongoing peace process in the country and its commitment to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table. President Ghani approved a strategy of reconciliation towards Pakistan. To that end, he delayed the implementation of a strategic partnership agreement with India and started to reduce Pakistani concern over cross-border militant infiltrations. As cross-militant infiltration was a serious matter for Pakistan. The relations between both countries were apparently on the right track as Pakistan had started military operations against militants' hideouts in the North Waziristan agency of its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) near the Pak-Afghan border. However, in 2016 bilateral ties of both countries came to their lowest ebb with mounting accusations from Afghanistan against Pakistan. Afghanistan blamed Pakistan for preparation of terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan by stating that she had instigated the Haqqani Network. Afghanistan increasingly sided with India to isolate Pakistan regionally and to blame it globally for violence and Taliban insurgency in the country.

1.1 The Rationale of the Study

Afghanistan and Pakistan are both Muslim neighboring countries lying at the heart of Asia. They occupy a key geopolitical and geographical position which is a crossroads between West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, and East Asia. Peace and stability in both states is very essential factor towards the progress and prosperity of the entire region as they can provide trade and transit routes to rapidly growing or emerging economies, or access to major energy resources of the World. However, peace, stability, progress, and prosperity in the region have mainly been hampered due to their tense bilateral relations who, besides

other factors, badly undermine law and order in the two states. Both countries accuse each other of harboring terrorism on their soil for several reasons. Nonetheless, several factors are requiring in-depth studies related to the domestic polity of both states that affect their relationships.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan share several common religious, cultural, and linguistic affinities and have centuries old political and economic ties. Still both countries generally did not enjoy good neighborly relations in the last seven decades. Pak- Afghan Relations have been experienced ups and downs since the beginning on account of the Durand Line that has gained the status of a controversial border on part of Afghanistan while Pakistan recognizes it as an international border. Both countries face the challenges of national integration, security, and law and order situation coupled with economic development, poverty alleviation, and employment generation. Moreover, due to the diverse nature of Afghan population, problems of ethnicity, religious and ideological affiliations, role of different stakeholders, power vacuum, issue of warlords and the role of non-state actors have further contributed to the suffering of Afghanistan. Domestic instability of Afghanistan has a direct impact on the peace and stability of Pakistan since both share a long, porous, and unsafe border. The post-9/11 syndrome bore a direct imprint on the Pak-Afghan relations on account of the alleged involvement of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban in the insurgency and terrorism across both sides of the border and that provided safe havens to the terrorists. This resulted in the blame game and counter blame game on part of both the immediate neighbors. The focus of this study is to analyze “Domestic Political Issues as Mediating factor in Pak- Afghan Relations: (2008 - 2017)”.

1.3 Aims and Objectives

This study aims to pursue these objectives:

1. To understand the nature of conflict and cooperation in the relations of both countries.
2. To explore the major factors and forces that affects their bilateral relations.
3. To highlight Pakistan's role in Afghanistan reconciliation.

1.4 Research Questions

1. What were the main factors or forces that affected the bilateral relations of Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2008 to 2017?
2. Why have some of the positive terms in the relations not been effective to improve bilateral relations?
3. How domestic issues of Afghanistan affect their foreign policy with Pakistan?
4. What are the main irritations in Pak-Afghan relations and how they are related to their domestic politics?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This research mainly analyzes the domestic and political issues of both Afghanistan and Pakistan and brings into light its consequences on the future politics of Pak-Afghan relations. The study tries to fill the gap in the existing literature in the subject area that has not been explored. The research helps researchers and academia in exploring the engagement and estrangement in Pakistan and Afghanistan's relationship and its impacts on regional security. It also helps policymakers devise future strategies with respect to the internal security policies and domestic politics to create harmony between the neighboring countries.

1.6 Delimitation of the Study

This research work emphasizes the various aspects of Afghanistan–Pakistan relations particularly the impact of domestic issues on their bilateral ties. It mainly covers the events from 2008 and 2017. However, it has been updated in some respects up to 2020. In 2008, a new democratic government came into power in Pakistan which completed its tenure in 2013. This study is delimited to Domestic Political Issues as Mediating Factor in Pak-Afghan Relations: (2008-2017).

1.7 Operational Definition of Major Terms

1.7.1 Foreign Policy

Foreign Policy enshrines broad aims that direct the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states. The development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behavior of other states, or plans to improve geopolitical patterns.

1.7.2 Bilateral Relations

Consists of the political, economic, or cultural relations between two sovereign/independent states.

1.7.3 Domestic issues

Concerning the internal affairs of a nation.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

This research can best be analyzed through linkage theory. The 'linkage politics' approach, is an approach that focuses on the relationship and particularly the interaction between domestic political processes and foreign or defense policymaking. Domestic politics and foreign policy are regarded as distinct spheres of policymaking. Foreign policy is deemed "high politics," the domain of the central leadership, while domestic policy also concerns the

legislature, interest groups, and the public (Waltz 1979, 1986; Gilpin 1981). "Linkage politics" explains how domestic politics can affect the foreign policy of a state. In periods of internal political or economic strife, the ruling elites redirect public concern towards a real or imagined external threat. Domestic politics and international politics are closely related and interdependent areas. Both have autonomous spheres but at the same time important linkages between the two are present. Basically, the two have a similar nature. Everything in politics whether domestic or international flows from the fact that people have needs and wants. To satisfy all these needs and wants people meet each other. These contacts lead to the formation of groups. These groups follow certain policies and do certain actions to satisfy their needs and wants. Politics arises from the very existence of groups and the disagreements among them for the system under which their needs and wants can be fulfilled. The Pak-Afghan relations mostly remained unfriendly for several decades due to quite a few reasons though both countries shared long historical, cultural, geographical, and political ties. But under national interest, domestic and international politics compel them towards cooperation. As it is need of the time that for national interest and bilateral relations in both states' cooperation are indispensable. Positive interaction in the relations leads towards

Linkage theory is the way in which one negotiation influences or determines the process or outcome of another can effectively explain the relationship between a negotiation and its relevant environment. A. Morgan and Castle presented the theory of linkage. This study examines how external events grounded in multilateral, regional or bilateral environments influence negotiation process and outcome. The controlling influence of multilateral negotiations on regional negotiations is of particular interest, as is the use of a bilateral–multilateral linkage strategy by nation-states in pursuing geopolitical ends. Wallace (1976) famously claimed that "linkage between unrelated or only loosely-related issues in order to gain increased leverage in negotiation is an ancient and accepted aspect of

diplomacy". Tomz (2007) identified issue linkage as "a central idea from international relations theory". Linkage theory offers an additional source of power, within a global-multilevel system, for any actor that understands how to manage it effectively (Larry, 2009). Similarly, one can reasonably assume that democracies are more vulnerable to such domestic political pressures than autocratic regimes, it seems operationalizing the potential influence of domestic political pressure could be accomplished by measuring the presence of democratic states in the negotiation.

Negotiations are sufficiently difficult to initiate, maintain and conclude, so the importance of linking + process to something with momentum is a technique that has utility (Devereaux et al. 2006). In spirit strong independent and stable political system and a stable unintegrated international system tend to reinforce one another. This supportive relationship suggests that the leaders of a strong and stable domestic political system may have a special affinity for an unintegrated competitive international system. The other side of linkage theory in international relations is an important linkage between the domestic politics and international political system requires the active participation of an effective team of officials charged with successful implementation and management of their foreign policy goals.

A situation may evolve or be designed in a relevant environment to create an action forcing event such as a deadline (Watkins 1998), but a situation can also obstruct negotiation process via issue linkage (Sebenius 1983; Tollison and Willett 1979). Linkages may be most potent in the commencing and concluding stages of a negotiation, as this is where opportunity is first created and finally secured, but linkage opportunity and challenges may be observed throughout the negotiation process. It is not unusual to find a single international negotiation grounded in a network of negotiations involving the same parties, negotiating over the same issues in bilateral, regional, and multilateral settings.

Negotiation linkage is a useful conceptual tool for understanding the relationship between a specific negotiation and its environment. "Negotiation linkage" is defined as the way one negotiation influences or determines the process or outcome of another (Crump 2007). Understanding when, how and why a negotiation is influenced by its relevant environment multilateral, regional and bilateral is possible through linkage theory.

In Pak Afghan relations this theory is applicable on both sides bilateral relations to resolve their issues through negotiations under linkage theory. To give imputes to both states relations a trade strategy should be adopted, and trade agreements should be fully endorsed i, e. the signing of Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement in 2010 is an example of trade strategy among the two states. Both the states should adopt bilateral and multilateral trade strategy. Similarly, peace process and reconciliation among the Taliban and Afghan government is also a strategy of linkage theory. To settle their disputes with negotiations and contact each other without any external authority. Pakistan's role in Afghanistan reconstruction and development, similarly Pakistan's influence to bring the Taliban on table talks with the Afghan government as a way of linkage theory.

1.9 Literature Review

Many scholars, writers, and intellectuals worked on Pak-Afghan Relations. But most of the experts and scholars are of the view that the bone of contention between the two states is the Durand Line. It is this border that has gained mixed feelings between the two states; people along this side of the border particularly the government considers it to be an international border while people on the other side of the border regards it as a controversial border that has detached them from their Pashtun brethren. Some of the writer's concerns are that Afghanistan's domestic political and deteriorating situations started after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, similarly, this research analyzes the surge in the domestic issues

of Afghanistan, that has catered for the instability and power vacuum in the country. The main causes of the tense bilateral relations also started in 1979, when Afghanistan was engulfed by war and political instability.

Many scholars have written enough on the Pak-Afghan relations with reference to the Taliban era as according to them Pakistan enjoyed the best of relations during this regime. Pakistan accepted their rule, and the Taliban also extended cooperation with Pakistan in their regime. From 1996 till US intervention in Afghanistan both the states enjoyed the best terms in bilateral relations. But the weak side of the relations can also be observed during the civil war and then US attacks on Afghanistan. Literature is also available on Pak-Afghan relations during US attacks and Pakistan's role in this whole scenario. Some relevant material may also be found when Pakistan established its relations with the National Unity Government (NUG) of Hamid Karzai and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is a preferred need of time and research to analyze various government reports, websites, newspapers, and articles and organize in proper research that both states tackle such issues and once again start their bilateral relations in a friendly and fruitful environment. This will also find out new ways and means of economic and political progress and stability. Among some of the influential figures who work on Pak-Afghan relations are:

Green (2017) work is about religion in Afghanistan, in his views that cultural, social, and political force in Afghan history has significant influence. In pre-modern times different modifications of Islam spread in the rough geography and ethnic demography of Afghanistan. In modern times these various editions of Islam acted as a mighty socio-political source, offering dialects and association of state and Anti-state organization. In Afghan society, Islam has not been as much of a threatening force, even as religion has been adopted as the national strengthen of a mixed ethnical state under the Taliban rule, which declared Afghanistan as an Islamic republic. Hamid (2017) in his research work analyzed that Pak-Afghan relations have

deep-rooted historical relations due to common religion, culture, and strategic partnership, which dates to the pre-partition Indian sub-continent. The partition created issues of demarcation, which marked up ups and downs in the relations from the very beginning. The foreign interference of the USSR and the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan further changed the regional scenario. The Afghan conflict generates the flow of Afghan refugees, drug trafficking, and a law-and-order situation for the region in general and particularly for Pakistan.

Abbas (2005) in his book brings into light the Pak-Afghan early relations. After the disintegration of the USSR in 1989 and the success of the Taliban in 1996 to install a government in Afghanistan, Pakistan was among the three states along with Saudi Arabia and UAE to recognize the Taliban regime in Kabul. It was only that short span of five years that the blame game between Kabul and Islamabad had halted. But this thaw in the relations vanished with the tragic accident of 9/11 when *Al-Qaeda*, the close ally of the Taliban, took responsibility for these heinous acts. Pakistan under US pressure changed its Afghan policy, and the Taliban movement disperses in Pak-Afghan border areas. To play a front-line state against the US war on terrorism. Pakistan itself became the victim of terrorism. The repercussions of the terrorist's intervention shook the foundations of Pakistan's security and economy. Such a law-and-order situation obliges the Pakistani establishment to launch military operations in tribal areas of Pakistan. As result, many people became dispersed in Pakistan's different areas in the form of IDPs.

Behuria (2008) highlighted about bilateral relations of the two states during the Taliban rule, then the US intervention in Afghanistan, and its aftershocks on Pakistan's security and relations with the Taliban. Pakistan enjoyed the best of its relations with Afghanistan under the Taliban rule in Kabul. The US attacks on Afghanistan disperses the

Taliban. They were now divided into two groups the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban having links with each other most of them successfully made haven in Pak-Afghan tribal areas. They destabilized the security situation of Pakistan the Taliban resurgence was evident from many terrorist accidents that occurred on both sides of the border. As the center of gravity shifted from the Al-Qaida to the Taliban, which is the most dangerous and organized, common peoples in Afghanistan quickly joined the Taliban and accepted their system of government. To tackle such a serious situation the only solution is to change the power structure in Waziristan.

Haqqani (2005) elaborated on Pakistan's role all through the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989). It led Pakistan to establish good relations with Islamist groups in Afghanistan, for security concerns as well as to enhance Pakistan's wider economic and political influence in the region and to get advantage of the strategic depth against India. The abrupt change of Pakistan's Afghan policy was predictable in the wake of September 2001, but it would be erroneous to assume that Pakistan would be able to distance itself from the political developments in post- 9/11 Afghanistan.

Bakshi (2002) threw light on the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. In his view, the fragmented situation of Afghanistan started in the 1970s when millions of people migrated to Pakistan and Iran, while lots were displaced in Afghanistan. Only in Kabul city thousands of people were killed. From the Soviet invasion to "Afghan Jihad" against the Soviet forces carried by the USA, Saudi Arabia, the Western Countries, and front-line Pakistan the peoples of Afghanistan suffered. Especially women were deprived of education and their basic rights. So, a well-established state is listed as an anarchic and a failed state due to continuous anarchy. The author also brings into light the geographical importance of Afghanistan. Due to its geographical proximity landlocked Afghanistan has always been the

traditional invasion route to the Indian sub-continent. From Alexander the Great to the USA invasion all the dynasties who rule Afghanistan are very systemically elaborated by Bakshi in his book. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rich resources of Central Asia give more importance to Afghanistan due to short routes via Afghanistan.

Dupree (1997) highlighted the old issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan in a very coherent manner. He discussed that instead of domestic political issues the older issues also caused great security concerns for Pakistan and Afghanistan, i.e., the issue of Pakhtunistan, Durand line, and cross-border infiltration which are still unresolved. Due to these issues, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan have remained hostile toward each other. Dupree much work done on Afghanistan's historical background. In his view, the tribal people living from Pakistan tribal areas to Kabul are one belt. The demarcation left them split up, the tribes divided into two distinct units, living side by side on the Durand line.

Warikoo (2007) claimed that the 9/11 incident further worsened Pak-Afghan relations. The causes of sudden U-turn by Pakistan in so far as its foreign policy is concerned even though it had shaped its unique Afghan policy to pursue its objectives of strategic depth. The decision was difficult for the military government to achieve its foreign policy objectives which were abandoned suddenly and decisively in the cause of national interests and immediate goals.

Zaeef (2010) discussed the nature of Pak-Afghan relations after the 9/11 accident and especially during the Russian intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan's help to the Afghan *Mujahidin* and the refugees in this life-threatening condition has also been evaluated. The shift in Pakistan's policies after 9/11 and the changing stand of Pakistani establishment towards the *Taliban* government under the US pressure. Several Jihadi organizations were banned and many of the *Taliban* leaders were arrested and handed over to the US authority,

which negatively affected the Pak - Afghan relations and led the *Taliban* to adopt a negative policy towards Pakistan.

Ikram, (2006) discussed the Pak-Afghan relations in his manner that both the state's bond has hardly been cordial. Terrorism, militant infiltration from across the border, the issue of poppy cultivation, and its trafficking and Afghan refugees on Pakistan soil are some of the points of divergence in both countries' relations. These domestic issues not only destabilized Pak-Afghan relationship but have a direct impact on regional security. These issues are bilateral now because both the states are uniformly responsible to deal with them positively. Some measures were taken by both the states to tackle it, some bore fruitful results while some are still unresolved. Like border fencing has positive implication for Pakistan, it not only secures border but also control illegal border crossings. Due to this, allegations and counter-allegations on border disputes settled to some extent. The issue of Afghan refugees still needs consideration, as most of them safely returned but still, the presence of countless refugees on Pakistan soil is a burden on Pakistan's weak economy. This issue needs strong commitment on both sides.

Mullen (2010) highlighted that some of the Afghanistan domestic political issues had a direct impact on Pak - Afghan relations. Charges of increased corrupt bureaucracy greatly destabilized the country's situation. Narco trade is also a genuine issue. The opium production in Afghanistan is almost 90% of the World's creation. The drug industry had a direct impact on Pakistan due to a large amount of drug movement from Afghanistan into Pakistan adjacent areas near to Pak-Afghan border. Law and order situation, rising instability for the Afghan National Army and ISAF forces to avert the prevailing roots of the Taliban existence in Afghanistan.

This is increasing with each passing day and still, the main areas are under its control and beyond the control of international forces. In such a state of antagonism, Afghanistan

needs loyalty and friends. The future of Afghanistan lies in the friendly relationship with its neighbor countries, especially with Pakistan. Afghanistan after a very long time passed through a transitional government, the national unity government should stabilize the security situation in Afghanistan. When harmony and compromise reestablish then no country on the planet can prevent Afghanistan from progressing and free international strategy. But the issue lies in Afghanistan, the law-and-order situation in the presence of the Taliban elements, and many other issues, which not only shook the foundation of Afghanistan but also destabilized its relations with neighboring states.

Hand (2000) explored the roots of opium in Afghanistan in his view; most Afghans rely on drug money to cultivate opium. It is a cash crop and due to internal war-like situations and lack of other recreation opportunities, its cultivation is easy money for Afghans and even for the Taliban. His work reveals momentous change locally and internationally, in terms of Afghanistan drug production the author's opinions are that Afghans are producing drugs for international markets as well as generating drug economy inside the country. A most important change exclusively observed in Afghanistan is that the local people's occupations were the cultivation of wheat farming, gardening of fruits, livestock farms, and other small-scale industries that swift to the cultivation of opium production due to easy money. Such a large-scale opium production is an identification of extended farms of cross-border illegal smuggling associated with the global markets which restructured the global political economy. To tackle such an alarming situation, due to the spread of the opium economy other ways of earning should explore for the Afghan people. The land of Afghanistan is suitable for many other cash crops, but the lack of utilization of precious resources keeps the people of Afghanistan on the wrong path. They are earning through illegal ways because the states are not able to provide for the basic needs of life.

Katzman (2017) highlighted that the country's governance in the post-Taliban era is a great challenge for Afghanistan's establishment. The existence of ISAF forces and growing Taliban control in a different part of the country is such a state of the situation which is beyond the current government's control. The state's peace and stability are now the responsibility of the Afghan National Army and Afghan Police as well as on new establishment to tackle the current situation. But the Taliban are not willing to table talks with the present government until and unless the ISAF forces have not completely left Afghanistan. According to the concern of the US authority, the presence of the minimal ISAF forces is just for security purposes to tackle the deteriorating situation of Afghanistan. When peace is restored in Afghanistan the entire forces will leave Afghanistan. The new setup in Afghanistan is looking more towards Pakistan in Afghan peace and reconciliation. Pakistan played a vital role to bring the Taliban into negotiation with the Afghan authorities. As an important figure in Afghanistan, the Taliban usually wants a stake in state administration.

Semple (2009) underlined the current Afghan system which was established under the Bonn agreement in 2001. According to him, it was largely hoped that the collapse of the Taliban regime and framing of the new constitution under the supervision of broad-based international administration would bring an end to the large-scale instability in Afghanistan. The Accord made ways for the reconciliation among different political stakeholders of the country, for everlasting peace, stability, national reconciliation, and human rights respect in the country. It was an interim transitional government that would implement until the full administrative government was established after the onset of Parliamentary elections. In this regard, it was expected that the reconciliation would bring a secure and non-violent Afghanistan. In terms of peace, a national unity government would be established under the sponsor of international peace builders.

Rashid (2008) suggested that Afghanistan was entangled in permanent strife, deep corruption, and reconciliation with the different stakeholders in Afghanistan, political instability, law, and order situation. In the last many decades Afghanistan exercised instability and uncertainty, peaceful ethnic coexistence, and brutal traditional conflict during the 1990s can be observed. Warlords and comparatively actual dominant laws, Islamic militancy as well as restrained Islamic followers were common during this period. In fact, from the rule of Emir Abdur Rahman in the late nineteenth century to date, Afghanistan has not seen the pendulum of stability, centralization, and foreign influence swing back and forth a couple of times, to create tremendous upheaval and change at each passing day.

Clayton (2020) an analyst in the Middle East analyzed Pakistan's Afghanistan relations in the current scenario that Pakistan on many occasions played an important role in Afghan affairs. But some of the major bilateral issues weaken their relations. The presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and cross-border infiltration on the long-running 1,600 km border destabilized Pakistan and Afghanistan. One of Pakistan's major concerns in Afghanistan is India's diplomatic and largest regional contributor in Afghan reconstruction and development. Pakistan is fearful of strategic encirclement by India. Javaid (2015) argued that some of the Afghanistan core issues were the cause of Pak - Afghan hostile relations. To solve domestic issues in Afghanistan, Pakistan's efforts are necessary for improving better relations between the two states. Pakistan has little influence on the Taliban to reconcile the trust deficit between the Taliban and the Afghan government. While, the Afghans perceive that Pakistan has full influence over the Taliban and can easily bring them towards the negotiation table with the Afghan authority, in Pakistan's views to bring such scattered militants towards table talks is not a quick and easy task.

Sial (2016) is of the view that, unlike his predecessor Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani has adopted the rapprochement policy towards Pakistan. He first delayed the implementation of the strategic partnership agreement with India which was signed by the Hamid Karzai government. Obtained close partnership with Pakistan's security establishment and established a special proposal to alleviate Pakistani concerns over cross-border militancy. Pakistan managed to bring the Taliban into negotiation with the Afghan authorities in Murree on July 7th, 2015. The peace process among the Taliban and the Afghan authorities was derailed after the death of Mullah Umar. With joint efforts of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Taliban once again started negotiations and resume the Murree talks in Doha.

Amir (2010) in his book stated that revealing Pakistan as a hated country was the most common phenomenon in Afghanistan's previous rules. Despite Pakistan's warm welcome to the Afghan migrants and Pakistan's support towards Afghanistan stability. Nonetheless, the world is also recognizing Pakistan's hospitality to Afghan migrants for more than three decades. Even small-scale businesses went into the hands of Afghan migrants in Pakistan, especially in KPK province. But the Afghan government on every occasion criticizes Pakistan, never spotting its neighbor positively. Pakistan extended its full cooperation towards the newly formed national unity government of Hamid Karzai and now towards Ashraf Ghani. But the blame game continues from the side of the Afghan authorities. Any kind of accident or security issue occurs in Afghanistan, they blame Pakistan and vice versa.

Hashimy (2016) discussed that the financial calamity and downturn were disheartening for those who are aiding Afghanistan, especially the external powers. The major cause is growing insecurity in Afghanistan, which is evident from the latest security report showing that militants are in control of 30 % of the Afghan territories. The extremists

even threaten the status of the state economy, that's why Afghanistan is not stabilizing economically, because every foreign investor first wants economic and political stability. After the formation of the National Unity government, it was hoped that the county will go on the right track. An atmosphere of teamwork among the different political and ethnic groups will be created. But corruption and misuse of powers among the government officials vanished the mass expectation from the government side. The allocation and government position to certain individuals has made it harder to cooperate. The result was that people's fells lack job security due to mass corruption in different governmental sectors. Hundreds of cases are registered against corrupt government officials with no effective outcomes and many cases are under trial in courts. Many of the Afghans for business purposes flee to the foreign states and many foreign private stakeholders are forced to leave the state, as some elements never want the country's prosperity. Due to such a situation, the people have no trust in the state's establishment for the provision of peace and progress in Afghanistan even after the US withdraws.

Shehzad (2011) argued that core disputes should be resolved through dialogue amongst Afghanistan and Pakistan after the US drawdown. The West has realized the inspiration of the different stakeholders and the Afghan people and admits that the use of force on Afghans is not an effective explanation to eradicate terrorism from Afghanistan. The only need is the dialogue process with the *Taliban* and the Afghan government. That is why the US engages with the *Taliban* in negotiating; Pakistan should be committed to working on a dialogue strategy, a move that may boost the prospect of negotiation with the *Taliban*. As an adjacent neighbor, Pakistan will perform an effective role in preserving harmony in Afghanistan and the accomplishment of pro-Pakistani elements in Kabul. In the reconciliation process, the Afghan establishment should take into confidence all the ethnic groups as well as Pakistan.

William & Felbab (2016) argued that 2016 could potentially be a critical year for Afghanistan. They noted that ISIS was growing in power and the Taliban were gaining ground due to which Afghanistan's stability is deteriorating with each passing day. The major powers and active members of regional peace like China, the USSR, the US, and Pakistan are working to bring the Taliban on-table talks with the Afghan government for reconciliation. Pakistan has had a little inspirational role on the Taliban in the past through which it could use to play a mediating role in Afghanistan. But all the Afghan Taliban are not in Pakistan's control, which was Afghan's perception. For this purpose, the adjacent neighboring states, as well as the superpowers, have their sole role in Afghanistan policies to create soft power for their interests.

Waheed (2008) argued that there were some common problems faced by both the states and can say that some of the major domestic issues among both the states are mutual. But neither of the two states had strived to resolve mutual disputes. That is why the Pak-Afghan borderland is always under strong criticism and criticism allegations. Misconduct and disorder in one state affect the peace of the other state, especially in the case of Afghanistan. Since most of the time, Afghanistan remains under foreign influence. Similarly, Pakistan should also adopt a positive attitude in favor of Afghanistan. As peace in Afghanistan is peace in Pakistan and the whole region.

Grare (2006) draws attention to the main domestic issues and challenges facing both the states in their domestic affairs. According to him the growing insurgency in border areas adjacent to Pak-Afghan borders once more created tension among the two states. For which both the states are accusing each other of interference in their domestic affairs. Afghanistan blamed Pakistan for destabilizing its democratic process during the Hamid Karzai era, while Pakistan accused Afghanistan of the Baloch insurgency and deteriorating situation in

Waziristan. Therefore, the normalization of relations between these two states is global as well as regional arrogance.

Kilcullen (2014) assessed the potential security situation of Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario. In his view, the US drawdown created a diverse situation for Afghanistan. The US' long-lasting stay in Afghanistan did not produce peaceful environment for Afghanistan, as it was guaranteed by the NATO forces, because the Afghan National Army or Police has nominal control over the entire region. He cautioned that Taliban militancy could rise once NATO forces depart. He also analyzed the causes of widespread corruption and governance problems in Afghanistan.

1.9.1 Gaps Found in the Literature

Most of the authors overlook the relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan just on political grounds or discuss the depressing scenario of the relations. They are providing the historical background of old issues that are the cause of the tense relations that the destabilized relations are due to hostile terms in the past. But no specific attention was given to Afghanistan's domestic political issues and their implications on the Pak-Afghan unfavorable conditions. Hence there is no specific study or literature in books and articles regarding cross-border militancy and Pakistan's efforts related to border fencing, the issue of Afghan immigrants, poppy cultivation, and reconciliation with the Taliban. Because these are the entire main causes of tension among the two states in the recent scenario. So, this research work will explain the above issues in detail with facts and findings. The available studies are not appropriately applied to Pakistan-Afghanistan unfriendly relations due to the available domestic political issues on their bilateral relations. Some of the studies do not fit the proposed issues in both states' bilateral relations.

As the literature is carried out on immediate issues after Pakistan's independence and their impacts on both state relations. But after the passing of many decades in relation the old issues underwent a new modification according to the present circumstances. As the US withdraws from Afghanistan keeps the Afghan stakeholders in a situation to co-operate or betray the Taliban as a main stakeholder of the state. Here co-operation in the form of reconciliation is required. But the literature is insufficient to bridge the gap on the issue of the Taliban settlement. The same is the case with other domestic and bilateral issues. Therefore, it is proposed that the current issues will reach valid findings over the present research theme. Several writers are confined to the unfriendly relations of both the states based on old disputes and ignore the current situation of the relations. But this research will discuss allegations and counter-allegations considering Afghanistan's domestic political issues and their impacts on both states' bilateral relations. It will analyze the divergence of old disputes which emerged soon after Pakistan's emergence and will also evaluate the prevailing circumstance after the emergence of the Taliban. Production of the poppy cultivation and its impacts on Pakistan, issue of the Afghan migrants as a burden on Pakistan's economy and creating security situation for Pakistan.

1.10 Research Methodology:

1.10.1 Research Design

This study is mainly qualitative in nature for which both primary and secondary sources have been utilized. The researcher has taken interviews from different researcher's expert in the field of the subject area to give novelty and uniqueness in the research. Thematic analysis within qualitative research has been used while conducting the research. Thematic analysis is often understood as a method or technique in contrast to most other qualitative analytic approaches - such as grounded theory, discourse analysis, narrative analysis (S.

Nowell, 2017). The researcher has made analysis of the subject area by keeping in view both the primary and secondary sources and in the end has given her own findings, recommendations, and conclusion.

1.10.2 Data Collection

This research has been conducted in the light of both primary and secondary sources including interviews, research books, journals, web pages and relevant sources available in authentic form. Speeches and statements, selected biographies, interviews from intellectuals on Afghanistan, ambassadors from both the sides, analysts on Pak-Afghan relations, politicians, and civil and military officials' interviews were conducted. In secondary sources, books, research articles, newspapers, unpublished research work, reviews and magazines, and websites of think tanks and media organizations were used. Both the content analysis method and documents-analysis method were used to measure qualitative data.

1.10.3 Data Analysis

The data has been analyzed based on interviews, books, research journals, newspapers, magazines, web pages and relevant pages. Historical background of Pak-Afghan relations, keeping in view the comparative analysis of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani era and their relations with Pakistan. Data on Afghanistan's international situation and its impacts of bilateral relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan are collected from different libraries, International Islamic University Islamabad, University of Malakand and Swat Library, University of Peshawar Library, Center for International Strategic Studies Islamabad, NDU, IPRI, IPCS, CSIS and official websites.

1.11 Organization of the Study

This research comprises seven chapters including the introduction and conclusion.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Historical background of Pak-Afghan Relations

Chapter 3: Political, Military and Security Associated Relations (2001-2017)

Chapter 4: Pak-Afghan Transit Trade, Economic, Reconstruction and Development Relations

Chapter 5: Major domestic political Issues in Afghanistan

Chapter 6: Major domestic Political issues of Pakistan

Chapter 7: Conclusion

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

1. Introduction

Afghanistan and Pakistan are two sovereign neighboring Muslim states located in South Asia and sharing a border of about 2430 km (1510 miles). Both the countries are directly linked by the provinces of Afghanistan that are adjacent to the Pakistani border; *Badakhshan, Nuristan, Konar, Nangarhar, Paktiya, Khost, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimruz* (Institute for Study of War, 2017). Ethnic Pashtuns populate the area along with the Pak-Afghan boundary. The most important crossing points along with the Pak-Afghan borders are Torkham, bordered by Peshawar and Jalalabad, and Spinboldak in Quetta and Kandahar (ISW, 2017). Afghanistan extends about 600 miles from North to South, and 500 from East to West, almost 270,000 sq. miles, having its length and breadth every 200 miles (Ghani, 1989).

Both the countries share a common culture, common religion, and common political history. In August 1947, Pakistan got independence from British rule and thus the area was divided on the religious ground between Pakistan and India. On the other side, Afghanistan has a much longer political history than Pakistan that dates back to the 18th century. Hotaki (1709-1738) and Durrani (1747- 1823) rules functioned for the welfare of the people of Afghanistan. The Hotaki had been Ghilzais tribesman who defeated the Persian Safavids and seized control of much of Persia during 1722-1738. King Ahmad Shah, a former high-ranking military chief and following the Durrani Empire, most of Afghanistan was protected in his era under the rule of Nadir Shah of Persia (New World Encyclopedia). Since 1748,

when Ahmad Shah Abdali proclaimed himself in Kandahar as the king of Afghanistan, the country got its current name (Priestley, 1981). The people of Afghanistan belong to different races including Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. The main language spoken in Kabul is Dari, a variant of Persian, a language of the Tajik minority as well as of (Durrani) Pashtuns (Nazir, 2002).

Due to Persian dominance on this land for years, Afghans also contributed significantly to Persian literature (Ghani, 1987). In the account of shared culture and religious festivities, the commercial marketplaces of Afghanistan are saturated with Pakistani goods. Hundreds of Urdu words, phrases, and terminologies are absorbed by Pashto and Afghan (Dari) languages. Millions of Afghans know the name of Pakistani cities, villages, and streets due to their family relationships. Similarly, thousands of Pakistanis work in Afghanistan in different fields. Every day, thousands of people from both sides cross the border for their basic needs. These interactions affect both countries' society, politics, and culture from Kabul to Karachi (Rasikh, 2014).

2.1.1 Ethnic Divisions as a Problem in Afghanistan

The creation of the Durrani Empire in 1747 started a revolving point in Afghan history when Pashtuns emerged as the largest ethnic group under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durrani. However, the term 'group ethnic' was the first time used by French philosopher Dollot, who categorized Afghanistan into different ethnic groups in the mid-20th century (Mazhar et al, 2012). Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state which complicates the country's situation for the smooth implementation of the democratic process. In 1978, the PDPA seized authority, leading to a violent civil war. These regional conflicts led to the struggle between the PDPA and Russian intervention. It also led to the split among the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan PDPA into two factions (Khalaq and Parcham) in

1967. In the 1970s, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin Daoud. Daoud was overthrown and killed by PDPA in April 1979 with the support of Khalaq and Parcham leaders, Nur Muhammad Tarakai and Hafizullah Amin in the Saur revolution. Tarakai became president but was replaced by Amin in a Coup in September 1979 (Katzman, 2015). Both leaders tried to prove their strength from Pashtun's ethnicity. While giving more representation to women in government, such a move was strongly opposed by religious parties. President Hafizullah Amin of Khalaq faction was overthrown by a Soviet-led coup in December 1979, and replaced by Babrak Karmal, a Parcham party leader. However, widespread disturbance and fighting among the Khalq and Parcham factions resulted in the complete eradication of PDPA by anti-Communist Islamic forces (Ages, 2018).

In early 1992, a Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Masood, Gen. Abdur Rasheed Dostum head of the powerful Uzbek militia allied with Najibullah along with Hazara faction of Hizb-i-Wahdat formed a coalition called the Northern Alliance. On 15th April 1994, the non-Pashtuns factions took control of Kabul, and President Najibullah was forced to leave presidency who took asylum in the UN compound for four years in Kabul. Masoud entered Kabul and expelled Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from the coalition, a pro-Pakistani leader. Hekmatyar launched massive rocket attacks on Kabul which forced them to leave Kabul in 1994. Thus, Burhanuddin Rabbani a Tajik leader from Jamiat-i-Islami became the president. In 1995, Hekmatyar joined forces with Rasheed Dostum to oust Rabbani, resulting in a civil war in which Masood had the support of India, Iran, and Russia while Pakistan extended support towards Hekmatyar. In 1996, the Taliban took control of Kabul and Masood was confined the north of Afghanistan. In 1997, the Taliban established the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan while imposing Islamic laws. Ethnicity was further ascended by the Taliban as most of them belonged to Pashtun thereby received disapproval by other ethnic groups, especially, the northern alliance of Ahmad Shah Masood supported by India (Rashid, 2010).


After 9/11, US attacked Afghanistan, leading Northern Alliance to holds all key positions even though Karzai was Pashtun president. During such a scenario, Pakistan was under strong criticism from international critics and alienated Pakistan on the plea to support the Taliban, Quetta Shura, and Haqqani network.

During the 2004 and 2009 Afghan presidential elections, Pakistan fully supported Hamid Karzai as a Pashtun. Similarly, Pakistan also supported Ashraf Ghani as a Presidential candidate in the 2014 elections. He got the majority in Pashtun's majority areas in second balloting. While in first balloting, Abdullah a former advisor to Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masood was in the leading position. The election results were criticized and created law and order situation. After months of US negotiations with the Afghan authority, the two candidates formed a national unity government; Abdullah became chief executive a newly created office for him while Ashraf Ghani served President of Afghanistan, yet the shadow of this conflict badly influenced Pak-Afghan relations.

Multiplicity, ethnic identities, and linguistic divisions make Afghanistan a challenging country. Previously, ethnicity was not a great problem in Afghanistan, as most of the Afghan leaders came from the Pashtun tribes (Siddique, 2012). At present, 14 ethnic groups live in Afghanistan of which Pashtuns are in majority while the other ethnic groups are Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Baloch, Kirghiz, Nuristani, Aimak, Arab, Sadat, Qazelbash, and Pashaye (The Asia Foundation Report, 2011). All these groups lived together for almost 5000 years and stood united against foreign encroachment of Great Britain and the former USSR (Pervaiz, 2015). Iran supports Hazara Shia's group which constitutes a small entity that adopted Dari and Persians as its languages. They are mostly considered the poorest and downgraded among the Afghan communities (Siddique, 2010). Tajiks are considered as well skilled and educated, and the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, contributing

almost 27% to the Afghan population. They remained influential in Afghan politics in Post 9/11 scenario. Uzbeks are the smallest ethnic group comprising almost 8% of the Afghan population living between the Hindu Kush and Central Asian region near the Amu Darya (Mazhar, et al. 2012).

Map Showing Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan



Maintaining harmony among the different ethnic groups nowadays is one of the challenging tasks for Afghanistan. These different ethnic groups possess strong cultural components, which are at odds with obvious boundaries. Having conflict for centuries is not

suitable for Afghanistan (Siddiqui, 2012). Along with multi-ethnicity, Afghanistan is a multi-linguistic state too. Different languages are spoken here including Pashto, Dari, Uzbeki, Turki, Urdu, Arabi, and Balochi. To address the issue of their languages, all the major dialects were declared as the official language of Afghanistan in their respective areas. In the National Anthem, all major ethnic groups are mentioned by name (Shah, 2012).

In 1747, the Pashtuns were a leading ethnic group in Afghanistan that recognized its rule in the eastern and southern parts of the country. Political powers long rested in their hands in the early 1990s and governed over many parts of Afghanistan (Merrill & Tobey, 2006). Pashtuns are the largest ethnic entity having historically asserted the “right to rule” in Afghanistan. Most of the people are Pashto speaking but many in governmental positions also speak Dari in Kabul. Pashtuns in Afghanistan are extensively believed to establish 42-45% of the population and comprise five main casts including Durranis, Ghilzais, Karlanri, Sarbani, and Ghurghusht holding top governance position in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2014). The Taliban movement was also completely based on Pashtuns' ethnicity largely from Ghilzais tribes (Harrison, 2007). In a foreign policy magazine report, Robert Kaplan pointed out that “the Taliban constitutes merely the latest incarnation of Pashtun nationalism.” Traditional Pashtuns live on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Much of the fighting in Afghanistan today in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan is due to the presence of Pashtuns (Totten, 2009). The US airstrikes in Afghanistan is mostly targeted the Pashtuns. The radicalization of the Pashtun areas has made stronger both Islamist zealotry and Pashtun's nationalism (Harrison, 2007).

Former President Hamid Karzai was a Durranis Pashtun, his cabinet and the advisory circle was dominated by men from Ghilzais and Durranis Pashtun tribes. President Ashraf Ghani also belongs to a prominent Ghilzais Pashtun tribe (Katzman, 2014). During Pakistan's


independence movement, Pashtuns parties had links with the All-India National Congress (AINC) who did not accept the 1947 referendum and struggled for independent Pakhtunistan (Khalil, 2017). Afghan conflict took several turns in the past and changes in the shades of ideology, ethnicity, and sectarianism became profound. An ideological conflict was continued between Islamism and communism during the cold war. This conflict intensified after 1973 when Daoud Khan came into power after over-throwing Zahir Shah. Communism had played a key role in a coup that brought Daoud into power. Thus, they held key positions in government and expanded their influence in every field. The Islamists, on the other hand, put resistance to the new regime. This violent conflict continued until the Saur revolution and even after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The fall of the Najibullah regime was a blessing for the Islamist regime. As the Taliban captured several areas, an interim rule was recognized in 1992. In 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul and established the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan. However, various warlords who had fought the communist compatriots and their Soviet masters could not agree on power-sharing which led to an outbreak of civil war which was based on ethnic diffractions and personality clashes.

2.1.2 Demography

The population of Afghanistan has a diverse culture and consists of diverse collections, each preserving its traditions. It may be divided into two groups, Afghans and Non-Afghans. Afghans include those who call themselves Pashtuns, found all over in Afghanistan, but mostly in the South and the Hindu Kush under numerous tribal names such as Durranis, Barakzai's, Saddozais, Achakzais, Usufzais, and Ghilzais, etc., inhabiting slopes of the Suleiman range which are mutually called the Frontier Tribes now a day. While, the non-Afghans consist of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkoman, Hindkis, and Arabs, etc. They are mostly found in the North of Hindu Kush. Some of the non-Muslims as

minorities are mostly found in Herat and Kizibashes in Kabul (Ghazni, 1989). The people of Afghanistan are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse. The only thing which all Afghans have in common is Islam (Marsden, 1998).

Map Showing Demographic position of Afghanistan



Regarding the geographic location, Afghanistan, is a landlocked state located to the west of Pakistan, Tajikistan to the northeast, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to the north. The total area of Afghanistan is around 252000 squares km, and it is the 41st largest country in the world. Its population is almost 31 million which makes Afghans 42nd most populated country

in the world". Owing to the geo-strategic position of Afghanistan, it is difficult for foreign invaders to control this state (Rashid, 2009). Afghanistan due to its Geo-strategic location called by Marco Polo, "Roof of the World" extending from Central Asia through China to Pakistan and because of towering peaks of the Pamir Mountains had made it a crucial point for political benefits of international and local powers in the history (Rashid, 2009).

Pakistan is located strategically and economically in a very important location, undoubtedly known as a gateway to Central Asia. It lies between 24 and 36.75 northern latitudes and 61 and 75° eastern longitudes, with an area of 796096 sq.km. During the 1920s, it was a hub of strategic importance for the great powers. This region where Pakistan is located has witnessed the intervention of three great powers, i.e., Great Britain, Russia, and the US. Geographically, the north side of Pakistan is adjacent to China with a 400 km long border, which is divided by a narrow Wakhan strip in the north divided by Tajikistan. In the east, lies Punjab-Rajasthan's 1650 km border. Towards the west is Afghanistan located 2250 km long at the Durand Line border, in southwest is Iran, and the south Arabian and Indian sea coastal belt of 700 km. Pakistan is the 5th largest populated country in the world.

The population growth rate in Pakistan is 2.1% higher as compared to other countries in the region. The stream of Afghan refugees is also contributing to the rapid growth of Pakistan's population. According to the 2017 census, Pakistan's population is estimated around 22, 774,520 people. The province of Punjab is the largest in terms of population where 56% of the country population is residing, Sindh is the second populated province with 23% of total inhabitants, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the third with 17 % of the population, while the province of Baluchistan has 5% of state residents. FATA comprised of 0.5% the population, while Gilgit-Baltistan covering an area of 72, 520 sq. km with a population of 883, 799, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir comprised 11, 639 sq.km. By 2020 Pakistan's

population is projected to increase by 4, 363, 526 persons (Kugelman, 2011). English is the official language while Urdu is the national language. Besides six major languages are in practice along with several known Pakistani languages. Major languages are Urdu, Pashto, Punjabi, Sindhi, Saraiki, and Balochi (Pakistan Annual Plan, 2015-16).

2.1.3 Economy, Culture and Politics of the Two States

Pakistan is a semi-industrialized country, developed at a higher rate in different segments, witnessing a transition from agriculture to an industrialized country. Pakistan's GDP represents 0.46% of the world's low-cost. According to the World Bank report, Pakistan's GDP growth rate was 5.5 for the fiscal year 2017-18 (Trading Economies, 2018) The land of Pakistan is agriculture-friendly, producing many crops especially wheat and sugarcane in a large amount.

Afghanistan's weather on the other side is not that much suitable for agriculture and the major agriculture products include dry fruits, melons, dates, pomegranates, and grapes, as well as the largest producer of opium. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Law and order situations and political instability provides less opportunity for foreign investors. Now with the assistance of IMF, ADB, India, and Western countries, the government of Afghanistan is working on the recovery of the degraded status of the economy. Afghanistan's GDP grew to 3.60 % in the 2016/17 fiscal year. The average growth rate of GDP was 8.53 out of each hundred from 2003 to 2017, accomplished on a high scale of 28.60 percent in 2003 to a record level of 1.80 % in 2016.

2.2 Emergence of Pakistan and Issues in Pak-Afghan Relations

Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947 based on the two nations' philosophy, that was Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations living in the sub-continent. The

founding fathers of Pakistan had rejected the notion of territorial nationalism before partition and strongly abhorred ethnicity and provincialism after the creation of Pakistan. Religion was a defining factor in Pakistan's ideology before and after its creation. Pakistan was created based on Muslim nationalism defined in terms of religion as the most important and committed nation (Adnan, 2012) with Islam, an identity for Muslims living in the sub-continent. Pakistan was created in the name of Islam with the promise that it would be turned into a laboratory for the teaching of Islam. It was promised that Islam would serve as a supervisory value of the state policy.

After the creation of Pakistan, the country was projected as a fortress of Islam. Religion not only got significance in the domestic policies but also in foreign policy. Building cordial relations with the Muslim countries was the main pillar of Pakistan's foreign policy. Indeed, Pakistan also championed the cause of pan-Islamism or the unity of the whole Muslim world (Amin, 2000). As such, to pursue brotherly relations with neighbor Muslim countries such as Iran and Afghanistan were Pakistan's main foreign policy objective. Pakistan was fortunate that it enjoyed cordial relations with Iran which was the first country in the world that had recognized the newly created Muslim state of Pakistan in 1947.

However, the situation was different in the case of Afghanistan. On 8th August 1919, a peace agreement stayed signed at the peace conference in Rawalpindi by the British and Afghan deputation. An informal document recognized the Afghan's independence and restored Afghan foreign policy. Ali Ahmad Jan who presided Afghan delegation declared in a public gathering that today we are free in our foreign policy with any country in the world (Ghani, 1987). Until the assassination of King Habibullah commonly known as (Baccha-i-Saqa, the son of water carrier) in 1919, Great Britain had controlled the country's foreign affairs (Girardet, 1985). In 1929 Nadir Khan succeeded to the throne of Kabul. However,

Nadir Khan was also assassinated in 1933 by a university student in a crowd. After his death, his son Zahir Shah was the last king to serve Afghanistan. His throne was toppled by Muhammad Daoud Khan who declared Afghanistan a republic in 1973 (Dupree, 1973).

2.2.1 Overview of Pak-Afghan Relations in the 1950s

Afghanistan passed through several upheavals since its birth. Pakistan as a next-door neighbor generally sought friendly relations with Afghanistan. But relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan always remained at leisureliness since Pakistan's independence. Other than regular ethnic, geographical, cultural, social, and religious ties, these two deliberately significant neighboring Muslim nations share a long border that divides the ethnic tribes of Pashtuns into two geographic units. The tribes on both sides have customary and social ties, yet unexpectedly the governments on both sides have regularly been at loggerheads with each other. Most likely, this condition of opposition was because of some personal stakes and chiefly because of misunderstandings on both sides.

It is more evident that since the independence of Pakistan on 14 August 1947, the stressed Pak-Afghan relations moved from unpleasant to more regrettable. At the point when the then Afghan government deterred Pakistan's entrance into the United Nations Organization (UNO) in September 1947, raising the issue of Pakhtunistan and discrediting the international Pak-Afghan border commonly known as the Durand line. Pakhtunistan stunt and altogether negligence of the "Durand Line Agreement" of 1893 has been a deadlock in the friendly relations between the two countries. The shared long border and common historical ties of the two neighboring nations by no means contributed cordiality in their relations because of misperceptions on both sides of the border. The strained relations between the two nations have many causes which are discussed below.

2.2.2 Issue on the Demarcation of the Durand Line

The first cause of tensed relations was the boundary line agreement flanked by British India and Afghanistan recognized as Durand Line, the international boundary between the two countries which is 2,430 km long running from Pamir in the North to Koh-i-Malik Siah at the tri junction with Iran and Baluchistan in the South (Hussain, 2005). The history of the Durand Line dates to the May 26, 1879, treaty of Gandamak marked between Great Britain and Afghanistan amid the Second Anglo-Afghan war (Siddique, 2011). British anxiety over Russian influence on Central Asia, West Asia, and particularly in Persia, triggered the two Anglo-Afghan wars and the siege of Herat (1837-1838). The Persians wanted to expel the British and retake Afghanistan, therefore they sent armies into the country and fought with the British around the city of Herat. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) lasted till the defeat of the British army, which culminated in a successful Afghan resistance towards foreign interference (Robert, 1846). The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) was flashed by Sher Ali Khan's rejection to admit the British influence in Afghanistan (Omran, 2007). Towards the end of the second Afghan war in 1879, the then Afghan ruler Amir Yaqub Khan signed the Treaty of Gandamak in which he surrendered parts of western Baluchistan, Quetta, and many portions of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to Britain (Rashid, 2009).

In the late 1980s, the Amir of Afghanistan Abdur Rehman set up a need for a well-defined border with British India. Likewise, the British also needed a clear buffer state free from its sphere of influence under his great game policy, keeping in mind the Russian influence and expansionist desires concerning central Asia. Amir of Afghanistan agreed to hand over Afghanistan's foreign policy to the British in imperative that the British would not interfere in Afghan's internal affairs for this purpose, a clear and well-defined demarcation of the western border was necessitated. So, Amir sent a letter to the viceroy of India to request a

mission and settle the Indo-Afghan border disputes (Biswas, 2013). Durand's mission left Peshawar for Kabul on the 19th of September 1893 and was warmly welcomed by the Amir. The conversation was held in the Persian language between the Amir and Sir Durand in a free atmosphere without the help of an interpreter. Kafiristan was left to the Amir, which he had a free hand to occupy; Wakhan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura, and a portion of Waziristan were counted in Amir's territories. "While he abandoned the areas including the railway station of New Chaman, Chageh, the rest of Waziri, Bulund Khel, Khurram, Afridi, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Chitral. The boundary line agreed upon ran from Chitral and Baraghil Pass up to Peshawar and onward up to Koh Malik Siah" (Ghani, 1987). When Lord Roberts left for India, Amir Abdur Rehman invited a mission to Kabul and got a map of tribal territories between India and Afghanistan from the Indian government. The territories of Waziris, New Chaman, Chageh, Bulund Khel, the whole of Mohmand, Asmar, and Chitral, etc. were referred to handed over to India. On the other hand the Amir's advice was not appreciated and the Indian ruler by force expelled Afghan officials from Bulund Khel and Wana (Ghani, 1987).

The agreement was endorsed by the then foreign secretary of the administration of British India Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdul Rehman of Afghanistan in a well-known "Durand Line agreement" on November 12, 1893. The original document released in 1893, was confirmed by Habibullah Khan in 1905 (Khan, 1967). A new insurgency came across on the border demarcation after the demise of Amir on 1st October 1901. After his death, Habibullah Khan, Amir's son ascended the throne of Afghanistan. But the British authority refused to pay the subsidy to Habibullah khan on the statement that the agreement was signed among the Amir and the British Indian expert. Thus, Habibullah replied that "if the deal was personal with Amir Abdur Rehman, then it means that the Durand Line agreement stands invalid now". The British authority pressurized the new Amir for visit to India to renew the

Durand Line agreement. Since the document had lost its validity after Amir's death, Habibullah Khan dropped the request and forced Louis to visit Kabul. W Dane, the British minister of India had to visit Kabul and talk about the two-sided matters. Louis paid a visit to Kabul in late 1904 along with a draft of a new agreement. Habibullah Khan debated his perspective and after a long discussion, an agreement between the two parties was finally signed on 21 March 1905, generally well-known as the "Dane-Habibullah agreement" (Biswas, 2013). After the agreement, the British government resolved to restart an aid of 1.8 million Afghan rupees along with previous installments and the permission of military equipment to Afghans through India (Qassem, 2008).

During the First World War in August 1914, Afghanistan remained neutral, many states obliged Afghanistan against the British, but Habibullah Khan was the ruler of Afghanistan at that time, and he strongly opposed taking participation in world war first. On 20 February 1919, Habibullah Khan expired, and his third son Amanullah Khan became the Amir of Afghanistan. After consolidating his position, he declared Afghanistan a free state both internally and externally from any kind of foreign interference. His negative attitude against the British was known to the British. He delivered to the Indian viceroy that any agreement without his alertness with the British authority would not be acceptable, including the Durand Line agreement. This statement was an offense for the British and preserving Afghan affairs was a cherished desire for them. Thus, for a decade Afghanistan became a buffer state among the British and Russian threats. This resulted in the third-Anglo Afghan war among the unproductive Afghan forces and Indian-British forces for a short time. The war ended on 3rd June 1919 and discussions began among the two state's authorities and finally, a peace treaty was signed on 8th August 1919 in Rawalpindi. Through this treaty, the British authority assumed the freedom of Afghanistan, and under Article 5 of the Durand treaty it was mentioned, "the Afghan government accepts the Indo-Afghan frontiers, which

was accepted by late Amir (Habibullah Khan)." So, for the first, the two states recognized the validity of the Durand Line (Qassim, 2008).

The agreement was subsequently recognized by the successive Afghan government who came into power in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2012). On November 22, 1921, the Anglo-Afghan Treaty succeeded the Rawalpindi agreement and affirmed the outlying understanding. In article 2 of the agreement, Kabul recognized the Durand Line as an international border. Last yet not the least, in 1930, Nadir Shah, father of King Zahir Shah, reaffirmed the complete legitimacy of the treaty with full force on May 6, 1930. The British government gave monetary and political advantages to the Afghan rulers because of the British extensive key interests in the area to ensure his position in this region (Ross & Vassefi, 2012). As indicated by an American geographer, Prof. Niger Allen, Afghanistan was turned into a state, but a space between Russia and the British (Warikoo, 2007) that led to the tussle of power in the region among the communist and capitalist political ideology. Afghan's concern that Amir was compelled on the agreement because of the situation during this time, he was occupied with fighting against rivals in Hazaras. So, the British led advantage of such a situation and bribe Amir a huge sum. Through payments and bribes, the British divided tribes on both sides of the border and interact with them and keep them an attentive eye in this area (Ross & Vassefi, 2012).

The borderline divided the Pashtuns into both sides of the frontier that included 10 million in Afghanistan and 12 million in Pakistan (McCauley, 2002). The line split at least twelve villages in half and divided many agricultural fields. It also cut the tribal groups like the Birmal tribe of Waziristan in which half was on the Afghanistan side while the rest of the Waziristan tribes was on the Pakistan side. The same was the case of the division with Mohmand tribal areas (Omran, 2009). The truth of the matter is that after the arrangement of

the Durand Line, Amir got a yearly appropriation of Rs. 600,000 from British India and even praised the British and asked Afghan Sardar and subjects to be loyal towards the British as companions. This denoted the zenith of British forwarded policy (Qureshi, 1966). This border still leads to numerous anxieties for Pakistan such as unlawful cross-border infiltration, drug trafficking, criminal organizations, and non-state actor activities in Pakistan tribal areas. It is to be noted here that the mutual border division (tribes on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border) has never gone under the genuine control of any administration. Indeed, even the Taliban government had no control over illegal cross-border activities (Iqbal, 2010).

With the Indian independence of 1947, the British and Russian chaotic relations came to an end. The resulting power vacuum caused substantial anxiety for the Afghan government. When the British authority went, Afghanistan was not able to play conventional diplomacy amongst the East and West. The US never understood the strategic importance of preserving Afghanistan as a buffer state. According to John Evarts, US deputy chief of mission in Afghanistan from 1951 to 1953, the state department had no interests in East-West relations, Afghanistan came under the South Asian division, where the focus of attention was India, Ceylon, and Pakistan (Girardet, 1985).

Afghanistan motivated by internal and external factors raised Pakhtunistan, ruling family of Afghanistan sought to consolidate its position and grip on power in Kabul. The Afghan rulers used the issue to attract political support among people particularly Pashtuns for the state. This issue was more popular among the tribes living on both sides of Pak-Afghan border which had the feelings that Durand Line had unjustly divided them into two states. It had badly affected their socio-economic lives. The Afghan rulers in ethnically diverse Afghanistan intended to bring more Pashtuns under their rule to increase Pashtuns numerical strength against other ethnic groups. It is to be noted that non-Pashtuns make

roughly one-half of Afghanistan's population. Yet another perspective is that the royal family also intended to use this issue to consolidate its position through appeasing Moscow and seeking Soviet support for the regime. Moscow used the Pakhtunistan issue to prevent Kabul from coming closer to Islamabad or the Western alliance and to increase its own influence in the state. However, it also alienated non-Pashtun population. Yet, there was another reason that prompted Afghanistan to raise the issue of Pakhtunistan. In 1944, the Afghan government proposed the British government that Afghanistan should be given a corridor to the Arabian Sea through Baluchistan. The British government, however, turned down this demand. This demand was even articulated by the Afghan government later also. After its opposition to Pakistan's membership in the UNO, Afghan government sent Najib Khan as its representative to Karachi for talks with Pakistani leadership. Besides other demands, he also demanded Pakistan to give Kabul access to the Arabian Sea "either by the creation of an Afghan corridor in West Baluchistan or by allotting a free Afghan Zone in Karachi" (M.A. Nazeer, 2020).

Since the division of the Durand Line to date, the Pak-Afghan borderline was viewed as a bone of conflict for both states. Thus, the relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan are far from being normal because Durand Line According to Louis Dupree, "Durand Line is a classic example of an artificial political boundary cutting through a culture area", a difficult and porous border difficult to police, particularly many passes and paths in Waziristan through which tribes on both sides move easily from Pakistan into Afghanistan and back due to family's relations across the border (Omran, 2009). In this manner, due to cross-border movements from both sides, the tribal area never experienced stability due to uncertainty and foreign aggression in Afghanistan. As mostly due to porous cross border movement was rare from both sides, however, after independence, the tribes on the Pakistan side fully recognized

the Pakistan government and in terms of border disputes always protect the boundaries (Qureshi, 1966).

2.2.3 Pakhtunistan Issue

The second reason for stressed Pak-Afghan relations was the Pakhtunistan issue. It was utilized by the Afghan governments against Pakistan since 1947 to undermine the Durand Line. The Afghans raising the issue of Pakhtunistan that Northwest Frontier Province NWFP referred to as 'Pakhtunistan' by the Afghans was formally considered part of Afghanistan due to Pashtuns' ethnic majority (Hussain, 2005).

When the British rule proclaimed her firm determination to hand over its authority over the sub-continent under the independence Act-1947 to Pakistan and India, *Khudai Khitmatgar* Tehreek or Red Shirt Movement of Ghaffar Khan (Bacha Khan) a Congress leader of NWFP now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) rejected the approximation and raised the third option of Independent Pakhtunistan, at least autonomy within Pakistan (Hussain, 2005). Even the Indian authorities fully supported and extended complete help for Pakhtunistan. Indian perception that in the case of the Indo-Pak war on Kashmir, the Afghans tribe will not support Pakistan against India and will open a second front on the North-Western border to destabilize Pakistan. There was a misperception created by Indian authorities in Afghan's mind regarding Pakistan that Pakistan will not survive for a long time alone. Thus, the Afghan rulers start claiming Pashtuns majority areas before Pakistan disintegrates (Khan, 1967). When Pakistan got independence from British India, the Kabul government began the discussion on the return of lost domains of Pakistan's adjacent tribal areas, however it yielded no outcome (Rubin, 2002). Pakistan strongly believed that Afghan stance on Durand Line was just an emotional and prompted by India and had no historical, legal, and logical basis. Afghanistan based its claim on a selected and brief period of history while ignoring the other and longer instances of the past. This fact was highlighted by former President Ayub Khan in

these words: “if the Afghan interest is based on the historical fact that Afghanistan at one time in history ruled over some parts now constituting Pakistan, then they should not forget that there were also times of much longer duration when Delhi’s sovereignty extended up to Kabul and beyond” (M. A. Nazeer, 2020).

On July 3, 1947, a referendum was held in which most of the people opted for Pakistan. Only 0.5% opted for India while 55 % out of 55.5% of the total voters who took part in the referendum voted for Pakistan (Dupree, 1997). Bacha Khan dismissed the referendum that unfair means were applied to contain the desires of the Pashtuns to get an independent state. Afghanistan rejected the referendum results, saying that no third option of independent Pakhtunistan was given to the Pashtuns of NWFP now KPK, only than an option of either joining India or Pakistan. Afghanistan wants the joining of the Pashtuns-dominated area on both sides of the border. This was additionally an extraordinary request from the Afghanistan side that the general population of the NWFP should join Afghanistan because of Afghanistan's territorial landlocked status to get an outlet to the sea (Hussain, 2005).

There were different domestic factors besides external ones that determined Afghanistan's policy position on the Pakhtunistan issue. Afghanistan on the issue of Pakhtunistan pressurized Pakistan on many occasions and challenged Pakistan's security on the western border as well as diplomatically continues to reject the agreement of border demarcation. Externally, India and the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement of Bacha Khan influenced Afghanistan to pursue that policy. Indeed, India was more instrumental, and Its leadership had the belief that Pakistan would be short-lived. To fulfill its self-prophecy, it sought to create hurdles for a newly created state of Pakistan. The issue of Pakhtunistan was part of the same plan by allying with Afghanistan and separatist elements in Pakistan such as the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. New Delhi wanted to keep the latter under pressure, diverting its energies and attention through creating a two-front scenario for it. Afghanistan

was communicated that in case of the collapse of Pakistan, Pashtuns' majority areas and parts of Baluchistan would be given to Kabul (Sial, 2013).

It had a strong connection with Afghanistan's domestic political factors. Afghan rulers who always lacked political legitimacy could rally the support of mass particularly Pashtuns in the name of the Durand line or Pakhtunistan. The issue could strengthen Pashtun's nationalism. The possible inclusion of Pashtuns tribes across the Durand line into Afghanistan could consolidate their numerical strength and political power in culturally diverse and ethnically divided Afghanistan. It was a significant issue for the Pashtuns tribes living on both sides of the Durand line. Afghan government extended support to those tribes living on both sides of the Durand line. Thus, this issue could prolong the line of the Afghan monarchy which was generally fragile in the past. It was evident from the fragmented changes on the throne and political instability for decades before the creation of Pakistan.

Afghanistan is a landlocked state that badly needed access to the Arabian sea for its foreign trade. Under the prevailing conditions, it had to rely on Pakistan for trade and transit facilities. However, Kabul expected that the collapse of Pakistan and the accession of Pashtuns and Baloch territories to Afghanistan can provide access to the Arabian sea. Thus, it supported the idea of the accession of these territories to Afghanistan or the creation of an independent Pakhtunistan that could later be integrated into Afghanistan. There was another reason that prompted Afghanistan to raise the issue of Pakhtunistan. In 1944, the Afghan government had made a representation to the British government that Afghanistan should be given a corridor to the Arabian Sea through Baluchistan. The British government, however, turn down this demand. This demand was even articulated by the Afghan government later also. After its opposition to Pakistan's membership in the UNO, Afghan government sent Najib Khan as its representative to Karachi for talks with Pakistani leadership. Besides other demands, he also demanded Pakistan to give Kabul access to the

Arabian Sea “either by the creation of an Afghan corridor in West Baluchistan or by allotting a free Afghan Zone in Karachi (M. A. Nazeer, 2020). These domestic factors played a key role in determining Afghanistan’s policy over the issue. Pakhtunistan issue was simply to subvert Pakistan, as a demonstration of Afghanistan’s political moving to destabilize Pakistan for the legitimacy of the Durand Line (Hussain, 2005).

2.2.4 Afghanistan opposition Pakistan’s Membership in the UNO

Pakistan applied for UN membership soon after independence in 1947. Afghanistan opposed its membership on the plea that Pakistan was not willing to implement basic principles of UN norms and it had violated it through negating the right of plebiscites of the Pashtuns of the NWFP. The Afghan representative in the UN, Abdul Husain Khan Aziz, declared in September 1947 that his country did not recognize the NWFP as an integral part of Pakistan, as it deprived Afghanistan of Pashtun territories. This opposition did much to jaundice relations between the two countries (Siddiqi, 2009). Once Sardar Daoud proclaimed, “British did a wrong thing many years ago and we have been fighting to rectify it, until that is done the struggle will continue” (Grare, 2006). Afghanistan claimed that when the referendum was held in NWFP, no third choice was given to the people to opt according to their wishes while the referendum was forced on them in which most parts of the Pashtun areas stayed away. While Pakistan’s position was that, if the Pashtuns dominated area of both sides of the Durand line was given the right of self-determination, they would certainly opt for Pakistan instead of Afghanistan (Grare, 2006).

Since Pakistan’s independence, the entire successive ruler’s Zahir Shah, Sardar Muhammad Daoud, and their successors maintained the old Afghan claim of ‘Pakhtunistan’. According to Afghan sources, the Pakhtunistan consisted of the West of river Indus up to the Afghan border, tracking land of 1, 90, 000 squares miles. Inhabited by 7 million people who are divided into numerous tribes largely, nomadic sets shifted back, and into view crossways

the boundary utilizing comparatively privileged circumstances (Qureshi, 1966). Instead of bilateral issues, reconciliatory efforts started when the Afghan government withdrew its negative vote against Pakistan in the United Nations, both states exchanged ambassadors in 1948. Nonetheless, relations normalized when Pakistan appointed Mr. Chandigarh as the first ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan in February 1948. The Afghan government sent Sardar Shah Wali Khan as the first ambassador to Karachi but relations between the two countries remained strained. It was hoped that relations would be normalized over time (Dutta, 2009).

Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Daoud Khan (1953-1963) started a vigorous campaign for Pakhtunistan. By 1961, he was offering help to the volunteers in the Pakistan tribal organization of Bajure to bring the general population's desire up for free Pakhtunistan (Siddique, 2011). James Spain noted in 1954 that relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were centered on one subject that was Pakhtunistan. With the passage of time, the importance of this matter went into the background. Durand Line is considered cumbersome and the notorious edge of all Pak-Afghan problems (Omrani, 2009). Due to Pakistan's efforts, hopes were raised for better relations but on August 12, 1949, an Afghan-sponsored meeting of Afridi tribesmen held in Tirah Bagh that disrupted the relations because the meeting was called for asserted the creation of Pakhtunistan. Afghanistan extended full-fledged support and declared 31 August as 'Pakhtunistan Day' and observed it as a national holiday (Hussain, 2005). Tensions between the two countries were markedly highlighted in 1955 as soon as Pakistan proclaimed that it was merging its position over its tribal belt. In reaction, Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Muhammad Daoud disapproved of Pakistan's action over the radio waves of the 'Radio Kabul' on March 29, 1955. Large-scale protests were staged in Kabul and Jalalabad and Pakistani flags were pulled down and disrespected. As an alternative, Pakhtunistan flag was raised on the chancery of the Pakistan embassy in Kabul. With the

occurrence of such accidents, diplomatic relations were interrupted until 1957 as both countries withdrew their ambassadors (Ross & Vassefi, 2012).

Pakistan joined two Western-sponsored defense pacts, Central Treaty Organization (CEATO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SENTO) with the US in 1954 and 1955, respectively. Afghan government bitterly opposed and criticized the US option of weapons assistance to Pakistan (Durrani, 2009). Moscow severely criticized Pakistan's joining of SEATO and CENTO. Soviet leaders, Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin paid a tremendously eminent visit to India and Afghanistan. USSR started backing Afghanistan on the Pakhtunistan issue and provided \$100 million in financial and military aid. The visit marked the Indo-Afghan relationship with Pakistan. To realize the Afghan prospects in the Soviet bloc, the US, Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia tried to normalize the two state's bilateral relations. Both the state leaders' exchange of visits restored diplomatic relations (Khan, 2009).

However, efforts from both sides were made to normalize the diplomatic relations between the two republics. The influential personalities of different countries also took interest and played mediating roles to bring normalcy to these bothersome relations of the two neighbors. Egyptian president Jamal Abdul Nasser, Saudi Arabia, and the US appealed to Pakistan not to breakup its diplomatic affairs with its neighbor country. Pakistan's President Sikander Mirza officially visited Kabul in 1956 and Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy toured Afghanistan in 1957. These visits were reciprocated by King Zahir Shah's visit to Pakistan in 1958 and Prime Minister Sardar Daoud's visit in 1959. The exchange of visits resulted in a refined positive attitude on both sides and brought back transportation services for the Afghan trade route. Pakistan's most important determination was to appease Afghanistan's Pashtuns' creativity and reestablish the Afghan transit trade. In

the late 1950s, bilateral relations between the two countries were generally improving but the military coup of General Ayub Khan took a downturn in the relations on October 8, 1958,

In the 1960s, fresh border clashes took place between the two states, yet Ayub Khan wanted to settle the dispute through dialogue. In 1960, the then foreign minister of Afghanistan Sardar Naim, and President Ayub Khan held talks to improve the relations but to no avail. In 1961, more than 15, 000 Afghan Lashkar men crossed the border and entered Pakistan territory of Bajaur agency. The infiltration was repelled by pro-Pakistan tribesmen, but borders remained closed until 1961 (Arif, 1984). Through the mediation of the Shah of Iran in May 1961, relations were restored, and the border was reopened in 1963. Due to the Afghans' economic deteriorating situation, Prime Minister Sardar Muhammad Daoud was asked to resign in March 1963 by King Zahir Shah. The resignation of Daoud was followed by the induction of Dr. Muhammad Yousaf as Prime Minister of Afghanistan. It helped to improve bilateral relations (Ali, 2010).

During Prime Minister Daoud's period, cross-border infiltration worsened the scenario and both countries reached to close the border in 1961 which greatly affected the trade of landlocked Afghanistan. Through the mediation of the Shah of Iran in 1963 helped détente between the two neighbors and restored the diplomatic relations and reopened the closed border for trade and bilateral relations. President Ayyub Khan (1958-1969) wanted to settle the trade issues through negotiations for which he visited Kabul twice, i-e. in 1964 and 1966 respectively (Gartenstein & Vassefi, 2012). Due to friendly relations, in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Afghanistan did not create any problem for Pakistan which enabled Islamabad to fully focus on its eastern border. Pakistan's former ambassador to Afghanistan, Rustam Shah Mohmand, highlighted it in these words that, "regardless of some mistrust, in 1965 when Pakistan had troubled relations with India, the Afghan government advised Pakistan to remove all the troops from the western border. they (Afghans) will take care of the western

border and Pakistan can take troops to the Eastern border" In 1971, again the Afghan government said we will not create any problem for Pakistan if it has any trouble with India. So, on these two historical occasions, the Afghan government showed solidarity with the Pakistani government and people. That should not be overlooked by Pakistani students and historians that the relations between the two countries were all time negative, there have been bright spots in the relations (Mohmand, 2013).

In 1968, King Zahir Shah visited Pakistan who was warmly welcomed. All through the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, Afghanistan was entirely neutral to refrain herself as of enchanting benefit of Pakistan's obsession in fighting (Durrani & Khan, 2009). It is worth mentioning that during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, both India and the Soviet Union had attempted to pursue Afghanistan to create trouble for Pakistan, but Afghanistan leadership refused. Probably this was the reason that King Zahir Shah was overthrown in a coup by Soviet-trained military officers in 1973.

2.3 PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS IN POST-ZAHIR SHAH ERA

On July 17, 1973, King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan was overthrown by his cousin Sardar Daoud who declared Afghanistan as a republic (Dupree, 1997). Daoud was pro-Russia and pro-India. After consolidating his position, he showed a negative attitude towards Pakistan by raising the issue of Pakhtunistan. He provided aid to the Baluch rebellions and altogether neglected the Durand Line. Pakistan's response to Afghan aggression was to unify an anti-Daoud confrontation through religious groups opposed to the government in Kabul (Abbas, 2005). President Daoud in his first speech on July 17, 1973, roused up the 'Pakhtunistan' issue. He stated: "our relations with Pakistan, which is the only nation with whom we have a political difference over the issue of Pakhtunistan, which we do not solve so far, will be based on our permanent effort to find a solution to the Pakhtunistan problem"

(Abbas, 2005). The issue raised by Daoud played a vital role in his downfall. Initially, he spoke positively, but later it was revealed that his views were not different from those in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By 1975, Pakistan was accusing Afghanistan of creating troubles within Pakistan's borders (Yunas, 2006).

2.3.1 Pak-Afghan Relations under Z.A Bhutto and President Daoud

Prime Minister Z. A Bhutto was keen to improve relations with Afghanistan. On February 21, 1974, at Second Islamic Conference, Bhutto invited President Daoud to attend the meeting. However, Daoud instead of taking part himself sent a diplomat, Abdu-ur-Rehman Pazhwak who at the session highlighted the disorder in Baluchistan and the political issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The members of the conference, however, emphasized that it would be better if such issues were not pointed out on this forum to keep the friendly atmosphere (Yunas, 2006). Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan paid an official visit to Moscow, on October 24 - 26 1974. He persuaded the Soviet leadership an energetic leadership emerged for the first time in the history of Pakistan which was keen to open dialogue with President Daoud. His government was not in favor of any conflict with the Soviet Union and hoped that Moscow would pressurize Afghanistan not to use Soviet arms against Pakistan.

The democratic government of Prime Minister Bhutto tried its level best to promote constructive relations with Afghanistan. A severe earthquake hit northern Afghanistan causing extensive damage to life and property in 1975 and Pakistan on this occasion offered aid on charitable for building up good relations in April 1976. Daoud accepted the aid and as a gesture of goodwill, sent an official invitation to Bhutto which was promptly accepted (Yunas, 2006). To ensure an era of friendship and brotherhood among the two neighbors, Bhutto visited Afghanistan from 7 to 10 June. By 1976, Daoud understood that his negative

strategies against Pakistan were not proving beneficial to his regime. Thus, both countries got closer to bridging the gap in bilateral relations. Bhutto enjoyed a varying degree of popular intimacy with Daoud. Both leaders remained well self-assured to determine the deadlock flanked by the two countries than any other front-runner earlier. On his visit to Afghanistan in 1976, Bhutto expressed his views that he had come to Afghanistan to solve the problems between the two countries. Both sides delivered fruitful discussions. President Daoud also accepted Pakistan's invitation keenly. After being satisfied with the discussion with Bhutto, Daoud finally dropped the question of Pakhtunistan and accepted the reality of the Durand Line (Yunas, 2006).

For the second round of talks, Daoud visited Pakistan from 20 to 24 August 1976 (Dupree, 1997). To further improve the relations, Daoud and Bhutto discussed bilateral issues in Islamabad, Lahore, and Murree. President Daoud received an unprecedented warm welcome from Pakistan's side. On June 9, 1977, Prime Minister Bhutto on return from Tehran had an overnight stop in Kabul to meet President Daoud (Yunas, 2006). Bhutto was deposed by Chief of Army Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq in a martial coup, on July 5, 1977. Political activities were banned, and Martial law was proclaimed in Pakistan. But General Zia continued Bhutto's policy to improve relations with Kabul. He informed President Daoud that Pakistan not only wished to preserve 'the spirit of Kabul' but accepted the joint communiqué issued from both sides and wanted to promote and strengthen it. Daoud in his positive response invited Zia who expressed his desire to see President Daoud and visited Afghanistan in October 1977.

Talks were held to continue the dialogue process, President Daoud visited Rawalpindi (Pakistan) on March 5, 1978, and dignified reception was arranged for him at the airport. At the request of General Zia-ul-Haq, Sardar Daoud delivered significant words on his visit to

Pakistan while attending the Shalimar public reception at Lahore on March 8, 1978; “Your strength is our strength, your welfare is our welfare, and your stability is our stability ...Let’s walk hand in hand in the warm glow of brotherhood and sincerity, I hope that friendship between Pakistan and Afghanistan will be permanent and everlasting” (Khan, 2011). Diplomatic relations improved as President Daoud appointed former Prime Minister Noor Ahmad Etemadi as ambassador to Pakistan. On March 8, in Lahore Daoud declared that both countries were moving “hand in hand in the warm glow of brotherhood...the era of divide and rule is over” (Hussain, 2005). At the concluding session of his visit, President Daoud told in the press conference that his visit was “a crucial step towards the betterment of relations between the two countries.” He said that the next round of talks would be held in Kabul. But unfortunately, both could not meet again, Daoud was ousted by a People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)-led a coup on 27 April 1978 and was murdered along with his family members (Siddiqi, 2009).

2.3.2 Bilateral Relations during PDPA Government (1998-1992)

With the overthrow of President Daoud's government led by Nur Muhammad Tarakai in July 1978, the communist era in Afghanistan started. Tarakai a Ghilzai remained President of the country until 1979 (Yunas, 2008). The murder of President Daoud in a coup popularly known as a “Saur Revolution” of July 1979 plunged Afghanistan into prolonged unrest, instability, war, and strife that also severely affected the process of normalization of bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The PDPA government led by Tarakai introduced several reforms that were bitterly opposed and resisted by the traditional Afghan society, particularly the religious elements. The Islamic groups that had initially started armed resistance against President Daoud, intensified their activities in PDPA led Afghanistan. Zia could not succeed to establish cordial terms with Tarakai, the first

communist leader of Afghanistan because of Taraki's stance on Pakhtunistan (Grare, 2006). However, Pakistan recognized the Tarakai regime and in July 1978 Zia paid a day trip to Kabul. But it did not bear any fruitful results regarding Afghanistan's attitude towards Pakhtunistan. In 1979, both the leaders again met on the sidelines of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) summit in Havana (Cuba). Meeting on such occasion, Pakistan sought to improve relations with Afghanistan. Tarakai government also hinted to normalize its ties with Pakistan. Tarakai proposed to President Zia that "Afghanistan would recognize the Durand Line as the international border between the two countries if Pakistan stopped helping the *Mujahidin* (Rahman, 2012)."

However, internal differences, personality clashes, and power struggle with PDPA led to another bloody coup that killed Tarakai and brought Hafiz Ullah Amin into power. Amin ruled the country as a President from September 1979 to December 27, 1979. Amin was killed when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and installed Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction of PDPA as the President (Rashid, 2008). In the history of Afghanistan, this period was disastrous which precluded an unending war and pushed the state into anarchy (Yunas, 2008). Pakistan condemned Soviet intervention and did not recognize the Karmal government in Kabul. Later, indirect talks started between the Afghan and Pakistan authorities under UN auspices at Geneva to discuss Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

On December 27, 1979, about 80,000 Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. To withdraw the Soviet forces from the Afghan soil, volunteers from all Arab countries came to join the Afghan '*Holy War*' Jihad. In any case, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan allowed Pakistan to reconsider the Afghan policy. Miran Shah and Mirali routes were left open as a helpful way to use guerilla tactics against the Russian forces. By January 1980, well over

twenty identifiable parties had established themselves in Quetta and Peshawar. To prevent the situation out of hand, Islamabad recognized only seven major parties and supported them morally and financially (Girardet, 1985). These seven groups of the Mujahidin were Hizbi Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jamiat-i-Islami of Burhan Uddin Rabbani, Hizbi Islami led by Younis Khalis, Harakat-i-Islami led by N. M. Mohammadi, Milli Islami Mahaz-i-Afghanistan led by Ahmad Gilani, Ittehadi-e-Islami led by Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, and Jaba Nijat-i-Milli Afghanistan led by Sibghat Ullah Mujaddadi. Numerous small groups also existed along with ethnic, tribal, and religious lines but exercised only limited power. The origin of Hizb-e- Islami and Jamiat-i-Islami can be drawn back to the time of King Zahir Shah (Amin, 1982).

Pakistan attempted to play the Islamic card and it sponsored seven religious parties out of which six were Pashtun (Grare, 2006). To form a presence in Afghanistan was Pakistan's greatest advantage because of the negative attitude from past Afghan rulers. In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan assumes a crucial role in pushing out Soviet forces. A few researchers noticed that Pakistan began to pursue a 'forward policy' in Afghanistan as early as the 1980s by encouraging religious parties to seek ideological allies in Afghanistan to bring peoples of both countries together to defend against Soviet forces (Haqqani, 2005).

Pakistan persuaded the greater part of the Muslim and Arab countries that Islam was in danger and to take part in the 'Holy War' in the resistance against a godless foe to drag it out from Afghanistan was the obligation of Muslims (Abbas, 2005). President Zia in collaboration with the CIA and Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States, and Egypt joined the anti-Soviet struggle with great enthusiasm (Hussain, 2005). He has been regarded as the staunchest supporter of the Mujahidin and the fundamentalist Hezb-i- Islami

of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Saikal & Maley, 1989). The political scenario of Pakistan changed with the tragic death of President Zia on 17 August 1988. The basic purpose of President Zia was to install a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. On one occasion he expressed his views that:

We have earned the right to have a friendly government in Kabul. We will not permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims to our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, part of a pan-Islamic revival, which one-day will win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union, you will see (Hussain, p 123)

The financial and technological assistance of Arab and Western countries respectively drove the volunteers to back the Afghan Jihad to run what was now called Pakistan's Afghan war (Rashid, 2009). Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan described in his autobiography that ISI propelled the exceptional program to train the *Mujahidin* with sophisticated weapons in the mid-1980s near Quetta in its quest of crushing the power of the Soviets troops. It was known to everyone that most of the support, weapons, and training were provided through the ISI. Pakistan's border areas grew into vast Jihadi bases (Zaeef, 2010). Almost 80,000 Mujahidin were trained, hundreds and thousands of arms and ammunition were distributed, and billions of dollars were spent on this logistic training. The Mujahidin settled their families in camps near to Pak-Afghan border and came for medical treatment to Pakistan (Yousaf, 2008). Volunteers from Arab countries also joined the Afghan jihad. Thus, the Soviet defeat was the result of "American technology, Saudi Arab money, and Muslim demographics zeal" (Huntington, 1997). As far as the role of Pakistan was concerned, during the Zia regime, Pakistan aspired to the security interest of 'Strategic Depth' in Afghanistan, particularly to curtail the Indian presence on Afghan soil. To fulfill such a gap, Pakistan fully supported the Taliban regime in Kabul. Similarly, the US also wants to curtail the Soviet presence from Afghanistan therefore, US provided technological

support towards Pakistan's government to crush the power of the Russian forces from Afghanistan. This support was in the form of cash and weapons (Yousaf, 2008).

The costs of the war for the Soviet Union were unbearable, conferred to Soviet spokesman by mid-1988 that about 13310 Soviet soldiers had died and almost 35, 478 wounded in Afghanistan. President Gorbachev in February 1986 termed Afghanistan as a 'bleeding wound' (Maley & Saikal, 1989). Due to worldwide pressure, the Soviet Union declared to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 1989 as a major aspect of the UN-supported Geneva Accord signed on April 14, 1988. Najibullah government in Kabul declared National Reconciliation Program, changed the party's name from PDPA to Hizb-e-Watan, held *Loya Jirga* on 29-30 November 1987 in Kabul Polytechnic auditorium, which approved the 1987 constitution. The National Assembly was formed in June 1988. Loya Jirga of 1990 approved certain changes in the 1987 constitution and implemented it with some modifications in Afghanistan (Yunas, 2008).

President Zia esteemed that the Mujahideen could not take over the Najibullah government after Soviet withdrawal. He was expecting a long war after the extraction of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and wanted to support a provisional setup before the withdrawal as it was the only way to avoid continued violence inside Afghanistan and to ensure a smooth implementation of the Geneva Accord (Yunas, 2008). Nonetheless, Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo supported by opposition parties decided to sign the Geneva Accord. A signing ceremony was held on 14 April 1988 in Geneva between the government of Pakistan and the Kabul administration led by Najibullah under the supervision of the UN (Saikal & Malet, 1989). First Geneva Accord entitled, bilateral agreements, on the principle of mutual relations, non-interference, and non-intervention between the government

of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the Second Accord that was participated by USSR and USA, which prevented both the states from interfering in their internal affairs.

The third Accord was pertaining to the voluntary return of refugees. All the Afghan Refugees temporarily present on Pakistan's territory would be given the safe passage to return to their homeland. The Fourth Geneva Accord signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan aimed that both the states settle their bilateral disputes. All accords entered into force on 15 May 1988 (Saikal & Maley, 1989). Earlier President Gorbachev decided to withdraw Soviet troops from other states including Afghanistan (Yunas, 2008). After the withdrawal of Soviet Forces in 1989, fighting continued between the Soviet-backed Najib government and Mujahidin till 1992. The Uzbek forces revolted against the Najibullah government under the leadership of General Abdur Rashid Dostum, and far ahead Najibullah was arrested at the Kabul airport by Dostum's troops when he was leaving for India. Far along, Najibullah was killed by the Taliban in 1996. During this period, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan did not improve. Pakistan continued to support Mujahidin groups and the Afghan government sustained its efforts to sponsor subversive and terrorist activities in Pakistan as it was doing the same during Soviet occupations.

The fall of the PDPA regime in favor of Mujahidin led the Islamic government in Afghanistan. Pakistan enjoyed the best of its relations with the Taliban regime but sometimes faced criticism on the international forum due to Pakistan's support towards the Taliban, thus the Islamic movement in Afghanistan had both positive and negative consequences for Pakistan. On the positive side, the Mujahidin government could provide a broad-based setup on a national level. For a substantial grade of constancy and domestic stability, reconstruction, and religious and geographical ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Mujahidin felt a positive stance. It was due to the widespread support of Pakistan on the

Afghan cause, it was expected that such a regime would be inclined to maintain good friendly relations with Pakistan (Maley, 1989). Pakistan considered that due to the support to refugees, their voluntary repatriation would be fruitful for Pakistan. Second, the victory of the Mujahidin put to rest the long-standing border disputes and this issue will not raise again in the pro-Pakistani regime of the Mujahidin. Consequently, Pakistan would set itself free from the Afghan problem and will divert its attention towards other foreign policy issues. The negative aspect of the Mujahidin support for Pakistan was that it would diminish the justification for US financial and armed support to Pakistan which would end the flow of all international aid, marking the military and economic issues and problematic foreign policy choices (Saikal & Maley, 1989).

After the fall of the Najib government, a civil war broke out in Afghanistan between the non-Pashtun Tajik forces led by Burhan Uddin Rabbani and his Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Masoud and chief of the Hezb-e-Islamic party Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, a Pashtun leader. (Coll, 2004). Kabul was seized by the Tajik commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud until overthrown by the Taliban (Siddique, 2009). It was the first time in the three hundred years of Afghan history that Kabul fell in the hands of non-Pashtuns Tajik forces of Burhan Uddin Rabbani (Rashid, 2008). However, Pakistan played a key role in backing a peace agreement between the Mujahedeen groups. *Mujahidin* alliance was directed by separatist and spiritual frontrunner Sibgatullah Mujaddadi as a president for six months, under the 'Peshawar Agreement' of April 1992. As far as the role of Pakistan in the Peshawar Accord is concerned, Pakistan along with the UN, the United States, and UAE tried to unite various Afghan factions.

The popularly known Peshawar Accord was signed on 24 April 1992 in Peshawar, Pakistan. Except for Hekmatyar, all the members signed the agreement, as per Hekmatyar he

was not ready to share power with his rival Ahmad Shah Masoud. In 1992, under Peshawar Accord an interim set-up for the new government was agreed upon under the leadership of Mujahidin leadership Sibghatullah Mujaddadi for two months who established Dowlat-e-Islamia Afghanistan followed by Burhan Uddin Rabbani as a President for the next four months until the Shura elected the new setup for eighteen months (Javaid & Fatima, 2013). But a conflict started among the Shia and Sunni groups on the control of Kabul University. Hekmatyar attached to Kabul has the support of Hezb-e-Wahdat as both the parties were against the government. On the invasion of Hekmatyar and its allies, Kabul was divided into many factions. More than 5000 people were killed during the civil war. Despite repeated efforts, the war continued among the different Afghan factions for almost two years (Renard, 2015). Masoud who was serving as a defense minister resigned from his post for the sake of the country's peace.

Almost one thousand Afghan Shura members again elected Rabbani as a president for eighteen months. Hekmatyar rejected the Shura decision and declared it illegal. After intensive negotiation with Afghan President Rabbani and other top leadership at the request of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, a peace agreement was signed on 7 March 1993 in Islamabad. Rabbani signed Islamabad Accord along with other major parties' members as a guarantor of the cease-fire, following attacks by the Hezb-e-Islami group of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Agreement termed for the power-sharing among Afghan groups with Rabbani as a President and Hekmatyar served as the Prime Minister till the 1994 election. The Afghan government appreciated the constructive role of Pakistan to promote peace in Afghanistan and praised the genuine efforts of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The leadership of Afghanistan also recognized the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia to send their special representatives for Afghan peace efforts in Islamabad. The role of Saudi

prince Shah Fahad Bin Abdul Aziz to determine the transformation among the Afghan fellows concluding peaceful dialogue was significant. Pakistan inhabits a foremost role in endorsing arrangements among the different Afghan groups through Peshawar and Islamabad Accord. Both the agreements were settled with the participation and efforts of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The basic purpose of these accords was to end strife in Afghanistan and generate a state of peace so that Afghan refugees return to their homes safely and take participation in the country's reconstruction. But despite such efforts fighting continued in Afghanistan's major towns, and thousands of people lost their lives (Ali Khan, 2009).

Owing to continued political instability and war in Afghanistan, a new peace accord was signed on 12 March 1993 by mediation of King Fahad of Saudi Arabia and prime minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif. It was a national reconciliation agreement called by the joint appeal of King Fahad and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif which was appreciated throughout the Islamic world. King Fahad's special envoy Prince Turki Al Faisal who headed Saudi intelligence for 24 years, played a special role to bond different Afghan groups on one platform. It provided power-sharing among different Afghan factions to halt the bloodshed and pave the way for Afghanistan reconstruction. Hezb-e-Wahdat, an Iranian-backed group of eight small parties also signed this accord who previously did not sign the Islamabad accord. Nawaz Sharif stated on this occasion that this accord was signed on the holy place of Makkah, so no Afghan leader dare to break this agreement, otherwise, he will be answerable to Allah. Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani admired the role of Pakistan and Afghanistan on this occasion saying that "the efforts of Muslims worldwide, foremost among them were King Shah Fahad, who made repeated appeals to Afghan leaders to settle their differences peacefully, led towards the national reconciliation agreement" (Monthly Newsletter of Saudi Arabia, April 1993).

In 1994 Rabbani's term ended but he refused to step down. That ensued another phase of the Afghan civil war and the rise of the Taliban. In 1994, the country was fragmented among different warring groups, Rabbani's ruling was limited Kabul and northeast of the country, an Uzbek general Rashid Dostum controlled six provinces in the north, while West and central Afghanistan was in the hands of warlord Ismael Khan. In Pashtun areas, there was great rift among the groups; Hekmatyar's control had limited to three provinces bordering Pakistan, while multiple commanders were ruling in the southern part of Afghanistan (Rashid, 2009). In conclusion, it is said that during 1992-1996, Afghanistan had been in the grip of the power struggle groups. Transformation in loyalties and groupings became the main feature of Afghan politics.

2.3.3 The Taliban Rule in Kabul

During the civil war and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Mujahidin rose to power between 1988 and 1994. In 1994, the Taliban's presence appeared in Maiwand and marched towards Kandahar which became a center of the Taliban activities (Behuria, 2008). The Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar seized Kabul in 1996 and declared Afghanistan as an Islamic state. Pakistan along with Saudi Arabia and UAE recognized the Taliban régime in Afghanistan". The only group in Afghanistan to deny the power and authority of the Taliban was the National Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan popularly known as the Northern Alliance that controlled about fifteen percent of the Afghanistan area. Northern Alliance was an organization of several guerrilla groups under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Masood. Masood was popularly known as an anti-Soviet military leader who also served as a defense minister in the Rabbani government during 1992 (Rashid, 2001).

Till 2001, the Taliban controlled most parts of Afghanistan which was in Pakistan's interests to curtail the Indian influence and secure its strategic depth policy in Afghanistan. But the UN sanctions on the Taliban due to harsh policies obliged Pakistan to alter its Afghan policies. Pakistan's backing towards the Taliban was on the way to put in a pro-Pakistani rule in Kabul to get access to the oil and Gas areas of Central Asia through Afghanistan. While on the other side, Russia wanted the oil to flow through its region. Russia wants to encircle Pakistan for a new strategic partnership agreement with India-Iran and Russia. On the other side, Pakistan's support towards the United States was to get access to Central Asian oil and gas reserves as per a tangible reward from the US. Central Asia and Russia together produce around one tenth of the world's oil and almost one-third of its natural gas reserves (McCauley, 2002).

It was aimed at becoming accustomed to Pakistan's Afghan policy and support to Mujahidin. Pakistan's support towards the Taliban does not mean that Pakistan had a complete hold over the Taliban. It was only such an era that Pakistan found pro-Pakistani elements in Kabul in the form of the Taliban. It was better for Pakistan as well as for the Taliban leadership to establish political and economic relations and counter each other to continue their relative nature rule. Through such friendly relations with the Taliban during this period, Pakistan felt relaxed from the western border against any anti-Pakistani elements. The Taliban leaders also praised Pakistan's support to recognize its government (Siddique, 2009). Soviet and Indian supported the northern alliance faction of Burhan Uddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masoud. It was in Pakistan's interests to secure its strategic importance in Afghanistan to curtail the Indian influence. Pakistan's support towards the Taliban was a convergence of interests with pro-Pakistani elements in Kabul against Iran, India, and Russian sponsored Northern Alliance (Haque, 2011). Pakistan appreciated the utmost positive relations with the Taliban from 1996 till December 2001.

Nonetheless, the Taliban government was a blessing in disguise and surprisingly beneficial for Pakistan due to the best of Pakistan relations with the Taliban during the civil war. Pakistan's military well-thought-out her provision to the Taliban as part of the state's strategic interests (Rashid, 2009). The Taliban under Mullah Omar kept on at odds with India, not because of Pakistan's encouragement but because of Indian support to the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan and later its support to Northern Alliance and non-recognition to the Taliban regime.

The US likewise supported the Taliban initially to overthrow pro-Russian elements from Afghanistan and secure their influence for future scenarios to reach the rich resources of Central Asia and curtail the communist expansionism policy. However, some of the Taliban's strict measures to enforce Shariah and strict policies regarding women and minorities invited harsh criticism from the US and the West. Despite long protests from the world community on March 10, 2001, the statutes of Buddha were blown up by the Taliban when ordered by their leader Mullah Muhammad Omar (Rashid, 2008). Earlier the arrival of the Al-Qaeda chief to Afghanistan in 1996 had transformed Afghanistan into the world's largest humanitarian catastrophe. Osama came on the invitation of Hekmatyar when he was expelled from Sudan following assaults on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Siddiqi, 2009). The occurrence of the 9/11 incidents changed the world scenario, an era of new convergence and divergence started, which opened a new chapter in the history of Pak-Afghan bilateral relations. After 9/11, the US placed pressure on the Taliban to hand over Osama to the US authorities. The Taliban refused on the plea that Osama was their guest, and his security and service was their responsibility. Pakistan, the principal supplier of weapons and fuel to the Taliban, after the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks was in an unwieldy position but promised to stand by UN sanctions (Rashid, 2008).

2.3.4 Sectarian and Ideological Dimension of the Afghan Conflict

The ideological dimension of the conflict took a new form, i.e., former communist and others under the label of liberals pose a challenge to Islamists who wants to impose Shariah and reject westernization. The groups that opposed the Taliban formed the National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan generally known as the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Masood had financial, diplomatic, and military support from Iran, other neighboring states, and Russia (Afghanistan, 2017). The people from urban areas mainly supported liberals whereas those from rural areas supported Islamists. The latter were in majority while the former was well informed, organized, and resourceful due to which they could dominate the opponents. All the communities particularly the Western nation also supported the liberals. Nevertheless, this conflict was sharp and deep-rooted and showed a lack of tolerance and accommodation on the part of both groups.

Meanwhile, there is also a sectarian dimension of the conflict too. Most of the Afghans are Sunni Muslims which are almost 84-90 % of the population while the Shia Muslims are 7-15% of the population. Afterward, the post-withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, a rapid increase of various religious and ethnic groups emerged in Afghanistan, prominent among them were Shias, Wahabis, and Hazaras, the Shia, Wahabi tussles discoursed hatred not only in Afghanistan but in Pakistan too (Ahmar, 2005). During the Soviet occupation, several Sunni organizations were banned in Pakistan and almost eight Shia groups were banned in Iran. The Shia group named Hazaras, a minority group greatly suffered by Sunni Muslims to practice their Shiite religious practice. Such ethnic conflicts among the different ethnic groups resulted in conflict and killings in Afghanistan. Societal discrimination between the Shia-Sunni continued through the race, class, and religious lines. Such insight was created

in the form of illegal taxes on Shia's Hazaras and Kochi tribes through forced labor and enforced employment, physical exploitation, and confinement. The Shia minorities in Afghanistan were also disapproving of government policies on the ground that they were providing privileged treatment to the Sunnis majority while ignoring minorities on religious grounds.

Various Shias Hazaras suffered at the hands of the Taliban during the civil war, in which most were based in the province of Bamiyan. The Taliban also ousted the two main giants Buddha of Bamiyan for which they face strong criticism worldwide. Similarly, many reports noted ethnic tensions among Tajiks and Hazaras which was also on a key issue in Afghanistan for years. Many times, ferocity broke out among these two groups which caused the killing of thousands of people (RDC, 2014). In the 1980s, two Shia's Islamist parties came to the front, one was the Harakat-i-Islami under the guidance of Sheikh Mohsin and the second was the Nasr party based on Hazara's ethnicity mostly from Iran. In the wake of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Iran united all Shia's components under Hizb-e-Wahdat whose majority came from the Nasr party. Hizb-e-Wahdat was founded after years of negotiations among the different Hazaras groups and was headed by Sheikh Mazari who he was killed by the Taliban later in 1996 and was replaced by Karim Khalili. The Hizb claimed to be the defenders of the Shias community or in other words, the guardians of ethnic Hazaras. The party joined the Northern Alliance in 1992 but several times indulged in fighting with the Ittihadi Islami movement of Abdul Rabb Raouf Sayyaf. In 1998, thousands of Hazaras were killed by the Taliban when the Taliban took control of the Mazar-i-Sharif. The main issue of the fighting was sectarian hatred among the Sunni and Shias (Roy, 2002).

The political and social condition of the Hazaras changed after the over through of the Taliban regime by the US-led attacks on Afghanistan in 2001. The ISAF forces got full

cooperation from the Hazaras community. The Bonn agreement and the constitutional law of Afghanistan were established which was based on the participation of Hazaras and other minorities in the central government. The Hazaras fully supported the Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani governments. Similarly, they got participation in the central government in both regimes. In the Karzai era, eight portfolios were given to Hazaras as ministers and vice-President in parliament (Sarabi, 2005). In 2016, several terrorist attacks of Daesh/ISIS targeted mostly Shia's community in Afghanistan. The Shia's and Hazaras communities were of the view that the terrorist attacks launched from Pakistan. But in the current scenario, Islamic State (IS) or Daesh in the Taliban faction is a new emerging threat for Afghanistan and Shias. The self-proclaimed agenda of Daesh is sectarianism because they follow a strict interpretation and practice of Islamic Shariah. And those who do not follow IS's thoughtful views of Islam are considered in fields including Shias.

For a couple of times, such kind of sectarian violence went through in Pakistan as well the current sectarian resurgence in the form of the Taliban in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan spread across both states. Their sectarian violence in different forms threatens the fragile security situation of both the states and alternatively both states blamed each other for such accidents. From the emergence of Pakistan till the fall of the Taliban regime, many conflicts and cooperation can be observed in both countries' relations. Under Prisoners Dilemma in game theory, both the states stopped cooperating each other in bilateral relations. However, both the neighbors never go to direct war with each other like that of Pakistan and India. and Pakistan extended its full diplomatic, transit trade, and economic support towards Afghanistan.

Similarly, during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars, Afghanistan remained neutral and assured Pakistan to feel relaxed from its northwestern border and to concentrate

on its eastern border with India. The issue of the demarcation of the Pak-Afghan border was indeed a critical one but with the passage of time and emergence of the new issue when Afghanistan was engulfed under the Soviet war and then US attacks on Afghanistan, the domestic disputes in Afghanistan accelerated similarly, conflicts continued for several years on the issue of Pakhtunistan. Many leaders of the world mediated and started diplomatic relations between the two states. Similarly, Pakistan enjoyed the best of its relations with the Taliban government in Kabul because the Taliban establishment was pro-Pakistani and kept anti-Indian sentiments. This was for Pakistan's interest to recognize the Taliban regime along with UAE and Saudi Arabia. After the fall of the Taliban rule, at the beginning of the US assault on Afghanistan, the Taliban shattered in different areas and started their guerrilla tactics against the US forces. In such prevailing circumstances, Pakistan also altered its Afghan policy due to ground realities at that time.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND SECURITY RELATED RELATION

2001-2017

3.1 Evolution of the Worsening Situation in Afghanistan after 9/11

In the early morning of September 11, 2001, in New York, breaking news flashed on CNN and other TV channels of the international media under the red headlines stating, “America under attack”. It was the first-ever attack on the American soil. The nineteen suicide bombers who hijacked four planes and then struck two of them into the Twin Towers at the World Trade Center in New York and one at the Pentagon in Washington DC. The fourth one was shot down by the US forces. The 9/11 terrorist act renewed the international interests in Afghanistan to play a role in the latest strategic realignments therein. Within a short span of extremist outbreaks, the US government determined that it was an act of *Al-Qaeda* led by OBL and that a little effective counterstrike was not probable lacking Pakistan’s support. The US demanded the Taliban to expel OBL, but the Taliban responded that he was their guest and it was against the Afghan's customs/traditions to expel him from their soil. US President George W. Bush leftward not any distrust about the providence of the Taliban rule as soon as he clearly expressed “We will make no difference between those who made these acts and those who support them”. Bush further said that “America was at war with international terrorists. Those who make war on the United States have picked their demolition” (Rashid, 2008). Afghanistan once more became an international battlefield.

Pakistan also played its title role utilizing a “frontline state” in the fight for freedom and democracy in the war against terrorism.

3.1.1 Shift in Pakistan's Afghan Policy

The 9/11 placed Pakistan on a very embarrassing situation and was faced with a dilemma that she had never been faced with. In such a state of scenario, Pakistan was forced to fall under US policies to eradicate terrorism and its remnants from across the world. George Bush and US Secretary of State Colin Powell talked to President Musharraf on a phone call and gave time to Musharraf to think on five major demands by US including the provision of bases to the US fighter planes. Wendy Chamberlain, a newly appointed US ambassador to Pakistan met Musharraf on 13 September 2001. She laid up the following US demands on Pakistan.

1. Break support to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda against the US
2. Rights of over-flights to US planes from Pakistan to be used against the Taliban
3. Access to Pakistan's borders, maritime and air main office to US authority
4. Provision of intelligence information against top Al-Qaeda leaders
5. Stop unpaid assistants as of Pakistan addicted to Afghanistan to link the Taliban (Shah & Riaz, 2013).

In the second week of September 2001, coincidentally, the then ISI chief Lt. General Mahmood Ahmad was on a US trip as a CIA chief guest. General “Mahmood Ahmad, Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI (1999-2001)” was in Washington on September 11, 2001, and went into meetings with the US authorities following the attacks on the Pentagon and WTC. On 12 September, he was called by the US authorities and revealed to him that *Al-Qaeda* managed the terrorist attack on US soil. The officials additionally informed him that the US was going to teach a lesson to *Al-Qaeda*. On

September 13, 2001 – U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage gave Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud a list of seven demands:

1. limit Al-Qaeda movement at the Border
2. Support the U.S. with complete landing privileges to operate operations in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
3. Require territorial and naval entrance in Pakistan
4. Provide Intelligence
5. Publicly criticize terrorist attacks
6. Cut off training and supplies to the Taliban
7. End the diplomatic relations with the Taliban and help the US to destroy Usama bin Ladin (The National Security Archive, 2010).

In such a prevailing circumstance, Pakistan was compelled to change its pro-Taliban posture and joined hands with the US to invade Afghanistan. With the passage of a bit over a week, Pakistan succumbed to US pressure and accepted all points and allied itself to the US-led combat taking place against the menace of terrorism. The head of ISI agreed to all American demands in Washington and pulled out support from the Taliban in favor of the US, providing airbases and arriving rights. On 7th October 2001, the US launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” and started airstrikes against the Taliban. This US war in Afghanistan lasted till 28 December 2014, and a new series of Resolute Support Mission started with non-combat advisory capacities after the US drawdown to support the Afghan National Army and Police (Voksi, 2011).

It was a sudden shift in Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Even though it had shaped its unique Afghan policy to pursue its objectives of strategic depth, the decision was difficult for the military government to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Such a U-turn in Pakistan’s

Afghan strategy provoked Islamic groups to hold anti-government protests (Ahmar, 2006).

President Musharraf in his speech to the nation on September 20, 2001, pointed out that.

“Pakistan is facing an extremely delicate situation; and in my opinion, it is the most delicate phase since 1971. At this moment, our decision may have far-reaching repercussions. The expanse and span of these decisions are very wide. The worst result, God forbid, may endanger our territorial integrity and survival. Our critical concerns may be harmed. I mean that our nuclear strength and our Kashmir cause may be harmful” (Abbas, 2005).

To fight against terrorism as the US ally, Musharraf gave five reasons.

1. To secure Pakistan’s strategic interests.
2. The Kashmir issue should be safeguarded.
3. Thwart Pakistan as of existence to profess as an extremist country.
4. Pakistan will emerge as a responsible state diplomatically and
5. An-anti Pakistani government would be deterred from capturing power in Afghanistan.

The occurrence of the 9/11 disastrous incident forced the Pakistani policymakers to change their Afghan strategy in general. Pakistan, before US intervention in Afghanistan, attempted to protect the Taliban by trying to influence her leading role to handover *Al-Qaeda* leader Osama bin Laden to the US authorities and offered a channel of negotiations but the latter did not respond in the same manner (Grare, 2006). The Taliban were set into their isolation and determined to confront the might of the US and its allies.

Under the enormous US strain, Pakistani-based Jihadi outfits were banned which were experienced in Afghan camps and the US authorities faced strong resistance from the Taliban side. President Pervez Musharraf detained a meeting of senior Jihadi influential and guaranteed them that the US existence in Afghanistan would be for no more than five years.

So, they would stay persistent and hold on to Pakistan's about-turn of solidifying Jihadi arrangements once more. "But those who planned the 9/11 incident were conscious of the events and understood that the distance between Pakistan's military apparatus and the Jihadi dispensations was bound to widen to the point where Pakistan did not have much choice but to support the US war against terror" (Shahzad, 2011).

To protect from the NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban moved safe places to protect themselves from US aggression. Due to the porous border with Pakistan, the Afghan militants easily infiltrated into Pakistan's tribal belt which later became great security threats for Pakistan. When the US realized the might of the Taliban due to guerrilla attacks on NATO forces, the US pressurized Pakistan to begin military operations against these elements. As a frontline state against the US conflict and fight against the terrorist fundamentalists, Pakistan itself turned out to be the target of extremism. Pakistan launched several military actions in diverse parts of Pakistan's tribal areas. Taliban offered strong resistance to the Pakistan security forces. Pressure on Pakistan to 'do more', it continued to launch military operations against remnants of the Taliban in North and South Waziristan in the form of Taliban, *Al-Qaeda*, and Haqqani networks (Shahzad, 2011).

Taliban defeat was the outcome of US attacks in Afghanistan. Musharraf and the military began the lengthy process overseen by the Americans, of capturing and killing Arabs and *Al-Qaeda* activities who fled to Pakistan. The US gave cash rewards to Pakistani security officers. Musharraf's determination to wipe out *Al-Qaeda* and its growing Pakistani support base was undercut by his double-edged policy (Iqbal, 2010).

3.2 Pakistan's Support towards the New Setup in Kabul

After the fall of the Taliban government, an interim setup was established in Afghanistan in December 2001 to run the government in a democratic way. To restructure the Afghan state, a conference of Afghan leaders was held in Bonn, Germany. Different envoys

of anti-Taliban ethnic factions participated. The Taliban were not included in talks. Eighteen states' representatives also took part as observers. The Bonn contract remained detained on December 5, 2001 by members of many Anti-Taliban groups and radical parties. After prolonged discussion, a 29 members interim setup was established. A systematized international peacekeeping force was to be set up to make all available security in Kabul for the smooth implementation of government policies. It recognized a schedule for creating peacetime and safety, rebuilding of the republic and re-establishment of approximately crucial organizations, human rights protection, and give a talk to military disbandment and incorporation (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Bonn's agreement also provided the legal framework order until the implementation of the new constitution. Bonn agreement called all the armed groups to merge into the new Afghan Armed Forces. On this occasion, it was decided that the UN should assist the Afghan army and all UN members should facilitate the peaceful implementation of the agreement to use the good office (Ahmad, Takrim & Gul, 2017).

The Bonn conference elaborated an approved transfer of power from one nominal head of state, Burhan Uddin Rabbani to another interim leader, Hamid Karzai. President Karzai emerged as an interim head of state fewer than 30 members of the interim governmental was set up on December 22, 2001. While the first-ever presidential elections in Afghan antiquity were held on October 9, 2004, in which Karzai got selected as president for five years tenure (Shah, 2012). It was an exceptional case in Afghan history that transfer of power occurred without war and assassinations which was common during the 1978 to 2001 period (Byrd, 2003).

Pakistan welcomed the Bonn agreement and offered facilitation to the UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan and his special representative Lakhdar Brahimi for its smooth

implementation. Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman Aziz Ahmad Khan in a statement said that “Bonn is an encouraging moment for Afghan’s people”. He further added, “Pakistan has borne heavy economic social costs because of the Afghan conflict. The provision of asylum to over three million Afghan refugees has resulted in consequential environmental damage, the proliferation of weapons, narcotics trafficking, smuggling, and terrorist crimes” (Hussain, Gulf News, 2001). Karzai remunerated an official visit to Pakistan in February 2002. Similarly, in April 2002, President Musharraf visited Afghanistan and announced \$100 million aid for Afghan reconstruction. Pakistan extended full ethical, political, and financial provisions for the innovative administration in Afghanistan (Tanner, 2002).

In October 2004, Afghan Presidential elections were held in which the majority casted their votes in favor of Hamid Karzai. On this occasion, Pakistan sealed the Pak-Afghan border for improving security in Afghanistan during the election process. Karzai could not satisfy the masses due to the country’s deteriorating situation and most of them held him responsible for bad governance in the prevailing state of antagonism. Many Afghans were uncomfortable with the presence of Hamid Karzai as a President as he got involved with some notorious warlords in the manner that a ‘secular’ constitution was imposed on them. However, most of the areas were beyond the control of the Karzai government. An estimated 50% of the area was in control of the Afghan government, whereas the remaining parts were in the hands of the Taliban and regional warlords (Afghanistan Profile, 2008). Even though, Karzai government blamed Pakistan for its failure to restore peace in Kabul, Pakistan actively participated in the Afghan peace and reconciliation process. It strove that Afghanistan should not face isolation on the national and international front and validate the peaceful withdrawal of NATO forces (Mazhar, Khan & Goraya, 2013).

After the decrease of the Taliban influence in Kabul, President Musharraf affirmed his clear provision to the newly established Afghan régime of Hamid Karzai. Pakistan recognized the first democratic government of Hamid Karzai, extended aid, and stated a desire for friendly relations with Kabul (Usman & Khan, 2017). However, since 2001 a series of allegations and counter-allegations also took place between the two states. On Afghan demand, Musharraf ‘s traced Al-Qaeda leaders on Pakistan soil and launched military actions counter to the Pakistani Taliban. Nonetheless, with the efforts of the US and Turkey, several trilateral meetings in both states normalized the relations (Setas, 2013). The numerous visits of the two Presidents paid to each other’s country as well as the visit of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in July 2005, helped to ease tensions. Nevertheless, conflict and cooperation in the two states remained a common feature. Karzai constantly suspected Pakistan of extremist acts in Afghanistan. By 2005, Afghanistan ought to start as soon as to celebrate Pakhtunistan day. Furthermore, in February 2006, Karzai openly called the Durand Line a ‘line of hatred’ and stated that “it raised a wall between the two brothers’ means to divide the Pashtuns on either side of the border” (Rashid, 2009).

President Musharraf remunerated an official visit to Kabul in August 2006 which was considered vital in easing all the misperceptions prevailing between the two countries. Both sides agreed on boosting cooperation in the sphere of trade and communication and curbing drug trafficking. A meeting was organized for Musharraf with Afghan elders ‘*Wolesi Jirga*’ and Vice President Karim Khalili during which both sides committed that militant leader of obscurantist ideology must be defeated who created trouble on both sides. Musharraf during a press conference in Lahore in late November 2006 stated that the real problem was inside Afghanistan and the core was reconciliation. The cross-border activity was a consequence of the conflict inside Afghanistan, which required a better coordination mechanism rather than an exchange of accusations. Rustam Shah Mohmand, Pakistan’s former ambassador to

Afghanistan, told in an interview with the researcher, "Relations between the two countries are well from people to people's point of view, yet from government-to-government points of view, relations are not so bad". One reason for this is the American presence which would not allow bilateral relations to an extent where it can disturb the American agenda in the region.

3.3 Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga 2007

A major rapprochement came in both countries' relations when a Pak-Afghan first Joint Peace Jirga was convened in Kabul from 9-12thAugust 2007 at the invitation of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. This was the first important meeting of almost 1600 delegates including 300 women protected by 12, 000 security personnel (Mariet D'Souza, 2010). The jirga consisted of politically influential leaders, spiritual intellectuals, tribal heads, representatives of the corporate community, and civil society groups on the way to exposing a network of communication and people-to-people contacts. The inauguration conference was addressed by President Karzai and Pakistan's Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz while the closing conference of Peace Jirga was lectured by President Musharraf and his Afghani counterpart Karzai. On the platform of Peace Jirga, many references remained laid onward to convey normality in both country's bothersome relations (Joint Declaration Adopt by Pak-Afghan Peace Jirga, (Daily Times, 13 August 2007).

The Jirga put forward the following recommendations:

1. The proposed selection of a small Jirga comprising of 25 members from both sides to settle the mutual problems and to continue the process of strategic dialogue and reconciliation with contradictory forces.
2. Both states must respect each other territorial sovereignty, non-intervention concerning each other matters.
3. The eradication of poppy cultivation, processing, and trafficking.

4. Collaboration with the international community, development of social and economic infrastructure in opium cultivated areas to motivate peoples towards other jobs (Safi, 2008).

○ Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga was initiated with US support which raised the hopes of peace and that would help to eradicate terrorism and religious extremism from the region. The second round of Peace Jirga was expected to be held in Pakistan after the 2008 general elections, but it could not hold. No Taliban member was included in this Jirga. The initiative was short to bring the Pakistani-based Taliban on-table talks (D' Souza, 2010).

3.3.1 Pak-Afghan Relations under PPP Government

After the general elections held on February 18, 2008, a new and democratic government led by Pakistan's Peoples Party (PPP) took far-reaching steps to bring normalcy in both the state's bothersome relations. Along with other neighbouring states, the PPP government wanted to improve relations with Afghanistan. For this purpose, President Zardari invited President Karzai as a special chief guest to his oath-taking ceremony. It showed an indication of the PPP government's sincerity of efforts to improve bilateral relations with Kabul. Pakistan's people's party policy towards Afghanistan was clear and unchanged. The PPP government pursued the policies of supporting the Afghan and US establishment in their efforts to tackle the menace of terrorism (Setas, 2013). The Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi while re-stating the government's strategy in the direction of Afghanistan declared the fact that Pakistan intended a non-violent, approachable, and constant Afghanistan. Pakistani military's position on Afghanistan remained crystal clear to Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kiyani when he also expressed the above words regarding Afghanistan.

In the last phase of the PPP government, issues emerged like cross-border infiltration, US operation against OBL in Abbottabad, and NATO airstrikes on Pakistan's Salala check posts. Continuous border violations from the Afghan side further worsened Pak-Afghan relations during this period. To tackle extremism, the Pakistan proposed a joint operation against anti-state elements along with the Pak-Afghan border. About 151,000 troops were deployed along the Pak-Afghan border for security and combating drug smuggling. Almost 800 border security forces were proposed to monitor cross-border movements. PPP was also optimistic about free trade with Afghanistan, wide-ranging economic enterprise, safe passage of transportation, trans-regional and intra-regional energy supply, and energy security measures (Javaid, 2018). Afghanistan's second presidential elections were held on 20 August 2009. It observed a welcome shift in Pak-Afghan policies as compared to Karzai's first term in office. Karzai's first term (October 2004-2009) engulfed Pakistan under chaos and blame game. According to Professor Dr. Adnan Sarwar, Karzai was more enlightened towards Pakistan as compared with India when he said Pakistan was a brother while India is his friend. So, a friend is a friend while a brother has a blood relationship and is more responsible towards one another as compared with friends. So, he elevates Pakistan more than India (Sarwar, 12 March 2019).

Hamid Karzai, after his re-election, availed another chance to boost the efforts towards cordiality in the relations. Karzai was emboldened to stand up to the US policies once he found Pakistan on his side. During an interview with Pakistan's largest satellite network Geo TV, Karzai remarked that "if there is a war between Pakistan and the US, we will stand by Pakistan. He puts his hand on his heart and described Pakistan as a 'brother' country and said, "Afghanistan will never betray their brother" (Guardian, 2011, October 23). Furthermore particularly, he consumes not only to recognize Pakistan's role in fighting in contrast to aggressiveness but ought to at a standstill delivering antagonistic announcements

and charges against Pakistan for each nuisance which his state confronted. Kabul administration had been looking “more towards Pakistan’s assistance than that of the US for ensuring stability in the country. In the wake of the planned US drawdown, Karzai understood that he would be left alone and needed to secure himself with Pakistan’s assistance. There was a realization within the Afghan government that they were bound to accommodate Pakistan’s wishes in the future policy set-up. Particularly, the situation emerged after the Pak-US strategic dialogue where it became apparent that the US also needed Pakistan’s backing in the Afghan reconciliation process. President Zardari’s first official visit to Afghanistan in January 2009 brought the two state’s leaders on much-awaited dialogue on APTTA. Zardari also signed the Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) TAPI, under this contract a gas pipeline would be provided contributing billions of cubic feet of gas to Pakistan per day (Tahir, 2013).

3.3.2 Salala Accident

The occurrence of the Salala Accident once again derailed the bilateral relations. On 26th November 2011, US forces targeted two Pakistani check posts adjacent to the Pak-Afghan border. Salala attacks were the most offensive accident on Pakistan’s military bases launched by US forces. Prime Minister Gillani called it ‘outrageous’ and summoned an emergency meeting of the cabinet (Pakistan Outrage after NATO Attacks, BBC News, 2011). Within a short period, Pakistan ceased NATO crossing from Pakistani roads and vacant Shamsi airbase of NATO forces in Baluchistan. Pakistan’s call for a request for reconciliation and elimination of drone attacks from Pakistan territory. Pak-US relations suffered seriously, as a non-NATO ally Pakistan always supported the US cause of war on terror. On strong protests from the Pakistani side on June 3, 2012, the US Secretary of State officially apologized and opened the NATO supply route.

3.3.3 Afghan's Security During Karzai's Era

As far as military relations in the Karzai era are concerned, Pakistani Army Chief Gen Kiyani met Afghan President Karzai along with other officials including ISAF Commander Gen. David Petraeus and Afghan National Army Chief of General Staff Gen Sheer Muhammad Kirmi on the sidelines of the 31st Tripartite Commission in Kabul and discussed the new counter-terrorism strategy for the region. Pakistan also “extended full support to the goals of Kabul Conference held on 20th July 2010. The conference was hosted by the Afghan government and co-chaired by the United Nations”. In mid of February 2012, Afghan President Hamid Karzai paid an official visit to Pakistan to attend the trilateral summit along with President Zardari and Iranian counterpart President Mahmood Ahmadi Najad. On this occasion, Karzai appreciated Pakistan's role in the Afghan peace and reconciliation process. While addressing the OIC summit at Makah on 16th August 2012, President Zardari said that Pakistan had remained extremely affected by a disturbance in Afghanistan and urged the Muslim heads of states to join Pakistan in Afghan peace and reconciliation for stability in the region (The Nation, 2012).

On November 21st, 2012, the “36th tripartite commission in Kabul signed the Border Mechanism which is known as the Tripartite Border Coordination Mechanism. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani from Pakistan side, the acting ISAF commander Lieutenant General Carter, Afghanistan's Chief of General Staff (COGS) General Karimi attended the conference and discussed the matter of borders security. On this occasion, both states focused on the consolidation of military-to-military collaboration and regional constancy (Yousaf, 2013). On December 13th, 2012, President Zardari laterally with Afghan and Turkish counterparts attended the 7th trilateral summit in Cankaya Presidential Palace in Turkey. On this occasion, President Zardari pledged that Pakistan would always

make provision for those efforts which were in the best interests of Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan to ensure the safety and prosperity of the region.

The cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan looked like strategic negotiations. The democratic governments on both sides were serious to develop positive relations with each other. Pakistan has always been optimistic about stable Afghanistan to secure its strategic interests. The success of these relations can be gauged from both the country's bilateral relations in distinct phases of CBMs. This reflects that the relationship between the two governments has substantially transformed and placed on more cooperative diplomacy (Kalsoom, 2018). Both countries were on the track of democracy, which increased the hope of stability in bilateral relations of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On January 27th, 2013, Afghan designation under the association of Afghan Defense Minister, General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi paid five days visit to Pakistan. He met with his Pakistani counterpart, General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Afghan Defense Minister thanked the Pakistani consultants for the release of the Taliban members which would promote peace in the region. "Tripartite Border Standing Operating Procedures" discussions were similarly held on. "sharing border mechanisms and co-operation for the improvement of security and defense-related issue from Pakistani authority" (The News International. 2013 January 29). On February 3-4, 2013, a four-tier leadership of three countries Afghanistan, the United Kingdom (UK), and Pakistan came across. A Trilateral¹ meeting was held at Chequers, the residential palace of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron at London along with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, high-level military officials from both sides, and members of Afghan High Peace Council attended the conference. For sustained peace talks, the Afghan

¹ It was third summit in which Pakistan took participation, before it first summit was held in July 2012 in Kabul, and second was held in September 2012 in New York (USA) in which Pakistan did not take part.

and Pakistani leaders settled on a peace agreement in the coming six months (Khan, 2016).

On the question of Pakistan's role in Afghan peace and reconciliation, Professor Waqar Ali Shah is of the view.

“Change of perception brings the possibility of co-ordination in both state relations. A long list of Afghan students in Pakistani educational institutions and Nawaz Sharif's announcement of thousand scholarships to Afghans is appreciated. A fresh start in the relations, we are now treating them as our neighbors earlier and not our colony like before. During and after the Zia era, the Pakistani mindset was made to dictate Afghanistan like its colony which is not possible in the current circumstance. Only reconciliation can bring both states together” (2018, September 4).

3.3.4 May 2013 Elections in Pakistan

On May 11th, 2013, general elections were held where and a new governmental under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif was established in Pakistan. The Afghan administration raised the prospects of collaboration from the Nawaz Sharif government. Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Javed Ludin spoke at the opening meeting of the “International Contact Group” of more than 50 countries including Pakistan, the US, and European nations that there was a need for serious reflection and soul-searching in both countries’ relations. Afghanistan was vigilantly hopeful nearby the role of PML (N) to perform its part in the intangible amity and settlement development. Nawaz Sharif could be an asset in the peace negotiation in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Daily, 2013 May, 13). Karzai on Thursday, June 6, 2013, called on Nawaz Sharif the then newly elected Prime Minister and congratulated him on the assumption of his office. Karzai requested him for an official visit to Afghanistan with the hope of improving the bilateral relations. PML (N) was extra kind on the way to the Taliban

and could be a contributor to peace efforts in Afghanistan. The two leaders appeared to hit a rock when Karzai made a congratulatory call to Nawaz Sharif and discussed how to take the Pakistan-Afghanistan peace process forward. On July 18th, 2013, during British Foreign Secretary William Hague's visit to Pakistan, Sharif reaffirmed Pakistan's obligation to backup entire creativities intended for encouraging peacetime and permanency as a cutting-edge in Afghanistan (Observer, 2013). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif through his first official visit to Kabul in November 2013 held a meeting with President Karzai on security and political transition. The transition of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and the forthcoming Afghan Presidential election came on the agenda. Sharif said, "I have assured my brother President Karzai that Pakistan would continue to extend all possible facilitation for the Afghan peace process." Emphasis was also made on strong economic and trade cooperation.

US mission in Afghanistan is half accomplished; the Afghanistan domestic political situation clearly showed that US military drawdown in 2014 would create a power vacuum that would be once again filled by the remains of the Taliban (Husain, 2014). Karzai distanced himself from US policies in such a scenario and did not sign the Bilateral Security Agreement which would grant additional territorial rights to the remaining NATO forces after December 2014. Karzai was willing to influence sympathetically the Taliban and non-Taliban factions of Afghanistan for reconciliation to prevent the country from civil war and destabilization. Such a state of uncertainty and disruption would have further disturbing consequences for Pakistan and Iran as well (Hussain, 2014). In such a world scenario normalization of relations among Pakistan and Afghanistan are the roots of political stability in Pakistan as well as peace and harmony in Afghanistan (Grare, 2006).

Military domination in Pakistani state is the problem. Frequent changes in government destabilize the political system of Pakistan. In almost seventy years of political history in Pakistan, frequent political changes and military coup weaken the state's political institutions.

The instability, law and order situation and frequent changes of government in Afghanistan and are the significant factors in influencing the relationship between the two countries. Pakistan wanted to see a friendly Afghanistan in its backyard to secure its security interests shortly after its independence. Pakistan has a critical role towards peace, stability, and reconciliation in Afghanistan. If nearby amity and constancy in Afghanistan, this determination secures Pakistan's interests and resolves to pave the way for peace and security in the region. Any government that comes into power in Afghanistan must develop working relations with Pakistan due to the former's landlocked status. Security maintenances and various development pursuits of both countries rely upon cordial and mutually cooperative relations between the two immediate neighbors (Hussain & Latif, 2012). It also offered a reflection of the way forward to defuse the trust deficit amongst the two republics. Pak-Afghan cooperation can be structuring a stable relationship based on trust, cooperation, and mutual interests. In fact, if there is turmoil in Afghanistan, Pakistan will continue to suffer from terrorist attacks and remain a victim of terrorism. As far as the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan reconciliation is concerned, the US is also optimistic about Pakistan's role in country stability as Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said, "I never talk about Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan" (Rias, 2008).

For the last several years the people of Afghanistan have faced disorder and anarchy. The Afghan public looks forward to their country's reconstruction and political development. On December 24, 2014, the NATO combat mission under Operation Enduring Freedom started drawdown. However, a very minimum number of NATO armed forces endure the

determination to stay in Afghanistan under the ‘Resolute Support Mission’ while handing over Afghanistan security to Afghan National Army (Amina, 2016). Under the constitution, President Hamid Karzai stepped down after the completion of two terms as a President. In the same year, Afghanistan passed through a new presidential election paving the way for the country’s first-ever democratic transfer of power. However, the elections were more controversial than the 2009 presidential elections (Gall, 2015). The country rushed into sectarian ferocity due to heightened attacks from the Taliban side while the businessman moved their money out of the country owing to the financial and political crisis. Afghans called this time dark days for the country the same as a civil war-like situation in the 1980s and 1990s. More than 4, 600 Afghan security forces were killed in ten months as the American commander-in-chief described it as unforgivable. The Taliban reaching into Kabul gunning down foreigners and blowing up themselves in the heart of the capital was the symbol that the Taliban position in Afghanistan were going to be strong (Gall, 2015).

3.4 Afghan Presidential Elections 2014

Afghan Presidential elections held in June 2014 which were facilitated by the USA and UNO. After the elections, a National Unity Government (NUG) was formed in September 2014. Ashraf Ghani was sworn as the President of Afghanistan on 29th September 2014, while his election rival candidate Abdullah Abdullah was given the position of the newly created post of Chief Executive. The new Afghan management faced numerous problems. Due to the broad-based setup and inclusions of many representative groups in government formation, the issues of governance, relations with neighboring states, and Afghan political reconciliation with the Taliban to achieve durable peace were the major challenges (Sial, 2016). In the words of UN special representative of the Secretary-General, Tadamichi Yamamoto, “without enhanced efforts by the National Unity Government to

increase political inclusiveness, strengthen accountability, and improve the Government's credibility, particularly in the security sector, we are likely to face more crises in an increasingly fragile environment" (Tronc, 2018).

Although Karzai remained a President of Afghanistan for two successive periods, his government failed to provide good governance and security to Afghanistan and the state remained corrupt, weak, and ineffective (Amina, 2016). However, Ashraf Ghani unlike his predecessors along with Chief Executive Abdullah took drastic steps to address the Afghan's problems and deal with the State's matters, especially reconciliation with the Taliban to transform post-2014 Afghanistan into a well-governing state (Khan, 2016).

3.4.1 Pak-Afghan Relations in 2014

Pak-Afghan border was considered a major source of friction in the Karzai era. Karzai deeply distrusted Pakistan and his major problem was his incapability to solicit Pakistan's collaboration. Since the formation of the Ashraf Ghani government in 2014, a drastic shift came across in the two country's relations. Ashraf Ghani seized the bold initiative for Pakistan while offering constant collaboration in exchange for its assistance in attaining a wide-ranging peace with the Taliban insurgency. Ghani was accurate to the desire for this importance that essential peace with the Taliban and with Pakistan is a prerequisite. Ashraf Ghani stated that "partnership with Pakistan was an important pillar of Afghan's foreign policy." A constructive long-term relationship with Pakistan is essential for landlocked Afghanistan to act as a hub of an integrated South and Central Asia economy. Due to constructive approach towards Pakistan, President Ghani confronted tough criticism at home because of the Taliban's dangerous strategies against the Afghan army, police, and civilians (Smith & Yousaf, 2015). In the same way, Pakistan also realized that supporting Ashraf Ghani's strategies is also in Pakistan's best interest. Nawaz Sharif expressed his views that

Pak-Afghan relations have been experiencing optimistic conversion in the meantime when the new régime held office. Nevertheless, some of the political and military CBMs in the Ashraf Ghani era showed a flurry of diplomatic relations. Pakistan might this time see self-interest for the fulfillment of Afghan's reliability and desire for stability in the region.

Retired Brigadier Muhammad Saad, during an interview about Pak-Afghan relations deliberated that Ghani was better than Karzai in his leadership attributes. He stated: "Ghani is a little hard temper man, belongs to Kochi tribe, much more educated than Karzai. It is easier for Pakistan to deal with a man like Ashraf Ghani as compared with Karzai. Karzai is a more complex character than what does he wants. On the other hand, Ashraf Ghani is a more open man, whatever is in his heart he speaks out. So, Pakistan should talk with such a man like Ashraf Ghani as a trustworthy man".

3.4.2 Ashraf Ghani's Positive Attitude towards Pakistan

Subsequently, with the formation of the Ashraf Ghani government as a President in Afghanistan, a paradigm shift was noted towards Pakistan by the Afghan government. At the Beijing Conference in October 2014, President Ashraf Ghani defined Afghanistan's future foreign policy in five circles. He placed Pakistan in the first circle and declared its neighbor an important pillar of Afghan foreign policy while positioning India in the fourth circle. The rapprochement in both countries' relations was seen due to the civil and military exchange of visits from both sides as part of CBMs (IPRI, 2015).

Ashraf Ghani believed that peace and stability in Afghanistan are linked with Pakistan's support. Although faced with severe criticism on the domestic front, Ashraf Ghani was more optimistic towards Pakistan as compared to his predecessor Hamid Karzai. He tried to address some of Pakistan's foremost concerns to improve relations. For instance, he delayed the implementation of a Strategic Partnership Agreement with India and postponed

the purchase of Indian weapons, which had been settled by Karzai during his last visit to India. Ghani took some strategic initiatives to curb cross-border terrorism in Pakistan and to dismantle TTP safe-havens in Afghanistan. He provided access to Pakistan's ISI officials on the way to Afghan jails to help investigate anti-Pakistani elements on Afghan soil (Sial, 2016).

3.4.3 Political CBMs of the Two States

President of Pakistan Mamnoon Hussain visited Kabul on 29 September 2014 to attend the oath-taking ceremony of President Ashraf Ghani as a goodwill gesture. Mamnoon Hussain expressed the hope that Pak-Afghan relations under the new Afghan administration will enter a new era of bilateralism (Anwar & Idrees, 2017). After a brief time, Sartaj Aziz's the then advisor of Pakistani prime minister on foreign affairs paid a visit to Afghanistan on 20 October 2014 to mitigate the trust deficit in bilateral relations (Khan, 2016). He met with President Ghani and foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani and reiterated Pakistan's desire for peace, harmony, and prosperity in Afghanistan. Both states emphasized the working of friendly relations and signed an MoU aimed at eradicating terrorist safe havens and presented an initiative to ease Pakistan's concern over cross-border terrorism (Usman & Khan, 2017).

Ghani faced strong criticism internally, however, he believed Pakistan would play a mediating role and would use its good offices by influencing the Taliban to engage them in talks with the Afghan government. Ghani's rapprochement towards Pakistan was not acceptable to some of the Afghan elements. Secondly, the death of Mullah Omer resulted in the criticism of Ashraf Ghani's pro-Pakistani policies. The growing instability in Afghanistan declined Ghani's reconciliation policies towards Pakistan (Sial, 2016). Professor Dr. Syed Waqar Ali Shah in an interview expresses his views that; "Policies are the same whether Karzai in Kabul or Ashraf Ghani. Most of the Afghans made responsible Pakistan for the

deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. So, policies are the same as the blame game continues from both sides. Any kind of terrorist act took place in Kabul, Afghans hold responsible Pakistan for that, which wiped out positive terms in the relations" (6 September 2018).

3.4.4 Ashraf Ghani two days visit to Pakistan

Soon after taking oath as a President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani paid two days' visit to Pakistan on 14-15 November 2014. His visit was considered a paradigm shift from conflict to cooperation in both the state's foreign policy. Ghani asserted that "Pakistan and Afghanistan have overcome obstacles of 13 years in 3 days." On this occasion, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif asserted that "both countries recognize the opportunity to work together and build a stronger relationship based on mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, marked by mutual trust, understanding, and close cooperation" (Khan, 2014).

Ghani's visit carried twofold vibrant communications: first, he unstated Pakistan's armed force's role in Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan. That is, the role of the Pak-Army could not be denied in shaping Pak-Afghan policies. Second, Ghani stressed Pak-Army to send a message of reconciliation to the Taliban's Quetta Shura. In the concluding ceremony, a Memorandum of Understanding among the two states' intelligence agencies, ISI and NDS respectively was signed to eradicate the remnants of terrorism. During Pakistan's COAS Raheel Sharif's visit to Kabul in November 2014, President Ghani told the former that good relations with Pakistan are in Afghan strategic interest. Ghani stated that "Afghanistan wants to bolster ties with Pakistan, including cooperation in border management." He mentioned, "Pakistan and Afghanistan should sincerely and jointly act against the common enemy and cooperate for the establishment of peace and stability in both country's bilateral collaboration." He further added that both states should strengthen

government to government and institutions to institutions cooperation (COAS Meets Ghani. Abdullah offer training to ANSF (Tribune. 2014).

3.4.5 Afghan Security Forces Got Training in Pakistan Military Academy (PMA)

Six Afghan cadets attended an 18-month course in Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) Kakul, Abbottabad. It was an opening period that Afghan National Security Forces got military training in Pakistan which was previously denied by the Afghan establishment. It was a positive shift in bilateral relations (Khan, 2014). Before that, Afghan cadets mostly got training in India, yet Pakistan provided a “full range” of military training and development services to ANSF in Pakistan military academy. Pakistan first offered training to Afghan security forces at the NATO conference in Brussels in 2010. The proposal aimed at bridging the trust deficit in bilateral relations. In 2013, Afghan defense minister Bismillah Muhammadi visited Pakistan to supervise the training facilities. During Raheel Sharif's visit to Kabul in 2014, he again proposed training to Afghan security forces which was accepted. In February 2015, the first batch of six Afghan cadets arrived in Pakistan. In April 2016, the first group of Afghan army cadets passed out from PMA in passing out ceremony (Yousaf, 2014).

3.4.6 APS Incident and Its Impact on Bilateral Relations

Unfortunately, the rapidly growing relations soon broke with a series of terrorist attacks in Kabul in 2014 which left 50 Afghans dead and almost 300 wounded in such attacks. Afghan administrators blamed Pakistan, especially due to the Haqqani network. The response of Afghan people and officials turned negative towards Pakistan. They alleged that Pakistan was not serious to tackle the Taliban militancy. The efforts which began with the hope were now seriously distressed (Aziz, 2015). The terrible attack of TTP on Army Public School (APS) Peshawar on December 16, 2014, was another incident that severely

undermined the relations between the two states. Following the attacks, General Raheel and ISI Chief Gen. Rizwan Akhtar visited Kabul on January 11, 2015, to hold consultations with Afghan authorities to act against TTP beached in Afghanistan. Ashraf Ghani condemned the attack and assured all types of assistance. In this regard, Afghanistan captured five suspected TTP activists allegedly involved in the APS attack (Khan, 2015). President Ghani and the ISI chief also talked about the challenges of security and terrorism. After taking charge as ISI chief in 2014, Rizwan Akhtar visited Kabul three times. Afghan COAS Sher Muhammad Karimi also visited Pakistan in December 2014 and held discussions with Pakistan counterpart in Army headquarter (GHQ) Rawalpindi. Both counterparts identified terrorism and extremism as a common challenge that required a common approach and close cooperation for effective handling.

3.4.7 Indian Presence in Afghanistan and its Covert Activities against Pakistan

All through an independent republic, Afghanistan had the right to develop diplomatic relations with all countries of the world for their state interests, but on the condition that Afghan soil would not be allowed to use against Pakistan or any other state. Pakistan had constantly been confronted that the growing influence of India in Afghan territory is a straight menace towards Pakistan's security. India supported every government in Afghanistan from 1947 until 1992. Only the Taliban regime in Kabul was against the Indian presence in Afghanistan (Grare, 2006). India consumes not any shortest link through Afghanistan, nonetheless, the increasing existence in the arrangement of massive investment worth about \$1.2 billion in diverse substructure developments had great anxiety for Pakistan's security. India's quest for Central Asian markets also vying its interests to expand its trade with Afghanistan and presently is the second-largest trade partner after Pakistan (Byrne, 2013).

As far as the security threats for Pakistan are concerned, India wants deliberate benefits contrary to Pakistan to initiate a stage on the way to conduct its covert actions in Baluchistan over Balochis protesters to destabilize Pakistan (Durrani & Khan, 2009). Many terrorist accidents in Pakistan showed the Indian hidden activities against Pakistan's security, especially the Hazara, Shia, and Sunni conflict and the killing of many Shias that were aimed to start a conflict among the two ethnic groups and destabilize Pakistan's security situation. India is engaged in exposing its soft power in Afghanistan while investing in rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. India invested in schooling, women empowerment, charitable support, energy developmental projects, constructions, vocational training, and upgrading security to enhance Afghanistan's long-term capabilities (Javaid, 2016).

When Russia withdrew from Afghanistan and installed Najibullah a pro-Russian and pro-Indian faction, India wholeheartedly supported him. When Kabul fell in the hands of Pakistan-backed Mujahidin in 1992 and Najibullah was dragged from the UN office in Kabul and hanged by the Taliban in 1996, India expressed 15 days of mourning in response. India prompted its utmost support to President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Northern Alliance but gained less support because different Afghan factions were engaged to implement its influence in the Afghan region. Indian growing presence near to Pakistan border i-e, to open consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif have great apprehension for Pakistan as India was supposed to support of Baluch separatists against Pakistan (Grare, 2006).

Karzai also faced the problem of harmonizing Indian and Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. Enduring the India-Afghanistan connection that touched an extreme level during his first tenure was neither in the interest of Afghanistan's stability nor for his regime. In the assessment report of Gen., M.C. Chrystal say that "increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan was considered obstructive as it led to regional hostilities and tensions with

Pakistan" which was too expensive. President Karzai's visit to New Delhi (India) in October 2011 and the signing of a wide-ranging 'Strategic Accord' deal for sharing of real-time intelligence would respectfully have great unease for Pakistan (Pakistan Observer, 2012, May 2)." President Karzai could not balance Indian existence in the country which affected Pakistan's collaboration on the way to determine the predicament in Afghanistan.

The fear of India is among the Pakistani public and elites. Pakistan's concern is that India used Afghan territory and intelligence agencies to interfere in Pakistan and create insurgency in Pakistan's tribal belt and support Baloch separatist movements. Prime Minister Gillani of Pakistan while attending the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit on July 16th, in Egypt was reported to provide requisite proofs with names and photographs of Indian officials to his Indian counterpart while attending the meetings with Baloch dissents (Durrani & Khan, 2009). The growing Indian presence in Afghanistan as the fifth largest socio-economic investor in terms of men and resources is a great concern for Pakistan's security. Through such investment, India wants to increase its trade (Iqbal, 2010). Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said in May 2010, "India's huge financial investment in Afghanistan has played a key role in helping the deteriorating government of Hamid Karzai by bringing the Afghan economy back on track." Both countries also signed different projects to facilitate trade (Javaid, 2016).

To curtail the Indian factor on Afghan soil is the responsibility of civilian and military leadership in Pakistan for which they need to establish cordial terms with Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted to curtail India's influence and limit its cumulative encouragement in Afghanistan vis-à-vis its security. Especially, after the completion of the Zaranj-Delaram road, emerged the possibility for India to increase the Afghan-India trade (Khan, 2011). The doctrine of 'strategic depth' first developed by Pakistan has been obsessed with addressing its paranoia of India-Afghan encirclement. To give credence to the

impression of shedding the strategic depth policy, Pakistan took several steps to establish its influence on Afghan soil. It needs to understand that everyone in the region including the private sector of Pakistan looks towards India for trade, business, and investment and Afghanistan does the same. The US also wants that India should act an important role in the Indo-Pacific region; therefore, India went up to its guiding role in the region (Imad udin, 2017).

3.5 Closure of Pak-Afghan Border

The Pak-Afghan border can be considered as a soft one as it is open throughout the year for formal and informal trade. Through 2560 km long border, there are some regular entry points where one can enter through a visa while many others are irregular entry points. Due to cross-border infiltration, the irregular entry points are now strictly monitored, particularly after 9/11. As a self-regulating border that regulates tourism, trade, people-to-people interaction, and border transition with mutual interaction (Kundi, 2016). But the frequent closing of Pak-Afghan borders (Torkham, Peshawar, Chaman, Spin Boldak, Ghulam Khan) happened on many occasions, whenever tension escalated on both sides due to cross border militants' attacks. Owing to terrorist attacks in 2016-17, borders remained closed for security reasons, in which thousands of people and vehicles were trapped on both sides.

The closure of borders seriously affected the trade relations of the two states and traders on both sides suffered. Owing to the long-term negative consequences of frequent closing of the border, Afghanistan is searching out for other transit routes through Iran and Central Asian states. As a result, trade volume among the two states reached from \$3 billion in 2016-17 to \$500 million in 2017-2018. Since Afghanistan became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it can trade with 163 countries (Amanullah, 2016). In 2017, a series of terrorist attacks on Pakistan's territory once again derailed the dialogue process

between the two states. Torkham and Chaman border crossings were closed for an indefinite time which strained the situation for hundreds and thousands of people as well as problems for loaded trucks of trade goods to Afghanistan. After a short time as a goodwill gesture, Nawaz Sharif reopened the border (Afghan President Letter to Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan Today, 2017 April 15).

3.5.1 Security Cooperation

On 23rd December 2014, to improve both country's relations and border security measures a trilateral conference was held in Islamabad. The meeting was attended by Pakistan COAS Raheel Sharif, Afghan National Army Chief Sher Muhammad Karimi, and ISAF commander General John Campbell. Discussions were detained on the security cooperation of the Pak-Afghan border (Amina, 2015). Border management is crucial for state security, normally borders around the world are physically managed by border police and paramilitary forces. The Pak-Afghan border is special from several perspectives as out of 34 provinces, 11 are attached with Pakistan's three provinces, Baluchistan, FATA, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

So, effective border management will defiantly profit both countries economically, politically, socially, as well as on the security level (Ikram & Marwat, 2018). In a joint statement, the member states emphasized working for peace and harmony in Pakistan and Afghanistan and promoting the Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process while accelerating the political efforts and putting an end to terrorism and violence in both states. Dialogue with the Afghan Taliban and CBMs among the two neighboring states would be encouraged to safeguard Afghanistan's sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity. On this occasion, Pakistan and Afghanistan committed to broadening economic,

political, security, state to state, and people to people cooperation and interaction (Yousaf, 2015).

3.5.2 Pak-Afghan Relations in 2015

On January 1, 2015, an adherence keeps on in Afghanistan, organized in the Presidential palace to celebrate the completion of security transition command from NATO to the Afghan National Security Forces. The US after completed its contest task in Afghanistan on December 31, 2014, was substituted with a new alliance commission named 'Resolute Support Mission' to provide training, advising, and supporting ANSF (Sultana, 2015). Following the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, some positive outcomes were observed in Pak-Afghan relations.

3.5.3 Exchange of Visits

An Afghan political delegation along with policymakers led by Chairman of International Affairs Command of the Wolesi Jirga Abdul Qadir Zazai and senator Baz Mohammad Zormati visited Pakistan at the beginning of 2015. The delegation attended the 12th session of the parliamentarian's dialogue in a meeting with Nawaz Sharif and conveyed a message of the Afghan government to visit Afghanistan. The designated members also condemned the attacks on Peshawar Army Public School (Sultana, 2015). In the same manner, to flourish the CBMs, a high-level delegation from Pakistan included Mehmood Khan Achakzai, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, and Afrasiab Khattak visited Afghanistan on 11 January 2015. The delegations met with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and deliberated multiple matters including enhancing joint teamwork on safety, constancy, improvement in political circumstances, pursuance of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and counter-terrorism strategies. They noted that Pakistan and Afghanistan were facing similar challenges. "There is no difference between the good and the bad Taliban, the threats that emerged from the

terrorists are not only facing Pakistan, but the entire community is under its grip". From the Afghanistan side, Hamid Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah, and national security advisor Mohammad Hanif Atmar attended the meeting. Afghan media did not warmly reacted to the delegation's visit and stated that the above-mentioned members are close friends of Afghanistan, "they have been coming and going for years to Afghanistan if influential political leaders like Imran Khan and Maulana Fazel Rehman, who are responsible for bloodshed in Afghanistan accompanied the delegation, then the talks would be significant" (Observer, 2015).

3.5.4 Nawaz Sharif Day-long Visit to Kabul

Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif paid a day-long official visit to Kabul along with COAS General Raheel Sharif and other high-ranking officials on 12 May 2015. He was invited by President Ashraf Ghani and a guard of honor was presented by the Afghan army on the arrival of premier Sharif at the Afghan Presidential palace. In a joint press conference, Sharif asserted that "we stand in solidarity with Afghans; the enemies of Afghanistan cannot be a friend of Pakistan." Pakistan's resolved to further deepen defenses, energy, and security partnership as well as endowed reserves of human and material resources". Pakistan's COAS on this occasion said that both states will not allow their territory to use against one another (Mateen & Haider, 2015).

3.5.5 Multilateral Efforts to Improve Pak-Afghan Relations

The war in Afghanistan was never purely a domestic one, only a multilateral international agreement can end it and simultaneously empower Afghan stakeholders to determine their country's future governance. A dual-track United Nations-led mediation platform, bolstered by a collaboration between Washington and Brussels offered the best means to achieve this end. Ending the war in Afghanistan requires two tracks that arrive at a

common destination. Domestically, the Taliban must be persuaded that an agreement in which politics replace violence is both achievable and viable (Thomas, 2021). However, to bring peace in Afghanistan, peace agreements among the US authorities and the Taliban were taking place to end the Afghanistan war. The United States is not the only country with interest or leverage in Afghanistan. Other countries, as well as international bodies, also playing a role in facilitating or mediating talks, as well as monitoring and enforcing implementation of any deal. Pakistan is perhaps the main potential spoiler of peace in Afghanistan, having directly supported the Taliban and other groups in the name of countering India. India has also built a footprint within Afghanistan in an effort to resist Pakistan's influence, and the recent clash between the two powers over contested territory in Kashmir threatens to heighten the stakes for all involved. Similarly, both Russia and China have agendas in Afghanistan, i.e., for the former the advancement of its Belt and Road Initiative for global development and for the later the desire to rebuild its influence in the region. (Werleman, 2021).

Heart of Asia Process (HOAP), a global platform was originated on November 2nd, 2011, in Istanbul, Turkey. It is an organization of fourteen Asian states along with regional and international organizations. This organization was founded in Turkey; the idea came into being during 1996-2002, the era of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. As terrorism during this era was not the problem of only Afghanistan but of the entire region. Therefore, generating peace and stability in Afghanistan was the collective responsibility of all the regional states. HoA provides regional connectivity and assistance in addition to Afghanistan next to its central. Every year the conference arranges the meeting of member states. A stable Afghanistan will pave the way for peace and prosperity in the regions.

The focus was to address the joint challenges of Afghanistan and its adjacent regions. It consists of 14-member states including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It also comprises 17 supporting countries including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Iraq, Japan, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK, European Union (EU), and the US besides 12 supportive local and global organizations such as UN, NATO, SAARC, SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and OIC, etc. Its first conference was held in 2011 in Turkey, second in 2012 (Kabul, Afghanistan), third in 2013 Almaty (Kazakhstan), fourth in 2014 Beijing, fifth in Islamabad in 2015, sixth in 2016 in India, seventh in 2017 in Baku (Azerbaijan).

In the Baku declaration, the member states emphasized priorities of counterterrorism and violent extremism to enhance economic connectivity and advance regional economic growth (UN, GASC Agenda, 2017). Afghanistan is the permanent presiding officer of the HOAP (Deolankar, 2016). The outcome of such meetings was to save Afghanistan from terrorism through collective efforts. As most of the terrorists were using drugs to continue their activities through such platforms, ways and means were put forward to eradicate such evil and to generate Afghanistan's revenue through trade on the regional and international levels. The member states' perception was to counter the Afghanistan crisis collectively. The focus was given on how to develop declining Afghanistan's natural resources and spread education among the masses to uplift the social and political lives of Afghans (Deolankar, 2016).

3.5.6 Security Situation of Afghanistan in 2016

The year 2016 was considered a critical time for Afghanistan. The rising of ISIS (Islamic State for Iraq and Syria), the Taliban insurgency, and the beginning of National

Elections in October 2016 were some of the major issues in 2016. Since 2001, more than \$80 billion have been spent on the security condition of Afghanistan but not no substantial transformation can observe. According to the US Special Inspector General Report for Afghanistan Rebuilding (SIGAR), Afghanistan was worse off today than it was before 2001. Despite the claims of diminishing the Taliban insurgency, they are stronger than before and had taken more territories in Afghanistan. In 2016 the Taliban achieved military successes over Kunduz, Lashkar Gah, and Trinkot. Several states like the US, China, Pakistan, and the Afghan government were trying to hold talks with the Taliban and convey them for mutual consultations with the Afghan government and gave a conclusion to the war in Afghanistan. Among them, Pakistan is one of the most important countries that have a profound influence on the Taliban. It was suggested that Pakistan would use its good offices to bring the insurgents on the table talks. While the involvement of different ethnic groups in the Taliban organization is beyond Pakistan's capacity to bring them towards negotiations with the Afghan government (Williams & Brown, 2016).

3.5.7 Ashraf Ghani Stance towards Pakistan in 2016

Ashraf Ghani became a harsh critic of Pakistan during the HoA ministerial conference in India. As compared with his initial policies towards Pakistan, he made it an inspiration to reach out to Pakistan through some positive statements and diplomatic gestures. This shows the resetting of Pak-Afghan ties as a core agenda of his policies. His positive stance was warmly welcomed by Pakistan's military and political leadership following several CBMs. Pakistan's perception of Afghanistan was also genuine that President Ghani was more inclined towards India as compared to Pakistan. Although Pakistan made several military operations in Pakistan's tribal areas, especially in North Waziristan to melt down the power of the militants. To fight the war against terror, Pakistan itself became the victim of

terrorism and security issues in Baluchistan. The anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan's eastern region became a thorny issue. The criticisms against one another have led both the state's relationship to deteriorate for the time being. However, efforts in significant areas improved relations on the right path. Cooperation is mandatory in cross-border militancy through border management that is a regional issue of Pakistan and Afghanistan. As far as the Progress in political reconciliation with the Taliban is concerned, Pakistan continues to use its good offices to motivate the Taliban towards the negotiations, while Afghanistan can calm down its antagonistic rhetoric attitude against Pakistan (Brown, 2016).

3.5.8 Security Situation in 2017

Afghanistan during 2017 passed through many hitches as the Taliban forces are rapidly taking control of many areas. After the formation of the Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan, the war turned from the South to the North. The Afghan security and police forces faced high casualties during this era, almost 800 deaths and 1325 injuries have been noted in the first two months of 2017 which illustrates the Afghanistan worsening situation (Brown, 2017). Besides, the fall of quite a few districts in the hands of the Taliban "*Char Dara in Kunduz, Kohistan in Sar-e-Pol, Yamgan in Badakhshan, Ghurmach in Faryab, Tala Barfak and Dand-e-Ghori in Baghlan*" the city of Kunduz also came in the hands of the Taliban. Conferring to the '*long war journal*' report released in October 2015, out of 398 districts of Afghanistan, 31 were occupied by Taliban. In 2016, the number increased to 33 districts, and overall, 16 provinces were under Taliban control. According to the SIGAR report, the Afghan government holds 63.4%. In 2016, the Afghan government controlled remained 68 out of 70 % of the territory, while the rest of one-third fell into the hands of the armed opposition. Regardless of criticism, the number of offensive aerial strikes of international forces over the year was stronger against the Taliban. In 2017, more than 2,000

air-strikes have been conducted. On the one hand, the US is conducting the dialogue process and convincing the Taliban that peace can't restore in Afghanistan without the Taliban's support, while on the other side such airstrikes derail the peace process (Tronc, 2018).

President Trump's overall strategy on the way to Afghanistan was to stay for a long time in Afghanistan with an enlarged military capacity. But an increase in military forces had ignored the governance and political side of Afghanistan. The US interests in Afghanistan are limited to military presence to control and keep watch on terrorists' activities that this state may not once again become a haven for such elements (Felbab-Brown, 2017). A more aggressive US strategy in Afghanistan introduced by US President Trump in August 2017 included a surge in airstrikes that pushed the Taliban back from several districts and provinces. But the larger part of the country was still under the Taliban's control and their activities against the US forces continued. Such activities compelled the Afghan and US authorities to hold talks with the Taliban and put an end to the 17 years long war, which neither side seemed capable to win.

In 2018, the US war in Afghanistan entered its 18 years but there was no end in sight of the US combat mission in Afghanistan, the longest war in US history. Donald Trump before his election as President of the USA also interrogated the war's costs and the country's sustained involvement in Afghanistan. But as a President, he adopted the same policy for Afghanistan as his predecessors and sent more troops. He said to the US forces "With our resolve, we will ensure that your service and that your families will bring about the defeat of our enemies and the arrival of peace." Donald Trump further said that there was no guarantee of victory and peace for the US forces in Afghanistan. The US would keep just a small number of troops to train the Afghan national army and will keep under observation the de facto control of the Taliban (Byman & Simon, 2017).

A series of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan from January to July 2018 caused the deaths of more than 100 Afghan National Army personnel, civilians, and US soldiers. Despite a ceasefire from the Afghan government in Eid days, many soldiers were killed by the Taliban (Aljazeera News, 2018). In the Inter-Continental hotel attack in Kabul on 20 January 2018, 42 peoples were dead, and more than 14 people were injured. In May, June, and July dozens of people were killed in militant attacks across the Afghan cities. Afghanistan blamed the Haqqani network. US pressurized Pakistan to end alleged terrorists' safe heavens and cut off any kind of support to the Taliban involved in Kabul attacks. Pakistan strongly condemned the Kabul attacks, in response to Kabul's blames on Pakistan, it declared that the charges were based on misperception created by foreign elements (Kabul, Gunman Attack Inter-Continental Hotel, BBC News, 2018 January 20).

3.6 Pakistan's Role in the Afghan peace process

Afghanistan was hopeful about Pakistan's role to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table with the Afghan government. Pakistan to influence the Afghan Taliban started efforts several weeks before the Murree talks. Talks were held on July 7th, 2015, facilitated by Pakistan, supported, and attended by US and China officials as observer states (Khan, 2017). From 7 to 8 July 2015, Pakistan hosted the Murree talks; a prominent leader of the Afghan Taliban Agha Motasim Jan praised the Murree negotiations. The major participants in dialogue were the Taliban leader Abdul Latif Mansoor, Abbas Akhwand, and representative of the Haqqani network. Ibrahim Haqqani put forward the suggestion of Taliban leadership in the direct involvement of the Peace Process. The Afghan government declared the Murree talks successful. Hekmat Khalil Karzai, Afghan deputy foreign minister after participation in talks announced that his government was willing to talk with the Taliban on all matters to achieve durable peace in Afghanistan. But rift among some of the Afghan

Taliban continued which was clear from the announcement of Mullah Omar's death two days before the inauguration of the second round of Murree talks scheduled to be held on July 31st, 2015. Mullah Omar's death was kept secret for two years but an announcement on such occasion derailed the negotiation process (Sial, 2016).

Considering the aims and importance of HOAP, the Islamabad Conference of 2015 focused on Pak-Afghan dialogue with the Taliban to develop the economy of Afghanistan through trade, issues related to Afghanistan security and restoration of stability, discussion about the presence of Daesh in Afghanistan, non-interference in each other's core matters. Member states praised the combat mission of ISAF that would contribute to the realization of harmony and solidarity in the region (Islamabad Declaration, 2015). Intended for the promotion of economic connectivity, it was urged that the region has enormous potential for human and natural resources. Energy productivity, trade enhancement, movement of people, employment opportunities, and revenue generation would transform Afghanistan as a transit hub to remove bottlenecks in way of transit and trade (Foundation, 2016).

China's greater role in Afghanistan's rebuilding eventually encourages Beijing to keep Pakistan under pressure for the efforts in Afghan reconciliation with the Taliban. Pakistan may on international pressure takes more interest due to its policies in Afghanistan and the lodging of militants than ever before (Vanda, 2015). On the bilateral level, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is planned to provide links to Afghanistan, Iran, and India. Afghanistan should benefit from these multi-billion regional connectivity projects. The signing of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan (TAPI) gas pipeline on 13th December 2015 is a positive initiative of the concerned states which is expected to be completed in December 2019 with the cost of \$ 10 billion. In an attempt for peace in Afghanistan, the first meeting of the Afghanistan, Pakistan, US, and China Quadrilateral

Coordination Group (QCG) was held in Islamabad on 11 January 2016. While the Taliban were not part of this group (Khan, 2017).

3.6.1 Afghanistan Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS)

The APAPPS is a platform for assistance in the field of counter-terrorism, a decrease of ferocity, amity, and understanding, the deportation of Joint Economic Development, and the return of Afghan refugees. It is a mechanism for finding solutions to bilateral areas of concern and deepening interaction in all spheres of bilateral engagement (Yousaf, 2018). The APAPPS is considered a valuable framework for a broad-based and organized meeting on all shared problems. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Tehmina Janjua led the Pakistan side in the first round of talks on the APAPPS mechanism to Afghanistan. The Afghan side led by deputy foreign minister, Hekmat Khalil Karzai. The participants encounter military and civilian officials including the Director-General Military Operation and deputy chief of NDS. During Prime Minister, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi's visit is to Kabul in April 2018, seven point's plans of the APAPPS came under discussion that is.

1. Pakistan to support Afghan-led and Afghan-own initiative.
2. No anti-state activities against each other, nor will use their territory by any other country, group, or individual.
3. To undertake actual action against any outlaws and conflicting fundamentals posturing a security threat to either of the two countries.
4. For the realization of agreed actions through Liaison officer's joint supervision, coordination and mechanism will be put in place.
5. The two states will try to avoid regional and in-flight volition of each other's territory.
6. Both the states will avoid the public blame game and instead use APAPPS to resolve shared problems.

7. Establishment of Joint Working group and necessary mechanism for the smooth implementation of APAPPS and the above mutually reinforcing principles (Ahmadi, 2018).

3.6.2 Meeting of Joint Working Group

In February 3rd2018, in the first-ever Joint Working Group of Pakistan and Afghanistan, a Pakistani delegation led by Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua reached Kabul for participation. Mohammad Faisal, foreign office spokesman said that Pakistan had proposed five joint working groups related to countering terrorism, intelligence sharing, military, economy, transit, and trade interaction, refugee repatriation, and connectivity. Pakistan always wants peace in Afghanistan, but the Afghan government needs to settle with different Afghan groups. The joint working group focused on comprehensive engagement for counter-terrorism, the return of refugees, intelligence sharing, economic prosperity through trade and development, and reduction of violence by a wide-ranging approach.

To hold the second round of discussion on APAPPS, on February 9th, 2018, the Afghan delegation led by deputy foreign minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai arrived in Islamabad for two days visit. Pakistan's National Security Advisor Lieutenant General Nassar Khan Janjua intensified efforts for APAPPS on this occasion and asserted it as a renewed jump to link the prevailing breaches, shaped a recognized apparatus of collaboration in all areas of mutual interests, and take positive and practical arrangements to support confidence flanked by both the states (Afghan Studies Center, 2018). Pakistan welcomed the visit of Afghan delegates for talks on bilateral engagement on peace and security as well as recent terrorist attacks in Kabul. US and China also encouraged the bilateral meeting of the two states and admired the importance of Pakistan for hosting millions of Afghan refugees and contributing to the war of terror (Sajjad Syed, February 2018). NDS chief Masoom Stanekzai during a

meeting with Prime Minister Abbasi handed over a list of individuals and Madrassas suspects involved in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The discussion was also held on Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's allegations of Pakistan's involvement in the Kabul attacks.

3.6.3 Afghanistan Expectations from Pakistan in Afghan Reconciliation

In Afghan perception, Pakistan is not undertaking enough efforts to deal with militants that found sanctuary in Pakistan while in Pakistan's viewpoint, Islamabad is doing as much as possible. It is a challenge, the root cause, and rifts among the two states that are continuing and will eventually prevent the meaningful improvement of bilateral relations (Putz, 2016). On the question of Pakistan's role in Afghan peace and Ashraf Ghani's expectations from Pakistan, brigadier ® Muhammad Saad said "*Ashraf Ghani is expecting too much from Pakistan in a very short time. This is not a realistic method; this is a step-by-step approach and complex matters to convince the Taliban for table talks easily*". However, Pakistan has intensified the efforts to keep on track the dialogue process of the US with the Afghan Taliban. In this way, both the parties reach a settlement which later will pave the way for reconciliation between the Taliban and the Kabul regime. As reconciliation with the Taliban leadership is mandatory for the success of Afghan state structure development (Tellis, 2009). Pakistan arranged the meeting in Abu Dhabi among the Taliban members and Zalmi Khalilzad US special envoy for Afghanistan (Gul, 2019).

For the endgame in Afghanistan, both states made considerable progress towards finding significant ground after high-level talks between two sides in Pakistan on May 27, 2018. The Afghan side was led by its advisor to national security, Haneef Atmar, interior minister, Waris Barmak, Masum Stanekzai, head of NDS, and Afghan ambassador to Pakistan Omar Zakhilwal. Afghan members took the discussion with Lt. Gen retired Nasser Khan Janjua advisor to prime minister for national security advisor, and later with COAS Gen.

Qamar Javed Bajwa. Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Tehmina Janjua was also present on this occasion. Talks were focused on border management, regional stability, and security, on the Afghan peace process, bilateral ties, and detect irreconcilable elements. The visit was in the framework of APAPPS to reiterate the need for achieving regional peace and security. TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan also came under discussion. Pakistan demanded action against TTP and its affiliates. The positive response from both sides can be seen through mutual interactions. Change in the Afghan approach to avoid using public forums to point a finger at Pakistan was viewed as the first sign of positive understanding. Pakistan is committed to strengthening mutual interests in all spheres including political, diplomatic, military, intelligence, regional connectivity, economic, trade, culture, and people-to-people contacts (Yousaf, 2018).

In March 2018, US Vice President Mike Pence, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khaqan Abbasi held a meeting. Pakistan expressed its readiness to cooperate in the Afghan reconciliation process according to its national security policy. For this purpose, the cooperation of the Afghan government and the US must make a framework for dialogue strategy. This backdoor diplomacy started after the proclamation of the Afghan government's initiative to hold talks with the Taliban for the rebuilding of the reconciliation process (Khan, 2018, March 23). The Afghan government's demand from Pakistan, to convince the Taliban leaders for table talks with the Afghan government is not a valid demand. Pakistan can provide mediation or good offices among the Taliban and Afghan government but has no complete influence over them to pressurize the Taliban for table talks with the Afghan authorities.

Like in recently held the US- Taliban dialogue process, Pakistan provided mediation. The Taliban leaders departed through Pakistan while the airline provided by UAE.

Different rounds of the dialogue process among the Taliban and the US authorities started in which Pakistan played an important role. A starting round was held in July 2018 with US deputy secretary of state, Alice Wells. The second round was held on October third November in Qatar. Then on the wish of Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arab authorities were also included in the dialogue process and another round of the dialogue process was held in UAE on 17-18 December 2018. Also, in February 2019, many rounds of the dialogue process continued in Qatar which is an immense breakthrough and progress towards peace in Afghanistan (Khan, 2019).

To curb the existence of the Taliban by force would create instability in Afghanistan and the only option is reconciliation with the Taliban is the dialogue process. This state of antagonism directed the Taliban to concentrate on fighting internally and with international security assistance force rather than to support the regional presence of the Islamic State whose terrible plans stretch beyond Afghanistan (Jamal, February 2018). On the other side, the Taliban showed their willingness to end the war through peaceful dialogue only on the condition to oust the foreign forces and accept the Taliban's right to form the government. Due to mistrust, the dialogue process was postponed, ambiguity on the part of Afghanistan that led to the blame game on neighbors especially on Pakistan derailed the dialogue process again. Pakistan on several occasions rejected the accusation to sponsor the Taliban but showed willingness for the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan. US deputy secretary of state, Alice Wells also admired the role of Pakistan in the Afghanistan's peace process. She said in a concluding conference in Kabul that "we believe that Pakistan can positively help to facilitate talks and will pressurize the Taliban to move forward towards a politically negotiated settlement" (Kaura, 2018).

On 6th April 2018, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi paid his first one-day trip to Kabul. Several bilateral issues were discussed on this occasion. The visit was considered candid on both sides. Afghanistan and Pakistan are keen to conclude their bilateral dialogue framework, peace, and negotiation with the Taliban, and advise the militant groups to join the peace process without interruption. The Afghanistan Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) on two-sided dialogue got an assumption during this long day trip of Prime Minister Abbasi. During the Abbasi's visit to Kabul, issues related to counter-terrorism, peace and reconciliation process, bilateral trade, and regional connectivity, and return of the Afghan refugees were discussed.

It was decided that for policy recommendations and new engagement on the agenda, at least three rounds at a foreign secretariat level would be held in the coming months. The Afghan government had some reservations on the agenda of APAPPS. However, the Afghan presidency agreed to continue the talks and advised the foreign minister and security advisor to make an agenda for the new mechanism. Pakistan on this occasion appreciated the idea of Ashraf Ghani for peace and reconciliation with the Taliban. Both countries' leaders stressed the Taliban to positively re-join the peace and reconciliation proposal of the Afghan government without further delay (Tronc, 2018).

Pakistan COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa paid a day-long visit to Kabul on June 12, 2018. COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa stated with optimism that a break in fighting by combatant groups in the holy month of Ramzan and on Eid would pave the way for enduring peace and end the prolonged war. COAS was accompanied by Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua, ISI chief Lt-Gen Naveed Mukhtar, DG Military Operation Lt-Gen Sahir Shamshad, and other military officers. Gen Bajwa held discussions with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, and Commander of Resolute Support

Mission (RSM) Gen John Nicolson. Discussions were held on mutual security, ongoing efforts of reconciliation in Afghanistan, measures for the eradication of ISIS from Afghanistan, smuggling and drug trafficking being the same network together and the issue of terrorist sanctuary due to Pak-Afghan porous border. COAS appreciated the ceasefire between the militants and the Afghan government on Eid. The two countries agreed on a new mechanism of Afghan peace and stability. It would include five working groups, of which one group would be included on armed and intellect to steer the affiliation out of disgrace, distrust, and recrimination. It will carry added assistance and harmonization amongst the two states.

The occurrence of the 9/11 accident altered the world scenario and changed the policies of the great powers. America was now at war with the terrorist and Afghanistan was the battlefield. Pakistan also plays a role as a front-line state against the US war on terror. Pakistan banned several jihadi camps and captured important Taliban commanders and handed them over to the US authorities. The United States praised Pakistan's role, but the Taliban elements were divided into two groups, pro-Pakistani and anti-Pakistani elements. As a front-line state, Pakistan itself became the victim of terrorism and terrorist safe-heavens in Waziristan and adjacent tribal areas on the Pak-Afghan Border. For its eradication, many military operations took place. However, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan are a concern, Pakistan extended full support towards an interim setup in Kabul under the Bonn agreement. President Musharraf and Karzai government exchanged several visits and started an era of bilateral relations. However, the blame game continues from the Karzai side even though Pakistan assured that the real problem is inside Afghanistan, which needs to be tackled with reconciliation and strong border security measures required to challenge cross-border terrorism.

The 2007 Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga was an encouraging step of bilateral relations towards peace in Afghanistan. Similarly, the democratic government of PPP and PML (N) also showed a goodwill gesture towards Afghanistan. After the completion of two consecutive terms of Hamid Karzai, a new Presidential election of 2014 brought Ashraf Ghani as the President of Afghanistan. He took drastic steps towards reconciliation with the Taliban. Similarly, he was expecting Pakistan to bring the Taliban towards negotiation with the Afghan authority. Pakistan facilitated strong support in Afghan peace and reconciliation and along with Afghan authorities arranged meetings of Afghan and the Taliban members in Qatar as well as in Islamabad. The Trump administration also thanked Pakistan to facilitate US talks with the Taliban. US special envoy to Afghanistan also praised Pakistan's role in Afghan peace and stability. The US also facilitated the Afghan reconciliation role while releasing Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar from custody in 2018 and assisting the Taliban members in traveling to talks for Afghan reconciliation in Doha (Thomas, 2020). A friendly and peaceful Afghanistan is in Pakistan's interest because peace in Afghanistan is peace in Pakistan.

CHAPTER 4

PAK-AFGHAN TRANSIT TRADE, ECONOMIC, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT RELATIONS

4.1 Pakistan's Role in Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development

After the fall of the Taliban regime, the US reconstruction efforts raised the possibility for Pakistan to expand its reconstruction efforts. The Pakistani products, especially the demand for reconstruction materials increased as well as chemicals, foods, and labour force (Report, 2014). The government of Pakistan provided financial, technical, and institutional assistance to the Afghan government in concerned fields. Under the Pakistan planning commission, the Afghanistan cell was established to monitor all the developmental projects. In 2002, during a conference in Tokyo Pakistan provided the US \$ 100 million for Afghanistan reconstruction and development. Pakistan gas companies Sui-Northern and Sui-Southern also focused on how to utilize Afghan gas infrastructure. Almost 80 to 70 thousand Pakistani are working in developing systems in Afghanistan while taking interest in Afghan reconstruction and development and a source of earning for Pakistan. Similarly, about 1.7 million Afghan refugees are engaged in different employments in Pakistan for their earnings. During Zardari's visit to Kabul, the two Presidents settled to advance a mechanism to implement mega projects like Peshawar-Jalalabad-Herat Expressway and Peshawar-Jalalabad rail connection. Pakistan has completed the construction of a road from Torkham to Jalalabad in the eastern Nangarhar province of Afghanistan. Karachi Port and Port Qasim are linked by the railway line to Peshawar and Chaman and Pakistan railways carried out a feasibility study

for linking Gwadar to the rail network which has great potential for Afghanistan. The establishment of the Joint Working Commission (2002) also emphasized an issue related to trade and development. Under the program of rebuilding Afghanistan's developmental projects by the government of Pakistan, the following issues were put forward before the Pakistan planning commission for further development.

1. Instead of one 100 bed eye hospital in Herat, two more hospitals of 50 beds may be constructed in Kunduz and Paktika. And the construction of a Kidney hospital at Balkh.
2. Construction of 35km internal roads in Jalalabad and approval of feasibility study of Chaman-Kandahar and NOC for 100 right ways for Chaman-Spinboldak railway.

Pakistan progressed on many projects like the Chaman-Kandahar railway line, rehabilitation of Jalalabad-Torkham Road, Ghulam Khan Khost road, and power transmission line to Khost, provision of 200 trucks, 38 ambulances, 100 buses, rehabilitation to schools, and Jalalabad and Mazer-Sharif kidney center (Hanif, 2018). Pakistan was involved in remodeling the road to turn it into a dual carriage highway. Other than the trade sector, Pakistan was also engaged in building a hospital in Kabul, known as the Jinnah Hospital Complex and Allama Iqbal Faculty of Arts at Kabul University. In views of former Pakistan ambassador

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan's developmental partnership was Pakistan's strategic interests. It was a strategic and diplomatic requirement of Pakistan to enhance her influence as a neighbor state as Afghanistan is passing through a critical stage, and regional state assistance is indispensable (Sadiq, 2019).

Nawaz Sharif during Karzai's two days visit to Islamabad on August 26-27, 2013, added a new expansion to bilateral relations. He stated that Pakistan wanted full implementation of bilateral agreements with Afghanistan and vowed to reinforce energy and communication

links with its neighbor by the regional initiative. Equally the focus of this relationship must be on a firm economic and strong trade partnership that serves the common interests of both countries (Zaafir & Raja, 2013). Pakistan on this occasion freed several Taliban members as a goodwill gesture (Idrees & Anwar, 2017).

In February 2014, Mr. Ishaq Dar Pakistan's finance minister visited Kabul to attend the Bilateral Joint Economic Commission (BJEC) founded in 2002 to boost bilateral trade. During the visit, Ishaq Dar assured to increase the Afghan development fund from \$385 to \$500 million and showed interest in the construction of a two-way road from Peshawar to Jalalabad. Dar handed over the keys to Kidney hospital to his Afghan counterpart. Pakistan invested in many developmental projects of Afghanistan, like 400 beds Jinnah hospital in Kabul, 200 beds hospital in Logar province, Liqueate Ali Khan Engineering University in Balkh, Nishtar Kidney hospital in Jalalabad, and many other small projects are under consideration. Further, Pakistan and Afghanistan predicted 265 km of motorway from Kabul to Peshawar. Construction of a link road from Chaman to Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif to Termez near the border of Central Asia is also under consideration. This road connectivity will enable Afghanistan to start commercial activities through the Gawadar port in the Indian Ocean (Hafeez, 2018). Pakistan restated the offer for capacity-building programs in the field of medicine, diplomacy, judiciary, customs, agriculture, banking, railways, and in the provision of training to Afghan police (Report, 2017).

Pakistan and Afghanistan reiterated the promise not to allow each other's soil for anti-state activities against one another. This is the only way to diminish the blame game, which is the root cause of tense relations between the two states. To improve transit and trade, rail, and road connections were put into consideration. Both sides agreed on Joint Economic Commission to arrange as early as possible the implementation of the gas pipeline, energy

projects, Chaman-Herat-Kandahar railway line, Peshawar Kabul motorway, and key rail road's connectivity with Central Asia which will be helpful for both states (Dawn, 2018).

4.1.1 Pak-Afghan Trade Cooperation

Despite convergence and divergence in bilateral relations, trade relations between the two states have never been a break. Sometimes, border clashes on both sides derail the trade possibilities. Afghanistan is a landlocked state avail trade opportunities through the Pakistani port Karachi since Pakistan's independence under international law. Trade via Pakistan has very great importance for Afghanistan, due to its landlocked status Afghanistan on several occasions raised the issue of Pakhtunistan getting an outlet to the sea while integrating many parts of Baluchistan under Baluch insurgency, backed by the Indian intelligence agency to create instability and bad security environment for Pakistan, as well as destabilize Pak-Afghan relations.

While for Pakistan the importance of Central Asian states could not be denied, Pakistan through Afghanistan wants to avail trade potential with CARs. Afghanistan is considering a gateway to Central Asian states. The non-costal Central Asian Republics are rich in natural resources, which has great importance for Pakistan for its energy requirements. Similarly, the warm water coastline of Pakistan is also very important for the Central Asian Republics for its trade potential with the rest of the world. In this regard, Pakistan is always seeking a pro-Pakistan setup in Kabul to cooperate and enlarge transit trade. Afghanistan due to its Geo-strategic position has the direct routes to provide direct paths to Pakistani import and export with the South Asian Republic (CARs). Similarly, Afghanistan can become a hub of trade activities for Central Asia, the Middle East, China, and South Asia (Shah & Andlib, 2016).

4.1.2 Brief History of Pak-Afghan Bilateral Trade Under 1965 ATTA

Naturally, Afghanistan is blessed with natural resources but lacking three necessities first an outlet to the sea as a landlocked state and a reduced number of primitive means of transportation and communication. The second trade with the world and third essential assistance is the lack of ways and means for economic development. Afghanistan trade passes through Iran, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. For Afghanistan transit trade the best natural and suitable route is from Khaybar pass to Karachi port. Due to political differences, both states do not take benefits from each other. During Prime Minister Daoud's era, due to cross-border attacks boundary was closed for transit trade in 1961. In 1963 through the mediation of the Shah of Iran tension was restored. To further improve the trade relations, President Ayub Khan twice visited Kabul in 1964-1966 to settle the issues through negotiations. Under international law, Pakistan provided a trade facility to Afghanistan, which was regulated under the 1965 Transit Trade Agreement.

This agreement allowed all transit to Afghan imports from all over the world by Karachi port. Informal transit trade, across the Durand Line, existed since Pakistan's independence. Arrangements of two primary routes, Peshawar-Torkham and Chaman-Spin Boldak were agreed upon in the 1965 contract. Chaman is a key city of Baluchistan province and considering an important route for the Afghanistan trade. During the 1965 agreement, Afghan imports were exempted from customs duties, services charges, and port levies (Hanif, 2018). Land and sea routes for transit trade by way of Pakistan are the lifeline for the Afghanistan economy. Afghan transit trade with the rest of the world is conducted via Karachi and port Qasim, while for bilateral trade several land routes and crossing points are operationalized. Torkham/Peshawar in FATA's Khyber agency is the main path of bilateral trade among these two states. Other routes are in the North link KPK's Chitral, Upper Dir,

Bajaur, and Khyber agency connected with Nuristan, Kunar, and Nangahar province of Afghanistan. Ghulam khan checkpoint among North Waziristan and Khost provides another trade route, while the Chaman/Spinboldak linking Baluchistan and Kandahar province is one more full active crossing point after Torkham (ICG Report, 2014). Pak-Afghan transit trade was regulated under the 1965 agreement, but with the passage of new advancements, the old agreement seems new advancements to standardized trade abilities.

As for trade relations are concerned, universal regulations make it compulsory on the adjacent surrounding by a land nation-state to provide transit trade facilities by the next to the border. Under the United Nations laws of the Seas in the Geneva Convention of 1864, the neighboring states are obliged to provide transit trade facilities to adjacent landlocked states (Sultana, 2011). Nevertheless, quite a lot of difficulties are facing both countries in their bilateral relations but subsequently, as Pakistan's got independence transit trade between the two countries had occasionally superseded (Haque, 2011). Afghanistan is a landlocked country dependent on Pakistan for its economic development and transit trade to access international markets, decided on territorial expansion as a way out to the sea. Trade has enormous potential for Afghanistan through Pakistan and is a matter of concern, for which on several occasions Afghanistan raised the issue of Pakhtunistan. To incorporate the Baluch majority areas into Afghanistan would, in turn, could solve one of Afghanistan's major strategic weaknesses. The fact that it is a landlocked state and Baluch majority area would give them access to the Arabian Sea (Gartenstein & Vassefi, 2012). Nonetheless, bilateral trade relations were operative from January 1, 1948, under UN Conventions and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was signed on October 30, 1947 (A. Rahim, 2017). Three existing points were identified for ATTA under March 1965 agreement.

These three present-day points were Ghulam Khan, Peshawar-Torkham, and Chaman-Spin-Boldak. Article 1st of ATTA guaranteed freedom of transit trade to both states.

Since 1965 ATTA took place by rail and roads under National Logistics Cooperation (Shabir & Kausar, 2017). Pakistan is the major supplier of wheat to Afghanistan since the 1960s. The private sector in both the states explored new trading possibilities, and due to their active interest trade among the two states was seven-fold increased between 2002 and 2010. From the 1970s until the fall of the Taliban regime, undocumented trade reached its peak, Pakistan became the major trading partner and exporter to Afghanistan. By 2010 Afghanistan was the third-largest export market for Pakistani goods, almost 7.9% of Afghans total export (Shabbir & Ahmad, 2013).

However, the agricultural and natural resource sector in Afghanistan were strictly hurt because of wars and four years of serious famine 1998-2002. Livestock and agricultural production were drastically declined. Due to which Afghanistan mainly relies on Pakistan, Iran, and other states for its food needs. Afghanistan can resolve such issues by adopting improve technology, subsidies farmers, subsidizing fertilizers, tractors, machinery, and interests' free loans to the farmers. But the Afghanistan food security situation is not self-sufficient to provide such facilities to the farmers which caused a deficit from 2007 to 2015 in supply and demand. To reduce food deficits formal and informal trade between the two states continue. The unofficial trade among the two states was larger than the official trade in 2002. Unofficial trade takes place to prevent, tax, and customs duties and quantify restrictions from adjacent countries by smugglers to get huge profit while sale the commodities (Shamsher, 2007). However, recent measures are taken by the Pakistan government as well as the Afghan authorities to keep a check on the porous border and control illegal movements and informal trade. To consolidate their economic relations Pakistan and Afghanistan took the following steps.

1. To promote trade relations, in 1992 both the states established the Pak-Afghan Joint Economic Commission (JEC). The commission took several meetings in the headship

of economic ministers in Islamabad and Kabul, respectively. The main agenda of this platform was to reconcile the hindrance in transit trade and issues in bilateral trade.

2. Both the states agreed to revive transit trade and Pakistan reduced the negative lists of six objects beneath the transit trade.
3. Initiation of ten new trade ideas and opening of new trade ways on the Pak-Afghan border.
4. Both countries contracted an investment pact to protect the savings situation.
5. Settlement for the opening of bank branches in both states, separately (Ikram, 2006).

Until June 2011 Pak-Afghan transit trade was being carried out under the old ATTA of 1965. However, considering the demands of time, the old agreement of 1965 seemed outdated in the 21st century. Technological developments and the occurrence of recent problems on the Pak-Afghan border like border raids, smuggling, and corruption in the following decades, attracted both countries' attention towards the renewal of customs and regulations to monitor and regularize trade. The porous border has also been facing the problem of deliberate illegal trafficking activity, in which tribes on both sides of the border are involved. According to a rough estimate, over two billion rupees worth of goods is brought into Afghanistan under transit trade and then returned to be sold in Pakistani markets (Khan, 2011).

For the removal of trade barriers and strengthening of economic ties to ensure free movement of goods, joint working groups (established in 2002) were set up from time to time to discuss trade-related issues. The first round of negotiations was started in 2006 and the second in 2008 with the outcome of a deliberate discussion, the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on May 6, 2009. This MoU was signed during the trilateral meeting between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States in Washington. Pakistan's Commerce Minister Makhdoom Amin Fahim and his Afghan counterpart Anwar-ul-Haq

Ahadi, in presence of President Hamid Karzai, Asif Ali Zardari, and US Secretary of state Hillary Clinton signed an MoU to begin talks for renewing the transit trade agreement (Afzal, 2010).

Between 2009 and 2010, seven meetings were held between the two countries' concerned departments keeping in view the previous shortcomings. Deficiencies of the 1965 ATTA were highlighted, and both states agreed to resolve each other's concerns in a positive manner. At last, the historical document was signed on 28 October 2010, in Islamabad. The Pakistani side was led by Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs Dr. Abdul Hafeez Sheikh, and the Afghanistan side by Afghan Finance Minister Hazrat Omer Zakhilwal. Earlier, the 'two countries signed a 'Note for the Record' on July 18, 2010, in which Pakistan agreed to allow Afghan trucks to work between Afghanistan, Karachi, and Wagha to carry Afghan goods. The agreement guaranteed the contracting parties to operationalize the described framework for regulating and enabling the trade agreement. For this purpose, the Afghan-Pakistan Transit Trade Coordination Authority (APTTCA) has been formed to regulate and monitor the smooth implementation of APTTA under article 34. The contract has five years term, after which mutually agreed added provisions will be added or deleted. The agreement will renew after five years of terms until either party has concluded it (Kausar & Gul, 2017). In 2013, FBR established a separate Directorate known as Director-General based in Karachi while its regional Directorates working in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi to facilitate transit trade.

Installation of a biometric system and tracking devices on transport units and railway track, to link Quetta (Baluchistan) to Southern Kandahar and Peshawar to Jalalabad was the next step of cooperation. Some practical steps were taken regarding APTTA. The previous agreement did not allow Afghan trade with India through the Wagah border. In the past trade ties between the two states have substantially affected and declined. The main reason is

Afghanistan's focus on transit trade to other regional states. India is contributing both in terms of payment, competitive tariffs, and subsidies. Iran has also a better quality of infrastructure and offering glowing facilities and tariff to Afghanistan. This resulted in an intensive shift of bilateral and transit trade from Pakistan to Iran (PAJCCI, 2018). Muhammad Sadiq, Pakistan's former ambassador to Afghanistan commented that the *APTTA of 2010 collapsed in 2015, the new one not signed. Now a day's transit trade is carried out without any agreement. Despite the Indian factor, several other issues were also responsible. With time, new changes are needed. Afghanistan's products could go through India via Wagah, but Indian products to Afghanistan through Pakistan are not allowed. Afghan trucks cannot cross the Wagah border through this agreement, even Pakistani trucks cannot cross the border so, how Afghanistan. Bilateral Indo-Afghan trade is going on through Karachi port, which is now increasingly shifted through the Iranian port of Chabahar (29 January 2019).*

4.1.3 Importance of APTTA

APTTA opened new avenues of trade for both the countries; provided “10 additional transit corridors in Pakistan and eight new corridors in Afghanistan. This increased freedom of transit would link Pakistan to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and beyond to Kazakhstan and other key trading partners” on designated trade routes under APTTA. Pakistan would also take advantage of improved access to raw material from Central Asia. Likewise, APTTA would link “Afghanistan to the world via three Pakistani ports under designated routes. Afghan trucks would now be allowed to transport Afghan exports to any of the three Pakistan seaports (Karachi, Bin Qasim, and Gwadar), load goods, and return with imports from third countries or Pakistan. Moreover, APTTA will allow Afghan exports to be transported to India and China”. To resolve additional trade-related

problems, the dialogue of the head of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCJ) Azrakhsh Hafizi and Pakistan's Minister of Commerce and Industries Makhdoom Amin Fahim took place in Karachi on November 25-27, 2010. The focus was to eliminate the trade problems and to give a relaxed entree to Afghan traders to Karachi port (Siddique, 2012).

Through President Karzai's visit to Islamabad in March 2010, "Pakistan's role remained prominent in the talks as it proposed to enhance cooperation in transit trade, reconstruction, and technical projects. They agreed to develop the communication network, boost trade to \$15 billion a year by 2015, and enhance cooperation in education with exchange programs and doubling scholarships from 1,000 to 2,000. In agriculture, the creation of a Pakistan-Afghanistan food bank was under consideration, while in the energy sector joint strategies for early implementation of trans-Afghan energy projects were agreed upon, with a focus on Central Asia and South Asia (CASA-1000) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and India (TAPI) gas pipeline. A Joint Declaration was signed by the two countries' foreign ministers, Shah Mehmood Qureshi and Dr. Zalmay Rassoul, for developing roads, rail and bus services, and air connectivity and upgrading the existing facilities" (Masood, 2010). Priority was given to the completion of the Peshawar-Jalalabad Expressway and the feasibility study of the Peshawar-Jalalabad rail link. Pakistan and Afghanistan were also planning to establish a Silk Route, CEOs Forum, and 'Pakistan-Afghanistan Reconstruction Consortium' for reconstruction and development purposes. Both countries agreed upon setting up economic and industrial zones (Pak-Afghan to boots transit trade, News, 2010, March 11).

During President Zardari's visit to Kabul on 20 July 2011, both countries committed to working on the joint strategy of trade. Afghan President Karzai raised the issue of loaded Afghan container carrying goods, including fresh items and food, under the Pak-Afghan

Transit Trade Agreement. Zardari assured the Afghan leaders that the food containers would be immediately allowed to transit through Pakistan. Zardari proposed that the bilateral transit trade agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be transformed into a multilateral agreement with the Central Asian Republics (CARs). According to Dr. Syed Waqar Ali Shah, *until and unless the guns are not silent in Afghanistan, Pakistan cannot reach the Central Asian markets for its trade connectivity through Afghanistan.*

Quite a lot of measures were taken against different mechanisms as tracking, and container transshipment, arbitration, custom, information sharing, conveyance of goods in internationally recognized open trucks, and last but not the least provision of scanning at the entry and exit points for security purpose. Under this agreement, imported goods should be properly sealed and supplied through secured containers, biometric and visa systems for truck drivers. Pakistan agreed to issue permits to the truck driver and one conductor (Yousaf, 2011). To resolve all forms of trade clashes among the two partners states, the “Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Coordination Authority (PATTA) was established on January 12, 2011” for making the trade and commerce smoother and more transparent between the two states. It was set up by an arbitral law court for ensuring the peaceful settlement of transit trade disputes and to take in planning the trade agreement. The “APTTA is to be reviewed after every five years and if needed would be revised before the prescribed period”. It would also curb border smuggling.

Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan witnessed many ups and downs in the relations. But 2010 APTTA bound both states as international trade partners (Hanif, 2018). The overall dimensions of trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan were 169.93 million U.S. dollars in 2000-2001, which flew to \$ 1235.01 million in 2007-2008 and a 58 % increase in 2014. APTTA consumes to detach the negative list and permits Afghan trucks to transmit Afghan export shipments to Pakistani seaports. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also expressed a

desire to broaden strong trade relations and economic partnership with Afghanistan. In 2017-2018 Pak-Afghan bilateral trade crossed \$ 2 billion. During the last two years, Afghanistan's export to Pakistan increased by 29.53% as compared with 2016-2017 which was \$ 342 million (Khan, et al, 2017). In the views of Professor Dr. Adnan Sarwar, ex-chairman Department of International Relations University of Peshawar, sometimes trade relations deteriorated due to misperception, allegations, and counter-allegations. But Afghanistan cannot bypass Pakistan to search for alternatives in the shape of India, Iran, or Russia. Because we have a long border with Afghanistan as compared with other states (Sarwar, 2019).

A big market awaits Pakistan; there was a huge demand for Pakistani goods in Afghanistan due to proximity. In 2010 Pakistan exported goods to Afghanistan worth \$1.2 billion as compared to \$1.7 billion in 2011, and the informal Pak-Afghan trade climbed to \$4 billion. Pakistan along with other nations also invested about \$330 million in Afghanistan mostly in – education, health, and transportation. According to Rustam Shah Mohmand, ex-Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan, Pak-Afghan relations have their dynamic character that would carry it forward. Both need each other badly due to the landlocked states of Afghanistan and Pakistan's need to access the CARs for trade purposes through Afghanistan. They are created by nature in such a way that they are interdependent upon each other. Pakistan could benefit from the hydropower potential of Tajikistan; Pakistan could also benefit from the huge mineral reserves that are going to be exploited in Afghanistan. Afghanistan can take benefit from technology and benefit in the educational field.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai paid a two-day visit to Pakistan on February 1, 2012 and held meetings with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gillani. Karzai officially opened the joint peace commission for trade and security purposes. He discussed several issues of trade, economy, and education besides joint counterterrorism efforts within the

framework of the joint peace commission. Karzai also met the President of Pak-Afghan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PAJCCI) Zubair Motiwala. On this occasion, Hamid Karzai allowed multiple entry visas to Pakistani businessmen, which was a long-standing demand of the business community in Pakistan. The businessmen who are members of PAJCCI would receive six months multiple entry visas from the Afghan Embassy on the recommendation of PAJCCI (Qayum, et.al, 2016).

Some of the reservations regarding APTTA highlighted in the mass media that Pakistan is contrary to Afghanistan trade through India which is not the circumstances; the accurate position is that Pakistan is uncertain to allow Indian export cargoes to Afghanistan over its territory as it resolves to consume thoughtful consequences for Pakistan's security. Strong security measures are required to allow Indian export to Afghanistan while using Pakistan's land (Afzal, 2010). The US also encouraged the Pak-Afghan transit trade extension to India by means to convert the financial dynamic of the area. "Opening of transit trade to India would be transformative because India is going to be such an important economic aspect for the region in the 21st century and will bring very important transit revenues for Pakistan and Afghanistan," told US secretary Hillary Clinton. Pak-Afghan transit trade agreement will extend to Central Asia and will pave the way for economic development for the region and would help to bridge the gap in the two country's relations (Qayum, 2016).

As for trade relations between India and Pakistan are concerned, India is the second most significant export destination for Afghan goods. Indo-Afghan trade potential is one way through Pakistan. Afghanistan can export to India but cannot import it. Afghan trucks are allowed till Wagah under APTTA which was not allowed previously, but not to go Attari, which is just a kilometer away from Wagah (Rahman, 2017). Afghan suggestion to permit the

transit of goods from India have been met the following challenges from the Pakistan side. Pakistan neglected that it would have negative effects on Pakistan's industrial products.

The essential intended for the establishment of a trade link has an enormous possibility for Pakistan and India. Pakistan's obligation to enthusiastically involve India to practice her route intended for trade-in Afghanistan on the footings' greatest appropriate towards Pakistan. India desires safety, Pakistan wants devotion and "friends". Such multilateral coming together of trade-based benefits can potentially bring \$6 to \$8 billion royalty to cash-strapped Pakistan. This is a trade of benefits and a method intended for development that necessitates partnership as of each other to determine the stresses. A senior Pakistani diplomat, special advisor on national security, Sartaj Aziz on July 21, 2013, held a day visit to Kabul to start a higher-level discussion with Karzai and conveyed a friendliness letter as of the new management to start bilateral relations. During a statement to the media "The Adviser" stressed that bilateral relations must be underpinned by strong trade and economic relationships. He further underscored that the two countries must work together to strengthen links with Central Asia, including through trade and mutually beneficial energy projects, that would reinforce regional cooperation and promote common prosperity," the declaration alleged. Pakistan Foreign Office additionally specified that "both sides *inter alia* agreed to hold the next meeting of the 'Coordinating Authority' established under the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) as early as possible to address matters related to transit trade" (Dawn, 2013).

In July 2012, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend their trade with Tajikistan, an initial step towards the North-South economic corridor. The recommended agreement would permit Tajikistan to use Pakistan Karachi and Gawadar port for import and export functions similarly to Afghanistan while Pakistan will enjoy trade with Tajikistan under terms and conditions of transit trade. To keep in practice the Pak-Tajik trade cooperation a

ministerial delegation arrived in Pakistan to explore ways and means of trade in various sectors. Similarly, during Ashraf Ghani's visit to Pakistan in 2014 he also expressed his desire that Afghanistan would just be like a bridge between Pakistan and Central Asian states. In response, Pakistan will allow Afghanistan for its trade with India. Regarding transit trade with India, in April 2015, Pakistan's commerce minister Khurram Dastgir put forward the proposal to eradicate earlier constraints towards the Afghan authorities. It was approved that the duty-bound Afghan trucks for India would be allowed to reach the Wagah border passage and in return would be allowed to carry Pakistani exports to Afghanistan. Likewise, the Pakistani trucks would be allowed to transit through Afghanistan without refilling. Through such efforts, the transport companies and transport investors would be the main recipients by investing in means of transport structures (Husain & Elahi, 2015).

To analyze the 2016 HoA conference, India used to compel Islamabad for trade connectivity with Afghanistan through the Wagah border under transit trade. The APTTA is not a bilateral trade agreement, but it is a transit trade agreement that provides the provision of transit facilities to each other concerned states. Pakistan removed the negative lists and permits Afghan trucks to transmit export items to the Indian Wagah border which was not allowed previously. But in return, Afghan trucks are not allowed to carry Indian goods (Shabbir, et al. 2017). The Afghan government is of the view that Afghanistan should give access to Indian goods through Pakistan. This is not possible due to certain reasons, in which security is the main cause. It will keep Pakistan's domestic industries in a clear detrimental position. Indeed Indo-Pak competition for influence in Afghanistan is not an old phenomenon. Pakistan's policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan is against India. While India secretly supported Afghanistan on the Pakhtunistan issue, as well as extended full support to the Northern Alliance after the Russian forces withdraw to achieve an authoritative position in Afghanistan and Central Asia to counter Pakistan's influence in the region.

4.1.4 Difference between 1965 and 2010 Transit Trade Agreement

As the 1965 ATTA restricted Pakistani vehicles to Afghanistan and Afghan vehicles were not allowed to proceed beyond Peshawar. But the revised pact resolved such restrictions. APTTA opens new trade ways for both countries; provides 10 extra transit flight paths in Pakistan and eight new corridors in Afghanistan. Through such an agreement Pakistan will benefit from Central Asian markets. To resolve additional trader's problems on November 25-27, 2010, Makhdoom Amin Fahim and his Afghan counterpart hold several meetings. The concentration was to diligence the trade problem and easy access to Pakistani ports. Pakistan accepted the demands of Afghan authorities (Siddique 2012). It was suggested from the Pakistani side that, apart from the APTTA, the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) would also facilitate that would provide potential to both states' goods on concessionary lines (Ali, 2008). Indeed, it was a great opportunity for both the states to properly keep in practice the much-awaited APTTA. In the words of US Secretary of state Hilary Clinton, "This agreement has been under discussion for 43 years and without resolution, Afghanistan and Pakistan have reached an important milestone in their efforts to generate foreign investment and stronger economic growth and trade opportunities" (Siddique, 2009). Under the 2010 APTTA Pakistan will get access to move in all regions of Afghanistan to carry their products, while Afghanistan through Pakistan Karachi and Gawadar ports can carry transit trade with the rest of the world. Afghanistan was also allowed to trade with India through the Pakistan Wagah border, but this is not in practice to date due to several bilateral issues.

4.1.5 Smuggling on Pak-Afghan Border

The Pak-Afghan border can be defined as a softer one, on which smuggling is a common problem in the sense that it is open for formal and informal transition throughout the year. It is also called an inter-reliant border to regulate trade, tourism, and border conversion

with mutual interconnection (Kundi, 2016). The 1268 km long Pak-Afghan border is an immense source of arms, duty-free petrol, trafficking of auto spare parts, foreign currency, and drug smuggling. During the 1980s Pak-Afghan border involved a huge Western military and financial support for resistance groups on the way to Pakistan (Waqar & Asmat, 2014). Thus, illegal smuggling generates financial as well as security losses for Pakistan.

Illegal trade among the two states on the Pak-Afghan border is a growing concern for Pakistan for several years. According to the information of the Pak-Afghan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PAJCCI), profitable smuggling in the form of trade is more than \$ 3billion which is more than double of official trade among the two states. The official trade stands at \$ 1.2 billion according to the State Bank of Pakistan statement. The fencing of the Pak-Afghan border will not only stop the militants and drug smuggling but will also restrain widespread smuggling. There are many crossing points, mostly used for illegal activities, 18 of them are easy crossing points approachable by vehicles corresponding to the FBR report that Afghan imports and transit trade had adversely affected Pakistan's economy and the cause of generating the black economy in Pakistan. Afghanistan is providing fake data to the UN's sub-body of international trade center places the imports worth numerous times less than the actual statistics, that is Pakistan's objection alongside Afghanistan relating to smuggling. Bara Markets in Pakistan are a hub worth billions of rupees smuggling items that come from Iran and Afghanistan with illegal paths, which is damaging local industries especially cigarettes and auto parts (Asif, 2019).

In 2011 Pakistan's Federal Tax Supervisory Body stated, that high-cost goods such as vehicles, cigarettes, and electronics items were being smuggled from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Avoiding the customs duties, an official estimate showed about three-quarters of all goods smuggled into Pakistan come through the APTTA before diverting into Pakistani

markets. In views of Afghan concern authorities, those Afghan origin products from Pakistan are traded in return to Afghanistan at a top price, forcing Afghans to pay customs duties on their goods. Their second concern is low-cost imports from Pakistan in the agriculture and manufacturing sector. Both states also criticized each other considering road structure and custom clearance (Husain & Elahi, 2015). The government of Pakistan is at work on many suggestions to bring in Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) to manage the pilferages in the progress of smuggling goods on both sides of the border. The proposals go forward across three parts that is; increase the figure of commodities in negative lists, allow a quota of different products and collect duty on Pakistani ports, and reimbursement on transit outside (Khan, 2019).

4.2 Economic Relations of the Two States in the Context of Regional Cooperation

As far as, the economic side of both states' relations is concerned, Afghanistan has been the major destination of Pakistan's export. In 2014 Afghanistan remained the largest trading partner of Pakistan in the economic field, as the estimated trade was \$2 billion in 2014. In the post-2014 scenario, commercial and non-commercial trade was reduced. The reduction in non-commercial trade was due to the bulk of the NATO force's withdrawal. While commercial trade decreased from 75,000 to 35,000 metric tons in 2014 because Afghanistan shifted transit from Pakistan to Iran. It owed to the improved infrastructure of Iran, a decrease in transportation cost compared with Pakistan extra charges on Afghan cargo, frequent closure of the Pak-Afghan border, the imposition of regulatory duties on imports, and devolution of Iranian currency against the US dollar (Zulfiqar, October 2015).

In 2014-2015, both states' trade reached \$ 2284, million in 2015-2016 it was \$ 1847.2 million, while in 2016-2017 \$1637.14 million bilateral trade was recorded. In 2018 Pakistan and Afghanistan trade values showed a 20% decline from the previous year.

However, Afghanistan's import from Pakistan was valued at \$800 million. According to the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI), our trade volume decreased while Afghan exports increased by 29.53% during 2017-18. It requires that Pakistan also needs to devise policies to alleviate the impacts of its decline on Pakistan's economy. Afghanistan is always dependent on Iran and Pakistan, and Afghan traders wanted to work on a joint economic zone that will boost the trade of both states. There is possibly a considerable economic opportunity for Pakistani investors too, but this is possible till modernized financial mechanisms, upgraded transportation development, and secured personal security (Husain & Elahi, 2015).

Deputy Head of the ACCI, Dawari Tawfiq said that they wanted good trade relations with neighbors but would focus first to balance trade. Trade relations are continuing among the two states, but Afghanistan now uses alternative transit routes for trade in international markets. Pakistan's commercial concerns in Afghanistan would desire a stable neighbor. Indeed, a stable and peaceful Afghanistan will provide industrial and business opportunities for Pakistan such as thousands of Pakistanis are currently employed in different fields and development and infrastructure projects. Various Pakistani developmental projects are undergoing in Afghanistan, while the private investment is also growing from the Pakistan side.

4.2.1 Regional Cooperation

Regional collaboration among the different states is not an easy task, but due to globalization, owing to some common challenges and for national interests, the states of the region come close together. Some of the regional issues like terrorism, energy deficiency, lack of regional cooperation to resolve each other hurdles the states organized and shaped different projects. Pakistan is a founder member of SAARC and ECO; thus, the two largest

regional organizations connect them with six South Asian and eight Central and Southwest Asian states. Afghanistan has been asserted to quite a few regional organizations, for the security and economic cooperation with concerned states. Afghanistan is appropriate to the Economic Cooperation Organization ECO, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the organization of Islamic States (OIC). In November 2005 with the assistance of India and Pakistan, Afghanistan became the eighth member of SAARC. Afghanistan became the 10th member of ECO in 1992, along with six Central Asian states. Apart from ADB, all these organizations have played a less signifying role in Afghanistan's economic and security ground and have not achieved their desired goals and agreements. The ECO has got on several schemes in energy, trade, transport, agriculture, terrorism, and prevention of drugs, but progress can be judged in a few sectors. Similarly, SAARC is a regional platform of member states, which aim is to promote trade and security cooperation especially, regulating terrorism and narcotics. The inclusion of Afghanistan in such organizations will help the country economically, politically, and psychologically. Afghanistan is strategically a very important state in South Asia (UNIP Report, 2006).

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is also a regional association founded in 1985 among the founder states of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey for the improvements in the socio-economic and cultural field. In 1991, the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought six independent states which also became members of ECO in 1992. Afghanistan joined the organization in 1993 (Abbasi, 2012). Common cultural and religious characters, geographical links, comparative political position, and common history are some of the foremost shared points of ECO achievements. This organization is providing a platform for a trading block like EU states. The main objective of this organization was the cooperation of member states in commerce, industries, development in the energy sector, trade, and transportation. Different trade agreements were signed on this platform, like ECO Trade Agreement

(ECOTA) signed in 2003 and put in practice in 2008 have the highest position; Transit Trade Agreement TTA, Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA), etc. are some of the attainments of ECO (Chawla, 2017). Pakistan is providing trade facilities to Afghanistan through the Arabian Sea, which can also provide benefits to other Central Asian countries as well. The rest of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) are rich with natural resources, and Afghanistan and Pakistan have transit potential for these states. Owing to political instability in Afghanistan this organization is not more effective as it was considered. If the strategic goals are set in ECO, Pakistan can emerge as one of the fastest economically developed states. Such improvement will also be beneficial for Afghanistan because both states' peace and economic stability are indispensable for each other.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established on 8th December 1985, during the first summit meeting of the seven regional countries. It includes Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. In 2007, Afghanistan became a member of SAARC. The primary objective of this organization is to meet regularly and to promote economic, social, and cultural development in the region (Ahmad, 2017). Such collaboration will be based on mutual sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, and political independence. SAARC members desired to extend this platform to promote free trade, visa-free travel, a common currency, and common defense to have to evolve the concept of greater economic cooperation like the EU and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the future. Considering the world as a global village, so regionalism and globalism have an intricate relationship (Shabbir, 2015). The main purpose behind this organization was to link historically, politically, culturally, and ethnically common states of the region for mutual benefits. But, due to frequent interruption in its meetings the member states still face numerous hitches (Hafeez, 2016). SAARC members have the potential for energy cooperation, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

In 1987, Afghanistan first time applied for membership at the third SAARC summit in Katmandu, which was supported by India. But Pakistan opposed the Indian proposal on the plea that Afghanistan will use this forum to lobby against Pakistan on the issue of the Durand line. However, the US presence in Afghanistan brought greater opportunity, as the 13th SAARC summit in 2005 approved the matter of Afghanistan. Its membership was approved and confirmed in 2006. In April 2007 Afghanistan officially was given entry as the 8th member of SAARC, during the 14th SAARC summit in Delhi, which was attended by Hamid Karzai. This forum enhanced Afghanistan's bilateral relations with its member states. Afghanistan actively participated in SAARC summits after becoming its member. Due to Afghan interests, the meeting of the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was organized in Kabul in 2015. SAFTA has the potential to uplift Afghan trade and provide tariff-free access to Afghanistan products to Indian and Pakistan markets (Ahmad & Zahoor, 2018).

In 2004 during the 12th SAARCH summit at Islamabad, an agreement was signed among the member states for free trade under the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) which was enacted on 1st July 2006. Afghanistan also acceded to SAFTA in 2002. This agreement operationalized from 1 January 2006, under which the member states reduced customs duties of all trading goods up to zero by the year 2016. SAFTA will also resolve disputes resolution among the member states through expert committees. The accomplishment of SAFTA is subject to the number and kinds of products included in the sensitive list. SAFTA also reduced 5% of tariffs on Afghan goods, not on its sensitive list. This agreement also paves the way for Afghan transit trade with India and Pakistan (Ramay & Abbas, 2013).

SCO, a joint Russian-China attempt, to counterbalance the NATO and US influence in Eurasia and beyond, formed in 2001 by Shanghai's five states attracted international

attention. China, Russia, and CARs republics are its member states. In 2005 Pakistan, Iran and India were given the observer state status while Afghanistan was given the observer state status in 2012 (Aris, 2013). Russia has adhered to admit Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India as full members of SCO where they were previously given observer status. Pakistan and India became full members of SCO on 9 June 2017 at a summit in Astana Kazakhstan, while Afghanistan is still an observer (Khetran, 2017). It is a viable forum to thwart interstate conflicts and makes CBMs among the regional states. To strengthen mutual trust, develop cooperation in economy, trade, science and technology, communication, transportation and peace, and security. SCO states have developed a strong strategy to beef up security measures. The concerned states are already active in the social and economic assistance of Afghanistan. Pakistan is a natural link among the SCO states. Pakistan intends to create a vital attractiveness in Afghanistan's peace and stability, so the SCO platform will provide such an opportunity to resolve the tension (Rehman, 2014).

4.2.2 TAPI, CASA-1000 and CPEC

Turkmenistan is the fourth-largest natural gas producer after Russia, Qatar, and Iran. It has proven 8.1 trillion cubic meters reserves in 2009. In 2002 the arrangements started among Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. India joined this project in 2006 (Abbas, 2012). In February 2016, the leaders of the four concerned countries met in (Turkey) and contracted the joint venture project of the TAPI gas conduit. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) assists as TAPI's transition consultant and development partner. The estimated cost of the project is \$10 billion. Each of the member states will hold 5% shares, while the Turkmen gas company will front-runner of the association and takes 85% impartiality of the TAPI pipeline corporation built in Dubai, which oversees the development and procedure of this project.

In December 2016, Turkmenistan took a \$700 loan from ADB to finance the project. The pipeline diameter is 56 inches, while its length is 1814 km. It will provide 33 billion cubic meters of gas annually for the term of 30 years. Afghanistan will get 500MMcf/d of gas from a total of 33 billion cubic, for India and Pakistan; the quantity is equal to that is 1,325MMcf/d. This plan is aiming for carrying a pipeline of natural gas beginning at the Galkynysh gas turf in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (D'Souza, 2017). In this scheme, a gas pipeline will go over the Afghanistan region of Herat, and Kandahar, in Pakistani territory this project will pass over to the areas of Multan and Quetta and then will reach the India border. Turkmenistan started exertion on 214km division of the pipeline taking place in her area, and then the conduit went portable 773km in Afghanistan territory and 827km in Pakistan earlier entering at the endpoint of Fazilka, Punjab region of India near to the Pak-India border (ADB, 2012).

From Turkmenistan's side, the construction of pipeline work is already in progress. The efforts to build this project on Afghan section started on February 23, 2018, when a ceremony was held near Serhetabat a small town of Turkmenistan; president of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow chaired the ceremonial function which was also attended by Ashraf Ghani, Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and M.J Akbar, Indian minister for external matters. TAPI is expected to alleviate the political tensions among the concerned states. Due to the ongoing security environment in Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani pledged a 7,000 strong force to safeguard the pipeline. It shows the interest of the Afghan authorities in the TAPI project. The Taliban also gave a green signal and warned Americans to stay away so, it was assured that a “peace pipeline” will safely pass-through Afghanistan (G. Remy, 2018).

For Pakistan and India TAPI will hold a huge potential for Indo-Pak energy demands. Pakistan is passing through the worst energy crisis and its indigenous reserves are rapidly declining. It is an enduring justifiable solution for the intensively increasing demands of the concerned states. TAPI will serve as a source of energy and power for industries and will generate almost 15,000 indirect jobs, especially for Afghanistan. TAPI can become a 'game-changer for the region in economic integration once it was completed. Thus, TAPI has the potential of being a CBM in South Asia that would be able to compel the regional states towards zero-sum rivalry for mutual benefits (D'Souza, 2017). Pakistan will also receive transit fees of \$2.5 million from India while Afghanistan could earn over \$ 1.4 billion as a transit fee annually from Pakistan after its completion. It is the beginning of a new era in cooperation especially beneficial for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India's trilateral relations. The USA is the main supporter of the TAPI project to restrain Russia.

Another economic developmental project for Pakistan and Afghanistan is **CASA-1000**. Central Asia and South Asia (CASA-1000) energy plan with the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan will provide a chunk of 1000MW electricity to Pakistan and 300MW to Afghanistan. This project was approved in 2014 and its innovative ritual was held in Tajikistan (Dushanbe) on 12th May 2016. It was approved to be finalized at the end of 2020 but due to several reasons, it is still presently throwing through attaining development for AC/DC converters and communication wires. The cost of the project is estimated at \$1.16 billion, which is approved by the World Bank. For the transmission line in Pakistan, the world bank offered \$120 million, and the rest will be provided by the Islamic development bank (Zafar, 2014). The foremost hurdle in the way of the CASA project is the security situation of Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan tribal areas. Pakistan through operation Zarb-e-Azab cleared the tribal areas from the militants and border fencing which is almost completed with the Pak-Afghan border will further provide security to CASA but not in the

case of Afghanistan. The security situation and political instability in the concerned states cannot be rejected. Frequent changes in government are also a hurdle, as every new setup has changed schedules. But the most challenging state in this project is Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is considering a key state in this project because it is covering more lengths in the CASA-1000 transmission line plan as compared with other states jointly. As a central stage, the transmission line will pass through Eastern areas which are relatively protected, but the Western part is still under Taliban control. The transmission line was proposed to line up Tajikistan after passing through Afghanistan, but the security situation in both states bordering areas is not satisfactory. On the other hand, Tajikistan and Afghanistan's diplomatic relations are not too good, border disputes are common in both states. Security is a folding development; protection means not to lose assets or substances. In the CASA project security of workers and equipment and its proposed transmission line would be secured from terrorist attacks, which are the responsibility of all the associate states. Instead of security many other issues like lack of funds and seriousness and strong determination on the part of concerned states are also required. Only then a project can make progress if its security is guaranteed (Abbas, Afridi & Kalim, 2018).

The inclusion of Afghanistan into *CPEC* in the coming era by China is a positive move towards regional cooperation. Pakistan and Afghanistan for peaceful expansion and security of CPEC started the mechanism of the Afghan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APPS) to curb militancy. The importance of this project for Pak-Afghan relations is economic connectivity to Afghanistan. CPEC urges all the regional stakeholders, especially Afghanistan and Pakistan to change the position on bothersome relations. Because both states need each other peace and stability, only then the Pak-Afghan region earns from CPEC. The trilateral cooperation of China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan under CPEC would be beneficial

for the concerned three states. Frontier works organization (FWO) is a leading infrastructure development organization of Pakistan, besides, the execution of CPEC projects FWO in collaboration with public-private partnership built many infrastructure plans. The completion of such projects will connect Gwadar with China over the Karakorum highway and Afghanistan and Central Asia through Chaman and Torkham. Western route will further be linked with Afghanistan at Ghulam Khan and Angoor Adda through the development of the Central Trade Corridor in FATA.

It is time that CPEC move beyond Pakistan and China towards Afghanistan, as per its boundary with Pakistan and China. As a breakthrough Pakistan-China and Afghanistan agreed on road connectivity through the Peshawar-Kabul motorway during its second phase. The three countries foreign ministers agreed on such a proposal, that the connection of Peshawar and Kabul through the motorway will certainly link Afghanistan to CPEC, as the Peshawar motorway is already connected to the CPEC route. The China belt and road initiative will connect land-lock Afghanistan to Pakistan's strategic Gwadar port, which will ease Kabul's trade issue. The BRI was launched in early 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the creativity of 86 countries along with Afghanistan signed an MoU with Chinese authority (Abrar, 2019). CPEC is a flagship of the BRI project, which is not successful without peace in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is also willing to join this project. One of the initiatives is the promise of CAPP. The three friendly states named this project would be China-Afghanistan-Pakistan plus Cooperation (CAPP) aiming for joint connectivity projects for trade purposes, and to build peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan can play an important role to reconcile peace in Afghanistan, while China can protect any kind of peace agreement among the two neighbors (Abrar, 2019). The entire connectivity project's successful completion depends upon peace in Afghanistan. The unstated security situation of

Afghanistan is the main hurdle in the completion of such projects. Along with CPEC other connectivity projects may face serious challenges of extremism and terrorism.

Pakistan along with other states of the region wants peace and stability in Afghanistan. The regional stakeholders include China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement of a four-nation mechanism to fight against terrorism for regional peace and stability (Rauf, et.al, 2018). China is mostly anxious regarding the conflict zone exceeding Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is doubtful for China how Pakistan will tackle militants to protect one belt one road schemes. Additionally, it will provide a corridor to militants for unrest in China. That is why China is also focusing on reconciliation in Afghanistan for peace and security in the region. China wants to strengthen the trilateral dialogue initiative among Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan and contact groups of the Shanghai cooperation organization. This involves constructing environments to compete the Afghan Taliban in the Afghan peace process with many advantages. And pave the way for peace and development in Afghanistan and beneficiary in the region (Sharaf, 2017).

The above regional, national, and international organizations of the world connected all states of the region for the purpose to promote peace, harmony, and brotherhood. The concerned states also take benefits from each other resources, which mean every state is dependent on one another for their necessities and the promotion of national self-interest. In this globalized world, no state can live in isolation, the creation of such an organization providing plate farms to the adjacent states to assemble wholly and discuss their deficiencies and suggest the best possible ways and means. Many issues were tackled through such cooperation. Besides, for the future course of action, several measures are put into consideration.

4.3 Role of Media in Both States

As a fourth pillar of the nation, the role of the mass media is to inform, entertain, educate, and influences people's behavior and mind. It reflects foreign policy and awareness for high-ranking officials. In the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan media in both states was not well established in the early days. Pakistan's print media was already established since British time many newspapers were working successfully. However, the rapid and impressive growth by the media of Pakistan in the last decade set examples for other countries too. Similarly, in 2012, in Afghanistan almost 80 TV stations and 175 FM radio channels, and hundreds of print media operating in Afghanistan. Pakistani media is giving positive coverage to Pak-Afghan relations as compared with Afghan media which is more critical towards both state relations. It is also evident that media in both states are affiliated with the foreign policy of their governments (Mushtaq & Baig, 2015). Media in both states should promote mutual projects of peace to coordinate bilateral relations.

Inappropriately, media in Pakistan and Afghanistan do not play a dynamic or constructive role to build an optimistic approach in Pak-Afghan relations. According to journalist Tahir Khan, media in both states depict a negative picture. Pakistani media nowadays has less focus on Afghanistan. No News Agency of Pakistan has any reporter in Afghanistan and the same is the case of Afghanistan's media in Pakistan. Pakistani TV channels are also very popular in Afghanistan. So, TV channels should be allowed to operate in both countries. Media should play a positive role to promote cultural events in each other countries and show a positive picture of both state relations. So, media is not playing as much positive role as it is necessary to reset their state relations. In an overall comparison of media coverage in both states, Afghan media is mostly negative towards Pakistan as compared to Pakistani media (Tahir Khan, 2019).

With the alleged involvement of both states' media in negative propaganda, former President Karzai banned Pakistani channels, newspapers, and websites. In response, Pakistan too banned Afghan TV channels broadcasting. Previously Dari and Pashto programs were allowed but were banned having no "Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority" (PEMRA) license (Usman & Khan, 2017).

4.3.1 Exchange of Visits of Media Persons

Eight members of the Afghan media delegation paid five days trip to Pakistan on March 13, 2017. In a visit to the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) headquarter the members exchanged views on the promotion of bilateral cooperation in the field of media. Both sides' participants were of the view that the promotion of a news exchange agreement between APP and Afghanistan Bakhtar News Agency and the appointment of Islamabad and Kabul media correspondents could play an effective role in bilateral relations besides economic and political advancement. The visits were followed by a Pakistan media delegation under the supervision of senior Pakistani journalist Rahim Ullah Yousafzai and APP representatives in July 2017 (APP Report, 2017).

Another group of senior journalists from Pakistan visited Kabul on five days trip on December 10, 2017, for mutual dialogue and understanding in bilateral relations in the words of Mirco Gunther resident representative of Friedrich-Ebert- Sifting (FES) in Afghanistan. "It's an important visit that comes on a tough time in bilateral relations of the two states, and we firmly believe that media has a key role in the promotion of dialogue on peace and security in the region". 13 members delegation of media group was headed by Rahim Ullah Yousafzai a prominent journalist, other famous personalities were Asma Shirazi, Saleem Safi, and Hamid Mir. Media groups of Pakistan and Afghanistan signed an MoU on crucial challenges facing the journalists and media on both sides and the matter of land rights for TV

channels also came under discussion. The delegation met with Afghan civil society, members of Parliament, and senior Afghan journalists and participated in Afghan TV channels Ariana, Zan TV, and Tolo News talk shows. Such efforts of bilateral media delegations were expected to defiantly pave the way for cooperation and will fortify civil society exchange of ideas (Afghanistan- Pakistan Media Exchange Dialogue (News, 2017).

CHAPTER 5

DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES IN AFGHANISTAN

5.1 Introduction

Afghanistan after a civil war has lost all state institutions, the state structure, and the historical and political institutions once they had. Two opposite groups emerged after the civil war in Afghanistan, one was the Pashtun's domination and the second was the Northern Alliance comprising of Hazaras, Uzbek, and Tajik to seek controls in their respective areas. The rise of the Taliban, their strict rules, and their explanation of Islam complicated the situation of Afghanistan in the 1990s which widened the gulf among different ethnic groups (Rias, 2000). However, quite a lot of other factors destabilized Afghanistan's domestic circumstances. The supports of the divergent theory are of the views that, government officials in most states are confronted with social, political, and economic domestic problems. To suffer politically they are backing wars to divert public attention from internal problems. The war compelled peoples to stay alive just for survival and eradicate the necessity of life from citizens, due to conflicts the states came under anarchy and endless fights and the residents suffered a lot (Blomdahl, 2016).

Afghanistan faced numerous domestic political issues, like endless strife, massive and widespread corruption, and deep-rooted social obscurantism, weak rule of law, vicious ethnic strife, instability, and warlords. Strong tribal structure, weak infrastructure, rocky

geography, unfriendly climate, and limited ability for standing army have weakened the political structure of Afghanistan. Certainly, Afghanistan for several decades passed through many upheavals and foreign influences wing forth and back a couple of times. Counterinsurgency, rebuilding, stabilization have worked in partnership with organized crimes, illegitimate financial problems, and widespread corruption since 2001 that distorted the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts of Afghanistan (Brown, 2017). The measurements of transparency, lawfulness, and cohesiveness of Afghan governance are crucial for Afghanistan's stability. The US withdrawing from Afghanistan handed over the authority of Afghanistan to the national unity government. But the country is still facing numerous political and administrative strains at local, regional, tribal, districts, and national levels (Katzman, 2014).

The lack of political parties in Afghanistan is also a key issue in the smooth implementation of the democratic process. Afghan politics revolve around personalities instead of party politics. Some are old warlords, and some political distribution is based on different ethnic and linguistic groups (Safi, 2018). Political disorder in Afghanistan has a direct influence on the security and politics of Pakistan. Principally peace does not sustain in Afghanistan, up until by eliminating several annoyances. Both states need to work in cooperation for the improvement of active border supervision, to wipe out the arrangements of drug traffickers, warriors, and militants from both sides of the border (Yaseen & Muzaffar, 2018). In views of Dr. Husnul Amin. Afghan's domestic political issues were shaped by Pakistani political, military, and religious establishment after 1979. Different parties and their leaders in Afghanistan were attached to the Pakistani establishment and had an affiliation with Pakistan due to their long-time stay in Pakistan. Same as Pakistan, Iran has also a very strong lobby to support Shia Hazara's community in Afghanistan. Similarly, Russian support towards Khalq and Parcham faction of the Northern Alliance and the Arab world has their

influence in Afghanistan. Thus, Afghanistan is a typical case in the appetite for foreign interference and linkages, Afghanistan is the only state where superpowers worked for their interests. These interests may be financial, military, or physical. Pakistan is always in search of the pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan has a deep political and historical affiliation with Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, every state has its lobby like the USA, France, Saudi Arabia, China, Iran, Central Asian States, Russia, India, and Pakistan.

Afghanistan has been in an enduring state of war since Soviet occupation, among different Afghan ethnic factions. Tajiks were organized under the shadow of Ahmad Shah Masoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani of Northern Alliance, which became Jamiat-e-Islami a primary Tajiks organization. Uzbeks organized under Junbesh-e-Miili of Rashid Dostum. The followers of Abdul Ali Mazari were under the Hazara Hezb-e-Wahdat and Pashtun mainly are followed Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar (Frishta, 2015). Now new coalitions in the form of new parties emerged from the 2014 elections, was the Right and Justice Party, National Coalition of Afghanistan, National United Party, National Solidarity Party, National Participation party, and National Union party are some of the Afghan registered parties having officials' candidates in Afghan parliament (Policy, 2010).

Due to socio-political impacts, Afghanistan has been facing instability in the form of wars and law and order situations. Pakistan being a front-line state against the US war on terror badly affected by Afghanistan's situation. Subsequently, on 9/11, US attacks on Afghanistan generated once again the inflow of Afghan refugees. Having a fragile economy in Pakistan affected by the bulk of huge Afghan refugees impacts Pakistani society with sectarianism, illegal and sophisticated weapons smuggled to Pakistan, drug culture became common and religious extremism also have negative impacts on Pakistan. Afterward, the Afghan refugees' camps turned into nurseries of terrorists, who threaten Pakistan's security

and defense (Idrees, 2016). A wave of terrorist accidents badly affects Pakistan's tribal areas and most parts of KP because of the landscape and mountainous areas adjacent to the Pak-Afghan border, terrorists easily infiltrated on both sides of the border.

On the way to get rid of terrorists' safe fortifications, Pak-Army started military operations in Waziristan agencies. As a result, millions of such area inhabitants were motivated to migrate to adjacent safe areas of Banu and Kohat. Another serious implication of the Afghan war on Pakistan is the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity by subsequent Drone attacks. These attacks were carried out by the US from the Afghanistan side to target the terrorist but killed innocent people too.

Due to the US occupation in late 2001, the Taliban regime collapsed. A new democratic setup was established in Afghanistan under the Umbrella of the US-drafted Bonn Agreement a roadmap for the future constitution of Afghanistan (Shah, 2012). Hamid Karzai is shown as ahead of 30 members' interim government on 22 December 2001. The first-ever presidential election in the history of Afghanistan was held on 9 October 2004, in which Hamid Karzai was elected as a President for five years. Parliamentary elections for *Wolesi Jirga* were held on 18 September 2005. After completion of the Presidential and Parliamentary terms elections were again held in 2009 and 2010, respectively (Shah, 2012). In September 2014, the third round of Presidential elections was held in which Ashraf Ghani gained a majority and took oath as a President of Afghanistan for five years term. A new office of chief executive was founded on which Abdullah Abdullah got selected. National Unity Government (NUG) was formed. Despite the democratization process in Afghanistan, the state is still facing many challenges on the political front. Afghans touched fear while participating in the election process, especially women and people of rural areas.

Peaceful protest, political activities, and criticism of government plans publicly are strongly depressed. The utmost vital factor in Afghan politics is that its administrative members consist of substantial ethnic diversity. In which 23 are Tajiks, 22 are Pashtuns, 11 Shia Hazara, 4 Uzbeks, one Pashayi (Ethno-linguistic group in eastern Afghanistan), and one Aimak (Aimak are mostly Sunni Muslims of Hanafi branch, living in north-west steppe land of Afghanistan like nomadic peoples); (Sakhi, 2015). Afghanistan's future depends not only on personalities, ethnicities, and patronage networks rather than on governing ideas and policies agenda. To stabilize the country and overcome the insurgency a more positive and improved vision is required, and an idea-based struggle is essential for future power politics (Birkle & Sherjan, 2011).

5.2 Lack of Security and Stability

The continuity of war and insecurity included attacks, violence, and terrorism, resulting in the instability is the main hurdle in the way of smooth implementation of the democratic process. Many of the conservative minds Afghans consider democracy as western agenda imposed by external elements, as an un-Islamic act a threat to their religious beliefs, cultural, and traditional norms (Shah, 2012). According to the Asia Foundation survey 2011, instead of the Afghan Security Forces and tens and thousands of US-led ISAF army, Afghanistan is still facing an absence of security and stability. Half of the people (46%) respond was positive that the county is moving in a direct direction. While 35% of people are of the view that the country is again going towards instability and wrong direction due to corruption, bad governance, and unemployment (Survey, 2011). The scattering movement of the Taliban in quite a lot of provinces worsened the security situation. The National Unity Government faces strong criticism onnational and international levels. Internally Afghanistan

is divided between 34 provinces, which are subdivided into nearly 400 districts. Most of the areas face security threats and instability all around (Collins, 2011).

Afghanistan is also considered one of the most corrupt states in the world in many fields of life. In Transparency International 2015 Perceptions Index, Afghanistan was ranked 166th out of 168th in corruption, the third corrupt country in the world. The absence of electricity and clean drinking water, the nonexistence of health and education services remain approximately the basic roots of a weak economy in Afghanistan (Foundation, 2016). Corruption not only destabilizes the Afghan government but also the international organization, aid agencies, and private sector that were involved in reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. It is a key challenge for the maintainable rule of law and sustainable private sector-led economic growth (CFC, 2012).

Vanda Felbab-Brown senior fellow of the Brooking Institute suggests the following policy measures to the National Unity Government (NUG) of Afghanistan to reduce corruption and advance governance on subsequent methods. Continue proper arrangement and counternarcotics measures, including maintaining drug postponement and its destruction, that are producing powerful mafias. Consolidation of state institutions and supporting civil society against all social evils are very helpful in bringing peace and stability in the country. Limit the role of warlords and their guerrilla tactics and illegal powerbrokers. Pointing out the dangerous networks, such as those having links with international terrorist groups that are most selfish and harmful to the society for the development of an independent state. In the 2018 survey of Transparency International Index Afghanistan ranks 4th out of 180 corrupt states in the world (Brown, 2017).

Rising insurgency and unstable political fluctuations worsened an already turmoil situation of Afghanistan, corruption, and corrupt leadership is one of the basic reasons.

International military troops' drawdown in 2014 left the fragile security environment, the Taliban fasten expanded its presence countrywide and struggling for a nationwide economy. National Unity Government (NUG) is also not able to tackle the issues of governance, human responsibilities, and financial problems. Civilian and military casualties, as well as conflicts, continue to grow (Report, 2017). Even though some progress can see in the last decade, like the protection of women, minorities' rights, and enforcement of the new constitution, but the country is still facing many security threats having direct impacts on Pakistan's security. Instead of thirteen years of prolonged stay of US troops and so-called state-building, Afghanistan is far from being stable. Ferocity, chaos, incapable governance, interflow of refugees, unmonitored cross-border movement of the militants, flourishing drug economy, and growing Taliban presence are serious threats to Afghan's stability. Nevertheless, these homes grown domestic issues have direct implications for Pakistan's security due to the nature of the Pak-Afghan porous border. Continual foreign troops' involvement in Afghanistan is also a major cause of the poverty of Afghanistan on many grounds (Khan, 2016).

The rise of the Taliban, the issue of the Afghan refugees, the growth of poppy cultivation as a growing drug mafia in Afghanistan, and cross-border infiltration on the Pak-Afghan border are some of the major domestic political issues which not only destabilize Afghanistan but have direct security implications for Pakistan, as well as having negative consequences for both states' relations.

5.3 The Taliban Insurgency

The Ulema and village Mullahs are at the heart of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. These religious leaders were ignored during the years of state-building. Several attempts were made to include them into state structure and put them on government

portfolios. These efforts stood only to crush their traditional hold on the rural population of Afghanistan but produced no fruitful results to switch the growing influence of the Ulema which later seemed like an influential force in the shape of the Taliban with dissimilar ethnic groups (Rasanayagam, 2002). The disappointment of the Mujahidin to convey peace in Afghanistan after the Soviets left in 1989 opened the route for development. For utmost peace people of Afghanistan wholeheartedly supported the Taliban movement. Approximately the Taliban members defeated the Soviet forces; most of them got training in refugee camps in Pakistan. The Taliban emerged with full power in 1994, controlling almost 90% of Afghanistan, and emerged as a prominent political strength, imposing their law in the state (Hand, 2003).

Afghanistan is facing a de facto situation among the Northern Alliance in the North and Pashtuns in the South as well as Uzbek and Tajik warlords. Even the donor countries at that time who were taking interest in Afghanistan reconstruction also hesitated on Afghanistan law and order situation. That the money we will put on the table for rebuilding can be used as an attraction to get various groups to cooperate. This will make the warlords very powerful (McCauley, 2002). When the Taliban government in Afghanistan collapsed, the Taliban supporter returned to their fragmented nature (Afghanistan Report, December 2011). There remains no unified group within the Taliban network. Different commanders with different organizations such as Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin group, and the Haqqani network have proved very detrimental to the security of Pakistan. These sets have firm common features:

1. Disapproval to the Western armed forces
2. Rejection to admit the prevailing political structure
3. The Taliban will be engaged with the Western troops until it completes withdrawal

4. Universal demands for firm Islamic governing structure

The Taliban followers believed that the existing democratic structure is untrustworthy, antagonistic in nature, and detached. The entire community, interim leaders, and officials in Afghanistan have made quite a lot of effort for the agreement with the Taliban. These efforts have been vulnerable by many trials (Background, 2011). From 2003 to 2008, the Taliban revolt extended and almost one-third of the country's population conflicted. Some of the measures and mechanisms for reconciliation yield nearly positive outcomes, but a major sign of reconciliation remained elusive. Due to Afghanistan's devastating situation, the Afghan government came under growing domestic criticism, not only because of the rising Taliban position but its internal division among different splits. According to Saleem Safi, "one of the key domestic political issues in Afghanistan is the presence of the Taliban, whose resistance is a headache for Ashraf Ghani's establishment. The Taliban are willing to talk with the US authorities but not with the Ashraf Ghani government. As the Taliban are not accepting the present government of Ashraf Ghani as legitimate (Safi, 2018).

In the meantime, it is clear to the ISAF forces that the security of Afghanistan cannot be raised without the help of the Taliban. The presence of US troops was not acceptable to the Afghans' local community and the Taliban leadership. The number of US forces in Afghanistan, which was 100,000 in 2011, decreased to the number of about 14000, only to assist and train Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) under the '*Resolute Support Mission*'. The US asserted that the Taliban still posed the threat to Afghan political stability. The death of the Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor by US unidentified airstrikes once broke the negotiation settlement flanked by the Afghan government and the Taliban (CRS, 16, September 2016). But the Taliban are now on the table talking with US authorities after a long time in different phases during July, November,

and December 2018. On the question of the Taliban's new strategy in Afghanistan in an interview with the author, Tahir Khan said.

The Taliban leadership has two points one is foreign, second is national.

1. First, the Taliban wants to know whether the foreign troops will leave Afghanistan. If yes, then when? We want a time frame.
2. Second, the Taliban leader's want their leadership names should be excluded from UNSC sanctions lists.
3. Third, they want recognition of their office in Qatar.
4. These all powers are in hands of US authorities that is why the Taliban leadership first wants to negotiate with the US establishment.
5. The second phase of future setup in Afghanistan will start after that with the Afghan government (Khan, 2019).

Afghanistan National Security Council (ANSC) based on article 64 of the Afghan constitution, intends to bring the insurgents towards the negotiation table. ANSC presided by the President, high ranking civilian and military officials are its members. The President holds usually one meeting a week to appraise the security of state and policy recommendations (Biography, 2018). The members of ANSC and the provincial authorities come across senior Taliban leaders on a discrete level to bring them towards compromise. These efforts had provided a means of communication between the President and the insurgents. ANSC to some extent was effective to bring a few of the Taliban leaders towards reconciliation (Background, 2017). According to professor Waqar Ali Shah views in an interview with the author, "The Taliban now wanted to prove to the outside world that we are home-grown people, we are not getting any dictation or facilitation from Pakistan if the Taliban carry on this process on international forum and realize to the world that we want no

more stay of foreign troops in Afghanistan and needs its complete pullout, so it will be beneficial for Pakistan too" (2018, September 4).

Afghan leadership also strives to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table. President Karzai offered a peace deal to the Taliban by conducting a *grand peace jirga* in 2010 and then *Loya Jirga* in 2011. But the Taliban rejected Karzai's virtues. Similarly, President Ashraf Ghani not only politically recognized the Taliban as a legitimate political entity but also offered power-sharing with them. The Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid positively answer Ashraf Ghani's peace initiative and said "We support all efforts that lead to ending the ongoing crisis in this country. "It raised the expectation for peace talks between the Afghans and the Taliban leaders (Kaura, 2018).

5.4 Cross Border Infiltration and Border Fencing

Mismanagement on the Pak-Afghan border is one of the antagonistic issues in bilateral relations. Round about 56,000 people cross the border on both sides of the Durand Line on daily basis to meet their relatives and dear ones. Out of which 90% of the flow originates from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Many issues emerged from the unrestricted movement of people for both the states. Even insurgent activities have been taking place under the shadow of trade (Khan, 2015). In border activities, cross-border militant infiltrations are a genuine issue especially in the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Blame game on each other strongly pressurized governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to secure their borders. This not only destabilizes the inter-governmental relations but also affects the safe passage of people, legal energy agreements, and transit goods. To close the vital routes, both states' economies suffer (Clarke, 2010).

In 2001 when the Taliban regime ended in Kabul, most of the insurgents crossed the Pak-Afghan border and took asylum into Pakistan's tribal areas. Since the beginning of the

US military operation against the Taliban insurgents, cross-border movement and outside support to the Afghan guerrillas are a mutual phenomenon. These border activities have greatly destabilized the security situation and made it more difficult for both countries to tackle counterinsurgency tactics (Larsdotter, 2014). Blame game on each other continues due to cross-border militant activities. Every sovereign state has the right to border management under international law, in views to Nafees Zakaria foreign office spokesman, “we have continued efforts to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan, some of the Afghans are misguided by those elements who didn’t want peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that effective border management will serve mutual interest” (Ikram & Marwat, 2018).

Prime Minister Gillani paid a special visit to Afghanistan in July 2011 to boost the efforts of the cross-border incursion, in June 2011; Karzai discussed resolving this issue through the border mechanism commission his visit to Pakistan (Raja, 2011). At a news conference in June 2011, Karzai said he wanted to see a quick and peaceful solution. Prime Minister Gillani views that his Army exercising ‘utmost restraint’ against militants and cross-border incursion this situation ‘needs to be defused quickly’ (Tribune, 2011). And at last, Pak-Army took this initiative to start work on border fencing. Afghan government criticizes this plan on the plea that it is discrimination to divide the peoples into both sides. But this allegation was removed from the Pakistan side that its only purpose is to stop illegal movement and the provision of security in both states. However, no major accident took place from the Afghan side to attack or erect the fencing. Even the Pak-Army during the construction process of the border took constructors from both sides of the border to complete this work.

Professor Fakhrul Islam's opinion in an interview about the fencing of the border from Pakistan's side as a sovereign state Pakistan has the right to protect her border against any intervention through fencing like every nation. As per the Afghans, a negative attitude

about border fencing is concerned. Afghans are raising the issue of territorial claim adjacent to the Durand Line, which is wrong because they have no evidence or proof with documents that it was signed for 100 years. On 3rd June 1947 Plan, Pakistan Muslim League, India, and the British, all signed the border demarcation. So, Pakistan is a unanimously accepted independent state, and whenever the new state emerged the old treaties went into the background. So, in the prevailing circumstances of war against terror, the issue of the Durand line went on which basis Afghans are denying the border fencing its Pakistan's right and a good decision to protect her borders.

Under the National Action Plan and afterward the successful military operation of Zarb-e-Azab, Pak-army took this issue under consideration. Eventually, under the supervision of the Pakistan army, the work on fencing of the Pak-Afghan border started in June 2016 which completions are in the last stages. It is hoped that until next June 2020 this project is going to be completed. It is not just border fencing but for the protection of border fencing, border forts are also built for its protection. Only 443 border forts are required on an area adjacent to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa areas of the Pak-Afghan border. In the 2300 km border area construction work of fencing was done in a 45 km zone. Pakistan's DG ISPR elaborated that, the purpose of border fencing was to stop militant infiltration from either side, as Afghanistan has been more critical on this issue so, their concern keeps under confidence. Afghan ambassador in Islamabad was officially informed by Pakistan, while to start its construction work. After that, the Afghan government on no occasion raised condemnation about border fencing. According to Major General Asif Ghafoor Bajwa, "we have shared through our foreign office a comprehensive action plan document with Afghanistan, and subsequent action will lead for further improvement" (Khan, 2018).

The construction work will be completed in three phases, first fencing of all areas connected to Pak-Afghan borders, the second component of fencing is the construction of

border forts, and the third section is border management system control on informal cross-border movement from both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. Paktika and Khost villages are seeing clear on the border side of Afghanistan. Nearly 750 forts will be constructed on every 3 km of distance in which 243 forts are already completed, while more than 39 are near to completion. The official estimate of the project will cost over \$550 million or 56 billion. A pair of nine-foot wire fences, with a six-foot gap and topped with barbed wire. The fencing of the border will not only regulate the movement of people and goods but will also check the militant's infiltration from across the border (Dawn, 2017). However, today the entire Pakistani nation stands along with Pak-Army on such an issue to protect its border from foreign aggression especially Indian undesirable activities in Pakistan's province of Baluchistan. It is important in the sense that fencing will stop illegal trafficking too, which will be a positive sign for both states' trade management and similarly will reduce both states' problems.

5.5 Both States Position on Border Fencing

During the visit of Pakistan COAS, Afghan concern of border fencing cleared that the fencing was to stop the unauthorized cross-border movement of the militants and not to erect the walls between the people of two states. Ashraf Ghani appreciated Gen. Bajwa's security measures for peace and stability. Both sides agreed on continuity of peace and stability to achieve both state objectives (*COAS holds crucial talks in Kabul, the Express Tribune, on 13 June 2018*). According to Muhammad Sadiq, former Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan, "The Afghan government publicly oppose the fencing, but Pakistan's said that the fencing is undergoing in its territory, not on Afghan soil. Some of the Afghan leaders were against border fencing, but no serious accident occurs from the Afghan side. Nor internationally Afghanistan opposed the fencing. Locally small-scale resistance appeared which set

promptly. In Sadiq's views, the outcome of fencing will be positive on both states' security if the law enforcement system of Pakistan punches accordingly. In borders smuggling from both sides, the concerned authorities are involved. Fencing will reduce the chances of such issues".

A high-level Afghan security delegation visited Islamabad on June 19, 2018, for a discussion on bilateral security and intelligence cooperation. The Afghan delegation comprised of Interior Minister Wais Ahmad Barmak, Hanif Atmar advisor to national security, intelligence chief Masoum Stanikzai, and other senior officials. The delegation took the discussion on a recent ceasefire from the Afghan government with the hope to initiate a possible solution to the war overstated country. Pakistani officials stated the visit took place as a new engagement framework. This is followed by Pakistan's COAS visit to Kabul on 12 June. At the death of TTP leader Maulana Fazlullah in June 2018, Pakistan was pressurized by the US and Afghan authorities to push the Taliban towards reconciliation (Afghan Security Delegation Visit, Daily Dawn, 2018 June 20).

Despite criticisms on both sides, tolerance is obligatory in relations since there seems no conventional alternative approach of regular trust-building and nonviolent meetings, which are required for mutual understanding and trust-building. Now requires an environment of shared perception, where both the states have prompted their grievances and a central way is required which can help to break the impasse. The civil-military approach makes improvements in Pak-Afghan ties, especially in the civilian-directed areas in the field of trade and people-to-people contracts should be encouraged.

5.5.1 Cross-Border Military Operations and Border Security Measures

When the Taliban government ended in 2001, many thousand Afghan Taliban militants fled crossways the border to Pakistan, resulting in the Pakistan's militant's

infiltration of Afghan insurgents in the shape of worse law and order situation in the country. The boundary zone has since then been used broadly by Afghan guerillas as heaven and they have had considerable flexibility to work in Pakistan. Due to the presence of Afghan migrants, various terrorist incidents occurred in Pakistan (Larsdotter, 2014). The US also realized the negative impacts of cross-border infiltrations on the security of Pakistan. US President Barack Obama his Regional Stabilization Strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan professed on 1 December 2009 that; *Today, it is clearer than ever before that we must expand our relationship with Pakistan beyond security issues and lead the international community in helping the Pakistani people overcome political, economic, and security challenges that threaten Pakistan's stability, and in turn undermine regional stability*" (Larsdotter, 2014).

After assuming the state security by the Afghan National Security Forces, a significant increase can be observed in border attacks. Almost 194 border attacks were noted from 2007 to 2010. In 2011, 67 border attacks from both sides were reported. Similarly, the number of attacks rose to 732 in the year 2012 whereas, in 2013 twenty-three such infiltrations were reported (IPRI, 2015). In 2014 a dramatic rise in civilian and military casualties on the Pak-Afghan border was noted which triggered the closing of the border from both sides (Khan, 2015).

In June 2016, firing erupted on Khyber Agency from the Afghan side which continued for two days. Pakistan decided to construct the gate on Torkham, for facilitating cross-border movement, check, verification, and halt militants from across the border (Khan, 2016). In shelling from the Afghan border side, two of the Pakistani soldiers were seriously injured, one Major Jawad Changezi has been killed and 18 civilians were also injured. Curfew was imposed on the Torkham border, which sabotages Pakistan's efforts of border management. On this occasion, Pakistan's Interior Minister Chaudry Nisar said that

Afghanistan would have to decide to support Pakistan's stance for peace or play someone else game in the region (Tribune, 2016).

In a move towards border management, both states replaced numerous interactions, which opened a new era of bilateral relations. In this respect, on 11 January 2015 Lt General Hidayat Ur Rehman paid a visit to Kabul in which "Matters related to border security came under discussion. During the meeting ways and means were also discussed to further enhance the existing border coordination mechanism." The meeting was attended by ISAF representatives and the Afghan Border Police. On 13 January 2015 Commander of Southern Command Lt General Nasir Khan Janjua visited Afghanistan for the second round of the Commander's meeting. The two sides emphasize border mechanism especially at two points i.e., Torkham and Spin Boldak (Dawn, 2015). A high-level army delegation from Pakistan headed by Chief of General Staff (CGS) Lieutenant General Bilal Akbar visited Kabul in the direction of COAS Gen Bajwa in April 2017. The delegation held a meeting with Afghan acting defense minister Mr. Tariq Shah and Afghan Chief of Army Staff General Mohammad Sharif Yaftail. The delegation paid condolence on the tragic accident of the Mazar-e Sharif attacks and conveyed the message to Afghan authorities that the "Pakistan army had control and standing armies in all areas adjacent to the Pak-Afghan border and intend not to permit its soil to be used against Afghanistan as terrorism is a shared menace for both states."

On October 2, 2017, COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa on the invitation of President Ghani visited Afghanistan as an additional chapter in ending the Afghan conflict. Several critical issues came under discussion including the war on terrorism, regional security, bilateral relations, border security management, peace and stability, and transit trade. Bajwa said that "Pakistan would provide any cooperation in the war on terrorism and supports an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace talk." Ghani said that both states are

friendly nations, joint working together can help in moving forward peace and reconciliation of the two countries, as well as cooperation, can lead the peoples of both states out of poverty (Tribune, 2017). Pakistan is on track for the facilitation of reconciliation among the Taliban and Afghan government, as it appears to join US and China facilitation talks with the Taliban and Kabul regime. The visit was marked as a new session of relationship too gets more from cooperation instead of blaming each other.

5.6 Afghan Refugees Problem

Afghan refugees are a by-product of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan; almost 3 million Afghan refugees came to Pakistan during 1979-1989. After the 9/11 US attacks on Afghanistan, the figure reached 5 million in Pakistan. Of which 85% are Pashtun's dialect and the rest are Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazaras (DIIS Report, 2011). Afghan refugee is a great hindrance to Pak-Afghan's smooth relations since 1979. Their presence in Pakistan is now a concern for Pakistan's security because they are spread in all provinces of Pakistan as well as in the tribal belt of FATA and the capital territory of Islamabad (Khan, 2015). Almost 5.7 million Afghan migrant's paybacks to Afghanistan from Pakistan, while 1.7 million registered Afghan refugees are still in Pakistan as of March 2009 source. Afghan refugees are living in quite a few countries as well, while Pakistan is number one in the world to host such a large number.

In Pakistan currently, 3 million Afghans stayed as immigrants of which 1.6 million are registered and the rest are unregistered (CSRS, 2015). The migration of Afghans is a great problem for Pakistan and Iran. Law and order situation, unemployment, prolonged war, and insecurity are the main reasons which compelled the Afghans to migrate. On the question of Afghan refugees, Tahir Khan said; here are three kinds of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. One registered Afghan refugee in Pakistan has a Proof of Registration Card (PRO) its number is

1.4 million. Second documented Afghans, which were not registered previously that is almost 70 to 80 thousand, have no POR cards they are considering only registered Afghans and their stay is illegal in Pakistan. Third, those hidden refugees who have not documented themselves number 30 to 40 thousand. Currently Pakistani has 2.3 million Afghan refugees. At the request of the Afghangovernment, their stay in Pakistan has been extended till June 2019, due to some administrative and security issues (Khan, 2019).

5.6.1 Factors Responsible for the Afghan Migration

1. Insecurity and War; For the last 16 years Afghanistan is under war, civilian causalities, and the country's unstable situation compelled the masses to migrate.
2. Economic Problems of migrations in Afghans; Corruption, bad governance, lack of education facilities, and unemployment in young Afghans are also the factor of Afghan migration.

There are two main factors behind migration that is push and pull factors (Todaro, 2001).

Push aspects

These are domestic circumstances that force the individual to transfer unwillingly when sometimes life is at risk. It may include domestic insecurity like civil war, authoritarian regimes, political fanaticism, noncompliance of human constitutional rights, customs, and several viruses, etc. For example, in 2017, almost 507, 000 Afghans were forced to flee their homes due to the conflict of ISAF forces (Tronc, 2018). The Taliban and other militant groups are competing for power in many districts that triggered domestic insecurity in Afghans are also the cause of migration.

Pull factors

These are named economic, political, and security factors (CSRS, 2015). Push factors are mostly correlated, suppose there is political and economic conflict in an area, the physical

security will also suffer from such people, which compel them to migrate (European Asylum Support Office, 2016).

Socio-Economic Factors

Good economic chances in foreign states, poverty constraints, economic hardships, and advancement of communication enlarged the young Afghans' activities to leave the country for education and job purposes to extend family income (Todaro, 2001). The presence of family and relatives in foreign states is also broadly accepted in the pull factor of migration. Consuming a family associate out of the country is also a factor associated with an inclination to leave Afghanistan. Afghans family mostly sends one male family member to set aboard and then he makes assets for the moving of the whole family. Almost 38% of Afghans are living abroad in the US, Iran, Germany, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, providing economic assistance to their families and relatives. Due to the porous Pak-Afghan border, most of the forced migration movements are found in Pakistan and to some extent in Iran. On June 1, 2016, Pakistan imposed strict travel permit rules that affect Afghan's stay in Pakistan. Similarly, Iran also took drastic policy measures against Afghan irregular migrants and asylum seekers. When Afghans realize the resettlement and restrictive policies of destination states, they look for alternatives. A significant increase of Afghans looking for accommodations in European countries like Germany, Norway, Switzerland, and EU member states (Asia Foundation Survey, 2016).

Political and Security factors

These are also one of the major causes of Afghan migration. Afghanistan is facing a lack of political stability due to a decade of war, violence (real or perceived), insecurity (threats to personal security, ethnic rebellion, suspension of political and fundamental human rights, and human rights abuses). Afghans had fewer chances of a political well and different ethnic

groups mostly destabilized the process of the election caused huge rigging and abolishing the electoral process (European Asylum Support Office, 2016).

5.6.2 Implications for Pakistan

Its accommodation was a complicated task for the government of Pakistan to provide basic needs to a substantial number of refugees. Accommodation, arrangements of schooling for the Afghan children in tent villages, medical facilities, relief work, and food supplies present complications for the government of Pakistan (Mehdi, 1987). Pakistan asked the international community for the assistance of the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Many relief organizations like, Save the Children Fund, the World Health Organization (WHO), The League of Red Cross Societies, the Pakistan Red Crescent Society, Church International services, and other relief agencies assisted Pakistan during the Soviet occupation. Apart from the United Nations, twenty-eight international and voluntary agencies were involved in the rehabilitation process (Girardet, 1985). Due to the heavy influx of Afghan refugees' streets in Peshawar turn into Afghan domination and hold over the small-scale business, carrying their weapons and drugs, causing traffic difficulties, and generating law and order situations for security agencies. Another problem was Afghan agents in the refugee camps, a common marvel that Afghan warriors have come to Pakistan on the pretext of spying on refugees to create hurdles among the migrants and local peoples (Mehdi, 1987).

5.6.3 Geneva Accord and Issue of Afghan Refugees

In Geneva Accord signed on 14 April 1988, the government of Pakistan and Afghanistan were the high contracting parties. With the desire for normalization of relations and strengthening international peace and security, both contracting parties (Pakistan-

Afghanistan) agreed on arrangements for the safe return of Afghan refugees. It was mentioned in Article 1 of the Geneva Accord that all Afghan refugees on the territory of Pakistan shall be allowed to return voluntarily to their homeland and provide all possible assistance in their repatriation (Yunas, 2008) whereas the government of Afghanistan in this regard shall take all essential actions for the intended returns of the Afghan migrants in their mother country.

According to the United Nations, November 2001 estimated that there were 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan (McCauley, 2002). The returning of the Afghan refugees started once again soon after the terrorist attack of December 16, 2014, on Army public school Peshawar. According to the report of UNHCR, almost 91485 Afghans were returned to their homes from January 1 to June 30, 2015. This estimation shows a 418% increase as compared to 2014 (CSRS Report, 2015). According to Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Major General Asif Ghafoor, up till 2017, there are 54 Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, of which 43 camps are in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. Asif Ghafoor said that terrorists easily escaped in refugee camps, which is a direct security threat to Pakistan as well as to Afghanistan and the US.

These camps are used for terrorist activities; therefore, the safe return of remaining Afghan refugees is in the best of Pakistan and Afghanistan interests. Till 2017, the strength of registered and non-registered Afghans in Pakistan is almost in millions. The government of Pakistan had given the final deadline of 31 January 2018, which was extended till 30 June 2019. From March to June 2018, almost 6 thousand 8 hundred eighty-six (6886) registered Afghans families returned to their homeland. UNHCR provided \$200 to each Afghan returnee (Daily Ajj, June 7, 2018). "There are still 3 million Afghan refugees in which 1.4 million are registered and the rest are non-registered, which is still huge pressure on the

government, and the poor refugees also suffering from several problems. Their numbers increase due to porous border, it should be encouraged that only documented people were coming to the country in the right manner but harassing people on check posts will create a negative picture."

Afghanistan ambassador to Pakistan, Dr. Umar Zakhilwal asserted that Afghan resident refugees should return to their country, Pakistan instead of looking with suspicion should treat them as guests and respectively return them as a goodwill gesture of brotherhood. The Afghan refugees are a problem for Pakistan's economy, its return will ease the financial burden and Pakistan will reaffirm some control over its dilapidated state institutions and border security (Rashid, 2008).

5.7 Drug Production and Poppy Cultivations in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is not only the great opium producer in the world but also the extreme opium user in which many individuals are in serious condition (Weekly Analysis, 2016). Drugs are more dangerous than terrorism. In the entire world daily 100 people are killed by terrorism, while 500 people are killed by drugs. Drug manufacture and drug trading have great belongings as well as the rootsof radical uncertainty. They embellishment under feeble states and withstand that feebleness by funding rebellion and warlords. It also threatens the official prosecution activities and security forces. Drug eradication failures are connected to absences in security and governance. During the 1970s, the poppy was refined over half of Afghanistan's 28 provinces giving 250 Metric Tons of opium to carry across (Hyman, 1992).

5.7.1 Poppy Production during the 1990s

From 1992 to 1995 Afghanistan ought to form steady progress of 2200-2400 metric tons of opium every single year, equaling Burma as the world's major manufacturer of raw opium (Rashid, 2008). In 1996 Afghanistan produced 2250 metric tons. According to the

United Nations Drugs Control Program (UNDCP) in 1996, only Kandahar province formed 120 metric tons of opium, collected as of 3160 hectares of poppy fields, an overwhelming growth from 1995. In 1997, when the Taliban control prolonged to Kabul and North of Afghanistan, opium production rose by 25 percent to 2800 tonnes. Tens of thousands of Pashtun refugees who arrived from Pakistan to Afghanistan (in the Taliban control areas) started farming the easiest and more lucrative cash crop (Rashid, 2008). In 1980, all the Mujahidin guerrilla leaders had cast-off drug currency to finance their armed campaign. Publicly the Taliban refused to admit drug trafficking, but none of them admire controlling its production. In 1997, UNDCP valued that 96 percent of Afghan heroin came from the Taliban-controlled areas. According to an Afghan Taliban “, we cultivate it because of its hurt non-Muslims. That is why we are growing it, and its growth will continue against non-Muslims to fund the Taliban activities (Brahimi, 2010). The central Asian region was mostly hit by the explosion of Afghan heroin.

The returnee Afghan refugees from Pakistan once again continue the lucrative production of the poppy crop (Maley, 1989). Massive narcotics trade developed in Pakistan with the help of seven Mujahideen groups, Pakistani drug dealers, the involvement of some government officials, and military elements. Drug money in Pakistan seriously sponsored industries and trade. For eradicating the products of drug, the western countries provided Pakistan with \$ 100 million aid resulting in the decease of products to 24 MT during the year 1997 (Rashid, 2000). Afghanistan is a major producer of illicit opium production directly involved in the processing of heroin. Afghanistan produces almost 350 tons of heroin's annually, almost 75 percent of the world's supply. Western European countries' annual consumption of heroin is almost 120 tons of which 80 percent emanates from Afghanistan. Especially, the land and atmosphere of Jalalabad and Helmand are well suited for growing poppy production which provides almost one-quarter of the world's production (Marsden,

2002). The question arises in concentration that why did drug production decrease during the Taliban era? and why did the existing establishment fail to stop its production? There are several competing theories regarding the increase and decrease in drug production. During the Taliban era, it was assumed that the Taliban may have seen the drug as a bargaining chip to negotiate with the Western Countries. Another assumption was that it increases the price of opium, which had gone down due to overproduction in previous years from \$60 per kg to \$20 per kg. Ensuring the ban on its cultivation, prices, and demands increased ten-fold internationally (UNDCP, 2001).

In 1999, Afghanistan produced 75% of the worldwide illegitimate drug production. Due to a ban on poppy cultivation in 2000, its production dramatically declined from 4,700 metric tons to only 74 metric tons (Good hand, 2003). During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, Mullah Omar the leader of the Taliban movement imposed a complete ban on poppy cultivation. In August 1999, Mullah Omar issued a decree against poppy cultivation, which reduced its production to one-third $\frac{1}{3}$. He convinced the farmers to farm and grow crops instead of opium cultivation. Fields of opium crops were set on fire, but the ban may have been a tactic to push up drug amounts on western markets. The second decree implemented on July 27th, 2000, declared its manufacturing un-Islamic or Haram bringing down the production to 74 MT (UNDCP, 2001).

5.7.2 Increase in Drug Production Since 2001

However, the Northern Alliance which controlled 10 percent of the Afghanistan area continued to cultivate poppies crop. Owing to reduced supply from Afghanistan the price of heroin dramatically rose from the US \$30 to \$700 during 2000-2001. In November 2001, because of the US-led military operation in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime collapsed. In the year 2002, Afghan farmers once further planted poppy in their fields, which increased the

growth rate of heroin up to 3,400 MT (Good Hand, 2003). The availability of drugs has had drastic effects on Pakistan and Iran as a next-door neighbor to Afghanistan. Both neighboring states have the highest rate of heroin addiction in the world. Half of the Afghan's GDP accounts for narcotics, 2.5 million peoples are directly involved in its production and trade (Clarke, 2010). It is difficult to completely eradicate the growing of opium crops from Afghanistan as half of the population depends on poppy cultivation for survival. Nowadays the US in Afghanistan is not considered to eradicate the evil of heroin from this land; their only interests are the minuscules US narcotics industry. The U.S. and NATO also support counternarcotics efforts because the Neo-Taliban relies on funding from narcotics sales (McCauley, 2002).

5.7.3 Drug Dealers and Mafia behind Poppy Production

The opium trade is a profitable one in Afghan terms. In total profits of production, only 1% goes to farmer's hands, while 2.5% remained in the hands of Pakistan-Afghanistan dealers. Even though 5% was spent on countries through which the opium passed en route, whereas the rest of the profit accumulated in the hands of the US and European dealers. Approximately, 85% of all seized heroin in the UK is produced from Afghanistan opium (Good hand, 2003). After the oil and arms trade, the drug trade constitutes the major attractiveness in international trade.

Nonetheless from 2001 to date, drug production increases instead of decreases. Drugs also have great implications for Afghanistan. The country is at risk of a considerable spread of HIV due to unsafe ways of using drugs i.e., injections of drugs, needles, and syringes (P. Caulkins, et al. 2010). Many counter-narcotic efforts were taken for political and administrative stability, but not successful in the case of Afghanistan (P. Caulkins, et al. 2010). Ex-interior minister Rahman Malik in a statement said that Afghanistan is a hub of

terrorism and drugs, almost 90% of the world's drug production is collected from Afghanistan. Drugs are collected under government supervision from 21acks acre land of Afghanistan. He further said Pakistan and the entire World are seriously affected by drugs.

Pakistan very successfully eradicates the evils of opium production from Pakistani society under the supervision of the Army, government, and civil society. Due to a porous border and cross-border movement with Afghanistan, drugs were very easily smuggled to Pakistan which critically affected Pakistani society. United Nations should have emphasized Afghanistan for the eradication of opium production and its smuggling to Pakistan and the entire world (Chaudry, 2017).

Despite all the effects, capable management with wide-ranging domination all over the country is the only key to drug eradication (Weekly Analysis, 2016). The heroin detonation originating from Afghanistan is now touching the policies and economy of the entire region. It breaks the social order, alters the previously breakable state economy, creates a class of narco-elite that forecasts the ever-increasing insufficiency of the inhabitants (Rashid, 2008). Millions of people are affected by using drugs in different diseases like Cancer and HIV, which is a great human disaster that needs strict measures for the eradication of such evil (Chaudry, 2017).

According to an Afghan researcher, "Kabul regime having fewer developmental projects in rural areas as compared with urban areas that's why the production increases. The different living standard of rural and urban areas is a big perception; urban is supporting the government while people of the rural areas are supporting the Taliban. This has huge political implications. In 2018, a record of opium production was noted in Afghanistan as compared last 40 years due to a security issue. Political instability is the main cause of its growing production (Adnan, 18 March 2019)."

Many factors are responsible behind this mafia, deficiency of the rural areas and the lack of the Kabul government interests in such areas are the main cause of its growing production, continued fighting and lack of self-confidence in the country. Drugs demand, particularly from the Western States. It has been discussed that illuminations of this universal problem of drug addiction lie within consumer countries themselves, as most policy tools are counterproductive or ineffective (Brown, 2017). According to the UNODC report in \$70bn profits of drugs in Afghanistan, only \$2bn went into agriculturalists' hands and the rest of the cash die in the hands of drugs smuggler and drug mafia inside and outside of Afghanistan.

26th June is observed as International Day against Drugs abuse and illicit trafficking. Regardless of rigorous exertions by the international community, internal drug implementation agencies, and the Afghan government, poppy production endlessly increases the problem for Afghanistan. With the inauguration of the new Afghan government under the Bonn Conference guidelines, Afghan President Hamid Karzai attempted to eradicate opium production. He established several institutions i.e., the counter-narcotics department of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Public Health, and Ministry of Agriculture organizations for the eradication of drug production, but still, Afghanistan produced almost 90% of the world's opium. Almost 3.3 million Afghans are involved in drug manufacturers. Most people are involved in dealing with heroin trafficking into European countries, which kill every year thousands of people worldwide. The Afghan government has not been effective. They are of the view that foreign forces were directly responsible for its failure because insecurity was the main hurdle in the way of drug eradication (War in Afghanistan, 2011). In 2016, a report of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) about the increase of opium production turned the attention of the Afghan government towards the switch of poppy cultivation. In this regard, the lower house of the Afghan parliament (*Wolesi Jirga*) summoned the Minister of Counter Narcotics, public health, and Interior Affairs Minister.

The production of drugs decreased to some extent. It is mentioned that severe weather was the main cause of low poppy production in 2017-2018. But the poppy production had a landmark increase in 2016. According to the joint investigation report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) and the Afghan government in 2016, it was estimated that poppy production increased by almost percent. While the production of opium increased by about 43 percent which shows that Afghanistan once again emerged as a great opium producer in the world (Weekly Analysis, 2016).

With multi-layered effects on Afghanistan, in 2017 the opium production reached its highest level. Its production reached from 63% to 328,000 hectares in 2016-17, became the world's second principal creator of opium. Opium manufacture reports up by 87 to 9000 metric tons, the maximum rapid increase of poppy cultivation in the history of Afghanistan. Helmand province is a center of opium production as well as the Taliban insurrection (Brown, 2017). Helmand produced 79% to 63,700 hectares, around half of the overall national production, the durable increase was also experimental in Balkh, five times more than in 2016. Almost 60% of farming took place in the South of Afghanistan, the Western region producing 17% of total cultivation, the Northern region manufacturing 13%, and the Eastern region producing 7% of total production (UNODC, 2017). In 2017, the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan diminished from 13 to 10, while the number of opium cultivated provinces increased from 12 to 24. The province of Balkh which remained declared poppy-free in 2014, prolonged its production from 204 hectares in 2015, and an almost 100% increase was noted in 2017 (UNODC, 2017).

Some of the above Afghanistan domestic political issues are bilaterally destabilized both state relations. The Taliban issue is common and bilateral, such elements existing in both the state, in Afghanistan they occupied a major portion and want to rule over state

machinery. Similarly, cross-border military infiltration is also a bilateral issue for which both the states blame each other. But the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border to some extent will reduce the tragic accidents of militant infiltration. The Afghan refugees are also a great burden on the Pakistan economy, but the Afghanistan security and political deteriorating situation do not allow migrants to return to their homeland and settle permanently.

Last but not the least, the production of opium manufacturing is rapidly increasing in Afghanistan. Almost 90% of the world's opium comes from Afghanistan and mostly passes through Pakistan. It generates illegal money in both the states as well as common and cheap availability increases the number of its users in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. These are some of the Afghanistan domestic political issues, and these domestic issues closely affected their bilateral relations with Pakistan. As a next-door neighbor, Pakistan's security, and stability, it is the economy and state institutions desperately disturbed due to wars and the law-and-order situation in Afghanistan. The porous Pak-Afghan border had numerous anxieties for Pakistan; it was the foundation of terror's safe passage and many other evils. But the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border is a top decision of Pakistan's army, which will stop illegal movement and will also curb the menace of smuggling and terrorism.

CHAPTER 6

MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES IN PAKISTAN

6.1 Introduction

Foreign policy is a combination of ends (national interests) and means (power and capabilities) of a state (Kundi, 2005). The contacts among the nation for achieving them are the perpetual subject of state management. For the promotion of its national interests, states of the world establish a pattern of a relationship with the outside world. The external world consists of non-state actors i.e., non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international governmental organizations (IGOs). In the words of Ayub Khan, nobody gives you freedom, you must fight for it. Nobody fights for you; you fight for yourself. The first principle of Pakistan's foreign policy is security and independence. The Indian threat to Pakistan's security was a real and constant risk. Indian entire efforts were to isolate and disintegrate Pakistan on the foreign policy front. The signing of SEATO and CENTO by Pakistan was to seek allies against India to secure its position in case of war (Khan, 1967). Pakistan faces several challenges on the foreign and domestic front no country has ever progressed until all the state institutions make equal strides and work in harmony. However, Pakistan's foreign policy stood by foreign influence, any kind of change in international politics has changed the foreign policy of Pakistan because of its geopolitical location. The aftermath of 9/11 or Soviet intervention in Afghanistan shaped world politics and Pakistan was one of them to

face problems and challenges and took a drastic shift in their foreign policies on US pressure (Kundi, 2005).

As far as the relations of Pakistan with Afghanistan and other countries are concerned, the foreign policy of Pakistan was India-centric. On the issue of Kashmir India keep on hold the diplomatic relations, while willing to engage in one point that is terrorism. On the issue of the Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), both states are blaming each other. The Taliban movement launched by the Deobandi groupings began its activities along with the Pak-Afghan border for the implementation of Shariah and the ousting of NATO forces from Afghanistan. Due to internal and external criticism, Pakistan banned the TTP, Afghanistan was on the view that any kind of terrorist accident that arises in Afghanistan are originated from TTP operating from Pakistan, while Pakistan's perception is that Afghanistan provided safe heavens to ban TTP and its main leaders from launching attacks on Pakistan from inside Afghanistan. Only in 2016, the TTP launch 106 terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. TTP members were mostly Pashtun's dialect activated from Pak-Afghan border areas. Afghan-based TTP was responsible for various terrorist attacks in Pakistan's tribal belt, Pakistan sealed the border on many occasions to deter TTP intrusion. Pakistan on many occasions raised the issue of cross-border military infiltration and fencing of the Pak-Afghan border was also suggested on different forums (Amina, 2015).

At the culmination of the cold war, Pakistan took a break from the demise of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The deep economic crisis does not permit pro-Pakistani to setup in Afghanistan. However, both states Pakistan and Afghanistan are independent in the domain of their foreign policy because both are sovereign states. No one can dictate each other for their policies (Shah, 2018). Pakistan's strategic partnership with the USA for security reasons molded the nature of its foreign policy concern (Rashid, 2008). Since the 1950s Pakistan's

civil society, elected government, and parliament were not allowed to participate in state politics, only the military-bureaucratic-intelligence elite has the right to determine Pakistan's security and foreign policy. The terror and disproportionate anxiety of the US also change our national spirit during the 1970s and after the 9/11 terror accidents. Pakistan's government was extensively supposed to be formed and removed by the US; Pakistani citizens exercised the right to vote but brought minor changes in Pakistan's foreign policy, due to mass rigging on Election Day (Ahmad, 2010). In an interview, an active member of Awami National Party (ANP) and former Senator Afrasiab Khattak, talks most of Pakistan's policies are made and implemented under Army supervision. The elected representatives have not as much given and taken in foreign policymaking (Khattak, 2018). The 33 years of military rule derailed the democratic process of Pakistan. The constitution was suspended, and martial law rules and regulations were implemented.

In the views of Professor Ijaz Khattak, Pakistan's foreign policy is India-centric. "Pakistan's approach to Afghanistan goes through its relationship with India. These are the conflicts that have been affecting its relations with Afghanistan whether Karzai or Ashraf Ghani or someone else rules there. Pakistan wants a government in Afghanistan that is friendly towards Pakistan and that keeps India at arm's length. Afghanistan has the right to establish friendly relations with India, but it should not allow India to use its territory against Pakistan. However, the security relations of Indo-Afghan should be limited while trade relations should be kept intact to certain limits. This is not happening in Pakistan's favor to have a complete controlling influence in Afghanistan especially after 9/11. India-Pakistan conflict is the permanent rift of their mistrust, blame game, and lack of cooperation on different issues Pakistan is not getting out from Indian Affairs that keep both state's relationship retains from improvement" (Khattak, 2018). Pakistan faces several social,

economic, religious, and political issues, some of which not only destabilized Pakistan on the domestic front but also harm the International level. General issues included.

6.2 Terrorism Law and Order Situation

Violence means annoyance, devastation, suicide attacks, and the murder of innocent people without any cause just to create havoc in the life of common citizens. Such kinds of terrorist accidents damage the structure of the state, cause political instability and declining economic well-being, lower foreign direct investment, and intensification in risk insights (Khan, 2013). Security issues cause a wider gap between advanced and developing countries. Pakistan as a nation passing through numerous hitches, as a developing state the problems of Pakistan lie within its territory, due to disintegration along traditional, spiritual, and dialectal grounds. The perception of these objects is vital for state structure; the absence of such entities could derail the country's situation as in the case of Pakistan (Adnan, 2012).

As Professor Ejaz Khattak told "both states' domestic political issues touch the policies of each other. On the issue of the Taliban, both are blaming each other. Afghans claim that the Taliban inside Afghanistan are being supported by Pakistan and they come from Pakistan while Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of the provision of safe havens to TTP who are active inside Pakistan which affected their bilateral relations as well as internal security situation. Both states try to divert the attention of people from their failures and solution of critical issues, and they put the extra blame on each other, which is a common phenomenon of developing states like Pakistan and Afghanistan" (Khattak, 2018). Foreign troops in Afghanistan quite a lot of times violated Pakistan's sovereignty, entered Pakistan's tribal areas. Drones' strikes killed many civilians and innocent children in the name of terrorism and the prevailing of terrorist elements. Such a state of the situation has direct impacts on Pakistani politics and the economy. The war on terrorism badly affected the

internal situation of Pakistan, as well as desperately pressurized by external forces on the foreign policy front. The politically unstable state cannot allow effective policies on the issue of terrorism and law and order situation (Memon, 2003).

The government of President Ashraf Ghani gave imputes to the new war-like situation in Afghanistan. That has a direct security cost for Pakistan, and the intensity of war spread to Pakistan's settled areas of FATA and KPK which suffered the most. In response, Pakistan started direct military operations after declining for years to act against the hub of militant groups in the tribal areas of Pakistan. It was a thoughtful campaign, with bombers and weapons clearing out the towns of Miran Shah and Mir Ali, the emptyhole of the Tochi River Valley along with the Afghan border. In the aftermath of the military operation, Pak Army busted open bomb factories, training camps, and strenuous cells. More than half a million population of the tribal belt internally displaced IDPs fled to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and a quarter of a million fled to Afghanistan (Gall, 2015). Since the inception of the war on terror after the accident of 9/11, Pakistan lost more than 65,000 citizens and 9000 security workers, and almost 125billions of infrastructure lost. Millions of people fled from South Waziristan, Swat, and Orakzai agencies, in which some of them returned to homes while still, a minimum number of peoples are in camps or settled areas. Due to military operations, the residents of conflict areas suffered from physical and psychological abuse and trauma due to the feeling of death, destruction of infrastructure, and miseries of dependence devastated them (Khan, 2013).

The root cause of terrorism among the tribal belt of Pakistan is a socio, economic and political backwardness. The main problems facing the people of FATA are in the agriculture sector, health, education, trade, tourism, minerals, livestock, overseas employment, and access to information. Some of the conservative mindsets and strong supporters of old

customs and habits in the lives of tribal peoples also keep them ignorant from the rest of the world. That is the reason that the youth of the tribal belt is mostly involved in anti-state activities of terrorism and drug trafficking. The tribal peoples have a special role in the disintegration of the USSR and the US attack on Afghanistan. Through deliberate discussion of military and governmental officials, the peoples of FATA were convinced to cooperate in the fight against terrorism to bring peace and prosperity in Pakistan and Afghanistan which is beneficial for them as well as for their coming generation (Ghauri, 2009). Domestic instability has been a continuous problem for the Pakistani leadership. While, consolidation of governance, structure socio-economic hitches, and building authentic organizations are essential for long-term sustainability. Inappropriately, the situation in FATA is a forthcoming threat that entails abrupt consideration (Mike, 2009).

The government of Pakistan sustains all military and non-military assistance for the people of FATA. Many developmental projects were launched to uplift the survival of common citizens, like Pakistan's Annual Development Program Fund for FATA 2008-09. FATA Sustainable Development Fund (SDF) 2006-2015 and US development assistance for FATA were started for the enhancement of the people. Several other funds were also allocated for developmental projects like for Senators and MNAs from FATA under the Khushal Pakistan program, which is used for the developments in concerned areas (Ghauri, 2009).

1. Pakistan, the US, and the international community raise the living facilities of the tribal peoples economically, socially, and administratively. Despite aggressive desires against illiterate and cautiously backward peoples.

2. Long-lasting peace in Pakistan's tribal belt is possible through different military operations from the Pakistan Army side to get rid of terrorist safe heavens, which is a positive sign.

6.2.1 Sectarian Violence and Religious Intolerance

Sectarianism is the term used as discrimination of one sect against the other, due to differences of religion, culture, opinion, and classes. To seize more and more power religion has been used by religious, political, and military elites in Pakistan. Due to such exploitation of religion, sectarianism emerged in Pakistan as part of our culture. In Pakistan, numerous ethnicities and sects with diverse cultures reside but all these different entities became one nation based on religion (Sheikh & Memon, 2003). Founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah strained to set a uniform system for the country to sidestep partition over religion. Jinnah declared Pakistan as having no interference of religious conviction in the politics of Pakistan. In a speech on August 11, 1947, Jinnah declared that "You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state" (Lisa, 2016). Reflecting on his secular views, Jinnah himself was a Shai but tried to create a multi-confessional state, included Hindus, Ahmadi's, and several Shias in his first cabinet (Ispahani, 2017). After six years of Pakistan's independence mass movement started against Ahmadi to affirm them as non-Muslims. In 1974 President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto voted for a resolution to declare them as non-Muslims (Majid, 2014). However, articles 20-22-25 and 36 of the 1973 constitution protected some basic rights of the minorities to lower the religious prejudices (Haider, 2014). In the constitution of Pakistan, it was acknowledged that every citizen has the right to progress his religion. It guarantees equality for all, irrespective of religion, caste, gender, language, and region (Majid, 2014).

Minorities have reserved seats in Pakistan's parliament, on which only religious factions can contest elections. For the ratification of laws whether it is unacceptable to Islam or under the Shariah, a Federal Shariat Court (FSC) was established under the constitution, to acknowledge the validity of laws that may not be prohibited to Islam (PIRF Report, 2015). However, sectarian violence had immoral impacts on Pakistani society; the terrorists used the Shia-Sunni divide for their evil gains and compensations. This conflict was well-thought-out remnants for the Afghan Jihad, which also remained a cause of tussle between the Shia's and Sunni groups. They started targeting one another religious shrines, from 1999 to 2010 some 22,000 Shia targeting mostly in Khurram agency, Para Chinar, Hangue, and Orakzai agency. Such attacks destabilized Pakistani society internally and formed security complications, in response, Pakistan banned several Jihadi groups, i.e., Sipah-e-Sahaba, Sipah-e-Muhammad, and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Idrees, 2016).

The role of religion in Pakistani society and politics has had a significant role. The country is a breeding ground for religious extremism, militants' groups directing brutal attacks against, the Shia, Ahmadi, Christian, and Hindu peoples (Haider, 2014). The darkest feature of the religious deeds with an orientation to social progress is fierce radicalism, militancy, and terrorism which overwhelmed Pakistani society in the name of Islam. Which halt the process of development due to the extreme form of religious ferocity? Sectarian violence, especially among the Shia and Sunni, has been dominant since the 1980s, has been made worse by the ideological influence of Saudi and Iranian doctrines (Lisa, 2016). Pakistani society is also engulfed under the influence of *Pirs* and *Mullahs* bringing up both morality and spirituality in people's lives. It sometimes led to the way to misrepresentation in society, that's why, Muhammad Ali Jinnah stressed on devoid of conflict based on individual modes of expression and belief (Haider, 2014). However, the Islamization and radicalization process of General Zia impetus South and Central Asia in the Soviet War. Zia jihad was to

save Islam from Western and domestic infidels. Eventually, Madrassa turned into militant organizations, mostly funded by Sunni dominant states like Saudi-Arabia and Iraq. These Jihadi groups conducted attacks in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan against religious minorities (Haider, 2014).

Curtis noted that due to religious narrow-mindedness and oppression of spiritual factions endangered the actual form of Pakistani society and declined fairness. In Pakistan, around 95 % of the country's population is Muslims, in which a minor population is being Shia Muslims. Christians and Ahmadi's accounted for around 2 % while Sikhs, Hindus, Parsis, and Buddhists make up almost 1% of the rest of the population (Lisa, 2016). The dimmest aspect of spiritual intolerance in Pakistan is that from the last two decades thousands of people have been killed due to sectarian violence. These people were targeted by different Islamic sects during Eid prayers, religious gatherings, mosques, and shrines (Azam, 2010). Many modifications exist in Pakistani society amongst the diverse school of thought based on religion. Some consider terrorism and violence as a Jihad against another sect, which is an extremeform of viciousness (Azam, 2010).

Islam is a religion of peace, Muslims are more tolerant towards non-Muslims as compared with Christian's deeds with non-Christians (Umar, 2011). Fortification of spiritual autonomy is not the only issue of human rights, but in such a society the minorities are facing a deliberate safety problem too. It must be part of the wide-ranging description that tries to find and counter the message of Islamist radicalism. This is destabilizing the state of Pakistan, the need of provisions required to redress spiritual modifications for all to express their religious state of mind (Curtis, 2016). On the question of religious intolerance in Pakistan, Professor Ejaz said that "Religious intolerance in Pakistan is another major issue.

In Pakistan's case, religious elements exist in their foreign policy. The emphasis is too much on religion, using religious slogans in their security policy. They considered security to protect them under the sort of Jihad against the enemies of Islam, and enemies of Islam do not want Pakistan to become a fort of Islam, it shows a tussle between Hindus and Muslims. That has made Pakistani's mindset quite sympathetic towards the Taliban, Jihadi forces, and freedom fighters. This generated religious fundamentalism religious intolerance and already existing extremism in Pakistan and considering them genuine freedom fighters in Afghanistan, gaining popular support. Pushing peoples towards terrorism as well, affecting Pakistan's politics and image internationally as tolerant and sponsored by extremism. Afghanistan is a broken state whose main cause is its ethnicity among Pashtuns, non-Pashtuns, and other different factions" (Khattak, 2018).

Terrorism has had shocking effects on sports throughout the history of sports. Due to Pakistan's law and order situation in 2002 a New Zealand cricket team was on a Pakistan tour when a suicide bomb blast occurred near to team hotel, no injury to the team but damaged Pakistan's image. Similarly, on 3March 2009 terrorists attacked the Sri Lanka cricket team bus on way to Lahore to participate in a test match against Pakistan. In which eight people lost their lives and almost six were injured. Thus, such fear of attacks exaggerated sports in Pakistan (Hassan, 2012).

6.3 Political Instability

Political variability means the inclination of a transformation in the policymaking that is more by legitimate or undemocratic conduct. This is a very serious problem and deterring economic growth in developing and under-developed states (Chawdhury, 2016). Regarding political instability, the Lipset concept is "a country is considered stable if it has been a liberal and consistent democracy or dictatorship for 25 years". The reliability of rule

rests on a strong political system (Tabassum et al., 2016). After the independence of Pakistan, the state is facing one of the major issues are political instability and policy uncertainty, which split the society due to unsatisfactory government rules and regulations, alternatively becoming the reason for frustration, violence, and political disorder among society (Javed, 2017).

Here are so many causes of such evil; among some of them are lack of proficient and autocratic leadership which is mostly based on hereditary patterns. Corruption on the part of politicians and institutions, the institutions have lost the trust of donor states, which do not support the government directly even in difficult times too rather than invest through a non-governmental organization. Bad governance, disorganization of political parties, deadlock among the center and provinces, weak political culture, lack of check and balance system, bureaucratic red tape, and frequent military interventions in politics do not stabilize the political system of Pakistan.

Frequent changes in government due to the military establishment did not permit the democratic government to achieve the desired time and complete the task. Pakistan remained 33 years under direct military rule and the other 30 years under dissimilar forms of government democracy. Parliamentary form of government, presidential, and socialism, mostly toppled before the completion of the desired time (Qureshi & Ali, 2010). Political instability also leads to economic instability. Satisfactory economic growth and nation-building can be achieved only under stable political institutions (Sheikh, 2003). Progress is not possible in a politically systematized structure; Political stability is essential for nation-building. Pakistan faced regime instability, political emergencies, and constitutional deadlock for a long time (Javed & Mamoon, 2017). Since independence, economic growth was high

from 1958-1970, 1977-1988, and 1999-2008. All the prescribed regimes were military-led rule (Qureshi & Ali, 2003).

A politically uneven state does not make ground for foreign stockholders to capitalize on a doldrums government. Through they feel hesitant to invest money for the failure of government, the implementation of martial law, and the law-and-order situation. Internally Afghan war spells over Pakistan territories which created instability for foreign direct investors and depress Pakistan's socio, economic and political situation. A strong and sustainable government with virtuous policies can produce a better outcome as compared with a weak while corrupt administration may wrench the state into a catastrophic situation (Bhatti, Ali & Iqbal, 2008). Political instability civil war onset is the cause of social unrest in society and the toppling of government from democracy to military rule, which affected different economic sectors, like export and import, price level, ports and shipment activities, negative impacts on GDP, revenue collections, tourism, and other vital economic factors (Chawdhury, 2016).

Public debt is an additional root of political uncertainty, public debt is total debt secured by the government from inner and outside sources. It also creates unrest in the country and disturbed the political situation (Salahuddin & Awan, 2017). Brigadier retired Muhammad Saad's views in an interview with the author on the question of Pakistan's current economic situation: "A political instability is a major factor that's why Pakistan is not going forward economically. Political governments are unstable. Anyone coming in for investment wants stability. If Pakistan is in a turmoil situation nobody will come. Then public sector entities, like steel mills, PIA, electricity distribution companies are collapsed, circular debt went to 300 to 400 billion. Improvement of such things can make Pakistan stable economically".

Nevertheless, political stability plays a leading role in state unity, economic growth, social consistency, and preservation of the law-and-order situation in a country (Salahuddin & Awan, 2017). Political stability is important for state progress and national integration, which has a direct influence on state structure and effects on the formation of political parties (Sheikh & Memon, 2003). An unstable situation generates ambiguity and unpredictability which decreases private investment leading to a reduction in economic growth (Tabassum, 2016). In instability, a state becomes a tug of war among warring factions of vested interests. An unstable government derived extra loans and start new plans to remain in office until the next elections. The new government repays that debt, which slows down economic progress and decreases GDP growth. Tax payment is also very low in Pakistan due to corruption, which creates inflation. For tax collections and protection of corruption, rigid policies should be applied to decrease the debt burden. Governments do not matter whether it is parliamentary, presidential or autocracy, only good and long-term consistency strategies can contribute to economic growth (Salahuddin & Awan, 2017). The promotion of political stability is indispensable for economic stability because politically stable states reduce social unrest and political turmoil which boosts the investors to invest and promote economic development (Shabbir, *et al*, 2016).

6.3.1 Civil-Military Relations

Since independence, Pakistan has experienced 30 years of military rule (1958-1971, 1977 to 1988, and 1999 to 2008), and democracy has suffered the most. Pakistan's military has either direct or indirect control over the civilian government. Civil government and military rule have continuously strived for power politics, especially the military took clandestine and explicit tactics to dominate over foreign policy as well as on domestic politics (Greenwood, 2014). After the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, due to internal strife amongst

the incapable political leadership, the country's military institution, civilian bureaucracy, and intelligence apparatus saw itself as a state guardian. This also derailed the democratic process in Pakistan, and that is the reason for Pakistan's unstable political situation. The existing political instability is due to an unbalanced relationship among the civil and military institutions. Civil-military relations in Pakistan are a continuous uncertain block to consolidating democracy in Pakistan. India's hostility is also a single largest security threat as well as a major influential factor of army influence on Pakistan's politics. Similarly, Pakistan's trouble relations with Afghanistan inline areas entitlements existing a serious threat to national identity, and regional integrity led to the distribution of extensive funds to the military (Janjua, 2010). To eliminate the encroachment of the military, civil supremacy is obligatory with the well-established political system and a high level of institutionalization. A key factor in political development is the growth of durable political institutions (Najiyah Khan, 2010).

6.4 History of Poppy Cultivation

According to the US state department report, Pakistan is one of the world's top transit corridors for opiates and cannabis, transfer through the porous border of Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran. Almost 70 percent of Afghan opium is harvested in the main five provinces, which are adjacent to Pakistan's borders areas. Illegal narcotics then circulated worldwide through Pakistan's seaports, airports, postal services, and unpatrolled coastal areas (INCSR, 2016). Pakistan next to Afghanistan is under the severe problem of drug abuse, heroin trafficking, and conduit as well as producing nearly 8,200 metric tons every year. Due to the international demands of drugs, the 'Golden Crescent' regions of South Asia, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have overtaken the triangle of the world's leading countries in the production of heroin (UNODC, 2008).

Almost 40 percent of Afghan drug production illicitly enters Pakistan, some used for domestic consumption and the rest for transit to international markets of China, Gulf states, Africa, and Europe. The Afghan drugs enter the Baluchistan province of Pakistan and some of the transport to Iran-Sistan and onwards to Turkey and Europe. The second root is Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) mostly heroin smuggled through this route onwards (UNODC, 2008). Domestically Pakistan is home to 6.7 million drug users, who consume 59 metric tons every year (INCSR, 2016). During the 1970s the heroin production in Turkey and manufacturing in France were banned, the primary source of European illegal heroin. The Western States now looked towards Pakistan as an alternative source and the first heroin laboratory in Pakistani provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan appeared in 1975. After 1979, a rapid increase and demand for heroin were observed in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Due to the Iran-Iraq war and the closing of the Iran border, Pakistan's and Afghan opiates' demands increased in European and North American states by about 75 percent (Windle, 2012).

Two factors are responsible for its rapid increase; first, due to the high level of corruption in governmental machinery as the Pakistani drug dealers were protected beneath the shadow of the political executive. The second reason was Pakistan's and United States' support towards the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union, as no states were willing to suppress the cash crop cast-off for their profit's determinations against the allied forces (Windle, 2012). During the 1980s the Afghan Mujahidin expanded opium production under the CIA supervision in Afghanistan and Pakistan linked nearby heroin laboratories to the world market involved in the processing and export of heroin. These two states became the second-largest nation of illicit drugs. These areas also turned into the center of the world's criminal activities in narcotics crimes. The entrance of black money into Pakistan's politics submerges Pakistan under the danger of corruption and political instability which destabilized the state governmental structure (Haq, 1996).

The implementation of the Haddod Ordinance by General Zia in 1979, completely banned the irrational/and non-medical drug trade and production. Opium production areas were forced to eradicate under the strict supervision of governmental authorizes. Many farmers were arrested, charged, and prosecuted, which decreased its rapid production. Illicit opium manufacture resurged in 1986, a high production rate was observed until 1996, after that a sharp reduction was observed. In consequence, Pakistan was declared 'poppy-free in 2001 by the UNOffice of Drugs and Crimes. This sharp decrease was the result of the UN and many international developmental agencies ' projects (Windle, 2012).

Opium is the cash crop that is cultivated in almost every region of the world and many parts of Pakistan. Especially, its cultivation is in progress in Pakistani Tribal Areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Kohistan, some parts of Punjab, and Baluchistan. Malakand division, Swabi, and Gadon Amazai a mountainous region of KP was well-known for poppy cultivation. Gadon became the hub of Pakistan's illicit opium production to the world's narcotic market. Political instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the 1970s damaged the agriculture sector and prompted the steady progress of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. Before the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and Pakistan, opium production was on a small scale. The CIA covert operation in Afghanistan against the Soviet forces turned the Pak-Afghan borderland into the world's top illicit opium production areas, which produced almost 60% of heroin demand in the USA. The drug dealers in this field earned much money in this sector, while the efforts of farmers are more than, but farmers earn a minimum amount. Due to drug money corruption in governmental sectors are on the top. It created black money all over the world and probably in Pakistan and Afghanistan which not only generated evils in our society but emerged as an illegal forum for business. According to the 2014 Transparency International report, law enforcement members and judiciary personal established a working partnership with the drug dealers, which produced the general domestic

possibility of the state. It has damaged legalized trade innovativeness and government progress (Khan, *et al.* 2016).

6.4.1 Effects of Drug Production in Pakistan

This explosion began not only in Afghanistan, but Pakistan was equally hit by heroin production in the 1980s. In Pakistan until 1992, the military ongoing concrete efforts under the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Asif Nawaz to eradicate the narcotics mafia, Heroin crossed the threshold of Pakistan's politics, society, and economy. Drugs lords funded members of national and provincial assemblies during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto era. During this period 30 to 50 percent of the Pakistani economy was subsidized by drug money (Rashid, 2008). After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US reservation on Pakistan remained under pressure to curtail opium production. Pakistan also becomes a big opium cultivator, due to the adjacent tribal areas.

With the support of the CIA, Pakistan also started poppy cultivation. According to the United Nations, Office on Drug and Crimes (UNODC) almost \$30-27 billion in heroin is smuggled from Afghanistan to Pakistan. This drug inflow has terrible consequences on Pakistan, as the number of heroin users increased on an alarming level only in 2012, there were 6.7 million drug users in Pakistan (Khan, 2016). In 1989-1999, the US provided \$100 million to Pakistan for the combat of narcotics. Poppy cultivation considerably decreased from 800 metric tons to 24 tons between 1997 and 1999 decreased to two (2) tons. These efforts succeeded in NWFP now KPK, Pakistan was no longer a heroin producer country, but provide transportation routes to the Afghan drug dealers same as arms supply pipelines to the Mujahidin in the 1980s (Rashid, 2008).

6.4.2 Drug Prevention and Treatment

Opium production and cultivation are the globally acknowledged problem, which is beyond the capacity of any state or government to completely eradicate this menace. Pakistan turns out to be the target of such evil, which is a difficult task for state authorities to deal with the opium problem with meager resources (Khan, *et al.* 2016). In Pakistan, several peoples are chronic drug addicts. The surge of drug practice through injection is annoying in terms of HIV/AIDs, Tuberculosis, and Hepatitis-C transmission. Easy availability and low price resulted in its growth among the common masses (UNODC, 2008). Millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan facilitate drug addiction, which puts most of them at risk of blood-borne and HIV infections. In Pakistan high-risk practice of Afghan refugees in Quetta found that most are likely to use drugs through injections and needle sharing. This humiliation is associated with mental illness and addiction in war-torn countries. Which needs faith-based and other alternative use programs to blockage mental disorders (Ayesha Farooque, *et al.* 2017).

Lack of drug treatment facilities and access to addictions clinics is also a great hurdle in the way of drug prevention. Only 30,000 drug users received detoxification therapy annually, in which almost 90 percent of centers are regularized under different foreign NGOs. Donor states particularly the US aided Pakistan in the field of treatment, 'train-the-trainer' programs for prevention and reduction of heroin addictions, which reduced the rates of drug users up to 80 percent (INCSR, 2016). Due to several domestic and security challenges, Pakistan always keeps the eradication of narcotics as a national security priority. The drug is more dangerous than terrorism for humanity, which caused the death of 700 people daily. It's also a great source of Taliban funding because its production increases in the Taliban's controlled areas of Afghanistan which are using drug money for weapons and terrorism

purposes in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2015). Coordination among the law enforcement agencies and awareness campaigns among the masses about the side effects of drug use can play an important role in the eradication of such evil from Pakistani society. Curtailment of drug production in Golden Crescent states should get rid of diverse methods. Admiration of farmers through other cash crops, financial incentives, education in the field of farming, and consciousness of the detrimental practice of drugs (Ayesha, *et al.* 2017).

In 2015 Pakistan took several anti-drug awareness actions, arrested almost 90 foremost drug dealers with the joint counternarcotic collaboration of the US Drug Enforcement Agency and Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force (PANF). Substitute means of support programs started for poppy cultivators under foreign assistance and supervision. Like the distribution of seeds, construction of small roads, agriculture, and irrigation reforms in such areas to control its growth. The United States benefits Pakistani customs and law enforcement agencies to uplift the capacity of concerned institutions to explore intelligence drives and control drug-related crimes. Extension and prolonged funding of different NGOs for counternarcotics and poppy reduction efficiently working in Pakistan's numerous areas along with ANF (INCSR, 2016).

6.5 National Integration

Integration means when landmass is united and transformed into a single entity, and represents a single nation (Sagar, 2016). National integration refers to the unity of state citizens combined irrespective of one nation, color, race, region, religion, and culture a pursuit of harmony. In which all peoples unite in one territory based on nationhood, it is oxygen for a society without which survival is unbelievable. National integration is a process of achieving harmony, devising a common identity, and national responsiveness among the people of a definite territory (Khan, 2017). It is a core element of national security; in place

of political stability and national security both are interconnected. Through national integration, all peoples live with peace and consider themselves one community on an ideological, political, and social basis. Integration is the extra persistent necessity of all societies, which plays a key role in the development of a state. The more a nation is united the more it would be stable, as a united heterogeneous nation can transform society into a strong and developed nation (Sagar, 2016).

In the case of Pakistan lack of national integration is a big hurdle in the way of national unity, harmony and stability, economic growth, social and political strife. It is a bleak scenario for Pakistan that a state which has emerged based on Islamic integration, is currently facing the crisis of income inequalities, social injustice, political blow, leadership crisis, provincial biases and social injustice, military involvement in Pakistani politics, and many more issues emerged. Lack of harmony on major state issues such as regionalism, provincialism, linguistics, and communalism. Integration is a process of achieving national cohesion, stability, strength, feelings of being united as a nation. These parts cannot be fitted unless they are like-minded (Hussain, 2009). After Pakistan's independence there has never been a crisis based on religion or ideology. Some remote actions took place infrequently with religious dimensions, which were curbed through different strategies. Ethnicity and misappropriation of religious factors indeed were the main hurdle in the way of disunity used by the non-state actors. The Islamic ideology was misinterpreted by the religious leaders and TTP. Islam encourages peacetime, harmony, shared admiration, and the blessed nature of life, which is in practice opposite by the militants (Khan, 2017).

Provincial biases on the distribution of NFC awards are also a serious threat to national unity, as the provinces do not agree on the formula of resource distribution on a population basis. As the distribution should be built on the formula of multiple purposes

rather than population. It fueled the sense of regional prejudice and broadened the gap amongst the provinces for geographical integrity. The impartial distribution of resources among the provinces is the key to socio-economic confrontation. This generates regionalism; alternatively, regionalism has divided the whole nation into minor fractions, works for their vested interests rather than for national interest. For state survival, a comprehensive nation is indispensable, with common political-cultural, common socio-citizenry values, and a sense of identity. As a federal form of government powers are distributed among the center and provinces on a parity basis. But lack of harmony and frequent changes in government before completion of tenure created misperception among the provinces. Corrupt leadership is a root cause of political instability and frequent intervention of the army in politics destabilized the state situation. Poor governance, mismanagement, and corrupt bureaucratic culture contributed to the weak economy of Pakistan. The ethnoreligious factor is also contributing to manipulation by the political leadership to cover their negligence. Linguistic problems sometimes pose serious intimidations to geographical integrity, Pakistan lost one of its eastern parts owing to many problems, the linguistic matter was one of them.

6.5.1 Factors Responsible for National Integration

Here are various factors that influence national integration some of them are: Culture: a way of life, customs, and habits of an explicit collection of individuals. In heterogeneous societies, national integration has been an attempt to forge “unity in diversity” to spread socio-cultural alterations and enforce uniformity (Ishaque, 2017). Language: in multi-linguistic societies is an important tool that has the deep-rooted inconsistency of unifying a nation and generating a sense of estrangement and relegation. Language riots were one of the major causes of the debacle of East-Pakistan parting. Religion is another most important factor for harmony in national integration. Religious freedom is every single

person's right, and its protection is the earnest obligation of the state government. Ethnicity: a challenging factor, sensible conduct well-known based on distinctiveness and devotion. Like in the case of the US where diverse ethnic groups united to form an American identity and shared values of democratic rights and principles (Shah, 2017).

Our national anthem, sports, national flag, common history, and heritage must serve the purpose of nationalism (Khan, 2017). A determined state brings political stability; it acts as a stabilizer in the political process and safeguards smoothness and transparency. Through political reliability, economic progress can also achieve. Both aspects are going hand in hand, marches towards nation-building. National integration also creates a sense of loyalty and the essence of devotion. Abide by laws and keep on dedicated to them, which is only possible through national integration. Justice is the absolute need of a society and an opponent of disparity, wherever justice exists inequality dies. National integration encourages justice and eventually eradicates prejudice (Sagar, 2016).

Media is a source of information and a link to educate people about governmental functions and images of the state structure. Media both print and electronic, national as well as private channels can play an important role in the promotion of national integration. Most of the private channels fuel the fire on some important issues rather than focus on its solution for the national cause, as an important pillar of the state media should give special time to promote national harmony and political integration. Media can play a leading role in the prevention of provincialism and sectarianism in a democratic state to be a supervisory body. Through the appropriate application of good governance, the dominant social strife in society can switch without difficulty. On the part of the political side, the people's centric approach should be adopted, while using political authority rather than the usage of governmental rules for personal practice. Due to many political, economic, social, internal, and external

challenges on the domestic and foreign front, a harmonious society is the need of time for Pakistan. At a distance from the ruling class, media, civil society, academia, intellectuals and religious influential can play a constructive role in national narratives (Khan, 2017).

6.5.2 Provincialism and Ethnicity

The matter of provincialism started after the feeling of deprivation on the part of underprivileged provinces. The issue of independent Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab (Saraiki and Bahawalpur) was emerged not because of fewer provinces but due to lack of provision in the constitution (Soherwordi & Khattak, 2010). It was a difficult task for politicians and policymakers to resolve. After the rename of NWFP to KPK, deprivation among the people of Hazaras increased resulted in the death of 10 people in April 2010. On the other side, feelings of ethnicity also generate separatist movements. Ethnicity combines a society under common religion, language, values, and mutual economic and political interest. Socio-economic disparities foster ethnic conflict (Hashmi, 2013). The province of KPK and Baluchistan under such conditions felt destitute due to the centralization of the federal government, with time some of their grievances were resolved which declines the separatist movements (Shahzad, 2010).

6.6 Economic Development

Political constancy and financial evolution are interrelated, the political uncertainty is associated with a decrease in investment and several problems, however weak financial presentation may well be central to government failure. In every single state, the ruling parties are supposed to remain dedicated to the economic and social development of their country. When the desired antagonism factors enlarge among the different segments of the society, the state onwards degraded political instability and hamper the desired economic development (Chawdhury, 2016). Here are three main factors that are responsible for or

affect foreign direct investment, that is a democracy, political stability, and policy implementation (Bhatti, Nasir & Iqbal, 2008). On two bases political uncertainty consumes an undesirable effect on economic development, first, it interrupts market actions and worker relations which have direct contrary influences on productivity. Second, economic growth reduced and distressed investments harmfully, due to state doldrums circumstances small and medium enterprises also bothered (Chawdhury, 2016). The reduction of economic growth threatens the local and foreign investors not to put at risk their investment, which resulted in the reduction of productivity, savings, and consumption level. Pakistan should open new ways of import and export to uplift the market economy.

Due to globalization trade opportunities enlarged, in the earlier years, Pakistan's perception was that economically Afghanistan is 100% dependent on Pakistan due to its landlocked status. But the situation is now changed; Iran offered Chabahar port to Afghanistan for trade, India and China also offered free trade market to Afghans, the provision of the free market to Afghan products less the importance of Pakistan (Shah, 2018). The issue of Afghan migration is also an immense burden on Pakistan's economy. Millions of Afghan refugees settled in different areas of Pakistan for several decades. Most of them permanently established and occupied small- and large-scale businesses in Pakistan. Utilizing the critical situation in Afghanistan, the Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan are not willing to leave Pakistan. The migrated peoples also captured the labor market of Pakistan, as most of them were willing to work on low wages (Subhani, 2018).

Economic instability leads the way to inflation and unemployment which cut a reduction in purchasing and earning power amongst the masses (Javed & Mamoon, 2017). Uncertainty in a state reduced the level of investment, increases inflation and public debt as well as slows down the developmental projects. Due to inflation exports of a country

restricted and affected the tax system (Salahuddin & Awan, 2017). In the promotion of economic development foreign direct investment, an independent judicial system, competent population, and political stability played a pivotal role. The competence of the political institutions also acts an important role in the state economy. Corruption in an under-develop state like Pakistan is an immense hurdle in the way of economic progress. It reflects the nation's socio, political and cultural values. "Corruption can be defined as bad policy options and inefficient institutions that are put in place to collect bribes from individuals seeking to get around them". So, it is an unlawful and biased action of people having authority in their hands and they are abusing this power for personal advantages (Shabbir, *et al.* 2016). According to a World Bank report, corruption in Pakistan's state institutions is the main obstacle in the way of economic and social development. Dishonesty distorts the rule of law and fails the basics of organizations on which financial progress rests on. Nearly five democratic regimes in Pakistan were distorted based on corruption before the completion of the prescribed constitutional period (Shah & Khan, 2004).

Violence and terrorist activities in Pakistan by hidden internal and external elements destabilized our state economy; in such a state of situation national as well as foreign investors frighten to invest (Subhani, 2018). Such terrorist activities stopped the law-and-order situation. Contempt of quality-based selection, lack of job protection in private institutions, where they can easily fire as compared with government permanent employees (Qayyum, 2007). With an adequate level of natural resources, Pakistan is facing an extreme level of energy crisis. Due to the lack of appropriate planning, Pakistan is unable to provide adequate electricity to residential areas. In such a state of scenario, access to energy supply to factories and industries is a challenging task. Therefore, most of the businessmen transferred their business to Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka as well (Zeeshan, 2018). Muhammad Saad said that; "we are spending one rupee and earning fifty paisa, so how can we prosper. We are

spending too much on Geo-politics, let us get into Geo-economics. You come to the trading hub, rather than a hub of confrontation. Pakistan should encourage the Pak-Afghan trade with India which is beneficial for both states" (Saad, 2018).

However, during the last five years, revised improvements have been witnessed in the form of wide-ranging reforms in the field of the agriculture sector, a remarkable growth of 3.81 from 3.5 percent due to government supportive policies. In the years 2017-18 Pakistan has made great strides to improve its economic outcome and to reduce financial weakness. Due to economic growth, major international companies attracted Pakistan, which increased the GDP from 5% to 5.7% in the outgoing fiscal year. Apart from economic developments, the country is still facing many challenges on domestic and external fronts due to the widening Current Account Deficit (CAD) and a decline in exports. In the last few years, Pakistan's exports were declining, the balance of payment also remained under stress, and global oil price recovery pushed up the import bill, the State Bank reserves also declined by US \$ 4.5 billion in July-March 2018. Although the remarkable growth in export earnings and foreign remittances cannot fulfill the trust deficit (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2017-2018).

6.6.1 Corruption

Corruption in Pakistan is one of the greatest problems which corrupts the moral values of common Pakistani citizens as well as all the hierarchical structure of Pakistan. The roots of corruption in Pakistan dates to the British period the British awarded lands, titles, and awards to their faithful and desired individuals as a bribe to make them under his subjugation. No institution is immune from it, even the Judiciary and legislatures are also under the grip of this hazard (Javaid, 2010). Poor governance leads in several ways, i.e., bribery in law enforcement agencies, blackmailing, favoritism, deception, and misappropriation. In this way, the effectiveness diminished on which state economy depends, by cumulative the cost

of investment and let down the latent return. Due to widespread and systematic corruption in Pakistan, the government's capacity and resources of investment are reducing. The widespread corruption in the public sector was carried out while issuing tenders for developmental projects, in which 40 percent budget of tender ended up on misappropriation (Rehman, 2011).

From top to bottom all the state institutions are involved in corrupt practices whether directly or indirectly. Poor governance and bribery edge economic growth and retard the expansion of the vigorous private segment. Extra-large corruption can be observed in developmental projects and some renowned fields, like bribery in the power sector, dishonesty in the local government system, tax and custom, police and law enforcement agencies, health, education, and land administration are the corrupt institutions (Javaid, 2010). The menace of corruption in Pakistani society weak the foundations of a state institution, in 1999 the government of General Pervaiz Musharraf started accountability with the essential inquiry and judicial structure. A National Anti-Corruption Strategy applies in 2002, was a three-pronged strategy i.e., prevention, awareness, and enforcement, which offers a comprehensive plan for attempting with corrupt cases. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) is capable of all-inclusive powers to investigate and accuse subjects (Transparency International, 2008).

6.6.2 Causes of Corruption in Pakistan

Here are quite a lot of causes of corruption in Pakistani society, which some of them are:

1. Misuse of power by the governmental authority person.
2. Incompetency of the political leaders.
3. Lack of liability and absence of check and balance system on authority persons and institutions to control inducement.

4. The weak judicial system and lack of awareness among the masses highlight the corrupt practices (Rahman, 2011).

Corruption prevails in many farms in Pakistani society, which is extensive fiscal radical corruption, favoritism, and use of authority. To access basic government services, people commonly face stresses for bribes in businesses. Almost every management institution bribe working on a routine basis. Intended for this purpose, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy is in practice under the National Integrity System. Though, the (NACS) is initiated by military establishments, which targets politicians, civil servants, and capitalists while disregarding military men and security personnel. There are many hurdles in the smooth implementation of NACS policies; lack of political leadership and authentic political process, structural constraints, and deprived communiqué with the public (TI, 2008). Public Procurement Regularity Authority (PPRA) was regulated which saw the purchase value beyond the worth of Rs. 50 million. Under the supervision of the Auditor General's office, a plan was regulated titled '*Project for Improvement in Reporting and Auditing*' (PIRA) to adopt new reporting formats for auditing and financing (Javaid, 2010).

Due to a lack of checks and balances on corrupt establishments state institutions are not working properly. Corruption leftovers as a most important task to the impartiality structure and on the efficiency of law implementation. Regardless of the legislative instructions, critical free press that exposes corrupt practices, and an independent judicial system, slight encouragement can highlight to expose corrupt practices. Corruption continues to facilitate the unethical and fraudulent segment of Pakistani society (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2016). According to the NAB report during 2008-2013 the daily value of corruption in Pakistan was a stunning amount of Rs.12 billion per day and Rs. 4320 per year, which is almost 17% of the country's GDP (Ahmad, 2018). According to Transparency International Perceptions Index 2017, Pakistan ranked 117 in corruption out of

180 least corrupted countries in the world. The use the scale from 0 to 100 in which 0 is a highly corrupted state while 100 is spotless, during this measurement scale Pakistan score number 32 out of 100 corrupted countries (CPI, 2017).

To create awareness among the people about corruption 9th December was declared as World's International Anti-Corruption Day. On this occasion, different seminars, workshops, and gatherings were arranged by a different segment of Pakistan's civil society. Different forms of corruption and its effects on Pakistani society and future generations were highlighted. People were also informed by the Right to Information Laws existing in Pakistan and urged the participants to use them for transparency and liability (TIP, 2017). To restraint corruption, Transparency International stressed the global community to receipts the subsequent activities against corruption.

1. The government as well as an open engaged civil society, encourage free speech and independent media, that journalists could work without fear and repression to highlight government corrupt practices.
2. The state should ensure transparency and accountability from the top, in public and private institutions, and on the federal, provincial, and local levels (Javaid, 2010).
3. A national Anti-corruption strategy is setup as an independent watchdog.
4. Promotion of such kinds of laws having access to information, to enhance accountability.
5. State management and business class should proactively reveal appropriate public interests' statistics in exposed information set-ups.
6. A strong merit system should be followed in the selection of the head of institutions and correspondingly like any other else (Rahman, 2011).

7. And the active revelation of pertinent data, together with government budgets, company possession, public buying, and access of media to political parties' assets to explore the causes of corruption (TI, 2017).

6.6.3 Unemployment and Illiteracy

As an underdeveloped state Pakistan is in front of quite a lot of problems, like sheer unemployment, low literacy rate, inflation, law and order circumstances, and an increase in foreign and internal debt. Unemployment means that a person has the quality and ability to work but consumes no opportunity to donate his/her capabilities. Being without a job is one of the vital emerging socio-economic problems nowadays in Pakistan. In the labor force survey, Pakistan is producing the largest labor in the world that is almost 57 million working in the gulf-states on low wages due to the weak economy of Pakistan. Low-quality education and high unemployment are the actual tasks in the existing scenario. The rudimentary hypothesis of education is low income of people led to unproductive education which causes unemployment due to a lack of quality knowledge. Thus, low income affected the quality of education which leads to joblessness among the youth, and a great reason for criminal activities, depression rate, physiological and behavioral effects, illegal drug trade, and terrorism in Pakistani society. Consequently, the high unemployment rate is due to lack of education, lack of capital, lack of proper skill, poverty, and the high growth rate of the population in Pakistan (Ahmad & Khan, 2016).

Illiteracy in Pakistani society is a shared challenge, which is the root cause of all other problems and led towards poverty and terrorism. Less-educated peoples have little role in the economic and political development of a state. Due to the lack of awareness people in Pakistan are not properly using the right to vote, which leads to incompetent leadership. Skilled leadership, quality, and stability are not probable without eminent education. Population growth is the main problem regarding illiteracy and being without a job. Rapid

growth in the populace means ignorant individuals in the field of labor. Pakistan's population growth rate is 2.1 % annually, which is one of the highest rates in the world (Subhani, 2018).

The madrassa is an Arabic word, which means a place for education, either secular or religious (Raza & Iqbal, 2015). Madrassas claim to be the sole custodian and flag bearers of Islamic education and are considered as the guardian of Islamic customs, values, and ethics. Another view is that madrasas are the sole cause of terrorism and sectarianism. 1979, Soviet attacks in Afghanistan gave momentum to the US and Saudi led Afghan Jihad against the Soviet forces. Pakistani madrasas took hold of mushrooming growths in many parts and thus turned into Jihadi organizations. It had to challenge and take control of many parts of Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal during the 1980s and 90s, Pakistan was left alone, and such a security vacuum created the Taliban, the students of these madrassas, to generate a new topic. In the post 9/11 scenarios, such madrassas became the focus of world attention, even though no Pakistani madrasa student was involved in the attacks on the US twin towers.

Pakistan faced strong criticism, and even security threats from such madrasas, who propagated religious violence. For this purpose, madrassas education has been frozen some time, failing to reform and update to fulfill the up-to-date requirements. The madrassas graduates have an inflexible mentality with conservative wisdom to rationalism and argument. The Lal Masjid and involvement in other terrorist operations keep the issue alive to carry madrassas reforms and registration. But resistance from the madrassas side and half-hearted efforts by the government halted the process. In 1979 education policy was planned in which modern subjects would be taught in religious institutions. A 'Madrassa Reform Commission' was formed that proposed several changes in religious institute's curriculum. Similarly, in the 1998 education policy establishment of 'Modern Madrassas' was proposed,

where students would teach with a modern set of courses along with the religious curriculum (Tahir, 2010).

Presently in Pakistan are more than 11, 805 Madrassa of which almost 925, 319 students are enrolled. On August 18, 2001, an Ordinance called the ‘Pakistani Madrassas Education’ was enforced, intending to secure registration, regulation, and uniform curriculum. In August 2002 “Madrassas Registration and Control Ordinance” was promulgated for the purpose to keep a check on any foreign aid to the Madrassas. Through the ministry of education in 2002, a five-year program was launched to mainstream 8000 madrassas with modern education of Mathematics, Computer science, English, Pak-Studies, and Economics courses taught across Pakistan in public and private educational institutes (Tahir, 2010). In 2005, the “Madrassas Voluntary Registration and Regulations Ordinance” was formulated. Under which no Madrassa will operate without registration and will submit their annual report of educational activities regularly. After the attack on Army Public School in January 2015, the government brought more reforms for madrassas to eliminate extremism and militancy.

The abovementioned Pakistan’s domestic political issues not only destabilized state institutions but greatly affected their state foreign policy, especially with their neighbor Afghanistan. Terrorism and lack of security and stability is common threat towards both states. Its roots originate from Pakistan as well as from Afghanistan, for which both the states make responsible each other. The Madrasas are solely responsible for the emergence of the Taliban because the young madrassa students in Pakistan took participation in the Afghan war during the Soviet war and this activity continued till the US attacks in Afghanistan in 2001.

The Taliban became the emerging power during the 1990s and established the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. But the sudden US attacks collapse their government and disperse the Taliban leadership, who took protection in adjacent neighboring states. After the US drawdown, the Taliban leadership once got control of the main areas in Afghanistan and wants a key role in state administration. They are not accepting the National Unity Government and consider them as a puppet regime of foreign forces. The only solution to political instability is reconciliation among the different stakeholders in Afghanistan. Pakistan always supported the reconciliation efforts of the Taliban and Afghan government and played a key role. It is also in Afghanistan's interests to sit with the Taliban on table talks and set the country's future course of action and lead the country towards stability, peace, and progress.

Corruption in both states is also common, due to weak and corrupt institutions there is a lack of political stability. The corrupt elements in both states are always busy making black money and had a great supporter of drug mafias, illegal movements on the border, and smuggling of criminal activities. Rigging during election leads towards incapable leadership, and weak government. In such a state of situation, the elected leadership is not able to make decisions independently, and thus the state institutions collapse. Corruption and corrupt management destabilize the country, and in such circumstance's democracy did not flourish. This is the case with both the states that frequent changes in government mostly occur and military interference derail democracy for various years. Several issues are responsible for both states' distressing situation, which needs strong reconsideration and reconciliation on both sides.

To analyze the impacts of post-US presence in Afghanistan on bilateral relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the US attacks on Afghanistan further worsened the scenario and

impacted the Pak-Afghan bilateral cooperation. They include sovereignty concerns, security interests, geopolitical dynamics, cross-border ties, and connectivity and trade. As foreign troops withdraw and prospects for a peaceful settlement darken, these themes will become more important to building future stability in Afghanistan and restricting the reemergence of proxy conflict in the region. The 9/11 attacks and US and NATO intervention in Afghanistan followed a similar pattern, both shaping and responding to existing Afghanistan-Pakistan ties. The presence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, enabled by the Pakistan-backed Taliban, speaks to the global impact of regional security calculations. The conflict and instability in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and their regional implications had very negative repercussions, for the years following the US invasion of Afghanistan not only saw a huge influx of Afghan refugees across the border into Pakistan but also witnessed a sudden spike in the frequency and scale of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The cumulative impact of these developments adversely impacted the overall growth rate in all major sectors of the economy. Pakistan continues to pay a heavy price both in the economic and security terms due to this situation and a substantial portion of precious national resources both men and material, have been diverted to address the emerging security challenges for the last several years. The rise of violent extremism and increase in terrorism in Pakistan due to instability in Afghanistan not only caused serious damage to Pakistan's economy but has also been responsible for widespread human suffering due to indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population.

Pakistan likewise shaped external involvement in its decision to ally with the United States yet maintain links to Taliban fighters as a hedging strategy. US influence in the region, meanwhile, has affected local economic, political, and security dynamics, especially in Afghanistan. The group entered direct talks with the US back in 2018, and in February 2020 the two sides struck a peace deal that committed the US to withdrawal and the Taliban to

preventing attacks on US forces. Other promises included not allowing al-Qaeda or other militants to operate in areas it controlled and proceeding with national peace talks. But in the year that followed, the Taliban continued to target Afghan security forces and civilians, advancing rapidly across the country.

After 20 years of US presence in Afghanistan and ousting the Taliban, US President Joe Biden has defended his decision to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan a move which led to Taliban militants returning to power. Mr. Biden has been widely criticized at home and by his allies over the abrupt manner of the US withdrawal, which led to the unexpected collapse of the Afghan security forces US troops had trained and funded for years. The Taliban militants were able to reclaim control of the whole country within 11 days finally entering the capital, Kabul. It came after foreign forces withdrew from Afghanistan following a deal between the US and the Taliban, two decades after US forces removed the militants from power in 2001. The Taliban forces have pledged not to allow Afghanistan again to become a base for terrorists who could threaten the West and destabilize the state and threaten the security of its adjacent neighbors. The Taliban's aim is only to implement an "Islamic government" and will not pose a threat to any other country. When the Afghan Taliban took control of the country in the aftermath of the US forces withdrawal, neighboring countries specially Pakistan appears to be worried over the likely security implications.

Hopefully, America's "forever war" has ended. Pakistanis are now becoming increasingly aware of the political vacuum in Kabul. Islamabad seems desperate to make sure that the Taliban's actions should not give the international community, particularly the U.S., any reason to isolate them diplomatically and cripple them financially. With the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from Afghanistan they left behind a feeble, fragile, and embattled Afghan government under President Ashraf Ghani to manage an uncertain and unstable political environment. The situation on the battlefield did not favor Afghan security forces, as

their capacities could not compensate for the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, leading to the recent fall of Kabul. Now, with the Taliban having control over the country, they are looking for global acceptance from the regional and global powers. To get global acceptance, especially from the US, Taliban leadership will have to make sure that Afghanistan's soil is not used to threaten the security of the United States and its allies as agreed by both actors in the Doha Accords.

However, it is too early to say if the Taliban will be able to gain global acceptance and legitimacy. In any case, there will be countries willing to work with them. For instance, China has already expressed its desire for maintaining friendly relations with them. On the other hand, Afghanistan's neighboring countries are watching the situation carefully, not only concerning the security situation but also about their national interests. Of all the neighboring countries, it has been mostly Pakistan that has been bearing the brunt of instability in Afghanistan. Islamabad is currently worried about the repercussions that might emerge in the wake of the US and NATO forces' withdrawal. A dominant Taliban, being Islamist in outlook and perception, may encourage the TTP militants to reorganize themselves and pose a security challenge to Pakistan again. Starting in 2010, Pakistan has put major, mostly military, efforts in fighting terrorist networks based in provinces such as Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Considering the rapid speed with which the Afghan Taliban has recently taken over the country, it seems that they might have a stronger say in any next governmental dispensation.

The success of the Afghan Taliban has already emboldened militant groups like Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and others in Pakistan, and even those whose networks have been disrupted in Afghanistan may yet have the potential to revive and pose a security problem to Pakistan. Besides this, the Pakistani government is estimating a problem in the

expected influx of refugees fleeing from increased violence in Afghanistan. The primary worry it has is that TTP elements presently hiding in Afghanistan might sneak into Pakistan under the garb of refugees. Pakistan believes that it had a small influence over Taliban leadership, which it used at the behest of America, persuading the Taliban to sit across the table for a negotiated end to the Afghan complications. Although Afghanistan is now in the hands of the Taliban, Pakistan still favors an inclusive political settlement representing all Afghan ethnic groups and believes that there was never a military solution to the issue. On the other hand, it also seems likely that sooner or later Pakistan will accept a Taliban-led government and establish ties with them, if they do not let their soil be used by anyone, including TTP, for any sort of terrorism against Pakistan.

CHAPTER 7

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION

7.1 Findings

- i. Pak-Afghan relations have mostly been at doldrums on account of the bitter experiences that both the countries have been through in their history.
- ii. Some of the major factors that have led to the bitter relations between the two countries are mainly the issues of greater Pakhtunistan, Baloch insurgency and the validity of the Durand line.
- iii. The country of Afghanistan is inhabited by the multifaceted ethnic population speaking different languages and it is on account of this ethnicity that the country has issue of different stakeholders. But the denial of giving representation to these groups has led to the creation of power vacuum, and political instability.
- iv. In 1997, the Taliban established the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and imposed strict Islamic laws that on one hand pleased the orthodox religious mullahs but on the other hand they gained the wrath of the western world.
- v. The 9/11 episode proved to be a turning point in the history of Afghanistan when she was attacked by round about 44 countries on the alleged attack on the Twin Cities of Pentagon by the Al-Qaeda network.
- vi. Creating harmony among the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan is a challenging task as the very existence of the multi-ethnic group provide for different challenges in the country.

- vii. It is a fact that due to the issue of Durand Line; Afghanistan was the country to oppose the entry of Pakistan into the United Nations that further exacerbated the relations between the two countries.
- viii. It is important to mention that security situation became worsened in Afghanistan in the post-9/11 scenario on account of the US intervention and the resultant military operations. These military operations were also extended to Pakistani's tribal areas along the Durand Line and the Drone Attacks.
- ix. The post-9/11 syndrome brings about the drastic changes in Pakistan's Foreign Policy as far as Afghanistan and the United States is concerned.
- x. Under severe pressure from the US the government of Pakistan banned all Jihadi organizations in the country to resolve the issue of security in the country.
- xi. In 2012 the Tripartite Border Coordination Mechanism was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan to resolve the issue of order security.
- xii. The initiation of the drawdown scenario in 2014 in Afghanistan had prognosticated that Taliban would fill in the power vacuum because of the drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan.
- xiii. The security of both the countries is interlinked and much depends upon the military engagement and operations in the respective countries.
- xiv. The frequent closing of Pak-Afghan borders (Torkham, Peshawar, Chaman, Spin Boldak, Ghulam Khan) happened on many occasions, whenever tension escalated on both sides due to cross border militants' attacks.
- xv. In the post -2014 drawdown scenarios of US forces from Afghanistan, the security of Afghanistan was mainly handed over to the Afghan National and Defense Security Forces with the role of NATO forces changed to the Resolute Support Mission.

- xvi. It is a truth that most of the top leaders of Talban were murdered during the US military operation in Afghanistan but still both the Taliban and the US realized to enter a patch up agreement which was initiated in July 2018.
- xvii. It is a fact that approximately 56,000 people cross the Pak-Afghan border on daily basis to meet their relatives and near ones, but the most important thing is that 90% of such people make their entry into Pakistan.
- xviii. The post-9/11 era brought about a drastic change in the Pak-Afghan relations resulting in the initiation of blame game and counter blame game on part of the both the countries.

7.2 Recommendations

- i) It is an admitted fact that relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have always been worse due to their internal issues but due to their family terms and frequent visits to each other countries have added a lot in this direction. Both the countries need to understand the internal situations of their respective countries and then decide in terms of their respective national interest. It is national interest that can keep them closely knitted.
- ii) Both the countries need to focus on Border Management to resolve all the outstanding issues associated with the Durand Line. But it is necessary to mention that border management does not mean to compel Afghanistan to recognize it as an international border but to make necessary steps for proper maintenance of the border such as installation of walk through gates on all sensitive points, increase the number of security personnel along both sides of the border, installation of biometric points at the important entrants and exits and proper visa system for entering the other country would resolve the issues to a greater extent.

- iii) Since Afghanistan is greatly inhabited by the multifaceted ethnic groups that have led to the issues of insurgency and terrorism in the country. The government of Afghanistan need to focus on resolving the issue of ethnicity as the best option before them is establishment of a federal form of government which would cater to the accommodation of all ethnic groups irrespective of their caste, race, language, and religion. By giving representation to all the groups based on proportional representation would help Afghanistan a peaceful country in the region.
- iv) The strict policies of the Taliban during their regime in 1996-2001 compelled the US and allied powers to intervene in the internal politics of their country the price of which they are still paying in the form of civil war, militancy, power vacuum and political instability. Since Taliban are again in power now, they must realize the mistakes made by them during their early regime and focus on non-discriminatory policies for both the male and female to make the country a symbol for peace and security in the region.
- v) The 9/11 episode made the world realize the significance of security by devising different security strategies for their respective countries. It was this heinous attack that compelled all the major states to think in terms of their internal as well as external security paradigm.
- vi) The question of multi-ethnicity in Afghanistan has created the inherent issues of instability and civil war since the different stakeholders are not given opportunities of participation and representation in the domestic politics of the country. It is only through their direct involvement in the political affairs of the country that can help in bringing peace and stability in the country.

vii) For long lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the issue of Durand Line need proper attention on part of both the governments as this is the only viable solution to peace and stability in the region. This can better be resolved as Afghanistan must either agree to recognize it as an international border already between them and the British government back in 1893 or agree on the proper management of the border since on most of the occasions, the metallic gate installed at the key entries are destroyed by the Afghan people. Moreover, the assistance of an international arbitrator comprising members from both the countries could also help in resolving the issues of border infiltration and the resultant insurgency and terrorism.

viii) Harmony amongst the different ethnic groups living in Afghanistan can be created by carving out a federal form of government in the country and that too by including all the stakeholders as per their population and representation in the local provincial and national set up of the government. Giving them representation in almost all spheres of political set up of the country would give them more valuable efforts in bringing all the discordant elements into a unified whole.

ix) It is an un-denying fact that Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's entry into the United Nations, but it had an inherent problem of the Durand Line that has been the cause of the exacerbated and adverse security situation in the country. It is a matter of great concern for the law enforcement agencies of both the countries that peace and stability is *sine qua non* for their survival and existence. Long lasting peace and security can be the topmost priority of the security apparatus of the two countries and can better be achieved by stationing a joint military force on the sensitive and critical points of the border.

- x) As far as the internal security paradigm of Pakistan is concerned, the government of Pakistan during Musharraf Regime mostly banned all the Jihadi organizations that were working against the national interest of Pakistan and were creating hurdles for the smooth and harmonious relations of Pakistan with the neighboring countries. To avoid such inharmonious and disturbing situation, the government of Pakistan needs to make proper legislation for such organizations and enforce strict laws with strict adherence to them in future.
- xi) The Tripartite Border Agreement signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan signed in 2012 between the two incumbent states must be put into practical shape to bring more normalcy and smoothness in the country. This would help in resolving the most burning issue of the border and the resultant cross border infiltration and incursions into other territories.
- xii) The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was a good sign for the people of Pakistan, relations between the two states remain normal and cooperative. But it is also important to mention that Pakistan should take more advantage from their regime and should work on to resolving the most outstanding issue of the Durand line to wind up this issue once for all.
- xiii) A peaceful Afghanistan is very essential for the political stability of Pakistan and the entire region. This can only be guaranteed if all the stakeholders in Afghanistan are on the same page and enjoy the same power-sharing scenario as is enjoyed by all the important government functionaries.
- xiv) Both the governments need to take joint venture regarding the closing the Torkham, Peshawar, Chaiman, Spin Boldak, and Ghulam Khan cross points and must take joint efforts to keep all these areas open for the in and out of all passengers passing through these points.

xv) Since the security of Afghanistan was handed over to the Afghan Security Forces in the 2014 drawdown scenario, so the government of Taliban should now take great care of further strengthening the law enforcement agencies of the country. It is also important to mention here that during the fall of Kabul, the law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan easily bowed down before the Taliban but since they are now in power and need to focus on the security of the country and particularly stationing more troops at the Pak- Afghan border so as create harbor more cordial relations with the immediate neighbor.

xvi) Since most of the top-class leadership of Taliban were martyred during the US and allied forces bombardment from 2001 to 2016, the current leadership of Taliban seem more moderate and must focus on harboring strengthened relations with the United States and other major powers so as to avoid any future attack and incidence of dismantling the network of Taliban in Afghanistan.

xvii) Keeping in view the crossing of border by at least 56,000 people from across both countries, out of which mostly 90% people from Afghanistan make their entry into Pakistan, is also noteworthy in the sense that the border must properly be managed for the inflow and outflow of the two brethren into each other country.

xviii) Just as the 9/11 syndrome brought about a drastic change in the Pak-Afghan relations, it is hoped that the victory of Taliban in September 2021 would usher in a new era for the both the countries and would refrain from the system of blame and counter blame and would not criticize the policies of each other in determining their relations.

7.3 CONCLUSION

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime remained under the shadow of distrust. As a close neighbor, Pakistan brought numerous efforts to maintain good relations, but still facing distrust and blame game from the Afghanistan side, due to cross border militant's infiltration, drug trafficking, and terrorist safe havens in FATA. On the other side, Pakistan is also uncertain about the Indian influence in Afghanistan and their terrorist activities against Pakistan from Afghan soil. Even though both the states are strong allies against the war on terror, but there is a broad gap of trust deficit in their bilateral relations. Subsequently, both the state's relations cannot pay for mistrust and hostility, but the vacuum of mistrust allows the regional powers to interfere in the internal affairs of both the states. This research work analyzed the nature of Pak-Afghan relations to conclude trust-building through its constant mutual methodologies.

Pak-Afghan relations revolve around trust and mistrust in different regimes, sometimes cordiality in relations and erstwhile uncertainty, but no persistency in the relations. Many CBMs show a positive sign in Pak-Afghan diplomatic relations but the current scenario and a power vacuum after the US drawdown and Afghan peace and reconciliation process need cooperation. Both the states take out the ways for mutual partnership in the field of transit trade, a settlement with the Taliban members through peace talks, permanent solutions of disputes on the Pak-Afghan border which are causing the killing of innocent peoples. In which border fencing started from the Pakistan side under the supervision of Pakistan military forces and a major part of border fencing completed is an example of cooperation to halt the flow of militant infiltration.

Pakistan and Afghanistan see each other in a zero-sum relationship where the gain of one is the loss of the other, and for both states better pay is the rational choice, i.e., collaboration or defection. Both the states are seeking security and peace, but any concrete step in this regard facing lack of coherence and defection remains dominant in the way of peace and friendly relations. After the fall of the Taliban regime and the emergence of a national unity government under the US umbrella. Pakistan recognized the first democratic government of Hamid Karzai and offered any kind of assistance.

Nonetheless, both states' relations in no way saw cordiality in such a period, and a dilemma in the situation prevailed due to allegations and counter-allegations. Both states' relations normalized when Ashraf Ghani succeeded Hamid Karzai in September 2014 elections. Both the state's leadership extended hands for cooperation and peace, signed an MoU for the exclusion of terrorism and extremism. A flaw in both states' relations came across in the terrorist accidents in 2015 in Afghanistan, which disappointed the reconciliation process. Since ISIS was involved in such attacks but Afghanistan persistently blamed Pakistan. Correspondingly, Pakistan was also confronted by a wave of terrorist attacks in the described period. Although did not directly blame Afghanistan but asserted that the terrorist sanctuaries are in Afghanistan which is used by the hostile powers came across the border. Pakistan gave a list of alleged terrorists to the Afghan embassy and required immediate action by the Afghan government. In the prescribed period both the states interfered in each other internal affairs. Pakistan is skeptical about Afghanistan's role in Baluch separatist and Pashtun nationalists to sabotage the security of Pakistan. While Afghanistan's perception is that Pakistan is aiding the Islamist groups as a strategic asset against Afghanistan.

Pak-Afghan relations have been mostly criticized by mutual distrust and blame game. There is a lack of cooperation in both states' relations, which makes both the states

more selfish rather than cooperative, subsequently in trust deficit. In Pak-Afghan relations, the major issue in the way to overcome the dilemma is a deadlock on several issues. Some economic cooperation can be seen but the political side of the relations is standstill. Many factors are responsible in this regard, Pakistan having a stronghold in Afghanistan in the form of Pashtuns and pro-Taliban elements. The Afghanistan internal disorder not only impacted Pakistan, but all the adjacent regional countries are also under the grip of security threats. Afghanistan was not the only actor in the creation of political, economic, and diplomatic clout of global dimensions. But internal and external actors have been involved in a country destabilizing situation. This long internal strife dating back to the early 1980s and US involvement in Afghanistan has impacted regional and world scenarios.

In a security atmosphere where a state economy is heavily dependent on external support, states in front of insurgency and terrorism, tussles among the political parties, imbalance, and lack of harmony among the state institutions are the catalyst for the perpetual disorder. Even though Afghanistan and Pakistan have epochs of ancient historical, dialectal, religious, cultural, and traditional relations with one another, but both countries are confronted with diverse ties on the diplomatic front. Both states have uneven relations on the issue of cross-border militants' infiltration, the incursion of Afghan migrants, and the presence of insurgents in the Pak-Afghan border sides. Nevertheless, despite the anxious political attitude, individuals of the twin states remain adjacent to one another.

Deficiencies are on both sides of the border; Afghanistan should agree to take the Durand Line as the International border and Pakistan should accept Afghanistan as an independent state. It is a remarkable fact that Frontier Tribes under all changes of monarchies on both sides of the mountains maintained their integrity and independence alike of Kabul and frontier regions of Pakistan. East and West both sides have trodden and retrodden their

homes in hands of most powerful ranges but confused every power that attempts to cross their regions against their well. To give imputes to the Afghan problem, first its internal issues should be put into consideration. For this drive, the total withdraws of the NATO armies beginning from Afghanistan and the restoration of the non-Aligned and Islamic status of Afghanistan is essential.

Respect of the Afghans for their political rights, according to their wishes without foreign hands interference. Peace should be restored, with the assistant of Pakistan, Iran, and other regional actors interested in Afghanistan for internal peace in the region. Pakistan's proclamation of \$500 worth of projects for Afghanistan's health, education, and developmental progress are encouraging. The provision of education facilities to 100 Afghan students in the world's top universities (Lahore University of Management Sciences) is also an appreciated step in the normalization of relations.

Afghanistan's peaceful future lies in a favorable regional situation, with Pakistan at the essential site can play an important role. On the contrary, an unbalanced Afghanistan will threaten Pakistan's security, thwarting the restoration of its economy and annihilating dangerous situations to create a law-and-order situation for Pakistan. Even though the outreach of President Ashraf Ghani consumes become fond of welcoming relations with its neighbors, but the geostrategic stance of Pakistan and the restrictions of its discriminating counterterrorism policies have not decisively altered, due to dramatically improved India-Afghanistan relations. The vacuum created by the weakness of state governance and lack of harmony among the management has enabled the security institution to further expand its political and economic clout of both Pakistani and Afghan establishments. Both the country's protection and foreign policy tasks have not been fulfilled without establishing a friendly environment of relations with its neighbors. On the part of Pakistan, its foreign policy

challenges seem to be growing, which enabled India has provide an opportunity to peruse an aggressive foreign policy and exploit our deficiencies.

To restore peace in Afghanistan is not only in the hands of the US but other regional stakeholders like China and Russian should be kept under confidence for eternal peace in Afghanistan as well as in the entire region. Subsequently, in the 2014 uncertain presidential elections, a fraction amid the two groups of National Unity Government has disallowed the establishment of executing broadly reinforced programs, especially contrary to bribery. Afghanistan's peaceful future rests on a favorable regional situation. In this regard, the role of stakeholders in Afghanistan could not be denied. Even though President Ashraf Ghani asserted more demands from Pakistan that Pakistani leadership should take measures against the Taliban sanctuary existing inside Pakistan. Pakistan is assured to influence the Haqqani network and Quetta Shura but cannot force them to make concessions against their core interests. Though the rise of growing divides inside the movement has diminished Pakistan's influence over the Taliban. Pakistan and Afghanistan connections are one of the most intricate strengthening trials facing the world today. The complex security situation of Afghanistan has led to large global attention. Peace and stabilization programs build on the assumption that stability needs to be achieved in a larger regional context.

This will be led Afghanistan and Pakistan towards economic development as a precondition for the stabilization of widespread areas. Both states 'cooperation and support towards each other on regional and international platforms will also vanish the tragic terms in both states' relations. Afghanistan and Pakistan in partnership, as well as self-sufficiently, should make hard work by their efforts for persuasion dedicated rudiments to relinquish insurrection; and it is in Pakistan's interests to have harmony and stability in Afghanistan. This is the obligation of Afghan leaders also to acknowledge and facilitate further collaboration with Pakistan. To stop negative propaganda against its neighbor Pakistan. As a

conjoined associate find reflection in the way to handle each other's concerns. The recommendations are powerful, we should also focus on the underlying points, make each other so at the mercy of each other that mutual distrust and blame game becomes awful. Both countries need each other, they will further suffer if not resolve their domestic political issues. However, the collaboration will open a new chapter of regional development. A Greek poet, *Hesiod* rightly said that 'you can easily change your friend but not neighbors. "Once remarked that a bad neighbor is as great a calamity as a good one is a great advantage, a good neighbor is a blessing" (Rashid, 2010).

According to the Taliban anxiety that the national unity government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan failed to protect rule of law of Afghanistan. The Taliban does not trust the government of Afghanistan's capability to safeguard the stability, safety, and protection of the reconciled insurgent's leaders. The Taliban also seeking the implementation of Islamic Laws. Complete withdraw of foreign troops and for the country's security the Islamic states of Afghanistan have kept security forces for peacekeeping. As the role of the Islamic states of Afghanistan is concerned.

The government of Afghanistan wants to generate a nonviolent and safe state, construct a strong economy, strengthen regional relations, and associate with the global community. After being affected by extensive war, the government of Afghanistan wants reconciliation and peace talks with the Taliban leadership as having staked in-country stability. As the government of Afghanistan has anxiety that most of the Taliban leadership has locality in Pakistan, so settlement with the Taliban is linked with the political reconciliation of Pakistan. The achievement of Afghanistan reconciliation is related to the instant termination of aggressions, acceptance of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to all the groups. Finally, an arrangement to assist all stalemates to Al-Qaeda and altogether the terrorist groups.

7.3.2 Counter Drug Policies in Afghanistan

Global production of heroin and opium, Afghanistan remained the major producer of the world's demand for several decades, regardless of counter-narcotics efforts. The drug economy has a significant role in Afghanistan's corruption, poor governance, and law and order situation. The Drugs economy gave access and funding to insurgents which leads to the insurgency in Afghanistan. Warlords in Pakistan and Afghanistan are in authority for \$80 million returns in drug marketing which are accountable for the help of the Taliban. This also created a black-market economy, developing a radical association leading to corrupt control of a significant part of the regional economies in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Afghanistan government agencies should focus on the issues of regulation of rules, reduction in forceful radicalism, and shaping conciliatory assistance countrywide. Afghanistan is overwhelmed by non-state actors, the Taliban have added strength as they have formed an illegal market economy reinforced by a viable illegal system, powered by an increasing narcotics expertise. Political leaders must have the will to eliminate the evil of narco-products and need to think beyond the immediate national interests. Drugs enrich only corrupt officials, which led to strengthening the stable authoritarian rule. With counter-narcotics policies, Afghanistan can avail of the opportunity of virtuous leadership.

Suppressing drug trafficking is difficult in the best of circumstances, and circumstances are far from ideal in Afghanistan. It is observed that due to the use of drugs by injections HIV is spreading very fast in Afghanistan. In recommendation needle and syringe program was the most effective health effort, due to the conservative nature of the Afghan people it gains no remarkable results. The ministry of drugs and Crime creates an effective mechanism to fight against drug production and its associated institutions and needs to establish a joint counter-narcotics unit. Averting the powerful individuals, government

administrators, mafia, and parliament associates from interfering and violating drugs-related laws. Strengthening the state system of monitoring over the production of heroin and ensuring strict measures against its eradication. Before poppy eradication, alternative programs such as biotechnologies, replacing the illicit economy with a legitimate system. Pharmaceutical corporations would match black market prices, this will be severing supply to criminal elements who are supporting poppy cultivators.

If the Afghan drug market vanished entirely (because of an upsurge in lower-cost production somewhere else) the insurgent cause would suffer and the security and governance in Afghanistan would improve automatically. That issues resulted in radicalization and militant recruitment among the young generation and to produce opium and focus on its cultivation to earn the money. If the global demand for opium and heroin remains and no other potential producer state displaces Afghanistan, the drug economy will transform Afghanistan and no counter-narcotics policy will remain effective. The price of one-kilo heroin in Afghanistan sells in weight around \$2250 it retails in London some time the price increase 50 to 70%.

7.3.3 Border Security Measures

The porous Pak-Afghan border which is open on many points emerged numerous issues. Almost twenty crossing points on the Pak-Afghan border Durand line using frequently for daily routine. Due to the geostrategic location of Afghanistan, its northern side and a small border with China are normally protected. Due to the least border management, smuggling increases between the two states. Formal and informal types of trade are \$ 2.5 billion. Smugglers are also using Iranian ports for imports under Afghan Transit Trade which find their way to Pakistan. Subsequently, Pakistan should not discourage Afghan transit trade on the excuse of trafficking, rather strengthen border control management and observance by

discouraging any state institutions involved in smuggling. Unnecessary checking and halting of export cargo trucks on the border, declining trust mainly due to transit issues, unexpected closing of borders, much-awaited table talks, and penetration of other regional states are some of the main hurdles in the way of APTTA. Due to which the agreement halted in 2015 and trade is undergoing without agreement nowadays.

Nonetheless, the tri-border region's concrete administrations in the region for border protection have failed. In the Pak-Afghan border region radicalization and lawlessness are widespread, which led to substantial illegal trade and smuggling of weapons and opium, and this tribal belt on both sides provides safe heavens to the terrorist. Many narcotics smugglers that finance the Taliban activities pass through Pakistan, due to the porous Pak-Afghan border. On the presence of the Pashtuns tribal belt, and the absence of civil law mutually on the Pak-Afghan boundary focus of border solutions turned towards border disputes. The tribal people are mostly busy in a mutual tug of war and search for justice. A shared admiration for territorial integrity was a rudimentary requirement for any development, that is why the issue of border disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be resolved through bilateral discussion. The establishment of Pak-Afghan border security forums regularly, a forum should be supported by online data and opinion sharing initiatives.

The most effective way to take on strategic dialogue is strictly monitored rather than left alone on papers. Addressing Pak-Afghan cross-border combativeness problem on both sides, and efforts for the resumption of the Afghan dialogue process that was halted by the Afghan's hostility and US irrelevance policy. An evaluation of current cross-border security measures to make more effective the existing security measures and the introduction of modern technologies for border security and management along with the biometric system. Feasible migration and visa system among both the states; as well as an approach of trust

edifice and diplomatic appointments wherein cooperation Pak-Afghan seek to compromise and address grievances to choose a middle way for can help break the deadlocks. Deferring Pak-Afghan imminent disputes for the predictable future with courage and patience. There is a trust deficit in the relations, while the response of Kabul towards Pakistan is far from being positive. Here is also a shortage of efforts to revive the relations especially on the side of civil society.

Now is the time to reach out for a host of visiting delegations and cultural exchange programs to appease Afghan grievances. To stimulate education in the border region, an educational exchange program should be encouraging. Closer of illicit transit points and secure the creation of a lawful trade zone. Opportunities should be provided to religious scholars on both sides aimed at governing the militants in the border region. On the internal front Pakistan is also facing several challenges, to see Pakistan progressive, peaceful, free from internal and external clutches, stable and moderate, fundamental human rights be secured, rule of law under check and balance system should be fully implemented, freedom of expression, free press, and strong opposition are required. Politically, the main pro-independence dissertations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are an underprivileged image of the “real” lives of people in both countries. Whereas separatists have cast off the Durand Line as a line of abhorrence between Afghanistan and Pakistan as a political gathering exclamation, they are unable to remember one important thing: that the demarcation line is entirely a myth.

Outlines, borders, and territories change and are in unremitting instability in many states of the world. Though the Durand Line exists on paper and in *de facto* political terms, it has never worked as a ‘real’ border. Both Afghans and Pakistanis have been crossing it for a long time. And they will continue to do so in the future, lacking esteem to which country it goes. National reconciliation and political stability in Afghanistan are durable for peace in the

country as well as in the whole region. The Afghan establishment agrees to make crucial changes in the state constitution, to put up the reasonable demands of the Afghan Taliban. similarly, the Afghan Taliban should keep in mind that alone they are not able to exercise authority on Afghanistan completely. Obscurantist policies and the exclusive role of the Taliban nor in the benefits of Afghanistan nor the interests of Pakistan.

The negligence of the Afghan authority and the Afghanistan unfolding situation is a very serious expansion, predominantly for Pakistan. Afghanistan's dependency on the US and the other Western countries has prevented them from national building, reintegration, and restructuring of Afghanistan. Pakistan's friendship with the US should not halt us from perusing an Afghan policy that is calculated to serve our best national interests. Pakistan and other stakeholders of the region are looking forward to the stability and prosperity of Afghanistan to seek friendly relations. There is a need for a capable, genuine, and mature Afghan leadership to put his reign in order before it is too late. Preservation of the present situation may lead ultimately to the division of Afghanistan.

The National Unity Government of Afghanistan is facing strong criticism due to the coalition government of Dr. Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, two deputies of President Ghani two of Abdullah and Hamid Karzai. It is a heavy burden on the Afghan economy generating \$874 million from duties and taxes. Geo-strategic, geo-political geo-economic, and other grounds make it imperative for both the countries to have cordial terms and commitment to multilateral, trilateral, and bilateral cooperation. Both states are facing common security threats, they should create a joint border security mechanism to halt the threat perception in bilateral relations. Negative factors and forces are on both sides of the border, which never want stability in the relations. Regularly elaborated minor issues and turned the positive

direction of the relations towards negativity. However, the two sides adhere to the policy of non-intervention and non-interference in each other's inner matters.

Bilateral cooperation in the field of economy, exploration in the field of mineral resources, transit trade, investment in education, agriculture, and technology. Pakistan should provide trade facilities to Afghanistan with India, while Afghanistan will provide to Pakistan transit route till Central Asian Republics this would help to connect South Asia with Central Asia. Smooth implementation of APTTA, which will not only ensure economic gains for both states but also the entire region. Collaboration at regional and international forums i-e, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and United Nations Organization (UNO). In the promotion of trade between the two neighbors, the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), the Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement (ECOTA), and APTTA should be fully implemented. The focus should be given on the improvement of structure development, calculation of rail and road links, the construction of transportation and communication, and last but not the least transit corridor should be promoted that both countries connect to the entire region.

Afghanistan is still facing many domestic political issues; the problems are inside Afghanistan, and the Afghan stakeholders also want to resolve such issues. Mullah Baradar in Doha said, that "we seek an Afghanistan that is independent, sovereign, united, developed, and free. An Islamic system where everyone can participate without discriminations" (Thomas, 2020). Afghans must keep in mind that if they continue to shift the blame on Pakistan, it will not change their destination and will not going to solve their problems. Pakistan's stance of friendly government in Afghanistan to restrain the growing Indian

influence, which is a direct security threat to Pakistan. As Afghanistan is not looking serious to stop Indian presence from its soil, it keeps Pakistan thoughtful for an alternative way.

Therefore, it is a viable option to manage the 2,600km long border with Afghanistan, to protect Pakistan from the ill-effects of crisis and conflict in Afghanistan, as well as to put an end to Kabul's blame-game. Afghanistan has not been doing near enough to protect its citizens or territory from what it has alleged have been the activities of Pakistan-based and Pakistani-supported terrorist organizations. Mistrust among the two states is an essential matter, which eventually connected with internal factors. Internally, both states are facing some common challenges like corruption, bad governance, unemployment, extremism, terrorism, opium production, cross-border militant infiltration, and economic and political instability. The trust deficit in both states relations is not a new phenomenon. Measures have never been made to address it systematically and overcome any issues by clearly eliminating the frustrations that continue to manifest for one explanation or the other. What the two nations have done rather is to perpetually address on a specially appointed assumption any issue that has emerged. The aggregate impact of this mindset is presently truly influencing if not split our relations with Afghanistan. In state-to-state relations nothing is fixed and changeless; everything revolves around state interest. It turns out to be simple for nations to cooperate when their inclinations combine. The interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan do unite on one point coordination and peace in the region. In this rapidly developing world and considering the political and financial improvement occurring in the region, it is considered a genuine concern for the two nations to defeat the intensity of the past and push ahead towards reinforcing two-sided relations. At the point when some development is achieved that it will be easier for the two states to move on to other rapid issues.

Some of the above issues are intertwined among Pakistan and Afghanistan which not only destabilized both country's relations, but the public taking place on both sides of the border is heavily disturbed and affected. The issue of Afghans Muhajir greatly destabilized the business and law and order situation of Pakistan. Various small-scale business is in the hands of Afghans in Pakistan. The growing instability and crimes in Pakistani society are based on the presence of Afghan migrants, which Pakistan has hosted from Afghanistan of whom 1.6 million are still in the primary border regions of Pakistan. Afghanistan receives some refugees because of the Waziristan offensive. After the withdraw of foreign forces in the endorsement of the US-Taliban agreement, it is hoped that the residual Afghan refugees will return to their homeland. Once peace is restored in Afghanistan, the state will be led towards political and economic stability and the Afghan migrants will certainly move towards their land to contribute to Afghanistan reconstruction.

There is a positive and constructive atmosphere in which to peruse political, security, and economic cooperation between the two neighbors. Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for its transit trade, at the same time Afghanistan's most important trade partner making effective legal border trade a potentially important booster of development on both sides of the border. Pakistan's other major hike towards Afghanistan is in daily use, and major support in the educational field i-e, around 30,000 Afghan students graduated from Pakistani Universities and provision of 2000 scholarships in the last three years in pursuit of social progress. Pakistan regardless of its economic complications contributing on the way to Afghanistan's rebuilding and progress in the field of education, health and infrastructure spent about \$ 330 million on the above developmental projects. Pakistan to establish its influence in Afghanistan, especially in the non-military sense of strategic depth to have access to Central Asian Republics (CARs) should establish joint, trilateral, and multifaceted planes to support intra-Afghan reconciliation.

Pakistan's interests and strategies in Afghanistan are unmoving where Pakistan optimism to have a friendly and stable government in Kabul, which is not somewhere endangered by anti-Pakistan elements. Pakistan's wish in Kabul for such kind of political settlement that permits pro-Pakistani Pashtun influential to participate in provincial and national government policies. That not only in Afghanistan interests to keep on hold the Pashtuns memberships under confidence but will also be beneficial for Pakistan. Nevertheless, for Pakistan, there is a strong repercussion in the presence of other stakeholders in Afghanistan to gain strategic depth, especially against India. India is investing more in Afghanistan to gain influence against Pakistan. So far, the collaboration of Pakistan and Afghanistan to convince the Taliban for table talks and their participation in understanding and development will positive sign used for Pakistan too.

For ultimate dependency, fundamental conflicts should be determined particularly from Afghanistan crosswise. The recurrent outbreaks on Pakistani territory from Kabul's side which became the root of many innocent people's death, this tension should be resolute over two-sided deliberations. Both countries guilt one another; Pakistan's observation that Afghanistan is not thoughtful to settle down the cross-border disputes. Blame game on the part of both sides adds fuel to the fire. Afghanistan insight that Pakistan has a long history of supporting Afghanistan's Taliban and another insurgent group. A policy of consistency is required regarding the Taliban. On which both sides are facing liabilities on the national and international levels. The present government of Ashraf Ghani is trying its level best to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, and for this purpose admired the role and cooperation of Pakistan in Afghan peace and reconciliation. Ghani acknowledges that partnership with Pakistan is an important pillar of Afghan foreign policy. It would be prudent for Afghan leadership to privileged circumstances with Pakistan.

Pressure on each other will not deliver peace in the region, it will only jeopardize improvements in both the state's strained relations. The border needs to be better managed rather than leaving it open to unhindered random movement. The Afghan government should respect Pakistan's sound proposals, easement rights, and the issuance of biometric identification cards. Further steps are required to guarantee the security of the borders between the two countries to solve this issue. In a substantively democratic Pakistan, where the institutions of the state can impose their pre-eminence over the non-elected one. It will also require an environment of reasonable reciprocation by Pakistan's neighbor (Afghanistan).

The convergence of strategic interests among Pakistan and Afghanistan will help in the negotiation of a settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Bilateral agreements between the two states, eager to regulate the relations. While, encouraging co-operation, good neighborliness, and reinforcing universal peace and security in the region. It is time to protect trade routes with Afghanistan for the prosperity of this region. Accusations and counter-accusations tetanus and the prevailing mistrust had better be resolved through reciprocal reliance and self-assurance for utmost peace in the region. If history is any guide both countries should have settled the long-standing disputes for a better imminent and peace process as a dawn of the day.

Bearing in mind the principle of non-intervention, and non-interference in the external and internal dealings of each other states. Both the states have the right to regulate their own political, economic, cultural, and social system, for the will of their people. Lacking external intrusion, insurrection, coercion, or threat in any form should be strictly discouraged. According to the United Nations resolution of 24 October 1970, which was related to the principle of non-intervention, predominantly the pronouncement on Principle of International Law, relating to Approachable Relations and co-operation among the states.

Afghanistan will gradually take control of its affairs over the coming years, as external presence will decrease with time. The government of Pakistan, Iran, and other Muslim states and organizations also should use their good office to keep unity and as a deceive factor for future struggle. Learn from the experience, the disparity between the quality of technology and skill among the freedom-fighters and invaders must be a bridge. Pakistan cannot sight the Afghan problem merely as a bilateral issue because of the foreign policy and security choices of Afghanistan, not lonely made by the Afghan government. Afghan policies are influenced by the internal power of the US and India especially regarding Pakistan. The issues of terrorism, Afghan peace, and stability cannot be steady entirely at the Pak-Afghan bilateral level, as the growing interests of India, China, Iran, Russian, and Central Asian states should also keep under consideration. Therefore, the Afghan problems and domestic political issues should be viewed as a bilateral-cum-multilateral matter.

To give attribute to countries relations, Pakistan and Afghanistan need to cooperate on different issues as both states' destiny is connected. Transparent policies are in the interests of both states. Pakistan to acquire oil and gas benefits from CARs should work with Afghanistan for their interest to provide roots to Afghan productions via Pakistan. Similarly, landlocked Afghanistan has benefited from Pakistan but can be free from Indian influence. To achieve such goals, regional powers like, China, Russia, and the US should play a constructive role among Pakistan and Afghanistan. Besides, it supports economic, political, and territorial steadiness, stability, and uniformity in both states' relations are indivisible. For peace and security in both the states steadfastness in communication, the need for trade-off and collaboration in resolving different issues is required. As cooperation has better pay-offs. If Pakistan desires to achieve long-term foreign policy achievement in Afghanistan, Pakistan should adopt the policy from the perspective of geo-Economic rather than geo-Strategic. No military solution for the current Afghan conflict is essential, use of force is not appropriate in

any case. Because history teaches us that you can win the area by force, but not the hearts and minds of peoples in war.

A policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of each state should be adopted accurately. If one option leads towards a better outcome the other option will pursue an effective strategy. That is why both states stop conflicts and mutually prefer cooperation. It is possible to overcome the conflict in Afghanistan, with strong confidence-building measures among Pakistan and Afghanistan with sustained diplomacy. However, these efforts must be taking advantage of wide-ranging collaboration with shared trust and understanding. Such progress will help to alleviate the economic and security situation of both the states and will end the conflict.

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ANNEXURE A

**AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS
OF
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
AFGHANISTAN
AND
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
PAKISTAN**

**AFGHANISTAN - PAKISTAN
TRANSIT TRADE AGREEMENT,
2010 (APTTA)**

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PREAMBLE

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, from here on referred to as the Contracting Parties,

desirous of strengthening the economic ties between their two countries on a mutually beneficial basis,

recognising the right of Afghanistan to freedom of access to the sea as an essential principle for the expansion of its international trade and economic development,

recognizing the importance of the North-South Corridor for Pakistan in relation to trade with Central Asia and for Afghanistan in relation to trade with ECO and SAARC countries,

reiterating their commitment to ensure the smooth, rapid and efficient movement of goods and vehicles between and through the territories of the two countries,

recalling the objectives and principles enunciated in the Convention on High Seas (Geneva 1958) and the ECO Transit Transport Framework Agreement (Almaty, 1998),

recalling further the WTO rules and provisions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1994, Article V) concerning "Freedom of Transit",

considering that the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) of 1965 does not take into account the current economic realities and the new international transit requirements,

acknowledging the need for effective reciprocal transit services between the two Contracting Parties

have agreed as follows:

SECTION I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1: PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The Contracting Parties agree to facilitate the movement of goods between and through their respective territories and to provide all possible facilities in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

The Contracting Parties shall take all necessary measures.

(a) to ensure the efficient and effective administration of transit transport, avoiding unnecessary delays in the movement of goods and commercial vehicles between and through their territories,

- (b) to bring about the simplification, transparency and harmonisation of documentation and procedures relevant to traffic in transit;
- (c) to promote intermodal freight transport;
- (d) to cooperate with a view to minimising the incidence of customs fraud and avoidance; and,
- (e) to monitor the trade of controlled chemical substances with the aim of preventing their diversion for illicit purposes.

ARTICLE 2: DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the meaning hereby assigned to them.

Authority means the Afghanistan – Pakistan Transit Trade Coordination Authority established by the Contracting Parties for the implementation and monitoring of the Transit Agreement;

Bilateral trade means exchange of goods and services between two countries;

Carriers/transport operators means legal or natural person responsible for the transport of goods by rail, road, either directly or using a third party, and by whom, or in whose name, a contract of carriage for hire or reward has been concluded;

Container means standardised receptacle or loading unit for freight to enable (i) loading and unloading (ii) movements by one or more modes of transport, without intermediate reloading and (iii) locking and sealing;

Control services means the relevant law enforcement authorities and services responsible for carrying out all or part of the controls, other than Customs control, to the importation, exportation or transit of goods which include Medico-sanitary, veterinary, and phytosanitary inspections;

Cross border traffic means traffic originating from the territory of one contracting party that ends up in the territory of the other contracting party;

Customs means the Government Service which is responsible for the administration of Customs laws and the collection of import and export duties and taxes and which also has responsibility for the application of other laws and regulations relating, *inter alia*, to the importation, transit and exportation of goods

Customs control means measures applied to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations relating to the importation, transit and exportation of goods which the Customs are responsible for enforcing;

Customs transit means procedure through which goods are transported under Customs control from one Customs office of one contracting party to Custom office of other contracting party under suspension of payments of taxes and duties.

Dangerous goods mean goods posing a significant risk to health and environment, security and property when being transported or lying in storage;

Domestic legislation means the entire body of national or local laws and regulations in force in respective countries of the contracting parties;

Examination of goods means the process of physical ascertainment by Customs of nature, origin, condition, quantity and value with reference to transit documents submitted, with understanding that this definition is applicable to only up to 5% of the goods under risk management system

Custom office means that the Customs administrative unit competent for the performance of the Customs formalities and the premises approved for that purpose by the competent authorities.

Freight forwarder means a natural or legal person having a contract of freight forwarding services with a shipper;

Freight forwarding services means services of any kind relating to the carriage, consolidation, storage, handling, packing or distribution of the goods. They include also services in connection with Customs and fiscal matters, declaring the goods for official purposes, procuring bank guarantee and insurance for the goods and collecting or procuring payment or documents relating to the goods;

Import duties and taxes means Customs duties and all other duties, taxes, and other charges levied in accordance with domestic legislation on, or in connection with, the importation of goods, but not including the cost of services rendered.

Inspection of Goods means the superficial process of confirmation that the marks and numbers of bulk in open cargo and container number and seal number for the containerized cargo are in accordance with the particulars furnished in the Goods Declaration or bill of lading.

International transport means transport between the territories of the two Contracting Parties (bilateral traffic) or through the territory of the other Contracting Party (transit traffic);

Home country means for transport operators, the country of establishment, and for vehicles, the country of registration;

Host country means the country where transportation of goods is performed;

Intermodal freight transport means movement of goods in one and the same loading unit (container) which successively uses two or more different modes of transport, without the goods themselves being handled;

Internal traffic means carriage of goods loaded in the territory of a Contracting Party for unloading at a location within the territory of the same Contracting Party; internal traffic is also referred to as "cabotage";

Means of transport means road vehicles and railway rolling stock;

National treatment means a Contracting Party shall grant treatment to services and service suppliers of the other Contracting Party, no less favourable than that which it accords to its own like services and service suppliers;

Permit means a document, identifiable by the biometric device, whereby the driver and cleaner of a vehicle shall be allowed to cross border;

Port of Entry/Exit means an officially designated location at seaports, Airport and or Customs stations where Customs officers or employees are assigned to accept declarations of merchandise and vehicles, control import & exports, clear passengers, collect duties, and enforce the various provisions of customs, immigration and related laws.

Protocol means a document attached to this Agreement setting out specific technical and administrative arrangements;

Quota means the number of vehicles permits issued annually by the competent authorities of each Contracting Party based on transit transport needs;

Shipper means any natural or legal person by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf a contract of carriage of goods has been concluded with a carrier, or any person by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf the goods are actually delivered to the carrier in relation to the contract of carriage of goods;

Temporary Admission Document (TAD) means a document issued by a competent authority of one Contracting Party that allows vehicles registered in the territory of the other Contracting Party to enter or exit or transit through its territory;

Third country means a country that is not a Contracting Party to this Agreement;

Transit traffic means goods (including unaccompanied baggage) and vehicles in transit across the territory of a Contracting Party, when the passage across such territory, with or without transhipment, or change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey which begins and ends beyond the borders of the Contracting Party across whose territory the traffic passes;

Transit country means a country through the territory of which the transit traffic passes;

Transit transport corridor means a route in the respective territories of the Contracting Parties for use by the other Contracting Party for their traffic in transit;

Transport for hire or reward means the carriage for remuneration, of goods, on behalf of third parties;

Transport for own account means a transport operation that is an ancillary activity of an enterprise aimed at moving the goods that are the object of its commercial activity in vehicles owned by the enterprise and operated by its employees;

Transport Operator (TO) means National Carriers who, in conformity with the internal legislation of their country are permitted to carry out international transport operations

between the territories of the Contracting Parties or between his home country and to/from a third country through the territory of the other Contracting Party;

Transport unit: means aircrafts, freight containers of international specifications transported by road, railway wagons or road vehicle including trailers, semi trailers;

Through traffic means the transportation of goods from one point of departure outside the territory of the contracting parties with final destination outside their territory;

Vehicle means any rigid road vehicle, articulated vehicle, unaccompanied trailer or semi trailer;

Medico-sanitary inspection means the inspection exercised for the protection of the life and health of persons, with the exception of veterinary inspection;

Veterinary inspection the sanitary inspection applied to animals and animal products with a view to protecting the life and health of persons and animals, as well as that carried out on objects or goods which could serve as a carrier for animal disease;

Phyto-sanitary inspection means the inspection intended to prevent the spread and the introduction across national boundaries of pests, plants and plant products,

SECTION II

RIGHT OF TRANSIT

ARTICLE 3: FREEDOM OF TRANSIT

1. There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party, via the pre-settled routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting party. No distinction shall be made which is based on flag of the vessel, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, vessels or other means of transport

2. If any Contracting Party is of the opinion that some goods or class of goods being allowed in transit are smuggled back in its territory and are hurting the economy, industry or import revenue, it may file a complaint with the Authority, stating its grievances along with facts and figures and damage being caused to the Contracting Party. On receipt of the complaint, the Authority shall convene a meeting within three months of the filing of the complaint and may agree on taking any appropriate measures to address the problem.

SECTION III

TRANSIT TRANSPORT CORRIDORS

ARTICLE 4: DESIGNATION OF TRANSIT TRANSPORT CORRIDORS

1 The routes used for transit traffic through Pakistan and Afghanistan shall include,

- (i) maritime ports in Pakistan;
- (ii) airports in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for air to air transit only;
- (iii) transit rail/ road corridors through Pakistan and Afghanistan; and,
- (iv) land stations between the Contracting Parties, or between one Contracting Party and a third country.

2. Annex 1 to this Agreement on "International Transit Transport Corridors and Ports of Entry and Exit" defines routes and points of entry and exit for the transport of goods in transit. These corridors may be discontinued or new ones added upon mutual written agreement.

ARTICLE 5: SAFETY OF TRAFFIC IN TRANSIT

The Contracting Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of traffic in transit along the transit routes specified in Annex 1 to this Agreement.

SECTION IV

FACILITATION OF TRANSIT TRADE

ARTICLE 6: PROVISION OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES

1. The Contracting Parties agree to build or upgrade the required infrastructure as listed under Annex 1 to this Agreement in accordance with international best practices and standards.

2. The Contracting Parties, with a view to ensuring the clearance of transit traffic without delay, agree,

- a. to maintain or establish related infrastructure and Customs clearance facilities, within their national jurisdiction, physically adjacent, to each other as far as possible, so as to facilitate the inspection of the means of transport and their cargoes;
- b. to cooperate in order to gradually achieve "coordinated controls" by which the officials of the Contracting Parties will carry out their inspection jointly and simultaneously;

- c. to ensure that adequate human resources are made available for the speedy completion and clearance of border formalities, such as immigration, Customs, and other controls and inspections;
- d. to coordinate the hours of operation of their adjacent Custom stations;
- e. to provide facilities for priority clearance of commercial vehicles with the appropriate transit permits;
- f. to provide adequate and secure parking space for container trucks and other vehicles awaiting clearance, and
- g. to provide and maintain rapid and reliable telecommunication services.

SECTION V

GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR TRANSPORT IN TRANSIT

ARTICLE 7: MARITIME PORTS

1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan guarantees the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the right to use the ports of Karachi, Port Qasim, and Gwadar Port, for the movement of goods in transit to and from Afghanistan in accordance with the official tariffs, rates and conditions applicable to other users of the ports without any discrimination.
2. Adequate sheds and spaces shall be made available for goods in transit to and from Afghanistan to accommodate the required traffic.
3. For dangerous goods, separate arrangements for storage shall be made available.

ARTICLE 8: OTHER PORTS OF ENTRY/EXIT

1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan agrees to provide at the Afghan Ports of Entry/Exit listed under Annex 1 Section 1 the same facilities as mentioned under Articles 6 and 7 above and under Annex 1 Section 2 of this Agreement.
2. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan similarly agrees to provide at the Pakistani Ports of Entry/Exit listed under Annex 1 Section 1 the same facilities as mentioned under Articles 6 and 7 above and under Annex 1 Section 2 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 9: CHOICE OF MEANS OF TRANSPORT

The Contracting Parties agree to permit:

- a. shippers to select, according to their needs, the mode and means of transport to be used for traffic in transit within the territory of the other Contracting Party;
- b. all vehicles to remain within the specified routes of the territory of the other Contracting Party and to exit the same within specified time. In case of force majeure or breakdown, accident of vehicle, the time may be extended by the permit issuing authority of the host country

ARTICLE 10: LICENSING OF TRANSPORT OPERATORS

1. The Contracting Parties agree to harmonise and facilitate the requirements necessary for the carriage of goods into/from and through their own territories.
2. National Transport Operators in order to undertake international transport operations shall be licensed by the Contracting Party where they are commercially registered, according to the criteria set out in Protocol One to this Agreement - *Section II 'Criteria for Licensing Road Transport Operators for International Carriage of Goods in Transit'*

ARTICLE 11: EXCHANGE OF ROAD TRAFFIC RIGHTS

1. The national transport operators licensed for international transport operations in one of the Contracting Parties according to Article 10 shall be entitled to apply for Temporary Admission Document, in order to undertake transport operations of goods in transit to/from/through the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance with Protocol One and Two of this Agreement
2. Two types of transit Temporary Admission Document shall be issued as per procedure laid down in Protocols One and Two
 - a. Temporary Admission Document for transit traffic rights for the goods imported or exported by sea for transportation through the territories of one or both the Contracting Parties;
 - b. Temporary Admission Document for transit rights for the goods not imported or exported by sea, i.e. to go through the territory of the other Contracting Party to pick up and deliver cargo to/from a third country provided both the Contracting Parties have Transport Agreement with the Third Country;
3. The Contracting Parties may agree to set up a quota system when issuing transit Temporary Admission Document to respect a fair share of traffic between the two Contracting Parties.
4. The vehicles carrying the Transit Cargo will be allowed to carry the return transit cargo from the territory of the other Contracting Party

ARTICLE 12. PROHIBITION OF INTERNAL TRANSPORT AND THIRD COUNTRY TRANSPORT

Unless specific permission has been obtained from the relevant authorities of the concerned Contracting Party, means of transport registered in one Contracting Party shall be prohibited from carrying:

- a. goods loaded at a point in the territory of the other Contracting Party for delivery at any other point in that territory (cabotage)
- b. goods from/to another country (third country) than the Operators home and these to be delivered/picked up to/from the territory of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 13: RAILWAYS TRANSPORT OPERATOR

1. The Contracting Parties shall extend national treatment to the transit goods by Railways
2. The movement of Transit goods will be made as per Railways Rules & Regulations of the country through which the goods are in Transit
3. In case a need arise for a separate Protocol on Railways, Contracting parties shall discuss and draft a new Protocol

ARTICLE 14. COMMERCIAL PRESENCE

Subject to Domestic legislation and clearance from the concerned authorities, the Contracting Parties agree to grant permission to freight forwarders and transport operators of the other Contracting Party to establish offices in their respective territories for the purpose of operating activities related to trade in transit. This permission of commercial presence shall be granted on the basis of reciprocity.

SECTION VI

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADMITTANCE OF ROAD VEHICLES

ARTICLE 15: ADMITTANCE OF ROAD CARGO VEHICLE IN THE OTHER CONTRACTING PARTIES' TERRITORY

The Contracting Parties shall admit to their territory vehicles whether left-hand or right-hand drive, (operated commercially), registered in the other Contracting Party, in accordance with the rules set out in Protocol One to this Agreement - *Section One Technical Requirements for The Admittance of Road Vehicles*.

ARTICLE 16: MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF DRIVING LICENSE AND VEHICLE REGISTRATION DOCUMENTS

The Contracting Parties shall recognize domestic driving licenses, vehicle registration documents and vehicle license plates that are issued by the competent authorities of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 17. TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF VEHICLE

Road transport vehicles shall conform to the technical requirements regarding dimensions, maximum weights and loads, emission standards and related matters with a view to harmonization and the establishment of common standards specified in Protocol One to this Agreement - *Section One "Technical Requirements for the Admittance of Road Vehicles"*.

ARTICLE 18: MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INSPECTION CERTIFICATE

1. Each Contracting Party undertakes to institute periodic inspection of road vehicles and other means of transport registered on its own territory and used for transit transport

operations to ensure that they are in good working conditions and meet required safety standards;

2. The Contracting Parties shall recognize periodic inspection certificates of road vehicles and other means of transport used for transit transport operations issued by the other Contracting Party

ARTICLE 19 THIRD PARTY VEHICLE INSURANCE SCHEME

1. Road vehicles traveling to the territory of the other Contracting Party shall comply with requirements for compulsory third party vehicle liability insurance in the host country.

2. The Contracting Parties shall take all steps necessary to ensure that their motor vehicles registered in their respective territories have insurance that covers third party liability incurred in the course of transit traffic.

ARTICLE 20: MULTIPLE ENTRY TRANSIT PERMIT

1. The Contracting Parties shall, in accordance with their respective laws, rules and regulations, grant multiple entry permit valid for a period of six months each stay not exceeding 15 days to the drivers of the vehicles and the persons engaged in international transit traffic operations who are subject to permit requirements.

2. In exceptional cases when the permit expires while the driver holding the permit is in the Contracting State, the permit holder may refer to the Ministry of Interior and extend his/her permit. Conditions pertaining to Article 10.2 apply here as well.

3. Procedures for granting of permit, mentioned in paragraph 1 above, shall be simplified including reducing the number of documents required for the procurement of such permit.

4. Any change in validity of permit or period of stay shall be decided by APTTCA.

SECTION VII

CUSTOMS CONTROL AND OTHER CONTROLS

ARTICLE 21 HARMONISATION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF CUSTOMS PROCEDURES

1. The Contracting Parties agree that all cargo to be transited through Pakistan and Afghanistan in:

- a. containers of international specifications,

- b. for a period of three years the cargo shall be allowed in internationally acceptable and verifiable standard of sealable trucks;
- c. oversize and bulk cargo (not imported in containers--like ship load) shall be transported in open trucks or other transport units;
- d. Export of perishable goods in transit (like fruits and vegetables etc) shall be transported in open trucks or other transport units

2. in case of bulk or oversized cargo, which cannot be placed in sealed containers, other means of transport sufficiently secured for Customs and transit control purposes shall be used.

3. to limit Customs controls on the means of transport and goods in transit passing through their territories to the minimum required level to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations that the Customs is responsible to enforce,

4. up to 5% of containers arriving at port of entry will be subject to examination under the risk management system. No further inspection is allowed en route unless irregularity is suspected as provided in the Revised Kyoto Convention, 1999.

5. to encourage cooperative arrangements between their Customs services in order to ensure speedy customs clearance with minimum delay to transit traffic;

6. to accept mutual recognition of checks and findings undertaken by their respective Customs officials.

7. to be guided, whenever possible, by the standards and recommended practices of the *International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs Procedures (Revised Kyoto Convention 1999)*;

8. to implement the provisions specified in Protocol III to this Agreement on *Customs Control and Transit Regime*,

9. to authorize the importation of containers without the payment of duties and taxes subject to re-exportation and other conditions laid down in the *Customs Convention on Containers (Geneva, 1972)*.

ARTICLE 22 PHYTOSANITARY AND VETERINARY INSPECTION

The Contracting Parties may be guided by the multilateral agreements signed under the umbrella of the World Health Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organisation and World Organisation of Animal Health and other related international organizations in applying inspection of goods crossing the border viz phyto-sanitary and veterinary inspection

ARTICLE 23. SPECIAL PROVISION ON TRANSPORT OF PERISHABLE GOODS

1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Contracting Parties shall endeavour to facilitate and speed up the transport of perishable goods and to grant a priority regime for border crossing clearance formalities to avoid undue delays.
2. The Contracting Parties agree to define phytosanitary measures and Customs requirements to allow direct transport of perishable goods without transshipment.

ARTICLE 24: SPECIAL PROVISION ON TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS.

1. The Contracting Parties agree to take into account the provisions of the *European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR-1957, Geneva as amended 2007)* for transit and cross border movements of dangerous goods.
2. The term Dangerous Goods are those substances and articles that are referred to as "Dangerous Goods" in Annexes A (General provisions and provisions concerning dangerous articles and substances) and B (Provisions concerning transport equipment and transport operations) of the ADR.

ARTICLE 25: ARMS; AMMUNITIONS AND MILITARY GOODS

This Agreement shall exclude the transit of arms, ammunition and military equipments unless agreed upon by the two Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 26: CONTROL OF PRECURSORS AND CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES

The Contracting Parties agree to set out measures to strengthen their administrative cooperation to prevent the diversion of substances used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances as defined in Protocol Four to this Agreement on *Control of Precursors and Chemical Substances* used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances

ARTICLE 27 HARMONISATION OF CUSTOMS CONTROLS AND OTHER CONTROLS

The Contracting Parties agree to harmonise border facilities for goods in transit as per international best practices. In particular, the Contracting Parties agree to make every effort to ensure that:

- (a) Controls other than Customs controls of goods and vehicles in transit, by the relevant authorities responsible for the enforcement of applicable laws and regulations, shall be carried out in a harmonised manner with customs controls, simultaneously if possible, or with the minimum delay,
- (b). Customs authorities may, through explicit delegation of powers by other control services, carry out on their behalf, all or part of the control for which these services are responsible. In this case, the relevant services will ensure that the Customs have the required means in terms of training, information and equipment to conduct properly these controls.

SECTION VIII

DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES

ARTICLE 28: DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURES

1. The Contracting Parties recognize that documentation and processing procedures can be costly and time consuming affecting the efficiency of transit operations, and that efforts should be made to reduce these costs and delays
2. The Contracting Parties, therefore, agree to make effort
 - a. to limit the number of documents and reduce, procedures and formalities required for traffic in transit;
 - b. to harmonize, as much as possible, codes and descriptions of commodities commonly used in international trade;
 - c. to consolidate procedures and documentation so that transit traffic will not be subjected to redundant requirements;
 - d. to periodically review the necessity and usefulness of all documents and procedures prescribed for transit traffic;
 - e. to adopt a risk management approach for transit traffic in order to reduce delays;
 - f. to establish a Customs Transit System, including a Customs Guarantee Coverage, for the cargo as mutually agreed;
 - g. to align their documents to the United Nations Layout Key (UNLK) for trade documents.
3. The documentation and procedures to be applied by the Contracting Parties in the implementation of this Transit Customs Regime are specified in Protocol Three attached to this Agreement on "Customs Control and Transit Regime"

ARTICLE 29 PUBLICATION OF PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS

The Contracting Parties agree.

- a. to give due advance notice to the other Contracting Party of any additional requirement or modification in prescribed documentation and procedures to be introduced with regard to traffic in transit;
- b. to establish one or more enquiry points where traders and transporters may acquire specific information on relevant measures that affect traffic in transit. In particular, information shall be made available relating to Customs inspection, and on the certificates and documents required for fulfilling the Customs formalities

SECTION IX

DUTIES, TAXES, CHARGES AND PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS

ARTICLE 30: CUSTOMS DUTIES

The Contracting Parties agree that no customs duties and taxes shall be levied on goods in transit regardless of their destination and purpose

ARTICLE 31: TEMPORARY ADMISSION OF MEANS OF TRANSPORT

1. The Contracting Parties agree to grant temporary admission to means of transport which is used or intended to be used, for the carriage of goods under the Customs transit regime through their territories

2. In particular, motor vehicles (and the fuel contained in its standard supply tanks, its lubricants, maintenance supplies and spare parts in reasonable quantities) shall enter in the territory of the other Contracting Party without payment of import duties and other taxes, subject to the conditions laid down in Protocol Two to this Agreement on "Temporary Admission of Road Vehicles for Commercial Use". Provided that no duty/tax credit shall be allowed in respect of goods supplied or services rendered to the vehicles of the other Contracting Party

ARTICLE 32: LEVIES AND CHARGES

1. Each Contracting Party may levy charges, generally applicable for all traffic in the territories of the Contracting Parties, including fees for weighment, scanning and sealing by customs officials; toll for the use of roads, bridges, tunnels and parking, or those commensurate with the administrative expenses which result from traffic in transit, or with the costs of services rendered.

2. All charges imposed on traffic in transit shall be reasonable and applied in a non-discriminatory manner.

ARTICLE 33: NATIONAL TREATMENT

The Contracting Parties agree that

- a. in the National Legislations, rules and procedures affecting transit traffic treatment applied to the transporters from the other Contracting Party shall be no less favourable than applied to their own like services and service providers,
- b. any charges, expenses or financial obligations incurred with regard to the means of transport and labour used for transit operations, administrative expenses entailed, or actual cost of services rendered, shall be calculated on the same basis as those for similar domestic transport operators

SECTION X

AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN
TRANSIT TRADE COORDINATION AUTHORITY

ARTICLE 34: ESTABLISHMENT OF AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN TRANSIT
TRADE COORDINATION AUTHORITY

1. Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Coordination Authority (APPTCA) shall be established for monitoring, facilitating, and effective implementation of this Agreement.
2. The Authority shall be co-chaired by the Deputy Minister of Commerce and Industries, Government of Afghanistan and Secretary Commerce, Government of Pakistan
3. The Authority shall consist of an equal number of representatives from
 - a. the stakeholders ministries or similar agencies of Contracting Parties
 - b. private sector including Joint Chambers of Commerce and Industry, freight forwarders, and road transporters
 - c. Co-chairs may co-opt any other or invite anyone as special invitee as and when required.
4. The Authority shall frame its own rules of business

ARTICLE 35. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF APPTCA

1. The Authority shall deal with all matters related to transit trade and transport in the context of APPTA, and in particular will undertake the following tasks
 - a. monitor effective implementation of this Agreement,
 - b. ensure uniform interpretation and application of this Agreement by both Parties,
 - c. Formulate measures to address/ curb un-authorized trade
 - d. Monitor implementation and effectiveness of measures adopted to curb un-authorized trade,
 - e. resolve disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or implementation of APPTA
 - f. authorize studies on issues related to transit trade,
 - g. consider any other matter for smooth operation of this Agreement

2. The Authority shall submit reports of its meetings to the Pak - Afghan Joint Economic Commission.

ARTICLE 36. MEETINGS

1. The Authority shall meet once every six months alternately in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties
2. At the request of a Contracting Party, the Authority may hold extraordinary meetings
3. Each Contracting Party shall bear the cost for the participation of its delegation at regular and extraordinary meetings of the Authority

ARTICLE 37: DECISIONS BY THE AUTHORITY

Decisions by the Authority shall be taken by consensus of both parties.

ARTICLE 38: SECRETARIAT

The Ministries of Commerce of the respective Contracting Parties shall provide secretarial services in their respective countries

SECTION XI

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM

ARTICLE 39: SCOPE AND COVERAGE

1. Unless otherwise provided for in this Agreement, the provisions of this Section shall apply to the settlement of disputes between the Parties concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement
2. The rules, procedures and time frames set out in this Section may be waived, varied or modified by mutual agreement.
3. Arbitral tribunals appointed under this Section shall interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law

ARTICLE 40: COOPERATION

The Parties through APTTCA shall at all times endeavour to agree on the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement through cooperation to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter that might affect its operation

ARTICLE 41: CONSULTATIONS

1. A Party may request consultations with the other Party with respect to any matter affecting the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement which cannot be

resolved by the APTICA. A Party may make the request to the other Party if the Party considers that:

2. If a Party requests consultations with regard to a matter, the other Party shall reply promptly to the request for consultations

3. Any request for consultations shall be submitted in writing and shall give the reasons for the request, including identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the factual and legal basis of the complaint. Each Party shall also:

a. provide sufficient information to enable a full examination of how the measure might affect the operation of this Agreement, and

b. treat as confidential any information exchanged in the consultations which the other Party has designated as confidential

4. The Party to which the request is made pursuant to this Article shall reply to the request within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request and shall enter into consultations within 30 days after the date of receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution

ARTICLE 42: ESTABLISHMENT OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS

1. The Party which made the request for consultations in accordance with Article 41 may make a written request to the other Party to establish an arbitral tribunal under this Article provided

a. the Party to which the request is made does not reply to the request within 10 days after its receipt, or does not enter into such consultations within 30 days after the date the receipt of the request under Article 41; or

b. such consultations fail to resolve the dispute within 60 days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations

2. The request to establish an arbitral tribunal shall include an identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the factual and legal basis of the complaint.

ARTICLE 43: COMPOSITION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS

1. Each Party shall, within 30 days after the date of receipt of the request for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, appoint one arbitrator who may be a national of its country and propose up to three candidates to serve as the third arbitrator who shall be the Chair of the arbitral tribunal. The third arbitrator shall not be a national of the country of either Party, nor have his or her usual place of residence in the country of either Party, nor be employed by either Party, nor have dealt with the dispute in any capacity

2. Both Parties shall agree on and appoint the third arbitrator within 45 days after the date of receipt of the request for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal. If the Parties fail to agree on the third arbitrator the parties shall request the two arbitrators appointed pursuant to Paragraph 1 of this Article to appoint the third arbitrator. If the two arbitrators fail to appoint the third arbitrator within 10 days, the parties shall consult each other in

order to jointly appoint the third arbitrator within a further period of 30 days. If the two parties do not agree on the appointment of the third arbitrator two names of non-national and non-residents shall be proposed by each sides. The third arbitrator shall be selected by drawing lots from the four proposed names

3. If an arbitrator or the Chair appointed under this Article resigns or becomes unable to act, a successor arbitrator or Chair shall be appointed in the same manner as prescribed for the appointment of the original arbitrator or Chair, and the successor shall have all the powers and duties of the original arbitrator

4. The date of establishment of an arbitral tribunal shall be the date on which the third arbitrator is appointed

ARTICLE 44: FUNCTIONS OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS

1. The function of an arbitral tribunal is to make an objective assessment of the dispute before it, including an examination of the facts of the case and the applicability of, and conformity with this Agreement and make an Award

2. The arbitral tribunal shall, in consultation with the Parties and apart from the matters set out in Article 41 regulate its own procedures in relation to the rights of Parties to be heard and its deliberations

ARTICLE 45: PROCEEDINGS OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS

The arbitral tribunal shall determine its own rules of procedures keeping in view WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes

ARTICLE 46: SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION OF PROCEEDINGS

1. The Parties may agree to terminate the proceedings before an arbitral tribunal established under this Agreement at any time by jointly notifying the Chair of the arbitral tribunal to this effect

2. Before the arbitral tribunal makes its decision, it may at any stage of the proceedings propose to the Parties that the dispute be settled amicably

ARTICLE 47: IMPLEMENTATION

1. On receipt of the award of the arbitral tribunal, the Parties shall resolve the dispute accordingly, the award being final.

2. The arbitral tribunal shall provide its report to the Parties within 30 days after the date of the referral of the matter to it. When the arbitral tribunal considers that it cannot provide its report within this timeframe, it shall inform the Parties in writing of the reasons for the delay and shall submit its report within 45 days after the date of referral of the matter to it

order to jointly appoint the third arbitrator within a further period of 30 days. If the two parties do not agree on the appointment of the third arbitrator two names of non-national and non-residents shall be proposed by each sides. The third arbitrator shall be selected by drawing lots from the four proposed names.

3. If an arbitrator or the Chair appointed under this Article resigns or becomes unable to act, a successor arbitrator or Chair shall be appointed in the same manner as prescribed for the appointment of the original arbitrator or Chair, and the successor shall have all the powers and duties of the original arbitrator

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ARTICLE 47. IMPLEMENTATION

1. On receipt of the award of the arbitral tribunal, the Parties shall resolve the dispute accordingly, the award being final

2. The arbitral tribunal shall provide its report to the Parties within 30 days after the date of the referral of the matter to it. When the arbitral tribunal considers that it cannot provide its report within this timeframe, it shall inform the Parties in writing of the reasons for the delay and shall submit its report within 45 days after the date of referral of the matter to it.

ARTICLE 48. EXPENSES

Each Party shall bear the costs of its appointed arbitrator and its own expenses and legal costs. The costs of the Chair of the arbitral tribunal and other expenses associated with the conduct of its proceedings shall be borne in equal parts by both Parties.

ARTICLE 49: FOCAL POINTS AND SERVICE OF DOCUMENTS

Both parties shall designate a focal point for this section. Any request, acknowledgement, written submission or other document relating to the dispute settlement procedures in this section shall be delivered to the relevant Party through its designated focal point.

SECTION XII

FINAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 50: AMENDMENTS

This Agreement may be amended by mutual consent of the contracting parties. Such amendment shall be approved by the parties in accordance with their respective legal and constitutional procedures and enter into force on agreed date.

ARTICLE 51: EFFECTIVENESS OF RELEVANT TREATIES

None of the provisions stipulated in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of a Contracting Party arising from existing international treaties and conventions to which it is a Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 52 NON-APPLICATION OF APTTA PROVISIONS ON VEHICLES OF THIRD COUNTRY

The provisions under this Agreement shall not be extended to road transport vehicles registered in a third country that use the roads of one Contracting Party or which are involved in the transportation of goods of one Contracting Party into the territory of the other Contracting Party, unless the third country has concluded a road transport agreement with both Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 53. GENERAL EXCLUSIONS

The contracting parties agree to ensure that no measure taken under the agreement could risk harming or destroying (i) public morals; (ii) human, animal and plant life; (iii) national treasures; (iv) security of its own territory, and (v) any other interests as mutually agreed upon.

ANNEXURE B

TRANSIT TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1965

CHAPTER XIII TRANSIT TRADE

- 126 Chapter not to apply to baggage and postal articles...
- 127 Transit of goods in the same conveyance...
- 128 Transport of certain classes of goods subject to prescribed conditions...
- 129 Transit of goods across Pakistan to a foreign territory...

THE AFGHAN TRANSIT TRADE AGREEMENT, 1965

[Kabul the 22nd March, 1965]

AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF AFGHANISTAN FOR REGULATION OF TRAFFIC IN TRANSIT

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the Kingdom of Afghanistan being desirous of strengthening basis improving the difficulties in the movement of goods through the two countries and having taken into consideration the present volume and future development of transit

trade have decided to conclude an agreement and to this end have appointed their plenipotentiaries as under -

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Wahiduzzaman, Minister for Commerce

The Government of the Kingdom of Afghanistan.
Mohammad Sarwar Omar, Minister for Commerce

Who have exchanged their full powers found in good and due form have agreed to the following articles -

Article-I

The Contracting Parties undertake in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement to grant and guarantee to each other the freedom of transit to and from their territories

No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination or any other circumstance relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport

Article-II

Goods including baggage, and vessels and other means of transport shall be deemed to be in transit across the territory of a Contracting Party when the passage across such territory or without transhipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Contracting Party across

whose territory the traffic passes: - Traffic of this nature in this Agreement 'Traffic in Transit'.

Article-III

The transit routes shall be:

- (1) Peshawar - Torkham and vice versa
- (2) Chaman - Spin Boldak and vice versa

Additional routes may be agreed between the Contracting Parties from time to time. Goods moving via these routes shall be entered at the proper Customs post prescribed by each Party. Adequate transit and other facilities shall be provided by the Contracting Party concerned at these posts.

Article-IV

No Customs duties, taxes dues, or charges of any kind whether national, provincial or municipal regardless of their name and purposes, shall be levied on traffic in transit except charges for transportation or those commensurate with the administrative expenses entailed by traffic in transit or with the cost of services rendered.

With a view to achieving simplification of existing Customs Practices and Procedures, the Contracting Parties agree to adopt at points of entry and exit the procedures laid down in the Annex to this Agreement.

Article-V

Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article III, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall earmark sheds and open spaces in the Karachi Port Area, to be known as Afghan Transit Area, for the good in transit to and from Afghanistan. For Hazardous and awkward goods separate arrangements for storage will be made indicated in the Annex.

Article-VI

The two Contracting Parties recognising the importance of the Kabul-Torkham-Peshawar transit route, have decided to examine all matters pertinent to the development of this route, including further consideration of the extension of the railway from Landi Khana to Torkham.

Article-VII

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan undertake to meet in full the requirements of wagons for transit traffic on both Karachi-Spin Boldak and Peshawar-Karachi routes.

Article-VIII

Each Contracting shall appoint Liaison Officers to look into the working of this Agreement, and to refer, for expeditious solution, to the appropriate authorities of their own country and to the Liaison Officer of the other country, any question arising from the operation of this Agreement. The Liaison Officers will meet as often as necessary and in any case not less than once in six months.

and the contracting Parties shall provide them with the necessary facilities

Article—IX

The Contracting Parties agree that railway freight, port and other dues shall be subject to the most sympathetic considerations and shall be no less favorable than those imposed by either Party on goods owned by its own nationals.

Article—X

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption and enforcement by either Party of measures necessary to protect public morals, human, animal or plant life or health and for the security of its own territory.

Article—XI

The Contracting Parties shall meet and consult each other once a year to review the working of this Agreement.

Article—XII

The Contracting Parties agree to resolve any difference relating to the misinterpretation of this Agreement by negotiation and in the event of failure to reach a settlement, to refer the matter to an arbitrator acceptable to both Parties whose decision shall be binding.

Article—XIII

Nothing in this Agreement or its Annexes will affect in any way the political stand of the two countries or the political difference existing between them, and the contracting Parties fully reserve their rights with regard to these subjects.

Article—XIV

This Agreement shall be ratified and the Instruments of Ratification shall be exchanged at Rawalpindi. The Agreement shall come into force from the date of the exchange of the Instruments of Ratification and shall remain in force for five years from the date it comes into force. Unless notice of termination is given in writing by either Contracting Party to the other six months before the expiration of the five years period, the Agreement shall be automatically renewed for a further period of five years. It can be thereafter be terminated by either Party at any time provided six months notice of termination is given by either party.

Article—XV

The present Agreement is drawn in duplicate in English and Dari languages, both texts being equally valid.

IN WITNESS THEREFORE, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed, the present Agreement

Done in duplicate in English and Dari at Kabul on 2nd March 1963

For the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan

SI.

WAHIDUZZAMAN
MINISTER FOR COMMERCE

For the Government of
the Kingdom of
Afghanistan

SI.

MUHAMMAD
SARWAR OMAR
MINISTER FOR
COMMERCE

PROTOCOL ANNEXED TO TRANSIT AGREEMENT
SIGNED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF
AFGHANISTAN
DATED MARCH 2, 1965

In accordance with the provisions of the Agreement signed in Kabul between the authorised representatives of the Contracting Parties on March 2, 1965, regulating Traffic in Transit to and from Afghanistan, the signatories in order to regulate the transport of goods by lorries from Peshawar to Kabul and from Chaman to Kandahar and vice versa until such a time as extension of rail and road is completed have agreed as follows:

Article-1

The two Governments agree that there shall be open competition for all transporters for carriage of all categories of goods to and from Afghanistan irrespective of ownership of goods.

Article-2

The two Governments agree to accord to transporters and clearing and forwarding agents from either country national treatment.

Article-3

Determination of freight rates shall be left to market conditions for goods of all descriptions and denominations. No discrimination shall be made by the authorities of either Government in the matter of fixation of freight as between the transporters of either country.

Article-4

Each Government agrees that no taxes shall be levied by it on transport vehicles registered in the territory of the other country except by prior consultation and on basis of equality.

Article-5

The two Governments agree that

- (a) Route permits shall be issued by the country in which the vehicles are registered
- (b) Driving Licences and certificates of fitness in respect of transport vehicles covered by this Protocol issued in one country shall be valid in the other country also. Vehicles carrying petroleum and petroleum products shall

continue to be governed by existing practice regarding certificates of fitness and

Done in duplicate in English and Dari both texts equally authentic in Kabul on the 2nd March, 1965

(c) The period for which vehicles of one country may stay in the other on each trip shall be fixed on uniform reciprocal basis

Signed on behalf of the
Government of the
Islamic Republic of
Pakistan

Signed on behalf of the
Government of the
Kingdom of
Afghanistan

Article—6

The two Governments agree to grant to transporters multiple entry visas valid for a period of six months at a time

WAHIDUZZAMAN
MINISTER FOR
COMMERCE

MUHAMMAD
SARWAR OMAR
MINISTER FOR
COMMERCE

Article—7

The two Governments agree to grant to transport vehicles road permits for a period of six months at a time

ANNEX ON THE CUSTOMS AND OTHER PROCEDURES TO
THE AGREEMENT SIGNED ON THE 2ND MARCH, 1965
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF PAKISTAN AND THE ROYAL AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
FOR REGULATING TRAFFIC IN TRANSIT

Article—8

The two Governments shall consult each other with a view to adopting necessary measures to facilitate the flow of traffic between the two countries and shall seek all possible means within their power to remove any factors which may damage the normal accomplishment of the operation foreseen in this Protocol

1. CUSTOMS AND OTHER PROCEDURES IN RESPECT OF GOODS AND PASSENGER'S UNACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE ENTERING PAKISTAN FOR TRANSIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Article—9

This Protocol shall come into force simultaneously with the Agreement on Traffic in Transit signed on 2nd March, 1965

(1) On arrival of the goods the owner or his agent shall at the time of entering them at the Custom House

(a) Declare that the goods are intended for such transit;
(b) Furnish in quadruplicate an invoice of the goods so declared in the prescribed form specifying thereon

description of the packages involved by such re-packing shall where possible seal the road transport to Afghanistan return the original copy of the invoice so endorsed to the owner or his agent and forward the duplicate copy to Customs Officer at Torkham. On arrival at Torkham, the goods must be presented to the Customs Officer along with the duplicate copy of the invoice for inspection and final clearance. The Customs Officer shall note the re-packing particulars if any, on the reverse of the triplicate copy and return the duplicate to the Customs Officer at Peshawar.

7. In case of goods entering Pakistan at Lahore the procedure will be the same as detailed above in respect of Karachi except the provisions of paragraph 2 above.

8. The procedure in respect of goods moving into Spin Boldak will be enforced only when the railway line has been extended up to that point. Until then the formalities provided for in respect of Peshawar-Torkham route will apply *mutatis mutandis* to Chaman and to the Customs Post opposite Vash.

9. Afghan goods or passengers unaccompanied baggage arriving in transit by sea at Karachi if moving by air to Afghanistan from Karachi airport will be transported under Customs seal to Karachi Airport and placed on board the on-carrying aircraft under Customs supervision. The documentation in respect of such goods will be similar to that for goods despatched by rail with appropriate modifications.

II PROCEDURE IN RESPECT OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS UNACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE MOVING IN TRANSIT FROM AFGHANISTAN TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THROUGH PAKISTAN

1. On entry of the goods at the land Customs stations at Torkham Peshawar or at Chaman until such a time as the railway line is extended upto Spin Boldak and Torkham, the Afghan exporter or his agent shall declare that the goods are in transit to a third country or overseas and furnish in quadruplicate an invoice in the prescribed form.

2. The Government of Pakistan may require certain specified goods despatched in transit from Afghanistan to foreign countries to be sealed by the Afghan Customs before their despatch out of Afghanistan. A list of such goods will be furnished to the Government of Afghanistan from time to time.

3. On compliance with the above provisions the seals on the goods will be checked and the goods removed under Customs provisions to the transit shed or area at the Pakistan railhead at Peshawar or Chaman under Customs control. Re-packing facilities will be allowed at these transit sheds or areas as well as at the transit shed in the Karachi Port area.

4. The goods will be loaded under the Customs supervision into railway wagons exclusively provided for in-transit goods which will be sealed by the Railway. The original copy of the invoice duly checked and completed by the Customs will be handed over to the owner or his agent. At the same time, the duplicate and triplicate copies of the invoice will be forwarded by the Frontier Customs Officer at the Pakistan railhead to the Collector of Customs, Karachi if the goods are to be exported by sea or to the Land Customs Officer at the Land Customs Station through which the goods are to be exported by land to India. The quadruplicate copy will be retained by the Frontier Land Customs Officer for his

record. The Customs Officer who supervises the loading of goods into the railway wagons will record on all copies of the invoice the numbers of the wagons in which the goods have been despatched.

5. (a) In the case of goods to be exported by sea from the Port of Karachi, the goods will on arrival at Karachi railway station be unloaded from the wagons under Customs supervision after verifying that the seals are intact. They will then be carried under Customs supervision to the Afghan transit shed specially set apart for the purpose in the port area under Customs control. The goods will remain in Customs control until they are duly shipped or filing of an export shipping bill. The goods will be inspected and examined if necessary before shipment is allowed under Customs supervision.

NOTE Goods of hazardous nature such as cotton which are in transit from Afghanistan to foreign countries cannot be stored in the transit shed along with other goods and the present arrangements of storing such goods will continue.

(b) In the case of goods to be exported by Land to India the wagons will, on arrival at the Land Customs Station, be inspected by the Customs. Detailed examination of the goods will be dispensed with if the seals on the wagons are intact. The Customs Officer will satisfy himself that the seals are intact and that the numbers of the wagons correspond with those entered in the invoice. If the duplicate and triplicate copies of the invoice have not been received from the Frontier Customs Officer he will not detain the goods but will pass them after entering the verified particulars of the wagons and if necessary of the goods owner or his agent. On receipt of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the

invoice he will make the necessary endorsement on the basis of the particulars recorded in his register.

6. After the goods have been duly shipped for export by sea or handed over to the railway authorities for onward transmission by land the Customs Officer will certify on each copy of the invoice that the goods have been duly shipped or exported. The original copy of the invoice will be returned to the owner or his agent, the duplicate copy will be sent to the Frontier Customs Officer at Peshawar or Chaman as the case may be, and the triplicate copy will be retained for record by the Custom House, Karachi or the Land Customs Station of export as the case may be.

7. As soon as the Railway line is extended to Spin Boldak and Tokham the documentation and sealing of packages in respect of such goods will be the responsibility of the Afghan Customs, the sealing of wagons being done by the Railway, the detailed procedures respecting which will be drawn up by mutual consultation by representatives of the two Governments.

