

PH.D. RESEARCH THESIS

**CHINA POLICIES TOWARDS WARM WATERS AND CHALLENGES
AHEAD; A CASE STUDY OF BALOCH MILITANCY**



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Table of Contents

DECLARATION	6
DEDICATION	7
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	8
ABSTRACT	9
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	11
LIST OF FIGURES	14
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION	16
1.1 Rationale of the Study.....	21
1.2 Statement of the Problem	21
1.3 Objectives of the Study.....	22
1.4 Research Questions	23
1.4.1 Sub Questions:	23
1.5 Limitations of the Study	23
1.6 Operational Definition	24
1.7 Literature Review	24
1.8 Theoretical Framework.....	31
1.9 Methodologies	34
1.9.1 Primary Data.....	35
1.9.2 Secondary Data	35
1.10 Chapters Organization:	36
CHAPTER TWO THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	38
2.1 Complex Interdependence An Overview	39
2.2 Theoretical Model and its Implications	54
2.2.1 Multiple Channels	56
2.2.2 Absence of Hierarchy Among Issues.....	59
2.2.3 Minor Role of Military Force.....	61
2.3 Baloch Militancy and Complex Interdependence	63
CHAPTER THREE	67



PAK-CHINA RELATIONS AND CPEC	67
3.1 Historical Background: The Initial Period (1950–1969)	69
3.2 The Pre & Post-Cold War Period (1970–1999)	71
3.3 Pak-China Relations 2000-2018:.....	73
3.3.1 CPEC Components	75
3.3.2 Pakistan's Energy Sectors	76
3.3.3 The Transportation Linkage	77
3.3.4 Economic Zones.....	77
3.4 Projects Covered by CPEC	80
3.5 Project of Gwadar Port	80
3.6 Roadway Projects.....	81
3.7 The Silk Road (Karakorum Highway) Project	82
3.8 Western Alignment	82
3.9 Eastern Alignment.....	83
3.10 Projects Related to Railways.....	84
3.11 Projects Connected to Energy Sector.....	85
3.12 Early Harvest Projects	87
3.13 Routes of CPEC	88
3.14 CPEC and its Impacts	88
3.15 CPEC: Impact on the Economy of Pakistan.....	89
3.16 Pakistan and China Relations and CPEC.....	90
3.17 Military Relations between Pakistan and China.....	92
3.18 Pakistan-China Economic Relations	93
3.19 Transport Infrastructures	96
3.20 Projects of the Energy Sector	98
3.21 Cultural Relations between Pakistan and China.....	100
3.22 Domestic Politics	100
3.23 Terror Dilemma of China Regarding CPEC	102
3.24 BRI and Baloch Insurgencies	103
3.25 CPEC and Apprehensions of Balochistan	104
3.26 The Nationalist and Revolutionist Movements in Balochistan	106

CHAPTER FOUR	108
4.1 The geopolitical importance of Balochistan for China	110
4.2 Gwadar: A Gateway to the Arabian Sea.....	112
4.3 Position of Foreign Powers in Balochistan.....	114
4.4 The US, Concerns	116
4.5 Iranian concerns	122
4.6 Gwadar Port vs Chabahar Port: India-Iran Nexus.....	126
4.7 Indian Concerns	127
4.8 External Powers Role in Current Baloch Militancy: Challenges Events (2013-2020)	130
4.9 Opportunities for Pakistan and China	138
4.9.1 Opportunities for China	144
4.10 BRI and CPEC	145
4.11 Gwadar Factor: Challenge	146
4.12 The Distance Factor: Challenge	146
4.13 The Malacca Issue: Challenge.....	148
4.14 Industrialization of Xinjiang Challenge.....	148
4.15 External Challenges to CPEC	150
4.16 Indian- American Apprehensions	156
4.17 Sino-US International Politics and Diplomacy	157
CHAPTER FIVE	159
BALOCH MILITANCY AS A MAJOR CHALLENGE.....	159
5.1 Baloch Militancy: Pakistan and China's Interests	161
5.2 China's Responses to Militancy	162
5.3 China's Stance Concerning Baloch Militancy	164
5.4 Balochistan's Perspective Regarding CPEC	165
5.5 Natural Resources	170
5.6 Impediments in Balochistan and its impact on our economy	174
5.7 End of Energy Crisis.....	178
5.8 Infrastructure Development.....	178
5.9 Foreign Investment.	178
5.10 Gains for China.	179
5.11 Indian Concerns	179


5.12	Security Hazards	180
5.13	Foreign Investment	181
5.14	CPEC and Security Hazards.....	182
CHAPTER SIX QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS.....		185
6.1	Rationale for the Survey	185
6.2	Types of the Samples of the Survey	186
6.3	Survey questionnaire and summary of the data.....	186
6.4	Likert scale	187
6.5	Description and analysis of the survey	187
CONCLUSION.....		214
FINDINGS		218
REFRENCES		232
APPENDIX I - QUESTIONNAIRE.....		251

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DEDICATION

Dedicated
to my motherland **Pakistan**
which is my identity in the world

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
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
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

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

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
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ABSTRACT

China is an emerging economic power. However, despite occupying a huge area of the World's land, it has access to warm water through long distance. The distance of China's Shanghai port to Middle East is approximately 12900 km and the sea travel takes 2-3 months. It consumes much time and costs heavy taxes and duties. As compared, Balochistan's Gwadar port is situated at a distance of 2500 km from China. It is warm waters port in Arabian Sea and is in operation throughout the year. In this scenario, the development of Balochistan is in the supreme interest of China's economy. China is an emerging global player with significant influence in the area as it is the only great power that is attached to South Asia. One estimate suggests that, with the present remarkable growth rate, it is expected to reach the level of the second-largest economy in the world. China's desire to play an important role in the Indian Ocean stems from its historical association with the region and the presence of its vital sea trade routes in the area. Its long-term interests in the Indian Ocean are both economic and politico-strategic. China's policy towards warm waters faces several challenges i.e. sheer distance, the Malacca dilemma, counter-China policies, and local security problems, etc. but an important challenge among them is the militancy in Balochistan. In changing regional dynamics, Balochistan as an energy and trade corridor could strengthen the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan and will provide opportunities for mutual benefits. However, several external power's concerns are involved and they are playing their role in fueling unrest in Balochistan which is a hurdle in China's policies toward warm waters.

This research is important to analyze an in-depth study of China's role in the South Asian region. It is a prominent regional power in this region and one cannot ignore its presence in a contemporary regional affair. On the other hand, Balochistan has significance in China's policies to warm waters.

The research has mainly focused on the divergent interests of China, The US, and India in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The research, therefore, described cooperation between China and Pakistan to create a trade and energy corridor. An attempt has also been made to examine the implications of China and Pakistan's bilateral friendly relations for the South Asian region. This research has explored the geo-political importance of Balochistan for China's policies towards warm waters in the contemporary geo-political and economic scenario. It has also highlighted how the Baloch militancy constitutes a major challenge to China's policies toward warm waters. Mix research method of qualitative and quantitative have followed for interpreting collected data in this study.

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BLA	Balochistan Liberation Army
BLF	Balochistan Liberation Front
CAR	Central Asian Republics
CENTO	Central East North Territory Organization
COPHCL	China Overseas Port Holding Company Limited
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
EC	Economic Corridor
EHP	Early Harvest Program
ETIM	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
JCC	Joint Cooperation Committee
JuA	Jamaat-ul-Ahrar
KKH	Karakorum Highway

KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LNG	Liquid Natural Gas
MW	Megawatt
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRC	National Development and Reform Committee
NDS	National Directorate of Security
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PBOC	People's Bank of China
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
PSA	Port of Singapore Authority
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
ROC	Republic of China
SEATO	South East Asian Territory Organization
SEZ	Special Economic Zones
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

LIST OF FIGURES

S. No	Title	Page. No
	Figure 1: Multiple Channels of Complex Interdependence.....	59
	Figure 2: Major Projects of CPEC (Aqeel, 2016).....	78
	Figure 3: Breakdown of CPEC Deliveries (Khaleeq, 2018).....	79
	Figure 4: Road Network of CPEC (Pant, 2012).....	82
	Figure 5: Western Alignment of CPEC agreement (Pant, 2017).....	83
	Figure 6: Table of Projects (Ahmed, 2016).....	87
	Figure 7: Routes of CPEC (Ahmed, 2016).....	88
	Figure 8: The Samples of the Gender Balance	188
	Figure 9: Sample Representations of the Respondents – Age	189
	Figure 10: Sample Representations of the Respondents – Qualification	190
	Figure 11: Sample Representations of the Respondents – Profession	191
	Figure 12: Response to Question Number One of the Sample Survey	192
	Figure 13: Response to Question Number Two of the Sample Survey	193
	Figure 14: Response to Question Number Three of the Sample Survey	194
	Figure 15: Response to Question Number Four of the Sample Survey	195
	Figure 16: Response to Question Number Five of the Sample Survey.....	196
	Figure 17: Response to Question Number Six of the Sample Survey	197

Figure 18: Response to Question Number Seven of the Sample Survey	198
Figure 19: Response to Question Number One based on Qualification	199
Figure 20: Response to Question Number Two based on Qualification	200
Figure 21: Response to Question Number Three based on Qualification	201
Figure 22: Response to Question Number Four based on Qualification.....	202
Figure 23: Response to Question Number Five based on Qualification	203
Figure 24: Response to Question Number Six based on Qualification.....	204
Figure 25: Response to Question Number Seven based on Qualification	205
Figure 26: Response to Question Number One based on Profession.....	206
Figure 27: Response to Question Number Two based on Profession.....	207
Figure 28: Response to Question Number Three based on Profession	208
Figure 29: Response to Question Number Four based on Profession.....	209
Figure 30: Response to Question Number Five based on Profession	210
Figure 31: Response to Question Number Six based on Profession.....	211
Figure 32: Response to Question Number Seven based on Profession	212

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

China, is an emerging global economic power. It takes 12900 kilometers and 2-3 months by sea to go from China's Shanghai Port to Middle East. It spends a lot of revenue; which triggers high taxation and charges. While Gwadar port is thousands of kilometers away from China, it operates during the year as it is a year-round port. The Gwadar Port will enable China to diversify its crude oil import routes and extend its presence in Arabian Sea. Arabian Sea is one of the warm water seas available for sake of safe route to get energy imports to China. The growth of Balochistan is good for China's economy. Pakistan is strategically important for China. Gwadar Port represents both Pakistan's and China's interests. Geo-strategically Pakistan will provide a warm-water port for China which is a strategic resource.

As the global energy demand is becoming significant so major role players like the United States of America, as well as India, have been considering the People's Republic of China as an emerging competitor in securing long-lasting energy supplies. The Chinese government has been working to acquire the tools that will make their sustained development possible. To reach this goal China and Pakistan are actively working to develop Gwadar as a launch point for the Chinese-Pakistani Economic Corridor (CPEC). In this way, China may protect its energy imports and can expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. To many outsiders, the rise of China's presence in its area is a cause of concern. Gwadar is of strategic significance because it lies across the shipping lanes linking the Strait of Hormuz with the Arabian Sea from where more than 13 million barrels of oil are used to be transported regularly (Dawn, 2008).

China is reportedly shipping 80% of the oil it needs across the dangerous Strait of Malacca. China's oil pipeline and railroad moving from Gwadar Port to Western China offer them a quicker and smoother way of accessing the Middle East to procure oil. Chinese engineers are currently undertaking a feasibility report for a rail and pipeline line to permit Gwadar to accommodate most of the oil tankers going to China. (Fazl-e-Haider, 2012).

China is a strategic actor and thus is aligned within South Asia as well as the whole world as a significant influencer within the area. Currently, it is listed as the biggest economy in the world. The Chinese covet the Indian Ocean's many resources because of their historical and religious ties to the region. The Indian Ocean alliance is broad both economically and strategically. China continues to base its strategic analysis on energy protection because of its dependence on oil imports. (Nye, 1989) It seems that China is following the growth of the economy.

Balochistan, a land between the Arabian Sea and the Iranian mountains has immense mineral and energy wealth. There will be a significant rise in economic activity in Balochistan because of Gwadar Port. China has proper rights to the Gwadar port as it spent a lot in terms of economic as well as technological fields. China has also invested in a new highway that will allow the port of Gwadar to connect with Karachi. There is also China's participation in Saindak Gold and the projects of copper mining in Balochistan. India, while not responding to the development of Gwadar because of its own profit and economic interests. The presence of the US is seen as another aspect of the "Great Power War" being played in Central Asia after the end of the Soviet Union. There is a perception that the United States of America needs to compete with China and Iran for their oil reserves to accomplish its targets, the USA has been using the strategy of "Greater Middle East". Chinese infrastructure expansion in the Middle East region is a big threat to the US because of their oil and naval activities in the region.

Because of the rebel militancy in Balochistan, Pakistan is already divided into separate groups. The Baloch movement for democracy poses a geopolitical threat to China as it calls for a new Balochistan state. This transition will have considerable implications in South and Southwest Asia. On top of this, the regional threat from neighboring India, Afghanistan, Iran as well as other Central Asian States, has further complicated Pakistan's international status, as well. These countries have a clear political or economic interest in destabilizing Balochistan by setting up gas pipelines (The News, 2005).

Pakistan still considers a foreign presence in the Baloch militancy. Pakistan says that its Baloch militancy is funded by international forces and there is evidence of weapons shipments. (The News, 2005). In 1978, India developed an interest in Afghanistan and at the same time, it began attempts to fund the militancy against the government in Balochistan. This way, India fueled the unrest between the state and the rebelling Baloch Sardars. India's goals were to keep Pakistan far away from oil production to ensure that the nation remained economically weak. This political and economic turmoil would compromise Pakistan's viability as an independent state.

The goal is to avoid the development of the Gwadar port in Pakistan. The government of India funded the militancy in Balochistan. Former president Pervez Musharraf, at the time, had also raised questions about efforts by India to destabilize Balochistan. Before that, General Musharraf cited that Pakistan was told that India through Afghanistan has provided military training to Baloch militants through Brahamdagh Bugti and Baloch Marri, two Baloch nationalists who were studying in Kabul (The Express Tribune, 2012).

Afghans supported the Baloch rebels during the third rebellion in 1962. The Afghan Prime Minister permitted Baloch rebel groups to set up camps on the border with Pakistan (Harrison,

1981). Iran was said to be behind the Baloch rebellions in Pakistan. Iran asserts that Pakistan and the United States are operating in concert to destabilize Iran (Daily Times, 2005) because Iran is urgently attempting to become the key route to the Caspian Sea for Central Asia via Pakistan, and for this reason, it has developed its port at Chabahar to battle Pakistani Gwadar port. However, the Iranian government repeatedly denied it's involved in Iran-Balochistan troubles and claimed it has no such inclination to destroy the Gwadar initiative.

Iran has no clear interest in Balochistan because of its stand on the Balochistan issue and the apparent result of the Balochistan issue that will be a complete economic loss for Iran. (The Daily Times, 2005) The only worry of Iran regarding Baloch rebels is the rebellion triggered by Iranian Baloch living within the country and helping their Baloch companions living in Pakistan in the struggle to free Baloch regions in Iran. This is the justification for the assistance Iran offered Pakistan during the uprising of Baloch insurgents, in 1973.

For Pakistan, the United States is considered a potential threat. It is suspected that the US would like to use Balochistan as a front base for an assault on Iran and want to stir up instability so that China can retreat from the region (Daily Times, 2005). However, the US intentions are not well explained, which makes it difficult to read US motivations. On the other hand, the Baloch nationalists have always been blaming the government of Pakistan to conspire with the United States of America for crushing down the Baloch fight for freedom.

The CPEC needs to rely on the advancement of infrastructure, and as the infrastructure expands, this will reduce the growth of militancy. There is a connection between infrastructure improvement and the decrease in militancy.

The goal of China's policies towards warm waters under CPEC is to link the Gwadar Port of

Pakistan and Kashgar of China. There is more than 80% of Chinese trade is performed through maritime routes across the Indian Ocean. This path goes across the Pirate-infested Strait of Malacca. The path is now being safeguarded by American and Indian fleets to defend container ships from piracy. If a dispute is triggered, it will cause an energy cut-off to China. This initiative decreases gaps between trade partners by more than 10,000 kilometers. Without pause, China should have its import and export capital. In contrast, shipping from China takes 10 days as opposed to the current 15 days travel time. This lowers transportation costs for Chinese goods because of decreased travel time and the more convenient road.

CPEC is important for both countries. Pakistan needs to resolve its socioeconomic development, while China needs Pakistan to improve its position in the future. It is important to remember that the concept of “Go Global” was adopted by China as part of its “Go Global 2001” policy. China can benefit Pakistan as it requires a route for its energy imports and export goods. Therefore, it is appropriate for Pakistan to consider the development of the region, rather than spending time on less important issues. It should not be the federal government that has the opportunity to take over the reform plan from the provinces. China is taking over the management of the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan. Gwadar port is supposed to provide large storage of freight and transport facilities to promote foreign trade and shipping. This new port will be able to contend with the Persian Gulf ports like Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, and other port cities in the area. Gwadar port will act as a supply line for the New Silk Road. It will link the communicational networks of the region to China. This facility will play an important role in the highway projects in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as it locates close to the Persian Gulf. Gwadar could play a key role in safeguarding the energy security of China by having a much shorter route than the existing 12,900 Km route from the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Malacca to China's Eastern Seaboard. (Daily

Times, 2005) In each region, they try their best to find shorter routes to distribute their goods. Nations invest in utilities such as highways, railways, and pipelines to improve commerce. Infrastructure is of paramount significance. Adequate infrastructure will theoretically speed up service times and decrease shipping costs.

1.1 Rationale of the Study

This research is essential to examine the role of China in the South Asian region. Since it is a dominant country in this part of the world, therefore, no nation can neglect its existence in other areas. Balochistan has its significance in the Chinese expansion towards warm waters.

The importance of China's global energy demand is increasing at an unprecedented pace, particularly its demand for oil. These two facts have led China's economy to be more connected. It is proposed that a corridor from the Xinjiang Province of Western China to Balochistan Pakistan, be constructed to fulfill the energy and trade needs of the aforementioned country to decrease the reliance upon the goodwill of US. Baloch militancy could pose a serious challenge to China's interests in Balochistan by attacking China's installations, kidnapping and killing of Chinese workers, and fighting against Pakistan Army.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Considering this background, the importance of Balochistan for China's policies towards warm water through this research was addressed. The main focus of the study is on the international geopolitical interests of China as well as the US and India in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Therefore, it distinguishes cooperation between China and Pakistan in the sphere of trade and oil. There have been several studies aimed at analyzing the relationship between China-Pakistan friendly ties and South Asian affairs.

Another problem for China that is an important topic is the militancy in Balochistan which has been a critical issue keeping in view the current situation of the province. Balochistan which is an energy and trade conduit connecting China and Pakistan, is a matter of concern for foreign forces that is stirring instability in Balochistan which is a serious problem for China in its policies for warm water.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The study has been undergone with the following objectives:

- To explore the importance of Balochistan and Gwadar port for China's current policies towards expansion into warm seas.
- To evaluate the Baloch struggle as an obstacle to China's policies of warm waters.
- To explore the conditions of unrest in Balochistan that have been triggered by external factors.
- To analyze establishing a causal link between the violence at Gwadar and the instability in Balochistan.
- To evaluate the potential of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which may create development for China and Pakistan in general and Balochistan in particular.

1.4 Research Questions

The key questions of the research are:

1. What is the strategic value of Balochistan for China in the contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic scenario?
2. What is the effect of Baloch militancy on China's policies towards the Arabian Sea's warm waters?

1.4.1 Sub Questions:

Q1: Why Balochistan is strategically important when its geopolitical situation is considered?

Q2: Is there any linkage between the violent unrest in the Province of Balochistan and Gwadar Port?

Q3: Why does Baloch have apprehensions towards the Gwadar Port as well as the CPEC?

Q4: Which external powers have been fueling the situation of militancy in Balochistan?

Q5: What measures can be taken by Pakistan to make CPEC and Gwadar Port fully functional for the successful policies of China towards the warm waters?

1.5 Limitations of the Study

This study is also important for other several regional states including India, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian states. However, this study only focuses on the role of China, India, Pakistan, and the most vibrant global player; the US. Only internet interviews and the speeches of the concerned individuals have been used as primary sources because it is not possible to conduct direct interviews with important policymakers, and top representatives of the

US, China, India, or Balochistan.

1.6 Operational Definition

China policies in this research will include Gwadar Port and CPEC. Warm waters in this study are used as the Arabian Sea.

1.7 Literature Review

This study has looked more at China's policies towards warm waters under CPEC to make strong China-Pak relations. It has evaluated Baloch's concerns about growing economic ties between Pakistan and China. This study has explored the importance of Balochistan and peaceful measures to decrease Baloch militancy. It has highlighted the role of India and the US in fueling Baloch militancy.

In this background, Nadir (2012) in his book stressed the geographical advantageous position of Pakistan. This is one of the economic means for Pakistan. Balochistan is Pakistan's chance to replace assistance oriented economy with economics built on trade and energy transit. Pakistan should take advantage of its central location amongst several nations due to its strategic geography. Pakistan is situated in the middle of Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, and China. The author emphasized the importance of Gwadar port as the converging center of all possible trading and transport routes originating from Central Asian Republics, China, and even Russia. He opined that Gwadar port would act as an influential economic focal point for some of the most important Asian and Gulf countries. This research explores the function of Gwadar Port and its geographic significance for China and Pakistan.

Kondapalli et al., (2010) said in a book that China is a growing superpower. China is a nation of considerable strategic significance in East Asia. China is attempting to increase its position in foreign relations through the state. China is eager to retain its unipolar dominance in the globe. The book addresses China's challenges in coping with the issues of contamination of water and energy supplies. The authors of the book are hopeful and enthusiastic about the future of China. China perceives readiness to take the next step into Gwadar as America is pulling out of Afghanistan. This could likely lead to the development of road ties between Gwadar and Central Asia and then linked to China. This will help ease China's so-called "Malacca problem," in which China has stopped importing oil from the Middle East. China is presently constructing much of its train network across Central Asia. A gas pipeline from Gwadar to China addresses energy needs without using the Strait of Malacca. China could establish a listening post along the Persian Gulf where it could potentially perform well in Gwadar. This research will further improve China's energy stability. The world geopolitical implications of Gwadar are broad as the Gulf Region has 75% of the world's proven oil reserves and 50% of the world's proven gas reserves. About 16 million barrels of oil per day flow through the Strait of Hormuz. The Gulf area sends about 90% of the oil imported and over 40% of the world's supply. Gwadar is important with the involvement of the Chinese there.

Dr. Talat Shabbir (2021) has researched and documented the relationship between China and Pakistan in the context of future possibilities and options in his book. This book is a brilliant and timely discourse on the multifaceted partnership of both the countries going forward. He has traced the history of this relationship since its inception and where we stand today. He has brought forth the various facets of these ties ranging from diplomatic, political, and economic, to strategic. He argues that every rare state of mutual trust enjoys two neighbors. This book shows

that whatever happened in the world, the bond between Pakistan and China kept deepening and strengthened. And this is a unique feature of the bilateral relationship. The writer captured the essence of the bilateral relationship. Both sides have continued to support each other during their respective testing times. It is indeed a unique model in inter-state relationships. CPEC is very significant for Pakistan and China, and both sides will continue to work on this in the second phase hoping to focus on industrial development in Pakistan. Balochistan importance and position are not discussed in this book. This study fills this gap by giving a detailed discussion of Balochistan.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., (1997) in his book, analyzed the military capabilities of India. He stated that there is no question that India's military capabilities are impressive in South Asia, but not in other nations. But besides being a maritime entity, India has considerable control over regional politics. Ties between India and Pakistan have been governed by security issues rather than economic ones. It is no surprise why relations with India are estranged. The two countries have waged more than two wars and many events of fighting. The regional power balance with Pakistan has played a major role in Indian-Afghan relations since 1979. India's key foreign policy aim when dealing with Afghanistan is to fight the growth of Pakistan in West Asia and use Afghanistan as a crucial pipeline to Central Asia. David et al., (2005) argue that the rapid growth of China in the economic sector has led to a peak in petroleum consumption. In the world, China absorbs about 8.2 percent of the world's oil, compared to the 4.5 percent it generates. The author of the book forecasts that the Chinese intake will also multiply three times its current size. To meet the order of the administration, China would need to import 60% of its crude. In this book, the author analyzes long-term supply issues and makes proposals for policymaking in China. The author criticized the role of China in the global energy crisis.

Daqiong, & Zha, (2006) illustrates the problem with China's use of resources without essential reform. While China is the largest coal production center, it is also a big coal user that creates significant environmental issues. An aspect is the climate change that impacts the economy of the planet. The European Union also relies on various regions for its energy security. The emergence of China as an economic force generates a new oil market. The book illustrated the competing desires and approaches of individuals. The author did not convey that China's energy insecurity is not a key problem. Similarly, nuclear energy contributes little to the national power supply. They account for less than 1.4% of the overall power generation. The nation also lacks an office or employee that can lead energy policymaking at the ministerial level. Therefore, there are domestic and foreign challenges to China's energy stability that it cannot ignore these internal and external challenges Harry, et.al., (2007) in an article that offers extensive details on China's oil needs and provides a debate about whether China's increasing use of oil for manufacturing and renewable energy would cause uncertainty for the international community. China began diversifying its crude oil sources in recent years. It acquires oil from Angola, Sudan, Russia, and Venezuela (Latin America). For this supply, China has taken the most possible forms including railways, sea lanes, and pipelines. These high-profile measures bring into question China's stance on oil supplies being grabbed from other nations. China claims its latest military tactics are not a threat to any other country. The writer describes China's path to oil diversification to become energy-secure. This study would address Gwadar seaport for secure oil transportation.

Paul & Joshy, (2016) places their energies on evaluating China's energy security policies for India. Energy security is a key problem for many countries such as India and China that are very energy-intensive due to the evolving economic system. Energy stability means affordable and safe energy supply which is crucial for economic development. The author suggests that the lack of oil is a

crucial destabilizing factor in the energy security scenario. Between 2008 and 2012, China had to import a large amount of oil products. In addition, the number will continue to rise between 2012-2016 due to the growth of the economy. Demand for coal will decrease from 71.5 percent in 2004 to 52.3 percent in the future, while the oil market will rise from 22.4 percent to 28.9 percent of the national supply. Between the mid-1990s and 2010, China took about double what it had previously taken. According to the projections, the Middle East will be an energy source for China for the next two decades since it has the highest oil reserves. Due to the rise in military strength of China in the Indian Ocean, China is expanding its naval operations. China's long-term past in the Indian Ocean through the existence of military bases is clear. The author explains that China is pursuing energy stability as part of its policy to attain superpower status.

The writer Khan, (2013) in the article addressed open rivalry and competitiveness between China and India in the South Asian region. There's a question about India's rising presence in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. Both of the countries are seeking to grow their energy interests by expanding Gwadar and Chahbahar. This is a significant comparative examination of the two ports. This study explores Gwadar Port's potential for future development.

Bukhari & Bakht, (2014) in an essay addressed the promise and challenges of Gwadar Port that it brings to China, Pakistan, and India. They stated that by investing in the port, China would have a major effect on the trade and energy sector of Pakistan. China was constructing an oil pipeline from the Middle East to Pakistan. It was building railways between Pakistan and China. The presence of China's navy makes for the maintenance of US Navy forces. Accordingly, China retains control over the Persian Gulf and security danger to Asia. Besides, Chinese oil and gas companies would get a fair amount of benefits in terms of other taxes and other incentives provided by the Pakistani government. Besides opportunities of the outside powers continually interrupting

to destabilize Balochistan. Pakistan's government and law-enforcing institutions are doing their best to fight these activities and will soon beat them. Pakistan is having significant problems with Balochistan. China, India, and The US utterly overlooked which will be addressed in this study. Bilal, (2014) in his article describes the economic significance of the Gwadar Port and its geographical position in improving Pakistan economically as well as regionally. He notes that China's construction of Gwadar Port benefits both Pakistan and China's economic growth. Pakistan is the only country that provides China and other countries with secure and easy access to its trading countries. Gwadar Port will be a landmark in China-Pakistan cooperation. The economic corridor would allow China to export commodities including oil and gas from central Asia. He criticized the US position for helping India financially and militarily to fight China's rising economy. India and The US concerns are evaluated in this study to enhance China-Pak economic ties.

2757
An essay in a newspaper Rizvi, (2008) addressed the factors of alienation of the Baloch. He thinks that Balochistan province feels deprived because it is geographically the biggest but economically the weakest. Alienation in Balochistan needs to be identified, accepted, and addressed. Without overcoming several problems faced by Balochistan, the province's accession to the national mainstream will remain a distant target. Gwadar is a total of Baloch national importance. In this study, Gwadar is fully discussed as a central piece of CPEC.

The Guardian Newspaper (2011) discusses the significance of the Karakorum Highway in her report and discusses the need for China to reach the oil and gas-rich Central Asian states. It appears that China has also been keen to gain a political and economic advantage by building a 2500km link between Kashgar and Gwadar. The construction of the Karakorum highway in Pakistan is part of China's assistance package to Pakistan. This project would disrupt the other rising force in the

region: India. Because of Gwadar's strategic position, Pakistan will continue to play a crucial role in the future global arena. KKH expansion for CPEC is included in this study.

In the newspaper South Asian Voice, Sulman Ali discusses that Balochistan's Gwadar port project is not welcome by India because of China's presence in the Indian Ocean. China's pledge to help Pakistan in building Gwadar port, India is assisting Iran in developing Chabahar port to counter China's assistance. China has taken sufficient advantage to keep an eye on the Indian Ocean. Gwadar Port in Pakistan will form a maritime link between the states of southern Asia. The Port is situated along the Strait of Hormuz, which handles 20 percent of the global oil traffic. It would turn the tables around. Pakistan will reap billions of dollars from Gwadar Port and China will get cheap oil and energy stability because of Gwadar Port.

In the Guardian, esteemed writer Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan (2011) addressed the strategic role of Gwadar. The port would have a fast approach to the Central Asian states and Afghanistan for transportation purposes. Gwadar has such significant value that it will allow China to fulfill its potential energy needs. The shipping port now has been incredibly significant as it links three big continents namely Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Hussain (2012) evaluated Gwadar Port as a significant move for developing a deeper alliance between Pakistan and China. He believes this port would fulfill the purpose of linking Asia with the central as well as eastern parts of the world. China heavily relied on petroleum products to power its economy and production. The oil the nation gets travels a very long way. The cost of transportation is very high. Gwadar makes for a cheaper and more economical sailing route.

Tilak(2019) sheds light on Baloch nationalist movements and current Baloch militancy, the role of the Army, and the response of the government to this militancy in this book. He explained two groups in the nationalist movement, moderates, and separatists. Moderates seek maximum

provincial autonomy whereas others seek independence through militant ways. In this study, the solution to these issues through suitable measures has presented. China's domination of the Gwadar port highlights some of the objections raised against China in the literature. This is a great opportunity for Pakistan as China is actively involved in its economic and political growth. The study would be useful in evaluating the current situation of Gwadar Port and the players involved in it. The analysis would be immensely beneficial for decision-makers to evaluate China's policies and plans towards the Arabian Sea and its impact on Baloch Militancy, India, and the US. Research gaps regarding China's peaceful economic development design towards warm waters would be evaluated in this study. Interdependent relationships between China and Pakistan would be highlighted regarding CPEC and Gwadar Port.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The theories have always been applied to explain state-to-state relationships. A political philosophy, a political ideology, or a political viewpoint is a core set of beliefs that help shape how the state makes decisions regarding political issues and how it will interact with other states. Political philosophies include conservatism, liberalism, realism, communism, fascism, etc. As theories, beliefs, ideas, and paradigms are created and changed from time to time and place to place in different social environments, hence, their meaning and perception are relative and different in conceptual variation.

Researchers wanted to use a specific research methodology, which was derived from a particular theoretical approach, to conduct their studies. In this case, the researcher will focus his analysis on "Complex Interdependence Theory," taking into account the topic "China Policies Towards Warm Waters and Challenges Ahead: A Case Study of Baloch Militancy" in which the researcher must

examine the conflicting and opposing interests of China concerned to achieve its strategic goals by implementing its policies. As a result of the way that the present governments of China have started foreign policies that are closely tied to the international relations theory of complex interdependence, compared to the Cold War, this theory tends to take a more pragmatic approach. The Complex Interdependence Theory explains China-Pakistan relations the best, in the twenty-first century, after the cold war ended. Now, China and Pakistan are becoming more and more interdependent and soon will become even more indebted to one another simply because the opportunity for investment and trading is so valuable in the future. The existing policies of both countries are now attempting an intensified effort to lay down the degree of mutual understanding that might contribute towards mutual collaboration in all facets of the relations of the two nations. Due to the interconnectedness of bilateral economic activities, cooperation between China and Pakistan would be mutually beneficial. China is expanding its muscles in the South Asian region by offering economic assistance and playing a role in the infrastructural growth of that region. China is working to develop cordial and good relations with many South Asian nations and countries that are in a position to protect China's economic and security interests in any future crises. Pakistan is also one of the South Asian nations to whom China decided to give preference in developing cheerful relations. Pakistan-China relations are vital in the strategic calculations of China. China has been providing help to Pakistan by lending it the money necessary to carry out the development of Gwadar Port. Through this act, the region further cemented its ongoing bilateral ties with the countries. The Gwadar port provides vital opportunities for China. It is vital for the enhancement of trade between China and Pakistan. This port has made China's policy of opening up to the whole world a reality. Taking over Pakistan along with the sea route can allow China to access the resource-rich regions of the world.

The dynamic interdependence theory emerged from the evolving world of the 1970s, as more new dimensions of interstate relations started to supplant the realist viewpoint on international relations. Although the global stage has changed dramatically, the origins of the original theory in the field of International Relations were built on the same fundamental concepts of Complex Interdependence.

The laws and policies that have been in effect for the last ten years have been founded upon these principles. The military strategy has shifted in emphasis from economic interdependence as compared to the military strategy during the Cold War, says (more discussion on) to the realist perspective theory.

In the Keohane & Nye, (2001) report, the common link within political organizations is the channels that include the relationship between the multinational corporations and the multilateral organizations.

Besides the technologies developed by major multinational firms and the environmental concerns in developing countries, there are also increasing effects of the national governments around the technology in these areas. Environmental Incidents like global warming and industrial releases do not restrict only the national boundary but can have disturbing effects on the global community.

Not only is the Internet a widely accessible, portable, and personal repository of knowledge and information, but it has also spread thought and knowledge like a virus and has also made the world a global society. A nation's policies related to its foreign affairs, its economic affairs, its environmental affairs, and its technological affairs play to a large extent in its domestic affairs. As these new indistinct lines are increasing the number of issues that are relevant to foreign policy decisions, these new lines lead us to believe that they should play a great role in our foreign policy

decisions.

However, it has become clear that the interdependence of all states together determines the importance of military force decreasing in the toolbox of a country as compared to the impediment of the issues that arose since the end of the Cold War.

In China's policies towards the Arabian Sea, the interdependence theory seems to be suitably applicable as it assumes that people and institutions depend on each other to survive and achieve their goals, a truly fitting representation in that the interdependencies between China-Pakistan are a joint success.

In support of the interdependency theory Keohane & Nye further argue that the present international system is exemplified by the growth of interdependence i.e., mutual responsibility, the dependence on others, and the flow of international rules through treaties on interdependence. Due to the increasing globalization, it has become a point of focus of discussion about the character of interdependence and the strengthening of the idea of interdependence. Of the total capabilities that are shared by both systems, rather than merely speaking in terms of the events that are balanced between the systems. It seems to be that the common judgment about interdependence is whether the relationship is mutually beneficial.

1.9 Methodologies

This research has followed mix research methods of Qualitative and quantitative. This research is analytical and exploratory. A descriptive research attempt has been made to discuss and clarify while offering additional details about a subject. Also, Content analysis has been used to measure qualitative data since it refers to a general group of methods suitable for interpreting and recognizing collections of text.

This research provides a strong context by using a variety of different mathematical approaches to compare and contrast the factors (independent variables), along with the factors contained only in secondary studies (intermediate variables) by evaluating both primary and secondary results. SPSS technique is used to analyze collected through survey questionnaire.

1.9.1 Primary Data

A primary source consists of the official records of the government hearings, testimony, and online interviews provided by key policymakers in the public, news releases, studies generated by the government, court rulings, opinion polling, and political histories. Official government website. Overall and as a whole, both structured closed-ended and semi-structured open-ended questions have been performed as means to collect primary results through questionnaire. Therefore, questionnaire has been filled with experts in the relevant subject area in Pakistan.

1.9.2 Secondary Data

For the secondary evidence used for this study, it can be briefly noted that a significant portion of the background information for this research has mainly been extracted from the books and journal papers described in the literature review. Newspapers and articles written in different journals and magazines have been consulted. Different libraries in Islamabad will be visited to study, such as the National Library of Islamabad, Quaid-e-Azam University's Library, Library of International Islamic University Islamabad, National Defence University's Library, and Allama Iqbal University Islamabad.

1.10 Chapters Organization:

Chapter One

This first chapter of the thesis will present an overall introduction of the basic idea, research questions, literature review, and other background of the study.

Chapter Two

Chapter two presents the theoretical background of the study. The theory used in this research as theoretical background is the theory of Complex Interdependence. This chapter presents an overall view of the theory, its current application in international relations, and its advantage over theories of international relations. This chapter also discusses how this theory helps to understand the rise of contemporary China in wider international sociological transformations.

Chapter Three

Chapter three presents the history of China Pakistan relations and the nature of their relationship after the end of cold war. It also informs different elements of CPEC. China's policies under Gwadar Port and CPEC strengthens their relations.

Chapter Four

This chapter explains motivation behind China's Policies and focus on warm water port. The core theme discussed in this chapter is that China's economic policies in Pakistan in post-cold war have opportunities and Challenges with its trade, investment and economic aid. China is emerging as global economic power and investing in infrastructure development in Pakistan for the sake of safe route to get energy imports.

Chapter Five

Chapter Five analyzes the role of Baloch militancy as a challenge in China policies. It has been argued that for the development of Gwadar Port that is a centerpiece of China policies, militant groups posed threat. Their role and apprehensions discussed in detail. Survey questionnaire is analyzed and data is used to present the positive and negative aspect of China policies toward warm waters

Chapter Six

Chapter Six presents detailed analysis of data collected through questionnaire by using variety of different mathematical approaches to compare and contrast the data. Conclusion and findings of the study has been presented in the end of research work.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical and conceptual aspects of the dissertation on China Policies Towards Warm Waters and Challenges Ahead: A Case Study of Baloch Militancy would be discussed in this chapter. Relating to the research design and assertions of the study, it would point to an attempt to explain how the structure of the study's underlying theoretical assumptions and epistemological foundation is addressed. The main assumption of this study would be that complex interdependence is the main reason why states formed bilateral relations to gain interests and mostly adhere to the ultimate goals they have developed

As an exercise, it is important to recognize the definition of this term to understand the kinds of policies and actions being taken by various states. In response to international developments, the theory included a comprehensive understanding of any international political event as well as a systematic study of state political practices. From another perspective, the theory is an interpretation of foreign political laws as well as a "list or series of laws relating to particular action or pattern" (Waltz, 2010). The theory of international relations (also called IR) also tries to justify and often predict the actions of a country (or state actor) on the international level. The goal of international relations theories will create a counter-argument to the complexities of international politics as well as the various size complexities that are considered. Academic researchers sought to gain a better understanding of the causes behind political developments and to build a more confident foundation for policy.

Although international relations theories provided states with patterns of behavior in terms of their interactions with other states, there were some overlaps between theory and policy or practice in

the real world. If we were to take a look at the "Building theory" without knowing the actual "ground realities" will also be challenging. (Walt et al., 1998). Theories may be based on assumptions and epistemologies, and they may be limited to certain circumstances within an explanatory objective, but they are not necessarily 'correct or wrong.' (Slaughter, 2011). Theories will describe specific state actions in a series of events that arose as a result of various international developments. Complex interdependence was proposed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. It is helpful to consider the dynamic theoretical paradigms of interdependence in the sense of this study before applying them to the research questions. This study claimed that states seeking to extend their reach will increase military spending or form alliances to counter a threat due to complex interdependence.

China and Pakistan have strategic, diplomatic, and military ties. Due to the limited societal connections, the economic linkages could not, however, be fully realized. When these gaps are filled due to CPEC the relationship has become "Complex Interdependence". The CPEC is the largest project in the history of China-Pakistani ties (Sohail A. et al., 2018).

2.1 Complex Interdependence An Overview

This section looked at the theoretical underpinnings of Complex Interdependence. The interdependence theory was established in response to the flaws in the 1970s practical model. The rational paradigm argued that the state was central to international politics and that all state behavior, whether weak or strong, stemmed from its stature. Interdependence theorists, on the other hand, argued that non-state actors like corporations would begin to exert influence in the global political arena. They said that competition for power or protection will be minimized.

Interdependence scholars will anticipate optimism from human nature and consider it as mutually beneficial and in opposition to practical thought (Wilkinson, International Relations,).

When 'Power and Interdependence' was published in 1977, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye discussed interdependence and transnationalism. The release occurred during the United Nations (UN) decade of progress, during which time states pushed for economic and social betterment. The 1970s were also a particularly peaceful decade during the Cold War; it was at this time that the European Community (EC) made significant strides towards realization. The old schools of thinking appeared to be less and less relevant to comprehending global legislative challenges as the world advanced at a rapid rate. States are currently so connected through financial and cultural issues that many people find it impossible to imagine a state existing alone.

Even though states are frequently perceived as being interdependent, they are not essentially interdependent; frequently, one state is more submissive to another. The theory of complex interdependence, in contrast to structural realism, emphasizes the emergence and growth. While highlighting the ever-growing importance of cooperation, international organizations, multinational collaborations, and trans-governmental organizations in international politics, it challenges the conventional wisdom that views armed power as the most effective tool of policy. The suitable word to use to describe modern international politics is "interdependence". The phrase refers to the interdependence of all state and non-state players in the globalized globe, which is self-explanatory. Dependence entails a high level of sensitivity to external factors.

Interdependence, on the other hand, is the shared dependence of states on one another. The most important aspect of world politics is the reciprocity between states principle (Nye, 1977). Transnational and trans-governmental interaction has replaced just interstate interaction

throughout the world. Although the state continues to play the primary role in the international political arena, non-state players like multinational corporations and international organizations are more important than ever (Khalid, 2016).

Cooperation and conflict are both present in the dynamic of interdependency, and the acts of one actor have a direct or indirect effect on the actions of the other player. Despite the possibility of armed war, economic and environmental cooperation occur in the Complex Interdependence model (Rana, 2015).

The bilateral relations between the two countries are explained by the principle of Complex Interdependence. Richard N Cooper coined the phrase "trade transactions between two or more countries to economic changes within those nations" in his 1972 paper (Cooper, 1972). Robert O Keohane and Joseph Nye proposed the idea of dynamic interdependence to explore international relations in terms of interdependence. The theory of Complex Interdependence originated in the 1970s, when realism, while being the prevailing theoretical discourse, failed to discuss some aspects of international politics and state relations.

In the age of globalization, states will depend on each other. Reciprocal effects apply to the interdependence of states or multiple state actors that are influenced by external factors. Interdependence, sensitivity, and vulnerability can exist in two dimensions. Interdependence between sensitivity and vulnerability could be social, political, or economic, while interdependence between vulnerability and liability could be the actor's responsibility to suffer from external influences. According to Keohane and Nye, interdependence necessitated states cooperating rather than competing. In the post-World War II period, economic factors for interdependence became more relevant. According to Nye, interdependence has four dimensions:

sources, advantages, costs, and symmetry. Cooper's influential idea of economic interdependence became a reality in today's world, and the concept gained a lot of attraction after WWII and during the Cold War.

The post-Cold War period has seen new trends in foreign relations. To achieve their goals of gaining and retaining control over the global and regional arena, international actors have rearranged their political and economic agendas to suit their global and regional goals. Traditionally, security imperatives have defined state rivalry, but discussions about forging cooperation and interdependence between states have gained attraction for mutual benefit. The academics started a debate about what constitutes real force, rather than just constructing arsenals. Instead, true strength will be a sound economy, with economic clout and recent technological advancements. This model opened up a plethora of opportunities for states to collaborate and interdepend.

Henry Kissinger, a well-known post-World War II realist, recognized the change and argued that the old pattern of international order was crumbling and that the world had become interdependent in many aspects of human interaction (Kissinger, 1975). Various global political events in the post-World War II era shifted international politics' theoretical outlook. States were linked at multi-tier levels, and there were numerous transnational relations and interdependencies between states, according to complex interdependence. In the 1970s, the work of Keohane and Joseph Nye became a threat to international political realists.

Power has been an ephemeral term in international relations. Realists considered power alone in military terms, but theorists of interdependence explained power differently. According to Keohane and Joseph, power was described as an actor's ability to compel another actor to do

anything he will not normally do. Before highlighting various aspects of Complex Interdependence, Keohane and Nye described interdependence as a situation where there isn't an "evenly balanced mutual dependency." Furthermore, asymmetries in dependence can give one actor an advantage over another when dealing with them. A less reliant actor might profit from using his position as a bargaining chip to solve one problem while still affecting other issues (Keohane & Nye, 1977).

Complex interdependence refers to either bilateral or multifaceted state interdependence in different governance domains involving other nations. Complex interdependence proponents saw the term as an ideal that reflected existing international political realities.

Another closely related term was globalization, which was described as a multi-dimensional bilateral interdependency. The concept was based on one state's reliance on another, stressing shared interests. With the participation of over 70 nations currently and the building of six corridors, the BRI is a reconstruction of the former Silk Road and, when complete, will act as a connection between Asia, Europe, and Africa. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the predecessor project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is the most ambitious undertaking in the history of China-Pakistani ties. With the current participation of over 70 nations and the building of six corridors, the BRI is a reconstruction of the old Silk Road and, once complete, will act as a link between Asia, Europe, and Africa. (BRI, n.d.).

Chinese and Pakistani policymakers have legitimate reasons to be quite optimistic about the gains from CPEC. Overall, CPEC will not only solve China's Malacca conundrum but also make it easier for Pakistan to construct a modern infrastructure, alleviate the energy crisis, and boost economic growth. A further \$2.5 billion is set aside for the construction of LNG pipelines to provide access

to transportation from Iran to Nawabshah (Sindh) and Gwadar. (Baluchistan) (Khan, 2018). Balochistan, the largest province in terms of surface area in Pakistan, will see the development of several SEZs.

Robert O Keohane and Joseph Nye highlighted three main features of Complex Interdependence, providing a unique international system perspective. The paradigm aimed to eliminate the system's conventional hierarchy, introduce multiple networks, and reduce the use of force. These features, however, would necessitate a pattern of interdependence. It's also worth noting that the existence of these characteristics would provide interacting states in the current international system with a variety of constraints and opportunities (Taylor & Francis, 2001).

In reality, symmetric interdependence is rare, thus it's crucial to keep in mind that interdependence is not always evenly balanced (Khalid, 2016). It becomes obvious that the interdependence in the case of CPEC is asymmetric. Although both nations gain from the enterprise, China ends up being the biggest gainer. The less dependent actor has the advantage of having more negotiating leverage over the dependent one in a relationship when there is asymmetric interdependence among the actors (Koehane & Nye, 1977).

According to the asymmetric interdependence concept, China has an advantage when interacting with Pakistan over the CPEC. China made the largest foreign investment in Pakistan's history as of 2017, investing \$62 billion. Therefore, Pakistan has the upper hand geographically while China holds the position of power economically (Khalid, 2016).

Multiple channels were the first characteristic of complex interdependence aimed at linking various cultures, with both governmental and non-governmental elites giving way to trans-governmental ties between states (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Multinational corporations (MNCs)

will also have a major effect on domestic and interstate affairs. Governments, companies, banks, and labor unions would conduct business and affect various states, which would be amplified by transnational contact. 'Foreign economic policies impact more domestic economic activity than in the past, blurring the domestic-foreign policy lines and increasing the number of foreign policy concerns,' according to one channel. Non-state actors and sub-state actors may be involved in several networks (Kaarbo & Ray, 2010).

Transnational and nongovernmental relationships exist. Intercultural and inter-societal communication is no longer limited to interstate exchanges. States are no longer the only actors in international interactions, contrary to realist theories. The concept of track two diplomacy has become extremely well-known alongside formal ties. This practice is used by independent business people, international corporations, and artists (Rana, 2015).

The second characteristic of complex interdependence was the lack of hierarchy between issues. It meant that there would be several problems on the interstate relations agenda, none of which would be structured in a simple hierarchy. Military stability, for example, will not be at the top of the priority list, contrary to the proposition of realism. There will be no difference between domestic and international issues, resulting in a broader and more complex area or domain for foreign policy. Issues that concern specific domestic policy but are not deemed a national security danger will be discussed, assisting in the development of a fair and coherent foreign policy.

The third attribute of dynamic interdependence is the use of military power. Governments would not use military force against each other if there is a complex interdependence between two states. While it prohibits states from using force against one another, it does allow for the use of force against a rival bloc. Force will not be an effective way to achieve economic or other goals. Some

conventional international political theorists expressed reservations about the accuracy of these characteristics, but it was believed that complex interdependence on global economic and ecological issues could be fairly accurately approximated (Keohane & Nye, 1977).

The idea of complex interdependence was interpreted as a mechanism whereby two or more societies pursued to reap the benefits of mutual dependency. The framework didn't just concentrate on security; it also included a variety of other elements, such as state-to-state economic and technical interactions. Many non-governmental actors operating at the social level have become major players in addition to the state. The regions in a state of interdependence would not be isolated or separated, but rather interconnected and interdependent at the level of different levels of society. As a result, interdependence became a form of conflict prevention or deterrence, creating a conducive atmosphere for peace. As a result, this definition enabled societies with viewpoints to interact in "complex and interdependent ways" (Bickford, 2006).

An interdependent world would be a peaceful place where states might rely on one another for economic cooperation and mutual interests. In the age of interdependence, the essence of world politics shifted, and states were increasingly reliant on one another for various governmental and non-governmental businesses. Many practical scholars have expressed the immense capacity for states to have interdependent and mutually beneficial relationships over the last three decades. According to the complex interdependence theory, the world has become a global village with shrinking distances, and in bilateral ties, dependency on other states has become one of the few options.

The paradigm of dynamic interdependence defined various aspects of interstate relations. When states sought to rely on one another for their interests during the globalization period, complex

interdependence became important. The acquisition and preservation of military force have received less attention in complex interdependence than cooperation. Three features of complex interdependence have been widely used to describe the interdependence factor. There are a variety of networks that can help states and communities to communicate formally or informally. Since there was no hierarchy between concerns, it was assumed that problems were not solely influenced by military security.

The Interdependence Scholarship believed that international relations had changed and that states had strengthened bilateral and multilateral connections. Transnational interdependence between different levels of society has increased as a result of various channels that connected the states. As a result, governments' perspectives shifted, and they started to consider connectivity. When addressing bilateral state relations, prominent features of complex interdependence will be mentioned, such as multiple networks, a lack of a hierarchy of issues, and a substantial reduction in the use of military force. States were becoming increasingly reliant on each other according to proponents of complex interdependence. Economic power, rather than military power, is essential, according to scholars who promoted interdependence in international politics. States have ceased to be rivals as a result of this interdependence, and economic cooperation has developed. They viewed the world as a global village in which state-to-state interdependence was becoming a more important choice.

This research aims to examine the diplomatic relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as well as the interdependent model between the two countries and the goals achieved through it.

The Economic Corridor (EC) is a tool for improving regional cooperation, boosting economic

growth, and bringing Asia's sub-regions closer together. The fastest-growing trend in South Asia is the growth of economic corridors. The most recent example is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Wolf, May 11, 2016).

Interdependence allows both countries to benefit from business and investment. China and Pakistan are two countries that are intertwined in global trade, security, and power dynamics. Both countries have had a synergetic relationship for a long time. In almost every platform, they were respectful of one another. Their bilateral ties are continuously improving due to mutual understanding and regular high-level visits by government officials. The strongest link in their partnership is their defensive bonds. With its fast-moving economy, China has now diversified its relationship with Pakistan, aiming for a more diverse and involved position in global politics and energy demand. Via their CPEC warm water policies, they are working to increase bilateral trade, investment, infrastructure growth, energy projects, and people-to-people interaction.

In 2013, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Agreement was discussed, along with the formal transfer of Gwadar Port to China for construction and economic activity. The CPEC can see a variety of projects worth a total of 62 billion dollars. This diplomatic relationship of interdependence and economic benefits has become a key factor of concern for the entire world because it is a game changer for the entire region. The economic powerhouse and world leaders will change as a result of this relationship paradigm. The aim of this study is to look at both countries' interdependencies as well as the goals they have achieved on the ground. Four CPEC project investments may aid in the development of Pakistani infrastructure and the resolution of the country's energy crisis, but nothing is free. What role does Balochistan play in China's Warm Water policies, both geopolitically and economically? And how does the instability in Balochistan affect China's warm water policies? The CPEC is a comprehensive package of China's competitive

economic initiatives that can enhance an industrial boom in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan, after the completion of projects. Thar Coal is one of the world's greatest coal assets, lying untouched in the Balochistan Desert. For a long time, Pakistan's coal industry has been able to meet the energy needs of the entire country.

As a result of this diplomatic partnership, Pakistan and China's economic adventures around the world have influenced the United States' decision to join the Indian market, putting bonds with India in competition with China and Pakistan. While access to the market has improved, international and political relationships remain difficult for countries around the world. Iran, India, and the US are all working to create their joint investment corridor. As a result, Pakistan and China are free to set their interests aside to gain an advantage over competitors. The CPEC project is the culmination of decades of warm bilateral ties focused on mutually beneficial state-to-state terms.

From a geopolitical and geoeconomic standpoint, we can say that it is an extension of China's expanding economic network. China's regional connectivity needs are increasing, and the CPEC project is an addition to its economic development. China's Belt and Road Initiatives, which were introduced in 2013, are investing even more in Central Asia as part of China's strategy of renewing the Old Silk Road. This project would improve economic ties between the two countries by opening up many avenues of cooperation in the long run. China is investing in Pakistan, and the route will connect western China to the port of Gwadar, improving economic activity in Balochistan over time by linking Central Asia and the region as a whole. CPEC brought China and Pakistan together for a win-win situation by using the politics of interdependence.

In the modern world, there has been a paradigm shift from tactical grouping to the establishment of economic collaboration between countries around the world, with the state's political interests and security being the determinants of this relationship. States are redefining their goals and

strategies because they recognize that their existing capacities do not appear to be sufficient to support their well-being (Ashraf, 2015). A strong collaboration between countries in a variety of fields, such as industrial enterprises, growth ventures, defence, infrastructure, and other areas of cooperation, is marked by apex talks and diplomatic meetings (Noor, 2008). For decades, China has been referred to as a "sleeping giant," but it has recently awakened and is now playing an important role not just in South Asia, but also globally. President Xi Jinping's predecessor, Xiaping, pursued a conservative foreign policy of "hide your strength, bid your time, never take the lead," but President Xi now calls for a more militant, activist, and assertive foreign policy and dreams of a "strong and powerful" Chinese state. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan have had diplomatic relations since 1950, shortly after the PRC's founding. Mutual trust and assurance underpin the two's long history of friendship. Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, said that the PRC was willing to establish diplomatic relations "with any foreign government willing to uphold the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity" (Mahdi, 1986). In 1950, Pakistan recognized the PRC in response to his call. In 1954, Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai said that "all individuals should have the right to choose their state system and cannot export their way of life without the interference of another country's revolution" (Mahdi, 1986). Despite believing in an entirely different ideology, Pakistan initially adopted the Chinese concept, allowing two states with vastly different socio-political systems to form enduring bonds. Second, Pakistan was persuaded that there were no plans in the PRC to expand its territory against its neighbours. Third, Pakistan determined that there was no real 'conflict of interests' between the two countries.

The China-Pak relationship was then developed on a more cordial basis. Establishing a healthy relationship with China is an essential part of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan has aided China

in maintaining the region's power balance (Iqbal,2015). The Chinese President characterized China's Good Neighbor Policy as part of a peaceful development strategy that China wanted to nurture as an interdependent, rather than competitive, relationship with its neighbors and the rest of the world (Iqbal, 2015). China and Pakistan began armed cooperation in 1966, established strategic alliances in 1972, and began economic cooperation in 1979. The relationship is said to be "higher than mountains" and "deeper than seas." The following are some significant events in Pakistan's relationship with China. In September 1950, Pakistan voted in favor of a UN resolution opposing Chinese nationalist representation and demanding that the true representative of Beijing's government be chosen. Pakistan endorsed the 'One China Policy,' and the two countries established formal trade ties in 1951. Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1955, respectively, to defend itself against India (Syed, 2013). These agreements were adopted as a cordon solitaire to contain the Soviet Union and China. Between the mid-fifties and the early sixties, Sino-Pak relations were strained. Finally, in the 1960s, the Sino-Pak relationship was solidified. In 1961, Pakistan recognized her status as a Western ally and reestablished ties with China. Pakistan has voted in favor of China's UN status once again.

Long-term collaborations with China lead to new economic ventures and new international partnerships. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has strengthened bilateral ties, and both countries appreciate the acknowledgment of these ties. The CPEC provides both countries with interdependent economic and political benefits. Today, the CPEC is envisioned as the most significant shift in the global economic landscape, spearheaded by China and rooted in Pakistan. Furthermore, the importance of the BRI and CPEC for both countries' economic leadership and regional dominance is examined, as it connects China and Pakistan to the rest of the world for easy trade. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a project that shows China's global reach in Asia,

Africa, and Europe.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a key component of this initiative. "Higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the Indian Ocean," and "sweeter than honey" are two clichés often associated with Pakistan-China diplomatic relations. Seven decades of peaceful coexistence with no state-level conflicts is a remarkable example of bilateral ties around the world. [Pakistan-China diplomatic relations, which have lasted over seven decades, are a remarkable example of a modern international political structure. Until the turn of the century, this relationship was largely limited to government-to-government, defense, political, and diplomatic cooperation. Since the turn of the century, the relationship has developed in the commercial and socioeconomic realms. Both sides recognize that, in the changing regional and global environment, the two countries need each other more. Nonetheless, understanding each other's society and culture remains uncharted territory. Pakistan and China have a long history of close relations. For decades, they have been 'all-weather' friends and their friendship is strong and enduring. China and Pakistan were initially drawn to each other in a geostrategic context, but their alliances have become increasingly multifaceted since the end of the Cold War. China has emerged as a regional economic power, and through the development of a large export ability and a robust market, it has succeeded in establishing its sphere of influence. With a long history of rivalry with India, Pakistan got its way and then fought the war on terror, which dragged her into poverty. Pakistan and China are concerned about India's increasing interest and influence in the region, as well as its cooperation with the US.

This study attempted to explain that while CPEC is an obvious way for Pakistan to address Balochistan's economic crises and militancy, d. In 2013, China and Pakistan announced plans to build an economic corridor connecting Kashgar in China's Xinjiang province to Gwadar in

Pakistan's southwest (Naranjan, 2015). As diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan were already hurting India's cause, this shared bond centered on the economic belt put India's dream of winning the race in jeopardy, and this became a troubling problem for India (Rasheed, 2017). After the start of CPEC, the US, and India collaborated on many trade agreements and economic ventures to cover the market and leave less for China. It has effectively adopted a non-confrontational foreign policy, focusing solely on its political and economic interests. As a result, countries' interdependencies are due to economic relations and trade agreements to protect their investments and achieve the goals set by many interdependent countries. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a bridge connecting China and Pakistan. Both countries are related via it based on economics and exchange for mutual benefit. This has aided security and military ties between the two countries by protecting their investment from external threats. Interdependence is both an analytical and rhetorical tool (Nye, 1977).

Dependency is a term used to describe a state of being regulated or affected by external powers. The most fundamental definition of interdependence is mutual reliance. Interdependence in world policy refers to situations in which countries or actors in various countries have reciprocal consequences (Nye, 1977). Interdependence is distinguished from mere interconnectedness by the existence of costly reciprocal effects. They argue that distinction is necessary to understand the politics of interdependence. Keohane and Nye distinguish two types of interdependence: consciousness and weakness, in order to illustrate control and interdependence. "Sensitivity implies accountability for costly external consequences before policies are changed to try to change the situation," the sources say. Vulnerability is described as an actor's obligation to bear the costs of external events, even after policies have been modified (Nye, 1977). The meaning and interpretation are ambiguous. What's less evident is that the concept is crucial to grasp the meaning

and dynamics of international organizations, as well as international relations. Strategic and economic vulnerability, for instance, China must offer Pakistan economic, political, and strategic support. On the other hand, a stable Pakistan supports and extends China's peaceful rise throughout the region, as well as offers a cheap and secure path for the delivery of China's energy needs.

2.2 Theoretical Model and its Implications

"Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or actors in different countries" (Keohane & Nye, 1977: 8). Pakistan is also working to finish the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan's attempts to make it a success story are due to several factors. First, to address the nation's power shortage to facilitate public and privately owned industries. The country's brief decline has intensified since 2007, resulting in continued public outrage and reduced manufacturing productivity. Numerous energy projects are included in the CPEC, including hydropower, thermal plants, coal-fired facilities, wind, and nuclear power. Not only is it helpful to create more work opportunities, but it is also important to manufacture more products and improve the productivity of the industry. Pakistan's sinking economy could see rapid growth by attracting more foreign investment and joint ventures with foreign governments to boost exports. It will also reduce the current imbalanced bilateral trade volume gap between China and Pakistan, which is now in China's favor.

Second, since the start of the War on Terror, the country's infrastructure capability has been deteriorating. Infrastructure is one of the most important factors in determining a country's development. Pakistan's lackluster transportation and manufacturing infrastructure has hampered the country's economic development. The situation is deteriorating due to a wave of terrorism and militancy in the region, especially in Balochistan, where infrastructure has been severely

damaged. The CPEC's numerous road connections, highways, pipelines, industrial parks, and economic zones would alleviate their misery.

The third goal Pakistan wants to achieve through the CPEC is the development of a deep-water port in Gwadar, Balochistan. It is strategically situated near the Persian Gulf's Hormuz Strait, which transports about 40% of the world's oil daily. The port has already been established and handed over to her for potential operations. In Balochistan's historically backward and militancy-ridden area, both economic initiatives and job opportunities will become mainstream. The Gwadar Port also competes with Chabahar, Oman, and Dubai.

The fourth feature is regional connectivity. South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, as well as Africa and Europe, are all part of the CPEC initiative. Gwadar offers easy access to the Indian Ocean for import and export trade for Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics. Several Central Asian countries and Afghanistan are included in China's Belt and Road initiative. Pakistan's trade and energy relations with these countries will rapidly develop. Economic empowerment is the fifth priority, which aims to eradicate populism and militancy in the country and region. Pakistan has suffered a high number of casualties in the war on terror, and Balochistan is also plagued by militancy and separatism. Extremism, militancy, and separatism are being eradicated slowly but steadily by economic interventions.

The sixth aspect is to investigate new minerals and, with Chinese assistance, to scientifically use those that have already been discovered. Balochistan, which is rich in natural resources, is a win-win situation for China and foreign investors. Modern technological skills will assist unemployed youth in raising their living standards and strengthening the economy.

2.2.1 Multiple Channels

As theory explains formal and informal interaction between governmental elites are a source of connecting societies but informal ties among non-governmental elites and transnational organizations are gaining more and more importance. As a result of China's recent change in policy from inward to outward, Pakistan has emerged as China's most important ally. Pakistan has handed over the port of Gwadar to China under a joint agreement that benefits both countries. Several interdependencies have resulted from China-Pakistan friendship on various fronts through multiple channels, which are explained mentioned below:

Transnational and nongovernmental (NGOs) relationships exist. Intercultural and inter-societal communication is no longer limited to interstate exchanges. States are no longer the only actors in international interactions. The concept of track two diplomacy has become extremely well-known alongside formal ties. This practice is used by independent businesspeople, international corporations, and artists. (Rana, 2015) Such as Pakistan China Institute (PCI), Research and Development International (RDI), and China-Pakistan Study Center(CPSC) in Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI).

Nongovernmental interactions occur when performing artists interact, foreign bureaucrats have direct contact with one another, and private corporations blatantly affect international relations. Participation between China and Pakistan is gradually growing, and more Chinese organizations will be funding Pakistan Cultural ties between China and Pakistan must be strengthened. Both nations must improve people-to-people contact, develop an awareness of one another's cultures, and elevate this relationship to a societal level, according to Pakistan's former Minister for Information and Broadcasting (People-to-people interaction to transform CPEC, 2016). Chinese

language classes serve to bridge a communication gap between Pakistanis and the Chinese to improve mutual interactions and people-to-people contacts

Cultural promotion includes the promotion of China's language at Roots International School and City School. In the film industry, production companies, in making, increase cooperation between the film industry of China and Pakistan such as the co-production of "The Journey" a movie about the China-Pakistan relationship under CPEC. Also, the two countries run a 24-hour "Dosti" (friendship) radio channel, which includes an hourly "Learn Chinese" in its programming (Jakhar, 2018).

For higher education Pakistani and Chinese universities are involved in bilateral and multilateral cooperation networks, for example, the CPEC Consortium of Universities, and the University Alliance of Silk Road (UASR). Center for collaborative research in the CPEC and surrounding themes in Pakistan universities for example China-Pakistan management at LUMS; CPEC Integrated Center for Research at University of Punjab at Lahore. Also hosting international students in China for example 3500 sponsored by Chinese government scholarships in 2016 and 28000 in 2018 (Ministry of Education of PRC, 2019).

To improve relationships among people, both governments signed a cultural cooperation agreement in 2018. In the future, China and Pakistan will both take more measures to deepen their cultural ties, according to Luo Shugang, China's minister of culture Pakistan, China signed a cultural agreement to increase people-to-people contact (2018).

Government sectors are the main organ to run the CPEC project such as the Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives, Ministry for Information Technology, Ministry of Communication, Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Railway, Ministry of Finance, and

Ministry of Energy. Also, the exchange of bureaucratic governmental and non-governmental elites is part of CPEC.

In the private sector following major private Chinese companies are working China Overseas Port Holding Company Ltd (port and shipping company), Gwadar Free Zone Ltd, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd (Communication), China State Construction Engineering CO. (construction), and Sino-Hydro Corporation (power), etc.

The following Banks are financing the projects of CPEC; China Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Bank, Silk Road Fund, Exim Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and State Bank of Pakistan

First, the gap between goods supply and trade is narrowing. China currently deals with the majority of the world through the Pacific and Indian Oceans. China relies on the Malacca Strait to import oil, other commodities, and commercial goods, as well as to export its goods to Middle Eastern, African, European, and other markets. The distance between the coasts of the Middle East and the port of Shanghai is about 12900 kilometers, and the distance between the northwestern Sinkiang region of China and the coasts of the Middle East is about 16000 kilometers. There is too much distance to cover logically, and it is also costly. To link Kashgar and Gwadar, Pakistan needs only 2500 kilometers of highways, railways, and pipeline networks. CPEC's completion not only saves China time but also makes its supply safer and more reliable., A commission Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) from Pakistan and China's Development Reforms Commission (CDRC) from the China side was established to monitor trade activities under CPEC.




Figure 1: Multiple Channels of Complex Interdependence

2.2.2 Absence of Hierarchy Among Issues

Within the world of Complex interdependency, there are no hierarchy among issues. The partitioning line between domestic and remote arrangements gets to be obscured and there's no clear plan for interstate relations.

Numerous issues are not orchestrated in a clear or steady chain of command. Among other things, "military security does not reliably overwhelm the agenda" (Keohane& Nye, 1977:25) The outside undertakings plans have ended up increasingly different presently. As restricted to the realists' presumption where security is continuously the foremost imperative issue between the

states, in complex interdependence, any issue-area could be at the beat of the universal motivation at any specific time.

Both Pakistan and China collaborated to deliver the Karakoram F-16 and JF-17 in arrange to set up military participation, a few illustrations of this association are the improvement of the Karakoram airplane and the JF-17 Warrior Flying machine. The bequest of AWACS comprises a gadget that makes a difference see at discussing travel and following space advances (Press, 2013).

Chinese money has essentially extended speculation within the Pakistani economy from US\$100 million to US\$700 million. Such venture has been made in each conceivable field, such as the telecom industry, the oil showcase, rail framework, overwhelming fabricating, military undertakings, data innovation, and mining (Zafar, 2014) According to (Baloch, 2016) both nations, both Pakistan and China have continuously been paying consideration on the social relations alongside the reason of change of participation between the individuals of both the nations, for this reason, both the nation's trade social troupes on distinctive events. Pakistan has been making endeavors for spreading China's dialect and has too created an organization within Pakistan for making individuals mindful of China's Dialect. China has continuously acknowledged the endeavors of Pakistan in this respect (Abbhi, 2015).

Moreover, Chinese and Pakistani officials are expecting that the establishment of a special zone of information technology, and education industries will help to upgrade the performance of education in the region (Barrios, 2008). For example, the Panjab-Jiangsu Cultural Center (PJCC) is part of the CPEC initiative between the National University of Modern Languages (NUML) of Pakistan and the Chinese Xinjiang Normal University, which provides a platform for understanding culture and improving the quality of education in the region. Similarly, the CPEC

route will improve people's communication with individuals, this will promote culture, make it easy for citizens to meet their friends, and families and bring the part in various social activities (Kanwal, Pitafi, Ahmad, et al., 2019), which will also give unique identification to the area. Previous debates indicate that CPEC offers several educational/cultural possibilities that would give various advantages to both residents and tourists and that these possibilities and advantages are probable to have an important beneficial effect on the subjective well-being of both residents and tourists. Based on the above discussion, there is a significant link between residents' perception of cultural/educational benefits with the development of CPEC and their subjective well-being. (Ghani, et al,2020)

At the moment, there is no hierarchy of issues within the scope of this specific theoretical framework. Military security is no longer prioritized over issues like ideology, culture, and the economy. Furthermore, there is no distinction between internal and foreign policy. In the case of CPEC, China does not have a clear purpose to explain its strategy, but it can use this project to promote its ideology and culture in Pakistan. China, for instance, constructed institutions to advance its culture and ideology. To advance, the traditional plan no longer suffices. A unique and modern type of agenda has emerged. While philosophy and regional rivalry used to make up the diplomatic agenda, other sectors, such as the environment, are now also included.

2.2.3 Minor Role of Military Force

Military power has a relatively little part in Complex Interdependence Theory. It is no longer regarded as the most successful instrument of foreign policy. The alliance members' agreements could not be carried out using it. Because military wars are expensive and all states are aware of the importance of reducing the cost of war, force, and intimidation are no longer seen as essential

tactics for accomplishing goals, whether they be economic or political. Although states don't use force, it nonetheless has used it when the alliance deals with its competitor bloc in the international system. Additionally, it can be used as a negotiating tool to settle disputes, particularly in asymmetric warfare (Rana, 2015).

As contradicted to the central part that drive is given in a realist's world, i.e. an extreme need to ensure survival, Complex Interdependency accepts that in worldwide relations constrain is striking. When Complex Interdependency wins, a military constraint may well be unimportant in settling contradictions on financial issues among individuals of an organization together, be that as it may at the same time be exceptionally critical for the alliance's political and military relations with its match alliance. Agreeing with Keohane and Nye, strong connections of common impact may exist but constrain are no more considered an suitable way of accomplishing other objectives such as financial and technological welfare which are getting to be more imperative, since for the most part impacts of military drive are exceptionally exorbitant and dubious (Keohane & Nye, 1977:28) In reality due to advanced atomic, natural and chemical weapons, all the on-screen characters are mindful of the maximized costs of war.

In this way, the centrality of military constraints as a key arrangement instrument has declined within the globalized world. Be that as it may, its part as bartering apparatus is still critical and may shift from issue to issue. Its role cannot be overlooked.

In this relationship, the less subordinate on-screen character may utilize it as a bartering device. Despite using force in changing part of constrain has made the circumstance more complex. Now soft measures Such as the Agaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan program supply the most extreme help to the individuals of Balochistan by giving them job openings and

bringing them in standard beneath the Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan bundle. China will construct a range of streets, railroads, and interstates over Pakistan, contributing to foundation advancement and financial development. CPEC can bridge these holes and change the connection into "Complex Interdependence". The minor role of the military in developing Gwadar Port to ensure safety and security only is discussed in the study.

With regard to CPEC the Chinese border with Pakistan is regarded as the safest border among all other boundary lines because China and Pakistan have never utilized armed force against one another. The relationship between China and Pakistan has traditionally been founded on the ideas of peaceful coexistence, strategic interests, and shared goals. An alliance free from conflict on the battlefield and in politics was made possible by shared strategic interests. An important aim is to strengthen the neglected and backward Balochistan and other northwest areas. Pakistan aims to create jobs as well as to combat separatist and militant tendencies. The East Turkistan Islamic Movement, a separatist group, threatened Sinkiang, which is bordered by Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Beijing regime claims that economic development would help to minimize militancy in the country.

2.3 Baloch Militancy and Complex Interdependence

Complex interdependence theory enables both an increase in economic activity and a decrease in conflict. It is also known as progressive or development theory since it is useful in ending interstate conflicts and fostering peaceful coexistence. Traditional notions of state power and the primary role of the military are becoming less relevant in today's highly globalized society. It is impossible to escape global cooperation, and non-state entities, particularly intergovernmental organizations (IOs) and well-known civil society figures have become important players in the global system.

The concept of complex interdependence has gained acceptance in the international community, which has greatly increased global connection and had a significant impact on state relations. International Organizations play a visible role in today's globe; although gains are scarcely symmetrical, both strong and weaker states profit from them. Developed states regularly contribute to the formation of non-governmental organizations. This can result in them controlling an excessive amount of that association.

It is acceptable to state that the China-Pakistan relationship is interdependent on CPEC. Due to Pakistan's advantageous geographic location, China depends on it for all of its needs and sees no other options. The key reasons Pakistan is dependent on the Chinese are its finances and economic situation. The CPEC project is a win-win endeavor whose spillover effects would be felt in the adjacent nations as well. Despite years of great diplomatic and strategic connections, societal development and interpersonal interactions have lagged. There is still a long way to go, even though certain recent initiatives from both governments will strengthen society relations (Khalid, 2016).

Unbalanced trade is another significant issue that has to be addressed. As a result of the CPEC, the China-Pak relationship has unquestionably evolved towards interdependence, and with the completion of this project, it will inevitably enter the realm of Complex Interdependence.

India's fabled "change of heart," which resulted in its decision to join CPEC, will unavoidably strengthen its relations with China and Pakistan and is likely to promote peace in the region. There will probably be a less intra-regional rivalry for hegemony and major power status. China has occasionally found it difficult to support either India or Pakistan in tense situations. However, given that this is the very definition of complex interdependence, peace, and stability in the region should arrive sooner rather than later. Baloch nationalists also represent a significant domestic

challenge. However, the cooperation of the Pakistan Army and the local patriotic public has reduced India's funded waves of militancy in Balochistan.

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China and Pakistan are committed for completing the CPEC project at all costs. It will bring economic growth and stability in both countries and their underdeveloped and impoverished regions. It will merely be a numerical extension of the economic sphere. The CPEC is likely to be extended in the future to provide connectivity with Afghanistan, Iran, the CARs, and others. CPEC is, indeed, a long-term project. China is more geographically vulnerable because it relies on Pakistan's geostrategic importance. For the first time in their bilateral relations, China is investing heavily in a variety of ventures with the help of various government and private companies, banks, and business communities.

Private Pakistani companies have already established direct contact with their Chinese counterparts. They may also begin to make an impact on social experiences, but this will take time. Strong linguistic and cultural differences are a big reason for this. Pakistan is more vulnerable because of the cost, as the war on terror and political unrest in Balochistan have harmed the country. However, it is hoped that the CPEC will boost bilateral trade and reduce imbalances in

the future. Last but not least, China and Pakistan have formed an interdependent relationship that may develop into a complex interdependence in the future.

CHAPTER THREE

PAK-CHINA RELATIONS AND CPEC

Energy is an important part of the order as it helps to keep economies going on. Pakistan has been able to do more than many other nations in energy matters because of our use of hydrocarbon wealth. Many of the national problems arise from the oil shortages. The global recession was triggered by the crash in commodity prices. An extreme lack of oil in the world affects the lives of most citizens. The fact that the link between oil and the prosperity of a nation has been identified scientifically proves that economic stability depends on electricity (Rehana, 2004). The rise in the demand for energy resources has resulted in the deterioration of the economic conditions of the world estimated that in 2015, Pakistan lost the economy by \$14 billion (7% of GDP) due to power cuts and load shedding. (Saleem, 2017)

Pakistan has been inefficient in developing its electricity system for the last twenty years. The war on terror and its uncertainty are messing up the financial situation in Pakistan. It has been said that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a potential solution for Pakistan's energy crisis. (Awan, 2014). CPEC is expected to be a long-term initiative that has a future in connecting China to Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. This indicates that the government aims to deliver prosperous areas with numerous positive impacts on everyone. The main projects CPEC is going to include in the following are trade and market access, industrial and expansion, global value chains, socio-economic development and alleviation of poverty, agricultural modernization and development of Gwadar city and blue economy, and development of rural connectivity and third world participation. Besides these, there are a huge number of Pakistani laborers working in China's construction and building schemes and helping to finish

these even quicker. Wire linking China and Pakistan uses cross-border cable (Khunjerab-Rawalpindi). According to the press, the cable installation is completed now. By developing the Transit Europe-Asia Terrestrial Cable Network (TEAT), Pakistan will expand its IT sector in the northeastern areas of the country as well as increase connectivity across Pakistan. The satellite network is being placed into operation in many nations as part of the civilian development of information capability under Civilian Development of Information Capability. (CPEC).

Ebrahim, (2015) stated, "Pakistan is strategically vital to China. It links China to the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, and Central Asia, in turn connecting China to the global economy." Gwadar Port supports China as well as the Middle East. Pakistan is situated near China, which offers warm water for Chinese exports (Economic Times, 2014).

With the oil demand, USA and India are facing China as a competitor to secure stable energy sources. (Hindu, 2015). To achieve sustainable economic growth in China and Pakistan, the governments are collaborating to promote the construction of Gwadar Port in Balochistan (Economic Times, 2015). China's increased energy demand is one explanation for the country's renewed intent to link its energy sources by sea and to extend its footprint into the Arabian Sea. Many foreign powers such as the US are afraid of Chinese expansion into the warm waters of Balochistan. On account of the strategic importance of Gwadar, it is worth to be discovered. (Dawn, 2015)

Pakistan is optimistic that the United States will not bomb the nuclear installations of Pakistan but has some doubts. An article states that the US is planning to make its alliance with Iran by supporting Baloch rebels and weakening China's presence in the region. (Daily Times, 2005). America's position in Balochistan is unclear as they didn't specify clearly what they want.

Either Baloch nationalists or pro-Baloch have differing opinions about the Baloch themselves. (Khaleeq, 2018). On the other side, there are the Baloch nationalists who blame the Pakistan government for siding with the United States to crush down the Baloch liberation movement. (Hussain, 2015).

3.1 Historical Background: The Initial Period (1950–1969)

China's diplomatic relations with Pakistan, the first Islamic country to welcome China in 1950, officially began in 1951. However, diplomatic relations gradually deteriorated after Pakistan joined the US, SEATO (South East Asian Territory Organization), and CENTO (Central East North Territory Organization) because these alliances were opposed to the Communist bloc, particularly the USSR and China. According to Dobell (1964), Pakistan had the chance to allay Chinese concerns and present justifications for joining SEATO and CENTO during the Bandung Conference (1955).

Premier of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Bogra used this opportunity to personally reassure Premier of China Zhou Enlai. Mr. Bogra asserted that we have no plans to be hostile to China and that we are members of SEATO and CENTO because we are concerned for India. This attitude was acknowledged by the Chinese government. Hussain Suhrawardy and Zhou Enlai, the then premier of Pakistan and China, paid visits to one other's states in October and December of 1956, respectively. However, following the 1957 visit to the US by Pakistani premier Suhrawardy, relations between the two nations began to deteriorate in 1959.

According to Akhtar (2009), another step was an official meeting held in Karachi by Taiwanese Hajis, who met with Pakistani religious officials. Regarding this, China accused Pakistan of

supporting US interests at the expense of the One-China policy. In the meantime, in September 1959, border clashes broke out along Hunza's border. Chinese MIG aircraft have entered Pakistani airspace illegally. President Ayub Khan vowed to defend India collectively against China and sent Gilgit scouts from Hunza to the Xinjiang border in November 1959. However, this offer was rejected by Indian Prime Minister Nehru.

Due to boundary disputes on both sides, which subsequently escalated into war, Indo-China relations were beginning to turn hostile at the beginning of the 1960s. India was providing the Dalai Lama and his supporters with political shelter while also becoming indirectly involved in the Tibet problem. China changed its foreign policy towards Pakistan and South Asia in response to the evolving regional political landscape. The United States supported India diplomatically and economically in its conflict with China. This is an opportunity for Pakistan and the People's Republic of China to develop a strong connection.

According to Retzlaff (1963), India had identified and labeled China as a threat to the region, but Pakistan had diplomatically fought for China to say that it posed no threat. In 1962, a border war between China and India erupted; India was supported totally by the US and USSR against China. According to Bhatty, an agreement between China and Pakistan to separate their border between the western section of China (Xinjiang region) and Pakistan's administered Gilgit-Baltistan was struck in March 1963. India expressed their strong disapproval of this deal and their concern that "there was no common border between China-Pakistan."

According to Chen (2007), the conflict between Pakistan and India officially started on September 6, 1965. China sides with Pakistan and directly warns India to destroy the border posts if it wants to avoid an attack from China within three days. Pakistan complied with the UN's request for a

ceasefire at that point after it had been made. Pakistan played a crucial role as a bridge between US-China relations and helped to break China's isolation at the end of the 1960s. Due to lessening the USSR's influence in power struggles, the US adjusted its approach to China in terms of foreign policy.

3.2 The Pre & Post-Cold War Period (1970–1999)

Reformers were on the rise in China throughout the 1970s, led by Deng Xiaoping. The reformists altered China's foreign policy and strengthened its ties with other countries, particularly those in the area. A policy of openness towards economic expansion was another development under Deng Xiaoping's leadership. Without harming Sino-Pak relations, China and India established a positive connection. Pakistan experienced numerous internal and foreign issues as a result of the change of leadership during the Cold War in 1970. Yahya Khan, the newly elected president of Pakistan, was unable to control the internal unrest, giving India the chance to support the separatist movement in East Pakistan. In 1971, Pakistan and India started a war that resulted in its division. Bangladesh was the name given to a new nation.

According to Choudhury (1982), the US never provided Pakistan with diplomatic or military assistance. Because the US sent the Seventh Fleet to rescue US citizens in Bengal Port, Pakistan felt let down by the US and opted to leave SEATO in 1972 and CENTO in 1979. Only "verbal support" was provided by the Chinese against Indian aggressiveness on the UN platform.

In regional politics, the US, China, and Pakistan formed a strategic triangle. The Chinese government invited Pakistan's President Z. A. Bhutto to visit China in January 1972. The Chinese

leadership firmly condemned how India had attacked Pakistan and requested that the aggressor forces leave Pakistan.

According to Rind (1973), China used its veto power against Bangladesh at least four times and utilized it first in the UN as a result of its aggressive collaboration with Pakistan. On September 29, the USSR brought up the issue of Bangladesh at the UN. China disagreed, saying that "the principles of the UN Charter must be observed and that the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions must be implemented." On November 29, the UN finally decided to send the prisoners of war home. It was a significant diplomatic triumph for China. Small (2015) claims that China adjusted its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era in response to Pakistani military capabilities.

In this sense, President Jiang Zemin's trip to India aimed to sever the two countries' existing diplomatic, economic, and regional harmony links. The new development had no impact on Sino-Pak relations, though. President Jiang Zemin spoke in Pakistan's National Assembly during his visit and explained the new adjustment in foreign policy. He characterized Sino-Pak relations as being between "friends in need" and "brothers bound by a common fate." He added that "having 'disputes and differences' with neighbors was normal."

Despite disagreements, President Jiang Zemin urged to maintain a positive relationship with India. He suggested that, similar to how China began a partnership with India despite the Kashmir dispute and Pakistan should increase its ties with India.

Despite disagreements, President Jiang Zemin recommended maintaining positive relations with India. He made the implication that China will develop connections with India despite the Kashmir dispute and that China would strengthen those ties with India despite border disputes. 2000–2018

3.3 Pak-China Relations 2000-2018:

The relationship between China and Pakistan entered in a new phase in the twenty-first century as a result of the frequent visits to the leadership of both states. In this regard, President Musharraf traveled to China in November 2003 and signed a document with the Chinese government titled "Joint Declaration on Direction of Bilateral Relations." China and Pakistan have agreed to expand their partnership in both the economic and strategic spheres. Wen Jiabao, the president of China, visited Pakistan in April 2005. Both nations signed documents during this visit.

The Sino-Pak pledged to refrain from joining any bloc or alliance that would compromise either nation's sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity under the terms of this pact. Sino-Pak halted joining any blocs or alliances that were hostile to one another after the signing of this treaty. With the geopolitical ramifications of South and Central Asia, Pakistan becomes a crucial element in China-US ties as a result of the favorable influence on Sino-Pak relations against regional rivals.

President Musharraf was welcomed by US President George W. Bush on his visit to US in February 2006. President Musharraf traveled to China for four days in February 2006 as a gesture that Pakistan views China as a significant nation. During this visit, President Musharraf received appreciation from Chinese President Hu Jintao for his efforts to improve Sino-Pak relations. He referred to President Musharraf as a long-time Chinese friend. Both nations honored the 55 years of diplomatic ties and inked some agreements in the energy, communication, trade, and defense sectors.

President Asif Ali Zardari visited China for four days in October 2008, according to Kataria (2014). President Zardari was making his first trip since taking office as leader of the Islamic

Republic of Pakistan. MOUs were signed by both parties in the areas of economy, agriculture, communication, and information technology. During the "Pak-China Friendship Year" in 2011, Pakistan and China celebrated their friendship's 60th anniversary.

This year, both President Asif Ali Zardari and Premier Raza Gilani traveled to China. As a result, both countries' economic, defense, energy, and trade sectors experienced tremendous growth. Presidents Hu Jintao and Zardari signed several agreements about information technology, the economy, and other sectors in 2012 after numerous high-level visits from both sides.

Li Keqiang, the Chinese prime minister, visited Pakistan in 2013. The Sino-Pak friendship was agreed to be strengthened in the diplomatic and commercial spheres during his visit. Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister of Pakistan, made his trip to China in 2013. Even though these connections were centered on the geostrategic backdrop, Pakistani and Chinese friendship is a rare instance of international relations in general. The results of this project will be increased people-to-people interaction, geopolitical significance, economic growth, the resolution of the energy issue, and political stability in Pakistan and the wider region. CPEC is another significant milestone between two friendly nations.

Terrorism impacted Pakistan in the twenty-first century, and Pakistan's economy suffered greatly as a result of its engagement in the war against terrorism. Iqbal (2018) claims that the CPEC will turn the course of history in Pakistan's favor by making it the region's economic hub and bolstering Pakistan's economy. By the end of 2022, the CPEC will have generated more than 17,000 megawatts of electricity, solving Pakistan's energy crisis. Pakistan now has the chance to expand its role as an economic link between Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and other Asian nations.

3.3 CPEC- An Analysis

In a meeting of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor in China with the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the Chief of State of China stated this proposal (also known as CPEC) (Jinping, 2015). The ICPC (the Integrated Coal Power Projects in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) will be signed by the end of this year. President Xi Jinping's forthcoming visit to Pakistan was close to the list of leaders this politician rattled off. Sharif was working on his accepted idea of constructing a nuclear power plant, which would benefit both China and Pakistan. According to an article in the Pakistani newspaper (Pakistan Observer, 2018), China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will comprise the building of a 25 km long road and transportation network between Gwadar Port and Kashgar in Xinjiang (Pande, 2015). The main countries participating in this CPEC will be China and Pakistan, and how it will be strengthened through its electricity and transportation networks throughout its lifespan. China has a great number of expectations to spend at least 46 billion dollars on a northerntransit corridor network. There are disputes over this project between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This initiative would significantly assist China's ability to export cargo by way of rail to Pakistan(Aqeel, 2018).

The Indian media has criticized the CPEC program. China plans to assert its dominance in the South China Sea and the Arabian Sea, which would make China very strong. Pakistan will do well with China's proposal because if it gets access to the Chinese market, it will expand its economy and gain more money for investing. CPEC schemes offer advantages to all the countries it traverses. (Panda, 2014). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is supposed to improve trade and connectivity, as well as increase cultural exchanges between China and Pakistan. Apart from it, the south will be the national economic center to serve the different parts of the region. Money

and power would be a big factor in Eastern integration. (Pant, 2017).

3.3.1 CPEC Components

Minhas, (2018) confirmed that it is a huge project, agreed to by both Pakistan and China, for the next 10 years, and that they are currently preparing the specifics of this project. China and Pakistan have signed a long-term electricity and climate change strategy. The deal centered on projects that have to be finished first, including energy-efficient hydropower projects, which need to be completed by 2020. See (Pant, 2017). Pakistan, with great assistance from China, agreed to become a part of this mega project. Both nations would work to make this project a success. (Singh, 2015)

Pant, (2017) assessed the CPEC as covering four major implementation areas including Gwadar port, transportation infrastructure, electricity, and industrial cooperation to meet socioeconomic, educational, and technical demands. New research illustrated (Schneider, 2013).

As mentioned Urooj, (2017) to promote cooperation among both countries, a Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) has been developed the purpose of which is to work on 5 big programs, all of which were still in the planning stage.

In case of the absence of the Chinese Minister, the Cabinet Secretary is to contact and cooperate relevant to CPEC with the line ministries. Top-level entrepreneurs are responsible for deciding on projects, executing projects, as well as for forming the board of directors (Ahmad, 2017)

3.3.2 Pakistan's Energy Sectors

Therefore, CPEC is one of the major purposes of the whole budget of the economy, which is about 65% in the current year and 73% in the next. (Khan, 2014). In addition to domestic use, that \$33

billion is going to be invested in finding alternative resources, such as alternative energy, to make up for the shortage of natural energy resources at home. (Schneider, 2013).

3.3.3 The Transportation Linkage

The second key aim of CPEC will be to establish a transport network in Pakistan. The taxes are devoted to the construction of the infrastructure, which includes bridges, highways, railways, and other related sites. Almost 24% of the entire budget has been allocated to the development of transportation infrastructure in Pakistan. (Observer, 2018). The construction of the road is essential to satisfying many economic needs, one of which is the construction of a long, motorway between Karachi and Lahore. Some roads agreed to do the Karakorum Highway and the railway line again as they did recently, while others have tried to do the same thing with many other roads and railways, with China Development Bank and EXIM Bank among them (Reporter, 2018)

3.3.4 Economic Zones

To be in contact with local industry, CPEC focuses on regional connectivity. This is why the SEZs are also established in some very important locations in Pakistan. One example to prove that China is involved in the Middle East is using infrastructure investments like Gwadar Port in Pakistan. (Jinping, 2015) In an effort to further China's electricity and transportation needs, preparations are in going forward for a pipeline to Iran, which will carry liquid and natural gases from Iran. An example of better business policies is the establishment of the Free Trade Zone at the Gwadar port (Aqeel, 2016).




Figure 2: Major Projects of CPEC (Aqeel, 2016)

The CPEC architecture reveals how many different sections of the belt system this journey has "One belt" represents the central region of Lahore, Quetta, Peshawar, Gwadar, etc. These networks are so linked that they separately, and together, form a small country which is a sort of Lahore-Quetta-Peshawar-Gwadar axis. On the other hand, "many passages" reflect the many roads and railroads linking Islamabad to Karachi as well as Gwadar. (Khaleeq, 2018)

Area of Investment	Proportion of Investment	Amount of Investment
Infrastructure	23.91 percent	\$11 billion ²¹
Energy Resource Development	71.7 percent	\$33 billion
Liquefied Natural Gas	4.34 percent	\$ 2 billion ²²

Figure 3: Breakdown of CPEC Deliveries (Khaleeq, 2018)

Listed below are a few of the cities which have been linked through the corridor

- a. Tumshuq
- b. Kashgar
- c. Shufu
- d. Sukkur
- e. Multan
- f. Quetta
- g. Lahore
- h. Islamabad
- i. Hyderabad
- j. Atushi
- k. Dera Ismail Khan

- l. Gilgit
- m. Peshawar
- n. Gwadar
- o. Karachi

3.4 Projects Covered by CPEC

The main focal point for the CPEC project is Gwadar, as it is part of the Belt and Road Project as well as the Silk Road Project.

3.5 Project of Gwadar Port

Ebrahim, (2015) claimed that the initial work of the Gwadar project was done in 2007, but later, under the CPEC agreement, it was agreed to extend it, by adding improvements plans, to upgrade projects for large ships, the construction of break water, the development of liquid natural gas opportunities, that could transport 500 million cubic feet per day from Iran to Gwadar (Corridor, 2015).

The ports (which have upgraded capacity) are modeled on special economic zones of China. Three separate stages are there to complete the special economic zones, and it is more possible that these industrial zones established before 2025, and more likely that any additional extensions were produced before 2035 (Modigliani, 2016). When a reporter asked the chairman of a corporation that had a multibillion-dollar budget for transport infrastructures overseas, he said "I have no problem to help build any highways, hotels, and other infrastructures you want."

A new International airport is being built in Gwadar, China for a price of \$230 million. Pakistan's government has set aside 4000 acres for constructing an airport. In addition, a 300MW coal power plant is built in Gwadar (Modi, 2015). Even some other developments included the building of 300 beds hospital. There are proposals in progress that include the construction of a 19 km road to be built via the Pakistan-managed Makran Highway that connects to Gwadar port. Almost 800 million dollars will be assigned to these additional programs. (Panda, 2014). On his journey back to Pakistan, President Obama revealed a proposal for a "Pak China Technical and Vocational Institute" in Gwadar.

3.6 Roadway Projects

CPEC is a growth program that is aimed at developing Pakistan's transport infrastructure for which China has allocated \$10.63 billion. Almost \$6.1 billion has been allocated for the development of Early Harvest Road Projects in Pakistan (Panda, 2014), and for freight transport, there are three passages.

1. The Western Alignment (in less developed areas of KPK and the Balochistan Province (Panda, 2014)
2. The Eastern Alignment (situated in more densely populated and comparatively more developed areas of Punjab and the Sindh Provinces)
3. The Third one is the central alliance (in the future) that will go through KPK, Punjab, and Balochistan (Pant, 2012).

3.7 The Silk Road (Karakorum Highway) Project

Pakistan and China have agreed to the reconstruction of the Karakorum Highway under the CPEC Agreement. The highway is 887 km long covering the distance between Pakistan, China Border, and Burhan. In the picture below, the red line shows the National Highway that has been reconstructed because of the CPEC. While the blue lines are representing the road between Gilgit and Skardu which has been upgraded (Pant, 2012).



Figure 4: Road Network of CPEC (Pant, 2012)

3.8 Western Alignment

Western alignment comprises the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and the Western area of Punjab. Part of the CPEC deal is that Federal Government will support Balochistan province in reconstructing highways and other facilities. In the diagram, the one on the left is showing the route for the western alignment, which will link India to Gwadar Port, and the one on the right depicts the route for the new expressway from Gwadar connecting the port to Chaman-

Laluabad road of section 6. The 70 % share, relating to the future development of the pipeline is also part of the CPEC agreement (Pant, 2017).



Figure 5: Western Alignment of CPEC agreement (Pant, 2017)

3.9 Eastern Alignment

(Singh, 2015) To go from Karachi to Lahore, drive on the Eastern Alignment, straight away from Karachi to Lahore city, with time, formed a continuous motorway segment of 345 km, portion M9 completed at the costly expense, each part of the motorway is divided into 2 or 4 sections, the length of motorway ranges from 1,152km to 1,175 km (that will connect Hyderabad and Sukkur). A railway line will be 392 kilometers long (that will connect Sukkur and Multan) and last 333 kilometers long (that will connect Multan and Lahore) (Ahmad, 2014; Rhodes et al., 2012)

As per Ahmed, (2019) in their study on the path for the Motorway M9, CPEC agreed that the line would run through the interior of Sindh. Staff are currently working on this initiative. It aims to help users fly at high speed. It is also known as the mega highway of life. It will be finished

in almost the next 30 months. Many of the city's roads have only been opened for public use (Timesof India, 2015).

According to (Tribune India, 2015), after the completion of the Hyderabad-Sukkur motorway, the M6 stretches onto a 345-km length. It connects Hyderabad to Sukkur. The Chinese Premier agreed to invest \$1.7 billion in CPEC. For this project, several bridges need to be built over the River Indus. To create this road, they intend to build it parallel to the road that connects the 2 countries. According to a recent article (Times of India, 2015).

The portion of the proposed budget for part three is for the road between Sukkur and Multan. The last segment that connects Multan to Lahore will arrive with a \$1.5 billion budget, it is 333 km long, and it is currently under construction (Farwa, 2020)

3.10 Projects Related to Railways

Under this CPEC deal, it has been agreed that Pakistani Railways will be strengthened in some way or another. Several significant railway line schemes are going on in China today. Reconstruction of the Karachi-Peshawar railway line is also known as the Main Line 1; this line is carrying more than 70 percent of Pakistan's railway traffic (Farwa, 2020).

The section is the portion of the plan that outlines the rebuilding of Main Line 1. The \$3.65 billion allotted for the first phase of the project, and the \$8.2 billion set aside for the entire two phases of the project is for the development. (Ahmad, 2017). It is projected that this train will exceed the speed of 160 km/hour in 2021 due to this train's project completion. The First Part of the study highlights Multan to Peshawar, then Hyderabad to Multan, and then eventually Hyderabad to Karachi, to demonstrate how the feeder roads lead in various directions, all leading

to different city centers (Corridor, 2014).

Between Kotri (Sindh) and Attock (Punjab), the railway line is known as Main Line 2. The "CPEC" arrangement contains an agreement on constructing a control center for Main Line 2. The committee agreed to connect Gwadar to Jacobabad, which is in Sindh. (Khan, 2014). Projections of railway line construction under the CPEC arrangement include the development of 560 km of railroad tracks, among other initiatives. This is intended to be seen as an alternate trade road (Reporter, 2018).

As per (Reporter, 2018) it has been announced that the building of the 682-kilometer-long railway track across the Khunjerab Pass and connecting it with the neighboring city of Havelian and Gilgit-Baltistan is part of the CPEC plans. We think the project is going to cost about \$12 billion. They have made some proposals but do not expect the real building to be finished until after 2030 (Yousaf, 2012).

3.11 Projects Connected to Energy Sector

Currently, Pakistan is facing a lack of electricity; of its existing energy capacity, its net capacity is 24830MW. The CPEC seeks to leverage the massive energy potential in Pakistan and begin to produce it. The budget of the CPEC is about 33 billion dollars. Private Independent power suppliers will be in charge of all electricity programs in the CPEC deal (Diplomat, 2020).

China has promised to compensate Pakistan for the shortfall it will face in the building of hydropower projects. To provide backup for this, China will pay \$2.4 billion for the construction of the Kohala Hydropower Plant, which will generate 1,100 MW of electricity. Additionally, China

will send Pakistan \$1.6 billion for the construction of the Karot Dam, which will produce 720 MW of energy (Hussain, 2015).

Even though other electricity generators such as nuclear, solar, and wind are cheaper, the CPEC team agreed to use coal-based turbines to provide the full amount of energy. The coal plants cost the public \$5.8B. The reason why these plants were selected was attributed to the pieces of the Early Harvest program. (Xi Jinping, 2015), In response to the situation in Pakistan, the Chinese have begun construction of various coal plants in different provinces, including Punjab where Sahiwal is currently under construction (Observer, 2018).

As per (Ebrahim, 2015), two Chinese companies were both involved in its production. Yet another coal power plant has been shelved from production after China and the United States negotiated the construction of a coal mine. A coal plant jointly constructed by a Pakistani and Chinese company is being established in the country's Balochistan province. The two companies planned to build a small coal power plant in the state of Gujarat, and another one in Balochistan as well (Economic Times, 2014).

This Sindh Chinese energy corporation has constructed two energy plants, one 660 MW and another one 300 MW. They will be part of the first coal plant Thar-1. Furthermore, the Pakistan Port of Qasim power plant is also a significant project that has an output of more than 1300 MW and a budget of around \$2.08 billion (The Economic Times, 2014).

CPEC also pays considerable attention to LNG (Liquid Natural gas) projects. The Chinese government has agreed to construct a long 773 km long pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah, Pakistan; and allocated a sum of \$2.5 billion. Another LNG station in Kasur is under development. It is named the Balloki Power Plant (Ahmed, 2016).

3.12 Early Harvest Projects

Under the CPEC project both the countries have decided for the development of 10,000 MW of electricity till 2020. Undoubtedly some of the projects may not be completed by 2020, however, some projects have the capacities and locations shown below for a better understanding (Ahmed, 2016).

"Early Harvest" Energy Project ^[212]	Capacity	Location
Pakistan Port Qasim Power Project.	1,320 MW (2 x 660 MW plants)	Sindh
Thar-I Project	1,320 MW (4 x 330 MW plants)	Sindh
Thar-II Project and coal mine	1,320 MW (2 x 660 MW plants)	Sindh
Sahiwal Coal Power Project	1,320 MW (2 x 660 MW plants)	Punjab
Rahimyar Khan coal power project	1,320 MW (2 x 660 MW plants)	Punjab
Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park	1,000 MW	Punjab
Suki Kinari Hydropower Project	870 MW (expected completion in 2020) ^[213]	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Karot Hydropower Project	720 MW (expected completion in 2020) ^[214]	Punjab
China Power Hub Generation Company	2X660 MW	Balochistan
Thar Engro Coal Power Project	660 MW (2 x 330 MW plants)	Sindh
Gwadar coal power project	300 MW	Balochistan
UEP Windfarm	100 MW	Sindh
Dawood wind power project	50 MW	Sindh
Sachal Windfarm	50 MW	Sindh
Sunnec Windfarm	50 MW	Sindh
Matiari to Faisalabad transmission line	660 kilovolt	Sindh and Punjab
Matiari to Lahore Transmission Line	660 kilovolt	Sindh and Punjab

Figure 6: Table of Projects (Ahmed, 2016)

Along with these fields, CPEC also covers other areas where development and/or improvement is required such as Science, Technology, Climate, and Agriculture etc.

3.13 Routes of CPEC

The following figure presents a summarized and proposed route for CPEC as per the CPEC agreement.



Figure 7: Routes of CPEC (Ahmed, 2016)

3.14 CPEC and its Impacts

For China, the fact that the CPEC was included in the 13th five-year plan indicates that it is really important to them. China will be able to get substitute routes and other new routes for trading and energy transfer. CPEC is a gateway, or path, to globalization and investment. China will use this route to strengthen its interests (not just for finance) and accomplish its foreign policy goals (Khaleeq, 2018).

3.15 CPEC: Impact on the Economy of Pakistan

As per (The Atlantic, 2017), the Pakistan government finds CPEC essential for their economic growth. It is expected that CPEC will change Pakistan's economic situation. It is expected that CPEC infrastructure development will bring transformational improvements and economic growth to the region. Pakistan's government and media declared the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to be a "game changer" or "fate changer". Unlike other countries, both Pakistan and China claimed that CPEC would fuel development in Pakistan. (Times, 2016). Yesterday when the government passed the budget, Pakistan's Chinese Chairperson of Overseas Port Holding Company also said that the "EXPERT" Committee would review China's CPEC proposal adding that China has intend to spend another \$1.3 billion on the transportation system in Pakistan (Times, 2016).

Since 2017, Pakistan has suffered from the energy crisis, as the country has a deficit of about 5000MW, reduced GDP by 2.5%, and is witnessing a lack of electricity daily. In 2017, in an article published in Express India, it was highlighted that the key problem in foreign investment is load shedding. Pakistan's economy is declining day by day as a result of insufficient electricity supply, according to the World Bank. (Ijaz, 2018) announced that Pakistan is capable of generating surplus electricity due to CPEC in 2017; Awais Leghari, Federal Power Minister, said Pakistan is capable of generating electricity more than the amount of power needed (Express India, 2017).

According to the national newspaper, many industries are highly affected and will suffer because of load shedding like textile, stated by (Nation Pakistan, 2016). Encouraged by the need for useful resources, early harvest initiatives concentrate on the production of electricity, to meet needs. The company agreed to fund more electricity by 10,000MW. As it has been mentioned before, The

prime minister also claimed that by working with China, Pakistan's economy and security problems are going to be stable (Ijaz, 2018).

Reuters, (2017), the Chinese government expected this project to improve the country's status in South Asia, while the Pakistani government claimed that this project would play an important role in regional connectivity. When the house no longer is used for its original function, it would create a lot of profits. It is predicted that China Pakistan Economic Corridor will prove to be a fate changer for Pakistan-China ties, making them stronger! (Pakistan obzerver, 2017).

In short, it can be seen that relations among both countries Pakistan and China are getting stronger as time goes by (The Guardian, 2016). Both countries still share diplomatic relations, cooperation, and military interaction. Before CPEC, Pakistan was facing threats in almost every field including militancy, the oil crisis, population growth, and climate change. China's investment is the need of Pakistan for better solutions to these problems. (BBC News, 2016) about this occurrence. In addition to all of its benefits, CPEC would also have job opportunities in Pakistan. China does not export goods at less expense to other countries, but it has sold products to Pakistan. We may claim that China's future with Pakistan is more optimistic and its relationship can generate even more possibilities for both countries more and more in the future. (Ijaz, 2018). Their relationship has the possibility of triggering more fears about their economies. The Pakistan-Sinorelations will bring drastic improvement within the economic field for both Pakistan and China.

3.16 Pakistan and China Relations and CPEC

(BBC Hindi, 2016) recalling the early 1950s beginning of Pakistani and Chinese relations, it was demonstrated that the bilateral relationship started during the decade in which Pakistan was

founded as an independent country in 1947. Also considered to be a significant precursor to Pakistani-Chinese relationships was the war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, which was resolved by an UN-negotiated cease-fire in 1949; however, the need for an outlet for her increasing population for China's capital ultimately culminated in an Indo-Sino war in 1962. (Times India, 2016). Both countries have made their partnerships progressive, engaging in and trusting each other. To make many incentives or deals with other nations, all countries collaborate to meet in person. The Chinese have provided economic, scientific, and military support to Pakistan for the past many years (The News, 2012). The original Chinese policy of neutrality began China's unique ties with the Arabs. Long term, in terms of economic development, Pakistan might become more dependent on China than India.

The embassies of the two countries were established in 1950, and military relations were engaged in 1966. The event was published in 1972 by the Wall Street Journal. Although economic cooperation was initiated in 1979 between Pakistan and China, the Chinese Premier has concluded that it is extremely necessary to improve relations with Pakistan (The News, 2012). The government of China has been a very major sponsor and seller of weaponry to Pakistan and is one of the biggest exporters of weapons to Pakistan in Asia. The economic relations between China and Pakistan have been very positive; in the third position alphabetically, China is the most important trading partner of Pakistan (Routledge, 2012). Over the past few years, both China and Pakistan have agreed to expand their civilian nuclear programs. China has always been the backbone of Pakistan's foreign policy and has always helped Pakistan against any problem India blames, Kashmir disputes, etc. (Xlibris, 2011). China is supplying arms to Pakistan and armaments in the military because of the war in Afghanistan. China represents support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, which raises Pakistan's ability to support China on Xinjiang, Tibet, and other issues.

Every single day China's support has been growing higher for Pakistan; particularly since China invested in Pakistan for its energy and transportation infrastructures at the harbor of Gwadar (Xlibris, 2011). On the other side, being a bridge between China and other Muslim countries, Pakistan always has proven its value. As China's cultural influence in the world, Pakistan also helped to connect China and Western countries to sustain contact between countries, particularly compared to Cuba. Both nations were very close and mutually assisted each other with positive intentions. To cite a paper (Johnson, 2005) noted that China made its debut on the map of the world on May 19th in the year of 1949. After sometimes the Sino-India dispute during the 1960s occurred, there were Conflicts between India and China. (Press, 2013) Pakistan stood up for China to fight against India. China was able to open the doors of the West to themselves with the aid of Pakistan, but in exchange, the Chinese provided Pakistan with economic and political support (Press, 2013).

3.17 Military Relations between Pakistan and China

China and Pakistan are two important countries in South Asia. Both are important countries because they are part of the South Asian community. As a result of this position, the pair is important to not only the region but also the global geo-political structure (Press, 2015). Since Pakistan and China are engaged in military ventures, the relations between Pakistan and China are closer than ever before (Ijaz, 2018). In 1962 China provided Pakistan extra assistance in the forged of ammunition factories by lending them machinery, new facilities, and generous technical support (Zed Books, 2012). Both Pakistan and China collaborated to produce the Karakoram F-16 and JF- 17 to establish military cooperation, some examples of this partnership are the development of the Karakoram aircraft and the JF-17 Fighter Aircraft. The legacy of AWACS

consists of a device that helps look at air travel and tracking space technologies (Press, 2013).

There are armies of both Pakistan and China that do military drills with one another. One of the key developments made by China is the Gwadar port in Pakistan, but both America and India did not like this. China sent more military arms to Pakistan, providing Pakistan's military with additional means to assault others (Al Jazeera, 2012).

Ijaz, (2018) supported by China, Western nations are making it very difficult for Pakistan to attain its nuclear ambitions reigniting rhetoric over nuclear progress while pressuring Pakistan to resort to China for arms. Despite all these costs China has supported Pakistan in building the Khushab reactor which would be the main development of plutonium within Pakistan (Al Jazeera, 2012).

3.18 Pakistan-China Economic Relations

We are seeing the relationship between Pakistan and China getting better all the time, recently both countries have signed trade agreements. These economic links lay the basis for growing trade ties between these two nations (BBC Urdu, 2014). In recent years, the amount of capital Pakistan has spent on its military showing China to be rising. There have been several changes in the roads of China to further the growth of Pakistan's transportation system. Pakistan is in a severe electricity crisis that's forcing the government to move on to finding more efficient ways of renewable energy (Minnesota Press, 2014).

The close relationship between the two countries has been considered significant by the international community and globally it is compared with America-Israel relations. In a survey conducted last year, around 84 percent of the respondents favored the view of China while there

was only 16 percent who had favored the view of the USA (Burdman, 2015). Pakistan once viewed China as an "all-weather friend" that could be counted on for many years to come. Meanwhile, Chinese officials have promised Pakistan that their wonderful and lasting relationship would continue for as long as the two nations need one another (Khaleeq, 2018).

According to a report from Ahmad, (2015), reported that both of these countries proclaimed 2016 a "year of friendship", after 65 years of not being near. These ties are getting more and stronger each day. With the "good neighborly policy", both countries of Pakistan and China still take a close approach to ties and alliances in the region on regional issues (Anwar, 2010).

After General Musharraf (the ex-president of Pakistan) took an oath to his office as president in 1999, the relationship between China and Pakistan became more economic (Gul, 2016). When the Chinese president visited Turkey, he laid the cornerstone of economic cooperation between both countries. Both countries see a great increase in their commerce and investment. (Shah, 2018). In 2001, Chinese President Zhu Rongji visited Pakistan. He realized that the two countries should work together to create an industrial park that provides agricultural goods, economic growth of transport infrastructures, and information tech for the mutual benefit of the trade partners. Both countries in Pakistan and China signed a total of six agreements of reciprocal cooperation. (Khan, 2018) The two countries agreed on the following; Economic and technological cooperation, Tourism cooperation, Selling of Locomotives for Pakistan's railway, Exportation of Locomotive sets to China's railway network, Procurement of passenger coaches for Pakistan's railway, and Agreement for White Oil Line between Pakistan and China. (Rehman, 2018)

(Khaleeq, 2018) China's currency has significantly expanded investment in the Pakistani economy from US\$100 million to US\$700 million. Such investment has been made in every possible field,

such as the telecom industry, the oil market, rail infrastructure, heavy manufacturing, military affairs, information technology, and mining (Zafar, 2014)

According to Khaleeq, (2018), many Chinese companies have been integrated into Pakistan, including Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Karakorum Highways heavy industries in Taxila, and many production lines of Pakistan Ordnance Factories. Between 1970 and 1980, China developed many heavy Steel Factories, which are efficient in Pakistani industries and help with technology (Kuo, 2018).

Recently, when Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited Pakistan, both countries signed some important agreements. When Pakistan's ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited China, there was a grand signing of a lot of treaties over stuff relating to mega energy projects in China, which meant both countries were working together a lot of the time (Syed, 2015).

It would result in a reform of the economic conditions of Pakistan. Pakistan's government and media declared the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to be a "game changer" or "fate changer". Unlike other countries, both Pakistan and China claimed that CPEC would fuel development in Pakistan. (Walsh, 2016). When CPEC is authorized, the Chairman of China's complex for the overseas port holding company said while talking to India "China is very interested to spend more \$4.5 billion on the construction of roads, railways, highways and other transport infrastructure in Pakistan." (Walsh, 2016)

Details of these investments and projects are discussed below:

3.19 Transport Infrastructures

For this reason, a total budget of about 24% of the entire state's budget was authorized to be spent on planning and preparing for the growth of transportation infrastructure in Pakistan. (Baloch, 2016). As we have described earlier, the development of a long motorway between Karachi and Lahore in order to meet economic and external needs is also part of it (Ahmed, 2014). Some roads in the world agreed to reconstruct like the Karakorum Highway and the Karachi-Peshawar railway line. Several banks issued long-term loans to these roads for this construction like China. (Jehanzeb, 2016).

Here in this arrangement was a road map where it would work out how relations between Pakistan and China would be in the future. In 2004, both countries Pakistan and China jointly signed seven more agreements. All apply primarily to commerce. The WTO has conducted an economic analysis affecting both countries. (Hassan, 2016).

These trade agreements between China and Pakistan would significantly help both countries. More agreements are signed in 2005 that include collaboration in different fields including economy, security, education, and many more. The list is very comprehensive. Thus, (Hassan, 2016). The Trade Promotion Program was initiated at an early (Horticulture) to enhance the bilateral trade between both countries. In terms of exporting, China provides far more material to Pakistan as opposed to the material that is supplied from Pakistan to China. We should think that China is even more mindful of Pakistan. (Jehanzeb, 2016), found the following. As a result of China's efforts, Pakistan has started to become independent and can meet its needs by itself. On the other hand, India has not shown interest in this technology. (Baloch, 2016)

To better address the economic needs of Pakistan, the Chinese government has signed an agreement that will bring Chinese investments over the next five years. (Jehanzeb, 2016) As part of CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), it is agreed that Pakistan will repair or rebuild railroad lines under the deal. Any of the most notable railway schemes are listed below.

(Marex, 2017) said that [the] restoration of the Karachi-Peshawar line [also] called Main Line 1, less than three hundred kilometers long and also passing via KPK and NWFP in Pakistan, cost more than one hundred million Pakistan rupees. The restoration of Main Line 1 is the core component of the Early Harvest program. The Lead Investigator of this project has allotted up to \$3.65 billion from the overall budget to only the first phase and the entire project has a total budget of \$8.2 billion. This is one of the projects of the company that is scheduled to complete in 2021. The train at the speed of 160km/hour. First, it mentions the route from Multan to Peshawar, and then it mentions the route from Hyderabad to Multan, and then eventually from Hyderabad to Karachi. (Akram, 2014)

Next, the research also has listed the railway line between Kotri (Sindh) and Attock (Punjab), which is also known as Main Line 2. The CPEC deal requires the restoration of 1,254 kilometers of Main Line 2. The valley is nearly paralleled by the Indus River. It has been agreed that Gwadar will be associated with Jacobabad Sindh (Marex, 2017). The last portion of the railway projects was also included in the upstream steps from the CPEC. Most likely it will be a 560km railway line network that would be constructed in between the two cities of Buner and East Waziristan, (Bostan and Kotla Jam). This is supposed to be used as a trading road. (China Overview, 2016)

The construction of the Orange Line in Lahore also belongs to the CPEC program. 1.6 billion US dollars are counted as CPEC's spending. The building is almost over, and very better than expected.

(Johnson, 2015). The construction of the 682 km long Khunjerab railway line is also envisaged in the CPEC, it will connect Khunjerab Pass to Havelian. They forecast that the whole project would cost \$12 billion. The project has a timeline that is planned to be finished by the year 2030. (China Overview, 2016)

3.20 Projects of the Energy Sector

Pakistan is currently facing energy shortages, which are emanating from the low potential for energy production. The current generation of Pakistan is 24830MW. The CPEC seeks to leverage the massive energy potential in Pakistan and begin to produce it. The budget of the CPEC is about 33 billion dollars. Private Independent power suppliers will be in charge of all electricity programs in the CPEC deal. (Johnson, 2015)

To be in contact with local industry, CPEC focuses on regional connectivity. This is why the SEZs are also established in some very important locations in Pakistan. One of Intel's examples to prove that China is involved in the Middle East is using infrastructure investments like Gwadar Port in Pakistan (China Overview, 2016). In addition, the construction of the gas line is expected to transfer Iranian natural gas and liquid from Iran's massive gas fields to Pakistan's huge oil reserves. An example of better business policies is the establishment of the Free Trade Zone at the Gwadar port (Baloch, 2016).

China has taken responsibility to build the Karot Dam project in Pakistan to meet energy needs in the region, the launch of work has been set to \$2.4 billion which is projected to make 1,100 MW of energy, a second project is the construction of the Kohala Hydropower project which has a budget of \$1.6 billion which will generate 720 MW of energy. P.S. (Rustici, 2014).

Even though other electricity generators such as nuclear, solar, and wind are cheaper, the CPEC team agreed to use coal-based turbines to provide the full amount of energy. The government has invested \$5.8 billion in these coal plants and they are the early-stage ventures of Early Harvest. (Baloch, 2016). In response to the situation in Pakistan, the Chinese have begun construction of various coal plants in different provinces, including Punjab where Sahiwal is currently under construction. (Rustici, 2014),

Yet another coal power plant has been shelved from production after China and the United States negotiated the construction of a coal mine. (Neo, 2016). A coal plant jointly constructed by a Pakistani and Chinese company is being established in the country's Balochistan province. The two companies planned to build a small coal power plant in the state of Gujarat, and another one in Balochistan as well. This Sindh Chinese energy corporation has constructed two energy plants, one 660 MW and another 300 MW. They will be part of the first coal plant Thar-1. Furthermore, the Pakistan Port of Qasim power plant is also a significant project that has an output of more than 1300 MW and has a budget of around \$2 billion (\$2.08 billion to be precise). (Daniels, 2016)

CPEC also pays considerable attention to LNG (Liquid Natural gas) projects. The Chinese government has agreed to construct a long 773 km long pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah, Pakistan; and allocated a sum of \$2.5 billion. Another LNG station in Kasur is under development. It is named the Balloki Power Plant (Neo, 2016).

3.21 Cultural Relations between Pakistan and China

According to (Baloch, 2016) both countries, Pakistan and China have always been paying attention to cultural relations along with the purpose of improvement of cooperation between the people of both countries, for this purpose both countries exchange cultural delegations on different occasions. Pakistan has been making efforts for spreading the Chinese language and has also developed institutes within Pakistan for making people aware of the Chinese Language. China has always appreciated the efforts of Pakistan in this regard. (Abbhi, 2015)

3.22 Domestic Politics

There are several different security views surrounding CPEC. Because of the disparity in the political parties in Pakistan, a common strategy for developing governance has been adopted by different provinces. The major faction in charge of Pakistan's Punjab is the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. PTI is now leading in KPK (Abbhi, 2015). Parties on the topic of CPEC have varying views regarding the routes of the CPEC. The key opposition of the PMLN government raises popular concern about the issue. Most have skipped the western path through Sindh. The most important portion of PPP was PMLN's neglecting of city and town problems that sparked massive migration to Punjab's areas (Neo, 2016).

In addition, PPP lifted its voice on ignoring the territories of Gilgit and Baltistan. PPP is still quite angry that the decision-making body did not include initiatives that may have been helpful to Gilgit and Baltistan. The Pakistani government, when it comes to this territory, has very little to say. This is why people are not happy with what they have to say (Neo, 2016).

(Ijaz, 2018) The PPP, a major political party of Pakistan and supposedly a "satellite" of the Pakistani military, argues that the construction of the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)" is illegal, according to the PPP, the construction of this corridor is an infringement of the interests of Pakistani Baloch citizens. (Ghumm, 2016) After the development of Gwadar Port, both the countries of China and Pakistan formed two links. A road connection as well as a sea link (Abхи, 2015).

The Chinese government also notices that they have connections with political parties when they focus on seeking a solution with just a few parties over CPEC. (Ijaz, 2018) The strategy of China is to build constructive and friendly relations with Pakistan, and they will not do anything to influence anyone else in internal politics. China's concern is that there may be some differences in the CPEC within the domestic community. The latest path plans for CPEC would be focused on the country's internal politics (Muhammad, 2018).

Pakistan's and China's strength is being slowly strengthened day by day. Both countries still have a very deep political, commercial, and security partnership. Before CPEC Pakistan was facing problems in almost every field, including militancy, oil shortages, population explosion, changes in the environment, visa issues, foreign investment rules, and corruption in the country. China's investment in CPEC is a need of Pakistan for better solutions to these issues (Farwa, 2020). Besides all the wonderful benefits CPEC exhibits, it will have job opportunities in Pakistan. Today China is one of the most important countries in the world, and Pakistan is one of the most important in the region. Their relationship will generate reciprocal gains for both of the two like Pakistan is doing business with China. (Ijaz, 2018) Their partnership would add more fears about the economy of both nations. If Pakistan and China move forward, their partnerships with one another will open up further economic growth prospects for both sides (Muhammad, 2018).

3.23 Terror Dilemma of China Regarding CPEC

(Muhammad, 2018), China has always been concerned rather worried regarding the extremist belonging to Pakistan, particularly in the Balochistan region, who serve more as an internal security challenge for Pakistan itself alongside the PRC and its related interests in Pakistan. China spent approximately \$65 billion on the China-Pakistan economic corridor and, according to a separate body of researchers, China's investment is continually under attack (Farwa, 2020).

(Ahmad, 2014) thinks that China's government feels that the Pakistani government is unable to protect and safeguard the CPEC project from the extremists in the disguise of Baloch Militants, particularly because they marry the terrorists, and is constantly trying to arrange for their security measures. One fascinating thing is how Xinjiang is so influential as a conduit of Chinese responses to repressive efforts of the United States and other Western forces in the region. To understand the next steps that China will take to safeguard its Central Silk Road Project, we need to go over the Xinjiang Strategy in its entirety (Balochistan, 2020).

Because of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China can be seen as having become involved in the nearby countries to deter America from affecting them. (Farwa, 2020) essential China has spent a lot of money outside China to reach new markets, to move its factories outside itself to prevent needless contamination of the region, and to avoid loss of human and private rights and serious dangers caused by the rapid production of such oil.

Gwadar is more of a danger to America and India because they believe that sooner or later, Gwadar Port will serve as a Chinese Naval base and China will be able to float on the Arabian Sea, making for more trading possibilities for both their nations. (Ahmad, 2017) Unsupportive of China's potential over the Arabian Sea, both America and India will have a lot of trouble. Besides their

participation as a nation's partner in this endeavor, China would have a simpler escape strategy out of the Malaccan dilemma. Here, a general note is required that China mainly has its oil supplies but has to rely on the Middle East and Africa for other resources. (Balochistan, 2020). India is reportedly worried that if China is not prevented from its domination of the Strait of Malacca, this would make it able to obstruct its way to its suppliers of oil from the Middle East and Africa. The potential possibility of being blocked on the Straits of Malacca has made China rely more on the CPEC corridor because it is the only chance to address China's security problem (Ministry of Planning Pakistan, 2018).

3.24 BRI and Baloch Insurgencies

The Chinese dream to turn "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) into practice involves the investigation of the role played by Beijing primarily in Pakistan. The "Belt and Road Initiative" was first implemented in China's ally country Pakistan (Ministry of Planning, Pakistan, 2018). This project is focused on the dream of linking Asia, Africa, and Europe, which is another secret purpose behind the huge CPEC project that took place between China and Pakistan. What this corridor would do is link the Xinjiang province to Gwadar Seaport under the rule of the ruling government in Pakistan (Pakistan Observer, 2018).

Balochistan is one of the largest and least populated areas of Pakistan. The province of Balochistan was historically has been equipped by radicals and dissidents. Both branches of the military police are permanently based post in Balochistan. In the British period, this region was governed by the British.

When World War One broke, Balochistan was fighting hard to obtain its independence from British control. Afterward, it was broken into two nations, Pakistan and Iran, at the time of the Iranian Revolution. (Umbreen, 2018) The Balochistan province is the main part of Pakistan covering one-third part of the total area of Pakistan. There is an area within the British Indian Empire that is still struggling towards making Balochistan an autonomous and prosperous province.

Involved with a private Pakistani organization the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), the fear of violence has escalated in Balochistan to such a degree as to force assassination, familial abduction, the danger to minorities, and extrajudicial killings (Tripathi, 2016).

3.25 CPEC and Apprehensions of Balochistan

The antagonist of CPEC may be the catalyst for causing instability in Balochistan, to the point that Chinese governments are also showing their concern about violence in Balochistan. The government of China has a proposal to spend \$46 billion on CPEC programs. Thus, if Beijing's terror level grows, then this could lead Beijing to take a step back from owning investments in Pakistan. The Pakistani government has continuously said India is one of the key triggers of any rising terrorism in the region (Economic Times, 2014).

After the explosion in the middle of the night on August 8, 2016, the Prime Minister and Army Chief announced that it is caused to be a significant disruption in the measures and development of CPEC.

Though the situation was made worse with the American government looking for an alternative country to receive the port in Gwadar, the Pakistani government still went ahead with the project

to turn China and Pakistan into one nation (Gilmartin, 2015). The Road and Seaport is a vital part of the BRI project as it offers a link between the Road and Sea. Gwadar, an important seaport lies close to the Persian Gulf. It can provide a clear route connecting with China, for every country in the Middle East or Africa to communicate with each other. It is a refining center that can refine pure oil of almost 19 million tons annually afterward and exports it to China. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018).

The key reason for the Gwadar port development is China; which built a road eight thousand kilometers long with an almost \$10.63 billion budget that links the port to Kashgar (Gilmartin, 2015). Therefore, gas lines are built to provide trade with Iran and/or Pakistan. The proposal for this initiative was first recognized simply as the peace pipeline between India, Pakistan, and Iran. Soon after the nuclear agreement is signed, the gas supplies to these countries will be taken over by China instead of India and this will deter trade with Iran. (Khaleeq, 2018)

India, which has been one of the biggest opponents of CPEC for a variety of reasons, feels that they should be paid for it if they get security threats from your path. The explanation for this is that this route passes through areas that India has defined as their sole assets in Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. By way of illustration (Khaleeq, 2018). When the Indian government deemed it unconstitutional. Through contacting the Chinese government, they told those in charge of their concerns. In solidarity, the Chinese government notes that it is in favor of fixing this problem rather than making it the basis for the project being left unfinished. (Ahmad, 2014)

Contrarily, Pakistan had problems with its safety concerns of Gwadar Harbor due to it being in the hands of China's and Pakistani militaries, who would have likely caused India and Pakistan's imports and exports to be affected. Although India is wary of the expansion of Gwadar port, instead

of being provided with elucidations of what will be used for, they are still careful. (Ijaz, 2018)

(Ahmad, 2014) notes that instead of investing in the Gwadar port, India invests its investments in the Chabahar seaport of Iran which is just 72 km away from Gwadar. A non-conventional method of therapy that offers a natural substitute. India, Iran, and Afghanistan have signed a major trade agreement that enables India to trade with Central Asia through Pakistan. When there are disputes between India and Pakistan, this is a good path for Indian trade to move through in Pakistan (Ijaz, 2018).

3.26 The Nationalist and Revolutionist Movements in Balochistan

(Hussain, 2015) indicates that an explanation for the current instability in Balochistan is separatist forces and revolutionary movements. The Pakistan government alleges that several separate training camps situated within Afghanistan are set up by India to train specially chosen Baloch separatists. The original use of these originated from India, then gradually decayed to areas of Afghanistan.

As per Pakistan Observer, 2018, Afghan President Daoud Khan, has established a camp for training towards the readiness for a possible entry of Taliban militants who had recently come to power in neighboring Pakistan. On the one side, though he has decided to inform the government of Pakistan that his land would not be used for plotting terrorism in Pakistan (Ahmad, 2017).

Although India blamed Pakistan for the blast, one can also assert the Pakistani government had nothing to do with it. In reality, (Ahmad, 2017). In this speech, He said that he was against the actions of the Pakistani authorities and that Balochistanis and Kashmiris should be grateful that he lifted his voice against wrongdoings by Pakistan and not step back from his path. With this,

Pakistan is being accused of letting the Russians intervene in its internal matters. (Pande, 2015)

Out of the Indian authorities, the Navy decided that it was a part of their naval powers, but they denied any connection with him. Pakistan thinks that Yadav is likely to cause harm to the Gwadar seaport that is being constructed by the CPEC, particularly damaging and having a negative impact. Iran stubbornly says that the case will be prosecuted by a team of special investigators and all proper norms will be maintained to avoid irritating their ties with Pakistan (Pande, 2015).

As per (Rasmussen, 2017), Iran, like Pakistan, is a neighboring country of India (it is nearby geographically and politically), and from here it offers an alternate route and connection to Afghanistan. The only way to link the two countries is that. Pakistan is used to link India and Iran. (Zulfiqar, 2014). After the U.S.-India nuclear agreement went into effect, Pakistan is less pleased about how close India and Iran are getting. (Peerzada, 2016)

The Congress of the US is also apprehensive of violations in Balochistan. On 8th February 2012, the US Foreign Affairs Committee was the US delegate who made note that Balochistan is ruled by the federal government of the country, and the province of the region is not permitted to have their right (Mickey, 2012). To blame America's interference in the region, the Balochs blame Pakistan's injustice to use American force.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHINA POLICIES TOWARDS WARM WATERS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

Due to its location in Southern Asia, Balochistan has always been a testing ground for various Dynasties. The place where "soaring mountains and lush meadows" are centered has never lost its geopolitical and geo-strategic significance. "Amid many stages of darkness," The area we currently live in is situated next to the Middle East, Indian Ocean, Central Asia, and South Asia. In the past, any foreign citizen or leader who wanted to enter Pakistan used Balochistan as a border to enter the country. Balochistan is situated in a geographical position that makes it an influential area not only for our country but also plays a significant role in the development of our historical interest in global powers in terms of deciding the importance of this region on the world's international level.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the latest venture in the history of bilateral economic cooperation, with a \$62 billion investment in energy and infrastructure development in Pakistan—is considered a game changer for Pakistan's economy. As a flagship project of China's Belt and Road initiative, the corridor will connect Kashgar in Western China with the port of Gwadar in Pakistan on the Arabian Sea, serving as a gateway to the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. The CPEC, in addition to boosting Pakistan's economy and meeting China's energy needs and development of its western region, is likely to bring stability to the region through synergic relations.

However, a project of this size undoubtedly encounters comparable difficulties. This study discusses potential roadblocks to the project's realization, including the tumultuous situation in

Balochistan, conflicting interests of a close neighbor like India, and U.S. reservations about the plan. Domestic problems in Pakistan, in particular militancy and violence, may have an impact on how the CPEC project is carried out.

On August 14, 1947, the province of Balochistan became an official part of Pakistan. In 1972, the province became the province total in the country. The Balochistan deserts are a desolate mountainous area. Iran, Afghanistan, and the southern parts of the Arab world are bordered by the sea. In the northernmost part, Gwadar possesses a strategically significant position at the entrance to the Strait. The 1,002-kilometer-long border with Afghanistan rightfully belongs to the disputed "Pashtunistan," a region that shares a 1,002-kilometer-long border with Iran (Sial & Basit, 2010). Gwadar, located in Pakistan, was not very important until 1958. Then, Pakistan paid a lot of money for this very small and useless area. As of 2005, twenty-six massive port projects were launched to establish a deep-sea port in China, with a total of twenty projects initiated across eleven provinces and cities. Phase I (a project taking 2 years) of the project was finished in 2007 and Phase II (a new project after 8 years) of the project was handed over to the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA International) In 2012-2013, however, the Contract with PSA was orally waived and the Port Authority terminated the agreement at the end of 2013 and entered into a second agreement with China Overseas Ports Holding Company Limited (COPHCL). The withdrawal of PSA (Post- surgery Adult Prostate Biopsy) came ostensibly because Pakistan would not transfer 584 acres of land under the control of the Pakistani Navy, where security issues were also cited as a similar reason due to local militants. (Haider, 2012)

The Balochistan province is the biggest in terms of land, but it is also the smallest in terms of population. The mine is situated in the province of Balochistan (specifically, the Southwestern District), covering an area of 2.5 million square kilometers, which makes up 44 percent of

Pakistan's total land area, or the equivalent of the size of the United States. Based in Punjab, the former tribal areas are now home to almost 12 million people, 52.5% of whom are male and 47.5% of whom are female. Balochistan's population is nearly double the population recorded in 1998, with an average annual growth rate of 3.37 percent, which is also the highest of all Pakistan's provinces. In terms of percentage, however, Balochistan makes up more than 6% of the total population of Pakistan (according to the 2015 census), and is considered to be six times more crowded than urban Cairo. Of society today, almost 72% of the total number of its citizens reside in rural areas, while the remaining 28% live in urban areas. As a result, in the southern part of Balochistan, the Baloch are the majority, while in the northern part of Balochistan, the Pashtuns are the majority. The populations of many Makrani Baloch tribes can be found along the coast. Education in Pakistan's Balochistan province is the lowest in all of the nation's educational systems, with a 26.6 percent literacy rate including 36.5 percent for male adults and 15 percent for female adults. The statistics in Pakistan show that 96.2% of the population is Muslim.

There is this report that Pakistan's most neglected, underdeveloped province is Balochistan and women are at a lower standard in that region of Pakistan, although we are also the largest and most resource-rich province. Citizens' complaints about National Security played a part in the nation's anger and caused problems. People want more localized authority over their countryside, more autonomy in the provinces, and more positions in mega-projects to be transacted with the local community.

4.1 The geopolitical importance of Balochistan for China

Throughout history, the land of Balochistan has hardly ever been visited by any kind of settlers,

traders, conquerors, and others. While sometimes the people of Balochistan have had to suffer many years of political clashes and fighting, the beauty of this place has never changed. Since this happens to be located so close to various parts of the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean, this process is seen as of great significance. In this area, there has been significant importance made for its history's significant pasts as mentioned by historians, leaders, and large armies such as Persian, Greek, Arab, Mongol, Ghaznavid, Ghoris, Mughals, and British.

(In the "Historical Gazetteer of Punjab district, vol. 1", 1908)

As the best possible marine passage in the Indian Ocean of Asia's Eastern, Central, and Western Divisions, Balochistan has acquired a highly important position among foreign powers by creating a highly competitive atmosphere for securing and dominating its maritime routes, which are now vital for massive global trade and energy shipments. The natural history of Balochistan is becoming relevant in regional politics as we observe the strengthening of sectarian divisions. Since natural gas is one of the main resources we need and use for cooking and heating and also because the resources in the countries we live in are rich in natural gas and other minerals, foreign developers and investors have begun to focus on the areas that contain these resources. The goal of these states is to become economically more attuned to American domination by controlling the largest portion of global energy resources and their resulting historically high global hegemony. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to do so and then keep the global control of energy, to put it more like it is over energy resources, to introduce more oil sources in the trade, and to also exploit Balochistan because of its significant geo-political status

In terms of geography, the position of Balochistan, which connects the Iranian Plateau with South East Asia and the Central Asian States to its long coastal line on the Arabian Sea, gives it great significance.

The area of Iran now known as Sistan-Balochistan on the west side of the country used to be part of the country known as Iran ("Estan va Irak"). Since the 2008 invasion of Pakistan's eastern province of Balochistan, the areas of Helmand and Herat in Afghanistan have been directly affected by the conflict. The Persian Gulf was formed by the South Arabian (Arabian) coast. Though yes; the aid of the other three provinces in Pakistan, Khber Pakhtoonkhawa(KPK).

A lot of these are in regions that are closer to the border of Northern Pakistan. This facilitates many crossing points for militants inside these regions. Any wars or political struggles in areas of the Middle East become the direct effect of the growth of the military and other government agencies in the Middle East region. Hot areas of interest in geopolitical forecasts like Afghanistan have, according to some research, often been places that are strategically regarded as places of interest to superpowers.

Pakistan, partly due to the narrow mouth and so traps and to avoid being under the control of others, has chosen maritime routes that are closer to the Eastern and Central divisions of Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the approaches to the Sea of Japan and the Strait of Malacca through which the East-Asian trading routes pass and the Indian Ocean has become an area of unprecedented importance on the distribution of world trade and oil.

4.2 Gwadar: A Gateway to the Arabian Sea

Because of the political dispute between the Baloch people and the Pakistani government/military, Balochistan is also considered an important territory of international strategic significance (the

region is rich in natural resources and is home to many important military bases). The struggle to survive in this country has had a profound impact on peace in Balochistan as well as its adjacent regions. At this present time, the region of Balochistan is of little interest to regional and foreign actors. Development opportunities in this region of mountainous terrain have become less compelling. In reality, unless Balochistan is included in its defense plans, no strategy of any of the countries vying for influence in the region can be called detailed and practical. In Balochistan, there are influences from the Great Powers, ranging from those with less stature to the two supermajor powers, that come together and then change how the Great powers view a certain issue in the area at a particular time or a certain level of space (Ahmad and Feldman, 1992).

Some US experts discussed that Balochistan is an important oil region for China. Balochistan has always had a very strong impact on regional, national, and global politics. For one, Balochistan is strategically significant in that it is the border of two of Asia's most important countries, Afghanistan and Iran, and it has a majority of its citizens living in those two countries. The instability in the area is a concern, and therefore any kind of violence or unrest in Balochistan would impact the neighboring countries and thus become a regional conflict. Due to the high demand for Balochistan, the province of Balochistan, which includes the areas of Iran and Afghanistan, the government would suffer from deadly problems with the Baloch militants. (Javaid et al., 2010). At this point, Pakistan remains a regulated territory within the hands of global geopolitics. It is situated within Northern, Western, and South-Western Asia. The interest and importance of Gwadar port to the national economy have increased geo-political competition among global powers, with the ability of Gwadar port to trade landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asian states to the Indian Ocean as a foreign trade gateway and corridor for transporting natural petroleum resources has increased geo-political competition among global powers. You can see

firsthand that traditional Balochistan, in addition to having the nation's interest, has also become more important than internationally, with a lot of oil reserves, trade routes, and maritime choke points. With the unfamiliar event occurring, the state's leaders are presented with a golden opportunity to further pursue the interests of their state. Nations are continuously moving toward more and more, multi-polarity, and, in particular, in Asia, economic and military powers are rising. The U.S. has been in good condition only since after the system of the Soviet Union was gone. The goal for Asian countries like China and India is to become more economically powerful by controlling the largest portion of the world's energy resources and becoming a global power.

The countries of China, India, Russia, and other countries in the Asian region are growing increasingly in need of the availability of energy resources, making it increasingly difficult to expand their influence over world energy supplies, energy transit routes, and land and maritime trade links. To incorporate the fundamental geo-political agenda in Pakistan, Balochistan has become the focus of this region's geo-political exploitation. By giving military and political cheap as a one-time historical payment, it will impact China, Iran, India, and Pakistan's economic development. The definition of free Balochistan is a proposition that states that Balochistan is not part of Pakistan, but rather is an independent nation that gets its needs and demands from the West. Also, the West wants to sustain and maintain its geo-strategic and diplomatic benefits.

4.3 Position of Foreign Powers in Balochistan

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4.4 The US, Concerns

The US military has a great deal of importance in the region of Balochistan because of the war with Iran. In the future, we are going to have to rely on China's natural resources and the Arab World's oil to offset this oil shortage. Then in Balochistan, we are going to have to worry about China's local involvement in Afghanistan, our geographic limitations are not going to allow us to intervene in the Middle East, now for the US to get involved, we will have to cross Balochistan and establish involvement in Iran. Though America has been the dominant economic power in the world for years, that power could be reduced. Though, other economic powers may also block this territory from being developed and made productive, thus decreasing the power of America. The biggest explanation for the Pak-China cooperation in the construction of Gwadar Port is due to China's present contract with Pakistan.

After the Taliban was purportedly overthrown in Afghanistan, the Taliban (an Afghan group) went across the Pak-Afghan border to invade Balochistan and organized a revolutionary war against Afghanistan's disgruntled forces. In addition to Pakistan's increasing strategic significance, the re-emergence of the Baloch nationalist militants has complicated Pakistan's internal security situation. It is useful as an energy supply route for the US, a new unifying factor for Baloch nationalists, and a local proxy for Saudi Arabia.

The situation in Balochistan became extremely volatile with the construction of the Gwadar port in the Sea of Oman and the expansion of Balochistan's water space in a way that will provide international trade, which makes Balochistan important to the United States because it is a key piece in Central Asia and it will open a direct link between Central Asia and the rest of the world. In the new Great Resource Creation Game in Balochistan and other parts of Asia, the US (United States) must maintain a crucial and critical role. Because of the report of the Senate Special Committee on Afghanistan, three key factors played a very strong role in achieving and developing serious US attention to Balochistan: the (Taliban) militancy, Baloch militancy, and Balochistan's potential significance as an energy transit route. It has been said that, fourteen years ago, due to its close location to Afghanistan, Balochistan had a big hand in the early victory of the U.S. War on Terror after 9/11. Making the situation worse, Pakistan gave the US access to Balochistan's airspace and airfields to the US aerial bombing of Kabul, killing Afghanistan's Taliban regime and network. (Asaad, et al., 2010), It had important strategic significance for the US and NATO in South and West Asia's geo-strategic development long before the post-9/11 US war on terror, but during the war, the geographical proximity of Balochistan to Afghanistan was exploited by US-led powers to the fullest.

The American involvement in the region (in the war in Afghanistan) is blamed for bringing the Pakistani Baloch militants over to the side of the Baloch. In Afghanistan in the 1990s, CIA agents were known to provide the Baloch insurgents with financial assistance. It has been revealed that the CIA seeks to cause discord between Baloch's and Pashtuns for the Taliban Shura to be weakened by compromising and splintering upon political leadership and tribes. When the Americans call a figure like Mullah Omar a "Quetta Shura," it's to mean that they agreed with his (or its) decision to not engage in direct combat with them. (Waheed, 2011)

In the fall of 2011, the controversy over the CIA's decision to release an American citizen, which is framed for an incident of the murder of two Pakistanis, increased the strain on the U.S./Pakistan relationship and also exposed the illegality of the CIA in Balochistan. The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) is unusual in having a branch in Balochistan. The focus of the CIA in Pakistan is to access and study Balochistan. It is very nice that the cooperation of America along with India and Israel has, in reality, the main agenda of creating Greater Balochistan. (Hassan, 2011), and others. The US is complaining about the state of stability in Pakistan, but at the same time, they are helping in hindering China's projects in the region, not to mention that they are interfering with China's near future presence in the region by unnecessarily delaying and stopping their projects. It is not only in Gwadar that American-inspired influence is expanding, but also in other regions of Balochistan. Because of the important role this port has in the relationship between China and Pakistan, one of the US concerns is the damage done to this joint venture between China and Pakistan from the terrorism it has wrought. Since too many instances of violence exist in Pakistan, the United States is willing to overlook some of these acts in Balochistan to facilitate development projects between Middle Eastern powers and Pakistan.

The aim is to observe the arrival of the Chinese in the province of Balochistan. The United States and China are political rivals and its presence in Balochistan is not helpful for the future and economic growth of America. The hope is that the port of Gwadar can be used to support US Navy in the region. For the US, this is a matter of great concern. As you know, we in India cannot tolerate anyone putting a hand on our energy constraints, at any stage, considering that such an event makes us want to mobilize on the eastern front. The Indian Ocean, in the Persian Gulf, will be within China's eyesight for certain. When this happens, it will be difficult for the United States to maintain its monopoly in the region. The conflict in Balochistan is escalating as we speak because of the

differences in interest among different groups. China is providing Pakistan very little support in the political and economic sphere, and they are also unwilling to provide Pakistan with any further technical assistance, as both China and the U.S. have said that any concrete amount of assistance would be contingent upon Pakistan's government carrying out a serious and fundamental review of the political and economic situation (Messer, 2011, 2011).

The United States has spelled out its goals in the pipeline project in Pakistan to weaken Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan and at the same time, it attempts to harm Chinese economic interests in Africa and the Middle East by creating several obstacles in the pipeline project. It is only by supporting the Balochistan Nationalist Movement (BNM) that the geopolitical situation will be further undermined and that this environment will be rendered unfavorable for any economic investment by China. The elements supported by the CIA independent of American, British, and Indian counterparts are using America, British, India, and Afghanistan as their venues for coordinating, organizing, and implementing the Independent Balochistan Plan's operational bases. Pakistan's military-supported American and UK political lobbies and some UK political lobbies are also aiding anti-Pakistani forces to carry out nefarious activities against Pakistan. (Hassan, 2011).

The United States thinks China is stepping up resources and military assets. Many in the United States are also interested in Iran playing a role in the region, for if Iran crosses the line, the United States will take action against this. The present poor state of Balochistan is much more conducive to a stable and economically prosperous Balochistan than to the US. Should there be any disruptions in the development of the Iran-Pakistan oil pipeline, it reduces the chances of construction in Balochistan. The fact that Harrison was actively opposed to the pipeline project has been widely known by the US. A study found that (Bansal, 2008).

Since the American strategy primarily is to secure their national interests in the region, they are very concerned with the Central Asian States, and Balochistan is a convenient way for them to access these resources. The United States is working towards the objective of having more leverage over its future security plans across the entire region and getting rid of the involvement of its only rival and competitor, China. The US has two long-term goals that help explain how important their presence in Afghanistan is. These are the wants to be secure and reliable pipelines for all Central Asia's energy resources and the ill will against China. The shortest passage between the Indian Ocean and Central Asia outside of the Gulf is provided by Balochistan. In the world today, the Trans-Afghan Pipeline is hindered by regional turmoil that encourages the control of economically strong and established South Asian states over this region such as India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc. This is because regional suppression of US economic hegemony makes this pipeline an option for Afghan economic development to be independent of the Taliban and other drug runners.

Both the US and Russia have been concerned with Balochistan's exploitation of the land as an instrument to make Pakistan a poorer state while the US feared Balochistan. Following the Soviet Union's dissolution Russia has attempted to help resolve the Sindhu Desh, Pakhtonistan or (Independent) or Greater Balochistan problem (Najmuddin, 1984). Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was rational since they were attempting to take control of the port of the Indian Ocean. This support for Soviet attempts in Afghanistan, along with the local nationalistic and populist (belief that the Baloch only support the Baloch legitimate to the Baloch national interests) Baloch campaign, would be responsible for the Soviet's inability to control or influence the nearby Pakistani port, a victory that would be of great importance to future Soviet efforts in Afghanistan (1981 at Elelele Nui).

Russia, as a powerful country, had a militaristic policy by its predecessors in its only toehold in Central Asia. This policy was to have such an effect on the Baloch that they would revolt against the central government, and hand their power over to Russia. Unfortunately, Russia had failed in that objective. (Ismail, 2014) In regards to the Russian policy of Afghanistan, the theory was that they should develop as much power in Afghanistan as they could and create complete control over the country, which it was their desire to have as little control as possible over the Balochistan region of Pakistan and they would either merge it with Afghanistan or create a new and independent country. Since the Russians want to be the next superpower in the region, they are focused on places like Afghanistan, Balochistan, and the Indian Ocean (Ahmad, 1992).

Russia is looking to establish some kind of cooperation with India to ensure it stays warm like it ought to be. The US and Russia also see themselves as one the only two countries that can control all of Central Asian capital. All the Central Asian States (CAS) are "a burden" on Russia for their necessity to import their energy needs. While the Soviets did share interests with the US in Balochistan, they were not much different from the US's interest in the issues specifically. Russia is currently seeking to track oil in the Gulf, which accounts for around 60 percent of the world's total reserves. Russia's hopes of building a string of pipelines across Afghanistan will be squashed if there are any issues in the southwestern part of the country.

In the future, this country will be influential in the Indian Ocean and Antarctica. It has motivations and targets that are racial and geopolitical. The fish that is caught in the Indian Ocean and, in particular, the Arabian Sea, is very abundant. Although this fish is normally transported overland through major waterways, due to the length of voyages, the fish flounders, is unable to return to the oceans and thus causing many health issues. If Russia were to take control of Balochistan, it would provide Russia with a short distance to travel to the resource-rich Antarctic continent

(Ahmad, 1992). According to Mazhar et al. (2012), All these potential probabilities, which can provide Russia with economic stability, are linked to Balochistan.

4.5 Iranian concerns

In Pakistan, the province of Balochistan is the only one that shares a direct border with Iran. Being a restricted territory within the boundaries of the Federal Republic of Pakistan, Balochistan's location on the Pakistan-Iran border defines its socio-cultural and economic ties with landlocked Iran. As the only factor in Pak-Iran relations that can have an impact, the Balochistan issue needs to be monitored. There are, unfortunately, some disappointing and inadequate factors that create confusion, doubts, and stress and make Balochistan a weakening factor in the relations between Pakistan and Iran. Balochistan plays an important role in integrating economies and societies between Pakistan and Iran. Based on many religious and cultural similarities, as well as the strong relationship between the people of the two countries, great economic, cultural, and social relations have developed between the people of Iran and Pakistan. In this high-growth area roads will be built to make travel easy and in the future high-speed rail systems will make travel even easier. The proposed Hub refinery would give Pakistan and Iran an excellent opportunity of cooperating closely to "strengthen the economic cooperation between the two countries" based on the current situation related to the Afghan situation and the political misunderstandings that are said to be being conducted. (Khan 2012).

This project will be based to give the least developed province of Balochistan a more powerful economic impetus as well, one which will also bestow increased demand for diesel. Our country will also begin oil and gas exploration in the region of Baloch as well. The most promising aspect of the economic partnership between Iran and Pakistan is the construction of a gas pipeline

between the two countries. A gas pipeline designed to cross between two countries will provide economic and political benefits for both countries.

The ongoing militancy in Balochistan has not only had a major impact on the friendly ties between the two countries but also on many of the objectives of the United States as the Iranian government has blamed the government of Pakistan for its participation in the Balochistan-based Jandullah Organization, a terrorist organization that, with the active support and cooperation of the United States, causes political disruptions in Iranian regions (Khan, 2012).

Baloch nationalists reject CPEC, which Pakistan views as a way to solve its economic issues, a path to prosperity, and a chance for the future.

The opposition takes the form of Baloch nationalist demonstrations and assaults against Chinese workers, security personnel, and infrastructure projects in Balochistan. Attacks have claimed the lives of 44 CPEC project workers since 2014 (Rafia, 2017). Nazar Baloch, the leader of the Balochistan Liberation Army, pledged to attack CPEC more frequently in 2016 (K. Iqbal, 2017). Two terrorist assaults were carried out in Balochistan as a result of this vow, just before the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing in May 2017.

One of the attacks was attributed to ISIS, while the other was carried out by Baloch nationalist militants (K. Iqbal, 2017). The Chinese Consulate in Karachi was attacked on November 23, 2018, which was the most recent occurrence. According to Notezai (2018), this was the first time Baloch militants attacked Chinese officials in Karachi outside of Balochistan. Baloch nationalists attack CPEC projects, their employees, security personnel, and Chinese officials to spread fear among Chinese citizens, terrify Pakistani government employees, and scare away foreign investors from

Balochistan. They believe that by doing this, they may stop CPEC from becoming a reality. Baloch nationalists reject CPEC for many reasons.

Baloch nationalists believe that they, not Pakistan, are the rightful owners of Balochistan's natural riches and that the Pakistani government is robbing them by utilizing them as its own. In Balochistan, it is frequently said that "Islamabad is reaping all the benefits, depriving the locals of their legitimate share" (Wolf, 2017).

Baloch nationalists' claim that resources are not exploited for the Baloch people is supported by the fact that Balochistan is Pakistan's poorest region while being wealthy in natural resources. Baloch nationalists say that the CPEC project will exploit Balochistan and that they will lose all control over its natural riches as a result of Pakistan opening up its resources for China to use. Even some analysts (Outlook, 2017) contend that because CPEC is exclusively intended to benefit China, it would neither assist Balochistan nor any of the other regions through which it travels.

The Baloch also contend that they were not consulted about CPEC, that their opinions were ignored, and that their sensitivities were disregarded. The Baloch's believe that they have been entirely shut out of CPEC decision-making procedures. However, Balochistan is not the only part of Pakistan where people say that the CPEC's decision-making procedures are opaque and that Pakistani citizens have been shut out of the process. Additionally, it is asserted that CPEC's new job prospects are not available to Baloch people. Opposition to CPEC is influenced by emotions of exclusion from employment prospects and decision-making procedures.

Baloch nationalists also have problems with immigration to the area and the presence of foreigners there as a result of the CPEC project. The increase in Chinese residents they started to see around them led several Balochs to learn about CPEC. For instance, 71,000 Chinese nationals are thought

to have landed in Pakistan in 2016 (Akins, 2017). In the upcoming years, it's anticipated that almost a million people will move to Balochistan (Wolf 2017).

The Baloch, not just Baloch nationalists, worry that the region's demographics will change as the number of foreigners increases and they will lose their majority status in their own country. They may have cause for concern since a survey by the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry predicts that by 2048, there would be more Chinese residents in the area than in Baloch (Akins, 2017). Baloch nationalists assert that the Pakistani government is attempting to alter the demographic composition of the area and is seizing the opportunity provided by CPEC to do so.

Additionally, Baloch nationalists believe that China is responsible for Balochistan becoming militarised and consider CPEC as a "Chinese military project" (Akins 2017). Recent rumors that China is attempting to establish a military facility close to Gwadar cause unrest in the area. These reports were denounced by Pakistan and China as "propaganda" meant to undermine the CPEC. However, these reports support the concern of Baloch nationalists.

Numerous anti-state terrorist groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), and the militant wings of some political parties, pose potential threats and are capable of pursuing Chinese interests to undermine the Pakistani government. These terrorist organizations have frequently attacked Chinese laborers and engineers in the past.

Chinese interests in Pakistan are also seriously threatened by the ETIM and militant Chinese Uighur groups who collaborate with the TTP. The ongoing military operation "Zarb-e-Azb" in FATA, which has targeted the nation's hostile territories in the western and northwestern frontier

regions, has, however, reduced the operational capabilities of all domestic and foreign terrorist groups, including ETIM and Uighurs.

Baloch militants frequently blow up railroads and gas pipelines to deter foreign investors in general and Chinese developers in particular. They are opposed to such developments and have already assaulted several Chinese citizens. Baloch people suffer from both political and economic disadvantages, and they also fear that outsiders will move in and reduce them to a minority. With the aid of outsiders, Baloch terrorists are taking advantage of this situation and have warned China to stay away from Gwadar. Some contend that the project is being sabotaged by India's arch-rival and that RAW, the spy agency of that country, has established a special office with a \$300 million investment just for that purpose.

4.6 Gwadar Port vs Chabahar Port: India-Iran Nexus

Pakistan and Iran's rivalry has a direct effect on their relations. This rivalry does not only disagree in their relationship but also produces intense competition for trade that will develop across both ports. For example, the Persian Gulf now is very much important for the oil market, which is the largest energy market in the world

Chabahar seaport is situated in the Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan about 70 kilometers from the Pakistani seaport of Gwadar, built with Chinese assistance. The difference between the two lies in the fact that many issues arise during a visit to Gwadar, one of them being the bad security situation that occurs in Balochistan and the lack of proper transportation links to the main highway. The project does not have a fast enough rate of success due to slow growth behavior. There is no such situation as a negative one developing at Chabahar, which is being developed rapidly and has gained, both, attention, as well as, successful, interest, of China. Not only in China

but also in Iran, Afghanistan, and India, Chabahar Port is equally concentrating at Gwadar Port ahead of the trade and commerce center.

The Chabahar seaport is set outside the Strait of Hormuz in the Free Economic and Industrial (FIE) Zone of Iran. The Strait of Hormuz is a 2,576 km long natural passage on the Arabian Sea that allows marine vessels to pass safely. In addition, it also provides easy access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Along with Afghanistan developing bit by bit, there are also plans to build a road and rail connectivity system between Afghanistan and Central Asian states. India's intense location switching over to the construction of this seaport has been because of the reason of avoiding Pakistan's route to Iran, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian States. (Hussain, 2015:146) has stated that...

Chabahar is somehow at least an Indian-developed port (building a port is somehow an Indian effort), it looks like part of the Indian plan to make a port in Iran to combat Pakistan and create a less important port, its competitor Gwadar. India is aiming to link up the Chabahar port with Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan via high-speed rail to avoid the crisis along its borders with Pakistan and reduce their dependence on the port of Gwadar. (Khan, 2012; Whatley, 2011) Though Gwadar Port has a promise for both Pakistan and Chinese facilitation, it is also expected to improve both Pakistan's and China's presence in Central Asia and beyond. Gwadar being a scenic and beautiful port in Pakistan, makes it a fantastic and desirable trading hub between the Central Asian countries and Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistani trade cars (Karshi, Urgistan, etc.) can be greatly accelerated with this new trade route being a route for the Central Asian states to bring their products to Pakistan.

4.7 Indian Concerns

Chabahar Port is providing India with an all-weather access point for the Oman sea, to the Afghan city of Herat. A series of agreements between the Indian corporation and all Central Asian countries have been signed to the effect that India would offer special priority and tariff reduction to Indian trade goods. (Khan, 2012; Vimpani et al., 2016) By creating a "Danger Pattern" towards India, Gwadar Port is a threat to Indian trade through the Indian Ocean. If we move the base of Gwadar to Gwadar, this will be able to bring a very massive negative impact to our commercial interest as it will be giving Pakistan the ability to enforce total control over the entire energy routes. Gwadar is also a port for China's maritime surveillance capability. Thus, it provides China an opportunity to track and evaluate Indian naval activity in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and any possible maritime collaboration between India and Iran is easily monitored by China. Just like other countries, Iran too feels threatened by the US using Gwadar as a base to keep track of their activities within their own country. The other day, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon. Not only are Iran's intentions in the Persian Gulf very significant, but India is also trying to secure energy routes to counter the growing Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean. India elected to work with Iran, a country with which she shares a strategic partnership. India has invested in the building of a harbour, and also in the improvement of trade between the two countries. In the Persian Gulf, Iran is already working on a port in southeastern Iran, called Chahbahar, which will facilitate Indian trade activities within Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Chinese interference in Pakistani Gwadar and Indian influence on Iranian Chahbahar has resulted not only in economic competition and strategic rivalry between India, Pakistan, and China but also has increased the likelihood of controversy for the economic and natural resources of Central Asia. The emergence of India and China to face each other as rivals is hurting the economic ties between

Pakistan and Iran. Gwadar and Chahbahar are the cities that, like a drink to an alcoholic, trigger rivalry between people and countries. As an argument against China over the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, the Chinese say China is worried about the rapid and growing growth of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. In addition, the growth and warming up of Indo-US ties after the end of the US-India civilian nuclear cooperation and mutual assistance between India and Iran in Afghanistan and Central Asia became a matter of serious concern for China's long-term strategic and economic objectives in the region. (Khan, 2013, p. 11)

India has recently set up strong relations with India's neighbouring countries, including Afghanistan and Iran, to contain Pakistan. This was done to counterbalance the rise of Chinese power in the region since Chinese power is the only power capable of competing and suppressing Indian hegemony. Due to longer lasting effects of national pride, China does not wish to surpass India. China and Pakistan will most likely need to work together in the development of the port of Gwadar to impress each other and surpass India. Gwadar, China, would hold dominance of the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf through the supply of a secure passage and increased trade through the same areas. (Khan, (2013)

In recent years, the war between Afghanistan and other states appears to be a confrontation between major powers. Much of Afghanistan is in a state of war, but that is not the only thing that is going on. The country is still in the process of nation-building and there is no functioning type of economy, which is therefore highly dependent upon limited agriculture. With foreign donations, it is nevertheless able to provide food for its people. (Shah, 2007, p.18). The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran (TAPI) pipeline project is a big hope to help rebuild the Afghan economy as the project would bring in over 300 million dollars' royalty to the country and other foreign investments in the project would do a lot to stabilize and revive the Afghan

economy with the reconstruction of other infrastructure. Individuals undertake Afghan transit trade early on, but now the Gwadar port will act as an alternative port for the Afghan people. The idea that the establishment of Port D less than 6 km from Gwadar has raised the hopes of the people of Afghanistan and also stimulated Pakistan's investment, creating a joint and experienced group, which will serve the region's economic and commercial, and social needs. (The Dawn, 2003).

4.8 External Powers Role in Current Baloch Militancy: Challenges Events (2013-2020)

There has always been a feeling among the government of Pakistan that an outside hand is playing a role in the Baloch militancy. Due to Pakistan's obsession with the Baloch rebels, it is easy to see that Pakistan has claimed that the Baloch have received highly sophisticated explosives and military training, which in turn can be seen as a possible sign that the Baloch have received support from a nation. (The New York Times, 2005). A big example that took place during the 1973 war was when the Pakistan government discovered an ammunition store at the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, which was being used to implode, bridge, and demolish buildings. In a Pakistani hideout, Pakistani officials discovered more than three hundred submachine guns and over forty-eight thousand rounds of ammunition. At that time Akbar Bugti was the only Baloch Sardar that fully supported the central government in the dismissal of the NAP government in Balochistan and got the designation of governor of Balochistan due to his support. (Kenneth & Joyce Babisz, 2015). The one responsible for the military atrocities against the Baloch people during the uprising of 1973-77. The government alleges that were being shipped to help out the Baloch militants as well as someone else who is unnamed.

India took an interest in the world's supply of warlords in Afghanistan when India was caught in a war with East Pakistan from Bangladesh and simultaneously, India started to encourage an uprising in the mountain region of Balochistan, another supply of warlordse. Therefore, it was easier for India to manipulate the enmity between the state and the rebellious Baloch Sardars. India's goals as a country were to keep Pakistan away from its energy wealth and to transform Pakistan into an economically poor state. Due to the loss of such macroeconomic and political uncertainty, Pakistan's ability to survive as an independent state will be placed in great danger.

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) occurred during the era of the 1970s as the most active insurgent group with a heavy leaning toward the Soviet Union. Since the militaries of the Soviet Union were said to be willing to train/educate insurgents, it is believed that BLA got weapons from there. One of the Bosnian Baloch leaders has publicly listed India as one of their sponsors. Visitors from India and Afghanistan were invited when they came to support the Baloch nationalist cause. Examples of this are similar to those in the movie "The Pacifist".

"We love our Indian friends and want them to support us and save us from being tyrannized by the oppressive party." In fact, the only country in the world which has shown great concern for the plight of the Baloch is India. It is crucial to push our Balochistan problem at international forums. In the same way, Pakistan has done, we need to do the same to push our Balochistan issue. We want the government of India to support our just cause in every way possible, and supply us with all forms of moral, economic, military support, and diplomatic assistance (The University of California, San Francisco, 2015).

The fact that they included the province of Balochistan in their quest and caused such destruction clearly shows the fact that they are military-qualified experts. In a militancy (major or small) insurgents need large funding to operate, so such insurgencies can't last without significant

financial funding. According to (an estimate by) the government, it costs about 10-15 million rupees per month to run the scientific service at BLA. Supposedly, money is being transferred from Afghanistan to the hands of the members of this smuggling ring. (by [name of person], 2015).

It is said that the US has been encouraging Baloch insurgent movements since a long long time ago and with the help of India. At the time the US was encouraging India to develop its spy network in Afghanistan by helping it establish consulates in the countries located along the Afghan border with Pakistan. The Indian consulates in Indian towns were used to provide financial and other forms of support to the Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Baloch may be receiving support from these Indian handlers. The Baloch population of Pakistan has been largely overlooked historically as a terrorist presence, with the allegiance of various terrorist organizations largely derived from the Indian spy-influenced Kashmiri population of the region. (The Daily News, 2005). Pakistani officials have continually referred to the involvement of Indian troops. However, they still point their fingers at the involvement of Iran and even America.

In India, military training camps have been constructed along the Afghanistan border to prepare and train the members of the Baloch Liberation Army so that they can fight invaders. Both India and the UAE have been accused of supplying a steady amount of arms and funds to the Baloch rebels. The point is to create such a safety risk in the construction of the Gwadar port. The Russian Government's helped the Baloch Rebels in their battle against the Pakistani Government. Former President Pervez Musharraf also raised the point with US officials in September 2007 and asked the US to get involved on the issue of the attempt by Afghanistan and India to destabilize Balochistan and to cut Pakistan out of South Asia. In a national broadcast, General Musharraf

stated that "India and Afghanistan were involved in efforts to provide arms, training, and support for Baloch extremists." He also said, "government was trying its best to find out who was responsible for these issues." (The Christian Science Monitor, 2012). The former Governor of Balochistan, Owais Ahmed Ghani has also claimed that India is providing tools for us we should consider them a part of the militancy. India is talking about getting these people arms and educating them. India is talking about helping the warlords. Yes, indeed, India is going to arm these militants. As reported in the(saudigazette.com, 2015).

Afghanistan has also played a role in supporting Baloch separatist movements in Pakistan. It is said that during the first three insurgencies, the Baloch militant insurgents were given political and logistic support from Afghanistan, and by the way, the Balochs were part of the Afghan tribes. In the first uprising in 1948, Abdul Karim and his comrades ultimately began their lives in Afghanistan. (Harrison, 1981:26) He used both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan as many sources of support during his period of unusual success. A lot of publicity went Karim's way, but Baloch nationalists had no problem ignoring him either; they just said they denied supporting him. (Harrison, 1981, p. 26). Karim similarly instigated his second Baloch rebellion in 1958. At the time, he again solicited the support of Afghanistan for his cause. Harrison (1981)

In the third of the revolts of 1962, Afghanistan itself claimed that it had backed the Baloch rebels. The prime minister of Afghanistan, Mohammad Daud granted permission for the Baloch Insurgents; the Pararis; to establish their camps along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Hamlet (1984), Gardner (1984). As the name suggests, these camps were first established to provide shelter to the displaced Baloch, but sometimes instead of providing shelter, these camps were used to provide a base for the Baloch rebels. Why did Zia ul Haq continue to extend amnesty to the Baloch rebels during the same political period when he was releasing others living in Afghanistan from the other

nation? Turner, Aburish, and Jones (1991).

The government of Iran even accuses the government of Pakistan /of financing terrorist activities. Iran believes that Pakistan and the United States are working together to establish a military outpost in Balochistan as a preemptive strike against Iran. Iranian plans to build the port in southern Pakistan are in response to Pakistani intentions of being the sole passage to Central Asia for India while reducing Pakistan's reliance on India, and India's support for the port, and the Iranian motive for taking the port was to counter Pakistan's Gwadar port. After the attacks in Bamyan in March, the Iranian government never admitted any involvement. They say they have no intentions to do any harm to Gwadar by helping Baloch militants. (Daily Times, 2005).

However, Iran does not need to get involved in the Baloch militancy directly as Iran probably would not be able to openly oppose Pakistan because Iran and Pakistan have a mutual interest in exporting Iranian gas to India, and a revolution in Balochistan would only damage the chances of building a gas pipeline through the province and ultimately, it would be a major economic loss to both the countries. (The Daily Telegraph, February 5, 2005.). The only thing Iran ever sees as a problem with the Baloch militancy is the instability created by those Baloch who are of Iranian descent living within Iran, and helping out their Pakistani Baloch friends for the liberation of those Iranian Baloch areas located within Iran. It was for this reason that Iran aided Pakistan during the uprising of 1973 to help it put down the Baloch rebellion.

The Pakistani government does not see the United States as being a potential threat, but as, on the other hand, a possible troublemaker. It is believed that the United States is interested in using Balochistan as a base for staging to attack Iran while also exploiting the tribal leadership to get China out of the region. (Daily Times of Belgrade, January 30, 2005). The US has been demanding

to open a consulate in the city of Quetta in Pakistan. It is also proposing that the CIA be allowed to use this consulate as a base of operations. But unfortunately, the government of Pakistan did not allow the US to open a consulate in that country.

But the US reasons are never clearly stated by Pakistan, and it is difficult to understand whether the US is opposing the Baloch nationalists because they are being sponsored by Iran or whether the US is opposing the Baloch because they are the ones hostile to China. Although the Taliban placed the blame on the government of Pakistan for its anti-Baloch campaign, Baloch nationalists placed the blame on the government of Pakistan for working with the US to crush Balochi's independence.

The geopolitical position in which Balochistan is located, the huge mineral and energy resources that this territory holds, and the high attention that is traditionally given to the work and projects of the military, have made Balochistan a special interest of the regional and international political actors. Such a move would not be in the best interests of any country but would have a very favorable outlook with neighboring countries and a very concerned Balochistan in depth.

Besides exporting energy and trade, the Gwadar port can be the focal point of energy and trade passage to and from China and the Central Asian Republics. The undeveloped port of Gwadar in Pakistan is owned by China, which has invested a lot in making the port harbor an international port. In addition to a sea-to-sea highway connecting Gwadar with Karachi, China has also invested in a coastal highway. China is very involved in the Saindak gold, copper, and silver mining project in Balochistan. Previously, China and Egypt have competed on the world markets for the best deals, but in recent years, the Chinese and India have negotiated and cooperated for the mutual benefit of both nations. India does not wish to see the development of Gwadar Port, as it does with

Chabahar Port, similarly lucrative for China as well as for Pakistan. The United States presence in the region is part of the “Great Power Game” that is being played by the international powers in Central Asia since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is believed the United States is trying to compete with China and Iran by controlling the oil supply lines from the Middle East and the Central Asian States and to achieve its strategic target, the US is using its Greater Middle East policy to take apart the major Muslim states and rebuild the borders in the region according to its own political and economic beliefs. It is believed that the US and British intelligence agencies are helping the Baloch militants to destabilize the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project and weaken the Gwadar port from being functional due to Chinese involvement which would certainly be a major threat to US oil and naval interests in the Gulf region.

A persistent militant militancy in Balochistan is becoming a great threat to the image and growth of Pakistan as it will divide the country into different ethnic groups as it has acquired the status of a separatist movement. The Baloch demand and armed struggle and separatist movement for an independent Balochistan have political impacts not only on India and the United States but also it has economic impacts on Iran, China, and Central Asia. This situation will bring drastic changes in the fiscal, political, and strategic environment of South and Southwest Asia. Furthermore, international pressure from India, Iran, China, and Central Asia is complicating and weakening Pakistan’s position on the international level. These countries have strategic energy and economic interests tied up in Balochistan using pipelines, ports, and highways.

Often compared to every other state in the world, India borders the warm waters of the Bay of Bengal, which is crucial to its national security. China is the most suitable state for Pakistan to ensure it has access to warm water ports and in turn guarantees its products are delivered to foreign markets in time. As a key geographic position, Balochistan provides a gateway for China to join

warm seaway and this is why on April 20, 2015, China concluded the \$46 billion agreement with Pakistan. China is currently in negotiations to have a 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor'. It is the most high-profile investment of a foreign territory at this time (Afzidi & Khalid, 2016). Not only did this agreement improve the bond and friendship between the two countries, but it also opened up many opportunities for both countries. In Pakistan, CPEC brings advances in infrastructure and job prospects while helping China enter warm waters to export its products and services around the world.

This has created an enormous chance for Pakistan as it will bring many possibilities (Ibrar et.al, 2016). Moreover, the CPEC will also contribute to Pakistan's infrastructure and economic sector. More importantly, a highly thriving road network will soon be established, connecting the small towns with the metropolitan areas in Pakistan. Many infrastructural projects worth approximately \$11 billion are in the pipeline to boost national trade, allowing domestic goods to reach the international market (Hurley et al., 2019). The cost is equivalent to giving out to several borrowers at 1.6% interest a concessionary loan, which is most likely not profitable (Mehar, 2017). Under the CPEC partnership, both Pakistan and China will lift the rate of Pakistan's agriculture and industries. The result will be economic prosperity for the people living there. The CPEC would provide Pakistan with numerous jobs and investment opportunities, but it will not be easy for Pakistan and China to implement the project without regional disruptions.

In the opinion of the Pakistani academic community and the international community, there is a debate in Pakistan and Pakistan's circles that India and Iran, and the United States will try to fight China's economic initiative. China expects to dominate the area once the Gwadar port is operational and the supply of Chinese goods is guaranteed. By weakening India's economic power, China can ultimately reduce the strategic importance of the Indian ports. The Indian government

stated that it will be allotting \$500 million to be spent on the port of Chabahar for its growth (Bajpaee, 2005). There is no disputing the fact that over the past few years, India has been working to develop security and economic relationships with countries in the region. China has argued what they consider a 'hegemonic' position and has supported their development of Gwadar. As a result, it is said that any step toward cooperation between the United States, Afghanistan, India, and Iran could slow down the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Abid & Ashfaq, 2015). In this chapter, the researcher will analyze that to order to survive, CPEC will need to grow in many ways, though it is important to grow in ways that are right for Pakistan.

4.9 Opportunities for Pakistan and China

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is regarded as the largest investment ever made by any foreign country on Pakistan's territory, with the prospects of infrastructure, economic development, political stability, and security in place. It is widely believed, that all work will be finished and ready as the CPEC will link Pakistan to the rest of the world and will make Gwadar port very important for Pakistan. Doing these activities will increase the quality of life. In the move to create Metro lines in several cities across the country, the Orange Line Metro in Lahore is one of the projects under construction. The very commercial huge project, 27.1 km long, is considered to be such a feature that could bring great development and success to Lahore. (Mehar, 2017).

In addition to the infrastructural development, CPEC would be excellent enough to meet Pakistan's energy demands (Osama et al., 2018). The program under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a \$33 billion project for the energy sector is expected to be planned (Malik, 2015). The regulatory body decided that a few private, independent energy firms would run the energy market under the CPEC agreement. These private independent Power Companies will be financially

funded at an interest rate of 5 to 6 percent of their available funds by the Exim Bank of China and ultimately the Government of Pakistan will be obligated to buy the energy from these private independent companies (Leung, 2011). CPEC (Corporate Pakistan Educational and Cultural Day) is a long-term initiative aimed at bringing about the development of infrastructure and economic growth in Pakistan. While several measures are still underway, and are likely to, be carried out soon, the effect should be felt in the socio-economic sectors of Pakistan.

The CPEC would bring socioeconomic prosperity to Pakistan, as Chinese companies would enter the country, and most importantly, China would build roads and bridges. Recently in the country of Pakistan, the company of Zonergy is constructing a solar power plant near Bahawalpur. This farm is situated on over 6,000 acres and is known as being a very large farm. The power plant is expected to generate 1000 Megawatts of electricity, this is to say, the electricity capacity is high (Abid & Ashfaq, 2015). There are rather several energy-related projects under consideration. Such discussions aim to end the current energy crisis. In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, a hydroelectric project called the SukiKinari Hydropower plant is in the development phase, projected to generate 870 megawatts of electricity. The SukiKinari Hydro company will receive financial support from the China Export-Import Bank. The total price tag to implement the new program is estimated to cost \$1.8 billion (Raza et al., 2018).

Dehydrated coal power is a part of the CPEC-Early Harvest scheme, too. This year, there are planned projects worth \$5.8 billion that will fall into the category of coal-related. There are about 660 megawatts of energy that will be generated by two power plants; two power plants are being developed by Shanghai Electric. Thar-1 Project's main coal plants over here will include these three plants (Nasir et al., 2018). Under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement, the China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Company has contracted to develop the

Matiari to Lahore electric transmission line, costing \$2.1 billion (Kousar et al., 2018). As well as taking part in CPEC, the three provinces are also getting extreme benefits out of CPEC. One of the coal plants that is currently being constructed is the Sahiwal Coal Power Plant, which is being operated by the Huaneng Shandong Company and Shandong Ruyi Company. This special project would yield around \$1.8 billion worth of 1320 megawatt hours of electricity (Naseeb, 2018). To provide a reliable electricity supply the Hub Power Company and The Chinese Power Investment Company in Pakistan will have to construct a new coal tur Power plant. At the technology's pace, this power plant produces 660,000 megawatts of electricity in the area for the next 50 years. Another reason for China's high interest in Gwadar is that they can construct a coal power plant without any interest rates being hiked in Pakistan (Abid & Ashfaq, 2015).

In addition to supplying electricity, China also commits to ensuring that natural gas is available for Pakistan to raise electricity through the use of natural gas. The Chinese Government has said that a new pipeline would stretch from Gwadar to Nawabshah, extending the natural gas flow from there and allowing for an increase in industrial progress in the region (Irshad, 2015). First, it should be remembered that the pipeline is part of an energy transfer between Iran and Pakistan, and not between Iran and Iraq. The construction of the pipeline already had been completed by Iran, and in the early stages of the process, however, Pakistan showed a sluggish reaction because of two main reasons. First, since countries like Saudi Arabia and the United States have pressured Pakistan to block any progress with Iran on the IP agreement, Pakistan has resisted this to not be blacklisted in the international community (Munir et al., 2013). Second, as a result of the financing problems Pakistan faced, the pipeline project with Iran could not be completed. On the other hand, China not only reiterated Pakistan's stance regarding the IP project after the conclusion of the CPEC agreement but also announced that it would assist Pakistan financially to build the pipeline

project from Gwadar to Nawabshah at an approximate cost of \$2.5 billion. The Chinese government assigned the task of constructing the pipeline from Gwadar to Nawabshah to the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, which is a Chinese state-owned company (Ranjan, 2015). The project is likely to provide one billion cubic feet of natural gas per day to Pakistan and the rest of the world (Munir et al., 2013).

These gas projects would enable Pakistan to minimize its energy crisis and also implement the National Action Plan for the control of the country's high rate of electricity outages. The fact that the USA is the second largest investor in Afghanistan means that we are unable to continue with TAPI because of the need to keep the Taliban (which TAPI was supposed to ship) in the backseat. It is a long-term plan, that when implemented by Pakistan will make it easier to increase its power generation. And it should be noted that the construction of the TAPI Project is being launched on December 13th of 2013 from Turkmenistan, where it is scheduled to be started in Afghanistan and Pakistan in February and December of next year, respectively. In the meantime, not yet done is the subsequent process.

The CPEC agreement tends to incorporate transformative changes not only in the socio-economic and infrastructural fields in Pakistan but also in the science and technological sectors, bringing growth and development. To speed up its marketplaces, plan, hospitals, educational institutions, and offices, Pakistan will be improving new technology and machinery for itself. It should be noted that the two countries have agreed to create a joint China-Pakistan Joint Marine Research Center for Marine Science Research Center. (Rizvi, 2015). In addition to these two countries agreeing on the Pak-China Park, they have agreed to set up a park by the name 'Pak-China Science, Technology, Trade and Logistics Park' (Yousaf et al., 2018). The park will be financed by China's government via a loan. Dr. Yoichiro Nambayashi, Executive Director of the Japan Center for

Cotton Research Bangkok, and Dr. Qadir Ali Ur Rehman President's Science and Technology Commission held discussions in which they agreed that they would agree to set up a 'China-Pakistan Joint Cotton Bio-Science and Technology Laboratory' in Pakistan (Qazi, 2019).

It is universally agreed that the CPEC by itself would double Pakistan's GDP growth rate (Abid & Ashfaq, 2015). The Chinese government and companies have a great deal of investment in Pakistan that will prove fruitful as everyone sees the great progress that is being made there. Mr. Zhang Baozhong, the Chairman of the Chinese Overseas Port Holding Company, said he will spend an additional \$4.5 billion on infrastructure for the Gwadar area, including the construction and establishment of highways, hotels, bridges, power plants, and international airports. This will lead to economic reforms in Pakistan. Even though Pakistan has been recently in an energy crisis, it is not the first time the nation has been in such a crisis. The load shedding not only affects the average citizen in Pakistan, but it also has a detrimental impact on industrial growth. International companies who were interested in investing in Pakistan were discouraged by the energy crisis and weak infrastructure. Chinese investment would result in huge relief and sustenance from the energy crisis. Also, of course, China will offer a source of affordable infrastructure and stability. Thirdly, China will make it appealing for other foreign companies to come to Pakistan (Shah, 2016).

Industrial firms are considered to be one of the cornerstones of an economy's economic development, and, as such, one of the primary staples in economic growth. However, as in many other places around the world, Pakistan has increasingly become short of energy. With the constant load shedding in the country's industrial sectors, mostly the large textile industries and factories of Faisalabad were severely affected, particularly those powered by gas and coal (Zameer & Wang, 2018).

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CPEC, which stands for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, has been described as the chosen solution to end Pakistan's energy crisis, which would enable Pakistan's disrupted industries to be revived, which would grow Pakistan's economy. CPEC will represent and benefit Pakistan in the wider world by enhancing its relations with the Asian and Eastern European states in the international milieu. In addition to making Pakistan a strategic partner of China, the Central Asia connectivity agreement would also make Pakistan a gateway to the Central Asian countries. In a statement released in November, the Asian Development Bank said that the CPEC is cutting-edge and will incorporate the world's elite economic forces into Pakistan's developed territory (Khwaja, 2015).

It is the main pillar of economic growth to have a built-up infrastructure strength of communication, as it enhances the means of communication. In addition, the philosophy behind infrastructure is to build an intricate network of roads, railways, bridges, highways, schools, hospitals, ports, airports, and utilities to provide prosperity and safety to us all. Infrastructure refers to the building and maintaining of the larger machines around us, generally referred to as the "Giffen nice." (WEF, 2016) says that unless a nation enhances its transportation and connectivity, it will not be able to survive. Infrastructure building has been shown to increase the pace of economic growth because it would use human resources more, the property would be more productive, and goods and or items would be produced faster and sooner. For socialization, political mobilization, and social inclusion in Pakistan, proper infrastructural growth would be useful.

Balochistan, the most backward, poverty-elevated part of Pakistan is considered to be the most backward and afflicting part of Pakistan. The Chinese-funded investment in Balochistan is looking to stimulate the economy, resulting in more work opportunities for the people who live there. Like

people living in Punjab, and other areas, people living in Balochistan would easily have access to metro cities where they can easily fulfill their needs. In addition to bridging the connectivity gap across road networks, it should be noted that CPEC would also provide local people in Balochistan with opportunities to start their businesses. To raise the local people so that they can set up their businesses, more vocational schools will be created. The Government of Pakistan has announced plans to establish universities and colleges in large cities of however in the hopes that by doing so, the local populace will become highly-trained humans and, for the good of the country, will play an important role in helping with the development of the region (Tai, 2017).

4.9.1 Opportunities for China

It just comes down to understanding why China will spend so heavily when one looks at the investment and the value of the project. Pakistan and China are "brothers and sisters." Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif once referred to the relationship between the two countries as "higher than the Himalayan mountains, deeper than the seas, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel." That being said, the Chinese investment of over \$1 billion is motivated by neither collectivism nor emotions. Rather, it is a well-thought investment after taking into account economic and geographic variables. Pakistan will receive \$45.6 billion in foreign direct investment that is intended to be used for a commercial loan. The money will be paid back at a fixed interest rate. For one thing, Mr. Trump's support of CPEC indicates how he will be linking the initiative with his policies regarding China. First, in the past few years, China has entered into contracts with other countries that exceed \$7 trillion. Why does China need more than 600 billion dollars for the construction of the Gwadar Port; what is the first thing being done to improve the Malacca Strait between Indonesia and Malaysia; and why is Beijing promoting the annual 30-million-dollar project to link the Central Marshes in Xinjiang province with the ocean. Some of the factors that

China is looking for in the success of [CPEC] is for the sake of what this means for their country.

4.10 BRI and CPEC

As President Xi Jinping looks forward to connecting China once again to former trading partners in the Caspian region and also having trade and political cooperation with European countries such as Russia and Turkey among others, China has a plan for reviving trade routes that it has used in the past. It will connect all of China with Russia and other former Soviet states via a connecting process with one main path. This will also provide a market connection in commerce with the entire Europe and also Pakistan. In the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) China of the CPEC is an essential and inevitable part of it (Jinping, 2013). In 2013, Li Keqiang, the Chinese premier, launched the CPEC project in Pakistan to further improve bilateral cooperation between the two countries. As the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Shareef visited Minister Zhu Chenghu in Beijing to address the project and to further its progress. The newly named President of China, Xi Jinping, visited Pakistan last year and declared that China will make a \$46 billion foreign investment in Pakistan for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, focusing on developing Pakistan's energy sector and that these projects are expected to be completed by 2018-2020. The plans of this country are not primarily directed at the country's energy sector but include the construction of railways and roads to link up the territory to the coastal region of China. However, it is thought that the port of Gwadar on the coastline of Pakistan and the connecting rail line between Gwadar and Kashgar would be fully essential for CPEC in China, otherwise, no other economic activity can be carried out (Usuri and Jana, 2016).

4.11 Gwadar Factor: Challenge

The most influential piece of the puzzle is Gwadar, and CPEC is believed to make it so that there will be intense strategic competition along the coastal belt in the midst of this. Without Gwadar, it is difficult to imagine China investing in Pakistan to such an extent and (Centre for Pakistan and Gulf Studies, 2014), China's energy supply will be much quicker because it would have a shorter path compared to a 12,900 km sea route. Pakistan will profit from exporting goods through the corridors into the Arabian Sea, which could then be exported elsewhere. In addition, Central Asian countries would also be able to use the corridor as an opportunity to develop their territory. As the route will pass through every province of Pakistan, the CPEC will boost regional connectivity in Pakistan, which also means that the underdeveloped areas of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, will have the opportunity to expand rapidly and play a vital role in the country's emerging economy. However, the main point here is the fact that Gwadar will be one end of the corridor and will provide a gateway to the sea to China's western provinces.

4.12 The Distance Factor: Challenge

The importance of the distance factor in the CPEC agreement is that it is readily agreed that it is a big factor for China in the CPEC deal. It has the potential to meet the economic and political interests of both nations, providing both nations with reciprocal benefits. While it is questioned that the project could be beneficial to Beijing, the project is believed to be more beneficial to Beijing. Pakistan can play the role of a 'corridor' only, and it can be said that there would be no point for the CPEC to exist in the first place without Gwadar. For reviews, see (Newsweek Pakistan, 2015). To understand how the Gwadar Port will benefit China, we first have to

understand how far it is from China in kilometers. The table below lists how far each country is from China.

Sr.No	From To via Shanghai (miles)	Via Pakistan(miles)	Saved (miles)	Saved (%)
1	Central China middle east 11206	3626	7580	68
2	Central China Europe 17801	10928	6873	39
3	Central China Pakistan Gwadar 10601	3081	7520	71
4	Western China Middle East 12537	2295	10242	82
5	Western China Europe 19132	9597	9535	50
6	Western China Pakistan Gwadar 11932	1750	10182	85

Table 1: Saving in terms of Distances (via Shanghai vs. Gwadar)

Source: "Pakistan's Potential as a Transit Trade Corridor and transportation challenges", pg 268. The total distance traveled by the Chinese Silk Road can be understood with the use of a figure, once the math is done, the total distance traveled by the route is 7,580 miles. What you see in terms of figures can take up a lot of space on paper, but they are certainly huge numbers that can make a major difference in the trading field. In moving to China will face a large expense and time is the most crucial factor. One of the reasons it would enable China to trade even more, and they would have more money in their hands to make additional investments.

4.13 The Malacca Issue: Challenge

When it comes to oil in the Asia-Pacific region, China is the world's second-largest oil consumer and the most significant importer. More than 80 percent of its oil and 30 percent of its natural gas comes from other countries. It's been mentioned that (Business Insider, 2015). There is a great debate about China seeking an alternative path, one of the hypotheses is probably for geo-political reasons, the other hypothesis is that they are losing out to shipping companies, which undercut their costs. The world's new piracy hotspot is called the Strait of Malacca, which is around 1/3 of the trade between China and the rest of the world that passes through this waterway. If any acts of piracy occur, it will cost China a big loss. It is something you should also note, as it is a geopolitical problem, and the concern of a state or non-state actor taking control of the strait and blocking the trade. China will most likely be affected by this, as their economy and the energy sector by being strongly affected. Thus, China will have shorter and safer access to the Arabian Sea through Gwadar. They will be able to transfer a large portion of their oil imports via the important National Highway which nicely parallels the Arabian Sea, but ultimately it depends on how much Pakistan can handle.

4.14 Industrialization of Xinjiang Challenge

As industrialization works across Xinjiang, the rural areas have oil mines on their territory. After a map of China, it can be concluded that China's Eastern area is the majority of China's industrialized and developed zone, as China shares a coast with the East China Sea in which it gains access to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Likewise, the towns of the world's economic and trade centers, such as London, Amsterdam, New York City, and Istanbul, were able to benefit from

sharing their water boundaries to boost the economic and trading advantages of each city. What here in Shanghai does not contribute to the city's economy? What in Dubai does not transform the city? And, what in California does not enrich our lives in one way or another? Therefore, other regions of China are less developed, less urbanized, landlocked, and far from the eastern coast. The reason is that they are farther west from Shanghai.

From the map, it can be seen that the western region of China is the best opportunity for the Development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CPEC. The province of Xinjiang shares its northern border with Pakistan and so does the road from Gwadar to Kashgar. (The CPEC will be placed right at the border of the Arabian Sea. The Kashgar Pilgrimage site is where an expansion could come quickly—after all, it was included on a UNESCO list. After the operationalization of the Special Economic Zone in the town, Kashgar is destined to exponentially grow. If the growth of the seaport of Shenzhen provides an important insight into the growth of seaports, then the growth of Kashgar, which is located near this seaport, will surely develop at a rate close to 20 percent per year, since the growth of Shenzhen, which is located near this seaport, grew at such an impressive pace of 25.8 percent in 30 years. (Rong, 2011).

One of the reasons why CPEC and Gwadar are so important for China is because they will link the western part of the Persian Gulf with more developed parts of the Persian Gulf. (Khan, 2014). If the environmental protection project is to be made, it would mean taking the city for an entire complete change, replacing arid with fertile land and supporting dense with a massive industrialization process. In case it evolves like Shenzhen, the boost to the Chinese economy could be remarkable. There may be more possibilities for China in this project, but it can be verified that these three themes are at the top of this project's priority list. Ultimately, the new Chinese law

would work to secure the country's energy supply while allowing for further growth as an economic powerhouse.

4.15 External Challenges to CPEC

Throughout all of the different possibilities that Pakistan and China have when working on the CPEC, India is going to have serious apprehensions and apprehensions that they will have with Pakistan and China. It is a mirror image of the relationship between India and Pakistan, where peace has not been seen on the same record. The recent revocation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution has been another thorn in Indo-Pak relations. After India and China, the world is Pakistan's traditional competitor so the CPEC (Central Asia-Pakistan Economic Corridor) will never be operational in the world. It may be possible that India would interfere in Pakistan's internal politics. Violence can be more easily conducted by providing Afghan territory to the Taliban, who would then operate there illegally. There are other opponents of the measure; these enemies are still waiting for their chance to block any initiative. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, has caused concern due to the road that is being constructed. India has opposed the economic project running through Gilgit-Baltistan because this territory is rightfully owned by India, though it has been ruled by Pakistan since 1947. A Pakistani analyst and expert on Balochistan commented on China's CPEC project: "India, China's competitor in the global energy game and in establishing regional hegemony, is very worried about the objectives that China hopes to accomplish through the CPEC project: The Indian Ocean as their uncontested area of supremacy." In recent years, China has been increasingly active in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the area of Gwadar port, which is the most direct route for South Asian oil and gas to reach China's coast and will likely be of concern for Indian and Pakistani shipping. Indian strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney warns that Gwadar Port, which a Chinese state-owned company

operates as a commercial port, could "double as a key outpost for the Chinese Navy in the future and serve as the first overseas naval station in China." CPEC would intensify China's challenge to India's security interests by providing China with access to the Indian Ocean (The Japan Times, 2011).

In view of these concerns, the implementation of the CPEC would not be risk-free and challenging, as the agreement would increase Pakistan's strategic and geographic significance in the region. Pakistan's commitment to improving its ties with China will not only strengthen Pak-Sino relations but will also provoke the US and India to add to Balochistan's barrel. Even though Pakistan has a navy, the government must avoid a military promise with a neighboring country; they must trust in their naval forces. The talks were focused on building a pipeline for Iraqi oil. The agreement will see the Gulf States' oil exported to China for refining in general and then further shipped on to East Asia on a pipeline through Pakistan. Other goods besides oil may be imported by water or by another path to different countries. Through the amount of cargo moved through this port, the economy will grow and a larger volume of products imported and exported will happen (Abid & Ashfaq, 2015).

On the one hand, the increasing role of Gwadar Port would reduce India and Iran's geo-strategic position. on the other hand, the port's increasing role would reduce the geo-strategic importance of India and Iran. Instead of using the Chabahar Port and Indian Ports, the Gwadar Port will be favored by the major economical powers because it will cost them less and much faster. Historically, for a long time, India has enjoyed the advantage of having to have access to warm waters nearby, hence, it would be very difficult for her to sacrifice its strategic importance, which would undoubtedly be counter-balanced (Mazhar et al., 2012).

Also, India is exploiting the ongoing troubled situation of Balochistan because they do not agree

with China's new base in Balochistan or the CPEC agreement. Before these negotiations get started, there should be a reminder that the insurgent insurgents and the Balochistan separatist parties have had a longstanding history of opposition. India has been accused of supporting and promoting the militancy of the Taliban.

Balochistan will likely be able to overcome the Diamer-Bhasha Dam/CPEC project's failure. Behind the scenes, India is helping the Taliban with more sophisticated weapons to help them battle Baloch nationalists. The RAW is accused of using the situation in Balochistan where security forces have heavily guarded construction sites for the Gwadar port, claiming that these sites are much needed but could not be used for construction purposes in Balochistan and could be used for other places (Pattanaik, 2012).

India made an effort to ally itself with Iran to theoretically weaken the CPEC. It is important to note that the effective implementation of the CPEC would boost the importance of the port of Gwadar, and Iran fears that the port of Chabahar will lose its importance because the port of Chabahar has located 72 km from the port of Gwadar. They are well-suited competitors because they allow you to ship small quantities of goods from two distant points almost instantly. Even though Gwadar Port is a Chinese project, its members realize that the Indo-U.S. Alliance in the Indian Ocean will certainly do everything necessary to prevent any operation from being conducted at Gwadar Port (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008).

The US and India convinced Iran that the prosperous operation of the port of Gwadar would reduce the importance of Chabahar, while the US would never want Chinese products to take control of the international market. In response to concern about the United States' relationship with Iran, the US, and India are pushing for the inclusion of Balochistan in Gwadar port and bilateral issues, but

are also working together with China (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) to undermine the CPEC and Gwadar Port. Iran's participation in the US and Indian community aims to maintain the importance of the Port of Chabahar, which it fears may not be so powerful all of a sudden after the active operation of the Port of Gwadar. It should be noted that Pakistan's leaders have never said they want the Gwadar Port to compete with the Chabahar Port, rather they claim that the focus of the Gwadar Port is to unite people of various countries in South Asia and complement Chabahar's position as the new port of Afghanistan. So far, the Iranian desert has been in the United States party amid many complaints against him.

Pakistan under the agreement is well aware that the foreign enemy of China's CPEC, Afghanistan's instability, or Iran's meddling, will endanger the agreement. The Government of Pakistan also decided to meet with Iranian officials during the meeting and discuss the issue of Iran's control of the region. Iran has told representatives that any abuse of the religious aspect of their society is to be regarded as disruption. Pakistan and Iran's behavior indicates that Pakistan needs regional stability and peace. Iran must also know that India and the US have no ulterior motive for going into the area (Khan, 2012).

While they have the advantage of dealing with these two ethnic groups, the Chinese government and the Pakistani government have to deal with several internal problems to better implement the CPEC. It has been mentioned above that Balochistan plays a very important role when it comes to CPEC construction. The province of Balochistan is politically unstable and economically impoverished. If the Pakistani and Chinese governments were to sign a peace deal with the Balochi people, it would still be tough to implement the agreement. Following the war in 1945, in the 1960s, the nationalistic, leftist parties of Balochistan raised considerable fears that Balochistan

was being marginalized by the central government. They say that the CPEC would put the local people at a better disadvantage by bringing in more foreigners and changing the demographics, which would end up changing the land in the region. An arming group of Baloch militants who have gone underground put intimate attacks on educational institutions, military institutions, government offices, and even on local officials as they fear that the identity of the Baloch would be lost to the success of the CPEC. In addition to the weapons, supply of food, and financial support for Baloch rebels, such foreign interference could also lead to the organization of delays in the CPEC's actual implementation. Thus, the government of Pakistan must negotiate with the nationalist leaders of Balochistan and must use fair and sensible methods to settle their conflict before it gets out of hand. The government should seriously consider the Balochistan issue and believe that giving at least a large part of the CPEC to Balochistan would enhance the CPEC's overall economic benefits. Systems will be created to ensure that basic services are being provided in every province. A more equitable policy and a fairer share to residents is the goal. To prevent anyone from taking your work, it would be necessary to formulate policies relating to the domicile of the other provinces so that the citizens from other provinces do not occupy the employment of the locals (Bashir et al., 2019).

Like other Balochistan provinces, the KP also has some reservations about the routes of the CPEC that will need to be followed and approved by Pakistan's federal government. Just against the KP Nationalist Groups, who are claiming that the government has lied about where and how to construct CPEC, the federal government is not seeking to transform the original CPEC route from KP to Punjab to make the economic and infrastructural benefits accessible to Punjab. The western road will connect to the underdeveloped region called Balochistan and from there will link up to the divided regions of Pakistan known as the KP. Of the reasons posed by the KP nationalist

leaders, the main objection is that they believe that the original route change is an overstep of authority for the government. The opposition claims that, if the KP were to deviate at all from the original road plan, that would just deepen the gulf between the KP and the current PAS government. The view of the Provincial Government Bureau that the intended CPEC route was to bind the Province economically feels that the initiatives organized were justifiable. Based on the reports given, the reservations of the KP national parties seem to be real, because poverty and extremism can be eradicated only if grassroots people are brought into the mainstream. The CPEC is the best opportunity to align the province's impoverished areas with business-related activities to reap economic benefits (Kasi, 2015).

This provides US forces a strategic advantage because it is easy to pick up phones and get information in Balochistan, which is right across the border from Afghanistan. When dealing with the Chinese in Balochistan, America is somehow blamed for assisting the Baloch militancy making China's involvement in Balochistan worse. In Afghanistan, there is strong evidence supporting the argument that CIA agents employ the help of Baloch insurgents. The main objective in this situation is to track the increasing role of China in Balochistan (Bansal, 2008, pp.182-200). Since China is such a large trading nation and advantageous for our economy, China's presence in Balochistan is of little use to our potential strategic and economic needs. Many critics believe that the U.S. has concerns of great importance about the construction of Gwadar, Pakistan, as it has the potential to serve as a Chinese naval base. The Indian Ocean, near the Strait of Hormuz, an oil export route from the Gulf states, will very likely be under Chinese surveillance and control, causing serious problems for the US in the Indian Ocean to maintain its monopoly in it. In the long term, the divide-and-rule policies of various players are making the situation in Balochistan worse. "Under dangerous and unstable circumstances in Balochistan, China will not move forward to

provide Pakistan with any further technical or financial assistance to develop or advance any economic project," said Geng on TV. Migliaccio, "Migliaccio" (2005). US foreign policy openly states that it aims to exacerbate Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan by creating Western obstacles in the Gwadar port to strengthen control in the Central Asian region and harm Chinese economic interests in Africa and the Middle East.

4.16 Indian- American Apprehensions

CPEC is the world's largest road project currently under construction, and it will follow the world's new economic regimes. Other Indian neighboring countries China and Pakistan openly opposed both countries' economic interdependence because it would jeopardize India's dream of becoming an Asian Economic Leader. India has tried to win in competition with a reciprocal agreement on Chabahar Port, Iran, with the help of America, which is indirectly opposed to Pak-China friendship. Since 2013, when the CPEC deal was signed, India has claimed that the route passing through Kashmir is Indian territory, but Pakistan has denied this. Both countries have been involved in several non-traditional military and diplomatic conflicts.

The United States, on the other hand, has trade relations with India to cover the Asian market and to maintain its position as the world's largest economy, which has forced India to enter the Indian market. Several reciprocal trade agreements have been signed. To maintain its economic strength, America has allied with the Indian regime on many fronts, but the Indian government's refusal to allow American access to the Indian market has contributed to the relationship's demise in recent years. The US strategy of partnering with India and making power politics interdependent with the Indian government has failed, and high-end nodes and interdependencies have reduced the alleged threat to Pakistan-China relations.

4.17 Sino-US International Politics and Diplomacy

The US strategic community is paying more attention to China's "Belt and Road Initiative," which is a key part of the country's national development and global diplomacy. Since 2018, the US administrative and legislative branches have reached greater agreement on balancing the "Belt and Road," with debates and policy debates around the "Belt and Road" heating up dramatically. In general, the US strategic community believes that China's continued promotion of the "Belt and Road" cannot be overstated.

It has the power to change Eurasia's geoeconomics and geopolitical balance in a variety of ways, including technological advancements, military stability, and international development. It poses a serious challenge to the US and even jeopardizes the US's post-World War II global hegemony. The "Belt and Road" game can be described as focusing on the growing competitive factors in Sino-US relations, as well as the general patterns and key characteristics of the US implementation of China's competitive strategies.

The US national security policy has undergone a significant shift in its central goal of reacting to the rivalry between large countries and now views China as a more dangerous force than countries like Russia. This strategy depicts the reality of the strategic competition between the two countries, and it essentially represents the strategic community's consensus and the US's attempt to do so.

CPEC is useful on both sides and is helpful for both Chinese and Pakistanis. This corridor would have to be improved tremendously to reduce the time it takes a vessel to reach warm water from 12900 to 2500 km. CPEC provides the shortest and cheapest path in the South China Sea, in comparison to the Yellow Sea route across the Straits of Malacca, to deliver goods to the international market. Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be at the center of the

government, China will soon be the largest economic giant in the world, not just the nation called the "Middle Kingdom". On the other hand, the CPEC would open the door to Pakistan to benefit from economic benefits not only through the routes of the CPEC agreement itself but also through the other Pakistani projects supported by this agreement through China.

The government in Pakistan is enthusiastic about the prospects for this corridor becoming a career opportunity for Pakistan's young people. Several opportunities are going into Pakistan's economy, but the median expectation will be that Pakistan would grow by two to two and a half percentage points per annum in the 2020-2030 period. Three distinct steps would be used to bring economy into full functionality. The first major phase of this project will be finished in 2020. By the year 2025, the second milestone will be completed.

By 2025, a variety of different industries are projected to be developed 2025, including large-scale production, commodity processing, and raw-material extraction. With the extension of the building projects, the third stage of the area is now planned for completion in 2030. As I am living in an international corridor, I am getting a little bit weary of the international worries that come along with it. Due to differences among Pakistani political parties, the standoff over these projects must be resolved through negotiations. Another essential step Pakistan must take to address international concerns is to establish confidence and create co-existence with the international community by solving regional matters and international challenges.

CHAPTER FIVE

BALOCH MILITANCY AS A MAJOR CHALLENGE

Because of the political dispute between the Baloch people and the Pakistani government/military, Balochistan is also considered an important territory of international strategic significance (the region is rich in natural resources and is home to many important military bases). The struggle to survive in this country has had a profound impact on peace in Balochistan as well as its adjacent regions. At this present time, the region of Balochistan is of little interest to regional and foreign actors. Development opportunities in this region of mountainous terrain have become less compelling. In reality, unless Balochistan is included in its defense plans, no strategy of any of the countries vying for influence in the region can be called detailed and practical. In Balochistan, there are influences from the Great Powers, ranging from those with less stature to the two supermajor powers, that come together and then change how the Great powers view a certain issue in the area at a particular time or a certain level of space (Ahmad and Feldman, 1992).

Diverse racial, linguistic, religious, and sectarian groups exist in Pakistan. There are numerous provincial languages, as well as other ethnic minorities and six significant ethnic groups (Worldatlas). The majority of people in Pakistan are Muslims, however, there are also followers of Christianity and Hinduism. The reality that there are ethnic separatist groups in Pakistan does not change even though Pakistani nationalism may be developing. Baloch nationalists are one of these separatist movements.

Before 2006, according to some Baloch nationalists, the goal was provincial autonomy within the Federated States of Pakistan; but, since that year, the goal has changed to a push for an independent Baloch state (Akbar, 2014). However, it appears that nationalists do not agree on the goal; there is

a division between nationalists who desire an independent Balochistan and those who prefer provincial autonomy.

We cannot assert that Baloch society was an easy place for nationalism to emerge. The emergence of nationalism in Baloch society took place over several years and may be broken down into three primary phases. The first is the time before colonization. The idea of a "state" or "state authority" was meaningless at this time to the divided various tribes of Baloch civilization. The Khan of Kalat attempted to unite several Baloch tribes under a military and administrative structure in the 18th century by creating a Baloch army made up of 25,000 soldiers and 1,000 camels (Singh, 2016), which might be viewed as an effort to create a sense of state and national consciousness. However, at the time, these and comparable programs were not big enough to reduce hostilities between tribes.

British colonial rule is the second era. The tribes resisted colonial rule throughout this time, but their resistance had little noticeable impact on nationalism. Tribal conflicts increased as a result of Britain pitting tribal chiefs against one another. Due to the increasing tribal strife and the subsequent fragmentation of Baloch society, there was no organized national opposition to colonial rule. Baloch society was divided, although there was still sporadic resistance to colonial authority (Singh 2016).

Baloch exclusion from the military and civilian bureaucracy fueled Baloch's nationalism even more. Baloch nationalism is so fundamentally an expression of nationalism that has been influenced by the disapproval of the Pakistani government and its policies.

Baloch nationalists rose very quickly after Pakistan was founded in 1948, and uprisings persisted in succeeding years. Baloch nationalists rebelled against the federal government in 1948, 1958,

1962, 1973–1977, and 2005 because they believed they were excluded from administration and that Pakistani sovereignty was a tight centralized system (Grare, 2013). Numerous Baloch nationalist organizations, including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), participated in militancy (Feyyaz, 2013) and carried out attacks on the federal government (Grare, 2006). Baloch nationalists who have lost faith in democracy and believe that armed conflict is the only way to uphold their rights are cited as the causes of the uprisings and attacks.

5.1 Baloch Militancy: Pakistan and China's Interests

According to (Rasmussen, 2017), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and China that will connect Gwadar Port in Pakistan to China's Kashghar area. Until now, China has provided significant financial assistance in the form of loans for various projects connected with the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)." (Tripathi, 2016). Despite being a neglected part of Pakistan, the province of Balochistan is constantly under armed forces focus due to Baloch militant violence that began after the operations against Nawab Akbar Bugti during General Musharraf's rule (Ahmed, 2012).

(Rasmussen, 2017) mentions that the fault of the state government became more evident when the military of the country was stationed in the Balochistan region, and the construction of the (CPEC) mega project was launched with China. Cui bono (who benefits) questions the Balochistan government to assert China as a collaborator in crime as it supposedly sacrifices its natural wealth to international forces that directly control the Balochistan government as was done with the Saindak mine. On the other hand, the Balochi regard the Chinese as a hostile invader, because the Chinese have violently taken over their precious mines (Tripathi, 2016). When interviewed by a

British newspaper, a spokesman for the BLA (Baloch Liberation Army) claimed that “China is stealing wealth in Balochistan in the name of Mega-Projects by calling it CPEC”.

Besides the above-stated argument, locals of Gwadar also say that the plants built for construction purposes in the area may help the ports but not exactly the residents of this area and that is why they have the least interest in the completion and extension of this mega project. (Ijaz, 2018) Due to the development of this mega project, issues have arisen for the people of Gwadar, such as it's hard and costly to find water and electricity. Due to its main entrance to the sea, the Gwadar port is seen as the possible future trade and commercial hub in Pakistan. However, some locals fear that the opening of the port could lead to Chinese investment and pressure on the local population (Mickey, 2012). As a reaction to Chinese activities in Sichuan, they have to face an attack from the Baloch militants as a way of demonstrating their frustration and aggressiveness towards Chinese participation in Tibet and Balochistan (Tripathi, 2016).

5.2 China's Responses to Militancy

(Tripathi, 2016) The history of China since its foundation is one of ease and progress. This has been apparent in the way China has been able to face up rebellion, nuclear attack, and the threat from the first strike in a peaceful manner. The city of Gwadar is constantly facing numerous attacks and reactions from the residents of Balochistan. (Baloch, 2016). It is because of a deep-seated resentment from early childhood that causes some to revolt against their state (Dawn, 2015). Young people rebelled against injustice and they have become defiant because they were concerned about the unequal privileges that the government gave to various classes, political parties, etc. The decision to devote more labor and use Chinese labor capital to the project has contributed more to China's hostility against the CPEC. People from China have over the locals

from Pakistan by 2048 because the bulk of Chinese chooses to work on the CPEC project with their businesses, and engineers (Financial Express, 2017).

There are frequent terrorist attacks and major insurgencies from Tehreek e Taliban, Lashkar e Jhangvi, and others. These groups continue to threaten not only Pakistan's peace and harmony but also for the Chinese working at CPEC. In the past, previous threats from Al-Qaeda and ISIS have claimed that China is their rival (The Financial Express, 2017). These utterly horrific occurrences have happened in China where the Chinese have been held by an internal terrorist group.

Xinjiang has also been a center of focus for these Islamic Militant Separatist groups, which were found in the region of Xinjiang (Business Insider, 2016). The Chinese government is aware of Pakistan's inability to defeat the insurgencies of the jihadi terrorists and has chosen to retain its grip on the Chinese province of Xinjiang and the multi-billion dollar CPEC project through their means, particularly within their borders (Reuters, 2017). Any of the precautionary steps taken by China against these radical rebellions included passing numerous laws against the peaceful expression of Muslim identity by the Muslims living in Xinjiang Province (Pande, 2015).

Despite all the laws intended to ban the Muslim faith in Pakistan, China has not only adopted these as a precautionary measure to secure security policies in China but has also been on the agenda to develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with Pakistan. Research from Industry Insider revives the economic debate. (Business Insider, 2016)

China imposed a ban on fasting by Muslims during the month of fasting i.e. Ramadan. Ramadan. This research (Sethi, 2016) showed... They have also prohibited many Muslim women from wearing the headwear of the Hijab or other Islamic religious items and have shortened the length of the religious beards too. The Chinese government became worried that Chinese Muslims were

not having enough religious education, so it enacted a law that declared that only places of worship and prayer were permitted in the cities and small provinces where Muslims are a majority (Business Insider, 2016). This use of the army for this reason has allowed the Chinese to take control over the city.

5.3 China's Stance Concerning Baloch Militancy

The Chinese have had a history of managing assimilation in Xinjiang Province, China, and this problem is the same, so they are using a similar game plan to secure their \$46 billion CPEC project strategically and economically in Pakistan. (Sethi, 2016) First, China will stop the violent actions of the Pakistani government. Second, as China has stopped such actions, it will aggravate the Baloch issue less which will help in enhancing general ties with Pakistan. All, as 2017 came around, acknowledged that if they wished to prosper against the Islamic State, there were no other opportunities and acts that could get IS and anti-China terrorists to withdraw from going after China and CPEC (Business Insider, 2016).

After the implementation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Project in 2013, Xinjiang policies and China's brutal advances against Muslims in China have made TTP and al-Qaeda more violent towards China and some of their ventures with Pakistan and CPEC project lie on the top of hit target. (Khaleeq, 2018) TTP has announced its plans to strike China and has discussed how this would be its "next target" ("next target" simply means "the penultimate target"). It also mentions that they need to "punish the Chinese" ("punish" can have different meanings here, but most will accept that it means "to discipline or punish"). TIP and TTP illustrate how China is just as poor as Britain and is just as wicked as the EIC that had conquered and pillaged the sub-continent during the late 18th Century (Hussain, 2015).

With the success of getting the American forces out of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda has chosen to strike China as the next move. With this in mind, the Al-Qaeda is attempting to push the United States out of Pakistan. (Hussain, 2015) Various attacks by TTP can be observed in the last decade which are still in progress where Chinese visitors were kidnaped and killed by them as a vengeance for what China did in Xinjiang Province. (Khaleeq, 2018) All those terrorist attacks that have happened inside China against Pakistan prove to be a greater barrier against talks with the Taliban and their other support groups. It also takes away confidence that talks will succeed and only raises the apprehension of Chinese interference in Pakistani ventures and projects like the CPEC, which is inflaming Pakistani's already tense situation (Pande, 2015).

According to (Hussain, 2015) in reaction to all threats and the attacks of TTP on the Chinese people, property as well as projects, China has managed to install their first military base in Djibouti which has been considered a step for deploying their army to Pakistan to safeguard the measures against CPEC protection (Hussain, 2015). CPEC project has been looking heavily towards the support of China in terms of financial as well as labor assistance so that Pakistan can adjust to the supremacy of China within the region and the supremacy leading towards China for adapting the strategy of Xinjiang Province for encountering the threats against the success of CPEC Project in Pakistan (Ahmad, 2017).

5.4 Balochistan's Perspective Regarding CPEC

Balochistan has been absent in all industries since the inception of Pakistan, and a variety of reasons have triggered this crisis in the region. (Ahmad, 2017) The province is powerless to be part of what is happening to the world as a whole. The biggest reasons for the province lagging in growth and causing the average man to live his life without basic needs are neglect on the part of

the federal government and, most notably, tribalism. (Panda, 2014). Balochistan is a strategic position that serves a significant role in the region. In addition to being the land bridge with Afghanistan, the coastline also has access to the sea via the Gwadar Port. It takes up a significant portion of the sea lines of contact, which are crucial for the free flow of 40% of the world's crude (Pakistan Observer, 2018).

As a result of their sincere efforts, not only will the province of Balochistan come out of its turmoil, but will also play an important role in the country's growth. (Pakistan Observer, 2018). Even though the country has reeled in an insurgency, several forces counteract and keep the development back from ever becoming greater. As a result of this dispute in Balochistan, of Dera Bugti, being a Bugti myself, will carry out an in-depth study of the causes of the crisis in Balochistan and make the necessary recommendations to the leadership of Balochistan so it can serve as a link among the government (Pakistan Observer, 2018).

In Balochistan, the people are cracking bonds of darkness that are shrouded in psychological bondage. This research has been split into these three sections (Reuters, 2017). At the beginning of the crisis, a variety of causes have played a part in the matter. These include land-related disparities, sectarian differences, and problems of capitalism and insecurity. The second portion involves the revival of the province where the Balochi opposed the rule of the state under feudal lords. The third aspect of the strategy splits the middle of the region into various social groups, the feudalists, and the tribalism (Telegraph India, 2015).

The government ignored the people of Balochistan and tried to rule the area economically due to the military presence of the Nawab and because of tribal activity. The last section of this study addresses the political condition in a province, which has had years of detrimental impact on the

minds of the natives and the efforts of another part of the nation, which has been polluting the minds of people for decades (Reuters, 2017).

While the people of Pakistan have made strides in something that Balochistan has missed in as far as any stability, the Balochs have replied to the public doubting Pakistan's allegiance to them.

(Telegraph India, 2015) On August 14, 2012, Baloch patriots proclaimed Pakistan's Freedom Day as a "Dark Day." After the passing of his dad, Akbar Bugti's brother, Nawabzada Jamil Bugti, conveyed, "I don't understand how any decent Baloch will practice Pakistani autonomy. (Reuters, 2017). It has been sixty years of slavery, boorishness, and torture for us." (Atlantic, 2017) One young Baloch lady started her remarks during the Pakistan TV program *Arrangement Matters* with Nasim Zehra in which the host talked with Baloch understudies about the situation in Balochistan by saying, "The only thing I need to let you know is that I'm not Pakistani. My character is Baloch."

"Baloch lobbyist Mazdak Baloch, who has been estranged abroad in India since 2016, also said in a meeting with BBC Hindi, "We are not Pakistani. For Pakistan, we are not of any interest. We are the state of Pakistan." (Diplomat, 2020) He said in a previous meeting, "Consider me a canine, but not a Pakistani. (Atlantic, 2017) I am a Baloch." He proceeded to clarify: "Since there is no instruction (Diplomat, 2020)

In the province of Balochistan, some people claim that this is because the center ignored the province and their position on this is that it's a product of feudalism. (Hindustan Times, 2016).

What needs to be changed is the manner the problem is handled or how it is evaluated. There are no rules here, only errors. The living conditions of the locals are abysmal and, at best, their daily lives are below average (Hindustan Times, 2016).

The planet has been digitized and becomes a digital village in this new century, but the odd thing here is that people living in Pakistan's largest province are not aware of it. (Today, 2017). Since independence has only illuminated the issues of the area without sufficient remedies instead of addressing them, may it be feudal lords who rule their domains in this independent land, or may it be the leader who treats them as leaders of their territories (Diplomat, 2020). Instead of losing talent and putting the province in the dark, there is a desperate need to recognize the trouble areas and make sincere attempts to eliminate the province from the crisis. (Hindustan Times, 2016)

In Balochistan, the classical Sardari structure was once fictional to promote and preserve the truthfulness, dignity, and sovereignty of tribesmen. In the course of events, though, the development of the province at the micro-level has lost all its relations. (Hindustan Times, 2016) The regime continues to exist, but it works to hold the masses under its control and strip them of their constitutional rights to equality and liberty.

These tribal leaders claim to be the province's only honest and patriotic citizens. Probably, they benefited a lot, and in return, the common people got little (Diplomats, 2020). The Centre is genuinely blamed for its incompetence and dismissive attitude, but these nationalist politicians do little good or fair to their people. If the Centre is kept accountable for holding the province stagnant, the weak, the illiterate, and the underdeveloped, but the old nationalist leaders of these decades have founded no growth schemes and projects, i.e. schools, colleges, highways, hospitals (Telegraph India, 2015). When the common man becomes trained and well-informed, the feudal rulers have always dreaded the lack of empire and the collapse of their maneuvers, which could end up challenging the dominance of their lord (Telegraph India, 2015).

In reality, these peace, nationalism, and justice flag-bearers have attempted to jump from tribalism into capitalism. They've got nothing to do with the people of Baloch. The self-interest of reactionary Sardars cannot be turned into a cause worth fighting for by any slogans regarding socialism and national self-determination. (Hindustan Times, 2016) To retain their dominant role in society, they just don't want knowledge, learning, and growth in general. History reveals that their ivory towers have always been held high and they have made people their slaves, who have all but a voice (Hindustan Times, 2016).

The Sardari or tribal system in Balochistan is a centuries-old system, It can be traced back to Arabia's evacuation of the Baloch. This system of Sardari was nourished by tribal homogeneity. Each tribe used to give loyalty and devotion to the Sardar, grand Sardar, and the leader of the alliance or confederacy, Khan of Kalat, under a tribal chief (Hindustan Times, 2016). In 1876, under the famous Gandamak Treaty, the British established their rule throughout Balochistan. In the British and the leased areas, the British formed a fortress and built garrisons to maintain law and order, while the native Balochistan remained under the rule of the Sardars (Ijaz, 2018). The Sardars were not independent but engaged to obey the Raj, without any intervention, with a so-called free hand in handling their affairs of tribes. They formulated their legal system, which was generally based on Jirga. The term of a Sardar was conclusive in the affairs of his tribe.(Ebrahim, 2015)

Until the formation of Pakistan, the scheme proceeded. According to (Ebrahim, 2015), in the past, the Zardari regime, a distortion of the past, actually intended to support and encourage the dignity and autonomy of the tribesmen, may be of something good to a certain region, but history shows that the growth of the grassroots was deficiently denied under this system. (Diplomat, 2020). The

thousands of square kilometers of vast land and the inhabitants of the province were severely impacted by the blessings of the centuries-old structure (Ebrahim, 2015). No steps were made for socio-economic development or the creation of educational institutions, rather than paving the way for their sons and grandsons to receive international degrees. The lack of true democracy and the lack of consciousness of the masses assisted and improved the entire revolution economically, financially, and eventually by hijacking the Sardars (Economic Times, 2014).

5.5 Natural Resources

Nineteen trillion cubic feet of natural gas and six trillion barrels of oil reserves are projected to be the natural wealth of Balochistan. When it comes to the management of natural resources, the Balochistan government is the least autonomous (Modi, 2015). The media, educational curriculum, labor, tourism, healthcare, and the environment are regulated by the federation. The most important point is the federal government's school program, which mistakenly eliminates the meaning of the Balochi language and cultural representations. Balochistan was at the hands of the Nawabs, while the British reinforced the institutes of the Nawabs before partition (Nawabs, 2014).

Via leveraging the tribal structure through a few people getting their stake, the whole system was so articulated to encourage their management of Balochistan. There were no steps taken to change this feudal structure after independence (Nawabs, 2014). Sardars, though presenting themselves as patriots and saviors of the region, had kept the locals impoverished under their laws and control. The lack of fulfillment of necessities in the region has also contributed to the misrepresentation of the masses (Modi, 2015). Training has played a significant role in the lack of understanding among the local community as a result of government neglect in the education sector. While its influence has been over more than a generation of Balochs, the Government is now taking action to ensure

that the errors made by its predecessors are reversed. (Modi, 2015)

According to (Modi, 2015), the reconciliation of Balochistan into the new territories of Pakistan after Section in 1947 was undoubtedly not a smooth development. The political condition of the four August states in the locale was the fundamental cause of the underlying episode of contention (Nawabs, 2014). The 562 regal states were not formally coordinated into British India under the British Raj, but within their political limits, as self-governing political units existed under auxiliary collusion with the border administration. As a result of the definition of their diplomatic alliance with the British Raj, the newly free nations of India and Pakistan, the royal states were subsequently not recognized (Ebrahim, 2015). Or possibly, for which new state they would enter, the representatives of each royal state were given the right of judgment (Nawabs, 2014).

The English Chief Administrator, Lenient Atlee, also left open the prospect of their independence being granted. Three of the regal states of Baloch, Makran, Las Bela, and Kharan, decided to join Pakistan in 1947 (Ebrahim, 2015). In any event, the leader of the fourth, the Khan of Kalat Ahmad Yar Khan, was first expected to create a free state. He shifted his position after long exchanges and weight from Pakistan and named the Instrument of Raise to join Pakistan on the guarantee of retaining internal self-sufficiency. Not everybody in his region was pleased with his choices. (Corridor, 2014). The brother of the Khan, Sovereign Abdul Karim, led a rebellion against the new state beginning in July 1948, finding it a tool for Balochistan's Punjabi mastery. (Modigliani, 2012). In a letter to his sibling, he said, "We can see just Punjabi extremism from whatever point we take a gander at the new Legislature of Pakistan. The people have nothing to do with it. The norm is the military and weapons" (Corridor, 2014).

Right now, there is a terrible situation for any other network, the Baloch, his Sind, the Afghans, or the Bengalis, even whether they are equally ground-breaking. This rebellion was eventually

suppressed by the Pakistani military after two years of combat, one of the big measures was Military College Sui (Umbreen, 2018). The Military College Sui is an example of these measures in delivering quality education to Baloch students and taking them to the benchmark set by the rest of the country (Modigliani, 2012). Several alumni members have joined the Pak Army as commissioned officers and continue to pave the way for decades to come. The establishment of the Gwadar Port would improve Balochistan and bring it to new heights of growth (Diplomat, 2020).

The government could not ignore its principal province at all times. In Balochistan, Pakistan cannot continue to have any difficulties. In Balochistan, our rivals and countries with a stake in Balochistan are well prepared to take advantage of these conditions. Concentrate on the welfare of young people (Umbreen, 2018). Education should be the government's primary priority as the youth will further boost the development and stability of the region with proper guidance. (Diplomat, 2020). It would play a vital role in the development of people's living conditions. The deprivation of education was a significant contributor to the Balochistan crisis and needs to be resolved to take a step in the right direction (Diplomat, 2020).

As the Sardari/Nawabi system in Balochistan has prevented the region from developing, the feudal system has been abolished (Modigliani, 2012). This governance structure has not only hindered development in the region but has also prevented local people from advancing beyond the limits established by the Sardars and Nawabs. To loosen the hold of the feudal lords and give the area its due independence and freedom, this structure must be resolved by the government (Diplomat, 2020).

Accountability was zero, even though Balochistan is Pakistan's largest province geographically, it is the smallest province demographically (Hindustan Times, 2015). With a refined structure of representation in the governing bodies, it is important to resolve the alarmingly poor level of success in the area. To ensure that the distribution of investments and funds, along with the degree of transparency, is on par with other provinces, high-profile officers and decision-makers in the region are required (Umbreen, 2018). In the past, the underdevelopment of the region is due to the government's neglect and its focus on the main parts of the country rather than the potentially prosperous and large province of Balochistan. It should be paramount to turn the emphasis onto the area, as the results from geological surveys have shown that a significant amount of resources remains untapped. Military College Sui was, on the recommendation of the military leaders of the Pak Army, a step in the right direction taken by the government (Hindustan Times, 2015).

In getting Baloch youth up to date with the national mainstream, it played a crucial role. While steps to save the province from the tyranny of the feudal lords are being taken, the region is still under the rule of its tyrants (Umbreen, 2018). As international investment in Balochistan grows, measures need to be taken to safeguard the interests of the local population and to ensure the supply of electricity, gas, and water (Delhi, 2015).

(Umbreen, 2018) noted that because of the offensive position of the military as well as the CAFs, the country has seen a reduction in the state of terror and aggression over the past 10 years. Policy and expenditure areas should be reassessed and revalued, taking advantage of the momentum produced by the measures taken in the region, with an emphasis on the growth of the region for future generations, whilst constantly enhancing the quality of everyday life for those currently living in the underdeveloped sections of the province. (Delhi, 2015)

5.6 Impediments in Balochistan and its impact on our economy

For a long time, Pakistan has served as a frontline state against the Soviets and terrorism and suffered immensely, but the mechanism allowed China to unobtrusively grow and prosper for 35 free years (Diplomat, 2020) found out that the geo-political situation is evolving quickly, and after its long and rocky path, things are brightening for Pakistan. A new age of geo-ecological partnership with Pakistan has entered China and aims to raise two-way trade from \$12 billion to \$20 billion, a promising change for Pakistan's eco-growth (Umbreen, 2018).

A hammerhead-molded landmass at the westernmost tip of Balochistan's coastline on the Bedouin Ocean, a region verifiably inhabited by Baloch anglers, is Gwadar, which means the "entry of wind" in Balochi. (Ministry of Planning, 2018). Gwadar was acquired by Pakistan from Oman for 3 million pounds in 1958, originally a portion of the Khanate of Kalat, and eventually transferred to the Sultan of Muscat in 1784 (Diplomat, 2020). With no base, the region has been immature. "The encompassing locale, a territory with a 470-mile-long coastline, had just five miles of the cleared street by the 1980s, driving from the home of the official to the tiny airport. A 21st February 1980 report in the Washington Post referred to Gwadar as "an infertile fix of soil and sand" that "doesn't have anything to offer travelers.

It is clarified that given its ordinarily deep hot-water port and geographical proximity to the Center East, Gwadar, in any case, was consistent of key significance for contending countries in the region (Khan et al., 2017). It was thus that the state-owned China Abroad Port Property obtained the Gwadar Port authoritatively in 2013, the construction of which began in 2007 as a joint initiative between Pakistan and China to fill in as the wellspring of the China-Pakistan Financial Passage

(CPEC), connecting Gwadar with Kashgar in the western Xinjiang district of China (Pakistan Observer, 2018).

This initiative spreads the essence of China in the region as state-owned Chinese companies had just settled and a reliable equilibrium by mining deals, such as the Chinese Metallurgical Alliance renting the Saindak Copper and Gold mine in Balochistan in 2002. (Khan et al., 2017). President Musharraf, who began upgrading the port, would have preferred to use Gwadar and CPEC as engines to push the floundering Pakistani economy and turn this barren piece of shoreline into another Dubai or Shenzhen (Umbreen, 2018).

As per (Xi Jinping, 2015), CPEC is a piece of China's broader "Belt and Road Initiative" financial operation designed to build new mechanisms and trade organizations that consistently link China with Asia, Africa, and Europe and help form a Chinese model for monetary globalization. (Khan et al., 2017)

In a meeting in Beijing in May 2017 with Pakistani Chief Administrator Nawaz Sharif in attendance, the \$124 billion plan, planned to be a 21st-century Silk Path, was announced. "Chinese President Xi Jinping announced at the conference, "We hope that through the progression of the Belt and Street, we will unleash new financial forces for worldwide growth, organize new phases for worldwide improvement, and rebalance monetary globalization so that humanity will come closer to a network of usual destiny (Umbreen, 2018).

(Pakistan Observer, 2018) reported that on November 13, 2016, Gwadar Port, with the capacity to deal with 19 million tons of crude oil each year, turned out to be authoritatively operational, set apart by a stupendous opening feature directed by Leader Sharif (Jinping, 2015). Notwithstanding the port, China has just put \$10.63 billion into the construction of a 2,000-kilometer Pakistani road

and railroad trade infrastructure to transfer goods and properties and increase Chinese organizations' extraction of various properties from Balochistan (Umbreen, 2018).

(Pakistan Observer, 2018) suggested that the involvement of China in the Pakistani CPEC system is focused on hitting \$46 billion by 2030. CPEC and Gwadar Port will be assembled and developed as one of the most important remote ocean ports in the district at all costs," General Raheel Sharif, former Pakistani Armed Force Head of Staff, said in July 2015 (Reuters, 2017). The beginning of the creation of Gwadar in 2007 came when the defiance of Baloch in the aftermath of the murder of Bugti was beginning to steam up.

CPECs were considered by the nearby population to be a tool for settling more notable amounts of untouchables in the city. Chinese specialists have increasingly fulfilled a significant part of the need for both skilled and inept jobs (Tribune India, 2015), just as they serve in senior administration roles. For example, the number of Chinese who entered Pakistan in 2016 is assessed at 71,000. According to (Riaz, 2017), a study by the Trade and Industry Offices of the Organization of Pakistan, Chinese nationals could dwarf local Baloch by 2048 given the current pace of convergence.

Now that Pak is in desperate need of another big infrastructure round (the first being the Indus Water Treaty), the purpose can be effectively fulfilled by CPEC. (Reporter, 2018). The CPEC investment of \$46 billion relative to our overall res of \$17.5 billion makes it a potential game changer for Pak. World media also announced that Pak could be the next Asian tiger after CPEC's materialization. (Reporter, 2018). Now that Pak has been included by China in its broader regional strategy entitled Belt and Road Initiative, Pakistan will act as a new Silk Road bridge for Euro-

Asian connectivity and a city of the ASEAN Maritime Silk Road. For both Pakistan and China, it is a win-win sit-in. (Pant, 2017)

This initiative with its Early Harvest of \$28 billion would soon produce for the developer nation like ours. Many advantages of Pakistan are now explicitly connected to this initiative, either one or the other. A gist of the Pak-related salient aspects is:

- a. 10,400 MW of electricity will be in the national grid station by 2017-18.
- b. Both the road and railway networks will be greatly strengthened. For Panda (2014),
- c. Strategic and eco-friendly relations with China are focused on confidence and cooperation.
- d. Boost Pak's economy. (About Pant, 2017)
- e. Goal 2000 Pak for a wide variety of technical aspects in China.
- f. Exchange meetings with young people.
- g. 44 million dollars of fiber optics will be moved from China to Pak. (Jinping, 2015)

"With the materialized CPEC, Pak will get rid of names such as "terrorism epicenter," "most dangerous state," and "failing state. Pak's GDP, i.e. \$274 billion is projected to lift a strong indication of a strengthened economy by 15 percent. (Al Jazeera English, 2012). An effect of this was noticed in the budget of last year when our budget shortfall was 4.7 percent of GDP as opposed to 7 percent of India. (Ahmed, 2019)

5.7 End of Energy Crisis

(Diplomat, 2020) announced that \$ 33 billion will be spent out of \$ 46 billion (total investment in CPEC) to boost Pak's energy sector. Pakistan is likely to have 10,500 MW in its national grid station by 2017-18; this will certainly end the Pak energy crisis as our short drop is 4000-6000 MW as of now. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018). In addition, Pak will get 8000 MW from four new nuclear reactors by 2023 compared to about 1000 MW currently provided by the Pak Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC, 2020).

5.8 Infrastructure Development

Both the road and rail networks will be significantly improved: -

- a. Road to Kashgar, from Gwadar.
- b. Motorway from Lahore-Karachi (1240 km).
- c. Upgradation of the Karakorum Highway. (Diplomat, 2020)
- d. 1,800 km of rolling lines.

5.9 Foreign Investment.

A lot of foreign investment would flow to Pak as "BRI" links about 60 cities and half of the world's population with Gwadar port being the face. Not only will Gwadar dwarf the port of Chabahar, but it will also be the largest port in the Persian Gulf (Diplomat, 2020)

5.10 Gains for China.

The CPEC is an innovative Chinese initiative to improve the global ecological muscle of the region. China is expecting gains in u/m: -

- a. Chinese products would be available to half of the people of the planet.
- b. The infamous Malacca Strait will be bypassed by China. Express Services (India, 2017).
- c. The waters of the Indian Ocean are going to rule China.
- d. By sitting on the face of the Persian Gulf, China is going to dominate 40 percent of global crude.
- e. China will receive the investments back two years after the project gets operational, as per the statistics provided in the Chinese Parliament. Express Services (India, 2017).

5.11 Indian Concerns

These projects were taken up by the Indian as a thorn in her pawn. The new office in Delhi has been unveiled by the global media to counter/disrupt CPEC with last month's initial budget of \$300 million. For India, the most significant issues are: -

- a. 4 new nuclear plants, sponsored by China, in Pakistan. (Diplomat, 2020)
- b. China is supplying eight new submarines worth five billion dollars to Pakistan.
- c. The relationship between the ISI and NDS b/w is improving.
- d. Overshadowing the port of Chabahar. (Diplomat, 2020)

It is recommended to defeat Indian hegemonic designs: -

- a. To have a search and fight Indian attempts to disrupt CPEC, the special/designated outfit in ISI. (Hindustan Times, 2016)
- b. Near ISI co-op with the NDS.
- c. Pak will strive to get both the SCO and the BRICKS membership.
- d. To develop cordial ties with the CAR States, the Gulf States, and the ASEAN States, the foreign office must play a crucial role. (India, 2016)

5.12 Security Hazards

Because of CPEC, security risks are likely to occur;

- a. The road from Gwadar to Kashgar passes through a turbulent area and must be maintained/monitored for a long time. (UNDP, 2016)
- b. Non-state entities with the aid of other nations, e.g. India is likely to sabotage the scheme, as the mischievous intentions of non-state players would be thwarted by economic development/prosperity. (The Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018)

Pakistan is going to become the next Asian Tiger as Pakistan is going to go through major changes with this initiative, so a committed effort is needed at all levels. In this respect, the U/m is recommended: -

- a. Before taking any decision relating to CPEC, APC should be very productive and both parties should be assured. (UNDP, 2016)
- b. Technical support to be with the ministers to advise and offer strategic guidance (involved specifically, in CPEC projects).

- c. APC choices need to be shared based on expertise with the masses to carry leadership and lead on the same grid. (Reuters, 2017)

While the challenge of the energy crisis may stop, Pakistan must ensure that: -

- a. China's professional recommendations to boost the deficiencies in the power field.
- b. Continuous attempts to improve the electricity market. (The Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018)
- c. To make it resistant to weather threats, new infrastructure should be under Gr. (Reuters, 2017)
- d. To generate economic opportunities for residents, labor should be withdrawn from the areas being created.
- e. By splitting the region into sectors, simultaneous work should be begun by NHA and FWO on the schemes. (Reuters, 2017)

5.13 Foreign Investment

- a. Gwadar, with its financial headquarters (a stock exchange), international regulations, administration, and well-equipped police, is to be proclaimed an international city.
- b. A selection of international investment, insurance, real estate, banking, investments, and advertisement services to be offered to global buyers. (The Times of Hindustan, 2016)
- c. In compliance with international laws in vogue, numerous multinational cooperatives will be offered for their headquarters in Gwadar and along the route in dry ports and special ecozones.

5.14 CPEC and Security Hazards

- a. Among the newly raised div., the whole route will be split.
- b. Intelligence services should be well prepared to deal with any category.
- c. Information drive to disclose non-state actors and their financial sp. through the media (India, 2016).

Many Balochs griped that while the port and its supporting system in the city saw an elevated rate of speculation, the community network did not benefit from this. (K, 2014) Regardless of the billions of dollars donated, a 2016 study by Pakistan's Structure, Development, and Reform Service found that considering all, 71 percent of the utter population of Balochistan lives in multidimensional need, compared to 31 percent in Punjab and 43 percent in Sindh (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018).

In cooperation with his constituents, the nizam, or city hall mayor, of Gwadar, Majid Sohrabi, who won the political race in 2005, saw the lopsided plans for change. "Gwadar can be a town for the future, but these individuals are continually weeping about water and simple well-being offices. On the off chance that a port may be assembled by the government, for what cause will they not be able to create another school?" ("Development versus Democracy). (The Britannica Encyclopedia, 2018). As impoverished city residents struggle day after day for their basic needs such as food and water, engineers focus on constructing five-star resort inns and new strip malls, with land sold below promotional expenditures and promises of a "forty-year charge incentive" (Economic Times. 2014). As a result of land purchases necessary for the construction

of parkways and avenues, various community networks in Balochistan have also been dislocated (Economic Times. 2014).

"A local Baloch angler gripped Sharif Shambazi in a conference with water rights lobbyist Sharif Shambazi," They reach our homes and turn us down, settling others from far away. On the off chance that someone bursts into your home and kicks you out, and you scream your feeble shout, will you be willing to be accused? These people believe we are opposed to Uber projects. We don't. Be it as it may, we're never counseled (Diplomat, 2020).

As shown by the Balochistan Human Rights Organization (Hindustan Times, 2015), 2,578 families have been expelled from their houses, 31 As of 2007, psychological militant assaults within Balochistan saw a steady rise, with the sum of utter assaults rising by a standard factor of 1.5 per year between 2007 (with 35 assaults) and 2015 (with 483 assaults) (Corridor, 2015).

Therefore, the infrastructure being developed has been combined with an improvement in military proximity. Gwadar has been successfully turned into a violent area with a persistent closeness to the surrounding community by security forces. (Diplomat, 2020) Pakistan has allocated a military force of 15,000 citizens for the insurance of Chinese employees and truck caravans helping merchandise across the territory.

Furthermore, China has contributed to the militarization of the region, with the new Kalat Khan Mir Suleman Dawood referring to CPEC as a "Chinese military mission." ("Development as opposed to democracy)." (Aqeel, 2018). In November 2016, after a bomb attack on a Sufi worship site in the Khuzdar area of Balochistan that killed fifty-two and wounded more than one hundred, China dispatched its warships to protect the Gwadar Port as a team with the Pakistan Naval Force. (Khan et al., 2017) clarified that, in any event, as Chinese interest in Pakistan grows, it is not only

Balochistan that is affected. CPEC is pursuing a path that takes it through Pakistan-controlled Kashmir's touchy northern district of Gilgit-Baltistan, taking measures to threaten its delicate security equilibrium (Khan et al., 2017).

Neighborhood residents, much like India, have raised criticisms about the increasing proximity and influence China would have through CPEC in the region. Individuals in Gilgit-Baltistan expressed fear that the growth of CPEC, referred to as the 'Street of Gulami (Bondage)' during a progression of fighting against China and CPEC in 2016 and 2017, would prompt the further misuse of their water properties without money-related benefits to the locale and an expansion in the sight of blundering security forces (Khan et al., 2017). The then Priest of Arranging Improvement, Ahsan Iqbal, said that demonstrators against CPEC will be prosecuted under Pakistan's enemy of fear-based laws of tyranny because of the 2016 wars.

CHAPTER SIX

QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

A survey has been a reliable tool for collecting data for any research work. Interviews and questionnaires being standard practices for carrying out the survey would facilitate the researcher to find answers to the research questions and build a central argument. Data collection, in the social sciences, would provide the opportunity to secure the related information. The survey would be an orderly way to ask people to give information about their 'opinion or belief' and the success of the survey would be largely determined by how the responses matched the reality (Poland, 2005).

The survey questionnaire was aimed at obtaining precise responses within the parameters of some scale and the questions addressed various dimensions of the study. Respondents included individuals who had the requisite knowledge of the subject, they were responding to. The software SPSS was used to organize, interpret and analyze the data to reach certain conclusions. During the research, a survey was conducted by preparing a survey questionnaire and obtaining responses on a scale. To test research questions and hypotheses, relevant data was fed to the software to get interpretation and analysis.

6.1 Rationale for the Survey

During the study, a comprehensive literature review and discourse analysis of various dimensions of China's policies towards warm waters and challenges were carried out. To quantify the analysis of the discourse, a survey was 'considered appropriate for the study. Since the study was related to bilateral and multilateral relations between Pakistan and China having regional and global dimensions, a careful balance in gender, age, qualification, and professional stature of the

respondents were kept attaining a balanced opinion of the respondents. A survey questionnaire, therefore, was structured to obtain responses to the queries related to the research questions and hypothesis of the research study.

6.2 Types of the Samples of the Survey

Of the four types of samples that were used in the survey, gender was the foremost. Gender balance would be paramount in any survey to obtain the views of both men and women in society. Gender balance would increase the credibility and any negative imbalance would cast doubt on the validity of the survey. Out of 100 respondents, 55 were females making 55% of the total respondents and 45 were males making 45%. Age was the second category of the sample and the respondents included were from 20 years of age to 70 years of age to have representations from individuals of most ages. The third kind of sample was educational qualifications. The survey was aimed at having analysis from people with a balanced approach with a reasonable minimum standard of education. A minimum level of education for respondents was, therefore, kept at graduation. The fourth sample was professionals and respondents to the survey questionnaire were selected from corporate sectors, research scholars, academia, businessmen, government employees, and members of civil society.

6.3 Survey questionnaire and summary of the data

Various research indicators addressed in the sample were Pakistan-China bilateral relations in the framework of region, emerging global order, and the US policy of containment of China regarding its Pivot to Asia strategy. The survey questionnaire offered focused information to support the research questions and central argument of the study. A set of five questions in the shape of the

questionnaire was structured to address all the research questions and a response was sought from individuals having adequate knowledge of the subject. The questionnaire focused on Pakistan-China relations with a focus on the US policy of containment of China, the US Pivot Asia strategy, the emerging global political order, emerging bilateral and multilateral relations of Pakistan and China with India, Afghanistan, and Iran, and regional and global imperatives of Pakistan-China relations.

6.4 Likert scale

The Likert Scale was a measurement to gauge the opinion of respondents while the survey questionnaire was circulated to the respondents, their response was obtained on the following Likert scale: -

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

6.5 Description and analysis of the survey

SPSS statistical software generated a set of graphs and tables based on the survey questionnaire as below: -




Figure 8: The Samples of the Gender Balance

Figure 8. Specified the gender of the respondents who were represented in the sample questionnaire. The male respondents were 45 which came to 45 % of the aggregate respondents whereas the female representation was 55 respondents which was 55 % of the total respondents. The female representation was higher than the males and the reason for the improved literacy rate. The gender balance however was encouraging and the formed inclusive data for the survey.




Figure 9: Sample Representations of the Respondents – Age

Figure 9. specified the age of the respondents who were represented in the sample questionnaire. There were five categories of age of the respondents representing a certain age group. Five categories related to age included 20-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, and 61-70. The respondents to the survey questionnaire were 70 %, 10 %, 10 %, 5 %, and 5 % with individual representation as 70, 10, 10, 5, and 5 respectively. That made nearly equal representation from all the categories of ages that were set for the survey questionnaire.




Figure 10: Sample Representations of the Respondents – Qualification

Figure 10. specified educational qualifications i.e. BS/BA/BSC, MA/MSC, MPhil, and Ph.D. of the respondents who were represented in the sample questionnaire. The minimum qualification considered for the respondents was graduation and the maximum education was a doctorate. Respondent's representation came to be BS / BA/BSC (54.7 %), MA/MSC (27.4%), MS/M Phil (6.2 %), and Ph.D. (11.8%) which numbered in individuals as 55, 27, 6, and 12 respectively. As evident from the respondents, the BS/BA/BSC category of the respondents ranked at the top whereas 11.8% of respondents held PhD degrees. It manifested the standard of the survey and the contribution by respondents who held with such educational credentials signified a meaningful input.




Figure 11: Sample Representations of the Respondents – Profession

Figure 11, referred to the profession of the respondents that were represented in the survey questionnaire. There were five categories of professions of the respondents representing diverse educational backgrounds and professional training. Five categories included government employees, businessmen, academia, students, and others. The response to the survey questionnaire came to 8.4%, 4.2 %, 25.3 %, 49.5 %, and 12.6 % with representation individuals coming to 8, 4, 25, 50, and 13 respectively. The response from specific categories mentioned the sample ranged from 8% to 50% with students taking the lead though all categories were amply and judiciously represented.

1. Do you agree that CPEC will serve/enhance both China's and Pakistan's interests?




Figure 12: Response to Question Number One of the Sample Survey

Figure 12. referred to the first question of the survey sample and the question was 'Do you agree that CPEC will serve/enhance both China's and Pakistan's interests?' Most respondents fell into the category of 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. The survey substantiated that 57.9 % (58) of respondents agreed and 27.4 % (27) strongly agreed with the statement. 4 % (4) respondents strongly disagreed, 2 % (2) disagreed whereas 8.5% (9) remained neutral. The graph indicated that the majority of the respondents were of the view that there was a US policy of containment of China and in the wake of the containment policy, Pakistan-China bilateral relations would enhance.

2. Do you agree that the strategic location of Balochistan is important for China's policies towards warm water?




Figure 13: Response to Question Number Two of the Sample Survey

Figure 13. referred to the second question of the survey sample and the question was 'Do you agree that the strategic location of Balochistan is important for China's policies towards warm water?' The responses by most respondents fell into the categories of 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. The survey substantiated that 52.6 % (53) respondents agreed and 27.4 % (27) strongly agreed with the statement. 2 % (2) respondents strongly disagreed, 1 % (1) disagreed whereas 16.8 % (17) remained neutral. The graph indicated that the strategic location of Balochistan is important for China's policies.

3. Do you agree that US, India, and Iran are playing their roles in the unrest in Balochistan?




Figure 14: Response to Question Number Three of the Sample Survey

Figure 14, referred to the third question of the survey sample and the question was 'Do you agree that US, India, and Iran are playing their roles in unrest in Balochistan?' The leading response by most of the respondents fell into the category of 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. The sample survey substantiated that 40 % (40) respondents agreed and 40% (40) strongly agreed with the statement. 4% (4) respondents strongly disagreed, 2% (2) disagreed whereas 13.7% (14) remained neutral. The graph indicated that the majority of the respondents opined that US, India, and Iran are playing major roles in the unrest in Balochistan.

4. Do you agree that CPEC will have to face resistance from the internal powers of Pakistan i.e. political parties and the Baloch community?




Figure 15: Response to Question Number Four of the Sample Survey

Figure 15. referred to the fourth question of the survey sample and the question was 'Do you agree that CPEC will have to face resistance from internal powers of Pakistan i.e. political parties and the Baloch community?' Most respondents fell into the category of 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. The survey substantiated that 36.8 % (37) respondents agreed and 24.2 % (24) strongly agreed with the statement. 0 % (0) respondents strongly disagreed, 15.8 % (16) disagreed whereas 23.2 % (23) remained neutral. The graph indicated that the majority of the respondents were of the view that resistance from the internal powers of Pakistan will affect China's policies towards Pakistan.

5. Do you agree that the construction of CPEC and Gwadar Port will strengthen the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan?




Figure 16: Response to Question Number Five of the Sample Survey

Figure 16, referred to the fifth question of the survey sample and the question was 'Do you agree that construction of CPEC and Gwadar port will strengthen the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan?' The responses by most respondents fell into the category of 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. The survey substantiated that 53.7 % (54) respondents agreed and 34.7 % (35) strongly agreed with the statement. 3 % (3) respondents strongly disagreed, 3 % (3) disagreed whereas 5.1 % (5) remained neutral. The graph indicated that the majority of the respondents were of the view that China's policies would have a positive impact on Pakistan-China bilateral relations.

6. Do you agree that Baloch apprehensions should be removed to make CPEC and Gwadar fully functional?




Figure 17: Response to Question Number Six of the Sample Survey

Figure 17. referred to the sixth question of the survey sample and the question was 'Do you agree that agree that Baloch apprehensions should be removed to make CPEC and Gwadar fully functional?' The responses by most respondents fell into the category of 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. The survey substantiated that 40 % (40) of respondents agreed and 12.6% (13) strongly agreed with the statement. 2% (2) respondents strongly disagreed, 8.4% (8) disagreed whereas 36.8 % (37) remained neutral. The graph indicated that the majority of the respondents were of the view that the removal of Baloch apprehensions is necessary to make CPEC and Gwadar fully functional.

7. Do you agree that the Baloch conflict can cause a challenge for China's policies towards warm water?




Figure 18: Response to Question Number Seven of the Sample Survey

Figure 18, referred to the seventh question of the survey sample and the question was 'Do you agree that the Baloch conflict can cause a challenge for China's policies towards warm water?' The responses by most respondents fell into the category of 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. The survey substantiated that 48.9 % (54) respondents agreed and 7.4% (8) strongly agreed with the statement. 2% (2) respondents strongly disagreed, 12.8% (14) disagreed whereas 28.7% (32) remained neutral. The graph indicated that the majority of the respondents were of the view that the Baloch conflict can cause a challenge for China's policies.

8. Do you agree that CPEC will serve/enhance both China's and Pakistan's interests?




Figure 19: Response to Question Number One based on Qualification

Figure 19. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who opined on question number one of the surveys. The survey reflected those 4 respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement represented 1 BS/BA/BSC, 1 MA/MSC, and 1 MS/MPhil. And 1 Ph.D. whereas respondents who disagreed included 1 BS/BA/BSC, 1 MA/MSC, 1MS/MPHIL, and 1PhDs. Neutral included 4 BS/BA/BS.C,3 MA/MS.C,1 MS/MPHIL, and 1 Ph.D. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 34 BS/ BA/BSC, 15 MS/ MA/MSC, 4 MS/MPhil, and 5 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 15 BS/BA/BSC, 7MA/MSC and 5 PhDs. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' belonged to highly educated categories.

9. Do you agree that the strategic location of Balochistan is important for China's policies towards warm water?




Figure 20: Response to Question Number Two based on Qualification.

Figure 20. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who gave their opinion in question number two of the survey. The survey reflected those 2 respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement represented 0 BS/BA/BSC, 1 MA/MSC, and 1 MS/MPhil. And 0 Ph.D. whereas respondents who disagreed included 0 BS/BA/BSC, 1 MA/MSC, 0 MS/MPHIL, and 0 PhDs. Neutral included 14 BS/BA/BS.C, 1 MA/MS.C, 0 MS/MPHIL, and 2 Ph.D. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 27 BS/BA/BSC, 14 MS/MA/MSC, 4 MS/MPhil, and 8 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 14 BS/BA/BSC, 10 MA/MSC, 1 MS/MPHIL and 2 PhDs. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' belonged to highly educated respondents of the sample survey.

10. Do you agree that US, India, and Iran are playing their roles in the unrest in Balochistan?




Figure 21: Response to Question Number Three based on Qualification

Figure 21. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who offered their opinion in question number three of the sample survey. The survey reflected those 4 respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement represented 0 BS/BA/BSC, 3 MA/MSC, and 1 MS/MPhil. And 0 Ph.D. whereas respondents who disagreed included 0 BS/BA/BSC, 1 MA/MSC, 0 MS/MPhil, and 1PhDs. Neutral included 8 BS/BA/BS.C,4MA/MS.C,0 MS/MPHIL, and 2 Ph.D. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 22 BS/BA/BSC, 10 MS/MA/MSC, 3 MS/MPhil, and 5 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 25 BS/BA/BSC, 9 MA/MSC, 2 MS/MPHIL and 4 PhDs. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' were highly educated respondents who offered their opinion.

11. Do you agree that CPEC will have to face resistance from the internal powers of Pakistan i.e. political parties and the Baloch community?




Figure 22: Response to Question Number Four based on Qualification

Figure 22. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who offered their opinion in question number four of the sample survey. The survey reflected that 0 respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement represented 0 BS/BA/BSC, 0 MA/MSC, and 0 MS/MPhil. And 0 Ph.D. whereas respondents who disagreed included 6 BS/BA/BSC, 6 MA/MSC, 2 MS/MPhil, and 2 PhDs. Neutral included 12 BS/BA/BS.C, 7 MA/MS.C, 1 MS/MPHIL, and 3 Ph.D. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 24 BS/BA/BSC, 6 MS/MA/MSC, 3 MS/MPhil, and 4 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 13 BS/BA/BSC, 8 MA/MSC, 0 MS/MPHIL and 3 PhDs. The graph reflected that the majority representing the category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' were highly educated respondents.

12. Do you agree that the construction of CPEC and Gwadar Port will strengthen the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan?




Figure 23: Response to Question Number Five based on Qualification

Figure 23. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who gave their opinion in question number five of the sample survey. The survey reflected those 3 respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement represented 1 BS/BA/BSC, 0 MA/MSC, and 1 MS/MPhil. And 1 Ph.D. whereas respondents who disagreed included 2 BS/BA/BSC, 0 MA/MSC, 0 MS/MPHIL, and 1 PhDs. Neutral included 4 BS/BA/BS.C, 0 MA/MS.C, 0 MS/MPHIL, and 1 Ph.D. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 29 BS/BA/BSC, 17 MS/MA/MSC, 3 MS/MPhil, and 5 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 19 BS/BA/BSC, 10 MA/MSC, 2 MS/MPHIL and 5 PhDs. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the category of agree and strongly agree were highly educated respondents.

13. Do you agree that Baloch apprehensions should remove to make CPEC and Gwadar fully functional?




Figure 24: Response to Question Number Six based on Qualification

Figure 24. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who gave their opinion in question number five of the sample survey. The survey reflected that 2 respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement represented 1 BS/BA/BSC, 0 MA/MSC, and 0 MS/MPhil. And 1 Ph.D. whereas respondents who disagreed included 6 BS/BA/BSC, 1 MA/MSC, 0 MS/MPHIL, and 1 PhDs. Neutral included 29 BS/BA/BS.C, 6 MA/MS.C,1 MS/MPHIL, and 1 Ph.D. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 13 BS/BA/BSC, 15 MS/ MA/MSC, 5 MS/MPhil, and 7 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 6 BS/BA/BSC, 5 MA/MSC, 0 MS/MPHIL and 2 PhDs. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the category of agree and strongly agree were highly educated respondents.

14. Do you agree that the Baloch conflict can cause a challenge for China's policies towards warm water?




Figure 25: Response to Question Number Seven based on Qualification

Figure 25. referred to the qualifications of the respondents who gave their opinion in question number five of the sample survey. The survey reflected those 2 respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement represented 0 BS/BA/BSC, 1 MA/MSC, and 0 MS/MPhil. And 0 Ph.D. whereas respondents who disagreed included 4 BS/BA/BSC, 5 MA/MSC, 1 MS/MPHIL, and 3 PhDs. Neutral included 17 BS/BA/BS.C, 10 MA/MS.C,1 MS/MPHIL, and 1 Ph.D. Those respondents who agreed with the sample statement included 31 BS/ BA/BSC, 9 MS/ MA/MSC, 3 MS/MPhil, and 6 PhDs whereas respondents who strongly agreed included 3 BS/BA/BSC, 2MA/MSC, 1 MS/MPHIL and 1 PhDs. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the category of agree and strongly agree were highly educated respondents.

15. Do you agree that CPEC will serve/enhance both China's and Pakistan's interests?




Figure 26: Response to Question Number One based on Profession

Figure 26. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number one of the sample survey. The survey reflected that the response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 2 strongly disagreed, 0 disagreed and 0 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 4 government employees, 2 businessmen, 17 academia, 28 students, and 7 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 1 businessman, 5 academia, 16 students, 3 others, and 2 government employees comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing leading categories of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' came from the categories of academia and students.0

16. Do you agree that the strategic location of Balochistan is important for China's policies towards warm water?




Figure 27: Response to Question Number Two based on Profession

Figure 27. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number two of the sample survey. The survey reflected that the response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 0 strongly disagreed, 1 disagreed and 1 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 5 government employees, 1 businessman, 11 academia, 29 students, and 7 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 2 businessmen, 8 academia, 13 students, 3 others, and 1 government employee which comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing leading categories of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' came from the categories of other, academia, and students.

17. Do you agree that US, India, and Iran are playing their roles in the unrest in Balochistan?

25




Figure 28: Response to Question Number Three based on Profession

Figure 28. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number three of the sample survey. The survey reflected that the response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 0 strongly disagreed, 1 disagreed and 2 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 3 government employees, 2 businessmen, 10 academia, 19 students, and 6 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 1 businessman, 12 academia, 20 students, 5 others, and 2 government employees comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the leading category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' came from the categories of other, academia, and students.

18. Do you agree that CPEC will have to face resistance from the internal powers of Pakistan? i.e. political parties and the Baloch community?




Figure 29: Response to Question Number Four based on Profession

Figure 29. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number four of the sample survey. The survey reflected that the response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 2 strongly disagreed, 1 disagreed and 1 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 5 government employees, 2 businessmen, 13 academia, 12 students, and 5 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 0 businessmen, 8 academia, 11 students, 4 others, and 1 government employee that comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the leading category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' came from the categories.

19. Do you agree that the construction of CPEC and Gwadar Port will strengthen the bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan?




Figure 30: Response to Question Number Five based on Profession

Figure 30. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number five of the sample survey. The survey reflected that the response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 1 strongly disagreed, 1 disagreed and 0 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 3 government employees, 2 businessmen, 13 academia, 29 students, and 7 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 1 businessman, 10 academia, 17 students, 4 others, and 3 government employees comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the leading category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' came from the categories of others, students, and academia.

20. Do you agree that Baloch apprehensions should remove to make CPEC and Gwadar fully functional?




Figure 31: Response to Question Number Six based on Profession

Figure 31. referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number five of the sample survey. The survey reflected that the response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 0 strongly disagreed, 1 disagreed and 3 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 4 government employees, 2 businessmen, 5 academics, 27 students, and 2 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 1 businessman, 4 academia, 6 students, 2 others, and 0 government employees which comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the leading category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' came from the categories of students and academia.

21. Do you agree that the Baloch conflict can cause a challenge for China's policies towards warm water?




Figure 32: Response to Question Number Seven based on Profession

Figure 32. Referred to the profession of the respondents who were represented in question number five of the sample survey. The survey reflected that the response to the question statement was diverse. Of the respondents who were government employees, 1 strongly disagreed, 0 disagreed and 0 remained neutral in their response to the sample. Respondents who agreed to the question statement included 6 government employees, 2 businessmen, 5 academics, 30 students, and 6 others. Those who strongly agreed with the question statement included 1 businessman, 1 academic, 4 students, 0 others, and 1 government employee which comprised the miscellaneous respondents. The graph reflected that the majority of the respondents representing the leading category of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' came from the categories of students and academia.

To obtain a viewpoint on various dimensions of China's policies towards warm waters and Baloch militancy, the survey and data analysis was carried out to quantify the opinion of the respondents. Seven simple questions related to various aspects of the dissertation were made part of the sample survey questionnaire. Since the discourse was based on intellectual and academic input so an effort was made to select categories of respondents who not only had requisite formal education but also had firsthand information and knowledge of various aspects of China's policies and challenges ahead toward warm waters. The sample size was 100 selected from scholars of international relations, researchers, analysts, government official students, businessmen, and certain members of civil society to obtain information that was reliable and authentic. A considerable number of MPhils and PhDs taking part in the survey added to the reliability of information and balanced viewpoint.

The survey questionnaire focused on the nature of China's policies towards warm waters and its future dimensions and the issues in Balochistan that had a deep impact on the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor and Gwadar port. The major issues faced by Pakistan and China were emphasized in the sample survey. In the context of regional factors like India and global factors like the US, their roles in fueling unrest in Pakistan and China were vital issues. The considerable majority of the respondents admitted the fact that China's policies did have regional and global implications and agreed that these developments would have a positive impact on bilateral Pakistan-China relations and resolve the Baloch apprehensions thereby endorsing the central argument of the dissertation.

CONCLUSION

China and Pakistan desire to complete CPEC timely despite Baloch separatists' resistance and opposition. China emphasizes its security concerns and is aware of Pakistan's domestic issues, but it has never considered abandoning CPEC. Baloch separatists and other CPEC opponents face fierce resistance to the two states' resolve.

The steps made by the Pakistani government to secure CPEC are a clear indication of their determination. For instance, the Special Security Division (SSD) was established to protect Chinese nationals and the CPEC. In addition, the Pakistani Navy established a Task Force to guard the Gwadar Port and the CPEC. According to reports, the Chinese government exerted considerable pressure on these actions. When visiting SSD headquarters in February 2016, The CPEC is a Chinese dream that will be realized with Pakistan's strong assistance.

Pakistan's military presence in Balochistan has grown as a result of the security measures put in place for CPEC, and the area has essentially become a military zone. China is negotiating with Baloch nationalists to protect its investments and citizens while Pakistan expands its military presence in the area to assure the security of CPEC.

Chinese authorities also make an effort to placate the Baloch people by asserting that Gwadar Port is only used for economic activities and that China does not intend to militarize Pakistan. This demonstrates how discussions with Baloch nationalists boost security measures. Even though Chinese government representatives did not remark on the meeting, the Chinese ambassador to Islamabad stated that the dialogue had made Baloch nationalists less of a threat to CPEC.

In this regard, the risk presented by Baloch nationalists to CPEC has greatly decreased as a result of the actions taken by China and Pakistan in their desire to achieve CPEC and safeguard its security.

Baloch nationalists' goals cannot reflect the preferences of the Baloch people because not everyone in Balochistan shares their viewpoints. Baloch politics are divided between pro- Pakistan and anti-Pakistan camps or those who favor integration and those who favor secession. Even leaders of the anti-Pakistani separatist movement disagree with one another and behave suspiciously around one another.

Naturally, the tribes' rivalry precludes them from speaking with a single voice. Additionally, Balochistan's political parties are tribal organizations that prioritize short-term goals over long-term objectives. The Baloch are unable to adopt a unified, unwavering, and aggressive stance against CPEC because political parties lack long-term, shared ideals and do not guide the populace toward specific goals.

According to Pakistani academics, nationalism there is growing and more people are identifying with their country daily. Pakistan's 2008 elections, which have relevance to Balochistan, are a good illustration of this. The Baloch participated in elections despite separatist calls for a boycott. Elections in 2013 in which Baloch nationalist political parties also participated provide another clue. A 2012 survey found that only 37% of Baloch people support independence, meaning that the vast majority are opposed to the idea. The advantages of CPEC economically are more significant for the Baloch. Balochistan would draw an initial investment worth USD 7.1 billion, according to statistics from the Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform.

There are expectations of an "economic revolution" as a result of the CPEC's increased investment in Pakistan and rising employment. The idea that people won't be left out of the economic revolution is starting to gather traction, especially in Balochistan, which is home to the Gwadar Port, which will catalyze regional development. The governor of Balochistan, Muhammad Khan Achakzai, has said that the Baloch people will primarily benefit from the CPEC project. As a result, Baloch nationalists are invited by Chinese Ambassador Yao Jing to "look after the interest of the country and work towards its progress if they are true Pakistanis".

Balochistan's economic activity has already increased. Locals have established stores, hotels, and homes in the CPEC-completed areas of Balochistan in addition to the energy and infrastructure investment projects that have already started. CPEC will aid in the development of 400,000 employments, according to the International Labour Organisation. According to the Applied Economics Research Centre, between 2015 and 2030, CPEC could generate approximately 700,000 direct jobs.

Asserting that the Belt and Road Initiatives benefit local communities and guarantee job development, Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi said, "We will ensure that these projects do not create distortions and will be inclusive and open to all". This results in jobs for the Baloch, and the spreading idea that "There is work for everyone" has a good effect on the Baloch's perception of CPEC. "CPEC is a great step towards progress and development," a Balochistan citizen said. We have great expectations for it because Balochistan's residents would be the project's ultimate beneficiaries.

In conclusion, CPEC appears to have given the Baloch people reason for optimism. Because of this, even while some Baloch nationalists persist in maintaining their resistance, it is expected that this will lead them to reevaluate their views on CPEC. For instance, Jeander Baloch, a BLA spokesperson, declared that the Baloch people "under no circumstances" would embrace the conspiratorial plot known as CPEC.

FINDINGS

Given the situation, it is possible to predict that the socioeconomic progress brought about by CPEC will result in a decrease in terrorist acts and uprisings. Terrorist assaults and target killings have already decreased by 50%, according to a report from the provincial home department (Saleem, 2017). Balochistan's security situation has started to become better. Baloch people integrate well into Pakistani society as a result of socioeconomic progress and a safe environment. Even while the conflict between the center and the peripheral won't completely disappear, it will be lessened as a result. Baloch nationalism characterized by antagonism to the center may deteriorate if the conflict between the center and the periphery subsides.

This study is appropriate for an in-depth review of China's role in the South Asian zone. Since it is a major regional player in this field, it cannot neglect its role in contemporary regional affairs. Balochistan, on the other hand, has a special role in China's warm-water policies. China's hunger for Middle Eastern resources, especially crude oil, is unquenchable as a growing global force. China also relies on the US Navy, which patrols the waters around the Middle East's oil fields, as well as the Straits of Malacca, through which almost all of China's oil and commercial products travel. As a result, a pipeline running through Pakistan from Balochistan to Xinjiang, China's western province, will satisfy China's thirst while reducing its reliance on American goodwill. The Baloch militancy, on the other hand, could pose a serious threat to China's interests.

Pakistan and China signed a historic CPEC agreement in 2013. The multibillion-dollar CPEC project will link Pakistan's Gwadar Arabian Sea port with China's landlocked Xinjiang region. The 2500-kilometer route gives China direct access to the warm waters of the Arab Sea. In Pakistan, CPEC is being hailed as a strategic game changer, and China sees it as a crowning achievement in

their Belt and Road Initiative coordination strategy (BRI). With a \$1 trillion budget, the BRI aimed to link Asia, Europe, and Africa through highways, railways, and ports. Gwadar's all-weather deep channel terminal is responsible for CPEC's geopolitical significance. Even though Gwadar's strategic importance to Pakistan had increased since 1958, it was underdeveloped and neglected due to the CPEC program Gwadar port will assist China in securing maritime energy routes and project power to the Persian Gulf's Cape of Good Hope and the Horn of Africa. CPEC presents major security risks for India and the United States. Pakistan has become embroiled in the current cold war by aligning with China against the Indo-US Grand Axis aimed at containing Chinese hegemony in the region. This cold war's results will have a huge influence on Pakistan-India relations. The CPEC project's development, as well as China's dream of connecting to the Arabian Sea, is crucial for peace in Pakistan and Balochistan. Particularly, incredibly.

The CPEC was seen by insurgents as an assault on Baloch's land and rights. For them, it would result in regional demographic imbalances, as outsiders from Punjab and other parts of Pakistan marginalize them and threaten their cultural survival.

China-Pakistan should honestly allow India to join the CPEC project because, in the international scenario, China-India-Pakistan has the same position in the nuclear sense, but China-India has a population, size, and economy that are comparatively equivalent. The economic factor can be quite similar to China-India because both countries strive to be big economies or strong international powers. China-India, as well as two big markets and developing countries, are major neighbors of each other. Despite this, their shared unresolved problems serve as a buffer in successful relationships. China-Pakistan does not have a problem of this kind that hinders its close relations. So, ahead of China, there is a new image for India-Pakistan. Given these similarities, it is crucial to foster confidence, understanding, and economic cooperation between China and India. Wars do

not matter in the international arena, but economics matters. It is the economy that has provided a fillip to China's CPEC initiatives that will boost the Chinese economy globally. As a result, India should either join the CPEC or look for another viable option. Otherwise, China could be interested in India-Pakistan in the future as China blocks India's permanent membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as in the Kashmir question that the CPEC passes through. In reality, India is the only country in South Asia that poses a serious threat to China's dominance.

Nevertheless, as witnessed by the recent U.S. revelation of a new South Asian strategy, especially about Afghanistan and Pakistan, India-U.S. became a close strategic partner, where the U.S. indicated that India assume responsibility for playing a greater role in assisting war-torn Afghanistan in economic and development assistance. The United States has brought India into the picture by entrusting India with a strategic position in Afghanistan. U.S.-India relations have resulted in a strategic shift in South Asia as a result of the India-U.S. alliance and the China-Pakistan alliance, with the potential to increase regional complexity.

Though CPEC is a big Beijing-Islamabad initiative, as this dissertation shows, it also faces significant challenges. Conflicts between regional players' interests have also become more likely. On the one hand, due to the energy crisis, Pakistan is losing 18 billion dollars a year. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would benefit Pakistan's economy as well as China's regional economic influence. The execution of short-term projects demonstrates that the CPEC meets the requirements; an example is the solution to a 30% electricity problem in Bahawalpur. In addition, the economic growth of Pakistan grew from 5.4 percent in 2017 to 5.8 percent in 2018, with FDI growing to 5 percent of GDP. The export rate continued to rise to 12.0 percent, while 16.6 percent of imports fell. CPEC would boost China's presence in the region because it is the fastest and easiest way to save time and money while gaining easy access to Eurasian and Central Asian states.

Ships arrive in China in 27 to 32 days on average, although this is projected to drop to 7 to 8 days soon. On imports from the EU and the Middle East, China will save US\$1350 and US\$1450.

India, on the other hand, wishes to strengthen its political and economic presence in the region. They believe it would be unlikely without China's power and Pakistan's economic development. By exposing the Balochistan rebellion, Narendra Modi and RAW spy Kulbhushun thwarted the CPEC (Rahat Shah, Shakir Hussain, and Asif Rasheed 2020). Another explanation is that New Delhi misunderstood the effect of CPEC on the 788 Indian companies that work in the Jabel Ali port. These are potential reasons why India is funding the Balochistan rebellion to halt the project. Furthermore, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is fair and has assertive policies; one recent example is India's attack on Pakistan on February 27, 2019. "India breached the Line of Control (LoC)-Strikes from Pakistani airspace across the LoC. "In retaliation, two Indian aircraft were shot down in Pakistani airspace by the PAF (Pakistan Air Force). If the militancy issue is not resolved quickly, foreign investors would be afraid to invest in Gwadar for fear of losing money if FDI suffers a negative impact. The game-changer will become a game-tension without solving these issues. The game-tension in Pakistan must be altered.

Two limitations encountered by the investigator during the study will need to be listed. Second, interviews have helped in forming the right and wider viewpoint on the issue to some degree as a powerful qualitative tool. The researcher interviewed scholars from China and Pakistan in the cooperative, but not from India, which could have helped to cover different points of view.

In international affairs, bilateral or multilateral relations between states have been addressed, both from a practical and a complex perspective of interdependence. Two opposing paradigms of international relations theory, namely realism and dynamic interdependence, were used to examine

the relationship between Pakistan and China. To create a relationship between the abstract realm of theory and the actual domain of policy implemented by both countries, various assumptions were referred to as explanations. In the sense of all-encompassing economic cooperation involving electricity, infrastructure, and trade, Pakistan and China have become more and more dependent on each other over time. The relations that have been established between the two countries over the last five decades through various networks, such as government and private sectors, non-governmental elites, banks, and business organizations, reflect this cooperation and interdependence. The bilateral relations between Pakistan and China, as well as the paradigms of complex interdependence, were very important in this context, and the links between Pakistan and China were better represented.

As a result of the unresolved territorial conflicts, Pakistan had safety problems with India. As a result, the theoretical model approached bilateral relations through elements of dynamic interdependence, while realism clarified 'Pakistan-China ties,' but did not threaten each other in their respective security domains in terms of their security problems. Interdependence was the result of economic necessity,

Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and China began in 1949, and numerous global, regional, and national developments have been maintained. Three distinct stages of historical development have seen the relations between the two nations. The first step was taken during the Cold War, when, because of ideological differences, relations between Pakistan and China were initially characterized by aversion and hesitancy, but eventually progressed to reconciliation and cordiality. Pakistan and China formed a close relationship during the second period, which started following the Cold War. It was a time when China was establishing itself as a global economic power, and the world was coming to terms with the fact of US primacy in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's

disintegration. After 9/11, the third move started when China was well on its way to reclaiming its role as a regional and global stakeholder, and the United States joined Afghanistan in its global war on terrorism, which had repercussions for South Asia as well as East Asia.

There was a superpower competition between the two world powers in the geographical vicinity of Pakistan and China during the Cold War. Pakistan wanted to join US-backed alliances, such as SEATO and CENTO, to alienate the Soviet Union to resolve its security problems. In terms of alliances and foreign policy measures, China expressed concern about Pakistan's decisions. During a time when states were encouraged to join one of the two global power centers of global scope and effect, India chose to remain non-aligned. During this time, India also arrived close to China. When the United States was looking for state support to fight the communist Soviet Union's expansionist ambitions during the Cold War, China preferred to rely on the Soviet Union.

Not only were global and regional developments a factor in the patterns of behavior of Pakistan and China, but domestic events and threats were also involved. In the case of Pakistan, the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the 1971 war and subsequent dismemberment of Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the involvement of Pakistan in the fight against it were the events that had a profound effect on Pakistan as a state. Similarly, the 1949 revolution and the CPC's rise to power, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the 1978 reforms and opening up, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Tiananmen Square incident all formed China as a nation. Despite this, Pakistan was almost always involved due to two reasons. First, as in Kashmir, Pakistan was engulfed in Indian aggression over territorial disputes, and it was difficult for both countries to emerge from the vortex of animosity. Second, Pakistan's geopolitical position continued to keep it engaged with the United States, first in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s and then in the post-9/11 US war on terror.

At the end of the Cold War, there was a change in regional and global political alignments. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union around the world, the USA began to exercise leverage as the sole superpower. As a result of its economic reforms and agenda opening, China, on the other hand, has begun to extend its regional and global reach. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India started to realign and lean towards the United States, projecting it as a huge market and the world's greatest democracy. Pakistan, which had partnered with the US for almost a decade to stop the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was wary of obtaining nuclear weapons from the US. Both Pakistan and China were equal political, strategic, and economic partners in the unique situation in which the United States began distancing itself from Pakistan. The events of September 11th, 2001, have transformed the country's domestic and global political environment. In its global war on terror, Pakistan became a significant ally that the US began to rely on in the post-9/11 era. In their immediate neighborhood, China had misgivings about the US presence and Pakistan became a crucial ally in the U.S. war. Pakistan could somehow assure China that its alliance with the US was, under the circumstances, a kind of compulsion and had nothing to do with China and that the closeness of Pakistan to the US does not, in any case, affect the relations between Pakistan and China. The courtesy between Pakistan and the United States, on the other hand, was not a welcome development for India, and it did not stop India's regional hegemony ambitions. In the post-9/11 period, many state-level leadership visits were exchanged for ink agreements, and political, strategic, and economic relations continued, demonstrating the friendly political ties between Pakistan and China.

During Pakistan's conflict with India, China was a staunch supporter of the region. Following the tragedy of 1971, when the region was dismembered, China provided all necessary assistance, assisting Pakistan in becoming self-sufficient in its military capabilities to fend off any possible

threat. China has assisted Pakistan in achieving its nuclear energy acquisition goals through materials, information, and technology. China's strategic support for Pakistan, as well as subsequent security cooperation with its armed forces, has been motivated by the need to counterbalance India's ambition to extend its sphere of influence.

Trade, investment, energy, and infrastructure growth have included the economic ties between Pakistan and China. The CPEC would be a game changer in the two countries' economic relationship because it will bring in a whopping \$50 billion in investment, with more set to follow. The proposed construction of energy projects in various parts of Pakistan, as well as connectivity from the Chinese province of Xinjiang to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, would be the most significant benefit that Pakistan would reap from this partnership. The economic outlook of Pakistan will improve with that investment. With regard to trade, during the fiscal year 2014-15, the trade volume between Pakistan and China increased by 18.2 percent. It indicated the mutual benefits that both nations have started to reap from trade ties.

China's remarkable development in the post-Cold War period was nothing short of phenomenal. China not only became a leading Asian economy, but it also started to aspire to global status after achieving the position of the second largest economy after only two decades of continuous transition. The rise of China was a development that had regional as well as global consequences. The United States had refrained from taking steps to prevent China from presenting a threat to the US's regional and global interests, acknowledging the miracle of China's rapid growth. To preserve primacy, the US, on the other hand, had been reacting to China's regional and global outreach. Although the implementation of a containment policy against China was rejected by US officials, US developments in East Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia indicated that the US planned to have

a strong presence in these countries.

The United States presence in Afghanistan, as well as a strategic nuclear deal with India, facilitated regional containment efforts. Many academics in the United States have argued that our China strategy must include both containment and engagement because China's participation in regional and global political and economic systems would be more beneficial to the United States than isolation. By involving more than sixty continental nations, China's Belt and Road Initiative, which it defines as an ambitious undertaking, is expected to weaken containment and rebalancing strategies. Even China, however, would need to be cordial in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. China and India have emerged as competitors in the South Asian region as a result of rising strength. Pakistan and China have developed friendly political, strategic, and economic links.

Its primary aim would be to foster and sustain peace and stability in the periphery to achieve the region's economic and development goals. China's decision to place its territorial disputes with India on hold showed that the country intended to negotiate with regional countries while also addressing territorial disputes with them. That policy will show that China has prioritized its economic interests over political differences. India, for its part, also formed cordial ties with Afghanistan and Iran when all three political, strategic, and economic aspects of relations were in place. Instead of taking a confrontational approach, India would prefer to pursue its economic interests with China. Nonetheless, animosity and resentment over unresolved territorial conflicts will continue to plague India-Pakistan relations, leading to an atmosphere of distrust.

While there was an economic justification for India and China that both countries offered each other to participate in economic and trade opportunities, there were reasons to believe that competition between the two countries was also true for the regional power to assert space. In

terms of realism, before intervening to protect its economic interests, China would attempt to negotiate with India and would certainly start to contain India if it challenged China's regional interests. The government identified two challenges to India's regional hegemony. Firstly, China, which India pointed out as a justification for carrying out its nuclear tests in 1998, and secondly, Pakistan, which became a nuclear-armed state the same year and continued to challenge the hegemonic regional aspirations of India. The competitive essence of ties will continue to dominate if states view the relationship through the lens of their interests. If states choose to work together based on interdependence and cooperation, engagement would be successful.

Changes in the global context, as stated in the paper, had a major impact on China's policies and relations with Pakistan. The new international order, the India-US nuclear agreement, and the US containment policy for China are all major changes or components. These developments affected global politics in the post-Cold War period in general, and especially in the post-September 11th century. In the post-9/11 period, the United States was embroiled in a war that not only expanded the strategic reach of the nation but also exhausted its financial resources. Following 9/11, the rise of China and several other countries ushered in a multipolar world in which no single nation would dominate. As organizations, the EU and the BRICS have exercised influence, and countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa have begun to make an impact. Multipolarity is likely to return, considering that the planet has historically been a multipolar entity and that unipolarity has only existed for a short time. However, the growth of China or other developing countries does not suggest that the US is weakening. The United States will remain a central player in the multipolar world order, with a major role in global decision-making.

The sanctions regime was imposed in 1998 after India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests. Shortly after these nuclear accidents, India and the United States started nuclear negotiations,

which culminated in India receiving a remarkable nuclear package. With India's position in the nuclear world, it was difficult for India to complete the contract, but US support helped India overcome the obstacles. The offer worried Pakistan's and China's policy and diplomatic circles. The Chinese scholarship posed concerns about the US' intentions to include China, and the agreement seemed to be in line with this proposal. Not only did the agreement award India global nuclear status, but it also strengthened India's position as a regional rival to China. Pakistan, a longtime competitor of India and a close US partner in the war on terror felt left out. Apart from Pakistan's and China's worries, the world believed that US discriminatory acts could cause a global nuclear arms race. The nuclear agreement between India and the United States strengthened Pakistan's and China's nuclear relations.

The rise of China appeared to cause two styles of reactions from the rest of the world and the United States: intervention and containment. Countries that wish to engage with China positively will prefer to benefit from China's economic wealth while also ensuring that their political and strategic interests are not jeopardized. Countries that want to contain China, on the other hand, should expect their political and strategic interests to be questioned and policies to be established in response. Instead of confronting or containing China, US officials, and academics argued that the US preferred to engage with it because China's development, in their opinion, was counter to US interests in the region and around the world. Without directly referring to the containment policy, the US has carried out a range of measures, such as alliances with countries on the Chinese periphery, the India-US nuclear deal, and the US military presence around China, which have indicated the structure of the strategy. As Pakistan was never included in the regional containment ring of China, this would also help strengthen ties between Pakistan and China.

This study aimed to understand the unrest in Baloch as a major challenge to China's hot water policies and to resolve Baloch's concerns about the successful completion of the CPEC and Gwadar port's political, strategic, and economic aspects. The study discussed the imperatives of internal factors such as extremism, provincial road rivalry, regional autonomy, militancy in Baloch, and global factors such as the new international order, the US-India nuclear deal, and China's US containment strategy. The adoption of the peace and reconciliation process to achieve regional peace and stability, as well as the region's connection to economic dividends and the common good, would be an obvious response. Similarly, avoiding political and strategic conflict and entering a time of productive interaction will be the global outcome. The conflict would mean conflict and turmoil, while stabilization and stability would mean participation. Bilateral and multilateral participation of regional and international players was the way forward if the planet was to be a peaceful place for all.

Nonetheless, the key areas of cooperation and issues related to the CPEC have been addressed in current research. It was clear that the relations between the two countries were founded on strong ground and that, amid a series of regional and global events that threatened to destabilize these vital links, they had thrived. Despite the stresses of changing regional and global developments, it can be expected that these partnerships will continue to exist in various areas and remain solid and mutually beneficial. This is possible because Pakistan and China both understand their ties and appreciate the importance of partnerships in the CPEC planning and implementation process. Since both nations have been determined to safeguard their traditionally fraternal relationships, they are expected to be able to cope with storms, setbacks, and difficulties peacefully and move forward together.

The related problems found in the objectives of the research project were discussed in the current doctoral dissertation. Certain topics may not, however, be discussed in the dissertation. There were some topics on which the researcher might have spent considerable time deliberating, but doing so would have placed the study's emphasis at risk, and those topics were not significant enough to merit their project. Comprehensive studies and prospective research in some of the most relevant areas will be proposed in light of the regional and global factors affecting CPEC and Balochistan. Future recommendations would include the possibility of Iran joining the CPEC, Pakistan as a factor in the ties between India and China, the role of major powers in the CPEC, the prospects for regional connectivity between South Asia, the conflicting interests of Pakistan-China-India in the region and Pakistan's strategy to balance China with the US.

China's BRI plan should be viewed as a component of its soft power strategy as it strives to become a regional and global force. An essential component of BRI is CPEC, which connects Kashgar with Pakistan's Gwadar Port.

The Pakistani center has welcomed CPEC with enthusiasm because it sees it as a way to address the nation's economic issues and as a chance to elevate Pakistan to a position of geopolitical importance in the region.

Baloch nationalists in Pakistan reject the initiative for several reasons despite their country's enthusiasm. This opposition has taken the form of demonstrations as well as attacks on officials, Chinese workers, and projects. China worries about the safety of its financial investments and of its citizens who are employed in Pakistan. Baloch nationalism is viewed as one of CPEC's hurdles because of this.

Baloch nationalism is not a barrier to CPEC. Baloch nationalists are dispersed and unable to communicate as a unit. Baloch nationalists lack the power in their dispersed state to persuade the Baloch populace of the merits of their opposition to CPEC.

Additionally, the anticipation that CPEC will bring about an economic revolution in Pakistan and Balochistan, the region that is home to Gwadar Port, as well as the assumption that jobs, earnings, and living standards will rise, leads to the Baloch having a good attitude towards CPEC. In impoverished Balochistan, these hopes must not be undervalued. Baloch nationalists may change their perspective on CPEC as a result of this. Geographically, we are neighbors whereas history has made us friends. Economic has made us partners, whereas necessity has made us allies.

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APPENDIX I - QUESTIONNAIRE

CHINA POLICIES TOWARDS WARM WATERS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD: A CASE STUDY OF BALOCH MILITANCY

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Note: Sir/madam you don't need to answer all the questions. You can answer at your convenience/expertise. I am also not expecting long answers keeping in view your schedule.

Research Questions

Q 1: What is the strategic importance of Balochistan in contemporary geopolitical settings?

Q 2: How do you foresee Baloch unrest as a challenge to China's policies towards warm waters?

Q 3: What are the apprehensions of Baloch regarding Gwadar Port and CPEC?

Q 4: What role internal and external powers are playing in fueling unrest in Balochistan?

Q 5: What measures can be taken by Pakistan to counter security threats from Baloch militancy to make CPEC and Gwadar fully functional for successful China policies toward warm waters?

Q 6: In the current geo-political and economic scenario what are China's policies towards warm water and its significance for Balochistan?

Q 7: How Baloch conflict can cause a challenge for China's policies towards warm waters?

