

# **SINO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS DURING COLD WAR ERA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**



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**INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY**  
**ISLAMABAD**

**2020**

PhD  
327.5105421  
AUS

Accession No. 7H25282



Accession No. 7H25282

China  
Pakistan  
Diplomatic relations

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
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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the Discipline of History at the Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University, ISLAMABAD

**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY & PAKISTAN STUDIES  
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY  
ISLAMABAD**

**2020**



*In the name of Allah,  
the Most Beneficent,  
the Most Merciful*

## **DEDICATION**

This Research Work is dedicated


To

**MY WORTHY PARENTS  
&  
SAIMA TARIQ**

## DECLARATION

I, Muhammad Tariq, hereby declare that this dissertation has been written by me in its entirety on the basis of my research work under the sincere & heartfelt guidance of my supervisor- DR. ABDUL ZAHOOR KHAN at the Department of History & Pakistan Studies and Co-Supervisor-DR. MANZOOR KHAN AFRIDI at the Department of Politics & International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Islamic University Islamabad.

No portion of this Dissertation has neither been copied from any source nor has been submitted before for any degree or qualification in this or any other university or educational institution.




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
## **FORWARDING SHEET**

The Dissertation, titled "SINO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS DURING COLD WAR ERA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE", put forward by Mr. Muhammad Tariq, Registration No: 5-FSS/PHDHIS/S12 in partial fulfillment for the award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in History, has been successfully completed under our guidance, care and supervision.

We are satisfied with the excellence of scholar's research work and he is now allowed to get his dissertation in its indistinguishable formation / configuration (Subsequent to having had all supplementary accomplishments if there any exist, congregated) submitted for the finishing point of go forward course of action as per modus operandi of International Islamic University, Islamabad.



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
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
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
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
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Dated: **June 16, 2020**

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Beyond measure & too wonderful thanks to ALLAH (سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى Subhanahu wa-ta'ala)- The Supreme Creator of the whole universe and the world hereafter, Who until the end of time guides in gloominess as well as in light & illumination, does help in difficulties and odds, when all supplementary channels' upper limits end.

Prime respects and honors to the absolute (Last & Final), the most beloved Prophet-MUHAMMAD (S. A. W. W.)-Mercy for all the worlds, who enabled the human-being to recognize his Creator.

It is really difficult to include the names of all those persons who did involve directly or indirectly in the accomplishment of this research. I have secured guidance and help of many individuals and institutions.

First of all, I would like to express my deepest sense of gratitude and indebtedness to my commendable supervisor, Dr. Abdul Zahoor Khan, for his invaluable guardianship (academic & administrative), and scholarly supervision. His knowledge, expertise, skillfulness and guidance were a great source of strength and motivation all along-from the very beginning till the end.

My humble compliments go to my Co-Supervisor, Dr. Manzoor Khan Afridi, who guided very constructively during the research period, proved very much fruitful for me.

Many thanks go to Dr. Mujeeb Ahmad- my creditable teacher & Chairman Department of History & Pakistan Studies- who made me accessible the very foundation that led to the finishing point of this study.

I am very much grateful to my admirable teachers-Dr. Akhtar Hussain and Dr. Safi Ullah Khan Marwat, who guided me and I have learnt a lot from both of them.

My paramount gratitude goes to Dr. Syed Akmal Hussain Shah who guided me and corrected the very pitch for my research that I dreamt to have.

I cannot remain thankless to my worthy father- Major Mumtaz Ali Khan (Retd.) and praiseworthy mother who had always prayed for all the successes and highest points of mine in my life and it was their mission for me to do PhD in my subject.

It will be a predetermined injustice if I ignore my family members; who all provided me moral and financial support during my whole research. More than ever, I owe my special gratitude to my wife- Saima Tariq, who with her great & grand patience, understanding and encouragement helped me complete this dissertation.

I am also thankful to my lovely daughter Fatima Tariq and son Hamza Khan Tariq, for their supplications and my little 'Lucifers' like Abdullah Khan Tariq and Romaysa Tariq, who tried their best not to give me a moment of peace to concentrate on my studies.

I am highly obliged to my Mother-in-Law, Mrs. Safi, who resides in Rawalpindi. I would not have attended the coursework without her strong help and shelter which she provided to me & my family.

I am especially thankful & appreciative to my PhD-Fellows at IIUI, Dr. Muhammad Idrees, Dr. Shakeel Ahmad, Dr. Muhammad Altaf Malik, and Dr. Ismaeel Adaramola Abdul Azeez for their encouragement and genuine camaraderie for all the time.

I shall be failing in my sense of duty if I do not acknowledge, most sincerely, the help and contributions of staff members of many institutions in Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Islamabad. In particular, I would like to mention Army Central Library- GHQ, Rawalpindi, Central library, University of Peshawar, National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad; National Documentation Wing, Islamabad; National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad; Central Library Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Seminar Library of the Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah Library, Islamabad; Central Library International Islamic University, Islamabad; National Library of Pakistan, Islamabad; and Press Information Department, Islamabad.

**MUHAMMAD TARIQ**

## ABSTRACT

*The intention and purpose of this research is to understand the nature of relationship between two neighboring countries, whose political system are juxtapose to each other. Pakistan is the only country in the world, which is established on the name of Islam and which is an Islamic Republic. China, on the other hand, is a Communist nation and has no belief in God (As far as political system is concerned). Chinese considered religion anathema to political and economic development and Pakistanis, during the Cold War, considered Chinese as 'Godless Society'*

*This study is the historical perspective and it seeks to analyze the growth of relationship between the two countries, which were opposed to each other in their initial days, ambivalent in mid-fifties and then forged a strong relationship, which is considered as higher than mountains, deeper than the ocean, stronger than steel and sweeter than honey.*

*President Xi Jinping, during his visit to Pakistan in April, 2015, had called Pakistan as "Iron Brother" which means a friend who is firm and solid as iron. Calling a friend "Iron Brother" is the highest praise and affection that can be expressed for a friend in Mandarin. The use of this phrase for Pakistan by President Xi Jinping simply shows that China attaches the highest importance to Pakistan-China friendship in the conduct of its foreign policy. There is no doubt that these friendly sentiments are fully reciprocated by Pakistani people and government. Over the past several decades, Pakistan-China cooperation in political, security, economic, commercial, and cultural fields has followed an upward trajectory. Both sides recognize the need to deepen this cooperation even further.*

*The strong foundation of friendship, which was evolved in early sixties, strengthened in seventies and eighties and passed through all the trials and tribulations of the Cold War era. This time-tested friendship is an example for all the developing and developed countries. It can rightly be said in 21<sup>st</sup> century that China is Pakistan's America and Pakistan is China's Israel. However, the researcher has tried his level best to answer the following questions in this study;*

- 1- How does Pakistan start to establish its diplomatic ties with China and United States as, it has been facing the initial difficulties and extortions to the security of Pakistan?*
- 2- How does Pakistan face the early ups and downs in Sino-Pakistan relations?*
- 3- What are the events which compel the then President, General Muhammad Ayub Khan to bring out a specific transformation in China-Pakistan Relations?*
- 4- What are the ambiances and surroundings under which Pakistan predisposes towards China in 1970s?*
- 5- Has the then President, General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq stood successful in establishing the close relations with both of the states, China and United States, simultaneously?*



## **ABBREVIATIONS**

CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
COAS	Chief of the Army Staff
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Cooperation
GATT	General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
GHQ	General Headquarters
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEFA	North-East Frontier Agency
PIA	Pakistan International Airlines
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialists Republics

## GLOSSARY

<i>Akhand Bharat</i>	Akhand Bharat or Akhand Hindustan is an irredentist term meaning "Undivided India" in Sanskrit and encompassing those nations or regions of South, East, and Central Asia that were once part of pan-Indian empires or influenced by the spread of Hinduism and Buddhism.
<i>Bhai Bhai</i>	This term was used in early fifties when relations between India and China were very warm and Indians considered Chinese as their brothers. The term literally means that Indians and Chinese are brothers. Due to political differences the slogan lost its utility.
<i>Lok Sabha</i>	The Lok Sabha or House of the People, is the lower house of India's bicameral Parliament, with the upper house being the Rajya Sabha. Members of the Lok Sabha are elected by adult universal suffrage and they hold their seats for five years or until the body is dissolved by the President on the advice of the council of ministers. The house meets in the Lok Sabha Chambers in New Delhi.
<i>Panchsheela</i>	The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, known as the Panchsheel Treaty: Non-interference in others internal affairs and respect for each other's territorial unity integrity and sovereignty (from Sanskrit, Panch: five, Sheel: virtues), are a set of principles to govern relations between states.

## INTRODUCTION

*When a US delegate once confronted a Chinese diplomat about Beijing's uncompromising support for Pakistan, the Chinese reportedly responded with a heavily-loaded sarcastic remark: "Pakistan is our Israel" <sup>1</sup>.*

The year 1947 has been a reference point for the people of South Asia, evoking simultaneously the jubilation and pride at the achievement of freedom from colonial rule and pain and horror at the unimaginable bloodshed which accompanied Partition. While in India Partition was mourned as an act of tearing apart of Mother India, in Pakistan it marked the birth of a new state for Muslims of India created in the face of opposition from both the British and the Hindus<sup>2</sup>. Pakistan, at its birth, realized that great powers had not welcomed the division of India. United States, China and Soviet Union wanted the withdrawal of British forces and the emancipation of India from British yoke of slavery but no one was interested in the division of Sub-Continent. Chinese, under Chiang Kai-Shek, vehemently opposed the division of India in Cairo Conference of the Allied. Soviet Union deadily opposed the division of a country on the basis of religion. Relations between Pakistan and Soviet Union had never been good<sup>3</sup> from the inception. The Soviet government did not send felicitations on the establishment of the country. The American government opted for hand off South Asia approach<sup>4</sup>. They gave a cold response to Pakistani requests for arms. Pakistan's relations with India were at worse. Relations with China took a new turn with the establishment of Communist regime there. When the Indians, in 1949, stopped the supply of coal, the New Chinese regime took initiatives to supply coal to Pakistan. Korean War (1950-53) further strengthened the relations; however, Pakistan's alliance with the United

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<sup>1</sup> Aljazeera. (2010). China: 'Pakistan is our Israel.' Aljazeera. Retrieved 5 March 2015, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2010/10/20101028135728235512.html>

<sup>2</sup> Shahid Nadeem and Madeeha Gauhar, *The India-Pakistan Reconciliation And Other Experiences In Post-Conflict Management* (Paris: The Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2009), p.89.

<sup>3</sup> Latif Ahmad Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America* (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980), p.61.

<sup>4</sup> H. W. Brands, "India and Pakistan in American Strategic Planning, 1947-54: The Commonwealth as Collaborator", *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, July 2008, p.42.

States' strained the relations considerably. Relations till 1958 were tense but when, Ayub Khan came into power on 7<sup>th</sup> October 1958, situation further deteriorated. With the Pakistan's entry into a defense alliance with the United States in 1959, Chinese parted the ways with Pakistan. They, however, advised Pakistan to stop at the precipice. But after the accession of President Kennedy to power, Pakistan felt lonely in the region because her policies were heavily tilted towards India. After 1962 Sino-India war, President Muhammad Ayub Khan brought changes in Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's policy from 1962 to 1966 is considered to be heavily inclined towards China. Ayub Khan followed a policy of bilateralism from 1966 to 1969. It was the most difficult task for Ayub Khan because China, United States and Russia did not like this policy. The next President General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan followed Ayub's policy. He visited China but at the same time tried to come closer to US and Soviet Union also. This was not liked by any Super Power. Even Soviet Union advised General Yahya to select one great power. In 1971, when Pakistan and India fought over Bengal, no great power came to Pakistan's rescue. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto established very close relations with China. Sino-Pakistan close nuclear cooperation disturbed many in India and USA. General Zia Ul Haq was the only successful leader of Pakistan who milked both China and US at the same time, thanks to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. With the Soviet departure from Afghanistan, US-Pak relations were again in doldrums but Sino-Pakistan relations proved their worth. They were really time tested now.

### **Statement of the Problem**

During Cold War Era (1947-1991), the World was divided into two blocs, the Capitalist bloc and the Communist bloc. China, till the demise of Stalin (a leader of the Communist bloc), was on the side of Soviet Union. Till 1971, USA was the enemy of both Soviet Union and China. Although China-Pakistan relationship is special because it transcends the

changes of the times and politics and represents a fine example of friendly state-to-state interactions but in past Pakistan had been vacillating between the two giants, USA and China. At that times it was difficult for Pakistan to establish close relations with both the countries. Even post 1971, when USA and China had come closer to each other and Pakistan played pivotal role in bringing them closer but when India exploded bomb in 1974 and Pakistan's security was threatened, China came to Pakistan's rescue. The nuclear cooperation between the two countries was not acceptable to US. Only in Afghan war, Pakistan established closed relations with both China and United States at same time.

Anyway, in this research the relationship between the two countries (China and Pakistan), during the Cold War period has been investigated and the upshots of Sino-Pakistan relations on India, Afghanistan, Soviet Union and United States have also been tried to make unearth.

### **Objectives of the Study/Research**

- 1- To investigate the modus operandi, how Pakistan starts to establish diplomatic ties with China and USA.
- 2- To explore the early vicissitudes in Sino-Pakistan relations.
- 3- To examine the events which compel the then the President, General Muhammad Ayub Khan to bring out the change in the China-Pakistan Relations.
- 4- To scrutinize the circumstances under which Pakistan has inclined towards China in 1970s.
- 5- To evaluate the role of President, General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq in establishing the close relations with both of the countries, China and USA simultaneously.

## **Scope and Significance of the Study/Research**

The major objective of this study was to explore Pakistan-China relations in the context of various developments taking place in the post-Cold War period. Within this context, the dissertation would focus on the possible responses and foresee developments in the future which would impact Pakistan-China relations. Most importantly, the aim of the study would be to understand the regional and global implications of Pakistan-China relations.

China is a great country, both economically and militarily. Because of its influence, military power and emerging economy it cannot be neglected in international politics. Even during the cold war, it was a leading communist nation. In Third World it is considered as a militarily giant and potential rival to United States of America. Pakistan, at the dawn of independence, was in deep internal and external troubles. India was an arch rival and Afghanistan also emerged as a hostile country. Both Afghanistan and India collaborated against Pakistan. Pakistan was in search of new friends and alliances. India was the closest and immediate threat to Pakistan and the later wanted security against the former. This study sheds light on strategic and political studies. It is not related to defensive and economic relationship.

## **Review of the Literature**

There is plenty of literature available on Pakistan's Foreign Policy but very few authors have particularly contributed on Sino-Pakistan relations.

Latif Ahmed Sherwani in his masterful achievement, *India, China and Pakistan*<sup>5</sup> has written a beautiful comparative study of relations of the three countries. He covers the Indo-China war of 1962 and the advantages which Pakistan wanted to gain from their confrontation. Latif Ahmed Sherwani's another terrific book, *Pakistan, China and America*<sup>6</sup> is also a

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<sup>5</sup> Latif Ahmad Sherwani, *India, China and Pakistan* (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1967).

<sup>6</sup> Latif Ahmad Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America* (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980).

comparative study like India, China and Pakistan. In this triangle he described the role of USA in Pakistan's affairs and Pakistan's efforts for normalization of relations with China and the difficulties which Pakistan was facing in maintaining smooth relations with USA and China. He elaborated in detail China's relations with non-aligned Pakistan and aligned Pakistan. The book is divided into 12 chapters.

B. L. Sherma's, *The Pakistan-China Axis*<sup>7</sup> elaborates Pakistan's relations with China and its repercussions for India. The author thinks that China-Pakistan Axis is one of the fascinating developments in international affairs. Like an exploding meteorite, it has affected many countries and regions in various ways. The book contains ten chapters. He discusses the vicissitudes in Pakistan's foreign policy. He elaborates the Jinnah's vision of Pakistan, who wanted close relations with India. However, his early demise did not allow that dream to materialize. He also notes that the division of India created more animosity than amity and Pakistan looked to the Western countries and China for security. The book is an Indian perspective of Sino-Pakistan relations.

P. L. Bhola's book, *Pakistan China Relations* discusses all the shades of Pakistan China relationship and its impacts on India and India's responses. It is forwarded by Professor Iqbal Narain. The author considers fostering of Pak-China relationship as a search for Pakistan's politico-strategic partnership. It is the story of two countries' close interaction from 1958 to 1971. He discusses in detail that in the initial period both China and Pakistan were not interested in each other but he thinks that Pakistan had some political and strategic objectives. Indian, Soviet and Afghan factors were the source of Pakistan's strengthening of relations with China. Indian, Soviet and American involvement in the region also brought China in the limelight.

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<sup>7</sup> B. L. Sherma, *The Pakistan-China Axis* (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1968).

K. Arif edited some papers on *China Pakistan Relations 1947-1980*<sup>8</sup>. The book is consisted of press statements of high dignitaries of both Pakistan and China. The book is consisted of five chapters. The book includes notes, speeches and interviews of Chairman Mao, Chou En- Lai, President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This book is one of the important sources of Sino-Pakistan relations.

Anwar Hussain Syed wrote history of *China & Pakistan Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*<sup>9</sup>. It is divided into eight parts and many chapters. He has described the context of Pakistan's China policy vis-à-vis the antagonistic attitude of India and Soviet Union and the unreliability of Americans. Slowly he develops the story from hostile to positively hostile and eventually to intimate relationship. The book discussed Pakistan-China relations from 1949 to 1972. It covered Pakistan's signing of SEATO and CENTO, Bandung conference in 1955, Ayub Khan's era and Pakistan-China alliance, Indo-Pak war of 1965 and China's military and economic assistance in the post Tashkent phase. Pakistan-China rapprochement and cooperation that began in the 1950s and 1960s has been explained in this book and it provided an account of the shaping of Pakistan-China relations.

Farhat Mahmud's book *A History of US-Pakistan Relations* is an interesting story of US-Pakistan relations and the involvement of China. Chapter two is Pakistan-United States-China Relations: 1958-60 and chapter six is The Development of Sino-Pakistan Relations: 1960-65 and chapter seven is Pakistan's Relations with China and the United States during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and after. It is a marvelous book which narrates the story of four countries, India, Pakistan China and USA. Ayub administration started, as expected, by drawing closer to the western block in general and the United States in particular. Relations with China worsened in the initial years of Ayub Khan Regime, however, the

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<sup>8</sup> K. Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-80*, Lahore : Vanguard Books, 1984.

<sup>9</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, *History of China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale* (United States, University of Massachusetts Press, 1974).



arrival of Kennedy to the White House changed the scenario and Pakistan leaned towards China. The author elaborated Pakistan's relations with China and United States during Indo-Pak war of 1965 and after.

Niloufer Wajid Ali wrote *Communist China and South & Southeast Asia*<sup>10</sup>. The book is divided into five chapters. The book discusses Chinese perspectives of foreign policy. China's border problems and the demarcation of the borders are discussed. Chapter five discusses China's relations with the committed (Aligned) countries including Pakistan.

Mushtaq Ahmed's book *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*<sup>11</sup> deals with the early period of Pakistan's relations with major powers. He discussed Pakistan's quest for an alliance with the West and its vicissitudes in relations with China. The book was published in 1968.

Ramakant edited *China and South Asia*, which is a conglomeration of various write ups, who contributed articles on Chinese perspectives of South Asia, modernization of Chinese military, India-China Relations, Pakistan-China Relations and Chinese relations with other smaller South Asian countries are discussed.

King C. Chen edited *China and the Three Worlds*. It is the Chinese perspective of their foreign policy. The book contains articles written by Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai. The book projects the Peking's perspectives of the world, China's foreign relations between 1949 and 1970 and relations since 1971.

Dennis Kux's book, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000*<sup>12</sup> is voluminous book. It narrates the story of fifty years of US- Pakistan relationship, no specific chapter is assigned to Pakistan's relations with China, and however, references have been given to Sino-Pak relations and apprehensions in the US about the gradual development in their relationship.

The book of Shahid M. Amin's *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, A Reappraisal*, is about

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<sup>10</sup> Niloufer Wajid Ali, *Communist China and South & Southeast Asia*, (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1975).

<sup>11</sup> Mushtaq Ahmed, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Karachi: Space, 1968).

<sup>12</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies*, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2011).

Pakistan's relations with important countries, it terminates at the Kargil crisis and a whole chapter is assigned to Pakistan-China relations. The book is consisted of sixteen chapters. The book starts with the rationale of partition and discusses Pakistan's relations with neighboring countries. The author successfully brings the story of foreign relations to the Kargil crisis of 1999 but chapter ten particularly deals with Pakistan's establishment of diplomatic relations and the early vicissitudes in relations with China.

Mushtaq Ahmad's book *Foreign Policy, Pakistan's Options*<sup>13</sup>, consists of Pakistan's relations with important countries. He discusses Pakistan's relations with India, Russia and USA and only one chapter 'China's Impact' is dedicated to Sino-Pak relations and he declares China as a new power in the making. He discusses Pakistan's initial encounters with China, joining of SEATO, China's fears, Sino-India war and Sino-Pakistan rapprochement and Chinese help in Indo-Pakistan disputes.

Musa Khan Jalalzai's book, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Sectarian impacts on diplomacy*, consists of Pakistan's relations with the neighboring countries and the Super powers. A chapter is dedicated to Sino-Pak relations. The story starts from 1951 and finishes at 2000.

Mohammed Ahsen Choudhri's book, *Pakistan and the Troubled World*<sup>14</sup>, also highlights Pakistan's relations with important countries and a chapter is written on Sino-Pak relations. Latif Ahmed Sherwani's, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* is another substantial contribution in understanding the background of present study.

Hameed A. K. Rai's, *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*<sup>15</sup>, Vol- I is a comprehensive study of Pakistan's relations with Super Powers and India and the policy of alliances, he

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<sup>13</sup> Mushtaq Ahmad, *Foreign Policy: Pakistan's Options* (Karachi, Royal Book Co, 1995).

<sup>14</sup> Mohammed Ahsen Choudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World*(Karachi, Royal Book Co, 1993).

<sup>15</sup> Hameed A.K. Rai's, *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Vol-I*, Lahore : Aziz Publishers, 1981.

discusses Chinese world strategy and China's foreign policy towards Pakistan and China as a factor in Indo-Pakistan relations.

*Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, Vol II is the second volume about Pakistan's Foreign Policy; the author elucidates the development of Sino-Pak relations. Hameed A. K. Rai's, *Pakistan in the United Nations* is a voluminous and splendid material. It is about the speeches delivered by Heads of Pakistani delegations in General Assembly from 1948 to 1978. It sheds light on Pakistan's efforts for Chinese representations in the UN and Pak-China cooperation at the UN Forums at later stages.

Rafi Raza edited *Pakistan in Perspective*<sup>16</sup> in 1997. This important reference provides a wide range of historical and other information about Pakistan's first fifty years. The articles, written by leading Pakistani experts, discuss education, the constitution, foreign affairs, family planning, economics, and human rights. In this particular edition, he discussed concisely Pakistan's relations with USA, USSR and China. He elaborates Pakistan's efforts for alliances, Pakistan-China cooperation, deterioration of relations with USA, Indo-Pak war and the super powers.

V. B. Karnik's, *China Invades India* elaborates the story of invasion against the background of Chinese history and Sino-Indian relations and it describes the Indian apprehensions about Pak-China relations. It consists of five chapters. The author discusses in detail the policy adopted by Nehru government, the escalation of tension and later Indo-China war. He elucidates the originality of the border dispute.

Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri wrote *Pakistan and the Great Powers*. It is an interesting narration of Pakistan's interaction with big powers. He discussed Pakistan's relations in detail in chapter *Pakistan and China*.

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<sup>16</sup> Rafi Raza edited *Pakistan in Perspective*, Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1997

S. M. Burke's, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis*, is a beautiful narrative of Pakistan's foreign policy. It is a year-wise story of Pakistan's Foreign affairs and written in beautiful manner.

S. M. Burke also wrote *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*. This book is an account of Indo-Pak from the years prior to the independence of Pakistan to 1974. Chapter seven is written about the Sino-Indian war.

*Foreign Policy of Pakistan* is written by many authors. Qutub ud Din Aziz wrote chapter five on 'Relations between Pakistan and Peoples' Republic of China'. He ends the story of relation in 1963.

William J. Brands wrote *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*. It is a voluminous book. It consists of four parts and seventeen chapters. The author successfully wrote on Indo-Pakistan disputes, tussles and the involvement of Great Powers including China. He discusses in detail the trauma of independence and Pakistan's search for status and security. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* is a terrific narrative on Pakistan's foreign endeavors. Bhutto is heavily inclined towards China. He discusses the International relations' theories and close relations with China.

Bhutto's *The Myth of Independence*<sup>17</sup> is another interesting book on foreign policy of Pakistan. He discusses the overall review of Pakistan's relations but also highlights Sino-Pak relations.

*India and Her Neighbors* is written by Dr S. S. Bindra. It is a study of India's Political, economic and cultural relations and interactions. The book is divided in to five chapters. All the chapters deal with five neighbors' of India except Bhutan. Chapter one deals with India's relations with Pakistan. He talks about various bones of contention including Pakistan's close relations with China, which India considered to be Indo-centric.

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<sup>17</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, Reproduced by Sani. H. Panhwar (Karachi: Mehran UET, 1967).

John Rowland's book *A History of Sino-Indian Relations*<sup>18</sup> is very important secondary source. This book addresses the origins, nature, and significance of Sino-Indian tension and its relationship to Sino-Soviet conflict. By giving accurate dimensions to the Chinese threat confronting India and the Himalayan kingdoms, the author provides clues to the crucial question of Peking's intentions in Asia. The book starts from 18<sup>th</sup> century Chinese-Indian interaction. He slowly develops the saga and brings it to the post-independence cordial relationship of the early years. He discusses Sino-Indian war and then Pakistan as India's 'troublesome' neighbor at length.

Girilal Jain's book *Panchsheela and After* is written before the 1962 Sino-India war but he discusses in detail the initial cordial relationship.

*Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations* is a gigantic book which deals with the aims and principles of Indian foreign policy. The book consists of 751 pages.

J. S. Bains' *India's International Disputes*<sup>19</sup> is a legal study. The book is written before the Sino-Indian Border War; however, it recognizes the border dispute as a big source of trouble. Disputes with Pakistan are also discussed. It is a good study of the Pakistani, Chinese and Indian disputes.

R. K. Chatterjee wrote *India's Land Borders, Problems and Challenges*<sup>20</sup>. It is consisting of 269 pages. The book discusses India's relations with her neighbors'. The book starts with the Himalayas as the spiritual home of Hindus and Buddhism. One whole chapter discusses Indo-Chinese relations on Tibet issue and then Chinese invasion of India. Chapter three elucidates the border troubles with Pakistan, the Kashmir issue and other small irritants with Pakistan.

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<sup>18</sup> John Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations* (United States, D. Van Nostrand Co.; Edición: Probable First, 1967).

<sup>19</sup> J. S. Bains, *India's International Disputes: A Legal Study* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962).

<sup>20</sup> Chatterjee, R.K. *India Land Borders: Problems and Challenges* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1978).

President Muhammad Ayub Khan's, *Friends Not Masters*<sup>21</sup>, is another important primary source about the period under study. He exclusively discusses Pakistan's relations with United States and China. It consists twelve chapters and appendixes. Apart from initial few, which pertain his childhood and biography, the rest deal with political history of Pakistan. The book was reproduced by Sani H. Panhwar in 2018.

Another important primary source about the period is President Mohammad Ayub Khan's diaries. *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan (1966-72)*<sup>22</sup> is edited and annotated by Craig Baxter. It is a voluminous book, consisting of 600 pages. President Ayub Khan started writing diary from 2<sup>nd</sup> September 1966 till 30th November 1972. Field Marshal Ayub Khan kept his diary from September 1966 to October 1972, a very active period in Pakistan's history which included Ayub's yielding of the presidency to Yahya Khan and the period of Yahya's rule that saw the ending of Yahya by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Ayub's diary presents his views and interpretations of the events of the period for which it was kept. The diary was discontinued when declining health preventing him from writing. In his introductory note he stated that the diary must be withheld from publication for an unspecified time as his comments may contain sensitive material. Accordingly, the diary has been withheld from publication for 30 years, although it does include material that is critical of many personalities and events. Ayub also stated that the material contained in the diary might serve as the basis of a sequel to his book, *Friends, not Masters*. The editor has included additional notes that pertain to many of the persons and events of this turbulent time in Pakistan's history. The diary will therefore provide essential material for those studying the period, and also provide a means for those who lived through these times to understand the views of Ayub Khan.

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<sup>21</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends, Not Masters* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967).

<sup>22</sup> Craig Baxter, *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1966-1972* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008).

G. W Choudhury in his book, *Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966*<sup>23</sup> discusses the relations of two countries but in chapters Divergent Foreign Policies: Part I 1949-59 and Armed Conflict 1965 thoroughly discusses Pakistan, India and China.

Sangat Singh's *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*<sup>24</sup> is consisting of seven chapters. Chapter four of the book specifically deals with Pakistan-China relations

Abdul Sattar's *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005*<sup>25</sup> is consisting of twenty three chapters. Chapter seven particularly deals with China. He discusses Pakistan's alliances with the Western countries and China's concerns. He highlighted Pakistan's developing relations with China in 1950s.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's *Bilateralism, New Directions* is a good treatise of Pakistan's foreign policy in general and about the history of Pakistan-China relations in particular. He wrote about the importance which Pakistan had given to China and the role Bhutto played in establishing intimate relations with China.

*China, A Country Profile* and *Pakistan, A Country Profile* are two books published by US government. They are not related to the foreign relations of the countries but about some facts & figures and respective histories of the countries.

J. P Jain's *China Pakistan and Bangladesh*<sup>26</sup> is about the close Sino-Pakistan relations. It is consisting of eight chapters. Establishment of diplomatic relations, boundary agreement, course of relations and Chinese help to Pakistan in 1965 war are thoroughly discussed. The book ends at 1971 war and Chinese assistance to Pakistan and relations of China and Bangladesh.

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<sup>23</sup> G. W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

<sup>24</sup> Sangat Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (place Asia Publishing House, 1970).

<sup>25</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005 : A Concise History* (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2007).

<sup>26</sup> J. P. Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974).

*Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-66* is a book on the two sub-Continent rivals, by K. C. Saxena, but chapter five, Sino-Pakistan Alliance and chapter fifteen, China's Ultimatum, are related to close Sino-Pak cooperation against India. The book shows Indian perspective of Sino-Pakistan relations.

R. K. Jain edited *China Pakistan and Bangladesh, Basic Documents, 1950-76*. It consists of 170 Statements, Notes, Resolutions, Press Conferences, Reports, Announcements, Speeches, Letters, Comments, Editorials, Declarations and Joint Communiqués of the celebrities of Pakistan and China in the above mentioned time frame.

*Foreign Policy of Pakistan*<sup>27</sup> is written by conglomeration of authors. Qtubuddin Aziz wrote thorough article on Relations between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China.

G. W. Choudhury also wrote *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the major Powers*. It consists of four parts and eleven chapters. The part three of the book deals with China and the Sub-Continent. It consists of China's relations with different countries of the Sub-Continent.

Hasan Masuma edited *Pakistan in a Changing World*<sup>28</sup>. It consists of eleven articles and chapter ten of the book, *The Focus of China's South Asian Policy* is written by Zubeida Mustafa. She discussed political and military relations between Pakistan and China in detail.

*Khurram Ali Shafique* wrote *Iqbal-An Illustrated Biography*. It consists of 208 pages and is divided into five chapters. Although it is not about the Sino-Pakistan relations but Iqbal's views on communism are given in it.

Latest edition to Pakistan's foreign policy is Andrew Small's book '*The China Pakistan Axis*'<sup>29</sup>, Published by Random House India, the book contains 344 pages and is divided into eight chapters. Broadly the book is concerning the post-cold war period but references have been given related to the Cold War history. It is an attempt towards the hitherto less studied

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<sup>27</sup> Qtubuddin Aziz, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Karachi: The Allies Book Corporation, 1964).

<sup>28</sup> Masuma Hasan, *Pakistan in a Changing World* (Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978).

<sup>29</sup> Andrew Small, *The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).



and less researched arena of the Sino-Pakistan relationship. It is a vital area of study in the global political setup, and has various ramifications on not only South Asia but cross-continental implications. Andrew Small has delved deeply into the study of this peculiar relationship and its changing contours down through the corridors of time. Small has given a proper insight into the fomenting of the Sino-Pakistan relationship and the changing nature of this relationship over a period of time. The relationship is guided by political expediency, changes in the internal political dynamics of Pakistan, insurgency in Xinjiang province of China and also the various geopolitical changes in the greater international system. China has helped Pakistan as a vital entity which can enable it to contain India and thus balancing the power dynamics of the region.

Oxford University Press' published *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012* written by Pakistan's Ex Foreign Minister Agha Shahi is a good edition. It is divided into 26 chapters and have lot of material related to the subject.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's *The Quest for Peace*<sup>30</sup> sheds light on Pakistan's Foreign Policy. It consists of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's speeches which he delivered in 1963-65. He delivered those speeches in United Nations Security Council, in the Afro-Asian Solidarity forum and on Pakistan's relations with India. Those speeches were full of China's praises.

Verinder Grover edited a book *Political System in Pakistan*. The book consists of various articles which the writers wrote in different journals.

G.W. Choudhury wrote *Basis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy*. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wrote *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*.

Wayne A. Wilcox had written on *India Pakistan and the Rise of China*. Chapter five is about *The Undeclared War in Southern Asia*. In this chapter he elaborated China's threatening

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30 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace: Selections from Speeches and Writings, 1963-65* (Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs; Edition First, 1966).

policies, its border agreements with Pakistan and Burma and China's border tensions with India.

Mohammed Younous wrote *Reflections on China*<sup>31</sup>. Mohammed Younous remained Pakistan's Ambassador to China. The book consists of 323 pages and eighteen chapters. It is an attempt to interpret China's strategic role in the region as well as in the world. In part I, the author discusses historical and ideological background of China, In part II he elaborates regional situation on China's borders and Part III is about some aspects of China's world role. Chapter nine is about China & Pakistan's friendship in adversity.

Swaran Singh edited *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation*<sup>32</sup>. It is an Indian perspective of Sino-Pakistan relations. It is written by conglomeration of writers. The book consists of 405 pages and eighteen chapters. Although the book describes China-Pakistan relations in the context of 9/11 but history of the relations is also mentioned frequently.

*Pakistan Horizon of 1986* is a good source of Sino-Pakistan relations. Nilofer Mehdi wrote on *Sino-Pakistan Relations: Historical Background* Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema wrote on *Significance of Pakistan-China Border Agreement of 1963*, M. B. Naqvi wrote on *Pakistan's Place in Chinese Calculations* and Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri wrote on *Strategic and Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations*.

Mao Siwei's *China and the Kashmir Issue*, written in Strategic Analysis Magazine in March 1995, is one of the most important article on China's policy on the Kashmir issue in 1950s and 1960s.

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31 Mohammed Yunus, *Reflections on China: An Ambassador's View from Beijing*(Michigan, United States, Wajidalis Limited, 1986).

32 Swaran Singh, *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation: Indian Perspectives*(New Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 2007).

Muhammad Tajuddin's *China's Third World Policy from Mao to Deng*, also written in Strategic Analysis Magazine of March 1996, is very important source which insinuates China's policy towards Pakistan and other Third World countries.

Dawa Norbu's *Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region*, published in the said magazine of July 1988, is also a good source of Chinese policy towards Pakistan and India in 1950s and 1960s.

Steven I. Levine in his lengthy article, *China and South Asia*, discusses China's policy towards South Asian Countries including Pakistan. The article was published in the above mentioned magazine in January 1989.

Philip Mason's *Afro-Asian Conference Prospect*, was published in Royal Central Asian Journal in April 1955. It is a good story of the Bandung conference.

*Baghdad Pact and SEATO* were Pakistan's very important defense agreements with Western countries which created apprehensions in Chinese minds. The Pakistan Review published three articles, *The Baghdad Pact*, in May 1956, *Pakistan and the Baghdad Pact* in April 1956 and *Facts about "SEATO": Background Information also in April 1956*.

Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi's press conference on 29<sup>th</sup> September 1965, published in *international magazine, Survival*, in December 1965 after the culmination of Indo-Pak war is also important primary source. Khurshid Hyder's *Pakistan's Foreign Policy in Survival* of January 1967 is a good source on Pakistan's relations with Afro-Asian countries, America and China.

Khalid Bin Saeed in his article, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests*, published in Asian Survey in March 1964, is very important treatise on Sino-Pak relations.

Five articles appeared on Sino-Pak relations in *IPRI Magazine* of Summer 2001, summer 2003, July 2003, March 2005 and summer 2005.

Asian Edition of *Time Magazine* on 24<sup>th</sup> September 1965 wrote about China's policy on Indo-Pak war.

Cabinet Division Library (NDC) was consulted and highly important declassified primary source material ranging from 1950 to 1969 was procured.

Former President Muhammad Ayub Khan's articles in *Foreign Affair Magazine* in Jan 1964, *The Pakistan American Alliance*, *Pakistan Perspective* and his *Essentials of Pakistan's Foreign Policy* in 1961 were the important source on Sino-Pakistan relations. President Ayub Khan also wrote *Foreign Relations* in 1965 and *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, in 1967. Both the articles were published in *Pakistan Horizon* in 1965 and 1967 respectively. These articles also shed light on the trends of Sino-Pakistan relations and its impact on Pak-US relations.

*Pakistan and Her Neighbors*, *Foreign Relations of a New State*, June 1956, *Pakistan: Foreign Policy under Review*, in March 1962, *Pakistan: A Flexible Foreign Policy*, in November 1963, *Pakistan Turning Point for Asia*, 1963, *Pakistan A Step Child of the West*, September 1963, *The Coolness of America*, September 1965, *Pakistan: Dissatisfaction with Tashkent*, July 1966, *Popular Feeling for China*, in August 1966, and *America back in Favor: Weaker Political Ties With China*, April 1968, were few important articles appeared in the *Round Table Magazines* are also consulted. The articles were written by Pakistan desk of the Round Table Magazine and the names of the authors were not given.

*China's Himalayan Frontiers: Pakistan's Attitude*, October 1962, *Tashkent and After*, written by Michael Edwards in July 1966, were published in *International Affairs Magazine* and cover Sino-Pakistan relations.

W .M. Dobell's *Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan*, (Spring 1969) was written after Ayub Khan's resignation and is a good view of Ayub Khan's policies. The article was published in *Pacific Affairs*. Gurtov Melvin's *Sino-Soviet Relations and Southeast Asia* was published in *Pacific Affairs magazine* of winter 1970-71.

Charles B. McLane's *Chinese Words and Chinese Actions*, published in International Journal of Canadian Institute of International Affairs in summer 1963. It was a good narrative of China's policies towards other fellow Asian countries.

In Regional Studies Magazine from Islamabad, Rashid Ahmad Khan wrote *China's Policy towards South Asia*, in winter 1986-87 and Professor Khalid Mahmud wrote *Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All Weather Friendship*, in winter 2001. In Pakistan Horizon very important and thought provoking articles were written from time to time. K. Sarwar Hasan's *The Foreign Policy of Liaqat Ali Khan*, in December 1951, just after his assassination was a good article on the ex-Premier's policies. M. A. H. Isphani's *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-64*, Pakistan Horizon 1964, was a superb narrative of Pakistan's relations with other countries including China. Khalida Qureshi wrote *United States Arms Policy in South Asia, 1965-67*, explains the bilateralism of Ayub Khan. It also focuses on the last phase of Ayub Khan's relations with the Super powers. Chaudhri Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's first foreign minister, wrote *South Asia-A Perspective*, in Pakistan Horizon, 1965 and Zubeida Hassan wrote *Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India*, in the same magazine of 1968 issue. Zubeida Hassan discussed Ayub Khan's efforts for normalization of relations with Soviet Union. Zubeida Mustafa wrote on *The Sino-Pakistan Border: Historic Aspect*, in Pakistan Horizon's magazine in 1972.

Dr. Muhammad Ijaz Butt's article *Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement-2 March 1963* is a thorough study of the un-demarcated border between the two countries. He discussed in detail the history, negotiations and Indian objections on the demarcation agreement. The article was published in the Pakistan Defense Review of summer 1997.

Dawn News Papers from 1958 to 1991 were scanned.

## **Research Questions**

- 1- How does Pakistan start to establish its diplomatic ties with China and United States as, it has been facing the initial difficulties and extortions to the security of Pakistan?
- 2- How does Pakistan face the early ups and downs in Sino-Pakistan relations?
- 3- What are the events which compel the then President, General Muhammad Ayub Khan to bring out a specific transformation in China-Pakistan Relations?
- 4- What are the ambiances and surroundings under which Pakistan predisposes towards China in 1970s?
- 5- Has the then President, General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq stood successful in establishing the close relations with both of the states, China and United States, simultaneously?

## **Research Methodology**

### **Research design**

The research is based on qualitative research design and sub-design is that of historical, descriptive and analytical.

### **Data collection**

The primary sources are available at National Archives of Pakistan, National Documentation Wings, Cabinet Division Islamabad, Punjab Archives, and Punjab Secretariat Lahore.

The secondary sources are available at IIIRD, International Research Institute of International Islamic University, Islamabad and in the Central library of International Islamic University, Islamabad. The Secondary sources used in the research like books, articles were collected from National library Islamabad, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, Allama Iqbal Open University Islamabad, Punjab University Lahore, The Islamia University of Bahawalpur, Staff and Command College Quetta Library, Army

Central Library GHQ, Rawalpindi, National Defense University Islamabad and International Islamic University, Islamabad. Apart from these sources, e-Resources available on internet.

### **Locating the Sources**

Primary and secondary sources are the sources for data collection. For primary data, documents have been used from National Archives of Pakistan, National Documentation Wings, Cabinet Division Islamabad, Punjab Archives, Army Central Library GHQ, Rawalpindi and Punjab Secretariat Lahore.

### **Identifying the relevant sources**

The researcher has identified the relevant sources from plenty of literature. Thus, the Newspaper, official files, government documents are used for this research.

### **Review of source**

Most of the primary source's documents or interviews, diaries, autobiographies, official documents, speeches, and proceeding collectively helped for the research. They were more helpful in order to collect the reliable material and reach to the main target of the research.

### **Collection of Facts**

The sources of data collection have been primary and secondary sources. Review of the documents are the books and articles. The documents for the data collection are composed of reports, official documents, diaries, and other relevant sources.

### **Data Analysis**

The method to achieve the objective of this research work is historical, descriptive and analytical.

## **Tools of reliability**

The researcher has been had the internal criticism and have not accepted the information given by the source uncritically but has also been consulted other contemporary sources to cross check that information or fact.

In a nutshell, the research has been done in both of the historical, descriptive and analytical manners. Maximum emphasis has been laid on the authenticity and truthfulness. Efforts have been made to contribute a biases free and an impartial research on Pakistan-China relations.

Primary sources have been consulted in the completion of the thesis. Oodles of secondary available sources written by Pakistani and Foreign authors have thoroughly been made practicable. Internet facilities have also been utilized. Various magazines and Journals published from time to time have been referred to, particularly the Dawn Newspaper from 1958-1991 are consulted. Time, The Economist, International Affairs Magazine, The Round Table Magazines of various countries have been accessed for the writing of the thesis. Dawn Newspaper are acquired from Army Central Library GHQ, Rawalpindi. Plenty of declassified materials regarding Sino-Pakistan relations from 1950-1969 have been utilized.

## **Organization of the Study/Research**

Not including the Introduction and the Conclusion, this research is divided into Six chapters. Chapter- 1 "*Early Years of The Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Phase- I (1947-1958)*" deals with the critical analysis of the Foreign Policy of Pakistan during the very beginning of the bondage between the two states. Chapter- 2 encompasses the "*Sino-Pakistan Relations: An Exploration for The Alliances, Phase- II (1958-1962)*" Chapter- 3 consists of the "*Pakistan's Policies Pro-People's Republic of China, Phase- III (1963-1966).*" Chapter- 4 comprises on the critical analysis of the "*Pakistan's Quest in Lieu of The Bilateralism and General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan's Foreign Policy, Phase- IV (1966-1971).*"



Chapter- 5 takes account of the “*Pakistan-China Relations During the Regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the Early Years of General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq, Phase- V (1971-1979).*” And finally the Chapter- 6 includes the “*Soviet Union’s Intervention in Afghanistan, Its Impact on The Region and Pakistan- China Relations (1979 - 1991).*”

### **Findings of the Thesis:**

- Throughout history, Pakistan remained in search of security. Initially, Pakistan was not interested in China as it was not the member of Security Council. Taiwan was permanent member and she favored Pakistan’s stance over Kashmir. However, when Pakistan realized that soon China will become member of Security Council, Pakistan recognized China.
- Aim of Pakistan’s policy makers was security against India. Communism till Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had never been a threat to Pakistan.
- Pakistani politicians, bureaucracy and intelligentsia were inclined towards West and considered Communist China as ‘godless society’, but when Pakistan was repeatedly rebuffed by West, and then it inclined towards China.
- Most of the time-period Pakistan wanted to maintain balance in its relations with China and US. However, the more US would pressurize Pakistan, the more it inclined towards China.
- After 1962, Pakistan found a common friend in shape of China against India.
- The history of relationship tells us that although China actively helped Pakistan in economic and security fields but during wars, Pakistan had to fight alone.
- The credit for establishing close relations is always given to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, however, this credit should go to Prime Minister (and later Foreign Minister in Ayub Era) Muhammad Ali Bogra and President Mohammad Ayub Khan.

- It is seventy years of strong relationship that gave impetus to CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridors)

# CHAPTER- 1

## EARLY YEARS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN, PHASE- I (1947-1958)

### 1.1- History of the Region

Contacts between people living in Indo-Pakistan region and Chinese are not new. They have old history, though they are newly born.<sup>33</sup> Pakistan's Indus valley and China's Xia civilizations are amongst the old civilizations of the World. When Buddhism was the supreme religion in China, craftsmen from Swat used to construct metallic statues for the Chinese. Old rock carvings tell us about the travels of Chinese envoys to Kashmir about 2000 years ago.<sup>34</sup> Cultural contacts were numerous but geographically the territories were cut off by the Himalayas for most of the history.<sup>35</sup> The Chinese and Indian civilizations had trade with each other but because of the huge Himalayas in the north, they were virtually cut off from each other. Contacts were very less because of almost impenetrable Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau.<sup>36</sup>

Islam penetrated into South China in 8<sup>th</sup> century. Sinkiang and some other Chinese regions were brought under Muslim control. The Muslims of the Sub-Continent kept relations with China, including diplomatic and commercial relations.<sup>37</sup> The historic relations remained intact even after the arrival of the British in India and the cultural and commercial interaction between the two peoples continued.<sup>38</sup> President Xi Jinping, while visiting Pakistan in April 2015, reminded that Chinese leaders had had relations with Pakistan for 2000 years,<sup>39</sup> (He

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<sup>33</sup> Mohammad Yunus, *Reflections on China* (Lahore: Services Book Club, 1988), p.127.

<sup>34</sup> Ghulam Ali, "China's Kashmir Policy: Back to Neutrality", *IPRI Journal*, Summer 2005, Islamabad. Research Institute, P.43.

<sup>35</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.39.

<sup>36</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), p. 31.

<sup>37</sup> Qutubuddin Aziz, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Karachi: The Allies Book Foundation, 1964), p.75.

<sup>38</sup> J.P.jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974), p.1.

<sup>39</sup> *The News*, Rawalpindi, 29 April 2015.

meant the land not Pakistan). There is no doubt that the visit of the Chinese leader was highly productive and undoubtedly a real game-changer. Pakistan, in its history, had not received such a welcome foreign guest, whose visit had opened the floodgates of massive development. Not only local elements but some foreign countries including a couple of apparent friends of Islamabad are also strongly inimical to the vast Chinese investment in Pakistan specifically development of Gawader port. Gawader is an outlet for China for trade with the Middle East, Africa and Even Europe. This link, between Gawader and Chinese province of Xinjiang, would reduce the distance of Chinese trade route that is 12,000-kilometre that Middle East oil supplies now take to reach Chinese ports through Pacific Ocean.<sup>40</sup> This economic corridor, which is called CPEC, that is, China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is further a part of OBOR (One Belt and One Road), would link Kashgar in China with Gawader and open up enormous economic opportunities for both countries<sup>41</sup>.

## **1.2- Foreign Policy At the Dawn of The Independence**

Both Pakistan and China in the early phase as nascent, new modern, states faced lot of challenges and tremendous problems. Both the countries faced war in the early phase of their lives. Pakistan fought bitter war against India in Kashmir which continued till the end of 1948 and contrary to that China had to be dragged in Korean War (1950-53) in 1951.<sup>42</sup> At the dawn of independence Pakistan was involved in multiple problems. Pakistan wanted to continue the British legacy. Resources of the State were meager and Pakistanis were oblivious of the changes occurring in China. Mao Tse Tung had brought a great revolution in China and cleansed China of other countries' interference. But Pakistan was in the throes

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<sup>40</sup>*The News*, Rawalpindi, 21 April 2015.

<sup>41</sup> *The Express Tribune*, 11 February 2015.

<sup>42</sup> Rizwan Naseer, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Natural Alliance Against Common Threats", *Journal of Social Sciences* Vol. 1, No. 2, Feb 2011, Berkeley, p.1.

of life and death. Keeping in view the threats to the existence of the country, only two months after independence, Pakistan's father of the nation and the Governor General Mohammed Ali Jinnah decided to befriend United States. He invited the United States to become a main source of support and help his new state. Jinnah's request was extraordinary. That was the start of the relations between two countries. Pakistan had not shown any credentials against Communism. Main threat to Pakistan was from India not North. In those circumstances the demand for a loan of almost \$2 billion over a five-year period for Pakistan's Armed Forces and for industrial and agricultural development project was not welcomed in United States.<sup>43</sup> Obviously, the offer was rejected. The enemies of Pakistan were active. The Hindus had accepted the division as a temporary necessity. It was observed by the All India Congress Committee that when the passion would subside then the false doctrine of Two-Nation Theory would be discredited and discarded by all.<sup>44</sup> Sardar Patel was sure that the new state of Pakistan will not last long and will soon succumb to India or it will be absorbed in India.<sup>45</sup> Soon after the establishment of the country, Pakistan's founder Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was not given to exaggeration, realized that type of talk. He felt that deliberate propaganda was going on in India, and that was directed by the Indian government, to absorb Pakistan and to compel it to come to Indian union as penitent, repentant, erring son and to that end, to paralyze the new-born state<sup>46</sup>. Almost all the Pakistani leaders were convinced that India had grand designs and it wanted to build an empire extending from the Hindu Kush Mountains to the Mekong River<sup>47</sup>. One American

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<sup>43</sup> McMahan, Robert J, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Dec., 1988), p.818.

<sup>44</sup> V.P.Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Calcutta, Orient Longman; 1999), p.384.

<sup>45</sup> Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p.242.

<sup>46</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Bilateralism, The Third World, New Trends* (London: Quartet Books Ltd, 1977), p.41.

<sup>47</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, pp, 42, 47-48, 115-117 and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, Reproduced by: Sani H. Panhwar, (Karachi: Nov 1967), pp.6-7, 34, and *The Myth of Independence*, pp-7-8.

had declared Pakistan a queer country, because you cannot draw the map of the country (It was established both in East and West of India).

The main objective of Pakistan's foreign policy makers, since its inception, has to strengthen its security which was continuously threatened by its most powerful neighbour India<sup>48</sup>. The focus of Pakistan's foreign policy in early years was India. Pakistan did not want to see, out of Indian Sub-Continent. If it had after all to move out of Sub-Continent, the aim was only to preserve the country against Indian aggression. The fear of India was dominant with the Pakistani foreign office. India was considered as the biggest and most forthcoming source of menace to Pakistan and the government wanted to enhance the defence capabilities against India. Indian Muslims had got India divided and got emancipation from the British slavery in spite of the opposition of Hindu majority who stood for independent but United India. Pakistanis were convinced that Hindus and Muslims were from different stock and they were from two diverse civilizations. The Hindus had accepted the division as a temporary necessity. The All India Congress Committee made a judgment that with the passage of time the craze and emotions would cave in then the false doctrine of Two-Nation Theory would be rejected and cast off by all.<sup>49</sup> Sardar Patel was of the view that as the new state of Pakistan was not viable so it will not survive for longer duration and very soon it will collapse.<sup>50</sup> Pakistan's policy makers had full realization of the strategic location of Pakistan. The constant Hindu propaganda campaign, religious outbursts against the *raison deter* of Pakistan and the military bluffing made the Pakistanis realize that the Communist countries were situated away from Pakistan's geographical boundaries, but India was the immediate neighbour and the enmity of India would be more costly to Pakistan. It seemed that the main aim of Pakistan's foreign policy had been to obtain a shield against a possible

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<sup>48</sup> Tehmina Mahmood, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Post Cold War Period*, Pakistan Horizon, Vol 50, (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, July 1997), p.101.

<sup>49</sup> V.P.Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, (London: Orient BlackSwan, 1957), p.384.

<sup>50</sup> Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p.242.

attack from India, while the main aim of India's foreign policy seemed to be to isolate and weaken Pakistan.<sup>51</sup>

### 1.3- Pakistan's Outlook of China

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Pakistan was established on the name of Islam and on the other hand China believed in Communism. In 20<sup>th</sup> century Communism had emerged as a religion, apart from political system. Both Islam and Communism were anathematic to each other. It was noticed that Pakistani people were more inclined towards West then Communist bloc. From the very beginning, the people of Pakistan had some sort of reluctance towards the Communist political system and Communist way of life. The repugnance for Communism was evident in the Pakistan's foreign policy of the initial days. Pakistanis inclined towards Islamic causes as the leaders of Pakistan wanted to make Pakistan the fort of Islam. Pakistanis might have extreme hatred for the Indians but they despised the communism also. In retrospective the Muslim scholars, it seemed, had no penchants for communism. They regarded the rise of communism an anathema to Islamic principles and ideology. Muslim scholars considered communism an un-Godly political system. They thought that communist system destroys the human capabilities and the communists do not believe in God. The famous poet of Urdu literature and Pakistan's national poet, Dr Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), long before the movement for Pakistan was born, had written in a letter to the daily *Zamindar* of Lahore on 'Islam and Bolshevism' that 'To hold Bolshevist views, in my opinion, are to place oneself outside the pale of Islam.'<sup>52</sup>

Even after the creation of the country, the views of Pakistani politicians didn't change. The first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951) had special loathing for communism. Even before partition, in the interim government of India, when Nehru (1889-1964)

<sup>51</sup> G. W. Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-66* (New York: Free Press, 1968), p.223.

<sup>52</sup> S.M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis*, London: Oxford University Press, April 1991), P.92.

appointed his sister as Indian Ambassador for Russia, Liaqat Ali Khan declined to suggest a name for the post; he even tried to block the move. Later on, after the establishment of Pakistan he encouraged the United States that it should guarantee the territorial integrity of Pakistan so that Pakistan should concentrate on economic improvement and this would keep out the impending menace of communism. When the United States approved arms aid (1954) to Pakistan, the Soviet Union vehemently protested and declared Pakistan as enemy country. Pakistan made six charges against the Soviet state and the fifth one was that *'they reduced the Soviet people to a sub-human species because without complete freedom of thought and speech man cannot remain man. They do not believe in God and cannot therefore have any morals, because religion whatever it may be is the basis of all moral codes.'*<sup>53</sup> Muslim religious figures particularly hated the communist political system. Maulana Abul AlaAl-Maududi, a well-known religious scholar and the head of Jamaat-e-Islami declared the communism based on the ideas of Marx as un-Islamic. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, chief of National Awami Party, although he was inclined towards forming intimate and cordial relationship with communist countries, also rejected the communism as Godless system.<sup>54</sup> The reason for his penchant for communist countries might be his abhorrence for the Western imperialistic system. It seemed that in the initial years of the establishment of Pakistan, the foreign policy of the country was heavily influenced by the Islam.

The earlier period of Pakistan's foreign policy saw her hosting to various Islamic conferences. At that time there were references of Pakistan being the largest Muslim state to share responsibilities for the causes of Muslim countries. Some Muslim countries even didn't like the policies of Pakistan and called it over-optimistic and amateur approach. On the contrary, other Muslim countries had no such feelings. For example Egyptians had more

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<sup>53</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.93.

<sup>54</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 13 December 1969.



sympathies and friendly relations with India then with Pakistan. It is said that in November 1951 the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Salah-el- Din Pasha, while talking to an Indian media person in Cairo said that Egypt looked to India for moral support in her struggle for national liberation. King Farouq lampooned Pakistan's over-zealous gestures towards Islamic causes by saying to his courtiers, *'Don't you know that Islam was born on 14<sup>th</sup> of August 1947?'* Another large Muslim country Indonesia was also inclined towards India. Although Pakistanis were chauvinistic about Islam and Muslim countries but they were living in the world of realism. They realized the defence of the country prior to everything and for this their policy makers were inclined towards the West. The Communist countries neither looked at religious ideologies with benevolence nor did they have predilection towards the Western countries. But Pakistan stood for the Islamic causes and for intimate relations with the West also. Pakistan did not look to Communist block for support and help. Consequently, the Chinese had no inkling towards Pakistan; the Russians sent no felicitations, at all, on the establishment of Pakistan.<sup>55</sup> Although the start of the mutual relations was not fine but it seemed that despite Pakistan's revulsion for communism, it did not see communism a serious threat to its security; it viewed India to be the prime threat to its defence. Pakistan realized that the world had already been divided into two blocs, Cold War was in progress and if Pakistan sided with the Western Powers then Pakistan would not be alone if it was invaded by the communist states. This was evident even in 1960, when U-2 was shot down and President Ayub Khan (1958-69) stated that 'If there would be any aggression against Pakistan, response would come from somewhere else and Pakistan would not be alone'.<sup>56</sup> Secondly as the age of colonialism was over so the communist states would not commit any aggression against Pakistan. But in case of Indian aggression the Western countries would not come to Pakistan's help and secondly India would not even hesitate to

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<sup>55</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.98.

<sup>56</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000*, p.113

occupy Pakistan because it considers Pakistan to be its lost territory and the International community would also consider Indo-Pak war as civil war. If India attacked Pakistan or Pakistan-held Kashmir on the excuse that it was recovering what it claimed to be Indian territory, Pakistanis feared that the great powers would again be unwilling to intervene out of consideration for their global policies and unable to thwart Indian aggression.<sup>57</sup> As the main concern of the West was the containment of Chinese communism (or Soviet communism), in the same way the main concern of Pakistan was the containment of militarist or militant Hinduism.<sup>58</sup> For years Pakistanis had been struggling in SEATO to acquire the material help of the Western countries against India. Pakistanis were very concerned about the rise and spread of communism but they thought that it was a menace to all and was not likely to make Pakistan its exclusive target whereas Indians themselves have made it clear more than once that Pakistan was their number one target.<sup>59</sup>

As compared to Pakistani leaders, Nehru (Indian PM from 1947 to 1964) was interested in neutral foreign policy from the very beginning. Nehru's India had no negative notions about communism. Nehru was more inclined towards communist countries than the 'Imperialist' West. Foreign Policy was Pandit Nehru's strong point. He excelled himself in the field of foreign policy to the 'point of dangerous perfection'.<sup>60</sup> He was an astute student of history, foreign relations and diplomacy. Nehru had inclination towards socialism even before the partition of India. He appointed his own sister Vijay Lakshmi Pundit (1900-1990) as United Indian ambassador to Soviet Russia. He was in favour of establishing close relations with the USSR. He wanted to be very close to Soviet Union, when most of the countries were running away from Soviet Union considering it an aggressive and imperialist country.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan American Alliance", *Foreign Affairs*, An American Quarterly Review, January 1964.

<sup>58</sup> Saeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests", *Asian Survey*, Institute of International Studies, University of California, May 1964, p.746.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Quest for Peace* (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p.69.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p.70.

#### 1.4- Pakistan and The Old China

In the case of China, Nehru established very smooth relations with Chiang Kai-Shek but the leaders of All India Muslim League had not concentrated on the foreign policy options before the partition of Sub-Continent. Chiang Kai-Shek despised the policies of dividing the colonial states, and that too on the basis of religion. He visited India in 1942 and appealed British to leave India and give immediate independence to the Indians. His appeal of the grant of independence to the Indians was also the demand of Indian National Congress, who started 'Quit India Movement' the same year and Gandhi said that the '*British leave the India to God*', but Chiang Kai-Shek's announcement was opposed to the political philosophy of All India Muslim League which was pressing the British for the division of India on the basis of Two-Nation Theory.<sup>62</sup> Even after the establishment, Pakistan was not ready to jump into the foreign relations arena instantly. Pakistan's resources were very meager. It just wanted to contact few important countries for financial help and for defence equipment against India, which was bent upon the destruction of it. Pakistan faced tremendous problems in the wake of partition, which has no parallel in history. Keeping in view the plethora of problems, foreign relations were the last priority in Pakistan. National exchequer was completely empty. Commerce and trade reached to a total standstill. It is undeniably a wonder of modern history and an accolade to the patriotism of the people of Pakistan that the country successfully had surmounted its trials and tribulations of the time. Once the worst was over, it looked beyond its own frontiers to foster links with the outside world and play its natural role in the foreign affairs.<sup>63</sup> 'China Digest's New Delhi correspondent Harin Shah rightly commented on 10 August 1947, that: 'The trends in

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<sup>62</sup> Yunus, *Reflections on China*, p.128.

<sup>63</sup> "Pakistan and Her Neighbours", *Round Table Magazine of Commonwealth Countries*, June 1956, p.237.

Pakistan are likely to invite deep interest in China too. So far the leadership of Pakistan has no time to think much of affairs beyond their borders'.<sup>64</sup>

Contrary to this prediction the course of Sino-Pakistan relations was not smooth. Many hurdles appeared in Sino-Pakistan relations in the early years of their independence. Pakistan followed fickle and capricious policy towards China, sometimes Pakistan's policy was favourable to China and sometimes it was unfavorable at all. It seems that the policy remained directionless.<sup>65</sup> In 1947, when Pakistan got independence, its northern neighbour, China, was still in the throes of revolution. Fierce fighting was going on between Mao's Red Army and Chiang-Kai-Shek's Nationalists. Unfortunately, Pakistan had neither been closer to Chiang-Kai-Shek's Nationalist government nor to Mao's communists. Gandhi and Nehru on the other hand were very close to Chiang-Kai-Shek. As Pakistan was faced with its own problems and China was suffering from the Civil War, both the countries didn't show any haste in developing diplomatic relations. Both India and Pakistan, however, had to take the decision of recognizing People's Republic of China because of the proximity of China to both the countries. They shared wide borders with China. It would have been simply preposterous to close one's eyes to a cataclysm of the kind that had occurred in the neighbouring country.<sup>66</sup>

### **1.5- Relationship Under Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan and Establishment of The Diplomatic Relations**

When Pakistan came into being, China was governed by the Kuomintang with Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek at its head.<sup>67</sup> In the initial months, Pakistan suffered economically. It had faced myriads of problems. Finance was the biggest problem for Pakistan in 1948. Even the

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<sup>64</sup> K. Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-80*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1984), p.3.

<sup>65</sup> P.L. Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, (Jaipur: R.B.S.A Publishers, 1986), p.62.

<sup>66</sup> Mohammad Yunus, *Reflections on China, An Ambassador's Views from Beijing*, (Wajidalis Limited, 1986), p.128.

<sup>67</sup> Sangat Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Lahore: Farhan Publishers, April 1977).p. 102.

country could not find resources to establish diplomatic relations.<sup>68</sup> Pakistan's first priority was the stabilization of the state and only then she could establish relations with other countries. Panikar, the first Indian Ambassador, on the other hand, took up his duties in China in the spring of 1948. India not only set up diplomatic relations with China but it also became the 'floor leader'<sup>69</sup> in persuading other countries to recognize China. Prime Minister Nehru, renowned for his sense of history, showed an early realization of the importance that the relations between the World's two most populated countries could have in the context of his faith in a resurgent Asia.

An isolated and inward-looking China can pose a serious threat to peace in Asia, but a China susceptible to world opinion and friendship of such countries as India may feel less encircled by a hostile World. If India and China can develop mutual friendship and cooperation, it will strengthen peace in Asia. The future of peace in Asia, indeed of the World, will depend to a large extent on the kind of relations that develop between India and China<sup>70</sup>

After recognizing China, India also considered it logical that China must have entry into the United Nations Security Council. During a stopover in London *en route* to Washington, on 10 October 1949, Nehru pressed Prime Minister Attlee for an early recognition to China. Pakistan was interested in the developments inside China but was not in special urgency to recognize it. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said that 'Pakistan did recognize China in 1950 and in the UN conceded it to be the sole representative of the Chinese people'<sup>71</sup>. But this had been done in the imitation of Great Britain than as an independent and sovereign country. The action had not been taken on merit<sup>72</sup>. However consultations in the Commonwealth countries showed to the World that very soon India is going to extend recognition to the new regime in China. It was also clear that soon China would assume its permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and Kashmir issue would be under consideration in the Security Council. There were some speculations that Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek's rag-tag army would re-conquer the mainland China but most of the countries believed that

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<sup>68</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.62.

<sup>69</sup> Senator Knowland in 1956 described the Indian efforts for bringing communist China into the United Nations). Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.101

<sup>70</sup> Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, "Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia", *Regional Studies*, Vol XII, No 4, Autumn 1994, Institute of Regional Studies, p.6.

<sup>71</sup> Arif, *China Pakistan Relations*, pp.5-6.

<sup>72</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Pakistan and Alliances* (United States, University of Michigan), p. 35.

he was a spent force. Pakistani leaders were also convinced that Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek's remnant of an army could not regain the mainland of China'.<sup>73</sup> In such circumstances, Pakistan also did not want to lag behind India. India started negotiations with China for the latter's recognition and India's complete break with the Formosa, which was one of the preconditions for establishing diplomatic relations with China. India recognized China on 30<sup>th</sup> December 1949. Pakistan followed and recognized new Chinese regime on 4<sup>th</sup> January 1950, the Third Non-Communist country to do so<sup>74</sup>. Although Pakistan had recognized China, the relationship was not much cordial<sup>75</sup>. Pakistan had no interest in China as she was not the member of the Security Council. In whole Muslim World Pakistan was the first country, which had accorded recognition to China and in Non-Communist states, Pakistan recognized China soon after Britain and India.<sup>76</sup> However the designation of ambassadors still took a lot of time. The Chinese Ambassador took lot of time in coming to Pakistan. He presented his credentials to Pakistani authorities in Karachi on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1951 and Pakistani ambassador General A. M. Raza, presented his credentials to Chairman Mao Tse-tung on 13<sup>th</sup> November 1951.<sup>77</sup> The economic problems of Pakistan, instability in China, Indo-Pakistan war in Kashmir, the doubts that Chiang Kai-Shek could come back and could overthrow the communists and international situations as the major World powers except Russia were against the establishment of communist political system in another country might be some important reasons for the delay in the transfers of Pakistani and Chinese ambassadors. As Pakistan was not inclined towards Communism, it didn't feel any haste in sending diplomats nor was China interested because it was preoccupied with its internal affairs. Pakistan had only recognized China because of her competition with India. It seems that the establishment of relations was delayed for two reasons; Pakistan did not follow diplomatic norms in extending recognition. Pakistan's decision for recognition was conveyed to the Chinese Foreign Minister by the Pakistani Ambassador in the Soviet Union. The Ambassador wrote: "I have the honour to inform Your Excellency, I have got the order from our government.

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<sup>73</sup> Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, (Karachi: Ferozsons, 1967), p.76.

<sup>74</sup> Niloufer Mahdi, "Sino-Pakistan Relation: Historical Background", *Pakistan Horizon*, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi 1986, p.60.

<sup>75</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto *The Myth of Independence* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969), p.91.

<sup>76</sup> Fazal-ur-Rehman, *Pakistan's Evolving Relations with China, Russia and Central Asia*, p.212.

<sup>77</sup> Annex A: Government of Pakistan's declassified document on General Raza's presentation of credentials to Chairman Mao Tse-tung on 14 November 1951.

Pakistan government announced the recognition of establishment of Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Peking as the legal government of China."<sup>78</sup>

It was against normal diplomatic norms that instead of the foreign office contacting China, Pakistan's Ambassador to Soviet Union was directed to send recognition. This was not a dignified way and Chou En-Lai, who was the Foreign Minister also, considered it derogatory to his dignity. The other reason for delay in establishing diplomatic relations was that there was no mention of Pakistan government's intention to withdraw recognition from the Kuomintang Government. Pakistan soon realized its mistake and the government issued an official communiqué on 24th January 1950 which stated that the Government of Pakistan had withdrawn the recognition from the Chinese Kuomintang Government located in Taiwan. The Government of Pakistan also instructed its Ambassador in Soviet Union, on 29<sup>th</sup> January 1950, to write a letter to the Chinese Government in continuation of his earlier letter of 5<sup>th</sup> January 1950. Because of the sparseness of funds, Pakistan requested China to treat Lt Col Muhammad Sadiq, Consulate General in Kashgar as Pakistan's representative in Sinkiang and allow him to manage the office in that capacity and provide him all necessary facilities. China rejected Pakistani request and argued that Lt Col Sadiq would be considered as a foreign national till the formal exchange of diplomatic representatives between the two countries takes place. Chinese refusal to accord diplomatic status to Lt Col Sadiq in Sinkiang might be its apprehensions about the possibility of Pakistan carrying on subversive activities in the sensitive area of Sinkiang.<sup>79</sup> Sinkiang was the Muslim majority province of China. The diplomatic bickering was soon resolved and the course of new relationship between the two countries took its way. After the recognition of China, Pakistan became the champion of China's permanent seat in the United Nations. Pakistan brushed

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<sup>78</sup> R. K. Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Basic Documents, 1950-76*, Vol II, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1977), p.3.

<sup>79</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.64.

aside all those forces who wanted to keep China out of the United Nations. Pakistan realized that as the communists were actually at the helm of affairs and the *de facto* communist government was established in China then international community should give *de jure* status to them. China should occupy its seat in the United Nations Security Council as a sovereign state. At least this was the official stance of Pakistan about the Chinese representation in the early phase of Pakistan's foreign policy. Foreign Minister of Pakistan Sir Zafrulla Khan argued in the United Nations that:

China is not applying for admission to the United Nations. It is a member state, a permanent member of the Security Council, one of the big five. I do venture to submit that whether it is willing or not, it is entitled as of right to be represented in the UN like every other member state, until it is a contingency that might apply to every other member state also-expelled in accordance with the provisions of the charter.<sup>80</sup>

Some political thinkers say that in recognizing Peking government, Pakistan was led by geo-political and economic considerations. Ideology, an important factor in Pakistan's foreign policy, was not taken into account. Pakistani leaders realized that they would have to live with China-Communist or Non-Communist as a neighbour. Pakistan thought that it could not change the neighbour. Pakistan's relations with India, Afghanistan and Soviet Union were not friendly; Pakistan didn't want to antagonize another powerful neighbour by refusing recognition to it.<sup>81</sup> However, it is not necessary that ideology might be a bar in establishing diplomatic relations with non-Muslim countries in generally and Communist states in particularly. Apart from some political theories trade might be another impetus for Pakistan's early recognition of China. After two years of the recognition of China, Britain devalued its currency, India followed but Pakistan refused. India immediately retaliated by refusing to accept the new rates of exchange of the Pakistani rupee and closed trade with Pakistan.<sup>82</sup> As more than half of the Pakistani trade was with India, Pakistan could not afford

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid, P.65.

<sup>81</sup> Qutubuddin Aziz, "Relations between Pakistan and People's Republic of China", in Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan, An Analysis*, p.82.

<sup>82</sup> Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, (Karachi, Allied Book Corporation, 1964), p.76.



any trade barriers with India but India, as it was the dominant and economically in good position, stopped the supply of coal to Pakistan. As a result of India's ban on export of coal to Pakistan, Pakistan's rail system was badly affected. Soon trade between India and Pakistan also came to a standstill. Now Pakistan realized that instead of depending upon India, it should diversify its trade with other countries. Pakistan was also looking for customers for its Jute and Cotton. Stoppage of trade with India posed a serious threat to Pakistan's rail transport which was dependent on Indian coal. It was not easy to explore new markets. In such deplorable conditions in Pakistan's history, China came to Pakistan's help and made a barter agreement for supply of coal against Pakistan's raw Jute and cotton. During his official visit to United States, Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan explained that Pakistan considered Peoples Republic of China an established fact and recognized it in order to ease the flow of trade. In the Korean War also Pakistan adopted a policy which was hailed by both the United States and China. Pakistan did not vote for imposition of trade sanctions on China and North Korea and the Chinese appreciated it. In the same way Pakistan condemned North Korean aggression against South Koreans (June 1950) which later on even President Kennedy appreciated.<sup>83</sup> When China fought against the Western forces in North Korea and it was denounced by the West (European countries and United States), Pakistan abstained in United Nations to censure China. Pakistan had started heavily leaning towards China. In February 1953 Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin said that the contemplated blockade of China 'would affect many friends of United States who want to trade with China. In our case we want to sell our cotton.'<sup>84</sup>

One of the main aims of Pakistan for the early recognition of China was to get the Chinese support on the Kashmir question, which though could not materialize as China adopted very

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<sup>83</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000*, pp.121-122.

<sup>84</sup> Mushtaq Ahmad, *The United Nations and Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p.85.

cautious policy about Kashmir. China believed that United States through the manipulation of United Nations wanted to send its own troops to Kashmir which would jeopardize the security of China. As China was not the member of the United Nations Security Council, it had grave apprehensions against the same. China thought that Security Council was a stooge in the hands of Americans and small countries like India and Pakistan could not withstand Super Powers' pressure and would allow the American forces in Kashmir, which the Americans would use against China as a base. Therefore, China expressed satisfaction over the talks conducted between Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra and Indian Premier Jawahar Lal Nehru in August 1953, outside the ambit of Security Council. China thought that the Sub-continent rivals should solve their disputes peacefully through negotiations.

### **1.6- Korean War (1950-1953) and Sino-Pakistan Relations**

The Pakistanis and Chinese were destined to become special friends from the early 1950s onwards, but the relationship took many years to evolve and reach the zenith of full-fledged alliance and fair-weather friendship.<sup>85</sup> While Pakistan and China were coping with the recognition problems and exchange of diplomats, war broke out in two Koreas. China wanted peace and stability in the region to boost its economy. It all came about through the machinations of a seemingly minor player: Kim Il-Sung, the ambitious Soviet-installed ruler of North Korea, a state that had been created only two years earlier by agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union based on the zones of liberated Korea each had occupied at the end of the war against Japan.<sup>86</sup> North Korea was under Soviet and Chinese influence and South Korea was supported by United States and other Western countries. All the efforts for the unification of two Koreas had miserably been failed. North Korea crossed 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and attacked South Korea on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1950<sup>87</sup> in order to unify the divided

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<sup>85</sup> Von Willem Kemenade, *The Fragile Pakistani State: An Ally of United States and China*, p.2.

<sup>86</sup> Henry Kissinger, *On China*, p.169.

<sup>87</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005, A Concise History*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, April 2007), P.38.

country by force. They won initial victory by taking Seoul and pushing the South Korean army to Pusan area until the UN forces landed in September 1950.<sup>88</sup> As war in Korea was quite away from Pakistan's borders, so the later was not interested in it. When the war between the two Koreas started, Pakistani Premier Liaqat Ali Khan was on his official visit to United States. He supported the US decision to protect the South Koreans as aggression had been committed against them. United Nations Security Council hurriedly passed resolutions and condemned North Korean aggression. Pakistan supported UN resolutions<sup>89</sup> but when the war widened and it implicated China also, Pakistan abstained on the resolution calling China as aggressor.<sup>90</sup> Pakistan's interests in the war developed because of Chinese intervention in the war, which brought the war to Pakistan's borders and because at that time Pakistan was searching markets for its surplus cotton and in need of importing coal for its rail transport. China offered her markets for Pakistani cotton and supplied coal also to Pakistan to keep going its railway system. Korea also emerged a big market for Pakistani cotton. Although Pakistan's export got boom in Korean War but keeping in view the human disasters and the difficulties in keeping the balance between USA and China, Pakistan wanted the cessation of hostilities. Therefore, Pakistan was determined not to send any military contingent and reduced its contribution to supply of 5000 tons of wheat to South Korea.<sup>91</sup> Later on Pakistan showed interest in sending a brigade for the protection of South Korea but if Pakistan's own security was assured in the event of Indian aggression.<sup>92</sup> It is also said that a brigade of Pakistan Army was ready for leaving to Korea and the Americans had also promised to equip the brigade with modern weapons but the advisers of Prime

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<sup>88</sup> King C. Chen, *China and the Three Worlds* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), p.9.

<sup>89</sup> **Anx B:** Government of Pakistan's declassified document on the Cabinet's decision regarding North Korean aggression, in the absence of Prime Minister

<sup>90</sup> K. Sarwar Hasan, "The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan", *Pakistan Horizon*, December 1951, p.185.

<sup>91</sup> **Anx C:** Government of Pakistan's declassified document of the Meeting of the Cabinet on 24<sup>th</sup> August 1950. The Cabinet decided to regret the UN request for military assistance and contribute wheat for the Affected Koreans.

<sup>92</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005*, p.38.

Minister Liaqat Ali Khan didn't agree on the rationality of committing Pakistan without getting anything tangible.<sup>93</sup> Resultantly, Pakistan asked United States if it would help Pakistan if the later was attacked by India. United States was not ready for such assurance and Pakistan refused to send troops.<sup>94</sup> It seemed that Pakistan was more interested for the security of itself. The country was at the mercy of India. Militarily Pakistan was very weak and she was in search of alliances. Pakistan's decision of not sending military help to South Korea, to help the Americans and the West against the attacking North Koreans, later proved as blessing because later on the Chinese were also involved in War and in that case Pakistani forces would have fought against China.

### **1.7- Tibetan Crisis- 1950 and Pakistan**

The political geography of South Asia was shaped in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century by the British in India. Russia, Britain and China were involved in the region<sup>95</sup>. There was the need of elaborate boundaries to separate all the three powers. Wakhan strip was deliberately included in Afghanistan in order to prevent the Russian and British empires from sharing border.<sup>96</sup> China was militarily and economically weak. The British realized that its Indian empire would be an easy prey to the marauding Russian army. Hence the British had already been following the policy of buffer zones, so Tibet was established as a separate state and alienated from China. Since the demise of Manchu dynasty in 1911, Tibet had enjoyed *de facto* independence but the Chinese regimes had considered it as part of China. In 1914 the British drew McMahan Line between Tibet and India and declared it as border between the two countries but when the threat of Russian expansion receded then the British lost interest in the buffer zones and in the agreements

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<sup>93</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.128

<sup>94</sup> M. A. H. Ispahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1947-64", *Pakistan Horizon*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 1964, p. 237.

<sup>95</sup> Norbu, *Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region*, p.371.

<sup>96</sup> Masuma Hassan, *Pakistan in a Changing World* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978).p.194.

which it had concluded with Sinkiang and Tibet. Just after independence Prime Minister Nehru realized that the era of buffer zones was over but still he believed some sort of arrangements in which mighty Chinese empire would be away from the Indian borders. Soon after independence Nehru conveyed to Tibet that all the past treaty commitments would be respected. But after the establishment of communist system in China, the new Chinese government opted for assertive foreign policy and tightened its control on the regions which were out of their suzerainty. After the division of Sub-Continent and the establishment of Communist system, China became very apprehensive of American and British designs in Tibet and considered India to be in connivance with them. However, China did not design its policy towards South Asia until the Tibetan issue emerged and it spoiled China's relations with India. China's South Asia policy did not take shape until the Tibet issue came up as a serious problem between China and India<sup>97</sup>. Chinese felt that India was under the influence of American imperialism.<sup>98</sup> When communist China invaded Tibet in 1950 to 'liberate' it, Prime Minister Nehru himself had commented 'from whom they are going to liberate Tibet, is, however, not quite clear. Since Tibet is not the same as China, it should ultimately be the wishes of the people of Tibet that should prevail and not any legal or constitutional arguments'.<sup>99</sup> Nehru himself was not clear on the question of Tibet. That is why some time later Nehru advised Dalai Lama not to take the issue of Tibet to United Nations as no good would come of it.<sup>100</sup> India had faced war also in Kashmir with Pakistan. Now India was faced with severe challenges to its national security on its Western frontiers. The founding of China did not touch upon that sensitivity until Beijing to deploy its army in Tibet, which changed the geopolitical landscape from Indian perspective. Decision-

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<sup>97</sup> Zhao Gancheng, "China's South Asia Policy: Balancing and Stabilizing", *Regional Studies*, Vol XXIII, No 3, Summer 2005, Institute of Regional Studies, p.4.

<sup>98</sup> Girilal Jain, *Panchsheel and After* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p.7.

<sup>99</sup> S.M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1974) p.147.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, P.160.

makers in Delhi were concerned and they had serious debates over that event. One of the typical views represented by Home Minister Vallabh Bhai Patel was that, 'the Tibet, as we know it, disappears and the expansion of China almost up to our gates, while the Western and North Western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and North East. Thus for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously'<sup>101</sup>.

Despite the negativity between China-Pakistan relationship in the initial years of their policies towards each other, but Pakistan for certain reasons was now inclined towards China and the later was very accommodative towards Pakistan, might be because of the strategic location of Pakistan. China's relations with Soviet Union were not smooth; China was not a small country to be used as satellite by Soviet Union. China's perception of India was also very negative, and it felt that in the end its interests would clash with India because the later wanted to become the leader of Asia. Chinese realized that Russians and Americans were encircling China and they were courting India for this purpose. In the South-West, Pakistan was the only outlet to China. Soviets had already interfered in Afghanistan and they constructed excellent roads. There was a threat that Pakistan would also provide the Soviets an access to the warm waters.<sup>102</sup> Pakistan caused fewer problems for China by adopting neutrality on the issue. Pakistan thought that it would make no difference if the communists take control over Tibet.<sup>103</sup> As Pakistan adopted flexible attitude on Tibet, China got closer to Pakistan. Pakistan was a small country as compared to India. Unlike India which wanted to lead Asia, Pakistan's foreign policy aims were very limited. China considered India to be involved in Tibetan crisis. On the other hand Soviet Union abhorred

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<sup>101</sup> Gancheng, "China's South Asia Policy: Balancing and Stabilizing", p.4.

<sup>102</sup> Hassan, *Pakistan in a Changing World*, p.195.

<sup>103</sup> **Anx D:**, Government of Pakistan's declassified documents, (Cabinet Meeting of 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1950 in which establishment of diplomatic relations with China and China's tightening of the noose around Tibet was discussed. Pakistan's government initially thought that occupation of Tibet may be threatening only to India).

Pakistan's indulgence in Kashmir and Middle East. Soviet Union leaned towards India and China towards Pakistan. It is, however, very unfortunate that both Pakistan and India stood for the liberation of all the Afro-Asian countries but in case of Tibet, Pakistan acquiesced and adopted the Chinese line of action.<sup>104</sup> The Government of Pakistan was cautious and the Prime Minister of Pakistan stated that the scene was far away from the borders of Pakistan. India, on the other hand was also dubious. It, at the beginning protested when the Chinese resorted to excessive measures to demonstrate their sovereignty in Tibet<sup>105</sup> but soon it accepted the reality. Chinese People's Liberation Army was firmly established in Tibet and it was not possible for Indians to dislodge them. The only option for India was to befriend China.<sup>106</sup> Befriending China had become a Hobson's choice for India.

### **1.8- Pakistan's Inclination Towards West and Its Relationship with The People's Republic of China**

The relationship with China cannot be discussed separately. China's relationship with Pakistan has generated stresses and a strain in the latter's relations with superpowers. Sino-Pakistan relations are thus entangled in a much larger web of relationships. Sino-Pakistan relationship is not complete without elaborating Pakistan's relations with India, the United States and the Soviet Union<sup>107</sup>. For containing Soviet and Chinese expansionism in South Asia, United States needed a friend in this region in 1950s<sup>108</sup> and to protect its security against India, Pakistan needed US aid. However, United States was more inclined towards India than Pakistan. American administration under President Harry S. Truman (1945-53) was more inclined towards India than Pakistan in post-independence years. Almost all American think tanks, officials and other important personalities were heavily inclined

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<sup>104</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.107.

<sup>105</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.64.

<sup>106</sup> Norbu, *Chinese Strategic Thinking on Tibet and the Himalayan Region*, p.372.

<sup>107</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, *China & Pakistan Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1974), p.7.

<sup>108</sup> Akhtar Shahnaz, "Dynamics of USA-Pakistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Period: Hurdles and Future Prospects", *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 2 No. 11; June 2012, p.205.

towards India. They felt that with strong leadership, vast natural resources, huge population and great size, India was certain to become a great power and play important role on World stage. On the other hand, Pakistan was smaller in size and population. Its leadership was weaker and economically it was not that much strong. They felt that Pakistan's survival itself was a big question.<sup>109</sup> United States signed a point four agreement with India in December 1950. Again in October 1951, Mr. Chester Bowles, who was considered as pro-Indian, was dispatched to India to study India and to offer generous assistance for India's First Five Year Plan.<sup>110</sup> The more Americans were inclined towards India, the more disillusionment grew<sup>111</sup> and both countries differed on many issues. The idea of establishing intimate relations and having military alliances with the Pentagon was conceived by Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan.<sup>112</sup> General Ayub Khan instructed the new Military Attaché to Washington Major General M. G. Jilani, to explore the possibilities of a military alliance with the United States. Ayub Khan also visited United States in 1953. There was little doubt that General Ayub Khan had gone for discussing the details of a possible aid package although technically he had gone for inspection of American military installations.<sup>113</sup> The Governor General Ghulam Muhammad also left Karachi for a six-week tour to America for medical reasons. As General Ayub Khan was already in America, there were speculations that defence talks would take place.<sup>114</sup> The Pakistan cabinet and Parliament were not consulted although Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra and Zafrullah Khan actively participated.<sup>115</sup> In February 1954, Pakistan made a formal request for American military aid on the plea that the demands for adequate defence

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<sup>109</sup> Robert J. McMahan, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Dec., 1988), p.817.

<sup>110</sup> Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, p.38.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, p.40.

<sup>112</sup> F. M. Khan, *The Story of Pakistan Army*. p.154.

<sup>113</sup> Farooq Naseem Bajwa, *Pakistan and the West* (Oxford University Press, 1996), p.64.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p.67.

<sup>115</sup> B. L. Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1968), p.53.



were becoming heavy and the strain on its economy was immense.<sup>116</sup> On February 25, 1954, the United States declared its programme of military assistance to Pakistan. Soon after this, Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed between the two countries on May 2, 1954.<sup>117</sup> The US agreed to enhance military capabilities of Pakistan by providing defence related equipment to Pakistan and to involve Pakistan in the defence related plans for the area. Pakistan, on the other hand agreed to take some steps for cooperation with the United States and not to have trade links with those countries which will threaten the world peace,<sup>118</sup> hinting the communist states. However, the agreement could not satisfy Pakistan, which was looking for some guarantees against Indian attack but this alliance was confined only to defend against communist aggression. The aim of Pakistan by joining those alliances was not the threat of Communist countries but was to ensure its own security and protect itself against looming Indian threats. Pakistan felt no threat from China and Soviet Union, and was not aggressive towards them.<sup>119</sup> China didn't like Pakistan's indulgence in defence alliances with the West<sup>120</sup>. Moreover Pakistan also banned Communist Party in 1954. In April 1954, Pakistan permitted US planes carrying French troops for Indo-China to refuel within its territory. Pakistan also deployed additional troops on its borders with Burma as if to deal with the situation created by a possible communist drive through Burma and Thailand.<sup>121</sup> Pakistan was also less careful in its anti-communist rhetoric. Although Chinese reaction to Pakistan's entry in US sponsored military alliances was stern but China's opposition to SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) was even greater. However, Bandung (Indonesia) Conference abated the tension created by the defence agreements. At Bandung Conference Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra asked Chinese Prime Minister

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<sup>116</sup> Hassan, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.51.

<sup>117</sup> Mc Mahan. Robert. J, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 75, No. 3, Dec, 1988, p.812.

<sup>118</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005*, p.46.

<sup>119</sup> Bhutto, *Pakistan and the Alliances*, p.36.

<sup>120</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, p.66.

<sup>121</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.23.

Chou En-Lai for a meeting to explain Pakistan's rationale for joining defence alliances, Chou En-Lai's response was beyond expectations, he replied that he would come himself to call on Bogra that afternoon. The differences were resolved in the meeting.<sup>122</sup> In fact Bandung had given a golden opportunity to China to explore the possibilities of establishing relations with the Third World countries and to end her isolation. In 1954 China started cultural exchanges with Pakistan. Dignitaries from both sides visited each other's countries. On the occasion of National Day celebrations China invited a delegation of women from Pakistan. Pakistan sent seven member delegations to China.<sup>123</sup>

### **1.9- China and The Pakistan's Participation in SEATO**

The French defeat in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu gave birth to the idea of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Vietnam had been under the virtual occupation of France since the World War II. Vietnamese fought against the French with the active Chinese support. Gradually Vietnam became untenable for France. Clandestine Chinese support for Vietnam led to the rout of the French forces in 1954. America realized that if the French would withdraw then whole of the Far East would fall to Communism. SEATO was visualized by the United States. The aim of this agreement was to organize an alliance with the South East Asian countries generally against Soviet Union and particularly against China and Vietnam.<sup>124</sup> When the US confrontation became more acute with Chinese then the Eisenhower administration began negotiating a formal mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, followed by the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.<sup>125</sup> At a conference held in Washington in June 1954, between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill the problem of South East Asia was discussed.<sup>126</sup> They proposed that a conference

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<sup>122</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005*, p.51.

<sup>123</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.68.

<sup>124</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005*, p.46.

<sup>125</sup> Kissinger, Henry, *On China*, (Penguin Press HC: 2011), p.222.

<sup>126</sup> "Facts About SEATO: Background Information", *The Pakistan Review*, National Monthly, April 1956, Ferozsons Lahore, p.13.

of important Western countries and Far Eastern countries should be held in Manila, where they should discuss the formation of a defensive alliance against communist threat in Indo-China. Later on Pakistan was also invited;<sup>127</sup> initially Pakistan hesitated but later on accepted an invitation to the conference. A conference of Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, USA, United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand was held in Manila and a treaty was signed on 8<sup>th</sup> September 1954. It was a defensive alliance against communism and is also called Manila Pact. There was nothing interesting for Pakistan in the SEATO; however, Pakistan joined the alliance hoping that it might protect it from its arch rival, India. Once Pakistan joined SEATO, it played a leading role in every conference. Conferences were held every year in different cities of the member states. Chinese vehemently criticized every session of the organization. Apparently, Pakistan was active but the main aim of Pakistan was to ensure its security against Indian aggression and solution of the Kashmir problem.<sup>128</sup> The SEATO in particular was designed to contain China and the Chinese spoke plainly by denouncing it as a tool of 'American Imperialism.'<sup>129</sup> Chinese objections were not only political but legalistic. For instance they argued that SEATO was not a proper regional organization within the meaning of the articles 51 to 54 of the UN charter<sup>130</sup>. It is strange that Pakistan was the only Muslim country in SEATO. Although America contributed in the formation of the organization but it declined to participate in its conferences. United States also did not agree that it would protect Pakistan against Indian attack, which was the prime aim of Pakistan. The United States provided state of the art military equipment to Pakistan armed forces. Pakistan military was also trained in modern way. But Pakistani military had apprehensions against India. Pakistan wanted to bolster its negotiating position against India

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<sup>127</sup> McMahan, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954", p.812.

<sup>128</sup> **Anx E:** Summary for the Cabinet, Proposals for the Third Meeting to be held in Australia from 11<sup>th</sup> March to 18<sup>th</sup> March 1957, Declassified Documents.

<sup>129</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relation: An 'All-Weather' Friendship", *Regional Studies*, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Winter 2001, p.4.

<sup>130</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan Diplomacy of Entente Cordiale*, p.55.

while talking about Kashmir and to further prepare its conventional capabilities.<sup>131</sup> Till 1959 when the Sino-Indian border clash erupted Pakistan was not conscious of any direct threat to Sub-Continent from China. Chinese disliked Pakistan's joining of SEATO. On 14 August 1954, in Pakistan Day Reception, Chou En-Lai tried to dissuade Pakistan from joining the treaty and pleaded for Asian Security. When Pakistan joined the agreement, Chinese termed it a "dangerous decision."<sup>132</sup> Pakistan was the only Asian member of the SEATO, which had diplomatic relations with China as well.<sup>133</sup> Chou En Lai severely criticized SEATO but stopped short of criticizing Pakistan. Although China regarded SEATO, which was mainly directed against it, as a threat to peace, it had shown understanding and foresight in its dealings with Pakistan, realizing that danger of aggression from India, rather than any hostility towards China, was the *raison deter* of Pakistan's alliance with the United States. Pakistan had given a reassurance to China about its desire for friendly relations before joining SEATO<sup>134</sup>. While meeting with Pakistan's Ambassador Muhammad Raza, Chinese Premier Chou En Lai conveyed him that when he heard about Pakistan joining the SEATO, he was hurt but he further said that now he can understand Pakistan's peculiar circumstances.<sup>135</sup> Upon joining SEATO, Pakistan conveyed through its Ambassador in Peking assurances that it would not be a party to any aggressive designs against China. Peking listened but it was not altogether mollified. Chu En-Lai said:

One can't strengthen one's country by getting foreign aid. The real strength should arise from within and from the internal strength of a country it is essential to get rid of foreign elements. Pakistanis should, with American assistance, develop their own military manufacturing capabilities rather than acquire tanks and planes. Weapons become obsolete in no time and the recipient country remains always dependent on the donor country. The donor could threaten Pakistan with stoppage of aid to make Pakistan do its bidding.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Riedel. Bruce, *US-China Relations, Seeking Strategic Convergence*, P.2.

<sup>132</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.25.

<sup>133</sup> Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.77.

<sup>134</sup> Bhatti, "Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia", p. 9.

<sup>135</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.214.

<sup>136</sup> G. W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers* (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1975).p.160.

Russians and the Indians on the other hand ridiculed Pakistan. Pakistan was criticized for becoming partisan and opting for the West against China and Russia. But it is also interesting to note that the same Indian Premier, who lampooned Pakistan, in 1954 for accepting western aid, was begging the West in 1962 for arms to fight the Chinese.<sup>137</sup> Although Chou En-Lai visited Pakistan in December 1956 and the visit ended on a happy note, however, 1957 brought oodles of changes in Sino-Pak relations. Relations were positively hostile and went towards more hostility after Suhrawardy's US visit and Pakistan's vote against Chinese representation in the UN. In such circumstances Chinese criticized Pakistan and her role in SEATO also. Pakistan also reacted sharply. On 8<sup>th</sup> September 1958 Foreign Minister Malik Feroz Khan Noon issued strong worded statement by saying: "SEATO was born against the background of the deteriorating political situation in South-East Asia and the Far East, when as a result of inspired insurrections and aggressions, the map of the free world started shrinking. Be it said to the credit of SEATO, that ever since its inception, not a single country in the area has fallen a victim to 'external aggression'".<sup>138</sup>

American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1953-59) also praised SEATO for making immense contributions to the stability of the region against communist aggression and subversion. He criticized China and said that communist ruthlessness backed up by Red China should keep all free people keenly aware of the need for vigilance and cooperation.<sup>139</sup>

### **1.10- The Baghdad Pact (CENTO)**

As SEATO was formed to tackle the Chinese communism in the Far East, CENTO was formed to create a bulwark against Soviet menace. Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq were the original members of the organization. All those countries were located in the south of Soviet

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<sup>137</sup> Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.78.

<sup>138</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 9 September 1958.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid*, 9 September 1958.

Union and all of them are Muslim states. America was the real force behind the formation of this organization. This organization in its history is remembered as Baghdad Pact. It remained Baghdad Pact till 1958. After revolution in Iraq in 1958, the later relinquished it. So it was renamed as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). The organization was comprised of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as its regional members. Pakistan was the only Asian country being member of both SEATO and CENTO. Baghdad Pact was formed to counter the Soviet policy of expansion towards South. USA participated in the activities of Baghdad Pact but never officially signed the treaty. United States only established political and military liaison with the organization.<sup>140</sup> Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact with greater enthusiasm than SEATO because of the participation of Muslim countries. Of SEATO and CENTO, the former was organized against the alleged threat from China and the latter against Soviet Union. It was not easy for Pakistan to explain to these two communist giants that the real reason for it to join the defence alliances was not so much the fear of communism, which was negligible in Pakistan, as it was the need for security against India. Pakistan's explanations were accepted in Peking but they made little headway in Moscow.<sup>141</sup> Although China was not happy over Pakistan's involvement in defensive alliances with West but it was not much annoyed over the formation of Baghdad Pact because all the countries of the pact, except Pakistan, were away from the borders of China. It was purely anti-Russian pact. Pakistan joined it because of two reasons, first because it was consisted of Muslim countries and Pakistan wanted to establish cordial and close relations with Muslim brethren's and secondly, Pakistan wanted security against its rival India.

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<sup>140</sup> "The Baghdad Pact", *The Pakistan Review*, National Monthly, May 1956, Ferozsons Lahore, p. 14.

<sup>141</sup> Yunus, *Reflections on China*, p. 129.

### **1.11- The Asian-African Conference at Bandung- Thaw in the Relationship**

The Bandung conference provided platform for building Sino-Pakistan relations. India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia met in Colombo in April 1954 to discuss the Indo-China. Bitter war was being fought in Vietnam. Asian countries felt the heat of the war and India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia negotiated the deteriorating situation in Vietnam in Colombo. Indonesia suggested that there should be a conference of Asiatic and African states. However, Former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had a different point of view, 'There is another background to that unavoidable meeting between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and China attending the same conference than is disclosed by official claims. The truth is that like some other aligned nations, Pakistan attended the Bandung Conference more with the object of guarding Western interests than for promoting Afro-Asian solidarity'<sup>142</sup>. The conference was full of interesting events of Indo-Pakistan tussles and the Chinese efforts for conflict resolution. Indian Prime Minister severely criticized Pakistan. He said that Premier Chou En-lai was very compliant and he avoided bringing up any controversial and confrontational issues. Chinese Premier's aim was to get an agreement done. Pakistan and Turkey on the other hand wanted to create as many problems as they could. Pakistan was neither interested in any agreement or in the success of the conference. Pakistan even threatened to prevent any agreement and wanted to fail the conference. Decisions were not to be done on the basis of majority but unanimity was the rule. So it had become easier for the small groups to play nasty and to stop any progress of the conference.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Bhutto, *Pakistan and the Alliances*, p.35.

<sup>143</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Edited by Ravinder Kumar and H.Y. Sharada Prasad. Second Series, Reference on Bandung Conference, volume 28 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.50.

India was one of the prime movers of the conference but it was China which gained most from the conference and emerged as the leader of the Afro-Asian countries. Nehru was the principal architect of the conference and was better known than his Chinese counterpart among the delegates, yet it was Mr. Chou En-Lai who overshadowed Nehru. On the onset of the Conference, Pakistan and India scuffled with each other. Pakistan's Prime Minister Muhammad Ali and Sri Lankan Premier Kotelawala challenged Nehru and according to some reports, the Indian leader lost his temper and created a poor impression. The Pakistanis gleefully watched the leadership of the conference passed from Nehru to Chou En-Lai.<sup>144</sup> Although China played positive role but it was Pakistan that initially opposed Chinese participation in the Conference. Interestingly Chinese participation was valuable for Pakistan. However, Pakistan accepted Chinese participation in the Conference when it found that even Sri Lanka was siding with Nehru but Premier Muhammad Ali Bogra was successful in excluding Israel from the Conference. He said that if Israel was invited then Arabs would not attend.<sup>145</sup> The Conference opened at Bandung, Indonesia, on 18 April 1955 and ended on 25 April. It was attended by 29 countries. The Conference was divided into Aligned countries and Non-Aligned countries. Two communist states, China and North Vietnam, Twelve neutral states and fifteen anti-Communist states participated. Its original purposes were to promote goodwill and review the position of Asia and Africa in the World. However, as the meeting went on, the participants engaged in political quarrels.<sup>146</sup> Keeping in view the divergent foreign policies of the states it was difficult to reach to a conclusion. That is why the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai declared at the very outset that the Chinese delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel. Chou En-Lai played a mediatory role in Indo-Pak scuffles. China was in search of friends and it wanted to play a conciliatory

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<sup>144</sup> *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, p.159.

<sup>145</sup> Philip Mason, "Afro-Asian Conference Prospects", *Royal Central Asian Journal*, The Royal Central Asian Society, April 1955), p.167.

<sup>146</sup> Chen, *China and the Three Worlds*, p.15.



role in the Third World problems. China didn't want to be seen a hegemonic state by the Third World and also to establish its leading role in the Afro-Asian countries. However, Pakistan and India, the two arch rivals, throughout the conference challenged each other and the Chinese found lot of opportunities to show their maturity and statesmanship. On 17 April, one day before the scheduled opening of the conference, Nehru, along with the approval of 21 delegates, took the decision that there should be no preliminary speeches and only texts should be circulated, to avoid the controversy and save the time. When Muhammad Ali Bogra came, he vehemently protested that such an important decision was taken in the absence of eight important delegations including Pakistan which was one of the sponsors of the conference. Muhammad Ali Bogra succeeded in reversing the earlier decision. Chou En-Lai circulated his speech and also delivered personally. Muhammad Ali Bogra severely criticized Soviet imperialism but exonerated China from it. Important development occurred when Chou En-Lai met Pakistani Premier Muhammad Ali Bogra on 21<sup>st</sup> April 1955. Premier Muhammad Ali Bogra had specially commissioned Major General Muhammad Raza, who was then Pakistan's Ambassador to Iran, to join Pakistan's delegation to the Bandung Conference.<sup>147</sup> Major General Muhammad Raza had earlier been the Ambassador to China and he had cultivated intimate relations with Chinese leaders. During the Bandung Conference, Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai assured Pakistani Premier Muhammad Ali Bogra that China wanted cordial and very close relations with Pakistan and it would be naïve to reject the Chinese overtures towards Pakistan without thinking.<sup>148</sup> During his two private meetings with Chinese leader Chou En Lai, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra tried to explain Pakistan's participation in SEATO. Bogra further informed his Chinese counterpart that Pakistan did not feel any threats from its northerly neighbour and the alliance with United States and other Western countries was in

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<sup>147</sup> Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.79.

<sup>148</sup> Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, p.112.

no way against China and if the United States will wage war against China, Pakistan would not be a party to it as it was not the part of a coalition war against Korea.<sup>149</sup> Ambassador Raza recalls that he even proposed to have a dinner party at which the two prime ministers might meet. Chou replied that Raza need go to no trouble and that he would be happy to call on Bogra<sup>150</sup>. Later on Chou En-Lai revealed that Muhammad Ali Bogra had assured him that although Pakistan was a party to the military pacts, Pakistan was not against China, and Pakistan had no fear that China would commit aggression against it.<sup>151</sup> Pakistan conveyed to the Chinese that the motive behind its joining defensive alliances was India and not China.<sup>152</sup> In spite of the fact that Pakistan had severely criticized Soviet Union in Bandung Conference, which was the ally of China, the latter adopted very accommodative posture. Mohammad Ali Bogra made clear distinction between China and Soviet Union; he refused to regard China as imperialist, since China had no satellites.<sup>153</sup> Chou En-Lai wanted to tell the world that although Pakistan was a member of the western military alliance, it didn't share the aims of Western countries<sup>154</sup>, there was no fear of China in Pakistan's policy, and he also wanted to convey that China was reasonable and conciliatory in accepting a country which was in opposite camp. On 25 April, 1955, at the end of the Conference, Muhammad Ali Bogra had lunch with Premier Chou En-Lai and their meeting continued for two hours. Chinese Premier invited Muhammad Ali Bogra to China, which he accepted but because of the change of government in Pakistan by the end of 1955, the visit did not materialize.<sup>155</sup> The Bandung Conference also revealed that in the long run the interests of China and India

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<sup>149</sup> Ghulam Ali, "China's Seat in the United Nations, An Analysis of Pakistan's Role", *IPRI Journal*, Vol IV, Number 2, Summer 2004, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, p.106.

<sup>150</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan Diplomacy of Entente Cordiale*, pp.61, 239.

<sup>151</sup> Kahin, *The Asian African Conference*, p.57.

<sup>152</sup> Niloufer Wajid Ali, "Communist China and South & Southeast Asia", October 1949-June 1972, (Lahore: 1975), p.182.

<sup>153</sup> Sangat Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1970), p.106.

<sup>154</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.61.

<sup>155</sup> Assad Homayoun, "Pakistan-China Relation Up to 1970", PhD Thesis, The George Washington University, 1972, p.19.

would clash.<sup>156</sup> After the Bandung conference, in ensuing years, Pakistan lost its credibility as neutral state in East-West clash. Although Pakistan was active in the organization of the Bandung Conference but when the Bandung Conference gave birth to Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, Pakistan, because of its participation in Western Defence Pacts, was excluded.<sup>157</sup>

### **1.12- Exchange of Visits**

Muhammad Ali Bogra broke the ice in Sino-Pak relation in Bandung. In fact Bandung Conference was the platform where the foundations of Sino-Pak relations were established. In Bandung Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai invited Muhammad Ali Bogra for official visit, which he accepted but because of political instability at home, Bogra lost the power and Choudhary Muhammad Ali came to power. He also could not pay visit to China. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, the next Premier, got the credit of visiting China. Suhrawardy went on 12-day visit to China in October 1956 and received a tremendous reception. He and his hosts exchanged pleasantries and gifts. Prime Minister Suhrawardy gave the Peking Zoo a baby elephant to amuse Chinese children.<sup>158</sup> Chou En-Lai affirmed that Pakistan's membership of the SEATO should not be a bar to expand friendly relations between China and Pakistan.<sup>159</sup> At the conclusion of Suhrawardy's visit, the two Prime Ministers, in a joint statement on 23 October 1956, affirmed a further appreciation of their respective problems. Russian leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India in December 1956 and confronted Pakistan. The Russian leaders paid a formal visit to the disputed state of Kashmir and referred to it as the northern areas of India.<sup>160</sup> Chou En-Lai visited both India and Pakistan

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<sup>156</sup> John Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Hostile Co-existence*(London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967), p.100

<sup>157</sup> Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Overview, 1947-2004*, p.14

<sup>158</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.66.

<sup>159</sup> Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.106.

<sup>160</sup> Yunus, *Reflections on China*, p.129

in 1956; the itinerary also included Burma, North Vietnam and Cambodia. In Delhi he was welcomed by not only Nehru but also the Dalai Lama of Tibet. There was no dearth of crowds shouting Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.<sup>161</sup> When Chou En-Lai came to Pakistan, he was given an enthusiastic welcome, particularly at Dacca. Unlike his India visit where he was warmly welcomed but no Joint Communiqué was issued because of mutual differences, here in Pakistan everything went smooth.<sup>162</sup> Suhrawardy was so overwhelmed by Chou En Lai that he even wrote to President Eisenhower supporting the claim of the People's Republic of China to represent in the United Nations but Eisenhower rejected Pakistani point of view. As a result of these important visits and interaction between the leaders, Prime Minister Suhrawardy, in February 1957, told the National Assembly of Pakistan that Pakistan wanted the Chinese friendship and that he was very much sure that whenever some bad times comes, China would come to Pakistan's assistance.<sup>163</sup> Apart from the visits of head of the governments, late in 1955, a Chinese Women's delegation headed by China's Health Minister Madam Li Teh Chuan visited Pakistan at the invitation of All Pakistan Women Association. On Pakistan's Independence Day reception, on 14 August 1955, Chinese Premier hoped that cultural and economic interaction would increase. In January 1956, Chinese Vice-President Madam Soong Ching Ling visited Pakistan and Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali welcomed her. China's Vice-Premier Marshal Ho Lung attended the Republic Day celebration in Karachi on 23 March 1956.<sup>164</sup> China also invited Pakistani Parliamentary delegation in 1956 on the expenses of Chinese government.<sup>165</sup> Sixteen Pakistani editors also visited China on the invitation of All China Journalists Federation. Frequency of mutual visits made Mao happy which led him to present 4000 metric tons of

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<sup>161</sup> Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, p.159.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid*, p.161.

<sup>163</sup> Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.108.

<sup>164</sup> Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.81.

<sup>165</sup> **Anx F:** Visit of Pakistani Parliamentary delegation to China, Meeting of the Cabinet held on 5<sup>th</sup> September 1956. Declassified Documents of Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Division.

rice free of charge and promised another 60000 metric tons at fair and reasonable rates.<sup>166</sup> In September 1956 an exhibition of Chinese arts and crafts was opened in Dacca. In that year China was Pakistan's fifth biggest customer and Pakistan ranked sixth in China's trade.<sup>167</sup> However, with the Suhrawardy's visit to the United States the relations entered into difficult phase. During his visit Suhrawardy criticized China but the reaction of the Chinese was comparatively mild. Suhrawardy made strong pro-American speeches. In San Francisco he said 'we feel proud of Pakistan's alliance with the US. We intend to place our resources at the disposal of the ideal which both of us are pursuing'<sup>168</sup> However Chinese ignored the statements of Suhrawardy. They hoped that Sino-Pakistan relations would improve despite Suhrawardy's utterances.<sup>169</sup>

### **1.13- China's Stance Over Kashmir**

The Kashmir issue had engulfed the Sub-Continent even before the establishment of People's Republic of China. Kuomintang government had the permanent seat in the UN. Chinese representative Mr. Tingfu stated that it was obvious that the key to the problem located in plebiscite.<sup>170</sup> Communist revolution had occurred in China on 1st October 1949. Pakistan from the very beginning welcomed China's entry into UN. Pakistan considered it illogical to recognize the country and then to oppose its entry into a World Forum. Pakistan also expected that soon China would resume her Security Council seat in the United Nations and the Kashmir question would be on the table. Once India recognized new Chinese government, Pakistan could not afford to delay the recognition. China was also a neighbour and Pakistan didn't want to create bad blood because neighbours cannot be changed. Moreover there was no possibility of the reinstatement of the Kuomintang government. As

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<sup>166</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.27.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid, P.28.

<sup>168</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 21 July 1957.

<sup>169</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis*, p.216.

<sup>170</sup> Ali, "China's Kashmir Policy: Back to Neutrality", p.44.

Pakistan decided to support China's new government, it led to the speculation that despite its pro-US attitude Pakistan would eventually support Peking's claim to China's seat in the United Nations.<sup>171</sup> As soon as the new Chinese government was established, the revolutionary regime found itself in multitude of problems. China remained busy in her own internal affairs. The civil war in China had destroyed the entire infrastructure. China had no interest in the ongoing Indo-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir. In early 1950s hardly any reference was available that the Chinese would have shown any sort of concern over Kashmir. Peking was following Soviet policy on the issue as Mao Tse-tung had said on 30 June 1949, three months prior to the establishment of People's Republic of China that Chinese communist foreign policy should "lean to one side- to the Soviet side".<sup>172</sup> Both Soviet Union and China believed that United Nations should have no role in Kashmir. The issue should be solved through negotiations. Less than a year after the establishment of the communism, China found itself in war with the United States in Korea. China also penetrated in the Tibet region, claiming it to be the historic part of China. In those days China was not interested or in a position to adopt a policy for the solutions of the world problems. Till the time China's reaction to Kashmir was not known, its silence over the issue was no problem for Pakistan. China's first comments about Kashmir came in 1953 on the Nehru-Bogra meeting. China welcomed the meeting because it didn't like taking the issue to the UN because it had apprehensions of US intervention in the region. China realized that United States and Britain on the pretext of Kashmir want to interfere in the soft belly of China i.e. Sinkiang and Tibet. China emphasized on the need of mutual negotiations between India and Pakistan. When the Chinese Premier visited India in December 1956, at a press conference in Calcutta he declared that:

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<sup>171</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.70.

<sup>172</sup> Chen, *China and the Three Worlds*, p.8.

The Kashmir question is an outstanding question between India and Pakistan. We hope that this question will be settled satisfactorily. India and Pakistan are sister countries. The people of these two countries are of the same race. There is no dispute between these two countries which cannot be settled.<sup>173</sup>

However, Kashmir was not mentioned publicly when Suhrawardy was in Peking. Now in Karachi reporters asked Chou En Lai on the subject. He maintained that like other disputes among Afro-Asians the Kashmir dispute could be settled amicably<sup>174</sup>. During his visit to Pakistan, in December 1956 also, Chou En Lai avoided the Kashmir question and advised that Pakistan and India should solve it through negotiations. In his press conference on 24 December 1956, at Karachi, when Chou En-Lai was asked, whether China could help India and Pakistan to solve this question? Chou En-Lai replied that, "We are still in the stage of making a study of this question. We firmly believe that before one makes full study of a question, he has no right to speak. This is the principle we strictly adhere to".<sup>175</sup>

China didn't want to be involved in the Indo-Pakistani disputes, it was strictly following neutrality, but China also didn't want that United States and Britain should be involved in the problem. It thought that the involvement of those "Colonialist" powers would result in making a new colony in South of China<sup>176</sup>. Chou En-Lai said that the Colonialists, who had originally caused the dispute to arise, must not be allowed to meddle with it.<sup>177</sup> China's policy of neutrality and of not taking the issue to United Nations suited India. India also wanted mutual negotiations but Pakistan had realized the uselessness of the talks. However, when Suhrawardy visited USA in summer 1957, he delivered anti-communist speeches. He said that 'peace is safe in American hands.'<sup>178</sup> He described the Chinese position as one of hostile expansionism which has threatened peace and freedom in Asia. The reasons for Suhrawardy's condemnation of communists was his being extremely pro-west, he supported

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<sup>173</sup> Mao Siwel, '*China and the Kashmir Issue*' (Delhi: Strategic Analysis, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, March 1995), P.1574.

<sup>174</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.69.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid, p.1574.

<sup>176</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.70.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid, p.69.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid, p.73.

the West whole heartedly in Suez crisis and Hungarian issue. The Nationalist government of Taiwan had also strongly supported Pakistan in the United Nations on Kashmir issue, which changed the views of Suhrawardy regarding China. Pakistan also voted in the Steering Committee of the General Assembly in favour of a US resolution to exclude China's representation from the UN agenda<sup>179</sup> which had bad effects on Sino-Pak relations. By now it seemed that Suhrawardy had realized that, in the near future at least, there were no possibilities of China's accession of the United Nations because of the intense opposition of United States. The Taiwanese government had also supported Pakistan in the Security Council over Kashmir issue. In February 1957 Chou En Lai issued a joint statement with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mr. Solomon Bandranaike, calling for joint Indo-Pak efforts for the solution of Kashmir problem. Chou En-Lai also said that China was not in favour of sending UN troops to Kashmir. This angered many Pakistanis who wanted to see the UN role. Suhrawardy rejected the joint appeal for direct Indo-Pak talks on Kashmir.<sup>180</sup> He said, "Pakistan can't accept their suggestion for direct talks between Pakistan and Bharat on Kashmir."<sup>181</sup> However, Pakistan hailed Mao Tse-tung statement for China's neutrality on Kashmir. Foreign Minister Malik Feroz Khan Noon welcomed this change in China's policy.<sup>182</sup> On 20 July 1957 he said:

I was very interested to read in the papers today that Mr. Mao Tse-tung had made a statement that the Chinese Government was going to be neutral in the matter of Kashmir, and that in his view, other Communist countries should also be neutral. If the information is correct, welcome the change at least in Communist China's policy, because until now the statements issued by Mr. Chou En-Lai have always been to the effect that Bharat and Pakistan must decide the issue among them, which means no decision. I consider that attitude hostile towards Pakistan.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.71.

<sup>180</sup> Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.83.

<sup>181</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.15.

<sup>182</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 21 July 1957.

<sup>183</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.15.



Foreign Minister Malik Feroz Khan Noon also hoped that Russia would also adopt similar attitude because he said that its neutrality over the Kashmir issue in Security Council would help a lot in the solution of Kashmir dispute. He further enunciated that:

If Russia were to adopt a similar attitude, and not help Bharat by vetoing resolutions in the Security Council, which aim at a practical solution of the dispute then the Kashmir question would be settled immediately. The only practical solution is sending of an international force to the State of Jammu and Kashmir for its demilitarization<sup>184</sup>

Malik Feroz Khan Noon later became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Relations between Pakistan and China entered into difficult phase with Suhrawardy's United States visit. He severely criticized the Communist bloc. In December 1957, Malik Feroz Khan Noon became the Prime Minister. He appealed to both Soviet Union and China for neutrality on Kashmir. Malik Feroze Khan Noon even requested Chinese leaders to influence the Russian leaders as well and when the desired change in Soviet policy didn't materialize, Premier Noon severely criticized both China and Soviet Union.<sup>185</sup> It was naivety of Prime Minister Noon that he was expecting Chinese sympathies on Kashmir when his own delegation was voting against China's seat in the United Nations. In March 1958 in a debate in the National Assembly, on Kashmir, some members suggested that China should be cultivated to impress upon the Western countries that without all-out support on Kashmir they would not obtain Pakistan's friendship. Prime Minister Noon told the National Assembly on 8 March 1958 that China refused to intervene in the dispute and advised for bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan and that no help could be expected from China.<sup>186</sup> China adopted very shrewd diplomacy over Kashmir issue; it was the complete neutrality, which Pakistan did not want. Prime Minister Malik Feroze Khan Noon, while briefing the National Assembly attacked both China and Russia. He said:

We have even gone to the extent of approaching Mr Chou En-Lai. I have approached him personally and told him that if you have any influence on Russia, Please ask them not to take a partisan attitude in Kashmir case so the two Asiatic countries should not fight each other. But Russia and China have taken no interest at all. It

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<sup>184</sup> *Dawn* Karachi, 21 July 1957.

<sup>185</sup> Sherwani, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.84

<sup>186</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.72

is not that we have failed to make approaches. It is actually the higher politics of the cold war which prevents, I suppose, the Russians and the Chinese in taking any interest.<sup>187</sup>

On the eve of Ayub Khan's Coup d'etat, China's relations with both Pakistan and India were not cordial, so it opted for neutrality in all Indo-Pakistani disputes.

#### **1.14- Pakistan's Policy on the Question of The Two Chinas and People's Republic of China's Seat at United Nations**

From the very beginning, communist China regarded the island of Formosa as an integral part of China and it always remained an irritant in Sino-Pakistan relations.<sup>188</sup> On the other hand United States had recognized Formosa as a separate state and was not ready to accord recognition to Chinese government. China thought that by adopting such policy US not only deprived China of Formosa but was also trying to create two Chinas.<sup>189</sup> After entering into alliances with the Western countries, Pakistan supported them on the question of Formosa. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra, in 1955, said that the Formosan question should be settled in the UN and that Pakistan might recognize the Nationalist government if it styled itself as the government of Formosa only.<sup>190</sup> Pakistan also cast vote in favour of USA for the postponement of consideration of China in the UN, under United States pressure.<sup>191</sup> When in September-October 1958, a clash over Taiwan seemed probable; the Chinese Foreign Office forwarded the following query to Rawalpindi through the Pakistani Embassy: "Pakistan in the past on most international issues sided with America. While China does not expect a great change in Pakistan's foreign policy, she would like to know the attitude of Pakistan as an Asian Nation in this dispute {On Taiwan} between China and America invading Chinese territories".<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.33.

<sup>188</sup> Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, p.162.

<sup>189</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.199.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid, p.199.

<sup>191</sup> **Anx G:** Declassified documents of Pakistan Government, Meeting of the cabinet held on 14 September 1955 and then the top secret telegram of Pakistani Ambassador to Government of Pakistan after voting against Chinese representation.

<sup>192</sup> Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, p.162.

Pakistan went so far as to disregard the implications of its own recognition of the People's Republic of China and transmitted to the Chinese that "the juridical position of sovereignty over Formosa" was not clear.<sup>193</sup> Pakistan's position on the question of China's seat in the United Nations Security Council had always been fickle. Sometimes Pakistan had been supporting their cause and sometimes not only declining their support but criticizing the Chinese's aggressive designs also. Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister at that time, stated that Article 4 of the UN charter dealt with the admission of new members and not about the validity of the representation, with which debate was concerned. He further states that keeping in view this article China should not apply afresh but she is already the member of the United Nations Security Council.<sup>194</sup> Pakistan therefore supported China's representations in the United Nations<sup>195</sup> but when Pakistan entered into alliances with the West, it became difficult for Pakistan to take independent stance. US pressures on Pakistan led to anomalous stances. It was strange that Pakistan recognized People's Republic of China but it could not oppose the US resolutions for the postponement of China's representation in the United Nations. In 1956, despite the fact that Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy had made a visit to China and the Chinese Premier was due in Karachi on his historic visit, Pakistan opposed Chinese entry in the United Nations Security Council.<sup>196</sup> Chinese termed it as double dealing tactics of extending recognition to China while at the same time ignoring China at the United Nations.<sup>197</sup> For some years, while still maintaining the recognition, Pakistan persistently voted in the United Nations against the immediate representation of China.<sup>198</sup> Pakistan abstained in the United Nations' voting on

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<sup>193</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Bilateralism, New Directions*, (Karachi: Ferozsons, 1976), p.13.

<sup>194</sup> Ali, "China's Seat in the United Nations", p.105.

<sup>195</sup> **Ann H**, Pakistan Government's declassified documents, Cabinet Division File, a brief for the Pakistan delegation on the occasion of Afro-Asian Conference regarding the representation of China in the United Nations.

<sup>196</sup> Bhutto, *Bilateralism*, p.42.

<sup>197</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.21.

<sup>198</sup> Bhutto, *Bilateralism*, p.13.

China representation in 1952 and 1957 and voted against China for several years up till 1960.<sup>199</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The first phase of Sino-Pakistan relationship is full of turmoil. There is witnessed an instability in the relationship. Although the relationship between the two peoples are decades old but the states are new. Pakistan is neither interested in Chiang-Kai-Shek's government nor does it take any interest in the change of government in China. However, when India recognizes the new Chinese government, as it follows Pakistan. Pakistan thinks that soon China becomes permanent member of UN Security Council and the Kashmir question would be under discussion. However, soon Pakistan enters into the self-justifying pacts with United States and the relationship with China cools down. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra creates ripples in relations when he meets Chou-En-Lai. When Ayub Khan became the President, Pakistan has been isolated in the region.

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<sup>199</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2005*, p.69.

## CHAPTER- 2

### SINO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: AN EXPLORATION FOR THE ALLIANCES, PHASE- II (1958-1962)

#### 2.1- The Revolution<sup>200</sup>

‘The hour had struck. The moment so long delayed had finally arrived. The responsibility could no longer be put off’.<sup>201</sup> Pakistan Army’s first Muslim C-in-C decided to assume the responsibilities of the country and to go for Coup d’état against the Central government with the connivance of that time President Iskander Mirza, to which General Ayub Khan had called ‘the Revolution’. The President had realized that the political situation had reached a point of no return and the political question might not be solved with political dialogue. President Iskander Mirza discussed the issues with Ayub Khan and decided to impose Martial Law. General Muhammad Ayub Khan didn’t want to shoulder the responsibility of the abrogation of the constitution. He demanded the President that he would give in writing to him. It is a nemesis of history that, after eleven years of strong rule, in 1969, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, demanded the same from the beleaguered President Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan.<sup>202</sup> But now ‘The curtain was rung down at 8.00 P.M. when, in a dramatic sweep, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the constitution, proclaimed Martial Law throughout Pakistan, dismissed the Central and Provincial governments and appointed me Chief Martial Law Administrator’.<sup>203</sup> Within days, General Muhammad Ayub Khan realized that the besieged President Iskander Mirza was a liability rather than an asset. President Iskander Mirza himself had clipped his powers. He was blamed for machinations and intrigues in the Army and was exiled to England. General Mohammed Ayub Khan became the sole authority in the country.

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<sup>200</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.70.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., p.70.

<sup>202</sup> G. W. Choudhri, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (London: G. Hurst & Company, 1974), p.40.

<sup>203</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.71.

## 2.2- Reappraisal of the Foreign Policy

In October 1958, when General Muhammad Ayub Khan assumed power in the country, he stated that he would repair the damage done to Pakistan's relations with USSR, China and UAR. Pakistan's relations with these countries had received setbacks in the recent years. Pakistan's participation in Western defence alliance systems was irreconcilable for Soviet Union. Egypt had fought a bitter war with Britain, France and Israel in 1956 and had lost Sinai and most of its military machine but was victorious in the political arenas over the three countries. Pakistani masses were clearly on the Egyptian side but Government was ambivalent in its policies. Relations with People's Republic of China also suffered heavily. Premier Muhammad Ali Bogra played important role in befriending China but his successors could not maintain the pace of relations. Initially the relations were positively hostile but later on Pakistan and China reached on the verge of precipice. President Ayub Khan realized the loneliness of Pakistan and the sensitivities of the Chinese and announced to bridge the differences and curb the worsening of relations. He said that there were no eternal enemies and no eternal friends.<sup>204</sup> President Mohammed Ayub Khan inherited a foreign policy, which was confused and self-contradictory. In principle, the country was the champion of Muslim causes and in practice, a party to the Western sponsored alliances. Privately it had ensured China of its friendship and on the ground it had censured it. Pakistan was the member of SEATO<sup>205</sup>; Pakistan had recognized China but opposed it for the membership of United Nations. Soon President Mohammad Ayub Khan reappraised the foreign policy of Pakistan. In 1958, Pakistan felt lonely, the downward trend of Sino-Pakistan relations that had started in the reign of Premier Suhrawardy continued through the first two years of Ayub Khan's presidency.<sup>206</sup> It means President Ayub Khan did not bring

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<sup>204</sup> Aziz, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.84.

<sup>205</sup> Mushtaq Ahmad, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1968), p.121.

<sup>206</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.74.

any change in relations with China. Chinese considered Ayub Khan pro-West even before his coming to power. The only thing Ayub Khan did in the first two years of his rule was that he ended the confusion and double standards in relations with China. In categorical terms, he stood up for close alliance with the West. Pakistan's relations with India had always been bitter; negotiations with India had come to a standstill. Pakistan was also not successful in raising the Kashmir issue in Security Council. Soviet Union knew well the importance of Kashmir. It had vetoed the Security Council resolutions in 1948 and 1949.<sup>207</sup> Soviet Union had assured India of its full support regarding Kashmir issue. Soviet Union used its seventy-ninth veto on Kashmir and Kashmir had become an issue in the East-West cold war.<sup>208</sup> China had initially adopted neutral attitude on Kashmir question but keeping in view Pakistan's tough stance over China's representation in United Nations and Pakistan's increasing flirtation with the Western countries, China also adopted sullen attitude. Relations with Afghanistan had already been soar. Pakistan's increasing infatuation with the West also angered anti-American Arabs. It is said that during a visit to the Middle East President Nasser of Egypt even refused to see Prime Minister Suhrawardy.<sup>209</sup> Egypt stated Pakistan its enemy number one, which must be scared before Egypt tackles the Western countries.<sup>210</sup> Egyptian News Papers strongly condemned Suhrawardy and called him an imperialist and more loyal to America and Britain then Americans and British themselves.<sup>211</sup> As the SEATO had affected Sino-Pakistan relations, Baghdad Pact sealed Pakistan's relations with important Arab countries. In February 1958, President Nasser of Egypt condemned the Baghdad Pact and accused Pakistan of dividing the Arabs.<sup>212</sup> In September 1956, Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia also came to its nadir, when Saudis greeted

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<sup>207</sup> Yunus, *Reflections on China*, p.129.

<sup>208</sup> Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India*, p.243.

<sup>209</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.73.

<sup>210</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 11 August. 1957 and *Dawn*, 27 August 1957.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid*, 11 August 1957.

<sup>212</sup> K. Sarwar Hasan, *Pakistan and the United Nations* (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company for the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1960), p.15

Premier Nehru with the slogans of 'Marhaba Rasool al Islam'. Pakistan protested over the comments.<sup>213</sup> Although Pakistan had isolated itself for the Western countries but the realization in the country was growing that despite this Pakistan was left high and dry.<sup>214</sup> Pakistanis were worried that despite that Pakistan was cooperating with the West and playing pivotal role in the SEATO and Baghdad Pact, United States preferred India to Pakistan. India was getting heavy economic aid from America and in this way it was able to allocate maximum resources for its defence. Senator Kennedy appealed his Government that the United States must give massive aid to India because Mr. Nehru's country was the democratic hope in all of Asia.<sup>215</sup> *Dawn* severely criticized the American policy towards Pakistan. It commented:

The West is now talking to Pakistan in a new voice. It is not the voice of a friend, nor an ally. It sounds like that of a hostile stranger. It is not a prelude to a big let-down; it seems as if this is let-down. Not so long ago Mr John Dulles Foster did not like neutralists but he thinks differently now. A SEATO ally like Pakistan, he says, is not entitled to greater support than a neutral country like Bharat.<sup>216</sup>

Faced with these problems Ayub was deeply struck by the geopolitical situation of the country. 'The first question which President Ayub Khan asked himself was, which were the major countries interested in Pakistan? Ayub was thinking on pragmatic lines, the objective of his foreign policy was to try and evolve a pattern of relationship which would protect the country from any threat of aggression.'<sup>217</sup> As a military man the object of his foreign policy was the defence and security of his country against India. Ayub Khan was fearful of India's ambitions for the re-absorption of Pakistan.<sup>218</sup> Ayub Khan decided to go for maximum close relationship with the West. Although inherently Ayub Khan decided for strengthening relations with the West but overtly he declared that the past regimes in Pakistan were responsible for creating bad blood and misunderstanding between Pakistan and countries

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<sup>213</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 205.

<sup>214</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 30 March 1958.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.117.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid, p.115.



like China, Soviet Union and United Arab Republic.<sup>219</sup> Soon after he started following American policy of the containment of Communism in Asia. Communists and their sympathizers in Pakistan were put behind the bars. Famous poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Maulana Bhashani were thrown into jails. The Chinese committee of Afro-Asian solidarity sent a cable to Ayub Khan protesting against the arrest of Pakistani leftists and demanded their release.<sup>220</sup>

### **2.3- Uprising in Tibet**

With the Tibetan revolt in March 1959, Sino-Pakistan relations entered into very thorny phase. Tibetans had revolted against Chinese highhandedness. The Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of the Tibetans and fifteen hundred others fled to India.<sup>221</sup> India granted them asylum<sup>222</sup> and ordered strong security measures to protect the 23-year old "god-King" of Tibet against Chinese communists' attempts to kidnap him.<sup>223</sup> Initially India adopted very favourable and sympathetic attitude towards Tibet. It gave asylum to the Tibetan fugitives and also permission to project their cause and convey their sentiments to the world. On 20 June 1959 at a press conference, Dalai Lama accused the Chinese of killing more than 65000 people and destroying 1000 monasteries since 1956. Addressing a press conference he said that Chinese aim was to extend the extermination of Tibetan culture and the absorption of the Tibetan race.<sup>224</sup> Chinese actions were criticized throughout the World. There was uproar in the United Nations also. Ireland and Malaya stood for the cause of Tibet<sup>225</sup> and Pakistan supported their stance in the United Nations' General Assembly. The Irish-Malayan proposed resolution on the question of Tibet was adopted on 21 October 1959 by the General

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<sup>219</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 8, October 1958.

<sup>220</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.78.

<sup>221</sup> Chen, *China and the Three Worlds*, p.20.

<sup>222</sup> Bhatti, "Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia", p. 10.

<sup>223</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 5 April 1959.

<sup>224</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 21 June 1959.

<sup>225</sup> Ahsan Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p. 84.

Assembly after a two-day debate by a vote of 45 to 9, with 28 abstentions. Britain and India were among the abstainers. It is interesting to note that India, which was the immediate neighbour of Tibet and was very sympathetic to its cause, not only abstained but also advocated other means to resolve the matter than the United Nations. Dalai Lama regretted the Indian policy regarding Tibet and said that Nehru's policy was not clear to him.<sup>226</sup> Indian leaders had read the writing on the wall. Premier Nehru advised Dalai Lama not to approach the United Nations because he thought that no good would come from United Nations.<sup>227</sup> When Dalai Lama declared that the Tibetan people recognize them as the Government of Tibet, this evoked a sharp rebuttal from Mr. Nehru's government which in a formal statement said that the government of India does not recognize any separate government of Tibet and there was no question of the government under the Dalai Lama functioning in India.<sup>228</sup> Pakistan on the other hand followed its Western masters. Instead of adopting shrewd policy on Tibet, Pakistan's representative in the United Nations, Aly Khan, criticized India by saying that the opinions of certain delegates, who say that there was little in the UN, were wrong.<sup>229</sup> United Nations General Assembly condemned the human right violations in Tibet. On 20 October 1959, Pakistan's representative in the United Nations further said:

The People of Pakistan have been greatly concerned over the unfortunate events in Tibet. The Tibetan people are our close neighbours. For hundreds of years, they have pursued their traditional way of life. They have the right to choose the way in which they wish to live. Equally, it is the duty of the rest of the World to respect their choice.<sup>230</sup>

Pakistani stance was quite contrary to its policy adopted in the wake of Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, when Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, M. A. H. Ispahani had said, "Pakistan is quite removed from Tibet and I don't think it would make any difference if the Communists controlled Tibet."<sup>231</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 3 July 1959.

<sup>227</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.198.

<sup>228</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 4 July 1959.

<sup>229</sup> Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations* (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1991), p.56.

<sup>230</sup> Jain, China, *Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.18.

<sup>231</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.107.

Pakistan also condemned the Chinese brutalities in the SEATO meeting. Regarding Tibet, Pakistan changed its earlier policy. After 1950 occurring in Tibet, Pakistan had stated that the incidents had occurred in a 'far away' country but now Pakistan stated that the events had occurred to a close neighbour.<sup>232</sup> In 1959, China regarded Pakistan's stance on the question of the Chinese army's entry into Tibet as interference in the internal affairs of China<sup>233</sup> but the Dalai Lama issue created bad blood in Sino-India relations also. Over the fifties, Sino Indian relations blossomed, bloomed and then faded. The exuberant '*Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai*' turned into the disillusioned Hindi Chini bye bye<sup>234</sup>. By late 1959, most of the cordiality of the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai days had dissipated.<sup>235</sup>

## 2.4- Joint Defence of the Sub-Continent

"As a student of war strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the North in the direction of the warm waters of Indian Ocean. This push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other."<sup>236</sup>

Pakistan's policy of the Joint Defence of the Sub-Continent was not a new one in 1960. Pakistan had been proposing the joint defence of the Sub-Continent since 1951. As India had been eager for the no-war pact with Pakistan, the later was interested in joint defence of the Sub-Continent, which seems to be one-step ahead of no-war pact. Even before the partition of India, Jinnah had proposed a sort of 'Monroe Doctrine' of their own for the defence of the Sub-Continent against all outsiders.<sup>237</sup> On 30 August 1952, Ayub Khan wrote a letter to the Indian Cricket Souvenir that India and Pakistan should unite to face the impending dangers.<sup>238</sup> On 8 September 1957, Foreign Minister Malik Feroz Khan Noon

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<sup>232</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p. 79.

<sup>233</sup> Mahdi, "Sino-Pakistan Relation: Historical Background", p. 62.

<sup>234</sup> A.I. Akram, *A Look at India's Foreign Policy*, (Islamabad: Regional Studies, Vol VI, No II, Institute of Regional Studies, Spring 1988), p.8.

<sup>235</sup> Bhatti, "Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia", p. 11.

<sup>236</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Pakistan Perspective, Foreign Affairs* (New York), July 1960, p. 556.

<sup>237</sup> S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 55.

<sup>238</sup> Colonel Mohammad Ahmed, *My Chief*, (London: Longman Green & Company Publishers, 1960), p. 26.

offered India armed alliance in exchange for Kashmir settlement. The Foreign Minister uttered that Pakistan would consider an attack on India as an attack on Pakistan. He said that if there was peace between India and Pakistan both shall make rapid progress and would create an example for the World.<sup>239</sup> However one positive note in Foreign Minister's statement was the armed alliance in exchange for Kashmir settlement. The Foreign Minister had commented on Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru's statement before the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs that Pakistan might make a desperate bid to take Kashmir by violence.<sup>240</sup> The revolt in China and the subsequent flight of Dalai Lama to India created a situation, where both Pakistan and India realized that their respective countries might be embroiled in war with China.<sup>241</sup>

On 24 April 1959, Ayub Khan said that:

*'I said that in the case of external aggression both India and Pakistan should come together to defend the Sub-Continent'.*<sup>242</sup>

Mr. Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha on 4 May 1959 that India is not going to have alliance with any country, come what may. Prime Minister Nehru further lampooned and made fun of this issue by saying that he did not understand that why People talk about Joint Defence and against whom? He enunciated that we are not going to become member of the Baghdad Pact, SEATO or somebody else?<sup>243</sup> Nehru thought that by entering into defence agreement with any country India would lose self-respect among the Afro-Asian states.<sup>244</sup> Nehru even ridiculed the offer by rhetorically asking, 'Joint defence against whom?', Ayub Khan persisted, forecasting that South Asia would become militarily vulnerable in five years to major invasions from the north.<sup>245</sup> Now Ayub Khan changed his tone and emphasized that

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<sup>239</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 9 September, 1957.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid*, 27 August 1957.

<sup>241</sup> B. L. Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, p. 71.

<sup>242</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.126.

<sup>243</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 5 May 1959.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*, 5 May 1959.

<sup>245</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 1947-2012*, p. 78.

what he had in mind was a general understanding for peace between the two countries.<sup>246</sup> However, Pakistan's tirade against China did not stop. Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir expressed disappointment at Prime Minister Nehru's rejection of Ayub Khan's proposal; Nehru had mockingly asked that 'joint defence? Against whom'?<sup>247</sup>, Manzur Qadir said that Nehru was taking slaps after slaps from the Chinese and still pretending that he had not been slapped at all.<sup>248</sup> Ayub proposed that India and Pakistan instead of deploying forces on each other's borders, should station their forces on the Northern borders to save the Sub-Continent from the impending attack from the north.<sup>249</sup> On 23 October 1959, President Ayub Khan addressed a press conference. He talked about 'the serious threats from the North', said that 'events on the Tibet border would make the Subcontinent militarily vulnerable' and emphasized the necessity of India and Pakistan coming together to meet the danger<sup>250</sup>. However, Nehru rejected the proposal categorically. India's unwillingness to consider joint defence of the subcontinent was discouraging, although to settle many of the outstanding disputes with Pakistan in the years 1959 and 1960 was a hopeful sign but there was no significant progress on Kashmir<sup>251</sup>. When Ayub visited United States in the summer of 1961, his pronouncements revealed the tentativeness of his thinking about China. He still talked of the danger from the north and urged Indo-Pakistan cooperation to meet it<sup>252</sup>. China felt Pakistani political maneuverings and protested over the double standards. On one hand, China had been assured of friendship despite Pakistan's membership of SEATO and on other Pakistan was proffering joint defence of the Sub-Continent to India.<sup>253</sup> There was no doubt that Ayub's proposal for joint defence of the Sub-Continent was against the

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<sup>246</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.127.

<sup>247</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.74.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid, p.76.

<sup>249</sup> William. J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p.159.

<sup>250</sup> Bhutto, *Bilateralism*, p.44.

<sup>251</sup> William. J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p.316.

<sup>252</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, *China & Pakistan Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, p.83.

<sup>253</sup> B. L. Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, p.77.

aggression from the China.<sup>254</sup> Ayub Khan had realized that both China and India were following divergent policies and the clash between the two was inevitable in the near future. Ayub Khan believed that China and India may come to some sort of understanding but the time of 'Bhai Bhai' was over.<sup>255</sup> However, by proposing joint defence of the Sub-Continent Ayub Khan had also two aims to achieve, he thought that India would not agree to his proposals and Ayub Khan would have strong case in Washington for increase in aid to Pakistan and secondly in every proposal he conditioned the solution of main issues between the two countries prior to joint defence. He says:

I emphasized that the prerequisite for such an understanding was the solution of big problems like Kashmir and Canal Water. Once these were resolved, the armies of the two countries could disengage and move to their respective vulnerable frontiers. This would give us the substance of joint defence that is, freedom from fear of each other and freedom to protect our respective frontiers.<sup>256</sup>

Whatever might be the motives of Pakistan behind proposing joint defence of the Sub-Continent these proposals had put very negative effects on Pakistan's relations with China.

## 2.5- Taiwanese Hajj Mission

Pakistan meanwhile did not miss another opportunity for annoyance to China. A hajj delegation from Taiwan visited Pakistan from 29 June to 5 July 1959 on its way to Makkah. The delegation reached Karachi on 29 June 1959 and Lieutenant General Osman Ma led the delegation.<sup>257</sup> The Taiwanese Hajj contingent met with religious leaders, issued statements and delivered speeches. Talking to reporters Ma said:

Muslims in Taiwan--- were all for a united front for the liberation and emancipation of Muslims all over the World, especially those in the Republic of China who had no freedom to worship or preach their religion. On the contrary, in Taiwan we have complete freedom as Muslims to worship or preach our religion the way we like.<sup>258</sup>

The news of the uninvited guests were played up in the Indian press and given a twist.<sup>259</sup>

China protested and stated that the contingent included Chiang Kai-Shek's Lieutenant

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<sup>254</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.78.

<sup>255</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.166.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid, P.127.

<sup>257</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, p.51.

<sup>258</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 30 June 1959.

<sup>259</sup> Aziz, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.85.

General and they were masquerading as pilgrims.<sup>260</sup> China realized that the Taiwanese delegation was invited with the connivance of the Americans and the later were interested in creating 'two Chinas'.<sup>261</sup> China's People's Daily noticed the unfriendly acts of Pakistan and threatened that the Pakistan government should pull up the horse before the precipice, reverse its hostile stand towards the Chinese people and return to the road laid down by the Bandung resolutions and the road of Sino-Pakistani friendship.<sup>262</sup> The relations between the two countries had touched their nadir because of Tibetan issue and Pakistan's pro-west policies. The event of Taiwanese pilgrims further aggravated the situation.

## **2.6- Downward Trend in Sino-Pakistan Relations**

The downward trend in Sino-Pakistan relations characteristic of Suhrawardy's tenure as Prime Minister continued through the initial phase of military takeover in Pakistan<sup>263</sup>. On 21 July 1959, China sent a strong protest note to Pakistan. Several grievances including Pakistan's voting against China's representation in the United Nations, Pakistan's role on the Tibetan issue and permitting a delegation of Taiwanese pilgrims, headed by a Lieutenant General of Chiang Kai-Shek's clique, to visit Karachi, aggravated the relations.<sup>264</sup> China protested that Pakistan was wantonly slandering China, flagrantly interfering in China's internal affairs and waging cold war in the mode of the United States.<sup>265</sup> In the protest note, the Chinese blamed Pakistan of following the footsteps of the United States.<sup>266</sup> The protest note caused surprise and regret in Karachi and Pakistan declared them unwarranted charges.<sup>267</sup> Pakistan's alliance with the West created a lot of problems for the country. The alliance had brought the hostility of the communist bloc, including Soviet Union and China,

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<sup>260</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, P.77.

<sup>261</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.40.

<sup>262</sup> Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1980*, p.22.

<sup>263</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All-Weather Friendship", p.6.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid, P.6.

<sup>265</sup> Mao Siwei, "China and the Kashmir Issue, Strategic Analysis", World Affairs, New Delhi: Vol XII No 12, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, p.1576.

<sup>266</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.16.

<sup>267</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 25 July, 1959.

and the antagonism of Muslim countries and provided India with yet another pretext to tighten its noose over Kashmir. Khrushchev threatened Pakistan with annihilation after the U-2 incident.<sup>268</sup>

Unknown Chinese planes also violated air space of Pakistan over Hunza in July 1959 and over Gilgit area in September 1959. Low flying Chinese planes violated Pakistani air space many a time. Chinese troops also appeared on Sino-Pakistan borders and took away the cattle. In retaliation, Ayub Khan sealed the border and moved the Gilgit Scouts up to the China border. In October 1959, Government of Pakistan came across a Chinese map showing some Pakistani territories as part of China. Interestingly the maps had come from India and the Indian press displayed them gleefully.<sup>269</sup> On 2 October 1959, the Governor of West Pakistan reached Gilgit for a personal survey. It was a first ever visit of any Governor to the area. He made the survey because the Chinese maps had shown 4000 square miles of territory as Chinese territory.<sup>270</sup> Pakistan adopted very strong policy regarding China and even criticized India for being soft on Mc-Mahan line. Pakistan criticized Indian withdrawal from the Tamadem, which the Indian had been claiming as their territory. Pakistan said that:

Pakistan was not concerned with the 2000 miles Mac Mohan line but there would be no yielding of any kind as far as Pakistan's extreme northern borders are concerned. The sanctity of the Mac Mohan line must be preserved and maps or no maps, we will not countenance the loss of even a single inch of our territory. If anyone anywhere thinks he is in for a rude shock.<sup>271</sup>

Pakistan initially decided not to be cowed down by the pressure tactics. Pakistan also hinted that it may take the border violation issue before CENTO.<sup>272</sup> Pakistan wanted that Western Allies should give guarantee for the security of Pakistan's borders. The dramatic change came when in 1959, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in NEFA and Ladakh. Dalai Lama

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<sup>268</sup> "Pakistan: A step-child of the West", *The Round Table, A Quarterly Review of British Commonwealth Affairs*, September 1963, p.395.

<sup>269</sup> Aziz, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p. 85.

<sup>270</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p. 46.

<sup>271</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 3 October 1959.

<sup>272</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 7 October 1959.



ran to India. In July 1959, Chinese troops massed on China-Bhutan borders and the total Chinese army strength on Bhutan and Nepal's border was estimated at 200000.<sup>273</sup> Initially India supported him and he talked to All India Radio against China but later on India came under severe Chinese pressure and Nehru called Dalai Lama not to raise the Tibetan issue in United Nations. However, Nehru declared Red China an aggressive nation with Communism or without Communism.<sup>274</sup> Now Pakistan felt the heat and Ayub Khan government was feeling the need of negotiations for the demarcation of the border. Pakistan was so concerned by the Chinese maps and the recent Indo-China border clash that Pakistani Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir on his return from United Nations immediately went to Gilgit for talks with Pakistani soldiers on the Pakistan-China border.<sup>275</sup> On 23 October 1959, Ayub Khan proposed the demarcation of border but received no response; however, the tenor of Ayub Khan regime regarding China did not change. In the same statement, Ayub Khan also talked about the utility of the joint defence of the Sub-Continent. He talked about the serious threat from the north and said that events on the Tibet border would make the Indian Sub-Continent vulnerable.<sup>276</sup> In May 1960, Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir stated that China's admission to the United Nations would not mitigate its expansionist designs. In an interview to the American television, Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir said that 'expansionist tendencies were more noticeable in China than in Russia.'<sup>277</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto told reporter at UN that China had made extensive incursions into Kashmir and thus violated the UN resolution concerning the stationing of the troops in the region.<sup>278</sup> Pakistan also entered into bilateral defence agreement with the United States on 5 March 1959, which further deteriorated Sino-Pakistan relations. China described the agreement as a threat to

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<sup>273</sup> Ibid, 27 July 1959.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid, 13 September 1959.

<sup>275</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p. 47.

<sup>276</sup> Bhutto, *Bilateralism*, p.16.

<sup>277</sup> Mehmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, p.46.

<sup>278</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All-Weather Friendship", p. 6.

Soviet Union also.<sup>279</sup> China severely criticized Pakistan for making an agreement with the United States. Ayub Khan regime was criticized that since it had come to power, it was not only playing against the interests of Asia but also against the national interests of Pakistan. China stated that the mutual defence agreement was against China, Russia and India.<sup>280</sup> Pakistan was now isolated in the region. On the contrary, India's alliance with the Soviet Union stood the test of time and helped India in the realization of its long-term security interests in the region. The United States despite its alliance with Pakistan considered India a bulwark against communism in the region and did not lose an opportunity to court India. As a matter of fact by 1958-59, India had been receiving aid not only from the Soviet Union but also from the United States<sup>281</sup>

## **2.7- U- 2, Incident**

An American spy plane, which was flying over Soviet lands and it was speculated to have flown from Pakistan, was shot down by the Soviets and furthermore, its pilot Gary Powers was captured alive.<sup>282</sup> On 6 May 1960, it became known to the Pakistani press that American spy plane was shot by the Soviets on 1 May 1960. Initially Americans refused to take the responsibility of the U-2 and stated that US jet was 'probably' on a mission for intelligence but they said that the flight was not authorized by Washington. However, President Eisenhower had given the orders for inquiry.<sup>283</sup> Khrushchev threatened to hit Pakistan with rockets because the plane had flown from Pakistan and was going to Norway<sup>284</sup> but the Pakistani foreign office declared that it would contact the Soviet Government for information as no Western bases were there on Pakistani soil and it was a

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<sup>279</sup> Yunus, *Reflections on China*, p.130.

<sup>280</sup> Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.109.

<sup>281</sup> Farzana Shakoor, "Recasting Pakistan-India Relations in the Post-Cold War Era" *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol 50, The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, October 1997, Karachi, p.77.

<sup>282</sup> Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980), p.91.

<sup>283</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 6 May 1960.

<sup>284</sup> Wajid Ali, *Communist China and South & Southeast Asia*, p.186.

sheer psychological propaganda against Pakistan.<sup>285</sup> Pakistan rejected the Russian allegations that the aircraft shot down over Soviet territory had remained in Peshawar for three days. However, President Ayub Khan personally gave the orders of inquiry.<sup>286</sup> Nevertheless, after the Soviet threat of annihilation, Pakistan adopted a belligerent attitude. Instead of apologizing, Pakistani newspapers were more ready to do battle with Khrushchev.<sup>287</sup> Pakistani press advocated that Pakistan should be on the side which was right, just and honorable and should not be afraid of Soviet threats.<sup>288</sup> Pakistan's belligerent press was in connivance with the Government. The Dawn instead of suggesting the Government for apologizing wrote inciting article '*so what*'<sup>289</sup> and justified that keeping in view the policies of the communist regimes, such types of activities were justified. Initially Pakistan stated that it was unaware of the use of the Badaber facility, whereas during his visit to the United States in 1958, Ayub Khan discussed the U-2 flights and the proposed intelligence facility.<sup>290</sup> Also in May 1959, a fresh arms supply issue arose after the Pakistanis asked for supersonic F-104 fighter aircraft. In justifying the request, Ayub Khan stressed the problems that the US intelligence facility at Badaber had caused for Pakistan. He said that Soviet Union, China and India, despite public denial, suspected that the unit was an actual or potential launching site for missiles.<sup>291</sup> China on the other hand felt the act but never mentioned it with the Pakistani authorities and directed its fire against Americans.<sup>292</sup> Chinese government strongly condemned the incident of spying and declared President Eisenhower responsible by calling it 'Eisenhower's Gangster Attitude'<sup>293</sup> The pilot of the

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<sup>285</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 10 May 1960.

<sup>286</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 9 May 1960.

<sup>287</sup> Anwar Hussain Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p. 44.

<sup>288</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 19 May 1960.

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid*, 11 May 1960.

<sup>290</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p. 95.

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid*, p. 104.

<sup>292</sup> Werner Lev, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China", *Pacific Affairs*, Volume xxxv, Number 3, 1962, p. 220.

<sup>293</sup> Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, p. 64.

ill-fated spy plane Gary Powers admitted that he had used the Peshawar facility and it was rumoured that the plane had visited Sinkiang but the Chinese government didn't mention it to Pakistan, although it remained sullen.<sup>294</sup> The U-2 incident also compelled Pakistan to change her policy towards United States. President Ayub Khan realized that keeping all the eggs in the American basket would be hazardous for Pakistan. The confidence in the United States was now declining and soon Pakistan concluded oil exploration agreement with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>295</sup> Bhutto rightly observed that:

U-2 incident was the fact of Pakistan's inexperience in international affairs. Who but a novice would expect that, by providing the Badaber surveillance base to the United States, India would be made to disgorge Kashmir? It was this base which figured in the famous U-2 incident in 1960 and provoked the public threat from Nikita Khrushchev that the Soviet Forces would wipe out Peshawar. AUS Senator visited this base, asked Pakistani official what compensation they had received for it and on hearing the reply, remarked, 'You Pakistanis are suckers. For less important bases, hundreds of millions are given.'<sup>296</sup>

## **2.8- Pakistan's Offer for the Demarcation of the Border**

On 23 October 1959, when Ayub repeated his offer for joint defense to India, he also suggested the demarcation of borders with China. By now, Ayub Khan had realized that Sino-Indian strained relations might result in any untoward incident. President Ayub thought that at least it should be avoided on this side of the border. In the Cabinet session, some ministers suggested that the Chinese response was unlikely but Ayub Khan thought that there would be no harm in preparing a memorandum and getting in touch with the Chinese authorities but there was no response from the Chinese government for a long time.<sup>297</sup> In the first week of May 1962, however, both Pakistan and China announced their intentions for the demarcation of the borders, which did not demarcate.<sup>298</sup> India protested with China and Pakistan on 10 May 1962, declaring that it was also a party to that controversial issue. India claimed that Pakistan had illegally occupied the Kashmir territory and it had no right

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<sup>294</sup> Aziz, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.86.

<sup>295</sup> Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p.162.

<sup>296</sup> Bhutto, *Bilateralism*, p.43.

<sup>297</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.162.

<sup>298</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, P.90.

to negotiate with China.<sup>299</sup> Both Pakistan and China rejected its claims. China's agreeing to the demarcation of the border was a success of Pakistan's foreign policy because by agreeing to the settlement of the border problem means that China had recognized the question as a controversial issue. Indians had earlier thought that Chinese were following Indian point of view on the question of Kashmir. On March 16, 1956, Chou En-Lai was alleged to have told the Indian Ambassador that the People of Kashmir had already expressed their will; therefore, the Indians had the right to Kashmir. Until 1961, Indians thought that Chinese were sticking to the same policy.<sup>300</sup> In 1960, when the border tension between China and India intensified, Premier Chou En-Lai visited India. Both the leaders discussed the border issue. The Indians also wanted to discuss the Sinkiang and Pakistan-Kashmir border which the Chinese refused to negotiate.

In December 1961, when Ayub Khan returned from United States, he met with Chinese Ambassador. President Ayub asked him about Pakistani suggestion for the border demarcation. Chinese Ambassador replied that the demarcation of the border was very complicated issue. Ayub Khan told him that if the demarcation was complicated then the admission to the United Nations was even more complicated.<sup>301</sup> Pakistan's relations with China took a positive turn from that meeting and since then there had been a considerable improvement in Sino-Pakistan relations.<sup>302</sup> In December 1961, China announced its readiness for the demarcation of the border<sup>303</sup>. On 3 May 1962, the two countries announced that agreement had been reached to begin negotiations for the demarcation of the border between Chinese Sinkiang and the contiguous areas.<sup>304</sup> In October 1962 negotiations between the two countries started for the demarcation of Sinkiang and Hunza border. An

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<sup>299</sup> Saeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests", p.748.

<sup>300</sup> Wajid Ali, *Communist China and South & Southeast Asia*, p.52.

<sup>301</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.162.

<sup>302</sup> *Pakistan-1963-64*, p.156.

<sup>303</sup> Zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan: The Focus of China's South Asian Policy", in Masuma Hasan, *Pakistan in a Changing World*, p.200.

<sup>304</sup> John Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations*, (London: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1967), p.193.

agreement on the alignment of the boundaries was reached in December 1962. On 26 December 1962, a Sino-Pakistan joint communiqué announced that complete agreement in principle had been reached on the border alignment, details were ironed out in February 1963 and an agreement signed on 2 March 1963.<sup>305</sup> During 1959 and 1960, China demarcated its borders with its other neighbours. On 28 January 1960, an agreement with Burma was reached on the demarcation of the border, On 21 March 1960 an agreement with Nepal on the question of boundary was made<sup>306</sup> and in 1962 negotiations with Pakistan on the demarcation issue started that concluded on March 2, 1963.

## **2.9- Sino-India War- 1962**

India regarded itself as big power in Asia; its earlier overtures to China were on the basis that it would come to some sort of understanding on the division of the areas of influence. Nevertheless, that could not happen.<sup>307</sup> The differences between China and India which had started from the Tibetan issue, now entered into second phase and the controversial issues of the borders came to the surface. History shows that there had been no agreement ever about the border demarcation between Central government of China and government of British India.<sup>308</sup> Mc Mahan line was very sensitive to the Chinese. Mc Mahan line had never been accepted by any Chinese government. Neither the Imperial government of China in 1914 nor the Chiang Kai-Shek's government agreed to it.<sup>309</sup> China suggested the observance of the line of actual control pending negotiations to delimit the boundary, taking into account both the historical background and the existing realities. India, however, insisted on the acceptance of the McMahan Line<sup>310</sup>. India was initially adamant not to bring any change to the Mc Mahan line but later on signaled for minor adjustments in the 2000 miles Mc Mahan

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<sup>305</sup> Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p.189.

<sup>306</sup> Ramakant, *China and South Asia*, (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1988), p.21.

<sup>307</sup> Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance", p. 199.

<sup>308</sup> Bhatta, *Great Powers and South Asia*, p.105.

<sup>309</sup> *IPRI Fact file*, Volume V, Number VII, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, July 2003), p. 7.

<sup>310</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, p.83.

line. In September 1959, the situation deteriorated further. Nehru declared China an aggressive power. Earlier the Chinese had also sent 200000 forces on the borders of Bhutan, expecting Indian moves from Bhutan borders.<sup>311</sup> In September 1959, The Chinese troops entered in Indian territories in many places and strengthened their positions.<sup>312</sup> Now China demanded India the evacuation of Indian forces from the disputed territory. Chou En-Lai insisted that if Indian forces were withdrawn, the situation would normalize but he also reiterated that pressure tactics would not work.<sup>313</sup> The situation vividly changed when the Chinese troops entered in few places in Ladakh area.<sup>314</sup> Although border remained tense till 1962, when open war between the two countries started, but there was no igniting incident. Much before the outbreak of hostilities on the Sino-India border, President Kennedy sent Mr. Lyndon Johnson to Delhi to support India in its differences against China. He urged India to extend its leadership to other parts of Asia.<sup>315</sup> This convinced India that in case of Sino-Indian war, the West would come to its help and it would not be abandoned. Moreover, India would not have to modify its position of Non-Aligned country. In December 1961, India invaded Goa. Historically Goa was a part of India but before the arrival of British in India it was occupied by the Portuguese. It was located in the South-West of India. Indians considered it a part of Indian Union and when the negotiations for its annexation failed with the Portuguese, India occupied it forcefully in 1961. Portugal, as a member of the NATO, appealed to NATO for help against Indian aggression but NATO failed to protect its own member from Indian aggression. Goa's occupation was a message to both Pakistan and China that India would not follow the Gandhian policy of non-violence and its forces were not ceremonial one.<sup>316</sup> Indians wanted to show hegemony in the region and use some force.

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<sup>311</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 27 July 1959.

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid*, 2 September 1959.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid*, 10 September 1959.

<sup>314</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 26 October 1959.

<sup>315</sup> Ahsan Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World*, p. 94.

<sup>316</sup> Wilcox, *India, Pakistan and the Rise of China*, p.65.

The Defence Minister of India Mr Menon confidently told the Congress Party workers that just as the Goa problem has been solved by use of force, India will use military force and will solve China and Pakistan problems also.<sup>317</sup> Pakistan was also terrified by the Indian use of brutal force against Goa. Pakistan realized that in future punitive action might be taken against Pakistani Azad Kashmir. Some Pakistani politicians pointed up the failure of NATO to come to Portugal's help in the Goa crisis and questioned validity and effectiveness of CENTO and SEATO<sup>318</sup>. On the other hand in relations with the neighbouring countries Chinese repeated their Burmese strategy of alternating between use of force and diplomatic initiative. However, in case of India the diplomatic niceties were replaced by hard and tough notes. India sent forces to Bhutan and Sikkim and declared that if war was thrust upon Nepal, it would be considered war against India. In the 'buffer zones' Militiamen and intelligence officers were replaced by Indian soldiers, direct confrontation had started.<sup>319</sup> In August, Indian forces fought with Chinese on a picket and Chinese penetrated for about forty miles in Ladakh. India handed over Ladakh to military. Prime Minister Nehru announced in 1961 that the military balance in the region had shifted in favour of India. While India was taking military steps, China maneuvered to isolate India in the region. China concluded boundary agreements with Nepal, Burma and Pakistan. The arrogant Indian Premier, while going to Sri Lanka, on 12 October 1962, disclosed that he had given orders to the Indian Army to clear Indian territories of Chinese aggressors.<sup>320</sup> On 20 October 1962 India launched an all-out offensive on China borders.<sup>321</sup> This was sheer provocation of China.<sup>322</sup> Some scholars<sup>323</sup> are of the view that Nehru deliberately provoked an attack by China because he knew that

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<sup>317</sup> *The Statesman*, New Delhi, 26 December 1961, As quoted by Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace*, p.42.

<sup>318</sup> Assad Homayoun "Pakistan-China Relation Up to 1970", p.22.

<sup>319</sup> Wilcox, *India, Pakistan and the Rise of China*, p.66.

<sup>320</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.238.

<sup>321</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 21 October 1962.

<sup>322</sup> Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace*, p.73.

<sup>323</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.136 and Bhutto, *Myth of Independence*, 76.



was the one way to obtain massive quantities of arms from the West<sup>324</sup>. The purpose of getting those arms was to realize the dream of *Akhand Bharat*. Chinese responded vehemently and Indian Army met with ignominious defeat. Approximately 4000 Indian soldiers were rounded up.<sup>325</sup> The fighting stopped on 21 November, when the Chinese unilaterally declared ceasefire. However the Chinese pull out from the Indian territory was slow. The withdrawal completed in March 1963.<sup>326</sup>

In 1962, India had compelled China to go to war because of India's encroachment in Chinese territory.<sup>327</sup> It was only because of the provocation of Indian Army that a stage came when the Chinese Premier and Chief of Staff could bear it no longer.<sup>328</sup> Nehru, who had some scorn for the militaries, had to pay heavily for the prejudice against the Armed Forces. He had hurt his Armed Forces badly. Nehru had a sort of repugnance for army personnel. He preferred his Defence Minister to the Chief of Army Staff. Nehru failed in performing the duties of defending his country against the onslaught of the Chinese. He failed in discharging the fundamental duties as a leader. History would find it difficult to wash this stain from the image of Nehru.<sup>329</sup>

## **2.10- Impact of Sino-Indian War**

The Chinese invasion of India in autumn of 1962 had severe impact on Pakistan. Pakistan was unsympathetic to India's plight.<sup>330</sup> Pakistan's reaction to the defeat of India by China was a mixture of pleasure and fear. Pakistan savoured because its arch rival was beaten and was worried because a bigger bully than India was in the neighbourhood.<sup>331</sup> Keeping in view

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<sup>324</sup> Niloufer Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-81, The Search for Security*, (Rawalpindi: Ferozsons Pvt Ltd, 1999), p.191.

<sup>325</sup> Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*, p.167.

<sup>326</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 2 March 1963.

<sup>327</sup> Ahsen Chaudhri, *Strategic and Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations*, p.18.

<sup>328</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.135.

<sup>329</sup> Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace*, p.65.

<sup>330</sup> Wilber, *Pakistan: Yesterday and Today*, p.240.

<sup>331</sup> Wilcox, *India, Pakistan and the Rise of China*, p.75.

the strategic position of Kashmir and its centrality in Indo-China War, Pakistan could not be expected to neglect the happening on its borders. On 26 April 1963 Bhutto said:

I am not going to discuss the merits of the Sino-Indian conflict. It primarily concerns the People's Republic of China and the Government of India. But one cannot overlook the facts that Kashmir is very close to China and that most of Kashmir is under the occupation of India, a country in conflict with China. Thus when fighting flared up between India and China on the Laakh front, the Kashmir dispute acquired a new aspect. Ladakh is the part of Kashmir and contiguous to China. The realization of this vital fact rekindled worldwide interest in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Important emissaries from leading Western powers rushed to India and Pakistan to make an effort to bring about a settlement of that question.<sup>332</sup>

Sino-Indian war had negative repercussions on US-Pakistan relations. The war had also affected the whole course of Pakistan's foreign policy.<sup>333</sup> India had always been following idealist policy regarding cooperation with the West. Now the Indians spurned all those principles and were asking Americans for aid. Americans had also found an age-old opportunity of containing China. It had long been the conviction of American officials that regional conflicts between non-communist nations have been damaging to the US efforts to contain Communist power. They were both worried and annoyed by Sino-Indian friendship in the Purnasheel era and reacted to the emerging border dispute between India and China with quiet satisfaction, thinking that it would awaken India to the dangers of Communism and the need to cooperate with the West. Some realized that the inherent dangers of the dispute might bring India and Pakistan close together<sup>334</sup>. The Americans abandoned Pakistan, which had been the close ally of the West. The Indo-US alliance had loosened Pakistan's ties with the West. Pakistan received a new cause of disillusionment with the American policy. The United States, Britain, Soviet Union and members of the Commonwealth poured oodles of arms in India. The United States initiated a programme of military assistance to India ignoring Pakistan's appeals that such a programme be linked with the settlement of the Kashmir problem<sup>335</sup>. Pakistan was obviously concerned with this

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<sup>332</sup> Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace*, p.45.

<sup>333</sup> Khurshid Hyder, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (London: Survival, The Institute of Strategic Studies, January 1967), p.20.

<sup>334</sup> Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p.316.

<sup>335</sup> Farzana Shakoor, "Recasting Pakistan-India Relations in the Post-Cold War Era", Karachi: *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol 50, October 1997, The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, p.78.

development because it felt threats to its security.<sup>336</sup> Pakistan felt that it had been left abandoned if not betrayed by the West. Pakistan also argued that the same aid would be used against Pakistan rather than against China, therefore, the issue of Kashmir should be resolved before the initiation of arms to India but the Americans spurned Pakistan's requests. Even before the initiation of hostilities, India had massed 85 % of her troops against Pakistan and had also moved the infantry division it used in Goa, along Pakistan border. Only one division and a half had been deployed against China.<sup>337</sup> Indian leaders on numerous occasions had stated that in spite of their conflict with China, Pakistan was India's number one enemy. Bhutto said:

The leaders of India have repeatedly declared that in spite of their conflict with China, Pakistan is India's Enemy Number one. The weapons newly acquired by India can be turned by it against Pakistan and against other countries of South Asia. These weapons will not be used against the colossus of the North, for India cannot match China's manpower and resources. Even if it could, it would be a serious disadvantage in the mountainous terrain of the Sino-Indian border. The smaller countries would, therefore, be the inevitable prey of India's ambitions. This is the natural and genuine fear of Pakistan.<sup>338</sup>

Most people in Pakistan thought that while other countries need friends, India needs enemies; and if no enemies are available, Delhi will invent them<sup>339</sup>. Sino-India border war ushered a new era in Sino-Pakistan relations. US-India cooperation had compelled Pakistan to come out of its shell and diversify its relations.<sup>340</sup> Pakistan realized that at least war should be avoided on Pakistani side. Pakistan blamed India for the start of hostilities.<sup>341</sup> Pakistan also admitted that the war between India and China was a local and limited conflict. After the war, the Western countries rushed to the help of India. The border war induced the United States to unleash to India huge arms aid on the basis of age-old proverb: the enemy of my enemy is my friend.<sup>342</sup> President Kennedy had already been inclined towards India.

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<sup>336</sup> Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliances", p.200.

<sup>337</sup> Foreign Policy under Review, *The Round Table Commonwealth Affairs*, (London: The Round Table Ltd), p.198.

<sup>338</sup> Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace*, p.43.

<sup>339</sup> A.I.Ikram, "A Look at India's Foreign Policy", *Regional Studies*, Vol VI, No 2, Spring 1988, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, p.6.

<sup>340</sup> Hyder, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.21.

<sup>341</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China relations*, p.91.

<sup>342</sup> Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India*, p.266.

When China and India clashed for the first time in 1959, Kennedy, in November 1959, in a speech in California, had said that 'no struggle in the World deserves more time and attention from this administration and the next than that which now grips the attention of all Asia: The battle between India and China.'<sup>343</sup> Pakistan tried to convince the Western countries that there was no threat to India's security from China. President Ayub Khan was worried about the supply of weapons to Indians. He stated that these weapons would be used against Pakistan.<sup>344</sup> But the Indians reacted sharply to Pakistan's opposition to the supply of weapons as Indians had reacted to supply of arms to Pakistan in 1954. In late 1950s, China's relations with India deteriorated and proportionately Pakistan's relation with China improved. In the period from 1959 to 1963, mainly due to the resolution of the boundary question, China had to get involved in Kashmir. Initially China remained neutral but intimacy with Pakistan resulted in pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir.<sup>345</sup>

The border war between China and India damaged Chinese peaceful and friendly overtures towards South Asia. Peaceful coexistence between the two Asian giants became difficult. As a result of this brief border war, China reviewed its South Asia policy. The hostility between China and India after the border war presented a new landscape on the political map in which geopolitical elements accounted for a large part in their respective decision making. In retrospect, it could be said that although China was the winner in the war but war and its results were used in favour of India. It was loudly said in USA and USSR that the balance of power in Asia was disturbed and keeping in view Chinese threatening postures towards South Asia particularly towards India, the later needed urgent economic and military aid. As a result of this China was more isolated in the region, then it had been. The fast changing geopolitical environment as a result of Sino-India war forced China to

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<sup>343</sup> Sherwani, *India, China and Pakistan*, p. 63.

<sup>344</sup> Hasan, *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan*, p.369.

<sup>345</sup> Mao Siwei, "China and the Kashmir Issue" *Strategic Analysis*, Vol XII No 12, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, p.1575.

look favourably towards Pakistan and to consider India as enemy country. China now wanted to befriend Pakistan in South Asia to minimize threat from this side. As a result, Pakistan's role in South Asia's geopolitical environment was increased. Both USSR and USA neglected Pakistan, but China on the other hand gave due importance to Pakistan. China started negotiations with Pakistan for border demarcation and now decided to make Pakistan an ally.<sup>346</sup>

### **2.11- Ayub Khan's Visit to United States and Changes in Pakistan's Foreign Policy**

In 1961, President Mohammad Ayub Khan paid visit to the United States. He talked about the looming threat from the north and again proposed joint Indo-Pakistan efforts for defending the Sub-Continent. He even declared Pakistan, the most dependable friend of United States. However, he gave vent on a change in Pakistan's policy towards China. He expressed Pakistan's desire of normalizing relations with China and the demarcation of border with it. But at the same time Ayub Khan antagonized China by proposing representation to both the Chinas; China and Taiwan, in the United Nations.<sup>347</sup> Even before his departure for United States, President Ayub publicly asked: "What is at the back of it? Can it be that the United States is abandoning its good friends for people who may not prove to be such good friends? Pakistan is re-examining its membership of the US backed SEATO and CENTO".<sup>348</sup>

During his visit to the United States, he candidly conveyed the apprehensions of Pakistan about the supply of weapons to India. To some extent, Americans were convinced and they promised that according to the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement America would come to Pakistan's help if aggression was committed against the later. United States also committed to change its lukewarm policy on Kashmir and use its good offices to end the

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<sup>346</sup> Gancheng, "China's South Asia Policy: Balancing and Stabilizing", p. 6.

<sup>347</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p. 83.

<sup>348</sup> Ahmad, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.124.

dispute, However, when the Sino-Indian clash occurred, the Americans changed their policies. During 1961, Pakistan was standing alone in the region. In May 1961, relations with Afghanistan reached the breaking point. In December, Indians occupied Goa, convincing Pakistan that such type of aggression could be committed against it also. China was already opposed to Pakistan's policies. Other communist countries were annoyed particularly Soviet Union over the U-2 incident. President Ayub could not convince President Kennedy on the arms sale to India, However, Kennedy promised that in case of military assistance to India, Pakistan would be consulted. But Kennedy's failure to consult Pakistani President before giving arms to India in November 1962 deeply offended the Pakistani leader.<sup>349</sup> During his visit to the United States the two Presidents also, for the first time, differed on China. Kennedy was extremely unhappy when Pakistan announced its intention of giving vote for China's representation in the United Nations. Although he had said that, he was satisfied<sup>350</sup> from the results of the visit but actually Pakistan had parted the ways. In such circumstances, Pakistan chose to normalize relations with China to avert any untoward incident on the border.

The air of change started blowing by December 1961. Pakistan after a long gap voted in the United Nations in favour of Chinese' seat. It was opposition to the American policies. Pakistan had earlier announced that it will cast vote in China's favour despite American and other Western countries' opposition. United States and Britain by their large-scale military and economic aid to India had changed the course of Pakistan-West relationship. Western countries were also unable to allay Pakistan's fears about India. Kashmir was the most important issue for Pakistan but West was blind in its enmity against China. They did not

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<sup>349</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.123.

<sup>350</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p.121.

put any pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. They left no choice for Pakistan but to enter into close relationship with Communist China.<sup>351</sup>

## **Conclusion**

President Mohammad Ayub Khan is the architect of Western defence systems. His accession to power is not welcomed in China. He soon enters into Reinsurance Treaty with the West. Soon U-2 incident (May 1960) has come into being and China feels apprehensions. When the relationship has deteriorated between India and China, President Ayub Khan offers Joint Defence of Sub-Continent to India, which it scornfully rejects. When Kennedy becomes the President and he initiates pro-Indian policies, Pakistan has been left high and dry in the region. Chinese has shown some Pakistani areas as theirs and their planes violated Pakistani air space. Ayub soon realizes his country's isolation and offers China for the demarcation of the borders. After a little period of silence, Chinese responds and the borders were demarcated and a new era was ushered in relationship.

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<sup>351</sup>Ibid, p.119.

## **CHAPTER- 3**

### **PAKISTAN'S POLICIES PRO-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PHASE- III (1963-1966)**

In the period under study, Indo-US relations improved during Kennedy-Johnson period. The reasons for the improvement in their relations were multiple but Sino-India war of 1962 played a major role in US' tilt towards India. United States wanted to allay Pakistan's fears by giving arms to India but Pakistan had its own apprehensions. Pakistan was convinced that the weapons, which were being exported to India, would be used against it. In contrast to that, Pakistan's relationship deteriorated with the US naturally. Pakistan did not agree with the US that India's security was beefed up against China. The failure of Indo-Pakistan talks over Kashmir in the wake of Sino-Indian border conflict had led to a serious reappraisal of foreign relations by Pakistan. Soviet Union was already in alliance with India and was providing heavy weapons to India. Both the Super Powers, United States and Soviet Union forgot their Cold War enmity and kept supplying weapons to India. The latter had launched a major drive to build up its armed forces. Pakistan not only felt betrayed and isolated, notably by US, with which it had alliance relationship, but also visualized the threat of a military assault from an India determined to demonstrate its muscle following its humiliation by China<sup>352</sup>. Pakistan realized that Soviet Union was in opposite block, United States had opted for India, Britain and France would obviously follow US' path. Relations with China were also not cordial. As the border was not demarcated and Chinese had claims over some areas. Pakistan now wanted to normalize its relations from this direction. Relations with China entered into a new phase in 1963. Pakistan President Muhammad Ayub Khan had come back from United States and the visit was mostly declared as unsuccessful. After this, Ayub Khan thought of bringing change into Pakistan foreign

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<sup>352</sup> Bhatti, "Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia", pp 20-21.



relations towards China. By the end of the year in 1962, President Ayub Khan met with the Chinese Ambassador. President discussed diversified issues pertaining to South Asia and Sino-Pakistan relations with Chinese Ambassador but most important of the issues was the border demarcation between the two countries. It was a hot issue and recently Chinese had fought with India. Ayub wanted to resolve it. The resolution of the problem had already been communicated to China but still Pakistan was waiting for their response. Because of the meeting both the countries intensified their contacts and set seriously for the demarcation. Although negotiations for the border demarcation had started even before the Sino-Indian border skirmishes but it gave impetus to the negotiations in right direction. The same year as US-Pakistan relations became strained due to heavy American economic and military aid to India, Pakistan also conveyed to the US of its intentions to give vote in favour of China in United Nations. This change in Pakistan attitude had happened after a big interval. For years, Pakistan had been voting against Chinese representation in the UN Security Council. Although Pakistan had established intimate relations with China in fifties, especially as a result of Bandung Conference and Pakistan's assurances that their country would never be used against China. The relationship, however, deteriorated as a result of Pakistani premier Suhrawardy's visit to United States and his fiery speeches against Communist countries. Pakistan's pro-West policies worsened the Sino-Pak relations and in retaliation the Chinese hardened their stance over the undemarcated border. Chinese fighter planes violated Pakistan's air space a number of times. Chinese also issued some maps, showing Pakistani territory as their own. They showed almost 4000 square miles of Pakistani territory as their own. After the proclamation of Martial Law in Pakistan in 1958, Ayub Khan became the President. He announced that relations with China would further be strengthened. However, his first two years had seen further deterioration of relations. Ayub Khan was very intimate with the Western countries, especially with the US. It is said that President Ayub Khan was too much enthusiastic towards Americans and he kept all his eggs in one basket and that

was held by the Americans.<sup>353</sup> The Sino-Indian war and the ensuing events compelled Ayub Khan to change his foreign policy vis a vis West and China. He realized that too much dependence on the Americans was bad. By the end of 1962, he took few bold decisions and the relations between Pakistan and China came on track and both the countries stopped at the verge of precipice and turned their backs to that. Although the normalization process had started before Sino-India war but the Sino-India war increased Sino-Pakistan hostility towards India.<sup>354</sup> The border demarcation agreement was indeed the first step in the improvement of relations between Pakistan and China.<sup>355</sup> The border demarcation gave impetus to the relations and both the countries diversified their relations in different fields. In 1963 and 1965 the relationship further strengthened. Both the countries signed a number of agreements and visits were reciprocated. Although China was not the member of United Nations but in other international forums it strongly supported Pakistan. Pakistan too reciprocated. Friendship with China was considered as great achievement and the Pakistani rulers gave impression to the public that in case of Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan would be supported by China. Indo-Pakistan conflict really tested Sino-Pakistan relations.

### **3.1- Prelude to the Demarcation**

At the dawn of partition, the border between Pakistan and China was not demarcated. The length of the border between two countries was almost three hundred miles. Pakistan's main city in the northern area is Gilgit and the Chinese contiguous area to Pakistani border was Muslim dominated Xinjiang. This small portion of Pakistan and China, Northern areas, is surrounded from all sides by five countries. India, Afghanistan and Tajikistan are the other countries. Tajikistan is almost twenty kilometer away and could be considered as close neighbour. Both Pakistan and China, in initial years of their independence, did not take

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<sup>353</sup> Ahmad, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.125.

<sup>354</sup> P.L. Bhole, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.96.

<sup>355</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.164.

notice of their unresolved border but later they realized that this undemarcated border will create further misgivings, particularly after the Sino-India border war. In 1957, Pakistani government noticed that their border areas were deliberately being violated by the Chinese. Some frontier parts were shown in Chinese maps as their territory.<sup>356</sup> Pakistan had also claimed some Chinese areas as its territory occupied by the Chinese forcefully. In 1959, the relations between the two countries worsened. The violation of Chinese fighter planes of the Pakistani territory further intensified the relationship towards negative side. It was announced that Pakistan and Azad Kashmir's territory was violated at least nine times in the past seventy-six days. There were some unauthorized flights over Hunza valley, Chitral, Gilgit area and Iskoman.<sup>357</sup> Pakistan, however, did not launch protest to the Chinese. The border violations, intrusion in Pakistan by Chinese planes and Chinese claims over some of the Pakistani territory completely baffled Pakistan. Keeping in view the constant border violations, there were some proposals of Joint defence of the Sub-Continent against the Chinese. Pakistani leaders realized that the imminent threat to its security was not from Russia but from China. At later stage Pakistan also proposed demarcation of the borders. Along with the offer of negotiations to Chinese and India's invitation to the joint defence against imminent threat from the North, Pakistan beefed up its scouts in the Northern areas. Governor of West Pakistan visited Gilgit and reviewed the security parameters there.<sup>358</sup> On 23 October, when the border region was further aggravated, President Ayub Khan offered India for the joint defence of the Sub-Continent. This was a novel idea. However, the Indian Prime Minister scornfully rejected it. President Ayub Khan, however, also invited for the border demarcation. Chinese were highly circumspect. They normally react after thorough deliberation and take lot of time in decisions. This time they were very careful and did not

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<sup>356</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 10 October 1959.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid*, 30 September 1959.

<sup>358</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 3 October 1959.

respond Pakistan immediately. There were some multiple reasons also for the delay. Their relations were strained with American backed Taiwanese regime, some internal problems and lingering border dispute with India and might be they were observing Pakistan's policies towards China.

Pakistan on the other hand was isolated in 1959-60. Pakistan severely criticized President Kennedy's pro-India policies; relations with Afghanistan were also hostile. However, despite all this negativity for Pakistan, the latter signed Indus Water Treaty with India in September 1960. Now Chinese were also realizing that their relations with both Pakistan and India were getting hostile. Ayub Khan's repeated offers of Joint defence offended the Chinese and they felt that the joint defence will change the geo-political environment of the region and whole South Asia will turn against China. President Eisenhower had made a visit to both Pakistan and India in 1959. As there was a threat of Chinese aggression against the Sub-Continent, President Eisenhower tried to unite both Pakistan and India against the impending threat from the North.<sup>359</sup> Situation in east of China was already hostile and the Chinese felt that America was trying to isolate it. Already American forces were deployed in South Korea and Japan. China was keenly observing that United States wanted united South Asia against China. Americans wanted a looming threat from China. Chinese were surrounded from every side by enemies. For countering the Americans' moves in South Asia, Chinese decided at least to engage Pakistan and to remove the threat from this side. Nevertheless, the Chinese wanted some positive moves in Pakistan's attitude towards China. President Ayub Khan's failed visit to United States in 1961, further paved the way for good relations because Ayub Khan for the first time disagreed with United States over the issue of China's representation in the UN.<sup>360</sup> Pakistan reverted to its pre-1954 position on the

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<sup>359</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, P.99.

<sup>360</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.123.

issue of China's seat in the UN<sup>361</sup>. There were some news that even before departing for China, Ayub had consulted with the Chinese and the latter had shown willingness on the demarcation of the border region. Chinese had realized that border situation was alarming on the Sino-India border and at least this particular side of the border should be made safe.<sup>362</sup> In December 1961, President Ayub Khan met with the Chinese Ambassador. Pakistan informed the Chinese ambassador that after a long interval Pakistan is going to give vote for China's entry into United Nations Security Council.<sup>363</sup> China also agreed with Pakistan for the demarcation of the borders.

### **3.2- Negotiations for the Settlement of the Border Dispute**

On 15 January 1962, in this period of uncertainty and political confusion, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Mazur Qadir announced that negotiations between the two countries about the demarcation of the two regions, which include Pakistan's Gilgit area and Chinese' province of Xinjiang, would soon take place. He further enunciated that both the countries agreed for the conduct of the negotiations.<sup>364</sup> Both the countries signed a proper agreement for the conduct of the demarcation of the regions involved on 3 May 1962. The areas involved in the agreement were mentioned as China's Xinjiang province and Pakistan's Hunza valley.<sup>365</sup> Later a joint communiqué was issued, agreeing that both the countries will embark upon the negotiations. But it was clearly mentioned that the agreement will not be permanent and it will be provisional and after the final solution of the Kashmir problem, it will be renegotiated:-

The Government of Pakistan and the Government of People's Republic of China, after an exchange of views, affirm that the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, defense of which is under actual

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<sup>361</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.191.

<sup>362</sup> **Anx I**, Government of Pakistan's declassified document on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations' summary to the Government of Pakistan on 14 February 1961 and then the Cabinet's meeting on 25 February 1961, in which approval was granted for the initiation of dialogue with China on the border demarcation.

<sup>363</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.162.

<sup>364</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 16 October 1961.

<sup>365</sup> Zubeida Mustafa, "The Sino-Pakistan Border: Historical Aspect", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXV, No 2, 1972, p.48.

control of Pakistan, has never been formally delimited and demarcated in history. The two sides have further agreed that after the settlement of the dispute over Kashmir sovereign authorities concerned shall reopen negotiations with Chinese Government.<sup>366</sup>

It was a huge development. At least both the countries had realized the need to demarcate the boundary and to establish cordial relationship. Government of Pakistan and the People's Republic of China entered into a new phase of relations with signing of this agreement. This was of great significance and a great milestone because in the past the border had never been demarcated between the two regions.<sup>367</sup>

There was one country, which did not welcome the agreement for the demarcation of the border and that was India. India not only protested but rejected the idea on the plea that this particular area under discussion for the demarcation was pertaining to Kashmir, which was a disputed region between Pakistan and India and therefore could not be discussed without India's approval. They said that the area under discussion has forcefully and illegally been occupied by Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru disapproved this announcement and severely criticized the joint Communiqué and on 7 May 1962 announced that the areas actually belong to India and Pakistan had no rights to negotiate the issue with China. He further alleged that by agreeing to negotiate it with Pakistan, China has actually interfered in the internal affairs of India. The Indian Premier also reprimanded China and questioned Chinese decision of holding direct talks with Pakistan. He said that it was tantamount to accepting Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. On 10 May 1962, India moved one step ahead and sent a note of protest to both Pakistan and China and questioned Pakistan's right of negotiations.<sup>368</sup> But contrary to that on 31 May 1962, China not only rejected Indian note but also asked that when the Chinese had accepted Indian sovereignty over Kashmir? India even went to the extent that as whole Kashmir belongs to India so how could Pakistan

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<sup>366</sup> Jain, China, *Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.25.

<sup>367</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 4 May 1962.

<sup>368</sup> Qutubuddin Aziz, "Relations Between Pakistan and The People's Republic of China", in *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p.88.

conduct negotiations with China. They uttered further that Pakistan had no border with China at all and they, meaning Pakistanis, were negotiating others' borders.<sup>369</sup> Pakistan rejected Indian stand on the issue. Even though Indian stand was spurned by both Pakistan and China, India kept on corresponding with Pakistan and China and even approached United Nations Security Council on the issue. Pakistan rejected Indian protests and raising the issue at UN level. Muhammad Ali Bogra was appointed as new Foreign Minister by President Ayub Khan in 1962. Bogra was Pakistan's Ex-Premier and had a vast experience of Chinese affairs. He had had pleasant experiences of the past with the Chinese. He had conducted successful negotiations with Chinese at Bandung in 1955. He had cleared Chinese doubts about Pakistan's joining of CENTO in general and SEATO in particular and other Western defence pacts. N.A.M. Raza was immediately appointed as Pakistan's new ambassador to China by the Foreign Minister. General Raza had also served one stint as Pakistan's ambassador to China in the past. He knew the Chinese way of working and had established personal friendships with the Chinese. General Raza presented his credentials on 1 September 1962 to the Chairman Liu Shao-Chi.<sup>370</sup> Just before the Sino-Indian border war, which started on 20 October 1962, negotiations for the solution of the border started on 12 October 1962. As Sino-Indian war had started soon after the start of the negotiations, an impression had been got by the Indians that Pakistan had taken advantage of the deteriorating border situation between India and China and concluded the border agreement with China, and that Pakistan had thus stabbed in the back of India.<sup>371</sup> At the outset the negotiation process was very time-consuming. It seemed that still the minds of both the countries were not cleared about each other's and they were walking on tight rope. Doubts about each other sincerity were still lurking in the minds of the leaders of China and

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<sup>369</sup> Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p. 189.

<sup>370</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 2 September 1962

<sup>371</sup> Chaudhri Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, "South Asia-A Perspective", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XVIII No 2, 1965, p.119.

Pakistan.<sup>372</sup>The border skirmishes between India and China, however, accelerated the process of negotiations. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto later said that the Sino-India war jolted the slow process because China wanted to have peace on its borders and not to offend all its neighbours. He said that like all the countries, China also wanted to have had peace and avert the open danger.<sup>373</sup>Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto commented further in the National Assembly on 17 July 1963 that:

'Though our negotiations were progressing, they were progressing in an unsatisfactory manner. Then at the time of Sino-Indian conflict, an impetus was given to these negotiations and we can understand why an impetus should have been given to these negotiations because no state would like to face any unresolved situation on two fronts'.<sup>374</sup>

Both the countries announced on 26 December 1962, that an agreement had been reached in principle on the alignment and the location of the existing border between the two countries.<sup>375</sup>External Affairs Minister Muhammad Ali announced in Karachi that 'Pakistan and the People's Republic of China had reached complete agreement in principle in regard to the alignment of the common borders of China's Sinkiang and of the contiguous areas, the defence of which was the responsibility of Pakistan'.<sup>376</sup>Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was the Industries Minister, told that the agreement with China was a signal of triumph for the process of peace. Pakistan's renowned and official newspaper, Dawn, welcomed the successful negotiations and appreciated the efforts of Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali and Ambassador N.A.M Raza. It must be cleared that the newspaper was considered as the mouthpiece of the government.<sup>377</sup>

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<sup>372</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.100.

<sup>373</sup> Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, p.249.

<sup>374</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.68.

<sup>375</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p.124.

<sup>376</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 27 December 1962.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid*, Karachi, 27 December 1962.



### 3.3- Demarcation of the Border On March 2, 1963

Northern Areas of Pakistan are mainly consisting of Gilgit, Baltistan and Hunza. These areas have a long common border with the Chinese province of Xinjiang.<sup>378</sup> Actual border agreement was signed between the two countries on 2 March 1963. The agreement was related to the demarcation of almost 200 miles of frontiers which is a tri-junction of Pakistan, Afghanistan and China and it runs in the south-easterly direction up to the Karakoram pass.<sup>379</sup> Bhutto had become the Foreign Minister after the sudden death of Muhammad Ali Bogra. Although ex Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra had negotiated successfully with the Chinese but as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto signed the treaty so the success of the negotiations had always been attributed to him. New Foreign Minister said that ideological difference would be no hurdle in bringing the two countries closer to each other. He said that his visit would even help to consolidate the world peace.<sup>380</sup> United States, however, did not like Pakistan's approaches towards China. Z.A. Bhutto's visit was criticized by the United States. Americans realized that Pakistan's approaches towards China will damage US' efforts for China's isolation. United States behaved more like an irritable child than a dependable state. Mr. Bhutto's visit visibly upset the United States. US' ambassador in India, Professor Galbraith, who was supposed to visit Calcutta in connection of the fourth round of Pakistan-India talks on Kashmir, was advised to cancel his visit. The Kashmir talks in Calcutta between Pakistan and India were due on March 12, 1963.<sup>381</sup>

As far as the border specification is concerned, it is a 200 miles long border. China handed over almost 750 square miles of territory to Pakistan in the region<sup>382</sup>, beyond the main watershed of the Karakoram Range comprising Darband Darwaza and Oprang valley.

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<sup>378</sup> Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Significance of Pakistan-China Border Agreement of 1963", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol XXXIX, 1986, p.45.

<sup>379</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, p.87.

<sup>380</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 1 March 1963.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid*, 2 March 1963.

<sup>382</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All-Weather' Friendship", p. 4.

Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto participated in an impressive ceremony held in Beijing. Joint commission was formed for the demarcation of the boundary.<sup>383</sup> For the demarcation of the border the watersheds were followed. Water draining into the river Tarim of China was given to China and water draining into the Indus of Pakistan was handed over to Pakistan. Except India, no other country adversely reacted to the border agreement between Pakistan and China.<sup>384</sup> Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru severely criticized Pakistan for handing over Indian lands to China and China was accused of grabbing Indian lands. While talking in the Indian Parliament, on 5 March 1963, Jawaharlal Nehru referred to the difference of 3400 square miles between the Chinese claim and the Pakistan claim line. He said that even if it is accepted that Pakistani claim of having received 1350 square miles, including 700 square miles of area which was in China's possession, the China had been given 2050 square miles.<sup>385</sup> Pakistani government rejected all the Indian claims and it was stated that Pakistan and China agreed on the same border which was accepted by both China and the British Indian government in 1927, rather Pakistan had slightly improved it in north of Shimshal.<sup>386</sup> The government of Pakistan rejected Indian claim of surrendering territory to China rather claimed that it got 750 square miles of territory.<sup>387</sup> Bhutto said that:

Pakistan had not handed over an inch of Pakistani territory to China. The figures varied according to the diplomatic interest of certain countries. The border agreement had been exploited for other purposes. At one stage, Pakistan was said to be surrendering 4000 square miles, then 3000 and later 2000. Now the pendulum has swung and it is being said we have surrendered 13000 square miles<sup>388</sup>

The Indian allegation that Pakistan ceded a part of Kashmir territory to China was unfounded. Since a recognized boundary historically did not exist, there could be no question of any such give away. Pakistan did not transfer any territory that was under its control<sup>389</sup>. Pakistan recommended to the Indian leader to come to the negotiating table and

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<sup>383</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 3 March 1963.

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>385</sup> Jain, China, *Pakistan and Bangladesh*, pp.70-71.

<sup>386</sup> Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, p. 250.

<sup>387</sup> Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p.189.

<sup>388</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 7 March 1963.

<sup>389</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, p.79.

resolve the border issues with China.<sup>390</sup> Pakistan said that it had gained control of six out of the seven passes along the Karakoram Range and gained three quarters of the World's second highest peak K-2.<sup>391</sup> But Indian government did not agree to the point and sent a protest note to Pakistan on 7 March 1963 citing that Pakistan had given almost 13000 square miles of territory to China.<sup>392</sup>

Whether Pakistan got something from this border agreement or lost something to China, the fact of the matter is that Pakistan won China's friendship and Chinese hearts and India lost the opportunity and this border dispute not only created bitterness in Sino-India relations but future rivalry also. India realized that their negotiations with China had miserably failed and resulted in war, in which Indians were badly defeated and contrary to that Pakistan not only demarcated the borders with China but also won their friendship. The agreement constituted a landmark in the Sino-Pakistan relations.<sup>393</sup> The agreement permanently removed the security threat from the frontiers of Pakistan. Pakistan and China became commendable friends and the Indians always blamed the Chinese and Pakistanis for making an alliance against them.

Americans and Britain also did not approve the border demarcation between Pakistan and China. The Anglo-US supported talks on Kashmir were underway between Pakistan and India when the Sino-Pakistan border agreement was signed, and neither the Indians nor the Americans approved of the Pakistani move. The Times of India called it a 'Shady Agreement', which it said was announced by the government of Pakistan two hours after the Indian delegation had called upon President Muhammad Ayub Khan. The New York Times termed the announcement as a 'deliberate provocation', intended to pressure India

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<sup>390</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 4 March 1963.

<sup>391</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.103.

<sup>392</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 8 March 1963.

<sup>393</sup> Qutubuddin Aziz, "Relations Between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China", p. 92.

into making concessions on Kashmir<sup>394</sup>. However, Pakistanis considered it an ushering of a new era. President Mohammad Ayub Khan called it a significant landmark in the history of friendly relations.<sup>395</sup>

### **3.4- Pakistan's Pro-China Policy**

The border agreement opened up new vistas of opportunities. A new chapter of friendship and cooperation had started. From here Sino-Pakistan ties went from strength to strength. Both the countries never turned back. The agreement shows political will on both sides to resolve the outstanding issues and hence move forward. The settlement was concluded in less than a year and the actual negotiations did not take more than two and a half months. The conclusion of the treaty in such short span of time, speaks volumes for the political will involve for the settlement of the matter. The treaty offended the Indians. They declared it as the most opportunistic deal in Asian history in modern times.<sup>396</sup> The treaty created a false fear in the minds of Indians, and that was enhanced by Z. A. Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan through his repeated statements about Chinese support for Pakistan against India, that a united Sino-Pakistan front was in the making. A big question was that why China and Pakistan will come closer to each other against India? Foreign Minister Bhutto stated that India's hostility towards both countries had provided them a common enemy. It was in Pakistan's national interest to seek China's friendship and in China's national interest to support Pakistan<sup>397</sup>.

Now the resolution of the border dispute unleashed a new era of friendship. The Indians did not like the new outlook of relationship between China and Pakistan. They sternly rejected the border talk and the recently concluded agreement. India declared that Pakistan has done

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<sup>394</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All-Weather", p.8.

<sup>395</sup> Ayub's telegram to Liu Shaoqi on the Sino-Pakistan border agreement, March 4, 1963, in Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-80*, p.9.

<sup>396</sup> K. C. Saxena, *Pakistan: Her Relations with India 1947-66* (New Delhi: 1966), p.36.

<sup>397</sup> Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, p.148.

more than her rights and Pakistan had been accused of handing over a vast chunk of territories to China. On the other side, however, the relationship skyrocketed. In June 1963, a Pakistani journalists' delegation visited China and they received a tremendous amount of zest and zeal for having cordial relationship for Pakistan among the Chinese people. The Chinese leaders conveyed their Pakistani friends that by signing this border agreement they have set a good example for the world to solve the disputes through peaceful means. Chinese were able to convey to the world that they are peaceful people and they want to resolve the issues through negotiations, especially after the Sino-India war over the border China was considered as an aggressor in the West. Premier Chou En-Lai, while meeting the Journalists' delegation said that, China would defend Pakistan throughout the world as Pakistan had defended China in SEATO and CENTO.<sup>398</sup> It is noted that in 1957, Pakistan had stated in SEATO conferences that China was no threat to Pakistan's security and it had no expansionist designs. Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto defended Pakistan's relations with China and at the floor of the National Assembly even declared on 17 July 1963 that:-

An attack from India on Pakistan is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan involved the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia, and, therefore, this new element and this new factor brought in the situation a very important factor and a very important element. I would not at this stage like to elucidate any further on this matter, but suffice to say that the national interest of another state itself is involved in an attack on Pakistan.<sup>399</sup>

This was one of the most dramatic statements of Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The statement was vague in nature but it created ripples and fears in India. It was thought that now both Pakistan and China were in unison against Indian integrity. Message was conveyed to India indirectly that if Pakistan was attacked by India, Pakistan would not be alone. Although the statement was considered good for the public consumption but it was very unfortunate, emotional and childish statement. The Chinese had not given any written or verbal guarantee to Pakistan. Neither there was an agreement signed nor understanding

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<sup>398</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 18 June 1963.

<sup>399</sup> *Ibid.*

between the two countries. On one side the statement created fear in India and alarmed it and on the other side the Western countries and America also got cautious. The Western countries were united in the defence of India because they felt that both Pakistan and China might attack India. The Indians also made a huge clamour about the unison of Pakistan and China against them. The statement also embarrassed the Chinese, who did not know what to say. It antagonized India and compelled it to strengthen its defence.<sup>400</sup> Nevertheless, Pakistan later explained that there was no such treaty signed between the two countries. However, Pakistan's dependence upon the Chinese increased. As the Western countries increased their support to India, Chinese increased their economic and military support to Pakistan. As the United States was volatile about its South Asia policies, Pakistan conveyed that this policy may compel Pakistan to incline further towards China for its protection.

President Ayub Khan said:

The answer to that lies with the United States' authorities. If India grows menacingly strong, we shall be in great predicament and shall have to look around for someone to help us. Moreover, if we are attacked by India, then that means that India is on the move and wants to expand. We assume that other Asiatic powers, especially China, would take notice of that.<sup>401</sup>

While discussing Pakistan's dependence upon China, it is to be mentioned here that Pakistani leaders had never accepted the existence of any such agreement signed between the two countries. In 1950s and 60s, Pakistan was heavily dependent upon USA. However, the arrival of Kennedy to the White House completely changed the geopolitical panorama for Pakistan. United States was the dominant power and permanent member of the Security Council. Therefore, Pakistan could not abandon United States at all. On the other hand, China also, although not a member of the Security Council but a big power in the region and could not be avoided. It was a powerful neighbour of Pakistan and could play significant role in Indo-Pakistan disputes. It had always sided with Pakistan against India's hegemonic designs. Pakistan, therefore, wanted to establish intimate relations with it. Pakistan was in

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<sup>400</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p.131.

<sup>401</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 13 September 1963.

two boats. It sided with China but at the same time wanted to remain friendly to United States. Pakistan was also afraid that if Sino-Pakistan defence agreement were announced, then United States would openly side with India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto himself later on retracted his statement and when he was asked about Sino-Pakistan alliance against India, that he said there was no defensive alliance but consented that there was a strong assumption that China would come to Pakistan's help.<sup>402</sup> China on the other hand wanted to influence Pakistan's policies and bring it out of US' influence. Chinese supported Pakistan to isolate India and keep it busy in South Asian affairs. They felt that Pakistan needed strong support of a strong power in its disputes against India. That was the reason that the Chinese leaders gave some meaningful statements. In December 1963, the Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade, Nan Han-Chen assured the Pakistani leaders that if ever there is a war between India and Pakistan; China will surely support Pakistan and not India.<sup>403</sup> Chou En-Lai also stated once on his visit to Pakistan that, 'constant development of smooth and cordial relationship between China and Pakistan is not only necessary for both the countries but necessary for the defence of peace in Asia and the World.'<sup>404</sup> Prime Minister Chou En-Lai again annunciated on another occasion about close friendship with Pakistan. Again while conversing with Pakistani media; Chou En-Lai announced that 'China would defend Pakistan throughout the World because Pakistan had defended China in SEATO and CENTO'.<sup>405</sup> In March 1965 when the conflict between India and Pakistan escalated in the Rann of Kutch, Chinese Foreign Minister visited Pakistan and supported Pakistan wholeheartedly. While talking to journalists Foreign Minister Chen Yi said, "China would fight the aggressors because if our friends are wiped out, how can we exist".<sup>406</sup> In the 1965 Indo-

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<sup>402</sup>*Dawn, Karachi*, 9 October 1963, Bhutto's statement in the United States, when he was asked that whether China would come to Pakistan's help if she is attacked by India.

<sup>403</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.112.

<sup>404</sup> Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations*, p.195.

<sup>405</sup> Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, p.254.

<sup>406</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.297.

Pakistan War China sided with Pakistan and issued strong warning to India. The Western countries were not convinced about the sincerity of Chinese friendship towards Pakistan. They were of the view that China wanted to see the Sub-Continent rivals keep fighting so that Chinese will increase their influence in the region and because the unison of India and Pakistan would be hazardous to China. They also advocated that the Chinese wanted to raise Pakistan bogey for India. The Time Magazine, during 1965 war, commented, "At the present moment, China's interests are well served by letting its two neighbours waste their scanty substance in war against each other. An Indian official said grimly, that they must be laughing hard in Beijing"<sup>407</sup>. Although Pakistan cultivated intimate friendship with China but it always rejected the Indian claims that Sino-Pakistan friendship was based on enmity to India. Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto out rightly rejected the Indian claims that the friendship was forged on Indian enmity. "Nothing could be farther from the truth. Our policy with regard to the People's Republic of China is not of a negative character. It has a positive content. It does not stem from our differences with India. It is of logical nature."<sup>408</sup>

Although it is evident that Pakistan's closer relations with China were meant to forge alliance against India but the Indians considered the relationship based on India-bashing. Indians felt that there is unison among Pakistan-China and Indonesia under the garb of Afro-Asian unity. They felt that the axis was established to isolate India.<sup>409</sup> The fact of the matter is that both China and Indonesia were working for the conduct of another Afro-Asian conference<sup>410</sup> but the aim was not to isolate India.

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<sup>407</sup> *Time*, Asian Edition, 24 September 1965, p.26.

<sup>408</sup> Bhutto, *The Quest for Peace*, p.27.

<sup>409</sup> Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.114.

<sup>410</sup> **Ann J**, Government of Pakistan's declassified document on the Cabinet Meeting held on 3 March 1962 and they discussed the Indonesian President Soekarno's letter to President of Pakistan for the conduct of another Afro-Asian Conference and the cabinet decided to support such move.



### **3.5- Trade Agreement**

The border agreement opened the way for other agreements. The agreement was followed by flurry of visits from both the countries. Pakistan had felt its isolation, when it was abandoned by the United States led Western countries. Soviet Union was already hostile to Pakistan. The pro-India attitude of United States compelled Pakistan to rely on China now. Pakistan and China signed a number of agreements. The most important one was about trade. Pakistan had established trade relations with China since 1950s, even before the Korean War, which began on 25 June 1950, when India stopped trade with Pakistan; China came to Pakistan's rescue and supplied coal. Trade flourished during the Korean War when Pakistan exported huge quantity of cotton to China. When Sino-Pakistan relations went sour in 1958-62, the trade between the two countries also declined considerably. Americans had also diversified their relations. They were no more confined to Pakistan. They had now established close relations with India. In this context, Pakistan signed trade agreement with China on 5 January 1963. According to the agreement, Pakistan had to import steel products, machinery, coal, metal, raw materials, cement, chemical, and to export Jute and jute goods, cotton and cotton textiles, leather and sport goods to China. The agreement was followed by barter agreement between the two countries on 29 September 1963. According to this agreement, Pakistan had to export jute in exchange for Chinese cement.<sup>411</sup>

### **3.6- Air Transport Agreement**

Sino-Pakistan relations got their first major intake of substantive content, above and beyond the rhetoric of goodwill, when the two nations made border and air-travel agreements in 1963<sup>412</sup>. Towards the end of 1962, however, PIA was looking for new business. It wanted to extend travel to Tokyo but the British prevented this by refusing to grant landing rights

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<sup>411</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 30 September 1963.

<sup>412</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.81.

in Hong Kong<sup>413</sup>. Pakistan now decided to have air links with China.<sup>414</sup> With Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's blessing Air Marshal Noor Khan visited China and discussed the establishment of air links with the China.<sup>415</sup> Later on, Pakistan and China signed the agreement on 29 August 1963 in Karachi and the direct flights started on 29 April 1964.<sup>416</sup> Mr Hameeduddin Ahmed, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Mr Shen Tu, Deputy Director General of General Administration of Civil Aviation of China signed the agreement, on behalf of the governments of Pakistan and China respectively.<sup>417</sup> Through this agreement, contacts were established between Karachi and Shanghai and Dacca and Canton. Pakistan was given traffic rights in Canton and Shanghai and China in Dacca and Karachi. The air agreement opened Burma and South Asia to China through East Pakistan and Africa and West Asia through West Pakistan.<sup>418</sup> Unfortunately, the Chinese planes could not land in East Pakistan because East Pakistan was surrounded by India from three sides and the Indian refused to give permission to Chinese planes to fly over its air space.<sup>419</sup> This was the first air agreement, which China had signed with Non-Communist state; on the other hand, Pakistan Airlines also became the first international carrier to operate through Canton and Shanghai.<sup>420</sup> Although Pakistan declared it, a commercial venture because Britain had refused the landing rights to Pakistan Airlines at Hong Kong,<sup>421</sup> Actually PIA wanted to enhance its foreign exchange resources by flying to Tokyo through China. PIA applied for permission for landing in Hong Kong but those were denied to it by the Britain. Then PIA approached the Chinese Aviation authorities who agreed to accord to it the

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<sup>413</sup> Ibid, p.94.

<sup>414</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 8 June 1963.

<sup>415</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.143.

<sup>416</sup> *Pakistan: 1963-64*, Pakistan Publications Karachi, p.156.

<sup>417</sup> Jain, China, *Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.89.

<sup>418</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, p.108.

<sup>419</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, p.251.

<sup>420</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.293.

<sup>421</sup> *The Round Table*, September 1963, p.396.

necessary facilities.<sup>422</sup> However, this agreement tremendously annoyed the United States. The United States called the agreement 'an unfortunate breach of the free World solidarity'.<sup>423</sup> United States immediately suspended aid of \$ 4.3 million for the development of Dacca airport.<sup>424</sup> As a reaction Pakistan suspended the talks for the extension of the communications intercept facility at Badaber. America sent George Ball for negotiations on Badaber, which succeeded, but stopping Pakistan from further flirtation with China failed. While the relations between Pakistan and America were getting sour, Kennedy died and Johnson became the President he understood very less of Pakistan's sensitivities. The start with the Johnson administration was not good and President Johnson even in his first meeting with Foreign Minister Bhutto involved in heated discussion over China issue. Bhutto believed that a wild man had come to the White House.<sup>425</sup> Although Sino-Pakistan air agreement was criticized by the United States, calling it a breach in the solidarity of the nations but Pakistan instead of reversing it, continued with the agreement. Early in 1971, Pakistan Airlines, in a full-page advertisement in the *London Times* announced with pride: "There are only two London-Shanghai flights---Ours".<sup>426</sup>

### 3.7- Other Agreements

On 23 July 1964, the Associated Press of Pakistan signed an agreement of friendship and cooperation with New China News Agency.<sup>427</sup> On 16 September 1963, a telecommunication agreement was signed between Karachi and Peking. For the promotion of culture, science, arts and literature another agreement was signed on 26 March 1965. This was Pakistan's first cultural agreement with any Communist state. Shipping agreement was also signed between the two countries.

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<sup>422</sup> "Pakistan: A Step-child of the West", p.396.

<sup>423</sup> Ibid.

<sup>424</sup> Bhutto, *Bilateralism*, p.21.

<sup>425</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.148.

<sup>426</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.78.

<sup>427</sup> P.L. Bhola, *Pakistan-China Agreement*, p.114.

### 3.8- Exchange of Visits

Pakistani and Chinese leaders visited each other's countries. Chinese leader, Chou En Lai, visited Pakistan in 1964(18-26 February 1964) which was followed, by President Ayub Khan's visit to China in March 1965 (2-9 March 1965). Chou En-Lai visited many countries in February 1964 in order to mobilize the support for the Second Afro-Asian Conference. Pakistan was also included in the itinerary. On 18 February 1964, Chou En-Lai along with forty-eight member delegation came to Karachi. The Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Mrs. Chen Yi also accompanied him. Karachi gave an exciting reception to Mr. Chou En-Lai when he arrived on his much awaited eight-day friendly visit to Pakistan at President Ayub Khan's invitation.<sup>428</sup> Chou En-Lai visited important cities and addressed National and Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was attending the United Nations session, left the deliberations on Kashmir and reached Pakistan the other day to meet the 48 member high level Chinese delegation.<sup>429</sup> The joint communiqué was issued on 23 February 1964.<sup>430</sup> Chou En-Lai brought new change in Kashmir policy and stated that Kashmir dispute should be resolved according to the wishes of the people of Kashmir. At Dacca, Prime Minister Chou En-Lai was given a warm welcome. On 25 February 1964, Chou En-Lai addressed a press conference at Dacca and remarked that President Ayub had convinced him about Pakistan's aim in joining the SEATO. He said that step of Pakistan was 'defence, not aggression against others'. President Muhammad Ayub Khan also reiterated the need of China's representation in the United Nations. Ayub said that United Nations would be incomplete without the Chinese representation. Pakistan also supported China to conduct the Second Afro-Asian Conference.<sup>431</sup> However, the joint communiqué was silent over the Taiwan issue.

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<sup>428</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 19 February 1964.

<sup>429</sup> *Ibid*, 19 February 1964.

<sup>430</sup> Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1980*, p.46.

<sup>431</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 24 February 1964.

<sup>432</sup>Pakistan took severe stance over the issue of Taiwan, which was against the national interests of China. When Ayub was questioned about the silence of communiqué over Taiwan, he replied that: “It is a very difficult situation, after all the Americans are committed to defending Taiwan and it is an honourable commitment.”<sup>433</sup>

President Ayub also revealed that Premier Chou En-Lai had listed his grievances against the United States but he had also told him that the US had also grievances against China. Although Pakistan came very near to China but it did not compromise its pro-American policy. When later on US Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball visited Pakistan, the latter sympathized with Western countries and supported the alliances. Pakistan said that it had not changed the sides and it was still the loyal partner of the alliance. President Ayub Khan paid a seven-day return visit to China in March 1965 on the invitation of Chinese Premier<sup>434</sup>. The visit coincided with the second anniversary of Sino-Pakistan border agreement. Prior to his visit, there were other manifestations of the growing cordiality between Pakistan and China. At the Commonwealth’s Prime Minister’s Conference, in 1964, Ayub Khan opposed the demand of the Malaysian Prime Minister that the Commonwealth should declare its joint opposition to the Chinese threat, and criticized both Britain and United States for their double standards in wooing Russia and trying to isolate China. Party Chairman Mao-Tse Tung personally expressed appreciation for Ayub’s stand to a visiting Pakistani minister<sup>435</sup>. In visiting China President Ayub Khan also wanted to show that he was following independent foreign policy. He received the most enthusiastic welcome that the Communist regime had ever accorded a foreign leader.<sup>436</sup> Ayub Khan described that ‘people, millions of people in the streets, clapping, cheering, and waving

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<sup>432</sup> Burke, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, p.294.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid.

<sup>434</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005*, p.72.

<sup>435</sup> Bhatti, “Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia”, p.21.

<sup>436</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.153.

Pakistani and Chinese flags.<sup>437</sup> Both Pakistan and China claimed that their relationship was not against anyone and it was a long-term friendship.<sup>438</sup> President Mohammed Ayub Khan delivered a speech at a mass rally in Peking on 5 March 1965. The President said that; "We have made it (border) a border of peace and tranquility, a frontier of untroubled disputes and violations. On that frontier, armies do not confront each other."<sup>439</sup>

The joint communiqué was encouraging and Pakistan for the first time joined China in criticizing the US policy of 'two Chinas' however, this time the communiqué was utterly silent on the question of Vietnam.<sup>440</sup> It meant that the two countries differed on the issue. In May 1963 at the invitation of the Chinese government prominent business -persons of Pakistan visited China. They witnessed the export commodity fair at Canton. The delegation also met with Premier Chou En-Lai. In May 1963, a delegation of Pakistani journalists also visited China to attend the Afro-Asian Journalists Conference. On 17 May 1963, Chou En-Lai met with them and assured them that 'China would defend Pakistan throughout the World as Pakistan had defended China in SEATO and CENTO'.<sup>441</sup> Chinese pilgrim delegation also visited Pakistan and Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto presented 500 copies of Holy Quran to the Chinese Ambassador. In June 1963, Air Marshal Noor Khan visited China and the Chinese Civil Aviation delegation returned the visit in August the same year. Pakistani Communication Minister Sabur Khan visited China in October 1964 to participate in the fifteenth anniversary celebration of the Peoples' Republic of China. Also on the nuclear experiment of China, President Ayub Khan facilitated it.

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<sup>437</sup> President Ayub gave the above mentioned statement, when Nixon asked him about his recent concluded visit to China. President Ayub called Nixon that he should also pay visit to China. However, Nixon says that in contrast when he visited China the roads were empty. Richard Nixon, *In the Arena*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, First Edition, 1990), P.3.

<sup>438</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 4 March 1965.

<sup>439</sup> Jain, China, *Pakistan and Bangladesh*, pp.107-108.

<sup>440</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.297.

<sup>441</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p.129.

On the issue of Kashmir also a clear tilt towards Pakistan's position began to shape up in China's policy. China expressed full support for the resolution of the Kashmir problem 'in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan'<sup>442</sup>.

### **3.9- Indo-Pak War- 1965**

A Kashmiri leader, Sheikh Abdullah, who was released by Nehru on 8 April 1964,<sup>443</sup> visited Pakistan in May 1964 and announced that in June President Ayub and Premier Nehru would meet to explore the Kashmir issue but on 27 June, Nehru died.<sup>444</sup> New leadership came into power in India; Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister of India. China had already defeated India in 1962 border war, which had tarnished the image of Indian Army and Nehru as the Prime Minister. However, the death of Nehru also created political instability. The death of Nehru also created false impression in Pakistan that India was suffering from political instability and there was no political leader of Nehru's stature<sup>445</sup> to lead India through crisis. The success of Ayub Khan in 1965 elections strengthened him. His economic policies were also hailed internationally. Now President Ayub also concentrated on foreign affairs more vigorously. He visited China and Soviet Union. Relations with China were extended to political, cultural and economic fields. Ayub Khan also neutralized Soviet stance in his confrontation with India. President Ayub Khan believed that in any future dispute with India at least Soviet Union would not help India openly and on other hand China would come to Pakistan's active help.<sup>446</sup> However, because of the Western countries' active military help to India the balance of power was disturbing and not favourable for Pakistan. Negotiations over Kashmir failed. The rearming of India had made Pakistan a

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<sup>442</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, "China and the Kashmir Problem", *Regional Studies*, Vol XII, No 3, Summer 1994, Institute of Regional Studies, p.93.

<sup>443</sup> Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations With India, 1947-66*, p.285.

<sup>444</sup> Riza, *The Pakistan Army War 1965*, p.19.

<sup>445</sup> Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, p.20.

<sup>446</sup> P.L. Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, P.125.

desperate.<sup>447</sup> Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the responsibilities for the initiation of hostilities would only be put upon Pakistan.

### **3.10- Runn of Kutch- A Prelude to The War- 1965**

The boundary in the 3500 square miles of area, north of 24<sup>th</sup> parallel in Runn of Kutch was not demarcated. This was a marshy area between Pakistan's Sindh province and Indian State of Gujarat<sup>448</sup>. The confrontation started from the Rann of Kutch area. Both the countries fought a low level war in the region. However, Pakistan had not committed aggression in the area. The Indians had forcibly occupied the Chad Bet Post in 1956 and until now, the negotiations were going on for the solution of the border problems of West Pakistan and India.<sup>449</sup> India had alerted its armed forces and it seemed that they wanted to solve the problem with military power. However, Pakistan's armoured divisions threw the Indians out of the region. Through British High Commissioners in Islamabad and Delhi, intense negotiations were held. Both countries agreed to refer the case to international tribunal and to abide by its decisions. Relying on evidence, the tribunal awarded 350 square miles of area to Pakistan, which was merely 10 percent of the total area and the rest was given to India. Pakistan was relieved that the dispute was honourably resolved but India was not happy.

### **3.11- Moving towards the War**

In normal circumstances, the solution of the problems might have contributed to the normalization of the relations but circumstances between India and Pakistan are seldom normal. The death of Nehru caused to India internal chaos and the new Indian leadership wanted to divert the attention of the nation from instability to foreign adventures. President Ayub followed a successful foreign policy and the Indian prestige had gone down particularly after the defeat at the hands of Chinese.<sup>450</sup> In the non-Aligned countries, also

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<sup>447</sup> Dr Mohammed Yunus, *Reflections on China*, p.135.

<sup>448</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, p.102.

<sup>449</sup> Sherwani, *India, China and Pakistan*, p.97.

<sup>450</sup> Ibid, P.96.



India's reputation was damaged when it begged the Western countries for help. Although Soviet Union and United States were neutral and they tried to stop the hostilities but China fully supported Pakistan. The British Prime Minister Harold Wilson persuaded both Pakistani and Indian governments to resolve the issues peacefully.<sup>451</sup> Pakistan miscalculated Indian intentions and prepared 'Operation Gibraltar.' It was a plan for instigation of the Kashmiri people, which failed and resulted in Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The operation was prepared by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and was approved by the President. Calling for incursions by Kashmiris volunteers into Indian held Kashmir, it was based on three assumptions- People in Kashmir would rise to support the guerrillas, a large scale Indian offensive against Azad Kashmir was unlikely and the possibility of Indian attack across the international border could be ruled out- All of which turned out to be wrong.<sup>452</sup> 'Operation Grand Slam' was prepared in GHQ and according to it Pakistan Army had to occupy Akhnur, which would force Indian Army to throw up what they had gained in Pakistan-held Kashmir but this step of Pakistan Army met with an all-out war.<sup>453</sup> As has been mentioned earlier during the conflict United States and Soviet Union adopted neutral attitudes but China sided with Pakistan. United States, however, blamed Pakistan for having started the war.<sup>454</sup> Instead of involving in Indo-Pak conflict, United States cut off aid to Pakistan and India. As Pakistan was already dependent on US aid, the aid cut severely hit Pakistan. In a way, this action of United States' went in favour of India. Soviet Union, however, sent identical messages to Ayub Khan and Shastri on 4 September 1965 and emphasized that the hostilities should be ended. Russian leaders were mindful of Chinese intervention in the affairs and its taking side of Pakistan; therefore, on 19 September 1965 they invited both President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to Tashkent

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<sup>451</sup> Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-66*, p.291.

<sup>452</sup> Muhammad Asghar Khan, *The First Round*, (Vikas Publishing House Private, 1979), pp.75-76.

<sup>453</sup> Riza, *The Pakistan Army War 1965*, p.113.

<sup>454</sup> Yunus, *Reflections on China*, p.135.

for peaceful solution of the problems.<sup>455</sup> United States and Soviet Union cooperated with each other in UN Security Council. Both Pakistan and India accepted Security Council resolution of 20 September 1965 and war ended on 23 September.

### **3.12- China's Policy in Indo-Pakistan War- 1965**

Pak-India war was a test of Sino-Pakistan friendship. Although Pakistan's allies, Iran and Turkey gave her full support, as did Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and many other countries but of all of Pakistan's supporters China spoke the loudest.<sup>456</sup> Years later, after his resignation from Presidency, Ayub Khan wrote on 13 July 1969 that:

"Our people are naturally concerned that under no circumstances must we do anything which can be construed to be hostile to the Chinese interests and quite rightly so. The Chinese are the only big power that came to our assistance in the time of the 65 war and even risked war with other big powers. I don't think any Government in Pakistan can be so foolish as to disregard the friendship with China."<sup>457</sup>

Even before the war started in the Rann of Kutch, China supported Pakistan. During President Ayub Khan's visit to China in March 1965, Foreign Minister Chen Yi declared that in any Indo-Pakistan conflict China would support Pakistan and would not disappoint it.<sup>458</sup> On 9 June 1965, Prime Minister Chou En-Lai also had a stopover in Karachi. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi also had stayed for a while in Karachi on 4 September 1965, while going to Mali. He declared Pakistan's support and accused India for the border violations. After the start of the war, China sent a protest note to Delhi; the latter was blamed for violation of Sino-India border. China demanded that India should dismantle all the aggressive military structures on the Sino-India border.<sup>459</sup> China sent another ultimatum to India on 16 September, another on 19 September and China demanded that within three days India should dismantle aggressive structures, return kidnapped persons and sheep and behave properly in future. China physically did not intervene. Might be the Chinese were

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<sup>455</sup> Riza, *The Pakistan Army War 1965*, p.281.

<sup>456</sup> Ahsan Choudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World*, P.98.

<sup>457</sup> Craig, Baxter, *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-72*, (Karachi: Oxford University, 2014), p.321.

<sup>458</sup> *Dawn*, 7 March 1965.

<sup>459</sup> Rafi Raza, *Pakistan in Perspective 1947-1997*, p.95.

realizing the widening of the war and the Soviet and American participation which would have made it World War. They only confined to the ultimatums. Although China did not intervene in the war, however, its ultimatums played a significant role. Soviet Union, America and President Ayub Khan were mindful of Chinese actions. President Ayub thought that Chinese entry in war would make Russia and United States hostile to Pakistan and on other hand, potential Chinese involvement would have spurred both the Soviet Union and America to new efforts in the Security Council for cease-fire.<sup>460</sup> Indians also took Chinese ultimatums seriously. The ceasefire was affected on 24 September 1965 and on the same day; the Chinese delivered a final note to the Indian government stating that India had to withdraw intruding Indian troops and to demolish some of the aggressive military works within the time limit set by the Chinese but the issue was permitted to lapse.<sup>461</sup> During the Indo-Pakistan war, the Chinese support for Pakistan did not confine to political support or only to the ultimatums to India. Rather China severely criticized United States and United Nations. China declared United Nations as the tool of American imperialism and told Pakistanis that they should not expect any justice from the United Nations. China accused India of crossing the border and committing aggression against Pakistan. China also blamed United States and Soviet Union of taking sides with India.<sup>462</sup> A few days after the invasion when the war between the two countries reached a stalemate, Pakistan's ammunition and petroleum stocks began to dwindle and it became obvious that the United States was not going to help Pakistan, President Ayub Khan turned to the Chinese and frantically appealed them to do something. <sup>463</sup> Ayub Khan sent Foreign Minister Bhutto on a secret mission to China for immediate help and Bhutto returned with good news for Ayub Khan and for

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<sup>460</sup> Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p.208.

<sup>461</sup> Wajid Ali, *Communist China and South & Southeast Asia*, p.189.

<sup>462</sup> Ahsan Chaudhri, *Pakistan and The Great Powers*, p.96.

<sup>463</sup> Syed, *China and Pakistan*, pp.117-118.

Pakistan and Ayub Khan told Bhutto that the nation would be grateful to him forever.<sup>464</sup> It is also noted that President Ayub Khan had also sent Air Marshal Asghar Khan to China for necessary help against India. Although the Chinese offered generous help to Pakistan on Pakistan's requests, however Ayub Khan was ambiguous about the consequences of it. He thought that the direct supply of arms from China to Pakistan would anger the Americans and they might come in direct help to India. President Ayub Khan suggested alternate route to China. Chou En-Lai was unable to understand President Ayub's logic and stated that when the arms would reach to Pakistan by the alternate routes, it would be too late. Premier Chou En-Lai even offered to come over to Pakistan but President Ayub Khan even did not want to allow because he thought that it would infuriate the Americans.<sup>465</sup> The Weekly Magazine Time noted that 'even a military demonstration on the Himalayan front would seriously weaken the Indian effort. A Chinese offensive on the scale of their last one in 1962 would be more than India could handle, for New Delhi is barely equipped for a one enemy war. It could never deal with two at once.'<sup>466</sup> There can be no doubt that vast majority of people in Pakistan deeply appreciated the Chinese support. Karachi students, carrying huge portraits of Chou En Lai and Chin Yi, called on the Chinese ambassador to thank him. Some Rawalpindi lawyers sent off a telegram to Chou En Lai for thanking him.<sup>467</sup> In the post-1965 period, when US arms aid was terminated, China provided military and economic aid to Pakistan and encouraged the establishment of an indigenous arms industry<sup>468</sup>.

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<sup>464</sup> Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, P.296.

<sup>465</sup> Ahmad Faruqi, "The Complex Dynamics of Pakistan's Relationship with China", *IPRI Journal*, VolII, Islamabad Policy Research, Summer 2001), p.2.

<sup>466</sup> *Time, The Weekly Magazine*, 24 September 1965, p.26.

<sup>467</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, September 13, 1965.

<sup>468</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981*, p.192.

### 3.13- China-Pakistan Entente and the United States

President Ayub Khan, when came to power was considered pro-American. He was called the architect of Pakistan's defensive alliances with the West. However, after 1959, Sino-Indian tension, the Sub-Continent panorama changed dramatically. Americans and other Western countries inclined towards India, which was not acceptable to Pakistan. As India raised objections to Pakistan's military aid in 1954-55, Pakistan did the same with regard to India's military aid from America in 1962-63.<sup>469</sup> Pakistan realized that the new arms would jeopardize Pakistan's security. Pakistan thought that only the solution of the Kashmir problem would give it the guarantee of India's peaceful intentions and that the modern Western weapons would not be used against Pakistan.<sup>470</sup> Pakistan's point of view was rejected by the Western countries, which resulted in Pakistan's maximum penchant for China.<sup>471</sup> Pakistan completely rejected the idea of China's conquest of India. Ayub said that: "The conquest of a continent is by no means easy. A war between China and India is not possible. Geography would not allow it and the Chinese are not such fools. Why should they, already seven hundred and fifty million, take on the added responsibility for five hundred million impoverished people? The sacrifice would not be worth undergoing."<sup>472</sup>

When Pakistan did not succeed in stopping the Western countries and America from giving economic and military aid to India then it insisted on short-term aid to India. According to Nassau agreement, USA offered \$60 million worth of military aid to India. Pakistan protested but it was told that this was a temporary arrangement but just after this America gave another \$ 60 million worth of arms to India.<sup>473</sup> Pakistan's government maintained that it was not against the military aid to India but the problem was that the question of Kashmir

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<sup>469</sup> Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India*, p.270.

<sup>470</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p.150.

<sup>471</sup> Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.115.

<sup>472</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Foreign Relations", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol XVIII No 1, 1965, p.

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<sup>473</sup> "Pakistan: The Coolness of America", *The Round Table*, September 1965, p.370.

was not solved, the propaganda against the existence of Pakistan was going on in India and the Indians had already declared Pakistan as their enemy number one. In such a situation, the American military aid, which was in enormous quantity, had already disturbed the balance of power in the Sub-Continent. Military balance had already been altered from three to one to four to one in favour of India.<sup>474</sup> Pakistan realized that the conflict between China and Russia had alarming and dangerous effects on the security of Pakistan. Both the Russian and American policies have coincided in making India strong as a bulwark against China. It seemed very difficult that Russia and America would ever succeed in raising India a rival to China but they succeeded in making India a real menace for Pakistan.<sup>475</sup> Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rightly observed in the National Assembly of Pakistan, when he said that: "In 1965 this is the situation. In 1970, India can turn round to the United States and say: now close your eyes. The Partition of India was injustice to the Bharat Mata. Let us settle the problem in our own way."<sup>476</sup>

Pakistan repeatedly reminded the World community that India could not fight China and ultimately would turn against Pakistan. Bhutto said: "The leaders of India have repeatedly declared that in spite of their conflict with China, Pakistan is their enemy number one. The weapons newly acquired by India can be turned by it against Pakistan. These weapons would not be used against China for India cannot match China's manpower and resources."<sup>477</sup>

Pakistan government was of the view that Chinese did not intend to expand their 'empire' in any direction. China was a peaceful country and just after punishing India because of its provocation, it withdrew to its borders. Prime Minister Nehru was just raising the bogey of China's expanding Communism to get maximum western military and economic aid. President Ayub Khan as a purely military man said that:

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<sup>474</sup> Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests", *Asian Survey*, March 1964 VolIV, P.755.

<sup>475</sup> *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-72*, p.20.

<sup>476</sup> "Pakistan: The Coolness of America", *The Round Table*, September 1965, p.371.

<sup>477</sup> Bhutto, *The Quest For Peace*, p.43.

The border between India and China is such that even in the unlikely situation of war, India could not deploy more than 3 to 4 divisions against the Chinese. One may justifiably ask, then, why India is doubling the size of her standing army to 22 divisions. What are the remaining divisions aimed against? The fact of the matter is that India is planning to raise two armies, one with which to face China and the other to use against Pakistan.<sup>478</sup>

Pakistan's relations with United States strained as a result of supply of Western weapons to India. Ayub Khan repeatedly conveyed America that Western weapons would be a threat to small neighbouring states of India then to China. He stated that:

The feeling is emerging in the minds of many countries surrounding India, that with the help of American assistance, India is enlarging her military powers as a pretext of opposition to Communist China. And there is a feeling of uneasiness in many of the smaller countries around India that India may engage in an aggressive and expansive programme. Many people feel that the USA is very closely identified with India and therefore with aggressive Indian designs. If this goes on I have no doubt the smaller countries in this area will be forced to look for protection elsewhere.<sup>479</sup>

Americans rebuffed President Ayub's thoughts. In his regular column, the New York Times Chief Washington reporter, James Reston, who was regarded by some as President Kennedy's conscience keeper in the Capitol Press Corps wrote that Washington should not get too excited by Pakistan's silly threats.<sup>480</sup> Relations between the two countries deteriorated. Pakistan was very worried about the supply of US arms; it conveyed its grievances and views to Washington.<sup>481</sup> However, Washington was in no mood to listen to Pakistan. Initially Pakistan had hoped that it would convince the Western countries from giving military aid to India on long-term basis but Kennedy and Macmillan Birch Grove announcement of the continuous aid to India on 30 June 1963, completely disappointed Pakistan.<sup>482</sup> Initially Pakistan had also tried to get assurances from the United States for the security of Pakistan against Indian attack but President Kennedy was not interested in any more guarantees.<sup>483</sup> Instead of this, President Kennedy wanted to get assurances that Pakistan would not attack India.<sup>484</sup> Kennedy rejected all Pakistani arguments against giving

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<sup>478</sup> Mohammed Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance, Stresses and Strains", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964, P.204.

<sup>479</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 13 May 1962.

<sup>480</sup> *Ibid*, 13 May 1962.

<sup>481</sup> *Ibid*, 22 May 1962.

<sup>482</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.289.

<sup>483</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.127

<sup>484</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 31 October 1962.

military aid to India and said that America would proceed to help India. Pakistan should accept that fact. About China, President Kennedy said that Pakistan must realize that there were some limits, which should not be overstepped.<sup>485</sup> American administration severely criticized Pakistan for keeping simultaneous relations with both China and America although it herself tried to consider both Pakistan and India equal and postponed the visits of President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri in 1965<sup>486</sup>. Although when President Ayub Khan was asked that, whether Pakistan could survive as a small country in the position of a lamb between the lions, Ayub denied that Pakistan was a lamb and asserted that 'he knew how to live peacefully among the lions by setting one lion against another. Pakistan would remain in CENTO and SEATO and yet have good relations with China and Soviet Union'.<sup>487</sup> As a Super Power the Americans, however, did not approve this that Pakistan should benefit from both the powers and should keep engagements with the enemy country like China. US officials severely lambasted Pakistan and compared Pakistan with the prostitute who walked on both sides of the streets.<sup>488</sup> One of the reasons for the estrangement between Pakistan and US was the personal tilt of President Kennedy to India also. On assuming power in January 1961, Kennedy appointed known friends of India to high positions in administration, including Chester Bowles, former American Ambassador to India, as Under Secretary of State. Kennedy set out to base American policy in Asia on cooperation with India.<sup>489</sup> Pakistan's flirtation with China troubled United States. Interestingly, when Pakistan blamed America for arming the Indians to the teeth, the later accused Pakistan for its growing relations with China.<sup>490</sup> In February 1963, when Sino-Pakistan negotiations over border demarcation were in final stage, United States warned

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<sup>485</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.134.

<sup>486</sup> Ibid, p.154.

<sup>487</sup> Ibid, p.153.

<sup>488</sup> Frank N. Tragar, "The United States and Pakistan: A Failure of Diplomacy", *Orbis*, Vol IX, No. 3, Fall 1965, P.626.

<sup>489</sup> Sherwani, *India, China and Pakistan*, p.64.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid, P.117.



Pakistan that the proposed border agreement with China might endanger Pakistan's negotiations with India on Kashmir.<sup>491</sup> America also did not like Pakistan's support to China for the conduct of Second Afro-Asian Conference. The Afro Asian Conferences have always been suspect in Western eyes. They thought that the Chinese were building the Afro-Asian forum as the 'Third World'<sup>492</sup> to challenge the West. In March 1964, US Secretary of State Phillips Talbot was sent to Pakistan to inform Pakistani officials about US sensitivities. Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also disclosed that President Johnson also informed Pakistan that if it did not stop the pace of relations with China, United States would stop all military and economic aid. At the Commonwealth Conference in July 1964, President Ayub Khan opposed the Malaysian Premier's move to declare joint opposition to Chinese threat. Ayub Khan also stated that in case of Sino-US conflict in North Vietnam, Pakistan would not be involved because Pakistan's capacity had been rendered ineffective by the actions of its friends;<sup>493</sup> this was a direct signal to America. Actually, Pakistan wanted to convey the Americans about the change in Pakistan's policy towards United States because Americans had already brought change in their policies regarding Pakistan and they had befriended India at the cost of Pakistan. In early 1965, President Ayub Khan decided to visit China, the Americans showed great resentment on the proposed visit. However, when the Russians invited President Ayub Khan, United States also invited him. President Johnson thought that like Liaqat Ali Khan, Ayub Khan would also abandon his Soviet visit and Like Choudhury Mohammad Ali his China visit. However, on seeing that President Ayub Khan was going to Soviet Union and China, President Johnson cancelled Ayub Khan's visit to America. In July 1965, President Johnson sent a message to President Ayub Khan for the stoppage of aid until September and advised that meanwhile Pakistan should reconsider its policies.

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<sup>491</sup> Ibid, p.114.

<sup>492</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, P.165.

<sup>493</sup> Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Southeast Asia in Pakistan's Foreign Policy", *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1968.

United States also requested aid-Pakistan Consortium to postpone its meeting for two months. President Mohammad Ayub Khan truly commented about the negative policies of America in those words:

American policy is supposed to be based on their dislike of my policies: they want to seek a weak and diminished Pakistan so that India is free to face China more positively and perhaps take military interest in South East Asia against China. Such conjecture cannot be brushed aside. The menace of big power interference in the internal affairs of weaker countries is real and constant. They do not want to see new countries stabilize unless it suits their purpose. Previously, the Communists and especially the Russians used to be blamed for such activities but it seems now the Americans have surpassed them in this technique and skill.<sup>494</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The third phase of relationship between the two countries is a marvelous period in their diplomatic relationship. Pakistan's relations are deteriorated with the US as the latter pressurizes Pakistan to avoid enhancing relationship with China. Pakistan starts pro-China policies and even Pakistani leaders give impression that in case of Indo-Pak conflict, the largest state in Asia can protect Pakistan. Soon in war- 1965, Pakistan is thoroughly supported by China.

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<sup>494</sup> *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-72*, P.310.

## CHAPTER- 4

### PAKISTAN'S QUEST IN LIEU OF THE BILATERALISM AND GENERAL AGHA MUHAMMAD YAHYA KHAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, PHASE- IV (1966-1971)

#### 4.1- Foreign Policy Passing Through Transition

In the third phase (1966-71), Sino-Pakistan relations entered into marvelous stage. However, many factors changed the course of relations. Pakistan strengthened its relations with China but also realized that over-dependence on any country was hardly productive. In 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, China, although it issued several ultimatums to India for its misadventures, could not come to Pakistan's active help. The *raison d'être* for China's inability might be the American and Soviet Union's pressure. Both Soviet Union and United States warned China to avoid fishing in the troubled waters. Soviet Union cautioned outside forces against facilitating the widening of the conflict by their provocative statements and policies.<sup>495</sup> Even before 1965 war Pakistan had displayed signs of bilateralism in its relations with super powers. In early 1965, the Americans wanted that President Ayub Khan should cancel his visit to Soviet Union and should come to America like the one former Premier of Pakistan Liaqat Ali Khan had done. But Ayub Khan did not comply with American wishes and he visited both Soviet Union and China, which resulted in the cancellation of his American visit. The economic autarky and President Ayub's electoral win against Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Father of the Nation Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave him the boost and confidence. President Ayub embroiled himself in the arena of international politics. Years of rule gave him the experience to live among the lions and pitching them against each other. The nature of relationship between Pakistan and China changed from close and intimate union to balanced relationship. Pakistan had diversified its relations in early 1960s only to

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<sup>495</sup> Sharma, *The Pakistan-China Axis*, p.112

reduce its dependence on United States. However, after 1965 war, Pakistan realized that now she had become more dependent on China and Chinese influence was on increase. China tried to dissuade Pakistan from participating in the Tashkent Conference. Chinese abhorred the Soviet Union's interference in Pakistan. The Tashkent Conference did not succeed in opening new vistas in Indo-Pakistan relations, however, it was the *raison d'être* of the declining influence of People's Republic of China in Pakistan. Chinese were always susceptible to the role of Soviet Union<sup>496</sup> and United States in South Asian affairs. It seemed that United States had given an implicit approval to the Soviet Union for the resolution of the Indo-Pakistan disputes. In a way the Chinese realized that, both the super powers were trying to oust China from the South Asian affairs and they were united against China. After 1966, political instability also stayed in Pakistan; on the other hand, China was also involved in its cultural revolution.

#### **4.2- Bilateralism**

Bilateralism is not a new-fangled notion.<sup>497</sup> The countries of the Third World, who did not want to be implicated in Cold War, were following the policy of bilateralism. The countries who gathered under the umbrella of Non-Aligned were in fact the pioneers of bilateralism. As a member state of the United Nations, it is the duty of any state to have bilateral relations with all the countries. Pakistan was an ideological state; it had to establish cordial relations with all the Muslim countries. Apart from it as a sovereign state on the map of the world, it had to fight for the causes of the Third World, end of usurpation, colonialism, Arab World and Africa's struggle against racism.

Pakistan, after 1965 Indo-Pakistan war started bilateralism in its relations with the super powers. But despite Pakistan's close intimacy with China and developing relations with the Soviet Union after the Tashkent Conference, Pakistan primarily remained pro-West in its

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<sup>496</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p. 129.

<sup>497</sup> Bhutto, *Bilateralism*, p. 1

approach. Washington had always expressed doubts on Pakistan's inclination towards Communist powers and Pakistan repeatedly explained that its improved relations with China did not mean animosity towards the United States. Keeping in view the geographical location of Pakistan, it could not be inimical either to China or to Russia merely on the plea because they happened to be Communist countries. President Ayub wanted to follow the policy of bilateralism and not to allow any country to challenge Pakistan's sovereignty. Addressing a meeting of the Pakistan Muslim League Council on 14 July 1965, Ayub Khan said:

If the Americans want that we should incur the hostility of China and the U.S.S.R. without any rhyme or reason and also humiliate ourselves before the Indians, we cannot accept these conditions.....if any friendship impinges on the sovereignty and independence of our country and is against our interests, we no longer desire such friendship. We are prepared to undergo trials and tribulations, but we will not allow our sovereignty to be eroded.<sup>498</sup>

Even before 1965, Pakistan brought changes to its foreign policy. Pakistan had close links with the West before 1962. Sino-India war changed the political scenario and provided an opportunity to Pakistan to widen its relationship with China. President Ayub Khan made visit to Soviet Union in 1965 and a new era in relationship unleashed. He tried to keep smooth relations with all the three countries. Pakistan was among very few countries in the World (Afghanistan being the other) who achieved this distinction of keeping friendly relations with all the three major powers, the United States, China and the Soviet Union.<sup>499</sup> In this period, Pakistan also minimized its interest in the defence pacts with the West. Although Pakistan did not leave SEATO and CENTO but Pakistan's participation in its conferences was merely ceremonial.<sup>500</sup> Keeping in view the geographical location of Pakistan, it did not want to involve in the political differences of super powers and also in the territorial disputes of regional countries. Pakistan was surrounded by big powers and as

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<sup>498</sup> "Pakistan: The Coolness of America", The Roundtable, September 1965, p.373.

<sup>499</sup> A Pakistani Correspondent, *"America Back in Favour, Weaker Political Ties with China"*, February 1968, p.213.

<sup>500</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, P.358.

the World was already divided in two blocks. Pakistan did not want to be the part of any block.<sup>501</sup> However, Ayub Khan realized that although Pakistan should not exploit the differences of other powers but it should know their mutual differences and should augment Pakistan's endeavors for peace. He wrote:

In dealing with these great powers, we have to consider not only our bilateral relations with them but also their relations with each other and the picture of the world as a whole with its confrontations and alignments, its national rivalries and ideological conflicts. In this complex situation, we are guided by the knowledge that the interests we seek to further is the interest of peace and peaceful settlement of disputes in the region of which we form a part and in the world.<sup>502</sup>

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain explained in the National Assembly, on 28 June 1968 that 'Pakistan no longer takes any part in the military sides of these pacts and attends the Ministerial Council meetings as an observer country. Pakistan's interest in the organization is confined to cultural and economic activities'.<sup>503</sup> With the establishment of Pakistan's cordial and intimate relations with China, Pakistan had already lost interest in defence alliances with the Western countries. Even in 1962, Dawn wrote in an editorial 'The CENTO Business, We have often said that the threat to Pakistan's security does not come from that quarter, at any rate. SEATO, therefore, is of no further military use to us—and CENTO seems to be going the same way.'<sup>504</sup> In 1963, also, SEATO and CENTO were denounced in Pakistan's National Assembly and the opposition demanded the revision of the foreign policy. Opposition strongly pleaded for the policy of non-alignment.<sup>505</sup>

After Ayub, President General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan also followed the policy of bilateralism. He said that:

Experience tells us that over-commitment to any one power is not in our interest. The interests of great powers keep on changing. Small powers can only react to those changes and the process of adjustment becomes rather difficult for over-committed small powers. We therefore, try to hold a balance in our relations with the major

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<sup>501</sup> When in October 1967, Pakistan's C-in-C visited Iran, the Shah complained that Pakistan was having cordial relations with Iran and still trying to maintain closer relations with Egypt which was the rival of Iran. And then he enquired that how was that possible for Pakistan to maintain close relations with all the three super powers. Ayub told General Musa who had to visit Iran to tell Shah that 'it is not an easy matter to keep this balance but we have no other choice. We are the victim of our geopolitical situation'. *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-72*, p. 165.

<sup>502</sup> Ayub Khan, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan", p.15.

<sup>503</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 30 June 1968.

<sup>504</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 4 May 1962.

<sup>505</sup> *Ibid*, 24 July 1963.

powers around us and with the USA. We do not solicit the friendship of one at the expense of the interests of another. We feel that this policy of non-involvement has to be genuine and not a thinly disguised bargaining device. We do not try to play off one power against another and most decidedly we do not play on both sides of the street.<sup>506</sup>

### **4.3- The Tashkent Conference and People's Republic of China**

In 1960s, Sino-Soviet rupture broadened and in case of South Asia, a strong rivalry started between the two giants. Even before the emancipation of communist China, Soviet Union had occupied many Chinese lands. Mongolia had been incorporated in Soviet Union. Stalin did not intend to solve the border disputes. However, it was after Stalin that the relations deteriorated rapidly. Soviet Union considered itself the leader of the communist bloc but China contradicted it. Chinese leaders and writers explained that the Soviet revolution was an example for imperialist or oppressor countries while the Chinese revolution was a beacon for colonial, semi-colonial and oppressed countries.<sup>507</sup> Soon rivalry between the two communist giants started, which resulted in complete rupture. Chinese wanted to have their influence in South Asia particularly in Pakistan. Soviet Union, after the defeat of India in 1962 Indo-China war, realized that India alone could not face China. Soviet Union decided to befriend Pakistan also. Both Soviet Union and China were opposed to each other's involvement in the Sub-Continent.<sup>508</sup> United States was also following the policy of isolating China and it tacitly approved Soviet policy. As United States was engaged in Vietnam War, which had exhausted American resources and maneuverability, taking advantage of it, Soviet Union jumped in the Sub-Continent affairs. Soviet Union was supporting India and China was favoring Pakistan. After 1965, Soviet Union decided to minimize the Chinese influence in Pakistan also. Rift between China and Soviet Union had begun due to Nikita Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization, which was disliked by Mao. Later on Mao, during 1957-58, adopted more radical policies for the establishment of communism inside the

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<sup>506</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.360.

<sup>507</sup> Yunus, *Reflections on China*, P.239.

<sup>508</sup> Wajid Ali, "Communist China and South & South East Asia" p.190.

country and also criticized Soviet Union for its defensive approach towards America, which annoyed Khrushchev. Peking and Moscow were at odds on three specific points concerning revolutionary strategy, the timing of external support and encouragement of liberation movement. Khrushchev did not want national liberation wars and if they had to occur, he did not want to involve militarily. The Chinese publicly countered that the Soviet Union needlessly feared a direct confrontation with the United States.<sup>509</sup> This estrangement from the Soviet Union influenced the overall foreign policy of China and its Third World policy.<sup>510</sup> It is not true that China wanted to keep India and Pakistan in a state of warfare constantly. The Chinese supported Indian and Pakistani efforts to come to an understanding. China realized that both United States and Soviet Union were in unison regarding the Sub-Continent and both wanted to oust the Chinese influence in Pakistan and bring both Pakistan and India under their influence. Chinese also realized that both the super powers wanted to wean Pakistan away from China and to isolate it. Soviet Union in the garb of mediation between Pakistan and India was actually trying to increase its own influence in Pakistan, cease Chinese influence there and to segregate Pakistan.<sup>511</sup> Pakistan also brought changes to its relations with super powers. Pakistan had also shown overtures to Soviet Union and started diversifying its relations in all directions. President Muhammad Ayub Khan visited Soviet Union before 1965 war and new relationship was founded between the two countries. President Ayub Khan's visit neutralized Soviet support for India in war and it declared its neutrality and pressurized both Pakistan and India to cease hostilities. Pakistan's search for new friends was not acceptable to China.

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<sup>509</sup> Melvin Gurtov, "Sino-Soviet Relations and South East Asia Recent Development and Future possibilities", p. 493.

<sup>510</sup> Mohammad Tajuddin, "China's Third World Policy from Mao to Deng", p.1707, *Strategic Analysis*, March 1996.

<sup>511</sup> Mahdi, "Sino-Pakistan Relation: Historical Background", p.65.



The war between Pakistan and India had started on the issue of Kashmir. Neither country could win the war. United Nations Security Council passed a resolution on 20 September 1965 calling both the countries to end the hostilities. War had come to standstill and both Pakistan and India had to accept the United Nations call. Pakistan's Foreign Minister announced in a tense pre-dawn session of the Security Council that Pakistan accepted the Council's terms for halting the fighting. President Ayub Khan went on air to describe the UN cease-fire order as inadequate and unsatisfactory because it did not include a specific solution of the Kashmir problem. But he announced that in the interests of peace he had accepted it. The fever of crisis had broken, but the virus was still alive.<sup>512</sup>

Although Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire surprised the Chinese leaders but President Muhammad Ayub Khan explained Pakistan's constraints and the Chinese, showed understanding of Pakistan's decision even though their own view was different.<sup>513</sup> Both Pakistan and India were confronted with the issues of withdrawal of troops from each other's territories, exchange of prisoners of war and most important in case of Pakistan, it was interested in the Soviet pressure on India for the solution of Kashmir problem. Soviet Union had played a positive role in the war and was expecting that both India and Pakistan would use their good offices for the end of hostilities. Pakistani leaders had also in mind to milk Soviet Union because of American arms ban during the war, which had negative repercussions on Pakistan's fighting capabilities. China vehemently opposed the Tashkent Conference. President Muhammad Ayub Khan met with Chinese leaders before attending the Conference.<sup>514</sup> China, however, did not condemn the agreement because condemnation would have involved President Ayub Khan also and it would have meant the support of anti-Tashkent forces namely Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. However, Tashkent agreement deeply

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<sup>512</sup> Rowland, *A History of the Sino-Indian Relations*, p. 202.

<sup>513</sup> Rafi Raza, *Pakistan in Perspective, 1947-1997*, p. 96.

<sup>514</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, P. 144.

disappointed China.<sup>515</sup> China strongly condemned United States and Soviet Union. In January 1966, however, leaders of Pakistan and India attended the Tashkent Conference. Soviet leaders endeavored to make the Conference a success. Both President Muhammad Ayub Khan and Indian Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri had divergent opinions on the Kashmir dispute. In Pakistan, the public opinion was in favour of the solution of the Kashmir problem. Although Ayub declared that he was going to Tashkent with open mind but he also reiterated that: "Premier Kosygin would earn the gratitude of 600 million people of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent and of the whole world for having removed a critical threat to world peace if he succeeds in cutting the Gordian knot of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir".<sup>516</sup>

On 1<sup>st</sup> January 1966, in his first of the month address to the nation, President Ayub Khan stated about his programme of going to Tashkent (Soviet Union). He said that the Soviet Union had signified about the solution of Kashmir dispute which was the root cause of the conflict between India and Pakistan in accordance with the UN resolutions of September 20 and November 5 1965.<sup>517</sup> While Ayub reiterated that Kashmir issue would be discussed, Premier Shastri ruled out negotiations on the Kashmir. On 10 January 1966, Tashkent Declaration was made and both Ayub and Shastri announced that they would solve the mutual problems peacefully. Both the leaders agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries should be withdrawn before 25 February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965, and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line.<sup>518</sup> Both sides agreed to repatriate prisoners of war promptly, to reestablish normal diplomatic relations, not to permit hostile propaganda against each other, to settle their disputes peacefully and to consider measures for restoring cultural and economic relations<sup>519</sup>. As far as Kashmir was concerned, it appeared that Tashkent was a triumph of Indian diplomacy.

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<sup>515</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations" p.11.

<sup>516</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 2 January 1966.

<sup>517</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>518</sup> Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-80*, p.95.

<sup>519</sup> Syed, "China & Pakistan Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale", p.131.

In one sense at least, Pakistan had visibly gained nothing either by war in Kashmir and the Punjab or by complying diplomacy at Tashkent.<sup>520</sup> A small minority of enthusiasts who hailed Tashkent agreement as a 'Magna Carta' vanished in no time.<sup>521</sup> Soon Tashkent lost its importance for the Pakistanis. The relief, which Tashkent agreement brought, soon ended.<sup>522</sup> Later the future revealed that attending the Tashkent Conference was the biggest political gaffe of President Ayub Khan. Actually, Tashkent Declaration was an Indian draft, which the Soviets had made their own by making marginal changes in it.<sup>523</sup> As the Time Magazine had commented in its article, during the Indo-Pakistan war, that the Chinese would be laughing in Peking over the follies of India and Pakistan.<sup>524</sup> Chinese wanted to keep the things hot in the region. The solution of the Indo-Pakistan problems would be a great setback to Chinese interests. Chinese did not appreciate Pakistan's participation in the Tashkent Conference.<sup>525</sup> Chinese wish that Pakistan should not attend the conference might not be directly conveyed. It might be their wish. They might have strongly advised Pakistan not to attend the conference.<sup>526</sup> It is also believed that Pakistan and China might have agreed on the issue because during the Tashkent deliberations the Chinese put strong military pressure on India. The Chinese again and again sent messages to India to stop intrusions in Chinese territories otherwise it will hit back. For several months, even after the ceasefire, the Chinese put tremendous pressure on the frontiers of Bhutan, Sikkim and North East Frontier Agency. It was said that the Chinese wanted to strengthen Pakistan's position in Tashkent conference.<sup>527</sup> This led to the speculation of other countries of China's mention to

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<sup>520</sup> Michael Edwardes, "Tashkent and After", p.383, *International Affairs*, July 1966, Royal Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>521</sup> A Pakistani Correspondent, "Dissatisfaction with Tashkent", *The Round Table*, July 1966, p.309.

<sup>522</sup> *Dawn*, 27 March 1966.

<sup>523</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p.153.

<sup>524</sup> *Time*, *The Weekly Magazine*, 24 September 1965, P.26.

<sup>525</sup> Bhole, *Pakistan-China Relations*, P. 144.

<sup>526</sup> Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, p. 129.

<sup>527</sup> Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 196.

torpedoing the conference and strengthening the hands of Pakistanis.<sup>528</sup> Although the Tashkent Conference was hailed throughout the World, particularly by Russian press<sup>529</sup> but its effects on Pakistani people were opposite. The Conference dejected the Pakistani masses. It was a setback for President Ayub Khan's regime. He was severely criticized by his opponents. The conference, however, increased the Soviet Union's influence in Pakistan. Pakistan also wanted to mend its relations with the Soviet Union to pave the way for the solution of the Kashmir problem because the Soviet veto was the only hurdle in the way. In March 1966, Chinese President Liu Shao-Chi paid an important visit to Pakistan. The main reason for the visit was to judge on what lines Islamabad was thinking. President Ayub had just returned from the Tashkent Conference, which the Chinese had despised. China accused USSR as henchman of United States.<sup>530</sup> Apart from the fact that they wanted to cement their relations with Pakistan further, they wanted to discern the impact of Tashkent on Pakistan. President Liu Shao-Chi arrived in Pakistan on 26 March 1966 and was accompanied by Vice Premier Chen Yi and a large contingent of other officials. Differences had already erupted between President Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. On the arrival of Chinese Premier Liu Shao-Chi, nearly a million people welcomed him. Bhutto accompanied the Chinese Premier and shared the applause<sup>531</sup>. President Muhammad Ayub Khan thoroughly discussed the Tashkent Conference, relations with Soviet Union and United States.<sup>532</sup> China had strongly supported Pakistan in the recent Indo-Pak war. President Muhammad Ayub Khan especially thanked the generous Chinese support for Pakistani causes.<sup>533</sup> China welcomed Pakistan's stance of brushing aside all Western and Indian stances that China was a threat to the security of South Asia. Chinese

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<sup>528</sup> William J. Brands, "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability amidst Discontinuity", *China Quarterly*, September 1975, P.477.

<sup>529</sup> Choudhury, *Pakistan's Relations with India*, 1947-66, p.302.

<sup>530</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.117.

<sup>531</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan, Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, p.132.

<sup>532</sup> Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, p.192.

<sup>533</sup> Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements*, Vol VIII, July 1965-June 1966, p.131.

President particularly appreciated Pakistan's stance that China was not a threat to the security of Sub-Continent and the Taiwan issue.<sup>534</sup> China strongly supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.

The years after the Tashkent Conference revealed that only China truly helped Pakistan. The rest of the world powers only wanted the containment of the conflict. They wanted to save the world from catastrophe but no one was interested in the solution of the root cause. Except China the rest of the powers were now lukewarm in resolving the underlying cause of the conflict. The solution of the Kashmir issue took secondary position. World powers were interested to bring peace with or without Kashmir.<sup>535</sup>

#### **4.4- The Warmth in Pak-Soviet Relations and Chinese Apprehensions**

The second Indo-Pakistan war saw the highest watermark of close Sino-Pakistan interaction. However, Pakistan introduced bilateralism in its relations with super powers soon after the war and it was a worrisome factor for the Chinese. Due to various factors, Soviet Union came near to Pakistan. One of the important reasons for Soviet initiative towards Pakistan was the Soviet-Chinese split and Soviet intentions to throw China out of the Sub-Continent politics. Soviet Union had not only decided to defeat Chinese' diplomacy in the Sub-Continent but in whole of Asia. Moscow's main target in Asia was Peking. Soviet Union had already signed defence and friendship treaty with Mongolia and Vietnam and the later agreed to attend the Soviet Communist Party 23<sup>rd</sup> Congress in Soviet Union. These treaties must be viewed as Soviet diplomatic offensive against China.<sup>536</sup>

United States, although busy in Vietnam War, did not like Chinese intervention in Sub-Continent and it tacitly approved Soviet demarche. China was well aware of Soviet and American machinations. It advised Pakistan that Tashkent should be avoided and instead

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<sup>534</sup> *Pakistan Horizon* (1966) p.198.

<sup>535</sup> A Pakistani Correspondent, "*Pakistan: Popular Feeling for China*", *The Round Table*, August 1966, p.441.

<sup>536</sup> John Rowland, *A History of Sino-Indian Relations*, P.204.

Pakistan should suggest a conference in any Third World country. China thought that Pakistan was a small country and it would be impossible for it to resist Super Powers' pressure. China realized that: "During the Indo-Pakistani conflict, both the United States and Soviet Union instigated and encouraged the Indian aggressors. The truth is the Soviet leaders went to all that trouble to conjure up a "Tashkent Spirit "for the simple reason that they wanted to continue backing up the Indian reactionaries."<sup>537</sup>

The Soviet Union offered its good offices during the war. As early as 4 September 1965, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR, Alexei Kosygin sent identical messages to Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan. He wrote that 'both sides could count on its (Soviet Union's) willing cooperation, or to use the accepted expression, on its good offices'.<sup>538</sup> Soviet Union again offered its offices for peace on 19 September 1965. Soviet offers put India more under pressure than Pakistan. President Ayub Khan readily accepted Soviet offer. He was ready for offensive, dialogue and any effort that would have helped the solution of Kashmir issue. America was also not in a position to play any role. The Vietnam War had tremendously clipped US' peace-making role but it did not want to permit Chinese intervention in the region. Soviet Union also wanted to reduce Chinese influence in Pakistan.<sup>539</sup> It is also said that only Soviet Union emerged victorious from the Tashkent Conference. The Tashkent agreement was a triumph for Soviet Union and for Kosygin personally.<sup>540</sup> Soviet success in getting Pakistan and India to talk on neutral ground and agree to a statement was a feat no other country had performed before. It greatly enhanced the prestige of Soviet Union in the Third World and Afro-Asian countries where it was competing with China for influence.<sup>541</sup>

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<sup>537</sup> Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-80*, p. 97.

<sup>538</sup> Sherwani, *India, China and Pakistan*, p. 120.

<sup>539</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan, Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, p. 130.

<sup>540</sup> William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p. 212.

<sup>541</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 352.

When the conference started both Pakistani and Indian leaders were brimming with differences. Both the leaders had vented their differences even before the start of the negotiations. Initially both Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan adopted very rigid stances. Both Pakistan and India had to cut short their demands and stances. Indian Premier Shastri was not at all ready to discuss the Kashmir question and he demanded no-war pact. Ayub Khan insisted that peace was not possible without satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir problem. Soviet Premier Kosygin intervened wherever the negotiations hit the snag. He reminded President Ayub that India had occupied more territory than Pakistan and to the Indian too he reiterated that if Indian government did not reciprocate, Soviet Union might not be on its side on the Kashmir issue. There were chances that the conference would not succeed but because of the Russian Premier's extreme pressure both the leaders had to give in. Premier Shastri died in Tashkent but for Pakistani President Tashkent remained a swollen injury and became one of the reasons for his downfall. However, Pakistan's relations with Soviet Union received a boost and the level of interaction with the Soviet Union went up in economic, social, political and cultural fields. Number of delegations from both the countries visited each other's country. Soviet vice-Premier visited Pakistan in May 1966, followed by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. Russian football delegation also visited Pakistan. Pakistan was mainly interested in Russian arms supply. India was not dependent for the supply of arms on a single country. It had been acquiring weapons from east and west. Pakistan also wanted new markets. In June 1966, Air Marshal Nur Khan led the military delegation to Soviet Union. The process of normalization of relations with the Soviet Union received further impetus when in September 1967 President Muhammad Ayub Khan paid his third visit to Soviet Union.<sup>542</sup> The Pakistani President had two objectives. First, he wanted the supply of Russian arms to Pakistan, because he did not want Pakistan

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<sup>542</sup> A Pakistani Correspondent, "America Back in Favour, Weaker Political Ties with China", p.214.

to be dependent upon United States only and secondly he wanted to influence Soviet Union's Kashmir policy and to neutralize its support for India regarding Kashmir.<sup>543</sup> In April 1968, Russian Prime Minister Kosygin returned the visit to Pakistan. Russian Premier agreed in principle for the arms sale to Pakistan.<sup>544</sup> Russian commitments annoyed the Chinese. They could not see the increasing Soviet influence in Pakistani affairs. China realized that both Soviet Union and United States were collaborating with each other to encircle China. In July 1968, President Ayub Khan sent a high-powered delegation under General Yahya Khan to Soviet Union. Soviet Union was interested in reducing the Chinese and American influence in Pakistan and it demanded the termination of the facilities for the US bases in Pakistan. In complying with the Soviet demands, Pakistan asked the United States to terminate all the facilities in the Badaber base, near Peshawar. On the other hand, Pakistan conveyed Russia to pressurize India for the solution of Kashmir problem. Soviet Union desired for the normalization of Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan insisted that arms aid to Pakistan had to be provided on parity with India. Soviet Union did not agree on the parity but increased Pakistan's economic aid and gave substantial aid for Pakistan's third five-year plan.<sup>545</sup> Soviet Union, however, agreed to give less lethal weapons to Pakistan. Pakistan also did not expect to get much-sophisticated weapons from Russia. Pakistan just wanted to fill a few gaps in defence requirements<sup>546</sup> and to soften the Russians on Kashmir. However, Pakistan's inclination towards Soviet Union was a moment of worry for China. China did not approve Pakistan's policy and doubts lingered in China that Pakistan was bringing change in its China policy. It was speculated inside Pakistan and in other countries also that the warmth and cordiality that was seen in Sino-Pakistan relations in the early 1960s had

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<sup>543</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, p.148.

<sup>544</sup> Zubeida Hasan, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol XXI, (Fourth Quarter 1968), p.32.

<sup>545</sup> Zubeida Hasan, "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR in the 1960s", *The World Today*, January 1969, P.34.

<sup>546</sup> Hasan, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan and India", *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume XXI, (Fourth Quarter 1968), p.354.



been diminished considerably. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was now one of the important pillars of the opposition, also blamed the government for the diminishing Sino-Pakistan relations. He wrote that:

The cumulative effect of all things done by the government in the past two years has resulted in a decline in Pakistan's relations with the People's Republic of China. Outwardly, there is no break in our relations with China. Foreign policy changes are often imperceptible. It is like a rose bud, which opens slowly into a full flower....The luster of Pakistan-China relations, has been lost.<sup>547</sup>

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vehemently opposed Pakistan Government's overtures towards Soviet Union. He thought that Soviet Union would not grade Pakistan equivalent to India but its main aim for political inclination towards Pakistan was to veer Pakistan away from United States and China, as they could not tolerate the Chinese increasing influence in the Sub-Continent. Bhutto further commented:

Whatever gesture the Soviets made towards Pakistan was chiefly motivated by China's growing relations with Pakistan and not in response to Pakistan's belated half measures forced by circumstances. The most important thing to remember is that the Soviet Union took some initiative for an approach towards Pakistan, the most significant being that at Tashkent, not to down grade the importance of India, but to combat the influence of China in Pakistan.<sup>548</sup>

Despite criticism from many quarters, the relationship between Pakistan and Soviet Union improved. But the American presence in Badaber was an irritant. It was not till Pakistan decided to close down this facility that the Russians agreed to supply her with arms.<sup>549</sup> Finally, a Pakistani delegation led by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan visited Soviet Union and it was announced that the later was ready to provide weapons to Pakistan. During his visit (June 1970), Russia agreed for assistance for the construction of the steel mill in Karachi. On political matters, however, both sides did not reconcile. Pakistan wanted Russia to use her influence over India for the solution of the Kashmir problem and Soviet Union wanted the condemnation of the US in Indo-China. Over Kashmir, Soviet Union encouraged for direct negotiations with India and over Indo-China, only 'concern' was expressed in joint communiqué.<sup>550</sup> However, on economic front, Soviet aid increased. Soviet Union

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<sup>547</sup> Z. A. Bhutto, *Political Situation in Pakistan*, (New Delhi, 1968), p.23.

<sup>548</sup> Bhutto, *Political Situation in Pakistan*, p.21.

<sup>549</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.364.

<sup>550</sup> Ibid, P.365.

basically wanted to wean away Pakistan from China. The defeat of India in 1962, Indo-China war convinced both Soviet Union and USA that alone India cannot stand to China. Both Pakistan and India will have to work together. Keeping in view, China's factor, Leonid Brezhnev's Asian Collective security System was rejected first by Pakistan, for it did not want to gang up against China and then by India for not compromising over her non-alignment. Again, General Yahya's government rejected the idea of constructive cooperation between India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Soviet Union. Because Pakistan realized that it was an alliance against China and secondly, regional cooperation without the solution of Kashmir problem was out of question.<sup>551</sup>

Although Pakistan considerably improved its relations with Soviet Union and both the countries agreed on most of the political squabbles. However, the Soviet Union's decision to supply arms to Pakistan was seen with suspicion in Peking. Until the end of his rule, Ayub Khan constantly conveyed Chinese that there was no change in Pakistan's policy towards China but the Chinese were not convinced.<sup>552</sup> The praise of Pakistan and its leaders was absent from the Chinese press in 1968<sup>553</sup>, which was the peak year for Pakistan-Soviet Union honeymoon.

#### **4.5- China and Pakistan-US Relations**

In the Second Phase (1962-66) of President Ayub Khan's foreign policy, relations with United States deteriorated considerably. The *raison d'être* for the descent in relations was Pakistan's pro-China policies. Pakistan justified its inclination towards China because of United States' leaning towards India. America supplied horrific weapons to India to raise its military muscles against China. Pakistan considered that such arms would be used against

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<sup>551</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 11 July 1969.

<sup>552</sup> Ayub noted in his Diary on 21 May 1967 "the Chinese seem to be apprehensive that the Russians will attempt to put us against them. The Chinese were concerned about our Foreign Minister's visits to Russia and Japan in quick succession." *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-72*, p. 97.

<sup>553</sup> G. W. Choudhury, "Pakistan and the Communist World", *Pacific Community*, Vol 6, No 1 (October 1974), pp. 124-25.

Pakistan, the stance, which was rejected by US administration. Finally, during Indo-Pak conflict United States banned arms supply to both the belligerents.<sup>554</sup> It caused consternation in Pakistan because it was heavily dependent on US arms, whereas India did not feel the ripples of the arms ban. President Ayub Khan brought basic changes to his foreign policy after 1965 war and introduced bilateralism, so that Pakistan should not be dependent on any country.<sup>555</sup> With bilateralism in his mind Pakistan's President visited United States in December 1965. He tried to clarify US misunderstanding about Pakistan's close relations with China but he was fully mindful not to dependent Pakistan wholly upon United States. President Ayub Khan decided that he should replenish his stocks, which were depleted in the war. He was successful in getting the arms from the United States, but keeping in view the problems for supplying direct weapons to Pakistan, in the American administration, USA preferred to supply arms indirectly to Pakistan. United States was also not worried about Pakistan's relations with China. It means that Pakistan's attempts to use China as a bargaining counter with the United States had also failed.<sup>556</sup> As Pakistan was heavily dependent on US, so Pakistan sought to get weapons from US stores. Americans authorized the sale of lethal weapons through third countries, particularly the NATO countries, thereby getting around its own embargo on lethal weapons. Thus, 100 American M-47 Patton tanks were sold by Italy to Pakistan at cheap rates and four US supplied C-130-B troop transport aircraft were received by Pakistan from Iran. However, in certain cases American and Indian governments conveyed their annoyance to the prospective suppliers of weapons to Pakistan. India explained to them that by supplying weapons to Pakistan those countries would endanger the Indian security. India feared that new arms race would start in the Sub-Continent and India would be compelled to allocate developmental funds for defence

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<sup>554</sup> Mahdi, "Sino-Pakistan Relation: Historical Background", p.66.

<sup>555</sup> Hyder, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy", p. 22.

<sup>556</sup> Michael Edwardes, "Tashkent and After", *International Affairs*, July 1966, p.385.

procurement. After the 1965 war, Iran bought ninety, F-86s from West Germany and sent them to Pakistan. Germany had acquired the planes from Canada. India lodged a strong protest to Canada.<sup>557</sup> Indian pressure on Iran, West Germany and United States caused their return to Iran.<sup>558</sup> On the other hand, Pakistan had also caused alarm at reports that India was receiving American arms through Taiwan.<sup>559</sup>

United States offered 300,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan.<sup>560</sup> The American decision of supplying wheat to Pakistan was criticized instead of being appreciated, because America had offered three million tons of wheat to India for which India would not have to pay anything, no freight charges and no payments in hard currency.<sup>561</sup> The Americans objected Pakistan's pro-China policies but Ayub Khan rejected their stance. He told the Americans that China was Pakistan's neighbour and because of Pakistan's geopolitical location, it could not disturb relations with China.<sup>562</sup> Because of its involvement in the Vietnam War, United States could not play any role in South Asia but still it did not want to leave South Asia to Soviet Union and China. Vietnam War marred the fighting capabilities of the United States and paralyzed its political maneuvers. United States on many occasions requested Pakistan to establish its contacts with China. Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto twice in April 1966 for Pakistan's help to arrange a meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister for discussion on Vietnam.<sup>563</sup> Pakistan lost the opportunity of cashing itself. China in meantime was also engaged in its Cultural Revolution and it cut its outside contacts considerably. Soviet Union was the only power, which increased its dominance and influence in Sub-Continent. However, United States still

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<sup>557</sup> Khalida Qureshi, "Arms aid to India and Pakistan", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol XX No 2, Second Quarter 1967, P.143.

<sup>558</sup> Syed, *China & Pakistan*, p.139.

<sup>559</sup> Zubeida Hasan, "United States and Arms Policy in South Asia, 1965-67", p. 135.

<sup>560</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, pp.119-120.

<sup>561</sup> *Ibid*, pp.119-121.

<sup>562</sup> "Pakistan and the World", A Quarterly Survey, *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XIX (1st Quarter, 1966), pp.1-5.

<sup>563</sup> Rafi Raza, *Pakistan in Perspective 1947-1997*, P.87.

wanted to feel its presence in the region. American Vice President Hubert Humphrey visited Pakistan with \$50 million loan but the Americans were worried about Pakistan's increasing dependence upon China. American Vice President Hubert Humphrey conveyed America's annoyance over the proposed Chinese President's visit to Pakistan in 1966. Just before the Chinese leader's visit to Pakistan, Ambassador Mc Conaughy expressed US regrets about Pakistan's receiving Liu at a time of international bad behaviour of the Chinese and expressed the hope that the public welcome would be kept within bounds. But President Ayub answered that public enthusiasm must be expected, after all the Chinese came to Pakistan's side with unconditional offers of assistance.<sup>564</sup> Vice President on his visit to Pakistan also criticized China; however, his comments about the threat of China to both Pakistan and India were severely criticized in Pakistan. Humphrey had said that provision of economic aid to Pakistan and India depended upon their common understanding of the activities and designs of Communist China.<sup>565</sup> Pakistan rejected Vice President Humphrey's statement. President Ayub said: "I would like to reiterate that Pakistan attaches due importance to her relations with the United States, which have a context of their own, just as our relationship with China had its own context. It has been our belief from the very beginning that there is no danger to the Sub-Continent from China provided no uncalled for provocation is aimed against that country."<sup>566</sup>

Regarding relations with the United States, President Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto always differed. Ayub Khan wanted Pakistan to follow the policy of bilateralism but to keep relations with the United States should be the focal point of Pakistan's policy. On the contrary, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto suggested that China should be given priority. In May 1966, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto even criticized America for its role in Vietnam. He said: "Big Powers should know that foreign intervention in any country, however small, could

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<sup>564</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.169.

<sup>565</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 21 February 1966.

<sup>566</sup> Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements, July 1965-June 1966*, p.130.

not force its people to submit to the intervening forces. Such intervention strengthens the forces of resistance and creates a greater consciousness among the suppressed.”<sup>567</sup>

Keeping in view their differences on various policy matters, particularly regarding China and United States, President Ayub Khan dropped Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from his cabinet. Ayub Khan was blamed that the reason for Bhutto’s dismissal was the appeasement of Americans.<sup>568</sup> It was also speculated that he was trying to weaken the pro-China faction in his government.<sup>569</sup> Although to compensate Bhutto’s dismissal, on which Chinese were worried, Ayub Khan also dismissed pro-American Finance Minister Shoaib, which upset the Americans<sup>570</sup> but Bhutto’s removal from office, was highly speculated because it was coincided with the restoration of full economic aid to Pakistan.<sup>571</sup> However, relations with America in post-1965 era could not be considered intimate and very close. In April 1967, the United States Government announced its decision not to resume military assistance to Pakistan.<sup>572</sup> In fact, the Americans did not like the policy of bilateralism. American Vice President Johnson made an unprecedented stopover in Karachi, by the end of 1967, while turning back from his tour of East Asia to Europe. He met with President Muhammad Ayub Khan. This unscheduled meeting, although of sixty-five minutes’ duration, was of great significance.<sup>573</sup> It confirmed that Pakistan was again bringing change to its foreign policy, which was extreme anti-American since Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. It was said that the meeting had eased the tension between Washington and Rawalpindi.<sup>574</sup> The fact that from end 1967 until the end of President Ayub Khan’s rule, March 1969, no significant visit took place revealed that relations with the United States were not remarkable. Bitterness in Pak-

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<sup>567</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, P.153.

<sup>568</sup> George J. Lerski, “Pakistan-American Alliance: A Revaluation of the Past Decade”, *Asian Survey*, Vol VIII, No 5, May 1968. P.414.

<sup>569</sup> Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, p.310.

<sup>570</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.170.

<sup>571</sup> Ahsen Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p.101.

<sup>572</sup> Zubeida Hasan, “United States and Arms Policy in South Asia, 1965-67”, p.127.

<sup>573</sup> By a Pakistani Correspondent, “America Back in Favour”, *The Round Table*, P.213.

<sup>574</sup> A Pakistani Correspondent, “America Back in Favour: Weaker Political Ties with China”, *Round Table*, No 230 (April 1968), p.213.

American relations was visible in Foreign Minister Sharif-ud-din Pirzada's visit to United States in October 1967. He had two meetings with Dean Rusk. In first meeting, Rusk was constructive about US-Pakistan relations but in second, he blamed Pakistan for all US' failure. He said that Pakistan had failed them in Korea and Vietnam. Ayub Khan wrote that the Chinese ultimatum to India during our war was challenge to the United States. From that time on, Pakistan had lost the United States'.<sup>575</sup> However, it should also be kept in mind that America was preoccupied in Vietnam War in those years and Johnson administration essentially gave up in frustration and was willing to accept a more passive role in competition with the Soviet Union and China for influence in the South Asian region.<sup>576</sup> The arrival of Richard Nixon to the White House in early 1969, however, raised Pakistani expectations. In the May 1969, Aid Consortium meeting in Paris, the US delegation gave strong support to Pakistani requests for assistance.<sup>577</sup> President Nixon visited Pakistan the same year in August and was given rousing welcome. Pakistani military aid was restored two days before President Yahya Khan's US visit in October 1970.

#### **4.6- The Cultural Revolution and Sino-Pak Relations**

Cultural Revolution was a political campaign in China. It was launched in 1966 by Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong to eliminate his political rivals and revolutionize Chinese society. It was a sort of civil war, which continued for years. Mao Tse-Tung eliminated his political rivals. President Liu Shao-Chi and his family also suffered at the hands of revolutionaries and were put to death. Thousands of people died and millions were imprisoned or exiled in the social chaos and political persecution that followed.<sup>578</sup> Bureaucracy was still enjoying the privileges, they still controlled China, and the intellectuals and professional still benefited from the perquisites. Mao's wife Jiang Qing and

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<sup>575</sup> *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-72*, P.170.

<sup>576</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, pp.173, 176.

<sup>577</sup> *Dawn, Karachi*, 22, 23, 24 May 1969.

<sup>578</sup> Microsoft Encarta 2007, *Cultural Revolution*.

her associates emerged on the scene and they strongly defended Mao's policies. All those who wanted gradual changes, and were called moderates, were crushed in the name of Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution had far-reaching impact on all aspects of Chinese society. The years of chaos from 1966 to 1969 saw the slowdown and partial collapse of the Chinese economy. Chinese became more introverts and at the time when, Chinese President Liu Shao-Chi was penetrating into the Third World and was removing the negative impression about his country, Cultural Revolution came and China terminated all its outside contacts. Most countries adopted the policy of wait and see regarding China.<sup>579</sup> President Liu Shao-Chi, along with thousands of moderates also suffered. China curtailed its foreign contacts and busied itself in internal cleansing. China dramatically dropped her external links. The number of exchanges of delegations between China and all foreign countries dropped from 1322 in 1965 to 66 in 1969.<sup>580</sup> Chinese Cultural Revolution presented Moscow with another opportunity to erode Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.<sup>581</sup> Pakistan's relations with China could not be discussed without mentioning the Cultural Revolution. Outside world saw the impact of Cultural Revolution on China's foreign policies.<sup>582</sup> The Cultural Revolution worried Pakistan about the certain change in China's policy towards Pakistan; on the other hand, China was also worried about Pakistan's possible change in its relations after 1965 war. China tried to explain the Cultural Revolution and its effects to Pakistan. Chinese Foreign Minister Chin Yi explained Cultural Revolution to visiting Pakistani Commerce Minister Ghulam Faruque and ensured that Cultural Revolution had nothing with the down trend in Sino-Pakistan relations.

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<sup>579</sup> Chen, *China and the Three Worlds*, p.28.

<sup>580</sup> Ibid, p.28.

<sup>581</sup> Melvin Gurtov, *Sino-Soviet Relations and South East Asia Recent Development and Future Possibilities*, Pacific Affairs, winter 1970-71, P.494.

<sup>582</sup> William J. Brands, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, (New York, 1972), p.215.



#### 4.7- The Development of Relations

The third Phase (1966-71) of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, under Ayub Khan and later President Yahya Khan, saw a steady strengthening of relationship. Pakistan, after 1965 Indo-Pakistan war adopted a new course for its foreign relations. President Ayub Khan realized that if United States could maintain mutual relationship with both Pakistan and India and the Soviet Union could also follow in the same fashion, Pakistan could also keep friendly relations with all the great powers. However, United States and later on Soviet Union both did not approve the policy of bilateralism. For China, Pakistan was a window to the outer world. China was worried about Pakistan's close relations with other two Super Powers. Indian scholars accused China of pressurizing Pakistan to carry the fight with India and it should not go for peace settlement. Indians also blamed China for stopping Pakistan from participation in Tashkent. However, Pakistan rejected the Chinese desire and Pakistani leaders went to Tashkent.<sup>583</sup> Pakistanis did not accept that they were pressurized by China. However, they said that China had politely suggested that Pakistan should not participate in the Tashkent Conference because it was not pleased with the Soviet Union playing any important role in the politics of South Asia.<sup>584</sup> Although Pakistan's participation in Tashkent Conference dejected the Chinese, however, they accommodated Pakistan's compulsions. China did not want to lag behind and to remain behind as influential player in Sub-Continent politics. After 1965, war China supplied sizeable amount of equipment to Pakistan. Some MIG 19 (F-6), tanks and some other weapons were displayed at the Pakistan Day Parade in 1966.<sup>585</sup> It was also speculated that even during the war Chinese supplied MIG 19 and some other lethal weapons to Pakistan. Ayub Khan in later part of his rule admitted to Shah of Iran about the procurement of those planes:

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<sup>583</sup> Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations*, P. 238.

<sup>584</sup> Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*, P. 309.

<sup>585</sup> Ahsen Chaudhri, 'Strategic and Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations' p. 21.

During the demonstration (of Pakistan Air Force held on 9 March 1967), I told the Shah how MIG 19s were obtained from China. On one occasion, I flew over the Karakoram in the middle of the night, got to Peking in the morning, negotiated an arms deal with the Chinese leaders, and flew back to Pakistan the next night. Elaborate precautions had to be taken to keep the operation secret. Even my household people did not know that I was not in the house. Faruque and Bhutto accompanied me on this occasion.<sup>586</sup>

Although China was busy in its Cultural Revolution and it adopted inward policies but it was not negligent about its security. China realized that both the super powers, United States and Soviet Union, were encircling China and Soviet Union was using Pakistan for that purpose. Chairman Mao condemned the Western countries for plotting against Sino-Pakistan relations. He said that: "One should support what the enemy opposed and oppose what he supported. The imperialists (United States), the revisionists (Soviet Union) and the expansionists (India) had all united in opposing Sino-Pakistan friendship, which proved <sup>587</sup>that it had been a good thing".

A strange coincidence had also occurred in USSR and USA policies towards Sub-Continent. Both USA and USSR took joint stand against the Chinese threat to South Asia. Peking's apprehensions were not without any foundations. Even in September 1965, the US secretary of State Dean Rusk commended the USSR for its helpful attitude on the Indian-Pakistan fighting and accused Peking of seeking to make political capital out of it.<sup>588</sup> The relations between Pakistan and China cooled off during the prescribed period. However, it was also seen that during the period of 1966-69 cultural relations between the two countries flourished. It means that political relationship reached its zenith and the era of cultural relationship started. During the post-Tashkent period, twelve delegations from Pakistan went to China and China sent five delegations to Pakistan. Trade and economic aid are one of the most important instruments of diplomacy. Trade flourished between the two countries and China started giving economic aid to Pakistan after 1965.

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<sup>586</sup> *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-72*, p.71.

<sup>587</sup> *Syed, China & Pakistan*, p.134.

<sup>588</sup> *Jain, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.118.

During this period political relations strengthened, trade flourished but suspicion still lingered in the minds of Pakistani and Chinese leaders about the intentions of each other. Just after the Tashkent Conference, Chinese President arrived in Pakistan on 26 March 1966 on a seven days visit<sup>589</sup> to examine the trends in Pakistan. Despite morning drizzle, thousands of people thronged in the streets of Rawalpindi to have a glimpse of the person who supported Pakistan in its war of survival. President Liu Shao-Chi was the cynosure of Pakistani's eyes. Chinese President was accorded one of the most lavish welcomes Pakistan had ever provided.<sup>590</sup> During his visit, public demonstrations got out of control in their enthusiasm for Pakistan-China friendship.<sup>591</sup> President Ayub had rightly enunciated that 'the people of Pakistan remember with deep gratitude the support they received from the government and people of China in their hour of trial.'<sup>592</sup> Chinese President wanted to know the impact of Tashkent agreement on Pakistani leaders, to ascertain the influence of Soviet leaders on Rawalpindi and to boost up the mutual relationship<sup>593</sup>, so that Pakistan should be barred from coming closer to Soviet Union. One of the aims of Chinese President's Pakistan visit was that China wanted to make it difficult for Pakistan to pull away from it. As the Western countries had put an embargo on arms sale to Pakistan and India was strengthening itself to the teeth, China came to Pakistan's rescue. China agreed to arm three mountain divisions of the Pakistan army and supply it other equipment, including aircraft.<sup>594</sup> Chinese exhibition was also displayed for three weeks in Karachi before the visit of President Liu Shao-Chi. Three thousand articles of light and heavy industries, agricultural implements, food products, textiles, crafts and books were displayed.<sup>595</sup> Pakistani leaders gave warm welcome to the Chinese guests. President Liu Shao-Chi, on this occasion appreciated Sino-

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<sup>589</sup> Ahsen Chauhri, *Pakistan and the Great Powers*, p. 100.

<sup>590</sup> William J. Brands, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, (New York, 1972), p. 214.

<sup>591</sup> Michael Edwardes, "Tashkent and After", p. 387.

<sup>592</sup> Jain, China, *Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p.153,

<sup>593</sup> Ramakant, *China and South Asia*, p. 99

<sup>594</sup> Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 122.

<sup>595</sup> Jain, China, *Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p. 138.

Pakistan relations and declared that it had passed all the tests of the time. He was thankful for Pakistan's support against American Vice President's rhetoric on his Pakistan's visit. He declared that:

Recently when the imperialists and their collaborators were vilifying China without scruple and attempting to form a ring of encirclement against China, the Pakistan Government refuted the nonsense about China's threat to the Sub-Continent. Thus expressing the firm will of the Pakistan people to maintain friendship with the Chinese people.<sup>596</sup>

Chinese were very vocal about Pakistan's problems and issues and supported the country. They supported Pakistan's struggle for national independence against the foreign aggressors and ensured Pakistan that in future also China would support it against its jingoistic neighbour. Foreign Minister Chin Yi, who accompanied the Chinese President, declared Pak-China friendship "Mujahidana Dosti" (A profound and militant friendship). By declaring India as a common enemy, Chen Yi won the hearts of Pakistani nation. Chen Yi also declared that: "In the future, should East Pakistan or West Pakistan again face the armed attack of any aggressor, the Chinese Government and People will continue to support the Pakistan people in their struggle to safeguard national independence, state sovereignty and national unity."<sup>597</sup>

Although the Chinese knew that Pakistan had started diversifying its relations and they were no more pro-China but President Liu firmly supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. China's support on the Kashmir issue was visible from the joint communiqué issued on 31 March 1966. Although from the Chinese leader's visit, Pakistan's gratitude was visible but Pakistan was extremely careful in not offending USA and Soviet Union. Chinese President wanted to get Pakistan's support for Vietnam but the communiqué issued at the end of the visit avoided President Liu's favourite topic, Vietnam. Nevertheless, it also comforted the American President that Johnson-Ayub communiqué of December 1965 had also avoided

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<sup>596</sup> President Liu Shao-Chi spoke on the occasion of his Pakistan visit at the banquet given by President Muhammad Ayub Khan in his honour on 26 March 1966, Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-80*, p.102

<sup>597</sup> Foreign Minister Chen Yi's speech at Dacca on 29 March 1966, Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.123 and *Dawn*, 30 March 1966.

in July 1966.<sup>601</sup> As compared to Bhutto, Pirzada had no bias for or against any power.<sup>602</sup> Although the new foreign minister instantly issued a policy statement vowing to continue his predecessor's foreign policy towards China and other countries but it was widely considered a customary declaration.

Ayub immediately sent Commerce Minister Ghulam Faruque to pacify the Chinese. The Chinese were apprehensive of change in Pakistan's Foreign policy. Western countries were also sponsoring maneuvers to encircle China. In 1965-66, there were some reports of America seeking a grand Asian alliance of India, Pakistan, Japan and Indonesia to form a bulwark against Communist China. The idea of grand Asian alliance was not new Mr. Dean Rusk in 1964 first mooted it.<sup>603</sup> Keeping all this in view Chinese Foreign Minister Chen yi cryptically stated to the visiting Pakistani Commerce Minister Ghulam Faruq that: "I can say with certainty that this scheme {of joint Indo-Pakistan opposition to China} of the United States and Soviet Union will not be countenanced by the people of our two countries nor by our two governments. No force on earth can undermine the friendship between the Chinese and Pakistan people."<sup>604</sup>

In October the same year, new Foreign Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada paid a visit to China. Pirzada met with Chou En-Lai and Mao Tse-Tung and explained them the policy of Pakistan but the Chinese remained apprehensive about change in Pakistan's policy. One of the reasons for sending Pirzada was to silence the domestic condemnation of Bhutto's dismissal. Again, when the Soviet Union assured Pakistan of arms supply, Chinese were highly alarmed and President Ayub sent Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan army General Yahya Khan to China, in November 1968, to pacify the Chinese apprehensions about Soviet-

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<sup>601</sup> *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1966-72*, p.3.

<sup>602</sup> Ramakant, *China and South Asia*, p.99.

<sup>603</sup> A Pakistani Correspondent, "*Popular Feeling for China*", August 1966, p.442.

<sup>604</sup> Singh, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.125.

Pakistan alliance. It is to be mentioned that in July 1968 General Yahya Khan had visited Soviet Union and made a defence alliance with them.

Although political suspicions remained between Pakistan and China but cultural and trade relations tremendously improved. In true sense, China became the impeccable friend of Pakistan. In 1964, China granted Pakistan \$ 60 million loan. Pakistan faced food shortage in 1966 and China exported 100000 tons of food grains to Pakistan on barter basis. In 1968, China provided heavy machinery for the Taxila Heavy Complex. The volume of trade rose from Rs. 28 million in 1961-62 to Rs. 381 million in 1966-67. Pakistan was the only country from SEATO, CENTO and Western-Aligned state, which was accorded a Most Favoured Nation status by China.<sup>605</sup>

#### **4.8- Karakoram Highway- The Zenith of Friendship**

On 21 October 1967, China and Pakistan signed an agreement on the opening of the Gilgit-Sinkiang route for the trade purpose and a new vista in the relationship of the two countries started. This project which was to establish a road link between Pakistan and China via the Khunjrab pass and open the way for overland trade countries. The KKH project was envisaged to revive the historic 'silk route' which had existed for centuries as the trading link for caravans between Xinjiang and Gilgit<sup>606</sup>. It took another four years to complete the project and open it to traffic on February 16, 1971 at a colourful ceremony at Baltit fort in Hunza.

The year 1968 was a period of turmoil in Pakistan. There were student riots and public demonstrations against the Ayub Khan's regime. Gradually these disturbances and oppositions swelled to disproportionate level, culminating in the downfall of Ayub Khan's regime on 25 March 1969. Similarly, in China, also, the Cultural Revolution or the power tussles between Mao-Tse-Tung and Liu Shao-chi reached new heights in 1967. As a result,

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<sup>605</sup> Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, p. 141.

<sup>606</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All-Weather' Friendship", p.12.

the bilateral activities slowed down visibly and a comparative, though transitory, lull prevailed in Sino-Pak relations.<sup>607</sup> Pakistan brought new element of “bilateralism” in its foreign policy. Through bilateralism, Pakistan endeavored to establish cordial relations with all the three super powers, namely, United States, Soviet Union and China. This created doubts between Pakistan and China on one side, and, Pakistan, and America on the other side. However, relations with Soviet Union improved considerably. President Ayub Khan wanted to neutralize Soviet Union’s support for India on Kashmir and to get some weapons from Soviet Union but he did not succeed. China gave tremendous economic aid to Pakistan in this period but it was no substitute for America. Friendship with China continued but obviously, because of Pakistan’s attempts to maintain a balance of cordiality with the three major powers—the US, USSR and China—the warmth and closeness displayed during the days of Bhutto (as Foreign Minister) turned into a slight decline.<sup>608</sup>

President Yahya Khan followed Ayub Khan’s foreign policy. He advocated cordial relations with all the great powers. In his address to the General Assembly on 22 October 1970, Yahya said that friendly relations with China were the corner stone of Pakistan’s policy, and pleaded the USA, USSR and China to harmonize their relations for the sake of World peace.<sup>609</sup>

## Conclusion

In this phase of relations, Pakistan tries to diversify its relations. After the War-1965, China tries to stop Pakistan from participating in Tashkent peace process. Despite Chinese pressures, Pakistan participates in Tashkent and President Ayub Khan extends a warm hand to Soviet Union. Ayub wants to neutralize Soviet support for India. However, relations with China also improves. Next President, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan also follows

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<sup>607</sup>Homayoun, “Pakistan-China Relation Up to 1970” p.36-37.

<sup>608</sup> Khalid B. Sayeed, *Preliminary Analysis of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: In Terms of Objectives, Costs and Returns*, Political System in Pakistan, Edited By Verinder Grover, p.134.

<sup>609</sup>Burke, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, p.362.

the policy of bilateralism. However, when Pakistan mediates between China and the United States; it became unforgivable turpitude of Pakistan for the Soviet Union. President Yahya rejects the participation in Soviets' Asian Security programme and Soviet Union enters into the Treaty of Friendship with India, which results an active Soviet support to India during War- 1971.



## CHAPTER- 5

### PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS DURING THE REGIME OF ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO AND THE EARLY YEARS OF GENERAL MUHAMMAD ZIA UL HAQ, PHASE- V (1971-1979)

#### 5.1- Internal Disturbances in Pakistan

President General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan's complete tenure is replete with disturbances. These disturbances had a long history. Soon after independence, Jinnah had to visit East Pakistan to placate the emotions about the language issue. The students protested during his speech. In 1950, East Pakistan Muslim League asked for maximum autonomy. In 1954 elections Muslim League was defeated and the new emerging party, United Front, asked for complete autonomy according to the Pakistan Resolution.<sup>610</sup> East Pakistan remained isolated in 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and in March 1966 Awami League Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman presented his six points. India's intelligence Agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) intensified subversion in East Pakistan. In election of December 1970, Awami League swept the polls by winning 167 out of 169 seats allocated for East Pakistan.<sup>611</sup> President Yahya Khan convened the session of the National Assembly on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1971<sup>612</sup>, but leader of the second largest party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, boycotted the session. Session of the National Assembly was postponed and military action was initiated on 25 March 1971, when Yahya Khan ordered the Pakistan Army to do their duty and fully restore the authority of the government.<sup>613</sup> By October-November 1971, due to Indian interference in East Pakistan and their support for Mukti Bahni and separatist elements, situation was getting out of control. Conditions in Islamabad were confused and

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<sup>610</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 125.

<sup>611</sup> Kemenade, *The Fragile Pakistani State*, p. 9.

<sup>612</sup> Ibid, p.127.

<sup>613</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 397.

chaotic. The Army was said to be operating largely on its own. By October 1971, Yahya Khan informed Washington that he was willing to grant full autonomy to East Pakistan. A month later he was even agreeable to a unilateral withdrawal of soldiers from East Pakistan. But Indira Gandhi had got an opportunity and she wanted to go for a 'Kill'.<sup>614</sup> Pakistan was also feeling isolated in the World. On diplomatic front India feared Chinese reaction, in case of her attack on East Pakistan. Therefore, Indian Commanders insisted on waiting till November when weather in the Himalayas would make Chinese intervention more difficult. Sino-US rapprochement through Pakistan, changed the strategic position of the region altogether. In July 1971, it was announced that Henry Kissinger had made visit to China and as a result of that visit President Nixon would undertake visit to China. It was a total upset for the Soviets and Indians. Soviets felt that détente in Sino-US relations means encirclement of Soviet Union and Indians felt that a new US-China-Pakistan axis was in the making and felt depressingly isolated.<sup>615</sup> American rapprochement towards China and Pakistan's involvement in the process united both India and Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was the only power in the World, strong enough, to furnish India with the necessary reassurance. Mrs. Gandhi lost no time in accepting the Russian hands for the treaty of friendship. Russians had always been pressing (since 1969) for the Treaty of Friendship. Now within a month of American announcement of President Nixon's visit to China, the Indians and Soviets signed Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.<sup>616</sup> Signing of this agreement was the immediate result of Kissinger's visit to China.<sup>617</sup> The purpose of this agreement was not direct attack over Pakistan but to pressurize Pakistan to take immediate steps for the solution of the East Pakistan problem and to modify Pakistan's policies towards China and America. This view finds support from the authoritative Soviet Journal, New

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<sup>614</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 130.

<sup>615</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 402.

<sup>616</sup> Ibid, p. 403.

<sup>617</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p. 177.

Times, which soon after the treaty was signed, offered a similar treaty with Pakistan, pledging Soviet support for the territorial integrity of Pakistan if only it would leave SEATO and CENTO.<sup>618</sup> It means that Indo-Soviet Treaty was the first step towards the establishment of a system of Collective Security in Asia.<sup>619</sup> Pakistan government, after this treaty, either paralyzed or got confused. Whatever was the case but they did nothing to take Pakistan out of this mess. Pakistan's confused attitude further encouraged India. In mid-September her Defence Minister said that the refugees could return to their homeland only when it became an independent country. It was not conceivable that Pakistan will grant independence to Bangladesh but we will have to work towards a situation in which Pakistan will be left with no alternative.<sup>620</sup> On 21 November, Indian forces crossed the border and fought side by side with the Mukti Bahani against Pak Army. From 21 November to 25 November several Indian divisions were practically fighting in East Pakistan. War started on Western front also on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 1971. Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered on 16 December 1971 and War came to an end. There might be a barrage of causes for the division of the country but it ultimately bifurcated due to military defeat. While giving interview to German Television on 2 April 1972, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said:

Well, there are, I suppose, many causes over the past 25 years. I think basically the economic exploitation of East Pakistan was the primary factor and, I think that lack of political participation and institutions was the second factor. If we had evolved a constitution in the earlier years, when there was all the enthusiasm to work together, that would have brought about the participation, strengthened political parties in both wings of the country, strengthened the services; and with that, of course, as I said earlier, the first and the most important factor was the economic system. There was exploitation. My party repeatedly warned the successive governments about the internal colonial structure of the economy, and we advocated social and economic reforms giving the East Pakistanis much greater participation, but I think there are other factors also. Taking everything into account, these are the two most important factors in my opinion.<sup>621</sup>

Bhutto became President of Pakistan on 20 December 1971, when the country was already dismembered. He gave new hope to the defeated nation. He was a beacon of light in those dark days. He picked up the pieces and knitted a new foreign policy. He diversified

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<sup>618</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p. 178.

<sup>619</sup> Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*, p. 209.

<sup>620</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p. 179.

<sup>621</sup> Lashari, *Bhutto's Vision of Pakistan, 2006*, p. 30.

Pakistan's relations and started very close relationship with China, as he was the architect of relations with the Chinese.

Bhutto embarked on a policy that was to lessen Pakistan's dependence on the United States, bringing it out from under the cover of a pro-West military alliance. Bhutto struck out in several directions. Diplomatically he moved to energize Pakistan's Islamic identity, creating new and strong ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Islamic states. Pakistan became a key member of the OIC (the Organization of the Islamic Conference) founded in 1969, and has repeatedly sought OIC support in its relations with India. Bhutto also stressed Pakistan's non-aligned and 'developing' credentials, calling his new policy 'bilateralism', which implied neutrality in the Cold War. Bhutto withdrew Pakistan from SEATO, and military links with the West declined. CENTO was disbanded following the fall of the Shah of Iran in March 1979, and Pakistan subsequently became a member of the Nonaligned Movement.<sup>622</sup>

## **5.2- Pakistan- United States' Relations**

Relations between USA and Pakistan had considerably been deteriorated in post 1965 war era. Due to Vietnam War American interest in South Asia was also minimized. However, relations improved with the accession of Nixon's Presidency in 1969. He was an advocate of close relations with Pakistan in 1950s. In October 1970, Nixon told Bhutto that despite difficulties due to Congressional opposition, he would stand by his friends. He decided to make a one-time exception to the Congressional embargo on military sale to Pakistan.<sup>623</sup>

Nineteen sixty nine is considered to be much better in Pakistan's foreign relations. Pakistan was able to maintain smooth relations with all the three powers at the same time. Pakistan's relations with China had always been smooth and friendly. Republican Party had come to power in November 1968 elections in United States. Richard Nixon was the new President. The US President told his Pakistani counterpart that 'nobody has occupied the White House who is friendlier to Pakistan than me'. Moreover, US President and the administration were friendly towards China and the hatred towards China vanished all of a sudden. In fact, the US President had been advocating China's place in World forums. He said that it was in the interest of the peace that China should play pivotal role in World politics. The Soviet Union had also been trying, ever since Alexi Kosygin visited Rawalpindi, to improve relations with

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<sup>622</sup> Stephen P. Cohen's article, *Pakistan and the Cold War*, published by Chandra Chari's book *Superpower Rivalry and Conflict The long shadow of the Cold War on the twenty-first century*, p.78.

<sup>623</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, p.122.

Pakistan. But this unique advantage was neutralized by the domestic developments in Pakistan and the lack of imagination showed by those at the helm of affairs in handling them.<sup>624</sup> The gigantic step forward in Pakistan-China relations came in 1970, when Pakistan helped to establish contacts between China and US and to facilitate the historic secret visit to China of US National security adviser Henry Kissinger.<sup>625</sup> As soon as Nixon came to the White House, he started working on normalization of relations with China.<sup>626</sup> Americans tried to indirectly contact Chinese. In January 1970, the US offered to send representative to China to consider idea to reduce tension. Kissinger, well known for his secret diplomacy, used personal friends for confidential contacts with the Chinese Embassy in Paris. In October 1970, President Nixon asked President Yahya Khan to convey Chinese message of friendship. Pakistan was helpful in arranging Kissinger's secret trip for talks in Beijing, 9-11 July 1971.<sup>627</sup> It was announced in July 1971 from America that President Nixon's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger had visited China through Pakistan. Kissinger had used his contacts in Pakistan and Pakistani soil and had a secret visit to China. Furthermore, it was announced that as a result of that visit the American President would now visit China in 1972. It was a huge setback to the Soviet policy makers and was considered as one of the biggest explosions of the time.<sup>628</sup> Pakistan's role of intermediary in Sino-American relations infuriated USSR. USSR decided to punish Pakistan for meddling in the triangular power politics. Russians signed Treaty of Friendship with India. The Soviet Union was ready to back an Indian move to partition Pakistan and establish East Pakistan as an independent state, while the US saw China as a potential partner in containing the

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<sup>624</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p.162.

<sup>625</sup> Mohan Guruswamy, "Pakistan-China Relations Higher than the Mountains", *Deeper than the Oceans*, Claws Journal summer 2010, p.95.

<sup>626</sup> Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p.684.

<sup>627</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, p.122.

<sup>628</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p.176.

USSR and was willing to cooperate with China in punishing India for its move against Pakistan.<sup>629</sup>

During the War, the United States efforts were directed towards preventing a war between India and Pakistan, and after war had broken out, towards bringing about a ceasefire.<sup>630</sup>

When the War broke out in Western sector, America called upon immediate session of UN Security Council but a resolution calling for ceasefire was vetoed by Soviet Union. On 12 December 1971, another American move in the Security Council was vetoed by Soviet Union. In the Nixon-Chou joint communiqué the two sides stated their positions on South Asia separately but both called upon the belligerent countries to withdraw their forces to the earlier positions, which they were holding before the start of the hostilities, meaning that both sides must withdraw to their respective Kashmir line of control. China moved further one step by enunciated that the right of self-determination must be extended to the people of Kashmir.<sup>631</sup> Pakistan's policy towards US was structured on its security needs. Bhutto, although chanting for the Third World but still wanted close and intimate relationship with USA. Although Pakistan had left SEATO but still it was the member of CENTO. Bhutto rationalized: "I don't wish to leave myself naked. In the light of Indo-Soviet Treaty and how it was used to dismember Pakistan, it would be madness for me to abandon old commitments. I am merely opposed to entering into new ones."<sup>632</sup>

Bhutto, like all other Pakistani leaders was not ready to accept Indian hegemony and to cultivate very close relations with US. He wanted smaller army with great technology.<sup>633</sup> This dream, he thought, could not be materialized without American armament. He said that the people of Pakistan will never forgive him if he left CENTO knowing the disparity in Indian armaments and the Indian war machine and the Pakistani war machine.

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<sup>629</sup> Graver, *India's Foreign Policy, Retrospect and Prospect*, p. 94.

<sup>630</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 405.

<sup>631</sup> Ibid, p.406.

<sup>632</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-81*, p.157.

<sup>633</sup> Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan*, p.124.

Pakistan was persistent in removing American arms embargo. The embargo was partially lifted in March 1972 but only for non-lethal weapons and spares. Bhutto visited the United States to persuade the Americans to increase the quantity of arms sale. Bhutto's relations with the United States were superb but after American approach towards China, the strategic importance of Pakistan was eclipsed. The urgency of having Pakistan as a base against Soviet Union and China was modified by Americans. Pakistan had already decided by 1962 that it would not be used by the US against PRC and later the lease of the base in Badaber, under American use, was allowed to lapse. Secondly, Pakistan's importance to the Gulf region was reduced with the emergence of Iran. Thus America was reluctant in providing arms to Pakistan. It was at this point, that India detonated nuclear bomb. Bhutto, for public consumptions, stated that we will eat grass but would make a bomb<sup>634</sup> but actually he realized that getting nuclear bomb was a long term project and he wanted to fulfill Pakistan's immediate needs. While visiting United States in 1975, he wanted to use nuclear weapons as lever. The Prime Minister further stated that it depends upon America to provide weapons to Pakistan, as the country now had to face nuclear India. He stated that America must enhance the conventional capability of the country. In that case, he further enunciated, Pakistan would be ready to place its nuclear reactors under the control of international inspection and would not produce nuclear weapons. In February 1975, Americans lifted the arms embargo but Bhutto was not happy. He stated:-

The United States lifted the embargo, but the embargo has been lifted for both India and Pakistan.... And further, the embargo has been lifted for sale of arms to Pakistan. The treaties provide for gratis assistance of military aid to Pakistan. But here it is not gratis, it is a question of sale of arms to Pakistan on a case-by-case basis.<sup>635</sup>

Bhutto had lot of reservation about United States. The US did not come to Pakistan once it was faced with dismemberment. US only wanted to stop Pakistan from getting nuclearized.

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<sup>634</sup> K. Arif (ed), *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, Ltd, 1984), p.376.

<sup>635</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-81*, p. 161.

It was not interested in providing modern weapons.<sup>636</sup> The US started to begin distrust Bhutto as he became less malleable to their will.<sup>637</sup> Benazir Bhutto revealed:-

The United States or rather the bureaucrats of the States Department began asking: Is Pakistan getting too big for her boots? Is it not time to cut Pakistan down to size? The State Department officials called Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington for a briefing. They informed him that Pakistan's militant support to Third World countries was beginning to cause concern to the United States.<sup>638</sup>

Relations between Pakistan and US deteriorated over the nuclear issues. Henry Kissinger hurled threats at Pakistan. Bhutto retorted: "With the United States' diminishing role in Asia, Pakistan, relative to its past, has more friends. American aid is not coming to a country like Pakistan which is entitled to military assistance. If Kissinger can take a hard line, so can I."<sup>639</sup>

A bad patch in US-Pakistan relations again came in 1976, when American administration under President Ford put tremendous pressure on Pakistan to relinquish from the nuclear deal it had signed with France. Pakistan refused and the relationship started fraying. The downward trend in the relationship had actually started with Pakistan's efforts to procure nuclear weapons much earlier. US tried to blackmail Pakistan by exerting pressure that if it will not suspend negotiations with France, US will stop all economic and military aid. US enunciated that they would stop the supply of A-7 bombers to Pakistan. As a result of Pakistan's pursuance of nuclear technology, President Carter, in 1979, blocked all US aid to Pakistan. US also put tremendous pressure on France and compelled it to break the nuclear deal with Pakistan, which happened in 1976.<sup>640</sup>

Bhutto was over thrown on 5 July 1977. America did not oppose the imposition of Martial Law. A number of events had taken place in couple of years which brought both Pakistan and US closer to each other. Bhutto, who pursued the nuclear path, had been removed.

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<sup>636</sup> *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXVII, No.3, 1974, p. 162.

<sup>637</sup> Pran Chopra, *Pakistan and Asian Peace* (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1985), p.134.

<sup>638</sup> Benazir Bhutto, *Foreign Policy in Perspective* (Lahore: Classic, 1978), p.79.

<sup>639</sup> *Foreign Affairs*, Vol III, No 2, November 1976, p.7.

<sup>640</sup> Lubna Sunawar, Tatiana Coutto, "U.S. Pakistan Relations during the Cold War", *The Journal of International Relations, Peace and Development Studies*, Arcadia University and the American Graduate School in Paris, p.7.



Iranian Emperor Raza Shah Pehlvi's West-oriented government was overthrown. The subsequent anti-US posture of the post-revolution Iran changed the US perceptions about the Persian Gulf. Similarly, the establishment of pro-Soviet puppet government in Afghanistan and Soviet expansionist designs towards warm waters of the Indian Ocean and some other minor factors brought Pakistan's geopolitical and geo-strategic importance to the fore.<sup>641</sup> All those events destabilized the region and the American attention was diverted from Pakistan's nuclear activities to other important issues.

### **5.3- Pakistan's Role in Normalization of Sino-United States' Relations**

In Sino-Pakistan relations a big jump towards further cementing of the relations occurred when Pakistan decided to facilitate contacts between China and United States in 1970. The historic trip of Henry Kissinger was facilitated by President Yahya Khan's government in Pakistan. Islamabad was very active in the backchannel diplomacy as it had the confidence of both America and China. Nixon had a historic 'tilt' towards Pakistan and China was a trust worthy friend. As in late 1960s America was badly beaten and defeated in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon was looking for some upset. Sino-Soviet split had already been occurred. US wanted to get benefit out of that split. To alleviate America's flailing position in South East Asia and give a setback to USSR, America wanted to befriend China.<sup>642</sup> Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, were captivated with Pakistan's President Yahya Khan and believed that "Pakistan was our only channel to China."<sup>643</sup>

The relations between China and US had never been cordial. Since the establishment of Communist Revolution in China, USA had not recognized the new regime in mainland China. Successive American governments in US had been considering China as an enemy country. Nixon wanted to isolate Soviet Union by cultivating close relations with China. In

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<sup>641</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.6.

<sup>642</sup> Bruce Riedel, Pavneet Singh, *U.S.-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan*, p.3.

<sup>643</sup> Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson: Joseph, 1979. p.704.

Americans' views Pakistan was the only and most reliable country, who could bring China close to America. Paradoxically, Islamabad had developed pleasant relations with Beijing which were not acceptable to Washington. The relationship had not only been criticized by United States but they put up massive pressure on Pakistan to curtail the saga of relations. Ex-Presidents, Kennedy and Johnson considered this relationship as Pakistan's biggest and unforgivable sin and now the same United States was looking Pakistan for favours. Now this relationship had become Pakistan's cardinal virtue. Nixon was looking for ways to communicate with the Chinese<sup>644</sup> and his eyes fell upon Pakistan. During President Nixon's visit to Pakistan, in summer 1969, he sought President Yahya's help in bringing China and US closer. In October 1970, when President Muhammad Yahya Khan visited USA, Nixon again sought his help in establishing relations with China. Nixon said that he wanted to send ambassadors.<sup>645</sup> With this a secret diplomacy, Ping Pong diplomacy, started between US, Pakistan and China.<sup>646</sup> Very few top-class individuals were involved in this channel diplomacy. This diplomacy ended up in Secretary State Henry Kissinger's visit to China in July 1971.

In February 1971, President Yahya sent message to the White House that Chinese had responded positively to President Nixon's overture. In June 1971, Pakistan conveyed Chou's proposal that Kissinger travel to China. It was agreed that Kissinger would stop in Pakistan during an Asia trip and travel to Beijing in a PIA Jetliner while supposedly resting in the mountains after the feigned attack of dysentery. Pakistan conveyed to US that full arrangements will be made during Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Beijing.<sup>647</sup> In July 1971, While Pakistan itself was burning in the Indian instigated fire in East Pakistan,

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<sup>644</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p.182.

<sup>645</sup> *Declassified Documents, Memorandum of Conversation, The White House Meeting between President and the Pakistani President Yahya.*

<sup>646</sup> Willem Van Kemenade, *The Fragile Pakistani State, An Ally of the United States and China*, p.11.

<sup>647</sup> US Declassified Documents, Pakistan's Ambassador to US' handwritten note to US.

Kissinger visited China through Pakistan. Kissinger's visit to China was a success for USA but it infuriated the Russians. Russians threatened Pakistan for fishing in troubled waters. Actually both China and America had changed their policies about each other. Criticism in US about China and its policies had tremendously been reduced. United States benefitted from the Sino-Soviet rift and border dispute. Both the countries wanted to initiate a process of reconciliation. However, it was difficult for both to take the first step and melt the ice. It was Pakistan who helped both the countries in bridging their differences. Pakistan was among very a few countries who had close relations with both China and USA. Although Pakistan had been criticized in the past for holding relations with China but now Pakistan had become an indispensable country. Pakistan approached China because it was an ally of US. Pakistan realized that in case both China and US will come close to each other than Pakistan will have no problems in maintaining relations with them at same time. Pakistan did not realize the negative repercussions of bridging this difference. This entente cordiale brought both its opponents, India and Soviet Union close to each other. In August 1971, soon after Sino-US entente, a 'Treaty of Security and Friendship' was signed between India and Soviet Union.<sup>648</sup> This treaty completely paralyzed Pakistani leadership. On 21 February 1972, President Nixon visited China along with thirteen American officials. This was one week visit, which changed the World.<sup>649</sup> Six years later another American President Jimmy Carter completed the formal process of normalization of relations. In December 1971, both the countries decided to establish diplomatic relations. The thaw between China and US had several impacts on Pakistan. Kissinger's visit was followed by President Nixon's visit. China was relaxed about American encirclement. Although India and Soviet Union signed friendship treaty but China's fear were subsided now as another great power was on its side

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<sup>648</sup> Rizwan Naseer, Musarat Amin, *Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Natural Alliance Against Common Threats*, Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 1, No. 2, Feb 2011, p.7.

<sup>649</sup> Solomon, *The China Factor in America's Foreign Relations*, p.1.

but Pakistan's fear about joint Indo-Soviet alliance had increased. China also found friend in shape of US. Once relations with US were normalized, it was followed by other countries. Now China was not to see the World through only Pakistani lenses. World opened their gates for China now.<sup>650</sup>

#### **5.4- Pakistan- Soviet Union's Relations**

Soviet Union's relations with Pakistan had never been smooth and friendly. Soviet Union had inclined towards India. Pakistan had close relations with China and USSR, on the contrary wanted to encircle China through her satellite states. In late 1960s, Russia was interested in Asian Collective Security System, around China. In late 1960s Russians were lightly inclined towards Pakistan. Ayub Khan visited Moscow in 1967. Kosygin returned the visit in April 1968. In post Tashkent years Pakistan had also been trying to procure weapons from Russia. In 1966, a Pakistani military delegation negotiated with Russia for procurement of weapons but the negotiations remained inconclusive. Pakistan informed the Americans that after the expiry of agreement about the use of Electronic base in Badaber in July 1968, it will not extend the lease for further period. Soviet Union appreciated Pakistan's decision. In 1968, Kosygin announced Soviet assistance for Steel mill.<sup>651</sup> In 1969, Russian offer to Pakistan was not collaborating on this account.<sup>652</sup> Soviet leaders frantically visited Pakistan in 1968-69 and later in June 1970 President Yahya Khan was also invited to Moscow for talks, but keeping in view Pakistan's close relations with China, she was not ready to change her stance over Asian Collective Security System. Soviets continued to pressing Pakistan to join Security System as late as 1977.<sup>653</sup> The aim of Soviet Union's close relations with Pakistan was to create distance between Pakistan and China. Soviet leader

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<sup>650</sup> Willem Von Kemenade, *The Fragile Pakistani State, Ally of the United States and China*, p. 14.

<sup>651</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, p. 119.

<sup>652</sup> Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy*, p. 8

<sup>653</sup> Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times* (Oxford university Press, New York, 1993), p. 297.

Kosygin asked Pakistan to establish relations either with China or with the Soviet Union. He said that it is not possible for a Third World country to have relations with two Superpowers.<sup>654</sup>

Indo-Pakistan 1971 war further deteriorated Soviet-Pakistan relations. But when Bhutto assumed power in December 1971, he realized that now Pakistan should look beyond Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1971. Therefore, he undertook a three-day official visit to the Soviet Union on 15 March 1972. Soviet Union wanted to play a mediatory role in Indo-Pakistan disputes but India officially rejected it.<sup>655</sup> Keeping in view, Pakistan's close alliance with China and USA, Mr. Bhutto's visit was marred with recriminations. Premier Kosygin declared that the separation of East Pakistan vindicated their stand and if in future this is repeated, Russia will take this stand again. Russia had courted India, it did not want alliance or the solution of the Indo-Pakistan disputes. It only wanted to stop Pakistan from coming into complete Chinese influence and convince him to join Asian Security System.

A Pakistani newspaper rightly observed:-

Pakistan cannot allow itself to become embroiled in the politico-military strategy behind an Asian pact which is clearly directed against China. Rightly did President Bhutto observe on his return from Moscow in March last that the Soviet Union's main obsession was containing Peking and it was the target of the Asian pact. Needless to say, Pakistan cannot enter into any arrangement designed to throw a ring round its great friendly neighbour, the People's Republic of China.<sup>656</sup>

When Zia Ul Haq took the reins of power in July 1977, he succeeded to a situation in which Soviet-Pakistan relations had shown only sporadic improvement but the long term, basic contradictions in Soviet-Pakistan relations continued intact. During the period, July 1977 to December 1979, Islamabad's efforts were directed towards maintaining cordial relations with Russia.<sup>657</sup>

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<sup>654</sup> Kux, *United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, p. 181.

<sup>655</sup> *Dawn*, 17 March 1972.

<sup>656</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 8 June 1972.

<sup>657</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-81*, p. 241.

## 5.5- East Pakistan Quandary and People's Republic of China

The crisis of 1971 gave way for further destabilization of the country and ultimately resulted into dismemberment of Pakistan. As a result of Indo-Pakistan war a new country Bangladesh had emerged in December 1971. This was one of the most important events in the history of Pakistan. The war was not only fought in the battlefield but inside UN also where the three big powers, USA, Soviet Union and China brawled with each other. Though China could not succeed to stop the dismemberment of Pakistan but it played very positive role during the crisis.

China considered East Pakistan internal crisis as Pakistan's internal affairs. China was opposed to India's use of force and aggression. Chinese were aware of Indo-Soviet machinations. Guerrilla activities with active Indian support had started just after the Pakistan Army action in March 1971. The guerrillas who were trained, armed and aided by India stepped up their subversive activities.<sup>658</sup> With the military action in East Pakistan, American aid to Pakistan was stopped, Russians increased their arms supply to Pakistan, Britain was supporting India, in those circumstances China was the only glimmer of hope for Pakistan. China's support to Pakistan was not only confined to verbal criticism but it practically demonstrated it. China moved a resolution condemning Indian aggression and asking for the withdrawal of forces from each other territories. The move was vetoed by USSR.<sup>659</sup> During the last days of war in East Pakistan, when it seemed certain that Pakistan Army could not hold on for long because of the Indian blockade and Pakistan's lack of air protection, It was reported that Chinese naval ships entered in Bay of Bengal to rescue Pakistani soldiers.<sup>660</sup>

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<sup>658</sup> *Dawn* Karachi, 12 December 1971.

<sup>659</sup> "The East Pakistan's Crisis", *Pakistan Horizon Special Issue*, Vol XXIV, Number 2, 1971, P. 150.

<sup>660</sup> Mahmood Ali Shah, *Pak-China Relations 1960-77*, p. 126.

China gave strong verbal support to Pakistan throughout the period of tension but did not give India any ultimatum comparable to the one she had delivered during 1965 War. However, India kept a close watch on China's moves and levels of support for Pakistan.<sup>661</sup> China feared Russian preemptive strikes against her nascent nuclear facilities.<sup>662</sup> Some Historians are of the view that Chinese do not like the concept of defensive alliances. They only helped Pakistan by providing maximum arms. Michael Beckley says that Chinese are against physical interference in any other sovereign country. Pakistan had always been supported, morally, economically and militarily by China in all its contests and wars against India but still the Chinese were weary of physical interference in wars. In both the wars, 1965 and 1971, Chinese kept on threatening India and supporting Pakistan but they never guaranteed its security. Economic and military aid was funneled to Pakistan, Indian aggression was rejected and Pakistan was supported in United Nations Security Council and all the World Forums but explicitly rejected Pakistani requests for direct military assistance. In 1971, China saw Pakistan being dismembered but did not take any physical action.<sup>663</sup> Pakistani President (Later Prime Minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, rejected such types of ideas. While giving interview to BBC correspondent, Jan Macintyre, in February 18, 1972, Bhutto said:-

I would say that within the limitations, China did what she could. Some people think China could have done more, but I think that you have to take a number of factors into account in assessing Chinese role in the last conflict, and a series of successive blunders were committed by the Yahya regime. Events moved so fast that other countries did not have time to fully assess them. You have to take all these factors into account, and as I said, let us not look to the past events we have to look to the future. But, whatever has been China's participation, we have not lost confidence in China's friendship or in China's words.<sup>664</sup>

However, it can be said that Chinese cooperated with Pakistan and provided economic and military aid. And in United Nations, China had become a floor leader in giving moral and political support to Pakistan. Indian hegemony in and outside the United Nations was

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<sup>661</sup> Graver, *India's Foreign Policy, Retrospect and Prospect*, p. 93.

<sup>662</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.404.

<sup>663</sup> Beckley, *China and Pakistan, Fair-Weather Friends*, p. 11

<sup>664</sup> Lashari, *Bhutto's Vision of Pakistan*, p. 13.

condemned by China, Bangladesh was not recognized as an independent and sovereign state by China and its entry was blocked to the United Nations even after it was recognized by Pakistan. China for the first time used its veto power in the UN Security Council to protect Pakistan's national interests in South Asia. On the other hand, during all this period both India and Soviet Union had been striving their best to make the recognition of Bangladesh by the world community. China declared establishment of Bangladesh as Indo-Soviet machination and kept aloof from it. When Pakistan recognized Bangladesh then China also took a step for recognition and improved relations with Bangladesh.<sup>665</sup>

As compared to China, Pakistan had also old association with the United States but despite US President's so called 'tilt' and Nixon's outbursts and hatred towards Indira Gandhi, nothing came out of its' commitments. In Article 1 of the April 1959 Pakistan-US Cooperation Act, US pledged that it 'regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace the preservation of independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan'. It further stated that 'in case of aggression against Pakistan... the United States of America... will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon...in order to assist Pakistan in its requests. And in Article II, the US pledged 'to assist Pakistan in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of economic development'. USA failed to honour its agreements and SEATO members did not consider 1965 War or 1971 Indian military intervention in East Pakistan to come under the purview of the treaty.<sup>666</sup>

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<sup>665</sup> Rizwan Naseer, Musarat Amin, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Natural Alliance Against Common Threats", *Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Feb 2011, p. 8.

<sup>666</sup> Qadar Bakhsh Baloch, "Engagement and Estrangement In US—Pak Relations", *The Dialogue*, Vol. I, Number 4, P. 35.



## 5.6- East Pakistan Debacle and Pakistan- China Relations

As the year 1971 opened, Pakistan was faced with its problem in East Pakistan. Apart from China's role in that conflict, there were three events that occurred in 1971, all of which had relevance to Pakistan's security. The first was the seating of the PRC's delegation in the UN, the second, the opening of the Karakorum Highway, and the third, Kissinger's trip to China.<sup>667</sup>

Chinese were still out of the United Nations but Pakistan had been trying to get UN permanent seat. Commonwealth conference was held in Singapore in January 1971. Pakistan pointed out that China had no expansionist designs and should be given its rightful place in the UN.<sup>668</sup> Pakistan was the co-sponsor of the Albanian resolution which declared that there was only one China, and that the PRC was the sole lawful representative of China.<sup>669</sup> On 26 October 1971, the PRC was recognized in the UN as the sole representative of the Chinese people. Dawn pointed out that even the American Ambassador to the UN, George Bush congratulated the Pakistani delegation on the clean, hard fight, Pakistan had waged on the behalf of the PRC.<sup>670</sup> Chinese entry into the UN was a great success not only for China but for Pakistan also. Pakistan felt that now they have an ally in the UN as India has a dependable friend in shape of Soviet Union. Another major development was the opening of the Karakorum highway on 16 February 1971. To provide a road link, the two countries decided, in 1969, to build a road across the Karakorum. China played a major part in the construction of the spectacular Karakorum Highway linking Gilgit in the Northern areas with Kasghar in Xinjiang over the second highest mountain range in the World and through the 15800-foot high Khunjerab pass.<sup>671</sup> This route was to replace the old 456-mile

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<sup>667</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-81*, p. 192.

<sup>668</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 16 January 1971.

<sup>669</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 4 August 1971.

<sup>670</sup> *Dawn*, 28 October 1971.

<sup>671</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, p. 119.

Silk Route that had linked Chinese Kashgar with Gilgit. The all-weather two-lane road was built with Chinese help, and started from the Khunjerab pass on the Sino-Pakistan border over some of the most dangerous mountain terrain in the World.<sup>672</sup> Pakistan expected that trade relations between the two countries would be enhanced and Karachi would be transformed into hub of Chinese goods. However, the military implications of the road were more than the economic. Soon in 1971 Indo-Pakistan War Chinese military aid was dispatched, on the highway.<sup>673</sup> Pakistan's third important contribution to the Chinese friendship was the visit of Henry Kissinger to Peking and the Chinese invitation to President Nixon to visit China.<sup>674</sup> Chinese also contributed to the friendship. They continued their support to Pakistan and cooperation in the economic and technical fields.

At the end of 1971, Bhutto took over. Although the Chinese may have had reservations regarding Bhutto's failure to convey to Yahya their dissatisfaction regarding the latter's policy in East Pakistan, Peking was prepared to overlook the lapse.<sup>675</sup> Since 1960s it was Bhutto who advocated a pro-China policy and he was the architect of the Sino-Pakistan amity. The Chinese Premier Chou En Lai wasted no time in congratulating Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on his becoming President and in assuring his support for new Pakistan.<sup>676</sup> With the arrival of Bhutto as the President of Pakistan, Chinese were happy that a time tested friend had assumed the responsibilities of the state. Chinese had their apprehensions about General Yahya Khan. Chinese were discontented with him over the East Pakistan issue.<sup>677</sup> Chinese opposed the Soviet Asian Collective Security System tooth and nail. Chinese wanted a strong Pakistan to stand against joint Indo-Soviet machination. Chinese vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-Hua stated that: "Mr. Bhutto has had the complete support of the Chinese

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<sup>672</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971- 81*, p. 193.

<sup>673</sup> Ibid.

<sup>674</sup> *Dawn*, Karachi, 5 August 1971.

<sup>675</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971- 81*, p. 194.

<sup>676</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p. 212.

<sup>677</sup> *Dawn*, 21 December 1971.

leadership for years, and is looked on here as the only man who could take Pakistan out of its present dilemma."<sup>678</sup>

In post East Pakistan dilemma, where USA opted an even handed approach between India and Pakistan but China was vehemently inclined towards Pakistan. Pakistan had already conveyed to Americans that their even handed approach was hurting Pakistan more than the Indians. Apart from the moral and diplomatic support, Chinese took strong tangible actions to strengthen Pakistan economically and militarily. China stepped in to help Pakistan rebuild its shattered national capabilities through large scale assistance – including assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons effort.<sup>679</sup> On the contrary, USA refused to lift arms sale embargo till 1975.

President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited China on 31 January 1972. This was a goodwill visit. The President wanted to thank the Chinese friends for their help during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War.<sup>680</sup> The Chinese provided strong moral, economic and military aid to Pakistan. They demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops from East Pakistan and asked India to cease military provocations against Pakistan.<sup>681</sup> At diplomatic level Pakistan faced two tremendous problems, the expatriation of the POWs (Prisoners of War) and the recognition of Bangladesh. For the release of POWs India wanted to coerce Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh. Bhutto did not want to be cowed down. He got the Chinese support and China played its cards well inside and outside UN.<sup>682</sup> China agreed with Pakistan that India had hegemonic designs in Indian Sub-Continent. Chou En Lai explained to Bhutto during his visit that Nehru had outlined India's expansionist designs in his book, *Discovery of India* and Indira Gandhi had taken her first step in the attempt to realize that ambition by her action in East Pakistan. He ridiculed the Indian press demands that India be crowned the Empress

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<sup>678</sup> *Dawn*, 21 December 1971.

<sup>679</sup> Graver, *India's Foreign Policy, Retrospect and Prospect*, p. 94.

<sup>680</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 1 February 1972.

<sup>681</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 1 February 1972.

<sup>682</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-81*, p. 196

of India and said that the fall of Dhaka was not a victory for India but would only sow the seeds of strife in Indian Sub-Continent.<sup>683</sup> China realized that weak Pakistan will succumb to the pressure of both India and Soviet Union. Soviet Union wanted to isolate China and make Asian Collective Security System. That is one of the reasons why China was advocating Pakistani causes so vehemently in the UN. It was on the basis of Chinese support that Bhutto said that if Dhaka tries to enter UN, it will find the doors closed. Bangladesh got UN membership only once Pakistan recognized it. To strengthen Pakistan economically and militarily, Chinese opened their doors. Islamabad's losses in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India were made up by Beijing and although recently its arms supply has taken on a commercial aspect, a large number of the earlier shipments were either gratis or given at throwaway prices.<sup>684</sup> During President Bhutto's visit China announced that they would write off \$110 million, in past loans, defer demand for the repayment of on-going loans for a period of twenty years and make new loans on the same easy terms. In January 1973, Chief of Army Staff General Tikka Khan visited China. As a result of this visit China sent TU-16 bomber aircrafts to Pakistan. It was reported that the Chinese delivered to Pakistan during March-April 1972, a hundred tanks, six hundred patrol boats, one hundred and twenty six MiG aircraft, military vehicles and other defence material.<sup>685</sup>

Upon the Simla agreement between Pakistan and India, the Chinese were not effusive in their reaction but they appreciated Pakistan's needs and upheld its stance.<sup>686</sup> There were reports that the relationship between the two countries cooled down. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, immediately after his return from India where he signed an agreement for the return of the Pakistani prisoners of war, went to Beijing. The

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<sup>683</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 1 February 1972.

<sup>684</sup> Lalit Mansingh, *Indian Foreign Policy, Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Vol II, Foreign Service Institute Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1998, p. 231.

<sup>685</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 5 June 1972

<sup>686</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 11 July 1972.

Chinese Foreign Minister welcomed the agreement and said that, as in the past, China will firmly support Pakistan.<sup>687</sup> Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr Pai Hsiang-Kuo visited Pakistan to negotiate trade agreement. An editorial in Pakistan Times stated that:-

China's friendship and goodwill for Pakistan need no reiteration.....the leader of the visiting trade delegation has once again pledged his country's support for Pakistan in its struggle to safeguard its sovereignty and integrity....it is most welcome. If the Indians drew any secret strength from their own speculation that China's diplomatic support to Pakistan had begun to wane, Mr Pai hsiang-kuo's pronouncement must come as a setback.<sup>688</sup>

Bhutto tried to diversify Pakistan's relationship. Therefore, he visited United States and Soviet Union also. Chinese had their apprehensions but Pakistan did not want to establish its relationship with other countries at the cost of its relations with China. Bhutto asked for Soviet financial support and the construction of steel mill in Karachi but refused to isolate China and involve in any type of anti-China alliance. While addressing a mammoth public gathering in Lahore, he said: "The Soviet Union is our neighbour with which we want friendly ties and good neighbourly relations, but, we could not develop these ties at the cost of friendship with China... We will never be a party to any conspiracy against China."<sup>689</sup> Again on 4 July 1972, Bhutto found it necessary to state that Pakistan's relations could further improve with Soviet Union, with the United States, with India but it did not mean that Pakistan could forget the friend who stood by it in its hour of need and trial.<sup>690</sup> Pakistan, at every moment and gesture of Indo Pakistan relations, wanted to take the Chinese in loop because at international forum Chinese were supporting Pakistan. So once the Simla agreement was signed Aziz Ahmed was again sent to China to explain the latest situation to the Chinese.<sup>691</sup> Pakistan also conveyed to the Chinese that its participation in American defence agreements was not against China. Pakistan left SEATO in 1972; it remained nominal member of CENTO. Pakistan just wanted to get weapons for its security through

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<sup>687</sup> *Dawn*, 1 September 1973.

<sup>688</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 26 June 1972.

<sup>689</sup> *Dawn*, 20 March 1972.

<sup>690</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971- 81*, p. 201.

<sup>691</sup> *Dawn*, 1 September 1973.

CENTO. Pakistan also recognized North Korean and North Vietnam. The relationship between China and United States improved as a result of President Nixon's China visit. Now China had no apprehension about US-Pak relations. America had also abandoned its China containment policy, at least for the time being.

Pakistan, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, soon asserted itself. Soon Pakistan came out of the dark shadows of the 1971 war. Pakistan competed with India in Third World. Bhutto made clear that Pakistan's security needs would best be served by demonstrating its capacity to assert itself in the international arena. It was vital for Pakistan to have the support of the PRC, as it was the only major power Pakistan could count on. PM Bhutto visited China again in May 1974. The joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit<sup>692</sup> was different from the joint communiqué of his 1972 visit.<sup>693</sup> The joint communiqué of 1972 largely dealt with the problems arising out of the 1971 war but the last communiqué dealt with the problems of the Third World. It seemed that Bhutto was uniting the Arab Muslim countries for the Third World causes, against Western domination.<sup>694</sup> In joint communiqué of 1974, Pakistan supported Chinese claims over Taiwan against American wishes and China supported the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their just struggle for the right of self-determination. By the end of 1974, South Asia passed through some important events. In May 1974, India exploded nuclear bomb and brought the South Asia at the verge of destruction and new race. Pakistan faced severe internal problems. Insurgency had started in Balochistan. And lastly India's Irredentism continued, as she amalgamated Sikkim. In 1974, India tested a nuclear device and this provided even greater impetus to Sino-Pakistan relations.<sup>695</sup> Internal disturbances resurrected in Balochistan once again. This time

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<sup>692</sup> *Dawn*, 15 May 1974

<sup>693</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 3 February 1972.

<sup>694</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971- 81*, 202.

<sup>695</sup> Mohan Guruswamy, "Pakistan-China Relations Higher than the Mountains, Deeper than the Oceans", *Claws Journal*, Summer 2010, p. 95.

it was of severe nature, funded by foreign elements and states. Pakistan did not officially accuse Russia but it was felt that they were inciting Kabul to help and train the insurgents. This interference in Balochistan was not acceptable to China and they supported the Bhutto regime. Chinese vice Prime Minister Li Hsien-nien, visited Pakistan in April 1975. Li stated that Pakistan had persistently safeguarded state sovereignty and national independence against foreign interference, subversion and sabotage.<sup>696</sup> Another important incident occurred in September 1974, that a small landlocked tiny Sikkim was occupied. It showed India's hegemonic designs. Both Pakistan and China had same opinion about it. Pakistan protested. Chinese not only condemned Indian action but linked it with Pakistan: "This is another act of outright expansionism committed by the Indian Government after dismembering Pakistan with the backing of Soviet Union."<sup>697</sup>

When India detonated its nuclear bomb, Pakistanis were terrified. Foreign Minister Agha Shahi rushed to China. Chinese committed to protect Pakistan against any Indian use of nuclear weapons.<sup>698</sup> China supported Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon-free South Asia and an Indian ocean as a zone of peace.<sup>699</sup> Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wanted to visit China in May 1976 but the death of Chou En Lai precipitated the things. In his message to the Chinese Vice Premier, Bhutto said that Chou En Lai's unwavering attachment to principles, his clear commitment to Pakistan in its hour of trial and tribulations can never be forgotten by our people. A Pakistan newspaper wrote: "Eight hundred million Chinese are not alone in mourning and honouring this great eminence of our times. The World is the poorer for his going. It would have been a very different place without him. It is not going to be quite the same now that he is not there."<sup>700</sup>

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<sup>696</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 21 April 1975.

<sup>697</sup> *Dawn*, 15 September 1974

<sup>698</sup> *Dawn*, 11 June 1974.

<sup>699</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971- 81*, p.205.

<sup>700</sup> *The Pakistan Times*, Editorial, 10 January 1976.

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went to China to pay last regards to this great leader. Whole Pakistan was in deep sorrow over the death of Chou En Lai. Pakistan genuinely felt that it had lost a reliable friend:- “While Mao, the political philosopher, poet, acted as a spiritual leader, who provided charismatic vision, it was the able and practical diplomat and administrator Chou En Lai who gave practical shape to that vision.”<sup>701</sup>

Bhutto had extensive discussions with the new Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-Feng. The joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit reiterated the self-determination of the Kashmiri people. That was the time of thaw in Sino-Indian relations. After a long time both the countries agreed for exchange of ambassadors. Despite that China sided with Pakistan and supported Pakistan in declaring South Asia nuclear free zone. Chairman Mao-Tse Tung, in spite of his failing health, received Bhutto, who became the last foreign dignitary to have met the great Chinese leader before his death. Bhutto on his part assured that Pakistan would continue to support the Chinese people in their struggle to liberate Taiwan which is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.<sup>702</sup> Soon, leader of the Communist Revolution, Mao Tse Tung died on 9 September 1976. Bhutto hoped that his death will have no negative effect on Sino-Pakistan relations and the relationship will flourish in future as it is based on principles not on personalities.<sup>703</sup> Bhutto was right; the friendship was not based upon personalities but principles and interests of both the countries.

A Pakistani newspaper wrote:-

There are not many men in history who have so fundamentally changed the lives of so many men as Mao Tse Tung. The renewal and transformation China achieved under his leadership constitute a brilliant chapter in the history of our times. In rousing his people to make sacrifices and even to die so that a nation of beggars should become a proud people, standing upright, he made a tremendous impact on the lives of the oppressed peoples the World over.<sup>704</sup>

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<sup>701</sup> *Dawn Special Supplement*, 15 January 1976.

<sup>702</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p. 218.

<sup>703</sup> *Foreign Affairs*, Vol III, No 9, September 1976.

<sup>704</sup> *Dawn*, Editorial, 10 September 1976.



When there was a change of government in Pakistan, in July 1977, China hoped that the friendship will continue. With the fall of Bhutto, the voice of the rights of the Third World melted down. China, after Sino-American détente, was also not interested in pitting the Third World against the industrialized nations. As relations between Pakistan and USA were not smooth, thanks to Pakistan's nuclear programme, Pakistan was further inclined towards China for its economic and defence needs. However, by 1977, Bhutto's relations with Chinese leaders came under some strain as during Antigovernment movement of PNA (Pakistan National Alliance), Bhutto came under Soviet magic. Knowledgeable sources said that he started taking advices from Soviet ambassador, which must have bothered the Chinese considerably.<sup>705</sup> Immediately after that Prime Minister Bhutto was overthrown, the new President General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq declared that: "So far as foreign relations are concerned, I want to make it absolutely clear that I will honour all the agreements, commitments and contracts signed by the outgoing governments."<sup>706</sup>

President General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq embarked upon five day visit to China on 14 December 1977. He informed Chinese of his efforts for normalizing relations with India, Bangladesh and will continue Bhutto's efforts for negotiating with Afghanistan. For increasing the flow of trade, a new agreement was signed between the two countries.<sup>707</sup>

President Zia Ul Haq was received in Great hall of China with great honour. Dawn commented that: "Seen in the perspective of the change in leadership which has taken place in both the countries, it should come as a source of profound satisfaction that the leaders of the two countries have reaffirmed their principled support to each other."<sup>708</sup>

On 16 June 1978, Chinese vice Prime Minister Keng Piao, arrived in Pakistan for a five days visit for the formal opening of the Karakoram Highway. The importance of this work

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<sup>705</sup> *Pakistan, China and America*, p.219.

<sup>706</sup> *Dawn*, 6 July 1977.

<sup>707</sup> *Ibid*, 4 January 1978.

<sup>708</sup> *Ibid*, Editorial, 20 December 1977.

can be estimated from the fact that some four hundred Pakistani and Chinese workmen gave their lives in making this highway functional and in connecting the two countries through road. In September 1978, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited China.

The region was the centre of change in 1979. Political turmoil was everywhere. There was a change of government in India, In Afghanistan Sardar Daud tried to resolve the issues with Pakistan. That was not acceptable to both Soviet Union and India. Iran was not stable and was in the throes of Revolution. Sardar Daud was dismissed and new Afghan government under Noor Muhammad Tarakai was hostile towards Pakistan. To show sympathy with Pakistan, on 20 January 1979, Chinese vice Premier Li Hsien-nien paid a three-day official visit to Pakistan.<sup>709</sup> Dawn in its editorial wrote that: "Major diplomatic moves by the big powers have created an element of uncertainty in many areas of international politics. Seen against this backdrop Mr. Li Xiannian's (Li Hsien nien) visit acquires a new dimension."<sup>710</sup>

In June 1979, Minister for Labour and Manpower Lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chishti visited China. Chinese were impressed by President Zia Ul Haq's deep love for Islam. In July 1979, China sent a delegation of her Islamic Association led by Ilyas Shen Xiaksi. The Pakistani President personally received this delegation and said: "We are exceptionally happy and proud to see an Islamic delegation from China. The visit will further consolidate and promote the friendly ties between Pakistan and China."<sup>711</sup>

Sino-Pakistan relations got prominence when Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan. Iranian Revolution had already destabilized the region, now Soviet invasion further threatened Pakistan's security. During the period January to May 1980 a number of visits had taken place between Pakistan and China. China gave firm support to Pakistan against Russia and India.

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<sup>709</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 22 January 1979.

<sup>710</sup> *Dawn* Editorial, 23 January 1979.

<sup>711</sup> Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, p. 223.

The Sino-US contacts resulted in establishment of diplomatic contacts between the two countries. Sino-US contacts compelled India also to sign a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Those two developments overshadowed all other events. Pakistan was now pushed aside and virtually neglected. No one came to Pakistan's help when it was being dismembered by India with the Soviet help. Bitterness between Pakistan and India started when Pakistan aspired for nuclear technology. American interests again emerged in the region when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979; Pakistan was back on the chessboard of big-power rivalry and became the linchpin in the new American cold war game. Throughout the 1980s, China and India were secondary players in the matters of peace and conflict in the region.<sup>712</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Relationship between the two countries is further cemented. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has already established his credentials. Bhutto makes frequent visits to China. Chinese provides huge economic assistance to Pakistan. When the Indians explodes their nuclear weapons in May 1974, China actively supports Pakistan. When Chou-En-Lai and Mao-Tse-Tung pass away in 1976, Bhutto visits China. This may be taken as the golden period in the history of Sino-Pakistan relations.

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<sup>712</sup> Chintamani Mahapatra, "India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 4, October-December 2011, 415.

## **CHAPTER- 6**

### **SOVIET UNION'S INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, ITS IMPACT ON THE REGION AND PAKISTAN- CHINA RELATIONS (1979 - 1991)**

Both Pakistan and China has proved to the World that their friendship is above board. Their friendship is an example for the rest of the World. Keeping close relations with China has become an integral part of Pakistan's foreign policy. The people of Pakistan strongly support Pakistan's inclination towards China. China, in the country, is considered as a trusted friend of Pakistan. It is considered as indispensable and all-weather friend. Sino-Pakistan friendship is an example and model for other countries. Both the countries have different political systems, which are opposite to each other but still they have ideal relationships.<sup>713</sup> Pakistan and China can rightly been described as countries with two different political systems, China having communism and Pakistan having Islamic inclinations, but both are friendly and one, on most of the political issues. The relationship had evolved over the years. During the 80s relationship was further cemented. It was tested during Afghan conflict again and again. During the 80s, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China and the normalization process of their relationship also started but it was not felt in Pakistan that China's improving relations with India were at the cost of China's relations with Pakistan. Both the countries had the confidence of each other. In 1980s China diversified its relationships with other countries including India. The leaders of both the countries visited each other's countries. The trade relationship between India and China increased as compared to Pakistan and China. China left mentioning Kashmir in its pronouncements. Pakistani policy-makers felt visible change in China's Kashmir policy. However, Pakistani policy-makers believed that change in China's policy towards India and softening of attitude

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<sup>713</sup> Speech by President Hu Jintao at Economic Forum in Islamabad, November 24, 2006, IPRI Paper 13, p.57.

would have positive repercussions on Indo-Pakistan relations. Furthermore, good neighbourly relations between China and India would restrain Indian belligerency towards Pakistan. As China had been supporting Pakistan like a trusted friend at all international fora, Pakistan supported China over all the issues pertaining to Chinese national interests like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet. Pakistan even gave strong support to China over the issues of democracy and human rights like a trusted friend.<sup>714</sup>

The aim of China in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was to concentrate on their internal development and avoid outside confrontation with other countries. They tried their utmost to avoid all sort of disputes and to resolve their issues amicably. Their perceptions and policies in the international spheres continued to stress the need to minimize confrontation, harmonize relationship and to encourage an environment suitable for the economic progress. But international situation in the neighbourhood of China, in Afghanistan dramatically changed. In this period of turmoil Soviet militancy was on its peak, and the Soviet Union wanted to intimidate China and to further isolate it. Isolation and encirclement of China was the prime policy of Soviet Union.<sup>715</sup> Both, Pakistan and China made an alliance against Soviet Union. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was opposed tooth and nail by both Pakistan and China. The relationship was dominated by concern about Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.<sup>716</sup> Both Pakistan and China kept aside some of the important issues and concentrated only on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Both countries tried their best to avoid all sort of disputes and differences with neighbouring countries and to raise the Afghan issue inside United Nations and outside also, because the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan had threatened the security of both the countries. Pakistan was sandwiched between India and Soviet occupied Afghanistan.

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<sup>714</sup> Fazal-ur-Rahman, *Pakistan's Evolving Relations with China, Russia, and Central Asia*, p. 214.

<sup>715</sup> Bhatti, "Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia", p. 25.

<sup>716</sup> *Handbook of Pakistan China Relations*, Dost Publications, p. 44.

When Soviet Union landed its forces in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, Pakistan was politically unstable. Relations with India were not cordial, although General Zia Ul Haq had started foreign policy initiative towards India but soon the Janata government in India was thrashed by Indian National Congress of Indira Gandhi. With the arrival of Indira Gandhi to Premiership, the environment again became gloomy. Pakistan's relations with the United States were also tense. After the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974, Americans had the fear that Pakistan will also get nuclear energy and will use it for making nuclear bombs. It resulted into the deterioration of relations. Due to Pakistan's nuclear programme it was under severe US' sanctions and relations had reached to its nadir. In 1979, not only Pakistan was at the cross roads but whole region was destabilized. Israel and Egypt signed Camp David accord in USA for bringing peace to the region but the reaction was opposite to that. Egypt was made target of scorn and ousted from Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Arab countries cut off diplomatic relations with Egypt and it was expelled from Arab League (AL). Pakistan President General Zia Ul Haq was sympathetic and in favour of restoring Egypt's seat in the OIC but could not reconcile the Arab countries. He had to tread the path very carefully<sup>717</sup>. In Iran also, change was in the offing. Demonstrations had started against the Shah in 1977-78. General Zia was sympathetic towards Shah but at the same time wanted to have balance and keep the contact with the revolutionaries. Zia could not afford enemies on all sides, India was arch enemy, and Afghanistan was against Pakistan since its inception and now Iran in the throes of revolution. India was also in the sight of turmoil. The Morarji Desai's government succumbed to its weaknesses, elections were held and Indira Gandhi again became the Prime Minister. But the biggest test of General Zia was inside the country. The government of President Zia Ul Haq, itself was not stable. He was not an elected leader. He had promised elections to the electorates but the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's case changed the

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<sup>717</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.442.

circumstances in the country. Bhutto was tried on murder case and ultimately hanged on the orders of Supreme Court on 4 April 1979. Zia alone had the powers to spare his life but he did not rescind the death sentence.<sup>718</sup> So once the Russians hit in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, whole region was destabilized, particularly Iran and Pakistan.

### **6.1- Pakistan's Internal Politics and External Threats**

Elections to the National and provincial assemblies were held in 1977. Despite all speculations that the opposition will win, the government had won. It created discontentment in the country. The opposition took to the streets and a long protest against the government had started. Initially, the government did not take any notice of this but later on the protests increased and spread throughout the country. Bhutto government felt the heat and was compelled to negotiate with the opposition. The religious cum political leaders had always been blaming Mr. Bhutto for his autocratic and secular policies. Pakistan's religious parties made alliance with nationalists and an alliance under PNA was formed. After severe opposition movement which had crippled life throughout country, eventually in June 1977 an agreement was signed between government and opposition. It was decided that the agreement would be signed on 5 July 1977. But still the PNA team had all the doubts about the implementation of the agreement. Pakistan military struck in, realizing that the country was going towards destabilization. Bhutto was tried in Supreme Court and was sentenced to death. This decision had all negative implication in country. Protests broke out in Punjab and mostly in Sindh. But Zia Ul Haq continued ruling the country. In 1985, President Zia was elected in one of the controversial referendum in country's history. Non-party based elections were held in country and Muhammad Khan Junejo was nominated and later elected as Prime Minister by the National Assembly. Prime Minister Junejo had earlier committed to lift martial law and later after becoming Prime Minister he had done that. However, as

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<sup>718</sup>Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p.443.

Junejo established his self, he cultivated differences with President Zia. Junejo tried to bypass the President. He interfered in the foreign affairs and especially Afghan issue, which was so dear to President Zia, who had been handling the issue for last 9 years. Junejo sent representative to Geneva and signed the accord despite President Zia's opposition. This angered President Zia, who as a reaction dismissed the Junejo government on 29 May 1988. President Zia promised new elections in October, however, he did not see the elections as he died in a plane crash on 17 August 1988, which was later proved to be highly sophisticated sabotage by unknown perpetrators.

After President Zia Ul Haq's unfortunate plane crash, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was the Senate Chairman, had become President for interim period and Vice Chief of Army Staff as next COAS. It was decided to continue the democratic process and hold elections in November 1988. Elections were held and Opposition leader Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister of Pakistan. She largely continued Ex-President Zia's foreign policies. However, due to corruption charges, she was dismissed in August 1990. Again elections were held and Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif became new Prime Minister of the country.

## **6.2- Pakistan– Afghan Relations and Soviet Invasion**

In the late seventies, the Iranian and the Afghan revolutions, followed by the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, disturbed the strategic balance in South Asia.<sup>719</sup> Afghan rulers were in predicament. On one side the state was fighting against Afghan insurgents and on the other absorbing pressures from Soviet Union. Earlier the direct assumption of power in his own hands by ousting Tarakai in a later coup, Hafiz Ullah Amin, too, seemed willing to negotiate a deal with Pakistan mainly due to the rising tide of the Islamist resistance and the Soviet distrust of him. According to Agha Shahi, Hafizullah had renewed the invitation to Zia-ul-Haq for visit to Kabul to clear the way for a dialogue with him. It was fixed for 22

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<sup>719</sup> Khadim Hussain, *Sino-Indian Relations in the Eighties* (Islamabad: Regional Studies, Vol V, No 4, Autumn 1987, Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad), p.54.



December, but had to be postponed at the very last minute because Kabul airport was snowbound and December 29 was decided as the new date.<sup>720</sup> However, before Pakistan could do anything for Amin, the situation changed altogether when the Soviets ousted him by sending their military forces into Afghanistan.<sup>721</sup> The Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan happened at a time when the Soviets were convinced that they were being encircled from all sides by the Americans. The policy-makers in Moscow strongly believed that America in connivance with China and other Western countries was following the policy of encirclement. The most important decision, as per their thinking, was the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe on 4 December 1979. The Americans had also organized a new force, Rapid Deployment Force, with its thrust against the Southern boundaries of the Soviet Union along the Persian Gulf region.<sup>722</sup> Ironically, the same was the impression in China. They thought that Russians were planning to surround them from South. The instability and strife in Afghanistan and the ambiguity in the region resulted into increase Soviet pressures. After observing and interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan for quite some time, now Soviet Union entered its forces on 27 December 1979. They came on the plea that they had been invited by the Afghan government. The first causality was the Afghan President, Hafiz Ullah Amin himself, who was surrounded in his headquarters and was killed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is considered as one of the most important events in the history of the Cold War. This event not only changed the rules of the game but it changed the structure of the whole international system. The Sovietization of Afghanistan jeopardized the security of Pakistan and China and both the countries got united in a cause and that was the liberation of Afghanistan. Policy-makers in Pakistan were seriously worried about this upsurge of events. There was a realization that the Soviet

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<sup>720</sup> Agha Shahi, *Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 5.

<sup>721</sup> Siddiqui, *Pakistan's Afghan Policy (1979–1992)*, p. 37.

<sup>722</sup> Dev Murarka, "The Russian Intervention: A Moscow Analysis", *The Round Table, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, April 1981, The Eastern Press London, P. 131.

invasion of Afghanistan threatened the very existence of Pakistan. Pakistan felt that the country was surrounded by enemies from all sides. Since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan had been confronted for the first time with the Super Power. A direct military threat from a superpower, that had reached its borders, was first of its kind confronted by Pakistan since its creation in 1947.<sup>723</sup> Pakistan's sense of vulnerability was further increased by the Durand Line issue upon which the previous Afghan Governments had repeatedly raised doubts. In this hour of crisis United States later pumped massive military and economic amount to Pakistan for combating their Cold War adversary<sup>724</sup>. But at the moment, when Pakistan was internally destabilized and externally surrounded by enemies, United States further offended Pakistan by stopping all aid and even threatening of taking further drastic actions against Pakistan.

Soviet action was widely condemned in Europe and throughout Third World. Inside and outside United Nations, Russian act was condemned. This strong reaction totally perplexed the Russians. They had expected very less. They had estimated that some hue and cry would be made, few countries might protest and some may sever diplomatic relations but the wide spread agitation confounded them. It was a miscalculation, proving once again that the Soviet capacity to comprehend American behavior was very limited indeed. It also demonstrated that the Soviet understanding of Third World sensitivity, too, was rather poor. As realists, the Soviets had anticipated that soon the comity of nations would ultimately recognize the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and would live with it. They thought that it was a sort of defensive aggression on their part. The Russians did not consider themselves as aggressors. They said that they had been invited by the Afghan government and the aim was not to conquer it but to stabilize it and protect it from outside aggression, which were

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<sup>723</sup> Siddiqui, *Pakistan's Afghan Policy (1979–1992)*, p. 34.

<sup>724</sup> Rizwan Naseer, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Natural Alliance Against Common Threats", *Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Feb 2011, P. 9.

causing the collapse of Afghan government and state. Therefore, they regretted the reaction of the Third World; they put the blame for it mostly upon Anglo-American propaganda.<sup>725</sup> The Soviet's intervention had tremendous effect on Pakistan also. Millions of Afghan refugees took refuge in Pakistan. The economy of Pakistan was already fragile; the arrival of refugees further aggravated it. The country was surrounded from one side by India, the eternal enemy, and on the other by Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal regime. The already cold relations between Soviet Union and Pakistan deteriorated further. The more Pakistan highlighted the Afghan issue, the more Soviet opposition to Pakistan increased. Pakistan had realized that it was surrounded from both sides by India and Soviet Union. Soviet Union had the feelings of encirclement by Washington-Beijing and Islamabad. Moscow accused Pakistan and China of collaborating with each other and of supporting, training and arming the Afghan Mujahiddins in Afghanistan. Soviet Union blamed Pakistan for playing in American hands and with fire. Radio Moscow in a broadcast on 11 February 1985 alleged that Washington had under a secret accord secured rights to use military, naval and air bases in Pakistan.<sup>726</sup> Moscow also viewed with concern the recently reinforced Pakistan-China ties. Moscow's repeated allegations against Beijing about training the insurgents, helping Pakistan to explode a nuclear device in China to prevent its detection and its adverse comments on the opening of the Khunjab pass in the Karakorum clearly manifested its resentment against the growing Pakistan-China amity. Soviet Union used carrot and stick policy against Pakistan. To induce Pakistan to come to some arrangement about the Afghan issue, it offered economic aid, assistance in the nuclear field and cooperation in hundred projects. At the same time, it missed no chance to show its displeasure. Soviet Union kept on violating Pakistan's air space. Its planes used to bombard Pakistani territory. It also

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<sup>725</sup> Murarka, "The Russian Intervention: A Moscow Analysis", p. 132.

<sup>726</sup> Mehruddin Ali, "Pakistan Foreign Policy: Trends and Challenges of the Eighties", in *Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-98*, p. 258.

arranged the postponement of Niaz A. Naik's visit to Moscow in July 1984 and cancelled the visit of a high level Soviet delegation.

Zia wanted to have the solution of the Afghan issue. Despite opposition of Afghan Mujahidins, he stated his desire that Afghanistan should be a non-aligned, free, democratic, Islamic state, friendly to the Soviet Union. He sent his Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan to Geneva year after year to find some solution to the Afghan quagmire. After six years of indirect talks in Geneva significant development was made. On 14 April 1988, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed agreements which they hoped would produce a final overall settlement. President Zia Ul Haq finally accepted Kabul government because United States wanted to get rid of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

### **6.3- Pak– US Relations and Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan**

The relations between Pakistan and United States had never been stable. There had always been ups and down in their relationships. Both the countries tried to use each other for their interests. Americans wanted to get Pakistan's support against Communists during Cold War and they got it. Pakistan wanted to strengthen its defence against India instead of fighting against Communism. Pakistan, a number of times conveyed to China in 1950s that it felt no threat from the latter. When Americans did not need Pakistan, then they stopped all military and economic aid to Pakistan, accusing Pakistan of being involved in making nuclear bomb. When the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan, then everything on ground changed. The Afghanistan crisis had increased the importance of Pakistan. Pakistan had good relations with China, with Iran also Pakistan was very cordial, despite the Islamic Revolution and the overthrowing of Shah. The US policy makers perceived that Pakistan was strategically important for containing Soviet expansion.<sup>727</sup> The events in Afghanistan and Iran in 1979 compelled both Pakistan and United States to review their spoiled relationship and keep the

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<sup>727</sup> Snehalata Panda, "Indo-US Relations: US Perceptions, Emerging Trends in the Post-Cold War Period", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, Vol XLII No 10, October 1993, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, P. 3.

hot issue of nuclearization on back burner and entered into a new relationship. Ultimately they entered into durable and long lasting relations because it was based on greater commonality of perceptions and interests.<sup>728</sup>

Nineteen seventy nine, saw greater changes happening in the region. Pakistan's relations with the United States eclipsed in this period. It reached its lowest ebb. Iran faced Islamic Revolution in February 1979 and this had destabilized the whole region. There were elections in India and Indira Gandhi had become Prime Minister once again. Before that India brought the region to a nuclear threshold when it exploded nuclear bomb in May 1974. Pakistan had also decided to follow India and not to be lagged behind as it considered it too dangerous for its national security. Pakistan was now on the way to get a nuclear weapon. This thing was neither acceptable to India nor to United States. Pakistan's pursuits for the nuclear bomb deteriorated US-Pakistan relations. As the United States was creating problems for Pakistan to become nuclearized and putting pressure to relinquish the nuclear option, the relationship not only came to halt, rather the United States tried to stop other countries from cooperating with Pakistan in the nuclear field. In this environment Pakistan tried to convince France for the provision of nuclear enrichment plant. French agreed to provide one to Pakistan. After news of the proposed fuel enrichment plant from France became public, any offers of weapons sales from the United States became coupled to it. For Pakistan, it was one national interest weighing against another. In Washington's perceptions, the Pakistanis had no viable option except to come around because a single (or even a few) nuclear devices were hardly an acceptable substitute for conventional power and security.<sup>729</sup> Americans considered Pakistanis too naïve to follow the nuclear Path. Americans thought that for Pakistan best option would be to enhance conventional

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<sup>728</sup>A. Z. Hilali, "US Policy towards Pakistan after September 11, 2001 and its Implications", *IPRI Journal*, Winter 2009, Vol IX, Number 1, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, p.133.

<sup>729</sup>Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*, p.97.

capability. As Pakistan was too small to face the Indian nuclear threat, they told Pakistan that it cannot defend their country by merely having one or two nuclear weapons. But in Pakistan it had become the matter of prestige to get nuclear. Carter administration opposed nuclear option tooth and nail. Pakistan feared that American administration may stop the aid but it was even ready for this option also but not in mood to leave the nuclear option. Pakistan's fears about the stoppage of US aid were not baseless. Pakistan had realized the Americans' apprehensions and seriousness about its' nuclear programme. Americans wanted to stop Pakistan from being nuclearized at any cost. For that matter, in April 1979, the United States stopped all development aid to Pakistan on the pretext that the country was following a nuclear path and was manufacturing a nuclear device and will achieve one very soon.<sup>730</sup> But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed all the rules of the game. United States policy regarding Pakistan's nuclear option was changed overnight.

Pakistan was well aware of the Soviet game in Afghanistan. Pakistan, from time to time, had been expressing concerns over increasing Russian activities in Afghanistan. Pakistan had been conveying the World about the precarious Afghanistan situation and peaceful solution to the political instability in Afghanistan and need of solving the issue politically. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which according to him changed the balance of power in the region. Pakistan government enunciated that the historical role of Afghanistan has been changed from a buffer state to pro-Soviet state. Afghanistan had always remained as a buffer state between Soviet Union and British India. Pakistan had the worst fears of Soviet Union. The country was surrounded by India and Soviet controlled Afghanistan. Afghanistan, India and Soviet Union were collaborating with each other against Pakistan. In such circumstances Pakistan had been clamouring for the American aid. Pakistan challenged the Americans to face the Soviets in

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<sup>730</sup> Mehrunnisa Ali, *Reading in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-98*, p. 231.

Afghanistan because they were fast moving towards Warm waters. The Pakistani advisers and experts asked the Americans that Soviet pressure on Afghanistan was increasing and that was the most appropriate time to stop the Soviet Union. This warning and advice fell on deaf ears in United States and the hypothesis of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became a reality. Soviet tanks and soldiers moved in Afghanistan with full might.<sup>731</sup> Now the United States focused intensely on the Sub-Continent in the aftermath of the December 1979.<sup>732</sup> Carter felt that the Soviets had threatened US vital interests by sending 80000 Soviet troops into Afghanistan. And even if years of Soviet buildup had not been a clear indication of aggressive intentions, deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was clearly unacceptable. Carter viewed Afghanistan as a watershed. Iran was in turmoil. The Saudis were nervous. Options were limited with American Administration. One of the few immediate military moves open to Washington was to revive its military relationship with Pakistan. After a great deal of consultation within the State Department, military, CIA and White House, a plan was unveiled.

Russian intervention and occupation of Afghanistan changed everything not only for Pakistan but for United States and China also. Pakistan, which was located in one of the most strategic locations and was neglected by the United States, once again assumed its old role. The most critical people in American administration had now abandoned their old policies regarding Pakistan's nuclear options. As America needed Pakistan's help so Pakistan's nuclear programme was deliberately avoided in future plan of action. Pakistan had come to the centre of the World strategy. Once the United States revived its relationship with Pakistan, the rest of the Western world followed it. Pakistan's economic and military aid was revived and the most sanctioned ally had now become the frontline state against

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<sup>731</sup> Lubna Sunawar, Tatiana Coutto, "U.S. Pakistan Relations during the Cold War", Volume 1 Issue *The Journal of International Relations, Peace Studies, and Development*, p. 8.

<sup>732</sup> Kheli, *India, Pakistan and the United States*, p. 38.

Soviet aggression in a Third World country. The changed circumstances in South Asia compelled American government to send deputations to Pakistan to ponder over the prevailing situation and stop the Soviet Union from further aggrandizement. President Jimmy Carter sent Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Pakistan to deliberate upon the changed geopolitical scenario. He further offered to Pakistan the revival of military and economic aid.<sup>733</sup> Americans had decided to restore Pakistan's military and economic aid. Dramatic changes had taken place within couple of months. The destabilization of the region, which had started with Iranian revolution in February 1979, reached its zenith in December 1979 when the Soviet forces swept over Afghanistan. All these changes restored Pakistan's geostrategic importance.<sup>734</sup> The source of the trouble was not a South Asian country, as in the past, but instead America's main rival.

President Zia Ul Haq of Pakistan, being a military general was abhorred in United States. He had thrown a democratic government in Pakistan and was not allowing the democracy to return. Even ex-Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged, although through the decision of the Supreme Court but to a larger extent it was claimed that the military dictator had influenced the decision and wanted to remove a political opponent. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan jeopardized the American game plan. The same President Zia, who had become a pariah for the West was hugged and was declared a champion of the free world. Western media changed its mood. President Zia had become a darling of the west all of a sudden. He was thought to be the last bastion and the resistant leader. He was eulogized for his cooperation with the West against Communism. Pakistan had become a conduit for the Western weapons to Afghanistan.<sup>735</sup> The invasion closely followed the fall of the Shah in Iran at the hands of anti-American group and fed Washington's concern that the tide was

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<sup>733</sup> Jehangir Khan, "US-Pakistan Relations: the Geo-Strategic and Geopolitical Factors", *Canadian Social Science*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, p. 68.

<sup>734</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 155.

<sup>735</sup> Ibid, p. 71.



turning against the West in the region. The seizure of the Embassy in Tehran and the public humiliation of Americans held hostage there left a legacy of negative feelings in the United States regarding the region in general coupled with the fear of Islam in new Iranian garb. In November 1979, United States was dismayed at violence against American assets in Pakistan as the embassy was burnt by an unruly mob. Nevertheless, in his last months in office, the Carter Administration came to realize that with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan had replaced Afghanistan as the buffer state in South Asia. The move toward assistance had already been initiated before the end of Carter Administration. To assuage Pakistan's doubts about the seriousness of US intentions, munitions lists began to be prepared. The lists were to be presented to the government of Pakistan in February 1980 in Islamabad, in order to demonstrate US resolve in meeting the Soviet challenge.

American government offered \$400 million of military and economic aid to Pakistan. United States was taken aback as Pakistan was completely quiet over US' decision to supply aid to Pakistan and later it rejected the aid. The US administration was of the view that Pakistan's security was threatened by Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and whatever aid will be offered to Pakistan, it will take it. But President Zia not only rejected the aid but also made fun of it by declaring it as merely 'peanuts'. Pakistan felt that such less amount of economic and military aid would only entangle the country in superpower rivalry and would not be sufficient to bolster its security apparatus. The rejection of the American aid by any Third World country only humiliated the United States. This was considered as one of the most ignominious blunders in post war American diplomatic history.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran in February 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 changed everything in the region. These were the two prime events and key international developments which changed US' policies towards Pakistan. The most irritant Pakistani nuclear programme was pushed aside in front of the looming threat hovering over

the region.<sup>736</sup> The United States could be the only source of help during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but there the Carter administration instead of supporting Pakistan in this ordeal, had imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its' nuclear programme. In 1979, relations with United States had reached their lowest ebb. American embassy in Islamabad was attacked by students of Quaid-i-Azam university Islamabad. They were accusing the Americans for their hand in the seizure of Haram Sharif in Makkah. Two Americans died and President Zia declared it regrettable. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created ripples in United States. On 23 January 1980, the Carter administration, issued Carter doctrine<sup>737</sup>. As per this doctrine Soviet Union was threatened that if they try to exploit the fluid situation of the gulf region, it would be answered by the United States with the use of military force. President Carter enunciated in January 1980 that any Soviet attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be considered as an attack on American interests and such type of attack will be repulsed. The 1959 commitment to Pakistan was thus reconfirmed.<sup>738</sup> Americans had decided to come to Pakistan's help and to make it a frontline state against Soviet Union in Afghanistan and to support Afghan Mujahiddin. President Carter believed that Pakistan could be reconciled with moderate offer of aid but President Zia, a clever tactician, rejected the offer as peanuts. Ronald Reagan was a strong supporter of maintaining close relations with Pakistan. Even when the presidential campaign was in progress, during 1980, Ronald Reagan called for having military bases in Pakistan. Pakistan's President Zia Ul Haq, although wanted to befriend America, opposed the establishment of American military bases in Pakistan because he felt that military bases had not provided any benefit to Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 wars with India.<sup>739</sup> However, the change of government

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<sup>736</sup> Sunawar, "U.S. Pakistan Relations during the Cold War", p. 8

<sup>737</sup> Sara M. Birkenthal, *Grand Strategy in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Carter, Bush, and Obama Doctrines*, p. 26

<sup>738</sup> Leo E. Rose, *United States-Pakistan Relations*, Research papers and policy studies 13 Institute of East Asian Studies University of California Berkeley, p. 5

<sup>739</sup> Sunawar, "U.S. Pakistan Relations during the Cold War", p. 8

in Washington changed US policies towards Pakistan. Reagan government was more comfortable with President Zia and his government. President Reagan started a programme for increasing the military prowess of Pakistan. The Reagan Administration was well aware of Pakistan's economic and military needs. US administration showered favours on Pakistan. The same Pakistan which was scorn in America a year ago was now frontline state. US Under Secretary of State Mr. James Buckley, on 12 November 1981, declared Pakistan 'an essential anchor of the entire Southwest Asia region'. The Reagan Administration increased aid on September 15, 1981, with a \$ 3.2 billion five-year programme divided equally between economic and military assistance. This economic and military aid also included most sophisticated F-16s. Because of Pakistan's geographical closeness to the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, her important role in stopping the Russian aggression and a barrier against further Soviet expansion towards South Asia, Pakistan was recognized as an important regional ally by the Americans.<sup>740</sup> Pakistan and United States enhanced their cooperation about Afghanistan. A new US-Pakistan and China axis was established to deal with the Afghanistan situation and the outcome of Soviet invasion. Pakistan had become one of the largest recipients of US' military aid by 1985. Only Israel, Turkey and Egypt were receiving more aid than Pakistan from America. Once the first six years of defensive agreement were terminated, the American government gave another package, this time more than the previous one. The approval of another package of \$4.02 billion military and economic aid in 1987 made Pakistan as the second largest recipient of American aid after Israel.

Change of government in India in 1979 and Indira Gandhi's refusal to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and further cooperation with the United States compelled the latter to look favourably towards Pakistan. Americans felt that Indira had chosen sides and they

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<sup>740</sup> Jehangir Khan, "US-Pakistan Relations: the Geo-Strategic and Geopolitical Factors", p. 71.

offered President Zia some lethal weapons to give teeth to Pakistan military. In December 1982, President Zia Ul Haq made a successful visit to United States. His credentials in America were not good and he was considered as the hangman of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. President Zia was a shrewd man. He tried to improve his image. Before going to America, President Zia Ul Haq paid official visits to many other countries including Persian Gulf States, Iran, China, Soviet Union and Turkey. Zia wanted to improve his credentials as important world leader. In Soviet Union, he met with Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov. The visits marked him as World class statesman and improved his rating in the eyes of the Americans.<sup>741</sup>

#### **6.4- China Inside**

The impression of the Mao in China was that of an old man who was holding the power for last 27 years. Although he was a great Communist leader who steered the ship of China but at the same time he was made responsible for the economic and social upheaval and political pandemonium which the country had faced as a result of the Cultural Revolution. This revolution, which had been started in 1966 terminated with the death of Mao in 1976. Hua Guofeng became the leader after Mao's demise for a transitional period. However, in post Mao period Deng Xiaoping emerged as a supreme leader of China. Deng Xiaoping was a vital link for the generation that launched Cultural Revolution. During 1950s he was the General Secretary of the Communist Party. By seventies, he had emerged as a credible and great leader, whose acumen and expertise reshaped the policies and direction of China. His policies were solely responsible for the peaceful rise of China among the comity of nations. Deng unleashed a new era of economic reforms. Although Deng had never assumed any formal appointment in China's government but he was the fountainhead. Deng continued to rule actively till the new generation under Jiang Zemin emerged to rule in 1992. By the time

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<sup>741</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 453.

he reached the seventies, the practice of inducting younger leaders every ten years was continued. This change, introduced by Deng Xiaoping himself, reflects recognition that the resort to lifetime primacy, found especially in Communist countries, is not only undemocratic but also stifles innovation and progress. Indeed this change reflects a lesson, learnt from the Mao era, since it was after Mao reached the age of senility that he launched the Cultural Revolution, which the “Gang of Four”, had manipulated for its own ends. Deng had started a new programme of economic development. He opened China to the World. Mao had tried to preserve it, Deng strived to open it. Deng initiated reform and opening movement in 1970s to transform conserved and isolated China to a progressive, vibrant and fast developing China. Mao, however, was against this policy. He had rejected the prevalent rules of international system.

Both Mao and Deng were opposite to each other in the forte of foreign policy also. Mao’s foreign policy was aggressive and Deng was opposite to that. Mao kept China alone and isolated. Pakistan was the only window to the world for China. Except for Pakistan the rest of the world was closed for China. For most of his reign, Chairman Mao tried tooth and nail to oppose both the Super Powers. He tried to raise Third World countries against US and USSR. He tried to have close association with the Third World countries but most of the countries were under the Super Powers’ influence. Under Mao, despite his efforts, China remained isolated. Deng took China in the opposite direction. He took China to new heights. For bringing economic prosperity at home, he promoted economic engagements with international community. China expanded its international profile. US-China détente opened up lot of fora for China. China became member of numerous non-governmental organizations. In the opening address at the “Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China” in 1982, Deng Xiaoping gave a new idea of:-

Implementing socialism as per the Chinese characteristics. The intent was, to unite the people of all ethnic groups in working hard and self-reliantly to achieve, step by step, the modernization of industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology and to make China a culturally and ideologically advanced and

highly democratic socialist country. To strive for China's unification and particularly for the return of Taiwan to the motherland and to oppose hegemonism and work to safeguard world peace – these are the major tasks of our people in the 1980s. Economic construction is at the core of these tasks; it is the basis for the solution of our external and internal problems.<sup>742</sup>

Deng Xiaoping was a visionary leader. Achieving economic affluence was the main target of Deng's restructuring. He wanted to adjust Communism according to China's own needs. He approached the opening up of the country and the economy both on the capitalist agenda. That was his gradual process. He resolved the diplomatic issues deftly. He opted for basic diplomatic strategy. In 1985, he invited Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to visit China. The visit materialized in 1989 and both the countries, during his visit decided to reduce the tension and put the bitter past aside and usher a new era. The Soviet forces had also been withdrawn from Afghanistan by that time. Unlike the Sino-Soviet confrontational relationship of 1960s and 70s, this visit evolved their relations into friendship, mutual benefit and good neighbourliness. Deng wanted to cool down the environment in the region. He wanted to divert attention from foreign policy to internal policies and to emerge China as an economic power. Massive troop reduction was there in his era. Deng ordered the reduction of troops to almost one million men. That was based on his assumption that in the near future there would be no World War. His vision of a "one state, two systems" about Hong Kong was a unique idea. Deng successfully conversed with United Kingdom's Premier Margaret Thatcher for the solution of the Hong Kong problem.

US-China détente opened up the World for China. However, Deng also contributed in opening China for the world. As a result of his policies China soon became the member of important UN affiliated organizations, including World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 1980s. China's policy for liberalization and getting technical assistance from UNDP was a momentous departure from the previous regime's policies of stress on self-reliance. In 1986, China renewed its application to regain its seat as one of the founding members of

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<sup>742</sup> IPRI Paper 13, Published by Asia printers Islamabad, August 2008, p. 18.

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the field of foreign policy formulation also, Deng brought tremendous changes. Mao was an autocrat but Deng discussed issues pertaining foreign policy in Politburo. Although the will of Deng used to prevail because of his stature but in all the issues facing the country discussions were approved by the politburo. Foreign Affairs Guidance Group was established by Deng and as a result, the opinions of the State Council's executive members were emphasized increasingly in foreign policy decisions. Research institutes were established to play role in formulation of Foreign Policy and their role was enhanced also. In 1989, lot of changes had occurred in China and Soviet Union. Soviet Union was the leader of Communist bloc and it conceded defeat in Cold War in 1989. Soon the Soviet Union started withdrawal of military from Afghanistan. This was a biggest step Soviet Union had ever taken. Soviet forces had never been withdrawn from any country since the end of World War II. Pro-democracy movement had also started in Soviet Union and China. Germany was reunited after the masses demolished the Berlin Wall. Communism ended in almost whole of Eastern Europe. Obviously, China could also not remain isolated from the pro-democracy movement. China was not immune from the pro-democracy protests. The movement against Communism affected the Xinjiang, Muslim dominated province of China. Protests against Chinese governments' ruthless techniques had started there also. By the summer of 1989, there were scattered protests by students and workers in China. They were protesting against misuse of authority by Communist party officials. Cracks appeared in Communist Party also as two different wings of the party wanted different policies. One section in the party under Zhao Ziyang wanted conciliation and reform in response to agitation and the other wanted ruthless measures. The government wanted to handle the situation peacefully and not to resort to use of force. However, the workers and students set armoured vehicles ablaze and killed many soldiers. As a result the government under Deng Xiaoping adopted to use of brutal military force. The PLA restored peace by killing few hundred demonstrators. West was alarmed

with this brutal use of force and as a result of these Western countries approved sanctions on investment and trade against China. Chinese did not care about West's clamour. Soon peace prevailed and rapid economic growth started. China accused west for fomenting the instability in their country. There had been no repetition of the protests against state after this.

### **6.5- Pakistan–China Relations**

Vietnam War affected American reach to other Asian countries. Americans wanted to get relief and they withdrew from other international engagements for the time being. The after-effects of Watergate and retreat from Vietnam compelled President Carter to adopt passive international stance on most of the issues vis-a-vis Soviet Union. The introvert American policies encouraged Soviet Union to opt for aggressive overtures. Soviet Union stepped up and opted for expansionism. Soviet Union actively started backing pro-Soviet factions in different countries like Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia. Lack of Western reaction encouraged Soviet Union to intervene militarily in Cambodia in 1978. A year later, in 1979, Soviet Union entered its forces in Afghanistan also. It prompted China to feel that their country was being surrounded by pro-Soviet satellites. Americans were also forced to believe that their adversary Soviet Union was on aggressive mode. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan heated up the Cold War. American defeat in Vietnam had dented their moves at international forums. In early 1970s Americans were in deep troubles in Far East. Americans approached China to facilitate the withdrawal of their forces from Vietnam. This rapprochement further antagonized Soviet Union. As Pakistan had played a key role in bringing US-China to the negotiating table, Soviet Union declared Pakistan as key enemy and never forgave Pakistan for this sin. As a result of Sino-US détente, Indo-Soviet agreement of Friendship was also signed. Pakistan had expected that close relations between China and America would make it easier for it to maintain close and cordial relations with



both. Soviet Union realized that with Pakistan's active role both US and China were trying to encircle it. On the other side China felt threatened with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It felt as if Soviet Union was planning to encircle it. Pakistan itself was worried thinking that both India and Soviet Union had encircled it. Pakistani realized that the situation was worse than 1971 and when the Indians occupied Siachin glaciers in 1984 then Pakistan was sure of Indo-Soviet machinations. The issue of Afghanistan played pivotal role in Chinese foreign policy overtures. In all Chinese policies initiatives Afghanistan was the central point. As Pakistan was the main player in Afghan quagmire, the relationship between Pakistan and China reached new heights.<sup>743</sup>

Apart from the fear of encirclement, Chinese had another worry. Xinjiang was the soft belly of China. It was a restive Muslim majority area. The Russians had already been interfering in the region. Chinese thought that with the occupation of Afghanistan, the security situation in the province would become aggravated. The Chinese anxiety was stemmed from the fear of anarchy in its restive autonomous region of Xinjiang and the containment strategy of the Soviet. The geographical proximity of the region with the Soviet Republics was not out of danger. Chinese felt that India was already against China and was in Soviet camp, Vietnamese had close relations with Soviets. In that case the encirclement of China was almost complete. So the occupation of Afghanistan was a matter of great concern for China. The common interest in the form of opposing the Soviet aggression to ensure security, neighborliness and time-tested friendship of China and Pakistan drew them closer to each other. They were joined by the United States and other countries in the struggle against hegemonism and expansionism. With the arrival of Ronald Reagan to the White House, history repeated itself as it was in 1971, when Pakistan, China and United States were on one side and India and Soviet Union on the other side. The Soviet support for India in

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<sup>743</sup> Bhatti, "Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia", p. 26.

defense, economic and technological sectors was increased. On the other hand, American and Chinese support for Pakistan tremendously increased. The three countries collaborated closely by establishing the intelligence network and base for weapons' supply. Pakistan received a huge amount of arms and economic aid by becoming a meeting ground to plan strategies and train the mujahideen against the Soviets. Apart from this great game which was being played in the region, there were two other developments which had occurred in the region in 1979-80. Those were of great significance for not only Pakistan and India but for the whole region also. One was the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the other one was removal and later exile of Shah of Iran in February 1979 which destabilized the whole region.

Pakistan was the linchpin and the pivotal state of the region in the period from 1979 to 1989. Relationship with India had never been good but in this period of time it was highly volatile. Although the eastern border of Pakistan was not directly threatened but it was also vulnerable to the danger of aggression. There was a threat of unilateral Indian action against Pakistan or joint Indo-Soviet collaboration. Pakistan wanted to secure its borders from any threat. Pakistan felt that in case of Soviet invasion, America might come to its rescue but in case of Indian attack neither America nor China would be in position to help it as it had already happened in 1971. Pakistan needed weapons to secure her sovereignty while India had reservations about the developments in former's defense sector. On the contrary, Pakistan had long been protesting against the superpowers' inflow of arms to India which was strengthening Indian position in the South Asian region. In this regard, the role of Soviet Union was of prime importance. Since the inception of Indo-Soviet friendship in 1971, India had been using the Soviet card to maintain her as a guarantor of peace in the region. The USSR was a godfather for India against Pakistan. India and Soviet Union kept their already good relations warm in the aftermath of Afghan invasion. Initially, India was reluctant in taking any stand on the Afghan issue. Although they were sympathetic towards Russia,

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi invited President Zia Ul Haq for joint strategy for the solution of the Afghan conflict. But keeping in view India's ambiguous stand and sympathy toward Soviet Union, President Zia Ul Haq rejected the offer. Indira Gandhi's initiative in justifying the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, prompted Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to visit New Delhi in February 1980 to sign an agreement for the supply of Soviet military equipment at concessional prices. However, Indira's close policies and favours towards Soviet Union increased the gulf not only between India and China but also between US and India. The evidence of increasing Indo-Soviet collaboration led China to make moves designed to conciliate India. Despite the fact that India had opted for Soviet Union and accepted the new puppet Afghan regime supported by Soviet Union, China felt compelled to ostensibly make some overtures towards India and to cool down the situations on its borders. During his visit to Belegarde in May 1980, to attend the funeral of Marshal Tito, Chairman Hua Guofeng met Mrs Indira Gandhi and stressed China's desire to have cordial relations with India. But he also met President Zia Ul Haq of Pakistan and gave an assurance that any improvement in Sino-India ties would not affect Sino-Pakistan relations.

There was a marked improvement in Sino-Pakistan relations in the decade of 1980s. The relationship converged in Afghanistan because Islamabad played a key role in the aftermath of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Bhutto was instrumental in bringing China Pakistan close to each other but his exit did not impair the relationship. Though General Zia had initially responded negatively to Chinese pleas for the use of his powers to spare the life of ousted Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was executed in 1979, Beijing appreciated the new leader's resolute stand against the Soviet move. President Zia was also compelled by circumstances to cultivate close relations with China and United States. As the security of Pakistan was threatened by Soviet Union's invasion, reaffirming friendship with China had become Zia Ul Haq's top agenda. As soon as Zia Ul Haq assumed the leadership of Pakistan, he made his maiden visit to China in December 1977. He was assured by the

Chinese leadership that the relationship which had been started by leadership of both the countries would continue unchanged.<sup>744</sup> New Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed China's unshakable support for Pakistan in all the times of turmoil. Pakistan was assured that China will support it in the dispute of Jammu & Kashmir<sup>745</sup> At the termination of the visit; President Zia Ul Haq declared that between the two countries there was a complete unanimity of thought and no differences whatever.<sup>746</sup> While talking to a group of visiting American journalists in February 1978, President Zia praised the Chinese for their cooperation. He praised China and declared it a true friend as the former was interested in making Pakistan a self-reliant in military equipment and wanted it to develop indigenous capability. President Zia Ul Haq further said that the Chinese had provided financial help to Pakistan without any strings attached to it. They had provided economic help which was without strings and military aid without any payment involved.<sup>747</sup> President Zia Ul Haq also took many initiatives to underline that basic content of Sino-Pakistan relations would be preserved regardless of changes of leadership. The high level contacts between the two countries reached new zenith. Pakistan consulted Chinese leadership on the course of struggle and resistance against Soviet Union. China was one of the biggest supporters of Afghan resistance movement. China provided economic, military, diplomatic and moral support to Afghan Mujahidins and to the Afghan immigrants in Pakistan.

Chinese Vice-Prime Minister Geng Biao visited Pakistan in June 1978. The visit was utilized for the formal opening of the Karakoram Highway. On this occasion he made it quite clear that the Chinese were concerned that a pro-Soviet regime had taken over in Afghanistan. As Indian Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee wanted to visit China and the visit could create miscalculations and misgivings between Pakistan and China, so

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<sup>744</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All Weather Friendship", p. 16.

<sup>745</sup> *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-80*, Documents edited by K.Arif, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1984, p. 9.

<sup>746</sup> *The Pakistan Times*, December 21, 1977.

<sup>747</sup> Arif, *China-Pakistan Relations, 1947-80*, p. 176.

Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian made his important visit to Pakistan to remove the misgiving and clear the things. Vajpayee's visit was scheduled to take place in February 1979 and Chinese leader visit had taken place in January 1979.<sup>748</sup> The visit was successful and all the fears in the minds of Pakistanis were being sidelined. President Zia had informed the Chinese Premier that Pakistan wished to remain neutral in the situation developing in the region and did not want to be caught up in big power rivalries.<sup>749</sup> The Chinese realized, notwithstanding Zia's statements, that Pakistan's geostrategic position in regard to the Afghan and Iranian situation would put it precisely in the path of superpowers rivalries.<sup>750</sup> Li's unscheduled visit and support was very welcomed in Pakistan. It was timely also as Indian Foreign Minister was scheduled to visit China in February 1979. There is no doubt that Pakistan was disturbed by Vajpayee's planned visit.

Cold War during 80s mostly circulated around Afghan issue. Most of the alliances in South Asia during this period were made on the basis of Afghan crisis. Pakistan's role was most crucial in all the policies regarding Afghanistan. The period understudy was the acme of détente and entente among US, China and USSR. Soviet Union's grand strategy was aimed at encircling China from all sides and at the same time confronting the Americans to increase their influence in the Third World. Soviet Union was China's biggest threat. Chinese felt that they had been surrounded from all sides by the Soviets and the aim of their policy was to break the encirclement. Soviet troops were deployed on Northern borders of China in Mongolia, Soviet Union supported Vietnamese in their war against China in 1978 and lately Soviet's military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 further jeopardized China's security. Pakistan and Iran also felt the heat of Soviet pressure especially Pakistan felt being surrounded from all sides by India and Soviet Union. China was greatly vexed concerning

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<sup>748</sup> *The Pakistan Times*, 22 January 1979.

<sup>749</sup> Ibid.

<sup>750</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981*, p. 210.

its “main ally” (Pakistan) and had the apprehensions that Baluchistan could be used by Soviets drive to access warm waters.<sup>751</sup> China’s ties with Pakistan were further cemented by this war, which saw China, the US and Pakistan on the same side and which the Chinese seemed to regard as a Soviet pincer movement against Beijing in tandem with Moscow’s relationship with India and Vietnam.<sup>752</sup> During this time the value of the Chinese support to Pakistan’s security problems was greatly highlighted. Chinese supplied variety of weapons to Pakistan. Trade relationship between Pakistan and China was also enhanced. Khunjab pass was opened in 1982. It was a source of great link between the two countries. Lot of Pakistani and Chinese engineers and other workers had faced the tough weather conditions and sacrificed their lives in connecting both the countries. China continued its military and economic aid for Afghan Mujahidins.<sup>753</sup> But President Zia was a shrewd man. He had participated in Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and did not want to totally rely on one country.<sup>754</sup> He diversified his relations in all the directions. President Zia visited China in May 1980. Complete unanimity of thought was seen between the two countries. Chinese contributed to the defence of Pakistan. Pakistan procured a variety of weapons from China. Chinese agreed to strengthen Pakistan by supplying it with modern weaponry in its arsenals like Bombers, T 59, T 60 light tanks, MI-4 Heli copters and anti-aircraft guns and most sophisticated ground to air missiles by August 1980, while other consignment of fighter planes by November 1980.<sup>755</sup> The two countries coordinated policies and their respective stances were close enough for Zia to declare on his Beijing visit in May 1980, that there was complete understanding and unanimity of views between Pakistan and China in all fields.<sup>756</sup> China

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<sup>751</sup> Umbreen Javaid, “Pakistan-China Strategic Relationship: A Glorious Journey of 55 Years”, JRSP, Vol.52, No. 1, January-June, 2015, p. 172.

<sup>752</sup> V. P. Dutt, *India-China: Promise and Limitation*, P.231, *Indian Foreign Policy Agenda for 21<sup>st</sup> Century* Vol II, Foreign Service Institute Delhi, Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1998, Edited by Lalit Mansingh.

<sup>753</sup> Shahzad Akhtar, “Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Assessment”, *Strategic Studies*, vol. XXIX, no. 2 and 3, Summer and Autumn 2009, The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, p. 74.

<sup>754</sup> Rakisits, *Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations 2001-2011*, p. 87.

<sup>755</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-81*, pp. 211-212.

<sup>756</sup> *Pakistan Times*, May 7, 1980.

also assured Pakistan of its moral and material support. The Chinese reaction was premised on a danger Beijing perceived in two contexts. Firstly, the Chinese considered the occupation of Afghanistan as grand Soviet designs of expansion plans of Soviet social imperialism. Soviet Union also wanted to have an access to the Warm Water. This was an old approach in Soviet thinking, as most of the sea touching Soviet Union was frozen most of the times. They wanted to come to the Indian Ocean to utilize the Warm Water. Through this way they will also have access to the mouth of the Persian Gulf. They dreamt of controlling the Persian Gulf oil and exploiting it against America, Japan and other European countries. Secondly, Soviet troops were seen as a threat to the Sub-Continent, but specifically they posed a grave danger to Pakistan's security. China gave its full diplomatic and moral support to Pakistan in this regard. China used several means for this. Pakistan was supported by China in the United Nations forums and out of that. China strongly shored up the successive resolutions of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Pakistan had been supported by China in its call for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from a sovereign country. Pakistan wanted unconditional withdrawal and that too without any delay from Afghanistan. It called upon Western Europe, Japan and the US to come forward with genuine assistance to meet Pakistan's security needs. This period of close Sino-Pakistan military cooperation also saw the beginning of their collaboration in the nuclear field. Western media was full of reports about Sino-Pakistan nuclear collaboration and furthermore, that with the help of China, Pakistan had already acquired nuclear energy and technology and China had given a green signal to Pakistan for the conduct of Pakistani nuclear weapon on Chinese soil.<sup>757</sup>

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang arrived in Pakistan on a four-day official visit in June 1981. While he reiterated Chinese friendship for Pakistan, in particular its support on the

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<sup>757</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All Weather Friendship", p. 17.

Afghan issue, he significantly enough avoided making any reference to the Kashmir question in his official pronouncements. Observers said it was due to Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's India visit later in the month to reopen talks on normalization of Sino-Indian relations and the Chinese Prime Minister was trying to strike a conciliatory note vis-à-vis India as he told a news conference in Islamabad that China and India were two powers of Asia and close neighbours. Chinese Premier said that: These two countries must live in peace because it is in the Interest not only of the two countries but also of peace of Asia and whole World.<sup>758</sup>

Post-Mao era in China shed the Communist ideology as far as foreign relations were concerned. China tried to warm up its relations with India. But it took many years for China to normalize its relations. As ideology became a non-factor in foreign policy and the Chinese focused on economic development and modernization they set about mending fences in pursuit of peace and stability. Among the countries they sought to win back as friends again was India but, as it became clear in the years to come, not at the expense of their friendship with Pakistan. Pakistan and China steadily expanded their technical, cultural and economic cooperation. Slowly they expanded their cooperation in other fields like space research and nuclear cooperation. Pakistan on the other hand helped China in establishing close relations with other Muslim countries. Pakistan provided facilities to Chinese Hajj pilgrims proceeding to Saudi Arabia. China had been the strongest supporter of Pakistan in establishing nuclear-free zone in South Asia.<sup>759</sup>

The normalization process between India and China had started with the death of Indian Premier Indira Gandhi. At Mrs. Gandhi's funeral on 3 November 1984, China was represented by its Vice-Premier, Yao Yi-lip. He and Rajiv Gandhi had a brief discussion of the boundary dispute. India strongly believed that China was providing Pakistan with the

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<sup>758</sup> *Dawn*, June 4, 1981.

<sup>759</sup> Bhatti, "Evolving Chinese Perceptions Towards South Asia", p. 29.



technical help in its nuclear weapon programme.<sup>760</sup> In October 1985, Beijing contradicted the statement of the Indian Chief of Army Staff to the effect that Pakistan would conduct a test of atomic bomb in China. Keeping in view growing Sino-Pakistan military relations, it was not accepted in India. The latest evidence of this was the upgrading by China of the Karakoram highway, linking Kashghar in North West of Xinjiang region with the Pakistan held part of Kashmir- A move which India considered against it. The relations between India and China began to come to normalization. Border talks were also held. However, with the visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo to China in November 1985 the relationship got new heights. The Chinese supported the Pakistani claims on Siachin Glacier. Despite all efforts during the whole decade of eighties, India and China have failed to normalize their mutual relations.<sup>761</sup>

## **6.6- Exchange of Visits**

Pakistan and China's leaders visited each other's countries frequently in 1980s. President Zia made a visit to China in May 1980; Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang returned the visit in June 1981. A protocol was signed between Pakistan and China in August 1982 for opening the Khunjerab pass. President Zia went to China for the second time in October 1982, visit was returned by Chinese President Li Xiannian in March 1984. After the transition from autocracy to democracy, Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo visited China in November 1985. Premier Zhao Ziyang made second visit to Pakistan in June 1987. Premier Junejo visited China for the second time in May 1988. After the restoration of democracy in post Zia era, Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister. She visited China in February 1989. In November the same year, Chinese Premier Li Peng returned the visit. In the 1990s cooperation between the two countries further cemented. The relationship was now more

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<sup>760</sup> M.G. Gupta, *Rajiv Gandhi's Foreign Policy, A Study in Continuity and Change*, M.G. Publishers, India, 1987, P.289.

<sup>761</sup> Khadim Hussain, "Sino-Indian Relations in the Eighties", p. 65.

than economic aid and defence equipment. China was seen involved in different projects. The Cold War was ended and the international situation had already changed but the traffic of visits to both the countries continued as usual.<sup>762</sup> The value of the Chinese support to Pakistan was highlighted in 1979 when the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan. China's ties with Pakistan were further cemented by the war in Afghanistan which saw China, the US and Pakistan on the same side and which the Chinese seemed to regard as a Soviet pincer movement against Beijing in tandem with Moscow's relationship with India and Vietnam.<sup>763</sup> Chinese not only condemned Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan but also gave full support for Pakistan's territorial integrity and independence. In January 1980 Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Pakistan and assured full Chinese support against Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.<sup>764</sup> Speaking to a meeting of Afghan refugees near Peshawar, he said that Beijing 'was on their side and would do everything it could to relieve their suffering'.<sup>765</sup> China supported Pakistan again when President Zia Ul Haq visited China in May 1980 and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to Islamabad in May-June 1981. China increased humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees and Economic and military aid to Pakistan. China supported Pakistan at United Nations also. China enhanced military support to the Afghan fighters. Geneva Accord was welcomed by China in 1988. Chinese appreciated the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan and declared it a momentous day in February 1989. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a security threat to China. The US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, visited China and discussed the eradication of peril to the security of both the countries. Thus, China also sided with the United States. The oil-rich states in the Persian Gulf also got alarmed.

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<sup>762</sup> Khalid Mahmud, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: An All Weather Friendship", p. 20.

<sup>763</sup> Lalit Man Singh, *Indian Foreign Policy Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Vol II, Foreign Service Institute Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, 1988, P. 231.

<sup>764</sup> *Handbook of Pakistan China Relations*, Dost Publications, P. 45.

<sup>765</sup> *Handbook of Pakistan China Relations*, Dost Publications, P. 45.

Chinese supported Pakistan on almost all the issues during 1980s. They assured Pakistan's territorial integrity. They gave full support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue but acknowledged that this unresolved issue must be solved through mutual dialogue between Pakistan and India. Chinese were the strongest supporters of Pakistan's idea of nuclear-free zone for South Asia and a reiteration of Chinese friendship.<sup>766</sup> Between January and May 1980, an exchange of high level visits took place.<sup>767</sup> In those four months, The Chinese Foreign Minister visited Pakistan and President Zia Ul Haq went to China. In March 1980, Chinese military delegation visited Pakistan. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan affected both Pakistan and China. The war in Afghanistan brought them so close to each other that Pakistan's President Zia Ul Haq declared that 'we have a perfect understanding in all fields'<sup>768</sup>. Chinese were realizing that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was in the pursuit of Middle East oil and access to warm waters. But Chinese also felt that the Soviets posed a grave danger to Pakistan's Security<sup>769</sup>. Pakistan feared that the Soviets might conspire with the dissident elements in NWFP and Baluchistan. Pakistan was the back door to the Middle East. The Chinese support and aid was highly valuable as Washington was reluctant to annoy India by giving arms to Pakistan. During his visit of May 1980 to China, President Zia said: "The American administration, currently, we find is very sensitive to the Indian reaction to this region.....I hope the United States will realize its interests in Pakistan and will treat Pakistan on its own merits."<sup>770</sup>

As a result of President Zia Ul Haq's visit to China, the later agreed to provide Pakistan with surface to air missiles, helicopters and medium bombers etc. High level defence cooperation started between Pakistan and China. In November-December 1980, two Chinese military

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<sup>766</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 22 January 1979.

<sup>767</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981*, p. 210.

<sup>768</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 7 May 1980.

<sup>769</sup> Mahdi, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981*, p. 211.

<sup>770</sup> *Ibid*, p. 211.

delegations visited Pakistan and the same month Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited China. Keeping in view the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the military cooperation between the two countries increased. In December 1980, reports appeared that a secret agreement had been concluded between China and Pakistan for the construction of Chinese Naval Base, in the West of Karachi.<sup>771</sup> Russians also picked up the news but it was later denied by Pakistan. Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang came to Pakistan on four-day visit. China supported Pakistan on Afghan issue, however, Kashmir issue was not referred in official pronouncement, although President Zia discussed the issue at length with the Chinese leadership.<sup>772</sup> However, continued Chinese support to Pakistan, strengthened its hands against India considerably. Thaw in Indo-China relations had started in Indira Gandhi's second stint but with Pakistan's Premier Muhammad Khan Junejo's visit to China in November 1985, the Chinese started supporting Pakistan's claims on Siachin Glaciers.<sup>773</sup> Pakistan and China increased the volume of trade through Khunjerab pass. Relations between China and India deteriorated in 1985-86. On the contrary, Pakistan's relations with China further cemented. In 1986, the largest ever maneuvers by Indian military forces, code named 'Brass Tacks', led to a Pakistani counter mobilization and a tense military standoff along the border. As India-Pakistan forces were still facing off, confrontations began to occur between Indian and Chinese patrols in remote disputed areas. By fall 1987 the prospects of another war with China and with Pakistan, stared India in the face.<sup>774</sup>

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<sup>771</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 23 December 1980.

<sup>772</sup> *Dawn*, 3 June 1981.

<sup>773</sup> M.G. Gupta, *Rajiv Gandhi's Foreign Policy, A Study in Continuity and Change*, M.G. Publishers, India, 1987, p. 290.

<sup>774</sup> John W. Graver, *India's Foreign Policy, Retrospect and Prospect*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 95.

## 6.7- Pakistan- China Relations Under Benazir Bhutto

Pakistan's longest serving President, Zia Ul Haq, died on 17 August 1988, in air crash. Zia was shrewder than any of his predecessors.<sup>775</sup> He fooled all the pundits and milked both China and United States. S. M. Burke has rightly observed:

His death ended an eleven years reign which was notable for its Islamization programme but even more so for its foreign policy. He was a gifted balancer and an astute reader of contemporary events. While never overcoming his unpopularity, he managed to steer Pakistan through a difficult decade without loss of direction and purpose. But Zia left behind all the problems that burdened his administration in the years of his rule. It remained for those who followed him to pick up the threads of his programme or ignore them for another vision, possibly another view of Pakistan's destiny<sup>776</sup>

The sad demise of President Zia brought smooth transition of power in Pakistan. Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the President of Pakistan as per the constitution. Elections to the National and provincial assemblies were held in October 1988. Pakistan Peoples' Party won the elections and Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister. On Afghanistan front changes had already occurred in the last years of President Zia. In the mid-1980s, new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had initiated Soviet-China détente and US-Soviet entente, which made the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan easy in post-Geneva Accord period. The accord for the withdrawal of Soviet forces was signed on 14 April 1988. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto continued President Zia's policies especially nuclear and Afghan policies. Benazir Bhutto supported Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a close associate of Ex-President Zia Ul Haq, as the new President and Zia's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was also retained. It showed that she would not bring a big change in the foreign policy. However the normalization of Indo-Pakistan ties accelerated. Despite the fact that Benazir Bhutto followed pro-American policies and inclined towards India on most of the issues and wanted to resolve the issues through negotiations, Americans had apprehensions about Sino-Pak relations and Pakistan's struggle for achieving nuclear technology from China. Washington was skeptical and had doubts about Sino-Pakistan

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<sup>775</sup> Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan, South Asia Initiative*, p. 10

<sup>776</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 462.

relations. As US policies towards China changed after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, America inclined towards India.<sup>777</sup>

The defeat of Soviet Union in Afghanistan brought lot of changes in the World. Pro-democracy and pro-independence movements started in Soviet Union and China. China was initially reluctant but later used force and suppressed the demonstrators. This brutal use of force was severely criticized in US and West. Pakistan refused to toe the US policy regarding China's human rights abuse. Pakistan not only supported Chinese government's policies but also supported Beijing's 'one China' policy. Pakistan supported China's national integrity about Tibet, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Yet, Chinese leader Li Peng offered Pakistan to resolve all disputes with India bilaterally for it had become a 'vital country of South Asia'. Hence, friendly relationship among all neighbours would be indispensable for regional stability and development and to contain superpowers' intervention in the region.<sup>778</sup>

## **6.8- China and Kashmir Problem**

China has never accepted Kashmir as an Indian part. India's occupation of Kashmir had always been condemned by China and people of Kashmir had been strongly supported by successive Chinese governments. From time to time China had been asking for the resolution of the Kashmir problem. It is obvious that China has maintained a tilt towards Pakistan, which is evident from Chinese stances and statements. However, the details of Chinese policies are varied over the times. China had been shifting its policies stances on the method of resolution of the Kashmir issue because of some international compulsions and China's policies towards South Asia.<sup>779</sup> In the early phase of its policies China avoided taking sides on Kashmir issue. China considered it a dispute to be resolved by India and

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<sup>777</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 451.

<sup>778</sup> Umbreen Javaid, "Pakistan-China Strategic Relationship: A Glorious Journey of 55 Years", *JRSP*, Vol. 52, No. 1, January-June, 2015, p. 173.

<sup>779</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, "China and the Kashmir Problem", *Regional Studies*, Vol XII, No 3, Summer 1994, Institute of Regional Studies, p. 91.

Pakistan. Chinese opposed to highlight the issue internationally. Despite Pakistan's entry into Western defence pacts and Pakistan's pro west policies, China maintained that Kashmir issue must be resolved mutually. Chinese opposed Pakistan's moves to engage United Nations and the West in the resolution of the issue. Chinese cautioned that the involvement of United Nations means to give opportunities to imperialistic west and America. China said that the issue had been created by the colonialists and should not be resolved through them. Pakistan urged Soviet Union to adopt China type policy about Kashmir, which was although not strongly pro-Pakistan policy but at least accepted the dispute. China opted for clear policy about Kashmir when Sino-India relations deteriorated in the aftermath of Sino-India war of 1962. This improved Sino-Pakistan relations. During this period China gave full moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris in their fight against India for the self-determination. The Chinese became more vocal in their support in the early seventies. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan changed the regional game. China tried to diversify its relations with other countries. Chinese were threatened by the Soviet Union and now they wanted to befriend India. They wanted not only to establish intimate relations with India but with all the Third World countries. This brought changes in China's Kashmir policies also. Kashmir was again declared as a bilateral issue between Pakistan and China and the two countries must settle the issue amicably without the involvement of United Nations, as the involvement of UN means involvement of West and America. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan changed a lot. In June 1981 when the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Pakistan, he avoided to insinuate Kashmir issue although President General Zia Ul Haq raised the issue of Kashmir in his banquet speech. Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang talked in detail about the solution of the problems through dialogue and following reconciliatory policies. He wanted to make South Asia free from outside interference especially free of Western and Soviet areas of influence. He said that China was against the hegemony of one country and that dialogue must continue on equal footings.

Many reasons can be attributed to Chinese shift in its policy towards Indo-Pakistan disputes especially Kashmir issue, which is one of the largest and most important dispute between Pakistan and India. In 1980s China took the initiative in improving its relations with India. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit especially normalized the bitter relationship. China kept its tone low over the Kashmir issue. China wanted not to offend India. Even before Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, Chinese had brought changes to their policy over Indo-Pakistan disputes. In 1981, during Zhao Ziyang's visit to Pakistan the expression for the Kashmiri right of self-determination was missing because Chinese Foreign Minister was to go to India on a propose visit to India. China did not want to offend India at that critical moment. China also did not want disputes in the region especially around it. In order to maintain the relationship, China avoided passing comments over India's attitude toward other fellow neighbouring countries. In the backdrop of such policy, Kashmir, one of the most important disputes between Pakistan and India was also sidelined by China. Another most important reason for the change in China's stance over Kashmir was Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. This Russian step was responsible for lot of changes in the region. China persistently supported the independence and sovereign nature of Afghan people, demanded the drawdown of Soviet forces and highly supported Pakistan in its efforts to provide support to the Afghan resistance movement. Instead of Indo-Pakistani disputes, occupation of Afghanistan had become the central point of Sino-Pakistan concerns in 1980s. All the high level delegates who visited each other's countries in the period, 1980-82, highlighted the Afghan issue. Both the countries pondered over the ways and means to remove the Soviet threat from Afghanistan. Both the countries opted for joint strategy against Soviet Union. It seemed that as the Afghan crisis had threatened the security of both the countries, Kashmir issue was deliberately kept on the backburner. China either try to avoid any reference to the solution of Kashmir issue or just referred to it that it should be resolved peacefully through bilateral efforts. Pakistan



understood China's compulsions and accepted it. Both the countries understood the prevailing situation and diversified their relationship. Relations were expanded in Industrial, technical, Scientific, cultural, economic and defence fields.

Apart from the Chinese foreign policy, a sea change had occurred in the internal policies of China also. The arrival of Deng Xiaoping to power in the post-Mao and Chou period changed everything in China. A new Chinese history was unleashed. The period of Mao's idealism and sticking to the principles of Communism was over. A new period of pragmatism had started under Deng. This was opposed to Mao's idealism. The reformists did not keep China aloof from the comity of nations. They went for the economic development of China and declared it as the first priority. New government introduced sweeping reforms in China. China was earlier considered a closed country to the foreigners. New government opened it up. The ideological rhetoric of the past was now history. They normalized relations with countries other than Pakistan and Communist bloc. China especially took care in normalizing relations with countries in its periphery. The reforms had a substantial impact on Sino-Pakistan relations which, since then, have been witnessing both quantitative as well qualitative changes in political, economic and strategic areas. China opted neutral stance in the disputes especially in Indo-Pakistan disputes. India was such a big country to be avoided by any policy maker. Chinese felt that they should not embroil their country in other's disputes. Chinese support to Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir was not that much vocal now. Although China considered Kashmir as a dispute between the two countries but they were not supporting the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people. Now they wanted to resolve the issue through bilateral means. Islamabad considered this change in their policy regarding Kashmir as a major setback. China was a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and its change in policy was a great loss. On other contentious issues between India and Pakistan, China showed its neutrality. It indicated that China would no longer side with Pakistan in case of

the latter's conflict with India. That was a signal to India that they want normalization of relations with them. India reciprocated to this good-will gesture by arranging visit of their Foreign Minister. In 1979, Indian Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee visited China in 1979. This was followed by series of high level visits between the two countries. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China was the culminating point of all the visits. It was the first visit by any Indian Prime Minister to China. The demarcation of the border was the biggest hurdle in normalization of relations between the two countries. Both the countries started negotiations for the solution of this problem.<sup>780</sup>

### **6.9- Deterioration in Pak- US Relations and Course of Sino- Pak Relations**

There were many critics of President Zia Ul Haq's foreign policy and especially his Afghan policy. Although he had the support of the right wing but the left wing in the country's politics severely criticized his handling of Afghan policies. They blamed him for bringing the Kalashnikov and heroin culture to Pakistan. Zia was blamed for bringing Afghan war to the doors of Pakistan and antagonizing a great super power, the Soviet Union. Benazir Bhutto led PPP, a left wing political party, was one of the biggest critic of Zia's Afghan policies. She said that General Zia was using the Afghan issue for his own aggrandizement of power. They even criticized the Americans and other Western countries for supporting Pakistan by providing economic and military equipment. The departure of Zia Ul Haq paved the way for Benazir Bhutto to come to power. After becoming the Prime Minister in 1988, the US and Indian lobby put tremendous pressure on Pakistan to relinquish the nuclear path. Benazir Bhutto visited United States in 1989. There she conveyed to the American administration that Pakistan neither had the bomb nor any intentions to have one. But at the same time she had been conveying to the World that as a sovereign nation Pakistan had the right to pursue a nuclear programme for its defence. In the wake of her visit to US, the

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<sup>780</sup> Shahzad Akhtar, "Sino-Pakistani Relations: An Assessment", p. 73.

Americans had shown some interest in maintaining cordial relations with Pakistan. They promised to provide additional thirty-eight F-16s to Pakistan along with further economic and military aid. However, the withdrawal of Soviet forces changed the ground realities. There was no threat from the Soviet sides to the region and now Pakistan's nuclear programme was the main issue in US-Pakistan relations. America was doubtful about the true peacefulness of Pakistan's nuclear programme. They considered it a threat to the regional stability.

The dismemberment of Soviet Union resulted into the end of Cold War. The termination of hostilities and the emancipation of the Eastern Europe from Communism and the independence of Central Asia further jolted Pakistan's position. In the wake of all this Pakistan had lost its geographical vitality. American priorities were changed. Terrorism, non-proliferation of nuclear material, human rights violation and drug trafficking had emerged as top American priorities. All those issues were linked to Pakistan. US administration put tremendous pressure on Pakistan to abandon the nuclear path. US congress demanded Pakistan to open its nuclear installations for international inspections and to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). United States was not alone in pressurizing Pakistan. Some other European countries also joined. The demand was rejected by Pakistan, as she was not ready to stop the nuclear activities unilaterally. Pakistan had been asking that she was ready to stop the nuclear programme if the Indians will do it, which the Indians had rejected. Pakistan said that its programme was for peaceful purposes<sup>781</sup> and will continue. As Pakistan was not ready to compromise its nuclear programme and was ready to face the consequences, therefore, the US cut off all the economic and military aid to Pakistan under the terms of the Pressler amendment in October 1990. As per the Presseler amendment, American administration was required to issue a certificate every year that Pakistan was not

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<sup>781</sup> Tehmina Mahmood, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Post Cold War Period", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol 50, July 1997, The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, p. 103.

following the nuclear path. For several years President Reagan and later President Bush had been issuing certificates that Pakistan was not pursuing nuclear programme. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan changed everything in the region. Americans felt that they did not need Pakistan's services in Afghanistan. Americans' interest in Afghanistan, especially after the drawdown of Soviet forces, almost finished. It was the end of the Cold War. Pakistan's role in post-Cold War was diminished. Now the United States suddenly felt that she could not certify the absence of nuclear weapons and the aid was stopped to Pakistan in 1990.<sup>782</sup> Pakistan's strategic value was reduced considerably in the wake of USSR's dismemberment in 1991. The 1990s was a testing times for Pakistan as US was inclined towards India and it put massive pressure on Pakistan for following nuclear programme and because of Pakistan's cooperation with China. Strategically Pakistan again emerged as a frontline state against terrorism in post 9/11 period.

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<sup>782</sup> Stephen P. Cohen's *Pakistan and the Cold War in Superpower Rivalry and Conflict The long shadow of the Cold War on the twenty-first century* edited by Chandra Chari, p. 79.

## CONCLUSION

The area in which Pakistan is located had always been the centre of epicenter of all the conflicts. Therefore scholars had shown their interests in writing about this area whether they were Pakistani, Indian or Western Foreign Policies' experts. However, access to primary sources in Pakistan remained very difficult. Only late 1940s and 1950s' official documents have been declassified. Despite the booming Sino-Pakistan relationship or the concept of Iron-brother or All-Weather Friends, very scanty material is available on the relationship. Very scanty material has been written about the relationship. Almost negligible numbers of scholars have contributed to the full spectrum of relationship. Lot of references to Sino-Pak relations are there in books related to Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Authors wrote chapters in books about Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Indo-Pakistan Relations and US-Pakistan Relations.

Pakistan and China are new born countries. They got independence one after another. However, the people of those two regions had been in contacts from centuries. Indus civilization in Pakistan and Xia civilization in China were supreme in ancient times. Rock carvings show that Chinese travelers had been coming to Kashmir about 2000 years ago.<sup>783</sup> Although trade was there between the two people but geographically the regions were cut off from one another. Himalayas had separated the two regions. In Caliph Walid bin Abdul Malik's times Islam for the first time reached to South China. Even in the times of British also, cultural and trade relations were there. The relationship between the two nations reached its zenith when China, in twenty first century opened the floodgates of investments in Pakistan. The linking of modern deep sea port of Gawader with Chinese province of Xianjing will not only cement the relationship but will also make China more dependent upon Pakistan. It will shorten the Chinese sea route to Middle East, Africa and Europe.

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<sup>783</sup> Ghulam Ali, "China's Kashmir Policy: Back to Neutrality", p. 43.

The takeoff of the relationship was very slow in 1947. Pakistan was not interested in cultivating friendship with China and vice versa. Chinese were in the throes of the revolution and were busy in their own affairs. Pakistan took the first step of developing relations with China in 1950 when it recognized China in 1950 as an independent state. As soon as People's Republic of China was proclaimed as an independent and sovereign country on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1949<sup>784</sup>, Pakistan was among the pioneers to extend diplomatic recognition to the new government. Rather Pakistan was the first Muslim country to do so. The first step towards strategic partnership has been taken in April 2005 when both the countries entered into a new treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Relations.<sup>785</sup>

The history of both the countries is filled with splendid journey and all-weather friendship. Both the neighbourly countries were destined to become special friends from the early days of their independence but it took many years before their tentative relationship cemented in a full scale alliance and an all-weather friendship.<sup>786</sup> They developed a multidimensional relationship. Their social, political and economic systems are different but still their relationship is an example for the World. Both the countries have a common threat of India, which has united them and it created a strong bond of entente. Lot of vicissitudes have occurred to China's relationship to other neighbouring countries and with super powers but still its relationship with Pakistan has been flourishing and thriving. Despite the fact that China's support to Kashmir cause has changed from 60s and 70s and altogether different in 80s and 90s but both the countries are firm in their relationship and cooperation. In post-cold war their cooperation increased instead of decreasing. Both countries have enhanced their cooperation from defence and politics to trade, socio-economics, culture, investment and other spheres of life. A key focus of the thesis is to shed light on the historical events

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<sup>784</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*. p. 44.

<sup>785</sup> Javaid, "Pakistan-China Strategic Relationship", p.157.

<sup>786</sup> Kemenade, *The Fragile Pakistani State*, p. 2.

that took place in the Cold War era which brought both the countries together and to know the circumstances which caused convergence in their relationship. As Pakistan's relationship with other countries like India, Soviet Union and USA had direct influence with Sino-Pak relationship, so relationship with those countries have also been touched upon. The vicissitudes in Pakistan's relations with Soviet Union, USA and India have further cemented Pakistan's relationship with China. While mentioning the strong foundations of Sino-Pakistan relations and strategic partnership, the research has been carried out in strict chronological order.

The bond between Pakistan and China is very old. Chinese travelers visited the region in early seventh century. Because of the trade and frequent contacts between Sub-Continent and China, cultural and religious contacts deepened in Chinese Xinjiang province. Islam spread in China's Xinjiang province and Buddhism was also exported to different parts of China. Both countries had trade connections through Silk routes. In 20<sup>th</sup> century when Pakistan emerged, geographical location of the country attracted many countries towards it. Pakistan was at the crossroads of big powers' rivalries and politics. Any development and change in Pakistan or its closeness to any country will attract the attention of super powers like USA, Soviet Union or China. Even the emergence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, did not dwindle the strategic importance of Pakistan. In 1980s, Pakistan became the hub of all sorts of activities against Soviet Union. Pakistani and American interests converged in Afghanistan against Soviet Union in Cold War era. Pakistani and Chinese interests converged against India during Cold War and even after that. The relationship in the thesis have been described with different angles like Pakistan-China relationship and India, Pakistan-China and USA, Pakistan-China and Afghanistan and the last but not the least, Pakistan-China and the Soviet Union.

At the dawn of our independence, China was in the purview of political changes. The government of Chiang-Kai-Shek was rapidly losing writ and control over its regions. Communism was in the offing. Pakistan itself was in dilemma. Its own security was threatened from East and West. On eastern side India was creating problems and the war was ensuing in Kashmir, on western side of the border, Afghanistan made some claims over Pakistani territories. Pakistan was confused whether to recognize the new government in China in 1949-50 or to side with the United States, from where it had already received invitation to its Prime Minister for a visit. Recognition of China at that time would mean a setback to relationship with United States. Secondly, ideological differences were there in both the countries. Pakistan had come into being on the name of Islam and in Chinese political spectrum; there was no place for religion. However, the first wave in the relationship had come, when India devalued its currency and asked Pakistan also to follow it, if it wants trade with India. As Pakistan was dependent upon India for most of the things, it had become very difficult for the country. However Pakistan refused to devalue its currency. Now trade between Pakistan and India completely halted in September 1949. Pakistan was dependent upon Indian coal for running its trains and used to export its cotton and jute to India. A deadlock was created with India in trade. The Indian refusal to supply coal to Pakistan's nascent industry was a hinder for Pakistan's economy. Despite not having diplomatic relationship with Pakistan, China offered Pakistan for a barter trade agreement, coal for cotton, which Pakistan accepted and the wheel of the economy again started moving. Long after that Pakistanis remembered China for coming to its help in times when it was surrounded by threats to its economy and was being threatened by India. There was a sudden spurt in Pakistan's trade with China. In 1949-50 Pakistan had sold 47000 bales of cotton to China, in 1950-51 the figures rose to 109000 bales. China supplied coal to Pakistan which was badly needed for the running the railways and industry. In 1948-49 imports from



China were insignificant but in 1949-50 they were at Rs 8.4 crores.<sup>787</sup> When India recognized the new government of China, Pakistan did not want to lag behind and followed the Indians in recognizing China. Pakistanis felt that as comity of the nations were accepting China as an independent and sovereign state, very soon it will assume its permanent seat at United Nations Security Council and the Kashmir issue would be raised in front of the council. For getting support on this count, the recognition of China was necessary. But unfortunately, USA had been frustrating Soviet Union's efforts to bring China to Security Council. China's campaign in Tibet and Taiwan also met with US resistance. Pakistan and China established diplomatic relations with each other during 1951-53. Although, the border between Pakistan and China was not demarcated but it was largely peaceful. China had cordial relations with India also which was the forerunner in bringing China to the comity of nations. Therefore, Chinese stance over the Kashmir issue was not known. By 1954, Pakistan crossed the threshold and joined the Cold War on American side by entering into defence agreements with the United States. It brought Soviet-Pakistan relations to the lower level. Chinese also did not like this agreement. Beijing was especially concerned when Pakistan entered into SEATO, as China thought that this alliance was organized against it. At Manila conference Pakistan assured Chinese that the relationship would flourish despite Pakistan's entry into defence alliances with the West. Pakistan also participated and played important role in Bandung conference. Pakistan's Premier Muhammad Ali Bogra convinced Chinese Prime Minister Chou En Lai that Pakistan had no threats from China and had signed SEATO with the Americans just for its security compulsions against India. A new era in Sino-Pakistan relationship had started with the Bandung conference. Later Prime Ministers, Chou En Lai and Suhrawardy visited each other's countries. Those visits opened up new vistas of opportunities and relationship was diversified in cultural, diplomatic, commercial,

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<sup>787</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 15.

defence and people-to-people contacts. Interestingly, India tried to lead the Afro-Asian countries and its interests conflicted with China.

Things started changing with the advent of Martial Law in Pakistan. President Ayub Khan, worried about the security of Pakistan, initiated pro-US policies. Pakistan did not support China's seat at the UN, it refused to support China's sovereignty over Taiwan and the Taiwanese hajj mission, which came to Pakistan enroute to Saudi Arabia was welcomed in Karachi in 1959. Soon Ayub Khan realized isolation in the region as newly elect President, Kennedy, was heavily tilted towards India and Ayub also brought changes in his foreign policy towards China. In 1960s relationship between Pakistan and USA further deteriorated when China and India fought a bitter war in Himalayas in 1962. Pakistan had sympathies with China and USA was not only heavily inclined towards India but it strongly supported the latter and sent heavy military equipment to India.<sup>788</sup> Even before the second phase of the 1962 conflict, military supplies from the USA and UK had started pouring in.<sup>789</sup> As result of Sino-India war of 1962; Pakistan completely changed its policies. Border demarcation agreement was signed in 1963 and a great relationship had started after that. The border agreement was not only rejected by India but was severely criticized by United States. Soon after this, Pakistan entered into air transport agreement also with China, through this agreement airlines of both the countries could land and operate along with other services. PIA was one of the best airlines of the time and it wanted to get profits by enlarging its business. The two countries commenced their relations and won hearts and minds of people. United States took retaliatory measures and stopped \$ 3 million aid for the construction of Dacca airport. China gave full support to Pakistan in 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. China's support was in diplomatic, military, economic and moral arenas. For the development of

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<sup>788</sup> Shahnaz Akhtar, "Dynamics of USA-Pakistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Period: Hurdles and Future Prospects", *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol. 2 No. 11; June 2012, P. 206

<sup>789</sup> Guruswamy, "Pakistan-China Relations Higher than the Mountains, Deeper than the Oceans", p. 97.

small industries and infrastructure, China also provided millions of dollars interest free economic assistance to Pakistan. The era of 1970s started with the greatest crisis in the history of Pakistan. The country was initially pushed into anarchy and later India waged war against Pakistan. China supported Pakistan at all levels but despite this could not save East Pakistan as the Soviets were openly supporting India. In 1971, Pakistan also struggled to bring both China and US to a negotiating table. Pakistan realized that US-China entente would help Pakistan in exploring its relations with both China and United States at the same time. However, as a result of 1971 war, Indian explosion of Nuclear bomb and US' efforts to stop Pakistan from going nuclear, Pakistan left both SEATO and CENTO. Over the times Pakistan realized that during threats to national security no one will come to its rescue. United States instead of helping Pakistan in trying times, sent Seventh fleet to rescue its own citizens. China after promising support against any threat to Pakistan's security, backed off. That's why Premier Z A Bhutto established close relations with China but he followed a policy of bilateralism. However, heavy industries were established with the help of China in 1970s.

Dramatic changes occurred in 1979, when Iranian revolution erupted and Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. The whole region was destabilized. America, which had left the region, again was back in the game. Chinese offered help to Pakistan. And Pakistan once again had become a frontline state against Soviet Union. As soon as the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan, Pakistan got prominence. Pakistan became the conduit of American weapons. Pakistan, keeping in view its geographical locations, had become the centre of Cold War and the most important country for the American policy makers. The scuffle in Afghanistan brought down the importance of China and India in the eyes of Americans.<sup>790</sup>

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<sup>790</sup> Chintamani Mahapatra, "India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 4, October-December 2011, P. 415.

The interests of China, Pakistan and United States converged and US-China-Pakistan nexus was established. During 1980s, Afghanistan was the centre of Cold War. Cold War reached its zenith over the Afghan issue. President Zia Ul Haq, with open support from Americans, highlighted the Afghan issue inside United Nations and outside also. It was the acme of US-China-Soviet strategic détente and entente. Pakistan had become the linchpin in this crisis. Soviet Union wanted a grand strategy of encircling China and at the same time confronting the US by expanding influence in the Third World countries. Therefore, a new alliance among US, China and Pakistan emerged. All those countries had their interests. Pakistan was using both China and US against USSR, Americans were using Pakistan in great game in the region and Chinese were using both to stop the encirclement of their country by USSR. Thus, Pakistan was on the top of US agenda. However, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, United States changed its policies towards Pakistan, accusing it of working on nuclear programme for making atomic bomb. All sort of American aid was stopped to Pakistan and the latter completely turned towards China for all sort of military and economic aid. After the death of President Zia Ul Haq, when Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister of the country, she opted for close relations with America and tilting towards India but Americans were weary of Pakistan's closeness to China. The demise of Soviet Union brought lot of changes in World politics. United States emerged as the sole Super Power in the World and started democratization worldwide. United States, began criticizing China for repressing democracy nationally and violating human rights by 1989. Relations between China and United States no longer remained cordial as they were during Cold War. But Pakistan's relations with China remained cordial, rather after the bitterness in US-China and US-Pakistan relations, Pakistan's dependence upon China further increased. Pakistan backed China's 'One China' policy, China's strategy about Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong. But the Chinese were cautious about Indo-Pakistani disputes. China throughout 1980s emphasized the importance of Kashmir issue being resolved through

mutual negotiations. Premier Li Peng offered Pakistan to resolve all disputes with India bilaterally as for them India had become very important player in the region.

With the dismemberment of Soviet Union, Cold War came to an end. Cold War had mixed outcome for Pakistan. In four decades of the Cold War, Sometimes Pakistan got the benefits and sometime it was at loss. For most of the Cold War times, Pakistan had been in alliance with the West. Lot of vicissitudes had come in Pakistan's relationship with United States. Initially, United States had no inclination towards Pakistan. Pakistan was in need of getting security against India. India had been the main instrument in Pakistan's foreign relations. Pakistan, till the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had never felt any threat from Communist countries. The first and foremost threat to Pakistan's security was from India. Pakistan later realized that the West will never come to its rescue against India. Yes, against Communist threat it will stand beside Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan decided to boost up its defences against India. Only the superior Western, specifically American technology could do this. But the West was not reliable. America wanted to use Pakistan against Communist countries, especially Soviet Union and Pakistan wanted to use and get American support against India. But American aid and support to Pakistan was neither consistent nor reliable. America had its own international compulsions. Senior American officials were less interested in Indian-Pakistani disputes. They considered Indian Sub-Continent as British sphere of influence. Most of the American think-tanks and every successive government were of the view to follow the British government experiences and British lead on all substantive matters relating to South Asia<sup>791</sup>. It showed that the Americans were least interested in Sub-Continent affairs. But Pakistan had its own compulsions. It wanted

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<sup>791</sup> McMahan, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954", p. 815.

security from India and it realized that security and assistance could only come from America.

Pakistan from the very beginning wanted to have an alliance with America. In May 1947, Mr. Jinnah met with the US Charge d' Affairs in New Delhi and told him that Pakistan will follow close relations with the Muslim countries of the Middle East and Pakistan would help the Western countries against possible Communist aggression and would like to have American assistance.<sup>792</sup> In early fifties Americans realized that Pakistan wanted to join alliance against Soviet Union. But the US was interested in getting Indian support. Despite Prime Minister Nehru's visit of USA, circumstances proved that India was on Soviet side. Whereas, she had always been claiming to be advocating the non-aligned countries. The biggest loss to Pakistan in early years of its independence was the loss of Soviet support. After the refusal of Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan to visit Soviet Union, the subsequent events and especially Pakistan's entry into Western Defence Alliance system permanently antagonized Soviet Union. Although Pakistan lost the Soviet friendship but Pakistan was not ready to surrender Sino-Pakistan friendship to the Americans in subsequent years. When Ayub Khan became President in 1958, after successful coup, Pakistan was in Western mode. Ayub further twisted it towards United States. Resultantly Pakistan, by the advent of Kennedy to American Presidency, was alone in the region. Kennedy, as a result of Indo-China border skirmishes, fresh disturbances in Tibet and arrival of Dalai Lama to India, tilted towards India. When Indo-China relations got tense, USA left Pakistan in the lurch. USA increased economic and military aid to India and Pakistan had been crying that the same would be used against it. Ayub as a retaliation bent towards Chinese. In 1965 war the United States instead of helping Pakistan, stopped all sort of aid to both Pakistan and

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<sup>792</sup> Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, p. 6.

India.<sup>793</sup> As Pakistan was more dependent upon American aid, such sanctions hit Pakistan more than India. United States had shown complete neutrality in Indo-Pakistan war. In 1971, Bangladesh war also, despite Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan, the latter had not been rescued, rather 7<sup>th</sup> American fleet was sent to Bay of Bengal for rescuing the American citizens and it was misconstrued that they were coming to help Pakistanis. After Indian nuclear explosions, United States was more worried about Pakistan than India. They felt that Pakistan would follow the Indians in making nuclear bomb. Initially, Americans tried to lure in Pakistan by offering fighting planes to Pakistan but later when that offer was rejected then they stopped all economic and military aid to Pakistan. Soon the policy was reversed and heavy economic and military aid was renewed, thanks to Pakistan's geographical and strategic location. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the whole spectrum completely. Now again Pakistan and United States were in alliance. President Reagan was the biggest supporter of Pakistan. Both the countries fought Cold War jointly against Soviet Union as their interests converged. In 1989, when the Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan and the democratization of the Eastern Europe started and then the recession of Soviet pressure from Western Europe, Americans changed their policies. In 1990, President Bush who had been elected recently, stopped all sort of aid to Pakistan. Pakistan had been pursuing nuclear programme and due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Americans had been avoiding and neglecting the nuclear programme but now Pakistan had to pay the price. This nuclear programme, which Pakistan declared as peaceful but west had all the suspicions, had become sticking point of US-Pak relations.<sup>794</sup> As contrary to the Americans, the relationship with the China was totally different. The relationship was weak in early phase and got stronger and stronger. In early years, like United States, China was not

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<sup>793</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *Pakistan and the Cold War in Superpower Rivalry and Conflict: The long shadow of the Cold War on the twenty-first century* edited by Chandra Chari, p. 77

<sup>794</sup> Cohen, *Pakistan and the Cold War in Superpower Rivalry and Conflict*, p.79.

interested in Pakistan. There was the problem of Communism and Islam, as both the entities were considered opposed to each other.<sup>795</sup> The religious classes in Pakistan had strong disliking towards Communism. People in Pakistan were West-oriented and thought that the west was at least 'Ahl Kitab', that is heavenly religion. Defence alliance, although severely criticized in India, Soviet Union, China and other pro-Soviet countries but was welcomed in Pakistan. In fact Pakistanis felt the biggest threat to them emanated from India and wanted to beef up their defences against India. Pakistan, also in Bandung, conveyed to the Chinese that they do not fear any threat from China and would never support West in any war against it. Premier Chou En Lai was convinced that India was the foremost fear in Pakistanis minds. However, Ayub Khan was considered as pro-American and his arrival to the presidency alarmed the Chinese. Ayub Khan took some further steps which antagonized China. He offered Joint defence agreement to India against North, and North was construed as China. In fact the idea of joint defence of the Sub-Continent was not new. As India had been asking Pakistan repeatedly to make no war declaration, Pakistan till 1962, had been inviting India again and again to enter into an arrangement through which they could jointly defend the Sub-Continent against all outsiders.<sup>796</sup> Ayub gave bases to the Americans to spy over Soviet Union. A spy plane flying from Peshawar to Oslo was shot down by the Russians and further bad luck that the pilot was captured alive, who conceded that he had been spying. The Soviets threatened Pakistan to be completely obliterated from the map of the World. China did not overtly protest to Pakistan but was alarmed about US ambitions in the region with Pakistan's tacit support. However, 1962 Indo-China war and American inclination towards India totally changed the things.

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<sup>795</sup> Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, p. 38.

<sup>796</sup> Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, p. 53.



The Sino-Indian hostility, Pakistan's disappointment with its Western allies and New Delhi's refusal to Pakistan's proposal for a joint defence of the Sub-Continent and the US' arming of India against China changed the politics of the region. These developments changed the scenario of China-Pakistan relationship.<sup>797</sup> Now Ayub started pro-China policies. China was standing on Pakistan's side in both 1965 and 1971 wars. After 1962, Pakistan diversified its relationship with China. Demarcation of the border was done despite Indian protests and American apprehensions. When the PIA signed agreement with Chinese airlines and got the landing rights in China, Americans had stopped the aid which was supposed to be given for the construction of Dacca airport, the Chinese came forward and provided the requisite amount of money. After 1963, Pakistan started getting heavy Chinese economic and military aid. Chinese invested in different fields in Pakistan. 1962, Indo-China war united both Pakistan and China as the enemy of both the countries was one, that was India. Their relationship converged on Indian enmity. When India exploded nuclear bomb in May 1974, China offered all type of technical and financial aid to Pakistan. China had always been accused of helping Pakistan in making bomb but she had always been refusing and rejecting such allegations. However, Pakistan's former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's point of view was different to the theory of enemy of my enemy is my friend. He says:-

Pakistan's relations with China have greatly improved since 1962. This has caused misgivings in the United States, where the rationale of this relationship has been much distorted. Sino-Pakistani relations are not primarily based on the differences of the two countries with India. That factor forms only a part, important though it be, of the rationale. China is Pakistan's neighbour and it is essential for us to maintain good relations with all our neighbours on the basis of friendship and equality. There are no territorial or other disputes between the countries to give rise to differences. Ever since the Revolution in China, the leaders of that country have made sincere efforts to establish normal relations with Pakistan. During the Bandung Conference, Premier Chou En-Lai assured the Prime Minister of Pakistan that China desired good relations with Pakistan, and it would have been unwise for Pakistan to have spurned a gesture of goodwill from a powerful neighbouring country. China's dominant place in Asia is assured; Pakistan is an Asian state, whose destinies are forever linked with those of Asia, and it is vital for Pakistan to maintain friendly relations with China for strengthening Asian unity.<sup>798</sup>

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<sup>797</sup> Shahzad Akhtar, *Sino-Pakistan Relations: An Assessment*, p. 69.

<sup>798</sup> Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, p. 112.

China had always been the strongest supporter of freedom of Kashmir as Pakistan had always been supporting the cause of 'One China' and had never accepted Taiwan as a separate state. However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the demise of Indira Gandhi, China's Kashmir policy changed. New Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China and the process of reconciliation had started in their relations. China changed its pro Pakistan stand on Kashmir to a neutral position. China states that it is a controversial issue and must be resolved through negotiations between Pakistan and India. In fact China does not want to take the issue to the United Nations, as the inclusion of United Nations means the interference of United States in the softer belly of China that is Xinjiang. It is also said that as the Russian forces had intervened in Afghanistan, Chinese felt threatened. Chinese considered it as an encirclement of it. At that moment of time they did not want to offend India. It was in the interest of Pakistan also to normalize relations with India as it was also encircled from both sides by Soviet occupied Afghanistan and India. It is evident from the Chinese support of Pakistan in other fields. Despite Chinese neutrality over Kashmir, China had always been the stronger supporter of Pakistan in all the international forums. For economic and military assistance also Pakistan is heavily dependent upon China. After the US' sanctions over Pakistan in 1990, Pakistan was totally dependent upon China. In 1990s as the Cold War closed with the demise of Soviet Union, the strategic importance of Pakistan was declined due to changed international scenario. As, Pakistan had been supporting the Talibans in Afghanistan, therefore, Pakistan felt isolated in the region and it had to review its foreign especially security policies. With the dismemberment of Soviet Union, rivalry between two blocs came to an end. In 1990s, China started emerging as a key player in the unipolar world order. Pakistan was subjected to severe economic and military sanctions along with China for their alleged collaboration in nuclear and missile technology. But despite all those sanctions, China stood by Pakistan as Pakistan was on China side in 1989 over Tiananmen Square issue when China was condemned by West for human rights

violations, and did not bow to pressure. The political instability of 1990s adversely impacted Pakistan's economic growth but China supported Pakistan economically when the US had turned its back towards Pakistan by placing economic sanctions on it.

It is in the interest of Pakistan to seek Chinese support to protect itself from Indian domination. China also wants to maintain a balance of power in South Asia. Beijing wants a fragmented structure of power in South Asia, to keep India busy in Sub-Continent squabbles so that it may not challenge China's powers in the region. China wants to keep Pakistan strong enough to remain independent and challenge Indian hegemony. This fundamental geostrategic interest has not changed with the end of the Cold War, nor is it likely to change for the foreseeable future.<sup>799</sup> If America is going to support India against China, China will do the same to Pakistan against India. It is also said that Pakistan is China's Israel in the region.<sup>800</sup>

Broadly, Sino-Pakistan relationship can be divided in four different phases i.e A period from 1947 to 1962, when Pakistan was initially least interested in changes occurring close to its borders then inclining towards Western countries. Second phase was from 1962 to 1971, when Pakistan entered into intimate relationship with China and it had its' negative repercussions on US-Pak and Soviet-Pak relations. Resultantly no one including China came to Pakistan's rescue in Third Round of Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, rather Soviet Union aggressively acted against Pakistan and supported and helped India. From 1971, the Third Phase in Sino-Pakistan relations had started which culminated in 2015. In this phase China supported Pakistan in economic, military and nuclear fields. Both China and United States helped Pakistan in Soviet-Afghan war. Interestingly, United States after Afghan War left the region high and dry. Sanctions were imposed on Pakistan for following nuclear path but

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<sup>799</sup> Garver, "The Future of the Sino-Pakistan Entente Cordiale", p. 390

<sup>800</sup> Small, "The China Pakistan Axis, Asia's New Geopolitics", p. 1.

Chinese stood by Pakistan in tackling with the Post-Soviet Afghan War and giving economic aid and achieving self-sufficiency in missile technology. The last phase started with the advent of CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), which is still continuing. This time Chinese emphasis is mainly on economic development of Pakistan. China injected more than \$ 60 billion in construction of roads, railways and Industrial Zones. Billions of dollars are to be spent on the development of Gawader sea port, which will connect Chinese Sinkiang region to the Arabia Sea. Despite protests from India and concerns from United States and some Middle Eastern countries, neither Pakistan nor China abandoned this project. It seems that the future of Pakistan and China relationship is bright and both countries will act in unison against their common enemies.

## APPENDICES

Annex A

Copy of extracts from 'D A W' dated 14th Nov., 1951.

.....

GENERAL RAZA PRESENTS CREDENTIALS TO MAO TSE-TUNG.

London, Nov. 12: Major-General Nawabzada Aslam Khan Raza, First Pakistani Ambassador to China, presented his letter of credence to Mao Tse Tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government of China, yesterday, according to Reuters news agency message received in London.

Mao Tse Tung expressed great pleasure in receiving the letters of credence and expressed the hope that closer ties between China and Pakistan would contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and the world.

Ambassador Raza said that his mission was to strengthen the friendly relations existing between the two countries.

Reuter.

Ann-B

SN<sup>o</sup> 3

TOP SECRET.

From ... FOREIGN, KARACHI.  
To ... PAREPUN, NEW YORK.  
Repeated ... PAHC, LONDON.  
  
No. ...  
Dated ... 1st July, 1950.

-----  
MOST IMMEDIATE.

For Prime Minister from Zafrulla Khan.

Cabinet agrees with views in my earlier telegram  
viz that North Korean action being a clear case of  
aggression we should fully support Security Council  
but not to take up any attitude with regard to  
Russian responsibility for North Korean aggression.

-----  
Please issue the above telegram in cipher.  
No circulation.

*Alvachay*  
*P.S. to Secy Gen.*

1- 7- 1950.

Cipher Bureau.

*Issued  
on  
2/7.*

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

MEETING OF THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE OF  
CABINET HELD IN GENERAL. THE 24th  
AUGUST 1950. AT 2.30 P.M.

Amv

Case No. PCG14/R/50 --- Aid to Korea.

P\_R\_E\_S\_E\_N\_T

The Hon'ble the Prime Minister.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Foreign Affairs &  
Commonwealth Relations.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Finance and  
Economic Affairs.  
The Hon'ble Minister for the Interior,  
Information & Broadcasting and  
Refugees & Rehabilitation.  
The Secretary to the Cabinet.  
The Joint Secretary to the Cabinet.

M\_I\_N\_U\_T\_E\_S

The Hon'ble Minister for Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations said he had discussed the draft letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the Hon'ble Minister for Finance who had expressed the view that we should so amend it as not to shut out entirely the possibility of our offering armed aid. He was in agreement with the Hon'ble Minister for Finance on this point and suggested that the words "at this juncture" be added after the words "they are not" occurring in the last but one sentence of the draft.

In the course of subsequent discussion it was pointed out that since we could not at present be quite certain regarding the amount of our surplus in rice and as we ourselves imported the bulk of our medical supplies, we should not offer either of these items. It was considered sufficient to make available 5,000 tons of wheat as our contribution.

The Secretary-General said that in entering into this commitment we would be incurring the hostility of Russia in the military sense. It was for consideration therefore whether we should now ask the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Services to prepare a paper showing what forces, equipment, and industrial and other installations would be adequate to repel an attack by Russia against Pakistan, with a view

to approaching the Government of the United States of America for assistance to meet such an attack.

### D\_E\_C\_I\_S\_I\_O\_N

The Defence Committee of Cabinet agreed :-

- 10 (i) that the summary should now go to the Cabinet for consideration and approval of the following draft communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of 14th July 1950. My Government have given their most careful consideration to your Excellency's communication and are anxious to render such aid as lies in their power to the United Nations in meeting the aggression in South Korea. Our Armed Forces have however, been organized on a strictly limited basis for our own defence needs. Their primary duty is to meet any threat to Pakistan's territorial integrity and independence. Pakistan unfortunately is not free from grave dangers affecting its own security. My Government, therefore, deeply regret that they are not at this juncture in a position to send any ground forces or military equipment to assist the forces of the United Nations in Korea. But they would be happy to render such immediate assistance in support of the stand taken by the United Nations as may be within their power and I have been authorized by my Government to offer 5000 tons of wheat."

- (ii) that the Commanders-in-Chief should prepare a paper showing the forces, equipment, industrial and other installations considered adequate to repel an attack against Pakistan by Russia.



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SECRET  
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NOTES ON THE CASE  
22nd Jan 1956

Case No. 597/60/56 - 11. Proposed Governor of Iraq  
Minister's Conference  
January 1956  
(1) Proposed Visit of the  
Minister to Iraq  
(2) Proposed Visit to Iraq  
of the Minister of Iraq  
Minister's Conference  
January 1956

The Hon'ble the Prime Minister.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Commerce & Industries.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Food & Agriculture and Law & Order.  
The Hon'ble Minister for the Interior, Information & Broadcasting.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Education.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Industries.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Communications and Health & Welfare.  
The Hon'ble Minister of State for External Affairs, Finance and Economic Affairs.  
The Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations.  
The Joint Secretary to the Minister.

The Hon'ble the Prime Minister stated that he had a few things to mention in this regard:-

(i) He had accepted the invitation to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference to be held in London on the 4th January, 1956. It was expected to last 5 days.

Some time ago, he had received an invitation from the Government of Iraq to visit that country. While accepting the invitation, his idea was to go there in January or February, 1956. It would not be possible for him to go there in January because of the Prime Ministers' Conference in London. In February he would have to go to the Punjab to be present at the Provincial elections. There would not be a special session of the Punjab Session of the Legislative Assembly. As to long a postponement was likely to be understood, he had suggested to the Iraqi Government that he would be willing to visit their country for about 10 days, starting from the 1st of March, 1956. He hoped that the Iraqi would accept the proposal and that the Government would be able to make the necessary arrangements.

A visit to Iraq was also invited to the Iraqi Government.

in January, 1951. In view of the dislocation caused by recent floods, this month would not suit the Punjab Government. February too, would not be suitable because of the coming elections. The Regent had, therefore, been asked to come here on the 21st or 22nd February, 1951. It was probable that he would defer his visit to a later date because of the serious illness of his sister - the Queen Mother.

(iv) After the Indian-engineered trouble had started in Nepal, a letter was received from the Nepalese Ambassador in Delhi through our High Commissioner in India, intimating that the King of Nepal had left the throne and sought asylum in a foreign embassy, and thereby forfeited his right to the throne. A grandson of his had been installed in his place.

Soon after, the Nepalese Ambassador in London contacted our High Commissioner in the U.K. and enquired if Pakistan would be willing to give asylum to the Maharaja of Nepal, (i.e. the Prime Minister) in case the situation in Nepal deteriorated to such an extent as to necessitate his flight from the country. The reply given was in the affirmative. It was, however, felt that such a contingency was not likely to arise. It was proposed to acknowledge the letter of the Nepalese Ambassador in Delhi, conveying Pakistan's recognition of the Boy King and expressing the hope that the cordial relations existing between Nepal and Pakistan would be further strengthened. It would be for the Nepalese Ambassador to decide whether to give publicity to his letter and Pakistan's reply to it.

It had not so far been possible to open diplomatic relations with Nepal because they did not allow any Muslim to live in Kathmandu. Efforts would be made to accredit our High Commissioner in India to Nepal.

The Hon'ble Minister for Kashmir Affairs expressed the view that the Cabinet should discuss the recent developments in Tibet and China.

The Hon'ble the Prime Minister stated that the Government of Pakistan had recognised the present Government of China and  
efforts...

- 1 -

110

efforts were being made to establish diplomatic relations with them. No agreement had yet been reached as the Chinese Government wanted somebody to be sent from here to negotiate the opening of diplomatic relations with them. In view of recent developments in Korea, namely the active participation of Chinese nationals in the Korean fight and the appointment of a representative of Pakistan on the Korean Commission, it was not considered opportune to start negotiations with China just now. It would be better to wait for a short while to allow the situation to crystallise.

As regards Tibet, the Government of Pakistan always recognised China's suzerainty over Tibet and it would not, therefore, be proper to take sides in the present dispute. The incursion of China into Tibet might create problems for India. The most likely route from which threat to India could develop was the Cantok-Gyantse route which was the easiest of the three mountain routes and was jeepable. The Laddakh route with its high passes could be ruled out because of its unsuitability for large-scale movement of troops.

COPY No. 10.

TOP SECRET.

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND  
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS.

SUMMARY FOR THE CABINET.

Subject:- Third Meeting of the SEAC Council of  
Ministers to be held at Canberra, Australia,  
from the 15th March to the 18th March 1957.

The Council of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the eight-member countries (Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, the U.K. and the U.S.A.) holds its meeting once a year. The first and second annual sessions of the Council were held in San Francisco, California in February 1955 and March 1956 respectively.

3. The third meeting of the Council of Ministers is scheduled to be held in Canberra from the 15th to the 18th March 1957 to review the progress made by SEAC during the previous year and approve the programme for 1957-58. The agenda will be as follows:-

1. Public Opening Session.
2. Election of the Chair man.
3. Approval of Agenda.
4. Exchange of Views on matters affecting the Treaty area.
5. Consideration of the Classified Report and Recommendations of the Council Representatives.
6. Consideration of the Economic activities of SEAC.
7. Consideration of the Report and Recommendations of the Military Advisers.
8. Other Business.
9. Approval of Communiqué.
10. Public Closing Session.

Public Opening Session.

3. The Public opening session will probably be addressed by the Australian Prime Minister. Other Foreign Ministers will also avail themselves of this opportunity of making statements on SEAC for the benefit of the Press and the Public.

.....2/-

Election of Chairman.

4. As per Item 2 of the agenda, it may be stated that the election of the Chairman takes place at the public opening session. It has been laid down in the Rules of Procedure that normally the Foreign Minister of the host country will act as Chairman of the Council. It may, therefore, be taken for granted that Mr. R.S. Casey, Minister for External Affairs for Australia will act as Chairman of the Council. It has also been a precedent that the name of the Chairman is proposed by the Leader of the Delegation of the Country which served as host for the previous council meeting. Accordingly the leader of the Pakistan Delegation will propose Mr. Casey's candidature for Chairmanship.

Approval of agenda:

5. As per Item 3 of the agenda namely "The approval of agenda" it may be mentioned that Item 6 of the agenda has been introduced on our recommendation. Since we have no other specific issues to raise, it is recommended that our Delegation may support the adoption of the proposed agenda.

Exchange of Views on Matters affecting Treaty Area.

6. The fourth item of the agenda relates to "Exchange of Views on matters affecting the Treaty Area". Each Council Minister gives his own assessment of the situation existing in the Treaty area and also suggests ways and means for strengthening the peace and security of the region. It will be recalled that at the Second meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers held in Karachi in March 1956, Pakistan asked other SEATO members to support her stand on Kashmir and the Durand Line in view of the hostile statements made by the Soviet leaders in Brjnzgar and Kabul in December, 1955. The SEATO Foreign Ministers approved Pakistan's

~~stand to the following terms:~~

~~They particularly deplored statements and interventions by Soviet leaders in recent months designed to increase tension and promote division in the South Asian region and among other nations of the free world. In view of these statements referred to above, the members of the Council generally declared that their governments~~

....3/-

recognised that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it was consequently affirmed that the area referred to in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty includes the area up to this line. In so far as these statements concerned Kashmir the Members of the Council noted that the United Nations' resolutions remain in force, affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the United Nations or by direct negotiation".

7. It will be recalled that at the Manila Conference in 1954 Pakistan had succeeded in having the word "Communist" deleted both from the Preamble and Article IV of the Washington draft of the SEATO Treaty. As a result of this deletion, the SEATO Treaty was supposed to guarantee Pakistan's defence against aggression not only from the direction of Communism but also from unfriendly neighbours like India and Afghanistan. The U.S., while signing the Treaty, however, attached a reservation to the Treaty which restricted the obligation of the U.S. under paragraph 1 Article IV to Communist aggression alone. As a result of this reservation, the U.S. is bound to meet an aggression on Pakistan only if such an attack proceeds from Communist quarters. In case of an armed attack on Pakistan from non-Communist quarters, the obligation of the U.S. will be sufficiently discharged by consulting with the other Parties immediately (under paragraph 2 of Article IV) in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for Pakistan's defence. In a letter dated the 21st February, 1954 to the then Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammed Ali, the U.S. Secretary of State clarifying the American reservation, however, stated "Of course, if an attack were in fact instigated by the Communists that, I think I can assure you, would be judged by the United States to be 'Communist aggression'".

8. Although all SEATO countries, except the U.S., signed the SEATO Treaty without any reservation, some of the SEATO countries started issuing statements after signing the SEATO Treaty which qualify their commitments under Article IV Paragraph 1 of the Treaty. (1) The Australian Foreign Minister referring to SEATO stated on October 27, 1954:

[illegible]

(a) action by the S270 powers in the publicity field against neutralization groups.

(c) Embargo on supply of defence and strategic material to neutralist as to commercial.

Since the United States is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is bound to support the principles of collective security and to oppose any action which might lead to a general war.

It is the policy of the United States to support the principles of collective security and to oppose any action which might lead to a general war.

next

threat of aggression.

- (4) With a view to strengthening SEATO, major SEATO powers should refrain from all such actions which might lead to a general war. The United States should encourage the action that neutralism pays.



COPY NO.

SECRET

MEETING OF THE CABINET HELD ON  
WEDNESDAY, THE 5TH SEPTEMBER, 1956,  
AT 10.00 A.M.

P\_R\_E\_S\_E\_N\_T

The Prime Minister.  
The Minister for Commerce and Industries.  
The Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs.  
The Minister for Health.  
The Minister for Labour, Works and Minority Affairs.  
The Minister for Communications.  
The Minister of State for Refugees & Rehabilitation and  
Parliamentary Affairs.  
The Secretary to the Cabinet.  
The Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet.

Case No. 750/50/56.-

Visit of a Pakistan Parliamentary  
delegation to China.

The Prime Minister stated that a letter had been received from the Chinese Government inviting a Pakistan Parliamentary delegation to visit China. All expenses, including the cost of passages, would be borne by the Chinese Government.

It was agreed that consideration of this matter should be taken up after Cabinet had fixed the date for the next session of the National Assembly.

MEETING OF THE CABINET HELD ON  
WEDNESDAY, THE 14TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1955,  
AT 4.30 P.M.

Case No. 694/89/55.

--- The question of renunciation  
of China in the United Kingdom.

PRESENT

The Hon'ble the Prime Minister.  
The Hon'ble Minister for the Interior.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Law.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Commerce and Industries.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Education and Kashmir Affairs.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Health.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Information & Broadcasting.  
The Hon'ble Minister for Food and Agriculture.  
The Hon'ble Minister of State for Refugee & Rehabilitation  
and Parliamentary Affairs.  
The Hon'ble Minister of State for Finance.  
The Secretary to the Cabinet.  
The Joint Secretary to the Cabinet.

MINUTES

The Hon'ble the Prime Minister said that he had had notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Relations had made no mention of the fact that we had very friendly relations with America and were receiving aid from that country. On the other hand the relations with China were improving, and in view of the fact that China was the most powerful country in Asia for many years to come, it was important to have very friendly relations with China. He would have the views of his colleagues in this regard.

During discussion the following observations were made:-

In view of what had happened in Germany and the attitude of the Chinese Prime Ministers it would be extremely awkward for us to vote with America in favour of partitioning China. On the other hand, the Chinese would still support America until 1957. Presidential elections were taking place in 1958 and the Republican Government was not likely to risk unpopularity by what might appear to be supporting a communist Government. Therefore, if we voted against America it would be the subject of severe criticism.

THE.....

the American press and would not be liked by the people of America. The State Department itself realizing our position, would not perhaps re-act violently. It would be advisable, therefore, to sound America through diplomatic channels and to let a decision utter itself.

If we remained neutral we could say to America that although we had recognized China and in view of our position would support China, it was in deference to the views of the American Government that we had remained neutral. On the other hand, we could explain to China that in view of our friendship and certain commitments to America we should have sided with America but in view of our friendly feelings for the new Chinese Government.

Against this I have contended that neutrality was not open to either party. We were in a difficult position and I think we should have sided with China. It was better to displease China than to displease America in view of the fact that the new Chinese Government was a friend. Even when we had the Communist threat, if the threat was really that they would turn on us, we should have sided with the U.S. In view of the fact that the threat was not likely to come up in that form, we had some ground for maneuvering.

Siding with China would give us certain benefits. Firstly, it would give us an ally in the Far East. Secondly, it would give us a better position in the Far East. Thirdly, it would give us a better position in the Far East. Fourthly, it would give us a better position in the Far East. Fifthly, it would give us a better position in the Far East. Sixthly, it would give us a better position in the Far East. Seventhly, it would give us a better position in the Far East. Eighthly, it would give us a better position in the Far East. Ninthly, it would give us a better position in the Far East. Tenthly, it would give us a better position in the Far East.

We should, therefore, immediately sound the American Government through our Ambassador in Washington. Soundings to the American Government should not mean that we were surrendering our foreign policy to the wishes of the American Government. We should, therefore, immediately sound the American Government through our Ambassador in Washington. Soundings to the American Government should not mean that we were surrendering our foreign policy to the wishes of the American Government. We should, therefore, immediately sound the American Government through our Ambassador in Washington. Soundings to the American Government should not mean that we were surrendering our foreign policy to the wishes of the American Government.

Amongst.....

Amongst friendly countries such consultations were considered both appropriate and normal. However, if we were really pressed hard we should vote with America.

S\_U\_C\_C\_I\_S\_I\_O\_N

The Cabinet decided that our Ambassador should informally explain our position vis-a-vis China and Colombo Powers to the American Government and sound them on this subject. If we find that the reaction of the American Government to our voting against postponement of Chinese admission to UN is very strong, then we should vote for the postponement or the consideration of the question during the next UN Session if our position is that unfavourable.

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SECRET

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
&  
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS.

ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE IN BANDUNG (INDONESIA)

18th April to 24th April, 1955.

Subject :- REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE  
UNITED NATIONS.

BRIEF FOR PAKISTAN DELEGATION

Ceylon has proposed an item relating to admission of new members to the United Nations and the deadlock over the admission of certain States. In the discussion of this item, the question of representation of China in the United Nations is also likely to be raised either by the Indian or the Communist Chinese Prime Minister. It is therefore necessary to furnish a brief to our delegation on the subject.

2. China is an original member of the United Nations and one of the "Big Five" permanent members of the Security Council. When the Charter came into force, China came to be represented by the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai Shek in the various organs of United Nations. After the flight of the Chiang Kai Shek to Formosa as a result of the Communist revolution on the mainland, the Chinese seat continued to be occupied by the Nationalist Government based on Formosa. This situation has ever since been challenged from time to time by the Communist Government and within the United Nations itself by the Soviet Union.

-----2/-

standing the expulsion of the representatives of the Nationalist Government and the seating of the delegates of the Central People's Government.

3. This demand was first made on 18th November, 1949, in a cablegram to the President of the General Assembly from the Foreign Minister of Central People's Government repudiating the legal status of the delegation of Nationalist China and maintaining that it could not represent China and had no right to speak on behalf of the Chinese people in the United Nations.

4. In the fifth session of the General Assembly, in 1950, India moved a resolution calling upon the Assembly to recognise the right of the Central People's Government to the Chinese seat. Pakistan voted in favour of this resolution which was, however, rejected by 33 votes to 16 with 10 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted another resolution freezing the status quo with regard to the Chinese representation until it should decide otherwise.

5. This situation has prevailed ever since and attempts by the USSR to seat Chinese Communist representatives year after year, have been defeated on account of the bitter opposition of the United States which has always succeeded in lining up a majority in order to postpone consideration of this question. Pakistan has always voted in favour of recognising the right of Communist China to the Chinese seat and by implication, for the expulsion of the Nationalist representatives.

6. The real issue in this question is not the admission of China to the United Nations, for China is already a member, but which government claiming to represent China, is entitled to be seated in the Organisation. A clear distinction between the two has not always been drawn with the result that they have tended to become confused.

7. The then Foreign Minister, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, defined Pakistan's stand in the following terms in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25th September 1950 :-

"The sole question is: who is entitled to represent China, a Member State, in the Assembly? What are the undisputed, incontrovertible facts bearing upon that question? The Government from which the delegation present here purports to draw its authority has for months ceased to exercise jurisdiction over any portion of the Chinese mainland. The struggle for supremacy in China between the two contending Chinese governments has come to an end. The status of the island of Formosa, where the Nationalist Government is now based, is itself the subject matter of determination, as witness the question placed upon the agenda at the instance of the United States delegation. In these circumstances, can it be pretended that it is the Nationalist Government that effectively represents China, in other words, the Chinese people? Or can it be denied that the Peking Government does in fact represent them? The truth of the matter is that the General Assembly is unwilling to concede the existence of a fact, not because the fact has not been established but because the majority regard it as unpleasant.

"This question of the representation of China is important in itself, but is even more important as indicating the chances that the gulf that at present divides some of the great powers and prevents understanding between them may be bridged at an early date. The consequences of this gulf widening or remaining unbridged would be vast and incalculable and are terrifying to contemplate. There may yet be time, through a sober and realistic approach towards this and other cognate problems, to avert the deadlock which threatens to overtake the functioning of the United Nations Organisation."



8. Despite the clear case for seating the representatives of the Central People's Government and the incontrovertible thesis that recognition is to be viewed as an acknowledgment of fact and not a certificate of good conduct, no argument has been able to alter the hard political fact that the United States and several other countries influenced by her, will not recognise Communist China or admit her to the United Nations at this time. The hardening of the U.S. attitude goes back to the intervention of the Chinese "People's volunteers" in the Korean war towards the end of 1950 which roused high feelings in the United States. The adoption of a resolution shortly afterwards by the General Assembly, condemning this intervention as aggression made the situation worse.

9. Early in June, 1953, the U.S. Congress went on record as follows:-

"It is the sense of the Congress that the Communist Chinese Government should not be admitted to membership of the United Nations as the representatives of China."

It was not without difficulty that President Eisenhower succeeded in dissuading the Congress from adopting a resolution not to pay the U.S.A.'s financial contribution to the U.N. which amounts to nearly 36% of the total U.N. budget if Communist China were seated. In return, however, he had to pledge himself not only to oppose any attempt in this direction but also to lead the opposition to it in the U.N.

10. Our delegation to the 9th session of the General Assembly last year was briefed to vote in favour of postponement of China's representation in the United Nations because the time was not ripe for deciding the question. Moreover, we were influenced by the fact that our relations with the United States had become closer in account of the acceptance of

U.S. military aid and our participation in the Manila Treaty. The General Assembly decided not to consider this question during the 9th session.

11. Of the countries participating in the Asian-African Conference, only the five sponsors, North Viet Nam and Afghanistan have recognised the Central People's Government. None of the Arab countries or Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, Japan, Cambodia, Laos or South Viet Nam have done so.

12. It would not be surprising, if, as a result of the Conference, Japan and some of the Arab countries led by Egypt extend recognition.

13. The U.S., which was one of the first countries to recognise the Communist regime, has made no secret of its views in favour of seating Communist China in the United Nations. But, in deference to American sentiment and public opinion, it has from time to time, though with great reluctance, urged a moratorium on the consideration of the question by the General Assembly.

14. In August last year, President Eisenhower dropped a hint that while the U.S.A. was at present strongly opposed to the immediate entry of Communist China into the U.N. the position might be different at some future date. Since then, however, the United States attitude has again hardened on account of the Formosa crisis and the declaration by Communist China to "liberate" Formosa by force, if necessary. The recent refusal of Chairman Liu to give any undertaking to refrain from using force to obtain possession of the off-shore islands from the mainland, has frozen the deadlock which had shown signs of yielding as a result of Indo-China settlement.

15. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we shall be precluded from opposing any resolution in favour of Communist Chinese representation in the United Nations. This follows logically not only from the fact that we

recognised the Communist regime as far back as 4th January, 1950, and have maintained diplomatic relations with it from May, 1951, but also from our stand on the United Nations and the statement in the communique after the first meeting in Colombo of the five Prime Ministers that representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations "would help to promote stability in Asia, ease world tension and assist in bringing about a more realistic approach to the problems concerning the world, particularly in the Far East". In the Bogor meeting, we were a party to extending an invitation to the People's Republic of China to participate in the Asian-African Conference.

16. In view of the above statement of the position, our delegation may extend its support to the representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

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TOP SECRET

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COMMONWEALTH  
RELATIONS**

**SUMMARY FOR THE CABINET**

**SUBJECT:—Demarcation of Boundary between India and Pakistan**

1. Informal approach has been made to the Government of China for the demarcation of the boundary between China and Pakistan in the Hukang region. A detailed note is attached as Appendix A.

2. On the 31st of December, 1950, the Chinese Government orally expressed their formal acceptance of our proposal and requested that we should have a proposal in written form.

3. The Government of China has also asked whether we would be prepared to demarcate the boundary in the Baluchistan region.

4. For entering into formal negotiations with China, the Government of Pakistan has requested the Cabinet to give its approval.

5. The previous Governments of Pakistan felt that it was necessary to make an approach to the Chinese on the boundary question.

6. The Valley of Kashmir was completely under Indian occupation administratively and militarily.

7. An agreement was reached between India and Pakistan.

8. While there was no formal agreement, the Chinese Government, at the present time, was an opportune moment for making an approach. The Government of China has confirmed its appreciation.

9. It is proposed to make a formal approach to the Chinese Government.

10. Our stand with reference to the status of Kashmir is that it is an integral part of Pakistan. Though it is a disputed area, the claim there is no dispute why we should not proceed on the basis of our stand. On the other hand, with reference to Baltistan, our stand has all along been that it is a part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, though directly administered by us.

11. In view of the fact that in making our protest to the Security Council against India's proposed negotiations with China on the border of India, we made it quite clear that no party had the right to negotiate with reference to the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, it would be inconsistent on the part of us to negotiate with reference to the border of Baltistan.

12. Cabinet's permission is requested for entering into the Chinese that we are not prepared to demarcate the boundary in Baluchistan region.

8. *De facto* position on the Hurma Sinkiang boundary is described in the note of the Ministry of Defence at Appendix 'B'.

Keeping in view the Strategic needs, what our demand should be is discussed in the note of the Ministry of Defence at Appendix 'C'.

Cabinet is requested to approve the proposed stand explained in this note and in particular the last ditch demand along line XBCDH of the attached map as suggested by the Ministry of Defence. Efforts will, of course, be made to secure the best we can as explained in Appendix 'D'.

9. It is proposed that the negotiations should begin at an official level. If preliminary negotiations prove fruitful, the level may be raised to that of Ministers. The Chinese seem to be anxious to invite the President for this purpose. It has been made clear to them that the President would consider such a proposal only if the ground has been previously prepared at lower levels.

Cabinet's permission is requested to ask the Chinese to send an official delegation.

10. It is further requested that a Committee may be formed consisting of the representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Kashmir Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, I S I Directorate and Surveyor General to prepare our case based on a careful examination of all available data.

The Ministries of Defence and Kashmir Affairs have seen the summary and concurred in it. The Foreign Minister has approved it.

M. ISRAHIMULAI  
Secretary to the Government of Pakistan

KARACHI.  
Thu. 14th February, 1967

TOP SECRET

PRESIDENT'S SECRETARIAT  
CABINET DIVISION  
(Cabinet Branch)

No. 11/CN/61.

Rawalpindi, the 25th February, 1961.

The undersigned is directed to inform the Ministers that a meeting of the Cabinet will be held at 9.00 A.M. on Wednesday, the 1st March, 1961, at the President's House, Rawalpindi.

A\_G\_E\_K\_D\_A

1. Proposal to start negotiations with the Government of Kuwait for concluding a bilateral air transport agreement. (Minister of Defence)
2. Amendment to Force of Defence Act, 1903 (Act No. 19 of 1903). - do -
3. Air transport agreement between Pakistan and Japan. - do -
4. Demarcation of boundary between China and Pakistan. (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
5. Periodical report on the price of rice, stocks etc. of rice in East Pakistan for the 1st half of February, 1961. (Minister for Finance)
6. Pakistan's participation in the 10th session of ECAFE to be held in New Delhi from 19th to 20th March, 1961. (Minister for Finance)
7. Introduction of through passengers, parcels and goods traffic between East and West Pakistan and West Bengal and Assam. (Minister for Railways and Communications)
8. Formation of a Central Board of Film Censors in Pakistan. (Minister for P.R. & I)
9. Monthly report of Pakistan for the month of January, 1961. (Minister for Defence)
10. Limited trade agreement with France. - do -

S. Iqbal Hussain  
Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet

The President.  
All Ministers.  
Director, B.M.  
Secretary, Ministry of Defence

SECRET

CABINET MEETING HELD ON SATURDAY,  
THE 3RD MARCH, 1953, AT 9 A.M. AT  
THE PARLIAMENTARY HOUSE, KANAKPORE.

PRESENT

The President.  
The Minister for Health, Labour & Social  
Welfare, Education & Scientific Research,  
Kashmir Affairs and Minority Affairs.  
The Minister for External Affairs.  
The Minister for Food & Agriculture and  
Rehabilitation.  
One Minister for Economic Co-ordination.  
The Minister for Industries.  
The Minister for Railways & Communications.  
The Minister for National Reconstruction &  
Information.  
The Minister for Public Power & Natural Resources  
and Works.  
The Minister for Home Affairs.  
The Minister for Finance.  
The General Secretary.  
The Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet.

The Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet.

The Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet stated that the  
Cabinet had considered the report of the  
Joint Commission on the subject of the  
internal Security situation. The President said that  
we should agree to the suggestion and send it to  
the Prime Minister accordingly.

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