


**An Analytical Study of the Economic Development of  
Balochistan, 2000-2015**




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**2017**



~~Accession No~~

Accession No TH:18159

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338.9  
NAA



Balochistan (Pakistan) - Economic conditions

" " - " history



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**2017**

**In The Name of ALLAH Almighty**

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By

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
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
Certified that contents and form of thesis entitled, "**An Analytical Study of the Economic Development of Balochistan, 2000-2015**" submitted by **Naseeb Ullah**, Registration # **48-FSS/MSHIS/S14** have been found satisfactory for, in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **Master Studies (MS)** in History.

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DEDICATION

*To My Beloved Sister*

*Bibi Spozmai*

## **DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by myself and that all the work carried out herein is of my own except where particularly indicated.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Countless thanks to ALLAH Almighty, Creator of all perceivable and non-perceivable, Worthy of all value, Who always guides in darkness and helps in difficulties and bless an overthrowing force/power against odds, when all other sourced channels upper limit ends. Prime respects and honours to **His Last Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.W.)**; Prophet of Revolution and Mercy for all the worlds, who enabled the man to recognize his Creator.

I feel an unfilled honour to express my gratitude & indebtedness to my respected, learned, ingenious, and reverend Research Supervisor- **DR. ABDUL ZAHOR KHAN**, for his invaluable guardianship, kind-hearted attitude, and agile, skilful, and sweat supervision, during this research period.

I wish to acknowledge my utmost thanks to my highly regarded teachers at the Department of History & Pakistan Studies, IIUI- **Dr. Mujeeb Ahmad** (Chairman Department), **Dr. Akhtar Hussain**, **Dr. Safi Ullah Khan Marwat** and **Dr. Syed Akmal Hussain Shah**, who all guided me individually & independently whenever I wanted to have at all the way leads to research. My humble respects go to **Prof. Dr. Razia Sultana**, who gave me scores of constructive. Tips during the research period, proved a Beacon House for me.

I would like to express my heartiest gratitude to my **Father, Mother, sisters, brothers** and all family members; their love, prayers, and constant care were the assets for me during the span of my life.

I have no words to there for PhD. scholar Muhammad Nawaz Shahzad and MS scholar Hafiz Najeeb Ullah for his support. I am also thankful to Najeeb Ullah; my younger brother, Advocate Fareed Ullah Kakar and Advocate Najeeb Ullah Churmy for their support in Quetta. Finally, I appreciate the encouragement and cooperation of all my friends and colleagues whose names are not being written, but their cooperation is being recognized.

**Naseeb Ullah**

### **List of Abbreviations**

BF	Bugti Force
BL	Bugti Lovers
BLA	Balochistan Liberation Army
BLF	Balochistan Liberation Front
BLUF	Baloch Liberation United Front
BMDO	Baloch Musallah Difai Organization
BNA	Baloch National Army
BRA	Baloch Republican Army
BSO	Balochistan Students Organization
BSU	Baloch State Union
CASA-1000	Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
DIG	Deputy Inspector General
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
HRCP	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
IFFRAS	International Forum for Rights and Security

IG	Inspector General
IRG	Iranian Revolutionary Guards
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISO	Imamia Students Organization
ISSI	Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KSNP	Kalat State National Party
KSU	Kalat State Union
LB	Lashkar-i-Balochistan
LJ	Lashkar-i-Jhangvi,
MI	Military Intelligence
NAP	National Awami Party
NATO	North Atlantic Territory Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him
PIPS	Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies
PkMAP	Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
PSA	Port of Singapore Authority

RAW Research and Analysis Wing

SCP Supreme Court of Pakistan

SSP Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan

TPP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

UN United Nations

USA United States of America

WW II World War Second

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## Introduction

Ethnicity refers to a complex combination of cultural, racial, and historical features, which occasionally divides societies into hostile and doubtlessly separate, political entities. Almost anything can be used to set up ethnic divisions, though, after skin colour, the two most common by a long way, are religion and language. According to the Dictionary of Politics,

“[e]thnicity raises the whole socio-political question of national identity that is why ethnic politics is at its most active and important in third world countries whose geographical definition is indebted often far more to European empire builders to tend them to any ethnic homogeneity.”<sup>1</sup>

The politics of Ethnicity in advanced societies; struggling for organizing a productive economy, while in third world countries it is absolutely central to the problems of organizing a working political system at all.<sup>2</sup>

In modern world there are very few modern states, which are ethnically homogeneous. The problem arises when ethnic movements grew to transforms into nationalist movement. The ethnic seek to gain advantages within an existing state; while nationalist movements seek to establish or maintain their own state.<sup>3</sup>

The sense of nationalism gets roots in Baloch tribal society at the time of withdrawal of British from India. After the partition of India into two domains; India and Pakistan, Baloch states were acceded to Pakistan. Pakistan comprised of multi-ethnic societies, but the governing class had ignored the fact and tried to change the multi-nation status into a single nation.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> David Rober, *The Penguin Dictionary of Politics* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 111-112.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Tahir Amin, *Ethno-Nationalist Movements of Pakistan* (Islamabad: IPS, 1993), 2.

<sup>4</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 16.

In the case of Baloch, the result of that ignorance was continuous but frequent armed conflict between some Baloch insurgents<sup>5</sup> and State of Pakistan; from 1948 till 1977.<sup>6</sup> During military regime of Musharraf economic developments were initiated to address the grievances of Baloch, which unfortunately resulted in a more violent Baloch insurgency in Balochistan.

Relationship between federal government of Pakistan and the province of Balochistan is worst over the distribution of political power and resources, as at least the current insurgency is fifth one after the foundation of Pakistan. From 1948 till 1977 Baloch were protesting frequently for their rights as in 1948, Prince Abdul Kareem was dismissed from his office as governor of Lasbela, from 1958-1964 protest was meant for the release of political prisoners and from 1973-1977 the protest was carried against the dismissal of elected government of the tribal chiefs in 1973.<sup>7</sup> These events not only increased political instability but also worsened the law and order situation in the province.

The current insurgency started after 2005. When mega projects were started in the province without the consultation of Baloch tribal chiefs<sup>8</sup>; such as Gwadar Sea Port, Saindak project and coastal highway from Gwadar to Karachi. The nationalist movement has strategic impact felt in Kabul, Delhi, and Washington and economic impact felt in Tehran, Dubai, Beijing, Russia and Central Asia. This time due to foreign involvement the Baloch way of protest gets recognition as a Baloch National movement at international level; after the

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<sup>5</sup> In the entire work Baloch insurgency word is used to ease the reader but it does not mean that all Baloch are involved in the insurgency. Baloch Insurgency represents only those Baloch who are involved in armed conflict instead of political means.

<sup>6</sup> Afshan Ahmed, *Analysing Possible Role of USA in Pak-Baloch Conflict* (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2012), 3-5. Also available at, [www.sdpi.org](http://www.sdpi.org). (Retrieved 15 March, 2015).

<sup>7</sup> In 1948, 1958, 1962-1964, 1973-1974 Baloch resisted and in 2006 the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti sparked the issue with a more violent nature. For detail also see, Afshan Ahmed, *Analysing Possible Role of USA in Pak-Baloch Conflict*, 3-5.

<sup>8</sup> The Baloch Tribal chiefs perceived that the lands of their tribes belong to them and they wanted autonomy in all spheres. On the other hand these perceptions were challenging the rite of the state. See also, Afshan Ahmed, *Analysing Possible Role of USA in Pak-Baloch Conflict*, 5-6.

kidnapping of the head of Human Right Commission of Pakistan.<sup>9</sup> Henry Kissinger said in 1962,

“[i] wouldn’t know [this] problem if it hit me in the face”.<sup>10</sup>

Most experts for example Afshan Ahmed, G. Cheema, Feroz Ahmad, Tahir Amin, and others agree that the existence of Pakistan could be jeopardized in such circumstances of political instability and will spoil the economic, political, and strategic landscape of South and South-West Asia. The current strategic and economic importance of Balochistan is due to its location and the development of Gwadar Port. With the resolution of the issue not only Pakistan but also the region will fund the way for development.

The federal government of Pakistan tried to address the backwardness of Balochistan and the grievances of Baloch by initiating a series of economic development.<sup>11</sup> The federal government although started a program with the name of Aghaz-i-Haqooq-i-Balochistan for the social uplift of the people of Balochistan but it was too late as the regional powers exploited the grievances of some of the Baloch tribal chiefs. The involvement of the foreign hands and the exploitation of the Baloch insurgency not only distract the people of Balochistan from becoming a develop society but also created hurdles in the regional development.

### **1.1 Statement of the Problem**

The economic activities initiated by Government of Pakistan after 2000, such as Gwadar deep seaport and economic corridor via Gwadar-Kashgar rout provides a chance to all ethnic groups (Baloch, Pashtoons, Punjabi and Sindhi etc.) to integrate within state of Pakistan. On

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<sup>9</sup> For detail see Chapter No 4, *The Dilemma of Baloch Nationalism*, 36-47.

<sup>10</sup> Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for international peace, 1981), 152.

<sup>11</sup> Such as, Gwadar Deep Seaport, Coastal Highway, National Highways, CASA-1000 Project and CPEC.

the other hand these developments threatened the interests of regional powers wanted to establish their hegemony in the region. These powers exploit Baloch insurgency against the development in Pakistan.

After the three decades of political stability, in 2005 Balochistan saw fifth insurgency, which was more violent than all the previous insurgencies. This time the Baloch resistance gets recognition as a movement, because of foreign support. The economic developments without social developments will increase discrimination in Pakistan as well provide a chance to foreign hand for interference in Balochistan. The continuation of insurgency not only distract the Baloch from becoming a develop society but also threatening the federation and existence of Pakistan.

## **1.2 Review of the Literature**

*Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview, volume 1 and 2* serve a basic source for understanding the phenomena of Nationalism in the World. Daniel Chernilo's book, *A Social Theory of the Nation-State: The Political Forms of Modernity Beyond Methodological Nationalism*, provides a renovated account of the nation-state's historical development and recent global challenges via an analysis of the writings of key social theorists.

*The Routledge Dictionary of Politics* third edition serves as basic source while defining political terms such as Political economy, State, Ethnicity, Nation and Nationalism. Douglas Woodwell's work; *Nationalism in International Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity*, have an account for understanding Nationalism in globalized world. Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman's team work "*Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*" not only is the account for Nationalism but also discusses the computability of nationalism with democracy and globalization. Apart from this the above literature provides a theoretical

framework to analyse whether the Balochistan issue was nationalism or simply a protest and resistance of few Baloch insurgents.

Aristotle in his famous book; *Nichomachean Ethics* had raised the concept of political economy and the question of the individual values. Kenneth Arrow tried to answer the question raised by Aristotle in his book; *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd edition. The discussion over politics and economy was combined by Karl Marx, in his work; *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*.

Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast team work; *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*, provides an account of the political economy as well its impact on society and individual. Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson work; *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*, provides an account of the economy and its impact on politics.

Karl Polanyi book; *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, deal with the question that how transformation of political system can take place with the economic system.

*Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States*, edited by Kersbergen Van, Kees, and Philip Manow, is an account of the political economy and its relation with religion and class formation. John W Dardess's book; *Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty*, Yijiang Ding's book; *Chinese Democracy After Tiananmen*, and Benjamin A Elman's book; *Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Ch'ang-Chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China*, not only provides an account of the Chinese political thoughts and its influence over economy but have also provided the impact of Confucianism over the China political economy.

K. N. Chaudhuri in his book; *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, provides an account of understanding the political economy of Indian Ocean region with a historical context. Gregory Copley's work; *New Strategic Equation in the Indian Ocean* highlights the importance of the trade especially that of Indian Ocean.

Beside this the work also provides an account of the new developments took place in Indian Ocean trade as well its strategic importance for the region. Sam Batsman's work; *Indian Ocean Region: Prospects for a New Regional Community* also highlighted the political economy in the Indian Ocean region. It also indicates the competition among the regional states for the control of sea trade.

There is plethora of literature available on Balochistan issue, Gwadar, economic development and political situation of Balochistan. I am lucky as, for updates *Golden Palms (Residential Estate, Gwadar)*; a web page provides the collection of News from different NEWS papers about the development taking place there in Gwadar.

Sidra Tariq in her work; *India and China in Indian Ocean: A Complex Interplay of Geopolitics Highlighted* the importance of the sea trade and its impact for China and India. This work also presented the importance of Gwadar as newly built seaport.

Ziad Haider in his work; *Balochs, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port*, draws a triangular picture of the Gwadar seaport developments. This work provides an account of the interests of both China and Pakistan. It also presented Baloch nationalists point of view i.e. the benefits of Gwadar will pass them. This work further considers that Baloch nationalists found a common cause with Al-Qaeda and terrorizing the province with the support of neighbouring countries.

Hasan Yaser Malik highlighted the importance of Gwadar seaport in his work; *Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port*. He explains the interests of China, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, Persian Gulf and Asia as a whole and concluded that Gwadar Sea Port is not only providing strategic depth to Pakistan but surely brings in prosperity for entire region.

Captain K. Raffat Zaheer, in *Development and Operations of the Port of Gwadar*, produces an account of development taking place in Gwadar and concluded that, activities at Gwadar are expected to generate about two million new jobs in the next 8–10 years. He further noted that despite the challenges, the overall potential for development of business, commerce and services at Gwadar is indeed impressive. Provided the GOP is sincere and effective in implementing the plans for building inland road/railway links, the dream of a booming Gwadar comes true.

Muhammad Shafiq in his work; *Emerging Trends in Geo-politics of Asia Pacific Region*, predicted the start of a new cold war in Asia Pacific region, among the three key players i.e. USA, India and China. This work contains an account of the clash of the interests of these three players. He finally suggested that Pakistan has to closely watch these developments and is to make necessary adjustments in her foreign policy outlook as well as outreach to Asia Pacific region.

Siraj Nizamani also expresses the same picture of geo politics of the Asian Pacific region in his work *India's Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy*. This work also pointed the common interest and strategy of India and USA. Qaisar Ullah, Madeline Berma and Faridah Shahadan team work; *The Economic Impact of Gwadar Port Development on Gwadar Region, Pakistan*, reveal both positive and negative impact of Gwadar port development on

regional economy. This work suggested that positive impact is mainly on the total economic output and industrial structure while negative impact is on environmental issues.

Jehanzeb in his work; *The Trade Potential and Industrial Development in Gwadar*, noted that Gwadar is not only going to play pivotal role in Pakistan's economy but is also likely to influence other neighbouring countries like China, Iran, Central Asia etc. Gwadar, therefore, has importance not just for Pakistan but for the whole region. He further expected that Gwadar project generates thousands of jobs for the local people due to which there will be revolutionary changes. The progress will be on different levels i.e. individual and family, city and society, province and the country at large.

Apart from this, the works done on the Gwadar and Balochistan have discussed the importance of Gwadar and reason behind the political instability. Some works focused on the Baloch insurgency and provides a link between Gwadar development and Balochistan political instability. On this behalf, the work can be divided into two distinct classes.

The works, which express the Baloch grievances presents the Baloch theory or Baloch's political point of view. Musa Khan Jalal Zai's, *Sectarianism and Politico-Religious Terrorism in Pakistan* and Ayesha Sidiqa's work; *The Cost of Conflict in Balochistan*, presented the view of provincial discrimination with Balochistan by the federation of Pakistan. This work focused over the provincial discrimination as main cause of Baloch insurgency, which is the ultimate cause of political instability.

These works suggested that the issue can be resolved by facilitating Balochistan and launching provincial autonomy. Although the federation facilitated Balochistan through "Aghaz-i-Haqq-i-Balochistan" and provincial autonomy through 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, but the issue remain on its place.

In this regard John Breuilly's work; *Baloch Ethnic Nationalism: From Guerrilla War to Nowhere?* Sketched Baloch ethnic movement and concluded that Baloch ethnic movement started at the time of withdrawal of British from India and from 1947 to 1973 and remained unrecognized force. His work further added that it was in 1970s that the Baloch nationalist movement gets recognition due to the foreign involvement; due to economic and strategic importance of the province of Balochistan. This work provides a significant concept of the Baloch ethnic movement, but it only covers the subject till 1977 and also ignored the state perspectives. Thus this book will serve the study to examine the facts preserved by it.

On other hand the works; like the work of Inayatullah Khan Baloch; *Resistance and National Liberation in Baloch Poetry*, Ahmad Yar Khan Baloch; *Baloch Inside Balochistan* and Selig S. Harrison; *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, also present the Baloch perceptions of the discrimination by federation. They believe that, the introduction of major projects in the field of development in Balochistan is the main cause of Baloch insurgency. Here the current study get help from these sources to analyse their presented facts and it provided the study an angle for the involvement of foreign hands in Balochistan.

Alok Bansal's *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad* is an important source for this study. In this book Bansal presented political development that took place in post-colonial Balochistan. This book also serves the study as it also included the importance of the Balochistan for Pakistan and region. The writer further highlighted some of the facts which attracted the attentions of regional powers to Balochistan. The writer also presented his point of view by summarizing that Baloch always resisted the authority of the State of Pakistan. Although he pointed some of the facts with accuracy but it was his ignorance for being included all the Balochs in resistance against the state authority. The book contained some

the facts which indicated the involvement of foreign hands in Balochistan for worsening the law and order situations.

Bansal's point of views plays important role in this study as it will provided one side of the picture leading the study to search for its conflicting point of view. In this regard Martin Axmann's book; *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955*, is the brief history of Baloch Nation and National state building process. It also highlighted the role of British and the State of Pakistan to govern the Balochs. The events are critically discussed and facts are presented with chronological order. The study investigates the genesis of Baloch nationalism during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, analyses the emergence of a Baloch national movement, and sets it into relation to the rise of an Indian and Muslim Indian (Pakistan) national movement in British India during that time. The study portrays the decline and disintegration of the Baloch Khanate of Kalat during the last decades of British rule, analyses Kalat's lack of integration but increasing attachment to British Indian affairs, and summarizes the colonial legacy of Balochistan in respect of political, administrative and constitutional development.

It investigates the emergence of a royalist movement around the figure of the Khan of Kalat, and discusses his attempt to turn back time and revert to Balochistan's pre-colonial status. It analyses into the coincident rise of a Baloch nationalist movement, and analyses the political and cultural framework of an emerging Baloch national identity. It traces the political demands of Baloch nationalist pioneers, and looks for interrelations with the Baloch royalist and Indian Muslim nationalist movements. It ascertains the emergence of a Baloch national movement as the outcome of the historical and political circumstances during the British withdrawal from India, and portrays the evolution of Baloch national identity as a reaction to the territorial, political and cultural inclusion on side of the All India Muslim League and the Pakistan movement.

The work of Taj Muhammad Breseeq; *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, presents the Baloch point of view about the origin of Baloch ethnic movement and also provides an account for the administrative changes that took place in first decade of Pakistan's independence.

Among the Baloch writers, Gul Khan Nasir's *Tarikh-i-Balochistan 1952-1954*, (The History of Balochistan 1952-1954), in two volumes, is seemingly the best and the most authentic account of the events, activities and personalities related to the Baloch history, nationalism and national movement. It examines the theoretical writings on the subject and concludes that nationalism is the sense of identity shared by a group of people who are linked by either a civic-territorial or by a linguistic-ethnic bond and by the belief that their corporate interests can best be protected by control of their own state. The central theme of the dissertation revolves around two basic questions:

1. Is there a Baloch nationality with a sufficiently developed national consciousness and distinctive characteristics shared by the members of this nationality?
2. If so, is the national consciousness of the Baloch, their determination to maintain their national identity, and their desire for political self-government, strong enough to say that there is a Baloch national movement. The dissertation serves several purposes.

It fills a gap in our knowledge of Baloch nationalism in Pakistan and Iran and explores in detail its development in the 1920-80 period. By adopting a comparative approach it contributes to a better understanding of sub-national movements in both countries. The main approach to the study is historical: using primary and secondary sources, it describes and analyses the foundations, evolution, dynamics and implications of Baloch Nationalism. Nasir was among the top leaders of the Baloch national movement. He was also, during the 1930's, one of the few indigenous deputy ministers in the Khanate Cabinet before he resigned

and joined the national movement. In 1971, he became the Minister of Education of the short-lived autonomous Balochistan within the Federation of Pakistan. At the same time, he was an elected member of the provincial legislature dominated by the Baloch movement under the rubric of the National Awami Party.

M. Sardar Khan Baloch's *Baloch a Nation and History of Baloch Race and Balochistan* and of Mir Khuda Bakhsh Marri's *Searchlight on Baloches and Balochistan* are two important works. Sardar Khan Baloch, who had a Master's degree from Aligarh University, was among the ideologues of Baloch nationalism during the 1930s and 1940s. He was also close to the Khan's Darbar (Court) as Minister of Education of the Khanate for a short period. The preparation of the first map of a Greater Balochistan showing all the traditional Baloch regions is ascribed to Sardar Khan and Abdul Aziz Kurd simultaneously. It seems to have been a joint work which is still in use in different ways. Khuda Bakhsh Marri (Bar-at-Law) was a Pakistan High Court judge. He belongs to the most rebellious and the largest Baloch (Marri) tribe. Like Sardar Khan's book, Marri's work suffers from imposed political limitations. In Mir Ahmad Yar Khan's political autobiography, *Inside Balochistan*; his naive insistence to justify his demand for a sovereign Balochistan and his goodwill for Jinnah's Islamic Pakistan at the same time, give a senile colour to his work. However, with all their shortcomings, these works provide useful background material and some glues to alert and curious readers.

The works of Shireen Mazari; *Balochistan and the 'Great Power Games*, Mary Anne Weaver's; *Pakistan: in the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, Frederic Grare; *Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism*, Asim Yasin's; *Tariq sees Foreign Hand in Balochistan Unrest*, and G. S. Bhargava's; *How Serious Is the Baloch Insurgency?* Presents the federation perception of the problem. The emphasis is laid over foreign involvement in Baloch insurgency and argues that political instability of Balochistan is mainly caused by it.

These works contend that the aim of foreign hands is to detour the economic development in Balochistan. The main reason behind the foreign involvement in Balochistan is due to Gwadar, as it affects their hegemonic interests. The report of Pak Institute for Peace Studies; *Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan: Assessing Strategic Policy Options for and Security 2010*, is also a useful source for the study. This provides a brief account of the Baloch ethnic movement. International Forum for Rights and Security (IFFRAS) Research Team's work; *Balochistan: Denial of Destiny*, not only provides a brief account of Balochistan issue but also highlighted the foreign support for Baloch insurgency.

This literature provides a sense that, the economic development in Balochistan without social development is not acceptable for the Baloch. The Islamabad and Baloch perceptions countering each other, which shows the incompetency of the steps that had been taken in the case of Balochistan.

The works of Howard Becker and Harry Elmer's; *Social Thoughts from Lore to Science*, M. Ashraf Chaudri; *Iqbal and Modern Muslim Society*, Peter Singer's; *Hegel, E. A Sreedharan's; Text Book of Historiography: 500 BC to AD 2000*, and Mohammad Musleh-ud-Din's work; *Islamic Political Thoughts*, relates that history of the societies shows the moulding of human nature toward good.

The philosopher who regarded human nature to be originally good, have to seek to mould the corrupt nature of the men to its original form. The philosophers who regarded human nature as a combination of good and evil, sought to mould it toward good. For the purpose of good complete reliance is placed on education to achieve the desired result. In the globalized world it is also impossible to transform a primitive society (Baloch Society) into mess consuming society without evolution. For this evolution hundreds of years are required.

Thus for faster evolution to transform Baloch society into mess consuming society emphasis must be led on education beside economic developments.

### **1.3 Scope and Significance of the Study**

The current study helps to understand Balochistan issue with Historical-approach. The Historical-approach for Balochistan issue and analysis of the facts is the uniqueness of the study. This study highlights the facts that Balochistan issue from 1948-1977, as it remains and unrecognized force on international level and it gets recognition as a force after 2005, due to foreign involvement. The study suggests that the economic development can be used for political stability, social uplift and ultimately the integration of the Baloch in state of Pakistan, by introducing the social development through education. Gwadar Sea Port as a mega project is highlighted. The study also explores; Gwadar as source of tension, foreign involvement and political stability. This study narrates the concepts of different theorists regarding social development and also suggests the necessary steps the transformation of backward society of Balochistan, into developing and progressive society.

### **1.4 Hypothesis**

The constant tension between the State of Pakistan and Balochistan; which move toward recognition after 2005, was caused by the introduction of different economic projects in Balochistan. This resulted political instability that can be minimized not only by economic development but beside economic development socio-political development through education.

### **1.5 Research Methodology**

The methodology entreated in this research study is descriptive, while describing the subject a co-relational approach is followed to establish a relation of Balochistan issue with the

economic activities. However deductive approach is used to deal the facts and analysing these facts led the study to conclusion and verification of the hypothesis. Beside this in chapter three inductive methods is used for analysing facts related to Baloch ethno-nationalist movement. This study is qualitative in nature and based on secondary data. The secondary data was collected from different libraries in Islamabad and Quetta. In Islamabad the Doctor Muhammad Hamidullah Library is consulted for collection of different books to serve the study. Doctor Muhammad Raziud-Din Siddiqui Library in Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad also served this study by providing many useful books. The Pakistan Quetta Museum Sandeman Library, Balochistan Library Quetta, the Library of Baloch Academy and University of Balochistan Central Library are also consulted for the data collection.

Turabian Manual is followed in the entire study. The proposal, main body of research, end notes and bibliography are done according to the instruction of the manual. The bibliography used in this study consists of both primary and secondary sources, produced by Pakistani, Baloch ethno-nationalist and foreign researchers. Primary sources are only mentioned when it needs while secondary sources are widely consulted to become clear about facts and situation of the subject.

## **1.6 Objectives of the Study**

- To explore the nature of Balochistan issue and causes of Political instability in Balochistan.
- To explore the causes behind the interruption of development in Balochistan.
- To highlight the importance of mega projects; especially Gwadar Seaport and economic corridor, initiated by state of Pakistan.

## **1.7 Research Questions**

- Is Nationalism computable with Baloch issue and how for it affects political stability of Balochistan?
- To what extent the perception that, “economic development (especially Gwadar Seaport) speeded the Baloch Ethnic movement” is correct?
- What possible role Gwadar Seaport and other mega projects play in the development of Balochistan, Pakistan and the Region?
- What measures are necessary for the peaceful, progressive and economic development in future for the state of Pakistan?

## **1.8 Ethical Limitations of the Study**

The researcher only uses the sources and information which is authentic as will lie in the ethical criteria of the institute, state and religion. The researcher has to bring the opinion of the authority's whether belonging from any part of Pakistan but has connection with the subject. Beside this, the study did not allow the researcher to come with emotional opinion of the public as well un-ethical facts. The researcher had to discuss the insurgency as cause of Political instability and a detouring obstacle in the way of development in Balochistan. The focal point of the study is political instability and economic development not Baloch insurgency.

## **1.9 Organization of Study**

The study is organized into six chapters. First chapter “Introduction” providing the basis and over all structure of the study. The introduction briefly sketched the study; in which the scope of the study has been highlighted. It also provides the reason behind the work. The hypothesis

set in the first chapter is of significance. The study is designed to verify it, with the help of questions raised in the introduction. The literature mentioned in the “Review of the Literature” of the introduction is the date which feed this study.

The second chapter “Brief Political History of Balochistan” provides brief chronological information about the political history of Balochistan. This chapter describes the medieval political setup of the Baloch tribal society, which is important as it provides base for the further study of the political condition of Balochistan. In this chapter the evolution of the concept of political authority and challenges for it is briefly discussed. The socio-political and socio-economic conditions are focused in the end of the chapter. The political authorities of Kalat are briefly discussed from 1666 AD till 1948. The accession of Kalat to Pakistan and the political situation after the accession are also highlighted, which is linking the third chapter for further explanations.

The third chapter “The Dilemma of Baloch Nationalism” is the most important part of the study; as this part of the study focuses over the questions raised in the first chapter. This chapter provides analysis for the Baloch nationalism. This part of the study starts from the emergence of the sense of nationalism in Baloch society in a factual way leading to the rise of the national sentiments at the time of British withdrawal from India. This part of the study further highlights the story of accession of Kalat and it's after myth. The initial four Baloch uprisings from 1948 to 1973 are focused. The last part of this chapter provides analysis of these Baloch uprisings.

The third chapter “The Dilemma of Baloch Ethno-Nationalism” provides basis on the factual way to support the established hypothesis and answer two of the questions raised in the introduction. The fourth chapter “Gwadar and Its Importance” not only provides the answer of the question number two and three, but it also follows the objectives of the study. In this chapter Gwadar see port, its importance with respect to different powers are discussed.

The foreign involvement in Balochistan is highlighted, which is followed by the strategic and economic importance for these powers.

The fifth chapter “Challenges of Baloch Identity and Response” highlights the challenges faced by the Baloch society due to changing economic and political conditions. Describing these challenges a theoretical approach has been used. The study at this stage also provides the response of the Baloch toward these challenges. An effort is made to discuss these challenges and responses with a theoretical approach. This part of the study fully supports the established hypothesis and provides base to answer the last question raised in the introduction. This part also highlights the future challenges for the Baloch.

Last part of this study the “Conclusion” will be summarising of the facts explained in the study. In this part the study the last question of the Introduction has been answered. Different points of views of different scholars have been discussed about the social development and will suggest steps for the development of Balochistan in political way. The main focus of this part of the study is the point of view of those scholars, who proposed social development through education.

## CHAPTER 1

### Brief Political History of Balochistan

Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote:

“[i]t would be better before examining the act by which a people give itself to a king, to examine that by which it has become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society.”<sup>12</sup>

Analysing these sayings of Rousseau in the case of Balochistan; this study examines that who forced the Baloch for being a group and what are the factors which inspire the Baloch. To establish a platform for the understanding of the subject it is necessary to discuss the importance of Balochistan.

Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan; with respect to area and is located at the South-West of Pakistan. Balochistan has a common provincial line of administration with all the three provinces of Pakistan. In North of Balochistan it is connected with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa KPK and Federally Administered Tribal Area FATA. In North-East it is connected with Punjab and in the East to Sindh. With respect to area it stood at the first position as, it is the largest province of not only Pakistan, but also of entire South Asia.<sup>13</sup> Its total area is 347,190 Kilometres square, which is 43% of the Pakistan's total area. Geographically and strategically it is the most important part of Pakistan.

In the North Balochistan has a common border of 1096 Kilometres with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is considered to be “The Heart of Asia”. Iran is located in the West of Balochistan; which is not only an important Muslim country but also rich with natural resources. The Iranian border in West of Balochistan; has a length of 814 kilometres. In the

<sup>12</sup> Jean Jacques Rousseau. in: Robert Maynard Hutchins (ed.), *Great Book of the Western World*. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1982, vol. 38: Montesquieu, Rousseau, 391.

<sup>13</sup> Alok Bansal. *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad* (New Delhi: Manas publications, 2010), 11.

South of Balochistan, Arabian Sea is located; which is an important sea trade route. Balochistan has a coastal line of 714 kilometers with Persian-Gulf.<sup>14</sup>

Topographically it comprises off Mountain ranges, Hilly regions, Plains and Deserts.

Climatically it is in temperate zone with an average rainfall from three to twelve inches per year. Out of 47 million acres of its total plain area only 4.5 million acres is cultivated.<sup>15</sup>

Balochistan is rich in natural resources. Large deposit of natural gas, oil and minerals are present in the mountains and deserts of Balochistan. Its coastal line with Arabian Sea and a gate way to Afghanistan and Central Asia increased its importance, as Central Asian countries are also rich in natural gas and oil.<sup>16</sup>

Demographically Balochistan comprises of different ethnic groups. Baloch, Brahui<sup>17</sup> and Pashtun are major ethnic groups of Balochistan.<sup>18</sup> The history of Balochistan saw long chains of conflicts among these groups. The other minor ethnicities are Urdu speaking Punjabi, Hazara and Persians. Baloch and Brahui are living In Southern parts of Balochistan, while Pashtuns are living in the Northern districts of Balochistan. Quetta being capital of the province is hometown of all the major and minor ethnic groups of Balochistan.

Religiously 98.3% of the population were Muslim according to Census of 1981.<sup>19</sup> Hindus, Christians, Ahmadis and Zikris are also part of the population of Balochistan. The

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<sup>14</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 12.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 21-23.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>17</sup> Brahui are also included in Balochs, although their respective languages are quite different from each other. Including Brahui in Baloch; the Baloch makes the larger ethnic group of Balochistan, followed by Pashtoos. Rehana Saeed Hashmi, in his article *Baloch Ethnicity: An Analysis of the Issue and Conflict with State* concluded that. The Pakistan statistical book (2008) explains that about 40% of the population speaks Baloch language. Brahui speaking people are 20% and Pashto language is also spoken by around 40 percent. At, [http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/4%20PC%20Dr.%20Rehana%20Saeed%20Hashmi\\_52-1-15.pdf](http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/history/PDF-FILES/4%20PC%20Dr.%20Rehana%20Saeed%20Hashmi_52-1-15.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> It was difficult to identify the actual Baloch-Pashtoon ratio, as different claims were made from both ethnic groups. For more detail See, Adnan Aamir, "Census in Balochistan: Who Gets Counted?" *Balochistan Point: Voice of Nation*. At, <http://theBalochistanpoint.com/census-in-Balochistan-who-gets-counted/> (Retrieved, 7 April 2017)

<sup>19</sup> Census Report 1981.

Baloch were Shia Muslims but they later accepted the Sunni version of Islam.<sup>20</sup> Most of the Pashtuns are Sunni Muslims. Beside Pashtun, Urdu-Speaking, Punjabis and other minorities; except Hazara community, also belong from Sunni sect of Islam.

The historical evidence presented the presence of older civilization from third millennium BC in the region of Balochistan.<sup>21</sup> Archaeologists consider that the people of Balochistan in the earlier times 3000 BC become familiar with agriculture and the use of wild animals, and that they lived in houses made by clay brick. Ornaments and jewellery made of precious stone were also found. Archaeologists believe that during the third and second millennium Balochistan served as an intercessor link between the cultures of South Asia and Middle East.<sup>22</sup> That is why they find cultural similarity between the settlements in Balochistan and those of the Indus valley civilization.<sup>23</sup>

The archaeological evidence of the Indus valley Civilization indicated the cultural mixing; around 2000 BC, of the inhabitants of the civilization with Mediterranean people through trade.<sup>24</sup> Trade and cultural relations between the Indus Valley civilization and the contemporary Sumerian civilization were well established. The Sumerian and Akkadian records, dating from 3000 and 2000 BC, mention such trade relations between the Tigris-Euphrates valley and places called Magan and Melukhha, identified with the present-day Makkoran.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Muhammad Qasim Farishta, *Tarikh-i-Farishta* (Lahore: Shaikh Gulam Ali & Sons, 1981), 551-552.

<sup>21</sup> Beatrice de Cardi, *Excavation at Bampur: A Third Millennium Settlement in Persian Balochstan*, Vol- 51:3 (New York: Anthropological papers of the American Museum of Natural History, 1970), 258-269.

<sup>22</sup> Gergory L. Possehl, *Kulli: An Exploration of Ancient Civilization in Asia* (North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 1986), 58-61.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> S. Wolpert, *A New History of India* (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), 176-180.

<sup>25</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development* (Quetta: Royal Book Company, 2004), 129. Also available at, <https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=cw0DHAAACAAJ&dq=Baloch+Nationalism+its+Origin+and+Development+by+Taj+Muhammad&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiQv5X2y5DTAhVIXRoKHfHICEkQ6AEIfzAA>. (Retrieved, 5 April 2017).

The province of Balochistan saw migration from early ancient times. Dravidian peoples were the first whom reached this area. Dravidian were followed by Aryan and then by Dravidians tribes around 1500 BC and 1000 BC.<sup>26</sup> This shows that the people of Balochistan were migrated from other parts of the world in different times. However the origin of the people of ancient Balochistan is not clear. Taj Muhammad Breseeg pointed that,

“[t]he mythology, traditions and genealogy of the Baloch shows that their race has an Arab orientation.”<sup>27</sup>

The Semitic origin of the Baloch is questioned by Baloch as well other scholars. They asserted that posturing as Arabic descendants was a political motive as the Baloch were sandwiched between the two more powerful empires i.e. India and Iran.<sup>28</sup> According to Inayatullah Baloch,

“[t]he belief of the majority of the Baloch that they are of Semitic or Arab descent, and are thus a non-Iranian and non-Indian race, justifies to themselves their status as a separate nation on the basis of a different background in Pakistan and Iran”.<sup>29</sup>

There exist two perceptions regarding the origin of Baloch. The first view presented that the Baloch people are native and described them as the Oritans, the Jatts and the Medes; in the historical records. The second idea describes them as migrants whose migrations took place some two thousand years ago. According to Taj Muhammad ‘the native theory is based on the perceptions’ that,

“[t]he indigenous people of Makkoran form the bulk of the Baloch nation. Probably, the word ‘Baloch’ is a corrupted form of Melukhha, Meluccha or Mleccha, which was the designation of Makkoran during the third and the second millennia BC as shown by the Mesopotamian texts”.<sup>30</sup>

The native theory coined the Baloch as the descendent of the Med; which were nomadic Aryan tribe of Median Empire (900-500 BC).<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Yu. V. Gankovsky, *The Peoples of Pakistan: An Ethnic History* (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, Central Department of Oriental literature, 1971), 146.

<sup>27</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 129-130.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 130.

<sup>29</sup> Inayatullah Khan Baloch. *The Problem of Greater Balochistan: A Study of Baloch Nationalism* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987), 41.

<sup>30</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 131.

<sup>31</sup> Mir Naseer Khan Ahmadzai, *Tarikh-i-Baloch wa Balochistan* (Quetta: Baloch Academy, 1988),

Taj Muhammad Breseeg, pointed that,

“[t]hese two theories, however, are not totally antithetical. It is possible that a group of people who are native to the land lived in the area for thousands of years speaking a dialect, which is related to the modern Brahui language”.<sup>32</sup>

However it is possible that with the arrival of Persian people from the region around in the 5<sup>th</sup> or 6<sup>th</sup> centuries AD, the native population may have unrestricted their earlier language and accepted the language of the new arrivals. Regarding the subject matter of the study it is not of much importance to provide in detail about the origin of Baloch; whether they are indigenous people or migratory, the Baloch have lived in the area of Balochistan since the start of the Christian era.<sup>33</sup>

Muhammad Sardar Khan Baloch wrote about the political situation of Baloch that,

“[t]hey had no central organization but each tribe was under its own chief; although temporary combination under the chiefs of Rind or of Lacer [Lashari] were occasionally formed...the loose organization prevented the establishment of any permanent kingdom. Each tribe fought for itself and them often against each other”.<sup>34</sup>

Baloch played an important role in shaping the history of Iran, Iraq and Syria from 600 BC to 700 AD. They remain the cavalry of the Cyrus of Achaemenian Empire, who helped in defeating Medians. The Baloch were the warriors, and for them the word surrender was unknown. Even the strong army of Nausherwan in 570 AD did their best but failed and meet with defeat from the hands of Baloch warriors. Unfortunately their leader of that time was not mentioned by the historians. From the beginning of Seventh 7<sup>th</sup> Century they were engaged in wars with Arabs and in 10<sup>th</sup> century they were in conflict with one or other ruler in their neighbouring.<sup>35</sup>

From 6<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> century AD the Baloch established their independent states in Sind under Talpur Mires and Balochistan under the Khan of Kalat. In 10<sup>th</sup> century Ahmad Ali and

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<sup>32</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 134.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Muhammad Sardar Khan Baloch, *History of Baloch Race and Balochistan* (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1984), 46.

<sup>35</sup> Henrik Samuel Nyberg, *A Manual of Pahlavi* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1974), 43.

Hassan Ali declared themselves masters of major portion of Iran and Iraq reducing the authority of the caliph. In 943AD Ahmad Ali entered in Baghdad ending the rule of Buwaihid dynasty. The Baloch remain in war with Bawaihid due to first and second Kirman's wars in 946 AD and 998AD, due to which Baloch's rule became limited to Kirman, Makran and Coastal areas of Seistan province. Latter due to weakening of military power and tribal conflict this area splits among the Baloch tribes.<sup>36</sup>

However with the loss of central control over the tribes, these warriors disturbed the trade routes. Noor-ud-Din Ufi a historian of Sultan Altamish (1221-1255) wrote in *Moajm-al-Tawarikh* that some emissaries of Mahmood Ghaznavi were looted and killed by Baloch robbers. Mahmood sent his son Masood to deal with them. During war Baloch fought bravely and 40 of them were killed and the rest of 40 were captured. Another time when Masood was in Iraq, he was informed about Baloch disturbance. He sent caravan of poisoned apple, which was looted by robbers. Many of them died due to eating of these poisoned apples. Another court historian of Delhi sultanate Abu Omar Minhajud-Din (1246-1265) wrote that Baloch tribes were organized under their tribal chiefs. They were warrior but kind, who preferred fighting till death instead of subdued or capture by others.<sup>37</sup>

The reign of Umaid Caliph Walid bin Abul Malik (705-715), saw the Arabs conquest of Balochistan. With the arrival of Arab rule in the early 8<sup>th</sup> century, the Baloch increasingly accepted Islam.<sup>38</sup> The Arab rule brought some tremendous socio-economic changes in the region. The rule of Abbasid Kalifates in the region of Makkoran resulted in the establishment of big trade centres, flourishing of towns, cultivation of the date in Makkoran valleys and a

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<sup>36</sup> Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baloch, *Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan* (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1974), 99-101.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 118-120.

<sup>38</sup> Inayatullah Khan Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Balochstan*, 70.

proper system of irrigated agriculture.<sup>39</sup> The growth of the towns and commercial centre beside the recruitment of Tribal Baloch proved helpful for the awakening of the political thoughts at the time of the political decline of Abbasid in Balochistan.<sup>40</sup>

The period of direct Arab rule over Makkoran lasted about three centuries. By gradually accepting Islam, the scattered Baloch tribes over vast area acquired a new common identity, the Islamic. These developments appear to have played a significant role in enabling the Baloch to form large-scale tribal federations that led to their gradual political and military supremacy in the territories now forming Balochistan during the period of 11<sup>th</sup> to 13<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>41</sup>

In 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century the Baloch established themselves in Makran, Kalat, Kechi and Sibi under Mir Chakar Khan.<sup>42</sup> The tribal wars; of Rind tribe under Mir Chakar Khan and Lashari tribe under Mir Gohram was ignored by historians, as it only affected Sindh and Punjab. Whose rulers were of less importance and were called Zamindars. From 1535 to 1620 the Kalat split into smaller factions controlled by tribes, due to the Rind-Lashari tribal conflict.<sup>43</sup>

At the early days of the newly Mughal rule of India, Mir Umar exploited the rivalry of Emperor Humayun and Governor Mirza Kamran, he established a tribal confederacy. The tribal confederacy was a loose political institution, which was not permanent. The tribal confederacy was in act when, they faced foreign invaders threats. At the time of peace internal rivalry works and the confederacy was to be broken. The history of the Kalat Confederacy can be divided mainly into three eras:

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<sup>39</sup> Thomas Holdich, *The Gate of India: Being an Historical Narrative* (London: 1910), 193.

<sup>40</sup> Gankovsky, *The People of Pakistan: An Ethnic History*, 145.

<sup>41</sup> Holdich. *The Gate of India*, 297-301.

<sup>42</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 148-149.

<sup>43</sup> Khuda Bakhsh. *Search Light on Baloches and Balochistan*, 137-139.

1. The era from 1666 to 1839,
2. The British era from 1839 to 1947,
3. The era of incorporation of the State of Kalat and its feudatories into the Pakistani federation from 1947 to 1948.

The latter two eras witnessed the emergence of the modern Baloch nationalism.

## 2.1 Mir Chakar Khan

Martin Axmann wrote that,

“[t]he seed of tribal system, pattern of Baloch social organization had been sown in Amir Chakar’s time; the tree came into full bloom under the Ahmadzai ruler”.<sup>44</sup>

Mir Chakar Khan established a loose tribal confederacy, later it turned into Khanates; ruled by their tribal chiefs. Kalat saw its golden age during Nasir Khan’s reign.<sup>45</sup> The rulers of Kalat in the earlier time were merely petty chiefs and ruled as the subject of the permanent powers. They remained under the Mughal emperor and supplied men-at-arm on demand. They had to show allegiance to the Shah of Iran and after the foundation of Afghanistan they had to accept the authority of Afghan King till 1838.<sup>46</sup>

The first half of 15<sup>th</sup> century saw the rise of strong tribal chiefs in Balochistan. Mir Chakar Rind and Mir Gohram Baloch were the most influential of these tribal chiefs. Mir Chakar and Mir Gohram mutually agreed for alliance. Their joint alliance attacked the green valley of Kechi, which was under the control of Mir Jam Ninda. Mir Jam Ninda was Hindu ruler of Kechi who could not tolerate the joint attack of Mir Chakar and Mir Gohram.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Martin Axmann, *Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>46</sup> Lt-col, Muhammad Rizwanullah, *Lonely Guardian of Khojak Pass* (RawalPindi: Feroz Sons Publishers, 1964), 14-16.

<sup>47</sup> Mir Gul Khan, Naseer. *Tarikh-i-Balochistan (Urdu)* (Quetta: Rubi Publishers, 1986), 7-8.

After the conquest of the Kechi war broke between Mir Chakar and Mir Gohram. The war lasted for 30 years when Mir Chakar was forced to escape to Punjab. Mir Chakar appointed Mir Umar as governor of Kalat. Mir Umar was very powerful, who forced Mir Gohram to flee for Sindh. Mir Umar left Mir Bijar to rule on Kalat, who died in 1666.<sup>48</sup>

The Mughal governor of the Kandahar took the advantage of the death of Mir Bijar and attacked Kalat. He successfully appointed governor at Kalat and took oath from the tribal chiefs as, to not kill or injure any person with wood or iron made weapon. Upon his return the tribal chiefs killed the appointed governor and appointed Mir Hasan as Khan of Kalat. Although this time the tribal chiefs reached to mutual harmony but Mir Hasan died in 1666.<sup>49</sup>

## 2.2 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-I (1666-1695 AD)

Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-I was elected by the tribal chiefs as Khan of Kalat in 1666. This time the decision proved successful. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan took oath from the tribal chiefs, according to which the tribal chiefs accepted that,

“[w]e shell obey the order of the Khan-i-Baloch unreservedly without any objection, and we will not hesitate to sacrifices our all, to protect the throne from its enemies”.<sup>50</sup>

Sardar Khan Baloch very rightly said that the seed of tribal system sown by Mir Chakar; saw bloom under Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. The above oath became a force of obeying the policy of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. This also obliged morally all the tribal chiefs to play their role in Kalat affairs. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan gives full support to tribal chiefs. The newly political body of Divan comprises of all the Baloch tribal chiefs. The Divan was autonomous body which decided the affairs of Kalat. He also established the ‘Baloch Jirga’, in which all

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<sup>48</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan. *Baloch Inside Balochistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), 70-75.

<sup>49</sup> Sardar Khan Baloch. *History of Baloch Race and Balochistan*, 169.

<sup>50</sup> Sardar Khan Baloch. *History of Baloch Race and Balochistan*, 76-77.

the Baloch chiefs were given the right of expression of their opinion upon a matter of mutual interest.<sup>51</sup>

Mir Ahmad Yar Khan wrote that I Successful defended the sovereignty of the Kalat. During his time Kalat was facing the threats on invasion from Mughal Emperor of India. Mughal Army made 17 attacks on Kalat but Ahmad Yar Khan stood fast on depending Kalat. Ahmad Yar Khan not only defended Kalat but also conquered Mustang, Quetta and Pishin. He died in 1695. After his death his son Mahrab Khan-I was made the Khan of Kalat. Mahrab Khan-I was killed by Kalhoras of Sindh in 1695 in the battlefield.<sup>52</sup>

The fall of the Rind-Lashari confederacy in 16th century, stimulated the Safavied ruler of Persia to conquer Kalat. It was the political diplomacy of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, who established friendly relations with the Mughal emperor of India.<sup>53</sup> To encounter the growing pressure of the Safavieds, the founder of the Ahmadzai dynasty, Mir Ahmad-I pursued a policy of friendship with the powerful emperor of India; Aurangzeb.<sup>54</sup>

However, the reign of Mir Samandar, saw the invasion of Kalat confederacy by Iranian army. In response to Iranian threat, Taj Muhammad wrote that,

“[t]he Mughal emperor not only admired this deed but also agreed to pay him Rs. 200,000 annually as military aid to meet the challenge of Iranian aggression.”<sup>55</sup>

### 2.3 Mir Samandar Khan (1695-1714 AD)

After the death of Mahrab Khan-I, Mir Samandar Khan was made the Khan of Kalat. Mir Samandar Khan consolidated his rule. He followed the established system of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-I. Mir Samandar did not introduce any socio-political change in Kalat. Mir Samandar Khan shows allegiance to the authority of Mughal Emperor Aurangzaib Alamgir. He stopped

<sup>51</sup> Mir Gul Khan, Naseer. *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*, 27.

<sup>52</sup> Gul Khan, Naseer, *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*, 77-78.

<sup>53</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow of Afghanistan*, 15.

<sup>54</sup> Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Balochistan*, 102.

<sup>55</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 165.

the Iranian Army of 25,000 men near Quetta, which was on the way to attack Mughal Empire.<sup>56</sup> He also arrested two Kalhora chiefs and presented them in Mughal court. The Mughal Emperor on reward gives him the title of “Ameer-ul-Umera” and annual sum of cash worth 2,000 rupees.<sup>57</sup>

#### **2.4 Mir Abdullah Khan (1714-1734 AD)**

The next Khan of Kalat was Abdullah Khan, who was an ambitious person. Abdullah Khan became Khan of Kalat in 1714 and ruled Kalat till 1734. He also accepted the authority of Mughal Emperor. In the early days of his reign he started war against Kalhoras. Mughal Emperor imposed 40,000 rupee annual payment to Khan of Kalat on Kalhoras. Upon their refusal of payment Abdullah Khan captured Karachi from Kalhoras.<sup>58</sup>

TH. 18/59  
Abdullah Khan remains successful in defending the integrity of Kalat as well as the sovereignty. During his reign Kalat was attacked by Afghans from the north and the Kalhoras attacked from the South. When the Afghan army reached Quetta, Abdullah Khan adopted friendly diplomacy and accepted the authority of Afghans.<sup>59</sup> Abdullah Khan fought against Kalhoras and died in the battlefield. The accession of Mir Abdullah Khan to the throne of Kalat established dynastic system of governing.

#### **2.5 Mir Mohabbat Khan (1734-1749 AD)**

The tribal political system of Kalat experienced changes and development from 1666 to 1734. The death of Strong Khan Abdullah Khan follows the dis-orderings in Kalat politics. After his death Mohabbat Khan his son was made the Khan of Kalat by some chiefs. He soon faced the conspiracies from tribal chiefs and royal family members. It was earlier mentioned that

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<sup>56</sup> Gul Khan, Naseer. *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*, 64-67.

<sup>57</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan. *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 78-80.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 95.

with course of time the tribal political system was transformed into dynastic rule. Like other dynastic rule Kalat also saw conspiracies within the royal family members. With the help of powerful tribal chiefs, Iltaz Hussain Khan forced Mir Mohabbat Khan for exile. Mir Mohabbat Khan adopted the diplomacy and requested Iltaz Hussain Khan to allow him to live in Kalat as a common citizen. Iltaz Hussain Khan allows Mir Mohabbat Khan to stay in Kalat but Mir Mohabbat Khan started covert activities against him.

Nadir Shah, King of Iran asked Iltaz Hussain Khan in his court. Upon the acceptance of his authority Nadir Shah rewarded him with the title of Ameer. Soon Mohabbat Khan and tribal chiefs of Kalat visited the court of Nadir Shah and complained and they also requested for justice. Nadir Shah restored Mohabbat Khan as Khan of Kalat and Iltaz Hussain Khan was forced for exile from Kalat. Mir Mohabbat Khan was placed on the office of Khan of Kalat in 1737 by the Nadir Shah's Army Chief Lutf Ali.<sup>60</sup>

The conformation of his authority did not bring an end of the dis-orderings in Kalat. Mir Mohabbat's reign was full of conspiracies, internal conflicts and covert activities. The internal conflicts weakened the authority of Mir Mohabbat Khan. Mir Naseer Khan; an influential royal family member was conspiring against him. He sent Naseer Khan to the custody of Nadir Shah in Kandahar. After the death of Nadir Shah, Naseer Khan managed to escape from Kandahar and reached back to Kalat. Mir Naseer Khan again started conspiracy against Mir Mohabbat Khan.<sup>61</sup>

## 2.6 Mir Naseer Khan Noori (1749-1817 AD)

Naseer Khan was able person, who started meetings with influential tribal chiefs and the royal family members. Within a short span of two years he was able to replace Mir Mohabbat Khan. Mir Naseer Khan became Khan of Kalat in 1749. During his exile in Kandahar he

<sup>60</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan. *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 81-82.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

learned the art of government and military from the administration and army of Nadir Shah. He also studied history of nations, ideologies and the role of religion in society. These made him a perfect personality for governing the state of Kalat.<sup>62</sup>

Mir Naseer Khan introduced administrative reforms. The basic unit of his administration was “*Payro*”. Few *Payros* were grouped together in “*Shalwar*”, which was under the supervision of a tribal Sardar; known as “*Kamash*”. *Shalwars* were grouped into *Takar*. Each *Takar* was administered by tribal chief known as “*Takari*”. *Takar* formed the main two division of the Kalat i.e. *Sarwan* and *Jalwan*. *Sarwan* was the Northern part of Kalat and *Jalwan* was the Southern region of Kalat. The most influential chief was made the governor of *Sarwan* and *Jalwan*.

This administrative division proved to be effective. The affairs of the tribal and divisional areas were managed efficiently. The Sardars from smaller division were supervised by the larger unit. The chiefs of larger units were obliged to follow the instructions of Governors. Beside the administrative effect it also kept the Sardars busy in their affairs and allows Mir Naseer Khan to rule smoothly. The administrative division also ended the harmony among the tribal chiefs. Instead of creating disturbance for the Khan they were busy in competing each other.

Mir Naseer Khan established standing army, of which, 1200 soldiers were always present in the capital. These soldiers were appointed from each tribe with a fixed ratio according to their population. Three other division of army were established. The first one was to manage intra-tribal affairs. The second one was for the protection of *Sarwan* and the third one for the protection of *Jalwan*. Intelligence corps was formed; who were collecting information about each tribe and tribal chiefs.

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<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

Mir Naseer Khan established Baloch Parliament. Tribal chiefs of forty tribes were the member of Baloch Parliament. Decisions were made with majority votes. Each Sardar was required to show his presence in the parliament; and was required to come with 1/12 portion of army under his command. Before the reign of Mir Naseer Khan this area was known as *Turan* and Mir Naseer Khan officially gives the name of Balochistan to it.<sup>63</sup>

The ruler of Ketch was converted to Islam from Zikri faith, which was not tolerated by Zikri Khalifa. Zikri Khalifa attacked him and killed. The son of the ruler sought help from Mir Naseer Khan. Mir Naseer Khan attacked two times but the issue did not resolve. Finally he attacked Ketch and ordered general massacre of Zikris.<sup>64</sup> Which brought conflict with king of Afghanistan; Ahmad Shah Abdali. The king of Afghanistan marched to Kalat. At Mastung war was fought but Baloch army was pushed back to Kalat. Ahmad Shah Abdali made the forty days siege of Kalat fort, but Mir Naseer Khan did not surrender. Finally Mir Naseer Khan was forced to sign an agreement with the king of Afghanistan to establish peace.<sup>65</sup>

## 2.7 Kalat Agreement

This agreement is known as “Kalat Agreement”. Before this Mahabbat Khan was to pay 20,000 Rupees annually to the king of Afghanistan and was bound to provide 1,000 men on the time of emergency. Mahabbat Khan was also obliged to provide safe passage for the trade caravans of Afghanistan and at the case of damage he had to pay the compensation money.

Mir Naseer Khan regarded this as assault of his authority and personality. According to Kalat Agreement the King of Afghanistan accepted the independent status of Kalat. Mir Naseer Khan was bound to share fixed amount with king of Afghanistan and provide full military support at the time of need. That is why 250,000 Baloch took part in the

<sup>63</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan, *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 83-85.

<sup>64</sup> Gul Khan, Naseer, *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*, 30.

<sup>65</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan. *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 61-62.

third battle of Pani Pat. The King of Afghanistan Ahmad Shah Abdali gave the title of Brother-i-Wafadar. Mir Naseer Khan gave his daughter in marriage, with Ahmad Shah Abdali. Thus a matrimonial alliance was established.<sup>66</sup>

The King of Afghanistan gifted Shalkot (the present days Quetta; the capital of Balochistan) to the mother of Mir Naseer Khan.<sup>67</sup> It was for the first time in the history of Kalat that they got close associates with Afghans. Afghans started to penetrate inside Baloch areas. This also brought Pashtuns under the direct control of Mir Naseer Khan.

During the rule of Mir Naseer Khan, Sultan of Muscat was forced for exile in Gwadar. When Mir Naseer Khan was informed about the presence of Sultan he gifted the area of Gwadar to Sultan. In 1817 Sultan recovered and defeated the rebels. Sultan went back to Muscat and Gwadar also passed to the state of Muscat; which remain till 1958 when the State of Pakistan bought it back.<sup>68</sup> Mir Naseer Khan died in 1817.<sup>69</sup>

## 2.8 Mir Mahrab Khan-I (1817-1831 AD)

After the death of Mir Naseer Khan-I, Mir Mahrab Khan assumed the office of Khan of Kalat in 1817, at the age of seven only. His age not allow him to be a competent ruler of Kalat. Thus he remains under the influence of powerful Sardars of Kalat court. Mir Mustafa a competent member of royal family dislike his way of ruling. Mustafa was sent to Kechi and was poisoned. Karachi was annexed by Talpurs of Sindh. Prince Bahram revolted but was crushed with the help of Shah Shujah of Afghanistan. The incompetency of the Khan produced insecurity.<sup>70</sup> He died in 1831.

<sup>66</sup> Gul Khan, Naseer, *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*, 35.

<sup>67</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan. *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 62-75.

<sup>68</sup> Gul Khan, Naseer. *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*, 77-82.

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid*, 83-84.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*. 97-99.

## 2.9 Mir Mahrab Khan-II (1831 AD)

In 1831 Mahrab Khan-II assumed the office of Khan of Kalat. He found himself surrounded by selfish Sardars, who were working just like spies of British or Afghan ruler.<sup>71</sup> The British wanted to attack Afghanistan, which was not possible without the support of Kalat. The British had two choices whether to conquer Kalat or to install a puppet Khan at the throne of Kalat.<sup>72</sup> The British attacked Kalat, and forced Khan of Kalat to submit in front of British.

Mir Mahrab Khan-II gave tough resistance and the war continued for more than a week. The British exploited the tribal chiefs and Mir Mahrab Khan-II was killed. The death of Mir Mahrab Khan-II provides a smooth corner for the British intervention in the internal and external affairs of Kalat.

## 2.10 Mir Naseer Khan-II (1832-1857 AD)

The British install Mir Shah Nawaz as Khan of Kalat. The tribal chiefs rejected Mir Shah Nawaz as Khan of Kalat. They supported Naseer Khan-II and fought against British. British wanted to kill Mir Naseer Khan-II and they attacked Noshki and Panjgur. British were defeated and were forced to accept the legal status of Khan of Kalat. After 1850 British again started intervention in Kalat affairs but were resisted by Mir Naseer Khan-II. Finally in 1854 friendly relations were established. Mir Naseer Khan-II died in 1857.<sup>73</sup>

Some Baloch historian such as, Inayatullah Khan Baloch; are of the opinion that Mir Jalal Han Khan was the founder of the Baloch Confederacy, in the 12<sup>th</sup> century, which was also supported by Traditional Baloch folklore.<sup>74</sup> According to him the Baloch Confederacy included 44 Baloch tribes; which were forced to migrate from Sistan and Kerman (nowadays

<sup>71</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan. *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 103-104.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>74</sup> Sabir Badal Khan. "Songs as Register: Socio-Cultural Role of the Poet in Balochistan". *Annali, Oriental University of Naples, Italy*, 64/1-4, 2004. 99-119.

Iranian Balochistan), to Makran. Justice Khuda Bakhsh Marri and Sabir Badal Khan; consider Mir Chakar Khan Rind's era (1479-1524) as the golden era of the Baloch nation.

However, the Baloch mythology does not give much detail of Jalal Khan's rule and administration. The Chakarian era on the other hand, was a time of internal wars and feuds over the green pastoral lands of Balochistan. Rind and Lashar, the two main tribes of the Baloch, fought each other for 30 years over controlling of the green pasture lands and other petty issues.<sup>75</sup>

However, this study refers the era as an era of tribalism rather than nation and nationalism. Historically the first Baloch Confederacy was established by Mir Ahmad Khan in 1666-1667 with Kalat as its centre. Initially, it was a weak confederacy consisting of the areas of Sarawan and Jhalawan.<sup>76</sup> The Baloch were divided into various contending tribes and small dynasties. It was Naseer Khan Noori I, who brought the scattered Baloch tribes under the suzerainty of the Kalat State. He provided Kalat with a representative and constitutional structure setting up the houses of parliament, and created a fighting force comprising of individuals from each tribe.<sup>77</sup>

Naseer Khan Noori also established diplomatic relations with neighbour countries. However, after his death in 1817, a period of crises erupted again in Kalat on various grounds. According to Axman (2009: 24);

“[t]he succession of his son and grandson [to the throne] were challenged by the cousins supported by various Sardari factions...and as the Khans espoused a feudal system, the Sardars advocated a decentralized confederation and believed the Khanate to be based on tribal rather than feudal principles”.<sup>78</sup>

However, by 1830s, Kalat was divided by internal disputes; the agents of Khan had killed several important Sardars and most parts of the Sarawan. The Northern tribes of the

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<sup>75</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 171. Westminster Research: At <http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/>. (Retrieved on 8 April 2017).

<sup>76</sup> Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, *The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi, and Mohajir Ethnic Movements*. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 53.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 54-57.

<sup>78</sup> Martin Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 24.

Kalat state were in revolt. Such lack of law and order compelled the British to intervene in Kalat for the purposes of securing the British Indian Empire from the Russians incursion via the state of Kalat.<sup>79</sup>

### **2.11 Mir Khudadad Khan (1857-1909 AD)**

Mir Khudadad Khan ascended to throne of Khan of Kalat in 1857 at the age of sixteen. Like Mir Naseer Khan he also faced the problem of British interference and conspiracies of tribal chiefs. The clashes among tribal Sardars forced him to invite British for intervention. The tribal conflicts were dissolved with the help of British.

Mir Shair Dil Khan in 1863 resisted against Mir Khudadad Khan and Mir Khudadad Khan was forced to leave the office. Mir Shair Dil Khan was also accepted by the British as Khan of Kalat but soon he was killed. This again provides opportunity for Mir Khudadad Khan to become the Khan of Kalat. The British again started intervention and attacked Kalat. This time Mir Khudadad Khan diplomatically dealt with British and British army was sent back with a Baloch regiment.

His decision was disliked by many Sardars but finally they had to support. In 1876 an agreement was signed by Mir Khudadad Khan with British. According to which the internal affairs of Kalat should be administered by British agent. This made Mir Khudadad Khan a rubber stamp. In 1893 differences arose between Mir Khudadad Khan and British. Mir Khudadad Khan was imprisoned in Pishin, where he died in 1909.<sup>80</sup>

### **2.12 Mir Mahmood Khan-II (1909-1933 AD)**

Mir Mahmood Khan-II was rewarded by the British as Khan of Kalat in 1893, on account of his help against Mir Khudadad Khan. With the instalment of Mir Mahmood Khan-II; the

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<sup>79</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 172.

<sup>80</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan, *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 108.

British found an empty ground to play. All the affairs of Kalat on both internal and external front were managed by the political agent of Indian Viceroy.<sup>81</sup> During the First World War the Baloch State of Kalat fully supported the British policy of the colony of India. Mir Mahmood Khan-II died in 1931. He was followed by Muhammad Azam Jan, who was also a British choice. Mir Muhammad Azam Jan died in 1933.<sup>82</sup>

### **2.13 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-II (1933-1948 AD)**

The last Khan of Kalat was Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-II<sup>83</sup>, who was an educated person. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-II also served British in civil and military offices. This made him an experienced ruler of Kalat. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-II became the Khan of Kalat in 1933. He introduced many reforms in the educational and political system of Kalat. The education budget was increased by 30% from 13,000 to 400,000. He also introduced reforms in the political system of Kalat. Two houses system of government was introduced i.e. House of Lords and House of commons. The house of elders was concern with legislation. Its members were both elected and nominated. He restored the Sharia law of Naseer Khan's time.

Mir Ahmad Yar Khan tried to reverse most of the British obligatory administrative actions. His main purpose was more or less reverting to the system of the initial tribal administration, which was established by Mir Chakar Khan Marri in 1666. Under that system the Kalat was the loose Baloch Tribal Confederacy. Chakar Khan empowered the tribal chiefs and run the state affairs by himself. The tribal administrative structure was matured by Mir Naseer Khan Noori, as he divided the Kalat state into two divisions. Each division was controlled by a Chief. The divisions were further sub divided and the responsibilities were

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 109.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.

<sup>83</sup> Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-II is also known as, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Ahmadzai. There also exists Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-I (1666-1695) whom is considered as the founder of Kalat Confederacy. As both were Ahmadzais so it will be difficult for the reader to differentiate without pronouncing them first or second.

distributed among the local tribal chiefs. Naseer Khan's administrative division made the tribal chiefs responsible and questionable for both public and Khan of Kalat.

## **2.14 Socio-Political Conditions (1666-1948 AD)**

Mir Ahmad Yar Khan copied the previous system with slightly matured and modified form. In the administrative setup of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Prime Minister of Kalat was responsible for the Legislature. The legislature during the Khanship of Ahmad Yar Khan comprises two houses i.e. House of Lords and House of Commons (Dar-ul-Umra and Dar-ul-Awam).<sup>84</sup>

The cabinet comprising of House of Common were either selected or nominated members, from separate portfolio and different tribes. The House of Lords or State Council comprises 12 members. Which includes representatives of the tribes or tribal chiefs and 6 members were drawn from the Cabinet. Judges were appointed in every tribal territory which was accountable to religious authorities. A panel of Religious Scholars (Ulama) was set up to supervise and advise the judges.<sup>85</sup>

Agriculture was given due attention with the establishment of several farmhouses. The Baloch students of Kalat were given remunerations to specialize in this inclination. Kalat became rich in fruits both in feature and variety. A widespread hawser of fruit-farms was established which was under the direct control and management of the administration of Kalat. It was aimed to streamline the gardening production on profitable and commercial basis. This shaped a healthy inexpensive atmosphere between the Kalat State run and private sector. It was the first steps by any Khan of Kalat toward socio-economic development of the

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<sup>84</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 17.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

State of Kalat. It was a great effort by Mir Ahmad Yar Khan for the wellbeing of his subjects.<sup>86</sup>

The political conditions at the second half of 20<sup>th</sup> century were not much different that of 19<sup>th</sup> century during the Khanship of Mir Naseer Khan Noori. Mir Naseer Khan Noori evolved the political institution of Mir Chakar Khan, who established a loose confederacy of the tribes of Baloch. The change in political structure was not seen in the Baloch history from 1666, till 1948. Thus here it seems that politically Boloch society remain inactive during medieval era.<sup>87</sup>

The economy of the Baloch was based on agriculture and animal grazing. The mode of the Baloch economy was nomadic. Most of the nomadic societies remain out of the control of central authority. That is also the case of the Baloch society, whose nomadic characters prevent the establishment of a centralized government in Baloch areas.<sup>88</sup>

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the main concern of the British was the protection of the Indian Empire for which they tried to create buffer zones on the borderlands. The Khan of Kalat was not in the position to remain unoccupied by the Russian in the case of the arrival of Russian forces. The British, therefore, intervened into Kalat affairs to stop Russian forces from encroachment toward the borderlands of British India.<sup>89</sup> Frahan Hanif Siddiqi stated that,

“British involvement in Balochistan was in lieu of its imperial rivalry with the Russian Empire. Balochistan bordered Afghanistan, the latter being susceptible to Russians because of its geographical proximity to the Central Asian Region, where the Russians were now slowly and gradually expanding”.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, *Federalism in Pakistan: Theory and Practice* (Pakistan: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1994), 33-34.

<sup>87</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 171-177.

<sup>88</sup> Axman. *Back to Future*, 29.

<sup>89</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 173.

<sup>90</sup> Frahan Hanif Siddiqi, *The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi, and Mohajir Ethnic Movements*, 54.

However it was British international diplomacy to make Afghanistan tough and steady in order to utilise it as a buffer state against Russian expansionism toward British India. They decided to support an exiled Afghan leader with the name of Shah Shuja, for placing him to the Throne of Afghanistan. The British policy for installing the king of their choice resulted in the first Anglo-Afghan war from 1839 to 1842.<sup>91</sup> The success of the British plan to support Shah Shuja was dependent on the cooperation of Khan of Kalat as, the British Army was to be sent through Bolan Pass of Kalat. The British sent an envoy to meet the Khan of Kalat and negotiated an agreement with him for the safe passage of forces to Afghanistan. This was first time in the history of Kalat that,

“[t]he British had come into direct contact with the Khan of Kalat and a treaty was signed in 1839 between the then Khan, Mehrab Khan (1721-1839) and Alexander Burnes, an Envoy of the British Government”.<sup>92</sup>

Article 3 of that treaty stated that,

“[a]s long as the British army continues in the country of Khorasan: [i.e. Kachi and Bolan], the British Government agrees to pay Mehrab Khan the sum of one lakh and a half lakh [150000] of company's rupees from the date of this engagement by half-yearly instalment.”<sup>93</sup>

The treaty also bound the Khan to acquire supplies, carriage, and guards to protect the provisions and supplies going and coming from Shikarpur by the route of Rozan, Dadar, the Bolan Pass, through Shal (Quetta) to Khuchlak from one frontier to another.<sup>94</sup> The British followed ‘the closed border policy and the forward policy’. According to the closed border policy (1854-1872), it was sustained that the British could pre-eminently defend their Indian Empire through the support of the local rulers of Kalat and Afghanistan.<sup>95</sup> They did not interfere directly in the affairs of the Kalat state but through local agents. Thus, following this policy, the British entered into a treaty with the Khan of Kalat in 1841 and then again in

<sup>91</sup> Gul Khan Naseer, *Tareekh-i-Balochistan* (Urdu). (Quetta: Kalat Publisher, 2010), 138.

<sup>92</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 173.

<sup>93</sup> Hameed Baloch, *Balochistan Papers: Selected Documents on Kalat State and its Territories from 1925 to 1948*. (Karachi: Sayad Hashmi Reference Library, 2007), 856-857.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> Axman. *Back to Future*, 28.

1854. The aims of these treaties were to maintain peace in the area and to gain the Khan's allegiance. Under the treaty of 1841, Mir Naseer Khan-II, offered his allegiance and submission both to the British Government and to His Majesty Shah Shujaaul-Mulk of Afghanistan. He also acknowledged himself as the Vassal of the King of Kabul.<sup>96</sup>

However, the British, wanted a peaceful Kalat for their own purposes but:

"[o]wing to the vast landscape and the scattered population, the Khan failed to maintain peace in his state. The Eastern tribes of the Baloch such as the Marri and the Bugti were in revolt and often targeted the British convoys on their way to Afghanistan and back. As a result, the closed border policy failed to achieve its desired goals since the Khan was unable to secure the communication route owing to the internal instability of the State of Kalat".<sup>97</sup>

Khan of Kalat due to internal differences with Sardars could not follow the terms of the treaty, which forced the British to prohibit the close Border policy and opt for the forward policy in 1870s. The British feared that the internal instability of Kalat could encourage Russian advancement. The legitimisation of the British forward policy was shaped by another treaty was signed in 1876 between the British Government and Mir Khudadad Khan.<sup>98</sup>

The forward policy of the British Government is also known as the Sandeman system which reduced Kalat to playing the role of a buffer state. The state of affairs of Kalat and the status of the Khan after the introduction of Sandemanian system can be explained by the 1886 Administrative Report of the Balochistan Agency. The Report (1886:9) which states,

"[t]he Agent to the Governor General has practically taken the place of the Khan as head of the Baloch confederation. His Highness [Khan of Kalat] is still the nominal head; the Sarawan and Jhalawan chiefs still sit on his right hand and his left hand in Durbars [court]....and till he [Sardar] is invested by the Khan with the khilat [robe] or mantle of succession, 'a Sirdar [Sardar] is not to be legitimised as the representative of his tribe. But in essential questions of nomination of Sirdars, the summoning of Jirgahs [a tradition judicial system] for settlement of inter-tribal disputes, and the general preservation of peace in the country, the Agent of the Governor General is recognised all over Balochistan as having taken all the place of the Khan, and his mandate naturally commands a great deal more respect and obedience than ever did that of His Highness."<sup>99</sup>

<sup>96</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 173-174.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 175.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 176.

<sup>99</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 176.

Beside these above mentioned agreements the British forward policy in Kalat divided Kalat Confederacy into seven parts.<sup>100</sup> This division of land and population belonging to the same ethno-national groups was resisted by the Baloch people and their Khans' as well as by the Pashtun population on both sides of the border, but all in vain.<sup>101</sup>

## **2.15 Accession of Kalat to the Newly Established State of Pakistan**

Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-II wrote memorandum to British authorities. In which he asked the British government to hand over the administration of Kalat to him. The British government accepted his request. He made agreements of oil exploration with Burma Oil Company for the exploration of oil and gas in Kalat.<sup>102</sup> Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-II also established Mineral Research department. On 4<sup>th</sup> August 1947 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan-II signed an agreement with the leadership of All India Muslim League, in which it was agreed that Kalat will announce its independence on 11<sup>th</sup> August 1947. In 1948 Khan of Kalat signed the documents of accession of Kalat to the State of Pakistan.<sup>103</sup>

## **2.16 Kalat's Political Conditions after Accession to Pakistan**

During the Great Game "Vassal status was given to Khan of Kalat."<sup>104</sup> After the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars the British became able to get control of the foreign affairs and started interference in the internal affairs of Kalat. From 1871 to 1893 the British divided the

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<sup>100</sup> The British get control of the Eastern part of Kalat as they incorporated portions of Kalat Confederacy into Sind, Punjab and British Balochistan. Under the Goldsmith Line Some of the area was given to Iran. The Durand line provided the Northern parts of Kalat Confederacy to the Kingdom of Afghanistan. For more detail See, Gulzar Khan. *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 1770180.

<sup>101</sup> Jayshree Bajoria, "The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border". *Council on Foreign Relations*, 20<sup>th</sup> March, 2009. Available at, <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905#p1> (Retrieved on 15 April 2017).

<sup>102</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan. *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 118-121.

<sup>103</sup> For the detailed 'Story of the Accession of Kalat to the State of Pakistan, See Chapter No. 3 of this thesis.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

Khanate into seven parts.<sup>105</sup> This division of Baloch areas into different administrations produced a sense of nation in Balochs. The World War First (WWI) worked as a catalyst and in 1920s the sense of nation and nation state emerged. The sense of nation evolved into national identity at the time of withdrawal of British from India.

After the partition of India into two domains in 1947, India and Pakistan, Kalat was acceded by Pakistan in 1948. The Baloch find themselves as a minority, as they were incorporated in the large State of Pakistan. The Baloch resisted the accession of Kalat to Pakistan, which get the shape of armed struggle against Pakistan for the independence of Kalat.<sup>106</sup> Baloch nationalist again resisted the merger of Kalat into West Pakistan under the One Unit scheme in 1958, 1962 and 1964.<sup>107</sup>

In 1970, Kalat was amalgamated with British Balochistan and was named as Balochistan. In 1972, election was held and National Awami Party NAP won the majority of the seats in Balochistan. The Baloch leadership of NAP demanded for state rights, mentioning to the circumstance that the province was the least developed part of Pakistan with the majority of the civil and military bureaucracy coming from Punjab. The discovery of natural gas reserves in the province had made the area vital to Pakistan. The refusal central government headed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to allow the NAP internal autonomy in the province; worsen the political situation.<sup>108</sup> In 1973 Bhutto dismissed the first ethno-nationalist elected government in Balochistan. These two event again sparked the insurgency in Balochistan in 1973. Which was stronger the all the previous insurgencies, and continued till 1977.

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<sup>105</sup> After the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1839-42, the British opted close border policy, and from 1871, they opted for forward policy, which resulted in the administrative and political division of Baloch areas.

<sup>106</sup> Alok Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2010), 273.

<sup>107</sup> Khuda Bakhsh, *Search Light on Baloches and Balochistan*, 295-301.

<sup>108</sup> Axman. *Back to Future*, 223-241.

In 2002 Elections, the Religio-Political Parties were supported by the international political change and war in Afghanistan. The international forces; especially American and allied forces, started the American war against terrorism. For this connection they attacked Afghanistan, which produces pro-religious sentiments among the people of Pakistan. The religious political groups formed alliance in the form of Muthahida Majlis-i-Amal MMA. In Balochistan Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam Fazal-ur-Rahman JUI-F group had a strong hold in Pashtun areas of Balochistan. But they form alliance of MMA with other Religio-Political Parties, which results in the wining of 2002, election in Balochistan.<sup>109</sup> They established their government in Balochistan. The lack of the ethno-nationalists' representation in the elected state body caused the revival of the insurgency in 2004.<sup>110</sup>

The Baloch issue was ignored by the World community, but in 2009 the kidnapping of the head of the Human Right Commission of Pakistan HRCP, attracts international attention toward Balochistan. This time the insurgency posed a great threat to the development and peace of not only Pakistan but to the region also. The 2013 election give chance to mixture of the Pashtun and Baloch ethno-nationalists and middle class Baloch.<sup>111</sup> This may be a positive political change but beside the socio-cultural differences, challenges and competition, it will pave the way for the future Baloch-Pashtun conflict, as that was seen in 1980-81.

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<sup>109</sup> For more detail see the final results of the election given by Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). At, <http://ecp.gov.pk/Documents/General%20Election%202002/Balochistan.pdf> (Retrieved on 11 April, 2017),

<sup>110</sup> Alok Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 222.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHEPTER 2

### Dilemma of Baloch Ethno-Nationalism

Historically little or nothing is known about the administrative setup of the area, where Baloch are inhabited.<sup>112</sup> As earlier mentioned that from 600 BC to 700 AD Baloch had played important role in shaping the history of Iraq and Iran, but the concept of Baloch state building was yet not conceived by the Baloch people. From sixteenth century A.D onward the independent Baloch states of Sind and *Kalat* emerged.<sup>113</sup> These Baloch state faced both inter-states and intra-state conflict and also remain in conflict with the neighbouring empires.<sup>114</sup> Due to these conflicts *Kalat* spilt into small factions controlled by tribes.<sup>115</sup>

Balochistan was ruled by the feudal lords and the concept of the nation state emerged in 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>116</sup> In 1666 AD Mir Chakar Khan established a loose tribal confederacy, later it turned into Khanates; ruled by their tribal chiefs. Kalat saw its golden age during Nasir Khan Reign.<sup>117</sup> Muhammad Rizwanullah stated that,

“[t]he rulers of Kalat in the earlier time were merely petty chiefs and ruled as the subject of the permanent powers.”<sup>118</sup>

They remain under the Mughal emperor and supplied men-at-arm on demand. They had to show allegiance to the Shah of Iran and after the foundation of Afghanistan they had to accept the authority of Afghan king till 1838.<sup>119</sup>

During the Great Game, the authority of Khan of Kalat was reduced to the position of rubber stamp.<sup>120</sup> After the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars the British became able to get

<sup>112</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 59.

<sup>113</sup> Khuda Bakhsh, *Search Light on Baloches and Balochistan*, 99.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 226-227.

<sup>116</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation*, 129.

<sup>117</sup> Martin Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 20.

<sup>118</sup> Muhammad Rizwanullah, *Lonely Guardian of Khojak Pass* (Rawal Pindi: Feroz Sons Publishers, 1964), 14.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-16.

control of the foreign affairs of Kalat<sup>121</sup> both by wars and diplomacy.<sup>122</sup> The British made treaties with the Khan of Kalat and started interference in the internal affairs of Kalat. From 1871 to 1893 the British divided the Khanate into seven parts. This division of Baloch areas into different administrations produced a sense of nationhood in Balochs.

### 3.1 Emergence of Baloch Ethno-Nationalism

The Baloch Ethno-Nationalism emerges in British colonial rule in India and transformed into national identity at the time of their withdrawal from India. Injustices and economic deprivation compelled the Baloch for resistance against British policies. The prime objective of their resistance was liberation of Balochistan from British control. World War First (WWI), Russian revolution of 1917, and Lenin support of self-determination for oppressed nation has immense impact on the birth of Baloch ethno-nationalism.

In 1920, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd initiated a political movement in Balochistan from the platform of young Baloch. In 1929, the *Anjuman-i-Ithad-i-Balochistan* was formed in Quetta jail by Youssef Magasi for the unification of Balochistan.<sup>123</sup> Azam Khan became the Khan of Kalat on 1931 with the support of *Anjuman*. Which was the first victory of modern democratic rule in Baloch society and was the first political loss of the British government in Balochistan.<sup>124</sup> Azam Khan changed his attitude towards *Anjuman* once he was installed in the office of Khanship of Kalat.<sup>125</sup> The British government wanted to protect the *Sardari* system in Balochistan, so that her interest would not be undermined by nationalist movement. Interestingly at that time the British ruled and interfered in Tribal Baloch area, with the help

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<sup>120</sup> Ahmad Yar Khan, *Baloch Inside Balochistan*, 211.

<sup>121</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeq, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 78-80

<sup>122</sup> Bansal, *Balochistanin Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 37-38.

<sup>123</sup> Janmahmad, *Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan: Emergence, Dimension, Repercussion* (Quetta: Gosa-i-Adab, 1982), 168.

<sup>124</sup> Inayatullah Baloch, *Resistance and National Liberation in Baloch Poetry* (Sweden: University of Uppsala, 2000), 153.

<sup>125</sup> Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 25.

of nominated Sardars. Thus it was in the great interest of British to support Sardari system, to safeguard their interests in Kalat. On 27 December 1932, Balochistan and All India Baloch Conference were held in Jacobabad. It was based on the unification of all Baloches.<sup>126</sup>

In 1933, when Ahmed Yar Khan became the Khan of Kalat State, he sent Youssef *Magasi* to Britain to discuss the sovereignty of Kalat and to negotiate the return of all the leased areas to the Khanate.<sup>127</sup> British showed reluctance to Khan's demand. *Magasi* fevered an armed struggle, with the help of the Soviet Russia, to achieve an independent and united Balochistan.<sup>128</sup> Unfortunately *Magasi* died in 1935's earthquake at Quetta, and the desire of Khan for the independence remains on place.

On the question of cooperation with British; the Anjuman split into two parts. In 1937, *Anjuman*'s radical wing met at Sibi and formed the Kalat State National Party KSNP.<sup>129</sup> The aim of KSNP was the liberation of Balochistan and the abolition of *Sardari* system.<sup>130</sup> It reflected deep nationalist sentiments and determined to work for the liberation of the country. Khan of Kalat also expressed his reluctance to the manifesto. Sardars with the help of British authorities launched an armed attack on the annual meeting of KSNP and disturbed the meeting. On July 1939, Prime Minister of Kalat issued a decree declaring the Kalat state National Party illegal within the boundaries of the Kalat state."<sup>131</sup> With the outbreak of World War Two (WW II) British banned political activities in the region and KSNP splintered into different parts.

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<sup>126</sup>Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development* (Karachi: royal book company, 2004), 215.

<sup>127</sup>Baloch, *Resistance and National Liberation in Baloch Poetry*, 155.

<sup>128</sup>Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 148.

<sup>129</sup>*Ibid.*, 155.

<sup>130</sup>Janmahmad, *Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 169.

<sup>131</sup>Baloch, *Resistance and National Liberation in Baloch Poetry*, 156.

### 3.2 Baloch Ethno-Nationalism During the Partition of India

The Government of India Act of 1935 opened a new window for limited and controlled political activities. This act had treated Kalat State as an Indian state by providing representation for it in the federal legislation. The Khan submitted a protest to the government of India against what he considered to be violation of the treaty of 1876.<sup>132</sup> In 1945 Labor Party win the election in Britain, they decided to send cabinet mission for the transfer of power in India. Kalat state memorandum was forwarded through Viceroy of India by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In which the Khan demanded the British to review promises of status of the Kalat. In 1946, Sir, I. I. Chundrigar wrote a memorandum in which he clearly declared that Kalat is not an Indian state so we and the British should declare the independence of Kalat.<sup>133</sup> In the same year Mir Ahmad Yar Khan and Tribal chiefs of *Marri*, *Bugti*, *Mazari* and *Leghari* tribes demanded the independence of unified Balochistan.<sup>134</sup>

After signing ‘Standstill Agreement’ Khan declared the independence of Balochistan on 12<sup>th</sup> August 1947. In a coronation speech Khan expressed his intention for a peaceful and prosperous Balochistan free from foreign influence. The aim of Khan was to achieve unity of Baloch so, that they could retain their identity and live in accordance with their traditions. In an announcement on 11<sup>th</sup> August 1947, Khan declared that in future the government of Kalat will exercise complete rights of an independent government having an overwhelm command on its internal and external matters”.<sup>135</sup> On August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1947 a formal

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<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 170.

<sup>133</sup> Jan Mahmud, *Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 179.

<sup>134</sup> Ayub Awan, *Balochstan: Historical and Political Processes* (London: New Century Publishers, 1985), 28.

<sup>135</sup> Jan Mahmud, *Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan*, 181.

declaration of its independence was announced by the Kalat government. The national flag of Balochistan was hoisted with green and red colure.<sup>136</sup>

The Khan had promulgated a constitution through what was called the Government of Kalat state act 1947. The Khan becomes the supreme and absolute ruler while appointing Muhammad Aslam Khan the Prime Minister and Mr. D. Pell the foreign minister. The written constitution 'consisted of two chambers, *Dar-ul-Umara* (the house of tribal chiefs or upper house) and the *Dar-ul-Awam* (the House of Commons, or lower House).'<sup>137</sup>

The written constitution paved the way for election which resulted in the victory of KSNP, which managed to get 39 seats out of 51 seats in the House of Commons. It was believed that, the election was the great achievement of the democratic forces in Balochistan, who had insistently worked for the democracy and an independent greater Balochistan. To discuss the issue of leased area, which was under the control of outgoing British government, Khan of Kalat sent prime minister and foreign minister to Karachi.<sup>138</sup> Meeting did not bear fruit. Later, Khan visited Karachi on the invitation of Muhammad Ali Jinnah to discuss the future relation of Khanate and Pakistan. Visit was solely confined to the matter of accession with Pakistan.

Khan put the proposal of accession in front of the Parliament. From 12<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> December 1947, the proposal was debated in the several session of *Dar-ul-Awam*. As the house was dominated by the staunch nationalist members, they positively responded the proposal and aimed for the independent and sovereign Kalat state. The prime minister explained of Muhammad Ali Jinnah about the hesitancy of parliament to the proposal of accession of Kalat into Pakistan. After returning back, Muhammad Ali Jinnah again

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<sup>136</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*. 247.

<sup>137</sup> Baloch, *Resistance and National Liberation in Baloch Poetry*, 59.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

dispatched a letter to Khan for accession of Kalat. Muhammad Ali Jinnah visited *Sibi* on February 12, 1948; where a meeting took place between the heads of the both States.<sup>139</sup>

The Baloch Nationalists blamed that the Pakistani authorities adopted different tactics and strategies. Their claim is also supported by many Baloch writers such as Sardar Khan Baloch, Inayatullah Khan Baloch and others. They asserted that the Pakistani authorities, decided to make use of the long standing rivalries between the Khan of Kalat and the rulers of the subordinate states of *Las Bela* and *Kharan*.<sup>140</sup> Both states enjoyed considerable internal autonomy. Jam of *Las Bela* and the Nawab of *Kharan* were exposed by the authorities in March 1948. They extended their territories to Pakistan separately and irrespective of Kalat state. By losing these two territories, Kalat became deprived of its connection with Iran and its access to Arabian sea and was made left high and dry and in sudden isolation.

In this connection Taj Muhammad Breseeg wrote that, Makkoran as a district of Kalat, had no separate status and that the foreign policy of Lasbela and Kharan was placed under Kalat by an agreement.<sup>141</sup> However the same writer time and again mentioned that Kalat was a Baloch Confederacy. Furthermore Gulawar Khan, Inayatullah Khan Baloch and Taj Muhammad mentioned that in the initial stages of the establishment of the Kalat Confederacy, it comprised of 44 Baloch tribes.<sup>142</sup>

On the other hand the accession of Northern Balochistan (which was known as British Balochistan), was also done through democratic process of that time. The representative body of British Balochistan was called Shahi Jirga and the process of accession was based on the recommendations of the Jirga. In this regard Abdul Samad Khan Achekzai; a Pashtoon nationalist leader of Balochistan believed that, the accession of Balochistan was done through

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<sup>139</sup> Baloch, *Resistance and National Liberation in Baloch Poetry*, 185.

<sup>140</sup> Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 232.

<sup>141</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 251.

<sup>142</sup> Gulawar Khan, *Politics of Nationalism, Federalism, and Separatism: The Case of Balochistan in Pakistan*, 171.

democratic process.<sup>143</sup> He further explained that, although he participated as a spokesman of Indian National Congress INC, it was done through referendum; in which all the members of Shahi Jirga were present, which was the political authority of Balochistan at that time.<sup>144</sup>

Interestingly, after the accession of Kalat the issue was raised; which was further supported by the Baloch historians. They ignored the fact that the document of accession was signed by the then Khan; the sovereign authority of Kalat. They claim that, the decision of the Khan of Kalat was not according to the law of Kalat, as it required the vote of the tribal representatives. Then they must also pay respect for the decision taken by the representative bodies of British Balochistan, State of Las Bela, Kharan and Makran, the authoritative bodies of which accepted, merger with Pakistan.<sup>145-146</sup>

### **3.3 Baloch Identity Crisis and Amalgamation with the Federation of Pakistan**

According to the 3<sup>rd</sup> June plan; the states like *Kalat* were required to seek accession to either Pakistan or India.<sup>147</sup> But Khan of Kalat opted for independent Kalat State; the proposal was brought ahead of British; whom rejected. With the rejection of proposal of the independence of Kalat by the British, the Kalat Cabinet was left to consider the following four possibilities,<sup>148</sup>

1. Kalat becoming a British protectorate. This proposal was rejected by the foreign minister of the Khan; Douglas Y. Fell.
2. Merger with Iran. This proposal was rejected due to brutal treatment of Tehran toward Baloch demanding self-determination in Western or Iranian Balochistan.

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<sup>143</sup>Shaukat Tareen, *The Politics of Khan Shaheed*, (Quetta: Qalath Publishers, 2007), 61.

<sup>144</sup>Shaukat Tareen, *The Great Pashtoon*, (Quetta: Roz-u-Din Ghaznavi, 2007), 69.

<sup>145</sup>Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 232.

<sup>146</sup>Taj Muhammad Breseeq, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 253.

<sup>147</sup>Awan, *Balochstan: Historical and Political Processes*, 224.

<sup>148</sup>Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Balochistan*, 181-182.

3. Merger with Afghanistan. The proposal was supported by some of the royal family but foreign minister Douglas Y. Fell pointed his reservation of the possible Communist infiltration of the Khanate through Soviet influence in Afghanistan. Thus Khan of Kalat then rejected this proposal too.
4. Merger with India. This was perceived geographically not manageable and recognised as awkward geographically and this decision would be seen in Pakistan as a provocation.

However with the rejection of the above four proposals, Khan of Kalat asked the Prime Minister to accept the fifth proposal, which stated that Kalat would maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and ensure sovereign equality.<sup>149</sup>

There were four states in Balochistan namely *Kalat*, *Kharan*, *Mekran* and *Lasbela*.<sup>150</sup> *Lasbela*, state signed the “Instrument of Accession” on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1948, while *Kharan*, and *Mekran* states signed it on 17<sup>th</sup> March 1948.<sup>151</sup> As the three Baloch States had already signed the Instrument of Accession to Pakistan, so there were no other proper options for the Khan of *Kalat*, as *Kalat* was surrounded by these three states. On 27<sup>th</sup> march 1948 Khan singed the unconditional merger documents with Pakistan. Khan told that, he did so because the very existence of Pakistan was at danger.<sup>152</sup>

According to Axmann, the constitution of the Baloch confederacy, the constitutional head, the Khan had no right to take unilateral decision without the consultation and the approval of state assembly.<sup>153</sup> But according to the Article 33, Part three of Chapter 3, of the Government of Kalat State Act 1947; Khan of Kalat was given the absolute power in the subjects of for most importance for the State of Kalat, will be decided by Khan. The

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<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

<sup>150</sup> Syed Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992), 67.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

<sup>153</sup> Axmann, *Back to the Future*, 89.

constitution further explained that such a decision of the Khan will be considered as Act of the constitution of Kalat.<sup>154</sup>

On August 15, 1948 Pakistan got absolute power in Balochistan and the legal status of Khanate of Kalat; being as independent state, was abolished forever. It is believed that, the Baloch resisted the accession of Kalat to Pakistan, which gets the shape of armed struggle against Pakistan for the independence of Kalat.<sup>155</sup>

The decision was resisted by Kalat State National Party (KNP) and other leaders but Kalat was included in the state of Pakistan.<sup>156</sup> After controlling the administrative power, the State of Pakistan started to deal with the resistive force of Kalat. The independent status was to be ended. Political agent was employed as an officer sub-ordinate to Governor General to look after the administration. Kalat State National Party was banned to work in Pakistan and few Baloch tribal leaders associated with KNP, such as Mir Gaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd and others were arrested.<sup>157</sup> Few Baloch Ethno-Nationalist evaluated this action as a systematic political elimination of Baloch representation that further aggravated the animosity between the state and the Baloch.<sup>158</sup>

The exclusion of the Khan from; his inherited office produced grievances in the tribal chiefs. The result was the armed struggle against the rite of the State of Pakistan, which was led by Prince Abdul Karim Khan; brother of the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1933-1948). Abdul Karim Khan managed to escape to Afghanistan, from where he organised insurgency in Balochistan. Here it is interesting that the number of insurgents were from 200

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<sup>154</sup> The Government Act of State of Kalat 1947. Article 33, Part 3, Chapter III. At [https://issuu.com/qalandarmemon/docs/constitution\\_kalat\\_state2](https://issuu.com/qalandarmemon/docs/constitution_kalat_state2) (Retrieved 21 April 2017).

<sup>155</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 273.

<sup>156</sup> M Dehwar and M Saeed. *Contemporary History of Balochistan*. (Quetta: Third World Publications, 1994), 311-324.

<sup>157</sup> Mir Gul Khan Naseer, *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*, Vol. II (Quetta: Kalat Publishers, 1979), 522.

<sup>158</sup> Mansoor Akbar Kundi, *Balochstan: A Socio-Cultural and Political Analysis*, (Second Edition). (Quetta: Qasim Printers. 1994), 41.

minimum and 1000 maximum. The State of Pakistan was forced to send army in Balochistan to deal with insurgents.<sup>159</sup>

However, the State of Pakistan responded effectively and on 27 November 1948, Abdul Karim Khan, was tried by a special *Jirga* in Mach Jail and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5000. His colleague and advisor, Mohammad Hossein Anka, also received ten years imprisonment. The other insurgents of his group were given various sentences and fines.<sup>160</sup>

### 3.4 Amalgamation of Kalat in West Pakistan

The January 1955, agreement signed between the Khan of Kalat and the Governor General of Pakistan, assigned the status of “President of the Council of Rulers of the Balochistan States Union” to Khan of Kalat.<sup>161</sup> This agreement, agreed the rulers of *Kalat, Lasbela, Kharan* and *Mekran* to cede their sovereignty to the Government of Pakistan. This agreement also included all their territories, including leased areas. With the integration of the provinces into One Unit in 1955, Balochistan became part of the province of West Pakistan.<sup>162</sup> Baloch nationalist again resisted the merger of Kalat into West Pakistan under the, One Unit scheme in till 1958. The Baloch in 1958 started protest against the imprisonment of their tribal leadership in the start of the military regime of Ayub Khan. Although the release of the leaders was promised but later on the demands were ignored. Thus in 1962 the Baloch Khan, named Nawrooz Khan started armed resistance which came to an end in 1964.<sup>163</sup>

The implementation of the One-Unit Scheme brings political unity among the ethno-nationalist political groups. On 30 November 1956, six nationalist political parties joined hands together in a meeting at Lahore and formed a new political party; Pakistan National

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<sup>159</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeq, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 254.

<sup>160</sup> Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*. 526.

<sup>161</sup> Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochstan: Its Strategic Importance*, 151-153.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 154.

<sup>163</sup> Khuda Bakhsh, *Search Light on Baloches and Balochistan*, 295-299-301.

Party.<sup>164</sup> These political parties included Ustaman Gall from Balochistan, the Azad Pakistan Party (APP) of Punjab, Khodai Khidmatgar (Also Known as, Red Shirts) of Abdul Ghaffar Khan from NWFP, G. M. Syed's Awami Party AP, from Sindh, Sindh Hari Committee (SHC) of Haydar Bakhsh Khan Jatoi and, the Wror Pashtun (WP) of Abdul Samad Achakzai from Commissioner Province. The main objective of the creation Pakistan National Party was opposition to the One Unit plan, because, they perceive that, they were being denied their constitutional, national and economic rights.<sup>165</sup>

However, in 1956, Baloch grand Jirga was held, in which forty four tribal *Sardars* including the Baloch *Sardars* of Dera Ghazi Khan and Sindh participated. The Jirga was chaired by the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. The Jirga demanded abolition of One-Unit system and regaining the original position of the Kalat state.<sup>166</sup> It is said that in the same time the Khan also hoisted the old Kalat flag over his Palace.<sup>167</sup>

Ayub Khan's military takeover was followed by the arrest of political leadership in Balochistan. Khan of Kalat and other leaders were also arrested. On 10<sup>th</sup> October 1958, four days after the Khan's arrest, the army came face to face with a *Lashkar* (tribal force) near *Wadh* about 40 miles South of Khuzdar and tried to inflict losses on it, but the power of the rebels could not be broken.<sup>168</sup> This was the start of third Baloch insurgency, lunched by Nauruz Khan; to resist the arrest of the political leadership. 1960s was a very decisive period for Baloch ethno-nationalism. Pakistan government reacted by removing the traditional *Sardars* and replacing them with other sardars. By killing these appointed *Sardars*<sup>169</sup>, the

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<sup>164</sup> In 1957 Mulana Bashani also joined PNA and was named as National Awami Party (NAP). See Also, Gul Khan Nasir, *Balochistan Kadim aur Jadid Tarikh ki Roshani men*, 339.

<sup>165</sup> Lawrence Ziring, *The Subcontinent in World Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 338.

<sup>166</sup> Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Balochistan*, 172.

<sup>167</sup> Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 83.

<sup>168</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeq, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 302.

<sup>169</sup> In 1963 the tribesmen assassinated the new appointees, Doda Khan, an uncle of Khair Bakhsh Marri, and Karam Khan Mengal, the uncle of Ataullah Mengal's father.

Baloch insurgents showed their dissatisfaction against the government policy of replacing their exited leadership.<sup>170</sup>

To control the law and order situations in Balochistan, Ayub Khan used the force to arrest the insurgents. Nauruz Khan and seven other insurgents, including his elder son, were tried in Hyderabad and sentenced to death on charges of treason. The death sentence on Nauruz was altered to life imprisonment because of his old age.<sup>171</sup> In 1963, a group of Baloch nationalists headed by Sher Mohammad Marri, began to lay down the organisational infrastructure of the Farari Movement with an aim of waging an extreme guerrilla war to back the Baloch demand for the withdrawal of the Pakistani army from Balochistan, cancellation of the One Unit Plan, and restoration of Balochistan as a unified province.<sup>172</sup>

However, Ayub Khan remains successful for countering the insurgency of the time being, but the Farrari's established 23 camp bases in the major strategic points of Central and Eastern Balochistan. By 1969, these camps employed a command force of 900 full-time activists responsible.<sup>173</sup>

### **3.5 Merger of Kalat with Commissioner Province**

In 1970, Yahya Khan undoes 'One Unit' and restored the former provinces of West Pakistan. In 1972, Kalat was amalgamated with British Balochistan and was named as Balochistan.<sup>174</sup> On 10 February 1973, a large amount of arms and ammunition was recovered from the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, which was of Soviet origin.<sup>175</sup> *National Awami Party* NAP government in Balochistan was charged by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto for working on a covertly long-term plan to break Pakistan and Iran with the help of Iraq and the Soviet Union.<sup>176</sup> He

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<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 280.

<sup>171</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 28.

<sup>172</sup> Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Balochistan*, 282.

<sup>173</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 308.

<sup>174</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 273-274.

<sup>175</sup> Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance*, 181

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 180-182.

dismissed the Balochistan government, banned NAP and arrested their leaders. This marked the beginning of yet another phase of insurgency in Balochistan. These two events again sparked the insurgency in Balochistan in 1973, which was stronger than all the previous insurrections, and continued till 1977.<sup>177</sup>

This time the insurgency began when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto a democratically elected Prime Minister (PM), dismissed the Baloch provincial government and banned the ruling NAP. Furthermore, he jailed the prominent Baloch personalities including Khair Bukhsh Murri, Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bukhsh Bizenjo. This led to another uprising against the federation.<sup>178</sup> The insurgency remained at a high pitch during 1974, prompting army action in different parts of Balochistan. The 1973's insurgency was the worst of all the three. Though the exact number of casualties from both the sides was never known hence, Selig S. Harrison provided that,

"[i]t is presumed that some 53000 Baloch guerrillas and 3300 army men were killed. There were 55000 Baloch combatants fought against around 80,000 trained military force".<sup>179</sup>

In 2002 Elections the political authority swept from the Baloch tribal chiefs toward the religious class of the province. Although all political parties were allowed to take part in the election, but the social conditions preferred the Religio-Political parties; due to the American attack on Afghanistan.<sup>180</sup> The loss of political power was not tolerated by the ethno-nationalist tribal chiefs who caused the revival of the insurgency in 2004.<sup>181</sup> The Balochistan issue was ignored by the world community, but in 2009 the kidnapping of the

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<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, 183-184.

<sup>178</sup> M. A. Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan* (New Delhi: Viking, 2003), 111.

<sup>179</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 139.

<sup>180</sup> According to election results the respective positions were secured in the provincial assembly of Balochistan. (Pakistan Muslim League (Q) 20, Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal Pakistan 18, National Alliance 7, Balochistan National Movement 4, Jamhoori Wattan Party 4, Pakistan Peoples Party 3, Balochistan National Party 2, Pakhtunkhawa Milli Awami Party 2, and Independents 1). Seen At, <http://ecp.gov.pk/Documents/General%20Election%202002/Balochistan.pdf> (Retrieved, 11 April 2017),

<sup>181</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 222.

head of the human right commission attracts international attention toward Balochistan.<sup>182</sup> This time the insurgency posed a great threat to the development and peace of not only Pakistan but to the region also as, Balochistan is gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

### **3.6 An Analysis of the Baloch Ethnic-Movement**

The above explanation presents one sided views, which shows the Baloch insurgency as Freedom war of Balochs against Pakistan. In the Baloch national narratives the insurrections helped shaping Baloch nationalism. For analyses that either these insurrections were fought for their demands or freedom movement, some facts would not be ignored.

Regarding the Balochistan, it is least populated<sup>183</sup> and less developed area of Pakistan as compare to other provinces.<sup>184</sup> Balochistan being as an area inhabited by Tribal people will also has its own tribal conduct<sup>185</sup>, thus their mode of protest will be different. For example in Punjab the method of demand is protest, by blocking the highways or roads; which can produce hurdles for administration. These protests can force the administrators for negotiations. Being as a plane area, politicians or bureaucracy can approach for negotiation. Ultimately the result will be a peaceful resolution of the problem through bargaining.

The capital of Balochistan is Quetta which is least populated and developed as compare to other cities from other three provinces. Balochistan is backward and geographically it is impossible to ménage a protest that will affect the administration to force for the acceptance of demands. The Baloch way of protest is their tribal perception. Once they found themselves unwilling to accept or demanded for their rights; they have to perceive

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<sup>182</sup> Saleem Shahid, "Balochistan group says it kidnapped Solecki" *Dawn*. FEB 08, 2009. At, <https://www.dawn.com/news/342452/Balochistan-group-says-it-kidnapped-solecki>. (Retrieved, 10 April 2017).

<sup>183</sup> "Population of Pakistan", Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. At, [http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/other/pocket\\_book2006/2.pdf](http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/other/pocket_book2006/2.pdf) (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>184</sup> "Pakistan: Health Action in Crises," WHO. August 2008. At, [http://www.who.int/hac/crises/pak/Pakistan\\_Aug08.pdf](http://www.who.int/hac/crises/pak/Pakistan_Aug08.pdf) (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>185</sup> Syed Abdul Quddus, *The Tribal Balochistan* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1990), 223-229.

it in traditional form. In Baloch society once a demand was made they will get it. If these demands were accepted by the authorities, they have to announce.<sup>186</sup>

We all know the nature of bureaucracy which is quite different from the tribal nature. Thus the Baloch protest for demand will get the shape of climbing the hills with arms. Unfortunately todays writers ignored the nature and way of the protest of Baloch tribal society and they declared it unanimously as freedom movement of Balochistan. These writers ignored the geographical and tribal cultural factors of Balochistan. These writers wrote in a way of reporters and it seems that they did not know about the political culture of Pakistan. These writers also ignored the pacts which declare a movement as freedom or national movement.

To analyse whether it was a national movement or a way of protest some of the facts must be discussed here. These factors are also common mostly in entire five time disturbance in Balochistan.

1. Whenever the Balochistan experienced a change in the political setup or experienced new mode of economy; the issue raised. The strength of the issue is also dependent over the intensity of change.

For example the insurgency of 1948 was not as stronger as that of 1958. It is analysed here that in 1948 only prince Karim Khan was removed from his office of governorship<sup>187</sup> but in 1958<sup>188</sup>, many of the tribal leaders were imprisoned.<sup>189</sup> Similar pattern can be seen in 1973, insurgency. In 1973 an elected tribal government was overthrown and the tribal leaders were arrested,<sup>190</sup> which affect the whole Baloch tribes. That is why the insurgency of 1973, was

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<sup>186</sup> Syeed Abdul Quddus, *The Tribal Balochistan*, 83-88.

<sup>187</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeq, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 254.

<sup>188</sup> Inayatullah Baloch, *The Problem of Greater Balochistan*, 282

<sup>189</sup> Lawrence Ziring, *The Subcontinent in World Politics*, 337-338.

<sup>190</sup> Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, 111.

more intensive than all of other before it. The length and strength of the current insurgency also indicate that Baloch again found themselves in the verge of massive political and economic changes. i.e. the swept of government from tribal leadership to religious leadership in 2002 election<sup>191</sup>.

2. Whenever tribal chief were challenged or their authority was questioned by the prominent power; the issue arises. The uneducated tribes and their tribal culture were exploited by these chiefs; which results in plunging the tribes in the problem.

For example when Prince Karim Khan; the brother of Khan of Kalat; Mir Ahmad Yar Khan II, was dismissed from his office of governorship after the accession of Lasbala to Pakistan; he revolted against the state of Pakistan<sup>192</sup>. Although Mir Ahmad Yar Khan condemned his act but it got support in tribal structure. Thus tribes were pushed into problems. Similar was the case of Akbar Khan Bugti; who was pushed to hills of Dara Bugti and then was killed<sup>193</sup>. This also pushed the Bugti and Mari tribe in war with state. Anyhow, the question arises that the participation of such a large scales of the common public, why? The answer can be given by the following points.

1. In the history of Balochistan the whole tribe never supported the insurgency. It was few people who raised the standard of revolt.
2. During the insurgency of 1948, only 200 tribal men went with Prince Karim Khan.
3. In the 1958, uprising only few hundred people were involve in the attacks against the military government of Ayub Khan.
4. During the insurgency of 1962-1964, Navrooz Khan was supported by few (1000-5000) of his tribal people.

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<sup>191</sup> "the final results of the election 2002", Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP).

<sup>192</sup> Syed Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochstan: Its Strategic Importance*, 136.

<sup>193</sup> Saleem Shahid, "Baloch Jirga Criticises Government's Meddling in Tribal Affairs".

These points raise the question that if few people were involve in the insurgencies then why government use military language although it can be settled by political way too?

To answer this question we must look upon the geography of Balochistan and the political culture of Pakistan. Baloch are living in mountainous region. Whenever insurgency was started the insurgents took shelter in these risky mountains. For negotiation, the politicians must have to meet with the demanders to address their grievances. But here the politicians cannot afford the risk of their lives. Thus each time military was sent to these areas; who does not know diplomatic language. The military used its own language which caused the loss of life. That is why grievances cannot be addressed properly. The military is not familiar with the word dialogue, and their way of action is armed response rather than negotiations. This produces the misconception that the Baloch are fighting for their freedom.

This above factor is common in all five insurgencies. In the insurgency of 1948, beside this factor there are two factors, which will show it an insurgency or protest rather than freedom struggle. Firstly in 1948 the brother of Khan of Kalat, Prince Abdul Karim was the governor of *Lasbela*.<sup>194</sup> He was removed from his position and he protested against it. Second fact is that in a freedom movement there will be the participation of a nation, but here only about 200-1000 Baloch participated.<sup>195</sup>

Ayub Khan arrested the Baloch tribal leadership in 1958. As concern about 1958 and 1962 insurgencies, led by Nawroz Khan was also a protest for the release of their tribal leaders. In these insurgencies the participation was little more than 1948's insurgency. Almost from 1000 to 1200 Balochs, this is enough to declare it as freedom movement. In 1973, the nationalist's government was dismissed resulted in an armed insurgency. The

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<sup>194</sup> Mir Gul Khan Naseer, *Tarikh-i-Balochistan*, 522.

<sup>195</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeq, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 254.

resistance was a protest against dismissal of the elected government rather than freedom struggle.

These revolts of from 1948 to 1973 were the Baloch way of protest for their rights, which have now gone in nationalist mythos. The Baloch nationalist tradition presented these events as the Baloch resistance movement against Pakistan for the freedom. These mythologies form the basis of the Baloch freedom movement in 2004.

The Baloch for the fifth time started resistance against Pakistan in 2005. The resistance was again a protest against the swept of political authority from nationalists toward religious elements. The action of military raised the protest to the level of freedom struggle. The question of the length and strength will be addressed in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 3

### Gwadar and Its Importance

The second chapter of this study provided a short political history of the Baloch people. The political ups and downs were highlighted, and focus was laid on Baloch insurgency. The third chapter analyses Baloch insurgency in detail. In third chapter the analysis provided that, Baloch insurgency was frequent response of the Baloch toward the political changes of the time. However, the fifth insurgency, that was started; after the initiatives taken by the central government for the economic development, gets length and strength. Thus this part of the study is dealing with the question that, why the insurgency in Balochistan gets strength and length?

The current situation insurgency in Balochistan started building up when the central establishments of Pakistan started developing Gwadar Sea-Port with road and rail links. The development projects of the coastal highway, Saindak Copper Gold Project and the Gwadar port have been opposed by Baloch nationalists, whom asserted that it will change Baloch ethnic culture and will expose the Baloch resources for others ethnic groups in Pakistan.<sup>196</sup>

Since December 2005, Pakistan's army is fighting against insurgents in Balochistan. The main targets of the insurgents are; killing of Army and civilian government officers in Balochistan produced terroir in the society. The Government offices, Gas pipe lines and even breaking of Railway lines were also tactic of Baloch militants.<sup>197</sup>

The military government claimed that the operation was launched against militant nationalists who attacked government personnel, buildings, and installations, but its attacks

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<sup>196</sup> Qazi Shakil Ahmad, "Balochistan: Overview of Internal and International Dimensions," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 58, No. 2 Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. (April 2005), 27-39 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394091>. (Retrieved: 10/04/2014).

<sup>197</sup> Amir Ali Chandio, "Baloch National Movement 2003- 2012: An Analysis," *Institute of Interdisciplinary Business Research Interdisciplinary Journal Of Contemporary Research In Business*, Vol 4, No 10. February 2013.

have been indiscriminate and resulted in loss of life and property of innocent people.<sup>198</sup> Militant nationalists maintain that the operation is the Punjabi-dominated army's attempt to strengthen its control over Balochistan's natural resources, which are already being exploited by the central government.

This conflict is the fifth time "the Pakistan army has launched an armed operation in Balochistan during the past six decades. A day after the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, the Khan of Kalat declared independence, offering Pakistan special relations in the areas of defence, foreign affairs, and communications."<sup>199</sup> Central government of Pakistan launched its first military operation in April 1948 to counter the insurgents, while in 1958 another operation was launched to respond the insurgents in Balochistan,<sup>200</sup> which was a protest against the one Unit Scheme and the arrest of tribal leadership of Baloch.<sup>201</sup> In 1962, the Pakistan army was again sent to curb the militant activities of left-wing nationalists. The most fierce and brutal insurgency started in 1973 and continued until 1977, in which 3,000 army men and 6,000 Baloch (including insurgents and civilians) were killed.<sup>202</sup>

In 2002, the political authority swept from Baloch nationalists toward religious group, as the *Muthahida Majlis-i-Amal* MMA formed the government in Balochistan. The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti sparked the violence in Balochistan in 2006.<sup>203</sup> The fifth operation started in December 2005 and is still going on.<sup>204</sup> This time the resistance get the shape of freedom movement and gets roots in Baloch society. The Baloch insurgency posed great

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<sup>198</sup> "Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan," *Crisis Group Asia*. Report No-119, September. 2006.

<sup>199</sup> Adeel Khan, *Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), 109–26.

<sup>200</sup> Adeel Khan, *Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan*, 126.

<sup>201</sup> Under the scheme, the four regional entities of the West wing of Pakistan were amalgamated into one unit to establish some parity with the country's East wing, Bengal (now the nation of Bangladesh), because of the latter's overwhelming majority in population.

<sup>202</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 3.

<sup>203</sup> "2006: Aftermath of Nawab Akbar Bugti's death," *Dawn*. May 30, 2011.

<sup>204</sup> Amir Ali Chandio, "Baloch National Movement 2003- 2012: An Analysis," 1053.

threats for the existence of Pakistan. Pakistan responded the Baloch issue in different ways but could not counter the insurgency.<sup>205</sup>

The main trigger for the new wave of nationalist militancy was the Pakistan central government's announcement in 2001 that it would build a port with Chinese participation at Gwadar on the southwest coast of Balochistan. The port is one of the mega projects with no local participation. When President Musharraf "signed the project agreement with Chinese vice Premier *Wu Bangguo* on March 24, 2002, no representative of the provincial government was present."<sup>206</sup>

The prolonging and power of Baloch insurgency indicates foreign involvement in Balochistan. There will be diverse interests of the regional powers in Balochistan. The foreign policy, Ideology of Pakistan and strategic importance of Balochistan attract the regional powers to prolong the insurgency. The importance of Gwadar port cannot be ignored while discussing the interests of regional powers in the region.<sup>207</sup> Here the researcher will try to answer the question which was raised at the end of second chapter.

#### **4.1 Foreign Involvement in Balochistan**

##### **How can the Baloch Manage an Insurgency of such Strength for a Long Period?**

The Baloch struggle of their rights from 1948-1977, get the shape of freedom movement in 2006. Baloch are financially week and they cannot sustain such an armed struggle for a long period. Now here the question remained to be answer that, how can they manage financially an insurgency of such strength for a long period?

The answers of these raised questions will be related to foreign involvement in Balochistan. Muhammad Ilyas Khan wrote that,

<sup>205</sup> M Ilyas Khan, "Back to the Hills", *The Herald* Karachi 2004, 57.

<sup>206</sup> Frederic Grare, "Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism," *Carnegie Endowment's South Asia Report* Washington, DC, no. 65, January 2006.

<sup>207</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 234-244.

“[i]ntelligence Agencies in Islamabad and government circles in Quetta estimate the monthly expenses of Baloch Liberation Army’s operations from 40 to 90 million rupees respectively.”<sup>208</sup>

According to news in Pakistani Urdu Press,

“[t]here is a conspiracy to make Balochistan secede from the federation. A large body of men are being trained for terrorism against the Pakistani state and immediate motive is the huge oil reserves that are likely to be discovered in the province. External powers want this resource to be governed by an independent Balochistan rather than Pakistan.”<sup>209</sup>

According to media reports,

“[t]he presence of external influences in Balochistan is no hidden secret. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), in large part, has been funded by external interests who have sought to maintain a clout in the affairs of the province.”<sup>210</sup>

The role of foreign involvement was further explained by Alok Bansal as he wrote that,

“[t]he members of the BLA appear to be well trained, their selection of targets indicates that they understand their tactical and strategic aims quite clearly. They also appear to be everywhere and seem to have an effective communication network. All these tend to indicate that at least a core group if not a larger number of BLA members has been trained by persons who are well versed in military matters. As there are unlikely to be BLA sympathizers in the Pakistan Army, the obvious interpretation is that the military training to BLA is being imparted by the foreigners.”<sup>211</sup>

The role of regional powers and their involvement in Balochistan is also expressed by the former Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad ISSI, Shireen Mazari says,

“[a] pattern can be discerned which points to a deliberate targeting of communication systems and national assets, impacting the country across provincial boundaries. With more sophisticated explosives, which demonstrate a greater access to external sources of weapons and money, the so-called [Balochistan Liberation Army] BLA has moved away from targeting soft civil society targets to installations, military set-ups and communication links. The acts of sabotage are clearly not random but have careful planning behind them, as well as certain level of technical sophistication. And of course is the very important financial aspect. All these indicators prove the strong external linkages to what is happening in Balochistan.”<sup>212</sup>

The fact remains here that Balochistan Liberation Army BLA has never faced the short supply of sophisticated arms and ammunition.<sup>213</sup> The insurgent enjoys a “large number of sophisticated arms and ammunition. According to Alok Bansal “more than 626 rocket and

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<sup>208</sup> M Ilyas Khan, “Back to the Hills”, 57.

<sup>209</sup> Shafqat Mahmood, “Center does not hold”, *The News*, Internet Edition, January 21, 2005.

<sup>210</sup> Moed Yusuf, “Use of Force will Worsen the Situation in Balochistan”, *The Friday Times*, January 21-26, 2005.

<sup>211</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 236.

<sup>212</sup> Shireen Mazari, “Balochistan and the ‘Great Power Games’”, *The News*, Internet Edition, February 2, 2005.

<sup>213</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 236-237.

122 bomb attacks were carried out in 2004".<sup>214</sup> During the four days fight in January 2005 in Sui, insurgents fired 14000 rounds of small arms, 436 mortar and 60 rockets.<sup>215</sup> Similar situation was seen on 17 March 2005 in Dera Bugti, when insurgents not only corresponded security forces in hammering each other's positions in shelling, but also refused several suggestions of ceasefire. This indicates a worthy stock position of sophisticated arms and ammunition of Baloch insurgents. This definitely raises the question about the source of their arms and ammunition supply.

The above mentioned facts show foreign involvement in Balochistan. The next part of this study analyses the involvement of different powers in Balochistan. The study also analyses the reason behind the involvement of these powers in Balochistan.

#### **4.2 Regional Powers Involvement in Balochistan**

##### **Which Regional Powers are Involved in Balochistan and what are the Causes of their Interference?**

The above discussion proves the foreign involvement in Balochistan but here again a question be raised that, who can that power be? The countries connecting to Balochistan are Iran and Afghanistan. Ayesha Siddiqua, the expert of the affairs of Pakistan Military, sighted the Balochistan issue with respect to foreign involvement as,

"[t]he fire could be further stoked by the Indians, possibly Iranians. There are even rumours of American Intelligence operating in Balochistan".<sup>216</sup>

Regarding the financial support Alok Bansal stated that,

"BLA also does not seem to be short of finances and the large and prosperous Baloch diaspora, especially in the Gulf States, which is sympathetic to the Baloch nationalist cause, is believed to be the most likely source. Some support must also be forthcoming from fellow Baloch in Afghanistan, but their capacity to provide material assistance would be severely limited."<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup> Syed Irfan Raza, "Troops to Protect Sui Plant: Sherapo, Operation in Offing ISPR", *Dawn*, Karachi, 13 January 2005.

<sup>216</sup> Ayesha Siddiqua, "The Cost of Confliction Balochistan", *The Friday News*, January 21-26, 2005.

<sup>217</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 237.

The most probable source of arms and ammunition deliveries appears to be Afghanistan.

“Afghanistan was the exclusive source of arms and ammunitions supply to insurgents in 1970s, when Bhutto launched operation against insurgents.”<sup>218</sup>

Balochistan is located at the cross-section of competing and conflicting interests of local, regional and international powers. A wide array of issues and interests ranging from global strategic concerns of countries like the United States and China, to less ambitious regional security and economic concerns of India, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as energy politics have affected the conflict in Balochistan in one way or another.

Moreover, the reincarnation of a new ‘great game’ in Afghanistan, border issues and the US-led war on terror have made Balochistan all the more important. The government alleged that outsiders were involved in the rebellions. In the 1960s it was Afghanistan, in the 1970s it was the Soviet Union, and then India which was allegedly interfering in Balochistan through its consulates in Afghanistan.<sup>219</sup> Balochistan contains,

“[w]ithin its borders all the contradictions that affect the region, including the war on terror.”<sup>220</sup>

Since colonial times, the strategic location of Balochistan has made it a target of external manipulation and interference. It was sought after by both the British and the Russians during the “Great Game”. The Russian “interest in the region continued during the Cold War with the Soviet Union seeking an opening to the Indian Ocean through the Baloch areas.”<sup>221</sup> Still today, the province attracts many foreign powers. The Pakistani government “blames India for fomenting an insurgency in the area. Washington has a major strategic interest in peaceful accommodation between Islamabad and Baloch leaders.”<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, 127.

<sup>219</sup> Satish Kumar, *The New Pakistan* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978), 161.

<sup>220</sup> Fredric Grare, *The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 4.

<sup>221</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 25-27.

<sup>222</sup> G. S. Bhargava, How Serious Is the Baloch Insurgency? *Asian Tribune*, 12 April 2007, <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/5285> (Retrieved 20 April 2014).

#### 4.3 The Economic Importance of Gwadar

Historically, different countries including Britain, Germany and Japan offered technical help and financial assistance to build the Gwadar deep seaport. The Pakistani government was not concerned in building the port. In the 1970s, several proposals came from different countries for the building of port but were turned down. In 1972, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the Governor of Balochistan, Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo, visited Iran. It is reported that Bizenjo made a request to the Shah of Iran, Raza Shah Pahalvi for building the Gwadar deep seaport for giving a boost to the economic development of Balochistan and promoting regional peace and security.<sup>223</sup> The Iranian government made a

“[c]ommitment to provide financial assistance for the project. It is claimed that in the backdrop of these facts, Bhutto decided to build Port Qasim. Baloch intellectuals criticized Bhutto for denying Balochistan the second port and diverting national resources for building the second port in Karachi.”<sup>224</sup>

However, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1994, decided to develop Gwadar as an alternative port for Pakistan due to two reasons: presumed vulnerability of Karachi to any potential Indian air or naval attack, and providing transit facilities to the landlocked Central Asian states.<sup>225</sup>

Pakistan is underdeveloped country, whose economy suffered due to the proper place in global market.<sup>226</sup> The Gwadar port; located near the entry to the Channels of Hormuz can offer boom to Pakistani economy. The Gwadar port is estimated to become a major centre for international trade as, it is a major gateway to Central Asia. Its strategically location could attract the influx of foreign direct investment FDI into Pakistan. If it happened so Pakistan’s economy will touch the standard of developed country.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Siddiq Baluch, *Political Economy of Balochistan* (Quetta: Express Publications, 2002), 23.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>225</sup> Mehtab Ali Shah, *Ethnic Impact on Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 102

<sup>226</sup> Robert E. Looney, "Pakistan's Progress Towards Economic Freedom", *Contemporary South Asia*, June 1, 1997, 79-98.

<sup>227</sup> Sadia Nasir, "Stabilizing Balochstan!", *Pakistan Times*, Internet Edition, 2005, <http://pakistan-times.net/2005/02/28/> (Retrieved 14 April 2014).

Energy resources, especially fossil fuels, play an important role in the economy of a country. The Gwadar port could provide access to vast reserves of Central Asian natural gas and oil, whose

“[m]arket access is hindered by political and geographic conditions, including continued Russian influence, limited access to waterways beyond the Caspian Sea, and limited export infrastructure.”<sup>228</sup>

It is estimated that the Central Asian reserves of oil and gas will match the combined oil reserves of Iraq and Kuwait and the natural gas reserves of Saudi Arabia.<sup>229</sup> Central Asian Countries have limited access to global markets as, these countries are landlocked. The main focus of these Central Asian countries is on domestic consumption due to the subjugation of the Russian economy.<sup>230</sup>

In December 2002 an agreement was signed to construct oil pipeline from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Gwadar by the governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.<sup>231</sup> This agreement was much important for Central Asian states as, it not only ends up the hegemony of few Russian companies over their oil and gas resources but also will boom their national income.<sup>232</sup>

This above mentioned economic activity would increase

“[c]ompetition among the European countries too for the consumption. It will not only benefit the producers but will also those countries through which the pipelines would run, as they will receive substantial transit fees”.<sup>233</sup>

This will also attract the foreign investment for unexploited reserves,<sup>234</sup> which will ultimately results in the prosperity of the region.

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<sup>228</sup> Ariel Cohen, "US Interests and Central Asia Energy Security", *The Heritage Foundation*, November 15, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/11/us-interests-and-central-asia-energy-security>. (Retrieved 14 April 2014).

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>230</sup> Richard Weitz, "Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, No. 3, 2006, 155-167.

<sup>231</sup> Cohen, "U.S. Interests and Central Asia Energy Security."

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>233</sup> Ziad Haider, "Balochis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 2005, 95-112.

<sup>234</sup> Cohen, "US Interests and Central Asia Energy Security."

On the other hand it produced competition among regional countries like Pakistan and Iran as both have easy access to world markets having deep water ports.<sup>235</sup> For this purpose both Iran and Pakistan are working at major port development projects.<sup>236</sup> The development of Gwadar port will divert the trade rout of Russia for Middle East countries (Russia using Western route via Turkey),<sup>237</sup> and will serve as primary transit trade rout. The potential profits of the Gwadar will serve Pakistan economy to compete with Iran for further extension of mega projects.<sup>238</sup>

#### 4.4 Iranian Perspective

Beside the advantages of Gwadar Port, it also has some disadvantages for some of the regional countries. Pakistanis and Iran both are developing their deep water sea ports. *Chabahar* of Iran and Gwadar port of Pakistan both projects are underway.<sup>239</sup> The development of *Chabahar* is financed by Indian companies and Gwadar is financed by Chines. Both ports are located 110 miles apart and are directly competing for access to the same markets.<sup>240</sup> The success of any one would cause a huge financial setback for other.<sup>241</sup> This competition will lead to the rivalry between Iran and Pakistan, which are the important countries of the region and would eventually undermine the development process. The fight for development also alarmed the rivalry between China and India, as both are investing huge

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<sup>235</sup> International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan", *International Crisis Group*, September 14, 2006, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/119-pakistan-the-worsening-conflict-in-Balochistan.aspx.pdf>. (Retrieved, 14 April 2014).

<sup>236</sup> Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port", 97.

<sup>237</sup> S. Frederick Starr, "A Partnership for Central Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2005, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60833/s-frederick-starr/a-partnership-for-central-asia>, (Retrieved 12 April 2014).

<sup>238</sup> Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port", 103-100.

<sup>239</sup> Although Gwadar Seaport has been completed but it is still not connected with market and producing units in Central Asia and China.

<sup>240</sup> Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port", 103-100.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.

amount for the construction of these ports.<sup>242</sup> One of main reason for Indian finance of *Chabahar* port is the natural rivalry<sup>243</sup> toward Pakistan, which dated back to 1947.<sup>244</sup>

The construction of the port in Gwadar is also a worrying development for India for a number of reasons. It complicates India's naval strategic planning as it diversifies Pakistan's naval defence. Moreover, India grasps the port as another link in China's chain encircling India.<sup>245</sup> Some political analysts assert that India is extended active support to Baloch rebels to undermine the province so that the Gwadar sea port project does not emerge. Thus, by enhancing the projections of the Iranian *Chahbahar* port through *Zaranjan-Delaram* Highway.<sup>246</sup>

The dimensions of the region's political geography made Baloch problem more complicated. Around a million ethnic Baloch live on the other side of the border with Iran. During Pakistan's crackdown on the Baloch insurgency in 1973, when thousands of insurgents were killed, Iran gave Pakistan logistical support, including helicopters.<sup>247</sup>

The two countries were allies supported by the US during the Cold War. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 changed these friendly relations. Since 1979, Tehran has been worried about the developments in Balochistan. This concern is further enhanced by the emerging Baloch rebellion against the regime in Tehran since 2005.<sup>248</sup> The Sunni-dominated group called *Jondullah*<sup>249</sup> is fighting the Iranian government for independence. *Jondullah* came to attention in 2005 when it took eight Iranian soldiers hostage. According to the reports of

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<sup>242</sup> *Ibid.*, 102-103.

<sup>243</sup> Pakistan before 1947 was part of the United India, and after independence India wanted to undo Pakistan.

<sup>244</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1-19.

<sup>245</sup> Parveen Swami, "Balochistan Shadow Over India-Pakistan Ties," *The Hindu*, May 9, 2006.

<sup>246</sup> Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port", 103-100.

<sup>247</sup> I. Tharoor, "*Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Balochstan*", <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1933394,00.html> (Retrieved 14 April 2014).

<sup>248</sup> G. S. " Bhargava, How Serious Is the Baloch Insurgency?".

<sup>249</sup> Iranian People's Resistance Movement for the freedom of Baloch.

Amnesty International, it operates in Baloch areas in Iran and has bases across the border in Pakistan.<sup>250</sup>

Iran has a Baloch population of one million and has always remained worried of Baloch independence movement since the time of Shah of Iran. Therefore, Iran not only has worries over rising anti-Shia feelings in Balochistan but also worries that Baloch separatist movements might have some impression on its part of Balochistan.<sup>251</sup> In the recent past, there have been many terrorist attacks in Iranian Balochistan, which had apparently been perpetrated by *Jundullah* militants. On October 18, 2009, a suicide attack in Seistan Balochistan killed over 40 people, including senior commanders of Iranian Revolutionary Guards IRG.<sup>252</sup>

Tehran has assumed that *Jundullah* has been using Pakistani territory to launch terrorist attacks in Iran. Some analysts believe that, the capture and hanging of *Jundullah* chief Abdul Malik Regi assisted to ease Pak-Iran relations as, Regi was traveling on Afghan passport and not a Pakistani one when he was arrested and also because the Pakistani government's assistance had helped Iran in detaining Regi.<sup>253</sup>

There is a perception in Islamabad that Iran is an opponent of Gwadar Deep Sea Port Project because this project would compete with Iran's newly built *Chahbahar* Port on Balochistan coast,<sup>254</sup> being developed with Indian assistance, to emerge as a gateway to Central Asia. Pakistani Intelligence Agencies have confidence in that the insurgent are

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<sup>250</sup> Amnesty International, *Iran, Human Rights Abuses Against the Baloch Minority*, 17 September 2007.

<sup>251</sup> Weekly *Nida-i-Millat* (Urdu), March 17-25, 2005. 15-24.

<sup>252</sup> Andrew Lee Butters, "Why a Bombing in Iran Could Be Bad News for Obama," *Daily Time*. Monday, Oct. 19, 2009. <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1930943,00.html> (Retrieved 8 April 2017).

<sup>253</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "Arrest of Abdul Malik Regi: a step towards better Pak-Iran relations", *Monthly Tajziat* (Urdu), Islamabad, March 2010, 5-6.

<sup>254</sup> Ilyas Khan, "Back to the Hills", *The Herald* Karachi 2004, 58.

receiving economic funding and arms from Iran and India, who are mistrusted with the production of the Gwadar Port.<sup>255</sup>

This however, gives the impression relatively dubious as Iran a substantial Baloch population and Iranian province of *Seistan* is mainly inhabited by Baloch. Any insurgency that advocates the cause of Baloch homeland is inevitable to produce unrest in Baloch populated areas in Iran. This is exactly the reason why Shah of Iran went out of his way to provide military support to Pakistan during the last insurgency in Balochistan.<sup>256</sup>

Above all Iran had to protected interest in the region, while the development of Gwadar, anti-Shiah growing sentiments and manipulation of Afghan policy by Pakistan are the main threats for the interests of Iran. Iran is promoting its political and sectarian views in Balochistan through Shiah (Shiite) minority. Although in 1973 Shah of Iran provided logistic support for Pakistan on the other hand the Baloch from Iran also supported Baloch insurgents in Pakistan.<sup>257</sup> Thus in the light of the above discussion the study concluded that, Iran has the following interests in Gwadar to oppose the development of Sea-Port:

- Iran suspected that development of the Gwadar seaport will help the Sunni Baloch separatists of Iranian Balochistan.
- Iran also suspected that Pakistani land has being used by Jundullah.
- Iran is being subjected to international trade sanctions, but Iran wanted access to the international market via Pakistan; to supply its oil and gas to India.
- Iran is a Shia/Shiite dominated Muslim country, wanted to influence the Afghan policy against Saudi Arabia; with which Iran has competition in Middle East.
- Iran supports Indian policy in the region to strengthen commercial relations with India.

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<sup>255</sup> Bansel, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 235.

<sup>256</sup> Abdul Satar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947-2005* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007),

<sup>257</sup> Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Penguin Books, 2011), 346.

#### 4.5 Perspective of Arab Countries

After 1979 the Iranian revolutionaries openly supported the Shiite of Pakistani Balochistan; for the transport of revolution to Balochistan. This not only produced sectarian violence in the province but also attracts the Arab countries to support anti-Shiite elements. The Iran-Iraq war provided opportunity for Arab countries to counter the revolution through supporting Baloch in Iran. It posed threats for the survival of Pakistan, as the ultimate result will be Greater Balochistan comprised of Baloch areas across border.<sup>258</sup>

Saudi Arabia other Muslim countries and NGOs funded the Sunni group in Pakistan against Iranian inspired activities.<sup>259-260</sup> This rivalry between the two Islamic countries led Pakistan towards sectarian strife between the Sunni and Shiah groups. During that time LJ, the most violent Sunni organization was formed.<sup>261</sup>

In fact, the controversy between the two Islamic countries the Iran and Saudi Arabia, with two different sects failed to comprehend that their clash would create insecurity in the other Muslim countries. The Islamic revolution in Iran had great influence on its neighbouring countries. The Shiah communities get organized due to this revolution. Iran supported the Shiah groups of Pakistan and a Shiah version of new militancy emerged. “Arabia share a couple of advantages; both have petro dollars they can use to finance their

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<sup>258</sup> M. Asghar Khan, *We've Learnt Nothing from History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 205.

<sup>259</sup> Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism*, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 106-116. Seen in Muhammad Munir, *IPRI Journal XIV*, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 124-146.

<sup>260</sup> Hayat Alvi, “Saudi Arabia Funds Lashkar-i-Jhangvi,” March 3, 2013.

<https://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/saudi-arabia-funds-lashkar-i-jhangvi/> (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>261</sup> Ted Galen Carpenter, “Terrorist Sponsors: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China”, November 16, 2001. <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/terrorist-sponsors-saudi-arabia-pakistan-china> (Retrieved 11 March 2015).

campaigns both draw religious sectarian and ethical appeal to pre-empt ready-made blocks of supports".<sup>262</sup>

With the development of the Gwadar port, the Arab countries can exploit the sectarian violence to deter the peace in Balochistan Gwadar port and the resources of Balochistan not only threaten the interest of Iran but also of Arab countries. It is believed that Gwadar port will attract and diverge the global market from Arab countries. The main source of finances for the Baloch insurgents come from Gulf countries, through different ways (Remittance, help, Charity).<sup>263</sup> The above discussion the following concerns of the Arab countries regarding Gwadar sea port development:

- The Arab countries will be concern for the involvement of Iran in the economic activities carried through the development of Gwadar, as they will find competition of customers in the oil market.
- In case Iran is excluded from the CPEC, the Arab countries will also has concern regarding Central Asian production of petroleum, but it can also be supplied to China via land route excluding Pakistan.

#### **4.6 Perspective of Afghanistan**

Regarding the involvement of other regional powers a question will be raised that, Balochistan has its geographical connection with only Iran and Afghanistan, so how can we claim the involvement of rest of the regional powers involvement in Balochistan? This question produces the sense of international relation of Pakistan. Soon after the independence

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<sup>262</sup> Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Make a Difficult Triangle, National Security, Monday, July 30, 2012, <http://pksecurity.blogspot.com/2012/07/iran-saudi-arabia-and-pakistan-make.html>, (Retrieved April 10, 2014).

<sup>263</sup> Bansel, *Balochistan in Turmoil*, 237.

of Pakistan India, Russia and Afghanistan established their diplomatic relations.<sup>264</sup> Zarina Salamat claims that

“[t]he Afghan Government... [Initiated] propaganda...urging the tribes on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line to create an independent Pakhtunistan”.<sup>265</sup>

This decision was taken by the Afghan *Loi Jirga* [Parliament of Afghanistan], it was also decided that Afghanistan will not recognise the Durand Line as an international Border.<sup>266</sup>

The Afghan government was backed by both Russia and India. From 1947 India tried to undo Pakistan and establish hegemony in the region. In these environments the Pakistan’s pursuit for security was misperceived by Russia, which also turned toward India. The involvement of regional powers in Balochistan takes place through Afghanistan. Balochistan shared a long border with Afghanistan, across that ethnic Baloch providing the insurgents a safe shelter.<sup>267</sup>

Durand Line issue has the potential to flash up again. Given the dissertation of Pashtun:

“[t]he nationalist parties of Balochistan, especially *Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party* (PkMAP), the Pakistani establishment is always worried with all the possibilities that can arise out of the Pak-Afghan border disputes.”<sup>268</sup>

The Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan has an added significance being the shortest transit route between Karachi and Kabul via the Chaman border for supply of fuel and other provisions to NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Some scholars believe that Afghan government has neither reason nor any resources to support insurgency in Balochistan. They further contended that the American presence in Afghanistan also guarantees that the Afghanistan government cannot indulge in actions contrasting to the political policies of United States.<sup>269</sup> Moreover, gaining and using

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<sup>264</sup> S. M Burke, *Main Springs of Indian Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-59* (London: Harvard, 1972), 99.

<sup>265</sup> Zarina Salamat, *Pakistan 1947-1958: An Historical Review* (Islamabad: NJHCR, 1992), 190.

<sup>266</sup> M. Razvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1971), 107-114.

<sup>267</sup> Amin, *Pakistan’s foreign Policy*, 40-49.

<sup>268</sup> Safdar Sial and Abdul Basit, *Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan: Assessing Strategic Policy Options for Peace and Security*, User Report (Islamabad: PIPS, 2010), 42.

<sup>269</sup> Mir Jamilur Rahman, “Balochistan in Turmiol,” *The News*, 15 January 2005.

reservations in the bordering Afghan provinces would be difficult on account of the insurgency of Taliban, who are dominating these provinces and are definitely not sympathetic to the cause of Baloch nationalists.

Afghanistan's interests in the Baloch and their territory appear to be more linked to historical and ideological themes rather than economic factors. Afghanistan has traditionally been an advocate of Baloch separation from Islamabad.<sup>270</sup> Many perceive this interest to be founded in the concept of Pashtunistan<sup>271</sup> 'an ethnically based homeland for Pashtuns'. Some perceptions of Pashtunistan encompass beyond the lands of Pashto-speaking people and comprise the Baloch as well. This incorporation of the Baloch territories into Afghanistan links back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Ahmad Shah Durrani, then the king of Afghanistan, ruled over the Baloch State of Kalat for fourteen years.<sup>272</sup>

Accordingly, when Kabul protests about the British-fixed border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (India), the Durand Line, it occasionally includes the Baloch as part of their rightful territory. In 1978, the Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin said that the Durand Line 'tore us apart' and that, 'we will do our historical duty when the time is right.' As a result of this commitment to the Afghan interpretation of the Afghan-Pakistan border, Hafizullah Amin further added that the 'Baloch nationalist movement is very dear to us.'<sup>273</sup>

Mary Anne wrote that Afghanistan is a safe haven for the Baloch insurgents. From 1960s the Afghan government supported the Baloch insurgency with the aim to weaken the nation building process in Pakistan.<sup>274</sup> In 1970s Afghanistan not only provided support in arms and ammunition but also finance them for war. The main source for finance comes from smugglers and drug mafia. They also made arrangement for the insurgent wars through the

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<sup>270</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 141.

<sup>271</sup> Pashtunistan was a Pashtoon ethno-nationalist movement. It is also pronounce as Pakhthunistan.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

<sup>273</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 144.

<sup>274</sup> Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, 102-106.

support of India and Russia.<sup>275</sup> During the 1973-1977 insurrections the insurgents get shelter in Afghanistan, as that was also seen in 1948. The situation was more worsened as; Baloch living in Afghanistan also provided support for their brothers.<sup>276</sup>

Apart from the last four insurrections Afghanistan was also contributed in the current situation of Balochistan. Brahamdagh Bugti the grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti; has taken asylum in Afghanistan. Brahamdagh Bugti was a leading figure of the insurgents in Balochistan. He has backed with full support of Kabul and New Delhi.<sup>277</sup>

Afghanistan has pleasant relations with India and Iran. Both India and Iran are nervous of Pakistan's ties with the US and its past role regarding both these countries. This convergence of interests of the three countries makes a case for Afghanistan to take an anti-Pakistan stance. The underlying motive is to distance itself from Pakistan so that Pakistan may not be able to influence the process of nation-building and reconstruction of Afghanistan.<sup>278</sup> Afghanistan ambitious journey of pressurizing Pakistan to promote closer ties with India revels around interference in Balochistan.<sup>279</sup> Afghanistan's main interest in the region is benefiting from the gas pipelines from Central Asia via Afghanistan to Pakistan and beyond. The transit route will produce for Afghanistan considerable revenue through transit fees.<sup>280</sup> Thus the study analysis that Afghanistan in actual will be an equal beneficiary as Pakistan; from the development of Gwadar and by the completion of CPEC. On the other hand Afghanistan has the ages old claim of Durand Line; which was in the time when the political norm was kingship. The Afghanistan claim (backed by India), in the modern democratic time is just meant for creating disturbance in the region.

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<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, 104-107.

<sup>276</sup> Musa Khan Jalazai, *Sectarianism and Politico-Religious Terrorism in Pakistan* (Lahore: Tarheel Publishers, 1993), 145.

<sup>277</sup> "Afghanistan and India behind BLA: Malik", <http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/afghanistan> (Retrieved 12 April 2014).

<sup>278</sup> Abdul Satar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A Concise History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 293-294.

<sup>279</sup> "Afghanistan and India behind BLA: Malik", 114.

<sup>280</sup> *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Volume 3, Number 4: 4.

#### 4.7 Indian Perspective

India has been said to provide funding and training to terrorists groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army in Pakistan's tribal areas with the goal of destabilizing the country, an aim clearly at odds with American efforts to cultivate Pakistan as a partner in the War on Terror.<sup>281</sup> It seems that everything goes wrong in Pakistan as, some Pakistani journalists and politicians blamed India for interference in Balochistan insurgency. Indian condemnation of Nawab Akbar Bugti's killing and expression of fear at the strengthening military violence in Balochistan provided acceptance to these beliefs.<sup>282</sup>

Balochistan former chief minister Aslam Raisani publicly stated that the Indian Intelligence Agency, the Research and analysis Wing RAW was running at least 40 camps in the province.<sup>283</sup> They also feel that with Indian presence on Pak-Afghan border and in Iran (Zahidan), the chances for supporting Low Intensive Conflict have multiplied for India.<sup>284</sup> Same views were expressed at a press conference on July 26, 2006, by Tariq Azeem<sup>285</sup>; he expressed the Pakistani former minister of state for information and broadcasting as, he blamed Indian embassies in Afghanistan near Pakistani border of involvement in continuing violence in Balochistan.<sup>286-287</sup> Rehman Malik, the former interior advisor to Prime Minister of Pakistan in a session of the Senate on April 23, 2009 stated that India and Afghanistan were actively backing the BLA, which was raised by former USSR.<sup>288</sup>

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<sup>281</sup> Armin Tarzi, "Afghanistan: Kabul's India Ties Worry Pakistan," *Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty*, April 16, 2006, [www.rferl.org/content/article/1067690.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1067690.html), (Retrieved 11 April 2014).

<sup>282</sup> "Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan", *International Crisis Group Asia*, Report No 119, 9. September 14, 2006.

<sup>283</sup> "NDS-RAW nexus fuelling terrorism in Pakistan," *The Nation*, September 28, 2015.

<sup>284</sup> Mazari, "Balochistan and the 'Great Power Games,'" *The News, Internet Edition*, February 2, 2005.

<sup>285</sup> "Assemblies' term can be extended by one year: Tariq," *The News*, July 26, 2006

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>287</sup> Asim Yasin, "Tariq sees foreign hand in Balochistan unrest", *The News, Internet Edition*, July 27, 2006.

<sup>288</sup> Mumtaz Alvi, "Foreign hands behind Balochistan unrest", *The News, Internet Edition*, April 24, 2009.

Insurgency in Balochistan was started at a time, where Indo-Pak relations were on the upswing and it did not make any sense for India to stir trouble in Balochistan. These views are also supported with these two facts. Firstly none of Indian agent was arrested and was never brought in front of media. Another fact is that Balochistan has no boundaries with India so that India could supply Arms for the insurgency.<sup>289</sup> The beliefs are further strengthening by the fact that U S and Allies navy had full command of Arabian see, to inspect the smuggling of arms. India could however, provide support in combination with other countries in the region. According to the report of International Crises Group on Balochistan, that although India was believably cultivating Baloch rebels, following an age-old pattern of both countries interfering in the other's internal affairs, the extent of such support would likely be limited.<sup>290</sup>

#### **4.8 Chinese Perspective**

China is keen and has a focused eye on Balochistan. The Gwadar Port has been completed with its help because China wants to import raw material and oil from Middle East and Africa and export goods through a land corridor that would extend from Gwadar to China's *Sinkiang* Province. Strategically, Muhammad et al. this port is situated near the Straits of Hormuz, "A Major Oil Shipping Lane" and China wants entrée to the sea for its land-locked western provinces.<sup>291</sup>

The strategic importance of Balochistan has even attracted China to the province. The Chinese interest in Balochistan has to be seen in the context of the good relations that Beijing has developed with its equivalent in Islamabad.<sup>292</sup>

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<sup>289</sup> Mir Jamilur Rahman, "Balochistan in Turmoil", *The News*, Internet Edition, 15 January 2005.

<sup>290</sup> "Pakistan: The worsening Conflict in Balochistan", *International Crisis Group, Asia*, Report No 119, September 14, 2006, 26.

<sup>291</sup> Alexander Atarodi, "Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance," *FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency*, January 2011, 26-27.

<sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

China has a vital interest in the Gwadar port because it gives China access to warm waters on the one hand, and secures oil supplies from Iran and Persian Gulf states on the other hand. Baloch nationalists had strongly criticized the government for handing over the Gwadar port to Port of Singapore Authority PSA. Some nationalists even assert that it should have gone to China.<sup>293</sup> On the other hand China has also shown her willingness to join Pakistan and Iran in their gas pipeline project if India does not join in.<sup>294</sup> Furthermore, Chinese interests in Balochistan stanch from presence of US airbases and military outposts in the province. US presence in the province directly smashes with Chinese interests pursued through the construction of the Gwadar port.

A deep water port of Gwadar, being built by the Chinese giving them unrestricted access, near the main US base in the region is definitely a cause of anxiety for the US security establishment which perceives China as its potential enemy and considers its containment as primary strategic objectives.<sup>295</sup> Interestingly, Gwadar a plausible Chinese naval base and a city that has the potential to run the Baloch into a minority in their own province; which is the concern of US and the Baloch nationalists.

“It brings about a deadly convergence of interests in a delicate geopolitical era”.<sup>296</sup>

As long as Balochistan remains unstable and the law and order situation remains uncertain, Gwadar’s true potential cannot be released and the “Chinese will certainly be compelled to take an additional look at their growing economy commitment in Pakistan”.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>293</sup> Amir Mateen, “Gwadar Port may be Given to China”, *The News*, September 15, 2010.

<sup>294</sup> Safdar Sial, “IPI or TAP Pakistan needs Early: Materialization of a Gasline”, [http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=ra&id=epi\\_list\\_1](http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=ra&id=epi_list_1). (Retrieved March 29, 2014).

<sup>295</sup> Mazari, “Balochistan and the ‘Great Power Games’”, *The News, Internet Edition*, February 2, 2005.

<sup>296</sup> A H Amin, “The Six Steps to Get Out of The Balochistan’s Quicksand”, *South Asian Tribune*, Washington DC, February 25, 2005.

<sup>297</sup> Mazari, “Balochistan and the ‘Great Power Games’”, *The News, Internet Edition*, February 2, 2005.

#### 4.9 Russian Perspective

Most of the weapons used by BLA are Russian in origin and this led Pakistan to speculate about Russian involvement in the Balochistan insurgency. The concern of Pakistan over the Russian relation; with Afghan and Indian government make it suspicious, about the Russian involvement in Balochistan. Rehman Malik has stated in Senate that India, Afghanistan and Russia were involved in unrest in Balochistan and the BLA had links with them.<sup>298</sup> He claimed that 1000 Baloch students, who were imparted, training in Russia, were now back in Balochistan.<sup>299</sup> A Central Asian website has reported the presence of Soviet's era agents involved in Balochistan previously, running camps in Afghanistan and Balochistan in collaboration with India and US.<sup>300</sup>

Russia is too worried with its own problems and problems in its backyard to spare time and resources for stirring trouble in remote Balochistan, which has lost its strategic significance for them with the disintegration of USSR. It is also inconceivable that the US will allow Russia to run such camps in Afghanistan. The involvement of certain individuals with previous experience in Balochistan, however cannot be ruled out. But the individuals by themselves will hardly have the resources to trigger an insurgency of this magnitude.

Superpowers Russia and America had "focused their interest on Balochistan from the start of Cold War. Soviet Union encouraged the separatists Movement of *Sindh-Desh*, *Pashtunistan* and Greater Balochistan".<sup>301</sup> Although it is believed that Russia had lost its interests in Afghanistan, but its thirst for worm water is still there. For this goal Balochistan is shortest route and still has importance for Russia.<sup>302</sup>

Soviet interests in Balochistan can be seen under following points.

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<sup>298</sup> "Baloch backlash", *The News*, April 24, 2009.

<sup>299</sup> Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, 105-106.

<sup>300</sup> Mumtaz Alvi, "Foreign Hands behind Balochistan Unrest", *The News, Internet Edition*, April 24, 2009.

<sup>301</sup> Najmuddin Dilshad, *Threat of Insurgency; Consequences and Measures* (Rawalpindi: National Defence College, 1984), 60.

<sup>302</sup> Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochstan: Its Strategic Importance*, 253.

1. It wants to control the Gulf oil and thus the natural resources of the Indian Ocean and Antarctica will be under its influence.
2. Transportation of fish catch, from Indian Ocean to Central Asia Republics over lands would be trouble-free, speedy and economical.<sup>303</sup>
3. It will have the shortest route to Antarctica for mineral resources.
4. Russian economy will boost up.

Baloch insurgents asked time and again the foreign powers for financial and material support.<sup>304</sup> Receiving Indian support the Baloch also try to pursue the support of United States.<sup>305</sup> The Baloch insurgents seem to be trying their best to seek assistance from the Russians. There is historical example for this move as the Soviets outmoded the Baloch during the Soviet-Afghan War.<sup>306</sup> In their efforts to access the Indian Ocean, the Soviets promised military and other forms of aid to the Baloch in return for their assistance in southern Afghanistan and Soviet access to Gwadar during the Cold War.<sup>307</sup> Although the Cold War is over, there are still remaining feelings of distrust between Washington and Moscow in the region, and when combined with increasing Chinese interest in the region, the potential for some form of international crisis is motivated.<sup>308</sup>

#### **4.10 American Perspective**

After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Balochistan's importance has increased in US estimates, because of the region's proximity to the Channel of Hormuz and the Gulf of

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<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.*, 256.

<sup>304</sup> Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, 110-114.

<sup>305</sup> Ahmed Quraishi, "Pakistani Kurdistan: Terrorists Preparing To Declare Independent Balochstan," *International Analysts Network*, August 5, 2009, [http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art\\_id=3080](http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3080). (Retrieved 12 April 2014).

<sup>306</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 43-47.

<sup>307</sup> Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan A Hard Country*, 358-361.

<sup>308</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 48.

Oman, two most strategic points for the US military in the Persian Gulf. Russia is the only power which can threaten the interest of US across the globe.<sup>309</sup> Ariel Cohen stated that,

“[w]hile Russia prefers to see itself as a global power; its global leverage is typically limited by its innate economic weakness. Often, it acts more to hobble the United States rather than set a course in line with its own preferences.”<sup>310</sup>

The recent deployment and the flow of US troops in southern Afghanistan, in areas bordering Balochistan that have traditionally been strongholds of Taliban, can force Taliban militants to cross the Pakistani border and flee into Balochistan in case an operation is launched by the US-led forces. Besides free movement of Afghan nationals across the Pak-Afghan border, many Afghan Taliban injured in the fighting have already been coming to Balochistan for medical treatment. The security forces maintain it is not easy to spot a Taliban commander or militant as their appearance and features are similar to those of the Pashtuns living in Balochistan. The Afghan Taliban has a significant presence in *Chaman* where religious seminaries have become a hub of militant recruitment.<sup>311</sup> A Taliban retreat to Balochistan notwithstanding, the US military operation in Southern Afghanistan can also increase Taliban recruitment in the province for the war in Afghanistan.<sup>312</sup>

Balochistan's long border with Afghanistan has strategic importance for NATO and US and allied forces in Afghanistan, not only because of the presence of terrorist networks along the Pak-Afghan border but also, to secure the main overland supply routes for the international forces especially when attacks on NATO supply convoys continue unabated elsewhere in Balochistan. US drone operations in Afghanistan are launched from *Pasni* and *Dalbandin* in Balochistan. Another factor which enhances US interest in the province is the

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<sup>309</sup> Amitai Etzioni, "The Devolution of American Power," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* vol.37:1, winter 2013 : .26.

<sup>310</sup> Ariel Cohen, "Russia's New Scramble for Africa: Moscow attempts to rebuild its sphere of influence in the African continent," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 2, 2009, [www.online.wsj.com/article/SB124639219666775441.html](http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB124639219666775441.html), (Retrieved 12 April 2014).

<sup>311</sup> Zahid Hussain, "The Taliban-Balochistan Link", *Monthly News Line*, Karachi, November 2009.

<sup>312</sup>*Ibid.*

presence of Taliban there. The cross-border movement of Taliban also has consequences for the war on terror and Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan and the US.<sup>313</sup>

Pakistan is important for America due to Balochistan. In order to counter Iran, America has already given the signals of attack to Israel and US Congress has agreed over it. The main factor is China. The experts are of the opinion that in the next 30 or 40 years that there are chances that the natural resources of China and oil of the Arab world will eliminate and after that the, US will be dependent on Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan; and for which the US would have to cross Balochistan and its Coast.<sup>314</sup> Therefore, it would not be an easy job, owing to the interference of China. Though America, being an economic giant of the world; yet it would not be able to sustain its position in next 25 or 30 years, USA will be replaced by China. In this regard, Gwadar Port and coastal line of Balochistan will play a key role. That is the main reason behind US annoyance over the contract of Port that was given to China.<sup>315</sup>

The US seems considerably disturbed by China's participation in the Gwadar port project, perceiving it as a bid to gain traction in the north-western part of the Indian Ocean, where the Americans maintain a formidable naval presence through a chain of military bases and concentration of warships and submarines.<sup>316</sup> Vicinity of the province with Afghanistan, Iran and China also makes Balochistan a key area for US interests. Balochistan also puts the US in a unique position vis-à-vis China. India located on Pakistan's eastern border shares much security, economic and geostrategic interests of the US and would be a natural ally of the US as a counter-weight to China.<sup>317</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> Safdar Sial and Abdul Basit, *Conflict and Insurgency in Balochistan: Assessing Strategic Policy Option for Peace and security*. Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol 3, 2010. 39-42.

<sup>314</sup> Alex Capri, "Why China Won't Replace America As The Leader Of Free Trade Any Time Soon," *Forbes*, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexcapri/2017/02/28/china-will-not-replace-america-as-the-leader-of-free-trade/#5ff2186976d9>. (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>315</sup> Majeed Asghar, "Balochistan Ka Saahil", *Jang News*. March 24, 2011.

<sup>316</sup> "Balochistan: Conflict and Players", *Pak Institute for Peace Studies*, Islamabad, 2009. 132.

<sup>317</sup> Zahid Hussain, "The Taliban-Balochistan Link", *Monthly News line*, Karachi, November 2009.

Pakistan is a key American partner in the fight against terrorism. Ensuring its stability is seen as a key aspect of America's strategy to bring peace to the South Asian region.<sup>318</sup> During the presidency of George W. Bush, the US made a tactical move to keep General Musharraf in the US camp rather than provoke him to support the Taliban. This meant that Pakistan partly collaborated closely with the US as a frontline ally after 9/11. However, along the political and military developments in Afghanistan during the recent years, tensions over conflicting interests and challenges have risen in Islamabad and Washington.<sup>319</sup>

Regarding the developments in Balochistan, the US has a major strategic stake in a peaceful resolution between Islamabad and the province. This is partly because Balochistan is being used as a corridor to transport essential supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan. This concern has led to the US recently establishing a consulate in Balochistan to supervise development projects in the province.<sup>320</sup>

The US interest in Balochistan does not end here. Rich in energy reserves and strategically situated along the borders of Iran and Afghanistan, the province is central to the energy politics of the region.<sup>321</sup> There is also a strong and growing fear in Washington that is related to China and its increasing presence in Balochistan.

The US fears that China's involvement in building Pakistan's critical warm-water port of Gwadar on the Southern edge of Balochistan may mean that the US will lose out on all that energy wealth. With Washington involved in many wars in the region and a potential stand-off with Iran, it may look to Balochistan as a critical staging area for US attacks in Afghanistan or Iran.<sup>322</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> United States Institute of Peace, *Going Forward: USIP Goals in Pakistan*, <http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/going-forward-usip-goals-in-pakistan#understanding> ( Retrieved March 21, 2014 )

<sup>319</sup> The Baloch Hal, *US Is to Open a "Small Consulate" in Balochistan*, 14 May 2010, <http://thebalochhal.com/2010/05/us-to-open-a-small-consulate-in-Balochistan/> ( Retrieved March 21, 2010 )

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>321</sup> Alexander Atarodi, "Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance", *FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency*, January 2011, 26.

<sup>322</sup> Atarodi, "Insurgency in Balochistan and why it is of strategic importance". 27.

Moreover many Pakistanis believe that for the US, Baloch instability is far more preferable to a stable and economically becoming Balochistan with its strategic location especially since the latter will have positive economic fallout for neighbouring Iran. The US is also keen to isolate Iran, regionally as well as internationally and the deterioration of Pak-Iran relations due to rumours of Iranian involvement in Balochistan suits US interests, as it compels Pakistan to seal its border with Iran. As the US rhetoric against Iran has increased in belligerency the acts of sabotage in Balochistan have increased in frequency and intensity.<sup>323</sup>

Strategic analysts in Pakistan like Shireen Mazari, the former director General of Islamabad based think tank Institute of Strategic studies have argued that for the US there is a much wider context to what is happening in Balochistan. Breaking up larger Muslim states redrawing borders between some of them, creating new political entities all these are part of the new strategic game plan. In Pakistan's context it is important to remember that the Afghan elections revealed a clear ethnic split and that targeting Iran also includes seeking opportunities to encourage old notions of Greater Balochistan.<sup>324</sup> The new US agenda is possibly the creation of a Kurdish state and it would not be a surprise if that is extended to the creation of a new Baloch state. An independent Baloch state would give the US an excellent base which could possibly replace or supplement both Pakistan and Afghanistan.<sup>325</sup>

Ralph Peters, a retired US army officer, in an article in the US Armed Forces Journal, has endorsed the redrawing of borders in the region to the west of India. According to the "proposed borders redrawn by him both Iran and Pakistan, another unnatural state would lose its Baloch territory to free Balochistan".<sup>326</sup> This clearly indicates that there are sections within the US intelligentsia, who have been thinking along these lines. A large number of Baloch

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<sup>323</sup> Mazari, "Balochistan and the 'Great Power Games'", *The News, Internet Edition*, February 2, 2005.

<sup>324</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>325</sup> Bansal. *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 223.

<sup>326</sup> Ralph Peters, "Blood Borders", *US Armed Forces Journal*, June 2006, <http://www.Armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899> (Retrieved 11 April 2014).

nationalists have been openly asserting that, America is coming and we are waiting for it. They believe that the Americans would help for independent Balochistan dependent on the US.<sup>327</sup> Seymour Hersh has also written about special operations being launched from Balochistan against Iranian nuclear assets.<sup>328</sup>

Under the prevailing circumstances, destabilizing Iran's periphery may be the best option available to the US against Iran. It realizes that "sanctions are unlikely to be effective; moreover sanctions will result in oil prices beating the roof, which may be terrible in these times of recession. Military action at this stage when US forces are overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan is not viable option."<sup>329</sup>

The US appears to be working on the strategy of turning Iran's minorities against the Iranian regime and "all the minorities inhabiting Iran's border, the Baloch, *Ahwazi* Arabs, the *Azheris* and the *Kurds*, are simultaneously in uph eaval. The fact that Baloch from western Balochistan were granted membership of UNPO, a pro-Western organization espousing the cause of unrepresented people of the world, suddenly in June 2005"<sup>330</sup>, although they had been struggling for decades, indicate a definite shift in US policies in the region. Simultaneous disturbances in Iranian Arabic South West, Kurdish West, Azeri North West and Baloch South East definitely point towards a pattern and Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may not be off the mark, when the access the US and its allies of trying to destabilize Iran through ethnic unrest.<sup>331</sup>

The official of the security agencies time and again reported the foreign involvement in Balochistan. The official claimed for the excessive involvement of India and Afghanistan. The reports also pointed the involvement of UAE, Russia and Saudi Arabia in Balochistan.

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<sup>327</sup> Bansal, Balochistan in *Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 224.

<sup>328</sup> Aditya Sinha, "Battlefield Balochstan", *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, January 15, 2006, 16.

<sup>329</sup> Bansal, Balochistan in *Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 224.

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>331</sup> "Ahmadi- Nejad accuses US of fomenting ethnic unrest", At, <http://www.Thenews.com.pk/updates.asp#2598> (Retrieved 20 April 2014).

Regarding the involvement of Saudi Arabia, Federal Minister for Inter-provincial Coordination, Riaz Hussain Pirzada, accused the Saudi government of creating instability across the Muslim world, including Pakistan, through distribution of money for promoting its ideology.<sup>332</sup>

Director General of Intelligence Bureau IB; Aftab Sultan, in a briefing to the Senate standing committee meeting, informed that, a terrorist arrested during last three years are being sponsored by the foreign countries. He further explained that, “Out of the 865 terrorists arrested during the last three years, a significant number had connections with India’s RAW and the Afghan NDS”.<sup>333</sup> DGIB further stated that the reason behind the terrorist activities to undermined the economic development through CPEC in the province.<sup>334</sup>

Major General Sher Afghan IGFC, during a press conference after the Quetta Police Training Center; stated that, these attacks are made by Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Al Almi, which is taking directions from Afghanistan and supported by Indian intelligence agency RAW.<sup>335</sup> IGFC Major General Ubaidullah Khan while addressing media claimed that 151 insurgent’s camps are being operated in Balochistan. He further stated that insurgents are being headed by Harbiyar Marri, Brahamdag Bugti, Nazar and Javed Mengal, who are running concentrated campaigns to defame state institutions.<sup>336</sup>

According to WikiLeaks cable, A briefing given by the then Director General of military operations; Ahmed Shuja Pasha, to parliamentarians DG military operation told

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<sup>332</sup> Mateen Haider. “Federal minister accuses Saudi govt of destabilising Muslim world,” *Dawn*, January 20, 2015. At, DAWN.COM. (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>333</sup> Sanaullah Khan, “Indian, Afghan agencies supporting terror in Pakistan: IB chief,” *Dawn*, October 25, 2016. At, DAWN.COM. (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>335</sup> “Afghanistan, India behind Quetta police training Center attack that claimed 60 lives today: Pakistani security sources,” *Daily Pakistan*. <https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/pakistan/india-involved-in-quetta-police-training-centre-attack-sources/>. (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>336</sup> “151 insurgent camps in Balochstan, Afghanistan creating unrest: IG FC,” *Express Tribune*, June 2, 2012. At, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/387805/151-insurgent-camps-in-Balochistan-afghanistan-creating-unrest-ig-fc/>. (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

that, India and Russia were involved in the insurgency in Balochistan. He further explained that, India had managed nine training camps of the insurgents BLA, along the Afghan border. He also claimed that, India and the UAE were funding and arming the Baloch. He pointed that these countries wanted destabilization and worsening of the law and order situation in Balochistan, with an aim to undermine the CPEC project.<sup>337</sup> Regarding the Russian involvement, Ahmed Shuja Pasha claimed the direct involvement of Russian government for finance and ammunition of the insurgents.<sup>338</sup>

The State of Pakistan responded the foreign involvement in Balochistan, but the strategic and economic importance of Balochistan attracts the above mentioned power. These foreign powers are supporting the Baloch insurgents to deteriorate the law and order situation in Balochistan, so that to undermine the economic development in Balochistan.

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<sup>337</sup> Saba Imtiaz, "MPs told Russia, India and UAE involved in Baloch insurgency," *Express Tribune*.. December 3, 2010. At, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/84902/wikileaks-india-russia-supporting-baloch-insurgency.> (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER 4

### Challenges of Baloch Identity and Their Response

After three decades from 1970s, in 2004 the violence broke again in Balochistan, which was also recognised by the government of Pakistan. The banned Organizations; Balochistan Liberation Army BLA and Balochistan Liberation Front BLF attacked over the gas pipeline, railway tracks and government infrastructure, and claimed the responsibility. They attacked with the aim; of free Balochistan from Punjabi dominance. Initially the government of Pakistan ignored the threat, but finally after thirty one year security forces were mobilised to destroy the insurgence training camps, to protect the national economic interests in Balochistan.<sup>339</sup>

These events were followed by Lady Doctor gang rape case by security officials in 2005, which sparked the violence<sup>340</sup>. The insurgence attacked the Sui gas field and the town of Sui. The insurgence cut off *Dara Bugti* from the rest of the country. The violence spread through the Baloch areas including the capital city Quetta.<sup>341</sup> The government of Pakistan blamed Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, responsible for the violence and launched military operation against him. Heavy weapons were used from both sides.<sup>342</sup> On December 14, 2005 the BLA claimed the responsibility for the attacks over the paramilitary forces camp in *Kohlu*, where general Musharaf was going to address one hour later. On 15 December 2005,

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<sup>339</sup>Bansal, Balochistan in *Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 89-90.

<sup>340</sup> “I am still terrified: Dr Shazia”. *Dawn*, January 30, 2005. Internet Edition, Seen At, <https://www.dawn.com/news/145815> (Retrieved, 12 April 2017).

<sup>341</sup> Akbar Khan Bugti, Interview by Haroon Rashid. *At the moment, war is being imposed on us*. February 2005. Seen at, <http://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/interview-akbar-khan-bugti/> (Retrieved 10 April 2017).

<sup>342</sup> Asma Mahsood and Amanullah Khan Miankhel, “Baluchistan Insurgency: Dynamics and Implications”. *Global Advanced Research Journal of Social Science (GARJSS)* Vol. 2(3): 51-57. 54, March, 2013. Available online <http://garj.org/garjss/index.htm> (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

the insurgents attacked a helicopter carrying Inspector General IG and DIG of Frontier crops.<sup>343</sup>

The government launched operation against the insurgents at *Kohlu* and *Dara Bugatti*. The insurgence responded by attacking over gas pipeline and communication, not only in the province but also out of the province. The economic activities of the province especially the mining and agriculture were affected.<sup>344-345</sup> The government sources claimed the elimination of 12 out of 40 *Ferrari* Camps.<sup>346</sup> The government strongly restricted the media about the Balochistan, even Asma Jahangir the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan HRCP was not allowed to visit Balochistan due to the worsen law and order situation in Balochistan. HRCP claimed that 85 per cent of the inhabitants fled from their homes, due to operations by the security forces over the town, against the insurgents.<sup>347</sup> This time it appears that it will pose the greatest threat to the State of Pakistan then all the previous insurgencies.

Balochistan was cut off from the rest of the country. The nationalist declared the current situation of the time as, the worst situation in the history of Balochistan. Abdul Haye Baloch (a Baloch nationalist) said; that the situation of Balochistan is just like that of former East Pakistan in 1970.<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> Saleem Shahid, "FC chief, deputy injured in firing". *Dawn* Newspaper, December 16, 2005.

<sup>344</sup> Due to the insurgence attacks over the electricity lines the shortage of electricity caused the destruction of the agriculture in the province, including Pashtoon agricultural areas.

<sup>345</sup> "Conflict in Balochstan". Report of, *HRC fact-finding missions December 2005 - January 2006*. Lahore: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, August 2006. 1-2. Also available at, <http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/20.pdf>. (Retrieved 10 April 2017).

<sup>346</sup> Muhammad Ejaz Khan, "12 Farrari camps dismantled in Balochstan". *The News*, Internet Edition January 22, 2006.

<sup>347</sup> "Conflict in Balochstan". *HRC fact-finding missions December 2005 - January 2006*. 1.

<sup>348</sup> Muhammad Ejaz Khan, "Crackdown on militants Launched in Kohlu". *The News*, Internet Edition, December 19, 2005.

On 26 August, 2006 Nawab Akbar Bugti was killed along with tribal militants, in an operation in which the security forces conforms the death of 21 soldiers.<sup>349</sup> As earlier stated that, due to deteriorated law and order situation it was difficult for media to come with true story of the operation. This resulted in different contradictory stories about the manner and circumstances of Akbar Bugatti's death. For the time being; the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti brought solidarity among all the Baloch tribes, even the rival tribe of *Bugatti, Raisani* tribe express solidarity with them. The Khan of Kalat called the tribal *Jirga* on October 2, 2006, in which they criticised the government and asked the State of Pakistan to vacate Baloch areas.<sup>350</sup>

In December 2007, President Pervez Musharaf announced that, 53 *Farrari* camps of Baloch insurgents had been eliminated, and there is now peace in Balochistan. However, the statement of the IG police of Balochistan that, the terrorists activities had been increased in Balochistan in 2007 as compare to 2006<sup>351</sup> presents a different picture of Balochistan. According to the 2007, report of Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies PIPS the situation in Balochistan remain tens, the nationalist continued targeting the state interest in the province. After the death of Ballach Marri in 2007, beside BLA, BLF and Bugti Militia new insurgence organisations including *Lashkar-i-Balochistan* LB, Bugti Force BF, Bugti *Lovers* BL, *Baloch National Army* BNA and *Jundullah* are active for the establishment of Greater Balochistan.

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The situation of Balochistan during 2006 and 2007 is clear from the number of attacks and its affect. According to Alok Bansal, in 2006 there were total 403 attacks from the

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<sup>349</sup> Saleem Shahid, "Bugti killed in operation: Six officers among 21 security personnel dead". *Dawn* August 27, 2006. At, <https://www.dawn.com/news/207726/bugti-killed-in-operation-six-officers-among-21-security-personnel-dead>. (Retrieved 8 April 2017).

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>351</sup> "Balochistan police efforts praised: Curbing terror", *Dawn* Newspaper, Internet Edition, 1/14/2007. At, <https://www.dawn.com/news/227860/newspaper/newspaper/column>. (Retrieved 9 April 2017)..

<sup>352</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 115.

insurgence, in which 277 people were killed. In 2007 the number of attacks increased to 536, in which 224 people were killed, including 157 civilian.<sup>353</sup> Similarly the number of attacks on the Gas pipe line also increased; in 2006, it were 19 but in 2007 and 2008 the number of attacked reached to 31 each year.<sup>354</sup>

According to Alok Bansal, the insurgents targeted the symbol of government authority and the communication links, with an aim to force the non-Baloch leaving in Baloch areas.<sup>355</sup> Their act was also supported by provincial government Punjabi settlers were targeted with an aim to force them to leave Balochistan.<sup>356</sup>

The State of Pakistan strongly responded the Balochistan issue. Several attempts were made to dilute the Baloch identity by creating differences among the Barohi and Baloch speaking people. The government also supported other ethnicities (Afghans and Non-Baloch Pakistani), by facilitating them and allow them to purchase property in Gwadar and other parts of Baloch developing areas.<sup>357</sup> Military cantonment was built to increase the presence of army in Baloch area. Instead of all efforts of the government to restore peace in Balochistan the insurgency continued. According to the reports in 2009, the total number of the terrorist attack in Balochistan were 737, in which hundreds of people lost their lives?<sup>358</sup>

However, the incidents of violence in Balochistan are also reported by media. For example IG, FC tolled the media that 53 Ferrari camps are being eliminated in the

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<sup>353</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 116.

<sup>354</sup> “Number of Attack on Gas pipeline in Balochistan: 2005-2017,” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/data/Attacks Gas pipeline.htm>

<sup>355</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 116-117.

<sup>356</sup> The provincial government of Balochistan ordered the settlers to leave Balochistan within 90 days. The so called settlers started migration, including those living there from generations. For detail see Alok Bansal. *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 116-120.

<sup>357</sup> Sabir Shah, “Terrorism continues to grip restive Balochistan since 2001”. *The News*, August 20, 2016. Also Seen at, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/143806-Terrorism-continues-to-grip-restive-Balochistan-since-2001-I> (Retrieved 12 April 2017).

<sup>358</sup> *Business Recorder*, At, <http://fp.brecorder.com/2013/04/201304121174388/> (Retrieved 20 April 2017).

operations.<sup>359</sup> He further stated that, "Despite meagre resources, we are determined to restore traditional peace of Balochistan".<sup>360</sup> Similarly, from 2005 till 2015 the number of attacks on Gas pipeline was 230, in which 16 people are reported to be killed.<sup>361</sup> The number of people killed in Suicide attacks presents even more worsen picture of the law and order situation in Balochistan; as from 2003 to 2015, 834 people were killed and more than 1600 people were injured.<sup>362</sup>

The previous chapter of the study provided a detail of the foreign involvement in Balochistan that is why the violence in Balochistan is not limited to the activities of insurgents targeting the symbols of the authority of the federal government. Hazara community was repeatedly targeted. The reports show that,

"[t]housands of Hazaras have been targeted and killed in various attacks and shootings in Balochistan."<sup>363</sup>

These violent activities indicate that Baloch people faced challenges, and they are responding these challenges.

However, to summarise, the most important challenge that Baloch people faced is the "Baloch Identity". The Baloch from 1948 faced the challenges of their identity. The accession of Kalat to the State of Pakistan changes their ratio in number as a result of amalgamation with a more populous country. Similarly the Baloch faced the crisis of identity as they were included in West Pakistan under the One-Unit scheme. They also faced identity problems when they were amalgamated with the Pashtun areas of commissioner province in 1972. In the same way Baloch people again faced the challenge of Identity, when the

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<sup>359</sup> Syed Ali Shah, "IG FC reveals 50 insurgent camps operating in Balochistan," *Dawn*, January 03, 2014.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>361</sup> "Number of Attack on Gas pipeline in Balochistan: 2005-2017," [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/data/Attacks\\_Gas\\_pipeline.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/data/Attacks_Gas_pipeline.htm). (Retrieved April 11, 2017).

<sup>362</sup> "Suicide Attacks in Balochistan, 2003-2017," <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/data/suicideattacks.htm> (Retrieved April 11, 2017).

<sup>363</sup> "Timeline: Hazara Killings in Balochistan," *Dawn*, January 11, 2013. <HTTPS://WWW.DAWN.COM/NEWS/777973>. (Retrieved April 11, 2017).

government encouraged the non-Baloch people in 1970s, to strengthen the administration of the newly established province. The Baloch also confronted with challenge of identity, when Pashtoon of Balochistan welcomed the refugees from Afghanistan during the crisis year (1979 till today), in Afghanistan.<sup>364</sup> The story of the identity crisis of Baloch does not ends here but the prevailing Baloch conditions indicate the further lengthen of the issue.

The modern political system was the product of British rule in India. Lahore remains the centre of the political activities at least since 1906, with creation of All India Muslim League. During the freedom movement of Pakistan leadership was from Punjab, KPK and Sindh actively participated, which presented their consciousness of modern political system.<sup>365</sup> Similarly all the ingredients of modern system utilised in these areas much earlier than the people of Balochistan. This earlier contact with modern system shows that Baloch were modernised much latter than all the other linguistic groups of Pakistan and also all the other parts of Pakistan. That is why the Baloch faced challenge of competition with these stronger ethnicities. In the case of Baloch this historical difference created the challenge of political supremacy in Balochistan. Tahir Ameen termed the political struggle between local and the federal representatives as “State elite and ethnic elites in the provinces”.<sup>366</sup> The Balochistan political history presented that the Baloch tribal political authority struggled for supremacy and even for autonomy in Balochistan. As earlier discussed that the first insurgency of Baloch, was caused by the undermining tribal political authority by the modern or federal political authority.<sup>367</sup> Similarly the second and third insurgencies were also caused due to the subjugation of the Baolch tribal authority by federal authorities.<sup>368-369</sup> The 1970s

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<sup>364</sup> Imtiaz Ali, “The Balochistan Problem,” *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (April 2005), 41-62  
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. At, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394092>. (Retrieved 10 April 2014).

<sup>365</sup> “The Punjab: Moving Journeys Part One”. *Royal Geographical Society*. At, <https://www.rgs.org/NR/rdonlyres/64D5A277-42AA-44ED-B019/BA08E667850F/0/ThePunjabMovingJourneysPart1.pdf>. (Retrieved 12 April 2017).

<sup>366</sup> Tahir Amin, *Ethno-Nationalist Movements of Pakistan* (Islamabad: IPS, 1993), 20.

<sup>367</sup> Taj Muhammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development*, 254.

<sup>368</sup> Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance*, 151-153.

conflict however represents a clearer picture when the elected Baloch tribal authority was undermined by the federal political power.<sup>370</sup> Finally the Baloch tribal authority finds itself out of power when Religio-Political parties find its way to the political power of the province.<sup>371</sup>

The final challenge that Baloch faced was their perception of the economic development taking place in Balochistan. In 1970s the result of the repression of the Baloch was that, the radical Balochs lost faith in the political system and normal party politics.<sup>372</sup> Although Army Chief Pervez Musharraf shows harmony toward small provinces by including provincial autonomy in his seven points agenda<sup>373</sup> but the economic activities initiated during Musharraf regime were misperceived by Baloch. The Baloch perceived that, these economic developments just expose the resources of Baloch for the others to undermine the Baloch within the province.<sup>374</sup>

### **5.1 The Future Challenges for Balochistan**

The State of Pakistan strongly responded to the insurgency in Balochistan. It made attempts to dilute and subsumed the Baloch identity into Pakistani identity of the Pakistani nation by encouraging settlers,<sup>375</sup> although the encouragement of non-Baloch was meant for the effective administration. An attempt was also made to create differences among the Baloch and Brahui speaking people on linguistic bases through censes, by classifying them separately. An influx of outsiders was encouraged from Afghanistan; during the USSR invasion of Afghanistan by establishing camps for them in Balochistan in 1980s.<sup>376</sup> The

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<sup>369</sup> Khuda Bakhsh, *Search Light on Baloches and Balochistan*, 299-301

<sup>370</sup> Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, 139.

<sup>371</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 222.

<sup>372</sup> Tahir Amin, *Ethno-Nationalist Movements of Pakistan*, 135.

<sup>373</sup> Christopher Jaffrelot, *History of Pakistan and its Origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 37.

<sup>374</sup> Beberg Baloch, "CPEC will outmatch Gwadar," *Express*, December 25, 2016. At, <http://www.bexpress.com.pk/2016/12/cpec-will-outmatch-gwadar>. (Retrieved 11 April 2017).

<sup>375</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 121.

<sup>376</sup> Harrison, *Baloch Nationalism*, 211.

development activities and mega projects provides the employment opportunities and also attracts the outsiders to Balochistan. The federal quota assigned to the province is not on ethnic bases, due to which it is filled by the Pashtuns or other ethnic group. Outsiders are also allowed to purchase property in Gwadar port and Makran coastal Highway.<sup>377</sup>

The State of Pakistan did not try to resolve the issue in political way as, none of the political party having government in the centre had no roots in Balochistan. The two main political parties of Pakistan i.e. Muslim league (N) and Pakistan People's Party always picked the Sardars' and still not find its place at ground level. The military had been used to eliminate the Sardars. These military actions resulted, the displacement of 200,000 people from *Kohlu* district in 2005. Large number of Baloch sympathisers disappeared including students, teachers, lawyers and people from all other professions. This brought the losing of faith by the Baloch youth over the political system of Pakistan.<sup>378</sup> The security forces building new cantonments in the province to increase their presence. These attempted focused over the elimination of the threats rather than to negotiate the settlement.<sup>379</sup>

Balochistan is politically divided into different ethnic groups, the major are Baloch and Pashtun. This political division is to safeguard their ethnic interest against each other. This brought division in the public opinion and rivalry among the ethnic groups. The ethnic rivalry undermined the development process in the province. For example the agriculture college was to be constructed in Balochistan with the collaboration of foreign aid. Due to ethnic tension it was shifted to Sri Lanka.<sup>380</sup> The ethnic conflict with in the province is not only creating problem in the way of development, but its political system also failed to have a well-known politician of national level.<sup>381</sup>

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<sup>377</sup>*Ibid.*, 123.

<sup>378</sup>*Ibid.*, 124.

<sup>379</sup>*Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>380</sup>Mansoor Akbar Kundi, *Balochistan: Socio, Cultural and Political Analysis*, (Quetta: Qasim Printers, 1994), 15-16.

<sup>381</sup>*Ibid.*, 22.

During the insurgency of 1970s the war conditions forced many Baloch to migrate to Sind and the Pashtun with other settlers occupied the fertile land.<sup>382</sup> The insurgency destroyed the communication and infrastructure in the Baloch areas. During the Bhutto administration provided the United Nation tube wall scheme of 6,000 to Balochistan. The Baloch could not benefit them as the real benefitors were Pashtun and Panjabi.<sup>383</sup>

The refugees from Afghanistan (704,168 in number in 1993) settled in Balochistan and became the common labour, transporters, shop-owners, restaurant-owners and also controlled the carpet market in the province.<sup>384-385</sup> In 1980 more than 90,000 Afghans entered Pakistan.<sup>386</sup> The process of migration to Pakistan remains on its peak and Pakistan hosted 3,270,000 Afghan refugees in 1989. This huge number of population was 3% of the total population of Pakistan in 1989.<sup>387</sup> The continuous flow of the influx of Afghan refugees remains till the end of the cold war era in 1990. The fall of *Mujahedeen* regime in 1992, the insecurity and political uncertainty; forced Afghans to pursue shelter in Pakistan as refugee. The UNHCR with the collaboration of Government of Pakistan started the repatriation program in 1992, for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.<sup>388</sup> In its initial phase the repatriation program remained successful and some 1.2 million Afghan refugees were repatriated. The refugee population was fallen from 3.2 million to 1.47 million. The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan also sent influx of refugee to Pakistan. Due to war condition the repatriation was disturbed and only 120,000 refugees were repatriated.<sup>389</sup> The Taliban regime was full of

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<sup>382</sup> Harrison, *Baloch Nationalism*, 210-211.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*, 203.

<sup>384</sup> Mansoor Akbar Kundi, *Balochistan: Socio, Cultural and Political Analysis*, 88-93.

<sup>385</sup> Harrison, *Baloch Nationalism*, 211.

<sup>386</sup> William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009), 198- 202.

<sup>387</sup> Nancy Hatch Dupree, "Demographic Reporting on Afghan Refugees in Pakistan," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1988), 845-865.

<sup>388</sup> Imran, Yusuf, Who are the Hazara?.*Dawn*, December 30th, 2014. At <http://www.dawn.com/news/1153911> (Retrieved, 14 October, 2016).

<sup>389</sup> Peter Madsen, *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 37-40.

conflict and wars, which made it difficult to come back to a point from where change was brought. Thus during Taliban rule the repatriation program of Afghan refugees remain disturbed.<sup>390</sup> The Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001. Apart from the repatriation program the further Afghan crossed the border; as a refugee, to Pakistan. After the American attacks of 2001, the number of refugee accedes than three million.<sup>391</sup> The UNHCR again started its struggle for the repatriation of Afghan refugee in 2002. As a result of the effort of government of Pakistan a Tri-parties agreement was signed for the repatriation of Afghan refugees with the support of UNHCR. Apart from this, more than 900,000 Hzara are living in the Provincial capital of Balochistan.<sup>392</sup>

According to the senses of 1972, there were 55% Baloch and 40% Pashtun in the province, but the influx of Afghan refugees changed the ratio in the favour of Pashtun. The refugees from Afghanistan changed the ratio which brought conflict between the Baloch and Pashtun during 1980-81. Apart from the 1980s rehabilitation, in American war on terror pro-Taliban beside the refugees get settle in the Northern Balochistan. This not only created a sense of identity crisis for the Baloch and shift the balance in the favour of Pashtun, but also increased the existing tension between the Baloch and Pashtun.<sup>393</sup>

According to Justice Hussian, ‘former chief justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan’ SCP, when we provide an opportunity to the Baloch for the development they could not benefited them. For example we issue the permits for the factories, the Pashtun and Panjabi bought that from the Baloch. When opportunity is created in the state services, they could not

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<sup>390</sup> William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009), 198– 202.  
<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>392</sup> Imran Yusuf, Who are the Hazara? Published in “The Express Tribune”, October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2011. At <http://tribune.com.pk/story/267225/who-are-the-hazara/> (Retrieved, 18 October, 2016).

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, 205-221.

race the other ethnicities of Balochistan (Pashtun and Punjabi).<sup>394</sup> Selig Harrison wrote in his book *Baloch Nationalism* that in 1970s, out of 16 there was only one Deputy Commissioner from Balochistan, who was also Pashtun. Out of 830 high provincial only 81 were from Balochistan, who were mostly Pashtuns of Balochistan.<sup>395</sup>

There are some clear differences between Pashtuns and Baloch, as Abdul Qudus stated. This difference is not only of origin but of also physical, social and political.<sup>396</sup> Ibn-Khaldun's 'Assabia' is much stronger in Pashtuns as compare to Baloch. Pashtuns society is egalitarian and more violent than that of Baloch. The Pashtun had adopted the culture of the society development and participation in the globalizing process.<sup>397</sup>

Punjabi settlers were targeted with an aim to force them to leave Balochistan. The provincial government of Balochistan ordered the settlers to leave Balochistan within 90 days. In 2008 the violence in Balochistan continued. Besides BLA, Baloch Revolutionary Army BRA emerged in Bugti area. They along with BLA targeted security forces, symbol of government authority, oil and gas pipelines, power grades and coal mines with an aim to weaken the authority of the state and to stop the supply of energy resources to other parts of the country especially Punjab.<sup>398</sup>

From the above facts it is clear that in future the Pashtun will try to establish their dominance in Balochistan and the Baloch will resist it. The Pashtun-Baloch differences can emerge in the form of conflict, which can worsen the peace in Balochistan, even lead to civil war. This kind of situation not only disturbed the development in Pakistan but will also threaten the whole region.

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<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid.*, 190-191.

<sup>396</sup> Syeed Abdul Quddus, *The Tribal Balochistan*, 91.

<sup>397</sup> *Ibid.*, 90-93.

<sup>398</sup> Harrison, *Baloch Nationalism*, 118.

## Conclusion

The emergence of Baloch ethnic identity in 1920s was the neutral response to the functional demands of modernity and its disruptive effect on Baloch society. The transformation of the Baloch ethnic identity into Baloch national identity at the time of withdrawal of British from India was the inclusion and incorporation of Baloch into British India and the partition of India into two parts Pakistan and India. This brought rapid social and political changes, which was the most conducive to the emergence of Baloch nationalism.

After the partition the Baloch lost their homeland in the form of incorporation of Khanate in the large state of Pakistan, which converts them into ethnic minority. The Baloch find the continuation of British policies as, in 1952 the remerge of Khanate into Kalat State Union KSU, in 1954 the merger of Baloch State Union BSU and Commissioner Province and in 1955 their merging into West Pakistan under the One Unit scheme. They resist these political changes in the form of armed struggle in 1948, 1957-58 and 1963-64. After the dissolution of One Unit Scheme they were again amalgamated with the Pashtun of British Balochistan. This change diluted Baloch identity and they resisted it in the form of 1973-77 insurgency.

The 2002 election also brought political changes as the political authority swept from nationalist to the religious parties. The result was again the armed insurgency in Balochistan. The 2013 election give chance to the Pashtun nationalists of Balochistan and mixture of Baloch nationalists and middle class Baloch. This may be a positive political change but it will pave the way for the future Baloch-Pashtun conflict, as that was seen in 1980-81.

Ibn- Khaldun theory of '*Assabia*' can be applied to the Baloch Ethno-nationalism. In earlier time it was so week that it could not brought the sense of a nation. In 17<sup>th</sup> century it gets strength resulted the rise of Khanate. In 20<sup>th</sup> century the '*Assabia*' in Baloch became so stronger that they tried to establish the Greater Balochistan. On the other side the group

solidarity in Pakistan as Pakistani nation also get stronger, resulted the competition between the solidarity among the Baloch as a nation and Pakistani as other nation. Here in the mind of the reader the question may be arises that, there are few non-Baloch supporter of the Baloch ethno-nationalism, how they be subjected to *Assabia*? The answer lies in the question itself, as if the support of the non-Baloch people are to be subjected to *Assabia*, than the support of those who are supporting Pakistani territorial nationalism will also be subjected. Interestingly *Assabia* is a bounding force among the group, which is based on blood relation, so those who are non-Baloch do not lie within the group. Thus the non-Baloch supporters of Baloch Ethno-Nationalism are not subjected to the theory of *Assabia*.

The Baloch faced the challenges of the dilution of Baloch identity<sup>399</sup>, the emergence of stronger Pakistani identity and social and political changes unknown to their culture and traditions. Applying the Albert Toynbee theory of challenge and response<sup>400</sup>, the Baloch find the armed struggle to respond these challenges as the best one. In future the Baloch have to contest Pashtuns of Balochistan at least.<sup>401</sup>

The Afghan war also led to an influx of Pashtun refugees from Afghanistan into Balochistan, numerically marginalizing the Baloch population within their own province. According to Usman Kakar, president of *Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party* PkMAP Balochistan chapter, the leading Pashtun nationalist party in the province, Balochistan is a multi-cultural province, or Baloch-Pashtun *Shareek* (shared) province, where the Pashtun have very low representation in the provincial set-up due to miscalculation of their population. For the last five years, the governor, chief minister, and speaker of the provincial assembly have been Baloch. Kakar believes that the size of the Pashtun population of

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<sup>399</sup> The process of dilution of Baloch Identity was based on the amalgamation of Baloch with non-Baloch. The process is been already explained in the Second and third chapter.

<sup>400</sup> jurgen schmandt and c. h. ward, "Challenge and Response". *Sustainable Development: The Challenge of Transition*. Cambridge University Press. Available At, [http://assets.cambridge.org/97805216/53053/excerpt/9780521653053\\_excerpt.pdf](http://assets.cambridge.org/97805216/53053/excerpt/9780521653053_excerpt.pdf). (Retrieved, 11 April 2017).

<sup>401</sup> Rehana Saeed Hashmi, "Baloch Ethnicity: An analysis of the Issue and Conflict with State". *JRSP*, Vol. 52, 63.

Balochistan is about the same as the Baloch population and the Pashtuns.<sup>402</sup> In near future the Baloch have to respond and contest the stronger Pashtun identity. In the lack of creative minority their response from 1920s till 2014 was the only one i.e. armed resistance. In the case of Pashtun that will be a great disaster of Baloches as the Pashtun will be backed by both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Hegel's philosophy of Dialectical Idealism offered a philosophical interpretation of the social change. According to that the social change is a recurrent process of Thesis, Anti-Thesis and Synthesis.<sup>403</sup> Applying Hegelian philosophy the emergence of Baloch Nationalism (Ethno Nationalism) in 1920s was the thesis, which was itself the outcome of WWI; as the world proclaimed for self-determination. As above stated that every thesis encompasses the anti-thesis, thus the emergence of the Pakistani Nationalism in 1947, was the anti-thesis (Territorial Nationalism). Both of these nationalisms are in constant conflict since 1947. As Hegel regarded the process of change as natural,<sup>404</sup> thus both these nationalism will synthesis in the form of religious nationalism. Now the question remains here that; how these will be Synthesis in the form of Religious Nationalism? To answer this we have to know about the response of both (state of Pakistan and Baloch nation) toward the problem.

In the past sixty years the State of Pakistan had responded the Baloch Problem militarily, and tried to dilute the Baloch identity. No political steps were taken to resolve the problem. Although some steps were taken for the economic development, instead of resolving the problem these steps further voided the gap between the state and Balochs.

Addressing Balochistan Grievances the State of Pakistan had taken many Steps. After the 2008 General Election, coalition Government led by the Pakistan People's Party has taken

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<sup>402</sup> Safdar Sial and Abdul Basit, *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Volume 3, Number 4. 11.

<sup>403</sup> W. H. Walsh, *An Introduction to Philosophy of History* (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1967), 136-137.

<sup>404</sup> E. H. Carr, *What Is History?* (London: Macmillan, 1962), 85.

landmark steps to address the grievances of Balochistan. The three key initiatives have been made were<sup>405</sup>:

1. *Aghaz-i-Haqooq-i-Balochistan* Package: November 2009
2. 7th National Finance Commission Award: December 2009
3. 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan: April 2010

The Provinces have also been given power to raise domestic or foreign loans with the approval of the National Economic Council.<sup>406</sup> The *Aghaz-i-Haqooq-i-Balochistan* package includes six constitutional, five political, 16 administrative and 34 economic proposals. The federal and provincial governments are yet to initiate some mega projects.<sup>407</sup>

Incidents of killings and kidnapping by 'unknown' agencies in Balochistan have not decreased either as promised under the package. February 13, 2012 marked a milestone in Pakistan's history when on the Supreme Court orders to the Military Intelligence MI and Inter-Services Intelligence ISI seven prisoners were produced in front of the Supreme Court. On March 1, 2012 the Supreme Court reprimanded the intelligence agencies by telling them that they are not above the law. The Chief justice also termed them as the biggest violators of the law of the country. While commenting on the role of Intelligence agencies in Balochistan the Chief Justice said, "You are an Arsonist. You have set Balochistan on Fire."<sup>408</sup>

Senators allege that the government failed to deliver on promised political rapprochement with the estranged Baloch leaders in exile and security related issues. The

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<sup>405</sup> "Aghaz-i-Haqooq-i-Balochistan: 80% work complete, says Gilani," *The Express Tribune*, November 30, 2011: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/299979/aghaze-> (Retrieved 12 Jun, 2014).

<sup>406</sup> Shahid Hamid, "Impact of the 18 Constitutional Amendments with Special Reference to Federation-Provinces Relations and Demarcation of Roles between the Federation and the Provinces," *PILDAT Briefing Paper*, July, 2010. [Http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/PAP/Impactofthe18thConstitutionalAmendmentonFederalProvincesRelations-BriefingPaper.pdf](http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/PAP/Impactofthe18thConstitutionalAmendmentonFederalProvincesRelations-BriefingPaper.pdf) (Retrieved 12 Jun, 2015).

<sup>407</sup> "Aghaz-i-Haqooq-i-Balochistan: 80% work complete, says Gilani".

<sup>408</sup> "Missing Persons Case: Fiery SC lays down the law for spy agencies," *The Express Tribune*, 2 March 2012. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/344312/missing-persons-fiery-sc-lays-down-the-law-for-spy-agencies>. (Retrieved 12 Jun, 2015).

reasons, they say, is that political rapprochement and security related issues are seemed not to be in control of the civilian government. The deteriorating law and order situation was also accepted by the Advisor to Prime Minister on Human Rights, Mustafa Nawaz Khokar in the National Assembly, who stated that the number of forced disappearances in Balochistan have increased during the current year. In 2010, he said, cases of 102 forced disappearances were reported while in 2011 the total number of cases was 206.<sup>409</sup>

The State of Pakistan beside military operation, also took other steps to resolve the issue, but on the other hand the Baloch are sceptical of these measures and consider it a “usurpation” of Baloch resources under the umbrella of “development.” As the Baloch Nationalist claimed that the introduction of mega projects only expose the Baloch population and resources to the World and will further weaken their hold on their recourses.<sup>410</sup> The steps for economic development did not provide the solution although some of the thinker stress upon it. Frederic Grare terms the latest conflict in Balochistan to have been provoked, due to the introduction of the federal government's mega projects in this backward area.<sup>411</sup>

Grare in his analysis in early 2006 said, that,

“[t]he central government's suppression of nationalistic aspirations; the absence of economic and social development...exclusion of the provincial authorities and local population from decisions on major regional projects, most notably the construction of the Gwadar Port as the major reasons of “armed insurrection” in Balochistan.”<sup>412</sup>

The situation in Balochistan is closely linked to the one in Afghanistan, which has been demonstrated by the American '*Afghan-Pak*' policy. From this point of view, the start of the U.S. war in Afghanistan pushed radical elements into Balochistan, which led to further destabilization of the country. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite positive cooperation

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<sup>409</sup> “Balochistan Package: government failed to implement major demand,” *Business Recorder*, February 11, 2012: <http://www.brecorder.com/> (Retrieved 12 Jun, 2015).

<sup>410</sup> Bansal, *Balochistan in Turmoil: Pakistan at Crossroad*, 276.

<sup>411</sup> Frederic Grare, *Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baloch Nationalism* (Carnegie Papers, January 2006), 65.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.*

with the West in the war against Afghanistan, Pakistan stayed loyal to the Afghan Taliban. Most of the Taliban are Pashtuns, as are a great portion of the Pakistanis. This loyalty dates back to the post-soviet years when Pakistan offered diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime under Mullah Omar in exchange of stability in Afghanistan and more importantly, a pro-Pakistan leadership in Kabul that denied India influence in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan caused an influx of extremist militants, leading to an increased presence of paramilitary troops in the Balochistan province. The presence of Afghan Taliban to run their war against U.S. forces in Afghanistan from Quetta resulted in the increase of violence in the province by many ways. The security landscape of Balochistan is disrupted by a combination of nationalist insurgency, sectarian-related militancy, Taliban presence in the northern part of the province, politically motivated target killings, attacks on NATO supplies, and activities of drug cartels and the land mafia hand in glove with criminal syndicates.

At the level of human security, acute deprivation, underdevelopment, abject poverty, illiteracy, chronic unemployment and continuous deterioration in the law and order situation have forced the non-Baloch to migrate to the relatively safer Pashtun localities. The Punjabi settlers, who may have lived in Quetta for generations, are being forced to leave for other provinces. Similarly, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, use of excessive by state agencies against political rallies, illegal detentions, torture of political activists during interrogation and uncalled for house raids and searches have sowed the seeds of deep insecurity among the masses, especially the Baloch. With severe financial controls and checks and balances on charities, it has become difficult for militant organizations to sustain themselves.

These conditions led to an emerging nexus between militant organizations and criminal networks, which resulted rise in crime. Militants are now involved in abductions for

ransom across Pakistan and the link between militant organizations and criminal gangs are obvious. According to the report of Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies PIPS, Annual Security Reports 2008-2012; from 2007 to 2011 the number of casualties was 2847 caused by the increasing violence in the province.<sup>413</sup>

The increase in violence in Balochistan is clearly evident as a number of militant organizations are functional in the province. The Nationalist militant organizations like Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-i-Balochistan and Baloch Musallah Difai Organization (BMDO). Balochistan Students Organization (BSO) and many more are challenging the state rite in the province. The Religious Extremists groups like, Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ), Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Imamia Students Organization (ISO), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Sipah-i-Muhammad, Jundullah and Taliban Shura are not only threatening the law and order situations but, also undermining the state authority.

Almost all Afghan refugee camps along Quetta-Chaman Highway are used by criminal gangs. Drug mafia, land mafia, car thieves and other criminal elements use these camps as their hideouts.<sup>414</sup> Afghan refugees are allegedly involved in crimes like robberies, car theft, kidnapping for ransom, drug peddling and gun running.<sup>415</sup>

Smuggling is now virtually a parallel economy in Balochistan. It has become an invincible trade which is being run by big barons, *Sardars*, public representatives and influential people of the province for many decades. Human trafficking, gun running, drug smuggling and illegal trade of contraband items are rampant in the Pak-Iran and Pak-Afghan border regions. In the recent past, smuggling and stockpiling of illegal weapons has also

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<sup>413</sup> Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) Annual Security Reports 2008-2012; South Asian Terrorism Portal ([www.satp.org](http://www.satp.org)) ; Data received from the National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC), Ministry of Interior, Pakistan.

<sup>414</sup> Zahid Hussain, "Taliban Balochistan Link," *Newsline*, November 2009. 32.

<sup>415</sup> Rahimullah Yousafzai, "And now there is Tehrik-i-Taliban Balochistan," *The News*, March 4, 2009.

increased manifold in Balochistan and made it hub of weapons trade that also include Improvised Explosive Devices IED .<sup>416</sup>

Drug and crime syndicates have outreach to almost all parts of Balochistan, from the bordering areas to the provincial capital, and from coastal area to industrial cities like Hub. Their role in the overall Baloch conflict is an implicit but significant one. They not only enjoy close collaboration with Afghan Taliban for smuggling of drug and weapons from Afghanistan into Pakistan but at some level coordinate with Baloch insurgents as well their potential customers for smuggled weapons and provide them safe passage within Balochistan.<sup>417</sup> As the economic development not only increase the discriminatory feelings in Baloch but also provide an occasion to the other ethnic groups to have control over their recourses. With the failure of the military and economic development steps to resolve the Baloch problem the scholars stressed for the use of the political solution through the existing political system.

In reality, however, there has to be a political agreement on minimum conditions for dialogue. The unrest in Balochistan needs to be sorted within Pakistan's Federal framework. While the Government insists it will not talk to terrorists in the north-west of Pakistan until they lay down arms, should the same conditions be applied in Balochistan? The need for a political solution to Balochistan has almost become a dramatic demand. Emphasis is also placed on finding a solution "through dialogue." But dialogue with whom and on what conditions?<sup>418</sup>

However to resolve the Baloch problem the dialogue and negotiations will be carried between the political authorities of the state and the insurgents, but there is a gap between

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<sup>416</sup> Mansoor Akbar Kundi, "Borderland Interaction: The Case of Pak-Iranian Baloch," *IPRI Journal*, Vol. IX, No. 2, (Islamabad: Summer 2009), 90-105.

<sup>417</sup> Ghani Kakar, "IED Smuggling on the Rise in Pakistan," *Central Asia Online.com*, August 8, 2010.

<sup>418</sup> Pildat Issue Papers, *Balochistan: Civil-Military Relation*. March 2012. 25.

them. The Baloch insurgencies are in those areas where a Pakistani politician cannot access due to its geography. The state has to send armed forces, who naturally did not know the way of dialogue. The state has to avoid the military option and use the card of the social and political development through education. Rather than this all other responses would be just like changing the capes not their minds. The current situation fevers the militants groups and the conditions will lead to anarchy in society in the absence of central power. Finally the extremist religious elements will be succeeded to establish their power in the secular society of Baloch.

To resolve the problem of Baloch identity we have to look back in history. History of the societies shows the moulding of human nature toward good. The philosopher who regarded human nature to be originally good, have to seek to mould the corrupt nature of the men to its original form. The philosophers who regarded human nature as a combination of good and evil, sought to mould it toward good. For the purpose of good complete reliance is placed on education to achieve the desired result.<sup>419</sup>

Socrates wrote that, the maxim of knowledge is virtue, and the true knowledge is the solution to all the social problems, which improving the moral value of the citizen.<sup>420</sup> Plato his ideal society was based on the training of the citizens. For him good as a social virtue in the individual and must lead to good as a collective virtue of the society. To cultivate it through the state controlled education.<sup>421</sup> True knowledge alone had the power to transform the existing society into ideal society and the education is the only medium through which the individual as well as society could acquire this slandered of ideal society.<sup>422</sup> Socrates had the same view for the improvement and development of the ideal society. The difference between

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<sup>419</sup> M. Ashraf Chaudri, *Iqbal and Modern Muslim Society* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 2005), 39-40.

<sup>420</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>421</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, English Trans; By H.D.P. Lee, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), 179-195.

<sup>422</sup> M. Ashraf Chaudri, *Iqbal and Modern Muslim Society*, 40.

these two great philosophers was only on the nature of the education, as Plato refers to ethical education.<sup>423</sup>

Aristotle believes that the virtue of the golden men could be cultivated in social institution through strict education<sup>424</sup> which ultimately led to develop society. Thomas Aquinas; society arose because of men's needs to fully realize his true nature, for this hierarchy have to stress religious education to achieve that goal.<sup>425</sup> For Hegel the spiritual entity of men could develop its self-consciousness on the basis of universal reason, which will bring him closest to his true nature.<sup>426</sup> That required education to cultivate the quality of rationality in him.<sup>427</sup>

Karl Marx believes that history is the continuous transformation of human nature; Capitalist shaped influenced that through their social idea. It would be transform through proletariat revolution. The basis of that revolution would be cultivated through education is proletariat class.<sup>428</sup> Voltaire a political thinker also conditioned the social development to education.<sup>429</sup>

Above all the teachings of Islam and Prophet (PBUH) also stressed over education to build peaceful and developed society. The Prophet (PBUH) declared the education obligatory for all Muslims<sup>430</sup> for the development of a peaceful society. Mohammad Muslehuddin in his book "*Islam and its Political System*" had explained the teachings of Islam for the establishment of a peaceful society as,

"[a]cquiring knowledge, it enables the possessor to distinguish right from wrong; it lights the way to heaven; it guides us to happiness; it sustains us in adversity; it is the weapon against enemies

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<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>424</sup> Howard Becker and Harry Elmer, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Gloucester Mass: Peter Smith Publishers Inc., 1978), 188-189.

<sup>425</sup> M. Ashraf Chaudri, *Iqbal and Modern Muslim Society*. 40.

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>427</sup> Peter Singer, *Hegel* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 18-19.

<sup>428</sup> M. Ashraf Chaudri, *Iqbal and Modern Muslim Society*, 41.

<sup>429</sup> E. Sreedharan, *A Text Book of Historiography: 500 BC to AD 2000* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2004), 117.

<sup>430</sup> Mohammad Muslehuddin, *Islam and its Political system* (Islamabad: Dr. Muslehuddin Islamic Trust IIUI, 1988), 129.

and an ornament among friends. By the virtue of it, God exalteth nations, and maketh them guides in good pursuits, and giveth them leadership; so much so, that their footsteps are followed, their deeds are imitated, and their opinions are accepted and held in respect.<sup>431</sup>

From theoretical ground it is clear that the development of the Baloch society is dependant over education. The education statistics of Pakistan clearly indicated the worst conditions of education sector in Balochistan as compare to other parts of Pakistan.<sup>432</sup> The development of education system in Balochistan not only resolve the issue in the present but it will also avoid the future conflicts of Baloch with other ethnic groups in Balochistan and will pave the way for the development of the country.

The history of relationship between central government of Pakistan and Balochistan presents a long story of political and economic exploitation and unfulfilled promises. The policies and affairs of Balochistan are under the control of Central government, which are responsible for causing the crisis in Balochistan. From more than 60 years the people of Balochistan under harsh economic realities developed a sense of discrimination. Above all, the negligence of the development needs created massive despair in Balochistan's people.

This deprivation has made the masses more vulnerable to the appeal by the extremists. Federal government despite its claim remains unable to design formal conflict resolution mechanisms. One of the main reasons for their failure to cope with the problem has been the weak democratic history of the country, which created the basis of deep polarization due to which the general masses cannot find a chance to integrate themselves in State.

From 1948 the Baloch nationalist movement get strength, as in 1948 it was only 200 people sided with Prince Karim; protesting against the dismissal as a governor of *Lasbela*. From 1958 to 1964 the protest against military rule and arrest of Baloch tribal and political leadership arose the felling of discrimination in Balochistan. From 1973 to 1977, the felling

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<sup>431</sup>*Ibid.*, 129-130.

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gets stronger resulted in violent protest against the dismissal of nationalist government by Bhutto. After 2000, the outcome of the central government policies was the wide range and violent insurgency in Balochistan. The Baloch graveness was exploited by foreign involvement threatened the sovereignty of Pakistan.

The federal government tried to address the Baloch issue but when economic developments were introduced it further worsened the situations. The announcement of building a major seaport in Gwadar involved regional powers in Balochistan. The development of Gwadar threatened the interest of Iran, India and the United States. Pakistani government was in the search of balancing of power in the region and also to attract investments in Gwadar. India and Iran dictated Afghanistan to increase violence in the province, which was multiplied by U.S competitions with China.

The situation became more and more tense, disturbing the way of economic activities in the province. The worse situation of law and order not only undermines the economic development in Pakistan, but also disturbing the development in the region. The functioning of Gwadar will increase the economic potential of Balochistan and will ultimately address the graveness of Baloch. The federal government has to support the social development through educating the inhabitants of Balochistan, which will make it difficult for other powers in the region to exploit them. The functionality of Gwadar not only benefits Pakistan but will also benefit the neighbouring countries in the region.

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