

MS RESEARCH THESIS

**CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS**



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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the name of Allah the most gracious the most merciful






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
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
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
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USMAN KHAN

Dedication

My respected parents and my brothers, for their great kindness, love, support, guidance, prays inspirational determination that gave me peace of mind, to enable me to concentrate on the work and help me to achieve my goal throughout my entire educational life.

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All glories are to ALLAH, the most merciful, beneficent, Omnipotent and Omnipresent, who bestowed me upon with health, understanding and acumen to achieve my destined goal. My source of guidance is Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W), who illuminated our life by guiding to recognize ourselves and our Creator.

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Abstracts

Since its creation the democratic process of Pakistan has been challenge by numerous obstacles and constraints. The early deaths of founding father and members of his team who struggle for establishment of Pakistan is the main reason for democracy not taking the roots in Pakistan. In the latter stages the bureaucratic takeover of the state and clashes between the politicians of eastern and western wings further redistricted the space for democracy in the country. Whereas the repeated military interventions takeover brought the democracy the lowest ebb, the hereditary and dynastic politics did not allow commoners and educated lot to step into the political process of Pakistan through democracy. Over the years, these factors greatly contribute towards weakening the democracy in Pakistan. This research would investigate the challenges facing the democracy in Pakistan at multiple levels while recommending a workable way forward for the smooth functioning of democracy where every Pakistani can become its part and beneficiary of the process.

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

The word democracy is derived from two Greek words: "Demos: meaning people and "kartos: meaning power. Broadly, it means the rule of the people. Democracy is the form system of government which was known as "Democratia". It is a system of government which has the power to make alternation in the law and the government structure with the eligible citizens. Ultimately, people themselves or by their elected representative to the parliament through free and pair election under the rule of law make legislative decisions to run the affairs of the state, sovereign power resides within the people to make social state.

In the years 507–508 BC, Cleithenes introduced the concept of democracy into the political discourse of the Greek city-state of Athens. Since Cleithenes is regarded as the founder of Athens' democracy. It was a form of direct democracy with two different characteristics, one of which was the selection at random of regular residents to fill judicial and administrative positions in the government. The second was the legislative assembly, which was open to all qualifying states but did not include landowners, individuals under the age of 20, slaves, foreigners, or women. The huge portion of the populace being excluded speaks to the true nature of ancient civic conceptions. The Athenian democracy was introduced by Cleisthenes but later expanded by ephialtes and perciles. They worked hard to preserve the democratic principles of quality among the Athenian citizens as no one allowed to hold the administrative office more than once. The government system was completely reformed and recognised to change the fundamental of the political organisation as well as introduce the quality of the rights for all citizens to have more power. (Sabertian, 2016)

The actual power of sovereignty under a democracy, in the words of Thomas Hobbes, "rests in the hands of the common people. Democracy's history has demonstrated that ancient Athenians engaged in a model of it. The political history of Pakistan has shown that the parliamentary system of democracy's future is unclear and that it has consistently been usurped by a small group of privileged individuals. A voter turnout of 30% raises serious questions about the legitimacy of the political process because, by democratic standards, this number does not accurately reflect the population as a whole. In Pakistan's democratic past, the parliamentary system has developed into a playground for delusions and evils, like horse-trading, the establishment of puppet kings, and a lack of accountability and transparency. (Greek, 2018)

The responsibility to answer to the government and the public is the essence of democracy. A democratic system offers a form of government where the rights of the people are respected, but sadly,

in Pakistan's democratic system, the rights of the average person are denied in all aspects of daily life. Family-oriented political parties have consistently dominated Pakistan in the guise of democracy, giving rise to an autocratic type of democracy in that country. Pakistan is among the 167 nations that operate these democratic systems of governance. A variety of democratic systems were in place in the nation, according to the constitution of 1973. Some were established by civilians and dictators, while others were both. (Shah, 2013)

Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah stated that Pakistan was established for the benefit of its inhabitants. The people elect their leader, and it is the leader's duty to meet the demands of the people and advocate for this nation day and night. The people of Pakistan have always struggled for a better Pakistan, and democracy is the best option for a better government. However, due to terrible democratic government governance, democracy was unable to take root and was derailed by a wealthy class of individuals and weak political leadership. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made significant contributions to the resuscitation and longevity of democracy in Pakistan. He stated, "The Pakistani people deserve better fate when it comes to democracy. It is a wonderful country, and democracy is the ideal political system for it. Let democracy triumph and observe how the country grows in front of you.

Right now, there is a monarchical form of democracy where people are denied justice, denied their fundamental rights, where government policies are made behind bureaucratic tables, where it makes no sense to send the right person to the right place, where there is no transparency and accountability for public spending, where there is no rule of law, and where there is no rule of law. All facets of the government are rife with corruption. The implementation of a presidential type of democracy in the nation would be the genuine answer to these flaws and evils in our democratic style of government. However, it is urgently necessary to construct more provinces in a province with a high population, particularly Punjab, before implementing this system. (Waqas, 2014).

It is a well-known fact that, as part of the democratic process, party representatives select citizens by secret vote to support their political candidates for seats in the National Assembly or provincial assemblies. It is possible to say that the government is of the people because it is chosen by the people. However, the situation is utterly at odds with the principles and ethics of democracy in Pakistan's democratic framework. In the democratic process of Pakistan, voters used a secret ballot to choose a representative for the National and Provincial Assemblies. The Prime Minister is chosen by secret ballot by the members of the National Assembly, and the Provincial Assembly members choose their respective provincial presidents in a similar manner. Ministers and advisers are chosen by the Prime Minister at the federal level, while provincial ministers are chosen by the Chief Minister. (Bibi, 1970)

Almost all the major political parties of Pakistan have become fiefdoms of the families that founded them. Their control will continue with them far into the future as the 'crown' will automatically pass to their 'heirs'. Other lower or provincial office bearers are also favorites of these families because they always go behind the dictates coming from above. In these parties, no one dares to question the logic of decisions or policies, as such daring is generally considered obedience and disobedience. They are "monarchies" disguised as democratic parties. During the military martial law, these parties were part of alliances aimed at restoring what they call "democracy". (Narasimha, 2015)

Statement of the Problem

Since its creation the democratic process of Pakistan has been challenge by numerous obstacles and constraints. The early deaths of founding father and members of his team who struggle for establishment of Pakistan is the main reason for democracy not taking the roots in Pakistan. In the latter stages the bureaucratic takeover of the state and clashes between the politicians of eastern and western wings further redistricted the space for democracy in the country. Whereas the repeated military interventions takeover brought the democracy the lowest ebb, the hereditary and dynastic politics did not allow commoners and educated lot to step into the political [process of Pakistan through democracy. Over the years, these factors greatly contribute towards weakening the democracy in Pakistan. This research would investigate the challenges facing the democracy in Pakistan at multiple levels while recommending a workable way forward for the smooth functioning of democracy where every Pakistani can become its part and beneficiary of the process.

Significance of the Study

Democracy has played a very important role in the story of civilization, helping transform the world from power structures of monarchy, empire, and conquest into popular rule, self-determination, and peaceful co-existence. Democracy in Pakistan face many challenges since has post-colonial era, like military intervention, corruption, Weakness of political institutions, no fair and free election, hereditary politics, inconsistency in democratic process and restrictions on political parties. So in this research will helpful to understand and critically analyzed the challenges to democracy in Pakistan. This study is very essential because it will open the door for the future researchers, scholars, reader, and policy makers, to understand in real about the challenges to democracy in Pakistan.

Objective of the Study

This research is aimed at achieving following objectives:

- To analyze the dynamics of democratic process in the politics of Pakistan.
- To examine challenges posed by military intervention towards democracy in Pakistan.
- To evaluate the hurdles posed by hereditary politics towards democracy in Pakistan.
- To examine the factors which can contribute towards smooth functioning of democracy in Pakistan.

Research Questions

On the basis of statement of problem and objective, following research questions have been formulated for logical research.

- What are the dynamics of democratic process in Pakistan?
- What challenges are posed by military interventions to democracy in Pakistan?
- How hereditary based political parties restrict the dispensation of true democratic process in Pakistan?
- Which factors can contribute towards smooth functioning of democracy in Pakistan?

Delimitation of the Study

The democratic process of Pakistan has been challenged by numerous obstacles and constraints, since its creation. The early deaths of founding father and members of his team who struggled for establishment of Pakistan is the main reason for democracy not taking the roots in Pakistan. In the later stages, the bureaucratic takeover of the state, the repeated military takeovers brought the democracy towards its lowest ebb, the hereditary and dynastic politics. These factors greatly contributed towards weakening the democracy in Pakistan.

It is difficult to analyze all these threats that influence democracy in Pakistan since 1947. There for this study will be limited to critically analyze the military intervention, dynamics of democratic process and hereditary politics in Pakistan since post-colonial era to 2022.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Hassan Rizvi (The military and politics In Pakistan), Political parties play a terrible enough role to undermine Pakistan's democratic tradition. Each politician belongs to a different political party. Based on open merit, the national legislature has 270 seats overall, whereas 216 political parties are registered in Pakistan. The basic requirements for political party registration are void under the constitution. The government is being threatened and paid off by these political parties, who only have one or two members in the legislature. This pattern has never allowed the political culture to support or destabilise the state's political system. These manipulation schemes encourage outside parties to get involved. Small political parties employ these forces once they have intervened to further their objectives. The people have negative perceptions of these political parties. These insignificant political figures are offered for sale at extremely low prices, they set a corrupting precedent inside political parties, and they serve as a warning to the state's citizens that democracy has failed. A culture of horse dealing was established by these politicians. Political parties have historically been known for their personalities. The traditional demeanour of politicians is harming Pakistan's political system. Whenever these politicians get a chance to rule, they always choose to appoint their relatives and stop thinking about all the merits, but when they are in the opposition, they assert the merits. These are the disadvantages of our politicians and political parties which are anti-democratic. (Rizvi, 1997)

Kamran tahir in his paper (Dynastic politics in south Asia), Political parties lack the ability to win back the public's trust in them. Political parties don't have a strong infrastructure, they've lost the ability to educate the populace at large, and they don't engage voters in a way that motivates them. Political leaders and the general public place more value on race and religion than on the actual message of political parties. Instead of speaking directly to voters, the party leadership would prefer to communicate with the public through print or electronic media. The communication gap between politicians and the general public widens as a result of this trend. This approach undermines public confidence in political parties and poses a challenge to the growth of democratic culture. The role of politicians, political parties, and institutions is not included in the textbooks taught in schools. The primary focus of the textbooks does not clearly identify the value of democratic structure and

procedure. After parliamentary elections, elected officials cease communicating with the local populace; this is a very significant development for political culture. The average person cannot comprehend the way that political leaders operate. The constituencies of these landlords are erected on their own lands, and the residents of their constituencies lack the second option and the fortitude to vote against the interests of their masters. It is therefore obvious that politicians are landlords and dislike interacting with laypeople. What kind of democratic culture would be created in such ambiguity? Apparently, this is a way to motivate people to accept an alternative option, which is apparently the military in third world countries (Kamran, 2022)

Ayesha Siddiqi in her paper (inside Pakistan military Economy) The military plays the most important role in problems of national security. When it comes to matters of domestic security, economic development, and international security, the Pakistan Army's work is still unclear. However, the task of maintaining and expanding international security in specific regions falls to Pakistan's armed forces. The military seized power of civilian governments four times after Pakistan was founded in 1947: in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999. The military plays a crucial role in a variety of public service endeavours, as well as in several economic sectors and frequently in disaster relief missions. Additionally, the civil government is responsible for maintaining sociopolitical control throughout the nation. Commanding officers have made numerous attempts to manage and eliminate the disparities between the armed services and politicians. The key issues are those related to political economics, maintaining law and order, and issues like corruption, etc. All of these items are resources that they can personally own and are a component of the state apparatus. For instance, the military helped the president remove civilian governments from politics in August 1990, April 1993, and November 1996 because they could no longer guarantee domestic peace, stability, and order. Army has been providing its services for Pakistan's growth while attempting to preserve the role of domestic security. According to reports, the military is keenly engaged in both foreign policy and home security matters. Military leaders routinely handle matters of foreign policy. The Pakistan Army's key goals are to continue working on matters of internal security and foreign policy. The military publicly dominated nuclear policy and oversaw the Afghan war during the General Zia period. The military waits for the present and continues to serve as the de facto decision-making body in Pakistan's nuclear

institutions, such as the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the Research Laboratories of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, in 1988, following the fall of General Zia's dictatorship(siddiq, 2007).

Ayesha Jalal in her Book (The struggle for Pakistan) Since Pakistan's founding, poor leadership and governance have been a major reason for military interventions in Pakistani politics. Shuja Nawaz, a well-known political analyst, has outlined the reasons for Pakistan's poor leadership. He claimed that Pakistan was experiencing issues with weak leadership following the passing of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the country's founder. Another academic, Ayesha Jalal, asserted that Pakistan's underdeveloped political structure is to blame for the majority of military interventions in Pakistani politics. She also questioned the army's ongoing influence over and participation in Pakistani politics. She continued by saying that the relationship between higher-ranking military officers and the political system is what leads to military takeover of politics. After General Zia-ul-dead Haq's in 1988, there was a widespread belief that the military would never again get involved in Pakistani politics. Unfortunately, General Pervez Musharraf suffered yet another mishap on October 12, 1999, and he overthrew the civilian administration of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. The 1999 coup demonstrated that Pakistan's military remains the country's most important institution.(JALAL, 2014).

Abdul Qadir Mushtaq in his paper (Dynastic Politics in Pakistan) The dynastic and hereditary politics is the primary cause of the failure of Pakistan's political system—is pervasive in Pakistan's major political parties, where the only merit for promotion to the highest rank in the party is to be the next of kin of the party leader. The truly hardworking and dedicated political workers are bound only to chant slogans and face hardships for the party, while all the privileges are given to the party leader who forms a large kinship group based on their collective political and economic interests. The lack of democratic norms in political parties means that no real leadership from within the party can emerge and rise to higher positions in the party. The population therefore loses confidence and interest in the entire political system, where they have no role at all except to be in perpetual political and intellectual servitude. This also leads to a brain drain from political parties, further worsening an already struggling system. Political families that follow hereditary politics develop and install their next generation to lead the party leaving no room for a genuine political worker to excel thereby ending any likely positive competition in the party. During their time in

government, political parties expand their political influence using the state machinery. People are controlled with the help of police and patwari and persecuted through armed gangs who force them to take the help of influential politicians at the expense of their political support. Similarly, during by-elections in Pakistan, it is usually common practice to use state machinery and government funds for the candidate of the party in power (Mushtaq, 2016).

Muhammad Naseem in his paper (Pakistan's Absent of Democracy) Any democracy's core tenet is the rule of law. The establishment of rules and regulations is merely the first fundamental component of democracy; the rule of law also refers to how laws are carried out in the state, regardless of gender, race, or ethnicity. The application of laws that (i) were passed and approved in accordance with predetermined procedures; (ii) are not retroactive, but rather general, stable, clear, and hierarchically ordered; and (iii) are applied to specific cases by independent, open, and accessible courts, whose decisions adhere to procedural rules and which establish guilt through reasonable means. In Pakistan, everything is fair and friendly for the rich people. Law does not apply on them. It applies on the poor people (Naseem, 2006).

Zahid Hussain in his paper (Challenges to Democracy) the fruit of democracy is mainly dependent on how electoral system of the country is accountable. The election process is the main indicator how people of any country perceive the process of democratic change. Change in the power structure or change in the government is due to fairness of the electoral process. Electoral accountability is the main function and element of the democracy. (Hussain, Z. 2018).

Irshad Ahmad Haqqani in his paper (Failure of Democracy in Pakistan) after the birth of Pakistan Muslim League assumed the sole power of leadership in Pakistan. But with the sudden death of Jinnah and later Liaqat Ali Khan assassination the situation changed. After the death of two main leaders of Muslim League, there was created a huge gap between the remaining leaders of Muslim League. The main politicians who participated in Pakistan movement belonged to East Pakistan. On the other hand, in the West Pakistan, leadership was held by the new comer feudal. They were more powerful and strong in the regard of the material affluences as compared to the East Pakistanis. So this leadership crisis became a major challenge in the way of smooth democracy in Pakistan. (Haqqani, I. A. 2006).

Muhammad Waseem in his paper (Pakistan lingering crisis of diarchy) the government or democracy mainly functions when three main pillars work in coordination with each other.

Legislature, executive and judiciary must work in coordination with each other by making each accountable. If these institutions don't work in close link with each other then it becomes difficult to operate. In Pakistan judiciary and executive often found to be locking horns with each other. The political system of Pakistan from its inception, it would be clear that there was a little inter-institutional cohesion among different institutions of government. Due to the absence of this cohesion, a smooth track of democracy could be developed in Pakistan (Waseem, M. 1992).

Muhammad Waseem in his paper (Politics and the state in Pakistan) the Political participation of people in politics is at lower level in Pakistan. Political participation requires the educated members of society. The educated citizens participate in political matters more than the uneducated because they have not more knowledge about the political matters. This is the main reason. The Pakistani politics is basically consisted of the feudal politicians that restrict the masses to participate in political matters. The people of Punjab are more educated and conscious than the people of other provinces that why they participate more. But on the other hand, the people of interior Sindh cannot even imagine speaking before their feudal lord politicians. (Waseem, M.1994).

Altman in his book (Assessing the quality of democracy), the government's primary duty and capacity to please the populace by attending to their needs. Responsiveness is a way to see representation "in action" through four main aspects: the policies that are at the core of the public interest; the services that are provided to the people and groups that the government represents; the provision of tangible goods to their constituents through the public administration and other entities; and the extension of intangible goods that foster, reinforce, or reproduce a sense of loyalty and support for the government. However, Pakistan continued to place less significance on this. The government gives less importance to responsiveness. There are further justifications for not meeting the requirements of the people. The government's ability to be responsive to the needs of the people is hampered by military operations, a lack of education in Pakistan, and personal interests. "Military involvement in Pakistan can also be blamed for a lack of reaction. Due to repeated military interventions, the policy's consistency is still quite low. (Altman, L 2002).

Muhammad Asif Malik in his paper (Ideology and Dynamics of Politics in Pakistan) unfortunately, the creation of Pakistan faced so many problems. With the creation of

Pakistan, the Hindus were unhappy and they started to create problems for Pakistan since its first day. Basically, Pakistan emerged as a security state. The Hindus and the Sikhs started to harm and even kill the Muslims as they started to move from India to Pakistan. The Amritsar massacre is very dreadful dream for the Pakistanis. Due to Kashmir issue, the first Indo-Pak war started in 1948. Pakistan had to give importance to military institution that cannot be ignored. Every government put its major concern to military due to security threat. The importance of military is also another factor in the walk of democracy because now in Pakistan the military institution has become more powerful as compared to political institution. (Malik, A. I.2001).

Muhammad Waseem in his paper (Federalism in Pakistan) there is no a political consensus throughout the history of Pakistan. The reason is that who came into power became the lord rather than a politician. Later on, till today the same type of politics is being practiced whether this is Nawaz Sharief, Asif Ali Zardari or so on. Everyone is committed to his own benefits not for the national benefits. With such thinking, the progressive way of democracy is unable to practice because the democracy is somehow totally different form the wishes of our Mughal politicians. There is not political consensus even between the members of same political parties (Waseem, M. 2010).

Tamseel Aqdas in her paper (The Dilemma of Democracy: Why has Pakistan Failed as a Democratic) the periodic restrictions on the political parties in Pakistan, factor that led to democracy deficit in Pakistan. Many times the political parties were banned or stopped to work. Firstly, Ayub Khan banned political parties and put restrictions on political leaders for six years. Secondly, Yahya Khan placed restrictions on political parties. Thirdly, Zia-ul-Haq enforced restrictions on political activities strongly targeted PPP. Fourthly, Musharraf did not ban political activities but targeted PPP and PML (N) (Aqdas, T. 2020).

(Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan)The author analyzed the Civil-military relations are the core factor behind low performance of democracy in Pakistan. However, several military interventions right from the inception of Pakistan has restricted the democracy to perform well in the country. Pakistan not yet witnessed any military intervention hence democracy is flourishing in Pakistan. Pakistan inherited weak political institution and relatively strong military. Moreover, due the external threats and internal secessionist movements, military intervened in domestic politics on numerous occasions.

Political institutions and election process were very weak but these institution and practices were never allowed to grow (Sayeed, K. B. 1959).

Muhammad Waseem in his Article (Judging democracy in Pakistan, Conflict between executive and judiciary) the performance of bureaucracy is found to be a factor in low performance of the democracy in Pakistan. In Pakistan the Weberian concepts of bureaucratic inertia and red-tapism are hindering the performance of the democracy. Similarly, bureaucracy has always been under the heavy pressure of political leaders. This situation is alarming and has restricted the bureaucracy to under-perform which ultimately became demerit of the democracy. The performance of bureaucracy has been good during military interventions which again raised the question pertaining to the performance of bureaucracy in connection with democracy (Waseem, M. 2012).

Research Gap (Gap of Knowledge)

A research gap is a problem or question that has not been answered by any of the research or studies in your field (Elyse W. 2021). Many research and study has been done on challenges to democracy in Pakistan. While reviewing the studies and researches related to challenges to democracy in Pakistan, I came across questions and problems that were not clearly answered. Therefore, this research will be done in order to solve those problems and access the answers to the questions mentioned in the Research Questions section, like critical analysis of hereditary politics, dynamics in democratic process, military interventions, corruption, weak performance of political institutions.

Theoretical Frame Works of the Study

Theory of Democratization

A theoretical framework is used to apply the theory of democratization, according to which a political regime becomes democratic through the process of democracy. Beginning in the middle of the 20th century, democracy grew rapidly around the world, changing the political landscape from one in which democracies were the exception to one in which they were the rule. The establishment of international norms that link democracy with many significant positive results, from

respect for human rights to economic prosperity to security, is largely to blame for the rise in interest in democratization among academics, policymakers, and activists alike.

The parliamentary democracy that Pakistan was founded as in 1947 was disbanded in 1954, opening the door for the military dictatorship that has dominated much of Pakistan's history. Four direct military interventions—1958–1969, 1969–1971, 1977–1988 and 1999–2008—as well as the adoption of four different constitutions emphasise Pakistan's turbulent relationship with the military and society's inconsistent application of the rule of law. In this paper, political conflicts and crises in Pakistan are discussed as the country's polity transitions from an authoritarian to a democratic order. We draw the conclusion that Pakistan's democratization is a highly fragile process that calls for ongoing vigilance and additional reforms to prevent a return to earlier anti-democratic political patterns.

Lack of regular elections, frequent military interference in politics, a lack of strong leadership, corruption, hereditary politics, extremism, and security challenges from surrounding nations all contribute to Pakistan's fragile democracy. All of these issues must be resolved for Pakistan's democracy to flourish. Regular elections must be held, hereditary politics must be avoided, military interventions must be avoided, political awareness must be improved, corruption must be eliminated, and democratic culture must be strengthened.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Any research paper's methodology—the approach the researcher uses to pose research questions and get to conclusions using these scientific techniques—is its most important component. (Bennett, P., & Michael, N. 1994). The importance of methodology is that it distinguishes a research document from other documents.

In This study the researcher will use qualitative research method. This research is based on secondary data and the researcher will collect data from library resources, official documents, journals, published books, research articles, newspaper, magazine and online portals etc.

Research Design

A research design is a strategic framework for action that acts as a bridge between research questions and research implementation or, a research design is a design that directs the conditions for data collection and data analysis in a way that combines the research purpose with cost effectiveness (Durrheim, K. 2006).

In this research will use content analysis, the evolving the challenges to democracy in Pakistan will be analyzed and observational methods will be used to conclude.

Data Collection

Data collection is the systematic approach to gathering and measuring information from a variety of sources to get a complete and accurate picture of an area of interest (Emilly M. 2020).

This research is based on secondary and qualitative data. In this study secondary data will be collected from relevant books, official documents, journals, newspapers, online portals, published writings i.e., research articles and reports etc.

Data Analysis

Data analysis is an important part of any research. Data analysis summarizes the data collected. This includes interpreting the data collected through the use of analytical and logical reasoning to determine patterns, relationships, or trends (Bazeley, P. 2013). Secondary data analysis is a flexible approach and can be used in a variety of ways. It is also an experimental exercise with procedural and evaluation steps, as in the collection and evaluation of primary data (Doolan, D. M., & Froelicher, E. S. 2009).

This research is based on secondary and qualitative data. In this study the researcher will use content analysis method for the critical analysis of challenges to democracy in Pakistan. Therefore, the data in this study will be analyzed by developing the research questions, then identifying the data set and fully evaluating it.

Plane of the Study

- I. Introduction of the study This section will comprise of introduction and historical background of the study, statement of the problem, significance of the study, Objective of the study, research questions and delimitations of the study Then there will be a

detailed discussion of literature review and this research work will try to fill the gap found for this study. Research methodology is the very significant part of the research work. It includes research design, data collection and data analysis.

- II. The first chapter will discuss the dynamics in democratic process, obstacles and challenges to democracy in Pakistan.
- III. Second chapter will discuss critical analysis of the obstacles and hurdles to pose by repeatedly military intervention to democracy in Pakistan.
- IV. The third chapter will critically examine the dynastic and hereditary politics and its challenges to democracy in Pakistan. And then we will conclude the study along with recommendation for the smooth functioning of the democracy in Pakistan. In the end, list of references will be provided.

CHAPTER 1

The Dynamics of Democratic Process in Pakistan

1. The Emergence of Pakistan

The roots of Pakistan's multifaceted problems can be traced to March 1940 when the All-India Muslim League formally orchestrated the demand for a Pakistan consisting of Muslim-majority provinces in the northwest and northeast of India. By asserting that the Indian Muslims were a nation, not a minority, the Muslim League and its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had hoped to negotiate a constitutional arrangement that provided an equitable share of power between Hindus and Muslims once the British relinquished control of India. The demand for a "Pakistan" was Jinnah's and the League's bid to register their claim to be the spokesmen of all Indian Muslims, both in provinces where they were in a majority as well as in provinces where they were a minority. Jinnah and the League's main bases of support, however, were in the Muslim-minority provinces. In the 1937 general elections, the league had met a serious rejection from the Muslim voters in the majority provinces (Hayat, 2017).

There was an obvious contradiction in a demand for a separate Muslim state and the claim to be speaking for all Indian Muslims. During the remaining years of the British Raj in India neither Jinnah nor the Muslim League explained how Muslims in the minority provinces could benefit from a Pakistan based on an undivided Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan in the northwest, and an undivided Bengal and Assam in the northeast. Jinnah did at least had tried to get around the inconsistencies by arguing that since there were two nations in India-Hindu and Muslim-any transfer of power from British to Indian hands would necessarily entail disbanding of the unitary center created by the imperial rulers. Reconstitution of the Indian union would have to be based on either confederal or treaty arrangements between Pakistan (representing the Muslim-majority provinces) and Hindustan (representing the Hindu-majority provinces). Jinnah also maintained that Pakistan would have to include an undivided Punjab and Bengal. The substantial non-Muslim minorities in both these provinces were the best guarantee that the Indian National Congress would see sense in negotiating reciprocal arrangements with the Muslim League to safeguard the interests of Muslim minorities in Hindustan (Hayat, 2017).

Despite Jinnah's large claims, the Muslim League failed to build up effective party machinery in the Muslim-majority provinces. Consequently the league had no real control over either the politicians or the populace at the base that was mobilized in the name of Islam. During the final

negotiations, Jinnah's options were limited by uncertain commitment of the Muslim-majority province politicians to the league's goals in the demand for Pakistan. The outbreak of communal troubles constrained Jinnah further still. In the end he had little choice but to settle for a Pakistan stripped of the non-Muslim majority districts of the Punjab and Bengal and to abandon his hopes of a settlement that might have secured the interests of all Muslims. But the worst cut of all was Congress's refusal to interpret partition as a division of India between Pakistan and Hindustan. According to the Congress, partition simply meant that certain areas with Muslim majorities were 'splitting off' from the "Indian union." The implication was that if Pakistan failed to survive, the Muslim areas would have to return to the Indian union; there would be no assistance to recreate it on the basis of two sovereign states. With this agreement nothing stood in the way of the reincorporation of the Muslim areas into the Indian union except the notion of a central authority, which had yet to be firmly established. It was challenging to establish a central authority, in part because the provinces had been run by New Delhi for such a long time and because Indian Territory separated Pakistan's eastern and western wings by a distance of 1,000 miles. Even if Islamic sentiments were the best hope of keeping the Pakistani provinces unified, their pluralistic traditions and linguistic affiliations were formidable stumbling blocks. Islam had certainly been a useful rallying cry, but it had not been effectively translated into the solid support that Jinnah and the League needed from the Muslim provinces in order to negotiate an arrangement on behalf of all Indian Muslims. (kreem, 1997).

Therefore, Pakistan's diverse provinces posed a possible danger to the federal government. While the provincial arenas remained the main hubs of political activity, it was either weak-willed politicians or civil servants versed in the venerable customs of British Indian administration that set about establishing a centralized government in Karachi. The inherent flaws in the Muslim League's organizational design combined with the lack of a centralized administrative structure that could oversee state operations ultimately proved to be Pakistan's undoing. A central authority that was not established nor equipped to handle the millions of migrants that were present needed to take immediate corrective action. The commercial groups had yet to invest in some desperately needed industrial units. And the need to extract revenues from the agrarian sector called for state interventions, which caused a schism between the administrative apparatus of the Muslim League and the landed elite who dominated the Muslim League (Zafar, 2020).

1.1 Power and Rule

The instability brought on by division had an impact on both the military and civil administration. In the midst of its impending political and economic challenges, Pakistan has gone through a number of politicians. There was little prospect for a democratic state that would bring socioeconomic justice and fair governance to all Pakistani residents because politicians were corrupt, focused in preserving their political power, and working to protect the interests of the privileged. General elections have been postponed and the constitution-making process has been slowed down by contentious disagreements over the national language, the place of Islam, provincial representation, and the balance of power between the centre and the provinces. The first constitution of Pakistan was promulgated in October 1956 after a consensus had been reached. The democratic experiment was brief but unsatisfying. In October 1958, with national elections set for the following year, ministries were swiftly established and dismantled. General Mohammad Ayub Khan then executed a military coup with astonishing ease. (Hussain, 2015).

From 1958 to 1971, President Ayub Khan managed to centralize government through autocratic rule without the inconvenience of unstable ministerial coalitions that characterized his first decade after independence. Khan brought together an alliance of the largely Punjabi military and civil bureaucracy with a small but influential industrial class as well as segments of the landed elite to replace parliamentary government with a system of grassroots democracies. Based on Khan's observation that politicians and their free-for-all rivalry were a negative influence on the nation, the Code of Basic Democracies was created. In accordance with the Elected Bodies Disqualification Ordinance 1959, he therefore disqualified all senior politicians (EBDO). A democracy that "fit the genius of the people" was then used to support the institution of Basic Democracies. Members of the provincial and national legislatures were chosen by a limited group of basic democratic voters—originally eighty thousand, split evenly between the two wings, and later increased by another forty thousand. As a result, the system of basic democracies did not empower individual citizens to participate in the democratic process, but opened up the possibility of bribing and buying votes from a limited electorate who was privileged enough to vote.

Khan sought to enhance central authority and the mostly American-led projects for Pakistan's economic development by allowing the civilian bureaucracy (a small number) to participate in electoral politics. But his actions exacerbated divisions that already existed between and within the regions, which gave the eastern wing's complaints a power that endangered the same centralized control that the Khan was attempting to establish. In West Pakistan, notable gains in productivity have been more than countered by growing rural inequality and underrepresentation, the painful urbanization process, and the concentration of wealth in a few number of industrial families. Growing regional instability in East Pakistan following the 1965 war with India and urban

unrest in West Pakistan contributed to undermining Ayub Khan's authority, forcing him to resign in March.1969(Irshad, 2012).

1.2 Separation of Bangladesh

General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan led the second military dictatorship from 1969 to 1971 after Ayub Khan. Thirteen of the country's first twenty-five years had previously been spent under military authority. The extent to which Pakistani society and politics had been divided by the process of centralization under military and bureaucratic control was made clear by this second military dictatorship. For the first time in Pakistan's history, the general elections held in 1970 using the adult franchise showed how, despite attempts at managed growth, regionalism and social conflict dominated politics. The Awami League, led by Mujibur Rahman, won all but one seat in East Pakistan and gained an absolute majority in the National Assembly by running on a six-point agenda of provincial autonomy. The Pakistan People's Party, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, emerged as the largest single bloc in West Pakistan thanks to its populist programme that grabbed the spotlight from the Islamic parties (the Muslim League, the country's oldest political party, gained only a few seats). Politicians in West Pakistan felt threatened by the idea of an Awami Leagues government, so they plotted with the military leadership to keep Mujibur from assuming the presidency. The Eastern Wing had had enough of being underrepresented in all facets of government, suffering from economic hardship, and finally having the democratic process suppressed. This was the final straw. All these difficulties were brought on by the armed rebellion in East Pakistan, which was put an end to by Indian military intervention. Bangladesh was founded in 1971 as a result of Pakistan's involvement in its third war with India. (Musa, 2021).

1.3 Democratic Government

General Yahya Khan was forced to hand over control to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which saw the formation of a government led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after the dissolution of Pakistan rendered both the civilian administration and the military ineffective. Bhutto's electoral power, however, was only effective in the Punjab and Sind, and even there it was not supported by a strong political party structure. Because of this and the PPP's disinterest in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan, Bhutto was unable to work within the central apparatus without at least the tacit approval of the civil bureaucracy and the military high command. The 1973 constitution offered a framework for a political system based on a pretence of national unity and made significant concessions to the non-Punjabi regions. However, Bhutto was unable to put the constitution's federal elements into action. He neglected to make the PPP a truly well-liked national party and instead relied on the state's coercive power to crush political opposition. Bhutto was unable to establish a strong social base of support due to the discrepancy between his popular rhetoric and the meagre results of

his sometimes haphazard economic reforms. The military and the civil bureaucracy continued to be the most crucial elements of the state structure, not Pakistani citizens who were still engaged in a struggle for democratic legitimacy, despite a brief loss of face in 1971. Even though Bhutto's PPP won the 1977 elections, a coalition of nine parties called the Pakistan National Alliance accused him of cheating the results. Pakistan was once again brought under military government and the 1973 constitution was suspended on July 5, 1977, thanks to General Zia-ul Haq's army using violent urban unrest as justification.

1.4 Zia-ul Haq Era

General Zia declared his intention to transform Pakistan's state and society into an Islamic one after taking office and outlawed all political parties. Bhutto was executed in April 1979 after being found guilty of murder, and the rest of the PPP's leadership was either jailed or exiled. Zia attempted to create a broad base of support by holding nonpartisan elections and launching a number of Islamization programmes in the hopes of establishing the military's legitimacy in Pakistani politics. Zia's dictatorship grew in popularity after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 as a stable government close to Soviet territory. Although Pakistan was already formally left SEATO and CENTA and joined the Non-Aligned Movement, the West still views it as a crucial front-line state that receives a lot of US financial and military assistance. Despite numerous data praising the economy's health, there were nevertheless, if quiet, murmurs of unhappiness. Zia finally lifted martial law and signalled the beginning of a new democratic era in Pakistan on December 30, 1985, after defending his own position in a contentious "Islamic" referendum, finishing a new round of non-partisan elections to provincial and national assemblies, and introducing a number of amendments to the 1973 constitution. The transition to democracy in Pakistan was as turbulent as its political past. On the basis of nonpartisanship, the major political parties demanded a boycott of the 1985 election. Political party identification was substituted by local problems for the majority of candidates as a result of the absence of political parties. With 52.9% voting for the National Assembly and 56.9% voting in the provincial elections, it is apparent that the Pakistani people were interested in democracy and disregarded the impulse to abstain.

The 1973 constitution needed to be amended in order for President Zia to maintain control over the legislative system. The Eighth Amendment has been found to have the most negative impact on public confidence in the democratic process. Now, the president could exercise total control and authority to take whatever steps he thought were required to protect the integrity of the country. Presidents utilized this modification to oust several prime ministers over the course of the following twelve years, most frequently as a result of personal difficulties or ambiguity surrounding the handover of power.

Muhammad Khan Junejo was appointed prime minister following the 1988 elections, and the National Assembly unanimously voted to have him in that position. Junejo seemed to be a promising member of the Pakistani administration; he advocated for a seamless transfer of power from the military to the civilian government, which inspired hope for Pakistan's democratic process. Junejo was able to find a compromise in his first year in office between building the parliamentary body's legitimacy as a democratic institution and keeping President Zia's approval. He created a five-point agenda with the goals of enhancing development, raising literacy rates, combating corruption, and bettering the lot of the average person. He also made improvements to international policy while dealing with a substantial fiscal imbalance brought on by spending sprees by martial law administrations. But on May 29, 1988, President Zia invoked Article 58-2-b of the Constitution to dissolve the National Assembly and appoint a new Prime Minister. He accused Junejo of working with others to undermine his authority and the National Assembly of being corrupt for failing to advance Islam.

Due to the early elections, opposition parties backed Zia's decision. They asked that, in conformity with the constitution, elections be called in 90 days. The constitution was interpreted differently by President Zia. Even if the election may take place later, he felt compelled to declare the schedule for it in the next 90 days. At the same time, he wanted elections to be held without regard to party, as they had been in 1985, but the Supreme Court ruled that this went against the letter of the constitution. Zia's suggestion to delay elections in order to reform the political system in the interest of Islam caused political unrest. There was fear that Zia might declare martial law, and the Muslim League split between supporters of Zia and Junejo. All this came to a halt when Zia died in a plane crash on 17 August.

Elections were launched after Ghulam Ishaq Khan was sworn in as President and Senate Chairman, which shocked outsiders who were concerned the military may quickly grab power. For the first time in fifteen years, the November 1988 election was based on party policies. In the National Assembly, neither party was able to secure a majority, but the Pakistan People's Party ended up with the most seats overall. After the PPP assembled a group of minor parties to establish a task force, Benazir Bhutto, the PPP's chairperson, was chosen as prime minister.

1.5 Confusions Era

Due to his reputation as a power-hungry and probably corrupt individual, Prime Minister Sharif was facing resistance on many different fronts. His family business, Ittefaq Industries, was doing extremely well for the times shortly after he revised the Eighth Amendment. He also promptly removed the supreme court chief judge and the commander in chief of the military. During the economic downturn, allegations of corruption grew. Many others, including Army Chief Jahangir

Karamat, feared Sharif's expanding influence and demanded that the military be involved in national decision-making to counterbalance civilian leadership. He announced his resignation two days later, installing General Perviz Musharraf in charge. One of the key strategists in the Kashmir conflict with India was Musharraf. He soon became suspicious that his robust campaign in Kashmir was being pursued without the political backing of the civilian government. Sharif's hesitation in the Kashmiri opposition, escalating factionalism, and terrorism all combined to give Musharraf the green light to organize a coup and topple the civilian administration. He effectively ousted Sharif and the Muslim League on October 12, 1999, on the grounds that he upholds law and order while bolstering the institution of government.

The Pakistani people thought that this could be temporary and once the situation stabilized, Musharraf would call for new elections for the National Assembly. However, Musharraf refused to restore the National Assembly through elections by October 2002, a deadline set by the Supreme Court. In July 2001, Musharraf declared himself president before meeting with the Indian prime minister to legitimize his authority in the Pakistani government. He has since summoned all regional militant Islamic factions across Pakistan and called on them to return their weapons to the central government. He is adamant about Pakistan's position on Kashmir, which has led to the curtailment of talks with India. It now works with the US government and the Western world in a coalition against terrorism, which puts it in an awkward position vis-à-vis its neighbors in Afghanistan and splinter groups in Pakistan who sympathize with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden on ethnic, ideological and political levels (ABDULLAH, 2014).

1.6 Power Shifting Between the Civil Government and Martial Law During the 1980s and 1990s

Political parties re-registered to run in the elections after Zia ul Haq died in an aircraft crash in 1988. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto leader of the PPP, became Pakistan's first female prime minister in 1988. Yet this victory for Benazir Bhutto was short-lived - the late 1980s and 1990s in Pakistan are known as an era that saw power shifts between elected leaders and the military and vice versa. This instability between politicians and the military reduced the chances of democratic norms and institutions to take root and nurture. As a result, Pakistan's political culture continues to be improper and alien to democratic practise. The odds of democracy diminished after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was assassinated and Zia ul Haq assumed power; yet, Zia's passing created expectations for economic progress, an independent judiciary, and free and fair politics, but these goals were not attained. Being in politics for most of Pakistan's history, military dominance over elected civilian leaders has been beyond the ability of elected leaders to make or break. The military rose to operational status as a governmental entity with sway on politics, the economy, and society. This

chapter discusses the political, social, and economic issues that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each faced throughout their back-and-forth power struggles in the 1980s and 1990s.

1.7 Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990)

Belonging to a charismatic family and due to the legacy of his father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto received a considerable amount of support and sympathy from civilians. Benazir Bhutto was the first female prime minister of a contemporary Muslim state and the daughter of "a former prime minister who many considered was hanged unfairly" 5 in 1988. Many people looked forward to her as a lady who, despite being severely persecuted and imprisoned in the early 1980s, refused to submit to Zia's dictatorial leadership. Benazir's first task after being elected prime minister was to restore democracy after it had been "created under Zia, Pakistan transformed from a parliamentary government to a presidential one, focused on a process of Islamization, and got involved in the crisis in Afghanistan that was getting worse day by day."

According to Talbot (1998), the military had control over matters such as "Afghanistan, defense spending and terms of service, the military exercised veto power over government policy. Although Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister, the PPP did poorly in the elections because it "could not capture more than 92 of the 207 National Assembly seats'. Although Nawaz's coalition The Sharif and Junejo Muslim League was created with eight other parties and the military manipulated the provincial elections in Punjab, the opposition Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI) party won more seats in Punjab than the PPP. Nawaz Sharif was able to become the Chief Minister of Punjab thanks to this trickery (Talbot, 1998).

According to Dawn, the downfall of Benazir's administration was caused by a weak parliamentary foundation. The Zia-enacted 8th Amendment, which allowed the President to appoint the Prime Minister before they could be chosen by the National Assembly, was not repealed by Benazir Bhutto. Because of this, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan did not consider her to be Prime Minister until Benazir granted the military full power and authority over important domains including finance, defence, and foreign policy, as well as Afghanistan. The absence of Strong the parliamentary party of Benazir In order to maintain the stability of its administration in Sindhi and to "pack the post of chief minister" in the former North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), the PPP established a coalition with the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP). But the MQM was "seduced by Nawaz Sharif and its Common Benefactors," and the PPP eventually severed its ties with both the MQM and the ANP as Benazir failed to uphold the alliance.

The break in the alliance between the MQM and the PPP led to violence in Hyderabad, noted large-scale targeted shootings and bombings. In 1988, there was a massacre in Hyderabad targeting Sindhi Mohajirs. About two hundred civilians were killed in the targeting the Mohajir immigrant community. While it was not stated who carried out the acts, officials claimed that "unknown gunmen sprayed bullets into the crowd". Mohajir community accused Sindhi nationalists targeted and carried out attacks against their community similar statements were made by the Sindhi community. In response, the authorities sent troops to enforce curfew in Hyderabad and parts of Karachi. The Karachi Declaration, which sought to foster peace, love, and rights in the hope of bringing together the rural and urban Sindhi community, was signed in 1988 by the PPP and the MQM. However, masked gunmen in Karachi killed people at mohajir areas in 1989. MQM leader Altaf Hussain said in a speech to a crowd in Karachi that these attacks resembled an effort to spark riots by "those who feared that the MQM could unite all the oppressed classes in the country and challenge their system exploitation" (Talbot, 1998). In order to "condemn the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi during an adjournment motion in the National Assembly," the MQM joined the JI, the PPP's adversary (Talbot, 1998). Benazir Bhutto responded to these attacks by labelling them a "mini-rebellion" and attributing the problem to the lingering effects of the preceding eleven years of martial control, saying that "the tree of martial law will not allow anything flourish in its shadow." The situation will not change overnight (Talbot, 1998).

In 1990, relations between the PPP and the MQM turned hostile Altaf Hussain was out of the country for treatment of kidney problems when the Pucca Qila incident took place in Hyderabad. During the incident, the Sindh Police entered Pucca Qila, a Mohajir locality in Hyderabad, to recover illegal weapons. In this raid Sindh Police opened fire, he killed about forty people and wounded fifty. The MQM has accused the Sindh Police of carrying discrimination and that women holding Korans above their heads begged the police to stop the massacre. Still, the Sindh Police claimed that their actions were taken in self-defense as MQM supporters opened fire. According to Talbot (1998), "President Ghulam Ishaq Khan used the incident and the wave of violence that followed in Karachi, including the Qayyum bus massacre on May 31, as part of his reason for toppling the Bhutto government, whatever the truth may be. (Talbot (1998).

1.8 Benazir Bhutto was dropped from "Night Jackals"

Since the 1988 elections, Benazir has faced challenges from the president and the chief army staf. By forming an alliance, the president and the army staff hindered Benazir conducting a functional government. Benazir's hands were tied on matters concerning Afghanistan, lack of power over nuclear program policy and, most importantly, constant plans by intelligent agencies to overthrow her government. For example, one such attempt was made on October 6, 1989, a meeting between "night jackals in Rawalpindi. This meeting consisted of leadership ISI officers Major Aamer

and Brig. Imitate, the opposition National Assembly and the Sindhi PPP members. The unexpected aspect of this meeting was not the discussions about putting an end to the overthrow of Benazir Bhutto's government, but the revelation that Benazir had been somehow made aware of it. As a result, "a trap was laid to catch the conspirators in the hope that the Punjab Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif himself could be implicated. Nawaz Sharif, however, opted not to attend this event due to the tense interactions between the government and the ISI. It is important to mention that the secret meeting was held in response to the removal of the head of the ISI by the Benazir government after the failed ISI supported the Afghan Mujahideen attack on Jalalabad earlier that year. In addition, Benazir Bhutto also formed a committee to investigate the intelligence agencies (Talbot, 1998)

Benazir Bhutto's actions weakened and weakened civilian power instead of making allies of the president and the military. As a result, in addition to the unrest in Sindh and the opposition party IJI's ongoing strikes, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan removed Benazir Bhutto from office and dissolved the National Assembly as well as the Frontier and Sindh Provincial Assembly using the authority granted to him by the Eighth Amendment. The President asserted that Benazir Bhutto's departure was brought about by this corruption, its participation in political "horse-trading," and its incapacity to uphold law and order. Benazir Bhutto's downfall was caused less by the president's accusations against the military and more by the fact that she stepped on their toes. "National and regional elections were set in accordance with the constitution, despite the dissolution of regional assemblies.

1.9 Nawaz Sharif Government (1990-1993)

Following the dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the interim caretaker prime minister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi took office pending elections. During this time Benazir Bhutto's husband Asif Ali Zardari was arrested for kidnapping Murtaza Hussain Bukhari, while corruption cases are still pending against Benazir Bhutto herself. Elections in this period did not reflect any intention of institutionalizing democracy in Pakistan as politicians paid more attention to how to concentrate power rather than finding solutions to problems such as ethnicity and central province relations. Following Benazir's ouster, Bhutto insulted Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi in public by calling him "a conspiracy of usurpers, thieves, rapists, robbers, and robbers." November 7, 1990 Nawaz Sharif became the prime minister despite similar challenges before him like his predecessors. Nawaz Sharif, known for having close relations with the Zia regime accused of corruption, insufficient Islamization efforts and failure to deal with the crisis in Sindh. However, Nawaz Sharif made many economic reforms compared to Benazir Bhutto's government. According to I.A Rehman, Nawaz Sharif's priorities were somewhat different from previous governments. Sharif focused on and prioritized "free enterprise, fulfilling nuclear ambitions and asserting power within oneself. Once in power, he announced the abolition of foreign currency controls that entered the country to secure foreign currency to ensure investment. Other economic changes carried out by Sharif included tax

holidays for a number of people as well as the privatization of other nationalized and other businesses like PIA and WAPDA, which raised the popularity of the Prime Minister (Jaffrelot, 2002).

A number of populist measures to combat poverty and social inequity were also launched by Nawaz Sharif. For instance, in 1991 he "declared that 3.75 lakh acres of land in Sukkur and Ghulam Muhammad Barrage districts of Sindh will be handed to the landless haris, each owning 15 acres." In 1992 he announced a fixed monthly minimum salary of Rs 1,500 for unskilled workers. In 1993, Nawaz Sharif also unveiled The "Yellow Taxi Scheme," an initiative to modernise Pakistan's taxi business and support young people seeking self-employment. From the financing it obtained, almost 40,000 households benefited. The unemployed were promised self-employment, and 95,000 taxis, buses, and trucks were authorised. Nawaz Sharif quickly resumed Islamization attempts that had been started by Zia ul Haq by proposing the execution of Sharia law Act

Even though he had great success with economic changes, the Prime Minister turned the President and the Chief of Army Staff against him. Sharif disagreed with the President's choice of the new army leader following the passing of General Asif Nawaz Janjua and General Baig's retirement.. The result is Nawaz Sharif tried to escape the president's scrutiny by proposing the 12th Amendment in 1991. This amendment attempted to empower the Prime Minister to take control of the administration of the province. The IJI did not support Sharif as it feared President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and tensions appeared between the president and the prime minister, as the prime minister failed to confirm whether he supported the former's re-election. Like Benazir Bhutto, even Nawaz Sharif failed to appeal (Jaffrelot, 2002).

Karachi's Mohajir issues allow the president and the military to take control of civilian administration. Following the division of the MQM party into the MQM (Haqiqi) and MQM factions, the government in Karachi initiated a military operation known as "Operation Clean Up" in 1992. (Altaf). This operation's goal was Sindh's terrorists and criminals. The army discovered "weapons caches and torture cells for which MQM was responsible" during this clearance. (Jaffrelot, 2002).

The army discovered 17 torture cells operated by the MQM "used to punish MQM dissidents and opponents... and that 60 people were arrested from the cousin. fighting broke out. It is important to ask where the MQM party got the weapons from of? Who funded the MQM party, PM Nawaz Sharif or the army? In Article the Frontier Post of 8 July 1992 by Ahmad Bashir claims that "Altaf Hussain and his MQM compatriots are not the only terrorists... but those who sponsored and protected them are terrorists, especially Ghulam Ishaq Khan." Bashir goes on to state that Nawaz Sharif was he is also not aware of the events taking place in Karachi but to secure his coalition government he decided to look the other way. Bashir claims that Benazir Bhutto's administration attempted to halt it.

When MQM did not commit to overturning her government, she was compelled to "withdraw registered cases against MQM." The Pucca Qila episode was caused by tapes that Benazir Bhutto had that were made by MQM and sent to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the army chief, and media. Journalists have also asserted that Nawaz Sharif offered Hyderabad MQM approximately five crore (millions) as a present when he served as Chief Minister of Punjab under Benazir's administration. (Ahmad Bashir, 1992).

In 1993, President Ishaq Khan removed Nawaz Sharif from his position as prime minister and dissolved the national legislature. The Supreme Court upheld Nawaz Sharif's appeal against the president's decision, finding the removal to be unconstitutional. Nawaz Sharif then filed an appeal with the Lahore High Court, which was also granted in his favour, asking for the reinstatement of the Punjab Government. This return to power, however, was fleeting since the commanders of the army corps they urgently met on July 11 to address the problem, showing that they were in charge of politics at the time. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan were both asked to step down in 1993 (Ahmad Bashir, 1992).

1.10 Return of Benazir Bhutto Government (1993-1996)

After the 1993 elections, the daughter of the East returned to power as prime minister stronger and more powerful. The defeat for her during the election was that she won only 86 mandates out of 202 and therefore had to re-establish an alliance with the Muslim League which was led by Junejo and MQM. Her position as prime minister became secure and effective and when the PPP was able to elect one of its seniors, Farooq Lehar, as president in 1993.

Leghari as president was fruitful for Benazir because he did what he was told. The President Leghari dismissed the NFWP government and replaced it PPP. Having more power than before, one would believe the transition to democracy would be smooth, but political corruption and criminalization were once again at their peak. The prime minister did not solve these problems. For example, Benazir's husband Asif Ali Zardari was the investment minister but is well known as "Mr. Ten percent" for commission he pocketed. In addition, Benazir's brother Murtaza Bhutto, who returned from exile in Syria he was also assassinated because he wanted to join politics against Benazir and her husband; who he with the support of their mother. Murtaza Bhutto's supporters blame Zardari for murdering his brother-in-law.

Jaffrelot (2002) argues that as the war in Afghanistan approached, the level of corruption increased and criminalization reached its peak. He claims that under the protection of politicians, "weapons and opium smuggling often flourished" and in return the politicians asked for favours from gangs. These gangs became useful during elections in the polling stations. Additionally, Benazir's second term

also saw the rise of small Sunni and Shia Islamic groups there was a decline in Islamic parties in elections and also in response to Zia's Islamization. Tahrik i Nifaz-i Shariah Muhammadi (TNSM), a Sunni group founded in 1989, demanded civil law to be replaced by Sharia. The TNSM movement was suppressed but resulted in forty deaths and secured the judicial powers of the mullahs in the NWFP. Conflicts between Sunnis and Shias reached their peak in Jhang district as Sunnis were supported by Saudi Arabia and Shias by Iran as an attempt to establish Islamic leadership on Pakistani soil. However, this movement was also suppressed because there was an attack on the Iranian Cultural Center in 1997.

The second dismissal of Benazir from the office of prime minister was not caused by the intervention of the military it was rather the alienation of President Leghari by the Prime Minister. For example In 1994, Benazir Bhutto wanted to appoint eleven judges to the Supreme Court, which consisted of three women whose nomination was not based on merit. The Supreme Court held these nominations illegal, but Benazir ignored the Supreme Court's order and continued. In reaction to Benazir's actions, "lawyers in Karachi and Lahore boycotted these 'political judges' and President Leghari sided with the Supreme Court decision. Apart from this incident, Jaffrelot (2002) argues that three other incidents created poor relations between the president and prime minister, which consisted of 1) buying a luxury villa in Surrey, 2) murder her brother Murtaza Bhutto and 3) attempts to buy votes in Punjab from MPs government of her choice on the spot. Henceforth, in 1996, President Leghari dismissed the Prime Minister Bhutto and dissolved the National Assembly and this time the "Supreme Court ratified her dismissal.

1.11 The Second Term of Nawaz Sharif (1996-1999)

Nawaz Sharif became prime minister for the second time in 1997 and won back support of the army. The military helped Sharif win the 1997 election with a record three-quarters majority. Once in office, Sharif invested all his energies in solving problems with India, especially the conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. For example, in 1998, Sharif announced that he would do this to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) only if India chooses to sign the agreement. Earlier that year, India had tested five nuclear weapons, known as Operation Pokhran II, and rather than test its own nuclear weapons, Pakistan wanted to reach an agreement. However, India chose not to sign the agreement and Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon on 28 May 1998, the second on 30 May 1998. Both India and Pakistan faced economic sanctions and condemnation from the international community. This led the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to sign Lahore Declaration of 1999. The purpose of this declaration was to secure national interests of both nations, which was to create an environment of peace and security. Further the prime ministers also agreed that "their governments will intensify efforts to resolve all issues, including the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Both

governments also decided to hold off from interfering and meddling in each other's internal affairs. However, with a start of war in Kargil, Kashmir; the agreement between the two countries was cancelled. In 1999, relations between Sharif and the army, navy and air force deteriorated as he was not briefed plans to attack Kargil and Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf made the decision to attack alone.

In October 1999, relations between Sharif and the military deteriorated he tried to oust the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Army Staff, General Musharraf. Sharif also denied the landing of General Musharraf's plane because he suspected a military coup, but Sharif's army on the orders of Musharraf and safely removed from power. he landed his plane in Karachi. Sharif was placed under house arrest by the army and put on trial Anti-terrorist court for crimes such as kidnapping, attempted murder, kidnapping, terrorism and corruption. The court sentenced Sharif to life imprisonment, but after an agreement with Saudi Arabia, the military has expelled Sharif from the country for another 10 years. Political power shifted again to the military, which had ruled Pakistan for ten years. This chapter presents the history of political, economic and social affairs in Pakistan under the elected civilian leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Both the leaders served as prime ministers of Pakistan for two terms, but both were removed from office for threatening military interests. Once in power, Bhutto tried to downsize military power by trying to make changes to the constitution. Nevertheless, the army supported them its opposition leader Nawaz Sharif became prime minister and ousted Bhutto from power. With the support of the military, relations between Sharif and the military stabilized, but with the economic and political reforms that Sharif wanted to bring, the military and the "establishment" saw their interests as threatened. For example, peace negotiations with India on Kashmir would reduce the importance of the military in society and therefore it can be stated that to stay powerful and relevant, the army attacked Kargil. If relations with India were to stabilize, the threat to national security would disappear, the military would weaken, and most importantly, foreign financial aid would stop. Staying relevant in political matters and powerful, external the threat was necessary.

1.12 Military Rule Emerges, End of Democracy

In 1999, Nawaz Sharif's second run as the Prime Minister came to an end through a bloodless coup. The Chief of the General Staff of the Pakistani Army, General Pervez Musharraf, came to power became the President of Pakistan. His reign started in 1999 and ended in 2008. Almost ten years Military rule has made it very difficult for Pakistan to develop a political and economic environment that allows democracy to take root in the country. In addition, the international relations that Pakistan developed with the United States during the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks increased the power and role of the military as never before in Pakistan. The era of military interventions was over and Musharraf's position was in trouble. United States too imposed automatic coup-related sanctions

on Pakistan under "Section 508 of the annual Foreign the Aid Rationing Act." Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not declare martial law after the dismissal of the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Musharraf chose the title Director General instead of being a martial law administrator. As Chief Executive Musharraf had considerable support from Westernized elites, radical civil society groups and Non-governmental organizations even from the new Prime Minister M.Z. Jamali, who was elected in controlled elections by the military.

1.13 The 9/11 Attacks

Much like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought gains to the Zia ul Haq administration, the September 11, 2001 attacks saved the Musharraf administration from falling into an era of unwanted coups. When Musharraf came to power, the United States imposed an embargo that ended its financial assistance to Pakistan; however, after 9/11, the United States considered Pakistan to be a crucial ally in the international anti-terrorist coalition and argued that "the Musharraf government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Congress removed restrictions and authorized extensive United States financial aid to Pakistan. According to in the 9/11 Commission report, "The Bush administration also refrained from commenting strong public criticism of Pakistan's internal practices," yet he argued that it was necessary strengthen civilian political institutions. Thanks to this alliance with the United States Musharraf became a powerful leader whose military dictatorship was legitimized due to "continuous waivers of coup-related aid restrictions" which hindered Pakistan's democratization process. Even if democratic political institutions, Pakistani political parties were strengthened and civil society destabilized and weakened as military influence deepened. According to Pakistani political analyst Najam Sethi, "Musharraf's major policy changes after 9/11 are undergoing coercion by external pressure or events and that although the direction of change in Pakistan's politics has been appropriate, the momentum of change is too slow and inconvenient and uncertain that it will create a critical and irreversible mass." This support from the United States, made Musharraf powerful, but only marginally more satisfactory', which did the bare minimum of what it was it is expected of him. Therefore, many political scientists and correspondents argued that it was necessary that "the country's secular political parties" can appear and function in the system so that the country can stabilize and endure democracy. Similar to the era of Zia ul Haq, foreign aid from a legitimized military government of a Western country and reduced the chances of democratic institutions taking root in Pakistan. Despite the United States saying it does will help restore democratic institutions so that Pakistan can prosper economically and become a moderate Muslim state by negotiating with the military. However, I argue that financial aid allows the United States to monitor political developments by using the military as its implementer, and as a result, "Pakistan's fragile democratic institutions remain constantly under control." the threat of the authoritarian influence of the country's powerful military and quasi-feudal economic structures.

1.14 Democratic Government of Asif Ali Zardari

In 2008, the military regime of General Perviz Musharraf, who paved the way, ended the path to free and fair elections that brought President Asif Ali Zardari to office. However, in the struggle for the balance of power after the Musharraf era; actions of elected political representatives failed, proving that the military still runs the show, if not directly, then indirectly. For example, during the first six months in office, President Asif Ali Zardari and the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani has been pushing for the downsizing of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency Pakistan, which has been involved in politics for many years. Zardari advocated "bringing the ISI under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior", 18 nevertheless they relented in this. Must have the military saw this as an attempt to limit their power. Instead, Army General Ashfaq Kayani, a former ISI chief, claimed to support civilian-led democracy but rejected Zardari the decision to transfer control of the ISI to the Ministry of the Interior. General Kayani claimed that "the army should be able to manage its own affairs without the interference of the civil government" and he replaced the director general of the ISI with his associate, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha. This the decision to appoint Pasha as director caused tension between President Zardari and the military. After the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 173 people; Zardari was unable to convince Pasha to cooperate with investigators in New Delhi. This lack of ability to move power away from the military and ISI shows that establishing control over the military is difficult because the interests of the military are at risk and therefore the military takes all measures to secure its interests. The Zardari government has continuously pushed for the introduction of monitoring and control of the military establishment. For example, the "Memo gate" scandal of 2011 challenge the Zardari government when the military accused him of delivering the memo Pakistani Ambassador Hussain Haqqani as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America Admiral Mullen. The message Haqqani gave Mullen represented the military's concerns coup after the killing of Osama bin Laden. According to the memo, Zardari argued that "the inability of the Pakistani military to withstand the humiliation of the bin Laden raid by US forces may lead to a military coup" and therefore the Obama administration's assistance was they needed to end the "brinkmanship" of Chief of Staff General Kayani and ISI Chief General Pasha aimed at overthrowing the civil apparatus." The memorandum promised to punish political officials who were responsible for harboring Osama bin Laden and also gave the United States authorization to conduct operations to capture and kill al-Qaeda and Taliban officials.

The memorandum was to remain a secret, but Mansoor Ijaz, an intermediary for Haqqani, published the memo in the Financial Times in 2011. The military accused Haqqani, a close ally of Zardari, of drafting the memo and urging Ijaz to submit it to Mullen. Both Haqqani and Zardari deny that they were involved in the preparation of the memorandum and the political one analysts say it is a plot against them by the military. Dawn, a political newspaper commentator Cyril Almedia claimed that "the boys (the military establishment) are on their way tricks again." The memorandum case

was brought before the Supreme Court, leading to Haqqani's resignation and exile to the United States, claiming that his life was in danger and that he was not. they want to go back to Pakistan to meet the mob. In addition, the power of President Zardari weakened when allegations of corruption surfaced against him; enables the military continuously exercise its control over economic and foreign policy and indirectly political affairs.

1.15 Return of Nawaz Sharif 2013-2017

In 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to power after free and fair elections were carried out nationwide. Nawaz Sharif came to office with a plan to create good relations with neighboring rival country India to ensure economic growth and stabilize internal democracy Pakistan. As a step towards good relations with India, Sharif went to the swearing-in ceremony Prime Minister Modi and in 2014 engaged in talks on the control of terrorism and "Restart the stalled peace process." The Dawn newspaper notes that since the peace talks there has been an increase in trade between the two countries, and in 2015 it was predicted to touch the \$5 billion mark. However, in 2014, the Nawaz Sharif's decision to put General Musharraf, the former military dictator, on trial for suspending the constitution led to tension between them civil-military relations. Just days after Sharif's decision to track down Musharraf; opposition Party chairman Imran Khan took to the streets to claim that the election that brought Sharif to office was rigged. These staged protests delayed the planned visits of the Chinese leader regarding China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project and weakened the government, urging Nawaz Sharif to rely on the army chief "to avert the threat of a coup The army was unwilling to allow their former general to be humiliated by the Sharif government; however, support for Sharif's decision also received a lot of support from parliament and opposition parties he stood by Sharif, which had a negative impact on civil-military relations.

Despite the successful peace talks between India and Pakistan in 2014, that is, in 2015 again witnessing the rivalry between the two countries. Political scientists claim that for For years the military has justified its control of foreign and national policy by claiming that India is still the enemy and these Sharif-Modi peace talks challenged its interests of the army. As a result, the Pakistan Army launched attacks on Indian Army bases in Kashmir is causing tension between the two countries. In response to these attacks by India PM Modi has decided not to attend the 19th SAARC Summit hosted by Pakistan in Islamabad. Apart from this, PM Modi also avoided talks with PM Sharif on the Kashmir issue. In addition, these attacks on Indian Army bases also led to a showdown between India and Pakistan at the UN General Assembly over Kashmir in 2016. Pakistan claimed it still wants to build peace with India but "it is not possible by resolving the Kashmir issue" On the other hand, India has accused Pakistan of being a terrorist state and for "feeding, spreading and exporting terrorism". Indian Foreign Minister Sawraj informed about it that all allegations made by Sharif regarding human rights violations in Kashmir are baseless and Jammu and Kashmir will remain part of India.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif changed the army chief three times, but each time “he selected a dark horse for the coveted spot, hoping to tip the balance of power towards his civilian government.” In 2017, Sharif was removed from office after being accused of corruption he was indicted by the Panama Papers scandal, which alleged that Sharif had offshore businesses and capital in his children's names. Sharif was not overthrown by the army, but by the Supreme Court, which declared Sharif a rogue leader. However, political scientists also claim this that although the military had no direct intervention; senior and middle-ranking officials in the military intelligence agencies fed anti-Sharif material to the media. The Panama Papers the scandal is important because it unfolded during unresolved major issues between civil-military. Most importantly, a joint investigation team (JIT) is probing the case Sharif consisted mainly of ISI and Military Intelligence (MI) personnel. It can be argued from these events that the military used to scandal to destabilize the government in the sense Ghosal's "power without accountability and responsibility".

1.16 The Democratic overnment of Imran khan 2018-2022

Imran Khan lost a parliamentary vote of no confidence (VNC) on 10 April, after nearly four years as prime minister. The constitutional right of the opposition to bring this vote is not new in our political system, having been introduced in the past against most sitting governments. Yet this is the only time she was successful with 174 votes out of 342. Now Khan is trying to show some street power. He drew crowds and interestingly many overseas Pakistanis opposed his expulsion and accepted him as an honest politician on a crusade to make Pakistan independent from foreign interference and corrupt politicians of the past. Despite their ability to draw a crowd, Imran Khan and his PTI are not safe for Pakistan's democracy; and those in Pakistan and overseas Pakistanis protesting from the comfort of liberal democracies should know why:

Khan has undermined Pakistani institutions and processes that oversee and support the country's fragile democracy. His worst attack was on Parliament. During his nearly four years in power, Khan has shown a reluctance to engage with parliament and parliamentary processes. He often did not show up for parliamentary meetings, refusing to go because, he says, there are chor (thieves) — his reference to the opposition political parties. His party also felt unable and somewhat intimidated to engage in the cacophonous parliamentary process of introducing laws. This inability and unwillingness to understand that Parliament is the supreme law-making body has resulted in over 50 laws being passed through Presidential Ordinances instead of regular and routine legislation by Parliament. This meant bypassing the constitutional requirement for Pakistan's democracy of lawmaking through scrutiny, discussion and consensus. Since the primary prerogative of the legislature is usurped (and thereby undermined), the president's power to issue decrees is very limited, only exercisable when parliament is not in session and pending the next session of parliament. cause

"irreparable loss to the people of Pakistan". No such circumstance existed when the PTI used the presidential powers route to pass laws.

PTI does not know how to lose - a necessary ingredient for functioning democracies. When a constitutional VNC was set up against Khan, he did everything in his power to subvert it, shaking the fragile democratic structures of the country, the aftershocks of which have yet to be felt. In order to stay in power, the PTI staged a 12-minute parliamentary session, the result of which was the following: the vote was rejected, the constitution was violated, and those who were in favor of the vote were branded disloyal to the country (because they voted at a time when a foreign conspiracy to oust Khan was all, just not loyal). The process firmly planted the seed of ghaddari—an allegation often leveled against civilians by undemocratic forces—in the democratic space. While a US plot for regime change is not a wild idea – examples of US meddling in the politics of other countries abound in the Global South – there is no concrete evidence of this imminent threat to Pakistan. Invoking the narrative of a Western conspiracy to avoid the VNC makes for an effective campaign slogan, but undermines the integrity of parliament and the constitution and creates major political instability.

Khan refuses to accept an important constitutional role in the political opposition. He is a natural agitator and effective on the issues of those in power. The problem is that he refuses to do so as the leader of the opposition. Instead, it prefers headline-seeking, emotion-evoking, voracious street protests. The current coalition government, an alliance of different political parties, now sits in parliament without an effective opposition to challenge and hold it to account. It is about unraveling the basic equation that those in power and those in opposition together make up a functioning and healthy democracy. Khan's colorful, crowded and coordinated street protests can create the facade that democracy is in action, when this very act of Khan's at a time when parliament is sitting and functioning is damaging to democracy.

Khan has all the ingredients of a populist leader, and populism threatens democracies. As Cas Mudde, author of *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*, says, "Populists divide, not unite," dividing society into "two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the pure people on one side and the corrupt elite on the other." PTI's election campaign before 2018 and the narrative throughout their tenure in government is to remove corrupt politicians before their promised change is possible. The populists have also chosen to focus only on themselves – apart from Khan always talking about himself, PTI folklore is also all about Khan, the messiah, the crusader, the savior. To achieve the promise of Riyasat-e-Medina, Khan subverts any democratic demands that come his way, including targeting political parties on trumped-up charges of corruption; sustained attacks on the media; undermining legally created watchdogs. Even the Supreme Court was not spared the constant campaign against a judge considered too independent. In the spirit of usurping all power, the PTI attempted to challenge the 18th Constitutional Amendment, which devolves power to ensure more autonomous provinces, a

more dialogue-based approach between federal and provincial units, and less top-down control and centralization. The 18th Amendment makes Pakistan more democratic and less prone to coups and undemocratic takeovers. So it is not surprising that the PTI contested it.

Khan sowed the seeds of division in an already fractured society. Khan and his followers faithfully populistly frame his political career as a moral obligation that will save Pakistanis from the elite status quo and plunge us into utopia. Khan's success in spinning a narrative of division and sabotage of democratic processes meant that young people in Pakistan and overseas Pakistanis who live in democratic societies where the rule of law prevails will never understand why democracy is important to us. As Pakistanis celebrate Khan's subversion of the constitution as "outwitting" and "outsmarting" the opposition, we should remember that disciples will do what they see. After four military coups, three failed coup attempts and 34 out of 74 years of living under a dictatorship, Pakistanis understand that rules are meant to be broken. The difference this time is that the flagrant violation of the rules is not a man in uniform. In civilian guise, the PTI under Khan is attempting what Pakistanis associate with the establishment's version of politics, making us even more suspicious of who to trust.

Constitution, rule of law and democratic norms and systems are essential for the survival of Pakistan. Both Khan's rhetoric and actions show that there is not much difference between him and previous military dictators. In letter and spirit, Khan refers to dictators like Ayub and Zia who violated the constitution and undermined the rule of law. Modi is now the one Khan publicly praises, showing how he sees authoritarianism as ideal. PTI seeking election through Azadi march is just a red herring. The reality is that what matters to Imran Khan is power, not democracy. This may be beneficial for PTI and its supporters, it is very harmful for Pakistan and its future.

1.17 The Collapse of Imran Khan Government

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan's government has been floundering, but the speed at which it unraveled in the face of the opposition's no confidence move on Sunday surprised even the most seasoned analysts. Not only have coalition partners of Khan's party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) joined the opposition camp, but Khan's own party has imploded. Facing the humiliation of being voted out, the prime minister took an unprecedented step by dissolving the National Assembly, which is Pakistan's lower house of Parliament, and calling for early elections.

Just minutes before the vote, the Speaker of the National Assembly abruptly rejected the opposition's no confidence motion as illegal on the basis of what he described as a "foreign conspiracy," preventing the vote that would decide whether Khan remained in office. But the National Assembly cannot be dissolved during no confidence proceedings against the prime

minister, possibly making Khan's move a blatant violation of Pakistan's constitution. With many of Khan's allies joining the opposition, the prime minister lost the confidence of the house. Dissolving the National Assembly was a last-ditch attempt to escape his imminent ouster, but the move has inevitably plunged the country into a constitutional crisis. On Sunday, the Supreme Court took suo motu notice of the matter, and is undergoing hearings at the time of writing. While awaiting the court ruling, Pakistan remains in political uncertainty.

1.17.1 Was There a "Foreign Conspiracy" to Oust Imran Khan?

The speaker of the National Assembly's charge of foreign interference in Pakistan's internal political matters—which is his reason for rejecting the no confidence motion—is built around a cable from a Pakistani diplomat, based on his conversations with senior-level U.S. State Department officials. Earlier this year, addressing a public rally in Islamabad, Khan brandished a paper saying that it contained evidence of a "foreign-funded conspiracy" to topple his government. He claimed that he was being punished for pursuing an "independent foreign policy" and not succumbing to foreign diktat. Although the contents of the letter were later made public, there is little evidence to substantiate the government's claims that the no confidence motion was sponsored by foreign forces. More likely, the government purposely exaggerated an informal conversation between a former Pakistani ambassador in Washington and an American diplomat to build a narrative that paints the opposition's democratic move as a foreign conspiracy.

1.17.2 How did Pakistan Get Here?

Khan's fall from grace marks the end of Pakistan's experiment with a "hybrid rule" with the military actively backing the civilian administration. His journey from being a sporting hero to occupying the corridors of power is largely owed to Pakistan's powerful military. Khan was projected by his supporters as the last best hope. It is not surprising that Khan's government survived for so long despite a very thin majority: he was supported by the military in the 2018 elections, and a coalition of disparate groups was built to provide his party enough parliamentary support to form the government. Even with the military's support, his government struggled, largely due to Khan's limited understanding of statecraft.

To Khan, it is either the misrule of previous regimes or mafias that were responsible for the country's predicament. Khan's frustration seems to have arisen with the collapse of his

government's 'anti-corruption' drive that had mainly targeted opposition leaders. He blamed both the judiciary and media for failures of governance. Self-righteousness and the politics of religiosity did not help him deal with the worsening political crises. And as the crisis evolved, Khan's government became increasingly authoritarian with an overreliance on the security establishment's support and under-reliance on Parliament. Its contempt for elected institutions was evident.

A perception that the military leadership had distanced itself from the government gave a further boost to the opposition, resulting in a major shift in the country's political scene when two main opposition parties—the PML-N and PPP—aligned against the government. This led to a shift in loyalties that has long eroded democracy in Pakistan. Pakistan's military is often considered the determiner of national security and foreign policy, and its role became more pronounced under the Khan government. On various occasions, the military leadership has been involved in sorting out problems with other countries arising from some impulsive decisions taken by the prime minister.

But the military's recent decision to keep itself out of the unfolding power struggle has changed Pakistan's traditional political dynamics. In fact, the military's decision to refrain from politics can be interpreted as a political decision in and of itself. While the military may have pulled back from supporting the Khan government, it is not necessarily completely out of the political game.

1.17.3 What Could Happen Next?

Like other populist leaders, Khan will not accept defeat easily. He called upon his supporters to take to the streets to protest the vote in Parliament. He tried to mobilize mass support by resorting to religious slogans and depicting the unfolding power struggle as a conflict between "good and evil." This show of strength during the Parliament session was a desperate move to pressure elected lawmakers, reminiscent of how former U.S. President Donald Trump incited his supporters to march on the U.S. Capitol to prevent the peaceful transition of power after his electoral defeat in January 2021.

What we witnessed in the National Assembly on April 3 in Pakistan was a mockery of democracy. Whatever the Supreme Court rules, there is little hope of it strengthening Pakistan's democratic political process. With persisting unresolved political issues, the role of the security establishment is likely to be strengthened. On Thursday, April 7th, Pakistan's Supreme Court determined that Prime Minister Imran Khan acted unconstitutionally in ordering the speaker of the Parliament to suspend the no-confidence vote and dissolving Pakistan's National Assembly. Imran Khan was subsequently removed from office with a no-confidence majority vote of 174

legislators from the 374-member body. On April 11th, opposition leader (PML-N) Shahbaz Sharif was elected prime minister of Pakistan.

stated that “only twenty families control 66 percent of all industrial capital, 80 percent of banking capital and 97 percent of insurance capital. During his ten-year rule, Ayub Khan increased gross fixed investment from 8.5% of GDP in 1958-1959 to 14% in 1968-1969 (McGrath, 1969).

2.3 The Collapse of the Ayub Khan Militar Regime

In 1968, minor challenges against Ayub Khan's military regime became major, leading to the collapse of his government and the establishment of liberal democratic institutions in Pakistan. In previous years, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, once an associate of Ayub Khan, created Pakistan People's Party in response to differences between Bhutto and Ayub over Kashmir. Bhutto left politics and toured West Pakistan to drum up support for her party by accusing the government of being ineffective in dealing with issues such as corruption, nepotism, civil administration and most importantly, freedom for Kashmir. Bhutto's campaign increased the number of student demonstrations in Pakistan. Student demonstrations against the Ayub Khan regime took off place in Rawalpindi that killed the student and boosted support for Bhutto and his political celebration. Two shots were fired at Ayub Khan during the 1968 conference. (Lawrence, 1971)

The result is Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and other political leaders were arrested on charges of involvement in the events that led to the safety and security of countries at risk. With increasing pressure from political parties and leaders, as well as the signing of the Tashkent Declaration and other political crises, the military stopped supporting Ayub Khan. The army pressured Ayub Khan to resign all duties and decided that a transfer of power was necessary. Therefore, in 1969 despite the demonstrations and the rise of political parties demanding democratic elections, the army decided to transfer power to Yahya Khan rather than political leaders. Yahya Khan is aware of the criticism the Ayub Khan regime introduced new political and economic policies to ensure military dominance (Majeed, 2010).

2.4 Regime of President General Yahya Khan 1969-1971

Yahya Khan replaced Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan without any opposition in 1969. During the beginning of his Yahya Khan regime he followed the steps of Ayub Khan as he did not have much political experience. Yahya Khan issued a "Provisional Constitutional Order" which asserted that until the enforcement of a new constitution (created in 1973), Pakistan will be governed by the 1962 constitution. 1962 The constitution empowered presidential military leaders like Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan with all political powers including executive, legislative and financial powers under the presidential system. The National Assembly consisting of 156 MPs became weaker compared to powers of the executive. Similar to the Ayub Khan regime of fundamental rights the courts, enshrined in the 1962 constitution, were suspended and

lacked the ability to pass any order against the decision of the Chief Martial Law Office. Arguably, these limitations on executive, legislative and judicial power have intensified under military regimes and created an unbreakable military superiority and hegemony and dissolved the chances of democratic institutions were created (Pakistan, 2015).

Yahya Khan had no political experience, he appointed an adviser from Ayub Khan administration in new positions. Yahya Khan relied only on a few agents and individuals which consisted of the General Staff and Officers of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator and three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators for "the first few months of martial law" as decision-makers who controlled central and provincial administration. I argue that alliances and power in the hands of a few military leaders made this possible army to come out of the domestic crisis that emerged during the Ayub Khan era and became capable keep all institutions under control. Military leaders also secured power by maintaining international support as political parties and politicians re-emerged and began to gain public support (Britannica, 2003).

2.5 The Martial Law of Zia ul Haq

In 1977 Zia ul Haq declared martial law, suspended the 1973 constitution and became Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). As with previous martial law, the federal and provincial cabinets were dissolved as well as the national and provincial assemblies. The Prime Minister and leaders of the opposition parties were arrested, while the President of Pakistan was allowed to continue as head of state and the president of the provincial high courts were entrusted with the office of governors for their provinces. The military council had the right to serve as the highest decision-making body. As under Ayub, Pakistan was again divided into five martial law zones, each governed by a martial law administrator. After taking office at Zia ul Haq declared that a democratic government would be strengthened in Pakistan within 90 days. However, the election was postponed as the release of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto brought masses to his demonstrations and signaled that it would not be an easy victory for military-backed political parties such as the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) party (Khalid, 2020).

On the other hand, Bhutto challenged the military and the PNA and pressured the military to open up cases against Bhutto, which included a murder case in which Bhutto was reported as a co-conspirator. Rizvi notes that "martial law authorities issued several white papers spread over 2,771". Pages detailing how Bhutto rigged the March 1977 election, how he and his family undermined government institutions and procedures and acquired or extended to other illegal kindness.

The Bhutto murder case dragged on until 1978 and Bhutto was extradited death sentence by Supreme Court. Elections were moved to 1979 and the military implemented changes to the electoral

system, but these changes drew a lot of criticism from political parties. Some political parties also refused registration. As a result, the military decided to hold on non-partisan elections in which PPP members were successful in winning the majority of seats. In reaction to these results, the military decided to postpone the election a second time, saying that yes it was not a good time for elections. In 1985 General Zia ul Haq held general elections as promised and revoked martial law. However, despite the elections that brought Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo to power, Zia ul Haq still had influence over the civilian government. In 1988, Zia ul Haq dismissed his personally handpicked prime minister due to tensions between Zia and Junejo over the Ojhri blast and the Afghanistan issue in which Junejo "stepped out of line" (Rizvi, 1984).

2.6 Politics Under Zia ul Haq

Zia ul Haq mainly emphasized Islamization and did not abrogate the 1973 constitution. Zia allowed President Fazal Illahi Chaudhry to remain in office and continue as leader State. However, President Chaudhry resigned in 1978 and Haq became the CMLA. During At the beginning of his regime, Zia ul Haq imposed restrictions on political activities that caused political demonstrations against the military regime. The most vocal critics were lawyers, journalists and political parties forming the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy" was founded in 1981 by PPP members consisting of and various other political parties. In addition, Zia ul Haq also "put forward a proposal for a constitutional guarantee that would allow the military to share decision-making power the political elite at the national level". Zia ul Haq also decided to create National Security Council (NSC), which consisted of 11 members, had powers of direct role in constitutional and political settings. The members of the NSC in this were chosen by the President the Zia ul Haq case and therefore dominated mostly by the top military brass who gave them the ability to veto any policy decisions made by political leaders while also serving as a key decision maker creators by imposing a state of emergency. The NSC was later abolished (Welch, 1976).

The martial law administration also appointed military officers to civil service positions. These military officers "were assigned to the civil administration and to semi-government and autonomous corporations. These military officers also had access to the elite groups of the Central Superior Services. Military officers were also given positions in the district leadership groups and foreign services of Pakistan, sparking anger among civilians conducting competitive exams for these positions. It is evident that like Ayub and Yahya, Zia ul Haq wanted to hold on political power in the hands of a few military officials. During the Zia ul Haq era the army has become one of the strongest institutions in Pakistan as it has received financial support United States during the Afghan-Soviet War (Waseem, 2007).

2.7 Fall of Zia ul Haq

In the 1980s, militant Shia, feminist and opposition parties took to the streets to demonstrate against Zia's Islamization policies and edicts. According to Jaffrelot(2000) "in 1981 eleven parties came together to form the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MMR). There were few parties like the Muslim League and Jamaat-i Islami that did not participate in this alliance as well as groups such as Pashtun and Baloch separatists. Nevertheless, MRD happened popular in Sind because the Pakistan People's Party was behind the organization of this movement and Bhutto, the PPP founder martyred by Zia, became a symbol. In order to control the disturbances caused by this movement, "three divisions of troops" in three weeks of repression the Governor of Sind alone recorded 189 deaths and nearly 2000 prisoners. To secure his position in office and gain popular legitimacy, Zia assured the country that elections would be held by March 1985 and also organized a referendum asking Pakistanis whether they approve of his Islamization policies and his continued desire to transfer power to the people's representatives" (Akbarzadeh, 2003).

The MRD boycotted the elections and also condemned the Zia-announced legislative elections. Still, voters were enthusiastic about the vote. National and Regional Assemblies for the 1985 elections, it consisted mainly of real estate owners, representatives of the business sector and men who were financially able to participate in elections without the support of a political party. During the first parliamentary session, Zia named himself the President of Pakistan and appointed a native of Sind (Sindi) province, Muhammad Khan Junejo, as prime minister in the hope of weakening and breaking the MRD alliance. Martial law was declared in December 1985 rose and political parties re-emerged. The Muslim League became the government party, in the order of the Junejo Party, while Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in 1986 and was arrested for organizing demonstrations for free elections. In addition, Zia dismissed the Prime Minister Junejo in 1988 as the 8th amendment of the constitution gave him the right to dismiss any government. Zia removed Junejo and "proclaimed the dissolution of the assembly (Akbarzadeh, 2003).

Zia justified the removal of the prime minister and the dissolution of the assembly by expediency to control the issues and problems that have arisen in Karachi which is under his direct control Mohajirs. Jaffrelot(2000) argues that this pretext was used again and again in the coming years that "authoritarian repression has reached its limit". In 1988, Zia and the US ambassador was killed in a plane crash, allowing a return to multi-party parliamentary democracy. After Zia's death, Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg announced the army's withdrawal from politics and allowed Ghulam Ishaq Khan to serve as interim president until the next election (Jaffrelot, 2021).

2.8 Power Shifts between Civil Government and Martial Law in 1980 to 1990

After the death of Zia ul Haq in a plane crash in 1988, political parties again came forward to participate in the elections. During 1988 the PPP, now led by the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, became the first female Prime Minister of Pakistan. Yet this victory for Benazir Bhutto was short-lived - the late 1980s and 1990s in Pakistan are known as an era that saw power shifts between elected leaders and the military and vice versa. This instability between politicians and the military reduced the chances of democratic norms and institutions to take root and nurture. Therefore, the political culture of Pakistan remained inappropriate and foreign to democratic practice. After the assassination of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia ul Haq taking office, the chances of democracy decreased; but the death of Zia raised hopes for economic growth, an independent judiciary, and free and fair politics, but these objectives were not met (Pakistan, 2015).

Being in politics for most of Pakistan's history, military dominance over elected civilian leaders has been beyond the ability of elected leaders to make or break. The military became an institution that was politically, economically and socially powerful operational status in the state. This chapter focuses on the back and forth power transfer Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1980s and 1990s discuss the ethnic, political and economic problems they both encountered (Aqdas, 2020).

2.9 The Martial Law of Pervez Musharraf

The military government of Pervez Musharraf from 1999-2008 can be described as "a brand of lifestyle-liberalism mixed with another brand of dictatorial politics". It was also "unfashionable" and they were looked down upon by other states on the international stage as the era of military interventions came to an end, putting Musharraf's position in trouble. United States too imposed automatic coup-related sanctions on Pakistan under "Section 508 of the annual Foreign Aid Rationing Act." Unlike his predecessors, Musharraf did not declare martial law after the dismissal of the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. Musharraf chose the title Director General instead of being a martial law administrator. As a Chief Executive Musharraf had considerable support from Westernized elites, radical civil society groups and Non-governmental organizations even from the new Prime Minister M.Z. Jamali, who was elected in controlled elections by the army (Admin, 2012).

All these factors enabled Musharraf to form a government consisting of carefully a select political elite and a group of bureaucrats and technocrats. Because the judiciary has a history of approving and working with military rules, the higher judiciary awarded Musharraf "three years after his coup to hold elections." In 2002, Musharraf followed through on the promise and held elections in which "a pro-military alliance won many seats, while a coalition of Islamist parties put on a

surprisingly strong show.” In response to the election of 18 Pakistani political parties formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), but Musharraf managed to neutralize the effectiveness of this alliance with a court verdict in his favor (Raza, 2021).

In the same year, Pervez Musharraf also made changes in the constitution to strengthen his position with the announcement the army chief himself and the president of Pakistan at the same time. In 2003, Musharraf made a deal with Islamic opposition parties that brought forward constitutional changes parliament and an assurance that Musharraf would resign his military rank or post in 2005. In 2004, the government created the National Security Council (NSC), which legitimized the role of the military and allowed it to oversee the civilian cabinet. The aim of this council was to institutionalize the governing role of the military. Apart from this change, Musharraf is also bending the rules and bring in his close ally, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, as prime minister. This particular action marginalized the opposition parties and signaled that Musharraf was not respected follow the agreed rules (Raza, 2021).

2.10 The 9/11 Attacks and Musharraf's Secure Dominance rule

Like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought profit for the Zia ul Haq administration, the September 11, 2001 attacks saved the Musharraf administration from falling into an era of unwanted coups. When Musharraf came to power, the United States imposed an embargo that ended its financial assistance to Pakistan; however, after 9/11, the United States considered Pakistan to be a crucial ally in the international anti-terrorist coalition and argued that "the Musharraf government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan" (Khan, 2020).

In addition, Congress removed restrictions and authorized extensive United States financial aid to Pakistan. According to in the 9/11 Commission report, "The Bush administration also refrained from commenting strong public criticism of Pakistan's internal practices," yet he argued that it was necessary strengthen civilian political institutions. Thanks to this alliance with the United States Musharraf became a powerful leader whose military dictatorship was legitimized due to "continuous waivers of coup-related aid restrictions" which hindered Pakistan's democratization process. Even if democratic political institutions, Pakistani political parties were strengthened and civil society destabilized and weakened as military influence deepened (Khan, 2020).

According to Pakistani political analyst Najam Sethi, "Musharraf's major policy changes after 9/11 are undergoing coercion by external pressure or events and that although the direction of change in Pakistan's politics has been appropriate, the momentum of change is too slow and inconvenient and uncertain that it will create a critical and irreversible mass." This support from the United States, made Musharraf powerful, but only marginally more satisfactory', which did the bare minimum of what it

was it is expected of him. Therefore, many political scientists and correspondents argued that it was necessary that "the country's secular political parties" can appear and function in the system so that the country can stabilize and endure democracy. Similar to the era of Zia ul Haq, foreign aid from a legitimized military government of a Western country and reduced the chances of democratic institutions taking root in Pakistan. Despite the United States saying it does will help restore democratic institutions so that Pakistan can prosper economically and become a moderate Muslim state by negotiating with the military. However, I argue that financial aid allows the United States to monitor political developments by using the military as its implementer, and as a result, "Pakistan's fragile democratic institutions remain constantly under control." the threat of the authoritarian influence of the country's powerful military and quasi-feudal economic structures(Admin, 2012).

2.11 Lack of Social Reforms Under Musharraf

Unlike previous military coups, Musharraf faced challenges from ethnic groups in Pakistan. In 2005, there was increased unrest between the military and tribal groups Balochistan due to the rape of women by the army in the regions. Liberation of Baluchistan The army (BLA) attacked various infrastructures, projects and staffs, and local tribal leaders demanded political autonomy as well as control over the regions' natural resources. However, Musharraf protested the political autonomy of the Baloch people and engaged in a counter-insurgency paramilitary operation leading to an increase in human rights abuses and humanitarian aid crisis(Looney, 2008).

In addition to tensions with tribal groups, Musharraf also began to lose support NGOs, trade unions and human rights activists. Women and minority groups lacked equality in the political system and women had difficulty and were not allowed to vote to run for office due to oppression from social and religious conservatives. Tide shift toward democracy in the international sphere took its toll in Pakistan as small institutions began to address numerous cases of human rights violations such as "enforced disappearances", torture and discrimination against women and religious minorities. NGOs were allowed to publish critical materials and unions could exist but not engage in strikes or collective bargaining. Like international politics had changed, as had domestic politics in Pakistan, which posed a threat Musharraf's rule that led to his impeachment in 200.(Looney, 2008).

In addition to human rights abuses NGOs and activists, the military censored most of the material published by the media. If the media broadcast anything that challenged the authority of the armed forces, then the media outputs and journalists were harassed by military officials, suppressed by the blasphemy law or turn off. In 2002, foreign press corps was attacked by angry mobs and Indian journalist visa was not granted. The same year, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was

kidnapped murdered by Islamic fundamentalists. In addition to Islamic fundamentalists, journalists also suffered from physical attacks by hired thugs and the police (Richter, 2014).

In 2003, Shaheen Sehbai, the editor, was pressured to resign because he had published an article against intelligence agencies. In 2005, journalists were not able to report on the crisis unfolding in the tribal areas near Afghanistan border as the reporters' vehicles were set on fire after killing two and injuring two journalists. The ongoing problems in the tribal areas, human rights abuses and lack of press freedom reduced support for the Musharraf regime. I argue that these events encouraged these groups to form an alliance that became necessary during the Lawyers' Movement that brought an end to Musharraf's 2008 military coup (Sehbai, 2022).

2.12 Lawyer Movement, Ending the Musharraf Coup

In 2005, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was sworn into office by order of Musharraf's interim council. During his tenure, Chaudhry worked to expand the role of Pakistan's judiciary, handling public interest cases and cases requiring government scrutiny power and authority. In 2006, the chief justice subpoenaed representatives of the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency for links to the global war on terror. Musharraf took these reforms as a challenge to his authority and therefore suspended the Chief Justice due to his growing support for his reforms and placed the chief justice under house arrest because Chaudhry refused to resign (Munir, 2013).

Continued media coverage of Supreme Court Chief Justice Dismissal and house arrest; in major cities, lawyers joined protests, while Supreme Court judges publicly supported the chief justice. When media showed how the chief justice was "pulled by the hair by a policeman" public support came from the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, as well as experts, students, NGOs and other civil society groups have turned it into a mass movement (Munir, 2013).

In 2007, Musharraf declared martial law, suspended the constitution and parliament. The judges faced suspension because they refused to take a new oath and the media was taken off the air for refusing to stop broadcasting news of the protest. Members of the public who joined the protests were beaten and arrested. As domestic and international pressure increased, Musharraf resigned in the summer of 2008 (Jazeera, 2008).

2.13 Democratic Government of Asif Ali Zardari

In 2008, the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, who paved the way, ended the path to free and fair elections that brought President Asif Ali Zardari to office. However, in the struggle for the balance of power after the Musharraf era; actions of elected political representatives failed, proving that the military still runs the show, if not directly, then indirectly. During the first six months

in office, President Asif Ali Zardari and the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani has been pushing for the downsizing of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency Pakistan, which has been involved in politics for many years. Zardari advocated "bringing the ISI under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior" nevertheless they relented in this. Must have the military saw this as an attempt to limit their power. Instead, Army General Ashfaq Kayani, a former ISI chief, claimed to support civilian-led democracy but rejected Zardari the decision to transfer control of the ISI to the Ministry of the Interior. General Kayani claimed that "the army should be able to manage its own affairs without the interference of the civil government" and he replaced the director general of the ISI with his associate, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha. This decision to appoint Pasha as director caused tension between President Zardari and the military (Abbas, 2015).

After the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 173 people; Zardari was unable to convince Pasha to cooperate with investigators in New Delhi. This lack of ability to move power away from the military and ISI shows that establishing control over the military is difficult because the interests of the military are at risk and therefore the military takes all measures to secure its interests. Zardari's government has continuously pushed for the introduction of monitoring and control of the military establishment. For example, the "Memogate" scandal of 2011, attacked the Zardari government when the military accused him of delivering the memo Pakistani Ambassador Hussain Haqqani as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America Admiral Mullen. The message Haqqani gave Mullen represented the military's concerns coup after the killing of Osama bin Laden. According to the memo, Zardari argued that "the inability of the Pakistani military to withstand the humiliation of the bin Laden raid by US forces may lead to a military coup" and therefore the Obama administration's assistance was they needed to end the "brinkmanship" of Chief of Staff General Kayani and ISI Chief General Pasha aimed at overthrowing the civil apparatus." The memorandum promised to punish political officials who were responsible for harboring Osama bin Laden and also gave the United States authorization to conduct operations to capture and kill al-Qaeda and Taliban officials (Rotella, 2014).

The memorandum was to remain a secret, but Mansoor Ijaz, an intermediary for Haqqani, published the memo in the Financial Times in 2011. The military accused Haqqani, a close ally of Zardari, of drafting the memo and urging Ijaz to submit it to Mullen. Both Haqqani and Zardari deny that they were involved in the preparation of the memorandum and the political one analysts say it is a plot against them by the military. Dawn, a political newspaper commentator Cyril Almedia claimed that "the boys (the military establishment) are on their way tricks again." The memorandum case was brought before the Supreme Court, leading to Haqqani's resignation and exile to the United States, claiming that his life was in danger and that he was not want to go back to Pakistan to meet the mob. In addition, the power of President Zardari weakened when allegations of corruption surfaced

against him; enables the military continuously exercise its control over economic and foreign policy and indirectly political affairs (News Service, 2018).

2.14 The Return of Nawaz Sharif 2013-2017

In 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to power after free and fair elections were carried out nationwide. Nawaz Sharif came to office with a plan to create good relations with neighboring rival country India to ensure economic growth and stabilize internal democracy Pakistan. As a step towards good relations with India, Sharif went to the swearing-in ceremony Prime Minister Modi and in 2014 engaged in talks on the control of terrorism and "Restart the stalled peace process." The Dawn newspaper notes that since the peace talks there has been an increase in trade between the two countries, and in 2015 it was predicted to touch the \$5 billion mark.

In 2014, Nawaz Sharif's decision to put General Musharraf, the former military dictator, on trial for suspending the constitution there was tension between them civil-military relations. Just days after Sharif's decision to track down Musharraf, opposition Party chairman Imran Khan took to the streets to claim that the election that brought Sharif to office was rigged. These staged protests delayed the planned visits of the Chinese leader regarding China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project and weakened the government, urging Nawaz Sharif to rely on the army chief "to avert the threat of a coup" The army was unwilling to allow their former general to be humiliated by the Sharif government; however, support for Sharif's decision also received a lot of support from parliament and opposition parties he stood by Sharif, which had a negative impact on civil-military relations (Waraich, 2013).

Despite the successful peace talks between India and Pakistan in 2014, that is, in 2015 again witnessing the rivalry between the two countries. Political scientists claim that for years the military has justified its control of foreign and national policy by claiming that India is still the enemy and these Sharif-Modi peace talks challenged its interests of the army. As a result, the Pakistan Army launched attacks on Indian Army bases in Kashmir is causing tension between the two countries. In response to these attacks by India PM Modi has decided not to attend the 19th SAARC Summit hosted by Pakistan in Islamabad. Apart from this, PM Modi also avoided talks with PM Sharif on the Kashmir issue. In addition, these attacks on Indian Army bases also led to a showdown between India and Pakistan at the UN General Assembly over Kashmir in 2016. Pakistan claimed it still wants to build peace with India but "it is not possible by resolving the Kashmir issue On the other hand, India has accused Pakistan of being a terrorist state and for "feeding, spreading and exporting terrorism". Indian Foreign Minister Sawraj informed about it that all allegations made by Sharif regarding human rights violations in Kashmir are baseless and Jammu and Kashmir will remain part of India (Chaudhary, 2014).

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif changed the army chief three times, but each time “he he selected a dark horse for the coveted spot, hoping to tip the balance of power towards his civilian government.” In 2017, Sharif was removed from office after being accused of corruption he was indicted by the Panama Papers scandal, which alleged that Sharif had offshore businesses and capital in his children's names. Sharif was not overthrown by the army, but by the Supreme Court, which declared Sharif a rogue leader. However, political scientists also claim that although the military had no direct intervention; senior and middle-ranking officials in the military intelligence agencies fed anti-Sharif material to the media. The Panama Papers the scandal is important because it unfolded during unresolved major issues between civil-military. Most importantly, a joint investigation team (JIT) is probing the case Sharif consisted mainly of ISI and Military Intelligence (MI) personnel. It can be argued from these events that the military used to scandal to destabilize the government in the sense Ghosal's "power without accountability and responsibility (Malik, 2017).

2.15 The Role of Military in the Collapse of Imran Khan Government

Historically, none of Pakistan's prime ministers have completed their five-year term. It is rare for any Prime Minister to remain Prime Minister for more than three years: only three of 22 have managed to surpass the four-year mark in the past 74 years. Interestingly, most of them have been removed by extra-constitutional/parliamentary or court actions, yet no prime minister has been ousted by a vote of no confidence. When Imran Khan came to office in 2018, he came up with the slogan "Naya Pakistan", promising a new policy. He managed good relations with the army for two to three years. Trouble started for Imran after the extension of Bajwa's tenure, as the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the move and sought parliamentary approval for the extension. Imran Khan was left embarrassed. Until last year, Imran and the army seemed to be on good terms. Things looked set to change after the appointment of a new ISI chief in 2021. It was widely reported in the media that Bajwa wanted to appoint Lt. Gen. Nadeem Anjum to replace Lt. Gen. Faiz Hammed as the new spy chief, but Imran Khan held on to the appointment for nearly three weeks. Imran did not want to replace Hameed, who was said to be involved in the former star cricketer's electoral victory. It is said that Imran's reluctance did not sit well with Bajwa (Jazeera, 2022).

Rumors were rife that Imran and Hameed had some sort of quid pro quo understanding between them. Bajwa was due to retire in November 2019, but secured an extension until November 2022. Imran's stance on Hameed's transfer fueled speculation that the prime minister could secure the next term, while the ISI chief could eye the top army post. Although Bajwa eventually prevailed and Anjum was appointed ISI chief, it left a visible rift in his relationship with the prime minister. When India abrogated Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, Pakistani opposition parties like PML (N), PPP and others criticized Bajwa and Imran for "failing Kashmir". The poor Covid situation and mounting debt were other burning issues, but Imran remained confident and relied on Bajwa. That

obviously changed after the Hameed episode. Imran and Bajwa's contrasting views on the US now signal where things stand between them. Imran has long pursued an independent foreign policy, which has led to Pakistan's move away from the US. But with Pakistan's military establishment benefiting massively from US financial aid, Bajwa may not have liked this scenario (Sodhi, 2021).

CHAPTER 3

Hereditary and Dynastic Politics in Pakistan

3. Hereditary Politics in Pakistan

The current political system of Pakistan is under the strong control of hereditary politics. The term hereditary political system refers to a system where political positions are transferred or conferred by inheritance from a parent or grandparent. Today, the major political parties of Pakistan present a very clear picture of hereditary politics with an inherent list of flaws. The biggest disadvantage of this form of politics is that it does not allow mainstreaming of the political system by limiting its mandate to a limited and classified class. It is more or less an extension of the monarchy with the difference of a clear and written nomination of a crown prince or political heir. This form of politics goes against the true spirit of governance and rule by the people which are considered the essence of democracy. As defined by political scientists; democracy is a form of government "that is of the people, for the people and by the people. In fact, in a democracy, people are at the helm of affairs and the leadership consists of high potential individuals, selected from the wider social class without any inclusions and exclusions. The people of the state are part of the system and central to the decision-making process of the political system. A further elaboration of democratic values is; freedom of speech, inclusivity and equality, citizenship, consent of the governed, right to vote, freedom from unjustified government deprivation of the right to life and liberty and the rights of minorities. In hereditary politics, the few families make decisions for millions who have no choice but to follow their dictates without their will or desire. In a way, millions are nothing more than hostages who even elect political elites (hereditary politicians) as a decree that rather exercises their freedom of choice (Khan, 2022).

Since in hereditary politics a few families are privileged to rule the state and the masses and make decisions that suit them and their associates rather for the greater benefit of the state and society, the result is the breakdown of the state into three levels political, economic and social. In a country like Pakistan, the political leaders or ruling elites run the society (masses) as well as the economy. Politically, the wider and talented youth in Pakistan are politically alienated, which limits the innovation and potential needed to redefine and formulate strategies to improve the political process through an inclusive nationalist approach, which is the essence of the democratic process and the gateway to democracy. The most undesirable result of this hereditary policy was that, the political system of Pakistan and democracy is what the rather literal meanings of these terminologies define.

Over time, such a limited and rotten political system gives rise to agitation against the ruling hereditary elites, who are then replaced by one another hereditary elite who may end up with the same fate, it brings uncertainty and chaos that destabilize the state, its economy and society as a whole. This fragile and rotten hereditary political system and so-called democracy, with its inherent flaws, ultimately allows institutions to infiltrate the political scene through direct and indirect strategies (Khan, 2022).

Since these institutions are not well acquainted with the political system, it adds to the existing flaws in the process of implementing corrective measures and reforms. As a result, these institutions are vilified and accused of directing the entire political process, which might not otherwise be their main objective. Defaming institutions, especially the institutions of the army, in no way serves the interest of the state and society of Pakistan. Pakistan today faces a situation where a hereditary and ugly political system and inept political elites have brought security institutions into the limelight for criticism from anyone and everyone. In fact, this is the main flaw of hereditary politics in Pakistan, which goes against the democratic value and made more challenges to the smooth running of democracy in Pakistan. Political scientists are of the opinion that it is easy for the power centers to control the hereditary political elites by pointing out their corruption and wrong doings because they are brought up in a controlling environment. If it was a matter of mainstreaming politics in Pakistan with the involvement of even a common man at the head of a political party, based on potentials and capabilities, the political system might have flourished with strong democratic and nationalist foundations and values. Such a vibrant political system would, on the one hand, strengthen the state and at the same time create a broader harmony among society with a clear mandate to bring about economic development and ensure the sanctity and truthfulness of national security institutions (Khan, 2022).

3.1 Pakistan People's Party

PPP: Founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967, the man led the party until his execution in April 1979. When he was behind bars for a murder trial, his wife Begum Nusrat Bhutto led the party. In 1982, she was allowed to go abroad for cancer treatment and daughter Benazir Bhutto became co-chair. Benazir Bhutto also spent many years in London. On her return to Pakistan in April 1986, she became the de jure co-president. Her mother accepted a supporting role. After the assassination of Benazir on 27 December 2007, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari became the party chairman. However, as he was still immature, Benazir's husband Asif Ali Zardari led the party for some time. Bilawal now functions as the chairman of the PPP and even senior party leaders with decades of association with the party have accepted him as their boss. 'Democrats' in the party do not question the man's fitness for the top job. In case the situation changes for any reason, Asifa is being groomed as the party chief.

The second sister Bakhtawar does not play any role in the party, but the possibility of her taking a key position in the future cannot be ruled out (desk, 2020).

The cult of the Bhutto has deepened over the decades as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's judicial murder by the split Supreme Court bench in 1979 has always been a controversial act in public memory. This collective view was further supported by admission by the former Chief Justice on a television program in 2007 that Supreme Court judges were under pressure from the military regime to rule against Bhutto. However, this cult would not have deepened if his daughter Benazir Bhutto had not fought in prison, house arrest, solitary confinement and exile amid brief interludes of power to continue the politics of the populist brand of her father. Benazir Bhutto was elected twice as Pakistan Prime Minister, in complete defiance of patriarchal norms and clerical decrees declaring a woman's election as head of state un-Islamic (based on a contested saying of prophet Muhammad – PBUH). These two terms in office were not smooth and did not give enough room to Benazir Bhutto to implement the populist programs of her party's ruler. This is why, for years, she was in political oblivion and stayed in exile for nearly a decade until 2007 when she returned to Pakistan (Rumi, 2022).

The second homecoming marked a political milestone, when millions received her at the Karachi airport, thereby confirming her legitimacy as the dynastic inheritor of Bhutto politics, as well as establishing her own independent legitimacy as a leader. Her first homecoming on 10 April 1986, under the regime of Zai Ul Haq, was a pure act of succession politics and therefore settled her claim of being the only inheritor of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's political legacy (Rumi, 2022).

This status of sole heir did not go unchallenged, as her brother Murtaza Bhutto also had claims to the succession as an eligible patriarchal candidate. Murtaza Bhutto returned to Pakistan during Benazir Bhutto's tenure as Prime Minister and attempted to mobilize loyal cadres within the Pakistan People's Party to make this claim a reality. However, his claim to the dynasty was curtailed by his tragic assassination in 1996, when his sister was prime minister, and this incident was ironically used by opponents of the PPP (mainly the security establishment and right-wing political parties) to undermine Benazir Bhutto's legitimacy by making direct accusations of her husband's complicity in her murder brother. Separately, a high-level judicial commission acquitted Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari several years later, when Benazir Bhutto was not in office. However, although the grand conspiracy, the judicial commission noted, has not yet been uncovered, in public memory the allegation continues to plague the credibility of Benazir Bhutto's husband, who succeeded her after her assassination in December 2007 (Scott, 2014).

After the assassination of Murtaza Bhutto, his widow Ghinwa Bhutto formed the PPP faction and proposed Murtaza's beautiful daughter Fatima Bhutto as the 'true' successor to the Bhutto dynasty. Fatima Bhutto faces Benazir Bhutto's son, Z Bilawardari Bhutto, as the officially nominated heir, and apparently this succession saga is far from over. Fatima Bhutto has re-enacted the feud within the

dynasty in her recent book, constantly criticizing her late aunt and her husband. In fact, such was her hatred in 2008 after the death of her aunt that a leading academic and activist from Pakistan wrote an open letter to Fatima Bhutto stating:

You and your stepmother... are arguing that the name Bhutto should not determine political success or confer privilege. I agree, but then why is Ghinwa Bhutto leading her PPP faction as Murtaza's widow? It is not her husband's name that she is using and the Bhutto 'heritage' is not being used here, and Fatima, are you not being targeted by the media, political and social circles just because you are a Bhutto?!

This open letter sums it all up and suggests how the use of dynastic mode not only ensures legitimacy, but paradoxically challenges legitimacy. Thus, dynasty becomes a political framework for understanding and negotiating politics in a post-colonial society like Pakistan. Turning away from Sindh province, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group (PML-N) in Punjab is led by Shahbaz Sharif on behalf of his brother Nawaz Sharif. The latter proved to be a non-feudal option for Punjab politics in the 1980s, under the military rule and enjoyed two terms as provincial chief minister (1985-90) before becoming the prime minister's, first in 1990 and again in 1997. In his second term, he appointed his brother Shahbaz Sharif as Chief Minister of Punjab. A military coup in 1999 led to the worst and subsequent end of both brothers in 2000. The Sharifs struggle against erstwhile benefactors i.e. the Pakistan army, allowed them to enter the usual arena of civil-military contest and legitimized their populist position in the country (Scott, 2014).

3.2 Pakistan Muslim League-(N)

PML-N: Launched by Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in 1993 due to "ideological" differences with Sindhi leader Muhammad Khan Junejo, a favorite of spiritual leader Pir Pagar. Junejo was elected Prime Minister by then President and Chief Martial Law Administrator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq after non-party elections in 1985. While Junejo tried to assert his identity as a politician, Sharif, who was also the Chief Minister of Punjab, always worked as a humble servant of a military ruler. After the 1985 elections, Gen Zia allowed some parties to function. Junejo was the party's national-level head, while Sharif served as its provincial chief. As the two leaders had serious political differences and had their own camp followers, Sharif decided to form his own party before the 1993 elections. Since then, the party has been under the control of the Sharifs. When the going got tough, the party's central working committee created a new office and elected Sharif as "Quaid" for life (mufti, 2021).

Sharif's exile ended in 2007, and after the 2008 elections, the younger brother was re-appointed Punjab chief minister by the party. Indeed, the younger Sharif had earned a reputation as a good

administrator in their earlier tenure and his return to power was seen as an impressive re-entry into the power matrix. Currently, the elder Sharif is the Quaid (or grand leader) of the party, while the younger brother is the elected head of the party. In recent years, the sons of both Sharifs have also been groomed as the next generation of leaders. The Sharifs are part of post-1947 Pakistan's urban business industrial elite, and the support base is firmly rooted in the cities and towns of Pakistan. However, their politics - especially patrimonial nature - does not remain too dissimilar to tribal and feudal content. This is the dilemma of Pakistani politics. As Javeed Akhtar says

Personalized nature of politics is closely related to the dominant position and brought the Pakistani story of a narrow-minded political white man who was of feudal and tribal origin and remained in view even as he gradually rose to power with the well-to-do urban groups. The latter epitomized by the rise of Mian Nawaz Sharif, who came from a Punjabi background. Although the members of power differ in social origin and background, members of this power elite share a similar feudal tribal style of conducting politics; Personalized, based on primordial, social hierarchies, characterized by patronage seeking activity and preoccupied with protecting and promoting their economic interest and privileged.

A parallel dynasty, an offshoot of the Muslim League from the Punjab, also emerged in part three decades. Former Speaker and Chief Minister of Punjab (December 2002-2001), Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi succeeded his cousin and brother-in-law Chaudhry Hussain as Chairman of the Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q). Chaudhry Shujaat's brother, Wajahat Hussain and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi's son, Monis Elahi, have already done their appropriate political moves by contesting provincial assembly seats in the 2008 elections. The genes of the Chaudhrys are found in opposition to the Bhuttos of Punjab. The elder - Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi (Chaudhry's father) was a victimized by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1970s when he was the prime minister of the country. After a military coup in 1977, the military junta found a natural ally in the disaffected and influential Punjabi in their efforts to forge a grand anti-Bhutto alliance in Punjab. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Chaudhrys were allies of Nawaz Sharif until a military coup in 1999. In the following decade, these politicians were staunch supporters of General Musharraf and formed a new, pro-military faction of the Muslim League, the PML-Q, which is now a political force in its own right (Mufti, 2021).

3.3 Pakistan Muslim League-(Q)

PML-Q was formed by General Pervez Musharraf after the ouster of the PML-N government in October 1999. Its first president was former Governor Mian Muhammad Azhar. But as Gen Musharraf relied more on the Chaudhrys of Gujrat, he got Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain elected as the head. This party came to power as a result of elections in 2002. Since then, the leadership - national and Punjabi - has been with the Chaudhry brothers. They appoint or are elected other office bearers of

their own choice. It was because of their ties to the general that Chaudhry Shujaat became Prime Minister for two months and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi remained Chief Minister of Punjab for a full five-year term (Dwan, 2013).

3.4 Jamaat-i-Islami

Jamaat-i-Islami is also a party that does not follow dynastic politics like PTI but has more structure in its ranks. After Maulana Syed Abul Ala Maudoodi, who founded the party in 1941 and remained its chief until 1972, it was led by Mian Muhammad Tufail, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Syed Munawwar Hassan and now Senator Sirajul Haq. Generally, a person once elected to the highest office is re-elected until he expresses his inability to bear responsibility. Dynasty is out of the question. Syed Munawwar Hassan was replaced because apparently his thinking about the establishment differed from the party line. Ameer Jamaat-i-Islami Senator Sirajul Haq says the era of dynastic politics is coming to an end and only genuine representatives of the public will be elected to the legislature. Addressing a rally in Hyderabad, he reiterated the need to hold all politicians, especially those who remained in power at the center or in the provinces, accountable. (Mitra et al., 2015).

3.5 Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam

Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam is a religious party with dynastic practices. Maulana Mufti Mehmud took over its leadership in 1962 and retained the seat until his death in the 1980s. It was then headed by Maulana Hamid Mian for some time until Maulana Fazlur Rehman grew up and took control. He is expected to keep the chair for life. He faces no challenge as far as his leadership is concerned. It is flexible enough to work with parties of different ideologies. In case any change is needed, son Asad Mehmud is there to replace him. He was already elected a member of the National Assembly. The party has followers in KP and Balochistan. However, it has no roots in Punjab and Sindh despite the fact that most Deobandis reside in these provinces. And the party is not taking any measures to improve its position in these provinces either (mehmood, 2015).

3.6 Hereditary Politics in ANP

The ANP was the largest Pashtun nationalist party in Pakistan from 2008–2013, with influence lying in Pashtun-dominant areas in and around Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. They ruled the province from 2008–2013, but lost to the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf in the 2013 assembly elections. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the secular Pashtun nationalist politician Asfandiyar Wali Khan, whose claim over the party is also family based leads the Awami National Party (ANP). Khan is the son of Abdul Wali Khan and the grandson of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who was companion of Gandhi and an

ally of the Indian National Congress in the early twentieth century. Before Khan, the ANP was led by Wali Khan's wife, Begum Naseem Wali Khan. After the death of Wali Khan, conflict within the dynasty led to the ascension of the 'son' as party chief (Noorani, 2022).

3.7 Hereditary Politics in Military

Military rulers in Pakistan did not resist creating a political legacy. The son of General Ayub Khan (1958-69) entered politics while his father was at the helm. In later decades, he became associated with right-wing politics and rose to various positions of power. In the Musharraf era, his son also entered politics and was elected and became the Minister of State for Finance. Similarly, the sons of General Zia ul-Haq have been active in politics since their father's death in 1988 and have been elected from their respective constituencies more than once (Mufti, 2021).

Another powerful general who headed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, who died along with his boss Zia ul-Haq in 1938, also left a political legacy. Both his sons are now active politicians and have happily won elections. In all three cases, right-wing nationalist ideology, wealth amassed during wanton looting, and the open support of intelligence agencies was evident. In all three cases, rural or tribal networks were less important than leveraging family heritage and establishing a network of clients in local constituencies. The civil-military bureaucracy that ruled Pakistan for most of its existence, directly or indirectly, also encouraged the emergence of dynastic politics in Pakistan. If anything, the military joined the trend, and their long periods of rule helped to fortify and perhaps entrenchment of political dynasties. They too benefited from the uncertainty of politicians due to the interference of unelected institutions such as the military by keeping it all in the family (Mufti, 2021).

Dipankar Gupta, drawing on Charles Tilly's theory of the state, talks about political families having a monopoly on violence – the ability to control, resist and inflict violence. This is a critical qualification needed to enter politics and can only be obtained by those who belong to the established tradition of dynastic rule. This monopoly of violence is necessary because politicians as patrons need to be able to protect the electorate by transferring their interests to the state in exchange for a vote. Dynasty thus becomes an informal extension of the state in countries where democratic politics has not yet taken firm root. In such societies, informal institutions such as *biradars* and ethnic *beads* can distort public options. In such situations, family control over violence is the best guarantee of party survival. There is much debate about the control mechanisms that these families may employ. A ruler buys the loyalty of his tribe in exchange for appointing public office. "In India, for example, Indira Gandhi's patrimonial strategies consolidated her own position in power and ensured her son's succession in office. This patrimonial relationship between patron and client is also evident in Pakistan, where political parties are clientelistic in nature." Once a leader is secure in his position of

power, a circle of advisers and successors are handpicked in the event of death or ouster (Gupta, 2008).

The predominance of family politics also has a lot to do with the money, time, and connections that can only come from being part of a family. Kristoff points to the increase in the size of constituencies and rising campaign costs that make it harder for unfunded unknowns to enter politics because of the political monopoly these families have. In essence, voters do not vote for a party, but for a candidate who is expected to win and has access to patronage, and thus the vote rarely reflects individual choice. In South Asia, patron-client relationships are feudal and embody relationships of personal obligation and feelings. A politician depends on kinship networks to secure the support of *biradari* (Pakistan) or faction (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) or caste support (India) at the local level experienced in patronage and development to reach the population. "The legacy of martyrdom that surrounds the Bhutto family is collectively remembered as a sacrifice for exposing injustices in society, Pakistan's middle-class professionals have never paid the price that politics demands. The price includes long periods in prison, exile, harassment by intelligence services," death threats and the knowledge that all too often the law offers them minimal protection when they are in opposition. For the other side of politics, the minority that actually engages in deserving leadership, the thing is that they rarely become part of populist politics. Indeed, intellectuals and economists are more willing to serve military regimes than elected civilian ones, in part because those with professional rather than family backgrounds are disadvantaged in electoral politics." and "feudal" politicians who return to the legislatures every time an election is held then a fondness for technocratic solutions and a willingness to cooperate with military dictators (Nafisa, 2007).

If Pakistan hopes to develop a viable democratic system, and if civic structures and practices need to be reshaped within this democracy the norm, then political parties must be openly democratic, which means that the party leadership should not be passed from one generation and family to another? Parties should opt for open elections leadership and top management positions should be open to all members of political party. Otherwise, the entire nation will become private the property of one large extended political family. Look at the recent Nawaz For example, the Sharif cabinet. Almost all major cabinet positions were either in the possession of Mr. Sharif's immediate family members or his associate extended family (Nafisa, 2007).

Of course, if this is the case with the most powerful politician's positions in the government, then the children of these leaders feel aptly entitled to think of themselves as the "natural" ruling class. Our so-called leaders forget that the survival of any powerful regime depends on it the "willing" consent of the people.² For a group of politicians to consider themselves as part of the "natural" ruling class to recognize this claim it must come from the people, because if no one accepts you as the ruling class, regardless of your claims, you cannot become this so-called ruling class. People, on the other

hand, should see the kind of arrogance that encourages our cultural and political elite to see themselves as the 'ruling class'. The two major dynasties in our politics, the Sharifs and the Bhuttos, if we look at their history, both were supported by military dictators and served the interest of the dictators in the first years of their political rise. Of course, both of these families eventually broke away from their masters and they have charted their own political path, but it is our job as humans Pakistan to keep reminding them that they got their ridiculous "governance family" status either by selling their loyalty to military dictators or, if we want to go further in the past by selling their dedication to the four former colonizers. This critique of the "naturalized" claim that it is rulers must be consistently presented through the media and social media. The idea is that no one gets past the claim that they somehow belong to us destiny as their birth right (Ihsan, 2005).

There is much at stake in the process of eliminating dynastic politics; the case is closely related to personality politics. Any policy which rests on a narrative of liberation from the hands of one man, one leader, is bound to unleash macro and micro fascist tendencies in our culture. In simply put, fascism is nothing more than a deeply internalized belief that one single leader can somehow solve all our problems. So anytime we look around for one strong leader to set us free, we express our latent fascism. By eliminating dynastic politics we might also be able to get rid of this deeply rooted fascism in our souls and could then eventually seek collective solutions to our diverse problems. We all need to look at our political parties to see how democratic they are they are in their structures before we give them the power to run our democracy. Yes, there are some religious parties that tend to be more democratic, but because they consider one single interpretation of religion to be the solution for all our problems, their worldview becomes more exclusive and less democratic. That is, despite their democratic practices in their selection their vision of the future will always be limiting and reliant on it one way of looking at the world that can never be a recipe for success in a country as diverse as Pakistan (McGrath, 2018).

CHAPTER 4

4. Conclusion

Since independence, Pakistan has experienced various forms of government such as parliamentary form of government, presidential systems, martial law and also democracy. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit's 10th edition of the Democracy Index, "Pakistan witnessed a steady decline in democratic health as the country's score continued to decline after 2014, with more than four months of deliberations before Pakistan's parliament, incidentally". The process of democratization in the country has been slow and passive and its nature has remained fragile since the creation of Pakistan. For a long time, democracy was widely accepted as the best form of government, and hence Pakistan's leaders emphasized the democratic form of government. Free and fair elections are the main component of representative democracy, yet electoral manipulation manifested itself in the form of political victimization, stuffed ballot boxes, and intimidation of election staffs, pressure on the masses, use of state property and violation of election commission rules set for elections.

The failure of bureaucratic regimes created space for the military, which was more organized than the civilian bureaucracy, to intervene in the country's political sphere. The military's formal involvement in civilian affairs began with martial law in Lahore in 1953 to control unrest between Ahmedis and Sunnis. A dictatorship ruled the country from 1958 to 2008. All four military regimes continued to be characterized by the imposition of martial law, the banning of political parties, media censorship, the dissolution of assemblies, and the abrogation or suspension of constitutions. They have thus destroyed political institutions and frustrated the media. Democracy in Pakistan lacks its true essence due to the ignorance of people about the form of democracy in Pakistan. One of the reasons for the lack of reforms is the absence of public pressure on the leadership. And that is mainly because the debate about democracy in Pakistan is confusing. Much of the confusion centers on democracy meaning and purpose. Throughout Pakistan's political history, defections within various parties have caused problems for various governments. In the late 1980s, democracy in Pakistan was once again at a crossroads following the death of General Zia in a natural disaster. Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif also failed comprehensively. Four general elections in the 1990s brought each of them to power twice. They did not seem interested in developing democratic norms in the country. Neither of them respected the restrictions on the use of power, rather modifying and modifying the constitution for their personal convenience. Their behavior brought ruin to democracy. It also brought the military back to power. So in conclusion, we see that the main causes of the decline of democracy in Pakistan were lack of respect for the country's constitution and abuse of powers. The

constitution of the country has been ignored and manipulated time and time again. Deviation from the constitution was the main reason democracy could not flourish and flourish in the country.

After partition from India, as a newly independent state, Pakistan had weak leadership, lacked plans for a democratic state, and was constantly insecure about its national security from India and Afghanistan. These factors weakened the position of politicians in Pakistan as the military came to dominate politically and economically. These military leaders not only eliminated and rejected the democratic system government, but also made changes to the constitution to ensure military supremacy consuming legislative, executive and judicial powers for its present and future. Both Khan and Haq were able to bring economic development to Pakistan, but it is proven that this development was short-lived and this economic stability did not bring help in building effective political institutions. Instead, the military became a dominant institution and figure thanks to financial support from the state budget and from abroad. , not only these political representatives failed to reduce the influence of the military in political affairs, but also failed to achieve strengthening democratic roots in Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto successfully reduced military power and attempted to unite political leaders from various Islamic countries to become a powerful entity in Southeast Asia. Yet the opening of murder cases and protests by opposition parties allowed the continuous use of the military to suppress these internal ones scanty. Additionally, the United States' disapproval of the commitments made by Islam the leadership of the countries during the Lahore summit also threatened not only to united state, but also Israel. As a result, the United States also indirectly consented to the removal these political leaders who were present at the summit using the military. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif also failed to strengthen democratic norms and values in Pakistan and instead used all their energies to reduce the powers of the military, leading to exile of both leaders. The year 1990-1998 saw the back and forth of political power in Pakistan change between Bhutto and Sharif, which arguably was enough to build democratic political institutions. Yet these leaders used their power of political office and military to debase opposition political leaders. In 1998, General Pervert Musharraf came to power and announced a military coup. Musharraf announced a military coup at a time when he was considered "unfashionable" and did not have foreign financial support like previous military leaders. But the events of 9/11 made the Pakistani military and Musharraf's presence in politics an advantage. However, an open attack on the highest judge and the suspension of the constitution in 2007 reduced public support for Musharraf in Pakistan. The 2007 Lawyers' Movement ensured the removal of Musharraf and the transition of power to the democratically elected leader Asif Ali Zardari in 2008. It can be argued that despite the emergence of stable and effectively functioning political institutions in Pakistan; inquiring about military actions cause problems for elected leaders. If not directly, the military has indirectly reduced the power and influence of elected leaders by supporting

opposition leaders and their protests. Army helped opposition parties open Memogate scandal against Zardari, while he removed Sharif on the bases of the Panama Papers.

The military's indirect influence in politics is as dangerous as its direct involvement. This indirect overshadowing of politics makes it impossible for the leadership to operate and perform political duties, which hampers the process of political and economic development. Although there has been a transition to democracy, it is clear that the norms and values of this system are not fully met they were fed and they won't if the military has indirect influence. Political journalists and analysts in Pakistan have argued that if democracy is to survive, tensions between the civilian government and the military must be reduced either by working together on national security and political issues, or by working independently without encroaching on each other's spheres. However, military independence can be costly because it allows for "military professionalism" to result. direct military intervention. Political leaders and the military may work together, but these agencies they require mutual accountability, which leads to tension. That's why I say political management refrains from engaging in issues and matters that diminish or challenge the status quo army. A country like Pakistan which has constant military interventions and coups throughout its history, should resist challenging the authority of the military. Instead, political the leadership should invest all energy in strengthening the political institutions that ensure democracy and promote economic development. With such development and progress, it turns into a natural society will occur, which will naturally shift the power paradigms in the country. Taking Zardari and Sharif leadership in consideration; leaders challenged military decisions and actions threatening military interests. Therefore, the military indirectly created tension during their term with the support of opposition parties. It was imperative that these leaders invest their attention to issues of strengthening institutions that could help reduce the number of military forces dominance rather than challenging it. As a result, countries that had military interventions or coups, they should understand that the military is a powerful institution and only with gradual political and economic development can democracy strengthen its root and end indirect military influence.

The current pulitical system of Pakistan is under the strong control of hereditary politics. The term hereditary political system refers to a system where political positions are transferred or conferred by inheritance from a parent or grandparent in some form, without judging the ability and potential of the next. Consistent the major political parties of Pakistan present a very clear picture of hereditary politics with an inherent list of flaws. Pakistan is a country with high illiteracy rates, especially in rural areas, so a name can win or lose an election. The reason dynastic families enjoy enormous power in the political system is because being "dynastic" substantially increases the chances of winning an electoral contest. The two largest political parties in Pakistan, PMLN and PPP, are working on the phenomenon of dynastic politics. Maryam Nawaz is the new face of PMLN making her way into politics mainly because she is the daughter of former Prime Minister Nawaz

Shareef. After the death of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his daughter Benazir Bhutto took over the leadership of the PPP and after her assassination, her son Bilawal Zardari took over the leadership of the party. Bhutto's name was added to his name to declare that he would now lead the party and to reassure the masses that he was the new 'heir to the throne'. Even after 12 years of continuous PPP rule, the miserable condition of Sindh can be seen. In many countries, under-delivering on promises, poor governance and corruption scandals can lead to leadership change or resignation, but here there is no accountability in this regard. There are countless names in Pakistani politics who are 'politicians' just because of the surname; either they are related to some political, military or bureaucratic elite. So it is basically the names they bear and not their individuality as political leaders. Unless they are the sons/daughters of political leaders, no one knows who they are. I sincerely hope that a normal individual in Pakistan should realize how these dynasties have gripped Pakistan by its roots and slowly transformed it into an oligarchy state where few enjoy power and pleasures and the rest pay the price. Besides, there is an urgent need to reform and de-politicize the bureaucracy, police and judiciary if we want to see a movement of progress in the country.

In Pakistan, political leaders, officers tend to be corrupt, dishonest and inefficient. They ask for a bribe. This results in mistrust of the citizens. This very adversely affects the functioning of democracy in the country. The role of antisocial elements arises during elections. Many people are forced or bribed to vote for a particular candidate or party. Rigging also takes place during elections. There are many socioeconomic inequalities among people. All citizens have the right to vote and fight in elections, only rich people have a chance to win elections. During elections, a large number of voters give weight-age to a candidate's caste and religion. Political parties also keep a person's caste or religion in mind while distributing election tickets. Representatives elected on the basis of caste or religion work for the welfare of people belonging to their caste or religion only.

4.1 Recommendations

On the base of above research study I have listed few recommendations for the strengthening of democracy in Pakistan.

- Democratic principles should be reformed in practical form by strengthening democratic practices and traditions. There is a need to increase the value of political involvement of ordinary citizens. It can be done by the efforts of political organizations, parties and movements.

- The Supreme Court and other lower courts should function effectively because the quality of their performance has a direct impact on the well-being and state of society in terms of adherence to the rule of law and faith in democracy. The Electoral Commission, its performance and its strict neutrality are also essential for a fair and solid democratic foundation.
- Neither democracy nor the country's economy will improve in a society where there is such a high percentage of uneducated people. Pakistan's politicians can no longer treat education casually. It should be given high priority and state of emergency to fulfill the modest aspirations of the young generation.
- Another area that Pakistan needs to focus on is the participation of women in politics and their fair representation in parliament, cabinet and decision-making bodies. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan women continue to face challenges in participating in electoral processes, including the ability to vote and stand for election.
- No country can achieve political stability without the active coordination of various state institutions working within their own specified parameters. Consensus among political forces and other stakeholders is essential for a nation to move smoothly on the path to prosperity and maintaining national cohesion. The history of developed and successful democratic nations is evidence of such cases where political stability has emerged as a result of collective national wisdom.
- In a broad view of the effectiveness of civilian political leadership in strengthening democracy through cooperative politics and consensual work on national issues, civilian leaders are still not working according to the aspirations of the people. Many of our politicians are involved in corrupt practices. Those who claim to be clean do not have a very reliable past. So far they have not been able to prove by their effectiveness that politicians can provide Pakistan with the best form of government that will make Pakistan a welfare state providing equal opportunities to all. Although this is no excuse for military powers to interfere in politics. So the problem is how to get this desirable sustainable and permanent system in Pakistan as the inefficiency and corrupt practices of the politicians still offer military leaders a chance to take over the government in Pakistan.
- For the success of democracy, government institutions play a role as legislative, executive and judicial branches. The role of elected politicians is to work for the welfare of their citizens.

Free, fair and timely elections are essential for a peaceful transfer of power. The fair role of judges is important for building public confidence in their institutions.

- The role of politicians is also important in this respect, because the basic amenities of life, basic human rights, justice and economic progress are the right of every citizen. Democracy is famous because it works for its citizens and a true democratic state is a welfare state that works for their public.
- The role and influence of big money donors should be controlled and reduced. Some people also criticize the monopoly of two political parties in the US and UK. Since more than two political parties can give the public more options to choose their representatives.
- For democracy to succeed in Pakistan, there is a need to bring merit to all institutions and eliminate corruption, especially among politicians. The date of the election after five years should be decided once and all parties must follow that like in the US the date of the election is decided and every four years both political parties must follow it. In Pakistan, economic growth and progress are prerequisites for real change. Improving socio-economic and political arrangements will strengthen public confidence in democrats. A single merit can help bring talented people to all walks of life, especially politics.
- Cooperation between the civil-military leadership is also important to address poverty, terrorism, corruption at the domestic level and will be useful for our foreign policy as well.
- Education is essential for creating citizens' awareness of their rights and for choosing honest leaders in elections. Only education can bring real change in society and also be beneficial for the success of democracy. Through education, the general public could learn about true democratic norms, values and tolerance.

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