MS THESIS

INDIAN ARMED FORCES CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY: ANALYZING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

(2013-2023)

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FINAL APPROVAL

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Dedication

"How happy is the blameless vastal's of life!
The world forgetting, by the world forgot. Eternal sunshine of a spotless mind!
Each pray's accepted and each wish resign'd

I dedicate this thesis to the pioneers of my family **Haji Aziz Ullah Khan Nasar (Late), Wali Khan Nasar, Habib Ullah Nasar, Naqeeb Ullah Nasar, Asghar Khan Nasar, Zohaib Khan Nasar, Aimal Khan Nasar and** young pupil **Daniyal Khan Nasar (Late).** I extend my dedication to my family members, your selflessness will always be remembered. Thank you for enabling me to achieve this feat. I love you all!

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List of Abbreviations

CSD	Cold Start Doctrine
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
NWS	Nuclear Weapon State
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon States
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CoG	Centers of Gravity
LoC	Line of Control
NSG	Nuclear Supplier Group
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
SFC	Strategic Forces Command
SPS	Strategic Planning Staff
TNWs	Tactical Nuclear Weapons
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
AAD	Advanced Air Defence
PAD	Prithvi Air Defence
DRDO	Defense Research and Development Organization
AESA	Active Electronically Scanned Array
BVR	Beyond Visual Range
IAF	Indian Air Force
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
HEAT	High Explosives Anti-Tank
ATGMs	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
MBT	Main Battle Tanks
AWACS	Airborne Early Warning and Control
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
SLBM	Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile

SRBM	Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile
SLOCs	Sea of Line Communication
ISRO	Indian Space and Research Organization
A2/AD	Anti-Access-Area Denial
BVRAAM	Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missiles
ALCM	Air Launched Cruise Missile
LCA	Light Combat Aircraft
RFI	Request for Information
ECMs	Electronic Countermeasures
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
SEAD	Concealment of Hostile Air Safeguard
H&RI	Human and Remote Intelligence
EAD	Enemy Air Defense
MLRS	Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems
MIRV	Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle
WMDs	Weapon of Mass Destruction
BECA	Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
C4	Command, Control, Communication, and Computers
IBG	Integrated Battle Group
LEMOA	Logistics-Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
COMCASA	Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement

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Abstract

This thesis examines Indian Arms Forces conventional superiority and security implications for Pakistan. In the context of arms race, the complex dynamics of how imbalances conventional forces have contributed in state's security dilemma that have often been overlooked. Despite scholarly discourse, definitive consensus remains ambiguous in the antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan. This study focuses on the rapid growth, conventional capabilities and exploring the resulting uncertainties and impacts. The research is based on Kenneth Waltz's theory of Neorealism, providing a theoretical framework to analyse India's assertiveness. This study is illustrated through qualitative research methodology and influences credible sources such as research papers, books, and journals to explore the complexities of security landscape in South Asia. The qualitative approach enables a thorough investigation and the challenges posed by India's armed forces conventional superiority, guiding the formulation of effective strategies for Pakistan. The primary objective of this research is to illuminate the opportunities and challenges for Pakistan in balancing India's conventional superiority. Acknowledging the evolving threat environment, the study includes a comparative analysis of deterrence, emphasizing the dynamic nature and strategic importance of a nuclear doctrine and postures. Pakistan, recognizing the need to counter-balance India's offensive stance and has achieved the heights of responsible nuclear weapon state. The findings of this research contribute valuable insights into the effectiveness of maintaining a conventional balance against India. This research has practical implications for policymakers and strategic thinkers, offering a nuanced understanding of the complexities inherent in the India-Pakistan security dynamics.

Keywords: Indo-Pak, Surgical strikes, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Nuclear Weapons, Conventional Deterrence, Army, Navy, Air Force, Stability-Instability, Cold Start Doctrine

1 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

In 1947, the subcontinent was violently divided into Pakistan and India, two independent states. They have a number of unresolved issues between them, most notably the Kashmir dispute, which has led to multiple previous wars. Despite having existed for 75 years, neither country has been able to settle their differences. As previously stated, Pakistan and India are at odds over the unresolved Kashmir issue. The states fought each other for Kashmir in 1948, shortly after gaining independence from Great Britain. Another war broke out in 1965, and the dilemma in Kashmir was a contributing factor in the 1999 Kargil conflict. However, the arch rivals' "India and Pakistan" detonated nuclear weapons as a result of their hostility. Between these two significant and powerful South Asian states, there has been a nuclear arms race ever since. India has always viewed itself as the hegemon of the region because of its expended industrial-nation with strong economic capabilities. Other South Asian nations are viewed by it as satellite-states or subordinate entities. The aspirational actions play a crucial role in India's military development. Pakistan has always taken a reactive stance and worked to maintain a balance in the conventional and strategic equation with India in order to avoid marginalization. India's assertive military posture focuses to achieve its long-term goal for regional giant and already has one of the biggest militaries in the world, Delhi, enjoys numerical superiority in the conventional sphere. Besides, under the codename "Smiling Buddha" India conducted its first nuclear tests in 1974 "Peaceful nuclear explosion". Pakistan felt uneasy about the aforementioned "peaceful test" following the fall of Dhaka. Pakistan, most certainly, started its own military nuclear Programme in order to maintain equilibrium with New Delhi and to secure its own survival (Tahirkheli, 2022),

Indian leaders have been unable to come up with a plan to prevent Pakistan from obtaining both conventional and nuclear weapons since the late 1980s. Despite having nuclear weapons and outclassing Pakistan militarily in conventional terms. India has failed to stop strikes that it claims are supported by Pakistan. Nonetheless, at first, Indian officials believed that their country's nuclear weapons would aid in thwarting both conventional and subversive aggression. India's then prime minister justified Delhi's nuclear explosion by claiming that China and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed neighboring powers, had attacked India four times already (Clary & Narang , 2019).

Historically, Indo-Pak assertiveness have had been witnessed by international community. Although India considers Pakistan to be a threat as well and desires to maintain its position as a significant regional power. Due to the development of nuclear weapons by the two rivals, the first arms race between them was conventional in nature but has since evolved into a nuclear one, this, reflects their differing perspectives on security. The two adversaries have been embroiled in an action-reaction cycle about nuclear weapons and the development of ballistic and cruise missiles for the past few decades. To protect its sovereignty, Pakistan complied with India's decision to develop nuclear weapons. Pakistan retaliated by constructing the missiles that intends to destroy and saturate the system which will undoubtedly modify its nuclear force posture. Similarly, India is creating a modest "Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability" with future ambitions of an extensive system to counter Islamabad (Jalil G. Y., 2017).

Recent increases in India's defense budget have raised concerns about upsetting the conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. This has encouraged Islamabad to acquire Tactical Nuclear Weapons(TNWs) beside some sophisticated measures, posing consequential outcomes for subcontinent's strategic stability. However, an analysis of Pakistan's conventional deterrence suggests a more optimistic outlook considering certainties such as topography, favorable disposition of Pakistani conventional forces, and a lack of strategic disbelief in likely war-time scenarios (Ladwig, 2015).

The nuclearization of Pakistan served to accelerate nuclear development in India. There seems to be no evidence to indicate that the military doctrine of the Indian army towards Pakistan shifted from deterrence by conventional arms based on nuclear deterrence. Rather it would be more spot-on to say that the Indian army tried to enhance its conventional arms capability so that it would not be offset by the nuclear capability of Pakistan. In addition, "Operation Brasstacks" concludes that the operation was a provocative exercise aimed at making it known that "the conventional capability of the Indian military is not offset by the nuclear capability of Pakistan." As illustrated here, the pursuit of nuclear development by India is not logically tied to its military doctrine vis-à-vis Pakistan. As mentioned at the outset, the progress of India's nuclear development has been a reactive response to circumstances of which Pakistan's nuclear development is thought to be one such circumstance (Marie & Shinichi , 2003).

the 2000s, concerns about China and Pakistan posed a two-front military threat, which prompted India to create a deterrence-based strategy. However, resource limitations and unresolved vulnerabilities persist. Seeking durable peace with one adversary, ideally Pakistan, is deemed the smartest choice for New Delhi. Yet, the current strategic landscape, characterized by long-term competition with China and ideological differences with Pakistan, leaves the Indian military in a challenging position (Singh, 2021).

The overt nuclearization post-1998 has altered the region's strategic dynamics. Such developments have made the Indian army for adoption of the concept of "limited war" under "nuclear overhang" later formalized as the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) in 2004. Subsequent developments include the introduction of sub-conventional warfare and surgical strikes against alleged militant hideouts that are attributed to Pakistan's support for insurgents, according to Indians. The rationale behind aggressive military doctrines, such as CSD, is to deter or punish Pakistan's alleged support for militancy in India. Pakistan, on the other hand, contends that it supports a legitimate freedom struggle in Kashmir and disavows any involvement in terrorist incidents. Most certainly, this study argues that Pakistan should escalates its conventional deterrent-developments through an effective military capability to counter any misadventure by the Indian military under the CSD or other aggressive strategies (Rehman & Kundi, 2019).

1.2 Rationale of the Study

The conventional war and its developments have been subjects of scholarly debate since the dawn of the 21st century. Historical evidence documents the conflicts between India and Pakistan, and the hostility between these nuclear-armed nations has transformed the nature of warfare. Various developments have induced a security dilemma for other states, necessitating an examination of the role and politics of the international community. From their inception, both countries have possessed strategic arms due to a lack of trust in peace agreements. This includes missiles, warheads, nuclear submarines, conventional submarines, border security, and state-of-the-art technology acquired from developed nations. Consequently, the primary objective of this study is to evaluate India's arms forces conventional buildup. The researcher aims to extract potential security implications for Pakistan, considering that India has been experiencing rapid conventional growth, while Pakistan grapples with economic challenges and potential political instability. India, throughout its history, has adopted antagonistic policies against Pakistan, positioning itself as a competitor in the realms of strategic and

conventional affairs. This study seeks to dissect the trajectory of India's conventional capabilities and distinguish how it may impact the security landscape of Pakistan.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

South Asia is often referred as pivot region of the world due to its strategic significance. The dynamics of this region play a crucial role in influencing the regional peace and security. Due to India and Pakistan's conventional and strategic developments and arms race has brought a security challenges in the region. Most certainly, the two independent nations hold a detailed account of wars and ongoing political instability. However, the strategic and conventional race is a prevailing situation of uncertainty. Contemporarily, India and Pakistan are well-equipped militarily and possesses credible conventional and nuclear arsenals. India's various developments, especially in the realms of conventional and nuclear capabilities have security implications for Pakistan. Despite the existing literature on the subject, there remains a gap in addressing imbalances between sovereign nations in the region. Consequently, the primary focus of this thesis is to assess India's conventional superiority and analyze its implications for Pakistan by investigating the details of India's military advancements. The research goals to deliver an inclusive thoughtful of the impact on regional security, particularly from perspective of Pakistan's security concerns.

1.4 Research Objectives

- To explore Indian escalating conventional forces superiority from 2013 to 2023
- To analyse Indian conventional offensive postures, developments and its implications on Pakistan's security

1.5 Research Questions

- How India has been growing conventionally and acquiring conventional superiority that implies antagonistic approach towards Pakistan from 2013-2023?
- What options do Pakistan possess to overcome the escalating security implications against India and to maintain balance of power in the region?
- Why Pakistan has to rebalance the major Indian conventional arm forces development and its security challenges in the region?

1.6 Significance of the Study

The evolution of nuclear deterrence, strategic and conventional imbalances between the nuclear states has introduced strategic competency and security risks. India's pursuit of conventional development is distinctly Pakistan oriented. Consequently, Pakistan's endeavors

to acquire similar advancements fall within the ambit of Indian influence. The unfolding conventional and nuclear developments pose potential risk factors among the nuclear powers of South Asia. Undoubtedly, India's conventional arm forces developing are perceived as a clear threat to Pakistan's security, that creates "security dilemma" within the political landscape of South Asia for Pakistan. Therefore, through a thorough analysis of existing and emerging data, this research aims to provide a comprehensive examination of India's arm forces conventional superiority and its associated security implications for Pakistan. The significance of this study lies in discerning the extent to which these developments contribute to stability, balance of power, and imbalances in the region, thus explaining the challenges faced among these nuclear giants.

1.7 Delimitations of the Study

The thesis encounters limitations in several aspects, notably in terms of access to Indian official sources from both the armed forces and political representatives. Additionally, the absence of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan has restricted the researcher's ability to engage directly with pertinent queries. Consequently, this thesis relies heavily on diverse sources such as books, research papers, news articles, online reports, insights from academicians, and expertise from strategic analysts. The challenge of conducting interviews and accessing Indian authorities in person to address a pre-defined set of questions is acknowledged. However, this limitation will be mitigated to some extent by utilizing alternative means, such as engaging Indian officials through email correspondence and online interviews, while ensuring adherence to ethical research practices.

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW

The exclusive purpose of the literature reviews to unveil the facts that concerns Indian arm forces conventional superiority. It is crucial to outline objectives, select an appropriate methodology, and assess data using verifiable facts and evidence, often achieved through a thorough review of pertinent literature or publicly available information. Leveraging the prior work of others and the accessibility of relevant information is integral to the research process. This approach not only facilitates the researcher in refining their objectives but also aids in broadening their understanding and generating innovative ideas for the study. Accordingly, the researcher has intentionally scrutinized earlier works, including books and articles, addressings about Indian arm forces conventional superiority authored by renowned scholars both national

and at international level. This approach is undertaken to comprehend diverse perspectives offered by different writers and to build upon the existing body of knowledge in this area.

1.9 Review of Related Literature

In the contemporary context of air warfare, the prioritized strategy is operationalized through a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The offensive CONOPS, termed the "target system" tactic, evolved through deliberations among joint planners, Chiefs of Staff, and senior Air Force Commanders. This strategy encompassed three target systems, addressing significant enemy targets comprehensively. The first system focused on neutralizing the enemy air system through aggressive offensive operations against its air defenses while securing India's airspace. The second strategy aimed at targeting the enemy's critical Centers of Gravity (CoGs), impairing its short and long-term war capabilities, including fuel storage tanks, oil refineries, petrol stations, hydroelectric power plants, and other energy-related facilities. The third system involved attacking vital rail and road communication networks and choke points connecting Pakistan's interior to the Karachi Port, essential for the movement of supplies, goods, logistics, and labor. An evaluation of the Indian Air Force's performance in the conflict necessitates an analysis from the perspective of its strategy and CONOPS (Choudhury, 2022).

The Kargil conflict marked a pivotal moment in the turbulent history of the subcontinent. Unfolding the repercussion of the decisive war between Indo-Pakistan. This has posed distinct challenges to the established norms of earlier conflicts. Firstly, despite both nations possessing extensive armed forces, they deliberately confined their operations to a limited theater of war, departing from the sprawling Indo-Pak war of 1971. Secondly, the aftermath of Kargil reinforced the trend of nations avoiding major wars for strategic objectives, with Pakistan shifting its focus primarily to unconventional options against India. Thirdly, Pakistani forces violated the Line of Control (LoC) in contravention of international agreements, challenging conventional wisdom and inviting the specter of force despite the conflict's limited scope and the looming nuclear shadow. These events tested the deterrence theory within the nuclear-armed nations and the broader strategic community (Chadha, 2018).

In recent years, there is an apparent trend wherein India is making substantial investments in the development of conventional capabilities. This encompasses arms trade, infrastructural enhancements, and the acquisition of advanced weaponry systems. The modernization efforts of the Indian military encompass the improvement of missile defense systems, procurement of sophisticated fighter jets, submarines, surface ships, and the

augmentation of air defense capabilities. In 2021, India allocated $76 billion to its military expenditures, securing the third position globally. The evolving power dynamics in the region necessitate a careful analysis of India's conventional military buildup and its repercussions on strategic stability, particularly in relation to Pakistan and the broader South Asian context. Over the years, India has been a significant importer of weapons, with Russia, France, the United States, and Israel being its primary suppliers. The enduring collaboration between India and Russia persists, with Russia maintaining its status as India's principal source of weaponry (Jalil G. Y., 2023).

The wars between India-Pakistan underscores Pakistan's challenges achieving strategic objectives primarily through conventional means. Despite the secondary role played by sub-conventional elements. This underscores that the reliance on hybrid warfare does not guarantee success. In instances such as 1947–1948, 1965, and 1999, a failure to accurately gauge an adversary's strengths and weaknesses led to an inability to achieve defined objectives. While the outcomes of the ongoing Kashmir conflict remain uncertain, the noteworthy shift in Pakistan's strategy toward prioritizing unconventional means is evident. This strategic adaptation aligns with the unique strategic culture of the Pakistani Army, characterized by the utilization of "various mobilizations of Islam" and modified tools designed to address diverse security challenges (Chadha, 2018).

In the contemporary era, military forces are gravitating towards weapon systems capable of precision strikes. The air force takes precedence in this context, given its lower threshold compared to ballistic missile strikes. Indian forces, deployed from Siachen to the Rann of Kutch, operate in proximity to Pakistan's borders. The Indian Air Force's unequivocal commitment to utilizing airpower was demonstrated in the recent Balakot assault in 2019, signaling its intent to leverage the air force in future acts of aggression. The strategic positioning of Indian airbases in terms of proximity to the Indo-Pak international border, the Line of Control (LoC), and the working boundary, indicates the assertive posture of the Indian Air Force. The prioritization of facility upgrades at these bases underscores their strategic significance and the commitment to maintaining superior serviceability and quality of aircraft deployed (Ali N. , 2023).

The security, political, and economic landscape of the region has become more complex over the past 20 years as a result of the development of strategic partnerships with India. The US has inked several defense agreements with India and recognized it as a major defense

partner. These actions are intended to strengthen US military assistance to India and give India access to cutting edge military and dual-use technologies. Notwithstanding India's questionable policies and the instances of nuclear material (uranium) theft incidents that raises the possibility of proliferation and instability in the area and beyond. The US and India signed a civilian nuclear agreement and granted India an exceptional Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) waiver, which is assisting India in improving its nuclear production capacity. The US does not even examine India's strategy to wage a limited conventional and preemptive war under nuclear overhang; instead, it continues to ignore the country's advancement in its missile program's intercontinental ranges and its tendency to resume nuclear weapons testing. Paradoxically, India was not punished by the US for acquiring the S-400 under CAATSA. All of these events point to a significant change in US strategy in the area, which tries to use India as a counterbalance to China (Kakar, 2023).

Since full diplomatic ties between India and Israel were established in January 1992, the two countries' defense and security cooperation has dramatically increased. India requested Israeli security assistance even when full diplomatic relations were not yet established. The conflicts between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 were when this was most apparent. Two decades later, in the 1999 Kargil War, Israel provided the same weapons used in these wars, such as 160 mm mortars. Following 1992, the "defense and security cooperation" has served as the main tenet of the India-Israel strategic alliance. Israel has provided India with cutting-edge equipment to help with the modernization of its armed forces and to fill urgent security needs. India had to look abroad for such equipment because the Indian defence industry was unable to meet these demands. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. India gradually increased the amount of defence products it bought from Israel, starting in 1996-1997 with the purchase of "Super Dvora" patrol boats and searcher Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), with the original contract dating back to 1996. The Kargil conflict led India into a strengthening ties with Israel. Moreover, India acquired important supplies, such as ammunition for its artillery guns. Since then, India has acquired a variety of weapons, including assault rifles, fire-control radars, missiles, and the Phalcon airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (Rajiv, 2022).

Over the past decade, the institutional engagement of the Indian military in nuclear planning and operations has become integral to New Delhi's endeavors in establishing a credible deterrent. While strides to enhance civil-military relations in the conventional domain have been gradual and intermittent, civilian leaders in India have adeptly instituted robust civil-

military institutions to oversee the nuclear arsenal. This integration involves the amalgamation of the military with the scientific entities that previously held sway over nuclear planning. Two seminal developments in this trajectory include the establishment of India's tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC) entrusted with executing nuclear operations. The formation of the Strategic Planning Staff (SPS). The latter is tasked with long-range planning and providing impartial advice, marking significant strides in consolidating the nexus between the military and strategic planning (Kampani , 2016).

The impending addition of the S-400 in India's arsenal signifies a cutting-edge upgrade. This system encompasses its entire performance envelope through the utilization of four different missiles and a multilayered radar tracking system. Upon installation along India's border with Pakistan, the S-400 will provide a substantial radar coverage of 600 km, enabling the interception of enemy missiles or aircraft 400 to 40 km outside of India's territory. Successful efforts between Russia and India include an agreement for nuclear-powered submarines and collaborative work on the fifth-generation T-50 (PAK-FA) fighter jet, intended to contest against US F-22 Raptor (Naveed A. , 2016).

Prospect of Pakistan initiating a conventional war is hindered by India's nuclear arsenal, both current and future. The primary war risk stems from terrorism originating in Pakistan. India's need for tactical nuclear weapons is contingent on its intention to invade Pakistani territory in response to terrorist attack that could prompt Pakistan to deploy its nuclear weapons. Presently, India's nuclear arsenal lacks reliable options for restricted use. Achieving feasibility and credibility for limited nuclear options would necessitate significant investments in military equipment, software, and various enabling capabilities. The influence of Indian tactical nuclear weapons on Pakistan's insurgent groups is doubtful, and the addition of nuclear power does not guarantee a resolution to this issue. The possibility of nuclear conflict could increase if India deploys Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in a future conflict on Pakistani soil. It is a common practice in India to disclose or discuss operational concepts or weapon systems publicly before their actual development, prompting Pakistan to establish new defenses in response (Dalton & Perkovich, 2016).

The predominant component of India's armed forces, the Indian Army, confronts imperatives of preparedness against an amalgamation of short to medium-term threats, spanning asymmetric, informational, and conventional domains. This imperative is underscored by the specter of nuclear coercion emanating from the western border and

protracted challenges originating from the northern front. In navigating a prospective "two-front war scenario," the Indian Army necessitates the cultivation of cross-spectrum capabilities, encompassing nuclear, conventional, and counter-sub-conventional warfare. This strategic paradigm seeks to establish both credible and punitive deterrence vis-à-vis potential adversaries. Given India's abstention from traditional military alliances, the preservation of military independence assumes paramount importance, serving as a barricade for strategic autonomy and the preservation of unity and territorial integrity. Consequently, the Indian Army's organizational scheme adopts a nuanced "two-and-a-half front" structure. Thereby developing conventional prowess for the Western and Northern Fronts, along with the requisite capacity to address the more diminutive "sub-conventional front" through strategic deployment. This strategic posturing is particularly pertinent as extant threats are chiefly characterized by conventional conflicts over disputed territorial boundaries and sub-conventional challenges, exemplified by insurgencies and cross-border terrorism (Compose , 2017).

In characterizing Pakistan as the United States' "most allied ally," historical precedence is accorded to the nation's pivotal role as a frontline-state during the Soviet’s assault of Kabul in 1979. Pakistan's influential contribution in composing the defeat and subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces during the subsequent Afghan jihad years underscores its strategic significance. The denouement of the Cold War did not diminish Pakistan's strategic centrality. The ascendancy of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the unforeseen repercussions of the Afghan jihad characterized by 9/11 attacks on American soil. This had pushed Pakistan into a prominent role within the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Persistently positioning Pakistan at the nexus of its regional strategy, the United States acknowledges the country's strategic relevance within the continually turbulent geopolitical location of the region. Unexpectedly, however, the militaristic tenor of Pakistan's engagement has impeded the trajectory of democratic governance and institutional accountability. The disproportionately influential role of the Pakistani Army has eclipsed other state institutions, resulting in an overly fortified military establishment at the expense of a nascent statecraft (Behuria & Kumar, 2013).

Over the course of its evolution, India's deterrence strategy has predominantly centered on denial tactics, strategically devised to diminish an adversary's capacity to inflict substantial harm. This is achieved through fostering resilience and the subsequent deployment of force in response. Addressing the Munich Security Forum, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval articulated a commitment to India's deterrence systems with adaptability. This adaptability is

envisioned to accommodate unusual actors, emergent forms of warfare, and dynamic operational scenarios. The contemporary administration has actively sought to project assertiveness, exemplified by cross-border operations against rebels along the Indo-Myanmar border, the execution of "surgical strikes" across the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the Indian Army's resistance at Doklam, and the preemptive air strikes carried out by the Indian Air Force at Balakot (Subramaniam, 2023).

1.10 Literature Gap

To analyze the above literature, many scholars and academicians have illustrated various aspects of conventional, sub conventional, strategic developments, defense ties and superiority of India. Certainly, Pakistan fills the gap at strategic domain, unfortunately, conventional lack in comparison to India still exists. India has been conventionally growing rapidly, as such, advanced military equipment, submarines, roadway coverage, railway coverage, infrastructure, securing border with air bases and its naval basis, external defense ties with modern nations. Besides, on the very edge of the country ensures water security from any external threats. The country's leadership is keen to expend its military ties and defense collaboration internationally in the coming years. Modi's regime placed a high priority on strengthening India's conventional armed forces and steadily increased military spending.

India's desire to dominate South Asia has long been a source of concern for Pakistan, but now it also worries India's overwhelming conventional military advantage. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that Pakistan is accelerating the development and production of nuclear weapons; as of right now, it has 110–130 or more warheads, which is even more than India. India has taken note of Pakistan's nuclear development and will do whatever it takes to protect its own national interests. And because India has consistently sought to dominate South Asia, which has led to Pakistan's ongoing growth. Particularly since the Modi administration took office, India has expressed a desire to lead not only the South Asian continent but the entire world. As Modi assumed office, he put forth the notion of "making the 21st century the century of India." The "Great Power Dream" has significantly increased India's military might. Global Firepower data from 2019 shows that Pakistan is now ranked 17th and India is currently ranked 4th. However, certain failure of India being a responsible state could have triggered a war between the nuclear powers as far as the misadventure of Indian-BrahMos in March, 2022 is concerned. Including, the frequent theft incidents of uranium would probably be used by non-state actors against any country. This

would have serious repercussions beyond the border, if the missile incidents and thefts continued in the years to come. It has been widely neglected that Pakistan conventional capabilities yet challenges Indian advanced conventional forces as far as the case of the befitting reply of Pakistan exists in the course of history. Yet, Pakistan must not undermine the external determinants that are helping India to grow conventionally and as well politically. Pakistan needs to revisit its foreign policy again in every domain to balance India traditionally and militarily. The gap undermines that Pakistan lacks conventional capabilities because of its not-working foreign policy and cripple economy in international domain. Pakistan's conventional capabilities would grow if it does not only rely on Chinese cooperation. In the sphere of diplomacy, Pakistan needs to maintain its roots with West also for years to come and growing challenges to overcome.

1.11 Theoretical Framework

In examining Indian arms forces conventional superiority through the lens of its security implications for Pakistan. The neorealism theory proposed by Kenneth Waltz explains the evolving dynamics of conventional development, impacting Pakistan's security specifically and holding broader regional consequences due to the anarchic nature or structure of international relations. India and Pakistan, with their extensive history of wars and political discord, exemplify the complicated geopolitical landscape. In this context, the global arena has observed significant conventional advancements in India's military, encompassing both conventional and strategic domains. Neorealism underscores the notion that a state's developments can pose a substantial threat to the security of other states, summarizing the concept of a "security dilemma."

The maximization power equilibrium between India and Pakistan is undeniably skewed due to inherent asymmetries in power relations. Attempts at maintaining amicable relations with both nations often encounter uncertainty, leading to a lack of trust from either side. Under conditions of imbalance and uncertainty, Pakistan seeks external assistance to counterbalance India, presenting a complex challenge in reconciling both sides without external intervention. Stakeholders involved must take a stance and objectively assess the gravity of the situation to advance their respective regional interests.

Neorealism theorizes that states consistently seek opportunities to maximize power, creating hegemony to assert superiority over weaker states in the region by expending strategic and diplomatic ties. Certainly, India's strategic affiliations with the US, Israel and Russia

exemplify a pursuit of power maximization through strategic alliances. Strategic trade, involving the sale and purchase of arms with other nations, serves as a means to establish regional hegemony. India's engagement in surgical strikes and support to sub-conventional forces in Pakistan has resulted in heightened instability and terrorism. The military initiatives constitute a pivotal step in the strategic partnership between India and Israel, driven by events such as the 1999 Kargil crises, the 9/11 attacks, and subsequent terrorist incidents (Tellis, 2013).

The escalating Sino-Pakistan alliance in the IOR-region has heightened Delhi's apprehensions, prompting a quest for technological superiority over Pakistan. The deep strategic ties between India, Israel, and Russia underscore significant conventional imbalances between India and Pakistan. The collaborative arms trade, estimated at around $10 billion over the past decade, exemplifies the depth of defense partnerships between India and Israel, contributing to the prevailing conventional imbalances in the region.

The tenets of neorealism depict states' endeavors to secure themselves. The conflicts inferred from these presumptions are portrayed as tragedies wherein security-seeking states are compelled to engage in hostilities against their will. However, the theory does not offer justification for security-seeking states to resort to aggression, despite the disorder in the international system and uncertainties about other states' intentions and capabilities. While anarchy fosters mistrust and survival anxiety, it does not provide a rationale for states to initiate hostilities despite profound security concerns. Fear, according to Jack Donnelly, is essentially a defensive motive, focused on preserving existing conditions rather than acting aggressively and preventively (Donnelly, 2013).

In essence, the application of neorealism serves to analyze the implications of Indian conventional superiority on Pakistan's security and the broader regional dynamics. It provides a theoretical framework to comprehend the intricate interplay of power dynamics and security concerns in the South Asian context.

In a nutshell, the theory of neorealism illustrates the study and will be applied as a theoretical framework. Globally admitted anarchic international system and peace under the anarchic order is not durable as security interest varies. The quest for enhancing security of India and Pakistan resulted and drag the region into an unending arm race. Defense ties and collaboration of India beyond the region expresses the close diplomatic and strategic dependency and trustworthiness with other nations. In response, Pakistan unanimously fills the

gap of balancing India by credible conventional and strategic forces but yet needs to rebalance assertiveness in certain manner for any unfortunate events. However, the purpose of the applying neorealism is to meet the debate of superiority of one state and its implications on other state besides it will enable the researcher to meet the objectives and research questions.

1.12 Research Methodology

The present study adopts a qualitative, exploratory and analytical method. The qualitative research approach is chosen to gather and analyze information derived from diverse sources such as interviews, official documents, books, and research papers. This selection is based on the inherent strengths of the qualitative approach, which allows a comprehensive investigation of the subject matter by incorporating various perspectives from stakeholders and experts. The qualitative methodology proves valuable in offering nuanced insights into the research questions. To effectively analyze the gathered data, the study employs analytical analysis, a technique focused on identifying and examining ideas or arguments within qualitative data. This method involves the transcription and thorough analysis of the data to draw meaningful conclusions. The qualitative research methodology serves the implications stemming from India's conventional and strategic arms buildup, particularly as they relate to the security paradigm of Pakistan.

1.13 Research Design

The thesis will utilize a qualitative research method, incorporating both primary and secondary data to thoroughly investigate the intricate dynamics of the Indian conventional arms buildup and its implications for Pakistan's security. The data collection process will align with the qualitative method's exploratory and analytical approach, facilitating a comprehensive exploration of the subject matter.

1.14 Data Collection

The study will make use of both primary and secondary data. Interviews with subject-matter experts as well as official documents and government speeches will make up the primary data. In order to analyses the Indian arm forces conventional superiority and its implications for Pakistan’s security (2013-2023), researcher concentrates on existing knowledge or secondary data. For the purpose of this study, secondary data will be gathered from a variety of sources including government reports, published institutional reports, articles, thesis, books, and online sources. The selection of secondary data will be based on its reliability and quality.

1.15 Data Analysis

The study will be explorative and analytical, whereas, primary documents would be analyzed through content analysis approach. Secondary data of content analysis will be made through literature available. Findings and conclusions would be created and based on the content analysis.

1.16 Operational Definitions of Major Terms

Conventional Superiority: Conventional threats are typically defined as military threats that a country faces from another country that affects its trade, marine region under its control, or sovereign integrity in accordance with international law, which is governed by a number of national and international regulations.

Strategic Arms: The term "strategic weapons system" refers to any weapons system specifically designed to target an adversary at the core of their military, economic, or political strength. In practical terms, this involves the destruction of significant strategic target of vital socio-political and eco importance like major cities, factories, vital bridges, military installations, lines of communication and transportation, as well as the central seat of government.

Security Implications: The profound evolution of a neighboring state significantly influences the security paradigm of the adjacent state.

1.17 Ethical Consideration

The thesis, titled "Indian Armed Forces Conventional Superiority: Analyzing Its Security Implications for Pakistan Security (2013-2023)," is an independent research effort conducted by the researcher. The work is not derived from or attributed to the research of others. Proper references and a comprehensive bibliography will be provided at the end of the thesis, affirming the authenticity and originality of the researcher's work.

1.18 Organization of the Study

This research thesis is comprised of the following chapters and conclusion

Chpater-1: Introduction

This chapter includes thematic understanding and conceptual underpinnings of the subject matters along theoretical framework.

Chapter-2- India-Pakistan Conventional Asymmetries

This chapter analyzes the conventional asymmetries of India and Pakistan in all domains. i.e. Land, Air and Sea.

Chapter-3: India-Pakistan Conventional Symmetries

This chapter analyzes the Pakistan and India symmetrical conventional capabilities.

Chapter-4: Implications for Pakistan

This chapter analyzes the implications towards Pakistan over the asymmetrical conventional capabilities.

Conclusion

This chapter provides the conclusive findings and recommendations of the topic under investigation and direct the subject matter towards objective understanding.

2 CHAPTER TWO

INDIA-PAKISTAN CONVENTIONAL ASYMMETRIES

Military doctrines integrate and encourage armed forces to achieve strategic objectives while also serving as a war prevention tool through credible deterrence. However, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and access to modern technologies has fundamentally transformed the character of warfare, adding layers of complexity. This strategic shift has resulted in the diversification of sub-conventional warfare in the India-Pakistan context, blurring the line between war and peace. Non-contact combat has gained importance in Indo-Pak competition, however both governments continue to prefer traditional military techniques while engaged in sub-conventional battles. Furthermore, this asserts that the compatibility of conventional military doctrines with the changing nature of combat is uncertain, which requires deeper research (Khan A. , 2024).

2.1 The South Asian Military Balance

After examining the structural and environmental factors that would influence military operations and, as a result, conventional deterrence, this examines the relationship of forces between India and Pakistan. Accounting for the amount and types of weapons systems in a state's arsenal, commonly referred to as "bean counting," is insufficient for estimating a state's military capability or potential. However, when used in conjunction with assessments of a military's skill and taking into account the technical sophistication of the platforms in question, force structure is an essential component of any assessment. This is especially true in this case, as a number of commentators have stated that India's expanding lead in both numbers and sophistication of weapons systems is fueling Pakistan's interest in tactical nuclear weapon (Khan Z. , 2020).

2.2 Growing Conventional Asymmetries: South Asian Debate

India spends seven to eight times as much on defense as Pakistan does, which explains why it has more conventional troops. For instance, India spent $40 billion on defense overall in the 2015–2016 fiscal year. This amount has increased in the years that have followed. In addition, India has emerged as one of the global leaders in the purchase of sophisticated conventional armaments; with the assistance of technology acquired from France, Israel, and other key countries, it is building a strong ballistic missile defense system. With the support of night vision cameras, it intends to build new aircraft carriers, purchase helicopters, upgrade

existing aircraft, and develop several additional state-of-the-art conventional force capabilities. This might place it in a favorable position, enabling it to defeat the terrorists by launching limited offensive attacks against regions of Pakistan. India believes that by approaching from the other side of the border and holding onto territory for diplomatic reasons, it can achieve its military and political objectives. India neutralizes South Asia's growing conventional forces imbalance by using its advanced conventional forces to tip the scales in favor of itself. This puts pressure on Pakistan to modernize its conventional forces or rely on nuclear weapons. How this might undermine South Asia's strategic stability. It is necessary to further unpack at least two major conventional force imperatives that India has embarked on developing in order to understand why the CSD and the BMD advanced conventional force capability could further exacerbate conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan and how these developments could, as many in Pakistan believe, jeopardize the strategic stability of South Asia (Mason, 2016).

2.3 Cold Start Doctrine: India’s conventional Force Component

Indian army chief after commencing the command of India “General Bipin Rawat” told India Today that "Cold Start doctrine exists for conventional military operations." He further added that "weaknesses can only be overcome if you accept the strategy." You will allow your weaknesses to constrain you if you reject the plan. India's long-standing ambiguity surrounding the use of conventional force, shielded by the unapproved CSD, is now openly acknowledged. It intensifies concerns that India would use assertive conventional military adventurism against Pakistan. Additionally, it gives India a reason to project conventional strength against all other South Asian nations. Such a plan is not surprising, since the majority of Pakistanis mistakenly think that the Indian army has been developing its CSD for a considerable amount of time (Gady F. S., 2019).

A significant change in India's nuclear and conventional military posture towards Pakistan is noteworthy, regardless of the army's actual attainment of this capacity. The use of the CSD might result in a nuclear arms race that would be disastrous for all parties involved and result in no one winning. It may be argued that terrorism is an indictment of Indian leadership, and that an act of terrorism could trigger a serious crisis within India. This kind of crisis might result in a significant interstate disaster and would be more dangerous than the CSD. Academics should investigate this particular component of the CSD in relation to terrorism, particularly whether India's military doctrine needs to be developed for the purpose of fighting limited war against Islamabad. Besides, India should consider creating a counter-

terrorism strategy that is more effective than the CSD. This could involve fighting terrorism inside India rather than resorting to using the CSD, which could have unfavorable effects on South Asian deterrence and stability (Khan Z. , 2020).

2.4 BMD Program-Shield and Sword

The Pakistani centric approach of India's BMD's is double-layered designed comprised of sea and land based interceptors. Hence, with the multiple layers, the initial one is named as "Prithvi Air Defence" (PAD) and followed is named as "Advanced Air Defence (AAD). The acquisition was introduced in response to the threat posed by Pak-China collaboration. Low-altitude interceptions are handled by the AAD, whereas high-altitude interceptions are handled by the PAD. A variety of tracing locations, radars, and C2 posts support for both tiers. Only five nations now have BMD systems in place: the US, Russia, China, Israel, and India. With the development and testing of missiles such as the "Prithvi, Akash, Long Range SAM, Quick Reaction-SAM (QR SAM), and Medium Range-SAM" of India has become fairly self-sufficient in BMDs. India's BMD program is based on these interceptor missiles, as well as additional assets and supporting infrastructure. India has also developed the nuclear triad, which consists of nuclear weapon delivery capabilities based on land, air, and sea. India's BMD is essentially multiple layered which protects against inbound hostile enemy aerial targets up to 5,000 km in range. This intercepting action can be carried out during any one of the trajectory of launch of the hostile missile when it comes to approaching ballistic missiles (Khan & Saeed, 2020).

2.5 The First-Second Layer

The Prithvi Air Defence System, situated on land, forms the foundation of the Indian BMD shield. This system is designed to shoot down enemy missiles that approach from a great height. According to a number of publicly accessible sources, it ranges between "50 and 80 kilometers. While Delhi focuses to improve the PADs altitude capability above 180 kilometers. India will benefit greatly from this in order to better defend itself against any incoming missiles from the Chinese mainland. An "exo-atmospheric kill" is when an enemy missile is destroyed outside of the earth's atmosphere by this technology. Besides, the AAD, it was intended for interception up at lower altitudes to 15 to 50 km, is the second layer of the Indian BMD system. When an enemy missile enters the earth's atmosphere, the AAD can intercept it, and named as 'endo-atmospheric kill'. There are not many details regarding this second phase in the public domain because it's still in the development stage. India is currently attempting to enable both

endo- and exo-atmospheric kills with the PAD and AAD. Moreover, the Indian Navy and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) successfully tested sea-launched interceptor missile on April 23, 2023, marking the most recent advancement in the Phase-2 BMD. With the passing of this test, India has once more joined the select group of nations possessing sea-based BMD capability (Wankhede, 2024).

2.6 India's Strategic Force Modernization

It is impossible to ignore India's conventional force expansion when examining South Asia's strategic environment. Due to their historical differences, Pakistan was compelled to embrace a "First Use" nuclear posture. The Indian arm forces are rapidly modernizing and introducing a number of significant offensive weaponry. The Shivalik and Talwar classes of frigates and the Kolkata class destroyers were delivered to the Indian Navy (IN) in commission. These ships, which have "anti-air-ship" with installation of ground assault, are regarded as cutting edge capability. Six Kalvari-class submarines, a conventional submarine version developed in France, are being introduced by the nation into the submarine fleet. Besides, Indian navy procured US-made Boeing long range maritime patrol aircraft, this, considered as most advanced advancement of IN. The nation is modernizing its armored units in the Army domain by introducing brand-new T-90 tanks from Russia. In addition, Korean technology added its potential to the Indian conventional capabilities, such as, M-777, an ultra-light 155mm howitzer and advanced artillery system like K-Vajra. These would certainly improve the IBGs' ability to launch CSD against Pakistan through offensive and striking capabilities. New strike and support systems were introduced by the Indian Air Force (IAF). Besides, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars and Meteor beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles introduced into the IAF, five French Dassault Rafale jets can launch much more powerful offensives. Additionally, the US supplied the service with CH-47 Chinook transport helicopters, AH-64E Apache assault helicopters, and C-17 Globmaster strategic transport aircraft (Tahirkheli, 2022).

2.7 Indian Armed Forces: Its Transformation

2.7.1 Indian Army: Modern Perspective

It is dangerous to wage a conventional war in South Asia after the overt nuclearization. Indian strategic thinking has been centered on waging a small-scale, swift, high-intensity war since 2004 in an attempt to discourage Pakistan from supposedly aiding the rebels fighting for freedom in Indian-held Kashmir. The doctrine of the Indian military has shifted from the

Sundarji's Doctrine of deeper thrusts to CSD, which contrasts with their modernization. To carry out limited operations beneath Pakistan's nuclear threshold, the Indian army recognized striking units into an "Integrated Battle Group (IBG)" in 2018 and developed a land warfare doctrine that strives for rapid, and fierce restricted combat with adaptable forces. Therefore, given that given that both governments possess nuclear weapons, a full-scale confrontation, it is not impossible for there to be limited fighting in South Asia, the modernization of the Indian Army is consistent with its strategic maneuvering in the region. Ladwig and Vipin Narang claim that India might not be able to fully operationalize its aggressive CSD against Pakistan at this time. Nevertheless, the Indian arm forces would be undoubtedly be able to operationalize its constrained and close any gaps as a result of the fast military development war doctrine against Pakistan (Choudhary, 2024).

2.7.2 Acquisition of T-90: Quick Maneuvers

The T-90 Main Battle Tanks (MBT) is held by the Indian military as the groundwork of any forceful mission. It is assessed that around 124 home-fabricated Arjun tanks, 1,950 T-72 tanks, and 900 T-90 tanks with improved night vision capacities are worked by the arm powers. Furthermore, with Russia for 464 T-90 MBTs, valued at US$2 billion has been placed in order. The India's arm forces would have more outreach and an offensive punch, thanks to these tanks. At the moment, an arm forces have eighteen regiments of battle-tanks operating in the Punjab and Rajasthan areas for operations specific to Pakistan. Indian intends to replace all of its aging tank regiments with T-90S units by 2020. Besides, the 125 mm gun on the T-90 is capable of firing a variety of rounds, including shrapnel, high explosives anti-tank (HEAT), and armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS). Additionally, it has anti-tank guided missiles, which can reach a target 4,000 meters away in 11.7 seconds. Helicopters traveling at low altitudes up to five kilometers can be brought down. With its deadly weaponry and exceptional mobility in the plains and deserts, the T-90 tank defeats Pakistan with all these attributes (Gady F. S., 2019).

2.7.3 Race for Anti-Tank Guided Missiles

In order to impede the progress of enemy armor, mechanized troops, armored personnel carriers, etc., anti-tank missiles are essential. The majority of nations extends its dependency on "anti-tank missiles" in contemporary warfare to prevent the enemy's swiftly moving MBTs from making narrow or profounder incursions into their territory. There is now a severe anti-tank missile shortage inside the Indian Army. A report claims that the Indian Army is short on

850 distinct types of launchers and 68,000 ATGMs. It is anticipated that in 2021–2022, indigenous production could begin. Moreover, the Delhi intends to procure its 44 motorized infantry units and 382 infantry battalions with third- and fourth-generation ATGMs. Appreantly, it might take a few years to close operational deficiencies in this area. To prevent the misadventures on the soil of Islamabad, to this, Pakistan has already deployed third-generation ATGMs. Moreover, Pakistan can upgrade its MBTs with advanced characteristics, such as night vision, increased agility, thick armor, and increased firepower, to solve the issue of Indian ATGMs in the future (Dubey, 2017).

While China and Pakistan are already working together to produce advanced HJ-8 ATGMs. However, the Chinese military has also deployed the upgraded HJ-12 ATGM, which can pierce the heavy armor of the most sophisticated MBT, including the Russian T-90S and the American M1 Abrams. This ATGM is a nightmare for moving tanks or APCs because it can also destroy targets at a distance of roughly 2.5 miles and has fire and forget features. As stated by Philipp, Pakistan may easily prevent the Indian Army from engaging in any coercive operations and limited or deep thrusts with its advance T-90S MBTs or other mechanized troops, especially with the expected induction of HJ-12 in the future (Khattak & Kundi).

2.7.4 Artillery: Dhanush 155 mm

Delhi has acquired the "Dhanush," an indigenous 155 mm/45 calibre artillery cannon. Certainly, this will be more accurately in taking out targets that are farther away. This cannon has extremely sophisticated computational and electronic technologies installed. Manohar Parrikar, the former Indian defennce Minister, declared says Dhanush artillery has effectively fulfilled all technical requirements. The addition of Dhanush will bolster India's aging artillery capabilities as its gun boasts a range of approximately 38 km, equaled to current Bofors weapons' 27 km. The Pakistani soldiers stationed at the line of communication or international border will face significant challenges from such advanced artillery (Arthur, 2024).

2.7.5 Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS)

The Indian Defence Research and Development (DRDO) Organization developed Dhanush artillery with a 155 mm/52.26 ATAGS caliber. These guns' advanced electronics and computing, extended range, lightweight design, and processing power will greatly benefit the Indian Army. ATAGS are intended for rugged, steep terrain such as that found around the LoC. India already owns heavy lift helicopters from the US that might be used to transport these

weapons. They will strengthen the Indian Army's offensive capabilities and increase its firepower (Siddique, 2024).

2.7.6 K9-Vajra 155 mm/52 Artillery Guns

In a defense deal with South Korea India has signed a contract under a US$720 million, arm forces of India are currently obtaining K9 Vajra 155 mm/52 caliber. This artillery gun has just conceded all trials and has a practical range of approximately 40 kilometers. The Indian arm forces would be having one hundred K9 Vajra rifles. In case of an attack against Pakistan, the K9 Vajra would uphold the Indian motorized troops and would give bound space fire help. Pakistan likewise needs to get long-range cannons batteries with further developed portability and capability to counter these progressions. In case of threats along the "Line of Control (LoC) or a worldwide boundary", Pakistan should moreover introduce "Weapon Finding Radars" to distinguish and focus on the Indian gunnery weapons (IAW) (Peri, 2022).

2.8 Indian Military: Transport and Logistics Capabilities

2.8.1 Hercules Transport Aircraft: C-130J

Indian arm powers obtained C-130J Hercules airplane to grow its essential arrive at in South Asia. Additionally, very complex US-made transport and planned operations airplane. It at present works five C-130J Hercules airplane, and it intends to procure six more later on. This transport airplane is utilized for extraordinary exercises like battling in unfriendly conditions and salvage missions in troublesome landscapes. The C-130J is equipped for drifting up to 26,000 feet with 20,227 kg of provisions, ammo, or other freight. The C 130-J can work a ways off of 1,956 miles and has a most extreme speed of 410 mph. Buying C-130 planes would extend the IAF's functional reach and ability to do strategic missions in severe weather conditions regardless of timetable imperatives (Peri, 2024).

2.9 Air Defence Systems: Procurement of Long Range

Since airpower is a fundamental element of both limited aims strategies neither as a stand-alone tool for conducting strikes against ground-based targets across the border. Or as a crucial enabler of a quick ground offensive to seize territory it makes sense to start our analysis with the air-to-air balance between India and Pakistan. In both the military and scholarly domains, the experience of contemporary militaries in combat since 1991 has given rise to the belief that modern airpower is genuinely transformative capability. In fact, among the disparities in military capability, some South Asian security experts think that India's stronger

airpower "is the most serious for conventional military and nuclear instability." But there's reason to think that in a limited war to capture territory and impact of advanced airpower on a ground battle will be less decisive. With 881 combat aircraft against its smaller rival Pakistan's 450. The Indian Air Force enjoys a 1.9:1 overall advantage over the Pakistan Air Force. The number of high-performance aircraft in the fleet, rather than the overall number of aircraft, provides the most accurate understanding of the capability disparity between the two fleets. If we use the term "modern aircraft" broadly, we mean all fighter aircraft of the fourth generation or beyond, which are multirole fighters with designs from the 1970s or later (Lee, Chistopher, & Bluth, 2019).

India may not be able to fully benefit from having more modern fighters in a shorter conflict than it would in a longer one, even if the IAF's numerical superiority would probably translate into domination over the PAF. Not all of India's front-line aircraft can be used against Pakistan in worse scenarios. Some must stay near the Chinese border to prevent Beijing from trying to ease pressure on its "all weather ally" or use crisis to resolve its own territorial disputes with India, while others may be limited by the quantity of airbases located within 1,000 kilometers of the border. Additionally, the Chinese border is there to make sure Beijing does not try to ease pressure on its "all weather ally" or use a crisis to resolve its own territorial problems with India. However, other factors might limit what can be done, such as the quantity of airbases located within 1,000 kilometers of the border (Lee, Chistopher, & Bluth, 2019).

2.9.1 Long-Range Air Defence System (LR-ADS): S-400

This would cause a strategic imbalance in South Asia and posed a challenge for Pakistan. It is capable of engaging 36 targets at the same time. This air defence system will allow the Indian arm forces to identify. Pakistan's airplane, rockets, drones a way off of about 600 km and obliterate them at 400 km, making Pakistan's flying corps very helpless to such an exceptionally present day air guard framework.

2.9.2 Barak-8

560 missiles and sixteen launchers would be provided to one regiment of the Indian Army. Additionally, India plans to equip the indigenously constructed aircraft carrier INS Vikrant with Barak-8 missiles. The goal of both nations is to provide the Barak-8 to nine Indian Air Force (IAF) units. The Barak-8 system has a 70–100 km range and can carry a warhead weighing around 60 kg at Mach-2 speed. It is an extremely sophisticated air defense system that surrounds costly resources and thwarts any aerial threat more quickly, accurately, and

precisely. Furthermore, there is already an arms race in the region between India and Pakistan, the two nuclear-armed enemies, as a result of the growing defence cooperation between the two countries and the rapid development of conventional and non-conventional military weaponry. This development is creating a vicious cycle of action and reaction because it makes finds Pakistan more challenging to uphold the traditional and strategic balance with India and to successfully counter the growing danger posed by the India-Israel defense collaboration (Sultana, 2021).

2.10 Indo-Pak Competition in the Air Defense Domain

The offensive doctrines of the Indian military demand flawless air defense to shield its aircraft against Pakistani aircraft or missiles. The IM (Indian military) intends to acquire extremely sophisticated air defense systems in order to disable the Pakistan Air Force and preserve aerial supremacy throughout the area. The acquisition of S-400 and Barak-8 long-range air defense systems by the Indian military would aid in the country's ability to maintain air superiority and instill confidence in the event of any mishap, such as CSD or surgical strikes. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan's planes, missiles, AWACS, and UAVs would be under danger from these capabilities. At a safe distance of roughly 400 kilometers, India would be able to identify and destroy Pakistan's aircraft assets. Pakistan, on the other hand, is unlikely to overlook these developments and would probably take decisive action to keep its long-range air defense capabilities on level with those of India. Despite lacking the 42 squadrons necessary to sustain air superiority over Pakistan in South Asia, the Indian Air Force is making a concerted effort to bridge the gap and acquire contemporary aircraft from French, Russian, or other suppliers in order to preserve its lead. Because Pakistan currently lacks long-range air defense systems to support the IAF's stand-off capabilities, if these capabilities are in place, the IAF will feel more confident to carry out limited war against Pakistan (Khan A. , 2024).

2.10.1 Procurement of SU-30 MKI Aircraft

Multi-mission SU-30MKI airplane, which can convey many sorts of warheads, is a significant resource of the Indian Flying corps. The IAF works around "200 SU-30MKI airplane, and it has set for extra 53-airplanes" with Russia's military modern complex. With its devastating weapons, sophisticated avionics and SU-30 is a multirole aircraft. It is outfitted with 150 rounds of ammo for a 30mm Gsh-30-1 cannon. The SU-30 is a 3,000 km effective range aircraft designed for air superiority. The Indian military's use of this aircraft will be crucial to any offensive plan. The PAF will examine its alternatives and plans more carefully

due to the capabilities of the Rafale and the Indian government's confidence in those capabilities in particular. Failure might put it in a bad situation if anything like to what happened in Balakot occurs again. In addition to Rafales, Pakistan will need to consider how the IAF will use them in conjunction with other aircraft, particularly the Su-30 MKI, Tejas Mk-1/MK-2, and S-400 air defense system. With the purchase of cutting-edge and potent weaponry, Pakistan will work to alter India's potential perception of Pakistan as an easy target (Ali S. , 2021).

2.10.2 Induction of Dassault Rafael Aircraft

Under an agreement worth US$8.7 billion India has interest for acquisition of 36 Rafael aircraft from Paris. Rafael can travel up to 1,915 km/h at its fastest and can carry various warheads at 1,850 km. In addition, Rafael has Nexter-30mm DEFA 791B cannon, with a maximum firepower of 2,500 rounds per minute, and a dual gun pod installed. Rafael would enable India to conduct both close-quarters and long-range operations against Pakistan (Kaushik, 2023).

2.10.3 C-17 Globe-master-III Aircraft

At a cost of US$4.1 billion, it purchased ten Globe-master planes from US defense company Boeing to increase its capacity to provide vital supplies, food, ammunition, reinforcements, and logistics during a fight in difficult terrain or at high altitudes. The C-17 can transport 150 soldiers and their whole kit, weighing 80 tons in total. The Indian military's ability to transport and operate logistically would be enhanced with the acquisition of C-17 aircraft, which would also provide it more offensive power to conduct operations inside Pakistan or across the Line of Control (Panda, 2019).

2.10.4 Chinook Heavy Lift Multi-Purpose Helicopters

India and the US have inked an agreement for India to purchase fifteen extremely advanced “Chinook helicopters for US$833 million”. The multi-mission Chinook helicopters are primarily used for specific activities, such as the weather-appropriate delivery of supplies, ammunition, and logistics. The addition of Chinook helicopters would improve the Indian military's capacity to deliver weaponry, supplies, and Special Forces rapidly and agilely in challenging circumstances, enabling them to accomplish goals outlined in their limited war doctrines. For the Indian military's planned specialized operations, these helicopters are essential. Future conflicts in the strategic context of South Asia would involve small-scale,

fast-moving, high-intensity operations against an opponent in order to acquire tactical advantages and create an element of surprise (Economic TImes, 2022).

2.10.5 Apache Attack Helicopter

India wants to operate quickly and efficiently under the cover of nuclear power, but it lacks the agility and speed necessary to carry out the proactive military strategy. In order to enhance its military's maneuverability and firepower, it has agreed to pay US$2.5 billion to acquire 22 Apache helicopters. India needs this aircraft in order to put its aggressive military concepts into practice. The most-deadly machine in the world, the Apache is outfitted with automatic guns, hellfire missiles, 70 mm rockets, and night vision capabilities. For any swift and furious operations against Pakistan, the Apache would provide the Indian ground forces with more agility and firepower (Sankalan, 2021).

2.11 Indo-Pak Race: Acquisition for Gunship Helicopters

Helicopters equipped with essential gunship component of any rapid and efficient military plan. Proactive military actions, or fast thrusts under CSD, are the focus of the Indian military. The Indian military and political establishment emphasized their commitment to executing surgical strikes on a regular basis. Greater coordination and integration between the air force and the ground forces, close air support from highly developed gunship helicopters, and deadly weaponry to instill fear in the opposing forces are all necessary for such missions. In order to preserve its leadership in this field, the Indian government has completed significant defense agreements with the United States to acquire extremely advanced Apache helicopters. Pakistan was forced to purchase advanced helicopters from China, Russia, the US, and Turkey in order to maintain conventional parity with the introduction of Apache helicopters of India in south Asia (Khattak M. U., 2019).

2.11.1 Chinese Z-10 Thunderbolt Helicopter

In 2015, China and Pakistan began integrating Z-10 gunship aircraft, which are meant to replace the aging US Cobra helicopters. Originally, Pakistan brought-in Z-10 "Thunderbolt" helicopters in 2015 to bolster Army aviation's offensive capability and close operational gaps. The HJ-10 anti-tank missile and 23mm chain gun capable to fire around 600 shells in a minute. Besides, the US Apache-Gunship helicopters and Z-10 Thunderbolt helicopters are said to be interchangeable. These helicopters are well renowned for their improved speed and dexterity in close quarters combat situations. They also have night vision capabilities. In addition to

enhancing strategic relations between the two countries, Pakistan would be better able to maintain credible conventional deterrence against any military threats with close collaboration of China (Khattak M. U., 2019).

2.11.2 The Induction of Russian Mi-35 Gunship Helicopter

A significant addition to this were Russian Mi-35 Helicopter, in 2015, Pak-Russia agreed to purchase four Mi-35 helicopters. The Mi-35 is a multi-mission helicopter designed for specialized tasks in inclement weather and difficult terrain. It sometimes referred as a "flying tank" due to the various equipped ammunitions. Additionally, equipped with advanced missiles and night vision capabilities this gunship aircraft can obstruct the enemy's mechanized forces without waiting for any amount of time. The Russian Gunship can go up to 310 km/h and has a powerful range of roughly 460 km. The Mi-35 is a deadly aircraft in the air thanks to these attributes (Gady F. S., 2018).

2.12 Indian Navy Maritime Dominance

Delhi is aggressively modernizing fleet to close operational deficiencies in its ability to wage maritime warfare. The Indian Navy's primary combat zones are the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. It has shaped three maritime orders at "Vishakhapatnam, Kochi, and Mumbai" to keep up with command over these locales. The Indian Sea will be the focal point of an arising international rivalry among China and India," predicts Unforgiving V. Gasp. To offset Delhi. Pakistan appears to have chosen to cooperate with Beijing. As a result, India has set aside a minimum of $8 billion to update its naval fleet. Since 90% of India's trade is done by sea, the country's governments have been forced to keep a sizable navy in order to defend its maritime interests and assert its dominance in the nautical world. In addition to more over 250 aircraft and 16 submarines, it maintains 171 warships. India intends to retain three aircraft carriers by 2020 in order to preserve its dominance in maritime. South Asia consists of just one country “India” that possess an aircraft carrier (Hassan, 2019).

However, the Indian Navy also intends to construct five nuclear submarines, giving it greater mobility and ensuring that it can launch a second attack against Pakistan and China in the future. Sagarika-K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a 3,500 km range would be mounted on these nuclear submarines. This will increase India's capacity to launch strikes against Pakistan and bolster its offensive capabilities. In addition to nuclear submarines, India and France are discussing a contract for the purchase of US$3.5 billion worth of highly developed Scorpene submarines that are outfitted with cutting-edge weapons and

technology. For dominance in the IOR, these submarines have an advanced command and control system, a superior detection range, and stealth capabilities (Khan & Khan, 2021).

2.13 Counter Balancing by Pakistan

Indian navy, however, has received billions of dollars from the Indian government in an effort to maintain conventional superiority in the Indian Ocean Regions (IORs). As for now, Indian Navy contemporary has one aircraft carrier in service and expects the addition. Certainly, the addition of nuclear submarines to Indian Navy would have tremendous influence on Pakistan's maritime ambitions. In addition, "P8I anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft warships" equipped with long-range SLBs, including Stealth Frigates. Additionally, Pakistan has a smaller but nonetheless strong naval force in the Arabian Sea that it can use to defend its interests in the region's maritime resources and coastal areas. In order to counterbalance the Indian Navy's maritime superiority and safeguards its maritime interests Pakistan has transformed a conventional submarine. Moreover, nuclear-tipped Babur-III cruise missile with a 700-kilometer range, besides, formed the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC). Pakistan is now capable of a second strike, although, the low range of cruise missiles and the limited endurance of conventional submarines preclude the assertion of second-strike capabilities. This capability would surely enhance second strike capability for Pakistan. Strategic thinker expressed his belief that the Babur-III test will yield a temporary solution, stating that it is not the final answer. In addition, Long-range missiles, especially SLBMs, are the best option since they can carry larger payloads than cruise missiles (Khattak & Kundi, 2019).

Pakistan's strategic considerations primarily shape its marine interests. Pakistan's prosperity and economic improvement can be greatly hindered by any disruption to its energy transit and maritime trade, which are vital to the country. Through its seaports, Pakistan conducts about 97% of its trade. Three major ports are located in Pakistan: Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim. It is critical to maintain maritime order in order to handle future problems. Pakistan views the protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOCs), territorial seas, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and coastline as essential to the country's oceanic refuge. Seaborne trade is anticipated to increase in volume significantly in the future. Unfortunately, the range and intensity of threats, such as piracy, maritime terrorism, drug trafficking, gun running, human smuggling, pollution, accidents, and interstate conflicts, are predicted to rise along with traffic. The primary concern regarding the threats to Pakistan's maritime interests is

the growing Indian influence and growing naval might in the Indian Ocean. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan do not share the same interests when it comes to marine partnership. There are 153 surface ships, 19 submarines, and 55,000 troops in the Indian Navy (Khattak & Kundi, 2019).

2.14 Network Centric and Electronic Warfare Capabilities

2.14.1 Battlefield Surveillance Radars (BFSRs)

Short-range BFSRs have been developed by the DRDO to identify several targets in a given area. BFSR weighs about 15 kg and is very portable. Targets such as low-flying helicopters, small and heavy war vehicles, and a group of creeping troops can all be detected, tracked, and classified by this radar. In the Indo-Pak setting, these skills are critical for inadequate or distinct maneuvers (Kanwal , 2018).

2.14.2 The Weapon Locating Radar-(WLR)

To decide the area and scope of Pakistan's gunnery, mortar adjusts, and short-range rocket locales way off of approximately 50 km. India has created and set four WLR at the LoC. General Rawat, India's military boss, stated "the WLR is being utilized broadly along the LoC. Parrikar added that Pakistan was unable to use artillery at the LoC because of these WLRs. Up to 99 weapon sites can be tracked by the WLR, which can exchange this information with a central command for countermeasures. The Indian Army's capacity for electronic warfare would jeopardize Pakistan's advantageous location along the border (Babur, 2020).

2.14.3 Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AeW&CS)

In 2017, India developed an “AeW&CS” named it "eye in the sky". This plane follows inbound Pakistan’s missiles, planes, UAVs. Its 240-degree coverage radar, the AeW&CS can detect incoming threats up to 200 kilometers away safely and provide the information to command centers so they can take preventative action. The creation of the “AeW&CS” would improve the IAF's reconnaissance competences and provide it with more room, litheness, and outreach to respond quickly to aerial threats (Mohammad & Sultan, 2021).

2.14.4 Army, Air Force and Navy: Spy Satellites

According to claims made by Vijay Kumar Saraswat, the previous Chief of the DRDO, India intends to add a few satellites per year in order to meet its tri-service requirements. In order to strengthen its marine surveillance capabilities in the IORs, the ISRO launched a second satellite, GSAT-7 (Rukmini). The GSAT-7 allegedly "seamlessly networked, 60 warships, 75”

planes during the Bay of Bengal's "Tropex" naval drill, which lasted for a month. Indian Navy, which employs space for missions connected to national security, strategy and introduction of GSAT-7 represents a major development. The GSAT-7, the Indian Navy would have 3,500–4,000 km footprint across the Indian Ocean Rim and would be able to network assets in real time both on land and sea. India introduced GSAT-6 for the Indian Army in 2015. For soldiers to operate in inclement weather and difficult terrain while maintaining safe and secure communications, it is thought that the GSAT-6 is essential. With its investment in space satellites, India will be able to improve the armed forces' observation and reconnaissance capabilities and get “real-time information about Pakistan's deployment and posture (Bommakanti, 2020).

2.14.5 Israeli Heron UAVs: Its Procurement

Since 2001, Indian arm forces has been enhancing its observational capabilities with Israeli assistance. It has sent UAVs into Pakistan to keep an eye on the movement and stationing of troops as well as purported fighters from Kashmir near the Line of Control. India placed an order for eighteen extremely advanced UAVs in 2003, totaling US$130 million. Delhi’s military was outclassed in the area of reconnaissance and surveillance by the extremely sophisticated Heron unmanned aerial vehicles. These UAVs could be deployed across the border for tactical and strategic tasks. Israeli Heron-TP is another significant addition to the Indian UAV squad. The endurance time of this drone is 45 hours. India has agreed to pay US$400 million for ten Heron-TP drones, which will presumably be used to launch missile strikes over the border to take aim at the rebels ' purported strongholds. Although Pakistan is capable of opposing these actions by the Indian military and launching counterattacks if necessary, the peace and security of the region would be at jeopardy in such a situation (Malhotra & Rammohan, 2017).

2.14.6 India’s Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capabilities: Pakistan’s Imbalance Approach

The information edge is important to modern combat. In a conflict, it would be evident that a nation with better surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities would be at an advantage over its foe. Pakistan is concerned about the Indian military's use of spy satellites, AWACS, and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to enhance its overall monitoring and reconnaissance capabilities. The Indian military would have information dominance in any battle with Pakistan thanks to these capabilities, which would strengthen its reconnaissance

capabilities. Indian surveillance satellites would pose a serious threat to Pakistan's strategic sites, military deployment patterns, and weapon movements. However, if the conventional gap widens in the future, India may choose to use a limited conflict or surgical strikes across the Line of Control or working boundary in order to take advantage of Pakistan's military's conventional weaknesses. Pakistan's nuclear deterrent would be severely strained in such a situation. In the future, Pakistan will have to mostly rely on nuclear weapons to offset conventional imbalance. But in the present era, Pakistan is successfully counteracting the conventional purchases made by the Indian military (Mohammad & Sultan, 2021).

2.14.7 Cruise missiles

The Nirbhay is a ground-launched cruise missile being developed by India. The missile bears resemblance to both the Pakistani Babur and the American Tomahawk, and it may have been designed for both air and sea deployment Despite several rumors to the contrary, neither US intelligence nor the Indian government believes the Nirbhay to be dual-capable. An April 2020 test of the Nirbhay cruise missile with an in-house propulsion system was rescheduled until August 2021. The test was partially successful, with the engine firing as intended but the delivery platform collapsing later. Early in 2020, the Defence Research and Development Organisation announced that other Nirbhay cruise missile variations, such as air- and submarine-launched versions, are in the early phases of planning and development (Kristensen & Korda, 2020).

2.15 A More Challenging Strategic Environment

With comparable adjustments or asymmetric alternatives, New Delhi must quickly stay up with new capabilities. However, the Defense Research and Development Organization, which is in charge of India's defense-industrial complex, has not been particularly innovative or flexible. Notable exceptions include its strong domestic missile program, which has produced a number of ballistic missiles and the BrahMos cruise missile in collaboration with Russia, and its adequate national technological base, which enables it to compete internationally in the cyber and space domains. Except for these specialized skills, however, India's domestic weaponry development and manufacturing which includes the Arjun tank, the Tejas aircraft, and even rifles and helmets has typically been marked by massive cost overruns, delays, and antiquated technology. Combat forces have had to eke out every last bit of resources. The Indian military continues to place less emphasis on conceptual or technological

innovation since the traditional offensive doctrine derives its fighting capability from the mass of majors conventional formations (Tarpore, 2020).

2.16 A Less Useful Force- Indian Orientated

The Indian military's utility as a tool of governing the country will wane. Of all the Indian military services, the army is still by far the biggest and best-funded, making up 57 percent of the defense budget (as opposed to 23 percent for the air force and 14 percent for the navy) and 85 percent of the total military strength (as opposed to 9 percent for the air force and 4 percent for the navy). The army's officer promotion system, which heavily favors officers from the combat arms especially infantry and artillery uses quotas to maintain a bias in favor of conventional offensive operations. The army's general staff organizes the force and controls doctrine, reflecting and upholding this combat weapons prerogative. Since at least 1965, the primary notion of victory in Indian military strategy has been punishment. According to this argument, India could repel aggression and prevent similar attacks in the future by making the adversary pay a heavy price, particularly by seizing some enemy land to use as leverage in peace talks after the war. Prior to diplomatic intervention ending the conflict, the Indian Army intended to do this in the 1999 war and had already done so in the 1965 and 1971 conflicts. It intends to use its Integrated Battle Groups and Mountain Strike Corps to carry out this task, which it anticipated doing during Operation Parakram. India has also used cost-imposition tactics in its military operations in order to avoid going to war. Both the Balakot attack and the post-Uri raid were depicted as attempts to impose penalties on the adversary terrorist networks in Pakistan to dissuade them from future attacks (Mason, 2016).

2.17 Problematic Scenario of Indian Arm Forces: Benefit for Pakistan

There are four main issues with India's punitive cost-imposition strategies and the ground-centric capabilities that underpin them. First, India is unlikely to be able to accomplish the necessary battlefield impacts against China or Pakistan given military balances. Most likely unable to take large areas of territory or decisively defeat enemy forces. India is unlikely to use military action to conquer Pakistan because, despite an increasing disparity in total national power, Pakistan maintains about equal strength in conventional military balances in Kashmir and Punjab and openly threatens with nuclear weapons. China has a growing military presence on India's border, with few strategically important targets within missile range of Indian ground forces, and the potential to launch missiles far into India's rear. Even if it were possible, a small-scale Indian ground invasion is not likely to force a Chinese surrender. China and Pakistan both

continue to fiercely opposed to India, possessing centralized military and political leaderships that are impervious to the kind of coercive pressure that India may apply (Khan K. , 2022).

Second, India's cost-imposition tactics are unlikely to stop its adversaries from continuing their sub-conventional provocations given its limited military might. China and Pakistan have not given up on their aggressive tactics because they are aware that Indian decision-makers must choose between everything and nothing. China is still using military force to compel neighboring governments, including India, along its land border, while Pakistan is still funding and leading terrorist networks hostile to India. Pakistan and China are both defensible. After the war in 1971, Pakistan was sufficiently intimidated to refrain from overt provocations in Kashmir for almost twenty years. Preliminary data indicates that Pakistan could still be effectively pressured today by a combination of international financial penalties, such as those imposed by the Financial Action Task Force. If India, for example, skillfully wields the threat of greater diplomatic and strategic alignment with the United States, China may be encouraged to lessen its coercive strategy. However, Indian military threats will not achieve these results, and they have not achieved these results despite repeated attempts (Tarapore, 2020).

Thirdly, these tactics carry a risk. India's punitive tactics have inadvertently encouraged its adversaries to adopt more provocative and unstable tactics of their own. Pakistan has incorporated tactical nuclear weapons into its military strategy as a reaction to the Cold Start doctrine. It has also repeatedly warned that it will not hold back from using nuclear force to exacerbate a situation. It's possible that Indian strategists and planners are creating a counterforce option to defang Pakistan's nuclear weapons ahead of time, maybe to prevent the danger of a nuclear attack by Pakistan. The vulnerabilities already present in India's conventional offensive doctrine would increase if a counterforce component of a cost imposition plan were to be implemented. This is especially true given that India's counterforce capabilities are still being developed and have not yet been shown. China has increased its border deployments in reaction to India's increasing military presence close to the Line of Actual Control. It also occasionally makes provocative incursions to try and change the status quo on the territory (Tarapore, 2020).

Fourth, the tactics of punitive cost-imposition are expensive. Establishing the ground forces necessary to inflict enough punitive damages on India's enemies is a massive and time-consuming task. A sizable army is required to guard long, contested borders and to conquer

and retain portions of enemy territory, according to the orthodox offensive doctrine, which aims to capture enemy land without giving up any Indian territory. Thus, in order to win a fiercely contested battlespace, a force structure centered on massive ground-holding formations is required, devoting resources that could be used for military modernization. In the Indian army, having a big number of personal has become a politically sensitive employment program for the government and a proxy measure of military prowess; their rising costs are eating up an ever-increasing share of India's defense budget. Although the army has acknowledged the need to reduce superfluous manpower and increase efficiency, the suggested solutions have only been minimal thus far. As a result, India's ability to project deterrence in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) is diminished by the doctrine, which comes at an opportunity cost. As long as the army prioritizes its traditional aggressive doctrine, the Indian military will not have the resources needed for much-needed modernization (Tarpore, 2020).

3 CHAPTER THREE

INDIA-PAKISTAN CONVENTIONAL SYMMETRIES

The Indian subcontinent is threatened by nuclear weapons since the overt nuclearization of Pakistan and India in 1998. The nuclear dimension of India-Pakistan relations has been affected by the long-standing competition between the two countries, which is fueled by historical grudges and geographical disputes. Pakistan has been on military excursions in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999 because of its perceived danger from India. If not, a more general strategic conclusion has been reached, according to which India is now conventionally superior due to its military modernization, which has been made possible by quick economic and technical advancements. Pakistan's defense build-up and nuclear strategy have been shaped by India's conventional military (Velangi & Bommakanti, 2025).

3.1 Pakistan's ability to counter Indian military strategy

India and Pakistan continue to engage in a limited conventional military conflict centered around the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The CSD discussions, both intellectual and strategic, have succeeded in making CSD into a political instrument and are now a crucial part of India's offensive Strategies. Because China uses cruise missiles for its anti-access-area denial (A2/AD) operations, topography and geography continue to be important factors in the design of any operational plan. This has also been a significant impediment to the US creating its Air-Sea Battle Doctrine (Khattak, Khan, & Qumbar, 2019).

3.2 The air defence and aerial aspect

Nevertheless, keeping in mind the parameters of the research, this missile system “S-400” is equipped to counter both ballistic and cruise missiles as well as high- and medium-altitude aircraft. It is not surprising in the slightest to have a missile that can intercept incoming ballistic missiles, fly at incredible speeds, be agile, and have seeker and guidance systems supported by radars for target acquisition. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) continues to obtain new missiles with stabilized flight-radars-sensors and accompanying equipment, along with an increase in the number of its batteries, it is likely that it will become increasingly challenging for it to operate in its own airspace and territory. Aerial tankers, transport, and airborne early warning and control systems, or AWACS, are used in a number of ways. One example is when this system is deployed close to Pakistan (Naseer, Khan, & Raza, 2022).

Since the deployment of Beyond-Visual-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (BVRAAM) to mislead homing missiles and air assets have started employing countermeasures such electronic jamming pods. The great range of the BVRAAMs has a major impact on airborne early warning-control systems. However, the PAF acquired Chinese-made SD-10 BVRAAMs and combat-tested AIM-20 “AMRAAMs” manufactured in the United States. These weapons effectively deny IAF Rafales the ability to effectively encounter the near Pakistani territory against any Indian aggression. But in terms of “avionics and advanced aircraft”, PAF has to think about buying the Russian-built Su-35, Chinese J-20 and J-31, or the Eurofighter Typhoon (Naseer, Khan, & Raza, 2022).

3.3 The missiles proportion

The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche once said that "the greatest weapon is another enemy" in order to defeat an opponent. While it is true that some modern weapons can be hazardous, one could argue that the best defense against them is a low-cost weapon. Some claim that the key to modern warfare is identifying and taking advantage of gaps and mismatches in the opponent's strength and defenses. Creveld claimed that the former could be created and bought for less than US$10,000, but curiosity got the better of him. Furthermore, others assert that the employment of low-cost or maybe asymmetrical weapons could instill significant fear in the minds and hearts of the adversary. German Beetles and other autonomous ground vehicles contributed to Germany's technological superiority (Ali M. Z., 2016).

Accordingly, cruise missiles are the best weapons to use against tanks and armored vehicles because they are also very cost-effective. There are many different types of payloads that cruise missiles can carry, including conventional, chemical, nuclear, and biological warheads. The technologies that cruise missiles provide, such as GPS, digital scene mapping with area correlator, and terrain contour matching, makes them extremely lethal and precise. A cruise missile's warhead's explosive radius can be increased or decreased. Pakistan's cruise missiles can be fired from a number of platforms, despite the fact that they travel significantly slower than sound. Pakistan possesses land-based cruise missiles such the Raad and Babur in addition to its air-launched missiles, which can be employed to neutralize and destroy opponent air defenses (M, B, & Johnson, 2017).

3.4 The ground Realities-T90 Tanks and MBT-2000

In the hands of a Rommel, Guderian or Patton, the Russian T-90S is a formidable and active weapon. With its enhanced firepower and speed, it could be unbeatable in combat. Due

to the unique topography, geology, geography, and climate of the Indo-Pak border regions, the T-90S enjoys a distinct edge. It can even cross rivers and canals with the use of a snorkel. During the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the BRB Canal, which divided Lahore from Wagah, proved to be a crucial strategic asset, preventing the Indian Army's march into the former. Nonetheless, it is evident that the T-90S is more than capable of conquering these challenges. Nevertheless, recoilless rifles and ATGMs, which are lightweight, durable, lethal, portable, and reduce or even eliminate the efficacy of this warfighting machine (Koblentz , 2018).

3.5 The Naval Aspect

Without maritime prowess, modern military forces, especially conventional ones, cannot function. The INS Vikramaditya currently uses Sea-Harrier and MiG-29K as its main strike aircraft, however Rafale could be added to the fleet in the future to expand its capabilities. The aircraft carrier is a unique naval weapon in that it can project force like no other, but it also has several built-in limitations. Large ships find it challenging to conceal their locations during armed conflict due to their strong radar signature. Owing to their large turning radius and poor speed, their range of motion is limited. Despite their seeming insignificance from a strategic standpoint, these structural limitations have a big influence on the battle's operations and tactical results. Clausewitz's dictum determines war, as he asserted that the real combat occurs at the tactical level. The Pakistan Navy can defeat its opponent's huge surface ships by taking advantage of tactical flaws and employing Rüdeltaktik, often known as "Wolf Pack," tactics developed by Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz. The "Breaking of Enigma Code" undermined German Navy OPSEC, yet Doenitz's U-boat Wolf Packs came dangerously near to winning the Atlantic War.

3.6 Revisiting the conventional arms in the theater of India

It is crucial to emphasize that, despite being the front-runner in Pakistan's pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons, there are other short-range missile systems in the country's arsenal that can be used in the event of a limited or all-out war, this include the Nasr. Whether Pakistan is genuinely pursuing a warfighting strategy will determine how important the Nasr is in comparison to other short-range and strategic missile systems in the nation's arsenal. At the operational and tactical stages of a battle, other short-range weapons that can be used with comparable or even greater impact include the subsonic Babur Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM), which has a range of 700 kilometers, or roughly 434 miles. A number of Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) are available that are suitable for potential counterforce

employment, such as the 180-kilometer (or 112-mile) Abdali, the 280-kilometer (or 173-mile) Ghaznavi, and the subsonic Raad Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), which has a range of 350 kilometers (about 217 miles). Notable for their unique "operational and tactical level capability" are the 180-kilometer Abdali and the 280-kilometer Ghaznavi (Ahmed M. , 2016).

3.7 Indian Air-Bases: A Strategic Threat

Military forces nowadays are pursuing weapon systems that can strike a target in the shortest amount of time possible. Given that its threshold is lower than that of a ballistic missile strike, the air force is superior in this sense. From Siachen to the Rann of Kutch, Indian force employment and deployment occurs quite close to Pakistan's frontiers. In 2019, India launched its most recent attack on Balakot, using its air force. This demonstrates unequivocally that India will employ the air force in any other egregious acts of aggression similar to the one that occurred in February 2019. Pakistan is the ideal target for the deployment of the Indian air force. It is evident that the Indian Air Force maintains an aggressive stance when examining the airbase/airstrip locations, which span the Line of Control (LOC), the operational boundary, and the Pakistani-Indian international border. The aircraft are the best in the Indian military while they are stationed at certain bases, both in terms of quality and maintainability. This is the publicly viewable top priority list for base facility upgrades. The bases in Pakistan were given precedence in May 2021. Pakistan lacks strategic depth; hence the bases are arranged to cover every city in the country. Pakistan's biggest cities, include Rahim Yar Khan, Bahawalpur, Hyderabad, Faisalabad, Lahore, Multan, and Sialkot and even the capital, Islamabad, are within the Indian Air Force’s reach. The same goes for the areas in Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan (Ali N. , 2023).

3.8 Credibility of Capabilities

A person's assessment of the veracity of their own and their adversary's skills is a crucial component, ranking after technology, capability, and numbers. It is expected of a reasonable actor to accurately assess what the other side has and is attempting to convey. Conversely, an irrational actor may fail to recognize or underestimate the legitimacy of an adversary's capabilities. The strategic goal of the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) leadership is to establish India as the dominant force in the region. This was the idea shared by other Indian political parties as well, but the BJP is pursuing it with greater vigor (Tellis, 2016).

It has attempted to push the boundaries of its authority in order to accomplish this goal and has worked to contain Pakistan within a range through the use of coercion, military

aggression, and diplomatic pressure. Under the BJP leadership, there has also been a rise in the utilization of hostilities and bloodshed with Pakistan as a means of bolstering domestic political gains. Due to its political goals, access to cutting-edge hardware, and geopolitical goals, India has come to be seen as having more technological capabilities than Pakistan. Political leaders find it simple to believe that a military system is superior when the nation selling it guarantees its capabilities. In order to secure government approval and financing, military acquisition programs occasionally overstate specific platforms and systems. These elements influenced how Indian perception developed. IAF Modernization of dominance over Pakistan. Although increased PAF pilot morale and training are benefits, the growing technology divide between the IAF and PAF would not be beneficial (Military Balance, 2020).

3.9 Current Shape of IAF and PAF

The Indian Air Force is composed of two support commands for maintenance and training and Western, Southwestern, Eastern, Central, and Southern are the five regional air commands. Wings, stations, and squadrons are other divisions of these regional commands. As of 2016, the IAF had 36.5 squadron units; by 2027, it hopes to have 42–45 squadron units. Typically, a squadron comprises 16–18 aircraft. Compared to the 42 authorized fighter squadrons, the IAF has 30 fighter squadrons as of 2020. As a result, the IAF's fighting power has decreased. The IAF now has 776 aircraft that are equipped for combat. There are ten Su30MKI Flanker squadrons, six MiG-21 Bison squadrons, five Jaguar squadrons, one MiG-27 ML squadron, three Mirage 2000 squadrons, and one Tejas squadron. IAF is proceeding with the acquisition of 36 Rafale aircraft from France (Sagar, 2018).

Additionally, 123 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) built by “Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)” are expected and scheduled to be delivered. In 2018, the IAF also issued a “Request for Information (RFI)” to procure 110 medium-weight multirole combat aircraft that would be produced domestically by foreign manufacturers. The larger and more capable LCA Mk-2 is currently in development. By 2032, a fifth-generation advanced medium combat aircraft (AMCA) built in the country is expected to be in service. All of the IAF's inventory aircraft are also undergoing upgrades. Jaguar, MiG-29, Mirage-2000, and Su-30MKI are a few of these. It is probable that IAF's numerical and technical flaws would have drastically decreased in the upcoming years. However, Pakistan, it possesses three regional commands: Central's headquarters are in Sargodha, Southern's are in Karachi, and Northern's is in Peshawar. There are 404 combat-capable aircraft in all. There are three squadrons equipped

with various F-7 variants, four squadrons with various F-16 Fighting Falcon versions, five squadrons with JF-17 Thunders, one squadron with Mirage III, and four squadrons with Mirage or political reasons above all, it may not be feasible to acquire more F-16 planes. Thus, PAF's efforts are focused on creating the JF-17 Thunders Block III. Additionally, there are reports of interest in obtaining another cutting-edge fighter. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex is also engaged in fifth generation fighter aircraft research and development (Ramesh, 2022).

3.10 Numbers Matter

Pakistan will keep the 76 F-16 aircraft, the Mirage 5 and Mirage III, and about 200 JF-17s of various blocks, including the two seat variant, in the upcoming years. The JF17s will take the place of the F-7. PAF's fourth-generation fleet is projected to be led by the JF-17 and F-16, barring any other unidentified but potential inductions. In contrast, the Indian Air Force is expected to possess more than 500 fourth generation aircraft, which include the Su-30MKI, Rafales, Mirage 2000, and LCA Tejas. According to some, Pakistan can fend off the Rafale threat with a larger JF-17 fleet. When formulating a numerical strategy, the PAF should, however, also consider the other fourth-generation aircraft, such as the Indian Air Force's Tejas and Su-30. IAF can also make plans along similar lines to counter JF-17s using Tejas and Su-30's superior numbers. IAF is likely to address the Su-30's weaknesses, such as its BVR capabilities and electronic countermeasures (ECMs) and electronic counter countermeasures (ECCMs), after the events of February 2019. It is unlikely that two Rafale squadrons will replace the 10 Su-30 squadrons (Khan B. , 2017).

Even though it is also possible to argue that LCA is long-delayed and that the PAF will take longer to acquire 114 jets, they would not be rushing to build the capacity to counter them. The JF-17 can produce up to 25 aircraft annually at its current rate. For instance, if PAF does not confirm any more acquisitions beyond the JF-17 Block III within the next five years. Additionally, 26 dual-seat JF-17B versions are being developed. They are fully functional, but they are for training only. The PAF strike package during Operation Swift Retort was made up of two JF-17s plus two Mirages five and two Mirages three. Twelve to eighteen JF-17s and F-16s also backed and supported them. This brings the total number of aircraft committed to the mission to 24, consisting of one Saab 2000 AEW&C and one Falcon 20 EW/ECM jet. It may be difficult for the PAF's limited inventory to handle many simultaneous missions. The tactical situation may not be as advantageous to PAF as it was during Operation Swift Retort, with the S-400 system active, Rafale enhancements in Su-30 MKI, and filling gaps in IAF's EW/ECM

inadequacies. Due to this, PAF must get ready for a foe that is both technically and numerically more sophisticated (Tufail, 2020).

3.11 Balancing IAF: Options for Pakistan

India is benefiting from a favorable international political environment at the moment. India is taking full advantage of the opportunity at hand and has started acquiring cutting-edge military equipments from both the West and Russia. Another component is the resources, where India has less of a problem than Pakistan, which is severely constrained. Pakistan might work on several options to oppose India's Rafale, Su-30MKI, Tejas, and other potential aircraft acquisition, as well as the S-400 air defense system. Above all, new sub-systems should be added to JF-17 as part of ongoing efforts to upgrade and improve it. Block III standards can be used to update the previous Block-I and II. In the case of the Rafale, relying on other nations for maintenance, upgrades, and overhauls is less dependable and more expensive when done locally. Pakistan can modify JF-17 to suit its requirements and the demands of the scenario. Second, similar advances on the other side of the border have made the introduction of medium- and long-range air defense systems necessary. The task of bringing down the enemy aircraft that has intruded is shared by air defense systems and aircraft. Pakistan has installed an insufficient HQ-16 air defense system. There is a chance to introduce Chinese HQ-9, which is based on the Russian S300 (Ansari, 2019).

Another sensible method to fight missile defenses and reduce the number of aircraft is the acquisition of combat-ready UAVs. UCAVs' combat capabilities are becoming more advanced in addition to their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Turkish UCAVs have improved recently in terms of quantity, sophistication, and combat capability. Pakistan apparently inked a contract with China to co-produce 48 Wing Loong II UCAVs, and the country has built Burraq UCAVs domestically. The creation of UCAVs in significant quantities may be beneficial to PAF. Pakistan currently has six Saab-2000 Erieye, four ZDK-03 AEW&C, and a small number of Falcon-20F electronic warfare/electronic intelligence aircraft. Guaranteeing a survivable number, more of these platforms must exist. Under Project, Pakistan is creating a fifth-generation aircraft (Franz, 2018).

However, creating a next-generation aircraft from the ground up takes time, and development may take ten years. A collaboration with China or Turkey, which have created or are developing fifth generation fighter aircraft, could be pursued to quicken the pace. The purchase of a cutting-edge aircraft with a weapons kit and performance comparable to or

superior to the Rafale will be the most significant and credible step in terms of India's view of PAF capabilities. As the IAF upgrades its fleet with cutting-edge platforms and technology, it will also be necessary in the upcoming years to purchase a next-generation aircraft with stealth features. The PAF should consider and assess the choices available in China and Russia, even though there might not be any accessible Western solutions (Jamal, 2020).

3.12 Countermeasures to S-400: Balancing the Asymmetry

Pakistan answered India's acquisition of S-400 ABM by promising "to address dangers from any sort of undermining weapon framework" and "foster capacities which render any BMD framework ineffectual and temperamental." This infers a likely game-plan and guards that Pakistan intends to take in the future to counter the Indian BMD safeguard danger. Rather than procuring a comparable multi-billion dollar BMD system as a disincentive, Pakistan can utilize the subsequent strategies to eliminate or significantly reduce the risk associated with S-400. The Concealment of Hostile Air Safeguard (SEAD) and Annihilation of Hostile Air Guard (DEAD) capacities" can both be utilized to do this. Pakistan has a few choices for taking out the S-400 battery areas as a feature of the DEAD arrangement. To protect its tactical stations, India is most likely going to put three of the five batteries along the Pakistani boundary. It implies that the system will remain unchanging and susceptible to destruction by human and remote intelligence (H&RI). To take down the system, Pakistan can use its air-launched cruise missiles, which have a sufficient stand-off range and can be fired from safe airspace (Gady F. S., 2021).

India cannot totally keep away from atomic tipped rocket strikes from China and Pakistan. To kill India's BMD abilities, Balraj Nagal predicts that China and Pakistan will utilize "immersion strikes, blending of traditional and atomic rockets and broad utilization of distractions to befuddle the interceptors, and will go after space, digital and ground frameworks. This is significant because it will be difficult for India's developing BMD to "distinguish between conventional and nuclear missiles," which will limit its options for retaliation. Acquiring the SY400 short-range precision-attack ballistic missile system and the YJ-12 air-launched missile from China with the aim of striking the Enemy Air Defense (EAD) will ensure the DEAD capability. The S-400 batteries can be neutralized by using multiple rocket launcher systems (MLRS), such as the Chinese A-300, which has a CEP of only 30-45 meters. India is expected to install the system at least 300 km off the western border in anticipation of this threat, which will allow the Pakistan Air Force to breach (Nagal, 2016).

Pakistan can counter the danger by improving its Ababeel based MIRV innovation with a different quantities of fakes on board alongside atomic warheads. Additionally, the danger can be alleviated by creating Hypersonic Guide Vehicle (HGV) which can enter the complex air safeguard establishments. Besides, Pakistan is likewise gathering a colossal stock of robots (having tiny marks) that can empower Pakistan to overpower the S-400 ABM in a 'swarm assault' where the objective is immersed to answer. This is apparent by the prompt Sino-Pak bargain for the obtaining of 48 Wing Long-II top of the line equipped robots following the Indo-Russian S-400 (Dhillon, 2018).

3.13 Debacle: Pakistan called India’s air defense bluff

The head of the Indian Air Force described it as a "booster dose" for the country's military, emphasizing how dependent India is on the development of its air defense system. Its BMD shield will have the unintended consequence of providing India with a false sense of security, allowing New Delhi to proceed with the preemptive strikes on Pakistan. For example, India attempted to test Pakistan's conventional deterrent by carrying out "missed" airstrikes into Balakot across the Line of Control, which caused only little damage to the forest despite claims of killing over 300 militants (Vijayan & Dernan, 2019).

The extremely following morning, Pakistan effectively struck the planned area of the Indian military central command in Kashmir, calling India's air guard protections inadequate. The Pakistani flying corps destroyed an IAF Su-30 MKI and a Mig-21 during the furious Indian flying corps pursuit. The pilot of the Mig-21 was captured and later turned over to India as a gesture of goodwill. Not only was India's offensive weaponry humiliated, but its air defense system was also rendered useless as its own Mi-17 helicopter was "mistakenly" shot down by friendly fire, instead of identifying and targeting the Pakistani air force. In summary, India overstated its offensive strike capabilities while also underestimating Pakistan's counter-offensive capabilities, which is why the entire situation became a nightmare for New Delhi (Safi & Malik, 2019).

Moreover, the case that the S-400 will act as India's last line of protection in case of threats between the two countries is mistaken. The S-400 ABM framework India bought "neither destabilize(s) Pakistan's cautious wall nor make(s) its hostile strike" incapable. As recently referenced, Pakistan can counter the danger presented by the S-400 framework by growing the assault region and using reasonable weapons, for example, air-sent off voyage rockets (like Ra'ad and YJ12 and SRBM SY-400), different distractions prepared MIRV

Ababeel, and the arrangement of multilateral observation frameworks (MLRS) like the Chinese A300. Furthermore, it is indistinct that the three batteries at the western boundary would have the option to cover the entire mainland of India, which makes the way for counter-esteem strikes on Indian urban areas utilizing IRBMs like Ababeel and Shaheen-III. Consequently, to forestall tragic results in case of a threatening circumstance with its neighbors, especially Pakistan, India ought to practice alert while expanding its capacities and try not to fall into the snare of a misguided sensation (Ansari, 2022).

3.14 Missiles and nuclear Weapons-Triggering India

Each country possesses ballistic missiles that are equipped to carry nuclear bombs. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington states that India has in possession of nine different types of operational missiles, one of which is the Agni-3, which has a range of 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers. With Chinese aid, Pakistan has developed a missile program that comprises mobile short- and medium-range weapons that are capable of reaching any location in India. With a 2,000 km range, the Shaheen-2 has the longest range. Pakistan declared its possession of tactical nuclear weapons in 2011. These weapons counter relatively small-scale conventional Indian strikes by attaching tiny nuclear warheads to missiles with a 50–100 km range. By lowering the bar for using nuclear weapons, Pakistan now has its military refers to as "full spectrum deterrence" against India's conventional forces thanks to the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons to its arsenal. The "Cold Start" doctrine of India, which calls for a limited invasion of Pakistani territory without going over its previous nuclear threshold, was challenged by the development of the weapons. SIPRI estimates that Pakistan possesses 140–150 nuclear warheads, compared to 130–140 in India (AL-Jazeera, 2019).

3.15 India leads Pakistan for the first time in nuclear arms race

India maintains a strong nuclear capacity thanks to its vast air, land, and sea-based nuclear delivery capabilities and one of the greatest domestic uranium stocks in the world. Moreover, India was able to acquire a significant quantity of nuclear fuel in 2008 thanks to a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which preserved its own uranium for possible use in weapons development. Because of this tactical advantage, India's true nuclear capabilities were underestimated by current Western estimations. The research states that neither India nor Pakistan currently have nuclear weapons in use. Nevertheless, it appears that India is moving toward a policy in which, in times of peace, some nuclear warheads are pre-installed on its launchers. However, estimations from SIPRI as of January 2024 show that

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal remained at roughly 170 warheads, in line with estimates from the previous year. The research states that these warheads are dispersed among aircraft, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles, which make up Pakistan's developing nuclear triad. Pakistan's nuclear capabilities could increase during the next ten years, as evidenced by the country's continued development of new delivery systems and buildup of fissile materials (Syed, 2024).

3.16 The Nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan are growing

India's nuclear posture is still "remarkably conservative," and its arsenal has increased gradually but is still less than Pakistan's. It's instructive to compare with the nuclear ones. Both the United States and Russia have sizable arsenals intended to facilitate so-called counterforce strikes, which aim to neutralize the other side's nuclear weapons before they can do as much damage as possible. They therefore need to have sizable, highly developed arsenals that are constantly monitored. Mr. Tellis contends that, in contrast, China, India, and Pakistan despite their numerous differences all see nuclear weapons as "political instruments" as opposed to "usable tools of war." For example, China and India both make the "no first use" vow, meaning they would not use nuclear weapons unless their adversary has used WMDs first. Just as Pakistan doubts India's pledge, the US does not believe China's. However, the arsenals of China and India match the promises (The Economist, 2022).

3.17 The cyber warfare

Furthermore, Pakistan may learn a lot from North Korea as the latter has employed a significant degree of cyber and electronic warfare while making use of its asymmetrical capabilities with regard to potential adversaries. Cyber and electronic warfare can effectively impede enemy communications and impose non-kinetic access restrictions by employing techniques such as jamming, sabotage, and disruption. Using information and electronic warfare to produce a "contemporary fog of war" like to that described by Clausewitz, strategists assert that execution brilliance is more crucial than ever (Hali, Ahmed, & Iqbal, 2020).

3.18 Pakistan to balance through conventional force advancement

While strengthening its sophisticated arm forces capability the USA has started to lessen its over-reliance on nuclear-powered weapons; other nuclear weapon nations, including India, may follow suit. The US's intention to increase its conventional military capacity is indicated by the strengthening strategic alliance between India and the US. However, India has no

immediate intentions to reduce its nuclear arsenal and is instead strengthening its conventional capabilities (Khan Z. , 2018).

Similar to this, Pakistan might devise a plan to strengthen its conventional force capability which would include both strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces while maintaining a credible minimum deterrence as its economic indicators improve. Major portions, if not all, of India's conventional forces might be qualitatively countered by the increased conventional force capacity. Pakistan will be more equipped to fight bigger battles and protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity because of forward-deployed modern conventional forces that are closer to the Indian border. Pakistan's increased development of its conventional forces in comparison to India may produce at least a rough balance, which might then counteract Pakistan's reliance on nuclear weapons. Additionally, maintaining a balance between the two sides' conventional forces could lessen the likelihood of an arms race in South Asia, boosting the likelihood of regional peace and strategic stability. The extent to which Pakistan's economy develops and how long it can be maintained will therefore be crucial, as advanced conventional forces need a robust economy. Strong economies can afford to do this, giving them an advantage over other nations, which would have to devise practical responses to maintain equilibrium (Lieber & Press, 2017).

One could argue that Pakistan's powerful conventional forces could still start a conventional force arms race in South Asia, increasing the likelihood of war with India, even if Pakistan were to offset its conventional force asymmetry. In this regard, John Mearsheimer has provided empirical evidence demonstrating the frequent failure of conventional deterrence and the frequent use of conventional weapons by nations to wage war against other states. Nevertheless, Pakistan might strengthen its ability to dissuade India's use of conventional force while maintaining its reliance on nuclear weapons to counteract India's superiority in this area, preventing India from engaging in both large-scale and small conflicts (Mearsheimer, 2016).

Conventional deterrence is unlikely to endure indefinitely, even if both nuclear and conventional deterrence carry some risk of escalation. Given the empirical evidence that conventional deterrence fails, especially when contending states have a large conventional asymmetry. However, decreasing the nations reliability on nuclear weapon would impossible when it comes to India-Pakistan debate and south Asian region. In order to overcome strategic implications, it is understandably required that both countries must initiate Strategic Restrain

Regime to prevent the unacceptable certainties and to enhance regional stability, if not, these would have serious consequences beyong the region (Mearsheimer, 2016).

4 CHAPTER FOUR

IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN SECURITY

A thorough military modernization plan is being trailed by India; regardless of numerous regional obstacles it has gained sufficient cutting edge weapons in different fields. Resultantly this has improved the weakness range in the area and Pakistan specifically. In such manner, key security and overall influence in the South Asia area especially among Pakistan and India is tangling. In the radiance of geostrategic impulses, India has been effective in getting resolute help, particularly from the US-drove Western world basically against China. Moreover, one of the most territorial obstructions is a never-ending weapons contest in the district which is

viewed as quite difficult for local turn of events and flourishing. Be that as it may, the overflow impact of unfamiliar upheld Indian military modernization has represented specific impulses on Pakistan to upgrade its tactical capacity. Such provincial improvements are dramatically boosting the current vacuum set off by regional contentions and philosophical contrasts among Pakistan and India (Khan & Saeed, 2020).

Pakistan is the essential objective of the Indian military's entire conflict battling system. India has been looking for a shortcoming in Pakistan's military's atomic and conventional capacities starting around 2001-2002 to do CSD or retaliatory strikes. Beginning around 2004, India's doctrinal development has been sporadic in light of the fact that to lacking hostile weapons and essential NCW capacities. To safeguard data matchless quality, the Indian military has added various weapon frameworks to its stockpile beginning around 2004 and is at present attempting to fortify its NCW and EW capacities. The Indian military expressed in its 2018 new land battle system that it would answer any asserted fear based oppressor episode with "correctional strikes." It is sensible to trust that India's hostile teachings, modernization, and abilities mean to utilize restricted strikes, which could heighten the contention (Ahmed, Kausar, & Chodhary, 2019).

The extending conventional edge would give the Indian military more noteworthy space to execute its restricted conflict tenet, sub-regular tasks, or careful negative marks against Pakistan. Pakistan needs to fortify its ordinary obstruction against India to keep up with vital soundness in South Asia and keep the Indian military from acting forcefully. Solid traditional capacities, as per defenders of customary discouragement, would make the foe unfortunate and that any restricted regular fight would end in an embarrassing loss or a simple embracement at an expense that would offset any expected increases. In the Indo-Pak setting, the ordinary contrast is really reasonable for Pakistan and isn't turning out to be more regrettable at the present time. With respect to Principal Fight Tanks, Advance Gunnery Weapons, Assault Helicopters, Hostile to Tank Directed Rockets, Second Strike Capacity, and Equipped Automated Elevated Vehicles, Pakistan has effectively offset Indian military in a couple of regions. Be that as it may, regular differences among Pakistan and India are sure and this would have serious outcomes in the locale as well as across the region (Abdullah, 2018).

Moreover, to preserve the traditional balance with India, Pakistan will need to make investments in the foreseeable future in a few areas where it lags behind. These fields include electronic warfare capabilities, long-range air defense systems, fifth generation aircraft, nuclear

submarines, long-range armed unmanned aerial vehicles, spy satellites, and network-centric systems. In order to keep regional peace, Pakistan's conventional forces are essential. Although the Indian military might not use its CSD or Pivot Corps or invoke Pakistan's red lines, what if it were to launch targeted, limited incursions or surgical strikes across the Line of Control using cutting-edge aircraft supported by long-range air defense systems? Pakistan will not employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield in that scenario (Sood, 2022).

Furthermore, TNWs cannot counter a concentrated artillery fire at an international border, working boundary, or line of communication. Pakistan must continue to have sufficient conventional deterrence supported by nuclear weapons in order to confront India's conventional capabilities. With China's assistance, Pakistan's military must develop its domestic defense sector to reduce its reliance on expensive imports and modernize and repair its MBTs, APCs, and other mechanized forces. China can assist Pakistan in overcoming its concerns about long-range air defense. Pakistan might purchase a Chinese long-range air defense system, which is capable of eliminating any contemporary aircraft on the planet and supporting the Indian Air Force's ability to hold off. In addition, Pakistan and China are currently producing aircraft together, and there are speculations that the fifth-generation aircraft's development has already started. In the near future, these modifications would assist Pakistan in maintaining strategic parity in the region to thwart any offensive operations under CSD, proactive military operations, sub-conventional operations, or surgical strikes. A fresh wave of instability in South Asia is probably going to be sparked by the acquisition of the S-400 system. True to form, Indian BMD "will fuel shakiness and influence reciprocal relations among India and Pakistan, which could additionally bring down the atomic edge and entice Pakistan to go for an atomic first-strike," as indicated by Brutal V. Gasp, a teacher at Lord's School London. The offence/defence paradox explains why a state lacking BMD will perceive a greater threat of a preemptive strike. India may launch such a preemptive strike, raising the likelihood of what New Delhi sees as the "limited war" with Pakistan. For instance, in "unveiling Limited War Doctrine," former Indian defense minister George Fernandez asserts that India may wage a limited war against Pakistan as long as it has enough BMD to serve as a credible deterrent (Mohan, 2020).

With the introduction of advanced BMD, South Asia's current weapons race was accelerated. Pakistan is probably going to add additional offensive weapons to its armament since it feels left behind by India's military prowess. The purchase of cutting-edge BMD forces Pakistan to build up its nuclear arsenal and Low Yield Nuclear Weapons (LYNWs), lowering

the nuclear threshold between the two nations and raising the possibility of a nuclear exchange. This is due to the fact that Pakistan's conventional deterrence is being diminished by India's military upgrading, which is causing a nuclear arms race (Khan Z. , 2017).

The S-400's long-range interception and wide range of features put the Pakistani military's current equipment to the test. All weapons, however, have a number of vulnerabilities that can be addressed with potential counter-measures to negate their effects. Despite being an advanced weapon system, the long-range S-400 ABM has enough room for counter-measures. This is due to the challenging border area between India and Pakistan along the Line of Control (LoC), where mountains, hills, and deep forests can obstruct and distort the S-400 radar's tracking ability. By using the 40V6 mast assembly, the system gets over this obstacle, but doing so significantly lessens its capacity to "shoot and scoot," leaving it open to a counterattack (Arif, 2021).

Even if Moscow were to demonstrate it, the fictitious 40N6E missile, which has a 400 km range, has not been shown off and is not expected to be included in the exported version of the system. As a result, the main weapon of the S-400 is a 240-kilometer-range 48N6 missile, which is unable to intercept contemporary ballistic missiles because it cannot engage airborne targets above 27 kilometers in altitude. With a travel distance of something like five minutes, the S-400 is less inclined to assist India with opposing Pakistan's long range rockets than it is to target US long range rockets, which are almost thirty kilometers from Russian coasts. Besides, the S-400 rocket framework holds a timeframe of realistic usability of only 10 years which implies that India will squander US$ 5.2 billion on the off chance that the framework isn't utilized in that frame of mind until 2030 (Ahmed M. , 2022).

4.1 India-Israel Collaboration

Their shared strategic interests and ongoing cooperation appear to make India and Israel's defense and military alliance sustainable. Israel is helping India obtain the updated weapons, defense industrial capacity, and equipment it needs to retain its alliance and pursue its goal of becoming a significant regional and international force. India's desire to resist the combined danger posed by China and Pakistan is evident in its high budget allocation for defense and its advanced military technologies gained with Israel's assistance. Therefore, India's hegemonic attitude to regional and global affairs, coupled with its increasing defense cooperation with Israel, is not only throwing off the balance of power in the region but also poses a severe hazard to the stability of the pivot region. Their tight cooperation that emerged after the Cold War and

their covert relations during the Cold War proven to be major concern and most specifically for Pakistan's security. Delhi is driven by its fixation with projecting force against strategically aligned Pakistan and formidable adversary China, and it is drawn to Israel as a dependable defense partner (Khan, Ishaq, & Din, 2024).

By pursing military modernization, India has improved its defense cooperation with Israel during the past 20 years. According to Timothy Hoyt, those with a substantial military and economic edge over the majority of their neighbors or those embroiled in bitter political-military conflicts within the region tend to have the most advanced military modernization. Potential external threats, whether from neighboring nations or external forces, are a concern for many developing states. Moreover, greater military-industrial base and enhanced military capabilities military capabilities and a larger military-industrial base are typically demanded in response to these threats. Resultantly, India is persistently purchasing delivery systems, advanced nuclear technology, and missile defense systems to enhance its capacity for deployment and operation. It ultimately increases the "level of threat, insecurity, and arms race in the region in general and for Pakistan in particular." The military might of Indian arm forces and has undoubtedly increased as a result of multiple agreements on missile defense and collaboration with Israel. At the same time, the balance of power has been upset, forcing Pakistan to invest more money in the military sector. In addition, India's gains in the air, navy, satellite, and space programs have given it a strategic edge over Pakistan (Rana, 2018).

Moreover, India's use of Israeli weapons to launch attacks inside Pakistani territory during the Balakot incident in February 2019 is one instance that illustrates how the two countries' defense collaboration is developing. This episode simply serves to heighten Pakistan's danger profile, disrupt regional peace and security, and raise the possibility of war between the two states, although a little one. Moreover, there has been an increase in defence ties between India and Israel in recent years, including the exchange of advanced weapons and training. Israel has been diligently aligning itself with the national BJP government of India. However, India has emerged as the Israeli arms trade's main target market for weapons (Krishna & Singh, 2023).

4.2 India’s Dream of Asian Giant

Israel's military technologies and security collaboration provide India, a country aspiring to become a "Asian giant," the best means of addressing its security challenges. This partnership is driven by geostrategic and geopolitical interests. By fortifying its defense sector,

it is making sure that its military might extends beyond its borders. The objectives are broad and include geo-economic ones such as preventing Pakistan from entering the Middle East and undermining its influence in the states of Central Asia and the Middle East. In the end, it aims to undermine China's influence in the area and destabilize Pakistan by weakening its defensive balance capabilities on both the eastern and western fronts. India hopes to emulate Israel's annexation strategy and acquire the illegally held area in Kashmir. To put it concisely, the strategic partnership between India and Israel is posing a serious danger to South Asia's strategic stability and has significant ramifications for Pakistan's security (Horimoto, 2017).

The rising defense connections and proximity between India and Israel are being examined, and it is seen that this is tipping the strategic balance in India's advantage. Their relationship's development not only threatens region's military balance but also destabilizes the conventional equilibrium against Islamabad. Pakistan is worried about how the subcontinent's strategic balance is rapidly shifting against one of the most obvious consequences of India and Israel's close defense ties. It struggles to match India's and Israel's combined conventional military might. Therefore, India's military might, both traditional and non-conventional, is helping it to undermine Pakistan's security and create regional hegemony. Furthermore, Israel is extremely concerned about Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the two countries are constantly bolstering their military ties development, India's fears over conventional and non-conventional arsenals of Pakistan. This explains that, in addition to impacting the strategic stability of the region, India-Israel defense and missile cooperation is also igniting an arms race in South Asia and upending the deterrent equation (Fareed & Adnan).

4.3 Indian Military Modernization under the Modi regime

Pakistan is forced to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons to counteract anticipated Indian belligerence and aggression as a result of India's offensive military policy, which disrupts regional peace and security and widens conventional imbalances in South Asia. With its rapidly expanding economy, New Delhi is considering becoming a major player in the world stage and is spending heavily on the armed forces. The main goals of India's military modernization efforts thus far have been force recapitalization and platform replacement. This has had no appreciable impact on the military balance. Pakistan is under tremendous pressure from India's military modernization, as the country lacks the funds to modernize on its own. India has been implementing cutting-edge technological advancements (Economic Times, 2023).

Pakistan is undoubtedly the nation that is most at risk from India's military buildup. China, however, is powerful enough politically and economically to stop Indian aggression Islamabad will therefore be vulnerable to these kinds of strikes. India, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), spent USD$72.9 billion on the armed forces in 2020, ranking it as the world's fifth-largest military spender. With USD $252 billion in military spending, China is the second-largest military spender in the world, behind the US. When it comes to military spending, Pakistan is far behind India. Despite having a weak economy, Islamabad spent $11 billion in 2021 (SIPRI, 2021).

Sharp rise in Indian military spending will change South Asia's geopolitical environment and provide serious difficulties for both China and Pakistan. In the new global order, New Delhi is competing fiercely to emerge as a major power. The US and other defense partners are giving the Modi government a hard time when it comes to obtaining encrypted defense technologies. It is thought that the US and other western nations are backing India for business reasons, particularly China's containment strategy (Naveed S. , 2020).

4.4 Defense Deals Limits Pakistan Conventional Superiority

Signing defense agreements with the US like LEMOA and COMCASA has revolutionized the Indian military and strengthened its deterrence against China and Pakistan. In contrast, COMCASA, provides India an encrypted communication equipment so that the Indo-US air and maritime forces could combine and communicate securely in both peace and conflict (Roy, 2020).

The strategic stability of the region would be further complicated by the US and India signing the BECA on October 27, 2020. The use of BECA is expected to bring about a modernization of the Indian military, enabling the country to leverage US intelligence and ultimately lead to improved weapon accuracy. All of this will be useful for navigating ships, locating targets, fighting battles, and gathering intelligence. The US and India can exchange sophisticated satellite pictures and telephone intercepts under BECA. The infusion of the aforementioned cutting-edge technologies into the Indian military will heighten concerns about China and Pakistan, upending the region's power equilibrium (Roy, 2020).

BECA was signed during the Ladakh impasse between China and India. Data communication on Chinese weaponry and troops at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was one of the most important aspects of BECA. The US and India are making it quite evident that BECA would probably be used against China. India serves as the US's ally and bulwark in this

situation. On the surface, it appears that the US and China are engaged in a full-fledged great power competition. China is too strong for the US to contend with alone, hence New Delhi's assistance is critically needed to keep China in check. Keeping the former in check will also irritate Pakistan, Beijing's steadfast ally (Mishra, 2017).

Without a doubt, Pakistan would respond forcefully if India attempts to cross the border once more or launches a phony surgical strike. The PAF has lately provided evidence of this. There will be a quid pro quo plus reaction if India makes another mistake and more losses occur on the Pakistani side. This could be extremely detrimental to India. Presumably, India may intensify the confrontation and launch further strikes against Pakistan if it suffers significant losses in the event that Pakistan responds, given the pressure from the public and its reputation. The military of Pakistan will not remain inactive; instead, it will react appropriately, and the confrontation may grow on both sides (Shah & Salam, 2020).

The details stated above demonstrate how Pakistan is forced to take countermeasures because to the conventional imbalance in South Asia. Although certain C4I systems are in existence now, and Pakistan's own military industry makes an effort to meet the difficulties, more advanced AWACS and spy satellites will be needed in the future for air, ground, marine observation and reconnaissance. The conventional balance would be severely undermined by India's acquisition of NCW capabilities, which would also encourage Pakistan to join the arms race. By making wise acquisitions and employing tactically effective techniques, Pakistan may make investments in quality, lethality, and the best possible use of its resources (Gul, Khan, & Iqbal, 2022).

4.5 Commensurate Strategizing-Conventional Blitzkrieg

At present, Indian military are stationed in close proximity to Pakistan. Over 81% of the bases used by the Indian Air Force are set up intentionally to be hostile to Pakistan, as are the majority of India's military commands. In addition, India has deployed seven missile groups and eight IBGs the size of a division, all of which are designed to oppose Pakistan. According to Shireen Mazari, the BrahMos I-II hypersonic cruise missile, which India has inducted and which is expected to be a key component of Indian military policy, is part of the CSD, which is designed to carry out preemptive strikes against Pakistan. She goes on to say that this was all in response to Pakistan's development of the Nasr short-range cruise missile. In addition, in August 2019, Pakistan conducted a test launch of the Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile (SSBM) Ghaznavi which has a range of 290 kilometers, at night to demonstrate its operational

readiness to support any aggressive incursion from New Delhi into Pakistani territory in a matter of 48–72 hours at the start of a military blitzkrieg (Mazari, 2019).

Indian military commanders have stated that the objective of the CSD is to promptly and decisively initiate a limited conventional military offensive into Pakistani territory in response to any allegation that Pakistan is funding an asymmetrical strike against India. The goal of this attack is to be completed before Pakistan reaches the stage where it is considering nuclear retaliation against Indian forces, or before the international community can intervene. However, up until today, the Indian military hierarchy has not been transparent (Khan & Khan, 2020).

4.6 India's Unsurprising Plans

Such concept makes sense, since the majority of Pakistani strategic thinker mistakenly thinks that the Indian army has been developing its CSD for a considerable amount of time. Regardless of the real attainment of this capability by the Indian army, it is noteworthy to observe a significant change in the way India presents both its conventional and nuclear forces in relation to Pakistan. India is becoming more assertive as a result, attempting to project power swiftly in order to accomplish its military and political objectives. With the development of CSD, ballistic missile defense system, nuclear submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, multi-independent re-entry vehicles, and improved conventional military capacity, India has demonstrated even more ambition. Many in Pakistan would view this as an attempt to put strategic pressure on the country, giving it cover to retaliate in accordance with the core principle of credible minimum deterrence, which is intended to maintain deterrence stability and prevent the two bitter enemies from going to war (Narang & Ladwig, 2021).

The effectiveness of a state's security organization's countermeasures against its opponent is contingent upon the degree of threat they face. Islamabad may thus conclude that it would be in Pakistan's best interest to achieve at least a balance, if not parity, with India in the military sphere in order to stop the erosion of deterrence in South Asia. Pakistan would not pursue an arms race amongst its weapons since doing so might compromise the ideas of minimal deterrence. Furthermore, this might provoke a backlash from the international community since it would jeopardize the international nonproliferation regime to which Pakistan has progressively adopted a normative stance by continuing to participate in arms control-related symposiums and international nonproliferation conferences (Ali N. , 2023).

4.7 An Overview of Strategic Stability in South Asia

Keeping in view India's most recent patterns in air safeguard rocket frameworks alongside other Military Modernization plans and with upgraded long-range target obtaining and drawing in capacities, this will prompt pre-emption and result in bringing down of the atomic edge which will additionally weaken the essential soundness of the area. To counter arising dangers from the BMD safeguard and to guarantee survivability Pakistan should zero in on the improvement of MIRVS and MARVs in the essential circle, other than focusing on India's air protection rocket framework and BMD safeguard there is a necessity to modernize chosen areas of military too. The ongoing equilibrium of customary weaponry slants vigorously in support of India. Taking into account the long scope of the S-400 rocket guard framework it isn't just a danger to local nations and yet, it is a danger to extra-territorial powers in the Indian Sea. Taking into account India's domineering plans and its broad Military Modernization process the world local area at large should find substantial ways to check India's becoming stronger as it is a danger to provincial and worldwide security (Lo, 2003).

The tactical modernization of India is an extraordinary worry for the policymakers of Pakistan. A couple of difficulties, which Pakistan experiences because of India's tactical modernization are explained in the accompanying conversation. Indian aspirations of ruling the South Asian area strategically and militarily will have critical negative ramifications on more fragile conditions of the district and Pakistan will be the most awful victim of this organization (Jaspal, 2018).

4.8 Conventional Capability Alignment

Pakistan ought to settle on difficult decisions about safeguard needs, condition of workmanship hostile to tank weapon frameworks to be enlisted, current and long-range air protection frameworks to be secured, and counter methodologies ought to be saddled with deadly gear. Pakistan should seek after an exhaustive indigenization program and staged modernization plan to keep up with dependable discouragement for a viable reaction to the developing Indian danger. Pakistan holds the choice of remuneration against steadily expanding Indian danger and against Indian domineering plans. In this methodology, any forceful activity from the Indian side will be actually countered by a similar kind of activity by the Pakistan side (Abbas, 2024).

4.9 Tactical Nuclear Weapon

In the long run, Pakistan cannot contend with India routinely as the distinction between economies is enormous. Any endeavor to acquire the distinction traditional power will be shocking for Pakistan as the flow financial circumstances are more awful than at any other time. This will for sure build Pakistan's dependence on the utilization of Strategic Atomic Weapons this is a savvy approach however the main accessible choice in current financial circumstances to decrease public safety challenges. Until and except if Pakistan's economy settles we need to substitute atomic for traditional capacities however by expanding dependence on atomic weapons to cover guard spending plan deficiencies, the outcome will be as an increased security issue. Without certainty building measures and compromise process with India in the protective stance of Pakistan, there will be expanded jobs of atomic weapons resultantly the security quandary will win in the area and a weapons contest will begin between both adversary states. India appreciates predominance in traditional weapons and this will be actually countered by utilizing conventional weapons (Barrech & Siddique, 2022).

4.10 Combating Terrorism

Pakistan ought to keep censuring psychological oppression in any structure as we are one of the most obviously awful casualties of this hazard. Pakistan ought to execute compelling outside moves to really counter Indian endeavors to connect this illegal intimidation with Islamic fundamentalism. Pakistan was a non-NATO partner in the worldwide conflict against psychological warfare. Through viable tact, Pakistan ought to persuade the total populace and world media on the loose on the endeavors of Pakistan against the conflict on psychological oppression. Pakistan should put resources into acquiring support from Non-Legislative Associations, world media, and, center nation halls to take advantage of Indian abominations in Unlawfully involved Indian-held Kashmir, and how severely they are managing the populace there. Pakistan should take advantage of the common liberties infringement of India, its prejudicial treatment of minorities, wrongdoings against minorities, and its antagonistic relations with every adjoining state (Jalil G. Y., 2023).

4.11 Implications Specific to Pakistan

A couple of difficulties, which Pakistan experiences because of India's tactical modernization are illuminated in the accompanying conversation. Indian aspirations of overwhelming the South Asian strategically and militarily will have huge negative ramifications on more vulnerable conditions of the area and Pakistan will be the most awful

victim of this association. The developing US-India ties in the district are to contain China's impact in the Indo-Pacific locale. The US is chipping away at a compelling technique around here against the Chinese and working with close partners here in such manner US has endorsed the offer of 24 x MH-60R ASW hostile to submarine helicopters to India for $2.6 billion bucks These will be made by Lockheed Martin. These helicopters will be furnished with MK54 torpedoes, inferno rockets, high level accuracy eliminated weapon frameworks, more improved evening battling frameworks, and cutting edge radars and this economy and solid military will raise it to local power. India is seeking after a complete Military Modernization plan and is ceaselessly updating its military to accomplish its domineering plans. By accomplishing monetary and military strength Indians will manage Pakistan from a more grounded position and will apply a wide range of tension on Pakistan primary point will be to deplete Pakistan's economy by lengthy stalemates and delayed accelerations can likewise depend on intermediary wars and mixture fighting to weaken Pakistan inside and minimizing her globally (Khan & Khan, 2020).

4.12 Countermeasures to tackle Indian designs

A net evaluation of the examples of brutality and solidness shows that Pakistan is moving toward a tempest of dangers, including rising fanaticism, a faltering economy, ongoing underdevelopment, and a strengthening war, coming about in remarkable political, monetary, and social strife. Danger range is there and there is a necessity to manage it exhaustively for endurance. Danger to Pakistan's Public Interest is there because of the developing Indo-US key organization at the territorial level, it set off the discussion about its suggestions on China and the rise of India as an Asian power; A stabilizer to China. Since freedom India has taken on a threatening mentality towards all neighbors, never acknowledged their freedom, and is engaged with many state-supported psychological warfare exercises. With the motivation of turning into a force to be reckoned with and accomplishing strength in the locale she is following an exhaustive Military Modernization plan and expanding its military could by modernizing the military, Naval force, and Flying corps at the same time her fundamental accentuation is on motorization, powerful organization driven functional capacity, aggressive rocket improvement program, make in India drive for Native modernization drive, expansion in guard financial plans, purchasing condition of craftsmanship weapons from everywhere the world, developing binds with USA and participation in the atomic field, particularly where they are involving American enhanced uranium for tranquil exercises and involving own improved uranium for improvement of 25% atomic weapons yearly (Babur, 2020).

4.13 The Genesis of Cooperation

India and Israel appeared in 1947 however their relations were torpid nearly for quite some time. India decided not to start formal binds with Israel, keeping its dealings on the low ebb as a result of its conventional strategy inclinations towards the Middle Eastern states. Be that as it may, during this time, the two states were circumspectly participating in various regions, for example, security, knowledge sharing and move of military gear. Israel never faltered from supporting India militarily in a large portion of its significant struggles, be it the boundary struggle with China or a conflict with Pakistan.15 concerning the knowledge sharing, broad participation likewise created between the Exploration and Examination Wing (Crude) of India and Israel's Mossad 'under the initiative of Indira Gandhi (1966-77 and 1980-84) (Naveed S. , 2020).

4.14 India’s Advancement in Missile Defence System: An Alarm for South Asian Strategic Stability

Since the fruitful atomic tests in 1998, India has been improving the speed of long range missile protection framework improvement by getting progressed military and mechanical help from different states, like the US, Israel, France, and Russia.67 India is chasing after the rocket safeguard program to extend its power projection inside the prompt South Asian area and the more extensive Asia-Pacific locale. The acquisition of rocket protection advances from states, similar to Israel and the US, is helping India as its continued looking for the extraordinary power status as well as to practice provincial authority. This consistent progression in "rocket guard framework by India challenges the premise of prevention and gives "a misguided sensation that everything is OK to the Indian administration, subsequently increments precariousness and extends Pakistan's security problem opposite India (Gady F. S., 2021).

4.15 Implications of Genesis

The guard and military organization of India and Israel is by all accounts getting through in view of their shared vital interests and consistent joint effort. Israel is working with India to gain imperative guard gear's, protection creation capacity and redesigned weapons to keep up with their coalition and support its desire to be a significant territorial as well as a worldwide power. Refinement in military innovation with the assistance of Israel and the distribution of high spending plan for guard reason demonstrates that India needs to counter the joint danger of Pakistan and China. Consequently, India's provincial and worldwide domineering methodology and developing safeguard collaboration with Israel isn't just undermining the

local key equilibrium yet in addition conveys extreme ramifications for the dependability of South Asian area. Their stealthy relations during the Cool Conflict time areas of strength for and after the Chilly Conflict period ended up being a potential danger particularly for Pakistan's security. India's fixation on power projection against decisively viable Pakistan and solid opponent China entices it to find a dependable safeguard accomplice and Israel comes close (Abdullah, 2018).

4.16 Leap of Faith

First and generally quick, is a CBM for India and Pakistan to resuscitate the Joint Enemy of Psychological Oppression System that was concurred in 2006; consecutive to the 2004 Islamabad Accord. This instrument bombed because of Mumbai occurrence, 2008. The two nations genuinely must draw illustrations from the disappointment and work on the instrument in order to forestall wrecking of relations between the two nations because of a fear assault. It is improbable that psychological oppression in the area will vanish any time soon, however it is critical to not permit fear based oppressors to keep two atomic furnished states locked down. On account of Mumbai, there existed a halt of correspondence at both political and military levels following this horrendous occasion. This showed the delicacy of relations between the two nations. An intuitional instrument of decreasing such dangers - with a range of interchanges and goals going from a Mumbai-type fear episode, up to an atomic related mishap - is presently fundamental. The third CBM is oceanic in nature. Since the Mumbai episode included sea travel, there is even more justification for creating sea CBMs between the two nations. India and Pakistan can start under the soul of Lahore MOU, and INC Ocean arrangement, depicting sea limits to forestall anglers attacks, and furthermore foster sea participation in different regions like ocean piracy (Bommakanti, 2020).

An oceanic hotline ought to be put to more readily use as to forestall one more Mumbai related occasion, and snatching of blameless anglers. At last, despite the fact that it might seem untimely, India and Pakistan should lead an extremely clearheaded investigation of long range rocket inventories. As generally announced and grasped, the most limited went long range rockets, Prithvi-I on account of India and HATF-I on account of Pakistan, have minimal vital utility and more prominent specialized issues to make due. It could be insightful for India and Pakistan to consider dispensing with these two capacities as an initial step. This will end up being representative, without affecting military height, or capacities to address different possibilities. Essentially, in the long haul, there might be an acknowledgment that the following

classification of long range rockets, Prithvi-II and HATF-II, may likewise be left with less military utility. The specialized and key investigation of this proposition isn't given here, yet is again left for additional examination sometime in the not too distant future (Hassan, 2019).

4.17 Certainties of Implications

Indian political and military administration generally guarantee that they felt undermined by Chinese and security improving measures they are embracing are in light of China, for example the atomic test they directed in 1974 they contend that India security is powerless due to China's atomic test. In a similar way the new ascent in the regular power is to stop Chinese developing impact. On opposite the essential reasoning of India is coordinated towards Pakistan too and it has serious ramifications on Pakistan's security circle (AL-Jazeera, 2019).

4.18 Doctrinal Shifts

The change in tenet to CSD and Careful Strike is fundamentally intended for Pakistan. Pakistan and India share a long line which is for the most part the level fields where infiltration may be more straightforward. The tactical modernization and consideration of such exceptionally progressed and accuracy weaponry in the Indian overthrows is for the most part positioned close to the Pakistan's line. India has set 18 regiments of T-90 Tanks close to Pakistan line in Rajasthan desert and Punjab. India is likewise utilizing these long reach super light weapons on Line of Control. The Indian power is securing such profoundly progressed ordnance firearms and will be useful in the procedure on Line of Control. This will make a security challenge for Pakistan. Pakistani investigators accept that the S-400 will make Pakistan's flying corps and missile system powerless. The consideration of such profoundly progressed weapons in the military, flying corps and naval force will threaten Pakistan and make security difficulty for it. Thus, Pakistan to guarantee its security will likewise expand its tactical munitions stockpile and will opt for key association with China. Pakistan needs to make significant its atomic weapons to meet this imbalance in regular terms. Pakistan will likewise expand its tactical spending and it will likewise go for strategic weapons because of India traditional ascent. This will at last influence the essential strength and traditional prevention of the district (Abbas, 2024).

4.19 Impact on Socio-Economic Condition

India is among the main retainers that are spending on the tactical development. As indicated by the report by Stockholm's Worldwide Harmony Exploration Establishment India is the second biggest purchaser of safeguard related equipment after Saudi Arabia. India has

consented to various guard arrangements with Russia and other Western nations, it as of late finished up safeguard manage US of US$3 billion, for purchasing progressed, dexterous and cowhide weapons into its store to impact different states in the locale through its military may. This aggressive mentality of India hauled the locale into precariousness; even in its homegrown circle the expansion in military spending affect the socio-economic situation of the area. India is expanding its guard spending plan around 9.37%. In the year 2020 its guard spending plan is arroundUS$73.65, however different marks of society are going down. The report distributed by SOS Kids' Town Canada featured that the destitution rate in India is in a horrendous condition; close to two-third of the populace is living underneath the neediness line. The expansion in military spending implies that assets will be decreased from other social and financial improvement area to manta military store. The figures introduced in the financial plan plainly demonstrate that the assets in training, medical care and other social advancement area are not altogether expanded as the guard spending plan in India. This will expand the pace of joblessness and neediness and social and monetary divergence arose that outcome in friendly turmoil and expansion in crime percentage. There is a discussion on bread versus firearms emerge, individuals are biting the dust because of craving and absence of medical care offices India government as of late submitted a request to purchase warrior jets from Russia. The training financial plan expansion in 2020 is just 5%, which is far lesser than military consumption (Ali N. , 2023).

4.20 Indian Military Modernization-An Overall Context

India's tactical modernization endeavors appear to change the key equilibrium of the locale. This turns out to be especially significant when different key endeavors are embraced in request to impact and challenge the security structure of Pakistan. It, in this way, turns out to be especially significant for Pakistan to cook for these difficulties at the essential level. The connection between two atomic states has seen many ups and more downs over the most recent sixty years. The two nations have battled a few conflicts nevertheless issues between them are very confounded. Going from Kashmir to illegal intimidation, both nations have neglected to defeat these issues. The contested domain of Kashmir stays the essential wellspring of contention among Pakistan and India. Pakistan targets settling the Kashmir issue as per the UNSC took on Goal 47, yet India does not snotice rather has kept on stifling the voice of opportunity (Ali M. Z., 2016).

4.21 Electronic and Network Centric Warfare Capabilities

The Indian military has drafted a Long Reach Surveillance and Perception Framework (LORROS) from Israel in 2003 to keep cautiousness on line with Pakistan and actually look at penetration at the LoC. The LORROS can follow its focuses in constantly empowering Indian armed force to keep day in and day out beware of the boundary. This framework is furnished with current innovation which empowers it to recognize focuses a way off of around 13 km to 16 km range. One more significant stage in the procurement of organization driven fighting abilities was taken in 2005 during Vajra Shakti practice in which the Indian military rehearsed Power Increase Base (FMCP). The design was to coordinate progression of information from airplane, drones, reconnaissance airplane and radars to help the field commandant to make a quick move. After 2005, the Indian military rehearsed the Organization Driven Fighting (NCW) abilities in pretty much every tactical activity to consolidate current weapon framework to defeat functional shortcomings in its general conflict battling apparatus. The cycle to procure network driven and electronic fighting capacities is progressing. To accomplish these capacities Indian Protection Innovative Work Association (DRDO) has presented the War Zone Observation Radars (BFSR) to recognize foe's development at a short reach. The BFSR can spot, track, and arrange the items like sneaking men, a gathering, battle vehicles and helicopters (Kristensen & Korda, 2020).

4.22 India’s Strategic Puzzle

The utilization of rockets has modified the offense-guard balance for offense. Pakistan's advancement of double use rockets has presented India's weakness to both precautionary what's more, retaliatory strikes of Pakistan. Consequently, the atomic weapons combined with ballistic and voyage rockets have escalated Pakistan's discouragement capacity and validity, what's more, have likewise constrained its militarily better foe India than recognize and view into account in a serious way the current equilibrium of fear between aggressive neighbors in its making of procedure. Thus, the essential harmony comprised by Pakistan's atomic weapons had refrained India from military adventurism during the discontinuous halts, in spite of its predominance in the traditional weapons, enormous protection spending plan and mathematical strength of military personals (Jaspal, 2018).

4.23 Pakistan’s Strategic Posture

Atomic weapons capacity. It had dismissed UN Goal of 1172 which suggested that Islamabad related with different states that poor person yet done as such, to become party to

the Atomic Peace Settlement (NPT) and Exhaustive Test Boycott Settlement immediately and without conditions. Furthermore, Islamabad has been staying with its position on the Fissile Material Cut-off Deal (FMCT) at the Meeting on Demobilization. On July 28, 2011, talking in the Unified Countries General Gathering, acting Pakistani Minister Raza Bashir Tarar broadcasted a vibe of wariness against taking dealings for the FMCT outside the 65- part Meeting, saying, "Pakistan won't join any such process nor would it think about increase to the result of any such cycle." Islamabad has been persuaded that its atomic and rockets programs are instrument for keeping up with least atomic prevention opposite India. The essential motivation behind these weapons improvement has been to accomplish a key harmony involving vital steadiness by building an ability to bear a preplanned or shock forceful atomic strikes regardless have the option to answer with a power that could make inadmissible harm the enemy. Actually, through atomic stance, Islamabad has tried to achieve different targets, for example prevent the enemy from examining hostility; deflect expected foes; increment bartering influence; decrease reliance on partners; and procure military freedom by lessening reliance on outside wellsprings of military equipment (Abdullah, 2018).

4.24 Escalation of Asymmetries Between India and Pakistan

The conventional imbalance among India and Pakistan expands the last's dependence on its atomic weapons. That is why; Islamabad has embraced a first-utilize atomic stance. Vipin Narang brought up that: "A state with this stance [first-use] should in this manner have adequate strategic and possibly survivable second-strike key weapons to assimilate potential retaliation."32 The meaning of strategic atomic weapons is begging to be proven wrong, however retaliatory capacity is obviously fundamental. In any case, the believability necessities of first-use pose produce serious order and control pressures that increment the gamble of incidental utilization of atomic weapons (Ali N. , 2023).

Islamabad has been utilizing both discretionary and arms buildup ways to deal with safeguard the believability of its base atomic prevention since the May 1998. In the strategic domain, Islamabad more than once proliferated its 'Atomic Limitation System Proposition' to India. The proposition depended on tenable atomic discouragement at the base conceivable level, including non-acceptance of ballistic missile destroying rockets and submarine launched long range rockets in the district. Atomic limitation system proposition able to be named as 'Arms Control' proposition. It mirrors that through arms control proposition Islamabad wants to diminish the likelihood of battle between India and Pakistan; the expenses of arrangements

for battle with its eastern enemy, and the demise and annihilation assuming control fizzles and war becomes inescapable. The Atomic Restriction Proposition additionally shows that Islamabad has been in quest for three goals: acknowledgment of vital equality between India what's more, Pakistan by the previous; maintaining key solidness in the subcontinent with recessed-prevention capacities; and limiting conflict battling arrangements costs. New Delhi dismissed this proposition referring to danger exuding from Chinese military muscle. In actuality, the proposition was dismissed in light of the fact that the Indians were not able to yield equality to Pakistan and the rockets development was intended to connect with Islamabad in the twisting of an expensive and foolish weapons contest (Behuria & Kumar, 2013).

CONCLUSION

India has adopted a proactive and pragmatic approach to dealing with various conflict situations. The response to terrorist provocations could take the form of a 'Surgical Strike,' which would fall under the category of sub-conventional armed conflict." According to the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces-2017 (JDIAF-2017), the conflict will be determined or avoided through a process of credible deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and, finally, punitive destruction, disruption, and constantan in a nuclear environment across the spectrum of conflict.

However, a surgical strike is a perceptive war concept introduced in JDIAF-2017; it refers to the possibility of a limited war below a nuclear threshold. The primary goal and objective of current comprehensive military modernization is to achieve sufficient capability to conduct rapid and unexpected multiple attacks within Pakistan in order to achieve vital objectives below the nuclear threshold. India's economic growth is the driving force behind the comprehensive military modernization. India is a lucrative market for core countries. Their current vintage military hardware is approaching the end of its useful life.

This comprehensive military modernization has also changed the defensive posture from defensive to offensive-defensive doctrine. India's new Military Doctrine, which includes Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces (2017), Land Warfare Doctrine -2018, Cold Start Doctrine, and Pro-Active Operations, is poised to achieve critical objectives below the nuclear threshold. India's comprehensive military modernization has sparked an arms race in the region.

Furthermore, the lack of arms control (strategic restrains) suggests that strategic equilibrium in South Asia will eventually be replaced by strategic imbalance in the region. "Theoretically the limited conventional war between the nuclear armed adversaries is possible with a strong probability of escalation to all act war including nuclear strike enhancing." India's surgical strike strategy jeopardizes strategic stability in South Asia. Since independence, India has taken a hostile stance towards her neighbours, particularly against India. With the goal of becoming a regional hegemon, she is constantly increasing her military capabilities and implementing a comprehensive Military Modernization plan.

It remains to be seen when, how, and who will determine the prospects for addressing India's rising conventional imbalance with Pakistan, as well as whether talks on the subject would yield meaningful outcomes. India may not immediately agree to negotiations on the problem since it wants China to participate in the dialogue. The potential involvement of China would complicate the planned regime.

Indian policymakers are fully aware of the ramifications of all of these possibilities including the arms race. As a result, rather than directly engaging Pakistan, India's new strategy attempts to promote militancy in the country through hybrid warfare. Pakistan has already taken tangible steps to resist Indian hybrid warfare in Karachi, the old FATA, and Balochistan. But it still needs to go a long way. The strategic prognosis for South Asia appears to be intense, and it may face increasing instability and volatility in the near future as a result of the Indian military's doctrinal shift and proactive military policies, as well as a massive military modernization effort. To compete with India on a conventional level, Pakistan must strengthen its national defence sector and lessen reliance on external powers, particularly the United States.

India spends significantly more on its military than Pakistan does, which is indicative of the differences in the countries' conventional warfare arsenals. Pakistan is under increasing pressure to maintain strategic balance in South Asia and catch up with its minimum deterrence as this gap steadily widens. One may argue that Pakistan is India's only nuclear deterrent, whereas China and Pakistan are India's two enemies. But there's no denying that conventional asymmetry is increasing dramatically as India in the coming years inks massive arms deals with the US, Russia, France, and Israel.

The Indian government with its massive economy-policies and proactive methods would attempt to overwhelm Pakistan in conventional armaments. To close the gap in conventional asymmetry with arch competitor India, Pakistan must maintain robust conventional capabilities backed by credible nuclear deterrence. Lt. Gen Naeem Khalid Lodhi ®, a Pakistani vital scholar and master, believes atomic weapons to be an extraordinary hindrance against a mathematically predominant enemy, expressing that "so with atomic weapons with us, I don't think we really want to have any weapons contest, yet we should recollect one thing that inside the domain of atomic weapons, you need to keep a specific degree of vulnerability, reaches, and exactness so the prevention works." In that unique circumstance, Pakistan should foster a guaranteed second strike capacity to safeguard its atomic resources and C4I framework from any execution strike.

Also, the most favored technique for accomplishing guaranteed Second Strike Capacity is through atomic submarines furnished with long-range SLBMs. Naval commander (Retd) Muhammad Haroon, Pakistan ought to secure an atomic submarine on the grounds that "the expense of an atomic submarine or other military frameworks is considerably less than the misappropriation and debasement that happens in the country." We can oversee it, bear the cost

of it, and run it more successfully than the Indians. Pakistan's atomic weapons as an obstacle to the Indian military's traditional strength.

Pakistan should secure ATGMs as well as improving the Al-Khalid tanks, automated powers, and C4I vehicles' quality, speed, range, capability, warm vision, and mobility to face the Indian Armed force's procurement of unimaginably progressed T-90 tanks. Pakistan's military has to integrate EW and NCW capabilities, prioritize anti-weapons, and improve coordination and cooperation among its wings in order to challenge India's conventional superiority in the future. Furthermore, the human aspect undoubtedly plays a significant impact. Men are always behind the firearms, playing their roles. It is critical for the Pakistani military to integrate NCW capabilities into all corps, cadres, and ranks.

In addition, to reinforce customary obstruction against India, Pakistan ought to forcefully partake in talks and agreements for updating and acquiring regular arms from different sellers. Drives in the customary space, like the extension or potentially modernization of its voyage rocket program, air protections, automated elevated vehicles, and surface and sub-surface armada, will empower Pakistan to do a restricted or enormous scope traditional military activity against India on the off chance that essential by denying the Indian Flying corps the capacity to accomplish air predominance over Pakistan. Further developed air guards will permit Pakistani ground troops to execute cautious and counter-hostile activities against Indian integrated battle groups (IBGs) and strike corps.

India's defence relations with Israel, as well as the development of military and nuclear capabilities through its strategic cooperation with Israel, would not only threaten regional balance but would also have serious ramifications for South Asian stability in the long run. This cooperation demonstrates India's strong commitment to domination and power projection in the larger Southern Asian region, which encompasses the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits. India regards Pakistan and China as key obstacles in its goal for hegemony. As a result, the defence alliance with Israel is viewed as a guarantee of achieving its objectives. All major arms deal with Israel, including the transfer of technology and production of missiles, are "part of Prime Minister Modi's Make in India initiative for Indian regional hegemon.

The steady advancement and collaboration in missile defence systems with Israel under this effort is creating a regional security conundrum by jeopardizing the security of other governments. The turn of events and acquisition and also missile expansion are debilitating "vital strength" and having the "possibility to heighten" the weapons contest. In this movement,

Delhi appears to have dismissed the way that its exercises are irritating the security circumstance, making weakness, developing the weapons contest, and provoking Pakistan to take countermeasures, all of which will fuel the security climate in the region.

Unsurprisingly, the development and deployment of TNWs will dissuade the Indian military from engaging in CSD-related or proactive military activities. However, the Indian military's shift from CSD to 'surgical strike' would exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan. Indian strategic strategists believe that surgical strikes are feasible and acceptable on a domestic and global scale. Whereas the expense of such strikes would surpass the Indian military's aims. What if Indian planes or helicopters carrying out surgical attacks are shot down by Pakistani air defence systems, Indian Special Forces operatives are apprehended or killed by Pakistani security forces, or Pakistan responds with counter surgical strikes that cause even more damage? All of these possibilities would not only shame the Indian military in front of its own people, but would also put it under pressure to intensify the fight. In such a case, things could spiral out of control, and both countries could launch a full-fledged war, potentially leading to a nuclear exchange.

Because the role of nuclear deterrence in 21st-century nuclear politics may remain unchanged as long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear-weapon states are likely to be diminished. But when alternative options, including highly developed conventional forces, are developed to assist nuclear-weapon states in achieving their military goals, nuclear weapons will eventually be phased away. This will also hold true for the South Asian region, where increasing conventional asymmetry and the more advanced conventional forces of a single nuclear armed state, such as India, might erode Pakistan's deterrent capabilities in particular and further threaten the region's broader strategic stability.

Realistic measures are required to address the conventional disparity between India and Pakistan and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. One scenario is that India convinces Pakistan not to use its advanced conventional weapons against Pakistan by means of a legally enforceable agreement. Rather, the Indian Ocean region's other rising conventional and non-traditional challenges are being addressed under the country's 'Act East' policy. The second possibility is that India might resolve South Asia's conventional disparity by imposing restrictions and even stopping the development of superior conventional capabilities through a regime of strategic restraint. Additionally, Pakistan may decide to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons while bolstering its conventional troops in order to maintain some degree of balance

in South Asia, a move that the enemy is likely to understand. Lastly, Pakistan may choose to wait and see if a suggested international framework for arms control is sufficiently implemented, allowing disputes involving conventional and nuclear weapons to be settled gradually.

Despite the drawbacks of each of these routes, South Asia's strategic stability and peace can yet be restored. It will be up to the political and security authorities in the region to sort through the options and choose workable, long-term solutions. Nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent and stop nuclear countries from launching more extensive wars, but they are not a panacea for all current issues. To maintain peace and stability, South Asian leaders will need to develop alternative options beyond nuclear and sophisticated deterrent military capabilities. To restart the discussion, India and Pakistan must move beyond nuclear deterrence and an advanced conventional force posture. There would be less chance of misunderstandings, an endless weapons race, and accidental battles between them. To attain these goals, a constraint regime must be established.

The Indian civilian leadership could attempt to convince Pakistan that its purchase of sophisticated conventional capacity is not necessarily directed at Pakistan, even if doing so would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. In order to combat these and other conventional and non-traditional security concerns in the Indian Ocean region, India is instead bolstering its conventional forces. For example, India fears that China's rise may undermine its legitimacy as a significant regional actor. India's aspiration to become a regional power will surely lead it to amass superior conventional and other strategic assets that will facilitate power projection—a crucial function of a growing state. It will extend its sphere of influence beyond South Asia and keep enhancing its conventional and nuclear capabilities. Even if India is able to convince Pakistan that the security issue is not unique to Pakistan, its force capabilities may make it worse.

While addressing the issue of the growing conventional military gap in South Asia and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan may agree on whether the US and China should play a significant role in drafting the provisions of the proposed SRR. India's strategic interests would be harmed if Pakistan turned to nuclear weapons in the absence of an SSR. India will benefit from an SRR with Pakistan as well. A methodology for identifying conventional forces that Pakistan views as a danger may be agreed upon by both nations.

Moreover, conventional forces can be reduced to a level that is agreeable to both nations. It is possible to halt their expansion to prevent upsetting the strategic position of the opposing side. Secondly, the implementation of a legally binding agreement could guarantee that India's advanced conventional forces are not used against Pakistan. Three, a provision declaring that neither side would primarily rely on nuclear weapons and will only use them as a deterrent may be included in the proposed treaty. Ideally, this provision would limit the use of nuclear weapons after the problem of conventional military asymmetry has been resolved.

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