

**Security Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan and
Afghanistan: Post 2014**



Researcher

Ayesha Ayub

Registration No.20-FSS/MSPS/F14


Supervisor

Dr.Sadaf Farooq

Assistant Professor

Department of Politics & I.R, IIUI

**Department of Politics and International Relations
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD
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
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Supervisor:



Dr. Sadaf Farooq
Assistant Professor
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad

Internal Examiner:




Professor Dr. Amna Mahmood
Department of Politics and International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad

External Examiner:



Dr. Noman Omar Sattar
Director Area Study center
Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad



Professor Dr. Amna Mahmood
Chairperson
Politics and International Relations
International Islamic University Islamabad



Professor Dr. Samina Yasmeen Malik
Dean
Faculty of Social Sciences,
International Islamic University Islamabad

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Dedication

To my Beloved, Parents, Friends and Teachers

Acknowledgment

In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful Innumerable thanks to ALMIGHTY ALLAH, for giving me courage to accomplish the assigned task. Also, thankful to our Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) for enabling us to recognize our Lord and Creator.

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Table of Contents

Plagiarism Disclaimer.....	i
Dedications.....	ii
Acknowledgment.....	iii
List of Abbreviations.....	vi
Abstract.....	vii
Chapter 01: Introduction	
1.1 Rationale of the Study.....	3
1.2 Problem Statement.....	4
1.3 Objective of the Study.....	4
1.4 Research Questions.....	4
1.6 Significance of the Study.....	5
1.7 Literature Review.....	6
1. 8 Methodology.....	10
1.9 Organization of the Study.....	10
Chapter 02: Theoretical Framework.....	11
Chapter 03: Historical Perspective of Pak-Afghan Relations	
3.1 Durand line.....	19
3.2 Pakhtoon Nationalism.....	23
3.3 Soviet Invasion.....	25
3.4 Post Soviet Withdrawal (Civil War).....	27

3.5 Taliban Regime (1996-2000).....	27
Chapter 04: Pakistan Afghanistan Relations: Post 9/11 Era	
4.1 US Invasion: Interim Government (2000-2003).....	33
4.2 Hamid Karzai's Regime and Pak-Afghan Relations	35
4.3 Pak-Afghan Relations during Ashraf Ghani's Era.....	43
Chapter 05: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan and Afghanistan in Post 2014	
5.1 Challenges.....	46
5.1.1 Indian Factor.....	46
5.1.2 Refugees Conundrum.....	48
5.1.3 Cross Boarder Terrorism.....	49
5.1.4 Ethnic Chaos.....	51
5.2 Opportunities.....	52
5.2.1 Bilateral Trade and Security.....	52
5.2.2 Regional Linkage.....	53
5.2.3 Diplomatic Relations.....	56
Chapter 06: Post 2014 Pak- Afghan Relation: A Critical Appraisal.....	58
Conclusion & Recommendations.....	64
References.....	67

List of Abbreviations

APTTA	Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement
ASF	Afghan Security Forces
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Directorate of Security
NLC	National Logistics Cell
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
TAPI	Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan Gas Pipeline Project
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Abstract

Pakistan and Afghanistan, both the countries, despite having same history, religion, culture, languages and border contiguity, have never experienced smooth and positive relationships. The historical issues including Durand line, Pakhtunistan issue, Refugee crisis, and the most recent cross-border terrorism have held the foreign policy of both the countries captive to detrimental extent. In 2001, the deployment of international troops in Afghanistan led by US brought new challenges for Pakistan. Pakistan's responsibility for maintaining peace, law and order in its own territory was the biggest question mark because there is no defined border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The militants were allegedly hiding on both sides of the border and were entering Pakistan through this porous border.

With this background, both the countries require collaboration, high degree of mutual trust and confidence towards each other. Therefore, the purpose of current research is to find out that how the transition process in the realm of political, economic and security in Post 2014 scenario of Afghanistan have influenced Pak-Afghan relations. Pakistan and Afghanistan have always faced ups and downs in their relationships. Hence, the study also focuses on what steps Pakistan can take to reduce trust deficit with Afghanistan and how important Afghanistan is for enhancing Pakistan's security? The research argues that it is high time that Pakistan and Afghanistan move forward for economic cooperation and mutual consensus because Afghanistan is important for Pakistan, as well as, for the regional security.

Chapter 01

Introduction

Pakistan and Afghanistan, both the countries, despite having same history, religion, culture, same languages and border contiguity have never experienced smooth and positive relationships (Wazir, 2012). The cooperation between the two has always been hindered by the history of conflicts. Adding to these historical conflicts is the war on terror after 9 /11 that has resulted in militancy and extremism in both the states and deteriorated the hopes of cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Presence of other regional powers in this region further exacerbated the cooperation and triggered frictions between the two countries (David, Exum, & Irvine, 2011). History of conflicts starts from the Durand line issue which lopped off Pakistan and Afghanistan from one another. This conflictual demarcation has not yet been accepted by Afghanistan as an international border which makes the infiltration of people, narcotics and illegal trade out of the hands from both the states (Hussain & Latif, 2012). There have been several rounds of negotiations between both the states for the peaceful settlement of this contentious issue, but unfortunately, the issue has remained there and then. The Durand line issue always lingers between both the countries to halt their cooperation (Kayathwal, 1994).

With this Durand line the issue of Pakhtunistan, a claim by Afghan's government for the Western tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, comes between the long term prospects of cooperation among the two (Wazir, 2012). With the independence of Pakistan, Afghanistan refused to accept the newly independent state of Pakistan in the UN and claimed the Pashtuns of the two provinces Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan and the Pashtuns on the western tribal belt of Pakistan as her part and also placed a demand for the separate homeland for both the Pashtuns of

Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan's refusal to this claim of Afghanistan entangled both states in sort of permanent mistrust and hatred (Grare, 2006). In post-soviet, the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan moved towards normalization. The main purpose of this era was to reestablish strategic depth and sidestep any type of adverse consequences in Afghanistan (Hussain, 2008).

Pakistan, somehow, shared amiable relations with Afghanistan under Taliban regime but the 9/11 incident and Pakistan's support to US led war on terror not only destabilized both the states and societies of Pakistan and Afghanistan but also their relations with each other (Hussain & Latif, 2012). India's growing influence and her covert interests in the region and presence of other regional powers, blame game by both states against one another, porous borders and all the issues thwart to establish peaceful and cooperative relations (Grare, 2006).

Friendly relations of both, Pakistan and Afghanistan, depend either on the peaceful resolution of their disputes or adopting a diligent foreign policy of moving towards the soft issues and leaving aside the hard issues for a while to create an atmosphere free of mistrust that eventually will bolster their cooperation. Both, Afghanistan and Pakistan, cannot deny the fact that both states are vital for each other in maintaining stability, economic cooperation, countering militancy and for the long term cooperation in every field that is advantageous for both the states (Khan, 2014). Both states, though, are members of different organizations and several bilateral agreements and MOU's have been signed between both states for stabilizing the region and economic cooperation but the long withstanding disputes always create uncertainties in their relationship. After US forces leave Afghanistan, it would be the need of time that both states should resolve their past grievances and move ahead with new vigor of cooperation (Aziz, 2015). Long civil war in Afghanistan have ripped the country's economy and society. Pakistan being one of the neighboring regional power of Afghanistan can mend Afghanistan's frayed economy and society by providing financial and

manpower assistance, developing infrastructure, agricultural assistance, strengthening governance and providing trade routes to land locked Afghanistan. Both countries can further cooperate to dispose an issue of illicit trade resulting in a loss of trade revenues for states, in Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan gas pipeline project (TAPI), providing access to Pakistan for the Central Asian states and ultimately strengthening their trust for the peaceful resolution of their historical disputes (Usmani, 2015).

Before the complete withdrawal, US will have to take major initiatives so Afghanistan does not come under the clouds of instability and chaos again. There is a need of peace building and post conflict rehabilitation. For that purpose both the states, Afghanistan and Pakistan, will have to deal with each other, and the region as a whole (Khan, 2014).

1.1 Rationale of the Study

It is a historical fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan did not enjoy good relations. Despite of some common interest like history geography and culture there were also differences in certain issues. After continuous instability in Afghanistan the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were also disturbed. Recently, in Ashraf Ghani government the relations started to normalize and established bilateral economic, political and security relations but a U-turn in relationship of both the countries occurred. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the factors responsible for the ups and downs of Pakistan and Afghanistan relations specifically during Ashraf Ghani government. Furthermore, this study will be focusing on the methods through which the mistrust between the states can be reduced because it is an important factor for Pakistan's security and integrity.

1.2 Problem Statement

Pakistan and Afghanistan share geography, history, culture and religion. Both the states mutually need peace, stability and prosperity. However, the two did not enjoy healthy relations since the inception of Pakistan due to Durand Line, Pakhtonian issue, refugees' terrorism, security issue, illegal trade and corruption. Now, the question is, that how these issues will be resolved when Afghanistan is facing political, economic and geostrategic challenges in case of withdrawal from the country. Therefore it is important to understand the changing dynamics of Pak-afghan relations in Ashraf Ghani era and analyze the measures for enhancing trust deficit in both the states.

1.3 Objective of the Research

- To discuss the factors responsible for ups and downs in Pak-Afghan relations.
- To examine the political, economic and strategic repercussions on Pak-Afghan relations in the post-US withdrawal scenario.
- To analyze the steps Pakistan can take to reduce trust deficit with Afghanistan.
- To study the importance of Afghanistan for enhancing Pakistan's security.

1.4 Research Questions

Main Research Question

How the transition process in the realm of political, economic and security in Post 2014 scenario of Afghanistan have influenced Pak-Afghan relations?

Sub Research Questions

1. What are the main obstacles for Pak-Afghan relations in the post 2014 era?
2. What opportunities Pakistan and Afghanistan have for the improvement of their relations in the post 2014 era?

3. What factors are responsible for ups and downs in Pak-Afghan relations in Ashraf Ghani Government?
4. What steps Pakistan can take to reduce trust deficit with Afghanistan?
5. How important Afghanistan is for enhancing Pakistan's security?

1.5 Significance of the Study

Pakistan and Afghanistan did not enjoy smooth relations ever. Both the states have had ups and downs in their relations. Although, they share some commonalities like geography, history, ethnicity and culture but also have differences like Durand Line, which is the core factor for instability in their relationship. This study would provide a good understanding of challenges and opportunities in Pak-Afghan relations. It will also analyze the political and economic consequence after US withdrawal in Pak-Afghan Relations, which will be helpful for the researcher and academicians. This research will also focus on the management of porous border and security issues which may be a positive step for policy makers of both the states.

1.6 Operational Definition of Major Terms/ Key Words

1. Soft Issues: The predicament related to society culture trade and economy.
2. Hard Issues: The dilemma related to security, Border, military and sovereignty.
3. Post withdrawal: The period in Afghanistan after US extraction.
4. Transition: To move from one system or approach to another changing scenario.
5. Blame Game: To accuse the others for point scoring.

1.7 Literature Review

The researcher describes the declining security and economic situation of Pakistan in post 9/11 era. Author of the book described both external and internal problems of Pakistan. He also describes the historical, geographic and demographic characteristics. After that he mentions the provincial balance of the country. Finally, it comes down to Taliban and eradication of extremist elements from the country. He discusses the creation of Taliban and Pakistan's role in its creation and argues how Pakistan was not responsible for Taliban's creation. The researcher then throws light on US-China relationship and how both the countries cannot influence Pakistan (Lieven, 2012).

The book, by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Muneer Mahmud and Mustansar Billah, describes the internal social, cultural and security issues faced by Pakistan and the changing global dynamics. In this book, the authors mentions the factors of Talibanisation of institutions in their study "The Jehadi Curriculum—A Prelude to Talibanisation in Pakistan" which discusses the introduction of Jihadi literature in madrassas by the secret agencies during the Afghan war which later evolved into an uncontrollable monster. The book addresses the issue of "Human Trafficking in South Asia and the Indian Factor", and also discusses the reasons and regions where human trafficking is very common and how it is being done (2008).

Carlotta Gall in her works described her visit to Pakistan in year 2001. The author mentioned the attack on Malala Yousufzai by Afghan Taliban and the active participation of Pakistan in the conflict seen rather than it being fighting a proxy war. Gall basically sheds light on the role of ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency, and its past and current affiliations with Taliban and elaborate Pakistan's support for Taliban as an excuse against pro-India Afghan groups but does not mention the context of the stance. The writer gives many instances where she believes

that ISI has close links with Taliban and Osama Bin Laden but most of her accusations are based on her gut feelings and rough calculations. She also mentions her visit to a Taliban controlled village and reveal how she was guided and escorted by the Mujahideen there and the odd environment she could sense. Gall's Afghanistan is very closely associated with Pakistan as she is sure about the affiliations of Pakistani militants with Afghan militants and Al Qaeda. She relates the security position of both the countries which in some way or the other influences US security too. Gall presciently warns, militant Islamism is "a juggernaut that cannot be turned off or turned away from" and will tie the United States to the region for decades to come (Gall, 2014).

In this research, the author discussed that the Legacy is an important determinant of foreign relations of a country, besides both domestic and external variables. He also mentioned that history played an important role in understanding of any conflict thus he explains the complexity of Pak-Afghan relation in a historical context that is Durand Line. The problem in Pak-Afghan started when Afghanistan refused to recognize Pakistan on UN forum.

Furthermore, he discussed the one unit scheme of Pakistan in 1955 to integrate Pakistan's four provinces. But the Prime Minister of Afghanistan Sardar Daud Khan strongly condemned one unit scheme. Demonstrations were staged against this move before Pakistan's diplomatic mission in Kabul. He also elaborated Ayub Khan's relations with Afghanistan that he was a Pakhtoon but the relations at that time were also hostile (Kayathwal, 1994).

The author in his work pointed out the historical perspective of relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan that they are generally labeled as inseparable states due to their historical, religious, cultural, linguistic, trade and ethnic linkages. He focused on positivity of relationship between the states that their connections are so deep that even the Afghan President

Mr. Karzai, during his visit to India, compellingly professed that Pakistan and Afghanistan were “identical twins” (Wazir, 2012).

In the article the author stated that Pakistan and India are fighting an embryonic proxy war in war-torn Afghanistan. Pakistan sees the instability in FATA and Baluchistan with keen eye that it is because of growing Indian political, economic and military influence in Afghanistan. The author also focused on the evolving situations through Pakistani perspectives. In the end, the author concluded with a suggestion that, to achieve these ends, democratizing Pakistan is first and foremost a strategic imperative (Grare, 2006).

In this article, the author expresses that Afghanistan’s strategic partnership with India shows that Afghanistan is annoying on grounds that Pakistan didn’t fulfill her repeated commitments to shared ties with Taliban by explaining India’s strategic relationship with Afghanistan and the opposite role of Pakistan. He further explains Pakistan’s historical relationship with Afghanistan with the reference of Durand line issue and Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. He concluded that the peace process in Afghanistan is of high cost but it is necessary for long term peace and stability and prosperity of the region (Tripathi, 2011).

In his research, the author observes the challenges that Pakistan is expected to face after the withdrawal of United States troops from Afghanistan, at present. United States achieved its goal of curbing terrorism that posed threat on the US after killing Osama Bin Laden and it is now safe from all the possible threats from Afghanistan. The US president, Barrack Obama, has announced the withdrawal of forces from the Afghan territory. The researcher also mentions the economic recession and the influence of Afghan war on its budget but also mentions how the sudden withdrawal will ruin all the past sacrifices and investment Insurgent activities in

Afghanistan cannot be avoided, according to the researcher, due to Taliban. Insurgency in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan directly due to Taliban's designs (Soherwordi, 2012).

In this article the author writes about the possibilities Pakistan will be left with after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. According the researcher, the idea of an Afghan National Army cannot be appreciated. The capabilities of Afghan National Army cannot be trusted as they are not operationally and technically reliable. The soldiers of this army desert very often. This situation is very threatening for Pakistan. Pakistan has suffered a lot due to this war on terror already and cannot afford more sacrifices. The internal security of Pakistan is at high risk and the insurgency from Balochistan region is causing more threat to the country. Not only this, the US decision on the remaining troops is still not final and this pendency in decisions of their immunity is causing more ambiguity. It is hard for Pakistan to avoid its role and responsibilities in the reconciliation process but Pakistan has to support 'Afghan owned and Afghan led' process (Iqal, 2013).

According to the article, economic relations are very important for the Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relations. For that, the issue of Afghan refugees should be solved i.e. they should go back to their country. That is possible only when Afghanistan has peace and stability. In post 2014 era when both countries have the new presidents in their offices, both wanting to develop a bilateral ties, Pakistan could help Afghanistan on the grounds of security threats. The article briefly explained the Issues of Pakistan i.e. military interventions and Afghanistan i.e. corruptions, security issue and suggest what should Pakistan and Afghanistan do for increasing the bilateral relations (Dogan, 2014).

This article explains the press conferences' speeches of both the countries' Presidents. He discusses that terrorism is the common enemy of both the countries and peace and security is

important to stabilize peace and security. Both the countries want to see the bright economic future because they are located on the crossroad of region and the Chief Executive also requested the extension of deadline for refugees' expulsion from Pakistan. Pakistan is taking steps for the construction of the dam on the Kunar River, TAPI and KASA-1000 project with the solving the Afghan refugees issue (Manager, 2015).

1.8 Methodology

This research is qualitative in nature that adopted descriptive and explanatory method. For collection of data both secondary and primary resources are used. For primary sources in-depth unstructured interviews are conducted from the experts of the area. For secondary sources books, scholarly articles, reports, magazines articles, newspapers, TV program, and internet is used.

1.9 Organization of the Study

Chapter one is introductory, it gives overview of the whole research. Second chapter discusses the theoretical understanding of the study and its implementation on Pakistan Afghanistan Relations. Third chapters deals with the Pakistan Afghanistan relations through the lens of history. Fourth chapter deals with Post 9/11 Pak-Afghan Relations. Chapter fifth analyzes security challenges and opportunities of Pak-Afghan Relations in Post Withdrawal Era. Sixth chapter gives an analysis of Post 2014 Pak Afghan Relations. Chapter seventh as followed by Conclusion and with a few Recommendations.

Chapter 02

Theoretical Framework

Many of the researchers previously discussed Pak-Afghan relations in the context of realist and liberalist school of thoughts but this research is an effort to epitomize the relations between the two states with complex interdependence (a combination of realism and liberalism). Historically, the collaboration of Pakistan and Afghanistan has been extremely deep which experienced many ups and downs but in spite of that remained unbroken and continued to be boosted. The relations between the two countries are not dependent upon military or economy but in fact, both the states are tied in religious, social/cultural, geographical, economic and strategic links. This is why it will not be wrong to measure Pak-Afghan relations with emerging perspective “complex interdependence”. The theory covers a large area of international relations and is totally compatible to clarify the profound association of Pakistan and Afghanistan because it takes into account multiple factors (military; economy; culture; social) upon which the states build their relations in contemporary world.

It has been observed throughout history that those states governed the earth which developed huge and well-equipped armies. For dominance on international scene, a gigantic military was considered indispensable. From the time of Spartans to the era of Cold War, a massive military was brought about power for prevailing states (Banks, 1985).

While on the other hand, in 19th and 20th century, another fact was budding. Industrial and technological advancement began to reduce the massive significance of large military to gain power. The states identified that to control the world, military is not the only source, but strong economy can be proved more beneficial to overcome international stage (Ney, 1997). As economy

gained popularity among the international players, the concept of economic interdependence emerged suddenly (Crane, 1997).

2.1 Emergence of Complex Interdependence

The term “complex interdependence” was claimed by Raymond Leslie Buell in 1925 to describe “the new ordering among economies, cultures and races” (uell, 1925). The concept of complex interdependence was created in 1977 “after the world had seen two world wars and a number of conflict situations between nations, the devastating consequences that these acts of violence left on mankind where a proof of the intrinsic connections one state has with another, even if they are from different religious or political backgrounds, or if they are located on the other side of the globe” (Nye, 1977). The truth is that we are all linked with each other in one way or another, and that is what complex interdependence made emphasis on. This opened up a whole new world in the study of international relations, showing how dominant nations such as United States, Great Britain, and Russia were involved in interdependent relations with under developed nations (Waltz, 1986). The growing rate of transnational flows and the increase in channels of communication are creating an uprising in interdependence between states and nations, these relations influence them in many ways not only referring to material needs or objects but also in political and ideological concepts. Complex interdependence in international relations is the idea put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye that states and their fortunes are inextricably tied together in various aspects of their national resources, whether they be economic, military, agricultural, and political amongst others (Nye and Keohane, 1977).

Today's complex interdependence has become a versatile interdependence, one that includes a diversity of issues from cultural problems to environmental concerns, far from what it used to be, solely dependent on economic objectives and the support of military strength. This in

terms of international relations shows us that the evolution of international relations has gone from military and economic dominance to an environment of general concern referring to as much aspects of one notion as possible; "everything, from the strength of our economy to the safety of our cities, to the health of our people, depends on events not only within our borders, but half a world away. We must see the opportunities and the dangers of the interdependent world in which we are clearly fated to live." (President of the United States Bill Clinton, 1999). To make clarity about the links between Pakistan and Afghanistan, complex interdependence this is why, facilitates. Because the relations amid the two countries are beyond military and economy but build on culture, language, religion, geography, environment, strategy and security. In the current era, one can see that the issues of Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked with each other due to the mutual societal association. From political instability to terrorism and from environmental problems to economic destabilization, both the states are inter-connected. Complex interdependence covers all these issues under its domain and moreover, does not believe upon the hierarchy of concerns, this is the reason that the theory just does not explain the particular case but can smooth the impending Pak-Afghan relations.

The theory was hugely supported by the valuable study of Richard N. Cooper in late 1970. According to this surmise, international relations will depend on economy rather military in coming era and moreover, this economic interdependence increases if on persistent bases, the likelihood of War Between the States will decrease (Cooper, 1970). The hypothesis of economic interdependence is not a dispute against the contemporary world. In fact, economic interdependence has gained immense popularity prior to World War I and then again at a snail's pace after America's isolationist period post-World War II (Keohane, 1998).

According to Nye, “economic interdependence involves policy choices about values and costs” (Nye, 2002, P.6). These policy choices are based most often on the ideas of supply and demand; in the sense that what one country cannot supply for its citizens, can be supplied through trade with another country. These policy decisions however, are quite often not as simple as just supply and demand, but instead are largely dependent upon the distribution of resources, especially those resources considered to be “power resources” (Keohane, 1977). In Nye’s explanation of economic interdependence, he is very quick to point out that in and of it, interdependence is neither a good thing nor a bad thing (Ney, 1998). After the materialization of new perception (economic interdependence) the narrative of international relations has also been revolutionized.

Nye and Keohane argue, “The decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other forms of interdependence should increase the probability of cooperation among states” (Nye and Keohane, 1998, P.15). The work of the theorists surfaced in the 1970s to become a significant challenge to political realist theory in international politics and became introductory to current theories that have been categorized as liberalism (International Relations), Neoliberalism and Liberal institutionalism. Traditional critiques of Liberalism are often defined alongside critiques of political realism, mainly that they both ignore the social nature of relations between states and the social fabric of international society. With the rise of neoliberal economics, debates, and the need to clarify international relations theory, Keohane in 2002, has most recently described himself as simply an Institutionalism, nothing purpose for developing sociological perspectives in contemporary International relations theory (Keohane, 2002). Liberal, neoliberal and neoliberal institutional theories continue to influence international politics and have become closely intertwined with political realism.

Interstate relations are thought to be “normal channels” (Waltz, 1979) by realists. It is also known as horizontal dimensions of federalism (Waltz, 2000). Trans-governmental relations apply when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as units. Crane Liberals believe that states can work together in order to enhance interdependence” (Crane, 1997). Transnational relations apply when we relax the assumption that states are the only units. This is more of the liberal point of view that is evident throughout international relations, because of the belief of institutions. Nye describes interdependence in an analytical sense, as situations in which actors or events in different parts of a system affect each other (Nye, 2011). Nye continues his definition of interdependence by stating that the results are often varied and although the potential for benefits exist, the potential for tragedy exists as well (Nye, 1977). Despite this potential for varying results Nye also notes that it is very difficult and very costly for a country to try and cut itself off from the world, such as Myanmar or Albania did (Nye, 2002).

2.2 Vital Characteristics of Complex Interdependence and Pak-Afghan Relations

From the analysis, complex interdependence is characterized by three characteristics involving

1. The use of multiple channels of action between societies in interstate, trans-governmental and transnational relations. Multiple channels facilitate actions between communities either they be interstate or transnational (Keohane, 2011). In the context of Pak-Afghan setting, multiple channels played a fundamental role to fortify economic; social/cultural; political; strategic/security and religious relations not only on societal but on transgovernmental and as well as on transnational level. In the coming era, multiple channels can be utilized more to tackle the emerging challenges just like cross-border terrorism and refugee tension.

2. The absence of a hierarchy of issues with changing agendas and linkages between issues prioritized and the objectives. In fact, we have issue areas and regimes, which show us a wide agenda of topics that link states together in order to reach their objectives , in other words the line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred in this case, as realistically there is nuclear agenda in interstate relations (Keohane, 1977). When the case of Pak-Afghan relations is studied, it can easily be observed that the liaison between the two countries is based on various dimensions but whenever, the issues are endeavored to solve from the top down approach. As already mentioned that in international relations, there is no clear agenda and hierarchy of issues does not matter. The predicaments can be resolved from bottom up approaches. It is not necessary to find the solutions of political and security problems, both the states can take beginning from economic and social challenges.
3. Bringing about a decline in the use of military force and coercive power in international relations (Rees, 1993). As substitute routes, this shows the use of force as a non-viable tool in international relations and offers diplomacy and policies (Nye, 1997). In Pak-Afghan case, rigid stances by the governments, has been seen particularly, in recent era. When any type of activity related to terrorism and security matter creates instability in Pakistan or Afghanistan, a blame game generates. From Pakistani side, borders are closed, because of that daily routine life of Afghan people is affected. On the other hand, afghan government points the finger at Pakistani territory for the incidents of terrorism in Afghanistan. As according to complex interdependence theory, diplomacy and soft policies can solve the tensions between the states in a better way rather militarily solutions. Pakistan and

Afghanistan if focus on diplomatic options, they can handle not only their challenges but also can strengthen their historical relation more than before.

4. According to Nye interdependence can be divided into four separate dimensions, which are its 1) Sources 2) Benefits 3) Costs 4) Symmetry

These dimensions can originate in both the physical and social aspects of society (Nye, 1977). The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan in the near future must analyze their relations in the context of costs and benefits. They must concentrate on their social and physical sources and symmetry to maintain the friendly linkage and to face emerging challenges.

5. Today's international relations experts fully understand that globalization has taken over, and that the only way nations are going to improve their qualities of life, improve their domestic economies, and be seen as a strong and potential hot spot for external investments is to create deep rooted bonds with states worldwide (Waltz, 1986). Nations used to have pretty much basic foreign policies, mostly limited to imports and exports, but thanks to the breakthroughs in international relations, most foreign policies have expanded exponentially in the matters of agriculture, fiscal aid, terrorism, the environment, health, and education (Keohane and Nye, 2011). After the world trade center attacks on September 11, 2001, the world realized that terrorism is a major threat for everyone, because it can happen to anyone, anywhere, at any time, therefore it became a top priority topic in international relations, lead almost entirely by the United States and Great Britain. These new alliances wanted to create a worldwide network of nations fighting against terrorism, in order to avoid such regrettable acts such as the ones lived the citizens of New York City (Nye, 2011). Similarly, Pakistan and Afghanistan are facing the phenomenon of terrorism

as a great challenge. If both the states established alliances to tackle the fact of terrorism as developed world bound the states in strong ties. The issue of terrorism between the two countries can be ended.

The complex interdependence has created a major boost in international relation in the 21st century, by creating better and deeper relationships amongst nations, but certain academics have seen a growing problem in international relations in the new millennia; while the central problem of international relations in the 20th century was states that were too strong like Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union, the primary problems of international relations in the 21st century are states that are too weak for example Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, amongst others (McInnes, 1993). This is mainly because these states are going to need more detailed and consistent help from the global community, this is a positive aspect for these developing nations, but it could be seen as a negative for stronger states, because of the setbacks these relations can create in their domestic economies and issues (Crane, 1998). The government of the two states must utilize the multifaceted approach (complex interdependence), as the other countries are taking benefit by the influential work of the theorists of this concept.

Chapter 03

Historical Perspective of Pak-Afghan Relations

Pakistan and Afghanistan, both the countries, despite of having same history, religion, culture, some languages and border contiguity, have never experienced smooth and positive relationship. It is lamentable datum of the history, that since Pakistan's birth, the very close neighbor Afghanistan adopted an aggressive behavior toward Pakistan (Wazir, 2012). The relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan always revolved around two historic issues of conflict and destroyed cooperation between them. Afghanistan shows a very indifferent attitude towards the Durand line and Pakhtunistan issues. The Afghanistan's ambitions for both Durand line and Pakhtunistan issues was to gain control on those areas which was part of the Ahmad Shah Abdali's subjugated areas. Adding to these historical conflicts is the war on terror after 9 /11 that has resulted in militancy and extremism in both the states and deteriorated the hopes of cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Presence of other regional powers in this region further exacerbated the cooperation and triggered frictions but friendship (David& Irvine, 2011).

3.1 Durand Line

History of conflicts starts from the Durand line issue which lopped off Pakistan and Afghanistan from one another. This conflictual demarcation has not yet been accepted by Afghanistan as an international border which makes the infiltration of people, narcotics and illegal trade out of the hands from both the states (Hussain & Latif, 2012). There have been several rounds of negotiations between both the states and even with the mediation of the third party for the peaceful settlement of this contentious issue but unfortunately the issue has remained there and then. This Durand line issue always lingers between both the countries to halt their cooperation (Kayathwal, 1994).

The Durand Line is the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The name Durand line was given after the foreign secretary Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. The secretary Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Afghan agent Amir Abdur Rehman in 1893 drew down the boundary between Afghanistan and British India. The colonizer Britain had pinched three lines on the map of subcontinent when they were ruling that area (Mazhe & Goraya, 2009). These territorial demarcations were: first was McMahon Line, this line was the boundary area between India and China. The second was RadCliff Line, this line was the boundary division between the two countries. The third one was Durand Line, which show the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The three border line, later, turned into a conflict between the concerned states. The intensions of the Britishers were to separate their empire from Russia. The first border line was to bring the areas of subcontinent under the direct British administration and separate those areas which were under the control of Pashtuns. The second border, the Durand Line divided the Pashtun tribal areas from Afghanistan's administration. The third outer frontier, Afghanistan's border with China, Russia and Iran, fixed the British sphere of influence (Bajoria, 2009).

The Durand Line border of Pakistan side includes two provinces; Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the tribal areas. However, the Afghanistan side of the borderline prolongs from Nuristan province to Nimruz in the southwest. It extends to the Arabian Sea running the Pamir mountain range in the North for about 1,500 miles (Balance, 2004). The need for demarcation arose when there was a geopolitical struggle between the empires. The power struggle between British and Russia empires resulted in Russians seizing the central Asian lands and British taking control of the Indian subcontinent. British feared that Russians may not move ahead to the Afghanistan as it was a peak time of Great Game as European powers were competing for Central Asia and two Anglo-Afghan wars had been fought between British and Afghanistan in which British lost the

first war and gained control of Kabul in the second war. Following the second Anglo-Afghan war, British established a durable border regime with separate statuses for Afghanistan and Baluchistan and Pashtun territories under the administration of British India (Balance, 2004).

Durand Line agreement, that demarcates the British area of influence from Afghanistan, was recognized by Afghanistan government since 1905 and also continued in 1919, 1921 and 1923 (Mazhe & Goraya, 2009). Alongside the concept of expiry of a treaty is wrong, as there is no such document which stated that the treaty was valid for 100 years (Mazhe & Goraya, 2009). Moreover, there also has not been any evidences which state that the treaty had been signed under any duress by the British because if that was the case treaty would not have been ratified by the successive regimes of the Afghanistan. This distortion in the treaty is just propaganda by some Afghani writers and Indian writers who constantly distort the facts on the websites (Haq, n.d.). This propaganda is hitting the targets well which eventually is deteriorating the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and both states face numerous challenges like illegal trade and border crossing, illicit narcotics trade and cross border terrorism.

Pakistan and Afghanistan's peaceful relations are not only good for this region but it extends to the Central Asian states as well. But this distorted historical border dispute presents a major debacle between these two states. Since the inception of Pakistan the border has persisted a base of resentment between two countries. In 1950, Pakistan and Afghanistan had violent clashes on their borders (Dupree & Pazhwak, 2003). In 1960 both Afghanistan and Pakistan again had clashes on the border when Afghan forces infiltrated from Afghanistan into Bajour agency in FATA and clashed with Pakistan army (Khan & Wanger, 2013).

Several efforts have been made to end up this issue to avoid Skirmishes between both states that erupted since the inception of Pakistan but Afghanistan never cooperated on the issue with a

view of not slicing the Pashtuns residing on the borders of Durand Line. President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai said in a statement that this line is a 'Line of hate' (Mazhe & Goraya, 2009) and he further stated that The Afghan nation and not Hamid Karzai would have to decide the issue of Durand line" (Mazhe & Goraya, 2009). However later Afghan officials asked US to renegotiate Durand Line but United State refused to deal with the border issue and offered help for the relocating border posts (Mazhe & Goraya, 2009). In 2003 senior US, Pakistani and Afghan diplomats with military officials visited the site that where should the border demarcation lie but it could not go ahead to resolve the issue rather it just remained a mapping exercise between the two states (Ahmed & Bhatnagar, 2015). The government of Pakistan in Dec, 2006 announced fencing and placement of mines around the Durand line. (Ahmed, Arif, & Khan, 2012) But on UN reservation over mines and Afghan government's opposition it could not be done.

Both, Pakistan and Afghanistan, are suffering from this border dispute. Since the time of the eruption of this dispute till now, Afghanistan and Pakistan have lost many lives of the people and a lot of money on the check posts and for their security have been spent which could be used for the development of both states, but dispute has remained unresolved. Pakistan and Afghanistan should put this dispute aside or should come with some solution either bilaterally or with the assistance of the third party to avoid further clashes. The cooperation from both sides is needed to deal with the management of cross border conflicts which would be helpful to transform the disputed line into an area of collaboration rather than hostility (Khan & Wanger, 2013). After the departure of US forces from Afghanistan both states will have to cooperate with each other for the security and development of both states and societies.

3.2 Pakhtoon Nationalism

With this Durand line the issue of Pakhtunistan, a claim by Afghan's government for the Western tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, comes between the long term prospects of cooperation among the two (Wazir, 2012). With the independence of Pakistan, Afghanistan refused to accept the newly independent state of Pakistan in the UN and claimed the Pashtuns of the two provinces Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. The Pashtuns on the western tribal belt of Pakistan as her part also placed a demand for the separate homeland for both the Pashtuns of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan's refusal to this claim of Afghanistan entangled both states in sort of a permanent mistrust and hatred (Grare, 2006).

Afghanistan showed bad attitude towards Indian and Pakistan liberation. As Afghanistan was angry because they wanted to get back these areas to Afghanistan. Thus, they wrote a letter to Lord Mountbatten and asked "to raise the possibility of the Pashtuns coming under the Afghan wing" but the colonizers terminated the proposal.

The first Ambassador to Pakistan in his speech mentioned that:

"I declare that Afghanistan has no claims on frontier territory, and even if there were any, they have been given up in favor of Pakistan. Anything contrary to this which may have appeared in the press should not be given credence at all and should be considered a canard" (Omrani, 2009).

Kabul radio at that time also demanded that all the territory to the Indus and Baluchistan should be incorporated back into Afghanistan.

Afterwards in 1930's there was also a quest for Pashtun independence in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in British India. Local leaders like Ghaffar Khan formed a Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) or Red Shirt movement to campaign for an independent Pashtun state that is based on the non-violence. This non-violence made him famous as Frontier Gandhi (Saikal, 2010).

But the option of independence was not accepted by the British and therefore not included in the referendum of July 6 to 17, 1947 (Hussain, 2005). After the independence of Pakistan all those Pashtun organizations that promoted independence including the Khudai Khidmatgar movement were banned in 1948 (Khan & Wanger, 2013). Referendum was held in which Pashtuns were only given choice to either join India or Pakistan. Resultantly, Pashtuns boycotted the referendum (Saikal, 2010). As a result, skirmishes between both states erupted first in 1949 and later by a breakdown of diplomatic relations between both the countries in 1961 which were restored later in 1964. In the 1960s, Afghanistan not only continued to celebrate a Pashtunistan Day but also tried to internationalize the Pashtunistan issue by bringing it to the International Islamic Economic Conference and United Nations (Hussain, 1996). However, she could not get the international support on the issue. Later in the cold war Russia supported the Pashtun before invasion of 1989 to have good relations with Afghanistan by playing the cards of providing support to Pashtuns movement. Later when Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan's support to the Pashtun's resulted in a normalization of relations between the two and issue of Pashtuns was set aside for a while. However, later when Pakistan joined the war on terror and assisted US in combating Taliban in her territory and in Afghanistan and launched operations against Taliban in the tribal areas resulted in a detestation in the Pashtun's tribe in and across the border.

However, with the end of US led war on terror the Pashtuns communities on both sides of the border that makes 40% of the total population of Afghanistan and 16% of the Pakistan's population (Saikal, 2010) should be dealt strategically. Pakistan should give them representation in all segments of life so that their past grievances of marginalization may not surface the future well-being of Pakistani state. Afghanistan, on the other hand, should adopt measures to promote

effective governance, adopt strategies to counter militancy and maintain balance in regional powers for not having clash with Pakistan.

3.3 Soviet Invasion

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 27th December 1979. In this tragic event Hafizullah Amin, a statesmen and politician of Afghanistan, was killed. After the death of Amin, Barak Karamal, another Afghan politician, was installed as president of the country by Soviet Union. Barak Karamal being a Soviet ally created alarming situation for Pakistan. He started threatening Pakistan and brought the Red army near to the Khyber Pass. The Khyber Pass is the traditional entrance point for invaders to invade South Asia. The Soviet assault was perceived in Pakistan as a planned action more than a support to the new puppet government. The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan deeply deteriorated Pakistan-Afghanistan relations because during that time insurgency started in Baluchistan (Kux, 2001). The soviet military were spread in short time of an hour in different points of Indian Ocean, Baloch area and Persian Gulf.

The Soviet Union military movement was a direct threat to Pakistan. Strategically, Pakistan security is linked with Afghanistan because of such a long common border and the like was for Persian Gulf and Iran. Thus, the advocates of warm water theory were thinking that Pakistan was the terminal point for the Russian forces. Pakistan was under serious considerations to deal with superpower. Therefore, in this uncertain situation Pakistan had to choose how to deal with this situation: "accept it as the fait accompli, or provide full support to freedom fighters resisting against the invasion, or mobilize international community to put political pressure on Soviet Union along with covert support to the resistance forces" (Gul, 2006).

Due to serious security concerns Pakistan allowed United States to use Pakistani territory for proxy war against the expansion of communism. The Carter's regime offered economic and

military assistance to Pakistan of worth \$400 million for a time period of two years but this amount was rejected by Pakistani government.

Later in 1981, the Ronald Regan administration revised their proposal by understanding the urgency of the situation and increased the assistance up to \$3.2 billion for five years. America started arms supply to mujahedeen through ISI. The aid ranged to \$400 million in 1984, which was initially \$60 million in 1981 (Fair & Gregory, 2012). The foremost receivers of this assistance and trustworthy persons was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hezb-e-Islami. The Pakistan's tactical use of intelligence against Russian military forces made Afghanistan a "bleeding wound" for Soviet Union. In 1986, Gorbachev visited India and announced a political solution for Afghanistan that will assure its sovereignty and neutral status. Thus, it gave a new way to diplomacy and Pakistan commenced negotiation for the withdrawal of soviet forces. Hence, the diplomatic networks were drafting peace accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan but Ojiri Camp attack, on 10th April 1988, put hurdles in peace process. But with the continuous struggle on 14th April 1988 the Geneva Convention was signed in the presence of superpowers as a peace guarantors (Omrani, 2009).

The Soviet Union did not take necessary actions for post withdrawal period which triggered civil war in the country. After the withdrawal Afghanistan remained under civil war for eight years. After Soviet Union Pakistan made friendly relations with Afghanistan. The main reason of this foreign policy shift was the strategic depth against India. United States was also giving economic and military support to Pakistan to stop soviet expansion in the region. Pakistan made its position strong in Afghanistan with the help of Mujahidin and Taliban. In the post withdrawal period the government from Pakistan side paid special attention to their immediate neighboring country Afghanistan, to restore peace as well as strategic depth and avoid worse fallout (Hussain, 2008).

3.4 Post-Soviet Withdrawal (Civil War)

The Russian presence in Kabul was a grave menace to the sovereignty and security of Pakistan. Therefore, Gorbachev in 1986 visited India and wanted to sort out political solution of Afghanistan and ensured its territorial sovereignty. This step of Gorbachev opened the door of diplomacy and Pakistan started negotiations. So, the peace accord was signed on 14th April 1988 in Geneva (Durani & Khan, 2009) between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the presence of two superpowers as its guarantors.

The Pakistan and Afghanistan relations became deteriorated and the Pakistani citizens in Kabul were being termed as enemy agents. The situation went so worst that Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was closed down in July 1994 and Pak Afghan border was soon closed. Suddenly, a new force called Taliban emerged over the ashes left behind by the war lords in southern Afghanistan. Rabani betrayal created friction between Pakistan and Afghanistan and emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan provided Pakistan an alternative choice to replace Rabani (Hussain , 2005).

3.5 Taliban Regime (1996-2000)

Pakistan was looking for revival of peace and stability in Afghanistan and found an opportunity to realize its long awaited dream of having peace and stability in Afghanistan. The stability of Afghanistan was a necessary condition for the return of 3 million Afghan refugees to their home country. Disillusioned with the prolonged in-fighting and criminal activities of the Afghan Mujahideen leadership, the Tehreek-i-Islami-i-Taliban Afghanistan emerged in and around Kandhar in September 1994 and began as a new movement to pursue their demands. 1) To disarm all war lords/ militias either by persuasion or through coercion. 2) Restoration of peace and social order by enforcing Islamic laws in the areas under their control. 3) Retain control of all

areas liberated by the Taliban. 4) Defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan (Durani & Khan, 2009).

Taliban's rapid move and winning loyalties of opposing commanders by their success in bringing out peace and stability in the areas under their control have diluted the resolve of the Heratis, and the forces defending Jalal Abad, and Kabul to put up stiff resistance against them. Sultan Amir, Pakistan's Consul General in Herat recalls that "the Taliban brought peace, they eradicated poppies, gave free education, medical treatment and speedy justice. They were the most respected people in Afghanistan" (Gul, 2006). According to Mr. Abdul Sattar: "The Taliban twisted the situation and created chaos and tyranny of warlords, started from Kandahar, swept across the southern Afghanistan in 1995, gathering strength as the idealistic seminaries were joined by the former Mujahideen, fed up with factional internecine warfare. The public welcomed the more disciplined and better behaved Taliban. The popular base of reputed Mujahideen leaders was undermined. Continuing their march Taliban, on the dawn of September 27, 1996, drove into Kabul" (Durani & Khan, 2009).

The Taliban phenomenon soon became a reality. This assembled momentum and grew into a leading force that was to be considered. Pakistan was worried on the possibility of the over flow of Afghan civil war into its territory. Since, most of the Taliban's were amongst those who, during their stay in refugee camps during Soviet's occupation, were educated in Pakistan. Therefore, they had soft and sympathetic feelings for Pakistan. Taliban's timely military intervention helped Pakistan's NLC (National logistics cell) procession destined for Central Asia to get released from the detention of warlords. Having brushed aside resistance between Chaman and Kandhar, Taliban easily overpowered the disunited old guards defending Kandhar on 5th November, 1994 (Ikram, 2006). Fall of Kandhar to Taliban resulted in to high level defections in government forces and

local militias joining Taliban. Taliban consolidated their authority in and around Kandhar and spread north towards Kabul and West towards Herat. Soon the movement picked up momentum and by February 1995 they were in occupation of nine provinces. Capture of Charasyab, in February 1995, overrunning of Herat in September 1995, Jalal Abad on 11 September 1996 and Kabul on 26th September 1996 flushed the movement with success and fame. (Shroder, 2007).

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Taliban were finally able to control 27 out of 32 provinces in Afghanistan by the 3rd week of May 1997. India, following the old dictum that "your enemy's enemy is your friend" went all out to support Rabani and Ahmad Shah Masood who had developed serious differences with Pakistan on Taliban issue. India also succeeded in falsely feeding Iran that Pakistan, on the request of USA, is supporting Taliban with the sole aim of containing Iran. Taliban became a common enemy where Iranian and Indian interests came together. Whereas, India's main aim in Afghanistan was to prevent Pakistan in solidifying a common block of Muslim countries that would give strategic depth to Pakistan when confronted with India. India was also fearful from the Taliban's likely support to Kashmiri freedom fighters, therefore, India wanted to help Rabani and Masood in denying Taliban control of Afghanistan (Gul, 2006).

Pakistan was looking for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan with a cooperative government in Kabul that could facilitate return of over 3 million Afghan refugees, on one hand, and provide safe access to Central Asian markets on the other. Keeping in view the fast moving progress of Taliban movement, Pakistan felt that it could successfully move towards its goals through the Taliban administration in Kabul. It was the first time for Pakistan that Afghanistan had a government that was Pakistan friendly and had no link with India. Pakistan extended full diplomatic and economic support to the Taliban Government. To reconstruct Chaman Kandhar-Herat-Kushka highway, Pakistan provided financial and technical support to the Taliban, as well

(Shahrani, 2002). Pakistan's political and economic assistance to the Taliban was partially on a desire to promote its national interests. Taliban's success in controlling the war lord and bringing peace in their controlled areas influenced Pakistan to bet future of Afghanistan upon them. Pakistan's leaning towards Taliban was motivated by number of geo-economic and geo-strategic considerations. To cement its relations with Taliban regime, Pakistan accorded them diplomatic recognition on 25th May 1997 as they entered Mazar e Sharif (Siddiqi, 2008).

The Taliban government was meeting all the recognition requirements as per international law. Taliban government was in effective control of most of the Afghanistan territory including capital and included representatives of all the ethnic groups. Pakistan's recognition of Taliban government persuaded Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to follow the suit immediately after which they did the same. However, official recognition of Taliban widened the gap between Pakistan and Iran on the particular issue. The Pak-Iran ties were further deteriorated when Taliban asked Iran to close their Embassy and leave Kabul within 48 hours. All the Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan were against Pakistan marrying up with Taliban. American response to the Taliabn government was, though cautious, but encouraging. Robin Raphael (then Assistance Secretary of state) called Taliban an indigenous movement and hoped that their extremist policies be moderated by engaging them.

However, gradually US policy towards Taliban started changing because of Taliban's oppressive behavior towards women and presence of Osama and Taliban's open support for him. On May 5th, 1999, the US Senate passed a resolution calling on President Bush not to recognize any government that discriminated against women (Siddiqi, 2008). In 1998, Pakistan government generously provided over \$6 million in direct support to the Taliban in addition to the trade facilities. US intelligence assessment, at that time, contended that Pakistan was funneling the

Taliban forces with munitions, fuel and food. Taliban's brutal style of enforcing Islamic practices and cruel treatment to women sent alarms in the region and were soon alienated (Ali, 2009).

Simultaneously, Pakistan also persuaded Taliban to make a broad-based coalition government by sharing power with major ethnic groups in Kabul. Taliban having control of their 90% Afghanistan's territory refused to sit with Northern Alliance as coalition partner. Pakistan's insistence on broad based government backed by continued diplomatic pressure Taliban turned to Saudi millionaire Usama Bin Laden for economic support. Taliban allowed Usama to live comfortably in Afghanistan and in return he provided personnel, money and hundreds of Arab fighters to participate in the Taliban military campaigns in the north. Pakistan was caught between the American pressure, on one hand, and the Taliban's absolute refusal on Bin Laden's expulsion, on the other. Meanwhile, Taliban's killing of Iranian diplomats in Herat annoyed Iran pointing fingers at Pakistan. Pakistan also began to distance itself from the Taliban. In September 1998 Iran closed its borders with the Taliban.

Though Pakistan support to Taliban was based on its national priorities and objectives but at the same time Pakistan also tried to bring Taliban and the opposition closer. Pakistan viewed a broad based, multiethnic government in Kabul as the recipe for long term peace and stability in the country. The UN persuasion and Pakistan's intervention, Taliban agreed to meet anti-Taliban Alliance at Ashkabad from 10 to 14 March 1999 on the agenda of peace, cease fire and arrangements for broad based government in Afghanistan. The talk ended in fiasco without giving any credible output to proceed further. On 15th October 1999, the UN adopted Resolution that demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden. Failing to the resolution, UN imposed economic sanctions on Taliban on 14th November 1999. Taliban's relations with the Al-Qaeda

network were of mutual benefits. In return of providing safe sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban gained money, troops and arms to fight the Northern Alliance.

Pakistan's consistent engagements and pursuance to Taliban started paving the way for improvement on the issues of international concerns. It was the outcome of such constructive engagements that during his visit to Pakistan, Afghan Interior Minister not only resolved differences over Afghan Transit Trade, cordially, but also agreed to hand over proclaimed offenders involved in sectarian violence in Pakistan. Soon a meeting between the Taliban leadership and the US Secretary Thomas Pickering was arranged, by Pakistan, which helped both parties to understand each other's view point and agreed to continue talks. Resultantly, to honor their commitment, Taliban closed down three training camps including Rashkor and Kargha, cracked down on narcotics factories, and placed restrictions on Osama's related Arab fighters. Such a positive response, by the Taliban, helped build mutual trust not only with Pakistan but also with the US and other neighbors.

Chapter 04

Pakistan Afghanistan Relations: Post 9/11 Era

Afghanistan remained important for great powers due to its geographical location political structure and ethnic composition. During 18th and 19th century it was a “buffer state” between imperial Russia and British. In the cold war scenario Afghanistan remained on front between the US and Soviet Union and got the status of failed state after the cold war (Shah, 2008). In 21st century war on terror started, thus Afghanistan again got involved in the global struggle against international terrorism.

4.1 US Invasion: Interim Government (2000-2003)

Pakistan Afghanistan relations took a U turn after the attack on US twin towers in 2001. The situation changed with the 9/11 that brought American symbols of economic and military might under brutal attack and Osama Bin laden, living in Afghanistan, was declared as master mind behind the act. Pakistan condemned this vile act and denounced terrorism in all its manifestations. United States warned the Taliban, the ruling authority in Afghanistan, to hand over Osama or face the consequences. Taliban refused to hand over their guest who fought to liberate their homeland from the Russians. Hence, the U.S. decided to attack Afghanistan, destroy Osama and its training camps, and disintegrate the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and, giving unparalleled and unprecedented accumulation of power to the Northern Alliance –mainly a non-Pakhtoon entity (Grare, 2006).

The event of 9/11 changed Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, as Pakistan was given the choice by US to select “either with us or against us” (Durani & Khan, 2002). Thus, it was a challenge for Pakistan because George W. Bush, US president, made it clear that he would not make any division between the executor of terrorist attack and those who provide them shelter.

Moreover, Pakistan also had to decide, either to join US in war against Taliban and Al Qaida or if continue favorable relations with Taliban will have to suffer from America's revenge. Therefore, Pakistan chose to side the international partnership and to give intelligence, flight corridor and bases for logistic support and revitalization to the U.S. led military attack on 7 October 2001 over Afghanistan (Durani & Khan, 2002).

Pakistan, the immediate neighbor of Afghanistan did its best to prevent likely war and mediate between US and the Taliban. A former CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) head George Tenet in his book "Pakistan's efforts of bringing Taliban to the table and averting war" stated that Pakistan assisted in arranging meeting between Taliban leaders and CIA in charge in Pakistan to resolve the issue peacefully. Apart from this the DG ISI, Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, on September 17, 2001 with a high level delegation met Taliban leader Mullah Omer in Kandahar and convinced him to hand over Osama bin laden to avoid the serious cost of US aggression. The United State attack destroyed the training camps and large number of Al Qaida and Taliban detached and vanished into neighboring countries like Pakistan and Iran.

The fall of Taliban government in Afghanistan smooth the way for other foreign actors to secure their interest in Afghanistan. After the successful disintegration of Taliban government in Kabul, there was a need of government to run the state affairs. Therefore, United Nation invited all major afghan parties/tribes to international Bonn conference in Germany. They signed an agreement known as Bonn agreement, which later was validated by UN Security Council. The Bonn agreement prescribed the future course of action for the new government. The agreement also established an interim government under Hamid Karzai for six months. The Bonn conference did not specify any rehabilitation role for its immediate neighbor. Pakistan and India were given the task of reconstruction and rehabilitation (Mark Fields, 2011).

The Bonn agreement prescribed the future course of action for the new government. The agreement also established an interim government under Hamid Karzai for six months. The Bonn conference did not specify any rehabilitation role for its immediate neighbor. Pakistan and India were given the task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. The problem of terrorism and cross-border infiltration tops policy matters between the two governments. Since Pakistan announced its support for the US-led coalition against terrorism, it has been facing an increase in terrorist activities within its own territory (Fields & Ahmed, 2011).

Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives have crossed the border and taken refuge in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The Pakistan government launched military operations to hunt them down. The operations caused widespread anger among the tribesmen and, as a result, violent activities increased. Despite Pakistan's efforts to curb terrorist elements, Afghanistan blames Pakistan for not doing enough to tackle cross-border infiltration. Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US formed a Tripartite Commission in 2003 to make an end to the terrorist threats. It was believed that once the Commission was formed, there would be a decline in terrorist activities. However, it has not produced the expected result.

4.2 Hamid Karzai's Regime and Pak-Afghan Relations (First Term)

Pakistan took every successive measure to establish good relations with Afghanistan. During election in Afghanistan Pakistan provided full support for the peaceful conduct of presidential and parliamentary voting in October 2004 and September 2005 (Ikram, 2006). Pakistan also sealed its border to guard against any incursions across the border to disrupt election process. President Musharraf was the first head of state to visit Afghanistan after the successful completion of presidential election. The relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan soon deteriorated because of the plotting of the Northern Alliance members of cabinet. The trust deficit

broadened further with each passing day and president Karzai, once considered to be pro-Pakistan, started blaming Pakistan for supporting cross border terrorism. On the other hand, there were many domestic challenges to Hamid Karzai's government (Fields & Ahmed, 2011). The native people were not satisfied with the policies of the government because they were of the view that there are widespread corruptions by the government, its associated people and their relatives. Therefore, the government did not want to restore public law and order situation in the country.

After the US invasion, the Taliban moved to their safe heaven especially in their birth villages and started preparation to counter government and international forces. The people morale was already down due to the weak policies of Karzai so they joined Taliban and supported Taliban activities. Thus, an antigovernment force emerged along with Taliban and expanded to different areas and fixing support. They were also successful in taking control of villages. The local people supported Taliban by force and some of them joined willingly to earn money and to feed their families (Afghanistan and the Surrounding Region: Eyes Focused on the ISAF withdrawal , 2014). Baring the person of Hamid Karazi, the Bonn Conference wrongly neglected dominant tribes while giving political role in future set up of Afghanistan. This mistake turned in to disaster as it helped blossom the Afghan insurgency. The other Bonn conspiracy turned in to blunder was keeping Pakistan out of the process and from under taking any kind of reconstruction work. On the other hand Afghanistan's distant neighbor like India was provided opportunity to further its strategic interests against Pakistan. Since then, India has found a vast platform in Afghanistan to conduct its secret activities in Balochistan through Balochi dissidents and FATA through TTP in order to destabilize Pakistan (Hussain & Latif, 2012).

After 2001, on number of occasion both the states, Pakistan and Afghanistan, condemned each other on the movement of Islamist militants across Durand line boarder. After the downfall

of Taliban government, some of the Taliban fighters crossed the border and found safe refuge in Pakistan. With the passage of time the region became real shelter for Taliban who were engaged in war against NATO forces. The US president George W. Bush, in 2004, adopted grand strategy to defeat Taliban and al-Qaida and started Drone attacks in FATA region of Pakistan (Mahmood, Farooq, & Karim, 2015).

The term “Drone war” is used for the series of attacks. There is a huge insecurity in Pakistanis because of civilian casualties’ consequent to these attacks. There is a condemnation from the government of Pakistan against the Drone war but, as per some sources, there has been an exchange of information from the Pakistani authorities to the Americans. A permit has been given to the U.S., by the Pakistani forces, to operate drones from Shamsi base (Mahmood, Farooq, & Karim, 2015). The US administration itself recognized the link between the Afghan conflict and Pakistan when the US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, introduced new policies for Pakistan and Afghanistan, as a result of attacks on US consulates in 2006 in Kandahar and in 2007 in Jalalabad (Setas, 2013). Moreover, the leadership of Afghanistan continuously accused ISI for attacking on ASF (Afghan security Forces) as well as for providing sanctuary for Taliban leaders to operate from Pakistan. While, Musharaf’s government defiantly pursued Taliban and Al-Qaida members in Pakistan and thus launched military operation against them (Setas, 2013).

Thus it is also believed that the foreign elements present in Afghanistan are using Afghan territory against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. Former Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Mushahid Hussain stated in July 2006 that India had been training 600 Baluchs in Afghanistan, arguing that India had been fomenting the Baloch insurgency and denounced Afghan intelligence agency connections with RAW (Grare, 2006). The intensity of Pakistan Afghan relations increased as India established dozen of consulates all along

Pakistan-Afghanistan boarder which was the major security concern for Pakistan. The consulate was not working on their actual task. They were doing less humanitarian work and more spying network for the purpose of destabilizing Pakistan (Durani & Khan, 2002).

The blame game in Pakistan Afghanistan relations were further deepened with the cross border insurgency. The Anti-Pakistan activities that include channeling of arms, ammunition, and money in to Balochistan and FATA by these consulates have been pointed out by Pakistan at number of forums/ occasions. Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mr Yousuf Raza Gilani has reportedly provided requisite proofs of Indian involvement in Balochistan affairs to his Indian counterpart Egyptian resort of Sharmel Sheikh Summit on July 16th 2009. The proofs also included names and photographs of Indian officials meeting with Baloch dissentient Brahamdagh Bugti and other terrorists in Afghanistan and during their visits to India (Fields & Ahmed, 2011).

4.3 Hamid Karzai's Regime and Pak-Afghan Relations (Second Term)

In Afghanistan the presidential election were held in august 2009, which was reported to be unfair and the result was not satisfactory for the other factions in Afghanistan. The second candidate for presidential election was, Abdullah Abdullah, the former foreign minister. He came second in the first round of balloting with around 30 percent of votes and protested the fairness of election (Nicoll, 2011).

The George W. Bush administration established highly favorable bilateral relations between both states and had a direct communication between the two presidents. The regular TV conferences were held every other week by the US journalist Bob Woodward as good will gesture. Nevertheless, when President Obama came in power, he changed the traditional set by Bush administration because he did not want to keep personal relations with the national leaders. Consequently, President Obama's policies clearly developed a position of eradicating the reliance

of Afghan government on US. In 2009, the vice president Joseph Biden and senator Lindsey Graham visited Afghanistan. The US criticized the Afghan government for the issue of corruption and Karzai showed his dissatisfaction regarding massive killing of the native people by the US military attacks. Thus, on 27 March 2009 Obama administration announced new strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Through this strategy the US shifted its focus of antiterrorist activities from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The aim of US new policy was to vanish the terrorist network actively working in Pakistan.

The situation of Afghanistan worsened the Taliban along with its splinter groups strengthened its position as an opposing force to the rule of the Karzai government. According to statement of the Taliban, it expanded the area under its control in the east and south of Afghanistan, such as Nuristan. In the decade of 2000, the Taliban gained the reputation of highly violent and uncompromising group (Nicoll, 2011). The leader of Taliban mullah Omer remained strong and their council of their heads as known as Quetta Shura, which was run by the Taliban from all groups. They established their bases and strong set up in different areas in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. In the second half of the 2000, they made constant terrorist acts and armed attacks in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Taliban expanded its powers and took control of certain area in 2013 (Setas, 2013).

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations moved towards normalization when they renewed their trade relations. Historically, after inception Pakistan had to provide transit trade facilities to Afghanistan. The trade arrangement was extended under the provisions of the United Nations Conventions and article 5 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. However, a formal agreement was signed in 1965 called as the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). According to this agreement the two entry point for Afghan trade were allowed i.e.

Karachi Port and Port Qasim with two existing routes of Chamman and Torkhum .Therefore, new transit trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan was negotiated in 14th May 2009, which concluded on 18 July 2010. The agreement was termed as Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). Finally, this agreement becomes operational at 12 June 2011 (Naseer, 2014).

There is also very strong relevant argument and Pakistan's belief is that Afghanistan itself and international forces present in Afghanistan are responsible for this entire predicament. To detract from their own colossal failure and incompetence, the embattled Afghan officials are blaming the insurgency on Pakistan (Qarabaghi, 2005). Afghan administration and officials are too weak and incompetent to take care of the problems in the country and when they fail to tackle them they simply put the failure on Pakistan (Qarabaghi, 2005). They try to show the world that Pakistan is responsible for all their failure in Afghanistan.

On the other hand the expansion of India's presence in Afghanistan has encouraged terrorist incidents. The Indian embassy was attack three times consecutively in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The Obama after coming into power for second time and started deploying additional 30,000 U.S. troops, the administration believed, would control the Taliban insurgency, secure major population centers and access routes, and lay the groundwork for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops starting in July 2011 (Mark Fields, 2011). The success of the mission, however, is contingent on rapidly expanding the number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and training them adequately to fight alongside the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and eventually assume responsibility for Afghanistan's security.

Heads of the NATO states met in Lisbon, after nine years of the intervention of the U.S. military in Afghanistan, Portugal in November 2010 to discuss the days ahead that lie ahead of

Afghanistan. An agreement was signed between NATO allies, U.S. and government of Afghanistan to follow a formal evolution process that included the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan security forces. This had to start from early 2011 and had to be completed by 2014 (NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, 2010). President Obama's west point announcement was a step towards the exit and it could be the logical outcome. U.S., with an army of 101, 0000, launched a fully resourced aggressive counter-insurgency campaign against Taliban in 2001 (Nicoll, 2011).

In November 2011 the NATO forces attacked on Pakistan's two check posts at Salala near Pakistan and Afghanistan boarder, as a result of these attacks 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed. Consequently, the government of Pakistan blocked the NATO supply routes towards Afghanistan (Shaukat, 2016). Meanwhile, a number of United States' diplomats including NATO chief had visited Pakistan and met the then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, they asked for re-opening the NATO routes. After negotiating between American diplomats and Pakistan government, a new relationship with the US was established, this was based upon equality and non-violation of Pakistani territory. When Pakistan government remained stern on its stand by keeping the NATO supply lines suspended for the six months in wake of US pressure tactics, on May 10, 2012, the United States House Armed Services. The Parliamentary committee on National Security of Pakistan gave approval for re-engagement with the US (Shaukat, 2016).

The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have further deteriorated due to NATO strikes into Pakistan's territory in 2011 and the death of Osama bin laden in Abbottabad. Theses strikes have significantly alienated Pakistan as it considers it blatant violation of its sovereignty. It is also against the principles and rules of international law. Afghan government's carte blanche to

NATO forces to conduct strikes inside the territorial frontier of Pakistan, which has brought the relationship between the two countries to the lowest level of trust deficit. After the death of Osama bin Laden, the Afghanistan government demanded for the withdrawal of US forces. They are of the view as the mission of US was accomplished and Osama bin Laden was assassinated.

In late 2011, Bonn conference II was arranged to discuss the withdrawal policy of the US but Pakistan and the Taliban boycotted the scheduled Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. Pakistan refused to attend the conference after a NATO air strike killed Pakistani soldiers on the Afghan border. The main agenda of Bonn conference II was to settle the following issues:

- The transfer of security from International Security Assistance Force to Afghan National Security Forces.
- Reconciliation with the insurgent forces.
- Establishing relation with the immediate neighbor Pakistan.
- The role of international forces after withdrawal for training of National Forces to maintain security situation possible.
- The international aid after withdrawal will also be provided for reconstruction and economic development (Peter, 2011).

President Obama, in June 2011, in Chicago summit announced to pull out 10,000 troops and by the end of 2011 further pull down of 23,000 troops the end of 2012, the withdrawal of remaining troops would follow the steady pace till the role of the mission change from combat to support. The Afghanistan government showed its displeasure from the United States government also increased and recognized the American support for Afghanistan security (Nicoll, 2011). In October 2012, Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai accused the US of dishonesty in fighting against

Afghan enemies and criticized that United States' forces were acting to suppress rebellions in Afghanistan.

On July 8 2012, a meeting was held in Tokyo between Afghan Government and International community for the encouragement and consolidation of their partnership from transition to transformation. This event was the next round of Chicago summit to pursue fiscal and political help from the partners through 2017. These events were in conclusion of several other conferences which took place in Bonn, London and Kabul where a reiteration between Afghan government and international community took place to sign long-term assurances in the areas of governance, law and order, peace building, socio-economic development and regional collaboration. (The Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan From Transition to Transformation, 2012). In the next four years, U.S., Japan, Germany and U.K. vowed to give the civilian aid of \$16 billion (Loyn, 2012). This international aid was coming with some strings attached; Afghan government would have to perform and achieve some goals regarding governance, widespread corruption and must improve by guaranteeing transparency and accountability.

4.4 Pak-Afghan Relations during Ashraf Ghani's Era

In June 2014, the election was held in Afghanistan and the national government was formed in September 2014 which was facilitated and supported by United Nation and US. In September 29th 2014, Ashraf Ghani was confirmed as president and Abdullah Abdullah, was given the newly created position of chief executive. The new government and political administration in Afghanistan faced multiple challenges. These challenges were mostly related to governance, relations with neighboring states and international community as well as the political reconciliation among different ethnic groups and parties in Afghanistan. The issue was to seek cooperation domestically and internationally in achieving peace and stability in the country. Therefore it is

believed that because it was broad-based and representative of various ethnic political groups and parties, the new Afghan government had the opportunity to address these and other challenges facing the country. But on the other hand, the new government was considered internally weak because there were multiple factions involved. It was very difficult to address the grievances of all the factions and achieve an effective power sharing arrangement (Khaama Press, 2014).

The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were moving towards progress and prosperity after the new government in Afghanistan came in power. The new President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani stated that peace is the primary requirement to bring economic and political stability in the state. He also mentioned that the peace and stability in Afghanistan is not possible without establishing good relations, with the immediate neighbor, Pakistan. The perception was based on the Pakistan held considerable influence within Haqqaini network and Quetta Shura and could convince them to take part in peace talk with Afghanistan government. Therefore, the new Afghan president Ashraf Ghani adopted the policy of rapprochement towards Pakistan and get help from Pakistan to bring Taliban for talk.

Apart from peace talk with Taliban, the Pakistan military and political leadership gave a positive and friendly gesture to Afghan president. The President Ashraf Ghani's rapprochement towards Pakistan, in fact, reduced the Indian concern which remained unaddressed during the previous government of Hamid Karzai. There is also a growing consciousness in Pakistani policy makers that an unstable Afghanistan is dangerous for peace building and counter militancy efforts in Pakistan. Therefore, not only Pakistani Taliban militants have been carrying out cross-border attacks in Pakistan since they sought shelter in Afghanistan after operation but Pakistan cannot allow the Afghan Taliban to capture Kabul, because this could embolden their Pakistani counterparts and other militants, thus increasing the risk of violence in Pakistan (Husain & Elahi,

2015). Both the states, Pakistan and Afghanistan, built a very positive environment of mutual trust building. The relations were deteriorated after the announcement of Mullah Omar's, Afghan Taliban leader in July 2015, death. This news not only derailed the peace process with Taliban but also promoted attacks inside Afghanistan to give the notion that their leader's death had made them weak and divided. (Khaama, 2014).

The fifth Heart of Asia Conference was held on 6th December 2015, in Pakistan. Thus, in this conference both the countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan, agreed to start working on peace process with Taliban and build mutual trust. The relations between the two states was going to be more stable and trust deficit was reducing, as the Quadrilateral Monitoring Committee was formed, the member states of that committee was Pakistan, Afghanistan, United State and China. The main purpose of this committee was to support the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The formation of the committee indicated a form of agreement among these countries on the roadmap for peace talks. The first meeting of the committee was held in Islamabad on January 11th 2016, during which representatives of the four member nations stressed the need for an immediate resumption of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban (Aziz, 2015).

Chapter 05

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan and Afghanistan in Post 2014

Pakistan, somehow, shared amiable relations with Afghanistan under Taliban regime but the 9/11 incident and Pakistan's support to US led war on terror not only destabilized both the states and societies of Pakistan and Afghanistan but also their relations with each other (Hussain & Latif, 2012). India's growing influence and her covert interests in the region and presence of other regional powers, blame game by both states against one another, porous borders, all these issues thwart to establish peaceful and cooperative relations (Aziz, 2015).

5.1 Challenges

5.1.1 Indian Factor

India and Afghanistan enjoyed amiable relations, historically. But, during Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, with the takeover of Taliban, India faced a major pull back in her relations with the Taliban led Afghanistan. With the end of Taliban regime in Afghanistan 2001, India took a chance to re-establish her ties with Afghanistan with an aim to hold back the Pakistan's influence in the region during Taliban time, to maneuver her activities against Pakistan, to support the present government so that the Taliban may not come into power again and get an access to Central Asian states via Afghanistan. India also re-opened her embassy in Afghanistan with the fall of the Taliban regime (Aziz, 2015). India is exercising soft power in Afghanistan to carry out her interests in the region. At present India, in the region, is the largest donor in Afghanistan and fifth at international level. Both, India and Afghanistan, are cooperating in development and economic programs. India is also training Afghan civilians and military persons. Afghanistan's National Security advisor also said that Afghanistan is eager to expand cooperation with India to strengthen Kabul's ability to secure itself.

As long as there is India in Afghanistan, the division will always be there. The non Pushtoos support India and the Pushtoos support Pakistan. Afghanistan is dependent on Pakistan for trade and India won't ever be happy about good relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan. India and Afghanistan do not share common borders but India still is present in Afghanistan to damage Pakistan. India is giving educational scholarships there just to brainwash Afghans. They are training Afghans in India just to brainwash them. Afghans have lived here for many years and then there are many who go back and abuse Pakistan. India made the parliament there but it's not helping the masses. If anyone is a well-wisher of Afghanistan they should work for peace there. Pakistan has done a lot for Afghans. It would be wrong to say it was not for our own gains but we have common border with Afghanistan and we also share the same language and religion with them. India, on the other hand, shares nothing common with Afghanistan so there can be no common interest for both the countries. India is not doing much in Afghanistan other than cosmetic efforts. We gave refuge to their people for years (Mahsud, 2017).

There were some areas where Afghans were more than Pakistanis. And most of them were not even Pushtoos. Pakistan's role has been a lot greater than India. India is monetarily funding them more in the name of proxies. There is no industry in Afghanistan and no development. No universities or infrastructure is being worked upon. Warlords have gone but there is still not development. People wish to get out of Afghanistan (Mazhe & Goraya, 2009). The top leadership is working on the dictatorship of foreign hands. The situation cannot get better until the division of Pushtoos and non Pushtoos do not end and the leadership doesn't start working for the interest of the people. India, thus, is a major regional actor that is in Afghanistan with multiple interests foremost among is to destabilize Pakistan internally by being an influential partner with Afghanistan and making her western and eastern borders contentious and with this aim it sabotages

every peaceful effort of Pakistan and Afghanistan that eventually helps both the states in the long run.

5.1.2 Refugees Conundrum

The deteriorated relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are also the outcome of heavy burden of Afghan refugees on Pakistan's economy. The Afghan refugees' presence in Pakistan is not only a serious challenge to Pakistan stability but it is also an irritant in relationship of both the countries. Being the immediate neighboring country Pakistan has faced the burden of refugees during soviet invasion and, as well as, during US invasion and hosted more than five million Afghan refugees. Though, after the transition in Afghanistan, almost 3.8 million refugees have returned back to their home country but many of them are coming back to Pakistan. In Pakistan, there are almost 3 million afghan refugees which is a serious security threat because they are supporting militant groups operating in Pakistan (Khan , 2015).

There are many Afghan refugees who are not registered which not only increases the risk of insecurity but their presence is also straining the country's economy. It is estimated that Pakistan has spent billions of dollars on hosting Afghan refugees from last thirty four years. After 2014, Pakistan warned them to move back to their home country and the date of 31 December 2015 was given to clear the area. However, there was an anxiety that the large volume of the unregistered and registered refugees continued to stay in Pakistan due to the uncertain state of affairs in Afghanistan. The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan moved towards corrosion and the blame game further deepened (Khan , 2015). Afghanistan is of the view that Pakistan did not want to stabilize Afghanistan as the new government is not mature enough to settle all the issues and Pakistan is sending back over five million refugees along with this, there are 600,000 internally displaced people due to war on terror who need to be accommodated. But Pakistani leadership

justified this stance that they are facing insecurity due to terrorism and the refugees are a heavy burden on Pakistan's diminishing economy.

Therefore, it is the right time for both Pakistan to search for workable solution, because due to refugees both states are facing problems, if the fragility in Afghanistan exacerbates, the huge humanitarian crisis will aggravate and Pakistan could face more incursion of new refugees. Hence, it is important that a practical and effective mechanism for repatriation should be formulated with the help of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Barakat, 2010). This stance will not only resolve the key differences among both the countries but the contention of obstruction from, both, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

5.1.3 Cross Boarder Terrorism

Afghanistan and Pakistan governments took some specific initiatives to alleviate cross border terrorism. Afghan government addressed the Pakistani concerns over cross-border terrorism that included increasing pressure on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militant's safe haven in Afghanistan. They also provided access to ISI officials to investigate anti-Pakistan elements in Afghan jails, and also keeping check on border (Assad, 2015). Afghan security forces also conducted operations in Pakistani-Afghan border areas many times. When they were reported that Pakistani Taliban militants allegedly involved in the Peshawar Army Public School attack (December 2014) were hidden across the border.

Cross border terrorism, among other issues, is the major source of tensions between the both states. Both countries have suffered a lot because of this infiltration of terrorists and militants and stability and well-being of the both states demand the solution of this problem except blaming each other. Their past grievances led both states not to join hands to the most contentious issue. Afghanistan always blames Pakistani Taliban that operates from the Baluchistan in harboring the

terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan also blames Afghan Taliban for attacking their soldiers and civilians. In past attacks, for instance, in 2012 between June to October, 14 cross border attacks have been originated by Afghanistan which resulted in the casualties of civilians, soldiers and militants and in return Pakistan launched rocket and mortar attacks in Afghanistan causing the death of many Afghan civilians.

The trust deficit further broaden after 2016 terrorist attack in Afghanistan, Afghanistan blamed Pakistan for the terrorist attack in hotel resulted in killing of five persons and sabotaging the Afghan peace process between Taliban and high peace council and Pakistan in return out rightly rejected this allegation that disappointed Pakistan (Jamal, 2017). Terrorism thus is a major debacle between both states that not only ruins the prospects of cooperation between them but also results in a loss of human assets. Terrorism is not a one state problem but a global problem and needs cooperation among states. Pakistan and Afghanistan should realize the fact that mutual cooperation can curb terrorism for stability in their respective regions even after the withdrawal of US forces from the region. It has been more than a decade that both states are fighting against terrorism and it is a right time to work on mutual coherent strategy of curbing terrorism that would facilitate both states in the future (Siddique, 2011).

The relationship between the two countries has been checkered by both good and bad times, predominantly the bad ones. The issues which both countries started their journey in the arena of international politics have remained unresolved. These historical issues, such as Durand line and Pakhtunistan, coupled with the existing situation on either side of the border has given birth to an unprecedented complexity in the history of relations between the two countries. New issues have surfaced over time to exacerbate the situation. These include the withdrawal of US-led forces from Afghanistan, India's mounting presence in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical fabric of society.

The weight of the past, is certainly not insurmountable. Although Pakistan is not as developed as India and is not contributing monetarily in Afghanistan's development as Afghans would like to see, but the geographical contiguity offers her a unique advantage. Moreover, Pakistan enjoys a soft power in terms of the same religion and mixed population across borders for two of its provinces. A number of Afghan civil servants come to train in Pakistan every year (Siddique, 2011). There is still a large number of Afghans in Pakistan, who can be her ambassador once they return to their homeland. Pakistan must capitalize on these opportunities to effectively channelize this soft power in the direction of mutual trust and confidence between the two countries.

5.1.4 Ethnic Chaos

The Afghan government, due to its internal weaknesses, is unable to build up its own credibility among the masses and exploit rifts among the Taliban to its advantage. Indeed, the National Unity Government appears to be quite divided internally due to the fragile political system, weak political and security institutions, and the government's reliance on ethnic and tribal warlords. Ghani tried to include intellectuals and technocrats in his government, but finally had to rely on warlords, who when they feel aggrieved tend to work against the government, while some would even like to make secret deals with the Taliban (Safi, 2015). Power-sharing arrangements among key stakeholders further weakened the government instead of strengthening it. Ultimately, an internally weak and irresolute government could not send a strong message to either the Taliban or its own people.

5.2 Opportunities

5.2.1 Bilateral Trade and Security

In the start, Ashraf Ghani's rapprochement towards Pakistan was very positive and was trying to normalize the historical rival relations. Therefore, the new government after taking the office addressed Pakistani concerns. The very first initiative of Afghan government was that they delayed the implementation of the strategic partnership agreement with India and also decided against the purchase of heavy weapons from India, which was requested by Ex-president Hamid Karzai during his tenure in office. Through this effort the relations between the Pakistan and Afghanistan moved towards progress and this was the opportunity for Pakistan as to counter the growing influence of India (Amini, 2015).

Ashraf Ghani's government wanted close ties with Pakistan's security establishment to improve the security situations in Afghanistan and revised the previous government's policy that preferred to establish warm military and defense ties with India. The development in this respect was made in the first step; a high-level Afghan delegation led by Ghani visited the general headquarters of the Pakistani army in Rawalpindi in November 2014 (*The News*, 2014) and also laid a wreath at the Shuhada Monument. The Afghanistan government's gesture showed that they "understood the Pakistan military's dominant capabilities in the supervision of its country's foreign policy with Afghanistan" and wanted it to help Afghanistan achieve political reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban (Aziz, 2015). In January 2015, Ghani also sent six Afghan army cadets to study for 18 months at the military academy in Abbottabad (Assad, 2015). Subsequently, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Pakistan's and the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) for cooperation in intelligence sharing and coordinated intelligence operations on both sides of the border (Syed, 2015). These measures triggered a strong

disagreement in Afghanistan that entailed severe criticism of the Ashraf Ghani government from parliamentarians, civil society groups, and Hamid Karzai, who publicly accused the Ashraf Ghani administration of sedition for signing the intelligence-sharing agreement with Pakistan (Assad, 2015).

Pakistan and Afghanistan can establish bilateral trade relations, which will maintain peace and prosperity. Afghanistan is dependent on Pakistan for trade because it is a landlocked country. On economic front, Pakistan remained the largest trading partner of Afghanistan and bilateral trade has reached to \$2 billion in 2014. But it was expected to bring the level of trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan up to \$5 billion by 2017 (Javaid, 2016). Peace in Afghanistan will be very beneficial for Pakistan. There will be trade and commerce and Pakistan will be able to withdraw forces from borders that are against Afghans. If Pakistan and Afghans start living as normal neighbors, the security issues can be resolved as well. The militancy is mainly from Afghanistan in Pakistan. Peace in Afghanistan will help bring peace in Pakistan. The making of CPEC will be more beneficial for Afghanistan and there is a very narrow line between Pakistan and Afghanistan and they can get access through the CPEC as well. Afghanistan is landlocked so CPEC can bring as many opportunities for Afghanistan as for Pakistan. But it's only possible if peace prevails. Bilateral trade can help Afghanistan in the long run (Husain & Elahi, 2015).

5.2.2 Regional Linkage

Afghanistan is a landlocked country at the heart of Asia, and a junction of geographic and cultural regions, which is Indian subcontinent, central Asia and the Iranian plateau, due to which it has always remained a gateway for traders and invaders of various regions. It always remained under the control of multiple players; recently US exit from the region needed a stabilized mechanism keeping in view the previous experience, as a stable Afghanistan is not only necessary

for Pakistan but for the whole region (Iqbal, 2012). Pakistan and Afghanistan should cooperate to make a regional linkage because both the states are important for each other. The US withdrawal is an opportunity for Pakistan as well as for Afghanistan. Pakistan can revive its strategic depth in Afghanistan, since Pakistan believes in stone, integrated and stable Afghanistan. So, they can counterbalance its rivals in the region. Pakistan along with Beijing can play a great role in reconstruction and rebuilding process in Afghanistan. They can exploit natural resources not only in Afghanistan but they can also have easy access towards Central Asian Republics. Afghanistan is a bridge between South Asia and Central Asian region.

Apart from Pakistan the other states have stakes in Afghanistan, like china, India, Russia. The US Ex. President Barack Obama during his election campaign in 2008 also emphasized on the importance of Afghan dilemma, that it is necessary to take regional stakeholders into confidence, till then there would be no lasting and durable solution for the problem. In Afghanistan the political, economic and security interests of regional players overlap. All the regional players have to keep in view their wide range of interests, external intervention, Tribalism and factionalism and start work of reconstruction, rehabilitation and rebuilding of war ragged Afghanistan (Laidi, 2012). However, all the measure to bringing peace tranquility and stability in Afghanistan cannot be successful until and unless there is convergence of interests between regional powers, inter Afghan Taliban dialogue.

Iran has geo-political, cultural and religious stakes in Afghanistan and plays essential role in the economic and political stability of Afghanistan (Husain & Elahi, 2015). In the post-cold war era Iran and Afghanistan did not establish good relations but the Bonn Conference for US withdrawal from Afghanistan are seen as positive developments in Iran-Afghan relations. The Iranian involvement in Afghan matters is not devoid of politico-economic, religious, strategic and

cultural interests. Iran's stance in Afghanistan is dominated by two factors one is Hazara's issue and the second is to support Northern Alliance, so that wish to disintegrate Afghanistan on ethnic lines. The role of Iran should be stability and unity oriented which is not only the prerequisite to stabilize Afghanistan but also for all over the region (Khan, 2012).

Russia can play a great role in Afghanistan. After US withdrawal from Afghanistan a chance was given to Russia to make good ties with Afghanistan and cooperate in socio-economic and political sectors and to enhance the fragile security situations in the region, as security and development are interlinked with each other. In Afghanistan both Russia and United States' interests are most closely parallel. Afghanistan is an area where U.S.-Russian interests most closely align. Russia needs a more peaceful Afghanistan in order to avoid extremism from spilling over into the Central Asian Republics. However Russia feels endangered by united state presence in Afghanistan. The regional players' insecurity prevents the expansion of southern transit corridors for Central Asian exports, leaving it dependent on routes controlled by Russia.

India has strategic and economic interests in the region and more specifically in Afghanistan although it has geographic proximity. After the attack of 9/11, India offered her military bases to United States to launch war on terror over Afghanistan, but due to lack of geopolitical location India did not get attention of US. The India's strategic goals in South Asian region are: Indian encirclement of Pakistan, Indo-Afghan Strategic Partnership, containment of Islamic extremism, use Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asia and regional policeman. Pakistan was pressurized by Great Powers to give India transit facility or route towards Afghanistan (Mahesar, Parde, & Mahesar, 2012). India is trying to have an assertive role by introducing Soft Power presence besides socio-political, economic and security areas in Afghanistan. India has established consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif (Paliwal, 2016). Pakistan

feels that these steps on the part of India- like Strategic Partnership, and establishment of consulates, have triggered a new Great Game, clash of interests, civil war, and unrest in the region. India is believed to have been interfering in Pakistan. Indian deep involvement in Afghanistan is also considered as a big hurdle in the dialogue and reconciliation process with Taliban. China has been investing millions of dollars not only in energy sector but also in the rebuilding and reconstruction of Afghanistan. After the US withdrawal the power vacuum is created in the region. China is investing in Afghanistan by using its soft power tool to bring stability and integrity in the region (Paliwal, 2016).

5.2.3 Diplomatic Relations

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations always remained a source of conflict. Although, there are certain other factors which are common in both the states. Thus, conflicts can never be resolved through military means and the real security will not be ensured through arms. The enduring war in Afghanistan is another disastrous example. Pakistan and Afghanistan should focus on diplomatic relations which is the requirement of building peace in the country and all over the region (American Friends Service Committee , 2009). The diplomacy is a tool through which the people of Afghanistan can secure peaceful and stable future. Pakistan and the other neighboring can engage in diplomacy with Afghan government to address their graveness and make possible the long lasting peace.

Through the effective diplomatic means both the states can resolve the differences from the grass root level. People to people contact can minimize the spectrum of hatred and an element of respect will be emerging on both side of the border. As, Afghanistan remained in conflict for many decades and due to war extremism all the infrastructure especially the educational institutions have been destroyed therefore it is the prime responsibility of Pakistan to offer

scholarships for the young generations of Afghanistan. The educational scholarships not only help in removal of bad memories but it will also enable the young generation to get jobs easily.

Chapter 06

Post 2014 Pak-Afghan Relations: A Critical Appraisal

Pakistan and Afghanistan did not enjoy smooth and friendly relations since 1947. There are many ups and downs in their relations. The major powers always destabilize Afghanistan for their vested interests. In the very beginning the presence of Britain and their territorial demarcation, the invasion of Soviet Union and the United States invasion after 9/11 destabilized Afghanistan. United States, after a decade of war and operation in Afghanistan, decided to withdraw its forces and very little number of forces were left in Afghanistan to train Afghan National Security forces because ANSF were not trained and well equipped to counter insurgents. In 2014, general election were held in Afghanistan and Ashraf Ghani became the president of Afghanistan. The new government faced multiple challenges the most important was to bring stability in a war-torn state and the political reconciliation among different ethnic groups and parties in Afghanistan (Hussain, 2017). Apart from this, other challenges were to seek cooperation domestically and internationally to achieve peace.

Historically, there are critical dynamics in Pakistan and Afghanistan relations. But, if the new Afghan government relations with Pakistan are analyzed initially it was moving towards cooperation by keeping aside the history of conflict. The progress of cooperative relations can be seen with the mutual efforts of both the states to bring Taliban to the negotiation table, which is the pre-requisite of political and economic stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan government and military gave a friendly gesture to Ashraf Ghani (Hussain, 2017). Thus, the reconciliation between the two governments reduced the trust deficit and minimized the Indian role. But, these good relations soon turned into a deteriorated one after the announcement of Mullah Omar's death in 2015. But there are other factors which are responsible for the conflictual relationship between the

neighboring states, like terrorism, militancy, foreign involvement, refugees' problem, lack of capabilities of Afghan National forces, ethnic groups and porous border etc., which can be turned into great opportunities for both the states if they mutually address all these issues (Mahsud, 2017). Pakistan wants a stable prosperous and peaceful Afghanistan. It's a foreign agenda that Afghanistan still doesn't have peace. According to the analysis of experts the main challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan relations is foreign involvement (Yousafzai, 2017).

The presence of foreign power, currently India and US in Afghanistan brought instability which is in the best national interest US and India, which ultimately worsened Afghan relations with Pakistan. If the US invasion is observed, it becomes clear that it was liberal interventionist thought that forced US to indulge in Afghanistan in 2001. Stability in Afghanistan is not in the interest of India and US so it makes no materialized efforts to stabilize it. Because if there will be peace and stability in Afghanistan, US will have no reasons to stay in Afghanistan so it wishes to remain there in the name of security or rehabilitation. Thus, the chaotic situation have direct implication for Pakistan (Afzal, 2017).

In the Post 2014 era, one of the important challenge is Taliban. Thus, it is the need of the time to negotiate with Taliban, the way they negotiated with Gul Badin Hikmatyar. He negotiated when he lost all his support from the people and became a part of the government. But the case of Taliban is different, it is a reality that Taliban won't negotiate and take a weaker stance (Mahsud, 2017). They will not negotiate from the weaker side and negotiate from a strong position. While, on the other hand, the Afghan government wants that the writ should be of the government and not of the Taliban and the dictation must be made from the palace of the Kabul. Taliban's term and conditions are very different from government that's why the peace and the reconciliation process is not moving forward because of this difference of opinion. Thus, it is necessary to

minimize these differences, as both sides are there with mutual trust (Yousafzai, 2017). As after a decade of war in Afghanistan it was decided that NATO forces will be withdrawn from the country but the real issue still exists, as Afghanistan is facing security problem. Afghan national forces are almost 350k, which should be enough for the security of Afghanistan and countering militant activities. But the Afghan National Forces are not capable of managing the situation there as the fall of Kunduz occurred in September 2015 and attacks on other high security areas in Afghanistan took place.

The cross border terrorism and Taliban are the undeniable facts, which worsened the relations between the two immediate neighbor countries Pakistan and Afghanistan, in post 2014. If we observe the position of Taliban, the Afghan Taliban are friendly towards Pakistan. TTP is the enemy of Pakistan and have caused destruction in Pakistan (Mahsud, 2017). Pakistan army took action and carried many operations the most recent is Rad-ul-Fasad. During these operations some of the militants were killed in the operation and some moved to Afghanistan and made their basis there and NDS recruited those people in their favor. Therefore, Pakistan felt that now the security issues to Pakistan from Afghanistan were very imminent like the post 2014 APS attack, Bacha khan attack, and other attacks were carried out by them. It is in the interest of Pakistan to negotiate peace talk with Afghan Taliban and Pakistan tried hard to make it successful because it's in the interest of not only Pakistan but Afghanistan as well. Thus, through this way the cross border insurgency and terrorism can be controlled (Yousafzai, 2017).

Historically, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been facing issues in managing their porous borders. If analyze the relation after the political transition in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been trying to fence it recently but Afghanistan is reluctant. It is the right time for both the states to fence the porous border with mutual cooperation it cannot be manage unilaterally. The Afghanistan issue

will be resolved as they keep blaming Pakistan that the people from Pakistan keep going to Afghanistan and get trained there and carry out terrorist activities. Afghanistan should be welcoming this gesture from Pakistan but unfortunately they are not doing so. This behavior from Afghanistan indicates that they have been dictated from someplace else to not fence the borders so a disturbance can be created in Pakistan through Afghanistan. So, it is observed that there should be proper documentation when they cross the borders so the militants can be controlled. According to the personal opinion of Dr. Khan “the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan are unjust. They should support Pakistan in managing the borders as it is not an impossible task and it can be easily done. When there is a will, there is a way” (Khan, 2017).

There are many tribulations in recent Pakistan Afghanistan relations, as the new Afghanistan government takes dictate from New Delhi which cannot be expected to be in favor of Pakistan. India is following the Chankaya potalya philosophy which is to make the neighbors of your enemy your friends. This is what India is doing in Iran and Afghanistan. Iran is turning into Pakistan’s enemy, so is Afghanistan (Afzal, 2017). After 2009, Afghanistan’s interest of brotherly relation with Pakistan have changed, theoretically. Now they feel that Pakistan is their rival and all the problems in Afghanistan are because of Pakistan. There has been massive Indian involvement in Afghanistan like giving them universities and parliament buildings in Afghanistan but India is not doing it all as an investment in favor of Afghanistan but as a movement against Pakistan. The need of the time is the people of Afghanistan have to brainstorm themselves that there is no bright future in rivalries and it is not in favor of both the countries. The people should have to understand it at masses level, as the trust deficit is basically between the governments and now it is moving towards the general public of both the countries too (Mahsud, 2017). To bring the relations towards normality, Pakistan made its entire effort to undo what India did in

Afghanistan. Afghanistan belongs to Afghans and when Pakistan complains about the involvement India in Afghanistan then the Afghans have a counter narrative that we have bilateral relationship with Pakistan and India and Pakistan should not have a right to object the relationship of Afghanistan and India (Khan, 2017). Pakistan discourses that the people of India should not operate or should not be made to operate in Pakistan through Afghanistan. Pakistan cannot minimize the role of India in Afghanistan until Pakistan are in a friendly relationship with Kabul regime.

Today, India has acceptability in all parts of Afghanistan. After the 2014 transition the new government of Afghanistan adopted pro-Indian policies (Hussain, 2017). Previously, their presence was just in the northern parts but they are also present in the Pashtun belt. Pashtun belt is heavily infested with the Indian lobby in the form of contractors or rehabilitators. India's in-depth presence in Afghanistan is a nightmare for the Pakistan Afghanistan relations. Pakistan would be accused of interference in Afghanistan if Pakistan brings up the point of Indian presence there. Afghanistan is very touchy about India's role there. What Pakistan can do is try to build healthy relations with Kabul regime and try to tell them the role of Pakistan is not dangerous for Afghanistan (Yousafzai, 2017). Once Afghanistan is brainstormed out of the things imbedded in their minds, only then relations of Pakistan and Afghanistan can get better. The efforts will be fruitless unless the Kabul regime realizes these facts.

Refugees are not a threat to Pakistan. These people have become more Pakistani in the past years than the Pakistanis themselves and they do not want to go back to Afghanistan. But the problem is that many of the Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies have been installed in the garb of these refugees and they are carrying out some activities which are against Pakistan and are creating disturbances in the country (Afzal, 2017). They have been in the society of Pakistan and

are creating problems for Pakistan. So it's not the refugees who are the threat for Pakistan but the ones who are creating problems for Pakistan in the cover of refugees are a threat to Pakistan. And this is the reason Pakistan has decided to send the refugees back to Afghanistan so they can go back and stabilize their own country as well. The refugees have been in Pakistan for a long time and they established businesses here and their kids are studying in Pakistan but the TTP have been installed in the refugees which are causing a problem for Pakistan. As according to the opinion of an analyst, we have no proper data of the refugees which is a threat to Pakistan economically, socially, and to the security of Pakistan (Hussain, 2017).

Today, everyone talks about CPEC like it's the cure of all the diseases of Pakistan but everything comes with a cost. CPEC has invited some international enmity. For example India would not like CPEC to be a success and will make all its efforts to undo CPEC. And this is just the first leg of the China Pakistan project. The next levels of CPEC will be beneficial for China and it will give it a sort of a boost. So china's progress is not acceptable for India. China's success is not acceptable for its arch rival US either. So, to conclude, as CPEC progresses and matures, it is inviting equal amount of trouble for Pakistan side by side. If Afghans are in friendly relations with Pakistan it can also be beneficial for Afghanistan (Khan, 2017). CPEC is not just a road passing through geographical locations but it will be lineage to all over Pakistan. Afghanistan is rich in minerals and Afghanistan is a land locked country. Afghanistan can benefit a lot through this CPEC but provided they make sincere efforts into thinking about CPEC. Afghani economy can grow and prosper to manifold. CPEC is going to be a prosperous project not just economically but also strategically. It will bring in a lot of good not just for Pakistan and China but for Afghanistan as well if it gets ready to accept it (Afzal, 2017). But, of course there will be many challenges as well that come with the benefits of CPEC for all the countries

Conclusion & Recommendations

It is impossible for a state to get politically stable without maintaining good relations with its neighboring state. Stability and prosperity of a state is largely dependent upon mutual cooperation between the two states. Pakistan and Afghanistan shared common border, history, language and cultural proximity. But unfortunately, Pakistan and Afghanistan have never enjoyed smooth and friendly relations. Because of various conflicting zones like Durand line, Pakhtunistan and the recent ones cross-border terrorism have influenced the foreign policy of both the states.

Afghanistan always remained a major source of concern for great powers, it remained under the control of British rule. After the Britishers left, the Soviet Union invaded the state and after the disintegration of USSR, United States took control over the region. Thus, due to this continuous instability there has been a mutual trust deficit between Pakistan and Afghanistan. After 9/11, Pakistan joined war on terror and became US ally to cooperate with the US on its war against terrorism.

Almost after a decade, the United States decided to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in Bonn conference in 2011 and the withdrawal started in the wake of 2014 which was almost completed in 2016. But some forces were left behind to address the issues of post withdrawal time period because the new government was not mature enough to settle the entire situation. Apart from this, the NATO forces also had the responsibility of training Afghan national forces because the new government was facing the security problem from Taliban, Al-Qaida and also from the ethnic population trying to destabilize the new government.

Therefore, keeping in view the domestic and international challenges, it is necessary for both the states to cooperate with each other and establish an environment of mutual trust. It is high time for both Pakistan and Afghanistan to leave their hard issues aside and cooperate with each other

in maintaining security, help in economic sector and counter militancy in the long run. But unfortunately, the presence of other regional players makes it difficult for both, Pakistan and Afghanistan, to sustain collaboration in all fields. There are some factors which need to be considered in this regard:

- The growing Indian presence in Afghanistan is weakening Pakistan and Afghanistan relations. Therefore, it is necessary to minimize Indian influence and accommodate Pakistan's strategic shift. India should stop posing two way threats to Pakistan by using Afghanistan's territory and should confine its role to reconstruction and development projects. Otherwise, Pakistan will be constrained to react to counter India and safeguard its interest associated with Afghanistan and new game of power will start in Afghan soil. Thus, Afghanistan should stop, both, India and Pakistan and force them to keep their rivalries away.
- Pakistan, being the immediate neighboring country of Afghanistan, can help in defense sector. As, the new government of Ashraf Ghani, after coming into power wanted close ties with Pakistan to improve the security situations in Afghanistan and revised the previous government's policy. If both the states work with the same spirit they can easily vanish their common enemy and bring stability and prosperity domestically, as well as, all over the region.
- Pakistan should play its role diplomatically and adopt distinguished approach. Through this manner Pakistan can effectively handle the process of political reconciliation due to its cultural and ethnic linkages. Pakistan can bring all the ethnic groups for negotiation, which is the prerequisite for stable and prosperous Afghanistan.

- The people-to-people contact is an important provision for sustainable trade relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, it is necessary to bring relaxation in business visa policy and multiple entry visas for businessmen and workers to minimize their difficulties.
- Pakistan and Afghanistan should control the cross border movement and manage their porous border. So that the issue of cross border terrorism can be handled effectively. Both the states should identify their common enemy and fight the menace of terrorism with mutual cooperation.
- All the regional players, especially Pakistan, should work in development sector and focus on infrastructure and rehabilitation. It is essential for creating jobs and incentives for the people of Afghanistan, who remained war torn for decades and their infrastructure have been destroyed. Therefore, it is mandatory to give importance to infrastructure like railway network and roads, so that the trade can be making possible.
- Both the states should prioritize development and infrastructure projects to minimize the cost. The project like CPEC will be instrumental for the economic stability of both Pakistan and Afghanistan because it will make a trade linkage between Central Asian and south Asian states.

By pursuing the above mentioned recommendations, both the countries will move towards peace and prosperity. If both, Pakistan and Afghanistan, show their potentials, they will achieve, durable security, stable economy, and social progress, and successful state apparatus. Consequently, through this mechanism harmony and collaboration will prevail in Pakistan and Afghanistan relations. The weak democratic government of Ashraf Ghani, with the help of their immediate neighboring country Pakistan, will be converted into mature and sustainable democratic state.

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List of Interviews

- Interview with Nazir Hussan, Director and Associate Professor of School of Politics and IR Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, on 25th May 2017.
- Interview with Muhammad Mujeeb Afzal, Assistant Professor of School of Politics and IR Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, on 25th May 2017.
- Interview with Mansur Khan Mahsud, Executive Director FRC, Islamabad, on 27th April 2017.
- Interview with Muhammad Khan, Professor of Politics and IR IIUI (Ret. Brigadier), Islamabad NDU, on 6th June 2017.
- Interview with Rahimullah Yousafzai, Journalist, Peshawar, on 19th June 2017.
- Interview with Maj. Yasin Javed, Abbottabad, on 30th June 2017.